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URBAN RENEWAL POLITICS: A CASE
STUDY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO 1952-1961

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
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By

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Research Design

American cities have experienced a process of social, economic, and physical decline during the 1950's and 1960's which threatens to culminate in nothing less than disaster. Violence, tension, fear, and ugliness are endemic to urban life in the United States. Partisan differences may exist over cause and treatment, but there is consensus among government officials and private leaders that the urban community is moribund, especially at its vital core, and that only major corrective efforts, applied soon, can save it.

The portents of imminent destruction are familiar enough to warrant only a brief inventory; environmental pollution, soaring crime rates, deteriorating housing, rising taxes and shrinking tax bases, and the continued movement toward two societies--one black, one white--as described in the Kerner Commission report. The chronic inability of urban government to confront community problems makes matters worse. Much of this inability stems from the "Balkanization" of American local government and the state constitutional and statutory limits on the powers of urban governments. Another source of governmental weakness lies in the lack of financial resources adequate to the task of solving the complex large scale problems which have accumulated for so long.
Congress passed the National Housing Act of 1949 to give the cities a set of tools and a source of financing which would help compensate for the legal and monetary obstacles to urban rebirth. However, despite the passage of two decades since the federal government acted, the "urban crisis" continues to be a phrase with as much or more meaning today than in 1949. In the eyes of most of its proponents the key provision of the 1949 Housing Act was the Title One, Urban Redevelopment section. Title One of the Act established a program of slum clearance and redevelopment for the cities. By cutting out the cancer of slums the clearance and redevelopment program, or urban renewal, as it came to be known after 1954, would strike at the basic cause of core city decline and its social and economic by-products. Slums primarily comprised areas of substandard housing. They also included dilapidated commercial structures which often had been used as housing in an earlier day.

Advocates of clearance saw the slums as the principal carrier of blight, a complex of social, physical and economic pathologies identified by high crime rates, overcrowded living conditions, and high concentrations of people with low incomes. Slums required greater outlays of governmental services than they could pay for through taxes. Supporters of urban renewal viewed slums as the common denominator of urban decline. Cut out the slums and the cancer of blight would be

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1 A more detailed description of this legislation and its antecedents is contained in chapter two.
destroyed. Leave the slums as they were and blight would, like cancer, spread to other parts of the city, eventually destroying it.

Since 1949 Congress has amended the National Housing Act many times in response to changing needs and conditions. The broadening of slum clearance to urban renewal in 1954, provisions for more long range, comprehensive planning, measures aimed at preventing the growth of slums, and the inclusion of universities and hospitals as agents of urban renewal, represent the most important changes made since 1949.

Despite changes in urban renewal legislation, however, the foundation of the law remains intact. The preamble to the 1949 Housing Act pledges the federal government to the goal of "...a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family." Everything which followed in the law was designed to help implement this national policy of slum elimination through improved housing. But after twenty years of urban renewal, the forces of community disintegration still multiply, and the housing problems seem more intractable than ever. This condition has generated harsh criticism from the political Left and Right. Urban renewal is a fraud, say critics of the Left, because it takes from the poor, through mass demolition of low cost housing, and gives to the rich, by providing government-subsidized construction sites for businessmen. Furthermore, many liberals charge that replacement housing for families forced to leave project areas is no

2The addition of rehabilitation as an alternative to clearance prompted by substitution of the phrase, "urban renewal."
better, often worse, and usually more expensive than their previous homes. Slums only have been transferred, not eliminated, and at a human cost beyond calculation.  

Conservative opponents of urban renewal, like Martin Anderson, contend that government has intervened in the market place on behalf of goals better served through the mechanisms of private enterprise. The cost of this intervention by Washington is far higher than the benefits received—in physical and social terms. Anderson's catalogue of criticisms includes; loss of tax revenues during the execution stage of projects, questionable assumptions about the inability of private business to meet actual demands for new construction, the taking of private property for the commercial benefit of others—under the guise of promoting the public interest—and, the negative effects of destroying old neighborhoods without providing enough low cost replacement housing.  

Anderson advocates repeal of the federal urban renewal program. The violence afflicting cities in the mid-1960's and the preoccupation of government and private leaders at all levels of society with finding new ways to counter the forces of urban decay testify to the failure of

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3 Jane Jacobs is the most articulate liberal critic of urban renewal. Her book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961), argued that true renewal of declining neighborhoods actually is precluded when the bulldozer destroys whole areas, scatters the resident population, and pulverizes the sense of community interest necessary for enduring as opposed to facelifting rehabilitation.

older policies to achieve significant results. The confidence expressed in the 1949 Housing Act is in stark contrast to the gravity of the urban malaise after twenty years of clearance, rehabilitation, and redevelopment in the core city areas of the nation. Urban renewal clearly asserted very broad goals for itself. Its proponents envisioned a revitalized urban community brought about by the surgery of slum clearance.

Following the passage of the federal enabling legislation in 1949 local governments participating in urban renewal needed a period of time for policy definition— for the shaping of goals, consideration of priorities, achievement of political and financial support, and the construction of a policy-making structure of official and private leaders in the community. The federal legislation was permissive in nature, contingent upon states giving consent to local governments to participate in the program and requiring local governments to initiate the process of qualifying for federal loans and grants. It is this period of policy definition in Columbus, Ohio, 1952-1961, that is the focus of investigation for this research. Urban renewal in Columbus gained its essential meaning, as policy, during this period of time. Policy, in this context, refers to actual effects of goal decisions made, resources expended, conflicts resolved, bargains made—all in response to

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5 The federal Model Cities Program, a comprehensive social, economic, and physical approach to urban problems, and the National Alliance of Businessmen’s program for “hard-core” unemployed are two current examples of the desperate search for more effective remedies. The various programs of the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty also represent recent attempts to solve the multifarious urban crisis.
opportunities afforded by the existence of the federal urban renewal program.

The literature of urban renewal comprises many studies of policy making and the evaluation of policy impact. But, with the exception of Harold Kaplan's *Urban Renewal Politics: Slum Clearance in Newark* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), there is a paucity of longitudinal and comprehensive studies of urban renewal policy development. Anderson's *The Federal Bulldozer* is a macro-level critique of the national urban renewal program using aggregate data drawn from all renewal projects, concentrating on the economic and physical results of urban renewal. Anderson is an economist, not a political scientist, a position which leads him away from a concern for political processes and policy conflict. Rossi and Dentler's Chicago study is an intensive case study of policy making for one major project, the Hyde Park-Glenwood project adjacent to the University of Chicago. Many works on urban planning and sociological studies contain abundant material on particular aspects of urban renewal--relocation of families and small businessmen, project design, and studies of neighborhood resistance to urban renewal. At least one study of community power uses urban renewal policy formation as a test of certain hypotheses about relations of influence and power in the subject community.

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Kaplan's work comes closest to being a model for this research. It is a longitudinal study of ten years of urban renewal policy development. It encompasses a broad range of policy-related topics including political cultural influences, decision-making processes, the role of power groups in policy development, administrative/structural issues, the definition of values and goals for the program, and the development of policy strategies and tactics. This study of Columbus will depart from Kaplan's work in two important ways: the first difference is Kaplan's agency perspective; the second is his measure of accomplishment. First, Kaplan places the Newark Metropolitan Housing Authority at the hub of a policy wheel with all other instruments of policy development radiating from the center. The author's position as a member of the staff of this agency and his view of the urban renewal process from this vantage point dictate the perspective he takes of the program. As a participant-observer Kaplan had a proximity to the Newark urban renewal program which enabled him to marshall an impressive array of inside facts and to perceive relationships in the flow of influence which no outsider could have seen, no matter what his sources or how imaginative his use of them. Second, Kaplan asserts at the very beginning of his study that, "... throughout this study the term 'success' is used synonymously with high levels of clearance activity. Defined in this way, success may be measured by the number of blocks cleared, the number of new dwelling units constructed, or the total amount of
Thus, Kaplan assumes that the accomplishment of administrative goals is the proper measure of policy effects. Instead of asking what the effects of urban renewal are, he severely limits what he will find by establishing a single and purely quantitative standard—-one which only reflects administrative intentions.

Since the events of a decade past furnish the material for this analysis of Columbus, it was impossible to become intimately familiar with the details of events and to identify the precise and subtle patterns of influence c.f relationships Kaplan describes in his study of Newark. Thus, a broader and less precisely bound scope of concern was necessary for this research—-precluding either a decision-making or power structure study of urban renewal. Kaplan's proximity to his subject gave him access to details and insights necessary to the analysis of decision-making and power relations, but his closeness also may have narrowed his view of events and reduced his sensitivity to outside influences--influences which he classed as peripheral because they were beyond the ambit of the Newark Metropolitan Housing Authority. Kaplan's work on the Newark urban renewal program, however, provides useful categories for gathering data which form at least the skeleton of the research model for his study.

The first category or dimension of the model comprises data per-

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8 Kaplan, op. cit., p. 2.
taining to the structural setting for the introduction of policy incentives. Federal urban renewal legislation was a policy stimulus to local communities. The 1949 Housing Act created a set of opportunities to translate general goals into specific policy effects— "allocations of values," to use David Easton's serviceable concept. Structures were needed with which to receive the incentives, to provide an arena for sharing opinions about the various possible meanings and intentions of the incentives, and for deciding who would participate in translating goals into effects. Since urban renewal was a new program, traditional structures might have to be replaced or adapted to the requirements of the new policy.

Ideology constitutes the second dimension of the model. The federal urban renewal law was predicated on a set of value assumptions about the function and importance of the core cities of the nation. Supporters of the program underlay their economic and social arguments for urban renewal with explicit and implicit appeals to a set of community values which slums and blight threatened. Chapters two and three describe both the ideological aspects of urban renewal and early attempts to construct a structural framework within which local actors could hammer out the content of strategy and renewal policy in Columbus. The second and third chapters also describe the competition for leadership of the local program and analyze the impact on urban renewal of the early struggles with the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority.
In addition, chapter three discusses the difficulty Columbus urban renewal officials had in establishing the independence of this program from the unpopular public housing program.

The third dimension of the research mode describes the phase of policy modification. Initial policy goals had to be tested in combat, and often the result was the adoption of new strategies and tactics for accomplishing modified goals. Policy modification is the focus of chapters four and five.

The consolidation of policy goals and means constitutes the fourth category for organizing and selecting data. Subsequent to the modification stage of policy development a point is reached at which a structure of leadership emerges in a rather explicit and durable form. Fundamental direction and specific priorities also become evident--a policy agenda has been constructed. Success seems inevitable and momentum has built up behind the goals. Chapters five and six deal with this aspect of the research model.

Finally, the development of policy in response to crisis conditions represents the fifth aspect of the research model. Conflict, of course, is the dynamic force in policy formation, but it suddenly may reach emergency proportions. The success which seems so close at hand may be lost because a rapid acceleration of conflict threatens the previous gains. The crisis may be sparked by the sudden awakening of a previously quiescent power group in the community. The impact of an unanticipated outside event may send a shock wave through the net-
work of agreements and actor relationships so carefully fashioned at earlier stages of policy formation. Chapter six deals with the crisis stage of policy development for Columbus' urban renewal program.

The five dimensions of the research model need to be integrated into a more explicit formulation. Policy is made in response to a perceived need or demand for action. Ideology conditions the type of response made to the demands. Urban renewal, then, is one response to social changes which threaten a set of assumptions and preferences vis-à-vis the central business district of the city. Urban renewal, then, is one which needs to be seen as an instrument for the preservation of a preferred position and set of functions for the central business district. Forces of decentralization and obsolescence threaten the central business districts' traditional functions and importance.

The implementation of policy incentives requires the use of structures of decision-making, interpretation, conflict-resolution, and interest representation. In a federal system, especially in the American system, the point of most important policy implementation increasingly is the local level. National policy is translated into specific effects through local structures of government, augmented by their private counterparts. Given the limited powers of American local government, ad hoc private structures often must be constructed around each set of policy incentives flowing from the top of the system.

Once structures are established, goals defined, priorities set and initial action begun, a period of trial and error begins. Misinterpretations of goals, ill-advised strategies and tactics, unanticipated inter-
vention of outsiders, temporary setbacks, popular resistance, and a host of other "bugs" in the policy mechanism may slow or stop altogether the development of policy. Corrective actions usually are taken. It may be necessary to modify not only goals but structures as well.

The consolidation stage of policy development represents the achievement of routinized, predictable, enduring structures and a powerful momentum toward well-defined goals. There is consensus (or resignation) on means and ends--legitimacy has been achieved. There also is a high level of organizational efficiency and familiarity with the procedures of policy implementation. Confidence replaces doubt, success is assumed, and there is a record of significant achievement.

But the stages of policy development do not necessarily mesh easily in a smooth, inexorable sequence of steps. Political processes can not be insulated from exogenous forces and unexpected events. Leadership changes, economic influences, electoral events, the impact of other programs--any or all of these things may intervene in such a way as to pose a crisis for even a well-established policy system. At such times further modification or restructuring may occur in order to accommodate the demands of the crisis.

Pluralisms in American Politics: The Doctrine of Interest-Group Liberalism.

The general goal of this study extends beyond the limit of revealing one community's response to forces of decline. A secondary purpose
is to consider the validity and utility of a doctrine of policy making which
government officials and political scientists have used to explain and
justify policy processes in the United States for at least eighteen years.
Pluralism has been a key concept in the literature of American politics
since David Truman published *The Governmental Process* in 1951.

The best exigesis of pluralism as the operating principle of American
government is found in Theodore Lowi's recent criticisms of American
policy making. His article which appeared in the *American Political
Science Review* in 1967 and which is reprinted in an anthology of essays
on policy processes in the United States summarizes the assumptions,
techniques of practice and the weakness of pluralism as a normative
model. The following material is based upon the article by Lowi which
appears in *The New Politics of American Policy* under the title, "The
Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism."\(^9\)

Drawn from the well-known group theory of politics popularized by
Truman and many others, Lowi argues that interest-group theorists
have elevated pluralism to the status of a doctrine which he calls,
interest-group liberalism. Its acceptance by government officials,
private leaders and the mass media of communication gives the doctrine
of interest-group liberalism the aura of a public philosophy of American
government.

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Interest-group liberalism reduced to its component parts comprises the following assumptions:

1. Organized interests are homogeneous and easy to define. Elected spokesmen for the interest groups speak in close approximation to the views of every member.

2. Organized interests adequately represent all sectors of our lives...checking other organized groups as they prosecute their claims against society.

3. The role of government is one of insuring access, particularly to the more effectively organized, and of ratifying agreements...worked out among competing leaders."

these three cardinal assumptions are the framework for the working model of interest-group liberalism. The last point, says Lowi, "is supposed to be a statement of how our democracy works and how it ought to work." 12

Lowi challenges the utility of the doctrine as a normative model of policy development in contemporary American society. Interest-group liberalism does not provide an adequate framework within which to resolve the sharp, persistent conflicts so evident in the 1960's. To some extent, he feels, the prevalence of the doctrine has contributed to the intensity of the conflicts. It is no longer possible to feed social problems through a political gauntlet in which organized interest groups compete on an equal footing with government to determine the outcome

11Ibid., pp. 16-17.

12Ibid., pp. 16-17.
of policy processes.

The doctrine of interest-group liberalism has spawned such concepts as cooperative federalism, a Johnson administration invention which seemed to call for the strengthening of government's role in policy making. Upon closer inspection, however, creative federalism could be seen as a device for "parceling out powers between the central government and all structures of power, governments and non-governments. In fact, little distinction is made between what is government and what is not."  

Practically all major policy changes in recent years emerged not only as byproducts of the interaction of competing groups, but, more importantly, "were structured so as to allow the continuous development of specific policy decisions through the corporate representation of their interest group constituencies."  

The War on Poverty used such halo words as maximum feasible participation, partnership, and above all, consensus. Translated into actual effects, these terms reflected and invited the continuous inroads of interest-group liberalism assumptions and techniques of policy implementation. In every important area of public policy government has invited a cluster of interest groups to act as co-partner in a policy-definition process. This partnership of corporate interests has emerged for the purpose of defining specific uses for broad grants of power and

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13Ibid., p. 25. Italics mine.

14Ibid., p. 25.
funds made for public purposes. Local community action programs invite competing church and welfare organizations to grasp the opportunities for leadership made available by the terms of vague federal laws and loosely-knit programs. Self-styled leaders and groups claiming to represent various poverty constituencies vie for money and influence while federal officials periodically call attention to broadly defined standards and guidelines. "A program split off with a special imperium to govern itself... is a structure of power with impressive capacities to resist central political control." 15

Lowi makes passing reference to the federal urban renewal program. "Urban redevelopment programs... based upon federal support of private plans do not necessarily but all too easily become means by which the building industry regulates itself." 16

The costs of our adherence to the doctrine of interest-group liberalism are unacceptably high, the author argues. One cost stems from the way the operation of the model bestows privilege on the organized and virtually excludes the unorganized from "the interior regions" of policy making. "Only interests organized around values salient to the values of particular programs..." are represented. In short, the segment of the public which does not have a vested interest in the policy, usually the largest part, is excluded from the most important stage of policy formulation--after the law is passed and implementation and

15Ibid., p. 28.
16Ibid., p. 30. See chapter six of this study for a discussion of the relationship between Columbus building interests and the effort to obtain replacement housing for slum clearance project families.
interpretation begin. In Lowi's terms, this elevates conflict-of-interest to the status of political principle.¹⁷

A second cost lies in the conservative effects of the doctrine. At a time when demands for significant changes in policy are rising, the homogenizing effects of interest-group policy making precludes innovation. Since those groups which have the greatest stake in the status quo in their particular areas of interest are the very groups who will manage the translation of legislative goals into actual policy effects, there is small likelihood of serious change once a policy has run the interest-group gauntlet.

Lowi also charges that responsibility for policy is obscured because of the workings of the interest-group model. When government delegates power to semi-official private groups the public may not be able to see the chain of cause and effect relationships which, in democratic systems, should be clear so that fundamental electoral decisions may be made with maximum rationality.

In his conclusions, the author makes a crucial distinction between social pluralism and political pluralism. The former refers to conditions of ethnic, national, economic, religious and social class diversity—the general characteristics of American society. Political pluralism means government abdicates responsibility for authorizing policies to a congeries of interest groups which perform the most significant functions of policy formulation. If we conceive of government

¹⁷Ibid., p. 32.
as being another interest group, or at most, a referee for interest-
group conflict, then we will have no definition of the public interest
broader than the corporate partners allow. "Restoring pluralism as an
effective principle of democratic politics requires destroying it as a
principal of government . . . . the program of reform must begin with
some contemporary version of the rule of law and include debate that
centers on actual consequences of public policies. . . . " 18

Lowi points to the Social Security Act of 1935 as a model for future
legislation. This law included very specific standards of administration
and precise definitions of policy goals which gave government, indeed,
required it to exercise, a dominant role in applying and defining the
law. There was little opportunity for constituent interest-groups to
become partners with government and subject the law to the attenuation
of group bargaining processes.

In short, government should stand in a relationship of continuous
opposition to the series of interest-group coalitions seeking access to
"the interior processes of policy formation," in Lowi's phrase. It
should not act, as the doctrine of interest-group liberalism encourages,
as one more claimant which must seek accommodation of its interests
with those of private groups, in a perpetual exchange of counter-claims.

In many important ways the concern which Theodore Lowi expresses
for the viability of American policy-making processes and his critique
of the model of interest-group liberalism find expression in this study

18 Ibid., p. 38.
of urban renewal policy development. The ineffectual results of govern-
ment sponsorship of a slum clearance program in Columbus during the first few years of the program and its effort to generate group interest in the program reflect the basic modus operandi of policy formation which Lowi finds so deficient. The achievements of the Columbus program are linked to the coalescence of a constituency for the federal renewal legislation and the emergence of interest group activity initiating claims and counter-claims on the governmental agency legally responsible for the program.

The development of urban renewal policy is the primary focus of this research. It seeks to identify the events and activities which shaped the policy incentives for urban redevelopment contained in the 1949 Housing Act and to analyze their importance for the outcome of the urban renewal policy process in Columbus. And, accepting Lowi's call for study of actual policy consequences, the final chapter attempts to reveal the cumulative effects of ten years of urban renewal policy development.

Methodology

The author has employed an eclectic approach to the selection and gathering of data for this study: a blending of traditional with behavioral techniques of research. The broad range of the project and the focus on development of community policy over a span of ten years dictated a commitment to flexibility of technique and a willingness to experiment

\[19\] Government leadership would be an inaccurate use of the term.
with various sources of data. There is a very important historical dim-
ension to this research. The events of a decade past, poorly recorded
and imperfectly recalled by those who participated in them, had to be
reconstructed before any analysis of policy processes could begin.

Personal interviews with thirty-seven community leaders involved
in various ways with the Columbus urban renewal program constitute
a major source of data. Of the thirty-seven persons interviewed, only
the names of twenty-five appear in the bibliography because either the
subjects insisted upon anonymity as a condition of granting the inter-
view or, in three cases, because of the valuelessness of the information
revealed. The subjects for interviewing were selected by a reputational
technique in which governmental leaders with formal responsibility for
urban renewal policy development were first approached for informa-
tion and then asked to recommend other people who played a significant
role in the program at some point in its development. The format of
the interviews followed no rigid pattern. In general, the actor was asked
to explain his role in the urban renewal program and to discuss the
particular event or phase of policy development with which he was con-
nected. Such questions as: how he became involved; what his views
were or on what side was he in the events or controversy in which he
participated; what importance did he attach to urban renewal in terms of
Columbus' growth and present problems; what he saw as the basic pur-
pose of urban renewal in Columbus, and similar questions designed to
elicit answers pertaining to the political processes through which urban
renewal became reality. Discussions of technical questions were avoided and the general goal of the research described to the subjects at the outset was, to understand how a city like Columbus goes about the business of organizing to take advantage of a federal program like urban renewal. That there would be extensive participation by non-governmental leaders as well as government officials in urban renewal was established at the outset as a necessary pre-condition of success.

Once interviews were underway the response of the subject to questions very often led to discussion of events previously unknown. And, as the interviews produced a cumulative body of information it was possible to ask questions based upon this data and to compare responses of different actors as a test of the accuracy of their recall and interpretation of events.

Ordinarily, the interviews consumed about an hour. The longest interview required two and one-half hours and the shortest interview terminated after twenty minutes of fruitless questioning.

The files of the daily press in Columbus provided an invaluable chronicle of events for the period under investigation. No actor or combination of actors recalls with complete accuracy the events of ten to fifteen years ago, especially when he may only have participated in very limited ways or for a brief time. Then, too, the death of persons reported to have played important roles, or their move to other parts of the country, makes it impossible to rely on personal interviews as the sole source of information. The Columbus Dispatch, The Columbus
Citizen-Journal, and the defunct Ohio State Journal, which merged with the Columbus Citizen in 1959, are all on microfilm in the Columbus Public Library. In addition, the Columbus Room of the library contains an extensive collection of pamphlets and newsletters issued by various community organizations and local governmental bodies.

The third basic source of data was the records and reports of the local governmental and private bodies participating in the urban renewal program. The department of urban renewal issues annual reports and the federal urban renewal authorities require extensive supplementary reports and estimates of progress in implementing the various legal requirements for receiving federal funds. In addition the lay body of policy makers, the Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation Commission, maintains minutes of its meetings but, due to the varying skills and perceptions of secretaries who recorded transactions of the meetings, the minutes vary widely in their usefulness. In most years, only a minimum record of formal motions passed and departmental actions authorized are included in the minutes. But, there is enough verbatim record of individual views expressed to make the Minutes a useful source. The Development Committee for a Greater Columbus, a private group of central business district leaders who played a key role in the Columbus program, issues annual reports which are of little value but on occasion the committee publishes special studies of community problems, like urban renewal, which contain useful statistical data.

Citizens' Research, a self-described non-partisan fact-finding agency
supported by the Chamber of Commerce, produces a number of summary studies of various community issues, usually with an eye to prodding local government to move faster in some area of concern to the business leadership of the city.
CHAPTER II
THE FEDERAL URBAN RENEWAL PROGRAM

The 1949 Federal Housing Act made the development of an urban renewal program in Columbus possible. This Act emerged from a set of recommendations prepared by the House Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning and the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Redevelopment of the Senate Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning.

The federal government first had become involved in a major way in promoting home ownership in 1934 when it created the Federal Housing Administration and established the system of federally insured home loans. Congress first manifested interest in the problems posed by urban slums in 1892 when it appropriated a sum of $20,000 for an investigation of slum conditions in the cities. In 1937 Congress passed landmark housing legislation which created the U. S. Public Housing Authority to provide loans and contributions to local public housing agencies for low-rent housing and slum-clearance projects. Public housing for shipyard workers had been constructed during World War I by the federal government and, in 1933, the National Industrial Recovery Act had authorized a small number of public housing projects (fifty projects and 21,600 units in thirty-seven cities), but the 1937 Act represented a far more extensive commitment to public housing as a
The 1949 law, however, represented the first real attempt to formulate a national policy on housing and related areas of concern. In its opening paragraph the Act declared:

The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of blighted areas and slums and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family. . . .

The underlined portions of this paragraph point directly to the provisions of Title I of the Act, entitled "Slum Clearance and Community Development and Redevelopment." Described there was a new program to assist local communities in slum clearance efforts through federal grants which would pay for two-thirds of the net cost of assembling, clearing, preparing and selling the land on which slums had existed to private developers.

The Urban redevelopment section of the omnibus bill was the most politically popular of all of its sections. The Congressional Record for the period of the debate on the bill reveals that the most bitterly contested portions were the public housing sections which were very nearly

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deleted from the bill, surviving only by the bare margin of five votes in the House. However, Foard and Fefferman assert that, "At no time during the debate were the urban redevelopment sections seriously endangered." The goal of physically renewing urban centers was the most productive winner of votes of all the sections of the housing law.

In some measure the enactment of the 1949 Housing Act was an outgrowth of increasing liberal disenchantment and the concept of public housing. Liberals were disillusioned because it was obvious to all who studied urban problems that slums were on the increase despite the construction of thousands of units of public housing and the concomitant destruction of an equal number of units of substandard housing. The argument for public housing rested on the assumption that, given decent housing, people, and the neighborhoods in which they lived, automatically would be elevated to a higher condition of life. The slum problem solution simply was to demolish the tenements and relieve the crowded conditions by replacing slums with new, modern, standard housing at rentals which the poor could afford. Conservatives always had argued that public housing was a socialistic scheme, and/or a political boon-

\[^{3} U. S. Congress. House. Roll Call No. 117, Vol. 95, 1949, p. 8667.\]

doggle. The failure of public housing to cure all the ills of cities seemed to justify the continuous attacks on the program they had made since its inception in 1937.

In the Housing Act of that year Congress launched the first serious effort at slum clearance. Nearly three million units of publicly subsidized housing eventually were constructed and a like number of substandard units were destroyed.

The proponents of public housing, however, either underestimated or could do nothing about the more subtle and enduring social causes of slums. The presence of slum conditions is an indicator of a social pathology whose elements include over-crowding, undereducation, unfamiliarity with urban life styles, racial discrimination, the disintegration of family and the loss of employment opportunities for the unskilled. In short, the basic reasons slums exist lies in the attributes of the people who live in them. Demolition of tenements does not affect these things.

But even the environmental assumptions of the public housing advocates were not tested fully. Public housing usually was constructed on the site of demolished slum buildings, in the very midst of the injurious environment from which the public housing program sought to free the poor. Political opposition to the placing of public housing away from the central city area was great enough to block this in all but a handful of cities. To provide enough units to rehouse people in the spatial
limits of the slums required the construction of high-rise apartment building projects often resulting in a net increase in population density. The need for housing precluded creating sufficient open space, parks, and other environmental amenities which might have made the projects more pleasant and more conducive to the creation of so-called public regarding attitudes and values among the residents of the projects.

As the years passed and the supply of housing became more plentiful the public housing projects increasingly became the home of those on the lowest rungs of the social ladder. Negroes and poor whites from the rural South moved into them in larger and larger numbers. Puerto Ricans in large numbers emigrating to the mainland in search of jobs competed for space in the projects with those from the South.

The following table gives an indication of the extent of Negro migration into northern cities in the postwar period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Migration of Nonwhites 1950 - 1960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of U. S.</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>+ 541,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>+ 558,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>+ 332,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>- 1,457,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U. S. Census 1960
The distribution of Negroes in the United States changed from about eighty percent living in the states of the South to about the same proportion living above the Mason-Dixon line. Most of this migration occurred in the years between 1940 and 1960. As the group most deprived of the necessary skills for success in an industrial-technological society and most discriminated against, there was a natural movement of Negroes into the only available housing in the cities; the slums.

As the deteriorating downtown areas of the big cities pushed their boundaries outward, expanding the slums into previously satisfactory if marginal areas, more and more public officials, urban experts, businessmen committed to the central business districts, liberals concerned for the living condition of slum dwellers, and those who wished to preserve the city as a place where the values of the good life were most prevalent, focused their attention on the need for a more effective program of blight control.

Public housing was being referred to by its former champions as a device for "immuring the slums," or as "slums with hot running water." Some critics even spoke of public housing as a way of increasing segregation in the slums.\(^5\) A wholly different approach seemed

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to be called for and along with this a different concept of the problem was required.

Slums began to be thought about in a somewhat larger frame of reference. "Blight" was the term used to describe a whole syndrome of urban problems; crime, delinquency, physical decay, unemployment, economic stagnation and declining land values were lumped together under the rubric of "blight." This was, at least, a more sophisticated way of looking at the problems of the central business district. But, in application, blight was a no less physical conception of those problems than the public housing approach.

An excerpt from a statement made by the former Commissioner of the Urban Renewal Administration, William L. Slayton, succinctly states the premises of the new approach:

In the large measure, the growth and persistence of blight has its roots in the inability of private enterprise to rebuild without aid in the deteriorating parts of the city's structure to meet changing needs and functions of urban areas. There are two basic obstacles. First, the entrepreneur faces the problem of assembling a number of parcels, under diverse ownership, in order to create a tract large enough to support efficient, modern development, and at the same time withstand the effect of adjacent blight. One of two "hold-outs" can and sometimes do block his plans.

The second obstacle is the tremendously high cost. The acquisition costs to a developer would often reflect inflated, speculative values. They would also include the costs of existing structures which, though deteriorating and obsolete, do have an economic value that becomes a significant item of cost when they are demolished to make
way for new buildings. 6

The construction of public housing alone, then, had been a Sym-
tomatic approach to urban blight. Slum clearance and redevelopment
was to be the major corrective surgery which would make possible the
renovation of whole areas of the central business district (CBD).

The Housing Act of 1949 and, in particular, its Title I program has
undergone continuous modification since its passage. Also, the legal,
organizational, and technical aspects of urban redevelopment are com-
plex. Yet, a description of the changes and complexities is required
before anything can be said about the program in a particular community.

Under the procedure established by Title I, a community acquires
and assembles properties in an area designated by the appropriate
local and federal authorities as blighted. Assembly of property refers
to the goal of acquiring enough contiguous parcels of land and of such an
aggregate size and location as to make redevelopment economically
feasible. Clearance of the areas and preparation of the site follow final
acquisition action. Preparation of the site may require the construction
of additional and/or replacement public utilities, streets, modification
of traffic patterns, plus the provision of such supporting facilities as
schools, fire protection, and other services adequate to the proposed
use of the area to be redeveloped.

6William L. Slayton, Report on Urban Renewal, Urban Renewal
Administration of Housing and Home Finance Agency; Statement of the
Commissioner of the URA before the Subcommittee on Housing Committee
on Banking and Currency, U. S. House of Representatives, Nov. 21, 1963,
p. 391.
In land acquisition and assembly the community may use its powers of eminent domain where necessary. Negotiations between the owner and the city, however, is the first step. The taking of private property for urban renewal purposes was upheld in the United States Supreme Court case of *Berman vs. Parker* in 1954.

After clearance and preparation the local urban renewal agency sells or leases project land to a private developer who then proceeds to rebuild the area according to a plan previously approved by the city. Relocation assistance to those who are forced to move out of their homes is required as a condition for receiving federal monies. There are direct payments from the federal government to those affected to defray part of the cost of moving.

Urban renewal is, according to Title I, a local program—locally conceived, locally planned, and locally carried out. Specifically, it is the local public authority LPA which is responsible under the law for the initiation, implementation, and over-all leadership of the redevelopment program in the community. The generic term "local public authority" may refer to a wide variety of possible types of governmental units invested with this responsibility. In practice, state legislatures pass enabling legislation establishing the particular type and structure of the LPA for their cities. Some states authorize a separate agency (Ohio, for example) with a policy making body appointed by the mayor or city manager and approved by the elected
governing body of the community. In other states the legislature provided that existing public agencies such as local housing authorities might be designated as the LPA's. In still other states the law names the city council itself as the redevelopment authority and the entire program is carried out through a department of the city government. 7

The LPA is the administering unit for urban renewal, but ultimately it is the elected governing officials of the city, the council and the mayor, if applicable, who must ratify the plans, projects, and contracts of the renewal agency.

Since the original legislation was passed subsequent amendments have increased the number of requirements an LPA must satisfy in order to receive federal renewal funds. In outline form the major requirements are:

1. The redevelopment plan must be approved by the governing body of the community.

2. The local body must find that the plan conforms to a general plan for the development of the community as a whole.

3. The purchaser or lessee of the land is obligated to devote it to the use specified in the plan and to begin building improvements on the land within a reasonable time.

4. There must be a plan and facilities for the relocation of families displaced from the project area and the housing

7Ibid. p. 64.
to which they are referred must satisfy minimum standards, as defined by the LPA and approved by the URA.

5. There must be a public hearing before any of the project land may be acquired. See appendices I, II, and III for a description of all steps by the major actors in a renewal project.

Although the federal government defrays two-thirds of the net cost of a project the local community must provide the remaining one-third share either through cash or in noncash contributions. In actuality the cash contribution required from the local community has steadily diminished as the federal government has allowed more latitude in determining what constitutes an equivalent contribution to the cost of the project. "Cash payments as a percentage of the total local share have declined steadily over the years. From a high of 48% in 1955 they have declined to slightly over 37% in 1962. During this period non-cash grants-in-aid showed a corresponding increase." 8 Very few states provide financial assistance to urban communities for urban redevelopment. Therefore, cities must find the cash which is required from local resources. The issuance of bonds is a popular method for obtaining the "seed money" for a renewal program.

A major change occurred in the Title I program in the 1954 Housing Law. The President's housing message to Congress that year contained a shift in emphasis. The Title I program was to be broadened to

include areas of the CBD where land would not be acquired by the LPA. Rehabilitation of blighted areas by private entrepreneurs was to be encouraged as a preventive measure. Urban renewal replaced slum clearance as the descriptive label for the program.

This enlargement of approach was a tacit recognition that urban blight could not be dealt with by clearance measures. This would be too expensive, too time consuming and, in the end, probably unsuccessful because of the rate at which blight continued to increase.

To deal with the problem of long range deterioration of the CBD Congress broadened Title I of the 1949 Housing Act to include not only previously authorized acquisition, clearance, and disposal by the LPA but also the restoration of other less deteriorated but still problem areas. Under the 1949 law redevelopment was not possible unless a project area was large enough to attract the capital of a private developer. Sometimes areas obviously deteriorating but still containing salvageable structures and neighborhoods could not be redeveloped because of the spotty character of the deterioration. Under the 1954 rehabilitation program individual parcels of land could be acquired and demolished if necessary as part of an overall rehabilitation of the area. "An urban renewal project can be all redevelopment, or all rehabilitation, or a combination of the two."  

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9Slayton, p. 394.

10Ibid., p. 395.
Another important change brought about in the 1954 Housing Act was the inclusion of the so-called "workable program" as part of the requirements for a federal grant from the Urban Renewal Administration (URA). The workable program means that before an LPA may receive federal funds for a renewal project the URA must be satisfied that the city has an effective program for community wide slum prevention. Specifically, the community must have adequate housing and building codes, zoning regulations, and a program of enforcement. In addition, the city must be providing such other public services as are necessary to prevent areas on the verge of becoming blighted from going over the edge.

A summary of the workable program requirements would be:

1. Adequate codes and ordinances, adequately enforced;

2. A comprehensive community plan for land use and public capital development plans;

3. Neighborhood analysis for determination of blight;

4. Administrative organization adequate to an all-out; attack on slums and blight.

5. A responsible program for relocation of displaced families.

6. Citizen participation in the entire program.

7. Adequate financial resources for carrying out steps one through six above.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\)Greer, p. 10.
Determination of whether a community meets the standards is the responsibility of the Urban Renewal Administration.

A further change in 1954 provided new forms of assistance from the Federal Housing Administration for rehabilitation and redevelopment of blighted areas. Section 220 of the 1954 Act provided for FHA mortgage insurance for property owners who wished to rehabilitate their homes. Prior to the enactment of section 220 standards for obtaining FHA approved loans were too high for the type of property likely to be used as collateral for a rehabilitation loan. Section 221 of the 1954 law was added to assist low income families displaced by renewal activities in construction of replacement homes. 12

A portent of the long range evolution of the urban renewal program was contained in the 1954 amendment which permitted 10% of the federal grant funds to be used for projects not meeting the requirements of "predominantly residential" either before or after redevelopment. 13

In 1956 Congress authorized relocation payments to help displaced families and a small businessman move to new quarters. The project concept also was broadened considerably by allowing the URA to advance funds to the LPA for the preparation of so-called "general neighborhood renewal" plans, which covered areas too large to be renewed as single

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12 Foard and Fefferman, op. cit., p. 97.
projects. This change would allow longer range renewal planning and facilitate the goal of integrating each renewal project into a larger frame of community reference.  

The Housing Act of 1959 further broadened the concept of general community renewal by authorizing funds to assist communities in preparing community renewal plans (CRP). A CRP is a way of analyzing the problems of blight present in a whole city, identifying the worst areas, indicating possible future problem areas, and helping the community to embark upon a preventive program. Congress in 1959 also increased to 20% the allowable percentage of federal funds for projects not residential in character, before or after project completion. Also, Title 1 was amended to allow a LPA to obtain noncash grant-in-aid credit for expenditures made by a college or university for acquiring land and buildings within or in the immediate vicinity of an urban renewal project area. The effect of this change was to allow the urban renewal agency to shift funds from the renewal project adjacent to the university or college to other projects. The institutional expenditures often would equal the one third local contribution to the net cost of a project.

The last major change made to Title 1 of the National Housing Act

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14 Ibid., p. 100.

15 Ibid., p. 123.
occurred in 1961. Recognizing the need for obtaining housing for families of moderate income, Congress adopted provisions permitting sales of urban renewal sites at prices "appropriate to the construction of such housing." FHA mortgage insurance requirements were liberalized to help achieve this end. Pilot projects in rehabilitation areas also were allowed. An LPA could now acquire a property, rehabilitate it to demonstrate what could be done, and sell it when the property no longer was needed for an example. The 1961 amendment also added hospitals to the section allowing universities and colleges to contribute to the LPA's noncash grant-in-aid portion of its one third financing of a project. In addition, relocation payments to displaced families and small businessmen were liberalized and the percentage requirement for the non-housing proportion of a project was increased from 20% to 30%.

The last change indicates once again how the original housing goals of the 1949 Act were retreating in the face of increasing demand from LPA's and developers for assistance in the broadly gauged program of economic development and tax base strengthening. Finally, 1961 saw a much greater commitment of funds for urban renewal. The authorization for the program was doubled, from $2 billion to $4 billion dollars. 16

16Anderson, op. cit., p. 65.
The Ideology of Urban Renewal: Questions of Value

Thus far, attention has been focused on the general statutory basis for urban renewal. At the foundation of the legal program, lies a set of assumptions, perspectives, beliefs and perceived needs which constitute the ideology of urban renewal. This ideology needs to be described and analyzed for effect and significance.

The first assumption of the urban renewal ideology is that "slums are bad." On the face of it, this hardly represents a controversial statement. But, like coming out against sin, mere opposition to slums does nothing to help understand the nature of what is being condemned, nor what things have contributed to its existence, nor what actions are possible and efficacious in dealing with the problem. The question of what, specifically, is bad about slums also is one of great consequence. Retail businessmen whose capital is invested in the CBD, real estate interests, and bankers who control, finance, and create the structures and facilities necessary for commercial activity, all would give different answers to the question than a slum resident. Different answers also would come from urban planners, sociologists, policemen, civic leaders fostering some idealized version of "the city beautiful," and from the various federal officials in command of the financial resources necessary for slum elimination and redevelopment. Other answers would come from political leaders whose fortunes are tied into the downtown area and upon whom rest the tasks of mobilizing support for action
programs, conciliating differences in interest and goal, and providing
the formal if not always the actual leadership necessary for a reno-
vation effort on such a large scale.

There is a question about causal relationships which being against
slums glosses over. That is, should the physical conditions collec-
tively known as slums be the target for change? If poor housing and
obsolete buildings generate the social problems associated with slums
then tearing down old buildings and erecting new ones is the answer.
But if the conditions primarily are an effect rather than a cause, then
the demolition of whole areas of the CBD and the uprooting of the people
who live there can do nothing to alter the real problem, which is
social and economic, not physical. In fact, the bulldozing of the slums
and its attendant effects on the people of the area actually would exacer-
bate rather than ameliorate the "slum problem." Destroying old
neighborhoods, moving from substandard housing to housing on the
verge of becoming so only compound the human dilemmas of the slums.
Most significant of all, the destruction of slum housing may only gene-
rate a shortage of the only kind of housing which is available to and
can be afforded by persons on the lowest end of the income scale.

There are other functional questions which must be considered in
any evaluation of the urban slums. For example, the older, but not
necessarily useless or decayed, areas of a city may be the only places
where new business can begin, where the small entrepreneur seeking
to keep down his costs may launch his enterprise. Many small business-
men never reach the position where they can afford or where they really
require "modern" facilities. To destroy such buildings in the name of
renewal may have the effect of eliminating large numbers of marginal
businesses whose activities are legitimate, socially useful, and whose
efforts are no less valuable simply because they are small in volume,
profits, and tax contributions.

The next point requires careful delineation lest it be misunderstood
for a latter day version of social Darwinism. Socially, the slum
traditionally has provided the poor, the disadvantaged, and newcomers
to America, a staging ground for their final ascent into full citizenship.
Life in the tenements of large cities was a kind of transitional stage
through which passed millions of immigrants who came to the United
States in the nineteenth century. In such enclaves old customs,
languages and social ties were maintained while the political and econo-
mic battles for opportunity were waged by the more dissatisfied, and
the more politically conscious of the immigrant populations. The
"tenement trail" to full Americanization is one which many scholars
have described in rich detail.

For some, of course, the departure process took longer than for
others. Unquestionably, the Negroes in America's urban slum-ghettos
today face more difficult obstacles than all of their predecessors.
Racism in American society, long dominant and only recently challenged,
presents barriers more resistant and complex than any faced by earlier immigrant groups. For American Negroes, the departure process promises to be especially prolonged and difficult. All of the forces for achieving group cohesion, endurance, skill in obtaining political advantage, are of absolutely crucial importance in the Negroes' struggle for escape from the bonds of poverty and discrimination. The relationship of the Negroes' drive for freedom to urban renewal cannot be extensively treated here but some observations are possible.

Since about two-thirds of the people displaced by renewal projects are Negroes or Puerto Ricans, the costs of displacement fall upon the very people least able to find suitable housing at rents they can afford.\textsuperscript{17} Even when integration, however temporary, of former Negro ghetto residents is achieved through relocation the long run efforts are probably self-defeating.

The irony of requiring integrated neighborhoods for displaced Negroes is . . . compounded: Negroes relocated from urban renewal projects are usually the poorest and least educated--exactly the opposite of those most interested in living in integrated neighborhoods. Some would think it unfair to make the weakest and most poorly motivate carry the burden of radical social change.\textsuperscript{18}

Even the conventional notion that the ghetto is a trap may not be

\textsuperscript{17} Greer, \textit{op. cit.} pp. 58-59.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 59.
a valid basis for forcible relocation of slum residents.

Dozens of studies by sociologists indicate that the ethnic enclave is as much a protective community as it is a restrictive pale. And, when a protective community is destroyed, the personal loss of the displacees is another major cost or relocation. . . . For the greatest number (of relocatees) dislocation does lead to intense personal suffering despite moderately successful adaptation to the total situation of relocation.

In short, it may be that the relocation of disadvantaged groups is only a way of relocating the slums and destroying whatever strengths slowly may be developing among those innured in slums, a process which eventually would cause an "unslumming" of the slums, to use Jane Jacobs term, or a voluntary migration to better housing. 20

The reification of the concept of blight forms a very important part of the ideology of urban renewal. In America there has always been a penchant for physical solutions to social problems. The ideology of urban renewal provides a good example of this type of thinking. In the first place the concept of slums and blight was perceived as a physical phenomenon, apart from the broader cultural context. Slums, by definition, were places, areally defined sections of the city set off by streets, rivers, and other physical boundaries from the presumably non-slum areas. Buildings constituted the basic unit of the slums.

19 Ibid., p. 59.

20 Jacobs, chapter 15. The author presents a very cogent analysis of the forces which tend to produce slums and also describes how slums may revive themselves through the reintroduction of forces for diversity.
The people who lived in the buildings were their victims. The lack of sanitation, run-down conditions, high population density, the atmosphere of decay and all of the other negative attributes of the structures infected their inhabitants with a kind of social disease. Passivity, delinquency, crime, family disintegration, festering hostility toward the rest of the society were the component parts of this social disease. Demolish the incubator and the bacteria it harbors would also die.

The reification of the slum concept led to the perception of slums as having a life of their own, apart from the people living in them. Slums, therefore, were self-generating. Blight tended to spread in much the same manner as a malignancy of the body which is not surgically removed. Adjacent areas were exposed and vulnerable to "creeping blight." Presumably the entire community would eventually fall prey to blight unless effective barriers, physical ones, were created against it.

Many recent critics of the urban renewal program have raised serious questions about the utility, fairness, and the consequences of the physical definition of blight. It is difficult to arrive at an objective, generally agreed upon, useful definition of blight. The outward

\[21\] Scott Greer and Martin Anderson, in particular, have noted the ease with which renewal officials gloss over the meaning of such general terms as "slum," "blight," "adequate housing," etc. See Greer, pp. 20-27 and Anderson, pp. 202 ff. Also, see Jacobs, pp. 3-25 passim.
appearance of an area may be taken as the clearest indication that a slum exists, or is aborning. Littered alleys, broken windows, buildings on the verge of collapse, overcrowding of people are often so obvious to any observer as to make unnecessary any further criteria.

But the substandard housing of today often reflects yesterday's norms, and the use of such indices of "standard housing" as hot running water clearly reflect the values, and the technology, of a different time. Such amenities as hot water available at the tap in quantity, tiled bathrooms or enclosed plumbing may be considered as essential to the modern home buyer, or to the middle class apartment renter, but whether their absence necessarily represents a condition of substandardness is a debatable question.

Urban renewal officials often make decisions about the location of projects by comparing the actual with the original use intended for a building. Single family dwellings divided into apartments, or large homes converted to mortuaries, a high incidence of former residences with store fronts appended--these changes in usage often are taken as portents of slums. That the buildings may have accommodated themselves to the new uses, or that the new uses represent real needs of an economic or social origin appears not to matter.

Assuming that some structures clearly require demolition, what of the buildings in the marginal category which intersperse the area?

The logic of urban renewal requires that large areas be demolished
and redeveloped. Private developers are unwilling to take on the risks of redevelopment when a project does not appear financially feasible. Size, protection from surrounding blight, and the elimination of all possible sources of further deterioration make up the "financially feasible" condition.

The variables of design, spatial relationships, function, and density, are not so free of subjective content as to make them in any sense objective guidelines for the determination of blight. That they are subjective in nature is further indicated by the variability of definitions and standards employed from one city to another and from one building and housing code to another. Even professional urban planners and experienced developers are not in agreement on the meaning of many of the basic terms and concepts used to justify the demolition of whole areas of the city and the consequent relocation of millions of people.

Some set of standards and definitions obviously are necessary, and it must be said that the pressure of the Urban Renewal Administration in Washington, is having the effect of creating some uniformity among the local codes. There remains, however, a serious question of whether the standards and definitions are too open-ended to justify what is done in their name.

Since 1949 urban renewal advocates have steadily moved toward a position emphasizing the need to renovate the central business districts of America's cities. The original intention of eliminating slums
and replacing them with adequate housing now takes second place to the goal of reviving the commercial life of downtown. As Congress increased the percentage of project area nonresidential in character, either before or after redevelopment, the attractiveness of urban renewal to business interests, real estate and banking interests in particular, has increased proportionately.

The general decline of the CBD in physical and economic terms is a rather common phenomenon among American cities. Differences in degree exist, of course, from one city to another. But, overall, the CBD areas as we have known them face obsolescence. Their general shoddy appearance and the vacancy rates in once valuable commercial facilities attest to this trend. The growth of suburban centers of retail and manufacturing activity suggest that long range, enduring changes are making their impact felt. No better defensive weapon against the inroads of decline in the CBD has been found than the federal urban renewal program.

The notion that downtown is the heart and soul of the urban community represents the value underpinning of the thrust for renovation. Downtown is the place where the economic, social, political and cultural life of the community join into the complex, dynamic mosaic of community. It is here that the patterns of interaction, the attributes of proximity and the benefits of diversity are most clearly exemplified. Urban life means, in essence, the life of the central city. Yet,
despite the respect in which these conventional notions have been held, many contemporary scholars of the urban scene are challenging, tacitly or explicitly, the empirical bases for them. They see the ideology of CBD renascence as slowly losing the foundation of truth it once had.

The city of today is a product of 19th century needs and social conditions. As Scott Greer says, cities were designed for the "age of steam." That is, the need to be near the railroad was a crucial one for businessmen and manufacturers. The railroad brought the raw materials to the factories and provided the means to ship out finished goods. The railroad brought the finished goods to the wholesalers and retailers whose stores and warehouses were therefore located in proximity to the rail heads and terminals. The main artery of commerce in virtually all commercial activity was the railroad. 22

Centrality of location also was dictated by the need for manufacturers to be near their labor supply. The factory workers walked to work and the reciprocal needs of employee and employer required that they be close to one another. In addition, the general public, because of transportation limitations, found proximity to the business district to their advantage. They could shop, have fellowship with friends and family more advantageously within the orbit of the downtown area.

22Greer, op. cit., p. 129.
It is the value assumption of urban renewal officials and their allies that this pattern should be preserved, basically intact. The decentralizing trends of the mid-twentieth century which threaten the hegemony of the CBD have stimulated a counterattack.

These trends are too familiar to require extensive description here. Innovations in transportation radically altered the premium on centrality of location for industry and business. The street railway and the automobile gradually obviated the need for central location. Shipment of goods and materials was no longer dependent upon one mode of transportation. With the construction of modern highways (especially in the 1950's as a result of the federal interstate highway program), business could more easily and often more profitably locate away from the central business district. Land was likely to be cheaper and more available in outlying areas. Business could utilize great encircling "outerbelts" which connected the interstate highways with the central city area.

In addition to these inducements, new concepts of industrial plant construction could be better implemented in the outlying areas of the city. No longer were multi-story lofts functional for many types of industrial activity. Single story, elongated buildings were better suited for many kinds of industrial activities, and such structures were too expensive to build in the overcrowded and high-value areas of the central city. The dispersion and decentralization of business activity,
then, helped to hasten the decline in value of the central business district.\(^{23}\)

The loss of tax revenue was only one negative effect the city suffered. The general weakening of the CBD as an economic center had a wave-like effect on all commercial activity. Supporting industries and businesses moved out to where their major customers were. The obsolescence of downtown, like blight, was self-generating.

In a real sense, if it were not for the purely legal boundaries which intersected the urban community in an arbitrary manner the shift in economic strength from downtown to the suburbs would have been considerably different in its impact. Business moving out of the central business district to separate political jurisdictions meant, of course, the loss of tax revenues, instead of the shift in source of tax revenue which would have resulted if the city's political boundaries could have moved with the outward expansion of the community. But, state restrictions on the annexation powers of city governments usually hampered the city's effort to grow politically in tandem with socio-economic growth.

The general rise in personal income and concomitant increase in the range of housing choices available to more and more Americans further accelerated the weakening of the "old city." The preference

of most American families for "a home of their own" usually took the form of a development house in the suburbs. Here, space, modern conveniences, privacy, and status was available at prices an increasing number of Americans could afford. The automobile and the expressway made it possible to work in town and live in the suburbs. Although more and more suburbanites also work in the suburbs, this pattern basically still holds true. The federal government's policy of subsidizing the middle income home buyer through FHA-insured mortgage loans was a boon to millions who, even with rising incomes, could not have realized their dream "of a home in the country" without this added help.

All of the changes have a mutually reinforcing effect on each other. As people moved out of the city, businesses saw opportunities for expansion, or even for a complete break with the CBD. As economic activity began to increase in the fringe areas, jobs opened up to which people were attracted. The cycle is dynamic and seemingly inexorable.

In summary, there are presently at work long range forces for change which, for good or ill, are reshaping drastically the central city areas of the urban community we always have known. Although some forms of business activity still lend themselves to a central business district location, it appears that in the long run the trend toward business dispersion is gaining in strength. For most American cities the outlook is for an even more rapid pace of obsolescence in
the CBD.

The federal urban renewal program with its shifting emphasis to downtown renovation must be seen in the context of these changes as a primary weapon of preservation and defense. What is involved is an attempt to check and control very basic forces of change and to redirect them in a manner suitable to the interests of those who are committed to the CBD in its present form. The final outcome of this effort cannot be known as yet. The urban renewal program is too young for final evaluation.

One thing is clear. So long as the public officials and business interests maintain their alliance in behalf of saving the CBD and so long as they have powerful allies in the federal government able to support a mechanism like the urban renewal program, the resistance to change will continue as the full possibilities of the urban renewal program are grasped by more and more public officials and businessmen concerned about the transformation of the area to which they are economically and politically committed.
CHAPTER 3

POLICY DEFINITION

Organizational Beginnings

On April 27, 1950, Mayor James A. Rhodes convened a meeting of an interim group of city officials and private citizens for the purpose of exploring redevelopment needs in Columbus. Although a permanent policy making body would supplant this temporary one, during the eighteen months of its existence this group made a number of important decisions which affected the long range development of urban renewal in Columbus. ¹

For example, project area number one was established in the Goodale area as anticipated by nearly everyone in and out of government interested in redevelopment. Goodale, or "Flytown" as local residents called it, comprised an oblong area bounded by Buttles Avenue on the north, Neil Avenue on the east, and the Pennsylvania railroad tracks on the south, and the Scioto River on the west.

Second, the provisional slum clearance authority began the time-consuming process of making application to the United States Housing and Home Financing Agency for federal aid under the recently enacted

¹Minutes, Columbus Urban Redevelopment Authority, 4/27/50.
Title One program of the 1949 Housing Act was begun during this preliminary period of the urban renewal program's development.

The third important action taken by this temporary group was to hold open discussions with the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) regarding the construction of five hundred units of public housing for the purpose of rehousing the people who would be displaced by the bulldozers of the urban renewal program.

From April of 1950 until January 1952 this somewhat informal, changing group of city officials and community leaders met at irregular intervals to lay the groundwork for the formal establishment of an operational urban renewal program in Columbus. Except for the three actions described the major tasks of the group essentially were clerical and exploratory; preparing, and often preparing again, the forms and applications required by the federal authorities, discussing in general terms the redevelopment needs of the city, deciding which areas needed study as possible sites for clearance and redevelopment, and planning the staff organization of the redevelopment program.²

The penultimate step toward formal creation of a local public authority in Columbus was Mayor Rhodes' nomination of Lawrence Irvin as executive director for the urban renewal program. City Council approve the nomination on January 3, 1952 and giving Irvin the title of

²Minutes, CURA, April 1950-December 1951.
Commissioner of the Columbus Urban Redevelopment Authority. The interim authority directed Irvin to gather information regarding the advisability of establishing a second project area within the so-called Market-Mohawk area of the downtown business district. Next to "Flytown," the deteriorated area southwest of the state capitol in which the old Central Market building was the major landmark constituted the most popular target for redevelopment.³

The Columbus City Council formally enacted legislation authorizing a six-man urban redevelopment authority on March 10, 1952. The ordinance was pursuant to state enabling legislation passed by the Ohio General Assembly.

Finally, on June 19, 1952, the formal installation of members of the Columbus Urban Redevelopment Authority (CURA) occurred and, officially, urban renewal was underway in Columbus. The mayor and city service director were to be ex officio members of the Authority. In addition the mayor had four positions to fill, subject to the confirmation of the city council. The mayor also had the power to name the executive director, as Mayor Rhodes had already done six months earlier.⁴

Lawrence Irvin, whose responsibility it would be to organize and direct the Department of Urban Redevelopment, the operating arm of CURA, came to his new job with a background of public housing experience.

³Minutes, CURA, 1/3/52.

He had worked for the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) for a number of years and, in one sense, this experience seemed ideal preparation for the tasks now confronting him.

CMHA had been engaged in slum clearance for fifteen years. Since the passage of the National Housing Act of 1937 the demolition of slum housing and its replacement on a unit-for-unit basis by public housing was the only governmental tool for slum elimination.

Since its formation in 1937 CMHA had built only two projects, Pointdexter Village in 1939 and Riverside Homes in 1940. These two projects, housing 5,500 people in 1,352 units, represented the entire public housing program in Columbus until 1958 when expressway construction and slum clearance for redevelopment purposes necessitated the construction of Windsor Terrace. 5

Public housing had never been popular in Columbus, as witnessed by the comparatively small number of slum units replaced by public housing, at the time of CURA's establishment. Now, however, slum clearance would be possible without a concomitant increase in the stock of public housing. Real estate and building interests had always opposed "socialized housing" not only in Columbus but nationally as well. The 1949 Housing Act had created a "cake and eat it too," situation for these business groups. The economic threat of blight could be dealt

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with, in terms of physical and commercial values, through clearance and redevelopment subsidized two-thirds by the federal government, and one third by local government. Legally, the stigma of public housing had been removed from slum clearance.

This was the objective reality of urban renewal but the subjective image of the program to all levels of the community was as yet obscure and still heavily tinged with the pink hues of "socialized housing." The selection of a long-time public housing official to head the renewal program probably confirmed in the minds of many their suspicion that urban renewal was just another left wing scheme inseparable from the discredited public housing program. From the standpoint of urban renewal goals alone, that is, economic redevelopment of the downtown core, Irvin's appointment was unfortunate. It provided the first practical clue to what renewal would mean, what its goals would be and, as it eventually became clear, the clue was a false one. The presence of men on the putative policy making body, CURA, who represented the interests of downtown business could not have been so visible an indicator a placement of a public housing official at the helm of the city's department of urban redevelopment renewal staff organization.  

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6 False impressions of the meaning of urban renewal were cited by many of the non-governmental subjects of interviews as possible reasons for some of the difficulties later experienced by the program. Significantly, government people generally were reluctant to recognize this gap in public understanding.
Ohio enabling legislation determined the formal organization of urban renewal in Columbus. Figure 1 shows the general pattern of formal relationship between the redevelopment agencies and the main organs of municipal government in Ohio.

The mayor was to appoint the policy making authority for fixed overlapping terms of six years and the director of the administrative department, who would serve at the pleasure of the mayor. All appointments were subject to council approval.

Unlike the metropolitan housing authority in Columbus, the urban renewal authority was not a semi-independent agency. CURA and its administrative arm were closely connected to partisan politics and would be subject to the ebb and flow of partisan change in city government. Urban renewal would be affected by the activities of other city departments because of the dependence renewal people would have on the
cooperation of other officials and agencies of city government. In particular, urban renewal officials would be dependent upon the support of the mayor. Without his leadership the required legal approval of city council for clearance sites, bond issues, redevelopment plans, contracts with private developers, and operating funds would be hard to achieve.

The Department of Urban Redevelopment was on the same organizational level as other city departments. Thus, it would have to compete for operating funds with other agencies while at the same time needing the cooperation of these same agencies to a degree not found in any other operating department of city government. The success of the redevelopment department would depend on open communication lines and amicable relations between it and other city departments, especially those with supervision over such traditional functions as street maintenance, housing inspection, traffic control, planning, and public health. Also, autonomous governmental units like the school board and the local housing authority are centers of decision-making having a bearing on slum clearance and redevelopment.  

But overlapping functions contained the seeds of even more serious obstacles to success for CURA. Like bureaucratic organizations every-

the various departments of city government could be expected to promote their interests and safeguard their status through the acquisition of new projects and by maintaining jurisdiction over "their" areas of concern. However, because of the wide ranging scope of CURA's interests and activities it would pose a different kind of threat to other city agencies. The Department of Public Safety and the City Engineering Office might compete with each other for funds and status, but neither the policemen nor the firemen threatened to take over the basic functions of the city engineer's department. It was easily possible, however, for the other departments of government to perceive threats of interference and even usurpation of functions from the newly created urban renewal department.

Finally, unlike other agencies of government, CURA would be dependent upon direct public support for its goals. Since the federal program requires one-third of the subsidy to private developers to come from local sources a large part of CURA's efforts would be directed toward building favorable public relations with the voters who must approve at periodic intervals the bond issues nearly always necessary for the financing of the local share of the renewal program. CURA, unlike the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority, would have to receive formal permission of city council to place a bond issue on the ballot and then the approval of 55% of the ballots cast in a general or primary election. In addition

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8 Interviews with middle level project directors, planners, and administrators in CURA revealed a shared sense of being the object of inter-departmental jealousies, fears, and resentment.
to the formal approval of the city council for placing a bond issue before the voters, the permission and support of a private group known as the Metropolitan Committee of One Hundred Organizations would be required. This organization is a kind of loose alliance of the leading civic groups in Columbus in whose name a small executive committee of business leaders decides on the desirability and feasibility of publicly supported capital improvement projects. The Metropolitan Committee will be considered more closely in a later chapter. Suffice it to say now that here was one more external check on the activities of the local public authority for urban renewal in Columbus.

One other decision-making agency was expected to play an important role in the activities of SCAR. The Columbus City Planning Commission (CPC) ostensibly would be required to perform most of the major planning functions for CURA. CURA would eventually have its own planning section but long range surveys, and community-wide development plans required for receiving federal renewal funds would have to come from the local planning agency or from an equivalent private group.

Like most cities, Columbus had given little attention to planning of any kind until late in its development. It was not until after World War II that Columbus had an agency whose sole function was planning. By 1952 the CPC consisted of a director, Ernest Stork, who was a civil engineer, not a professional city planner. His staff consisted of two draftsmen. The city allocated twelve positions for the CPC in the budget
for 1952 but inadequate funds for salaries prevented the director from filling them. 9

Lawrence Irvin voiced concern at the weakness of the CPC very early in his administration of the redevelopment department. He emphasized that the whole future of urban renewal in Columbus was tied closely to the capacity of the CPC for performing its related functions in a professional way. "It will be necessary for them to tell us what the future land use on a neighborhood basis will be." 10

The Environment For Policy Making

Like any new policy urban renewal would represent a departure from the status quo. Lethargy and fear of change, if nothing else, would obstruct the goals of CURA. In order to overcome these obstacles at least two pre-conditions were necessary: One, relevant publics, those with the power to affect CURA's goals, needed to feel that action was required to stem the growth of slums and economic stagnation in Columbus. There had to be an awareness that problems existed which needed corrective measures. Two, the federal urban renewal program had to be perceived by the relevant publics as the proper and most efficacious method to check the decline of the central city.

Columbus satisfied the first pre-condition by the late 1940's. The ___________________

9Personal interview with Columbus Chamber of Commerce President K. L. Roberts - 5/16/64.

10Citizen, September 25, 1952, p. 2.
existence of slums in Columbus was a self-evident proposition, to those whose interests lay in the central business district (CBO). It was increasingly difficult to approach the CBO of the city from any direction without passing through several blocks of run down, shabby looking buildings. Perhaps, if high speed expressways had existed in the immediate post-war period, enabling commuters to drive literally over the rooftops of the slums, there would have been less public awareness of the spreading blight around the central city core. If the dispersion of retail shops and business activity into outlying shopping centers had developed further by this time perhaps fewer people would have been aware of the worsening conditions of downtown. But the late 1940's was still a time when the CBD was, in fact, the commercial center of Columbus and it was still the time when low speed, traffic-choked, streets stretching from the center of the city to its outlying limits were the only paths to the market places of the city. If there were those who did not go downtown very often, or who "screened out," or discounted the deterioration of the CBD, the metropolitan press provided a compensatory vehicle for creating an awareness of the problem. 11

Prior to and during the establishment of an urban renewal program in Columbus the local press campaigned extensively, even sensationally against the evils of slums. The reification of the blight concept--slums

11 Personal interview with Columbus Chamber of Commerce President K. L. Roberts - 5/16/64.
seen as a "live virus," highly contagious and needing drastic surgical
cure—owed much to the frequent accounts of rising crime rates, and
tax costs, and the "horror stories" of inhuman housing conditions in
areas like Goodale and Market-Mohawk which appeared in the Columbus
Dispatch, the Columbus Citizen and Ohio State Journal. The Columbus
press helped popularize the growing theory that physical conditions
"caused" the various social pathologies of "infected" areas.

That the Columbus Dispatch would campaign for slum removal in
light of its well-known abhorrence of federal governmental activity and
liberal schemes for spending tax money is not so hard to understand
when the nature of the Dispatch's interests in the CBD are described.

The economic power of the Wolfe family in Columbus is difficult
to assess. However, in addition to ownership and management of "Ohio's
Leading Home Newspaper," the Columbus Dispatch, and in 1952 its
morning counterpart, the Ohio State Journal, the Wolfe's, through a
complex interlocking directorate controlled the leading financial
institution in the community, the Ohio National Bank, the city's largest
radio-television outlet, WBNS, a chain of shoe stores, and The Ohio
Corporation, a brokerage house specializing in government securities.
Through the investments of the Ohio National Bank the Wolfe family has
amassed considerable interest in downtown real estate, especially office
buildings. In short, the Wolfe interests in the future development of
down-town Columbus were material and growing. Falling commercial
activity in the CBD would certainly result in declining revenues for the newspapers, a threat to the investments of Ohio National in downtown real estate, and a general loss of influence for the paper as community concern and activity moved away from the CBD to outlying areas. The downtown oriented press no longer would be in position to speak for the predominant business and political interests of the city if the CBD were to decline in importance. It was very definitely in the clear and general interest of the peculiar Columbus institution known as the Wolfe family to defend the traditional position of the CBD in the life of their community.

Many factors conditioned the interest of other downtown businessmen in urban renewal. At first, there were ideological obstacles to acceptance of the federal urban renewal program as the best means of dealing with CBD obsolescence. In addition there were varying perceptions of the seriousness of slums and the benefits of urban renewal as it affected specific business interests. As subsequent events demonstrated, some businessmen would see urban renewal as a serious threat and oppose CURA's plans to revitalize their area. There were other businessmen whose interests were so secure, e.g., the Lazurus family, that urban renewal, while generally and potentially beneficial, was not a crucial matter of survival to them. There were some who supported renewal as a means of realizing amorphous esthetic goals--the "city beautiful," and some who responded to the latent values of "Main
Street boosterism. " And there were always those who suspected that the whole program was tailored to the interests of a small elite, generally the Wolfe or Lazurus family interests, who, while they favored urban renewal in principle, suspected that its benefits would go to those "at the top," not the "little businessmen." Ideologically, the idea of accepting federal funds and attached strings disturbed all Columbus businessmen to some extent. This attitudinal problem had deep roots and a daily diet of Dispatch editorials reinforced attitudes of suspicion toward federal "creeping socialism." 12

To allay the apprehensions of businessmen and generate interest in CURA's plans, CURA director, Lawrence Irvin, arranged very early after his appointment for federal urban renewal officials to come to Columbus for public and private meetings with local civic notables. Speaking directly to the problems of Columbus the men from the HHFA described the process of decline in two of the city's better known slums, Goodale and Market-Mohawk.

The statistics they cited were compelling and seemed to verify the views of renewal officials and the press. In Goodale, the tax base of the area declined from $752,000 in 1924 to $189,000 in 1952. In the Market-Mohawk section of Columbus property valuation had shrunk from $9 million to $4 million during the same period.

Verifying what their audience already knew to be true was not the major thrust of the conference, however. Over and over the officials' 12Ibid.
theme sounded that urban renewal was, at its roots, private enterprise. Government would provide the stimulus—seed money and technical assistance—but private business would decide the place and the type of redevelopment in Columbus, not government. "It is not socialistic," asserted the representatives of an administration about to be replaced by the first Republican national administration in twenty years.13

Following up the meetings of local business leaders with federal officials, Irvin engaged in a continuous round of luncheon appearances, and short talks before various civic, business, and neighborhood groups with an interest in the proposed clearance and redevelopment program. Irvin persistently sounded the themes of the crucial need for and the "non-controversial" character of the urban renewal program. In a community environment like that of Columbus, Ohio, the image of federal paternalism and the stigma of public housing had to be eradicated from this as yet unborn program.

The Selection of Project Sites

In the context of this environment, CURA leaders knew that the most important task during the first year was to establish that the agency was capable of carrying out the goal of downtown renovation. The job of making the environment "friendly" to CURA's goals would depend in large measure on how favorably impressed various publics were with the capabilities and energy of the agency. Urban renewal

would require grass roots support as well as the active cooperation of elite groups. It was important to get off to a good start and create a sense of movement and purpose right away.

Image was not the only concern of the urban renewal agency, however. To delay would provide opportunity for opposition elements, already dormant, to organize resistance, to undermine what latent grass roots support there was, and to "pick apart" the program before CURA had a chance to show what urban renewal could do for the city.¹⁴ In the case of CURA, however, the attempt to create the right impression was not successful, as early decisions about sites revealed.

The Authority's selection of Goodale as the first project was an obvious choice. Goodale's conditions had been well publicized in the newspapers. It was synonymous with slums and declining property values. Even more important, Goodale's location, its closeness to the CBD, its relationship to the proposed expressway system—in short its commercial possibilities, made it an ideal site for "upgrading." But, not having experience with the urban renewal process, CURA did not foresee the need for securing prior commitments from other governmental agencies whose cooperation would be vital to successful redevelopment. But, most important of all, CURA did not realize the impor-

¹⁴Harold Kaplan discusses the importance of getting a head start in urban renewal and of creating a sense of momentum and direction early in the program in his study of the Newark program; see, e.g., chapter 2, "The Strategy of Clearance," (Urban Renewal Politics: Slum Clearance in Newark (New York and London: Columbus University Press, 1963.)
portance of obtaining prior commitments from developers for the cleared area, an error which would return to haunt the agency in the future.

Because of the complete lack of specifics on the nature of Goodale's redevelopment of even the extent of the project, CURA did not immediately fix its exact boundaries. Four acres was the legal minimum for eligibility under the Title One program and the maximum size was negotiable with federal officials. By announcing prematurely the choice of Goodale the agency left itself open to a process of piecemeal bargaining on the size of the project, and the nature of its redevelopment.

But such was the sense of urgency to get the program underway that the first clearance site actually was announced by the interim Authority even before an administrator for the program had been retained. Major decisions and commitments had been made by the essentially lay group of temporary policy makers before the professional administrators had the opportunity to undertake even a preliminary assessment of the situation or the mayor had named a permanent policy making group. Irvin had little choice but to go along. Indeed, he indicated no wish to do anything else, and according to Authority members at that time, agreed with their actions.¹⁵

The first administrative action taken by Irvin with respect to the

¹⁵ Personal interview with W. Ray Speer, former vice-chairman of CURA, 9/14/66.
Goodale site was the initiation of surveys to evaluate the housing conditions in the area— in effect, to validate the conclusions already reached with respect to the area. Demographic data on the residents also had to be gathered for the delicate and potentially explosive relocation of Goodale's residential and business population.

Irvin issued frequent announcements of the findings of the survey team as data trickled in. This was his method of maintaining the impression of movement toward renewal goals—of an as yet undefined nature, and of building among the public, elite and general, the consensus of approval CURA needed for the long haul. In August of 1952, when the survey was half completed, he issued a press release declaring that nearly all of the six hundred homes and business structures in the area were in violation of city fire, housing, and health codes. A month later, Irvin's preliminary judgment was verified by the final report of the survey team, headed by an Ohio State University professor, Dr. Carl Nissen, which concluded that most of the buildings in Goodale would have to be demolished.\(^{16}\)

On the heels of CURA's commitment in Goodale, with no redevelopment goals or planning support from the CPC, or CURA director Irvin, acted to focus public attention on the Market-Mohawk area.

Like Goodale, Market-Mohawk had a reputation for deterioration which made it a natural target for urban renewal. Lying southeast of

\(^{16}\)Ohio State Journal, 8/8/52, p. 8.
the Ohio state capitol, Market-Mohawk was a conglomeration of curb-
side wholesale produce markets, marginal businesses (used furniture,
stores, discount department stores, etc.), fish markets, dingy bars--
often the scene of after-hours activity, and dilapidated residences. If
economic activity alone was the criterion for decline, Market-Mohawk
should not have been selected as a clearance project. The area teemed
with business activity however chaotic, marginal, and unpleasing to
the eye it was to the planners of CURA and CBD leaders. The old
Central Market building, owned by the city and leased by stalls to small
entrepreneurs peddling their varied assortment of meats, vegetables,
and dairy products was a dingy looking bastion of individual enterprise.
But the area was a classic example of what city planners refer to as
"incompatible usage." The juxtaposition of commercial activity and
residential use which characterized Market-Mohawk was, in the view
of professional planners, stifling to either commercial or residential
growth.

Market-Mohawk, however, is an example of something even more
important to understanding the site selection process of urban renewal.
Although it satisfied the accepted criteria of a slum, sixty-three per-
cent of its structures were dilapidated, according to census data, the
establishment of such an area is as much a function of the preferences
of those who draw the boundaries as it is of the efforts of statisticians
who inventory the area's characteristics.

Demarcating a section of a city as a slum cannot help but be a some-
what arbitrary task. The boundary lines of such an area may or may not separate it from so-called non-blighted neighborhoods. Sections of the city just as blighted or more so may be "drawn out" of the designated clearance area for reasons entirely unrelated to the severity of the blight which affects the area. In drawing lines around a clearance area, however, the illusion may be created that on one side lies the slums while on the other side conditions are at least minimally satisfactory. If they were not either the undesignated area would have been included in the clearance area or another clearance area would be established. 17

An examination of census tract data reveals that housing conditions were about as bad in the so-called near east side area of Columbus. This is the area between Broad Street on the south and the Pennsylvania Railroad on the north, Taylor Avenue on the west and what is now the east leg of the innerbelt expressway system.

17 Harold Kaplan discusses the problems faced by a renewal agency in setting project boundaries in his chapter on "The Strategy of Slum Clearance" (Urban Renewal Politics: Slum Clearance in Newark (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
### TABLE 2

**COMPARATIVE HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GOODALE AND MARKET-MOHAWK CLEARANCE SITES AND THE NEAR EASTSIDE (1950)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Near Eastside</th>
<th>Goodale</th>
<th>Market-Mohawk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All dwelling units</td>
<td>9024 (100)*</td>
<td>1319 (100)</td>
<td>3254 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned units</td>
<td>2756 (31)</td>
<td>316 (23)</td>
<td>424 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white owner</td>
<td>2448 (27)</td>
<td>124 (9)</td>
<td>188 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented units</td>
<td>6161 (68)</td>
<td>989 (75)</td>
<td>2754 (85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white renters</td>
<td>4434 (49)</td>
<td>491 (37)</td>
<td>617 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple units</td>
<td>2986 (33)**</td>
<td>407 (31)</td>
<td>1833 (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No private bath or dilapidated</td>
<td>3011 (33)</td>
<td>682 (52)</td>
<td>1503 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No running water or dilapidated</td>
<td>1255 (14)</td>
<td>335 (25)</td>
<td>642 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro occupied units</td>
<td>6882 (76)</td>
<td>615 (47)</td>
<td>805 (25) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Figures in parentheses are percentages of the base.

** Multiple units refers to dwellings of three or more units.

*** Clearance sites do not coincide exactly with census tracts. However, the approximation is sufficient to allow significant comparisons between them and other areas of the city. For purposes of this table census tracts numbered 28, 29, 30, 35 and 36 comprise the near eastside; 32 the Goodale site; 39 the Market-Mohawk clearance site.

As the statistics reveal the difference between the indices of deterioration on the near eastside and the two slum clearance sites was not dramatically different. If smaller sections of the near eastside were demarcated, closer to the physical size of the two clearance sites, it
would be possible to point to evidence of slum conditions of nearly the same character. In census tract 29, for example, containing 1,558 dwellings, the census takers classified 41% of those units as having no private bath and dilapidated. The figures for Goodale and Market-Mohawk were 52% and 46% respectively.

The crucial difference lay in the commercial feasibility and the "show value" of redevelopment in Market-Mohawk and Goodale compared with the prospects for redevelopment on the near eastside. Goodale, close to the proposed innerbelt expressway and the railroad, lying athwart the main approaches to the CBD, represented the kind of slum area the urban renewal officials liked to help. Market-Mohawk, also located in a commercially strategic area, was an equally attractive and visible renewal site.

In addition to the differences in redevelopment potential, the two sites selected by CURA differed significantly in racial composition from the near eastside of Columbus. Table 2 also illustrates the importance of race as a factor in site selection. The non-white owner category shows a percentage of 27% on the near eastside while in the same area non-white renters lived in 49% of the housing units. Total Negro proportion of the entire near eastside population was 76%. In smaller, clearance-size sections, census tract 29, for example, Negroes comprised 91% of the population. By comparison Negroes accounted for 47% of the Goodale residents and a comparatively small...
25% of the people living in the Market-Mohawk area.

Relocation requirements would be difficult to satisfy in any case but to attempt a mass transferral of what amounted to the Negro ghetto in Columbus would have stimulated intense opposition to the program—perhaps sufficient to destroy the renewal program before it had really begun. Latter events involving the attempt by CURA and the metropolitan housing authority to get public housing built outside the clearance sites to accommodate displaced families revealed just how deep and intense was the fear of slum Negroes and whites moving into middle class (Negro or white) residential areas.

In addition to the staggering problems of relocation the near eastside was such a large area that CURA would have faced a seemingly impossible dilemma. To redevelop such a large area would require a major feat of planning and financing and take so much time as to be beyond the capacity of most potential developers. Certainly the effort would be in excess of the capacities of the fledgling urban renewal agency in Columbus. But even if smaller, more commercially feasible sites within the near eastside area could be cleared the prospect of an "island" of redevelopment surrounded on all sides by slums, or near-slums, would present risks both to CURA and to a potential developer. If the redeveloped slum, whatever character it took, should gradually be undermined, physically or financially, by the encroaching surroundings, the loss of prestige which CURA would suffer from such a
failure would certainly hamper if not preclude future urban renewal. It is self-evident that the problem of securing a developer increases in direct proportion to the risks entailed in investing his capital in slum clearance.\(^{18}\)

According to an executive of the Columbus Area Chamber of Commerce and former member of the Ohio General Assembly from Franklin County, the problems which would attend the relocation of large numbers of Negroes from Columbus' east side made the area virtually untouchable to renewal officials and CBD leaders.\(^{19}\)

The president of the Mt. Vernon Avenue Businessmen's Association and former director of relocation for the urban renewal program in Columbus confirmed this opinion. Although potentially the city's most troublesome housing problem the Negro ghetto was "too hot to handle" in the words of this former city official.\(^{20}\)

The influencing factors affecting site selection did not all originate from within the community. Studies of other urban renewal programs and the experience of Columbus renewal officials reveal that the Federal Housing Administration also was leery of underwriting redevelopment among the hardcore slums where sheer size made complete renovation

\(^{18}\) Personal interviews with business leaders in real estate who insisted upon anonymity.

\(^{19}\) Personal interview, Klein L. Roberts, 5/24/64.

\(^{20}\) Personal interview, L. B. LaCour, former president Mt. Vernon Avenue Businessmen's Association, 6/4/64.
seem impossible and where smaller redevelopment might eventually be inundated by surrounding blight. Without FHA-insured loans nearly all redevelopers and lending institutions would refuse to touch urban renewal projects. In effect, the location and use standards of FHA imposed conditions on local renewal officials precluded redevelopment in the very areas where housing conditions were very bad and where accumulating social problems associated with urban slums were most acute.  

It is ironic that, in the slum clearance program carried on under the auspices of the 1937 Housing Act the severity of blight was directly proportional to the acceptability of a clearance site by the federal Public Housing Administration for the construction of public housing. Under the new, presumably more efficient, Title I program enacted as part of the 1949 Housing Act, the needs of the mortgage-insuring FHA and those of the private redeveloper, most of all, took precedence over housing improvements. CURA could mount no more than a partial attack on slums and areas with greatest potential for becoming slums must be excluded from the effort.

Conflict between the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority and the Columbus Urban Redevelopment Authority for Leadership of Urban Renewal.

21 Personal interview, P. J. Phelan, Director, Department of Urban Renewal, 8/7/64.

22 See Kaplan, chap. 1. This was less understood by Columbus urban renewal officials than their Newark counterparts. CURA failed to take adequate account of redeveloper preferences and needs.
Perhaps the most destructive effects on the fledgling slum clearance program resulted from the struggle between CMHA and CURA for leadership of urban renewal in Columbus. Just prior to Mayor Rhodes' appointment of Lawrence Irvin as CURA administrator in December of 1951, CMHA director, Russell Taylor, announced a survey for a site to construct five hundred units of the first new public housing in Columbus since 1939. Following up the announcement by Taylor, Mayor Rhodes said that the new public housing would "start sorely needed housing and the elimination of slums in Columbus." Besides, said the Mayor, if Columbus did not act the federal money set aside for new construction in Columbus would only be shifted to another community.

The survey by CMHA would determine the location of the greatest need for low income housing in Columbus. Despite the imminent birth of a separate department of urban redevelopment, and the existence of an interim group of policy makers, Taylor foresaw a major role for the housing agency in future redevelopment activity. The initial press interpretation of the similar functions of the new urban redevelopment department suggested a tandem relationship between redevelopment and public housing and the older housing authority. A series of articles in January of 1952 described the separate but related functions of the two

23 Ohio State Journal, 12/15/51.
agencies. Coordination between the agencies would be necessary "since the public housing program offered a way of satisfying the relocation requirements established by federal regulations." More significantly, the article noted that a possible use of cleared slum sites was for additional public housing, assuming that CMHA's bid for the land was satisfactory to CURA. 25

By its incomplete reporting, the press told the public that urban renewal was tied to public housing program and that, moreover, urban renewal might mean public housing under some circumstances. Given the fact that, prior to 1949, this was the nature of government-assisted slum clearance in the United States, the idea was logical, if not necessarily correct. In theory, it was indeed possible, but very unlikely that redevelopment in cleared slum areas in Columbus might take the form of new public housing projects.

Simultaneous with the initial series of articles describing urban renewal, the Goodale project was announced. The Columbus Citizen published an outline map of Goodale indicating that clearance would be achieved in all or part of the study area. 26 In post hoc fashion, urban renewal and public housing were linked very early in the game.

The linkage of the two materialized when CMHA director Taylor

25 Columbus Citizen, 1/6/52, p. 10.

26 Columbus Dispatch, 1/23/52, p. 5.
announced plans for a second housing project to be placed within the proposed Goodale slum clearance project area, the prime target of CURA director, Lawrence Irvin. At that time, Irvin and his staff were completing surveys of Goodale to determine the extent of its deterioration. 27

Taylor offered redevelopment to the city at no cost. CMHA could clear the slums with funds from the federal Public Housing Administration and issue mortgage revenue bonds, backed by federal, not local support, and construct low cost housing in the cleared area. The CMHA plan called for a large facility, housing 476 families and occupying about twenty-four of the 120 acres in the Goodale project area. Not only would slum clearance and redevelopment be accomplished without cost to the community but there would be no relocation problems with which to contend. Presumably, most of the families and individuals living in Goodale would occupy the public housing units to be constructed. No clearer method for arresting blight, alleviating the social ills and lowering the tax costs of slums could have been presented than Taylor's proposal.

But the essentially non-housing concerns of urban renewal officials in Columbus were revealed by CURA director Lawrence Irvin's reaction

to CMHA plan. It was "more or less accepted around town," said Irvin, "that building public housing in Goodale would not be the best use of the area." Goodale was too desirable as a site for commercial and middle income housing development to develop as a tax-exempt public housing project. Also, Irvin knew that public housing and private housing appealing to middle income renters was an impossible combination. The prestige of "close-in," high-rise luxury apartments would be hard to establish with a low rent public housing project dominating the area.

Feeling confident that Columbus CBD leaders and city hall as well shared his views, Irvin's initial response to Taylor's announcement about the second CMHA project in Goodale was conciliatory and moderate in tone. Irvin said that his agency had neither jurisdiction nor priority in the Goodale area since the council had not yet adopted a plan for the area's redevelopment. He concluded his comments by pointing out that only the council could decide the future of Goodale and that both CURA and CMHA would have to wait for council to exercise its policy making authority.

The following day, Irvin, in an oblique rebuttal of CMHA's plans, issued a statement in which he pointed out the "crying need" for low cost private housing to rehouse dislocated residents from Goodale and future slum clearance projects. Eighty percent of Goodale's 1,300 families had income levels higher than the income ceiling imposed on
residents of public housing in Columbus. Although Irvin refused to
discount completely the need for new public housing, he said that the
proposed CMHA project in Goodale would fall far short of the relo-
cation needs of the people in the area. One thousand new private units
would be needed for this purpose, according to Irvin's estimate. 28

Convinced of the soundness of Irvin's assessment of Goodale's
proper future, the Columbus City Council denied Taylor the permit of
agreement he needed before CMHA could construct new public housing
in the city.

This reversal was a serious one for CMHA because the time in
which the housing authority had to obtain a site was dwindling rapidly.
June 30th was the latest time that Taylor's agency could qualify for
the PHA funds earmarked for Columbus. But, for the remainder of
the winder the relationship between CMHA and CURA was unmarked by
further conflict over the future development of Goodale. Apparently,
Russell Taylor had laid aside any idea he may have had for turning
urban renewal in Columbus into a public housing program.

The aftermath of the brief public dispute between the two agencies
was a stimulation of latent grassroots opposition to urban renewal in
Columbus. A series of letters to the editor appeared in the three
daily newspapers criticizing the renewal and public housing programs

28Columbus Citizen, 2/20/52, p. 3.
in terms familiar to the editorial writers of the Columbus press. Once
more the bugaboo of federal encroachment on local authority and the
charges of "socialistic schemes" for subsidizing the indolent were
raised in public print. The writers gave special attention to alleged
extravagance in the public housing program in their condemnations of
Washington and all of its works. It was outrageous, said the writers,
to "reward slum residents" with $16,000 to $17,000 apartments. The
figure represented the estimated per unit cost of the proposed first
new CMHA project. 29

Many months after the CMHA-CURA disagreement over the course
of redevelopment in Columbus began to lose interest to writers of
letters-to-the-editor, the CMHA director raised a second challenge to
the hegemony of CURA in the renewal field. In the spring of 1953
Russell Taylor announced that he would submit to the Columbus City
Planning Commission a plan for constructing a $7 million, twenty-three
acre housing project in the Market-Mohawk study area. Front page,
banner headlines announced CMHA's proposal for "A Huge New Public
Housing Project." An accompanying article predicted a showdown
between the still-fledgling urban renewal agency and the older, more
experienced public housing authority. 30

29Ohio State Journal, 1/7/52, p. 3; 1/12/52, p. 10. Many
examples of similar comments may be found in the press throughout
1952.

Reached for comment on the latest CMHA attempt to carve out a redevelopment role for itself, CURA director Irvin vowed to "vigorously oppose" the idea to use commercially valuable clearance land in Market-Mohawk, for such a purpose. With hardly any discussion city council rejected Taylor's plan at its first opportunity. 31

Irvin really had little more to fear from Taylor or his agency. Public housing was in trouble all over the country, from Washington to the local level, and especially in Columbus. By the spring of 1953 the Republican-controlled House of Representatives had voted to terminate the entire public housing program by refusing funds for its operation. There was legitimate concern that even if the more urban-oriented Senate should restore the appropriation, the future of public housing would be a perilous one, given the more conservative tone of the national government since the return to power of the G.O.P. Tying the urban renewal program to the vulnerable housing program looked like a risky course to follow, even if slum clearance land could best be redeveloped as CMHA proposed.

Although they had little to fear from the housing agency as a rival, Irvin and CURA did have much to fear from the tendency of the press and of many people in the community to identify public housing with urban renewal. Because of this tendency, the CMHA battle to obtain

31Columbus Dispatch, 5/13/53, p. 11.
a site in the Woodland-Woodward Avenue area of Columbus had impor-
tant effects on the urban renewal program.

The Woodland-Woodward Avenue Public Housing Fight

In November 1952, just prior to the attempt by Russell Taylor to
obtain an urban renewal site in the two clearance areas for public
housing, CMHA had sought a project site away from the central busi-
ness district for its first effort since before the war. Taylor's staff
had surveyed various areas of the city beginning early in 1952. In
November, ten months after losing the Goodale site, Taylor announced
that a location had been selected for a proposed 550 unit project. He
said that construction could start in the spring of 1953, assuming city
council's willingness to rezone the area in which the housing would be
built. The chosen site was vacant and so would present a minimum of
delays in construction. Shaped roughly like a triangle, the project site
was bounded by Woodland Avenue, Woodward Avenue, and Brentwell
Avenue and was located adjacent to the Pennsylvania Railroad tracks
just east of Fort Hayes. It would be CMHA's most important venture
in several years and when completed would comprise a quarter of the
entire stock of public housing in the city. The provision of relocation
housing for many of the buildings to be displaced in Goodale would be
assured by this CMHA project, according to Taylor.

It took less than a month for the opponents of the housing project
to mobilize their forces. The Woodland-Woodward project became a
cause celebre for the next several months culminating in a bitter referendum fight on a rezoning action of city council during the summer of 1953.

An organization of property owners calling themselves the "St. Mary's of the Springs Addition Property Owners' Association," (SMPOA) the name derived from the proximity to St. Mary's of the Springs School for Girls. The group numbered about a thousand members and launched a petition campaign designed to express the opposition of residents of the area to the housing project. Eventually, over 800 people signed the petition which asked that the Columbus City Council not grant the CMHA request for a zoning change to allow construction of the project. 33

A coalition of groups in agreement with the petitioners' request soon emerged. The East Columbus Ministerial Association, the East-gate Association (representing a private Negro apartment development), and several area Parent-Teacher Associations comprised the major strength of the anti-public housing alliance. 34

Taylor, somewhat surprised by the intensity of the opposition to the housing project, made an effort to mollify the residents close to the project site, by arguing that the new development actually would raise, not lower property values. The project would comprise a recreation center available to anyone from the area and there would

34Ibid.
be a large addition to the park and playground space in the area because of the housing project. His attempt to defend the project was unproductive.

SMPOA representatives were present in force at a meeting of the Columbus Community Relations Council on December 9, 1952 to participate in a discussion of the housing needs of dislocated slum residents. During the course of the meeting spokesmen for the property owners' association repeated the familiar litany of falling property values, unsavory social influences, and eventual deterioration of the neighborhood which would be caused if CMHA's plan succeeded. At one point spectators, presumed to be from the SMPOA, engaged in a shouting match with council members. Despite the intense, emotional opposition directed toward them, the Human Relations Council vote to recommend that city council grant the CMHA zoning change request to clear the way for construction of the Woodland-Woodward housing project.  

The city council delayed action for a week. SMPOA filed suit during this time seeking to enjoin the council from approving the zoning change. Following up the suit the association sent a strongly worded to council members demanding they vote against the zoning change request.

In the meantime, Taylor and his CMHA staff were mounting their

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own campaign to counter the SMPOA efforts. Taylor's strategy was based on the very compelling proposition that the proposed $39 million expressway system for Columbus which was about to get underway hinged on the availability of standard housing for those now living within the future right-of-way for the system. The CMHA director reminded CBD leaders that their hopes for renewal of downtown were linked to the construction of the innerbelt expressway which would girdle the CBD providing easy access to it for outlying areas. Building upon this theme, Taylor, through one member of the CMHA board of directors, released a statement just before council was scheduled to take up the matter pointing out that without the public housing project federal support for the expressway project would certainly be delayed, perhaps even withdrawn. 36

On December 22, 1952, in a session marred by shouted threats of retribution from spectators against the law makers, the Columbus City Council voted, four to three, to grant the request of CMHA for a rezoning of the Woodland-Woodward area sought by the housing authority for the public housing project. 37 The passage of the rezoning request marked the end of the first stage of the Woodland-Woodward project fight. The second stage, by far the more acrimonious and

36Ohio State Journal, 12/22/52, p. 3.
37Ohio State Journal, 12/22/52, p. 5.
publicized, began with a bitter publicity campaign waged by the property owners' association against public housing in general and the Woodland-Woodward project in particular. Included in the struggle, by implication more than by actual participation, was CURA and the urban renewal program.

The SMPOA strategy was to appeal to the latent fears of white home owners that they "could be next" to suffer devaluation of property if the next housing project were built adjacent to middle income dwellings. Since CMHA planned that the new project be racially integrated undoubtedly the property values threat took on a special urgency in the minds of sympathetic home owners from other areas of the city.

Urban renewal and the public housing program were lumped together in the broadside attack of the SMPOA whose spokesmen contended that slums were not eliminated, only moved into

"respectable, pleasant areas.... Further the more housing projects the city of Columbus will accept from the federal government, the more of this class of people the city will have. We don't object to cleaning up 'Fly Town,' or even rebuilding it, but people who live there should remain to live in the renovated or rebuilt areas, or should be transferred to a now undeveloped area outside of town, if necessary, so that good neighborhoods will not be hurt." 38

SMPOA repeated this message many times in advertisements placed in the local press. By asserting that slum residents should remain in the area of their original residence, the sensitive issue of

relocation as a corollary to urban renewal was spotlighted. As CURA
director Lawrence Irvin and CMHA director Russell Taylor had
pointed out, for different purposes, to be sure, some kind of different
housing for slum residents would be a crucial need for both the slum
clearance and the expressway programs.

Throughout January 1953 the SMPOA continued to hammer away at
their basic point that relocation of slum dwellers was a threat to every
residential property owner in the city. Who knew when the "planners"
would next decide to build a public housing project in the middle of a
"decent neighborhood?" "We're fighting for our homes and community
and for yours, too. You can help by signing our referendum petition."39

By January 20th, in time for presentation at that evening's city
council meeting, the petition contained over 8,000 signatures, suffi­
cient to force the rezoning action of the previous month to a public vote.

Taylor's initial response was to announce plans for consultation
with federal public housing officials about the possibility of drastically
reducing the size of the Woodland-Woodward project in order to in­
crease the size of the buffer zone between the project and the surroun­
ding residential area. The Woodland-Woodward project was important
enough to CMHA to stimulate Taylor to do almost anything to assure its
success.40 As an alternative defense, Taylor said that, "We could get

40 Columbus Dispatch, 1/10/53, p. 15.
an injunction... to prohibit the city clerk from certifying the petition on the ground that the language of the petition should have concerned itself with the resolution passed by council a year ago rather than the rezoning measure." 41 This was the tactic Taylor decided to pursue. Conversations with the regional FHA office in Chicago made him realize that it would be impossible to undertake major changes in the site plan for the project within the sixty day period his agency had to get firm hold on a site.

Strategic considerations were also involved in Taylor's decision to fight the SMPOA head on. If they should win the fight over Woodland-Woodward, encouragement would be given to any similar group which might form in the future. CMHA would be sued or forced into a referendum every time it planned a new public housing project. In terms of CURA's interests, the chairman of the CMHA put it even more pointedly when he said, "If they (SMPOA) stop this project they'll stop every program that depends on federal funds." 42

Certainly, the energy and intensity of the SMPOA did not stem altogether from the citizen home owners who comprised the bulk of the membership. Behind the organization stood a combination of building and real estate interests which always had opposed public

41 Ohio State Journal, 1/20/53, p. 4.
42 Ohio State Journal, 1/20/53, p. 27.
housing in Columbus. It was through the efforts of this coalition that the SMPOA was created in the first place. It was the public relations skills and money of the builders and realtors which fueled the petition effort and eventually the referendum campaign in the summer of 1953.\textsuperscript{43}

To add to the housing agency's woes, the federal Public Housing Administration (PHA) announced that on January 31, 1953, it would withdraw the $13 million grant reservation earmarked for Columbus. About half of this sum was intended by CMHA for the Woodland-Woodward project and the other half for the abortive Goodale housing project. All money for CMHA projects would be transferred by PHA to other cities where contractors were waiting to build. The PHA officials pointed out to Taylor that the legal and political muddle in which the Woodland-Woodward project was bogged down and the conflict with the urban renewal agency over the Goodale public housing project made Columbus a poor example of how PHA funds were being used. Federal housing officials were fighting for the life of their program with Congress at this time and the Columbus situation only provided ammunition for Congressional detractors of public housing.\textsuperscript{44}

Undaunted, Taylor announced his intention to press ahead with his open fight with the SMPOA and its friends in the summer referendum after failing to get the referendum petition nullified by a court order.

\textsuperscript{43} Personal interviews with two prominent realtors who must remain anonymous, 7/14/66.

\textsuperscript{44} Ohio State Journal, 1/23/53, p.13.
He wanted the referendum, he said, to have an opportunity to educate the public to the value of public housing for so many vital community improvements. In any case, if the withdrawn funds were to be replaced in the future, the CMHA would have to demonstrate to the federal officials that Columbus wanted public housing. PHA officials assured Taylor that if the Columbus program survived its present travails CMHA would go back on the list to receive the $13 million it had originally been authorized. 45

The forthcoming referendum, and its implications for the future of the urban redevelopment program in Columbus, posed difficult dilemmas for the press. It was not that its position would affect the outcome of the vote; a generation of strident conservatism flowing from the editorial and news columns of the Dispatch, in particular, had so conditioned its metropolitan readership that public reaction to so obvious a negative stimulus as public housing was beyond control. Trying to make a fine distinction between the "socialized public housing" identified with the hated welfare state and the public housing serving the practical needs of downtown economic interests would be difficult. In any case, the issue of race so dominated the question that it is doubtful, even if the distinction between "good" and "bad" public housing could have been made that it would have been sufficient to quiet the growing fears produced by the notion of racially integrated housing. 46

45 Columbus Dispatch, 1/23/53, p. 4.
46 Personal interview with Russell Taylor, CMHA director, 8/15/66.
Still, the issue was too big not to take a position on the referendum question. The morning Ohio State Journal expressed general approval of the existing public housing program in Columbus. But its editorial position on the referendum itself was ambivalent. The identification of slum clearance with public housing, however, was clear.

Perhaps between now and July 1 Columbus can select sites for public housing that will not be subject to last minute attacks by property owners. The need for such a slum clearance program (my italics) as public housing would provide is great and should be diligently pursued for the good of the whole community.47

The Dispatch position was never made explicit but the prominence it gave to the announcement by the Associated Builders of Columbus (ABC) that it planned to construct 5,000 new living units housing up to 20,000 displaced by slum and expressway clearance. The headline over the article, "City Gets 5,000 Living Units," and the tenor of the article following made it appear that ample private housing for the poor virtually was assured. 48 The Columbus Citizen, a Scripps-Howard chain newspaper, which followed a somewhat more moderate conservatism, only took a poll of St. Mary's of the Springs area residents, which served to forecast the gathering avalanche of opposition votes to the housing project and probably increased the opposition by dramatizing the attitudes of the residents.


48 Columbus Dispatch, 1/25/63, p. 5.
Throughout the winter and spring of 1953 a steady flow of letters-to-the-editor and advertisements denouncing public housing and slum clearance was directed to the public through the press. "Race-mixing" and "socialistic threats to property" were the most popular epithets used in the letters and advertisements although many others of a similar genre were employe. The local press is replete with examples during this period.\(^{49}\)

It was at the height of the Woodland-Woodward controversy in the spring of 1953 that Russell Taylor announced his afore-mentioned plan to build a housing project somewhere in the Market-Mohawk clearance area. It could not have come at a less opportune time, in terms of CMHA's goals. To expect public officials to endorse such an idea at the very time that an acrimonious, emotion-charged referendum fight on another project was in progress taxed the credulity of even the most fervent supporters of public housing in Columbus. The interim mayor, Robert T. Oestfeicher, who had succeeded to Mayor Rhodes position upon the latter's accession to state office on January 1, had voted for the Woodland-Woodward rezoning measure as a councilman, but declined to support Taylor on the Market-Mohawk proposal. Said the

\(^{49}\)Columbus Dispatch, 1/25/53, p. 3. Also, see Business Week, 6/26/54 for a short summary of the events in the referendum campaign and for a description of the formation of the Associated Builders of Columbus (ABC) for the purpose of building private, low cost dwelling units for Negroes to be displaced from slum clearance areas.
new mayor, "Two questions must be answered before council and I take a stand: Will Congress appropriate the necessary funds for the projects? Will the voters approve public housing in the August primary... I want to find out if the public wants public housing, particularly in the Woodland-Woodward project." 50

Predictably, the public housing referendum, scheduled as part of the August primary election, thrust itself into the competition for election between the candidates.

Robert T. Oestreicher, former Columbus city council president, had become mayor automatically upon the resignation of James A. Rhodes on January 1, 1953. Rhodes had been elected to his first state office the previous November and assumed his duties at the start of the new year. Oestreicher would serve an interim term until the next general election at which time someone would be chosen to serve the remainder of the four year term to which Rhodes had been elected in November 1951. In addition to the Republican incumbent, Oestreicher, there were two "independent Republican" candidates for a place on the nonpartisan ballot in the fall election for Mayor, Paul Jones and Ronald Devore. Only two democrats entered the primary, an insurgent Democrat named Henry E. Worley, and the party-endorsed candidate, Maynard E. Sensenbrenner, a newcomer to Columbus politics. 51

50 Columbus Dispatch, 1/31/53, p. 24.

In the nonpartisan race for mayor, the leading two vote getters in the primary election, regardless of party affiliation, would compete for the office in the general election in November.

Only one candidate running in the primary, Henry E. Worley, affirmed his unequivocal support for the Woodland-Woodward project. The endorsed Democrat, M. E. Sensenbrenner declared that, while he supported public housing, he felt that "it should be placed where it does not devaluate (sic) the adjoining property." Mayor Oestreicher, already vulnerable because of his vote in favor of the rezoning measure while a council member, made no comment on the issue even when pressed by reporters to do so. He would only repeat his opinion that the voters should decide the issue. Both of the independent Republican aspirants openly opposed the project and appealed for the support of the SMPOA and local builders and realtors.

The only group activity in behalf of the controversial housing project came from an ad hoc organization known as the Citizens Committee for Development of a Better Columbus. Its campaign in support of the GMHA project consisted of a low key appeal to largely professional and civic groups who could be expected to adhere to the values of planning

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54 *Ohio State Journal*, 7/1/53, p. 11.
and economic development. Publicity, as such, was not sought in the belief that it would stir still further grass roots and realtor-builder counteraction. 55

Opposition group activity continued to increase into the summer of 1953 as an umbrella organization known as the Taxpayers Defense Committee undertook to bring some seventy civic groups, clubs, and business and trade associations into the battle for "property rights." 56

The climax of the anti-public housing effort took place at a reported "mass meeting" of the SMPOA and allied groups at which the SMPOA director, James Albers, summarized the position of the property owners and their friends. This was the first stand in Columbus against public housing, said Albers. His address to the crowd gathered in a rented hall was laced with the expected condemnations of "socialized housing, tax-wasting schemes," and "intrusions on local rights." Added to these was the more compelling assertion that the "race-mixing" housing project would lower property values in its vicinity. In his peroration, Albers tried to disassociate the public housing project from the urban renewal and expressway plans of the city. He argued that there was sufficient private housing in Columbus to absorb the displaced families from the slum clearance areas and the right-of-way areas needed for

56 Columbus Dispatch, 7/5/53, p. 27.
the expressways. 57

With a proper sense of timing, the week before the scheduled primary and referendum, the Associated Builders of Columbus, the group formed to construct low cost private housing, announced with great fanfare that beginning September 1 the ABC would start construction of 1,000 units of "low cost, high quality" housing for victims of slum and expressway clearance activities. Fifty-dollar-a-month rentals would bring the units within the income range of most people now living in Goodale, according to the ABC. The Dispatch gave the ABC plan great prominence, running the announcement as part of a long feature article. 58

At the same time that local builders and realtors had reached the zenith of their anti-public housing exertions, the Ohio Association of Real Estate Boards (OAREB) contributed by backing a bill in the Ohio General Assembly which would require that all public housing sites approved by local legislative bodies be ratified by a referendum vote. The OAREB representatives in the state legislature pointed to the "tendency of public housing authorities to use vacant land in suburban areas. . . . Many of these areas are more suitable for private housing construction." 59

58 Columbus Dispatch, 8/5/53, p. 1.
59 Ibid., p. 11.
The results of the referendum on the Woodland-Woodward site for a public housing project showed a better than two-to-one defeat for the project. The Dispatch took great satisfaction in the outcome. It interpreted the vote as "a sign of the times, in which the public has become suspicious of the 'benefits' to be gained from the federal government for which the taxpayers must pay in increased taxes and of subsidies which . . . distort free market values."  

CURA had taken no public position on the housing referendum fight. The putative contestants were the CMHA and a very small core of builders and housing professionals on one side and the real estate-builder groups, supported by grassroots property owners groups, on the other. The reasons for Lawrence Irvin and the CURA leadership staying out of the contest are self-evident. Plainly, public housing was in disrepute in the community and was going to suffer a major setback at the hands of the voters. The desire to maintain as much distance as possible between the two agencies under these circumstances was logical. Irvin's agency still was organizationally very weak and, in terms of public understanding and support, CURA's status was unknown.

In a very real sense, however, it is probable that urban renewal was "on trial" as much as public housing. There is no way, in retros-

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60 Official Record of the August 1953 Primary Election, Franklin County Board of Elections, Columbus, Ohio

61 Columbus Dispatch, 8/12/53, p. 16.
pect, to test this proposition. The motivations of voters, conscious or unconscious, cannot be reconstructed after so much time has passed. Yet, it seems valid to argue that the stimulation of voter sentiment against federal programs by use of all the familiar scare words used so often in the Columbus news media would produce a transferral of the anti-federal attitudes to any program originating from Washington. Given the well-established political culture of central Ohio a call to resist federal "encroachment" is likely to effect opposition to all signs of such encroachment. Fine distinctions between "good" and "bad" federal subsidies and programs are difficult to make in the atmosphere created by the Woodland-Woodward project battle.

In addition to the spill-over of hostile attitudes to the urban renewal program there was a kind of gravitational attraction of such attitudes toward the renewal program caused by the lack of a clear, specific definition of goals and the relationship of means to goals by CURA. The definitional vacuum tended to be filled by the discordant struggle for public housing and once loosed, the genie in this bottle would be difficult to recapture.

The link forged between public housing and urban renewal in the mind of the public by the Woodland-Woodward affair was not entirely a case of mistaken identity. One major effect of both urban renewal and additional public housing was the resettlement of large numbers of lower socio-economic families, most of whom were from minority racial groups. The ends sought by CMHA and CURA, of course, diverged once
the bulldozers had leveled the designated slum target. But the goal of
economic development in the CBD pursued by CURA did not seem im-
portant or compensatory to the lower middle class home owner who saw
his status and his newly acquired property values threatened by the
imminent presence of people he deemed unfit to be his neighbors. More
and more, as CURA developed its program and attempted to win public
acceptance it would feel grass roots opposition to urban renewal based
on fears of the movement of the city's poor, especially its Negro poor,
out of the slums closer to buffer zone areas between the affluent sub-
urbs and the central city.

A final obstacle in the way of public understanding of urban renewal
policy goals, and the distinction between it and public housing, was the
fluid, leaderless, character of government at this time.

James A. Rhodes had enjoyed a long and politically successful
tenure as Columbus mayor. He ran unopposed in his final race for office
in Columbus in 1951. Ambitious for higher office, Rhodes won the
Republican nomination for state auditor in the 1952 spring primary and
went on to score a victory over the incumbent in the general election.
Rhodes relinquished the mayor's office to the president of the Columbus
City Council, Robert T. Oestreicher, as provided for by the city charter,
as of January 1, 1953.

Oestreicher was not a vigorous political executive. Accustomed to
the more cautious ways of the council, and feeling that his best chance
of getting his party's endorsement for mayor and winning the fall election lay in staying clear of touchy issues likely to stir opposition for him, the interim mayor was content to play a caretaker role until he was safely elected in his own right.

The upset election victory of a rank newcomer to local politics, Democrat Maynard E. Sensenbrenner, threw the political situation into uncertainty and sapped city hall of its leadership potential. Sensenbrenner was elected to serve the remaining two years of Rhodes' term. He would face a Republican-controlled city council during that time and, given the traditional strength of the Franklin County Republican organization, it was likely that at the end of two years Sensenbrenner would be replaced by someone bearing the GOP standard.

At the very time that the renewal program needed a strong helping hand from the city administration and support in council political leadership in Columbus was in a period of flux and uncertainty, unable or unwilling to assume new responsibilities or move in new directions. It is speculative, of course, but it does not seem unreasonable to say that if the city's chief executive had exerted stronger leadership beginning with Russell Taylor's attempts to carve out a role for his CMHA in Goodale and Market-Mohawk and perhaps the Woodland-Woodward conflict too, the whole imbroglio might have been avoided or at least "managed" so as to mitigate the damage done to both the public housing program and urban renewal in Columbus.
As it was, however, leadership of a destructive, negative sort was given a free rein. The prejudices, fears, and misconceptions of those who feared urban renewal and public housing were unopposed by government officials charged with the administration of the programs except for Russell Taylor, and even by those whose vital economic interests were threatened as a result of the series of events described.

The open forum was the very kind of battleground urban renewal as well as public housing officials would have to avoid in the future if at all possible. No matter how effective the official and private community leadership was, public opinion would be unlikely to grasp the indirect, long range benefits of renewal nor was it likely the "grass roots" would be dissuaded of the belief that urban renewal was a special interest program whose financial costs, and the costs implied by relocation, would be borne primarily by those not receiving the greatest benefits of the program.
CHAPTER 4

PRELUDE TO THE FIRST BOND ISSUE CAMPAIGN

Until the passage of the 1949 Housing Act very few federal programs were subject to a greater variety of imputed meanings than the federal urban renewal program. The previous chapter described the initial difficulties faced by the Columbus urban renewal agency in divorcing itself from an unpopular public housing program, whose formal goals appeared to be at least similar, if not identical, to those of urban redevelopment.

In a very basic sense, of course, urban renewal had goals which were contradictory to the traditional goals of public housing. But, such a superficial resemblance as the Housing Act's provision that redevelopment could take the form of public housing, subject to the approval of all parties directly involved lent substance to the image of urban renewal. The Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority made every attempt to structure at least part of the Columbus renewal program in this way. If the housing authority officials had succeeded in getting a foothold in either Market-Mohawk or Goodale, in all probability private redevelopment, which was preferred from the start by CURA officials would have been impossible.

The identity was rooted in the nature of the urban renewal law itself, which provided opportunity for many interpretations and defini-

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tions. CMHA had justification to think that slum clearance, in some measure, should involve public housing. History was on its side. So, too, did the CURA officials have justification to take issue with the housing people, in terms of the 1949 Housing Act, Title 1 provisions. The legislation invited, indeed, required a conflict of views in order that translation of general goals into policy could begin.

Another conceptual problem was that in the early phases of the urban renewal program's evolution there were many who conceived of urban renewal as a way of "fixing up the slums:" This notion grew from the root idea that urban renewal meant improvements in housing for those who lived in the slums. One who understood the intentions of the urban renewal law's framers was political scientist, Norton Long, then teaching at Cleveland's Western Reserve University and acting as chairman of a special citizen's committee investigating the slow pace of Cleveland's urban renewal program. Many of the findings of the Long committee were pertinent to Columbus at the formative stage of its renewal program.

Long's major point was that nobody in Cleveland really knew what urban renewal was all about. There was still confusion among official and private leaders about the goals of the program. Many still were equating urban renewal with the provision of better housing for residents of the central city. However proper this goal, or however needed, Long said that a clear distinction must be made between urban redevelop-
ment as envisioned by the 1949 Housing Act, Title I, and the traditional housing concerns of the people in Cleveland now trying to launch an urban renewal program. Housing, said Long, is really a small part of urban redevelopment. "The important reason for urban redevelopment is the declining tax duplicate--the deterioration of the central city." ¹

As a prescription for the difficulties of the Cleveland program, Long argued that first priority should be given to the preparation of long range economic studies to determine business trends and patterns in the CBD. Urban renewal officials needed reliable, comprehensive data on the economic life of the CBD before any kind of redevelopment could begin. Long stated that to start an urban renewal project on the basis of an area being a slum, having a large stock of deteriorated housing, is to operate on the basis of a fundamental error of definition.

Contrasting his own diagnosis of Cleveland's failure to make progress on urban renewal with the notions and goals of the program's administrators, Long pointedly noted that the planning director for the city was a landscape architect, and the director of the urban renewal program "has the idea that everything will be all right if he can persuade a few people to paint their porches." ² The report also asserted that rehabilitation was a delusion to which various associations of home

¹ Cleveland Press, 6/20/53, p. 22.
² Ibid.
builders, and real estate people seemed particularly susceptible. Their desire to keep government out of the housing field led them to emphasize the restoration of the existing housing supply. 3

The "clean-up-the-slums" delusion affected the thinking of two segments of the central business district leadership during the initial stages of urban renewal in Columbus. Real estate and building groups as well as the local press beat the drums for slum clean-up and for rehabilitation of housing for the first two years of CURA's existence. Actually, many real estate and building industry leaders never entirely abandoned the clean-up approach due in large measure to the way Congress in 1954 legitimized and provided funds for rehabilitation as an alternative to clearance.

The costs in time, energy, and skills, invested in the slum clean-up effort were shouldered by renewal officials and by private groups. Time which could have been better spent in long range planning and data gathering was consumed in largely futile efforts directed toward irrelevant, always superficial, even contradictory rehabilitation actions. Even greater political costs were incurred by CURA and by other city agencies which had functions related to the renewal program. Inter-agency squabbling over who would lead the slum clean-up campaign cropped up at frequent intervals, attracting unwelcomed notoriety.

3Ibid.
Such attention invariably aroused opposition to CURA among the organized business groups affected by clearance or threatened by "crack-downs" on "slumlords." Further, the acrimonious charges of "playing politics" which often were leveled at the officials involved in clean-up efforts by businessmen and by neighborhood groups only served to make the policy making environment for CURA more, not less, threatening. The "grass roots" public could only be further confused about CURA and its goals by the sensational but nearly always ineffectual slum "crack-downs." 4

The rehabilitation of the slums was a futile goal. Decades of neglect, weak or non-existent building codes, hit-and-miss programs of inspection and the legal complexity of enforcement procedures created nearly insoluble problems for everyone concerned. For officials, charged with the legal responsibility of "doing something," there was never enough money, inspectors, and time for the gigantic tasks of suddenly applying new-found standards to evaluate housing which for the most part could not possibly be made to meet most of the standards without major and expensive overhauling. When housing inspectors scratched the bare surface of housing conditions in the slums of Columbus, they simply identified problems which were beyond "correction" in the real meaning of that term. In so doing, the officials only made more

4 Personal interview with an official of the Division of Building Inspections who wished to remain anonymous, 7/21/66.
obvious the insoluble nature of the problem they sought to ameliorate.

The pro forma face lifting which occurred in some cases was of dubious value.

Building owners were asked to do what was usually impossible or of temporary value. Their, or their predecessors, neglect of property or the great age of it made really significant changes in the conditions of their tenant's housing impossible without the kind of major rehabilitation which would have forced up rents and made living in the buildings too costly for their tenants.

But it was the people who lived in the "sub-standard" housing who often suffered most from inept attempts at "fixing up" the slums and the sensational press campaign against slum housing.

If a landlord did perform major repairs on his property the expected result would be an increase in the rents. To groups on the bare margins of subsistence slum housing was what they could afford; with few exceptions only housing of this type, or possibly public housing met their limited economic capacities. For low income Negroes whose housing opportunities were severely limited by racial discrimination as well as the lack of money, the enforcement of housing standards in the really hard core slums had an especially unfair effect. Again, if major renovation was effected, a very unlikely prospect given the cost of time and money required, the housing would become too expensive for them.

The minor repairs usually were insufficient to change the basic charac-
ter of the housing and, in any case, experience showed that such repair orders hurt the tenant more than the owner. 5

There is no way, of course, to measure the effects of hopes raised and dashed by the "clean-up the slums" activities. The idea that slum residents' lives, through their housing, would be improved because of the rehabilitation efforts of government proved to be a cruel hoax. Suffice it to say that the credibility of governmental slum removal efforts was not strengthened by the abortive clean-up efforts.

Even the program goals of the agency charged with slum removal, CURA, were impeded by the slum clean-up campaign. There was no precise knowledge of where slum clearance project boundaries would be located at this early stage of redevelopment, and even later, changes would be made to satisfy the needs of federal and private actors. If the project boundary lines are fixed, however, temporarily, property owners within the project area will resist attempts to get them to fix up their property on the understandable basis that they may not get their money back when the urban renewal authority acquires their land and buildings. Haggling, futile negotiations, and future opposition to renewal is the likely result if property owners are pushed to repair their holdings when government acquisition of such property is in the offing. If, on the other hand, owners comply with code standards the property will be more costly for the renewal agency to acquire.

5 Ibid.
In any case, repairs of any significance on properties scheduled for the bulldozer are illogical from any standpoint.

There is one final incongruity in the simultaneous presence of a slum clearance-redevelopment program and a rehabilitate-the-slums effort. As soon as it is known that an area is likely to become a clearance area one effect is that owners, and tents as well, are discouraged from performing even routine maintenance on their property. Why bother when at some undetermined, but inevitable time, demolition of the area will take place. The time between the announcement of a clearance area and the start of demolition is usually many months, often several years. During that time it must be assumed that the rate of deterioration in the area will increase, thus strengthening forces of decline. The dominant effect on the people of the designated project area is the sense of imminent loss of home and familiar surroundings and, as the residents of the project area begin the gradual emigration out of the neighborhood they are usually replaced by other people in similar economic straits, since the demand for low cost housing is high, who lack the sense of permanence their predecessors had. Certainly, the physical condition of the neighborhood cannot be improved, probably not even held constant, during this transitional stage before actual clearance begins. And, of course, the period between announcement of a project and the start of clearance may extend to several years in fact, as it did in Columbus. Genuine rehabilitation under these
circumstances is improbable. 6

Slum clean-up efforts in Columbus caused uncertainty and raised false hopes among small businessmen in Goodale, especially. Many of them raised such questions as: "Can my business be spared if I perform repairs sufficient to meet code requirements?" The answer to this question was never clearly made.

Throughout 1952, the first year of real activity for CURA, the local press featured a series of sensational exposes replete with photographs of dark, decaying buildings littered with refuse, and children playing in rubble-strewn "yards." When fires occurred, stark pictures of families made homeless by tenement fires were featured. The recurring, very explicit message of the articles and stories was that stricter enforcement of building and housing codes and standards of safety and sanitation, could eliminate the causes responsible for the deplorable conditions depicted.

In the spring of the year the Columbus Citizen published a long editorial entitled, "Columbus Slums Must Be Cleaned Up," calling for clean-up efforts, even though the editorial emphasized clearance and redevelopment as the best long term remedy for slums. The lack of explanation of the apparent, to a great extent, real, contradictions in calling for rehabilitation and clearance simultaneously certainly im-

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6 Nearly every critic of urban renewal notes the accelerated pace of decline in areas earmarked for renewal.
pered public understanding of urban renewal.  

The strong editorial support for clean-up coincided with the appointment of a special prosecutor in the city attorney's office for the fire, health, and building inspection departments by Mayor Rhodes in March of 1952. John R. Schickler promised a full-fledged "crack down" on slum building owners. Businessmen of the community endorsed code enforcement especially those from the housing and building industry, because slum clean-up offered an attractive alternative to a federal public housing expansion in Columbus, an issue of much concern at this time, and for ideological reasons connected with the general hostility in the community toward "big government." But, slum clean-up was attractive to "liberals" as well as "conservatives."

Those who accepted the traditional assumptions of the public housing movement, that bad housing "caused" social pathologies, could back the code enforcement campaign. Inspections were diagnoses of a community ill, leading to the necessary curative actions to bring property "up to code." Those who failed to comply might face penalties or a building closing order or even be required to tear down their building in severe cases. The prospect of helpless victims of slums being thus liberated from their misery was an attractive one to many liberals.

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7 Kaplan's Newark study contains a very useful discussion of the political implications of slum "crack-downs." Also, see the comments of Norton Long, supra, p. 2 of this chapter.
Politically, slum clean up was an effective method of creating good will from virtually all segments of the community, except the owners of the slums buildings, who were neither organized, numerous, nor in good standing in the community. They made a perfectly safe target for anybody who wished to win approval by attacking them.

By late spring, Schickler reported that seventy-six dwellings harboring "serious violations" had been inspected for which repairs had been ordered. Thirty-one owners had "taken steps to begin repairs," he noted. He also assured the public that he would "keep on them" and that all substandard buildings would be brought up to code or he would "close them down."

As the war against "slumlords" gained momentum, various public and private groups took the opportunity to seek advantage from the activities of Schickler and his crew of inspectors. The Columbus Home Builder's Association was the most supportive of the effort being made and issued frequent press statements urging that a broad program of rehabilitation of all slum housing be developed from this initial inspection period. In the long run, said the CHBA spokesman, rehabilitation "was the soundest approach" to the problem of bad housing in Columbus.

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8 *Columbus Citizen*, 5/28/52, p. 11.

9 *Columbus Dispatch*, 6/12/52, p. 43.

In the meantime, John Schickler was becoming something of a popular hero as a result of his highly publicized war on the "slum-lords." The aura of "racket-busting district attorney" surrounded him. He was described as "fearless," "dedicated," and "persistent" by the editorial writers. Some of the administration leaders in City Hall saw Schickler's rising popularity as a threat to their political standing. On June 30, 1952 his superior, City Attorney Richard W. Gordon suddenly relieved Schickler of his assignment with the inspection program as a special prosecutor and gave him a minor assignment on a dam project.\(^1\) The shift in responsibilities seemed to have been inspired by Gordon's fear of his assistant's growing popularity. Only the day before Schickler's transfer, the Mayor, Rhodes, had publicly commended him for the job he was doing and added that Schickler had the "wholehearted approval of the administration."\(^2\) Also, to make the move seem even more suspicious, City Attorney Gordon refused comment on the action beyond the statement that "it was only a routine matter. . . made in the interests of efficiency."\(^3\)

Mayor Rhodes refused to be drawn into the controversy and issued a statement which expressed the hope that the work done by Schickler would be continued.\(^4\)

\(^1\)Columbus Citizen, 7/1/52.
\(^2\)Columbus Citizen, 7/1/52, p. 3.
\(^3\)Columbus Dispatch, 7/2/52, p. 2.
\(^4\)Ibid.
But Don Weaver, editor of the Citizen, interpreted the action of the City Attorney as an obvious attempt by Gordon to take the spotlight away from his assistant. Said Weaver in a front page editorial, "He Gordon delivered a body blow... to the slum clean-up program." Gordon's action was motivated by spite growing out of the obvious difference between the vigor and devotion to duty of Schickler and the ineffectual leadership of the city's legal department. The editor concluded his scathing criticism of Gordon by calling for his resignation and demanding the reinstatement of Schickler.15

Other members of the administration and members of city council refused to become involved in the dispute, although some members of council speculated privately that Schickler's ouster represented an attempt by Gordon to eliminate a rival for the Republican endorsement for city attorney. Gordon's mediocre performance in the job, according to one former member of council, was enough to justify his being dumped in favor of his popular assistant.16 Schickler, the center of the controversy, refused extensive comment, but averred darkly to "powerful interests" which were opposed to him and that "some people" were jealous of the praise he was winning.17

15Columbus Citizen, 7/2/52, p. 1.

16Personal interview, 9/1/64, former member of Columbus city council who wished to remain anonymous. Also, Columbus Citizen, 7/8/52.

17Columbus Citizen, 7/1/52, p. 3.
On July 9th, the city attorney announced his replacement for Schickler. Gordon selected a future member of the council, Dewey Garner, who occupied the post of assistant safety director at that time, to take over the slum clean-up job.\(^\text{18}\)

As the public quarreling among city officials ensued, members of city council seemed embarrassed that such pettiness should hinder the progress of this popular program. On July 9th, city council passed a resolution of support for the slum cleanup program, citing its usefulness as a slum elimination tool and requesting administration members in charge to stop "bickering" among themselves.\(^\text{19}\)

With the competition for political credit temporarily abated, the campaign to enforce the housing, fire, and health regulations began again in earnest. The Citizen provided chief newspaper support—exhorting, prodding, encouraging inspectors to persevere. E. L. McCoy, political writer for the newspaper, was the most energetic gadfly of the administration, pushing it always to speed up the inspections, condemnations, and building closings.\(^\text{20}\)

Building a Case for Urban Renewal

The 1952-53 period was a disorderly period of formative activity,
marked by distracting forays into a slum clean-up program by officials not part of CURA, competition between CURA and CMHA for overall leadership of renewal efforts, and a bitter fight between the CMHA and an anti-public housing group in which the urban renewal program as well as public housing suffered serious losses in prestige among the public.

The only means by which CURA might recoup some of its losses and separate itself from the harmful effects of public housing fights and peripheral code enforcement crackdowns was to move with as much speed as possible to construct a "package" which would be attractive to the public and to city officials. Goodale represented the "package" CURA tried to put together and draw attention to. No one disputed the commercial potential of the area. CURA director, Lawrence Irvin, claimed that the value of the area would increase four times over its present level, to an estimated $5.3 million, after redevelopment. The tax revenues alone on this new property would repay the eventual bond issue of $1.3 million with interest in about sixteen years, following the completion of redevelopment. Irvin, of course, did not take account of lost revenues from Goodale during the interim between completion of clearance and conclusion of rebuilding in Goodale. To be fair, no one could have known at this point how long the hiatus between clearance and completed redevelopment would last, although it is doubtful if anyone suspected it would be as long as it eventually turned
out to be. Urban renewal still was too new in the country for Irvin, or officials anywhere, to anticipate the long completion time for clearance projects. 21

The condition survey of Goodale which CURA had begun early in 1952 was completed in March of the following year, and Irvin announced some tentative goals. The existing 474 dilapidated buildings would be replaced by 161 modern, middle income, apartment houses providing quarters for about 1600 families. Eventually, many changes would be made in redevelopment plans for Goodale in response to federal requirements and as the needs of redevelopers, of which there were none in prospect at this juncture, were taken into account. The basic goals of a middle income residential complex and compatible commercial development, however, never were altered.

CURA attempted to provide an alternative to public attention, attracted by the acrimonious Woodland-Woodward housing referendum fight at this time, the first tentative opposition to CURA's goals manifested itself in Goodale. 22

An organization of small businessmen, the Near Northside Businessmen's Association, expressed concern over the fate of its members in the area who might be displaced by the bulldozer. At a meeting of the

21 Personal interview with CURA Project Director William Colwell for Goodale, 8/4/66.

22 Columbus Citizen, 3/20/53, p. 7.
Association the comments of the participants were not so critical or
hostile as they were fearful. These small, marginal businessmen,
employing anywhere from one or two to a maximum of thirty-five
employees, most of whom lived in the project area, survived only
because of the low rent, outmoded quarters and the generally marginal
conditions of life in the area. They and their businesses were reflec-
tive of the milieu in which they functioned. Any additional cost of
doing business, a forced move to other quarters where rent might be
higher, would probably be sufficient to force them out of business.
Both their market and labor supply were found in the Goodale area, as
it then was. Dispersing the people of the area, breaking up the neigh-
borhood, scattering their work force, meant the end of their often very
old, barely solvent stores, shops, and industries. For those who
worked for them the loss of jobs might be a greater hardship than job
loss usually is since the low skill levels of the worker made it difficult
for them to obtain new employment. 23

Since the "clean-up-the-slums'campaign still was in progress many
small businessmen in Goodale assumed that "fixing up" their property
was an alternative to clearance and redevelopment. One man said,
"Word is going around that if we clean up our property we can stay. We
can't get reliable advice about what to do about expanding or remodeling." 24

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23 Personal interview with L. B. LaCour, former director of
Columbus Relocation Office.

The most difficult question the Goodale businessmen raised, however, concerned the apparent injustice in taking non-blighted property of small businessmen, along with the sub-standard property, and turning it over to other businessmen to redevelop for more "compatible" purposes. From the standpoint of the CURA planners the incongruity of leaving a shabby shop in the midst of bright, new redevelopment might seem self-evident. But professional planning standards and values seemed understandably unfair in their application to unorganized, economically powerless businessmen facing the loss of life-long holdings.\textsuperscript{25} The weak, unorganized opposition to CURA, however, never matured and went largely unnoticed by anyone outside of Goodale.

In addition to the advance publication of tentative plans for the future of Goodale, CURA director Irvin decided to sponsor an event which might revive the flagging spirits of his staff, disheartened by the blood-letting over Woodland-Woodward and the competition for leadership of urban renewal.

In 1953 one of the most spectacular national slum renovation successes was unfolding in Pittsburgh--in the once smoke and soot-choked area now called the "Golden Triangle." The motivating forces behind the renaissance of downtown Pittsburgh were the money, leadership, and organizational skills of the Mellon family and the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.
CURA and the director of Citizen's Research, Inc., a private, business-sponsored, research agency in Columbus, felt that a conference of local urban renewal officials and the civic leaders from the Pennsylvania city would help to brighten the somewhat tarnished image of the Columbus program. Positive, even spectacular, examples of what urban redevelopment could do for a city would be paraded before the community leadership. There would be a "trickle-down" effect felt at the grass roots, Irvin hoped, perhaps making the voters more receptive to the bond issue being planned at this time.

Also, Irvin hoped that a visit by business leaders who had been in the fore-front of renewal activity in Pittsburgh might encourage their Columbus counterparts to take a more active role in their community. Up to this point the interest of Columbus business leaders had been very weak, and their participation in the real work of the program virtually non-existent. Only the president of The Union Clothing store, Robert Levy, long a supporter of downtown improvements, and Trent Sickles, the Lazarus Family's community gadfly, had played significant supporting roles for the renewal program. 26

The Columbus newspapers provided extensive coverage to the series of meetings which were held in May 1953. Nothing substantive emerged from them, but if publicity value was the chief objective, it must be said that the press provided all of the exposure and "buildup"

26 Personal interview with Klein L. Roberts, Columbus area Chamber of Commerce president, 7/8/64.
that could have been desired.\textsuperscript{27} Despite the attempt by Columbus
officials and business leaders to hold up Pittsburgh as a model for
their community to emulate there were too many important differences
between the two programs for one to be the standard for the other. In
Pittsburgh, a plan for redevelopment and a redeveloper led the way in
the Golden Triangle renewal effort. A developer was not in sight for
Goodale, nor was a definite plan in existence. Also, Pittsburgh was a
private business-led, planned, financed, and redeveloped project from
the very beginning. Another important difference between the two cities
was the stress placed on new public housing as a concomitant to renewal
in Pittsburgh. At the very time that Columbus leaders were supposedly
learning something from the Pittsburgh experience the very survival
of public housing in Columbus was in serious jeopardy as the Woodland-
Woodward project draw the fire of organized foes of the CMHA.

The visit of the Pittsburgh visitors may have drawn attention from
the unfortunate events occurring in the community at the time but as the
former vice chairman of CURA, W. Ray Speer said, "We were spending
too much time admiring other cities' programs instead of trying to
understand some of our own problems."\textsuperscript{28} One obstacle to greater
understanding of redevelopment problems and possibilities in Columbus

\textsuperscript{27} See the three Columbus newspapers for the period 5/6 - 5/9/59.

\textsuperscript{28} Personal interview, W. Ray Speer, former vice chairman of
CURA, 9/14/66.
was the undermanned Columbus Planning Commission (CPC). From the very beginning of CURA's existence one of its major needs was a city planning agency capable of carrying out studies and making recommendations for a master plan to guide redevelopment. Like most American cities, planning enjoyed a very modest status among the various functions of government in Columbus. The development of any planning at all in Columbus had taken nearly half a century to reach its unimposing position in the early 1950's.

As early as 1909, a purely unofficial group of civic leaders established a private "planning" committee whose functions were largely promotional and speculative. The group issued periodic "reports" describing the progressiveness of Columbus and optimistically forecasting the even greater achievements which lay ahead. In no sense was this organization planning anything. In 1920, the city planning commission was established with official status. But, again, the agency seemed more concerned with celebrating the present than preparing for the future. In 1932 it fell victim to depression-borne cutbacks in the city budget and was disbanded.

Anticipating postwar problems of community growth and, for the first time, evincing serious interest in long term development, the Columbus city council in 1944 created a city planning commission charged specifically with drafting a "thoroughfare plan" for the city. But it was not until 1949 that council authorized a small paid staff of pro-
professionals. A very small appropriation of $4,500 was granted that first year; it was increased substantially to $30,000 in 1950 but half of this amount went to the Franklin County Regional Planning Commission. Very clearly, the passage of the 1949 Housing Act precipitated major increases in local planning budgets all over the country, and Columbus was no exception. By the start of 1954 the Columbus Planning Commission (CPC) was spending $98,300, of which $32,500 went to the regional planning commission for work at the county level.  

Despite substantial relative increases in budget, however, the planning arm of city government in Columbus remained weak. Staff aid for the lay commission was minimal and even gathering basic statistical data taxed their capacity. In June 1953, the city council enacted legislation authorizing the staff director of the CPC, Ernest Stork, to hire an assistant director, an administrative assistant and four other technical people to give his agency the minimum personnel required for undertaking the task of drafting a master plan for the city.

Thus, at a point when CURA was in need of the planning assistance that federal law required the CPC was still struggling to create the bare semblance of a planning agency. Throughout the evolution of the urban renewal program in Columbus the Planning Commission was plagued by personnel shortages, and disenchantment among the citizen members of

29Columbus Citizen, 10/5/53, p. 6.
the Commission itself. Resignations amid expressions of "disgust," as one member put it, were far from unusual. Professor Eugene Van-Clef of The Ohio State University geography department, serving on the CPC, resigned in August of 1953, blasting the CPC for "the red tape and tendency to make decisions in response to political pressures." 30

The Failure of the 1954 Bond Issue for Urban Redevelopment

By 1954, the urban renewal effort in Columbus had reached the stage at which local sources of money needed to be tapped. Preliminary planning, surveying, and the fixing of boundaries for three projects were well along toward achievement. Seed money for the acquisition of property was now needed.

Financing the local contribution of the redevelopment program meant that the Columbus Metropolitan Committee of One Hundred Organizations, or, as it is commonly known, the Metropolitan Committee, would play the dominant role of community leadership.

Since 1945, when the Metropolitan Committee was first organized, this small group (twelve members) of Columbus business leaders has dominated community decision-making related to capital improvements of all kinds. It hears requests for support, determines which projects are most deserving, rounds up the support of civic and business groups, organizes and finances the campaign for public endorsement and, once the voters decide, the Metropolitan Committee provides an oversight

30 Columbus Citizen, 8/16/53, p. 13.
function, checking to insure the proper use of the voted funds.

The background of this remarkable organization needs description before an assessment of its role in the 1954 urban redevelopment bond campaign is discussed. During an interview with one of the original members of the Committee, he recalled that, "Before 1945 we couldn't put over a bond issue in Columbus. There was no confidence in any city administration. Some of us got together to call into being a committee of one-hundred organizations representing all segments of the community." The prime mover of the group was Edgar Wolfe, then the guiding hand for the various family enterprises, including the Columbus Dispatch and Ohio State Journal, Ohio National Bank, and W-B-N-S radio and television station. Later, Edgar Wolfe died and was replaced on the Committee by his son Preston Wolfe, the present manager of the family interests. 31

Another member of the Metropolitan Committee, also an original participant, said that Mayor James A. Rhodes had the idea to call such a group into existence, but that, having planted the idea with Mr. Wolfe, let the businessmen respond to the suggestion as they chose. According to this informant, Rhodes felt that "a citizen's committee was badly needed to provide the support and leadership from the business community in town for the long range projects he felt Columbus needed so much." 32

31 Personal interview, 5/26/64, with Robert Levy, long-time civic leader in Columbus affairs, who helped form the Metropolitan Committee and continues to serve on that body.

32 Personal interview with Paul H. Gingher, the first and only chairman of the Metropolitan Committee, 6/4/64.
Wolfe sent invitations to a small group of associates and friends, "about a dozen, or so, I think," who, in some instances, asked one or two of their friends to attend the plenary meeting of the as-yet-unnamed committee. Through the summer of 1945 the group met frequently in private sessions, met with the presidents, one by one, of all of the one hundred or so major civic, professional, and business organizations in the community, soliciting from each of them a list of capital improvement projects which, in their judgment, were needed for Columbus. 33

The following autumn, a general meeting of all of the chief executive officers of the one hundred organizations was called. At that first (and last) meeting the groups decided to form a permanent organization which would work to achieve the attainment of a comprehensive, long range program of capital improvements in Columbus. A preliminary list of such improvements was presented for the approval of the rank and file by the informal leadership group which had convened the meeting. Their support was obtained and the group voted to seek public support for the projects through presentation of a bond issue.

Perhaps the most important action taken at the first meeting of the Metropolitan Committee of One Hundred Organizations was to establish a permanent organization headed by a small, twelve-man executive body

33 Ibid.
drawn from the original members of the inner circle around Edgar Wolfe. It was (and remains) this executive committee, practically unchanged, except for the death of Edgar Wolfe, which came to be known as The Metropolitan Committee, although, formally, only a very small part of the total committee membership.  

From 1945 to the present, the Metropolitan Committee has maintained policy leadership in the capital improvements field and has enlarged its writ to include jurisdiction over tax levies for non-capital goals as well. School levies, welfare levies, virtually any request for public funds presented directly to the people must bear the committee's stamp of approval.

The power of the Metropolitan Committee rests on its possession of, or, at least, its ability to generate, the necessary resources for a successful appeal for support via the ballot. The Committee's approval means, among other things, money, organizational support, public relations skills, access to the press (through news columns as well as the editorial page), and the quality of legitimacy and semi-official authority which the committee imparts by its endorsement. Over the years such public agencies as the school board, the county welfare department, the city council, and public library, hospitals, and transportation groups, have come to accept the necessity of going to the Metropolitan Committee, that is, the executive group, to explain their needs.

\[34\] Ibid.
justify and perhaps modify their requests, and win the approval of the Committee before seeking public funds directly from the voters.

Public officials have always been excluded from the Committee's membership. It was intended to be, and has remained, a business-led and business-minded group with a primary interest in the central business district. Membership on the Committee has remained remarkably constant. A few deaths have occurred, but the majority of the men who formed the committee following the war are still on it. One man has served as its chairman from the beginning. 35

The Metropolitan Committee has built an enviable record of success during its existence. The first effort of the committee was in behalf of a combination of levies and bond issues presented just after the end of the Second World War. All of these requests passed the ballot test. It is significant that this was the first successful attempt to obtain approval for any project ever attempted in Columbus requiring voted financing. In 1951 the committee submitted an expressway bond issue to the voters and it, too, passed. Shortly thereafter, a municipal income tax was backed by the Metropolitan Committee and won the voted acceptance of the community. A portion of the revenue obtained therefrom is reserved for a sinking fund to retire the bonds issued for various public projects. 36

35 Personal interview, P. H. Gingher, chairman of the executive committee of the Metropolitan Committee of One Hundred Organizations, 6/4/64.

36 Personal interview, chairman of the executive committee, Metropolitan Committee of One Hundred Organizations, 6/4/64.
There have been a few failures, however. An early, and notable one, was the inability of the Metropolitan Committee to woo public support for the urban redevelopment bond issue in 1954. Alone, among a large package of issues and levies, the $5 million bond issue needed for financing the local share of the renewal program fell short of the necessary 55% majority needed for passage. The failure is notable because by every test the urban renewal issue was the most important single issue on the ballot; it was the largest in amount and certainly the most crucial one for the advancement of the long range interests of most of the people and groups comprising the Metropolitan Committee.

On July 13, 1954, the Columbus city council approved an $8 million bond issue package, following the public expression of approval given by the Metropolitan Committee, to be submitted to the voters in November. The "urban redevelopment issue," as it was named by the Council, would provide financing for the next six years, at least, of the urban renewal program. The Metropolitan Committee leadership and its allies analyzed the requirements and conditions for a successful effort, decided upon a basic strategy and pursued their goals with great diligence, but to no avail, with respect to the urban renewal program.

The leaders of the Committee recognized the lottery aspect of propositions and issues presented to the voters for direct consideration. Such issues, mixed with candidate selection, are likely to receive scant attention as personalities competing for favor draw headlines and voter
attention. Such was the case in the November 1954 election.

The Committee also recognized that a large portion of the vote on issues involving increased taxes is automatically negative as disgruntled taxpayers take advantage of the opportunity to "strike back" at those who would take more of their hard-earned income.

In the November election there would be a large number of issues, propositions, charter amendments, in addition to candidate selection. The Committee realized that the longer the list the more confusing it would appear to the voter and the more likely the vote on the issues would reflect irrational, unpredictable influences, such as ballot position, and the endurance of the voter. To read through to the end of the list of issues on the ballot might seem such a tedious job that many voters would skip over some issues, unless they were familiar with the number and title of the issue before going into the voting booth.

The inclusion of the urban redevelopment issue among so large a package of issues had other possibly favorable and negative aspects. If the voters were in an unreceptive mood their attitude could result in a wholesale loss of all the issues including some that might pass on their own. On the other hand, with an effective public relations campaign stressing the interrelated character of the package, the resulting positive attitudes among the voters could have the effect of a bandwagon for the complete combination. If the "credentials" of the bond issues package could be established at the outset and the impramatur of the
community's recognized leadership placed clearly on the package in an all out effort to win acceptance, then it was likely that the voters would respond favorably as they had the previous two times that the Committee had asked their support. In essence this was the strategy of the Metropolitan Committee. This largest combination of issues and levies yet presented to the voters would be "sold" as a single, interrelated bundle. 37

"For Welfare, Jobs, and Progress," was the adopted slogan of the Committee. Special attention to any one issue was avoided by the Committee until late in the campaign. Two weeks before the referendum was to be held the press began to write about "the big boy," referring to the urban redevelopment issue for $5 million. The newspapers stressed the need for urban redevelopment in terms of the trends toward downtown obsolescence, the "cancer of the slums," the "tax drain" of deteriorating property and the high service costs of the people who inhabited the property. The "soundness" of urban redevelopment as a corrective tool was argued in editorials and frequent attempts were made to reassure the voters that the federal program was not "socialism" or an attempt by Washington to "take over" local government in Columbus. 38

37 Ibid.

38 See the Columbus Dispatch for July and August of 1954. Many articles and editorial references appeared emphasizing the aggregate needs of the community. Not until October 25, did the press begin to single out urban redevelopment as deserving of special attention.
The only organized opposition to the package, or to urban renewal in particular, came from an ad hoc group calling itself "The Property Owners Association of Columbus and Franklin County." The group ran small advertisements infrequently in the press charging that the "slum clearance bond issue is the first step in (sic) more socialized housing." The group claimed that "taxes and rents" would be raised if the slum clearance issue passed. The slogan bannered across the top of their advertisements read, "The House You Save May Be Your Own." 39 The tactic was reminiscent of the Woodland-Woodward housing referendum fight of the previous year and was a portent of subsequent events.

The result of the voting was a substantial defeat for CURA and the renewal program and a blow to the prestige of the Metropolitan Committee. Of the several levies and bond issues for various projects on the ballot, all passed with the exception of the urban redevelopment issue. The ability of the Metropolitan Committee to "put over" any levy or bond issue it deemed worth while could no longer be assumed. Indeed, since the redevelopment issue was bigger than all the others combined, the committee's defeat was more serious than it might have appeared if it had only been a question of one of many equally important issues failing to receive public support. Even a bond issue for the purpose of constructing a railroad overpass over Hudson Street, a

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39 *Columbus Citizen*, 8/6/54, p. 5.
sectional benefit at best, passed the ballot test.

The urban redevelopment issue did receive a majority of the votes cast on it. The official count was 43,805 in favor, or 53.3%; 38,435 against, or 46.7%. But the city charter requires a 55% margin of approval, which the other issues and levies received with no difficulty.

Why did the redevelopment issue fail while the others succeeded? Indeed, can that question be even tentatively answered when, relatively speaking, such a small margin of votes separated the losing issue from the winning ones?

Of the possible explanatory factors which are visible in the election returns the following are significant: 1. The fact that, despite the narrowness of defeat, urban development was the one issue on which voters "crossed over" in large numbers. The other issues and levies all passed by substantial majorities, well above the 55% requirement. 2. The distribution of support and opposition for the redevelopment issues: the so-called Linden area and west and south Columbus were the chief centers of opposition to urban redevelopment, while the prospective project areas in Goodale and Market-Mohawk supported it heavily.

The drastic fall-off of "yes" votes in the Linden, southern, and western portions of the city can be explained as the expected reaction of low-middle and middle class groups afraid of an influx of displaced slum families into their neighborhoods. The fear of threats to property
values in their areas would tend to be greater than in more affluent areas where land values and the greater psychic security of the residents would tend to mitigate fears of a "slum invasion."

Also, it should be recalled, the bitter fight over public housing for slum families in the St. Mary's of the Springs Area the previous summer undoubtedly still was fresh in the memories of the people in the Linden area which abuts the area where Woodland-Woodward was slated for construction before the referendum blocked it. The fears of racially-mixed housing played an important part in the scare-tactics of the St. Mary's of the Springs Property Owner's Association.

The residents of Columbus's south and west sides were similar in social class characteristics to the people of the Linden section and their view of urban renewal as public housing in disguise probably was motivated by the same considerations affecting the attitudes of their counterparts in other areas of the city. It is not coincidental that the referendum vote of the housing project zoning change in the summer of 1953 reveals marked similarities in the distribution of the vote. In general, those who voted to block the Woodland-Woodward public housing project also voted against the urban redevelopment bond issue.

A more nebulous detracting influence, but one which cannot be discounted, was the widespread misunderstanding among virtually all segments of the community as to the nature and goals of urban renewal, or urban redevelopment, as it was often termed. The inconsistent,
sometimes contradictory clues about the meaning of CURA's program
caused by the "clean-up-the-slums" emphasis, the CMHA-CURA con-
flicts, and by the equation of public housing with urban renewal, most
certainly cut into the city-wide voting total. The stigma of the welfare
state still clung to the renewal program. A generation of reading the
Columbus Dispatch must have had an effect on the attitudes of rank and
file Columbus voters when a federally initiated program was evaluated
via the ballot box.

In testimony to this lack of understanding the many letters to the
editor which appeared in all three of the daily newspapers following
the election provide some support for this proposition. No less than
ten writers referred to the urban redevelopment issue as a result of
many people feeling that they had voted once for expressways and did
not see the need for money so soon. Five letters referred to the
urban redevelopment issue as something sponsored by the Urban League.
The sender of this letter said he opposed giving public money to private
groups for any purpose. A dozen more letter writers took satisfaction
in the defeat of something aimed at "pushing off" "shoving down our
throats," and "saddling the taxpayers" with "socialistic public housing." 41

40 See the issues of the Dispatch, the Journal and the Citizen during
the four weeks following the election.

41 Ibid.
The editor of the Columbus Citizen, Don Weaver, a member of the executive committee of the Metropolitan Committee explained the setback to the urban renewal program by pointing to the ambiguous quality of the phrase, "urban redevelopment." The concept had little meaning to the rank and file voter, or even to many downtown businessmen, said Weaver in a post election editorial. In an interview printed in the same issue of the newspaper CURA director, Lawrence Irvin, expressed agreement with the Citizen editor. Irvin had checked other Ohio cities and found that "no city passed a bond issue under the title 'urban development'." they passed it this year as 'slum clearance.'"

One of the paradoxical aspects of the vote on the bond issue was the overwhelming support forthcoming from the people of the two major clearance areas, Goodale and Market-Mohawk. In Goodale those who voted supported urban redevelopment by a two-to-one margin. In Market-Mohawk, the issue received a 64% majority. Despite the fact that urban renewal to these people would bring uncertainty and hardship--forced relocation--from residents in these areas a resounding vote of support was given to CURA.

An explanation of the seemingly unusual behavior is hard to construct in retrospect. The publicity given to the future of the clearance areas emphasized the idea that redevelopment would take the form of high-rise apartments and light industry. There was nothing more certain than the eventual displacement of everybody living in those areas.
Perhaps the aura of "cleaning up the slums" which permeated the press-created image of urban renewal or the still conventional notion that urban renewal did, indeed, promise them substantial improvement in their housing motivated them to endorse the issue.

Given the prevailing conventional knowledge about urban renewal and the typically low sensitivity to political issues of lower class groups it is probable that they simply did not recognize their "true interest" in the matter and voted in response to the most visible stimulus, which was the traditional notion of slum clearance as a "liberal" program and, therefore, good for people like them.

An immediate step taken by urban renewal officials in the wake of the bond issue defeat was to change the name of the lay policy making body from the Columbus Urban Redevelopment Authority to the Columbus Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Authority (SCAR). The sooner the process of educating the public to an acceptance of urban renewal began, the sooner its officials and supporters could go to the voters again for the necessary financial support.

The bond issue defeat marked a watershed in the development of urban renewal policy in Columbus. After November 1954 a number of important changes took place which caused the program for redevelopment of the CBD in Columbus to finally begin to move toward its goals. Effective support and leadership began to crystalize.

Strong business support would develop with the advent of the Develop-
ment Committee for Greater Columbus in 1955-56. This organization would shore up the staff resources of CURA and the City Planning Commission providing access to skills and management talent not available within the official renewal policy-making structure. Perhaps even more important, the Development Committee would provide a trouble-shooting, bottleneck-breaking function, in short the continuous prodding, checking, and oversight necessary to keep the renewal program moving ahead steadily. Freed from the detail of technical, routine activity which occupied so much of CURA's efforts and the political responsibility of a governmental body, the Development Committee would inject energy and purpose into the lagging renewal program.

The Development Committee also would give the renewal program the broad base of business and industry support it did not have at the time of the bond issue defeat. Organized, focused business support would replace the more or less random, discontinuous, largely token support given by CBD leadership during the first three years of CURA's existence.

The Metropolitan Committee certainly represented business and civic power in Columbus but only in a very limited way. It was a special purpose group, concentrating its energies on the actual waging of bond issue and tax levy campaigns. Its function was very important in the business of seeking support for any major community project affecting downtown. The problem was that the Committee did not enter the picture until too late in the game to help an agency like CURA whose
goals and reasons for being were far from self-evident to rank and file citizens or "elite" groups.

CURA needed a continuous liaison with the business community and active support in all phases of its activities from business leaders. CURA needed an infusion of the skills, energies, and money necessary for working changes on the scale contemplated by its leaders but unavailable within the framework of governmental capacities in Columbus. The Development Committee with its permanent staff, its well-financed backers, and its desire to salvage the CBD would perform these functions.

Following the bond issue defeat it was possible to take stock of the quality of political leadership and support, available to CURA. The lack of firm, continuous, executive leadership in the renewal program was especially apparent. Neither had city council been vocal in its expressions of interest in the success of urban renewal up to this time. In the mayor's office the fluidity in political leadership since the accession of James Rhodes to state office in 1953 deprived CURA of a potentially powerful advocate with the voters and with the business community. Rhodes was succeeded by Robert Oestreicher whose strategy for winning the election in his own right emphasized not "rocking the boat" until he was safely elected to a term of his own. During his twelve months in office the support of the city's chief executive for urban renewal was inhibited by partisan considerations.
Replaced in an upset by Maynard E. Sensenbrenner, Oestricher's defeat did not eliminate the leadership vacuum in city hall. Facing a Republican council, Sensenbrenner had little hope of doing any more than holding his own against the opposition. It did not seem politically wise to lead in behalf of what essentially is, a bureaucrat's program like urban renewal, to try to translate its poorly understood goals to a suspicious community, to risk entrapment in the tangles of slum clearance with its overtones of "race-mixing public housing."

Sensenbrenner's chance of survival in the face of a determined effort by the well-entrenched, Dispatch-supported Franklin County Republican organization at the next mayoral election were small enough without incurring unnecessary risks. He had less than two years of what remained of Rhodes' term to establish a base for himself and urban renewal did not promise the kind of popular base he needed. Sensenbrenner, like his predecessor, was largely immobilized with respect to the urban renewal program during his first two years in city hall.

At the end of 1954, urban renewal in Columbus was not yet policy. Its nebulous program had yet to be translated into specific, attainable goals. The Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation Department, and the policy-making authority which was supposed to lead the community effort to renovate the downtown core of the city were either unknown or viewed as emmissaries of Washington, paving the way for more public housing projects full of lower class residents.

Civic elites, intermediate level interest groups, had not "lined
up" in support of SCAR and its goals. Only token support had come from even the other agencies of government whose cooperation was necessary for success. A serious lack of backing existed among elected officials who continued to hold the urban renewal program at arms length until they themselves understood it more clearly. Random, politically safe, largely ineffectual "clean-up-the-slums" programs distracted them, and administrative officials, as well, from the problems of slum clearance. The local press expressed support for the idea of renewing the CBD and ritualistically condemned slums but it was not enough to build a "constituency" for urban renewal. 42

Neither the press nor any other opinion-influencing group had faced up to the relocation problems inherent in slum clearance. The fear of public housing deprived the community of a potentially effective, reasonable satisfactory method of providing better housing for people who so often were held up as the chief victims of slums, even though the primary concern of clearance advocates was the health of the CBD. 43

42 Columbus Citizen, 11/7/54.
43 Personal interviews with several downtown businessmen and a former member of the city council tended to confirm the importance of the lack of active political leadership on behalf of urban renewal.
On January 1, 1955, with less than a year to go before he would face a re-election campaign, Mayor Sensenbrenner announced his goals for the city. Any politician in so delicate a situation as he now found himself could not be expected to chart bold new policy courses. Predictably, in his first 1955 press conference, the Mayor set "public understanding of the issues facing the city" and "traffic, public transportation and parking" ahead of "housing and slum clearance" on his agenda of problems. \(^1\) Also, predictably, was the tying together of housing and slum clearance as if they were equivalents. Officials had a no more precise conception of urban renewal in 1955 than when CURA was organized three years earlier.

The second nine months of the abbreviated Sensenbrenner administration was one of intermittent warfare between the executive office and the city council. At its first meeting of the new year council voted to trim the budget by reducing the salary of the assistant safety director, responsible largely for the enforcement of housing regulations, from $7,020 a year to a nominal $1.00 per year. Councilmen felt that the assistant's function did not warrant a separate, full-time

\(^1\)Columbus Citizen, 1/1/55, p. 3.
official and, in effect, eliminated the office itself. This action by the Republican-dominated council effectively deprived the politically vulnerable Democratic administration of one of the cheapest, most popular methods of dealing with the "slum problem" i.e., the much-ballyhood code crackdown and clean-up-the-slums campaign long pushed by the downtown press, in particular the Citizen.

The negativism of council toward the administration was matched by one of the few recognizable interest groups opposing the very concept of slum clearance, the Association of Rooming House Operators in Columbus. Rooming house operators who violated housing and safety regulations were convenient and politically attractive targets for the anti-slum campaign which waxed and waned during the first years of urban renewal in Columbus. Smarting from the barbs aimed at them by Citizen editor, Don Weaver, and sensing an opportunity to make capital out of the break between the Mayor's office and council, the operators supported council's elimination of the post of safety director by calling for an end to the whole urban renewal program. Not only would this end "violations of individual property rights," it would also save the city $40,000 annually in planning costs.

These two instances of opposition to the redevelopment program

2Ibid.

3Columbus Citizen, 1/9/55, p. 7.
disturbed slum clearance and rehabilitation officials because, in the aftermath of the bond issue defeat of the previous November, they appeared as portents of even greater resistance. The failure of the redevelopment issue, alone, among the several presented to the voters, made the slum clearance program appear to be an inviting target for criticism. The fact that it now was linked with what appeared to be a lame duck administration further magnified the apparent political vulnerability of the clearance program.

The members of SCAR felt that public understanding and acceptance of the program had been weak from the very beginning of urban renewal in Columbus. The tendency to identify renewal with public housing was founded on a small part of the truth, the requirement that replacement housing be furnished for those displaced by clearance. It might have been possible, however, to have explained that slum clearance was not just public housing--that public housing was only a tool for physical and economic rejuvenation of the CBD. But even if this had been done other kinds of public doubts and suspicions would not have been dispelled so easily. They were rooted in attitudes of prejudice toward Negroes who would be relocated and a general hostility toward the federal government and all of its works. Like an iceberg, the racial issue lay largely submerged, its presence known but its true proportions still a matter for conjecture. Urban renewal officials were convinced, based on the outcome of the Woodland-Woodward referendum, that when relocation of slum residents began, urban
renewal might not survive the attacks which were sure to come.

As officials began to plan when and how to ask again for public support, it was the relocation issue which seemed to be the most difficult with which to deal. If existing public housing could somehow be set aside as vacancies occurred so that Negro families could move into public housing already in being, this would lessen the need to build new units. But, when approached by SCAR, CMHA director, Russell Taylor revealed that a policy of segregation existed in Columbus housing units. Of the total of 1352 housing units under CMHA's operation only 425 units, all in Poindexter Village Project, were available to non-white renters. 5

The inconsistencies between slum clean-up and urban renewal also lay dormant but signs of trouble began to appear early in 1955. There was increasing tension between SCAR and the division of building inspections in the Safety Department. The futility of trying to enforce code regulations in areas designated for eventual clearance and redevelopment was becoming more and more apparent to officials in the Safety Department. To SCAR, it clearly was a hindrance to its goals to have building owners served with "raze or repair" orders or in other ways pressured to bring their property into compliance

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4 Personal interview, W. Ray Speer, former vice chairman of CURA, 9/14/66.

5 Columbus Citizen, 1/27/55, p. 5.
with code requirements. The immediate danger was that acquisition costs would be increased but the long range problem was a political one. What appeared as harassment to the "slumlords" eventually might solidify opinion among many other potential clearance opponents and generate the first real resistance to SCAR among the varied, but usually unorganized, interests represented in clearance area. The political problem was even more frustrating because its remedy lay within the jurisdiction of a completely separate department of government, beyond the official limits of the urban renewal department's authority.  

Another complication had arisen from the sweeping housing legislation passed by Congress in 1954. Rehabilitation was added by the federal lawmakers to the armory of urban redevelopment weapons. Under the original 1949 Housing Act, Washington had fashioned a tool of "massive retaliation" in the war against slums. The only remedy for urban decay was the bulldozer--wholesale clearance and rebuilding of affected areas. This was a blunt weapon, however, suitable only for the worst slums which were reasonably compact. There might be (and usually were) many so-called gray areas of a city on the verge of becoming slums but not bad enough to qualify for clearance and, in any case, too big for "controlled" redevelopment. To wait until such areas

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6 Personal interview, L. B. LaCour, former director of Family Relocation Office, 7/20/64.
reached the end of the deterioration process before remedial action was taken seemed a poor way to counteract the processes of urban decay to many federal housing officials and their Congressional allies.

In addition, the 1949 Act had included no provision for slum prevention. Thus, the federal government's slum clearance program was being undermined as new areas of blight grew at faster rates than the old slums could be cleared and redeveloped, as statistics from many American cities indicated. In response to these problems and trends, the 1954 Housing Act provided for a so-called "workable program" requirement making slum clearance and redevelopment loans and grants contingent on the establishment of a workable slum prevention effort by local governments receiving urban renewal funds. Specifically, the Urban Renewal Administration henceforth would consider such things as zoning, building and housing codes and the quality of planning being done by municipal officials and within the metropolitan region before entering into a loan and grant contract with a city. This shift in emphasis was reflected at the local level in many ways. The title change of the LPA in Columbus to the Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation Authority; the addition of new goals which were more complex and long range in nature than the old clearance goals; and the almost unlimited possibilities for the extension of SCAR's activities into areas
of the city previously "defined out" of the agency's scope of interest. 7

Although Columbus urban renewal officials welcomed the broadening of the anti-slum program of rehabilitation, the SCAR staff felt that it so changed the equation of slum clearance and redevelopment as to require a completely new "look" at the meaning and requirements of urban renewal.

Early in 1955, SCAR sponsored a two day "slum prevention conference" on the Ohio State University campus. Speakers from the urban renewal Administration, local business leaders, city and state officials, and urban specialists from Ohio State, exchanged views and questions about the meaning of the 1954 Housing Law and its possible impact on the Columbus program. To many, it seemed like 1950 all over again, so far reaching were the implications of the new legislation. It was at this time that the phrase "urban renewal" really became descriptive. Renewal, rather than mere clearance and redevelopment of small, selected areas now would be the emphasis. The

7 Precise measurement of what was possible is difficult because of the more flexible and open-ended nature of the concept of "blight" as opposed to "slum." Criteria for establishing a rehabilitation area are sufficiently broad to allow an LPA great leeway in determining such areas. Drawn in circumference a radius from the CBD would encompass extensive areas of deteriorating neighborhoods. Given the commercial basis for the urban renewal program, however, it made sense to establish rehabilitation areas adjacent to already designated clearance and redevelopment areas as a "protection of the investment." This, in fact, appears to have happened when the Dennison-Hunter-Hubbard Avenues area, adjacent to Goodale, was made a conservation and rehabilitation area in 1956.
ambitiousness, and ambiguity, of renewal as compared to clearance would require more than a shift in emphasis—it would require, in order to succeed, a much larger role for private business than previously expected, to become the primary force in the renewal. During the OSU conference participants dissected the new housing law amendments. Explanations of the amendments by federal housing officials, by academic urban experts, and by SCAR people played up the idea that areas designated for clearance might be reclassified as rehabilitation areas. A tour of Goodale by the Commissioner of the Urban Renewal Administration gave rise to a spate of official statements made by local and federal people that the URA in granting funds to LPA would henceforth give priority to cities where rehabilitation programs were in progress. Nearly every official statement ended by asserting that renewal could best be achieved through private action which would refurbish the slums. The new law gave FHA-backing to home owners and businessmen who would rehabilitate or rebuild their property. Through sections 220 and 221 of the 1954 law, loans given for these purposes in blighted areas might be given the same kind of FHA loan insurance long available to individuals and builders in middle income areas of the city. 8

Many small businessmen and homeowners in the parts of Columbus already, or about to become, clearance areas were encouraged to

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believe that by rehabilitating their property they could avoid the bulldozer and wrecking ball. The Market-Mohawk section was especially suitable for rehabilitation in the eyes of businessmen in the area, and they were, in effect, encouraged by federal renewal officials to resist SCAR's general goals for the area. The legislative shift in emphasis from clearance to rehabilitation only served to cloud the concept of urban renewal. 9

The major local change in urban renewal policy development at this time was structural--the emergence of interest group activity as a shaping force in urban renewal policy making. In particular, this period of transition was marked by the creation of a business-led "action group which assumed the task of injecting life into the stalled urban redevelopment program.

A probable explanation of the generally slow-moving pace of policy development for urban renewal in Columbus lay in the virtual absence of a pattern of private group activity. Except for the Metropolitan Committee of One Hundred Organizations, one or two "grass roots" businessmen's associations, and the superficial interest shown by the Chamber of Commerce, there was no interest group interaction revolving around SCAR.

The Metropolitan Committee, for all its business "muscle" was a limited range power group. Capital improvements of all kinds and

9 Personal interview, Robert T. Mott, executive secretary, Development Committee for a Greater Columbus, 5/19/64.
any matter requiring voted financing were, and remain, its principal concerns. The Committee was a "council of elders" which approved and negotiated policy goals and marshalled support among the business community for the goals it adopted. But it performed no implementing functions. For this the Committee looked to the PTA's, the hospital boards, school boards, veteran's groups, or welfare organizations with material and substantial interests in the goals. Such groups formed a system of policy making in which the key roles and functions of policy formation were carried out. They gathered information, negotiated compromises, mediated conflict, maintained a communication network and generally supplemented the work of public groups charged with formal policy making. SCAR could do no more than authorize and legitimize policy, according to its own members.

In the urban renewal policy field there was no satellite system performing these functions. There was no "party" to champion and help fashion redevelopment policy: no "constituency" to which SCAR perceived a need to relate and to ally itself with. The presence of unspecified, often contrary CBD business interests or the amorphous goals contained in the Housing Law of 1949 were no substitute for a set of policy parameters which flow from symbiotically related private and public policy creating groups. In short, there was no linkage between groups charged with general goal selection and fund receiving.

10 Personal interview, W. Ray Speer, op. cit.
and interest groups necessary in American politics especially, for the translation of goals into specific program and actions having the support of a natural clientele.

The presence of a well-defined, active constellation of interest groups interacting around policy goals is especially important in the context of the often ineffectual, fragmented, local governmental systems existing in so many American cities. Rationally organized, continuous systems of partisanship are rare in American communities. Community political power tends to be dispersed in source and erratic in effect, the reputational school of community power theory to the contrary, notwithstanding. Given these qualities urban governments tend to be insufficient for the policy making tasks confronting them. They are often unable to generate a base of constituency support for their goals; poor communications between them and the private power centers of the community shut off government officials from the well-springs of influence and skill necessary to shore up weak governmental policy making agencies. A lack of understanding of basic problems growing increasingly technical and complex prevents many officials from defining alternatives, much less building effective courses of action which will enjoy legitimacy and popularity.

Urban renewal, like so many federal programs designed to cure urban ills, is no more than a set of exogenous stimuli until it is passed through a community policy making system and its formal goals take on
substance and effect. A federal policy in behalf of urban redevelopment and renewal means little until it triggers alterations in the behavior of community actors, redistributes local resources, and generates change in the balance of rewards and deprivations flowing from the local political system. In a federal system especially, the effects of policy are difficult to predict because of the separate state-national stages in the policy process and the plurality of local governments in the United States. Until policy stimuli are fed into the varied mechanisms of policy making at the local level and converted to actual effects on behavior and action, no policy may be said to exist.

Urban renewal had stalled in Columbus in 1955. SCAR was the transmission agency for policy initiatives from Washington. But it needed a receiving agency to whom it could relay the policy initiatives for "final processing."

The emergence of interest groups so many years after the start of the redevelopment program in Columbus may be explained by the ambiguousness of the putative goals of the 1949 Housing Act. The scope and complexity of this omnibus legislation posed a value dilemma to community leaders long convinced of the inherent evils of public housing and federal "interference" in local affairs. The Congressional proponents of the housing law had purposely used the redevelopment sections of the Act as a stalking horse for the unpopular (among housing industry spokesmen) public housing sections, attracting a broad range of political sup-
port for an otherwise controversial bill. But linking a "conservative" program with a "liberal" one made it difficult to unravel the two in the minds of conservative community leaders accustomed to suspect the motives behind all federal programs. It took five years for Columbus business leaders to understand the full potential of the slum clearance part of the Act and to overcome deeply-rooted anti-Washington attitudes. 11

Prior to the entry of business groups the only manifestation of interest group activity took the form of pro forma support by a scattering of non-economic groups; ministerial associations, neighborhood councils, churches, the NAACP and Urban League, and settlement houses. Such groups showed mild support for the urban redevelopment program because of their traditional interest in ameliorating the housing conditions of the city's poor. Like the businessmen, they too had only a limited understanding of the true significance and meaning of the urban redevelopment provisions of the 1949 Housing Act.

The eventual supremacy of business values over reformist values occurred because the Development Committee for Greater Columbus molded a CBD coalition able to take effective advantage of the opportunities afforded by the Housing Act. Conflict over the exact location and the nature of redevelopment occurred frequently and, at one point in 1959 threatened actually to destroy the program. But at no time following the creation of the Development Committee (DCGC) did chal-

11 Personal interviews with many CBD leaders confirmed this generalization.
lenges arise to the business leadership and general goals of the redevelopment program.

The previously described, abortive effort of the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority to assert hegemony over major clearance areas was the only even half-hearted attempt to provide social reformist direction to urban renewal in Columbus.

The Formation of the Development Committee for Greater Columbus

A core of CBD leaders from the Metropolitan Committee formed the DCGC in February of 1956. Don Weaver, a member of the Metropolitan Committee and editor of the Columbus Citizen, welcomed the group into existence with obvious satisfaction and a sense of anticipation. At long last progress might be made in many fields of unfulfilled civic endeavor. Weaver called the committee "our action committee," and described its functions as "expediting, trouble-shooting, and coordinating" the efforts of other groups in behalf of effective community problem-solving. "Its function... is to help, not fight with other agencies... But if stress is needed to cure inaction, stress there must be. Since it is unofficial and voluntary it can straighten out difficulties that those limited by the restrictions of politics or employment cannot handle.\textsuperscript{12} In short, if heads needed to be knocked together to achieve results, the Development Committee would do it.

The DCGC organized itself into several subcommittees each having

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Columbus Citizen}, 2/27/56, p. 9.
responsibility in a particular field of community problems. Slum clearance and redevelopment was only one of five major concerns of the group. Over two hundred Columbus businesses, individuals and service organizations sponsored the Committee, i.e., contributed to its treasury. The sponsors were to meet once a year to elect from their number a sixty-five man executive board. A still smaller group, the sixteen man steering committee, was to be elected by the executive board from its membership. The steering committee would meet monthly, or more often, as need required to develop broad policy guidelines for the work of the five subcommittees. A very small full time staff would be available to the Development Committee. Robert T. Mott, an engineer by training and city manager by profession, came to Columbus to direct the committee's efforts from the post of city manager of Delaware, Ohio.

Mott explained the origins of the DCGC as a reaction to the ineffectual, faction-ridden, leadership of the community "power structure." On nearly every problem for which concerted, private, leadership was necessary, Mott asserted that division, petty squabbling, ignorance of complex issues, and sharp differences in time and effort expended characterized the so-called community power structure in Columbus. In short, he felt there really was no power structure in the sense of a unified, continuously interacting elite able to formulate policy on all issues.
all issues.

"Many key people in town who traveled around noticed how other cities proceeded. . . . They had civic groups backing urban renewal, for instance, not just businessmen, but labor, minority groups, women's groups, churches--a broad spectrum of interests."

Why was private leadership so crucial to the success of important community projects? "Local government alone has no prestige among the power structure here." 13

Although Mott emphasized the numerous and diverse supporters of the Committee, he also recognized that a fairly small minority of business leaders comprised the core of the Development Committee's backers. He estimated that eighty-five percent of the DCGC's financial and political resources flowed from no more than fifty of the listed organizational and individual supporters. 14

The DCTC ties into the Metropolitan Committee of One Hundred Organizations as a "clearing house" for the Metropolitan Committee. The Development Committee is the general staff of the older group, making technical studies, trouble-shooting for it, expediting projects for which the Metropolitan Committee has solicited capital, prodding city officials into action, and helping the city to overcome the numerous

13 Personal interview, Robert T. Mott, executive secretary, Development Committee for Greater Columbus, 5/19/64.

14 Ibid.
bureaucratic obstacles between it and the federal treasury. In short, the DCGC governs capital improvements policy development in Columbus.

Commissioners of the Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation Authority expressed a desire for a group like the DCTC in the fall of 1955. All of the commissioners agreed that the Metropolitan Committee alone was not capable of channelling to the redevelopment program the continuous business support necessary.\(^1^5\) Overall leadership for both, however, was centered generally in the same hands. There was (and remains) an overlapping of leaders among all major community economic groups, including the DCGC, the Metropolitan Committee and the Chamber of Commerce board of directors, among others.\(^1^6\)

The often technical nature of Development Committee efforts and the existence of an effective, respected, executive director makes the DCTC a "bureaucrat's organization" where initiative lies in the subcommittees and with the director. Committee members may share common affiliation with the Chamber of Commerce or be on the executive committee of the Metropolitan Committee, but each membership requires different skills and resources and often casts members

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\(^{1^5}\) Minutes, Columbus Urban Redevelopment Authority, 10/17/55.

\(^{1^6}\) Personal interview, Mott, op. cit. It should not be inferred from the existence of over-lapping power group memberships that a tightly knit "power structure" exists in Columbus. Since the nature of Columbus power structure(s), if any, is not the primary concern of this research, general statements about community power in Columbus derived from this study should remain hypothetical until subjected to tests of verification.
in different roles. A subcommittee chairmanship of the DCTC might yield considerable influence in one area of community interest but a membership on the executive committee of the Metropolitan Committee would mean secondary status among a council of community elders. 17

To minimize possible conflict between this organization and governmental agencies, Robert Mott sought to cloak the DCTC with the mantle of nonpartisanship—to foster the image of an apolitical study group at the service of policy makers in government. To minimize suspicion of the committee's ties with "the interests," Mott frequently invites outside consultants with no Columbus ties to perform research or evaluation jobs for the DCCG. The committee, of course, remains free to reject, modify, or accept the advice of the special consultants in light of its view of community needs. The regional scope of interest of the Development Committee also acts as a protection against narrow provincialism or single interest representation affecting the activities of the committee. 18

The contributions of the Development Committee to the urban re-development program in Columbus were broken down by Mott into seven main categories: 1. Securing standard rental housing for the families to be displaced by clearance. 2. Promoting advance plan-

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
ning for the relocation of families before land acquisition began.

3. Coordinating planning for other public improvements with the urban redevelopment program. 4. Promoting the scheduling of capital improvements to fit into the redevelopment program. 5. Assisting in the execution stage of the program on a net rather than a gross cost basis. 19

6. Expedite approval of redevelopment plans by federal agencies.

7. Study means of obtaining adequate private capital to redevelop cleared land. 20

The committee agreed that special attention would have to be given to the vexing problems of relocation. From the very beginning of the program in 1952 this aspect of redevelopment had defied solution. Public battles over public housing and the racial dimensions of relocation had stirred bitter controversy which engulfed the entire clearance and redevelopment program.

The Adjustment of Policy Goals: 1955-57

The three years following the defeat of the first bond issue was a

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19 Federal regulations gave two options to local urban renewal agencies: they could assume the full cost of administrative overhead and the federal government would pay three-fourths of the net cost (after administrative costs were subtracted from total expenditures;) the LPA could count its administrative costs together with land acquisition and other expenses and the federal government would pay two-thirds of gross costs. Net cost basis was considered preferable by Development Committee leaders because much of the administrative cost could be born by businessmen through the Development Committee, counted toward Agency expenditures, and make the city eligible for larger federal grants.

20 Columbus Dispatch, 1/2/57, p. 2.
period of transition between a "time of troubles" and a genuine crisis. The crisis period featured a rising tide of grassroots opposition to renewal from one of the clearance areas and the most acrimonious public fighting between officials with diametrically opposed methods and goals for CBD redevelopment. This conflict nearly destroyed urban renewal in Columbus.

However, during the period between these two stages both officials and private leaders in the community began to develop a greater sophistication about the relationship of the renewal program to other policy making areas. They began to recognize the necessity for seeing urban redevelopment in a larger frame of reference. For example, official efforts to enforce building inspection, housing, health, and safety regulations in residential buildings clearly overlapped the system of renewal policy making. Yet, for over five years neither urban renewal officials nor safety officials recognized this fact. The result of this failure caused an open split between SCAR and the Department of Safety.

Public housing policy of the CMHA also impinged on urban renewal policy. The frequent outbursts of friction and impatience which marred relations between SCAR and CMHA were in some measure the result of no coordination between the two agencies. Although the effects of each agency's actions naturally touched the other at many vital points of policy execution the separation of planning, direction, and goal
selection inevitably created misunderstanding and antagonism between them. 21

Another previously unappreciated policy systems overlap was first recognized by Metropolitan Committee leaders and public officials in 1955. The importance of the federally sponsored expressway program to slum clearance and redevelopment in Columbus was a major topic of discussion when SCAR commissioners and the Metropolitan Committee met in January of 1955 to plan for the next bond issue campaign. SCAR director, Lawrence Irvin told the group that the best way to generate action in the stalled Goodale clearance project would be to tie it into the innerbelt expressway system then on the drawing boards. As the map indicates, the proposed Goodale expressway was to pass close enough to the slum clearance project virtually to be included within the project boundaries. The proximity of the two projects would impose very narrow planning limits for each unless both were seen as integral parts of the same planning process. For economic and esthetic reasons the expressway and the urban redevelopment project had to go forward together. 22

During the three year hiatus between crisis periods SCAR officials discussed the future of Goodale in general terms. As yet no redeveloper

21 Personal interview, Mott, op. cit.

22 Columbus Citizen, 1/18/55, p. 22.
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had been found on the assumption that the area must be cleared, residents relocated, and site improvements made before the last step was taken. Two major alternatives dominated the discussions of the officials.  

1. Redevelop the area with light industry. This type of redevelopment promised the greatest tax revenue potential.  

2. Redevelop the area with high rise, so-called prestige apartment complexes. The major concern of the commissioners in evaluating the two alternatives was the availability of private financing for each one. At this time the SCAR commissioners leaned toward the first choice, attracted by the almost certain tax returns. This way seemed the less risky of the two. Apartment buildings simply would not return as much to the city coffers under the best of circumstances and there were too many problems which could obstruct the success of this kind of redevelopment. Bad luck in finding tenants, the question of whether "prestige living" could be made believable to potential tenants in view of the former reputation of the area, and the proximity of the apartments to "gray areas" which would not be cleared and redeveloped or rehabilitated for a long time, if ever, all combined to detract from the merits of this redevelopment approach.  

With no redeveloper in sight, however, the discussions of the SCAR commissioners had an irrelevant quality about them since, in the last  

23Columbus Dispatch, 2/2/55, p. 11. Many scattered references to possible types of redevelopment in Goodale may be found in the press and in the Minutes of the CURA for 1955.
analysis, it would be the preferences of the redeveloper and the require-
ments of the FHA's which would decide the direction of redevelopment
in Goodale and in all other projects.

In the Market-Mohawk project area SCAR attempted to learn more
about economic trends in the area during the mid-1950s. The original
boundaries of Market-Mohawk encompassed many business concerns
whose owners took a keen interest in the future development of the area
and translated that interest into pressure on SCAR to "get the facts"
before clearance interrupted the commercial life of the area. The
active interest shown by Market-Mohawk businessmen contrasts shar-
ply with the passivity and ineffectualness of their Goodale area counter-
parts. There were many fewer businesses in Goodale, of course, and
of those there were more of the marginal than the thriving types of
enterprise found in great numbers in Market-Mohawk.

SCAR created an advisory group, the Market-Mohawk businessmen's
Study Committee (MMBS) for the purpose of analyzing long range economic
trends in the area and establishing a useful vehicle of communication be-
tween urban renewal officials and project area business leaders. Renewal
officials hoped that the advisory group might become an agent of SCAR's,
an advocate for its policies among the less convinced members of the
business community in Market-Mohawk.

The MMBS was a broadly constituted organization of eleven members
drawn from CBD business and financial leaders and from among the pro-
ject area business community. It was chaired by a SCAR commissioner and prominent Columbus builder and realtor, Wendell Beggs, of Beggs Building Corporation.²⁴

Two widely known Market-Mohawk business leaders, Elmer Dick and Lincoln Dennis, represented the clearance area businessmen on the committee. They were elected from the newly formed Main-Fourth Association, an alliance of merchants doing business in the general vicinity of the two main thoroughfares which bisected the project area, East Main Street and South Fourth Street. The Main-Fourth Association had been created specifically for the purpose of maintaining the essential features of the heart of Market-Mohawk. The stimulus for its organization came from SCAR itself, following closely upon the announcement by the urban renewal commission that Main Street might be closed as part of the redevelopment of the area. The prospect of having the major east-west traffic carrier into Market-Mohawk, and the location of many of the most important business establishments in the area, shut off from the CBD produced an immediate organized response.

At about the same time that the Messrs. Dennis and Dick were organizing, the Main-Fourth Association a more inclusive group of 275 generally smaller businessmen organized themselves into the Market-Mohawk Booster's Association. This group also included landlords and some tenants from the area. The stated purpose of the group matched

²⁴Minutes, CURA, 4/5/55.
the membership in diverseness. The Boosters were interested in "participation in civic affairs, the repairing and painting of property as well as of streets and alleys." 26

The inclusion of property owners and the token representation of tenants is notable because no counterpart group ever functioned in Goodale or in other clearance project areas. The wording of the statement of purpose is also significant because the Boosters asserted the need for "repairing and painting" instead of redevelopment. They seemed to be taking a cue from the 1954 Housing Law's rehabilitation approach to slum problems. The formation of a group with such contrary goals, contrary that is to SCAR's goals, presaged trouble for SCAR in Market-Mohawk.

This middle period of urban renewal policy development also was one of extensive public relations activity conducted by SCAR director, Lawrence Irvin. He was aided considerably by a sympathetic downtown press.

Throughout the years 1955 and 1956, as a prelude to the second bond issue campaign in the fall of 1956, every opportunity was taken to "sell" the redevelopment program to any group which would listen. By touching base with virtually every organization of any consequence, Irvin felt that "positive attitudes" toward SCAR and its goals would be generated

among opinion leaders and trickle down to the grass roots level of the voter. Somehow, this complex, misunderstood program with the Washington imprimatur had to be made acceptable to the general public long enough for SCAR to receive the indispensable "seed money" necessary to start the long-delayed clearance of slums in Columbus. Unlike past grant-in-aid federal programs urban renewal required more than the approval and cooperation of elite groups, having a direct interest in the policy. The approval of the rank and file citizen had to be gained at some point before policy development reached fruition.

Citizen columnist, Paul Quick, noted that it might help people to understand what urban renewal was all about if officials would minimize jargon and technical language in their descriptions of the program when they wrote or spoke about it for public consumption. The Columbus Urban Redevelopment Authority was an impressive sounding title for the renewal agency but to the general public such terminology sounded vague and "Bureaucratic." "Blighted areas" sounded more like dead shrubbery than slums, said Quick. He advocated calling SCAR a slum clearance agency and referring to rehabilitation as "an attempt to restore the neighborhood to what it was fifty years ago, or when it was new." 27 Later in the year CURA officially renamed itself, with consent of city council, the Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation Commission.

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27Citizen, 6/5/55, p. 12.
In addition to image-building, the renamed renewal agency again launched a major effort to explain and justify urban renewal. Interestingly, the theme of the explanation now openly emphasized the value of renewal as a tool of commercial and economic rejuvenation for downtown. Crime, poor housing and related social ills were accorded a decidedly secondary status. Prior to this time they had received at least equal treatment by the proponents of slum clearance.

According to SCAR and its supporters the long time movements away from the central city which had precipitated the deterioration of the CBD was near an end. "The saturation point of outward movement is being reached. . . . we must rebuild at or near the hub." The assumption that decentralizing trend could be halted was a key aspect of the urban renewal ideology discussed in chapter two.

All three daily newspapers published frequent editorials and feature articles which exhorted Columbus civic leaders and the people to support the clearance program for economic reasons. Nothing like this had been done in behalf of the bond issue which failed in 1954. Lawrence Irvin became the most peripatetic "super salesman" of all when he assembled an "illustrated program dealing with city planning, aspects of juvenile delinquency, . . . housing and private rebuilding" and made it available (with himself as narrator) to any group interested in urban  

renewal. Irvin electioneered for his program in other ways. He delivered dozens of talks before luncheon clubs, church groups, boards of directors of various organizations, neighborhood associations—any group which would listen to him. He participated in a radio program series called, "Our Expensive Slums." Even high school social studies classes seemed useful to Irvin as connecting links to the voters. 29

Irvin and his allies in the news media primarily the Citizen, pressed the campaign for the bond issue throughout 1955, looking forward to another ballot test in the fall of the year. But, at the last minute Irvin, Commission members and the Metropolitan Committee, decided to postpone submitting the issue to the voters until sometime in 1956, after city elections were over. The contest for mayor promised to be an unusually vigorous and bitter struggle; also there were four council seats to fill.

The incumbent, M. E. Sensenbrenner, had been in office only eighteen months and, as a Democrat, seemed likely to lose in a contest with the powerful Franklin County Republican organization. The mayor had endorsed the slum clearance program and if he lost the election he might take the slum bond clearance issue down to defeat with him. After having lost one bond issue election the supporters of urban renewal were in no mood to take unnecessary risks. The federal Urban Renewal

29 Minutes, CURA.
Administration warned SCAR in October of 1955 that Columbus projects must be underway by the summer of 1956 or reserved federal funds would be transferred to other cities with active redevelopment programs. Columbus, of course, could reapply for funds but it would have to repeat every step, preparing again the many forms and applications, with the attendant delays and frustration.  

If URA withdrew at this crucial juncture all the work which had brought the Goodale project to the point of execution could be lost forever. The preliminary planning which had been completed might be rendered obsolete if land acquisition could not begin within a fairly short time. Market-Mohawk then was only in the talking stage, but if action there were delayed too long, serious opposition to redevelopment was certain to emerge. The very sketchy, speculative, "plans" for the area which had been "leaked" to the newspapers already had stimulated the organization of potential opponents to redevelopment in the summer of 1955. The longer the renewal agency delayed formulating concrete plans the more encouragement would be given to the spread of rumors, half-truths and fear among Market-Mohawk business leaders.

Failure could result from too much delay. Of the two, however, submitting it early and running a high risk of defeat seemed the more dangerous. Thus, SCAR officials and the Metropolitan Committee

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30 Journal, 10/20/55, p. 30.
decided to postpone the bond issue election until the spring of 1956, when the mayoralty campaign was safely over.  

The decision to try to keep urban renewal "out of politics" represented a departure from the experience of many other cities where urban redevelopment was a key partisan issue in elections for legislative and executive office. Newark and New Haven were communities in which the rise and fall of partisan forces and changes in political leadership were linked very closely to the urban redevelopment programs. But, in the Columbus election of 1955 the incumbency of an apparent "fill-in" mayor and the split in Republican ranks which had originated with the departure of James Rhodes, during the ineffectual 1953 campaign for mayor of Republican City Council President, Robert Oestreicher, militated against an issue-oriented campaign. Factionalism and the lack of competitive party organizations tends to encourage personality-oriented contests and emotionally-charged appeals to the voters. Election campaigns in which programmatic appeals and discussion of the issues occur usually require stable, competitive partisan organizations representing durable voting alignments. Partisan politics in Franklin County traditionally emphasizes the opposite of this model of electoral combat and in 1955 the political situation was especially opposed to what might be termed "the party model" of political conflict.

Perhaps the one weakness the Republican party had at this time was

\[ ^{31}\text{Personal interview, Paul H. Gingher, op. cit.} \]

its long standing reliance on the vote-getting ability of its recently departed standard bearer, James A. Rhodes. So popular was Rhodes that he ran unopposed in 1951. A genuine leadership vacuum existed following the departure of Rhodes from the Columbus political scene. Robert T. Oestreich, Rhodes charter-designated successor, was unable to win election in his own right in the special election of November 1954. Compared to the flamboyant Sensenbrenner, Oestreich seemed barely visible during the campaign. 33

Upon the defeat of Oestreich, Columbus Republicans fell to fighting among themselves over the fallen standard of party leadership. Three candidates sought the party's endorsement for mayor in the non-partisan primary election of 1955. Two of the three were members of city council, Joseph R. Jones and Jerry Spears, and the third was a county commissioner, Henry R. Koontz. Jones won the most votes of the three Republicans in the primary but so sharply contested was the primary election that the party factions backing the two defeated candidates never were able to support Jones with the enthusiasm and efficiency typical of the county organization.

The contest between "Joe" Jones and M. E. Sensenbrenner was the most vigorous election battle seen in Columbus for many years, since before the first election of James A. Rhodes in 1943. Both Jones and Sensenbrenner levelled charges of a personal nature at each other with

33 See description of 1953 special election for mayor in chapter 3.
substantive issues receiving scant attention from either of them.

Mayor Sensenbrenner's only hope of retaining his office lay in his ability to rouse the partisan instincts of the poorly organized Democrats in Columbus and the voting blocs who for socio-economic reasons would vote Democratic. There was no lack of potential Democratic voting strength in Columbus. A large Negro population and the normal distribution of working class, lower-middle class groups resided in Columbus but a lack of the kind of unionized industry which motivates such groups to vote their pocketbooks reduced considerably the voting power of the Democrats. The lack of a politicized and organized lower class coupled with the organizational flabbiness of the Democratic party combined to reduce the value of the party's endorsement.

But Sensenbrenner had the kind of personal characteristics and the drive and energy necessary to overcome this obstacle. Flamboyant, looking like a prototype of the Jacksonian common man, and speaking in the accent and vernacular of the common man in Columbus, Sensenbrenner boasted of his humble origins and made virtues of his lack of extensive formal education and the absence of polish in his manner and speech. He was a Franklin County version of Harry Truman and delighted in "giving 'em hell" (the Dispatch and allied "special interests").

34 See Journal, Dispatch, and Citizen, September through end of November 1955. Numerous items, especially during the last four weeks of the campaign.
former Bible salesman, and boy scout executive, took obvious delight in "letting 'em have it right between the eyes," as he put it in a number of speeches.

Compared to the Mayor, Joseph R. Jones seemed pallid, indeed. In the opinion of many Columbus business leaders impatient to see stalle community projects moved forward, Jones did not represent the model of vigorous leadership they felt was necessary in city hall. With mixed feelings many of them decided that Sensenbrenner offered the better alternative and voted for him.

The technically complex urban redevelopment program was too difficult and ambiguous a set of problems to be translated into campaign issues. In addition, there were serious disagreements beginning to emerge among major CBD interests over the location and type of redevelopment which prevented the traditional sources of Republican strength from mobilizing effectively behind Jones. With some degree of unity of purpose it might have been possible for the Dispatch, as chief spokesman for the Republicans, to have built a glowing picture of a transformed downtown Columbus out of the redevelopment program and tied this futuristic utopia to the Republican party's candidate. This approach was used with good effect by partican groups in both Newark

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35Personal interview, Chamber of Commerce executive. His comment was, "At least Sensenbrenner offered hope for a change."
and New Haven during this period. 

Circumstances militated against this happening, however. Intra-party conflict, disunity and a lack of direction among CBD leaders with respect to the redevelopment program, and still prevalent public image of urban redevelopment as being a public housing program and a means of redistributing the city's poor, especially the Negro poor, deprived the Republicans of a potentially useful issue. The lack of an attractive issue to offset the low appeal of the lackluster G. O. P. candidate contributed to the generous proportions of Sensenbrenner's victory. He took 54% of the ballots cast for a total of 50,000 votes.

As urban renewal officials and their business allies strove to keep their program at a safe distance from the bruising election campaign of 1955 they continued to plan and prepare for the redevelopment stage of the program. Additionally, planning for the new rehabilitation phase of the program also was being done. In cooperation with the

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36 There was much speculation among officials and businessmen about where clearance and/or rehabilitation should occur after Goodale, Market-Mohawk, and Children's Hospital projects were well along toward completion. The area north of Long Street, around the Union Station, was an especially favorite project of Mayor Sensenbrenner's. The so-called Near Eastside, the Long Street, Mt. Vernon Avenue area, where most Columbus Negroes lived, also was discussed, but in hesitant, quiet tones. Where would the residents of that area go following clearance? The alternative of redeveloping with public housing enabling most residents to remain would certainly raise opposition from the builders who still opposed any addition to the public housing supply.

37 The Mohawk-Market Booster's Association declared its opposition to Sensenbrenner's reelection the day before the election because "the mayor favors slum clearance." There is no evidence to indicate this group's opposition had a major effect on the election results.
Regional Planning Commission, the Columbus City Planning Commission engaged a nationally known research agency, the Harland, Bartholemew, and Associates firm of St. Louis to make a comprehensive study of regional housing and transportation needs. There was no master plan for the city, or area, in existence at this time. After nearly five years of activity, and then primarily because of the requirements of the 1954 housing amendments, SCAR recognized the need for a comprehensive, systematic approach to urban redevelopment. The so-called "workable plan" requirements of the new federal housing law meant that the city would have to have an overall slum prevention plan in existence before funds for redevelopment became available. The Harland, Bartholemew study also would provide the data necessary for this.

The 1954 Housing Act further stimulated planning activity through its conservation and rehabilitation emphasis. Because of this change in federal renewal policy much larger areas now could become the object of urban renewal. Under the previous policy of clearance and redevelopment it was somewhat easier to fix compact project boundaries since only the worst examples of slum housing tended to become renewal projects. Fixing the limits of areas in need of conservation and rehabilitation would require more planning data and careful judgment on the part of renewal officials. Establishing the extent of deterioration, its rate of growth, defining the limits of conservation neighborhoods which might extend over very large areas of the city, would
require information about and understanding of long range trends not then possessed. For such a planning effort the Columbus City Planning Commission in 1955 was woefully inadequate. Only a full-time, fully-staffed organization like Harland, Bartholomew could undertake the assignment to gather the preliminary materials needed before SCAR could begin to plan a conservation program.

The first goal of the private research firm was to take an inventory of all substandard housing in Columbus--housing, that is, which fell between the unrecoverable stock of housing suitable only for demolition and the "gray area" residential tracts leaning toward but not yet over the salvageable limit. Harland, Bartholomew reported that 1700 acres of residential housing fell into this transitional class. The largest single contiguous area of such housing was the so-called Dennison-Hunter-Hubbard Streets section (D-H-H) immediately south of the Ohio State University campus abutting the northern edge of the Goodale clearance project. D-H-H comprised a 500 acre section of rambling, pre-World War One houses distributed along pleasant, tree-lined streets. Many of the homes had been divided into apartments. Once a "prestige neighborhood" it now had the appearance of decline, an appearance substantiated by the falling real estate values in the area. Rehabilitation, however, would require time and careful preparation and during the preparation and information-gathering period speculative discussions about possible conservation sites would be en-
couraged by the ambiguousness of the concept. 38

The greater opportunities afforded by the conservation emphasis of the post-1954 urban renewal policy were not entirely technical in nature. Under the new approach it was conceivable that many more areas of the city could become the beneficiaries of federal money. Expanding the possible scope of urban renewal tended to stimulate more and broader interest in the program. Hitherto a hard core slum program, urban renewal now offered hopes that areas less deteriorated, and more alert to their self interest, could qualify for federal funds. Subsequent events, however, discouraged participation in rehabilitation efforts on the broad scale first envisioned by SCAR leaders. 39

With the reelection campaign won and the Development Committee being organized, Mayor Sensenbrenner on the occasion of the publication of the Harland-Bartholomew report declared that "he was about to launch a concerted attack on the city's slums and rundown areas." Promising action on the long delayed redevelopment program, the Mayor asserted, "Slums are going to go, now." 40

38Harland, Bartholomew and Associates, Preliminary Study for Establishment of a Master Plan for Columbus, Ohio, 1954.

39Although D-H-H did become the area for a small scale rehabilitation-conservation effort, SCAR never could give the time and resources demanded. Clearance projects alone taxed the capacity of SCAR but the general disinterest of the CBD leadership, the Development Committee in particular, and purely housing program, deprived SCAR of the supplemental private aid necessary to success.

40Dispatch, 12/15/55, p. 11.
To implement his goal, the Mayor appointed his executive assistant, M. D. Portman, as general coordinator of all city efforts relating to neighborhood conservation and rehabilitation. Sensenbrenner also created a six member City Housing and Slum Elimination Board, chaired by Portman, for the purpose of "... coordinating the activities of the campaign against suburban decay in connection with slum clearance and urban renewal-related planning and the need for low-cost housing." 41

SCAR administrator Lawrence Irvin was a member of the new Housing Board but by the placement of Portman in the chairmanship, in combination with Portman's other wide ranging responsibilities in the anti-slum program, demonstrated the decline in Irvin's stature in city hall. Portman, in effect, was told to "shake up" the bureaucrats in charge of urban renewal and end the covert inter-departmental bickering and competition for influence over the renewal program. 42

The extent of the inter-departmental problems became known shortly after Portman's appointment and the creation of the Housing Board. The Board's first action was directed at the dormant "slum clean-up" campaign. Although the campaign effort varied proportionately with the number of editorials exhorting the city to clean up the

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41 Other members were W. C. Lehman, Assistant Safety Director; J. M. Adams, Assistant City Attorney; Ernest Stork, Director, City Planning Commission; Russell Taylor, Director of the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority. Also, Personal interview, M. D. Portman, 9/9/69.

42 Dispatch, 12/15/55, p. 11.
slums, the departments involved continued to expend a minimum effort at all times. The Housing Board, however, decided that all activities which tended to contradict the overall goals of redevelopment should be halted. They recognized the incongruity of Building Department Inspectors issuing "tear down or repair" orders to owners of property located in slum or expressway clearance areas. The board decided that it would be easier and cheaper for the city and certainly more consistent with redevelopment goals simply to padlock uninhabitable properties until they were eventually demolished. 43

However, the recommendations of the Housing Board did not come in time to prevent accumulating tension between SCAR and other city agencies from causing an open clash. Department of Safety Director, Leo Phillips, a member of the Housing Board, demanded of his fellow board member, Lawrence Irvin, a clarification of the Safety Department's role in enforcing building and fire codes in areas slated for clearance. Since the bond issue defeat of 1954, SCAR had continued to plan future activity on the assumption that eventually necessary local funds would be obtained. As clearance projects were established SCAR director Irvin privately arranged with Phillips to keep inspectors from his department's Division of Building Inspections away from clearance areas. Irvin felt that code inspections carried out after project boundaries were established might appear as harassment to property owners.

43 Dispatch, 12/27/55, p. 11.
In irvin's view, potential resistance to his agency's goals should be minimized, if possible, and overlooking code violations seemed to be a useful way of reducing the probability of opposition. Only in emergencies did safety department inspectors go into project areas. 44

A series of slum fires during the winter of 1955-56 served to make the private agreement between SCAR and the Department of Safety politically untenable. The deaths of a number of elderly people and children caught in the disasters produced an outcry in the press for an investigation of the inspection program of the Safety Department. Once more, as so often in the past after similar tragedies, the "clean up the slums" campaign became cause number one on the editorial as well as the front pages of the Columbus press.

The press directed its criticism at the division of building inspections in the Safety Department. The Dispatch and the Journal charged the administration with gross irresponsibility and laxity in performing his duties. In effect, Phillips himself was charged with personal responsibility for the fires and the resulting deaths. 45

Provoked by the severity of the newspaper criticism, feeling that he had been use as a shield for SCAR, the Safety Department director issued a public statement in which he blamed urban renewal officials for the accelerated deterioration of the slums in Columbus.

44 Journal, 1/5/56, p. 27.

45 Journal, 1/9/56, p. 2. The two Wolfe family newspapers made the most severe attacks, undoubtedly to embarrass the Sensenbrenner administration. But, it must be said, these criticisms were consistent with the preference for rehabilitation expressed by the Wolfe interests all along.
It had been pressure from Irvin which caused Phillips to reduce to a minimum the inspection of buildings in slum areas. Irvin quickly responded with the comment to a reporter that, "Hit or miss inspections and condemnations are not the answer to slum problems. . . only clearance and redevelopment can eliminate them." 46

Phillips countered with some heat that, "You (Irvin) don't know how awful it is in some of these neighborhoods. . . We can't just wait around for the bulldozer." 47

The exchange and counter exchange of charges continued for more than a week. The chief of the division of building inspections demanded a "coordinated policy" between his agency and SCAR which would allow the condemnation and razing of structures in flagrant violation of fire and building codes. Irvin demurred, however, reiterating his belief that such action would hamper the redevelopment program, perhaps generate opposition to the upcoming second bond issue proposal, and drive up redevelopment costs. He added that if "code enforcement had been done in past years there wouldn't be a slum problem today." 48

The 1956 Bond Issue Campaign

The abortive clean-up-the-slums campaign finally was put into

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Journal, 1/9/56, p. 5.
more functional perspective following the public quarrel between SCAR and the Safety Department. The Mayor's Slum Clearance and Housing Coordinating Committee cut the Gordian knot by ordering the building inspectors to "padlock" buildings unfit for human habitation and leave the marginal structures as they were in urban renewal project areas. Given the eventuality of clearance and relocation of project area inhabitants the course of action ordered by the SCHC was both logical and in the short run less costly in human terms. Owners and tenants would welcome the reduction in uncertainty and the two government agencies would certainly welcome release from the awkward situation into which their overlapping interests had drawn them. With this step the slum clear-up phase of urban renewal ended and a milestone was passed.

Another milestone, however, loomed very near. Whether it would be passed was a question of paramount concern to SCAR officials and their CBD supporters at the beginning of 1956. The November 1954 bond issue had failed to attract the necessary 55% majority at the polls. Now, in 1956, a second make-or-break attempt had to be made. SCAR had been marking time, for the most part, since the 1954 failure but it had expended large amounts of effort and time planning for the crucial second, possibly last, chance to win popular support for its controversial program goals. The SCAR leaders and friends delayed submitting another bond issue until they could be reasonably certain
of success. The Metropolitan Committee had advised skipping 1955 because of the dangers posed by the fluid political situation in Columbus at that time.

The period of the 1955 city election, however, could more easily be avoided than the other hard problems seen by Irvin and Metropolitan Committee leaders to be blocking a successful appeal for public support. In order of priority they were:

1. Convincing the general public and the need and utility of the redevelopment program.

2. Erasing the prevalent notion that federal urban renewal assistance was one more instance of "big government" encroachment on local government.

3. Mobilizing CBD resources, human and material, in behalf of a major capital improvements program (as represented by urban redevelopment and the stalled expressway system program).

4. Extend the commitment of the federal URA in the face of growing impatience with the lagging Columbus program. 49

Don Weaver, editor of the Citizen, had frequently editorialized in specific terms in behalf of downtown redevelopment and against slum

49 These four pre-conditions either are discussed in separate places in the previous chapters or have been inferred from discussions of indirectly related topics.
conditions. As a member of the Metropolitan Committee's executive group and as one of the founders of the Development Committee, Weaver argued often in print in behalf of urban renewal in Columbus.

In editorials and in his weekly "Mr. Citizen" column, Weaver stressed the increasing tax costs of slums and expressed indignation that there were 19,500 dilapidated houses in Columbus, infecting healthy areas—spreading the contagion of blight. True to the ideology of urban renewal, Weaver saw the problem in purely physical terms. Sick buildings threatened healthy buildings. The remedy—cut out the diseased portion of the housing stock. Weaver also emphasized the theme that the local renewal agency really was "in charge" of urban renewal in Columbus and that money from Washington spent to subsidize the renewal program actually was "our money." In fact, the money granted to SCAR represented only a fraction of the federal taxes paid by Columbus residents. By participating in the federal urban renewal program Columbus would, in effect, keep at home part of the resources normally flowing to Washington.

SCAR administrator Irvin continued his program of personal appeals to opinion-molding groups in the community whose public endorsement meant as much as the actual votes or funds they could contribute to the bond issue effort. 50

The establishment of the Development Committee in February 1956

50 See the more detailed discussion of Irvin's one-man campaign in chapter 5.
represented a response to the third problem.

By demonstrating genuine concern and effective purpose in dealing with obstacles 1-3, it was hoped that the 4th problem, federal impatience, would dissolve. SCAR leaders and supporters were keenly aware of the real possibility that federal support soon might end.

In early February 1956, nearly coincident with the formation of the Development Committee, the Metropolitan Committee met to discuss the various requests for public funds submitted by several community groups. The committee would decide only which requests would be presented to the voters but the general strategy for winning support.

To minimize the possible effects of partisan or personality issues, the committee agreed that a special election should be held in September for the sole purpose of presenting a "package" of capital improvement bond issues. This decision was a calculated risk because the city charter required a 65% majority for issues presented at other than general or primary elections. But, by avoiding unnecessary distractions and mounting a concentrated campaign around the issue of "decay or redevelopment" the Metropolitan Committee leaders felt they would enhance the chances for passage of the bond issue package.

51 See chapter 5 for a discussion of Irvin's one-man campaign in and formation of the Development Committee for Great Columbus, p. 52 Journal, 10/20/55, p. 13.

53 Dispatch, 1/25/56, p. 22 and 2/12/56. Also, personal interview with Paul H. Gingher, chairman, executive committee, Metropolitan Committee of One Hundred Organizations.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1956 Metropolitan Committee leaders and SCAR officials, now joined by Development Committee leaders, pressed the campaign to accumulate interest group endorsements and generate a favorable climate of grass roots acceptance. SCAR director, Lawrence Irvin, especially sought support from churches, social clubs, and business-groups within the project area boundaries. Such groups were the bellwethers of public opinion within the project areas on this issue. Their approval would tend to neutralize the opposition of outside groups.

Of particular importance were the Market-Mohawk Booster's Association, the Main-Fourth Association and the Council of South Side Organizations. The first two groups were composed of businessmen and the last was an "umbrella" association of social welfare groups. There were no groups of comparable significance in Goodale.

Irvin succeeded in convincing these groups and other, less important ones, that redevelopment was in their interest despite the fact that one of them, the Market-Mohawk Boosters, had opposed the reelection of Mayor Sensenbrenner because he had supported urban renewal. Important differences of opinion over the form of redevelopment still remained but gaining their commitment to the general policy of renewal meant that the real business of government-interest group bargaining could begin. In short, policy development through the traditional processes of public and private group interest representation hinged on
preliminary agreements to broad goals. Through the efforts of the Development Committee and SCAR's cooperation with the committee, the stage nearly was set for hard bargaining over the "conference table." Only the voters' acquiescence was needed.

On September 14, 1956, the voters of Columbus in a special election gave overwhelming support to a package of capital improvement issues, including the $5 million "slum clearance" issue. (The nomenclature used on the ballot.) Seven percent of the votes, 7% more than the charter required, were cast for the clearance issue. The other issues received nearly the same amount and, with Goodale area residents excepted, the distribution of support for slum clearance was equal throughout the city. The issue failed in Goodale.

By the time the second bond issue was presented, Goodale residents had begun to feel the harsh effects of expressway construction through their section of the city. Right-of-way proceedings were forcing people to abandon homes and neighborhoods. In the view of SCAR commission members the people of Goodale identified expressway clearance with slum clearance and expressed their opposition to both by defeating the urban renewal bond issue in their area.\footnote{Minutes, SCAR, 9/25/56.}

Their resistance to urban renewal was hardened by the shrinking market of replacement housing. People living in slums have very limited housing options and the designation of Market-Mohawk as a clearance...
area removed one of the largest areas of housing opportunity for the
typical Goodale resident. The CMHA, of course, had been unable, at
this time, to build new public housing to absorb displaced project area
families. 56

The Relocation of Slum Clearance Project Residents

The question of how and, more important, where to resettle the
people soon to be displaced by urban renewal and expressway programs
had lain dormant since the bruising public housing battles of 1953-54.
The accelerated pace of events following the passage of the bond issue
of September, 1956 were moving SCAR officials closer to the time of
decision on this very difficult program.

Already, the portents of how serious the problem would be were
evident in relocation required by the expressway program. Property
acquisition for the right-of-way had gone ahead steadily since the en-
actment of the federal interstate highway act in 1956. This legislation
provided for major financial assistance to cities constructing high-
speed expresway systems which would connect with the system of
interstate roads. 57

There were four possible sources of relocation housing. 1. Public

56Ibid.

57Dispatch, 1/2/57, p. 4. Acquisition of properties had pro-
ceeded with great dispatch. By the end of 1956 the city attorney re-
ported that 200 properties of the 308 to be obtained had been acquired.
Negotiations between the city and the owners were in progress on most
of the remaining cases and a few more were in court for various reasons.
housing; 2. existing standard housing (within specified safety and health requirements) which the low income project area residents could afford; 3. new or existing housing which a small proportion of "higher income" families could purchase or rent through the section 221 program of FHA-insured mortgages. Builders could construct single or multiple family units for sale or rent to families displaced by public works projects; 4. Private development of low cost housing, without benefit of the section 221 guarantees.

Immensely complicating the relocation problem, of course, was the racial barrier to a genuinely free housing market. In 1957 racial discrimination in housing was an accepted and quite visible part of relocation planning and action. The only hopeful signs were the requirement in the latest version of the federal housing law that section 221 housing must be available on a non-discriminatory basis and the fact that the Development Committee endorsed this position. It will be recalled that the Development Committee undertook as one of its first goals the orderly and rapid relocation of slum and expressway project residents. Robert Mott, working closely with Lawrence Irvin, organized the Family Relocation Office as the center for all official relocation activities. 58

Mott placed advertisements in the newspapers. He persuaded reporters to write articles encouraging landlords to make housing

58 Report #SC-6 Family Relocation and the Section 221 Program in Greater Columbus 1956-65, by the slum clearance and rehabilitation committee of the Development Committee for Greater Columbus, p. 1.
available to Negro families, especially those who soon would be forced to move out of the path of the Goodale expressway. Originally, there were 236 families in the first three demolition areas in Goodale. In January, 1957 eighty-six families remained to be moved. Sixty-six of these were Negro "and finding suitable housing elsewhere is no easy task," opined the Development Committee director.

Construction schedules specified the demolition of all dwellings in these three areas by March 15th. Despite the pressing circumstances of time and need a pitifully limited amount of "Negro housing" was available at this time. The Family Relocation Office file at the end of January contained exactly one house for sale available to non-whites big enough to accommodate five people, located twelve miles out East Broad Street. Ninety percent of the rentals for non-whites were two room units renting for $75.00 per month or above. The average need was for four rooms at about $55.00 per month.

As slum clearance caught up with expressway clearance in 1958 the problem promised to become even more acute. For purposes of description the relocation problems caused by expressways and slum clearance will be treated together. The two programs meshed physically and functionally at many points by this time. Indeed, in 1957, many observers of the federal urban renewal program agreed that the 1956 federal highway act was providing the major stimulus for com-

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munities to get on with their usually stalled redevelopment programs.

Highways and expressways are readily acceptable to diverse community interests. Most state and communities took quick action to avail themselves of the benefits of the highway program. The prospect of major changes in the urban landscape forced slum clearance officials and their community allies to exert more effort to implement renewal goals so that an integration of the two federal assistance programs could be effected. If the road builders were allowed to proceed alone the slum clearance people would have to accommodate their goals as best they could to the new highway systems.

By the start of the new year the city attorney announced the purchase of over half the properties needed for the Goodale leg of the Innerbelt expressway. SCAR would have to move quickly to avoid being left behind. Assuming responsibility for relocation (i.e., controlling its pace) would be one means for SCAR to tie itself to the expressway program, and to make sure the "distance" between the two programs did not grow too great. 60

The first relocation of Negroes from clearance areas into an all-white neighborhood occurred in the autumn of 1956. The Development Committees' recognition of the need to "colonize" residential areas previously restricted to white families brought a response from Negro

60 Dispatch, 1/2/57, p. 11. Also, personal interview with L. B. LaCour, former director of relocation for SCAR, 7/20/64.
realists and their white realtor counterparts who cooperated in a successful "blockbusting" effort. In August of 1956 no Negroes lived north of 17th Avenue in Columbus. By January of 1957 the north wall of the ghetto had been breached by the shifting of fifteen Negro families to 16th Avenue. Fifteen more were in the process of purchasing houses on the same street through the section 221 programs. But the availability of loan guarantees for displaced black families could not by itself have produced the transfer of Negroes into a white residential area. Working quietly with Negro and white brokers, Robert Mott and the Development Committees' subcommittee on relocation negotiated the "deal" which opened the street to Negro buyers. The falling domino effect of the initial breakthrough was indicated by the sudden availability of eighteen other 16th Avenue properties for sale in addition to the thirty already sold.  

The comparative ease with which displaced Negro clearance project families moved into the 16th Avenue area contrasts with the very strong resistance met in neighborhoods earmarked for multi-unit public or private low rent housing. In the latter cases the existing residents presented a united front of opposition. The "blockbusting" technique, however, was more difficult to counteract. Once the first sale was made to a Negro buyer, panic set in among the remaining white owners. Soon, all of them who possibly could stampeded to sell before

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\(^{61}\) *Ohio Sentinel*, 1/12/57, p. 1. Personal interview, LaCour, *op. cit.*
their property values declined further. The expectation of a decline in values, combined with ingrained fears and myths concerning racially integrated neighborhoods. . . . No amount of organization or appeals for unity in the face of such a perceived threat could restrain the frantic exodus of whites once it had begun.

To assist displaced families able to purchase low cost new housing SCAR received a reservation from FHA for 660 building loan guarantees for single-family dwellings and 2211 units of rental housing in January of 1957 worth $20 million in construction contracts. Pressure to provide replacement housing was mounting. Relocation Office officials declared at the time of the application, "We are only three weeks ahead of the bulldozer." Of the 486 families living in the future path of the Goodale leg of the expressway, only 172 had moved out. 62 The short lead time between moving and demolition worked to the particular disadvantage of Negroes, especially elderly, single Negroes ineligible for public housing because of the CMHA rule against renting to single individuals. This barrier was mitigated somewhat when CMHA announced later in the month that so-called synthetic families composed of two or more older persons not related would be accepted as tenants in public housing. 63

The frequency of official pleas for additional relocation housing

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62 Dispatch, 1/13/57, p. 19.
63 Citizen, 1/13/57, p. 5.
prompted an unnamed local builder to offer to build the entire allotment of 2211 rental units, on the condition that the administration relax enforcement of the building code. Mayor Sensenbrenner, already angered at the continued opposition of builders' to public housing, rejected the offer as a poor bargain which would only lay the foundation for future slums.  

Sensenbrenner saw the offer as symptomatic of the local builders' lack of understanding of the supporting requirements for redevelopment in Columbus. While paying lip service to the goals of SCAR, and to the expressway program, they insisted that the relocation requirements of these programs should only be met by private action. All new public housing construction was as bitterly opposed as in 1953.

The intensity of the builders' opposition soon revealed itself again. In response to the Development Committees' efforts to secure relocation housing the CMHA had begun purchasing land for a new project in the area bounded by the Pennsylvania R.R., Bonham Street, Windsor Terrace and St. Clair Avenue. As soon as the Associated Builders Corporation heard of the housing authority's activities in the Bonham Street area it announced with great fanfare its intention to stop the proposed $6 million CMHA project "at any price." Immediately, ABC

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64 Journal, 1/17/57, p. 2.

65 The Associated Builders Corporation (ABC) had been organized in 1954 to block CMHA from building new public housing and to provide a vehicle for constructing low cost private housing for families displaced by public construction projects.
prepared to challenge in court the permit of agreement the city council must issue before actual construction could begin. The builders also resorted to the tried and tested referendum petition technique so effective in blocking past efforts to construct public housing in Columbus. In this instance the petition they began to circulate called for a charter amendment to be placed on the November ballot which would require a public referendum on all new CMHA projects. To offset the appearance of sheer obstructionism the ABC declared its intention to build 125 single-family units in the Bonham Street area for victims of clearance. 66

As alternative moves were made toward meeting replacement housing needs plans for the destruction of over 7800 units of housing were being completed by expressway and urban renewal officials. Condemnation proceedings soon would begin and demolition contracts would follow shortly thereafter. An estimated 25,000 people lived in those homes. Two to three thousand people, or nearly 500 families, would be affected in 1957 with the major impact go be felt in 1958 as slum clearance and expressway construction moved into high gear in Goodale. 67

The simultaneous presence of the FHA "221" opportunity and the accelerating resistance to the Bonham Street public housing project prompted the downtown press to try to counteract the ABC's anti-

66 Dispatch, 1/17/57, p. 8.
67 Journal, 1/21/57, p. 21
CMHA efforts. The Ohio State Journal warned "A.B.C. and its friends government insured private housing is not the complete answer to our needs. There are too many older people on pensions or families on public assistance unable to afford any kind of new housing." Only low rent public housing could match their needs.

By the end of January the battlelines between the pro-and anti-public housing forces were sharply drawn. The Columbus Home Builders Association (CHBA) had joined its offspring, ABC, to seek an injunction blocking the housing authority from obtaining additional land or options to purchase in the Bonham Street area. CHBA president, Ivan H. Gore, said that since A.B.C. was seeking building permits to construct seven homes in the same area CMHA should be prevented from blocking the efforts of private business to assist in meeting relocation housing needs.

Mayor Sensenbrenner responded by convening a meeting of the city attorney and SCAR officials to plan how to keep ABC from obtaining permits to build in the Bonham Street area. He excoriated the builders in a press conference. "I'm bitter about this. We need this public housing project... [This is] the same kind of thinking that stymied progress in this city for twenty years. I won't have it." 69

68 Journal, 1/23/57, p. 16.
69 Citizen, 1/30/57, p. 1.
Notwithstanding the mayor’s angry opposition, however, the city could not legally withhold the building permits ABC sought. Triumphant over the successful flaunting of the administration and CMHA, the CHBA president, Ivan Gore, announced that his group would continue to battle "all housing developments financed by federal funds." 70

To emphasize the calamity which might befall the whole redevelopment program, including expressways, Sensenbrenner issued a statement the day after the permits were issued to A.B.C. calling the CHBA leadership a "selfish little clique," demanding that they offer a realistic alternative to public housing. "I've been waiting for an answer. They don't have one! We need places to live for one thousand families... over the next three years." 71 The mayor's concern was well grounded. By February 1 the C.H.B.A., aided by local realtors, had collected over 5,000 signatures—more than enough to require a vote on the proposed charter amendment tying all new CMHA projects to referendum approval. 72

In the Woodland-Woodward public housing battle in 1954 SCAR had remained aloof in part, because the urban renewal program was in no immediate need of CMHA services and, in part, because of housing authority director, Russell Taylor's, abortive efforts to share leader-
ship of the redevelopment program. Now, however, the juxtaposition of the extrassway program, the imminence of the execution stage of redevelopment in Goodale, and the timing of CMHA's action in the Boham Street area combined to force SCAR into the public housing fight. Urban renewal was gaining momentum too valuable to be lost through a breakdown in the relocation program.

At a meeting of SCAR commissioners, Lawrence Irvin pointed to a preliminary analysis of relocation patterns. Of sixty-three families relocated since the first of the year into rental housing, only sixteen were living in what the relocation office defined as standard housing. Twenty-three were living in future clearance areas, sixteen in quarters needing major repair and eight families lived in housing classified as dilapidated. It was very clear to the commissioners that this record had to improve significantly if federal certification of the Columbus redevelopment program were to remain in effect. Crucial to improvement, they agreed, was the provision of additional public housing.\footnote{Minutes, SCAR, 2/5/57.}

As urban renewal officials calculated their stake in public housing the builders reinforced their claim for a court injunction against further land purchase in the Bonham Street area by CMHA by citing the public support they were generating for the charter amendment petition.\footnote{Citizen, 2/6/57, p. 21.}

The public housing issue, however, was not resolved until after a series of events which culminated in a successful "section 221" housing

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program. It was the success of this program which made public housing acceptable to local building interests.

As described above, the Federal Housing Administration made available a $20 million "221" relocation housing program in early January, 1957. On February 13 the City Planning Commission received a request for a rezoning of sixty-two areas along Stelzer Road between 8th and 12th Avenues near the municipal airport. C. A. Smith, president of Carlisle Construction Company, proposed to build 160 single-family homes from the 545 for which FHA authorized support. At that meeting, however, representatives of the CHBA opposed the rezoning request on the grounds that FHA credits should be used to build houses on vacant land adjacent to industries, land commercially unsuited for anything but low cost housing or further industrial development, and that, in any case, the FHA credits should be "spread around" and not "spent" in large lump sums. The CHBA spokesman reflected the local construction industry's concern over the decline in business being felt in the industry all over the country at this time. The FHA section "221" program represented a government subsidy in which all construction firms were anxious to share. 75

SCAR administrator Irvin feared that this important aspect of the relocation housing effort would be jeopardized by builders jealously wrangling over participation in it. He made a strong appeal to SCAR

75 Dispatch, 2/14/57, p. 17.
commissioners to use their influence with local builders to help resolve differences over who should share and in what amount in the "221" program. "We must have some concrete action in the next two weeks or we will lose the confidence of the people we have promised housing. . . It would take two weeks to get approval for the Carlisle [Construction Company] offer. . . [and] even the immediate construction of 2000 units would not be enough. . . over 5,000 families now or soon will need replacement housing."  

The urban redevelopment director felt pressure not only from slum clearance relocation needs but also from the expressway and all other public works projects for which his agency had assumed relocation responsibility.

The congruence of economic self-interest and civic need proved to be a successful catalyst. Irvin announced on February 20, 1957, at a SCAR meeting that an "unidentified builder" was talking final details with FHA officials in Columbus about 400 units of rental housing for slum clearance families.  

A second major rental project of 385 units was approved by FHA two days later. The Harold F. Zeig Construction Company would build an apartment complex, to be called Terrace Gardens, with rentals ranging from $60-$85 monthly.

FHA, section "221" replacement housing now amounted to 945 units

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76 Dispatch, 2/16/57, p. 4.
77 Minutes, SCAR, 2/24/57.
78 Dispatch, 2/22/57, p. 23.
planned for construction, far short of the 2000 units Irvin said were required immediately--and contrasting sharply with the eventual need for over 5000 family units of new housing.

These disparities served to remind redevelopment leaders of the irreducible need for some additional public housing as well as more section 221 housing. In a direct challenge to the builders, the Development Committee's Executive Committee on February 25th declared that: 1. builders should increase their participation in the section 221 program since they were so adamantly opposed to new public housing and; 2. all CBD leaders and people interested in finishing the many capital improvements underway should combine to overcome the CHBA's effort to sabotage the Bonham Street public housing project. The Development Committee made the strongest statement in behalf of public housing by business leaders ever seen in Columbus. 79

The builders now were opposed by the most important and visible segments of the Columbus "power structure," notably the Dispatch and its satellite interests, the Citizen, the Metropolitan Committee and its operating arm, the Development Committee for Greater Columbus.

Two days after the statement of policy from the Development Committee, the Ernest G. Fritsche organization announced FHA approval

79 Citizen, 2/25/57, p. 34.
of their plan to build seventy-one single-family dwellings selling at $10,000 each. Other offers came so fast that by the end of the month the district FHA administrator in Columbus, Forrest Smith, announced that nearly twice the 2212 units originally authorized for Columbus had been applied for. But, just as the success of the section 221 program appeared certain, an old problem appeared to threaten this first breakthrough in securing relocation housing.

Reminiscent of earlier public housing battles, a property owner's association formed in the Fairwood-Innis Avenue area, adjacent to a proposed section 221 project called Terrace Gardens. After announcing its opposition to this major relocation housing project the association quickly collected enough signatures on a petition which sought to put to a referendum vote the rezoning ordinance recently passed by city council to clear the way for Terrace Gardens. Councilmen reacted swiftly to the news of the petition. They repealed the rezoning legislation to avoid a divisive referendum fight especially at this time. The builder, Harold Zeig, angrily denounced the action of council declaring that he could not wait until the next general election in November to have the issue decided.

Robert Mott, Development Committee head, stepped in to mediate the dispute. He well understood the implications of the conflict. If the essentially private section 221 housing program were blocked in the

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80 Dispatch, 2/27/57, p. 34.
same way public housing had been there would be no hope at all for urban redevelopment in any form. One purpose for which his trouble-shooting committee had been formed was to open bottle necks just like this. This was the first real test of the strength of the DCGC and standing as its leader would be at stake as well as the redevelopment program.

Meeting for a week of closed door sessions led by Mott, representatives of the Columbus Board of Realtors, the builders, planning commission members, city council leaders and residents of the Fairwood-Innis area, finally reached a compromise. Another site would be used—about a mile east of the original location. It was satisfactory to the governmental leaders and builder because it retained the general size and location characteristics. The residents of the area liked the new site because they would be insulated from it by a "moat" comprised of Ben Franklin Tuberculosis Hospital, Alum Creek, and the New York Central and Norfolk & Western Railroad tracks. 81

By negotiating the successful compromise Mott and the Development Committee caused the property owner's association petition to be withdrawn. The Terrace Gardens project could now begin and the "221" program would have an important precedent and a stimulus for follow-up action on other "221" projects.

There still could be opposition to similar projects if the planning

81 Dispatch, 6/11/57 and Minutes, SCAR, 6/25/57. Also, personal interview, W. Ray Speer, former vice chairman, SCAR, 9/14/66.
for them failed to anticipate residential reaction. But the Terrace Gardens incident revealed a significant truth about building relocation housing. The real and perhaps only problem, was one of racial and class hostility rather than political ideology. Federal paternalism and big government welfare spending was shown to be a very secondary concern.

The Dispatch and Ohio State Journal no longer even alluded to the ideological dimensions of government issues or public housing. Both the "221" and public housing were being strongly supported for commercial reasons. The only opposition from the downtown press would occur when grass roots sensitivities over the "invasion" of lower class, especially Negro, slum dwellers were activated.

One last major hurdle to the relocation program remained to be surmounted—the builder's obstruction of new public housing, especially the Bonham Street project.

While the CHBA members had responded well to the need for private participation in the "221" program they continued to cling to their position that CMHA represented a threat to the local building industry, especially at a time of economic recession.

With the "221" program off the ground, Mott and the Development Committee, turned full attention to the public housing bottle neck.

It will be recalled that in January of 1957 the builders easily collected over 5000 signatures on a petition seeking a public vote on a charter amendment which would force referendum votes on all new
public housing in Columbus. Mott had persuaded the CHBA to hold the petition until he and SCAR officials could discuss the issue. Mott, however, sought more than time to talk. By delaying their petition the builders allowed opposition to them to coalesce and pressure on them to build up. The "221" program was launched, the case for new public housing had been effectively made and by the summer of 1957 the CHBA and their realtor allies had been cast in the role of negative obstructionists--alone in their opposition to the Bonham Street project.

With the pressure against them mounting the builders began serious bargaining with Mott and SCAR leaders. The two sides soon reached an important compromise. The builders agreed to cease opposing all new CMHA projects providing the metropolitan housing authority would limit its initiatives to areas adjacent to industrial sites, unsuited for private residential development, and would build only for clearly defined, limited purposes, e.g., to provide housing for people displaced by public works projects unable to afford any other housing.

Although not explicitly stated, the cooperation of the builders certainly was encouraged by the opportunity for construction profits provided by the FHA '221' program, for which redevelopment leaders functioned as transmission lines to the federal treasury.\(^{82}\) From this

\(^{82}\)There is no hard evidence for this. But conservations with Development Committee members, who must remain anonymous, provided support for this thesis.
point forward, CMHA experienced little or no organized opposition to its activities, as circumscribed by the agreement with private builders. The Bonham Street project, later named Windsor Terrace, moved smoothly toward completion throughout the remainder of 1957. 83

Later, the same year, SCAR and CMHA took preliminary steps for a joint slum clearance-public housing project. Russell Taylor or CMHA suggested a 500 unit project located somewhat east of Ft. Hayes near Leonard and St. Clair Avenues. Taylor had tried without success in 1952 to cast his agency in the role of slum clearance project developer. Then, however, he had conceived of urban renewal primarily as a tool for creating new low cost housing in place of slum housing. By 1957 Taylor, along with builders, SCAR officials and CBD leaders now knew that improved housing, per se, was at best, no more than an administrative pre-condition for redevelopment and that public housing in Columbus was a last resort alternative to be used only under tightly controlled conditions.

In the Leonard-St. Clair project, later titled the Boliver Arms slum clearance project, all parties to the planning for it agreed on the new "ground rules" for public housing and no conflict occurred, although several years later many social welfare and civil rights groups raised

83See various items in local newspapers describing in routine fashion: the movement of Windsor Terrace project through successive stages of development. The lack of controversy is in sharp contrast to the pre-1957 period, lending credence to the thesis that some kind of "understanding" on the issue of public housing had been reached.
serious questions about the conditions of life in which Boliver Arms tenants would have to live.

The end of 1957 was marked by other protents of success in the redevelopment program. The federal Urban Renewal Administration formally approved the Goodale slum clearance project releasing $7.4 million in loans and grants. With financing for the city's share of the project cost now assured the next phase of SCAR's family relocation process now could start. This phase would focus on the rehousing needs of the people living in the slum clearance part, as distinguished from the expressway clearance area of Goodale.

While the simultaneous building of expressways and slum clearance had been a major stimulus to the slum clearance program, it worked an unanticipated hardship on project residents. The expressway preceded slum clearance in Goodale forcing families to move out of the right of way. But, very often they moved only out of the immediate demolition zone into adjacent housing on the fringes of the expressway path. Expressway activity in other areas of Columbus forced out many families and often they moved into Goodale if housing in the immediate vicinity was unavailable.

In other words, the slum population in many cases was simply redistributing itself to other "target" areas--chased constantly by the bulldozer, vainly seeking refuge in the future demolition areas. Indicative of this movement pattern was the dramatic increase in the popu-
lation of Goodale from early 1957 to March 1958 when slum clearance relocation began. Seven hundred forty families were counted by SCAR "census takers," in March 1958, an increase of nearly three hundred since the 1937 enumeration.

But with the barriers to providing relocation housing removed the problem of finding more housing than anticipated by SCAR did not seriously affect the relocation program. Throughout 1958 the construction of "221" housing proceeded well and the Columbus Real Estate Board worked closely with SCAR and the Development Committee to locate replacement housing from the existing stock.

The full scope of the migration from Goodale is difficult to document because nobody knows how many families moved without registering for assistance with the Family Relocation Office. The records of the office list 481 families who received help in the form of relocation payments, certification of eligibility for "221" housing or public housing, or who consulted the vacancy lists compiled by realtors. Significantly, however, the Family Relocation Office's own studies, done as evaluations of its program, estimate conservatively that forty percent of Goodale's families moved prior to property acquisition by SCAR or the highway department. The proportion is probably higher because many families may have moved at the first opportunity following initial announcement of Goodale in 1952. The six year delay between the announcement and start of project execution provided opportunity for "emigration" to
During interviews with leaders of NAACP and the Urban League one of the most frequently made criticisms of the renewal program was that relocation was handled in a haphazard manner with very little concern for human, as opposed to purely physical, needs. Among specific charges made were these: No concern was shown for the future quality of neighborhoods which were on the margin of acceptability. Such areas were flooded with refugees from clearance projects. With no attempt made to preserve the neighborhood the creation of a new slum was inevitable.

The "slumization" of such areas was assured, it was charged, by the non-enforcement of code standards, especially occupancy restrictions in affected areas. Inspection was purposefully discontinued to facilitate the relocation process. Many single-family dwellings housed two, three, four or more families and population density increased beyond proper limits.
CHAPTER 6
MARKET-MOHAWK: URBAN RENEWAL IN CRISIS

The second urban renewal project in Columbus comprises a thirty block area located to the immediate southwest of the state capital building. Ultimately the rectangular boundaries of Market-Mohawk were Third Street on the west, Grant Avenue on the east, Fulton Street on the south with the northern limit running along a line passing just behind the buildings fronting on State Street.

From the very beginning this area of the city generally was conceded to be second only to the Goodale area in physical deterioration. One of the first decisions of the original Columbus Urban Redevelopment Authority (CURA), the predecessor of the Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation Authority, was to establish a "study area" in the general area lying southwest of the state capital in which the century-old Central Market building was the most prominent landmark.

The federal government advanced funds for preliminary planning and surveys for "Project Area Number Two" on January 8, 1953, following the submission of preliminary study data compiled by the CURA staff. Although some shrinkage of the initial study area boundaries would occur, the indices of decline and deterioration were very similar in most parts of the area. Sixty-three percent of the buildings

\[^{1}\text{Minutes, CURA, 7/3/52.}\]
were dilapidated, according to CURA's standards, and the less subjective index of decline, tax valuation, showed a decline from $9 million in 1924 to $4 million in 1952. There were approximately twice as many residential dwellings in Market-Mohawk as in the Goodale project area, 3,000 to just under 1,500.²

It was due to the greater number of residential units in Market-Mohawk that Russell Taylor, director of the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA), had tried in 1953 to convince city councilmen that his agency should clear and redevelop the area with new public housing. Taylor argued the CMHA could give the city urban renewal "at no cost" and eliminate a major housing problem at the same time.³ But, as with his earlier attempt to place low cost housing in the Goodale area, Taylor was defeated by the support given by the Columbus City Planning Commission and the city council to CURA's policy goal of "getting private enterprise back into slum areas."⁴

For the first five years of urban renewal activity in Columbus planning and surveying proceeded simultaneously in Goodale and in Market-Mohawk. In 1954 the federal Urban Renewal Administration reserved $5 million for Market-Mohawk and $3.4 million for Goodale in anticipation of the

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²Minutes, CURA, 1/8/53.
execution stages of the two projects. The release of the funds had been contingent upon the passage of the 1954 bond issue proposal.

Following the loss of the bond issue urban renewal leaders initiated a period of public education (described earlier) in which housing conditions in Market-Mohawk provided especially useful examples of the need for slum clearance. Because of its proximity to the center of business life in Columbus, only one block east of High Street, Market-Mohawk represented an even more dramatic example than Goodale of the fate which could befall the entire CBD if corrective policies were not adopted soon. As notorious as Goodale was, it was somewhat peripheral to the main business district of Columbus. But, Market-Mohawk was the Trojan Horse within the walls of the city's commercial center. 5

The hiatus between bond issue campaigns afforded unofficial policy modification groups an opportunity to form, especially in Market-Mohawk. As described before, Goodale had no important representational groups acting as policy modifiers in the face of official redevelopment goals. But, in Market-Mohawk an effective "balance of power" relationship developed between the renewal agency and major project area interests.

Key project groups were the Market-Mohawk Booster's Associa-

5Journal, 6/6/55, p. 15.
tion, a group of landlords, tenants and businessmen who organized in the summer of 1955 and the Main-(Street) Fourth (Street) Association, the most influential of SCAR's adversaries. The section of Market-Mohawk which this organization represented was the most economically viable area within the project. It spoke for the Market-Mohawk elite while the Boosters' Association reflected a heterogeneous coalition of slumlords, marginal businessmen and project residents. The Boosters had been formed originally to fight slum clearance, and substitute rehabilitation of the area as the proper kind of urban renewal.

In all urban renewal projects the redeveloper(s) ultimately determine the specific nature of what will rise in place of the cleared slums, subject to the willingness of leading institutions and the F. H. A. to underwrite their efforts. But long before the redevelopment stage is reached the local urban renewal agency must submit general land reuse plans to the federal urban renewal authorities for approval in order to obtain a reservation of funds.

The existence of organized Market-Mohawk interests insured that even at this early stage of policy making strong feedback could be expected from SCAR's first planning decisions.

In January, 1956, SCAR commissioned an outside consultant, Real Estate Research Corporation of Chicago, to formulate a series of alternative land reuse plans for Market-Mohawk. Formally, it was the agency's "front group," the Market-Mohawk Businessmen's Study Com-
mittee, which initiated the study. This was the so-called citizens' committee formed by the old Columbus Urban Redevelopment Authority, to give it a homogenized coalition of project area and C. B. D. businessmen for use as a sounding board and a source of legitimacy. The study committee would receive the various land reuse proposals, consider them (with SCAR's staff acting in a screening and advisory capacity) and finally recommend to SCAR commissioners the plan they felt was best for Market-Mohawk. 6

The leaders of Main-Fourth Association, however, did not want to be completely dependent on SCAR's research consultant for the data and analysis which would set the parameters of redevelopment. To make certain that they would have a means to counter any unacceptable agency plans for the future of their area, Main-Fourth hired its own consultant to study reuse of cleared project land in Market-Mohawk. 7

Three months from its inception, the Real Estate Research Corporation presented its official land reuse study to SCAR. For the sixty acres comprising the study area, Real Estate Research recommended to SCAR and the businessmen's study committee that ten acres be used for 200 apartment units; forty acres for 430 "detached single-family homes," and the remaining ten acres be reserved for Grant

6Journal, 10/10/55, p. 3, and personal interview with former member of Market-Mohawk Businessmen's Study Group, 1/15/66.

7Dispatch, 1/26/56, p. 17.
Hospital to develop a "hospital campus" containing nursing student headquarters, laboratories, and related hospital support facilities. In an important section of the report the consultant also recommended that SCAR reserve a site for the recently announced new state office building, specifically, the block adjacent to the southeast corner of the capital building.

Generally, the report opposed reuse of Market-Mohawk for commercial office buildings, warehouses, light industry, or for so-called special uses, e.g., entertainment facilities.

Perhaps the most controversial change the consultant suggested was that of tearing down the 100-year-old Central Market building. The nearly one-block long, pavilion-style wooden structure sheltered in its stalls and cubicles a diverse assortment of hold-outs against the twentieth century food chains. On the weekends activity inside the market spilled onto the sidewalks as pushcart vendors and make-shift sidewalk stands flourished. The rich mixture of sights, sounds, and smells--and disorder--generated by the Central Market was so asymmetrical as to be jolting to the planners and designers of "the new Market-Mohawk." To leave the market in the very center of the re-developed project would represent an extreme case of "incompatible use" of land. The general area west of Fifth Street and south of Noble was suggested as a good place to reconstruct the market facility.  

8 Dispatch, 3/14/56, p. 1.
While final redevelopment plans would depend on the preference of the redeveloper, preliminary plans were more tentative than usual because of uncertainty about the exact route of the innerbalt expressway. So great was the potential impact of its route, the location of interchanges and the timetable of construction for the segments which would abut the slum clearance project that Lawrence Irvin cautioned SCAR commissioners against hasty or specific redevelopment commitments. Market-Mohawk planning would have to await the outcome of local, state and federal highway engineering plans.

In addition to this contingency, Irvin's expressed desire to mix rehabilitation and clearance in Market-Mohawk militated against adoption of any redevelopment plan until SCAR resolved the touchy issue of who would stay in the project after redevelopment. 9

Irvin's request for restraint in discussion of Market-Mohawk's future went largely unheeded, however. Throughout the last half of 1956, outside events initiated by groups beyond Irvin's control kept alive speculation about redevelopment in the city's biggest urban renewal project. This period was one of preparation for the second bond issue campaign diverting effort which might otherwise have controlled and managed such influences.

In January 1957, representatives of the State building commission

met with SCAR commissioners to discuss state office building sites in Market-Mohawk. Following an inconclusive meeting SCAR appointed a two man subcommittee from its membership "to work with the state" on a study of possible sites. 10

A second external stimulus for redevelopment speculation grew from concern for the future of the Central Market. This issue was too salient to project area interests for SCAR to control discussion as it saw fit. On the heels of SCAR's meeting with state building commission representatives the city council and the administration announced a joint decision on the exact future site of the new market building, following a consultation with leaders of the Main-Fourth Association (MFA). A half-block long structure should be constructed to extend from Rich Street to Town Street between Fourth and Lazelle. MFA leaders had persuaded the councilmen and some members of the administration, in effect, to bypass SCAR and assume an independent planning role for themselves in Market-Mohawk. 11

A month later, as if to emphasize the point that planning for Market-Mohawk impinged on too many community interests to be left to SCAR planners, the Franklin County Regional Planning Commission urged the state legislature to approve the Columbus Civic Center as the site for the states' new office building. "The so-called Civic Center

10 Minutes, SCAR, 1/15/57.

11 Dispatch, 1/24/57, p. 2.
Drive paralleling the Scioto River." For many years an important segment of the CBD leadership, generally the Wolfe family-Dispatch-Metropolitan Committee combine had advocated further development of the riverfront area, west of the city's geographic and commercial center, at the intersection of Broad and High Street. They contended that too much of Columbus was concentrated around Broad and High Streets. Siting the proposed state office building in the Civic Center would represent a "natural compatibility" of land use and, more importantly, it would attract further development resulting in the dispersion of CBD activity they considered desirable. 12

To the special chagrin of Lawrence Irvin, Mayor Sensenbrenner himself volunteered a personal endorsement of the idea and offered the "total cooperation of the city." With this latest example of interference with his and SCAR's authority, Irvin could not help but feel that leadership for urban redevelopment was passing out of SCAR's hands. In order to gain its objectives the agency might have to bargain with a number of separate interests and actors each capable of jeopardizing the ultimate success of redevelopment in Market-Mohawk. A kind of "pork barrel" policy process would be substituted for the more rational, in bureaucratic terms, hierarchical policy process with leadership clearly centered at the top and "lower level" interests

12 Personal interviews with several CBD leaders affirmed the long time goal of the Wolfe family-Dispatch interests.
performing a modification role at most. 13

The appearance of leaderlessness in Market-Mohawk was the
decisive factor in the Urban Renewal Administration's decision in
March of 1957 to withdraw support from Project Number Two until the
first project in Goodale moved closer to execution. The federal
officials also took note of the chronically undermanned SCAR adminis­
trative and technical staff. They pointed out the lack of compliance
with recent housing law amendments requiring a "workable program" for
slum prevention before slum clearance payments would be made.
Specifically, Columbus lacked a capital improvements budget and had
yet to adopt a land use plan for the community as a whole, both key
items in the workable program requirements.

During the spring and summer of 1957 Lawrence Irvin and Robert
Mott of the Development Committee worked hard to push the Goodale
project to the verge of execution and to obtain re-certification for
Market-Mohawk.

By the following November, Irvin and Mott had nearly reached the
point where reapplication for Market-Mohawk funds was possible. Only
two requirements remained to be fulfilled. There had to be a survey
of the whole project area to determine exactly which buildings would
be razed and which ones rehabilitated. Also, there had to be a formal

13 Dispatch, 2/28/57, p. 21. Also, personal interview with W. Ray Speer, op. cit.
resolution of land reuse questions which had been pending and the subject of increasing speculation since the Real Estate Research study of early 1956. The configuration of redevelopment now had to be made explicit and comprehensive.  

A "blitz survey" in the words of the man responsible for it, was begun in November to ascertain how many of the 212 properties in the project area would be saved from the wrecking ball. The results of the survey needed to be in the hands of the URA regional office in Chicago by January 15, 1958, or Market-Mohawk could not be included in the 1959 schedule of projects.  

Within a month Irvin felt confident enough in the ability of the survey team to predict completion before the January 15th deadline. But the very next day doubt was cast on Irvin's judgment by the manner in which the Dispatch interpreted a survey finding that revealed much greater land acquisition costs than originally estimated. In a banner page one headline, the newspaper announced imminent disaster because the original cost estimates were $2 million under what the survey showed would be required. The administration attempted to soften the impact of the articles suggestion that Market-Mohawk planning had been bungled by declaring that, if necessary other capital improvement funds would

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be diverted. But the sensational tone of the Dispatch coverage obscured this attempt to allay suspicions and doubts.

To many observers the Dispatch article was the start of a premeditated effort to sabotage the whole Market-Mohawk project because of the Wolfe interests opposition to redevelopment in this area of the city. Since the Wolfes were committed to riverfront development, many CBD leaders thought that the "Dispatch people" saw Market-Mohawk as a threat to their conception of where the city should concentrate its development efforts. Market-Mohawk, with the new state office building as its central attraction would attract other development so strongly that any chance of riverfront or across the river expansion would be forever lost.

But the Dispatch charges of imminent financial disaster in the project were overshadowed by the public announcement of what SCAR and its consultants had finally decided to recommend for the future of Market-Mohawk. The crucial decisions were:

1. Demolish the market building and rebuilt it on Mound Street between 5th and 4th Streets.
2. Construct multi-story medium rent apartment building and town houses in most of the area bounded by Grant Avenue, Fulton Street, Town Street and Fourth Street.
3. Consolidate an area of four blocks along South Sixth Street between Town and Fulton by closing off the streets and many alleys intersecting the area.
4. Construct two story "patio style" houses for sale or rent in a six block area between Fifth and Grant.
5. Construct office buildings on both sides of Town Street between 3rd and 4th Streets.
6. Retain the existing churches and schools.
7. Close off East Main Street between 3rd and Grant to all vehicular traffic and construct a shopper's mall complete with pedestrian walkways, and "islands" of grass and trees with park benches and flower beds to provide a pleasant backdrop for the "quality shops" lining the mall. 17

In less than forty-eight hours after the SCAR meeting at which Irvin presented his recommendations the MFA board of directors invited him to attend a meeting to discuss the redevelopment plan, especially the Main Street closing. At the meeting Irvin was roundly criticized for springing a surprise. Why had they (MFA) not been consulted on the street closing and mall plan before it was announced? Irvin did not attempt to defend himself for not having "cleared" the plan with the MFA before submitting it to the commission. He concentrated on the substance of the plan, arguing that the shopper's mall would be an excellent means of attracting more diversified commercial activity into the Main-Fourth area. 18

"Diversification" is an abstraction used by urban planners to describe a preferred configuration of business activity. But, to the businessmen already in the Main-Fourth area, diversification meant change—the effects of which were unpredictable. How would their investment in the area be affected? Irvin could only speak in broader "community

17 Minutes, SCAR, 1/8/58.
18 Dispatch, 1/11/58, p. 4.
terms" or refer to the "growth potential" of the area. But, whose growth and what kind of growth, and at whose expense would new growth occur? The absence of satisfactory answers to such questions, of course, was not entirely Irvin's fault. A redevelopment plan was not the equivalent of redevelopment and any plan would have to fit the needs and preference of a redeveloper before he would risk investing in the area.

To no one's surprise, considering the hostility Irvin experienced at the MFA board meeting, this influential project group expressed its "unanimous and unalterable opposition" to closing Main Street, even though they still supported the general goal of urban renewal in Market-Mohawk. 19

The ability to accumulate commitments to major renewal decisions is one key to urban renewal success. As related or interested groups lend their support a kind of "band wagon" effect is generated and other groups, whose veto could slow or stop progress, are under pressure to "go along." The state urban redevelopment law requires the formal approval of only the renewal agency's lay policy making group (SCAR commissioners), the local planning agency, and the local legislative body. But the failure of Irvin to win over such an important grass roots organization as the MFA meant that he would have to approach the

19 Dispatch, 1/12/58, p. 1.
governmental groups sensitive to external pressures, with a "hand wagon" was running the wrong way.

The city council, of course, was the most influenced by outside opinion and if the MFA persisted in its opposition other community groups might be persuaded to lend support to their position. In a situation where SCAR, or at least its director, was pitted against upper echelon power groups with the council having to resolve the conflict, Irvin would be at a disadvantage. Failure to obtain council approval of the redevelopment plan at this time would mean a delay of at least a year before Market-Mohawk would be in line to receive federal support.

Development Committee director, Robert Mott, persuaded Irvin to concede the likelihood of changes in the redevelopment plan during the six to nine month period following initial council approval. Objections to any part of the plan would be considered in public hearings and changes would be negotiated, contingent on federal concurrence, up to the point when actual clearance began. On January 12, 1958, two days before city council would pass upon the Market-Mohawk plan, Irvin issued a public statement in which he said that the present plan had to be submitted to the Urban Renewal Administration "as is" because it was too late to make changes and still meet the federal deadline. But, once Market-Mohawk was safely scheduled for funds, objections and changes still could be made. 20

The MFA attorney argued the position of his clients before the city council at its January 14th meeting. The major point of his argument was that Irvin had failed to consult with any other governmental bodies which would be affected by the Main Street closing—the Traffic Commission, Planning Commission, the Service Director of the city council. Considering the potential impact of the street closing, this was inexcusable, the attorney concluded.

Irvin won the skirmish over initial council consent for his plan but the tenor of the remarks made by members of council suggested that the real battle was yet to come. Councilmen criticized Irvin for failing to consult other departments of government in formulating the plan. They expressed particular concern about the advisability of developing a pedestrian shoppers' mall on the site of one of the main east-west traffic carriers in the city. 21

More than a redevelopment plan for Market-Mohawk was at stake however. If Irvin had to make substantive concessions to a parochial interest the way could be opened to other groups, now or in the future, to require major changes in SCAR's redevelopment plan as a condition for not opposing. The "log-rolling" approach to redevelopment represented the antithesis of traditional planning values, especially when the bargaining occurred in public. Moreover, the planning initiative for

21 Dispatch, 1/14/58, p. 36.
redevelopment might pass from SCAR to other official bodies—the City Planning Commission or the city engineer's office. Already, there had been disturbing signs of an erosion of SCAR's authority and prestige because of the way the planning commission and the administration had promoted a state office building in the Civic Center instead of Market-Mohawk. 22

Adding to the SCAR director's troubles was the city attorney's discovery of an obscure clause in the deed to the Central Market site requiring the city to return the land to the heirs of the original owners should the city cease using it for a public market. This information was announced the same day, January 15, 1958, that Irvin submitted the city's application for recertification of the Market-Mohawk project.

This discovery was fraught with unhappy possibilities, chief of which was the inability of the city to tear down the 109 year-old market building and use the site for other purposes, as indicated by the redevelopment plan just submitted to Washington. The whole Market-Mohawk project could be made impractical if the Central Market had to remain where it was. Certainly, at the very minimum, the project's feasibility was in doubt until the question of whether the city had a "marketable title" to the site was settled. 23 This question, however, was one

22 Personal interview, Robert Levy, member of the executive committee of the Metropolitan Committee, 5/10/64. Levy recalled that "We were surprised that Larry was so foolish as to let this thing come out in the open. He didn't clear it with anybody."

for the courts to settle and thus beyond Irvin's scope of official responsibility.

But very much within his scope of authority was the disposition of a parcel of land within the Market-Mohawk boundaries which Mayor Sensenbrenner suddenly announced his intention to sell. The city had purchased the parcel from the Board of Education and had been allowing its use as a free parking lot. Located on the site of the old Mound Street School the land was strategically placed with respect to the expressway route and it had great potential importance to Market-Mohawk development.

The Mayor, however, told a surprised city council that a super-market chain was very much interested in acquiring it and while this was only one alternative he was considering, he felt that whatever his choice of a buyer, sale of the lot would have no impact whatever on Market-Mohawk redevelopment.

MFA attorney, Troy Feibel, disagreed, asserting that his clients strongly favored using the land for some type of non-commercial facility in order to avoid adding to an already acute parking problem in the area. Lawrence Irvin also took issue with the Mayor's opinion and advised retaining the land, at least, until the unsettled state of Market-Mohawk planning was eliminated. SCAR might have to buy back the land later at a cost greater than the price received by the city if it was sold now.

A week of lively discussion among Irvin, Sensenbrenner, various
MFA leaders and members of the CBD leadership finally brought about a change of heart by the Mayor. Irvin stressed the need for additional parking for the proposed shopper's mall. This was critical to the success of the mall, since no vehicular traffic would pass through the area the parking facilities must be within easy walking distance of the mall. The former Mound Street School site was well situated for such a purpose. ²⁴

The SCAR director made his point so convincingly that he appeared to be retreating from his position of flexibility on the redevelopment plan for Market-Mohawk. He had spoken so definitely about the relationship between the mall and an adjacent parking facility that MFA attorney Troy Fiebel, felt compelled to remind that his clients were still "violently opposed" to the mall plan and closing Main Street to through traffic.

By this time, however, Irvin had decide to seek other employment. As one CBD leader put it, "Larry really got knocked around in his years as director. He got no support from city hall (the mayor's office) and a lot of pressure from just about every group in town. He spent most of his time trying to pass a bond issue and prepare for slum clearance and when it finally passed, things really got hot. Nobody blamed him for getting out when he had a chance for a better job." ²⁵

²⁴Dispatch, 2/1/58, p. 5 and 2/9/58, p. 2.

At the end of January 1958, Irvin announced his resignation. Effective March 1st, he would become director of city planning in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Irvin may have been emboldened by his anticipation of leaving to his successor the task of patching up the Market-Mohawk redevelopment plan or he may have been moved to defend the administrative values he cherished and saw being threatened. For whatever motive he suddenly lashed out against the "narrow" interests he saw picking apart the carefully drawn plans he proposed for Market-Mohawk.

Irvin categorically asserted that failure to close East Main Street to through traffic would substantially lower the resale value of the cleared land his plan earmarked for residential development, the area on both sides of Main Street between Fifth and Grant. "The financial situation is precarious now. Anything which would raise project costs would be deadly." 26

"If you want to spend a couple of years arguing about it, the $5 million in federal funds still could go to another city." 27

Irvin's warning, however, failed to stem the flow of criticism now coming from many quarters or allay rising fears and doubts about his controversial redevelopment plan for Market-Mohawk. The day following Irvin's admonition the morning spokesmen for the Wolfe family

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26 Ibid. Also, see Minutes, SCAR, 2/4/58.

interests, the Ohio State Journal editorialized against the plans to close Main Street. Several salient points were made: 1. Main Street was the city's second most important east-west traffic carrier (second only to Broad Street); 2. A comparatively new bridge across the Scioto River linking Main Street to the west side of Columbus would be "wasted" if traffic flow on the east side of the river were diverted by the mall; 3. The effects on downtown traffic patterns would be bad, causing congestion and delay in travelling the CBD and complicating traffic control. (If urban redevelopment was a tool for revitalizing the CBD making traffic problems worse than they already were would be self-defeating). 28

The highway committee of the Columbus Area Chamber of Commerce declared its opposition to the SCAR plan for Market-Mohawk at the same time the Journal did. The Chambers' committee cited the same points used by the newspaper but added that its position should be interpreted as representing a broad cross-section of downtown business leadership. It was not opposing the Main Street closing and shopper's mall for narrow reasons of self-interest. The committee felt that there was insufficient data available to evaluate the long range consequences of the street closing. The whole plan was too risky and too much was at

28 Ibid. The Board of Director of the Chamber of Commerce adopted a resolution in support of the highway committee's recommendation on March 25, 1958.
stake to accept the shopper's mall plan on faith. Irvin's lack of consultation with other city officials reinforced this last criticism.

SCAR was alone in its support of the mall plans. No other official or official groups had endorsed its position and most were openly hostile to it. Furthermore, some of the larger businesses in Market-Mohawk began to seek exceptions to the redevelopment plans encouraged by the examples recent events had provided. The administration, city planning, regional planning and an increasing number of unofficial groups had "trespassed" on SCAR's domain--and others would certainly be encouraged to follow suit.

Moreover, as SCAR entered a period of "lame-duck leadership" while commissioners sought a new permanent director, the agency would be even more vulnerable to outside influences. Its interim administrator could not effectively and authoritatively speak for the urban renewal agency--explain and defend its goals and negotiate compromises with groups like MFA.

On February 5, 1958, the evening of the day in which the Ohio State Journal and the Chamber of Commerce opposition to the mall plan appeared, SCAR commissioners met to decide what course of

29 The Gilbert Shoe Company had submitted a formal request to remain in Market-Mohawk with the proviso that it would remodel to the specifications of the redevelopment plan. Minutes, SCAR, 1/8/58.

30 Citizen, 2/5/58, p. 13. Article appeared referring to intention of many project businesses to seek exemption from clearance.
action they should follow in view of the mounting obstacles to Market-Mohawk plans. A protracted exchange of opinions revealed a distinct lack of harmony among the members on the controversial redevelopment plan. Reluctant simply to reject the mall plan and, in effect, desert their administrator, even though he was about to depart, the commissioners finally voted to ask the SCAR staff to "re-examine" the plan in order to assess the relationship of the plan to the CBD, as well as to Market-Mohawk development financing. 31

The "reexamination" decision was seen by MFA leaders as a sign of retreat by SCAR. The MFA attorney, Troy Feibel, pressed his advantage in a bitter attack on SCAR planners. He labelled them "a bunch of dreamers trying to force a controversial, radical experiment on this city. They are not doing (sic) slum clearance, they are doing city planning." As if this were not bad enough, Feibel added a charge of perfidy on Irvin's part. Irvin had purposely withheld the truth from Market-Mohawk businessmen when he showed MFA leaders in December a redevelopment plan which showed East Main Street open all the way through the project. 32

Irvin declined to comment on the allegation. Instead, he attempted to buttress his position by having the consultant firm which had drawn

31 Dispatch, 2/21/58, p. 3.
up the redevelopment plan suggest alternatives to closing Main Street, which would preserve the rest of the plan as originally proposed. The consultant suggested closing Rich Street to through traffic, between Fifth and Grant, but only as a last resort. Main Street, they said, needed to be closed if the redevelopment plan they had proposed was to be properly implemented. 33

Facing the imminent loss of its long time director, and an absence of alternatives from its planning consultant, SCAR commissioners tried to buy time and to reduce the intensity of conflict by inviting the president of MFA, Elmer Dick, to sit down with the SCAR leaders and hear the mall plan explained fully and objectively by representatives of the consultant firm. If Dick could be persuaded that financial ruin for MFA members was not the necessary corollary to the mall plan, a genuine compromise, not a SCAR surrender, might be negotiated. SCAR was willing to modify the plan but thus far MFA had defined the issue so that only complete abandonment of the mall plan, hardly a compromise, would be acceptable.

The tactic backfired badly. Although Mr. Dick expressed interest in the 'possibilities' of the mall plan at the meeting, his report to the rest of MFA's board of directors brought charges of "high-handedness" against SCAR and Irvin, in particular, for trying to drive a wedge between its members. Albert Schottenstein, another board member,

33 Dispatch, 2/27/58, p. 4.
disclaimed any connection between Dick's statement of interest in the
mall plan and the views of the full MFA board of directors. Schotten-
stein said, "No individual speaks for the organization except the board
of directors (sic). We have not softened our stand on the Main Street
closing." 34

On his last day as director of the Columbus urban renewal program,
Lawrence Irvin delivered a long repressed diatribe against the MFA
leaders. He accused them of obstructing SCAR's efforts to carry out
its legitimate functions and of selfish narrow mindedness in their
attitude toward the mall plan. He took special note of the lack of ap-
preciation MFA leaders showed for sound planning values. Irvin sug-
gested they "get some planning advice as well as legal advice." 35

For the next two months, March and April 1958, the Market-Mohawk
redevelopment plan drew fire from nearly all CBD interests. SCAR's
interim director, A. T. Connell, tried to maintain the status quo until
a new permanent administrator took command by presenting data on
traffic flow patterns which would answer some of the questions about the
effects of closing Main Street. 36

34 Ibid.
35 Dispatch, 4/21/58, p. 3.
36 Personal interview with W. Ray Speer, op. cit.
SCAR commissioners were reluctant to endorse changes lest the new director find his hands tied before he had had a chance to evaluate the situation. Besides, changes in the redevelopment plan were "planning questions" in the opinion of the commissioners, which they were unable to resolve without help. The other members of SCAR's staff were technicians and specialists in various aspects of urban redevelopment and without the guiding hand of a chief administrator it was doubtful that they could come together on such a touchy issue. 37

On April 17, 1958, SCAR named Sinclair Powell to the directorship held for over six years by Lawrence Irvin. Powell, a thirty-five year old public administrator with city management experience in Michigan, was exhorted by Mayor Sensenbrenner at the swearing-in ceremony, not to fear "the special interests" opposing some urban renewal projects in Columbus. 38

The new director flew immediately to Chicago to discuss the Market-Mohawk redevelopment plan with URA regional officials and the consultant firm which had drawn up the plan for SCAR.

Upon his return to Columbus, Powell announced that the controversial Main Street mall plan was being dropped and that tentatively, the alternative plan of closing off Rich and Mound Street to through

37 Ibid.
38 Dispatch, 4/18/58, p. 9.
traffic (as suggested by the consultant in January) would replace the original plan. This would "cool things down" while MFA representative, city planning officials and SCAR could sit down and iron out their differences over the basic design of the redevelopment plan.  

Powell reported to SCAR commissioners that federal officials in Chicago told him they were becoming impatient with the tie-up in redevelopment planning for Market-Mohawk. Unless he could effect a speedy resolution of the conflict the project definitely would be omitted from the next fiscal year's schedule of projects.  

SCAR commission vice chairman, W. Ray Speer, called an emergency meeting of the authority at which city planning commission representatives were present to expedite agreement on a course of action. At that meeting Powell revealed an interesting, hitherto, unknown bit of information. Searching through the formidable bulk of federal legislation and regulations governing urban renewal, he had discovered a section of the original 1949 Housing Act which specifically limited the proportion of project area ground space occupied by buildings to 30%. This restriction applied to property which would be left intact, as well as to land bought, cleared and redeveloped. To retain the original Market-Mohawk project boundaries would necessitate razing structures intended for inclusion in the completed project, and at the expense of

39 Interview, W. Ray Speer, op. cit.

the property owner, since project demolition cost estimates had not anticipated this expense.

Powell's solution to this new found problem was the escape mechanism SCAR needed to extricate itself from the Market-Mohawk dilemma. He suggested cutting out of the Market-Mohawk project the three-block-long Main Street business district in which the much-debated shopper's pedestrian mall was to be built. With a single stroke Powell had ended the bitter struggle between MFA and SCAR over Market-Mohawk redevelopment, and brought the project into compliance with federal regulations.

All sides expressed relief that the issue at last had been resolved. The MFA had won its goal of eliminating a major threat to their status in the area. SCAR had escaped from a genuine dilemma with its dignity reasonably intact. It could shift major responsibility for having to change its plan to federal red tape and avoid the appearance of a humiliating surrender to pressure tactics.

Irvin's resignation of course, made it much easier for SCAR to shift its position. He had invested a great deal of political capital in his redevelopment plan and to have conceded to MFA, the Chamber of Commerce and the towntown press would have amounted to a humiliating defeat for him—and by implication, for the urban renewal program.

41 Dispatch, 6/3/58, p. 11.
Sinclair Powell gained prestige from the resolution of the conflict, and SCAR would benefit from this. He had found a dramatic "out" for his agency before he had been forced to commit himself on the merits of the mall plan. As he began to grapple with the problems of redevelopment he would start with his status high and his options open. The Mayor would be grateful to him--Sensenbrenner would have another hard reelection battle in 1959 and if the urban renewal program could now move ahead on schedule, by the time the campaign began in earnest the incumbent could point to a dynamic urban renewal program as one of his accomplishments. Both Market-Mohawk and Goodale should be well along in the execution stage, and possibly in Goodale, some actual redevelopment might have occurred, a condition which would help gain support from the CBD leadership.  

Two issues lay dormant. The disposition of the Central Market building and the placement of the proposed state office building. At a public hearing on the revised Market-Mohawk plan, in June 1958, the new director experienced his trial by battle. During a two hour hearing he was bombarded with questions about the future of the market. While Powell himself was not criticized, the intensity and diverse base of support for the public market facility exhibited at the hearing amounted to a near-ultimatum to stop plans for tearing it down.

42 Many CBD leaders interviewed commented on the growing support for Sensenbrenner among downtown businessmen. They liked the way the Mayor listened to them and sought their counsel--and followed their advice.
The association of merchants leasing quarters in the market, the Central Market Association, represented by attorney Robert Reed, reminded Powell that, "In February 1955 the Central Market merchants were promised a new market. There are 165 businesses doing a gross sales of $5 million annually at stake. We want a city-owned building with a parking garage on the upper floor." Even city council president, Wesley Llewelyn, joined the critics when he reinforced the merchants chain by declaring his intention "to fight to the end for a new site for the Central Market." 43

The new director of SCAR avoided a stand on this issue as Irvin had done in January. The revised Market-Mohawk redevelopment plan had to be sent to the URA within a week's time. Therefore, city council must approve it in its basic form and leave details like the exact location of the new market to SCAR planners. Also, said Powell, finding a new location for the market outside the project boundaries was not SCAR's responsibility. The Urban renewal agency's concern with the Central Market was limited to its relationship to the task of clearing and redeveloping Market-Mohawk. The undermanned technical staff of SCAR had to use its efforts for first priority business, clearance and redevelopment in specific projects. 44

43 Ibid.
44 Minutes, SCAR, 6/5/58.
The previously described snag in Market-Mohawk planning unexpectedly was eliminated through negotiations between the city attorney and the heirs of the original owners of the Central Market building site. The terms under which the city acquired the land in 1840 specified the return of the site to the heirs if the city ceased using it for a public market. If the heirs had insisted on holding the city to these conditions a long court fight could have ensued causing an indefinite delay in final planning and execution of the project. Now, however, it only would be a matter of time before the old building would be destroyed. 45

The redevelopment plan consultant, Charles DeLeuw, Inc., of Chicago strongly advised the replacement for the Central Market be constructed outside of the project boundaries and that it offer more diversified services, e.g., a barbershop, a dry cleaning facility, and other limited retail business activity. SCAR did not have to demonstrate this sign of interest in the future of the public market since its legal concern stopped at the boundaries of its projects. But, in keeping with its attempt to forestall obstruction by affected merchants, a show of concern and some "free advice" was a good public relations technique. The planned destruction of the market still was a real issue in many quarters, including the city council, and the appearance by SCAR of "not caring" about this venerable Columbus landmark could hurt SCAR's chances for council approval of its plan for Market-Mohawk redevelop-

In any case, from a purely technical standpoint, the demolition of the old market and the construction of a new one would have to be coordinated to avoid a drastic interruption of business for the market tenants. If SCAR planning consultants could speed up planning for a new market this would facilitate the necessary coordination of efforts.

The policy of detached interest and aloofness with respect to the future of the public market did not completely save the renewal agency from charges of bias in favor of the market tenants. The two-hundred-member Columbus Retail Grocer's Association, through its president, Angelo Dorati, formally protested to the city council and to SCAR that providing a new and expanded public market represented granting special privileges to a few. "Our rent is tremendous and if a grocer-man can open a market financed by the taxpayers, it is unfair competition."

As SCAR prepared the foundation for Market-Mohawk redevelopment an increasing number of requests for exemptions from clearance poured into the urban renewal department producing more direct pressure than the grocers were generating. There were ample precedents for project businessmen to draw upon in support of their requests. SCAR policy was to grant permission for businesses to stay in the area if the business activity conformed to the land use standard established in the re-

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46 Citizen, 12/19/58, p. 13.
development plan, and if the petitioner would agree to make any structural changes necessary to integrate the property into the planning requirements being developed by SCAR. Armed with this knowledge a neighborhood group of businessmen located between Fifth and Sixth Streets, along East Main Street formed the Mohawk Area Association to push for the exclusion of a one-block area from the clearance project. This section was contiguous to the portions of East Main Street already placed outside Market-Mohawk boundaries following the shopper’s pedestrian mall controversy.

In their petition the Association members argued that their buildings were as well-kept and valuable as those next door which had been exempted from clearance the previous year. In fact, they noted, "the area between Fourth and Fifth Streets. . . includes many buildings which had been condemned for many years and presently are in poor condition." The Main Street merchants between Fifth and Sixth Streets charged that destroying their businesses would amount to a discriminatory act against them and would operate in favor of "similar businesses between Fourth and Fifth Streets by removing competition therefrom." 48

47Dispatch, 1/8/59, p. 34.

48Minutes, SCAR. Many references to individual exemptions from clearance are contained in the 1959-60 record of SCAR meetings.
The Dispatch gave much sympathetic publicity to the Mohawk Area Association's efforts to save its members from the bulldozer, placing SCAR director, Sinclair Powell, in the difficult position of having to explain in public why one block of run-down buildings should be spared demolition and a similar block, right next door, should be destroyed. In so doing he would have to justify, in effect, the whole policy of granting exceptions to the redevelopment plan. This issue also could serve to label the process of establishing project boundaries as one reflecting social and political considerations rather than purely technical-objective criteria.

Powell asserted in a report to SCAR commissioner members that redevelopment space requirements determined his agency's decisions on exemption requests, plus, of course, the matter of compatibility with proposed redevelopment. The Mohawk Area Association members offered to rehabilitate their properties in accordance with SCAR's requirements but Powell claimed the spatial needs of a future redeveloper made it impossible for SCAR to accede to the Association's wishes. The Market-Mohawk project would be cut nearly in two if the area in question were removed. A large "dent" already existed because of the exclusion of the three-block-square area between Third and Fifty, Rich and Noble Streets. To extend the excluded area further west would severely limit the redevelopment opportunities slum clearance was designed to create. Continuing, Powell said that there was no deviation
from past policy in this instance; that such factors as the need for off-
street parking and esthetic reasons could require demolition in
support of the primary target area. A building apparently sound, perhaps
relatively new, might have to be destroyed to make room for support
facilities for planned new facilities or the need to create a "proper"
setting for a planned new building might dictate the removal of some
adjacent structures. 49

A major problem with Powell's defense of SCAR's exemption policy
was his inability to identify in advance every exception the agency would
make. The redevelopment plan still was "unofficial" and subject to
change--even after city council had approved it a redeveloper might
seek modifications to suit his needs. Thus, Powell could not commit
himself on every single building in advance of actual clearance action.

It was this element of uncertainty which made possible the charges
of favoritism--of "politics" in deciding who could stay and who would
fall victim to the bulldozer. Also, it was "common" knowledge among
project merchants that Main-Fourth had beaten SCAR on the shopper's
mall issue. Powell's explanation seemed to be a poor attempt to
rationalize his "surrender to pressure." 50

The merchants comprising the Mohawk Area Association well re-
membered the successful fight waged by their neighbors in the Main-
Fourth Association which resulted in their area being exempted from

49 Minutes, SCAR, 3/22/59.
clearance. Even though Powell reminded them that it had been the lack of enough money to acquire and clear the area which finally brought about the separation of the block between Third and Fifth Streets from the Market-Mohawk Project, his explanation was never satisfying to the merchants. 51

The peripheral issue of a replacement site for the Central Market continued to resurface. SCAR leaders held to their position that the old market building must go and that any replacement structure had to be located outside of the Market-Mohawk boundaries. But the leaders of the Central Market merchants had employed their own experts to select the best site for a new public market. The block on Mound Street, between Third and Fourth Streets was recommended by their consultant as the most desirable replacement site. Since this area fell within the Market-Mohawk project SCAR rejected the idea and the issue continued to simmer.

SCAR's long-time antagonist, City Service Director Floyd Redick, an ex officio member of SCAR, championed the cause of a renewal site for the new market whenever the opportunity arose. Redick argued in behalf of his position and took SCAR planners to task for short-sightedness, poor judgment or using inadequate data on the market site question.

50 Dispatch, 4/1/59, p. 4.

51 Personal interview, Speer, op. cit. Speer referred to the discovery of the federal regulations on the proportion of commercial buildings allowable as "a lucky break that got us off the hook."
SCAR director Powell and Redick both attended a meeting of the City Market Commission on March 2, 1959 to state their opposing views. A bitter exchange between the two officials occurred. Powell argued that to give in on the market site issue surely would bring about "another shopper's mall battle." Also, it would undermine the integrity and independence of his agency. Collapsing under outside pressure on this issue would mean a surrender of planning principles to narrow, special interests. How would the Mohawk Area Association people take this? They would have every right to interpret it as a sign of SCAR's vulnerability to political pressure—if it were great enough. New, intensified pressures for special concessions would follow and urban renewal leaders would be hard put to deflect them in the name of good planning. Market-Mohawk development would become "pork-barrel redevelopment," a patchwork of bargains and trades between affected interests.  

SCAR successfully resisted the efforts of Redick and the public market tenants to gain a foothold in the redevelopment plans for Market-Mohawk. Powell had strong support for his opinion from most SCAR commissioners, most of the city councilmen, the administration, and the CBD leaders acting through the Development Committee and the Chamber of Commerce. Very few community leaders liked the idea of placing a new public market in any clearance area. The noisy, smelly, old market had little esthetic

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appeal to these businessmen and they saw no important economic advantage in its continued presence—even if housed in new quarters. The public market was a relic from the past which had been fastened onto the city's heart when the site still was beyond the commercial center of the city. Now there was an opportunity to eliminate what most community leaders saw as an eyesore.  

Also, pressure in support of retaining the public market, in or out of Market-Mohawk, never was widespread and steadily shrank as reality began to replace sentiment in the minds of the market's original supporters. The market tenants themselves were small in number and political resources. Marginal businessmen supported, in effect, by public subsidy could not hope to find allies among their "independent" counterparts who paid higher rent or owned their quarters and who represented the "elite class" within their group. Most of the "independent" merchants saw the Central Market people as "freeloaders with an unfair competitive advantage. The elimination of the market meant to them a restoration of a proper competitive relationship.  

But, as the public market issue faded into the background the battle

53 Personal interview, officer of the Columbus Retail Grocer's Association in 1959, 9/21/66. Anonymity required.

54 Interviews with several CBD leaders confirmed the prevalence of this attitude.
over placement of the proposed new state office building complex began to heat up.

In December 1958, city planning director J. B. Bachtel had presented a report to the planning commissioners outlining criteria for the states' use in selecting a building site. Although Bachtel did not suggest a specific location as best, the lack of complete plans from the state architect precluded this, he did seem to rule out the Civic Center Drive area because of possible future flooding of the Scioto River. The report included a reference to one possibly good site; the northwest corner of the Market-Mohawk urban renewal project. 55

Bachtel's comments, especially his suggestion that a flood threat existed in the Civic Center, drew immediate fire from Paul Gingher, chairman of the executive committee of the Metropolitan Committee. The Dispatch strongly backed Gingher's rejections of the planning Director's views. The Wolfe interests had supported the expanded development of the Civic Center for many years, and had the support of some members of the CBD leadership notably Paul Gingher of the powerful Metropolitan Committee. Defending this position, the Dispatch editorial stated that if for any reason the Civic Center proved to be impractical, the area west of the river between West Broad Street and West Town Street, bounded on the west by Belle Street, should be the second

55Dispatch, 12/27/58, p. 3.
choice. In no case, however, should Market-Mohawk be used as a site for the proposed state facility. The new development being sparked by the clearance program should not simply add to the already over-built area around Broad and High Streets. Urban renewal should be used as a tool for dispersion, not concentration of new growth.

While interest and conflict over the site of the office building mounted at the local level state officials displayed little interest in moving ahead with the project. Governor DiSalle declined to select a location until the state building commission had completed its study of all possible sites. The Governor said, at that time, the building commission would make a recommendation to him and "unless it were completely impossible" he would accept it.

In the meantime, the building commission would consult with experts on site costs and requirements as the state architect released more detailed specifications and plans for the facility.

But, unexpectedly in March 1959, the Governor announced that the administration was shelving the office building project "until the financial situation became clearer." DiSalle, however, directed the building commission to try to negotiate a Civic Center site for the

56 Dispatch, 12/30/38, p. 24.
57 Dispatch, 1/16/59, p. 2.
structure. The uncertainty of the state did not diminish speculation among Columbus CBD leaders on the topic. If anything, the Governor's statement only intensified the drive of both anti-and pro-Market-Mohawk groups. The state administration seemed to favor a riverfront location but was not foreclosing other options.

In April the state engineer's office announced that the area occupied by Central High School, just across the river, would be a desirable location for the office building. This site lay within the area suggested by the Dispatch as a second choice to the Civic Center Drive in its December 30th editorial criticizing the report of planning director J. B. Bachtel. The athletic field adjacent to the school would provide ample space for a large building. The Ohio State Journal contacted Superintendent of Columbus public schools, Dr. Harold Ebling, for his reaction to the idea of a trade of the athletic field for state land somewhere else in the city. Ebling expressed interest and agreed to discuss the matter with the school board.  

The idea was given short shrift by the board, however. Trading the athletic field to the state would not provide money for replacement of the lost facilities and there was no room in the school board's budget to finance replacement. The school board did offer to trade a parcel of land several blocks out on East Town Street for state lands closer to the

59 Journal, 4/10/59, p. 16.
center of the city. The same day, the state building commission rejected the site next to Central High School by declaring that it would want the option to purchase the rest of the school site, including the land occupied by the school. The state officials foresaw a complex of buildings which eventually would require more area than that taken by the athletic field. The distance between the center of town and the site offered by the school board precluded serious consideration of an outright trade. Thus, a stalemate existed on the question of using land across the river.

The significance of these events lay in the loss of a valuable bargaining tool for the riverfront advocates, primarily the Wolfe family interests. If the Civic Center should fail to attract the state than a fall-back position, still within the range of preference, was available. Now, it was the Civic Center or nothing, as far as the Wolfes were concerned.

For the next few months the issue lay dormant. State and city officials continued to talk about the Market-Mohawk site but the state administration could do little more than discuss generalities until the next General Assembly convened and the administration submitted a request for an appropriation.

Before the legislature met, however, the urban renewal program absorbed the effects of two important events, the latter of which led to the worst crisis faced by SCAR since the early bond issue failure. The

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60 Journal, 4/12/59, p. 7.

61 Ibid.
first event was the precipitous resignation of Sinclair Powell from the post of SCAR executive director in July 1959. Powell had been en-meshed in more or less constant intramural warfare with other agency heads from the very beginning of his term as renewal chief. Following his negotiation of the controversial shopper's mall issue, Powell was inundated by a host of pressures for further concessions in the Project area. Some of the pressures originated from inside the administration; for example, the effort of the Service Director, Floyd Redick to retain the public market in the Market-Mohawk project area.

Redick had been an especially severe critic of Powell's administration of the renewal program, charging him with failure to coordinate renewal planning with other city officials directing traffic control and street maintenance. Redick felt that the SCAR director expected the rest of the administration to tailor their activities to the needs of the redevelopment program. Another foe of Powell's was M. D. Portman, Mayor Sensenbrenner's finance director, who criticized the SCAR administration, often in public print, for seriously weakening the capacity of the renewal department in financial matters. 63

On the other side of the coin, however, many persons involved with the renewal program during his leadership, charged Sinclair Powell with a pettiness of temperament and a chronic inability to work with people especially those who disagreed with him. A former member of the

63 Dispatch, 4/28/59, p. 3; 4/26/59, p. 13; Minutes, SCAR, 7/9/59.
city council recalled that, "Sinclair Powell was a very bright, competent young man. But he had a know-it-all attitude and couldn't "bend" when he should have." 64

In his farewell to the SCAR commissioners, Powell admitted that, "The controversy is too much for one person to take; you have seen some of it here but there has been even more behind the scenes." 65

The departure of Powell, after little more than a year on the job, left the renewal agency without experienced leadership as it was starting the complex and controversial task of Market-Mohawk project execution.

If there had been continuity of political leadership in Columbus the new director, J. B. Willison, might have experienced more success. But, in November 1959, the election of a new mayor set the stage for the most troublesome period of policy development since the early years of public housing battles and bond issue failure.

W. Ralston Westlake, city council president, ran as an "independent Republican" advocating "dignity and harmony" in the administration of the city's affairs. With the considerable aid of the Dispatch, Westlake pictured the incumbent, M. E. Sensenbrenner, as a headline-seeking, uncouth politician who had interfered with the administration of the

64 Personal interview, Robert Van Heyde, 9/14/69, member of Columbus City Council 1958-61. Development committee members disapproved of Powell's aggressiveness in performing his duties. "Bob [Mott] complained that Powell tried to run the whole show," said one member of the DCGC.

65 Minutes, SCAR, 6/17/59.
departments of city government and then sought scapegoats for his mistakes among his subordinates. The resignations of two urban renewal directors in two years were blamed on Sensenbrenner. 66 Probably, however, Westlake's victory represented a return to normal G. O. P. supremacy and also, the lack of a bitter Republican primary fight, an important factor in the 1955 Democratic victory.

In no other way did the renewal program become an issue in the campaign.

Westlake became mayor of Columbus January 1, 1960. Soon after his inauguration portents of serious trouble appeared. He declared his firm opposition to the use of Market-Mohawk clearance land for a state office building complex. He argued that the urban renewal program had been stalled long enough and now that the financial and red tape barriers to clearance had been overcome and relocation was underway, development should be expedited. Waiting for the state to decide if it would build an office building was a risky business which could result in more delays and perhaps lost opportunities to rebuild the area and to start tax revenue flowing into the city coffers again. Even if the present legislature should approve the project another legislature might reverse or table the actions of its predecessors. Moreover, the state didn't even have architectural plans completed, much less assured financing. No-

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body knew how much land finally would be required or what the supporting space requirements would be; for example, how much land for off-street parking would need to be reserved. Westlake reasoned that if the state were serious about the idea it would build in the Civic Center where there were good sites available and where new development would better serve the long range needs of the business district. 67

The members of the SCAR commission opposed Westlake on Market-Mohawk redevelopment from the beginning of the new administration. As vice Chairman of SCAR (Mayor Westlake was chairman, ex-officio), W. Ray Speer assumed the role of chief antagonist of the Mayor but Speer was strongly supported by his colleagues right up to the point at which he and the pre-Westlake commissioners resigned in protest against what they termed the Mayor's obstructionism. 68

Joining the members of SCAR in support of selling Market-Mohawk land to the state was every other significant CBD leader. The focal point of anti-Westlake sentiment was the Chamber of Commerce and the Development Committee leadership. The chief spokesman for the Lazarus Company, Trent Sickles, long time public relations adviser to the

67 Minutes, SCAR. At practically every one of the meetings of SCAR throughout 1960, Mayor Westlake commented critically about the actions of his fellow commissioners regarding their attempts to keep the state office building proposal alive.

68 The other members of the SCAR Commission at the inception of Westlakes' term were: Leigh Koebel, Herbert S. Levy, Noverre Musson, and W. Ray Speer who served as vice chairman. Speer, Sayre, and Musson had been members of the old CURA (1952-55).
Lazarus Interests, came closest to being the individual leader of the *opposition.*

Backing the administration were, first and foremost, the Wolfe family interests, the Dispatch and Ohio National Bank leaders playing leading roles, and certain members of the executive committee of the Metropolitan Committee, notably its chairman, Paul H. Gingher, attorney and president of State Automobile Insurance Company. Backing them were groups of realtors and property owners with investments in the Civic Center Drive-riverfront area of the CBD. *70*

The split over the future of Market-Mohawk extended to city hall itself, as the majority Democrats on the council worked long and hard to force administration acceptance of anchoring Market-Mohawk development to a state office building complex. The executive-legislative stalemate meant that no action could be authorized because under the law, the council's approval of all renewal steps was required yet, without the cooperation of the executive in such basic matters as signing contracts, and in many other administrative functions council was powerless to initiate action.

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*69 Personal interviews, W. Ray Speer and Robert Van Heyde who led the fight against Mayor Westlake.*

*70 Personal interview, Paul Gingher, op. cit.*
The basis of the conflict was "ideological and economic." For many years the Wolfe family, represented now by Preston Wolfe, believed that the Civic Center Drive area provided a logical, necessary "third point" of a CBD triangle whose other two points were the intersection of Broad Street and High Street (the center of the CBD) and the Lazarus Department Store complex at the corner of South High and West Town Streets. A corollary opinion was that too much of Columbus already was tied to Broad and High and that further concentration would result if the state built a complex of office buildings a block away from Broad and High at the intersection of State Street and Third Streets. The Wolfes were supported by a scattering of other civic leaders but, as noted above, theirs was a minority position in the business community.

Another explanation, less publicized than the first, is that Preston Wolfe and Trent Sickles of Lazarus had conducted a running feud for years, partly for personal and partly for reasons of basic disagreement over what was good for the city. As a member of city council in 1960 expressed it, "Preston Wolfe was against the state office building (in Market-Mohawk because Trent Sickles was pushing it. They've been after each other for years and what one wants the other almost automatically fights." 71

71 Personal interview, Van Heyde, op. cit.
the presence of state government.) 72

But, according to the vice chairman of SCAR, W. Ray Speer, the primary reasons for trying to work with the state was the commissioner's conception of its own function. "We were acting as real estate agents for the city. When a good prospect for sale of the city's slum clearance land came along, we would have been remiss in our responsibility if we hadn't checked it out carefully." 73 Speer also stressed the point that promoting other sites in the city for redevelopment, i.e., Civic Center Drive "would be taking over" the authorized functions of the planning commission. Westlake often urged SCAR to discourage the state's interest in Market-Mohawk and suggested the feasibility of other sites. Speer felt that in doing this the SCAR commissioners would be misdirecting their time and energy--not to mention expanding their activities beyond the legitimate boundaries set by law. 74

A final point of disagreement between the Mayor and SCAR was the issue of redevelopment priorities. Goodale was rapidly being cleared of its last remaining people and homes. Soon, it would stand empty producing no revenue, and representing a potentially embarrassing symbol of failure if a redeveloper were not quickly found. The empty quiet of Goodale would mock the campaign rhetoric of Mayor Westlake who had charged the Sensenbrenner administration with bungling in

72 Personal interviews with several CBD leaders supporting Market-Mohawk site for state office building including: K. L. Roberts, Robert Levy, Don Weaver, and Trent Sickles.

73 Personal interview, W. Ray Speer, op. cit.

74 Ibid.
A not unnatural explanation of the Sickles-Wolfe rivalry would emphasize Sickles' role as chief spokesman for the views of the Lazarus family, the biggest rival combination of money, community status and investment in the downtown area in Columbus. It was understandable and probably inevitable that there should be a rivalry between these two community giants over the future of an area in which both had traditional and heavy commitments.

For the other supporters of a state office building in Market-Mohawk the question was: what alternative to the state's use of the renewal site did the administration have? They agreed that the slum clearance had dragged on too long in Columbus. But the state plan was the first tangible indication of any interest in redeveloping either of the two slum clearance projects. The city should be doing everything in its power to encourage the state to buy Market-Mohawk land. If only urban renewal leaders (including the mayor) would demonstrate unity on the office building proposal the state could be persuaded to purchase the site between Town Street and State Street, adjacent to the capital building. They also pointed out the value of this kind of development. The office building complex would draw "quality development in the removing area of Market-Mohawk. Attorneys, good restaurants, and shops and perhaps more branch offices of the kind of industry wanting to be close to the seat of state government would be encouraged to come in. (Columbus long has been known as a good location for branch office representation because of
operating the renewal program. Also, the Children's Hospital and Dennison-Hunter-Hubbard projects were just getting underway and needed close attention.

Westlake and the other SCAR members played tug-of-war with the SCAR director, J. B. Willison, in the middle. Speer, and the majority of the other commissioners, directed him to work with the state on arranging a Market-Mohawk site for the office building and the Mayor pulled in the opposite direction; insisting Willison "get going on Goodale," in particular, and stop "wasting time talking" with the state officials. 75

The struggle between the administration and the SCAR members with their CBD allies deteriorated into a name-calling, open war before the end of Westlake's first six months in office. Westlake impugned the motives of nearly every one of his adversaries some time during this period. In many SCAR meetings he strongly suggested that "some members of this body are too concerned about their private interests" in considering the office building question. 76

By that time he had been able to appoint Robert Niehoff, manager of the Lincoln-LeVeque Tower Property, to replace Elliot G. Whittlaker, whose term expired. Niehoff supported Westlake's position, in part, other commissioners said, because of his own private interest

75 Minutes, SCAR, 5/10/60.
76 Minutes, SCAR, 7/15/60.
in the development of the west-of-Broad-and-High-Street area in which the Tower was located.

In July 1960, the four-man Democratic majority on the city council pushed through legislation, over the Mayor's veto, creating the job of "urban renewal expediter," naming one of its own members, Robert G. Van Heyde, to the post. The expediter would consult with council on negotiations for the disposition of cleared land. He would be responsible only to the city council and, in effect, would become councils' own "urban renewal director," free of any tie to the divided SCAR commission where the Mayor sat as chairman. His first task would be to work with state officials on four Market-Mohawk locations for the state office complex, something the Mayor had forbidden J. B. Willison to do.

The deadlock over redevelopment and the sharp conflict accompanying it threatened to inflict serious, perhaps fatal damage on urban renewal in Columbus. In the latter half of 1960 SCAR director Willison in vain tried to interest developers in either Goodale or Market-Mohawk. Criticized by the Mayor for not increasing his efforts, Willison candidly replied that the major obstacle he encountered was the uncertainty and controversy which now enveloped the renewal program. With the local governmental and private urban renewal leadership divided over the proper course of redevelopment, no builder would risk becoming involved. 77 With the administration and the council each advocating.

77 Columbus Citizen-Journal. (Merged with Ohio State Journal 1/1/60), 8/21/60, p. 24.
opposing types of redevelopment and with SCAR unable to speak in behalf of the city there literally was no official group or person with whom a redeveloper could negotiate who could commit the city to a course of action.

At the end of the year the situation had not changed nor had a redeveloper been found for either of the two clearance projects. Urban renewal was completely stalled and prospects for breaking the stalemate were slight, indeed. Personalities now had crept into the dispute and hardened the positions of everyone involved.

In fact, the personality of the Mayor increasingly became a source of despair to those opposed to him. Even those who agreed with Westlake's views on the state office building generally conceded in interviews that the successor for the picturesque Sensenbrenner was a disappointment. While accepting his policy position, many of his supporters faulted the mayor for so completely alienating members of SCAR by his insinuation of improper motives. By such tactics Westlake made compromise much more difficult, moreover, he made the community look bad! Outside businessmen, who might be needed to redevelop slum clearance areas would not risk involvement in such a fluid political situation.

To his opponents, Mayor Westlake appeared to be no more than a pliant tool of the Columbus Dispatch. He was "Preston Wolfe's boy in city hall," is the phrase often used in reference to the mayor. More-
over, Westlake, in their eyes, was not "very bright." Every ex-
pression of criticism he interpreted as a personal attack. He broke
off all contact with the Development Committee and Chamber of
Commerce leadership because they took the council's side on the state
office building issue. He labelled as "interference" any attempt to
discuss the question privately. As one informant expressed it, "urban
renewal wasn't the only thing which ground to a halt around here when
Ralston took over. His term was a four-year disaster for just about
every major project in this city. He set urban renewal back four years--
and almost killed it off." 78

With the appointment of Lyman Brownfield to the SCAR commission,
the relationship between the administration and the majority of CBD
leaders deteriorated to the breaking point. Brownfield had served for
one year in Washington as general counsel for the HHFA. He had been
Vice President Nixon's law school roommate before the Second World
War and while in Washington, Brownfield had helped expedite matters
for his home city's application for Market-Mohawk funds.

Returning to Columbus following the close of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration in January 1961, Brownfield immediately was appointed to
the SCAR commission by his old friend, Ralston Westlake. The mayor
now had three votes on the seven-member commission, Brownfield's,
Niehoff's and his own. This was not enough to swing a majority vote--

78 Personal interviews with the following persons cannot be linked
to specific comments because of requests for anonymity: K. L. Robert,
Robert Van Heyde, Trent Sickles, W. Ray Speer, Maurice D. Portman.
only enough to polarize further the divided SCAR commission. With two firm allies Westlake would escape the onus of appearing as an obstructionist—the sole dissenter to the commission's plans for Market-Mohawk development.

Westlake may have caused despair and frustration among state office building supporters, but Lyman Brownfield "struck sparks" in the words of one of the former directors of the Development Committee, Robert Mott. He was outspoken in his opposition to the majority members of SCAR and their Development Committee-Chamber of Commerce friends. More skilled in articulating his views than the mayor, Brownfield often treated the other SCAR members as a prosecuting attorney would. At nearly every SCAR meeting tempers flared as the administration faction harassed and frustrated every attempt by the majority to work with the state on the office building proposal.

Brownfield added another issue of controversy, also: the question of a single versus two or more developers. The consensus of opinion among the CBD leadership; i.e., Development Committee and Chamber of Commerce leaders, favored a single developer—ideally one for both of the clearance projects. The reasons for their position were stated by Chamber president, Klein L. Roberts. First, the single-developer

79 Personal interviews with several government and private leaders who had contact with Westlake revealed common opinions with regard to Westlakes' personality and relations with people.

80 Minutes, SCAR. All meetings which took place from January through March 1961 featured harsh comments and criticisms, often of a personal nature, flowing in both directions.
idea had the backing of the planning consultant for Market-Mohawk redevelopment planning, the Urban Land Institute, second, engaging one developer for an entire project made complete redevelopment both easier and more probable. He would be responsible for the "choice" as well as the less desirable locations, whereas, if one developer could exploit the better redevelopment sites the remaining sections would be relatively unattractive and might not attract a developer for a long time. The pressure of having vacant clearance land on its hands might tempt the city to accept redevelopment not in the best interest of CBD growth. Also, a developer wishing to build in a clearance area probably would want assurance that his projects would not be devalued by the presence of a large tract of weed-overgrown vacant lots. He also would want to be certain of compatible redevelopment in the project area. With many developers involved, changes in the redevelopment plan would be more likely in order to accommodate individual developer preferences. The consequence would be a patchwork of largely unrelated reconstruction--laying the foundation for future blight. 81

Brownfield, in a well-remembered luncheon with the Development Committee leadership in January 1961, discussed his ideas on redevelopment with the skeptical CBD leaders in the course of which he al-

81 Personal interviews, Roberts, op. cit., and Charles Brooks, project coordinator of United Redevelopment Corporation in Goodale and Market-Mohawk.
legedly referred to selling "off Market-Mohawk in sections" to the highest bidder." 82

The SCAR commissioner's words produced anger and disbelief among his listeners. The notion of "auctioning off urban renewal land, lot-by-lot to the highest bidder," as one informant put it, "made us wake up and realize we had argued with the Mayor and his supporters long enough. We had to do something fast because if they tried to go through with this Washington would probably withdraw support for all time." 11

Brownfield denies he ever advocated "auctioning off" Market-Mohawk land "in small lots." He admitted he felt that Market-Mohawk was too big for one developer to handle and that if it were subdivided into perhaps four or five sections local people could divide the task among themselves. His concern, then, was two-fold: to make redevelopment easier, and to "spread the business around" among local builders and bankers. 83

Regardless of whether Brownfield meant to infer what his antagonists said he did, it was his perhaps misinterpreted remarks before the Development Committee leaders that galvanized the anti-admini-

82 Personal interview, Robert Levy, chairman, Downtown Area Committee of the Columbus Area Chamber of Commerce.

83 Personal interview, Lyman Brownfield, vice chairman of SCAR under Mayor Westlake from 1960-65.
stratification forces into action. Following the luncheon a small group of CBD leaders and the four Democrats on the city council began to meet privately every Friday for lunch. Trent Sickles, Lazarus spokes-
man, and gadfly to the Wolfe family interests, organized the group and acted as chief strategist. Other members were Robert Levy, chairman of the newly created Downtown Area Committee, a "spin-off" of the Development Committee, the vice chairman of SCAR, W. Ray Speer, and Development Committee director, Robert Mott. The group often was joined by other supporters so that the group changed its composition each week. But the men named here were the nucleus.

The strategy finally decided upon by the "Friday luncheon group" was to force Westlake into a showdown battle which either would force him to change his stance or put pressure on him (and the Dispatch) people) to offer a tangible alternative to redeveloping Market-Mohawk as a government center. It was a desperation tactic but no other choice seemed more practicable.

So it was that, in March of 1961, climaxing fifteen months of futile wrangling, the Columbus City Council, through its four-man Democratic

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84 Personal interview, Van Heyde, op. cit.
85 Personal interview, Norman Folpe, executive secretary, 6/19/64, Downtown Area Committee. The DAC came into being for the specific first purpose of finding redeveloper(s) for Goodale and Market-Mohawk. At first, it was an adjunct of the Development Committee but following the achievement of its initial goal the DAC became a standing committee of the Chamber of Commerce. It is a conciliation service, research body, and protector of the general interests of the CBD, not tied to capital improvements, as the Development was at this time, not hampered by the diffused membership base of the Chamber of Commerce.
majority, announced its intention to negotiate a contract with the state for the purpose of selling a Market-Mohawk clearance site to the state of Ohio for an office building complex. With Councilman Robert Van Heyde leading the fight, the four council Democrats enacted an ordinance which would require the administration to reserve a one and one-half block parcel in Market-Mohawk for construction of the office building. Van Heyde, as "urban renewal expeditor," would immediately proceed to discuss the terms of the contract with state officials and was empowered by the ordinance to commit the city to an agreement. Mayor Westlake vetoed the legislation but council overrode his veto by a four-to-three party-line vote. 86

Within two weeks of Van Heyde's signing a contract with the state which promised a reservation of Market-Mohawk land, administration forces counterattacked, filing suit in Franklin County Common Pleas Court charging that the city council had acted improperly by assuming administrative powers reserved in the charter for the chief executive or other administrative officials. The suit was successful, although, through appeals the issue was not officially resolved until the fall of 1961. 87

86 Personal interview, Van Heyde, op. cit.
87 Dispatch, 6/21/61, p. 1.
But the suit and the resulting appeals served the purpose of publicizing the cause of the pro-state office building forces. It placed the administration on the defensive as its opponents in council and among CBD leaders rhetorically kept asking, if not the office building, then what? The inability of the administration to answer indirectly was the product of the notoriety now attached to the Columbus renewal program. The harassed SCAR director, J. B. Willison, reported to the commissioners many times during this period that he could not attract serious interest in either clearance projects as long as the controversy over the office building remained unresolved.

Certainly, the most dramatic event in this confrontation of forces was the mass resignation of the SCAR commission, with the exceptions of the Messrs. Brownfield and Niehoff. As soon as it became certain that the contract ploy would not succeed, and that the state office building complex was dead as far as Market-Mohawk was concerned, the majority group of SCAR recognized the futility of remaining on the commission. The immediate cause of the resignation was a meeting in Governor DiSalle's office between the state and local officials involved in the office building fight. Present were the Governor, Mayor Westlake, the SCAR commission and representatives of the Development Committee (actually, the newly-formed Downtown Area Committee). Vice chairman Ray Speer had arranged the session in the hope that if all parties to the dispute could sit down together, in
private, compromise still might be possible. But before the meeting was fifteen minutes old a bitter exchange of accusations ensued between the Mayor, Brownfield and Speer. Speer's close ties with the Development Committee were attacked by the Mayor as a conflict of interest and Speer charged the administration with sheer stupidity for allowing itself to front for Preston Wolfe. Speer and his allies on the SCAR commission, Leigh Koebel, Harrison Sayre, and Herbert Levy, finally walked out of the meeting, resigning from positions they had held since the inception of the renewal program in 1952. 88

Mayor Westlake's victory was a Pyrric one. He had forced his opponents off the SCAR commission and finally laid to rest the state office building proposal. Later he was able to take satisfaction from the results of the November council elections in which three of the Council Democrats, Van Heyde among them, lost their seats to Republicans.

But before the end of the year the "power structure," or that part of it opposed to Westlake's policies, wrested the leadership of the renewal program from the new SCAR and the Mayor, and, in so doing shut out the Wolfe interests from further major influence over development.

The Downtown Area Committee (DAC), organized as a sub-committee of the development committee during the height of the state office building fight, was the instrument of Westlake's decline. It

88 Personal interview, W. Ray Speer, op. cit.
named as first chairman one of the most respected businessmen in town, a man known for his progressive views and hard work in behalf of good causes, Robert Levy of the Union Company. A small professional staff, led by an ingratiating executive secretary, Norman Folpe, gave the DAC the elements of success--ample funding, local support, prestigious leadership and skilled management.

The primary reason for the creation of the DAC was, in Folpe's words, "to take charge of the urban renewal mess." First on the list of objectives was to secure a redeveloper for Market-Mohawk and for the ninety percent of Goodale which was uncommitted. The principle of a single developer for Columbus clearance projects was adopted at the outset of DAC's search for a redeveloper. Thus, the Westlake-Dispatch faction was left isolated by the firm agreement of the other downtown leaders on this important point.

The second significant move the DAC leaders made was to decide that a local developer would be better than an outsider, for economic and "political" reasons. The desire to have a Columbus-based builder reap the rewards of redevelopment is easily understood. So, too, is the desire to make sure that whoever did take on the task would feel a hometown pride and desire to do his best. The local builder would be doing business in Columbus long after he com-

89Personal interview, Edmund Lowe, Citizen's Research Inc., executive secretary, 7/6/66; also, interviews with Levy, Roberts, Sickles--all of whom agreed that Folpe possesses great skill as a conciliator of differences and as a "technician of influence."
pleted his redevelopment tasks. He would want this job above all to succeed because of its public importance and visibility and the trust his peers were imposing in him. He would not want to have a public monument to his failure haunting him in his future endeavors.

The DAC leadership went to John Galbreath to persuade him to undertake the job. Galbreath was a builder and entrepreneur with varied interests who had a national reputation. He was "a local boy" who had made good. He also had extensive experience building urban renewal projects in other cities and his company was big enough to manage a project as large as Market-Mohawk.

Galbreath quickly consented to the proposal contingent on: 1. the willingness of Nationwide Insurance Company, also based in Columbus, to finance the project. 2. The willingness of the city to, in effect, let him plan the redevelopment of the clearance projects. In short, Galbreath would take the responsibility if financial backing could be obtained and if he could have a free hand, within very broad limits, to redevelop the slum clearance areas as he deemed proper. As Galbreath's chief assistant for the Columbus project succinctly expressed it, "Our plan became their (the city's) plan. . . except for traffic flow patterns, we replaced the city's redevelopment plan completely. We wouldn't have touched it (redevelopment) otherwise. Galbreath did it because they asked him--we didn't need the business--so we

90 Personal interviews, Speer and Brownfield and Mott, op. cit.; also Dispatch, 7/7/61, 7/8/61, 7/11/61.
thought we could expect them to accept our terms." 91

Nationwide leaders readily agreed to back Galbreath. The two firms organized United Redevelopment Corporation for the express and sole purpose of carrying out all private redevelopment in the Columbus slum clearance projects for however long it might take. 92

With the firm commitment of John Galbreath and Nationwide Insurance, DAC leaders presented the Westlake administration with a painful dilemma. If the DAC package were rejected, as Westlake and Lynan Brownfield, the new vice chairman of SCAR (replaced W. Ray Speer) wished to do—they would once again be in the position of blocking a tangible redevelopment opportunity. It would be impossible to escape a charge of "obstructionism." Moreover, the offer was backed solidly and strongly by most of the CBD "power structure." The Wolfe interests and a scattering of mostly second or third line leaders were the only political base the administration had. Previously, the opposition to the administration had been extensive, but disunited. Finally, the administration still had not the slightest lead on alternative developers. SCAR director Willison reported to the commission in September 1961 that he had received not even one "feeler" from any-

91 Personal interview, Brooks, op. cit.
92 Ibid.
body interested in redeveloping Market-Mohawk in accordance with the
city's original plan for residential construction in the area.

The patience of Federal urban renewal authorities was wearing
thin, as Brownfield and Westlake knew. There was real danger that
Columbus would lose certification for its redevelopment program if a
redeveloper was not secured very soon.

The administration accepted the Galbreath-Nationwide proposi-
tion and the redevelopment deadlock was broken. From that point on
the reconstruction of Goodale, and several months after, Market-
Mohawk, proceeded at an orderly, if slow pace. Now that the last
great hurdle had been surpassed, only time, construction schedules,
and the other variables of large-scale building activity, stood between
the supporters of urban renewal in Columbus and the attainment of
their goals.

\[93\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{Dispatch, 9/8/61, p. 13.}\]
CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions drawn from this examination of urban renewal policy development must be tentative and somewhat premature since the program still is uncompleted. However, since the scope of this research is the formative period of Columbus urban renewal policy—the period when the local program acquired its essential character and goals—defensible generalizations may be made which reflect this pre-policy stage. The only exception occurs in the discussion of urban renewal effects on the housing conditions of inner city residents. Also, since the federal urban renewal program promises to continue into the foreseeable future, generalizations based on the crucial gestation stage of policy development in Columbus may provide useful insights into future issues and probable consequences in other communities.

The time period of this research extends from the organization of the first urban renewal agency in May 1951 until the signing of the first contract for actual redevelopment of a slum clearance project in Columbus, May 1961. In recent years many critics of urban renewal have raised a number of important questions concerning the creation and implementation of policy based on the Housing Act of 1949. One of the most popular questions asked by critics is: Why has so much time
elapsed between the passage of the original legislation and the start of actual redevelopment? The average period in the U. S. between initial clearance action and the start of redevelopment is ten years. And even now, twenty years after Congress passed the law, most urban renewal projects in the nation still are in various stages of incompletion. In the eyes of many urban specialists, the weed-grown vacant lot is a monument to a lost cause! ¹

In Columbus the time required for the beginning of redevelopment in one project was ten years, almost to the day. But the completion of rebuilding took another seven years. The federal Urban Renewal Administration and the Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation Authority in Columbus "closed out" the pioneer Goodale clearance project in February 1968. Thus, it took nearly seventeen years to fulfill the goal of cleaning up "Flytown" and replacing its slums with a high-rise apartment building, a retirement home, a shopping center, and the other components of Goodale redevelopment.

The other major Columbus clearance projects, Market-Mohawk, in 1969 is just past the half-way mark in its transition to rebirth. Dramatic physical changes mark the former site of the many small businesses, markets and rooming houses which dotted the area before

¹Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963.) See especially the last chapter in which the author summarizes his reasons for calling for the repeal of the renewal legislation
1960. But with all of the changes, the sounds of construction will dominate the area until sometime in 1975, according to present estimates. If the reconstruction ends at that time, a full twenty years will have been required to redevelopment in Market-Mohawk.

In his book, *The Federal Bulldozer*, Martin Anderson assigned predominant blame for time lags and long periods of vacancy on project land to the federal government. Without becoming involved in a critique of Anderson's conclusion (many others have taken him to task for his over-simplification of the social, political, and administrative complexities generated by urban renewal) let it be said in defense of Anderson that his preoccupation with aggregate data on the national program and his consequent failure to examine any specific local urban renewal program inevitably led him to his judgment. His methodology pre-determined his allocation of responsibility for the weaknesses of urban renewal to Washington.

However, Anderson may be held accountable for his faulty conception of urban renewal as a national policy involving local implementation of national goals and standards. This research attempts to demonstrate that the operational level for urban renewal policy-making is the urban community. The point of impact between policy goals and the resistance forces of tradition, values—the hierarchy of advantage and deference, inertia—is the community—or, rather the hundreds of communities participating in urban renewal. To be
sure, federal authorities exert an oversight influence on the outcome of renewal activity at the local level, but this influence is secondary, modifying, ratifying, delimiting, and authorizing. The urban community is the actual battlefield whereon contending forces define need, assign priority, specify details, and transform general goals into effects which alter the quality, balance, and pattern of human relationships.

The federal urban renewal legislation is particularly susceptible to differential local use and definition. As Catherine Bauer wrote, "Like the blind men feeling the elephant, officials made entirely different assumptions as to the essential nature and purpose of this legislation." The 1949 Housing Act, even more than most Congressional products, was a package of concession and compromises, log-rolled through the gauntlet of particularistic interests, finally emerging on the floor with a gerry-built majority. To public housing advocates the Act was a weapon to carry or the fight begun with the 1937 Housing Act--to remove the cancer of slums from American cities and replace them with decent housing for low income families. But to many others, the heart of the 1949 Housing Act was the sections designed to rescue the central business district (CBD) from threats of decentralization and deterioration. And, to do it without more public housing.

The intrinsic difficulty in forging local policy responses to the dissimilar and even contradictory goals of the national housing law surfaced in Columbus very early. The sharp conflict between the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority and urban renewal officials in 1952-53 over placement of public housing in slum clearance projects was a natural byproduct of different official perceptions and values and the projection of the differences into the 1949 Housing Act.

Also, the futile, sporadic campaigns to "clean up the slums" represented another instance of how easy it was for Columbus officials and newspaper editors to take their own policy clues from the new federal law. The clean-up campaigns made it necessary for renewal administrators to make "deals" with other city agencies to "lay off" their inspecting and code enforcement activities in designated slum clearance projects as soon as publicity on clean-up abated. When some city officials later were accused of dereliction of duty resulting in tragic slum fires and losses of life, they responded by assigning the onus for accelerated housing deterioration to urban renewal administrators, who had pressured them to relax enforcement of the codes. To urban renewal leaders, of course, the relaxation of code enforcement made sense in terms of their agency goals. But to many other city officials, and probably to the general public, this seemed to be an odd way to mitigate the evils of slum housing.

Most central business leaders were not more clear about the
meaning of slum clearance and redevelopment. With a few notable exceptions, "downtown people" either were indifferent or only mildly attracted to urban renewal at first. They were long accustomed to seeing the hand of Washington as one that interfered in local affairs. But there was an additional, non-ideological, dimension to the lack of support from CBD leaders in Columbus. In the Chamber of Commerce, a group which might have been expected to embrace downtown redevelopment at the first opportunity, leadership was comprised of the oldest, best established, "old guard" of Columbus business leaders. Buckeye Steel, Ohio National Bank, real estate people, the insurance industry, and a host of small retailers, dominated the Chamber of Commerce in the early 1950s. These men viewed redevelopment as a potential threat to their hegemony in the business life of the city.\(^3\)

If there had been a purely "downtown" group within the Chamber of Commerce at this time, as there later was (the Downtown Area Committee), then a different response from this group might have been possible. But the diversity of interests represented in the Chamber introduced too many cross-purposes for an early mobilization of CBD support behind the urban renewal program. Not until the dissatisfied members of the Chamber and the Metropolitan Committee leadership organized the Development Committee for Greater Columbus in 1956 did

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\(^3\) Personal interview Don Weaver, former editor, Columbus Citizen-Journal, 9/12/69 and Trent Sickles, vice-president, F. & R. Lazarus Company, 9/19/69.
business support for urban renewal begin to crystallize.

If the initial reaction of the business community was one of skepticism and aloofness there was at least a gradual decline in the salience of these attitudes. For "grass roots" groups and the anonymous general public, however, hostility toward urban renewal tended to increase with time. The only indication of active public support for urban renewal occurred in the second bond issue campaign in 1956, when after an intensive public relations campaign under the favorable circumstances of a special election, eliciting half of the normal voter turn-out, over seventy percent of those voting said "yes" to urban renewal. People who vote in special elections usually are the most motivated and issue-oriented segment of the public. In this instance the supporters of slum clearance issue reached voters who had the "right" point of view and a package of capital improvement issues which included slum clearance passed easily. But, in three other ballot tests slum clearance or urban renewal (nomenclature varied) has been singled out for defeat among a "slate" of other issues presented. In 1954, 1964 and 1965, when either primary or general elections were used to present urban renewal issues, and there was much higher voter participation and more normal representation of local opinion, urban renewal lost.

Public housing referenda provided another popularity test for urban renewal in Columbus. From the materials presented on the Woodward and the Windsor Terrace public housing controversies, it is
apparent: that most voters linked urban renewal with public housing and while technically only expressing opinion on a particular public housing issue, in effect, were disapproving of slum clearance as well. The chief administrator for urban renewal, after all, was a former public housing official and in the early 1950s the director of the housing authority in Columbus, Russell Taylor, had twice tried unsuccessfully to put his agency in the slum clearance "business," at the cost of considerable public controversy. There was no effective vehicle to counter misunderstanding of the renewal program except the editorials and articles of the Columbus Citizen. Don Weaver, editor of the Citizen, displayed stronger support for the program than most downtown leaders. The Wolfe-owned Columbus Dispatch sniped at or openly opposed urban renewal during the period of this research. The presence of a Democrat in city hall who had opposed the Wolfes since his first campaign for mayor generated a feud of major proportions between the newspaper and the Sensenbrenner administration. The Dispatch pursued a campaign aimed at discrediting Sensenbrenner in any way possible to pave the way for a return to power of the Republicans and, they hoped, a friendlier administration. Exploitation of urban renewal programs was a useful device for accomplishing that goal. Of course, urban renewal, with its federal controls and financial support was not a program for which the conservative Dispatch
felt any natural affinity. 4

The victory of W. Ralston Westlake over Mayor M. E. Sensenbrenner in 1959 and the subsequent effort of the Dispatch-backed Westlake administration to sabotage the Market-Mohawk redevelopment plans of the renewal agency set back urban renewal in Columbus at least two years. In one sense, however, this ultimately worked to the benefit of urban renewal. The abortive attempt by the Wolfes and their man in city hall to recast urban renewal in a mold more acceptable to the Wolfe interests resulted in a polarization of opinion among CBD leaders with the Dispatch and its allies on one side and a much larger group of pro-urban renewal business leaders on the other. The Market-Mohawk affair angered many CBD leaders who had only recently awakened to the potential of the renewal program and who strongly disapproved of the Westlake administration-Dispatch maneuvers to block the state office building project in Market-Mohawk. Their willingness to fight the Dispatch on this issue by organizing the Downtown Area Committee which, in turn, set in motion events culminating in the formation of the United Redevelopment Corporation gave the stalled renewal program impetus to overcome the last major hurdle before actual redevelopment.

4Personal interviews with many CBD leaders produced a recounting of the manner in which the Scioto River Griggs Dam was built through use of local funds alone. The Wolfes opposed the use of Army Corps of Engineers' funds because, according to informants, the use of federal funds would dilute local, i.e., Wolfe financial control over an important project.
Urban renewal officials themselves contributed to the protracted evolution of renewal policy in Columbus. Unlike New Haven and Newark, cited as examples of successful renewal cities in so many studies of local redevelopment efforts, Columbus officials failed to acquire redevelopers for their projects until the projects nearly were cleared and awaiting reconstruction. Urban renewal depends on the profit instincts of redevelopers. Since profit opportunities do not always corelate with a renewal agency's clearance preferences, determination of clearance sites, size, and redevelopment plans prior to expressions of interest by potential redevelopers is a reversal of what would appear to be the normal sequence of steps in a basically commercial problem.

The choice of Goodale and Market-Mohawk, of course, was based primarily on the commercial potential of these areas, but the judgment was not made by people who would be doing the actual investing and reconstruction. The desire to see Goodale and Market-Mohawk reborn gave rise to expectations which subsequently proved to be based on

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5 Most CBD leaders interviewed felt that Preston Wolfes' support of W. Ralston Westlake against Mayor Sensenbrenner was a "horrible mistake." Westlake's clumsy opposition to the state office building in Market-Mohawk and the Dispatch's criticism of the renewal program gave the appearance of a desperate, obvious attempt to hold onto a declining position of community leadership. It appeared that the Wolfes were willing to sacrifice even the good of the city to get their way.
something less than hard, factual judgment. In both Goodale and Market-Mohawk, redevelopers could not be found to rebuild the areas as the renewal officials had originally planned. Finally, as a condition for obtaining redevelopers for the two projects, the official plans had to be largely scrapped in favor of the kind of redevelopment preferred by the people who actually would finance and organize the effort. The original assumption of the 1949 redevelopment legislation, that assembly and clearing of land was the obstacle to renewal proved only partially true in Columbus.

Finally, the weakness of governmental support of urban renewal in Columbus slowed progress on the program. The Columbus City Council backed urban renewal with a minimum of funds. The administrative staff for urban renewal never was at full strength during the period of this study. Personnel shortages and niggardly grants of operating funds resulted in low morale and a prevailing sense of frustration among renewal officials. Federal authorities threatened to withhold certification of the Columbus renewal program several times because of inadequate funding and staff resources.

The Columbus Planning Commission staff was of little help to urban renewal officials during this period. It was even more understaffed and financed and could accomplish little more than routine, housekeeping activities. It never had the capacity to provide the "long range planning" the first CURA director, Lawrence Irvin, called for in
1952. In 1956 and in 1959 federal officials expressed doubt about the sufficiency of planning support available to the urban renewal department and required renewal officials to curtail drastically their rehabilitation plans for the Dennison-Hunter-Hubbard area.

Effects on Housing Problems of Low Income Groups

The 1949 Housing Act set twin goals; the clearance of slums and the amelioration of the housing conditions in which slum families lived.

The actual as opposed to the intended effects of urban renewal on housing problems faced by society's disadvantaged has become a major cause for criticism of urban renewal. Critics label urban renewal a cruel hoax, a fraud, in that it has too often worsened rather than ameliorated housing problems of the poor in American cities.

An objective, comprehensive evaluation of accuracy of this charge will not be readily obtainable until the publication of 1970 census data, from which accurate comparison of housing conditions of the poor "before and after" urban renewal will be possible. In 1960 the relocation process in Columbus, and in many cities, still was underway. But, by 1970 it will be possible for the first time, on a broad scale and in terms of many precise indices of comparison, to gauge the effects of slum clearance (and relocation) on inner city housing conditions.

Bearing in mind the limitations of data, however, it is possible to develop a strong hypothesis supporting criticism of urban renewal described above. Utilizing selected categories of data on housing con-
conditions in Columbus after nearly twenty years of urban renewal it is possible to construct the outlines of a very disturbing picture of housing conditions in part caused by urban renewal and related activities.

The most often cited criticisms of urban renewal's effects on national housing conditions are:

1. Of the 1.5 million estimated people moved, or who will be moved, most will not find replacement housing, any better than they had before clearance forced them out of their previous homes.

2. Whether their housing is "standard" or not, the cost of replacement housing will be much greater than their former housing and it is unlikely that these increased costs will be offset by higher incomes, considering the low skill and educational levels of people from slum areas.

3. There has not been a commensurate increase in the supply of new low cost housing to offset the destruction of so much substandard, but still low cost, slum housing.

4. The aggravation of housing problems in the cities has created especial hardship for Negroes, since they usually are the most affected by slum clearance actions and are least able to find alternate housing.

How do these criticisms pertain to the housing situation in Columbus? Negro families were somewhat less affected by renewal actions proportionally speaking, than in many other cities with much larger Negro populations. Newark, for example, had a Negro population in 1960 amounting to thirty-four percent of the total. Columbus had in 1960 a population which was 12% black. Moreover, some of Newark's
biggest clearance projects were located in the very heart of the Negro
ghetto where ninety percent or better of the residents were non-white.
By comparison, the two major Columbus clearance projects, Goodale
and Market-Mohawk, had sixty-seven and twenty-five percent respec-
tively, of their populations composed of Negro families.

Also, whatever bad effects public construction had on the housing
conditions of the inner city the responsibility must be shared with other
projects than urban renewal. The period 1958 to 1968 was one of major
public construction in Columbus, requiring the demolition of 8,000
units of private housing. Urban renewal accounted for one-third or
2700 units destroyed for public purposes. 6 The interstate highway
system, innerbelt expressways, and a viaduct over the Pennsylvania
Railroad freight yards connecting Third Street and Summit Avenue
accounted for most of the balance. Since non-urban renewal activity
required two-thirds of the housing demolition it is not fair to assign it
more than a proportional responsibility for effects on basic living
conditions in the inner city of Columbus. But, since the putative
goal of urban renewal was to improve housing conditions for those it
displaced in the name of redevelopment the quality of its responsibility
should be judged against a different standard than that applied to

6 Statistical Summary of Relocation of Families: 1956-1965, SCAR,
1960 and Housing Analysis and Preliminary Recommendations, Hammer
expressways, for example. Expressways never were justified as a means to ease the housing problems of those who were moved out of the right-of-way. Transportation efficiency and related commercial goals provided the rationale for the expressways, which justifies a less stringent standard of judgment, even though the effect of expressway construction may have affected housing problems more than urban renewal.

Before assessing the contribution of urban renewal to the housing problems of the poor in Columbus it is necessary to describe the aggregate effects of ten years of intensive public construction on housing, per se, in Columbus.

First, what effects did this aggregate activity have on Negroes, the group which could be assumed had suffered the most from slum clearance, expressway construction, and other types of projects? Statistics compiled at the request of the Department of Development in Columbus (the merger of city planning and urban renewal staffs) reveal that Negro families occupied forty percent of the households displaced by demolition for public purposes during the 1958-68 period. Moreover, the data reveals that the amount of substandard housing in Columbus during this time of slum clearance and redevelopment actually has increased. Significantly, one hundred percent of this increase occurred in the housing stock available to Negroes.
The proportion of white-occupied substandard housing remained constant but fifteen percent of the Negro housing fell into the substandard category during the years between 1958 and 1968.

The elimination of poor housing was one of the explicit goals of the 1949 Housing Act. But the benefits of such action must be gauged in terms of corresponding improvements in the supply and availability of standard housing.

Coincident with the extensive and rapid bulldozing of substandard housing, Columbus builders constructed 63,200 units of new housing in the city. This was more than enough to replace the bad housing destroyed. However, Negro families moved into only four percent of the new housing, including units constructed by the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority.

The location of most of the new housing accounts for its unavailability to Negroes. Only 5200 units were built within the inner city of Columbus--the area encompassed by the innerbelt expressway system. Over eighty percent of Columbus Negroes live in this "island" community. Compounding the problem is the fact that over half of the 5200 units were built for high income families, not affected by housing problems, e.g., Thurber Towers in the Goodale urban renewal project. The balance of the new housing built in the inner city includes 700 public

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housing units and a scattering of four-family and duplex apartments. Since the latter types often are too small for large families and since children and poverty vary proportionally with each other, public housing represented the primary alternative for inner city families forced to relocate because of public construction activity. 8

White families in Columbus occupied nearly all of the new housing built from 1958 to 1968. The stock of substandard housing for them held constant. By contrast Negro families had to rely almost entirely on second hand housing to accommodate an 8400 household growth among Negroes during the base period. As white families released former residences to move on to better housing, a "trickle down" process occurred opening up previously all-white neighborhoods to Negroes. About 9300 units of housing changed racial hands in this manner. Significantly, 3000 of these units were substandard at the time of the shift. In addition, 3000 units held by Negroes in 1960, amounting to fifteen percent of the total Negro stock, declined to substandard levels by 19689

By 1968 the net results of these housing dynamics included a net increase in the volume of substandard housing for Negroes in Columbus. In 1958 an estimated 10,700 units of substandard Negro housing existed; by 1968 the number had increased to 12,700 units, an increase of twenty

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 3.
percent, despite the fact that Negro occupants constituted forty percent of all households displaced by demolition during the same period. 10

In short, through the period of urban renewal, policy development there was no net improvement in the housing conditions for white families and a further deterioration of housing conditions "for Negroes," the group which started the decade with the worst housing condition. One out of ten white families in Columbus lives in substandard housing in 1969, "the same as in 1968." For Negro families, the figure has stayed at one out of four families, but only because of the influx of Negroes into public housing units like Bolivar Arms and Windsor Terrace, built to accommodate the needs of displaced Negro families. These projects, of course, are in the midst of the racial ghetto, intensifying the overcrowded conditions and producing a "pile-up" of low skills, low income families. In this sense, housing conditions for Negro families declined in relation to white families during the base period. Some Effects of The Relocation of Slum Clearance Project Residents

As stated above, urban renewal should not bear the full burden of responsibility for the present housing crisis among Columbus' low income Negro citizens. Demolition of housing for other purposes exceeded that for urban renewal needs.

10 Ibid.
It is very difficult to specify the exact new effect of several years of urban renewal activity on inner housing conditions. To do so would require knowledge of where displaced families are today, for which records are not in existence in the vast majority of cases. For families who did seek the aid of the Family Relocation Office there is a record of where they moved in the city but no sure way of detecting the quality of housing they now have—or whether it varied, and in which direction, from the housing they had before relocation began.

In an impressionistic fashion however, it is possible to hypothesize the effects of the movement of families for which records are available which have compounded the already dangerous housing pressures in certain parts of Columbus. The maps reflect the distribution of relocated families from Goodale, and Market-Mohawk and areas of the city now facing acute housing problems. The data in the files of the Department of Development and housing surveys made by an independent research consultant provide data for the maps.

It should be born in mind that all statistics collected by the Family Relocation Office reflect only actual families assisted. As noted before this is considerably less than a majority of all families who once lived in the project area.

According to the Family Relocation records 481 families from Goodale and 769 from Market-Mohawk received Family Relocation Office assistance to obtain moving expense grants, certification for public housing,
II
RELOCATION OF FAMILIES FROM THE MARKET-MOHAWK AREA
BY OCCUPANCY

Legend

Purchaser
Renters
3 Renters

Area outlined in black identifies "Area Recommended for Intensive Study" by Hammer, Greene, Siler Associates because of the concentration of socio-economic and physical (housing) indices of decline.
III

RELOCATION OF FAMILIES FROM THE GOODALE AREA BY OCCUPANCY

Legend

1. Windsor Terrace Public Housing
2. Bolivar Arms Public Housing

Gray ▲ Negro Renter
Dark ▲ White Renter
Gray ○ Negro Purchaser
Dark ○ White Renter
certification for eligibility for Section 221 housing insurance, or, in seeking replacement housing in the private market through realtor lists. The records also indicate that this total of 1250 families accounted for only sixty percent of the original population of the two projects. Approximately 278 families from Goodale and 210 families from Market-Mohawk moved prior to acquisition proceedings. There is no official record of what happened to these people.

Moreover, it is likely that a much higher proportion than the records show moved with no government aid or advice. Census tract statistics for 1950 reveal total number of residences for Goodale and Market-Mohawk as 4573. Vacancy rates for the two projects are not available but even if a vacancy rate of twenty-five percent is assumed, meaning that only 3430 units were occupied in 1958, this still means that of 3430 families and individuals only 1250 or 36 percent of the people living in the two major slum clearance projects received aid in finding relocation housing. 11

In short, the relocation assistance efforts of the urban renewal department affected only a small minority of those displaced. Part of what happened to these people may be inferred from the "chase pattern" found by SCAR "census takers" in 1958. They found that the population of Goodale actually had increased as the families forced out by the Goodale section of the expressway moved into the urban renewal section

of Goodale, just prior to the start of relocation for urban renewal purposes. Thus, such families moved at least twice, perhaps more, as they were chased, in effect, by the wreckers from one clearance area to another. Eventually, of course, all were forced out of the various clearance areas and the probability is that their third or fourth move was into housing no better than they had occupied after the first or second move.

For those families who did receive government aid of some kind in obtaining relocation housing the results are mixed, at best. The following table depicts the pre-relocation and post-relocation housing costs for families from Goodale and Market-Mohawk.

**TABLE 3**

**COMPARISON OF AVERAGE HOUSING RENT PAID BY FAMILIES BEFORE AND AFTER RELOCATION FROM GOODALE AND MARKET-MOHAWK URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Goodale</th>
<th></th>
<th>Market-Mohawk</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Net Change</td>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>Net Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>$55.24</td>
<td>$49.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>66.75</td>
<td>+20%</td>
<td>68.05</td>
<td>-40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Those not eligible for public housing


The statistics in Table 3 demonstrate that, on the average, slum clearance families paid higher rent for their relocation housing and that
Negro families paid an increment twice as high as that paid by white families.

Another index of housing conditions is the gain in the number of home owners following relocation from clearance projects. Tables IV and XV describe the changes in proportion of home ownership before and after relocation and other significant housing changes. The tables show an increase in the number of home purchasers following relocation, especially among former Negro residents of the projects. In the case of former Goodale families thirty percent of the Negro families were owners before relocation and sixty-two percent after relocation. Negro families from Market-Mohawk improved from twelve and one-half percent ownership to twenty-six percent home ownership. For white families there was a decrease in home ownership among former Goodale residents—forty percent to thirty-eight percent. In Market-Mohawk only six percent of white families were property owners before urban renewal but after relocation seventy-four percent of the white families purchased homes. These figures, of course, are based on the number of families from the projects who received help from the Family Relocation Office and do not give an accurate picture for all of the original residents of these two slum clearance projects.

One of the most well publicized methods of obtaining relocation housing of good quality for slum clearance evacuees was the so-called Section 221 program whereby the Federal Housing Administration in-
TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FORMER FAMILIES OF THE GOODALE AREA BY RACE AND NEW OCCUPANCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NON-WHITE</th>
<th></th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Renter</td>
<td>Former Owner</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Former Renter</td>
<td>Former Owner</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renting</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. M. H. A.*</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(84)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of City</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(78)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority
  Low Income Public Housing

Source: Family Relocation Office Files; Department of Development, Columbus, Ohio
## Table 51

**Percentage Distribution of Former Families of the Market-Mohawk Area by Race and New Occupancy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Non-White</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Total</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Renter</td>
<td>Former Owner</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Former Renter</td>
<td>Former Owner</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Former Renter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Renting</strong></td>
<td>91.6%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>100% (22.9)</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>100% (77.1)</td>
<td>91.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purchasing</strong></td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>100 (25.9)</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>100 (74.1)</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C.M.H.A.</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100 (40.0)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100 (60.0)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Out-of-City</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100 (100)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unknown</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100 (4.2)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100 (95.8)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>100% (19.7)</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>100% (80.3)</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority
Low Income Public Housing

Source: Family Relocation Office File: Department of Development, Columbus, Ohio.
sured mortgages for various kinds of standard housing, new and used, rental and purchase housing, for the specific purpose of helping communities meet relocation needs. In the late 1950s Columbus had an especially active "221" program underway receiving an allocation of 2212 units from the FHA. Urban renewal activities, of course, generated only part of the need for relocation housing; about one-third of demolitions during the 1959 to 1968 period were required by urban renewal. Of the total recorded number of families forced to move only 130 were able to qualify for purchase of used housing, only ten met FHA requirements, even under the liberalized "221" provisions, for loans to buy new homes, and eighteen moved into rental housing mortgaged through the Section 221 program. For families displaced by urban renewal the "221" program provided very little assistance.

The remainder of families displaced by urban renewal moved into public housing. According to Family Relocation Office records only twelve percent were certified as eligible.

The last criticism of the relocation program nationally was that the quality of the housing is usually no better after relocation.

Federal law and local ordinances specify that all relocation housing must be "standard" housing in Columbus and every other city receiving urban renewal funds. But, except for new rental or purchased housing, which accounted for a fraction of the relocation housing in Co-

\[12\] Ibid. p. 3.
umbus, and the public housing units, there is no objective standard for evaluating the condition of relocation housing. As described in chapter two, standard housing is a highly protean term under any circumstances. When a particular interest may be served as when relocation officials seek to satisfy federal authorities that standard housing has been found for dislocated families, the measurement of housing quality may become less stringent--in application if not definition. On the other hand, when an urban renewal agency wishes to find data demonstrating that a particular area is deteriorated enough to warrant clearance and redevelopment, very high standards are likely to be applied.

There is no way to determine precisely the proportion of families displaced by urban renewal who found, with or without help from government, so-called standard housing. None of the records maintained by urban renewal or planning officials in Columbus classify relocation housing into "standard" and "non-standard" categories. Having quoted the appropriate section of the law in their various reports and statistical summaries, the officials apparently assume that what ought to be, in fact, is.

Aggregate data on housing trends in Columbus, however, strongly suggest that, at the very minimum, urban renewal relocation policies have added to growing housing crisis in Columbus. Most of the families for which records exist moved into areas of the city which now are classed
as areas "in need of intensive study," i.e., facing serious trouble if something is not done to halt the slide into ever greater deterioration—physically and socially.

The End of Urban Renewal In Columbus

The subtitle of this section is an exact quote from a long-time member of the planning staff of what is now the Department of Development in Columbus, following the merger with the City Planning Commission in 1966. Urban renewal, as it has been described and analyzed here, is over in Columbus, according to this official. The shelving of a proposed renewal project in the East side of Columbus, the merging of planning with urban renewal, the defeat of two successive bond issues in 1964 and 1965, all support his viewpoint. To other officials in the department, urban renewal will go on but in the form of more intensive planning and code enforcement—basically a preventative effort.

Has the Columbus urban renewal program stemmed the tide of CBD deterioration and decentralization? There is no doubt about the material benefits, in terms of increased tax bases and revenues, which will continue to flow from areas like Goodale and Market-Mohawk. In Market-Mohawk, valuation is projected to rise from $3.1 million to $16 million. In Goodale, completed in 1968, values have increased from a pre-clearance figure of $3 million to an actual $4.9 million. In other urban renewal projects, completed or in progress, comparable
increases in real estate values are in effect or in prospect.

In reality, there is no single answer to the question of how well urban renewal succeeded in any of its goals. To the CBD businessman watching the rise dramatically transformed Market-Mohawk area or viewing Thurber Towers from the expressway as he drives downtown one kind of answer is likely. To the low income, black family, or to the public official facing an imminent crisis in housing conditions, more portentious than twenty years ago, a different response is more probable.

To the student of American policy formation processes, the experience of cities like Columbus, Ohio, in transforming the variegated "clues" contained in the urban renewal legislation enacted by Congress two decades ago into policy, i.e., actual effects, is but one example of how much we need to learn about processes of political and social change initiated by government. The study of policy-making too often ends at the national level with the triumph of legislative reforms appearing to "solve" vexing social problems. We often know very little of the final outcome of what are only preliminary skirmishes in the ongoing conflict over the ultimate purposes of national policy.
## APPENDIX I

### Local-Federal Relationships in a Sample Urban Renewal Project

**Preproject stage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local governing body (city council)</th>
<th>Local Public agency (local urban renewal agency)</th>
<th>Housing and Home Finance Agency--Urban Renewal Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Workable program for community improvement:  
  (a) Participates in development of workable program and approves its submission to HHFA. |  
| 2. General plan and codes and ordinances:  
Adopts general plan for development of locality as a whole and comprehensive program for blight prevention through adoption and enforcement of housing, zoning building, and other local codes and ordinances. |  
| 3. Creation of local renewal agency:  
  a. Authorizes creation of local urban renewal agency (local public agency) pursuant to State enabling legislation. Appoints members of LPA board of commissioners. |  
|  
|  
|  
| b. Board of commissioners appoints executive director and other LPA officials, subject to applicable civil service regulations, and adopts bylaws and regulations for conduct of LPA affairs. |  
| b. Administrator certifies workable program. |
APPENDIX II

Project planning stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local governing body (city council)</th>
<th>Local public agency (Local urban renewal agency)</th>
<th>Housing and Home Finance Agency--Urban Renewal Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prepared application to HHFA for advance funds to finance costs of surveys and plans in preparation of a project in a delineated urban renewal area.</td>
<td>2. Approves submission of survey and planning application and determines that area is blighted or deteriorating and appropriate for an urban renewal project.</td>
<td>3. Approves survey and planning application and reserves grant fund estimated to be required for undertaking the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Undertakes surveys and prepares project plans, including urban renewal plan, relocation program, and financing plan. Submits survey reports and project plans to HHFA as pt. 1 of application for loan and grant.</td>
<td>5. Advises LPA of acceptability of pt. 1 of application of loan and grant.</td>
<td>6. Holds public hearing on the project-determines that project area qualifies under State urban renewal law. Approves urban renewal plan and determines that it conforms to general plan and affords maximum opportunity for renewal of the area by private enterprise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Administrator determines that requirements for a feasible relocation program have been met.</td>
<td>8. Administrator approves application for loan and grant and allocates loan and grant funds for undertaking of approved project.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX II

**Project planning stage continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local governing body (city council)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. continued

- Determines that relocation program is feasible.
- Executes cooperation agreements for provision of required local share of project costs.
- Approves submission to HHFA of application for loan and grant.
### APPENDIX III

**continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local governing body (city council)</th>
<th>Local Public agency (local urban renewal agency)</th>
<th>Housing and Home Finance Agency--Urban Renewal Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enters into all other contracts normally without HHFA concurrence.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conducts periodic audits of LPA project activities, and project expenditures for conformity with approved project plans, approved budget, contract for loan and grant, and URA policies and requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. HHFA audits and inspections</td>
<td></td>
<td>Site representatives inspect LPA project activities for conformity with approved project plans, approved budget, contract for loan and grant, and URA policies and requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Reports</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conducts final audit of project activities and costs, and approves certificate of completion and of project costs. Approves final grant requisition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submits periodic reports of project expenditures and physical progress.</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX III  
continued'

Project execution stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local governing body (city council)</th>
<th>Local public agency (local urban renewal agency)</th>
<th>Housing and Home Finance Agency--Urban Renewal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If required by State or local law, holds public hearing on proposed disposal and approves disposal.</td>
<td>If required by State or local law, holds public hearing on proposed disposal. Executes agreement for disposal of project land for redevelopment or rehabilitation.</td>
<td>Approves loan requisitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrange for provisions of cash and noncash grants-in-aid required to meet local share of project costs.</td>
<td>Periodically requisitions loan funds to repay planning advance and to meet project expenditures. (Either a direct loan from HHFA or a private loan secured by full faith and credit of government.) Periodically requisitions earned capital grant funds from HHFA, to repay loans in part. Obtains certificates of cost of noncash local grants-in-aid from providing entities and submits to HHFA.</td>
<td>Approves grant requisitions</td>
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<td>Approves certificates of cost.</td>
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<td>Concur in execution of proposed contracts.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX III

**Project execution stage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local governing body (city council)</th>
<th>Local public agency (local urban renewal agency)</th>
<th>Housing and Home Finance Agency--Urban Renewal Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Land acquisition:</td>
<td>Concurs in maximum acquisition prices.</td>
<td>Makes relocation grant payments to LPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submits to HHFA proposed maximum prices for acquisition of project land to be acquired, based on appraisals.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Makes relocation grant payments to LPA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acquires title to property through negotiation with owners or eminent domain proceedings.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Makes relocation grant payments to LPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Property management:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Makes relocation grant payments to LPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manages acquired property until occupants are relocated and property is demolished or disposed of.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Makes relocation grant payments to LPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relocation:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Makes relocation grant payments to LPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carries out relocation and rehousing of families, individuals, and businesses to be displaced by the project, in accordance with approved relocation program.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Makes relocation grant payments to LPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makes relocation payments to displacees for moving expenses and loss of property, and requisitions grant payments from HHFA as full reimbursement.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Makes relocation grant payments to LPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governing body (city council)</td>
<td>Local public agency (local urban renewal agency)</td>
<td>Housing and Home Finance Agency--Urban Renewal Administration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Site clearance and preparation: Provides for demolition and site clearance of project land to be redeveloped, and for installation of site improvements and preparation of the project area for redevelopment or conservation.</td>
<td>Concurs in proposed contract documents or in use of LPA force account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Rehabilitation and conservation: Carries out rehabilitation and conservation activities in accordance with approved rehabilitation and conservation report.</td>
<td>Concurs in methods of disposal, fair value of land (in consultation with FHA for land to be used for private residential redevelopment and forms of disposal documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Land disposal: Submits to HHFA proposed methods of disposal of project land, proposed fair value of land for uses in accordance with urban renewal plan based on appraisals, and proposed forms of disposal documents. Selects redevelopers under approved disposal method and makes public disclosure of proposed disposal.</td>
<td>Clears disposal to selected redeveloper.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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