CARREL, Clive Lawrence, 1932-
COLOR IN CAESAR'S BELLUM GALLICUM. [Portions of Text in Latin, Greek and German].
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1970
Language and Literature, classical

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
COLOR IN CAESAR'S BELLUM GALLICUM

DISSER TATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

by

Clive Lawrence Carrel, B.Sc., B.A.

The Ohio State University

1970

Approved by

Adviser
Department of Classics
I wish to thank, with much warmth, Dr. Mark Morford for his help and encouragement during the writing of this dissertation.
VITA

September 14, 1932. . . . . . . . Born, Melbourne, Australia

1953. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.Sc., Chemistry, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

1955-1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Experimental Officer, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, Melbourne, Australia

1961. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.A., Classics, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

1962. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tutor (part-time) Department of Classics, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

1963-1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assistant, Department of Classics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1967-1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assistant Professor, Department of Classics, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Color in Book I</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Color in Book VII</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Some Aspects of Book VII</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Word Analyses</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Fortuna</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Tragic, Moral, and Military Color</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Color, a rhetorical term, is used by Cicero\(^1\) in the sense of the tone that belongs to a passage; it is not something which can be created by the addition of more figures, but rather something which inheres in the whole passage; it is appropriate to the subject matter and to the attitude of the writer to this subject matter and to his audience.

I wish to examine the uses which Caesar makes of color in the Bellum Gallicum. To understand the tone of Caesar's writing—in effect, his highlighting of selected aspects of the subject matter in order to influence the reader to a certain judgment—sometimes entails the examination of rather lengthy extracts, as in Book I and VII. This is especially true in Book VII, where the book is unified to a very high degree; to establish with any precision the effect that Caesar wishes to create through the figure of Vercingetorix, for example, it is necessary to look at the book as a whole. Then, when we have examined in detail the various devices Caesar has used in the portrayal of Vercingetorix' character—omissions, contrasts, parallels, speeches, his effect upon others—we are able to describe the total effect which the figure of Vercingetorix has upon the reader. Of course, he is more than a mere character; he is inseparable from his surroundings and thereby all the more important. Caesar's attitude toward him is significant, as is the case with the other Gallic chieftains, and the color which Caesar uses is instrumental in revealing this attitude to the reader.

1
Similarly, we see in the very dramatic treatment given the rebellion of the Aedui an extended color to point up the importance of this episode in the whole revolt of Book VII, while the speeches of Ariovistus in Book I, by their tone, describe him to us and contrast him with Caesar, his antagonist.

The chapters dealing with separate words treat color in a somewhat narrower manner. In these chapters I shall consider the contribution that certain words—which seem to carry a special weight due to Caesar's emphatic and restricted use of them—make to the total effect of various passages.

Only in relatively few places have I examined in detail the color of a short passage. It may be instructive to do this here to indicate how, in a short compass, Caesar can set a situation before the reader.

In Chapter 1 of Book VII, Caesar's narrative covers a great deal of ground. It begins with a few rather flat remarks about his activities in Italy and ends with Gaul apparently on the brink of revolt. The intervening narrative provides a series of steps which arise out of the situation at the beginning and show a logical development to the end of the chapter. The various stages of the beginnings of the revolt are delineated with the help of indirect speech, that is, dramatically. These create a sort of rhythm within the chapter which builds to a rather emotional climax at the end. The presence of a number of Gallic "activists" is noted. News from Italy travels celeriter. We sense a situation where the Gauls are watching Caesar intently to pounce upon any seeming slackening in his vigilance. The
Gauls make additions to the news, inventing what they feel the situation requires, but keeping a substratum of fact, referred to earlier by Caesar when he speaks of the death of Clodius with its implications of unrest. Then, encouraged by this, others who, Caesar remarks, have been querulous in the past in the matter of Roman domination in Gaul, *liberius atque audacius de bello consilia inire incipiunt* (VII, 1, 3). Caesar is suggesting throughout this chapter the increasing boldness of the Gauls, allied with a certain rashness; this boldness receives its first mention here. Now the leaders begin to meet; *conciliis silvestribus ac remotis locis* (VII, 1, 4) has a sinister ring and more reason for grievance is given in recalling Acco's death and, by implication, the harshness shown by Caesar there. The chapter is in this way linked to the final chapter of the previous book. The words of complaint are numerous and insistent: *dolerent... queruntur... miserantur*. Again, we find indirect speech; they speak of the *communem Galliae fortunam* (VII, 1, 5). This is a notion that finds its fullest development in Book VII as we shall see later. Caesar, by mentioning it here is preparing the ground for the great movement in this book. Their enthusiasm is indicated with *omnibus pellitcitionibus ac praemiis* (VII, 1, 5), and a second great theme, *libertas*, is mentioned. This theme also finds its greatest employment in Book VII. *Communis fortuna* and *libertas* moreover, make for an emotional intensification of the narrative. When the Gauls state their plan, a certain amount of rhetorical ordering is made with *imprimis* (VII, 1, 6) and *postremo* (VII, 1, 8). A plan of action is suggested; it sounds naive with its *id esse facile* (VII, 1, 7); the
proneness of the Gauls to overestimate their chances is evident.

Finally, the chapter is concluded with a call to arms and an appeal to the *veterem belli gloriain* and the *libertas* which they had received from their ancestors. The cry is significant in that, though it well expresses the readiness of the Gauls for battle, it reveals at the same time a foolhardy rashness, a willingness to die because honour demands it rather than to ask themselves what is needed to rid their land of the Romans. Their attitude is typical of much of what we have seen of the Gauls so far in the *Bellum Gallicum*, but, significantly, after Chapter 4 and the entry of Vercingetorix, it will be discounted.

Thus, in one chapter, Caesar sets before the reader the brewing revolt, its genesis, its causes, its weaknesses, and its aims. He has mentioned no names, and has spoken in quite general terms. Particular events will come in the chapters immediately following, but by the time Chapter 2 begins, Caesar, in addition to showing that a rebellion is under way, has created the atmosphere appropriate to this rebellion.

And, while the events of Chapters 2 and 3 are foreshadowed here, the reader is better able to appreciate the significance Caesar wishes to attach to them because in Chapter 1 he speaks in general terms wherein both action and implication are interwoven. Caesar thus creates a sort of sounding board by which we can see, for example, the tactical futility of the action of the Carnutes or the foresight of Vercingetorix' exacting demands upon his troops.

Chapters 1 and 2 deal with the main dramatic *colores* in Book I and VII, respectively. I have found it convenient to treat some
aspects of Book VII separately, and accordingly deal with the Aeduan revolt and Labienus' campaign, the siege of Avaricum, and Critognatus' speech in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is concerned with Caesar's use of a number of rather important words and the indications, provided by this study, of Caesar's methods of persuasion; Chapter 5 does the same for *fortuna*, and I have added to this a discussion *fortuna* in connexion with tragic *color*. In the final chapter I have treated tragic, moral, and military *color* under these headings, and in recapitulating results arrived at earlier I have tried in particular to explain Caesar's use of *fortuna*. 
Chapter I

Color in Book I

The Helvetian episode of the Bellum Gallicum seems to lack unity when compared with, say, the Ariovistus episode. There are probably various reasons for this lack of unity, the first being the rather slow and erratic nature of the campaign itself. Another is that this campaign must serve as an introduction to the whole Bellum Gallicum. I feel that because the events do not lend themselves so well to dramatization as many later campaigns, we can discover indications that Caesar's use of color is here more obvious than in other parts of the Bellum Gallicum.

We find it used in various ways, applied to characters—Orgetorix, Dumnorix, Divico, Diviciacus—where it serves a larger functional purpose. It is used in setting down the grounds for war and the nature of the Gallic tribes, and also to create excitement and indignation in the reader.

It is interesting to note that the predominant rallying cry that Caesar uses in connexion with making war upon the Helvetii is not fear for the safety of the Province, although this is mentioned, but revenge. Neither of these, one suspects, was his primary motive; nevertheless, danger to Roman possessions and indirectly to Rome itself seems the logical thing to emphasize. As Collins points out, however, Caesar does not show great concern to give his actions firm legal justification. I would suggest that Caesar seizes upon the circumstances of
the victory at the river Arar, as these seem well suited to his tendency to seek out the exciting elements of a situation, in this case, an appeal to the strong historical sense of the Romans and their nationalism. Caesar is more concerned with the effect of this appeal than with its sophistication or true importance.

The first mention of the previous war comes when the request of the Helvetian envoys to travel through the Province is refused, and Caesar remarks: quod memoria tenebat L. Cassium consulem occisum exercitumque eius ab Helvetiis pulsum et sub iugum missum, concedendum non putabat (I, 7, 4). In I, 10, 1, Caesar hears that the Helvetii are heading for the land of the Santones. He suspects danger to the Province from these homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos (I, 10, 2), adjectives which refer back to Chapter 2 on the warlike nature of the Helvetii, and to Chapter 7 on their ancient enmity toward Rome. Then Caesar leaves the Province, and only after this, as Collins remarks, does he mentioned the depredations by the Helvetii of the lands of the Aedui, the Ambarri, and of the Allobroges. Certainly Caesar says immediately after this: quibus rebus adductus Caesar non exspectandum sibi statuit, dum omnibus fortunis sociorum consumptis in Santones Helvetii pervenirent (I, 11, 6). It seems, however, that Caesar treats various reasons for going to war as cumulative rather than makes one decisive.

Soon after this Caesar is able to destroy part of the enemy army at the river Arar; by coincidence, it is the very pagus which overcame Cassius' army—a defeat which Caesar has already recalled. There is more coincidence—a member of Caesar's family was also killed at that earlier battle. Thus Caesar wins a public and a private re-
venge, and he waxes rhetorical about this: \textit{ita sive casu sive consilio deorum immortalium, quae pars civitatis Helvetiae insignem calamitatem populo Romano intulerat, ea princeps poenas persolvit. (I, 12, 6).}

After Caesar crosses the river, Divico is sent to him, and we are reminded again of Cassius' defeat--firstly, because Divico, who was commander of the Helvetii at that battle, becomes a living symbol of it. Divico's speech to Caesar is strange, it does not seem possible that one proposal to Caesar should be so humble, and the other so arrogant. The arrogance is especially surprising in view of the recent defeat of the Tigurini. Divico refers to the ancient defeat of the Romans, then suggests unfair and despicable tactics in the recent battle. He ends with a proud prediction that another battle will make the place famous for a Roman defeat. Caesar answers in a very polemical vein, turning Divico's remarks against himself, accusing the Helvetii themselves of using unfair tactics against Cassius.

Caesar then turns rhetorically to one of the causes of the present trouble: \textit{quod si veteris contumeliae oblivisci vellet, num etiam recentium injuriarum... memoriam deponere posse? (I, 14, 3).}

Caesar seems to be making deliberately sarcastic use of \textit{memoria}, so unguardedly used by Divico at the end of his speech: \textit{quare ne committeret, ut is locus ubi constitissent ex calamitate populi Romani et internecione exercitus nomen caperet aut memoriam proderet (I, 13, 7).}

Caesar leads up to his ironical remarks with the words: \textit{eo sibi minus dubitationis dari, quod eas res, quas legati Helvetii commemorassent, memoria teneret (I, 14, 1).} Caesar makes yet another reference to
Cassius’ defeat serve as the rhetorical high point of his speech:

quod sua victoria tam insolenter gloriarentur quodque tam diu se
impune injurias tulisse admirarentur, eodem pertinere. consuesse
enim deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum
doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velit, his secundiores inter-
dum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere (I, 14, 4). Caesar in
this speech emphasizes the pride Divico takes in the ancient victory
with words like contumelia, insolenter, and gloriarentur. After this
very thorough use of the theme, it is mentioned once more, when a
gathering of Gallic leaders congratulate Caesar on his victory. They
begin by mentioning that Caesar has avenged an injury of long standing,
then they go on to speak of their gratitude at being saved from the
Helvetii (I, 30, 1-4). This last remark, of course, has a dual purpose
as it leads directly to the unfolding of their fears of Ariovistus.
There is no suggestion that the Romans were acting to defend the
Province--this notion seems entirely submerged by now--the revenge
theme has predominated.

I do not wish to suggest that any great importance should be
attached to this fact; Caesar probably realizes that it would be diffi-
cult to use the theme of danger to the Province with any great dra-
matic effect, simply because what little danger there may have been at
the beginning has shrunk to virtually nothing and Caesar’s readers
will realize this; hence, Caesar has used the coincidence of the Arar
battle to create excitement in another way.

The Romans, and hence Caesar’s readers, have a strong sense of
self-righteousness which can become identified with patriotism or even
jingoism. "My country right or wrong" can suffice, for instance, even in Book VII, if Caesar can show skillfully enough that the Roman army is in real danger, however nobly motivated and justified the adversary. If the prize is the glory of overcoming such an opponent, this becomes a justification of fighting. Caesar can and does use color to play upon different chords of Roman sentiment; he is not concerned if he is inconsistent in doing this. Here, as in many other things, he is, one might say, an opportunist. Hence, because of the special nature of the situation in Book I, Caesar's propaganda is generally more blatant here and characters are drawn in black and white.

In the Helvetian campaign, three leaders, apart from Divico, are given special prominence—Orgetorix, Dumnorix, and Diviciacus, who is almost a complete contrast to the other two. We find at the beginning of the *Bellum Gallicum* an amicitia between Orgetorix, Dumnorix, and the less important Casticus against the rest of Gaul and the established leadership in their own states. This amicitia presents a sinister aspect and lends to the beginnings of the *Bellum Gallicum* a considerable impetus. There seems no doubt that in Chapter 2, for instance, Caesar is going to some lengths to suggest simple, palpable causes for the migration and wishes to do it in a small compass. Caesar has used a geographical excursus already in the first chapter; now he uses it to describe and explain the predicament of the Helvetii. Their migration is made to sound quite natural, Orgetorix' plans are shown, hence the *facilius iis persuasit* (I, 2, 3). The geographical description here is much more emphatic than in the first chapter. Caesar uses superlatives in profusion here, just as he did in
describing Orgetorix, and he makes authoritative statements of cause and effect, *his rebus fiebat* (I, 2, 4), so that finally he allows himself to make the extraordinary statement: *hominès bellandi cupidis magno dolere adficiabantur* (I, 2, 4).

It is however the personal element that Caesar develops most. In Orgetorix and Dumnorix we have a type of person who causes Caesar a great deal of trouble in Gaul. In Book I the war is beginning and to include any suggestion that Dumnorix might be in some way a Gallic patriot would throw doubts on Caesar's whole enterprise. Later when Caesar is entrenched in Gaul, and fighting to maintain his position, he can be a little more objective about his enemies' motives. Here Caesar gives the impression that the Helvetii are being led on by an adventurer, *regni cupiditate* (I, 2, 1). In Chapter 2 Caesar connects Orgetorix' aims with political and geographical factors, as we have seen, but in Chapter 3, things are put on a more thoroughly personal level; the conspiracy broadens to other states where Orgetorix is shown to be just as persuasive as with his own people, who were *auctoritate Orgetorigis permoti* (I, 3, 1), and his confidence is given expression in the indirect speech: *perfacile factu esse illis... conata perficere...* (I, 3, 6), which recalls his words to his own people: *perfacile esse... totius Galliae imperio potiri* (I, 2, 2).

Chapter 3 ends with the hopes of the three leaders, plotting together, and we find the confident superlatives: *per tres potentissimos ac firmissimos populos totius Galliae sese potiri posse sperant* (I, 3, 8).

After this comes the dubious affair of the death of Orgetorix. Caesar does not satisfactorily explain it. One might expect the death
to be fatal to the movement, or, if this were not a necessary conclusion—for example, perhaps a dispute over leadership of the migration arose—nevertheless, the link with Dumnorix ought now to be broken. This is not the case, however, and Caesar carries on almost as if nothing has happened: post eius mortem nihilominus Helvetii id quod constituerant facere conantur... (I, 5, 1). Caesar is not greatly interested in the circumstances of Orgetorix' death; it only introduces complications into an otherwise regular development of the preparation of the Helvetii, and Caesar wishes to keep his account of this broad and simple.

I think that Caesar's use of color in the Orgetorix episode is stronger than in most of his writing. After his death one is naturally tempted to wonder if the stimulus to and organization of the migration could really have been, as Caesar suggests, the work of this man. The treatment of him is rather similar to that of Vercingetorix, who was both the leader of a movement and the essence of it. Caesar is very careless about telling us that Orgetorix is only dealing with part of the civitas in Chapters 2 and 3; also the remark ea res est Helvetiis per indicium enuntiata (I, 4, 1), seems rather incredible. Surely Orgetorix' embassy was common knowledge by now. Again, I doubt that Caesar is deliberately trying to mislead the reader; he is merely simplifying the situation, indicating circumstances which lead to Orgetorix' death.

We have seen that no new leader emerges for the Helvetii after the death of Orgetorix; one effect of this is that Orgetorix casts a longer shadow over subsequent events than would otherwise be the case.
The Helvetii themselves, without strong leadership, are tricked by Caesar into waiting until he can summon reinforcements to Geneva, and it is only through the good offices of Orgetorix’ ally Dumnorix that they can leave their homeland at all. Caesar says: *Dumnorix.*

*Helvetiis erat amicus, quod ex ea civitate Orgetorigis filiam in matrimonium duxerat.* . . (*I, 9, 3*). Dumnorix is: *cupiditate regni adductus* (*I, 9, 3*), the phrase recalling Orgetorix, *regni cupiditate inductus coniurationem nobilitatis fecit.* . . (*I, 2, 1*). Caesar stresses the likeness between the men to emphasize the dangerous nature of the coalition he faces.

During the unveiling of Dumnorix’ treachery by the Aedui, Caesar remarks that he is *summa audacia, magna spud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia, cupidum rerum novarum* (*I, 18, 3*); this is largely a repetition and hence an emphasizing of previous remarks about him. But now Caesar enlarges on this and indicates more precisely how Dumnorix is exerting his power and his manifold connexions with other states. In Chapter 19 Caesar speaks to Diviciacus concerning the fate of his brother, Dumnorix. Diviciacus has been mentioned before, usually along with his brother; now Caesar takes the opportunity to contrast him by implication with Dumnorix: *summum in populum Romanum studium, summam in se voluntatem* (*I, 19, 2*) which contrasts with *odisse etiam suo nomine Caesarem et Romanos* (*I, 18, 38*). Diviciacus exhibits *iustitia* (*I, 19, 2*); Dumnorix uses unjust methods in farming *Aeduan*; taxes and gains influence through his money. Diviciacus shows *fides* (*I, 19, 2*), presumably to his people and to Caesar; Dumnorix has deceived Caesar in battle and is, moreover,
cupidus rerum novarum (I, 18, 3). Diviciacus shows temperantia (I, 19, 2), Dumnorix summa audacia (I, 18, 3). Liscus remarks that Dumnorix facultates ad largiendum magnas comparasse (I, 18, 5), and apud finitimas civitates largiter posse (I, 18, 6). Caesar's picture of Dumnorix is naturally in Roman terms. He works to gain political power and influence through money; the Romans would call this ambitio. Sallust would call it a fault. Moreover, Dumnorix makes his money unjustly. Largitio in Sallust is a mala ars, and he contrasts it with abstinentia. Similarly, audacia, also attributed to Dumnorix, is contrasted by Sallust with pudor and called a mala ars. Presumably, then, audacia, being one of Sallust's malae artes would be connected with the wrong methods of gaining power. Presumption and insolence might describe it here, just what Dumnorix apparently shows in his high-handed treatment of the Aedui in the matter of taxes.

Dumnorix has made amicitiae with important people in various other states, especially the Helvetii. He is cupidus rerum novarum (I, 18, 3) and maxime plebi acceptus (I, 3, 5). Here we have a situation not unlike that of some wealthy backer of Catiline, putting things into Roman terms; he has presumably been using his wealth to gain favor with the plebs and, in using help from outside his own civitas, has treasonous designs.

Diviciacus, by contrast, is described as a supporter of the status quo; he has egregia fides (I, 19, 2). Here Caesar seems to mean in part to himself acting as a representative of Rome, with whom the Aedui have an amicitia. An amicitia cannot survive without fides, which is its basis. Fides is one of Sallust's bonae arces.
acus has justitia, which is somewhat similar to continentia, and like it would be contrasted with largitio, which Dumnorix shows so significantly. Caesar speaks of Diviciacus' summam in se voluntatem (I, 19, 2); he talks wholly from the viewpoint of his own interests, thus Dumnorix is a dangerous, faithless demagogue, Diviciacus, a reliable man of honor.

Now we can perhaps better understand Caesar's treatment of Orgetorix, who was affected by regni cupiditas, and, like Dumnorix, was a rich noble. He has made a coniuratio of the nobilitas and civitati persuasit; ut de finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent (I, 2, 1). He makes amicitiae with external nations to serve his ambitions, and his methods of gaining power are very similar to those of Dumnorix and are described in terms that would create disapproval in Caesar's readers. This type of description is perhaps unique to the first book, where the reader's attitude to these peoples is rather different from that which obtains when the Bellum Gallicum is fully under way. There is one last mention of Orgetorix, after the defeat of the Helvetii; Caesar notes that a daughter and a son of this man were captured (I, 26, 4). This is interesting; Orgetorix' name keeps coming back as if he were still a power among the Helvetii.

Caesar reserves by far the greater part of his information about Dumnorix until his meeting with the Aeduan leaders. I would suggest that just as Caesar makes no mention at all of Ariovistus in the Helvetian campaign, but waits until he arrives at the narration of his campaign against the Germans, so he waits until this moment to set down his ideas about Dumnorix. One might call this a kind of serial compo-
sition in which events or characters are treated separately. It is tempting to imagine that Caesar has warned Dumnorix perhaps more than once before this, but has not punished him because of his great following. Again, I would not call this a deliberate misleading of the reader on Caesar's part, but a simplification of the narrative, providing as it does the opportunity to create an effective scene. To make the sudden revelation about Dumnorix convincing at this late date in the campaign, Caesar shows the Vergobret Liscus speaking reluctantly: \textit{tum demum Liscus oratione Caesaris adductus, quod antea tacuerat, proponit} \ldots (I, 17, 1). He does not name names and mentions \textit{quanto id cum periculo fecerit, et ob eam causam quamdiu potuerit tacuisse} (I, 17, 6). Caesar only gets full information when he takes aside Liscus and other leaders and questions them in secrecy. Caesar builds up his case against Dumnorix methodically: \textit{quibus rebus cognitis, cum ad has suspiciones certissimae res accederent} \ldots \textit{satis esse causae arbitrabatur quare in eum aut ipse animadverteret aut civitatem animadvertere iubaret} (I, 19, 1).

Finally Caesar consults with Diviciacus before dealing with Dumnorix; it is a highly emotional scene, and, on reflection, it seems quite clear why this is so. Caesar has made the accusation of Dumnorix very impressive and dramatic, but now after his long accumulation of charges, he acts quite leniently with the culprit. This in itself is an anti-climax; compare it for instance with the meeting of the Gallic leaders with Caesar at which revelations about Ariovistus lead directly to the war against him. In the case of Dumnorix, Caesar is cleverly able to make the reader unaware of a letdown by showing convincing reasons for not punishing Dumnorix severely; he does this by making
Diviciacus' petition rests upon brotherly love and personal fears about reprisals that Dumnorix' followers might make if anything should happen to him. The scene is strongly played up by Caesar, with Diviciacus' tears, his painful reminiscence of how Dumnorix exploited him to gain power; perhaps the most dramatic part of the whole scene is when Caesar takes him by the hand to console him. Caesar's exceptional regard for the feelings and safety of Diviciacus has been partly explained a little earlier in Chapter 19 when he first summoned him. He enumerates very warmly Diviciacus' virtues and loyalty to himself and to Rome, saying: ne eius supplicio Diviciaci animum offenderet, verebatur (I, 19, 2). Throughout the Bellum Gallicum Caesar is hindered by a faction among the Aedui, who hold a privileged position as Caesar's most powerful allies in Gaul. This incident thus serves as an introduction to this faction, hence its purpose is more far-reaching than its first appears.

In Chapter 28, we find Caesar for the first time alluding to the possibility of a German threat. This is with respect to resettling the Helvetians in their homeland. This threat becomes the predominating theme of the second half of Book I. This is most interesting; Caesar remarks that if the Germans advanced into empty territory they would border on and constitute a danger to the Allobroges. We have seen that he did not mention this danger when he first decided to tackle the Helvetii.

At the beginning of Chapter 31, the Gallic leaders show the same secretiveness about opening their hearts to Caesar that the Aedui displayed earlier. The scene is reminiscent of the earlier one in a num-
ber of ways. Liscus, in Chapter 17, makes a short speech alluding to Dumnorix and ends it with an explanation of his previous silence, fear of reprisal. Diviciacus, in Chapter 31, ends with a warning about the consequences of revealing what was said at this meeting. The same type of suspense is created before the name of the oppressor is mentioned. Thus, the chieftains darkly hint that: si enuntiatum esset, summum in cruciatum se venturos viderent. (I, 31, 2). The following speech of Diviciacus is at first rather dry and undramatic; in describing Ariovistus' presence and involvement in Gaul he gives a résumé of the political situation in Gaul during the past few years. It would seem much more appropriate, stylistically, for Caesar to give this information himself; here it begins to sound like a lecture. This manner of exposition has been brought about by Caesar's rather desperate need to make all this seem new to him, incredible as this may appear to be. One concludes that Caesar is either hiding something or drastically simplifying in so sharply separating two main episodes of the first book. It may well be that his reasons are dramatic—that is, to introduce the Germans into the first half of the book would complicate it, and more importantly perhaps, throw Caesar's aims and justifications, which are fairly clear in the narrative, in both the Helvetic and Ariovistus episodes into confusion. Also, were the activities of Ariovistus known to the reader beforehand, the impact of the appeal by the Gauls to Caesar would be lessened.

When Diviciacus gets on to the subject of Ariovistus' treatment of the Gauls, and especially of the Sequani, he becomes more impassioned and makes a dire prediction: futurum esse paucis annis, uti
omnes ex Galliae finibus pellerentur... (I, 31, 11), and he describes Ariovistus as arrogant and cruel, so that the emphasis shifts from the political situation to something personal: *hominem esse barbarum, iracundum, temerarium...* (I, 31, 13). The only hope of the Gauls against Ariovistus rests with Caesar, and Diviciacus ends with another appeal for secrecy. Caesar now adds dramatic weight to Diviciacus' plea of fear through the appearance of the Sequani; the narrative becomes incredible, but Caesar does not omit one touch in his effort to bring life to it. We see the Sequani with lowered eyes, Caesar's amazement, their continued silence, and finally, Diviciacus is used again as narrator. Their plight is even worse than that of the Aedui; they cannot speak even in secret about it. The picture of Ariovistus' cruelty is intensified: *absentisque Ariovisti crudelitatem velut si coram adesset horrerent...* (I, 32, 4). The effect that Ariovistus has, even in his absence, here so vividly brought out, is a very important factor in Caesar's account of the campaign; we see it also in the mutiny, all of this building up to the reversal that occurs when the Romans meet Ariovistus face to face. The drama and emotion displayed in this scene are not in any way inconsistent with Caesar's general style. This is not a book of strategy or action; little space is devoted to these things. It is more a book of preliminaries; hence, some of the highest drama is found in the conferences.

After this emotional appeal, Caesar quite systematically sets down his reasons for opposing Ariovistus; Rome's relationship with the Aedui, the gradual infiltration of the Germans into Gaul, together with a lesson drawn from history, the menace of the Cimbri and
Teutones, and finally the arrogance of Ariovistus. This last reason is set down rather like an afterthought, rightly, after the more solid reasons: Ariovistus' arrogance will, however, be almost the predominating theme in the following chapters—that is, in the lengthy exchange of speeches between Caesar and Ariovistus.

Ariovistus' first words, in answer to a demand for a conference by Caesar, are appropriately arrogant, coming straight after Caesar's *ut ferendus non videretur* (I, 33, 5). Ariovistus thinks that Caesar should come to him, and also wonders what business Caesar has questioning his conquests. As Ariovistus will not speak with him, Caesar sends him an ultimatum, referring to the Senatus Consultum of the year of Messala and Piso directing Caesar to defend if possible Rome's friends, that is, the Aedui. Caesar's reply is certainly provocative and spirited; it is just what he should have said at this point. Ariovistus answers, again taking up the theme of *ius belli*, however, in doing so, he tacitly equates himself with Rome. Not only this, he accuses Caesar of doing *inuria* against himself by reducing his income from taxes. He takes up Caesar's injunction *neve Haeduos inuria lacerasset neve his sociisque eorum bellum inferret* (I, 35, 3), and uses it to add insult to injury with the sarcastic *neque his neque eorum sociis inuria bellum inlaturum, si in eo manerent quod convenisset...* (I, 36, 5). From this point Ariovistus makes his peroration in most inflammatory tones. In the next chapter, Caesar finds that Ariovistus has blatantly lied in Chapter 36, for the Aedui complain *seae ne obsidibus quidem datis pacem Ariovisti redimere potuisse* (I, 37, 2). Besides this, Caesar finds
cause for alarm at threatening movements of the Suebi. This makes him hasten all the more, he says, but it is not the occasion for his decision to tackle Ariovistus. This has apparently been decided in Chapter 33. Caesar certainly brings the information in at a dramatically telling moment; now he is able to set off in an atmosphere of crisis; conditions are not static; Ariovistus is connected with depredations, and the emotion of the conference is now being translated into action.

Caesar's picture of Ariovistus, and his evidence of the fear of the Gauls, are quite consistent with the near mutiny that Caesar faces a little later. The cruelties of Ariovistus have been mentioned more than once; he is not seen, but his intransigent attitude toward Caesar is known; he speaks boastingly of his military prowess; other German tribes appear to be threatening Gaul, and finally we have the report of the merchants and Gauls about the stature and fighting ability of the Germans. Caesar says that the unrest was caused by fear of these unknown Germans; it all stems from this panic. Caesar outlines the beginnings and spread of the panic, remarking that some pretended to be critical of Caesar's direction of the campaign rather than frightened. The panic is carefully and dramatically described; it becomes all part of the Ariovistus episode, the low point for the Romans and the high point for Ariovistus. It is perhaps fitting that the man whose trademark so far has been bullying, cruelty and, above all, arrogance, should come nearest to destroying the Roman army while he is still far away—that is, through reputation rather than force of arms.
Caesar describes the stages of the revolt from the less to the more soldierly of his men. He adds circumstantial details to the physical evidence of the fear; those who tried to mask their feelings were not wholly successful: *hi neque vultum fingere neque interdum lacrimas tenere poterant* (I, 39, 4). The fancifulness of this and the following sentences reminds one of the description of the Sequani in the recent meeting. Caesar has made the episode a very dramatic and possibly a very artificial one, whether the prime reason for the revolt was fear of the Germans, or some aspect of Caesar's generalship, or low morale among the men. However, by putting it the way he has, Caesar is able to add something to the Ariovistus episode, and at the same time he can pay a compliment to himself and stress his own leadership. This highlighting of Caesar is more prevalent in the first book than in any other; he is not only introducing the war in Gaul to his readers, but also himself, the Roman leader.

A mutiny is hardly a creditable thing for a commander, but Caesar succeeds in making this one seem to add a notch to his own stature. Caesar begins by roundly upbraiding the centurions; then ridicules the men's fears of Ariovistus, citing past experiences with German warriors, even suggesting that the Helvetii had the edge on them, a remark of doubtful worth if we are to believe the words of Diviciacus at I, 31, 14, where he appears to suggest that the Helvetii had moved to escape from the Germans. This is not important of course. Caesar is showing his powers of persuasion and his resourcefulness. Caesar makes very little of Ariovistus' victory over the Gauls, and having thus made his men's fears seem absurd, he attacks them more strongly; there is no
question of Caesar's taking an apologetic role, and he takes the bull
by the horns when he decides to make the vital test of allegiance as
soon as possible, putting forward the time of departure for this pur-
pose. Caesar has shown fine generalship here, and this is confirmed
by the immediate reaction of the men. Caesar has no trouble in quel-
ling the mutiny; its only result seems to be to strengthen the army's
morale and valour; there are no nagging differences left over, only
 emulation of the tenth legion, whom Caesar has cleverly used in his
speech. The mutiny becomes a vindication of Caesar's leadership, one
of his first triumphs. In a way, it gives him the right of command,
as the similar incident in the seventh book gives it to Vercingetorix,
and establishes him as undisputed leader of the Gauls.

The mutiny also has other effects. It bridges the gap between
the council and the earlier communiqués exchanged by Caesar and
Ariovistus, where Ariovistus is a distant, unknown, terrifying figure,
and the aftermath; almost immediately after Caesar's answer to his
men, the army is virtually in the presence of Ariovistus, the march
being mentioned only briefly in Chapter 41. Ariovistus seems rather
changed now that the Romans are near: quod antea de conloquio
postulasset, id per se fieri licere, quoniam proplius accessisset seque
id sine periculo facere posse existimaret (I, 42, 1).

Then we have the conference or confrontation on the mound; this
is no normal conference; there is danger in the air. Caesar describes
the conditions of it and the preliminaries graphically, however, his
first speech hardly adds anything new to the messages he has sent to
Ariovistus earlier. Caesar upholds the dignity of the Roman state
and the alliances that it makes. Ariovistus is rather more ready than
before to explain his position in Gaul; this he did not deign to
do in Chapter 36. Here he claims *transisse Rhenum sese non sua
sponte, sed rogatum et accersitum a Gallis* (I, 44, 2); also he says:
*non sese Gallis, sed Gallos sibi bellum intulisse* (I, 44, 3). In
Chapter 36 Ariovistus did not even mention his *amicitia* with the Ro-
man people, here he does, although rather sarcastically: *amicitiam
populi Romani sibi ornamento et praesidio non detrimento esse
opportere, idque se hac spe petisse* (I, 44, 5). He denies any aims of
further aggression in Gaul: *quod multitudinem Germanorum in Galliam
traducat, id se sui muniendi, non Galliae inpugnandae causa facere*
(I, 44, 6). At the beginning of his speech Ariovistus has generally
spoken reasonably, but at I, 44, 8, there are a couple of excited
rhetorical questions: *quid sibi vellet? cur in suas possessiones
veniret?* He calls the Romans *iniquos*, and remarks sarcastically:
*non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum...* (I, 44, 9).
Even about the *amicitia* he says: *debere se suspicari simulata
Caesarem amicitia, quod exercitum in Gallia habeat, sui opprimendi
causa habe* (I, 44, 10). Then he oversteps all bounds and reminds
Caesar that many in Rome would be delighted if he were to die; finally,
however, he makes an offer of money to Caesar in return for withdrawal
on Caesar's part.

Part of Ariovistus' speech seems temperate and considered, part
of it otherwise, it is as if although wishing to come to an agreement
with Caesar his temper has got the better of him, as if he were *fure
atque amentia impulsus*, to use the words of Caesar's speech to his
men (I, 40, 4). The arrogance of Ariovistus in the earlier chapters seems to be nothing more than this, a quick temper and a sharp tongue. Caesar answers calmly, firmly, and logically; the contrast is readily apparent, especially taken in connexion with Caesar's remarks about Ariovistus' speech: Ariovistus ad postulata Caesaris pauca respondit, de suis virtutibus multa praedicavit (I, 44, 1). The meeting is, however, suddenly broken off when Ariovistus' men start throwing stones and missiles at the Romans. This dishonorable conduct seems in line with Ariovistus' strange demands about the conditions of the meeting. The three speeches bring little new to the reader, little that has not already been spoken in earlier communications between the two leaders. It is rather personalities that are contrasted here; Ariovistus' remarks are personal, he has praise for himself, insults, and snide remarks for Caesar, whereas Caesar keeps rigorously to facts, alliances, senatorial directives, and so forth. In the presence of Ariovistus, and in the face of both verbal and physical provocation, Caesar keeps cool, just as he did in the face of the revolt a little earlier. It was in his speech to his own men that Caesar cut Ariovistus and his soldiers down to size, but in the meeting that follows, Caesar has no need to do any more of this directly; Ariovistus continues the process by his own folly and pettiness. Caesar takes careful measures to keep from seeming to provoke Ariovistus by withdrawing quickly and ordering his men not to return fire. On Caesar's return to camp, his soldiers are properly incensed at Ariovistus' arrogance and perfidy, and are all the keener to fight—that is, the incident has a similar effect to that of Caesar's speech. That speech
put things into perspective; Ariovistus' boldness seems more like impudence now; his cruelty, which inspired terror, is now replaced by foolish treachery.

So, not only has Caesar's army recovered from its panic, but Caesar's words and actions have been such that its morale actually improves almost in face of the danger. A final action of Ariovistus breaks off all further possibility of conciliation and again reveals, taken in conjunction with his request to Caesar for more talks, a recklessness and irrationality on the part of this man; his action is sudden and dramatic, as if from a sudden fit of temper: *exercitu suo praesente conclamavit: quid ad se venirent? an speculandi causa? conantes dicere prohibuit et in catenas coniecit.* (I, 47, 6).

This reminds us a little of his sudden anger at I, 44, 8.

Caesar's army has not done battle yet with Ariovistus, but the preliminaries have been full, exciting, with apparent turns of fortune, and much of the drama of the whole episode is contained here.
Chapter II

Color in Book VII

Perhaps the chief function of color in Book VII is to show that Caesar never made a mistake, that he was a unique commander. Bound up with this is the assumption of the immense importance of the commander of an army. Thus the effect that Vercingetorix has upon the Gallic army is shown to be something very special also. Caesar's reputation in the field depends, naturally, upon the quality of his adversaries and it seems that for this campaign Caesar is quite deliberately and systematically impressing upon the reader the strength of his opposition. This again has much bearing on the dramatic qualities of the book. Here we have a campaign where the high point comes at the end, at Alesia, and this gives Caesar the opportunity to build up the drama to a climax. This also can be called a color. The final victory over virtually all of Gaul forms a fitting coping-stone to the campaigns Caesar has waged thus far, and although he spent one more year there, he left the narration of it to another, because--it seems fair to conjecture--such a narrative could only be an anti-climax.

In keeping with the fact that Alesia represents a climax to the seventh book and to the whole of the Bellum Gallicum by Caesar's hand, a number of themes in Book VII are steadily and artistically developed to give the book a greater unity and power. Thus the Gauls gradually
harden themselves to the demands that hopes of liberty, treated seri­
ously and realistically, make upon them. We see Vercingetorix' re­
cruiting drive at several stages, gradually building up to a united
Gallic front against Caesar. The nature of the confrontations between
Caesar's and Vercingetorix' armies change, and lessons are drawn from
this. In the first half of the book most of the attention is focussed
upon Vercingetorix; he receives rather less attention in the second
half, however, possibly as a foreshadowing of his eventual defeat.
Caesar has a worthy opponent, but it should not seem that the scales
are balanced too evenly, for, in that case, Caesar's victory would
have to depend too much on chance.

From the ethical angle, Caesar offers nothing by way of justifi­
cation of the Roman presence in Gaul; as this is the seventh campaign,
such explanation might be deemed no longer necessary. Caesar admits
many times that the Gauls are fighting for their liberty. To a modern
reader this seems the most damning admission he could possibly make;
to Caesar obviously, it is of no concern.\(^1\) One reason for mentioning
libertas seems to be to underline the spirit of the Gallic resistance,
and also to account for the defection of Commius and the Aedui from
the Roman side. Perhaps in line with Caesar's apparently objective
view of Gallic nationalism, we find little trace of chauvinism in
Caesar; a number of times the credit for winning a battle is unreser­
vedly given to the German cavalry. Caesar praises the spirit and
morale of the Roman soldiers, but this is perhaps more a reflection
upon himself than upon his men. Caesar seems less concerned with the
fact that his soldiers should be Roman than with the idea that he as
leader can be successful with whatever troops are at his command. For
Caesar, personal glory is more important than Roman glory. Of course, whatever troops he commands share in that glory, and Caesar knows well how to command their loyalty and bring out their best. All this seems not inconsistent with Caesar's later willingness to plunge Rome into civil war for his own ends.

Caesar's remarks about the volatile and wayward character of the Gallic people might appear chauvinistic, but these remarks seem in part calculated to provide a background for Caesar's treatment of Vercingetorix. That is, it is part of the latter's immense achievement to galvanize an army of such men and to persuade them to make great sacrifices for a long-range aim. Caesar, however, does not only comment on the Gallic character in a general way, he also brings to the reader's attention several cases of duplicity on the part of various Gauls, as well as an inhuman proposal from Critognatus. These instances present a problem; Caesar's attitude is not invariably made explicit—in the case, for example, where Vercingetorix uses false witness to make a point.

Near the middle of the book Caesar is faced with the collapse of his policy of divide et impera; there is, however, in retrospect, the satisfaction of having defeated a larger force than Caesar would otherwise have had to face at Alesia. It is significant that after Alesia Caesar reverts to this policy. It is shown that he never displays malice at the treacherous actions of the Aedui, even of those whom he has singled out for special favours. Caesar omitted much from the *Bellum Gallicum* and certainly he could have said less about this whole episode of the defection of the Aedui had he wished, making
his efforts to retain their allegiance less conspicuous. Caesar, however was well aware of the political as well as of the military problems that faced him in Gaul, and he wishes the reader to realize them also. For Caesar, this war was chiefly a means to an end; he would prefer to have the co-operation of the Aedui without having to fight for it as he did at Alesia. By these episodes the reader is made aware of the complexity of Caesar's task in Gaul; we are impressed by his foresight and his resoluteness in following up his plans despite many rebuffs. Caesar may be fighting in Gaul primarily for his own ends, but he is intent upon doing a job that will last, of consolidating his victories.

In the above introduction I have been mainly concerned with indicating how Caesar has made use of color, either to win the approbation of the reader by showing his own actions in a good light and by indicating what great obstacles he faced, or by intensifying the drama already inherent in the situation by means of color. I now wish to substantiate the claims I have been making.

The treatment of Vercingetorix shows, I have suggested, something of Caesar's concept of the importance of leadership—at the same time presenting him as an antagonist worthy of Caesar who threatens Caesar's great achievements of past years until he is overthrown at Alesia. Caesar's portrait of him depends even more on the demands which grow out of Caesar's dramatic conception of Book VII than on the real man and his actions. The Gauls have in earlier books proved themselves excitable, impulsive, courageous, flighty, unable to plan ahead, lacking in stamina, and apt to put the interests of their own tribe or faction
ahead of those of Gaul itself. Caesar's concept of the importance of himself and Vercingetorix to their respective armies is indicated by negative methods at the beginning of Book VII. The Roman army is ineffective while Caesar is in Italy. It stands by, witnessing the ambiguous behaviour of the Aedui when the Bituriges go over to Vercingetorix. Rather similarly, the Gallic tribes lack direction before Vercingetorix appears, although they show a great desire for freedom and admirable spirit. Caesar puts the thoughts of these Gauls in oratio obliqua. They speak in very emotional terms; their first proposal is a good one—to keep Caesar out of Gaul. This is obviously no easy matter, yet they say: id esse facile. The oratio obliqua ends with: postremo in acie praestare interfici, quam non veterem belli gloriam libertatemque quam a maioribus acceperint recuperare (VII, 1, 7-8). It is a romantic call. Later, however, we shall find Vercingetorix a great deal more solicitous for the lives of his followers, his aim being to get rid of the Romans, by unpalatable and unglamourous means if need be. An unreflecting death for the sake of a cause means little to him.

The first warlike action of the Gauls is performed by the Carnutes, who set about killing Roman citizens and plundering their belongings at Cenabum—an action doubtless calculated to inspire the rest of the Gauls, but with little other useful purpose. It is an action of bravado that can only bring Caesar back to Gaul all the sooner.

We notice immediately a striking difference in the Gallic preparations when Vercingetorix appears. It is no longer various groups of Gauls meeting together and voicing their common grievances, but one
man persuading others to join him: quoscumque adit ex civitate, ad suam sententiam perducit (VII, 4, 3). He does not wait for events, but: dimittit quoque versus legationes (VII, 4, 5). Unlike the earlier Gallic plotters, Vercingetorix demands hostages. The enthusiasm and praise for the daring of the Carnutes gives way to something harder and more determined. Vercingetorix begins to organize, immediately demanding forces. He has firm notions of what he wants to do; he is especially desirous of having good cavalry. He will not rely merely on general enthusiasm in recruiting: magnitudine supplicii dubitantes cogit (VII, 4, 9); something like Roman discipline is introduced into the Gallic forces. In Chapter 14 of Book VII, after Caesar has taken three towns in quick succession, we find Vercingetorix announcing his tactics. He apparently feels that the Gauls are on the defensive; he realizes, however, the Romans' difficulties regarding supplies. He is not frightened of making a bold proposal: docet longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque antea gestum sit (VII, 14, 2). Vercingetorix is speaking primarily of the immediate past, of course, when he says antea, but I suspect that Caesar wishes the reader to feel that it also means the past few years, that is the years in which Caesar has been in Gaul. Vercingetorix adapts his words to his audience at the beginning of his speech: id esse facile (VII, 14, 3) recalls the same words at VII, 1, 7, when the Gauls are encouraging each other to take the initiative against Caesar. The Gauls are inclined to over-confidence just as much as to despondency, and Vercingetorix knows his audience; he realizes also that he has some bitter pills for them to swallow later in his speech, so
he is not loath to apply a sugar coating here. He paints a picture
of the Gauls harassing the Roman forces: *hos omnes cotidie ab
equitibus deleri posse* (VII, 14, 4). His demand for the burning of
buildings and villages is prefaced with the words: *praeterea salutis
causa...* (VII, 14, 5). Again, he spells out the effect of this
upon the Romans: *aut inopiam non laturos aut magno cum periculo
longius a castris processuros* (VII, 14, 7). His next words must have
sounded strange to his audience: *neque interesse ipsosne interficiant
impedimentisne exuant* (VII, 14, 8). Compare this with *postremo in
acie praestare interfici, quam...* (VII, 1, 8). Worse is to come;
y they must burn even their towns unless they are perfectly secure from
attack, and Vercingetorix again patiently sets forth his reasons for
demanding this, conceding the harshness of his demands in the perora-
tion with the spectre of *servitus* which will otherwise claim them; his
last words, *quae sit ncesse accidere victis* (VII, 14, 10), perhaps
point to his concern not so much with winning as with preventing de-
feat, for the time being at least. Vercingetorix' attitude toward
war is a new one for the Gauls, therefore he takes the trouble to
explain the reasons for his proposals. The Gauls, after their recent
losses, are in a chastened mood and hence the more disposed to listen
to advice; better anyway, they might reflect, to burn towns than to
let any more fall in quick succession to the Romans.

In the main, Vercingetorix meets with success with his proposals,
but a single exception is made—the Gauls decide to preserve Avaricum,
a move that has most significant repercussions. Moreover, Vercinge-
torix' policy of hindering, rather than meeting the Romans in open
fight, suggested in this speech, although unanimously approved omnium
consensu hac sententia probata... (VII, 15, 1), has still to be tested. This test comes in Chapter 19, where the rival armies meet but do not come to blows.

We find the suspicions of the Gauls thoroughly aroused; by nature they are irked at restraint; they are unused to combining and deferring to one leader, and even interpret the absence of Vercingetorix as indicating collusion with the Romans. After this serious attack on his right to lead, Vercingetorix is on the defensive for the first part of his address to the Gauls, and the way his speech loosens up as it proceeds is instructive. Thus, the charges have been introduced with four quod's, after which the conclusion of treason is drawn: non haec omnia fortuito... (VII, 20, 2). Vercingetorix at first takes up the charges almost word for word; thus quod castra propius Romanos movisset (VII, 20, 1) becomes expanded into quod propius Romanos accessisset... (VII, 20, 3). Then he begins to depart more radically from the wording of the charges, but continues with a reasonable justification of his conduct: quod cum omni equitatu discessisset (VII, 20, 1) becomes equitum vero operam... (VII, 20, 4). When he answers the charge of leaving his forces without a commander, Vercingetorix begins to launch his counter-attack. Someone else in charge may have been overborne by the soldiers and forced to begin fighting. Having been given this opening, he sharply criticizes the weakness of the men cui rei propter animi mollitiem studere omnes videret, quod diutius laborem ferre non possent (VII, 20, 5). His voice rises; it is a simple matter to infer this, and he makes a calculated appeal to Gallic braggadocio; the Gauls ought to be thankful
that they have seen the Romans from so close, noted their small numbers, and despised their spirit. The charges against Vercingetorix moved from the factual to wild inference and Vercingetorix, answering them in the same order, is able to become expansive and to throw in a sarcastic note as he proceeds; this is perhaps seen in the repetition of the word *proditio* (VII, 20, 7), as he ridicules the idea that he wishes for power granted from Caesar, and the confident tones of the preceding sentence are expanded into *quod habere victoria posset, quae iam esset sibi atque omnibus Gallis explorata* (VII, 20, 7). Vercingetorix, realizing the effect of these "fighting words" upon his audience, now can afford to make a gesture of renunciation, something which naturally would throw the listener off balance by its unexpectedness, and Vercingetorix follows this immediately with the introduction of some Romans to prove his claim that the Gauls have victory in hand. Caesar quite clearly emphasizes this by his change to direct speech. Caesar doubtless admires Vercingetorix' ability but has no qualms about revealing his mendacity: *producit servos, quos...fame...vinculisque excruciaverat. hi iam edocti quae interrogati pronuntiarent* (VII, 20, 9). This touch seems to indicate clearly that Caesar wishes that the reader rather than being swept away by Vercingetorix' speech, should be able to keep in mind its effect upon the Gauls; Caesar's revelation allows him to look more objectively at the scene. There is, it should be remarked, a grain of truth in Vercingetorix' claims; his lie is not so bold as that of Litaviccus later on in Book VII. Finally, after the Romans have borne witness, Vercingetorix continues flamboyantly: *'haec' inquit 'a me...beneficia habetis....'* (VII, 20, 12); the tables are completely turned, the Gauls should
be asking his pardon, not vice-versa; the _a me_ and _beneficia_ are both placed emphatically. He repeats the malicious charge contained in the word _proditio_, this time with a phrase almost identical to that in VII, 20, 1: _prodictionis insimulatis_ (VII, 20, 12). One feels that the Gauls appreciate this combativeness on the part of their leader and his bold recovery. He ends his speech with a special gusto, expressed in part by alliteration (though not too obvious) and a sense of absolute self-confidence, the _a me_ being repeated almost at the end.

The use of falsehood by Vercingetorix has been considered to be an implicit criticism of him by Caesar, yet Caesar certainly condones subterfuges by which one tricks the other side in war to gain advantage, and it may be that he admires Vercingetorix' tactics in extricating himself from severe difficulties. At any rate, it seems to me quite probable that the falsehoods are used by the narrator to point up the gullibility of the Gauls and to suggest once more Vercingetorix' grasp of the situation and his understanding of his audience. The effect upon the men is powerful: _conclamat omnis multitudo et suo more armis concrepat, quod facere in eo consuerunt cuius orationem approbant; summum esse Vercingetorigem ducem nec de eius fide dubitandum nec maiore ratione bellum administrari posse_ (VII, 21, 1). There is nothing left to say.

The confrontation with the Romans may have frayed tempers, but Vercingetorix is faced with a real set-back after the loss of Avaricum. He offers some stock consolations to his men: _non virtute neque in acie vicisse Romanos_ (VII, 29, 2); _errare, si qui in bello omnes secundos rerum proventus exspectent_ (VII, 29, 3). Then he turns to
himself, recalling that he had spoken against the defending of
Avaricum; it was done because of imprudentia Biturigum et nimia
obsequentia reliquorum (VII, 29, 4), that is, the lack of foresight
and tenacity of purpose of the Gauls. Vercingetorix, as in his pre-
vious speech, seems to set himself apart from the rest of the Gauls;
they still have much to learn in the way of disciplining their na-
tures. Vercingetorix then makes a boast as he did at the end of his
previous oration; he himself will repair the losses sustained: se. .
.unum consilium totius Galliae effecturum, cuius consensui ne orbis
uidem terrarum possit obsistere; idque se prope iam effectum habere
(VII, 29, 5-6). Confident words; Vercingetorix shows exuberance when
he wishes to; his audience is dispirited; the Gauls need someone who
can work magic; Vercingetorix promises it, and thereby, his position
as leader is cemented. The other allies he speaks of must be primar-
ily the Aedui, and the next important segment of the book is devoted
to the outcome of his intrigues in that direction.

The following chapter is devoted to Caesar's appraisal of the
effects of Vercingetorix' speech. The Gauls are impressed because
Vercingetorix did not act like the usual Gallic commander after a
defeat, but stayed in his place, also because of his advice regarding
Avaricum. Caesar sets this last point down with perhaps a trace of
sarcasm: plusque animo providere et praesentire existimabatur (VII,
30, 2); he seems to mock the impressionability of the Gauls a little
in the face of a superior intelligence. Caesar follows this with
the remark: itaque ut reliquorum imperatorum res adversae auctorri-
tatem minuunt, sic huius ex contrario dignitas incommodo accepto in
dies augebatur (VII, 30, 3). This is a two-edged compliment; Caesar
means that Vercingetorix is a wonderfully persuasive orator, and he has indeed brought this out in the three speeches made by him.

The combined effect of the recent defeat and Vercingetorix' increased influence even brings the men to fortify their camp: sic erant animo consternati homines insueti laboris, ut omnia quae imperarentur sibi patienda et perferenda existimarent (VII, 30, 4). The sentence says very clearly that Vercingetorix has succeeded now in the first part of his task; the Gauls implicitly trust him and will do what he bids them. His next step is to create a combined front of the Gallic tribes.

Up to this stage of the book, Caesar has given Vercingetorix a great deal of exposure, almost, but not quite, forcing Caesar himself into the background. Vercingetorix is never quite so conspicuous, however, in the final two-thirds of the book. This fact prompts questions about Caesar's attitude to him. Does he wish to create a close reflection of himself, that is with respect to his own military gifts and personal charisma? Only in part, I think: his charisma is undoubted but his military gifts are quite different from those of Caesar. He is a very dour tactician; he does not make lightning decision, nor does he ever act with such swiftness as to throw the opposition into confusion. I have mentioned above that Vercingetorix' personality is much determined by Caesar's picture of the Gallic character, and this is very important with respect to his military tactics. Above all, the Gauls need combining, steadying, and the power to endure, and wait, and dig; it is these qualities that Vercingetorix can instill into them. He does not have any notable grasp of the general-ship needed in actual battle. Lest it be thought that I am making too
much use of an argumentum ex silentio, that is, that Caesar was pre-
occupied with his own activities in the battlefield, and on this ac-
count, short-changes Vercingetorix, consider the battle at Gergovia,
where, apparently, Caesar has little to boast about, yet the battle is
portrayed not as a victory for Vercingetorix, but rather as a series
of blunders by the Romans. In fact, the only mention of Vercingetorix
in the main battle occurs when his men advance too far and he recalls
them to camp: Vercingetorix ab radicibus collis suos intra munitiones
reduxit (VII, 51, 4).

Then at Dijon Vercingetorix miscalculates badly. In his speech
in Chapter 66 he is right that the Gauls should not be satisfied if
Caesar should merely leave the region, for if he did he would surely
return; therefore, he must be given battle here and now. Vercingetorix'
predictions about the battle itself, however, are disastrous. He sug-
gests two alternatives, in both of which he envisions the Romans as
on the defensive. He himself will support his numerous cavalry by
bringing the infantry outside the camp, terrori hostibus futurum
(VII, 66, 6). Once more, Vercingetorix' speech fires his men, and
they swagger as they scent victory: conclamant equites sanctissimo
iure iurando confirmari oportere, ne tecto recipiatur, ne ad liberos,
ad parentes, ad uxorem aditum habeat, qui non bis per agmen hostium
perequitarit (VII, 66, 7). But Vercingetorix has been sadly astray
and the Gauls are routed and shocked; Caesar shows himself busy during
the action, directing the operations, but there is no word of
Vercingetorix doing the same, and his name only appears during the
rout, when his fleeing men reach him where he is waiting with the in-
fantry. Caesar allots him no glory whatsoever.
Finally at Alesia, Vercingetorix' chief contribution is once again the gathering of the Gallic forces; after he reaches Alesia and sizes up the position, he sends out all the cavalry (Chapter 71) to gather forces from every allied tribe, impressing his envoys with his services to the cause and the loss that will ensue if they are tardy in their mission. It is doubtless in great part owing to the name and the authority of Vercingetorix that so many men arrive to relieve the siege. Chapter 75, the roll-call of the Gauls who set out for Alesia, is like a tribute to Vercingetorix; it is, however, almost the last one in the book.

I shall speak elsewhere about the fact that Critognatus, instead of Vercingetorix, to harden the spirit of the Gauls makes a speech in Chapter 77. After the arrival of Gallic reinforcements, the fighting starts in earnest; Caesar certainly recalls Vercingetorix by reference to his cousin Vercassivellaunus, the leader of the new forces; but Vercingetorix himself is like a trapped animal; he is virtually helpless and dependent upon the relief forces for his safety. Almost ironically, at the point where he has gathered the greatest Gallic forces of the whole war, he is most surely in the clutches of Caesar, and his frantic attempts to break out only underline this. Vercingetorix is thus humiliated before the final defeat and surrender.

Caesar has in his narrative set up an imposing opponent for himself, but, however, admirable he is, he is not another Caesar, and his decline begins at Dijon and continues thereafter; it is not just in the last minutes of the war that Caesar gets the upper hand.

I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that Caesar was intent on proving that he never made a mistake and, indeed, it would be
difficult to find an example of Caesar's making a prediction which turned out wrong. The only setbacks that Caesar suffered were at Gergovia and with the Aedui and Commius. With regard to the Aedui, Caesar is at pains to explain to the reader why he let Viridomarus and Eporedorix go (VII, 54). This direct form of explanation is unusual with Caesar, but he cannot afford to look a fool to his readers. His claims to the gratitude of these men is set forth to them. We have seen, however, how Convictolitavis reacted to Caesar's claims upon him, and here also libertas becomes an overriding consideration, as Caesar himself expected, as he tells us (VII, 54). Obviously, Caesar strongly believes in his diplomacy or he would not emphasize it so. Caesar gives libertas as the reason for their defection. He makes no mention of jealousies or infighting among the Aedui, apart from the instance of the disputed leadership between Cotus and Convictolitavis. In view of the favouritism shown to certain Aeduan leaders by Caesar, it seems likely that this was another strong factor in the breakaway, but one less flattering to Caesar. Caesar indicates the ambitious nature of the Aedui when they ask for the leadership of the Gallic forces. He notes when they fail to get this: Caesaris in se indulgentiam requirunt (VII, 63, 8). They regret it now and realize that Caesar's offer was better than this. Caesar notes: inviti summae spei adolescents Eporedorix et Viridomarui Vercingetorigi parent (VII, 63, 9). They are still called summae spei even after they have betrayed Caesar, who is thinking in long range terms and wishes to prepare the reader for later developments. The desire of the Aedui for libertas is shown to be something less than their desire to have the upper hand in Gaul, and Caesar shows that he was right to try to use them in just
such a position. Thus, in a way, Caesar was right and it was the Aedui who did not know their own minds. In VII, 67, after a battle near Alesia, Caesar refers to only three captives by name—all leading Aedui—indicating again his continuing interest in this people, to whom he has been so careful to show no resentment. Finally, of course, after Alesia, we find him capitalizing upon his generous treatment of them by allying them once again to Rome.

With respect to the setback at Gergovia, Caesar anticipates criticism as far as he can. In VII, 43, he remarks that he was expecting a greater rising of the Gauls and consilia inibat, quemadmodum a Gergovia discederet ac rursus omnem exercitum contraheret, ne profectio nata a timore defectionis similisque fugae videretur (VII, 43, 5). Directly before the disaster, he addressed his legati: in primis monet ut contineant milites, ne studio pugnandi aut spe praedae longius progrediantur; quid iniquitas loci habeat incommodi proponit; hoc una celeritate posse vitari; occasionis esse rem, non proelii (VII, 45, 8). In describing the battle he underlines the temeritas of the men with two vignettes: Fabius leaping onto the wall, and Petronius admitting his folly and heroically giving up his life to help his comrades. At the same time, however, this misguided heroism, especially Petronius', diverts our attention from the ignominy suffered by the Romans. Significantly, no brilliant or courageous actions of the Gauls are mentioned, so that the Romans appear to save face to an extent. After the battle Caesar severely criticizes his soldiers; they have not obeyed orders. Of course, the disaster was Caesar's responsibility, come what may—that is the way an army functions—but short of denying this, he does everything possible to
clear himself of a blunder.

Caesar's unique qualities as a leader are manifested in his judgment, discussed above, in his swift decision, self-confidence, and *CELERITAS*, which we see in VII, 8, where, after an amazing crossing of the Cevennes, he catches the Arverni off guard. Also, after Vercingetorix' bold move in attacking the Boii, Caesar decides to bring his army out of winter quarters, despite great difficulties regarding supplies, and swiftly takes three towns, surprising the Gauls and drawing Vercingetorix off from the Boii. Above all, Caesar had a rare quality of inspiration; this is indicated in VII, 62, where Labienus bids his troops before the battle: *ipsam Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero hostes superassent, praesentem adesse existimarent* (VII, 62, 2). Moreover at the height of the great final battle at Alesia, we find Caesar hastening to take part in the action: *eius adventu ex colore vestitus cognito, quo insigni in proeliis uti consuerat* (VII, 88, 1). Almost immediately the enemy are put to flight and the battle is over.

The disciplining of the Gallic soldiers is an important theme in this book, and Caesar underlines the difficulty of such an undertaking by indicating a number of times the excitable, overoptimistic, changeable nature of these people. The whole treatment of the Aedui in this book seems to indicate this, as, perhaps, also do the accusations of Vercingetorix after he has been absent from the confrontation with the Romans near Avaricum. He is accused of treachery; this could, of course, be a move by his enemies, but the ease with which his repudiation of the charges completely wins over the host suggests that despondency prompted the attack. In VII, 29, after the loss of
Avaricum, Vercingetorix rebukes his men for being overly optimistic, and for desiring immediate victories. He also castigates the imprudentia of the Bituriges and the nimia obsequentia of the others in allowing the town of Avaricum to stand. Also the Gauls are pleased with Vercingetorix: quod ipse animo non defecerat tanto accepto incommodo neque in occultum abdiderat et conspectum multitudinis fugerat (VII, 30, 1)—with obvious implications as to the usual conduct of Gallic leaders. In VII, 42, Caesar mentions that the Aedui had just heard about a revolt instigated among the troops by Litaviccus, which was shortly afterwards quelled by Caesar. He continues: Haedui,... nullum sibi ad cognoscendum spatium relinquunt. impellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et temeritas—quae maxime illi hominum generi est innata—ut levem auditionem habeant pro re comperta (VII, 42, 1).

Although, as I remarked in the introduction, Caesar does not try to justify his presence in Gaul, his position seems to gain something from these weaknesses of character—as viewed by the Romans—that the Gauls exhibit. If Caesar's treatment of Gallic libertas seems strange to us, it should be remembered that it is essential to explain this great new uprising of the Gauls after Caesar had spent so many years pacifying the country. Hence, Caesar presents libertas as an incalculable transcendent element, in face of which other considerations become meaningless. The dramatic value of the book, moreover, is greatly enhanced by the realization of what the Gauls are fighting for. Caesar clearly sets the key for the book when in the first paragraph we find the complaints of the Gauls ending with postremo in acie praestare interfici, quam non veterem belli gloriam
Vercingetorix uses this theme when justifying his demand for a scorched-earth policy. In the peroration to his speech, he makes the emotional appeal: *haec si gravia aut acerba videantur, multo illa gravius aestimari debeberos coniuges in servitutem abstrahil* (VII, 14, 10). Vercingetorix exaggerates if he is speaking generally, but this is what the Gallic rhetoric regards as the opposite of libertas. Actually Caesar is able to reveal Vercingetorix once again as a man of foresight: the massacre that occurs at Avaricum, in spite of Vercingetorix' warning, is even crueller than his fears; even the women and children are slaughtered. When enumerating the forces which were summoned by Vercingetorix to Alesia, Caesar singles out Commius and his following—his erstwhile allies—remarkling: *tanta tamen universae Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recuperandae, ut neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur* (VII, 76, 2).

Critognatus would go to greater extremes for the recovery of libertas than any other Gaul. Speaking of resorting to cannibalism if necessary, he says: *Romani vero quid petunt aliud aut quid volunt nisi invidia adducti quos fama nobiles potentesque bello cognoverunt, horum in agris civitibusque considere atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem?* (VII, 77, 15). I think we can note a suggestion of a hardening of the Gauls' resolution between the beginning and the end of this book. I shall treat libertas and related words in more detail in Chapter 4.

Caesar makes good use of his material to create a development in other respects also. I have mentioned the appearance of a general move-
ment of revolt in Gaul early in the book and its consolidation by Vercingetorix, who also gives it vitally needed leadership. The pattern of the confrontations between the two armies throughout the book is interesting dramatically. The first is minor; the Romans are besieging Noviodunum in VII, 12, when a column of Vercingetorix' cavalry approach. They are beaten off, Caesar's German cavalry being the decisive factor as so often is the case. Next we have the confrontation near Avaricum; no fighting takes place; the armies look one another over. However, with the expectation of a battle frustrated, the tension rises with both armies now spoiling for a fight. When they meet again, however, at Gergovia, although the fortunes of the Gauls rise to their highest point, the engagement is an unsatisfactory one; the Romans have to fight under difficulties, and the Gallic victory is less glorious on that account. In the skirmish described in VII, 67, 68, the Gauls, despite their initial confidence, have the worst of it, and the scales finally turn. At Alesia we find the immense buildup of the Gallic forces, the Roman fortifications. The hardened spirit of the Gauls is symbolized by Critognatus, and the scene is set for a fine climax. The seriousness of this situation is emphasized by Vercingetorix' admonition to those who set out from Alesia to recruit a new army: *omnesque qui per aetatem arma ferre possint ad bellum cogant* (VII, 71, 2). The list of the new forces that arrive serves in part, as does the description of Caesar's fortifications, to increase the reader's apprehension of the coming battle. The leaders of the great new force are chosen and Caesar speaks of its confidence in VII, 76, 5: *omnes alacres et fiduciae pleni*, and of the feeling that the very sight of the army would overwhelm the Romans. Finally, we have
during the final battle at Alesia, dramatic indications of its importance: utrisque ad animum occurrit unum esse illud tempus (VII, 85, 2).

The fighting rises to a climax in VII, 85-86. At the beginning of each of these paragraphs, we find Caesar giving orders, and again he remarks on the crucial nature of the battle: omnium superiorum dimicationum fructum in eo die atque hora docet consistere (VII, 86, 3). Finally, Caesar himself conspicuously enters the battle as has been mentioned above.

Caesar's style is usually regarded as unspectacular and unaffected, but we find a tendency to create vivid scenes even in events that happened far away. Thus, in VII, 8, 4: celeriter haec fama ac nuntiis ad Vercingetorigem perferuntur. quem perterriti omnes Arverni circumstistunt atque obscurant.

As Oppermann remarks, Caesar's style is not given to reflections or explanations. He usually confines himself to a relation of events and to speeches, where, for the most part, are found his analyses of events. Caesar writes without calling attention to style. He uses the plain style; he is, quite naturally, at his most rhetorical in the speeches, where he is also best able to portray the characters taking part in the war. It is perhaps noteworthy that in the Seventh book, we see more of the opposing side and its quarrels and deliberations than in any previous book. Here we find a number of speeches made by Gauls to Gauls. This reflects the facts that the effort of opposing Caesar in this book is better organized and more powerful and persistent than in other books and that Book VII is the climax of the entire work.

Caesar's style is impersonal in form; this enables him to op-
pose himself to Vercingetorix on the same plane. Indeed, there are
times when Caesar greatly depends upon the third person, e.g. when
he appears in his red cloak at Alesia. Perhaps, however, there is also
another more subjective side of battle descriptions, as I have sug­
gested above.

How does Caesar's writing reflect a man who has even bigger
projects than this war on his mind? Perhaps the most telling indica­
tions are his detachment, his preoccupation with a victory that will
last. On the other hand, he makes no reference to events in Rome ex­
cept near the beginning of the book, when he is in Italy. As Collins
remarks, 10 we see nothing of his get-rich-quick civilian following in
the camp, nor do we read of his dispatching messengers to Rome.
Caesar, in the Bellum Gallicum, concentrates all his attention on the
fighting in Gaul, yet is perhaps true that he rarely admits to being
really pressed or in great danger there. Perhaps he almost always
felt that he had the situation well in hand; how otherwise could he
have given so much attention to Roman politics?
Chapter III

Some Aspects of Book VII

I have found it convenient to examine certain events in Book VII separately; these are the Aeduan revolt and Labienus' campaign, the siege of Avaricum and Critognatus' speech.

Aeduan Revolt—Campaign of Labienus

After Avaricum we find Vercingetorix recruiting again: nec minus quam est pollicitus Vercingetorix animo laborabat, ut reliquas civitates adiungeret... (VII, 31, 1), and the remainder of this chapter tells of his energetic measures in this matter. Caesar remarks: his rebus celeriter id, quod Avarici deperierat, expletur (VII, 31, 4). Moreover, Teutomatus, the son of an amicus of the Roman people, comes over to Vercingetorix with a large cavalry force. It is quite clear that Avaricum was merely a preliminary; Caesar had some success, certainly, but did not encounter Vercingetorix' main army.

So in Chapter 32 we find Caesar looking forward, now that the winter is over, to actually coming to grips with Vercingetorix, and in a strange way, the writing becomes almost lyrical, as though he were looking forward to a fox hunt in the freshness of the morning: iam prope hieme confecta, cum ipso anni tempore ad gerendum bellum vocaretur et ad hostem proficisci constituisset, sive eum ex paludibus silvisque elicere sive obsidione premere posset... (VII, 32, 2). The campaign of the year 52 is more a contest than any
other; Caesar's story contains elements reminiscent of epic writing; he almost revels in seeing the odds pile up against him, it makes his achievement the more notable—each confrontation of battle becomes a stepping stone on the way to Alesia, the scene of the final decision. And so the gradual build-up of the Gallic forces assumes a great importance in preparing for this climax.

We have seen Vercingetorix' successful recuperation and new gains in Chapter 31, but just when Caesar feels that the situation is ripe for action, his attention is diverted by trouble among the Aedui. I think he intentionally emphasizes this distraction; the troubles of the Aedui are apparently deep-seated and become progressively worse from Caesar's point of view throughout the campaign at Gergovia until the final rupture with the Romans. More space is given to the Aedui than to Vercingetorix and the battle itself. Although at first sight the Aeduan affair may seem a mere episode, the recounting of which causes some embarrassment in the development of the drama of the book, I think that Caesar has attempted to integrate it with the main narrative because, with respect to Alesia, it is perhaps even more important than the battle of Gergovia. Caesar mentions a number of times that he has treated the Aedui with exceptional indulgence and that he has relied more upon this people than upon any other to support him in Gaul. On the other hand, although Vercingetorix has been unprecedentedly successful in recruiting and disciplining Gallic soldiers, the rebellion will fall far short of a combined Gaul without the central state of the Aedui, perhaps the most powerful and influential in the land. Thus,
a tug-of-war goes on near Gergovia during the campaign there, and I think that Caesar means to suggest that the stakes are higher in this than in the battle against Vercingetorix. Caesar makes it quite clear that at no stage does he think of the battle at Gergovia as likely to be decisive; thus, in Chapter 43, before main hostilities commence, Caesar says: *ipse maiorem Galliae motum exspectans, ne ab omnibus civitatibus circumsisteretur, consilia inibat, quemadmodum a Gergovia discederet...* (VII, 43, 5). The *circumsisteretur* is interesting, it does really happen eventually, but at Alesia, and aptly symbolizes the final uniting of the Gauls. Most importantly Caesar's apparent decision to withdraw is occasioned by his trouble with the Aedui; this is an index of the importance of the previous chapters devoted to them. Caesar already feels himself on the defensive, it is no longer a matter of seeking out the enemy and drawing him on to battle, there is danger of being surrounded. Caesar has had a taste of the perils of dividing his forces. In a mood of confidence after having adjudicated between rival claimants to the position of Vergobret, he sent Labienus north with four legions, then at Gergovia, he thought so much of the importance of the Aeduan connexion that he left only two legions at the camp, thus severely straining his resources, as we see in Chapter 41, where Fabius' trials are related.

Caesar's remarks in Chapter 43 quoted above, together with his indications that he never made an all-out attempt to take Gergovia (VII, 47, 1), even though a full-scale battle did come about, make Chapter 43 as important a turning point as Chapter 50, where Fabius
and Petronius are killed at the walls. That is, in Chapter 43, Caesar implicitly renounces for the present his policy, stated in 32, 2, quoted above, of ferreting out the enemy wherever he is. Caesar had divided his army in order to catch the enemy in two places, as it were, with Labienus in the north and Caesar in the center of Gaul. Already, presumably, at Chapter 43, Caesar wants to reunite with Labienus, although he does not say this. It is especially significant that Caesar sets Chapter 42 and 43 before the battle; this is something which could easily have been mentioned afterwards, together with the final breakaway of the Aedui. However, Caesar chooses to place them directly after his successful march to regain the allegiance of the Aeduan soldiers whom he brings to Gergovia.

We might look at this section a little more closely. In Chapters 40 and 41, the need for swift decision and action arises. Caesar divides the army and it performs very well, with great spirit and discipline and energy. Caesar does not conceal his concern over the Aedui: magna affectus sollicitudine (VII, 40, 1); he acts swiftly: nulla interposita dubitatione (VII, 40, 1). It is a case where celeritas must decide the issue: res posita in celeritate videbatur (VII, 40, 2). Again, the urgency is reflected in adhortatus milites ne necessario tempore itineris labore permoveantur (VII, 40, 4). The narrative is swift and tight-lipped; Caesar seems to be narrating only essential points. Caesar neglects nothing, sending word to the rest of the Aedui regarding what happened and revealing his clemency to the rebellious soldiers. The action at the camp where Fabius was left in control is also given a brief treat-
ment, despite the hard and exhausting fighting and the dangerous situation of the comparatively small Roman force. Significantly perhaps, the following chapter relating events among the Aedui is written more fully and dramatically; an analysis of motives is inserted: *impellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et temeritas...* (VII, 42, 2). We find a neat triad of swift clauses: *bona civium Romanorum diripiunt, caedes faciunt, in servitutem abstrahunt* (VII, 42, 3). Convictolitavis is singled out for especial censure: *plebemque ad furorem impellit* (VII, 42, 4). This chapter describes events that actually have greater consequences than Caesar's actions in Chapters 40 and 41, which stem the tide only temporarily. Hence, perhaps the greater vividness of the writing in Chapter 42. Obviously Caesar realizes that only his immediate presence was able to keep the Aeduan army loyal, and that this will no longer be possible when they are parted, as indeed the people of the state itself, being at some distance, have acted in such an irresponsible manner. Caesar knows that the Aedui are going to be of little use to him until he can come to a new agreement with them, and, indeed, the presence of the Aeduan army in the battle at Gergovia is almost symbolic of this. There is a misunderstanding, and they tend to hinder rather than to help the Romans.

Chapter 42 is introduced with the words *dum haec ad Gergoviam geruntur*, exactly the same formula as is used at the beginning of Chapter 37. Caesar is obviously not concerned to make the information about the Aedui surreptitiously insinuate itself into the narrative; he makes no apology for introducing the subject, that is, he
seems to consider it part of the continuing narrative; he is trying as far as possible to keep things in temporal order.

Just as the ill-fated exploits of Fabius and Petronius represent the climax of the battle at Gergovia, the high point of the Aeduan revolt is clearly the speech of Litaviccus, and here, the connexion of this revolt with the earlier Gallic revolts is most in evidence. Caesar has already, in Chapter 37, spoken of Arvernian money tempting Convictolitavis to break his allegiance to Caesar, but I feel that in its effect upon the reader, a stronger link with Vercingetorix is made through this speech of Litaviccus, which so markedly recalls the speech of Vercingetorix at VII, 20. In fact, it seems almost a parody of it. Whereas Vercingetorix does some arguing before his dramatic peroration, Litaviccus begins in a very excited tone, weeping, lacrimans. Caesar reserved direct discourse for the end of Vercingetorix' speech, but Litaviccus begins in it: quo proficiscimur... (VII, 38, 2), introducing in the first sentence a piece of shocking news: omnis hostem equitatus, omnis nobilitas interit (VII, 38, 2), false, nevertheless. This, we recall, is just the way Vercingetorix acted, but his lies were somewhat less gross. Litaviccus' trick is a cheaper one, likely to be discovered at any moment. Litaviccus acts out his part with gusto, bringing on witnesses who escaped from the slaughter, and saying: dolore prohibeo quae gesta sunt pronuntiare (VII, 38, 3). Then the witnesses, like those of Vercingetorix, repeat the words that Litaviccus had earlier given them. The Aedui are won over already, not at the end, as in Vercingetorix' speech: conclamant.
Haedui et Litaviccum obsecrant, ut sibi consulat (VII, 38, 6).

Litaviccus is easily able to persuade the men to slaughter some Romans standing nearby and to plunder their goods, thus staining their hands, and hence deepending their new resolve to join the Arverni. The Aedui, apart from Dumnorix, lack the serious revolutionary purpose of Vercingetorix, and perhaps it is fitting that Litaviccus' speech should be such a stagey and comparatively shallow thing. Yet, inevitably, as I have remarked, it recalls Vercingetorix' speech and corresponds to a second crisis in the affairs of the opposition to Caesar. Litaviccus is not another Vercingetorix, nor meant to symbolize him or to speak in his place, I suspect, but he is meant to recall him. The melodramatic nature of the speech and the fact that its claims are easily and quickly disproved may be appropriate for a people who do not really believe in the rightness of the cause of the Gallic nation as a whole, as is shown later when the Aedui are quite disappointed at Vercingetorix' being voted the leader of the whole enterprise. Rasmussen goes perhaps a little too far, but his remarks are interesting: Hatten Labienus und die Centurionen die Stelle Caesars vertreten, so handelt Litaviccus in Abwesenheit seines Feldherrn als ein zweite Vercingetorix. Beide bedienen sich skrupellos der gleichen Mittel. Diese ins Auge springende Wiederholung derselben Szene innerhalb wenige Kapitel wirkt schon durch sich selbst: Sie prägt sich dem Leser ein. Der Leser weiss nun, dass die Gallier verschlagen, listig und grausam sind; er ahnt überdies, dass die Gallier nun bald einig sein werden.

After Gergovia, Caesar indicates the inevitability of the Aeduan breakaway, even good men like Eporedorix and Viridomarus,
who have already proved their loyalty to Caesar, leave him. Caesar shows how his hands are tied: *eos retinendos non censuit, ne aut inferre injuriam videretur aut dare aliquam timoris suspicicionem* (VII, 54, 2). We find Caesar outlining his favors to the Aedui and to Eporedorix and to Viridomarus in particular as they depart; he knows it is hopeless, but his words in VII, 54, 3-4 once more suggest how he has been cheated. This recital puts the following tale of outrages by the Aedui in a more glaring light. We see in Chapter 55 Caesar's great base at Noviodunum being plundered of hostages, grain, and horses, and Eporedorix and Viridomarus realizing the folly of swimming against the tide join in the killing of the Romans: *itaque interfectis Novioduni custodibus quique eo negotiandi aut itineris causa convenerant* (VII, 55, 5). The town is set on fire so as to be of no possible use to the Romans. This, of course, recalls the policy of Vercingetorix, with whom the Aedui are now negotiating (VII, 55, 4).

Caesar's position has now reached a point of crisis, and he emphasizes this in Chapter 56, showing the alternatives that face him. The safety of the Roman forces is now uppermost in his mind and naturally his thoughts turn to Labienus in the north. However, just before recounting Labienus' fortunes, Caesar gives evidence once again of his own resourcefulness, as he recalls the drama of thwarting the Aedui, who intended to trap him on the west bank of the Liger. The story is typical: *admodum magnis diurnis nocturnisque itineribus confectis contra omnium opinionem ad Ligerim venit...* (VII, 56, 3). A ford is discovered; the men cross with only their arms and shoulders
free of the water, the cavalry breaking the force of the stream, the
enemy having been frightened off—a brilliant operation briefly
and modestly recounted.

But the great forces of Gaul are about to unite, and Caesar
is isolated and on the defensive. Even more so is Labienus, and the
chapters devoted to him, coming at this point in the narrative,
serve to underline the isolation of the Romans. In Chapters 57 and
58, we see Labienus engaged in not very important or decisive actions;
these were made originally as preliminaries to something bigger,
but in Chapter 59 the news of Gergovia and the Aeduan defection ar-
prises, also: secundo Galliae motu rumores adferebantur... (VII,
59, 1) Moreover, the Bellovaci become restless, aroused not by
Caesar's loss at Gergovia, but by the action of the Aedui, evidence
that Caesar, as I have already suggested, regarded this as more
important than the battle. Labienus' plans are drastically changed:
tum Labienus tanta rerum commutatone longe aliud sibi capiendum
consilium, atque antea senserat (VII, 59, 3); he is now being pressed
on two sides, by the Bellovaci and by the forces of Camulogenus.
Now, more than ever, it is time for the spirit of the Romans to as-
sert itself: ab animi virtute auxilium petendum videbat (VII, 59,
6). This is what Caesar himself brought about in Chapter 56 and
Labienus' taking the enemy by surprise in crossing the river recalls
Caesar's action. The enemy scents blood: existimabant... omnes
perturbatos defectione Haeduorum fugam parare... (VII, 61, 4);
again the Aeduan rebellion is the reason, not Gergovia.

Caesar describes the ensuing battle typically; perhaps it is
briefer than usual; both sides fight bravely; then the turning point comes at: *incerto etiam nunc exitu victoriae...* (VII, 62, 6). The excitement and real accomplishments of Labienus' expedition have been confined to the retreat, the earlier part (Chapters 57 and 58) was not much more than maneuvering on the part of both sides. Thus the correspondence of Labienus' situation to Caesar's, his escape from difficulties in the manner of Caesar, emphasized, of course, by his words to the men before battle: *ipsum Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero hostes superassent, praesentem adesse existimarent...* (VII, 62, 2), all serve to integrate this episode with the main narrative.

At the completion of this narrative of Labienus' retreat, Caesar remarks: *defectione Haeduorum cognita bellum augetur* (VII, 63, 1), and the buildup of Gallic forces is related; in fact, only the Remi, the Lingones, and the Treveri do not join in. Vercingetorix, confirmed unanimously as the leader of the Gauls, now attacks the Roman Province, at the same time trying to win over the Allobroges by money, as he had done with the Aedui. The Gauls are approaching the height of their power and confidence, and the scene is set for Dijon and Alesia.

**Siege of Avaricum**

I have indicated elsewhere that Caesar uses an admirable economy in integrating the Avaricum episode with the rise of Vercingetorix. Here I wish to look at two highlights of the siege of Avaricum, which, I think, throw important light upon Caesar's methods of composition.
In VII, 24, Caesar has been describing a surprise attack made at night upon the Roman siege works. Everything is in turmoil; those Romans who have been sleeping are hastening to extinguish the flames. Then in Chapter 25, Caesar takes up the narrative again, after the battle has been raging for several hours. He is able to express the long, drawn-out nature of the battle and the effect of the relentless attacks made upon the Romans with a long *cum* sentence in which he relates the perpetual renewal of hope of the Gauls and the backing-up they give one another, cleverly indicating that throughout this whole period of time, the battle was fought with a special intensity: *omnemque Galliae salutem in illo vestigio temporis positam arbitrarentur* (VII, 25, 1). The Gauls are not desperate; the *salutem* refers, rather, to the destruction of the Romans than to escape from slavery by the Gauls. Vercingetorix, we must remember, is not far away, and his speech in VII, 20 had filled the men with optimism.

The Romans are not mentioned at all here; attention is concentrated upon the psychological state of the Gauls and the long drawn-out fury of battle. Then, in the same sentence, Caesar seems to cut the thread he has drawn so finely; he introduces, rather apologetically, what seems a parenthetical and somewhat arbitrary comment: *accidit inspectantibus nobis, quod dignum memoria visum praeterendum non existimavimus* (VII, 25, 1), and Caesar goes on to recount the scene of the Gauls going, one after the other, to certain death in their determination to keep the Roman *agger* aflame. Yet these remarks come at the formal climax of this long, and apparently
carefully wrought sentence, and we realize that Caesar is using this particular episode, with its rather deceptive introduction, to typify the Gallic spirit. One feels that things like this were occurring all over the battlefield. Caesar is using this particular instance to create a sharper and more forceful impression; a special human and pathetic dimension has been added to the foregoing picture. Now he has set before us the quintessence of the Gallic spirit and is able to re-create for the reader some of his own emotions during the battle.

Then we realize that not only has Caesar done this, but he has also used the incident in place of describing the gradual retreat of the Gauls, for Chapter 25 ends: *nec prius ille est a propugnatoribus vacuus relictus locus quam restincto egzere atque omni ea parte submotis hostibus finis est pugnandi factus.* Caesar is usually very careful about indicating climaxes, turning points and the like in battles, but here, instead of showing the Roman recovery of their position, he prefers to concentrate attention wholly upon the Gauls, partly in preparation for the narration of the end of the siege and the reaction of the people of the city. Until now, Caesar has nothing but unstinted admiration for the courage of the Gauls, and, as we have seen, he has left the Romans in the background as he described the battle. As hope wanes, however, we see another, less admirable, side of the Gallic nature assert itself.

Caesar dramatizes this about-face by having recourse to the style of tragic historiography; when the men try to escape secretly
at night, the women, thus abandoned, throw themselves at their feet: matres familiae repente in publicum procurrerunt flentesque proiectae ad pedes suorum omnibus precibus petierunt ne se et communes liberos hostibus ad supplicium dederent... (VII, 26, 3); the alliteration betrays the heightened style, but even more so does the apparently artificial scene. On the following day the Romans mount the walls and take the city amid scenes of terror: hostes re nova perterriti (VII, 28, 1), and there follows a shocking massacre.

These scenes of the taking of the city are to have a long range effect, we find. In the battle at Gergovia, as the Romans advance toward the city walls, some of the Gauls repentino tumultu perterriti (VII, 47, 4) get a faulty impression of the situation and throw themselves over the walls, to escape from the enemy, whom they believe to be already in the city. This recalls the attempt of the men to escape from Avaricum, a coincidence which is supported by a more striking one as the women beseech the Romans to spare them: pectore nudo prominentes passis manibus obtestabantur Romanos, ut sibi parcerent... (VII, 47, 5), again in the manner of tragic history. Moreover, the women mention Avaricum itself: neu, sicut Avarici fecissent, ne a mulieribus guidem atque infantibus abstinerent (VII, 47, 5). At a minute later we see Fabius mounting the walls; of him it was said: constabat excitari se Avaricensibus praemiis... (VII, 47, 7). Again Avaricum has been mentioned; the parallel to the former situation cannot be overlooked now, but, by the same token, neither can the differences.
At Avaricum, Caesar waited for the right moment, then with a very well-planned and disciplined move, sent his men to the top of the walls, after which they took the city at their leisure. At Gergovia, on the other hand, Caesar has sometime before given the signal for retreat; the Romans are in disarray. It is only briefly and apparently a repetition of Avaricum. The panic of the Gauls and the confidence of the Romans seem premature, and later events prove this to be true. Both sides—that is, Fabius and the Gallic men and women—are unreflecting, through greed and terror respectively. The whole reminder of Avaricum is an ironic one; it is introduced to underline the disobedience and defeat of the Romans.

This, I think, is a clear example of Caesar's artistic interweaving of events; by using such a recollection, Caesar can better bind the book together and create a sort of dramatic shorthand through which inferences can be made by the reader about the way Caesar wants him to look at a situation, that is, in what sort of context he wants that situation seen.

Speech of Critognatus

The speech of Critognatus, perhaps more than any other, raises questions about Caesar's methods. How close to the original did he keep in reporting speeches? Did Critognatus really advocate cannibalism? Did Caesar not feel free to transfer this idea to Vercingetorix? I have assumed that Caesar uses a fairly free hand in the speeches of Vercingetorix and Litaviccus. These, like that of Critognatus, were spoken to Gauls, and Caesar appears to set them
down with the intention of revealing character and situation and creating drama. Moreover, these speeches grow inevitably out of situations and are central to them. Yet, at Alesia, although, as Caesar remarks, various opinions were voiced, he claims to report that of Critognatus because of its unusual cruelty. Caesar uses the phrase non praetereunda videtur oratio Critognati (VII, 77, 2). This somewhat parallels his words: accidit inspectantibus nobis, quod dignum memoria visum praetereundum non existimavimus (VII, 25, 1). Here he goes on to relate that the Gauls at one gate, rather than let up on their attack on the Roman agger with combustible material, were going one by one to certain death. Caesar introduces the incident in a parenthetic way, but it is easily generalized to describe the spirit of the Gauls at this stage of the battle, and it has an important structural part in the narration of this battle. It is no mere fond reminiscence.

Now one of the most striking things about Critognatus' speech is that the crudelitas, on account of which Caesar ostensibly introduces it, is by no means its main theme. Nor do the Gauls afterwards come to the necessity of taking his advice. Critognatus is an advocate of remaining in Alesia rather than of surrendering or breaking out. His advice carries the day. Hence, it is natural that his viewpoint is given in preference to the other two. Moreover, it is likely that in view of the despondency in Alesia due to the non-arrival of reinforcements, it was necessary to take a particularly strong stand to prevent a collapse of the whole Gallic cause. Hence Critognatus, pouring contempt on the alternative suggestions and calling for supreme endurance on the part of his people
does just this. He implies that bravery is not merely a matter of risking life on the battlefield, but of realizing what one is striving for and acting in a way best calculated to get it. He posits a virtual absolute good and evil, *libertas* and *servitus*. His men must steel themselves to anything in order to escape *servitus*. In this way cannibalism becomes rather a symbol for iron determination than a sign of Gallic inhumanity. Insofar as Critognatus recognizes it to be inhuman, he sees the Romans as more so in trying to reduce the Gauls to eternal slavery. The speech very eloquently enunciates the stakes for which the Gauls and the Romans will very soon fight. And hence, it is impeccably placed in the narrative.

Yet Caesar has, as it were, sprung it upon us with his strange introduction; we are half expecting something incidental, unless we recall the passage at VII, 25, 1, quoted above. In both cases, I think Caesar uses the introductory formula partly as a device, and partly to capture the reader's attention. Even still it might be objected that Caesar could have introduced Critognatus' speech without resorting to this subterfuge, that is, he could have remarked that the words of Critognatus at the council carried the day, and then proceeded to relate the speech. There are two factors opposing this, I think. First, Critognatus' general outlook is very close to Vercingetorix' and the inclusion of Critognatus' speech in a matter-of-fact way, without explaining why he and not Vercingetorix is speaking, would be difficult. The reader of the *Bellum Gallicum* is not in the habit of seeing a subordinate take the limelight from his leader, especially in the matter
of speeches; in fact, the reverse tends to happen, as we see when Labienus deliberately recalls Caesar's name to his soldiers when the commander-in-chief is absent. Thus, if Critognatus is to speak the views of Vercingetorix, and, as we see, with an extremely authoritative tone, this will need either explaining or some other device. Caesar chooses to herald the speech by his sensational reference to inhuman cannibalism.

I believe there is another reason for Caesar's introductory words; he has put the speech into direct discourse. At every other occurrence of direct discourse in the Bellum Gallicum, whether indirect discourse has preceded it or not, it is introduced at a very dramatic moment, and the opening words betray this, e.g. 'haec ut intellecti sinque pronuntiari...'. (VII, 20, 8), or, 'quo proficiscimur sinquem milites? omnis noster equitatus, omnis nobilitas interiit...'. (VII, 38, 2). Critognatus' speech is a long one, and its climax comes later, but Caesar, by his preliminary remarks, has created a mood of expectancy in his reader; he has characterized Critognatus, at this, his first and only appearance in the Bellum Gallicum, in such a way that the reader is shocked, and this emotion does duty for the exciting situation usually present when direct speech is introduced. Again, the fact that the speech is a complete one and wholly in direct speech points to its importance; Caesar does not use this device lightly, judging by its appearances elsewhere. On such a basis, this speech ought to comprise one of the most important sections in the entire Bellum Gallicum, which once again, and even more urgently,
raises the question, why is Vercingetorix not given the speech?

I suspect it may be that, although Caesar has made the Gallic resistance dependent to a very great extent upon Vercingetorix for its organization, aims, and endurance, nevertheless, if Critognatus' speech were given to him, it would seem that to some extent Vercingetorix' efforts had been unavailing. That is, that he had not inculcated his spirit into his followers so that if any backsliding occurred, it still required his encouragement or scolding to stop it. Instead of this, Caesar is able to indicate different points of view at Alesia. Nevertheless, Critognatus speaks, at least throughout the greater part of his speech, presumably for a majority. At any rate, its effect is to carry the day.

Thus, the Gallic spirit of resistance, before the appearance of Vercingetorix, might be symbolized by Cotuatus and Conconnetodumnus in Chapter 3, desperatis hominibus, as Caesar calls them, who act bravely, but without much forethought. It is just this type of person for whom Critognatus reserves his more serious criticism; he spares few words on those who wish to surrender. Critognatus himself represents a new attitude among the Gauls, one that has been elicited by Vercingetorix, but which is no longer dependent upon him. The Gauls, I think Caesar means here, now know what the stakes are, and are willing to fight for them; it is no longer a one-man show; they have learned to look at war the way the Romans do.

Rasmussen remarks regarding Critognatus' speech: was folgt, ist ein leidenschaftliches Sich-Hineinsteigern in perfekte Unmenschlichkeit, die Caesar nicht gut dem durchaus sympathisch dargestellten
Vercingetorix zumuten konnte, and he quotes with approval Meusel's remark that Vercingetorix himself den Redner veranlasste, mit diesem Gedanken hervorzutreten. That is, Critognatus merely takes the place of Vercingetorix, whom Caesar does not wish to taint with notions of cannibalism. This does not seem a sufficient answer to me; Caesar was under no obligation to mention cannibalism; as I have remarked, it is not the main theme of the speech, and Caesar surely gave himself plenty of latitude in his reporting of what went on at the Gallic councils.
Chapter IV

Word Analyses

In this and the following chapter I have examined Caesar's use of a number of words that seem important in the context of the Bellum Gallicum. The results appear to have some significance, yet it would be difficult to say how conscious Caesar was of attaching to these words the meanings or overtones that emerge with analysis and comparison. Nevertheless, whether it be conscious or unconscious on Caesar's part, this selective and pointed use of certain words is part of his style and a means of creating color.

Virtus

Caesar includes a number of calls to virtus in harangues by himself and other leaders to their men. This is not a very important use for our purpose, although perhaps Caesar occasionally makes the reference significant by having the speech given in battle and showing immediately the troops' reacting to the call; i.e. a sudden call to valour, if it succeeds, is virtually equivalent to praise for it, and I shall treat it as such.

Secondly, Caesar speaks generally of the virtus of various armies or peoples. He does this frequently with the Gauls and the Germans during both narrative and ethnographic sections. In the narrative we find praise of the virtus of these peoples: at I, 31, 7, (by Diviciacus) of the Aedui; at II, 4, 5, of the Bellovaci; at II,
8, 1, of the Belgae; at II, 24, 4, of the Treveri; at VII, 59, 5, of the Bellovaci; at II, 15, 5, of the Nervii; at I, 13, 4, (by Divico) of the Helvetii; at II, 31, 5, of the Aduatuci; at I, 1, 4, of the Helvetii, and similarly at I, 2, 2; and at V, 54, 5, of the ancient Gauls. In the ethnographic sections, we find mention of the virtus of the Germans, at VI, 23, 2; of the Gauls at VI, 14, 5; and a comparison between the Gauls and the Germans at VI, 24, 1, and at VI, 24, 6. The only general reference by Caesar to the virtus of his own troops is at I, 40, 15, where he speaks of the tenth legion, propter virtutem confidebat maxime; however, the situation is abnormal here. There are reasons for Caesar's many references to the virtus of his enemies; through it he can ultimately glorify the Romans, their conquerors; he can heighten the reader's expectations of battle; moreover, Caesar has to bear in mind the reputations of his adversaries; and to plot his strategy accordingly.

Caesar's praise of individuals for their virtus is confined to Romans or their allies: Procillus (I, 47, 4), Commius (IV, 21, 7), Pompey (VII, 6, 1), Volusenus (III, 5, 2)—all cases of rather general praise. Caesar is more specific when he praises Pullo and Vorenus for their virtus (V, 44, 4), after describing their actions in battle.

Caesar speaks of the virtus of the Gauls and Germans far less than that of the Romans during battles. Thus, although he speaks of the virtus of both sides with approximately equal frequency (thirty-four references to Gauls and Germans, thirty-six to Romans and friends), the Roman virtus is something more specific; it is shown in
action and commented upon. Of course it is a fact that Caesar talks more about individual effort among the Romans than among their enemies.

I shall list the cases where Caesar speaks of virtus in battle. For Caesar's enemies the first mention is at II, 27, 3: *at hostes etiam in extrema spe salutis tantam virtutem praestiterunt, ut cum primi eorum cecidissent, proximi iacentibus insisterent atque ex eorum corporibus pugnarent*, and a little later, at II, 27, 5: *ut non nequiquam tantae virtutis homines iudicari debet a transire latissimum flumen, ascendere altissimas ripas, subire inquissimum locum*. Caesar is very explicit in both cases about the grounds for the use of the word. When we reflect that Caesar's army as a whole came nearest to defeat in this battle of all their time in Gaul, it is perhaps not to be wondered at that Caesar gives the Nervii such unstinted praise. At II, 33, 4, the Aduatuci make a desperate sally at night to break out of the Roman fortifications, after having already surrendered: *pugnatumque ab hostibus ita acriter est ut a viris fortibus in extrema spe salutis iniqui loco. . . cum in una virtute omnis spes consistaret*. The Aduatuci are desperate men, the more so for having broken faith with Caesar. In III, 21, 1, when Crassus and his men battle the Sotiates, Caesar remarks: *Sotiates superioribus victoriis freti in sua virtute totius Aquitaniae salutem positam putarent*. However, the battle is not described in detail or at length, and soon, Caesar remarks: *tandem confecti vulneribus hostes terga verterunt*. The zeal of the Sotiates is rhetorically balanced with III, 21, 1: *nostri autem, quid sine*
imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adolescuntulo duce efficere possent, perspicil cuperent. There is no particular praise for the Socrates here, nothing similar to II, 27, 3 and II, 27, 5 quoted above. There are three instances where Caesar speaks of the virtus of the Romans and of their enemies in the same breath. II, 8, 2 is not important: (Caesar) cotidie tamen equestribus proeliis, quid hostis virtute posset et quid nostri auderent, periclitabatur. Here is no praise for either side. In the Sabinus-Ambiorix episode, Caesar reserves his criticism for Sabinus, not for his men; it is not the fault of the soldiers' valour that they are overcome. Caesar says of both sides: erant et virtute et numero pugnandi pares.

\[\text{(V, 34, 2)}\]

At VII, 80, 5 both sides are spurred on by the fact that the fighting is done in the sight of all: utrosque et laudis cupiditas et timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabat. This again is no special praise.

Of Caesar's use of the word when applied to Romans in battle, there are fourteen occurrences, but only four of them refer to fighting done in the presence of Caesar, the other ten refer to incidents where the legati are in command. I shall first mention the cases where Caesar was present.

At II, 27, 2 the reference is not complimentary; Caesar's cavalry is merely trying to make up for its very poor showing earlier in the battle: equites vero, ut turpitudinem fugae virtute delerent. At III, 14, 8 by a device of the Romans the Gauls' ships are immobilized, thus: reliquum erat certamen positum in virtute, qua nostri milites facile superabant, atque eo magis quod in conspectu
Caesaris atque omnis exercitus res gerebatur. Brutus is actually commanding the fleet here, but Caesar makes himself the inspiration of his men. At VII, 50, 1, in the battle of Gergovia, just before the turning point comes with the confusion occasioned by the advance of the Aedui, Caesar remarks: *Cum acerrime comminus pugnaretur, hostes loco et numero, nostri virtute confiderent*, making a neat contrast. The result of the battle is a dismal one for the Romans and Caesar almost certainly in this passage is taking pains to indicate that there is nothing seriously wrong with his army, or its morale. This is perhaps the most important use of *virtus* when applied to the army in Caesar's presence. Finally in this section, again at Gergovia, Caesar remarks at a crucial point in the battle, when the Romans charge on through overconfidence, against his instructions: *nihil adeo arduum sibi existimabant, quod non virtute consequi possent* (VII, 47, 3). Caesar scolds his soldiers here but is emphatic that the defeat was not due to cowardice of his men.

The occurrences of *virtus* where Caesar's *legati* are in command begin with III, 19, 3; the Romans under Sabinus have the upper hand all the way: *factum est opportunitate loci, hostium inscientia ac defatigatione, virtute militum et superiorum pugnarum exercitacione, ut ne primum quidem nostrorum impetum ferrent ac statim terga verterent*. Caesar rather dilutes his praise here. At V, 34, 2, after the Romans have left their camp at Sabinus' urging, Caesar remarks: *nostri tametsi ab duce et a fortuna deserebantur, tamen omnem spem salutis in virtute ponebant, et quotiens quaeque cohors procurreret, ab ea parte magnus numerus hostium cadebat*. The men battle courageously,
but this is not enough, as we see in V, 35, 4: **nec virtuti locus relinquebatur neque a tanta multitudine coniecta tela conferti vitare poterant.** A crisis occurs during the seventh day of the siege of Cicero's camp; much of the camp is set on fire and the enemy advances shouting. Caesar remarks: **at tanta militum virtus atque ea praesentia animi fuit** (V, 43, 4) and goes on to say that despite incredible difficulties no man left his post. After the contest between Pullo and Vorenus, which Caesar uses as a sort of exemplum to reflect upon the conduct in Sabinus' camp a little earlier, he remarks: **neque diiudicari posset, uter utri virtute anteferendus videretur** (V, 44, 14). Through them we have an indication of the morale of Cicero's men in these dark days. At VI, 52, 3 and V, 52, 6 we have remarks by Caesar made not during a battle description, but referring to Cicero's recent battle. At V, 52, 3 we find Caesar marvelling at the state of Cicero's camp and congratulating the men: **ex his omnibus iudicat rebus quanto cum periculo et quanta cum virtute res sint administratae. Ciceronem pro eius merito legionemque conlaudat; centuriones singillatim tribunosque militum appellat, quorum egregiam fuisse virtutem testimonio Ciceronis cognoverat.** At V, 52, 6, referring to the shame of Sabinus' defeat, Caesar says: **quod detrimentum culpa et temeritate legati sit acceptum, hoc aequiore animo ferendum docet, quod beneficio deorum immortalium et virtute eorum expiato incommodo neque hostibus diutina laetitia neque ipsis longior dolor relinquatur.**

Caesar obviously has been greatly concerned by Sabinus' disaster, and endeavours in his description of the siege of Cicero's camp to wipe
away the stain. However, Cicero's men are very much on the defensive, and as we have seen in other cases, Caesar is inclined to invoke *virtus* more often in such situations, as he does when some of Cicero's men are surprised by a sudden attack when out foraging; they fight their way back to the camp: *hos subsecuti equites calonesque eodem impetu militum virtute servantur* (VI, 40, 5). The centurions fight gallantly and: *militum pars horum virtute submotis hostibus praeter spem incolumis in castra pervenit, pars a barbaris circumventa perit* (VI, 40, 8). At VII, 59, 6 we find Labienus in great difficulties, hearing of Caesar's defeat at Gergovia and rumours that he was heading for the Province, also that the Aedui had defected and that the Bellovaci were preparing for war against him. Caesar remarks: *tantis subito difficultatibus objectis ab animi virtute auxilium petendum videbat.*

Apart from fighting Caesar uses *virtus* to give specific praise to his men once, on the voyage to Britain in Book V when the wind failed and the men had to row hard: *qua in re admodum fuit militum virtus laudanda, qui vectoriis gravibus oue navigis non intermisso remigandi labore longarum navium cursum adaequarunt* (V, 8, 4). It can be seen from the above examples that Caesar does not make much use of the term *virtus* to colour his own exploits. On the other hand there is probably a tendency to use *virtus* when the Romans are in difficulties or in desperate situations to dispel any notions the reader might have of cowardice or a lack of morale of the Romans.

The chief remaining use of *virtus* is in exhortations and other speeches, but this is mainly a rhetorical use and unimportant for the
purposes of this investigation.

**Barbarus**

Caesar’s intentions when he uses *barbarus* as an adjective seem obvious enough. First it is used to describe the Germans whom the Sequani brought into Gaul to aid themselves against the Aedui; Diviciacus speaks of them at I, 31, 5: *hominem feri ac barbari*, then the same speaker characterizes their leader, Ariovistus: *hominem. . . barbarum, iracundum, temerarium* (I, 31, 13). Caesar takes up Diviciacus’ words in his reflection on his decision to take issue with Ariovistus, speaking of the Germans as: *hominem feros ac barbaros* (I, 33, 4). Thus, so far *barbarus* is used with words meaning wild, unrestrained, quick to anger, and these words suggest the connotations of *barbarus* in these contexts.

In his speech to his mutinous soldiers, however, Caesar remarks that the Roman army would not be beaten by the tactics used against *barbaros atque imperitos* (I, 40, 9), here referring to the Gauls. This is a different use of the word; previously, *barbarus* has been used in its formidable and frightening sense; here it means primitive, unskilled, etc. It is this meaning that Ariovistus uses so ironically. He charges Caesar with double talk about Roman alliances and friendships, remarking: *non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum ut non sciret. . .* (I, 44, 9). He takes up a word used in one sense by Caesar and uses it in another sense.

The other uses of *barbarus* as an adjective are perhaps less important, nevertheless it may be useful to catalogue its meanings. At IV, 10, 4 Caesar speaks of the tribes on the islands at the mouth of
Rhine:  quorum pars magna a feris barbarisque nationibus incolitur; some of these people are said to live on fish and birds' eggs. Again we see *ferus* in juxtaposition with *barbarus*; also there is a suggestion of primitiveness given by their eating habits. At IV, 22, 1 the Morini excuse their previous hostility to Caesar: *hominės barbari et nostrae consuetudinis imperiti*, *nostrae* here referring to the Romans. Again *imperitus* is used with *barbarus* meaning uncivilized here. In VI, 10, 2 Caesar, speaking of the Suebi, suggests that *barbaros atque imperitos homines* had little means of organizing supplies for their army when in straitened circumstances.

With the exception of VI, 20, 2, V, 27, 4, and VII, 29, 2, whenever Caesar uses the word *imperitus* of foreign peoples, he always uses it in connexion with *barbarus*, i.e. at I, 40, 9, IV, 22, 1, I, 44, 9, IV, 10, 4, and at VI, 10, 2 as noted above. In VI, 20, 2, in an ethnographic section on the Gauls, Caesar says: *saepe homines temerarios atque imperitos falsis rumoribus terreri et ad facinus impelli et de summis rebus consilium capere cognitum est*. This might, from what we have seen above, be a definition of *barbarus*. In VII, 29, 2 Vercingetorix speaks of the Gauls being *imperiti* about siege fighting, in contrast with the Romans, however, the word has no other pejorative connotations. I think that in view of the situation at V, 27, 4, it is natural for the reader to feel that *imperitus*, used here, somehow connotes *barbarus*, but that the latter word has been withheld by Ambiorix. He exults inwardly in his deception and the notion that *barbari* can do this thing is strongly felt by the reader. The irony of this is not put into words, as happens with Ariovistus in I,
77

44, 9 (non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum ut non sciret); Ambiorix says: non adeo sit imperitus rerum, like Ariovistus, referring to his knowledge of Roman politics and power. Ambiorix, in view of his wish to persuade, cannot risk the sarcasm of barbarus; Ariovistus' arrogance would defeat his purpose; the reader can, however, supply the word. The irony is allowed to break into the open only once in this affair, at V, 34, 1. Previous to this Caesar has spoken of the Eburones as hostes, however, when the Romans form a picture of chaos caused by the decision to abandon the baggage, Caesar says emphatically: At barbaris consilium non defuit. Caesar clearly uses barbarus (this time as a noun) ironically here, and makes manifest an irony which is only hinted at in V, 27, 4, as I have suggested. This is the only use of barbarus in Book V, and it is perhaps all the more striking on this account.

The remaining uses of barbarus as a noun are, I think, almost all significant; Caesar does not merely use the word indifferently, as a synonym for hostes, Galli, Belgae, etc.; he usually has some special reason for using it. The word has several different meanings in these cases: it can refer to a people strange and therefore frightening to the Romans, people who plunder and go where the whim takes them, people ignorant of the rules of war, people who can only be kept in check through fear, who lose heart easily and are easily impressed, who can fight fiercely and fanatically. The adjectives Caesar uses with barbarus when this word is used as an adjective also are iracundus, temerarius, ferus, and imperitus. These words are not at odds with the characteristics of barbarus
suggested above.

In II, 35, 1, Caesar, who has abstained from using *barbarus* with reference to the Gauls throughout this book, says: *His rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata tanta huius belli ad barbaros opinio perlata est, uti ab iis nationibus, quae trans Rhenum incoherent, legati ad Caesarem mitterentur, qui se obsides daturas, imperata facturas pollicerentur.* These are strange tribes, far from civilization, moreover, peoples who are strongly impressed by a show of force.

In III, 6, 2, Sabinus tricks a great number of Gauls, and at the turning point of the battle, the gullible natives are called *barbari.* At III, 14, 4, the ships of the maritime tribes are called *barbarae naves,* perhaps because of their extraordinary—to the Romans at least—construction. At III, 15, 2, the enemy in the sea battle lose heart quickly, being unused to hand-to-hand fighting, and flee; here they are called *barbari.* At III, 16, 4, Caesar speaks of the heavy punishment he must mete out to the maritime tribes for having broken faith with his ambassadors, an outrageous crime, he calls them *barbari* here on account of this treachery.

There follow two neutral uses of the word. At III, 23, 2, the natives are alarmed at Crassus' success in a campaign in Aquitania, and become very active in instituting some coherent defense against him. *Tum vero barbari,* Caesar remarks. At IV, 17, 10, Caesar strengthens the bridge he is building across the Rhine against any boats or tree trunks that the *barbari* might send against it.

In IV, 21, 9, Volusenus on a scouting expedition does not disembark: *qui navi egredi ac se barbaris committere non auderet;*
the Britons are strange, hence dangerous, here, and Caesar notes this with the word barbarus. Similarly, as the Roman fleet tries to land at IV, 24, 1, the enemy appear with chariots, to which the Roman soldiers are unaccustomed. Caesar here calls them barbari, and immediately after this we find the Romans in great difficulties, even perterriti (IV, 24, 4). At IV, 25, 2, the Britons are called barbari again, but this time probably because of their fear at the unaccustomed sight of Caesar's warships: nam et navium figura et remorum motu et inusitato genere tormentorum permoti barbari constiterunt. This is the imperitus aspect of barbarus. At IV, 32, 2, the Britons have ambushed some of Caesar's foragers with cavalry and chariots. This happens after Caesar has received a setback due to a sudden loss of ships; the Britons, who had previous to this come to an agreement with Caesar, now break their word and treacherously renew the battle, hence, perhaps, Caesar calls them barbari.

Caesar, at IV, 34, 1, is still musing upon the unusual conditions of fighting in Britain, quibus rebus perturbatis nostris novitate pugnae, and remarks that during the storm, interim barbari nuntios in omnes partes dimiserunt...quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui liberandi facultas dareetur, si Romanos castris expulissent, demonstraverunt (IV, 34, 5). The menacing nature of the enemy, their easy confidence, the hope of booty, are characteristic of barbari. In VI, 29, 2, Caesar retreating from Germany, decides to leave a garrison in a tower and to remove only part of the bridge across the Rhine so that the Suebi would be apprehensive of his return, feeling that something must remain there to impress more
permanently such a reckless and dangerous people, for whom, apparently, an enemy out of sight is an enemy out of mind: *ne omnino metum reditus sui barbaris tolleret.*

In Book VI Caesar is chiefly concerned with finding and destroying Ambiorix; in his cogitations about his troops’ safety in devastating the land of the Eburones, Caesar says: *locus erat ipse praesidio barbaris, neque ex occulto insidiandi et dispersos circumveniendi singulis deerrat audacia* (VI, 34, 6). It is the *ferus* and *temerarius* aspect of *barbarus* that Caesar has in mind here, I think. He uses this strong word here partly because he feels obliged to excuse his refusal to allow him men to do the job and wishes to show emphatically the great dangers they would face.

In VI, 35, 6; 37, 7; 37, 9; 39, 4; 40, 8; and 42, 2, where Caesar refers to *barbari*, he does so, I think, to emphasize the fact that Cicero’s camp was attacked not only fortuitously and suddenly, but by a rabble who had come into the area for plunder. They are fierce, disorganized, and impetuous, and, as Caesar remarks in VI, 42, 2, just as *fortuna* had brought them so suddenly, so she turned them away, *ab ipso vallo portisque castrorum*.

It seems from the above that Caesar is generally striving for some effect when he uses *barbarus*; also, this notion is strengthened by the fact that the word does not appear in the strictly ethnographic sections.

*Cupiditas, Cupidus, Cupio*

These words when applied to Caesar’s enemies are almost always attached to an object fundamentally different from their object when
applied to the Romans. In I, 18, 3, Caesar finds out from Liscus that Dumnorix is *cupidum rerum novarum*. At V, 6, 1, Caesar speaking again about Dumnorix, repeats this phrase and adds that he was also *cupidum imperii*. In VI, 35, 6, Caesar mentions as an aside that the *barbari* are very desirous of cattle, *pecoris*. . . *cuius sunt cupidissimi*. In I, 18, 8, we find that Dumnorix *fave re et cupere Helvetiis propter eam adfinitatem*. In I, 40, 2, in a speech to his mutinous men, Caesar says that Ariovistus *se consule cupidissime populi Romani amicitiam adpetisse*. All these references except the one in Book VI are political and concerned with individuals.

Finally, we hear in I, 2, 4, that the Helvetii are *bellandi cupid i*. Caesar here is beginning a polemic against this people and he later elaborates this description into a desire for conquest of Gallic and Roman possessions. The phrase is not meant as praise; it means that this is a warlike, dangerous people, troublemakers by nature.

In no instance does Caesar use any of the above words of desiring with approval. At VII, 80, 5, he makes *cupiditas* refer to both the Gauls and the Romans as they battle in the sight of all: *utrosque et laudis cupiditas et timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabat*. This is the only time, however, apart from the rather different *bellandi cupiditas* previously mentioned, where this group of words applies to Gallic battle morale.

It is a wholly different case with the Romans. Here every single occurrence of these words refers to his men's morale, although occasionally, Caesar speaks with disapproval where the men let their eagerness to do well in battle overcome their prudence. This, of
course, is far from being the most reprehensible of faults. In I, 41, 1, after Caesar's successful speech to his mutinous men, he says: *hac oratione habita mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes summaque alacritas et cupiditas belli gerendi injecta est.* The *belli gerendi* is not something vague like *bellandi* referring to the Helvetii at I, 2, 4, but eagerness for a specific war, against Ariovistus. It is noteworthy that Caesar uses *cupiditas* at such an important place in his narrative where his authority is asserted and the morale of his men regained after a crisis of confidence.

In the battle of the Sambre, after Caesar has taken up a shield at a highly critical moment, he is able to encourage the men and to restore their battle formation; he remarks: *cuius adventu spe inlata militibus ac redintegrato animo, cum pro se quisque in conspectu imperatoris etiam extremis suis rebus operam navare cuperet* (II, 25, 3). Here Caesar proudly links his own presence with a wonderful re-invigoration of spirit among his men.

In III, 19, 2, Sabinus, after tricking the much larger enemy force into advancing to a disadvantageous position, at last gives his men the signal to fight: *Sabinus suos hortatus cupientibus signum dat.* In the battle with the Sotiates, both sides are eager, the Romans because *quid sine imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adulescentulo duce efficere possent, perspici cuperent* (III, 21, 1). This is fine praise and redounds especially to the esteem in which the men held Crassus. In III, 24, 5, Crassus' men are very eager on account of the deliberate inactivity of the enemy, so he *cohortatus suos omnibus duplentibus ad hostium castra contendit.* At VII, 40, 4,
Caesar makes his very strenuous march from Gergovia after the defection Aedui: 

\[\textit{adhortatus milites ne necessario tempore itineris \ labore permoveantur, cupidissimis omnibus progressus milia passuum XXV. . .} \]

Once again the eagerness of the men is mentioned immediately following an exhortation.

The other occurrences of these words applied to the Romans denote over-eagerness on the part of the soldiers; in the case of Vorenus (V, 44, 12), with no particular disapproval attached, the examples at I, 15, 2, of the Roman cavalry attacking the Helvetian rearguard too eagerly, on unfavourable ground, and at V, 15, 2, of the cavalry again pursuing the Britons too far, are not especially important and Caesar attaches no particular blame here. At VII, 50, 4, however, we find the centurion Petronius blaming himself to his men: 

\[\textit{vestrae quidem certe vitae prospicium, quos cupiditate \ et gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi.} \]

Caesar has made a point of exculpating himself as much as possible for the defeat at Gergovia, and he is doing it dramatically in this episode. Finally, at VII, 52, 1: 

\[\textit{Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem militum \ cupiditatemque reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent, quo pro- \ cedendum aut quid agendum videretur.} \]

But Caesar is not criticizing their \textit{cupiditas} as such, merely the soldiers' action of allowing it to overcome their judgment and discipline; we see this later in the same speech. The commander is to a large extent responsible for his men's morale and as this is a quality rarely lacking in Caesar's army, according to his account, Caesar is able indirectly to give himself a great deal of credit; however, he does not claim it all.
for himself, as the passage about Crassus cited above indicates.
The fact that these words occur frequently after an exhortation, as I remarked above, also links morale even more closely to the commander.

**Conclamo**

It is perhaps significant that Caesar does not use this word with respect to his own men in the *B.G.* This is not so in the *B.C.* where Caesar uses it technically in connexion with both sides to indicate striking camp and, more importantly, the only other uses of it occur at 1, 69, 4, where Afranius' men realize that they will have to tackle Caesar and run to arms, and in two scenes where Caesar's own army shows its loyalty to him (1, 7, 7 and 3, 6, 2) in both cases after a speech by Caesar.

In the *B.G.*, on the other hand, I suspect that Caesar uses *conclamo* only in connexion with Gauls and Germans with a reason: i.e. to point up a certain conception of their character. The word, it should be stressed, is only used at highly dramatic moments; it seems that Caesar holds it back to gain special effects from it. It is used to suggest over-optimism in the Gauls, both at III, 18, 5, when Sabinus has tricked the Gauls by sending among them a deserter bringing false information as to Sabinus' confidence and intentions. The Gauls shout with excitement, and prepare their ill-fated attack. Again, before the battle at Dijon (VII, 66, 7), Vercingetorix' men shout an elaborate oath that each man shall twice ride through the Roman column; they are drastically defeated, however. *Conclamo* is used in connexion with panic at VII, 26, 4 when
the women of Avaricum, seeing their menfolk try to escape alone, cry out to the Romans and thus prevent this from happening. At VII, 70, 6 there is great confusion among the enemy: *non minus qui intra munitiones erant perturbantur. Galli veniri ad se confestim existimantes ad arma conclamant; nonnulli perterritori in oppidum inrumpunt.*

The word is used in connexion with a false sense of security, similar to the over-optimism mentioned above. We find it in Book VII, 21, 1 after a highly dramatic speech by Vercingetorix, in which the most striking and perhaps persuasive part of the argument comes from the use of false witness to indicate the desperate state of Caesar's army over food, the weakness of the men, and Caesar's intention of withdrawing after three days. Yet Avaricum falls to Caesar.

In the similar speech made by Litaviccus, we find that immediately after he has used false witness to report Roman treachery: *conclamant Haedui et Litaviccum obsecrant, ut sibi consulat* (VII, 38, 6). It is a highly dramatic moment, not of overconfidence, but certainly of delusion and some momentary panic. Caesar has worked very hard to maintain the Aeduan alliance, but their folly drives them to break it off.

In Book I, we have the only case of *conclamo* being applied to one person, Ariovistus, who, after Caesar has sent envoys to patch up the differences between the two leaders, *conclamavit: quid ad se venirent? an speculandi causa? conantes dicere prohibuit et in catenas coniecit* (I, 47, 6). This is the final and perhaps most
unwarranted example of Ariovistus' arrogance, and it is emphasized by the way he deliberately heightens his voice, pretending affront as he adds insult to injury before his disastrous battle with Caesar. It may be objected that Caesar's use of *conclamo* here is brought about by a desire for alliteration, which is used to emphasize Ariovistus' violent headstrong nature. Nevertheless, I doubt if we can entirely rule out other reasons.

Finally, two instances of the use of the word occur in Book V, in connexion with the Sabinus disaster, an episode which I feel brings forth many special effects from Caesar's pen. Ambiorix outwits the Romans and Caesar makes Sabinus' willingness to negotiate all the more astonishing as he describes the enemy after their brief initial attack has failed: *tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad conloquium prodiret...* (V, 26, 4). With *suo more* Caesar emphasizes the foreignness of these Gauls. Their change of attitude and sudden shouting would, moreover, instantly make for suspicion, one would think. Later at the climax of the ensuing battle, Sabinus is tricked once more and killed: *tum vero suo more victoriam conclamant atque ululatum tollunt...* (V, 37, 3). Again, the strangeness of this people is indicated by *suo more*, and also *ululatum*. The appearance of *tum suo more* with *conclamo* near the beginning and near the end of the episode, thus framing it, is perhaps not fortuitous. These shouts strike deeply at Caesar's pride, and he will spend most of the following year in an endeavour to wipe away the stain. Here, as elsewhere in these examples, the excitability of the Gauls is readily apparent, and, in general, it
is perhaps their unreflecting nature, their credulity and tendency to be carried away by the fears or hopes of the moment that are suggested by *conclamo*.

**Difficultas**

In the *B.G.* Caesar uses *difficultas* thirteen times, always with reference to the Romans. With the exception of one occurrence, moreover, the difficulty always faces Caesar or the army with Caesar. Naturally, other words can be used to indicate problems facing Caesar or his enemies, but this does not necessarily mean that they have equal significance with *difficultas* as Caesar uses it. Caesar cannot praise himself directly in his own work; this would show bad taste, nevertheless, he can indicate the difficulties he is faced with from time to time and then, in showing how he overcomes them, he can persuade the reader to admire his generalship, or judgment, or pluck, etc. Caesar can praise his own deputies or his enemies, of course, and hence in their cases there is less need to set down beforehand the problems they must overcome, he can mention these or imply them in whatever praise he bestows after the action has been performed.

Generally speaking, *difficultas* is used three ways: (A) to indicate a choice that faces Caesar, usually between a more and a less glorious course of action, (B) to indicate that Caesar is faced with difficulties although there is no question of backing out on his part, and (C) to provide an excuse for Caesar's having failed in some enterprise or not having attempted it. There are four examples in the last category. At VI, 34, 7, Caesar excuses himself for bringing in outsiders to devastate the land of the Eburones, taking care to note
that his men were nevertheless eager to do the job: ut in eismodi
difficultatibus quantum diligentia provideri poterat providebatur,
ut potius in nocendo aliquid praetermitteretur, etsi omnium animi
ad ulciscendum ardebant, quam cum aliquo militum detrimento
neceretur. Caesar is obviously a little shamefaced about not doing
the job himself. The word is used in the course of explaining the
very critical situation when Caesar's fleet began to disembark in
Britain and the Romans found themselves perterriti. Caesar remarks:
erat ob has causas summa difficultas, quod naves propter magnitudinem
nisi in alto constitui non poterant, militibus autem ignotis locis,
impeditis manibus, magno et gravi onere armorum pressis simul et de
navibus desiliendum et in fluctibus consistendum et cum hostibus erat
pugnandum... (IV, 24, 2). It is not until the standard bearer
calls to the men that the fortunes of battle change.

In Labienus' expedition in the north in Book VII, events sud-
denly take a turn for the worse; he hears of Caesar's withdrawal
from Gergovia, the revolt of the Aedui, the general revolt in Gaul.
The Gauls tell him that Caesar is heading for the Province; moreover,
the Bellovaci are arming against him. Labienus decides to retreat,
but, as we have seen, with ample reason: tantis subito difficultati-
bus objectis ab animi virtute auxilium petendum videbat (VII, 59,
6). Caesar explains his lack of early success against the maritime
states in Book III, 12, 5: nostrae naves tempestatibus detinebantur
summaque erat vasto atque aperto mari, magnis aestibus, raris ac
prope nullis portibus difficultas navigandi.
Of the uses in category B, we find an excellent example in the description of the battle at the Sambre, where the enemy take Caesar's men by surprise and so find them in confusion. The Romans are attending to setting up camp and hence are not in battle lines. Caesar, however, in the course of describing these disadvantages, is able to illustrate the discipline of his men and his own foresight:

His difficultatibus duae res erant subsidio, scientia atque usus militum...et quod ab opere singulisque legionibus singulos legatos Caesar discedere nisi munitis castris vetuerat (II, 20, 3). In Book VII, Caesar is confronted with the flooded Elaver and enemy forces on the other bank. He remarks: erat in magnis Caesaris difficultatibus res...quod non fere ante autumnum Elaver vado transiri solet (VII, 35, 1). Caesar then triumphantly tricks Vercingetorix, builds a bridge, celeriter effecto opere (VII, 35, 5); the tables are turned and Vercingetorix retreats quickly.

Perhaps the most important and typical category is A, where Caesar's willingness to take a chance and his self-confidence are so evident. Before the campaign against the maritime states Caesar remarks: Erant hae difficultates belli gerendi, quas supra ostendimus, sed multa tamen Caesarem ad id bellum incitabant (III, 10, 1), i.e. considerations of honour and prudence, and so Caesar went to war. Similarly in IV, 17, 2, concerning the crossing of the Rhine: itaque etsi summa difficultas faciundi pontis proponebatur...tamen id sibi contendendum aut aliter non traducendum exercitum existimabat. He says before this that it was hardly safe and unworthy of Rome's dignity to cross by boat. Near the beginning of Book VII, Caesar is
faced with the choice of summoning his army to the Province or of going to it: magna difficultate adficiebatur, qua ratione ad exercitum pervenire posset (VII, 6, 2). Caesar chooses the personally more hazardous but better course. After Caesar has reached his army, Vercingetorix sets off to assault Gorgobina, putting Caesar immediately into another dilemma: magnum haec res Caesari difficultatem ad consilium capiendum adferebat (VII, 10, 1). Caesar outlines the alternatives of inactivity and action with uncertainty of supplies and says: praestare visum est tamen omnes difficultates perpeti quam tanta contumelia accepta omnium suorum voluntates alienare (VII, 10, 2). As usual he emphasizes the difficultas, using magna; also, the word contumelia is very apt. Caesar does not wish to appear to be letting down any of his allies or dependents. The difficulties mentioned in these last two examples loom large as Vercingetorix inaugurates his scorched earth policy: summa difficultate rei frumentariae affecto exercitu (VII, 17, 3). This leads up to Caesar's grateful and proud account of his men's loyalty: nulla tamen ex iis vox est audita populi Romani maiestate et superioribus victoriis indigna (VII, 17, 3). Caesar offers to his men to raise the siege, but despite their hardships, they plead to go on. Here it is the men who make the decision, but Caesar is more pleased with this than if he had made it himself for them; their morale is a testimony to his leadership. The remaining occurrence of difficultas at VII, 56, 2, is not important.

There is not a great deal in common between Caesar's use of difficultas in the B.C. and in the B.G.. It is used four times in the
former. At 1, 70, 1, Caesar's army is delayed by difficulties of the route as it marches, but this is not important and is not dwelt upon. At 3, 15, 3, and 3, 15, 5, we find treatment of difficulitas rather similar to that of the B.G., except for the very important difference that it refers to enemies of Caesar, Bibulus and his men, who go on to overcome their troubles with distinction. The remaining use at 3, 20, 3, is not important. This comparison seems to indicate that Caesar was conscious in the B.G. of using the word with a special purpose, and did not dissipate its significance by using it elsewhere. This purpose of widely proclaiming his achievements is less important for him in the B.C., hence perhaps his less frequent and less discriminating use of difficulitas.

**Diligentia, Diligenter**

Caesar uses diligentia thirteen times and diligenter nine times in the B.G.; diligentia refers to the Romans eight times. In one of these cases it is used negatively, when Cicero has failed to observe Caesar's orders properly: *qui omnes superiores dies praeparit Caesaris summa diligentia militae in castris continuisset* (VI, 36, 1). He uses diligenter of the Romans five times, all positive examples.

We find diligentia applied to Crassus (III, 20, 1), to Crassus' men, their siege operations overcoming even experienced miners like the Sotiates (III, 21, 3), to Labienus at V, 58, 1, and to Caesar at I, 40, 4, at VI, 34, 3, at VI, 34, 7 and at VII, 32, 5. Diligenter is used when Cicero exhorts men to take a dispatch to Caesar (V, 49, 3), in reference to Labienus' men at VII, 60, 1, to Caesar at II, 28, 3, and finally at III, 16, 4 apparently to the Gauls—although ef-
fectively the word is concerned with Caesar's administration; Caesar orders strict punishments for the maritime states, *quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a barbaris ius legatorum conservaretur*. Possibly the most significant use of the word as it applies to the Romans is that mentioned above at I, 40, 4, where Caesar, addressing his mutinous soldiers, asks: *cur de sua virtute aut de ipsius diligentia desperarent*. Here *diligentia* refers to Caesar's care for his men and general prosecution of the war. Indeed, the uses of the two words under consideration are generally in line with this meaning.

Of Caesar's allies among the Gauls, the Allobroges are praised once for their *diligentia* for guarding their frontier against incursions at VII, 65, 3, and *diligenter* is applied twice to the Remi at II, 5, 1, and at VI, 12, 8—both unimportant examples. The words are applied to the Gauls in ethnographic sections: *diligentia* at VI, 14, 4, and *diligenter* at VI, 13, 12, both terms referring to Druidic education. *Diligentia* is applied negatively to the Gauls at III, 25, 2: *non eadem esse diligentia ab decumana porta castra munita*. A similarly negative use of *diligenter* occurs at III, 18, 6, where the Gauls have decided to attack Sabinus, partly on account of their own lack of provisions: *inopia cibariorum, cui rei parum diligenter ab iis erat provisum*.

Apart from the ethnographic sections these words are not used positively of those Gauls who are Caesar's enemies except at V, 35, 1, at VII, 4, 9, and at VII, 29, 6. The latter two instances refer to Vercingetorix: VII, 4, 9, where Caesar notes that he had used *summa diligentia* in the matter of recruiting a Gallic army, and VII,
29, 6, where Vercingetorix promises to win over the Gallic peoples who did not support the cause: *quaे ab reliquis Gallis civitates dissentirent, has sua diligentia adiuncturum atque unum consilium totius Galliae effecturum.* I have suggested elsewhere that Vercingetorix is quite exceptional among the enemy leaders, partly due to the fact that his ideas of fighting a war and maintaining discipline are much closer to those of a Roman general. This notion is in harmony with Caesar's use of *diligentia* here.

The remaining example at V, 35, 1 refers to Ambiorix' men as they attack Sabinus' camp; Ambiorix, noting the Romans making desperate charges and desiring to wear them out and drive them to hopelessness with a minimum loss to his own side, orders his men to give way when the Romans charge and then to close in as they retreat back to the main force: *quo praecepto ab iis diligentissimè observato.* Caesar uses the superlative for emphasis, and it seems possible that once again in this Ambiorix-Sabinus episode, Caesar is using irony to highlight the incompetence of Sabinus by praise of the enemy on just that point—discipline—where the Gauls have been continually weak. There is an ironic reversal of roles suggested here, and Caesar, perhaps unconsciously, breaks the pattern of usage of these words to suit the extraordinary situation.

**Studium**

This word is used occasionally in the *B.G.* in a bad sense. Vercingetorix, defending his actions in a speech to his men, explains why he did not depute the leadership while away: *ne is multitudinis*
studio ad dimicandum impelleretur (VII, 20, 5). He remarks that this studium has come from a mollities animi. In Book III Gallic riff-raff gather against Sabinus: quos spes praedandi studiumque bellandi ab agri cultura et cotidiano labore revocabat (III, 17, 4). The juxtaposition with spes praedandi suggests that the studium is no very noble passion, and the phrase is echoed in VII, 45, 8, when Caesar cautions his men before the attack on Gergovia: ne studio pugnandi aut spe praedae longius progrediantur. Studium is used with a negative at VII, 17, 2, where the Aeduans are not eager to help in the matter of supplying grain to the Romans: quod nullo studio agebant. As the Romans attempt to disembark on Caesar's first journey to Britain, Caesar remarks: non eadem alacritate ac studio, quo in pedestribus uti proeliiis consuerant, utebantur (IV, 24, 4).

There are two general references to the warlike nature of the Germans in the ethnographic sections: at VI, 22, 3, and at VI, 21, 3. It is only with the Romans and their allies that we find studium used in unqualified praise of zeal for fighting in connexion with some definite event; moreover, it is only here also that we find laudatory adjectives used with it. At I, 46, 4, after Caesar's parley with Ariovistus has been forcibly interrupted, he indicates the enthusiasm of his men resulting from this: multo maior alacritas studiumque pugnandi maius exercitui iniectum est. The importance of this remark is increased when we realize that shortly before Caesar's men had been in a mutinous frame of mind. In Book II, Caesar sends archers and slingers to help the Remi: quorum adventu et Remis cum
spe defensionis studium propugnandi accessit (II, 7, 2). In Book VI Caesar's men show wonderful spirit in their attempt to track down Ambiorix: paene naturam studio vincerent (VI, 43, 5). Caesar praises the men after swift repairs to the ships in Britain: itaque, cum summo studio a militibus administraretur (IV, 31, 3). Similarly, he shows his pride in the great effort of shipbuilding in 54 B.C.: singulari militum studio in summa rerum omnium inopia (V, 2, 2).

At VI, 9, 4, Caesar, building a bridge across the Rhine, says: nota atque instituta ratione magno militum studio paucis diebus opus efficitur. In Book VII Caesar, by dint of a great effort on the part of his troops, is able to leave Gergovia to deal with the recalcitrant Aedui and return in a remarkably short time: Caesar summo studio militum ante ortum solis in castra pervenit (VII, 41, 5).

In all these cases Caesar is able to comment upon the morale of his men and thus, as with his use of difficultas, indirectly to praise himself. An aspect of generalship, that of inspiring men to great efforts, is alluded to by Caesar's references to studium. It is interesting that the word is never used in connexion with Caesar's legati. This would correspond with the use of difficultas, but probably the numbers are too small to be conclusive.

Audacia, Audacter

Audacia, which occurs three times in the B.G., is applied only to Gauls; audacter occurs seven times, only once referring to Romans. Audacia is twice used to characterize individuals, one of whom is Dumnorix: summa audacia, magna apud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia, cupidum rerum novarum (I, 18, 3). It is not a complimentary
description, and Caesar seems to imply impudence and boldness.

This, however, is not quite the meaning of the word when applied to Vercingetorix' agent Lucterius at VII, 5, 1: *Lucterium Cadurcum, summae hominem audaciae. . .mittit*. Here the word seems to mean something like enterprise and daring. The meaning applied to Dumnorix above seems close to that at VI, 34, 6: *locus erat ipse praesidio barbaris, neque ex occulto insidiandi et dispersos circumveniendi singulis deerat audacia*.

Most of the cases of *audacter* occur in descriptions of battle. The British natives fight *audacter* at both V, 15, 4 and IV, 24, 3, having the advantage over the Romans from knowledge of the terrain and Roman immobility, or from the strangeness of their fighting methods. At I, 15, 3 the Helvetii are heartened by a cavalry victory against greater odds; at VII, 1, 3 the revolt of the Gauls is heartened when Caesar is detained in Italy: *hac impulsio occasione, qui iam ante se populi Romani imperio subiectos dolerent, liberius atque audacius de bello consilia inire incipient*. At II, 10, 3, when the Belgae cross the river Aisne and attack the Romans on the other side, many fall. Others, passing over the fallen bodies, are driven back by the Romans: *per eorum corpora reliquos audacissime transire conantes multitudine telorum repulerunt*. Here the Belgae seem fanatical. *Audacia* and *audacter* appear, in the examples under consideration, to give only qualified praise; the Gauls fight well because of some advantage they have or because they have been encouraged by some turn in the battle. These words do not suggest a cool, disciplined courage, and perhaps for this reason, Caesar applies them
preponderantly to his enemies. The use of *audacius* in I, 18, 2, when Caesar questions Liscus, who *dicit liberius atque audacius*, is not important. The one reference of the words to the Romans occurs, strangely enough, in the battle of the Sambre, when Caesar has instructed the tribunes to get the seventh legion into some sort of order: *quo facto cum alius alii subsidium ferret neque tmerent ne aversi ab hoste circumvenirentur, audacius resistere ac fortius pugnare coeperunt* (II, 26, 2). There is nothing blind or reckless about the confidence shown by the Romans here.

**Libertas, Liber, Libero, Servitus**

*Libertas*, whatever its rights or wrongs, is recognized by Caesar as an idea of great power, capable of driving men to hardships and risk of life to gain it. References to it appear especially when men or states group together in *coniurationes*, making a combined, and therefore more dangerous, front.

Caesar's favourite method of campaigning was to win over as many of the potential opposition as possible to his own side, thus reducing and dividing his enemies. He could do this by granting favours to certain of the tribes who helped him, so that in the material, and even in other senses, it would be to their disadvantage to oppose him.

When Caesar overcame an enemy tribe, it was his custom to demand hostages in order to keep the tribe obedient to him. By no means did this policy always work. Caesar took eight years to pacify Gaul; almost every year tribes that had been overcome revolted
from Rome, thus seeming to call in doubt the worth of Caesar's previous efforts. The main inducement for these tribes to revolt, or to desert after they had formed some sort of alliance with Caesar, is called the desire for libertas. Caesar paints this desire as something incalculable, something which will override all other considerations—e.g. of comfort, safety, honour, or alliances. Much of this is no doubt true, yet Caesar emphasizes this notion for particular reasons, in order that his policies should not look too foolish. The more we find Caesar insisting upon the Gallic love of libertas, the greater we find his failure in pacifying the land.

Also, of course, libertas is used for dramatization, especially in the speeches; it brings in another factor to the drama, the oppressed peoples seeking to escape from servitus. As I have remarked above, in the political sense, Caesar allows the Gauls no justification—they have become subjects of Rome by the ius belli, a point which arose from the speeches of Caesar and of Ariovistus in Book I (see especially I, 45, 3). In the dramatic sense, however, we find another justice at work in the battle between oppressor and oppressed. This is not to make the reader actually sympathize with the Gauls, but to bring excitement. Men are motivated by a powerful passion, and this at times can help give the Gauls a purpose and a discipline nearly equal to that of the Romans, in effect, making worthy antagonists of them.

Within this framework, we find a number of rather different attitudes to libertas on the part of various people, and a consequent characterization of these people, of their aims and attitudes.
The word first appears in connexion with Dumnorix, as Caesar conjectures after Liscus has made a veiled reference to an opposing party who are saying: *neque dubitare debant, quin si Helvetios supersaverint, Romani una cum reliqua Gallia Haeduis libertatem sint erepturi* (I, 17, 4). It has been made clear that Dumnorix is very ambitious and is plotting with the Helvetii against the Romans, and, as Caesar would suggest, against the interests of the Aeduan people. The remark about *libertas* appears thus as malicious propaganda, a mere slogan for special interests.

I think that it is with this background that we must view later references of the Aeduans to *libertas* or to similar words. In Book V Dumnorix is made to look absurd as he tries any ruse to avoid going to Britain with Caesar. He makes trouble for Caesar by trying to persuade other Gallic chiefs to do the same, by spreading lies about Caesar's intentions. Caesar notes his ambition: *cupidum rerum novarum, cupidum imperii, magni animi* (V, 6, 1). When, after escaping, Dumnorix is caught, he cries: *liberum se liberaeque esse civitatis* (V, 7, 8). This, of course, is a highly dramatic incident, and Caesar may well intend to gain pathos by the cry; the order, however, in which the ideas occur—i.e. *liberum se* first—tends to suggest that Dumnorix is interested firstly in himself, even when he is trying to cloak his selfish, capricious aims in a high-sounding name. Finally, we see in the seventh book the whole of the Aeduan people caught up in a dilemma, whether to side with Caesar or with the Gauls. We find Convictolitavis borrowing expressions from Vercingetorix: *hortaturque ut se liberos et*
imperio natos meminerint (VII, 37, 2), and esse nonnullo se Caesaris beneficio adfectum. . .sed plus communi libertati tribuere (VII, 37, 4). As we shall see later, Vercingetorix speaks of the imperium the Gauls can win; he also makes frequent use of the phrase communis libertas. Vercingetorix' view is, however, altogether a nobler one than that of Convictolitavis. The latter, when he says imperium means that of the Aedui over the other states of Gaul, which at once tends to modify the libertas he speaks of; it is a libertas which gives full rein to the Aedui to replace the Roman hegemony with their own. However Convictolitavis avoids making this explicit, thus he pays lip service to communis libertas, pretending to have the general good of Gaul at heart, and to have been swayed by such a noble consideration. Support comes for this interpretation from the reaction of the Aedui when Vercingetorix is confirmed as leader of the resistance movement over their own candidates (VII, 63). Caesar remarks: magno dolore Haedui ferunt se deiectos principatu, queruntur fortunae commutationem et Caesaris in se indulgentiam requirunt (VII, 63, 8). They seem to lose interest in libertas immediately upon receiving the setback.

In Book III Caesar makes reference to Gallic libertas and dwells upon it at greater length than in Book I (I, 17, 4 quoted above). I think, moreover, that his attitude to it is different here. At first it is a call for help among the maritime tribes to those states that had not already pledged themselves to act: reliquasque civitates sollicitant, ut in ea libertate, quam a maioribus acceperint, permanere quam Romanorum servitutem perferre malint (III, 8, 4).
Libertas here is a rallying cry made, Caesar suggests, on the spur of the moment; a little before this he remarks: ut sunt Gallorum subita et repentina consilia (III, 8, 3). In addition, the Gauls have been astray in their judgment, expecting Caesar to come to terms after they had imprisoned some of his men. It is interesting to note that in the following chapter Caesar is highly indignant at what he calls the facinus of the Gauls: legatos, quod nomen apud omnes nationes sanctum inviolatumque semper fuisset, retentos ab se et in vincula coniectos (III, 9, 3). The Gallic subjection, the desire of the Gauls for libertas have no bearing upon this, it seems. This is quite in line with the inference I have suggested from Caesar's remarks about ius belli to Ariovistus, and from Ariovistus' own remarks. I do not believe that Caesar wishes to give libertas a pejorative connotation here—despite his railings about the ambassadors—for in the next chapter, we find an apparently quite objective generalization on the subject: omnes autem homines natura libertatis studio incitari et condicionem servitutis odisse (III, 10, 3). This is stated merely as one of the reasons why Caesar should move quickly to put down the maritime revolt. There is very little in the way of emotional overtone going with libertas here. Caesar treats it almost as one of the passions, and he sets it down beside two remarks on the character of the Gauls: omnes fere Gallos novis rebus studere et ad bellum mobiliter celeriterque excitari (III, 10, 3). The fact that it is natural to expect men to fight for libertas underlies the next important use of the word, in Book V, where Ambiorix makes his hypocritical speech to the envoys from
Sabinus' camp. The power of *libertas* in cementing the Gallic conspiracy is invoked and lends credence to the opposition that Ambiorix claims to exist between his own attitude to the Romans and that of the other Gauls. Sabinus acts wrongly, of course, Caesar makes this plain; but his readiness to believe that the Gauls have made a combined front is an indication of the Roman respect for the power of *libertas* to stir men to concerted action.

Up to the beginning of Book VII, references to *libertas* are sporadic and comparatively few. I feel that Caesar has been holding the word in reserve, that he connects it with organized resistance, and this is a thing that did not really get under way until Book VII. The first mention in this book comes at a highly significant point in the narration, where Gallic chieftains gather and complain of the death of Acco (VII, 1, 4-6). Acco had been executed by Caesar at the end of the previous year for having, some months earlier, been the leader in a plot of several states to defy the Romans. Rice Holmes remarks: *The death of Acco was keenly discussed. The formality of his execution seemed a sign that Caesar intended to make Gaul a Roman province.* It seemed to the Gauls that Caesar's attitude was hardening, and Caesar makes this a very important cause of the conspiracy that soon arose. At VII, 1, 5, the Gallic chiefs mentioned above: *omnibus pollicitationibus ac praemis deposcunt qui belli initium faciant et sui capitis periculo Galliam in libertatem vindicent.* In VII, 1, 8 again they emphasize that risks must be taken and are worth taking for *libertas*: *postremo in acie praestare interfici, quam non veterem belli gloriam libertatemque quam*
maioribus acceperint recuperare. It is better to die than not to seek freedom. This attitude appears to be a rather different one from that mentioned above in Book III, where the maritime tribes opposed Caesar without a great deal of foresight, where libertas was merely a battle cry, i.e. it was not specifically linked with risks, self-discipline, high ideals, etc. Here at VII, 1, 8 libertas is connected with veterem belli gloriam.

In VII, 4, 4 Vercingetorix, so important a character in this book, speaks of communis libertas. This is the first use of this phrase in the B.G., apart from Ambiorix' bold invention, and it is very characteristic of Vercingetorix' ideas. He is painted as a sincere anti-colonialist with no special interests to uphold; he has foresight and great determination, and it is indeed the freedom of the whole people that he seeks. In keeping with this, he makes a successful and determined effort to unite all the Gauls. In VII, 64, 3 he calls for sacrifice, i.e. a scorched earth policy, for the sake of perpetuum imperium libertatemque. I think the perpetuum is significant here, naturally the libertas is to be thought of as perpetua also, and this notion is underlined in VII, 66, 4 where Vercingetorix claims that the Gauls would only have a short respite if they allowed Caesar out of the country: id sibi ad praesentem obtinendum libertatem satis esse. In VII, 71, 3 Vercingetorix speaks of himself to the Gallic envoys, whom he is sending out to gather reinforcements, as optime de communi libertate meritum, thus tending to identify himself with this communis libertas. A little later, in describing this drive for reinforcements, Caesar says of Commius' defection from the Roman cause: tanta tamen universae
Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recuperandae, ut neque beneficis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur omnesque et animo et opibus in id bellum incumberent (VII, 76, 2). This is an apology by Caesar for the failure of his policy, the opposition of Caesar's kindesses and libertas is familiar from Ambiorix' and Convictolitavis' speeches already referred to. Not only is Caesar apologizing for the defection of Commius and his people, but with the words universae Galliae consenio for the failure of his whole policy of pacification and alliance.

With Critognatus the sacrifice demanded in the name of libertas seems so great as to overstep the bounds of humanity, when he advocates cannibalism if necessary. He raises the spectre of eternal slavery to the Romans. Finally, at the end of the battle of Alesia and the end of the book, we get from Vercingetorix an even clearer avowal of his unselfish motives in seeking communis libertas; thus Caesar at this climactic point of the book re-emphasizes his earlier identification of Vercingetorix with the freedom of all the Gallic peoples. In this he is contrasted particularly with such people as Dumnorix and Convictolitavis.

It is suggested, I think throughout the B.G. that the desire for freedom is more a common factor among Gauls, and something more capable of moving to action than race, custom, friendship, alliances, etc., even though, as Caesar says in Book III, the desire for libertas is universal and not confined to the Gauls. The concept is useful to Caesar both politically and dramatically, but we should
remember that it must often represent either a significant simplification or a plain perversion of the facts of the situation.

Rice Holmes, speaking of Gaul after Caesar had gone, remarks: "Many of the states retained administrative independence, and none had exchanged independence for servitude. National independence they had never had; for they had never been a united nation. . . . Many of the smaller peoples had already been in subjection to powerful neighbours and it was less humiliating to obey an alien master than one of their own race." 5

Of the important occurrences of liber I have already mentioned those of V, 7, 8 and VII, 37, 2; the word appears twice in the Caesar-Ariovistus debate in Book I, Ariovistus seeking unhindered possession of Gaul, liberam possessionem Galliae (I, 44, 13), from Caesar, while Caesar counters: quodsi antiquissimum quodque tempus spectari oporteret, populi Romani iustissimum esse in Gallia imperium; si iudicium senatus observari oporteret, liberam debere esse Galliam, quam bello victam suis legibus uti voluisset (I, 45, 3).

Concerning the more significant occurrences of libero, in IV, 34, 5 in Britain the natives spread reports about quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui liberandi facultas daretur, si Romanos castris expulissent. Coming as it does with praedae faciendae, the word does not seem to serve a very important purpose here; it is rather a battle cry. At V, 38, 2 Ambiorix, speaking to the Nervii and attempting to incite them against the Romans, says: hortaturque, ne sui in perpetuum liberandi atque uliscendi Romanos pro iis quas acceperint iniuriis occasionem dimittant. The
use of the word seems similar to the previous example.

Caesar uses the word *servitus* fifteen times in the B.G.. In I, 11, 3 the children of the Aedui are spoken of as being enslaved to the Helvetii. In I, 33, 2 Caesar gives his reasons for attacking Ariovistus, again using the enslavement of the Aedui, this time to the Germans, in his argument. Caesar is not disinterestedly speaking of *servitus* here, it is merely that the Aedui are *fratres consanguineosque* of the Romani, and Caesar claims that for this reason he is bound to help them. Caesar is in Gaul to uphold Rome's alliances and to assert her prerogatives, not to preserve justice among the nations. That Caesar does not attach a great deal of moral or emotional significance to *servitus* in the examples mentioned seems likely when his treatment of *libertas* is considered. It seems certain, however, that in the first book, where Caesar's aims are different from those in the later books, he wishes that the mention of *servitus* should elicit sympathy for the Aedui.

In II, 14, 3 Diviciacus, bringing news of the conspiracy of the Belgae to Caesar says: *Bellovacos...impulsos ab suis principibus, qui dicerent Haeduos a Caesare in servitutem redactos omnes indignitates contumeliasque perferre.* Here *servitus* is a battle cry; the objectivity of the claim about it, however, is lessened for the reader because of the mention of *indignitates contumeliasque*. In both III, 8, 4 and III, 10, 3 we find *servitus* opposed to *libertas* rhetorically and these passages have already been dealt with. There are no more important occurrences of the word until Book VII where it generally follows the lines of *libertas* and is usually in close proximity to that word.
Chapter V

Fortuna

Fortuna in Caesar has been dealt with by a number of writers who for the most part have been concerned with the philosophical aspects of its use; little attention has been paid to its purely literary effect. It is this that I wish to examine here.

Caesar makes his most important use of fortuna in Book VI; this is quite obvious; he emphasizes it a number of times. He uses it largely here to help explain a near disaster and an unsuccessful enterprise. Before looking at this, however, it might be well to see how and when Caesar uses the term in other books.

The first time fortuna is used is in Caesar's speech to his mutinous men; toward the end of the speech Caesar remarks that he is not apprehensive that the men won't obey him and march: scire enim quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens: non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisset aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam. suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam (I. 40, 12). We are immediately introduced to the theme of Caesar and his fortune. This is a notion which appears in connexion with Caesar in certain classical writers--Lucan, Dio Cassius, Plutarch, etc.--and in the B.C.

However, I wish to examine Caesar's use of fortuna within the B.G. alone.
In the above quotation Caesar indeed presents himself as fortunate, i.e. a successful soldier, as is witnessed by his recent victory. We note felicitas used here as a synonym for fortuna.5 This campaign is the first in this land, thus it would seem rather presumptuous to make any larger claims for his fortuna than he does here. However, this notion, first suggested here, appears a number of times later in the B.G., and, although it is never allowed to become very conspicuous, Caesar tends to allude to it as if taking it for granted. The word appears at key places in the narrative, or, quite frequently, to round off a book. Caesar's books are not arbitrarily arranged, each encompasses the events of one year and thus has natural limits. It is therefore logical that Caesar should wish to indicate security about his position at the end of each year.

Thus near the end of Book I, Caesar, describing the results of battle upon Ariovistus, mentions an incident that befell himself. He came across Procillus, whom he had sent to negotiate with Ariovistus and who had not returned. Caesar makes much of it: quae quidem res Caesari non minorem quam ipsa victoria voluptatem attulit. . . . neque eius calamitate de tanta voluptate et gratulatione quicquam fortuna diminuerat (I, 53, 6). Obviously, Caesar was delighted; yet earlier in this chapter, Caesar has admitted that Ariovistus escaped alive. He makes very little of this fact, however, immediately following it with the news that the great majority of Ariovistus' men were rounded up and killed. Caesar then goes on to speak of the fate of Ariovistus' family, and finally narrates the episode about Procillus.

In view of Caesar's subsequent attitude to important enemy
leaders, it seems strange that Caesar does not indicate any chagrin over Ariovistus, especially considering that he has made so much, albeit partly for certain propaganda purposes, of his arrogance. (The death of Ariovistus is mentioned without elucidation in Book V.) It may be that Caesar deliberately inflates his reunion with Procillus for the very reason that he wishes to reader to overlook any incompleteness in the victory. Thence Caesar in the lines quoted above seems to speak in terms of complete satisfaction, for which fortuna is at least in part responsible. Fortuna acts here for Caesar in big and little ways; the word reflects back to his speech in I, 40, and the book closes—this is the penultimate chapter—on a confident note.

In the final chapter of Book V, we find fortuna again mentioned, aiding the Romans. Caesar's men have undergone great vicissitudes during this campaign, and the result of the year as a whole is a gloomy one for Caesar. However, here, at the end, there is a partial rehabilitation of the Roman prestige through the agency of Labienus, who tricks the dangerous Indutiomarus. When the Roman troops surprise and attack the Treveri, they have been ordered to neglect everything until they have killed Indutiomarus. Caesar remarks: comprobat hominis consilium Fortuna, et cum unum omnes peterent, in ipso fluminis vado deprehensus Indutiomarus interficitur caputque eius refertur in castra (V, 58, 6). Obviously this is not Caesar's special fortuna acting here; nevertheless, he indicates by this confident conclusion to the book that fortuna is now wholly with the Romans after Sabinus' disaster and the close call at Cicero's camp.
In Chapter 43 of Book VI, Caesar, leaving his description and reflections upon the events at Cicero's camp, returns to the search for Ambiorix for one chapter, the next to last of the book. This is no routine piece of writing; Caesar says considerably more than that his men, despite a thorough effort, failed to capture or to set eyes upon Ambiorix. He first describes the completeness of the devastation of the land: omnes vici atque omnia aedificia... incendebantur, pecora interficiebantur, praeda ex omnibus locis agebatur (VI, 43, 2). More importantly, he returns to a theme introduced earlier in connexion with Basilus, when he notes with excitement how close his men came to capturing Ambiorix: ac saepe in eum locum ventum est tanto in omnes partes dimisso equitatu, ut modo visum ab se Ambiorigem in fuga circumspicerent captivi... (VI, 43, 4). Caesar uses felicitas here, not fortuna, but we have seen them closely linked in I, 40, 12, and Caesar could have substituted the word here. At the same time we remember Caesar's remarks regarding fortuna in a very similar situation (VI, 30, 2), where Caesar first makes those reflections about fortuna which become such an important theme in the book. Thus, we are implicitly encouraged to see from the near misses referred to in Chapter 43, the hand of fortuna almost giving, then taking away: that is, the machinery of fate gave eventual respite in the affair at Cicero's camp, but cheated him of the capture of Ambiorix. Caesar gained one and lost one, as it were. Yet, Chapter 43, with its emphasis on the thoroughness of the revenge upon the Eburones themselves, upon the marvellous effort inspired by Caesar, and with the expression summam felicitatem,
gives the impression that it was not so much a case of either success or failure on Caesar's part, but that Caesar only lacks something to perfect his already good situation. The chapter has something of the ring of Chapter 53 of Book I, and it is noteworthy that in the following and final chapters in both these books, the style becomes less expansive and more businesslike. Caesar briefly picks up the threads and closes the book, but, in each case, Caesar's main concern of the year is concluded in the penultimate chapter, and with it, the excitement. As we have seen, it is just at these points of climax that Caesar speaks of or implies fortuna.

Finally, at Book VII, 89, in an epilogue to the fighting that was to determine the fate of Caesar and of the great army of the united Gauls, Caesar, in restrained language, sets down the circumstances of the surrender of Vercingetorix, who remarks: quoniam sit Fortunae cedendum, ad utramque rem se illis offerre, seu morte sua Romanis satisfacere seu vivum tradere velint (VII, 89, 2). Caesar is not gloating here; the magnitude of his victory is allowed to speak for itself, but Caesar's use of fortuna is perhaps significant. If Vercingetorix yields to fortuna in his defeat, then Caesar's own fortuna, mentioned in Book I, is more than something ephemeral, and Caesar is lightly hinting at a special status of his own.

Caesar's strongest remark about a special fortuna of his own comes at IV, 26, 5, when, after a tremendous battle, his men are able to beat off the natives and land in Britain, but cannot give chase to the enemy for any distance, due to the failure of the cavalry to appear. Caesar says: hoc unum ad pristinam fortunam Caesari
The most frequent use of pristinus in the B.G. is with virtus, where it has definite emotional overtones, the expression being used in exhortations (II, 21, 2; VII, 77, 4; VII, 62, 2; and V, 48, 6), and in boasting (I, 13, 4). Caesar thus refers to pristina fortuna probably as to some well known idea, something taken for granted, something consolidated since the Helvetian campaign by the habit of victory.

It is this same episode that gives an example of fortuna at work. In Chapter 24 of Book IV, Caesar sees his men perterriti, and ... non eadem alacritate ac studio, quo in pedestribus uti proellis consuerant, utebantur (IV, 24, 4), and Caesar announces a change in tactics. Nevertheless, despite the steps Caesar has taken—and they in themselves are quite successful, as he remarks—the men are still fearful. Just at this moment, an unnamed standard bearer, calling upon the gods, obtestatus deos ut ea res legioni feliciter eveniret, cries to the men: 'desilite.... commilitones; nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere; ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatoris officium praestitero.' (IV, 25, 3). Caesar emphasizes this episode by using direct speech. The men are encouraged and they disembark. The standard bearer calls upon the gods hoping that things will turn out feliciter, a word that through its related noun felicitas suggests fortuna. The fact that the standard bearer appears suddenly in the narrative, is never definitely identified, and that he invokes Caesar's own name all suggest that he is like a momentary personification of Caesar's fortuna.

To digress for a while, it is interesting that Caesar rarely
mentions the gods: a number of times *fortuna* is used where one might expect the gods to be invoked. His most conspicuous use of them is in Book I, where Caesar is very insistent about putting his campaign with the Helvetii into a historical context. He brings them in at first a little diffidently: *sive casu sive consilio deorum immortalium...* (I, 12, 6). There is a matter of poetic justice: *quae pars civitatis Helvetiae insignem calamitatem populo Romano intulerat, ea princeps poenas persolvit.* (I, 12, 6).

In the following chapter, however, Divico is introduced, and by this coincidence the historical aspect of the affair is re-emphasized. In the ensuing debate, Caesar links the gods with the avenging of wrongdoing, i.e. that of the Helvetii. Of course it is largely rhetoric; Caesar is paying back Divico's charges and invoking the gods in addition. I think that Caesar writes in this way mainly because this is his first campaign in the *B.G.*. There is small doubt that in Book I, Caesar is concerned to give at least the appearance of justifying his march out of the Province. He does this in various ways, generally tending to rely on dramatic or emotional means rather than on tight reasoning. I would suggest that Caesar uses whatever he feels will sway the reader most, thus the solemn *sive casu sive consilio deorum.*

Caesar seems more in earnest in Book V, when he again mentions the gods in connexion with revenge (*V, 52, 6*). The events referred to here are of immense importance to Caesar so far as his Gallic campaign is concerned, and it is interesting that he mentions the gods in this matter, and so rarely elsewhere. This coincidence in-
clines one to suspect that the gods are not thoughtlessly used here, and that perhaps some special importance attaches to this. Caesar uses the gods to make a final explicit connexion between the two attacks by Ambiorix, thus adding to the many links and contrasts that exist already in his narrative. He speaks in terms of making amends for the disaster at Atuatuca, caused by Sabinus' culpa and temeritas, through the men's virtus and beneficium decorum immortalium. As with the Helvetian episode, Caesar is invoking the gods, thus connecting an earlier Roman defeat with a later victory or revenge. Perhaps the only other time Caesar philosophically connects fortunate and unfortunate occasions occurs in Book VI, but there, as I have remarked, he connects them by fortuna alone.

It might be instructive to enquire why Caesar does not use fortuna as the key word in comparing the incidents in V, and why he has in fact substituted the gods. One explanation could be that Caesar uses fortuna in a certain way in Book VI, and nowhere else, because it suited his dramatic needs at the time, and that he is indifferent to its absence elsewhere. To make much of this absence we would have to postulate a certain consistency in Caesar's use of the word. In Book VI he describes events that depend on chance, or at least so he makes them appear to the reader. This is obvious enough with reference to the near capture of Ambiorix by Basilus, but not quite so obvious with reference to the attack on Atuatuca and the narrow escape of the Romans. There the narrative preliminary to the decision of the Germans to attack Caesar's camp is extremely elaborate, and indicates the precautions Caesar has been taking expressly
to save his men's lives. Then the coming of the Germans from across the Rhine is described rather fully; details are added—magno pecoris numero, cuius sunt cupidissimi barbari, potiuntur (VI, 35, 6)—and chance seems to pile upon chance: invitati praeda longius procedunt (VI, 35, 7). Again even though it is only plunder in general that draws them on, yet they are men of such a nature that obstacles which would, Caesar suggests, daunt other men, palus and silvae, do not deter them. Then, rather astonishingly, a captive they have taken, someone unnamed, bursts into direct speech. As Rasmussen remarks, he uses a word derived from fortuna and then fortuna itself, perhaps in a punning way: quibus licet iam esse fortunatissimos? ... huc omnes suas fortunas exercitus Romanorum contulit; (VI, 35, 9). Surely Caesar in this passage, which must be, if anything in the B.G. is, largely the product of his imagination, is anticipating his own reflections upon fortuna here. The captive gives information regarding Atuatuca, some of it untrue—i.e. about the size of the garrison—and this, another piece of chance, encourages the Germans to attack it.

The narrative then reverts to Cicero, and the chances continue to add up. It is the seventh day since Caesar's departure, and Cicero becomes distrustful about Caesar's keeping his word and returning on time. Hence, after keeping his men inside the camp summa diligentia up till now, he sends men out to forage. Also: a small point, Caesar attributes Cicero's apprehensions partly to the fact that neque ulla de reeditu eius fama adferebatur (VI, 36, 1). Here fama has failed to work and the Romans suffer; a little before (VI,
35, 4), *trans Rhenum ad Germanos pervenit fama diripi Eburones*, it works, but again it is to the Romans' disadvantage. Not only is Cicero apprehensive, but also he is eorum permotus vocibus, qui illius patientiam paene obsessionem appellabant (VI, 36, 2). There is a faint reminiscence of the Sabinus episode here, and of course Cicero is wrong to be swayed by the grumblings of his men. The word *permotus* echoes Book V, 31, 3, in a somewhat similar situation: *tandem dat Cotta permotus manus, superat sententia Sabini*. And so Cicero, with little or no fears, sends men out to forage. Just at this time—and Caesar emphasizes this, *hoc ipse tempore casu* (VI, 37, 1)—the Germans attack the camp, being hidden almost until they are upon it. The camp becomes a scene of uproar and confusion; the men who had been so contemptuous about staying inside just previously now believe that Caesar and his army have been destroyed. The picture is reminiscent of the earlier attack on Atuatuca in Book V, and Caesar alludes to this dramatically: *Cottaque et Titurii calamitatem, qui in eodem occiderint castello, ante oculos ponunt* (VI, 37, 8). At this point Caesar says of the Germans: *perrumpere nituntur sequre ipsi adhortantur, ne tantam fortunam ex manibus dimittant* (VI, 37, 10). Again Caesar emphasizes *fortuna*, this time with reference to the unreadiness of the Romans, and it is just at this point that Baculus appears. Almost everything about this incident where Baculus saves the day seems to depend upon chance; thus he appears as outside help for the regular garrison. Sick as he is, he is able to produce an extraordinary effort of will and leadership. Like Caesar himself in Book II, he snatches weapons from another
soldier and rushes to the ramparts. It is very much a personal ef-
fort, and certainly a clear case of fortuna at work for the Romans;
at the very point when it seemed that it was about to give every-
thing to the Germans, a sudden change comes about. The other cen-
turions follow Baculus' example, and the men are able to recover
their wits and restore order and discipline. Baculus' strength
lasts just long enough to enable this to happen.

In VI, 42, Caesar, on his return, takes up the theme of fort-
tuna enunciated at the very beginning of this incident (VI, 35, 2).
He remarks on the hand of fortuna in the sudden attack, the defense
of the camp when all seemed lost, and, most of all, the irony of the
Germans', whom he invited, doing Ambiorix' work for him. He criti-
cizes one thing only, that men were sent out of camp against his
orders. However, in his description of the attack, he has made the
situation within the camp seen as desperate—for a few minutes
anyway—as that of the foraging party outside. That is, the whole
camp, not merely the men outside, was in danger of being overwhelmed,
and it is with reference to the saving of the camp that Caesar speaks
of fortuna acting for the Romans, not with reference to the men out-
side, who have mixed fortunes. The panic and indecision within the
camp is not unlike that of the foragers. The complacency brought
about by the apparently dominant Roman position in the area created
the condition in which fortuna works, and it works for the Germans
and then for the Romans in doing the unpredictable.

Caesar has already spoken of fortuna with reference to Basilus
and his near capture of Ambiorix, and it seems no coincidence that
his comments in VI, 42 closely parallel those in VI, 30. In the
Ambiorix episode, Caesar can well evoke *fortuna* in helping the Ro-
mans and then Ambiorix in turn, for Ambiorix does escape, and the
Roman effort is enhanced by Caesar's reflections. In VI, 42,
however, Caesar, it would seem, has nothing to gain by admitting
that the Romans were saved only by *fortuna*, and not by the vigilance
or fighting qualities of his men. Yet Caesar is determined to empha-
size one important element in the situation, that his orders were
disobeyed, and he makes the repercussions of this delinquency momen-
tous, reading a stern example into it. Thus, not only are the men
in the fields endangered by Cicero's foolish move, but the whole
camp is put in jeopardy so much so that *fortuna* must save the day.
In this way, Caesar is able to emphasize that it was not his mistake
but Cicero's, although he does it here much more subtly than with
Sabinus. Hence, serving his own ends, Caesar balances the workings
of *fortuna* one way and the other. By using it to aid the Romans,
he is able to lend some sort of poetic justice to his use of it to
cover his own lack of foresight in not guarding against just such
an attack. *Fortuna* serves Caesar in both cases.

The situation is quite different at VI, 30; Caesar has no mis-
take to cover up here; his man Basilus surprises Ambiorix, but he
escapes. What worries Caesar is the thought of Ambiorix' actions
of Book V going unavenged, and the waste of effort by the Romans in
trying to catch him. Thus, Caesar devotes considerable detail to
this incident to show the reader just how *fortuna* works, just as his
writing is detailed and vivid when he describes the crucial moments
of its working in the attack on Cicero's camp. What could be some-
thing not worth reporting, since nothing came of it, Caesar has made into a highly dramatic and memorable episode, both by his description, and, more importantly, by his use of fortuna. By using it he is able to add substance to the episode.

Caesar mentions fortuna in the Ambiorix episodes in Book V, but does not use it in the same way as in Book VI. In V, 34, 2, Caesar says nostri tametsi ab duce et a fortuna deserebantur. He more commonly speaks of a change of fortune, or of bad fortune, but rarely of its merely deserting someone. However, at I, 40, 12, speaking to his mutinous men, Caesar mentions the conditions when men will not obey their leader: aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facioref comperto avaritiam esse convictam. Thus, Caesar appears to make fortuna dependent upon men's actions; here they have performed male, and fortuna deserts or is lacking after some blunder. That is, Caesar here seems to think of man being in control of fortuna. With Sabinus the blunder is obvious and its effects are being shown; after the garrison has left the camp, Ambiorix attacks, putting them into utter consternation. Thus, it seems very probable that Caesar means by the lack of fortuna a leader who has failed. Of course, not only has Sabinus made a mistake, he has been acting like a man under a delusion, and his actions have been criminally foolish. Cicero made a mistake, definitely, in Book VI, but still fortuna was able to come to his aid. With Sabinus, there is now no chance of this happening; this is perhaps Caesar's implication. From this point of the battle onward, as Caesar remarks, the Romans fight bravely, but hopelessly; Ambiorix plays cat and
120

mouse with them. Caesar says of the Romans: "omnem spem salutis in
virtute ponebant" (V, 34, 2), yet, this is of no avail, and Sabinus
then sets the seal on his folly by trying to come to terms with
Ambiorix, a reminder as it were, that *fortuna* is still lacking.

Thus the Romans have not been merely unlucky in this encounter,
they have brought the defeat upon themselves. Hence, in the follow­
ing encounter at Cicero's camp, when Ambiorix attacks, the Romans
cannot merely hope for a turn in the scales of *fortuna* to bring suc­
cess. This is not in Caesar's mind anyway; he wishes the contrast
between the two battles to be based on other factors. So we find
a series of contrasts drawn between the conduct of the leaders and
the men in the two incidents. We find *fortuna* mentioned once in the
second incident, at the close of the Vorenus-Pullo incident: *sic*
fortuna in contentione et certamine utrumque versavit, ut alter
alteri inimicus auxilio salutique esset neque diiudicari posset, uter
utri virtute anteferendus videretur (V, 44, 14). *Fortuna* is evi­
dently acting here as a spirit of cooperation, and transforms the
rather insignificant rivalry of the two centurions into a vivid
object lesson in mutual help. *Fortuna* is used most unusually here;
there is no parallel to it in the *B.G.* In Book VI, Caesar speaks
several times of the power of *fortuna*, but goes no further than this.

Here *fortuna* is doing something specific, and, in view of the
strangeness of its use, it seems reasonable to conclude that some
special significance may be attached to it. It is an agent that
alters their encounter from a competition into something far nobler
and more useful to the needs of the moment. Through *fortuna*, even
Pullo and Vorenus, men who are always at odds, come to epitomize, by a miraculous change, the way an army should be acting, i.e. in a spirit of mutual help. Caesar emphasizes this episode by putting the challenge of Pullo into direct speech. (Sabinus' direct speech had fuelled the dissension—now Pullo and Vorenus stand in contrast to Sabinus and Cotta.) Up till now in the battle we have seen Cicero's exemplary treatment of the enemy's proposal and the great fight on the seventh day when the Roman camp was gravely threatened by fire. The men keep their discipline and refuse to panic over their lost baggage. This is in direct contrast with the panic in Sabinus' camp and the disaster caused later over the baggage. The invitation of the centurions to the enemy to come down off the walls into the camp shows the Romans playing with the Gauls in a similar fashion to the way Ambiorix and his men played cat and mouse with Sabinus' men after they had left the camp. It is immediately after this that we find the Pullo-Vorenus episode, one that appears on the surface to be less closely integrated with the larger event than such episodes generally are in the B.G.. Thus the actions of Fabius and Petronius at Gergovia (VII, 50) of Baculus at Atuatuca (VI, 38), of the standard-bearer (IV, 25) at the landing in Britain, are not incidental; the only one of these cases where doubt might exist is that of Fabius and Petronius. But here, Caesar singles out two men, at the very turning point of the battle, and uses them to typify the spirit that drove his men on against his express orders, thus losing the battle.

The Pullo-Vorenus incident, however, does not occur at a
crucial point of the battle—as with the standard bearer or Baculus—nor is anything in particular gained by what they do here. Caesar merely uses them to point another contrast with the previous disaster, but this contrast is everything. The men at Sabinus' camp display virtus, eventually, at any rate, but they are destroyed not only by the folly of their leader, but by the dissension he provoked, which so lowered the morale of the men that their judgment and discipline suffered. Caesar remarks of the men in Sabinus' camp: comprehendunt utrumque et orant ne sua dissensione et pertinacia rem in summum periculum deducant (V, 31, 1), and a little later: res disputatione ad mediam noctem perducitur (V, 31, 3). Cicero has no co-leader in the camp and so perhaps a contrast in this matter of cooperation cannot be illustrated in the leadership, so Caesar is nothing loath to introduce the centurions, unmentioned until now, to create the most memorable piece of description in the whole battle, and to make an important point which is meant to colour the entire event. But Pullo and Vorenus do not create the spirit of cooperation here, rather it works upon them and transforms their relationship for the moment; this spirit is inculcated firstly by Caesar and is shown by Cicero and the whole camp, where courage, self-sacrifice, and presence of mind all do their part, and, of necessity, bring with them fortuna, which then, in Caesar's way of putting it, acts of its own accord upon the two centurions.

Now, we can say that fortuna is used in a very different way in Book V from its repeated use in Book VI. There is, however, no inconsistency in this; Caesar is speaking of different aspects of
fortuna: one very like luck, the other something that expresses the deserts of men's actions. Moreover, although Caesar has special cases to plead in both books, and fortuna is certainly used in these pleadings, in Book V, we do not have any inconsistency between action and result, whereas this is more the case in Book VI. As I remarked before, the explicit connexion between the two attacks of Ambiorix is made not by use of fortuna, but by use of the gods. The events, as Caesar narrates them, are self-explanatory; there is no need to remark, "great is the power of fortuna," for the gods here have not actually avenged the Romans against Ambiorix. All that Caesar means is that they have made up for Sabinus' folly: beneficio deorum immortalium et virtute eorum (V, 52, 6). Caesar is concerned here, as he has been all along in Book V, with the mistake of Sabinus and its consequences. The avoiding of this mistake, together with virtus on the part of Cicero's men ensured the aid of the gods whose function it is to pay men their due. Caesar adds that the laetitia of Ambiorix and the dolor of the Romans were, on this account, not long lived. However, Ambiorix is far from being punished yet, and the gods have not directly been concerned with him even if Caesar, by his mention of dolor and laetitia, makes it seem so. Caesar's reference to the shortness of Ambiorix' laetitia is interesting with regard to his words to Divico concerning the great length of time before the Roman revenge; obviously, it is only a rhetorical trick on Caesar's part. In Book V, then, the gods are acting in step with fortuna, i.e. giving men's actions their deserts. In Book VI, in the Ambiorix and Atuatuca episodes, the gods would seem irrele-
vant; they have nothing to do with the type of fortuna mentioned here.

Caesar mentions the gods even less in the B.C. than in the B.G., nowhere invoking them in terms of expiation or revenge. The Roman state might be favoured by the gods in a history such as Livy's, but Caesar is writing a commentary on his own deeds, and wishes to take the credit for his own victories, so his remarks about the gods are largely rhetorical; he does not attempt to fit them consistently into the structure of his work.

Fortuna and Tragic Color

I suggested that Caesar's use of fortuna in most of its occurrences in Book VI is rather different from its use elsewhere. In Book VI the word appears to approach the use of τὸ χάριτον made by certain Greek tragic historians as described by Polybius. Moreover, Caesar's treatment of fortuna has characteristics in common with tragic historiography as defined by the same writer. Thus at VI, 30 Caesar has quite deliberately worked up the incident where Basilus unexpectedly comes upon Ambiorix but fails to catch him. This episode, which has no consequence whatever, elicits some philosophical comments from Caesar. This inflation of the subject matter recalls in some, although not all, respects Polybius' remarks about writers dealing with the Syrian war concerning whom he remarks: τὰ μὲν μικρὰ μεγάλα ποιεῖν (XXIX, 12, 2) and whom, to judge from the context, Polybius would consider as tragic or rhetorical writers. Moreover, and more importantly, Polybius definitely appears to have "tragic" writers in mind when he says, speaking of Agathocles: ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μὲν

124
Polybius goes on to say that Agathocles was not an outstanding man and does not deserve such treatment. A little later he remarks that in the case of outstanding men it is right: εἰς ἐπίστασιν ἁγείν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας, καὶ που καὶ τῆς τύχης ποίησασθαι μνήμην, ἐτι δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπεῖν πραγμάτων, καὶ καθάλου προστιθέναι τοῖς ἐπεκδιδάσκοντα λόγοι ... (XV, 35, 7). It would seem that Caesar is using fortuna at VI, 30 in much the same way as Polybius' tragic historians use τύχη, that is, to lend distinction to an episode.

Ullman cites a story of Phylarchus, remarking. "This story, calculated to arouse pity, while not exactly a peripety, recalls Aristotle's illustration of one: Lynceus is led off for execution by Danaus, but actually, it is Danaus who is put to death."¹² Ullman cites this use of peripety or something approaching it as another distinguishing element of tragic history.

At VI, 42, 3 we find Caesar calling special attention to this very thing: quarum omnium rerum maxime admirandum videbatur, quod Germani, qui eo consilio Rhenum transierant ut Ambiorigis fines depopularentur, ad castra Romanorum delati optatissimum Ambiorigis beneficium obtulerant; that is, they had done the very opposite of what was to be expected of them. Moreover, Caesar uses the word admirandum, suggesting perhaps another function of tragic history,
to emphasize the astonishing. This comes directly after Caesar's remarks about fortuna, which parallel those at VI, 30: multum Fortunam in repentino hostium adventu potuisse judicavit, multo etiam amplius quod paene ab ipso vallo portisque castrorum barbaros aver-tisset (VI, 42, 1). Thus in Book VI, Caesar, by inflating his material and emphatically proclaiming the surprising action of fortuna, and by clearly drawing attention to a peripety, is using some of the devices of tragic historiography. It is important, however, to keep in mind that Caesar is not really using them primarily for an emotional effect. In VI, 30 Caesar endeavours to palliate his failure to avenge himself on Ambiorix. In VI, 42 he uses similar effects partly to bind the two incidents together, thus giving a greater unity to the book, and partly to exculpate himself for allowing the attack on Cicero's camp to occur. In both of these sections, Seel capitalizes fortuna, and the word seems reminiscent of the Greek deity τοξι. Tarn remarks that τοξι "was not blind chance, but some order of affairs which men could not comprehend."\(^1\) I think that this description well fits Caesar's use of fortuna in Book VI.
Tragic, Moral, and Military Color

Tragic Color in Caesar

I wish to consider possible examples of tragic writing in the *Bellum Gallicum*. Walbank has indicated that the writing that could be thus characterized is not confined to a particular school of historiography arising in Hellenistic times; he plays down the element of theory. Bearing this caution in mind, I shall quote a criticism made by Polybius on the writing of the historian Phylarchus, who, Polybius implies, uses tragic methods, καθάπερ οἱ τραγῳδιογράφοι (II, 56, 10). Polybius says σπουδασμὸν ὅτι τὸ ἱστορικὸν καὶ συμπαθῆς ποιεῖν τοῖς λεγομένοις, εἰσάγει περιπλοκάς γυναικῶν καὶ κόμως διερρημένας καὶ μαστῶν ἐκβολάς, πρὸς δὲ τοστοὺς δάκρυα καὶ θρῆνους ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀναμιᾷ τέκνων καὶ γονέως γηραιοίς ἀπαγομένων...ποιεῖν δὲ τὸ τοῦτο παρ' ἑλθὲν τὴν ἱστορίαν, πειράματος ᾗ (ἐν) ἐκάστοις δεῖ πρὸ ἄθραμμαν τιθέναι τὰ δεινὰ (II, 56, 7). This serves as a good definition of tragic history and is extremely interesting when considered in relation to Caesar; Polybius' words recall the behaviour of the Gallic men and women at the siege of Avaricum. The scene depicted in VII, 26 seems to be something of a *locus communis*; it seems unreal or exaggerated and appears to owe more to previous literature than to...
observation. It seems important, therefore, to establish whether Caesar introduced the scene primarily for purposes of evoking emotions such as pity (ἐλατος), and excitement (ἐπιληπτις). That is, does Caesar on rare occasions fall victim to the enticements of a style which one might expect to be rigorously excluded from his commentary?

If indeed Caesar's primary aim is to evoke pity in the scene at Avaricum, some rather momentous conclusions can be drawn, because shortly after this, Caesar tells of the atrocious slaughter of the inhabitants of the town. Caesar is by no means squeamish about reporting such things. The massacre of the Germans in Book IV includes women and children, as Caesar takes pains to mention (IV, 14, 5). As with Avaricum Caesar gives a reason for the massacre--here, German treachery; at Avaricum, the massacre at Cenabum. Neither reason is to be taken very seriously; they seem no more than gestures.

In II, 28 the older men, and the women and children of the Nervii, after the defeat of their army, send envoys to Caesar to announce their surrender. Caesar remarks: quos Caesar, ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordia videretur, diligentissime conservavit (II, 28, 3). It is one thing to recall honestly the massacre at Avaricum, with no serious attempt to palliate it; it is another to emphasize the pathetic elements of the situation in order to make it even more harrowing. Thus, to focus special attention upon the very women whom Caesar is about to kill would suggest a more than cruel streak in Caesar's nature. In this way the problem has become more complicated than it appeared at first sight.
In Chapter III I indicated that the scene in VII, 26 has a structural importance; it forms a very strong and doubtless deliberate contrast with the notable bravery of the Gauls (VII, 25). I suggested that by this contrast Caesar was commenting by implication on the Gallic character. Moreover, at VII, 26, 4 he makes a gnomic remark--quite a rare thing for him, and perhaps therefore all the more significant: *quod plerumque in summo periculo timor misericordiam non recipit.* We find that the piteous picture that Caesar has evoked is so closely bound up with the unworthy attitude and actions of the men that this is quite sufficient to explain its presence. The word *misericordia* is convincing proof of the deliberate nature of Caesar's attempt to write a scene full of pity, if such proof were needed. More importantly, such explicitness indicates just how concerned Caesar was to use the tragic scene for a special purpose. The demoralization of the Gallic menfolk is shown to be complete.

Thus there seem to be strong reasons for believing that Caesar is by no means writing primarily to evoke pity in the reader, but rather that he is creating a pathetic scene with very conventional elements in it, in order that we should all the more easily recognize it as such--that is, as a standard scene which has a quite definite purpose. The feeling of *misericordia* in the reader is important only so far as it enables him to see the lack of it in the Gallic men. To return to the question of the effect of the scene upon the massacre that follows, it becomes clear that Caesar did not intend to intensify the reader's feelings at the massacre.

The conclusions that I have drawn here are reinforced by Cae-
sar's treatment of a similar incident at Gergovia. Here again in VII, 47 we find a similar "tragic" scene, which as I mentioned above, contains a number of deliberate reminiscences of Avaricum to show that the Gauls are reflecting inversely the premature confidence of Fabius by their panic. They are repentino tumultu perterriti (VII, 47, 4), having sized up the situation wrongly cum hostem intra portas esse existimarent (VII, 47, 4). The color is perhaps even stronger and more artificial than in the Avaricum scene. Significantly perhaps it is just at the most pitiable part of the description that verbal reminiscence of Avaricum is strongest: ut sibi parcerent neu, sicut Avarici fecissent, ne a mulieribus quidem atque infantibus abstinerent (VII, 47, 5), corresponding to non mulieribus, non infantibus pepercerunt (VII, 28, 4). Not only do the women recall Avaricum, so does Fabius, as I pointed out in Chapter III. The panic of the women seems almost to mock the Romans in this battle; things go even better than the rash Roman soldiers deserve; the town seems ready for the taking, but their lack of discipline undoes them. Again the "tragic" scene with the women has a clear structural purpose, which far outweighs its other effects.

Both of the "tragic" scenes discussed above were brought about by fear. Caesar's treatment of the effects of fear—often quite startling and dramatic—is interesting throughout the Bellum Gallicum. In II, 24, 3 we see the camp followers wailing and shouting and running in all directions. The Treveri in the same battle desert their posts permoti and carry abroad the news that the Romans have been defeated; fear destroys their judgment. Caesar is more explicit
about the loss of the faculty of judgment in VI, 41, 3 when the Romans have suffered a prolonged attack by the Germans: *sic omnium animos timor occupaverat, ut paene alienata mente*. . . . They cannot believe that relief is near. Similarly, Considius in I, 22, fear overcomes him and he does not stop to reconsider his faulty impression. In IV, 14, 2 the Germans suffering a surprise attack by the Romans are *perterriri* and do not know what to do. In I, 39, the Romans lose their judgment and believe the worst, becoming susceptible to wild rumours and tales. Here, however, Caesar finds more difficulty in the way of dramatically expressing their fear than would be the case in, say, a battle or siege where he has a freer hand to give physical expression to it. Hence, here we have tears, complaints, and to show fear’s debilitating effects upon the minds of the men, the writing of wills. Caesar is describing a progression of panic from the less to the more experienced men of his camp. This panic is very important with respect to his following speech and to the whole Ariovistus episode. Caesar’s description of it is exaggerated; nevertheless, he is making an important point rather than trying to work up a moving scene for its own sake.²

There is a somewhat similar piece of pathetic and extraordinary *color* at the meeting of Caesar with the Gauls after the defeat of the Helvetii. Again we have an apparent absurdity: *Sequanos... capite demisso terram intueri* (I, 32, 2). They act rather like guilty children; they remain silent as Caesar questions them, and Diviciacus makes a reply for them. Caesar is intent here, as in the mutiny, on making the point that the Sequani live in fear of Ariovistus and
it is reasonable to wonder why they are at the meeting at all if they are afraid to speak. Caesar is determined to make this point dramatically and therefore we see the Sequani at the conference. The dramatic purpose of the conference is very plain; Caesar wishes to depict terror on the part of the Sequani, and reluctance to speak is the solution. They recall Caesar's men: *hi neque vultum fingere neque interdum lacrimas tenere poterant* (I, 39, 4). I have treated the rather extraordinary outburst by Diviciacus at I, 20, and have tried to show that Caesar here creates an affecting scene in order that his own subsequent action with regard to Dumnorix should not appear weak.

It seems in general that the more pressing the need for Caesar to describe fear and its consequences when they are structurally important to the narration, the less concerned he is with verisimilitude, and the more inclined to seize upon the devices of tragic historians to gain his effects, using such devices for quite different purposes than theirs.

**Moral Tone in Caesar**

Any conclusions about moral tone in the *Bellum Gallicum* must take into account the background of Caesar's sometimes very harsh treatment of the Gauls. More than one massacre was perpetrated by the Romans and Caesar makes no attempt to hide them, yet it would be impossible to charge the Gauls with anything worse.

A second important factor with regard to deducing Caesar's moral tone is that in general Caesar does not charge the Gauls with in-
justice in revolting against him; setting aside Book I, he gives himself very little justification for being in Gaul. Both of these points have been made by Collins. 3

Thus two very basic areas of grievance, perhaps the two most important ones, are foregone by Caesar. This is due partly to Caesar's honesty and partly to the toughness of the Romans on matters of imperialism and concerning the value of human life. 4

Yet Caesar tends to make his enemies morally inferior to the Romans by various means, more commonly by suggestion than directly; moreover he does not claim that his presence in Gaul and unremitting wars of conquest are thereby justified. Caesar actually undercuts his own moral position in his use of libertas-servitus. With his gnomic remark at III, 10, 3: omnes autem homines natura libertatis studio incitari et condicionem servitutis odisse, Caesar appears at first sight to condemn himself, yet he might have also said in the same objective way: "All powerful nations wish to subdue their weaker neighbours," and this would correspond just as closely to reality as the Romans understood it. So with the remark quoted above, Caesar explains the new revolt of the Gauls, thus removing some of the blame from his own administration; he is not here trying to create particular sympathy for the Gauls. Most of the references to libertas occur in Book VII, and it is here that the idea, used in connexion with Vercingetorix, becomes a motif of some significance. Caesar, in his preoccupation with dramatizing the great revolt, generously uses libertas to give it meaning, even nobility. Caesar's dramatic instincts seem to be uppermost here.
Caesar is content to adopt various means to impress and interest the reader; thus he will use a glorious victory as sufficient justification of a campaign, as in Book II, or he will add piquancy to his description of a campaign by arousing the reader's indignation against an enemy leader or people. A people may be described as wild or barbarian; this is not so much to give Caesar a basic justification for destroying them but to add interest by encouraging the reader to sympathize with the Romans. Caesar also arouses indignation by showing arrogance and overconfidence in the opposing army, reactions which are often provoked by the Roman army. But this is good storytelling technique, and it is to this that most of Caesar's apparent moral color must be referred. This notion is supported by the fact that Caesar is not thoroughly consistent in the use of these colores.

It is perhaps in this light that Caesar's use of libertas should be considered--i.e. Caesar is apt to seize upon the most convenient means at hand when he decides to make a point or to create atmosphere. This is done with the intention of eventually enhancing or adding interest to his military exploits rather than to create or sharpen moral issues.

I have looked at Caesar's invoking of the gods in Chapter V. They seemed to be used rhetorically rather than with any serious intent, and, moreover, they appeared very infrequently.

Caesar uses color rather extensively in the denigration of certain enemy leaders. With Orgetorix and Dumnorix, this is done in political terms; in Chapter I we saw this type of leader implicitly
contrasted with Diviciacus whom Caesar trusted and used extensively, although it would be logical to call him a traitor to his people. In the case of Ariovistus, Caesar takes great care to brand him as arrogant, cruel and quick-tempered. We saw these *colores* used alongside more specific grievances involving his right of conquest and in fact Caesar makes greater use of them than of the latter. We have seen that Caesar had little excuse for calling the kettle black on the scores of cruelty—witness Avaricum—or in the matter of keeping tribes in check through fear; this is an important part of Caesar's general policy; Caesar is, however, conspicuously siding with the Gauls at this stage (Book I), saving them from the German invaders, and he is quite blatant in the appeal for sympathy that he makes to the reader. Book I, it should be pointed out, is unique in this respect.

A similar arrogance is shown earlier in Book I by Divico. We also frequently see enemy troops swaggering with over-confidence before a battle. This occurs at II, 30, where the Aduatuci ridicule the puny stature of the Romans when they set up their huge siege engines. But it only requires these engines to be set in motion to impress the Gauls to the extent that they treat for peace. In Book III, Sabinus, because of his careful tactics, incurs the contempt of the Gauls and this makes it easier for him to trick them into attacking him on ground advantageous to the Romans. A similar thing happens at V, 51 and also at V, 57-58, where the *color* is directed both at the Gauls in general and at Indutiomarus in particular, who is the instigator of the whole revolt. Labienus takes his cue and
simulates fear as Caesar had so recently done, and the Gauls and their leader grow even more insolent, so that eventually the Romans are able to catch them off guard and overcome them, killing Indutiomarus with deliberation. Similar things happen at VI, 8 and VII, 66 where the Gauls swear an oath that each man shall ride twice through the Roman lines. In all of these cases, Caesar is clearly appealing to the partisan spirit of his readers.

These instances of Gallic swagger and folly lead us to Caesar's treatment of the character of his enemies in general. There are many remarks scattered throughout the main narrative of the Bellum Gallicum as well as in the ethnographic sections. I have spoken of the relation that the Gallic character bears to Caesar's conception of Vercingetorix. Caesar paints the Gauls as excitable, flighty, gossipy, subject to over-confidence and sudden despair, valiant fighters, but without staying power—all in all, without the moral strength of the Romans. Caesar's opinion of the Gauls appears, moreover, in his use of such words as conclamo and audacia—audacter, which point to over-confidence and a certain recklessness in them; thus, Caesar supports his own more explicit characterization by his selective use of these words.

Military Color in Caesar

A number of different types of color used by Caesar in the military sphere have already been distinguished. These include the indirect method wherein Caesar emphasizes the formidable nature of his adversaries. Thus, the Helvetii in Book I, 2 are bellandi cupidi. In Book II, 15, the Nervii are described as fierce men of great
courage; in Book IV, 1 and 2, the Suebi are very hardy and of great stature.

With the word *virtus*, Caesar lavishes considerable praise upon his enemies, yet the same word is used for more specific praise of the Romans—i.e. when they are in action. In this way the word does a double duty in indicating the valour of the Romans. The group of words *cupiditas*, *cupio*, and *cupidus* are closely connected with the high morale of the Romans, but are used without the same force with respect to their enemies. The situation is similar with *studium*, which again reflects well upon Caesar. By the use of the word *difficultas*, Caesar often sets before the reader the real magnitude of his achievements, a method rather akin to praise of his enemies, mentioned above. In Book VII, Caesar makes the point, that he has done great deeds in crushing the great rebellion, by constructing a carefully wrought drama. His demonstration of his *res gestae* in this book is a considerable work of art.

References to Caesar by his lieutenants or others in battle are part of the technique of *color*, aimed at the glorification of Caesar, making his influence on the battlefield appear all-pervasive. The standard bearer at IV, 25, 3 and Labienus—at VI, 8, 4 and at VII, 62, 2 remind the men of the commander-in-chief as they lead them into battle. Another glorification of Caesar occurs at II, 25, 2 where he takes up a shield at a most critical point in the battle and holds together the faltering Romans; also at VII, 88, 1, Caesar enters the battle in person and the result is that the enemy is put to flight.

In Chapter V, I indicated that *fortuna* appeared to be in a rather
close relationship to virtus a number of times. In view of this, it seems worthwhile to investigate the word as a possible color in the direction of suggesting military prowess. I shall here be considering only those occurrences of fortuna outside Book IV, where I believe that the word is used differently from its use in other parts of the Bellum Gallicum.

Before continuing, I shall cite the words of Cordula Brutscher in connexion with an examination of Cicero's De Imperio Pompei:

"Das Glück ist in keiner Weise mit den 'virtutes' verkniipft, es ist nicht Belohnung von Verdiensten, sondern etwas, das die Götter als besondere Gunst gewähren."\(^5\)

It cannot be said that Caesar's treatment of fortuna in the Bellum Gallicum clearly denies the distinction made by Cicero. On the whole it is not easy to assign definite meanings to Caesar's use of the word. Nevertheless, apart from Book VI, in the cases where fortuna is involved, it never seems to be in connexion with sheer luck. It is always with the Romans, except at V, 34, 2, and it is never said to be with the enemy, not even when they manage to get the better of the Romans, although it might seem a very serviceable excuse for Caesar.

A number of writers—Warde Fowler, Ericsson, and Brutscher\(^6\)—have said that Caesar does not imply in his writings that he has a special fortuna. I agree with this conclusion not only because Caesar's own treatment of fortuna offers only the most tenuous support for the belief, but also because Caesar never in any other way seems to suggest that any such magic qualities belong to himself or his
actions. In Chapter V I spoke a number of times of what I called Caesar's *fortuna*. Caesar himself provides justification for this through the implications of his remark at IV, 26, 5: *hoc unum ad pristinam fortunam Caesari defuit*. He speaks also of his *felicitas* at I, 40.

I suggested that the loss of *fortuna* at V, 34, 2 was closely related to Sabinus' bad generalship and its activity at V, 44, 14 in a very typical incident was related to the military virtues displayed in Cicero's camp. This might suggest that the word has in these cases a special moral significance, that it is closely connected with, say, *virtus* or *disciplina*. This would be supported by the use of *felicitas* at I, 40. It is difficult, however, to point to an obvious relation between *fortuna* and the military virtues in all the occurrences of *fortuna*. At this point it might be well to recall that I pointed out how *fortuna* is frequently used at important points in the narrative—i.e. its importance in literary terms at least is considerable.

There is one concept that would correspond without strain, I believe, to every use of *fortuna* and *felicitas*, this is success, implicitly a deserved success, the reward of good soldiership, discipline, etc. This fits very well with Caesar'd denial of *fortuna* to his enemies.

By using *fortuna* in this way, Caesar is able to add a self-deprecatory tone to the recital of his achievements through the strong suggestion of luck that the word brings. This provides an overtone of politeness, countering any impression of boastfulness on Caesar's
part. This overture is at its most emphatic when Caesar seems to personify fortuna.
NOTES

Introduction

1Cicero, De Oratore III, 52, 199: Dixi enim de singulorum laude verborum, dixi de coniunctione eorum, dixi de numero atque forma; sed si habitum etiam orationis et quasi colorem aliquid requiritis, est et plena quaedam, set tamen teres, et tenuis, non sine nervis ac viribus, et ea, quae particeps utriusque generis quadam mediocritate laudatur. His tribus figuris insidere quidam venustatis non fuco inlitus, sed sanguine diffusus debet color.

Cicero, op. cit., III, 25, 96. Ornatur igitur oratio genere primum et quasi colore quodam et suco suo; nam ut gravis, ut suavis, ut erudita sit, ut liberalis, ut admirabilis, ut polita, ut sensus, ut doloris habeat quantum opus sit, non est singulorum articulorum; in toto spectantur haec corpore.
NOTES

Chapter I


3 H. Fränkel, "Über philologische Interpretation am Beispiel von Caesar's Gallischer Krieg," Neue Jahrb. f. Wiss. u. Jugendb. 9 (1933) p. 35. Fränkel remarks, after quoting Bellum Gallicum 1, 5, 1: Die Gestalt dieses Mannes ist also überflüssig, wenn man an die selbständige Wirkungskraft allgemeiner geographischer Bedingungen glaubt. Wenn aber Caesar die Absichten und das Schicksal des Orgetorix so ausführlich schildert wie er es tut, und das Allgemeine nur in abhängiger Form Hilfsmotiv sein lässt, so lässt sich kaum ein anderer Grund erdenken, als dass für seine Geschichtsauffassung ein ehrgeiziger Mann mindestens als auslösender Faktor notwendig war.


5 Ibid., p. 12.

6 Loc. cit.

7 Loc. cit.

8 Fränkel, op. cit., p. 40. Fränkel speaks of this aspect of Caesar's style: Diese Kraft, die komplizierten Ereignisse und Verhältnisse auf eine reine Linie zu bringen, auf der sich alles nacheinander in grandioser Einfachheit abspielt...
Chapter II

1Collins, op. cit., p. 25.

2Ibid., p. 44.

3Hans Oppermann, Caesar, der Schriftsteller und sein Werk (Leipzig, 1933) p. 81.

4Detlef Rasmussen, Caesars Commentarii, Stil und Stilwandel am Beispiel der direkten Rede (Goettingen, 1963) pp. 37-8.

5Oppermann, op. cit., p. 100.


And there was one other factor in Caesar's success which we must never forget. Even his fortune and his genius might have failed against Vercingetorix if the hereditary enemies of Gaul had not crossed the Rhine to his aid.

7Cicero, Brutus 261: Nudi enim sunt, recti et venusti, omni ornatu orationis tamquam veste detracta.

8Oppermann, op. cit., p. 72: Auch der Sinn dieses Geschehens, die Zusammenhänge der einzelnen Ereignisse, die treibenden wesentlichen Faktoren und inneren Motive sind in seiner schlichten Einfachheit enthalten. Aber nur selten werden sie direkt angedeutet und für sich sichtbar, die Regel ist, dass sie "konkret in den Handlungen zum Ausdruck kommen" (Täubler).

9See Note 7 above.

10See Note 2 above.
NOTES

Chapter III

1 Caesar as Man of Letters. (Cambridge, 1956) p. 68. I find Adcock using this very word in connexion with the final battle at Alesia. "There is hardly a word that is not pure prose, but the effect is epic."

2 Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 42.

3 Oppermann, op. cit., p. 73. Er (Caesar) führt den Leser zum Verständnis des Geschehens, indem er die Handelnden in Reden sich über ihr Handeln verbreiten lässt. Sie selbst legen die Tatsachen, die Situationen dar, die für sie zu Motiven werden und dadurch die Ereignisse entscheidend beeinflussen.

4 Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 50. Adcock, p. 66.

5 Rasmussen, op. cit., Chapter I, "Die direkte Rede im Bellum Gallicum."

6 Ibid., p. 53.

7 Loc. cit.
NOTES

Chapter IV

1 Seel and Constans dagger this passage, Meusel and Fuchs delete it.

2 Novitate pugnae bracketed by Seel and Rice Holmes, deleted by Meusel and Fuchs. Nevertheless, even if this phrase is omitted, the quibus rebus refers to the unusual methods of the enemy.

3 Rice Holmes, op. cit., p. 129.

4 Gelzer does not see him quite this way; speaking of the beginnings of Vercingetorix' campaign, he remarks: Soon his ambition gave him ideas of becoming king in a national Celtic state... p. 155. Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, Peter Needham, trans. (Oxford, 1968).

NOTES

Chapter V

1 See bibliography under the following names: W. W. Fowler, H. Ericsson, C. Brutscher, M. Rambaud (pp. 256-264). See also Elizabeth Tappan, "Julius Caesar's Luck," C.J., XXVII, 1931, pp. 3-14.

2 Lucan, De Bello Civili, V. 580-584.

3 Dio Cassius, 41, 46, 3.

4 Plutarch, De Fortuna Romanorum 6.

5 Cordula Brutscher, op. cit. Brutscher discusses the relationship between these two words. She quotes Saint Augustine's distinction between them and paraphrases it as "glücklich sein"—that is, felicitas— and "Glück haben"—that is, fortuna. However, in Caesar's speech in I, 40 it is difficult to see any such distinction.

6 Bellum Gallicum V, 29, 3.

7 Seel capitalizes fortuna here. I shall refer briefly to the personification of fortuna under the heading "Military Color" in Chapter VI.

8 Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 22. Der Feldherr ist von den Umständen zum Nichthandeln verurteilt; Fortuna scheint zu herrschen. In dieser Situation, wo der Feldherr nicht mehr planen kann, erhält das Geschehen durch das Eingreifen des Soldaten den entscheidenden Impuls.

9 Gelzer, op. cit., p. 326. "He (Caesar) personally had no faith in the religion of Rome, and only used it as a political weapon." One might add, "as a rhetorical weapon also." The infrequency of Caesar's references to the gods is perhaps another indication of his lack of faith. The passages examined in this chapter provide the only instances in the B.G. where Caesar invokes them or appears to credit them with power over events.
Bearing in mind note 9 above, the invoking of the gods is merely a way of affirming that a certain justice has in fact been done, it does not necessarily imply anything as to Caesar's belief in a universal order.


NOTES

Chapter VI


2. Collins, op. cit., p. 30. Collins takes the opposite view: "All this, however, is mere literary flourish... It simply happened that the diplomatic exchange and the jockeying before the battle, including the panic in the army and the famous meeting on horseback by the tumulus terrenus was actually one of Caesar's most stirring experiences in the Gallic campaigns, and he described it con amore because he remembered it vividly and knew it would capture the imagination of his readers." Was Caesar so insensitive as to risk bordering on the ridiculous for the sake of "mere literary flourish"?

3. Collins, op. cit., Chapter II.

4. Ibid., p. 40.

5. Cordula Brutscher, op. cit., p. 78.

6. See bibliography.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


____________________. *The Roman Art of War under the Republic*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1940.


149


