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THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES: A STUDY OF
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DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
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By

James Ronald Blaker, B.A.

*****

The Ohio State University
1970

Approved by

[Signature]
Adviser
Department of Political Science
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS** ................................................................. iii

**VITA.** ...................................................................................... iv

**LIST OF TABLES.** ..................................................................... v

**LIST OF FIGURES** .................................................................... vi

**INTRODUCTION.** ...................................................................... 1

Chapter

I. **THE SPANISH PERIOD** ....................................................... 31

II. **THE CHINESE DURING THE AMERICAN ERA.** ...................... 78

   New Institutions
   The Chinese Newspaper
   Chinese Schools
   Case I: The Bookkeeping Law

III. **THE JAPANESE INTERREGNUM** ........................................... 160

   The Guerrilla Organizations

IV. **THE REPUBLIC PERIOD.** ................................................... 188

   The Context of Philippine Sovereignty
   Arrangement of Power in the Chinese Community
   Case II: The Retail Nationalization Act
   Case III: The Barrio School Project

V. **CONCLUSIONS** ..................................................................... 260

**APPENDIX**

   A. ........................................................................................ 288

   B. ........................................................................................ 296

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ........................................................................ 299
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VITA

April 15, 1939 . . Born - Chicago, Illinois
1961 . . . . . . . B.A. (with distinction), University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
1961-1964 . . . . National Defense Education Act Fellow, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1964-1965 . . . . Fulbright Fellow, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Republic of the Philippines
1966-1968 . . . . Captain, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

PUBLICATIONS


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Comparative Government

Studies in Theory. Professor James B. Christoph
Studies in Soviet History and Politics. Professor Louis Nemzer
Studies in Asian History and Politics. Professor Jerome Grieder
Studies in Chinese. Professor S. Y. Wang
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Distribution of Chinese in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Chronology of the Chinese Daily Press in the Philippines</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Statutory Restrictions on Alien Activity, 1945-52</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Size of Chamber Leadership Group, 1900-1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Tenures of Ten Leaders of Chamber Appearing Most Often, 1900-1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Percentage of &quot;New&quot; Members in Chamber Leadership, 1900-1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Percentage of Kuomintang Members in Chamber/Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Comparison of Community Cohesion and Nationalist Influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Nearly all polities have some segment of their populations which, although clearly embedded within the economic and social fabric of the state in which they reside and necessarily part of that state's political system, are believed to maintain political loyalty to another state. This phenomenon is often viewed, rightly or wrongly, as a problem and sometimes elicits actions which are unfortunate for both those who are viewed as alien and the polity involved. The detention of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry during the Second World War was, for example, of questionable value to the United States; the incarceration of "Zionists" in the Soviet Union during the conclusion of the Stalinist period probably did not improve the stability of the Soviet political system; the imprisonment and execution of Chinese in Indonesia during the mid-1960's may have created a climate which will retard economic progress there at precisely the time when progress is vital. These incidents, separated so greatly in terms of time and circumstance, all share a similar official rationale. In each the application of state power was justified by the argument that the groups or individuals against which it was applied did or could have maintained political loyalty to a foreign entity, and did or could have worked against the interests of the polity in which they resided.
Although this problem is one with which most nations are familiar, it is graphically expressed today in the relationship of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia to the political entities in which they reside. Currently involved in what they call nation-building, Southeast Asian political elites are vitally and quite verbally concerned with unity. While the techniques involved in the effort to fashion a common sense of national identity may be changing — emotional appeals and the reliance on charisma may no longer be viewed as sufficient bases for unity — it is clear that the quest for unity continues. Because of this, Southeast Asian political elites are generally very sensitive to groups or phenomena which they perceive as barriers to the unity they seek. That this sensitivity is often directed toward the Chinese in the area is indicated both by elite rhetoric and action. The following statement of a Philippine Senator is characteristic of many of the public analyses which are made:

"When the time of reckoning comes, the communist elements will, for certain, ensure that our 500,000 overseas Chinese will all side with Communist China and their task of completing our destruction will be simple enough because we have permitted by default their inroads in this country."

The suspicion of the overseas Chinese does not generally stem from the size of the communities in Southeast Asia. There are perhaps

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thirteen million overseas Chinese in the region, but excluding Malaysia and Singapore, nowhere do the Chinese approach native populations in terms of numerical strength. Estimates of the size of the various Chinese populations in the region vary greatly, but the following table, combining a number of estimates, is probably a rough approximation of the current distribution:

### TABLE 1

**DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Country</strong></th>
<th><strong>Number of Chinese</strong></th>
<th><strong>Percent of Total Population</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burma</strong></td>
<td>450-500</td>
<td>1.7-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brunei</strong></td>
<td>25-33</td>
<td>25.0-28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cambodia</strong></td>
<td>330-400</td>
<td>7.3-8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td>2,520-2,550</td>
<td>2.5-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Laos</strong></td>
<td>38-40</td>
<td>2.0-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malaysia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Malaysia</strong></td>
<td>8,900-9,000</td>
<td>35.0-45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sabah</strong></td>
<td>450-460</td>
<td>22.0-25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sarawak</strong></td>
<td>740-750</td>
<td>29.0-33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong></td>
<td>400-600</td>
<td>1.5-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Singapore</strong></td>
<td>1,300-1,400</td>
<td>75.0-77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thailand</strong></td>
<td>2,500-3,500</td>
<td>9.0-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vietnam (South)</strong></td>
<td>850-900</td>
<td>6.0-8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vietnam (North)</strong></td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>.3-1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The bases of suspicion and sensitivity actually stem from three interrelated factors: the strategic economic position of the Chinese; their cohesiveness; and, their cultural and political identification with China.

The Strategic Economic Position of the Overseas Chinese

In 1955, Thompson and Adloff pointed to the economic importance of the Chinese in Southeast Asia as follows:

"The economic grip of the Chinese upon Southeast Asia's economy is probably the basic cause of the indigenous peoples' resentment and fear of the Chinese minority ... Chinese are found throughout the entire economic gamut. Their importance in the different occupations varies from country to country, but everywhere they dominate commercial life, especially the retail trade."  

Although this interpretation has been eroded by both increasing restrictions on Chinese economic activity and the rise of indigenous commercial elites, the strategic economic position of the Chinese is still alluded to by nearly all the scholars who have addressed Southeast Asian problems. Chinese economic activity in Southeast Asia remains pervasive, if difficult to define. Retail trade is

3 Thompson and Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia, p. 4.

probably still dominated by the Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya. The processing, transportation and storage of prime agricultural goods in the region is still characterized by a heavy Chinese presence. International trade remains, if not in the hands of Chinese, clearly subject to Chinese interests in the Philippines, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.

The importance of the overseas Chinese has recently been reinforced by a growing potential for economic coordination among the various communities. Increasingly linked commercially by international banking institutions and the growth of international business firms controlled by Chinese, there is some evidence that contact between several Chinese Chambers of Commerce in the area is increasing.\(^5\) Travel and communication between the capitals of regional nations is expanding and if one were to survey the passenger lists of the airlines which fly between Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Djarkarta, overseas Chinese would probably be found to constitute a large percentage of the travelers. The Chinese in Southeast Asia are, of course, no more economically united than they are politically, and the communities throughout the region can be fairly easily distinguished from each other in terms of language, origin, history or demography. The growth of commercial contacts between the various communities is, however, readily apparent, and could eventually provide a basis by

\(^5\) Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce, Fei Hua nien Chien (Philippine Chinese Year Book), (Manila: Goodwill Press, 1965) pp. 6-44, 6-47.
which capital may be transferred and combined on a systematic basis between communities.

The economic importance of the overseas Chinese is magnified by timing. In nearly every Southeast Asian nation future economic growth -- which political elites define verbally, if not always by their actions, as essential to the future of their countries -- will be measurably influenced by the degree to which the resident Chinese are allowed and prompted to contribute to national development. In many of the nations the commercial and economic skills required for economic development -- indeed, perhaps the attitudes often linked to economic development -- have not yet diffused into the indigenous populations to an extent sufficient to assure progress. Yet the dynamics of population growth and increasing expectations make delay in economic growth increasingly dangerous, and it may be that until the required skills and attitudes have been built up among indigenous groups, several Southeast Asian nations will have to rely upon the Chinese in the region who have, by their past and current economic position, demonstrated that they possess the required attributes.

This obviously places the Chinese in a strategic economic position. They are strategically important not only because of their control of substantial amounts of capital, but because at this point in time and perhaps for the next several decades, they are one of the few groups who have demonstrated they can use capital effectively.

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In the future, their economic potential may be significantly different because of decreases in the relative amount of capital they control and the rise of competitors with comparable organization, contacts and experience. For the moment, however, the Chinese remain a key element in the current and short-range future economic life of the nations in which they reside.

The Cohesiveness of the Overseas Chinese

One of the reasons sociologists and other scholars have been drawn to a study of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia is the fact that they are generally fairly easy to distinguish from the indigenous populations and exhibit a degree of cohesion which makes them a fruitful universe within which to test hypotheses. Thus, Willmott turns to the Chinese of Semarang in order to deal with the effect societal change has on the structure and culture of a subsystem; Skinner turns to the Chinese in Bangkok to test the applicability of urban community leadership theory and analysis techniques developed in the United States to an oriental society; Freedman and Amyot use the Chinese in Singapore and Manila, respectively, to improve understanding of cultural transfer; T'ien Ju-K'ang turns to

the Chinese of Sarawak to address problems of social structure; and Simoniya uses the Chinese in Southeast Asia to demonstrate the validity of Marxist social thought.

The cohesion of the Chinese communities in the region is evidenced by the fact they are referred to as the Chinese community regardless of the country within which they reside. That is, they possess the attributes of a community: organization, shared interests and the perception of themselves as distinct from the surrounding population. Some of the bases of a distinct identity are, of course, changing. Since World War II, for example, Chinese migration into Southeast Asia has generally fallen rapidly and the proportion of China-born Chinese residents is probably already under 40 percent in the region as a whole. In some countries, notably the Philippines and Thailand, the proportion of China-born Chinese residents is much less. Likewise, the rise of communism in China has had the effect of curtailing the travel of overseas Chinese to mainland China as far as the communities in Thailand, South Vietnam, Malaysia, and Philippines, and recently, Indonesia are concerned. In short, direct, personal contact with mainland China is becoming the exception throughout Southeast Asian Chinese communities rather than the rule.


Yet most observers agree that the Chinese communities exhibit as much cohesion and distinctive identity now as they have in the last half-century, and in some cases may actually be more cohesive and unified than at earlier periods. Purcell argued in 1963 that the assimilation of the overseas Chinese into the societies of their country of residence, which may be taken as evidence of a breakdown of community cohesion and identity, had not taken place to any significant extent anywhere in Southeast Asia since World War II and was unlikely to occur rapidly if at all for at least another decade. Skinner saw trends in the mid-1950s which, if continued, would result in increasing assimilation of the Chinese to Thai society, but also commented extensively on the cohesiveness of the contemporary Chinese community. Willmott, T‘ien, Freedmann and Weightman also see possibilities for assimilation, but are reluctant to assess this movement as inevitable or rapid.

Part of the reason the Chinese communities have maintained a remarkable degree of cohesion can be traced to internal institutions which maintain a sense of communal identity and distinction. Two of

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13 Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 567-68.


the most important of these institutions are Chinese schools and newspapers, both of which have demonstrated uneven growth in the post-war decades. Chinese schools have been called the greatest barriers to assimilation, and Murray, in his comparative study of Chinese education in Southeast Asia, presents data which suggest that Chinese school enrollment rates may generally have exceeded growth rates of Chinese populations in the region. Although Chinese education has been subjected to increasing control by all Southeast Asian governments, with the exceptions of Thailand and, recently, Indonesia, it is possible for Chinese children to receive a full primary-secondary education entirely within the bounds of Chinese society. In general, he concludes, Chinese education has expanded steadily, not only in terms of an increase in the absolute numbers of schools and students but in the proportion of Chinese population attending Chinese schools.

Expansion has also characterized the history of the Chinese press in Southeast Asia for the last two decades. This is not to say that growth has everywhere been constant or the same in each country. In Indonesia, for example, the Chinese daily press experienced rapid expansion during the 1950's, a trend which was reversed

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18 Murray, "Chinese Education in South-East Asia," pp. 93-94.
in 1958 when President Sukarno closed down all Chinese papers. Some of these were later allowed to resume publication, but further curbs were imposed during the period of confrontation with Malaysia and following the 1965 coup. In March of 1966 all Chinese publishing facilities were placed under the direct control of the Chief of Army Information Center and although one Chinese language daily is now published, it is essentially a propaganda vehicle for the government. The Chinese press has been subjected to varying degrees of harassment in other regional nations also. In Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk announced the suppression of all privately published foreign newspapers in September 1967, which resulted in the temporary absence of any Chinese press, and the post-war period in the Philippines has witnessed the rise and fall of numerous Chinese dailies. In spite of significant variations from country to country and fluctuations within individual countries, however, Chinese press circulations are generally higher now than at any other period.\(^{19}\)

Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia are characterized not only by the presence of institutions which communicate a sense of cohesion and distinctiveness, but by similar control mechanisms. Thus, nearly all the communities are, in Skinner's terms, "dominated by the formal Chinese associations." These formal associations are generally not identical to those associated with the village environment of China where until recently, at least, social control was largely effected within lineages and informally by gentry and village elders. Among the Chinese in Southeast Asia social controls operate much more at the extra-familial associational level. Even in those cases where some Chinese communities have attempted to transfer lineage associations into the overseas populations, as in the Philippines, they are not identical to their mainland predecessors and have surrendered many of the traditional lineage functions to non-lineage associations.

All Chinese communities exhibit vertical associational divisions which are variously expressed in the existence of speech group associations (hui-kuan), hsien associations (t'ungsiang-hui), or surname associations. These vertical divisions provide the channels for the expression of special interests within the communities in

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22 Formal association for individuals identifying with a common county in China.
addition to meeting some welfare demands for their members. In addition to the vertical associations, however, there is usually at least one core organization which attempts to serve, on the one hand, as the channel through which the special interests of the vertical associations are coordinated and reconciled, and on the other, as the spokesman for the entire community vis-a-vis the surrounding political system. These organizations differ from the vertical associations in the scope of their control; they are viewed as central coordinating agencies for the Chinese community which speak on the behalf of all members of the community.

Several institutions attempt to meet these criteria. The Chinese diplomatic structure, whether Communist or Nationalist, is formally charged with the protection of the interests of Chinese nationals abroad, and as such, is often viewed as a primary spokesman for the community. Closer investigation reveals that in addition to acting or attempting to act as a spokesman for the entire community, Chinese embassies or consulates also attempt to serve as the forum within which special interests in the overseas communities are reconciled. The most important of these core organizations is, however, usually exemplified by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, or, as in Malaysia where the Chinese are allowed to play a more direct role in the political system, the Malayan Chinese Association.

The cohesion of the community is closely related to the strength and effectiveness of core organizations. Without them, internal disagreements could degenerate into irreconcilable divisions, special
interests could, and have on occasion, slipped into more or less open internal warfare, and in the absence of a strong coordinating agency, the community could be perforated by a wide range of clientele relationships with outsiders.

The Ties to China

The substance of Chinese education and the flow of communications within the Chinese communities through the Chinese press not only lead to greater cohesion but also maintain the cultural ties overseas Chinese have to China. There are other ways in which ties are maintained. Amyot's study of clans in the Philippine Chinese community, for example, has demonstrated that in the case of these associations, overseas Chinese attempt (with limited success) to recreate replicas of Chinese based organizational forms.

Of more importance is the fact that it has been the expressed policy of both the Republic of China and the People's Republic to assure the maintenance of the cultural ties. It seems clear that they pursue this policy for political as well as economic purposes. In terms of economics, the overseas communities constitute a source of investment funds and revenue; in terms of politics they constitute at least a potential channel for expanded Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.

Pye has argued that Southeast Asia has historically been responsive to the unity of China:

"Whenever in the past China has succeeded in bringing itself together under united rule, its
influence has never been limited to its geographic bounds... One of the most important reasons why it is impossible for the states on the periphery to ignore China is the key position which the overseas Chinese occupy in each of these societies."^23

Likewise, the view that the overseas communities may become an appendage of the Chinese political system is frequently expressed, if not usually by scholars, certainly by political elites in Southeast Asia.

Part of the basis for this view lies in the historically important role the overseas Chinese have played in Chinese politics since the turn of the century. The battles between the reformists of Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao and Sun Yat-sen's revolutionaries were fought on the pages of the overseas Chinese press to a greater extent than it was within China, and the overseas Chinese were the main source of support for Sun's revolutionary movement. Later, the rise to power of the Kuomintang was signaled by the expression of an aggressive Chinese nationalism which claimed that "where there are Chinese, there is China" and efforts to mobilize the loyalty of the overseas Chinese. This approach was initially adopted by the People's Republic. In the early 1950's Communist China began to depart from the earlier Kuomintang position regarding the citizenship of the overseas residents, but at the same time established political machinery and propaganda programs designed to elicit loyalty which

was far more extensive and effective than any comparable Kuomintang organization. The events associated with the 1965 Indonesian coup and, more recently, anti-Chinese demonstrations in Burma and Cambodia attest, if not to the continued political activity of the Chinese Communists among the overseas communities, certainly to the belief on the part of political elites in Southeast Asia that the overseas Chinese maintain political orientation and loyalty toward China.

The three characteristics of overseas Chinese communities outlined in the previous paragraphs — their economic power, cohesion, ties to China — are usually viewed at least implicitly as inseparable and mutually reinforcing. Thus, cohesion is viewed as a means by which the economic power of the community is increased; economic power is seen as the reason China seeks the support of the overseas community; cultural ties to China provide the vehicles for deriving political loyalty from the overseas communities; and the effort to derive support from the community on the part of China is viewed as a reason for greater cohesion. In general, there is a pervasive tendency to associate cohesion on the part of the overseas community with a willingness to work to achieve Chinese foreign policy goals.

If one looks closely at the argument, however, it is clear that it rests on a series of hypotheses rather than proven behavioral facts. For the purposes of discussion, the hypotheses on which most of the discussion and policy-making regarding the overseas communities rests can be described as follows:
1. "The greater the cohesion of the overseas Chinese community, the greater power the community is able to wield."

2. "The greater the cohesion of the community, the greater the political orientation toward China."

3. "The greater the political orientation on the part of the overseas community toward China, the more the community seeks to use its power for the benefit of China."

4. "The more the power of the community is directed to Chinese purposes, the greater danger the community poses to the economic and political integrity of the host nation."

The basis for the hypothesis that the power of the community is related to its cohesion rests more on logic and historical example than it does on detailed quantitative analysis. Cohesion and unity imply an increase in at least economic power in the sense that they facilitate the coordination of economic activity. Greater coordination, in turn, suggests that the community is able to both pool its economic resources and to bring them to bear at the time and place in which they would have the greatest impact. The history of Chinese boycotts appears to support the assumption, and although comprehensive analyses of Chinese boycotts have not yet been made, what is available indicates that their effectiveness is related to the existing unity of the community.

The second hypothesis, which ties cohesion on the part of the community to a greater political orientation toward China, is often based on observation of the most formal or symbolic expressions of cohesion; and formal cohesion is often most obvious during periods of Chinese nationalistic symbolism. In the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and South Vietnam, for example, the annual Double-Ten
Celebration brings forth symbols of cohesion, from the extensive display of the Republic's flag to demonstrations and meetings at which a wide spectrum of community organizations are represented. In other countries, the symbols and periods of display reflect the nationalistic ritual of the People's Republic, but the formal demonstration of cohesion on the part of the community is much the same. Likewise, there does seem to be some positive correlation between cohesion within a community and cultural, if not political, ties to China. Core organizations,—that is, those organizations which function as central coordinating agencies—are often either the sponsors of or closely associated with entities or activities which maintain cultural ties to China. The cultural attaché of the Chinese diplomatic structure often performs this function, while Chinese Chambers of Commerce throughout the region invariably have a department or individuals designated to coordinate the visits and activities of artists and other troupes from the mainland or Taiwan. Chambers are also generally closely associated financially with Chinese schools in the host countries and other institutions which maintain Chinese cultural values. In a sense, then, a strong core organization—which is the best indication of community cohesion—is probably associated with an increased awareness of China on the part of the community.

Yet, these two phenomena, the symbolic demonstration of nationalism in a context of cohesion and the presence of a strong core organization, are not in themselves a clear demonstration that cohesion
is correlated to an increased political orientation toward China.

A ritualistic display of nationalistic symbols proves only that political ritual is present, and the fact that on certain occasions the ritual is widely observed within the community demonstrates only that numerous groups or individuals in the community share the desire to take part in the ritual. They may do so for reasons other than political loyalty to the entity whose symbols they display and, in any event, it is neither direct proof of cohesion, nor a demonstration that the community would react in a unified, cohesive manner to orders from Peking or Taibei.

Although a strong core organization may stress cultural ties to China, it may also be very cautious about the degree of political orientation toward China it promotes by such actions. The reason the officers of a Chinese Chamber of Commerce or analogous institutions such as the Malayan Chinese Association view themselves as charged with the maintenance of Chinese cultural values, for example, may have very little to do with the Chinese political system and, in fact, be much more closely related to the political and social system of the host country. As an institution, a Chamber of Commerce or analogous organization derives its power and status from the fact that the community is not assimilated into the surrounding social and political systems. To the extent that the overseas Chinese residents are assimilated into their surroundings -- culturally, socially and politically -- the rationale that a single spokesman
for "Chinese" interests is required in the host country becomes less
tenable, and those institutions which have built their reputations
and power on the claim that they can act as spokesmen tend to de­
crease in terms of status and power. Thus, it is very much in the
institutional interests of the core organization to promote activity
which retards assimilation. But it is also against the interests of
some core organizations to allow the overseas community to become an
appendage of the Chinese political system, whether centered in Peking
or Taibei. To the extent that it does, core organizations such as
Chambers of Commerce will be replaced by such institutions as political
parties or the Chinese diplomatic organization. Therefore, from an
institutional point of view, it may be to the advantage of the
Chamber of Commerce or Chinese Association to assure that the cultural
ties to China do not become political ones. In this sense, the
activity which is sometimes taken as evidence that cohesion and in­
creased political orientation on the part of the community are insepar­
able, may be nothing of the sort. The efforts of the core organization
to channel cultural ties to China through its offices may actually be
a result of the desire to assure that such cultural ties do not become
too political; and although the relationships between Chinese political
parties and other institutions which are more clearly the source of
efforts to orient the community politically toward China are often
portrayed as amicable, there may in fact be much greater institutional
rivalry present than meets the eye. In short, the hypothesis that
cohesion and political orientation toward China are inseparable and mutually reinforcing remains to be proven. Cohesion depends on the growth of a central coordinating institution, an institution which may actually work against the development of extensive political ties and political orientations toward China on the part of the community. A much better guide to assessing the relationship between cohesion and political orientation of a given community may be by noting the fate of institutions which are primarily devoted to orienting the community politically toward China. If organizations such as the Kuomintang, overseas Chinese Communist Party or Chinese Embassy appear to show marked increases in strength at the same periods as the cohesion of the community is increased, then the hypothesis may be supported. However, until such an effort is made, it cannot be said that there is clearly a positive correlation between the cohesion of a given overseas community and increased political orientation and loyalty on the part of the community toward China.

The third hypothesis — that the greater the political orientation toward China, the more the community seeks to use its economic power to the benefit of China — also has not been the subject of comprehensive analyses. It does seem clear, however, that the direction and scope of the flow of finances from the overseas community toward the Chinese government has in large measure been a function of the political loyalty overseas Chinese have toward China. The Chinese government receives financial benefit from taxing or confiscat-
ing remittances which are sent to relatives in China for reasons which have very little to do with political loyalty, but the successful collection of donations for Chinese governmental purposes does seem to rest on a sense of political loyalty toward China within the community. Likewise, in those instances where the Chinese government has called upon the overseas community to take some economic action in the country of residence which it sees useful for Chinese foreign policy -- such as the anti-Japanese boycotts prior to World War II -- the success of such undertakings seems to be related to the overseas Chinese political loyalty to the Chinese regime. Thus, in the absence of any conflicting interpretations, this hypothesis seems valid.

The final hypothesis -- that the more the economic power of the community is directed to Chinese governmental purposes, the greater the danger posed to the host nation -- does not necessarily follow, however. It is valid, of course, only if China seeks to use the resources of the community in a manner which is detrimental to the host country. Chinese foreign policy goals do not necessarily have to work against the interests of other nations and it is conceivable, for example, that a situation could arise in which the economic progress and viability of a given Southeast Asian nation might promote or coincide with Chinese foreign policy goals. In such a situation, China might seek to use what influence it had in a given overseas community to bring about actions which would be beneficial rather
than detrimental to a host country. It can legitimately be said, however, that to the extent that the Chinese government controls the economic activity of the overseas community, the greater effect -- good or bad -- it is likely to be able to have on the host country.

These comments point to one of the interesting facts associated with the problem posed by the overseas communities; namely, that despite a great deal of hyperbole and a much less but growing body of scholarly literature regarding them, very little is actually known about the relationships between cohesion, political loyalty and the exercise of economic power. That the communities have gone through various periods of greater and lesser cohesion is generally accepted; that Chinese nationalism has risen and fallen in various communities has also been noted by several scholars; but the actual dynamics of cohesion and nationalism have not been directly addressed to the extent they should be, nor has much effort been devoted to identifying the phenomena which triggers periods of cohesion or fragmentation. As a result, the hypotheses on which policy dealing with the overseas communities is based generally remain implicit and untested, and although it may not be the function of scholarly discourse to directly propose specific policies, the fact of the matter is that scholarly discussions regarding the Chinese in Southeast Asia are used by decision makers there to justify and guide actions taken regarding the overseas residents. It is justified and perhaps incumbent upon scholars to look closely at the implicit hypotheses and arguments upon which policy is made.
The purpose of this study is to begin to test some of the hypotheses which have been outlined in the previous paragraphs. It seeks to better identify the relationship between community cohesion and political orientation and to better elucidate the factors and forces which appear to lead to greater cohesion and to an increased political orientation toward China on the part of the overseas Chinese communities. More specifically, it attempts to answer the following related questions: First, are periods of cohesion within the Chinese community accompanied by an increased political orientation toward China? Second, does increased cohesion within the community lead to a greater political orientation toward China? Thus, the study will directly address the first two of the previously noted hypotheses. It will also offer some tentative judgments regarding the latter two.

The Conceptual Framework of the Study

The approach of this study is essentially historical; the vehicle for the analysis is a single overseas Chinese community, that which resides in the Philippines. It should be noted from the outset that restricting the analysis to a single Chinese community necessarily limits the generality of the conclusions which may be drawn regarding other overseas Chinese communities.

The overseas Chinese community in the Philippines is not entirely representative of all overseas communities in Southeast Asia. No single community in the region is, however, and, while it cannot be argued that the overseas community in the Philippines is entirely typical of all other communities in Southeast Asia, it is
clear that most if not all the salient characteristics and prominent problems associated with other communities can be found in the Philippine Chinese community. Structurally, the Philippine community is similar to other overseas communities, possessing vertical cleavages expressed organizationally in much the same manner as they are in the communities of Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, and, as in other communities, core institutions which act as coordinating agencies between interests within the community and as a spokesmen for the community as a whole. Organizationally, ties to a Chinese political system, while not expressed in overt activity of an overseas Chinese Communist Party or diplomatic representative of the People's Republic, are maintained by an active Kuomintang and Chinese Nationalist Embassy. Chinese newspapers have flourished in the Philippines and have, on occasion, been subjected to restrictions and suspicions similar to those faced by the Chinese press in other parts of Southeast Asia. Chinese education has likewise expanded impressively in the Philippines since World War II. Perhaps even more than in other Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese in the Philippines are deeply embedded in the economic life of the archipelago, thus raising questions similar, if not typical, to those raised by the Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia.

The restriction of the analysis to the community in the Philippines was a result of the resources available and the techniques employed. An effort was made to go beyond a survey of the literature available regarding the Chinese in various countries in the region and to
introduce several case studies based on data derived from fairly extensive interviews. This technique provides somewhat greater depth, but requires a relatively greater expenditure of time and financial resources. The interview data was drawn over a period of approximately one year, and to draw comparable data from additional overseas communities was beyond the resources available. It was decided early in the research stage that more useful information could be elicited by concentrating on a single overseas community than by spreading the analysis over several communities. While no claim is made that the conclusions regarding the overseas community in the Philippines are directly applicable to all overseas communities, it is believed that this study presents useful hypotheses which may be tested in and perhaps explain phenomena associated with other overseas communities.

The study deals with two variables which are difficult to measure -- political orientation and cohesion -- both of which are, in the last analysis, functions of attitudes. Cohesion exists when people believe themselves to be members of a distinguishable entity and act in a manner consistent with this belief. Likewise, political orientation and loyalty are psychological phenomena, which, although at times expressed in action, are based in the attitudes of individuals. One way of measuring the existence of cohesion and the direction of political orientation is, therefore, the adoption of attitudinal survey techniques which, when applied to a representative sample of a given Chinese community, may provide useful data. This approach
has, in fact, been applied to at least one other Chinese community with impressive results, and may be one of the best ways of dealing with the problems associated with this study. Accordingly, some attempt was made during 1964-1965 to utilize these techniques, and a questionnaire was sent to fifty individuals within the community who were, through reputations, identified as "influential." The response was disappointing, however, and review of this effort indicated the presence of several factors which tend to make the application of attitudinal survey techniques difficult in the Philippine Chinese community. The experience of several members of the community with outside investigators had sometimes been less than helpful, and the general climate of suspicion regarding the Chinese in the Philippines is often adopted by members of the overseas community regarding outsiders who seek to elicit information, particularly data related to political orientation and activity. Chinese nationals in the Philippines are in a relatively tenuous position. The expression of sentiments which may be interpreted as support for Communist China or activity which can be interpreted as efforts to participate in Philippine politics has sometimes been grounds for incarceration or deportation, and the argument that an outsider is seeking information only for academic purposes is generally not accepted as valid by members of the Philippine Chinese community.

There are, however, other means of measuring political orientation and cohesion, some of which have been implied by the earlier discussion. Cohesion and political orientation, although based on the attitudes of individuals, are also reflected by the activity and strength of organizations, and if we accept the definition of an organization as an identifiable structure of differentiated roles established to attain a given goal or goals, then by identifying and gauging the strength of those organizations most closely associated with community cohesion and political loyalty toward China, these two phenomena may be traced.

The two most obvious candidates for such an analysis in the Philippines are the Chamber of Commerce and Kuomintang; the Chamber because of its close relationship functionally to community cohesion, the Kuomintang because of its efforts to solicit political loyalty toward the Republic of China. Within this framework cohesion can be said to be high when the Chamber (or its equivalent) is strong; that is, when the Chamber’s leadership exercises broad influence on the activity of other community institutions and does, in fact, provide a framework or means whereby the vertical cleavages of the community are reconciled and coordinated and speaks for the Chinese community vis-a-vis the surrounding political system. A political orientation toward China can be said to have increased when Kuomintang leaders exercise broad influence on the activity of other community institutions and are able to channel increasing financial resources toward China.
By viewing the overseas community in the Philippines over a period of time, it should be possible to elicit several kinds of information. First, historical perspective should give an indication of when the Chamber of Commerce experienced periods of strength, and, therefore, when the Chinese community was characterized by relatively greater cohesion. By comparing these periods it may be possible to distinguish certain common elements which can be identified as triggers of increased community cohesion. Second, given the proper time spectrum, it should be relatively easy to determine whether the periods of Chamber strength did in fact coincide with periods of strength for the Kuomintang, thus testing the hypothesis that cohesion is related to greater political loyalty toward China. Finally, a historical perspective should make it possible to distinguish if there have been significant structural or functional changes on the part of either the Chamber or Kuomintang; changes which might suggest that the Chamber or Kuomintang were other than what they seem to be on the surface.

With the exception of the concluding chapter, the following chapters have been organized similarly. An effort has been made to describe the general setting within which the entire overseas Chinese community found itself, the salient aspects of community organization, and the manner in which the community interacted with its political surroundings. Several broad divisions in this historical overview have been employed, each of which corresponds to a period of Philippine
history. Thus, Chapter One deals with the community during the period of Spanish control of the Philippines, when several precedents for Chinese community organization were apparently established; Chapter Two deals with the American era of Philippine history, during which Chinese nationalism became a significant factor in community life; Chapter Three deals with the short but important period of Japanese control in the Philippines; and Chapter Four describes the community in the post-war Republic period. The concluding Chapter returns to the hypotheses the study is designed to test, and, based on the preceding historical overview, presents several alternative hypotheses which better explain the relationship between cohesion and political orientation.
CHAPTER 1
THE SPANISH PERIOD

While Chinese contact with the Philippine archipelago antedates the arrival of the Spanish by several centuries, our understanding of these earliest contacts is generally restricted to knowledge derived from archeological investigation and a few references in Chinese sources to what appear to be the Philippines.¹ Wu Ching-hong, in his comprehensive examination of Chinese sources has determined 982 as the first date at which a clearly identifiable reference to the Philippines may have been made.¹

be found in Chinese sources, and while some excavations have uncovered Chinese pottery which predates this reference, the early Sung period (960-1279) is generally accepted as the point from which contact can definitely be historically established. Regular Philippine contact with Chinese traders was probably not established, however, until the stabilization of the eastern route of the Chinese junk trading system sometime during the earlier years of the Ming Dynasty (1369-1644).

The route originated on the southeast coast of China at the cities of Ch'uan-chou and Amoy, crossed the Taiwan Straits, and from Taiwan moved southward to Luzon and on down the axis of the Philippine archipelago, touching the future sites of Manila, Jaro, Iloilo and Zamboanga before moving on to Borneo. Because of the monsoons the movement was seasonal; junks moved toward the Philippines in the early months of the year and back toward China from summer until the year's end. The trip to and from the Philippines probably took about a week.

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Little is known of the trade contact between China and the Islands prior to the Spanish period. Archeological traces suggest that beginning in the fourteenth century ceramic wares and other trade goods from China began to flow into the Philippines in increasing numbers, and there is some evidence that Chinese settlements were established at various points along the junk route at about that time. Barter trade was undoubtedly carried on between the Chinese and natives, but the settlements that existed prior to the Spanish period were most likely designed to facilitate the arrival and departure of the junks and as such were probably composed of crew members whose stay was temporary. Until the Spanish arrival, the Chinese in the Philippines were small in number, undiversified in occupation and in general probably saw their residence there as transitory. With the spread of the Iberian Empire into Southeast Asia, however, the conditions and basis of Chinese trade with the Philippines were significantly modified; new opportunities for the Chinese were opened and the potential for profit greatly expanded.

The general history of Chinese-Spanish relations in the Philippines has already been traced by several authors and need not be

discussed in detail here. The following paragraphs are designed to elucidate some of the salient aspects of the relationship which appear to have had the greatest continuity and are, in a sense, the roots of the current situation. Indeed, it seems as if some present modes of activity had their precedents in the Spanish period and that vestiges of the original framework associated with the Chinese community during this period still exist.

The first extensive economic relationships between the Chinese and Spanish were a result of the Spanish maritime effort to link her empire and the fact that, unlike other western maritime nations, the Spanish were delayed in establishing direct commercial contact with the Chinese mainland; elements which led to the great Galleon trade

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linking China, the Philippines, Mexico and Spain. From the Chinese viewpoint, the arrival of the Spanish opened a path to great profits, for, among other things, it meant access to Mexican silver. As Wickberg points out:

"The arrival of the Spanish conquerors in the Philippines in the 1560's meant new opportunities for the Chinese. In Fukien province ... ship owning merchants immediately realized the potential economic significance of the newly-developed Manila Galleon trade between the Philippines and Mexico ... (The Spaniards) developed a pattern of waiting for the yearly monsoon winds to bring the Chinese junks to Manila, bearing silks and other luxury goods from China to be transshipped to Mexico on the Manila Galleon. On the Galleon's return voyage Mexican silver was brought to Manila, from whence it was taken to China by the Chinese junk traders in repayment for the luxury goods they had bought. Both the Chinese and the Manila Spaniards, who acted as middle men, profited enormously from this arrangement."

Gradually, however, Chinese enterprise regarding the Philippines became more diversified. Perhaps as a result of the seasonal delays and variations involved in the arrival and departure of the junks and galleons, the Chinese moved into the provisioning of the Spanish settlements with goods and services, and soon Chinese other than ship owners and shipbound merchants were arriving in the Philippines with


the intention of staying for longer periods than was previously the habit. The growth of the Chinese population in the Philippines following the Spanish conquest was dramatic. Roughly three decades after the founding of Manila in 1570, the Chinese population there was estimated to be about 20,000, of which a significant percentage were artisans and merchants who were more or less permanent residents engaged in satisfying the domestic economic requirements of the Spanish settlement. Within a relatively short period the Chinese not only dominated certain artisan fields, but acted as an economic link between the Spanish and the native population. Chinese in Manila and other areas in which Spanish settlements had been established channeled necessities of life to the Spaniards, who for the most part devoted themselves to trade in foreign commodities. In this, the Chinese residing near a Spanish settlement would exchange imported Chinese cloth, utensils or Mexican silver for local native products with which to provision the Spaniards. In short, prior to 1750 the Chinese had become economically integrated into the Spanish settlements in several important ways. They provided the link between the Spanish Galleons and Chinese junks, and were therefore essential to those Spaniards speculating in the Manila Galleon trade. Apparently monopolizing certain artisan trades, the Chinese were the only source of certain services. Finally, and most importantly, the Chinese provided the

9See Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 576-79 for population estimates during the entire Spanish period. The original source for the 20,000 figure is "letters from ecclesiastics, dated 15 December 1603," The Philippine Islands, ed Emma H. Blair and James A. Robinson, (Cleveland: Arthur Clark Co., 1903-07), XII, p. 253; this work hereafter referred to as B&R.
Spanish with foodstuffs produced in the Philippines, acting as the link between the native economy and that of the Spanish settlements. 10

Their importance to the Spanish was also enhanced by the taxes and several contributions derived from them. De la Costa has estimated that the Chinese provided 40 percent of the total Spanish governmental revenues derived from the Philippines. 11 Paying an annual tax of 81 reales, or slightly more than 10 pesos, the Chinese resident paid roughly four times that required of native Filipinos.

By the eighteenth century the economic relationship between the Chinese and Spanish had begun to change. Several factors seem to account for the modifications, among which some of the more important are the economic gains of the Chinese mestizo at the expense of the Chinese, the decline of the junk trade, and Spanish experiments with export crops.

In the early eighteenth century the solidification of Spanish control in the Philippines was nearly complete. Spanish dominance was not entirely inclusive of the entire archipelago, but the era of conquest had receded and the Spanish were never to advance, in terms

10 Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, pp. 4-7

of control and hispanization, significantly beyond the geographical extent that had been achieved by the 1750's. The solidification of Spanish control was accompanied by increased economic opportunities for any group able to seize them, but residence restrictions, immigration limitations and expulsions curtailed Chinese competition in the race. Instead, the Chinese mestizo, who, culturally and legally was a special kind of Filipino rather than Chinese, reaped the benefits, and had, by the late eighteenth century, begun to replace the Chinese in their pivotal economic role as suppliers of local produce for the Spanish population centers.

The decline of the role played by the Chinese junks was gradual and took place as a result of several developments. First, demand for Philippine products was growing in Mexico, and as a result more and more space was taken on the Manila-Mexico galleons by Philippine produced products and other goods. This began to restrict the Chinese silks-for-silver exchange. Secondly, by 1785 and with the formation of the Royal Philippine Company, Spain moved into direct competition with the Chinese junks by sending her own bottoms to China for cargoes, rather than awaiting the arrival of the junk fleet at Manila. Finally, during the eighteenth century, the success of other Western nations, such as the Dutch in the Netherland Indies, made other areas of South-


east Asia more attractive to the Chinese shipping interests. The opening of Manila in 1789 to non-Spanish European vessels carrying Asian trade goods ultimately eliminated the junks as a primary carrier of Chinese goods to the Philippines and by the end of the eighteenth century, the average number of junks arriving in Manila each year had fallen from the seventeenth century norm of twenty or thirty to about eight. In terms of cargo value, Chinese junks were doing only about 13 percent of the total import business at Manila in the first decade of the nineteenth century. These developments severely restricted the Chinese role as direct maritime traders, though resident Chinese maintained preeminence as importers of Chinese goods and were able to shift to the importation of western goods.

Spanish interest in the development of cash crops began in the late eighteenth century, initially as a means of supplementing revenues derived from customs duties on the galleon trade. But in the early nineteenth century a number of factors were coalescing to increase official Spanish concern with export crops in the Philippines. First, the demise of the Manila galleon trade in 1815 and the end of the private entrepot trade between Manila and Mexico, partially a result of the independence movement in Spain's American colonies, cut into customs revenue. Secondly, restrictive commercial, residence, and


15Quiason points out that the English were never totally excluded from the Manila trade and had cut into the Chinese dominance early in the 1670's: Quiason, "The Early Philippine-China Sampan Trade." It was the technological improvements of western shipping, however, that finally pushed the junks out.

trading laws were revised, resulting in the influx of North American and European entrepreneurs, who, acting as exporters of raw materials, were largely responsible for the development of certain crops to export status. By the 1820's local produce had assumed the leading place in Philippine exports.

The Spanish paralleled these economic developments with a series of measures designed to fit the Chinese into the stream of things. At first they sought by negative means to push the Chinese into agricultural pursuits, and from the expulsion of 1755, until the tax law of 1828, Chinese arriving in the Philippines found, on the one hand, their economic activities hampered to various degrees by legal restrictions on occupational pursuits, and, on the other, their physical mobility in the archipelago limited. Under Spanish regulations, only those dedicated to agricultural pursuits could legally reside outside the immediate


18 While numerous expulsions were ordered by Spain for security reasons during the period 1594 to 1766, the 1755 expulsion order was probably the result of pressure by Spanish citizens and urbanized mestizos seeking to enter retail trade at the expense of the Chinese already there. Apparently almost all the non-Catholic Chinese in the Philippines were expelled, leaving a total of about 10,000 in the entire archipelago, most of whom remained in Manila. Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 503; Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, p. 22.


20 Restrictions had been present earlier, some of which can be found in "Laws Regarding the Sangleys," Recapilacion de leyes de les Indias, 1594-1627, B&R, XXI, p. 151-160. It was apparently only after the English occupation of Manila in 1762 that consistently serious efforts were made to curtail Chinese activity.
Manila area; a negative approach in the sense that the authorities sought to punish with residence restrictions those who did not enter the agricultural occupations favored by the government. This was unsuccessful in channeling Chinese into agricultural pursuits and led to the adoption of the 1828 tax law which, accompanied by fewer residence restrictions, sought to grant tax preferences to those who went into farming. Based on the principle of taxation according to occupational classification, the tax law of 1828 did not include agricultural activity as a taxable category. Chinese residents who were taxed were divided into three classes according to business or trade, the "first class" paying an annual tax of 48 pesos while the others paid decreasing assessments. This system was superimposed upon the personal tax structure already in existence, and therefore, one result was a significant increase in the tax revenues derived from the Chinese. This has led some authors to argue implicitly that the tax law was designed as a revenue increasing measure rather than an attempt to force the Chinese into agricultural pursuits, but the penalty for non-payment was forced agricultural labor, and, given the atmosphere in which it was conceived, it was more likely designed to serve both purposes.

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24 See Jensen, The Chinese in the Philippines during the American Regime, p. 34, for the former argument.
In any event, by the 1850's the principle of tax incentives to guide Chinese into agriculture was well established. The tax law of 1850 granted specific preferred tax status for Chinese agricultural labors:

"Instead of paying 6 pesos tribute (or head tax), plus 6 reales 'community chest' tax, plus one or another of the rates established in the 1828 industrial tax, a Chinese agricultural laborer in Luzon was to be exempt from the industrial tax and pay only a reduced head tax and 'community chest' fee totalling 13 reales, or about 1 1/2 pesos. Plantation laborers in the Bisayas were to pay only 6 reales, or less than 1 peso. Chinese who settled as agricultural colonists on the frontier, whether in Luzon, the Bisayas, or Mindanao, were to be charged only the standard 12 real tax paid by the indios."25

A series of experiments involving the importation of coolies for agricultural purposes began in the nineteenth century, and although there is little evidence that they were officially inspired by the Spanish authorities, they roughly paralleled official measures to shift Chinese into agriculture and were attempted with official cognizance. 26 A few landowners requested and received permission to import Chinese as plantation laborers, and in 1849, Juan Bautista, a Manila Spanish merchant, was given permission to import, tribute free for fifteen years, 176 Chinese men and six Chinese women to act as


26 An early basis for Chinese agricultural colonies can be found in an April 1, 1785 order approving the proposal, Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 503.
agricultural colonists.\textsuperscript{27} Comenge alludes to Chinese agricultural settlements in the Calamianes Islands in the 1850's.\textsuperscript{28}

Despite these efforts, few Chinese went into agricultural pursuits. According to the first United States census in the Philippines, only about one percent of the 40,000 Chinese estimated to have been in the Philippines in 1870 were employed in agricultural occupations.\textsuperscript{29} The failure of the Spanish policy was probably due to several reasons, some of which were the loopholes in the legal instruments designed to push Chinese into agriculture, others which were perhaps more closely related to some basic contradictions. While the tax law of 1850 clearly sought to promote Chinese agricultural activity, for example, it was fairly easy for individual Chinese to avoid its canalizing effects. Chinese entering the Philippines under this plan had to show on arrival where and for whom they were going to work, but there was no official effort to ensure that they worked for the person under whose name they were admitted to the Philippines, unless specific contractual arrangements between the Chinese and employee had been made and broken. Then too, the Spanish efforts to shift the Chinese toward agriculture overestimated the ability or inclination of the hacienda owners to utilize coolies. Most land owners lacked the capital necessary to import Chinese because of the small size of their land holdings, and large

\textsuperscript{27}Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{28}Rafael Comenge, Cuestiones Filipinas, 1 parte: Los Chinos (Manila: Chafre y, 1894) p. 410.

\textsuperscript{29}U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the Philippine Islands, 4 vols. (Washington, 1905) II, p. 985.
hacienda owners, which were generally religious orders, believed the spread of Chinese to the countryside would endanger the Christianization of the natives and therefore preferred traditional methods of exploiting their land holdings. Thus, the economic relationship between the Chinese and Spanish authorities was never based on agriculture, but the gradual relaxation of residence restrictions which accompanied the Spanish effort to utilize the Chinese in the agricultural realm had the effect of neutralizing many of the gains of the mestizos in the commercial field.

After 1850, then, the economic role performed by the Chinese was significantly modified. The function performed by the Chinese as maritime traders was no longer the same; Chinese importers residing in the Philippines still sought with much success to import goods from China, but whereas in the past junks brought these goods to the Philippines for the use of Europeans, now European ships dominated the trade. The Chinese role as provisioner for the urban areas, lost to the mestizo during the period 1750-1850, had been regained, but in supplanting the mestizos, the Chinese were becoming important as commercial agents for the European export firms in Manila. Chinese economic activity in the Philippines was again becoming pervasive and the Chinese role as collector of produce for export was laying the foundation for Chinese dominance in retail trade, an activity later to become the object of political and economic attacks.

Chinese expansion into retail trade was a function of the development of export crops, a series of liberalized economic policies undertaken by the Spanish authorities and unique business organizational efforts on the part of the Chinese. As European entrepreneurs began to seek the purchase of crops for export, primarily to European and North American markets, they did not go directly to the producer for various reasons, some of the more important of which were the barriers of residence restrictions and the fact that the relatively small size of most land holdings made such an approach unprofitable. Rather, they depended upon the action of a number of collection agents and the existence of gathering points which, until 1844, were controlled for the most part by the provincial governors. The 1844 law which prohibited the provincial governors from participating in trade, however, opened opportunities for other groups to act as collecting agents. Yet, for the Chinese to get into the provinces a number of restrictions on their travel beyond the Manila area had to be lifted. This was accomplished in a series of governor-general decrees in 1847-48 which extended the period of transit in some provinces from three to twelve months and an extra-legal loosening of the restrictions on Chinese residence in the countryside.

As a result of these developments, the Chinese were on roughly the same ground as other groups in their ability to exploit the developing export crop market. But in contrast to their competitors who collected

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the export-destined produce at periodic markets, the Chinese adopted
the technique or instrument of the *tienda de sari-sari*, a kind of
general merchandise store which was open at all times and would barter
retail goods for the export crops:

"...Unlike the periodic markets held
in ... towns once or twice per week, the
Chinese sari-sari store was open all the
time. Another consumer advantage was the
readiness of the Chinese to offer credit
to his customers. From a producer's point
of view, the Chinese store was also an
improvement over previous marketing
systems. As early as the 1780's producers
of export crops had been receiving cash
advances from agents of the Royal Philip-
pine Company and mestizo wholesalers.
The Chinese storekeeper continued this
practice. But because he also had some-
thing to sell a producer who needed
supplies rather than a cash could
barter with him, which would take the
form of credit at the Chinese store
instead of cash advances against crops."34

While an individual sari-sari store operator could not deal in the sort
of volume which would interest the European entrepreneurs in Manila,
it was characteristic of the Chinese store owner that he fit into a
broader network and was often the agent of a Chinese wholesaler in
the urban areas. This system was headed by a single large wholesaler
of imported goods and export produce, to whom the individual sari-sari
store operators were tied as agents, who dealt with the foreign
business firms in Manila. The arrangement offered a number of
benefits to all participants not provided by the market system. To

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the foreign businessman it offered the advantage of a widespread network
for the distribution of imported goods and the purchase of export crops.
To the Chinese wholesaler it provided tax benefits. The Chinese agent
in the provinces reaped the advantages of relatively inexpensive access
to the foreign goods and credit from the Chinese wholesaler.

The sketch of the economic roles developed for the Chinese offered
above has hinted at part of the Chinese organizational structure which
had evolved by the late nineteenth century, but it is useful to
delineate the organizational characteristics in greater detail. In
this, it should be noted that the structure of the Chinese community
during the Spanish period was a result of many influences, but that one
of the more persistent was the Spanish effort to impose upon the Chinese
a system of control and exploitation; a system that varied from period to
period and which was motivated by a congerie of sometimes conflicting
desires. One component in this system was the Spanish desire for
physical security, a consideration which permeates early Spanish writing
regarding methods of dealing with the Chinese. A law of 1598, for

benefits accruing from the system were primarily a result of the changes
introduced by the 1852 tax law. This law replaced the levy on occupa­
tions by a levy on place of business. As a middleman commission merchant,
the Chinese wholesaler did not require a store or shop and was exempt, in
these operations at least, from the tax.


37See, for example, Pedro de Acuna, et. al., "Relations with the
Chinese", (Manila: July 1-4, 1605) B&R, XIV, pp. 38-53; Miguel de
Rodriquez de Maldonado (Sevilla: 1606) B&R, XIV, pp. 119-140. Anon.,
"Relation of the Insurrection of the Chinese" (probably written in
March, 1640) B&R, XXIX, pp. 208-259. An early historian returns to the
theme throughout his work; Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de los islas
1868).
example, preventing the housing of Chinese within the walls of the Spanish section of Manila, and the various expulsion orders and efforts to limit the influx of Chinese which occurred throughout the Spanish period appear, particularly prior to the nineteenth century, to have been based firmly on the idea that the Chinese posed a threat to Spanish life. Although later expulsion orders were tied to problems of commercial competition, the Spanish assumption that the Chinese posed a physical threat was never fully eliminated.

Another consideration which was prominent in Spanish thinking, however, was the relationship of the Chinese to the goal of Christianization of the Philippines. In this, a series of efforts designed to lead to the conversion of the Chinese were undertaken, but there also appears to have been a fairly prominent belief that the presence of infidel Chinese constituted a serious obstacle to the Christianization of the Filipinos. The two considerations, a concern with the safety of the Spanish residents in the Philippines and the potential impediment posed by the Chinese to the Christianization of the Philippines, were expressed in the various policies designed to segregate the Chinese.

38 "Decrees Regarding the Chinese" (Felipe IV, Madrid: June 1628-March 1629) BS&R, XXII, pp. 287-293; Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 517.

39 See note 18.

One further consideration inherent within the Spanish approach to controlling the Chinese was the desire for material gain. It soon became apparent to the Spanish that the Chinese constituted a source of financial augmentation and service, and it became important to the Spanish to devise a control system which could best utilize the Chinese residents as well as guard against them.

The early Spanish control system imposed upon the Chinese at Manila, therefore, had both locational and occupational aspects. It may have reflected an effort to accommodate and utilize certain structures already developed by the Chinese, but data for this hypothesis is lacking. One thing is quite obvious, however, the almost periodic resort to severe measures of repression attests to the limited success, at least in the eyes of the Spanish, the overall system had.\(^4^1\)

In terms of location, by the early seventeenth century the Spanish authorities at Manila had separated the Chinese population into three distinct groupings or settlements. The original settlement of Chinese near Manila, known as the Parian, was established as a segregated area for Chinese in 1580 by governor Gonzalo Ronquilla de Penalosa.\(^4^2\) Raised outside the walls of the fort at Manila, but close enough for

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\(^4^1\)The Chinese uprisings-massacres and estimates of their Chinese casualties were as follows: 1574, 1603, (23,000 Chinese killed), 1639 (22,000-24,000 Chinese killed), 1662 (2,000 Chinese killed), 1686, 1763 (16,000 plus). See also the chronologies in Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, pp. 500-504; Wu Ching-hong, "A Chronological Table of Important Events Relating to the Chinese in the Philippines During the Spanish Period," *The Bulletin of the Institute of Southeast Asia* (Nanyang University: 1960).

economic convenience and military control, the Parian became a Chinese
ghetto and center of the Chinese trade activity in silk and other
imported goods. Its establishment was accompanied by a series of
measures designed to restrict the movement of Chinese within the
Philippines and exclude them from the Spanish sections of Manila.
Thus, a required pass system for movement beyond six miles from the
city was instituted and Chinese could remain within the walls of the
Spanish section overnight only at the risk of death. The approach of
segregating the Chinese in a single area, however, promoted neither
assimilation nor Christianization, and as the population in the Parian
grew, the question of security probably became more intense to the
Spaniards. As a result, the original efforts to segregate the Chinese
in a single location gradually were curtailed, at first only for
Catholic Chinese, but eventually for non-Catholic Chinese as well. By
1594 a "second" Chinese settlement had been established across the
Pasig River at Binondo.

Binondo was established as a Chinese settlement by a grant of land
to several prominent Chinese merchants and artisans and it is doubtful
that the early settlers there were an accurate cross section of the
Parian population. It is more likely that they were chosen on the
basis of their distinctiveness from the Parian Chinese, their closer


44Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, p. 18; Purcell, The
Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 502; Hiquel, Garcia Serrano, "Letter
from the Archbishop of Manila to the King" (Manila: 1621-22) B&R, XX,
p. 233.

relationships with influential Spaniards in Manila and their nominal acceptance, at least, of Christianity. In any event, the area was taken as a parish by Dominican friars who sought to either create or accentuate the differences of the Binondo Chinese by, among other things, attempting to turn the settlement there into a community of married Chinese. By 1600 about five or six hundred Chinese lived in Binondo, most of whom were probably at least nominally Catholic and married to native Filipinos. That differences in orientation between the Binondo and Parian Chinese existed, is indicated by events related to the Chinese uprising of 1639. Spanish records indicate the Binondo Chinese did not participate, but it is unclear whether their lack of participation was due to antipathy toward the Parian Chinese or because of successful repression by Spanish and Dominican authorities in Binondo. Following the crisis, however, when Governor Fajardo attempted to rebuild the Parian in Binondo, Catholic Chinese protested vigorously, and in 1687 the Gremio de Chinos de Binondo, a formal municipal governing corporation and religious sodality had been established. Both of these events suggest at least some split between the Binondo and Parian Chinese was present.

Roughly paralleling the development of a separate Chinese community in Binondo, the Jesuits attempted to establish a similar

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mission settlement east of Binondo at Santa Cruz between 1619 and 1634.  
Little is known of the settlement, but it is likely to have been based on and designed to promote, as was the settlement at Binondo, Catholic married Chinese.

Spanish policies of separating the Chinese into different locations were probably tied to a desire to assimilate the Chinese into the native population. Separation in terms of locality, it was hoped, would lead to social, cultural and political divisions within the Chinese population, develop the kind of cleavages that would promote assimilation and, ultimately, lessen the threat to Spanish security in the Philippines. The effort was partially successful, but while the settlements at Binondo and Santa Cruz exacerbated differences between their inhabitants and the Chinese of the Parian, they did not follow the development anticipated by the Spanish. As Wickberg points out:

"Clearly, Binondo, by the seventeenth century was intended to be a settlement for Catholic Chinese and mestizo descendants, and ultimately, in the continued absence of Chinese women, an all-mestizo community. But such a community, once developed beyond a certain point, could not be dissolved with ease and its members assimilated into indio society. This was true even after indios began to settle in Binondo. The result was what might be expected: acculturation without complete assimilation and the

Thus, by the early seventeenth century the Spanish at Manila were actually dealing with roughly three Chinese settlements, two of which may have been distinguishable from the Chinese living in the Parian, but all of which were still definitely Chinese. Part of the failure of separation as a policy designed to promote assimilation can be traced to the negating effect of the other part of the control structure -- that based on occupational organization -- which tended to bridge the gaps created by separation.

Apparently from a very early date the Spanish authorities grouped the Chinese at Manila along occupational gremios, the total number of which varied from twenty to forty. Each gremio, which may or may not have been similar to a trade or craft guild, was headed by a cabeza or cabecilla. The cabecillas were collectively referred to as the cabecillas de oficios and were, in turn, headed by a single individual known as the cabecilla principal. One of the more important functions of this committee of cabecillas and their leader, or as it was known in the Philippines, the Principalia, was the nomination of a single representative for the Chinese to deal with the Spanish authorities. Upon approval by the Spanish governor, this individual occupied the office of Chinese governadorcillo or capitan (甲长) which, for

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51Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, p. 19. Wickberg's use of the term "indio" is not meant to reflect discredit upon the Filipinos of today, but was chosen to refer to the Malayan natives of the Philippines in a manner consistent with Spanish usage. "Filipino," as a term of national identification, is a post-1898 usage. In the Spanish period the term "Filipino" was ordinarily applied to Spaniards born in the Philippines while "indio" was the ethnic classification term for Malayan natives of the archipelago.
most of the community's history, was the most powerful position in the community.  

The duties demanded by the Spanish of the Chinese capitan were extensive, but could also have been the source of considerable power. He was at the same time tax collector, judge, and communication link between the Spanish and Chinese. Required to collect taxes of the Chinese, the capitan was not only in a position to increase his own financial resources, but could reward and punish, by a discriminate use of the tax collecting power, individual members within the Chinese community. His function as judge in most civil cases where both parties were Chinese provided an escape for other Chinese from the financial dangers of the Spanish courts, but as in the case of the tax-collecting duty, could have been a source of great power for the capitan. There is also some indication the capitan was held responsible for the maintenance of order in the Chinese community, which probably meant that he was among the first sought and executed by the Spanish in a Chinese rebellion, a factor which may have accounted for some hesitancy in assuming the position on the part of individual


53 Liu, Chung-Fei Kuan-hsi Shih, p. 449-500.
Chinese. But between direct clashes with Spanish troops, the capitan apparently was afforded some degree of coercion over the Chinese in the form of his own police force as well as access to the ears of Spanish military authorities, both of which were undoubtedly important instruments of power within the community. Finally, as intermediary between the Chinese and Spanish authorities, the Chinese capitan came close to monopolizing the flow of information in both directions, enabling him to interpret directives from the Spanish downward to the Chinese and to exercise some selection over the messages moving upward from within the Chinese community toward the Spanish authorities. Although some limitations were supposedly built into the structure — Chinese criminal cases and those civil cases involving large sums of money were to be handled by a special Spanish justice and the activity of the capitan was theoretically overseen by the Spanish fiscal\footnote{Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, p. 37.} — it is doubtful if these effectively limited the capitan's power. For one thing, the linguistic and cultural barriers between the Spanish and Chinese at very least inhibited communication, and since the perception of the Spanish legal code was filtered through the office of the capitan, any legal abuse of his duties was probably grudgingly accepted by the Chinese without an awareness of any recourse or right of appeal to the Spanish authorities. This was possibly less true in the case of those Chinese with either very close ties to the Spanish clergy or with constant commercial dealings with Spanish influentials. In these cases,
which were limited, access to Spanish authority could be attained through channels outside the capitán's office, but there was no guarantee that once having gained the ear of the Spanish, a Chinese seeking recourse to an abuse by the capitán would be handled with less venality or threatened with less financial loss in Spanish officialdom than by accepting the capitán's abuse. Indeed, the entire policy of segregation pursued by the Spanish and their apparent inability to head off Chinese rebellions before a resort to force was necessary, indicates there was little awareness of what was going on in the "other society" by either the Spanish or the Chinese. The overall impression is one of two relatively closed political systems, linked economically at several points and politically through the capitán office, but with severe restrictions on the flow of information between them. Structurally, at least, the capitán dominated the Chinese at Manila for the greater part of the community's existence.

The capitán's geographical jurisdiction extended not only over the Parian, but included the Chinese settlements of Binondo and Santa Cruz as well. Thus, one part of the overall approach taken by the Spanish to control the Chinese in effect conflicted with that part based on separation. By separating the Chinese into different residential areas, the Spanish sought to develop cleavages within the Chinese community which would both limit coordinated action by the Chinese and hasten their assimilation and Christianization. But by extending the

jurisdiction of the capitan system over all the Chinese regardless of place of residence, and by placing virtually all political functions required by the Chinese in that system, they provided the structural requisite which would maintain homogeniety and limit assimilation. Their approach was inherently self-defeating.

Although the capitan structure formed the basis of the community's organization throughout most of the Spanish period, there are some variations of the structure which should be mentioned. The creation of a Binondo Gremio de Chinos late in the seventeenth century has already been noted. This structure could have established a counter organization for at least some of the Chinese in the Manila area, but it apparently never fully assumed the same functions, such as tax collecting, which were monopolized for the most part by the capitan structure, and it is possible that it was more of a social club than a political challenge to the capitan system. It apparently lasted only until 1741 when the Gremio de Mestizos de Binondo, which was formed by former mestizo members of the Chinese Gremio, assumed superiority in civil and ceremonial affairs within the town. 56

At some point during the eighteenth century, the office of capitan became an honorary position and real power was assumed by the cabecilla principal. This did not really change the system, however, as the principal merely assumed the duties and powers formerly held by the capitan. The structure remained essentially the same and was characterized

by the dominance of a single office which had jurisdiction over all Chinese. Indeed, by the 1830's the principal had been replaced by the office of capitan. Of more significance was the policy, adopted by the Spanish in 1809, of awarding tax collection duties on the basis of open quinquennial contract bidding by all Chinese. This could have broken the concentration of power within the capitan office and introduced another locus for it within the community, as it is possible that one individual could have occupied the capitan office with its judicial and executive powers, while another monopolized tax collection. On the other hand, there were no restrictions on the same individual occupying the two positions simultaneously, and it is just as possible that this could have occurred fairly often. Unfortunately, evidence one way or the other is presently unavailable, but the fact that wealth was likely a characteristic of the occupant of both offices suggests that any disruptive effect of the Spanish action of throwing the tax collection open to contract bidding was less than it appears at first glance. The group of Chinese who could compete for both offices was relatively narrow, thus raising the chances for one individual to maintain control over the two offices, and there is little evidence that the Spanish threw the tax collecting power open to bidding specifically to break the power of the capitan.


58 Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, p. 38. Open bidding for the tax collecting privilege only lasted until 1828, at which time the function was returned to the capitan.
One grouping of Chinese over whom the capitán did not exercise direct jurisdiction was the temporary visitors associated with the junk shipments, for in addition to attempting to separate the Chinese residing in the Philippines from each other on the basis of what amounted to religious classification, the Spanish also from an early date attempted to distinguish in organizational forms between resident and temporary Chinese visitor. Although this approach is most graphically illustrated in the creation of the Alcadería de San Fernando, a separate living compound for transient Chinese traders, established in the late 1750's, the origins of the approach are probably found as early as the late sixteenth century and the creation of the pancada trading system. In 1586 a junta of Spanish citizens petitioned the Council of the Indies to adopt an arrangement of bargaining between a few representatives of the Spanish merchants and a representative of the Chinese merchants for the prices to be paid for the cargo of each incoming junk. (Prior to the adoption of this system, known as pancada, the purchase of Chinese goods was generally conducted on an individual basis between Chinese merchants, a number of which arrived on each junk, and Spanish importers.) The adoption of the pancada system, it was argued, would keep the prices of the Chinese goods down by restricting buyer competition and minimize translation problems, but of interest for the purposes of this discussion, the pancada system was also apparently designed to facilitate the rapid departure of the junks and to limit contact between the junks and the Chinese already residing in the Philippines.
According to Schurz:

"The large number of Chinese who annually came in the junks and constituted an unwelcome addition to the already large population in the Parian also disquieted the Spaniards. They believed that the more expeditious Pancada would enable them to rid themselves of their presence sooner than would the custom of long drawn out haggling at which the Oriental is so apt and which might end in altercations that would lead to more serious disturbances." 59

The approach was not successful in separating the Chinese traders from residents, but the Spanish concern with keeping them separate was never lost and over a century later this objective was institutionalized in the restriction of transient Chinese to the Alcaceria de San Fernando. The Alcaceria was a combined wholesale mart, separate living compound and customs house for transient Chinese traders. While established near the Chinese section of Binondo, it was designed to separate the Chinese and its creation was accompanied by strict, but relatively ineffectual laws to this end. 60

The actual relationship of the Alcaceria to the organization of the resident Chinese community is unclear. Overall control of the Alcaceria was in the hands of a Spanish official holding the office of the Alcaceria de San Fernando, and there were legal restrictions at least until 1843 on the movement out of the Alcaceria by newly arrived Chinese. There is, however, some evidence that resident Chinese acted as go betweens for Spanish importers and the Chinese


60Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, pp. 28, 81, 84, 115.
merchants residing at the Alcaceria, and despite the legal restrictions on associating with the resident Chinese, from the 1790's onward Binondo became a Chinese and mestizo town in which permanently residing Chinese, mestizos, and indios rubbed shoulders with newcomers from China. It is therefore likely that Chinese coming into the Alcaceria were soon made aware of the organization of the Chinese already at Manila.

The capitan structure, then, was for the Chinese residing in Manila at least, an extremely influential if not the single most important organizational structure. The evidence for this conclusion is, of course, circumstantial, but no other organization matched the capitan in either the scope of its jurisdiction or in the instruments of power at its command. Encompassing all Chinese regardless of the location

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^Wo other possible contenders for the pivotal organizational role among Chinese should be mentioned: the clan associations and secret societies. Amyot has pointed to the importance of clan associations in community affairs in the early twentieth century Jacques Amyot, The Chinese of Manila: A Study of Adaptation of Chinese Familism to the Philippine Environment, (PhD dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1960), while Freedman, among others, has noted the influence of secret societies in other overseas communities (Maurice Freedman, "Immigrants and Associations: Chinese in Nineteenth Century Singapore," Comparative Studies in Society and History, No. 3, 1960, pp. 37-38). The clan association, even if it existed prior to 1850 -- for which there is no evidence -- would not have been as inclusive as the capitan structure, and although there are some references to the existence of rival secret societies in the Philippines of the nineteenth century (see, for example, Liu, Chung-Fei Kuan-hsi Shih, p. 573; Comenge, Cuestiones Filipinas ..., pp. 136-140) the extent of their influence is portrayed as limited, and they certainly could not have enlisted the coercive power of the Spanish authorities to the extent that the capitan could. The relatively greater influence of the capitan organization is, of course, inferred from its formal structure. Available data does not allow comparison on the basis of actual case studies, but it is clear that the Spanish, particularly after 1850, viewed the capitan and not secret societies or clan associations as the most powerful organization in the Chinese community. See Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, pp. 182-183.
of their residence at Manila and with its influence permeating into even those Chinese groups over which it had no formal authority, the institution spoke for and acted on the part of the Chinese community. The powers it had over each Chinese were probably as great as or greater than those of the Spanish authorities and, as such, to the extent that individual Chinese in Manila sought power and wealth, control of or position within the _capitan_ structure undoubtedly became a goal.  

Excluded from participation in Spanish politics and cut off from participation in the political system of mainland China, political action for the Chinese of the Philippines was defined for the most part by the relationship between the individual and the _capitan_ system.

Although we have evidence that the _capitan_ system was imposed upon the Chinese at Manila, and do not know how closely it conformed to any preexisting organization within the community, three elements suggest that the Spanish may have utilized an indigent organization to govern the Chinese at Manila. First, common sense would indicate that to the extent the Spanish desired to manipulate the community, they would be willing to utilize any existing framework which might facilitate this. Second, the outline of the _capitan_ system, particularly in the apparent role played by the occupational _gremios_, has in broad form the dimensions and look of the organization of trade and craft guilds which

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63 The relative autonomy of the _capitan_ system was not unnoticed by the Spanish. As early as 1597 the Spanish authorities expressed some concern over the power exercised by the _capitan_ (B&R, X, p. 42), but the values to the Spanish of the system apparently overcame concern.

Later, in the late nineteenth century, the Spanish launched a concerted attack on the _capitan_ system by appointing, for a short period at least, competitors who were more directly tied to the Spanish authorities. See note 66.
existed on the Chinese coast. To the extent that the Chinese in Manila were acquainted with these forms, the capitan system might not have been entirely alien. Finally, the Spanish system of control, again in broad outline, conformed to the practices adopted by other metropolitan western nations in dealing with overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. This suggests that the approach was either a common western practice or that all Chinese overseas communities had an indigenous organizational framework which the western nations sought to utilize for their own purposes. However, until more information is obtained regarding the method involved in selecting the capitan (or principal), our understanding of the system must be based on the tentative assumption that the structure was not entirely an artificiality imposed without regard for the existence


of any indigenous organizational skeleton.

Such an assumption does not conflict with what bits of evidence we have regarding the earliest Chinese community. We can presume, for example, that for the community to be effectively organized around a single structural entity, it would most likely have to have a relatively high degree of homogeneity. This was a characteristic of the Chinese in

Prior to 1850 the capitan was "nominated" for appointment by the Spanish governor by both past and present heads of the various occupational gremios. In 1861 this was modified by including in the "electorate" payers of the first and second class rates of the industrial tax. The system provided for biennial nominations for the capitan, a deputy (tiente primero), comptroller (interventor) and chief constable (alguacil mayor). All eligible members of the electorate met in a joint meeting during which twelve of their number were selected by lot. This "sub-electorate" in addition to the current incumbent of the capitan's office, wrote on secret ballots the names of three favored candidates for each office. The person who received the largest vote for the office of capitan and the runner-up were listed as first and second choices, and the incumbent as third choice. This list was then presented to the Spanish governor for his selection, and it appears that in most cases the governor merely acquiesced in the choice of the "electorate". In 1887 the "electorate" was again expanded to include those Chinese who paid taxes down to 60 pesos and in that year 446 members assembled to pick the new capitan (from a total Chinese population at Manila of about 40,000). 1887 also saw a modification of the capitan system. In response to Spanish criticisms that the capitan had more power over the Chinese than the Spanish authorities, the Spanish government instituted the direct appointment of a number of Chinese who were to carry out tax collection and keep order among the community. They were to be directly responsible not to the Chinese capitan, but to the Spanish administration. This was apparently not fully successful as some subordination to the capitan continued in fact if not formally. See Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, pp. 180-83. This, of course, was the formal selection process. We do not know if it was a facade over some indigenous selection process which, in fact, depended upon the acquiescence of a much larger Chinese "electorate."
the Philippines who, at least until the late nineteenth century, were derived almost without exception from the areas in and around the eastern Chinese ports of Chuan-choû and Amoy, the cities from which the junks destined for the Philippines set forth. It was only at about the time the China trade was opened directly to the Spanish in 1785 that ships began plying the sea lanes to Canton, and there begins some record of the arrival of non-Hokkien Chinese in the Philippines. Even then, there is little indication that the introduction of Cantonese and Chinese from Portuguese Macao severely upset the relative homogeneous condition of the Chinese in the Philippines. It is only in the post-1850 period that there is a record of the formation of a "Cantonese Association" among the Chinese in the Philippines, and although this organization is believed to have taken over some of the judicial functions previously the perogative of the capitan -- particularly regarding disputes between Cantonese -- it probably did not fully insulate Cantonese from the influence of the capitan system.67

Amyot's study of familism in Manila points to the importance of kinship-based immigration in the twentieth century Chinese community in the Philippines.68 He describes a pattern in which once a Chinese had established a foothold in the Philippines and had achieved some success, he sent for or returned to China to bring back a son or nephew, establishing a kind of fragmentary family in the Philippines.


and over a period of time creating "rivers" of immigration, the sources of which were rooted in fairly restricted geographical areas of China near Amoy. There is no evidence currently available that this pattern existed earlier than the late nineteenth century, but it may well have been as important prior to that time as it became in the twentieth century. If so, it is conceivable that the occupational gremios on which the capitan system was based were imbued with kinship attributes similar to those later developed by the clan structure outlined by Amyot. The point is that the capitan system was not necessarily contradictory to the role kinship may have played in the early community.

One has the impression that the capitan structure served as a kind of core organization for the Chinese community throughout the Spanish period. This is not to say that its effect on the Chinese was continuous or always pervasive. As Spanish repressions became less frequent, it is possible that the Chinese felt less of a desire to support a single system or organization for their own protection. Wickberg argues along these lines in the following manner:

"Given the removal of pressures from the outside during the early nineteenth century the Chinese community was during this period less a community than a group, many of whose individuals had social ties with non-Chinese that were as strong as those with other Chinese. Without outside pressures or outside opportunities defined in community terms, there was little need for community-wide mobilizing organizations and community-wide institutions for dealing with the government or with other sources of pressure. There was little need -- and few if any such institutions existed." 69

There is also some question as to the impact the *capitan* system had on those Chinese who had moved into the provinces. The greater the distance a Chinese was from Manila undoubtedly meant the less he was influenced by the *capitan* system. But it is by no means clear that those Chinese who moved into the provinces or to other Spanish centers in the archipelago were totally unaffected by the structure. For one thing, Chinese coming to the Philippines almost always arrived at Manila, and were, in the later years of the Spanish period at least, accounted for and accountable to the Chinese *capitan*. And to the extent that the Chinese who had moved to the provinces acted as an agent for a Chinese wholesaler in Manila, he was indirectly tied to the *capitan* system. This was probably less true in the cases of those Chinese who lived in Cebu or Zamboanga or for those individuals who acted as their agents rather than agents for Manila Chinese wholesalers, but the impression one has is that in terms of numbers of Chinese affected by the system, most Chinese in the Philippines were aware of and influenced in varying degrees by the *capitan* at Manila. Although the figures are tenuous, it was only in the very last years of the Spanish period that the number of Chinese outside Manila exceeded those close to the geographical base of the *capitan* system at Manila. 70 It is possible that other "*capitan* systems" existed near the Spanish settlements of Cebu and Iloilo, but no documentation regarding this has been noted.

The persistence of the *capitan* structure at Manila, is however,  

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undeniable. Submerged for periods of time, it continually reappeared. By the late nineteenth century there is evidence that control of the capitan system was highly competitive, a phenomena which attests to the viability and importance of the structure. It may be that there is a much greater degree of continuity between this system and the development of the chamber of commerce structures beginning in the late nineteenth century than previously described.

It is the purpose of the following discussion not to provide a detailed description of the relationship between the Chinese community in the Philippines and the Spanish authorities, but to indicate aspects in that relationship which may have been characteristic of a style of interaction between the Chinese and the surrounding political system. This is necessary in order to begin to identify residues from an earlier period which seem in part to define, direct and circumscribe current Chinese activity in the Philippines, and to provide the basis for discerning change. Although necessary, a description is difficult for several reasons.

One problem in attempting to describe or reconstruct a characteristic style of interaction is the fact that the political system in the Philippines under the Spanish changed from period to period. Spanish control, after all, bridged over 300 years, beginning in an era of Spanish sea power and conquest and ending years after the international power of Spain had become but a shadow. It would be as naive to argue

72 Liu, Chung-Fei Kuan Hsi-Shih, p. 712.
that there was only one style of interaction between the Chinese and Spanish authorities as it would be to argue that the political system in the Philippines in 1898 was the same as that of the 1570's. The participants and context did not remain constant; there is little reason to believe a single style of interaction had completely solidified.

Another problem stems from gaps in the data from which a characteristic style can be constructed. Although Wickberg has pointed to the wealth of historical material which is available and has amply demonstrated how this material can be made to yield insights, the most valuable historical data is available for a relatively small portion of the entire Spanish period, that limited to the conclusion of the Spanish period in the Philippines. By its nature, it can offer only limited case studies. Most of the documentation for the period is, of course, Spanish and, in a sense, presents only one side of the interaction process. Chinese histories of the period are not extensive and are generally superficial. Raw data from Chinese sources, such as the records of the capitan, diaries, or letters apparently no longer exist, and secondary Chinese sources, such as newspapers, are available only beginning at the turn of the century.

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While it may be that the style of interaction between the Chinese and the Philippine political system during the Spanish period cannot be described with precision, some of the basis on which it was founded can be sketched, and what historians have pointed to as important aspects of the style can be listed. When this is done, it is suggested that the Spanish period left the precedent of a single organizational structure for Chinese affairs, centered in Manila and controlled by Chinese whose residence in the Philippines was extended if not permanent, and in which wealth became the single most important criteria for recruitment to leadership. It also left an ambivalence regarding the political status of the Chinese in the Philippines, an ambivalence which may have contributed to what several historians portray as personalistic and corrupt aspects, "typical" of the Chinese interaction with the surrounding system.

The precedent for unity was, of course, found in the capitan structure. Both judicial and executive or coercive functions were performed within this framework and while the capitan did not completely monopolize these functions, it is likely that many more individual disagreements between members of the Chinese community were resolved within the framework of the capitan system than in Spanish courts, and that most Chinese turned out to the capitan for an explication, definition and evaluation of directives from Spanish authorities. The precedent was also established during the Spanish period that there was to be a single "representative" of the Chinese in dealings with political authority in the Philippines. There is some evidence that the Spanish at least considered the approach of ruling the Chinese in the Philippines by splitting the community with a proliferation of organizations; the
Gremio de Chinos de Binondo attests to some such desire. But for the most part, the Spanish apparently found more advantage in dealing with a single Chinese "representative." Efforts to divide the Chinese at Manila into numerous and competing groups were restricted, and even where this might have been a goal, as in the distinctions drawn between Catholic and non-Catholic Chinese, it was undermined by the apparent belief that more could be gained in areas such as tax gathering by dealing with the Chinese as a unified entity. There is little evidence that the Spanish sought to aggravate clan or dialect cleavages within the Chinese community and no indication that they sought to promote variation by immigration policies which distinguished between Cantonese, Hokkien or other Chinese groups. The introduction of Cantonese to the Philippines was a reflection of the delayed arrival of Spain alongside other European and North American China traders at Canton and not a result of a conscious policy to promote competition within the Chinese community in the Philippines. Nor did the Spanish attempt to manipulate or otherwise utilize the separations created by the secret societies which appear to have had some influence in the last century of Spanish rule. 74

The most important center of Chinese activity was Manila during the Spanish period, and though the Spanish authorities vacillated between restrictive and permissive residence policies regarding the Chinese, Manila was firmly established as the geographical point at which the greatest concentration of Chinese, greatest continuity of

74Liu, Chung-Fei Kuan-hsi Shih, p. 556.
immigration and the closest contact with China occurred. As such, the precedent of a single organizational framework was wedded to the notion that the center of this structure was to be found at Manila. Cebu, Zamboanga, Iloilo, and Jaro were all to develop sizeable Chinese populations, particularly during the final years of Spanish dominance in the Philippines, but it was Manila where new ideas and forces were introduced to the Chinese community and an examination of Chinese activities outside Manila is likely to best be conducted on the hypothesis that activity in the provinces was in large measure a reflection or response to what was happening in Manila. In contrast, there is little if any indication the Chinese community at Manila was ever significantly responsive to forces growing within Chinese communities in the provinces.

Certain precedents were established regarding the internal functioning of the capitán structure during the Spanish period. For one, there is a fairly clear emphasis on wealth as an important criteria for advancement to control of the capitán system. Undoubtedly, the Spanish preferred to deal with a Chinese capitán who was Catholic, and there is some evidence that the Spanish governor approved the nomination by the Chinese for capitán only after consultation with the parish priest. But this preference was not always followed and it is likely that many Chinese capitans were non-Catholic or only nominal Christians. The emphasis on wealth, however, was required by the system.

As the official ultimately responsible for the payment of Chinese taxes, it was desirable from the Spanish viewpoint that the capitan be capable of adhering to his responsibility by use of his own personal funds if necessary. When the Spanish opened the tax collection privilege to bidding they merely confirmed the necessity of relative wealth in order to compete for leadership and power in the Chinese community. And since the capitan's activities were extensive and probably time consuming, he had to be sufficiently prosperous to be able to neglect his own business. In addition to being wealthy, extended or permanent residence within the Philippines was probably a characteristic of high rank within the capitan system. To be effective, from the Spanish point of view, it was necessary for the Chinese capitan to have the sort of knowledge and understanding of the Chinese in the Philippines that was impossible for an outsider. From the Chinese point of view, the requirement of wealth for movement into power necessitated the sort of access to the Chinese credit system in the Philippines which was limited to those individuals who had built, from extended residence and dependability, the necessary residue of confidence. The net result was an organizational structure which was relatively insulated from control by "outside" Chinese influences and run by older individuals. While the first acting Chinese consul in the Philippines, Tan Quien-sien (陳謙善) had been the Chinese capitan, he was not imposed upon the Chinese community in the Philippines from abroad and there is some

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indication that he was not the first choice of a formal diplomatic representative by the *Tsungli Yamen* (Chinese foreign office under the Ch'ing Dynasty.)

The ambivalence of the Spanish administration is perhaps best demonstrated by the general problem of citizenship. The conception of the Chinese as a national minority really only developed in the later Spanish period. There was, to be sure, a nearly constant Spanish view of Chinese as alien to the Philippines, but in only a few cases did this seem to be founded on the idea that they were subjects of the Chinese empire. Following the massacre of 1603, for example, the Spanish sent to the Chinese emperor letters explaining the massacre in terms of how the emperor's subjects had revolted without provocation, but up to the nineteenth century, problems involving the Chinese were seldom framed in a context of nationality. Part of this was probably due to the Spanish concept of their own role in the world, a concept which included the idea that all peoples in land conquered or pacified by Spain became vassals of the Spanish King. As such, there was no legal basis for the view that the Chinese were foreigners or citizens of another nation, and were never consistently considered as such by Spanish authorities in Spain or Manila. As the concept of nation grew in Spain during the nineteenth century, the legal role of vassal of the monarch was replaced by that of "subject of Spain," and both the basis for an idea of Spanish national citizenship and the differentiation

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of segments of the population along lines of nationality was created. This shift in conception meant that the Chinese in the Philippines began to be viewed not essentially as a cultural minority, as had been the case until the early nineteenth century, but as political aliens with certain attributes, namely their nationality, which distinguished them from other cultural minorities. The shift toward posing the problem of Chinese in the Philippines in terms of nationality rather than cultural diversity was paralleled by an interesting shift in terminology:

"...in the nineteenth century the old term sangley (as a term referring to the Chinese in the Philippines) was much less used in official Spanish documents, and was increasingly replaced by the word chino. Sangley stood for a cultural stereotype carrying pejorative overtones... Chino, as an expression closer to cultural neutrality, may have been officially used as a kind of token concession of Chinese status as a national as well as a cultural minority."  

However, while the Spanish had raised the question of the nationality and hence the citizenship of the Chinese by the late nineteenth century, they consistently failed to resolve it until the Spanish Civil code became effective in the Philippines in 1889. Even then, the lack of administrative machinery required by the Civil Code left the question

81See Chapter 11, p. 85.
open to debate and for some purposes, the Chinese were classed as foreign nationals, but for others, such as taxation, they were not. Thus, one other characteristic of the Chinese relationship with the political system in the Philippines which was carried over into the American era was a certain ambiguity regarding the nationality and citizenship of Chinese residents, an ambiguity which was later to be expressed by the Philippine Constitution and the debates surrounding its adoption.

Several historians believe that the ambiguity of the Spanish approach, coupled with their desire to exploit their colony, led to a relationship with the Chinese which was based on extortion. This condition is perhaps best portrayed by Wickberg:

"There were good reasons for the relationship of extortion and bribery existing between the Spanish officials and the Chinese. Spanish officials were poorly paid. Few of them had a transcendent interest in the welfare of the Philippines. They were in the Islands to make enough to retire in comfort to Spain. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that they should find it difficult to resist temptations to impose upon members of an almost defenseless minority group." 82

There may have been Chinese cultural proclivities which made the Chinese particularly willing to enter a relationship based on bribery. Again, as Wickberg points out,


"...[p] remodern China had a government of men and not of laws. Certainly the merchant in China did not depend upon the law to protect his property; he depended upon the kindness of the official. The good will of the official could be purchased with gifts and services, and the official could become a kind of protector or sponsor of the merchant's enterprises... This pattern of merchant-official relationships and conduct was so thoroughly ingrained and generally accepted that even a Chinese emigrant from a farm family... would be aware of it and accept it as the natural mode of behavior."\(^{84}\)

From this it can be inferred that the general style of interaction between the Chinese and the Philippine political system during the Spanish period was likely to have been characterized by extreme personalism from the Chinese point of view. The political system in the Philippines was probably viewed as an exploitative environment, and the government was perceived as something against which one should protect himself, not as an instrument with which to secure individual or group goals. Survival within this environment was possible, but depended on mentors in the government who would avoid carrying out their duties in return for direct renumeration. The higher up in the governmental hierarchy one could find a mentor, the better off he was. Unfortunately, the higher one went in search of an agreeable official, the more it cost.

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CHAPTEB II
THE CHINESE DURING THE AMERICAN ERA

On May 1, 1898, American naval forces under Dewey defeated the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. By July, American troops were bivouaced in Manila and the American era of Philippine history had begun. Nearly fifty years later, as the Republic of the Philippines rose from the destruction of World War II, the Chinese in the Philippines could look back on a tumultuous history and forward to the prospect of continued change, for the nearly half century of American rule in the Philippines had seen as many changes within the Chinese community as it did changes within the Philippine political system. New institutions within the community had arisen, some of which had little, if any, connection to the structural predecessors which had developed during the Spanish period. As they emerged, they began to channel new forces

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into the Chinese community. If during the fifty years prior to the arrival of American authority in the Philippines the Chinese had begun to seek political aid from China, it was in the American period that political ties established with the Chinese government solidified. If during the latter part of the Spanish era, the Philippine Chinese had become aware of modern Chinese nationalism, it was in the twentieth century that these stirrings became a prominent theme in the community, orchestrated by such institutions as the Kuomintang. Other new institutions, such as Chinese schools and newspapers offered the chance of greater cultural and political unity among the Chinese residents. Older institutions such as the capitán system were superseded by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and as the American era ended it appeared that a qualitatively new type of person held power in the community. In retrospect, the first half of the twentieth century appears to have witnessed as much transition, turmoil within, and modification of the Chinese community as had been seen during the nearly four previous centuries of Spanish rule.

Some of this probably would have occurred regardless of who ruled the Philippines. Chinese nationalism transcended significantly

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different administrative frameworks in Southeast Asia, and Chinese
schools and newspapers appeared or were already present in all
Southeast Asian countries and colonies in the first half of the
twentieth century. There can be, however, little doubt that the
expression of Chinese nationalism in the Philippines, the manner in
which new institutions developed within the community, or the role
the Chinese assumed relative to the Republic of the Philippines
were affected by the character of American rule and specific
actions of American administrators. It is therefore necessary to
outline the context and general character of American rule as it
applied to the Chinese community before looking in greater detail
at the changes which occurred in the configuration of power within
the Chinese community and the style in which the Chinese interacted
with the political system surrounding them.

4See, for example, the work by Lea E. Williams, such as, "The
Ethical Program and the Chinese of Indonesia," Journal of Southeast
Asian History, 11:2, (July, 1961), p. 35-42; Overseas Chinese National-
ism, The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, (Glencoe:
the Free Press, 1960). Skinner addresses the problem in his Chinese
Society in Thailand: An Analytical History, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1957). For Chinese interpretations see, Feng Tzu
Yu, Hao Ch'iao Ke Ming K'ai Kuo Shih (History of the Overseas Chinese
in the Revolution and Opening of China), (Shanghai: 1947); Huang Fu
Luan, Hua Ch'iao Yu Chung Kuo Ke Ming (The Overseas Chinese and the
Chinese Revolution), (Hong Kong: 1954).

5Douglas P. Murray, "Chinese Education in South-East Asia," The
China Quarterly, (October-December, 1964), pp. 70-71. Lau Tzu Cheng,
"Nanyang Ya Pao Chang Hsi Nien Piao," (A Calendar of Southeast Asian
Newspapers), Journal of the South Seas, XII, Part I.
Authors who have analyzed the impact of the American era on the Chinese in the Philippines usually express one of two general interpretations, each with different conclusions. The first general interpretation argues essentially that the total impact of American rule in the Philippines led to a more integrated and stable position for the Chinese in Philippine society. This view assesses American rule as it applied to the Chinese community as generally beneficial, in that it eliminated the periodic waves of persecution endemic under the Spanish administration and provided new opportunities for the Chinese to expand their economic activity. It takes particular note of the fact that by the end of the American regime the Chinese had become, if not the central economic group in Philippine life, one which profoundly affected the Philippine economic system. In short, this view argues that although there were times when friction arose between the Chinese on the one hand and the American authorities or Filipinos on the other, the effect of the American era was to provide a sounder basis for closer cooperation between the Filipinos and Chinese and a relatively strong foundation for the political integration

Nearly all historians of the American era in the Philippines have commented on the overseas Chinese community there, but those who have been most concerned with the period as it related to the Chinese are Jensen, The Chinese in the Philippines During the American Regime; George Henry Weightman, The Philippine Chinese, A Cultural History of a Marginal Trading Community; T.S. Fonacier, The Chinese in the Philippines During the American Administration (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1932); Hartendorp, A History of Trade and Commerce in the Philippines; and Hayden, The Philippines.
of the two peoples. The other general interpretation concludes in an opposite manner, arguing that it was the United States which "set the final seal of rejection upon full participation of the Chinese in Philippine society." This view suggests that in distinction from the policies of the Spanish regime, American authorities never addressed the problem of political integration for the Chinese in the Philippines. While the Americans created the economic conditions, which enabled the Chinese to imbed themselves more deeply into the fabric of the Philippine economic system, they brought with them both prejudices against Chinese and a lack of concern with the ramifications a dichotomy between economic integration and political segregation might have. Excluded from political participation in the Philippines during the American era, the Chinese turned inward culturally and toward China politically. The result was increasing unity within the community and a growing number of Chinese who took their political cues from China rather than the Philippines. The argument concludes that from the nearly half century of American control in the Philippines there emerged a Chinese community whose chances for easy integration into the Philippine political system on a legitimate basis were slim if they existed at all.

Both these general interpretations seem to be valid in part. It is relatively clear that Chinese economic interests in the Philippines

7 This is essentially the argument of Jensen, Fonacier and Hayden.

grew during the American period to a point where they were second only to the Americans in terms of the amount of funds invested in one way or another in the Philippine economy. Likewise, in 1946, as the last vestiges of American political control were terminated, it was apparent, to many Filipinos at least, that Chinese economic interests not only were to be found in almost every phase of the economy, but in effect monopolized key sectors of it. That this situation was in large measure due to some of the policies adopted by the American authorities during their tenure is also relatively clear.

Whether or not a basis for subsequent legal political integration was built during the American era, however, remains debatable. The argument that such a foundation was constructed does not appear to be supported by subsequent events. The history of relations

9 The exact extent of Chinese involvement in the Philippine economy by the end of the American era is difficult to portray for several reasons. Many records were destroyed during the Second World War, Chinese often used dummy corporations to cover their economic activity and the problem had, by the end of the period, become a political issue with concurrent charge and countercharge. Weightman presents a summary of statistical data which is as good as any. (Weightman, The Philippine Chinese, pp. 126-140). See, also I.T. Runes, "The Chinese and the Philippines Economy," Pacific Review, 1, (May, 1950), pp. 3-26; H. O. Callis, "Capital Investment in SE Asia and the Philippines," The Annals, Vol 226, (March, 1943), pp. 22-31.

between Filipinos and the Chinese community since the termination of American political control indicates no apparent trend toward greater cooperation and amity, suggesting that if the American authorities sought to build a foundation for legal political integration their efforts were unsuccessful. Likewise, several specific policies undertaken by the American authorities regarding the Chinese imply a desire to exclude them from political participation in the affairs of the islands. This orientation is suggested, on the one hand, by the rapid extension of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, then in effect in the United States to the Philippines, and, on the other, by the equally rapid confirmation of the effort to establish a Chinese consulate in the Philippines. Both actions were based on the assumption that the Chinese in the Philippines were essentially an alien element. But a conclusion that there were no efforts to construct a foundation for the legal political participation of Chinese in the Philippine political system is not valid. Some data suggests the opposite.

One analysis of the development of the Philippine law of citizenship, for example, indicates a relatively consistent judicial effort to build a legal basis for Chinese political participation during the

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11 The Chinese Exclusion Laws were extended to the Philippines on September 26, 1898 by order of the American Military Governor, E. S. Otis. By this order, all Chinese persons except former residents of the Philippines who left the islands between 1895 and September 1898 and those Chinese who belonged to certain exempt classes as defined by the US-China Convention were refused permission to land in the archipelago.
American era. Although this effort was reversed in 1935 with the adoption of the Philippine Constitution, it suggests that at least part of the American administrative structure was not fully committed to the exclusion of the Chinese from Philippine politics. Because this effort is sometimes ignored in studies of the Chinese in the Philippines, it is worth noting in somewhat greater detail. To do so it is necessary to briefly summarize the Spanish approach to citizenship.

While the Spanish did not always deal administratively with the Chinese in the Philippines as if they were Spanish citizens, the Spanish Civil Code, which became effective in the Philippines in 1889, appears to have made Spanish citizenship for the Chinese theoretically easy to acquire. Article 17 of the code defined as Spaniards all "persons born in Spanish territory, children of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain, foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers, and, those who, without such papers may have acquired a domicile in any town in the Monarchy." This was not without qualification as another article in the Code declared that children of foreigners retained the citizenship of their


13 Weightman, for example, argues that Chinese in the Philippines could not become Philippine citizens until 1935 and the approval of the Philippine Constitution. See, Weightman, The Philippine Chinese, p. 92.

parents prior to reaching majority unless their parents claimed, through the proper procedures, Spanish citizenship for their offspring. In the absence of such a claim individuals were required to state "within the year following their majority or emancipation, whether they desire to enjoy the Spanish nationality granted them by Article 17." In short, the Spanish Civil Code had adopted both the principle of *jus soli* (or the view that citizenship is determined by the place of birth) and *jus sanguinis* (or the view that citizenship is determined by the citizenship of parents), but had qualified the former by requiring a positive action on the part of the offspring of foreigners or their parents to claim what the Code granted them. The hitch in the case of the Philippines was the absence of the administrative machinery to facilitate the claim. The registries before which such declarations were to be made were never established in the Philippines, and, therefore, while the principle of the Code allowed the Chinese to become Spanish citizens relatively easily, the actual practice fell short. This was the status of citizenship precedents as the United States assumed control of the Islands.

The Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War in December 1898 contained a provision dealing with citizenship for the inhabitants of former Spanish territories. This provision stated that in the absence of a positive act claiming Spanish citizenship before 1901, former citizens of Spain would be held to have renounced

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Spanish nationality and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they resided:

"...In case (Spanish citizens) remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this Treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside..." 16

In 1902 the United States Congress again addressed the problem of citizenship for the Islands' inhabitants. The Philippine Bill, passed July 1, 1902, stated that all inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 -- the date the Treaty of Paris was ratified -- and who had not taken the necessary steps to preserve their Spanish citizenship automatically became citizens of the Philippine Islands, as did their children. 17 Subsequent statutes did not significantly modify this position, and in 1916 the Philippine Autonomy Act -- or Jones Act -- reaffirmed the position taken in 1902. 18

If the United States had sought to exclude the Chinese from political participation in the Philippines, one obvious course was open to the courts. By interpreting the Acts of Congress narrowly

16 Treaty of Paris, ratified April 11, 1899. 30 Stat at 1759.
17 32 Stat at 692.
18 Section 2, Act of August 29, 1912.
and taking note of the absence of the administrative machinery during the Spanish era by which Chinese in the Philippines could have claimed Spanish citizenship, American courts could have judged that the Chinese inhabitants of the Philippines could not claim Philippine citizenship. They did not do this, however, and a series of decisions appear to have been based on the assumption that the effect of the Spanish Code was to confer Spanish nationality upon persons born in the Philippines even though of alien parents and despite the absence of a formal claim of Spanish citizenship. This built the basis for a justifiable claim of Philippine citizenship — and by implication for the privilege of political participation on the same basis as Filipinos — on the part of increasing numbers of ethnic Chinese.

The most important of these cases was Roa v. Collector of Customs, decided in 1912. Roa, the son of a Chinese father and a Filipina, had been sent to China to study by his mother after the death of his father. After nearly nine years in China and shortly after his twenty-first birthday, he sought to return to the Philippines. He was denied entrance by the Collector of Customs under the authority of the Chinese Exclusion Laws in 1910. Roa brought suit on the claim of Philippine citizenship and was upheld by the Philippine Supreme Court, at that time dominated by Americans. In deciding the case, the court took cognizance of the fact that Roa's father had not made the declaration required by the Spanish

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19Roa v Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912).
Civil Code to obtain Spanish citizenship for his son, but concluded that this did not prevent Roa from attaining Philippine citizenship. In the course of its argument the Court stated that "by section 4 (of the 1902 Philippine Act) the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth which prevails in the United States was extended to the Philippines, but with certain limitations."\footnote{Roa v Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 333 (1912).} The Court did not spell out what these limitations were.

In subsequent cases, however, the principle of \textit{jus soli} appeared to be affirmed in the question of citizenship. Thus, in 1934 in Hau v Collector of Customs,\footnote{Hau v Collector of Customs, 59 Phil. 612 (1934).} the court held unequivocally that one born in the Philippines automatically acquired Philippine citizenship. Therefore, by the early 1930s the Philippine Supreme Court, no longer as dominated by Americans, but still under the review of the United States Supreme Court, had judicially developed the law of citizenship to the point where legal participation in Philippine politics on the part of those members of the Chinese community born in the Philippines would have been facilitated. At this point, however, the trend was reversed and a citizenship differentiation between ethnic Filipinos and ethnic Chinese born in the Philippines was asserted.

The reversal came in August, 1934, as the Committee on Citizenship and Naturalization submitted its draft of the citizenship...
provision to the Philippine Constitutional Convention. Section I of the proposed Article IV stated that "those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution" would be citizens of the Philippine Republic. Judicial decisions had determined that Philippine born children of Chinese parents were Philippine citizens, but the authoritative record of the delegate debates clearly indicates that it was not the intention of the constitution's framers that these children were to be considered Philippine citizens. Other scholars have pointed out the reluctance on the part of the drafters to extend the citizenship privilege to Philippine born Chinese:

"The conviction of the draftsmen of the article that jus soli did not apply in all cases of birth in the Philippines is also revealed by what would otherwise be the unnecessary provision conferring citizenship upon those who were born in the Islands of foreign parents and who had been elected to public office... While the record may be convincing that the Committee of Citizenship and Naturalization did not appreciate the implications of recent decisions of the Supreme Court, it is also quite persuasive that neither that Committee nor the Convention as a whole believed that the effect of the article would be to confer citizenship upon all those born in the Philippines prior to adoption of the Constitution."

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The fact that the Constitution received the approval of President Roosevelt in 1935 marked the formal acceptance of the reversal by the United States. For the bulk of the American era, however, the movement had been the other way.

The excursion into the development of the law of citizenship in the Philippines outlines the general character of the American administration as it related to the Chinese in the Philippines; a general stance that was mixed and sometimes contradictory. Parts of the ruling body imposed upon the Philippine Islands dealt with the Chinese there as if there were no question as to their alien status. Thus, the Bureau of Customs, charged with the administration of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, saw no conflict in using special administrative regulations when dealing with Chinese. The courts, however, acted on somewhat different assumptions, and in the effort to transfer the approach to citizenship expounded in the United States Constitution to the Philippines, began to develop a legal framework with significantly different implications. Other aspects of American rule appear to have been contradictory also. The American authorities placed a great deal of emphasis on formal education and provided the stimulus, climate, and on at least one occasion subsidies for the growth of Chinese schools. But the administrative authorities were also cognizant of the fact that it was not simply...

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education that led to good citizens, and after promoting the growth of Chinese schools -- which in many cases understood the relation of "citizenship training" to education and devoted themselves to the creation of good Chinese citizens -- attempted to make them vehicles for Philippine citizenship training by bringing them in line with the content of education as it was being taught in the public school system. 26 On the one hand, their actions prompted the growth of loyalty to China; on the other, they sought, ineffectively, to negate this development by a training program that was committed to the promotion of Philippine loyalty. Similarly, the channels through which the American authorities dealt with the Chinese in the Philippines were sometimes contradictory. The establishment of a Chinese Consulate in the Philippines seemed to imply that the American authorities had defined the Chinese as essentially alien to the Philippines. To be consistent with this definition, it would have been logical to have dealt with the Chinese community primarily through the Chinese Consul-General. The administrative records indicate that this was not the case, however, and that more often than not the authorities turned to local Chinese leadership groups, who, until

26 The content of Philippine education had, from its inception, a strong theme of citizenship training. The legal basis for this approach may be found in Concepcion A. Aquila, Educational Legislation, (Manila: Aquila Publication, 1959) pp. 68-123.
the 1930s at least, often opposed the policies of the Consul-
General. 27

New Institutions

In any cursory survey of the Chinese community during the
American period, five new institutions stand out. These are the
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese Consulate, Chinese political
parties, schools and newspapers. Each was related to the others in
a complex and dynamic manner.

Chapter I advanced the argument that a strong precedent for cen-
tralized control in the community had been established by the
Capitan system under Spanish administration. The Capitan system was
described as a socio-political hierarchy which acted as an arbitrator
among groups in the community, a mediator between the community and
Spanish authorities and took on community wide social functions such
as the maintenance of health services and charity. As the Americans

27 Most of the administrative records of the American authorities
in the Philippines prior to 1935 are housed in the US National
Archives in the Bureau of Insular Affairs file. The Bureau of Insular
Affairs functioned from 1898 to 1939. Its administrative powers in
connection with the Philippines were never sharply defined, but,
according to the Archives description, the Bureau gathered information,
advised, suggested and recommended policies regarding the Philippines
to the Secretary of War and governors-general rather than attempted to
execute policy. All the files have not been catalogued in detail,
but those dealing most directly with the Chinese are found in Record
Groups 370, 1214, 1246 and 28291. Other references are listed by
Kenneth P. Landen, Materials in the National Archives Relating to the
Philippine Islands (Washington: National Archives, 1942). Notes
referring to material from the archives will hereafter be referenced
to as "National Archives, Record Group (RG)."
assumed control of the islands, the term *capitan* was dropped, but the pattern of a single core of important individuals who sought to speak with authority in the Chinese community and on behalf of all Chinese residents in the Philippines was continued. This core group, originally composed of many individuals formerly associated with the upper levels of the *capitan* structure, was usually referred to as the "Chinese Chamber of Commerce" by the Americans; the Chinese knew it by at least three titles: "The Chinese Commercial Council" (中華商業會), "Chinese General Chamber of Commerce" (中華總會), and "Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce" (菲律賓華商總會).

The view of organizational change concerning the Chamber of Commerce by Chinese historians is usually an evolutionary one. Liu Chih-t'ien, for example, describes the rise and fall of the above mentioned organizations during the American era as a continuous growth process in which the early *capitan* system of the nineteenth century was supplanted by the Chinese Commercial Council in 1904. This organization, renamed the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1906, finally evolved into the Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce in 1931. Each modification of name, it is argued, was brought about by exogenous forces acting upon a unified community. The evolution of the *capitan* system into the Chinese Commercial Council is described as a

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28 Between 1898 and 1904 the core group was called the "Hock Kain Club" by English language newspapers in Manila.
result of the shift of political control in the Philippines from the Spaniards to the Americans and the concommitent expansion of economic opportunity for the Chinese. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce supposedly emerged in response to greater complexity of the economic environment and to certain modifications in the commercial code, namely the Corporation Act, undertaken by the authorities; the Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce arose again in response to greater complexity of the economy and the growing diversity of Chinese enterprise in the Islands. In each case the picture drawn is one of a unified community developing in a harmonious manner more sophisticated organizational instruments with which to meet the changes in the surrounding environment. There is little hint that modifications in the structure and composition of the various institutions could have been the result of tension, conflict, and compromise within the community, or even that such phenomena existed. Some evidence that tension and conflict did exist, however, is provided by examining the introduction of the second new institution to appear in the Chinese Community: the Chinese consulate.

That the Chinese Consulate in the Philippines provided a formal political link to the Chinese government and tended to confirm the

alien status of the overseas Chinese in the view of American authorities is relatively clear. However, the early relationship between the consulate and the community was far from harmonious, and until about 1930 it appears that it was often the consul general who was seen as alien in the eyes of the local Chinese leadership.

Although the Philippine Chinese community had probably always been aware of China's political and international dimensions, it was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century that efforts were undertaken by members of the community to establish a formal political connection with the Imperial Chinese Government. This is not to say that efforts to do this prior to the nineteenth century were never attempted. The actions vis-a-vis the Philippines of such individuals as the Ming protector Koxinga were undoubtedly motivated in part by the desire to build political bridges, but in this and similar cases the initiative always appears to have come from outside the community. Documentation of an interest in establishing a political relationship on the part of the Philippine community begins only in 1880. In that year an appeal for consular protection was sent from the Chinese community to the Ch'ing Emperor. The appeal is said to have prompted a suggestion by the Tsungli Yamen in Peking that the Chinese ambassador in Spain maintain contact with the community in the Philippines.  

30 Koxinga, or Cheng Ch'eng-kung, (秀 立) sent an envoy from his stronghold in Formosa to the Spanish demanding their surrender in 1662. Some accounts indicate that an effort was made by the envoy to contact the resident Chinese and enlist them in the service of the Ming emperor.

The exact reasons for the new effort by the community are not clear, but as Wickberg points out, the new interest roughly coincided with an increase in Spanish hostility toward the Chinese and a growing interest on the part of the Manchus in overseas residents. Personal ambition by community leaders also contributed to the new interest, as the Chinese in the Philippines had reason to believe that the pattern followed in Singapore would be duplicated in the Philippines. There, a similar request for the establishment of formal diplomatic ties had resulted in the appointment of a local Singapore Chinese as the Chinese consul general rather than an "outsider" from the mainland. Should the same thing happen in the Philippines, the establishment of Chinese consular representation in the Philippines would appeal to ambitious leaders in the Chinese community because it offered the chance of increased influence in the overseas community. A Chinese consul general could claim a certain degree of prestige even beyond that accorded the capitán, for although the capitán's office possessed some powers the consul could not match, it was an office created by the Spanish authorities and as such had its prestige tarnished. By combining the capitán's power with the prestige of Imperial status, however, any individual who occupied both offices could operate from a position of great strength. In addition, should the Singapore pattern be followed, it would open a channel to influence and prestige on the mainland that had previously been barred

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to members of the overseas community regardless of their local power. For if holding public office in China could not ordinarily be realized without the sort of Confucian education beyond the reach of the Chinese in the Philippines, here was an opportunity to achieve Mandarin rank without passing the normal scholarly examinations. In short, a consul would be in a position of prestige in both China and the overseas community.33

The possibility that the establishment of a Chinese consulate in the Philippines could be disruptive of the existing power structure within the community apparently was not addressed by either members of the Chinese community in the Philippines or the Tsungli Yamen. That its establishment in July of 1898 was disruptive, however, became obvious shortly afterward.

Spain reluctantly agreed to the establishment of a Chinese consulate in July, 1898, as the American forces were closing on Manila. Carlos Palanca, a former capitan and closely tied to the efforts of the community to establish a diplomatic link with China since the 1880s, was appointed "acting" consul pending the conclusion of hostilities.34 The exact arrangements made between

34Carlos Palanca, or Tan Quien-sien (陳謙善), was described by contemporary newspapers as the most powerful Chinese in the Philippines. (See, for example, The Manila Times, October 4, 1900). Arriving in the Philippines from Fukien Province in 1856, he prospered and established several personal connections with the Spanish authorities. When he became a Catholic his baptismal sponsor was a colonel Carlos Palanca y Gutierrez, and Tan Quien-sien assumed the name of his mentor. He occupied the office of capitan in 1873-77, 1885, and 1894. The best biographical sketch of Palanca's found in Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, pp. 199-201, although the author's version of Palanca's relationship with the consulate conflicts with that described below. See also, Liu Chih-t'ien, Chung-Fei Kuan-hsi Shih, pp. 532-534.
Palanca, the Tsungli Yamen and Spain are unknown, but it is reasonable that Palanca assumed that he was to be appointed permanent consul. This did not occur, and although the United States confirmed the establishment of a permanent Chinese Consulate for the islands, the first permanent Chinese consul general in the Philippines was Li Yung-yew (黎榮耀) who arrived in January 1899.  

Li had never been in the Philippines prior to his appointment as Consul-General. But coming from the diplomatic post in Havana where he had recently participated in the successful negotiations with Spain over the importation of coolies, he appeared to have many of the attributes the Chinese in the Philippines had suggested in their petitions they wanted in their consul general. Hindsight reveals that he apparently lacked two prerequisites for a successful tour of duty at Manila, however. Originally from Canton, he was automatically placed in a minority group within the Chinese in the Philippines. Unaware or unable to work within the existing power structure, he moved into the situation seemingly unconcerned with the impact of several decisions.

35 The Manila Times, January 28, 1899.
37 The American authorities were aware of a growing tension between the Consul-General and the community as early as April 1899. In April, Major-General Otis wrote Secretary Hay referring to antagonism within the Chinese community toward the consul's efforts to require registration of all incoming Chinese with the consulate. See, Report of Major-General Otis, House Document 2, 56th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. 5., pp. 519-521.
Nine months after Li arrived in the Philippines the antagonism between the Consul and Palanca had surfaced and was being expressed in a series of posters throughout the Chinese section of Manila. On October 17, 1899, Palanca began posting Tatzepao, or wall posters, in Manila which claimed in effect that the new Chinese consulate had no authority over the majority of Chinese in the Philippines. The posters stated that because of complaints by natives of the Amoy district that they were being victimized by customs officials "and others," the governor general of Fukien and Chekiang Provinces, who acted as minister of the Tsungli Yamen, had petitioned the Ch'ing emperor to appoint a "chief of a department for the protection of merchants in the Philippines." This new department was to have branches in Amoy, Manila and other Philippine locations; a membership to include vice-chairman, with proper seals of office; authority to deal with the American authorities in Manila regarding the rights of Chinese citizens in the Philippines and to register and collect fees from the Chinese there. The Emperor, the posters stated, agreed and appointed Carlos Palanca as the head of the new department, informing the United States of this action through normal diplomatic channels in China.

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38 The Manila Times, October 17-27, 1899.
39 The Manila Times, October 23, 1899.
From the description of the department afforded by the posters, the new organization appeared to have paralleled the structural form and functional mission of the Chinese consulate. The message was obvious; a counter to the consulate was being established which would clearly devitalize the consul general's position in the Philippines. Li's reaction was immediate. The same day the posters proclaiming the establishment of the new department headed by Palanca appeared, the consul general launched his own poster drive, attacking Palanca and the new department. Li proclaimed that only he represented the Chinese Imperial government in the Philippines, arguing that Palanca's action was without imperial authority, designed solely to extort money, disruptive to the public order of the Chinese community and founded on fraudulent documents. He announced that he had appealed to the Chinese Minister in Washington to confirm the illegal nature of Palanca's action and to the Philippine Commission in Manila to prevent the dissemination of Palanca's announcements.

The initial reaction on the part of the United States officials was to side with the consul general. Soldiers were ordered to remove and destroy Palanca's posters. Palanca, in turn, appealed to the military authorities and the American officials withdrew from the controversy, ordering that no posters be removed until the matter was clarified.

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40 The Manila Times, October 24, 1899.
41 The Manila Times, October 25, 1899.
The status of the consulate remained unresolved for several months as a series of compromises were apparently reached between Palanca and the Tsungli Yamen. Li was removed from his post, but promoted and sent to Madrid as charge d'affaires. While Palanca was given imperial recognition and his son Engracio was appointed interim consul general, the senior Palanca was refused the post. Shortly afterward, Cheng Ye-chiong arrived in Manila to assume the consul-general's post. In contrast to Li, Cheng appears to have had the proper background in terms of geographical origin, claiming as his native province Fukien rather than Canton. Palanca's son, Engracio, was given an imperial commission to collect and channel funds from various overseas communities into famine relief in China, the senior Palanca was appointed vice consul, and efforts were undertaken by the Tsungli Yamen to heal the wounds created by the first consul's arrival. In retrospect, however, the arrangement worked out after the first consul's transfer appears to have been temporary. In early August, 1901, a commission appointed by the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Wu Ting-fang, arrived in Manila, probably to assess the damage created by the initial establishment of the consulate and to reassert Tsungli Yamen control over the consulate's affairs. Within a month of the arrival

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42 The Manila Times, February 3, 1900.
43 The Manila Times, February 7, 1900.
44 The Manila Times, August 10, 1900.
of the Hsu Chao commission, as it was termed in honor of its leading member, the situation was further complicated by the death of Carlos Palanca on September 3, 1901. Palanca's death did not appear to result in much greater harmony between the consul general and the local leadership. The relationship of the consul general to the Chamber of Commerce, or "Hock Kain Club" as it was known prior to 1904, is not clear, but appears to have been basically antagonistic. In August, 1902, for example, as the Chinese community prepared to formally greet the new American military governor, William Howard Taft, Manila newspapers noted the absence of the consul's name on the official guest list of the club's banquet. This was explained as a result of "the reform tendencies of the Chamber of Commerce which are diametrically opposed to the ruling dynasty of China," a comment which suggests the antagonism may have been founded on a political issue between supporters of the Reformers in China and the official representative of the Ch'ing dynasty in the Philippines. Regardless of the reasons, however, the split apparently lasted for several years. Disagreement emerged in somewhat different form in April, 1903, when the secretary of the club claimed that the Chinese Consulate did not have the interest of the Chinese in the Islands at heart, and may have accounted in part for the arrival of another Chinese commission, this time under Imperial direction to study

45 The Manila Times, August 23, 1902.
46 The Manila Times, April 17, 1903.
conditions in the Philippines. Shortly after this commission arrived in the Philippines, the Hock Kain Club was reorganized into the Chinese Commercial Council and Cheng Ye-chiong was replaced by the third Chinese consul general in the Philippines, Mun Yu-chiong. After 1904, the bifurcation between the consulate and Chamber leadership appears to have been less public, although newspapers portray splits and antagonism in 1911, 1912, and 1920.

According to most informants the status of the consulate declined during the period from shortly before the formation of the Republic of China and the late 1920's. Of the several hundred references to the Chinese in the Philippines included in the Bureau of Insular Affairs files, for example, the activity of the consulate is seldom alluded to. Contemporary newspapers refer to the presence of the Chinese consul general at state functions sponsored by the United States, but the Bureau records indicate that most dealings between American officials and the local community were channeled through the Chamber of Commerce. In addition, there is some indication that an effort to establish an organization to openly counter the Chinese consulate diplomatic position was undertaken around 1913 in much the same manner as Palanca had attempted over a decade earlier. A report from the American consulate at Amoy alludes to the creation of a "Chinese Emigration Board" (福建暨南局) established by "Amoy and overseas Chinese" in late 1912. According

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47 The Manila Times, August 19, 1911; October 24, 1911; March 14, 1912; June 27, 1920.
to the report the Board was designed, among other things, to protect Chinese abroad, regulate Chinese overseas education, solicit funds from overseas residents and regulate the travel of overseas Chinese. Supposedly established at Amoy, this institution was said to have been created in response to requests by the overseas Chinese at Manila and Singapore, the only two cities in which branches were to be established. Although there is no evidence branches of this Board were ever established in the Philippines, the effort to do so illustrates the precarious position of the Chinese consulate during this period.

One reason for the eclipse of the consulate between 1910 and the late 1920's is probably related to events in China. During most of the period the Chinese consul general in the Philippines represented what was essentially a shadow government at Peking in a community where orientation was traditionally toward southern China. The Peking government was probably recognized for what it was during this period, an ineffective structure without significant authority either in the international arena or in China itself. As such, its diplomatic representative in the Philippines was not viewed by the local Chinese as a particularly useful channel through which to deal with the American authorities, nor even as a viable route to status and power in China. Another reason for the rather

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tenuous position occupied by the consulate in the Philippines had to do with its relationship with the Kuomintang, representatives of which were working within the Philippine Chinese community at that time for support of the Canton and, later, the Nanking governments. It was only as Chiang Kai-shek successfully pushed northward in China that the Consulate and Kuomintang in the Philippines were merged, an event confirmed by the dispatch of H.K. Kwong, a Kuomintang activist, as Consul General to the Philippines in 1930.

Mention of the Kuomintang introduces the third type of new institution which appeared in the community during the American era: Chinese political parties.

The history of Chinese political parties in the Philippines is dominated by that of the Kuomintang, the beginning of which can be traced to Sun Yat-sen's visit to the Islands in 1895. Sun's memoirs indicate he received a less than satisfactory reception to the idea of revolution and departed for the United States with few, if any, commitments on the part of the overseas Chinese in Manila to support him or his cause:

"Having arrived in the Philippines, I began to gather comrades to strengthen our Association for the Regeneration of China, but even old comrades, owing to our defeat, did not conceal their despair, while some simply forswore our ideas. Owing to the absence of the necessary factors for the development of a revolutionary movement, there was no reason why I should stay long in the Philippines, and I decided to leave
In retrospect, Sun's inability to seriously interest members of the community in his revolutionary activity appears to have been due to at least three factors. Those who occupied the most prestigious and influential positions in the community had already committed themselves to obtaining recognition by the Ch'ing Dynasty and the establishment of a Ch'ing Consulate in the Philippines. As such, their support of or identification with revolutionary forces in China would jeopardize, if not the establishment of a Chinese Consulate in Manila, certainly their individual chances of being appointed to its chief position and the possibility of mandarin status. Further, the capitan structure in Manila was dominated through the late nineteenth century by Fukienese. The Cantonese, with whom Sun could be expected to best communicate and identify were excluded from the upper levels of the power structure. Sun could not, then, persuasively argue his cause before the power holders when in the Philippines. His memoirs suggest that he was unable to make contact with, at least to the extent that he could elicit significant aid from, the secret societies believed to have been present at the time in the Philippines.

Another factor may also have contributed to Sun's initial failure to engender revolutionary activity on the part of the Philippine Chinese. He may have been competing with the forces of

the reformists. Weightman argues that Liang Chi-chiao had visited the Philippines, probably at about the same time as did Sun, and the formation of the reformist daily *Yu Hsing Pao* shortly after Sun's trip suggests that the timing of his visit to the Islands may have coincided with the prosylitizing efforts of his competitors.

Finally, the elite in the overseas community may have seen Sun as a threat to their position in the Islands. Sun was, after all, primarily concerned with the creation of a revolutionary organization, controlled by himself and other outsiders, which derived power from the overseas Chinese cultural attachment to the mainland. In effect he was challenging the *capitan*'s claim to speak with authority on events in China and was accordingly attacking one of the props on which the power of the elite depended. The lack of support Sun received from community leaders could have stemmed from the same phenomena which may have sparked the early clashes between the consulate and local community leadership; namely, a belief on the part of local leaders that a revolutionary organization represented an institutional rival.

Regardless of the reasons, it is clear the Sun's visit in 1895 did little to advance the cause of the revolution.

Little is heard of the revolutionary movement in the Philippines until the formation of the *Kong Li Po*, a revolutionary daily, in about 1910. It is possible that there were political aspects to the episode of 1909 when, upon the request of the Ch'ing Consul General in Manila, the American authorities arrested and summarily deported

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several members of the Chinese community. Some informants within the current community have argued that the action of the consul general was politically motivated and designed to curtail revolutionary activity in the Philippine Chinese community by deporting members of the T'ung Meng Hui, but no documentation for this argument has been discovered. At least two of those deported were members of the Hock Kain Club during clashes between that organization and the consulate and the 1909 episode could have reflected institutional rivalry rather than the conflict of Chinese-based political orientations. In any event, by about 1910 a core of revolutionary activists had emerged in the Philippines, the leaders of which were Tee Han Kee (李增光), president of the local T'ung Meng Hui, Huang San-chi (黄三记), Wang Chung-ch'eng (王忠诚), Huang Nan-chieh (黄漢傑), Teng Pao-wang (滕寶廷), Li Jih-an (李日安), and Wu Tsung-ming (吳宗明). At roughly the same time Hu Nan-min (胡南民), who in 1908 had been sent by Sun to head the Nanyang Department of the T'ung Meng Hui in Singapore, arrived in the Philippines and established several political indoctrination societies and the Kong Li Po. Although the activity of the T'ung Meng Hui in the Philippines is for the most part undocumented, it appears to have been fairly successful in informing the Manila community of the Chinese revolution and in eliciting their

51 This controversy may be followed in "National Archives," RG 370-227 to 370-251.

52 Feng Tzu-yu, Hua Ch'iao ke Ming k'ai kuo Shih, pp. 77-78.
support. When Sun declared the formation of the Chinese Republic in 1912, Chinese in Manila were described by contemporary English newspapers as "fully behind the new republic." The failure of the consulate to display the flag of the Republic was said to have caused a near riot among the Chinese residents, and an early mission to the Philippines claimed to have raised more than $600,000 for support of the new Republic over a period of about two weeks.

Although the Kuomintang was officially formed in China on August 25, 1912, the first branch of the Party was not officially formed in the Philippines until over a year following Yuan Shih-kai's 1913 order dissolving the Party in China. It seems to have been relatively dormant during Sun's exile in Japan and its membership probably declined until about 1927. In this, its history was roughly similar to the Kuomintang branches in other southeast Asian communities during the same period.

Most of the records regarding the T'ung Meng Hui and Kuomintang membership prior to the end of World War II have been destroyed. A rough profile of the early membership may be gained, however, by reconstructing the kind of individual who led the movement during its early period in the Philippines from secondary biographical profiles.

53 *The Manila Times*, October 13, 1912.
54 *The Manila Times*, December 19, 1912.
Dr. Tee Han Kee, an early president of the T'ung Meng Hui and the subsequent Kuomintang branch in Manila, appears to have been representative. Born in Amoy in 1880, he graduated from the Anglo-Chinese College in Fuchou in 1897, and probably became associated with the revolutionary movement during his five year residence at the Hong Kong Medical College. After attaining his degree there he departed for the Philippines where he had been offered a position in the Chinese hospital at Manila by the then president of the hospital's board of directors, Ty Chuaco. He arrived in 1902 and for the next decade worked to solidify his relationship with community leaders through his position at the hospital, and, after 1905, to establish local branches of the T'ung Meng Hui, which he did under the cover of several reading societies. He never was admitted to a formal position within the Chamber of Commerce, but apparently gained the ear and support of several leaders of that organization, particularly Ty Chuaco. Tee was in several ways a symbol of modernity to the community. Western educated, technically oriented, fluent in English and tied to the forces of change in China, he not only linked the Chinese in the Philippines to the revolution in China but could communicate with the American authorities in Manila as well.

With the exception of Ty Chuaco, members of the Kuomintang in the Philippines did not appear to any significant extent in the upper levels of the Chamber of Commerce hierarchy until the middle 1930s. The Kong Li Po claimed to have been highly successful in
raising funds in support of Chiang's Northern Expedition in the middle 1920s, and several Chinese schools sponsored by the Philippine branch of the Kuomintang were established prior to 1930. Most informants, however, believe that the period from about 1915 to the late 1920s was one of relatively little success for the Kuomintang in the Islands.

It was in the 1930s as Chiang successfully concluded his Kiangsi campaign against the Communists and the New Life Movement began in China, however, that a revitalization of the Party's branch in the Philippines appears to have occurred. Some evidence of this is found in the appearance of new organizations associated with the Kuomintang, such as the emergence of the Philippine branch of the San Min Chu I. Youth Corps, and the increasing number of Party members among the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce. Shortly before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the flow of funds to Chiang from the Philippines increased, the Kuomintang was said to have controlled most of the Chinese schools in the Philippines, and the Chinese Consul general became in large measure a creature of the local Kuomintang branch. The rennaissance of the Kuomintang in the 1930s appears to have come at the expense of some of its early founders. The San Min Chu I Youth Corps was, for example, instituted by two representatives of the Nationalist Government who had not been in the Philippines prior

56 Kong Li Po, 14 July 1927; Lu Shih-man, "Hua-ch'iao I chih Fei-Lu-p'in Liah Shih," Overseas Chinese Educational Record (Manila (?): no date) 1:8, p. 28.

57 Jensen, The Chinese In the Philippines, pp. 278-279.
to their assignment to establish a Philippine branch of the Youth Corps. Their arrival and activity in Manila appears to have created some antagonism on the part of the leadership of the local Kuomintang branch, and in particular, on the part of Sy Yat Sien, a member of the Kuomintang Executive Board in the Philippines. This friction resulted in the dispatch from China of a special envoy to mediate the differences of opinion in the Party in 1941, and probably contributed to the emergence of three separate Kuomintang guerrilla organizations during the Japanese occupation.

Similar in function, but differing in orientation was the Chinese Communist Party in the Philippines. Very little is known of its activities until World War II. Believed to have been established in 1930 in Manila, the Party was eclipsed by the Kuomintang until the United Front was formed in 1937, after which it is said to have grown in membership to about 1000. During the Japanese occupation the most notable Chinese Communist guerrilla unit — the Hwa Chi 48th Unit — was associated with the Hukbalahap and led by Ong Seh-hsueh. Its strength probably grew during the war, but the Kuomintang survived its challenge even after the fall of the mainland.

Chinese newspapers and schools, the new institutions remaining to be mentioned, expanded during the American era, due in part to the forces of nationalism within the community, but also because of the generally lenient attitude on the part of the American officials toward their development.

The Chinese Newspaper

Some Chinese historians term the American era the "golden age of Chinese journalism in the Philippines." The following table, tracing the development of the daily Chinese press in the Islands, indicates that it was in fact a period of journalistic expansion.

### TABLE 2

**CHRONOLOGY OF THE CHINESE DAILY PRESS IN THE PHILIPPINES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates of Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese News</td>
<td>1888-1890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila News</td>
<td>1890-1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Yu Hsing Pao</td>
<td>1900-1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila Beneficence News</td>
<td>1900-1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Time of Arousal</td>
<td>1908-1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kong Li Po</td>
<td>1912-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Daily</td>
<td>1914-1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min Hao Pao</td>
<td>1914-1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Fukien News</td>
<td>1915-1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common People's Daily</td>
<td>1919-1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Commercial News</td>
<td>1921-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese Bulletin</td>
<td>1922-1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Salvation Daily</td>
<td>1923-1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Star Daily</td>
<td>1923-1924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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60 See, for example, Liu Chih-t'ien, Chung-Fei Kuan Hsi Shih, pp. 581-585; The growth of Chinese newspapers is also discussed in S. Lai, "The Development of Chinese Journalism in the Philippines," The Manila Times, 14 Feb 1923.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates of Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fookien Times</td>
<td>1926-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Western Daily</td>
<td>1928-1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinatown Daily</td>
<td>1930-1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's News</td>
<td>1930-1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New China Herald</td>
<td>1932-1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Herald</td>
<td>1933-1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Daily</td>
<td>1934-1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National People's Daily</td>
<td>1938-1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Yat-sen Daily</td>
<td>1941-1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Guide Daily</td>
<td>1945-1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Herald</td>
<td>1945-1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great China Press</td>
<td>1945-1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek Daily</td>
<td>1945-1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Commercial Bulletin</td>
<td>1945-1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungking Daily</td>
<td>1945-1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Advertiser</td>
<td>1947-1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great China Press</td>
<td>1948-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese National News</td>
<td>1949-1950</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth's Evening News</td>
<td>1953-1953</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The newspapers that emerged during the American era shared many of the same desires. All, no doubt, sought financial return for their founders, the expansion of their readership and influence on the thinking of Chinese in the Philippines. But in many cases these
were sought not so much for themselves as for the promotion of other goals, the definition of which varied among newspapers. The period of journalistic expansion was marked by considerable journalistic diversity also. A survey of this varied and sometimes fragmented line of historical evolution, and discussions with present-day Chinese journalists, suggests that the Chinese daily publications in the Philippines may be classified into four broad categories or types. These types, for purposes of discussion, may be termed "external-political," "internal-political," "external-apolitical," and "internal-dissenter." All four types shared an effort to end what was viewed as community disunity, but did so for varying reasons.

"External-political" refers to newspapers which appear to have arisen primarily in response to political events on the mainland of China. They were characterized by an editorial viewpoint which viewed the overseas Chinese community as a means of affecting Chinese politics. Thus, the papers' activities centered around efforts to solicit aid -- usually financial -- for political organizations whose main concern was with political events in China.

"Internal-political" refers to daily newspapers which were created in reaction to political events occurring not in China, but within the Philippines. Papers of this type viewed the community as disjuncted, but with the potential of modifying, vetoing or preventing the execution of specific policies of the country of residence if unified. Their activity was devoted to the unification of the
community in respect to specific issues and the soliciting of aid — again, usually financial — to modify, veto or counter a given policy by the Philippine or American authorities.

"Externalapolitical" refers to those newspapers which appear to have arisen in response to what were generally taken as apolitical events on the mainland, such as natural calamities. They were characterized by attempts to utilize cultural and personal identifications on the part of overseas residents to solicit aid for what were generally non-political organizations whose main concern was the mainland.

"Internal-dissenter" refers to newspapers which appear to have arisen in response to a lack of representation on the part of a grouping within the community. Characterized by the view that power within the community was dominated by groups or alliances detrimental to the interests of the grouping they sought to represent, they became outlets for dissident groups seeking a new channel of influence on the power structure of the community. This demand was usually characterized by attempts to mobilize the members of the dissident group and was often expressed as criticism of the individuals or groups in the community which controlled the Chamber of Commerce.

The first example of a newspaper of the external-political type can be dated from 1899 when the I Yu Hsing Pao began irregular publication. The newspaper was the organ of the Philippine branch of the Imperial Constitutionalism Society, a political reform organization connected with the propaganda activities of
Liang Ch'i-chao following his retreat to Japan. The paper was relatively short lived, but it clarifies what is meant by the type; it appears to have followed the doctrine enunciated by Liang in 1902:

"A newspaper writer must serve the needs of the time and must propagate a single idea... If you want to conduct the people toward reform you must startle them by democracy. If you want to lead them to democracy you must intimidate them by revolution... If your newspapers are to be guidelines of the people we must understand this technique..."*

The I Yu Hsing Pao appears to have had the overall purpose of mobilizing the community primarily in order to solicit funds for Liang's activity in Japan. Many copies of the paper have been lost, and secondary materials dealing with it are at best sketchy, but from what is available it seems to have had little, if any, concern with issues unrelated to political events and changes on the main- and Philippine affairs were ignored or treated secondarily, a factor which may have accounted for the short life of the daily. The impact of the newspaper on the community is beyond description or analysis as neither circulation figures nor descriptions of the paper's readers are available. A precedent was, however, established by the paper and the I Yu Hsing Pao was followed by a number of newspapers which seem to fall into what has been termed the external-political category.

The papers most clearly associated with Sun Yat-sen's followers in the Philippines, the Kong Li Po and Min Hao Pao, are examples. The Kong Li Po, established by Sun's secretary and head of the Singapore-based Nanyang Department of the T'ung Meng Hui (南洋支部), Hu Nan-min, began irregular publication as early as 1909 and was printing regular editions by 1911. Originally the official organ of the T'ung Meng Hui, it became the main exponent of the party line following the establishment of the first Kuomintang branch in the Philippines in 1914. The Min Hao Pao is more clearly identified with Cantonese supporters of Sun in the Philippines. It began publication as the Kuomintang was formed and published under this title until 1932. Both papers were staffed by Kuomintang members and appear to have shared many of the same characteristics found in the earlier I Yu Hsing Pao. The substance of their political orientation was, of course, different from the earlier paper, but they shared a similar concern with mobilizing the resources of the Chinese community in the Philippines to affect political events centered on the mainland. Accordingly, the papers were closely involved in the solicitation of funds from the Philippine community to support the Northern Expedition and waged vocal anti-communist propaganda campaigns until the formation of the united front in China.

62 Philippine Post Office records indicate the Kong Li Po began publication in 1912, but the present editor (1965) has several copies of the paper dated from 1909.
The internal-political type of newspaper is exemplified by the formation and early development of the Chinese Commercial News. This newspaper was originally designed as the official organ of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines under the editorship of Yu Yi-tung. Yu came to the Philippines as a teacher but soon associated himself with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce; he rose to a relative influential position in that organization, and acting in this capacity, was placed in charge of all publications of the Chamber. Prior to 1919 these publications consisted primarily of newsletters, but in that year Yu instituted the Journal of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and began to devote most of his energy to this publication. The Chamber, ostensibly to minimize expenses, but probably also to broaden its appeal in the fight against the Bookkeeping Law, discontinued the publication of the Journal in 1921 and helped Yu set up the nominally independent Chinese Commercial News shortly afterward. The Bookkeeping Law required all corporations to maintain their financial records in English, Spanish or a Philippine dialect. Although passed in 1921, there were earlier precedents. Weightman (The Philippine Chinese, p. 165) points out that on October 18, 1914, the Collector of Internal Revenue for the Philippines had issued an order requiring merchants and manufacturers subject to the merchant tax to keep a record of their daily accounts in English or Spanish. This attempt was aborted shortly afterward when the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that the Collector lacked the authority to issue such an order. In 1920, Governor-General Harrison recommended that all business houses keep books in English, Spanish or a local dialect in his annual message to the Philippine Legislature. The Legislature responded with Act No. 2972, or the Bookkeeping Law, which was approved by Harrison on February 21, 1921.
Law was used by the editorial staff of the paper as the catalyst with which to mobilize the Chinese community in the Philippines—specifically to elicit its full financial support to oppose the law's implementation, but also in order to prepare the community to better deal with the anticipated changes occurring in the Philippines as the American authorities began to relinquish control to Filipinos. According to the paper's present editor, it was hoped that by using the issue of the Bookeeping Law the community could be mobilized into a greater potential force in the face of any issues which might emerge from the changeover.

The early Chinese Commercial News shared the desire of earlier papers to break down the divisions within the Chinese community in order to elicit its full potential. However, in contrast to earlier journalistic endeavors, the issue which was used to coalesce the community originated not from the swirl of political events on the China mainland, but from the Philippine political system, and the individuals attempting to initiate this mobilization became less concerned with external political phenomena and more with events which occurred much closer to the community in geographical terms.

The early Fookien Times, first published in February, 1926, may be taken as an example of what has been termed the external-political type of newspaper. As with the Chinese Commercial News, Dee C. Chuan, who dominated the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the twenties, was closely tied to the early development of the Times. Go Puan-seng emerged as the paper's policy maker shortly after its establishment.
The paper's name implies it was primarily concerned with a single group in the community, but early editions of the newspaper suggest a concern with events and phenomena beyond the interests of the Immigrants from Fukien Province. Its formation was apparently a result of the floods in Fukien at that time, but the paper sought to solicit aid for the victims not only from individuals in the Philippines with kinship or geographical ties to the devastated areas, but from all Chinese regardless of place of origin. As in the cases of earlier papers which were devoted to more political concerns, the Fookien Times sought to unify and mobilize the full potential of the community, but may be distinguished from them on the basis of the substance and geographical origin of the forces which motivated its formation. In contrast to the type of paper exemplified by the early Chinese Commercial News, the Fookien Times was instigated by pressures arising not from the surrounding Philippine political system, but which were generated from the mainland. In contrast with the type of daily exemplified by the I Yu Hsing Pao or the early Kong Li Po, the substance of the motivation is more clearly apolitical rather than political. Although criticism of the political authorities in Fukien was implied by the paper's efforts to solicit aid for the victims of the flooding, this does not appear to have been a prime motivation for the paper's establishment.

The Common People's Daily, Overseas Chinese Bulletin, New China Herald, and the post-war Chinese National News may be classified as
internal-dissenters. They are similar in that they all spoke for segments of the community which appear to have been seeking greater representation in the community's power structure, a concern generally indicated by marked criticism directed toward groups or individuals occupying positions in the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce. The Common People's Daily and the Overseas Chinese Bulletin were identified as labor oriented; the New China Herald and the post-war Chinese National News expressed the interests and complaints of the Cantonese minority in the community.

Both the labor and Cantonese newspapers seemed to express the view that the community was not a unified entity, but did not seek to end this disunity by breaking down divisions in the same sense that the other types sketched above did. Their main complaint appears to have been that the differences within the community were not recognized by the existing power structure or the groups that dominated it and that some interests within the community were ignored. While the other types of newspapers sought to unify the community in pursuit of certain goals, the type of newspaper exemplified by these papers fought to make the community more aware of the differences which existed.

Chinese Schools

The development of the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Parties in the community appears to have taken place for the most part outside the awareness or concern of the American administrators. Chinese political parties, while allowed by the authorities partially because
of their ignorance of the development, were sponsored by forces exogenous to the islands. In the development of Chinese schools in the Philippines, however, the relationship of the American administration was more direct; while the expansion of schools was not always regulated or even identified by the authorities, it is doubtful if it could have proceeded as far as it did had it not been for the general American commitment to the expansion of education in the Philippines.

The establishment of the first Chinese school in the Philippines antedates the formation of the public school system under the American regime. Founded on April 15, 1899, the Anglo-Chinese School was established to "formalize the teaching of the Chinese language and culture." According to informants, the school was organized in response to the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Laws by General Otis to the Philippines. It was to serve as an alternate means of educating the sons of wealthy Chinese in Manila, as travel between the islands and China had become more difficult. The Anglo-Chinese school appears to have been the only formally organized educational institution established in the community until the formation of several "reading societies" by the T'ung Meng Hui in about 1905. It was subsidized indirectly by the United States; part of the taxes

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64 Anglo-Chinese School, 50th Year Anniversary Program (Manila: 1948) (in English and Chinese).

derived from Chinese merchants in Manila were turned over to the Chamber of Commerce to run the school.

In 1901 the United States authorities set the tone for their approach to private educational institutions in the Philippines. In the act which established a public school system in the Islands, section 25 contained the following provision:

"...Nothing in the Act shall be construed in any way to forbid, impede, or obstruct the establishment and maintenance of private schools..."^{66}

The lenient attitude of the authorities toward the establishment of private schools, on which the T'ung Meng Hui justified its activity in 1907 when questioned about the "reading society" it ran in Manila,^{67} was apparently a result of the Philippine Commission's desire for the rapid education of the island population using all means possible. Little concern for the content of education in private schools was expressed until 1906 and the passage of the Corporation Law. This measure sought to introduce a greater degree of supervision over private schools by encouraging them to incorporate, an action which made registration with the authorities necessary, and which in turn enabled the Secretary of Education for the Philippines to grant them the governmentally approved privilege of awarding diplomas and conferring degrees. The act established no penalties for a failure to incorporate.

^{66} Philippine Commission Act no 74, 1901.

^{67} National Archives, RG 370-268.
The Anglo-Chinese School incorporated, as did a second and third Chinese school in 1912, and United States records indicate only the presence of these three schools until 1917. Informants and some documents, however, indicate that other schools or quasi-educational institutions were present prior to that date.

The T'ung Meng Hui, as noted above, had successfully established at least two "reading societies" prior to 1912. These organizations were established primarily for the purposes of political indoctrination, but carried out this activity while teaching language skills and Chinese history. As such, they were at least quasi-educational, and several of the Chinese schools in Manila today claim to have developed from these predecessors. By 1912, then, at least five Chinese educational institutions were present in Manila. At least one of these, the Anglo-Chinese School, was clearly controlled by the Chamber of Commerce; the reading societies were not.

In 1917 the Philippine Legislature again attempted to expand governmental awareness and regulation of private schools. Philippine Legislature Act 2706, passed March 10, 1917, made the inspection and regulation of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and established the position of Commissioner of Private Schools, the administrative structure which was to inspect private educational institutions. The provisions of this Act, however, called for the inspection of only those private

68 National Archives, RG 26869-4.
schools which had incorporated and which sought governmental recognition. The desire to expand governmental regulation over the private schools continued to be sought by inducement rather than coercion. No penalties were prescribed for failing to seek governmental recognition other than the necessity to forego the benefits governmental recognition provided. As these benefits were not particularly appealing to the Chinese, not all Chinese educational institutions sought them and the growth of Chinese schools continued to be unrecorded. Chinese schools which were established by non-Chinese institutions, such as St. Stephens Chinese School founded by the Anglican Mission in the Philippines in 1917, tended to seek governmental recognition. Those educational institutions designed to either maintain Chinese traditions at the expense of Christianity or to orient the Chinese population only toward Chinese political events avoided it, seeing the requirements for and benefits of governmental recognition as opposed to the primary purposes of their schools. The Monroe Survey Commission listed twenty-two Chinese schools, mostly in Manila and many sponsored by various Christian missionary organizations, which had incorporated and sought governmental recognition by the middle 1920s. Informants, however, claim that there were at

least ten additional unregistered schools at that time. The records of the board of education in 1935 list a total of 58 Chinese schools in the Islands, only about half of which were formally recognized. No figures are available regarding the number of students involved prior to World War II.\textsuperscript{70}

The Philippine Constitution, approved in 1935, contained the provision that "all educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the state." To implement the provision, Commonwealth Act no 180 was passed in 1936. Departing from earlier attempts at governmental regulation, this act rendered punishable by fine "any person or group of persons who shall open, direct, maintain or manage a private school or college, without the prior approval of the Secretary of Public Instruction." Before any significant action against Chinese schools could be brought under this regulation, however, World War II had begun.

The supervision over the Chinese schools exercised by the Chinese was not noticeably more coordinated or centralized than that exercised by the legal authorities until the 1930s. All of the twenty-two recognized Chinese schools in the early 1920s were at least nominal members of the Chinese Educational Association.\textsuperscript{71} The membership in this organization was, however, not a sufficient basis for

\textsuperscript{70} Murray, "Chinese Education in Southeast Asia," p. 70.

\textsuperscript{71} Ch'en, Fei-lu-p'ieu hua ch'iao chiao yu, p. 49.
any unified control by the organization's leaders, as the association had no budgetary control over member schools. Until the early 1930s, the association appears to have been little more than an advisory body, devoted primarily to the enhancement of its officer's prestige. The Chamber of Commerce directly subsidized no more than one third of the recognized Chinese schools during the early 1920s. Most of the unrecognized schools were probably subsidized by the Kuomintang. Beginning in the late 1920s, according to most informants, the Kuomintang began to expand its control over the schools by attempting to control, revitalize, re-staff and redirect the Chinese Educational Association, and as World War II erupted, the Kuomintang was said to have been highly influential in the financial backing, staff hiring policies and curricula of nearly all Chinese schools, recognized or otherwise, in the Philippines. This may account for the fact that all Chinese schools were closed by the Japanese during their occupation of the Islands.

The previous paragraphs have portrayed what appear to have been the salient organizations which emerged during the period of American rule in the Philippines. While those mentioned were not the only organizations present during the nearly half decade of American control, they stand out as the most important in a community-wide sense. The twentieth century also saw the growth of clans and trade associations in the Philippine Chinese community, and secret societies —

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72 Amyot, *The Chinese of Manila*. 
represented by the Tang t'ui Lang Chun Hui (常推郎氣会) and the Ch'ang Ho She (長和社) were present during at least the early part of the American era. These organizations, however, were in each case more concerned with defending or advancing the interests of a sub-grouping in the community than with speaking for or having an impact on the community as a whole. They differ in kind from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese consulate, political parties, and the newspapers and schools which appeared during the American era, and, accordingly, have not been addressed in any great detail.

The discussion of the Chamber, consulate, parties, schools and newspapers has until this point been essentially descriptive. In the following paragraphs, however, an effort is made to place these institutions into a general conceptual framework, and, by the use of a case study, attempt to portray some of the relationships which existed between them. Thus, in a broad sense it is useful to conceptualize two basic types or groupings which were present during the American era. One of these may be "traditionalists," the other, "the nationalists." By traditionalist is meant that grouping which sought to perpetuate the system characteristic of the community during the Spanish period; namely, the maintenance of a single organizational framework which acted as an arbitrating agency for internal community disputes, a mediator between the community and the Philippine political

73 Liu, Chung-Fei Kuan Hsi Shih, pp. 564.
system, and the repository for traditional Chinese cultural values. This grouping was politically and economically oriented primarily toward the Philippines. Maintaining a cultural orientation toward China, it saw contact with the mainland in essentially an apolitical sense. Individuals in this grouping sought to establish and maintain an awareness of China, but did so not so much in order to influence events on the mainland, as to enhance their own influence and prestige in the overseas community. By "nationalistic" is meant a significantly different grouping, one which was politically and economically oriented toward China rather than the Philippines and which sought to use the financial and political resources of the overseas community to affect events on the mainland.

Organizationally, the activity of the nationalistic grouping was expressed primarily in the consulate and Chinese political parties; that of the traditionalists was often centered in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, although even this organization often became an arena in which the two groups would compete. Schools and newspapers fit into this general framework, with some exceptions, as satellites of one or the other groupings. Thus, the Chinese schools which grew out of the T'ung Meng Hui's reading societies may be said to be instruments of the nationalistic grouping, while those which derived their funds from the early Chinese Chamber of Commerce were instruments of the traditionalists in the community. The former placed primary emphasis on political indoctrination and the growth of Chinese nationalism;
the latter emphasized Chinese cultural values and commercial skills applicable to the Philippines. Newspapers such as the Kong Li Po or the Yu Hsing Pao were clearly appendages of the nationalistic grouping, often directly subsidized by the Kuomintang or other nationalistic organization, while dailies such as the early Chinese Commercial News or Fookien Times are better understood as vehicles for the traditionalists.

Given this general conceptual framework, the data which implies the relationship between various community institutions was not always amicable begins to make sense. The early conflict between individuals such as Palanca and the Chinese Consul general, the difficulty Sun Yat-sen experienced in his effort to institutionalize the Chinese revolution among overseas residents in the Philippines, and the retardation of the growth of Kuomintang influence among the overseas residents can be attributed in large measure to a conflict between the two basic groupings in the community.

The advent of the American era brought about the destruction of the capitan system, clearly the bulwark of the traditionalists in the overseas community, in two ways. On the one hand, the semi-official link between political authority in the Philippines and the overseas power structure was removed by the elimination of the formal ties between the capitan structure and the administration in taxing procedure and police power. On the other, the American authorities no longer recognized the capitan as the sole representative of Chinese interests,
sometimes turning instead to the newly arrived Chinese consulate. A third prop supporting the capitan system — the role the capitan had as the primary communicator of events in China to the overseas community — was severely eroded by the introduction of the consulate and the permissive policies on the part of the American authorities which allowed the growth of Chinese political parties.

The traditionalists did not, however, entirely acquiesce in the destruction of the institutions through which they controlled the community, and for the first two decades of American rule sought to take advantage of the divisions within the ranks of the nationalists. The most obvious of these divisions prior to 1911 was, of course, those which existed between the revolutionaries and reformers on the one hand and the Ch'ing representatives occupying the consulate general position on the other. The result was a three way struggle for influence in which influence shifted from the traditionalists to first one and then another nationalist group. The 1911 revolution brought about a temporary consolidation of nationalist-revolutionary power. Community orientation was in fact shifted from concern with events in the Philippines toward those in China, the flow of funds toward the Chinese mainland probably increased and those community leaders who argued that the Chinese in the Philippines had more to gain by concentrating their orientation, resources and activity in the Philippine system were shunted to the periphery of core decision-making groups in the community. Revolutionary fervor waned following
the 1911-1912 highpoint, however, and traditionalists probably moved into center stage, perhaps replacing many of the nationalists who had risen to influence on the success of the Chinese revolution. It was only with the re-emergence of a revitalized Kuomintang roughly two decades later, that the nationalists again successfully challenged the traditionalists for overall control of the Chinese community. One of the most important arenas for this struggle appears to have been the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

At first glance, it appears that the Chamber of Commerce, under its various names, remained highly stable in the face of the new forces and institutions which emerged during the American era. The organizational skeleton of the early Commercial Council of 1904 was, for example, remarkably similar to that of the 1939 Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. Both organizations were formally controlled by a four member executive committee responsible to a board of directors.

Beneath the structural conformity, however, a series of changes in both framework and personnel had occurred in the intervening years. During the period of American rule in the Philippines (1900-1942) roughly 250 different individuals occupied some position
in the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce structure. The tenures of these individuals varied as did the size of the group they composed. Figure 1 portrays the variations in the size of the groups formally occupying positions of leadership in the Chamber structure, and, as the size of the executive committee remained constant through the period, modifications in the size of the board of directors account for the variations. The chart therefore portrays only size variations between boards of directors.

The graph indicates that until 1920 there was a relatively high degree of modification in the size of the leadership group from year to year. In terms of the trace of the line, the period

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Most of the analysis of membership in the Chamber of Commerce executive committee and board of directors is based on information derived from the records of the organizations involved. There are certain gaps in the data which should be noted. The records of the early Hock Kain Club, for example, were not available and therefore the leadership groups for the period prior to 1904 have been reconstructed from secondary material, in particular, contemporary newspapers and correspondence from the organization in the Bureau of Insular Affairs files. There were also certain gaps during the period 1911-42 for which secondary materials had to be utilized. In the graphical material which follows, those sections which relied on information other than the actual records of the organization involved have been indicated by broken lines. Variation was sometimes found between the membership listed by the records of the organization and that found in secondary sources. Where such conflicts occurred, the data provided by the organizational records was used, a process which does not necessarily assure accuracy. In one case, for example, informants argued that one individual listed as a member of the board of directors actually resigned for a period of two years before rejoining. He was carried as a member, they claim, because of "face."
Fig. 1.-Size of Chamber Leadership Group
Size of Chamber Leadership Group
prior to the 1920s suggests experimentation regarding the size of
the board of directors of the various organizations. After 1920,
however, the trace of the graph tends to flatten. Variations in the
size of the group continued to be manifested, but the shifts are
clearly less radical than those which occurred during the first
half of the period.

Modifications in the size of the leadership group do not reveal
much concerning the forces bringing about the changes, nor are they
particularly useful for hypothesizing about the degree of continuity
in terms of orientation that was maintained by the Chamber over the
entire period. Better data is provided by looking at the composition
of each year's leadership group, and identifying those periods when
the organization experienced an influx of new people. When this is
done, some interesting patterns are exposed. First, it becomes
apparent that there was no period in which the leadership group of
one year was replaced entirely by new individuals the following year.
Rather, the consecutive leadership groups were always linked by the
tenure of several members. Certain individuals such as Cu Unjleng
(邱光銘) or Benito Siy Cong Bieng (施光銘) during the
first part of the period and Dee C. Chuan and Albino Sycip during the
latter part of the period had the sort of tenures which linked quite
a number of leadership groups. Figure 2 demonstrates this tendency.
Of the roughly 80 different individuals who appeared in either a board
of directors or executive committee during the first fifteen years of
<table>
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Chinese Commercial Council

1910 — 1915

Chinese General Chamber of Commerce

Ten Leaders of Chamber Appearing Most Often, 1900-1915

邱世衡

林杰生

黄竹樑
the period, the ten appearing most often were plotted by dates of membership. The fact that their tenures overlapped implies a relatively high degree of membership stability in that regardless of the composition of any given year's leadership, there were always members who linked the group to the past. The graph illustrates a pattern which was repeated throughout the forty-two year period of the survey.

The fact that there was no clear break in membership continuity during the period suggests the maintenance of a fairly uniform orientation despite relatively radical shifts in the size of the leadership group at various points of the Chamber's development. However, this should be taken only as a tenuous indication that the Chamber maintained a high degree of stability. The data does not indicate the actual role performed by the individuals who had long tenures in office, and while such tenure implies relatively greater power, some studies of decision-making in Chinese groups have illuminated the essentially ceremonial role certain individuals play in such groups.  

Thus, without a detailed investigation of the internal operations of the Chamber, the evidence is inconclusive. Those who linked a relatively large number of leadership groups could in several instances have been the ceremonial facade behind which instability and conflict existed.

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By looking at the groups in terms of the percentage of new members each contained, it is possible to identify those periods when the personnel of the leadership presumably underwent the greatest change. Certain years stand out as periods in which new members were arriving. Thus, 1908, 1910, 1912, 1913, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1929, 1937, 1939, and 1941 were years when the percentage of new members was significant, in some cases accounting for nearly 50 percent of the entire leadership group. Figure 3 illustrates the years in which there appeared to be an influx of new blood to the leadership group, an almost cyclical pattern occurring roughly once a decade.

With this data in mind, the following history, based primarily on interviews with several members of the various leadership groups and outside observers, is offered for purposes of explanation. During the first ten years of the Chamber's history the variations in the leadership group reflected the relative fluidity of the surroundings. Sovereignty in the Philippines had changed and was again changing hands; first as a result of the war between two western nations and then shifting more gradually toward the native population. Political and economic manifestations accompanied these changes. The theoretically centralized regime of Spain had been replaced by the multiheaded American administrative structure, commercial conditions were in transition, and the spirit of Philippine nationalism, particularly after the convening of the first Philippine legislature, was rising. Beyond this immediate environment other forces were being expressed. The rumblings of the Chinese revolution were being institutionalized in the Philippines.
Fig. 3.-Percentage of "New" Members in Chamber Leaders
Fig. 3.-Percentage of "New" Members in Chamber Leadership, 1900-1942
by the T'ung Meng Hui at the same time personal travel to the mainland on the part of Chinese residents in the Philippines was, because of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, becoming more difficult. The problems of identification, always present within the overseas Chinese community were becoming more pressing, as, on the one hand, modern Chinese nationalism demanded an orientation toward and participation in the political events on the mainland, while, on the other, the growing economic opportunities tended to force a concentration of energy toward the area of residence. This resulted in a crisis of leadership between individuals who sought to move the community toward integration in the Philippine system and those who sought an orientation toward China. This tension resulted in experimentation and compromise within the Chamber structure, reflected by the relatively radical changes in leadership group size. As the first decade of the twentieth century ended, however, the forces of Chinese nationalism were becoming more influential and the new members entering the leadership groups in 1908, 1910, 1912 and 1913 were, probably, either members of the revolutionary party branches in the Philippines or their strong supporters. Documentation for this interpretation is difficult to obtain as the biographical data available regarding most of the new individuals who entered is not sufficient to fully support it. Many individuals, such as Ch'en Ch'in-wen (陳欽文) who appeared for the first time in 1908 or Li Wen-hsin (李文孝) who entered in 1910 are portrayed

76 This was an argument advanced by most informants.
as revolutionary supporters in biographical material written after that period, but the actual membership lists of the T'ung Meng Hui and Kuomintang were not attainable for this period. None of the new individuals on which material was available were portrayed as anti-revolutionary, but this is only indirect evidence of their actual positions.

As the revolution in China bogged down in an era of warlordism and fragmentation, however, the most ardent supporters of the revolution in the Philippines were gradually eased from positions of leadership in the Chamber. In general, the period from roughly 1913 to 1920 was one of decay as far as the Chamber at Manila was concerned. Other Chinese chambers of commerce sprang up in various parts of the archipelago. These had only loose ties to the Manila Chamber, however, and despite the increasing economic activity of the Chinese, informants have stated that the total membership of the Chamber did not increase at a rate commensurate with the number of Chinese firms established in that period.

An abrupt reversal in the fortunes of the Chamber occurred in the early 1920s as a result of the efforts of the Philippine Legislature to pass a series of "bookkeeping laws." The first of these, Act No. 2972 passed in 1921, challenged almost all Chinese economic activity in the Philippines. The Chamber of Commerce at Manila appeared to most Chinese at the time to be the logical vehicle through which to fight the law, and a new generation of leaders
seized upon the issue to expand their connections and control over
the various provincial Chinese Chambers of Commerce, calling the
first nationwide convention of Chinese chambers of commerce and
establishing a war chest, under their control, for the lobbying
effort. Interestingly, in conjunction with its efforts to mobilize
the Chinese in the Philippines against the Bookkeeping Law, the
Chamber at Manila also reasserted its control and direction over
functions that in the previous decade had tended to be carried out
relatively free from Chamber supervision. The early 1920s, for
example, marked the point at which the collection of funds for
Philippine public causes, such as the Red Cross, anti-tuberculosis
hospital or calamity relief, was centralized in the Chamber.
Internally, the Chamber revitalized the Chinese Educational Associa-
tion, channeling more money to various Chinese schools, subsidized
the formation of a new newspaper (The Chinese Commercial News) and
reasserted its direction over the Chinese hospital and cemetery at
Manila.

Organizationally, the renaissance was illustrated by both the
expansion of the leadership group of the Chamber and the rising
number of new members that occurred in the early 1920s. The new
members probably represented the other side of the identity question,
viewing the future of the community as inseparable from that of the
Philippines and arguing for greater integration into the political
system of the Islands rather than for an orientation toward China.
In this respect, it is interesting to note the emergence of the Chinese Commercial News and the Fookien Times, both formed in the twenties and each closely connected to some of the individuals who were taking over the Chamber at that time.\(^7^7\) The early Chinese Commercial News was clearly oriented toward the Philippines and the early Fookien Times, although oriented toward China, was essentially apolitical in tone. The formation of the Fookien Times could have been the result of an effort to offset the influence of such papers as the Kong Li Po, the journalistic vehicle of the Kuomintang, whose concern with China was political. If so, the leadership of the Chamber, which subsidized both the Commercial News and the Times, was in effect saying that a concern with China was acceptable as long as it was not expressed in a political context (Fookien Times), and that political action on the part of the Chinese in the Philippines was more properly directed toward events in the archipelago (Chinese Commercial News).\(^7^8\) Although the leadership of the Chamber expanded in the early 1920s, the period also saw the consolidation of power within the Chamber by two individuals: Dee C. Chuan and Albino Sycip. The Chamber was to remain dominated by the Sycip and Dee families at least until the late 1930s, and this is probably illustrated by the relative stability in the size of the leadership group from 1920 to

\(^7^7\)See above, p. 121.

\(^7^8\) Dee and Sycip, with whom the 1920 renaissance of the Chamber is associated, appear to have differed in outlook from the leaders of the earlier Chamber, a factor which could have contributed to their arguing in favor of greater integration into the Philippine political system. See below, p. 154.
the early 1940s. The connection of these families with the Kuomintang in the Philippines is unclear, but they apparently were not particularly enthusiastic in their support of the Party until the middle 1930s. Although the Chamber supported at least one anti-Japanese boycott in the 1920s, it did so relatively unobtrusively, and, according to one informant, only as a means of competing with other groups in the community seeking to speak for the overseas residents.

The influx of new members in the Chamber's leadership in the late 1920s and 1930s probably represented gains for the Kuomintang, and roughly corresponds with increasing Kuomintang influence in the Chinese schools. Some informants argue that the domination of the Dee and Sycip families had been eroded by the outbreak of World War II and the Chamber was again entering a period of decay and fragmentation. Contemporary American observers of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, however, did not note such a development and their descriptions of the Chamber sound remarkably as if they were describing the old Spanish capitan system at the height of its power.

The Interaction Process

Beginning in the American era, data on which to construct case studies of the interaction between the Chinese and the Philippine
political system becomes available, and the Chinese response to the Bookkeeping Law appears to offer one of the most fruitful cases to observe. The response took place roughly in the middle of the period, after American military rule in the Philippines had been replaced by civilian and during the early stages of its transfer to Filipinos. It also occurred at a lowpoint as far as the spirit of Chinese nationalism in the Philippines was concerned, taking place roughly midway between the excitement of the formation of the

79 It should be noted that there are comparatively greater problems associated with the data available for the Bookkeeping Case (Case I) than with the two cases discussed in a later chapter. The analysis of Cases II and III is based for the most part on interview data derived from individuals who were either personally involved in the cases or were observers on the scene. The same kind of source material is unavailable for Case I simply because most of the participants have died. The reconstruction of the Chinese response to the Bookkeeping Law therefore relies to a greater extent on secondary sources; some interview data was utilized, but information derived from these interviews is essentially hearsay. Interviewees who volunteered information regarding Case I were not direct participants. There is also variation in the amount of secondary source data which is available for the cases. Access was obtained to internal Federation records for Cases II and III, but for Case I primary reliance had to be made on newspapers and other publications. Case I, the Retail Nationalization Act, has been addressed by other scholars, the most notable of whom being Remigio Agpalo in his case study of the 1954 Act (The Political Process and the Nationalization of Retail Trade in the Philippines), but comparable studies of the Chinese response to the Bookkeeping Act or to efforts to curtail Chinese education in the Philippines have not yet been published. Within these strictures, however, an effort has been made to reconstruct the Chinese activities in each case within the same frame of reference and the format of each case study is essentially the same.

It would not, of course, be justified to claim that the response to the Bookkeeping Law was typical or characteristic of Chinese political action during the half-century of the American era. Although chronologically speaking, it took place near the mid-point in that period, the early 1920's were no more "typical" of American rule than any other given period after the end of military administration. Likewise, a single case study is a very tenuous base from which to generalize about something as complex and as subject to change as the interaction process.

But while the response to the Bookkeeping Law is perhaps not fully typical of Chinese political action during the American era, there can be little doubt that it is viewed by many members of the present Chinese community in the Philippines as a classic case of successful political action. As such, the precedent it established must have

80 The early 1920's were not, of course, a low point as far as nationalism in China was concerned, as the May Fourth Movement and its aftermath were to demonstrate. The impact of the May Fourth movement in the Philippines is not clear, but there is little indication that it was significant. Whereas Sun's 1911 revolution was in a sense sponsored by the overseas Chinese communities, the May Fourth Movement seems to mark the rise of nationalism internally. As such, its impact may not have been felt in the Philippines until several years later.

81 While in the Philippines during 1964-65, the author had the opportunity of associating with several Chinese students at the University of the Philippines, all of whom had been born at least twenty years after the Bookkeeping Law, but each of whom had an impressive grasp of the facts associated with the case and strong opinions about it. The case has been discussed by nearly every Chinese historian who has dealt with the American era in the Philippines.
been significant and subsequent action by the Chinese was probably
judged by the standard set in the Bookkeeping case.

CASE I: The Bookkeeping Law

Background

One of the reasons Governor General Harrison recommended in
his 1920 annual message to the Philippine Legislature that all
business records in the Philippines be kept in Spanish, English or
a local dialect was because no one seemed to know just how much
Philippine business was in Chinese hands. The consensus of opinion
was, however, that it was considerable. Under American rule the
economic role played by the Chinese had increased dramatically and
by the 1920's it was estimated that about 70% of all Philippine
retail trade was being conducted by Chinese.\(^82\) It was generally
believed that only about 15,000 Chinese mercantile and industrial
firms, the bulk of which were in Manila, existed, but Hayden,
remembering the state of commerce in the Philippines in the 1920's
related that "provincial capitals seemed almost Chinese towns so far
as business was concerned."\(^83\) Chinese probably financed the bulk of
rice production in the Philippines and controlled a significant
proportion of its distribution. In the early 1930's it was believed
that Chinese investment was about 7% of total investments in
the Philippines, a sum which constituted over half of all U.S. capital
investment in China at the time.\(^84\) Comparable figures for the


\(^84\) Hayden, *The Philippines*, p. 701; Jensen, *The Chinese in the
previous decade are not available, but the amounts and percentages were probably not much less. By all accounts, Chinese business activity in the Philippines was pervasive, and, in some sectors, hegemonic.

It was not, however, so much fear that the Chinese controlled too much of the Philippine economy which motivated the introduction of the Bookkeeping Bill, as it was the fact that the exact extent of Chinese control was unknown. This had some serious implications, particularly in terms of taxation. As promoters of the Bill saw it, Chinese shopkeepers had been defrauding the government out of millions of pesos in taxes because Filipino officials were unable to check their books.

There were other reasons why the Bookkeeping Law emerged which were associated with the entire thrust of US policy toward the Philippines as formulated by the Democrats in Washington and enunciated by Francis Burton Harrison. During the "New Era," which lasted roughly from 1913 to 1920, American policy was marked by rapid strides toward Filipino self-government and the extension of Filipino political power and authority. This movement in the political field was paralleled by efforts to stimulate a greater role for Filipino's in the economic affairs of the Islands also, and Harrison in 1920 was

86 Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, p. 23.
probably responding to Filipino desires replace the Chinese in retail trade. Such sentiments had, for example, been expressed prior to 1920, and for several years prior to Harrison's remarks the demands had been made with increasing volume and regularity.

The Chinese were aware of a growing desire for action which would increase the role of Filipinos in the economic life of the Philippines probably at the expense of the Chinese at least as early as 1919. This awareness had led to growing uneasiness as early as 1919 and had resulted in several efforts by the Chamber to impress the Governor General with the lawfulness of the Chinese in the Philippines. Some Chinese informants have suggested that the uneasiness pervading the Chinese community contributed to the rise to power in the Chamber of a new leadership.

Participants

The Chinese response to the Bookkeeping Law appears to have been initiated by a small number of members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Manila led by Dee C. Chuan and Alfonso and Albino Sycip. These three individuals were relatively young; Alfonso Sycip, the oldest, was in his middle thirties, Albino Sycip and Dee C. Chuan were in their early thirties. The Sycips were the second generation of a Chinese family which had established a wholesale retail trading combine in the late nineteenth century and had pioneered the development

of the salt industry in Negros. Both Alfonso and Albino were born in Manila but educated in English schools in China. Albino later went to the University of Michigan law school, receiving his LLB and beginning a law practice in Manila in 1914 upon his return to the Philippines. Dee, born in Fukien province, arrived in the Philippines in 1901. By 1919 he had developed a widespread economic conglomerate in the Philippines based on lumber processing and distribution. The Sycips had become involved in the affairs of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Manila in about 1915, Dee appears to have become a member in about 1917. By 1919 the Sycips and Dee were about to make a series of moves which would catapult them into the Chamber's leadership, from which they would dominate community affairs for nearly two decades.

In 1919 they established the Trade Journal, formally a newsletter of the Chamber but actually, in the view of the son of the letter's first editor, a communication device purposefully designed to tie Chinese population centers in the Philippines closer together and to organize support for a takeover by Dee and the Sycips. At the same time, efforts were undertaken to establish the China Banking Corporation, the first large scale financial institution originated by the overseas Chinese in the Philippines. The China Banking Corporation opened its doors on August 14, 1920. The following day, the leadership of Dee and Sycip in Chamber affairs was publicly announced.

88 Manila Times, August 15, 1920.
89 Manila Times, August 16, 1920.
The leadership of Dee and the Sycips was in several ways a radical departure from earlier patterns of Chamber leadership. Prior to the 1919 rise of these individuals, leadership in the Chamber had been closely correlated with age and wealth. Dee and Sycips could match preceding leaders in terms of wealth but their relative youth marked a departure from the earlier pattern. Likewise, they seemed to be a different sort of leadership in terms of outlook. One Chinese informant expressed this difference in the following terms:

"You see, before Dee and the Sycips the community leaders were what you might call narrow minded in their outlook. Well, some of them ran big businesses in the Philippines and they had some travel. But with Dee and Sycip all this was different. They were big business not only for the Philippines but for the world. You know, the China Banking Corporation which they set up was an international corporation. That's right. It was really a new stage in economic enterprise for the Chinese. Then too, you take the Sycips, why, Albino was more educated in American schools than a lot of Americans. He'd had western education and knew his way around Americans. The old leaders didn't."

**Style**

Harrison's pronouncement in late 1920 that the Philippine legislature should consider the passage of a law which would require the Chinese to keep business records in languages other than Chinese was the event from which the Chinese response can best be dated. In retrospect, however, most of the initial efforts
undertaken by the Chamber appear to have been directed toward the Chinese community rather than either the Governor General or members of the Philippine legislature. The distribution of the Chamber's Trade Journal was expanded; its pages alerting the Chinese in the Philippines to the potential changes a bookkeeping law would entail, and arrangements for a national convention of Chinese Chambers of Commerce were initiated. In about December 1920, a second stage of the response was initiated. Contact was made with the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines and with several large American businesses for the purposes of laying the Chinese position on the Bookkeeping Law out before potentially sympathetic ears. Interestingly, there appears to have been no serious effort to contact Philippine legislators directly until after HR 658, the resolution which included Harrison's recommendation, had been passed by the Philippine House. The records of the legislature indicate no lobbying effort by the Chinese until after the Bookkeeping Law had been enacted and the Chinese sought repeal of the measure. The apparent lack of interest in moving directly into the legislature was supported by the reconstruction of the Chamber's actions by an informant:

"The first thing the Chinese here did was to see if they could get other people on their side. They didn't try for Filipinos, of course, because it was the Filipinos who wanted the Chinese out of business. But Dee and others knew some American businessmen through
their business dealings and it was decided to contact the American Chamber of Commerce and see if they would help out."

This effort was successful. The American Chamber responded by passing a resolution in February 1921, which placed this organization on record as opposing the Bookkeeping Law. Events in the legislature were moving too rapidly for this to have much impact, however, and the Bookkeeping Law had been enacted and signed (on February 21, 1921) before the Chinese response had been effectively established. Faced with the enactment of Act 2972, the Chamber's reaction was twofold. On one hand it sought to have the Act repealed, on the other hand, it appealed to the executive branch to delay its implementation.

The efforts undertaken by the Chamber in both these areas were again directed primarily toward the American authorities rather than Filipino Legislators. The repeal resolution, of course, was introduced by a Filipino Legislator, but there is some indication that he did so after being contacted by representatives of the American Chamber of Commerce rather than the Chinese directly. In any event, most of the documentary evidence which is available indicates that the Chamber concentrated its efforts on the Governor General, seeking to have the newly appointed Leonard Wood take a formal stand in favor of repeal. Appeals were made directly to the Wood-Forbes Presidential

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90 American Chamber of Commerce Journal, (Manila), February 15, 1921.
Mission in May 1921, to the Secretary of War in Washington, and to the new Governor General when he arrived in Manile the following month. The direction of these efforts appears to have been in part due to the basic rationale of the argument conceived in the early months of 1921, an argument which necessitated primary effort toward the American executive rather than Filipino legislator and also required that the Chamber involve the Chinese consulate in the opposition movement. This argument was described by a member of the Chinese General Chamber whose father was closely involved in Chamber activities in the 1920s in the following terms:

"You see, there were to be two lines of argument. One was that the act was just plain wrong and against the American way of doing things. The other was that suppose the Americans let this happen to the Chinese in the Philippines, then maybe the same thing would happen to American business interests in China. The Chamber could argue the first line directly and they did by sending messages to Americans in the Philippines and even in the States. The other line of argument required some help from the Chinese consulate. So, a delegation was sent to the Chinese consul to get him to take the necessary steps because the Chamber's officers thought the second argument would have more weight if it came through those channels."

The effort had only limited success. Wood agreed to have a measure introduced which delayed implementation of Act 2972, but refused to sponsor its repeal. In the legislature repeal was

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91 National Archives, Bureau of Insular Affairs, RG 370-42; 370-47; RG 360-51.
92 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 706.
voted down amid charges that the Chinese were offering bribes. Hayden reports that three members of the Philippine House of Representatives expressed to him that they personally had reservations about the legality of the Bookkeeping Law and had thought seriously about repeal.93 They declined to vote for repeal because of the fear of being labeled Chinese bribe takers.

There are, however, some factors which might have prevented the Chamber from resorting to bribery. No documentation of such an effort is available and as one informant expressed it, the Chamber was simply not in a position to offer bribes to Philippine legislators:

"I don't think the Chamber went in for bribes for several reasons. First, it was too risky. Here was the Chamber getting together money for the fight with all the Filipinos and Americans watching and expecting it to be used in bribes. Alright, anything that looked like a bribe could have finished the campaign... Since no records could be kept of bribes, it would have been a dangerous thing to do in relation to the other chambers. You see, this was the first time they all got together and some of them were just waiting for the Chamber to make a mistake. The Chamber had to account for all the money they collected. If they had used it as bribes they couldn't have shown the other chambers where it went."

93 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 705.
These comments indicate the extent to which the desire to prevent the implementation of the Bookkeeping Act and the commitment to reestablish a central coordinating agency within Chinese community were intermingled. The two goals were, of course, mutually reinforcing; the threat of the Bookkeeping Law prompted the Chamber to assert its authority throughout the archipelago's Chinese population centers and the viability of the Chamber enabled the Chinese to mount an effective campaign against the law. An interesting side effect was what may have been a significant departure from the traditional mode of Chinese interaction with the Philippine system: the decline of bribery.

In any event, the failure of the effort to get repeal necessitated a modification in the direction of the Chamber's efforts. It was decided to shift the attack from the executive and legislative branches to the judicial realm. The vehicle for this became the test case of the Bookkeeping Law, *Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad*. This modification resulted in a minor crisis of authority for the Chamber. As the judicial battle was drawn out and conducted in what for most Chinese were esoteric and alien terms, the confidence in the Chamber appears to have slackened on the part of various groups of Chinese. Faced with this erosion of authority, Dee and Sycip engaged in what amounted to a loyalty campaign for several years, often through the pages of the *Chinese Commercial News*, several times by personally speaking to potentially dissident groups within the community. As one informant expressed it:
"Sometimes keeping the community united was as hard as getting rid of the Bookkeeping Law. Dee had to remind (Chinese) businessmen in Cebu about the seriousness of the problem several times to keep their support."

Having failed to have obtained a favorable ruling within the Philippine courts, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, at that time having appeal authority over the Philippine judicial system. Albino Sycip was dispatched to the US in 1925, returning a year later after the Court's invalidation of the Bookkeeping Law.
CHAPTER III

THE JAPANESE INTERREGNUM

It is difficult to objectively evaluate the effect of the Japanese occupation on the Philippines. Some of the physical scars of the occupation and liberation are still visible in Manila and the memories of the individuals who lived during the several years of Japanese control remain colored by intense emotion. There is a general consensus among historians and other scholars that the occupation set in motion a series of forces which had and continue to have profound affects on Philippine affairs. Indeed, it is inconceivable that the Philippine events of the last thirty years would have followed the course they did or that many of the names which color Philippine politics today -- Magsaysay, the Huks, Marcos, to name but a few -- would be the same, had not the Japanese invaded, occupied, and finally lost the Philippines. But despite a general recognition that the Japanese occupation was important, it has been only recently that reassessments have highlighted the effect of Japanese imperialism in Southeast Asia, suggesting that the Japanese military expansion of the 1940's may have been more seminal

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1 See, for example, Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, pp. 29-36; Rafaelita H. Soriano, Japanese Occupation of the Philippines with Special Reference to Japanese Propaganda, 1941-45, (Ph.D. Dissertation: The University of Michigan, 1948).
than earlier studies have given it credit for.²

The Japanese occupation of the Philippines differed in several ways from the occupation of other areas of Southeast Asia. For one thing, the Japanese sought to occupy the Philippines for military as opposed to economic reasons. After the invasion, efforts were made to fit the Philippines into the general economic plan of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, but it was apparently never believed by the Japanese that the Philippines were economically essential to the Empire. Rear Admiral Sadatoshi Tomioka, Chief of Naval Operations, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, pointed out that from the Japanese planner's view, "...it was military common sense that the Philippines had to be taken in the initial attack. The Philippines were an economic burden to Japan and the Planning Board knew this in advance. Nor were there any political motives for the Philippine attack. It was purely for strategic military reasons... to eliminate the threat of American advance bases on the Japanese line of communications to the southern regions of Indonesia, Malaya, etc."³ There were other distinguishing elements. In contrast with the occupation of less densely populated regions such as Borneo, the control of the Philippines was the prerogative of the Japanese Imperial Army as opposed to the Navy, a factor that introduced a distinguishable tradition and style to the administrative structure imposed on the archipelago. Finally, the character of the occupation

²This is an argument advanced by several East Asian historical "revisionists" among whom Grant K. Goodman is prominent. See his Imperial Japan and Asia: A Reassessment (New York: The East Asian Institute of Columbia University, 1967).

³U.S. Army, "Post-War Interrogation". Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966) Vol II, Part I, p. 51. The fact that the Philippines were sought for non-economic reasons may have contributed to the Japanese decision to grant nominal independence to the Philippines along with Burma, which was also occupied for strategic rather than economic reasons.
often reflected the personalities of the higher Japanese military commanders in the area who rotated in and out of the hierarchy during the occupation.\(^4\)

But in addition to the variations brought about by the peculiarities of Japanese military expansion, there was the fact that the Philippines themselves were unlike any other colonial possession in Southeast Asia. Of all the non-independent countries in the region, only the Philippines had been given a definite promise of independence by its pre-war governor, and in contrast with most Japanese occupied areas of Southeast Asia, only the Philippines was able to sustain significant anti-Japanese guerrilla activity by indigenous groups professing loyalty to a western power.\(^5\)

But while the character of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines differed in significant ways from other southeast Asian countries, the Chinese community in the Philippines shared with other southeast Asian Chinese communities many of the same effects of the occupation. Harry Benda gives a useful overview:

"The Chinese communities, suspect on account of their loyalties to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime, experienced harassments,"


\(^5\)Near the end of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Japanese authorities assessed the situation in the Philippines as inexplicable and frustrating. "Even after their independence, there remains among all classes in the Philippines a strong undercurrent of pro-American sentiment. It is something steadfast, which cannot be destroyed..." (Dispatch: Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section Report Saikin ni Okeru Hito Jijo -- Recent Situation in the Philippines: 31 March 44, p. 1) in U.S. Army, Reports of General MacArthur, Vol I, p. 311-12.
increased tax burdens and strict political surveillance. These were coupled with concerted efforts to win them over to the cause of the rival Kuomintang government established by Wang Ching-wei under Japanese sponsorship. There was only one area -- Malaya and Singapore -- where the Japanese launched a frontal assault on a sizeable group of Chinese residents... In most other occupied areas, however, the Chinese minorities were by and large allowed to maintain their livelihoods and possessions.\(^6\)

The Japanese were reluctant to move against the Chinese because they recognized the pivotal economic position they occupied. Conscious of the military requirement to convert the economic output of the former colonial areas to the Japanese war effort with a minimum of delay and disruption, Japanese policy was generally designed to utilize the economic role performed by the Chinese rather than eliminate that role. But while the Japanese generally curtailed attacks on overseas Chinese economic activity, they consciously sought, in the Philippines at least, to modify the internal community power structure in such a way as to maximize Japanese economic gain. Lucian Pye is correct when he points out that the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia was destructive of the existing power structure in the Chinese communities.\(^7\) Old elites lost power, but not simply as a result of their inability to protect the


community from the financial demands of the Japanese. If the Philippine case was typical, it could be argued that the destruction of the older power structure resulted from conscious efforts by the Japanese to replace it. Many members of the old elite in the community maintained their economic interests and their wealth during the occupation. The Japanese saw to it, however, that they were removed from positions of political power within the community.

In the Philippines, the destruction of the older alignment of power had actually begun prior to the Japanese invasion. It was noted previously that some informants suggested that the power of several of the most important leaders of the community was being eroded prior to the outbreak of World War II, and there appears to have been an increased degree of instability in the community leadership, as evidenced by the influx of new members in the late 1930's. This interpretation is strengthened by looking at what was occurring outside the Chamber.

Under the impetus of the Sino-Japanese war, the Kuomintang in the Philippines and the Chinese consulate apparently challenged the Chamber's claim to be the sole representative for and dominant structure over the Chinese in the Philippines. The challenge came in the form of a new organization termed the Enemy Resistance Association,8 an organization initiated by the Philippine Kuomintang and Chinese consulate rather than the Chamber of Commerce. Some members of the Chamber's board of directors were members of the Enemy Resistance Association, but the Association is said to have been led by individuals such as Yu Khe Thai, 8 Jensen, *The Chinese in the Philippines*, p. 335.
position in the Chamber hierarchy. The Association was designed to mobilize the Chinese in the Philippines against the Japanese. It collected funds to support the military activities of the mainland government and sought to organize boycotts against Japanese goods in the Philippines. Structurally, the Association was headquartered in Manila and paralleled many of the provincial Chambers of Commerce over which the General Chamber of Commerce in Manila exercised loose coordination. Association officers were almost invariably Kuomintang members and were, according to informants, generally between the ages of 25 to 40, which probably made the average leadership age of this organization somewhat lower than that of the Chamber. Many of the informant statements regarding friction between the Association and Chamber are hearsay, but the fact that a separate organization was formed to deal with the Sino-Japanese conflict, the membership difference between the Association and the Chamber, and the proselytizing efforts of the new organization tend to support the hypothesis that friction existed between the two organizations. Additionally, it was only with the Japanese invasion of the Philippines that a formal link between the Association and Chamber was established. By the late 1930's it was clear that a new organization had been formed in the community and was successfully obtaining funds and probably loyalty from significant numbers of Chinese in the Philippines. If the authority of the Chamber elite was not eroded, at


At least an organization had been formed which had the potential of doing so.

In any event, if friction existed between the Kuomintang acting through the Enemy Resistance Association and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, it quickly dissipated when the Japanese invaded the archipelago. A formal coalition, representing the Chamber, Kuomintang and Enemy Resistance Association, was quickly formed. Referred to as the "Security Commission," this organization established branches in the provinces, often using the physical facilities of provincial Chambers of Commerce. The coalition collapsed or was dispersed as the Japanese moved toward Manila.

One of the most severe blows to the authority of the old elites and in particular the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce was indirectly a result of the Japanese invasion. As the Japanese advanced toward Manila during the last part of December 1941, looting broke out in the capital and many Chinese business establishments were destroyed. Although documentation of the losses incurred by the Chinese business interests in Manila is unavailable, for the period of roughly one week between the retreat of the American forces from Manila and the entrance of Japanese troops, this period has been described by some informants as one of the most destructive of the war. According to some witnesses, the destruction of Chinese business during that period was equal to what occurred during the reoccupation of Manila by the

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Americans when the city was virtually destroyed. The losses are generally attributed to the absence of authority in the city, but the victim in terms of prestige as far as the Chinese community was concerned was the Chinese General Chamber ofCommerce. Thus, when the Japanese entered Manila on January 2, 1942, they arrived on the heels of an authority crisis in which the old configuration of power had been severely shaken.

The Japanese maintained this situation by moving rapidly against the previous structure of power in the community. Many of the first victims of the kempeitai, or Japanese security police, were the openly and clearly identifiable anti-Japanese elements of the community. On January 8, six days after the advanced guard of the Japanese 16th and 48th Divisions had entered Manila, the Chinese consul general, Young Kwang-sen, his staff, and nearly fifty prominent Chinese, including most of the Chamber's leadership were arrested.\(^\text{12}\) Many of these individuals were Kuomintang members, but the group also included a significant number of non-party members, some of whom had either sought to remain aloof from the efforts of the Kuomintang to mobilize anti-Japanese sentiment in the Philippines or who were said to have avoided any Kuomintang association. The Japanese arrest and incarceration of these individuals appears to have been based not only on the desire to eliminate openly professed anti-Japanese sentiment, but also to destroy any potential for organized opposition. Shortly after the fall of Bataan in April the consul general and the bulk of his staff were executed, along with seven members of the Philippine-based Kuomintang

and the editor-publisher of the *Chinese Commercial News*. Over thirty other Chinese were sentenced to prison terms of various lengths. Some former leaders in the Chamber escaped the initial onslaught of the Japanese invasion by leaving Manila, but their memoirs of the war years indicate that the former structure and communications network commanded by the Chamber was severely fragmented.  

In addition to moving against many of the individuals who composed the community's leadership, the physical facilities which were utilized by the old leadership were either destroyed, bypassed or ignored. The offices of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce were officially closed in January 1942. The two major Chinese newspapers, the *Chinese Commercial News* and *Fookien Times* were shut down for the duration of the war, as were all officially recognized Chinese schools.  

In place of these institutions the Japanese sought to establish new organizations, similar in form to those they replaced, but designed to perform significantly different roles. One of the first of these was the *Manila Shim bun*, a newspaper in Chinese published by the Japanese shortly after the *Commercial News* and *Fookien Times* had been closed down. Although similar in format to the papers it had replaced, the *Shim bun* was designed for an entirely different purpose than any of the previously established Chinese papers. Rather than a mechanism

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13One of the most revealing descriptions of the fragmented nature of the old Chamber of Commerce structure is found in Go, *The Hour Had Come*. Go, a former secretary-general of the Chamber, fled with Yang Sepang, the secretary of the Chamber at the time of the Japanese invasion, and had virtually no contact with any other leaders of the Chamber for three years.


or channel by which the Chinese could be mobilized to influence the government or events either in the Philippines or in China, the Shimbun was a device initiated by non-Chinese, designed to communicate the desires and regulations of the administrative authorities. This in effect reversed the role Chinese newspapers had performed in the Philippines prior to World War II. There were, particularly after 1943, several underground, anti-Japanese newspapers initiated by the Philippine Chinese, but these were covert communication channels which led an ephemeral life and could not match the Shimbun in circulation or publication regularity.

A second, and more important, organization which the Japanese imposed upon the community was the "Chinese Association," (華僑協會) overtly designed to supplant the earlier Chinese Chambers of Commerce, but as in the case of the Shimbun, actually designed to facilitate the Japanese administrative control over the Chinese. The "Chinese Association," initially organized in March 1942 and officially recognized by the Japanese authorities in June of the year, was originally headed by Go Co-lay (吳宗來). Go had been a Chinese importer in the

16 Two of the most well-known newspapers to develop out of the Japanese occupation were the Kuomintang sponsored "Souls of the Great Hans" (大漢魂), which after the war became the Great China Press, (大華報), and the Communist-sponsored Chinese Guide (華新報). See, Blaker, "The Chinese Newspaper in the Philippine, p. 258; Smin Chang, A Historical Review of the Chinese Guide: A Manila Daily Newspaper (Manila: 1945).

17 The discussion of the Chinese Association follows Liu, Chung Fel Kuan-hsi shih, pp. 652-660. See also, Weightman, The Philippine Chinese, p. 293; AV. Hartendrop, Short History of Industry and Trade in the Philippines, p. 176; Jansen, The Chinese In the Philippines, 351-60.
Philippines who, prior to World War II, had established extensive commercial dealings with Japanese business interests in Nagasaki. The vice president was initially none other than Tee Han-kee, a founder of the Kuomintang in the Philippines and, in the 1940s, the director of the Chinese General Hospital in Manila. Both these individuals had been excluded from positions of importance and power in the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce prior to the Japanese invasion, but each is said to have had prestige in the immediate pre-war community. Although Tee had been a founder of the Kuomintang in the Philippines, he had apparently been displaced from a significant role in that organization in the 1930s as Chiang Kai-shek dispatched party members from China to overseas Kuomintang branches. The Secretary-generalship of the Association was initially offered to the former secretary of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Yang Sepang, but when Yang declined, Tan Tien-lou, a native of Amoy who had at one time been a representative of the China Banking Corporation at Shanghai, received the position.

Although these three individuals spoke for the Chinese Association

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18 Beginning in the 1930s, the Kuomintang in the Philippines underwent a transformation, brought about by changes in leadership. Individuals such as Tai Kui-sien, Sy Yat-sien, Sai Kuo-chuan and Ten Un-liong, who had received extensive political indoctrination under Kuomintang auspices in China, moved into the party leadership in the Philippines. Shortly before the Japanese invasion, these individuals were joined by Party members with no previous contact with the Philippines (e.g.: Lin Tso-mei and Li Hai-jo). The infusion of new Kuomintang leaders in the Philippines was at the expense of the founders, and by the outbreak of WW II, Tee Han-kee had little if any power as far as the Kuomintang was concerned. His virtual exclusion from the Kuomintang shortly before the Japanese invasion may have contributed to his acceptance of the vice presidential position in the Japanese sponsored Philippine Chinese Association, but some Chinese historians argue that he accepted the position under stress.

19 Go, The Hour Had Come, p. 101
until their assassinations, the Japanese authorities made a serious attempt to portray the Chinese Association as a broadly based and widely representative structure, setting up a list of 77 "founders," and later, on their release from imprisonment, coopting several former leaders of the pre-war Chamber into the membership of the Association. The founders included several well known names from the Manila community and individuals who were designated as representative of "all aspects of Chinese life in the Philippines." Their role, according to most informants, was essentially decorative as was the role of the members of the old Chamber leadership who had joined the Association. Interestingly, however, there appears to have been some effort on the part of the Japanese authorities to integrate at least the nominal heads of several Manila-based Chinese trade associations previously outside the Chamber into the new Association. This was a variation from the organizational structure of the earlier Chamber which had not shown much willingness to admit representatives of all trade associations. Members of various trade associations had been members of the Chamber, but their membership in the latter organization was not a function of their trade association connections, nor did they represent the trade association in the Chamber's activities. In contrast, among the founders of the Japanese sponsored Chinese Association were several individuals who were identified as representatives of specific Chinese trade associations and were said to have been selected as founders because they represented the interests of these associations. While it is difficult to discern the criteria for selection beyond at least the acceptance of the Japanese authority, if the Japanese did in fact make a concerted effort to create an organization which encompassed the Chinese trade associations, this marked
a departure from the precedent afforded by the earlier Chamber. (Trade
association representation, or rather the lack of it, became one of the
bases on which the Filipino-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, the
successor to the "Chinese Association" and pre-war General Chamber, was
attacked and on which the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of
Commerce was established in the early 1950's).

Structurally, the Chinese Association paralleled the inter-provincial
framework which the earlier Chamber of Commerce had developed. Associa-
tion branches were set up under the supervision of the local Japanese
command in Cebu, Iloilo, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Jolo, Davao, Leyte, Samar,
Legaspi, Tugueganao, Aparri, Vigan, Lunao, Baguio, Luceno, and San Pablo.
The nominal leaderships of these provincial associations were drawn from
local Chinese communities and are said to have included members of the
old elite who had previously headed the provincial chambers of commerce.

Despite some remarkable similarities between the organizational
framework imposed on the Chinese by the Japanese and what had existed
prior to the occupation, there were significant variations. The Japanese
clearly did not want to create an organization which they could not
fully control. The Association they established was independent in
name only; its policy decisions, operating funds, and choice of leader-
ship came directly from the Japanese military inspection office
(軍政監部), a branch of the Kempeitai. And rather than func-
tioning as a representative of Chinese interests in the Philippines
vis-a-vis the ruling authorities, as the Chamber had done, the Chinese
Association was clearly an exploitative device imposed by the ruling
authorities to control, derive funds from, and maintain surveillance
over the overseas community. No actions taken by the Association during its three year existence are indicative of efforts to articulate or aggregate Chinese interests. On the other hand, the most notable activities it engaged in, such as the collection of funds to further the Japanese war effort, demonstrate that the Association was a creature of the ruling power rather than of the Chinese community in the Philippines.

This fundamental difference between the Chinese Associations and the earlier Chamber of Commerce had some interesting side effects. For one thing, the close connection to the Japanese military police network in the archipelago tended to emphasize the nationwide or interprovincial character of Chinese organization. The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce had begun a centralizing movement by formalizing the connection between Manila and provincial chambers of commerce through instituting a convention arrangement at the time of the Bookkeeping Law. This tied the chambers of commerce more closely together, but coordination and control by the General Chamber in Manila remained relatively loose, and by the 1930's the interprovincial consolidation movement had slipped into obscurity. Under the direction and supervision of Japanese occupational authorities, however, coordination and conformity between the positions and actions of the Chinese Association in Manila and the provincial organizations were stressed. Non-conformity was virtually impossible due to the ties with the military (i.e., the provincial échelons of the Japanese Military Inspection Office). This situation imposed a degree of rigor on the Chinese throughout the Philippines to which they had not previously been subjected and made them extremely
Another effect of the reorientation of the Chinese power structure from one designed to articulate or aggregate Chinese interests to one of acting essentially as a bureaucratic appendage of the government, was the promotion of much closer political involvement between Chinese and Filipinos. This occurred at two levels and was a result of two interrelated governing mechanisms imposed by the Japanese; the PRIMCO and the Pao-Chia system.

PRIMCO, or the Philippine Price Commodities Distribution Control Administration, was established soon after the occupation was consolidated to regulate the pricing and distribution of consumer goods (with the exception of rice).\(^{20}\) It did this in several ways; by setting the official price of the goods, allocating and supervising the distribution of goods to retail outlets, and by issuing ration slips to consumers which enabled them to purchase the goods at the official price. The board of directors of this agency was composed of four Japanese, one Filipino, one Spaniard and one Chinese. The Chinese was selected from the executives in the Chinese Association. As in the case of the Chinese Association, PRIMCO was essentially a regulatory device through which the Japanese occupational authorities publicized and implemented their decisions. As such, it is doubtful if the non-Japanese members of the board of directors had much say over the activities or policies of PRIMCO. For the first time since the end of the Spanish period in the Philippines, however, the Chinese were formally and officially made

participants in the regulatory aspects of the government.

The other device which had the effect of tying Philippine and Chinese together was the Pao-Chia system, a neighborhood regulatory device introduced in Manila and other major Philippine cities. The structure sought to establish a system of collective responsibility for districts composed of ten contiguous family units. The initial formation of a district was theoretically a voluntary act in which the families of a given section of the city spontaneously banded together and sought the recognition of the occupational authorities. The actual motive force in the creation of a district, or Pao, was, however, a function of the system of rationing. Ration slips were legally obtained only by presenting a certified membership card in a district to PRIMCO. This had the formal effect of tying the entire Pao-Chia system into an agency which had a representative of the Chinese Association as a leader.

These observations raise the question of whether the Japanese consciously and systematically sought to push the Chinese into the Philippine system. The interlocking administrative structures demonstrated by PRIMCO and the Chinese Association suggest this could have been a consideration, as does the fact that the Japanese prevented the

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21 Liu, Chung-Fei Kuan-hsi Shih, p. 662; Jensen, The Chinese in the Philippines, pp. 354-55, Manila Tribune, September 1, 1942. The functions of the Pao-chia system were five-fold: to "maintain peace and order, provide information regarding anti-Japanese elements, assure an accurate census, serve as a basis for collection of voluntary contribution and maintain good social habits." See Executive Order 77: Journal of the Philippines, 1, 45, RRFC, 24 November 1942.
reopening of Chinese schools which were clearly non-integrative in their effect. But while there might have been some reasons to promote Chinese political assimilation into the Philippines, the Japanese record is very inconsistent on this count. Despite actions which on the surface led to political integration, the Japanese also took steps which indicated an opposite orientation. No effort was undertaken during the occupation to modify existing citizenship laws, and membership in institutions nominally designed to channel popular interests, such as the Kalibapi or "Peoples Party," continued to be restricted to Filipinos. Thus, while the Japanese were apparently quite willing to involve the Chinese in the administrative aspects of the political system, they were not willing to provide an incorporative legal framework or otherwise encourage greater political participation by the Chinese in the Philippine policy.

The reasons for this are clear. The primary concern of the Japanese was control for purposes of their war effort. They had little regard to integration between the Chinese and Filipinos, and operated on an ad hoc basis, moving rapidly to destroy any organization which might limit their control, such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and establishing new organizations designed to facilitate it. The new organizations sometimes had the effect of drawing Chinese and Filipinos together, but this was not a goal of the Japanese authorities, per se. The presence of the Japanese invaders, of course, introduced a common enemy as far as many Chinese and Filipinos were concerned, but for this aspect of

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the Japanese interregnum it is best to turn to the organized anti-
Japanese response: the guerrilla organizations.

The Guerrilla Organizations

Behind the formal structure of power centered in the Chinese
Association and other Japanese sponsored organizations, an extensive
framework of power associated with the various Chinese anti-Japanese
guerrilla movements grew up during the occupation. Although fairly
extensive, the salient characteristic of this shadow framework, or
"government," was its fragmented and competitive nature. The major
split within the guerrilla structure was, of course, between the Kuomintang sponsored and led guerrilla organizations and the communist
guerrilla forces. This bifurcation of guerrilla forces was further
split as a consequence of the effectiveness of Japanese anti-guerrilla
activities and by the rivalries between various guerrilla organizations
within each of the two basic branches of the movement. One result of
this situation was the absence of a single viable alternative to the
Chinese Association during the Japanese occupation and the inability of
any single guerrilla group to gain full control over the Chinese community
during the American reoccupation at the end of World War II.

23 The best reference for dealing with guerrilla movements in the
Philippines is probably, U.S. Army, G-2 Historical Section Guerrilla
Resistance Movement in the Philippines, (Washington, D.C., Government
Printing Office, 1948) GHQ FEC, General Intelligence Series, Volume I.
Luis Taruc provides some discussion of the role of Chinese guerrillas
associated with the Hukbalahap movement in Born of the People (New York:
International Publisher, 1953). See also, Jensen, The Chinese in the
Philippines, pp. 339-347; Weightman, The Philippine Chinese, pp. 100-101;
Chang, The Chinese Guide, p. 11. A personal account of one guerrilla
organization during the war is provided by Shih I Sheng, "Chinese
Guerrilla Movement in the Philippines" Philippine-Chinese Cultural
The Kuomintang sponsored guerrilla organizations were of two types; those which grew out of the old pre-renovated Philippine Kuomintang and those which were sponsored by individuals sent by Chiang Kai-shek to the Philippines during the 1930's. In general, the latter type groups -- created and led by the individuals such as Sy Yat-sien (Shih I Sheng), Li Hai-jo, and Lin Tso-mei who had been instrumental in revitalizing the Philippine Kuomintang in line with the "new life" movement in China -- had greater discipline, numbers and continuity. These were the "Philippine-Chinese Volunteer Corps," led by Sy Yat-sien; the "Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsueh-kan Militia (COWHM)," led by Li Hai-jo; and the "Philippine-Chinese Wartime Youth Service Corps," led by the pre-war secretary general of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, Lin Tso-min. Sy's group was the largest of the Chinese guerrilla organizations in the Philippines, reaching about 800 personnel near the end of the occupation. It was also one of the most closely tied to Manila. Although centered in the Sierra Madre Mountains, Sy's group had wide contact and liaison with Manila Chinese from whom it obtained operating funds. In 1943 it made contact with Marcos Augustine's guerrilla organization (Marking's Fil-American guerrilla forces) with which it was associated until the end of the war. Its main military function was to act as a channel by which information and funds were sent out from Manila. Lin's group, the "Philippine-Chinese Wartime Youth Service Corps," was centered in Bulacan. Composed mostly of young former students from the Kuomintang high schools in Manila, this group had the most extensive contacts in the capital of all the Chinese guerrilla groups, and as such provided a number of guides to the American forces which closed on Manila during the liberation. Its
wartime personnel has been variously estimated to have been between 200-300 members. Engaged primarily in intelligence activities, Li Hai-jo's COWHM remained least connected of the Kuomintang groups to Manila. His forces were composed of about 100 former students of somewhat older ages than Lin's group.

These three groups operated independently of each other. All maintained their viability throughout the Japanese occupation and although they came together after the war to challenge the more radically oriented Chinese guerrilla groups, they maintained their organizational integrity and apparently some mutual rivalry. The maintenance of organizational integrity and continuity does not, however, seem to have been the pattern associated with those guerrilla groups which were formed by the "old guard" in the pre-war Philippine Kuomintang. These groups, many so temporary and small they had no names, centered around several individuals who had headed the Kuomintang in the Philippines prior to its reorganization in the 1930s. The career of Justo Cabo Chan may be characteristic of a pattern. Chan, a Chinese mestizo, had been a member of the Kuomintang since shortly after its formation in the Philippines. Although it is said that he had been removed from a significant role in that organization after the arrival of Lin Tso-min and Li Hai-jo in the 1930s, he maintained some association with the Kuomintang and was an organizer of the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods during the pre-WW II period. As Manila fell to the advancing Japanese troops Chan fled to

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24 While leading the group, Lin Tso-min adopted the name White Mountain (白山). His deputy commander was the pre-war editor of the Kong Li Po, Cheng Ho-fei.
Cabanatuan, accompanied by his family and several business associates. In the province, he maintained contact with several other bands of Chinese and Filipinos who were involved in anti-Japanese activity and is said to have engaged the Japanese military in minor skirmishes on several occasions. Following the consolidation of Japanese control in the Philippines his anti-Japanese sentiment waned, and when he was offered the Presidency of the Chinese Association after the assassination of Go Co-lay, he joined the Japanese, disbanding his small guerrilla force. This appears to have been the fate of several small Chinese guerrilla bands which were associated with the old guard Kuomintang, a factor that contributed to the further fragmentation of the Kuomintang in the Philippines.

Radical or communist Chinese guerrilla forces did not demonstrate much more coordination than did the Kuomintang organization, although the Japanese occupation generally tended to enhance the power and reputation of radical elements within the Chinese community. The most well known or notorious radical Chinese guerrilla group was the Hwa Chi 48th Unit, the unit which was associated with Luis Taruc's Hukbalahap movement in central Luzon. Actually, the Hwa Chi 48th Unit was probably the least representative of the Philippine-Chinese community in both composition and activity. As one of the branches of the "military arm" of the "Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Collaboration Association," the unit was supposedly made up of veterans from the Chinese Communist 8th Route and New Fourth Armies, who had come to the Philippines specifically to fight the Japanese. Marcus Agustine, the head of Marking's Fil-American Guerrilla Force, had one association with the
48th unit which he related as follows:

"We had moved into Luzon and had camped for the evening on a rise of ground. The Hwa Chi 48th moved through our camp on the way north. They were magnificent—perfectly disciplined and all about 6 feet tall. It was clear to me that they were tough -- I would not wished to have met them in battle...it was also clear that they were not from the Chinese community in the Philippines. With the exception of their guides, they all spoke a dialect from the north of China."

The Hwa Chi 48th apparently had an impressive war record in the Philippines. Luis Taruc credits the unit with the victory of Santa Cruz during the liberation and with successful actions against bandits in Luzon.

The 48th unit, although perhaps the most well known of "Leftist" Chinese guerrilla groups was actually only one of several units claiming the name Hwa Chi. Other Hwa Chi units existed, composed in part of trade unionists and journalists (from the Guide). All were nominally under the control of the "Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Collaboration Association" in which the Chinese Communists played a dominant role. Some informants have claimed, however, that coordination between the groups was tenuous at best and only became meaningful after the war when the struggle for control of the General Chamber of Commerce between the Kuomintang and Communist Party reached a climax.
The China Renovation and Traitor Liquidating Corps appears to have been directly tied to the Chinese Communist Party in the Philippines and responsible for many of the assassinations which occurred beginning in late 1943. Little is known of the genealogy of this organization; it was centered in Manila, headed by an individual fictitiously known as the "Flying Tiger" (飛虎) and is credited by various informants with the assassination of Go Co-lay and other early officers of the Chinese Association. Its victims were not always so clearly identifiable as Japanese puppets, and it apparently sought to eliminate the leaders of the Kuomintang in the Philippines in addition to the figures associated with the Japanese authorities. There were other Chinese guerrilla groups whose affiliation is not clear. "The Philippine-Chinese Pek Pek Guerrilla Force" and the "Pak Kiat Combat Unit" are two such organizations, said to have been tied to the "Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Collaboration Association" but whose composition and allegiance are undefined.

It is fairly clear that the war elevated the importance of radical elements in the Chinese community. Prior to the Japanese occupation, the Chinese Communist Party in the Philippines was effectively frozen out of the community power structure and existed as a loosely organized group of individuals centered in Manila. With the destruction of the older configuration of power, however, the prestige and power of the radical elements increased dramatically, particularly among the youth of the community. Wealth and family connections were never totally displaced as sources of power within the community during the Japanese occupation, but as the occupation came to a close, coercive strength
in the form of arms and military discipline became almost as important in the configuration of power. These were resources which were as available to the radical elements as they were to any other subgrouping in the Philippines, and which they sought to use, often more effectively than their competitors. Yet despite the gain in prestige and power on the part of the radical elements in the community, they were ultimately unsuccessful in gaining a predominant position. Part of this was due to their lack of coordination and discipline, for although some authors have claimed that the radical elements were more closely coordinated, disciplined and indoctrinated than were the Kuomintang groups, there is little documentation which supports this point of view. If anything, the connection and control exercised by the "Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Collaboration Association" over such units as the Hwa Chi 48th Unit was as tenuous as the links which existed between the various Kuomintang groups. In short, most Chinese guerrilla groups in the Philippines appear to have existed as nearly autonomous organizations which, during the war, built up mutual rivalries. These, in turn, prevented any single group or coalition made up of guerrilla groups from seizing power in the immediate post-war period. What emerged was not a direct fight between the Kuomintang and Communist forces, but an indirect struggle over who of the old pre-war elite would be allowed to reconstruct the community's power structure.

With the reoccupation of the Philippines by U.S. forces, a three sided debate emerged over the future of the Chinese community in the

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25See, for example, Jensen, The Chinese in the Philippines, p. 343.
Philippines. One side of this debate was presented by the old pre-war elite, many of whom had maintained their economic position and power in the community, but through their connections with the Chinese Association and the Japanese occupational authorities had lost prestige. They sought to reestablish the pre-war pattern of power in the community in which they exercised control not subject to veto by the Kuomintang or radical elements of the community. Another side was presented by the radical elements in the community who sought a nearly total restructuring of the community and the elimination of both the pre-war non-Kuomintang elite and their immediate rivals, the Kuomintang. The third side of the debate, adopted by the loose coalition of Kuomintang organizations which set up the "Collaborator Investigation Commission," sought a less radical restructuring. Because it had been more closely tied to the pre-war configuration of power, it sought to advance its interests by aligning itself with those members of the pre-war elite who did not actively support the Japanese occupation. Inevitably the debate centered around specific individuals and worked its way into the American military headquarters. The "People's Court" sponsored by the radical Chinese guerrilla organization sought the death penalty for Yu Khe-thai, Sai Kuo-chuan and the last President of the Chinese Association, Justo Cabo Chan. The "Collaborator Investigation Commission" sought to delay such a decision and tended to exonerate Yu and other suspected collaborators. Meanwhile, the U.S. military consolidated its control over Manila, establishing its own structure -- the Chinese Section of the Counter Intelligence Corps -- to adjudicate collaboration charges and moved to prevent the dispensing of death sentences by any other organization.
By the end of 1945 the military had curtailed an outbreak of Chinese assassinations, most of which occurred as a result of the Kuomintang-Radical split. By early 1946, the radical side of the argument and their plans for the restructuring of the Chinese community had been defeated. The Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce reemerged as a viable organization, but with significant modifications in its leadership personnel and its role in question.

The three years of Japanese rule in the Philippines had wrought some significant changes to the Chinese community there. As they entered the archipelago, the Japanese came upon a loosely coordinated interprovincial structure, centered in Manila and led by individuals who had first risen to power in the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce in the 1920's. Radical elements of the Community, associated with the Chinese Communist Party in the Philippines, were virtually without power. The Kuomintang, since its renovation in the 1930's, was on its way up, achieving greater representation in the Chamber's leadership and, under the impetus of the Sino-Japanese War, beginning to challenge the Chamber for control of Chinese schools and the authority to make community decisions. Since the height of the Bookkeeping Law controversy in the early 1920's the Chinese had moved away from political controversy in the Philippines, concentrating on economic concerns primarily and gradually extending their economic role to a position in which they could not be rapidly displaced or eliminated without the threat of severe economic dislocation.

The Japanese left the archipelago roughly three years later in the face of the American drive toward the heart of their empire and
as the structures and ideas they had sought to promote were in disarray. As far as the Chinese in the Philippines were concerned, they left a shattered power structure; one whose elite was under attack by organizations which, although they could not match the economic resources available to the nominal leaders of the Chinese Association, could compete in terms of prestige and coercive power, and could surpass them in terms of the important connections they had with the U.S. military forces moving toward Manila. The Japanese had in a sense emphasized and extended an authority crisis among the Chinese. Old elites had been tainted with their association with the Japanese occupation. New elites, at least those associated with the radical elements which had greatly expanded in power and prestige during and as a result of the occupation, sought not only the replacement of the older leaders, but a revolutionary restructuring of the community. The swing-group, the Kuomintang, was clearly in a position to profit from the situation, but its internal fragmentation and the fact that it was not as clearly disassociated from the Japanese as were the radical elements, limited what it could do.

The Japanese also left other things unresolved. They had moved against the "separatist" tendencies of the pre-war Chinese community. Closing the Chinese schools undermined an important part of the socialization process which promoted political loyalty to China among Chinese youth in the Philippines. Drawing the nominal leadership of the Chinese community into the economic and political administration of the archipelago reasserted the old capitán precedent of close involvement by the community leadership in the administrative aspects of the government. But the Japanese did not consistently seek to draw the Chinese into
the Philippine political system and never attacked all the bases of Chinese separatism. Citizenship laws were left untouched and no effort was made to draw the Chinese into legal participation in the albeit, Japanese sponsored political party.

In summary, the Japanese occupation left the Chinese community in a state of flux. The old configuration of power had been attacked, and severely shaken if not destroyed. New forces which found organizational expression in the Chinese Communist movement in the Philippines had been unleashed, and the political context surrounding the community had been modified. Yet, some older precedents had been reasserted. The concept of a central organization for Chinese community affairs had been refurbished, this time expanding the concept to include the entire archipelago. The concept of Chinese political participation in the Philippines had again been raised.
CHAPTER IV

THE REPUBLIC PERIOD

As Japanese control of the Philippines collapsed and the artificial unity imposed by the Chinese Association melted away, the rivalries within the overseas community became blatant. Indeed, the liberation period was remarkably similar to what the community had experienced at the turn of the century. As in the earlier period, the community was again characterized by fragmentation, turmoil, and the absence of a single structure in which authority resided. Leading traditionalists, such as Dee C. Chuan, had not survived the Japanese interregnum; others had been discredited by their association with the Japanese puppet organization. But if the authority of those who sought to limit the influence of nationalist groups had been tarnished and eroded, the nationalist groups were again split into competing organizations which were soon intent upon eliminating each other. The rhetoric of this battle revolved around the issue of collaboration; the challengers were the radical elements within the community, often associated with the Communist Party, who had risen to a position from which they could now dispute the Kuomintang for the right to interpret and communicate political events in China.
Alfonso Sycip, who led the Chamber prior to World War II, Yu Khe Thai, who held a relatively minor position in the pre-war chamber and had joined the leadership of the Chinese Association during the latter part of the war, and even Yang Sepang, former Secretary-General, who had avoided capture and association with the Japanese puppet organization, were all charged with collaboration by several of the radical guerrilla groups.¹ A people's court, sponsored by the "Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese and Collaboration League" sought the deaths of Justo Cabo Chan, Yu Khe Thai and other Chinese who had been associated with the Chinese Association, arguing that those of the community who had not fought the Japanese were unfit to lead, and further, that the leaders who had betrayed their position by collaboration with the Japanese not only were ineligible for positions of leadership, but had to be punished.² The argument went beyond an attack on individuals, however, and the attacks on Yu, Sycip and Chan appear to have been only what was considered a necessary step in the effort to realign power in the community. The Chinese Guide (華僑導報) spoke for this point of view, arguing


in several editorials that the pre-war community leadership had been representative of only the rich. It claimed that the war had brought about not only the destruction of the old order, but the rise of new groups, groups which had demonstrated the validity of their claim to participate in community decisions by their war record. At this stage of the controversy, there does not seem to have been much concern with destroying the Chamber of Commerce as a structure. Rather, the argument centered around eliminating the Chamber's pre-war leadership, particularly those members of the Kuomintang who had entered the Chamber shortly before the war, and expanding the representativeness of the Chamber organization. No substitute structure was proposed, and few if any claims were made to the effect that the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese and Collaboration League could replace the Chamber as a central structure for the community.

One informant, discussing the immediate post-war situation, assessed the radical argument as follows:

"They (the radicals) were really only a minority in the community and their organization was quite limited, geographically speaking. I think they recognized this and probably saw control of the Chamber as the fastest way of getting to run things.... In some ways their argument about the old Chamber representing only a few people was accurate. It really didn't represent Cantonese and since some of the left-wingers

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3 Chang, A Historical Review of the Chinese Guide, p. 6; Hwa Chiao Tao Pao, no. 141 (1 March 1945)."
were from Canton, their gripe about representation was understandable...
Of course, it wasn't a Fukienese-Cantonese split that was at the heart of the controversy. It was political; radicals and Communists against the Kuomintang, with the old Chamber leadership in the middle."

The initial radical onslaught was unsuccessful for a number of reasons. Because they concentrated their attack on specific individuals in the old Chamber leadership, they tied their own success to the fate of the individuals they attacked. Arguing that nothing could be done as far as community affairs were concerned as long as the individuals they attacked went unpunished, this point became a matter of prestige and a test of the radical claim to leadership. Recognizing this, they sought to establish their own judicial proceedings to assure the downfall of Yu, Sycip and Chan. The fate of many of these individuals, however, was taken out of radical hands by the United States Army's Counter Intelligence Corps. Chan and several other Chinese were taken into custody shortly after the first army elements reached Manila and by late May, 1945, the Counter Intelligence Corps had stated that collaborator trials would be delayed until a fully authorized court had been established by the Commonwealth government. The Counter Intelligence Corps did not arrest all Chinese who had been connected with the Chinese Association,

but a reconciliation was reached between most of the remaining old Chamber leadership, several of whom had been Kuomintang members, and the post-war Kuomintang guerrilla organizations. Interpreting the radical attack on Yu Khe Thai and others as essentially an attack on the Kuomintang, these organizations adopted the position that support of the leadership was a tactical requirement. Thus, although the Kuomintang groups shared with the radicals a contempt for surviving traditionalists, they sought to work with the old leadership, and adopted a conciliatory position regarding collaboration. With their survival at stake, the traditionalists agreed to support the Kuomintang in its attack on the radicals.

Both the radical and Kuomintang organizations had ties to the American military authorities. At least one Hwa Chi unit was attached to the 11th Airborne Division, while the Kuomintang-led Philippine Chinese Volunteer Corps was attached to General Krueger's headquarters. It is unknown whether this administrative relationship had any effect on the outcome of the controversy, but by the late summer of 1945, the Counter Intelligence Corps had adopted the view of the Kuomintang guerrilla organizations regarding the issue of collaboration and had exonerated most of the former Chinese elite who had been associated with the Chinese Association.

In response, the communists sought to attack the Kuomintang directly, assassinating several Kuomintang members during the period July to December, 1945. These actions, however, tended to affirm the United States military's identification of the Kuomintang elements as legitimate guerrilla organizations and led to growing acceptance of the Kuomintang position regarding collaboration. Ultimately, the result was the re-establishment of the Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, the reinstatement of most of its pre-war leaders, and the effective exclusion of radical elements from the Chamber organization. Barred from membership in the Chamber, the radical elements which had made up the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese and Collaboration League dissolved that organization, and, in September, 1945 established the Democratic People's League, a front organization which drew support primarily from Cantonese in Manila. Commenting on the Democratic Peoples League, an informant stated:

"The Democratic People's League was the last effort by the Communists to run community affairs from an open organization. Actually, it was bound to fail. It had little money, could claim the allegiance of no more than..."
about 1000 Chinese in Manila and
was set up when the political
climate in the Philippines was
already moving toward strong anti-
communism. Besides, the Americans
had already decided to side with the
Kuomintang, and as they clamped down
on lawlessness, the league's most
powerful weapon -- the threat of
force -- began to get less important."

The Democratic People's League appears to have been established
primarily as a counter to the Chamber. Where only a few months
prior to its establishment the radical elements in the community
had sought personnel changes for the Chamber, now they sought to
develop a competing structure. Centered in Manila, the League is
said to have established branches in Iloilo and Cebu, although
the degree of coordination and control exercised by the Manila head-
quarters is questionable. The League, speaking through the editorial
pages of the Chinese Guide, claimed to represent the interests
of all classes of Chinese, but several informants, perhaps reflect-
ing their own anti-Cantonese bias, have portrayed the League as an
organization composed predominantly of Cantonese and representative
of the lower socio-economic levels of the community. The League's
existence became increasingly tenuous and it was finally destroyed
in a series of raids on it and the Chinese Guide in September 1946. 10

8 Hwa Chiao Tao Pao, (no.182) November 3, 1945; Jensen, The
Chinese in the Philippines, p. 365.
9 Hwa Chiao Tao Pao, (no. 175) September 21, 1945; (no. 178)
September 27, 1945; November 7, 1945 (no. 184).
10 Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 649; The Manila
Courier, September 6, 1946; The Manila Chronicle, September 7, 1946.
Meanwhile, the Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce was slowly consolidating its central position. In terms of personnel there were some remarkable continuities. Alfonso Sycip re-emerged as President, Yu Khe Thai returned as head of the control board — a kind of auditing branch for the Chamber — and Yang Sepang reappeared as Secretary-General. Indeed, it appears that nearly all the individuals who had occupied leadership positions in the Chamber the year before the Japanese invasion and who had survived the occupation were reinstated in leadership positions shortly after the reestablishment of the Chamber. There were some significant differences in the post-war leadership; the Kuomintang appears to have had more representation in the 1945-46 board of directors and the absence of such powerful traditionalists as Dee C. Chuan undoubtedly had an impact, but the personnel who made up the Chamber leadership did not appear to differ markedly from the pre-war leadership.\[\text{11}\]

\[\text{11}\] \text{Fei-lu-p'in Mali Chung Hua shung Muei Shih Ch'eng (Historical Records of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce) Manila, 1945-1946. The assessment that Kuomintang members occupied more positions in the post-war period than prior to the war was arrived at by comparing the 1938-39 Board of Directors with the 1945-46 Board and identifying Kuomintang members from the lists of members presented in the post-war Kuomintang publication: Chung Kuo Kuomintang Chu Fei Tsung Chih Bu; di shr son chial chih chieu wei yuan ming bu (Philippine Kuomintang General Office: Records of 30th Deputy's meeting). An exact identification of Kuomintang members prior to WW II was unattainable and the assessment is presented tentatively. However, Kuomintang members made up about one-third of the immediate post-war leadership of the General Chamber as compared to about one-fourth prior to WW II. This percent seems to have dropped slowly after 1946 to a point roughly the same as the immediate pre-war period (about 23%).}
The Context of Philippine Sovereignty

The Chamber was clearly not the same as before, however, for the context in which it operated had changed significantly. The greatest change was clearly the increasing pressures brought on the Chinese in the Philippines by the post-war Commonwealth and Republic governments. These pressures were broad in scope, many having their genesis in the pre-war period. After the war and particularly following the establishment of the Philippine Republic in 1946, however, they became more prominent and more consistently pursued by the Philippine government than in any period during the previous fifty years. Their combined weight led to the decline of the Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the emergence of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce in 1954, and because the cumulative effect of these pressures seems to have been related to a shift in the alignment of community power some are worth noting in somewhat greater detail. The following discussion does not fully list the sources of the increased pressure nor exhaust the issues involved. It does, however, give a flavor of the times.

A harbinger of the sort of problems the Chinese were to face in the post-war period was provided by the Manila market stall controversy, an issue which can be traced to a pre-war ordinance. In January 1941, the Manila Municipal Board restricted business activity
in Manila public markets to Philippine nationals. A three year grace period was provided during which Chinese stall holders, who probably accounted for about one-tenth the market sellers, were to liquidate their holdings. The intervention of World War II delayed the enforcement of the ordinance, but in 1945, the effort to oust Chinese stall holders from public markets was resumed. The municipal ordinance was resurrected, no licenses were issued to Chinese seeking stalls in the thirteen public markets of Manila, and Chinese stall holders were again told to liquidate their holdings. In August, 1945, several riots broke out in which Chinese stalls were destroyed, and the number of small Chinese merchants in the city markets began to decline. By late 1946, the Manila municipal ordinance had been complemented by a Market Stalls Law which attempted to extend restrictions on Chinese market activities throughout the archipelago. A Chinese vendors association was formed to fight both the municipal ordinance and the Republic Act, but although successful in legislation to negate a Division of Finance order declaring all market stalls vacated and terminated as of January 1, 1945, the Act

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12 Ordinance 3051, Manila Municipal Board, January 1941.

13 Republic Act 37.
remained in effect and Chinese business activity in public markets was gradually curtailed.  

Some of the administrative structures set up by the new Republic also had distinctly anti-Chinese characteristics. PRATRA, or the Philippine Relief and Trade Rehabilitation Administration, established by Roxas' executive order No. 90 in September 1947, is perhaps the best example. PRATRA represented the post-war fusion of several administrative experiments attempted prior to the Japanese invasion which were designed to maintain price stability for food and other consumer goods. Because it was established under executive order and as a result of "wartime conditions" PRATRA was granted fairly extensive powers, one of which was phrased as follows:

"To undertake the prevention of monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation, private control, and profiteering affecting the supply, distribution and movement of foods, clothing, fuel and other articles of prime necessity."[16]

The means by which PRATRA was to carry out this administrative duty were not subject to explicit definition, but according to Hartendorp,

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were essentially unlimited. Interestingly, one of the express purposes of the Administration was:

"to find ways and means of encouraging and assisting Filipino retailers and businessmen such as by supplying them with merchantable goods at prices that will enable them to compete successfully in the open market." 17

Although the executive order which established the agency did not single out the Chinese for attack, this was apparently the interpretation of the order offered by Aldefonso Coscolluela, the Administration's general manager, and House Speaker Eugenio Perez who led the fight for the Administration's operating funds. Both Perez and Coscolluela were reported as saying PRATRA was designed to "wrest" the control of the wholesale and retail business away from China. 18 Hartendorp claims that PRATRA drove the Chinese out of the bakery business in the Philippines and tended to upset the entire distribution system. He interprets PRATRA and the post-war import control machinery as being set up "to take business away from old established firms, many of which were alien, and to give it to new Filipino business interests." 19

The Nationalization Movement, which in the Philippines meant the replacement of alien businesses by Filipino owned and operated firms

17 Quoted in Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade in the Philippines, p. 265.
19 Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade in the Philippines, p. 266.
rather than the governmental control of business enterprise, also had its roots in the pre-war period. In 1939, a bill designed to replace alien ownership of businesses engaging in retail trade within five years was introduced in the Philippine National Assembly. Providing preferences in the licensing of retail traders to Philippine or American nationals, the bill also called for the gradual liquidation of all Chinese (alien) ownership of retail trade enterprises. The intervention of World War II prevented the passage of that measure, but as the war ended, the movement was resurrected. Early in the special session of the National Legislature called by Osmeña, two bills, both calling for limited nationalization of the retail trade, were introduced. Later consolidated into House Bill 355, the measure sought to restrict the establishment of retail businesses to Filipinos or Americans only. The bill passed both houses and was sent to Osmeña in September. Osmeña vetoed the bill on October 16, 1945, arguing that although he personally favored the nationalization

20 Agpalo, The Political Process and the Nationalization of Retail Trade, p. 32.

21 As favorably reported by the House Committee on Commerce and Industry on July 13, 1945, the salient provisions of the bill were: "Aliens and other persons not owing allegiance to the United States or the Government of the Philippines and corporations or associations at least 75 percent of the capital of which is not owned by persons owing such allegiance, except those alien persons, corporations and/or associations actually engaged in the retail trade at the time of the approval of this act, are hereby prohibited from owning, operating or otherwise engaging in the retail trade, directly or indirectly."
of retail trade, such a law would conflict with the Sino-US Treaty of 1880. 22

Osmena's veto did not halt the nationalization movement. In 1946 three additional measures calling for the nationalization of the retail trade were introduced, 23 one of which passed the House but died in the Senate. In 1950, four more bills were introduced. Subsequently consolidated into House Bill 1241, this bill also passed the House but died in the Senate. 24 By 1954, the movement was reaching a high point, prompting a Manila newspaper to portray the first several days of the congress as characterized by a "deluge of nationalization bills." 25 Meanwhile, other areas in which the Chinese had an interest were being attacked in the legislature. By 1948, a labor nationalization bill which sought to restrict legal business activity to only those enterprises in which a majority of the officers and employees were Filipino citizens had been introduced. Although this measure was subsequently vetoed on the grounds that it conflicted with the Treaty of General Relations between China and the Philippines, 26 it became the model for the labor nationalization bills

22 Since under the Commonwealth arrangement Philippine foreign relations remained the prerogative of the United States, Osmena justified his veto on the grounds that he lacked the authority to sign a bill which would, in his opinion, conflict with the most-favored nation clause of the 1880 treaty. The Manila Times, October 17, 1945.

23 Philippine Legislature, 1st Session, 1946, House Bills 38, 438, and 652, the last of which died in the Senate.

24 Agpalo, The Political Process and the Nationalization of Retail Trade, pp. 35-42.


26 The Manila Times, June 20, 1948.
introduced in every congressional session for the next several years. Table 3 indicates various measures which were enacted in the post liberation period and which punished or curtailed some aspect of Chinese activity in the Philippines.

As concern over Communist activities in the Philippines grew because of the Huk movement, governmental attention began to concentrate on the Chinese schools as possible centers of subversion. As early as 1946, several Manila newspapers were hinting that many Chinese schools, particularly in the Provinces, were training grounds for Chinese units of the Hukbalahap. On August 8, 1948, the Manila Times questioned the kind of citizenship training being conducted not only in those Chinese schools under the influence of Communists, but

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27 See, for example, The Manila Times, June 27, 1948; Agpalo, The Political Process and the Nationalization of Retail Trade, pp. 36-44.

28 See, for example, Manila Daily Courier, September 6, 1946; September 7, 1946; Manila Post, March 15, 1947; Manila Times, April 8, 1947; April 11, 1947. The Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon and Communist Party of the Philippines were declared illegal and seditious organizations by President Roxas in March, 1948. The Huks responded by changing the name of their organization to Hukbong Magsaling Bayan, or People's Liberation Army, and stepping up its armed resistance. During 1949 and 1950 the Huks conducted a series of raids near Manila and had assassinated the late President Quezon's wife and other members of the Quezon family. The Philippine Republic, according to Grossholtz, was near collapse, but took two steps which ultimately reduced the insurgency. An appeal for aid was made to the United States, and, in September, 1950 Ramon Magsaysay was appointed Secretary of Defense and given broad power to end the crisis. On October 18, 1950 the Communist Politburo was captured in Manila and Magsaysay went on to win the Presidency under the Nationalists banner in 1953. See Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, pp. 39-44; perhaps the best description is, Frances Lucille Starner, Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry: The Agrarian Impact on Philippine Politics, 1933-1956 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Date of Effect</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA 691</td>
<td>October 15, 1945</td>
<td>Excluded aliens from obtaining agricultural land distributed from the public domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 37</td>
<td>October 1, 1946</td>
<td>Gave preference in leasing public market stalls to Philippine citizens (Constitutionally upheld in Co Chiong Case, 46 OG 4833, March 1949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 274</td>
<td>June 15, 1948</td>
<td>Excluded aliens from purchasing land formerly held in military reservations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 318</td>
<td>June 19, 1948</td>
<td>Excluded aliens from entering Chemical engineering profession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 337</td>
<td>June 24, 1948</td>
<td>Restricted formation of alien banking institutions. Required 60% capitalization by Philippine citizens and Philippine citizenship for 2/3 of directors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 426</td>
<td>June 30, 1949</td>
<td>Gave preference in allocation of imported wheat to Philippine citizens. (Upheld in Chinese Flour Association v. PRISCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 562</td>
<td>June 17, 1950</td>
<td>Alien registration act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 730</td>
<td>June 18, 1952</td>
<td>Excluded alien purchase of public lands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 751</td>
<td>June 18, 1952</td>
<td>Provided stiffer penalties for failure to meet requirements of alien registration act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 768</td>
<td>June 20, 1952</td>
<td>Excluded aliens from entering dental professions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 776</td>
<td>June 20, 1952</td>
<td>Excluded aliens from entering domestic air businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA 827</td>
<td>August 14, 1952</td>
<td>Provided penalties and deportation for aliens concealing illegal immigrants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Partially adapted from Agpalo, The Political Process.*
In all Chinese schools, a question which was subsequently raised with increasing frequency by Philippine educational associations.

A series of raids on Chinese newspapers and schools began in mid-1946 as the fear of communist subversion increased in Manila. On September 5, 1946 the military police raided and closed down the Chinese Guide, apparently on the instigation and with the help of Kuomintang elements in the community, but possibly because the Guide had been highly critical of the Roxas administration. Other raids followed. In April 1947, 80 alleged Chinese Communists were arrested and subsequently deported; August 1948 saw the arrest of 100, and in October of that year Immigration Commissioner Fabre asked that a new effort be made to eliminate "subversive aliens."

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29 The Manila Times, August 8, 1948, Magazine section.
30 See, for example, The Manila Times, October 8, 1948.
31 Philippine Liberty News, August 10, 1946; Manila Courier, August 11, 1946; September 7, 1946; Manila Chronicle, September 7, 1946; Manila Courier, September 12, 1946; The Hwa Chiao Tao Pao (Chinese Guide) had been engaged in an editorial battle with the Kuomintang-sponsored Great China Press since the end of the war; See Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 723.
32 Some newspaper accounts of the raid refer to the presence of Kuomintang officials who accompanied the police to act as translators. See Manila Chronicle, September 6, 1946.
33 Manila Chronicle, September 7, 1946.
34 The Manila Times, April 11, 1947.
35 The Manila Times, August 12, 1948.
The concern with eliminating what were defined as Chinese subversives was supplemented by growing fear of Chinese immigration. Following the war, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration sought to return displaced overseas Chinese to their pre-war domiciles in various Southeast Asian nations. Approximately 7,600 Chinese were certified by UNRRA as former residents of the Philippines, and negotiations with the Philippine government were undertaken for their return. The Philippine government, arguing that post-war problems of housing, food and employment would be aggravated by the return of the Chinese, was hesitant to accept any Chinese returnees beyond the 500 quota established by the immigration law of 1940. This stance resulted in an apparent increase of illegal Chinese immigration which in turn prompted a mounting number of raids on smuggling rings specializing in the transfer of Chinese into the Philippines. By September 1948, claims were made in Manila newspapers that the Chinese population in the Philippines was increasing at a rate faster than that of native Filipinos, measures to reduce the Chinese quota had been introduced in the Philippine Congress, and raids on Chinese schools and businesses in search of illegal immigrants had been stepped up.

37 The Manila Times, August 29, 1948.

38 See, for example, The Manila Times, July 10, 1948; July 21, 1948; August 12, 1948.
The Arrangement of Power in the Chinese Community

Within the context of persuasive pressure and increasing restrictions on the Chinese in the Philippines during the late 1940's and early 1950's, Chinese nationalists in the form of diplomatic personnel appeared to act increasingly as central spokesmen for the community. Circumstantial evidence that this was the case is provided by a survey of Manila newspapers and by several interviews. In nearly all areas of growing pressure, Chinese diplomatic personnel were portrayed by the press as the spokesmen for the Chinese in the Philippines. Osmena's veto of the Nationalization Act in 1945 and the veto of the Labor Nationalization Bill in 1948 both took place after extensive press coverage of the meetings between Chinese diplomatic personnel and members of the Philippine government, and in the controversy over market stalls it was the Chinese legation and the Chinese vendors association which were portrayed as leading the fight against the Republic Act and the municipal ordinance calling for exclusion of Chinese.

The interpretation that the Chinese Embassy and not the Chamber of Commerce was becoming the center of community affairs is supported by the remarks of several informants. A Chinese newspaper editor, when questioned about the post-war role of the Embassy, argued that:

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39 See, for example, The Manila Times, May 19, 1948.

40 See, for example, The Manila Times, May 2, 1948.
"The consulate was growing in prestige and influence before the war, but it was really only after the war that it reached its greatest influence. The war undermined the authority of the Chamber and after it was over, the consul general seemed to be the only person who could get things done."

None of the informants interviewed expressed countervailing opinions and most western observers tend to agree that the Chinese diplomatic personnel exercised increased influence in the post-war period. ⁴¹

There are several reasons why this could have happened. A basis for a more active role as Chinese spokesman on the part of the Chinese diplomatic organization was provided in the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of General Relations, or the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity, ratified after some delay in 1947. ⁴² One effect of this agreement was to elevate many of the general concerns of the Chinese in the Philippines to treaty status, for in addition to outlining the consular arrangements which would be respected by the Philippines, the treaty touched on questions of immigration, justice, education and political activity. ⁴³ Since many of the areas of community concern were now embodied in a treaty, the Chinese diplomatic structure became a more logical route through which to petition the Philippine government. This theoretically made the Chinese Embassy the most effective


⁴² The delays may be traced in the Manila Times, February 22, 1947; February 24, 1947; February 25, 1947; February 27, 1947. See also, Jensen, The Chinese in the Philippines, pp. 380-81.

⁴³ Philippine-Chinese Treaty of General Relations, Articles V, VI and VII.
spokesman of Chinese interests and placed the Chamber in a subservient position. The Chamber could, of course, petition the Philippine government on its own, but in doing so it would be susceptible to charges of avoiding the legally established route for making its demands heard.

Another factor which could have led to increasing influence for the Embassy was the anti-communist climate prevalent in the Philippines. Faced by a growing communist insurgency, with some indications that the Huk movement could have sympathizers among the Chinese in the Philippines, the Philippine government may have been more willing to recognize the Chinese Embassy -- an agent of a government waging war against communism and dominated by a political party whose main concern seemed to be anti-communism -- than any other representative of Chinese interests. On several occasions, as the 1946 raid on the Chinese Guide suggested, the Embassy's concern with purging the community of communist influence conveniently coincided with the interests of Philippine governmental officials. As the official

crackdown on the smuggling of Chinese immigrants into the Philippines began in April, 1947, the Consulate offered its services in the apprehension of local Chinese residents involved, apparently because it believed those involved were connected to communist elements in Manila.\textsuperscript{45} In August 1948, Chinese Ambassador Chen Chih-ping again announced the Embassy's support for the arrest of "undesirable aliens", by which he meant communists.\textsuperscript{46} Given its own interest in anti-communism, the Philippine government may have consciously gravitated toward an identification of the Chinese Embassy as the only spokesman for Chinese in the Philippines. This, of course, would have tended to increase the Embassy's influence within the community.

It is possible that what appears to have been increasing influence for the Embassy at the expense of the Chamber in the post-war period was, in fact, nothing of the sort. If the interests of the Chamber leadership clearly coincided with those of the Embassy, what seems to have been a gradual replacement of the Chamber by the Embassy could have been nothing more than the reflection of the Chamber leadership working through the Embassy. In this interpretation, the Embassy would simply have been a front for the Chamber leadership in its dealings with the Philippine government. Several factors tend to invalidate such an interpretation, however. For one thing, the first

\textsuperscript{45}The Manila Times, April 3, 1947.
\textsuperscript{46}The Evening Herald, August 11, 1948.
Chinese ambassador in the Philippines following the war, Chen Chih-ping (陳致平) had little if any contact with the Philippine community prior to his diplomatic assignment to the Philippines. If the Chinese Embassy had been only a front for the Chamber it is likely that the Ambassador would have either been chosen from one of the Chamber's leaders, as had been sought from the end of the nineteenth century, or from an individual with whom the Chamber had had previous contact. In addition, the embassy appeared to take several actions which, on the surface at least, would have conflicted with the desire of the Chamber leadership. The Chamber leadership, for example, was still closely tied to the China Banking Corporation, many of the directors of which served in the executive boards of the post-war Chamber. During interviews, several informants indicated that rather than fully supporting the China Banking Corporation in the post-war period, the Embassy promoted the interests of the Philippine Bank of Communications, established in 1939 and closely associated with the Kuomintang rather than the Sycip or Dee families. Finally, there are some hints that the zealously which the Embassy sought to eliminate Communist elements in the community may have conflicted with the desires of the Chamber leadership. In both 1948 and 1949, the Chamber protested raids on Chinese establishments by Philippine authorities in search of subversives, despite the fact that the Embassy either remained notably silent or had even called for such raids.47

In retrospect, it appears that the period 1945-1953 was one of mounting crisis for the Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. There were no direct attacks (other than the abortive efforts by the communists in the late 1940's) made on the Chamber during that period either from outside the Chinese community or internally, but the cumulative effect of the pressures on the Chinese coming from the Philippine government, coupled with the efforts of the Kuomintang and diplomatic staff to expand their influence over community affairs, prevented the Chamber from exercising the kind of control it had prior to the war. The most obvious evidence that this was the case was, of course, the formation of the Filipino-Chinese Federation of Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1954, an event that created an organization that differed significantly in terms of personnel, structure, and function from the General Chamber.

The Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce was formed on March 27, 1954 during Congressional consideration of a plethora of nationalization bills. Organized ostensibly to promote Chinese business interests throughout the archipelago and to assist in the economic development of the Republic of the Philippines, several other, perhaps more important, goals were present at the time of its formation. One of these was the specific purpose of curtailing the nationalization movement, then reaching a crescendo. As Agpalo points

48 Fei Hua Shang Lieu Tsung hwei Chang Ch'eng (By Laws: Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce).

49 Article II, Articles of Incorporation, Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce.
out, the Federation assumed overall direction of the Chinese efforts to defeat and then veto or recall legislation which nationalized retail trade.\textsuperscript{50} Several Chinese informants who were closely associated with the Federation at the time of its formation have supported this interpretation. The formation shortly after the Federation's establishment of a special committee on retail nationalization also indicates the presence of this goal.\textsuperscript{51} There were, however, other motivations involved in the origin of the Federation which were concerned with the structure of power within the community.

In order to explain why Chinese in the Philippines thought it was necessary to form the Federation, unstructured interviews were conducted with twenty-two informants, most of whom were Chinese either closely associated with the Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce or Filipino-Chinese Federation of Chambers of Commerce, or newspapermen believed to have been in a position where their observations would be useful. Although unstructured, each interview introduced the following interrelated questions: (1) What, if anything, was wrong with the Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce? (2) Why was the Filipino-Chinese Federation of Chambers of Commerce formed? (3) What kind of forces led to the creation of

\textsuperscript{50} Agpalo, \textit{The Political Process}, pp. 147-152.

the Federation? Responses to these questions varied widely and often reflected the institutional bias of the respondent. In general, however, the sixteen interviewees who attempted to describe "what was wrong with the General Chamber" agreed that the organization had demonstrated an inability to aid the Chinese in the Philippines. The following response from a member of the secretariat of the rival Federation is typical:

"The General Chamber wasn't doing anything for the Chinese here. It wasn't so much that the people who led the Chamber didn't have any loyalty to the Chinese in the Philippines, as it was the fact that they were old and couldn't meet the challenge of the day. You see, right from the end of the war, the heat on the Chinese here began. First it was pushing the Chinese out of the markets, then it was trying to close the schools and then it was trying to kick them out of retail trade. And all the time the Chamber would say this or that was wrong, but they never did anything about it."

Other respondents pointed to different specific crises which the Chamber had in their eyes failed to meet successfully, but there was a consensus among those interviewed that the Chamber could no longer successfully "defend" the community from its political surroundings. To demonstrate the range of issues involved which were cited as examples of threats against which the Chamber was ineffective, consider the following:
(Newspaper editor, pro-Kuomintang Daily): "Well, although the Reds went underground in the 1940's, they still were very dangerous. In fact, they had taken over a couple highschools right under the nose of the Chamber. This meant the Chamber wasn't protecting the Chinese here from communism as well as it should have, and that's why most Chinese wanted a new organization."

(Member, Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce): "It's true that there were some problems after the war with the Chamber, but most of those were procedural. Things were moving very rapidly in the late 1940's and early 1950's and there were a lot of pressures coming from all directions. The Chamber simply didn't deal with them all at the same time and some Chinese here didn't have the right amount of patience."

(Newspaper editor): "There were both internal and external problems. On the one hand, there was the mounting pressure of nationalization and anti-Chinese sentiment coming from the Filipinos and, on the other hand, there were some intense personal rivalries inside the Chamber which limited its effectiveness. The combination of outside pressure and inside splits was what was wrong with the Chamber."

Although most respondents expressed the view that the General Chamber had failed to cope successfully with the challenges of the post-war decade, they tended to specify different reasons for the formation of the Federation. Some pointed to splits in the Chamber hierarchy as the basic reason a new organization was formed rather
than efforts undertaken to reorganize the existing Chamber:

(Newspaper Editor): "Splits in the Chamber existed before the war, but they became prominent after the war when a 'new rich' group, headed by Yui Khe Thai, Peter Lim, Yao Shiong Shio and Antonio Roxas Chua challenged the Sycips and Dees. Yu and the others had been given positions in the Chamber, but had only nominal power with no real chance of getting any real say as long as they remained members of the Chamber."

Others tended to assign an important role to the Kuomintang in the creation of the Federation. One member of the Kuomintang stated quite frankly that:

"Despite the fact that Sy En (a Kuomintang member) had been made President of the Chamber, the Chamber did not always work as closely with the Party as they could have. A lot more could have been accomplished if they had, but the Chamber didn't recognize this and it became necessary for the Party to look elsewhere."

The head of a Chinese business firm who supported the formation of the Federation echoed the assessment of the Kuomintang's importance:

"The Kuomintang is what you call a kingmaker here. They're the power behind the throne and while they don't always run things directly, they have a great deal to say about who will. There always had been some antagonism between the leaders of the Chamber and the Kuomintang, and after the war the Kuomintang simply decided new leadership was required. So, they set up the Federation."
Finally, several respondents pointed to an effort to expand
the representation of the Chamber, arguing that the formation of
the Federation came about because several groups had no spokesmen
under the old Chamber arrangement.

(Member of Editorial Staff, Chinese Daily): "The Chamber never really
was of much use to the bulk of
Chinese trade associations. Many
of these, particularly those formed
beginning in the late 1930's had
been frozen out of the community
leadership, and in the crisis brought
about by the (retail trade) national-
ization act, they sided with the
Kuomintang and called for a new organ-
ization."

(Member of Federation Secretariat): "There are more Chinese in the
Philippines than just in Manila. Be-
fore the Federation was formed no
nationwide group really represented
those Chinese in the provinces. The
old Chamber had an annual convention
which was attended by Chinese from
outside Manila, but no machinery was
set up to carry out decisions made at
the convention. The result was grow-
ing dissatisfaction and a growing de-
mand for an organization which would
represent Chinese throughout the
Islands."

Structurally and in terms of personnel the new Federation re-
flected several of the points which were alluded to by the inform-
ants. The existence of personal rivalries between individuals in
the Chamber's hierarchy is difficult to document, but Yu Khe Thai,
Peter Lim (林亜白), and Yao Shiong Shio (姚通炯),
who were formerly members of the Chamber all moved to positions in
the Federation which were more prestigious and potentially more
Fig. 4—Percentage of Kuomintang Members in Chamber

The chart is based on information obtained from Fei Hua Shang Tsung Yueh Pao (Monthly Trade Journal), Vols. 1, 11, (Manila: Chung Hua SahangLiu min pao (Philippine Chinese General Yearbook), (Manila: 1952, 53, 54); and, Chungkuo Kuomintang chi san, shrsanye, shrsanerh Chiai chih chien wei yuan ming bi (P. Office: Records of the 30th, 31st, and 32nd General Deputy's Meeting).

The numbers (N= ) on the chart refer to the combined total of members of the control board for each organization. As can be seen, the size of this grouping was about the same for both organizations. Kuomintang members of the Federation's leadership were Kuomintang members in those years. Kuomintang members appeared to have played an important role in the activities during the early years. A survey of attendance at meetings showed that Kuomintang members were the decision-makers in the early period. Member attendance increased gradually to a point in 1964 where regular attendance at board meetings were not members of the
A chart showing the percentage of Kuomintang members in the Chamber/Federation over the years. The chart refers to the combined sum of executive board members for each organization. As can be noted from the chart, the percentage decreases in 1956 by an influx of non-party members to the Federation’s formal leadership. Kuomintang members appeared to have played their most significant role in Federation meetings.

Information obtained from Fei Huai Nien Chien, pp. 635-40; Hly Trade Journal, Vols. 1, 11, (Manila: 1956,58); Fei-Liu Min Pao (Philippine Chinese General Chamber of Commerce 3,54); and, Chungkuo Kuomintang chi fei tsung chih bu, di shih hai chih chien wei yuan ming bi (Philippine Kuomintang General h,31st, and 32nd General Deputy’s (Meeting), (Manila: 1948, 54, 56).
powerful. This is most graphically illustrated in Yu's movement from head of the Chamber's control board to President of the Federation. The fact that each of these individuals withdrew from the Chamber while several influential members of the Chamber refused until the mid-1960's to join the Federation also suggests that personality conflicts and personal power aspirations contributed to the Federation's creation.

Comparison of the number of Kuomintang members who appeared in the active leadership of both organizations indicates that Kuomintang representation in the Federation was greater. The following chart indicates, first, the increased representation of the Kuomintang in the Federation compared to the General Chamber, and second, the erosion over time of Kuomintang representation in the leadership of the Federation.

Structurally, it is clear that the Federation's sponsors made an effort to bring all the Chinese in the Philippines into a more closely coordinated system centered in Manila. The General Chamber had embarked on a similar effort at its foundation also and had originated the first archipelago-wide Chinese Chambers of Commerce Convention in the early 1920's. But the attempt by the General Chamber had only limited success. Although several conventions were called prior to and after World War II, no permanent formal machinery was established to coordinate the activity of Chinese Chambers outside Manila, and the conventions became, in the words of one
informant, "hollow rituals providing some social activity, but little meaningful coordination for the provincial chambers."

The Federation, in contrast, not only regularized a convention arrangement, but established a permanent committee and staff which maintained communication and coordination with provincial chambers on almost a daily basis. Shortly after the formation of the Federation, 227 Chinese Chambers of Commerce had become affiliated, a significant increase over the number which had participated in any of the conventions sponsored by the General Chamber of Commerce. Some Chambers were at first reluctant to join the Federation, but by the 1960's nearly every Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines had paid the required entrance fee and had been granted membership in the Federation.

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52 Originally performed by the organization committee (組織多員会), this function was taken over by the newly formed affiliation committee in 1956. (組織多員会).

53 The Federation by-laws established three classes of members. "Association membership" was a classification limited to Chinese Chambers of Commerce and trade associations. "Non-Association members" referred to financial institutions, industrial enterprises, trade of business firms, and factories not affiliated with chambers of commerce or trade associations already members of the Federation. "Sustaining members" referred to "firms and individuals, regardless of race, creed or citizenship who believe in the principle upon which the Federation has been organized and who are willing to support the Federation in the achieving of its goals." Regardless of the class of membership, members were required to pay an entrance fee, regular membership fees and "special contributions which may from time to time be imposed and levied by the Board of Directors." The first two fees were nominal, varying between 100-200 pesos depending on type of membership involved for the entrance fee and 20-30 pesos per month for the regular membership fees. The amount of special contributions varied from activity to activity and from member to member. Data on the exact amounts involved were unavailable.
In terms of the recruitment of personnel into the Federation leadership, the attempt to unify all the Chinese in the Philippines was not as pronounced as suggested by the structural characteristics of the organization or from the official descriptions supplied by the Federation. Leadership remained in the hands of Chinese from Manila. By far the largest number of individuals who appeared in the executive committee or board of directors were from Manila, a pattern which has been characteristic of the Federation leadership throughout its history. Still, some effort was made to recruit key personnel from outside the immediate Manila area. Tang Tack (唐克), who emerged as the Federation's Secretary-General in 1954, was brought in from Zamboanga and several other members of the Federation's staff were originally from the provinces rather than the capital.

In addition to attempting to expand its influence geographically, the Federation also attempted to expand its influence in a functional sense. In contrast to the General Chamber, membership in the Federation was opened not only to representatives from chambers of commerce, but to Chinese trade associations as well, a fact that was well publicized in the Chinese community and which was used to distinguish the Federation from its predecessor. Antonio Roxas Chua (安东尼奥·胡), one of the Federation's founders, came into the organization as a representative of the Philippine Rice Millers and Merchants Association and other members of the Board of Directors came directly from various Chinese trade associations rather than chambers of commerce.
Within a short time after the Federation's formation it was obvious, from a survey of Chinese newspapers, that it had supplanted the General Chamber of Commerce as the central coordinating agency for the Chinese in the Philippines.

Considering these changes, the establishment of the Federation appears to have been accomplished with surprisingly little delay and disruption. Two factors probably accounted for this. The political climate in the Philippines at the time was particularly propitious for a reorganization movement and both the Kuomintang and Chinese Embassy apparently promoted such a development. These factors were alluded to by several informants. A member of the Federation's staff, for example, described the establishment of the Federation as follows:

"You must understand the climate which existed in 1954 to understand why the Federation was set up so fast and why Chinese outside Manila supported it. The nationalization measures in congress weren't the only factors involved, although they were very important. There were other things. A new administration

54 Not all Chinese newspapers in the Philippines gave their unqualified support to the Federation. The Kong Li Po and Great China Press, both closely associated with the Kuomintang, have been the strongest supporters of the Federation from its inception. The Fookien Times at first seemed to adopt a neutral position regarding the Federation, but by about 1957 had become more clearly laudatory in its coverage of Federation affairs. The Chinese Commercial News, by contrast, has often been hostile in its journalistic approach to Federation actions."
was in power, Chinese had been and were being arrested throughout the Philippines, and there was a lot of loose talk about communist influence and infiltration. The result was a general feeling of crisis for the Chinese here and I think just about every Chinese had a sense of foreboding. Without this general atmosphere the Federation could never have been set up so fast."

A Chinese Newspaper Editor stressed the relationship of the Kuomintang with the Federation's foundation:

"Both the Kuomintang and the Embassy lent support to Yu (Yu Khe Thai) and the others who were trying to set up the Federation. Out in the provinces it was the Kuomintang that helped set up arrangements for the convention at which the Federation was established (March 25, 26, 27, 1954) and without their support in the sense of communications, promotion and coordination, the Federation would never have been set up as smoothly as it was."

One of the most striking phenomena associated with the Federation was the rapidity with which it expanded into the performance of social, political and economic functions for the community. Within three years of its formation the Federation had become the central adjudicating agency for inter-clan disputes as well as differences between Chinese business firms, had reorganized the

Chinese school association and revitalized the indoctrination of Chinese teachers, had initiated the creation of paramilitary youth associations in Chinese high schools and had called for the disbanding of several secret societies in Manila's Chinese section. In several ways it became a central aid agency for the community, supplementing and in some cases supplanting the aid programs which had been established in clan organizations. On August 28, 1954, the Federation organized the community's first mass wedding.56

Meanwhile, the Federation moved toward the traditional role occupied by the capitán and Chinese General Chamber of Commerce: that of spokesman for all Chinese in the Philippine Islands vis-à-vis the Philippine Government. It did this in several ways. Representatives of the Federation, identified by government officials or by themselves as spokesmen for the Chinese in the Philippines, began appearing with increasing frequency at various hearings sponsored by Philippine governmental agencies.57 These appearances were paralleled by well publicized participation in the meetings of non-governmental organizations attended by various Philippine law makers.

56 The Federation's first ten years are described in "Shi nien Ta Shi Hsiao Chi" (Short history of 10 great years), Fei Hua nien Chien, pp. 42-74.

57 See, for example, Philippine Republic Department of Labor, Conference on Trade and Commerce in the Philippines, Proceedings, May 1955; House Committee on Anti-Filipino Activities, Hearings, March 1956; House Committee on Commerce, Hearings, April 1956.
and governmental officials. Additionally, the Federation undertook several projects which supplemented Philippine governmental activities. In April 1955, the Federation organized the collection of funds from the Chinese community for aid to Philippine flood victims in Mindanao and Bacolod City. In January, 1956, it again sponsored the collection of funds for aid to Philippine typhoon victims, and since then, members of the Federation have made concerted efforts to represent the Chinese community in several Philippine charity collection drives. Shortly after its formation, the Federation created several institutions designed, in the words of a member of the Federation's secretariat, "to draw Filipinos and Chinese closer together," and organized formal discussion groups to address Filipino-Chinese relations.

There is some evidence that the Federation also undertook the task of consolidating and distributing campaign funds derived by Filipino politicians from Chinese in the Philippines. Evidence for this is at best tenuous. There are no published records of political contributions to Filipino politicians by the Federation and when

58 See, for example, Proceedings of the 5th International Association of Chambers of Commerce Convention, Manila: May, 1955; "Shi nien Ta Shi Hsiao Chi," p. G-55.

59 One of the most obvious of these institutions was the Philippine Chinese Public Library, organized and endowed by the Federation in 1954. Other organizations supported by the Federation were the Filipino-Chinese Cultural Association, and various cross national "conventions" conducted during the 1954-65 period.
queried, interviewees connected with the Federation denied know-
ledge of such an arrangement. It is, of course, understandable
why documentary evidence of a flow of campaign funds would be
lacking. Proof of such arrangements could result in deportation
for Chinese involved while the identification of a Filipino's
campaign with Chinese money would be an almost insurmountable
political liability for the politicians. Still, accusations that
such arrangements exist are frequent and often come from individuals
who could be expected to be informed observers. Several Chinese
informants stated that the Federation had, in fact, attempted to
establish a war chest specifically for campaign contributions and
had been initially successful. According to one informant, the
Federation had argued convincingly within the Chinese community in
1954 that channeling campaign funds through the Federation would
tend to enhance the political effect of such funds (by making the
total amount somewhat more worth negotiating for in the eyes of
Filipino politicians) and would create a buffer between the avarice
of politicians and the vulnerability of rich Chinese. The in-
formant indicated that this arrangement was adhered to by many of
the members of the Federation's board of directors during the first
five years of the organization's existence, but that the Federation

60 Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, p. 242.
61 See, for example, David Wurfel, "Philippine Finances,"
began to lose its ability to consolidate campaign funds thereafter. This was, he argued, due to the fact that "Filipino politicians never recognized the new arrangement, and merely went to both the rich Chinese and the Federation for money." Other informants also believed that the greatest success in the effort to become the central distribution point for campaign funds came in the earlier part of the Federation's history. Several suggested, however, that the Federation became less capable of performing this function because of a growing belief among Chinese in the Philippines that retail nationalization was irreversible. This interpretation was based on the idea that the Federation was able to consolidate campaign funds as long as there was an identifiable issue over which the distribution of money could be negotiated. When retail nationalization began to be recognized as a permanent factor in Philippine life, many rich Chinese lost interest in consolidating their monetary resources and calculated that their best protection lay in direct financial arrangements with politicians.

While the evidence that the Federation sought to consolidate and distribute funds is essentially hearsay, such an attempt is logical in the context of other, more easily documented, efforts by the Federation to become the key link between the Chinese community and the Philippine political system. Given the importance of money in Philippine politics,\textsuperscript{62} the creation of a central distribution point

for funds coming from Chinese would clearly make that point an important intermediary and would tend to enhance the Federation's claim to speak for the community, particularly among Filipino governmental officials. In short, the logic of such a development tends to support the descriptions of those informants who claim that the Federation did, in fact, assume this function.

Formal contact with China, at least that part of China represented by Taiwan, was increasingly channeled through the Federation until the early 1960's. Much of this was cultural in nature -- the Federation frequently sponsored and financed visits to the Philippines by Chinese artists, actors and literary figures -- but the Federation also claimed credit for several anti-communist demonstrations in the overseas community, fund raising campaigns for the Nationalist government on Taiwan, and the organization of an anti-Japanese boycott in protest against Japanese trade with Communist China. Interestingly, increasing contact between the Federation and China was inversely correlated with Kuomintang representation in the Federation's executive board. As indicated by Figure 4, Kuomintang representation in the executive board was greatest at the Federation's birth, after which it declined noticeably until 1960. Yet

the pattern of formal Federation involvement with China was just the reverse. The Federation sponsored far more cultural contacts with Taiwan in the four years following 1958 than in the years prior to that point, and the gestures of political or financial support for the Taiwan government on the part of the Federation reached a high point at roughly the same time that the representation of Kuomintang members in the Federation's executive board was near its nadir. Beginning in the 1960's, the contact with Taiwan seemed to be increasingly bifurcated between political and cultural aspects. Federation officers were, to be sure, quite prominent at the annual Double Ten celebrations and other Nationalist holidays. Likewise, the Federation has continually displayed symbols of Nationalist loyalty, whether Republic flags or the large stock of anti-communist literature found in the Federation library. In the early 1960's, however, Federation money and organizational skill seemed to be shifting away from political concerns toward what is more broadly classified as cultural. The organization of anti-communist demonstrations was undertaken more often by such institutions as the Filipino-Chinese Anti-Communist League rather than the Federation, while the latter was increasingly content with sponsoring the visits of artists, now often drawn from Hong Kong rather than Taiwan. In short, despite the initial Federation-Kuomintang links, the former appeared to be moving toward greater autonomy.

The Interaction Process

Two issues regarding the Chinese were prominent during the first twenty years of Philippine independence. One, the nationalization of
retail trade, was at least temporarily resolved in 1954 with the passage of the Retail Nationalization Act. The other, the issue of the role, if any, Chinese schools were to have in the Philippines, had been addressed by the Treaty of Amity between the Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines in 1947, but remained unresolved into the 1960's. The Chinese response to retail nationalization (Case II) and the response to growing Philippine encroachment on the content, scope and conduct of Chinese education (Case III) are, therefore, fruitful cases with which to begin to assess the interaction process during the post-war period.

The two cases differ in terms of specific content and time frame, but each arose from efforts by Philippine governmental decision-makers to change the status quo. The basic thrust of this effort in Case II was economic while in Case III it was more directly cultural in nature, but in both, the effort was much the same; namely, an erosion of the autonomy maintained by the Chinese in the Philippines. In terms of the time frame, Case II took place during the period the Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce was moving into a position of power in the Chinese community. Case III, the barrio school project, took place after the Federation had consolidated its position. In the middle 1950's, the period in which Case II occurred, the viability of the Republic of the Philippines was still in question. In the early 1960's, although questions remained, the Republic had successfully met the Huk challenge and seemed to have demonstrated a political viability which justified confidence in the future.
CASE II

The Retail Nationalization Act

Background

Early in 1954 the Chinese in the Philippines were aware of an impending crisis. Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Chen Chih-ping had alluded to clouds on the horizon in his annual New Year's message to the overseas residents in the archipelago, warning that attempts to curtail Chinese business activity there would be detrimental to Philippine growth. In the same speech he recalled, probably for the benefit of the Filipino reporters present, that the newly elected President, Ramon Magsaysay, had met with representatives of the Chinese community a month before and, in Chen's words, had promised "fair and just policy toward the Chinese." Chen's anxiety was justified about a week later when, in the first session of the third Philippine Congress, a plethora of nationalization measures were introduced.

By March, 1954, the spirit of nationalization was moving rapidly in the Philippine Congress. On March 4, 1954 the House committee on Labor had reported out a bill nationalizing labor and the House

Commerce and Industry Committee, chaired by Congressman Durano, was considering several proposals for the nationalization of retail trade in the Philippines. Durano's committee had summoned officers of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce to testify regarding the proposals to nationalize the retail trade in February, but those meetings were dominated by the proponents of nationalization. Various elements of the Chinese community had spoken out against retail nationalization, and a February 22 editorial of the Great China Press criticizing the movement had elicited Congressional condemnation and a special Congressional investigation of alien political activity. Outside the Philippines, the Republic of China's Legislative Yuan on Taiwan had passed a resolution calling on the Republic's Foreign Affairs Department to protest the nationalization movement then gaining momentum in the Philippines.

As it emerged that a serious nationalization effort was underway, the Chinese community appeared to be in disarray and unable to respond. Chinese newspapers were filled with statements of concern during the first two months of 1954, but there were few proposals regarding specific action and no identification of who was responsible for mobilizing and directing the sense of anxiety then permeating the community. The Chinese Embassy had sought to express community

69 Agpalo, The Political Process, p. 98.
apprehensions regarding the nationalization movement to the Philippine government, but had had little success, due in part to several factors. First, as far as its congressional supporters were concerned, nationalization was strictly an internal Philippine matter. As a representative of a foreign government, the Chinese Embassy had very little legal basis on which to mobilize an anti-nationalization campaign in the Philippines. It could communicate the dissatisfaction of the Republic of China toward nationalization, but beyond this there was little in the way of retaliation which could be threatened. Then too, some community leaders were not particularly interested in supporting the Embassy. Although the Embassy had often moved to the center of community affairs in the post-war period, this was sometimes at the expense of the influence and prestige of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, some members of which resented the new importance of the Embassy and were now reluctant to again subordinate themselves.

But if the Embassy could not mobilize a community response to nationalization, neither was the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce able to effectively meet the crisis. Divided internally and with their authority undercut by a resurgent Embassy, Chamber leaders had appeared before Congress to express community dissatisfaction but had been ignored. Now, the Chamber turned inward and seemed immobilized by internal tensions. Indeed, by late March, these tensions became insurmountable, resulting in the resignation of several Chamber
leaders and the formation of the Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce.

Participants

The initial response undertaken by the Federation toward the retail nationalization movement appears to have been primarily a result of the action and dynamism of the Federation's founders, Yu Khe Thai, Yao Shiong Shio and Peter Lim. Since part of their reason for breaking away from the older Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and forming the Federation was their belief that the Chamber was not successfully challenging the nationalization movement, it is reasonable to assume that they took a direct personal interest in formulating the new organization's strategy. Further, the Federation was born in the midst of the nationalization crisis and simply did not have the time to create an organizational framework within which the initiation of policy could come from lower levels. This interpretation was supported by several conversations with members of the Federation's staff. One staff member who joined the Federation shortly after its formation in March indicated that when he joined he was immediately brought into a smoothly functioning organization which had a clear sense of direction:

"When I joined the Federation -- only a few weeks after it had been set up -- it was already operating smoothly. The first time some of the officers discussed things with me they asked me what I thought of this idea and what I thought of
that idea. When our talk ended
I was convinced I was just work­
ing with a good organization
which knew what it wanted to do
and how it should be doing it."

Considerations of institution building colored the Federa­
tion's initial response to the nationalization movement, making it
difficult to determine whether actions taken were designed to pre­
vent nationalization or simply to build a more viable organization.
Thus, rather than directly lobbying against the Retail Nationaliza­
tion Act, the Federation undertook a resource-building campaign
from the time of its organization in March until about May. One
member of the organization's secretariat described the main consider­
atations during these months as follows:

"Well, everyone knew that some­
thing had to be done about the
retail nationalization, but the
effort had to be organized. So
maybe for two or three months we
worried about Federation affairs.
You see contacts had to be main­
tained, new people had to be
brought in, and the whole thing
had to be organized. I don't
think the Federation worried too
much about what to do regarding
the Retail Nationalization Act
until much later."

One aspect of this period was clearly the effort to establish
the Federation's position within the community. Yu and other leaders
personally contacted most of the leaders of provincial Chinese
chambers of commerce, arguing that the retail nationalization move­ment constituted the most serious threat to the Chinese in the Philippines since the end of the Spanish period and that their support for the Federation was necessary if anything was to be done. These personal contacts were backed up by voluminous staff correspondence between the Federation and provincial chambers.

Some accounts also indicate that Yu and the other founders feared the traditionalist-nationalist divisions which characterized the post­war Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, and, accordingly sought to expand the representation of Kuomintang members in the Federation. Kuomintang members did constitute a significantly greater percentage of the Federation's formal leadership than had existed under the General Chamber, but one ingenious explanation of the influx of Kuomintang members was that this reflected an effort to remove the Chinese Embassy as an institutional rival to the Federation. The informant that offered this explanation argued that increased Kuomintang repres­sentations aided the viability of the Federation by, on the one hand, making its loyalty to the Republic of China less suspect and, on the other, providing a channel to Taiwan through which Yu and other Federation founders could work for the replacement of Chen Chih-ping by a less dynamic Ambassador. Chen, by most biographical references a dynamic individual whose personality probably had much to do with the importance of the Embassy in the post-war period, was in fact replaced shortly after the Federation's formation, adding some
credence to an otherwise unprovable explanation. There is little doubt that the founders of the Federation viewed the General Chamber as a rival and sought to ally themselves more closely with nationalists in the community who were dissatisfied with the Chamber's traditionalist leanings. It is quite possible that the Embassy may also have been viewed as a competitor.

The other aspect of this early period was the technique which had been tested during the response to the Bookkeeping Law. Contact was established between the Federation and the American, Spanish and German Chambers of Commerce. Appealing for support in the upcoming fight against nationalization, representatives of the Federation urged the various other alien Chambers to take a stand against the movement. The effort was partially successful; by May the American Chamber of Commerce Journal had begun editorial attacks on nationalization and members of the Spanish and German Chambers had come out against the movement. Even this aspect may have been more directly related to institution building rather than an effort to derail the nationalization movement, however, for as one informant suggested, it established the principle outside the community that the Federation was the community spokesman and demonstrated internally that the Federation could deal with outsiders.

There was little hint in English language press releases by the Federation that the General Chamber was viewed as a rival, but many Chinese press reports pointed to the competition between the two institutions and much of the correspondence from the Federation to the provincial chambers was cast in criticism of the General Chamber.
Sometime in early May the Federation shifted more clearly into a direct response to the nationalization movement. It was decided, again apparently by the Federation's officers, to establish a propaganda vehicle directed against the urban Filipino population and congressmen and, at the same time, to more fully enlist the Chinese diplomatic representative at Manila in the effort to stem the nationalization movement. Arrangements were made to subsidize the publication of the Monitor, a Manila tabloid designed to point out, from the Chinese point of view, the dangers and inequities in nationalization. Efforts were made, however, not to make the connection between the Monitor and Federation obvious. Although the Federation subsidized the tabloid publication, this was never alluded to by the paper's editorial staff who portrayed themselves as "concerned Filipinos." The paper's distribution was confined to Manila because, in the words of an observer, that was where the people who counted were. Meanwhile, meetings increased between the Federation's officers and the Embassy in April and May, particularly after Ambassador Chen was replaced by Chow Shu-kai (周書楷).

It appears that the Board of Directors was split fairly evenly on the question of lobbying Congress directly. One side argued in favor of a more overt confrontation with Congress, the other argued that such an approach would be detrimental to the Federation as an organization and might result in more rapid Congressional approval of a nationalization bill. From what can be culled from the records of the early
meetings of the Federation's Executive Board, this debate emerged in early May and was unresolved for over a month, despite continued discussion. It was, however, decided by about May 10 to have the Federation's lawyer begin drafting a nationalization bill which could become a substitute for the bills already introduced.

In May, however, events began to occur rapidly. A May 3 meeting between Speaker Laurel and President Magsaysay regarding nationalization was followed four days later by an extraordinary conference between House proponents of nationalization and members of the Magsaysay cabinet. On May 9, at a meeting of Nationalists and Liberal Party members of the House, one of the nationalization measures which had been introduced in the first month of the Congressional session was selected as an agreed upon position, modified slightly, and reintroduced as HB 2523. Magsaysay certified this bill as an urgent matter on May 17; two days later it had been reported out of Durano's Committee and passed by the House. On May 20, the Senate passed the same measure after attaching an amendment which exempted the bill's application to US citizens.

The rapidity with which these events occurred apparently took the Federation by surprise. Their first response was to appeal to Chinese Minister Chow for action. He responded immediately, informing the

73 Agpalo, The Political Process, p. 103.
Philippine Foreign Office that he was preparing a diplomatic protest on May 21, which he delivered the following day. The Federation called several Executive Board meetings between 20 and 27 May during which it was decided to appeal directly to Magsaysay to veto the measure and to finish drafting the Federation's substitute nationalization proposal.

The Federation requested a meeting with Magsaysay on May 28, a request which was granted on June 3. The discussions with the President were, from the Chinese point of view, less than fruitful. According to an observer, Magsaysay listened to the Chinese position on nationalization, but agreed to do no more than to look at the Federation's substitute proposal. This proposal was submitted on June 7, but had little effect. Magsaysay signed HB 2523 on June 19 and retail nationalization, as expressed in RA 1180, was suddenly a fact.

The Federation's officers apparently entered a series of discussions immediately following Magsaysay's approval of the Retail Nationalization Act during which a series of alternative courses of action were raised. There was probably some degree of depression among the discussants, but also the consensus that the fight against retail nationalization should be continued. According to a member of the Federation's secretariat only a few members expressed much

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76 Manila Times, May 20, 1954.
doubt that the nationalization movement could be reversed. He
described the meetings and general climate of Chinese opinion at
the time in the following terms:

"There were some who were upset
over what had happened and said
maybe the Chinese should stop
fighting, but they were not many.
Others may have thought that time
was not too good for the Federal­
tion and that some Chinese would
say the Federation hadn't done
anything. But most of the officers
never thought about quitting and
were only worried about what to
do next."

There was some criticism of the Federation from within the
Manila Chinese community, but this criticism did not become general
and what was expressed or implied in some of the Chinese Commercial
News editorials was successfully refuted by the argument that the
Federation had been formed too late to prevent the passage of the
nationalization act. Inside the Federation those who had argued
for a direct confrontation with the Philippine Lawmakers apparently
became the proponents of the view that the Federation should now
push for repeal of RA 1180. Others argued that the correct strategy
lay in judicial proceedings, along a path similar to the one taken
by the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce in the 1920's. By the
end of June the debate had been resolved by the general acceptance
among the Federation's leaders that both courses should be followed.

See, for example, Chinese Commercial News, June 27, 1954.
Accordingly, a "special committee on the Retail Trade Nationalization Act" headed by Peter Lim was established, and several days later the Federation retained former Philippine Supreme Court Justice Ozaeta as counsel in a test case (The Ichong Case). Both these actions, although they were apparently oriented somewhat differently, shared certain characteristics which distinguished them from the actions undertaken by the Chinese General Chamber in the early 1920's.

The selection of Ozaeta, a Filipino, to lead the court battle against the Retail Nationalization Act marked a significant departure from the earlier court battle against the Bookkeeping Law. In the earlier case, a leader of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was directly involved in the court battle. In 1954, however, the Federation carefully avoided using a Chinese as its legal advocate. Sycip, who had personally directed the 1920 court battle, was brought into the litigation proceedings as an advisor, but apparently had little real effect on the legal strategy employed by former Justice Ozaeta. The actions undertaken by Lim's committee also differed from earlier precedence. Lim's committee was to perform two functions; it was to coordinate the collection of funds from members of the Federation for the fight for repeal -- in this following the pattern established over thirty years earlier by the General Chamber -- and it was to direct the repeal effort. This latter function was, however, virtually turned over to Filipino public relations experts (Federico Mangahas and Marcela Baldoz). According to Chinese observers, the day-to-day
direction of the repeal effort, its strategy, the disbursement of funds to effect repeal and, in general, the entire tone of the repeal campaign were placed in the hands of the Filipinos hired to neutralize the nationalization movement. Lim's committee, acting on behalf of the Federation, had the formal authority to approve or deny requests by Mangahas and Baldoz for operational funds, but apparently made a concerted effort to remain out of the immediate fight for repeal. A member of the Federation's secretariat, when queried whether the court battle in the Ichong case and the fight for repeal marked a new phase of the community's relationship to the Philippine government, responded in the affirmative. His comments, reflecting an undertone of concern for the viability of the Federation are worth repeating at length:

"Well, I think there were several reasons why the Federation did what it did after the (retail nationalization) act was passed. First was the situation. The movement in favor of the act was very sophisticated -- public relations, good ads -- all the modern techniques. Now, how do you respond to that kind of a thing? Why, with more of the same. I mean, you fight fire with fire. If they use public relations experts so do you. Otherwise, there'd be no chance. Second was the general climate. The whole movement (in favor of Act 1180) was anti-Chinese, so you think any Filipino, even the courts, would listen to what a Chinese said? No matter what a Chinese lawyer would say, it
wouldn't matter. So the answer was to get a Filipino, one that was respected, to give the arguments. You see, the Federation had nothing to gain by showing itself as the real director of the repeal movement."

Despite the efforts by the Federation to have the Retail Nationalization Act repealed or declared unconstitutional, it remained on the books and, indeed, subsequent court decisions suggested that the exclusion of Chinese from the retail trade might even extend to wholesale trading. By 1958, it was clear to most Chinese in the Philippines that the nationalization of retail trade would probably remain a fact of commercial life. The Federation had failed to reverse the nationalization movement. In the fight, however, it had become stronger. As one Chinese critic of the Federation put it, "the Retail Nationalization Act was a bad thing for the Chinese, but a good thing for the Federation. It ended up with more power than before and nearly everyone in the community believed it when its leaders claimed that the only reason they had lost the repeal fight was because they started too late."

**CASE III**

**The Barrio School Project**

**Background**

Many Chinese believed, in the early 1950's, that they had
been assured of the right to establish and conduct Chinese schools in the Philippines. Article VI of the 1947 Treaty of Amity between the Republic of China and the Philippines seemed to make this clear, reading, in part, that "the nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall be accorded, in the territories of the other, the liberty to establish schools for the education of their children."

Chinese education had, in fact, expanded greatly in the post-war period. By 1948, 60 Chinese schools (21 in Manila) with more than 20,000 students were registered with the Philippine Bureau of Private Schools, and others undoubtedly existed. By the early 1950's this number had nearly doubled; by 1955 there were 135 Chinese schools registered with the Bureau with an attendance of over 40,000. By 1962 the number of registered Chinese schools had grown to over 160 and provided educational services to over 55,000 students, including over 12,000 holding Philippine citizenship.  

But the post-war growth of Chinese education in the Philippines was not entirely smooth or without challenge. As early as 1946 Philippine police agencies had raided Chinese schools; other raids followed in July 1948 and November 1949, and at the height of the Huk.

78 Murray, "Chinese Education in Southeast Asia," p. 86.
threat in the early 1950's Philippine criticism and fear of Chinese schools was being voiced by both governmental officials and Philippine newspapers. In August, 1955, the Board of National Education, an ad hoc group composed of various governmental officials, was advised by Secretary of Education G. Hernandez, Jr. that "reports from the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, Military Intelligence Service and the Congressional Committee on Anti-Filipino affairs showed evidence that the Chinese schools were spawning Communist and communistic ideas, the real nature and extent of which could not be determined..."

As a result, the Board established a special committee chartered to propose means of assuring protection against Communist influence which had infiltrated Chinese schools. The committee, however, expanded the scope of its investigation and in its report, termed the "Perpinan Report", addressed the board problem of the kind of political education promoted by Chinese schools in the Philippines. Describing the courses in China as "part of a separate and complete system of education aimed at the training of the students for good Chinese citizenship" the report strongly implied that any problems associated with Chinese education in the Philippines were not limited only to potential or actual communist subversion, but might stem from

80 General Education Policies.
even the most anti-communist Chinese schools. Part of the problem, the report continued, was an inability or reluctance on the part of the Philippine government to supervise what went on in the Chinese schools. Then the report proposed an interesting interpretation of the Sino-Philippine Treaty of Amity. Recognizing the right to establish Chinese schools in the Philippines, the report suggested that the determination of what was taught in the schools was entirely the perogative of the Philippine Government:

"The main question underlying the problem is: Do the Chinese courses come under the jurisdiction of the Philippine government? The answer of the undersigned Committee is an unhesitating and unequivocal yes. This jurisdiction is asserted not only by law and the Constitution but by the Treaty of Amity itself between the Philippines and China. The right to operate schools for their children in the Philippines, nevertheless, subjects the exercise of this right to the laws and regulations of the Philippines."

Meanwhile, word that a move was underway to limit the Chinese discretion in the content of Chinese education had reached the Chinese Embassy. Early in August the Chinese Ambassador requested that the Philippine government reaffirm the right, established by the Treaty of Amity, of the Chinese to establish, maintain and supervise schools in the archipelago. The department of Foreign

81 General Education Policies, p. 20.
Affairs delayed any response until the Board of National Education had made a policy determination. The Board, for its part, derived four position statements: 82

(1) The Philippine Government through the Department of Education would exercise general supervision of all Chinese schools in the Philippines;

(2) All Chinese schools must register with the Bureau of Private schools;

(3) Chinese schools must require of their students the minimum curricular standard required of Philippine schools;

(4) After satisfying these requirements Chinese schools would be free to teach any other subjects.

These conditions were formally accepted by the Chinese Embassy in December 1955, and in implementation of this agreement members of the Embassy and Philippine Department of Education met to establish curricular requirements for elementary and secondary courses. 83

The results of this meeting were not entirely satisfactory as far as the Chinese Embassy was concerned. The curricular arrangements decided upon saddled the Chinese student with a tremendous volume of work—almost twice that of the Filipino child in a government recognized school. In addition, the bulk of these requirements were

82 General Education Policies, p. 23.

directed toward subjects in which the Chinese Embassy had little interest; time allotted to English subjects was to be in excess of that allotted Chinese. In the elementary curriculum 6,850 minutes per week was to be spent on courses in the English curriculum including Philippine citizenship training, while 5,000 minutes per week was to be spent on Chinese subjects. In the secondary curriculum the predominance of English subjects was increased: 6,200 minutes were allotted to English subjects per week while the number of minutes allotted to Chinese decreased to 3,900. Finally, the agreement provided for the entrance of Filipinos into the teaching staffs of the Chinese schools:

"The teachers for the subjects in English shall be Filipino citizens, but the teachers in the Philippine Social Studies such as Philippine history and government, Philippine Social Life, Philippine economics and other courses in this field, shall be native born Filipinos. The teachers in the Chinese subjects shall be Chinese nationals with such qualifications as are required by the laws and regulations of the government of the Republic of China. A list of Chinese teachers eligible to teach in accordance with said laws and regulations will be transmitted to the Bureau of Private Schools by the Embassy of the Republic of China in the Philippines,

84 "Elementary and Secondary Curricula in Chinese Schools," p. 23; Fei Hua nien Chien, pp. 0-41 to 0-47.
which shall serve as a panel from which Chinese schools shall choose their teachers for the subjects in Chinese.\textsuperscript{85} 

In general, most members of the community saw the action of the Philippines as a direct threat. A member of the Federation's secretariat in assessing the importance of the early 1956 agreements made the following comments: which were probably representative of widespread sentiment in the community:

"They (The Philippine Government) were out to close down the schools. They couldn't do it directly because of the treaty, so they came up with the idea of making it so hard to go to a Chinese school that they would have to close down. Imagine, Chinese students had to do everything Filipinos did before they could learn their national language. That's alright, but what was to stop them from squeezing out Chinese courses entirely?"

While most members of the community sensed a threat again emerging from the Philippine political system, reactions varied greatly. To some the agreements lent final impetus to a decision to seek closer involvement in Philippine society. A Chinese businessman who applied for Philippine citizenship shortly after the announcement of the curricular guidelines suggested that his decision was based on the belief that Chinese education for his children would become either so difficult to obtain or ineffective ("Pretty soon the Philippines would be picking all the Chinese teachers, and what kind of Chinese education

would that lead to?"") that it would not be worth the effort. A Chinese graduate of the University of the Philippines argued in the course of an interview that the Philippine infringement on the content of Chinese education probably contributed to the fact that he entered a Philippine secondary school rather than going to Taiwan for secondary school training.

To others, however, the agreements were interpreted in terms of the community's internal affairs. A Kuomintang respondent suggested that the "danger" in the agreements was not so much that they might lead to assimilation as they were a stimulus to greater Communist activity among the Chinese in the Philippines. He argued that rather than promoting assimilation, the new curricular requirements in Chinese schools would cause Chinese students to simply drop out of school entirely and seek the services of private Chinese tutors. This would provide access to the communists:

"(The new curricular requirements) were just what the reds wanted. The Chinese would never give up trying to get Chinese learning, but if this became too hard in formal schools, they'd turn to tutors. Now, schools can be regulated and watched, but anyone -- even a communist -- can be a private tutor and get away with it. Since the reds had been run out of the schools this was just the sort of thing which could lead to a resurgence of communist influence in the community."
Members of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce suggested that the agreements were the fault of the Federation and demonstrated that organization's incompetence.

Regardless of the way in which the agreements were interpreted by individual Chinese in the Philippines, there appeared to be a general consensus within the community that the maintenance of Chinese education in the Islands could no longer depend upon the provisions of the 1947 Treaty of Amity. Many Chinese informants seemed to believe that that battle on those grounds had been fought and lost when, in 1956, the principle of overall supervision by the Philippine Department of Education was established. Since the Chinese Embassy had agreed that the Philippines and not the Chinese government had the final say over what went on in the Chinese schools, it could be only a matter of time until the schools were Chinese in name only and Chinese subjects and teachers had been entirely replaced by Filipino. Editorials in some Chinese newspapers began to hint that the way to maintain Chinese education in the Philippines was no longer to be found in recourse to the Treaty arrangements between the Republic of China and the Philippines, and arguments in favor of Chinese schools began to shift from the claim that they were inviolate because of treaty provisions to the idea that they were essential to the Philippines. This subtle shift in rationale was expressed in the following terms by a respondent, a member of the Federation's secretariat, who was describing the
Chinese reaction to the 1956 agreements between the Embassy and Department of Education:

"Well, first I think they had no right to tell the (Chinese) schools what to do because the Treaty says the Chinese have a right to run schools here. But, okay, supposing they just have such a right to tell the schools what to teach and even close them down. Imagine, there were maybe 50,000 students in Chinese schools, and if they closed the Chinese schools what would they do then? Every year they were jumping and jumping around about a lack of schools, now where in the hell would they put this 50,000? Chinese schools were a good thing for the Filipinos, but they didn't realize it. Many people in the community thought that maybe this should be brought out."

One of the interesting aspects of the shift in rationale for the maintenance of Chinese education in the Philippines from one based on international law (i.e., treaty obligations) to an argument that Chinese schools contributed to Philippine development (i.e., by lessening the educational burden of the government), was the concurrent shift away from the Chinese Embassy as spokesman on the issue of Chinese Education. While the argument that Chinese education could be maintained rested on Treaty obligations, the Embassy had been the logical point of contact between the community and Philippines regarding Chinese educational matters. Now, because the argument no longer relied directly on the Treaty of Amity but on the view that Chinese education was "good for the Philippines," the
Embassy no longer seemed the most obvious point of contact for the issue. If the Chinese in the Philippines were going to maintain Chinese education there by arguing that its maintenance would contribute to Philippine development, then an organization which was more closely tied to the context of Philippine development was a more logical channel through which this argument could be made. The obvious choice was, of course, the Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce, and the response to Philippine governmental encroachment on the autonomy of Chinese education from about 1958 on appears to have originated primarily from this source.

Part of this response was the "Barrio School Project" which, beginning in 1961, was an effort to demonstrate to Filipino lawmakers that Chinese in the Philippines were committed to the expansion of the Philippine educational systems and would support this in return for continued Chinese control, preferably organized by the Federation, over the content of Chinese education in the Philippines.

Participants

The initiation of the Barrio School Project can be traced to the Secretariat of the Federation, and, more specifically to the General Secretary, Tang Tack. This was, at least, the opinion of several members of the secretariat and some informants who were not members of the Federation. Tang, when interviewed declined to take full credit for the project, but acknowledged that he probably contributed to the project's initiation by suggesting in several Directors' meetings in
the late 1950's that the "threat" to Chinese schools was related to the Filipino concern with nation-building. In July 1959, Tang argued that the problem was basically that the Philippine government viewed Chinese schools as dangerous to Philippine national development. What was needed, he believed, was a way of demonstrating that the Chinese in the Philippines were not opposed to Philippine nation-building, except when that entailed the destruction of Chinese education in the Philippines. As Tang expressed the problem:

"The problem was that Filipinos thought Chinese schools were a danger to their nation-building. So, we needed some way to show them Chinese weren't against national development and could help out. Well, everybody knows how important schools are here in the Philippines, so we thought the best way we could show them that Chinese didn't want to stop their nation-building was to donate some schools to them. This would show them that the Chinese didn't want to stop their development and maybe as a result, they'd stop the squeeze on the Chinese schools."

Although Tang presented the idea of school donations to the Federation's leaders in mid-1959, its reception was not particularly favorable. Some members recognized that there was growing pressure on the Chinese schools, but failed to see how the donation of schools to the Philippines would result in a diminution of the pressure on Chinese education. Others saw some merit in the idea, but suggested
that such an undertaking would probably entail considerable expense. Tang was told to see if he could propose something more specific.

An extensive discussion in the secretariat ensued, revolving around the broad problem of how to deal with the pressure on Chinese education in the Philippines, but generally framed in terms of how the Federation could benefit from various alternative responses. Both the suggestion of a broad publicity campaign in support of Chinese schools and an extensive lobbying campaign directed against the Department of Education and Congress were rejected because of institutional considerations. Diffuse publicity campaigns were viewed as overly expensive with little guarantee of success or of direct return for the Federation. Likewise, the argument for a lobbying effort was apparently defeated by a counter argument that the Federation could not afford to be identified too clearly as the Chinese lobby. One observer of the discussion stated:

"The Federation could have gone right into the halls of Congress and argued for Chinese schools, but that was pretty dangerous. It could have meant investigations, charges and maybe even the end of the Federation. It was too risky."

The debate in the secretariat was eventually resolved in favor of the school project and discussion then centered upon how best to "sell" the project to the Federation's officers. The solution decided upon consisted essentially of a coupling of the project with promises of increased Federation power. It was agreed that the school project
should be presented to the Board of Directors as a means of consolidating the Federation's control over the provincial chambers of commerce and of asserting Federation influence in the content of Chinese education. The first of these aspects was to be met by a sharing arrangement whereby the Federation would match the school construction funds supplied by provincial Chinese chambers. As an incentive for chambers outside Manila to contribute schools, the Federation would in turn contribute funds to the provincial Chinese schools. The price provincial chambers paid for this, in addition to half the money necessary to construct a one to three room school house in a nearby barrio, was affiliation with the Federation if this had not yet been accomplished, or, greater participation in the affairs of the Federation if the provincial Chamber was already a member (to include the payment of past dues, a problem that had become increasingly prevalent since about 1958). The price paid by the Federation was estimated by the secretariat as probably greater than that required by an extensive lobbying or publicity campaign. The potential returns were greater, however, for in addition to drawing provincial chambers of commerce closer to the Federation, the scheme also promised greater dependence by Chinese schools outside Manila on the Federation. This, it was argued, was to become the lever by which the Federation would begin to exert influence over the content of Chinese education throughout the archipelago, presumably at the expense of the Kuomintang.
The proposal was apparently accepted by the Federation's officers early in 1960, and a campaign designed to enlist the support of provincial chambers was undertaken. By late 1960, the Federation had succeeded in getting commitments from about twenty provincial Chinese Chambers of Commerce to match what the Federation supplied to construct new schools. Publicity costs for the campaign were to be shared; the provincial Chambers were to handle the publicity in the locality effected while the Chamber would attempt to get the project covered in the large metropolitan news media.86

Style

During the course of interviews with several of the participants and observers of the "Barrio School Project" several insights as to the Federation's view of the Philippine political system were outlined. One of the most interesting of these arose from an attempt to elicit reasons why more effort was concentrated in the provinces than Manila. One of the reasons for this appeared to be related to a belief that Chinese influence was more effective in the provinces than it was in the capital. This concept came out in the course of an interview with a member of the Federation's secretariat:

"Out in the province the relations between the Chinese and authorities is much better. A school in the barrio is really important; in Manila it isn't anything new and any project to build schools there

86Fei Hua nien Chien, pp. G-69.
would have been ignored. Now suppose you have thirty or forty barrio mayors saying the Chinese helped their barrio by supplying it with a school. Well, those ideas work their way up. Sure, maybe the congressman from the area claims the credit for the school, but he knows where it came from and he's just as important in Congress as someone from Manila."

There was a general feeling among those members of the Federation's secretariat and officers who were interviewed that the barrio school project was built on lessons learned from earlier efforts to modify or veto Philippine governmental programs effecting the Chinese. A sentiment often expressed was the view that the Chinese could not be too blatant in their effort to maintain the autonomy of Chinese Education, and in particular a belief that should the Federation appear too organized, unwanted repercussions could result. Indeed, the decentralized implementation of the school project appears to have been partially a result of the desire to avoid the connotation of a smoothly functioning pressure group.

The barrio school project was accompanied by a publicity campaign which varied from the earlier campaign associated with the Retail Nationalization Act case. Whereas the earlier campaign had been concentrated in Manila and was characterized by the creation of several new mass communication devices targeted primarily against urban Filipino population, in the barrio school project, most of the publicity effort
appears to have gone in two different directions. Rather than launch large scale publicity campaigns in the urban center of Manila, publicity designed for Filipino audiences occurred primarily at the local or barrio level where the results of the project -- the construction of a school -- were visible. But a large percentage of the money and effort spent by the Federation for publicity went for "internal" consumption. Most of the publicity about the barrio school project, perhaps the bulk, was published in Chinese and directed toward the Chinese community.

In 1964, the third year of the project, twenty-eight schools had been built. The results according to members of the Secretariat were mixed. The Federation had spent a considerable amount on the project, but Chinese schools continued to be viewed by the Philippine press and some Filipino politicians as dangerous anomalies. The curricular requirements imposed on Chinese schools had, however, remained stable, and as members of the Federation's secretariat saw it, the real value of the project had been its payoff of greater Federation influence in the community. Membership was up and now included some of the Federation's earlier rivals from the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. More important, however, was the suggestion offered by members of the secretariat that it was now the Federation which was the center of Chinese educational policy throughout the archipelago.

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88 Fei Hua nien Chien, pp. 0-43; Philippine Senate, Privileged Speech of Senator Ganzon (March, 1965); The Manila Times, 14 August 1964; The Manila Bulletin, 7 October 1964; The Manila Times, 4 October 1964.
As is apparent from the preceding historical survey, the Chinese community in the Philippines has been subjected to and modified by numerous forces, some growing out of the internal dynamics of the community itself, others which are better understood as impinging either from the political system immediately surrounding the community in the Islands or from the one centered in China. In the broadest sense, however, the history of the community can be portrayed in terms of relative unity and fragmentation, and can be summarized as follows:

Unity characterized the community as the nineteenth century ended, a unity symbolized and fostered by the presence of the capitan structure. This institution, given access to instruments of governmental power by the Spanish authorities in exchange for guarantees of overseas Chinese economic support and political obedience, had moved to the center of community affairs, barring the assimilation of the Chinese into Philippine society. It provided both the arena within which the interests of community subgroupings were reconciled and the main channel for communication between the overseas residents and Spanish authority. The capitan was also the closest thing the community had to a representative of the Chinese government. Indeed, late nineteenth century correspondence between community leaders associated with the
capitan structure and the Tsungli Yamen clearly indicates an effort on the part of the leaders to formalize such a role, and, until the establishment of a Chinese consulate in the Philippines, political and cultural contact with China was for the most part channeled through the capitan structure.

This situation meant great influence for the individuals occupying the uppermost positions in the capitan structure, who, for their part, were very much interested in maintaining the viability of a single institution, under their control, which encompassed a wide range of community life. Two disparate outsiders, Sun Yat-sen and the first representative of the Tsungli Yamen to be appointed to the newly established Consulate at Manila, were among the first to experience the tenacity of this commitment. Although Sun and the Tsungli Yamen's representative were rivals, they shared much the same goal as far as the overseas community in the Philippines was concerned; both were "nationalists" in that they viewed the overseas community as part of the Chinese political system and sought to orient the community in this direction. Accordingly, both sought the creation of new institutions, run by outsiders, which would replace the capitan structure as the primary point of contact between the overseas community and political events in China, an aspect which engendered the community leaders' resistance. Sun left the Philippines discouraged in the face of the leaders' reluctance to support the establishment of a revolutionary party branch; the first consul general left after his authority as
representative of the Ch'ing government had been undermined by the activity of a former capitan.

Although community leaders sought to maintain the status quo as the American era began in the Philippines, the old structure of power in the community was rapidly eroded. For one thing, the capitan lost formal sanction as the single mediator between the community and the surrounding political system. Neither the taxing nor the police duties formerly conducted by the capitan were recognized by American administrators, and as American rule was consolidated, the hierarchical administrative structure of the Spaniards was replaced by one which dealt with the Chinese community through a multiplicity of channels. The introduction of American rule in the Philippines did more than remove the semi-official status of the capitan, however, for by promoting the establishment and recognition of a Chinese consulate and providing the climate which allowed the growth of Chinese journalism and political parties, the near monopoly capitan leaders once had on the flow of political communications between the mainland and the overseas community was undercut. With its role as mediator between both the Philippine and Chinese political systems removed, the capitan system disintegrated and the community entered a period of relative fragmentation and disunity.

Thus, for nearly two decades the overseas community was characterized by internal competition and conflict, within which two broad groupings were discernible. One, the traditionalists, sought to reconstruct
the capitan system, and thus prevent the assimilation of the community into Philippine society. Yet in the face of growing Chinese nationalism sponsored by the arrival of outsiders bent on reorienting the community toward China and replacing old leaders who might retard such a development, a new element was added. Traditionalists became the proponents of independence not only in a cultural sense vis-a-vis the Philippines, but in a political sense regarding China. The other broad grouping, the nationalists, sought something quite different for the community. Imbued with the spirit of Chinese nationalism, they sought to make the overseas community clearly an appendage of the Chinese political system.

The influence of the nationalists was initially diluted by internal conflict between reformists, revolutionaries and defenders of the Ch'ing dynasty, and even following the consolidation of the nationalist ranks by the Kuomintang, nationalists were unable to fully integrate the overseas community into the Chinese system. They were not without effect, however. Their schools and newspapers bombarded the overseas residents with new concepts of loyalty, and if the Chinese in the Philippines were not fully reoriented toward political events in China, they were more aware of such events than at any other previous period. Likewise, the nationalists were able to prevent the consolidation of power by traditionalists. The result was stalemate, a stalemate expressed in the struggle between nationalists and traditionalists for control of the newly formed Chinese Chamber of Commerce and, for the community as a whole, relative fragmentation.

Effect, however. Their schools and newspapers bombarded the overseas residents with new concepts of loyalty, and if the Chinese in the Philippines were not fully reoriented toward political...
In 1919, however, the balance of influence shifted in favor of the traditionalists in the community. A new generation of Philippine Chinese, led by the Sycips and Dees, rose to power in the Chamber, and because of the new threat posed by the Bookkeeping Law, expanded the authority of the Chamber both geographically and functionally into community life. In terms of background, Dee and Sycip had relatively little in common with previous capitans other than extended Philippine residence. Western educated, comparatively young, and with their financial base rooted in a modern banking institution (the China Banking Corporation), they nevertheless shared with earlier capitans the successful effort to create a single, undisputed center for community affairs. Thus, the Chamber became the center of decision-making not only for the organization of Chinese business interests throughout the archipelago, but for Chinese education, information, health and burial services as well. This expansion, particularly in the areas of education and journalism, often took place at the expense of those institutions dominated by nationalists. Indeed, the occupancy of office space provided by the Chamber leaders on the part of the Chinese consul General was more than a symbolic demonstration that nationalist-traditionalist rivalries had ceased; it also symbolized the recognition on the part of the nationalists of their subordinate position. The new generation of Chamber leaders were undoubtedly aided in aggrandizing the Chamber by the near moribund condition of the Kuomintang, the authority of which had been severely eroded by events in China. But
regardless of the reasons which account for the rise to power of Dee and the Sycips and the eclipse of the nationalists, the result was the emergence of a greatly strengthened Chinese Chamber of Commerce led by individuals who argued explicitly and for over a decade quite successfully, that it was the Philippines and not China that demanded community resources. Dee and Sycip did not, of course, argue for the assimilation of the community into Philippine society, but it was clear that they, like the capitans before them, were interested in associating the overseas community with the Chinese political system only to the extent that such an association contributed to their own power and prestige in the overseas community.

The traditionalists had risen to power, a position they were to maintain formally for nearly two more decades, virtually unchallenged until the revitalization of the Kuomintang in the early 1930's. For the overseas Chinese community, the 1920's and early 1930's were a period of stability and unity; again, as during the last decades of the nineteenth century, prompted by the presence of a single multifunctional structure, led by individuals who sought to maintain the community's distinctiveness from both the Philippines and China.

In the 1930's, however, unity and stability were increasingly replaced by fragmentation and change. Structurally, the Chamber began to slip from its central position. The archipelago-wide provincial Chinese chamber of commerce convention arrangement, initiated during the Bookkeeping Law fight to increase the ability of Dee and the Sycips to coordinate Chinese activity throughout the Philippines, fell into disuse. Likewise, the Chamber's dominance of Chinese
education was eroded, primarily by the renewed growth of schools sponsored by the Kuomintang. Chinese journalism, dominated through the 1920's by the Chinese Commercial News and Fookien Times, both sponsored by the Chamber, again entered a period of new growth and diversity. Meanwhile, events in China prompted the arrival of a new generation of nationalists in the Philippines and in the context of the Sino-Japanese War, the reluctance by Chamber leaders to respond to the growth of Chinese nationalism in the community led to further erosion of their authority.

As World War II approached, then, the community reentered a period of relative fragmentation. The nationalists were in the ascendency, but their ranks were again split, this time between representatives and supporters of the Kuomintang and members and supporters of the Chinese Communist Party. Traditionalists were not yet willing to concede defeat to either of these factions, however, and belatedly adopted stances and created organizations designed to demonstrate that they, too, were concerned with what was happening in China. Thus, in the late 1930's and early 1940's the community was subjected to a plethora of anti-Japanese boycotts, demonstrations, and movements sponsored by competing groups. The disunity was temporarily reversed in the face of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, but as the Japanese interregnum was to demonstrate, the divisions within the community were deep.

The Japanese, seeking to eliminate any potential source of resistance within the community, imposed a system of control on the Chinese
in the Philippines which gave the illusion of unity. Yet beneath the artificial solidity of the Chinese Association, the community continued to slip into fragmentation and disunity. Both traditionalist and nationalist groupings experienced internal divisions, as those traditionalists who survived the initial onslaught by the Japanese military authorities split into collaborators and non-collaborators, and the Kuomintang-Communist division in the ranks of the nationalists was formalized into competing guerrilla organizations. Fragmentation and internal conflict continued to characterize the community until the formation of the Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce, nearly a decade after the Japanese had been ousted from the islands.

Many factors account for the formation of the Federation, among which continued antagonism between the pre-war leadership of the Chamber and the Kuomintang, internal rivalries in the post-war Chamber leadership and a growing sense of anxiety in the face of increased governmental restrictions on Chinese activity in the Islands are all prominent. Regardless of the aggregation of forces which prompted its formation, however, the Federation increasingly reasserted at least the structural precedents established by the nineteenth century capitán system and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of the 1920's. By the mid-1960's the Federation's authority stretched from one end of the archipelago to the other and was to be found in nearly every aspect of community life, including education, journalism, marriage and inter-clan relations.
Within this framework the community again experienced a period of relative stability and cohesion.

The history of the Chinese community in the Philippines is of primary concern to this study for what it can disclose regarding the four hypotheses outlined in the introduction. The first of these, it may be recalled, dealt with the relation of community cohesion and the exercise of power, arguing that the greater the cohesion of the community, the greater the ability of the community to wield power. Does the historical data provided in the previous chapters tend to support this hypothesis?

If power means the ability of an actor to participate in the making of decisions, and more specifically, to bring about or prevent a governmental policy which otherwise would not have occurred or have been prevented, then it would appear that so far as the overseas Chinese in the Philippines are concerned, the connection between community cohesion and the exercise of power is tenuous. Only one period of cohesion, that of the early 1920's, appears to have been marked by a successful effort to prevent increasing constraints on Chinese economic activity, and even then, success came after the issue involved -- the Bookkeeping Law -- had been transferred from the political system immediately surrounding the Chinese in the Islands to the distant halls of the United States Supreme Court. Nearly thirty years later the result regarding a very similar issue -- retail nationalization -- was the opposite, although the cohesion of the
community in the mid-1950's was at least as great as it was in the early 1920's. By the 1960's another highpoint so far as cohesion was concerned was reached, yet there was little empirical indication that the overseas community was better able to influence governmental decisions in the Philippines.

It would of course be incorrect to argue that the Chinese in the Philippines have been powerless since the 1920's. The three cases introduced in the previous chapters by no means exhaust the issues of concern to the overseas Chinese in the Philippines, nor are they the only instances in which the community sought to affect government policy, sometimes successfully. The point is, however, that there does not appear to be a clear correlation between cohesion and the successful exercise of power. Some degree of cohesion on the part of the Chinese may be a necessary condition for power, but it is clearly only one of the necessary elements.

Indeed, a case for the opposite relationship between cohesion and power might be made. That is, cohesion on the part of the overseas community -- particularly a unity which is perceived by Filipinos -- may lead indirectly to a decreasing Chinese ability to affect policy. Cohesion on the part of the community may well be a two-edged sword; it facilitates the mobilization of community resources, but when perceived by outsiders, also tends to aid the mobilization of anti-Chinese sentiment. Agpalo's study of the Retail Nationalization Act and Case II of this study both suggest just such a pattern. In 1954,
for example, the tempo of the nationalization movement seemed to increase as it became known that the Chinese were mobilizing and coalescing to meet the threat. The existence of such a reverse relationship is, of course, unproven, but it does point to the fact that community cohesion is only one factor in the power equation. Exogenous factors, such as the degree of opposition to Chinese interests are probably just as important in the determination of Chinese power, often becoming the prime consideration.

The second hypothesis, relating cohesion on the part of the community to a political orientation toward China, is equally suspect in view of the data. Assuming that political orientation toward China is highest when nationalists are in the ascendancy within the community, it is possible to compare such periods with periods of relative cohesion. When the pattern of nationalist ascendancy is superimposed on the pattern of cohesion, however, we find that there appears to be little positive correlation. With the exception of two periods, one prior to World War II and the other during the formation of the Federation of Chinese Chambers in the mid-1950's, periods of nationalist ascendancy and periods of cohesion do not correspond. Thus, the period of cohesion at the end of the nineteenth century was a period in which nationalists, whether the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen or the representative of the Ch'ing dynasty were notably unsuccessful in establishing roots in the community. In contrast, the period from roughly 1900 to 1915,
when the community appeared to be fragmenting, nationalistic fervor and institutions were experiencing a period of rapid growth and expanding influence. The nationalists began to slip from prominence shortly thereafter and were eclipsed for nearly two decades by a resurgent Chamber of Commerce led by traditionalists. This period appears to have been characterized by community cohesion. Shortly before World War II, nationalists were again in the ascendancy, their institutions revitalized by an influx of new personnel and assuming increasing importance in Chinese educational and other community affairs. Likewise, Kuomintang membership in the Chamber was rising, reaching a peak as the Japanese invaded the Philippines. Yet this period, with the exception of a brief interlude in 1942, was one of increasing fragmentation. The post war period is confusing, but was marked by a relative lack of unity within the community as a whole, an incapacity on the part of the traditionalists in the Chamber to reassert themselves as community leaders and internal conflict within the ranks of the nationalists. This situation was partially resolved with the formation of the Federation in the mid-1950's, the other period in which increased nationalist influence seems to correspond with increasing unity. In the 1960's, however, as the viability and authority of the Federation was expanding, nationalist influence, as evidenced by the percentage of Kuomintang members in the Federation's leadership, was slipping. In short, a strong case could be made that in most
instances community cohesion has been accompanied by decreased nationalist influence. Graphically expressed, these patterns are as portrayed in Figure 5.

It might be argued that what often appears to be a reactive correlation between nationalist influence and community cohesion is misleading in that community leaders during periods of cohesion were actually strong nationalists and that the Chamber or Federation was in effect only a front for institutions such as the Kuomintang. In this view, there would be no need for dynamism and growth on the part of the Kuomintang during periods of Chamber or Federation vitality because the community was already under the control of nationalists. Biographical data can be provided which suggests such an argument has validity. In no instance, for example, was a member of the Chamber's leadership during periods of community cohesion described as an anti-nationalist in the Chamber documents or clan biographies surveyed. On the contrary, much effort was clearly

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Figure 5 is designed to portray patterns which, when expressed verbally, are quite complex; it is not meant to imply a quantification of either cohesion or nationalist influence. The trace of each line is based on a number of considerations, but for the cohesion line, the primary consideration was the presence or absence of a single coordinating structure, with broad authority over a range of aspects of community life, the leadership of which was relatively stable. The trace of the nationalist influence line was based on an evaluation of the vitality of organizations such as the Kuomintang, as evidenced by, among other things, representation in the Chamber hierarchy and contemporary newspaper and informant evaluations.
Fig. 5.-Comparison of Community Cohesion and Nationalist Revitalization following Japanese Invasion of 1941.

Chamber of Commerce and Nationalist Personnel, incoming and Lower Nationalist Personnel, incoming.

1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
Fig. 5.-Comparison of Community Cohesion and Nationalist Influence
expended to portray impeccable patriotic credentials for these individuals and biographical data from such sources constantly alludes to activity on the part of Chamber or Federation leaders which demonstrated their commitment to Chinese nationalism.

Yet, for every bit of evidence in support of the view that Chamber leaders during periods of community cohesion were strong nationalists, counter-evidence can be provided. The conflict between Palanca and the first Chinese consul general in the Philippines was obvious, but was not a unique phenomena according to both observations by contemporary newspapers or remarks by informants. Some of the schools and newspapers sponsored by the Chamber during the 1920's competed against those sponsored by the Kuomintang, and the creation of parallel and competing anti-Japanese organizations during the Sino-Japanese War likewise suggests rivalry rather than complete cooperation between nationalists and Chamber leaders. Further, although clan and Chamber biographies do not suggest that there were gaps in the nationalistic fervor and commitment of Chamber leaders, this is not the image sometimes drawn by such pre-war Kuomintang dailies as the Kong Li Po or the post-war Great China Press, and for outright criticism of the nationalism, or lack of it, of many Chamber leaders, one has only to turn to any copy of the Hwa Chiao Tao Pao.

Biographical data which draws an image of strong nationalism on the part of community leaders is itself suspect. Community leaders
have had nothing to gain since the first decades of the twentieth century by portraying themselves as anti-nationalists, for Chinese nationalism has been a fact of community life to some degree for over fifty years. The formal profession of loyalty to China and concern with Chinese political events may therefore be merely a tactical requirement for gaining power within the community; a kind of ritual, the absence of which would limit a leader's authority, but which has little bearing on whether that leader will seek to integrate the community into the Chinese political system. Thus, in the last analysis, whether periods of cohesion are marked by increased nationalism depends not on how biographers portray community leaders during those periods, but on what leaders actually do.

If periods of community cohesion are examined closely for what leaders were, in fact, doing, the argument that the Chamber was merely a front for the Kuomintang or other nationalist institution seems even less credible. Periods of cohesion generally have been more closely related to phenomena associated with the Philippines than with China. It was the threat of the Bookkeeping Law which led to community cohesion in the 1920's and on which Dee and the Sycips built their power, not events in China. The Federation was built and expanded its authority primarily on the claim that it could better deal with pressures emerging from the Philippine political system than could either the old Chamber of Commerce or the Chinese consulate. Even in the period shortly before World War II, when nationalistic fervor and
community cohesion grew together, it was the Japanese invasion of the Philippines that sparked the fusion of these two phenomena. In short, this study indicates cohesion in the community has been more closely tied to activity oriented toward the Philippines than with efforts to orient the community toward China politically.

If cohesion does not appear to be directly related to the ascendency of nationalists in the community, how does one account for the surges of Chinese nationalism during the twentieth century? One important factor appears to be the resources, particularly in terms of personnel, political institutions in China are willing to devote to the effort to increase nationalism among the overseas community. High-points of nationalist influence in the Philippines, for example, appeared shortly after the introduction of new nationalists to the community or to personnel changes in those institutions which are designed to integrate the overseas residents into the Chinese political system. The fortunes of Chinese nationalism in the Philippine community were decidedly bleak until after the arrival of outsiders such as Tee Han Kee and Hu Nan-min. Similarly, the resurgence of nationalism in the 1930's appears to have been closely related to the introduction of a new generation of cadres from China who replaced older Party leaders, including Tee, prior to expanding the activity of the Philippine branch of the Kuomintang.

In the post-war decade, both the Kuomintang and Communist Party dispatched new individuals to the Islands, a factor which probably accounts for the maintenance of nationalist influence despite the deadly struggle between
Communist and Kuomintang elements. Finally, it is interesting to note that the 1954 rise of Kuomintang influence in the new Federation was accompanied by significant personnel shifts in both the Philippine branch of the Party and the Chinese Consulate.

If Chinese nationalism is closely tied to the introduction of new personnel to the community, we may have part of the explanation as to why increased nationalism in the community has often been accompanied by increased community fragmentation. As outsiders, new arrivals face inherent difficulties in moving rapidly into the existing power structure of the community; community leaders tend to identify them as rivals and, accordingly, exclude them from powerful positions in the core structure (the Chamber of Commerce or Federation). This has been the complaint, at least, of newly arrived nationalists, including Sun Yat-sen, communists associated with the Hwa Chiao Tao Pao, and representatives of the Kuomintang and Chinese Embassy of the 1960's. Because they have difficulty in working through the existing core structure, they are forced to form competing organizations, which, in turn, seek to assume control over aspects of community life at the expense of the authority of the core

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2 See, for example, Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary, pp. 197-98; Hwa Chiao Tao Pao, no. 141, (1 March 1945). The complaint was voiced during interviews in 1964-65 with the Secretary-General of the Filipino Chinese Anti-Communist League, the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy, and the Chief of the Philippine branch of the Central News Agency.
organization. Thus, their activity is conducive of community fragmentation, and their success is often related to the extent to which they can erode the dominance of institutions such as the Chamber of Commerce or Federation.

The two remaining hypotheses on which the interpretation of the overseas Chinese is often based cannot be directly addressed on the basis of evidence provided by this study. The history of the community in the Philippines does suggest that the community has diverted larger financial resources toward China during high tides of nationalistic fervor, but statistical verification of this is extremely difficult. Both the records of organizations which have managed collections during periods of increased nationalism and the amounts individuals in the community have claimed to have donated, are suspect and appear to be designed as much for political reasons as they are to provide an accurate indication of the flow of money from the overseas community to China. The Kuomintang has found, for example, that claims and records which suggest great success in fund raising campaigns often

3 The arrival of new nationalists has, in fact, generally been accompanied by the formation of new organizations within the community. Thus, Hu Nan-min's arrival is tied to the formation of the T'ung Meng Hui; the resurgence of nationalism in the 1930's was accompanied by the formation of organizations such as the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, while the 1954 rise of Kuomintang influence was signaled by the emergence of organizations such as the Filipino Chinese Anti-Communist League.

4 The hypotheses were: "The greater the political orientation on the part of the overseas community toward China, the more the community seeks to use its power for the benefit of China," and, "the more the power of the community is directed to Chinese purposes, the greater danger the community poses to the economic and political integrity of the host nation."
brings Philippine governmental ire, while individuals in the community have discovered that inflated claims of financial contributions to the Chinese government are difficult to check and an easy way to exhibit one's nationalistic credentials. One result is that the records of those collecting such funds often vary considerably from a tabulation based on the claims of donors. If accurate records of the amount of funds which have gone to the purposes of the Chinese government exist, they are hidden beneath layers of propaganda and confusion. The study has not, however, uncovered evidence that tends to negate the hypothesis, and in the absence of such evidence, the hypothesis that identifies Chinese nationalism with benefit to China appears valid.

Neither can the argument that to the extent that the community is directed to Chinese purposes, the economic and political integrity of the host nation is threatened be clearly supported or refuted on the basis of this study. Periods of increased nationalism on the part of the Chinese in the Philippines do not generally correspond to periods when the economic and political integrity of the Philippines was under severe stress. The exception to this pattern is, of course, the post-war period at the height of the Huk movement. Yet, there is little evidence which argues convincingly that the challenge posed by the Huks was related to the nationalism of the Chinese in the Philippines. The Huk movement, according to authoritative analyses,  

was essentially a Philippine based insurgency related tenuously, if at all, to what was happening in the overseas community at the time.

The difficulty in testing the fourth hypothesis is in large measure due to an inability to distinguish cases when the Chinese government actually sought to use the Chinese community in the Philippines to attack the economic or political viability of the Philippines. Malaysia, or perhaps Indonesia, might provide better grounds in this respect, but as far as the Chinese community in the Philippines is concerned, it can only be concluded that no evidence is available which tends to negate the argument that increased nationalism on the part of the overseas Chinese increases the potential of China to affect the host country's political and economic systems.

To briefly review, then, the Philippine-overseas Chinese experience cannot refute either the contention that a political orientation toward China by the overseas community is to China's benefit so far as community resources are concerned, or that Chinese nationalism constitutes at least a potential threat to the economic and political viability of the host nation. It does indicate, however, that the actual relationship between cohesion and nationalism is more complex and perhaps the reverse of what is often assumed. This, in turn, has significant implications both for the conceptual framework most profitable for scholarly investigation of the overseas communities, and for the policies Southeast Asian nations will develop regarding their overseas Chinese residents.
Much scholarly discussion of the overseas Chinese is implicitly based upon an "either-or" proposition and a view of the overseas communities in terms of a basic duality. That is, scholars often appear to assume that either the overseas Chinese will move toward assimilation into the host nation's society or they will become more closely associated with the Chinese political system, whether based on Taiwan, or, as is more often assumed, the mainland. Purcell, for example, ends the second edition of his study of the Chinese throughout Southeast Asia by comparing the factors that could promote the emergence of a Chinese "fifth column" in various nations with factors which could promote assimilation, an approach earlier adopted by Coughlin in his study of the Chinese in Thailand. Much of Skinner's and Fredman's work is devoted to an analysis of the process of assimilation, while Pye and Murray have concerned themselves with the other side of the dichotomy and seek to describe phenomena which could move the overseas Chinese toward closer alignment with Communist China. Many authors thus tend to portray the Chinese in Southeast Asia as located somewhere along a continuum, one end of which disappears in assimilation, the other firmly rooted within the Chinese political system. Movement along this continuum is a result of factors emanating

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5 Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 566-68.


from either end; to the extent that the nations of Southeast Asia adopt policies which promote assimilation, the overseas Chinese move toward that end of the spectrum, but to the extent that China adopts stances or policies which promote Chinese nationalism, the community shifts toward the opposite end.

Such a conceptual framework provides a means of accounting for both assimilation and Chinese nationalism on the part of overseas communities. It would be difficult to argue that assimilation is not tied to such factors as intermarriage, concepts of citizenship, education and economic privilege, all of which are susceptible to manipulation by the host country. And, as this and other studies have indicated, Chinese nationalism is a function of what occurs in China and the activity the government of China undertakes vis-a-vis the overseas Chinese.

What may be a severe limitation in this framework is, however, that the concept assigns no inherent viability to overseas communities and imputes no vitality to structures and phenomena within the communities which may resist both the forces of nationalism and assimilation. The communities are viewed essentially as non-entities which have little affect on their futures, driven almost entirely by exogenous forces, and with virtually no control over either the tides of nationalism emanating from events in China or the pressures for assimilation emerging from the host countries. The interesting fact that many communities have demonstrated neither rapid assimilation into the societies of their Southeast
Asian host nations, nor increasing integration into the Chinese political system is accounted for in terms of a balance between external forces. The concept allows little basis for arguing that it has been the community itself which has led to the immobilism on the continuum.

Yet this study suggests a great deal of vitality on the part of community structures which retard both assimilation and the growth of nationalism, and the view of the community in the Philippines which emerges in the previous chapters differs from that posited or implied by other analyses. Historically, the structure of power within the Philippine overseas community has rested on the ability of individuals to maintain the community's independence from both China and the Philippines. Individuals within the community have profited from the position of the community, and have established organizations which tend to maintain the middle position. Thus, the Chamber of Commerce and Federation have both been instrumental in retarding the assimilation of Chinese into Philippine society by sponsoring schools, newspapers, and a broad spectrum of other activities which maintain a sense of cultural distinction on the part of the overseas residents. But these same institutions have also tended to retard and dilute the success of those who would have the community become a political appendage of China.

The value attached to such institutions appears to have been fairly constant. Submerged for periods of time, organizations which in effect limit both nationalism and assimilation have been an underlying theme in the history of the Philippine community, and, as the three case
studies suggest, the vitalization of this kind of an organization has been prevalent during periods of crisis for the Chinese residents. It may be that the immobility on the continuum posited by other studies is, in fact, a result of balance between forces of assimilation and nationalism. What this study suggests, however, is that this balance is brought about by individuals and organizations within the overseas community by design, and that the immobility is a conscious choice of leaders within the community. The problem of community identification is therefore a three-sided problem. Nationalism and assimilation are obviously two important dimensions in the life of the overseas community, but the central factor appears to be the view of the overseas residents that they are distinct from both the Chinese and Filipinos. Accordingly, it is difficult to associate problems of identification, orientation, activity and loyalty regarding the overseas community with a duality.

The limitation of the conceptual framework employed by several analyses of the overseas Chinese is, then, an inability to come to grips with the probability that overseas communities themselves seek distinction from both the host country and China. Understanding might be better served by beginning with the assumption that the overseas communities are not only alien in terms of the countries in which they reside, but are also something other than Chinese. If such an assumption is made, for example, it becomes easier to account for certain phenomena which seem inconsistent given the conceptual framework that stresses a dual nature of the overseas community.
Conflict within the overseas community is one of these. Many studies of the overseas Chinese recognize that beneath the formal portrayal of solidarity, there often exists a great deal of internal conflict and competition. Within a conceptual framework which ascribes little integrity to the community as a separate entity, however, there are a limited number of explanations which may be used to account for the phenomenon. Conflict can be explained in terms of divisions and antagonism between individuals who seek to move the community toward China (e.g; Kuomintang-Communist antipathy), or, more broadly, in terms of a clash between those in the community who seek to move the overseas residents toward assimilation and those who desire that the community move closer toward China. Yet, these explanations tend to exclude evidence that suggests that a great deal of conflict stems simply from the clash of interests between outsiders and insiders of the community. Neither can the dualistic framework easily account for what seems to sometimes be hypocrisy on the part of community leaders: the formalistic display of great nationalism which does not appear to be backed by financial or other types of support commensurate with what is professed.

If one begins with the assumption that community leaders gain power from the fact that the community is neither assimilated into the host country or fully integrated into the Chinese political system, however, some of these phenomena can be explained. Such an assumption does not deny that conflict which is essentially a reflection of Chinese
politics -- the struggle between reformists and revolutionaries at the turn of the century and the later warfare between Communists and Nationalists -- has occurred within the community, nor does it exclude broad competition between those within the community who seek to move the community toward assimilation or nationalism. It does provide a basis for explaining evidence of conflict which does not fit into either of these two categories, however, and a means of explaining the frustration expressed over being excluded from community decision-making by those within the community who are either strong nationalists or who argue for assimilation. Likewise, what appears to be hypocrisy on the part of community leaders is really nothing of the sort, given the assumption that the community has interests of its own and that power is organized around the principle of independence from both the host country and China. In this framework, the formal display of loyalty toward China accompanied by a reluctance to back ritual with financial or other support is a logically consistent means of maintaining a middle position.

The data which suggest that increased nationalism on the part of the overseas community is a function of community fragmentation rather than cohesion has radically different policy implications than those which emerge from the hypothetical identification of community cohesion with an increased political orientation toward China. If this latter hypothesis is true, then the presence of a strong core structure within the community could be taken as evidence of an increasing ability by
Chinese on the mainland or Taiwan to manipulate the resources of the community to their advantage and, perhaps, to the disadvantage of the host country. One method of meeting this potential threat might therefore be governmental policies designed to break up such core organizations. If, however, the relationship between cohesion and Chinese nationalism in the community is not direct, and in fact, is the reverse of that often assumed, then actions taken to destroy core organizations may have unanticipated results. There is little doubt that strong core organizations retard the assimilation of the community into the host nation's society. Yet, they may also retard the growth of institutions within the community which are expressly designed to integrate the community into the Chinese political system and therefore limit manipulation of the community by Peking or Taibei. Thus, the destruction of the core organization may work to the advantage of institutions such as the Kuomintang or Chinese Communist Party, change Chinese nationalism in the community from a ritualistic obeisance required of Chamber or Federation leaders to an actual guide for action, and, ultimately, increase the possibility that community resources will be used to the detriment of the host nation.
The following entries provide brief biographical sketches of the individuals from whom interview data was derived. Age and position data are dated from the time of the interview. All interviews were conducted during the period 1964-65.

1. Quintin Yuyitang
   Age: 47
   Place of Birth: Shanghai
   Citizenship: Chinese
   Position: Editor and Publisher, The Chinese Commercial News. Yuyitang's father was closely associated with the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce from 1920 until his execution by the Japanese during the occupation. Yuyitang took over the role of chief editor and publisher of the Commercial News in 1945. Since that period, the paper has become an outspoken critic of the Kuomintang in the Philippines, a position which resulted in a 1961 raid on the paper's offices by Philippine and Manila authorities and Yuyitang's detention as a communist suspect. Charges were dropped in 1963. Yuyitang's close association with community affairs for nearly thirty years makes him an ideal informant of high credibility.

2. Go Puan Seng
   Age: 58
   Place of Birth: Amoy, China
   Citizenship: Naturalized Philippine
   Position: Chief Editor and Publisher, The Fookien Times. Go arrived in Manila in 1922 and took a position as a reporter for the Chinese National Tribune and became an editor of the Kong Li Po in 1924. Two years later, he was concurrently an editor and general manager of the Fookien Times and general secretary of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, holding the latter position until 1929. During the War, Go escaped from Manila and lived in the Sierra Madre mountains, returning in 1945 to reestablish the Fookien Times. Under his editorial guidance the post-war Fookien Times has moved increasingly toward a position in support of the Kuomintang and Filipino-Chinese Federation of Chambers of Commerce. The credibility of information derived from Go was rated as medium to high.

3. Tang Tack
   Age: 46
   Place of Birth: Manila
Citizenship: Chinese
Position: General Secretary, Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce. Prior to becoming the General Secretary of the Federation in 1954, Tang was a hotel owner and manager in Zamboanga and had little contact with the Federation's predecessor, the General Chamber, although he was closely associated with Yu Khe-thai. He went to the southern Philippine province in the early 1930's and worked closely with the Kuomintang branch there. These activities led to his placement on the Kempeitai's "most wanted list" during the Japanese occupation, but Tang was able to avoid capture. Following the war, he rose rapidly in the local Chinese Chamber of Commerce. His position as General Secretary of the Federation is strategically important in terms of the activities of that organization, but the actual role he plays is obscure. He appears to have become increasingly more important in Federation decisions since 1960. Information derived from Tang is considered highly credible regarding Federation affairs, but less reliable in areas tangential to these concerns.

4. Yu Khe-thai
Age: 71
Place of Birth: Lyang Syi, Fukien Province, China
Citizenship: Chinese
Position: Honorary President, Federation of Filipino - Chinese Chambers of Commerce. Yu arrived in the Philippines during the first decade of the twentieth century and began work as a clerk in a relative's business establishment. He rose to head one of the largest Chinese conglomerates in the Philippines, Yutivo and Sons, engaging in hardware sales, automobile assembly and backing. Yu became a Kuomintang member in the early 1930's, was a founder of the Chiang kai-shek high school and led several pre-World War II anti-Japanese boycotts. By the late 1930's he headed the control board of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, a prestigious but ineffective position. During World War II he was imprisoned, but released near the end of the occupation after agreeing to join the Japanese-sponsored Chinese Association. He became a target for anti-Kuomintang groups in the Chinese Community following the reconquest of the Philippines by American forces in 1945, but successfully avoided assassination or trial by the "People's Court" and reassumed his position as head of the control board of the General Chamber. In 1954 he led the formation of the Federation, becoming its president until his retirement in the mid-1960's.

5. Koa Chun te
Age: 56
Place of Birth: Fuchow, China
Citizenship: Chinese
Position: Publisher, The Great China Press
Koa came to the Philippines in the early 1930's and has been closely associated with the Kuomintang since that period, heading the party in the Philippines after World War II. His connection with the pre-war Kuomintang led to efforts by the Japanese to capture and execute him during their occupation of the islands, but he successfully avoided
the Kempeitai. During the war he initiated a Guerrilla newspaper, Soul of the Great Hans which was expanded into the Great China Press in the post-war period. Under Koa's control the Great China Press has become the unofficial spokesman for the Kuomintang.

6. David Sycip
   Age: 47
   Place of Birth: Shanghai, China
   Citizenship: Philippine
   Position: General Manager; Northern Motors, President David Sycip & Co. (Investments)

David Sycip is the third generation leader of the Sycip family, a wealthy and powerful Chinese grouping which led the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce from 1920 to 1948. Born October 17, 1917 in Shanghai, David Sycip was educated in Philippine schools and graduated from the University of the Philippines, College of Mechanical Engineering in the late 1930's. He entered Colorado University in 1937 and remained in the United States for the duration of WWII, returning to the Philippines in 1946. He has avoided association with either the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce or Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and identifies himself as a Filipino rather than Chinese.

7. William K.C. Wang
   Age: 34
   Place of Birth: Nanking, China
   Citizenship: Chinese
   Position: First Secretary, Chinese Embassy, Manila.

Wang, a career diplomat, was assigned to the Philippines from Taiwan in the early 1960's. Western educated and fluent in English, his contact with the Chinese community has resulted from his position with the Embassy. He serves as political officer and as such has close contact with the Kuomintang in the Philippines.

8. Cua Liok Po
   Age: 47
   Place of Birth: Nanking, China
   Citizenship: Chinese
   Position: Secretary-General: Filipino Chinese Anti-Communist League

Cua arrived in the Philippines in the late 1950's from Taiwan. A Kuomintang official, he assumed leadership of the Filipino-Chinese Anti-Communist League, from which position he deals on a daily basis with the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and the local branch of the Kuomintang. Cua is an alternate representative of the overseas Chinese residing in the Nationalist Legislative Yuan on Taiwan.
9. Liu Chih-t'ien
   Age: 52
   Place of Birth: Fookien Province, China
   Position: Principal, Chiang Kai-shek High School
Liu arrived in the Philippines shortly before World War II after attending both Chinese and English schools in China. He came to the Philippines as a teacher and Kuomintang Party member. During the Japanese occupation, he avoided capture and was associated with several Kuomintang guerrilla groups in the Philippines. As Principal of the Chiang Kai-shek High School in Manila, Liu is closely connected with the entire Chinese educational system in the Philippines. He acts as a kind of semi-official historian for the Chinese community and has compiled or authored several historical studies of the Chinese in the Philippines.

10. Chuang Ming-yuan
   Age: 51
   Place of Birth: Amoy, China
   Citizenship: Chinese
   Position: Editor, Kong Li Po
Chuang came to the Philippines in 1931 as part of the Kuomintang's effort to revitalize its overseas branches. He began as a reporter with the Kong Li Po. During the war he successfully avoided capture by the Japanese and was associated with the Kuomintang-led Chinese Volunteers. Following the war he assumed editorship of the newspaper. A Kuomintang member, he has developed a profound understanding of the Party's history in the Philippines.

11. Li Yueh
   Age: 43
   Place of Birth: Shanghai (?), China
   Citizenship: Chinese
   Position: Chief, Central News Agency, Philippine Branch.
Li came to the Philippines in the early 1960's on assignment from Taiwan. A Kuomintang member, his position as Chief of the Central News Agency in the Philippines ties him closely to the activity of the Kuomintang in the Philippines. Fluent in English, he sometimes acts as a spokesman for the Chinese community at various academic seminars and debates conducted at Philippine universities.

12. Betty Go Belmonte
   Age: 30
   Place of Birth: Manila
   Citizenship: Philippines
   Position: Managing Editor, Fookien Times Yearbook
Mrs. Belmonte is the daughter of Go Puan Seng, Publisher-Editor of the Fookien Times. Born in 1935, she lived with her father, primarily in the provinces, during the Japanese occupation and thus avoided Japanese internment. Educated at the University of the Philippines in journalism, Mrs. Belmonte assumed overall direction of the English section of the Fookien Times Yearbook in the early 1960's. She married a Filipino in 1963.
13. Antonio Roxas Chua  
   Age: 48  
   Place of Birth: Amoy, China  
   Citizenship: Naturalized Philippine  
   Position: Vice President, Federation of Filipino Chinese Chamber of Commerce  
Chua headed the Chinese Rice Millers Association in 1954 and joined with Yao and Yu in forming the Federation. Since that period he has been a Vice President of the Federation.

14. Francis J. Tatu  
   Age: 34  
   Place of Birth: United States  
   Citizenship: U.S.  
   Position: Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy, Manila  
Tatu, a foreign service officer with the U.S. Department of State, has specialized in overseas Chinese affairs in several Southeast Asian countries following extensive language training on Taiwan. He represents the U.S. Embassy at Chinese community business and social meetings and is closely acquainted with the activity of both the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines and the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

15. Joseph Hwang  
   Age: 44  
   Place of Birth: Amoy, China  
   Citizenship: Chinese  
   Position: Assistant Secretary: Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce  
Hwang oversees English language correspondence conducted by the Federation, a position he has held for the last ten years. As an assistant to the General Secretary, Tang Tack, he has been primarily responsible for liaison between the Federation and non-Chinese groups or individuals.

16. Yao Shiong Shio  
   Age: 58  
   Place of Birth: Fukien Province  
   Citizenship: Naturalized Philippine  
   Position: Vice President, Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce  
Yao, the second generation son of a wealthy Chinese family came to the Philippines in the late 1920's and began development of one of the largest commercial-industrial conglomerates in the Philippines. During the war, he led one of the Kuomintang guerrilla bands, and with Yu Khe Thai founded the Federation in 1954.

17. Remigio Agpalo  
   Age: 34  
   Place of Birth: Mindoro, Philippines  
   Citizenship: Philippine  
   Position: Chairman, Political Science Department, University of the Philippines
Agpalo studied in the United States and is now one of the foremost political scientists in the Philippines. His study of the 1954 Retail Nationalization Act brought him in contact with the Chinese community.

18. Billy C. Chan
   Age: 32
   Place of Birth: Manila
   Citizenship: Chinese
   Position: Special Assistant, to the Publisher, Great China Press

Chau, educated at the University of the Philippines, typifies the younger generation moving into power within the Chinese community. An ardent Chinese Nationalist, his education and fluency in English gains him access to Philippine industrial leaders. In his present position he acts as liaison/buffer between the Chinese publisher of the Great China Press and non-Chinese organizations.

19. D. K. Cheong
   Age: 51
   Place of Birth: Manila
   Citizenship: Naturalized Philippine
   Position: President, China Banking Corporation, Vice-President Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce.

Cheong, the son of Dee. C. Chuan, was educated in the United States where he spent the war years. He returned to the Philippines in 1946 and soon assumed a leadership position in the China Banking Corporation and General Chamber of Commerce. He joined the Federation in 1964, an event which marked a reconciliation between the old General Chamber of Commerce and Federation.

20. Yay Marking
   Age: 47
   Place of Birth: United States
   Citizenship: Naturalized Philippine
   Position: Columnist/Writer

Mrs. Marking is the wife of a Filipino wartime guerrilla leader. During the war she had contact with several Chinese guerrilla groups. Her war record and occupation of journalist-writer gives her access to both Philippine government circles and the Chinese community.

21. James C. Yao
   Age: 31
   Place of Birth: Manila
   Citizenship: Philippine
   Position: Special Assistant, Board of Directors, Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce.

Yao, the third generation representative of a wealthy Chinese family in the Philippines was educated in the United States, receiving an MBA from Indiana University in the early 1960's. Upon his return to the Philippines he began work with the Federation as a business advisor, in which role he has been instrumental in introducing data processing techniques and other western business concepts.
22. Ang Tuan kai  
   Age: 57  
   Place of Birth: Amoy, China  
   Citizenship: Chinese  
   Position: President, Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce.

23. Yang Sepang  
   Age: 56  
   Place of Birth: Amoy, China  
   Citizenship: Chinese  
   Position: Secretary-General, Philippine-Chinese General Chamber of Commerce

24. Rudolfo T. Ganzon  
   Age: 54  
   Place of Birth: Philippines  
   Citizenship: Philippines  
   Position: Senator, Chairman, Senate Committee on Labor and Immigration

25. Jesus E. Perpinan  
   Age: 48  
   Place of Birth: Philippines  
   Citizenship: Philippines  
   Position: Director, Bureau of Private Schools

26. Chan Kim Beng  
   Age: 46  
   Place of Birth: Manila  
   Citizenship: Chinese  
   Position: Executive Board member (Chairman, Industry and Commerce Committee), Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce.

27. Ang Po Eng  
   Age: 58  
   Place of Birth: Amoy, China  
   Citizenship: Chinese  
   Position: Executive Board member (Chairman, Welfare Committee), Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce.  
   Ang arrived in the Philippines at the age of 21 after receiving a grade school education in China.

28. Lao Kang Suy  
   Age: 57  
   Place of Birth: Amoy, China  
   Citizenship: Chinese  
   Position: Executive Board member (Chairman, Economic Affairs Committee), Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce; Member, Kuomintang Administrative Board.
29. Cua Giao  
   Age: 58  
   Place of Birth: Amoy, China  
   Citizenship: Chinese  
   Position: Executive Board (Chairman, Finance Committee), Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce; member, Kuomintang Control Board.

30. Co Sam  
   Age: 47  
   Place of Birth: Manila, Philippines  
   Citizenship: Naturalized Philippine  
   Position: Executive Board member (Chairman, Organization Committee), Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce.
APPENDIX B

AN ACT TO REGULATE THE RETAIL BUSINESS

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

"Section 1. No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no association, partnership, or corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail business: Provided, That a person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, or an association, partnership, or corporation not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, which is actually engaged in the said business on May fifteen, nineteen hundred and fifty-four, shall be entitled to continue to engage therein, unless its license is forfeited in accordance herewith, until his death or voluntary retirement from said business, in the case of a natural person, and for a period of ten years from the date of the approval of this Act or until the expiration of the term of the association or partnership or of the corporate existence of the corporation whichever event comes first, in the case of juridical persons. Failure to renew a license to engage in retail business shall be considered voluntary retirement.

"Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way impair or abridge whatever rights may be granted to citizens and juridical entities of the United States of America under the Executive Agreement signed on July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six between that country and the Republic of the Philippines.

"The license of any person who is not a citizen of the Philippines and of any association, partnership or corporation not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines to engage in retail business, shall be forfeited for any violation of any provision of laws on nationalization, economic control, weights and measures, and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.

"No license shall be issued to any person who is not a citizen of the Philippines and to any association, partnership or corporation not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, actually engaged in the retail business, to establish or open additional stores or branches for retail business.
"Sec. 2. Every person who is not a citizen of the Philippines and every association, partnership or corporation not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, engaged in the retail business, shall, within ninety days after the approval of this Act and within the first fifteen days of January every year thereafter, present for registration with the municipal or city treasurer a verified statement containing the names, addresses, and nationality of the owners, partners or stockholders, the nature of the retail business it is engaged in, the amount of its assets and liabilities, the names of its principal officials, and such other related data as may be required by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry.

"Sec. 3. In case of death of a person who is not a citizen of the Philippines and who is entitled to engage in retail business under the provisions of this Act, his or her heir, administrator or executor is entitled to continue with such retail business only for the purpose of liquidation for a period of not more than six months after such death.

"Sec. 4. As used in this Act, the term 'retail business' shall mean any act, occupation or calling of habitually selling direct to the general public merchandise, commodities or goods for consumption, but shall not include:

"(a) a manufacturer, processor, laborer or worker selling to the general public the products manufactured, processed or produced by him if his capital does not exceed five thousand pesos, or

"(b) a farmer or agriculturist selling the product of his farm.

"Sec. 5. Every license to engage in retail business issued in favor of any citizen of the Philippines or of any association, partnership or corporation wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines shall be conclusive evidence of the ownership by such citizens, association, partnership, or corporation of the business for which the license was issued, except as against the Government or the State.

"Sec. 6. Any violation of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three years and not more than five years and by a fine of not less than three thousand pesos and not more than five thousand pesos. In the case of associations, partnerships or corporations, the penalty shall be imposed upon its partners, president, directors, manager, and other officers responsible for the violation. If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines, he shall be deported immediately after service of sentence. If the offender is a public officer or employee, he shall, in addition to the penalty prescribed herein, be dismissed from the public service, perpetually disenfranchised, and perpetually disqualified from holding any public office."
"Sec. 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved, June 19, 1954".
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