ROUSSEAU'S SOCIO-POLITICAL CONCEPT OF LITERATURE

DISSERTATION

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By

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CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO

ROUSSEAU'S AESTHETIC PRINCIPLES

Rousseau's early essay on literature entitled *Idée de la méthode dans la composition d'un livre* (c.a. 1745) serves as a useful introduction to the author's aesthetic principles. The short essay on rhetorical procedure and style offers the rare opportunity of appraising Rousseau's critical thoughts on literature in a work relatively pure and undistorted by any apparent polemical aim or rhetorical intention to persuade. As a consequence, the Rousseau of *Idée de la méthode dans la composition d'un livre* avoids exaggeration and the appeal to the emotions fundamental to the "art of persuasion". He makes manifest the cool, rational side of his personality in order to probe the inner workings and the psychological ramifications involved in the composition of *un ouvrage de raisonnement*.

Rousseau narrows down the subject of his essay from "... la composition d'un livre", as seen in its title, to that of the specific category of *un ouvrage de raisonnement*.
or philosophic discourse (p. 1242). He feels that this philosophic genre is the one best suited for the study of composition; because, it requires "le plus de méthode et de proportion dans ses parties" (p. 1232).

From his choice of the philosophic genre of un ouvrage de raisonnement or philosophic discourse as the most demanding of all the genres, it is apparent that Rousseau shares the literary orientation of the French Enlightenment which esteems prose over verse and a literature of ideas over one of poetry. Rousseau leaves little doubt as to his early, philosophic orientation when he identifies the aim of un ouvrage de raisonnement as that of à convaincre et à plaire.

The philosophic, polemical quality of Rousseau's chosen genre is reflected by his substitution of the aim of convaincre for the French classical one of instruire. Its classical counterpart, plaire, undergoes a more dramatic change of value in his theory of composition. Rousseau seems to refer to it only out of respect for traditional aesthetics. In practice, the aim of plaire is assimilated by the discourse's prime function of convaincre.

Rousseau's attitude toward style reflects the same eighteenth century predilection of ideas or content and suspicion of poetic refinement. In analyzing the role of style,
Rousseau objects to the literary tradition which measures the worth of the work and the success of its author on the basis of stylistic quality (p. 1242). In order to correct this injustice to philosophic literature, Rousseau assigns style a neutral importance in the evaluation of a work. He contends that style can neither make a book bad nor good:

Cette partie qui renferme aussi le stile, est celle qui décide ordinairement du succès de l'ouvrage et de la réputation de l'Auteur; c'est elle qui constitue, non pas tout à fait un bon ou un mauvais Livre, mais un Livre bien ou mal fait (p. 1242).

Rousseau prefers to judge the value of a work by the moral criterion of bon ou mauvais rather than by the aesthetic ones of bien ou mal fait. His moral-philosophic approach to literature looks upon style as being morally neutral and dependent for its value on the content or ideas of the work.

The merits of the philosophic work, according to Rousseau's moral view of literature, stem not from its pleasing, artistic style but from its clarity of construction, the depth of its reasoning, and the moral orientation of its values in the aim of convaincre. Literary art, for Rousseau, is evaluated largely on the basis of utility. A philosophic work proves its worth by the demonstrated capacity of moving
the reader to a desired moral and intellectual position.

In his first major work, the Discours sur les sciences et les arts (1750), Rousseau enlarges on his concept of l'art utile as incorporated in the moral function which he assigns literature. At one point he touches upon the problem involved in the relationship between style and content. His aesthetic position remains the philosophic one which gives priority to the ideological worth and the moral utility of the work over the aesthetic qualities of style designed to please:

On ne demande plus d'un homme s'il a
de la probité, mais s'il a des talents;
ni d'un Livre s'il est utile, mais s'il
est bien fait.  

Rousseau follows the same eighteenth century philosophic scale of literary values by identifying "l'Esprit juste et une parfaite connaissance de sa matière" as the primary creative faculties needed by the writer in order to produce un ouvrage de raisonnement (p. 1242). In contrast to the classical aesthetics of Boileau which emphasize the noble style of a highly developed poetic skill and invention, as well as reason and bon sens, Rousseau stresses knowledge to the detriment of artistic skill and invention, and the intellect to the default of inspiration.
The emphasis upon the rational capacity rather than upon the poetic faculty is reflected in Rousseau's essay by the marked absence of references to the mysterious, spiritual quality known as genius, poetic inspiration, or "divine fury". In contrast, the classical literary theorist, Boileau, deems its possession and exercise as prerequisite to the creation of literary art. In the opening lines of the Chant Premier in *L'Art poétique* (1674), Boileau exhibits his awe of poetic art and its mysteries:

C'est en vain qu'au Parnasse un téméraire auteur Pense de l'art des vers atteindre la hauteur: S'il ne sent point du ciel l'influence secrète, Si son astre en naissant ne l'a formé poète, Dans son génie étroit il est toujours captif; Pour lui Phébus est sourd, et Pégase est rétif.

In short, Rousseau's scale of aesthetic values lacks the poetic mystery and the harmony of Boileau's classical ideal in which form and matter, under the combined direction of the rational intellect and divine inspiration, join together as equal partners in order to enrich one another and approach the ideal of poetic art.

The contrast between the aesthetic sensitivities of Rousseau and Boileau reflects the movement of eighteenth century away from the high prestige and dominance of classical verse and its poetic ideal toward the age of philosophic
prose. The reorientation of literature from verse to prose genres carries with it far-reaching ramifications. The poetic difficulties of verse referred to by Boileau reserve the main genres of the classical age to the genius endowed with a special, poetic talent given to few men in sufficient quality. The purity of the classical ideal and the prestige of its literature is safeguarded by its poetic difficulty.

With the coming of the eighteenth century and the predominance of the easier prose forms, literature becomes a more accessible activity for the less endowed. The participation of the non-genius in literature results in aesthetic and ethical abuses which Rousseau condemns in his *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750). He regards them as the outcome of literature's decreased difficulty:

... , que penserons nous de cette foule d'Auteurs élémentaires qui ont écarté du Temple des Muses les difficultés qui défendaient son abord, & que la nature y avait répandues comme une épreuve des forces de ceux qui seroient tentés de savoir (p. 157).

Rousseau seeks to mitigate the aesthetic and ethical abuses of philosophic literature by outlining in his essay the proper method of composition and the desirable attitude on the part of the writer towards his work and his public. The first step in the composition of a philosophic work,
according to Rousseau, includes the identification of one's terms (p. 1242). He explains that the first step should not be carried out in the mechanical manner of the mathematician, but presented, as called for, in the exposition of the subject (p. 1243). His view of style seems to remain, however, on the level of the arrangement and amplification of ideas.

Rousseau's emphasis upon ideas and their order becomes more understandable when he redefines the aims of the philosophic work as:

... d'instruire le public de quelque chose qu'il ne savait pas, ... de nouvelles vérités, ou en le désabusant de quelques fausses opinions dont il étoit imbu; ...(p. 1243).

In light of Rousseau's disinterest in the traditional aim of literary art to "please" as well as to "instruct" and his emphasis upon dialectic method in preference to artistic style, it appears that the line between philosophic literature, as Rousseau describes it, and philosophy in the eighteenth century is a tenuous one. Rousseau sees philosophic literature as being designed to deal in polemics and the "art of persuasion". Such a literature aims at effecting a change in the attitudes and, hopefully, in the conduct of the reader.

After discussing the general attributes of un ouvrage de raisonnement and its aims, Rousseau analyzes the best
method of argumentation or dialectic. His method takes the form of the "art of persuasion". Its first steps are designed to demonstrate the qualifications of the author to take a position on his subject and the sincerity of his purpose. The author of a philosophic work, according to Rousseau, must first of all show his grasp of the question under discussion by explaining to the best of his ability the various possible positions on the subject (p. 1243). The objective of this first step is to gain the reader's respect and favorable disposition toward the succeeding argumentation (p. 1243). However, knowledge cannot win alone the confidence of the reader. It must be complemented by a demonstrated sincerity and good faith (p. 1243).

The necessity of appearing to be completely objective and disinterested in Rousseau's method of composition requires a certain quality of illusion, art, or adresse (p. 1243). The author must not only present the arguments of the opposition in their best light in order to win the reader's esteem as a fair and highly qualified writer; he must appear to accord to the opposition much more than he really does in order to put the reader on his side (p. 1243). Winning the confidence of the reader is a prerequisite to the work's aim of à convaincre and à instruire. When the reader is prepared
in this manner, he becomes receptive to the argumentation which when skillfully conducted by the "art of persuasion" so overwhelms the initial concessions that they appear to be the effects of the author's natural moderation and generosity (p. 1243).

In order to create the illusion necessary to the "art of persuasion", style must set ideas into their most striking focus. The best effect of arguments, according to Rousseau, derives not from their number but from the skillful choice of proofs and their arrangement (p. 1243). Since the philosophic work aims at leading the reader from an ideological position founded upon opinions, prejudices, or false reasoning to the author's supposedly enlightened conviction, the philosophe must select the surest and safest method of argumentation.

Rousseau maintains that the argument must be presented in such a manner that the reader does not perceive its structure (p. 1244). Style is assigned the task, therefore, of hiding or disguising the method of composition and the dialectic in order to retain the illusion of complete objectivity, sincerity, and disinterest necessary to the "art of convincing". The strict demands that Rousseau makes on method of composition explain his judgment of un ouvrage de
raisonnement as the most demanding of the genres. Its author-ship necessitates the union of both literary and philosophic skills. The philosophe performs the dual functions of "l'Ecrivain judicieux et l'habile Dialecticien" (p. 1243).

Rousseau's ideas on the role of style are further developed in his explanation of how the contrived or "artistic" nature of the argumentation retains its illusion of simplicity and naturalness. Rousseau makes an analogy between the "art of persuasion" and the classical theatre. After the example of the tragic art, Rousseau advises the writer to open his philosophic work as simply as possible and to advance by degrees in the depth of proofs and the force of reasoning (p. 1244). In order that style through its elevation or embellishment does not distract the reader's attention from the movement of ideas or from the force of the arguments, Rousseau maintains that it must remain constant throughout the presentation (p. 1244).

In addition to the unity of style, Rousseau judges the dramatic quality of the theatre as being necessary to the philosophic work. In order to retain the constant attention of the reader, he advises the writer to establish a dramatic progression of arguments running from the weakest to the most forceful and without intervening periods of
digression(p. 1244). Rousseau fears that any slackening in the pace of presentation will cause a bored and, therefore, an inattentive reader to miss crucial points in the progression of the argumentation before the writer can retrieve his active attention(p. 1244).

Up to this point in his essay, Rousseau has conveyed some of his general attitudes toward philosophic literature, its aims, some of its elementary procedures, and the general rapport between style and content. In the next part of his essay, Rousseau considers in more detail the proper kind of matter for the philosophic work and the appropriate method of composition for the study of different problems.

Rousseau distinguishes, first, between two general categories of subjects—questions Physiques and questions or recherches morales(p. 1244). The distinction corresponds to the two general groups of disciplines referred to as the arts and the sciences. Each of these categories possesses its own problems or objects of study and presents its arguments or proofs in a different manner.

In the first category treated by Rousseau, questions Physiques, the approach of direct observation proves to be the most effective one. Its most valid proofs are found in the physical examination of the object itself. As an example
of a question Physique, Rousseau suggests the problem involved in understanding the nourishing system of a plant. Its solution can be found best by opening up the plant itself (p. 1244). It is not necessary, according to Rousseau, to study the rapports of the plant to its climate, soil, and other plants in order to discover its physical apparatus of nourishment (p. 1244).

The study of an object in its relations to other factors, ones which cannot be directly observed and physically examined, does not yield so readily such certain, but limited answers as in the case of the plant. The complexity of this type of problem carries with it, in Rousseau's opinion, philosophic and moral ramifications characteristic of his second category, questions or recherches morales (p. 1244). Rousseau, as a moraliste and a philosophe, is primarily concerned with the study of the latter category which corresponds to the arts.

The object of recherches morales proves to be "man" both as an individual and in his relations to other men and to society (p. 1245). It is the philosophic opinion of Rousseau that the study of man has been too long neglected by the learned. He asserts his contention in both of his Discours. In his Discours sur les sciences et les arts
(1750), for example, Rousseau identifies the study of man as the most demanding and the most difficult challenge of philosophic literature:

...; et, ce qui est encore plus difficile, rentrer en soi pour y étudier l'homme et connoître sa nature, ses devoirs et sa fin (p. 6).

Again in the Preface to his Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité (1755), Rousseau censures the learned for their neglect of man as the subject of study. In his first line, he states:

La plus utile et la moins avancée de toutes les connaissances humaines me paroît être celle de l'homme, ...\[12\]

Whereas the study of questions Physiques through material analysis yields conclusive and certain but limited answers, Rousseau feels that only through the study of man in recherches morales can the writer hope to attain the comprehensive truth necessary to mankind - the understanding of his nature (p. 1245). In view of Rousseau's preference of a moral rather than a physical study and explanation of man, it is evident that he considers the original truth of man to be present in his moral and social nature rather than in his physical organization.

In his insistence upon recherches morales as the means
of discovering man's comprehensive truth, Rousseau is in reaction against the material determinism of his age which is characterized by the following works either published or in the process of preparation during the period of Rousseau's early works: Diderot's *L'Encyclopédie* (1746-1780), Condillac's *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines* (1746), LaMettrie's *Histoire naturelle de l'âme* (1745) and his best known work, *L'Homme Machine* (1747). 13

Rousseau regards man essentially as a moral, social being whose human nature manifests itself best in his relations to other men and to society. In his opinion, the physical study of man yields only obscure truths while "moral research" provides meaningful ones as he contends enthusiastically in the following description of his proposed method of investigation:

... , j'en tirerois en tâtonnant quelques connaissances obscures et incertaines, ...
... , je me hâterois d'examiner l'homme par ses relations, et c'est de la que je tire­
rois une foule de vérités lumineuses ...
(p. 1245).

In order to discover the truth of man, the writer or philosophe transcends, therefore, the limited knowledge obtained through the physical study of man and its philosophy of materialistic determinism. He launches himself into the broader, more demanding but more rewarding study of man
in his moral and social relations. His study of man takes
the form of a philosophic work which draws its rhetorical
power to convince from the work's moral content and method
of argumentation rather than from stylistic refinement. In
short, Rousseau sees the writer mainly as a moraliste and
as a philosophe rather than as an artist.

Rousseau's reliance on the philosophic work's con­
tent to convey moral purpose rather than upon artistic ex­
pression is explained, in part, by the greater accessibility
of the former in contrast to the "hidden", unobtrusive nature
of stylistic significance. Rousseau reacts more strongly
against the ethical, moral abuses of literature (which are
conveyed mainly through content) rather than against the
aesthetic, stylistic ones which effect human conduct to a
much lesser degree and result, therefore, in a much lesser
evil. Nevertheless, Rousseau realizes the importance of
style and especially its control in the "art of persuasion".
He devotes the remaining third of his essay and about one
half of the total essay to the questions of style and form.

Rousseau defines style or l'art in negative terms.
He observes that it consists of more than just the choice
of proofs and their organization into a logical and effective
order(p. 1245). In un ouvrage de raisonnement, style func­
tions to set the tone appropriate to the subject matter
under consideration in order to reinforce the power of its raisonnements (p. 1245).

Unfortunately, Rousseau does not provide sufficient nomenclatures or literary examples for the different kinds of style which he identifies. There are three of them and they progress from the simple to the complex. For the sake of clarity, I choose to term them "simple art", medium art", and complex art". Rousseau's philosophic orientation, which relegates the value of thought or content over form or style, makes itself apparent in the relationship which he establishes between the progression of style toward complexity and the corresponding level of thought content.

Rousseau associates the progression toward stylistic complexity with the descending power of thought. The more thought relies on style as the source of its power to persuade, the less it approximates the purest form and the fullest force of simple clarity which permits thought to stand on its own merits. Rousseau leads one to this conclusion by his following appraisal of "medium art":

... ; d'autres raisonnements plus composés, plus foibles ou moins sensibles par eux-mêmes ont besoin du secours des images et des comparaisons: ...(p. 1245).

In other words, Rousseau regards style as a possible façade or mask which the writer is tempted to don in order to
disguise the superficial nature of his reasoning rather than accepting the challenge of the philosophic subject by working for greater profundity.

Rousseau's ideal style for the philosophic discourse appears to be that of "simple art". He maintains, for example, that there exists a form of reasoning so simple and solid that the force of its simplicity is undermined by "le moindre ornement" (p. 1245). In contrast, the more complicated type of reasoning and style characteristic of "medium art" lacks both the rhetorical force and the aesthetic sensitivity of "simple art" and requires images and comparisons to bolster the weakness of its arguments (p. 1245).

Rousseau's view on style in his early theoretical essay seems to be committed irrevocably to the French classical point of view which, as Henri Peyre explains, favors simplicity, clarity, symmetry, and order while it abhors ostentation, false dissimulation, and superficiality. Rousseau shows himself, however, to be above the dogmatism of any one absolute aesthetic point of view.

In the spirit of reason and moderation, Rousseau admits the efficacy and the occasional necessity of "complex art". He recognizes, in short, that there exists a type of reasoning which can only realize the nature of its
persuasive force through a highly decorated style. In the following description of his third type of style, "complex art", Rousseau declares his tolerant and enlightened view on artistic form:

... : il en [raisonnements] est qui ne reçoivent un air de justesse et de vivacité qu'à force de fleurs et figures (p. 1245).

By admitting the necessity of "complex art" in certain types of reasoning, Rousseau introduces into his view of literature a restrained form of aesthetic relativism. It replaces the notions of an absolute beauty and form by ones relative to the nature of the particular work's internal principle of organization.

Despite Rousseau's apparently enlightened tolerance in his acceptance of an aesthetic relativism, it is a limited one accompanied by a sense of reluctance and nostalgia for the classical ideal - simplicity of form together with profundity of content. At the same time, Rousseau's essentially negative attitude toward artistic style in general is not determined altogether by the eighteenth century's rationalist rejection of the poetic. His apparent disinterest in stylistic refinement is explained by the nature of the philosophic discourse as previously defined.

Rousseau pays tribute, but a negative one, to the
power of style. He warns the writer as to the dangers of an art which distracts the reader's attention from the line of reasoning through excessive ornamentation. The appropriate relationship between the style of the philosophic discourse and its reader is explained by Rousseau in the following passage:

Partout il faut que l'art travaille mais il doit redoubler ses soin pour se cacher dans les endroits où il est le plus nécessaire. Si le lecteur s'en aperçoit, c'est un avis pour lui de se tenir en garde (p. 1245).

The moral impact of the philosophic work takes precedence over the aesthetic one. Instruction is not to be outshined by stylistic polish.

The ideal composition of un ouvrage de raisonnement, according to Rousseau's literary theory, is one which contains a highly contrived dialectic but which appears clear and natural. Such a method of composition moves by degrees in a progression dramatic enough to retain the reader's attention and artistic enough to veil the sense of movement inherent in dialectic.

The concluding part of the philosophic work is best utilized, according to Rousseau, to propose and answer possible objections to its deductions and to cite examples in their defense (p. 1245). Rousseau warns the writer against
certain deficiencies in method of composition which act as pitfalls to the unwary author. The most important of these has to do with professional ethics and takes the form of conscious misrepresentation of opposing positions and arguments (p. 1246).

Rousseau insists on the principles of honesty and sincerity in the presentation of objections for both moral and aesthetic reasons. He contends that most authors raise only frail objections to their conclusions (p. 1245). They commit the error of subjectivity and bad faith by granting to the objections which they cite the limits of their own disbelief. By setting for themselves only feeble obstacles to overcome, they fail to challenge their minds sufficiently in order to attain the elevated thought of which they may be capable (p. 1246).

Sincerity and honesty comprise Rousseau's primary principles in the correction of the philosophic age's supposed misuse of literature. They restore its moral function and are, at the same time, prerequisite to the philosophic work's rhetorical aim of persuasion. Only by honestly confronting the objections of one's adversaries, can the writer do justice to them and to his own talent. Rousseau's reasoning maintains that the reader can only be convinced
if he has confidence in the author's sincerity and honesty as demonstrated by an objective, intellectual grasp of the whole problem.

In view of Rousseau's emphasis on sincerity, honesty, and a total, philosophic truth, as opposed to a sectarian one, it becomes evident that he places as high a value, if not higher, on literary ethics than on aesthetics. Rousseau's temperament seems to have oriented him to his eventual choice of a moral-philosophic approach to literary criticism.

In a poem written before his essay on composition, *Epitre à M. Bordes* (1742), Rousseau confesses his particular temperament and defends its effects:

Mon coeur sincère et franc abhorre la satire, Trop découvert peut-être et jamais criminel, Je dis la vérité sans l'abreuver de fiel.16

Rousseau elevates sincerity to the position of being his guiding philosophic and aesthetic principle. In view of his acute moral and emotional sensitivity, his uncompromising quest of truth, and his allegiance to the principle of sincerity, it becomes apparent already in his early works that Rousseau is destined by his temperament to clash with an age characterized by "politesse", dissimulation, bitter criticism, and partisan spirit.

Rousseau demands for himself and the writer in general,
as seen in the above quote, philosophic freedom from the social conventions of politesse and partisanship. He sees the writer as a dynamic force in society who cannot allow social allegiances to abridge his search and revelation of the truth of man. Rather than devoting himself to the cultivation of an artistic beauty vaguely related to the problems of man, Rousseau expects the writer to commit himself to their study and solution.

Rousseau charges the writer with the moral obligation of conducting his literary occupation under the same ethical principles as his daily conduct. An early fragment which predates his essay on the method of composition, Sur l'éloquence (1735), exemplifies Rousseau's insistence on the moral correlation between the writer's life and his works. Its thesis maintains that: "Telle a été la vie d'un homme tels ont été ses discours".17

Rousseau extends the rapport between the writer's life and his work in Sur l'éloquence to the condition of rhetoric and the moral life of the nation. His extended analogy illustrates the stoic nature of Rousseau's moral aesthetics in its stress on discipline and its condemnation of effeminate degeneration. His judgment as to the rapport between morality and letters is pronounced with the power
of belief as witnessed by his own words:

Si la discipline d'un état s'énerve et dégénère en délices, c'est un argument pour croire que l'éloquence contractera bientôt ce goût mol et effeminé; ...(p. 1241).

Acting in the humanist spirit of Montaigne's essay, De l'expérience (1588), Rousseau insists upon the fundamental unity of man. Thought and conduct or mind and body do not form separate abstract entities, in his opinion, but are interwoven aspects of the total being. Rousseau affirms his total acceptance of man in the following aphoristic declaration from Sur l'éloquence: "L'esprit ne peut pas être teint différemment que le cœur" (p. 1241).

Just as Rousseau insists on the unity of man's being, he refuses to divide human, creative activity into the separate and divorced categories of aesthetics and ethics. Instead, he binds them together in his moral-philosophic approach to literature in order to study the whole of human nature and not just the artistic faculty or talent in isolation from the total human condition. In short, Rousseau seeks general, philosophic truths in his study of man rather than abstract and specialized ones as obtained from the method employed in questions Physiques.

After clarifying the proper method of proposing and answering objections in the conclusion through the explanation
of his principles of honesty and sincerity, Rousseau proceeds in his discussion of the philosophic work's conclusion. Prior to his digression on literary ethics, Rousseau defined the conclusion as that part of the work in which the writer answers foreseen objections and cites examples. He does not pretend, however, to consecrate his definition as an universal rule.

Rousseau points out quickly, to the contrary, that his view on the function of the conclusion relates most validly to the work which passes swiftly and simply from one point to another along its line of reasoning (p. 1246). The latter description constitutes, no doubt, "simple art", Rousseau's ideal style and method of composition in the philosophic discourse or l'ouvrage de raisonnement.

Rousseau declines to consider his definition of the conclusion as an absolute principle in the composition of the philosophic work in order to accommodate into his aesthetic system the previously recognized, deviating form of style and composition characteristic of "complex art". Rousseau demonstrates again his aesthetic tolerance of "complex art" by acknowledging its absence of any unified conclusion as being consistent with the internal principle of a dispersed line of reasoning. In other words, Rousseau
accepts the necessity of "complex art" to mix conclusions and examples together with the proofs in the body of the work (p. 1246).

Even though Rousseau judges the "complex" manner of composition as a valid one, he questions the appropriateness of its application to philosophic works of reasoning. Since style and form are to render philosophic ideas more accessible through clarity and order, Rousseau sees only disadvantage in adapting philosophic material to "complex" form. He warns, in fact, that such a complex mixture runs the possibility of rendering "un Livre froid et long par cette méthode" (p. 1247).

Rousseau's reiterated preference of "simple art" over "complex art", this time in connection with the philosophic work's conclusion, illustrates the orientation of his aesthetics toward the classical ideal of progression, unity, and clarity. The tendency makes itself even more apparent if one reviews the form which he confers to his ideally composed work.

Rousseau advises, for example, that the philosophic work begin with an introduction which clearly identifies the philosophic problem or "moral question" and defines the terms to be used. The second part presents the secondary
and the primary proofs in that order. The third of final part of the work concludes by answering objections and citing examples. In view of his ideally structured composition, it immediately becomes apparent that Rousseau is thinking in the rhetorical terms of the work's division into a beginning, a middle, and an end.

Rousseau confirms the judgment of his aesthetics as being classically oriented in his return to the analogy with the classical theatre. Previously, Rousseau used the analogy between tragedy and the philosophic work in order to bear on the necessity of a dramatic progression in the argumentation. The dramatic technique, as applied to the philosophic work by Rousseau, is designed to sustain the interest of the reader in the author's line of reasoning.

Now, in the case of the philosophic work's conclusion, Rousseau contends that it must function as the tragic dénouement by terminating the work with the full force of persuasion in a swift self-fulfillment of its logic (p. 1247). The mistake that the writer must avoid, according to Rousseau, is that of prolonging the conclusion which will deprive it of dramatic force (p. 1247).

In the composition of the philosophic work's conclusion, Rousseau supports the French classical ideal of
conciseness and condensation which does not attempt to explain everything. Rousseau implies that a good conclusion to the philosophic work makes the reader think. If the author progresses in his argument by degree and with conviction, Rousseau feels that he can expect the reader to induce certain inferred meanings without a detailed explanation for the sake of a rapid, dramatic closing to the work (p. 1247).

Regardless, then, of Rousseau's aesthetic tolerance toward "complex art" with its rich imagery and mixing of conclusions with proofs in the body of the composition, his dominant aesthetic attitudes are inclined toward the classical point of view. In fact, Rousseau defends the traditional, classical nature of his views on composition by refusing to accept any credit for their originality. In connection with the composition of the conclusion, he states the following:

Je ne m'arrête point là-dessus, je ne dirois que les choses connues de tout le monde (p. 1247).

No matter how adamently Rousseau professes to continue the traditional, classical aesthetic view toward composition, the critic cannot, however, completely accept his self-judgment, Rousseau, as a man and as a writer, is too much an engaged force of his own age in order to evaluate objectively
his relation to traditional French aesthetics. In truth, Rousseau's classicism does not attain the ideal of a just balance between form and content.

Due to his philosophic orientation, Rousseau tends to equate profoundness of ideas and knowledge with feeling or sensibilité(p. 1245). Simple and clear ideas are associated in his scale of aesthetic values with a kind of pure energy or philosophic force which obviates the need of artistic stylization in the aim of moving the reader to a desired intellectual position.

In fact, "l'art" tends to be interpreted by Rousseau, in his early essay on method of composition, as a kind of decoration or disguise required only to compensate for depth of thought as seen in his rejection of "medium art"(p. 1245). At this early point in his career, Rousseau does not succeed, therefore, in associating complexity and profundity, both in form and content, when the work is a philosophic one.

Rousseau's adapting of the classical aesthetic principles of proportion, progression, clarity, and conciseness to the philosophic literature of his own age results in certain modifications. At the beginning of his essay, Rousseau professes to embrace the classical aims of plaire and instruire(p. 1242). In the course of his discussion, however, he
neglects to mention the specific aim of *plaire* again. Rousseau
dismisses its importance to the philosophic discourse in pre-
ference of the exclusively rhetorical ones of *instruire* and
*convaincre* (p. 1243).

Rousseau's preoccupation with the classical aim of
*instruire* and his neglect of its counterpart, *plaire*, move
in direct opposition to the relationships established by
the French classicists between the poet, his audience, and
the work of art. Professor Davidson explains, for example,
that despite the different ways in which Corneille, Racine,
and Moliere conceive of their audiences, each of the drama-
tists regards his primary duty (at least initially) as that
of "pleasing".  

In short, Rousseau disrupts the balance between the
classical aesthetic aims of *plaire* and *instruire*. He ex-
plotts the philosophic potential of *instruire* and transforms
it into the polemical aim of *convaincre* while dismissing the
classical artistic aim of *plaire*. His proposed application
of the dramatic techniques of progression and *dénouement*
to the philosophic discourse cannot hope, therefore, to pro-
duce the same elevating effects of the French classical
theatre. In fact, Rousseau does not aim at a moral elevation
of the reader through aesthetic means.
The dramatic mechanism of the philosophic work functions primarily on the basis of the reader's intellectual respect for the author's grasp of the philosophic problem or question and his confidence in the author's sincerity and honesty of purpose. Unlike the tragic mechanism, that of the philosophic discourse is not powered by the energy derived from tragic emotions. To appeal to the reader's fears rather than to his rational intellect would open the door, in view of Rousseau's stress on literary ethics, to the charge of unprofessional procedure.

Of all the classical aesthetic principles, Rousseau shows the most concern for that of vraisemblance (even though he does not refer to it by name). According to Rousseau, the author becomes the principle actor of his philosophic discourse. He assumes the role of an objective, well-intentioned "homme-de-bien" in order to gain the confidence of his audience (Premier Discours, p. 98).

In other words, the "art of persuasion" requires a dramatic illusion similar to the "natural" one of style in its disguise of the dialectical movement (p. 1244). The author functions as an actor by adhering to a consistent self-portrayal or characterization as the representative of objectivity and fairness. It is to be noted, nevertheless,
that the writer's assigned dramatic role does not necessarily conflict with Rousseau's insistence on the moral aesthetic principles of honesty and sincerity.

The writer performs validly by commanding a thorough knowledge of opposing arguments and by making certain concessions at the beginning of the work. He accepts the challenge of probable objections in his conclusion by proposing them justly and he surmounts them by the force of his proofs and examples. At the same time, the writer never loses sight of his philosophic goal of persuasion, a change of attitude on the part of the reader. To this end, the writer, as a professional actor, curbs his excessive emotion; follows his plan; does not fall victim to his own dramatic illusion through irrational and ineffective digressions.

Style and language are utilized by the author, according to Rousseau, in order to reinforce the *vraisemblance* of his dramatic role. Style disposes the reader favorably to the reception of arguments by concealing the mechanical structure of the dialectic. In a similar manner, language supports the author's assigned characterization through its sincere and honest simplicity. It avoids the classical tendency toward a gallant, aristocratic preciousness. Rousseau's writer aims not at demonstrating his nobility but
at securing the intimate confidence of the reader. To this end, he avoids pretentious erudition which would tend to erect a cultural barrier between him and his reader.

Because he desires to gain the reader's confidence rather than his awe, the writer of a philosophic work avoids the classical, aristocratic, socio-aesthetic conventions of bienséance and politesse. They form, as W. G. Moore explains in *French Classical Literature*, the common socio-aesthetic attitude of the French classicists (p. 163). In place of the artificial and pretentious, classical socio-aesthetic conventions, Rousseau substitutes the natural ones of force, virility, and individuality.

In fact, Rousseau goes so far as to condemn in *Sur l'éloquence* (1735) the aristocratic or noble style for its lack of virility and power to persuade. In reaction against the preciousness of the noble style, Rousseau leans toward the greater liberties of the romantic aesthetic by advocating greater freedom of language and style.

Despite his previous insistence upon morality, Rousseau sees an immodest or strong language as being more effective and less offensive philosophically than the refined préciosité of an empty, noble style. He states his preference of a natural, forceful language in the following observation
taken from *Sur l'éloquence*:

Et ce n'est pas un si grand défaut dans les discours d'employer des paroles puériles ou mauvaises, et plus libres que la modestie ne le permet, que de se servir d'un stile trop fleuri et trop doux si d'ailleurs il ne signifie rien et ne peut produire aucun effet que le son même des paroles (p. 1241).

Rousseau's proposed qualities of style such as force, virility, and naturalness derive logically from his philosophic aims of *convaincre* and *instruire* rather than from the classical one of *plaire*.

Rousseau's emphasis on the natural qualities of sincerity and honesty runs contrary to the French classical insistence on the necessity of a moderate degree of social and artistic dissimulation. The seventeenth century *moraliste*, LaRochefoucauld castigates, for example, hypocrisy and deception in his *maximes* on love, friendship, and virtue. But at the same time, he realizes that sincerity must be toned down by a conscious and moderate dissimulation in order that men can live peacefully together in society.  

The personal manner in which Rousseau conceives of his work differs, also, from that of the classicists. He maintains, for example, that the author must be present in his work in order to establish the impression of being a well-intentioned "homme-de-bien". The emphasis upon the writer as
a man and an individual both in his work and in society contradicts the classical attitude of the writer toward his work which is termed by W. G. Moore in his *French Classical Literature* as "self-effacement" (p. 164).

In addition to his non-classical or nascent romantic attitude which stresses the rapport between the writer, the work, and social conduct (as in accordance with the moral aesthetic principles of sincerity and honesty), Rousseau broadens the eighteenth century concept of rapport or relativism by endowing it with aesthetic significance.²² By preferring an aesthetics of relative values, as seen in his recognition of "complex art" as a valid form of art, over the classical belief in the existence of an absolute beauty of form, Rousseau prefigures the liberal aesthetics of Romanticism.

In view of the relatively unknown nature of Rousseau's essay, *Idée de la méthode dans la composition d'un livre*, and its somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the principle of aesthetic relativism (he accepts "complex art" in theory but advises against its use in philosophic literature), we do not intend to exaggerate the importance of his essay's concept of aesthetic relativism in the history of French Literature. Rousseau does not develop his ideas in a depth adequate enough
to permit his essay to be regarded as a literary milestone.

The general importance of Rousseau's essay and, in particular, its introduction of the principle of aesthetic relativism remains mainly within the scope of Rousseau's own works; for, it provides an insight into the direction of his aesthetics. They retain, as previously explained, the classical ideal of composition while reworking its rhetorical aims.

On the one hand, Rousseau's literary objectives become more specific and narrowed in their preoccupation with philosophic problems and dialectical method. Their stress on "l'art utile" neglects the functions of art to "please" and elevate through poetic beauty. On the other hand, Rousseau's aims expand the role of literature through the demands of his moral position. His application of the moral-philosophic principles of sincerity and honesty in the evaluation of literature requires the writer to achieve an added moral and social effect. His work is expected to help man understand his real nature rather than its prescribed social and conventional forms.

In short, Rousseau succeeds in expanding the classical conception of art in his essay, but fails to exploit the possibilities of his intuition into the principle of aesthetic relativism. He perpetuates the classical suspicion of
"complex art" (although he accepts its validity in theory). Rousseau favors the classical ideal of composition as defined by the qualities of clarity, simplicity, condenseness, proportion, and progression. At the same time, he negates the classical socio-aesthetic conventions of politesse, bienséance, goût, and préciosité.

The significance of Rousseau's essay goes beyond this chapter's use of it as a concrete medium or means of situating Rousseau in the history of French aesthetics. *Idée de la-méthode...* contributes its own original insight into Rousseau's discursive works for its answers two of the main criticisms of his detractors. Traditional criticism attacks the literary and philosophic validity of Rousseau's argumentation and conclusions, as in the case of his two *Discours*, by denouncing his logic as inconsistent and illogical.

Such critics as M. A. Espinas and Jules Lemaitre attempt to dismiss Rousseau's literary and, especially, his philosophic significance by presenting him as a completely irrational, romantic writer. They contend, for example, that Rousseau fails to exercise the traditional French control over his composition and its line of argumentation. In short, they deny the philosophic and literary unity of Rousseau's work.
M. A. Espinas portrays Rousseau, for example, in his article facetiously entitled "Le Systeme de J.-J. Rousseau" as being emotionally incapable and intellectually unsuited for the composition of a clear, logically unified, philosophic work. His attack on Rousseau's method of composition centers in one instance on the *Premier Discours* and takes the following antagonistic form:

On sait comment Rousseau composait. Il ne commençait pas par l'analyse et la discussion des idées pour aboutir à un plan abstrait. Il débutait par un accès d'enthousiasme; ensuite il avait, la plus grande peine à débrouiller les concepts vagues qui se dégageaient du tumulte de ses émotions.24

In answer to the criticism of Rousseau's supposed absense of rationality and lack of philosophic and literary unit of composition, as typified by M. A. Espinas' article, this introductory chapter disproves conclusively such contentions through the analysis of Rousseau's theoretical essay, *Idée de la méthode* ... . His essay on method of composition demonstrates his highly rational, acute literary awareness of the art of composition which is already well developed early in his literary career.

The analysis of Rousseau's essay disproves equally well a second traditional criticism which is associated with the charge of disunity in composition. The critic, Jules
Lemaitre, judges Rousseau as a Swiss and a self-educated man. He maintains that Rousseau stands outside the traditional French culture because of his Swiss origins and his non-traditional education. According to Lemaitre's reasoning, Rousseau lacks, therefore, the customary French training and grasp of composition.²⁵

To the contrary, the study of Rousseau's essay verifies the undeniably traditional nature of his proposed method of composition. His description of the proper procedure of argumentation follows traditional, classic rules of rhetoric. He thinks of the discourse, for example, in the terms of a beginning, a middle, and an end. Each of these steps in argumentation performs its own task and combines with the others to form a progression of reasoning.

The extent to which Rousseau thinks within the context of traditional, French classical literature is evidenced by his analogies with the classical theatre.²⁶ They emphasize unity of style, vraisemblance of presentation, and dramatic progression. Similarly, Rousseau's choice of subject matter for the discourse conforms to the humanist tradition of French literature. Rousseau selects questions morales or the nature of man as the subject of his study.

Despite his ties with the traditions of French
literature, the early works studied in this chapter show that Rousseau maintains an ample degree of intellectual independence. It is due, in large part, to his temperament rather than to his type of education. Rousseau analyzes, for example, the relationship between form and matter in the philosophic discourse and succeeds in surmounting, at least in theory, his own classical bias and that of his age (a feat of which M.A. Espinas and Jules Lemaitre prove themselves to be incapable) by gaining an insight into the principle of aesthetic relativism.

Rousseau keeps a tight hold, however, on the independent aspects of his personality in his essay. He considers in his theoretical analysis of the discourse every one of its traditional aspects of composition: dialectical form and progression of argument, the function of each part of the work, three main types of style, the role of the writer, the psychology of the reader, standards of aesthetic and ethical procedure, and the desired effect of the work.

In particular, Rousseau emphasizes the necessity of unity in argumentation and composition. To this end, he urges the application of the dramatic progression and dénouement techniques of the classical theatre. In order to convince and persuade the reader, Rousseau insists upon
dramatic conciseness as opposed to lengthy erudition and he condemns digressions as detrimental to the progressive line of argumentation.

In view of Rousseau's demonstrated rational comprehension and his acute sensitivity to the problems of composition, it cannot be validly maintained by his critics that Rousseau's temperament and supposed lack of logic blind him to the problems of discursive procedure. Rousseau's awareness of method of composition does not necessarily mean, however, that he applies his theory in practice.

The criticism of disunity of composition and inconsistency of argumentation remains, therefore, a serious challenge to the significance of Rousseau's discursive principles as well as to his socio-political ones. The problem receives continued consideration in the next chapters. It is treated, however, in relation to the dissertation's primary subject, Rousseau's moral-philosophic view of literature.

In the course of his essay, Rousseau examines the philosophic discourse from a variety of viewpoints. Some of his judgments, such as that on "complex art" remain in a state of transition. However, his general attitudes toward literature and society have taken form already. The following topics are introduced or implied by his early "idea of
composition" the role of the writer in society, that of art in the moral life of the nation, the aims of the work of art, the abuse of art, the nature of the "art of persuasion", the relation of art to society's institutions, and the irrelevance of French Classicism's socio-aesthetic principles. Rousseau's answer to these aesthetic questions of great socio-political import are presented, first, in his *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750).
Footnotes

1The essay was written by Rousseau while serving as secretary to Mme Dupin. It was published for the first time in Le Porte-feuille de Mme Dupin, dame de Chenonceaux, Lettres et écrits de J.-J. Rousseau, publiés par le Comte de Villeneuve-Guibert (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1884). The manuscript of the essay is found in the Harvard Library.

2Rousseau avoids controversy in his essay by keeping his analysis of composition on the theoretical plane. He avoids making specific references or citing particular literary examples.


   Note: all future references to this text will be indicated simply by a parenthesis and page number.


7Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, ed. by George Havens (New York: The Modern Language Assoc., 1946), 149.

8It can be argued that Boileau's aesthetic principles apply only to the verse genres. However, René Bray explains in his La Formation de la Doctrine Classique en France (Paris: Librairie Nizet, 1951) that French classical prose does not function in a literary vacuum. He sees the prose genres as being assimilated into the same system of classical aesthetics as the verse genres (p. 349). See footnote 18.
Footnotes (cont'd.)


17 Rousseau, op. cit., p. 1241.

18 Two minor French classical prose genres and one minor poetic genre, as exemplified by La Rochefoucauld's Maximes (1665), Pascal's Pensées (1670), and La Fontaine's Fables (1668), all apply the dramatic technique of dénouement. Their concise, condensed conclusions are designed to open up a vista of unspoken meanings. It is interesting to note that none of the above minor genres is ruled upon by Boileau in his L'Art poétique (1674).

Footnotes (Cont'd.)


21 See the chapter on "Art de Conversation" in LaRoche-foucauld's Maximes (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1913) where he speaks of "devoirs de la politesse" and the social limits on reason (p. 116).

22 The concept of relativity is fundamental to the philosophic literature of the Enlightenment. Montesquieu exploits its possibilities in his De l'esprit des lois (1748) in order to negate the dogmatic political and religious propositions which claim to be universally true.

23 The theory of aesthetic relativity does not receive its developed form until perfected by Mme de Staël in her De la litterature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales (1800).


26 Rousseau insists upon the strict adherence to the classical technique of dénouement. He criticizes "les Anciens Dramatiques", most of the plays of Terence, and "plusieurs livres modernes" for their prolonging of the work' conclusion (p. 1247).

27 See the quotation from Epitre à M. Bordes, p. 18.
CHAPTER II

THE COLLABORATION OF ART WITH GOVERNMENT

Rousseau's Discours sur les sciences et les arts wins the first prize awarded by the Academy of Dijon in 1750. In his answer to the question - "Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à é purer ou à corrompre les Moeurs" - Rousseau launches himself into a controversial literary career while founding a system of thought that synthesizes his philosophic and moral principles together with his attitudes toward literature.  

The significance of the Premier Discours in Rousseau's philosophic development is explained accurately and vividly by the literary and art critic Erna Schiefenbusch. She judges Rousseau's first major work as performing an early synthesis of his enduring Weltanschaung as evidenced by her following description of it:

Le Discours ... inaugure de façon remarquable et profonde l'oeuvre de Rousseau. C'est avec cet essai que commence la véritable carrière de l'écrivain. Le Discours, qui comporte à peine 70 pages, est le programme d'une conception neuve du monde; il fonde et indique un esprit nouveau; il est comme
In his Premier Discours, Rousseau asserts his non-conformity, individuality, and latent philosophic disposition by mounting a full-scale attack against traditional French aesthetics and social values in a thesis contrary to the principle of progress, the cornerstone of the "encyclopedic party". He questions the human value and the moral effects of the arts and the sciences (but mostly the letters as represented by his repeated attacks on the philosophes). His philosophic position clashes with an age that invests the intellectual and financial resources of its leading scholars and citizens in the endeavor to produce a monumental work, the first of its scope, L'Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1746-1780).

In the history of literary criticism devoted to the study of the Premier Discours, it has been a conventional practice to look for and denounce the work's supposed contradictions. Traditional criticism tends to dismiss the argumentation of the Premier Discours as the work of "un sentimentaliste, doué d'une imagination riche et ardente le précurseur des tempêtes romantiques." Rousseau scholars have tended, therefore, to concentrate on the external factors
of circumstance, influence, and intention in their study of Rousseau's first major work.

There are three such problems which form the main body of traditional criticism on the Premier Discours. They are: the originality of Rousseau's paradox, the intention of the Academy of Dijon in proposing the question, and the sincerity of Rousseau in his answer. None of these questions is relevant to the textual method used in this dissertation. But they serve to illustrate the often irrelevant or prejudicial nature that characterizes much of traditional Rousseau criticism.

The first problem is necessitated by the fact that Rousseau discovers the so-called core of his system and the Premier Discours, "la prosopée de Fabricius", while enroute to visit his good friend, Diderot, who was imprisoned at Vincennes in 1749 for the publication of Lettre sur les aveugles (1749). The findings of traditional criticism as to the extent of Diderot's influence on the composition of the Premier Discours are summarized by Albert Schinz.

The problem of circumstances of composition in the Premier Discours is followed in importance by a question of intention. Did the Academy of Dijon act as a conscious revolutionary agent by proposing its controversial question and
by granting the first prize to Rousseau?

Traditional criticism, as represented by Jules Lemaître and Albert Schinz, discounts the apparently audacious nature of the Academy's actions. Jules Lemaître attributes its question and choice of Rousseau as the winner to incompetence and imprudence rather than to daring. In like manner, Albert Schinz underestimates the initiative of the Academy. He sees its question as a standard, academic exercise intended to praise the Renaissance and the new Age of Enlightenment.

The contrary point of view shows itself to be characteristic of less prejudicial traditional criticism and of contemporary criticism in general. Erna Schiefenbusch contends, for example, that the Academy acted out of moral purpose in proposing its question and did not seek the confirmation of the century's values which include those of the Liaisons Dangereuses (p. 2). Her evaluation of the Academy's actions improves on Albert Schinz's judgment by making the following distinction between the intent of the question and its interpretation by contemporaries:

En proposant son sujet l'Académie partait d'un sentiment justement sérieux et moral. Mais les événements montrent que l'on interpréta en général comme une occasion d'entonner un hymne plus ou moins enthousiaste en faveur de l'art et de la science: ... (p. 3).
The contemporary critic, George Havens, moves even farther toward the judgment of the Academy as a conscious, moral and intellectual force. He makes the following logical deduction based upon the wording of the Academy's question:

En approuvant la question, il est évident que l'Académie admettait d'avance la possibilité d'une réponse négative. Autrement, aucune discussion n'eût été possible.10

The best answer to the question of the Academy's intentions is probably that of Rousseau. In his Lettre à Stanislas (1751), he illustrates the moral consciousness of the Academy of Dijon by contrasting it to L'Académie française. The latter demonstrates its conservatism by proposing a thesis rather than a question—"L'Amour des Lettres inspire l'amour de la vertu".11 The wording of this subject of discourse supposes a conclusion, as Rousseau observes, and leaves no room for individual judgment (p. 38).

In contrast to the judgment of traditional criticism as represented by Jules Lemaître and Albert Schinz, I believe that the audacity of Rousseau's Premier Discours is matched by that of the Dijon Academy. Because Rousseau's thesis involves criticism not only of socio-aesthetic conventions but political ones as well, the members of the Dijon Academy, as well as Rousseau, accepted the risk of being
censored, imprisoned, or exiled. The eighteenth century had already seen Diderot imprisoned and Voltaire both jailed and exiled. 12

The deficiency of traditional criticism's explanation of the Dijon Academy's intentions in connection with the Premier Discours is made apparent by its explanation of the Academy's actions five year's later. In 1754, the supposedly incompetent and/or socially unconscious Dijon Academy poses the following question which opens to public debate the very foundation of eighteenth century French society: "Quelle est l'origine de l'inégalité parm les hommes? Et si elle est autorisée par la loi naturelle?" 13

Previously, in the case of the Premier Discours, Jules Lemaître charges the Dijon Academy with incompetency and naïveté. He pictures them as the simple victims of Rousseau's fervent rhetoric (p. 87). Now, in his explanation of the Academy's intentions in proposing the question on inequality, M. Lemaître portrays Rousseau as the victim of the Academy's audacity.

He feels that the Academy, drunk with pride and publicity, poses deliberately the question on inequality in order to constrain Rousseau into composing the most revolutionary of his works (p. 104). The Academy seals his fate
as the prisoner of his philosophic system (p. 104). It is apparent that M. Lemaitre's criticism suffers from excessive reliance on the too simple criteria of victim and victimizer.

The third problem involved in the study of the Premier Discours involves, also, the question of intention. It questions the sincerity of Rousseau, himself a writer, in his anti-cultural thesis. It is an evident question which Rousseau answers in the polemics following the publication of the Premier Discours. Because the question is examined in the concluding analysis of Rousseau's "art of persuasion", it suffices to point out, at this time, that D'Alembert esteems Rousseau's thesis highly enough to feel obliged to answer it at length in his Discours Préliminaire - the philosophic introduction to the age's greatest cultural endeavor, L'Encyclopédie.

In review of the trends of traditional criticism on the Premier Discours, it is evident that the study of the questions involving circumstances of composition, intention, and motive do not lend themselves to conclusive, demonstrable answers. Regardless of the light which they shed on the work, such external evidence does not serve as a substitute for the explanation of the text—the primary document.

It is my contention that critics have approached the
Premier Discours too often with the premise of its lack of logic and contradictions. They make the mistake of placing unquestioning faith in Rousseau's personal judgment of his Premier Discours made years later in the apologetic work, Les Confessions (1789). Consequently, they fail to respect the distinction of genre and relative value by comparing the Premier Discours (1750) to other of his works such as Le Contrat Social (1762). In short, critics neglect to judge the Premier Discours within the context of the "art of persuasion" and its aims.

In addition to explaining the attitudes of Rousseau towards literature in this chapter, my secondary objective will be to demonstrate the rational rapport that there exists between form and matter in the Premier Discours. I will attempt to explain its supposedly irrational images and argumentation in order to make apparent the consistency of his ideas on literature within the framework of his chosen genre--the philosophic discourse.

The Discours sur les sciences et les arts (1750) presents interesting contrasts and developments from his essay, Idée de la méthode ...(c.a. 1745). He moves from the theoretical analysis of the philosophic discourse to its practice. The differences between the two works result from the demands
of genre. His expanded problem in the **Premier Discours** requires greater length and greater variety of tone. Its seventy pages and rhetorical concision are hard pressed, nevertheless, to develop a multitude of social, aesthetic, moral and political problems which together compose a whole view of the world and Rousseau's early, but basic system.

In the course of his argumentation, Rousseau transcends, when necessary, the classical restraint and moderation of his essay in favor of the force of conviction and persuasion. His aims remain those of *instruire* and *convaincre*. Commenting on the general importance of the **Premier Discours** to Rousseau's thought and, in particular, the power of his rhetoric, A. E. Carter observes the following:

Not until 1750, in Rousseau's famous **Discours de Dijon**, were civilized values seriously challenged. ... He repeated the argument in later books (**Emile**, the **Lettre à D'Alembert**, **La Nouvelle Héloïse**), and drove it home with an ardent dialectic which bears no resemblance to Montesquieu's cool generalizations.19

The **Préface** and the **Première Partie** of the **Discours** illustrate especially well Rousseau's rational application of the rhetorical principles of argumentation as explained in his essay on method of composition. They include the following steps: the identification of problems, definition
of terms to be used, initial concessions to win the confidence of the reader, etc. In the Seconde Partie of the Discours, Rousseau's progression of argumentation becomes less apparent and more artistic. It will be discussed in the next chapter in connection with Rousseau's proposals and conclusion.

In the first sentence of the Préface, Rousseau defines the problem to be treated in the following negative manner:

Il ne s'agit point dans ce Discours de ces subtilités metaphysiques qui ont gagné toutes les parties de la Littérature, et dont les Programmes d'Académie ne sont pas toujours exempts; mais il s'agit d'une de ces vérités qui tiennent au bonheur du genre humain.

Rousseau's negative definition of his problem, the misuse of literature, allows him to state his own position and attack the opposing view with conciseness.

His main charge against the philosophes is their abuse of literature's ideals and social purpose out of self-interest. In Rousseau's opinion, they transform philosophic letters into a meaningless exercise or a technical, non-humanist activity. In contrast, Rousseau insists that the proper subject of literature is man. It achieves its ideal only in the study of moral, philosophic questions relating "au bonheur du genre humain" (p. 93).

Rousseau contrasts his view of the audience with that
of the philosophes. He feels that their works serve to reinforce contemporary opinions because they seek only to "please" the "Beaux-Esprits" and the "Gens à la mode" (p. 94).

Rather than paying homage to the taste of the elite, Rousseau proposes to address his message to a more general public (p. 94). His position is echoed three years later by Diderot's call in De l'Interprétation de la nature (1753) for the popularization of philosophic ideas. In his criticism of philosophic letters for their supposed lack of social and moral enlightenment, Rousseau compares the unquestioned faith of the philosophes in metaphysical systems and in an abstract reason to the very fanaticism which they claim to oppose. Rousseau denounces the ideological abuse of literature and philosophic "intolerance" with the following undaunted sincerity:

Il y aura tous les tems des hommes faits pour être subjuges par les opinions de leur siècle, de leur Pays, de leur société: Tels fait aujourd'hui l'Esprit fort et le Philosophe, qui par la même raison n'eût été qu'un fanatique du temps de la ligue (p. 94).

Rousseau maintains, in other words, that the philosophes fail to serve man by informing the public as to "de tristes vérités" which can free him from the enslavement to vice. Instead, they misuse their ideals of literature - equity, moderation and virtue - as a disguise for their own
In his short introduction immediately before the Discours's Premiere Partie, Rousseau defends the constructive nature of his intentions by the following positive restatement of his thesis:

Ce n'est point la Science [knowledge] que je maltraite, me suis-je dit; c'est la Vertu que je défends devant des hommes vertuex (p. 98).

Rousseau completes the rhetorical step of defining his criterion. His central principle is shown already to be that of "la Vertu". He adds another moral one in "la probité" and a philosophic one in "la vérité" (p. 99). Rousseau's principles illustrate his moral-philosophic approach to the evaluation of art. It transcends, at least in part, the materialistic ones of the philosophes - ignorance, superstition, and economic enslavement—as seen in D'Alembert's judgment as to the value of progress in the arts and sciences since the Renaissance. 25

Rousseau proposes, in other words, to discard in his own study of progress the philosophic pretention that knowledge, art, and luxury result necessarily in greater human happiness. In his opinion, the well-being of man begins first in himself and is based primarily on la Vertu, la probité vérité. Without self-knowledge and spiritual freedom,
Rousseau infers that man lacks sufficient principles on which to reason. He cannot hope, therefore, to understand or control the external, socio-political forces in his life.

In his opening statements to the *Première Partie*, Rousseau continues to follow the rhetorical techniques outlined in his essay, *Idée de la méthode*. He makes concessions as to the relative value of progress in order to inspire confidence in the reader as to his moderate, objective, and competent view of the question. The concessions take the form of the following eulogy of progress since the Renaissance:

> C'est un grand & beau spectacle de voir l'homme sortir en quelque manière du néant par ses propres efforts; dissiper par les lumières de sa raison, les ténèbres dans lesquelles la nature l'avait enveloppé; ... (p. 99).

The relative value of material progress is brought home by Rousseau's insistence on the moral life of man. Under the cover of his apparently philosophic enthusiasm, he moves the reader to accept the superiority of *recherches morales* over technical advancement by appending the following observation to his eulogy:

> ... & ce qui est encore plus grand & plus difficile, rentrer en soi pour y étudier l'homme & connoître sa nature, ses devoirs & sa fin (p. 100).
Rousseau continues his eulogy of progress and the re-birth of the Belles-Lettres in his rapid cultural review of European civilization. In the eventual revival of learning with the coming of the Renaissance, Rousseau awards the Belles-Lettres with the prestige of being the first discipline to reappear (p. 100). He implies, however, that literary art remained in itself incomplete. It does not receive its complete form until the reappearance of science which lends to literature "l'Art de penser" (p. 101). Rousseau contends that the reasoning procedure of science joins with "l'Art d'écrire" of the Belles-Lettres in order to produce the ideal literature of the Enlightenment—philosophic letters.

The renovated literature of the Renaissance with its capacity for thought is judged to be "naturelle" by Rousseau (p. 101). It restores, in his opinion, literature's original social function (p. 101). In his definition of literature's original nature, Rousseau appears to make his greatest concession to traditional, classical aesthetics. He stresses its function of plaire as seen below:

... & l'on commença à sentir le principal avantage du commerce des muses, celui de rendre les hommes plus sociables en leur inspirant le désir de se plaire les uns aux autres par des ouvrages dignes de leur approbation mutuelle (p. 101).
The concession to the classical aesthetic principle of plaire proves to be more apparent than real. It takes on a broader, socio-aesthetic meaning in its reflexive form of se plaire. Literature addresses, according to Rousseau's interpretation of plaire, "les hommes" rather than the elite composed of "la cour et la ville" (p. 101). It has the moral and social function of bringing men together in harmony and inspiring in them a community spirit of mutual respect and co-operation.

The value of the literary work is judged, therefore, according to its socio-moral effects on the general audience. If the work succeeds in rendering "les hommes plus sociables", better or more human, it is likely to receive the "approbation mutuelle" (p. 101). By inference, the public as a whole, rather than individual critics or literary groups, determines the value of the work.

Rousseau observes an unnatural gap between the originally useful and benevolent function of literature and the form which it has taken through the centuries since the Renaissance. In his movement from the theoretical plane of origins to the applied one of evaluation, Rousseau first considers the general nature of man and society.

Rousseau's concept of man adheres to the humanist
belief in man's unity composed of the complementary functions of body and soul: "L'esprit a ses besoins, ainsi que le corps" (p. 101). On the broader scale of the society of men, the physical needs function to make up the foundation of society by bringing men together while the intellect renders the union possible through "l'agrement" of the arts (p. 101).

Rousseau extends by analogy his humanist concept of the unity of man's being to society. It operates as a physical body through the government and intellectually through the arts. Just as in the case of the body and the mind, Rousseau feels that the forces of government and art are meant originally to complement one another in the aim of rendering man a total, well-integrated and happy being. Rousseau sets, through his analogy, the stage for an attack on their "unnatural" unbalance.

In short, Rousseau sees two major forces at work in society, the government with its laws and institutions and the arts and sciences through their ideological works and technical implements. Each of the two forces serves to form man and his way of life. In his examination of the power relationship between the government and the arts, Rousseau demonstrates his conviction in the potential and actual force of art. In fact, he regards the arts as being
fundamentally more influential in directing the course of
civilization as shown in his following evaluation of their
effects:

Tandis que le Gouvernement & les Lois
pourvoient à la sûreté & au bien-être des
hommes assemblés; les Sciences, Les Lettres
& les Arts moins despotiques & plus puis-
sants peut-être, étendent des guirlandes de
fleurs sur les chaînes de fer dont ils sont
chargés, étouffent en eux le sentiment de
cette liberté originelle pour laquelle ils
semblent être nés, leur font aimer leur
esclavage & en forment ce qu'on appelle des
Peuples polices (p. 101).

In his attack on the arts (and indirectly on the govern-
ment), Rousseau avoids the orthodox, blanket condemnation of
knowledge as the necessary evil resulting from man's "fall"
and original sin. By means of a secular concept of origins
and evolution, Rousseau sees the Belles-Lettres of the "muses"
as coming into being "naturally" in order to serve man (p. 101).
His suspicion of them does not result from a rejection of
their right to possess great power. He is displeased, in-
stead, by literature's misuse or neglect of its moral and
social functions.

During the evolution of man since the Renaissance,
Rousseau feels that the unbalance between the rights of po-
litical power and intellectual creativity has favored the
former. Since superfluity of luxury forms the basis of the
arts, the intellectual community sacrifices its artistic freedom for the comfort of royal patronage (p. 102). In doing so, the arts abandon man to the mercy of the government. Moreover, the arts collaborate in the enslavement of the general public.

Instead of offering moral examples worthy of its originally benevolent function of preserving man's "liberté originelle" through mutual respect, the arts conspire with the government in order to rule man. They blind him as to the reality of his eroding freedom by preoccupying his mind with a non-material artistic reality. The arts "étendent des guirlandes de fleurs sur les chaînes de fer" (p. 102).

On the moral level of social conduct, the arts allow government to control man's habits by erecting a system of amoral socio-aesthetic values (p. 104). In the place of personal, autonomous moral principles, the arts establish a scale of "apparent" virtues in order to deceive man in his relationship to government and to weaken the solidarity with his fellow creatures (p. 103). Rousseau sums up the collusion between the government and the arts with the following rhetorical exaggeration:

Le besoin éleva les Trônes; les Sciences et les Arts les ont affermis. Puissances de la Terre, aimez les talents, & protégez ceux qui les cultivent (p. 102).
Apart from Rousseau's "art of persuasion" and the role which exaggeration and irony play in it, there exists the possibility that Rousseau does not overstate his thesis as to the collaboration of arts with political power. The critic, James A. Leith, supports the literal truth of Rousseau's charge.

Professor Leith studies the relationship between the arts and political power during the realm of Louis XIV. He observes the same misuse of the arts under Louis XIV that Rousseau describes in the following century. In truth, Professor Leith's judgments make those of Rousseau seem moderate. He depicts the absolute Monarch as manipulating the arts in order to entrench his own supreme authority in the following passage:

During the reign of Louis XIV, art had been employed to enhance the grandeur and celebrate the glory of the most powerful ruler in Europe. The King and his ministers had encouraged a monumental style in which everything was cast in a heroic mould.27

Royal patronage supports the arts, according to Dr. Leith, in order to control and form the public image of the King and his government(p. 21). In other words, the arts are exploited out of the artist's self-interest or fear of the ruler in order to glorify the state as personified by
the king. The real aims of Louis XIV in his patronage of the arts are described by Professor Leith as follows:

Neither Louis XIV nor Colbert had much love for art as a means to aesthetic enjoyment. For both the King and his ministers art had been only an instrument of government useful for enhancing the prestige of the monarch (p. 21).

The limitations of Dr. Leith's approach to criticism are obvious. Whereas his findings lead to greater understanding as to the social and political ramifications of art, his approach to aesthetics applies validly only to the plastic arts. In truth, his primary examples are based on painting, sculpture, and architecture (p. 5).

Despite the limitations of Professor Leith's findings, they prove invaluable to this study by revealing two general truths. First of all, Professor Leith's corroboration as to the government's exploitation of the arts for its own purposes during the classical and neo-classical ages demonstrates the rationality and validity of Rousseau's thesis. Secondly, the literal application of Rousseau's thesis to literary criticism is shown to be inadequate because of its neglect of the intrinsic value of literature.

In summary of Rousseau's theory as to the state of the arts, he sees them as having fallen from their original social purpose of bringing men closer together in harmony.
They exchange their independence for the comfort of royal patronage and serve the government, in turn, by enslaving the rest of humanity.

The arts institute their own order of aesthetically inspired values. The socio-aesthetic principles of politesse, bienseance, and goût promote the political ambitions of the government by effacing moral values that remind man of his innate freedom, his "liberté originelle", and his human duties to his fellow creatures (p. 102).

The originally authentic social aim of the arts in *se plaire* is transformed from a sincere mode of behavior designed to favor social tranquility and integration into a social façade. In its corrupt form, the socio-aesthetic principle of *plaire* fosters ostentation and affectation which are cultivated in order to make oneself stand out from others (p. 103).

The ideal of virtue undergoes a similar transformation in Rousseau's opinion. Under the direction of political power it deviates from its original function as the guide to moral conduct and is reduced to the show of pomp, hypocrisy, and bravoure (p. 104).

As the result of substituting the socio-aesthetic "virtues" of politesse, bienseance, and goût for moral
principles, Rousseau contends that the countenance of man no
longer reflects faithfully the sentiments of his heart. Individu­ality and personal feelings are suppressed in order to
conform to the socio-aesthetic rules of conduct based on dis­simulation, disguise, and poise(p. 105).

The aesthetic system of values fails, in Rousseau's
opinion, to render man either better or happier for two main
reasons. Originating from the exterior, the socio-aesthetic
principles of gout, biéne­ance, and politesse are subject to
constant change(p. 106). As such, they are vulnerable to
control by the state through the intermediary of the arts.
Secondly, the moral failure of gout, politesse, and bién­
seance is attributable to their lack of any valid inner,
spiritual and unchanging principle or source of meaning and
motivation.

Because the aesthetic "virtues" lack an inner, moral
basis, they are concerned primarily with exterior decoration
and giving the illusion of moral worth. Since the appearance
of virtue and not its reality is rewarded by society, man
dec­­lases morally through concentrating his efforts of improve­­
ment on the external self rather than on the inner, moral
one(p. 104).

Rousseau's conviction as to the moral failure of
socio-aesthetic principles is best summed up in the following thought from his letter, *Dernière Réponse à M. Bordes* (1752):

> A mesure que le goût de ces niaiseries [les arts et les sciences] s'étend chez une nation, elle perd celui des solides vertus: car il en coûte moins pour se distinguer par du babil que par de bonnes moeurs, des qu'on est dispensé d'être homme de bien pourvu qu'on soit un homme agréable.

Rousseau's castigation of the false front, the desire to appear rather than to be worthy of distinction, and the acceptance of appearances as reality are actually traditional themes of French classical literature. But they are pushed to their extreme conclusions by the logic, conviction, and fervor of a Christian humanist and son of Geneva.

The exaggerated use of traditional themes by Rousseau is designed to shock the bon goût of the polite society which he rejects. It impels the unquestioning devotees of culture to attain a new consciousness as to the relative value of socio-aesthetic principles. Forced to defend their cult of culture and its socio-aesthetic "virtues", salon society re-appraises their human significance.

In his criticism of goût, politesse, and bienséance, Rousseau accepts the challenge of offering positive examples. However, the rhetorical technique of exaggeration is at work, also, on this positive level of argumentation. The following
definition of Rousseau's moral man sustains, for example, its shock value for today's reader: "L'homme de bien est un Athlète qui se plaît à combattre nud" (p. 104).

There is a rational technique at work in Rousseau's portrayal of the virtuous man. He dramatizes and renders concrete his rejection of the socio-aesthetic principles of politesse, goût, bienséance, and préciosité (all qualities which Rousseau deems as effeminate and emasculating) by the virile, shocking image of nudity and brutal, male violence.

Rousseau's image of "moral man" originates from the traditional opposition of Sparta and Athens (p. 111). It functions as a visual, rhetorical device designed to correct the overemphasis on the intellect and restore the humanist respect for the rights of man's physical nature. Through exaggeration of the physical virtues, Rousseau attempts to stem the encroachment of art and its socio-aesthetic principles into the domains of moral conduct and physical perfection.

The humanist ideal of a perfect balance between body and mind does not blind Rousseau as to the reality of human nature. In his consideration of the state of the natural or rustic man "avant l'Art" (a dynamic concept of moral chronology), Rousseau attributes man's "bonté naturelle" primarily
to the absence of temptations. The soundness of Rousseau's idealism is made manifest by the following judgment as to the relative nature of man's original goodness:

La nature humaine, au fond, n'étoit pas meilleure; mais les hommes trouvoient, leur sécurité dans la facilité de se pénétrer reciprocement, & cet avantage, dont nous ne sentons plus le prix, leur épargnoit bien des vices (p. 105).

In the dehumanizing evolution from the natural state where man wore "l'habit rustique d'un laboureur" to an urban society characterized by the artificiality of the "Courtisan", Rousseau feels that man loses his uniqueness and sentiment of individual worth (p. 105). He is made uniform and captive through an "Art de plaire" reduced to rules (p. 105).

The socio-aesthetic code forces man to mould his actions according to its ideal (p. 105). Rousseau refers here to l'honnête homme. In the following passage, Rousseau portrays the suffocation of creativity and originality through the loss of individual freedom to the socio-aesthetic code:

... :sans cesse la politesse exige, la bienséance ordonne; sans cesse on suit des usages, jamais son propre génie (p. 105).

The tyranny of aesthetic rules transposed to social conduct deprives man of the right to exercise his conscience and reason. Uniformity produces sterility and liberty, virility.
The French classical ideal man, l'honnête homme as described by LaRochefoucauld, is expected to practice a polite and generous dissimulation. With the sanction of dissimulation as a virtue by society, Rousseau is of the opinion that man experiences a moral loss. He becomes the prisoner of his vices. Rather than confronting them, he disguises them. Social intercourse is reduced to a ceremony wherein façades are displayed and opposed. Consequently, mutual understanding, "se pénétrer reciproc quemment", a human quality which is necessary to social harmony, is thwarted (p. 105).

The main social problem of man assumes the form of attempting to ascertain the sincerity of his friend's or fellow man's motives (p. 106). In truth, one can no longer be certain as to his friend's real self since individuality is erased in favor of uniformity (p. 106).

Rousseau charges, in effect, that the social mask of "polite dissimulation" fails to fulfill its role of facilitating sociality. It impedes true communion by harboring "sous ce voile uniforme & perfide de politesse" doubts, suspicions, and opinions (p. 106). They fester and alienate men through misunderstanding rather than rising to the surface of conduct to be purged.

The impossibility of mutual comprehension results in
uncertainty and mistrust. In other words, the socio-aesthetic conventions and usages fail to provide society with a meaningful stability. A value system based on politesse, bienséance, and goût suffers from the instability common to the conventions of art. It lacks the absolute referent and intrinsic worth of moral principles. Consequently, below the apparently serene surface of "polite" society constant movement reigns.

Due to the general instability and disorder fostered by socio-aesthetic principles, moral standards of virtue come to be regarded in the same light, i.e., not as a stable, enduring values but as social conventions or usages. Hence, the finest socio-moral attributes of man—sincerity, honesty, and friendship—fall into disrepair (p. 106). The only means whereby man can reestablish harmony and order in himself and in society are threatened with extinction. Rousseau looks below the surface of eighteenth century and describes its social and moral disintegration:

Quel cortège de vices n'accompagnera point cette incertitude? Plus d'amitiés sincères; plus d'estime réelle; plus de confiance fondée (p. 106).

Rousseau's analysis as to the causes of social disunity and the loss of freedom does not represent an extreme or fanatic moral position. He reacts in a positive manner in
order to moderate the extreme tendencies which he observes at work in society. In his opinion, the tyranny of socio-aesthetic rules, as supported by royal patronage through the arts and applied by salon society, proves to be more deleterious to individual freedom than overt aggressions by the government (p. 101).

A second force in the intellectual community, one more literary than the socio-aesthetic code, is identified by Rousseau. It takes the form of the extreme abuse of the philosophic spirit of the Enlightenment. The philosophe in his ideological struggle against "l'ignorance méprisée", threatens to lead, in Rousseau's opinion, to the opposite extreme of a morally debilitating "dangereux Pyrrhonisme" (p. 107).

Such a philosophy of doubt without constructive proposals fails to solve the problems of ignorance and injustice in Rousseau's opinion. Instead, it leads only to excesses and vice (p. 107). Doubt and uncertainty are fostered, in turn, by the socio-aesthetic code which passes off philosophic excesses as social virtues (p. 107). In short, Rousseau opposes the socio-aesthetic and philosophic justification of excesses and irresponsibility. He exposes the cult of "un raffinement d'intemperance" and its disorderly, disintegrating
socio-moral effects (p. 107).

Rousseau sums up his thesis as to the rapport between the deformed evolution of the arts and the moral, human loss on the part of humanity in the following passage:

Où il n'y a nul effet, il n'y a point de cause à chercher; mais ici l'effet est certain, la dépravation réelle & nos âmes se sont corrompues à mesure que nos Sciences & nos Arts se sont avancés à la perfection (p. 109).

There is an important qualification which Rousseau observes in the restatement of his thesis. He extends his theory of art's degeneration after the Renaissance to the universal history of mankind. Rather than a single "original fall", he envisages a reoccurring, cyclic decadence as follows:

L'élevation & l'abaissement journalier des eaux de l'Océan n'ont pas été plus régulièrement assujettis au cours de l'Astre qui nous éclaire durant la nuit, que le sort des moeurs & de la probité au progrès des Sciences & des Arts (p. 109).

After the image of the rise and fall of the tides, Rousseau illustrates his thesis, next, by the rise and fall of civilizations. In his review of history, Rousseau sees a virile, strong, and unlettered West which is contaminated and weakened, one country after the other, by the luxury, corruption, and the soft sensuality of the East. The Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, and Turks conquer and are
weakened, in turn, by their great wealth and the aesthetic pleasures which it inspires (p. 110).

The excessive cult of the arts results in the neglect of man's physical nature and, on the moral plane, leads to self-interest. The direction of the state is neglected by the many who become morally and physically passive. Patriotism declines and dictators or barbarian invaders such as Philippe of Macedonia, the Germanic peoples, and the Tartars come to power (p. 121). In other words, luxury corrupts man both physically and morally through its excessive stimulation of the intellect and the arts. The resulting loss of moral and physical will leads to tyranny.

Rousseau does allow, however, for exceptions to his view of history. In ancient times, Sparta foresakes comfort, luxury, and artistic glory in favor of virtue, simplicity, strength, and immortal deeds (p. 116). In modern times, Rousseau sees Switzerland, "cette nation rustique", as having preserved its freedom through the practice of its moral values rather than theorizing about them (p. 115).

Just as certain states have avoided the common historical trend toward decadence, Rousseau judges that there exists true philosophes. Although rare, such great men as the Athenian, Socrates, and the Roman, Cato, practice the arts
and letters in a truly valid, philosophic fashion (p. 120). Due to their great intellectual and moral superiority, they do not fall under the spell of the artistic, illusory reality and its autonomous, segregative, socio-aesthetic principles. They avoid presumption; recognize the value of simplicity; retain their human interest in their fellow man and concern for the welfare of the state (p. 121). After visiting the artists and poets of Athens and observing their excessive pride and presumption, Socrates is portrayed by Rousseau as eulogizing ignorance (p. 120).  

In the last five pages of the *Première Partie* of the *Discours* there is a sharp rise in emotional tone. Rousseau calls upon the memory of Fabricius, the Roman general of the third century B.C. and model of simplicity and incorruptible integrity. 

Rousseau appeals openly to the heroic emotions and imagination by the following such exaggeration:

"Romains, hâtez-vous de renverser ces
"Amphitheatres; brisez ces marbres;
"brulez ces tableaux; chassez ces esclaves
"qui vous subjuguent, & dont les funestes
"arts vous corrompent. Que d'autres mains
"s'illustrent par de vains talens; le seul
"talent digne de Rome, est celui de conquérir
"le monde & d'y faire régner la vertu (p. 123).

At the end of the apostrophe, Rousseau returns to the present and calls upon the reader to learn from the experiences of history. He summarizes in condensed form the *rapport*
which he sees between "le luxe, la dissolution & l'esclavage" (p. 125). Viewing the present condition of eighteenth century from an historical perspective, Rousseau makes the following key statement:

Que ces réflexions sont humiliantes pour l'humanité! que de notre orgueil en doit être mortifié! Quoi! la probité seroit fille de l'ignorance? La science & la vertu seroient incompatibles (p. 126).

In this series of exclamations and questions, Rousseau reveals his general rhetorical intention in the first, negative phase of his argumentation. He aims at humbling pride and presumption based upon art and progress in order to prepare the reader for his own solutions to the problem of the supposed deleterious effects of the arts.

Rhetorical tone, structure, and matter are joined together by Rousseau to produce the dramatic effect of the dénouement which he proposes in his essay, Idée de la méthode... The apostrophe and the rhetorical questions which follow it act as a climax to the first half of the Discours. They lead to the second half of the argumentation.

The reader's interest is heightened by the appeal to heroic emotions and his curiosity is whetted by the rhetorical questions. They imply that answers are to follow in the next part of the Discours. In fact, Rousseau promises the
reader, in the following passage, that he has the solution to the cultural and moral dilemma which sees man as the slave of his artistic creation:

Mais pour concilier ces contrariétés apparentes, il ne faut qu'examiner de près la vanité & le néant de ces titres orgueilleux qui nous éblouissent, & que nous donnons si gratuitement aux connaissances humaines (p. 126).

Rousseau promises not only solutions but tells the method of arriving at them. The reader is called upon to disillusion himself as to his prejudices and the prestige of the arts. In other words, humility is required for a change in perspective.

In summary to the Première Partie of the Discours sur les sciences et les arts, Rousseau sees eighteenth century society as being characterized by moral and philosophic instability, disorder, and uncertainty. The constant erosion of man's freedom overrides the small but significant gains made by literary, artistic, and technical progress. Basically, the spirit of a human community has disintegrated. The guiding forces in society, the government and the arts, no longer work together for the happiness of man. Instead of serving him as a means to his perfection, they have become an end in themselves and humanity's master.

The arts have abandoned their originally benevolent
function of making human society possible through the desire to "se plaire", the spirit of mutual respect and communion, and "l'agrement" (p. 101). Out of the desire for comfort, leisure, and luxury necessary to their new cult of art, the intellectual community denies any social obligation to its fellow creatures. Humanity is left without an adequate spokesman to defend itself against the encroachment of political power on its freedom.

The government aims at guaranteeing and furthering its power over the majority by promoting divisions within it. To this end, the king patronizes the arts and encourages the spread of its socio-aesthetic principles of politesse, bientéance, and goût to the detriment of the moral system of virtues. Because the government controls the socio-aesthetic code, Rousseau feels that it manipulates man and society at will. The socio-aesthetic principles function to segregate and separate the community. The lack of unified opinion or principles insures the government against its overthrow.

Rousseau's fear as to the collaboration between the state and the arts may appear, at first, to be exaggerated. But one must not confuse the rhetorical technique of exaggeration with the relative truth of his theory. The
contemporary critic, James A. Leith, maintains that Rousseau's apprehensions are well-founded. In the following passage, he describes Rousseau's theory as fact:

Louis XIV had provided a recent example of how art could be used to glorify the state as personified by the king. The monarchy had made use of the "Académie royale de peinture et sculpture" to direct painting and sculpture toward political ends. The Académie had been used to eliminate the personal relationship of the artist with the general public and to minimize the importance of private patronage (p. 21).

The separating of art from the larger community of men through honors or the luxury of royal patronage accounts for the departure from its original social purpose according to Rousseau. Professor Leith goes on to explain how the artist lost his freedom in the seventeenth century to the state:

Originally a free society with unlimited membership, the Académie had been transformed into a state institution organized on a hierarchical basis under an authoritarian directorate. Obviously the goal had been to make artists dependent on the state for status and employment. This had become especially true after 1664 when the minister of finance, Colbert, became surintendant des bâtiments or "Minister of Fine Arts" (p. 21).

The observations of Professor Leith as to the governmental exploitation of the arts under Louis XIV tend to be limited to the plastic arts. However, Rousseau would conclude,
no doubt, that the fate of the plastic arts would necessarily foreshadow that of the letters. Art loses, then, its independence and can no longer act as a counterfoil to the state in order to preserve man's sense of his "liberté originelle" (p.102).

Rousseau's negation of the arts cannot be explained away as either the effect of his Calvinist religious background or as the result of a deeply engrained misanthropy based on an inferiority complex. These contentions, as represented by Emile Faguet, Albert Schinz, and Jules Lemaitre, are not supported by the text of the Premiere Partie of the Discours and do not suffice to explain Rousseau's ideas.

The attempt by traditional criticism to explain Rousseau's Premier Discours through secondary, biographical evidence is represented by Emile Faguet and Albert Schinz. The former claims to determine the sense of Rousseau's work through the analysis of his "mentalité religieuse". He interprets the Premier Discours as the direct effect of Rousseau's Calvinist upbringing(p. 76). In his opinion, Rousseau says that there is no progress and condemns civilization to a necessary fall(p. 76).

To the contrary, Rousseau concedes the advances made in material and technical progress(p.99). His argument states
that the study of man has been neglected and that his pro-
gressive moral loss is not justified by a limited, techni-
cal progress (p.100). As for the future of Western civiliza-
tion, Rousseau does not argue on the basis of a Calvinist
principle of predestination.

Rousseau demonstrates a faith in man to exclude him-
self from the cycle of power, wealth, and corruption through
the action of his free will. He excepts, for example, the
states of ancient Sparta and contemporary Switzerland from
the common fate as illustrated by history (p.114). On the
level of individuals, Rousseau contends that superior men
such as Socrates and Cato practice the arts in their true
and original spirit (p.120). This distinction must be under-
stood in order to comprehend Rousseau's proposal as to the
"superior man" in the Seconde Partie.

The critic Albert Schinz demonstrates the same inac-
curacy of traditional criticism in his assumption of a cor-
respondance between Rousseau's religious background and his
philosophic position in the Premier Discours. He concludes
that the moral traits of Sparta and the first Romans, as
portrayed by Rousseau, represent the Protestant ethic. To
the contrary, their morality is based on a military virtue
which is best realized in conquest for its own sake (p.123).
In his predilection of paradox, Albert Schinz neglects the dialectical nature of the *Premier Discours*. On the basis of Rousseau's preference of the militant, stoic virtue of the Spartans and Romans, he judges his morality as being "anti-naturelle" in the sense of the Protestant refusal of corruption (p.153). Albert Schinz forgets that Rousseau's dialectic requires an extreme, positive antithesis to his negative cultural thesis of corruption based on opulence in order to perform a moderate synthesis or solution. The latter step in argumentation takes place in the *Seconde Partie*.

In his assumption as to Rousseau's religiousness and in his love of paradox, Albert Schinz contends that the *Premier Discours* represents the traditional theological view of man as being innately perverse and corrupt (p.153). He interprets the relative goodness which Rousseau attributes to man ("La nature humaine, au fond n'étoit pas meilleure") as signifying the author's belief in the essential depravity of the "natural man" (p.153).

To the contrary, Rousseau judges present humanity to be corrupt but not the "natural man". He attributes to him a potential for both good and evil. He avoids vice by his uninhibited sincerity and mutual understanding with his
fellowmen (p. 105). In fact, Rousseau insists upon the distinction between his view as to the natural but unconscious goodness of man and the traditional view of his original corruption. The latter concept is termed by Rousseau in his *Dernière Réponse à Bordes* (1752) as "une absurdité". In addition, Rousseau avoids the orthodox opinion on the birth of the arts. He judges their origin as a natural part of social evolution (p. 101).

The most obviously prejudicial type of traditional criticism and the most difficult to disprove, perhaps, is that represented by Jules Lemaitre. He accounts for Rousseau's attack on the arts and sciences on the basis of personality factors. In his opinion, Rousseau's anti-cultural thesis stems from his inferiority complex, his misanthropic disposition, and general moral degeneration (p. 86).

In answer to Jules Lemaitre's charge as to Rousseau's supposedly anti-social attitudes in his *Premier Discours*, I wish to point out that Rousseau does not single out his own age for reproach. He affirms, in fact, that the degeneration which he observes is not a peculiar feature of any one epoch. Rousseau views the problem of dehumanization and decadence from a broad philosophic and historical altitude and observes a cycle of rise and fall on the part of
nations (p.109). They proceed from militant, masculine might to effeminate debility resulting from the neglect of the physical and moral nature of man.

Rousseau's plea for the acceptance of the total man and the restoration of his dignity, equality, and original liberty disprove the charge of misanthropy. His personal life does not necessarily prove or disprove the validity of his intellectual position on the arts. Even if Rousseau is considered "un dégénéré", he has been judged by several French psychiatrists as being "un dégénéré supérieur qui invente des chefs-d'œuvre". 39

In addition to its subject matter, the form of the Première Partie of the Discours has been misjudged. The most subtly pernicious and wide-spread misinterpretation is presented by Albert Schinz's contention that "la prosopée de Fabricius" forms the central part of the Premier Discours (p.151). To contend that this emotional and evocative part of the argumentation functions as the work's center is tantamount to judging the whole of the work as a piece of romantic emotionalism. 40

This chapter on the Première Partie of the Discours proves, to the contrary, that the apostrophe to Fabricius acts as its dénouement or climax. As explained in his essay
on the composition of the discourse, Idée de la méthode ...; Rousseau advises the use of the dramatic technique in order to heighten the interest of the reader.

In the Premier Discours, the apostrophe appeals to the heroic imagination of the reader; serves to confound his last resistance to the thesis; performs the final step of humbling the reader's intellectual pride in order to prepare him for the author's proposals in the Seconde Partie. Despite the apostrophe's emotionalism, it performs a rational function in the total plan of the dialectic. It ends the Première Partie dramatically and can not be considered the rhetorical center of the argumentation. 41

In short, Rousseau applies to the Première Partie the rhetorical techniques outlined in his essay on method of composition. In his explanation of the malevolent effects of the arts and their collaboration with the government, he employs the persuasive techniques of exaggeration, irony, and the opposition of extremes. The general function of the first half of the Discours sur les sciences et les arts is that of preparing the reader for the author's proposals to follow in the Seconde Partie. They are analyzed in the next chapter.

In order to correct the detrimental moral and social
effects of the arts, Rousseau has the choice of appealing to either the government, the arts, or the people. Instead of addressing the public for a total and violent reform through revolution, Rousseau works within the established socio-political structure.

Rousseau appeals to the moral sense of the artist and that of the polite salon society. He calls upon them to reexamine the role of art in society, the relative value of its socio-aesthetic criterion of politesse, bienséance, and goût, and their moral duty toward humanity.

At one point in his argument, Rousseau infers that the arts can restore the balance between them and the government. He describes their corruptive effects and demands their reformation in the following passage:

Telle est la pureté que nos moeurs ont acquise. C'est ainsi que nous sommes devenus Gens de bien. C'est aux Lettres, aux Sciences & aux Arts à revendiquer ce qui leur appartient dans un si salutaire ouvrage (p.108).

Despite the bitter irony of his appeal to philosophic and artistic experimenters to reverse the effects of their disciplines, Rousseau recognizes their potential power for the betterment of humanity (p. 101). In the Seconde Partie, however, he loses faith in the ability of the philosophes
to reform their objectives. Evidently, Rousseau regards them as being too engrossed in technical research or dependent upon royal patronage in order to regain their independence and serve the general public. Consequently, Rousseau opts for a political solution to the problem of restoring the social utility and humanist ideal to philosophic literature. He appeals to the moral sense and self-interest of the throne to revamp its relations with the philosophes.
Rousseau restates the original question of the Dijon Academy and adds the words "ou à corrompre" in order to render the question more dramatic. See Haven's edition of the *Discours*, p. 176.


Rousseau reacts in his *Discours* against "les subtilités metaphysiques qui ont gagné les parties de la Littérature" (p. 93). He speaks of "l'éternel fléau des Lettres" (p. 100). The victims of his attacks are the *philosophes* who have forgotton the study of man in their devotion to metaphysical systems. They threaten, in Rousseau's opinion, to immobilize man through "un dangereux Pyrrhonisme" (p. 107). At the same time, Rousseau's heroes are the true *philosophes*, Socrates and Cato (p. 120).


10 See George Havens' "Introduction" to his edition of Rousseau's Premier Discours, p. 25.


14 Rousseau, loc. cit.

15 D'Alembert, op. cit., p. 82.

16 Rousseau, loc. cit., I, p. 352. See, also, Chapter I, p. 31 of this dissertation for M. A. Espinas' judgment of Rousseau's composition which is based on the Confessions.


18 Schiefenbusch, op. cit.


20 Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, Ed. by George Havens (New York: MLA, 1946), p. 93

Note: all references to the Premier Discours are based on this edition and will be indicated simply by a parenthesis and page number.

21 Rousseau allows room in his condemnation of the philosophes for the really valid humanists. In his Réponse au Roi de Pologne (1751), Rousseau acknowledges the wisdom of D'Alembert's answer to the Premier Discours in his Discours Préliminaire (III, p. 56).
Footnotes (Cont.)


23 See *Lettre à Lecat* (1752) by Rousseau, *loc. cit.*, III, p. 100.

24 See Rousseau, *loc. cit.*, III, p. 98 who attacks primarily the amateur philosophes who retort to his *Premier Discours* such as Claude-Nicholas Lecat, secretary to the Academy of Sciences at Rouen, and Charles Bordes, minor author of Lyon. Rousseau cites specifically the case of Richard de Ruffy, the dissenting member of the Dijon Academy in 1750.


26 See Harold Höffding, "Rousseau et le XIXe Siècle" *Annales de J.-J. Rousseau* (Geneva: Julien, 1912), XVIII, pp. 69-98 who state that Rousseau's first principle is: "Rendez l'homme un ..." (p. 82).


28 A tragedy such as Racine's *Andromaque* (1667) undermines, in fact, royal grandeur. Its protagonist, King Pyrrhus is portrayed as an uncourtly, brutal lover, and traitor to his fellow Greeks. He is assinated eventually through a court plot. Dr. Leith explains, himself, the limitations of "l'art utile" in his chapter, "The Sterility of the Idea of Art as Propaganda".
Footnotes (Cont.)

29 René Wellek warns in *A History of Modern Criticism 1750-1950* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), III, p. 73 against Rousseau's intrusion of moral criterion into literary criticism. He negates, in fact, all value of Rousseau's moral aesthetics. In doing so, Dr. Wellek fails to follow one of his own principles - the recognition of the intrinsic worth of Rousseau's literary theory regardless of its relative value in applied form.

30 Rousseau, *op. cit.*, III, p. 73.

31 See Chapter I, p. 15 of this dissertation for the reference to Henri Peyre.

In contrast to the classical ideal of "l'honnête homme", Dr. Havens terms Rousseau's ideal as "l'homme unique".

33 See Chapter I, p. 28 of this dissertation.
The fact that LaRochefourcauld condones dissimulation when conducted with a conscious realization of its illusion as a social necessity does not deter Rousseau from its denunciation. Such an attempt to reconcile virtue with deception only compounds Rousseau's distrust of a reasoning that fails to offer moral alternatives to what he considers a harmful, dishonest convention.

34 Rousseau judges "ignorance" or simplicity as being less harmful than the presumption of the artist who fails to take a sincere interest in his fellow man and in the state. In addition, the artist is non-productive materially (p. 121).


See Rousseau's Réponse a M. Bordes, III, p. 82 where he clarifies his ideas on war. Outside of the dialectical demands of the Premier Discours, Rousseau condemns aggressive war as immoral.

Rousseau, op. cit., III, p. 80.


Albert Schultz makes the common error of relying too heavily on Rousseau's judgment of his Premier Discours in the Confessions instead of giving precedence to a study of the text itself.

The apostrophe may be considered as the original core of Rousseau's inspiration but not as the functional, dialectical center of the finished product. The distinction is prerequisite to determining the essential nature of the Premier Discours and an accurate description of it.
CHAPTER III

TOWARD A PROGRAM FOR THE RESTORATION
OF THE LETTERS

In the first two-thirds of the Seconde Partie of his Discours sur les sciences et les arts, Rousseau enlarges on the following themes of the Première Partie: the question of origins, the moral lessons of history, the problems of plaire and goût, luxury, and virtue. They concern the nature of literary art and its effects. New themes are introduced, also, such as the relationship between literary art and inequality, education, and religion.

Rousseau reiterates his charge as to the supposed abuse of philosophic letters on two occasions (p. 133, 149). He leaves no doubt as to the victims of his attacks, the philosophes. Their indictment goes beyond the previous charges of non-humanist erudition and disinterest in man. They are portrayed as ambitious, self-interested propagators of destruction for its own sake (p. 132).

Despite the apparent repetition of themes in the first two-thirds of the Seconde Partie, important changes in
perspective, tone, and form take place. First of all, Rousseau bears down on the specific effects and problems of literature such as the plight of the poet, the role of the literary salon and the academy, and the transmission of socio-aesthetic distinctions through education.

Secondly, an important but subtle change in tone occurs. The heroic emotions of "la prosopée de Fabricius" give way to a high seriousness. Now that Rousseau feels in control of the reader's earnest attention and good graces, he seeks to engage his support for the restraining of philosophic excesses and the reestablishment of literature's originally benevolent purpose. To this end, Rousseau appeals to the fears and the self-interest of the reading public and the throne. He depicts the philosophe as being irresponsible, dangerously ambitious, and a financial burden to the state (p. 132).

The third alteration in the Seconde Partie has to do with its rhetorical form. In the previous half of the Premier Discours, Rousseau conducts his reasoning along a linear, progressive line of arguments as outlined in his essay, Idée de la méthode... In contrast, the dialectical structure of the Seconde Partie is not so evident. It progresses more in a general linking of themes than in a succession of
arguments.

It would be convenient to suggest, as has often been done, that this modification of rhetorical form exemplifies Rousseau's inconsistence of argumentation and disunity of composition. Or one could attribute its apparent inconsistency to abnormal personality factors by using the contemporary, psychoanalytical method of criticism. In my opinion, both of these methods constitute evasions from the study of the text itself by asking it nonliterary questions in the attempt to reveal the author's personality.

On the basis of a close analysis of the text, it is my contention that Rousseau's modification in the structure of his argumentation corresponds to a reasonable procedure of dialectic or "art of Persuasion" whether the author is aware of it or not. I deem it, also, to be more valid to judge the work in the context of its own aims. Reference to other of the author's works should be limited to those belonging to the same period as the text under study. With this principle in mind, we recall that Rousseau states specifically in his essay on method of composition that the line of argumentation in the philosophic discourse should not be evident and that style is to disguise it.

The thematic or global argumentation in the first
portion of the *Seconde Partie* serves two functions, in my opinion—one psychological and the other rhetorical. Firstly, the reader finds himself bombarded by arguments from all directions. He becomes concerned, lost in the dramatized complexities of the problem, and frightened by the threatening anti-social consequences of the abused philosophic letters as portrayed by Rousseau. Hence, the reader is prone to reach out willingly and with gratitude to the solutions which Rousseau proposes toward the end of the discourse.

This initial period of global argumentation acts rhetorically as a transition to the next movement of his reasoning. Its flexibility allows him to counterbalance his exaggerated social criticism in the *Première Partie*. By dramatizing the complexity of the problems involved in the abuse of literature, he removes suspicion as to his previous generalizations and facile solutions. The tactic moves convincingly Rousseau's dialectic to its positive level of proposals.

The very first sentences of the *Seconde Partie* serve notice as to the new orientation of Rousseau's reasoning. He studies the question of the origins of the arts and portrays them as stemming from the vices of social man (p. 128). Instead of addressing the enlightened intellect of the
reader through a secular, naturalist use of the theory of
origins, Rousseau addresses his latent fears and perhaps
even prejudices. He defends his thesis as to the corrupt
social origins of the arts, letters, and sciences through
their mythological representation in the Egyptian god, Ten-
thus, and the Greek fable of Prometheus (p.127). They por-
tray "la science des lettres" as serving only to torment
man (p. 209).

The malevolent social effects of the letters stem,
according to Rousseau, from the source of their power. He
judges them as being completely dependent upon a luxury
which is unjustly gained and distributed (p. 128). The
letters are seen by Rousseau as being slaves to the system
which nourish them. Founded on luxury, they must promote
constantly further luxury in order to assure their contin-
unity. On the social level, the arts foster, therefore, in-
equality and injustice. On the aesthetic level, they submit
their own destiny to the external will of the power that sup-
ports their "progress".

Rousseau implies that literary art, as practiced in
his time, lacks a moral basis. The individual conscience of
the author is oppressed by economic necessity, and his art
preserves social injustices. It does not measure up to its
original purpose of promoting a benevolent moral and social consciousness. Instead, the letters aggravate social disintegration and promote an inequality based upon the criterion of wealth and social position (p. 134). These cultural distinctions do not reflect, according to Rousseau, any necessary intrinsic merit, but suggest rather a kind of social brutality.

In short, Rousseau sees luxury and literary art as necessary cohorts in a society which has lost its moral purpose and values. Dependent upon the luxury of the ruler, the men of letters negate their social mission of humanizing society and participate in the preservation of social injustice. In the following passage, Rousseau describes how the literary arts and luxury relate in the general abuses of the time:

C'est un grand mal que l'abus du temps. D'autres maux pires encore suivent les Lettres & les Arts. Tel est le luxe, né comme eux de l'oisiveté & de la vanité des hommes. Le luxe va rarement sans les sciences & les arts, & jamais ils ne vont sans lui (p. 133).

An important point to notice in the above passage is the fact that Rousseau indicates that there exists other abuses worse than those brought about by the letters and
This observation forms a concession that prepares the way for an even greater one as follows: "Je l'avoue, cependant; le mal n'est pas aussi grand qu'il aurait pu le devenir" (p. 151). The latter forms the transition to the positive phase of the argumentation where Rousseau offers his proposals.

In his attack on luxury as the foundation of the arts, Rousseau challenges one of the fundamental tenents of the encyclopedic program. Rousseau manifests his awareness as to the controversial nature of his rejection of excessive luxury. He defends his thesis on the basis of a moral interpretation of history as shown below:

Je sais que notre philosophie, toujours féconde en maximes singulières, prétend, contre l'expérience de tous les siècles, que le luxe fait la splendeur des États; ...(p. 133).

Rousseau illustrates his thesis as to the corruptive effects of luxury in a review of the rise and fall of nations. He perceives in the historical process a correspondance between the level of luxury and the national and moral strength (p. 135). On the basis of his moral insight into history, Rousseau proposes that each man and nation is faced with an existential choice. States must decide to base their glory on either courageous acts or on words and works
of art (p. 137). Individuals must choose to be either impressive through the perfection of a social façade or honest in their moral constancy (p. 137).

Rousseau's second criticism as to the supposed malevolent social effects of letters shows itself to be more material than moral. He appeals to the personal, economic interest of both the crown and the public by applying the criterion of "utility" to philosophic literature. In his opinion, it is financed by the state but fails to serve the needs of man. He sees the philosophes as indulging in purely metaphysical speculation such as "how the body and soul correspond without communication" (p. 131).

In short, Rousseau demands an accounting for the public's financial support of the literary arts. He declares his challenge in the following manner:

Revenons-donc sur l'importance de vos productions: & si les travaux des plus éclairés de nos savans & de nos meilleurs Citoyens nous procurent si peu d'utilité, dites-nous ce que nous devons penser de cette foule d'Ecrivains obscurs & de Lettrés oisifs, qui dévorent en pure perte la substance de l'Etat (p. 131).

It is important to note that Rousseau addresses directly the philosophes. He appeals to their reason. He urges them to recognize the need of a professional organization to
establish standards of proficiency in their disciplines.

Contrary to the popularized interpretation of Rousseau's view on philosophic inquiry and literary creativity, he does not call for their suppression. He makes the distinction between the valid "savans éclairés" and "cette foule d'Ecrivains obscurs" (p. 131).

As a man of the eighteenth century, Rousseau realizes the limited supply of manpower and educated personnel for commerce. He reaffirms, therefore, the traditional classical opinion that those without exceptional talent for literature would perform a greater service to society in other fields of endeavor. In other words, Rousseau proposes the wisest application of human resources for both the general good and individual happiness.

Rousseau believes that excessive social prestige has been granted to letters which results in an unbalance of values. In his opinion, too many intelligent but uncreative men doom their lives to unhappiness and unfulfillment by devoting themselves to literary occupations. They fail to realize that creativity, contribution, and purpose are available in other endeavors. Rousseau sums up the social duties of every citizen in the following revolutionary motto:

En politique comme en morale, c'est un grand
In order to understand the rhetorical tactic employed by Rousseau in his definition of the citizen's duty "de faire du bien", it is advisable to review the total, general problem of the belles-lettres as Rousseau sees it. In his opinion, they have joined with the government in the control of humanity. Together, these two forces possess the balance of power in the "social state."

They regulate both the physical institutions of political power through force and control the government's public image by its representation in the arts. The social conduct of man is directed through the government's encouragement of the salon with its socio-aesthetic principles of goût, politesse, and bienséance. They serve the government's purpose by keeping the majority disunited through social divisions and through the discouragement of serious humanists.

Rousseau appoints himself the defender of humanity and "le bonheur du genre humain". His course of action is twofold. Firstly, he must dissolve the union between the government and the arts. If he wins the allegiance of one of these forces to the general cause of man, he can either restore the balance of power with the arts as an ally or
gain its supremacy on the side of the government. Consequently, Rousseau must unify public opinion in order to exercise a force sufficient to induce either the government or the arts to foresake its union for a more attractive one with the people.

It may be construed, therefore, that an attack on one member of the coalition, in this case the philosophes, carries with it a condemnation of its counterpart, the government, which Rousseau can not openly defy. But he does set up an analogy which embraces them both in a general indictment as follows: "En politique comme en morale ...(p. 131).

Rousseau's criticism as to the human unhappiness and economic waste brought about by the social aggrandizement of literature applies strong pressure on the government for reform. His definition of civic duties implies censure of the government's neglect of social injustice and inequality. It repudiates not only socio-aesthetic prejudices but the social prerogatives of a noble, leisure class as follows: "... tout citoyen inutile peut être regardé comme un homme pernicieux"(p. 131).

Rousseau attacks the literary arts, as supported by the government, in order to unite the general opinion against their common abuse of power. His tactic aims at making the
government become the uncomfortable ally of letters. Rousseau demonstrates to the king that his manipulation of the arts no longer serves his best interests. Instead of dividing men through their socio-aesthetic distinctions, philosophic letters threaten to unite them in their criticism.

Rousseau's dialectic aims at moving the government to reform or renounce its patronage of the arts. If successful, the combined tyranny of the belles-lettres and the government over the people can be reduced. Therefore, Rousseau's argumentation sets up the arts, in this phase of his dialectic as the sacrificial victim for the greater freedom of man. The sacrifice proves to be a symbolic or a rhetorical one, however; for literature is preserved in his conclusion to the Premier Discours but in a purified and elevated form.

In order to effect a rapprochement between the political aims of the government and the common good of the public, Rousseau unites them against a common danger—the amateur philosophe, the false prophet, or charlatan (p. 129, 154). He appeals to the common self-interest of the government and the people. He emphasizes the high cost of financing philosophic speculation and the waste of human resources due to the exaggerated social prestige of the belles-lettres. In order to solidify the common interest of the throne and the
public, Rousseau goes one step farther and appeals to their fears.

Rousseau accuses the *philosophe* of a double transgression against the interests of the government and the public. The first is one of omission. Because the philosophic poet and writer encloses himself in his own metaphysical and aesthetic systems, he fails, in Rousseau's opinion, to perform his duties to the state and to his fellow man. He professes, according to Rousseau, to have no time "pour la Patrie, pour les malheureux & pour ses amis" (p. 129).

Rousseau's aim is to convince both the government and the public as to the disadvantages and dangers of encouraging the unqualified, amateur *philosophe* ("cette foule d'auteurs élémentaires") in the practice of letters. He dramatizes, therefore, the difficulty of attaining original thought and creative works by maintaining that "le faux est susceptible d'une infinité de combinaisons, mais la vérité n'a qu'une manière d'être" (p. 129).

Even if the *philosophe* performs his art with a high sense of professional honesty and sincerity, Rousseau contends that most writers will not be able to achieve "une vérité utile" (p. 130). They discover only misleading, dangerous half-truths (p. 130). In his description as to
the elusive nature of truth, Rousseau transcends, in part, the criterion of utility. He appeals directly to the metaphysical anxieties of the reader by the following image, which in the manner of Pascal, leaves man suspended in his weakness:

Sommes-nous donc faits pour mourir attachés sur les bords du puits ou la vérité s'est retirée? Cette seule réflexion devroit rebuter dès les premiers pas tout homme qui chercherait sérieusement à s'instruire par l'étude de la Philosophie (p. 129).

In effect, Rousseau warns the reader against credence in philosophic systems motivated by personal ambition and/or based upon insufficient ability.

The philosopher's errors of omission include, then, the following: the neglect of civic duties, the disaffection with the general problems of man through excessive specialization, and the propagating of half-truths. In addition to these often unintentional injuries to humanity, Rousseau makes the more serious charge of calculated malevolence on their part. In his opinion, too many philosophers disrupt society without moral purpose and out of the desire for personal gain or distinction. His accusation is made with the following militant candeur:

Que dis-je, oisifs? & plut-à-Dieu qu'ils le fussent en effet! Les moeurs en seroient plus saines & la société plus paisible.
Mais ces vains & futiles déclamateurs vont de tous côtés, armés de leurs funestes paradoxes; sapant les fondements de la foi, & anéantissant la vertu (p. 132).

According to Rousseau's thought, the philosophes do more harm than good. They destroy the principles of unity around which the general will of the public could conceivably unite—religion, virtue, and patriotism (p. 133). With his stress on the essentially destructive and disruptive effects of the philosophes, Rousseau appeals to the fears of the government in its desire for the continuity of its reigning power. His negative portrayal of the philosophes is designed to appear menacing to the throne as follows:

Ils [les philosophes] sourient dédaigneusement à ces vieux mots de Patrie & de Religion, & consacrent leur Philosophie à détruire & avilir tout ce qu'il y a de sacré parmi les hommes (p. 133).

Religion and patriotism comprise unifying principles for Rousseau. According to his point of view as to the rapport between the government and letters, the attack by the philosophes on religion should theoretically aid the government. It deprives the people of its principle of collectivity and reinforces the salon substitution of the socio-aesthetic principles of goût, politesse, and bienséance for moral ones.
Rousseau's dialectic implies, however, that the *philosophes*' assault on patriotism deprives the crown of a unifying civic belief necessary to its own political ambitions. Consequently, Rousseau draws the government and the public together in a common interest against the *philosophes*.

Rousseau aims at making manifest the need for supervision, moral direction, and control of philosophic literature. He does not go so far as to label the *philosophes* as the enemies of the state. His objective is not their persecution but the reorientation of their goals. Therefore, Rousseau declines to judge the majority of the *philosophes* as being maliciously pernicious. Instead, he portrays them as being the victims of their own excesses and vanity (p. 133). They need only discipline and direction, in Rousseau's opinion, as seen in the following passage:

> Non qu'au fond ils haissent ni la vertu ni nos dogmes; c'est de l'opinion publique qu'ils sont ennemis; & pour les ramener aux pieds des autels, suffiroit de les releger parmi les Athées (p. 133).

In his examination of the relationship between the author, his work, and the audience, Rousseau regards the author of his century as being the prisoner of his art. In his desire to distinguish himself and win recognition, he
gears his art to please "le goût du jour" as follows:

Tout Artiste veut être applaudi. Les éloges de ses contemporains sont la partie la plus précieuse de sa récompense (p. 137).

It is important to observe that Rousseau refers, here, to the **philosophe** as "Tout Artiste ...". His terms for the philosophic writer of the eighteenth century move easily from the specific one of **philosophe** to such others as **artiste**, **sage**, **savan**, **auteur**, and **Précepteur**. Rousseau views the **philosophe** as a humanist who embraces all genres of literary art and thought. His philosophic orientation and social consciousness reject the narrowness of the specialist in order to consider the human ramifications of all the sciences and the arts.

In practice however, Rousseau feels that too many so-called **philosophes** fail to meet both the moral and aesthetic standards of their art by denying their own conscience. In doing so, they violate the socio-moral function of literature as stated in its original principle of **se plaire**. Rousseau blames social factors for the mediocrity of eighteenth century literary art. In his opinion, the literary **salon** has usurped the prerogative of free creativity. It tyrannizes the creative man of letters by enforcing his conformity to the **salon** taste as follows:
Que fera-t-il [l'Artiste] donc pour les éloges obtenir, s'il a le malheur d'être né chez un Peuple & dans les tems ou les Savans devenus à la mode ont mis une jeunesse frivole [le salon] en état de donner le ton, ou les hommes ont sacrifié leur goût aux Tyrans de leur liberté; ...(p. 137).

Rousseau attacks openly his own century for its oppressive atmosphere, lack of creative freedom, and inspiration. His previous denunciation of the salon, in the Première Partie, stems from its socio-political ramifications. He sees the salon as collaborating with the government through the indoctrination of its socio-aesthetic principles of goût, politesse, and bienséance. Rousseau continues his refutation of the literary salon, here in the Seconde Partie, for the following aesthetic reasons:

...; où l'un des sexes n'osant approuver que ce qui est proportionné à la pusillanimité de l'autre, on laisse tomber des chefs d'oeuvres de Poésie dramatique, & des prodiges d'harmonie sont rebutés (p. 138)?

Rousseau's censure of salon taste as lacking in good literary judgment can be defended. The bluntness of his attack scandalized eighteenth century society as witnessed by the polemics engendered by the publication of the Premier Discours. Nevertheless, Rousseau's criticism of salon taste has famous literary precedents in French Classical
The apparent originality of Rousseau's use of this traditional theme derives from the stress on the sex of his salon opponents as witnessed by the periphrase, "l'un des sexes", and the precious attribute of "la pusillanimité", (p. 138).

Rousseau's attitude toward and dialectical use of the theme of feminism acts as a key to his rhetorical procedure. On the basis of his previous images, it becomes apparent that Rousseau thinks in the generic terms of male and female within the context of the Premier Discours. In his panoramic view of history, he envisages, for example, the West as a virile, masculine, unlettered, warrior race. It succumbs to the temptations of the East which, as an oriental courte­san, brings him soft sensuality, new desires, moral decadence, and physical debility.

Rousseau deplores the intrusion of oriental effeminacy into Western culture and extolls the stoic "vertu militaire" of the ancient Spartans and Romans as personified by Fabri­cius (p. 122). Similarly, in his general view of literature, Rousseau rejects precious language in preference of a virile and even rude one. He deems préciosité or gallant language together with the socio-aesthetic principles of politesse, bienséance, and goût as emasculating. He dramatizes his
rejection of them in his image of the nude, male wrestler as the "homme de bien" (p. 104).

It is not to be concluded on the basis of these criticisms, however, that Rousseau reverts to the medieval tradition of misogyny. To the contrary, he gives evidence of an unusually enlightened attitude toward the role of women in society as seen in his fragment, Sur les femmes (1735).

In the context of his argument, Rousseau utilizes the conflict of the sexes in order to dramatize the dialectical oppositions of East and West, strength and weakness, acts and words, and ignorance as opposed to bibliolatry.

Rousseau characterizes the literature of his century, then as being permeated by an effeminate, artificial standard of judgment. The salon taste fails to reflect, in his opinion, the full dignity of man. It produces inferior works that lack universal appeal and which mirror only the times.

Acting as a literary critic, Rousseau makes the following friendly criticism of Voltaire:

Dites-nous célèbre Arouet, combien vous avez sacrifié de beautés males & fortes à notre fausse délicatesse, & combien l'esprit de la galanterie si fertile en petites choses vous en a coûté de grandes (p. 139).

In view of his previous identification of " chefs
"d'oeuvres de Poésie dramatique" as the main victim of the salon taste, it is evident that Rousseau is referring in the above passage to Voltaire's theatre. It foregoes universal appeal, in Rousseau's opinion, through the desire of Voltaire to please the effeminate, gallant taste of the salon. The decline of contemporary interest in Voltaire's theatre confirms the validity of Rousseau's criticism.

In his analysis of the relationship between the author, the work, and the audience, Rousseau judges the eighteenth century literary public as being incapable of either inspiring or appreciating great literary art. The dramatic author is faced, therefore, with a choice. He must either accept immediate success based on an appeal to the mediocre salon taste or espouse a stoic existence full of misery but one which assures creative freedom and the lasting appeal of his work (p. 138).

The majority of the authors prefer, in Rousseau's opinion, to reduce the ideals of their art to the level of contemporary taste. He judges the artist, in other words, to be both the psychological and physical prisoner of his art in the need to "please" and in the economic necessity of patronage. Thus, Rousseau makes clear his lack of confidence in the philosophe—whether he be known primarily as either a
The philosophe shows himself, according to Rousseau's argument, to be the slavish servant of his vanity and the taste of the times. Rousseau implies that the philosophe can not be counted upon by the public as an ally against the government in the struggle for greater individual freedom. He proves to be too self-interested and unconcerned about man.

Just as Rousseau excepts the states of Sparta and Switzerland, and the true philosophes, Socrates and Cato, from the general trends of history, he allows for exceptions among his contemporary fellow men of letters. A few philosophes refuse to "prostitute" their art to the salon literary taste (p. 139). Even though such a refusal demands respect for its heroism, Rousseau believes that it is doomed to failure (p. 139).

Since Rousseau does not cite any specific philosophes to illustrate his positive opinion, it can be inferred that he acts as his own best example of the courageous, independent author in his Premier Discours. In truth, he strikes a heroic stance in his Préface where he portrays himself as performing a self-sacrifice to the true spirit of the philosophic letters and the good of humanity as follows:
Je prévois qu'on me pardonnera difficilement le parti que j'ai osé prendre. Heurtant de front tout ce qui fait aujourd'hui l'admiration des hommes, je ne puis m'attendre qu'à un blame universel; ...(p. 93).

Rather than courting the salon taste and an easy success, Rousseau chooses to write on the basis of his own "voix de conscience" as shown below:

...; & ce n'est pas pour avoir été honoré de l'approbation de quelques Sages, [l'Academie de Dijon] que je dois compter sur celle du Public: Aussi mon parti est-il pris; je ne me soucie de plaire ni aux Beaux Esprits, ni aux Gens à la mode(p. 94).

In truth, Rousseau performs as an anti-litterateur in his Premier Discours. He declines the title of philosophe or philosophic writer for that of "un Citoyen de Genève" as seen on his title page(p. 90). Avoiding the pretention of erudition, Rousseau refers to himself as "un honnête homme qui ne sait rien"(p. 97).

Rousseau illustrates the positive side of his negative argumentation by the manner in which he approaches his subject. He rallies to the side of le genre humain; appoints himself its spokesman in the cause of greater freedom; opposes the false philosophic and socio-aesthetic attitudes of his time. His objective is to make philosophic letters relevant to man by restoring their original social character.
and community spirit.

Instead of pleasing the cultivated society, Rousseau chooses to shock it out of its social complacency. He assures his independence from the control of an unworthy salon audience by writing for himself; he bases his reasoning on his own moral judgments. Instead of striking the servile pose of the poet before his patron, Rousseau assumes an audacious one. Rather than writing in a refined, gallant, precious style, he appeals to both the reader's intellect and imagination with a vibrant, vigorous, and militant rhetoric. Hence, it can be said that both the tone, stance of the author, and form of the Premier Discours illustrate his theory as to the proper attitude of the philosophic writer.

Rousseau summarizes the chain of cause and effect that brings about the loss of literature's original social function and high ideal in the following formula:

C'est ainsi que la dissolution des moeurs, suite nécessaire du luxe, entraîne à son tour la corruption du goût (p. 139).

Despite his extended denunciation of the salon influence on literature, it is to be noted in the above passage that Rousseau blames the broader socio-moral causes of luxury, and immorality for the decadence that he sees in eighteenth century letters.
Up to this point in his analysis of the supposed defects of philosophic literature and poetic art, Rousseau has shown the need for a reorientation of philosophic letters. According to his argumentation, they no longer do justice to their social and aesthetic ideals. Instead of elevating man, they only imitate and preserve his mediocrity, selfishness, and injustice. They aim only at pleasing. When they instruct, it is done irresponsibly and without moral purpose.

As a refreshing relief to the complication and corruption of the "fallen literary arts", Rousseau presents the second important image of the Seconde Partie. It portrays art in the state of nature as follows:

On ne peut réfléchir sur les moeurs, qu'on ne se plaise à se rappeler l'image de la simplicité des premiers temps. C'est un beau rivage, paré des seules mains de la nature, vers lequel on tourne incessamment les yeux, & dont on se sent éloigner à regret(p. 140).

With a high sense of drama, Rousseau depicts his moral-aesthetic ideals through this image full of nostalgia and melancholy. They show themselves to be simplicity and harmony. His concept of simplicity is not the French classical one which seeks to imitate the symmetry of Greek architecture. Rousseau's ideal forms an anti-art by basing its
appeal on apparent disorder. It aims not at separating man from nature through artistic manipulation and design but at a grand union of being. Both Rousseau's aesthetic and social ideals compose a vision of oneness characterized by the absence of tension and conflict.

Rousseau sees art, in its now corrupt form, as disrupting the natural unity of life that characterizes his natural or rustic state. There, men lived together with little distinction either between themselves or between them and their gods (p. 140). "Natural man" lives in close proximity to his gods and vies with them in courageous acts (p. 140).

With the coming of luxury which stimulates the growth of the arts, Rousseau sees man as separating himself from his gods through art and its socio-aesthetic distinctions. He relegates his gods to static works of art which serve the vanity of man by controlling the image of his gods. Through art, man seeks to become his own creator:

Quand les hommes innocens & vertueux aimoient à avoir les Dieux pour témoins de leurs actions, ils habitoient ensemble sous les mêmes cabanes; mais bien-tôt devenus méchants, ils se lassèrent de ces incommodes spectateurs & les releguerent dans des Temples magnifiqes. Ils les en chassèrent enfin pour s'y établir eux-mêmes, ...(p. 140).
Once again, Rousseau stresses the view that art, without direction or moral purpose, reinforces man's vices instead of inspiring him to greater values. Art does not only preserve man's vices, but its prestige is used by the powerful in order to fortify and perpetuate their reign as follows:

Ce fut alors le comble de la dépravation; 
& les vices ne furent jamais poussés plus loin que quand on les vit, pour ainsi dire, soutenus à l'entrée des Palais des Grands sur des colonnes de marbre, & graves sur des chapiteaux Corinthiens(p. 141).

Rousseau implies that the proper role of art is that of portraying the best in man and preserving the ideal of his original, natural harmony and freedom. It is to lead to unity and mutual understanding not division. Instead, art, as practiced by man of the "social state", imitates his worst qualities. It renders the vices of an age immortal through their portrayal and sanctions inequality through the illustration of the class in power.

The transmission of art with its aims, conventions, and unjust social effects is assured, in Rousseau's opinion, by traditional educational programs. Rather than seeking to expand the student's intellectual horizons, his ability to make both aesthetic and moral distinctions, and his general powers of judgment, Rousseau sees education as embarked on
the destructive mission of fostering social inequality and injustice. It aims not at true enlightenment of the mind but the transmission of socio-aesthetic conventions and prejudices as follows:

C'est dès nos premières années qu'une éducation insensée orne notre esprit & corrompt notre jugement. Je vois de toutes parts des établissements, où l'on eleve à grands frais la jeunesse pour lui apprendre toutes choses, excepté des devoirs (p. 145).

Rousseau sees education as being oriented toward decoration and division. Instead of stressing the common civic and moral duties which unite man, it emphasizes literary art and its socio-aesthetic distinctions designed to separate social classes. It gives precedence to the elite, learned dead languages over the common, national idiom; stresses style or appearance over content in composition; ignores the collective concepts of God and country (p. 146).

In his analysis of the socio-moral failures of both art and its means of transmission, education, Rousseau puts his finger on the great contradiction of Western civilization. It professes to be Christian but worships, in reality, pagan virtues and culture. Instead of uniting men through the illustration of national heroes and virtuous acts to which all can aspire, art with its foreign, pagan orientation forms an elite culture apart from the national one. 32
Education instructs the youth in mythological heroes and pagan ideals as embodied in great works of the ancients and their modern imitations (p. 149).

Rousseau attributes the evil effects of literary art, its socio-aesthetic principles of discrimination, and their institutional coronation through education to the following social cause:

D'ou naissent tous ces abus, si ce n'est de l'inégalité funeste introduite entre les hommes par la distinction des talents & par l'avilissement des vertus? Voila l'effet le plus evident de toutes nos études, & la plus dangereuse de toutes leurs conséquences (p. 149).

According to this passage, Rousseau sees inequality as rising from art, immorality, and education. The aesthetic distinctions of the "social state" supplant the valid, natural ones of the "rustic state". These amoral criterion of judgment lead to social and moral disintegration. The literary art of the "social state" falls under the control of a powerful elite and reinforces class divisions through an education based on aesthetic conventions. The letters aim only at pleasing the taste of the powerful and fail to offer moral instruction.

In contrast, Rousseau's ideal of art takes the form of a community activity designed to bring men together in
harmony and common understanding (p. 101). It is apparent that Rousseau's social ideal of art corresponds to the third state in the evolution of man as described by Rousseau in Discours sur l'inégalité (1755). The third or "patriarchal state" precedes directly the corrupt "social state". Rousseau refers to the third state as "une société naissante". There men lived supposedly in loose, unorganized village groups; hunted and fished for their food; found delight in spontaneous gatherings for song and dance.

Literature practiced on this level of man's evolution is evidently in the oral tradition of women's songs, heroic chants, and prayers of fertility. It is not until the fourth stage of human development, the "social state", that the written forms of literature come into existence according to the Second Discours (p. 171). Rousseau characterizes the "social state" by the invention of "la Métallurgie et l'agriculture" (p. 171).

With the trend toward economic complexity, division of labor, and specialization, the poet and the philosophe are intrusted with the preservation and cultivation of the arts (p. 171). Oral literature falls, then, from a community activity to an individual one. As such, it fosters social distinctions and the often violent competition for them;
indulges man's vanity and personal sense of worth which was awakened, first, by his awareness of being superior to the animals (p. 165).

Inequality forms, then, the basis of the arts, letters, and education. They reinforce the "unnatural" cultural, social, and aesthetic divisions within society. Rather than judging man on the merits of his conduct, the society of the "social state" applies its socio-aesthetic standards of cultural refinement. Consequently, agreeable words are given precedence over virtuous acts, according to the *Premier Discours* (p. 149).

The turning point in Rousseau's argument takes place in his concession as to the relative degree of danger posed by the abused letters. He concedes that "le mal n'est pas aussi grand qu'il auroit pu le devenir" (p. 151). He repeats, also, his contention that there exist certain sages who have preserved the dignity of their art against the pressures of the mediocre *salon* taste (p. 150). Nevertheless, the best interests of both art and society are judged by Rousseau as requiring major changes in the direction of literature.

According to Rousseau, too great a disproportion exists between *l'art agréable*, as fostered by *salon* society,
and l'art utile, or works of moral purpose (p. 150). As a humanist, Rousseau deplores the trend toward specialization into such academic categories as Physiciens, Géometres, Chymistes, Astronomes, Poètes, Musiciens, Peintres (p. 150).

Rousseau's conception of the philosophe does not prohibit a specialized grasp of one of the above fields. It requires that the philosophe apply his specific findings to the general philosophic-moral problems of man—his happiness, inequality, education etc. In other words, the philosophe must be a man with a social concern for the general good before being a specialist. His duties as a citizen of the state must not take the back seat to academic or artistic ambitions.

Rousseau's conciliatory judgment as to the relative evil resulting from the abuse of letters indicates that their condition is not beyond repair. He offers hope as to their salvage and the eventual reconciliation between man's moral nature and the art of the "social state". His means of solving the problem prove to be, in a large part, the power and the prestige of the government; for, his conclusion acts as a rapprochement to the crown.

Letters have been spared from total disrepair, Rousseau proclaims, because of their past patronage by Louis
XIV (p. 151). He is portrayed as a benevolent ruler who instituted certain societies and academies in order to control the excesses and preserve the high ideal of art (p. 151). Rousseau seems to favor, therefore, greater governmental direction of letters in order to correct their excesses. To speculate as to the sincerity of his eulogy of Louis XIV, "ce grand Monarque", is to pose the wrong question.  

Rousseau's eulogy of Louis XIV exerts considerable pressure on his successor, Louis XV, to match his record of interest in the arts. It challenges his pride. Rousseau intensifies his rhetorical pressure on the King through an analogy with nature. He interprets the natural law as requiring the Monarch to administer to the needs of the arts as follows:

La prévoyance éternelle, en plaçant à côté de diverses plantes nuisibles des simples salutaires, & dans la substance de plusieurs animaux malfaisans le remède à leurs blessures, a enseigné aux Souverains qui sont ses ministres à imiter sa sagesse (p. 151).

In order to reform the literary arts, Rousseau recommends initially the traditional solution. It calls for greater governmental direction of the arts through academies or "ces sociétés célèbres" (p. 152). Rousseau's advocacy of an enlarged academy system compliments royal power and acts as a
device to gain the King's sympathy for his final solution.

One of Rousseau's main objectives in his traditional academy proposal seems to be that of circumventing the influence of salon society. The honor of appointment to an academy frees the artist from dependence on salon recognition. He sees the "gens de lettres" as being able; in this manner, to reform their professional conduct and artistic aims. Such a program is based on the principle of self-interest and honors justly awarded. It is to function as follows:

Ces sages institutions affermies par son auguste successeur, [Louis XV] & imitées par tous les Rois de l'Europe, serviront du moins de frein aux gens de lettres, qui tous aspirant à l'honneur d'être admis dans les Académies, veilloront sur eux-mêmes, & tâcheront de s'en rendre dignes par des ouvrages utiles & des moeurs irreprochables (p. 152).

One of the main duties of the academy, in Rousseau's opinion, is that of offering a moral-aesthetic alternative to the taste of the day. It exerts an uplifting influence on both its non-members and its members. In his brief description of the academy's purpose and function, Rousseau seems to favor a concept which allows a considerable degree of independence from governmental control.

The members of Rousseau's ideal academy do not act as a rubber stamp for government's control of literature.
They owe only gratitude to the King for their appointment. No mention is made of financial rewards. They set up their own professional standards and have the right to select the subjects for literary contests (p. 152).

Because they are free from the salon requirements of plaire, Rousseau sees the academicians as choosing subjects of discourse designed to inspire "l'amour de la vertu dans les coeurs des Citoyens" (p. 152). Such works address the large audience of "les Peuples" (p. 152). Writers are encouraged by their academy honors to aim at making "le Genre-humain" happier and wiser (p. 152). Their works prove to be invaluable to society by their union "des lumières agréables" with "des instructions salutaires" (p. 152).

Rousseau's proposal as to the expansion of academies as a means of curbing the philosophic and socio-aesthetic excesses of the letters does not comprise his final solution. He foresees the violent objections of the salon elite and devotees of culture to his academy program. Such hardened resistance against the reform of literary art makes Rousseau realize that "les remèdes ordinaires", the traditional solution of academies, does not suffice to correct the social injustice and derangement of values enrooted in the practice of literature. He reasons as follows:
Because Rousseau deems the academy proposal to be incapable of reforming the practice of literature, which proves to be too enmeshed in the general corruption of the "social state", he searches for a stronger, more radical cure for its ills.

Rousseau's rhetorical tactic becomes that of establishing a sufficient cause for a more drastic solution to the reforming of the letters. On second thought, Rousseau seems to concur with the foreseen objections of his critics. He discards the improved academy program as being potentially dangerous. His reasons differ, however, from those of the imagined salon opposition.

Rousseau fears that the extension of the academy system may result in the aggravation of the unbalance in social prestige between the letters and the other professions or skills needed by society. In fact, he fears that the full support of letters by both the government and the general public may lead to a tyranny by the community of writers which would still include both "cette foule d'Auteurs"
clémentaires" and "ces Compilateurs d'ouvrages" (p. 158).

Rousseau warns society against the unconditional support of the philosophe's research:

Tant d'établissements faits à l'avantage des savans n'en sont que plus capables d'en imposer sur les objets des sciences & de tourner les esprits à leur culture. Il semble, aux précautions qu'on prend, qu'on craigne de manquer de Philosophes (p. 153).

In short, Rousseau fears that the philosophic letters, if supported without restrictions, may gain such control over young minds that both the government and the public would not be able to control them. Rousseau's stand against the uncontrolled spread of the philosophes' influence may seem intolerant and dogmatic. In reality, he is searching for an adequate solution to the extreme intellectual righteousness and philosophic intolerance which he pictures below:

Que contiennent les écrits des Philosophes les plus connus? Quelles sont les Leçons de ces amis de la sagesse? A les entendre, ne les prendrait-on pas pour une troupe de charlatans criant, chacun de son côté sur une place publique; Venez-à-moi, c'est moi seul qui ne se trompe point (p. 154)?

Rousseau regards the philosophe as being like the religious fanatic of the sixteenth century (p. 94). Convinced of his truth and filled with philosophic enthusiasm, he seeks converts. His ideological dogmatism leads to the
ill-treatment of those possessing different opinions and, thus, to general social strife.

On the basis of his observations as to the generally mediocre, self-interested, and disruptive nature of philosophic letters, Rousseau rejects the notion of their popularization. In his opinion, they tend toward an unprincipled polemics which results in the lowering of both the ethical and aesthetic standards of literature. Moreover, such an argumentative literature runs contrary to the natural law of selection by allowing those without an authentic vocation to participate in an area for which nature has not made them fit.

Rousseau considers the participation in the creative literary act as a superior function for which nature endows but few men. He protests against the absence of valid segregative restrictions which permits and encourages the choice and practice of the creative arts by those who are not elected by nature. In the following passage, Rousseau describes the "unnatural" state of affairs in literature:

... que penserons-nous de cette foule d'Auteurs élémentaires qui ont écarté du Temple des Muses les difficultes qui défendoient son abord, & que là nature y avoir répandues comme une épreuve des forces de ceux qui seroient tentés de savoir(p. 157)?
It is preferable, according to Rousseau, that those who show themselves incapable of original creativity and independent study be turned away from a career in letters as soon as possible. They are to be redirected toward "des Arts utiles à la Société" (p. 158). On the basis of both the common and the individual good, it makes more sense to Rousseau that the mediocre author lead a productive life in a more technical art rather than being "un mauvais versificateur" (p. 158).

Rousseau's final solution to the misuse and abuse of letters is based on the principle of natural selection. He proposes that the full-time cultivation of philosophic literature be restricted to the naturally "fit" geniuses such as Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Newton whom he considers to be the authentic "Précepteurs du Genre humain" (p. 158). There are several reasons which Rousseau offers in the defense of his proposal to limit literary and philosophic creativity to the "great men".

Rousseau sees his final solution to the problem of literature's abuse as coinciding with the natural law as follows:

Il n'a point fallu de maîtres à ceux que
la nature destinoit à faire des disciples.
Les Verulams, [Bacon] les Descartes, &
les Newtons, ces Precepteurs du Genre-humain n'en ont point eu eux-mêmes & quels guides les eussent conduits jusqu' où leur vaste génie les a portés (p. 158).

In his ultimate, radical proposal Rousseau does not aim at a literal return to nature wherein little differences existed between men.

Instead of attempting to suppress the distinctions which he observes in his century, a large number of which are fostered by literature's socio-aesthetic prejudices and conventions, Rousseau attempts to refound them on natural differences of extraordinary creative strength and intelligence. In his _Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité_, Rousseau clarifies the legitimacy of "_l'inégalité naturelle_" as follows:

Je conçois dans l'Espece humaine deux sortes d'inégalité: l'une que j'appelle naturelle ou Physique, parce qu'elle est établie par la Nature, et qui consiste dans la différence des âges, de la santé, des forces du Corps, et des qualités de l'Esprit, ou de l'Ame; L'autre qu'on peut appeller inégalité morale, ou politique, parce qu'elle dépend d'une sorte de convention, et qu'elle est établie, ou du moins autorisée par le consentement des Hommes.

The superior man or genius resembles in one respect the primitive man of Rousseau's hypothetical "state of nature". He enjoys an almost primitive type of independence.
and freedom of which the great majority of men in the "social state" are incapable. Because he is chosen by nature for original creativity, the "superior man" is portrayed by Rousseau as being free of the need to follow a teacher or past precepts (p. 1580).

Being a self-sufficient man (in somewhat the same manner as the lonely hunter in Rousseau's "état primitif"), the genius can free himself from the socio-cultural prejudices of the past. Neither can he be controlled and manipulated by either the government or salon society. He is by nature creative and his thought is so elevated that it requires little or no support from outside sources (p. 159).

The creative genius "walks alone" as seen in the following passage:

S'il faut permettre à quelques hommes de se livrer à l'étude des Sciences & des Arts, ce n'est qu'à ceux qui se sentiroient la force de marcher seuls sur leurs traces & de les devancer: C'est à ce petit nombre qu'il appartient d'élèver des monuments à la gloire de l'esprit humain (p. 159).

Because he obtains fulfillment in his struggle to attain the ideal, the genius' ability is not liable to debasement through the need to "please" the mediocre taste of the day. He leads the way to the future through original moral, philosophic insights rather than imitating the works of the past.
Rousseau does not propose to deify the "superior man" as a priestly, "creator class". In fact, he feels that all obstacles to their success should not be removed. They act as an incentive, in his opinion, to the real genius and discourage those who do not measure up to the challenge of autonomous creativity (p. 159). Consequently, Rousseau thinks that there should be no program to support the would-be "creators". However, they are to be allowed to rise as high as their endeavors carry them in all positions of leadership (p. 159). This principle indicates that the requirement of noble blood is to be waived for their ascent to power.

Rousseau opposes, in other words, the system of governmental support of the creative genius. It robs him, in Rousseau's opinion, of the challenge to realize his potential powers of leadership during historic moments (p. 159). Rousseau cites, for example, the cases of Cicero and Bacon who might not have acquired national stature if they had been tied to the security of some university chair (p. 159).

In the following passage, Rousseau clarifies the attitude of detached encouragement which society is to assume before the creative genius:

Mais si l'on veut que rien ne soit au-dessus de leurs esperances. Voilà l'unique encouragement dont ils ont besoin. L'ame se
It appears to traditional criticism, as exemplified by Jules Lemaître and Émile Faguet, that Rousseau's proposal constitutes a completely anti-intellectual position based on personality disorders. In reality, just the opposite is true. His limitation of creativity to the genius does not diminish the importance of philosophic literature in the culture of the nation and that of the philosophe in the national life. To the contrary, Rousseau's program is designed to unchain the true intellectuals from both dependency upon the government for financial support and upon salon society for approval.

The genius is awarded no special privileges usually associated with class distinction by Rousseau's plan. His appointment is made by the process of natural selection and it is affirmed by natural elimination, i.e., by the demonstrated ability to rise above economic problems faced by the general public, while being creatively productive.

Rousseau restricts the full-time participation in letters in order to consolidate and elevate their powers. He raises the true philosophe to the position of being "Précepteur du Genre-humain", a title on a par with that of
Souverain (p. 158). It is Rousseau's wish that the authentic philosophic author and thinker aspire to posts of political power as in the manner of Cicero and Bacon:

Le Prince de l'Eloquence [Cicero] fut Consul de Rome, & le plus grand peut-être, des Philosophes [Bacon] Chancelier d'Angleterre. Croit-on que si l'un n'eut occupé qu'une chaire dans quelque Université, & que l'autre n'eut obtenu qu'une modique pension d'Académie; croit-on, dis-je, que leurs ouvrages ne se sentiroient pas de leur état (p. 159).

A second objection to the academy system becomes apparent in the latter part of the above passage. Rousseau regards the security of patronage as an emasculating force that prevents the superior man from rising to the height of his creative and leadership potential. In short, Rousseau shows himself to be a believer in the historical concept of "great men". A superfluous number of amateur philosophes subtracts rather than adds to the prestige of the real philosophic genius in his opinion.

The dangers of Rousseau's proposal to found a restricted creator class have gone undefined by traditional criticism as represented by Jules Lemaitre, Emile Faguet, Albert Schinz, and George Havens. To restrict the active participation in the philosophic letters and thought to a chosen few runs contrary to the freedom of individual choice. Rousseau's
proposed organization of letters threatens, from the twentieth point of view, to reduce the individual to a creature of the state.

In reaction against the false optimism of the eighteenth century and its faith in material progress, Rousseau shows himself to be equally naive by associating in his thought the genius with virtue. He makes no provisions against the possible alliance of the ruler with the superior man who could use his mastery of words as a Minister of Propaganda in order to control men's minds. Hence, Rousseau's proposed cure as to the abuse of the philosophic letters and spirit of the enlightenment threatens to prove, perhaps, more dangerous than the malady. His objective remains, nevertheless, that of greater representation and relief from self-interested legislating cliques.

Rousseau elevates the valid philosophe to the rank of "teachers of the human race" and leaders of the nation. He advises the King to welcome their counsel (p. 160). In his revolutionary brashness, Rousseau enjoins the King, in fact, to curb his class prejudices and ambitions to absolute rule in favor of a broader, more enlightened base of power as follows:

Que les Rois ne dédaignent donc pas d'admettre
Rousseau's directive to the throne constitutes more than an attempt to placate the encyclopedic party through the doctrine of "le roi-philosophe" or "enlightened despot" as George Havens would have the reader believe (p. 247). Commenting on the general trend of Rousseau's political thought, Werner Bahner states the following:

Rousseau refuse l'idée d'un despote éclairé. Il désire un peuple souverain et les Encyclopédistes s'efforcent d'éduquer un peuple éclairé.

Rousseau's concept of the philosophe's role in government goes beyond that of being the advisor or teacher to the king. He does not merely add philosophic and literary lustre and sanction to the king's reign. Rousseau supports the direct sharing of political power by the valid philosophe who is to work with the king as equals "travaillant de concert à la félicité du Genre-humain" (p. 160). Consequently, Rousseau calls for the king and the philosophe to set aside their personal ambitions in the service of humanity.

The equality and independence of the elite philosophe
vis-à-vis the king is safeguarded by Rousseau's plan. He receives no royal compensation for his efforts other than "that of contributing to the happiness of the people" (p. 160). His authority and right to direct the course of events stems from the natural order which endows him with the greatest capacity for creative leadership. On contrast, the king's right to rule is based upon the political conventions of the "social state".

Instead of opposing these two orders, the social and the natural, Rousseau seeks to reconcile them. In his humanist vision, he sees total unity restored to the human condition. The mind and body of society, as represented by the philosophe and the king, are to function as complementary equals for the happiness of man as follows:

C'est alors seulement qu'on verra ce que peuvent la vertu, la science & l'autorité animées d'une noble émulation & travaillant de concert à la félicité du Genre-humain. Mais tant que la puissance sera seule d'un côté; les lumières & la sagesse seules d'un autre; les savans penseront rarement de grandes choses, les Princes en feront plus rarement de belles & les Peuples continueront d'être vils, corrompus & malheureux (p. 160).

Rousseau's total solution to the reform of letters calls for the reversal of the role played by their leading patron, the king. Traditionally, he exploits literature,
according to Rousseau, in order to manipulate its socio-aesthetic principles of conduct—politesse, bienséance, and goût (p. 102). They help the king to preserve his power by provoking and, then, reinforcing socio-cultural divisions among the people. The contemporary critic, Lester Crocker, recognizes the revolutionary import of the Premier Discours and states the following:

Rousseau's thought, then, bears from the very start the stamp of its revolutionary character. It is the first philosophy aimed entirely at praxis, or the transformation of society, even though it does not pretend to be a practical program. 47

In the "rustic state", as described in the Second Discours, there existed supposedly no division between art and government which functioned together in the harmony of a tribal, "nascent" society for the well-being of the entire community (p. 170). The difference between the restored harmony in the "social state", as proposed by Rousseau's program, and the natural one of his hypothetical tribal state consists mainly in the role of the people. They no longer participate as a community in the arts and the government. Rousseau sees the people, in the Premier Discours, as being incapable of meeting their more complex social and technical demands (p. 161).
Rousseau does not ignore, however, the third party to his dialectic. The people occupy always the back of his mind. In his conclusion to the *Premier Discours*, he attempts to draw them into the harmony of his solution in order to make it a total one. His program offers a creative alternative to a life given to letters and leadership. It takes the form of self-acceptance, the performance of one's civic duties, and the attainment of a happiness based on realistic aspirations. Rousseau includes himself in the category of the people as follows:

Pour nous, hommes vulgaires, à qui le Ciel n'a point déparé de si grands talents & qu'il ne destine pas à tant de gloire, restons dans notre obscurité.

...  

Laissons à d'autres le soin d'instruire les Peuples de leurs devoirs, & bornons-nous à bien remplir les nôtres, nous n'avons pas besoin d'en savoir davantage (p. 161).

It is revealing to note the exclusive importance which Rousseau grants the principle of *instruire*. It has expanded beyond its aesthetic counterpart, *plaire*, to encompass socio-political duties. In truth, the valid *philosophe* becomes, in Rousseau's program, the "teacher of the human race".

The role of the people in Rousseau's program does not
prove to be a completely passive one. They are not abandoned to a non-questioning acceptance of political and philosophic authority in all areas of life. The limits of such external powers on their conduct are set by Rousseau's concept of the individual's right to follow his conscience as follows:

O vertu! Science sublime des ames simples, faut-il donc tant de peines & d'appareil pour te connoître? Tes principes ne sont-ils pas gravés dans tous les coeurs, & ne suffit-il pas pour apprendre tes Lois de rentrer en soi-même & d'écouter la voix de sa conscience dans le silence des passions (p. 162)?

Through his insistence on the authority of the individual conscience, Rousseau preserves the dignity of man. In fact, his conclusion elevates "la science de vertu" to a par with that of "la science de conduire et instruire les peuples" (p. 162). In this way, Rousseau's argumentation succeeds in reconciling the intrinsic worth of the individual, despite his lack of learning or talents, with the forces of the enlightenment.

Real philosophy, Rousseau concludes, leads to a satisfying, productive life. It is based on self-knowledge and the fulfillment of one's social duties. Therefore, Rousseau calls upon the people of unexceptional talent to "cultivate their own gardens" to the best of their ability without either envying or hindering the philosophes. In the
following passage, Rousseau provides the people with a "philosophy" to their measure":

Voila la véritable Philosophie, sachons nous en contenter; & sans envier la gloire de ces hommes célèbres qui s'immortalisent dans la République des Lettres, tâchons de mettre entre eux & nous cette distinction glorieuse qu'on remarquoit jadis entre deux grands Peuples; que l'un saviat bien dire, & l'autre bien faire (p. 162).

Traditional critics refuse to concede that the conclusion to the Premier Discours synthesizes the following oppositions on which Rousseau bases his argumentation: moral progress - technical progress, false erudition - ignorance, moral corruption - militant vigor (Athens-Sparta), and tyranny - libertinism. They misjudge the Premier Discours as a static dissertation by overlooking the movement inherent in its dialectic.

Albert Schinz identifies, for example, three different kinds of virtue in Rousseau's Premier Discours - vertu romaine, vertu d'innocence, and vertu de sagesse ou philosophique. He regards them as static entities and judges them to be, therefore, incompatible (p. 145). In the context of Rousseau's dialectic, the first two of Albert Schinz's categories, vertu romaine and vertu d'innocence, act as antitheses in opposition to the physical and moral degeneration with Rousseau sees as characterizing the "social state".
Contrary to M. Schinz's analysis, it is my opinion that Rousseau concludes his work with two complementary orders of values rather than three contradictory ones. He identifies "la science de conduire les Peuples" and "[la] science de la vertu" as being two ladders to excellence and service of humanity. The first is practiced by the king and the philosophes who contribute to a better society through leadership (probably by means of persuasion and legislation or words written and spoken).

The second road to Rousseau's social ideal of harmony is that of virtue or civic morality as based upon distinguished conduct. The order of virtue allows for distinctions and gives recognition to outstanding citizens. Their accomplishments and honors raise them to the same level of perfection as the king and the philosophes but in a different order. In short, word and deed or bien dire and bien faire comprise two complementary means of elevation each of which possesses its own valid distinctions, contributions necessary to the total society, and criteria of success.

Of the contemporary Rousseau scholars, Jean Starobinski shows an acute understanding as to the direction of Rousseau's thought in the Premier Discours. He is right to emphasize its positive, optimistic unity. First of all, he
observes, contrary to the opinion of Jules Lemaitre, that Rousseau does not call for the abolishment of letters but the removing of the conflict which opposes "la puissance et les lumières". He sees the Premier Discours' conclusion as offering man hope in the possibility of a regeneration of common purpose among men (p. 139).

Rousseau's condemnation of the abused philosophic letters in his first major work does not originate from a Calvinist conviction in their inherent evil as traditional criticism would have us believe. Contemporary criticism, as represented by M. Starobinski, recognizes the broader, social ramifications of Rousseau's thesis as follows:

Le mal ne réside pas essentiellement dans le savoir et dans l'art (ou la technique), mais dans la désintégration de l'unité sociale (p. 38).

Art is not evil in its origins or symptomatic of man's fall from grace according to Rousseau. It is caught up in the cause and effect cycle of man's social and moral deterioration. Consequently, literature produces false effects.

Rousseau attacks the nonhumanist and mediocre aesthetic quality of the eighteenth century philosophic letters as part of the larger corruption of the "social state" which he sees as heading toward a new phase of decadence (p. 133).
The letters favor, in his opinion, social injustice, inequality, immorality, and disunity. They belie their original, benevolent function of bringing men together in understanding and harmony through the principle of *se plaire* (p. 101).

The writer is seen by Rousseau as having forfeited his creative independence for the comforts of luxury provided by royal patronage and out of his desire for salon recognition. The objective of Rousseau's program is to free the philosophe from dependence upon royal favor and the salon code of goût, politesse, and bienséance.

Despite his somber observations as to the condition of the letters, in the eighteenth century, Rousseau advances a program based upon the conviction that letters do not have to be decadent and that they can be redirected toward their originally constructive social purpose. His radical solution of establishing a creative elite aims at elevating the philosophe of genius to a position of power, comparable to that of the sovereign, in order to restore social unity and moral purpose.

In summary, Rousseau studies in his *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* the relationship between the government, philosophic letters, and the general condition of man. His method of study proves to be the moral-philosophic one which
insists on considering the whole of the cultural problem involved in what he views as the abused status of literature.

Rousseau's approach to literary criticism is based mainly on social and moral criteria such as virtue, honesty, sincerity and utility, (p. 104). He refuses to divorce literature from life and aesthetics from ethics. Consequently, his argumentation forms an explanation of the aesthetic, social, and moral duties of the philosophe.

Due to his frequent attacks on the philosophes, there is no doubt that they bear the brunt of Rousseau's criticism in his first major work. On the negative level of his argumentation, he refers to them as follows: métaphysiens, Beaux-esprits, Gens à la mode, Sophistes, Doctes, ces vains et futiles déclamateurs, une troupe de charlatans, cette foule d'Ecrivains obscurs & de Lettres oisifs, d'Auteurs élémentaires, ces compilateurs d'ouvrages.

On the positive level of his presentation, the one which proves finally to be dominant in his conclusion, Rousseau gives the following titles to the philosophes: quelques Sages, les vrais Savans, Precepteurs du Genre-humain, le Prince de l'Eloquence, ces savans du premier ordre. Infrequently, the philosophes are referred to by the more
traditional, literary titles such as: poètes, poète dramatique, and versificateur. Often, Rousseau uses simply the general category of Artiste.

A minor but significant tendency of Rousseau's comprehensive moral-aesthetics is the inclusion of the plastic arts in his consideration of art's abuses. He criticizes, for example, sculpture for its idealization of pagan virtues to the neglect of modern, Christian ones(p. 149). In particular, Rousseau urges the contemporary painters, Carle Van Loo and Jean-Baptiste-Marie Pierre, and the sculptor, Jean-Baptiste Pigalle to cease prostituting their arts in the illustration of royal grandeur(p. 141).

In view of the extensive roles which Rousseau assigns the philosophe - man of letters, poet, thinker, scientist, and political leader - and the loose distinctions which he makes between the arts and sciences, it becomes apparent that the Premier Discours' all inclusive view of philosophic literature characterizes its conception in the Age of the Enlightenment.

The philosophic literature of the eighteenth century moves toward the assimilation of the developing sciences such as astronomy, biology, and physics in their philosophic ramifications. Speculations on heredity, matter, the
experimental method, and physical abnormalities provide
Diderot, for example, with philosophic points of departure
in his *Lettre sur les sourds et les muets* (1751), *De l'inter-
prétation de la nature* (1754), and the *Rêve de d'Alembert* (1769).

Diderot's fellow *philosophe*, Buffon, compiles in his
forty-four volume *Histoire naturelle* (1749-1788) the greatest
repository of descriptive zoology until recent times. In
his *Théorie de la terre* (1749) and *Époques de la nature* (1788),
he challenges the age given to the earth by theologians.  

The distinction between philosophic literature and
the sciences in the eighteenth century is not a rigid one.  
In truth, it was the duty of the *philosophe*, according to
Diderot's *De l'interprétation de la nature*, to popularize
the sciences.  

In order to accommodate the demands of
philosophic literature, the *philosophes* move away from the
fixed forms of classical literature and incorporate new or
renovated genres such as the discourse, dialogue, essay,
and article.  

Rousseau's broad humanist demands on the *philosophe*
are fulfilled by the major philosophic writers of the day
who transmit their thought through the varied forms of
novels, poems, plays, discourses, dialogues, dictionaries,
short stories, political treatises etc. His ideal of philosophic literature, as manifested in the Premier Discours' program, limits literary creativity to those superior men of talent who can do justice to its varied demands. Despite the aura of sensationalism which surrounds Rousseau's rhetoric, his view of the philosophe conforms, in large part, to the one held by the encyclopedic party as set forth by Diderot in his article, "Philosophe". 60

Rousseau's program does not call for the exclusion of the poet from the state as in the case of Plato's Republic. 61 Even though Rousseau is known to have been an avid reader of Plato, the above analogy is historically inaccurate. 62 He does not think primarily in terms of a literary specialty such as poet, novelist, or dramatist but in the broad humanist one of the philosophe who seeks encyclopedic knowledge. In fact, Rousseau reacts against the excessive tendency toward specialization(p. 150).

Despite Rousseau's idyllic portrayal of the state of nature in the Premier Discours —"C'est un beau rivage paré des seules mains de la nature" — he proposes not the restoration of primitive times but a humanist return to man(p. 140). In truth, his program works within the possibilities of his contemporary institutions. He proposes
that the true philosophe and the king labor together in harmony "à la felicite du Genre-humain" (p. 160). Rousseau's own task in the Premier Discours is that of exploring the proper role of literature in society, a problem "qui tient au bonheur du genre humain" (p. 93).

Rousseau's program is designed to inspire and enable the philosophe to cope with the immensity of his socio-cultural tasks. It elevates his reputation and prestige by discouraging the participation in letters by those who would undermine valid, philosophic authority. Rousseau advises the King to welcome the superior philosophes into positions of power (p. 160). His directive constitutes a limitation on the rights of the sovereign. He is to share his authority with the philosophes in order to restore a just unity to society and to reorient letters for the public good rather than to restrict them to the illustration of his reign and political image.

In conclusion, Rousseau insists that the philosophe participate actively in the total life of his day. He is to be sociable as Diderot says or engagé in twentieth century terms. He puts his literary works in the service of humanity. For him, the closed world of aesthetic criteria and judgments can never suffice. He lends himself to the
exploration of general, moral, and philosophic problems or questions such as inequality, the role of education, the nature of man etc. His ethical standards of authorship are just as high as those of his social conduct. In short, he shows himself to be a superior man "plein d'humanité". 64
Footnotes


Note: all references to this work are based on the above edition and will be indicated in the future simply by a parenthesis and the page number.


5 See Havens, p. 19 who follows the convention of Rousseau scholarship by explaining the composition in the Premier Discours by Rousseau's description of it in the Confessions.

6 See Chapter I, p. 19 of this dissertation.

7 See L. Delaruelle, "Les Sources de J.-J. Rousseau dans le Premier Discours," Revue d'Histoire littéraire de la France, XIX(1912), p. 258 who uses the term, "la science des lettres" which grasps the general, non-technical significance which Rousseau gives to the word science.

8 See Chapter II, p. 54 of this dissertation.

9 Here we see a paradox. Rousseau is accused often by his critics (see Voltaire's Lettre à Rousseau) of desiring the return of man to his brute state. In reality, Rousseau defends the dignity of man against the system which determines his worth by the number of his monies. He states:
Footnotes (Cont.)

"Il s'évaluent les hommes comme des troupeaux de bétail" (p. 134).

10 I contend that Rousseau refers, here, to the abuses of political power. It is to be noted that in the first two-thirds of the *Seconde Partie*, Rousseau makes no direct, critical references to the government. He makes only such oblique attacks as these in order to render his solution possible which requires the cooperation of the throne.


13 See Lemaitre, *op. cit.*, p. 99 who labels Rousseau "le grand ennemi des lettres".


16 Both Voltaire in his *Lettres philosophiques* (1734) and Rousseau in *Emile* (1762) attempt to restore dignity to non-artistic callings such as those of the merchant and the artisan.

17 See Chapter II, pp. 61-62 of this dissertation.

18 See Chapter II, p. 54 of this dissertation.

19 See Chapter II p. 59 of this dissertation.

Footnotes (Cont.)


22 See Chapter I p. 21 of this dissertation.


29 See Arthur Lovejoy, "The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality," *Modern Philology*, XXI (November, 1923), pp. 165-186 who distinguishes the following four stages: 1) the primitive or pre-social state, 2) the long, wandering, herd-like state of transition, 3) the patriarchal state composed of family groups and loosely organized villages where song and dance arise, 4) the social state. At this point in the *Premier Discours*, Rousseau is referring to the third stage which comprises his ideal of nature. It is a tribal society and represents a compromise between the two extremes equally undesirable - ignorance and corruption.
Footnotes (Cont.)

30 The unorthodox nature of Rousseau's reasoning is revealed by his acceptance of a pagan mythological rapport between man and his gods.


In his Considerations sur le gouvernement de Pologne (c.a. 1772), Rousseau presents a public program of education designed to reverse the social divisions created by traditional education's emphasis on socio-aesthetic principles.

33 See Rousseau, op. cit. plus., p. 171.

34 See Leo Spitzer, "The Mozarabic Lyric and Theodor Ring's Theories," Comparative Literature, IV(Winter, 1952), pp. 1-22 who corroborates Rousseau's theorized origin of literature by identifying improvised dancing songs of women in the Spring as the origin of Romance lyrical poetry.

35 This major concession was prepared for by the earlier statement: "C'est un grand mal que l'abus du temps. D'autres maux pires encore suivent les Lettres & les arts (p. 133). It does not constitute, therefore, any sudden and illogical turn in Rousseau's argumentation.

36 See Havens, p. 240 who attributes Rousseau's eulogy of Louis XIV to the oratorial tone expected in an academic discourse and not to a rhetorical purpose.


M. Starobinksi recognizes only one solution - that of
the academy program. He dismisses its importance as an attempt by Rousseau to please the Dijon Academy. In contrast, Lester Crocker ignores the academy proposal by mixing it with Rousseau's second solution of the "superior men".

39 See Chapter I, p. 19 of this dissertation.
   In his Idée de la méthode ..., Rousseau identifies the answering of foreseen objections to the discourse's argumentation as the professional responsibility of the philosophic writer.

40 See Diderot, Le Neveu de Rameau (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p. 82 who presents a case study in dialogue form of the moral consequences of a mediocre career in the arts. Rameau is appreciated by salon society more for his wit than his talent and becomes the servant of its vices. He perfects his hypocrisy by studying Molière's plays, L'Avare and Tartuffe.

41 See Rousseau, op. cit., p. 131.


43 See Lemaître, op. cit. plus., p. 83 who maintains that Rousseau's proposal is contradictory. He asks how one is to go about recognizing the true from the false philosophe. According to the text, it is to be done on the basis of natural selection and elimination.


See Crocker, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 212.

See Werner Bahner, op. cit., p. 120 who explains Rousseau's attitude toward the people as follows: "Rousseau renonce à tout acte de soumission au prince de la part du peuple".


See Havens, p. 53 who observes that the Premier Discours' conclusion resembles that of Voltaire's Candide in its rejection of a false optimism and the emphasis on action over speculation.


See Jean Starobinski, op. cit., p. 38.


See Havens, pp. 226-228 who identifies the artist, Jean-Baptiste-Marie Pierre as having designed the fable of Prometheus and the Satyr on the title page of the Premier Discours' first edition.

57 See Maurice Dumas, *Histoire de la science* (Ste. Catherine, Brussels: Gallimard, 1957), p. 523 who refers to "le double titre" of the philosophes such as Hobbes who joins science together with philosophic materialism.


63 Diderot, *ibid.* , p. 276.

64 *Ibid.*
CHAPTER IV

TOWARD THE RECONCILIATION

OF INSTRUIRE AND PLAIRE

Rousseau's first major work, *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750), launches his controversial literary career. The polemics which arise after its publication last for three years and offer Rousseau maximum exposure to the reading public. Of even greater importance, his thesis is challenged by some of the leading academicians of the age. Consequently, he is obliged to defend, clarify, and develop his ideas on literature outside the Premier Discours' rhetorical context of persuasion. In his *Préface d'une seconde lettre à M. Bordes* (1753), Rousseau explains how his dialectic initiated a polemic which led to the development of his thought:

Cette méthode m'a mis dans le cas d'avoir souvent à repliquer, soit pour étendre et éclaircir des idées qui en avaient besoin, soit pour achever de développer toutes les parties de mon Système à mesure que les suffrages m'assuroient l'attention publique.

160
The aim of this chapter is to trace the evolution of Rousseau's attitudes on literature from those presented primarily in the *Premier Discours*. The polemical letters to be analyzed date from 1750 to 1753. They are complemented by the *Préface de Narcisse* (1753) and certain letters from Rousseau's *Correspondance* dating from 1754-1756.

Because the polemical letters are composed in a more conversational and informal style and operate on a less dialectical and theoretical plane, they provide an insight into the more practical demands made upon literature by Rousseau. In the final summary to this chapter, Rousseau's ideas on the academy, the *philosophe*, and the Enlightenment are contrasted with those of D'Alembert in order to give them historical perspective.

In his *Lettre à M. L'Abbé Raynal* (1751), Rousseau clarifies the main philosophic distinction employed in his *Premier Discours'* thesis. He is accused by M. Raynal of appearing to prefer "the European situation" before the Renaissance. In the following reply, Rousseau insists on the disproportion existing between social and intellectual progress in the Enlightenment:

... ; mais qu'entend-il par ce mot situation? L'applique-t-il aux lumières ou aux moeurs, ou s'il confond ces choses que j'ai tant
pris de peine a distinguer? Au reste, comme c'est ici le fond de la question, j'avoue qu'il est très-malladroit à moi de n'avoir fait que sembler prendre parti là-dessus (p. 31).

Progress in one area such as philosophic thought does not correspond necessarily, in Rousseau's opinion, to a similar social advance in humanity, justice, and civic virtue. To the contrary, Rousseau contends that the tendency toward an erudite literature has led to the philosophers' neglect of a humanist study of man and concern for his social and moral perfection.

The second criticism leveled at Rousseau concerns his apparent preference of "la rusticité à la politesse" (p. 31). Rousseau pleads guilty to the charge in the sense which he gives to these words. His reasoning, he explains, opposes rustic virtue with the vanity and "fausse politesse" of the century (p. 31). It is apparent to Rousseau that M. Raynal has not followed the evolution of his argument in the Premier Discours which is based upon "les distinctions" (oppositions) such as hypocrisy and simplicity (p. 31).

More general criticisms of the Premier Discours made by other adversaries are referred to by Rousseau. They criticize its rhetorical style, militant tone, limited content, and lack of practical solutions (p. 32). In his reply to
these objections, Rousseau gives his critics a lesson in objective literary criticism. The Premier Discours should be judged, in his opinion, according to the extent which it fulfills the demands of its genre, the philosophic discourse.

His discourse, Rousseau contends, answers the specific problem posed by the Dijon Academy within the specified length of composition (p. 32). It can not be condemned, therefore, for not treating other questions or all aspects of the particular problem under study (p. 32). Similarly, the work's rhetorical tone obeys the generic conventions of the formal, academy discourse (p. 32). Neither can such a work be expected to propose, in Rousseau's opinion, detailed, practical solutions; for, it is by definition philosophic and speculative (p. 32).

In his conclusion to the Lettre à M. L'Abbe Raynal, Rousseau reaffirms his belief in the truth of the Premier Discours' thesis as follows: "... je suivrai sans scrupule toutes les conséquences de mes principes" (p. 33). He foresees that his critics will oppose his arguments with the cultural virtues of the age such as Lumières, connaissances, bienseance, douceur, politesse, etc. (p. 33). In contrast, Rousseau is committed to the following principles:

Vertu, vérité! m'écrirai-je sans cesse;
vérité, vertu! Si quelqu'un n'apperçoit la que des mots, je n'ai plus rien à lui dire (p. 33).

In his next letter entitled Observations (Réponse à Stanislas) (1751), Rousseau's principles are put to the test by a royal adversary. Being the father to the Queen and patron of the Nancy Academy, King Stanislas personified the union of political and philosophic interests and authority. In answering his social superior, Rousseau defies both of these privileged dominions.

Instead of submitting his manuscript for the King's approval before publishing it, Rousseau decides "... desormais d'être mon unique Censeur". Of even greater audacity, Rousseau addresses the King as his equal. He declares that the allegiance to truth frees the philosophe from observing the social conventions of class distinction, for in matters of reason "les hommes rentrent dans le droit de la Nature, et reprennent leur première égalité" (p. 35).

Rousseau's elevated ideal of literature is made clear in this letter. It goes beyond the acknowledgment of art's intrinsic worth, for he thinks of literature as forming a direct connection to "L'Auteur de toutes choses" (p. 36). Creativity is viewed, in fact, by Rousseau as a king of participation in "la suprême intelligence" (p. 36). Because he
embraces the absolute truth of art and thought, Rousseau is revolted by their misuse. In the following rhetorical question, he enumerates his moral charges against a debased literature:

Mais comment se peut-il faire, que les Sciences dont la source est si pure et la fin si louable, engendrent tant d'impiétés, tant d'hérésies, tant d'erreurs, tant de systèmes absurdes, tant de contrariétés, tant d'inepties, tant de Satyres amères, tant de misérables Romans, tant de Vers licentieux, tant de Livres obscènes; ...(p. 36)?

Unlike the formal dialectic at work in the Premier Discours, this letter provides a clearer insight into the author's rhetorical intention. Rousseau explains, for example, that his attack on literature's detrimental social and moral effects is meant to make "social man" realize the relative value of art(p. 37). By portraying literature's negative effects on society, he hopes that man will give less of himself to art and more of his time to his fellow creatures(p. 37).

Rousseau's defense of virtue is complimented by King Stanislas; but, Rousseau replies, with all due respect, that the time for eulogies has passed(p. 37). He sees the convention of a false, ceremonial politesse as a threat to true progress. Literature carries much of the blame, in his
opinion, for unenlightened royal authority. In a footnote, Rousseau portrays the men of letters as deceiving the king through flattery and out of self-interest as follows:

Tous les Princes, bons et mauvais, seront toujours bassement et indifféremment loués, tant qu'il y aura des Courtisans et des Gens de Lettres (p. 37).

The true mission of literature, as Rousseau sees it, is not that of either amusing or enlightening man but that of rendering "un Peuple libre" - the best eulogy of a just kingdom (p. 38). 6

Rousseau displays a keen awareness as to the power of literature. He blames, for example, the Docteurs of the sixteenth century for kindling the spirit of self-interest, fanaticism, and intolerance which bring violence and social disintegration (p. 48). Peace and progress depend to a large extent, therefore, on the manner in which letters are practiced.

Rousseau reacts against the values of his age which oppose enlightenment to ignorance. In his mind, ignorance or simplicity contrasts with presumption and is not synonymous with barbarism. The ignorance of the Middle Ages meets Rousseau's disapproval, but he prefers it to the violent righteousness inspired by "la renaissance des Lettres" (p. 48).
In his consideration of the question of ignorance, Rousseau insists rightly on a distinction between "une ignorance féroce et brutale", and "une ignorance raisonnable" (p. 54). The former is born of a destructive disposition and corrupt principles; leads to crime, the neglect of duties, and the brutalization of human nature (p. 54). In contrast, "reasonable ignorance" derives from love of simplicity and indifference to worldly distinctions; consists of limiting one's curiosity to the reach of one's faculties; leads to happiness and virtue (p. 54). However, Rousseau adds in a footnote that ignorance does not necessarily lead to virtue anymore than does enlightenment (p. 54).

Rousseau's distinctions and oppositions explain the function which he assigns his thesis. It is intended to moderate the excesses of the philosophes. Rousseau fears that the genuine spirit of the Enlightenment runs the danger of becoming a closed, dogmatic doctrine enforced by a rigid party discipline. In order to expand the moral sensitivities of his century and preserve what is valid from man's cultural past, Rousseau appoints himself the "devil's advocate" to the "encyclopedic party".

Rousseau seeks to humble and humiliate the philosophes by injecting a salutary doubt in their minds as to the
supposed absolute good of the enlightenment. His dialectic aims not at undermining their philosophic ideals; it attempts to humanize and broaden them. In response to the philosophic opinion that regards philosophy as elevating man to his creator, Rousseau rejoins that it inflates more often his vanity (p. 41). Furthermore, Rousseau discounts the view that one has to be a philosophe in order to appreciate the beauty and marvels of the universe (p. 41).

If learning and letters comprise a natural inclination of man, as King Stanislas proposes, Rousseau concludes that man must learn to control it as he does his other natural yearnings (p. 41). Society can not hope to progress toward justice, according to Rousseau's thought, if its most capable citizens ignore their civic and moral duties to humanity through the perfection of talents and the pursuit of aesthetic pleasures.

The study of philosophy and the literary expression of one's thoughts and opinions lead, in Rousseau's opinion, to presumption in most men. Only "un petit nombre de génies" succeed in attaining wisdom (p. 41). Consequently, Rousseau sees two undesirable extremes to be avoided — ignorance and presumption. The latter is judged by Rousseau as being the greater potential threat to moderation and reconciliation in
his century.

Rousseau advises, therefore, a "controlled" Enlightenment in order to avoid needless disorder and futile human suffering. He reiterates his program for the limitation of creativity to the "superior men". A conciliatory tone marks the following passage:

Ces vrais Savans sont en petit nombre, je l'avoue; car pour bien user de la Science \textit{[knowledge]}, il faut réunir de grands talents et de grandes Vertus; or, c'est ce qu'on peut à peine espérer de quelques ames privilégiées, mais qu'on ne doit point attendre de tout un peuple (p. 39).

Rousseau does not content himself, however, with defending his thesis. In an historical review of Christianity, he attempts to demonstrate the destructive self-interested nature of the philosophes. With the rise of the new, revolutionary Christian religion, Rousseau sees the philosophes as collaborating with the pagan priests and unjust governments out of a narrow self-interest. Fearing the loss of their privileges, the philosophes work against the best interests of the people. Rousseau denounces their treachery in the following passage:

Cependant les Prêtres des idoles, non contens de persécuter les Chrétiens, se mirent à les calomnier; les Philosophes qui ne trouvoient pas leur compte dans une Religion qui prêche l'humilité, se
joignirent à leurs Prêtres. Les railleries et les injures pleuvrent de toutes parts sur la nouvelle Secte (p. 45).

In a literature of polemics against the ancient philosophes, Rousseau believes that Christianity adopts the corrupt attitudes of its opponents. Christian apologists indulge in erudition, mythology, and bel esprit (p. 47). Their literary success promotes personal ambitions, vanity, and the desire for distinction and power in the Church (p. 47). Hence, Christianity loses its simplicity and unity of spirit through the attempt to make it more intellectually respectable by dressing it up in ancient philosophy (p. 47).

Rousseau's historical review of the role played by literature in the corruption of Christianity dramatizes the extent to which the belles-lettres are rooted in the decadent foundation of the "social state". Rousseau considers, next, the courses of action available for the reformation of literature's divisive effects on society. They are three in number - revolution, return to primitive simplicity, and evolution.

The burning down of libraries, universities, and academies is judged to be self-defeating by Rousseau, for such destruction would plunge civilization into a barbarism which would defy any type of progress (p. 55). Neither can
man return to his original innocence. Rousseau maintains that even if society could restore equality and abolish luxury and idleness (the economic bases of art), the virtue of innocence can never be regained (p. 56).

Rousseau opts, then for a policy of evolution in which an organized effort should be made to raise both the qualifications of authorship and improve, thereby, the quality of literature's social effects on the course of civilization. In other words, Rousseau regards literature as being capable of too much good for it to be neglected. If the belles-lettres propigate social dissension, disintegration, and injustice, they possess, also, their best possible remedy:

Laissons donc les Sciences et les Arts adoucir en quelque sorte la féroce des hommes qu'ils ont corrompus; cherchons à faire une diversion sage, et tâchons de donner le change à leurs passions (p. 56).

The above statement acts as a capital compromise from Rousseau's platonic ideal of literature. He seems to reconcile himself to a nondestructive literature of diversion as being the best that one can expect from its practice in a corrupt and unjust state. Therefore, Rousseau calls upon the royalty to support the literary arts in order to divert man, at least temporarily, from his more destructive
passions (p. 54). This concession is developed in the Preface de Narcisse (1753), the last work to be studied in this chapter.

Rousseau illustrates the abuse of literature in his Lettre à M. Grimm (1751) by pointing to the course which the polemics on his Premier Discours have taken. Such controversies deteriorate, according to Rousseau, into an academic game which excites the passions of self-love, vanity, and bitterness. The adversaries oppose erudite sources and the truth is lost sight of in the desire for distinction. Rousseau disclaims polemical literature (in which he obviously excels and enjoys) with the following irony:

Les Brochures se transforment en Volumes,
les Livres se multiplient, et la question s'oublie: c'est le sort des disputes de L' érudition, qu'après des in-Folio
de claircissements, on finit toujours
par ne savoir où l'on est: ce n'est pas
la peine de commencer (p. 61).

A false, theoretical optimism characterizes, in Rousseau's opinion, M. Gautier's belief in the beneficial effects of literature and its politesse on the mores of society and the conduct of authors. In contrast, Rousseau contends that his own thesis is based on the direct observation of man (p. 62). Instead of a literature based upon erudition or speculation, Rousseau prefers one that is rooted in social realism. Hence, the writer must close his books and leave his study
in order to observe man in action (p. 62).

Rousseau dismisses *politesse* as a proof of man's social progress. It fabricates, in his opinion, a morality which renders excess and vice acceptable through the illusion of language and style (p. 63). In view of M. Gautier's association of *politesse* with morality, it becomes apparent that a problem of semantics prevents Rousseau and his critics from reaching a common understanding.

Rousseau evaluates literature's social effects on the moral-philosophic principles of truth, virtue, and honesty. In contrast, his critics defend literature's contribution to the progress of man on the basis of such socio-aesthetic ideals as *politesse*, *grandeur*, *bienseance*, *luxe*, and *goût*. The cultural confusion between the moral and aesthetic systems of value is blamed by Rousseau on an education directed toward the formation of aesthetic judgments rather than moral ones (p. 63).

Rousseau places priority upon moral content both in his judgment of a literary work and the worth of a man. An excess of art or style in a book arouses his suspicion just as an excessive *politesse* or *finesse* does in a man's social conduct. Rousseau's preference of a meaningful content over a pleasing form makes itself known in the following
criticism of M. Gautier's composition:

Si la réfutation n'est pas abondante en bons raisonnements, en revanche elle l'est fort en belles déclamations. L'Auteur substitue partous les ornement de l'art à la solidité des preuves qu'il promettait en commençant; ... (p. 65).

The style and tone of M. Gauteir's refutation reflect, in Rousseau's opinion, the same false politesse which he deplores as a product of literature. He accuses his critic of making enemies for him from "les Régens du Collège" to the sovereign himself (p. 67). In order to undermine M. Gautier's position, Rousseau discredits his critic's argument as being the result of self-interest and lack of literary freedom. In the following parody of M. Gautier's address to the Nancy Academy, Rousseau ridicules the servility of the philosophe before his patron:

C'est précisément comme s'il disoit; vous ne pouvez Messieurs, sans ingratitude envers votre respectable Protecteur, vous dispenser de me donner raison; de plus, c'est votre propre cause que je plaide aujourd'hui devant vous; ... (p. 67).

Rousseau's attack on politesse continues in his next polemical letter, Dernière Réponse (à M. Bordes). The thesis of M. Bordes' refutation maintains that the arts "rendent les hommes doux" (p. 72). Rousseau agrees with this observation but distinguishes between two different kinds of
douceur. The better one is active, in his opinion; it is based upon moral conviction and leads to virtue (p. 72). The other type of douceur stems from cowardice and pusillanimity; it looks upon good and evil with equal indifference (p. 72). This latter, passive douceur is the one which, in Rousseau's view, "inspire aux Peuples le goût des Lettres" (p. 72). It follows, according to Rousseau's distinctions, that literature does not lead to greater virtue but to moral indifference. 12

Literature is not pictured by Rousseau as suffering from an irreversible and innate defect. Its detrimental social effects can be reformed, in his opinion, through a greater selectivity in the quality of writers (p. 73). If the practice of the belles-lettres is open to all would-be authors, Rousseau feels that their great ideals become debased. Literature loses, then, its force to exert an elevating influence on man.

Rousseau's thesis supposes a correlation between the quality of a literature and the moral standards of the society to which it is addressed. Since Rousseau judges the aesthetic principles of politesse, goût, bienséance, and plaire as a disguise for the lack of moral-philosophic content, he reaches the same conclusion as to their cause and
effect on the plane of social conduct. The socio-aesthetic principles serve to compensate for the absence of virtue (p. 73). Therefore, the playgoer appears scandalized by the coarse but not obscene puns of a Molière comedy in order to give the impression of personal, moral content (p. 73).

Associated with the socio-aesthetic principles of politesse, is a general aim of literature - plaire. It is condemned by Rousseau as either the unique or major basis of literary art. If the poet seeks only to gain "l'approbation publique", he thinks solely of the means to that end (p. 74). Consequently, the general, moral effect of the work is neglected. In contrast, a "useful" work is written for others rather than out of the desire for personal gain (p. 74). The valid work of art incorporates, therefore the aim of plaire into a broader, general objective of instruire.

In Rousseau's discussion as to the detrimental effects of literature, the following qualities are drawn into play: l'oisiveté, le loisir, le luxe, and l'inégalité. It becomes apparent that Rousseau associates literature with the privileged class. He seems to feel that the elite has reduced the belles-lettres to a passive form of diversion or pastime for the idle.

Rousseau sees the privileged class as having stamped
on literature its amoral, socio-aesthetic values such as grandeur, politesse, goût, and bienséance. It may be concluded, therefore, that Rousseau's reaction against the abuse of literature takes part in a more general condemnation of social injustice. The following revolutionary stance on loisir adds credence to this thesis:

Mais je sais très certainement que nul honnête homme ne peut jamais se vanter d'avoir du loisir, tant qu'il y aura du bien à faire, une Patrie à servir qu'on me montre dans mes principes aucun sens honnête dont ce mot loisir puisse être susceptible (p. 91).

Luxury is attributed, also, a valid, philosophic function by M. Bordes. His point of view represents that of the Enlightenment which regards luxury as "le superflu nécessaire". It is defended by the philosophes as being an incentive to greater production of goods and exchange of monies. In contrast, Rousseau deems luxury as the visible expression of inequality and injustice which shortchanges the poor. Luxury is utilized to provide diversion for the privileged "Citoyens oisifs" and flows into the artist's pocket as follows:

Le luxe nourrit cent pauvres dans nos villes, et en fait périr cent mille dans nos campagnes: l'argent qui circule entre les mains des riches et des artistes pour fournir à leurs superfluités,
Since Rousseau considers luxury as being the economic foundation of eighteenth literature, to call for an equitable distribution of wealth would seem to necessitate the suppression of the belles-lettres. This is not, however, the case. Rousseau advocates a new role for a literature liberated from the luxury of patrons. In contrast to the traditional, politically passive cult of literature, Rousseau proposes one which acts as a formative social force for the well-being of man. It is to cease being the sole property of a leisure class in order to become socially responsive to the general needs of man.

In order that literature exert a beneficial influence on man, Rousseau believes that writers should reexamine the orientation of their values. According to his view, literature substitutes aesthetic ideals for the moral ones of bien faire, the giving of one's self, and a love of one's fellow man (p. 83). It idealizes an aesthetic glory, fortune, and virtue which consist in conquest, exploitation, and the erection of statues and philosophic systems (p. 85).

A new, reformed literature is proposed by Rousseau. It is to elevate and unite man by illustrating self-sacrifice.
and its enthusiasm, fidelity to one's conscience, virtuous acts, and the power of faith (p. 86). Rousseau demands that literature exercise not only the mind and please the bel esprit but nourish the soul in hope and solidarity (p. 82).

Since virtue rather than self-interest forms the foundation of Rousseau's reformed literature, there is no place in his ideal for the writer who collaborates with the unjust system of luxury as represented by wealthy patrons. Rousseau does not believe, as did Diderot, Voltaire and others, that the philosophe should be rich and fraternize with tyrants.  

In the concluding pages of Dernière Réponse, Rousseau summarizes his view of philosophic literature with this tolerant principle: "Oui, corrigeons-nous, et ne philosophons plus" (p. 94). This general conception of literature's function stresses action over passive speculation, thought over reflection and resembles the following sage words of Martin in Candide: "Travaillons sans raisonner, c'est le seul moyen de rendre la vie supportable".  

True wisdom is seen by Rousseau as consisting in self-imposed limitations and discipline. Since nature has already given man so many needs, literature should not multiply them; for, to do so, would put man into greater dependence (p. 95).
Therefore, literature performs its true mission by freeing man from his excessive passions, self-interest, and vanity rather than by awakening new desires and reinforcing old ones. In short, the true practice of literature elevates man and helps him to live better and wiser through the illustration of virtue as follows: "C'est l'office de gens de bien de peindre la vertu la plus belle qu'il se puisse (p. 86).

The deplorable passions aroused in the practice of literature are illustrated by Rousseau in his Lettre à M. Lecat (1752). He accuses his philosophic adversaries of working against the spirit of the Enlightenment by their violent attacks on his Premier Discours. They contest, according to Rousseau, the right and the propriety of his work to win the first prize (p. 97). Consequently, the freedom of speech which made the Dijon Discours possible is repudiated out of their self-interest in the traditional practice of literature.

Rousseau protests the righteous hypocrisy of the amateur philosophes who demand freedom of expression as a natural right of man but condemn it when used to express contrary opinions. They place self-interest above the general welfare as follows:

Mais si j'ai été surpris de l'équité de mes Juges [Dijon Academy], j'avoue que
The awarding of the first prize to his Discours sur les sciences et les arts by the Dijon Academy, a work whose thesis challenges both the aesthetic and socio-political values of an age, constitutes for Rousseau a significant breakthrough in the Enlightenment. He chides his critics for their failure to recognize the broad implications of his Premier Discours and its contribution to freedom of thought and expression (p. 98).

Rousseau sees a contradiction between the professed ideals of the Enlightenment such as equity, justice, and moderation and the violent reaction of the philosophes in the defense of literature's socio-aesthetic values and the traditional organization of education (p. 98). Rousseau implies that the philosophes cannot expect to achieve social reform and, at the same time, reap the benefits of literary occupations fostered by an unjust society. Their self-interest in maintaining the prestige of literary occupations sends them into a collision course with the general interests of man.
The hypocrisy of the philosophes falls under the scrutiny of Rousseau who challenges their claim to the title. Rather than being seekers of the truth, Rousseau shows them to be self-interested, sectarian men who resent his challenge to their intellectual domination of the century. They fear, in Rousseau's opinion, real freedom of debate and enlightened difference of opinion as follows:

... mais je ne sais comment des Philosophes osent trouver mauvais qu'on leur offre des voies de discussion: bel amour de la vérité qui tremble qu'on examine le pour et le contre (p. 99)!

The philosophes dominate public opinion and prevent its true enlightenment by presenting only their own point of view. They do not accept, according to Rousseau, the challenge of presenting opposing arguments to the best of their ability. In view of the philosophes' unethical procedure of refutation, they leave no doubt, in Rousseau's opinion, that their major concern is for a party truth and the defense of its privileged position in the century - "L'enthousiasme universel qui règne aujourd'hui" (p. 98). In short, Rousseau believes that the philosophes fear opposition to their ideology more than they respect the ideal of literature and the confidence of the public.

Rousseau's most fundamental criticism of M. Lecat's
refutation centers on the attitude of the polemicist toward his public. He deplores the subjective, personal level to which the debate on the *Premier Discours* has descended (p. 100). In his opinion, the polemicist owes respect to both his adversary and, most of all, to the reading public as follows:

... le véritable respect qu'on doit au Public, est de lui épargner, non de tristes vérités qui peuvent lui être utiles, mais bien toutes les petites harngeries d'Auteurs dont on remplit les Ecrits polémiques, et qui ne sont bonnes qu'à satisfaire une honteuse animosité (p. 100).

On a positive note, Rousseau offers his polemical letters as a model of ethical refutation; for, they utilize neither invective nor personal attacks to support their arguments (p. 100).

Rather than doing justice to the intellect of the public, Rousseau contends that his adversaries misguide it through the confusion of his life and his thesis. They harp on the apparent contradiction between his cult of "les Belles-Lettres" and his belief in their malevolent effects (p. 101). In his defense, Rousseau maintains that the truth of his ideas do not depend on either his grammar or his conduct both of which are no worse than those of his adversaries
In a more general sense, Rousseau questions the literary and philosophic validity of the polemical letters resulting from the controversy of his Premier Discours. They are characterized, in his opinion, by an excess of enthusiasm and a deficiency in reasoning (p. 101). Such a literature leads, in his view, to the participation of those who are not genuinely qualified to uphold its ethical and intellectual standards of procedure as follows:

... mais il y a au moins cette différence que j'étais seul de mon parti, au lieu que le leur étant celui de la foule, les derniers venus semblent dispensés de se mettre sur leurs rangs, ou obligés de faire mieux que les autres (p. 101).

In summary of this letter, Rousseau deplores the low literary and philosophic level of polemical literature. Passions are aroused more than reason. Bad faith and self-interest distort ethical standards of procedure. The personal life of the author is attacked together with his work. Despite the impressive erudition and art of some of his critics, Rousseau contemplates no major changes in his system or in his personal practice of literature. A useful truth remains his goal in writing. Addressing himself to the question of style, Rousseau reiterates his preference
of clarity over pretentious elegance; because, he writes not for the pedagogue and the amateur thinker but for the serious, valid philosopher as follows:

Ma première règle à moi qui ne me soucie nullement de ce qu'on pensera de mon style, est de me faire entendre; toutes les fois qu'à l'aide de dix solécismes, je pourrai m'exprimer plus fortement ou plus clairement, je ne balancerai jamais. Pourvu que je sois bien compris des Philosophes, je laisse volontiers les puristes courir après les mots (p. 101).

The role of literary independence in the formation of his system forms the central message in Rousseau's last polemical letter, Préface d'une seconde lettre à M. Bordes (1753). Rousseau opens his letter with an aggressive declaration of literary independence. He refuses adherence to the public's desire for termination of the three years' debate on his concept of literature (p. 103). As a free philosopher, he announces that his aim is not that of pleasing but the pursuit of truth. Being committed to this principle, Rousseau declares his readiness to sacrifice all personal ambition in its cause as follows:

... je ne suis point d'humeur à sacrifier mon zèle pour la vérité au soin de ma réputation, et je revois pas pourquoi je craindrois tant d'ennuyer des Lecteurs à qui je crains si peu de déplaire (p. 103).
The heated controversy over his Premier Discours proves to be beneficial to Rousseau's philosophic development and belief in himself. His principles survive the test of public debate during which Rousseau preserves his professional dignity; confounds his adversaries; refines the mechanism of his organized vue du monde. In the following passage, Rousseau attributes his success to courage, independence, and seriousness of purpose:

Je crois avoir découvert de grandes choses et je les ai dites avec une franchise assé dangereuse, sans qu'il y ait beaucoup de mérite à tout cela; car non indépendence a fait mon courage et de longues méditations m'ont tenu lieu de Génie(p. 103).

Contrary to the social ideal of French culture as represented by l'honnête, homme, Rousseau believes that the philosophic writer draws his inspiration more from private meditation than from social intercourse(p. 103).21 In his opinion, society life impedes free thought through the restrictions of an irrelevant politesse(p. 103). In order to best represent the cause of humanity, Rousseau implies that an objective distance between the philosophe and society is a major prerequisite.

It is the philosophe's duty, in Rousseau's opinion, to oppose the absurdity of man's condition.23 His task is
recognized by Rousseau as being a futile one which will bring about little significant change in exterior reality and only anguish to the writer (p. 104). In return for his attempt to restore human dignity to the man of the "social state", Rousseau expects only society's hostility as follows:

Je sais fort bien que la peine que je prends est inutile, et ne n'ai point dans mes exhortations le chimérique plaisir d'espérer la reforme des hommes: Je sais qu'ils se moqueront de moi parceque je les aime et de mes maximes parcequ'elles sont profitables (p. 104).

Despite the condemnation inherent in his vocation, Rousseau refuses to remain silent. Inaction constitutes for Rousseau a collaboration in the oppression of man. Consequently, he chooses to inform man of his alternatives in life and to make him aware of the choices implicit in his conduct. This is what Rousseau means when he refers to "la vérité utile" (p. 107).

There exists, also, a positive aspect to the philosophe's confrontation with the false values of his century. Rousseau reaps a personal harvest from the acceptance of his literary role. He is fascinated by the expanding intellectual grasp of his system but is wary of its dangers as follows:

Ce triste et grand Système, fruit d'un
examen sincère de la nature de l'homme, de ses facultés et de sa destination, m'est cher, quoiqu'il m'humilie; car je sens combien il nous importe que l'orgueil ne nous fasse pas prendre le change sur ce qui doit faire notre véritable grandeur, et combien il est à craindre qu'à force de vouloir nous éléver au dessus de notre nature nous ne retombions au dessous d'elle (p. 105).

Rousseau's consciousness of his system of thought is established in this letter. He refers to it, at one point, as "un Système vrai mais affligeant" (p. 106). Three more times during the course of the letter he speaks of "mon Système". Rousseau credits the Discours de Dijon for the discovery of his system and advises his adversaries to read it carefully as follows:

Souvent la pluspart de mes Lecteurs auront du trouver mes discours mal liés et presque entièrement découssus, faute d'apercevoir le tronc dont je ne leur montrois que les rameaux. Mais c'en étoit assez pour ceux qui savent entendre, et je n'ai jamais voulu parler aux autres (p. 106).

Rousseau sums up his ideas on literature, which have been enlarged upon in the course of the polemical letters, in the Préface de Narcisse (1753).²⁴ It is in this essay that the socio-political significance of Rousseau's attack on literature's abuses is made most clear. Of equal importance, he compromises on his ideal of literature and sets forth its
minimum requirements. On the more subjective level of his argument, Rousseau defends the truth of his ideas against the charge of inconsistency between his life and his work.

The questions of intention, motive, and sincerity are involved in the first criticism answered by Rousseau. His critics charge that he chose a paradox in his Premier Discours in order to demonstrate his rhetorical virtuosity. Such a refutation insults, in Rousseau's opinion, the purpose of literature. He denounces it as reflecting a frivolous attitude toward philosophic letters as follows:

Voilà un bel honneur qu'ils font en cela à la science qui sert de fondement à toutes les autres; et l'on doit croire que l'art de raisonner sert de beaucoup à la découverte de la vérité, quand on le voit employer avec succès à démontrer des foiles (p. 961).

Rousseau regards the "paradox" accusation as a tactic for dismissing the truth of a thesis without confronting it. It is the duty of the critic, in his opinion, to assume the author's seriousness of purpose in a philosophic work and seek better arguments in order to refute it (p. 961). Furthermore, Rousseau maintains that nothing in his writings or conduct contradicts the essential truth of his system (p. 961).

The question of sincerity is linked to the criterion of a correspondance between the life and the work of the
author. It is regarded by Rousseau's critics as a test of veracity and validity of ideas. Rousseau disputes the truth of this criterion. Acting as a literary theorist, he exposes the highly hypothetical and subjective nature of the principle of correspondance.

The critics can not demonstrate, Rousseau contends, that a work is not born of "bonne foi" even if the author's conduct is erroneous (p. 962). To expect a perfect consistency between word and deed, sentiment and act is to demand an unattainable, absolute ideal (p. 962). Contradictions characterize human behavior, and it is only in the realm of ideas that true consistency is possible, according to the following passage:

Qu'on me montre des hommes qui agissent toujours conséquemment à leurs maximes, et je passe condamnation sur les miennes. Tel est le sort de l'humanité, la raison montre le but et les passions nous en écartent (p. 362).

The negative judgment of his acts does not determine, to Rousseau's way of thinking, either the sincerity of his motives, "mon sentiment", or the truth of his principles (p. 962). Rousseau implies that his reasonings are evaluated justly when they are opposed to other, contrary arguments rather than by their exterior manifestations which are
In order to correct the false periphrases given to his *Premier Discours* thesis, Rousseau restates it as follows:

Le goût des lettres annonce toujours chez un peuple un commencement de corruption qu'il accélère très promptement (p. 965).

This simplified restatement of his thesis corroborates my contention that Rousseau is referring primarily to philosophic literature when he speaks of the arts and sciences. Again, Rousseau traces the cult of letters to idleness, inequality, and the desire for distinction (p. 965).

Rousseau relates the sources and effects of literature to the organization of the state in which they are practiced. The *Préface de Narcisse* illustrates my hypothesis that Rousseau's attack on literature acts as part of a broader condemnation of socio-political abuses. In a well constituted state, Rousseau proposes that each citizen has his duties to fulfill; no one has leisure for frivolous speculation; all citizens are equal (p. 963). Rousseau's assault on the state as the cause of literature's abuses as well as others of greater magnitude culminates in the following declaration:

Etrange et funeste constitution où
les richesses accumulées facilitent toujours les moyens d'en accumuler de plus grands, et où il est impossible à celui qui n'a rien d'acquérir quelque chose; ... où les fripons sont les plus honorés, ..., et moi j'en découvre les causes, et je fais voir une chose très-consolante et très-utile en montrant que tous ces vices n'appartiennent pas tant à l'homme, qu'à l'homme mal gouverné (p. 969).

The socio-political effects of literature concern Rousseau most. He blames philosophic literature for leading to a negative social disintegration without offering positive alternatives in the following passage:

Le goût de la philosophie relâche tous les liens d'estime et de bienveillance qui attachent les hommes à la société, c'est peut-être le plus dangereux des maux qu'elle engendre (p. 967).

The cult of literature produces, in Rousseau's opinion, unnatural and inhuman social and psychological effects in most writers which exercise, in turn, a destructive force on society.

The writer's immersion into the world of art and thought results, according to Rousseau, in a complete reordering of his life values. He ceases, first of all, to identify with the common cause of humanity for he recognizes allegiance only to art and its aesthetic values (p. 967). Rousseau implies that the artist or writer begins to judge
men as art objects.

Aesthetic and philosophic intolerance and scorn for mediocrity lead to the loss of the writer's humanity (p. 967). Eventually, he recognizes no duty to the state (p. 967). Through implication, he joins with others of his profession who compose together a state within a state. They erect their own criterion of citizenship and refuse to recognize those of family, humanity, and country (p. 967).  

Rousseau's indictment of the inhuman and anti-social effects of literature when cultivated by unexceptional philosophes constitutes a reaction against one of the Enlightenment's fundamental socio-economic tenents - the principle of self-interest. It was regarded by the philosophes as a sound economic basis for the distribution of wealth in society. They claim, according to Rousseau, to arrive at the general good through a mutual dependence based on "l'intérêt personnel" (p. 968).

Just as the philosophes propose self-interest as the economic basis of the state, they condone, in Rousseau's opinion, the practice of a literature based on the principles of personal interest, ambition, and the desire for distinction. Rousseau shows himself to be the Montesquieu of literary criticism in a sense, for he demands that literature
be founded on virtue or the love of duty and the common good above the self.

Based upon observation rather than on theory alone, Rousseau judges the principle of self-interest as promoting economic and artistic slavery, hypocrisy, and exploitation (p. 968). Two groups realize the greatest personal profit from a state organized on the principle of self-interest - "des riches et des raisonneurs, c'est à dire des ennemis de la vertu et du sens commun" (p. 969). In view of the malevolent socio-political effects of self-interest which promotes social inequality, injustice, and the corruption of writers, Rousseau rejects it as the founding principle of literature.

Literature is deemed by Rousseau as having a socio-political mission contrary to that of personal gain. If practiced according to its ideal, Rousseau implies that it leads to a human solidarity based upon the belief in the dignity of man rather than upon an unjust, enslaving interdependence. Hence, he argues for the positive principle of virtue as its basis rather than the negative one of personal interest.

Due to "social man's" strong tendency toward self-interest, Rousseau regards most men as being unsuited to
practice literature in a truly enlightened and disinterested manner - "La science n'est point faite pour l'homme en général" (p. 970). Only "quelques génies sublimes" show themselves capable of arriving at useful truths while remaining immune to the passions of vanity and self-interest (p. 970). They avoid the loss of humanity engendered in the less endowed by "le goût des lettres" (p. 970).

In the conclusion to his Préface de Narcisse, Rousseau moves from the theoretical plane of his dialectic to that of practical application. His thesis states that the rebirth of letters has not led to moral progress. The ideal solution to this situation is contained in his proposal of limiting the practice of literature to the "Précepteurs du Genre-humain" who are to work as equals with the king for the good of humanity.

The problem involved in the practical application of this ideal solution situates the question on the level of social action. It inquires into the form and the function which literature will take in the general life of the community. Are the belles-lettres to be limited completely to the "supérieur men"? Rousseau answers in the negative.

In addressing himself to the applied aspect of his thesis, Rousseau makes the ultimate of concessions. The real
problem, he declares, is not that of returning man to virtue but that of conserving the goodness which remains in him (p. 972). Since a state of virtue proves to be no longer possible for "social man", Rousseau concludes that his socio-aesthetic "virtues" or principles are better than none at all.

Rousseau does not urge man to abandon literature as a popular, social activity. But he does call upon the philosophe to make it function for the best possible good. Literature must find the remedy for its own abuses as follows:

En second lieu, les mêmes causes qui ont corrompu les peuples servent quelquefois à prévenir une plus grande corruption; ... et c'est ainsi que les arts et les sciences après avoir fait éclorer les vices sont nécessaires pour les empêcher de se tourner en crimes; elles les couvrent au moins d'un vernis qui ne permet pas au poison de s'exhaler aussi librement (p. 972).

Rousseau concedes, in short, the relative, social value of the socio-aesthetic principles. They do check, after all, the passions to some extent and exert some order on society as follows:

Elles détruisent la vertu, mais elles en laissent le simulacre public qui est toujours une belle chose. Elles introduisent à sa place la politesse et les bienséances, et à la crainte de paroître méchant elles substituent celle de paroître ridicule (p. 972).

Rousseau seems to indicate that "social man" possesses moral
principles to his measure.

Since literature can not hope to restore a primitive virtue which is lost forever, it can serve at least an honest diversion. Rousseau makes this concession to a previously criticized "frivolité" in the following passage:

Il ne s'agit plus de porter les peuples à bien faire, il faut seulement les occuper à des niaiseries pour les détourner des mauvaises actions; il faut les amuser au lieu de les prêcher (p. 972).

Rousseau restores the function of plaire to his conception of literature's role in society. He reestablishes it, however, on the basis of reason rather than upon tradition. In the course of his dialectic, he has sought to re-adjust the distorted balance between plaire and instruire. Rather than leading to virtue, literature promises, at least, to divert man's attention from self-preoccupation and personal interest. Music and theatre provide, in Rousseau's opinion, the most engaging art forms for this purpose (p. 973). ^27

In the conclusion to his Préface de Narcisse, Rousseau attempts, also, to evaluate the propriety of his participation in literature on the basis of his own theoretical criterion. It is too early, in his opinion, to decide whether he can be counted among the small number of "superior men" (p. 973). However, he feels that he has accepted the challenge
of philosophic literature by forfeiting his own tranquility and private life through a confrontation with the problems of man (p. 973). Until the effects of his talent makes themselves sufficiently clear, Rousseau proposes to continue his opposition to the abuses of literature as follows:

En attendant, j'ecrirai des Livres, je ferai des Vers et de la Musique, si j'en ai le talent, le temps, la force et la volonte: Je continuera a dire tres franchement tout le mal que je pense des lettres et de ceux qui les cultivent, et croirai n'en valoir pas moins pour cela (p. 974). 28

In summary, Rousseau concludes this phase of his attack on literature in a spirit of reconciliation and compromise. He seeks to accommodate his dialectic to the life of "social man". The enemy, as Rousseau reaffirms, is not literature by its abuses. He calls upon the philosophe to inject new moral and social significance into his works.

The traditional practice of literature is viewed by Rousseau as a social activity restricted mainly to an elite, salon or aristocratic class. He associates it with the socio-economic characteristics of the privileged few - leisure, luxury, and vanity. The belles-lettres serve as an amusing pastime; reinforce the patron's vanity; sanctions class privileges and inequality.
Rousseau sees such a restricted practice of literature as a cultural theft which has been forced upon the larger community. He demands that it revive its interest in the study of man and his total social, political, and philosophic problems. Literature is not to be the private property of the few but give meaning in life to the many.

Rousseau's condemnation of literature's abuses takes part, therefore, in a broader criticism of the Enlightenment and eighteenth century institutions. To his way of thinking, the philosophes oppose themselves to the people by considering ignorance as a barbarism and the enemy of the Enlightenment. Rousseau pleads the case of an expanded, humanized philosophic movement and concept of progress.

Fundamental socio-political conventions which are sanctioned by society and reinforced through literature and education pose the real threat to the Enlightenment in Rousseau's opinion. He sees injustice rather than ignorance as the real challenge of the age. The following passage from his Lettre à Voltaire (1755), exemplifies Rousseau's attempt at a rapprochement between the philosophes and popular virtue or simplicity:

Recherchons la première source de tous les désordres de la société: Nous trouverons que tous les maux des hommes leur viennent.
Freedom and equality are key words in Rousseau's examination of the author's role in society. The freedom, equality, dignity, and independence which Rousseau demands for the writer comprise the same justice which he advocates for all men. Exterior controls on the creative genius whether overt as in the case of patronage or disguised as in the salon's socio-aesthetic code of goût, politesse, and bien-séance are deemed to be sterilizing and inhibiting by Rousseau.

In his Lettre à Franz Christof Scheyb (1756), Rousseau defends the dignity of the true philosophe before his patron. Creative genius is by nature free in Rousseau's opinion. It thrives in freedom and can never be completely borrowed, lent, or suppressed. Rousseau sees genius as its own best guide. It transcends, therefore, the need of conventional regulation and external authority as follows:

On peut acheter la science et même les Savans, mais le génie qui rend le savoir utile ne s'achète point; il ne connoit ni l'argent, ni l'ordre des Princes, il ne leur appartient point de la faire naître, mais seulement de l'honorer, il vit et s'immobilise avec la liberté qui lui est naturelle, ...
(loc. cit., IV, 27).
The traditional rapport between the author and his patron is reversed by Rousseau. The Prince exists to serve the poet and his century through the preservation of superior talent. Since genius is by nature free and independent, Rousseau goes so far as to state that there exists no necessary correlation between progress and patronage. In fact, Rousseau hypothesizes that patronage may be detrimental to the sense of risk involved in the creative act. In the following passage continued from above, Rousseau discounts the importance of patronage:

Tachons donc de ne pas confondre le vrai progrès des talens avec la protection que les Princes peuvent leur accorder. Les Sciences règnent pour ainsi dire à la Chine depuis deux mille ans sans y pouvoir sortir de l'enfance, tandis qu'elles sont dans leur vigueur en Angleterre où le gouvernement ne fait rien pour elles. L'Europe est vraiment inondée de gens de Lettres, les gens de mérite y sont toujours rares; les écrits durables le sont encore plus, et la postérité croira qu'on fit bien peu de livres dans ce Siècle où l'on en fait tant (loc. cit., IV, 28).

The majority of Rousseau's ideas on creative independence have been absorbed into contemporary thought through their dramatization by the Romantics. In order to comprehend the revolutionary character of his attitudes on the traditional practice of literature, a contrast with one of
Rousseau's contemporaries is required. The more traditional philosophe, D'Alembert, fills the need in his following essays: the Préface of Eloge lus dans les séances publiques de l'Académie française (1779), Essai sur la société des gens de lettres et des grands (1753), and Réflexions sur le goût (1753).

D'Alembert's observations on goût in Réflexions ... prove the contemporary nature of Rousseau's attack on this socio-aesthetic principle. The application of l'esprit philosophique to aesthetics has resulted, according to D'Alembert, in the reexamination of all that is the object of goût. He refers to this principle as "la superstition littéraire" which served wrongly to justify everything in the ancients (loc. cit.). He defines goût in his Préface of Eloge ... as "le sentiment délicat des convenances" (loc. cit., II, 158).

The disparity in conceptions of literature's role in society held by D'Alembert and Rousseau derives from the questions of patronage and social action. Rousseau stipulates, for example, in his discussion of academies that they be composed of "les savans du premier ordre" who are to dedicate themselves to the moral edification of humanity. In contrast, D'Alembert conceives of the academy's function
in a more traditional and class-conscious manner.

D'Alembert confers upon the academy the more restricted, socio-aesthetic aim of "la perfection du goût" (loc. cit.). Since "les habitants de la cour" excel in the refinements of plaire and agrément, as witnessed by their polite language, D'Alembert judges the courtier as being naturally qualified for equal membership in the French Academy (loc., cit., 157).

Rather than upgrading literary standards and inspiring a humanist literature, D'Alembert proposes an academy designed to defend the privileges of the noble class. He criticizes the philosophes who demand equality of opportunity in literature as follows:

Et comment les gens de lettres pourraient ils envier ou méconnaître les prérogatives si légitimes des autres états (loc. cit., p. 158)?

In contrast to Rousseau's demand that social distinctions be based on natural differences such as talent and sensitivity rather than on conventional ones of position, D'Alembert regards class privileges as being part of the natural order. He urges the philosophes, therefore, to be "persuadés enfin de l'inégalité des rangs, que celle des esprits" (loc. cit., 160).

Unlike Rousseau who favors a direct sharing of political power by the "true philosophes" and an independent
academy, D'Alembert sees no conflict of interest or struggle for power between the academy and the throne. In his *Essai sur la société* ... , D'Alembert reviews the historical relationship between political stability and the progress of literature. He condones the government's use of the belles-lettres in order to reinforce its own power as follows:

> Il _Charles V_ fut sans doute assez éclairé pour sentir, au milieu des troubles qui agitaient son royaume, que la culture des lettres est un des moyens les plus infallibles d'assurer la tranquillité des monarchies, par une raison qui peut rendre au contraire cette même culture nuisible aux républiques quand elle est poussée trop loin; c'est que l'attrait qui l'accompagne, isole pour ainsi dire les hommes, et les rend froids sur tout autre objet (*loc. cit.*, IV, 337).

D'Alembert binds together the fortune of literature together with that of the throne in *Préface* or *Eloges* ... . He shows no fear as to the monarch's personal, political ambitions and associates royal interests with those of the academy. In fact, D'Alembert invites the king, in the following passage, to manipulate the academies as he sees fit:

> Chaque siècle a de même ses erreurs chéris, toujours contraire aux vrais intérêts des peuples, souvent même à ceux de l'autorité légitime; et c'est à la destruction lente et paisible de ces erreurs, que le gouvernement peut employer avec succès les sociétés littéraires, surtout une compagnie semblable...
a celle dont les productions, faites pour être repandues, doivent être plus propres à fléchir et à diriger les opinions vers le bien général de la nation et du souverain (loc. cit., II, 156).

In contrast to his views on the academy, D'Alembert concurs with Rousseau as to the servile condition of the eighteenth century writer. In fact, his observations make those of Rousseau appear mild. Rousseau complains, as we recall, that the salon society's socio-aesthetic code forces the writer to conform to its effeminate taste in order to achieve recognition.33

A similar but more radical charge is made by D'Alembert. He portrays the eighteenth century author in his Essai sur la société ... as being virtually without individual rights. Awards go generally to men of birth he contends matter-of-factly(loc. cit., IV, 355). He warns the philosophe not to compete with his social superiors(loc. cit.).

There exist, in D'Alembert's opinion, five different levels of writers who court the patronage of the nobles. The first four groups represent varying degrees of the "lackey" starting with the "slave" and ending with the flatterer(loc. cit.) The fifth group represents the "sage". He respects social prerogatives and conventions; knows how to manage prejudices ("et qu'il salue les idoles du peuple
quand l'on y oblige"); makes no show of pleasing; finds consolation in his talents and virtue; laughs without anger at the "great" whom he is obliged to court (loc. cit., IV, 357).

It is evident that D'ALEMBERT judges creative independence on the part of the eighteenth century writer as an impossible, dangerous goal. His views on patronage resemble those of Voltaire and Diderot who believed that the philosophe should court the wealthy and be rich. It is not surprising, therefore, that D'Alembert urges the philosophes to adopt a passive or at least, a patient role in social transformation as follows:

... le propre de la vraie philosophie est de ne forcer aucune barrière, mais d'attendre que les barrières s'ouvrent devant elles, ou de se detourner quand elles ne s'ouvrent pas (loc. cit., IV, 339).

D'ALEMBERT'S view as to the proper role of the writer in society lies in direct opposition to that of Rousseau. The latter would label D'Alembert's preferred conduct of the "sage" as being based upon hypocrisy, self-interest, and the forfeiture of literary independence for luxury. Instead of playing servant to the patron's vices and collaborating in social injustice, Rousseau advocates confrontation both in word and deed as seen in his *Lettre au pasteur Jean Perdriaud* (1754):
Il y a je ne sais quelle circonspection pulsillanime fort goûtée en ce siècle et qui voyant par tout des inconvénients se borne par sagesse à ne faire ni bien ni mal; j'aime mieux une hardiesse généreuse qui pour bien faire secoue quelquefois le puérile joug de la bienséance.  

Social utility and change characterize Rousseau's concept of literature. It does not reinforce injustice and inhumanity; it aims at freeing man from oppression and the renovation of his dignity. In his *Lettre à Etienne-Noël Damilaville* (1755), Rousseau defends the "true philosophes" in their social action. It includes an ironic attack on class privileges as follows:

Les Philosophes, dit-on voudroient tous les états, & ne rendre de devoirs à personne. Non, Messieurs, non, les Philosophes ne veulent rien confondre; ils ne sont jaloux ni de la bonne chère qui vous tue, ni de la carosse qui vous empêche de vous servir de vos jambes, ni des domestiques insolents qui vous pillent; ... Vous savez bien que c'est l'égalité [sous les lois] qu'ils demandent, & qui est nécessaire dans tout État bien gouverné; mais vous leur prêtez des sottises, parce que vous n'oseriez combattre les vérités qu'ils soutiennent (loc. cit., III, 80).

Rousseau proposes, therefore, a literature that deals with the broad socio-political problems of man. He is repelled by a literature which finds its sole *raison d'être* in functioning as the "polite" diversion of an idle,
privileged class. Because his critics oblige him to give his dialectic a pragmatic form, Rousseau concedes the necessity of literature as an honest diversion in his *Préface de Narcisse*. Despite his adamant demand for literary freedom and his romantic refusal to conform to the feudal social code of his day, Rousseau's general concept of literature reflects that of the Age of Ideas.

It stresses content and instruction while relegating form and style to supporting roles. The mind and the conscience are addressed more so than the cultivated aesthetic sensitivities as seen in this passage from *Lettre au ministre* Jacob Vernes (1755):

> Des ouvrages graves et profonds, peuvent nous honorer, tout le colifichet de cette petite philosophie à la mode nous va fort mal. Les grands objets tels que la vertu et la liberté étendent et fortifient l'esprit, les petits tels que la Poesie et les beaux Arts lui donnent plus de délicatesse et de subtilité ... Laissons en donc les raffinements à ces myopes de la littérature ...

(*loc. cit.*, III, 116).
Footnotes


Note: all references made to the polemical letters are based on this edition and will be indicated simply by the page number.

2 This letter appeared in the June, 1751 copy of the *Mercure* at the same time as M. Raynal's refutation. Being friends, M. Raynal allowed Rousseau to read his critique before publishing it.

3 See Montesquieu, *Oeuvres complètes* (Dijon: Gallimard, 1951), II, p. 255 who defines vertu in *De l'esprit des lois* as Rousseau uses it here:

> Je parle ici de la vertu politique qui est la vertu morale, dans le sens qu'elle dirige au bien général: .... .

4 This letter appeared in the September, 1751 copy of the *Mercure*. Its general title, *Observations*, avoids public confrontation between Rousseau and his royal adversary, King Stanislas.


6 See Werner Bahner, "Le Mot et la notion de peuple dans l'oeuvre de Rousseau," *Studies on Voltaire*, LV. Ed. by Besterman (Geneva: Institut Voltaire, 1967), p. 127 who maintains that Rousseau aimed at building a united society in order to assure a body politic based on the principles of liberty and equality while the encyclopedists sought mainly to dispel prejudices through "la diffusion des lumieres."


This more conservative philosophe and early spokesman of the encyclopedists presents in his *Préface of Eloges lus dans les séances publiques de l'Académie Françoise* (1779) the same desire as Rousseau for a "controlled" enlightenment but from a more aristocratic viewpoint.
Footnotes (cont'd.)

8 The literary motif and political reality of "conspiracy" forms again one of Rousseau's dialectical building blocks. It corroborates my interpretation of Rousseau's concept as to the relationship between the writer, the government, and the public in the Premier Discours.

9 Rousseau's use of the term philosophe transcends its literary context of an eighteenth century philosophic writer. It takes on the meaning of an ideological force present in all civilizations.

10 The Lettre à M. Grimm is dated November 1, 1751. It is addressed to Rousseau's friend, M. Grimm, in order to avoid giving the prestige of a direct reply to M. Gautier, member of the Royal Academy of Nancy founded by King Stanislas. M. Gautier published his refutation in the October 1751 issue of the Mercure.

11 Rousseau addressed this letter to M. Charles Bordes, writer and member of the Lyon Academy, in the April 1752 edition of the Mercure.

12 In a footnote, Rousseau pictures himself as the modern day Socrates who defends truth and virtue against the philosophes, hypocrites, fanatics, and self-interested artists (p. 73).


17 The Lettre à M. Lecat appeared, in brochure form, at Lyon in 1752. A copy is preserved at the Bibliothèque de Genève. It is addressed to Claude-Nicolas Lecat, permanent secretary of the Rouen Academy of Sciences. In his refutation, M. Lecat referred falsely to himself as a member of the Dijon Academy. The latter disavowed promptly his membership.
Footnotes (cont'd.)

18 See Chapter I, p. 17 of this dissertation.

19 According to Rousseau's dialectic there exists no contradiction between his thesis and his practice of literature provided that he show himself to be a "superior man." Rousseau considers this question in Préface de Narcisse, the last work to be examined in this chapter.

20 This letter appeared in Paris, during the month of September, 1753. It follows the Préface de Narcisse (January, 1753) but was left incomplete by Rousseau who felt that the controversy no longer held interest for the Parisian public. In addition, his attention was captured by a new question posed by the Dijon Academy in November, 1753 which inspires eventually his second major work, Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité.

21 See D'Alembert, op. cit., IV, p. 361 who recognizes in his Essai sur la société de gens des lettres (1753) that not all of the philosophes must court the society of the great, for the "discoveries of Descartes and Newton were not made in the Hotel de Rambouillet."


24 Rousseau obtained the right to publish Narcisse from the censor, Condillac, on January 11, 1753. Two editions of the work appeared in 1753. Although the Préface de Narcisse appeared before the last of the polemical letters, Préface d'une seconde lettre à M. Bordes (September, 1753), an unfinished work, I have chosen to discuss it after the polemical letters. The Préface de Narcisse sums up in a complete work of a different genre the clarifications made in the polemical letters.

Note: all references to this work come from the following edition: Oeuvres complètes (Dijon, Gallimard, 1964), IV.

25 Rousseau wants the République des Lettres to integrate itself into the larger community in order to exercise its influence on the direction of events.
Footnotes (cont'd.)

26 See M. Blanqui, op. cit.

27 The fact that Rousseau accepts a literature of diversion does not contradict either his thesis or his dialectical solution of the "superior men." A social participation in literature by the many does not equal original creativity which can still be restricted to the genius.

28 Once again, Rousseau tells us that he has been writing about literature and writers.


31 D'Alembert, op. cit., IV, p. 326.


33 Ibid.

34 See Crocker, op. cit.

35 See R. A. Leigh, op. cit., p. 56.
CHAPTER V

THEATRE AND POLITICS

The *Lettre à D'Alembert sur les spectacles* (1758) illustrates Rousseau's general socio-political conception of literature through its application to the specific literary medium of the theatre. It is my thesis that Rousseau studies the theatre primarily from the political scientist's point of view. Although this critical approach to the *Lettre à D'Alembert* ... does not represent the major trend of traditional scholarship, it is finding increasing support among contemporary scholars. In Allen Bloom's recent translation of *Lettre à D'Alembert* ... , significantly entitled *Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre*, he describes the work's socio-political import as follows:

The particular circumstances which provided the occasion for this book - which constituted his definitive break with the Encyclopedists - are reminiscent of a drama whose particular events are all meant to epitomize general issues; it is like a morality play, entitled "The Spirit of the Enlightenment against the Spirit of Republican Virtue."
Rousseau composes his study of the theatre in response to D'Alembert's article, "Genève" (Encyclopédie, VII, 1757), which proposed the establishment of a theatre in Rousseau's home state. The article's polemical purpose was dictated by Voltaire who, living at his Délices estate in Geneva since February 24, 1755 wished to force Geneva's pastors to accept a theatre. Hence, it is more than "l' esprit de contradiction" which moves Rousseau to oppose the "encyclopedic" proposal and its underlying principles.

The Republic of Geneva functions as one of the constant philosophic points of reference in Rousseau's dialectic and view of the world. It appears, for example, in his Epître à M. Parisot (1743). Although accompanied by a tender nostalgia for his homeland, Rousseau's concept of Geneva assumes already a dialectical potential. He contrasts Geneva's republican virtues with the vices of larger, more prosperous but corrupt and unjust countries as follows:

L'A rt n'est point le soutient de notre République Etre juste est chez nous l'unique politique; Tous les ordres divers sans inégalité Gardent chacun le rang qui leur est affecté: Nos chefs, nos magistrats simples dans leur parure Sans étaler ici le Luxe et la Dorure Parmi nous cependant ne sont point confondues, Ils en sont distingués: mais c'est part leurs vertus.

Geneva represents a socio-political ideal for Rousseau.
In his discursive works such as the two Discours and Le Contrat Social, Rousseau signs his title page as "Citoyen de Geneve". Eventually, his contemporaries refer to him as "le Citoyen". In his dialectic, Rousseau assigns Geneva the positive function of portraying humanity's hope for happiness through the exercise of moral will and political organization. Its republican virtues, which are opposed to the view and injustice of despotic states, make it an exception to the historical cycle of decadence. Consequently, Rousseau views Geneva as occupying the place in modern history which Sparta held in ancient times.

In view of Rousseau's ideal of Geneva and his political theory as to the socio-moral foundations of governments, his philosophic position forces him to challenge the logic of D'Alembert's theatre proposal. In his Lettre a D'Alem bert ..., he studies the probable socio-political effects of the theatre on a republic and, more specifically, on Geneva. His main question asks, therefore, if "l'austerite republicaine" can sustain the effects of the theatre without altering its fundamental, constitutional principles.

This primary, socio-political significance of the Lettre a D'Alem bert .... has not received sufficient attention by Rousseau's critics. They maintain that Rousseau
judges primarily the nature of theatre in itself and condemns it. In assuming this point of view, Rousseau's highly rational and relativistic argument is made to appear subjective and absolutist. Hence, the simplistic concept of Rousseau as a pre-romantic is preserved but falsely so.

In order to understand the organization of Rousseau's *Lettre à D'Alembert* ..., one must first take a close look at the arguments of D'Alembert's article, "Genève". They are clothed in a rhetoric which is designed to persuade and influence public opinion. D'Alembert aims at convincing the public as to the compatibility of the theatre with Geneva's republican form of government. His reasoning is based on the ideological tenets of the "encyclopedic party" and couched in a persuasive logic.

The article "Genève" is a well composed polemical work. Its discussion of Geneva leads the reader by degrees from the objective description of its geography, history, and form of government to a subjective commentary on its arts, lack of theatre, and religious beliefs. In his theatre proposal, D'Alembert identifies the reasons given by Genevans for their opposition to the theatre. They do not disapprove of the theatre in itself, according to D'Alembert, but fear "le goût de parure, de dissipation et de libertinage"
inspired by the dramatic spectacle and its actors (p. 350).  

In his defense of the theatre against these supposedly immoral effects, D'Alembert proposes that strict laws be enacted to control the conduct of actors in order to avoid their vicious examples of dissipation and libertinism (p. 350). He neglects, however, to address himself to the question of parure or luxury. Instead of answering the third major objection of the Genevans to the theatre, he delivers an emotional defense of actors which is designed to make the Genevans feel guilty for the acting profession's ill repute and morally responsible for reforming the theatre as follows:

Le préjugé barbare contre la profession de comédien, l'espèce d'avilissement où nous avons mis ces hommes si nécessaires au progrès et au soutien des arts, est certainement une des principales causes qui contribuent au dérèglement que nous leur reprochons: ils cherchent à se dédommager par les plaisirs de l'estime que leur état ne peut obtenir (p. 350).

On the socio-political level of his theatre proposal, D'Alembert argues that "une république si sage et éclairée" as that of Geneva should extend its freedoms and tolerate the effects of all the creative arts (p. 350). A theatre which is made to adhere to its moral principles would enrich the lives of Genevans and serve as a model to the actors and theatres of other nations (p. 350). Economically, D'Alembert
implies that a theatre in Geneva would attract a greater number of foreign visitors and contribute to its wealth (p. 351).

D'Alembert's argument portrays the theatre as the necessary fountain-head of civilization and bulwark against barbarism. It offers, alone, lessons in goût, finesse, and délicatesse (p. 350). Of greater importance to these socio-aesthetic qualities which afford man pleasure and cultivate his sensitivity, the encyclopedic principle of progress governs D'Alembert's pen. He contends that the cause of literature as a whole would profit from the establishment of a theatre in Geneva (p. 350).

In contrast to D'Alembert's preoccupation with the socio-aesthetic contributions of the theatre, Rousseau manifests a profound concern as to the broader social, political, and moral ramifications of founding a theatre in the Republic of Geneva. According to his reasoning as a political thinker and moralist, the stakes involve the survival capacity of the morals and manners of Geneva which lend themselves to the republican form of government. A superior way of life is threatened, in his view, by the unwarranted incursion of a foreign art form whose socio-aesthetic qualities contradict the governing principles of the Genevan Republic.

Rousseau divides his discussion of the theatre into
three general parts. He analyzes, first, the intrinsic value of the theatre in terms of its effects on the audience, generic potential, and dramatic mechanism. Here, Rousseau asks if dramatic beauty and emotion contribute to good citizenship.

The second part of Rousseau's study centers on the relationship between the theatre and the socio-economic features of a community which are required to support and finance it. The questions of luxury, law, style of life, and the acting profession are treated.

In the final and most overtly political part of his argument, Rousseau analyzes the probable effects of the theatre on the particular Republic of Geneva. Here, he suggests alternative forms of entertainment. They draw their force from the national way of life; strengthen republican virtues; reaffirm Geneva's socio-political governing principles of vertu, égalité, and simplicité. The Préface to Rousseau's Lettre à D'Alembert ... presents his criteria of literary evaluation; identifies his prime concern in answering D'Alembert's article; explains his motives for writing. Although his observations are conveyed in a respectful, restrained, and almost apologetic tone (as throughout the whole work), they imply a criticism of D'Alembert by contrast.
His title page prepares, for example, an opposition between two points of view or perspective. By referring to himself simply as "J. J. Rousseau, Citoyen de Genève," he identifies himself with the common cause of man (p. 178). His pragmatic, socio-political approach to the theatre question is stressed, in his préface, by his choice of addressing a broad reading public as follows:

Premièrement, il ne s'agit plus ici d'un vain babil de philosophie, mais d'une vérité de pratique importante à tout un peuple. Il ne s'agit plus de parler au petit nombre, mais au public: ni de faire penser les autres mais d'expliquer ma pensée (p. 180).

In contrast, the sectarian and deceptive ideological basis of D'Alembert's reasoning is exposed by Rousseau. He stresses his opponent's academic orientation and allegiance to the "philosophic party" by citing his membership in six different academies (p. 178). Through implication, Rousseau portrays himself as being free of party interests. His allegiance is claimed not by special groups but by the collective, philosophic ideals of justice, vérité, humanité, and patrie (p. 178). Whenever an author gives precedence to a particular group interest over the general one, he is guilty, in Rousseau's opinion, of opposing the above ideals (p. 178).
Unlike his adversary, Rousseau demonstrates an acute moral conscience and awareness as to the personal and socio-political stakes involved in his work. He realizes that his answer to D'Alembert will alienate him permanently from his friends among the encyclopedists for he had already experienced the loss of Diderot's friendship, his former Aristarchus (p. 180). His first concern is dictated, however, by his duty as a citizen to preserve and defend the Genevan Republic and its way of life (p. 180). Rousseau's seriousness of purpose is reflected by his doubts and fears of being equal to his task; they contrast sharply with D'Alembert's presumptuous self-confidence.

In short, Rousseau undermines, in his Préface, the limited perspective of D'Alembert's theatre proposal. He implies that it places the interest of the few over the many and art over humanity. Through the dramatization of his moral conscience and love of country and humanity, the insufficiency of D'Alembert's amoral rationalism is made concrete through contrast. It is shown to neglect the human, socio-political aspects of the theatre question in favor of socio-aesthetic ones. While D'Alembert promotes the theatre out of the desire for entertainment, relief from boredom, and instruction in taste, Rousseau is concerned
about the preservation of the Genevan Republic and its way of life.

Before starting his discussion as to the nature of the theatre, Rousseau answers the assertions made by D'Alembert as to the faith of Geneva's clergy. We will recall that D'Alembert takes up the subject at the end of his article. It represents, in his opinion, the topic which holds the most interest for the philosophes (p. 353). D'Alembert describes the Genevan Pastors' faith as "un socinianisme parfait" (p. 353). The refutation of D'Alembert's interpretation of the pastors' faith proves to be Rousseau's most disagreeable task, for he agrees to evidently with many of the Socinian or Unitarian precepts.

Upon first glance, Rousseau's defense of the pastors' orthodoxy may seem to be irrelevant to the theatre question. In reality, it counteracts D'Alembert's polemical intention on two different levels. Philosophically, D'Alembert's eulogy of the Genevan pastors as Socinians coincides with his encyclopedic belief in reason as being the sole basis of individual conduct and best guide to good government.

In contrast, Rousseau regards the socio-political attributes of civil virtue, fraternity, and equality - beliefs which are ingrained in the habits of a nation - as
determining the course of rational direction or legislation. Therefore, in order to nullify D'Alembert's deification of encyclopedic rationalism and its conclusions on the theatre, Rousseau is obliged to disprove, first, D'Alembert's rationalist interpretation of the Geneval pastors' faith.

On the political level of Rousseau's discussion on religion, he seeks to reunify Genevan public opinion and confidence in its ministers. By casting doubt on their orthodoxy, D'Alembert had attempted to splinter the union of clergy and conservative citizens who opposed the theatre. Not only were the pastors made to appear heretical, but they and other believers were intimidated into believing that enlightenment and reason were to be had only in Socinianism.

In order to combat the political implications of D'Alembert's article, Rousseau defends the Genevan pastors against the charge of heresy. His rhetoric is aimed at reconstituting the traditional consensus of opinion among his fellow citizens against the theatre. He attempts to represent the pastors in such a way so as to avoid forcing them into a fundamentalist position. However, the demands of his "art of persuasion" oblige Rousseau to go beyond the rhetoric of apology. In taking the offensive against D'Alembert's comments on religion, Rousseau chooses the
logical tactic of discrediting his opponent's credibility and literary ethics. This course of action is adopted with regret by Rousseau, for D'Alembert had shown great kindness to him in his *Discours préliminaire*.\(^{19}\)

The first argument leveled at D'Alembert is that of poor judgment and injurious inconsideration. He asks D'Alembert if he is unaware of the religious customs of Geneva which abhor "*tout nom du secte*" and rebukes his eulogy of the pastors for not honoring them according to their own customs (p. 182). Rousseau's stress on Geneva's particular national customs is aimed at revealing the false premise of universality behind D'Alembert's reasoning. The rationalism of the encyclopedists presupposed a moral universality based upon reason and unaltered by national traditions and customs.\(^{20}\)

In order to shift the weight of public opinion against D'Alembert and the focus of its attention away from the pastors, Rousseau accuses his opponent's statements on religion as being founded upon heresay (p. 182). One's faith can be judged only on the basis of conduct according to Rousseau (p. 182). Here again, Rousseau reasserts by implication that the truth of an individual or a state is gained more through observation than by rational analysis of
pronouncements. However, if certain pastors did express, in fact, Socinian views, Rousseau maintains that they did so in private confidence (p. 183). Their publication constitutes, therefore, an unethical breach of trust.

In short, Rousseau exposes once again the abusive use of literature by the philosophes. D'Alembert's article is shown to be in the service of a limited, party ideology. Its tactics include deception through a false politesse as expressed in D'Alembert's eulogy of the Genevan pastors and the mixing of factual and subjective statements. The socio-aesthetic principle of goût is given precedence over the philosophic one of vérité and the socio-political one of vertu. Of greatest importance, the article bears the destructive intention of disuniting the people of Geneva by arousing suspicion between its citizens. Instead of preserving the republican form of government in Geneva, a rarity in the eighteenth century, D'Alembert defends the cause of art, as the spokesman of the encyclopedists, and urges Geneva to adopt principles more in conformity with a monarchy.

The first major division of Rousseau's Lettre à D'Alembert ... considers the nature of the theatre. Rousseau sets the broad, philosophic tone of his discussion,
one which goes beyond the sole consideration of aesthetics, by aligning himself with ancient philosophy. In the following contrast of his viewpoint with that of D'Alembert, Rousseau mentions some specific socio-political criteria which shape his thinking:

Je n'exposerai point ici mes conjectures sur les motifs qui vous ont pu porter à nous proposer un établissement si contraire à nos maximes. Quelles que soient vos raisons, il ne s'agit pour moi que des nôtres; et tout ce que, je me permettrai de dire à votre egard, c'est que vous serez surement le premier philosophe qui ait jamais excité un peuple libre, une petite ville, et un Etat pauvre, à se charger d'un spectacle public (p. 186).

In his opening statements on the theatre per se, Rousseau defines it broadly as un amusement (p. 187). Although he does not deny the human necessity of diversion, he does employ strict criteria for its evaluation. In order for the theatre to be a valid amusement, it must prove itself to be necessary and useful (p. 187). 22 His attitude toward amusements is not explained by labeling it puritanical or Calvinistic. 23 A socio-political context rather than a religious one dominates his thought.

Rousseau implies that national states differ not only in forms of government but in types of amusement.
The theatre functions, in his opinion, to relieve boredom, inactivity, discontent, and idleness (p. 187). Since these attributes are linked, in his mind, with social inequality and injustice, it is apparent that he regards the theatre as the appropriate diversion of an elite class in a monarchy. On the other hand, Rousseau contends that there exist contrary amusements based upon natural pleasures of community life; they inspire activity, instruction, and contribution (p. 187). It is evident that Rousseau is describing, here, the amusements appropriate to a republic.

The citizen of a republic is portrayed by Rousseau as being so actively engaged in his family and civil duties that he possesses no time for idle amusements (p. 187). In fact, Rousseau implies that no antagonistic division exists between duty and pleasure in a republic where the citizen is committed totally to the giving of himself. His leisure activities relate to the community and they prove useful by reaffirming the bonds of union (p. 187).

In contrast, the theatre is viewed by Rousseau as a passive entertainment which isolates the spectators. While lamenting the misfortunes of fictional characters, they forget their friends, neighbors, and social relations (p. 187). Rousseau supports his view of the theatre as a non-communal
activity on the authority of nature. It is voiced by a barbarian during a visit to ancient Rome who upon seeing the magnificent circuses and games together with their multitudinous audiences asked supposedly the following question: "Les Romains, n'ont-ils ni femmes ni enfans" (p. 181).  

Realizing that the appeal to moral conscience and the authority of nature lacks the power to persuade his contemporaries, Rousseau decides to judge the theatre from a more pragmatic perspective. Rather than working with abstract ideals in a vacuum of reasoning, Rousseau feels that the theatre's truth can be understood best through the study of its effects on the audience as follows:

Demander si les spectacles sont bons ou mauvais en eux-même c'est faire une question trop vague; c'est examiner un rapport avant que d'avoir fixé les termes. Les spectacles sont faits pour le peuple et ce n'est que par leurs effets sur lui qu'on peut déterminer leurs qualités absolues (p. 187).

The key word of rapport in the above quotation signals the direction of Rousseau's argument. Whereas D'Alembert describes the theatre as a universal good, one which is capable of perfectibility through the administration of proper laws and a social necessity for the formation of taste and civilized behavior, Rousseau adopts the principle of
relativism - a fundamental tenet of the enlightenment. It contradicts his opponent's absolutist and optimistic faith in the innate beneficence of dramatic art.

Although humanity displays universal needs and desires, Rousseau claims that their manner of expression is modified by "une prodigieuse diversité de moeurs, de tempéraments, de caractères (p. 188). Due to these crucial cultural differences between peoples, Rousseau implies that the theatre enjoys no universal artistic form or moral effect on man. They vary with the governments, laws, customs, and manners which afford each people its own, particular criteria of judgment. As an example of the theatre's relative value and that of spectacles in general, Rousseau cites the case of Menander's plays. Made for the Athenian theatre, they were out of place in Rome (p. 188). Similarly, Rome's gladiatorial combats animated courage and valor under the Republic but inspired only love of blood and cruelty under the Roman emperors (p. 188).

Together with his use of historical and geographical relativism, Rousseau proposes an aesthetic relativism - a principle introduced previously in his essay, *De la méthode* ... . In order to negate D'Alembert's reliance on the supposedly absolute principle of taste, Rousseau maintains
that it varies among different nations and produces a diversity of theatrical expressions.

Rousseau's reasoning implies, therefore, that D'Alembert's criteria of evaluating the theatre, bon goût and mauvais goût, prove inadequate and invalid. They reflect primarily the particular manners and institutions of France. In place of D'Alembert's absolute concept of goût, Rousseau substitutes the more enlightened, philosophic one of "les goûts divers des nations" (p. 188).

The principle of relativism does not deny, however, the possibility of making generalizations on the particular type of theatre which D'Alembert proposes for Geneva. We will recall that he concedes the truth of the theatre's vile reputation but suggests that the actors' conduct on and off the stage be controlled by severe laws (p. 350). It is Rousseau's task to determine whether in fact the theatre is capable of this improvement, i.e., its perfectibility. In his study of this question, Rousseau considers the following principles of dramatic art: plaire, instruire, goût, and imitation.

The general aim of the theatre consists, in Rousseau's opinion, of pleasing in order to provide its particular type of aesthetic pleasure (p. 188). Rousseau sees the
necessity of plaire as placing severe restrictions on the playwright. It determines his subject matter and the socio-moral effect of the play. In order to please, he is obliged to portray those penchants and social attitudes which are fashionable in the society of his day (p. 188).

The playwright is imprisoned by his art according to Rousseau. Since the dramatic interest of a play hinges on the portrayal of human passions, he is obliged to flatter and reinforce them (p. 188). His art proves therefore, to be one of imitation; it can reflect only the social values present in his society. In order to moderate or effect some change in social attitudes, the dramatist would have to present them differently than they exist in reality. Their presentation in a distorted or exaggerated form would appear irrelevant to the spectators and inapplicable to their lives. Hence, such a play would fail to change their attitudes or values.

Rousseau concludes, therefore, that the dramatist suffers under restrictions derived from the nature of his art which render it incapable of the perfectibility and public utility attributed to the theatre by D'Alembert (p. 189). His judgment implies that the aesthetic prin-
principle of *plaître* proves to be incompatible with its philosophic counterpart, *instruire*, in a dramatic presentation. The playwright can only reflect and imitate the prevailing attitudes of a society. Consequently, Rousseau judges the theatre as being incapable of promoting constructive social change as follows:

> Qu'on n'attribue donc pas au théâtre le pouvoir de changer des sentiments ni des moeurs qu'il ne peut que suivre et embellir. Un auteur qui voudroit heurter le goût général composeroit bientôt pour lui seul (p. 189).

Rousseau defines the good play, i.e. the one which succeeds in pleasing, as the work which never shocks the morals, manners, and taste of its time (p. 189). As an example of his precept, he cites the case of Molière's *Le Misanthrope*. Because it anticipated "le goût général" of its day, but only by a bit, "the most perfect of his works" failed to achieve just acclaim during Molière's lifetime (p. 189).

Unlike the thinker who is free to express his thoughts, to state the truth, and to shock public opinion out of its complacency, Rousseau implies that the dramatist can never achieve an equivalent philosophic freedom or distinction. He is cut off not only from the principle of
instruire by the necessity of plaire, but his art acts primarily through passions rather than reason (p. 188). Therefore, the playwright is viewed by Rousseau as an imitator, a duplicator, and as an artistic flatterer. He can never be a true philosophe, for the theatre lacks the freedom of a philosophic genre. Instead of moderating the extreme tendencies of a society, the theatre can only aggravate them as follows:

Il s'ensuit de ces premières observations que l'effet général du spectacle est de renforcer le caractère naturelle, d'augmenter les inclinations naturelles, et de donner une nouvelle énergie à toutes les passions (p. 190).

In response to the forseen objections of his critics, Rousseau considers the theatre's traditional claim of moral purpose. According to classical dramatic theory, tragedy is supposed to purge the passions through fear and arouse pity. From the standpoint of reason, there exists for Rousseau a contradiction between tragedy's subject matter, the portrayal of passions and its claim of eliminating them. 29 He asks, for example, if the passions must be excited first in order to be purged (p. 190). It seems inconceivable to him that temperance and prudence can be reached through excess and madness (p. 190). The
defense of such illogical propositions is characterized by "la mauvaise foi" in Rousseau's opinion (p. 190).

Rousseau upholds that the real test of the theatre's effects is found in their influence on the conduct of the spectator. Since the individual conscience possesses the sole authority to make such a judgment, Rousseau appeals to the reader's moral sense (p. 190). The latter must ask himself if he feels a greater inclination to master and regulate his passions at the end of a tragedy's presentation (p. 190).

On the level of individual conduct, Rousseau maintains that reason alone can purge one's passions (p. 190). However, this prime faculty plays no significant role in the creation of dramatic art according to Rousseau's thought (p. 190). He sees the playwright as being powerless to effect even a change of passions in his presentation. The principles of his art, notably plaire and goût, force him to dramatize those passions which the spectator favors already (p. 191). Consequently, the moral claims of the theatre are judged by Rousseau as being pretentious. The dramatic art form shows itself to be incapable by its nature of exercising beneficial
moral and social effects on its audience as follows:

Il y a donc un concours de causes générales et particulières qui doivent empêcher qu'on puisse donner aux spectacles la perfection dont on les croit susceptibles, et qu'ils ne produisent les effets avantageux qu'on semble en attendre (p. 191).

Rousseau finds the theatre not only powerless to bring about positive socio-moral changes in attitude but, also, self-defeating in its attempts to do so. In the case of tragedy which leads to pity through fear, Rousseau condemns it as a sterile, aesthetic pity "qui se repait de quelques larmes, et n'a jamais produit le moindre acte d'humanité" (p. 193). It affords the spectator with the cheap, illusory satisfaction of having proved his humanity and fulfilled its duties through a few tears shed to fictions (p. 194).

There exists, in Rousseau's opinion, no dramatic technique that can remedy the inherent defects of the theatre. It can never be directed toward public utility (p. 195). Rousseau sees the theatre as composing a world in itself which possesses its own aesthetic principles, rules, morality, and style of language and dress (p. 194). These conventions make the virtue represented in tragedies appear distant and inapplicable, for no one
would think of speaking in verse and of dressing in Roman clothing (p. 194). Virtue is presented in tragedy, therefore, as "un jeu de théâtre" and relegated to the stage (p. 194).

Changes in the nature of tragedy are ruled out by Rousseau. In his opinion, neither realism, caricature, nor ridicule can make the spectator prefer virtue and despise vice. He feels that realism merely depicts without correcting (p. 194). Caricature leaves the realm of the relevant through exaggeration and does not render vice hateful but only ridiculous (p. 194). It makes the spectator more fearful of appearing ridiculous than vicious (p. 194). In short, Rousseau concludes that the true relations of things cannot be found in the theatre for it is based on the art of illusion and imitation (p. 195).

Of the two dramatic genres, tragedy and comedy, Rousseau judges the former to be less harmful to the morals and manners of modern man. Its violence, sterile pity, and grandiose virtue exercise a minimal influence on the spectator due to the cultural distance between his life and the dramatized grandeur of foreign myths (p. 199).
In contrast, the manners and morals portrayed by comedy enjoy a more relevant, immediate relationship with those of the spectator, and its characters resemble men more (p. 199). Hence, it is comedy more so than tragedy which bears the brunt of Rousseau's scrutiny of the theatre.

The successful comedy evokes laughter. Rousseau inquires as to the dramatic mechanism involved in the elicitation of comedy's particular pleasure. According to French dramatic theory, comedy is supposed to exercise a moral effect on the spectator by making vice appear ridiculous. Rousseau denies the reality of this theory and examines in detail the nature of the vices represented, the standards of conduct proposed as desirable, and the socio-moral effects of comedy on the audience.

Rousseau sees the principle of plaire as forming, also, the main concern of the comic playwright. He appeals to "le goût le plus général" of the public in order to accommodate the greatest number of individual tastes (p. 201). His standard of acceptable conduct is drawn from society's social ideal, "l'homme du monde"
rather than "l'honnête homme" (p. 201). Therefore, the virtue which comedy portrays does not reflect moral values but socio-aesthetic ones.

The definitions of vice and virtue undergo a change of value in the context of comedy according to Rousseau. Vice is reinterpreted to mean the conduct which proves unacceptable to polite society. Since the excess of virtue is considered to be in bad taste, it becomes, therefore, a social vice and fair game for the moderating forces of laughter (p. 201). Consequently, Rousseau regards comedy as exposing the ridiculous rather than the vicious, for it substitutes the socio-aesthetic conventions of politesse, bienséance, and goût for the moral criteria of vérité and vertu.

In support of his concept of comedy, Rousseau draws his examples from Molière, "le plus parfait auteur comique dont les ouvrages nous soient connus" (p. 199). Rousseau professes a great admiration of Molière's talents (p. 199). But, from his socio-political point of view, genius is judged by its effects on society. On the basis of this standard, he charges Molière with having established "une école de vices et de mauvaises
moeurs" (p. 200). In his desire to correct la cour, he corrupted la ville.  

Rousseau sees Molière as the shortsighted detractor of natural authority and panderer of society's vices. Disrespect for fathers, husbands, and masters is condoned in his comedies (p. 200). The fun which he makes of vices is not accompanied by the love of virtue (p. 200). His attack on the vices proves to be insignificant when compared with those he encourages: infidelity, lying, and impudence (p. 200). As an example of the prejudicial nature of Molière's plays, Rousseau judges M. Jourdain as being less blameworthy than the rascally gentlemen who dupe him (p. 200). In the case of L'Avare, Rousseau maintains that the great vice of miserliness and usury is exceeded by his son who robs and insults him (p. 200). 

Rousseau's thesis on comedy is illustrated mainly through his interpretation of Molière's Le Misanthrope. This is the section of the Lettre à D'Alembert ... which has been worked on most by traditional scholarship. Admittedly, Rousseau's analysis of Le Misanthrope appears to belong to the
recognizable literary activity of criticism. However, it serves as an illustration of a more general truth. The exaggeration of its importance leads, in my opinion, to the distortion of Rousseau's dialectic and the context of his argument. He judges Le Misanthrope from the viewpoint of the socio-political philosopher and moralist in the tradition of Plato. His primary concern is for the socio-political influences of the comic work on the conduct of a citizen and their compatibility with republican virtue.

In his critique on Le Misanthrope, Rousseau contests the validity of its title. The true misanthrope is a monster, in his opinion, and his portrayal would evoke horror and hate in the spectator (p. 201). These are not the effects which Alceste, the so-called misanthrope, excites in the audience. Rather than as the enemy of mankind, Rousseau views Alceste as being an essentially good man who refuses to compromise with the hypocritical socio-moral conventions of salon society. Even though Rousseau concedes the human failings and contradictions of Alceste's character, he implies that it reflects the only active moral conscience in the play (p. 202). As a result, the audience retains a sympathy and a certain
Rousseau's analysis of *Le Misanthrope* raises a valid, relative criterion of character evaluation. Rather than judging Alceste by his outbursts during moments of anger or upon an absolute correlation between his stated principles and his conduct, Rousseau compares him with the other personages of the play. In contrast with the deceit, slander, self-interest, corruption, and affectation found in Célimène's salon, Alceste's relative measure of virtue appears more impressive.

The level of conduct and virtue proposed by Molière's *Le Misanthrope* is represented, in Rousseau's opinion, by Alceste's friend, Philinte. Through an apparent opposition, Alceste is made to appear as the villain while Philinte embodies the desirable code of moderation (p. 203). It is based upon the socio-aesthetic principles of *bien être* rather than on moral virtue and conscience. Rousseau sees Philinte as playing the role of the amateur, *salon philosophe* who advises flattery, conformity, self-interest, and the corruption of judges. He reflects the taste of his age which lauds a false tolerance of public injustice and civil corruption (p. 203).

From Rousseau's socio-political point of view,
the Philintes of society aggravate social ills through their collaboration in them. Because Philinte manifests a lucid consciousness as to society's ills, his inaction makes him more guilty than the unthinking marquis. It is implied by Rousseau's reasoning that only the fanatic, such as Alceste, can shake society out of its apathy. Even if Alceste show himself to be a fumbling, naive, social critic, his ineffectiveness reflects only the general mediocrity of salon society.

In the conclusion to his analysis of *Le Misanthrope*, Rousseau concedes that Molière accomplishes with expertise his limited aim of pleasing the audience and perfecting the comic genre (p. 207). The necessity of pleasing an essentially corrupt society obliges him to promote "l'homme du monde", Philinte, at the expense of ridiculing "l'honnête homme", Alceste (p. 207).

Rousseau implies that the society for which *Le Misanthrope* was created could profit only from the socio-aesthetic code of a Philinte, for the moral conscience of an Alceste was out of place in salon society and could lead only to an awkward conduct. When Alceste shows himself, for example, to be inconsistent in his hesitancy to judge Oronte's sonnet, Rousseau contends that it is out of society's disapproval of
sincerity (p. 207). Therefore, if Alceste's conduct is to be derided as being inconsistent and hypocritical, it confirms merely the unnatural state of society in which honesty is infeasible. 44

Molière's use of the love theme in *Le Misanthrope* makes the comedy, in Rousseau's opinion, both a creative work of genius and a socio-political failure by its amoral example as follows:

> Je ne sache guere que le Misanthrope où le héros de la pièce ait fait un mauvais choix. Rendre le misanthrope amoureux n'étoit rien; le coup du génie est de l'avoir fait amoureux d'une coquette. Tout le reste du théâtre est un trésor de femmes parfaites (p. 215).

Alceste's love prevents him from remaining faithful to the moral dictates of his conscience. Rousseau implies that love, as portrayed in *Le Misanthrope*, conditions the spectator into accepting the defeat of his reason before passion instead of fortifying his moral resolution against it. In the next part of his discussion as to the theatre's effects on society, Rousseau examines its portrayal of love.

Rousseau judges the French theatre as being characterized by moral decadence and civil indifference. In a contrast between its form of tragedy and that of the ancients, he contends that the moderns have sacrificed tragedy's moral
dignity and its virile, dramatic power by exaggerating the love interest (p. 208). Because of their preoccupation with the love theme, modern playwrights neglect to dramatize the duties and conflicts based upon political crises (p. 208). Rousseau implies consequently that the "theatre of love" opposes the dramatist to the concerns of good statesmanship and the morality of good citizenship.

The sole reliance upon love as the source of tragic emotion in the French theatre is criticized by Rousseau. Love belongs to the realm of women in his opinion (p. 209). Its dramatization opposes duty and conscience with pleasure, self-interest, and personal happiness as exemplified by Racine's Bérénice and Voltaire's Zaire (p. 212). These dramatized conflicts pose a threat to the republican scale of socio-political values in Rousseau's opinion. In a republic, the citizen's duties comprise his pleasures; his self-interest is served through a dedication to the general interest; his love is directed toward the family, the community, and the state.

When love, as portrayed by the French theatre, becomes the governing principle of a society, it cannot hope to either preserve or develop a republic in Rousseau's opinion. It leads to a perversion of the natural relationships between
the sexes and age groups. Since the woman's influence reigns in matters of love, a feminization of society's values takes place. Just as the salon lady is portrayed in the theatre as the center of power and authority, Rousseau implies that she becomes the real legislator of the state (p. 210). Such a condition exists in France where women act as arbitrators of social conduct and as judges of literary merit according to Rousseau (p. 210).

The disunity of French society is accentuated by the theatre in Rousseau's opinion. Not only are the roles of men and women confused, but a dangerous generation gap arises. Because the playwright aims at pleasing an audience dominated by the ideal of passionate love, older citizens are portrayed on the stage as being either obstacles to young lovers or as lovers themselves and consequently ridiculous (p. 211). Because love forms the social ideal of their society, the older citizens can only maintain their respect by acting young (p. 211).

Such disorderly social conditions are regarded by Rousseau as running contrary to the principles of a republic. He implies that a matriarchy lacks the strength, the will, and the virile, stoic virtue necessary to a republic's survival. Such a state is governed through reason instead of
taste. Its leadership is based on the wisdom and experience of age, and its authority is founded on the moral principles of equality and justice rather than on the ideal of passionate love.

In the second major division of his *Lettre à D'Alembert* ... , Rousseau moves from the study of the theatre's inherent incompatibility with moral instruction to the more objective consideration of its socio-economical and eventually political effects on the life of a community. This approach implies a criticism of D'Alembert who failed to consider in a serious manner the long-term, socio-political effects of the theatre's proposed establishment in Geneva.

Rousseau works from a relativistic thesis which maintains that the value of an entertainment is in relation to its type of community. In this way, he denies the absolute good of the theatre. It exercises, for example, a beneficial influence in a big city where idleness, luxury, inequality, and corruption prevail (p. 217). Here the greater the number of theatrical amusements the better; for, they prevent the spectators from indulging in greater vices (p. 217). The theatre's socio-aesthetic code and amoral wisdom can serve to put, at least, some order in their lives.

The conditions present in a small city are regarded
by Rousseau as requiring different forms of entertainment. Because its smallness promotes a kind of community censorship which protects it from general corruption, the small town does not need the theatre's corrective satire and ridicule of social extremes (p. 217). So too, its principles of activity, frugality, and simplicity do not lend themselves to the support of a theatre which demands a high level of luxury and idleness.

In a highly romantic passage, Rousseau recounts the simple joys of small town life which he had witnessed during the travels of his youth. His emotional effusions make the life of a small town come alive and the role which diversions play in it. They prove to be active, constructive, and wise uses of leisure time which complement the working hours of the people. Hobbies such as woodwork, metal, self-education, applied science, painting, and singing increase the citizen's individual dignity, personal creativity, and productive capacity (p. 218). Unlike those of a big city like Paris, such small town diversions do not constitute evasions from the self. They enhance the individual's worth, contribute to society, and/or reaffirm communal bonds on the basis of mutual respect.

The introduction of a theatre into such a small
community would subvert its basic principles of simplicity, activity, frugality, and individual creativity in Rousseau's opinion. Productivity would diminish due to the time spent at an amusement unrelated to the citizen's work (p. 220). An increase in personal expenses for theatre dress and for the taxes required to subsidize a professional theatre would be reflected by inflation (p. 220). Local trade would be put at a disadvantage and industries would begin to move to more favorable regions (p. 220). Of equal socio-political importance, theatre dress would lead to a competition among women and to distinctions based upon luxury (p. 220).

In short, Rousseau judges the theatre as being capable of producing variable effects. In a big city such as Paris, it serves socially to stimulate the artists, occupy the rich, and divert its citizens from active vices (p. 220). Politically speaking, the theatre is judged by Rousseau as benefiting the ruler. It distracts the people from its miseries and makes the citizens forget their leaders in watching the theatre's buffons (p. 221).

In contrast, the presence of a theatre in a small republican type of community endangers the principles of its constitution. It weakens the love of work; discourages individual creativity; inspires the taste for idleness, luxury,
and false distinctions. Because the small town's resources are limited and its well-being is founded upon mutual respect, frugality, and industriousness, the theatre threatens a way of life necessary to its governing principles and, hence, to its very survival.

If the theatre imperils, in fact, the social, moral, and political virtues of a community, it follows that such a society must protect itself against the theatre's effects in one of two ways. It can be outlawed as in the case of Geneva. Rousseau finds this tactic to be in accordance with the republican form of government. Reason and not taste should decide, in his opinion, as to the best amusements of a society (p. 216). Their choice should not be left to "idle and corrupt men" who think only of their own pleasures and self-interest (p. 216).

The abuse of liberty worries Rousseau more than the restrictions placed on it for the general good. The preservation of a free, republican society takes precedence, in his view, over a literary freedom employed to entertain the wealthy, enrich the artist, and reinforce the authority of the ruling elite. A state which provides such an empty freedom reflects indifference rather than concern, in his opinion, for the quality of citizens which it produces. The
theatre acts in such a state as an instrument of governmental  
policy by keeping its subjects amused, for they are incapable  
of putting their leisure to better use in order to gain real  
freedom rather than an aesthetic one.

The second recourse open to the republic in the de­
fense of its constitutional principles against the theatre  
is that of legislation. It can attempt to control the thea­
tre's effects through laws of conduct. This method is the  
one proposed by D'Alembert(p. 350). In his examination of  
its merits, Rousseau finds the second recourse to be illusory.

It must be remembered that, according to the political  
theory of both Montesquieu and Rousseau, a republic is based  
upon civic virtues. Voluntary self-restraint forms such a  
principle and is fundamental to the sense of security and  
mutual confidence among the citizenry. The following  
question arises then. Can the virtue of self-restraint be  
legislated? If it is legislated, can it be enforced? Is  
it even valid since it is no longer voluntary?

The true science of the legislator consists, accord­
ing to Rousseau, in the establishment of a workable rela­
tionship between laws and a people's customs and manners  
(p. 222). The legislator aims not at the ideal law but at  
one which coincides with the life style of a people(p. 222).
In a republic the citizen should love the law and regard it as the protector of his freedom and individual dignity (p. 222). Whenever laws are enacted by the legislator which run contrary to the citizen's conscience or customs, they become impossible to enforce regardless of their moral intent. As a result, great harm is done to the laws for they fall into disrespect and their authority is degraded (p. 222).

Rousseau's political theory maintains, in other words, that public opinion rather than abstract reasoning serves as the best guide in legislation. When laws influence the morals and manners of a people, it is when they draw their force from them (p. 223). Since customs are bound up in human attitudes of an unreasoned nature, their rapid change can not be brought about by either the force of laws or the threat of violence.

The art of statesmanship consists, therefore, in knowing how to influence public opinion through the moderate use of reason and respect for customs. As an example of the wrong use of legislation, Rousseau cites the case of "le tribunal des marechaux de France" which was instituted by Louis XIV for the purpose of ending duels (p. 223). Rather than reforming public opinion, it created an irreconcilable
opposition between honor and law (p. 224).

In short, Rousseau asserts that laws are powerless to dictate a people's morals and manners, for they are based on public opinion which is in a constant state of flux. In order to assure stability in a state, the government's power is limited to arresting radical changes in social behavior (p. 227). It makes more sense to Rousseau, therefore, to avoid introducing the theatre with its foreign values into Geneva rather than trying to legislate its morality once it is established. As an institution, the theatre would clash inevitably with "le consistoire et la chambre de réforme", Geneva's traditional body of pastors and elders who exercised a general, moral supervision over the city (p. 221). Good statesmanship demands the preservation of the Republic's governing principles in accordance with its customs and public opinion.

In the third major division of the Lettre à D'Alembert ..., Rousseau applies his findings as to the nature of drama and its socio-political effects on a small town to the particular situation of Geneva. In an introductory description of his country, Rousseau stresses the customs of its inhabitants. Their industriousness and frugality compensate for poor lands (p. 241). Because of the close
proximity of the countryside, many Genevans live there half of the year and those who remain in the city seek, also, their diversion in nature (p. 242).

Because of its small size and sparse population as compared to Lyon, Bordeaux, Rouen, Lille, and Strasbourg, Rousseau believes that Geneva could not support a theatre without the levying of taxes (p. 243). Such an expense is uncalled for in Rousseau's opinion, since many of its citizens would abstain from frequenting the theatre out of patriotism and religious principle (p. 243). So too, many prefer their own, native institutions of amusement.

The Genevan counterpart of the theatre consists of cercles or societies. Unlike the theatre which brings the sexes into close association under the dominion of women and their emasculating taste, the cercles separate the sexes. Here, men are inspired to exercise their physical constitution through walks, games, swimming, and hunting (p. 248). Their minds gain, also, precision and vigor; for, they can talk of serious subjects such as "patrie et vertu" without fear of boring a salon hostess (p. 249). Because they put aside gallantry, polite language, and the duties of plaire, their discussions gain in meaning (p. 249).

Rousseau defends such fraternal societies upon the
example of the ancients. They preserve something of their morals, in his opinion, and agree with "des moeurs républicaines" (p. 245). By unifying the country's leaders and by guarding their virile virtues against the soft effeminacy of salon society, the cercles contribute to the preservation and perfection of the Republic as follows:

Enfin ces honnêtes et innocentes institutions rassemblent tout ce qui peut contribuer à former dans les mêmes hommes des amis, des citoyens, des soldats et par conséquent tout ce qui convient le mieux à un peuple libre (p. 249).

According to Rousseau's socio-political theory, a republic needs strong men and a militant virtue in order to defend its way of life. He sees the theatre, therefore, as a threat to the cercles because of its effeminate code of gallantry, finesse, and politesse. These socio-aesthetic attributes imperil Geneva's freedom which is based, in his opinion, upon strength, simplicity, and industriousness. In the defense of Geneva's Republic, Rousseau calls upon its citizens to preserve their way of life which has made freedom and independence possible: "Mais ne nous flattons pas de conserver notre liberté en renonçant aux moeurs qui nous l'ont acquise" (p. 254).

A republic is characterized, according to Rousseau, by
an equilibrium which prevails between the various parts of its society (p. 254). Great extremes of opulence and poverty cannot coexist for long without changing its nature (p. 255). Unlike a monarchy where the king is always the most opulent, the extreme wealth of a citizen in a republic can raise him above the law (p. 255). Rousseau is addressing himself in these comments to the question of equality. It comprises, in his opinion, a principle necessary to a republic's constitution.

In order to discourage the flaunting of luxury and mitigate the dissension of inequality, Geneva enforced sumptuary laws (p. 350). Rousseau contends that a theatre tax would upset the Republic's equilibrium by bringing about an intolerable degree of inequality. Its unjust distribution would favor the rich by making its entertainment less expensive while increasing the taxes of the poor man in a greater proportion to his earnings (p. 255). Moreover, the poor man would be tempted to frequent an attraction beyond his means and would lose, thereby, time from his work or its related activities (p. 256). 51

Apart from the economic effects of the theatre, Rousseau sees it as portraying socio-political attitudes which either contradict or prove irrelevant to the republican way
way of life. In his opinion, the tragedies of Racine teach that man is not free (p. 257). His portrayal of ancient kings and their duties prove inapplicable and unrelated to the duties of a citizen in a republic (p. 257). Of greater significance, Racine's theatre inspires a vain admiration for power and idealizes passionate love, gallantry, and softness (p. 257). All of these lessons represent, in Rousseau's opinion, a foreign scale of values which is incompatible with that of Geneva. Comedy is judged by Rousseau as posing a greater threat to republican stability. Under no condition would he as a citizen of Geneva be willing to see it established in his birthplace (p. 260). Due to the smallness of Geneva, Rousseau contends that comedy's depiction of human folly would degenerate into satires of recognizable persons (p. 260). As such, it would lend itself as a political instrument for factions, parties, and personal vengeances (p. 260). Because comedy would lead to disorder and disunity in the small Republic of Geneva, Rousseau casts the following anathema on it:

Quoi! Platon banissoit Homère de sa république, et nous souffrions Molière dans la nôtre! Que pourrait-il nous arriver de pis que de ressembler aux gens qu'il nous peint, même à ceux qu'il nous fait aimer (p. 257)?
In order to rectify the effects of a theatre whose values run contrary to those of the Geneva Republic, Rousseau speculates as to the possibility of creating a national theatre. Tragedy would draw its materials, as did that of the Greeks, from the past misfortunes of the country (p. 259). National heroes and martyrs to the Republic would illustrate Geneva's particular virtues and scale of values (p. 259). Geneva's former masters and national enemies would provide tyrants (p. 259). Rousseau's enthusiasm for a national theatre proves to be shortlived. Important political and historical considerations oblige him to take a negative view of the venture.

First of all, the portrayal of former enemies as tyrants and villains could reawaken, in Rousseau's opinion, old quarrels with countries now reconciled with Geneva through peace treaties (p. 260). 52 Secondly, the weight of history and tradition have formed the theatre to such an extent that Rousseau deems it improbable that Geneva could achieve its re-creation. He implies that Geneva would have to start from scratch by training its own theatre craftsmen and actors while a native genius would have to be found who could reflect faithfully the national character.

Of greater philosophic interest, Rousseau regards the
theatre as being marked by an inherent weakness. Its most common subject, love, enjoys the advantage of being reinforced by natural inclinations (p. 257). Rousseau's condemnation of passionate love as the most frequently used dramatic subject does not reflect an insensitivity to its beauty. As a matter of fact, he concedes that some very corrupt countries would improve their socio-moral standards by embracing the ideal of romantic love (p. 257). But in the case of the Geneva Republic, Rousseau believes that it is capable of obtaining the higher, nobler loves of l'humanité and la patrie (p. 257). To accept passionate love as its ideal would constitute, therefore, a step backward in perfection.

In preparation of his conclusion, Rousseau sums up the advantages and the disadvantages of establishing a theatre in Genova. The cultivation of a refined "taste" proves to be the theatre's principal contribution. Because of Geneva's financial limitations, sparse population, and religious customs, Rousseau predicts failure for a theatre in Geneva. It would never rise above the mediocre and would inspire only "un faux goût" (p. 258). Rather than preserving the originality of their customs and individuality, the citizens of Geneva would become the vain imitators of Parisian
Rousseau implies that the loss of cultural independence precedes that of the country's socio-political liberty. Hence, the disadvantages of the theatre prove conclusive to him. They include the introduction of the foreign socio-aesthetic principles of luxury and gallantry which undermine equality, order, and industry. Once introduced, laws prove incapable of neutralizing the theatre's effects. Because of the actors' popularity, Rousseau fears that they would be courted for political support and would become the real legislators of the nation as follows:

Enfin pour peu qu'ils [les acteurs] joignent d'art et de manège à leur succès, je ne leur donne pas trente ans pour être les arbitres de l'Etat. On verra les aspirans aux charges briguer leur faveur pour obtenir les suffrages; les élections se feront dans les loges des actrices, et les chefs d'un peuple libre seront les créatures d'une bande d'histrions (p. 261).

Once again, the socio-political ramifications of literature and artistic activity are emphasized by Rousseau.

In the conclusion to his study of the theatre, Rousseau remains true to the tendency of his dialectic by offering positive alternatives to the theatrical amusement which he opposes. Public fairs provide an ideal kind of entertainment for a free people in his opinion. They bring all age
groups and social classes together; take place whenever possible in the open air; contain an element of spontaneity; serve the republic by reinforcing the bonds of fraternity and common understanding.

Rousseau's proposed public festivals contrast sharply with the dramatic spectacle. The latter appeals, in his view, to an exclusive audience; closes up the spectators in a prisonlike fashion; presents images of servitude and inequality (p. 263). By comparison, the public fairs show themselves to be the proper amusements of a republican community. They demand active participation; mix the spectators with the actors; serve to improve the physical constitution of the people (p. 263). But of ultimate importance, the festivals reassert the communal bonds between citizens as follows: "Toutes les sociétés n'en font qu'une, tout devient commun à tous" (p. 264).

In addition to the festivals, Rousseau suggests that public balls be instituted in order to bring young marriageable persons together. Rather than denying nature and forcing its fulfillment to take place in the shadows of society, Rousseau contends that the community should make provisions for it. Balls provide the young with the assurance of meeting perspective mates and the public eye ensures their
upright conduct (p. 265). A broader, socio-political purpose is served, also, through the balls. All adult members of the family take part in the balls. Parents and elders act as spectators and are amused at little cost (p. 265). As a part of the dance ceremony, couples are required to bow at the beginning and at the end of each dance in front of the elders in order to honor age and wisdom (p. 266). Thus, respect for age and its authority, a virtue necessary to the stability of a republic, are conditioned in the young and associated with pleasure (p. 266). 55

Politically speaking, the balls reassure the peace and tranquility necessary to a republic. Divided families and factions are brought together in a festive atmosphere and are provided an opportunity for reconciliation (p. 267). Because all classes are represented at the public balls, marriages between different ranks would become more frequent (p. 267). They would serve to moderate party spirit and temper excessive inequality (p. 267). Hence, the Republic's equilibrium would be more stabilized.

In short, Rousseau urges Geneva to establish entertainments which accentuate its unique virtues, customs, and way of life. The originality of its public festivals and celebrations would be more prone to attract foreign travelers
and absentee citizens than a mediocre theatre (p. 268). In a highly sentimental and nostalgic passage, Rousseau conveys a basic, human truth which transcends the limited objectivity of encyclopedic rationalism.

Love of country is derived not from laws or reason alone. It is inspired through an original way of life characterized by fond memories of friendship and community spirit as follows:

Il faut que chacun sente qu'il ne sauroit trouver ailleurs ce qu'il a laissé dans son pays; il faut qu'un charme invincible le rappelle au séjour qu'il n'aurait point dû quitter; il faut que le souvenir de leurs premiers exercices, de leurs premiers spectacles, de leurs premiers plaisirs, reste profondément gravé dans leurs coeurs; ... il faut qu'au milieu de la pompe des grands États de leur triste magnificence une voix secrète leur crie incessament au fond de l'âme: "Ah! où sont les jeux et les fêtes de ma jeunesse? où est la concorde des citoyens, où est la fraternité publique? où est la pure joie et la véritable allégresse? où sont la paix, la liberté, l'équité, l'innocence? Allons rechercher tout cela" (p. 268).

Rousseau implies that, in the final analysis, the republic's main task consists of making good citizens. Since the theatre follows a different tradition, it must be excluded from the state in preference of cercles, games, festivals, and celebrations which safeguard a precarious way of
life and form of government - the republic.

In summary, Rousseau answers D'Alembert's proposal of establishing a theatre in Geneva from the viewpoints of a moralist and a political theorist. The central questions raised by Rousseau in his Lettre à D'Alembert ... concern the moral responsibilities of the writer to society, his role in the political state, and more specifically the proper effects of art in the republican form of government. These are questions whose relevancy to twentieth century man have captivated the attention of such modern French writers as Albert Camus. Recent studies by L. J. Hatterer, H. E. Read, and Allen Tate reexamine the socio-political ramifications of literature in light of the modern emphasis upon a literature of commitment.

Rousseau's study of the theatre reduces aesthetics to politics. He reasons on the basis of a relativism which negates D'Alembert's implied claim as to the French theatre's universal taste and beneficial effects on society. In the case of a republic, the dramatist cannot be allowed complete literary freedom with which to instruct the citizens. His art is based on foreign socio-aesthetic principles and he is himself the prisoner of its first rule—plaire. The responsibility of instructing the republic's citizens and
offering models of conduct must remain the domain of the legislators the elders, religious leaders, and parents.

Political freedom takes precedence, therefore, over that of literature in a republic. It can be maintained only through adherence to its founding principles. The citizen of a republic sacrifices a few aesthetic pleasures for the good of the entire community. In return, he enjoys rare pleasures unavailable in a monarchy. He experiences the really universal values of fraternity and love of humanity rather than the supposed one of "taste".

According to Rousseau's political theory, a free society cannot tolerate those influences which undermine its way of life. This point of view is dramatized three years later by Rousseau in *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761). From the viewpoint of the twentieth century, Rousseau's political theory seems to move in the direction of a closed, totalitarian society. Today, we take the survival of the republic for granted and are concerned more with individual freedom.

On the autobiographical level of the *Lettre à D'Alembert* ... , Rousseau is accused often by his critics of being self-contradictory. They call him "un homme à paradoxe" and "un homme à préjugés", for he wrote himself for the
It is well to keep in mind that Rousseau's study on the theatre is written out of a sense of duty and from the perspective of a "citizen" rather than for his personal pleasure as a private individual. The general, public interest guides his pen and he writes for the people (p. 267).

It is inaccurate, therefore, to refer to Rousseau as "l'ennemi de Molière". In his private capacity as a reader, he admires the great talents of French classical dramatists as seen in the following passage taken from a footnote to his conclusion:

La vérité est que Racine me charme, et que je n'ai jamais manqué volontairement une représentation de Molière. Si j'ai moins parlé de Corneille, c'est qu'ayant peu fréquenté ses pièces, et manquant de livres, il ne m'est pas assez resté dans la mémoire pour le citer (p. 267).

Despite his personal love of the theatre, Rousseau maintains that the philosophe's responsibility to the general good obliges him to transcend his love of art in order to serve the best socio-political interests of the public as follows:

L'amour du bien public est la seule passion qui me fait parler au public; je sais alors m'oublier moi-même, et si quelqu'un m'offense, je me tais sur son compte de peur que la colère ne me rende injuste (p. 267).

From an historical point of view, Rousseau's Lettre à D'Alembert ... can be regarded as part of a controversy
on the theatre that reaches back to the Renaissance. In the context of the eighteenth century, Rousseau's work influences the course of the philosophic movement. Due to the public's enthusiastic reception of Rousseau's attack on the article, "Geneve", D'Alembert resigned his editorship of the Encyclopédie in 1759.

The question of the theatre's proposed establishment in Geneva was decided finally in the streets. Because of its dangerous political situation in 1766, Geneva asked for the mediation of France. At the instigation of Voltaire, the French envoy, le Chevalier de Beauteville, demanded that the city admit the theatre (loc. cit.). However, a few months later upon the withdrawal of the French troops, the people of Geneva tore down the theatre and burned it (loc. cit.). Voltaire was forced to admit the victory of Rousseau's Lettre à D'Alembert ... A theatre was not established in Geneva until 1782, four years after Rousseau's death (loc. cit., 105).

Eventually, both the philosophes and the clergy modified their views on the theatre in general. According to Louis Bourquin's historical study of the theatre controversy, Rousseau's Lettre à D'Alembert ... helped to moderate their views. The philosophes no longer regarded the
theatre as a necessary social benefit while the clergy refrained from condemning it as a necessary evil (op. cit. plus.). Individually, one could enjoy the theatre. But from a social point of view, one could not promote it as being good for "l'intérêt général et la sauvegarde des moeurs communes" (op. cit. plus.).

In the history of French literature, Voltaire and Diderot are considered traditionally as the eighteenth century's foremost dramatic theorists. However, it is the opinion of Emanuel Von der Muhl that the reformers of the theatre after 1760, such as Sebastian Mercier, were more influenced by the moral-aesthetics of Rousseau than by the dramatic theory of Diderot and Voltaire.66 Within ten years after his Lettre à D'Alembert sur les spectacles (1758), Rousseau's judgment of comedy in general and of Molière in particular became the dominant one among the theatre's reformers (loc. cit.), 167. In Beaumarchais' Préface to Le Barbier de Séville (1775), Von der Muhl observes the influence of Rousseau in the playwright's sworn defense of persecuted virtue, his declared attack on social vices instead of their ridicule, and in his announced portrayal of the exploited class (loc. cit., 168).

We can only speculate as to how Rousseau would have
reacted to the different kinds of theatre created after the publication of his Lettre à D'Alembert .... He betrays a secret preference, in Von der Muhl's opinion, for the "drame bourgeois" as represented by Sedaine's Le Philosophe sans le savoir (1765) (loc. cit., 164). We will recall that Rousseau considered the portrayal of an honest man by the theatre as being doomed to failure (p. 205).

From an early twentieth century perspective, Albert Schinz feels that Switzerland has realized Rousseau's ideal spectacle with its Festspiel and pièces historiques. The rebirth of the medieval Mystères and Miracles would meet, also, Rousseau's approval while the development of "le théâtre du peuple" in France would certainly intrigue his interest according to Schinz (loc. cit.). As for the contemporary theatre, Bernard Waisbord feels that Rousseau would have liked the revolutionary theatre as represented by Brecht (loc. cit., 119). Rousseau deemed his contemporaries as being too much under the influence of Parisian "esprit" and elegance to be capable of such virile creations.

In the case of Rousseau's "fêtes", Waisbord fears that they would have degenerated into militant state demonstrations à la Hitler (loc. cit.). He echoes D'Alembert's
claim as to the universal value of the theatre in the following warning: "Il y a danger pour les peuples qui n'ont plus de théâtre (loc. cit.). Despite the exaggerations of Rousseau's "art of persuasion", I see no textual basis for this judgment. It must be remembered that Rousseau proposes public festivals for the particular state of Geneva in order to preserve its republican tradition.

As a general truth, most critics can agree probably with Von der Muhl that Rousseau's attack on the theatre reflects the general dissatisfaction of the eighteenth century with this art form (loc. cit., 163). Apart from its influence on the dramatic theory of the theatre's reformers, one must not neglect the general philosophic import of Rousseau's Lettre à D'Alembert ... . I agree with Jean Boorsch who sees Rousseau as building the foundation of modern conscience. 68 Rousseau makes us reflect on the broad, socio-political consequences of art. If his literary criticism loses something in its reduction of aesthetics to ethics, it gains a more than compensatory human meaning.
Footnotes

1 Albert Schinz, La Pensee de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Northampton, Mass.: Smith College, 1929), I, who describes La Lettre à D'Alembert ... as a major embarrassment to those critics who regard Rousseau as a romantic (p. 198). When such critics as Babbit dismiss the work's rationality as a product of "l'esprit de contradiction," Schinz accuses them of deforming deliberately Rousseau's thought (p. 234).


4 See Schinz, op. cit.


Note: all references to the Lettre à D'Alembert ... refer to this edition and will be indicated in the future by an aprethesis and page number.

Footnotes (cont'd.)

11 See F. C. Green, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1955), p. 221 who contends that Rousseau was not entrusted with writing the article on Geneva for polemical reasons. As a citizen of Geneva who had lived abroad for a long period, he would have been the logical choice for an objective report. It is odd, also, that the article, "Genève," is several times longer than that of "France."

12 D'Alembert's article, "Genève," is included by the editor in the same volume of Rousseau's Oeuvres complètes as the Lettre à D'Alembert....

13 These divisions follow those set up by Allan Bloom in his edition of Politics and the Arts. See footnote 2.

14 See Donald Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1967) for a study as to the significance of virtus in Greek and Roman thought. See also Chapter IV, footnote 3 of this dissertation for an explanation of Montesquieu's concept of vertu.

15 See Schinz, op. cit. plus., pp. 229-232 for an analysis as to the differences between "le rationalisme moral" of ancient philosophy (as represented by Rousseau) and that of the encyclopédistes of the eighteenth century.

16 Socinianism was a Christian sect closely allied with the development of Unitarianism. It was anti-trinitarian: denied eternal punishment; held that reason is the sole and final authority in the interpretation of scripture. Since Calvin had condemned the doctrine, D'Alembert's article implied that the Genevan ministers were heretics.


18 See F. C. Green, op. cit., p. 219 for a pithy explanation of the political ramifications involved in the Genevan theatre controversy.
Footnotes (cont'd.)

19 See D'Alembert, Oeuvres complètes (Paris: A. Belin, 1821), I, p. 82.

20 See Schinz, op. cit. plus.

21 D'Alembert employs consistently the vague term of "plusieurs pasteurs de Genève" (p. 353).

22 See Schinz, op. cit. plus., p. 204 who observes that Rousseau begins to substitute more and more the term utile for that of vertueux in the Lettre à D'Alembert ... .


24 Rousseau uses sometimes the broad meaning of the word spectacle, as included in his complete title, Lettre à D'Alembert sur les spectacles, to refer to anything that one goes to see, and hence entertainment in general.

25 See Chapter I, footnote 22 for an explanation on the importance of relatism to the eighteenth century.

26 See Chapter I, p. 29 of this dissertation.

27 In preparation of the Lettre à D'Alembert ..., Rousseau studied Plato's dialogues and especially the tenth book of Laws and the tenth book of The Republic. From his reading, he composed an essay entitled De l'imitation théatrale, "une espece d'extrait de divers endroits ou Platon traite de l'imitation théatrale" (p. 358).


Footnotes (cont'd.)

30 According to Rousseau, the horrors and violence found in ancient Greek tragedies served a different purpose. They formed part of a national tradition which recalled the crimes of ancient, ruling families from whose tyranny the Greek peoples had freed themselves (p. 199).


32 See Molière, Oeuvres complètes (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1962), I, p. 629 where he states in his Préface to Tartuffe the following: "Si l'emploi de la comédie est de corriger les vices des hommes, je ne vois pas par quelle raison il y en aura de privilégiés."

33 Rousseau uses the term "l'honnête homme" in its literal sense. See Chapter II, footnote 33.

34 See Politzer, op. cit., p. 256 who maintains that the Lettre à D'Alembert ... should be interpreted as being simultaneously a discussion of art and society in which the theatre and the actor become the symbols of society and the social man.


36 See Emile Faguet, op. cit., p. 218 where he describes Molière as being "aussi étranger au sentiment religieux qu'il est possible qu'un homme le soit." When Molière speaks of religion, it is out of the mouths of antipathetic characters such as the simpleton, Sganarelle, of Don Juan and the Hypocrite, Arnolphe, in Ecole des Femmes (p. 230).

37 See Faguet, op. cit. plus, p. 309 who feels obliged to agree with Rousseau that Molière's treatment of M. Jourdain in Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme draws its laughter from an unjust social prejudice.

38 See Waisbord, op. cit., p. 109 who wonders why Rousseau does not refer to Lesage who, unlike Molière, inspires sympathy for the people in a comedy such as Turcaret. Furthermore, he speculates that Rousseau saw probably the subtle grace of Marivaux as "un divertissement pur gens riches."
Footnotes (cont'd)


40 See E. Von der Muhl, "Rousseau et les reformateurs du theatre," *Modern Language Notes*, LV (1940), p. 165 who claims that Rousseau reacts more so against the political lessons of the theatre than its moral ones. The crimes of kings are made to be admired and their scorn shown to the honest bourgeois and peasant applauded.

41 See G. E. Lessing, *Hamburg Dramaturgy*. Trans. by Helen Zimmern (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 79 who agrees in essence with Rousseau (although he thinks that he is in disagreement with him) that Alceste does not become contemptible or lose the esteem of the audience.

42 The mediocrity of the salon taste was confirmed by the audience's reaction to Oronte's sonnet in *Le Misanthrope's* first presentation. Molière ridiculed it through Alceste while the audience applauded it.


44 See Politzer, op. cit. plus, p. 253 who exposes the inadequacy of the traditional interpretation given for Rousseau's defense of Alceste. He contends that Rousseau's identification with Alceste conforms to the "aesthetics of self-expression" as opposed to that of imitation.

45 See Waisbord, op. cit. plus, p. 116 who contends that Rousseau's opinion of Bérénice reflects that of his age which viewed it as a minor play of Racine.

46 See Karl Toth, *Women and Rococo in France*. Trans. from German by Roger Abingdon (London: G. G. Harrap & Co., 1931) who seconds Rousseau's judgment of the salon influence through his notion of the feminization of France in the Eighteenth century as being the primary determinant in the development of its rococo style.
Footnotes (cont'd.)

47 Rousseau continues his relative reconciliation with traditional aesthetics as presented in his Préface de Narcisse. See Chapter IV, p. 156 of this dissertation.


49 In the last part of the work's second division (see pps. 228-240), Rousseau considers the nature of the acting profession. He concludes that the prejudices against it are justified. The actor forsakes his personal dignity through his art of imitation, deception, and illusion (p. 231). The actrice assumes the boldness of men and relinquishes the dignity of her sex—modesty (p. 235). Consequently, a confusion between the roles of each sex takes place and the stability of society is threatened. Rousseau characterizes this discussion as follows: "Au fond, cette discussion particulière n'est plus fort nécessaire" (p. 228).

50 See Rousseau, loc. cit., p. 433 where he portrays in the Wolmar estate a closed society in which the sexes are separated during the working hours and in much of their diversion. In the context of the theatre, Rousseau states that only men played roles in the first Greek tragedies (Lettre à D'Alembert ..., p. 230).

51 Rousseau utilizes his discussion of the theatre tax in order to decry the injustice of taxes placed on the necessities of life such as those on wheat, wine, and salt (p. 256). They burden the people while the rich hardly notice them (p. 256). Rousseau avocates indirectly a luxury tax in order to equalize the responsibility of citizenship. Once again, we see how Rousseau attacks the greater abuses of society through his criticism of literary activities.

52 See D'Alembert's "Geneve," pp. 346-348 which describes Savov's historical ambitions against Geneva. Treaties had been signed with France in 1749 and one with the King of Sardinia in 1754.

53 See Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1957), p. 115 who identifies "la fête" as one of the key images of Rousseau's works. In his opinion, the theatre and "la fête" are opposed like "un monde d'opacité et un monde de transparence" (p. 117).
Footnotes (cont'd.)

54 See Starobinski, ibid., p. 119 who associates the exaltation of the collective festival with "la volonté générale" of the Contrat Social in which each citizen becomes both actor and spectator in the government.

55 Rousseau manifests a special concern for avoiding a generation gap. His amusements bring all age groups together in a communal, almost tribal, fashion.

56 See Albert Camus, Oeuvres complètes (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1962), III, p. 449 where he shows in his essay, L'Artiste et son temps, an ambivalent attitude toward French classical literature and an evaluation of Racine's Bérénice which resemble that of the eighteenth century. Instead of writing Bérénice, Camus feels that Racine should have defended the Edict of Nantes.


58 See Rousseau, loc. cit., p. 437.


60 See Waisbord, op. cit. plus, p. 110.

61 See Faguet, op. cit. plus, p. 2.


64 See Moffat, loc. cit., p. 104.

65 See Bourquin, op. cit.: N. 28 (1921), p. 574.


67 See Schinz, La Pensée de J.-J. Rousseau, I, p. 222.
Footnotes (cont'd.)

CHAPTER VI

LITERATURE AND EDUCATION

Rousseau's last major discursive work, Emile, marks a turning point in both his philosophic thought, his literary art, and his personal life. Philosophically, the pedagogical novel represents the last attempt to synthesize his moral, social, political, aesthetic, and religious views.  Emile is written concurrently with the Contrat Social and appears two or three weeks after the political treatise due to external circumstances. If these two works are considered together in the context of Rousseau's thought, they attain the full equilibrium of his dialectic as follows:

Presque en même temps était publiée
le Contrat Social, qui en est l'antithèse
et le complément: d'un côté l'individualisme absolu, de l'autre la souveraineté absolue de la collectivité; d'un côté l'élève de la nature qui lui donne tous les droits,
de l'autre le citoyen qui abdique tous ces droits pour ne plus conserver que ceux rétrocédés à tous par la société.

After the publication of Emile (1762), Rousseau is put on a defensive stance both in his life and in his future literary works. His pedagogical novel is condemned by both
the civil and religious authorities of France and Geneva (ibid). In the defense of *Emile's* moral intention, Rousseau turns to a personal literature which is begun by the polemical *Lettres écrites de la Montagne* (1764 (ibid). Eventually, Rousseau's persecution becomes more imaginary than real and he passes through an acute mental crisis of three or four years. It leads to the creation of an apologetic, autobiographical literature which occupies the last years of his life and includes the following works: *Les Confessions* (1782, 1789), *Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire* (1782), and the *Dialogues* (1789).

As his last major discursive work before his turn to the introspective, autobiographical genres intended to justify his essential goodness, *Emile* represents a synthesis of Rousseau's objective observations on the nature of man and society. It is appropriate, therefore, that *Emile* serve as the basis of this dissertation's concluding chapter. It examines the role which literature is given in Rousseau's method of education. Certain socio-aesthetic principles such as *plaire*, imitation, *gout*, and politesse are studied in the pedagogical context in order to illustrate their continuity in Rousseau's thought and their expanded significance. In addition, *Emile's* readings are
related to the political context of Rousseau's thought with its demands of good citizenship.

In his Préface to Emile, Rousseau explains the high importance of his attempt to found a pedagogical method appropriate to the nature of man. Educational theory comprises, in his opinion, the most necessary and useful application of the philosophic writer's powers of reason. He criticizes the philosophes for neglecting "l'art de former les hommes" in their philosophic works (p. 241). They bear a destructive intent instead of being oriented toward "l'utilité publique" as follows:

La Littérature et le savoir de notre siècle tendent beaucoup plus à détruire qu'à édifier. On censure d'un ton de maître; pour proposer, il en faut prendre un autre, auquel la hauteur philosophique se complait moins (p. 241).

Hence, a major need of mankind, one necessary to his total progress, goes unfulfilled according to Rousseau.

In view of philosophic literature's supposedly destructive nature and disinterest in the educational process, Rousseau shuns its principles in the definition of his method in Livre I. He implies, for example, that the philosophes divorce reason from conscience (p. 288). Their philosophy justifies immorality, selfishness, and the spirit of domination (p. 288). A child reared according to this way of thinking
would become, in Rousseau's opinion, a self-centered tyrant who would respect only the rule of force (p. 288).

Rather than educating the child according to the corrupt values of society and its literature, Rousseau chooses to model his pedagogical method after the natural development of pre-social man as follows: "Observez la nature, et suivez la route qu'elle vous trace" (p. 259). His aim is to preserve the natural goodness and dignity of his pupil. He is to be a free man rather than a slave to unjust institutions, social prejudices, conventions and vices. Rousseau's method aims, therefore, at shielding the child against those social influences, prejudices and opinions, which would distort the natural development of his character.

Since literature reflects the taste, conventions, and prejudices of society through its art of imitation, it is removed from the child's learning experiences. He does not study the novel, poetry, or theatre until the age of reason or judgment when he can understand art's relative value. Such a limitation on the child's reading materials is of little consequence according to Rousseau. Literary works contribute nothing to the child's developing faculties and function only as an enslaving social decoration as follows: "Toute notre sagesse consiste en préjugés serviles: tous
Rousseau's contention as to the denatured character of society forms the basic hypothesis of his pedagogy. It is illustrated by his discussion of infant care. Women refuse to nurse their children in order to enjoy the amusements of social life (p. 255). The baby is given to an usually indifferent wet nurse who proves incapable of the same affectionate care as the real mother. Not only is the infant handed over to a servant, but he is bound up in swaddling clothes which prevent his freedom of movement (p. 254). Rejected by his mother, ignored by his wet nurse, and imprisoned by custom, the infant is initiated into the cruel, enslaving injustice and prejudice of society.

Rousseau proposes an education from the cradle to adulthood which is designed to make man free. The baby is to be allowed freedom of movement and voice. Rather than being weaned by a servant, he is to be accepted into the family community as a necessary member. His models of conduct will be based on the actions of free men, the parents, instead of on self-interested servitude. Later as a child, he will talk easily and well by participating in family conversations. His language will not be deformed through
the memorization and recitation of literary passages with their artificial language (p. 296).

The long-term aims of Rousseau's pedagogical method in Livre I prove to be less conclusive than his theory of child care. At this initial stage of his work, he fears the incompatibility between his desire to form both a "natural man" and a citizen. The former requires freedom from social conventions and opinions and the latter necessitates a conformity of the general will and recognition of duties to the state. The conflict seems to be irreconcilable as seen below:

Alors le concert est impossible. Forcé de combattre la nature ou les institutions sociales, il faut opter entre faire un homme ou un citoyen; car on ne peut faire à la fois l'un et l'autre (p. 248).

It becomes apparent that Rousseau does not wish to form either "l'homme naturel" or "l'homme civil". The former is described by him as being an absolute entity without ties to his fellow man while the latter is portrayed as "a fractional unit" whose only value stems from his relationship to "le corps social" (p. 249).

The problem becomes one of substituting a relative independence for an absolute one in order to integrate the individual "self" into "l'unité commune" (p. 249). Since
his contemporary educational institutions show themselves incapable of synthesizing the best qualities of both the "natural man" and the "social man", Rousseau proposes to attempt the feat through a private program of education. For the time being, Rousseau aims primarily at forming "l'homme" (p. 252). There is little doubt, however, that exemplary citizenship will become one of Emile's integrated attributes. In Rousseau's opinion, a father has an obligation of preparing both a sociable man for society and a citizen for the state (p. 262).

By emphasizing man's conflicting duties to himself, to society, and to the state, Rousseau increases the dramatic interest of his pedagogical novel. Just as in a French classical tragedy, the reader is aware of the plot's probable outcome but is curious as to how the conflict of "l'homme naturel" vs. "l'homme civil" will be reconciled. In order to render his experiment more concrete and realistic, Rousseau becomes himself the tutor of Emile, an imagined child (p. 264).

Rousseau's insistence upon the physical development of the infant is continued in Livre II which outlines the education of a child from five to twelve years of age. His organs of perception are to be perfected through direct
contact with a multitude of objects (p. 301). These experiences supply the child's memory with the raw materials from which reason will draw information eventually in making judgments. It is to be noticed that memory, the primary intellectual faculty to be developed during this period of childhood, is not exercised in the traditional manner through rote learning and verbal lessons but by direct contact with the physical world.

While awaiting the age of reason, Rousseau's method of instruction proscribes certain other traditional educational practices. For example, the child is not to be taught literature because it appeals to the imagination. This is the faculty which causes most of man's problems according to Rousseau (p. 304). It excites the desires beyond one's capacity of fulfilling them (p. 304). Unlike the precociousness of society's children, Emile learns to accommodate his desires to his capacity of acting upon them.

Through an instruction geared to the physical mental, and moral level of the child, Rousseau attempts to recapture and preserve the contentment of the primitive state. It was characterized, in his opinion, by an equilibrium between pouvoir and désir (p. 304). In a more general sense, Rousseau wishes to avoid the excitement of the imagination in order
to prolong the dormant state of the child's passions. It is crucial that the last of his faculties to develop, reason, be trained to make moral judgments before the onset of adult desires and passions (p. 317).

Because the child from age five to twelve has not yet reached the age of reason and judgment, to instruct him in philosophy and religion is considered to be premature by Rousseau. The child has no understanding of moral relationships and the attempt at their abstract, rational explanation leads to false ideas (p. 316). Rousseau advises, therefore, a "negative education" which does not attempt to teach the child vertu and vérité but to protect his heart from vice and his mind from error (p. 323).

Emile is given no formal education during his childhood. His learning experiences are not derived from books and the passive, servile acceptance of authority but from direct observation and discovery of the objects in his rustic environment (p. 351). The skills of reading and writing are not forced upon Emile because his early education is not based on book learning. Consequently, it is not until his tenth year, at the earliest, that Emile masters the skills of reading and writing; but, he chooses freely to do so out of self-interest in their utility (p. 358).
Certain academic subjects prove to be especially harmful or useless to childhood education because they do not coincide with this stage of development. The study of languages in childhood runs contrary to the pupils' rational development in his opinion. It multiplies the signs or symbols of things without giving the child greater knowledge of their material representation (p. 347). In order to profit intellectually from the study of languages, one must have reached the age of reason. Then, the comparison of ideas and manners of expression becomes possible and productive (p. 346).

The study of the ancient languages, Latin and Greek, is criticized in particular by Rousseau. It consists of a mechanical process of rote memory and imitation which, unaccompanied by understanding, fails to provide a learning experience (p. 347). Such a study functions merely as a social decoration in childhood and proves to be meaningless in the child's development.

Because of the same lack of readiness, Rousseau advises, also, against Emile's instruction in history. Without a conceptual maturity and understanding of "les rapports moraux" a child's study of history yields false results (p. 348). As an example of his judgment, Rousseau cites a case from his own experience. After dining at a friend's home
one day, the son of his host recited the historical legend of Alexander-the-Great and his doctor, Philip, as recounted by Plutarch. Upon questioning the boy in private, Rousseau learns that he admires Alexander's courage for drinking a disagreeable medicine given to him by his doctor, Philip, without realizing the significance of the act (p. 349).

Even more so than foreign languages and history, Rousseau disapproves of teaching the child LaFontaine's Fables. They are inappropriate to his education, according to Rousseau, because their meaning does not coincide with "la morale des enfans" (p. 352). Rousseau implies that, as in the case of Moliere's Le Misanthrope, LaFontaine's art reflects the unjust standards and corrupt practices of society without any attempt at correcting them. They fail to offer an inspiring ideal of conduct or a positive alternative to the corrupt social code.

Rousseau sees the Fables as portraying an amoral wisdom based on cleverness and deception rather than on honesty and virtue. In the defense of his interpretation, Rousseau analyzes in detail the celebrated fable, Le Corbeau et le Renard. One has the impression that le Renard plays the same role in Rousseau's thought as that of Philinte in his critique of Le Misanthrope. He is the raisonneur,
the self-interested philosophe, the false friend, and the flatterer. Just as in the case of Le Misanthrope, Rousseau believes that le Renard, the deceiver, becomes the hero of the little drama.

In the Lettre à D'Alembert sur les spectacles, we are told that due to "l'amour-propre" everyone wants to associate himself with the winner rather than with the ridiculous and duped but honest victim. On the basis of this principle, Rousseau claims that the child favors the fox over the crow, the wolf over the dog, and the lion over all (p. 356). The models of conduct dramatized in these fables include those of flattery, inhumanity, and injustice (p. 357). It is apparent to Rousseau that the Fables illustrate the contradictory morality of a society in which words are opposed to deeds (p. 357). Since his method of "negative education" is designed to protect Emile against the corrupt values of society (so that they may not appear natural to him), LaFontaine's Fables have no place in his program of childhood education.

The morally ineffective or detrimental character of the Fables is due, in Rousseau's opinion, to the unbalance between the literary aims of plaire and instruire. Their art sacrifices "la clarté" for l'aggrément" (p. 352).
Rousseau's renewed indictment of literature's failure to give moral instruction through its content because of the preoccupation with a pleasing form or style reveals a fundamental bias in the case of the *Fables*. He reacts against the closed, symbolic nature of poetry with its multiple meanings.

The poetic art of LaFontaine lacks, according to Rousseau's stylistic analysis of *Le Corbeau et le Renard*, the logic, clarity, realism, and concreteness of philosophic prose. He criticizes the first line of the fable - "Maître corbeau sur un arbre perché" - for its meaningless inversion as follows:

*Qu'est-ce qu'un arbre perché? L'on ne dit pas: sur un arbre perché; l'on dit perché sur un arbre.* Par conséquent il faut parler des inversions de la poésie; il faut dire ce que c'est que prose et vers (p. 353).

The fable's word choice presents another impediment to understanding in Rousseau's opinion. In the third line - "Alléché par l'odeur d'un fromage" - he disapproves of the word, alléché, as being of a rare usage and belonging to a removed, stylized poetic language (p. 353). It distracts from the fable's message and renders it inaccessible to the child. As another example of excessive "poetic luggage",

Rousseau cites the periphrase, "Les hôtes de ces bois" and the redundant repetitions in the sixth line: "Que vous êtes charmant! que vous me semblez beau" (p. 354):

Literary convention rather than a realism aimed at instruction reigns in the fable according to Rousseau. The fox is given the meaningless title of "Maitre" and the crow is compared to "le Phénix" (p. 354). In view of the latter image, it is evident to Rousseau that the author did not find his models in nature but in literary tradition as follows:

Le Phénix! Qu'est-ce'un Phénix?
Nous voici tout à coup jeté dans
la menteuse antiquité; presque dans
la mythologie (p. 354).

Not only does LaFonatine's art render the fable's language more obscure and erudite but it deviates from common sense and logic in Rousseau's opinion. In his criticism of the word alléché, he remarks as to the improbability of the dramatic situation. It is very unlikely that a fox could smell a piece of cheese in the beak of a crow perched in a tree (p. 353). A more complex case of careless thinking and lack of logic takes place in the following lines: "Sans mentir, si votre ramage Repondoit à votre plumage" (p. 354). They encourage the comparison between the contrary qualities
of voice and feathers, and the meaning of the verb Répondoit remains unclear (p. 354).

Rousseau's exclusion of La Fontaine's Fables from Emile's study program is only a provisional one. Just as in the case of the Lettre à D'Alembert sur les spectacles where the factor of a city's size determines the theatre's relative usefulness, the age of Emile controls the value of the Fables in his education. Although excluded from his childhood, they will play an important role in the development of his judgment and knowledge of social relations in early manhood. In short, Rousseau deems the Fables to offer pleasing and profitable reading but only for the adult. 15

Not all of Rousseau's comments on Le Corbeau et le Renard are negative as seen in his appreciation of the following line: "Il ouvre un large bec, laisse tomber sa proye" (p. 355). Marveling at the harmony of its verse and the clarity of its image, he hears the cheese falling through the branches (p. 355). Such a demonstrated aesthetic appreciation of La Fontaine's art does not nullify his previous criticisms made from the objective viewpoint of the teacher in search of pedagogical materials appropriate to his method. In any event, the question of the fable's aesthetic beauty has no relevant bearing of this stage of Emile's instruction
for it lies beyond his capacity of comprehension (p. 355).

In my judgment, Rousseau's provisional rejection of LaFontaine's *Fables* coincides with the logic of his pedagogical method. It is based upon the undeniable principle of pupil readiness as follows:

Chaque âge, chaque état de la vie a sa perfection convenable, sa sorte de maturité qui lui est propre. Nous avons souvent oui parler d'un homme fait mais considerons un enfant fait: ce spectacle sera plus nouveau pour nous, et ne sera peut-être pas moins agréable (p. 418).

The moral problems involved in the *Fables* surpass the child's comprehension and can serve only to awaken prematurely his adult humors or feelings.

As a child, Emile is to perfect his "raison sensitive ou puérile" which is based upon the formation of simple ideas drawn from sensations (p. 417). It prepares the development of his adult "raison intellectuelle ou humaine" which produces complex ideas from simple ones (p. 417). If the child passes prematurely from the first level of thought to the second, Rousseau believes that his judging faculty will never reach its potential power. Of secondary importance, Emile does not need to study the *Fables* in order to be forewarned of social vices for he is not yet a member of society. His "negative education" shields him from its corruption.
Apart from the evaluation of LaFontaine's Fables within the context of Rousseau's pedagogical method, their intrinsic moral character has been widely debated. The French romantic poet, Lamartine, has labeled them, in the Préface to his Méditations, as lessons in cynicism which reflect badly on the French education. A more moderate judgment of the Fables' moral tone is presented by the critic Rene Bray. He admits to the Fables' "morale égoïste" but upholds their pedagogical usefulness in preparing the child for life when explained by the teacher. At the same time, Rene Bray reminds us that the morality expressed in the Fables is determined to a large extent by the classical tradition of the genre (Ibid.).

Personally, I doubt that the Fables can be classified as children's literature. Their aesthetic richness and philosophic meaning increase with the reader's age and experience. However, even if LaFontaine's Fables are compared with traditional children's tales, their amoral wisdom and physical violence prove to be no greater. By forcing the reader to make such comparisons, Rousseau contributes to pedagogical theory and a greater human awareness. He makes us reevaluate the moral content of traditional teaching materials from a more objective viewpoint. Consequently, the
extent to which literature transmits the prejudices and inhumanity of the past into the present is made apparent.

If Rousseau's criticism of the *Fables* is compared with that of the theatre in the *Lettre à D'Alembert* ..., certain insights into Rousseau's moral aesthetics can be gained. Rousseau does not recommend the theatre for the general use of adults as in the case of the *Fables* (p. 352). According to his view, they do not pose probably as great a danger to public morality as the theatre. The *Fables'* dramatized passions possess greater scope than the theatre's preoccupation with love and their lack of spectacle would tend to excite the reader less. Of greater importance, the fabulist does not feel the same pressure to please and to flatter as the playwright. Hence, the greater freedom of his *genre* allows him to provide some moral instruction.

Literature plays a more significant role in the next stage of Emile's development from age twelve to fifteen as portrayed in *Livre III*. During this period of early adolescence before the onset of puberty, he moves from the level of *sensations* to that of *ideas* (p. 430). The problem becomes one of awakening his imagination without arousing his passions or posing the complexity of social relationships. 19 Emile is not yet prepared for these adult
considerations and most complete his apprenticeship in the 
rapports between man and things.

In his search of a book with which to instruct Emile, 
Rousseau lays down a stringent list of philosophic and 
pedagogical demands. First of all, it must prove useful by 
relating directly to the educational needs and general develop-
ment of his student (p. 428). Instead of turning him away from 
life, Emile's reading must present problem solving situations 
from material reality.

The desired book appeals to "la curiosité naturelle 
de l'homme" rather than to the social desire for distinction 
(p. 429). "Natural curiosity" constitutes the need of man 
to know what is useful to his survival and well-being (p. 249). 
This motive for learning is natural, and Rousseau regards 
it as being akin to instinct (p. 429). The work which in-
spires this fundamental motivation possesses the attribute 
of "le goût naturel" (p. 429).

Besides posing problems on the material level of life 
and arousing a "natural" interest based upon the desire for 
survival, Emile's book must be free, also, from society's 
false values, conventions, and prejudices. It follows, 
therefore, that its models of conduct are to be drawn from 
nature rather than from literary tradition. The "natural
curiosity" which the reading is to awaken bears no relation to socio-aesthetic conventions. Being inspired by nature, it functions independently of society.

Rousseau finds a literary work to fulfill his pedagogical needs in Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe (p. 455). It meets all of his general demands by portraying a free man exercising both his physical senses and his reason in the attempt to survive. His life is organized on the natural principles of invention, experience, utility, and independence. Living outside of society, his conduct represents the true value of things. Iron is treasured more dearly than gold and a good instrument is held in higher esteem than an art object (p. 459).

Robinson Crusoe's adaptation to his forced isolation illustrates, also, the true blessings of life. He does not suffer excessively from passions which are aroused socially. They respond merely to "les besoins naturels de l'homme" (p. 454). The happiness which he cultivates eventually is in accordance with that of "l'homme naturel" (p. 444). It consists of a contentment based upon the satisfaction of physical needs, the feeling of independece, and a bit of comfort without superfluity (p. 456). This rudimentary type of happiness conforms to Emile's development, for he is not
yet ready to consider the complex problems of happiness on
the level of "l'homme moral" (p. 444).

Needless to say, Rousseau selects Robinson Crusoe
on the basis of philosophic criteria rather than on literary
ones. The unity of the work is not even respected by his
method. In order to circumvent the problems of social man
and protect Emile from society's false values, Rousseau
proposes to teach only that part of the novel which deals
with Crusoe's stay on the island as follows:

Ce roman débarassé de tout son fatras,
commençant au naufrage de Robinson près
de son île, et finissant à l'arrivée du
vaisseau qui vient l'en tirer sera tout
tout à la fois l'amusement et l'instruction
d'Emile durant l'époque dont il est ici
question (p. 455).

Defoe's novel reconciles only apparently art and nature.
Due to philosophic necessity, Rousseau selects only a portion
of the work in order to adapt it to his pedagogical method.

In view of Rousseau's manipulative use of Robinson
Crusoe, the novel seems to leave the realm of cition in
his method. In fact, Rousseau refers to it as "le plus
heureux traitte d'éducation naturelle" (p. 454). It is
valued not for its intrinsic aesthetic beauty or psychological
insights but acts instead as a means to exercise Emile's
imagination. An almost allegorical function is attributed to Robinson Crusoe by Rousseau. He sees it as a case study of Man without social relationships, freed from the conventions, habits, and prejudices of society.

The adventures of Crusoe are used by Rousseau in order to instruct his pupil in "les vrais rapports des choses"(p. 454). Crusoe's island is regarded as the true region of utility. Because society's false distinctions and values do not apply there, Emile has the opportunity of learning their artificial, arbitrary value. Rousseau's method is forced to resort to this contrived, indirect learning experience because of the impossibility of removing Emile completely from society. In order to make his reading lesson more realistic, he is encouraged to identify himself with the novel's hero and to even dress like him (p. 455).

Crusoe's adventures on his deserted island function as a contrast to life in society. His bare existence does not represent an utopia for which Emile is being prepared. It acts instead as a transitional state (realized through the help of fiction) from the natural condition of Emile to that of his future social existence as follows:

Au reste dépêchons-nous de l'établir
dans cette isle tandis qu'il y borne
sa félicité, car le jour s'approche, où
s'il y veut vivre encore il n'y voudra
plus vivre seul et où Vendredi qui
maintenant ne le touche guères ne lui
suffira pas longtemps (p. 456).

Emile's future social relations are inevitable and
his experiences lived through the imagination on Robinson
Crusoe's island will prepare him for the world - "l'isle
du genre humain c'est la terre" (p. 429). The founding prin-
ciples of his judging faculty are established in the labora-
tory of Robinson Crusoe's island. There, "les rapports
réels et matériels" are explored (p. 462). This pure,
natural, and material reality affords Emile with the values
needed to judge man in his relation to the objects which
he transforms into useful things. Indirectly, Emile gains
understanding of an individual's worth through the value
of his material contribution to society.

In his education as to the true relationship between
objects and man, Emile erects his own scale of values. It
runs completely contrary to the established one of society,
for Emile judges the arts according to their usefulness.
In a contrast between the artisan and the artist, Emile's
teacher explains how the artisan is superior to the artist
both in his contribution to mankind and in the preservation
of his personal, human dignity.
Social justice is made evident, according to Rousseau, by the elevation of the artist over the artisan. The latter serves the public through his industrious production of useful objects but is paid much less than the artist who makes "trifles and vain works" for the idle and rich elite (p. 457). Whereas the artisan's work is geared to the ability of the public to pay, the artist's production is given an arbitrary value based not on human needs but on opinion (p. 457). In practice, the value of art objects is derived, according to Rousseau's view, from the inability of the poor to possess them (p. 457). Hence, art functions as a distinction to separate the classes. It gives the wealthy an illusory sense of worth and provides an aesthetic experience outside of the people's reach.

The prejudice as to art's superior value represents the greatest danger to Emile's education. By accepting "le prix de fantaise" of art, he would no longer be able to judge "le prix tiré de l'utilité réelle" (p. 457). Rousseau's whole pedagogy is designed to shelter Emile from the false, socio-aesthetic values of society. He cannot learn to make valid judgments if his criteria are based on prejudice (p. 458).

Emile must learn first, the true value of things and
man's relation to them as dramatized in *Robinson Crusoe*. Afterwards, his objectivity will enable him to judge society's values or interpretation of material reality. Instead of being an unthinking imitator of social opinion, "un esclave des préjugés", Emile's education makes him an enlightened, free man (p. 458).

The real wealth and dignity of man consists in the complete possession of himself according to Rousseau's method of education. Emile is instructed through discovery and self-invention so as to be independent of either the authority of books or the facility of tools. In truth, Emile's training is aimed at making him a complete man whose active and reflective faculties work together in harmony. His whole being becomes an instrument of high potential, and he is ready to meet any demand of material existence.

In contrast to Emile, the future artisan, Rousseau sees the artist as being powerless to preserve his freedom and dignity. He is dependent upon a corrupt social order and its socio-aesthetic principles which create a demand for his art. Unlike the artisan who fills the demands of real needs, the artist is dependent on the changing tides of taste and the favor or patrons (p. 471). In order to be successful, he must "consent" to a corrupt system.
His art is financed through the superfluity gained from the exploitation of the workers. It affords him the leisure to create and the rich with the idleness to appreciate his creations.

In addition to his passive "consent" or collaboration in social injustice, the artist is obliged to participate actively in society's corruption in order to utilize his talents most effectively. Because his art is nourished on the luxury of the wealthy, he must gain their favor. Intrigues with women of the court, the bribery of cabinet ministers, and flattery become the rudimentary tools of his art (p. 471). In short, the artist trades his freedom, human dignity, and conscience for the chance to practice his art.

Because the artist is forced into moral corruption and his art opposes the general welfare, Rousseau decides to make Emile an artisan. He would prefer that his pupil become a shoemaker rather than a poet or a writer (p. 473). After careful consideration of the trades, their required skills and working conditions, Rousseau chooses that of carpentry (p. 478). It synthesizes his ideals of useful art and industry.

The carpenter leads a physically active existence; performs a necessary service to society; retains his
individual freedom and dignity through his mobility and the constant demand for his skills. In the art of carpentry, Rousseau implies that the worker is joined with the thinker as follows:

Il faut qu'il travaille en paysan et qu'il pense en philosophe pour n'être pas aussi fainéant qu'un sauvage, Le grand secret de l'éducation est de faire que les exercices du corps et ceux de l'esprit servent toujours de délassement les uns aux autres (p. 480).

Moreover, Emile's trade allows room for élégance and goût within the framework of utility (p. 478).

At this point in Emile's development, experience and exercise have perfected his senses; and, the study of the true relationship between things and man through Robinson Crusoe have established the sound principles of his reason. He can make objective judgments on the material level of life. In order to become a complete man, his rationality needs to be complemented by sentiment (p. 481). The time of his entrance into society approaches, and he must learn to understand the motives of man's conduct and to make judgments on the more complex level of moral and social relations (p. 488).

In Livre IV which traces Emile's intellectual growth from age fifteen to twenty, the problem of the passions
arises. Hence, a change in pedagogical method is required (p. 494). In order to instruct Emile in the dangerous consequences of the passions and their irrational effects on human conduct, direct observation and personal experience no longer prove advisable. Neither can the teacher expect Emile to accept his warnings against the dangers of lust, ambition, treachery, etc., for he has been trained to depend not on authority but on his own judging faculty.

Emile must be provided, therefore, with the opportunity of judging the physical and moral effects of passion on the lives of men from a distance so as to not corrupt himself in the process. The written word, in the forms of history and literature, afford him the chance to judge men in their social relations and to learn the secrets of the human hear(p. 525). Through his study of *Robinson Crusoe*, Emile learned the vanity of wealth and social position. Now, he must understand the vanity of glory, power, and lust.

Through the study of history, Emile becomes a "spectator of the human comedy". In order that he exercise his reasoning faculty on the plane of moral judgments as an active rather than a passive spectator of the human heart, Rousseau makes certain moral and literary demands on history. It must present problem solving situations and facts
in order to allow Emile to reach his own conclusions (p. 528). Rousseau resents the historian who interjects his personality, interpretations, and prejudices between the historical event and the reader (p. 528). The technique prevents the sense of involvement and identification which Rousseau wants his student to enjoy.  

In short, Rousseau regards history as a drama of passions and their consequences from which Emile can learn to judge the motives and outcomes of human conduct. For his pedagogical purpose, he prefers a history which concerns itself primarily with morals and manners instead of wars (p. 527). Its style must engage the reader through its natural language and realistic, detailed setting (p. 532). The history of the ancients meets his philosophic, literary, and pedagogical requirements (p. 530). It reflects, in his opinion, a more profound knowledge of man and puts less stress on pleasing than the history of modern authors (p. 530).

Instead of studying the conventional image of historical figures, Rousseau desires to instruct Emile in the inner life of the man behind the parade dress and social mask. For this purpose, the Lives of Plutarch is chosen. His art reveals moral character through its attentiveness to
details such as gestures and to small, private events in the life of an historical personage (p. 531). He does not decorate or idealize through the excessive use of the imagination but depicts with a lifelike quality in order to give the impression of "le naturel" or a real, human life (p. 531).

In contrast to the history of the ancients, Rousseau regards eighteenth century historical studies as failing to provide the objectivity and realism required by his pedagogical method. The philosophes' interpretation of history is pervaded, in his opinion, by "l'esprit philosophique" and "la fureur des sistèmes" which impose ideological lessons on past events (p. 530). Repeating his oft made charge, Rousseau declares that the philosophes are interested neither in truth nor in man but in their own systems as follows:

Ce ne sont point les philosophes qui connoissent le mieux les hommes; ils ne les voyent qu'à travers les préjugés de la philosophie, et je ne sache aucun état où l'on en ait tant. Un sauvage nous juge plus sainement que ne fait un philosophe (p. 535).

The philosophes are as far removed from material reality as the kings in Rousseau's opinion; they both judge the people from a distance as being stupid (p. 510).

Rousseau's criticisms as to the way in which the philosophes portray historical figures echo those made of
the modern dramatist in his *Lettre à D'Alembert* ... .

A lack of realism, an excess of *esprit* designed to please, and a false *politesse* or *décence* prevent the philosophic historian from dramatizing a veritable, objective presentation of the historical scene (p. 530). Just as in tragedy, the modern historian avoids "les détails familiers et bas mais vrais" in order to adapt his interpretation of history to the contemporary taste (p. 530).

Instead of penetrating into the particular, individual nature of the historical figure with all its contradictions, Rousseau implies that the modern historian uses it as a symbol of the general fate of man. He portrays the hero's social and political image as the truth rather than attempting to discover the man behind the myth as follows:

> La décence, non moins sévère dans les écrits que dans les actions ne permet plus de dire en public que ce qu'elle permet d'y faire; et comme on ne peut montrer les hommes que représentants toujours, on ne les connoit pas plus dans nos livres que sur nos Théâtres (p. 530).

Rousseau observes the same lack of virility and naturalness in philosophic history as in the eighteenth century theatre. An ostentatious taste and a false dignity restrict the modern historian from surpassing the illusory reality of heroic actions, glory, and grandeur. Rousseau
prefers to witness scenes from the historical figure's private life in a natural, even coarse language which reveal his moral character (p. 531). In the following passage, Rousseau rebukes the philosophes for their stylized and elegant histories:

\begin{quote}
Vcîlà donc ce que vous n'osez dire? Misérables! Soyez donc à jamais sans naturel, sans entrailles: trempez durcissez vos coeurs de fer dans votre vile décence: rendez-vous méprisables à force de dignité (p. 532).
\end{quote}

Rousseau’s criticism of eighteenth century philosophic history affords some insight into the consequences of his own method and "system". Even though he denounces the philosophes for their lack of objectivity and ideological interpretations of history, his own view of history is based on a thesis. It contends that political events are derived from moral causes. While censuring history's preoccupation with wars, Rousseau makes the following observation:

\begin{quote}
La guerre ne fait qu'oser que manifester des événements déjà déterminés par des causes morales que les historiens savent rarement voir (p. 529).
\end{quote}

Of greater significance for literature, Rousseau proposes to use Plutarch's Lives in the same manner as Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. Both are regarded as offering case studies. The former supplies the additional complexity
of passions and moral relationships. Hence, Rousseau's educational program disregards the generic distinctions between historical biography and adventure fiction. They are judged on the common basis of pedagogical utility. As a matter of fact, the question of style preoccupies Rousseau more in the discussion of history than in that of Robinson Crusoe. 

Not only do the passions necessitate the instruction of Emile through the written word so as to put an objective distance between him and his new subject matter, but the appearance of "l'amour-propre" or self-esteem adds a further complexity to his instruction in moral relations. Emile is now a man and can no longer be warned or corrected directly without challenging his self-esteem and, thus, encouraging rebellion (p. 540). His judgment can be refined best during this period through the study of LaFontaine's Fables (p. 540).

Just as the study of history assures Emile an objective distance from which to judge the passions, the Fables enable him to evaluate his own social experiences in a disinterested manner by seeing them enacted "sous un masque étranger" (p. 540). Through the presentation of selected Fables which correspond to Emile's own personal experiences,
the teacher corrects his pupil's errors of judgment without offending the adolescent's sensitivity. According to Rousseau's explanation, the main utility of the *Fables* derives not so much from their preventative capacity as from their art of generalizing on an experience already lived through. They engrave its lesson on Emilie's memory and transform it into a moral principle or maxim (p. 541).

The high success of the *Fables* as a pedagogical instrument of moral instruction results from their lifelike situations and their pleasure according to Rousseau. Emile enjoys them, first of all, because of their relevancy to his social experiences, a correlation unachievable by the child (p. 541). The *Fables'* moral insights are reinforced by their aesthetic delight. But, both their moral and aesthetic values are derived from the sense of personal discovery and revelation obtained in their reading (p. 541). Consequently, the teacher is warned by Rousseau not to explicate the *Fables* formally but to give his pupil the impression that they are embarked on the same adventure (p. 541).

In order to enhance the *Fables'* effectiveness as an exercise of the judgment, Rousseau proposes two changes in their organization. He contends, first of all, that the
moral attached to the end of most Fables distracts both from Emile's exercise in reasoning and his pleasure of self-discovery (p. 541). This criticism recalls that made by Rousseau of explicative history in which the author presents interpretations instead of dramatizing facts and situations so as to allow the reader to draw his own conclusions (p. 528).

Such judgments by LaFontaine, as incorporated in the Fables' morals, are regarded by Rousseau as restricting the meaning of the moral situation rather than expanding it for greater application (p. 541). In order to rectify this supposedly artistic redundancy, Rousseau proposes to discard the Fables' morals in his instruction just as he dismissed the beginning and the end of Robinson Crusoe (p. 541). In addition to his exclusion of their maxims, Rousseau suggests the reorganization of the Fables into "un ordre plus didactique" which would conform to the intellectual and emotional needs of his student's development (p. 542).

I consider this latter proposal as being defensible on the introductory level of instruction. It follows the principle of textual selection which renders a poet's work more accessible and relevant to the beginning student. However, in the case of Rousseau's first suggestion, the
elimination of the Fables' morals, it seems to be tantamount to a re-creation of the text. As an exercise in both judgment and composition, it would be interesting, nevertheless, to remove temporarily the concluding moral of a fable and allow the student to make up his own before seeing that of the author.

The rise of Emile's amour-propre, which necessitates indirect correction of his wrong judgments through LaFontaine's Fables, poses the general problem of love. It commands central importance in Emile just as in the Lettre à D'Alembert sur les spectacles. Rousseau identifies three kinds of love. The first is termed "l'amour de soi" which operates on the level of the child and concerns itself with the satisfaction of rudimentary, physical needs (p. 493). The second type of love, the adult amour-propre, tends to selfishness. It is never satisfied for it requires that others prefer us to themselves (p. 493).

The general aim of Livre IV is that of transforming Emile into a man who can experience "le véritable amour", the third type of love. The time is approaching when Emile will seek out a mate, for "on n'est pas fait pour vivre seul" (p. 502). In order to make Emile capable of "real love", his amour-propre or self-love must be extended to
others as a mutual and collective sentiment (p. 547). Emile's negative education gives him an advantage over the traditionally instructed student in the struggle to attain the mature capacity of true, sincere love.

Emile will be more capable of a valid love than his counterpart in the traditional program of education because he had not studied its portrayal in literature as a child and adolescent. He has not played at feeling passions or counterfeiting dramatized emotions beyond his comprehension (p. 505). The literary game of love with all its conventions and attitudes has not been part of his curriculum. Consequently, his emotions tend to be natural and true instead of stylized and imitative.

Upon entry into society, Emile is a natural man who possesses the intellectual habits of a thinker (p. 550). His conduct is based upon judgments taken from his life experiences. Because of his long separation from society, Emile is ready now to judge its principles and usages objectively and to assimilate their worthwhile features. His training may be regarded as an attempt to synthesize the best qualities of "natural man" and "social man". Paradoxically, the pedagogical method utilized to retain Emile's
natural goodness resorts to highly manipulated and artificial teaching conditions as follows:

S'il ne faloit qu'écouter les penchants et suivre les indications, cela seroit bientôt fait; mais il y a tant de contradictions entre les droits de la nature et nos loix sociales, que pour les concilier, il faut gauchir et tergiverser sans cesse: il faut employer beaucoup d'art pour empêcher l'homme social d'être tout à fait artificiel (p. 640).

The art most necessary to both l'homme and le citoyen consists of knowing how to relate to one's fellow man in society (p. 655). In his relations with society, Emile will avoid the extremes of nonconformity and servile imitation. Through his independent judgment, he understands the reasons behind society's ceremonies and, not wishing for distinction through external qualities, he conforms to them (p. 666). His politesse is not based on the desire for personal gain. Because Emile loves man, he wishes naturally to please: "la véritable politesse consiste a marquer de la bienveillance aux hommes" (p. 669). In his conduct, politesse ceases to function as a decorative, socio-aesthetic virtue and becomes a socio-moral one.

The final stage of Emile's education in the motives and passions behind man's social conduct is based on the study of "les principes du goût" (p. 671). Emile is
instructed in "taste" in order to develop his judgment in the realm of aesthetics. It acts as another tool or "l'instrument" by which his intellectual grasp and appreciation of beauty are expanded (p. 671).

By refining his powers of aesthetic perception and judgment, Emile adds, also, a social dimension to his behavior. Through taste, his life acquires "l'agrément" or the pleasure of art which compensates for the loss of rustic delights; its acquisition facilitates his adjustment to society (p. 677). However, Emile accepts taste only as an intellectual stimulant to form aesthetic distinctions and as a social implement to get along with his fellow man. The principles of taste reflect no absolute truth in his eyes, and he negates its claim to a moral foundation (p. 674).

Before explaining how "good taste" is to be acquired by his student, Rousseau defines taste in its most general sense. It reflects merely the general opinion of society as follows: "... le gout n'est que la faculte de juger de ce qui plait ou deplait au plus grand nombre" (p. 671). The applications of taste or the faculty of aesthetic judgments are restricted severely by Rousseau.

The principles of utility and morality play no significant role in the evaluations of taste in his opinion.
It operates primarily on the level of intuition or instinct rather than on that of reason and is fit to judge only neutral, material relationships rather than moral ones as follows:

Le goût ne s'exerce que sur les choses indifférentes ou d'un intérêt d'amusement tout au plus, et non sur celles qui tiennent à nos besoins; pour juger de celles-ci le goût n'est pas nécessaire le seul appétit suffit. Voilà ce qui rend si difficiles et, ce semble si arbitraires les pures décisions du goût, car hors l'instinct qui le détermine on ne voit plus la raison de ces décisions.

Not only are the judgments of taste morally empty and independent of reason, they reflect no universal artistic truth according to Rousseau's aesthetic relativism. They indicate only a given relationship of neutral, external factors which is dependent upon a given set of cultural, historical, and regional circumstances as follow:

In short, Rousseau views taste as being dependent upon conventions, opinions, and a variable perspective. It bears no relation, in his opinion, to the moral nature of man and
is not based on reason. As such, its judgments do not relate to the true value of things or people and do not apply to social, moral, or political questions and problems.

After defining taste and its legitimate role in society as the reflection of the general opinion, Rousseau analyzes the conditions of its growth and decadence. His observation that taste develops best in a populous community coincides with his previous judgments in the *Préface* to *Naissse* and the *Lettre à D'Alembert* ... as to the theatre's beneficial effects in a big city. It affords the leisure or *oisiveté* with which to frequent amusements, a multitude of comparisons, a freedom of public opinion, and a general sensuality (p. 672).

When these conditions fall out of balance through excess, Rousseau maintains that *volupté* degenerates into *vanité*; the "general taste" falls under the dominion of a group interest; *goût* is suffocated by *mode* (p. 672). Instinctive, disinterested taste which finds its models in the general opinion and free intercourse is replaced by "*le beau de fantaisie*" or the fashion dictated by a self-appointed, legislating elite (p. 672).

It is apparent to Rousseau that the "fashion" of an elite rather than the "general taste" reigns in the France
of his day. He identifies the artists, the nobles, and the wealthy as the legislators of taste (p. 673). Their self-interest and vanity lead them to appreciate only the costly and complicated works of art (p. 673). Such ostentation or luxe is regarded by Rousseau as forming an anti-nature which is synonymous with "le mauvais goût" (p. 673).

Rousseau believes that there exists a correlation between the decadence of art and that of society’s morality. Good taste conforms, in his view, to the design of nature. In his own age, Rousseau contends that both morality and nature have been perverted by the ladies of the salon, the savantes, who have made themselves "les arbitres de la littérature" (p. 673). They are not qualified, in his opinion, to judge philosophic works based upon "l'entendement" or "les choses morales" (p. 673). Rousseau would prefer that they limit their judgments to those works inspired by the senses or sensuality (p. 673).

There are both benefits and hazards involved in Emile’s cultivation of taste. Intellectually, its training increases his sensitivity, perception, and verbalization (p. 674). Socially, taste enables him to please and serve others (p. 673). In this way, he is assured of friendship. However, the refinements of taste can hinder Emile by
separating him from the great majority of humanity. They segregate the cultured from the general public and lead to endless disputes (p. 674). Despite these dangers, Rousseau is confident that Emile will not fall victim to this vain pitfall. He remains close to nature through his love of humanity and pity for the miserable (p. 666).

The formation of Emile's taste takes place in Paris (p. 674). It is conducted both through direct social contacts and the analysis of literary texts. In Rousseau's opinion, Emile will learn more from modern authors in conversing with them than in reading their books (p. 674). For the appreciation of literary beauty, and training in textual analysis, Rousseau prefers that his student return "aux sources de la pure littérature" through the study of the ancients (p. 676). He prefers their simplicity, clarity, conciseness, tolerant withholding of judgments, and natural portrayal of man (p. 675).

Surprisingly enough, Emile perfects his taste by attending the theatre. However, he goes there to observe the principles of taste in action and not a moral code, for the theatre is not made to portray "la vérité" (p. 677). It performs, in Rousseau's opinion, as the school of plaire
and the affairs of the heart (p. 677). Emile's study of the theatre leads to that of poetry. Again, his teacher prefers the ancient poets in addition, this time, to those of Italian verse (p. 677).

The aim of these readings in poetry is not to decorate Emile's mind for polite conversation but to make him capable of feeling and loving in his new manhood. They increase his desire for "real love" and make him realize the illusory happiness of a love based upon self-interest and the desire for wealth (p. 677). Now that Emile has become a complete man in whom both reason and sentiment are in balance, it is time for him to choose a wife.

The education of Sophie and her courtship by Emile are related in Livre V. A significant aspect of Rousseau's thought is revealed in this part of the novel. He breaks rank with his primary philosophic source of inspiration, Plato's Republic. This philosopher's proposals of dissolving the family, of giving the same education to both sexes, and of substituting patriotism for familial love are regarded by Rousseau as a subversion of the natural order (p. 700).

Love with its implied differences in sexual roles cannot be divorced, in Rousseau's view, from the sexes'
dissimilar political functions. He contradicts Plato's egalitarian treatment of women and her absence from the home with an insight into the political significance of familial love; one cannot love one's country without loving one's own wife, children, and family.

The liberty which one sacrifices in the marriage covenant corresponds to that of the citizen in the social contract. The breaking of the marriage pact by the woman provokes greater antisocial consequences than the infidelity of the man; it destroys the constitution of the family (p. 698). Hence, physiological differences lead to a natural inequality of moral relations between the sexes as follows:

La rigidité des devoirs relatifs des deux n'est ni ne peut être la même. Quand la femme se plaint là-dessus de l'injuste inégalité qu'y met l'homme elle a tort; cette inégalité n'est point une institution humaine, ou du moins elle n'est point l'ouvrage du préjugé main de la raison; c'est à celui des deux que la nature a chargé du dépôt des enfans d'en répondre à l'autre (p. 697).

Due to the physiological and moral differences between the sexes, Rousseau contends that a woman's education should differ from that of a man. Sophi's education follows "nature" but contrasts sharply with that of Emile. Nature and social convention are not in violent opposition in the
case of woman according to Rousseau's thought. Whereas Emile was allowed the largest possible freedom, Sophie is trained to accept constraint and social opinion. Instead of learning to judge independently, she is taught that her virtue depends decisively on the prejudices and judgments of others.

Sophie's education is not aimed, however, at keeping her in ignorance by preparing her only for the duties of a wife and mother. Her faculties of knowing and feeling are stimulated through reading, music, dance, and conversation in order to make her company agreeable and to afford her a grace and wit which compensate for her physical weakness (p. 703, 749). These feminine qualities are cultivated in relation to those of her future husband (p. 703). Sophie's task in her marriage is to please Emile while he is to serve her (p. 703). In matters of virtue and common sense, they are equals (p. 708).

Despite Emile's superiority of learning and reasoning, he can never be more than "le maître en apparence" (which is all that is needed in society) because of the following "law" of nature:

Voilà donc une troisième conséquence de la constitution des sexes ... par une variable loi de la nature, qui donnant à la femme plus de facilité d'exciter les désirs qu'à
When Emile reigns over his family, it will be only through the consent of his wife. His rule does not exceed that of a symbolic monarch.

Both Sophie's and Emile's conceptions of the perfect mate are based upon the exemplary lives of fictional heroes. They constitute an image of perfection which enable them to surmount the temptations of passion in order to be worthy of its hoped for realization. Sophie's ideal man originates, for example, from her reading of Fénelon's *Les Aventures de Télémaque* (p. 762). Her love of Télémaque does not represent a foolish, girl's dream but a projection of her moral principles.

Because of Sophie's "natural education", with its love of virtue and simplicity, she cannot bring herself to marry a man of her own decadent century (p. 762). The fictional representation of her hero, Télémaque, nourishes her hope in the existence of his virtues in a real man (p. 762). Sophie's limited but sentimental literary culture has oriented her love according to a moral aesthetics. Beauty, honesty, and virtue are equated in her conception of
perfection. She wants a man who will share her simple
tastes, her manner of thinking, and her moral maxims (p. 762).

Sophie's courship by Emile is accompanied by reappearing analogies with *Télémague*. Her hero becomes embodied in Emile. He arrives, for example, with his tutor at Sophie's house in search of shelter from a storm. Their coming is compared by her father to that of Télémaque and Mentor on the island of Calypso (p. 775). Unknown to both Sophie and Emile, they have been educated for one another through an agreement between Emile's tutor and Sophie's father. The latter takes pleasure in teasing his daughter by such a comparison. Emile's tutor joins in his friend's Marivaux-like banter by comparing Sophie's charm to that of Eucharis, "la n mpe amoureuse" (p. 775). Luckily for Sophie, her future lover does not perceive the hidden meaning behind these literary analogies for he has read only the Odyssey (p. 775).

There exists more than a literary gap between Emile and Sophie. Each of their fictional images, Robinson Crusoe and Eucharis, centers on the self be it in terms of survival or passionate love. Hence, each of the young lovers neglects to consider his own duties to the future mate and to the community. After five months of a fictionlike courtship,
Emile's tutor and Mentor makes him realize that his education is not complete. He likens Emile to the heroes of the theatre who are dominated by their passions and who think only of the means to their pleasure (p. 816).

Rousseau implies that Emile's passionate love has put him outside of nature, society, and philosophic moderation. It is not that his love is illegitimate, but its uncontrolled passions are considered by Rousseau to be an unsound basis for marriage. Consumed by his desire, Emile, "l'homme naturel fait pour vivre dans la sociéité", can no longer accept the inevitability of Sophie's death (p. 816). He has become the prisoner of his love and has given no thought to his future duties as the head of a family and citizen of the state.

It is concluded that Emile and Sophie are both too young and immature to marry; he is twenty-two and she, eighteen (p. 822). By traveling for two years with his politics in order to assume his civil responsibilities as the head of a family. Paradoxically, it is necessary that Emile leave Sophie in order to love her completely. Through the completion of his education in the study of citizenship, it is implied that Emile's marriage will be based upon reason, social consciousness, and a domesticated love rather than
an unruly, anarchic passion.

By postponing his natural inclination, Emile elevates his love from the fiction of illusory passion to a social act. Upon his departure, he and Sophie exchange their favorite books. Emile will read Téléméque while Sophie will study Addison's *le Spectateur* (p. 825). This exchange acts not only as an engagement; it signifies that Emile has yet to become a man while Sophie must expand her view of the world beyond the desire for a personal, domestic bliss.

In Emile's investigation of the civil order and social institutions, he travels in order to compare governments. With the help of his personal observations, he discusses political philosophy with his tutor. His knowledge of political theory is drawn from the reading of Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois* (p. 850). It affords, in Rousseau's opinion, the only comprehensive analysis of "les rapports nécessaires des moeurs au gouvernement" among the moderns (p. 850).

Nevertheless, Rousseau regards Montesquieu's great work as being limited to the descriptive aspects of politics or "le droit positif des gouvernements établis" (p. 836). It fails to answer the fundamental questions of *le droit politique* which "judges what is by what should be" (p. 836).
Emile's tutor fills in the gap of Montesquieu's theory by examining the political hypothesis of "l'état de nature", i.e., the validity of institutions established through force, and the social contract concept.

At the end of his journey which adds the finishing touch to his education through the observation of governments, customs, and the study of political theory, Emile undergoes a radical change of attitude. He arrives at an objective view of his relation to the social and civil orders. Because of his love for Sophie, he realizes that the independence of a natural man is impossible in society. Marriage acts as a contract with both society and the state. Emile accepts the necessity of this sole bond of dependence as follows:

Voilà mon père, à quoi je me fixe. Si j'étois sans passions je serois dans mon état d'homme indépendent comme Dieu même, puisque ne voulant que ce qui est, je n'aurois jamais à lutter contre la destinée. Au moins, je n'ai qu'une chaîne, c'est la seule que je porterai jamais, et je puis m'en glorifier. Venez donc, Donnez-mi Sophie, et je suis libre.

Emile is no longer the slave of his passions but a free man. His love has been enriched through a total commitment to its responsibilities within the social and civil
orders. The demands of both nature and society are reconciled in Emile's new view of the world. Now, he can appreciate Sophie both as Eucharis, the object of passion, and as Antiope, the chaste wife.

Emile's new social virtues are equalled by his civic ones. Unlike the citoyen who has lost his natural sentiments and fulfills his social functions blindly, Emile will perform them consciously and deliberately. But, his happiness does not depend on the state's imperfect laws or institutions. He possesses a moral freedom due to his lack of prejudice and fear of public opinion which, together with his economic mobility, make all countries his possible home and their inhabitants his friends (p. 857). In summary, Rousseau reserves the study of literature to the last stages of Emile's development. After the formation of his fundamental principles of reasoning and judgment through selected readings, he is free to expand his moral and cultural horizons without falling victim to society's socio-aesthetic prejudices. They place an exaggerated value on the intrinsic worth of art in order to accentuate social barriers and isolate the poor through their ignorance.

Literature is studied by Emile as a means rather
than as an end in itself. It provides the situations, problems, or materials by which he can exercise his judgment and inventiveness. Through the study of Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, Emile learns, for example, "les rapports réels et matériels" or the true relationship between man and things and his worth in relation to the principle of utility or productivity (p. 462). In his transition from a rustic, material existence to that of city life with its social sentiments and civic responsibilities, literature provides Emile with the transitional experiences and knowledge necessary to his new life.

In order to understand the problems involved in "moral relationships", Emile reads and discusses the *Lives* of Plutarch with his tutor. The work allows Emile to understand the often corrupt, dishonest, and self-interested motives of human conduct from a safe, objective distance. After having experienced the complexities of life in society, the study of LaFontaine's *Fables* helps Emile to profit from his misjudgments by generalizing their lessons into unforgettable maxims. They provide, also, a pedagogical instrument with which the tutor can correct Emile without antagonizing his self-esteem.

The study of literature and the formation of taste
enable Emile to adapt himself to the conditions of society and to the demands of the state. Through his attendance at plays, the reading of poetry, and the learning of languages, Emile masters the conventions of plaire which enable him to serve and get along with his fellow men in society. These aesthetic experiences awaken also, his latent sentiments and capacity for feeling. Of special importance, the reading of poetry implants in his mind the image of pure love. This same ideal is garnered by Sophie through her reading of Télémaque. It protects her from the corruption of society and from a marriage based upon material wealth.

Before the union of Sophie and Emile can take place, the latter is obliged by his moral conscience to attain a rational understanding of the marriage contract's social and civil implications. The study of Montesquieu's De l'espirt des Lois helps Emile to gain a fundamental comprehension of his rights and duties as a citizen. It represents a knowledge necessary to his family's survival in a political state where an unjust government, a persecuting religion, and excessive taxes can destroy one's happiness (p. 835).

Despite the key roles of literature in Emile's
education, there is little possibility that he would ever embrace writing as a profession. His appreciation of literary art is not designed, first of all, to go beyond that of feeling or sentiment. Of greater importance, Emile is trained to be a free man. A literary profession would necessitate his courting of royalty and wealthy patrons (p. 837). His art would be financed by inequality as manifested by luxury; illustrate unjust authority and power; work against the general interest of man.

Emile prefers to practice the manual art of carpentry. It proves to be superior to the profession of belles-lettres by preserving his human dignity and sense of the true worth of things and people. Rather than cultivating the removed reality of art, Emile will illustrate "les droits de l'humanité" through his own conduct and representation of the poor (p. 837). His social conscience will not be flaunted, however, in the manner of "un chevalier errant" determined to correct all wrongs (p. 544). Such an attitude would make him a vain actor on the public stage and jeopardize his own identity and personal freedom (p. 544).

It is not Emile's knowledge which impresses Sophie but his virtue. If we compare her education in sentiment through the reading of Télémaque with Emile's preponderantly
rational instruction, their awkward courtship and eventual separation in the unfinished sequel, Emile et Sophie, ou les Solitaires, become more understandable. All of Emile's principles such as frankness, unprejudicial judgment of an individual's worth, and reason work against him in wooing Sophie. She presents a complex feminine and social psychology which he cannot penetrate without the aid of his tutor.

Emile becomes a clown and his courtship, a comedy when his "natural" logic is confronted with the social problems of class distinction and inequality. He learns that his unsuspected wealth prevents Sophie from believing in his virtuous simplicity. Although her doubts are dispelled by Emile's industriousness as a carpenter and his artisan's integrity, their basic lack of understanding comes to a head the first night of marriage.

Sophie refuses to share her bed with Emile through a misunderstanding of the tutor's facetious pronouncement on individual freedom, even, in marriage(p. 865). Emile's ineptitude in either understanding or persuading his newly married wife is made painfully evident. His logic is thwarted by her wit, and he sulks in an awkward silence. Being concerned as to the outcome of this comedy, Emile's tutor decides to intervene and makes the following observation
on his student:

Emile est si bête qu'il n'entend rien à cela. Moi je l'entends; j'écarte Emile, et je prends à son tour Sophie en particulier (p. 865). 47

In conclusion, I maintain that Emile's failure to establish a sound and mature understanding with Sophie on his own reflects a basic weakness in his program of education. His readings have not dealt sufficiently with the female psychology which could have been acquired through a more serious study of the theatre as represented by Molière, Racine, or Marivaux. The reader has the impression that Emile has not succeeded in his leap from nature to society. One foot remains behind in the "state of nature", and he proves to be defenseless against coquetry. Consequently, his dependence upon the tutor has increased instead of diminishing during his courship of Sophie and early marriage.

The critic, Henri Roddier, expresses Emile's dependence on his tutor in the following contemporary terms:

Le précepteur d'Emile ne sera pas seulement, comme chez Fénelon, un mélange de sagesse antique à la Minerva et d'ange gardien Chretien il deviendra le guide indispensable, le maître ou le "gourou" qui joue le rôle d'initiateur à toutes les étapes selon la tradition indienne, celui qui les abîme aussi, en y préparant son élève auquel il doit transmettre les fruits d'une expérience qui le dépasse. 48
When Emile is left to fend for himself in *Emile et Sophie* ou *les Solitaires*, the unfinished sequel, he proves to be incapable of meeting the demands of personal loss and despair. After the death of his daughter, Emile fails to comfort his wife and to reestablish their relationship on a more mature level of understanding. While reflecting on his fall into decadence and the dissolution of his family in *Les Solitaires*, Emile blames the absence of his tutor for his sad state as follows:

Sans votre retraite je serois heureux encore; ... Non, jamais sous vos yeux le crime et ses peines n'eussent approché de ma famille; en l'abandonnant vous m'avez fait plus de maux que vous m'aviez fait de biens en toute ma vie (p. 886).

Emile's tutor has disappeared after having sacrificed his own freedom to an elevated duty in somewhat the manner of Vigny's *Moïse*. Although his sudden departure lends an heroic tone to the novel, it does not act in accordance with Rousseau's previous emphasis upon timing. After tending to Emile's total needs for twenty-five years, the tutor has become his parent and constant companion. It is cruel and unnatural that he should leave Emile all of a sudden. Instead, there should have been a gradual but never complete withdrawal from Emile's new life. Rousseau should have understood
that, morally speaking, the parent's duties, just as those of the citizen, are never terminated during his life.

According to *Les Solitaires* and to a lesser extent the poor start of his marriage at the end of *Emile*, Rousseau's pedagogical method forms a maladjusted young man rather than a fearless representative of the people. Although Emile commands the respect of others through his objective judgments, powers of reason, moral character, politeness, good taste, and strong physical constitution, his qualities of leadership are never realized. An excessive tendency to introspection prevents him from committing himself to the relief of human suffering. He is a revolutionary without a cause and without anger.

Despite Emile's limitations, the ideal behind his experimental education, the formation of a "new man" free of social prejudices and governed by reason complemented by sensitivity, retains its revolutionary appeal for new approaches in education. Rousseau illustrates through his pedagogical novel the supreme mission of literature. Instead of reflecting only contemporary man, society, and taste through an art of imitation, it participates in the greatest work of art, the re-creation of man.

Through Rousseau's pedagogical method, Emile is
rendered immune to the socio-aesthetic prejudices surrounding art and society. The distinctions of class, wealth, and culture play no part in his estimation of a person's worth. He judges a man by his moral conduct and productivity rather than by his manners or language. Hence, Emile's tutor has accomplished a moral elevation far beyond the powers of the legislator or philosopher. His experiment provides man with the fundamental principles with which to transform himself and society. A new "age d'or" is within man's power if he is but willing to direct his evolution according to moral principles (p. 859).
Footnotes

1 See Albert Schinz, La Pensee de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Northampton, Mass.: Smith College, 1929), II, p. 422.


Note: all references to Emile or Les Solitaires are based on the above edition and will be indicated in the future by a parenthesis and page number.

6 In the article, "L'Economie politique" (1755) written for L'Encyclopedie and in the essay, Considerations sur le gouvernement de Pologne (1773), Rousseau is concerned with the formation of a citizen through a public system of education. It stresses the national characteristics of Poland in order to insure its sovereignty. Stories of national heroes and Polish history make up the main subject matter. See Rousseau. Ibid., III, p. 966.

7 See Martin Rang, "L'Education publique et la formation des citoyens chez J.-J. Rousseau," Etudes sur le Contrat Social (Paris: Societe les belles Lettres, 1964), p. 262 for an explanation as to the two types of education--public and private--which are explored in Rousseau's works. The former aims at producing a citizen and accepts man and his political situation as they are. In contrast, private education is of a more speculative, experimental nature and is designed to form a new man.

Footnotes (cont'd.)

9 See Rousseau, op. cit., I, pp. 97, 117 where he relates in Les Confessions his difficulties with Latin.

10 See Rousseau, op. cit. plus, I, p. 9, where he refers to the following early readings: L'Histoire de l'Eglise et de l'Empire by le Sueur, the discourse on universal history by Bossuet, the Lives of Plutarch, and L'Histoire de Venise by Nani. Unlike the disorder of his own education, Emile will study history when he is old enough so as to stimulate his reason rather than his imagination.


12 See Charles W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1934), II, p. 95 who makes an analogy between the supposed moral meaning of tragedy refuted by Rousseau in Lettre à D'Alembert ... and the supposed moral lesson of the Fables. It is the deceitful, lying, flattering fables that fascinate. Their moral is either not seen at all or else forgotten just as the elders depart from the theatre with passions aroused and the lessons of reason a bare intellectual thing of no consequence.

13 See LaFontaine, Fables. Edited by P. Michel and M. Martin (Paris: Bordas, 1964), I, p. 48. In order to facilitate the following of Rousseau's critique on Le Corbeau et le Renard, I include the lines referred to therein:

Maître Corbeau, sur un arbre perché,
Tenoit en son bec un fromage.
Maître Renard, par l'odeur alléché,
Lui tint à peu près ce langage:
"He! bonjour, Monsieur du Corbeau.
Que vous êtes joli! que vous me semblez beau!
Sans mentir, si votre ramage
Se rapporte à votre plumage,
Vous êtes le phénix des hôtes de ces bois."
A ces mots le Corbeau ne se sent pas de joie;
Et pour montrer sa belle voix,
Il ouvre un large bec, laisse tomber sa proie.

14 Rousseau misquotes the eighth line—"Se rapporte à votre plumage" as "Repondait à votre plumage." The
Footnotes (cont'd.)

14 (Continued) editor, John S. Spink, does not indicate the misquotation but explains it, nevertheless, by observing that Rousseau quotes the fable from memory (p. 1379). In any case, the sense of the line remains the same and the error does not alter the validity of Rousseau's criticism.

15 See Rousseau, La Nouvelle Héloïse (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1960), pp. 567-568 where Julie explains M. Wolmar's pedagogical method to St. Preux. While trying to teach her son the Fables of La Fontaine, she recognized the difficulty of making him understand the difference between a fable and a falsehood. Convinced that the Fables are intended for adults, she replaced them by a collection of short storeies drawn mostly from the Bible.


19 See Rousseau, Oeuvres complètes (Dijon: Editions Gallimard, 1969), I, p. 8 where he describes in Les Confessions his own premature awakening of the passions. At age six, he read novels by D'Urfé, Scudéry, and La Calprenède with his father. Learning to feel before thinking, Rousseau believed that his whole life had been distorted by sensualism.


Footnotes (cont'd.)

22 Again as in the case of Robinson Crusoe, we see Rousseau's demand for an "aesthetics of self-expression." A work leaves the realm of illusion and imitation when the reader can become its fictional or historical character. See Politzer, ibid.

23 Rousseau identifies Polybius, Sallust, and Tacitus as being of excellent quality but too difficult for a young man (p. 529). The realistic art and objectivity of Thucydides wins Rousseau's praise, but he dwells on war (p. 529).

24 See Rousseau, ibid., p. 9 where we are told in Les Confessions that Plutarch made up one of his earliest readings from his mother's library. It was Rousseau's favorite book and compensated for his premature reading of novels.

25 See p. 1484 footnote 1 where the editor, John S. Spink, interprets Rousseau as attacking the philosophic histories of Voltaire in his reference to "systems."

26 Rousseau's disregard of the generic distinctions between historical biography and adventure fiction illustrates the eighteenth century's comprehensive view of literature. See Chapter II, pp. 120-122 of this dissertation.

27 See Hendel, op. cit., II, p. 118 who compares Rousseau's aesthetic concept of taste to his political one of the "general will"—a judgment in which all share. Its standard of reference is the pleasure of all as distinct from the interests of the few. In both cases, the theory does not imply that all possess the common attitude in the same measure or in all matters.

28 Rousseau's severe restrictions on taste are aimed at undermining "the legislators of taste," the salon blue-stockings. Taste is shown to bear no relationship to truth, virtue, or justice.

29 Rousseau's preoccupation with interests groups, representation, and power struggles in his discussion of taste illustrates his socio-political perspective.

30 Rousseau's charge against the salon ladies resembles that made against the actrices in his Lettre à D'Alembert .... He sees women as making a more important and lasting contribution within the family which
Footnotes (cont'd.)

30 (Continued) comprises the principal unit of society. Here, mothers make future citizens while in the salon men are transformed into dandies. Familial love unifies society while the passionate love supported by the salon disregards the primary social contract, marriage. Its forfeiture leads to social turmoil and disintegration.

31 In the controversy of the "Ancients and the Moderns," Rousseau opposes LaMotte and Fontenelle (p. 676). He feels that all men begin from the same point in philosophy. Time spent in studying the thoughts of others is time lost in the discovery of one's own principles (p. 676).


34 See Masters, op. cit., p. 23.

35 See Meyer, op. cit., p. 106 who maintains that, in Rousseau's eyes, the woman is man's strongest link with society. Rousseau never really formulated his own ideas about "natural woman."

36 See Rousseau, loc. cit., II, p. 1263 where in his essay, Quelle est la vertu la plus nécessaire au héros? (written in 1751 and published in 1768), he defines the hero in contrast to the sage or philosophe. The latter is interested primarily in his own happiness while the hero strives for the higher ideal of "le bonheur des hommes."


Footnotes (cont'd.)

38 (Continued) has Télémaque constantly in mind while writing Livre V of Emile.

39 See Burgelin, ibid., who suggests that the readings correspond to their differences in sexual and moral natures.

40 See Burgelin, ibid., p. 127 who compares this stage of Emile's and Sophie's passionate love to that of the young Julie and Saint-Preux in La Nouvelle Heloise.

41 See Jost, op. cit., p. 288 who observes that the first French edition of Addison was published in Geneva. Rousseau writes in his Confessions that as a young man he had read Le Spectateur ou le Socrate moderne which was translated into French in 1714. See Rousseau, loc. cit., I, pp. 110-111.

42 Jost, op. cit. plus, pp. 281-285 for a discussion as to Montesquieu's influence on Geneva and on Rousseau.


44 See Burgelin, loc. cit., p. 128.


46 The fictitious utopias of Télémaque are transformed by Emile from a mythological, fictional existence to a state of mind which liberates him through an expanded view of life.

47 See Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1957), p. 219 who identifies the fictional position of précepteur as a favorite one of Rousseau. It allows him to play the mediator between lovers. This role affords Rousseau a vicarious joy and sense of power.

Footnotes (cont'd.)


CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

One of the greatest difficulties in the study of Rousseau hinges upon the multitude of perspectives from which one can approach his rich work. Its traditional, historical interpretation based on the categories of pre-romanticism or romanticism— as represented by Jules Lemaitre, Irving Babbit, Charles Dédéyan, and to a lesser extent by Albert Schinz—gives the impression of confining Rousseau to the latter part of his century and to the beginning of the next.

The limitations of the traditional perspective are made apparent in contemporary scholarship by the brilliant, creative, psychoanalytical approach employed by critics Jean Starobinski, Jacques Borel, and to a lesser degree by Lester Crocker. This method succeeds in unlocking the secrets of Rousseau's internal world and the probable motives behind the creative act. However, it cannot hope, at the same time, to make Rousseau's thought come alive in its relevancy to contemporary man and his socio-political situation.

In contrast to the preceding interpretation, this
dissertation treats Rousseau as a philosophe. It is a truth recognized by Lanson but never really appreciated by his contemporaries—Nisard, Brunetiere, Lemaitre, and Faguet.\(^1\) I pose the objective question of Rousseau's concept of literature in relation to society and find that the answers are expressed in socio-political relationships. Through the method of objective, textual analysis, I conclude that Rousseau's socio-political thought retains its dialectical force and gains new meaning for contemporary man.

If Rousseau shows himself to be a philosophe, a man of his own century just as his contemporaries—Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Diderot—whose thought continues to influence us today, why then has he been interpreted primarily as a literary personality with romantic inclinations? It is paradoxical that Rousseau be eulogized by Kant, Hegel, and Engels for his innovative dialectic and, at the same time, be categorized by traditional literary critics as a forerunner of romantic sentimentalism.\(^2\)

In his recently published book, Michael Launay blames the rising bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century for Rousseau's romantic stereotype and refers to Stendhal's mockery of its tearful adoration of La Nouvelle Héloïse and horror at the mention of the Contrat social.\(^3\) On the other hand, Roger Masters speculates that the exaggeration of Rousseau's sentimental aspects is due to the
erroneous feeling that his socio-political significance as a thinker had become obsolete. It is implied that the originality of Rousseau's personality remained incontestable.

Whatever the reason for the largely derogatory image of Rousseau, this dissertation joins with Michael Launay in declaring the need for a new look at Rousseau's socio-political thought. In contrast to the highly evaluative interpretations of the past, Launay stresses the necessity of entering into the philosophe's concept of his own social role and view of literature as follows:

Le temps est-il passé où il était de bon ton de s'excuser quand on parlait de politique, alors que la littérature seule, la littérature «pure» devait être l'objet du discours? Nous l'espérons. Au besoin, nous aiderons ce temps à passer: ce livre n'a pas d'autre but. Si nous sommes intéressés au XVIIIe siècle, c'était parce que les grands écrivains de cette époque n'avaient pas élué leurs responsabilités politiques: Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, chacun à leur manière, participèrent activement, et sans honte, en tant qu'écrivains, aux combats philosophiques et politiques de leur siècle. Il ne leur venait pas à l'esprit que leurs écrits politiques pussent ne pas être de la belle littérature: bien au contraire, le public de leur temps, même quand il ne partageait pas leurs idées, considérait comme indiscutable la beauté littéraire de leurs livres (op. cit).

Because contemporary man is involved in political thought whether willingly or through the force of circumstances, he
looks toward the Enlightenment with a new, objective interest in its philosophic conflicts which prepared the way for rebellion, revolution, anarchy, and dictatorship.

The socio-political ideals of equality, justice, and unity govern Rousseau's concept of literature. From his humanist viewpoint, he attacks philosophic literature's preoccupation with metaphysical and scientific speculations. As a moralist, he condemns the frivolous qualities of eighteenth century fiction (drama, poetry, and the novel) for its exclusive dependency upon the theme of passionate love to the detriment of civic virtues—contribution, sacrifice, and restraint.

Literature's two faces of decadence, the erudite's self-interest and the poet's pandering to the public's senses—both negations of a citizen's responsibility—are denounced by Rousseau as part of the larger corruption of the "social state." In Emile and elsewhere, he sees it as heading toward a new phase of deterioration and violence: "Nous approchons de l'état de crise et du siècle des révolutions."\(^5\)

The traditional practice of literature (as well as that of the "encyclopedic party") favors social injustice, inequality, immorality, and disunity according to Rousseau. The belles-lettres belie their original, benevolent function of bringing men together in understanding and harmony through the principle of se plaire.\(^6\)
Although Rousseau's concept of literature in its relation to society and the state forms the central subject of this study, it operates through necessity in the context of the principles which constitute his Weltansicht. The subject sheds, therefore, some light on the two major problems of Rousseau scholarship—the supposed contradictory nature of his thought and his imputed totalitarianism.

While tracing the development of Rousseau's socio-political concept of literature, this dissertation acts as a reply to such traditional critics as M. Espinas, Jules Lemaitre, Emile Faguet, and Irving Babbit. For them, Rousseau represents an irrational, sentimental temperament incapable of a logically unified work. In contemporary criticism, this position is expressed often in psychological terms. Its extreme is represented best by Virgil W. Topazio who maintains that Rousseau's supposed contradictions reflect the "self-flagellatory needs of a confirmed masochist." In an effort to reconcile such apparent inconsistencies, the theses of bipolarité and dualism have been set forth by Jean Wahl and Ronald Grimsley.

Contrary to the theories of polarity and dualism which suggest a lack of control and method of composition if not a basic schizophrenic disposition on the part of Rousseau, this study finds a reasonable technique of
argumentation in his discoursive works. It is designed to persuade and to express complex truths about the nature of man and his society. In short, I concur with Lester Crocker that Rousseau's apparent contradictions exist only between the author's personal life and his work rather than in his reasoning itself.9

However, even in the study of Rousseau's psychological complexity, the common place attributions of eccentricity, maladjustment, and mental illness as explanations of his works prove to be no longer adequate or tenable. In a recent autobiography, Jacques Borel discounts implicitly the psychological validity of the polarity theory. There exists no necessary conflict between folie and raison in the mental condition which plagued Rousseau during the last fifteen years of his life.10 Similarly, Basil Munteano points out the superficial, contradictory, and nonliterary character of the psychiatric diagnoses of Rousseau's mental state.11 He concludes that from a psychoanalytical viewpoint, the critic can be safe only in describing Rousseau as "un degenerer superier qui invente des chefs-d'oeuvre"(ibid.).

The most illuminating analyses on Rousseau's manner of reasoning are, in my opinion, those by Pierre Burgelín and Basil Munteano. They serve as the dissertation's point of departure. In La Philosophie de l'existence, Burgelin defines unity in the context of Rousseau's rhetoric;
explains how it operates through oppositions and different contextual viewpoints. On a more abstract level, Munteano adopts Jean Wahl's thesis of bipolaires as a rhetorical term in order to express the following voluntary and conscious method of argumentation employed by Rousseau—"une Dialectique des Constants bipolaires et des contradictions experimentales" (loc. cit.). It aims at expressing the complex ambiguity of human existence (loc. cit., 110).

It is the conclusion of this study that Rousseau's discursive works evidence a consistent point of view and evolution of thought on the functions of literature. As a political thinker, Rousseau is concerned most with literature's socio-political and moral ramifications on the national way of life. He expresses these relationships in terms of collaboration, interest groups, representation, and legislation.

Rousseau sees two major forces at work in society, the government with its laws and institutions and the intellectual community or "République des Lettres" with its ideological writings, works of art, and scientific speculations. In his examination of the power relationship between the government and the arts, Rousseau contends in the Discours sur les sciences et les arts that since the Renaissance their salutary balance has been overthrown in favor of the government (loc. cit., 102).
Because superfluity or luxury forms the material basis of art, the poet sacrifices his creative freedom for the leisure and comfort provided by royal patronage. Once abandoned by society's most eloquent spokesman, the public feels the full weight of governmental authority. In his collaboration, the man of letters ceases to preserve the memory of man's "liberté originelle" and confirms instead the legitimacy of the throne through the illustration of its grandeur (loc. cit., 102).

Through an art of diversion, the writer blinds man as to the reality of his eroding freedom by covering "les chaînes de fer" with "des guirlandes de fleurs" (loc. cit., 101). The theatre distracts the public from its miseries. While watching the comedy's buffoons, the people forgets its rulers. On the other hand, tragedy inspires pity for royalty; it affords the spectator with the cheap, illusory satisfaction of having proved his humanity and fulfilled its duties through a few tears shed to fictions (ibid., 194).

On the moral level of social conduct, art allows the government to control man's habits by formulating its own order of aesthetically inspired values. The socio-aesthetic principles of politesse, bienséance, and goût promote the throne's political ambitions by effacing moral values that remind man of his innate freedom and the human
duties to his fellow creatures. They function to segregate and separate the community and are instituted through the literary salon. The resulting lack of unified opinion or common principles insures the government against its overthrow.

The second major problem of Rousseau scholarship involves the ideological trend of his thought. He is accused of harboring authoritarian political concepts which prepare the way for twentieth century totalitarianism. The problem is analyzed in depth by John W. Chapman who concedes the inadequacy of Rousseau's political theory on the question of keeping the government responsive to the general will as follows: "Here Rousseau's faith in the liberated reason of man faltered, and he sought to achieve liberal ends by authoritarian means." However, Chapman takes into account the eighteenth century's ignorance of modern democratic machinery with its technological aids. For both Rousseau and modern liberals, he concludes that man's social dependence does not necessitate the sacrifice of his individuality (ibid., 143).

In contrast to Chapman's balanced point of view, Lester Crocker represents in recent scholarship the thesis of Rousseau's consistent totalitarianism. He interprets "la volonté générale" as requiring total conformity without dissent or opposition. The novels, La Nouvelle Héloïse and Emile function, in his view, as experiments in
the obliteration of individual identity by submerging it into the collective self.\textsuperscript{17} As for the general role of art, Rousseau proposes supposedly to bring it under state control and yoke it to political ends in order to foster social unity.\textsuperscript{18}

The findings of this dissertation indicate, to the contrary, that Rousseau advocates the extension of freedom to the socially, culturally, and politically disenfranchised. If he seems to attack freedom in his conclusions to the Premier Discours and the Lettre à D'Alembert sur les spectacles, they act in reality as an indictment of its abuses. Lester Crocker's objection as to Rousseau's failure to regard literature as an end in itself goes to the heart of the question (loc. cit.)

Rousseau defends the general interest against three basic and interrelated forms of tyranny--political, ideological, and social. Being interdependent, an assault on one of these prime interest groups such as the "République des Lettres" or the salon elite carries with it a condemnation of the unjust, unrepresentative government which supports them both either financially through patronage or morally through its prestige.

The rights of individual creativity, moral conscience, and reason are threatened, in Rousseau's opinion, by the dogmas of the salon and the encyclopedists. The former rules over social conduct and controls literary
judgments through its amoral and effeminate soci-aesthetic
code of goût, politesse, and bienséance. Rousseau urges
the poet, playwright, philosophic writer, and artists in
general to resist these criteria based on sterile conven-
tion, class distinction, and social prejudice. Their
plight gains his sympathy, and he portrays the anguish of
the "misunderstood genius."19

The "encyclopedic party" poses an even greater danger
to both individual freedom and a just, collective unity
according to Rousseau. Just as the salon society, the
philosophes construct their own code based on the divisive,
amoral principles of progrès, luxe, and lumières. Instead
of revealing useful truths and inspiring greater humanity,
they lead to excessive specialization, party intolerance,
and fanaticism. Those who disagree with the major in-
tellectual credo are submitted to misinterpretations and
personal attacks.20

Basically, Rousseau feels that art and thought should
never be divorced from the human condition any more than
the government. As the guiding forces in society, govern-
ment and literature are to work together for the happiness
of man. However, instead of serving him as a means to his
perfection, they have become ends in themselves and humanity's
master. Opposing this union of disinterest in humanity,
Rousseau raises his militant voice as a "Man of the Provinces"
against the cultural island of Paris which had bled its
regions in order to provide political, social, and cultural brilliance as follows:

Le luxe nourrit cent pauvres dans nos villes, et en fait périr cent mille dans nos campagnes: l'argent qui circule entre les mains des riches et des Artistes pour fournir à leurs superfluïtés, est perdu pour la subsistance du Laboureur; et celui-ci n'a point d'habit précisément parce qu'il faut du galon aux autres.21

In his opposition to the three absolutisms of political, intellectual, and social life, Rousseau's dialectic transcends consistently negation in order to offer positive proposals. His problem consists of correcting literature's abuses by elevating its standards and by freeing it from dependence on royal patronage. In the Premier Discours, Rousseau considers and then rejects a renewed system of autonomous academies. In its place, he opts for the speculative concept of "Précepteurs du Genre-humain" which would limit the participation in literature to the few true, independent geniuses. Elevated on a par with the Souverain, these superior men are to aspire to posts of political power and work with the king as equals "travaillant de concert a la felicite du Genre-humain."22

Although seemingly authoritarian in its restrictions, the scheme circumvents the authority of the salon and its socio-aesthetic code. The members of the "creator class" are elected through a "natural selection" based on demonstrated genius rather than by royal favor, class
privilege, or salon taste. Rousseau's extreme solution to literature's renovation is moderated in his Préface de Narcisse by a cultural, geographical relativism. It recognizes the social utility of a lesser literature of diversion that distracts an already corrupt society from more pernicious vices.23

Rousseau's relativistic position is continued in the Lettre à D'Alembert sur les spectacles with its provision that the theatre can exert an elevating influence on a decadent society through its ideal of love.24 However, the dominant tone of Rousseau's argument is a severe, political one which judges the theatre as being incompatible with Geneva's mores and excludes it from the Republic in favor of more representative, national, and active entertainments such as the philosophic, atheletic cercles and the public fêtes.25

Rousseau manifests an acute understanding of a republic's vulnerability to disorder and the necessity of preserving the socio-moral virtues at the basis of its political principles. He fears, for example, that the actors and actresses, because of their wide publicity, will usurp the powers of the legislator to fashion laws and the right of religious leaders and parents to establish standards of conduct.

Rousseau's exclusion of the theatre from the Genevan Republic is repudiated by Lester Crocker as being contrary
to the pluralistic concept of society.\textsuperscript{26} If Rousseau's solution represents the tyranny of a closed society, it is that of the majority, in my opinion, rather than that of either the political, social, or intellectual elites—the ruler, the salon, and the "encyclopedic party."

Rousseau maintains, in other words, that neither the actor, playwright, nor scientist can be allowed the absolute freedom of experimenting on the general public and opts for a representative, civilian body to supervise them. It functions to reflect and form public opinion in the tradition of responsible, republican statesmanship.

The forceable, external correction of the eighteenth century theatre's universally recognized abuses through political exclusion acts, at best, as a temporary measure. Rousseau must have anticipated the theatre's eventual acceptance by Geneva for he instituted an experiment to correct the unjust and prejudicial effects of art through the reconstitution of art through the reconstitution of social man's principles of judgment.

In his pedagogical novel, Emile, the traditional, socio-aesthetic criteria of goût, politesse, and bienséance are shown to be based on convention rather than on reason. They reflect a relative truth of historical, cultural, and geographical conditions rather than a universal, moral one. Consequently, Emile's judgment of a man's worth is trained
to surmount socio-aesthetic principles in favor of the 
criterion of productivity, the socio-political one of 
citizenship, and the moral value of familial love and 
humanity.

Although Rousseau separates himself in *Emile* from 
the totalitarianism of Plato's *Republic* and creates a 
free, independent man, his experiment proves to be philo-
sophically romantic. It dramatizes the dilemma of main-
taining one's moral integrity in a hostile environment 
and one's individual freedom in a collective society char-
acterized by injustice and dominated by self-interested, 
elite groups. For a total solution to the problem of 
representation, Rousseau proposes a complete reexamination 
and reconstitution of society's institution in his *Con-
trat social*. It aims at reconciling the rights of the in-
dividual with those of the community as follows:

Trouver une forme d'association qui défende 
et protege de toute la force commune la 
personne et les biens de chaque associé, 
et par laquelle chacun s'unissant à tous 
n'obéisse pourtant ou'a lui-même et reste 
aussi libre au'aparavant? Tel est le 
problème fondamental dont le contrat 
social donne la solution(*loc. cit.*, III, 
360).

In reflection upon this dissertation, some critics 
would charge it with a false portrayal of Rousseau as 
a consistently rational *philosophe*. To the contrary, it 
contrasts Rousseau's viewpoint with that of his contemporary
philosophes such as D'Alembert; admits Rousseau's appeal to the emotions; but, sees in it a rhetorical technique at work in the context of the "art of persuasion." The "apostrophe to Fabricius" in the Premier Discours and the nostalgic eulogy of Geneva's community spirit toward the end of the Lettre à D'Alembert ... function, for example, to complement his reasoning and to overcome the reader's last resistance to his argument.

Rousseau addresses himself both to the mind and moral conscience of the reader. One of his repeated criticisms of philosophic literature concerns its supposed lack of feeling, realism, and concern for human misery. In contemporary terms, the philosophes "don't tell it like it is." Rousseau asks them if they are working for the limited freedom of art or for the general well-being of the multitude.

Because the "general interest" lacks any effective representation, Rousseau demands that literature cease to be a primarily closed, aesthetic, and intellectual activity for its own sake and embrace constructive socio-political goals based upon moral principles. Instead, he sees the philosophes undermining the forces of God and country which can unite alone the "general will." They support the traditional, prejudicial socio-aesthetic principles of politesse, bienséance, and goût--the monarchy's
substitute code for moral virtues— and attempt to force their entry into the Genevan Republic. They fraternize with royalty; accept the patronage and profit provided by a corrupt system which they claim to oppose.

In short, Rousseau's concept of the proper relationship between literature and society retains its relevancy for the twentieth century. He works with the eternal problems of progress, luxe or affluence, and nature. In reaction against the materialist doctrines of the philosophes, Rousseau maintains that true progress can not be measured solely in terms of technological inventions, personal comforts, and surplus. These advances must be accompanied, in his opinion, by gains in social consciousness and justice, good citizenship, moral principles, and sound family life. Today, we are aware, more than ever, of the disporportion between our technological successes and the failure of social programs. The problem of progress is given priority by Levi-Strauss who sees a danger both in underestimating and overestimating its value.²⁹

Rousseau proposes change but seeks to make the reader aware of its possible directions and their total ramifications. He is opposed to change for its own sake, a fashion without rational foresight and moral principles. For this reason, he has been called "Rousseau, auteur d'intention conservatrice et d'action révolutionnaire."³⁰ Regardless of his political position, one can not accuse
him, however, of avoiding the socio-political issues of his time.

Rousseau accepts the challenge of addressing himself to the eternal and perhaps unsolvable problems of life in the "social state." His discursive works respond to implied questions which go to the heart of society's capacity to endure. He seeks to improve its avenue of evolution and regeneration through a renovated educational philosophy and political principles giving priority to the general interest.

Rousseau proposes a program of education for true, total enlightenment. It is designed to liberate young minds from socio-aesthetic prejudices and conventions while avoiding the rejection of all authority and the subsequent fall into decadence. Examining the same need for justice and equality from a more political viewpoint, he reveals the dangers of elitism and minority control. Through his eyes, the reader sees the following groups vying to govern public opinion, the orientation of the state's institutions, and the country's way of life: the legislators and Statesmen, the truly superior men of the arts and sciences ("ces Précepteurs du Genre-humain"), the self-appointed social philosophers (ces vainz et futiles déclamateurs"), the non-humanist specialists (the métaphysiciens, or Doctes), and the actors and actresses (the eventual "arbitres de L'Etat")
together with their salon supporters ("les Beaux-esprits").

On the theoretical level of his thought as dramatized in his *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité*, Rousseau portrays the neolithic state as composing the condition most in harmony with the nature of man. During this period, as Levi-Strauss points out, man possessed as a thinking animal the inventions which assured his security, and he enjoyed freedom from the cold and hunger. An inner tranquility characterized his being, and an unreasoned pitie assured his humanity. Rousseau's hypothesized "state of nature" represents for him "un juste milieu entre l'indolence de l'état primitif et la petulante activité de notre amour-propre" (op. cit., 171).

The experimental image of the "natural state" acts as a prerequisite to Rousseau's inquiry into the nature of man and the origins of the "social state." However, on the applied level of his thought, Rousseau opts for an idealized conception of the Genevan Republic as his preferred state. It offers a communal life in which all share; the majority rules through its chosen leaders; a strong family life moderates the enthusiasm of the young through a conditioned respect for the elders and their wisdom; communion with nature and humanity has priority over the city's divisive affluence and aesthetic diversions. Change can be brought about. It is accomplished, however, by the community's
elected officials and religious leaders through their influence on public opinion. Such self-interested groups as actors, playwrights, and the encyclopedists are not permitted to assume more power to fashion laws and socio-political principles than the legislators who represent the majority will and who think in terms of the general good.

Rousseau's proclaimed preferences of nature over art, and sincerity over politesse have been denounced for two centuries in the name of culture and civilization. His poetic vision of "natural man" living in harmony with nature and the superiority of "primitive" life have led to the creation of a rustic style in the plastic arts and to new literary themes. It has proved, unfortunately, to be ineffective in altering the attitude of modern man toward nature. His unparalleled technological progress has made him the undisputed master of the world. However, man's victory over nature appears now to be, at least in part, an illusory one. Because of the earth's environmental deterioration, his origins in nature and dependency upon its balance have become alarmingly apparent.

Our century bears witness to the perspicacity of Rousseau's vision of the relationship between man, nature, and the social state. The increasing doubts as to the viability of today's cities and the crises of communication and mutual confidence have made rural life appear more
attractive. Affluence or *luxe* no longer suffices for some of today's young who yearn for the intimacy of communal life, the dignity of craftsmanship, and the independence of isolation.

Rousseau's inquiry into the nature of man forms the basis of his conception as to the proper relationship between the general forces of art and nature and the more specific one of this study—literature and society. Through his hypothesis or theoretical model of the "natural state," Rousseau frees himself from his historical context in order to evaluate society from an objective distance. He appreciates the crucial importance of literature in the evolution of society. Man creates and is formed in turn, by his own creations. Such investigation into the truth of man's being holds a key to his social progress, his self-knowledge, and perhaps to even his survival. Our debt to Rousseau is immense and continuing. It is expressed with beauty and force in the following eulogy by Levi-Strauss;

...Rousseau, notre maître, Rousseau notre frère, envers qui nous avons montré tant d'ingratitude, mais à qui chaque page de ce livre aurait pu être dédié, si l'hommage n'eût pas été indigne de sa grande mémoire. Car, de la contradiction inhérente à la position de l'ethnographe, nous ne sortirons jamais qu'en répétant pour notre compte la démarche qui l'a fait passer des ruines laissées par le Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité à l'ample construction du *Contrat social* dont l'Émile
révèle le secret. À lui nous devons de savoir comment, après avoir anéanti tous les ordres, on peut encore découvrir les principes qui permettent d'en édifier un nouveau (loc. cit., 421).
Lanson's contemporaries who formed the image of Rousseau for the twentieth century tended to regard the literary periods of Classicism and Romanticism together with genres as scientific truths. They accepted Sainte-Beuve's psychological and documentary procedures of research. Since "la critique universitaire" did not see in Rousseau a traditional type of thinker, it viewed him essentially as an irrationalist belonging to an unclassical period.


11Basil Munteâno, "Les Contradictions de J.-J.
Footnotes (cont'd.)


13 Rousseau's Premier Discours provides an important insight into the concept of the philosophe. See Chapter III, pp. 120-122 of this dissertation.


19 See Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, pp. 137-139.

20 See Chapter IV, p. 143 of this dissertation.


22 See Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les art, p. 160.

23 See Chapter IV, p. 156 of this dissertation.

24 See Chapter V, p. 207 of this dissertation.


Footnotes (cont'd.)

27 See Chapter IV, pp. 160-165 of this dissertation.

28 See Chapter V, p. 188 and VI, p. 246.


31 See Levi-Strauss, op. cit., p. 422 who is inclined to agree with Rousseau.

32 See Rousseau, Oeuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), III, pp. 154-155 who judges primitive man's "bonté naturelle" as being less perfect but more useful and effective than reasoned justice.

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF WORKS IN WHICH
ROUSSEAU DISCUSSES LITERATURE

1735:  Sur l'éloquence
1742:  Epître à M. Bordas
1745(c.a.): Idée de la méthode dans la composition d'un livre
1750:  Discours sur les sciences et les arts
1751:  Lettre à M. l'Abbe Raynal
1751:  Observations de J.-J. Rousseau sur la Réponse à son Discours [Reponse à Stanislas]
1751:  Lettre de J.-J. Rousseau à M. Grimm
1752:  Dernier réponse de J.-J. Rousseau [à M. Bordes]
1752:  Lettre de J.-J. Rousseau sur une nouvelle réfutation de son Discours par M. Lecat
1753:  Préface de Narcisse
1753:  Préface d'une seconde lettre a M. Bordes
1755:  Lettre de J.-J. Rousseau à M. Philopolis
1758:  Lettre à d'Alembert sur les spectacles
1761:  La Nouvelle Héloïse
1762:  Emile
1764:  Essai sur l'imitation théâtrale
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Correspondance complète de Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

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Works on Rousseau


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