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THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN FOUR AFRICAN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio University

By

Richard John Kestler, B.A.

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1969

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My sincerest thanks go to all who have helped me on the preparation of this dissertation. To Morton Sipress for valuable advice. To the members of the Political Science faculty of the University of North Dakota. To its Chairman, Henry Tomasek and Thomas Clifford, Dean of its Business College, for securing financial aid. To Mrs. Ben T. Hennessy, Helene Zimmerman and Sharon Jahner for their long hours of typing. To the Ohio State University Department of Political Science and its Chairman, Lawrence J. R. Herson. To my dissertation advisors, James B. Christoph, Giacomo Sani, and Theodore Meckstroth. Finally, to my wife Carol, who has had to put up with many long days and lonely nights while this dissertation was being researched and written.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation proposes to analyze the attitude changes and parliamentary behavior in the two foremost British political parties when confronted with a major, sustained, often emotion-laden problem: the granting of independence to four African colonies. Prime focus will be on the parliamentary debates over the years 1946-64, years in which Africa changed from a continent of colonies to one of mostly independent states. These dates are chosen because 1946 is the first year of the post-World War II era, and the first year of Britain's first all-Labour government. Labour fell from power in 1951, and was followed by an unprecedented thirteen year period of Conservative Party rule. Labour returned to power in October, 1964. The dissertation terminates with this latter date.

Our concern is to analyze the policy decisions leading to independence of the four colonies. It is also to attempt to assess underlying attitudinal changes accompanying changes in British policy.

\footnote{Only Ethiopia and Liberia were sovereign in 1946. There were thirty-six independent countries in 1964.}
One of these is the decline of British imperialism. Despite its great loss of men and material, Britain emerged from World War II with the largest empire in history virtually intact: over 600 million subjects in more than 70 countries. Eighteen years later the empire consisted of a few defense outposts (i.e., Malta, Gibraltar, etc.) and some territories deemed too small to become viable nations. The only other remaining colonies were those where some special factor had delayed the grant of independence. The rise of nationalism in the non-white colonies combined with Britain's weakened world position to bring about what John Strachey has called "The End of Empire." ²

The growth of this nationalism had begun before World War II. Many Asian colonies had well defined nationalist movements when that conflict began. But the war almost certainly made their development more rapid. In territories taken by the Japanese some nationalists helped administer their countries while others led resistance movements. In other Asian territories concessions to national groups were the price of winning their support in the war effort. British Africa was far less touched by the war, but every colony had its share of native troops; troops who returned to their homes with a broadened world perspective

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and often with changed attitudes. They joined with intellectuals (usually western educated students) to form the basis of the post-war independence movements which quickly developed among black Africans.

But nationalist movements were not so strong that they could not have been crushed had Britain been willing to use force. This has been the policy of the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, and of the white governments of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia. The approach has met with considerable success. Force was also used by Britain on occasion—in Malaya and, on the African continent, against the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya.

Elsewhere in Africa, except for the quelling of actual riots, post-war British policy permitted the organization of militant nationalist movements. Even when most Britons considered the claims of these movements both harmful and unrealistic, few were willing to commit British troops to suppress them. This, as John Strachey has pointed out,

3 Disgruntled veterans were the prime cause of unrest leading to the Gold Coast riots of February–March 1948, the first serious outbreak of violence in post-war British Africa.

4 These leaders often reported having become nationalists through having learned of the values reached by (and largely practiced in) the western colonial powers or the United States. They lost faith in governments which practiced different standards in their colonies than at home. Some, like Nkrumah, were first introduced to socialism or marxism in the West. (For a discussion of Nkrumah's college and post-college years in the United States and London see Race & Power: Studies of Leadership in Five British Dependencies. A Bow Group publication (Sussex: Oliver Burridge & Co., Ltd., 1956).
was contrary to the entire history of imperialism. Previously, countries had won independence only when they proved strong enough to militarily inflict sufficient casualties that the ruling power felt the prize no longer worth the price.5

Prevailing British attitudes toward the empire may in part have made the transition easier. Few Britons ever shared the French or Portuguese concept of assimilation. Not even the most organic British theorist suggested natives in British Africa should be taught from texts equivalent to the notorious history found in French African colonies which began "Our ancestors, the Gauls."6

In theory, Britain was merely serving in trust, until colonial peoples were sufficiently mature to conduct their own affairs. To quote Immanuel Wallerstein:

... autonomous development, the ultimate acquisition of independence, were always considered reasonable, indeed inevitable, objectives of British colonies in Africa. Once Britain had expanded her previously white Commonwealth after the Second World War to include the Asian dominions.... There seemed no reason why African countries ... should not proceed along this path.7

We feel a qualification must be added to the last part of this quote. Few M.P.'s denied the African colonies the right to "proceed along this path."

5Strachey, End of Empire, Chapter Eight (especially pp. 130-33).


7Ibid., p. 70.
path," but neither party was willing to grant independence to any colony unless certain conditions were met. The list included economic viability, government by law, a parliamentary form of government, protection of racial minorities, and orientation towards the West, or at least neutrality, in the Cold War. These criteria tended to be modified, in practice, as pressures for independence mounted. In theory, at least, no colony attained sovereignty until its people had developed "a common faith in the values of British democracy and some understanding of the spirit in which it is practiced."9

In reality few Britons would seem to have believed, in 1946, that black Africans would be able to fulfill these criteria for decades, if not centuries, to come. Until that time, it was Britain's duty to retain administrative control. This view was probably bolstered by the underlying attitude that the empire was an organic unity—an attitude reflected in the writings and policy statements of both major British parties. The concept was somewhat less prevalent, less rigid, in the writings of Labourites than in those of Conservatives; yet it may well have lasted longer, in modified form, in ruling Labour circles. Although the post-war decolonization process began under a Labour administration virtually all

8 Such statements appeared many times. We shall give concrete illustrations later in this dissertation.

Britain's major African colonies attained independence during the years the Conservatives were in office.

Why was the empire ended? Perhaps the existence of the Commonwealth eased the transition. Perhaps also the loss of British status—especially after the Suez Crisis of 1956—made it too costly to preserve the empire by force. We shall raise these issues periodically in the pages that follow.

Analysis of changes in British attitudes and policy also serves to illustrate aspects of the entire British policy process. Our investigations will proceed on several levels. We will, of course, review actual government policy decisions. These do not reveal the entire story. Although the two main British parties are highly responsible, although backbenchers almost never vote contrary to the wishes of their leaders, they do not merely ratify these policies unthinkingly.

This theme will be illustrated in Chapter II. Let us say now, however, that it is often quite revealing to read back bench M.P. opinions in Hansard. At the least their commentaries elaborate upon the reasoning behind front bench policy. Often the reasons given for supporting or opposing a measure are substantively different from those given by the party leaders. Perhaps this is sometimes rationalization to justify their vote. There is usually much substantive content in these statements, however. Information is often revealed which the party spokesmen failed
to mention.

On many occasions, the backbenchers stated attitudes more radical or more reactionary than those of their leaders. To some extent, these statements help define factions within the parties. We have also uncovered evidence to support the hypothesis that the parties grew more radical as the period progressed. As they did so they came to accept the views presented earlier by their radical wings. Thus the Labour Party gradually adopted the policies suggested by its left segment at an earlier time. With some modifications which we shall point out later, the Conservatives slowly moved leftwards also, covering ground recently abandoned by Labour. Even the Conservative right wing moved in this direction. By 1964, while these men remained to the right of their leaders, they were closer to the position their leaders had held a few years previous than to their own position at that time. For this reason alone analysis of back bench positions proved informative.

To further expand our knowledge of the period, we have supplemented our analysis of debates in Commons with a review of party journals. Both parties maintain their own publishing houses, and both

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Except where otherwise stated, radical will be defined throughout this dissertation as supportive of the views of the black African leaders, and supportive of independence for these countries in a shorter time than the party leadership accepted. Reactionary views are those which continued to adhere to the concepts of British imperial domination over the colonies and (where it existed) settler domination within them. Adherents wished to see black sovereignty granted slowly, if at all. Sometimes the terms left and right will be used as synonyms for radical and reactionary.
put out periodicals which contain a reasonably accurate assessment of the thinking of the respective national executives. Articles pertaining to colonial policy, especially that directed towards our four colonies, have been analyzed so as to provide further insight into policy at any given moment. Taken as a whole, these articles helped us to ascertain how that policy altered over time.

As a final source, we have referred to two major independent newspapers, The Times and The Guardian. Both have a reputation for accuracy and moderation. (The Guardian is usually a few shades left of The Times.) This provided us with a barometer—an external control—to contrast with the attitudes of the party representatives. We hypothesized that these papers would also evince a gradually more-radicalized stance over time. Assessment of their editorial positions is interspersed throughout the Chapters dealing with party positions towards colonial issues.

Rather than attempt an assessment of overall British colonial policy—or even overall policy in Africa, we have decided to confine our evaluation to four colonies. In so doing we can be more specific than would be possible in the case of the broader topics. Nonetheless, we attempted to choose colonies representative of four aspects of the de-colonizing problem. Much of what happened in these areas may be extrapolated to hypothesize what happened elsewhere.

Two of the countries--The Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Nigeria--
are in West Africa. The climate there is not conducive to European habitation, and no permanent white settlement took place. The decision to grant independence here revolved around such factors as whether African natives could be expected to control their own destiny as sovereign states in the modern world, and how best to train leaders and populace in democratic processes. We chose these two black states for our analysis because The Gold Coast was the first black colony to be granted independence in this century, while Nigeria was the one deemed by Whitehall as most likely to attain stable democratic institutions.

The other two countries analyzed—Kenya and Southern Rhodesia (now Rhodesia) were settler colonies—i.e., a substantial number of Europeans had become permanent residents. Here there was little need to convince the mother country of the ability of the ruling white class to govern itself. In 1946 Rhodesia's internal autonomy was already virtually complete.¹¹ Kenya's whites had considerably less control, but even they possessed a degree of economic independence and political power unknown to the native authorities in non-settler territories.¹²

The settlers expected Britain to follow its South African precedent--


and grant full independence to white-dominated regimes. But circum-
stances were different in 1909. Britain had had little choice but to grant
internal self-rule or face a second, more terrible Boer War. The South
African economy was better developed then than was the Rhodesian in
1960. The percentage of whites to blacks in the Union was about one to
four. In Rhodesia it never exceeded one to ten, while whites composed
no more than one percent of the population of Kenya.

13 Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher (with Alice Denny), *Africa and
the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent* (New

14 The figures given in the *Encyclopedia Brittanica*, 11th Edition
(1910), Vol. XXV, p. 464 are, for the four South African Republics
totalled, white 1,116,870; colored (including mixed bloods and Asians)
4,059,018. The 1910 figure for S. Rhodesia was whites 12,623, colored
600,000 (est.). White population increased, largely through immigration,
to about 210,000 in 1960, Africans then numbered some 2 1/2 million.
(British Africa, Labour Party Discussion Notes #25 (London: Transport
House, April, 1960), p. 15). Since 1963 white population has levelled
at about 225,000 while African population has sharply increased. A
racial breakdown is no longer given but the 1967 *Americana Annual*
p. 590) estimates total population for July, 1965 at 4,260,000. Except
for a small number of Asians the sharp increase is virtually all among
Negroes.

White emigration to Kenya was always smaller than it was to Rhodesia.
During the last years of the 1950's, as Kenya's future became uncertain,
it slowed to a trickle. The highest estimated white population, 66,000,
was for the years 1961-62. For the next few years emigration exceeded
immigration. Since independence, figures are no longer broken down
racially but there are fewer than 25,000 whites in Kenya today. The
general population figures have gone up sharply, especially in the post-
war years. African population in 1948 was placed at 5,406 million. The
total population figure for July 1, 1965 was 9,365 million. This total
includes some Asians and Arabs as well, but their total numbers were
under 200,000 in 1955, and there are fewer today especially since the
In the post-war period British respect for settler capabilities (and empathy for those with white skins) came increasingly in conflict with the need to recognize the power (if not always the justice) of steadily growing black nationalism. The black cause began to win adherents in the British Parliament—especially among a segment of the Labour Party. These, by definition, are referred to henceforth as the left wing, since they were the most sensitive to the black cause. The less willing an M.P. to see merit in the Nationalist position, the further to the right we shall place him. Gradually, even those who felt the blacks were wrong came to the realization their power could not be ignored. For these M.P.'s a conflict grew between their normative values and the realities of power. The Conservative governments after 1951 gradually subordinated the former to the latter in their policy decisions, although sometimes they did so so belatedly as to alienate both sides.

The concept of white rule gradually was abandoned; first in favor of equal power for each race (multiracialism), later in favor of one-man, one-vote (black domination). In Kenya the latter policy was completed prior to independence. In Rhodesia the settlers revolted. Before they would accept black control, they would risk international opprobrium. Rhodesia thus became the first British colony since 1776 to declare

independence unilaterally.

The method of analysis will be as follows. We shall attempt to assess both policy and attitudes at given times over the eighteen year period. We shall also attempt to analyze changes in those policies and attitudes over time. We shall isolate divergencies between back bench positions and those of the party leadership. We shall try to point out M.P.'s whose positions were later adopted by their leaders. Where possible, we shall strive to interrelate statements in Commons, in the party publications, and in the two newspapers.

Since attitudes and policies do not form in isolation, we shall present background material in Chapter III which will indicate some of the forces which drew Great Britain into Africa and the pre-World War II forces which helped set the stage for her post-war withdrawal. Since this is not our central research area, we have relied primarily on secondary source material only.

We shall suggest hypotheses from time to time. We also propose to use, as an overall conceptual framework, the Lindblom-Braybrooke concept of disjunctive incrementalism, as developed in their 1963 book A Strategy of Decision. This theme will be further developed in Chapter II.

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It is our hope that some consistent patterns will emerge, and that some light may be shed upon the degree to which incrementalism was utilized by the British, and the degree to which, when utilized, it proved effective. This will provide the overall framework for Chapters IV to VIII, within which we will analyze the formulation of British policy towards four African colonies.
CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL FORMULATIONS

In this chapter we shall look at several relationships as depicted in the literature extant on the roles of the British parties, the relationships between front and back benches, and the ideological orientation in British politics. We shall then discuss the strategy of disjunctive incrementalism as conceived by Dahl, Braybrooke and Lindblom. We shall establish the criteria by which this strategy might serve as an overall conceptual framework within which to view British policy decisions in the area being analyzed.

First, let us establish certain limitations upon this study. Our original goal was to assess policy and attitude changes only in the Labour Party. We discovered, however, that the interplay of two-party dialogue helped clarify our understanding of the ways in which decisions were formulated. It also aided in the development of insights into the pattern behind policy alteration over time. For the same general reasons, we rejected an analysis based only upon the statements of the government of the day without regard for the position of the opposition. For reasons we shall elaborate we did not limit ourselves solely to statements from
the front benches, but assessed back bench positions as well.

Since we were interested in changes in expressed attitudinal position, our focus is centered upon Parliament and the journals, not upon White Papers per se. Analysis of the content of the latter would in itself constitute a dissertation. Besides, they do not reveal the thinking of Britain's leaders nearly so well as do the debates. They don't reflect objections by the opposition at all.

Only rarely will reference be made to the House of Lords. This body still serves certain useful functions. It sometimes finds weaknesses in the language of bills sent from Commons. It may introduce relatively minor amendments, which will often be adapted by the Cabinet.\(^1\) It introduces legislation of a relatively non-controversial character.\(^2\) Such legislation virtually never applies to the area of colonial policy, however. Lords' power to affect major legislation has been reduced to the right to delay its passage for one year or two parliamentary sessions. (Finance bills may be delayed only thirty days.) Usually, even these powers are not exercised. Lords is not a representative body, both because it is non-elective and because the Conservatives


\(^2\)A good discussion of the role of Lords is: Bernard Crick, "What Should the Lords be Doing?" *Political Quarterly* (April, 1963), pp. 174-84. (Quotation p. 180).
retain a perpetual majority. Its members know its powers would be
curbed further if it exercised its remaining prerogatives with any fre­
quency. A body almost exclusively hereditary in composition cannot be
permitted to legislate in a democratic nation.3

There was only one area where Lords was sometimes of influence.
Revelations made there were sometimes important, since several of its
members had served in the Colonial Office before being elevated to the
peerage. The most important such incident occurred in 1962, and con­
cerned the charge that Britain had violated certain pledges when it granted
Nyasaland the right to secede from the Central African Federation. (We
shall discuss this in Chapter VIII.)

Party cohesion and responsibility are very high in Commons. The
government is, by definition, the party (or coalition) with a majority of
the seats. It remains the government only so long as it retains that
majority. The backbencher is expected to support his party on all legis­
lation except in the rare instance where a "free vote" is permitted. The
more important the legislation, the more binding is the whip. The M.P.'s
power to rebel is minimized on precisely those issues where his so doing
would be most significant.

It would therefore be meaningless, in a study such as this, to

3For an analysis of Lord's use of its powers see Douglas V.
Verney, British Government and Politics (New York: Harper and Row,
analyze votes in Commons by such criteria as the demographic nature of the M.P.'s constituency, the degree to which it is urbanized, the power of lobbies in certain areas, etc. The single factor determining the way an M.P. votes is, in nearly all instances, his party affiliation. When a vote is called members file down their respective sides of the aisle, cast their vote as the whips have designated, and return to their seats. No wonder voting in Parliament is known as a "division."

Revolts do occur, but only rarely. Those which are sufficiently widespread to cause the party leadership serious concern are rarer still. No non-coalition government has lost a no-confidence vote since 1890. The decline of the Liberal Party has ended the need for coalition governments in the post-World War II period. For these reasons, the role of the backbencher has been often ignored in the literature. His right to speak his mind is recognized, but this would be of little consequence if he could never bolt the whip.

British politics, then, is usually depicted as being conducted between two major, highly structured sets of party leaders. As Verney put it:

Each week it (the government) negotiates with the Opposition through the Whips. These 'usual channels' enable business to be dispatched efficiently, the Government realizing that the Opposition must be given ample time to oppose, and the Opposition recognizing that the Government must be given authority to govern. Both exercise their responsibility with discretion...\(^4\)

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 132.
This statement is basically correct. The backbenchers' independence is far less than that of his American counterpart. He works long hours for low pay. He theoretically represents his constituency's interests but, except for a rare opportunity to introduce a Private Bill, he has no opportunity to offer them legislative relief. Cabinet control of financial bills precludes pork barrel legislation, bargaining for location of government contracts, etc. On party bills, as mentioned, the M.P. is expected to vote the whip. Failure to do so may lead to positive reprisal. Even if it does not, the maverick has antagonized his party's leadership. It is these leaders who determine who will become a Junior Minister. Receipt of such a post is the usual way one enters the executive branch. From here one may hope to eventually reach Cabinet level. Those frustrated in one party are not likely able to join the opposition. Even if they wish to, they are rarely trusted with power. Minor party candidates or independents are virtually never elected. If they are,


6 Winston Churchill changed party allegiance three times and became Prime Minister. The man and the times were so exceptional his case helps prove the rule.

7 In recent general elections independent candidates have received about one percent of the vote. In 1959 only one was elected to Commons. In 1964 the number who ran almost doubled, yet none was elected. Gwendolen M. Carter, The Government of the United Kingdom (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 73; Encyclopedia Americana Annual, 1965, p. 304.
they are not usually able to participate in debate. If this were the only side of the coin, there would be little reason to assess back bench opinion. We do not share the view of R. H. S. Crossman that the M. P. is but a glorified errand boy, that the British people are ruled by a system of "alternating party oligarchy." Dissent takes many forms. Although it rarely reaches the stage of open rebellion its existence is significant. The government knows that if it is not able to settle disputes by compromise, revolt will take place. On a few recent occasions it has taken place.

The most influential modern example took place on May 8, 1940, when thirty-two dissenting Conservatives joined Labour's no-confidence move against Neville Chamberlain. The government's majority was not threatened, but unrest was so manifest that Chamberlain soon relinquished this post to his greatest critic, fellow Tory Winston Churchill.

The most crucial revolt since then occurred in April, 1964. Twenty Conservatives voted against their government's retail price-fixing bill.

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8 Debate takes place between the parties, across the aisle separating the front benches. Members of the executive usually make both opening and both closing presentations. Backbenchers speak for shorter periods, as time permits. At most, one Liberal will be allowed to speak. Independents are ignored by the Speaker. Their position would be private, and therefore not deemed relevant to the debate.

Another fifty abstained. This was proof of the difficulty Prime Minister Home was having in restoring intra-party confidence. It helped weaken that confidence further. Six months later Labour overcame a hundred seat deficit to be returned to office for the first time in thirteen years. Thus a party may have a large majority yet lose its ability to rule effectively. Alternatively, a party with a very small majority can rule effectively, if its backbenchers give it firm support. Labour was able to do so for eighteen months after the 1964 elections, although its absolute majority never exceeded five. After so many years out of office enthusiasm ran high. Even Labourites who disliked Wilson's program were loathe to threaten open revolt since that would, if successful, have led to a non-confidence vote and the return of a Conservative government in the election which must follow dissolution.¹⁰

Ironically, it was after his overwhelming victory in 1966 that Wilson's real trouble with dissidents began. Within a year a sizeable bloc of left wing Labourites were threatening to support the opposition even if that meant their party would lose power, since they did not believe their leaders were acting like good Socialists.¹¹ The threat of widespread revolt has reappeared periodically since that time. This


would confirm Richard Rose's suggestion that there remain within the Labour Party a substantial number of idealists who feel victory at the polls, unless followed by steps toward establishing a true socialist state, is a "worthless objective." We might expect to find people with such attitudes taking a rigid ideological position on the need to grant independence to the colonies. But as we shall point out, idealistic socialists have not always been automatic supporters of independence.

Rose found Labour somewhat more split into definite factions than was the opposition. This was especially true of a segment of the party which closely corresponds to those we have found to be most radical on African affairs. A number of right wing Conservative deviants were also found, but they comprised a much less organized, more fluctuating group of M.P.'s.

Others have made similar findings. Rasmussen analyzed the relationship between those Conservatives who dissented over the Profumo scandal and those who dissented on other issues during the 1955-64 period. There were more cases of clear violation of the whip than one might expect from reading about the cohesiveness of British parties—especially the Conservative. However, Rasmussen found insufficient overlap among the dissenters to feel there existed any permanent dissident

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13 Ibid.
bloc within the party. To this extent he confirmed the Rose hypothesis.

Liggett also found the Conservatives to be a reasonably cohesive party. Labour appeared to be "more a federation of shades of opinion." Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew, in their study of the signatories of Early Day Motions, concluded:

... in the Labour Party there was a tendency for ideas to live in association with each other so that a revolt on one issue tended to become a revolt on a broad front (while) in the Conservative Party revolts were usually ad hoc affairs involving no total attitude, no total rejection of leadership.

One significant correlation uncovered by this latter study is relevant here. Among Conservatives, M.P.'s entering Commons in 1951 were less "empire minded" than those who entered in 1950. Those who entered in 1955 were still less so oriented. This factor will manifest itself in the increasing willingness of the Conservatives to relinquish control over the four African territories after 1955.

Labour's party meetings are also more open and more quarrelsome than are those of the Conservatives. More resolutions of a controversial


15 Liggett, Issues, p. 137.

16 This summarization is from Ibid., p. 99.

nature are introduced. There were disputes during the 1959 and 1960 meetings over disarmament and retention of Clause IV (nationalization of the means of production as a long-range goal) respectively. These were viewed by McKenzie as amounting "virtually to a civil war." There were no comparable struggles at Conservative meetings.  

There are some historic reasons for the more amorphous structure of the Labour Party. In its early days its leaders pledged to be "democratic," as opposed to what they perceived to be oligarchical relationships between leaders and members in the two older parties. Issues would be discussed openly among M.P.'s and among all who attended the Annual Party Conferences. There would be an annual election of the party leadership.

Conservative literature, until recently, has spoken of its leadership as "emerging" by some undefinable process at once more mystical and more reliable than the vote of the rank and file. A greater measure of deference to the leadership is evident at its annual meetings and in its literature. The party did not begin electing its leader until 1965. Perhaps those with conservative temperament are naturally more quiet and polite than their more radical counterparts. There are some similarities to be found in the relative behavior patterns of Democrats and Republicans

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in the United States.

Dissent ought to be more prevalent among Labour M.P.'s than it is among Conservatives. We should not expect these differences to be too great, however, since there is evidence that the difference in the composition of the two parties is not so great as might be assumed.

In some ways Labour M.P.'s in the formative years of that party had less freedom than did their contemporary Conservative colleagues. All elected Socialists pledged to be bound by the majority decision in caucus. The parliamentary party would follow general directives issued by the non-elective National Executive Committee (NEC).

Actually, neither the democratic nor the binding features survived the growth of Labour's electoral strength. Backbenchers soon demanded and won the right to dissent from the caucus on "matters of conscience." The leadership in Commons waged an ultimately successful battle to make its decisions free from NEC control. It maintained, correctly, that an elected leadership could not be bound by policies made from those who did not have to seek public office. The closer the party "came to actual power, the more (it) . . . stressed its adherence to the traditional rules of the game." In short the two parties have been far more similar

19 This dispute seems not to have been finally resolved until Labour won its clear majority in 1945. Ibid., pp. 13-15.

in practice than one would imagine from reading party rhetoric.\textsuperscript{21}

Christoph attributes this metamorphosis both to the growing middle-class base of the party and to "acceptance of the ideology of parliamentarism." We agree both factors probably had an influence on the change.

The Cabinet system works to mold the parties to a set pattern. Once Labour attained sufficient strength to have a reasonable chance to win at the polls, its leaders found it necessary to organize as an executive capable of formulating policy. Backbenchers must be willing to support the program if the government is to survive. Outside elements, such as the NEC, cannot be permitted to dictate policy.

The nature of the system also tends to promote the moderates to the party hierarchy. The rise to power is through the ranks. One rarely becomes Prime Minister without having served twenty years as an M.P., ten of these as a Minister. The leaders must (except perhaps in severe crises) be brokers, able to unite the broad middle of the party, rather than ideologues who rigidly adhere to certain goals despite changing conditions.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21}McKenzie, \textit{British Parties}, Chapter XI.

\textsuperscript{22}Analysis has shown that by education, income and background leaders from both parties tend to be middle class. There are differences between these variables for the front benches, but the differential is much less than it is for the party as a whole. Jean Blondel, \textit{Voters, Parties and Leaders: the Social Fabric of British Politics} (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), pp. 148-53, 252-53. Also Verney, \textit{British Government}, p. 123.
Even the attitudes of the British public serve to strengthen the moderates' cause. Had Labour continued to adhere to a strictly socialist policy on such issues as nationalization of all means of production, it would not have succeeded in attracting enough middle class votes to permit it to win elections. Even a considerable segment of the trade union movement would be alienated, since they are oriented more towards immediate economic improvement than towards abstract ideological issues. The 1959 and 1960 intra-party battles over Clause IV illustrated this quite well.

Revealing also are the responses received by the British Institute of Public Opinion in polls taken between 1959 and 1961. A majority of respondents who expressed support for Labour opposed further nationalization of industry. A majority of those who would vote Conservative favored retention of existing nationalized corporations.23 This no doubt helps explain why the Conservatives denationalized only those industries (steel and long-haul trucking) which had been making a profit prior to takeover, and why these were the only industries nationalized following Labour's victories in 1964 and 1966.

Such a system is likely to build a strong, pragmatic, moderate government and a responsible opposition. It must also frustrate those who have rigid ideological commitments, especially those whose views are to

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23 Blondel, Voters, pp. 75-79.
the left of Labour or to the right of the Conservatives. They have little opportunity outside the two main parties. (The Liberal Party, on most issues, is between the other two.) There are constituencies which will elect ideologues. They will be free to express their views. On rare occasions they will gain sufficient following for it to be considered best that they be brought into the executive power structure. (Aneuran Bevan is perhaps the best recent example.) But while there is room for such people in both parties, there is little room at the top. For these reasons we should expect to find inter-party differences least sharply polarized when stated by the front benches. The most critical statements should come from the extremes least in accord with the leaders' position, the Socialist left and the Tory right. Criticism of their own leaders should become exacerbated when their party is in power since their leaders will tend to become more moderate, more like the opposition, at these times. The realities of power tend to modify ideological purity, especially among the kind of broker-oriented person we have shown is most likely to enter the Cabinet.

Backbenchers in both parties have organized to discuss their views and express their feelings to the leadership. As Labour's leaders came to assume the role of a Shadow Cabinet, they became less welcome in meetings of the Parliamentary Labour Party. Today this body serves as the
expression of rank and file opinion. A committee to represent back
bench Conservative views was formed in 1922, and thus bears the name
"The 1922 Committee." It has been called the "sounding board of Con­
servative opinion in Commons."25

The executive-in-Parliament for each party retains "exclusive
responsibility for the formulation of party policy." But requests from the
committees are counter-manded only if there are very good reasons for
doing so.26

Backbenchers have long had some say over who would be the party
leader. If anything, this was truer in practice among the Tories. The
annual election of the Labour Party leader has been mentioned. Prior to
1960, no leader was actually challenged for reelection. Conservatives
might say their leader "emerged," but they never considered him infallible.
They could not compel his removal but, to quote McKenzie:

The Conservative leader achieves office and retains power only
with the consent of his followers; and there is amply precedent
for the withdrawal of that consent.27

Lord Moran's recent history of Winston Churchill confirms this
thesis. Despite the Prime Minister's exceptional prestige and the

24 The struggle of the PLP to separate itself from the party leader­
ship is documented in Ibid., pp. 427-54.

25 The creation of this group is discussed in Ibid., pp. 57-61.

26 Ibid., p. 635.

27 Ibid., p. 22 (underlining in text).
affection for him, it was made clear at the 1954 Party Conference that the majority of delegates felt him "no longer fit to discharge his duties." He deeply resented this. Yet within six months he bowed to the pressure and resigned.28

Within Commons, liaison between the leaders and backbenchers is conducted by the whips. Their primary role is, of course, to inform the M.P.'s of the wishes of their government. They are expected to enforce discipline. But they also hear complaints from the backbenchers, and deliver messages from them to the party leaders.29 Although a diagram of lines of power would indicate the heavier line proceeding from Cabinet to M.P., a second line going in the opposite direction must also be drawn. When dissent from the rank and file is strong, compromises are usually made. Proposed legislation will often be modified or its introduction delayed. One example was the fate of nationalization, previously mentioned. A case study of the forces behind the introduction of commercial television to Britain also revealed a meaningful role was played by certain backbenchers at a critical stage.30


29 The role of the whips is discussed in Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies . . .," p. 42; Verney, British Government, pp. 132, 134, 136, 139, 177; McKenzie, British Parties, pp. 60-62, 388-89.

Finally, we must question the myth that the parties will "purge" all who bolt the whip on important issues.\textsuperscript{31} The structure of the British parties is such that they would appear far more able to do this than would their equivalents in the United States. They are highly centralized. There is no federal-state dichotomy of powers. The candidate for M.P. has only two weeks to actively campaign; an insufficient time to build a large personal following. His funds usually come from national headquarters. National, not local, issues are stressed. Sometimes the candidate doesn't even know the local issues for he is from another district. It is preferred if a man does run from his native constituency, but if this is considered unsafe, and if the party wishes his services in Commons, it will find him a district in which he is likely to win.

For most constituencies it might prove dysfunctional for a candidate to stress local issues even if he wished to. Attitude studies indicate the British people are far more party than issue oriented. It is the position of the national party and its candidate for leader which carry most influence.\textsuperscript{32} The party leader has campaigned outside his own constituency since 1882. Since 1959 considerable use has been made of nationwide television. Epstein believes a vigorous campaign will not usually add more than five hundred votes to an aspiring M.P.'s final

\textsuperscript{31} The term is from Price, \textit{Parliamentary System}, p. 319.

Under normal circumstances, most districts are considered safe for a particular party. Rose found nomination in up to three-quarters of the constituencies "tantamount to election to a degree unknown outside the American South." Once elected, over half the M.P.'s are reasonably certain of renomination and reelection until retirement.

Recent studies indicate this very stability weakens national party control over dissident M.P.'s. Real power appears to rest with the executive branch of the local Constituency Association, not with the national executive. The latter body must approve candidates, but this is usually a formality. If the local decides not to endorse a candidate, its decision is almost never challenged. Both Epstein and Rasmussen concluded that usually those who bolt the whip risk their seats only if by so doing they antagonize their local Association. In one case an M.P.'s local executive denied him reelection. Prior to the next election the national intervened to help him regain his seat. After debate and a vote


of active local citizens, the M.P. was again denied his seat. In fact such intervention might actually be harmful to a candidate's chances. Rasmussen found most local politics viewed national intervention "with suspicion and resentment." 

At least certain backbenchers would appear to possess considerable leeway in their actions. Most deviants in the Suez controversy retained their seats--even those who sat, for awhile, as Independent Conserva-tives. Only one of the Profumo Rebels who resigned the whip was purged. Twenty-three were readopted by their Constituency Associations. Four became Junior Ministers.

Desmond Donnelly was quite frank about his opposition to his party's decision to renationalize steel. He clearly gives the impression, in his book, that because he and one other M.P. refused to support such a bill, Wilson's first administration was forced to make concessions, even though it still had two votes over an absolute majority in support.

Nor did Donnelly gloss over his differences on this issue when he

37 Though only by one vote. See Epstein, Suez Crisis, pp. 134-38. Also, Leon D. Epstein, "British M.P.'s and their Local Parties: the Suez Case," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIV #2 (June, 1960), pp. 384-88. Epstein and Rose differed as to whether Constituency Associations tended generally to be more radical than the Labour leadership, more conservative than the Tory leadership. See Rose, "The Political Ideas . . .," p. 364.

38 Rasmussen, Profumo Rebels, pp. 43, 52-53.

39 Ibid., p. 43.
ran for reelection in 1966. At one constituency meeting he frankly told his audience:

My view is simple. I can give no undertaking to support any nationalization measure. If I am elected I must be permitted to exercise my own judgement in the national interest as a Member of Parliament.

The speech was met with "prolonged cheers," Donnelly states. He went on to reelection.40

Yet there are limits to one's effectiveness in such a gadfly role. Donnelly resigned the whip in January, 1968. Some of his friends felt he thereby forfeited his influence in the party. His response was that, as early as October, 1965, he believed his influence among the party leaders was already gone.41

Surely, after all this evidence, it would be difficult to regard the backbencher as a cipher, whose views need not be assessed in a study of attitudinal shifts in party policy over an eighteen year timespan. In fact, we suggest as a working hypothesis that the opinions of the Labour left wing were gradually adapted as party policy (even as the left went on to positions more radical still). With modifications, Labour's policy of 1945–51 was accepted and even expanded upon by the Conservatives after they gained power. In part it was the pressure of external events which forced acceleration of the timetable for independence, and forced

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40 Donnelly, Gadarene, p. 45.

41 Ibid., p. 54.
abandonment of the attempt to preserve the settler colonies for white rule. In part there would appear to have been a real shift in attitudes. If these are correct assertions, much of the language used by Conservative governments after 1960 should parallel that used by the opposition front benches in the late 'fifties,' and by certain left wing Labour M.P.'s prior to that. We shall attempt to validate this point as we review these events.

We have indicated why most statistical techniques used to assess American voting behavior would not prove meaningful for a study of votes in Commons. One technique which has been used with some effectiveness has been to analyze Early Day Motions as indicators of back bench dissent. Although rarely debated, they serve as a warning of back bench unrest, a warning the leadership ignores at its peril. One clear example is closely related to our topic. In 1961 a motion urging the government not to grant control to the black majority in Northern Rhodesia received nearly one hundred Conservative back bench signatures. It was widely reported in the press, and had an impact upon government policy.

A revolt of this kind is nearly as unique as a bolt of the whip, however, and cannot serve as a sustained index of back bench feelings.

Besides, Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew, authors of the paradigm

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42These are never signed by the government or the whips, only very rarely signed by the leaders of the opposition. Hence they have been described as "spontaneous unwhipped backbench manifestoes." (Christoph, "Consensus and Cleavage . . . ," p. 634).
study in this area, have themselves indicated sharp limitations on its applicability.\textsuperscript{43} Beyond this, except for the rare case of wide dissent, Early Day Motions are mentioned neither in speeches nor in the press. The motions themselves are preserved in the London Archives, and are available for scrutiny only to persons receiving special governmental permission.

For some time we considered utilizing recently developed techniques of content analysis. Both the validity and replicability of this procedure have been questioned. Besides, the method, to have any validity, requires at least six readers of the selected materials; beyond the financial resources of this author.\textsuperscript{44} After consultation this procedure was abandoned.

Measuring actions alone, rather than statements, would prove totally inadequate in assessing the degree of intra–party dissent. The most usual form of back bench protest is verbal. An M.P. 's statements

\textsuperscript{43} Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew, \textit{Backbench Opinion}, pp. 139-45.

\textsuperscript{44} The suggested minimum number of readers to insure replicability. See Bernard Berelson, \textit{Content Analysis in Communication Research} (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 171-74. "Only about 15 to 20 percent of the studies report the reliability of the analysis contained in them." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 172. Most studies have considered quantitative materials. Attempts at qualitative analysis of the scope demanded for this dissertation have been undertaken only at considerable cost and with the collaboration of many persons. See Robert C. North, \textit{et al}., \textit{Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis} (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963).
on the floor of Commons are unrestricted, save for the limits imposed by time available and by the rules of decency and relevency. M.P.'s are free to speak publicly, write articles for the press, etc. They are, of course, expected to support their party in such instances, but only present and former Cabinet members are bound by Privy Council oath not to reveal intra-party differences. M.P.'s have said or written things damaging to their party's cause.45

The British are a well-read, highly politicized people.46 Perhaps because the votes in Commons are usually predetermined, considerable weight is given to speeches. Evidence of intra-party strife is subject to commentary. The opposition knows it has little chance of actually winning a no-confidence vote. But if it can successfully appeal to the people by means of statements and articles, if it can show the ruling party is divided (despite the solidity of actual votes), pressure can be put on the government to modify its program. It would therefore seem plausible to accept Rasmussen's statement that, while crossing the aisle

45 Desmond Donnelly, for example, held a press conference shortly after resigning the Labour whip. Included in his remarks was the comment Prime Minister Wilson, after repeated vacillations on foreign and domestic policy, was at the point where "no one in the world believes a word he says." (Time, February 9, 1968, p. 34.) Despite his severance of party ties this comment must have been sweet music to Tory ears.

46 For a comparative analysis of the attitudes and degree of sophistication of the British and four other peoples see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1965).
is a "serious" breech of party discipline, verbal criticism is worse.47

Public opinion usually plays a small role in colonial matters. The subject is too distant and irrelevant to everyday living. The colonial peoples' own voice is lessened by distance. Besides, they have no vote. Only when there is a crisis, or when some British lobby chooses to make an issue of a colonial subject, does it attain broad media coverage. In all but a few instances, a BIPO survey revealed, matters of foreign policy may divide the party "at Westminster or in the constituency organizations; they do not divide Conservative and Labour electors against each other."48 This leaves the parties and M.P.'s freer to set their own policies than would be true for domestic policies—especially those with direct economic or financial implications.

Theoretically there is also a tradition of bipartisanship—at least in public statements—on colonial matters.49 There is evidence in the literature attempts have been made to preserve this tradition despite Labour's long-stated hostility to the empire. Davis and Verba concluded, after an analysis of partisanship in Commons during the 1947-56 period, that Suez was "the only post-war international issue on which Labourite

47Rasmussen, Profumo Rebels, p. 9.
48Blondel, Voters, p. 77.
and Conservative took a sharply antithetical position."^{50}

We find this statement to be an overgeneralization. One could not expect an analysis of speeches to always indicate friendliness between (or even within) the parties over issues as emotion-laden as the degree to which black Africans might be expected to rule themselves, the causes of the Mau Mau revolt, or the fate of the Central African Federation. Even when the party leaders remain friendly, backbenchers are almost certain to raise issues which will scarcely be deemed attempts to preserve bipartisanship. There are, in fact, blocs formed within the parties from time to time so as to more forcefully express beliefs on various issues. One in each party bears especial commentary in a dissertation on colonial policy in Africa.

Labour's most famous inner group is the Fabian Society. Its existence actually predates that of the party. In a very real sense the party began as the political manifestation of Fabian Socialism.^{51} Today

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it remains a numerically weak but highly influential elite.\footnote{It holds, at most, one seat of 28 on the NEC, now reserved for "socialist cooperative and professional organizations." Bloc voting by trades-unions at Annual Party Conferences renders its approximately 6400 membership insignificant (1963 figures, McKenzie, British Parties, p. 530). Yet its tracts have had great influence within Labour and have, in many cases, later gained much wider influence. In 1957, over 100 of Labour's parliamentary strength of 275 were members. See "Who Are the Fabians," Socialist Digest (July, 1957), p. 21.} It has long been associated with the party's left wing, but it has attempted with considerable success to remain neutral in intra-party squabbles. It serves as a research organ, either publishing tracts of its own or assisting the party in gathering information for their publications.

The most notable example of a cohesive intra-party bloc on the issue and period we have considered was the Bow Group. It referred to itself as an:

independent Conservative research society . . . a forum for serious discussion of contemporary Conservative policies and analyzing new ideas about all aspects of public policy generally.

Theoretically "all shades of Conservative opinion" were "welcome" and the Group saw itself as "on the right of politics"; joined together, in part, to refute "purely destructive and outdated left wing arguments."

Yet its promise to be pragmatic, and not "afraid of new ideas" actually attracted "the radical elements of present-day Toryism."\footnote{The Times, June 11, 1956, p. 5.} Its purpose was clear; to write, speak, discuss and keep "in close touch" with
Conservative leaders. By 1957 its spokesman believed it had "made an impact" on the leadership's policies. It had already published some tracts. It now began to produce Crossbow: A Quarterly Journal of Politics. It took stands on many issues, including colonial policy, and became an important voice in the debate over Africa.54

Since our analysis will be primarily concerned with statements in Commons and in the press, and since it covers so great a period, it is necessary to organize our material in such a way that we avoid two opposite errors; on the one hand writing a simple historical chronology without political significance and, on the other, interpreting the data to fit pre-conceived biases. We determined the best available tool was the "strategy of disjunctive incrementalism" (hereafter di) as developed by economist Charles E. Lindblom and philosopher David Braybrooke. (An earlier version of this theory was the combined effort of Lindblom and political scientist Robert A. Dahl.)55 The strategy was not, and is not herein used, as a thesis which can be subjected to quantifiable verification. It is rather a framework within which the events to be discussed


might meaningfully be categorized. The strategy will, in turn, itself be tested against the emerging pattern of events to indicate the degree with which it actually appears to explain British policy and attitude changes toward our four colonies.

One obvious advantage of the strategy is its flexibility. It was developed as a tool which might be utilized to give meaningful insight to policy changes which are not subject to more rigorous methods of quantification. It is the first half of the work—the part written by economist Lindblom—which is primarily utilized in our analysis. The paradigm for his construct was governmental decision-making in the United Kingdom. If the strategy explains policy making by any government, it ought certainly to explain actions of the British Cabinet. Thus we shall be testing the theory's ability to predict the actual outcome of a political situation. The strategy was designed to explain long-term changes rather than any given change. Again, this ought to render it eminently suitable for a study such as this.

Still another advantage of this is that its use need not be conscious. The authors suggest it is the best way to solve most disputes which arise in modernized industrial democracies. They also maintain it is the way such societies do, in practice make such decisions. We shall see if this was the way the British government acted in its relations with our four colonies. We shall also see whether such actions intensified or weakened pressures on Britain from those colonies. We can to some
extent indicate whether England was better able to ameliorate pressures when it acted in the prescribed manner than when it did not do so. We can view opposition and back bench proposals in the same light. Were these closer to or further from the tenets suggested by di than was the program of the government? The strategy helps us to evaluate changes in policy over time. It partially explains why the leaders did or did not move in directions earlier suggested by the more radical elements in Commons.

Let us first look at the earlier formulation of the schema by Dahl and Lindblom, then at the more refined Braybrooke-Lindblom concept. Oriental philosophies, Dahl and Lindblom suggested, have generally differed from those put forth in the West. The former have usually attempted to "reduce the pressures of desires." The post-Renaissance West, on the other hand, has been more concerned with "removing obstacles to desires." This has been most true of industrialized "polyarchies"—nations where leaders share controls over each other, and non-leaders have some influence over the decision-making process. Policy modifications in such countries are the result of "bargaining." The task of political (and economic) leaders is to find those conditions which permit "numerous individuals" to "maximize the attainment of their goals through the use of social mechanisms." If the process is functioning correctly, a general consensus on goals gradually develops. Disagreement usually exists only over the best available means to attain
Societies which have developed such forms of government tend to become "means oriented." They are pluralistic. There are periodic changes in leadership as a result of relatively free elections. Ends are not ignored, but pragmatism and compromise become the standard methods for problem-solving. Leaders tend to be "brokers" heading mass parties, subject to pressures from many quarters, and bound neither by rigid ideological commitments nor allegiance to small pressure groups or elites. Decisions are based less upon abstract ideas of right and wrong than they are upon notions of what will be generally acceptable to, and will satisfy, the maximal number of concerned interests. The interests of the major parties broadly overlap in many areas. A change in administration will not lead to radical deviation in policy.

Changes are incrementally applied, i.e., they are small and partial. If such changes appear generally successful, greater changes in the same direction will be introduced. If there are unexpected repercussions the program will be reversed. The reversal is usually in itself made incrementally. Indeed the goals themselves are subject to incremental reformulation over time.

Of course the authors are describing the industrialized, western democratic political system, most successfully practiced in Britain, the

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\(^{56}\)Ibid., pp. xxi, 29, 287ff, 325-26, 333-34, 422.
United States, and some of the smaller countries of West Europe. They go on to define the conditions necessary if such a system is likely to continue to be deemed legitimate by most citizens, e.g. a sufficiently high, standard of living for most people that they remain reasonably satisfied with their lot. They wish to preserve the status quo, or see only incremental changes in it. Their goals are reasonable extensions of existing trends. They will choose leaders of the "desired personality types" to continue the process. Election of extremists means the demise of the system. If the system is working as it should, extremists will stand little chance of being elected. Hence, short of severe crisis, the system once established, is self-perpetuating. By making marginal, incremental adjustments to problems as they arise, sources of alienation and unrest are muted before they become critical.57

Ideological rigidity withers. Faced with "concrete policy problems" leaders realize "mythical grand alternatives" bear only "the crudest approximation to actual situations."58 Most citizens concur. Some people retain a rigid perspective, of course, but they are a minority, unlikely to attain positions of leadership. This aptly describes the British parliamentary system.

Such criteria have been commented on by others. Lipsit has

57Ibid., pp. 85, 518, 525-26.
58Ibid., p. 87.
indicated the crucial interrelationship between legitimacy and effectiveness in democratic societies. The same author and others such as Daniel Bell have spoken of an "end of ideology" in polyarchical societies. Even though these authors seem to have overstated their case, manifestations of the reawakening of ideological issues in the past few years still are usually marked by issue-orientation and flexibility, nor rigid adherence to a totality of causal conceptualization. Current radical groups in the United States, for example, are rarely marxist or fascist, although they may possess overtones of either or both. Significantly, ideological totality is most manifest among groups such as the American black ghetto dweller, or the Irish Catholics of the United Kingdom, precisely those who have not been fully brought into the polyarchical system.

James Christoph has amassed considerable evidence to show that while the views of most Britons are rooted in their class origins, most are

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relatively pragmatic and flexible. Origins provide the individual with an "attitude structure," a way to "give meaning to the different political events experienced . . ." Only rarely do these rigidify into a weltanschauung, "a total explanation of life or a full vision of human destiny." Likewise British governmental policy has usually been "in terms of the kind of pragmatic outlook that Britons understand and approve." It is "closely related to other basic beliefs--in stability, in peaceful solutions, in mixed institutions and in the legitimating effect of gradual change."62

One further requirement of a functioning polyarchy is close adherence to certain procedural measures--especially those which permit the dissenter to dissent, no matter how obnoxious his views, so long as he does not by so doing prevent others from exercising like privilege. Both the theoretical writings and the practical politics of Britain reveal a relatively continuous evolution of expanding rights. Ecstein notes that while leaders of the major British parties have usually been highly pragmatic in their policy formulations, "they behave like ideologists in regard to rules." Among the rules most closely adhered to are those insuring the minority's right to criticize the government.63

62 Christoph, "Consensus and Cleavage . . . ." Quotes from pp. 629, 637.

The Dahl-Lindblom formulation is, as mentioned, not merely descriptive. The polyarchical approach is also prescribed as the most rational, most successful form of government for a nation which has attained enough stability and affluence to be able to preserve this form. The writers applaud the extent to which the social sciences have been dispensing with ideological suppositions, replacing them with more value-free language and a more empirical, objective approach to social phenomena.

In many instances, however, they feel social scientists have become overly rationalistic. Some have attempted to develop "pre-requisite techniques for rational social action." But man has severe "rational limitations." Computers permit him to solve many previously insoluble problems. Computers are no more accurate than the data being fed them. There are values which are important to a proper (or fair) solution, yet are not quantifiable. Hunches and other forms of subjective responses have often proven beneficial. The most rational planning can never cover all contingencies. Yet failure to plan usually results in consequences which are still less desirable. 64

The same point was even more forcibly made ten years later in Strategy. It was feared the social sciences had gone still further towards attempting to solve problems "synoptically." This term is defined as

arranging preferences with sufficient exactitude that they may provide an intelligible "order of priority that indicates precisely which principles govern the application of others and when." This requires possession of knowledge bordering upon empirical certainty, as well as the ability to choose correctly among policy alternatives at a given time.65

There were, thanks to great progress in computer technology, problems which could be solved synoptically now which could not be so solved when the earlier book was written. Surely further advances would be made. But some types of problems remained, and would remain, beyond the capacity of such solutions. These were "value" problems. Not even extreme adherents of the synoptic approach had suggested such problems could be so solved at this time. But they believed men both could and should have this goal in mind. The authors of Strategy disagree on both counts.66 We do not have to take sides with the second point, although we tend to agree. Point one would seem sufficient justification of our use of this conceptual scheme. Even if the British Colonial Office could have acted synoptically, there is little indication it did so act. It would be even less likely the press, the opposition or dissident backbenchers, with far fewer facts and resources at their disposal, would


66Lindblom cites Herbert Simon's modification of an original theory of goal maximization to one necessitating only "satisficing." Also cited are Snyder, et al.'s Korea study and works by Hyneman. See Ibid., pp. 9-10, 40ff, 83.
attempt to formulate synoptic solutions. An exception might be the ideologue. However few his facts, if he possessed a weltanshauung mentality, he might well be expected to pose solutions within the context of this pseudo-synoptic ideal. Here is a further hypothesis to which we shall refer later in the dissertation.

The strategy of di is to be utilized when objective criteria for forming synoptic decisions do not exist, but "problems requiring solutions do." In such cases rational decision-making will be maximized by rejecting extreme alternatives and relying on incremental and marginal changes in existing policy. Changes need not be formulated at all unless objectively derived information indicates modifications are necessary. The maximum number of options ought thereby to be left open. Only when a situation requires a drastic policy shift is one justified in taking a "calculated risk," for this is "the most rational action one can undertake" under the circumstances. Of course this means government will appear less tidy, less rational, than if large-scale overhauls were periodically introduced. But the less dramatic approach provides "a satisfactory degree of control." It is more likely to provide long-range

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By utilizing this approach, one avoids the pitfalls of either extreme. At one end is the changing of policy because it fails to conform to some preconceived notion of rationality or ideological purity. The other is not so clearly indicated by the authors. It is permitting policy to drift, until a major readjustment does become necessary. A contention implicit in this theory is that either extreme is more likely to result in a crisis than is the middle way.

No dictator can institute complete transition of values overnight. Dictatorial societies are nonetheless more likely than polyarchies to act in an arbitrary manner or to move in the direction of some more or less sharply defined "blueprint society." Since the strategy clearly maintains that the greater the deviation from existing policy, the less the certainty of the consequences; it would seem a clearly implied corollary that dictatorship is inherently less desirable than polyarchy, at least unless a crisis renders incremental solutions inoperable. Strict use of intervals or attempts to assign specific weights to specific actions are avoided. Heavy reliance is put on common sense. All change must be

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viewed as steps registered on a continuum. One needs no strict methodology to perceive some situations, some changes, are more fundamental than others.

Decisions are in accordance with the strategy when they reflect either "a change in a relatively unimportant variable" or, if the variable is an important one, "a relatively unimportant change." Changes will usually be "negative" as well, i.e., "better described as moving away from known social ills rather than moving towards a known ... goal." (For example, laws will be passed to suppress vice without an attempt

Four possible types of decision making are graphed at the bars of a cross, as follows:

70 Four possible types of decision making are graphed at the bars of a cross, as follows:

Useful changes in successful societies under normal circumstances almost all fit quadrant two: incremental changes based upon high understanding of likely consequences. Ibid., pp. 65-71. (Graph, p. 67.) For an analysis of the types of policy for each quadrant, see Ibid., p. 78.
to define virtue.)\textsuperscript{71}

Other characteristics of such incremental changes are: they are remedial, serial, exploratory and characterized by "adjustment of ends to means." Goals are not necessarily arbitrary, but they are flexible, incremental, subject to pragmatic modification on the basis of new information. The strategy is thus easier to implement, more likely to be effective, than is a more synoptic approach.\textsuperscript{72}

No end should be considered as a viable alternative to existing policy unless there exist the means to implement it. Since only marginal changes are to be considered, one need analyze only the probable effects of small deviations from the status quo. A program like social security begins as low yield old age insurance for a relatively small number of people. Results prove generally beneficial, hence coverage is gradually increased and the number covered broadened. Each step is itself the result of bargaining among interested groups. Each step is sufficiently incremental that consequences are predictable with a high degree of probability. It is not necessary even to be precise in one's evaluation of the likely effects of a change. When an error in calculation occurs,

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., pp. 64, 71, 102-03.

\textsuperscript{72}Eight ways in which it is deemed more effective are suggested, Ibid., p. 113.
it is usually necessary to reverse only the last step.  

A final characteristic of di is that application works best when decentralized. This "fragmentation" leaves the various segments in "imperfect communication" with each other. Duplication is valuable, however, since it permits experimentation with different solutions to the same problem. The one which works best may later be put into general use, but variation remains possible to meet local deviation. It is for this reason the strategy is described as "disjointed."  

The strategy is, in many ways, a modern, moderate and non-mathematical reformulation of Jeremy Bentham's utility theory. The utility calculus is rejected, the concept of the "greatest good for the greatest number" is not. Policies likely to prove harmful to considerable numbers are to be rejected out of hand unless extreme circumstances necessitate their implementation (always to the minimum necessary to meet the situation). Rules of fair play prevail, although

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73Ibid., pp. 74, 93-102, 108, 116. An unmentioned additional asset of such a policy is the likelihood of far greater public acceptance of a program which is introduced in stages, so the work of one stage is generally accepted before the next is undertaken. Acceptance of the principle of social security exists in the United States today even among groups once overwhelmingly opposed.

74Ibid., pp. 105-07, 128-29.

75The last half of Strategy is Braybrooke's attempt to formulate such a theory. We feel it is simultaneously on less stable foundations than the first half of the book, and less necessary for our purposes. It is more an abstract philosophy than a conceptual schema within which to view actual decision making.
even these may require incremental adjustment if circumstances so warrant.\footnote{76}{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 212-13, 220.}

The only requirement of a good official is that he view all policy alternatives as dispassionately as possible, in an attempt to discern whether one group "exemplif(ies) given distributive properties to a higher degree than another group." Every policy step is to be made not as an experiment but on its merits.\footnote{77}{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 179, 254 (footnote five).} This is strikingly parallel to the British Cabinet system, with its Minister's generalists, the specialists their subordinates.

The application to the formulation of British policy would appear clear. The strategy need not be consciously implemented to be considered as having functioned in actuality. It would be a rare situation in which Britain found itself with no options in its ongoing relationships with its possessions. The opposition is continually suggesting options. Rarely would these be impossible to try if shifts were made in priorities. Different suggestions must often be based upon different assessments of the relative merits of various alternatives. A difference on priorities must exist, for example, depending on whether one gave precedence to the needs of natives or of settlers.

The ability to make incremental shifts in priorities and commitments is the DI's greatest strength. Perhaps the theory's primary weakness is
its open-endedness. If one concludes implementation of the di strategy led to the grant of independence to most African colonies, one cannot thereby suggest this proves independence for these states was the long-range goal of British policy. Perhaps the government was led, in incremental stages, to a policy different from or even contrary to the one it initially held. Such questions can be answered, if at all, only by evaluating results in terms of earlier statements and policies. Moreover, the fact that the utilization of the di strategy led to independence for three of the four colonies and the refusal to grant it in the fourth case is not necessarily proof that this ought to have been the result of British policy. To the ideologue, at least, decisions must be philosophically justified. Perhaps one might argue Britain permitted growing nationalism to force it to withdraw before the colonies were able to stand as viable democratic states. Such arguments would be made. The di strategy can offer no response save those of pragmatic reaction to what appeared to be majority desire. One cannot, therefore, show the strategy was employed and then make the further step of stating this is proof the concluding policy decisions were correct in terms of other ways of determining policy standards.

Perhaps a greater problem is trying to assess the extent of the incrementalism. A decision might have been incremental. Yet so might another which nonetheless did a little more or a little less. Incrementalism shades off into drift on one side and attempts at synoptic
decision-making on the other. Britain could never act in a vacuum on the colonial issue. Her leaders might strike a balance among party or even national viewpoints as to what correct policy ought to be. But a different—sometimes very different—point of view often existed within the colonies. In the settler states Britain faced two sets of nationalist values which might converge or might become increasingly polarized. The British idea of proper settlement might well lie between these two, but attempts to get either of the other parties to compromise would not be possible if they saw the problem in different terms.

The purpose of the di strategy is to act incrementally and pragmatically to avoid crises. But crises might come from the colony because the changes deemed proper by Whitehall ran afoul of the way the African leaders assessed what was needed. In the face of Mau Mau, or Rhodesia's UDI, the di strategy proved of little use. We would expect failure to be bold enough to foresee and resolve the need for change, i.e., a policy of drift, would be likely to lead to an explosive situation requiring abandonment of di for the opposite reason. Independence is a heady brew. Once a taste is given it is virtually impossible to reduce it again unless that decision is to be enforced with arms. This is the very thing the British proved increasingly reluctant to do. Yet if the process was not reversible, one element of di was already lost. Perhaps more synoptically oriented decisions ought to have been taken at certain key junctures. Perhaps when divergence among vitally affected groups
becomes too great attempts to act as a broker lead to a policy of drift, with harmful long-range repercussions. These are questions which must at least be raised at various times throughout our analysis.

We shall attempt to evaluate the extent to which di was employed by British colonial authorities. We shall also attempt to assess whether, when it was employed, it effectively solved the problems. Before doing so, let us see whether British policy in Africa seemed to fit the di pattern prior to 1945. This will be our primary task in Chapter III.
CHAPTER III

BRITISH POLICY PRIOR TO 1946

We do not believe Britain was drawn into Africa primarily for ideological or even for economic reasons. Rather the evidence indicates she came almost against her will, victim of a combination of outside pressures and drift, with incrementalism serving to solidify gains once made. We shall enlarge upon this point for the next few pages.

By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, England had gained control of both the northern and southern tips of the African continent. 1 Except for a few coastal trading enclaves, and suzerainty over the island of Zanzibar, she made no serious bid to expand her holdings until the ninth decade of the nineteenth century. In fact the Cabinet refused to accept control of areas which were literally offered to it. Stanley, for example, was unable to secure permission to annex much of what is now Uganda for Britain in 1877, even though he had personally secured treaties from many chiefs in the area, and even though the area includes the strategically vital headwaters of the Nile. 2

2 Ibid., p. 237.
Of course England had its share of "imperial dreamers," men of power who looked "with longing eyes at the tempting territory which lay between... Cairo and the Cape of Good Hope." This fact is well documented by the 1936 work, Raphael's The Cape-to-Cairo Dream. But for a long time these men were unable to persuade their government of the advantages of colonization. Individual Britons established trading missions and occasionally even staked out claims. But it was with great reluctance that Her Majesty's government even went to the aid of its nationals in distress.

After 1870, to quote Strachey, "A new wave of imperialism surged out upon the world." Several European nations were involved in a race for control of new territory. Britain and France became rivals for the role of greatest colonizing power. Yet for another decade most of Africa was spared from this rivalry.

Then, in the 1880's, attitudes and policy changed. Even in the middle of that decade most Britons, when they spoke of interior development of Africa, meant only extension of lines of communication and transportation (telegraph and railroads). The concept was gradually developed to include spheres of influence, then protectorates, finally outright colonies. By the 1890's Cabinet Ministers were speaking openly

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3 Ibid., p. 1.

4 Strachey, End of Empire, pp. 79-81.
of a continuous territory north-south across the continent which would all "be colored a good British red on the map." 5

Why did this change in attitude and policy take place? Answers have been extremely varied. At one extreme is the Lenin thesis that imperialism was the inevitable, desperate drive of a capitalism which had lowered wages to the point that it had lost its domestic market, and must forcibly win new markets for its increasingly overpriced products. The opposite conclusion is that there was no rationale behind Britain's expansion; that she had, between 1880 and 1900, gained a third of the African continent, some 4.5 million square miles of land, with 75 million people, 6 in what John Seeley referred to as "a fit of absence of mind."

Most analyses shun a causal explanation. They do cite secondary influences which no doubt had their effect. Native uprisings threatened missionaries, traders and other nationals who sought protection from their government. Companies opened lucrative trade routes, then fell into bankruptcy. The government was pressured to take over these enterprises. Most influential perhaps was the pressure exerted by rival colonial powers. Britain feared gains in trade and influence at her expense. Even more, she feared the pressure rival colonies could exert upon her own adjacent holdings. She must expand to preclude expansion by others. We shall

5 Raphael, Cape-to-Cairo Dream, pp. 22-23.

6 The figures are derived from a table in Strachey, End of Empire, p. 80.
return to this theme later in the Chapter.

Support for expansion obviously came from those who expected to profit economically. It was not limited to them. Many Britons sincerely supported conquest in response to higher ideals: ending the slave trade, bringing law and order, Christianizing the heathen. Discovery of "areas which appeared suitable for white settlement provided an additional reason for European interest."\(^7\)

As colonial rivalry intensified it appeared increasingly as if most of Africa must fall to some European power. Idealism and self-interest became fused in the argument that the African would be better off under British rule than under that which could be provided by any other European power. Or, indeed, better off than if he remained under the "primitive" system provided by his own leaders.\(^8\) This was the rationale which became known as the "white man's burden"; it was Britain's "duty" to teach the heathen Christianity, democracy, and the rule of law.

Belief that Britain was "the only country fit to colonize" may well

\(^7\)Sometimes these factors intertwined for mutual reinforcement e.g. the missionaries caught in a war between Negro tribes and Arab slavers in the Zambezi region in 1888. Government reluctance to intercede was reduced when Portugal openly supported the slavers, further enraging the public and adding fear a rival power would be strengthened in the area unless Britain asserted supremacy. Raphael, Cape-to-Cairo Dream, pp. 23, 133, 139-40. See also T. R. Batten, Thoughts on African Citizenship (2nd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 4.

\(^8\)Such arguments helped convert many who had opposed colonization on other grounds. Raphael, Cape-to-Cairo Dream, pp. 151-52, 275.
have been rationalization of economic policy to ease troubled consciences. This does not mean it was any the less believed. Cecil Rhodes was especially expert in playing upon these instincts. As Sidney Low put it:

To shrewd financiers, keen men of action, lifelong worshippers of money and material success . . . a belief in Cecil Rhodes became a substitute for religion.®

The "burden" concept gradually pervaded the thinking of all British classes and parties (albeit to different degrees and with somewhat different ideological manifestations). On this point authors who disagree about other aspects of the growth of empire concur. Raphael mentions the growing chauvinism in the 1890's, a decade "peculiarly adapted to the growth of a Cape-to-Cairo movement."¹⁰ Leon Epstein calls the same decade "plain jingo years" in which expansion became a popular subject among all classes, even among those of the working class with doubts they personally would reap any benefit from such expansion. Perhaps this was due to their acceptance of their country's "civilizing mission." Perhaps it was the sense of prestige empire gave to the British in the eyes of other European nations.¹¹ Whatever the causes, the feeling seems to have

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®Ibid., p. 68. Rhodes' overall impact should not be minimized. A multimillionaire, Prime Minister of Cape Colony, and excellent propagandist he took the initiative when Whitehall was reluctant to follow. Acquisition of the Rhodesias was primarily due to his efforts. (See also Ibid., pp. 73, 126, 147, 173-81; Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 237-40.)

¹⁰Ibid., p. 151.

¹¹Epstein, End of Empire, pp. 9-10, 14, 24.
been widely held.

Part of Disraeli's genius was his realization of the growth of this attitude, and his capitalization upon it. In later years the Cabinet tended to express its expansionist aims to Parliament in these terms. And from the first such thoughts were in the minds of some of those individuals who, with or without their government's consent, undertook treks into the African interior, signed "treaties" with native "chiefs" and claimed sections of the continent for their Queen.¹²

From the beginning, argues Macmillan, many Charter Company directors "looked upon themselves as British instruments and . . . enjoyed playing a part as the champion of national interests."¹³ As Raphael saw, the influence of men like Rhodes in building the African empire cannot be discounted. A similar conclusion is drawn by Strachey. Colonization of the Nile Valley has been attributed primarily to the unrelenting efforts of Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer). It was Rhodes (aided at home by Joseph Chamberlain) who made colonies of the Rhodesias. The Union of South Africa was mainly united by "Milner's will power, which carried through, in the face of no small obstacles,

¹² Many of these treaties were signed by those with no authority to cede land. On the other hand, possession of a bill of sale from a white often gave a man new prestige in his tribe and helped make him a chief. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, p. 81.

¹³ Macmillan, Road to Self-Rule, pp. 44-46, 160.
the annexation of the two Boer Republics."¹⁴

There is overwhelming evidence this view did not extend beyond a small circle at this time. The myth of the "burden" became widespread only after English expansion had already proceeded a good way into the continent. It was an effect, a later manifestation of this expansion, not its primary cause.

Why the lower classes came to accept this philosophy remains subject to controversy. The Leninist, of course, would argue that the capitalist class in countries such as Britain bought off the workers by permitting some of their ill-gotten wealth to "trickle down." John Strachey, a noted British socialist and Cabinet member, has carefully compiled evidence to dispute this. In fact, he shows rather decisively that imperialism did unquestionably help impoverish the colonies. Imperial holdings clearly made some Britons wealthy. But imperialism would not seem to have increased the wealth of the nation as a whole.¹⁵

Strachey also shows that, while those who did profit had influence, they did not control the policies of even Conservative governments. The British flag did not always come to the rescue of the pound, he maintains, even when "native incompetence or recalcitrance" was generally regarded as the cause of the crisis. The government would intervene only if

¹⁴Strachey, End of Empire, p. 91.
¹⁵Ibid., Chapters 10-12.
neither risk nor cost appeared excessive.\textsuperscript{16} Since Strachey was a socialist he would have little reason to exonerate the policies of governments run by "capitalist" parties.

A similar conclusion was reached by Robinson and Gallagher. The flag did not always follow the trade routes. Likewise trade did not always follow the flag. In fact, areas colonized were often considered economically worthless.\textsuperscript{17}

The reasons we have mentioned so far, then, would seem to be inconclusive either in explaining why the colonial possessions became vitally linked, in the British mind, with greatness or even survival. Yet there can be little doubt they did. Again we cite Strachey. He was a dedicated, active proponent of dissolution. Yet he admitted, reluctantly, that the rapid transition from empire to Commonwealth caused misgivings even for him and his likeminded colleagues. It was seen to have "affected the morale, the spirit, the mental health even (sic) of all of us." For many, dissolution felt like "amputation." Loss of the colonies was "a closer shave" for the future of Britain as a viable nation than was the Nazi invasion threat in 1940.\textsuperscript{18}

Is there a logical explanation for the reluctance of the British governments to expand into Africa prior to the 1880’s, and, despite lack

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 97.

\textsuperscript{17}Valuable resources were often found after the area was colonized. Robinson and Gallagher, \textit{Africa and the Victorians}, pp. 15-18.

\textsuperscript{18}Strachey, \textit{End of Empire}, pp. 204-05.
of overall profit, their equal reluctance to relinquish their holdings? We offer the following as at least providing part of the answer.

Prior to 1884, Britain was governed by Cabinets comprised primarily of those who have come to be known as "Little Englanders." Their goal was free trade throughout the world. They believed in minimal governmental activity--i.e., in laissez-faire. They wanted as few expensive obligations as possible. Trade with the more primitive peoples, if it was to be undertaken at all, would be performed by private companies. They would receive Royal Charters, but were expected to conduct trade, make policy, and undertake the risks on their own.19

Macmillan believes lack of desire to gain colonial holdings was also shaped by the experience with the American colonies. The American revolution was generally viewed as having been precipitated by excessive interference from Whitehall in internal economic affairs. The loss of these colonies had much to do with rejection of the policy of mercantilism. Most existing colonial holdings were retained, but laissez-faire became the prevailing philosophy for their Governors to follow. There was very little coordinated planning; few policy directives from Britain.20 In fact, Jeffries' study of the development of the colonial civil service indicates decentralization was so pronounced it retarded growth of common standards

19Raphael, Cape-to-Cairo Dream, pp. 142ff.
of professionalism and efficiency.\textsuperscript{21}

Robinson and Gallagher add yet a further dimension. They attribute part of the reluctance to develop further imperial holdings to what they call Britain's "Victorian world outlook" at this time. This was a curious combination of an "expansive spirit," a belief in racial superiority of the northern European, and a conviction the world would be transformed through private actions, and the example set by "free minds, free markets and Christian morality." The black African was the least developed, least capable of the world's racial groups. Yet even he was to become an eventual "partner" in the development of a world based upon a free market economy, government by law, and liberal democracy. He would be persuaded by example, not forced through colonization. Thus, for both economic and ideological reasons, colonization was to be "avoided where possible."\textsuperscript{22}

In the 1860's and 1870's the vision was already being marred; by the 1880's it was shattered. Pressure upon Asian and African governments to reform were met with resistance, corruption, and a weakening of authority. These in turn engendered radical movements which strove for reform but almost invariably coupled it with extreme nationalism and

\textsuperscript{21}Charles Jeffries, \textit{The Colonial Empire and the Civil Service} (Cambridge: University Press, 1938), pp. xvi, xix, xxv, 7, 12, 18-20, 224).

\textsuperscript{22}Robinson and Gallagher, \textit{Africa and the Victorians}, pp. 1-5.
demands for the expulsion of European interests. This led to withdrawal from these areas. But the prospects were too good to permit permanent abandonment. As Batten put it, it became apparent Europeans could spread neither trade nor order "without spreading European rule at the same time." The argument for trade without conquest was pragmatically abandoned.

There was no sudden policy reversal. Abandonment came gradually and pragmatically, in keeping with our suggestion that British policy towards Africa often fits the di strategy.

Raphael suggested the change came primarily because supporters of the Cape-to-Cairo concept gradually won adherents in the Cabinet. She argued that Salisbury was gradually converted to this scheme during his years as Prime Minister after 1884. By 1888 he was in "substantial agreement" with the expansionists. Yet the difference cannot be attributed to the Liberal Party's fall from power in 1884. As Raphael herself points out Gladstone's successor, Lord Rosebery, was even more an "arch imperialist" than his Conservative rival. Little Englanders continued to hold important positions, especially in Liberal governments, but their influence gradually waned. Besides, the move into Egypt had taken

23 Ibid., pp. 5-6. Examples are Zanzíbar (see Chapter 2) and Egypt (see Chapter 4).

24 Batten, Thoughts, p. 6.

place in 1882-83.

The more likely thesis is that presented by Robinson and Gallagher. It was not so much conversion of the leaders which led to British expansion into Africa. It was changes in circumstances and the desire for policy continuity which gradually converted the leaders (or permitted leaders with expansionist views to gain key positions).

Even during the height of the "Little England" period, colonies gained during former expansionist eras were, for the most part, retained. Some were beneficial as coaling stations or for strategic defense. Others, especially India, were rich in themselves and had been won at considerable cost. Moreover, they blocked expansion by potential European rivals. Only a few of these (e.g. Zanzibar, the Union of South Africa) were in Africa. But continued possession of colonies anywhere meant continued need to defend them. To this extent, even Gladstone possessed a colonialist mentality.

There was also some failure to realize the consequences of allowing private companies the right to expand in Africa "in the Queen's name." When these men got into trouble, with natives or with the representatives of rival European states, they expected British assistance. This was hard to refuse, especially if the case were dramatized in the English press. Besides, as the products from Africa reached British shores, new markets were opened. Such goods were highly profitable to some. They became desirable purchases to many more.
In addition, the free trade concept favored Britain which had naval and monetary superiority over its rivals. Expansion by private British investors, however it was seen from Downing Street, was interpreted by rival powers as expansion of British influence. They made counter moves. These, in turn, created alarm among Britons that free trade would falter as other powers established favored nation clauses or created protectorates. Conferences solved less and less as the decade wore on. The scramble for territory made tighter hold over trade areas seem increasingly essential. The problem could be solved if spheres of influence were replaced by colonies. Gradually but inexorably, Great Britain became "as busy as the neighboring countries in pegging out claims for the future."  

On the other hand, even under the frankly expansionist Joseph Chamberlain, Raphael found no evidence the Colonial Office ever developed a systematic plan of African conquest. At the Cabinet level, the Cape-to-Cairo concept seems at most to have been a vaguely defined guide, not a blueprint of a course of action. If events permitted gaining another piece in the line, well and good. Some important opportunities to secure such territories were not capitalized upon. Only the taking of former German territories at the close of World War I created a contiguous north-south continental strip of "British red" territories.  

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26 Ibid., pp. 21-24, 111, 151, 155-61, 201-18, 245, 250-52, 267, 343-44. (Quote, p. 151.)

27 Ibid., pp. 22 and Epilogue.
implies what Macmillan specifically states: The movement into Africa would seem to have developed a momentum of its own. Each acquisition strengthened the ranks of those committed to expansion, until the opponents were too few to do more than offer mild dissent.\textsuperscript{28}

Robinson and Gallagher's recent, very detailed analysis of heretofore unpublished materials\textsuperscript{29} strengthens this view. Although they never go so far as to openly state that some process akin to the di strategy was at work, much that they say about British policy in Africa after 1882 suggests that it was. We shall not discuss most details from this most competent scholastic endeavor. We shall take one instance—expansion south from the Suez Canal. Stories with similar themes explain expansion north from Cape Colony and west from Zanzibar.

The works we have cited disagree as to the exact time Cabinet policy shifted from a desire to expand African markets to a policy of direct territorial expansion. Robinson and Gallagher do not believe that decision was finally made until Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary in 1895. Even those authors who place the date earlier agree there was no support of such a plan as early as 1882. Yet in that year decisions were made which started Britain on her irreversible path of conquest in Northeast Africa. The Egyptian government proved unable to pay its

\textsuperscript{28}Macmillan, \textit{Road to Self-Rule}, pp. 153-54.

\textsuperscript{29}Robinson and Gallagher, \textit{Africa and the Victorians}, pp. ix-xii.
debts. European creditors threatened to use force to collect them. Britain was under pressure from its creditors to do the same. But her real reason for concern was her possession of the Suez Canal.

To that time, Britain had found it useful to manage Suez jointly with France, supported by tacit agreements with the other members of the Council of Europe. Most of the Cabinet hoped to continue in this manner. France was virtually implored to act jointly to make good the debts and put down the growing unrest fomented by the Arabic nationalists. The Council was asked to work for joint solutions. Before unilateral intervention was approved there were even overtures to the Turks, whom Gladstone had but recently referred to as "unspeakable."

All these attempts failed. Britain was forced to move unilaterally. The Liberals repudiated their platform and their philosophy; non-intervention abroad and economization of government spending in the name of "peace, Christianity and conscience." Gladstone's philosophy had always been to rely upon persuasion and trust to the free market to rectify problems. His personal philosophy was rooted in Palmerston's doctrine of "'moral influence" rather than force. So long as this doctrine had been effective, there had been no need for force. Besides,

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30 It was Gladstone's hatred of the Turks which had led to policies that weakened their position so that by 1882 they were neither able nor willing to intervene. Ibid., pp. 78-79, 93, 95, 101-02.

31 Ibid., p. 92.
manipulation was cheaper than control, and often gave better results. The nasty moral implications of colonization were avoided. The Liberals could condemn Disraeli for jingoistic interference in other peoples' affairs. In turn they were denounced as "Little Englanders," an epithet which they did not find degrading. But when the choice came to be unilateral intervention or loss of influence over the Canal the Cabinet came round to a policy much like Disraeli's.\textsuperscript{32}

In Egypt, pursuit of the Liberal philosophy had implied the ability to persuade the native rulers to act the correct way on matters vital to England. The authors show conclusively that the Egyptian Khedive (like the Turkish Sultan) had been so manipulated for forty years. "At first sight . . . it seems remarkable that . . . Egypt . . . had escaped occupation until 1882."\textsuperscript{33}

Indirect rule for Egypt proved self-defeating—as it would elsewhere on the continent during the twentieth century. The inability of the Khedive to act on his own initiative weakened his position morally and politically. This strengthened the hand of the nationalists. In turn, the power of the Khedive was further reduced. Each setback forced the Sirdar (British 'advisor') to exercise his power more openly and directly. The nationalists capitalized on this as further proof their country was

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 82-92.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 76-79.
manipulated from without. A vicious circle ensued. The traditional rulers were too weak to make necessary reforms. Those with the power to reform linked modernization with an end to foreign influence. Not only were the British unable to withdraw, they were sucked in ever deeper, forced to exercise increasingly direct control.

Initially Britain had hoped "gunboat diplomacy" could be utilized to bluff the Egyptians to meet European demands. When this failed, unilateral occupation was rationalized in the belief the economy could be set on its feet, the debts paid, rebellion crushed within a year, at most two. Even after occupation France was initially invited to jointly administer the country's finances.^[34]

There was obviously little desire for a colony in Egypt. Even if the truth had been foreseen—if it had been realized an occupation was beginning which would cost billions of dollars and last seventy years—wonders if the Liberals would have embarked upon any other course of action. Not that there weren't excellent reasons for the government to extricate itself from Egypt once the full gravity of the situation began to become apparent. The nation was almost hopelessly bankrupt. Corruption was widespread throughout the government. Hostility towards foreigners ran deep within the populace. It now crystallized against the British. The cost of maintaining Egyptian operations was considerably

^[34]Ibid., pp. 94-121.
greater than original estimates. Even sole possession of the Canal had its drawbacks. It alienated France, long Britain's strongest ally against Russia.  

France rejected Britain's offer for joint administration. Other members of the "Concert of Europe" refused to pledge cooperation. Britain's European rivals enjoyed watching her wrestle with her problem. Their debts were being paid. Britain was footing the bill. The more of her resources were committed in Egypt, the more leeway they had to put pressure on her elsewhere.

Within Britain, especially within the Liberal Party, pressure built to withdraw. With each passing month it grew. The Egyptian financial structure had been overhauled by Baring. In a few years the country was operating in the black. The Khedivate was restored; the arabists suppressed. There were tangible political and economic reforms. As early as August, 1883 the troops were withdrawn to Alexandria. "Most of the Cabinet" viewed this as "the first step towards complete evacuation."

The whole structure retained a hothouse quality. It rested upon continuation of the British "presence." Yet so long as Britain pulled the strings native governments were unable to win the popular support.

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36 Ibid., pp. 143-44.
37 Ibid., p. 130.
necessary to provide the stability Britain considered essential before it could withdraw. Without stability and a government friendly to England the Canal remained in danger. So long as this was the case, Britain felt unable to withdraw.

Gradually, after the fact, sole possession of the Canal came to many Britons to seem desirable. By the end of 1882 a Cabinet member who had been a staunch opponent of unilateral intervention was arguing "the interests of England and of India . . . demand that no other power be allowed to dominate Egypt." Besides, didn't England deserve compensation for unilaterally undertaking the repayment of Europe? Other powers had refused to help. Now, as Lord Dufferin put it in a report to the Cabinet, steps must be taken to insure they would not "interfere between England and the Egypt she had re-created." By incremental stages, British entrenchment was being fortified.

At one point it appeared that those opposing occupation would win out. The intra-party split over Irish home rule prompted Gladstone to consolidate disparate elements. One concession was to promise Egyptian withdrawal. Two months before it was to be consummated, external events intervened. The Khedive determined to exercise independence in one of the few remaining areas open to him. He overrode Baring's

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38 Ibid., pp. 131-32.

39 Ibid., pp. 123, 128-29.
objections, and sent his army to crush the Mahdists in the Sudan. It was the Egyptians who were routed.

With the army crushed, the government demoralized, Egypt would not be abandoned. It was incapable of repelling even the Mahdists, let alone a European power. Britain had entered Egypt to protect the Canal and the route to India. She must remain to protect Egypt itself. For the first time many Ministers came to see "something of the maze which they had unknowingly entered." 40

The death of General Gordon at the hands of the Mahdists almost prompted British invasion of the Sudan. The Conservative front bench was for this, but the Liberals successfully avoided the additional commitment. When Salisbury took office he made no attempt to reverse the Liberals' decision. 41 Here is further evidence of pragmatic policy continuity even by a leader who disapproved the initial decision.

Eventually the realities of geography intervened: As other European powers showed increasing interest in Africa, the British were forced to move southward to protect their position. Mahdist activity in the south was no threat to the Canal. A European presence in the Sudan was. In 1889, to protect Egypt from a blockade of the Upper Nile, British forces moved into the Sudan. 42 They would remain over sixty years.

40 Ibid., p. 134.
41 Ibid., pp. 151-55, 339-54.
42 Ibid., pp. 283-89.
The sources of the Nile are in Uganda. By 1893 growing French influence there, and the economic collapse of the British East Africa Company, convinced the Liberal government of Lord Rosebury it must establish a protectorate in that area as well. It would not be long before the government felt compelled to intervene to preserve the neutrality of Ethiopia. There was no attempt to colonize that country, but only because she was able to keep it from domination by some other power. It was not so much the desire to "paint Africa red" as the negative need to protect what were considered existing commitments which forced the English to expand steadily into the continent. Similar policies by other colonial countries led to the Fashoda incident of 1898. War among the Great Powers was but narrowly avoided. 43

This period of British history has been called "jingo years." The statement is perhaps accurate, but the jingoism generally seems to have developed after the fact. It does appear true that abhorrence towards colonialism seems to have declined as its actuality was recognized. Economic and technological development made Britain more able to absorb the expense. The British presence was excused, even extolled, on grounds it performed a positive good for the native populations. By the 1890's there is evidence many Cabinet Ministers came to enjoy playing the colonial game. Even as the pace of conquest quickened, there

43 Ibid. , pp. 333-38, 346-49, 359-76.
seems no evidence anyone in the Cabinet ever developed a blueprint for expansion.

In the last analysis, Liberal principles would seem to have had little effect on British expansion into Africa. For all the earlier differences with advocates of the "forward policy," Gladstone and most "Little Englanders" shared their basic view of Britain's proper place in the world. For both groups, two primary objectives were prevention of a Russian foothold in the Mediterranean, and maintenance of a direct route to India. The Liberals were dedicated to upholding these objectives through trade and diplomacy rather than force. They preferred delegation of authority to private citizens to the use of governmental agencies or funds. They were, however, no less committed to the goals. In practice they:

never minimized the role of government in all this . . . If the Cobdenites objected that the exercise of power interfered with the growth of trade, the practical statesman found that the two worked together . . . Disraeli was stating their principle when he said in 1863: 'There may be grave questions as to the best mode of obtaining wealth . . . but there can be no question . . . that the best mode of preserving wealth is power.'

If the Suez Canal provided the shortest link to India "whatever its risks and enigmas it had to be held." The Liberals had not sought an end to empire. They had hoped to preserve it while ending "expensive

44 Ibid., p. 4.
It was only the form of the empire which had been changed, so as to "conform with the prejudices and nature of a liberal state." Whatever the early motivations for moving into Africa had been, they gradually were subordinated to bureaucratic norms. Whitehall has been described as operating in accordance with "concepts peculiar to the official mind." Its personnel had an ethos of intellectual aloofness. They considered themselves "socially superior and functionally detached from those who pushed trade and built empires." Their decisions were based less on ideology or power than on a flexible, multi-faceted "political arithmetic." Decisions were made with cautious care. Once made, they were rarely reversed. Surely this sounds like an agency which operated on a principle similar to that of the di strategy. The primary tenets would appear to be gradualism, pragmatism and disjointed incrementalism (disjointed because each colony was treated as a separate entity left mainly to its own devices).


47 For example, the decision to make the republics into a federation is seen not as a concession to Boer demands for independence but as a seeming concession which would actually make the area easier to control and cheaper to administer. Strengthening loyalty by giving home rule would grant to South Africa a "junior partnership in empire building." Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 56, 67.

48 Ibid., pp. 73-74.
By the 1890's Commons is usually portrayed as having caught the imperial bug. This has also been recently questioned. Robinson and Gallagher found little public or press support for African expansion before Fashoda. The British East Africa Company could not find much sympathy for its financial difficulties even in the business community. It found still less among the voters. Clive agrees that imperial decisions were made by "a small group of aristocratic statesmen, not, on the whole, subject to . . . popular control by . . . Commons."

The Cabinet majority had become imperialist. Commons, despite its Conservative majority, had not. The Prime Minister, prior to 1893, "feared Parliament even more than he wanted Uganda." When the annexation bill was finally sent before Commons, it made no mention of the primary motive for acquiring the territory (securing the headwaters of the Nile). The legislation was defined as:

a philanthropic measure against the slave trade. It mattered little that informed men knew that slave-trading in these regions was on the wane. The Foreign Office habitually explained its African moves to the ordinary voter as measures against the slave trade, for this was all he knew or cared about tropical Africa. Philanthropy was the first resort of diplomacy during the Scramble.

49 This is a central theme of Raphael, Cape-to-Cairo Dream.
50 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 307.
52 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 307-08.
Nor was this an isolated instance. Correspondence on South African affairs indicates areas such as Matebeleland were annexed by the British primarily because the High Commissioner warned if his country did not do so, the boertrekkers would. Similar motivations lay behind the Cabinet's decision to grant Rhodes a charter for the Zambezian territory (Rhodesia). To Commons and the public, these actions were justified as "a means of civilizing Africa and opening new markets." Only in this way would the Cabinet gain any public support. Nor was there much enthusiasm generated even for these reasons. "What public opinion there was on these matters seems to have pressed a negative policy" on the government. "It's compelling reasons for granting the charter lay less in the rise of imperial enthusiasm at Home (sic) than in South Africa."54

Britain's Africa policy was most frankly imperialistic in the years after 1895. Expansion was pressed in West Africa, even when this was not vital to policy elsewhere. This is attributed not to a shift in public (or Commons') opinion, but to the "peculiar balance of domestic politics." By playing factions against each other, expansionist Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain was able to gain an almost free hand for his African

53Ibid., p. 235.

54Ibid., pp. 240-41.
Only in the post-1895 period did there gradually develop an irrational imperialist spirit in the British press. Even then this commitment was limited to the Nile Valley area. It is not clear whether the public mood would have supported war after the Fashoda incident. In any event Robinson and Gallagher found no evidence that public pressures drove the government "to do what it would otherwise not have done."

But now support for a "Nile Valley Strategy" received nearly universal support within Commons. Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals and most Labourites joined in a "chorus of patriotic union."

Support for expansion for its own sake, then, began only after 1895. It was prompted by a "complex web of causation . . . late in coming and short-lived." It would seem, in retrospect, to have come after a long period of incremental buildup; unplanned and unpremeditated.

One might well argue that the British government followed a di policy,

55The question of home rule for Ireland divided an otherwise anti-expansionist majority in the Cabinet. Ibid., p. 320; Clive, "British History . . . Reconsidered," pp. 1001-002.

56The British press editorials were "considerably more stident" than those in French papers. Only the Manchester Guardian opposed confrontation. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 376-78.


meeting each contingency in a pragmatic, serial and remedial way deemed least likely to offend important groups or jeopardize existing colonial holdings. Colonial expansion would certainly not appear to have been a consciously followed Cabinet plan, at least prior to 1895. The resultant empire may well be seen, in retrospect, as having created more long-range problems for the British than it solved. This sheds some doubt on the Braybrooke-Lindblom suggestion such a policy is most likely to lead to the melioration or social or economic ills. Certainly there was far less moral opposition to empire in the 1890's than there would be in the post-World War II era. It appeared then, to many, that economic and even political benefits would come to both mother power and colonies alike. Yet perhaps following the path of the broker is sometimes less practical a course of action than taking a firm moral stand. In any case, the British had scarcely won for themselves a vast African empire than they began to seek ways to divest themselves of at least parts of it.

Maximal British territorial holdings were attained with the gain of Central Power territories following World War I. By then the resources to maintain further expansion were exhausted. So, it would seem was the desire to expand. Yet, as mentioned, dissolution was a bitter pill. The reasons for this must also be explored.

We mentioned in Chapter I that British policy rejected assimilation as a colonial end. It also rejected permanent colonial status. The
colonies were being held in trust (except where defense of the mother country was a primary factor) until such time as their peoples learned the civilized ways of life practiced in the mother country. When they showed they had done so, the British would gladly relinquish control. The Mandate Territories received after the First World War were simply areas where Her Majesty's government had pledged publicly to do what she had pledged to herself to do everywhere in the empire.

This was the noble theory. It was devoid of mention of economic, psychological or other benefits Britain received from its empire. It was not quite devoid of racial overtones. The white-peopled colonies might later be joined in a confederacy. The others were not expected to join. But this was put in terms of their not wishing to do so, because their cultures and histories were too different for either side to feel comfortable with such an arrangement. Even the white colonies were viewed as junior partners of any confederate arrangement. They would naturally defer to Britain, not merely because of her economic and military strength, but because she was the "mother of Parliaments"; the furthest advanced in the organic evolution towards democracy and rule of law.

Here was the Commonwealth in embryo. The concept had already been developed in the minds of some influential Britons by the beginning of this century. In 1905, South African Governor Lord Milner told an audience in Johannesburg of his visions; an "association" composed of Britain and the mature (white) Dominions:
a group of states, all independent in their local concerns but all united for the defense of their own common interests and the development of a common civilization, united . . . in a permanent organic union. 59

Such attitudes were most prevalent among, but not limited to, Conservatives. They persisted well into the post-war era. Writing in 1953, former Colonial Secretary Lord Salisbury could still speak of all the members of the Commonwealth agreeing, voluntarily, "in recognizing the commanding spirit of these islands." 60

In theory, all subject peoples would someday be independent. In practice, few Britons concerned themselves with the implications of this doctrine, even in the post-World War I period. This was especially true of black Africa. Debate seemed to center around whether the native was inherently inferior, requiring permanent protection, or whether he was like a child, who could be taught someday to rule himself. In the latter instance, the period of tutelage was still discussed in terms of many decades, if not centuries.

In the settler colonies the problem was further compounded. If the black were truly a child, it was the duty of the British administrator to protect him against "'the cupidity . . . and crimes of that adventurous class of Europeans who lead the way in penetrating the territory of"

59 Quoted in Strachey, End of Empire, pp. 93-94.

60 Marquiss of Salisbury, "Commonwealth and Empire," an address to the Primrose League, Conservative Commonwealth Series #1 (London: Conservative Commonwealth Center, April, 1953), p. 3.
Many administrators would appear to have attempted to fulfill this pledge. When they did so, they usually engendered hostility from the European settler class. Protection of Indian land-rights was a primary cause of friction leading to the American revolution. Similar problems were confronted in Africa wherever large numbers of settlers had moved. To the settler, administrators who protected native rights often appeared to be taking sides against their own "race," as well as preventing "the triumph of civilization over savagery."

Strachey takes a more cynical view. He argues the colonial officer whose concern was truly for the native was a rarity. British statements of the need to preserve native rights were for strategic purposes only; used as bargaining points or rhetorical moral assertions during conflicts with European rivals or with settler communities. Batten supports this viewpoint, and states rights of Africans were not usually considered when policy directives were made.

During (the) process of partition African tribes were only regarded as important when they fought against it. Generally, when this

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64 Strachey, *End of Empire*, p. 93.
happened, resistance was quickly overpowered.65

Where Europeans settled, natives were excluded from many of the best lands. They were excluded from ever attaining most high positions in industry or government. They received far lower pay for the same work when done by whites. They were nearly always subjected to segregated facilities, especially in urban areas. Yet rarely did official policy go far enough in these respects to suit the settlers. Although settlers usually enforced many such practices de facto, with covert civil service acceptance, there were pressures on the government to leave all such matters to be decided locally. This Whitehall usually refused to do. At least some native standards were preserved. Here, then, were the seeds of both the black and white nationalist movements which developed later.66

There were always segments of the British population, including M.P.'s, Cabinet Ministers and Colonial Office employees who really tried to act upon the belief their role in the colonies was to help enrich the native's life, to provide him with education and tools so he could gradually become civilized. Even the pre-World War I period produced lasting good effects. New health and education techniques are among the most obvious examples. Macmillan also cites the ending of the

65 Batten, Thoughts, p. 6.

slave trade, and the need to reorganize society in light of the changes produced by its passing.

The ordering of the chaos left by the slave trade was quite beyond the competence of any native African authority. There are obvious limits to the efficacy of the smooth modern formula, 'self-determination'. The alternative of bringing Western Europeans into Africa was the only possible way to help Africans to find their place in the wider world.®

As Macmillan himself admits, administrators with the best intentions sometimes created more problems than they solved. Internal tribal cohesion was usually based upon centuries-old traditions. Communities had well-defined rules and mores. The granting of rights depended upon the acceptance of duties. The power of chiefs was limited by similar rules. Most could be deposed for flagrant violation by councils of elders. But the chiefs became the intermediaries between the British and the native. This was meant not only to save staff and funds, but to preserve some semblance of the old ways. In practice, it often made it impossible to depose a chief. Simultaneously it compromised his standing in the community. Where this process of "indirect rule" went furthest, it often weakened the tribal structure without substituting western democratic processes.®


®® The "Native Administration" concept of rule through the chiefs was most fully perfected by Lugard in Northern Nigeria. During the interwar period it was widely applied elsewhere. But what worked in Moslem, hierarchial, semi-feudal Northern Rhodesia had disastrous effects in different societies. See Batten, Thoughts, p. 2.
Even imposition of law and stability sometimes had disastrous effects on areas without a consensual base: areas where tribes with centuries-old rivalries were now joined under common administration. Differences in dynamism, attitude and population growth rate were not usually considered when lands were apportioned. 69

Nationalist movements usually emerged among the western-educated urban elite, already alienated from the traditional tribal ways. Desires of this elite tended to go unrecognized and unrewarded by British authorities. This tended to further radicalize these "emergents." They had witnessed parliamentary democracy, and been exposed to democratic theory. The discrepancy between these and the administrative autocracy which governed the colonies—however benevolent its dictates—was all too apparent. Since the chiefs were associated with the British (and since many owed their salaries, even their office, to continued loyalty to the Governor), the new movements usually by-passed the chiefs. This fragmented the tribal structure still more. An unbridgeable gap often developed between the perceived goals of the leaders and those of the

69 Macmillan, Road to Self-Rule, pp. 17-20. This problem was especially acute among the Kikuyu, and has been called a primary cause of the Mau Mau uprising; Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 145-60.
Attempts at reform also met many obstacles at the administrative level. The Colonial Office was set in its ways. Change came slowly—often too slowly to answer changing needs. (Therefore it was closer to the policy of drift than it was to the strategy of di.) Besides, legislatures, where they existed, were overwhelmingly composed of settlers. If Africans served they were hand picked by the Governor. The result was a general lack of "purposeful colonial development." Even when sufficient incremental change was proposed in Britain, it was not always able to be carried out in the colonies.

Following World War I, British attitudes slowly altered. As the desire to aid the colonies increased, however, the ability to do so declined. Change was most likely to be instituted during the brief periods Labour was in office. Since it was in coalition with the Liberals, the Cabinet did not have a free hand. Objections to rapid change from Whitehall and from settlers would in any case have been a factor. Beyond

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71 Problems included staff shortages and rapid rotation (especially in West Africa). Centralized planning was most reluctantly introduced. Jeffries, *Empire and Civil Service*, pp. 11-12, 15-17.

this, many Labourites did not believe in immediate dissolution for ideological reasons. Among them were the first Labour Prime Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, and the first Labour Colonial Secretary, Sidney Webb.

We have already spoken of the degree to which Liberals, even "Little England" Liberals, would ultimately fight to maintain imperial holdings. There would seem little need to justify Conservative support of the empire. It was under their rule that much of it was established, and they took pride in that accomplishment. Epstein found the belief in empire served as a party catharsis. It proved to be an "emotive" issue for most party activists. It became "a Conservative ideological cement comparable to socialism in the Labour Party."73 Conservatives also used this theme as a means of gaining adherents among the electorate. It was, he suggests, especially useful in attracting working class voters, further proof that workers were far from immune to the appeal of imperial greatness.

The same can be said of much of Labour's intellectual wing, the Fabian Society. Labour M.P.'s would often speak of their party's anti-imperial tradition. In order to more fully understand their post-war policy we feel a few illustrations of early party views are necessary.

The Labour Party was not formed until the colonization of Africa was well underway. In its early years its primary concern was domestic

73 Epstein, Suez Crisis, pp. 20, 199-201.
reform. It took no stands on most foreign policy issues. In important ways Labour was heir to the Radical section of the Liberal party, which contained most of the "Little Englanders."

There were also Radicals who supported expansion, in the belief it was Britain's mission to better the lives of the backward peoples. Joseph Chamberlain was in this tradition. Men with similar ideals may also be found in the Labour Party ranks. They saw colonization as a means to further the cause of social democracy.

The party in Commons was less empire-minded than any of its rivals. It urged withdrawal from Egypt during the 1880's and opposed expansion into the Sudan. It opposed buying out the Royal Niger Company (the first step in establishing British influence in Nigeria). Both the party and the Fabian Society showed almost unanimous opposition to the Boer War.74

A Fabian Society pamphlet on the reasoning behind the latter position is quite revealing, especially since it was written by George Bernard Shaw.75 The Boer War should be renounced by all socialists, wrote Shaw, because it was an unjust war, a war for control of "gold-fields and the formidable armaments that can be built upon them." No nation

74 Ting fu F. Tsiang: Labour and Empire (Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, publ. 1923), pp. 70-81.

75 Fabianism and the Empire (London: Fabian Society Publication, Grant Richards Press, 1900).
had the right to misuse its colonies, Shaw continues:

The notion that a nation has a right to do what it pleases with its own territory, without reference to the interests of the rest of the world is no more tenable from the International Socialist point of view—that is, from the point of view of the twentieth century—than the notion that a landlord has a right to do what he likes with his estate without reference to the interests of his neighbors. 76

But neither all wars nor all imperialism should be categorically condemned. The paramount question to be asked in each situation was whether the action served to spread "civilization." No nation possesses an absolute right to exist:

The State which obstructs international civilization will have to go, be it big or little. That which advances it should be defended by all the Western Powers. Thus huge China and little Manaco may share the same fate, little Switzerland and the vast United States the same fortune. 77

The Shavian ideal was world federalism under socialist principles. This was admittedly possible only in the distant future. Meanwhile socialists should support expansion of the most developed states—those nearest to having democratic or socialist regimes. Colonial rule by these nations would benefit peoples formerly living under native despots and primitive conditions. The duty of the ruling power was to aid the colonial peoples and direct their progress towards full participation in the coming socialist civilization.

76 Reprinted in Ibid., p. 136.

77 Ibid., p. 137.
Of all the great powers, Britain was seen as having the most enlightened colonial policy. It was the duty of English socialists to support progressive government programs of colonial aid, while simultaneously working with native leaders to develop trade unionism and democratic socialism.

Nor was this solely a Shavian view. In 1899 the Fabian executive approved a policy statement stating, in part:

(Fabians should support) the expansion of empire only insofar as it may be comparable with the expansion of that higher social organization which this Society was founded to promote.  

The Fabians were somewhat ambiguous towards World War I, but tended to view the allied cause as furthering civilization against the less principled Central Powers. A 1916 statement avoided direct endorsement of British policy but noted:

Many members of the Society joined the army in the early months of the war, and already a number have given their lives for their country.

A 1918 Fabian tract condemned the "mad scramble" for territory motivated by desire for economic gain, which had helped precipitate World War I. It denounced the creation of African colonies through

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78This document was narrowly defeated in a general membership referendum but Pease believes this was primarily due to the belief the organization must utilize all of its limited resources in promoting domestic reform, not in disagreement with the expansionist tone of the document. Ibid., pp. 130-31, 133.

79Ibid., p. 234.
"deals" among the great powers, without regard to tribal relationships. It rejected the mandate system, and urged that the League of Nations be permitted to directly administer territories taken from the Central Powers. No further colonization ought to be permitted on the continent of Africa; but existing colonies of the victorious powers were to remain in their possession. Fabians asserted the principle of non-intervention while upholding the status quo which was highly favorable to Britain and her allies.

Not that Britain was beyond criticism. She too was to be condemned for ignoring international law in pursuing great power rivalries. But her record was, of all colonial powers "by far the best" for she "really was keen on suppressing the Slave Trade (sic), the liquor traffic, and on maintaining native rights." Criticism had been combined with general support from Cecil Rhodes' belief "Great Britain was the only country fit to colonize."  

As one would expect, the Fabians were more concerned with the rights of "natives" than were leading writers from other parties. They did not suggest independence as a serious possibility in black Africa. Hawkins' 1918 tract, for example, urged Britain to treat her colonies as


81 Quoted from a letter to Queen Victoria, reprinted in Raphael, Cape-to-Cairo Dream, p. 177.
if held in trust. A Board of Trustees should be established to develop procedures for the gradual introduction of a limited franchise (similar to that of Cape Colony). Meanwhile natives should consider themselves "represented by missionaries just as Irish villagers regard the priest as representative."82

Similar views were held by Ramsey MacDonald. In a 1907 work he called imperialism "incompatible with democracy." Yet independence for existing colonies was not possible. Preferable would be a voluntary "British Empire for self-governing states" secure by mutual advantage. Like his Conservative contemporary, Lord Milner, MacDonald had conceived the underlying structure of what would become the Commonwealth. Unlike Milner's model, it would not necessarily be limited to white dominions. The MacDonald scheme also had a socialist twist. An alliance of labor parties would precede an alliance of governments. The federation, in turn, would serve as a model for the ultimate goal of world federation under law.83

MacDonald harshly condemned administrative attitudes toward colonial peoples—especially black Africans. Civil servants, by nature "the least imaginative and sympathetic of men" must cease trying to "impose the ends of our national life," cease trying to make of the


African "a coloured Englishman." Such a policy would destroy the native's soul, even if it left his body unharmed. Instead the mother country must provide more moneys for native development, greater educational opportunities, etc. Treatment of the native as "a mere tool in the white man's hands" must be replaced by "an Imperial Standard of richness of life" for all subject peoples. The goal must be development of African society based upon African tradition. These are views decidedly in advance of those presented by the major parties. They would be accepted by most Conservatives only after World War II.

Once again, however, the evil is not seen as colonialism per se, only colonialism without a purpose beyond "economic exploitation." The government should replace its businessmen and aristocratic administrators with "educators and moral agents" who would "assume responsibility for the natives." Labourites debunked the "white man's burden" as a cover for the schemes of men like Rhodes. Yet it was they who seem to have first accepted the full implications implicit in that doctrine.

Sidney Webb, a founder and a leading theorist of the Fabian society, became Colonial Secretary in the Labour dominated government of 1929. His "Memorandum on Native Policy" suggested all colonies would be treated as mandates, in accordance with League of Nations guidelines for such territories. Protection of native interests would be the first

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obligation of the colonial power. Protection of the native's rights, development of his opportunities, were "'a trust from which Her Majesty's government cannot be relieved; the ultimate responsibility of this trusteeship must accordingly rest with them alone.'"\(^8\)

The coalition government fell before many tangible results could be achieved. But Webb's Memorandum was accepted, in principle by the national government which followed. Priorities would henceforward be placed upon development of industry, educational facilities, and social standards.\(^6\) Had it not been for the intercession of the depression and the war, much more would no doubt have been done. The 1929 Memorandum was the basis for the post-war Colonial Welfare and Development (CD&W) Acts, accepted by both parties.\(^7\)

The document also marks a turning point in relations between Labour and settler regimes. To the latter it meant the Socialists would support their forced integration with the uneducated, primitive black majorities. The White Paper was often referred to as the "black papers" (meant, no doubt, in both usages of the word).\(^8\)

\(^8\) Macmillan, *Road to Self-Rule*, p. 182.

\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 183, 207, 216-17.

\(^7\) A 1938 Royal Commission report urging much more rapid progress in these fields was accepted by all three parties in the National Government.

\(^8\) Macmillan, *Road to Self-Rule*, p. 184.
This would have unfortunate consequences when Labour won office in 1945. Most settlers distrusted the party's intent, however gradualist actual policy might be. Certain back bench statements furthered their misgivings. Yet when Labour relinquished power in 1951 not a single African colony had even a timetable for independence. It was left to the Conservatives to grant them self-rule.

Opportunities for multiracial development would be lost due to settler intransigence. This in turn would weaken the hand of moderate African leaders. Extremists from both sides thereby gained a greater following. The inevitable movement towards self-rule could not be prevented. The pill was simply more bitter when it finally had to be swallowed. Settler help was necessary if smooth transitions to black rule were to take place. The refusal of many whites to provide such aid made post-independence conditions worse than they need have been. 89

Actually, the Conservatives had already moved a considerable way in this direction. The Devonshire Declaration of 1923 had, for the first time, declared an African colony (Kenya) would be governed on the basis it was "African Territory." Native rights would be considered "paramount" when they conflicted with those of settlers. It was to be many years before this concept would receive much practical implementation. But the directive remained on the books. Indeed, its language formed part of the

89Ibid., pp. 190-95.
basis for the later Webb Memorandum. In the years before 1929, the beginnings of local self-government and native representation in the colonial legislature had also been introduced in Nigeria and in The Gold Coast. 90 Besides, neither Webb nor other Fabian pamphleteers in 1929 were advocating independence for African colonies in the foreseeable future. 91 Lest one be led to believe the Fabians were out of touch with their party's rank and file, Tsiang found no significant deviation between voting of the socialist and the trade union wings during the 1880-1920 period. The prevailing mood of both was "acquiescence" with the policy set by the government. 92

Even among Conservatives there began to be heard both the idea the black man really could be expected to one day rule himself, and the idea it was the British government's duty to help him attain that capacity as rapidly as he could. Britain gradually came to pledge internal self-government, if not independence, to her major African holdings. Meanwhile, it had the duty to improve native conditions, and to protect their

90 The Clifford Constitution, which permitted certain local forms of election, was adopted for Nigeria in 1923. Provincial Councils of Chiefs were to be chosen under the Gold Coast Constitution of 1925.


92 Tsiang, Labor and Empire, p. 95.
In 1923 Southern Rhodesia was granted Dominion status (virtual internal home-rule) under its all-white government. Native rights would be protected from London. This did not prevent many segregatory and discriminatory laws from being successfully introduced, whenever settlers fell threatened by the country’s huge black majority. As Rotberg put it:

pragmatic segregation was the only course ever acceptable to the mass of white Rhodesians . . . nearly all whites supported one or another form of segregation after 1923 . . . The govern­ment . . . faithfully reflected these concerns after 1923 by sharpened tools designed to effectuate segregation and by economic, political and social policies intended to entrench white prerogatives more securely. 93

Neither the Colonial Office nor Parliament refused to accept such laws. At most, private negotiations with Rhodesian leaders prevented even harsher laws from being passed. 94

1923 was the high-water mark of settler hopes. This was also the year of the Devonshire Declaration. From then on the cause of the black African slowly, almost imperceptibly, was accepted by Britons.

During the 1930's there was a gradual shift of party attitudes. Conservatives came to accept the commitment implied in Labour's more idealized version of the "burden." The Colonial Office was reorganized, section by section, to provide greater expertise and efficiency.

94 Ibid., pp. 106-07.
Commissioners were gradually replaced by resident, politically oriented officials, who used influence and prestige to try and lead the people to "better ways." This process developed furthest in northern Nigeria but was begun elsewhere. The white ruler still ruled but "discretely put himself out of sight." As one would expect, such changes took place disjointedly, incrementally and serially.95

As these policies once advocated by Fabians were accepted by Conservatives, Labour grew dissatisfied with them. First the left wing, gradually others, came to denounce imperialism of all kinds: to demand maximum aid be coupled with a definite commitment to withdraw, to move the colonies towards full Commonwealth status as rapidly as they could undertake self-rule. This, in a sense, was the ultimate irony. Britain was to set a moral example to the world by being the first nation in history to voluntarily relinquish an empire. Yet she could not play this role had she not acquired an empire to surrender.96 The policy-pattern of the post-war era was set in the pre-1940 period. It is never easy to assess why an attitudinal change takes place. Only a cursory search will be made here.

The First World War left Britain territorially strong but weakened at home. There was a serious shortage of funds and equipment. This was

95Macmillan, Road to Self-Rule, pp. 184, 199-203.
96Ibid., pp. 28-29.
more than a short term disruption. Britain was revealed as less able to recover than was her defeated rival, Germany, or her dissatisfied ally, Japan. (Here was one of the root causes of World War II.) As the British desire to aid the colonies increased, her economic ability to do so declined.97

This process was accelerated after World War II. Britain continued to act as if she were a great power until the revelations of the Suez Crisis. When the United States and the Soviet Union both condemned the intervention there, the British government found itself compelled to withdraw. Harold Macmillan, who was Prime Minister when most of the African empire received independence, was Chancellor of the Exchequer during Suez. Epstein reports he firmly supported the intervention, "until he found that the British financial situation could not stand the strain. . . ."98

There was also a gradual, incremental decline in the imperialist ideology. The will to rule slowly disappeared. As it did, the concept of sovereignty slowly developed in the colonies. It would prove increasingly costly to maintain order, even as the desire to commit troops waned. Britain relinquished her control before she was compelled to do so.

Some Britons fought to retain the non-white empire. Winston Churchill opposed the 1947 grant of independence to India on grounds

97 Strachey, End of Empire, p. 125.

98 Epstein, Suez Crisis, p. 72.
that this would end Britain's special status. He sounded then much as he had in 1935, when he declared:

We have on this island a population of 45 millions living at a higher level than the people of any other European country. One third of these would have to go down, out, or under if we ceased to be a great empire with worldwide connections and trade. If these words rang true in 1935, they should carry all the more conviction after the destruction and deprivation caused by six years of war. Yet a large segment of Churchill's own party refused to support his India stance.

One factor facilitating transition was the creation of the Commonwealth. The Statute of Westminster, signed in 1931, established complete equality and full sovereignty for each member state. Yet many Britons would go on believing they set the moral, legal, and administrative norms to which other members willingly adhered. This made it easier to accept the end of the empire. In the years we have studied, only Burma refused to join the Commonwealth. To many Britons the Commonwealth was merely a more modern form of the empire. (The term "British Commonwealth" was generally in use until well into the


100The ambiguities of British thinking are evident, for in a single paragraph the Dominions could be referred to as "autonomous communities" and nations "united by a common allegiance to the Crown (and) freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." The British Commonwealth, p. 1.
1950's. An irrational commitment permitted Britons to more easily accept the incremental transition from the world's greatest empire to a small island easily invaded from the European mainland.

It is not sufficient to suggest Britain made no profit from her empire, since most Britons believed she did. At any rate she made a large annual net profit from holdings in such colonies as The Gold Coast. Yet this was the first of her African possessions to be freed, while far less viable countries remained possessions. Besides, as Britain's real power declined, her psychological dependency on the empire—the need to feel she was still a great power—ought to have increased. She also had commitments—to the Commonwealth to NATO and SEATO—against expansion by her centuries old rival, Russia. And national acts, such as the development of the empire, tend to become glorified for their own sake.

Strachey has argued a real change in attitudes slowly pervaded

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101 The use of the term "British Commonwealth" disappeared gradually during the 1950's, first from Labour party publications, later from those of the Conservatives. It was still used in 1956 as the title of the first general compilation of Commonwealth facts ever published. Ibid., pp. ix, 1-9.


104 Strachey, End of Empire, pp. 340-41.
both the British government and her populace. World War I, he says, began the process.

Although it had not fatally weakened its physical power, it had done something to the spirit of European imperialism. Only momentarily, in the Nazi paroxysm of the 'thirties and 'forties, did it ever again show genuine expansive power.\(^{105}\)

Strachey's most coherent explanation for this phenomenon is that the growth of democratic socialism put an end to imperial desires. Socialists are committed to a world free of colonial holdings, he argues. Socialism makes such a world possible by creating a sufficient redistribution of wealth within industrial states that they no longer have need of external captive markets. Lenin was correct when he said if capitalism permitted such reforms it would not need to be overthrown. He was incorrect when he stated the capitalists would never permit evolution towards socialism, thereby necessitating communist-led revolutions. Great Britain was proof this need not be the case.\(^{106}\)

This suggestion has much merit. It was the Labour coalition government of 1929 which put Britain firmly on record in support of creating from its African colonies independent, black-dominated states. It was the first all-Labour government which set the pattern which led to independence for the African colonies.

But it is at best a partial explanation. Germany was ruled for a

\(^{105}\)ibid., pp. 129ff.

\(^{106}\)ibid., pp. 110-19.
decade by Social-Democrats after the First World War, but they did not reform the economy so as to end the desire for external conquest.

Communist victory in the USSR certainly did not lead to abandonment of Tsarist expansionist policies. Rather it reinforced them by adding to it the justification of the movement's historically inevitable mission. In countries where "genuine expansive power" did decline, following World War I the Social Democrats were not, for the most part, in power. Strachey himself lays tribute for beginning the economic and social transition to the Liberal reform governments of 1906-14. 107

The Labour victory in Britain might have accelerated the pace towards independence somewhat, but the basis of Labour policy was the CD&W Act of 1940, passed by a Conservative-dominated National government. Strachey also recognizes the dissolution process, once begun, continued "independently, on the whole, of whether a Conservative or a Labour government (was) in power." The Conservatives relapsed only once, at Suez. Its aftermath brought an acceleration of the independence timetable. 108

Even if domestic changes had been solely due to Labour's policy, even if these changes made colonies less economically necessary, military and psychological factors are not accounted for. Labour was no

107 Ibid., Chapter Six, pp. 229-30.

108 Ibid., pp. 140-41.
less committed to defending Malaya against the communists than were the Tories (although they were more likely to emphasize social and economic, rather than purely military, causative factors). Besides, as we have indicated, support for the concept of empire was widespread among sectors of the population which normally vote Socialist. Such an attachment remained even for Strachey. Economic relationships no doubt have an influence on prevailing cultural myths. One would scarcely expect the latter to change rapidly even after the former had been modified.

We can suggest only that a real change in attitude was gradually accepted, although its acceptance was not uniformly applied to all areas of policy at once. This in itself is logical in a nation where neither populace nor government have a weltanschauung mentality.

The ideology which would gradually prevail in the post-war period was well expressed in 1943, by a man who had been intimately connected with Britain's colonial policy, William Malcolm (Lord) Hailey. In his own way, Hailey corroborated the incremental withdrawal from empire which would later form the essence of the Robinson and Gallagher thesis.

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109 See Supply Debates in Hansard; Vol. 503 (June, 1951) cc. 2353-59, 2378-96. (Throughout this dissertation, all references to Hansard will be to the House of Commons volumes. C. or cc. will be used rather than p. or pp. since Hansard is numbered two columns to the page.

110 Hailey was twice a colonial Governor, and served on the League's Permanent Mandate Commission.
The extension of jurisdiction over the hinterland illustrates the force of the maxim 'where once you have established order in one small corner of the world, you are compelled by the mere need of protecting your own handiwork to establish order on your frontiers.'

Now, he argued, Great Britain must slowly extricate herself from this trap. Altruism is the stated reason for his beliefs. So is world opinion. Perhaps most interesting was Hailey's acceptance of economic principles once held only by socialists.

It has become clear that the standards of life of the industrialized section of the world can only be maintained by a betterment of the conditions of the underdeveloped peoples which will make them a more extensive market for its products.

Independence, he argued, could not be granted too quickly. This would disrupt the painfully established rule of law, set back social services "of which the colonial administrators are the only guarantee." But each ruling country, especially Britain, must strive to improve conditions in its colonies as rapidly as possible. They:

... have the responsibility, and should have the means of improving the conditions of life ... (European) powers owe their position largely to historical accident; but it is felt that their maintenance in this position demands some more substantial justification ...

Nor should changes be only at the economic and social levels.

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Political advance ought to keep pace with a people's capabilities. In much of Africa, there was seen to be "emerging an educated class on which we must rely for a progressive share in the formation of self-governing institutions." For their own sakes, these leaders must not be left to their own resources. They would soon "be submerged by the more primitive elements." The demand for "liberation" must:

imply the grant of self-government to areas which are already fitted for it, and the active promotion in others of a graded political education which will enable them eventually to manage their own affairs without external control, but on terms consistent with modern ideas of civilized rule . . . How far it will be possible to fix any predetermined date for the attainment of self-government in any one area must be discussed at a later stage. 115

Hailey sounds much like the most visionary Labourites of a decade earlier. Had his policies been followed more consistently, the transition to independence might well have been smoother; the new nations better prepared to cope with the problems of the post-war world. This theme will be more fully discussed in the next Chapter. We close this Chapter by suggesting British Africa, during the inter-war period, fit the phrase coined by Matthew Arnold, "wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born." 116

115 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

116 Cited in Macmillan, Road to Self-Rule, p. 189.
CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT OF COLONIAL POLICY DURING THE LABOUR PARTY'S PERIOD IN OFFICE: 1946-1951

Early in 1946, R. A. Butler gave a speech in Commons on "empire defense." It was no longer possible, he argued, for Great Britain to unilaterally preserve order in her empire. That task must become a "joint endeavor" of all members. The more mature dominions must provide troops, weapons and funds. African colonies should become "a center of strategic reserve or . . . a training ground."\(^1\)

Here, in essence, was the way most British M.P.'s viewed the role which the African colonies would play in the post-war world. They would not be so isolated as previously. The world had become too small for that. But they would remain in a subordinate, supporting position. There was scarcely a thought given the prospect that their peoples might prove unwilling to accept such a role.

The official position of both parties was that all major African colonies would receive independence some day, when they were deemed ready to govern themselves. Until such time, colonial government would

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\(^1\)The Times, March 5, 1946, p. 8.
be considered "a trust to be carried out for the colonial peoples." There was no suggestion as to "exactly when or how African demands for self-government would be met." The day when that question might meaningfully be asked was put so far into the future by most Britons that no concrete answers seemed necessary. Rapid development of nationalism soon forced a sharp reassessment of such attitudes.

Nationalist movements, already strong in many Asian colonies in the 1930's, were further stimulated by World War II. The European presence was materially and economically weakened. Natives were trained in military and administrative techniques. They gained knowledge, awareness of the world beyond their country's boundaries, and confidence in their ability to perform tasks they once believed only Europeans could master. There was an additional psychological factor. Initial Japanese victories ended any illusion the white man was invincible.

Africa was far less affected by the war than was Asia. None of the four colonies was invaded by troops from rival powers. But African blacks were recruited; some given important positions in the armed forces, industry and government. Some fought in other countries. Some went to Britain or other western countries for training or education. (This practice had begun considerably earlier but was sharply accelerated by the war.) The continent could never be the same. Nationalist movements, which

\[2\] Batten, Thoughts, p. v.
had begun in west Africa as early as the 1920's, would grow rapidly in membership and influence in the years after the war.

Labour's 1945 victory provided further stimulus to African nationalism. So did the grant of independence, during the late 1940's, to several Asian colonies; most notably India. Yet these facts were scarcely grasped by Britain's first all-Labour Cabinet.

Labour's first Colonial Secretary was George Henry Hall. Although he remained in office only a little over a year, he set the tone of moderation which did not change appreciably during the Labour years.

During 1946-47, colonial debates pertained mostly to Asia. The African colonies were scarcely even mentioned, except during the annual Supply Debate. There were no specific references to the four colonies. But the overview of Labour's colonial policy was made clear.

Continuity with earlier policy was a prevailing theme. Hall's opening remarks in the 1946 Supply Debate were made in praise of the colonial development program introduced by the previous National government. Of special merit was the CD&W Act of 1945, allocating £120 million for colonial development over the next ten years. This amount was admittedly small in terms of colonial needs, but "huge" in light of Britain's financial capability.

Hall also paid special tribute to his immediate predecessor, now Shadow Colonial Secretary, Conservative Oliver Stanley. "I readily and thankfully acknowledge" said Hall, "how much I have been assisted in
this task by the work of my predecessor . . . who, while at the Colonial Office, gave much thought and did much careful planning for the future, and led the foundations of much of the work which has been carried out in the Colonies during the last year."\(^3\) This should destroy any illusion the Labour victory marked a radical change in colonial policy. The Times, which might have been expected to sharply denounce radical change, had already editorialized that:

The Government (is taking) . . . new approaches to admitted problems . . . (but not) rush(ing) in with proposals deriving from catch phrases regardless of local conditions, (or) . . . challenging . . . continuity in colonial policy.\(^4\)

Hall's tone certainly bears out this assessment.

This is not to indicate Hall felt no acceleration of colonial aid was contemplated. The colonies, especially in Africa, must be aided in their growth--economically, socially, culturally and politically--as rapidly as funds and staff became available.\(^5\) Colonials must be given a greater share in governmental operations such as staffing their own civil services. They would henceforth be paid equally with settlers or Britons performing


\(^4\)The Times, January 5, 1946, p. 5.

\(^5\)Immediate plans included demobilization, repatriation and reparation but also agricultural development, resettlement of soldiers on the land, draining programs, etc. Hansard, Vol. 425 (July 9, 1946), cc. 238-40. Long range projects involved establishment of unions, welfare programs, agricultural techniques, research programs and some light industry. Ibid., cc. 260-61.
similar tasks. The British government would absorb the expense. 6

Despite superficial similarities every colony must be treated as an individual entity. The goal for all major colonies, ultimately, was self-government. "Every endeavor" would be made to accelerate progress. Already there were significant reforms. Provincial councils had been begun in East Africa and Northern Rhodesia. "Genuine political unity" would result from the new Nigerian constitution. Most developed of all was The Gold Coast where, for the first time, a black majority (unofficial) would soon be elected to the Legislative Council.

Strong labor unions should also be developed in each colony as an aid to viable democratic growth. All endeavors must be shared by Britain, the colonial governments, private industry and the native populations. The pragmatic, moderate, attitude of the Labour leadership was manifest in Hall's attitude towards the role to be played by private British (and colonial) industry. Transportation and other infrastructure must be developed by government, since it alone had the funds. The companies' role was to "assist . . . with proper regard, of course, to (sic) the public interest." 7 The language might be offensive to Tory ears, but, as

6 Ibid., cc. 252-53.

7 Ibid., cc. 251, 256-57. An example was the groundnuts scheme introduced later that year. It would be a Labour government project, but development of the sites and management of operations would be let to the private United Africa Company. The decision was made pragmatically; the company possessed more experts than the government. The latter retained overall supervision and ownership. Some Conservatives agreed
we will indicate, few opposed the underlying logic. The same incremental, pragmatic thinking may be discerned in the Cabinet's approach to the political development of the colonies. It was dimly perceived that an "awakening political consciousness" was beginning to manifest itself among Africans. The government was confident this could be successfully channelled into the growing number of available administrative, technical and advisory positions.\(^8\)

Ultimate self-government was promised but not before the native leadership had proven, to British satisfaction, it could rule "responsibly." This term was, for both parties, a synonym for government in accordance with the principles of parliamentary democracy.\(^9\) Labour's front bench still adhered to the belief that it must assume the "white man's burden" on behalf of the less-developed peoples of the empire. However sincerely this view was held, it is necessarily accompanied by a degree of paternalism. In Hall's case, there seems no evidence he believed in the inherent inferiority of black Africans. In fact, he felt these peoples possessed "the greatest potential for political advancement" in the

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\(^8\)Ibid., Vol. 425 (July 9, 1946), c. 243.

\(^9\)The terms "self-government" and "responsible" are used in the same sentence on a number of occasions. See Ibid., cc. 238, 240, 249, 255, 343-44.
empire. He did cite their "lack of productivity" as a reason greater measures of self-government ought not be granted at this time. Africans must "make a greater effort in the future."\textsuperscript{10}

He also recognized that some of the existing problems were due, at least in part, to previous colonial practices. Yet, it must be remembered:

Political development is governed by social and economic progress. It is difficult to create a democracy out of a hungry and illiterate people, and too many of the inhabitants of our Colonies have, in the past, been hungry and uneducated.\textsuperscript{11}

His Majesty's government would do all in its power to rectify existing social and economic deficiencies. Until they were rectified, it was Britain's obligation to retain control over these peoples "who have to depend on us for their security, development and welfare . . . (This) is a great trust . . . They shall go (forward) as fast as they show themselves capable of going."\textsuperscript{12} The clear implication was that British administrators must determine that capability.

Hall concluded his speech by suggesting greater aid to the colonies would strengthen the empire.

A strong united Colonial Empire, in a strong united British Commonwealth, can make the greatest possible contribution

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Ibid.}, cc. 242, 255.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, c. 249.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, cc. 238, 261.
to the world problems that face us, and I am convinced, playing our full part as we must, we can look into the future with every confidence.\textsuperscript{13}

Few Conservatives could have opposed this statement.

The concluding remarks of the debate were given by Arthur Creech Jones, the Under-Secretary who would soon take Hall's place.\textsuperscript{14} His tone was somewhat less paternalistic than that of his superior. He emphasized the need to work in "partnership" with native leaders. (That term did not appear in Hall's speech.) He also suggested the special privileges and discriminatory practices of settlers were among those aspects of African life which must disappear. Self-government would be granted "in the shortest possible time."\textsuperscript{15}

The Labour front bench was aware its caution might antagonize those, at home and abroad, who expected the party to champion the anti-colonial cause. Creech Jones joined Hall in asking for world understanding of their difficult position, and recognition that most colonies could not be immediately liberated. "Ignorance of what was happening in colonial territories" stated Hall "still produces suspicion among nations. I welcome any move which can bring other countries to a closer understanding of colonial problems." Britain's motives were "highly noble,"

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, c. 261.

\textsuperscript{14}Hall was elevated to the peerage and a seat in Lords.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Hansard}, Vol. 425 (July 9, 1946), cc. 343-46.
Creech Jones added. It was "a great pity that the world, as yet, does not appreciate the constructive and positive purpose of British policy."

What was needed were not new programs so much as better "publicity" so the government’s position would be better explained to the world. This theme would constantly recur among leaders of both parties in later years. 16

Given the moderation of Labour’s program it was not surprising to find the Shadow Secretary endorsing much of it. He did not wish to unnecessarily criticize Hall, who, "despite policy differences" had been "for long regarded as a friend." Here is further indication the two parties were relatively close on this issue. But Stanley promised to criticize when that was considered "necessary." 17

He emphasized the inherent dynamism of colonial relationships, and warned that those attempting to guide colonies towards independence would always be accused of moving too slowly, or too quickly, or of both simultaneously. Conservative policy had never been stagnant. The Tory credo considered progress towards self-rule a right for each territory and a duty for Britain.

16 Ibid., cc. 246, 342.

17 Ibid., c. 275. Proof inter-party harmony was not total may be seen in Creech Jones’ comments that Labour ought to rejoice "that, at last, our propaganda has succeeded in converting the Tory Benches to a much more human and liberal approach to the problems with which this Government now has to contend." Ibid., c. 343.
There were also practical, pragmatic reasons for a policy of serial, incremental steps in this direction.

If the Government go too slow, then they arouse immediately in the Colony doubts of their sincerity. They cause increased bitterness against that class of people whom they want to harness to themselves, if self-government is to be made a success, and they encourage a growth of irresponsibility, because it is sometimes found that, if people are left too long in opposition, when at last they are given a chance of power, they are not capable of taking it. (To move too rapidly, however, meant) erecting a constitutional administrative machine, which bears no relation to the standards of social or economic developments which have to sustain it. The danger there is that, in the name of self-government, we may not be, in fact, erecting a new Colonial democracy, but only handing over power to some oligarchy in the Colony concerned.18

This would appear an excellent statement of the kind of thinking representative of practitioners of the di strategy.

A difference in emphasis between the two parties remains apparent. If the Labour front benches subordinated political advance to prior economic and social progress, the Conservatives scarcely even mentioned the former category. Stanley emphasized administrators in under-developed colonies could no longer be concerned "merely" with maintenance of law and order. The British must work towards development of resources—especially agricultural—and persuade African farmers to abandon the old "leisurely" ways. They must rectify "in a hurry" certain legitimate grievances permitted to build during the war years. Some light industrialization was necessary and this should be undertaken by

18 Ibid., c. 264.
"private enterprise, or the state, or a mixture of the two." Such changes ought to be introduced now, but the burden upon the British taxpayer must also be considered. And neither development of heavy industry nor political change need be undertaken until the above changes had taken place. Overly-rapid growth in these areas would be unfortunate. A people must be taught self-reliance before they could consider independence. Only through self-help would they learn to "value what they get."

If reforms were conducted in the proper spirit, Stanley was "not in the least afraid . . . we shall weaken what are called the ties of Empire." Backbenchers who participated in this debate and spoke on Africa appear to have been more extreme in their thinking than were their leaders. Although each speech was unique, all Conservatives were more reluctant to introduce reform than was Stanley; all save one Socialist was more determined to speed self-rule than were Creech Jones or Hall. The exception was D. R. Rees-Williams, who seemed concerned with the effect too rapid change would have upon tribal custom and communal land practices. "Is it absolutely necessary" he queried, to: "take a primitive people right through the cycle--from socialism into the industrial revolution, then into capitalism, from there to state capitalism and back to socialism?" Could they not be modernized slowly keeping "that part of their culture which is good?" Even he urged speeding the pace of development over that of previous years. 

Contrast, for example, the remarks of two Labourites, Dr. H. B. Morgan and Dr. Haden Guest. Both were in favor of making greater

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19Ibid., cc. 268-70, 274-75.

20The exception was D. R. Rees-Williams, who seemed concerned with the affect too rapid change would have upon tribal custom and communal land practices. "Is it absolutely necessary" he queried, to: "take a primitive people right through the cycle--from socialism into the industrial revolution, then into capitalism, from there to state capitalism and back to socialism?" Could they not be modernized slowly keeping "that part of their culture which is good?" Even he urged speeding the pace of development over that of previous years. Ibid., cc. 313-14.
sacrifice than heretofore to aid the Africans in their legitimate striving to attain self-rule. Both felt not even their own leaders had fully grasped the extent of the problem. Guest's primary concern was economic, however, while Morgan's was political.

Guest believed the colonies had far greater natural resources than current estimates suggested. These must be developed to improve conditions of life of the native peoples, not the absentee owners. There could be an economic solution to most colonial problems. Labour must act so as to "justify the faith of people who (elected) . . . this Labour government (to) . . . begin the real socialization of the Colonial Empire."  

Morgan's attack was more pointed. Conservatives, for at least forty years, had improperly governed the colonies. Hall's opening remarks failed to indicate a sufficient break with this past. Welfare and development programs were "not enough, not from the Labour point of view." Exploitation of native workers and farmers still continued, he insisted. Why were they permitted to continue? Colonials must be considered "our brothers in a system of brotherhood." There should be full debate on colonial policy, at which time the government might hopefully admit "they recognize that the pace which they have been making is too slow and that they will do something to elevate . . . whole populations."  

21 Ibid., c. 281.

22 Ibid., cc. 293-94.
But Morgan was not for abandoning the colonies to their own devices. Brotherhood was not equality. Britain remained the "big brother" who must sometimes "smack his brother . . . to correct him." The goal could only be reached through "guidance and help."

Despite the more radical language, it could therefore be argued Morgan's precepts did not differ in kind from those of his government.

Perhaps the most eloquent right wing speech was delivered by Conservative M.P. Colonel Ponsonby. Experience gained from four visits to East Africa had convinced him greater effort must go into development of economic resources. Political independence was so remote it need not be considered. The long-range goal ought to be to make each colony economically self-sufficient. Even this would be impossible without Europeans doing most of the work.

Continuation of "good will and understanding" were the primary prerequisites for the future. These must be within the context of continued domination by the "superior" white culture. African life could be characterized by its three distinct civilizations; the European, "worked out by trial and error for 1500 years," the Indian, and the African, which until fifty years ago "had (no) contact with any civilization at all" and "no background but tribal fighting and bush life." It was "wonderful" to see how much progress had been made in developing "farms and

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23Ibid., c. 288.
plantations," and "volunteer public services."

There were some "very good, sound" chiefs and native citizens. Generally speaking, however, these people had "commonly demonstrated . . . a great love of leisure and a great disinclination to work." They had few incentives to do more than would keep them from starvation. Anyone who doubted which culture was superior need simply remember white settlers owned all but about half a dozen plantations. Before M.P.'s spoke of equality they should ask themselves whether they felt Africans, or even Indians, should "share equally--and I emphasize the word 'equally'--in the task of assisting (colonial) development with those who have undertaken the task on the basis of European ideals and Christian ethics?"24

Ponsonby's philosophy bore the merit of frankness. It was also disarmingly simple. Literally as well as figuratively it polarized into black and white. He urged Commons to cease divisive debate on colonial matters and return to "constructive" consideration of problems. Nowhere did he define that term.25

The statements of the opposing Colonial Secretaries indicate policy positions which were not too far apart. In light of expressed back bench positions, one wonders whether the Conservatives, if in power, could

24Ibid., cc. 282-83.

25Ibid., c. 286.
have acted as rapidly as Stanley felt they ought. Labour's leadership, however, was urged to adopt a still more progressive policy by its back bench M.P.'s. This becomes still clearer if one analyzes the references to the need to protect colonial peoples. Labour M.P.'s left little doubt it was the black man who was their concern. Three Conservatives who raised the issue spoke of the need to protect the rights of "minorities," i.e. the special status of the white settler.26

The next Supply Debate took place over a year later.27 A few changes are apparent. Creech Jones spoke of a "new sense of urgency" which existed in imperial relationships. Britain had entered:

a phase of colonial history in which there is a widespread demand from the colonial people, or at any rate from the vocal elements of them, for more practical evidence of the sincerity of our oftproclaimed policy of conferring self-government on the colonial communities.28

This was most true of Asia, but the African continent was not immune.

Obviously, not all demands could or should be met. Nonetheless the Colonial Secretary was:

convinced that in this modern age, with its forces of nationalism and freedom, its economic changes, its spread of education, and the political and social awakening ... we must adjust

26 The three were Mackson, Ponsonby and Squadron Leader P. W. Donner. The latter's other prime concern was curbing the "irresponsible" segments of the African press." See Ibid., cc. 285-86, 331, 337-38.

27 Ibid., Vol. 441 (July 29, 1947), cc. 266-378.

28 Ibid., cc. 266-67.
ourselves to a much quicker tempo of constitutional development than would have seemed practicable a few years ago. We have to experiment boldly, though not necessarily rashly, and to recognize that while the transfer of power to people not fully trained or with adequate experience or traditions to exercise it will lead to mistakes being made, it is only through actual experience in the exercise of responsibility that people can acquire a sense of duty and of service. The process may be a painful one, but the alternative of increasing bitterness and tension in the relationship of the people to the Government would be disastrous.\footnote{Ibid. See also statements by the Under-Secretary, \textit{Ibid.}, c. 368.}

A new sense of realism had thus entered official thinking, reflecting an incremental but distinct shift in its emphasis. Not only were the colonial peoples given more credit for their ability to solve their own problems. There was also a realization, as the last sentence quoted above clearly shows, that Great Britain did not have an indefinite time period in which to help solve them.

The pace of change would be speeded wherever possible. More emphasis would be placed upon bringing blacks into the colonial service and into positions of local government. Attempts to gain the "coöperation" of the population would be made prior to the introduction of new programs. Further suggestions would be discussed at a conference of all African colonial Governors to be held that November.

Terms such as "primitive" or "backward" were carefully avoided by the Secretary. Yet much of the earlier rhetoric remained. It was clear there was no expectation these peoples had the background to develop
competent economic or political structures without massive British aid in money, material, and ideas. The colonial power must "largely . . . create . . . the whole apparatus of modern government and . . . build up from scratch a whole series of new social services." A goal of the aid program was to make each colony capable of "making some substantial contribution to the present needs" of the empire and the world.  

The Conservative front bench now took the offensive. The Colonial Secretary's "bold words," Stanley asserted, contrasted sharply with Labour's "actual record" of the past two years. Goals were unclearly formulated; development slow. Of course periods of quiet were sometimes necessary ("We cannot give new constitutions to the same colony every month"). But the image the Conservative spokesman conveyed was clearly that his party, when in office, spoke less about abstract issues but performed better.

This progressive image did not pervade the Tory back benches. Colonial Ponsonby sounded even more officious than he had the previous year. Change must be undertaken. But the African could not be expected to recognize for himself the superior way of life Britain was granting. He must be lured into the twentieth century by the guidance of a "good

\begin{footnotes}
\item[30]Ibid., cc. 270-72.
\item[31]Ibid., cc. 288-94.
\end{footnotes}
bwana" in whom he would put his trust. Ponsonby was somewhat more reactionary than his fellow Tory spokesmen, but not substantially so. Squadron Leader Donner emphasized a similar theme. Britain must continue to play the noble role of providing moral education and regeneration. Negatively it must suppress "immoral, degrading and seditious influences" so as to "safeguard the untutored African mind." Greater aid should be given to the missions. To them should fall the brunt of the positive burden; ending "disastrous beliefs and cruel practices," promoting massive programs in moral, Christian, education. A. D. Dodds-Parker felt British policy in Africa had been so good she had "nothing to be ashamed of in the past one hundred years." Critics should be told to strive for Britain's standards, not make her lower them to approximate theirs. The colonies should be developed, then made U.N. members. They would, of course, express "immediate loyalty to the British Empire." Their example would help prove the beneficence of English rule.

Only one Conservative besides Stanley even suggested the possibility of significant political progress for black Africa in the years immediately ahead. This was A. T. Lennox-Boyd, who would become Colonial

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32 Ibid., c. 358.
33 Ibid., c. 308.
34 Ibid., c. 323.
Secretary in 1953. He and Stanley shared the view of other Conservative speakers that British development of Africa must be in such fashion it would result in a stronger empire and a more prosperous England.  

Labour's back bench was not free of imperialists, as one can see from the comments of Rees-Williams, that:

> The colonies cease to be places to which we merely give a certain amount of protection... They are now as much a part of these islands and of our economic system as are Scotland or Wales...  

Some Labour M.P.'s shared Conservative fears the African colonies might be advancing politically at too rapid a pace. None were as concerned about this as were Ponsonby or Dodds-Parker. Those who expressed such concern were more positive about suggesting reforms.

In 1948, for the first time, the Supply Debate was dominated by African affairs. Conservatives still focused on issues raised in previous years; emphasizing light industrial and agricultural development, strengthening education and expanding the percentage of natives in the civil service. Both the types of change and the manner of their

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35 Ibid., c. 296.

36 Ibid., c. 318. See also comments by Squadron Leader Kinghorn, Ibid., Vol. 447 (February 25, 1948), cc. 2081-90.

37 Ibid., cc. 306-07 (Donner); c. 330 (Pickthorn); cc. 351-52 (Skinnard).

38 Ibid., Vol. 453 (July 8, 1948), cc. 590-700. This despite the civil war in Malaya and the ferment in the West Indies.
Implementation clearly fit the pragmatic di pattern. Major political changes must await these prior developments. Meanwhile, the government ought to take greater (unspecified) efforts against revolutionary groups utilizing "malicious propaganda" to tarnish Britain's good name. 39

Creech Jones continued to stress the need for concurrent economic, social and political change. He was proud a number of African constitutions had been "overhauled" during the past year. Representation on legislative councils had been "improved." In general, the government had "increased responsibility by the people in their own affairs." 40 The most rapid political development had been in Nigeria and The Gold Coast. It had also become "practice" for colonial Governors to "consult all organized sections of African opinion" before taking important actions. 41

39 Ibid., cc. 609, 612-14, 615-17, 630-36, 667, 686.
40 Ibid., c. 594.
41 Representation levels were as follows:

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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>appointed by Nigerian House of Chiefs</td>
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<td>appointed by Regional House of Assembly</td>
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<td><strong>Gold Coast:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>elected by municipalities</td>
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<tr>
<td>elected by Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs</td>
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<td>elected by Ashante Confederation Council</td>
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<td>appointed by Governor</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
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Ibid., Vol. 452 (June 23, 1948), cc. 1339-40.
The general tenor of Creech Jones' remarks, however, was more cautious than the previous year. He now admitted what Stanley had charged; the Labour years had been largely spent "catching up" on pre-war commitments. The impression was given things would progress faster from then on, but a new note of caution had pervaded official Labour thinking. M.P.'s ought not expect "any big dramatic results" in the near future, since "the physical conditions of the world do not permit of such results." 42

By 1949 the government agreed to meet requests from both sides of the aisle for a special debate on African affairs. Both sides believed communist influences, already strong in many Asian colonies, had now begun to be felt in Africa. A Royal Commission report indicated "almost certain" communist "incitement" during recent riots in The Gold Coast.

The government was quick to point out there were also "legitimate" causes of unrest in that colony: rapid population growth, rapid inflation, rising awareness of and desire for modern social services, etc. These must be met by simultaneous attempts to improve all levels of society. Aid must be increased, but the African "peasant" must also be taught "that he cannot enjoy the social standards he demands while his methods of production are as primitive as they are." The people must be brought

42Ibid., Vol. 453 (July 8, 1948), cc. 598-99, 605, 692-94. Changes were being facilitated jointly, in some instances, with France, Belgium and Portugal. Gone was Labour's refusal to work with capitalist governments.
into "positive cooperation" in developing the responsible workings of government. 43

Creech Jones was especially cautious in discussing the rights of colonials to dissent. It was understandable and proper unrest would cause "agitation." It would be permitted so long as it was "legitimate." Stanley was assured this meant toleration only of "constitutional" forms of dissent. This was not further defined. 44

The realities of office would seem by 1948 to have moderated Labour idealism, to have made her leaders more cautious, more like the Conservatives. This irked the more radical Socialist M.P.'s, as may be seen from the snide remarks occasionally emanating from the Labour back benches. 45

Conservative arguments also shifted during the 1948-49 period, taking on a new harshness in light of communist and radical agitation—especially in Malaya, but also in The Gold Coast and Kenya. This made Conservatives less willing than ever to consider self-rule for colonies deemed either unready to exercise it or vital to imperial defenses. With Stanley ill, the main Tory spokesman became L. T. Gammans. In 1948


44 Ibid., c. 2910.

45 An example may be found at Ibid., Vol. 453 (July 8, 1948), c. 594.
he criticized a recent government paper for giving the impression there was an "unchallengable right to leave the Commonwealth. . . . Unless we find a better formula than that, the Empire will disappear bit by bit." 46

He was ready to admit Labour was more realistic than it had once appeared. "No one on the benches opposite now wants to give the Empire away, and, so far as I know, none of them even blushes about it." 47 In view of the current world situation, no colony's status, he argued, could be considered except within the context of the need "to hold the empire together as a world force," to preserve "imperial strategy and imperial communication." 48 In Churchillian rhetoric he added a reminder. Britain could not maintain its life standard if she lost her colonies. "We are either a great imperial Empire or nothing--just a friendless, lonely island in the North Sea, unable to feed or defend ourselves." 49

Gammans set one further limitation, especially important in settler colonies. This was the need to:

46 Note the interchangability of the use of the terms "Commonwealth" and "Empire." In the general Supply Debate of 1949 Lennox-Boyd, while praising the new Official Blue Book on the colonies, regretted substitution of "Colonial territories" for the older term "Colonial Empire." Ibid., Vol. 467 (July 20, 1949), c. 1408. Conservative publications continued to use the latter term well into the 1950's.

47 Ibid. (July 29, 1949), cc. 2830, 2843.

48 Ibid., Vol. 453 (July 8, 1948), cc. 613-14.

49 Ibid., Vol. 467 (July 27, 1949), cc. 2830, 2843.
get away from the idea that our only conception of self-government is one necessarily based on the ballot box. The ballot box, which implies the counting of heads—and very often illiterate heads at that—is very strong vintage. We have seen democracy disappear from many countries of Europe and Central and South America, not because anything was wrong with the constitution, but simply because the very essence of democracy was not there. If we go on doling out constitutions based on universal suffrage, literate or illiterate, without any qualifications whatever, then we are not going to get democracy: we are going to get demagogy. 50

Inter-party differences were emerging which would manifest themselves in later years over whether there ought to be incremental steps away from multiracialism, towards a system of one-man, one-vote.

Although the leaders of both parties had moved a bit to the right, the Conservative back bench speakers had moved a bit leftward to meet them. Even Ponsonby though still describing the Africans as "happy-go-lucky, carefree . . . slow moving and slow learning" admitted economic and political progress was being made and "It all seems to be moving in the right direction." 51

In the face of their government's more cautious position, some Labourites moved further left. Thomas Reid proved Gammans wrong. At least one Labor M.P. still believed in 1948 that Britain should abolish controls over any colony whose people asked for independence. He urged colonial leaders to think long and hard over whether their countries could

51 Ibid., Vol. 467 (July 29, 1949), cc. 2887-88.
survive better as separate nations or as parts of the empire. But if they decided to leave the empire, Britain ought to relinquish power, perhaps less for their sake than her own. No country could long be held unless its people acquiesced. To attempt to stay on if they did not merely heightened tension and resentment. Britain would be blamed for all wrongs. The good she had done would go unnoticed. Here was an M.P. with the old trade-union position. Labour ought to concern itself with building a sound Britain, not with forging a world order. 52

A prophetic maiden speech was delivered in 1949 by left wing Labourite George Wigg. His was the most sharply anti-Conservative talk of the debate. He also challenged his own government's policy. Of course the path towards independence in Africa must be "a long and slow process" he admitted. But real grievances were held by the common citizenry which were too often ignored by administrators and visiting M.P.'s, who spoke only to officials. It must be realized the very advances being made in literacy and urbanization would increase native awareness of the good things other peoples had which they did not. Even a "rabid nationalist extremist" like Nigeria's Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe ("Zik") should be given his due. He performed "a very important service . . . an outlet for unrest" which might otherwise explode into violence. Unless sympathetic understanding existed in Whitehall the initiative would be

52 Ibid., Vol. 453 (July 8, 1948), cc. 659-63.
surrendered to "the Ziks." "I think" he suggested "four years have been wasted." 53

The shifts in the positions of the front benches in Commons were, as one would expect, reflected in the commentaries of the party functionaries and party publications. Here, as in Commons, references to our four colonies were few. Africa was usually treated as a single problem, sometimes merely as part of the greater colonial picture.

Labour's NEC welcomed the 1945 CD&W Act as representing the long awaited "recognition" by the Tories "that we should have to spend money to develop the colonies." It did not suggest existing private and commercial sources of aid be replaced. 54

By late 1946 the NEC Chairman, Harold Laski, could still close his address to the Annual Conference by urging all join in a majestic march "to the Socialist Commonwealth." 55 After nearly a year in office, however, a note of caution had crept into party publications. The Party's Year Book still chastised Conservatives as "tempermentally afraid of change" while


54The Labour Party. Reports of the Annual Conference (of the NEC). Hereafter Annual Report (London: Transport House). These were not volumed by the publisher. The author used the volumes compiled by Columbia University. The above comments are from the 1945 Annual Report, p. 39.

55Ibid., 1946, p. 108.
Labour "welcomes change and wishes to go as fast as the people of the colonies are capable of going." Independence must come gradually, however:

   to those who are impatient . . . the reply must be made that they are living in a world of dreams . . . . Democracy cannot be built up by spectacular means . . . . Those who demand immediate independence for Colonies in which the mere idea of nationhood is in its infancy can never be satisfied . . . . By encouraging growth of forces which built the Labour Movement in this country, the Labour Government is taking the surest and quickest way . . . . the difficulty may well be to find enough individuals in the colonies to accept the necessary positions of responsibility rather than to create more. 56

Here is that same combination of subdued optimism and paternalistic progressivism we find in governmental speeches in Parliament at this time.

Not all Labourites accepted this new philosophy at the Annual Conference. One delegate indignantly stated:

   Mr. Attlee may say that British imperialism is now dead and gone forever. That should be so because imperialism is the absolute antithesis of the Socialism for which we stand, but the Empire is there.

Worse, she charged, white supremacy still reigned in parts of it. In Southern Rhodesia "60,000 whites keep 1.6 million natives in conditions of abject slavery—I cannot call it anything else." Yet Labour had made no move to end such practices. 57


57 Annual Report, 1946, pp. 209-10. (Comments by delegate Mrs. E. Denington.)
This position was far more radical than that of most delegates at this time. Dissent was sufficiently widespread, however, that a resolution passed which, in part, called upon the government to:

- dis-associate this country from financial exploitation of colonial peoples in the East and declare its belief in the right of Eastern peoples to assume the full responsibilities of nationhood irrespective of colour or creed.
- It calls upon the Government to assist the rapid economic, educational and technical development of the Colonies by their own peoples and to work energetically for the freedom of those colonies which desire it.

Speaking for the NEC, Arthur Greenwood defended the government's policy as the fastest way towards independence under the circumstances. He accepted the resolution "in the spirit in which I have spoken and not . . . as a vote of censure." There was no objection from the floor. But the leadership was given notice of rank and file desire that it quicken the tempo towards granting self-rule.

A year later a resolution from the floor again received widespread support. It urged the Colonial Office make clear "to all officials concerned" that the party's goal was "equal status and opportunity (for) the colored races in the Crown Colonies." Again the NEC interpreted the "spirit" of the resolution as being no different from current government policy. Again, the party's leaders were given fair warning they were being urged to move more rapidly.

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58 Ibid.

By 1948 things had quieted. Debate at Scarborough that autumn was limited to a reading of excerpts of Creech Jones' statements to Commons during the Supply Debate and to brief discussion of the proposed Colonial Development Corporation. Neither point encountered meaningful opposition. The rank and file were gaining clearer understanding of the difficulties involved in divesting their nation of its empire while insisting the colonial peoples attain certain levels of sophistication before they be freed.

In May, 1949, Fact, the party's monthly bulletin, issued a deca­logue of post-war achievements. Item nine began:

> The Labour government, believing that all men are brothers and have a natural right to direct their own lives, has given independence (in Asia) and . . . brought about a genuine friendship between East and West that imperialists of the old school would have never thought possible. . . . In almost every British colony, the participation of the local people in the government of their country has been increased.61

The remainder of the item indicated in Africa primary emphasis was still being placed on economic, not political, reform.

The Party Manifesto of that year barely mentioned the colonies, except to say there had been and was "continuing economic social and political progress." Growing fear of communism would seem to have

60 Annual Report, 1948, p. 60.

muted demands for progress by Labour militants. Some discussion took place at the Annual Conference over whether the best way to combat subversion was not by example and reform rather than villification and "red-baiting." The debate was relatively brief, however, and no relevant resolution was proposed.62

Debate remained muted at the Margate Conference of 1950. The sharp setback Labour had suffered at the polls earlier in the year would seem to have turned discussion towards internal problems and domestic reform.

Policy would seem to have jelled for the leadership by the end of 1950. The last of the year's issues of Fact presented a new, more dynamic statement of the need for political change in the colonies. All colonial evolution remained subject to review by Parliament. This meant not "benevolent autocracy" but a dynamic interrelationship. All large colonies now had both a Legislative and an Executive Council. Further progress meant changing the composition of these bodies, step by step, as representative institutions were gradually constructed. Other agencies, such as advisory bodies of tribal chiefs, would be utilized where appropriate. Labour's goal was "a partnership of free people, of advantage to all."63


63 Fact, Vol. 8 (December, 1950), pp. 183-86.
The paternalism of the Conservatives (as to a lesser extent with Labour) was coupled from 1948 with fear of communism and extreme nationalism. Gammans presented his party's position in the 1948 Supply Debate in terms of Britain's duty to continue to maintain its holdings in Africa, even if she put more money into them in aid than she got back in goods. His prime reason was that these colonies, bereft of British aid, must fall victim to "anarchy or ... the hammer and sickle." 64

There are fallacies in this logic. What if a colony preferred anarchy or communism to British occupation? The probable answer would be such a choice would be proof of that country's immaturity. The ironical consequences of such a position may be seen in the arguments of Conservative M.P. Walter Fletcher. To guarantee the colonies had "democracy" rather than "communist terror" Britain should:

> take the (colonials) minds a little off the ideologies, and a little off democratic forms and voting, and do what is much better for the man in the street ... see he can live a decent orderly life without interferences such as ought never to have arisen. 65

In other words, there must be less political freedom, more discipline and order now to insure the reverse could be provided in the future. Such arguments have long been used to justify dictatorships. It should scarcely be surprising some colonials saw this as a ruse by which the

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United Kingdom would try to frighten them into letting her maintain control. The more reforms were made, the more intense became the demand for greater reform.

The agitation level was rising. Stanley warned of a new type of disorder, unconnected to economic or political grievance, hence not subject to being quelled by concessions in those areas. The Colonial Office would seem to have reached a similar conclusion. The moderate British press was beginning to do so also. At this time, most such comments concerned events in The Gold Coast.

This harder line was most evident in Conservative Party publications. In 1945, a party election pamphlet admitted "The charge that Britain has hitherto neglected her Colonies has a measure of truth in it." Although much had been done, greater commitments would have to be made in the future. All colonies "should be given the opportunity of fitting themselves for further political advance."

By autumn, 1947, the party was on the offensive. Their bi-weekly magazine Notes on Current Policies (NCP) denounced Bevan for stating Conservatives had "mouthed 'Empire' for generations and done nothing about it." It was the Socialists who had "derided" empire while "we

66 Ibid., cc. 688-90.

have done much to develop it." Their Annual Conference report that year stated:

This conference, believing that the peace and prosperity, both of these islands and of the world, depend, more than on anything else, on a strong and independent British Empire, calls on the Conservative Party to reaffirm itself the great Imperial Party and to declare a policy furthering the Empire's economic and political unity.

By 1948 the government was being attacked for ignoring imperial defenses. The Party Conference pledged to "assist towards full self-government newly independent countries for which the circumstances of past history made us responsible." It saw the difficulties then being faced by Burma as proof of how foolish it was to "inflict" independence on a colony before it was ready to utilize it. Similar themes appear in NCP articles of the next two years. There were forewarnings of the future in allusions to the perceived need for federation in East and Central Africa.

Oliver Stanley, in a July, 1949 article, expressed joy Labour had finally "seen the light" and now championed the empire it once had

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scorned. The Conservatives possessed the maturity, the consistency of view, and the administrative capability to best perform the imperial task. They regarded the empire as "the supreme achievement of the British people . . . the (world's) most successful experiment in international relations." The party would not let the future of the colonial peoples be jeopardized by "any political movement which sets its own interests above those of the other countries in our great association of nations." (Presumably this could never apply to Britain.) It was "sheer folly" to ignore Soviet expansionism or marxist influences in several colonies, including The Gold Coast. Britain must lead her empire, setting a moral example against this "new barbarism."

Each colony would be permitted to advance politically "in accordance with the best interests of its people and of the Commonwealth as a whole." Stanley remained more progressive than most of his party—even using the term "Commonwealth" as Labour used it.\(^72\) He remained more paternalistic than Labour's leaders. By 1949 he too had reverted somewhat to the 1945 position that steps to independence must not weaken the empire.\(^73\)

He still sounded more flexible than his party's leader. Writing in \textit{NCP} in August, 1949 Churchill reaffirmed Conservative belief in

\(^72\) Later in the same issue he reverted to the more common Conservative usage "self-government within the framework of the British Empire." \textit{Ibid.}, Vol. III #14 (July 18, 1949), pp. 1-10, 16.

traditional "Imperial Policy." A study of economic and social needs was necessary. Gradual progress towards self-government would be permitted as colonies became ready. Meanwhile native participation in the Colonial Service should be increased. But development should be geared towards increased imperial trade. The colonies must further develop their raw materials production so as to help Britain, which "depended . . . for the maintenance of our own standard of life and our own security here upon a united and vigorous Empire and Commonwealth system."74

By the end of 1950 NCP was giving credit to Labour for having done much to develop the more backward colonies. They were still seen to be following the plans laid down by Oliver Stanley. It would be "foolish and incorrect" to say they had done no good of their own. "Under the stimulus and responsibility of office . . . (they had no option but to (abandon) Fabian theories and . . . face realities."75

Actually, events in the colonies themselves had forced both parties to face the kind of reality they had but recently denied. Nationalism was developing among black Africans at a pace few would have thought possible in 1946. It had developed most rapidly in The Gold Coast.

There had been rioting in that colony in 1938. Ten years later, what had begun as an orderly march to the Governor's palace to request

75Ibid., Vol. IV #16 (October 2, 1950), p. 33.
greater benefits by veterans had spread to other sectors, and soon led to widespread looting and disorder. Force was required to suppress it. In the end, 26 blacks were killed; 15 whites and 227 blacks wounded. Over one million pounds were looted, another million "lost" (not including property damage). The nationalist United Gold Coast Congress (UGCC) was blamed. Eight of its leaders were jailed.

M.P.'s on both sides of the aisle expressed shock that dissatisfaction and unrest were so widespread. Many seemed equally disturbed the Governor had reacted by suspending civil liberties and detaining the UGCC leaders without bail.

The Times' Accra correspondent found the rioting and subsequent need to use force "most regrettable." An editorial argued the rapid spread of rioting beyond Accra "hardly could be entirely spontaneous." In part it must be seen as the outcome of "the general economic dislocation of the world since the war." But there were also "less temperate forces at work," especially the newly formed Convention People's Party (CPP) which had split from the UGCC, and was "now influenced by the forcible personality of Kwame Nkrumah." There was no proof of communist involvement, but a full enquiry was needed to evaluate such possibilities.76

The editors of The Guardian were prone to cite the dislocation as

76"The Gold Coast Riots," Times editorial, March 5, 1948, p. 5.
more consequential than the effects of communist influence. Communism was much more likely to "blow upon the flames than light the fire." The Governor was felt to be correct in using force, but the underlying problems remained, and must be solved by other means. This suggestion, written at the time of the rioting, was later borne out by the report of a Royal Commission sent to investigate.

The report vindicated the police action, commended the police chief, and found the Governor had "acted in good faith and reasonably." It laid most blame upon the UGCC and CPP (its "working committee"), which had been "active in promoting every kind of complaint likely to inflame an excitable populace. . . ." Kwame Nkrumah, the CPP Secretary, was especially culpable. The Commission depicted him as a man who:

'appears while in Britain to have had communist affiliations and to have been imbued with a communist ideology which only political expediency has blurred.' In London he was identified particularly with . . . a body which 'appears to be the precursor of a Union of West African Soviet Socialist Republics.'

Not all blame could be laid upon the agitators. The Commission also found deep resentment to high prices and rapid inflation. The government had failed most in taking adequate account of two groups: returned soldiers, frustrated since their wartime experiences under "'different and better conditions,'" and the increasing number of

educated intellectuals who felt "'political frustration.'"\textsuperscript{78}

The report was considered too radical in some circles. M.P. Duncan Sandys, who would one day be Colonial Secretary, wrote a critical letter to The Times. He spoke as a citizen, thereby putting his own views on record without necessarily committing anyone else in his party. He called the Commission "eminently suited" to investigate and report on the causes and responses to the riot, but not suited to express itself on political problems or the need for general reform. His sharpest criticism was directed to the report's attack on the traditional role of the chiefs. The Colonial Secretary, he maintained, was perfectly correct in saying the chiefs remained essential to good government. Indeed, to undermine their position would destroy "the only traditional foundation upon which real progress can be based."

It was very difficult to develop democratic institutions even in Europe, Sandys continued:

\begin{quote}
To suggest that any durable constitutional advance can be made in The Gold Coast other than along African lines is to show complete disregard for local conditions and practical possibilities.
\end{quote}

In the long run, he concluded, the Commission's "uncalled for adventure into the field of political controversy . . . may have done more . . .

\textsuperscript{78}The essence of the Commission report and comments from The Times correspondent are found in an article of August 14, 1948, p. 7. See also "The Aiken Watson Report," editorial, Ibid., p. 3; article, February 23, 1950, p. 8.
harm than the riots."\textsuperscript{79}

This view indicates much of the difficulty in which the United Kingdom would find itself in attempting to establish viable policies for its colonies in future years. There were obvious pitfalls if the people abandoned the old ways. What would replace the traditional foundations? Upon what social fabric could viable democracy be built? Direct rule would also require greater numbers of British administrators, and greater expense to the British government. The chiefs were, by dint of their very traditionalism, if not their dependency upon the colonial regime, usually much more moderate than were the nationalist leaders. They would help Britain fulfill her perceived duty to bring the African into the twentieth century gradually, at a pace the average tribesman could comprehend.

Yet, for these very reasons the nationalists were already breaking with the chiefs. Theirs was the call of the future. Mass political parties would develop in a very short time. Whitehall was thus posed with a serious dilemma. If incremental policy were enforced at the pace the British government had up to now thought correct, there would be growing impatience within the colony. Already there had been one serious miscalculation. Continuation of the present gradualist pace would be used by the extremists in their drive for "Independence—Now!" (the slogan of

\textsuperscript{79}The Times, August 7, 1948, p. 6.
the CPP). In the face of this threat, and in the absence of a significant native settler population, the easiest course to follow was an acceleration of the pace of reform—economic, educational, administrative and political—without formulation of any definite plans for transference of power. Thus the pace was accelerated in accordance with the pragmatic flexibility which characterizes the di strategy.

One could perhaps argue the strategy had given way to a policy of drift prior to the Christenborg riots; that Whitehall had grown overconfident of the security of Britain's position in the colony. Or one could maintain Britain's leaders had utilized an unplanned but natural formulation of the strategy which must now be modified in light of these new events. In either case the strategy would now come into play. Britain would pay greater attention to the redress of grievances its leaders felt to be significant. It would increase the rate with which natives would be brought into the colony's lower civil service echelons. It would hasten programs for development of local elections and local decision-making power. Simultaneously it would increase its educational (propaganda) efforts to explain to The Gold Coast's people the benefits of their life under British tutelage, the nature of the reforms which had taken or would take place, and the danger of listening to Nkrumah and other extremists.

Since the strategy is disjointed, serial and incremental it can be accelerated in a disjointed, serial and incremental manner. It can also be applied without conscious knowledge of its use. It is doubtful anyone
in England had a long-range blueprint for Gold Coast policy. The new techniques would be tried. The policy would be left open-ended. This would provide maximum flexibility and maximum bargaining power. If any Britons of influence urged a specific time-table to be developed for the transference of power, they were not heeded. Most decisions would continue to be made by the colonial Governor and his advisors. Africans would be gradually co-opted into the system. Hopefully this would isolate the radicals.

This position was considered sound by the editors of The Times and The Guardian. The latter paper editorialized that it was the government's duty to remain in the colony until enough people reached a level of sophistication Britons deemed necessary for viable twentieth century rule. Meanwhile the constitution ought to be reshaped so "every African of ability should have a chance to help in government. Anything else will only stimulate national unrest." Yet such a policy may well have been obsolete before it was formulated. The same editorial admitted that the Aiken Watson Commission had found an almost universal belief among western-educated natives that the 1946 Constitution, lauded for its progressiveness in Westminster, was actually designed to "'cover up'" rather than "'advance their natural aspirations.'"80

80"Gold Coast Unrest," Guardian editorial, August 4, 1948, p. 5. (This piece of the report was not in The Times article of the same day.)
One important question raised during this issue was who had final authority in such matters. It was British tradition this power rested exclusively with a colonial Governor unless he requested aid. This was again confirmed by the Speaker's ruling following the 1947 debate on scheduled executions in that colony. The Crown had not totally relinquished power. It retained a reserve power in extraordinary situations, which might only be used upon the advice of the Colonial Secretary.

Creech Jones rose to agree with the Speaker's ruling and suggest this power would be used only in cases far more extreme than the one being discussed. He opposed any legislation permitting British intervention in other instances because this would undercut the authority of the Governor and "seriously impair the administration of justice in the colonies." Decentralization is one of the tenets of the di strategy. Labour would later regret the forcefulness with which it defended this tradition. Some leftist backbenchers already regretted it during the 1948

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81 Early in 1947 Governor Burns sentenced five men to death for a ritual murder for which they had been in prison awaiting final decision for three years. There had been a sharp debate in Commons over the humanity of this act. Churchill had sworn such an act would never have been permitted during his administration. Attlee stated the Governor had final authority in such cases. The Speaker agreed and ruled further debate out of order. The next day the Governor stayed the executions. The Times, March 4, 1947, p. 8; March 6, p. 8; March 11, p. 6. Three were later hung although their case was still on appeal to the Privy Council. Ibid., March 28, p. 8.

82 Ibid., August 12, 1947, p. 3.
rioting.

The same pattern would repeat itself in Nigeria. In November, 1949, demonstrations led to police shootings at the Enugu coal mines. Reactions in Commons are interesting. During debate, the Conservative leaders showed little concern over the use of force. Gammans' chief concerns were to ascertain whether coal production had been impeded, and whether there was any evidence of "outside interference." Anthony Eden, the Shadow Foreign Minister, assured Creech Jones of his party's "full support" in a crisis.83

In the question period a few days earlier, most of the penetrating questions came from the Labour back benches. It is they who wondered if there had been unnecessary police brutality. The most hostile protagonist, Labourite T. E. N. Driberg, reminded that "only three weeks ago" Creech Jones had spoken to all colonial Governors of the need to use humane methods in dispersing demonstrations. There should be a full investigation by His Majesty's government of this deplorable situation.84

Creech Jones' response was as it had been in 1948; the decisions were taken by the Governor. He was the man best able to assess the situation. It was not Colonial Office policy to intervene in such matters. Whoever made the decisions it is clear the political development of that

84 Ibid. (November 23), cc. 359-62.
colony was more rapid after 1950.

Unrest in Kenya was also beginning to emerge. There were reports of demonstrations there shortly after the 1948 rioting in The Gold Coast. The government assured the underlying motives were religious, not political.85 (The distinction would become meaningless during the Mau Mau rebellion which fused the two concepts into an anti-European doctrine.) In May, 1949, came the first reports settlers in the White Highlands were being harrassed.86

In July, 1949 a Kenya newspaper was banned. Colonial Under-Secretary Rees-Williams again argued such decisions depended upon the decision of the Governor. As colonies received more self-government, they must receive greater power to make their own decisions, without "interference from Whitehall on every little detail."87 The rub, of course, was that more self-government still meant national legislative majorities appointed by, and loyal to, the Governor.

But the primary focus remained west Africa. As late as June, 1949, The Times could speak of the principal need for political reform, even there, as being at the village level. This, after all, was where

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85Ibid., Vol. 448 (March 17, 1948), cc. 2067-68.

86Ibid., Vol. 464 (May 11, 1949), cc. 1839-40. The term White Highlands refers to land in the fertile high areas which was legally reserved for exclusive settler usage.

87Ibid., Vol. 467 (July 27, 1949), cc. 2468-70. Azikiwe's nationalist movement was suppressed by the Governor in 1950.
ninety-five percent of the people lived. Of the two main colonies, the
solution appeared easier in Nigeria. Leaders of the three major tribes
(comparable to the three major regions) all agreed that there should be
development of regional government prior to creation of an independent
nation-state. Reform, The Times maintained, had been set afoot "purely
on the initiative of the government. The demand for it, although it exists,
was not compelling." Dr. Azikiwe, "the extremist nationalist leader"
could be held in check since he represented only the Eastern Ibos.
Leaders of the western Yorubas were more moderate; those of the northern
tribes were scarcely even interested in rapid political change. Britain
was expected to have many years in which to develop a gradual transition
of power.

Conditions in The Gold Coast were different. There was less
agreement over whether the colony should move towards national or
federal government. This set the north and Ashanti (which favored
regionalism) against the majority of the nationalist leaders (who came
from the coast). For the most part the nationalists were also in opposition
to the chiefs. Africans could not attain their goals without European aid
but, in the eyes of The Times' editors, "a most unfortunate situation"
had developed. The British were the government; the Africans in the
legislature formed the opposition. This would create stalemate.

Viewed in that light, all talk of Britain's story in West Africa
lasting 10, 50 or 100 years is beside the point. The length of
the transitional period can only be measured in terms of the efficacy of the methods employed from now on by both races working in unison.\textsuperscript{88}

It is not surprising, then, that from mid-1949 until Labour lost office in 1951 most of the interest of Britons in Africa was focused upon The Gold Coast. In light of the furor caused by the Aiken Watson report a second Commission was sent to review economic, social, and political conditions in the colony. Headed by distinguished jurist Lord Coussey, the Commission broke precedent in that it was composed entirely of black Africans. At least in British eyes, this greatly enhanced its prestige and the weight of its findings.\textsuperscript{89} Nkrumah publicly denounced them as inadequate, and refused to promise to work within the limits the Commission suggested if he gained public office. In reaction The Times' editors denounced him in language rarely found in a newspaper known throughout the world for its objectivity.\textsuperscript{90} A few months later the paper blamed the Christenborg riots upon his poor judgment which had led him to lend his name in their support.\textsuperscript{91}

In the process of focusing on the radicalism of Nkrumah and his CPP The Times had moved significantly leftward of its own former editorial

\textsuperscript{88}"Nationalism in West Africa," \textit{The Times}, June 14, 1949, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{89}\textit{The Times}, July 2, 1949, p. 3; October 25, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{90}Ibid., July 2, 1949, p. 3. Of all Africa's leaders, only Jomo Kenyatta received such bad editorial treatment.
\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., October 29, 1949, p. 3.
position. It now contrasted Nkrumah's radical views with the moderation of the Coussey Commission report. Yet that report contained suggestions far more radical than anything The Times had been willing to endorse in earlier editorials.\textsuperscript{92}

The same shift is evident in the paper's assessment of personalities. In March, 1948, Dr. Danquah, the leader of the UGCC, was placed in the same category as Nkrumah: persons whose arrest was justified as imposition of "a quarantine . . . on people who have caught a dangerous infectious disease." Now Danquah's demand for "freedom in the shortest possible time" was viewed as a restrained request to be seriously negotiated. The reason for the switch in editorial position is almost certainly that Danquah did now seem moderate when contrasted with Nkrumah, his associates in the CPP, and their demand for "Freedom—Now!" Events within the colony must therefore be seen as the primary cause for the radicalization of attitudes within influential British circles. Within the strictures of the di strategy pressures from the colony to move at an ever quickening pace towards independence, unmatched by equally strong pressures to the contrary in The Gold Coast or in Great Britain, forced the British to accept an acceleration of their own willingness to

\textsuperscript{92}It called, for example, for an uneven native majority in the colonial Legislative Council, a step The Times had previously denounced. Now the editors called the report "progressive but responsible." \textit{Ibid.}, July 2, 1949, p. 3.
discuss a more rapid divestment of power to the colony. 93

1950 was an election year. A sharply reduced Labour majority took office in March. A general Cabinet shakeup followed. James Griffiths became Colonial Secretary. A post of Colonial Minister was added to those of Secretary and Under-Secretary, reflecting the increased importance attached to the Colonial Office. In that year's Supply Debate for Colonial Affairs African matters again were dominant. There were three recurrent themes: growing black nationalism (amidst growing settler recalcitrance), native demands for political change at a pace more rapid than economic change would seem to justify, and the fear of communism as a doctrine which might appeal to the frustrated, illiterate black masses. 94

Even now there were some Conservative M.P.'s who spoke as if it was inconceivable Commons could speak of black Africans ruling themselves. Sir Ian Fraser (raised in South Africa) still defined racial brotherhood as the duty of the white race to protect the black. To speak of independence, even in the remote future, was to raise false hopes since

93 _Ibid._ , March 15, 1948, p. 3. A similar move leftward may be seen in _The Guardian's_ editorials. See e.g. October 26, 1949, p. 4.

"the primitive man does not understand anything which is not to happen to him immediately." G. Beresford Craddock was even more condescending. Africans were "a very great people . . . kindly, lovable (with) a great sense of humour. Above all they (were) loyal to the British people." This could be illustrated by remembering how the Tanganyikans preferred "Bwana King George" to their earlier rulers "Bwana Boche." 95

Even if we minimize these as the views of the extreme right wing, Conservative attitudes in general were, if anything, less tolerant of rapid political development than they had been the previous year. In part the change can be understood as a consequence of altered events. Britain continued to face balance of payments deficits. Even after one discounted "socialist blunders" Tory M.P.'s were hard pressed to explain the degree to which the United Kingdom continued to have an unfavorable balance of trade. Until this situation was rectified, many argued, it would be folly to permit segments of the empire with favorable dollar-to-sterling balances to become independent. Among the most lucrative of dollar surplus colonies was The Gold Coast. Some M.P.'s went still further. They referred to CD&W fund aid as "charity" and expressed resentment that so much money was being so allocated while the standard of living remained

95 *Hansard*, Vol. 477 (July 12, 1950), c. 1414 (Fraser), cc. 1442-43 (Craddock).
unsatisfactory at home.  

Conservatives also criticized promises of independence to colonies deemed important to the Commonwealth's defense perimeter. Gammans, for example, protested Labour's failure to emphasize the right to self-government would not come with "no strings attached." Imperial security must be a factor. Eden agreed he would deny self-rule to any colony vital to British defenses. The colonial peoples must work closely with the United Kingdom, he suggested. Together they could attain mutual prosperity and help insure world peace. They could achieve neither separately. Most colonials understood this, he said, but there was a "claimant minority" which in some areas controlled the press, giving the people a distorted idea of British aims and the British an equally distorted view of the colonials' desires. The "larger, less vocal element" Eden insisted, was loyal and did not seek independence at this time. (He could offer no proof of this except the minority was often of "another race, religion or culture" than the multitude.)

96 Ibid., cc. 1426, 1460-62, 1466. There would seem to be a fundamental inconsistency in the attitude of men like Dodds-Parker, who called British aid charity, yet admitted sixty to seventy percent of all British post-war dollar earnings came from colonies which received much less than this amount back in CD&W funds. (See cc. 1463-64.)

97 The fact that the Shadow Foreign Minister led the Conservative side in this debate is clear indication how important colonial affairs had come to seem in these days shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea.
Even moderate, responsible Conservatives of prominence, such as Lennox-Boyd and Selwyn Lloyd, declared black Africans totally unprepared for self-rule and urged censorship of the inflammatory press. Eden stopped short of this, but demanded the government counteract such papers by increasing the output of the "responsible information" found in its own press, the state-owned radio, and the Official Gazette. The Conservative position was perhaps best summarized by Lennox-Boyd's comment that:

... The future destiny of the British Colonies is self-government within and not outside the British Empire. We believe that nothing else can be contemplated in the world as it is today.

What emerged from this debate was a contemporary Conservative variant of the "white man's burden": the African must be saved from black despotism, even if this meant Britain must act contrary to the expressed will of the native electorate, which, being so unsophisticated, might act in ways it would later regret. To buttress such arguments, Eden quoted Gold Coast leader Danquah, now considered a "moderate," who had recently warned that Africans might soon have to choose between "white imperialism or a black dictatorship." Of course there was no doubt in Eden's mind the former was the more benevolent alternative. Yet

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99 Ibid., cc. 1393 (Eden); 1430 (Gammans); 1482 (Lennox-Boyd).

100 Ibid., cc. 1387-88.
events might be taking the latter course. The Gold Coast was preparing for its first general election and Nkrumah's CPP was expected to do well. 101

Labour's leaders were sensitive to several of the opposition's points. Colonial Secretary Griffiths insisted he needed no reminder of The Gold Coast's "dollar earning and dollar saving" capacity. Colonial Minister Dugdale stated it was Britain's intention to retain these advantages. Throughout the debate there was no hint anyone considered the possibility The Gold Coast would be independent in seven years. 102

Real inter-party differences were also in evidence. Labour continued to refer to potential Commonwealth status for all important colonies; Conservatives still reserved this term for the present members and a few possible later additions such as Southern Rhodesia. Labourites were less likely to express concern that some present colonies might opt for independence outside the Commonwealth. Labour—especially its more radical members—was less likely to associate aid with the need to ward off communism, more likely to feel aid was a right the colonial regimes deserved to receive. Sorenson, for example, hotly rejected any notion

101 Colony-wide local elections had already been held. Eden charged there had been inadequate safeguard of the secret ballot. Besides, many voters had shown in interviews they were incapable of voting wisely. They sounded "very much like (voters in) the eighteenth century hustings here."

102 Ibid., Vol. 477 (July 12, 1950), cc. 1369 (Griffiths); 1489-90 (Dugdale).
aid was charity. Britain, he stated, gave "only a small proportion of its economic resources which (the colonies) are using for these purposes."

There was but one exception to the above Socialist position. Curiously, this was Thomas Reid. The man who two years earlier was most ready to abandon the empire now would give priority to suppression of "black racism" and "insidious communism" so reform could have value. ¹⁰³

The government seemed to have grown bolder in defending its policy of measured but real political progress. Griffiths admitted his new position had brought "a fuller realization . . . of the immense responsibilities that are ours for the well-being of the Colonial Territories and their people." His program sounded much the same as his predecessor's. Economically the goal was to "seek to build, in every one of the territories, a stable economy by . . . safeguarding the natural wealth . . . and most important, by diversifying . . . so that development is not lopsided . . ." ¹⁰⁴

Politically one must recognize there had already been "unspectacular but widespread and important progress" especially in "development of local institutions." Such changes must be completed before the next stage could begin. The goal remained:

¹⁰³Ibid., cc. 1398-99 (Eden); 1412 (A. Edward Davies); 1419-21 (M. Phillips Price); 1466 (Sorenson); 1400-05 (Reid).

¹⁰⁴Ibid., cc. 1368-69. External analysis indicates most CD&W funds were being poured into Africa. A chart from The Economist,
to guide the Colonial Territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth, and to that end, to assist them to the utmost of our capacity and resources to establish those economic and social conditions upon which alone self-government can be soundly based. 105

Differences in the two parties' attitudes were real. Inter-party differences, in this instance, were considerably greater than was intra-party dissent. In part one can no doubt attribute this to the historic role of the two parties; the greater commitment of the Conservatives to the empire, and their more pragmatic, less idealistic approach to the relative merits of the needs of Africans versus those of Englishmen. The leftist orientation of most emerging black African leaders would tend to further

Vol. 158 (June 10, 1950), p. 1266 reveals the following information:

alienate most Conservatives.

In part the inter-party differences also probably reflect the different outlook of the parties in and out of power. Five years out of office sharply reduced the Conservative frontbenchers' knowledge of political realities in the colonies. We are borne out in our earlier hypothesis the Conservative front bench would move incrementally in the direction of its backbenchers (in this instance to the right). This might be explained in terms of the ideological tendency of the front benches when not tempered by the realities of pragmatic power politics. It may also reflect the desire of the party leaders to mollify back bench opinion. (Again this is more easily done when in opposition for it is then less necessary to balance these opinions against other pressures brought to bear upon the government.) The tendency of the party leadership to react in this manner may itself be viewed as occurring in a gradual, disjointed, and incremental manner, perhaps in keeping with the "broker mentality" associated with most of those who attain leadership positions in Britain. Other evidence, presented later in this dissertation, indicates Labour's leaders underwent a similar leftwards attitude deviation over the years following their loss of power.

Nothing we have mentioned quite prepares one for the tremendous conviviality which epitomized the special debate following the 1951 Gold
Coast elections. As expected Nkrumah's CPP won overwhelming victory. Contrary to expectation, the voting took place in a fair, even exemplary fashion. 106

Up to a short time before the elections, the CPP and its imprisoned leader continued to be vilified in the British press. 107 Only two weeks before the elections Gammans moved in Commons that Nkrumah be declared ineligible, as a convicted criminal, to take public office.

But no political settlement could be reached in the colony without accepting the electoral realities. The CPP refused to assume office unless Nkrumah became "leader of government business." Within forty-eight hours, he was released from prison, ostensibly as an act of gubernatorial clemency. The Governor, of course, had no alternative. Two weeks later he met with the CPP leader and named him majority leader of the Legislative Council. Within another month Nkrumah had justified the British gamble. He ceased to charge the new constitution was "fraudulent," and urged instead that his followers show patience and work for reconciliation with Britain, so independence could be attained in

106 The CPP polled over 90 percent of the municipal vote, over 67 percent of the rural vote in every section of the country. For details of election procedures see The Economist, Vol. 160 (February 3, 1951), pp. 265-66; Hansard, Vol. 480 (November 8, 1950), c. 61; Vol. 482 (December 6), cc. 354-55.

the shortest possible time. 108

Even before Nkrumah's volte face, Parliament had resigned itself to the inevitability of his becoming government leader, and determined to make the best of it. A debate took place on February 19 in response to Labour backbencher James Johnson's motion Commons send its best wishes to the new Gold Coast regime prior to the convening of the empire's first black majority Cabinet.

There were some Conservatives who objected to having such a debate, but only on the procedural grounds it had been improperly scheduled. Perhaps this served as an excuse to hide reluctance to express support of the Nkrumah government, but no M.P. on either side of the aisle expressed such sentiments. Nor was anything hostile said about the colony's ruling party or its leader. A few speeches contained expressions of praise with "a but in it." 109 The strongest disclaimer made this night, however, was C. J. Alport's warning that in "setting up a constitution . . . we are not necessarily insuring its success." 110

It is hard to believe Nkrumah had made converts of all those who


109 This charge, made by Labourite Hector Hughes, appears to have been an accurate assessment of several of the evening's speeches. Hansard, Vol. 484 (February 19, 1951), cc. 946-47.

110 Ibid., c. 929.
but recently had so bitterly opposed him. More likely, all speakers were sufficiently pragmatic to see little use in criticizing a fait accompli. Nkrumah's party had won fairly conducted elections. He must be recognized as the legitimate leader of The Gold Coast's legislature. He must be treated with respect, in hope he could be persuaded to see the wisdom of the ruling power's moderation. Success or failure here might have profound implications upon Britain's relationships with its other African colonies. Those British M.P.'s who could not refrain from making adverse comments simply did not speak on this night. The rest shared A. C. Lennox-Boyd's "lively hope that (the colony's) political leaders will rise to the great responsibilities with which they are now confronted. We shall be watching with the closest and most sympathetic interest..."\textsuperscript{111}

The members of Parliament were beginning to realize their government was no longer able to solely determine the pace of progress among its African possessions. Griffiths, near the end of the Labour years, frankly suggested as much when he said:

\begin{quote}
We know perfectly well (the colonies) have not had the experience of democratic government which we have had. But we had to begin too. They, no doubt, will make mistakes. We made mistakes too.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

This would appear to have become the official view concerning The Gold Coast. Griffiths spoke of the new government as "the best answer to

\textsuperscript{111}Ibid., c. 950.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., Vol. 480 (November 3, 1950), cc. 521, 525.
those who accuse us of being imperialists." To cries of "Hear! Hear!" he especially praised George Wigg as one who early realized the so-called "backward areas" were now "reaching out towards the future."

All should join in congratulating the new regime.\textsuperscript{113}

The same transition occurred in the editorials of the two newspapers.

Even before Nkrumah took office The Guardian would suggest, editorially, that:

\ldots if political power brings responsibility and a real effort to make the \ldots constitution work Mr. Nkrumah and his colleagues may earn an honored place in history.\textsuperscript{114}

The Times took a bit longer to come round. By June it was running in-depth feature articles explaining the new constitutional structure in the colony. These were highly objective, and free of any political or personal attacks on the new regime.\textsuperscript{115}

Within a few months Labour would be defeated. When it regained power, in 1964, the process of imperial dissolution in Africa was virtually complete. The process of dissolution would primarily occur during the years of Conservative government. As the events of this Chapter have shown, many of the required early steps in this process were undertaken during Labour's six years in office. The Labour government showed no

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid., Vol. 484 (February 19, 1951), cc. 961-65.

\textsuperscript{114}"Kwame Nkrumah," \textit{Guardian} editorial, February 13, 1951, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{115}"The Gold Coast on Trial," \textit{The Times}, Part I, June 4, 1951, p. 5; Part II, June 5, p. 5.
great rush to divest itself of its African possessions. Its policy towards colonial Africa was an incremental and remedial acceleration of, not a major change from, the policies of the National government which preceded it. Nonetheless the evidence indicates it was somewhat more willing than the Conservatives, especially after 1948, to move in ways which would ease transition of west Africa, at least, towards sovereignty at some time in the foreseeable future. It was much more willing to grant independence to the colonies of southern Asia, which in turn, stimulated nationalist movements in Africa. It was less committed to the idea of British imperial greatness, more willing to at least contemplate independence for colonies which provided Britain with a balance of trade surplus or a military base. For all these reasons the extent of aid and reform and the pace of the move towards self-government almost certainly proceeded more rapidly in the 1946-51 period than it would have if the Conservatives had been in power during these years.

But as Chapter III dispelled the notion Labour was intrinsically anti-imperialist so this Chapter ought to dispel one's belief Labour moved rapidly towards dissolution of Britain's African holdings. When its term of office ended, The Gold Coast was the only African territory which had attained a substantial measure of internal self-government it had not possessed in 1946.

The pace of independence would continue to accelerate after Labour lost power. Actual divestment of British power would occur at a speed
considerably in excess of even the plans drawn up by the Labour Colonial Secretary. Changing world conditions and changing conditions in the colonies would cause an acceleration of this pace. We shall review this in the Chapters to follow, and attempt to ascertain one extent to which this acceleration correlates the pattern envisaged by the di strategy.

Once the date for independence had been promised, there was little leeway left for incremental shifts in British policy. The Gold Coast's electorate gave Nkrumah sufficient support in 1956 so Britain felt it had no choice but to grant his country its freedom along lines basically in accordance with those desired by the CPP leadership. However much it might have come to regret its position during the final months preceding transfer of sovereignty, the British had no choice but to proceed along the prescribed path. Failure to do so might well have led to violence in the colony. Violence is the very thing a di strategy is designed to render unnecessary. There were critical statements about Ghana's internal policy raised during the 1960 debate on its application for republican status. Leaders of both parties warned this was useless if not harmful. Britain could antagonize Ghana. It could not, however, refuse in any meaningful sense to grant her the status her leaders desired and her people had voted for. There could be no use for di in such a situation. The same applies to the debate over republican status for Nigeria three years later. In this instance, in fact, the debate was almost ludicrous, since the country became a republic before the act approving the change
reached Commons for Second Reading. There was absolutely no possibility that debate could do more than air respective M.P.'s views.
CHAPTER V

FROM THE CONSERVATIVE VICTORY OF 1951

TO GHANA'S INDEPENDENCE IN 1957

In 1938 Lord Hailey made a statement which appears reflective of the di mentality. "'It is not in the British tradition,'" he said, "'to explore far reaching constitutional issues until the force of circumstances makes it essential to do so.'" But circumstances in her African colonies were making it increasingly essential the United Kingdom reassess her policies there. It is perhaps too easy for the type of policy enunciated by Hailey to disintegrate from di to drift. In any case, many African nationalists would seem to have so interpreted it. This type of policy statement, suggest Kohn and Sokolsky, was of the type which "made African blood boil."¹ The 1951 Conservative victory made some African nationalists fearful there would be even less likelihood of British initiative in the years to come. They determined to increase the pressure for change in their colonies. They would appear to have been successful to the extent that, whatever private reservations the Churchill government had toward the pace of change Labour had followed, that pace was

¹Kohn and Sokolsky, African Nationalism, p. 29.
maintained and, in many instances, soon accelerated.

Ironically, despite the intense dislike for Kwame Nkrumah evinced by most Tories prior to 1951, The Gold Coast was now called a showplace of British policy achievement in Africa. CPP-initiated reforms received bipartisan Commons support.

In part, Nkrumah capitalized upon the growing national awareness within his colony. He had the right prerequisites for this task. His orientation and background were political, as opposed to professional. He grasped the meaning of the Watson and Coussey reports, realizing the British felt obligated to alleviate conditions causing widespread unrest, and to prove their good will by initiating national elections. With the aid of young, western-trained radicals, Nkrumah organized his CPP into a powerful party with broad appeal. Once he seized the initiative he never relinquished it.

Yet, by working closely with the Governor and the colonial administrators, he was able to retain their goodwill. There were several instances when corruption and intrigue were revealed within the ranks of CPP leadership, but the party leader was always able to clear his own name. In practice, he had abandoned "Freedom--Now!" for the policy of the UGCC, which he had once denounced for its moderation. But while he now argued for "Freedom in the shortest possible time," he could effectively warn that, unless his demands were met, he would be replaced by the more radical younger leaders of his party. Whatever doubts the men
in Whitehall privately held about the viability of the colony's economy and the stability of its leadership, both British parties became publicly committed to moving The Gold Coast towards independence as rapidly as its people could be prepared to accept it. The real question soon became not so much whether the colony would be granted independence but what kind of government the colony would evolve prior to independence. The CPP insisted upon strong central government. The opposition, mainly from the less developed regions and the chiefs, wanted a federation with broad devolution of powers to the regions.

Kenneth Kirkwood, writing of British policy in 1965, stated:

At each stage it became clearer that a strong centralist government was the objective and that little consideration would be given to regional, ethnic and cultural traditions.

This is easy to conclude in hindsight. It would not seem to have been clearly decided that this would be British policy during the 1951-56 period. Indeed, the failure of the United Kingdom to make a firm early decision of this nature led to a policy of vacillation which raised false hopes among Nkrumah's opponents and perhaps made it more difficult for the country to proceed with nation-building after formal independence was

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2 The world price of cocoa, the main source of foreign revenue for the colony, began to drop after 1954. It never recovered. For the effects of this see Fitch and Oppenheimer, "Ghana," Chapters 3 and 6.


4 Kirkwood, Britain and Africa, p. 80.
attained. Here again there would seem to be a wavering between a clear strategy and a policy of mere drift and reaction to external events.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of constitutional development in The Gold Coast during the first three years of Conservative rule was that it was discussed so rarely in Commons. There are occasions when the absence of discussion might well be as significant as its presence. We believe this to be true of the absence of lengthy debate about The Gold Coast from 1951-53. Labour, in general, seemed quite satisfied with the pace at which the colony was being moved towards self-rule. In fact Labourites found Gold Coast policy one of the few for which they could give praise to Colonial Secretary Oliver Lytton. If some Conservatives felt that pace too rapid they expressed their reservations privately.

Early in 1952 Nkrumah was formally elevated to the post of Prime Minister. His rank was second only to that of the Governor. He would hereafter be consulted before any new colonial Cabinet appointments were made. A short time earlier one might have expected such an announcement to be controversial. Now it was stated as one of the Oral Answers of the day, with no objection from either side of the aisle.5

The following day Commons learned recruitment of District Commissioners had been limited to Africans since the summer of 1951. These

5Hansard, Vol. 497 (March 5, 1952), cc. 424-25.
were now to be renamed "government agents," and were to be aided by a cadre of exclusively native lesser executive officers. 6 On May 30 Hopkinson told Commons the two governments had agreed that British civil servants would "be needed for some time to come" and that Nkrumah had officially requested all currently in his country to remain until Africans were properly trained to replace them. 7 One can only speculate whether similar announcements by a Labour government would have brought objections from Conservatives. The reverse was not the case.

The only angry note we found in debate on The Gold Coast between 1951 and 1954 was George Wigg's general comment the colonial government must be wary of "arousing in the minds and hearts of the people of the Colonies, especially of The Gold Coast, passions and hopes of self-government at a stage when other people believe that they are not yet ready for it." 8 (This objection could be applied equally, of course, to British M.P.'s--especially left wing Labour--with whom Wigg was himself closely associated.)

Other expressions of dissatisfaction were made occasionally by left-oriented Labourites who felt the colony was not proceeding towards

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6Ibid., March 6, c. 86. (Underlined pagination applies to the Written Answers sections of Hansard, which is italicized in that work.)

7Ibid., Vol. 501 (May 30, 1952), cc. 199-200.

8Ibid., Vol. 503 (July 17, 1952), Supply Debate: Colonial Affairs, cc. 2345-461. See cc. 2413-14.
independence rapidly enough. In the 1953 Debate on the Queen's Address, for example, the sole dissident vote came from Fenner Brockway, who was "profoundly disappointed" there was no promise to raise the colony to the dominion status—virtually full internal self-rule—already enjoyed by Southern Rhodesia. He asked, rhetorically, whether the real problem was not that the colony was not ready, but the fear South African would veto the motion.\(^9\)

At the end of 1953 a debate took place on a motion by Griffiths expressing "grave disquiet" at the government's policy in colonial Africa. More will be said of this debate later. The point to be made here is that The Gold Coast was about the only important British colony for which Labour expressed no objection to the way matters had been handled, probably because this was one of the few colonies where Conservatives had continued and incrementally expanded policies introduced by the previous government, and where a relatively rapid and smooth transition to independence was seemingly taking place.\(^10\)

In April, 1954, the Colonial Minister informed the House the two governments had reached agreement on a new constitution granting The Gold Coast full internal self-government, subject only to a last-resort

\(^9\)Ibid., Vol. 520 (November 4, 1953), cc. 271-73.

\(^10\)Some Conservatives objected that Labour criticized policy it opposed but refused to praise it when it approved. Ibid., Vol. 522 (December 16, 1953), cc. 452 (John Peyton); 507 (Harold Macmillan). At least one Labour M.P. did express such praise. (Ibid., c. 492 Frank Soskice.)
gubernatorial or British veto. This was the final step before complete independence. Again there were no objections from either side of the aisle. Several Labourites expressed thanks and offered a tribute to those from both countries who had achieved this result. Among them was Shadow Secretary Griffiths.  

The Times and The Guardian had also come to see developments in The Gold Coast as among the most hopeful in the empire. Again, presumably in line with the policy that good news is no news, significant editorials on progress in that colony were virtually absent in the 1952-56 period.

This was also generally true of the party organs, which scarcely mentioned the progress being made in the colony during 1952 and 1953. General elections took place in 1954. They were, for the most part, again conducted in an orderly and fair manner. The CPP won an overwhelming victory, carrying even Ashanti and the Northern Territories, the strongholds of the opposition.  

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The government had shown itself capable


12 The CPP was well organized and well financed. The opposition was not unified, and tended to subdivide along religious and tribal lines. The CPP also had the advantage of being the government. It had superior press coverage. And it had the dynamic, almost legendary Nkrumah at its helm. The man, the party, and the drive towards independence were becoming nearly synonymous in the minds of many citizens. In the June, 1954 elections, the CPP won seventy-one seats, the combined opposition thirty-three seats. The largest opposition party (NPP) elected only twelve M.P.'s.
and popular. "The overall record was sufficiently successful to mystify right-wing Tories, to satisfy sympathetic Socialists, and to horrify white settlers in South, Central, and East Africa."13

Yet opposition to the CPP was intense, almost visceral, among many elements within the colony. The party leadership, as mentioned, was comprised mainly of elements hostile to the traditional ruling elements and to the desires of Ashanti and the Northern Territories for a greater than equal share of revenues so their populations could catch up economically and educationally with those of the Crown Colony. The leaders of the other areas feared an independent Ghana ruled by the CPP would relegate them to a perpetually inferior status. Increasingly they came to see retention of the moderating influence of the British presence as their best hope for attaining equal rights and equal status. The previous history of the colony (prior to the British arrival) suggests these fears and hopes were quite reasonable.14 Events after independence further confirm this, as we shall indicate in a future Chapter. Now we shall limit ourselves to assessing events following the 1954 elections.

The overwhelming CPP victory gave it sufficient strength (given its near perfect party discipline) to get the two-thirds vote needed to pass constitutional changes after independence. The opposition panicked. It

13^Race and Power, p. 50.
14^Ibid., pp. 39-42.
appealed to the Governor and, through letters and informal meetings, directly to British officials and M.P.'s. They demanded a federal constitution, with wide areas of regional autonomy, and regional powers to veto certain types of federal governmental acts. They also demanded new elections and promulgation of a new constitutional assembly before the colony was granted its independence.

Whitehall was faced with a new dilemma. Prior to this time, the pace at which the colony moved towards self-rule had been gradually accelerated under pressures which came primarily from the emergent elements within the colony. The flexibility of the di type of administration was such that this acceleration could easily be permitted so long as it appeared the transition was working smoothly and so long as no real objection arose. Few Conservative M.P.'s would attempt to deny the surprising ability Nkrumah had shown to rule effectively and to speed the colony forward at a pace which prior British administrators had felt to be beyond the capacity of the native population to absorb. Many Labour M.P.'s had expressed satisfaction with the Tory policy towards this colony. This was no doubt useful at a time when the government was being condemned for its policies in other parts of the African empire.

But now there was adverse reaction within the colony itself. The broker mentality made the government desire to be fair to all major interests. Besides, it recognized the legitimacy of the opposition's fears. The British needed little reminder of the potential within the CPP
for radical, irresponsible action once they were gone. Yet Britain had
given its public pledge the colony would be granted full sovereignty in
1957. There remained elements within the CPP leadership which believed
Nkrumah had become too accommodating. They might well use an announce-
ment of delay as a pretext to replace him and begin mass action campaigns
to force the British out.

Whitehall compromised. Elections would be held in July, 1956. If
the CPP won a "significant" victory (a term not otherwise defined)
independence would be granted the following March. The opposition
united into a single party (NLM) for the first time. A few regional groups
also ran candidates. The CPP won fifty-seven percent of the vote. It
won seventy-two of the one hundred and four legislative seats (more than
a two-thirds majority). It failed, however to win a majority of the vote in
any region except the Crown Colony. The CPP declared victory; the
opposition insisted the election proved the need for regional government.
The British decided that since the CPP won at least forty percent of the
vote in every region it had proven itself the only party capable of ruling
an independent Ghana effectively. It also realized regionalism could
create virtually insoluble strains upon the new state. Some dissident
leaders were talking openly of secession. The Gold Coast economy,
already hurt by falling world cocoa prices, could not withstand loss of
any part of the area under British rule.

Again Whitehall attempted compromise. It promised independence
would be granted on the date previously set. In private talks Nkrumah was urged to grant many of the regional powers the opposition demanded. Despite some opposition within CPP leadership ranks, Nkrumah did accept most of these demands. Eight of nine powers requested by the NLM (all except regional police forces) would be incorporated into the new constitution. Moreover, decisions of the Legislative Council would be subject to nullification if rejected by two-thirds vote in any three of the five regional assemblies. In return for these concessions, the British refused to accept NLM demands for a further delay in granting independence, or for additional safeguards such as changing the constitutional requirement for amendment from two-thirds to three-quarters of the votes in the federal parliament.

There no doubt remained concern as to the viability of democracy in the soon-to-be-created state of Ghana. This was sharply intensified by the findings of a British Royal Commission sent to investigate NLM charges of improper government activities. It found many of the charges relating to "bribery, corruption, nepotism and inefficiency in the Cocoa Purchasing Company" to be "fully justified." There was evidence company officials had been pressured and bribes had been made during the 1956 election campaign. Worse, certain government officials, including Nkrumah, appeared to have been personally involved in making policy for this theoretically autonomous public corporation. The Times correspondent reported these findings had had little visible effect on the voters' loyalty
to the CPP. This pointed to the existence of "a somewhat different standard of values from those obtaining in a politically more mature community."¹⁵

It is unlikely British officials were happy with the prospect full independence would soon be granted to a colony so torn by internal dissent and scandal. Yet they now had little choice but to proceed with their pledge. Viable incremental alternatives could no longer be implemented. The timetable for divestment of power had been made public. To renege now would be to reject the desires of the majority of the colonial electorate. It would cause potentially violent reaction in the colony. It would serve notice to nationalists in other colonies that Britain could not be relied upon to keep her word.¹⁶

On August 3, 1956, the Gold Coast Assembly officially approved the government bill calling upon Great Britain to grant independence, as pledged, on March 6, 1957. The vote was seventy-two to zero. The entire opposition had walked out. Its leaders now demanded the right of any region to secede if its people so desired. This was certainly an inauspicious beginning for a new nation constitutionally dedicated to

¹⁵"The Birth of Ghana," *Times* editorial, September 19, 1956, p. 9. The *Times* correspondent appears to have spoken more in sorrow than in anger, in recognition of the fact it was too late for Britain to reverse its policy.

democratic liberalism and the rule of law.

The British House of Commons met to debate the independence bill in December. Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd admitted he was "acutely disturbed" by recent events in the colony; especially the deterioration of inter-party trust so essential to a viable democratic regime. Yet the electorate had expressed itself in a freely cast vote, and Her Majesty's government had pledged to abide by that decision. Besides, Nkrumah had acted in a statesmanlike manner for six years, despite pressures from within his party to declare unilateral independence. Britain owed him a debt which must now be paid.

Creech Jones, spokesman for the opposition, agreed. It was hoped that despite "very real" differences among parties and sections in the colony, trust would develop over time. Ghana would undoubtedly play a leading role in future African affairs. As this was the first black colony to attain independence, it was especially important she keep cordial ties with Britain and the Commonwealth. For Britain to refuse to grant self-rule now would be to play into the hands of the Soviet Union and other nations accusing her of still practicing "nineteenth century colonialism."\(^\text{17}\)

Both front benches further agreed the colony required a strong central government to be viable. Partition, the Under-Secretary insisted,

\(^\text{17}\)Hansard, Vol. 562 (December 11, 1956), cc. 315, 323-24 (Lennox-Boyd); 307, 311 and Ibid., Vol. 560 (November 13, 1956), c. 764 (Creech Jones).
would "cripple" the new nation before it began. Creech Jones agreed. Despite the lack of trust between the regions, all groups must realize national unity was "required to make a success of this venture." The NLM would "carry a grave responsibility" if, by its actions, it reduced the chances of that success. The future fate of the continent might well be affected.  

Since there was no bill before the floor there was no division. M.P.'s were free to speak their minds. Most of the fourteen backbenchers who spoke that night took the opportunity to wish the new nation well, and praise the United Kingdom for its enlightened policies. The first black-led colony was about to be admitted into the Commonwealth. The speakers praising this event included both long time supporters of such a policy and some who had once expressed grave doubts Ghana could run its own affairs in this century. R. W. Sorenson was especially eloquent in his praise of the policies Britain had followed towards her imperial possessions. He contrasted the steady progress of The Gold Coast with the recent suppression of liberalism in Hungary. (He politely failed to mention Suez.) He recognized the continuing need for help from Britain but urged all elements within the colony to subordinate fears and work together.

19Ibid., cc. 271-79.
Liberal Party leader Clement Davies attempted to put matters into perspective. Recent political maneuverings in the colony were unfortunate but, he reminded, similar practices were "not unfamiliar in this country only fifty years ago." Ghana must solve its own problems; "the less we interfere, the better--even with advice."20

As one would expect, most Conservatives supported their government and praised what they saw as hard-headed progressivism by the Colonial Secretary. They joined in urging the various factions to put trust in the government and constitution. In this category were five speakers: John Hall, Graham Page, Walter Elliot, Richard Fort and Phillip Bell. There were differences in their emphases, but they were all generally optimistic.21

Not all backbenchers saw unreserved merit in the decision to grant the colony its independence at this time. Two Conservatives and three Labourites must be listed as moderate dissenters. The Conservatives, John Tilney and Norman Pannell, both urged some British underwriting of continuing economic aid. Both also urged provision of either an upper legislative chamber or delaying clauses to prevent precipitous constitutional change. The United Kingdom ought not "dissociate ourselves, like

20Ibid., c. 265.

21Examples of the differences in emphasis may be ascertained by contrasting the statements by Hall (Ibid., cc. 273-74) with those of Elliott (c. 290).
Pilate, from all responsibility" in the colony's economic and political affairs.22

The sharpest dissenting voices were those of left wing Socialist backbenchers George Wigg, E. L. Mallalieu and Roy Mason. Wigg summarized their unhappiness. He reminded how, five years earlier, he had stood alone when he suggested Commons would, in the not too distant future, welcome Kwame Nkrumah as the leader of an independent Ghana. Yet now that his prophecy had been fulfilled, he had sharp reservations of the capability of the soon to be created nation. In fact, he argued, the government was no more satisfied than he, but was forced to accept independence because it no longer had a choice. "If the truth were told" about conditions, he suggested, and if it were "politically possible" to do so "the advent of self-government would be halted" by the United Kingdom.23

Mallalieu took a similar approach. It must be remembered, he reminded, that forty-three percent of the colony's electorate had voted against the CPP in 1956. Much of that opposition intrinsically doubted the fairness of the ruling party. In such a "highly volatile" situation it was not in keeping with the "duty" of a ruling power to grant independence until it had shown "that independence is real before it is granted

22 Ibid., cc. 251-54 (Tilney); 259-64 (Pannell).

23 Ibid., cc. 298-99, 304.
nominally." Yet Mallalieu admitted it had been proper for Britain to set a date for independence, since the realities of the situation left her no alternative. In essence it would appear the two speakers wished incremental alternatives still existed, yet realized they did not.\(^4\) Still, they felt compelled to raise the issue.

Mason's speech was the best researched in this debate. He cited figures proving the new nation would lack sufficient numbers of trained civil servants to run all its departments, or conduct proper local elections. Worse, although the facilities for such elections had been there during British rule, they hadn't been used for over three years. Nkrumah seemed to be losing touch with the hinterlands. Independence would bring "great frustration," as people realized it did not solve all their problems. The opposition would benefit from this disillusion. A CPP defeat at the polls might well appear imminent. Would free elections be held under such circumstances? The NLM had shown childish pique on previous occasions. Nkrumah, on the other hand, was showing "a dangerous tendency to act in a dictatorial manner." He was now "Life President" of his party. If he feared losing at the polls, Mason warned "we may well have seen the last General Election in The Gold Coast."\(^5\)

The abovementioned three speakers were going contrary to the

\(^4\)Ibid., cc. 284-86.

\(^5\)Ibid., cc. 254-59.
position of the Shadow Colonial Secretary in making these statements. Griffiths seemed determined to minimize the colony's internal difficulties in his own speech. He gave his front bench's full support to the government bill before Commons. He shared the government's belief Britain's pledge to Nkrumah must be honored. He also shared the fear there might be violence in the colony if this were not done, and violence was the last thing Britain wanted. Yet his speech, like those of the other two Labourites, contained a hint of sadness that there was no viable alternative to the grant of self-rule.

An even more poignant speech was made by Arthur Creech Jones, Colonial Secretary when the steps leading to The Gold Coast's independence had first been implemented. He too recognized there was now "no alternative to present policy." He also realized the new constitution could not be published in advance of independence, since only a sovereign Ghanaian parliament could promulgate it. Nkrumah had promised not to make important changes until existing ones had been fairly tried. Besides, Britain could not expect any colonial constitution to be a carbon copy of her own. Each country would develop procedures in accordance with its traditions. They would not always act as Britons might wish them to. There would be "lapses" and "disappointments." Black people were as capable as any others to "control their own destiny." They ought to be given the opportunity to do so.

Clearly, however, neither Creech Jones nor the other Labour
dissenters accepted the full implications of these remarks. They felt British colonies ought not be granted sovereignty until they had proven to be economically viable, socially compatible, and politically versed in democratic procedures. As Creech Jones himself put it, Britain ought never grant independence until she was reasonably sure it would prove to be "independence in democracy." 

The old Socialist idea of Britain's moral duty to her colonies was re-emerging. Labour had been more willing than the Conservatives to speed the pace towards independence. Now Labourites were proving more reluctant to accept the implications of that policy. The Tories were, for the most part, willing to be pragmatic realists. Once a colony had reached a certain point on the path towards independence, there could be no turning back. Britain could but grant her freedom and hope for the best. In this respect the Conservatives would appear to more closely approximate the Lindblom picture of the broker politician following a flexible di strategy. There would be parallel developments with each of our other colonies in later years.

In another sense, however, Labour would seem to have been the more realistic party. Both British parties hoped Ghana would retain democratic institutions. Labourites warned she would be less likely to do so if she did not continue, after independence, to receive large

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26 Ibid., cc. 232ff, 310-12.
amounts of British financial aid. The colonial economy remained under-developed. The fall in the world price of cocoa ended the hope she could maintain a favorable balance of trade until other resources were developed.27 The more strained her resources, Griffiths warned, the less likelihood her leaders would feel able to afford the luxury of democratic institutions. Some Labour M.P.'s also argued Britain had a moral obligation to continue aid because of the millions of pounds sterling the Gold Coast had earned for Britain in the years since World War II.

CD&W funds had provided the bulk of British aid. These were, by statute, for aid to colonies. Nonetheless, Labour urged continuation of this aid in this case—or replacement by aid of equivalent amount and type in other form. This matter was obviously of major concern to the opposition. It was raised in three successive debates on the Ghana Independence Bill: the Queen's Address, the Second Reading, and the Committee hearings on final wording.28

The government remained non-committal. In November Lennox-Boyd acknowledged there was a problem. In December he would say only that the matter was still being studied. The United Kingdom was financially unable to buy cocoa above the world price. It could not

27Ibid., cc. 246, 254-55, 263, 270, 308-09. See also Fitch and Oppenheimer, "Ghana," Chapter 3.

28Hansard, Vol. 560 (November 13, 1956), cc. 764-65; Vol. 562 (December 11), cc. 246-49; (December 18), cc. 1140-44.
guarantee that price without support from other countries. CD&W funds would not be used after independence. Alternative sources of aid were being considered, but none was as yet deemed acceptable. Private investment would be encouraged. The Secretary promised Britain would not simply "wash its hands" of the problem. Yet that is what the Conservatives tended to do. Talks continued, especially over aid to the Volta Dam project. Little actual money ever changed hands.

The Conservatives would appear to have felt independence ought to mean a severance of dependent ties with the former colonial power. They also were more likely than Labour to argue Britain simply could not afford such aid. In this instance Labour was probably the more realistic party. Had more aid been given prior to 1960, Britain might have avoided some of the grief suffered at the hands of Nkrumah in the years thereafter.

During the period when progress towards democratic self-rule looked increasingly uncertain in The Gold Coast, such progress looked increasingly bright for Nigeria. As the most populous British colony, this west African state was Ghana's obvious rival for future leadership of the

29 Ibid., Vol. 560 (November 13, 1956), c. 766; Vol. 562 (December 11), cc. 315-16; (December 18), c. 1164.

30 For example see Ibid., Vol. 578 (November 28, 1957), cc. 1252-54. See also "The Volta River Project," Times editorial, July 28, 1956, p. 7.
continent's black nations.

As mentioned, the leaders of the Northern Region, with half the colony's population, were in no hurry to expand upon democratic practices among their traditionally ruled Moslim subjects. Pressure for industrialization, modernization and political progress came from the south—especially from the Ibo peoples in the south-east. The degree to which these peoples had already become assimilated into modern ways frightened the traditionalists of the north. In fact the parts of the colony had been separate, sometimes rival, tribal units with nothing to build nationalism save the British desire to administrate the area as a unit. The potential for unrest, or even civil war, was there from these early years. But in the first half of the 1950's, it appeared these differences would be submerged in the common causes of nation-building and democracy.31

The British seem to have viewed events in Nigeria in a favorable light almost from the beginning. The Guardian was unusually kind even in its treatment of Azikiwe's nationalist movement. In contrast to its attitude towards Nkrumah in 1950, an editorial in that year called it "a matter of profound regret" the Governor of Nigeria had felt it necessary

to ban the nationalist NCNC. The Governor was a respected and liberal man who must have good reason for his action, the paper continued. But "Zik (stood) for something vigorous and authentic among his (Ibo) ... countrymen." It would be "an excellent thing" to have him active in public affairs, if only as a critic; "a constitutional opposition is the essence of democratic government." 32

The Times took a much more hostile position. Its correspondent agreed with northern leaders' assessment of Zik and his followers as "a dangerous clique and enemies of the best interests of the country" who "stir up hatred and malice," although the "overwhelming majority" of the population desired "progress without violence." 33

But Zik could not be blamed for all unrest in the colony. A Royal Commission sent to investigate the Enugu riots laid much of the blame upon the unreasonable demands of the rioters. It also found many grievances to be legitimate and, like its predecessor in the Gold Coast, it urged economic reform and acceleration of constitutional development. 34

This advice was heeded. The pace of political development was accelerated. The next month the Legislative Council ceased to be a purely advisory body. In addition, regional councils were established.

32 "Dr. Azikiwe," Guardian editorial, April 18, 1950, p. 6.
33 The Times, January 17, 1950, p. 5; April 14, 1950, p. 3.
34 The Times, June 10, 1950, p. 5.
The Labour government felt the demand for three regions "an obstacle to progress," but realized the differences in their development and attitudes necessitated such a structure.\(^35\)

Shortly before Labour's 1951 defeat, the colony got a new constitution. The regions received broadly increased powers over their internal affairs. Their legislatures would be elected in the Eastern and Western Regions, appointed in the north. This was in keeping with the desires of the three sets of leaders. The national government received considerably more power to direct colony-wide policy. Nigeria, like The Gold Coast, was well on the way towards becoming a self-governing state.

There were, of course, Britons who would argue west Africans were not ready to assume so much responsibility. Perhaps, The Guardian suggested, there was some truth to this assertion. But it was "sometimes better that the grant of responsibility should run a little ahead of the ability to make full use of it than that it should lag much behind."\(^36\) A dynamic, disjunctive and incremental policy would seem to be implied. His Majesty's government would seem to have been utilizing such a strategy in this case. Again, however, it had required a serious riot to wake the government from its lethargy.

The Conservatives would adopt most of Labour's program after they

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\(^35\) The Guardian, July 27, 1950, p. 7. Northern leaders were demanding southerners accept Mohammedanism if they wished a unified country.

took office. The pace of implementation was maintained or accelerated as the years went by. It is not surprising there was bipartisan agreement on most aspects of this policy during the early 1950's. Nigeria was mentioned in Commons even less than was The Gold Coast. All appeared to be progressing smoothly. There was some awareness of the problems which must be faced in granting such a country its autonomy. It would appear neither British party had fully grasped the extent to which the colony remained at least three separate nations.

The first mild inter-party disagreement over policy came in 1953. A political crisis had developed in the colony over whether to make Lagos (the capital) a federal district. A conference between Britain and the three regions yielded an apparently successful compromise. Griffiths praised Secretary Oliver Lyttleton for his skill in handling difficult negotiations over this issue. He had two objections, however. In choosing a plan different from those suggested at the conference, Lyttleton had undermined the confidence of the native leadership. In bypassing the Premier of the Western Region on a matter directly concerning him, he weakened regional government. This was contrary to the dictum that:

37Fact, Vol. IX #8 (September-October, 1951), p. 148, contained the warning political progress would be slower here than in The Gold Coast because of Nigeria's size and because "the majority of the people are not conscious of belonging to Nigeria at all."
... it is one of the duties of a Secretary of State, in building up these democratic governments, to seek also to build up the prestige of their democratic Ministers. 38

Lyttleton's defense was virtually unassailable. He had bypassed Awolowo because it was improper for a British Secretary of State to correspond directly with a regional leader without approval from the federal government. He was forced to choose his own alternative plan for Lagos because the constitution had made federal legislators too responsible to their respective regions to have sufficient power to make decisions on their own. This was a fault of the 1951 constitution written by a Labour government. It might lead to more serious problems in the future. 39

Either these answers satisfied Labour or left them too vulnerable to wish to pursue the attack. No further criticism of the government's Nigeria policy was forthcoming.

The rapid and seemingly smooth transition of power in that colony made it the most likely to be used as an example by those who advocated Britain publish set dates when colonies could expect to receive constitutional reform leading to independence.

This was a synoptic approach. It would sharply reduce the mother country's options. It would bind Britain to grant autonomous government

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on a certain day regardless of whether the colony was able to accept so much power at that time. We have shown how sorry many labour M.P.'s were that Britain had pledged a specific date when The Gold Coast would become a nation, even though that pledge was not formally made until 1956. Yet the idea of setting timetables was developed during a Labour Party Annual Conference.

At the 1952 Conference, Labour's leadership was successful in refuting a demand from the floor that it pledge, upon regaining office, "to give immediate independence to all British colonies and dependencies and to withdraw all British troops and administrators from them." The next year, however, party leader Attlee proposed a more moderate but still rather sweeping policy pledge:

As soon as the development of each territory makes it practicable, arrangements should be made between the Government and the responsible leaders ... to fix a date for the transfer of power.

The British government categorically refused to be bound by such a pledge. In 1954 almost identical language appeared as part of Labour's comprehensive policy statement on colonial development. Nigeria was singled out. Labour pledged "continued support for (its) rapid advance ... to


41 Annual Report, 1953, p. 150.

full self-government" and for "full and equal membership (in) the Commonwealth when sovereignty is transferred."43 No specific date was suggested, however. In fact, Labour was more frank than the government in warning that the sharp and continuing differences among the Nigerian tribes and regions might delay independence.44

Such mutual distrust had been much in evidence during the discussions over the creation of a federal district. It became considerably heightened after the first colony-wide elections were held in 1954. The election results led to a constitutional crisis.

The constitution had been designed to correspond to the seeming realities of power. The Northern Region contained over half the colony's total population. It was entitled to over half the seats in the federal legislature. The two other regions would not accept such an arrangement unless they had greater power elsewhere. Therefore a federal executive was established with nine ministers; three to be chosen from each region. It was anticipated each region would vote primarily on tribal lines and each would elect the party associated with the dominant tribe. Ministerial parity would help offset northern domination of the parliament.

Instead, Zik's NCNC won an unexpected victory in the Western Region, as well as an expected triumph in the east. As a result, it

43 Ibid., pp. 11-13, 24. A similar pledge was made to The Gold Coast.

could choose six of the nine ministers, while the North's NPC formed the

dominant party in the Assembly. An uneasy compromise was reached

when these two parties, long time enemies though they were, combined
to form a government.

One might have expected Britons to hail this as evidence tribal and
regional animosity was giving way. Instead it created fear that the
altered balance of power would set back the growth of national govern­
ment. No one could expect such a coalition to be stable. Besides, even
the editors of the moderate Guardian were sorry to see the extremist NCNC
defeat the Western Region's more moderate Action Group. Its fears were
enhanced when Azikiwe stated his ultimate goal was to abolish the regions
and establish a unitary regime.45 It was feared the leaders of the north
would never accept this peacefully.

The British government soon promised full internal self-rule would
be granted each region which desired it in 1956. This wording was to
placate reluctant northern leaders, who did not feel their people would be
ready for such a step.46 The Conservatives refused to accept Labour's
timetable for independence demands since this would bind them to an
insufficiently flexible program which could not easily be adjusted to


46 NCP, Vol. VIII #22 (December 6, 1954), pp. 36-37.
The government would seem to have been following a di strategy in this instance. Labour had been suggesting a more synoptic approach. Again this was no doubt partly due to the party out of power being freer than the government to suggest reforms based upon ideals rather than the reality of the political situation. We suspect the difference was partly due to the difference in ideological position as well. If our hypothesis is correct, the longer Labour was out of power, the greater was the pressure upon its leadership to move incrementally towards the position of the most ideological, most demanding, back-benchers. This helped preserve party unity. The leadership could no longer claim its immunity from back bench demands because it was the government—responsible to all the people. Nor did it face the necessity to compromise principle in the face of the day-to-day need to pragmatically balance demands from many different groups. It could become more purist, and its demands were increasingly those of the socialist who desired rapid independence so long as democratic values were likely to be preserved; but who would urge delay if it appeared those values might be threatened.

Internal self-rule was granted the Eastern and Western Regions in

1956. The regional assemblies would be chosen by universal adult suffrage. The north retained limited suffrage (including the total exclusion of female suffrage). It also delegated a larger share of power to the Governor. It continued to oppose independence for the colony prior to at least 1960. Thus when Ghana became independent her larger neighbor was still a colony, its political future still in flux. No one could yet predict the path Britain's most populous and wealthiest African possession would take.

In the settler areas things were more complex. Labour had toyed with a federation of British colonies in both east and central Africa. The east African experiment was abandoned in 1950. Each colony would be advanced towards independence at its own pace.

Kenya was the only colony in the east where settlers were a significant factor. Few numerically, they owned or controlled the bulk of the export products and also dominated the government.48 Under Labour, aid, especially to education, had sharply increased. Otherwise, despite the Devonshire Declaration's promise of native paramountcy, Labour had done little to alter the power balance. There was fear economic chaos

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48 In 1950 the colony contained approximately 38,000 Europeans, 98,000 Asians (mostly Indian), some 30,000 Arabs, and 5.5 million blacks. The latter were of many tribes. The Kikuyu were the largest of these, comprising perhaps twenty percent of the black population. For details on white control see Rosberg and Nottingham, *Myth of Mau Mau*. 
would result if unskilled natives gained control of the plantations. There was the feeling of obligation even a Labour government felt to settlers who had come to Kenya with the promise of British protection of their investment. Even a Labour government was not totally devoid of sentiment for brethren of the same background and skin color.

But such feelings were stronger and more prevalent among Conservatives. As a general rule, the more conservative an M.P.'s politics, the more he tended to support the special status of the European.

The colony received a new constitution shortly before Labour lost office. African membership in the Legislative Council was slightly increased, but the concept of multiracial "parity" was retained. Europeans would have fifty percent of all seats. The rest were divided among Negroes, Asians and Arabs.

This was in keeping with a policy first developed in Palestine in 1946, to preserve a "racial balance" between Arab and Jew. Rule by "mere numerical majority" was rejected as unjust to the special interests of both groups. The same concept was now applied to settler colonies in Africa. Neither side in Kenya deemed it just. Whites believed their economic and political position entitled them to more than half the representation. Some felt the new policy represented a Socialist sellout of their European brethren. To black nationalists, however, parity would

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49 The Times, May 1, 1946, p. 3.
come increasingly to be viewed as a denial of the equality of all human beings. They wanted a gradual implementation of majority rule. The new policy was an attempt to appease both sides. It gave the black man a greater voice than ever before. An African was for the first time, added to the Executive Council. At the same time, The Times pointed out "the principle is conceded . . . to the Europeans . . . that their position in the legislature shall not be (further) weakened except as part of a long-term all-round settlement." The changes were viewed as "a temporary adjustment in the constitutional arrangements to meet certain practical needs." Yet, in 1954, the Conservatives incorporated similar principles into a new constitution, they were condemned by Labour for giving inadequate representation to the black man.

Similar instances may be cited in the areas of education, discrimination, and land reform. Labour's education policy was, after 1950, based primarily upon the suggestions of the Beecher Report on educational reform. Yet when the Conservatives recommended those policies be continued after 1952 Labour's leaders called them completely inadequate for development of a truly multiracial policy in Kenya. It was not that the new government had rescinded Labour's previous program. It was that it continued to view the status quo as basically sound policy while Labour had moved by rather rapid increments to a belief in the necessity of a

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50 Ibid., June 1, 1951, p. 7.
more rapid program of black development. 51

All Labour's colonial officials in Parliament had called for an end to discriminatory practices in the colonies. Yet none would intervene to attain such a goal. For example, Creech Jones was once asked by fellow Socialist T. E. N. Driberg why such practices were permitted to continue in Kenya's hotels. The Secretary admitted instances were frequent and caused "great harm." He had discussed this with the Governor of the colony, who promised to do "what he could" to persuade hotel owners to act differently. But action by either government had been ruled out as "at present (not) the best line of advance." 52 Now, in opposition, the Labour front bench criticized the government for not taking steps to end such practices. Once again, in so doing, it took up the demands which the party's left wing had raised against it while it had held office. We do not suggest these changes were cynical calculated attempts to win the loyalty of the left wing. They were more likely due to a sincere incremental shift of attitude.

The most crucial area of inter-party disagreement soon became the proper status of the White Highlands. First Labour's left wing, then its front bench, came to insist these lands be gradually opened to competent

51 For discussions of this report's recommendations see Hansard, Vol. 482 (December 13, 1960), cc. 1303-13; Vol. 488 (June 13, 1951), cc. 2288-90.

52 Hansard, Vol. 466 (June 21, 1949), c. 1276.
black farmers. The change would be incremental and serial. Whites would not lose lands already being farmed. Only unused lands would be sold to natives, who would be pre-screened for agricultural competence. Thus Labour's plan would seem an ideal implementation of di strategy.

But incrementalism in this case ran counter to a principle—that the Highlands be reserved exclusively for use by whites. The rationale was part economic, part traditional, part white supremacist. For many years this settler position had been supported by Conservative government policy in Britain. It was condemned in increasingly harsh terms by African nationalists and now by the Labour Party. Yet, again, Labour had done virtually nothing to implement such changes while in office. It had perhaps used persuasion, but that had had no effect. Now its leaders insisted that if persuasion did not work, Her Majesty's government ought to insist the colonial Governor take measures to open the Highlands legally to blacks, and make it financially possible for them to purchase some of the unused land there. When the topic of debate was the status of settlers it was Labour which was likely to suggest dynamically incremental policy changes. The Conservatives clung to the synoptic principle of white privilege.

Once again we can attribute part of the change in Labour's attitude to its greater freedom, as opposition, to be critical. Part of the change is also probably due to the leaders' incremental move towards its left wing. To a large extent all the above policy shifts, especially this last,
were due to the altered situation within Kenya. The Mau Mau rebellion had begun.

The earliest mention of Mau Mau we can find in Commons was during Question Time, November 14, 1951. The government then viewed it as a localized, short-lived uprising. By the following autumn the nature and extent of the movement were becoming clear. Conservatives argued suppression of the movement could and should be prior to social or economic reform. In part this was simply because there were insufficient resources to do both simultaneously. It also stemmed from government belief existing relationships were adequate. It did not see legitimate grievances as the underlying cause of Mau Mau. Most Africans had remained loyal, Harold Macmillan argued late in 1953. They would not have unless they believed the colonial government would give them a "fair shake." The multiracial policy was itself proof of this and fulfillment of the 1923 declarations. Mau Mau could not be permitted to argue it was because of the revolt that some of their demands had been

53 Ibid., Vol. 493 (November 14, 1951), cc. 40-41. The term would appear to have been used by colonial administrators as early as 1948. Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, pp. 245-49, 320-34.

54 Hansard, Vol. 505 (October 16, 1952), cc. 388-94; (October 21), cc. 865-69; Vol. 508 (November 25, 1952), cc. 326-83. See also Sir Philip Mitchel, "East African Inquiry," The Times, September 24, 1952, p. 7 (part I); September 25, 1952, p. 7 (part II). Sir Philip was Governor of Kenya from 1944 to June, 1952.

met. The use of force could not be rewarded.

Labour's approach was, from the very first, somewhat different. No M.P. approved of Mau Mau. Even the most radical supporters of black rights agreed there was need to suppress the rebellion by force; including, if necessary, use of British troops. But Labourites generally coupled this approach with simultaneous demands for more rapid implementation of reform. They believed legitimate grievances were part of the cause of the revolt. Not only were such reforms deemed just in themselves, but Mau Mau could not be crushed until most of the people were convinced they would be better off under continued British rule. They could not be expected to feel this way if they were constantly discriminated against, deprived of the best land, and given no hope of eventual control of their own government.

Partisan polarity on this subject continued to widen. In 1953, Secretary Lyttleton again spoke of Mau Mau as:

---the unholy alliance of dark and ancient superstitions with the apparatus of modern gangsterism . . . Mau Mau is not the child of economic pressure.

It would not, therefore, be ended by economic reform.\textsuperscript{56}

The belief economic and agricultural injustices were root causes of the rebellion were at first held only by a segment of the Labour left wing. The demand for reform increasingly centered around opening unused

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 422.
portions of the Highlands to competent natives. This position was taken by Eirene White as early as February, 1952. The government rejected her proposal on grounds there was not enough unused arable land to make it worthwhile antagonizing the settlers. The latter had come there by right. They had found the area virtually uninhabited, and, by their own efforts, had made of it some of the richest farmland in the world.

By May, 1952, the Labour leadership was beginning to share its left wing's position on this issue. An NEC resolution of May 28 urged the government facilitate a more rapid development of African farming techniques, but all Kenya should "acquire, as part of a general policy of agricultural development, unused land in the area for African use." An order paper to this effect was tabled in Commons with over 200 Labour signatures, including Griffiths' (in violation of the custom the front benches do not sign such documents). By July, Griffiths was insisting in Commons that only land reform could ultimately alleviate tribal grievances which enhanced willingness to join Mau Mau. Europeans, he said, had made and would continue to make "a very important contribution to the economy . . . It is right that we should pay (them) tribute." But Europeans were also guilty of certain

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57Ibid., Vol. 496 (February 22, 1952), cc. 668-70 (White); 673-76 (Lennox-Boyd). Also Vol. 497 (March 12, 1952), c. 137.

58Annual Report, 1952, pp. 26-27, 69-70. This resolution received "overwhelming" delegate support.
excesses. Many plantations had their black workers living under "a mild form of feudalism." Some land was available in the Highlands. It should be opened to blacks, subject to removal for misuse. The physical problem would not be greatly alleviated, but there would be substantial psychological effect. Simultaneously greater effort should be made to modernize farming techniques on the reserves. 59

By November, Griffiths' language had grown more extreme. Now he argued preservation of the Highlands as a settler reserve was "a racist concept." Unless they were soon opened to competent natives, he warned:

We are in danger . . . of converting what began, or could have begun, as a struggle of all the decent, moderate, loyal people, African, Asians, and Europeans together, against Mau Mau, into a Black-White struggle. 60

Neither Lyttleton nor Lennox-Boyd were convinced. The former responded to Griffiths in July, 1952, by mockingly expressing his thanks the Shadow Secretary had not fully endorsed the position taken in a recent Fabian Society publication that farms be forcibly taken from their Highlands owners. He agreed there ought to be a "far reaching inquiry" of land policy at some date in the reasonable future. But his sentiments


remained with the settlers. They had acquired land under a British pledge it would remain theirs so long as they wished to farm it. They had raised their children as citizens of Kenya. For many Kenya was the only country they knew. Minister of State for the Colonies John Hopkinson added there was "good progress" being made in developing black agricultural techniques to better the yield of existing tribal lands. Funds were available for agricultural and educational improvement. The basic problem lay not in the fertility of the native's land but in the thought patterns of the "African mind."  

Another indication of the growing inter-party polarity towards policy in Kenya was that Labour tended to be much more critical of brutal behavior by the colony's white population. Excesses by Mau Mau in no way excused retaliation in kind by "civilized men," they argued. The Tories were much more likely to suggest that some white brutality was natural in the face of the beastly provocations these people faced daily. They emphasized how rare such instances had been. If especial brutality was uncovered, the government argued, it was the duty of the Kenya authorities to punish offenders. Labour suggested it was unlikely white would be punished by fellow Kenyans, and urged Britain to directly intervene. They were rebuffed by reference to the policy they themselves had

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61 Ibid., Vol. 503 (July 17, 1952), cc. 2377-78.
62 Ibid., cc. 2453, 2457-58, 2460.
helped strengthen in 1947; all but the most unusual colonial issues must be handled by the colonial authorities: It would be neither prudent nor legal for Her Majesty's government to otherwise interfere. 63

In November, 1952, a crowd of 2,000 natives assembled to hear speakers from the KAU, the colony's leading native political party. The gathering was peaceful, but in violation of the laws against public meetings which became effective when the state of emergency had been declared (October 20, 1952). The mob was ordered to disperse. It refused. The police fired shots. Twenty-one deaths and numerous injuries resulted.

Lyttleton defended the police action. Attempts had been made to peacefully disperse the mob. The police had shot only after it had moved towards them. The right of assembly should be restored "as soon as the state of public safety permits." It could not be restored now. Such decisions were the rightful prerogative of the Governor. He had the full confidence of the British government. 64

Griffiths disagreed. Britain must directly investigate the "abuses" associated with the Kirawara incident. If there were any repetition of such a situation, Britain must be prepared to directly intervene, so as to assert her "final authority for everything" which transpired in the colony.

63 Ibid., c. 2383.

64 Ibid., Vol. 508 (November 25, 1952), cc. 326-27, 331.
Abandoned was the position he had taken as Secretary, that it was not proper for Her Majesty's government to intervene unless matters reached the point where the colonial government was unable or unwilling to take effective action. Or, perhaps more accurately, he felt the Governor's acts were ineffectual.

What is more significant about this debate is the extent to which it reveals the nearly total collapse of a bipartisan approach to policy for Kenya. Griffiths refused to accept the validity of the Governor's report. He demanded a bipartisan Commons commission be sent to "find out ourselves exactly what happened." He also wanted a general review of policy for the colony. The Speaker had ruled debate must be confined to the incident itself and "such matters as can be shown to be relevant to it." Griffiths insisted nearly all recent policy decisions were relevant, since they indicated the colonial regime's failure to correct the "underlying causes" of the unrest there. It was Commons' duty to review all policy decisions taken in a colony under such circumstances, for these peoples remained "wards" and Parliament their "trustees." In the case of Kenya, close British review was doubly essential, since this colony might provide "the last chance we have in Africa of working out a democratic constitution in a country in which all races co-operate together." 65

In December, 1953, Labour moved a House debate of the full range

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65Ibid., cc. 328-30.
of events in the colony. The government agreed to debate the motion. The text indicates the extent to which the two parties' official positions had diverged over the proper way to handle affairs in this colony. Therefore we reprint it in full.

That this House extends its sympathy to all races in Kenya in their present ordeal and reaffirms its support of lawful action to eliminate Mau Mau and suppress barbarous and violent crimes against both Africans and Europeans and to re-establish peace and order. It expresses its grave concern regarding those measures which involve the punishment of innocent people and which if continued may permanently embitter race relations. It regrets the failure of Her Majesty's Government to act upon the urgent recommendation, made by the Governor of Kenya, in November, 1951 for the appointment of a Royal Commission and the unaccountable delay by the Colonial Secretary since that date in proceeding with its appointment; and urges that, once appointed, the Commission should forthwith investigate the fundamental long-term problems in Kenya, including the land problem, and that it should be required to issue an interim report on these matters as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the Government should take all practical measures to mitigate the most pressing hardships and frustrations of the African people, including the progressive elimination of the colour bar, cooperative farming, the raising of wage standards, the reduction of the cost of living, extension of free education, the creation of new industries and provision of housing and the democratization of local government. This House reaffirms its belief that cooperation and common action by all races is possible and necessary, and, to this end, welcomes the suggestions which have been made in Kenya for summoning a Round Table Conference of representatives of all communities.66

The Conservatives insisted the government was effective and was making gradual progress against the rebels. The opposition insisted necessary underlying reform of the economic, political and social systems

66 Ibid., Vol. 522 (December 16, 1953), c. 403.
was not taking place. Until it did, Britain was not fulfilling its obligation to the majority in the colony. The debate lasted three hours but neither side would alter its view. It would be a full year before a complete airing of Kenya affairs was again held in Commons.

There were also differences in the treatment of events in Kenya by the party journals during the 1951-54 period. The Conservatives' NCP was perfunctory, evaluating the situation as if only one interpretation were possible. Its explanation of the need for the declaration of the state of emergency, for example, read in part:

In Kenya, firm action has had to be taken by the local government, with the full approval and support of the British Government, against a crime wave and outrages perpetrated by a secret society called Mau Mau. This society, confined almost entirely to the Kikuyu tribe, encourages racial hatred and has for its aim the expulsion of Europeans from Kenya and the destruction of all authority other than its own. The situation deteriorated rapidly towards the end of the summer of 1952.67

Labour's Fact, on the other hand, suggested a more complex picture existed in the colony. Its approach was somewhat subjective, but assertions were buttressed by commentary by party leaders, and substantial in-depth analyses of the problem. It reiterated the theme of the party-in-Commons, that no true solution to the problems in this or any other colony could be reached without greater efforts to improve living conditions and

to win the support of the native peoples.\textsuperscript{68}

The differences between the front benches and the journals were relatively mild when contrasted with the assessments presented in Commons by the most vocal contingents of the two parties' backbenchers. The three Conservatives who spoke on Kenya in the July, 1952 debate well represented three typical party positions. G. P. Stevens in effect opted Commons out, arguing it was the British government which alone must determine the proper rate of political advance for each colony. Dodds-Parker continued to stereotype the settler position. A study of history would reveal the incalculable debt they were owed. Existing conditions necessitated preservation of their special status.\textsuperscript{69} Fred Harris epitomized the view towards the Highlands held by the party's right wing. It was well summarized by the statement:

I would definitely say that if all the White Highlands were handed over to the African (and) . . . if they were to continue with their normal system of peasant agriculture (the economy) would certainly be ruined.\textsuperscript{70}

The gist of his remarks indicated he had little expectation Africans were capable of adopting settler methods. They also ignored the fact no Labour M.P. in these debates had advocated handing the Highlands over


\textsuperscript{69}\textit{Hansard}, Vol. 503 (July 17, 1952), cc. 2415-17 (Stevens); 2402-03 (Dodds-Parker).

\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Ibid.}, cc. 2425-26.
to blacks.

All Tory back bench speakers in the debate on the Kirawara incident defended both the action of the Kenya police and the policy statement against intervention in a colony's internal affairs. Where reports were conflicting, they argued, the colonial government ought to be given benefit of the doubt. Teeling summarized the expressed thoughts of several colleagues when he asked why, when Mau Mau had committed so many atrocities, Labour became concerned when a few of them were shot?71

One Labour M.P. defended the government's actions.72 All others condemned the police for excess brutality and urged restoration of at least a limited right to hold public meetings. Efforts should be made to work with KAU leaders. Otherwise a vacuum was left which could only be filled by Mau Mau. The general sentiment was reflected by Sidney Silverman's comment Britain could not "by force impose a minority regime against the will of the mass of the people . . . we must . . . ally with our purpose the active consent of the majority of the people whose land it is."73

71Ibid., Vol. 508 (November 25, 1952), c. 345. Similar comments from other Conservative M.P.'s may be found at Ibid., cc. 332 (Craddock); 334 (Dodds-Parker); 356-57 (Peto); 372 (Peyton).

72Ibid., cc. 354-55 (S. N. Evans).

73Ibid., cc. 359, 462-63. Similar comments from other Labourites at Ibid., cc. 340-45 (Brockway); 368 (Wigg).
A. Fenner Brockway condemned the electoral laws for similarly discriminating unfairly against the vast majority of the population. (This perhaps proved somewhat embarrassing to Griffiths, since most of the changes had been approved during his Secretaryship.) Brockway could still support the concept of racial parity. But he insisted it was not being practiced when thirty-four elected legislators represented 38,000 Europeans while eight, none elected, represented 5.5 million Africans. A common roll and an immediate end to discriminatory practices were the only way to overcome fear on all sides. Europeans should be "models of interracial acceptance." Their "greatest glory" would come when Africans accepted them as true compatriots.74

The government did not see these issues in the same light. Nonetheless there was one good reason why it might have thought twice about going on record so strongly in opposition to Jomo Kenyatta and the KAU; the realities of politics. George Wigg warned of the bind in which the government might one day find itself placed. No matter how much settlers (or Britons) hated Kenyatta, he could not forever remain incarcerated without formal charges being brought against him. Even if sufficient evidence could be found to successfully convict him of leadership of Mau Mau, it was unlikely his charisma among Africans would be substantially diminished. If he were one day to be freed, every day he now spent in prison

74Ibid., Vol. 503 (July 17, 1952), cc. 2418-24.
would add to his stature then. Even if he died in prison his ghost would haunt Kenya's politics for many years. Nkrumah had proven to be the catalyst who could unite The Gold Coast's masses. Might not Kenyatta someday do the same for Kenya? It would be wise for Britain to accept his services if he offered to help organize the native population in a peaceful manner.  

In less than ten years, of course, Wigg's predictions would come true. Britain would be forced to swallow its pride, repudiate its pledges to the settlers, and accept Kenyatta as the leader of the strongest Kenyan political party. Had she been less dogmatic and peremptory earlier, she could have made this about face far less painful, and hurt fewer people in the process.

By December of 1953 Labour was openly demanding Secretary Lyttleton resign. His policy towards Kenya formed a primary reason for this demand. No speaker blamed Lyttleton for creating Mau Mau, but all insisted continuance of his policies could not end the revolt. Soskice's concluding address was perhaps the most specific. He charged the Colonial Office with overzealous, automatic defense of the police and the military despite clear indication there had been excessive brutality on occasion. Most settlers had acted with decency but both the British and the Kenya governments had been too reluctant to prosecute the few

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"trigger-happy . . . thugs." The Lyttleton administration had shown itself "completely inadequate to deal with Mau Mau." Could the Colonial Secretary really believe rebel success was "wholly divorced from the suspicion and hatred for which his own policy has been responsible?"76

It might well be argued that, had Labour been in office, prosecution of the war would have been little different. But with the party of the left out of power the inclination to relate to the black cause was less fettered. Much the same effect exists currently in the United States over Vietnam policy with a Republican administration now in power. The far left had spoken out against it anyway. But moderate Democrats who did not wish to embarrass their leaders now feel freer to express dissident views.

Deterioration of bipartisanship was now virtually total between the front benchers. Labour wanted an acceleration of reform, and was convinced this must be implemented immediately. But Labour was no more willing than was the government to grant independence until Mau Mau was crushed, the economy restored, the economic and educational level of the black citizen greatly enhanced, and the relationship of native to settler resolved. John Hatch neatly summarized his party's position in his lead paragraph to an article in Fact. It was traditional Labour policy, he asserted, to "accept self-determination and ultimate self-government as the main aim of . . . colonial policy." Such views must, however, be

76Ibid., Vol. 522 (December 16, 1953), cc. 498-500. Similar views were expressed at cc. 444-45 (Strachey); 469-73 (Dugdale).
reassessed in colonies where interracial conflict was rife. The same type of dilemma emerged in our other settlers' colony, Rhodesia. Here it was compounded by the decision to form a Central African Federation (CAF).

No discussion of S. Rhodesia can be complete without some reference to its ten year membership in the Central African Federation. Although we consider this tangential to our study of relationships between Great Britain and the Dominion, the role of the CAF played a crucial part in shaping that relationship. Some discussion of the Federation is therefore necessitated.

Ironically, it was during Labour's years in power that the initial steps to create the CAF were made. Agitation for a merger of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland may be traced back to Cecil Rhodes. It lessened after Southern Rhodesia attained Dominion status (virtual internal autonomy) in 1923. In the post-war years, discovery of vast natural resources and availability of cheap African labor led to renewed interest by Rhodesian settlers in the prospect of merger. Whites in the other two colonies were attracted to federation since it would strengthen their relationship vis a vis the natives, especially in Nyasaland, where a European population of only 9000 (in 1960) was able to preserve segregated facilities.

only in a few cities. It feared its special status would be swept away
when black nationalism reached the nearly three million natives.\textsuperscript{78}

The grant of Dominion status to S. Rhodesia had stipulated that
final authority over "native affairs" would remain with London. Legislation affecting natives would be scrutinized by the British government and, if deemed discriminatory, could be negated by act of Parliament. Differences in attitude towards the uses of this power would become a large factor in debates over the fate of Rhodesia in the 1960's. For now we shall simply point out that the veto power was never used. There were unconfirmed suggestions that, during private negotiations between the two governments from time to time, the threat of a British veto was employed to persuade Rhodesian leaders to dilute the content of discriminatory bills. But acts were passed which would appear segregatory and discriminatory on their face. Some of these were passed while Labour was in power in Britain. Godfrey Huggins, who served as Prime Minister of the Dominion from 1933 to 1953, was praised as a liberal by leaders of both British parties. Yet Rotberg cites wholly convincing evidence to prove that, under Huggins and his ruling United Federal Party (UFP), "... Southern Rhodesia moved inexorably toward a fuller control of Africans." There were white land reserves, legal segregation of facilities,

\textsuperscript{78}In 1960, N. Rhodesia had 80,000 whites and 2.2 million blacks. S. Rhodesia had 210,000 whites and 2.5 million blacks. The three colonies also had small numbers of Asians, mostly brought by the British to serve as small shopkeepers and semi-skilled laborers.
native registration and pass laws, restrictions against certain types of employment for blacks, etc. De facto discrimination was much more complete than the laws suggest. No black served in the Dominion legislature. "In settler eyes, Southern Rhodesia was a white man's country."^79

In 1945 a Central African Council was established to jointly operate certain public services of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. In 1949 an unofficial conference was held to discuss closer association. Huggins preferred outright amalgamation, but accepted federation when Britain refused to approve the other scheme. Other white leaders concurred. Labour later argued Huggins' primary motivation was to gain control of the Northern Rhodesian copper belt, which would finance greater white immigration into both Rhodesias.^80

No black spokesmen were invited to the Victoria Falls conference. If there were any doubts about white attitudes, they ought to have been dispelled by Huggins' frank statement "The natives must for the time being be ruled by a benevolent aristocracy." Roy Welensky, leader of the largest party in Northern Rhodesia, called federation "our best chance

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79 Rotberg, "White Rule and the Federation . . . ," pp. 101-07. The other two members of the CAF also "drifted gradually into the white orbit during the three decades before 1953" even though they remained colonies. Ibid., pp. 107-11. For corroborating evidence see "African Racial Fears," Times feature article, April 21, 1950, p. 7; "Southern Rhodesia To-day," Times feature article, July 18, 1950, p. 7.

80 British Africa, p. 17. White immigration was about 20,000 per year from 1950-56.
of breaking with the Colonial Office."\textsuperscript{81}

Such statements gave Labour pause. Yet there seemed good economic reasons in support of federation. (Huggins threatened to leave the CAC in any case.) There were also fears that if S. Rhodesia were blocked here, she would seek closer ties with the Union of South Africa. Moreover, while native leaders in the two Territories had expressed clear opposition to amalgamation The Times correspondent reported "there appeared to be general agreement that (they) would not oppose federation . . ." Just what facts this view was predicated upon is not mentioned.\textsuperscript{82} It would appear federation was viewed as the path of least resistance. Politicians with a broker outlook were attracted to it.

The British government gave tentative approval to formation of the CAF. Final approval would await a plebiscite in each territory and the development of legal guarantees for "native interests." As in the Dominion, final power to decide such matters would be retained by Britain.\textsuperscript{83}

The three colonial Governors met with Griffiths late in 1950.

Commons was promised that before plans for federation were approved


\textsuperscript{82}The Times, May 26, 1948, p. 3; June 30, 1948, p. 4; March 18, 1950, p. 5; April 5, 1950, p. 5.

there would be at least one more conference which black leaders would be invited to attend and "consult fully." Such a meeting was held, at Victoria Falls in 1951. Black representatives from the two Northern Territories participated, but the Dominion delegation included no blacks. The Labour government made no formal protest.

It was made clear at this conference that native opposition to any form of federation ran deep in the Territories. There were only settler assurances that the same was not the case in Southern Rhodesia. A 1960 Labour Party publication would argue that:

... the British Government were not committed to Federation and the strong African opposition which had been revealed would certainly have influenced it to postpone the issue or modify the proposals. But at this stage also ... a Conservative Government came to power.85

The clear implication is that the Conservatives refused to let native objections interfere with the desires of the white interests in central Africa, while Labour would have taken them into account. This is an unprovable hypothesis. The settlers controlled the economies and the politics in the three colonies. The Governors of all three approved federation. Had Labour opposed it, as later events will show, it almost certainly would have faced strong opposition from within its own ranks. It is thus questionable whether an incremental reversal of policy was

85_British Africa, p. 18.
possible even to a Labour regime, although it probably would have been more willing than the Tories to delay formation of the CAF.

All this is speculative. What is clear is that Labour, within a short time of its fall from power, was accusing its successors of crassly ignoring black opinion and Labour appeals, in its decision to permit rapid formation of a federation in central Africa.

Conservative party intent was made clear soon after it took office. Secretary Lyttleton expressed his "full agreement" with the conclusion drawn at the Victoria Falls conference, i.e., the conclusion of the majority of the delegates (the whites) that federation ought to be implemented as rapidly as possible. African interests must be protected, the Secretary stated, but closer association of the three territories was an "urgent need." All major interests accepted this, he argued, "except those African representatives who feared that it might impair their position and prospects." The statement appears so nebulous as to be irrefutable. No effort was made to show white delegates were any less concerned with position or prospects, nor that black fears were not reasoned and sensible.

In March, 1952, Lyttleton announced a London Conference for the following month, which was to decide final details of federation. Labour

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87 Ibid., #18 (October 6, 1952), pp. 38-39.
M.P.'s protested since black representatives were not scheduled to participate. Lyttleton stated there were invitations to black delegates from the Territories. A few days later he said he would "welcome" such a delegation from the Dominion as well but, since that colony was internally sovereign on such affairs, it alone had power to choose who would come.

When Labour was in office it had recognized this power of the Dominion. Now Labour M.P. Hector Hughes rose to challenge it. Africans would feel the conference "was prepared behind their backs" and grow suspicious of its purpose. Britain should demand S. Rhodesia include black men in its delegation.\(^{88}\)

It is unlikely the changed position was due merely to an attempt to embarrass the government, or to the greater freedom of Labourites to challenge a Conservative administration. It reflects the growing black resentment in the colony; a resentment made clear to sympathetic M.P.'s (most of whom were Socialists). Black nationalism had reached central Africa.

From this time on, whether the Federation or the Dominion was being discussed, inter-party polarity within Commons grew increasingly sharp. This was true to an even larger extent than it was of attitudes

\(^{88}\)Hansard, Vol. 497 (March 5, 1952), c. 420; (March 12), cc. 1365-66. Two Rhodesian blacks were finally made delegates but they were clearly hand-picked by the government.
toward Kenya, where at least both parties could agree upon the need to suppress Mau Mau. Labour (beginning once more with its left wing) came more and more to champion the cause of the native nationalists.

For some M.P.'s this was a pragmatic decision. F. H. Hayman, for example, argued whites were rapidly losing the world position of superiority they had so long possessed. Of necessity, if not choice, they must "regard the colored peoples of the earth as our brothers." They must be consulted and be allowed to participate in making decisions which would determine the future of their countries. A more peremptory position was taken by others, such as John Rankin, who argued that since Africans had not been consulted federation must now be abandoned or imposed. To do the latter might well unite blacks against Europeans. This "would be fatal" to the hope for a bright future for central Africa. 89

Most Conservatives also wished to see the black man achieve greater political and economic power than he at that time possessed. But they supported this only so long as it was done within a context of settler control. So long as the governments of these colonies advocated gradual improvement for blacks they would retain the support of the Conservative front bench.

Conservative back bench opinion also ranged from extreme to moderate. Extremists such as Gordon Alport still viewed nationalism as

89 Ibid., Vol. 507 (November 4, 1952), cc. 81-83 (Rankin); 115 (Hayman).
"an attempt to destroy (Africa's) moral progress," which had been developed by wise British administration, settler influence and Christian ethical standards. A moderate like J. G. Foster could see some merit in Labour's position. Yet he believed the S. Rhodesian government was firmly pledged to preserve African rights and could do so better, at this time, than could natives themselves. He was also convinced black support of the federation would grow as natives came to realize the benefits federation would bring to all central Africans.90

The vehemence of Labour's opposition caused the government to delay implementation of the CAF while it studied the proposed constitution and consulted further with settler leaders. Some constitutional modifications were suggested which partially rectified certain weaknesses Labour M.P.'s had pointed out. Having gotten Federation leaders to accept these, the Conservatives would brook no more delay. They believed federation would benefit central Africa, the federal constitution sufficiently protected native interests, and black opinion would gradually come to support it as the beneficial aspects of the new country were made manifest. Most important, the British leaders trusted the CAF leaders.

The division on the bill approving the new country came on March 24,

90Ibid. (November 7), cc. 488 (Alport); 543-46 (Foster). For supportive evidence see the following Commons debates in creation of the CAF: Ibid., Vol. 497 (March 4, 1952), cc. 208-339; Vol. 499 (April 29), cc. 1233-96; Vol. 504 (July 24), cc. 773-882; Vol. 507 (November 7), cc. 468-69.
So persuasive were the government's arguments that Labour actually faced one of the rare backbench revolts. Sixteen of its M.P.'s deliberately abstained. Two of these spoke during the debate, to explain why they did so. It is quite probable there were others who only reluctantly voted with their party.

Neither the delay nor the revolt weakened Labour's opposition to CAF. If anything the opposition became increasingly adamant in its belief federation was a ploy to permit the Rhodesian settlers to strengthen their hold over blacks in the two territories. Labour's front bench showed increasing hostility towards the leaders of both the Federation and Dominion branches of the UFP. The extent of the animosity may be gleaned from a resolution passed without debate at the party's 1952 Annual Conference; that:

This Conference convinced that the decision . . . about the proposed Federation . . . will be regarded both in this country and in Africa as the acid test of the sincerity of its Commonwealth Policy and having grave doubts about the trends of present negotiations, resolve that there be no Federation in Central Africa without education, full consultation, and agreement of the population in those territories.

The Conservatives kept Labour's pledge that each of the constituent

91 For the debate see Ibid., Vol. 513 (March 24, 1953), cc. 658-802.

92 Ibid., cc. 720-25 (C. R. Hobson); 767-83 (S. N. Evans).

countries would have an opportunity to ratify the CAF constitution before it was promulgated. It did not, however, make any attempt to conduct referenda. In the Territories only the legislators were polled. In both, all the African representatives, hand-picked by the governments though they were, voted against accepting the proposed form of federation. S. Rhodesia held a plebiscite, but only 5000 natives were on the electoral rolls. Of these, over ninety percent heeded the plea of the Congress Party leaders and boycotted the polls. A number of chiefs, despite their position as government approved appointees, signed a statement which held the federal constitution abrogated treaties signed between their ancestors and Britain, and relegated them to a position of subordination.

The nature of the referenda and the extent of the opposition served to further deepen Labour's opposition to the CAF. The dominant motive behind black recalcitrance, Griffiths stated, was the fear they would lose their chance to progress economically and politically. In view of speeches by Huggins, Welensky and other white leaders, these fears seemed quite reasonable.94

All back bench Labourites concurred. The abstainers of the previous March had returned to the fold. The two British parties were moving in opposite directions on this issue. There was no longer even an attempt

to find a compromise which would restore bipartisanship.

Lyttleton refused to entertain further requests for a delay. He also refused Labour's request he appoint a select committee whose purpose would be to receive reaffirmation from the CAF leaders that their ultimate policy remained creation of a fully multiracial state. There had been enough delays, the Secretary said. Britain had fulfilled its obligation to keep faith with its central African subjects. Further delays could only lead to further unrest and stimulate resistance by the unsatisfied black extremists. The CAF would be created as planned. 95

The party journals again reflected the disparity of views found in Commons debate. NCP readers would receive the impression the Conservatives merely inherited a federation scheme developed under the previous administration. The June 1, 1953 issue, for example, told of ratification of the document by the three colonies, without a word on the black boycotts. "Socialist efforts to delay the scheme" were mentioned, and much was made of the sixteen March abstainees. Yet the issues underlying the dissent were never aired, and rebuttal of Labour objections was deemed to require no more than the reprinting of a few brief excerpts from Lyttleton's remarks in Commons. During the three years of controversy, the African objections were briefly referred to only once, poorly explained.

95 Ibid., cc. 46-56. See also comments by Under-Secretary Foster, c. 155. Two days later the bill passed Second Reading. Third reading found Labour still opposed. The CAF became a legal entity on August 1, 1953.
and dismissed as invalid.\textsuperscript{96}

The overall impression one receives from this caustic approach is that, as with policy in Kenya, the Conservative publishers of \textit{NCP} felt no need to justify the party's position. It was sufficient to state it. Deference to the leadership's ability to deduce the correct response would appear to be a corollary of the journal's style.

\textit{Fact} once more provided considerable in-depth coverage and took greater pains to justify the policy which the Labour leadership had offered. One article, for example, zeroed in upon the sharp difference in living standards between white and black Rhodesians. Photographs supplemented the text.\textsuperscript{97} Nothing of this sort was attempted by \textit{NCP}.

Both newspapers supported federation in principle. The \textit{Guardian} had serious reservations, however, about the government's decision to move forward without winning the support of black leaders. Its concern for black opinion was evident from the beginning. In March, 1952, for example, an editorial stated all British parties wished federation, but Labour felt, correctly, that "the idea of partnership should extend to the introduction of federation as well as its administration--that it should be


introduced as a matter of mutual consent, not as an act of dominance."
The paper also warned "Africans will rightly pay more attention to what
. . . Huggins and . . . Welensky do than to what . . . Lyttleton and
Griffiths say: for it is the local leadership which will set the tone of
federation in practice." 98 This was a position close to that taken by the
Labour Party in Commons.

The Guardian's editors remained unpersuaded by subsequent govern­
ment arguments in support of CAF. They felt it deprived the native of his
rightful future. The day the White Paper was published an editorial stated:

(The) fundamental shortcoming of the suggested constitution . . .
is not, in our view, that it deprives the African population of
existing and established rights and privileges. It is that it
offers no reliable means by which existing rights . . . may be
extended in an orderly and constitutional way as African advance­
ment justifies it if European opinion is adverse. 99

It would appear the editors feared the CAF, as constituted, would deprive
the black African of precisely the kind of incremental improvement in his
status which ought to be afforded if a di policy were pursued.

The Times was, from the beginning, much more in sympathy with the
Conservatives' position. In a February, 1953 editorial it reprinted the
entire preface of the White Paper. Commentary simply elaborated upon
the text. 100 The next month its correspondent in Salisbury wrote of


100 "Year of Opportunity' in Central Africa," Times article,
February 6, 1953, p. 2.
unanimous black opposition to the federation. Yet this should not be taken too seriously, he suggested, since the mass of Africans possessed "little or no idea of what federation means." They simply preferred their present condition out of "fear (the CAF) might bring changes they would not like." Such fears were neither rational nor reasonable, he concluded.101

Hostility to the government's policy towards settler colonies led, by the end of 1953, to the almost total breakdown of the civilities which normally underlie Commons debate. An exceptional motion was tabled by the opposition openly declaring lack of confidence in the government's ability to handle "affairs in Africa."102

Throughout the continent, Griffiths charged, there had been a "steady deterioration in relations." This was due partially to events beyond Britain's control, but also to a considerable extent to the "mis-handling of affairs" by the Conservatives in general, Lyttleton in particular. True, there had been twelve new colonial constitutions since Lyttleton took office:


102 Hansard, Vol. 522 (December 16, 1953), cc. 393-520. The actual motion read "That this House expresses its grave disquiet at the handling by Her Majesty's Government of affairs in Africa."
but that is not the monument of policy nor the touchstone of success. Anyone can hand out a constitution. But will it work? Is it a framework within which democratic institutions can grow, or is it a source of strife and friction? Is it too slow to satisfy the progressive, or too quick to fulfill the needs of law and order?

The statement sounds almost like the one by Oliver Stanley over seven years earlier. But the emphasis had deviated 180 degrees. It was not a warning to be more cautious, but to be more aggressive. This is indicated by Griffiths' other remarks, e.g., it must be "reaffirmed to all African people . . . that we are determined to build a nation (sic) in which their own people will have the opportunity as human beings progressively to develop and to become full partners (in the) British Commonwealth of Nations."  

As we have indicated, the above resolution was an exaggeration in that Labour had little quarrel with government policy in west Africa. Nor was there any expression of personal hostility towards Lyttleton. But differences in assessment of the needs of the east and central African colonies had become so great as to place the two front benches on a collision course.

All Conservative speakers fully defended their Secretary and his policies. Yet within a few months Lyttleton was elevated to the peerage.

103 See Chapter IV, p. 121.

104 Hansard, Vol. 522 (December 16, 1953), cc. 393-412. Quotes at 393, 408, 412.
His successor, Lennox-Boyd, had staunchly defended his government's African policy. He had been Minister of Colonial Affairs in 1951-52. Yet he could bring fresh insight to bear on the problems of Africa. And his name had not become synonymous with those problems. It is a good example of the pragmatic, broker attitude of the Conservative government that a man under fire would be defended but soon replaced. Lennox-Boyd had been a staunch defender of the concept of racial parity. He continued to defend this concept after becoming Colonial Secretary. Yet it was during the years he held that office that the first important incremental steps away from that doctrine were taken. It would be replaced with the philosophy that the long term goal, at least, was majority (black) rule. Lennox-Boyd proved a more skillful, more flexible Secretary than did his predecessor. Labour never developed the hostility towards him it had shown to Lyttleton.

Belief in the idea that the solution for settler colonies was the creation of multiracial communities had been accepted by nearly all British M.P.'s. It also received at least verbal approval from most white spokesmen in the colonies. All but the most radical black leaders also used the term when speaking of their goals. It was used by the Conservative front bench when it talked of long range plans for Kenya. Leftist Fenner Brockway could readily concur. He once called development of a multiracial society in that colony "the greatest thing that has ever
happened within the British colonial system. 105

Yet it is a vague term. It was defined quite differently by black nationalists than it was by most settler groups. After 1951 the black definition was increasingly the one adhered to by British Labourites. First the party leftists, then the leaders, finally the most moderate back-benchers came to use the term in the sense of a nation in which all racial groups were recognized as being capable of making a significant contribution to the colony in which they lived, and in which minorities were constitutionally protected against discrimination. Settlers and most British Tories were still using the term to describe a system of racial parity, or at least one in which a small settler population was given a voice in government far in excess of that to which it would be entitled if numbers were the sole determinant of their strength. After Lennox-Boyd became Colonial Secretary the Conservatives began to move incrementally, sometimes reluctantly, towards the former definition. By the 1960's, only the most die-hard Conservative right wingers would still feel the latter definition represented the proper goal. The change would appear to have come largely in reaction to events within the colonies. In part it would seem also to represent a real change in attitude. Britons gradually came to feel that, despite educational and economic differences, despite racial affinity, the blacks must be in control of the destiny of the countries in

105 Ibid., Vol. 503 (July 17, 1952), c. 2418.
which they comprised the overwhelming majority of the population.

The incremental shift in Conservative statements, the beginnings of its implementation in the settler colonies, and the more skillful handling of situations and questions by the new Colonial Secretary are probably all reasons why tension eased in Commons after 1954. There were few debates on African affairs during the next two years. In 1955 there was not even a Supply Debate on this issue. There was also a sharp drop in the number of Oral and Written Questions concerning affairs in our four colonies during this period. Labour's publication Fact contains some articles which criticized government policy in east and central Africa, but the number and length of these articles diminished sharply from that of the previous two year period.¹⁰⁶

Steps toward independence were occurring relatively smoothly in west Africa. The Mau Mau insurrection was definitely weakening. The CAF was a fait accompli. It seemed to be working tolerably well. It could not be reviewed before 1960, since a seven year grace period had been written into the act which created the Federation.¹⁰⁷ Churchill retired in 1955. His successor, Anthony Eden, made several Cabinet changes, but he kept Lennox-Boyd as First Secretary of Colonial Affairs.


¹⁰⁷ This provision was part of the 1953 White Paper creating the CAF.
In mid-1956 Kenya once more became the subject of angry debate. Labour M.P. Barbara Castle charged the colonial government with permitting police brutality and improper prison conditions. Labourites generally supported her claim. Conservatives argued she had either inflated a few isolated incidents or accepted false native statements at face value. Her demands prisoners be released were rejected on grounds that the emergency might be lessening but Mau Mau was still capable of substantial terrorist activity. Vigilance must be maintained.\footnote{Hansard, Vol. 553 (July 6, 1956), cc. 1087-1213.}

A clear difference was emerging even in the two parties' assessment of prisoner conditions and Mau Mau strength. Even greater was the gap between the parties over proposed solutions. When the constitution was promulgated in 1952 Britain promised the settlers there would be no substantial revision before 1960. This meant continued disenfranchisement of the Kikuyu and certain other tribes. Other blacks could vote only on a separate roll from whites. A 1956 change enlarged the franchise but retained property and loyalty qualifications, and some multiple votes. Conservative speakers uniformly hailed this "step forward." Most Labourites supported Creech Jones' view that these changes were insufficient, overly harsh, and unnecessarily "illiberal." Most Africans, even most Kikuyu's, had been loyal, he said. They ought to be rewarded with more rapid progress towards the right to vote for leaders of their choice,
with power to determine many domestic policies.\textsuperscript{109}

The 1956 debates indicate the inter-party gap was still growing. Leon Epstein has suggested that one of the major failings of the British system is that while the opposition is expected to constructively oppose, its sources of information, especially on external matters, are very slim. Usually these consist of no more than the "custom" of Ministers and staffs discussing matters with former holders of the same office. In crises, Labour likely possessed "only as much confidential information as the (government) were willing to give."\textsuperscript{110} A logical corollary would be that the longer the opposition is out of power the less accurate its knowledge becomes. We have already found evidence the out-party leadership is likely to become more ideologically attuned to its more dogmatic back bench members. In this case a third factor intervened; the increasingly close association of Labour with black rather than white African aspirations. Shortly after Labour's bad defeat in the 1955 elections John Hatch wrote of the "tremendous trust and faith which Africans throughout the continent have of the Labour Party." He was certain most "politically conscious" blacks saw the election as a setback to their aspirations. Labour must continue, in opposition, the "challenging mission" to see that true racial partnership developed before greater self-government was

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., cc. 1111-14 (Creech Jones). See also 1142-46 (Hobson); 1178 (Harris); 1183 (Hale).

\textsuperscript{110}Epstein, \textit{Suez Crisis}, p. 78.
In line with Hatch's suggestions, Labour's policy moved towards a demand for a timetable for independence for all colonial peoples, together with a more rapid implementation of true multiracialism, i.e. towards representation in legislatures more consistent with a colony's actual black-white numerical population. Violence in settling colonial problems was deplored in a 1955 NEC resolution. The party simultaneously pledged non-interference in domestic colonial problems, a position they did not consistently adhere to in the years following.

These policies would create an internal conflict in the Labour position towards settler colonies in the years after Ghana became independent. The party's leaders wished to see an acceleration of the pace of political reforms leading to self-government. It also came increasingly to insist there be no promise of independence until a colony was clearly moving towards a one-man, one-vote governmental system. This meant an end to acceptance of parity and, later, an end to any type of multiracial government preserving a weighted franchise for Europeans. This would be the pattern for inter-party conflict in the post-1957 period. The next three Chapters will analyze this period in our west, east and central African colonies respectively.

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CHAPTER VI

EVENTS IN WEST AFRICA: 1957-64

This Chapter will briefly consider British-Ghanaian relations in the years following the latter's independence. It will also indicate attitude and policy changes in the United Kingdom during the years between Nigeria's receipt of internal regional control (1957) and full independence (1960). We shall also look briefly at post-independence relations between these two countries.

The after-effects of Suez are not easily determinable, except to say the Conservative government in Britain seemed, from then on, to be increasingly anxious to get on with the job of ending empire. Thus Nigeria, despite substantial problems in its final year as a colony, was moved towards sovereignty with even less hesitation by Parliament than had been true for Ghana. After the "winds of change" speech delivered by Prime Minister Macmillan in Johannesburg early in 1960, the settler colonies would be moved rapidly toward independence as well. By that time, the two west African colonies were already fully sovereign.

A phenomenon we did not fully anticipate was that once a former colony became fully independent, its internal politics ceased to be a
Discussion of the gradual decay of Ghanaian parliamentary procedures after 1957 therefore appears but rarely in *Hansard*. The same is true of events within Nigeria after 1960.

For both colonies there was one major exception. Each applied, three years after its independence, to become a republic. This required technical alterations of their constitutional relationship with Britain. There was no opposition to granting the request in either case, but the debate period on Second Readings provided an opportunity to discuss the political situation in these former colonies.

Ghanaian independence came in a blaze of glory. There were dawn to midnight celebrations in Accra. Nkrumah became a hero throughout Africa and an inspiration to nationalists in colonies everywhere. The British press lauded the new experiment in self-government. The *Guardian* was especially euphoric, suggesting there had been "no more spectacular demonstration of the essential radicalism of British colonial policy since the war."\(^2\)

*The Times* paid tribute to the several men who had so successfully brought the new nation to independence in so few years. Yet, in retrospect, the editors were sorry the initial decisions to hurry that process,

\(^1\)Admittedly the position was not always adhered to. The *apartheid* policies of the Republic of South Africa were the subject of frequent attack, especially by the opposition. This exception was justified on grounds this practice was such a flagrant violation of justice.

made in 1948, had not been more rationally planned. Rather those
decisions were "part of a chain reaction after the Christenborg riots . . .
and therefore conveyed an impression of weakness."

This was true. Yet, without the riots (or some similar crisis) would
the policy decisions have been made? Britain would seem to have
believed it had decades to develop incremental steps towards indepen­
dence in its African colonies. Would anything short of the nationalists
taking action on their own have shattered the lethargy of official policy?
We doubt it.

Nkrumah had made concessions to the NLM in the final months
before independence. This was no doubt done largely to appease the
British, who were urging him to act in a conciliatory manner. Had he
refused, Britain probably could not have delayed the date the nation
became sovereign. This way, however, he won the goodwill of the former
ruling power as well as that of the Commonwealth members and of the
United States.

Yet, in the final analysis, once he gained independence, Nkrumah
could do whatever his popularity permitted him to do. The British hoped
he would work to bring his friends and opponents closer together and
build responsible self-rule. There was little they could do, after March 6,
1957, if he chose to act otherwise. This was succinctly put in a Guardian

editorial written soon after the new state was born. One could easily imagine Nkrumah, "inspired by personal victory and the acclamations of the country . . . considering it his patriotic duty to throw the whole (constitution) into the fire and start fresh." He could succeed "for a time" even if he ignored parliament and assumed a "stalinist role." Some of his followers would welcome his using power to curb opposition. Only he could prevent excess since only he had sufficient mass support to determine the direction in which the nation would go. One could but hope he would act in accordance with honor and truthfulness and "show us all" his leadership ability in moving the country along democratic lines.

Discouraging signs soon appeared. Not long after independence, the CPP was able to win control of each of the regional assemblies, by means of local elections. The constitution was amended, in a perfectly legal way, to restore the power to Accra which had been weaned from it by months of difficult negotiations. From then on, manifesting a pattern with its own di overtones, political power was increasingly centralized into the hands of the ruling party leaders, most especially those of Nkrumah himself.

Resentment against the direction politics was taking in Ghana incensed many British M.P.'s. There was no necessary party consistence, however. Labour seemed especially ambivalent on this issue.

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On the other hand, Labour had been more emphatic than the Conservatives in insisting preparing a colony for independence be accompanied by the growth of democratic institutions. The 1957 publication Smaller Territories stipulated several times that self-determination ought to be granted a colony as soon as, but not before, "democracy has been firmly established." The charge Rhodesia retained overweighted settler rolls would later be a key part of Labour's assertion she was not democratic, hence not worthy of being awarded independence.

Yet Labour, especially its left wing, wished to avoid any right wing attempt to use events in Ghana as proof the black man was not yet capable of self-government. They were perhaps more willing to excuse undemocratic moves there than they were to excuse similar procedures in colonies where settlers retained power. The reverse attitude may be discerned among certain right wing Conservatives.

The majority may be called pragmatic realists. They often did not like the direction Ghana was taking, but realized little could be done about it. Therefore it was not wise to say much about it. This could only antagonize the country's government and further estrange it from Britain. A good example was George Mason's speech at the Second Reading of the Gold Coast Independence Bill. Events in Germany in the 1930's ought, he said, to have proven once and for all that constitutions, even those

5 Smaller Territories, pp. 7-8.
possessing entrenched clauses, could not guarantee democratic govern-
ment. 6

He was challenged by his own party's spokesman on colonial
affairs. Griffiths argued entrenched clauses would indeed protect the
minority peoples. Some M.P.'s from both parties agreed. The British
were perfectly well aware that the colonies could not become
democratic—at least not for decades—without formal constitutions
guaranteeing rights which had grown in their country through custom and
convention. They seemed sometimes unwilling to realize the validity of
the other side of the coin. Democratic government rests upon checks and
balances. These can only partially be formal, legal, or constitutional.
More crucial are attitudes, willingness to compromise, and the practical
balance of power. Without these, democratic institutions will not long
survive.

For the next three years the only matter of concern over events in
Ghana which appeared in Hansard was Britain's continued reluctance to
grant her substantial amounts of aid. The government spoke of negoti-
atations with Commonwealth partners, other friendly nations (especially
the U.S.A.), and international agencies. But it announced few results.
Britain's principal means of influence over the Nkrumah regime was thus
minimized. Occasionally there were warnings in Commons that failure to

provide more aid, especially with the Volta River project, might, as Mallalieu put it, "risk pushing that new state into . . . unorthodox directions." Yet financing of that project continued to be delayed. Ghana finally ceased to wait, and turned to the USSR for the funds.

In 1959 an alleged assassination plot against Nkrumah was followed by many arrests and introduction of emergency legislation. Labour M.P.'s seemed especially concerned over where such action would lead. John Hatch wrote in Commonwealth, in the summer of 1959 "strong government may take one of two forms." It could weaken democratic foundations and aim at dictatorship, or it could "defend the foundation of democracy from violent attempts to overthrow it." Hatch reported having discussed these subjects with Nkrumah, who "showed that he was well aware of the dangers" and had "assured" that recent preventive detention acts, etc., were temporary and designed only to deal with the emergency.

That October, Shadow Prime Minister Gaitskill, speaking in Commons, pointed to Ghana with pride. He hoped Nigeria, as it neared independence, would follow the example set by Ghana rather than that of central Africa.

In 1960 Nkrumah published a new constitution, establishing a

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republic, and combining the offices of Prime Minister and President in himself. This led to renewed fears of dictatorship. The Labour Party, in its 1960 pamphlet *British Africa*, indicated some concern. Yet, it argued:

All that can be said at this stage is that alongside this centralization of power Mr. Nkrumah's Government has pushed ahead vigorously with a policy of the widest possible spread of education among the people, a policy which one would have thought would have been contrary to the establishment of a dictatorship.

Besides, it was argued the new constitution would require a plebiscite before adoption. The Ghanaian leader pledged to periodically submit to future plebiscites. And he was urging a union of African states (which would supersede the national constitution). It was certainly not usual for "a would-be dictator to provide in this manner for his own future liquidation in a wider authority."\(^{10}\) Conservative semi-official publications seemed content with not commenting on events in the former colony during this period.

The decision to make Ghana a republic provided Commons with a last opportunity to debate that country's affairs. Second Reading of the bill amending the necessary British statutes came on May 17, 1960.\(^{11}\)

The government, the opposition leaders, and the Conservative back

\(^{10}\) *British Africa*, pp. 43-44. It must be noted that this pamphlet contains a front page disclaimer that it was issued "for discussion purposes . . . not (as) a statement of Labour Party policy."

bench all wished to avoid controversy by approving the bill as a formality. The request for republican status came after all, not only from a sovereign government, but after approval by its legislature and decisive support in a national referendum. Unanimous Commonwealth acceptance had also been obtained. The government's position was well summarized in Under-Secretary Richard Thompson's concluding remarks. This was not an occasion for recrimination or criticism, he said, but one to demonstrate Britain "want(e)d to give a fair wind to the new Ghana." 

The opposition front bench was, if anything, more accommodating. Republican status, said spokesman H. A. Marquand, had not harmed other Commonwealth members. It might help Nkrumah in his goal of encouraging development elsewhere on his continent. Britain would be wise to stay on the friendliest possible terms with a man whose qualifications to do so were beyond doubt. Meanwhile Britons could but "hope" the Ghanaian government would continue to act "with full recognition" of such declared Commonwealth objectives as "human freedom and . . . the prevalence of democracy." Labour's leaders would seem to have abandoned any idea of influence through pressure.

Conservative backbench speakers on this occasion confined

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12 The vote was 1,016,076 to 124,623, or over eighty-five percent favorable.


14 Ibid., c. 1109.
themselves to statements approving the requested legislation. Perhaps they were merely accepting the fait accompli. At least one former critic, Commonwealth Under-Secretary John Tilney, would appear to have become an ardent defender of Ghanaian democracy. He even berated the British press for being "unfair" towards the new nation, for speaking of "rigged" elections when the government had gone to great lengths to establish "extra precautions" against this possibility. As proof he mentioned that Nkrumah's percentage of the vote in his home constituency actually had declined slightly from its 1954 total.¹⁵

Once again the only opposition came from certain leftists on the Labour back benches. Certain equally radical Socialists came to the defense of the Nkrumah regime. There was a surprising degree of internal party hostility. We shall give an example of each viewpoint.

Roy Mason decried the CPP for first banning all significant opposition parties (i.e. those of a "tribal, religious, or regional nature") and then placing key opposition figures in jail. It now appeared to him Nkrumah had been "determined from the outset" to keep power, even if authoritarianism was the price to be paid. A request to become a republic meant the country was "but a short pace from dictatorship."¹⁶

Fellow Socialist John Stonehouse sharply dissented. He felt it

¹⁵Ibid., c. 1112.

¹⁶Ibid., cc. 1114-18.
necessary to "dissociate" himself from the "patronizing points" raised by his colleague. As we shall show later, Stonehouse was one of the most outspoken opponents of the policies of the white regimes in Southern Rhodesia. It is interesting to contrast his condemnation of emergency legislation there with his approval of its use by Nkrumah.

It was, he argued, "not up to us to decide when a people should receive independence," or what sort of institutions to "impose" upon them. To await a colony's attainment of standards such as Britain possessed would be to wait so long the people would rise up in "sheer desperation." Republican status represented merely the "final stage" in Ghana's progress towards full sovereignty. Fifty percent of the Ghanaian registered electorate had approved the new constitution. Only 38.9 percent of the British electorate had approved the Conservative majority now ruling England. What right had the latter nation to question democracy in the former?\(^{17}\)

The difference between his assessment of the policies of Ghana and Rhodesia, it would appear, was not so much the nature of the legislation as the nature of the government which passed it. Ghana's government was popularly chosen under universal adult suffrage. Rhodesia's was chosen only by a majority of its sharply restricted electorate. (We shall refer to this again when we discuss British-Rhodesian affairs.) It would

appear men like Stonehouse had fought too long for the right of black Africanders to rule themselves, to admit that blacks could oppress fellow blacks as ruthlessly as whites had oppressed them.18

Only one Conservative made critical comments on this occasion. One of these forms a fitting close to this debate. "What is concerning some of us" about the repressive acts of the regime, he said "is not that these things took place in the early stages (of independence) but that there seems to be a growing propensity for them to continue."19

The Guardian was more hostile towards the Ghanaian government than was The Times. In 1960 it criticized its government for not only failing to protest, but actually "smiling in approval" as Nkrumah acted increasingly irresponsibly.20 When, in May, 1962 the Ghanaian government announced an amnesty of political prisoners, the same paper welcomed the move. It now excused occasional emergency measures as perhaps necessary in countries where "a sense of national loyalty had not yet fully emerged." The Times, rather noncommittal during the earlier emergency, also praised the amnesty. Both, however, expressed hope that this was the first of several moves which would insure return of

18 The intraparty dispute continued as Brockway delivered a somewhat milder but still strong defense of Nkrumah. Ibid., cc. 1125-28. Then Mallalieu, also an outspoken Labour defender of black rights on other occasions, defended Mason. Ibid., cc. 1131-33.

19 Ibid., c. 1130 (F. M. Bennett).

The reverse occurred. Remaining freedoms rapidly deteriorated during 1963. Such prominent Ghanaians as J. B. Danquah, who gave Nkrumah his start in politics, spent over a year in jail after 1960. In 1963 he was again incarcerated, and died, behind bars, in 1965. Late in 1963, Arku Korsah, an internationally distinguished judge, was removed as Chief Justice of the Ghanaian Supreme Court following his dismissal of charges against three other prominent Ghanaians accused of an assassination attempt against Osagyefo (Redeemer) Nkrumah.

A referendum in January, 1964, completed the formal transition of the country to a one-party state. It also granted the President the right to remove any judge, at any time, for "reasons which appear to him sufficient." These measures were endorsed, the Ghanaian press reported, by 99.9 percent of those voting. The Osagyefo soon proclaimed his nation would henceforward be governed by principles of "scientific socialism."

Even our two moderate newspapers were incensed. The Times called Korsah's dismissal "disgraceful . . . scandalous . . . arbitrary . . . (but) no surprise" to anyone observing the deterioration of Ghana's political system in recent years. The Guardian was somewhat more restrained and objective, but pointed out Nkrumah's removal of the Chief

Justice was in violation of his country's constitution. Establishment of one man rule in Ghana only reinforced the ranks of white supremacists elsewhere on the continent.22

The Times' reaction to the 1964 referendum was total disillusionment. "One-party, one-boss rule" it suggested "is not the only way to hold a state together. The Congo . . . may suggest that it is the only way of which Africans are capable."23

Probably because it did not wish to unduly offend a sister member of the Commonwealth--especially a black sister--the NCP reported these actions without stating an opinion. Commonwealth provided its readers with greater explanation, but took pains to suggest Nkrumah's program, despite its marxist clothing, ought not to be seen as much different in practice from those of other African countries.24

Since Ghana was sovereign, the above events were not discussed in Commons. There is only one clue to the way at least some once friendly backbenchers had come to feel about Nkrumah by 1964. In January he was barely missed by an assassin's bullet. As would be perfectly normal among Commonwealth heads of state Douglas-Home sent a


message of congratulations. Labour's Donnelly took issue with even this action and demanded the Prime Minister make it perfectly clear the message "implied no support" for the Nkrumah regime. Home defended his act solely on the weak assertion that, whatever that regime was like "no circumstances" justified an assassination. Kwame Nkrumah, the villain turned hero, was once more a villain in the opinion of most Britons.

As had been true in past years, Nigeria was once again discussed least of the four colonies we are considering. The reason for this remained the relatively smooth transition from colony to republic; the absence of a settler population, the extent of the nation's resources, the relative moderation of the leadership. There was widespread belief among Britons that Nigeria would be the showplace of viable democracy in Africa, and the belief grew steadily in the first years after independence. This no doubt helps explain why the violent civil war of the past two years has been especially upsetting to the M.P.'s of the United Kingdom.

During 1957, 1958 and most of 1959 Nigeria was not the subject of any significant debate in Commons. Early in 1957 discussions with Britain over implementation of the 1956 agreements were temporarily set back when Eastern Region Premier Azikiwe was linked to a bank scandal. Despite rather clear evidence of his guilt, he went to the people "in

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defiance rather than in sackcloth and ashes." His party's majority was reduced, but he remained in power.26

Talks resumed in May of that year, and ended late in June "on a note of progress and compromise."27 A federal government of three regions (roughly comparable to the areas dominated by the three major tribes) was established. All three major parties agreed upon the NPC Vice President, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, as Federal Prime Minister. He, in turn, formed a national government with ministers from each of the three parties. Only one matter of sharp contention remained. Lennox-Boyd refused to specify a date for independence. He broadly hinted, however, that if all went well sovereignty might be expected sometime in 1960. The Times, in keeping with its usual pragmatic approach, called this decision "empirical and generally wise."28 In light of the reluctance of the Northern Region to move as rapidly as the other regions wished, and in light of the clearly less politically mature status of the people of this region (with half the colony's population) this decision seems doubly wise.


28 Times, June 27, 1957, p. 11.
We would disagree with Labour, and support the view of the liberal Conservative Bow Group, that prior establishment of rigid timetables for independence was disfunctional under these or most other circumstances. Situations in the colonies were usually too fluid. Such synoptic commitments might well prove detrimental to all parties concerned. Yet there was clearly a desire on the part of nationals to receive a binding British commitment to withdraw on a specific date. At some point they would be strong enough to secure such a pledge. Then, even if conditions within the colony deteriorated, the British would have little choice but to withdraw by that date. Still, the later such a pledge had to be made, the greater the British bargaining position, the more the likelihood she could get disparate groups within a colony to compromise so as to gain the freedom they all desired.

In Nigeria it appeared for a while such leverage would be scarcely necessary. Further talks with Britain were held in September, 1958. They resulted in almost unprecedented accord among all major participants. Each regional leader made concessions in the interest of the nation. The Times warned this could be more apparent than real. "The gaps between tribe and nationhood are still great and they will not be bridged in a day." Nonetheless it appeared as if Britain's largest African colony would enjoy  

\[29^{29}\text{Race and Power, pp. 15-16.}\]
the smoothest of the continent's transitions to self-rule.30

New elections were held at the end of 1959, under generally peaceful and democratic circumstances. Votes were primarily along tribal and regional lines. The NPC campaigned only in the north, and won by far the largest number of parliamentary seats. It failed to gain a majority, since thirty-two northern seats fell to rival party candidates.31

The northern and eastern regional parties formed another coalition government, and relations between them became increasingly cordial. Sir Abubakar again became Prime Minister. Azikiwe, his major political rival, accepted the largely ceremonial post of President (and later of Governor General). He retained leadership of the NCNC. The Action Group won in the west, and again became the official opposition. It campaigned largely on a platform of creating new states to represent other tribal blocs. This caused considerable strain in its relations with the other parties. (This is most interesting in light of the 1966 crisis, when the Western Region remained loyal after the east declared itself the independent nation of Biafra.)


31 Election results were as follows:
NPC (north) 142 seats
NCNC/NEPU (east) 89 seats
Action Group (west) 73 seats
Others 8 seats
The very absence of Commons' debate on the colony's progress was clear indication most M.P.'s believed matters to be proceeding smoothly. Occasionally there were explicit statements to this effect. Shadow Prime Minister Gaitskill, for example, in his remarks during the 1959 Debate on the Queen's Address, contrasted the steady progress of Nigeria to the bitter rivalries delaying advance for east and central African colonies. Of course the principal reason for this difference was the absence of the complicating settler factor in the west. Later, when democracy broke down in Ghana and Nigeria, Britons could ease their consciences by stating they had had democratic institutions when independence was granted.

Given the low and regionally disparate economic, social, educational and political levels in Nigeria, given the short period of democratic experimentation, given the degree to which the country remained separate tribes with distinct attitudes, one might question whether they possessed democratic institutions anywhere but on paper. Admittedly Britain ran out of time. The political situation, especially in the Eastern and Western Regions, precluded the possibility of further delay. Once more, having decided independence would come, Whitehall would appear to have become overly euphoric in assessing the likelihood of a colony's

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32 Hansard, Vol. 612 (October 27, 1959), cc. 48-49.

33 For the budgets of the federal and regional governments see NCP, Vol. XIV #3 (February 15, 1960), p. 6.
success as a democratic entity.

Once again, it was certain members of the Labour backbenches, formerly among the most vocal supporters of independence at an early date, who became most reluctant to grant that status to Nigeria when the time to do so came near. As was true three years earlier with Ghana, the goal of these M.P.'s was to "help make the Commonwealth not just strong but democratic."34 Doubts as to whether this term could be correctly applied to this colony were expressed several times during the October, 1959 Debate on the Queen's Address. There was unanimous agreement the bill ought to be sent to committee without significant alteration. This much had been learned from the Ghanaian experience. Not all, however, shared Colonial Secretary Macleod's optimism that, at this "particularly telling time in the destinies of Africa," it was great fortune that a colony about to receive independence had proven to be "a model of democratic development."35

The Secretary based his observation upon the amicable relationships among the country's major parties and the degree to which they agreed in advance to establish constitutional safeguards. These included considerable decentralization of functions, a separate judiciary for each region, codes of fundamental rights at both the regional and national levels,

34 H ansard, Vol. 612 (October 27, 1959), cc. 93ff (Quote by E. L. Mallalieu).

35 I b id., Vol. 626 (July 15, 1960), c. 1793.
entrenched clauses requiring extraordinary majorities at both levels, etc. These were seen to provide "a considerable degree of firmness and stability in the fundamentals of independence."\textsuperscript{36} Once again form would seem to have taken precedence over substance. The fundamental distrust and attitudinal divisions among the tribes and the regions were largely ignored. Yet when the bill came up for Second Reading, no further objections were raised.

The opposition front bench, represented by H. S. Marquand, was almost as optimistic as Macleod. It was admitted the colony retained great problems, including a standard of living high by African standards but miserably low when compared to Europe. But Nigerians had done much in the past few years. They had proven "very willing . . . to help themselves." They had created "a western-type democracy" largely by their own efforts.\textsuperscript{37}

The closing speakers sustained the optimistic level. Labour's F. M. Bennett saw "no sign" in this colony of the "autocratic trends" apparent elsewhere on the continent, while Under-Secretary Richard Thompson felt the colony represented the "culmination of our work" a "shining example of a divided world" of how a colony could emerge "without bloodshed or rancour" to independence and cordial relations with

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.}, cc. 1794-95. Only the future fate of the Cameroons remained unresolved.

\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid.}, cc. 1802-04.
the former ruling power.  

The most unusual aspect of the ensuing debate was the virtual unanimity of the views expressed by all nine backbench speakers. Not a single Conservative expressed doubt the black Nigerians were able to govern themselves wisely. Not a single Labourite expressed fear that tribal and regional differences which remained would be sufficient to undo the goodwill currently extant. It would be impossible to tell Conservative from Labourite, radical from reactionary, on the basis of the words spoken during this debate.

Labour's former Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, expressed some concern towards the end of his talk, as to whether the preparation for independence had been "as thorough, sound and adequate as it might be." In the remaining months before full independence, he suggested, there ought to be a final crash program extending educational facilities, developing the economic infrastructure, further developing the native civil service and, in general, "making the foundations of the territory a

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38 Ibid., cc. 1842, 1845-46.

39 Ibid., cc. 1806-07 (Pannell); 1812-13 (Robinson); 1840 (Vaughan-Morgan). The one slightly sour note was a warning by right winger Kenneth Pickthorn that the "greatest risk" to a new nation's success came when Britain ceased to offer its "protection and sovereignty," especially in a colony like Nigeria with no tradition of democracy. Ibid., c. 1831.

40 E.g., Ibid., cc. 1826, 1829 (Brockway).
little more secure. "41 No other Labour M.P. showed even this much concern.

For most of his talk, Creech Jones, too, was optimistic. Only a few years ago, he reminded, the Nigerian situation was discussed, "as if we had eternity to play with it." The transition to participation in the "modern world" came with amazing rapidity. But Britain had acted with great skill and delicacy, and had now fulfilled its "enlightened ... purpose." Macleod had acted with both "humanity and a sense of realism." Anxiety remained over policy elsewhere in British Africa, but results in Nigeria proved the "superior quality of British methods over those of other nations."42

Party publications of the time also reflect the above euphoria. Labour's 1960 publication British Africa admitted problems remained. "The differences and antipathies between the peoples of the three regions (were) great." The alliance between the NCNC and the NPC "has its dangers." But strong, experienced regional governments plus constitutional limitations on the power of the federal government were seen as sufficient checks to deter any likelihood of the breakdown of constitutional government.43 The 1960 Party Conference expressed satisfaction

41 Ibid., c. 1821.
42 Ibid., cc. 1814-16.
43 British Africa, pp. 44-45.
there would soon be a new nation which would "exercise a stabilizing influence throughout Africa." 44

The Conservatives' NCP likewise stressed the constitutional arrangements. It saw the document as excellent. It was flexible where it ought to be—in its regulation of internal relationships. Underlying this was "a considerable degree of firmness and stability." This was especially true in its enunciation of fundamental human rights, spelled out "at the desire of the Nigerian leaders themselves." All Britons could feel "abiding pride" as they wished "God Speed" to the soon-to-be sovereign nation. Nigeria's road to independence fulfilled Britain's colonial purpose; "to serve first as masters, then as leaders, finally as partners, and always as friends." 45

Events in Ghana would seem to have taught the Colonial Office a few lessons. Continuation of British aid after independence was promised to Nigeria. So was technical assistance and, perhaps, educational and training agreements. 46 Labour remained critical, however, charging the government was giving the impression there would be far more aid than would be the case. Over eighty percent of the cost of the colony's announced seven year plan would come from its own resources.

44 Annual Report 1960, p. 73.
46 Hansard, Vol. 632 (December 12, 1960), c. 16.
And CD&W funds would again be terminated. Commonwealth summarized Labour’s attitude as follows:

In view, therefore, of the considerable contribution in men and materials made by Nigeria to the Commonwealth war effort, and of important dollar earnings with which she helped Britain to solve her balance of payments difficulties in the post-war period, the British Government’s farewell contribution can hardly be said to be over-generous.47

Again one might well charge the party out of power with being over generous in spending the people’s money. Yet Labour had a real concern lest lack of sufficient funds damage the colony’s ability to begin independence under favorable circumstances. It was pledged, if reelected, to spend one percent of Britain’s annual income on aid to less developed peoples. It seemed less concerned than its opposition over the chronic domestic balance of payments difficulties; arguing proper management and curtailment of defense spending would solve this problem.

After independence, it was both government and opposition policy not to discuss Nigerian affairs in Commons. A last opportunity to do so arose when, like Ghana, Nigeria decided to become a republic three years after it became a sovereign state.

In the interim period events in the colony were discussed somewhat in the party journals; frequently in the two newspapers. The journals limited their articles to description. The press occasionally made opinionated comments. The most detailed analyses of events were two


The colony was just beginning to awaken to its massive potential as continental leader, Holden reported. It was slowly shaking off "the hangover of colonialism" its leaders realizing it must make its own decisions rather than rely, as before, on "the financial conservatism of her British trainees." This was one of the very few African nations to possess the resources to become a truly viable nation. She must learn to utilize them so as to avoid twin pitfalls. If she moved too slowly, the masses would grow impatient. If she moved too quickly, as Ghana had, she risked "falling credit, inflation, austerity and perhaps political upheaval."

No one even attempted to deny existence of widespread corruption and nepotism, although so far there had been no move so foolishly costly as Nkrumah's purchase of a fleet of Soviet Ilushin air liners. On the other hand the colony had so far exhibited "remarkable capacity for leadership." "For better or for worse," Holden concluded, this would be the most powerful country on the continent. She could not avoid a leadership role. The only question would be the direction that role would take.48

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The Bow Group's January, 1962, publication The New Africa, was a bit less sanguine. Nigeria's leaders were viewed as having flatly rejected the fuhrerprinzip now extant in Accra. But the situation was not as stable as it appeared on the surface. There was as yet no dynamic national ideology to bind the various segments of the nation. In many ways the country still appeared to be a "mere geographic expression."\(^4^9\)

Hopes for a stable, developing democracy were sharply set back in 1962. In April a Midwest Region was established, designed in part to weaken the political base of the opposition Action Party. Nigeria was changing, The Times editorialized. The new direction was becoming clearer. Politics was not nearly so stable as appeared from Lagos. The youth were becoming disillusioned. Discontent was rising and, along with it, a tendency towards authoritarian response. The country was "confirming to the general, if to our eyes regressive, tendency of West African states."\(^5^0\)

Soon after the long simmering antagonism between the government and the opposition Action Party came to a head. Many of the Western Region leaders, including Premier Chief Awolowo and party Second Vice-President Chief Enahoro were brought to trial for treason. The details of this episode are beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the charges

\(^4^9\) The New Africa, pp. 51-52.

\(^5^0\) "Pressure Inside Nigeria," Times editorial, April 24, 1962, p. 11.
might have been valid, but there was an air of political intrigue about the proceedings which left a foul odor in London. As The Times put it, it was the height of irony that, at the very time Nkrumah was freeing his political opponents, the Nigerian leaders were moving to muzzle theirs.51

A state of emergency had been declared in May, when the alleged treason charges were made public. It was lifted the following New Year's Day. The Times titled an editorial "Democracy Restored," and praised the country for returning to "the broad reliance on democracy which is Nigeria's salient characteristic in an Africa increasingly ruled by all-powerful presidents."52

Reaction was far less favorable that September, when Awolowo received a ten year prison sentence. The Times accepted the evidence of his guilt. There must, it speculated, have been "some defect in an otherwise robustly realistic mentality." His fall still was seen to be a "bad blow" to Nigeria's future stability. It was questionable whether all the government's motives were in the interest of justice alone. Nigerian leaders strongly resented any suggestion of a pattern to break its opposition. The judiciary had "kept the professional rules." Yet prospects for

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a return to parliamentary methods were "not happy."

In December, 1962, publication of the results of the first national census since independence caused further unrest. Such statistics would have little political impact in most countries. Not so where parties were primarily regional, and the number of Assembly seats allocated to each region depended upon its population. The constitution had assumed a relative balance between the populations of north and south. The census figures gave the southern regions a sizeable majority. The northern government protested. The crisis was postponed when the regional and national Premiers together agreed to hold another census. When it was published, in February, 1964, it showed but a slight increase in the previous combined total of persons living in the southern regions. But the Northern Region now was reputed to contain over ten million more persons than it had a year and a half earlier. Now the Eastern and Midwestern Regions refused to accept the validity of the figures. Tension mounted. Resentment between Ibos and Hausas reached a new height. Ibo success in business ventures in the north further alienated the population

53 "Chief Awolowo's Fall," Times editorial, September 12, 1963, p. 11. On July 1, 1964, the Nigerian Supreme Court upheld the conviction. For details see Carter, Politics in Africa, p. 148. As of July 1, 1969, Awolowo was the highest ranking civilian official in the Nigerian government.

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<td>South</td>
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of that region, especially since, in the eyes of many, "pagans" had no right being successful in competition with those of the "true faith." This resentment would explode in 1966, where the assassination of Balewa led to a Hausa uprising against Ibos living in the north. The resultant slaughter was the primary catalyst behind the Biafra secession.

The Nigerian request for republican status, received in November, 1963, provided Commons with its final opportunity to discuss events in the colony in circumstances where it might legally do something to influence them. Actually this was a fiction. Ratification of the request, as both sides of the aisle knew, was a formality. Indeed the Nigerian parliament had declared itself a republic as of October 1, 1963. Royal Assent did not come until December 18, but was retroactive to the earlier date. It would have been ludicrous for any M.P. to seriously suggest refusing to grant republican status. The Nigerians would almost certainly have declared it anyway, and relations between herself and her former ruler would have sunk to perhaps irreconcilable depths. Britain no longer possessed the opportunity to reward or punish Nigerian behavior by taking or refusing to take incremental steps desired by the native leaders.

Indeed, this was so obvious that some speakers from both parties suggested African colonies ought henceforward to be automatically granted republican constitutions when they became independent. For a populace without European heritage, they argued, the concept of a perpetually
"absent sovereign" must bear no real meaning. The decision to become a republic was virtually inevitable. The temptation among rulers of such lands was to adopt this form to prove, if only to themselves, they headed truly independent states. The Indian example had shown such a move would not necessarily weaken Commonwealth ties. It ought to be immediately made.\(^55\)

British thinking had come a long way since the days when even the white Dominions were perceived as "junior partners" of the "British Commonwealth of Nations." The attitudinal change developed incrementally over the years, in response to the actualities of the declining empire and the totally voluntary nature of the Commonwealth. By 1963 not a single M.P. would be found opposing the above suggestions on republican status except for those proposing the alternative of expanding the membership of the Privy Council so as to make it truly reflective of all races and ethnic groups in the Commonwealth, with rotating meetings among the member states.\(^56\)

In March, 1964, British Prime Minister Home spoke, in Lagos, of the almost complete evolution of the old empire into the new Commonwealth. Each member must do its "full part" in harnessing technology, quenching hunger, curing disease and expanding ways to satisfy man's

\(^{55}\)Hansard, Vol. 685 (November 20, 1963), cc. 1128, 1132-34.

\(^{56}\)Ibid., cc. 1129-30, 1134-35.
thirst for knowledge. Nigeria ought to play a major role, probably the major role, in performing these tasks in Africa.\textsuperscript{57} Other Britons would echo these sentiments. They expressed high hopes that Nigeria had evolved truly democratic parliamentary institutions, that her government had really accepted British traditions of law and justice, albeit within a framework tempered by Nigerian tribal customs. Yet, as they increasingly realized, the most Britain could do to implement such actions was to set an example and hope the colony would emulate it.

Of course British hopes Nigeria would be the symbol of stable parliamentary democracy have been dashed. It is Nigeria, not Ghana, which has been beset by one of the most brutal civil wars in the history of man. Whether or not Biafra ultimately wins its independence, it would appear almost certain Nigeria, like Ghana, will be ruled by the military for years to come.

In part this might be Britain's fault. She urged her former colony to lend money and technicians to her less fortunate African nations (in part to offset Nkrumah's influence). Nigeria's economy proved too weak to sustain the burden. Her contingent of troops in the U.N. command served admirably, but again the strain on the Nigerian economy was great. This, in turn, meant fewer political options were open to the democratically oriented Nigerian leaders. There was widespread corruption, dash

(bribery) and nepotism. Inter-regional and inter-tribal animosity continued to run deep, although for a few years it remained sublimated beneath the seemingly smoothly running political system. Not only the British but many educated Nigerians were lulled by the surface calm.

In retrospect it would appear that Britain failed to adequately prepare either of her west African colonies for independence as parliamentary democracies. Of course no amount of preparation might have achieved that goal. But there were far too few attempts to build genuinely democratic institutions or a genuine concept of nationhood until her last few years of rule, when her influence had already sharply waned. Once again the colonial power had acted almost to the last as if independence, though an ultimate goal, were decades away. Nationalism arose far more rapidly than Whitehall had predicted. Both British power and the British will to use force to maintain her empire had weakened far more rapidly than was foreseen. This put too much strain on an incremental policy predicated upon the assumption that democratic political institutions could be developed in these colonies in accordance with a pace decided upon in London. British reactions to events in the colonies was often insufficiently dynamic. Many in Commons lacked the awareness to perceive how rapidly these colonies had become politicized. By the time that awareness came in the case of The Gold Coast Britain had already promised to withdraw. In Nigeria the British withdrew still thinking they had left a democratic legacy much sounder than it actually proved to be.
In both colonies, we must conclude, British policy was almost always pragmatic but only partly in accordance with the introduction of meliorative principles suggested by the di strategy. Bargaining from a position of weakness, the British were sometimes forced to subordinate principles to political reality. They seem to have overcompensated by assuring themselves they had indeed built a strongly democratic institutional, educational, and infrastructural base.

By any standards, however, decisions in the black colonies of west Africa were simple when contrasted with the thorny problems of democratic development in settler colonies. Here pragmatism was countered by a principle—loyalty to the white minority. It is to this problem which we now turn.

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58 For a discussion of meliorative (flexible) and peremptory (non-violable) rules see Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy, pp. 150-54.
CHAPTER VII

KENYA'S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

It was in the settler colonies that the problems of independence attained their greatest complexity. There were real differentials between settler and native standards and values. The settlers did play a crucial economic role which could deeply harm the colonial economy if it were destroyed or abandoned in too short a period of time. At least as important were the moral and racial factors. Britain had pledged to settlers in Kenya and Rhodesia their status would be protected by the colonial government and by the mother country. To abandon the concept of racial "partnership" and incorporate anything even closely approximating the African demand for one-man, one-vote, was to negate that pledge. Even if the new constitutions were so worded as to ensure protection of minority rights, the status of whites would never be the same. Besides, once the colonies became sovereign, what factor short of force could prevent black-dominated legislatures from abandoning such constitutional provisions? In countries like Ghana blacks were, by the early 1960's, persecuting other blacks. How much more likely that they would combine prejudice and envy to expropriate the property of whites who must come, in some
sense, to symbolize the evil of the former colonial rule? To many Britons the white colonials represented the best aspects of British civilization—economic, political, cultural. Beyond this, there was a sense of racial kinship. Was it just to abandon one's own kind to an alien, more primitive force?

The problem was particularly acute in Kenya. On the one hand there had, since 1923, been the pledge of the colony's ultimate status as black paramountcy. Moreover, the other colonies of British East Africa (with much smaller white components) were moving rapidly towards independence as black-ruled nations. On the other hand, settlers had, as late as the post-war years, been induced to colonize in part by the assurance that their lands would be protected—if necessary by force.

There was also the visceral reaction to Mau Mau, which seems to have become fixed in the British mind as different in kind from all other independence movements. Hostility remained focused upon Jomo Kenyatta as the very epitome of "'the African leader to darkness and death.'" This phrase was used in a May, 1960 speech by the colony's next-to-last Governor, Sir Patrick Renison.¹ Two years later Kenyatta was undisputed leader of the colony. By 1963 British politicians were saying "Kenyatta, of course, is the great stabilizing influence in East Africa."²

²Ibid., p. 54.
We would support W. P. Kirkman's position that Britain did not effectively meet the challenge of this period. What often took place was not so much pragmatic disjunctive incrementalism as a reaction to external events, interspersed by unstructured drift. To the extent British administrators so acted, the transition to independence was made more difficult than it would have otherwise been.

A critical period in Kenya's colonial history came in 1957. In March, seven of the eight elected black legislators (L.C.'s) refused to participate as ministers until new constitutional negotiations gave their people a greater share of power. The Times' Kenya correspondent expressed belief the creation of racially oriented electoral constituencies had actually backfired, placing a "premium on extremists." The rolls should be restructured before a new election was held. Yet he opposed more sweeping constitutional revisions. Time was needed to "digest" advances already made. Later, if these proved successful, the case for increased black participation "would be unanswerable." Here was the typical Times approach; cautiously incremental, assuming events would move no faster than Her Majesty's government permitted.

In April, the Kenya government took a similar position. It would not "submit to blackmail." Lennox-Boyd told Commons this policy had

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3 They were now demanding twenty-three black assemblymen.

his full support. The Times editorially called this the "only reply" which could be made. To substantively alter the Lyttleton Constitution before 1960, without the support of all racial groups would be "a clear breach of faith." Labour's Socialist Digest took a different view. The elections were, it felt "fought and won on a platform of opposition to the Lyttleton Constitution." The people had democratically spoken. It was proper their demands be met. On one point both sides agreed; there was "precious little left" of the constitution in practical terms. Kenya seemed "perilously close to the constitutional position that existed before the emergency."

In July the moderate Europeans—led by Michael Blundell—made a series of important concessions. For the first time in the colony's history whites were willing to increase the number of African L.C.'s without a corresponding increase in their own representation. The Times called this a "striking advance." Blundell was also praised for urging an end to the "senseless division of the land into separate and different sections," a statement not even he would have "dared to make . . . two years ago." It had usually been the settlers who proved intransigent at critical moments. Now, The Times hoped, the Africans would not repeat that mistake. They ought to show good faith, by returning to the government and approving "compensating safeguards for the immigrant minorities."

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5 Times editorial, April 11, 1957, p. 11; Socialist Digest, January, 1958, p. 40.

The African leaders did not see it this way. They continued to demand a pledge that eventually there would be elections based on universal suffrage. This, The Times admitted, was understandable from the African point of view. The KAU was not demanding immediate "black domination." But in appealing for "a planned, as opposed to an empirical policy" it was asking for "something which it was contrary to the character of British colonial government to give." Incremental pragmatism ought to prevail. Yet Britain was also chided for not formulating policy more clearly. It was considerably easier to find coherence in the pattern emerging in west or central African than it was in the eastern colonies.

Perhaps there could be further minor concessions. The editors felt, however, introduction of majority rule would be terrible. This was the "ultimate ideal," but it could not work until the races were closer together economically and culturally. This would require "many years." Above all, Britain should not pull out. "Premature" withdrawal would lead to interracial warfare. Whichever side won the country would be permanently hurt. The only logical policy was "diluted democracy" moving the country "in the right direction" but maintaining racial balance for a number of years to come.  

On November 8, five European and Asian Ministers resigned.

permitting the British government to take the initiative in formulating new policy. A series of Oral Questions and Answers in Commons on November 14 indicated both British front benches had concluded the 1954 Constitution was no longer satisfactory as written. A new formulation of parity was proposed. Each of the three major races would now have equal representation in the government. Negotiations could be held on other areas of the constitution. No further concessions in representation would be made. The blacks had failed to obtain immediate majority rule. But Europeans had finally been deprived of parity with the combined total of other racial representatives. Lennox-Boyd called this "a fair solution ... which ought to survive for a period of ten years." Revision would be "frozen" for that length of time.

All Labourites approved the changes, but some suggested they did not go far enough. Robinson wished to know whether, if the Africans remained cool to the suggestions, they were to be "imposed." The Secretary denied this, but stated any new arrangement must "protect the

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interests of all races in Kenya." However modified, the multiracial solution remained the only one acceptable to the government.\textsuperscript{11}

The same attitude prevailed concerning land redistribution. The Dow Royal Commission had recently suggested ending the reserve system. Lennox-Boyd argued it would be "injudicious to try to move faster than public opinion, among all communities, allowed." In other words, it was not the majority of opinion in Kenya which would determine policy. It was the majority opinion within each "community."\textsuperscript{12}

The Labour leadership had not yet abandoned this approach as current policy. But it would appear to have abandoned it as the ultimate objective. This is obvious from the remarks of Creech Jones, who felt it would "ease the situation" if the U. K. government pledged as its "ultimate purpose ... the establishment of democracy in Kenya, with safeguards for the minorities."\textsuperscript{13} In principle this was scarcely different than the KAU position. The Colonial Office refused—even in principle—to make such a declaration. This was a peremptory decision which reduced the number of available options.

For once The Times was closer to Labour's position. It chided the native leaders for failing to recognize the direction policy was taking was

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11}Ibid., cc. 1112, 1115.
  \item \textsuperscript{12}Ibid., c. 1118. See also Ibid., v. 591 (July 10, 1958), cc. 551-52.
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Ibid., Vol. 577 (November 14, 1957), c. 1114.
\end{itemize}
more crucial than the speed with which the changes were introduced. But it also criticized the government for sharing with the right wing settlers "ostrich tactics, thinking this may give the settlers yet more time to continue their domination and positions of privilege." Blundell was the paper's hero on this occasion. He had recognized the "new era" at hand. The duty of Europeans was not to "repress" their less sophisticated native brethren, but to "guide" them. Thus there was an incremental shift to the left from the paper's own previous editorial position over the year.

The Guardian was somewhat more flexible in approach. The Africans had received important concessions. They ought to accept such a compromise. Yet the situation was fluid. There would be "sweeping changes" coming. The future was not clear but "the Colonial Secretary is certainly a great trier." He ought to continue trying.

Further attempts to mollify black demands were made. In February, 1958, for example, constitutional modifications were announced, including creation of six communal seats. Yet, so long as Lennox-Boyd remained Colonial Secretary, the multiracial policy would not be abandoned. As late as March, 1959, Under-Secretary Amery remained adamant on this position. The Africans were deemed totally intransigent for refusing to

\[14\text{Times, November 22, 1957, p. 9.}\]

\[15\text{"Kenya Changes," Guardian editorial, November 9, 1957, p. 4.}\]
negotiate in areas where concessions were being offered, while insisting on more than parity with Europeans in the ministry. Parity must be retained at least until 1968.\(^{16}\)

Segments of the Labour backbench were by now in open opposition. In February, 1958, Brockway and James Johnson had both indicated the importance of the government's concessions and urged the Africans to "at least try" them.\(^{17}\) By March, 1959, they had moved closer to the native position. They were joined by Stonehouse and Dingle Foot, in demanding new talks begin, whether or not the Africans conceded in advance they would not press for greater executive representation at this time. The situation, Foot warned, was "thoroughly explosive . . . . Rightly or wrongly . . . . African opinion has never accepted the 'Lennox-Boyd' Constitution." Stonehouse added that many settlers were willing to abide by such an arrangement, thereby proving more flexible than the U. K. government. All Labour speakers appeared to share Foot's conviction that "To believe that we can preserve the present position of racial groups in Kenya for a number of years to come is, I suggest, a complete illusion."\(^{18}\)

*The Times* held to a middle position during this period. It praised

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\(^{16}\) *Hansard*, Vol. 582 (February 18, 1958), cc. 1005-07; Vol. 602 (March 26, 1959), cc. 1560-61.


the government for attempting to find methods of accommodation. It felt its position was basically sound. It suggested Africans be more realistic and accept the concessions they were offered. There were too many cases of attempting to "gain advantages without assuming responsibility." Political development would be speeded if "there were fewer illusions and more realism all round." Britain must remain as mediator. She must stand firm in pursuing her moderate course. But the paper supported Labour's contention that Britain must clearly assert democracy under majority rule to be Kenya's "inevitable" final status. If she lost touch with this reality, a real threat of white insurrection might later emerge.19 This was a prophetic comment in light of events in Rhodesia several years later.

The Times Africa Correspondent sent a disquieting dispatch early in 1959. There was "breathtaking beauty" in the fields and homes of "a settler colony." But there was much to be disturbed by just below the surface. Few Europeans seemed unhappy but:

... nobody seems to know where he is going. (They) have acquired the mentality of those who live on the slopes of Etna. They now know that there is a great deal of lava about, but hope the eruption will not come in their lifetime. They are surprisingly tolerant, compared to pre-Mau Mau (days), but they are not prepared to

concede much politically to an African nationalism which they judge to be unappeasable.  

The biggest danger was continual deadlock in negotiations, which could lead to renewed violence.

Two months later the correspondent could see no progress. The Africans had received important concessions. Yet the blame for their hostility "could not be laid exclusively at their door." There had been many compromises, but there seemed to be no clear-cut policy. The result was a "top-heavy and confused" governmental machinery.

A breakthrough occurred in April. Legislators of the three races offered a compromise package. Blundell resigned, to lead an interracial coalition aiming at reforms along lines relatively close to those Mboya had long been demanding. This gave Lennox-Boyd the opportunity to intervene, claiming European opinion in the colony had modified sufficiently to permit the British to take initiatives now acceptable to substantial segments of both major racial groups. He moved part of the way towards the position Labour had been espousing in Commons. There would be further constitutional "advance."

His tone remained cautious. Conditions for self-government were


22Tom Mboya was, in Kenyatta's absence, acting head of the KAU.
not yet close to being "fulfilled." At a minimum, there must be a competent, experienced civil service, and an adequate standard of living and freedom from oppression guaranteed for all. All must accept the rights of each "community" to play a part in public and private life. But the specific demand for parity among the racial groups was not repeated. The constitution was now called an evolving one. A conference ought soon be called to discuss the "next steps" in its development. It was made clear, for the first time, that the government saw no reason why "responsible self-government" should not be the "long run solution" for the colony.\

The Times editorially welcomed the changes. Blundell's supporters should find them satisfactory. The Africans ought to be satisfied since they, as much as minority groups "required certain safeguards." Real opposition would probably come only from the die-hard settlers. It had been British refusal to recognize the principles now put forward which had led to black boycotts in the past. Now "a general realization has spread to other sections of the community that the constitution needs to be re-examined on the merits of the case."\

The Guardian also hailed the new spirit. Blundell's suggestions would have had a "revolutionary effect on race relations" a decade ago.

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Now, although still important, they did not seem terribly radical. The biggest remaining fear was the possibility of polarization of extremist attitudes within both major racial groups.  

One of the major concessions concerned land reform. Blundell was now ready to accept an open Highlands policy. The British government called this a colonial decision, but gave every indication it fully supported it. (There seemed an implication in these remarks it might well have used behind-the-scenes persuasion to attain it.)

As we have previously indicated this was a policy demanded for several years by the Labour left and, more recently, by the Labour front bench. They had urged the Highlands be opened gradually, to farmers deemed competent by a review board, as land became available. In October, 1958, for example, John Stonehouse introduced a resolution that racial exclusion be ended. His language was radical even by prevailing Labour standards. In a well-documented presentation he indicated the Highlands had not been uninhabited when the settlers moved in. In 1939, 4000 natives had been resettled and compensated by the Kenya government. Even if it had been empty then, Kikuyu land hunger was intense and growing. Native bitterness ran high when they could work on the plantations and compare the crowded conditions of their tribe with the Highland's 400 square miles of unused or underused fertile farmland.

This was "one of the most outstanding injustices in the colonial world."

The Colonial Under-Secretary (now John Profumo) admitted some lands were underused. As farms came up for sale a government agency had been empowered to purchase, subdivide, and resell. But, he admitted under questioning, new owners must be Caucasian. This was justified by the need to retain the separate communities. Britain would continue to support the goals of settler farmers, who had "risked their capital, their skill and their future in developing an area of Africa which has often proved hazardous and intractable." He reminded that Creech Jones in 1946 had called preservation of the European settlements an "'integral part of Kenya's development as a whole.'" Was this not still official Socialist policy? In any case, it would remain Conservative policy unless and until there were changes in the "prevailing attitudes" of the white community. 26

As late as December, 1959, Julian Amery could say the Kenya government had decided against the Dow Commission's suggestion Highland plots even be rented to black farmers. 27 This statement marks the end of an era. Two months earlier the Kenya government announced as its new policy "'the progressive disappearance of racial land barriers.'" The Guardian referred to this as "a bold, almost revolutionary concept."

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In view of its long advocacy in Labour circles such a statement was perhaps too strong. The newspaper was quite correct, however, when it noted that all previous official references to the Highlands had called them "the inviolable sanctuary of the European landowner." The paper believed it was time this idea was challenged. New times necessitated new policies. The government must start somewhere. It had "chosen a good starting point."  

The change in Kenya's policy came as Great Britain was participating in a general election. Blundell, in his autobiography, states that it was right after receiving his huge victory that Prime Minister Macmillan decided Britain would withdraw from its remaining holdings in Africa "as quickly as decency would permit." It would be impossible to know exactly when that decision was made. Events in Africa were rarely mentioned in the election campaign. When they were it was usually in connection with the CAF. We found only one discussion of Kenya—a television interview of Lennox-Boyd by Christopher Chataway on October 2.

The Secretary laid great stress upon the progress under Tory rule. "The Socialists talk a lot about African political advance in East Africa,


29Quoted in Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire, p. 49.

30Reprinted in Daily Notes #16 (October 6, 1959), p. 12.
but what did we Conservatives find in East Africa in 1951. There were no Africans in the Government of Kenya..." Now, of course, great strides had been made. A "delicate partnership between the races" had been achieved.

This was a legitimate argument. Likewise, the long-range government goal was one to which Labour could scarcely object; "... to encourage a non-racial approach to politics so that all races will regard themselves as Kenyans..." But there was no suggestion from Lennox-Boyd that any sharp alteration of policy was being considered. On the contrary it was specifically stated that further political progress must await "successful agricultural and industrial development."

This was unsatisfactory to Labour. The leadership had now moved much further towards the position of its left wing; that steps must be taken to institute majority rule before the colony should be granted a greater degree of self-government. The recent Lancaster House decisions were praised for having "surrendered" the principle of settler parity in the legislature, and for establishing at least a partial common electoral roll. But "the power at the center" was still perceived as being solely in British and settler hands. There also remained the great "inequality" of land rights, especially in the Highlands.31

Perhaps it was not until after his huge electoral victory that

Macmillan decided to greatly accelerate the pace towards self-government under black rule in Kenya. Or perhaps the decision had been made earlier, but was not implemented until after the elections. This would make good sense, since announcement of such a change would have alienated a substantial segment of the Prime Minister's more conservative supporters. Now, granted a new mandate and a substantially enlarged parliamentary majority, he was much freer to act.

In any case there was a substantial, albeit still disjunctive and incremental, shift in government policy soon after the election. Much of the credit must go to the new Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod. According to Kirkman, a changed British policy towards Kenya was perceived by the Secretary as his "first task."

Kirkman believes the new Secretary knew what had to be done to make the colony able to rule itself. The black man must be afforded the paramountcy he had long been promised. Macleod also felt this ought to be British policy. By acting now, while his country still retained power to guide decisions in Kenya, Macleod hoped he could still win for the settler population a secure guarantee that equal rights for them would be retained after independence. His actions during his two years in office, suggests Kirkman, were based upon a perception

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32 Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire, Chapter 4.
... rare among politicians. He could see not only the general direction in which events were moving, but also the deviations that would have to be made along the route in the name of political manoeuvre... His disadvantage was that his efforts were often sabotaged by his enemies within his own party.  

Despite his efforts to preserve special rights for settlers, Macleod came to be hated by most of them. They saw his policy shift as an attempt to deprive them of the supremacy they believed they could retain for an indefinite future. Their complaints to certain right wing M.P.'s led, in turn, to much of the "sabotage" of his efforts referred to in the above quote. To the Tory right wing, incremental moves away from special white status, however slowly they were undertaken, were anathema. They were construed as placing the only civilizing force in the colony into the hands of pagan barbarians.

Macleod's acceleration of policy change ran against another barrier. In the settler colonies--largely because of the settler's special position and their desire to maintain it--there had been little attempt to implement local elections or self-government among blacks. Kenyans, in 1959, had less experience in democratic procedures than had Nigerians or Ghanaians in 1946. It had been general British policy that political equality must await prior educational and economic improvement to the point where the races could inter-react on a fairly equal basis. This process would no doubt have taken decades, since most settlers, jealous of their status,

---33 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
were reluctant to introduce steps which might accelerate the change.

Now there were leaks from high British circles that Kenya might be fully sovereign within five years. It is difficult to imagine Whitehall believed it could do for black Kenyans in five years what it had been unable to do for black Ghanaians in eleven years. Still less could they have hoped to alter racial prejudices in this length of time. Rather it would appear the Macmillan regime had decided it was no longer worth the cost in men, materials or prestige for Britain to retain its east African colonies much longer.

The first major break with previous policy was the opening of the Highlands. This decision, basically economic, assumed major political overtones. In making it the government had moved much closer to the position of Labour at home and KAU leaders in the colonies. Some Labour leftists were already echoing black demands all white-held lands be made available to natives who wished to farm them. The official Labour position, as of early 1960, remained much milder. It decried the Highlands situation, calling it "one of the major causes of social and political unrest in Kenya," and "a problem which should have been tackled long before now." Yet it was careful to point out "the great importance of European agriculture to the Kenyan economy. . . ." If fear of land expropriation caused a major exodus, "the consequences to the economy would be very serious indeed for a number of years." Besides, settlers, especially those born in the colony, "claimed with some reason that they
have earned a stake there and that it would be unjust if they were forced out or impoverished by a fall in land values brought about by political action." In fact, Labour's publication Commonwealth claimed the new government policy had not gone far enough in protecting settler investments by repaying those who sold out. It also urged financial aid be provided for otherwise qualified non-European applicants who lacked financial resources to buy into the Highlands. It urged the claims of registered cooperative societies also be considered, since these had already proven "a match for European farmers" in other parts of the colony.

Macleod also acted to dispell the notion that the Labour Party, in Commons, supported the interest of the black colonial, while the Conservatives supported the settlers. This issue had been raised during the 1959 British election campaign. The Earl of Home (who would succeed Macmillan as Prime Minister before this story is ended) accused Labour of:

deliberately (setting) out to mislead the Africans by telling them that one party in the United Kingdom is sympathetic to their

34 British Africa, pp. 32-33.

35 Commonwealth, Vol. I #4 (Winter, 1959), pp. 61-64. A similar position was stated as late as June, 1960 (Ibid., Vol. II #2, p. 81).
ambitions and another is not. But it is worse still when his account of events is inaccurate and marked by omissions.\textsuperscript{36}

To be fair, no Labour M.P. actually stated they believed each party supported a different race (although some accused the Conservatives of fostering this myth). Both front benches sought to reconcile or moderate between colonial groups. Fenner Brockway, for example, precisely because he was trusted by native leaders, attempted on several occasions to use this influence to persuade them to make concessions to whites and, above all, not to resort to violence. Certain Conservative M.P.'s played the same role with settler extremists. Yet, in practice, the two British parties had for several years evinced an increasing polarity towards support of the two major racial groups in the African colonies. Many colonials saw the British parties in this light. It was this role that Macmillan and Macleod now sought to modify. To do so, they must in part abandon support of the guarantees Britain had once made to Europeans who settled in the east and central African colonies.

A further government move to the left can be traced from February 3, 1960, the day Macmillan delivered to a Capetown, South African audience what has come to be known as the "Winds of Change" speech.\textsuperscript{37} Europeans in Africa were praised for the contributions they had made towards developing that continent. Even the nationalism now shown by

\textsuperscript{36}Daily Notes #14 (October 4, 1959), p. 15.

\textsuperscript{37}Text reprinted in The Times, February 4, 1960, p. 15. Article, p. 10.
many Africans was, Macmillan reminded, a western import. But he was quite clear about Britain's future position. "Whether we like it or not" he warned, the growth of black nationalism was "a political fact." Its presence was "the most striking . . . impression" he had received on his tour. All "must accept it as a fact. Our national policies must take account of it." Britain retained great sympathy towards the settlers. But she "reject(ed) the idea of any inherent superiority of one race over another. Our policy is therefore non-racial."

To give this speech in Capetown required considerable courage. Despite the superficial flattery, it was quite frank. Yet many settlers chose to continue to believe the Conservatives still championed their cause. Later, when it finally became painfully clear neither British party still supported multiracialism (parity) many settlers felt betrayed. They even claimed the Macmillan speech had created black nationalism in central and south Africa.

This was, of course, absurd. Kirkman has called it "incredible" that it took the Conservatives as long as it did to recognize that the wind of change was upon the continent. As late as 1959, he charges, despite the fact Ghana had been independent for two years, Whitehall was still acting as if Kenya "could remain in some unexplainable way an oasis bypassed by (that) wind." Only later was it realized that "Mau Mau, for all its bestiality, was an outbreak of nationalism in an acute form . . . .
the clock could never be put back again."38

Yet even after Macmillan's speech, even though a change in policy was long overdue, Britain failed to fully implement it. Worse, she was less than frank in explaining the policy changes which did go into effect. Perhaps British administrators did not fully assess the inevitable direction in which these policies must take the colony. New programs were often introduced hesitantly, only after months of fruitless negotiation. By the time they were introduced much of the effectiveness they would have possessed earlier was nullified. To put these arguments in our terms, changes were not made pragmatically and incrementally in accordance with at least generally preconceived goals. Rather they were introduced haphazardly, often only in reaction to external events. In the interim, there were lengthy periods of drift. This, Kirkman feels, hurt all concerned. The British were not fully reconciled to the abandonment of the settler's special status. The black leaders eventually received virtually all they had demanded. Since they were so often frustrated in earlier attempts to achieve these aims they developed much more bitterness and distrust of Britain than they would have if told earlier these were eventual aims of the colonial power. As for the settlers, we share Kirkman's opinion they:

... had a right to demand more honest treatment, and a franker indication of the truth which they were going to have to face than

38Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire, pp. 47-49.
the British Government gave them. The concept of Kenya as a white man's country died hard, and instead of killing it with a cold douche of truth when once the decision on policy had been taken Britain allowed the settlers to go on believing in the impossible. 39

During the 1960-63 period the Braybrooke-Lindblom strategy was only imperfectly and intermittently applied. Many pledges to settlers had previously been made in peremptive fashion. It was most difficult to reverse such decrees. Whitehall tended to wait until the last moment, then reverse policy with a rapidity which caused harm. In light of these errors, it is rather remarkable Kenya has emerged as as strong and moderately ruled a nation as has so far been the case. Much of the credit must go to Jomo Kenyatta. Similar indecision and drift helped cause the failure of British-Rhodesian negotiations, as we shall show in the next Chapter.

For the remainder of this Chapter, let us look at how Britain applied policy in three important areas of Kenya's development during the 1960-63 period; the disposal of the Highlands, the status of Kenyatta, and the unitary vs. federal state controversy.

As mentioned, the Highlands were opened to non-whites late in 1959. Blundell's resignation and formation of his multiracial New Kenya Group (later Party) were the justification for the Governor to declare attitudes within the white community had sufficiently changed to permit implementation of new policies. Yet settlers did not flock to the new

party and a majority of settlers who expressed opinions would seem to have been neutral or hostile to such sweeping land reform. Perhaps in de facto recognition of this, actual changes in policy came very slowly.

As early as November 3, 1959, Macleod informed Commons the newly enacted National Lands Registration and Land Control Ordinances had, as their long-range objective, extension of free-hold title upon Africans (subject to removal for misuse) for land throughout the colony. In July, 1960, he revealed there were plans for establishing "what one might call yeoman and peasant farmers." On both occasions direct mention of the Highlands was avoided.

Future policy remained unclear in 1961. Settlers were becoming increasingly uneasy. Intertribal and political rivalries were creating problems which would have rocked the colony's stability even without this complication. But settler uncertainty was causing serious additional economic disruption. In March, Conservative backbencher Philip Goodhart initiated a debate in Commons, to help clarify policy. Kenya, he believed, "contains all the ingredients of another and even bloodier Congo."

Goodhart did not feel all settlers should stay in the colony.

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40 _Hansard_, Vol. 612 (November 3, 1959), c. 32.
Some—perhaps fifteen to twenty percent—could not "adapt" to the new situation. Their continued presence would further "poison the atmosphere." They ought to be bought out, at fair prices, guaranteed by Her Majesty's government. As for the rest, their presence was not only economically vital, they were also owed a "debt of honor" that their farms would not be permitted to be ruined even if "worst comes to worst." 43

Britain could make no such guarantee unless she retained political control. To protect the land she might again be called upon to use force. She was increasingly resolved not to make such a commitment.

This becomes clear when one reads the government's response (delivered by Colonial Under-Secretary Hugh Fraser). Phraseology had shifted sharply since 1959. Land reserves were described as a "natural" concept when introduced, but "totally out of date" now. Non-racialism was official policy. Small plots would be permitted in the Highlands, but only for economic reasons. Exclusion on racial grounds was "a thing of the past." 180,000 acres would be redistributed to yeoman black farmers over the next three years. Meanwhile, attempts would continue to be made to improve yield on black-held lands. (Kikuyu reserves had had a six-fold increase in six years.) Drought was to blame for much of the recent loss of production, only a small part was seen as due to settler

uncertainty over the future. 44

Policy towards the settlers remained highly ambivalent. The government did not wish to make it too easy for them to sell, since it hoped most would stay. To promise to buy them out would enhance those very "racial aspects" of the situation it was attempting to play down. Besides, buying out all settler farms at full face value was considered prohibitively expensive. 45 At the same time, Fraser stated, the ministry felt obligated to help settlers wishing to leave, but whose life savings might be tied to their land. The issue was being studied. No clear policy directive could be given at this time.

Uncertainty among settlers increased. The Times correspondent stated settler reaction to Fraser's "brutally frank statements" was one of "dismay and disappointment." They had led many whites to realize for the first time they could not expect automatic British assistance in holding their lands. 46 This led to a further reduction of land value on the open market; exactly what Britain had hoped to avoid.

The government wrestled with this problem for many months, as can be seen by Macleod's uneasy answers to questions put in Commons. On July 6, 1961, he promised property rights would continue to be "protected"
and this factor would be considered in any future discussions of further constitutional advance for the colony.\(^4^7\) On July 13 he promised the government would "try to ensure" those wishing to sell land could do so "in a market which offers a reasonable price." He would give no details, except that the government would flatly refuse to compensate emigration.\(^4^8\) As late as October, \textit{NCP} was bemoaning the problem of establishing a just land policy in a multiracial state, where Europeans had "built up a prosperous economy that has done much to improve African standards of living."\(^4^9\)

No major revision of policy was announced until July, 1962. The new Colonial Secretary, Reginald Maudling stated while in Kenya that Britain would go far beyond its previous commitments. It would purchase one million acres for Africans over five years, at an estimated cost of £40 million. From then on the opening of the Highlands proceeded with increasing rapidity. That November Maudling told Commons a Central Land Board, with offices in each region and in Nairobi, had already purchased over 300,000 acres. In December Britain pledged to finance two-thirds of the cost of all these schemes. Farmers who sold would be paid

\(^{47}\textit{Hansard}, \text{Vol. 643 (July 6, 1961), cc. 140-41.}

\(^{48}\textit{Ibid.}, \text{Vol. 644 (July 13, 1961), cc. 566-67.}

\(^{49}\)"Ten Years' Work," \textit{NCP}, \text{Vol. XV #19 (October 9, 1961), pp. 31-33.}
in cash.\textsuperscript{50} In February, 1963, it was stated monies repaid to the Land Board would not be returned to the British treasury, but would be retained by the colony to help pay for further land development.\textsuperscript{51} Additional commitments were made at later dates.\textsuperscript{52}

Britain would seem to have learned one lesson from its experiences in Ghana. A colony with a primarily agricultural economy could not hope for stability in the final period before (or after) independence without continuing large doses of British aid. To some extent increased generosity in this case reflected the desire to aid the settlers—both those who left and those who stayed.\textsuperscript{53} This factor no doubt made it easier to win public support for these large measures of additional aid.

The ultimate fate of the settlers was still not squarely considered. The problem was stated well in the Bow Group's 1962 publication, The New Africa. The Highlands were officially open, but most of the major farms were still settler-owned. This was a situation "unique in Africa." The farmers could not carry on without "security of tenure." Assurances from KANU were not considered sufficient by most whites, unless backed

\textsuperscript{50}\textit{Hansard}, Vol. 669 (December 18, 1962), cc. 165-66. As of July 1, land schemes had already cost Britain £19.5 million.

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Ibid.}, Vol. 671 (February 5, 1963), cc. 44-45.

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Ibid.}, Vol. 678 (May 28, 1963), cc. 105-07; Vol. 684 (November 19, 1963), cc. 69-70; Vol. 692 (March 26, 1964), c. 147.

by British assurances as well. A mass white exodus would destroy the colonial economy. Some feeling of obligation to whites was certainly understandable. Yet the government ought not support them to the detriment of progress towards majority rule democracy. And Britain neither could, nor should wish to, interfere with the country's actions once it were sovereign. Perhaps the solution was to pledge compensation to those forced from the colony, but to deny it to those who left because "they just did not like a black-dominated government."\(^4\)

In February, 1963, Margery Perham found the situation still very unsettled. The black government, which now had virtually full internal autonomy, was not forcing Europeans to sell. But many who remained feared becoming an "island among African farmers, afraid of trespass, theft and cattle or plant disease." They were asking themselves "Can we—dare we—stay."\(^5\) Two months later Sir Anthony Hurd asked the government to comment on a *Times* story of that morning, suggesting governmental pledges to settlers "will never be fulfilled." Under-Secretary Fisher answered he "fully understood" the problem. But his statements were quite vague. One must, he said, realize there was a difference between African settlement schemes and European compensation

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schemes. All assistance must also be viewed within the context of the total amount of aid the United Kingdom could afford.\textsuperscript{56}

Only in July, 1963, after the date for full independence had been set, did the government announce arrangements whereby the new sovereign power pledged to guarantee existing titles and safeguard against compulsory acquisition of settler-held land. Yet a year later—seven months after independence—the final status of land tenure was still being debated in Commons.\textsuperscript{57} The Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary (Duncan Sandys) admitted the "urgency" of the problem. But when Labour regained office in October announcement of a final decision had not yet been given. A comment by the Secretary the previous April would seem to summarize matters. Sandys was asked whether ex-servicemen who had settled in the colony expecting permanent protection were now "more or less happy" over compensation schemes. "It would be very rash" he responded "for me to say that anybody was entirely happy about the situation."\textsuperscript{58}

Disjunctive incrementalism would seem to have been rather haphazardly applied in the land situation. It was even less in evidence on

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Hansard}, Vol. 676 (April 30, 1963), cc. 885-86.

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, Vol. 699 (July 21, 1964), cc. 248-49.

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid.}, Vol. 694 (April 28, 1964), c. 194.
official policy towards Jomo Kenyatta.

One would think after so many villains had become acceptable leaders (if not heroes) that Britain might have learned the fallacy of condemning a national hero as a radical unfit for any official position. In retrospect it appears there was never any likelihood of an independent, black-led Kenya without Kenyatta at its helm. Kirkman has stated the principle quite succinctly:

In judging the importance of a leader what matters is the strength of his support, not the sweetness of his smile. Leaders, in short, are not always likeable—and need not be.®®

In the case of Kenyatta, as we have mentioned, this truism was overshadowed by the visceral reaction many Britons had towards Mau Mau and its alleged leader.

By the late 1950's this view was beginning to be challenged. As was so often the case the new attitude first appeared among backbench Labour radicals. In part this was a reaction to new evidence which indicated his 1954 conviction was not carried out under conditions deemed in keeping with British legal procedures. There was also the admission by Rawson Macharia, one of the government's key witnesses, that he had perjured himself.®® This led The Times to declare, "If he was innocent,

®®Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire, pp. 55-56.

Kenyatta has suffered a wrong for which there can be no complete reparation."

Pressure for his release was also based upon simple pragmatism. As John Stonehouse put it, the man must "be released in due course" since both major black parties demanded it. He urged it be done now to improve the existing political climate. It would also permit leaders to "adjust themselves" in advance to the leadership role Kenyatta would inevitably play.

The government saw matters quite differently. Macharia's admission of perjury was deemed irrelevant, since his was not the primary testimony in the decision to convict. In any case, policy for the colony was that a prisoner would remain incarcerated so long as the Governor felt his release would be a "danger to security." This was true even if the sentence expired. Kenyatta had, in fact, been released from prison, but was now confined to a remote village. The Governor had reviewed this case in March, 1960, and concluded freeing the man at that time would not "help the situation in Kenya." Macleod told Commons he "fully supported" this stand.

By May the government's stated position had, if anything, hardened. On May 5 Macleod told Commons he was "firmly convinced that (Kenyatta's)

61"Kenyatta Trial," Times editorial, December 10, 1958, p. 11.

return to normal life in Kenya would in present circumstances bring a direct threat to the maintenance of law and order and thereby prejudice the fulfillment of our recent decisions for orderly advance in that territory.\(^63\) Five days later Governor Renison made his famous "darkness and death" speech. Kenyatta was, and would remain "unsuitable to hold political office."

*The Times'* position was much like Macleod's. In an editorial early in 1959 it commented:

> Unfortunately there is a mistaken tendency now for African nationalists to build up Kenyatta as a martyr. He was convicted as responsible for the biggest setback African nationalism ever suffered. He should never be permitted to 'come back into political circulation.' If he did, one could scarcely believe the colony could 'live in peace.'\(^64\)

The position continued to be rigidly adhered to as Kenya moved towards the first election in which enough blacks were enfranchised to permit them to determine its outcome. Both major black parties demanded Kenyatta's release. In light of this "general consensus" Brockway asked Commons whether Kenyatta's position would be reviewed. Macleod said such a review was solely up to the Governor, who retained Britain's "full confidence." He reminded the consensus of which Brockway spoke existed among blacks. Most among the "other races" very strongly opposed his

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Thus a concept of racial parity was still in use as was the doctrine the Governor made all decisions. There is little doubt the British felt uncomfortable about the prospect that Kenyatta's supporters would win, and transmitted this view to the Governor.

In December, 1960, it appeared the official position was softening. Macleod refused to give absolute assurance either that Kenyatta would, or would not, be released in the foreseeable future. The decision was the Governor's, but the Secretary admitted, "naturally, in a matter of this importance, (he) would not act without the full accord and support of Her Majesty's Government." Shortly thereafter The Times commented that the refusal to release Kenyatta no longer appeared to be "categorical and irrevocable," but would now seem to have been left to the "discretion" of the Governor. Yet at the end of January Fraser told Commons, there had been no change in the position of the previous May.

The Africans refused to accept this. Following the 1961 elections both major African parties demanded Kenyatta be released and permitted to stand for office. This would be a prior condition to either party's assumption of office. Kadu was more willing to compromise than was Kanu, but

66Ibid., Vol. 631 (December 8, 1960), cc. 1429-30.
even the former would seem to have demanded (in private talks) his release within a short time as part of the price for its cooperation. Once again the realities of power in the colony rendered impossible a peremptory position of the British government.

In March The Times was still referring to Kenyatta as "an enigmatic figure looming in the background" of Kenya's political scene.\(^{69}\) The Guardian was a bit more optimistic, but saw his future position as "obscure." Depending on whether he showed cooperation or vengeance he could "make or wreck Kenya's future."\(^{70}\) The official British position remained firm. Kenyatta's guilt had been "fully established in the courts."\(^{71}\)

Macleod told Brockway the Governor knew "perfectly well that he could form a strong, able and stable government from people of all races if he released Mr. Kenyatta." But a principle was involved. "Matters of law and order are not matters on which one can bargain."\(^{72}\) The Governor announced it was not his intention to keep the prisoner incarcerated "indefinitely." But he would be released only when the "security risk"

\(^{69}\) "Victory for KANU," The Times editorial, March 1, 1961, p. 13.


\(^{71}\) Hansard, Vol. 637 (March 28, 1961), cc. 1120-21. (Kirkman quotes a senior civil servant who told him "strictly speaking Kenyatta should not have been convicted 'although, of course, he was definitely guilty.'" He suggests this view was widespread. Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire, p. 55.

\(^{72}\) Hansard, Vol. 636 (March 16, 1961), c. 1723.
created by that act could be "accepted and contained" and when there was "no risk to law and order ... the economy ... or the administration" in so doing. Such was not now the case.\(^7^3\)

Even as these statements were being made a compromise was being worked out in negotiations between the Governor (supported by Britain) and Kadu. Kenyatta was to be moved closer to the capitol, and placed in a private home built at government expense. The government insisted he was still a prisoner like any other, living in a publicly built institution. This was technically correct, but the prison scarcely could be said to have bars. Kenyatta was permitted extensive visiting hours, and soon was receiving representatives from every important Kenya group wishing to see him, including foreign delegations. While still legally a prisoner he was, as Rankin put it, playing "an effective part in Kenya's politics."\(^7^4\) The realities of power had again forced Britain to retreat from a position it had attempted to dogmatically assert. Now she tried to save face.

Ultimate release would by this time appear to have been beyond doubt. Yet even now the Colonial Office would not directly say so. In April, 1961, there were press reports of a new compromise in the offing. The government refused to comment. Private negotiations, Fraser said, were not fit topics for parliamentary debate. Opposition members must


await attainment of a stable government before any statement would be made. On May 11 Governor Renison opened the new legislature. In July the government still insisted Kenyatta remained a prisoner "like any other." On August 17, Clyde Sanger, writing in The Guardian stated "That Kenyatta must be released is obvious." He was "the only possible leader who can unite the different tribes and parties." Only the timing of the release was now in doubt.

Within a few days, he was a free man. In October he became leader of Kanu. In December the Kenya government repealed the law denying anyone who had been imprisoned over two years the right to serve in parliament. In April, 1962 Kanu and Kadu formed a coalition government. Kenyatta became co-Prime Minister of his country. By the time of independence (December, 1963) he was, both in fact and in law, its only leader.

In retrospect it would appear Kenyatta's rise to power must have come, once the decision had been made to permit majority rule. Yet he had been portrayed as so evil for so long that the British government was reluctant to admit the inevitable. Since it did not, neither settlers nor conservative Britons were prepared to accept the rather sudden reversal when it came. In August, 1961, M.P. Biggs-Davidson asked Macleod


how he could have considered releasing a man who headed a movement whose "bestial cruelties and revolting rights . . . place it on an entirely different footing from any other nationalist movement." The words sound much like those the Secretary had himself used a year earlier. Yet now Macleod begged the question, and urged Commons to give him a free hand in this matter. A few months later the Bow Group contended even right wing settlers now welcomed Kenyatta's release for "every day's delay made his influence greater." The facts were as they had been. Their acceptance as such was altered. Adoption of a peremptory stand towards Kenyatta had made it impossible to incrementally retreat, as the political situation changed, without creating much greater dissent than would otherwise have been the case.

Let us now look at yet a third area where Britain and Kenya failed to act incrementally; the attitude towards the two black parties which formed in 1960. The ending of the emergency, late in 1959, had temporarily seemed to inaugurate a new era of political stability. But a highly explosive situation soon developed, in some ways reminiscent of events in The Gold Coast from 1954-57. Black sentiment split along tribal and regional lines. The smaller tribes feared domination by the Kikuyu and

77 Hansard, Vol. 645 (August 1, 1961), cc. 1151-56.
Luo. They wished to insure large measures of regional autonomy prior to independence. In Kenya these groups had early settled their differences sufficiently to form a single political party (Kadu). The nationalist party (Kanu) was potentially stronger. But it could not claim, as had the CPP, to have already held power before the opposition developed. Existence of a right wing settler party and of Blundell's New Kenya Party further complicated the situation.

Elections were held at the end of February, 1961. The participation, for the first time, of large numbers of black voters made violence appear to many Britons to be almost inevitable. There was virtually none. The Times called this "one of the most remarkable features of the election... . . . Authorities are at a loss to explain it." When asked, African leaders spread their hands, assumed a "tolerant expression" and asked in return why violence had ever been expected.\(^79\) As had been true in Ghana, the British underestimated the extent to which the native leadership was in command.

This was what The Guardian called "The Kenyatta Election."\(^80\) Kanu won 18 seats, Kadu 12, the NKP 4, the white Kenya Coalition 3, the India Congress Party 3. But there were also 10 "reserve" seats: 3 European, 2 Asian, 3 Muslim and 2 Arab. And there were 12 national members chosen

\(^79\) Times, February 28, 1961, p. 10.

by the Governor. Britain threw its support behind Kadu, as did Blundell and the appointed M.P.'s. Kadu formed a government which could, at best, be a loose coalition of very unlike groups, artificially supported, and exclusive of the colony's major party. Kadu's politics were less radical than were Kanu's, and as such more acceptable to Blundell and to Britain. Ngala was a more acceptable leader than was Kenyatta. But Whitehall was once again ignoring the realities of power.

In May, Macleod told the Commonwealth Council Britain fully recognized African's "passionate desire for freedom." But future progress rested on the government's ability to establish "the basic conditions of law and order and security of the individual." Such could be attained only under a "strong, multi-racial government." Britain still had not accepted the need for majority rule.

Independence, Fraser reported to Commons, remained "several years" in the future. It was probably on this assumption that Whitehall felt it could work with a minority government in the colony. Yet, as The Times suggested in an editorial entitled "The Fewness of Several," there had been no timetable established. Even if there had been, the future

81 Figures given by Macleod in Hansard, Vol. 635 (March 2, 1961), cc. 1740-42.
83 "Mr. Macleod Points the Path to Freedom in Africa," Times editorial, May 1, 1961, p. 6.
would largely rest on factors "not entirely within the control of the British government." Once again the British were acting only partly in accordance with a dynamic di strategy. A policy of drift was further complicating an already confused situation.

In October, 1961, a member of Kadu announced at a London press conference his party's plans for aborting the possibility of future tyranny by establishing regional government. These proposals, Kirkman suggests "(were) to colour all future constitutional negotiations until, and indeed after, independence." Kanu flatly rejected regional government in any form. Kenyatta gave up his attempt to become national leader and accepted leadership of Kanu.

Time was on Kanu's side. It was more dynamic than its rival. It had the support of tribes with much larger electoral base. (In the 1961 elections it had received sixty-seven percent of the vote as against sixteen percent for Kadu.) And Kanu had Mr. Kenyatta. He came to London in November, acted with dignity in the face of insults and thrown eggs, and made it plain to all observers that he was undisputed leader of the all-party delegation. "His colleagues, Asian and European as well as African, deferred naturally to him." Soon after his visit Maudling

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85 Kirkman, *Unscrambling an Empire*, p. 58.

told Commons the government was now able to develop "constitutional
advance on lines generally acceptable to the people of the country."
Speaking for Labour, Robinson called this decision "inevitable." Labour
M.P.'s questioned only that it had come so late.87

Early in 1962 The Guardian's Africa Correspondent warned of
serious unrest just below the surface calm. Kadu was still demanding
its regional plan be adopted as part of the independence constitution.
Kanu would not accept regionalism in any form. The situation was again
reminiscent of Ghana, but Macleod still refused to recognize that, given
the realities of political power, Kanu must ultimately have its way.
Patrick Keatley compared Macleod to Chamberlain during his talks with
Hitler, in that he continued to hope for the best instead of preparing for
the worst.88 Even The Times chided its government for being unrealistic
in attempting to get Kanu to accept part of Kadu's plan. It was acting as
if there was plenty of time to develop a compromise solution when obviously
time was running out.89 At this point Macleod had perhaps lost sight of
the political realities he had grasped so well when he replaced Lennox-
Boyd. In any case he was now replaced by Reginald Maudling.

After weeks of deadlock Maudling won acceptance of a compromise.

88Patrick Keatley, "M.P. Fears Tribal Warfare Outbreak in Kenya,"
Guardian, February 8, 1962, p. 5.
A Kanu-Kadu coalition government was formed. Labour joined its opponents in Commons to pay tribute to the Secretary's patience, tact, and success. So did The Times, which warned that while no constitution could work without a country's leaders having "the right spirit" this "truism . . . applies with more force to Kenya than to most other countries."

The compromise provided for strong central government but also for regional governments with wide autonomous powers. Kanu never accepted this as a permanent solution. In any case there were scarcely enough trained civil servants available to permit even one government to operate effectively. Britain ought to have realized this even if Kadu did not. Yet it permitted the two parties to spend months wrangling in committees, striving to establish mutually acceptable enabling legislation. While this was taking place, the way towards independence was smoothed in November by the replacement of Governor Renison.

In view of Renison's statements about Kenyatta, independence, etc., it would seem to have been prudent that the final independence negotiation be led by someone else. Sandys hinted at this when he described the new Governor (Malcolm MacDonald) as having had political

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92 See statements such as those of Mboya Reprinted in Commonwealth, Vol. III #4 (Winter, 1961), pp. 11-12.
experiences of a "wider character" than those of his predecessor, which would be helpful in a transitional period such as this. Mboya, speaking for Kanu, welcomed the change, provided the new Governor "works with us for early independence." If the change meant further delays, Africans would "act drastically."94

The Times reacted with more vehemence and less pragmatism than usual. Such a change at this time was "patent nonsense." It might prove "dangerous nonsense" as well. Renison knew the colony and its people well. His successor did not. The Africans were demanding independence soon, but it could not soon be granted. So delicate a situation should not be left to the hands of an untried Governor.95 It seems obvious the paper’s editors did not expect independence to come in a little over a year.

Clyde Sanger, writing in The Guardian the same day, took an almost diametrically opposed position. He saw Renison was unpopular in the colony. He lacked political foresight. He was "more of a kindly squire" than an astute observer of political trends. The new Governor was a more capable politician and diplomat. His appointment "delighted"

93(He was the son of Ramsey.) Hansard, Vol. 669 (December 11, 1962), cc. 185-86.

94The Times, November 19, 1962, p. 10.

95"Kenya Switch," Times editorial, November 19, 1962, p. 11.
most Africans. It would also appear to have delighted the newspapers' editors.

In the spring of 1963 the Independence Constitution was published. A year of very difficult negotiations produced "what was probably the most complicated constitution ever produced by the British Colonial Office." The Times hailed it as "a treaty or a social and tribal contract" between the two major parties.

It was scarcely printed when Mboya announced in London that Kanu, if it won the pre-independence elections (as it almost inevitably must) would change the document and restore central administration. Kenya, he insisted, would be ruled by its elected government, not the opposition. Kadu and the large segment of the Conservative Party which supported it felt betrayed. Here was a repetition of the situation which arose when the Highlands had been opened, and when Kenyatta had been released. Britain had synoptically adopted a principle which corresponded to her national concept of morality and justice. Regional devolution of power would better protect those tribes which were at odds with those comprising the Kanu coalition. Britain supported this for many of the same reasons she had supported multiracialism. But neither concept was

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96 Clyde Sanger, article, Guardian, November 19, 1962, p. 4.
97 Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire, pp. 61-63.
in accord with the political realities in the colony. As it was moved
towards independence, the will of the majority must prevail. The
majority supported a party which would not accept regionalism. A con­
stitution based upon the demands of the minority party, as Kirkman put
it, "could be no more than a ludicrous piece of make believe."\(^{99}\)

Had Britain been following a pragmatic, dynamic di policy she would
have realized all her desires for Kenya could not be fulfilled. She would
have informed Kadu, during the 1962 constitutional talks, that its regional
requests could not be met. Then she could have used this concession as
a strong bargaining point to try and win support from Kanu for some of the
other guarantees Kadu wanted. Had Kadu refused to support the new con­
stitution, Britain would still have been in power, and could have used it
to help quell disorder and ease the difficult period ahead.

Instead, the British continued to insist on a constitution which
contained many of the regional guarantees Kadu had wanted; a constitution
which, as mentioned, was so complex as to have probably proven unwork­
able in any case. Part of the British government's error was that Kadu's
position was morally appealing to it. Part stemmed from the support for
that position from moderate colonial whites such as Blundell. Part was
the support for it from among a substantial segment of the Conservative
Party which still distrusted Kenyatta and wished to see his power curbed

\(^{99}\)Kirkman, *Unscrambling an Empire*, p. 62.
as much as possible.

There would also have seemed to be the belief, in some British circles, Kanu could still be forced to compromise; to accept the regional proposal as the price for receiving independence. A Times editorial of July, 1962, for example, praised the Kanu-Kadu negotiations as "salutary lessons in realism," which were teaching both sides the kind of give and take required for democratic government to function. The same editorial viewed the alternative outcomes of the talks as "an agreed Kanu-Kadu solution, a British compromise, or no constitution." 100 Clearly it was felt Britain still retained the option of not granting independence if it did not approve the Kanu position.

This would appear patently unrealistic. There were already hints of a re-emergence of Mau Mau. If sovereignty had not been promised by 1963, widespread violence would almost certainly have erupted. Yet many Conservatives shared The Times' position. Even Lord Salisbury, a former Colonial Secretary who retained considerable influence among more conservative members of the Tory Party, still adhered to such a view. In an address to Lords at the end of 1962 he warned the government of Kenya might soon be handed over to "the tender mercies of men . . . only one generation removed from a savage state." The European "backbone" was rapidly "losing heart and hope." Britons must cease to be silent about

100 "Uphill Work," Times editorial, July 12, 1962, p. 11.
"their brother's fate." It must insure its friends, white and black, they would not be "abandoned." Salisbury had now come round to the position his government must give substantial aid to all "suitable" people of any race who wished to acquire land. His primary concern, however, remained restoration of settler confidence by guarantees that land rights, law and order would not further break down.101

This position also had considerable support from the Conservative back benches. Many M.P.'s expressed concern lest Kadu's demands be rejected during the negotiations. They wanted firm guarantees the new constitution would retain all the basic rights of former constitutions.

Others in the party were less naive. Spokesmen for the Bow Group also believed Britain was obliged to protect the "hitherto insulated" European during the transition to "full democracy." Such action would benefit the blacks, too, for the economy must suffer if whites left en masse. But they recognized independence must soon come, and there could be no interference in the internal affairs of the colony after it became sovereign. Resurrection of a Mau Mau like movement, if it came at all, would prove less a threat to Kanu than it once had to the settlers. There was no doubt they would act vigorously to meet it.102

For a long time, the government assured Commons no "basic

101 The Times, December 3, 1962, p. 16. See Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire, p. 94 for pertinent comments on this attitude.

alterations in the constitution were contemplated." By August, 1963, Sandys conceded a willingness to discuss "reasonable arguments" for a change, but only on condition previously agreed to "safeguards" would be retained. 103

Yet, as in the other cases we have cited, political realities must take precedence over pious hopes. In March, 1963, Sandys had announced independence would come in December. In May, elections were held. Voting ran "as was to be expected, almost entirely on tribal lines." Kanu won twice the number of seats won by Kadu. 104 It was clear which party would rule an independent Kenya. Kenyatta tried his best to be conciliatory. The Guardian found Kanu's campaign manifesto

103 Hansard, Vol. 678 (May 23, 1963), cc. 64-65; Vol. 682 (August 1, 1963), cc. 150-51.

104 The Official results were:

For the House of Representatives

- Kanu.............................................. 64 seats
- Kadu.............................................. 32 seats
- APP.............................................. 8 seats
- Independents............................... 8 seats (these later promised support to Kanu)

For the Senate

- Kanu............................................. 20 seats
- Kadu............................................. 16 seats
- APP............................................. 2 seats

(From NCP, Vol. XVII #16 (August 30, 1963), p. 26.)
to be milder than those of the British parties in the last election. It felt it was "remarkable" that Kenyatta had so far proven very fair towards both his black opponents and the settlers. The reevaluation of Kenyatta was virtually complete.

Kanu still lacked the parliamentary strength to alter the constitution without Kadu support. But once the country was independent there was little to prevent the ruling party from abrogating the agreements it had made. This would set an early precedent in arbitrary rule, and might end any remaining hope for constitutional government in the new country. The Colonial Secretary was caught between his pledges to Kadu and Commons, and the reality of power. As Kirkman put it "he had to reach a decision in impossible circumstances." There was only one decision he could reach. In October, he broke the pledges. "Our duty" he argued "was to do what was in the true interest of Kenya in the years ahead."

It was within this context that the Second Reading of the Kenya Independence Bill took place. The government's objective was no longer controversial. As summarized by Under-Secretary Hornby, it was to create:

- a united Kenya nation, capable of social and economic progress in the modern world, and a Kenya in which men and women have confidence in the sanctity of individual

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106 Kirkman, *Unscrambling an Empire*, p. 67.
rights and liberties and in the proper safeguarding of the interests of minorities. 107

Even the most Conservative backbenchers seemed resigned to the inevitable, although some, like Patrick Wall, still regretted a truly multi-racial state had not been formed, based upon "cooperation on the basis of what each race had put into the development of the country," rather than "on the strict counting of heads." But even he realized this could not be the case in light of the "inevitable trend of events." Kenya was to be "an African country." Britons must recognize this fact. 108 Wall becomes, in a sense, a mirror image of those Labourites who had regretted final independence for The Gold Coast.

Other Conservatives actually welcomed the recent events. Viscount Lambton, for example, thought the Kanu-led government had acted with reasonableness and responsibility. The truth about Kenyatta's earlier role in Mau Mau might never be known. But now he was acting to restrain his followers, "disappointing" those who had equated independence with the coming of "a white blood bath." 109

Labour backbench speakers all felt this to be a great day. Brockway was especially jubilant. He reminded Commons of the almost unbelievable changes in Kenya since 1951, when widespread discrimination and


suppression of black political activities were the pattern of one side, and the atrocities of Mau Mau were the response by the other. Credit for the changes was due to all parties.\textsuperscript{110}

The difference between leftists like Brockway and rightists like Wall was no longer one of policy—only of desire. Wall admitted it was no longer possible to impose a system of voter preference based upon "merit" (i.e. white dominance). But he wished it were so. Under the existing system he was sure "standards (were) bound to fall." To Brockway, on the other hand, adoption of majority rule was seen as more than a compromise to accommodate political reality. Higher standards would probably result, since these were always more likely to occur in a democracy than in a country ruled by "privileged groups."\textsuperscript{111}

A. G. Bottomly delivered official Labour's "cordial welcome" of the bill. The final steps in this "very difficult evolution" had now been taken. Not all steps were smooth, but each had meant progress. This last vote before independence "must give satisfaction to all of us." The government did not escape criticism, however. In Kenya, as in Ireland, Bottomly charged, a Conservative government had too long refused to acknowledge a situation of fact. This had led to acts of violence which, in turn, polarized sentiment and made it even more difficult to recognize

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Ibid.}, c. 1348.

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Ibid.}, cc. 1346, 1350.
the political realities. Multiracialism had had much merit in theory. But it negated the principle of one-man, one-vote for that of one-race, one-vote. It was, on balance, an untenable position. Europeans remaining in the colony must now expect to lose some of their earlier status. But in so doing they would "bear some of the burden which belongs to all of us Europeans who first invented the practice of racial domination." The Official Labour's position had come a long way since 1951.

In the concluding speech, Sandys defended the decision to renege on prior pledges to preserve a regional system. The British policy had always been to transfer power "to the people of Kenya as a whole." This must now mean establishing a working relationship with the majority party, in the interests of all Kenyans, including those whose rights Kadu had been seeking to protect. He was happy to see Kadu had itself come to recognize this, and was willing to accept the arrangements for power transferral.113

In the case of Kenya, the optimists have been vindicated. Of course the country has had post-independence crises. The most serious was an army mutiny in January, 1964, which was put down with the aid of British troops requested by the Kenyatta government.114 It is still too early to

112 Ibid., cc. 1335, 1337-38.
113 Ibid., cc. 1398-99.
tell whether the reasonably tolerant political situation will survive
Kenyatta's death, especially since the assassination of Mboya in 1969.

So far, the former colony has been one of the few stable nations in
Africa. The economy has thrived despite the mass exodus of Europeans.
Those who remained, if they obeyed the laws, have been left relatively
unmolested and have been permitted to retain their lands. The recent
expropriation of businesses owned by Asians must be put into perspective
of their refusal to accept Kenyan citizenship. It also means blacks now
feel themselves ready to assume the role of commercial entrepreneur, one
they long deferred to Chinese and Indians.

Political opposition has been tolerated—for a new nation—within
reasonably broad grounds. Kadu died of its own accord as its members
followed the "bandwagon effect" and joined the majority party. Ngala
became Vice President of Kanu. Odinga, unsuccessful in his attempts
to swing the country leftward, was voted out of the party leadership. He
has remained in parliament as leader of a sometimes vocal opposition.
Jomo Kenyatta, once in British eyes the most hated man in Africa, has
proven to be one of that continent's most benign and progressive leaders.

One must reasonably conclude, however, that the moderation of the
country's leadership has been more responsible for this situation than was
any long-range blueprint for Kenya's democracy made in London. It is
close to miraculous that a man treated as badly as was Kenyatta turned
out much less anti-British than did Nkrumah. The tribal and regional
animosities in Kenya are nearly as great as are those in Nigeria, and were compounded by the existence of a large and envied Asian shopowner class and an even larger, even more envied class of white patricians. Kenya had far less opportunity to practice pre-independence democracy than did the west African colonies.

Yet Kenya would seem to have vented most of its animosity during the Mau Mau rebellion, which took place while Britain still ruled. By the time sovereignty was granted, the leaders appear to have been ready to try and work together. The country's economy never suffered so painful a setback as did that of Ghana when the price of cocoa fell sharply just as independence was gained. Britain had learned it was essential to continue large-scale aid after independence. The decision to send troops, at Kenyatta's request, was also a departure from previous policy. It would seem to have been a successful move.

Surely one would be hardpressed to show Kenya's post independence good fortune was the result of deliberate British policy. On many occasions, that policy was not even a very good approximation of dynamic strategy, as we have shown. There was less planned incremental development than there had been in west Africa. Much of Kenya's good fortune, then, must be attributed to its moderate leadership and to good luck.
CHAPTER VIII

SOUTHERN RHODESIA: THE FAILURE OF
BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

There were more words written about Rhodesia during the 1957-64 period than about the other three colonies together. This was primarily for two reasons: the fate of the Central African Federation of which Rhodesia was the most committed member, and the black-white relationship within the colony. To fully discuss both these issues would require a chapter as long as Chapters VI and VII combined. Besides, the story behind the dissolution of the CAF has been well covered elsewhere.\(^1\) We shall concentrate primarily on British-Rhodesian relations, and refer to the CAF only when events there had direct bearing on them.

The inter-party cleavage, especially between the back benches, was far greater towards this colony than it was towards any of the others. It grew almost to a chasm by 1962. After that date the Conservatives abandoned the CAF and attitudes on that issue moved closer together. At least on the basis of verbal response, there was little attitudinal differentiation between the front benches over the belief the Dominion's settler

\(^1\)Kirkman, *Unscrambling an Empire*, Chapters 8 and 9.

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government ought to move more quickly than it was towards equal status for the black majority. Cleavage remained sharp on how to best handle the settler government's refusals to do so.

We shall treat events here, as we did in the other colonies, roughly in chronological order. We begin this Chapter with a discussion of a Commons debate held November 25, 1957. The month before, the CAF government had passed certain constitutional amendments. We shall not delve into their content. The key point is that the African Affairs Board declared some of them to be discriminatory. The Board was overruled by the federal legislature. Labour now urged the British government to exercise its right of veto. Since this power did not extend to item vetoes, the acts must be approved or denied in toto. This the government refused to do.\(^2\)

Certain Conservative backbenchers saw these acts as very beneficial. They saw the Federation, as Bernard Braine put it, as "an experiment in partnership . . . one of the most exciting experiments in human relations in the world."\(^3\) The Tory front bench was more cautious. It admitted certain aspects of the amended laws had not gone as far towards increasing native rights as they ought. Under-Secretary Alport also admitted the Federation had not always acted as the British government would have


\(^3\)Ibid., c. 842.
wished. But conditions for natives were improving, however gradually. Realistically there was little Britain could do to speed that progress. Were she to veto acts such as those just passed, on the other hand, she could well dampen the enthusiasm of those who wished to follow with more extensive reform. Indeed, a veto might well strengthen the white opposition, which favored retrenchment of existing native rights and establishment of a federation more closely approximating the South African system of apartheid. On the whole, Alport concluded, the proposed amendments represented a "step forward." So long as measures possessed more progressive than regressive features, Britain would approve them.\(^4\)

Alport's statement was in keeping with a Conservative policy directive issued the previous April. It helps explain why Britain had pledged it would not:

\textit{initiate any legislation to amend or to repeal any Federal Act or to deal with any matter included within the competence of the Federal Legislature, except at the request of the Federal Government.}

\textit{The Times} basically concurred with the government's position. It warned that Britain ought not lightly reject adverse reaction to CAF legislation from the AAB. The African population was already unsure of the intent of its white rulers. It would have its faith further shaken if adequate reason was not given for rejecting the AAB's requests. Without African support, the Federation could not survive. Nonetheless the

\(^4\)Ibid., cc. 823-34.
paper felt the legislation being considered was basically fair to all. In
devising legislation for multiracial societies, it stated, "The African has
a right to fair representation. The European has the right to demand that
government remain in the hands of civilized persons, hard though that
term may be to define." 5

The Guardian was considerably more critical. "As things stand
now" an editorial suggested "it looks as if the Board has the better case
and that its opinion should have carried more weight in Westminster than
in fact it has done." 6

Labour was highly critical of the government's rejection of the AAB's
warnings. Its stand was considerably less pragmatic, more peremptory,
than was that of the Conservatives. The front bench argued there ought
to be no approval by Parliament of any CAF measure which discriminated
in any way against the black majority. To reject the AAB report was to
perhaps destroy any future effectiveness that body might have. (Weaken­
ing of the Board's powers had been one of Labour's major objections to
the final form of the 1953 constitution.)

The positions taken on this issue generally reflect the attitudes
these parties held towards settler-native relations. Underlying this
debate one can find continued evidence that most Labour M.P.'s simply

5 "Votes for the Africans," Times editorial, March 15, 1957, p. 11;

did not trust settler motives. They were convinced the goal of the UFP—both the Federation and the Rhodesian branches—was to preserve white domination of the economy, society, and government of the area. Thus Labour supported the AAB’s contention the new legislation passed by the federal parliament failed to provide sufficient legislative representation or adequate safeguards to natives. No new legislation ought to be approved by Britain, the party’s leaders contended, unless it went a substantial distance towards guaranteeing such safeguards. The long-range goal must be majority rule. To quote one Labourite, "No minority group can forever pretend to govern these territories to the exclusion of millions of inhabitants there."

The same criticisms would later be applied to acts of the Southern Rhodesian regime. It was the Dominion which was the main source of settler strength and the main impetus behind attempts to strengthen the CAF. The leaders of the country pledged themselves to bettering the life of the native populace. This must take time, they insisted. Blacks would not be granted additional political strength until warranted by a rise in their educational, social and economic level. These latter conditions could be improved only as rapidly as the changes could be absorbed without disrupting the status of the settler population. Increasingly, Labour would come to argue this Rhodesian concept of a multiracial state

\footnote{Hansard, Vol. 578 (November 25, 1957), cc. 817-19.}
was an insufficient one. The pace of change must be accelerated. If the Rhodesian government refused to do so voluntarily, British pressure must be employed.

For a brief period, it appeared Southern Rhodesia might be willing to move more rapidly towards those goals both British parties wished to see fulfilled. Under Prime Minister Garfield Todd the Dominion made plans for substantial reforms which would end many practices of public segregation, increase educational and job opportunities for blacks, and enlarge their political power. But in January, 1958, Todd was met with a Cabinet revolt. This was partly connected with the problems being faced by the Federation. To a considerable extent, however, the opposition within the UFP acted on the presumption Todd's policies and statements had been too liberal. If he retained the party leadership, it was feared the opposition Dominion Party would win the forthcoming elections.

The Guardian denounced those who overthrew Todd. His policies had been sound. He was not guilty, as charged, with advocating "excessively rapid social and political advancement for Africans." The Times also condemned Todd's critics. But it laid blame on black extremists as well. Their "irresponsible remarks" had increased polarization, heightened settler fears, and helped undermine the position of men such as Todd who had been most willing to support their more reasonable demands. It was most unfortunate, the paper's editors continued, that whites in Southern Rhodesia now seemed to be less inclined to support
liberal measures than they had prior to the recent controversy over the constitutional amendments. Todd was not really more liberal than Huggins or (Federal Prime Minister) Roy Welensky. His error was that he was more vocal. The clear implication was that a good Rhodesian premier was one who implemented steps towards bettering the life of the native but attempted to couch his actions in conservative language which would not alarm the more segregationist-oriented settlers. Perhaps we might consider this a variant of the broker strategy so often practiced by British parties. On one thing the two British newspapers agreed. Whatever was said, "vigorous furtherance of African advance" must be practiced. This was "the cornerstone of the Federation."  

On February 10, Edgar Whitehead replaced Todd as Prime Minister. The Times called this "a wise choice" and felt it proof "the political judgement of Rhodesians is sound." The Guardian was more reserved. The new "team" was "capable," and Todd's defeat might ease the political crisis in Rhodesia. But it would weaken the country's status with London. It was good Todd would remain in the Cabinet. It would have been better had his post been Minister of National Affairs, for this would have helped alleviate African suspicions of the motives behind his removal.  


would appear one more expression of advocacy of a pragmatic di policy.

Elections were held early in June. The ruling UFP won eighteen seats to the right wing Dominion Party's twelve. Todd had attempted a comeback as leader of an integrated party. But the native leaders declared a generally successful boycott and most whites found his position too radical. His party failed to elect a single M.P. The Guardian saw the results as "cheerless, without being disastrous." The right had been rebuffed. This was more than offset by the "annihilation" of the left. Todd's name had come to stand for confidence between the races. Whitehead seemed a "sincere believer in racial cooperation," but had not yet won black confidence. "Without that, moderation is not enough."

Rhodesians possessed "an instinct to follow what they take to be the middle of the road. Unhappily, the road itself is still too narrow." 10

The Times remained somewhat more conservative and therefore somewhat more optimistic over the electoral outcome. It saw Todd's "misfortune" as having been "ahead of the electorate." The editors realized the extent of the DP's strength must be "something of a shock" to Britons. However, the situation in Rhodesia remained "a good deal more hopeful than it is in many other multiracial communities today."

The country was still following the middle-of-the-road policies of Lord Malverne (Huggins). There had been little opposition, even among DP

leaders, to the concept of integration as an eventual goal. The real contest was over the proper pace at which it ought to be introduced.\footnote{Thomas M. Franck, "Southern Rhodesian Nationalism in the East Central African Conflict," in Davis and Baker, editors. \textit{Southern Africa in Transition}, pp. 121-35. (Quote p. 124.)}

In an article written several years later, Thomas M. Franck (Director of N.Y.U.'s Center for International Studies) would be far less kind to the Rhodesians. Todd, he declared "was repudiated by the white voters for trying to give the Africans a few thousand votes and a few more shillings a week." The settler majority was never willing to truly share its power with the natives.\footnote{"African Verdicts," \textit{Times} editorial, April 18, 1958, p. 13; "Confusion," \textit{Times} editorial, May 26, 1958, p. 7. See also \textit{Ibid.}, article, June 7, 1958, p. 6; editorial, p. 7.}

By August, even The \textit{Times} had become more pessimistic, but for the opposite reason. Settler attempts to develop true racial partnership were seen as being undermined by a continuing native boycott of elections. In S. Rhodesia, as in Kenya, fewer than one-third of the eligible black voters had participated in the last election held. Since this meant the more liberal candidates stood less chance of winning, natives were hurting their own best interests.

Yet the paper also warned that, however erroneous or unfounded native fears were, they must be recognized as fears sincerely believed. Greater effort must be made to win their confidence. The partnership
settlers offered must be a real one. Attempts to create "fancy franchises" merely served to reconfirm black convictions they were being tricked into accepting permanent second-class status. Further concessions ought to be offered to prove the sincerity of the UFP leadership.\(^\text{13}\)

The editors' worst fears were realized when the next Federation elections were held that November. The UFP won readily in the Dominion, and attained overwhelming victory in the Territories.\(^\text{14}\) Both \textit{The Times} and \textit{The Guardian} felt Welensky had received a mandate for further reform. But of 30,000 to 40,000 Africans eligible to vote from the Dominion, exactly 628 braved the boycott declared by ZAPU, the major native political organization. On the other hand, sensing the more conservative mood in the white electorate, the UFP had campaigned cautiously. As \textit{The Times} phrased it, they were out to show "that in racial matters they can be almost as conservative as the Dominion Party."\(^\text{15}\) In a little over a year, both papers reminded, the seven year moratorium would end and the success or failure of the CAF constitution could be debated in Commons. Neither paper would speculate on what conditions in central Africa would be like by that time.


\(^\text{14}\)The Federal Assembly now contained UFP, 44; DP, 8; Independents, 1.

At its 1958 Annual Party Conference, Labour took another substantial step to the left. It demanded the CAF be reviewed at the instant the moratorium ended. Meanwhile it called upon the Federation government to promise it would take steps leading to "genuine" African representation in the federal parliament, "the rapid elimination of racial discrimination in both social relations and industry," expansion of inter-racial educational facilities and "an unequivocal statement that the objective of the Federation is complete democracy and equal rights for every citizen." Labour had again accelerated the timetable for the attainment of racial parity. More fundamentally, the leadership had now joined the left wing in stating publicly that it believed the final goal for these colonies ought not to be parity, but rather majority rule.

During most of 1959 British attention focused primarily on preparations for the coming debate on CAF. Welensky came to London in July. Talks were difficult, and the British government joined the Labour opposition in rejecting the possibility of granting the Federation Dominion status when the constitution was reviewed. Indeed, Macmillan pledged no such move would be considered until the two Northern Territories possessed full internal self-government, so they could participate in negotiations as equals with S. Rhodesia. This left open the possibility that Nyasaland, and possibly N. Rhodesia, would be represented at such

talks by regimes in which black Africans had a majority. It also left open the possibility they would be permitted to secede.\textsuperscript{17} A Royal Commission was established, under Lord Moncton, to review the situation and "advise" on the most likely alternatives for the future of federation.

Labour was reluctant to join such a Commission unless it contained adequate black representation and unless it possessed the power to recommend abrogation of the Federation altogether. This was made clear in a lengthy Commons debate early in November.\textsuperscript{18} Later that month Macmillan moved part way towards this position. He continued to insist it was fair that only five of the thirteen Central African members be black, since "What really matters is that African opinion of all shades will be fully heard and objectively recorded." On the other hand, he stressed the flexibility of the Commission's terms of reference, which would be:

To consider the whole field of the redistribution of powers in either direction between the Federation and the Territories, and to advise on the timing of any progress and the character of any changes in the framework that it may suggest.\textsuperscript{19}

Deputy Prime Minister R. A. Butler later went still further. The Commission would have full authority to decide what evidence it would

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17}"Only Then," \textit{Guardian} editorial, July 23, 1959, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{18}\textit{Hansard}, Vol. 612 (November 2, 1959), cc. 668-810.
\item \textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, Vol. 614 (November 24, 1959), cc. 207-218.
\end{itemize}
receive. The Times correctly suggested that, while the Commission's terms of reference remained technically what they had been in July, the "interpretation had been broadened considerably." Here was a case of incremental adjustment in response to altered conditions.

There would seem to be little doubt the government was spurred as much by events in central Africa as by pressure from its opposition at home. Nyasaland's black nationalist leader, Hastings Banda, was barred from entering the Rhodesias in January, 1959. The next month violence began in Nyasaland and spread to S. Rhodesia. A state of emergency was declared there on February 26, in Nyasaland on March 3. The African National Congress party (ANC) was banned in the Dominion. 450 of its leaders were arrested. On March 3 several Nyasa leaders, including Banda, were incarcerated. An inquiry revealed the unrest was partially due to widespread black resentment towards the Federation. The imprisonment of the leaders served to increase black solidarity and further strengthen Banda's position. And he was outspokenly opposed to the CAF. The unrest and the manner in which the detainees were treated also served to strengthen Labour's belief the CAF—at least in its present

20 Ibid. (December 3), cc. 1374-78.
22 For a chronological breakdown of events see Commonwealth, Vol. 1 #2 (Spring, 1959), pp. 29-32.
form—was not a viable political unit.\textsuperscript{23} This attitude was further buttressed when the Devlin investigatory commission referred to the emergency regulations as having created a "police state" in the colony.\textsuperscript{24} Labour now advocated that Nyasaland, at least, must have the option of secession after 1960. Such Labour assertions as these, combined with Macmillan's partial accession to them, weakened settler trust in the British government's pledges to them.

A partial split was now emerging between the goals of the federal and S. Rhodesian branches of the UFP. Welensky (who had succeeded the retired Lord Malverne as Federal Prime Minister) was determined to make the CAF a Dominion. He was prepared to compromise on details, but not to give up this objective.\textsuperscript{25} For S. Rhodesia, creation of a federal Dominion was a two-sided proposition. It would gain the vast resources and unskilled human labor pool of the Territories, which would combine with the financial and entrepreneurial power of the south for mutual advantage. On the other hand, creation of a single central African

\textsuperscript{23} Gaitskill and other Labour leaders challenged Lennox-Boyd over treatment of the detainees. See \textit{The Times}, April 10, 1959, p. 9, for a summarization. Labour also raised a storm in Commons over the Federation's decision to deny M.P. John Stonehouse access to Nyasaland, and to expell him when he tried to go anyway. In effect the opposition was denying confidence in the CAF's ability to run its own affairs. \textit{Hansard}, Vol. 601 (March 3, 1959), cc. 208-12; \textit{Ibid.} (March 4), cc. 519-84.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{British Africa}, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{25} "Something Entirely New," \textit{Times} editorial, April 1, 1959, p. 11.
Dominion would mean tremendous dilution of the white to black ratio. It was difficult enough for 200,000 whites to continue political and economic domination of the two million southern blacks. Unification would add 7,775,000 more natives and only 90,000 more settlers. This would necessitate a sharp rise in the number of Africans who must be given white collar positions. Segregation was tenuous in N. Rhodesia, dying in Nyasaland. Salisbury did not wish to attain greater capital at the expense of settler control.

Whitehead was cautious. He promised to ease existing restrictions on S. Rhodesia's native population in return for concessions from Britain. The most important of these was that either S. Rhodesia or an enlarged Federal Dominion be granted full internal autonomy. Britain would relinquish its power of final review over laws affecting native rights. Whitehead pledged to continue to move towards true racial parity after the United Kingdom relinquished control, but at a pace it alone would determine. If Britain refused the deal, the Dominion Premier hinted, there was always the alternative of closer ties with the Republic of South Africa. This alternative had dangers of its own. The Dominion's whites would be submerged into a wealthier economy. The South Africans were reluctant to merge with a country with a black to white ratio far in excess of its own. But, if Britain refused to make concessions, the possibility of closer links between the two countries remained. Most Britons were extremely disturbed by the prospect of S. Rhodesia's native population
being absorbed by a system practicing apartheid. The negotiations, seen in this light, take on many of the aspects of bluff poker.

A Times editorial in July, 1959, pointed out that S. Rhodesia had been moving steadily, albeit sometimes painfully slowly, away from segregation. The strict color bar imposed upon land ownership by the 1930 Land Apportionment Act—which had prevented the 600,000 Negroes who worked in "European" areas from living there—had begun to erode. The pass laws had been eased. Multiracial unions could now legally exist. Post offices no longer had separate entrances for white and black. Hotels could be multiracial "under certain circumstances." A multiracial university had begun to function in Salisbury. Africans would soon be permitted to enter the civil service.

Admittedly the record was imperfect the editorial admitted. Cinemas and restaurants remained segregated. So, for the most part, did land. Restrictions--both legal and practical--existed in the kinds of jobs for which Africans and settlers would be hired. Wide disparities in pay remained--even for the same job. Yet, there had been "encouraging changes," especially since 1953. An "impressive list of progressive legislation . . . had put a big hole in the wall of segregation in Southern Rhodesia." It was moving in a direction "diametrically opposed" to South Africa.26 The implication was that it would be most unfortunate for Britain

26 "Breaches in the Colour Bar," Times lead article, July 22, 1959, p. 6.
to take any action which might reverse this long-term incremental trend, and push Rhodesia into the arms of its southern neighbor.

The Conservative journal NCP drew a similar conclusion. It too pointed out discriminatory practices—especially those of the "pin-prick" variety—were gradually but steadily diminishing. It also pointed to the economic advantages federation had brought to each of the three constituent territories. The 1957 Dominion constitution had slightly increased the percentage of native legislators, and envisioned the gradual elimination of a dual electoral roll based upon racial qualifications. In light of these real advantages it seemed extremely distressing Britain's Socialists continued to stir anti-federation feelings. This permitted the native opponents of CAF to continue to hold the false hope that "under a Labour Government the clock would be put back."

The reason Labour continued to rail against the CAF was that it did not view events in the same light. This is apparent if one reads the 1960 party publication British Africa. The color bar was reported to be "still effective" in CAF cities. Africans were still "subjected to an obnoxious and oppressive pass system." The great majority of the population remained restricted to less than half the arable land. Racial intermarriage was technically legal, but the partners could not legally live in the same part of town. Segregation in industry was retained, primarily at

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the insistence of the European trade unions. The newly permitted multiracial unions could only operate under restrictions which insured continued white domination. Recent federal legislation in this area was woefully inadequate. Secondary education, a federal responsibility, remained totally segregated. Legal restrictions were much worse in S. Rhodesia than they were in the Territories (although the latter achieved many of the same results—especially in N. Rhodesia—by informal arrangements among whites). In short, the Conservatives emphasized that segregation was less prevalent than it used to be, while Labour emphasized the extent of the degradation which remained.

In *British Africa* Labour also challenged other aspects of the UFP's claims. Contrary to statements by both the Federation and British governments, Southern Rhodesia, not Nyasaland, was seen as the prime economic benefactor of the CAF. The 1957 franchise law was also seen by Labour as patently inadequate. Only 1500 blacks in the entire Federation qualified for the upper roll. 54,000 could qualify for the lower roll, but it was to be used for only nine of the fifty-nine Assembly seats, and then only in combinations with the upper roll.²⁸

Labour admitted that, however repugnant the existing government, the only substantial opposition party was worse, its program having "much in common with the South African policies of apartheid." Yet

²⁸*British Africa*, pp. 20-29.
Labour did not draw from this the conclusion the Tories had drawn; that it was worthwhile for Britain to do all possible to meet UFP demands, so as to help keep that party in power. To a Labour M.P. like John Stonehouse the UFP could not be trusted. Since the DP was sufficiently strong so it could win the elections and make conditions still worse, there was but one solution. Britain must intervene and impose a more rapid transition to majority rule.²⁹

Within the colonies, Labour pinned its hopes on increasing the electoral strength of the black parties. We have on several occasions now referred to the principal Rhodesian native party--ZAPU. By African nationalist standards, its leadership was quite mild. It was first established in 1957 as the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (ANC). Radicals were rejected for party leader in favor of moderate Joshua Nkomo. Opposition to his moderation within the party remained one of its major sources of weakness. Although Nkomo urged action only be taken via the legal and electoral processes, the ANC was banned in 1959. Many of its leaders were arrested and Nkomo went into exile. A similar party (NCP) soon emerged. After a trial period under others Nkomo again became its leader. He still urged black emancipation "a step at a time," and spent long hours addressing this theme to white audiences. Franck considers him to have been too moderate to be effective. White

audiences, mostly "small salons of European liberals in Salisbury and Bulawayo" were "polite but unresponsive." More militant blacks charged him with playing it safe, avoiding arrest, and making no effort to have previously jailed leaders released. Nonetheless, in December, 1961, the NDP was also banned. There was growing white hostility to even relatively mild black nationalism in the Rhodesias. In part this can be traced to the civil war in the Congo. Settlers abhorred the violence. They also feared that Lumumba was a Soviet sympathizer, and was attempting to establish a communist state on the very borders of N. Rhodesia. The settlers would fight against black communism with all their strength, Welensky told an all-white audience in July, 1960. "It has been," he said, "our role as white men to bring the light of civilization to this continent. We have no intention of letting the light be snuffed out."

That very day, three ANC leaders were arrested. 20,000 blacks then demonstrated in the streets of Salisbury. In another few days over 7,000 blacks confronted police in Bulawayo. Thirteen died. For the first time in over half a century, Rhodesian police had found it necessary to take an African's life. Perhaps the riots developed because a moderate regime had offered the majority of its population real reform, which whetted the appetite, then fulfilled its promises too slowly to satiate the thirst. This may well have been the case. If so, it was a failure of a di

31The Times, July 20, 1960, p. 10.
program which did not make incremental changes with sufficient rapidity. British failures may well have had their parallel in the acts of the moderate settler regimes. The result, in this instance, was that extremism was being encouraged on both sides. In such a situation, The Times editorialized, Britain was obligated to retain power so as to keep its moderating influence. Self-government ought not to be granted to the Dominion until sufficient progress in this regard had been made. The paper thus moved closer to the Labour Party position that independence must await, if not the grant of majority rule, at least greater reconciliation between blacks and whites.

The increasing polarization of opinion in Rhodesia had ramifications in Westminster. Even before the riots and arrests John Stonehouse requested and was granted the right to hold a Commons debate on the propriety of British intervention into Rhodesian affairs.

Many Britons accepted the Whitehead government, he charged, although they knew it was "a dictatorship of the minority over the majority." They excused this on the grounds the regime was "paternalistic." But it did not seem so to the natives. They found it harsh and oppressive.

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33 Hansard, Vol. 624 (June 3, 1960), cc. 1815-25. H. A. Marquand, the only other Labour speaker to this motion, agreed with most points. Ibid., cc. 1831-35.
True there had recently been minor reforms. But there remained in effect such laws as the Preventive Detention Act, which authorized jail sentences up to five years without trial; and the National Affairs Amendment Act, which could put a man in prison for six months for uttering a statement deemed "likely to undermine the authority of any officer of the government . . . any (tribal) chief (etc.)." Whitehead had himself used these powers on occasion. With such powers available to it, Stonehouse found it difficult to see how one could refer to the UFP as a moderate party. The only hope for the native was British intervention.34

Britain had the right to protect natives against "restrictive treatment" based on race (Clause 28). No law could gain effect until approved by either Her Majesty's government or the Privy Council (Clause 30). And Commons could disallow any law within a year of its passage (Clause 31).

These powers had never been invoked, and powers not used for so long lose much of their effectiveness. Yet, at least while Labour was in office, Stonehouse asserted, the knowledge that laws must be referred for British approval had had some influence. Acts even more discriminatory than those in effect had been supported by many white Rhodesians. Some had been introduced into the Dominion's parliament, but had been modified prior to enactment for fear of a British veto.

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34 Stonehouse had tabled an Early Day Motion urging these powers be invoked as early as March 24, 1959. Commonwealth, Vol. 1 #2 (Spring, 1959), p. 38.
"Quite clearly," the M.P. concluded, "S. Rhodesia is not an independent country. It is subject to the legislation of this House and to the scrutiny of the government of the United Kingdom." To withdraw this ultimate British weapon would be to expose Rhodesia's blacks to the kind of legislation which had been passed by the sovereign South African legislature. The Rhodesian black leaders realized this and placed great weight upon the reserve powers. Her Majesty's government ought to pledge in the Dominion, as she had in the Territories, that she would never grant independence without native consent. To do otherwise would abandon over two million loyal subjects. It would leave the way open to repression, civil warfare, or both.

Labour was thus in an awkward position. It wished to see Rhodesia advance as rapidly as possible towards independence. But it did not wish to see the government receive greater autonomy until it had clearly committed itself to a timetable for implementation of majority rule. So long as the Dominion government remained settler-dominated, many Labour M.P.'s actually wished to see retrenchment in the degree of autonomy it possessed. They seemed oblivious to the charge such action would almost certainly weaken those forces of moderation which remained among Rhodesia's settlers. Some, like Stonehouse, were simultaneously defending the increasingly dictatorial actions of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah. It is true the latter was chosen by a majority of his country's electorate—an electorate based upon universal adult suffrage. It is also true Ghana was
a sovereign nation. But Nkrumah was rapidly moving away from permitting any real opposition which could challenge him in another election. And other Labour M.P.'s were critical of Ghana even though it was sovereign. It would appear Stonehouse had developed different standards for black leaders than he had for whites.

Conservatives expressed sympathy with Labour's concern for native rights. They insisted the Whitehead government also shared this concern. It was on record as opposed to apartheid. The only difference was over the proper timing of reform. Important steps had already been taken, Patrick Wall reminded. Further steps would be made as blacks moved closer to whites in economic, social and educational terms. The franchise would then gradually expand. Was Rhodesia not following a policy similar to that Britain had pursued after 1832? The 1957 constitution retained flaws, Wall admitted. But Britons ought to realize the great difference between Rhodesia and South Africa. They must also realize Rhodesia had problems different from those of the United Kingdom. Measures which were unnecessarily harsh in the latter country might prove essential given conditions in the former. Besides, in practical terms, it would scarcely be possible for Britain to invoke powers unused for thirty-seven years. 35

During that time twelve allegedly discriminatory acts had been referred to 

35 Actually Rhodesia was never a colony in the technical sense. It was ruled by Rhodes' British South Africa Company until 1923. It then became a semi-autonomous Dominion.
Britain for review. All had been approved, including those submitted while Labour held office.\footnote{Hansard, Vol. 624 (June 3, 1960), cc. 1825-31.}

Commonwealth Under-Secretary Richard Thompson delivered the concluding remarks. In effect he accused Labour of having taken a synoptic position, based upon abstract ideological principles rather than political reality. To win concessions from Rhodesia, Britain must be willing to make concessions in return. Whitehead's regime must be recognized as democratically elected, moderate, and acting in good faith. If it moved too quickly, it would almost inevitably face a backlash from the settlers which could remove it from power and replace it with a regime far more repugnant to British ideals.\footnote{Ibid., cc. 1836-40.}

Here was the essence of the inter-party British split. Labour saw the principal threat to stability in the colony as coming from black impatience. Conservatives would seem to have believed the greater immediate danger to be from the settler right wing. Later events proved theirs the more accurate assessment.

They were also more correct in their view of the real limits on British power. They saw that any attempt to reverse precedent and impose legislation from Whitehall might well be ignored, and would then require force to implement. In any case it would push the settler population
further to the right. This would weaken informal, behind-the-scenes British influence. So long as the UFP retained office and moved in the desired direction—however slowly—the Conservative government would do its best to avoid confrontation.

In retrospect this would appear to us to have been a realistic policy. It was not as ideologically satisfying as the Labour alternative. It was perhaps callous, even cynical. But it was in keeping with pragmatism, realism, and the di strategy. Had Rhodesia existed in isolation it might have worked. But Rhodesian settlers watched events in east Africa; saw Britain renege on promises it had made to settlers there. This could not but undermine white Rhodesians' faith in British intentions. Even more damaging were events elsewhere in the Federation. First in Nyasaland, then in Northern Rhodesia, the overwhelming black majority forced Britain's hand. Finally it forced abandonment of the Federation itself. It is not surprising Rhodesians came to feel their future fate must rest in their own hands.

Rioting in July, 1960, further estranged black and white Rhodesians. It also increased the polarization in attitudes of the two British front benches. An emergency debate in Commons on July 26 clearly illustrated this fact. John Stonehouse was again the lead Socialist speaker. He read from a letter jointly signed by three NCP leaders, including Joshua
Nkomo, and Garfield Todd (now leader of the multiracial Central African Party), urging use of British force, if necessary, to restrain the "police-state tactics" being used against the black leaders of the country. Here was a liberal white joining with moderate black Rhodesian leaders to condemn their government. What further proof was needed that the United Kingdom must intervene? From the standpoint of the Rhodesian government, the Todd-Nkomo letter must have appeared to border on treason. A key passage prayed

H. M. G.:

will not flinch from the task of upsetting the present regime and guiding and assisting the establishment of democratic rule by the people of our land. This must have proved extremely embarrassing to the British government which had so recently defended the moderation of the Whitehead government. Especially embarrassing was the endorsement of the statement by a former Prime Minister recently hailed by so many Conservatives as a true democrat, whose main fault was only that he was a bit ahead of his countrymen in forming desired attitudes on the racial question. Speaking for the government front bench, Alport condemned

\[\text{38} \text{Forty-three leaders were imprisoned for sixteen months each. Others, including those very moderate by British standards, were temporarily detained.}
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\[\text{39} \text{Hansard, Vol. 627 (July 26, 1960), cc. 1535-36.}
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\[\text{40} \text{Reprinted in Ibid., c. 1536.}\]
the letter. It was difficult, he said, to believe the signatories "fully understood the implications . . . nothing could have done a greater dis-service to S. Rhodesia" than its publication. The Dominion government had full legal responsibility to ensure internal law and order. Todd, when Prime Minister, had actively supported the very franchise bill under which the current government had been elected. It was not a dictatorial regime. Britain had no intention of attempting to remove it from office. The Moncton Commission would soon provide "calm and wise advice on the future pattern" which should emerge in the Dominion and in the Federation. Meanwhile there ought not be precipitous action.

Although the lateness of the hour rendered the debate brief, party polarization was much in evidence. No Labour front bench M.P. spoke, however, so there would appear to have been a leadership desire to be cautious until more facts were known. All three Labour backbench speakers endorsed Stonehouse's position. Judith Hart argued the Rhodesian government continued to be guilty of "suppression of free political thought and activity." The British ought to suspend the constitution and take direct control, before the Dominion witnessed a repetition of the bloody Sharpeville confrontation which had rocked South Africa the previous March. Marquand reminded Commons many of the

41Ibid., cc. 1556-63.

42Debate began at 3:20 a.m. and did not conclude until nearly 5:00 a.m.
men now imprisoned had but recently shared tea at Westminster. They had seemed as moderate as any African leaders he had ever met. The riots had not led to the arrests. It was the other way round.

Fenner Brockway again revealed he was no longer the most fiery Labour M.P. on matters of African nationalism. He was reluctantly persuaded to support Stonehouse only because his respect for Todd made him believe the charges asserted in the letter. Action must be taken by Britain. Constitutional suspension must be a "last measure" however, to be implemented only if all other attempts to get the government to moderate its policies failed.43

Two Conservative backbenchers spoke. Neither, of course, supported Stonehouse's call for direct British action. Yet both expressed concern over the trend in the Dominion. They did not share the no-need-for-alarm attitude taken by Alport on behalf of the government. Peter Tapsell's concern seemed primarily to revolve around fears foreign investment in Rhodesia would suffer, and northern alienation towards the Federation would grow. Peter Kirk went further. He expressed "general sympathy" with the Stonehouse presentation. He still believed the matter should be settled internally. But Britain ought not condone the Rhodesian government's actions until it received information from an impartial

43Hansard, Vol. 627 (July 26, 1960), cc. 1547-49 (Hart); 1554-55 (Marquand); 1551-52 (Brockway).
investigation of recent events.44

It would appear from this that a section of the Conservative Party was growing quite concerned with the policies being pursued within the southern member of the CAF. This was made explicit in an editorial in the summer, 1960 edition of the Bow Group's publication, Crossbow. It was increasingly unlikely a close-knit political federation could survive in Central Africa, it suggested. The "greatest present danger" in Central Africa (or Kenya) it continued:

is not that we shall retain our responsibilities too long but that we may be induced, for reasons which are essentially self-interested but which may appear in the guise of liberal principles, to abandon them too soon.45

Liberal Tories were beginning to sound like the Labour front bench. Their party leadership could not ignore the implications of such unrest within their own ranks.

Yet an article by Michael Faber in the same edition of Crossbow reveals the pragmatic and realistic limitations on even Bow Group reservations. Choices must soon be made, he said. The longer proposals for future relationships within the Federation and within Rhodesia went unresolved, the more antagonistic the two races would grow. The best Britain could hope for from the existing regimes was a very gradual increase in African participation, a similarly gradual decrease in

44Ibid., cc. 1553-54 (Tapsell); 1543-44 (Kirk).

segregation. Yet these were regimes Britain should support. It must be remembered the Rhodesian white electorate was "a great deal more self-interested and reactionary" than was its current leadership. The Dominion would be hurt economically by an end of federation and it was "extremely unlikely" any liberally oriented government could survive the resultant slump.\(^46\) Again the advice was clear. Britain must support any reasonable demands from the UFP, because the DP was so much worse.

Soon after the riots, the Whitehead regime announced reforms. We do not know whether this was motivated by intrinsic concern over the deterioration of white-black relations, or the practical realization reform would be necessary before Britain would seriously consider granting independence. The press reported unconfirmed rumors of British pressure being quietly applied. By the very nature of such attempts at persuasion, they must remain secret to have any effect.

In any case, a Rhodesian Select Committee report of August, 1960, recommended revocation of the Land Apportionment Act—both symbolically and practically the paradigm of segregationist philosophy in Africa. A few days later legislation was introduced permitting Africans, for the first time, to elect their own labor union representatives. The Times applauded these acts, suggesting the government had recognized that "apartheid is
a luxury that South Rhodesia cannot afford."  

Optimism in the Dominion was soon shattered by two events. A riot in Salisbury in October saw Africans attack Europeans. A far greater shock came a few days later, when the Moncton Commission findings were published. It was admitted the Federation's breakup would end the hope for true multiracial development in Central Africa. Yet federation, in its present form, was deemed "too disliked to survive." Britain ought to promise each member country the right to secede, either upon reaching internal autonomy, or in a certain number of years. Meanwhile, many centrally administered activities ought to be returned to territorial control. African representation should be considerably increased in the Territories. The majority of Commissioners felt a thirty-thirty white-black split proper for the Federal Assembly. A bill of rights against discriminatory practices ought to be inserted in each of the four constitutions. Especially relevant for our purposes was the report's Point Five. Racial discrimination, particularly in S. Rhodesia--was deemed the heart of legitimate black opposition. It ought immediately to be abolished by law.  

The report's publication coincided with the Conservatives' Annual Party Conference. It was referred to several times in speeches there.

47 The Times, August 17, 1960, p. 7; August 24, 1960, p. 9.

48 The report was reprinted in The Times, October 12, 1960, p. 4.
Prime Minister Macmillan's closing-day address reflected his concern. The report was not necessarily binding, he told his party. It was intended to help develop the Federation, not to destroy it. It was, however, the duty of the Conservative Party to "carry out full responsibility towards all men of all races." Economic benefits of federation must be considered, but Conservatives knew "materialism (was) not enough."

"Materialism, to be hallowed, must be shared," even if this required "risks or sacrifices to achieve." 49

The Conservatives were beginning to modify their former support for the Federation, and for continued white rule in the Territories. This becomes clearer if one reads a policy sheet put out at this time by the Conservative Political Center. Total abandonment of the CAF was seen as a "tragedy" which could hopefully be avoided. But the Moncton Report findings must be accepted. Federation, in its present form, was indeed too disliked to survive. Perhaps, if the right to secede were admitted, extremism would be curbed. A more peaceful political climate could then develop, and a modified federal scheme could receive a fair trial. 50

The British government had not, as yet, formulated a clear new policy. It was obviously sending up trial balloons, however. The aware

49 Reprinted in The Times, October 17, 1960, p. 6.

settler was given warning there was little likelihood Britain would much longer support the extent to which he was presently in control. The new power balance would certainly give greater strength to natives.

The change in the British position must have sounded frightening to settlers already aware of the growing power of blacks in British east Africa. Welensky and Whitehead decided to lash out at the Moncton proposals in language as forceful as any one might expect to find used by government heads during peacetime. Whitehead likened the proposal for reexamination of the relationship between the federal and territorial governments to a botanist who "takes a plant up by the roots every five years to see if it is still growing." He believed a negotiated settlement between Rhodesia and Britain was still possible, but warned there could be no binding agreement without approval in a referendum by the existing territorial electorate.51

It would also appear the central African leaders decided they could no longer rely on Britain, and must act on their own to curb black nationalist extremists. Two weeks later, a harsh Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill was introduced in the Assembly. In effect it banned meetings or rallies by existing black political organizations. Chief Justice Robert Tredgold resigned in protest. The Times hailed his action as proof of the idealism which remained in the colony. It saw the bill as a "panic

51 The Times, October 19, 1960, p. 8.
measure" which might irrevocably alienate even the white liberals. It suggested they should now ally with moderates from the other races to save British traditions of fair play in the Dominion. 52

The salutary effects of the August reforms would seem all but undone. Action and reaction to the Moncton Report had stimulated hope for change among blacks, and increased disillusion and backlash among the settlers. Opportunities for Britain to develop an incrementally progressive policy acceptable to both races were correspondingly diminished.

Yet both the English and Rhodesian governments remained anxious to negotiate. Whitehead came to London in mid-November. British officials hinted it might be prepared to give up its reserve powers—thereby paving the way for the Dominion to become a fully self-governing member of the Commonwealth—if it could be shown such powers were "no longer necessary." The Times pointed to the ambivalence of recent tendencies in Rhodesia. It would be good if remaining "encumbrances" on its independence could be removed. But unless "suitable alternatives" to protect the black majority could be developed, Britain ought not relinquish its remaining powers. 53

52 "Crisis in Rhodesia," Times editorial, November 2, 1960, p. 8; Article, p. 12.

The Times now sounded much like the Labour backbenchers of six months earlier. Such reactions in the United Kingdom must have proven increasingly frustrating to the Dominion's government. All-black governments in Ghana and Nigeria had attained independence. Natives were moving rapidly towards control of the governments of east Africa. It appeared increasingly likely they would soon be in power in Nyasaland, perhaps even N. Rhodesia. Yet the Dominion, internally self-sufficient when the above-mentioned peoples were still considered too primitive to even practice democracy at the local level, was being prevented from attaining the final steps necessary for it to assume its place alongside Ghana as a full member of the Commonwealth. The pressures on Whitehead must have been great. If he did not return from London with a positive British pledge it would grant full internal sovereignty, he and his party would be in great political trouble.

The Federal Prime Minister suggested this in a rather frank speech soon after his arrival in England. He emphasized the positive facts of life in his country. Of course Europeans retained special status. This was because their influence was "indispensable" to the development of the CAF "at this time and for all time."

Whitehead also delivered a warning. The UFP could not have won the last federal elections without a pledge to reject any arrangement whereby the Northern Territories could "politically dominate" the federation. Unless this pledge were kept, the DP would win the next election.
It was also unlikely the existing electorate would approve further improvement in the natives' political position unless Britain promised first to relinquish its remaining reserve powers.\(^5\) This was not so much a threat as a statement of the political realities. The British could hope for gradual development of parity under his government, or permanent entrenchment of white rule under the opposition.

Clearly implementation of a di policy would favor the former course. If the DP were to win, Britain must almost certainly have had to use force to end white domination. She had shied from using troops even to put down black nationalism (except in the extreme case of Mau Mau). How much more unwilling must Parliament be if it were suggested force be used against the settlers. The Conservatives were quite ready to support Whitehead.\(^5\)

Labour, however, was not willing. It had come to champion the black cause, as symbolized by the demands of the NDP. It felt the UFP was firmly wedded to segregation and white rule. The Times pointed out the inconsistency in this stance. Labour condemned the UFP, yet praised the minority Progressive Party in South Africa. This party was radical when contrasted with the ruling Nationalist Party there. Its platform,


however, was almost identical to that espoused in Rhodesia by the Whitehead government.56

Her Majesty's government was being pragmatic; the opposition much more dogmatic. One can but guess whether either position would have been altered had Labour been in power. Faced with the possibility of sending British troops against Europeans, Labour might well have been less rigid. Prime Minister Wilson has, after all, flatly refused to commit troops even after the former Dominion unilaterally declared itself a sovereign state.

The Conservatives were in an ideal position to implement a di policy. Whitehead wished to gain greater home rule via British consent. He was prepared to initiate reforms the British wanted if he could gain this end. The Times editorial page of February 9, 1961, suggested a majority of the electorate supported such a compromise.57 For a time it appeared both sides would get what they wished. In the spring of 1961, miraculously, a compromise was prepared which not only satisfied the British and Rhodesian governments, but won approval from NDP leader Nkomo.

Rhodesia would take some important steps towards permitting real black participation. A declaration of rights would be incorporated into a


new constitution, prohibiting passage of discriminatory legislation based on race, creed or tribal affiliation. Legal review procedures would be developed to enhance enforcement. Major provisions of the declaration could be altered only if approved, in referenda, by majorities of each racial community. The Rhodesian Assembly would be enlarged to sixty-five seats. Fifteen of these would, for the first time, be chosen from a roll composed almost exclusively of blacks. In return, Britain would renounce its remaining legal powers to intercede in Rhodesia's domestic affairs.

The Dominion Party flatly rejected the compromise, claiming it gave far too many concessions to the African. Whitehead took solace in having won NDP support. Nkomo apparently had acted without prior consultation among his subordinates, however. Upon his return he was sharply attacked by powerful elements within his party for having too readily abandoned the principle of majority rule. Similar accusations came from nationalist leaders elsewhere in Africa, and Ghana threatened to cut off future funds or support. Nkomo reneged on his pledge, stating fifteen seats out of sixty-five to be insufficient black representation. He regained control of his party, but lost any remnant of trust from most settlers. He also permanently alienated Whitehead, whose prestige had suffered from the reversal. Franck, at least, has argued the December,
1961 banning of the NCP was "the Prime Minister's quid pro quo."\textsuperscript{58}

Adverse reaction to the compromise was not confined to Rhodesia. The British Labour Party was also disturbed, as can be seen by reading two Commons debates, in March and June, 1961. The earlier of these was relatively brief, initiated by certain Labour M.P.'s to discuss what they considered to be deficiencies in the proposals. The other was a very lengthy, highly partisan debate over passage of two Command Papers authorizing Rhodesia's Assembly to proceed with a new constitution.

In both, Labour's front bench admitted progress towards desired ends had been made. They doubted, however, whether Britain could trust the UFP sufficiently to relinquish its remaining powers. As G. M. Thompson put it, what proof was there further steps towards establishing true majority rule would be taken once British influence was terminated? The Rhodesian settlers had not shown themselves to be "the best judge(s) of the realities of the world in which they have to live." What would prevent them from deciding fifteen Assembly seats was sufficient black representation for decades to come? In like manner, the proposed bill of rights outlawed future discriminatory legislation, but it did not appear to cover laws already passed. Could the Rhodesian government be trusted to remove these of its own accord? Stonehouse added an economic side

to the picture. It was profitable to Rhodesian whites to maintain existing segregation practices. Without external pressure it was unlikely a majority would be anxious to willingly alter this structure.

The rise of black nationalism was seen as having given the reserve powers "a new potency." Before they were relinquished they should be used to develop "a more just society" in the territory. To relinquish them now was "not . . . at all satisfactory." 59

The most interesting part of this debate was Sandys' closing defense of Britain's position. He clearly still retained the belief the Rhodesian government was acting out of good will, and that a majority of the Rhodesian settlers believed in multiracialism. The recent conference was considered to have been of the "utmost significance." For the first time representatives of both major Rhodesian racial stocks had met together and discussed mutual problems. It was most unfortunate Nkomo had rescinded his earlier approval of the reforms, since these represented a real advance for his race.

Instead of criticizing creation of only fifteen black seats in the Assembly, Labour ought to remember that now there were none. Of course some discriminatory practices would remain. They could not disappear overnight. Nor could legal guarantees be foolproof. The trend away from such practices was the important factor. Besides, until Africans had

59 Hansard, Vol. 637 (March 23, 1961), cc. 705-11 (Thompson); 712-17 (Stonehouse). See also remarks of H. A. Marquand, cc. 720-27.
social and economic equality with Europeans some types of preferential (hence discriminatory) legislation were necessary for their protection. Existing harmful discriminatory measures such as the recently passed emergency laws were, admittedly, not abrogated by the new constitution. It would, Sandy's insisted, be a "gross breach of the spirit of the constitution if (they) were allowed to stand." Once again, the underlying difference between the two British parties would seem to have been not so much their disagreement over the specifics of the proposed laws but their attitudes toward the motives of the UFP.

The June debate was held at Labour's insistence. The government, represented by Commonwealth Under-Secretary Bernard Braine, noted how each proposed reform would advance the present status of the blacks. Braine was especially optimistic over proposed electoral reforms, suggesting that, as more Africans attained the required level of education and wealth, they would automatically be added to the electoral rolls. Thus, even with no new legislation, their voting power would continually increase. More blacks would be elected to the Assembly, although the final goal remained elections based on merit, not race. The Whitehead government had convinced the Colonial office, both by words and deeds, it was pledged to the gradual removal of discriminatory practices in all areas of life. Some laws now discriminated in favor of natives. These

60 Ibid., cc. 728-35, 738.
should not disappear at once. Even Nkomo had recognized this, before succumbing to the extremists. 61

Rhodesia had had an excellent record of maintaining internal peace, stable government, a modernizing economy and a high growth rate, Braine continued. Real powers and safeguards were now being afforded to the African people by their own rulers. It was questionable whether the reserve powers could be enforced after so many years of dormancy. On balance, "the safeguards developed are . . . more effective than the reserved powers which they will replace." 62

The opposition leadership again presented an almost totally different picture. Reforms had been made, more were being proposed. But, stated lead speaker Marquand, reform lagged well behind that rendered in other British African colonies. One tenth of the population would retain nine-tenths of the land and three-quarters of the legislative seats. This was "utterly out of line." The recommendations of the Moncton Commission were far more in keeping with what ought to be done. 63 Rhodesia's black leaders were moderates, Marquand insisted, with "no hatred in their hearts" towards whites. So far, their patience had been rewarded by new

62 Ibid., cc. 1696-98, 1702.
63 This is highly ironic. Labour, which had boycotted the Commission to the end, now espoused its report. The government which had appointed the Commission now reminded its findings were purely advisory, without binding force.
acts of repression against them. This was "a very sad and dreadful thing to have happen. . . . Do not allow them to think their trust has been betrayed."\(^6^4\)

The sharp inter-party polarity was even greater among the backbenchers. Conservative speakers continuously emphasized that the only alternative government to the one now in power was one led by the DP.\(^6^5\) Labourites continued to emphasize how little reform the UFP had initiated. Most saw little difference between a frankly segregationist party and one which preached multiracialism but only made concessions in areas where white dominance was not threatened. The only moral position one could take, they insisted, was in support of the black cause.\(^6^6\)

Labour's motion was defeated by a solid ninety-four votes. Yet the party leaders still determined to fight every step of the way. The Rhodesian parliament approved the new constitution, in slightly amended form. It was immediately subject to a Labour censure motion delivered in Commons, declaring, in part, there could be no assent to abandoning powers: "for the protection of the African people of S. Rhodesia, which


\(^6^5\) See *Ibid.*, cc. 1725-28 (R. H. Turton); 1738-42 (F. M. Bennett); 1756-65 (Patrick Wall); 1774 (Sir Lionel Heald); 1786 (Charles Longbottom).

\(^6^6\) See *Ibid.*, cc. 1731-37 (John Dugdale); 1744-46, 1751-52 (Barbara Castle); 1787-90 (George Mallalieu). One Labourite would seem to have agreed with the opposition, but his speech was somewhat incoherent and his reasoning not clear. *Ibid.*, cc. 1765-73 (Jack Jones).
have been formulated without their consent, and which fail to provide for
them a representation in the Legislature sufficient to safeguard their
liberties." The motion of course failed.

Commons still had to approve the constitution. During the Second
Reading, Labour introduced an amendment similar to the above motion. If
anything it was more strongly worded, since it held the document failed
to provide "adequate safeguards against discrimination" as well as
inadequate representation. Soskice, who introduced the amendment,
took pains to emphasize Labour was not anti-settler. It did not wish to
aggravate further an already tense situation. Nor did it wish to criticize
the British attempts to reach a satisfactory settlement.

But the existing state of affairs was not satisfactory. The
Rhodesian referendum on the new constitution, held the previous July, had
produced a two-to-one vote of support. But only 5,000 non-whites were
qualified to vote in an electorate of 82,000. The NDP held its own
"referendum," and reported black Rhodesians had "decisively rejected"
the document. This was logical, Soskice felt, since their rights would
not be adequately protected. He continued to insist Britain had the power
to revoke the constitution and insist upon legislation more favorable to the

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67 For comments on the motion see Commonwealth, Vol. 3 #3 (Summer, 1961), pp. 36-37.

68 Seventy-seven percent of the electorate voted. Of these 41,949 voted yes; 21,846 no. The NDP referendum listed 152,277 no votes, 235 yes. Ibid., p. 5.
natives. If it permitted the constitution to go into effect it would lose that power and abrogate its responsibility to the majority of the Dominion's population. 69

Government patience was wearing thin. Braine mentioned reforms past and contemplated. The Rhodesian assembly had, moreover, legally passed these reforms and Commons had no right to "endlessly debate" them or intervene. More importantly, the whole atmosphere had changed in Rhodesia in the past few months. Other Conservative speakers concurred. 70 They accepted Whitehead's recent remark that "'the idea of white supremacy was ... as dead as the dodo.'" It must be most discouraging, they argued, to the two-thirds of the settlers who had approved the referendum to find British Labour still doubted their sincerity in working for improvement of the African. This position was shared by liberal Africa reporter Clyde Sanger, who entitled a lengthy feature in The Guardian "Rhodesian Reforms Only a Beginning." 71

Conservatives accused Labour of attacking the letter of the new constitution, rather than accepting the spirit in which it was written. Labour agreed. Speakers continued to attack the constitution precisely on grounds its wording was insufficient to guarantee native rights and


70Ibid., cc. 1942-51 (Braine); 1071-74 (Heald); 1082-86 (Gower); 1091-94 (Wall).

native progress. They admitted it was the letter of the law which concerned them. To them this was the crucial matter because they did not believe the UFP had had a change of heart. 72

The NDP strike call had not failed because most blacks had come to support the regime, stated an article in Commonwealth. Nor was apathy the cause of the low level of response. It was caused by the existence of repressive legislation which had made strikes illegal and subjected violators to imprisonment for two to five years. Whitehead had pledged, following the NDP's referendum results, that "The government intends to take the firmest action to see that this kind of thing is put down with a rod of iron." It was statements such as these (which did not get reprinted in Conservative Party journals) which made Labourites question the sincerity behind the UFP's reforms. The editors of Commonwealth accused their government of "sacrificing its responsibility for the protection of African interests on the altar of the illusion of African progress." 73

One Conservative saw merit in the Labour position. Nigel Fischer argued the UFP had made concessions only so as to win full autonomy for

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72 Even Jack Jones had come round to this position. Hansard, Vol. 648 (November 8, 1961), cc. 1086-91. See also cc. 1067-71 (Donald Wade); 1075-82 (Elwyn Jones).

its settler dominated regime. Yet he supported the government bill, on
the purely pragmatic grounds that Britain had no choice. Her veto power
was impotent, atrophied from years of disuse. She could still trade that
paper power to win some advance for the natives. If she refused, she
would lose both the power and the opportunity.74

Fischer had hit upon a significant point. Most Rhodesian settlers
still felt loyalty to the British. Despite their increasing concern, they
still trusted the Conservative Party leaders. The UFP leadership wanted
British approval, and were willing to make some concessions to receive it.
They would not grant concessions beyond what they felt to be the tolerable
limits for permitting native advance. Nor would they go beyond what their
constituents would consider permissible, i.e. they would not risk defeat
at the polls. But they would make some reforms, and promise others at a
later date, if Britain would relinquish her veto--even though they knew
she probably could not enforce it. The majority of the electorate supported
this aim.

Most settlers probably believed it was proper to give natives more
power as their socio-economic status and educational levels advanced.
They might even have believed in equality at some time in the long-range
future. In any case, they had supported UFP proposals to grant some
improvement in native status, and some representation in the government,

74Ibid., Vol. 642 (June 22, 1961), cc. 1790-96.
if amicable relations with Britain could be retained, and if they won the right to fully control native affairs in the future. The leaders knew a Labour government might try to invoke the veto. They did not wish to face such a crisis. They wanted Britain to relinquish the veto while the Conservatives were still in office. DP leaders condemned the suggested concessions their government was proposing, but offered no alternative beyond insisting Rhodesia must control its own destiny. There was not yet any talk of UDI.

The offered *quid pro quo* would appear to us to have been a reasonable one for a government with a broker mentality to accept. The alternative would be to risk a crisis. This is precisely what the DI strategy is designed to avoid. The British government proposed to act accordingly.

Labour would invoke a crisis rather than back off from a principle. It would risk permitting a frankly segregationist party's taking office rather than relinquish power to one offering what it considered to be overly gradual reforms. Labour wanted Britain to maintain its present degree of control over Rhodesian affairs at all cost. The traditional roles of the two British parties were reversed. It was the Tories who wished to give a colony its independence, the Socialists who demanded it retain imperial control. The principle of permitting sovereignty was subordinated to the principle of one-man, one-vote.

The most striking indication of the gulf which had grown between the British parties were remarks made in the November, 1961 debate on
the constitution. Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth Secretary, praised the settlers for having given their "full consent" to "far reaching advances for Africans... an historic and almost unique event in... a territory of this kind." This assessment was certainly correct. Sandys took pride in Rhodesia's move towards multiracialism, and pride in the degree to which he and other Britons had helped persuade it to do so.75

Labour was no longer willing to accept such a solution, however. It had moved considerably leftwards from its own 1959 view that it had always been willing to support the CAF "provided that it established a genuine racial partnership... based on the voluntary adherence of the African people."76 Now Labour front bench spokesman Marquand admitted the newly accepted constitution was an example of "the multiracial approach." But this concept was outdated. Recent experiences had proven it a "mistaken philosophy." It must give way to the "non-racial approach"--a rule by the numerically dominant racial group--utilizing the "abilities" of the other races, but not subject to their veto.77

There was therefore little chance of a bi-partisan policy towards Rhodesia developing. The Conservatives had the votes necessary to approve the constitution. They might still have successfully carried out

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their compromise plan, had the Dominion been a single territory. Events elsewhere in the CAF brought new, ultimately insoluble pressures to bear.

The future of the Federation depended upon constitutional developments that were being worked out for N. Rhodesia. Colonial Secretary Macleod, presiding over negotiations in the territory, had by this time accepted the necessity for a non-racial (black majority) government. He was thus closer to the position of the opposition than he was to those of Welensky, Whitehead or Commonwealth Secretary Sandys. The Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office "were at daggers drawn."\(^7^8\)

The split was reflected among Tory backbenchers. Pro-settler opinion ran deep. In February, 1961, in an almost unprecedented move, almost one hundred Conservative M.P.'s signed an Early Day Motion urging their party leaders to "maintain the basis of non-racial representation" in N. Rhodesia. In effect this meant maintaining white rule. A similar, albeit modified proposal could still receive forty Tory backbench signatures a year later.\(^7^9\)

On the other hand, the Bow Group's January, 1961 publication *The New Africa* took a position at least as radical as Macleod's. It urged immediate implementation of the Moncton Report's suggestions for the

\(^7^8\)Kirkman, *Unscrambling an Empire*, pp. 115-18.

\(^7^9\)Rasmussen, *The Profumo Rebels*, pp. 19-24.
Northern Territories—including a black majority for N. Rhodesia's Legislative Council. This was seen as providing a stimulus to Salisbury, which was depicted as having retained the policy initiative, to "learn the way to dissolve discrimination" in S. Rhodesia. The UFP lacked specific plans, it was argued. Only U.K. prodding would keep it moving in the desired directions. As for the CAF, it was now viewed as a "scheme that was already out of date by the time it was put on the Statute Books." The strains of preserving it outweighed the disadvantages accruing from "regrouping the territories." 80

Early in 1962 Macmillan acted to resolve his inner Cabinet controversy. R. A. Butler, the Deputy Prime Minister, was given full charge of all affairs concerning central Africa.

Labour almost immediately put him on the defensive. Shadow Commonwealth Secretary Dennis Healey spoke in a Commons debate of "eighteen months of vacillation and dithering." He called upon his government to implement the Moncton Commission's recommendation the right of secession be afforded any territory where the majority of the people wished to do so. John Strachey warned of following one policy in east and west Africa, another in central Africa. The CAF, he said, clearly had "no future." Britain must move to implement majority rule in

However Butler decided to act, he must alienate part of his party. Again events in Africa were probably the decisive factor. Late in 1961 the UFP was defeated in elections in Nyasaland, and resigned from the government of N. Rhodesia. In S. Rhodesia in December, 1961, Joshua Nkomo announced creation of ZAPU to replace the outlawed NDP. It soon came out flatly against federation. In April of 1962 the UFP won an overwhelming Federation victory. It was opposed only by the right wing, all-white Rhodesian Republican Party. All black parties boycotted the elections, and UFP candidates were unopposed in forty of the fifty-nine constituencies. In an area with nine million people and 120,000 voters, only 15,000 had bothered to cast their ballot. The CAF was quite clearly no longer a viable political unit.

Still, Butler took office hoping a modified federal scheme would prove acceptable to all three regional governments. By August, Kirkman states, it had become clear to him Nyasaland would not voluntarily remain in any association with the Rhodesias. Britain was not prepared to use

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83 This may be seen from a speech of that date. See Kirkman, *Unscrambling an Empire*, pp. 124-25. See also "What Can be Saved," *Times* editorial, July 20, 1962, p. 15; and Commons debate summarized in *The Times*, July 31, 1962, p. 6.
force. The right to secede was granted Nyasaland in a speech in Commons on December 19, 1962. Kirkman is sure a promise to do this was given to Banda earlier—at the latest during his November visit to London.84

The pledge to permit secession was hailed by Commonwealth's editor. Here was "vindication" of ten years of Labour opposition to the CAF. The Conservative publication NCP still argued federation had provided adequate safeguards to blacks and economic benefits to all member states. It recognized that "certain sections of the African community" had never been convinced of this. This unfortunate situation had finally caused the Federation to fall.85

Welensky was furious. He told an emergency session of the Federation Assembly he had not been consulted, or even informed, of the decision until it was made. Britain had "'ratted'" on its commitments, and performed "'an act of treachery.'" It had also broken a pledge made during the 1952 negotiations that no territory could secede for a ten year period from the date the CAF came into being without approval of all five


This disclosure of a pledge never made public created quite a stir in London—especially when its existence was confirmed by several members of the House of Lords who had been privy to the negotiations. But "implied" it had been "improper" to reveal this information. The Times criticized the "intemperence" of Welensky's language, but agreed he had been badly treated and was deserving of sympathy. There were times when conditions changed so much that pledges could not be kept, the editorial continued. But release should always be sought in such circumstances by mutual agreement. For the Cabinet to have remained silent after it knew the pledges must be broken had been "downright reprehensible." Perhaps it could have been added that if Butler had been framer he might even have achieved some sort of bargain with Welensky. The latter, according to Kirkman, had already been persuaded


87Lord Salisbury (then Commonwealth Secretary) confirmed the agreement and denounced his party and government for abrogating it. Lord Chandos (then Oliver Lyttleton) and Lord Boyd (then Alan Lennox-Boyd) were somewhat vaguer about a formal pledge, but agreed there had been an "understanding" to that effect. For details, see Lords debate summary in The Times, February 14, 1963, p. 11; "The Pledges," Times editorial, Ibid., p. 13; Kirkman, Unscrambling an Empire, pp. 126-28.

"major changes were going to be necessary" to preserve any form of federal unity.\footnote{Kirkman, \textit{Unscrambling an Empire}, p. 124.}

Again incrementalism had given way to an either-or decision, the suddenness of which had exacerbated settler hard feelings and mistrust. As in Kenya, the British were not willing to use force to preserve an unpopular arrangement. As in Kenya, the only alternative was that pledges to the settlers be broken. In April, 1963, N. Rhodesia was granted the right to secede. It had already attained a black legislative majority. In July the formal dissolution of the CAF was announced. In January, 1964, N. Rhodesia was granted internal self-rule. On July 6, Nyasaland became the sovereign state of Malawi. On October 24, N. Rhodesia attained full independence as Zambia. These events had profound effect in the Dominion which, with little more sovereignty than it possessed in 1923, was still negotiating. However little one might sympathize with the settlers' point of view, one cannot be surprised that the majority of them lost patience with Whitehall. The days of special status had ended in the Northern Territories and in east Africa. Only in the Dominion were the settlers in a position to fight back. They proceeded to do so.

Within Rhodesia, black-white relations had been steadily worsening. Prime Minister Whitehead was still attempting to implement an incremental policy of his own. He pressed for continuation of gradual
elimination of his discriminatory legislation even as he placated the electorate with strengthened laws against violence or overt political agitation. This policy won no plaudits from Labour. On July 30, 1962, Dennis Healey (the Shadow Colonial Secretary) argued desegregation was no substitute for political power. "For the African majority," he continued, "S. Rhodesia is now a repressive police state." Britain must either "take some action" to curb the Rhodesian government's oppression, or expect mounting violence.90

Rioting and looting by blacks were on the increase. Franck suggests Nkomo's experiences had made him more radical, more willing to insist upon immediate political advance and ignore the slower, albeit more effective, multiracial attempts at strengthening labor unions and integrating public facilities. At the very time these efforts were having real success, they were undercut and Zapu denounced those involved as the Rhodesian equivalent of Uncle Tom's.91

In the summer of 1962, Zapu's leaders pledged to boycott the December elections, rendering the creation of the fifteen black seats farcical. Whitehead reacted by preparing a stronger Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill--making it a crime to "discourage" blacks from registering. He also warned Nkomo if his party were banned again it


would not be permitted to reform under a new name. The Times saw the two men as "locked in mortal extra-parliamentary combat." It did not share Labour's view Rhodesia was a police state, but warned that unless there were a compromise soon the country was in danger of becoming one.92

While Nkomo was visiting N. Rhodesia his party was outlawed. He took asylum in Tanganyika but, again under pressure from subordinates, returned home to join other party leaders restricted to what Franck calls "a number of 'little Siberias.'"93

Labour's hostility to the regime reached new heights. On October 1, Jennie Lee delivered an NEC Emergency Resolution to her party's Annual Conference condemning the arrests and the party ban, suggesting these would lead to the very violence they were intended to suppress, and demanding Britain insist upon a new constitution and an immediate increase in the territory's black legislative representation. The British government should also:

make clear to the Southern Rhodesian Government that Britain will make no further surrender of her constitutional rights until genuine representative government exists in the territory, and that future economic and financial assistance by Britain will depend on rapid progress to that end.94

92 "Rhodesian Omens," Times editorial, August 16, 1962, p. 11.


The Conservatives still hoped Whitehead could carry off his program, and realized he must act tough during an election campaign marked by mounting pressures at home. The DP had reorganized as the Rhodesian Front. It was hoping UFP concessions and seeming black ingratitude for them would cause a backlash in the electorate. On the eve of the elections Clyde Sanger reported from Salisbury that this campaign had "stirred up more dust of racial emotion than any political warhorse here can remember." The Front had made gains over the one-third of the voters who had supported the DP's opposition to the constitutional reform referendum. Yet Sanger remained confident the UFP would "have no difficulty in winning."\(^5\)

He was incorrect. The Front won thirty-five seats to the UFP's twenty-nine. (There was one independent.) Events in the territories helped cause this settler rebellion. But it was almost certainly furthered by what was felt to be British weakness in the face of Banda's secessionist demands. The December 19 announcement granting the right of secession must have seemed to many a confirmation of their suspicions. The United Kingdom, even under a Conservative government, could no longer be trusted to protect white interests in its colonies. Winston Field, the new Rhodesian Prime Minister, suggested as much in a speech made shortly after he took office. Butler was vehemently denounced. To

many settlers (and to right wing members of his own party) he seemed more reprehensible than the leaders of the opposition. They, at least, had been frank about their desire to destroy the CAF.

Field "regretted" the passing of the federation. Since hostile blacks now controlled the governments of both Territories, however, he felt it best his country made a "clean break." Rhodesia's whites must be able to control their own destiny. 96

The grant of secession for Nyasaland sealed the fate of the CAF and also ended Welensky's political career. Most of the literature on this period fails to point out that the Front's prior victory in the Dominion rendered the promise of secession anticlimactic. The governments of all three members of the Federation were already controlled by parties opposed to its continuation.

Field did not suggest a move towards apartheid. Existing laws would remain. 97 But integration would proceed no further. Black violence and agitation would not be tolerated, and would be suppressed by whatever means were required. 98

Had Britain been able to deal with Rhodesia in a vacuum, it is

96 *The Times*, February 14, 1963, p. 11.

97 This may have been tactical. The Front lacked the necessary two-thirds to amend the constitution without UFP support, and Whitehead condemned the harshness of several new laws. His effectiveness was blunted since most proposals were amendments to laws he had introduced.

possible it might still have salvaged something of its hope to move the territory towards greater African participation in return for relinquishing the final reigns of power. Despite pressure from his own party's right wing, Field was loathe to force the issue of independence. This can be illustrated by Butler's triumph in getting Field to Victoria Falls in June, 1963, where the "last rites" for the CAF were performed. (Federation came to a formal end on December 31, 1963.) Initially the Rhodesian leader refused to participate unless his country were first granted independence. Butler gradually managed to persuade him independence could not come until the Federation was dissolved. Therefore Field must cooperate in dissolving it. To refuse to come would also mean jeopardizing future entry into the Commonwealth, and future British aid. Field finally came, without having committed Britain to any specific terms for independence. In this venture—as in the arguments used to get Hastings Banda to attend the conference and sit at the same table with Field—Butler showed the advantages of a positive but incrementally flexible policy formulated sufficiently cogently to be implemented before positions became too inflexible to be easily rescinded.

Britain could still be useful to Rhodesia. In addition to economic aid, ties of legality, etc. the mother country defended her right to handle the Dominion in her own way, against Asian and African demands stronger

methods be used to impose a constitution pledging majority rule upon Field. There were demands in the United Nations that force be used against the Field regime, but it was British troops the black Africans wished to see employed. The United Kingdom refused. Rhodesian problems were called an internal problem of the empire. The Dominion was receiving better treatment under British rule than they could hope to receive if she decided to break relations.

Yet positions became increasingly inflexible. A Guardian reporter summarized the attitude of the Front leaders whom he interviewed as: "Britain stood firm at Dunkirk, but now she has lost her guts. But we shall show the world that we can still be tough." Few Britons, even in the Tory right wing, could sympathize with statements such as these.

Her Majesty's government remained vague on terms under which full sovereignty would be granted. She no doubt wished to keep her options open. But Field was under even greater pressure at home to receive a definite commitment. The Conservatives were no longer to be trusted. Worse, Douglas-Home's inability to unite his party indicated Labour might win the 1964 British elections. The Front did not wish to have to negotiate with a Socialist government.

100 In September, 1963, she was forced to use her veto in the Security Council to prevent such a resolution from passing.

Continued widespread loyalty to the Crown and the desire to negotiate with the Conservatives provided Britain with a little remaining leeway to request concessions from Field. Even at the end of 1963 The Guardian editorialized that Rhodesia remained "one of the few overseas problems in which British statemanship can (still) play a decisive part." A "fair solution" was seen as convincing white Rhodesians to work towards majority rule, while convincing black Rhodesians that since they had been unable to attain this end by their own efforts, they ought to be willing to accept a gradual transition. It was deemed "relatively unimportant" whether this took "one year or five. . . . S. Rhodesia is one place in Africa where a non-racial solution to a mixed racial problem is still attainable. . . ."102

This assessment appears to have been naïve even then. It grew increasingly unlikely such an agreement could be reached. The Field government had set about "grimly enforcing" white supremacy. By March, 1963, even The Times was calling his program "medieval."103

As late as March, 1964, Field was promising that, so long as he remained Prime Minister, the pursuit of independence would be conducted "'within the framework of the Southern Rhodesian Constitution.'" The government would act "'in all respects as (one) owing allegiance to the

102 Ibid.

Crown. This allegiance was further emphasized to be "to the Crown, and not to any particular British Government." A month later, Field resigned.

Leading Front spokesmen denied this was over a controversy pertaining to unilateral independence. The Times' Salisbury correspondent reported he had learned "authoritatively" that that issue was the primary one. In any event, as NCP stated, the resignations were "interpreted as a vote of no confidence in Mr. Field for being too moderate in his pursuit of independence." Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs had the unenviable task of inviting to the Prime Ministry a man who might unilaterally end the Dominion's ties to Britain: Ian Smith.

Even Smith made it clear he would much prefer to attain a negotiated settlement. Many settlers still opposed unilateral independence. (Whitehead called it an "act of rebellion.") Smith refused to set a date beyond which negotiations would be terminated, but hinted he could "visualize circumstances" in which negotiations would be replaced by "something else." Finally, in late June, he pledged to go to the

107 Ibid.
electorate on the UDI issue if he could not win a clear British pledge of a date for full sovereignty.

Although both the British and Rhodesian governments preferred a peaceful solution to their conflict, one was not possible without a fundamental concession from one or both sides. Yet neither side was in a position to easily make such a concession. For Britain to have rescinded its demand for a timetable for majority rule would have alienated the majority of the Commonwealth members, the Labour Party, and a good section of the Conservative Party—\textsuperscript{108}—in an election year. Yet what power did it have to persuade the Rhodesian government to reverse its avowed white supremacy? It had shown over and over that it was unwilling and probably unable to maintain white privileges if it retained control. The Front had come to power pledged to prevent a repetition of what had happened to settlers in N. Rhodesia or Kenya. To rescind that pledge would have meant an even more radical clique would probably have taken power.

At the 1964 Commonwealth Conference Douglas-Home was forced to place the Rhodesian situation on the agenda (or risk a walkout by many delegations). He promised he would demand further talks with Smith. In so doing he had tacitly admitted what Cabinet members had continuously denied: that Britain had some control over the internal affairs of the

Dominion.

In the final Commons debate at which we shall look, Barbara Castle made the above point. Worse, she charged that after the conference ended Home had reverted to his former position. Smith had rejected the resolution urging renewed constitutional talks with "'contempt.'" Home invited Smith to London. He received no response. It now appeared he did not know what else to do. He was "just drifting." This could only encourage the white extremists to "defy the British Government with impunity."109

Other Labourites joined the attack. But they had few concrete suggestions. Dingle Foot spent much time denying Labour even supported the bill approving the 1961 constitution. This seems correct but irrelevant. The same category applies to Brockway's insistence Labour was not opposed to protecting the rights of Europeans in Africa. Practices of the Smith regime were bitterly condemned (although Conservative Ronald Bell pointed out they were less totalitarian than those being practiced in Ghana, and he heard no Labour outcry about conditions there). In short, the Labour opposition seemed as unable as the government to find a solution to the growing crisis. It emerged with platitudes, such as Castle's suggestion "the very least the British Government can do is to appeal to

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the people of S. Rhodesia over the head of Mr. Smith." Did this mean urging a black revolt or merely hoping to channel public opinion? If the latter, how could this be done when the majority of the electorate had grown unwilling to put its faith in British ability or desire to sustain their special status?

The Conservatives had little to offer besides continuing the present policy---really no policy---of keeping channels open and hoping something would happen which would permit a face-saving solution. Thus R. R. Hornby, defending the existing situation, told Labour he "fully understood" their strong feelings. He promised independence would not be granted Rhodesia until she established "sufficiently representative institutions"---a term not further defined. A unilateral declaration of independence would not be "recognized" by Britain. But there was no statement of what might be done to forestall its establishment. It was "hoped" Smith would come to Britain, but there was no way suggested to force him to do so. The internal governing of the Dominion was again described as completely its own affair. The policy of disjunctive incrementalism would appear to have been of no use in this situation. Unwilling to act with force, unable to act meaningfully without its use, Britain permitted drift. As the months wore on, settlers became

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110Ibid., cc. 1510-12 (Foot); 1527-29 (Brockway); 1500-02 (Bell); 1596 (Castle).

111Ibid., cc. 1534-40.
increasingly resigned to UDI.

There was one final moment of hope in August. Sir Roy Welensky, who had moved to the Dominion, pledged to organize a new party—a "grouping of progressives"—thereby reversing his image with Britain's moderate left. Two weeks later Smith announced he would come to London; "to negotiate, not to issue an ultimatum." Both The Times and The Guardian welcomed his decision. 112

But the views of the two nations' leaders remained far apart, and the majority of each's electorate favored antagonistic conclusions. Smith's one concession was a pledge to gauge African support for UDI. He called an Indaba of chiefs and received unanimous consent. The chiefs, who owed their positions and salaries to the government were, in the words of The Times "for the most part elderly, conservative, parochial." The leaders of Zapu remained confined and unconsulted. 113

In October Labour won a slim Commons' majority. Harold Wilson's message to Smith termed it "very urgent" talks be held, and warned of the consequences of unilateral independence. The Labour victory almost certainly ended any hope Rhodesia would postpone such a move, however, for reasons we have mentioned. The referendum—held November 5, 1964—was a foregone conclusion. The majority of each's electorate favored antagonistic conclusions. Smith's one concession was a pledge to gauge African support for UDI. He called an Indaba of chiefs and received unanimous consent. The chiefs, who owed their positions and salaries to the government were, in the words of The Times "for the most part elderly, conservative, parochial." The leaders of Zapu remained confined and unconsulted. 113

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showed 58,091 for independence, only 6,096 against. Here is a clear indication of the rapid deterioration of moderate sentiment in the face of British inability to meet minimal white Rhodesian demands. A year of fruitless attempts to negotiate still was to come, but the outcome was already predetermined, barring some miraculous about face by one of the parties. There was none. The UDI announcement, November 11, 1965, was the result of the failure of an incremental strategy in the face of conflicting aspirations and the loss of mutual faith.

In summary, then, we can make the following points: Labour continued to undermine negotiations between the British and Rhodesian governments because of its increasingly synoptic policy position. The Rhodesian UFP was caught between two opposite forces: the DP (later Rhodesian Front) opposed concessions which would ease discrimination and give natives greater representation. The black parties became increasingly unwilling to accept partial reform. They wanted equality and political power in a shorter period of time than the UFP could possibly provide it. They received at least moral encouragement for these demands from British Labour.

The situation was confused still further by the CAF disputes. When the two Northern Territories fell to black majorities which demanded secession, the death knell of federation was tolled. From then on the Rhodesian settlers came increasingly to distrust even the British Conservatives.
A similar deterioration of the settler's special status had occurred in Kenya. There the settlers were fewer in number, and less able to fight back. Kenya was still a colony, which must accede to the Governor's wishes. S. Rhodesia, as a Dominion for forty years, had the leverage to refuse to follow British wishes. Had a Labour government attempted to use the native rights statutes, it is quite probable Rhodesia would not have obeyed the directive. UDI would then have come about sooner, and perhaps there would have been use of force as well.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

We may now review our research in an attempt to answer some of the questions previously raised. We can review the policy and attitudinal changes of the government and the opposition over the entire period considered. We will see whether back bench dissent appeared to have any effect upon front bench policy, i.e. whether the party leaders tended to move incrementally in the direction expressed by the most vocal segment of their back benches. If patterns emerged, we can assess whether these fit the criteria of a di policy position. We will review the position of the party journals, The Times and The Guardian, and attempt to analyze where they stood and in what directions they moved. Finally we can express some general opinions about the successfulness of a di policy (to the extent it would appear to have been used) in avoiding conflict in this type of policy situation.

We can clearly state that, in the case of three of our four colonies, both expressed attitudes and policy decisions indicated a continuous movement leftwards, i.e. towards a willingness to provide ever greater
measures of self-government. The pace with which such measures were introduced tended to be accelerated as the 1950's wore on. Opposition to granting self-rule from groups within Britain would appear to have steadily diminished over the years.

Support for greater autonomy for African states was, in the early post-World War II period, most fully endorsed by the Labour left. It was this group which subscribed to the opinion the black man could soon be expected to follow the yellow and brown man and develop the capacity to run his own affairs. This view gradually won support from the Labour front bench, especially after it became the opposition. The Conservative leadership remained more reluctant than Labour to speed the pace of black political power until it had provided a firm social, economic and educational infrastructure, and until it had taught the native to vote and run his affairs at the local level. It was simultaneously less willing than was Labour to spend British pounds to accelerate the pace of economic and educational reform. (As mentioned on various occasions in Chapter IV, Labour's front bench demanded, when in opposition, types of intervention it had rejected when proposed by its own left wing while it was in office.) Gradually the Conservative leadership came to support self-rule in west Africa, although a segment of the party continued to state the natives were not ready to assume such a role.

Changing outlooks on these matters may be gleaned from perusing party publications during the 1950's. In the early years of the decade
Labour began publishing a series entitled *Labour Colonial Policy Pamphlets*. These came increasingly to demand a timetable to independence be set for each African colony, even the small, economically non-viable ones (which were to continue to receive British and Commonwealth aid after they became sovereign).

The Conservatives put out a similar set of pamphlets, entitled the *Conservative Commonwealth Series* (CCS). The first of these reprinted a speech by the Marquess of Salisbury, Leader of Lords and former Colonial Secretary. Although Salisbury was one of the least willing of Tories to grant Africans independence, it was his views which the party central office chose to print. We must assume it was willing to allow people to believe they were representative of party thinking.

Salisbury spoke of the British empire as differing from all others in history in that it had neither been gained by conquest nor held by force. It was a "unique ... organic family," bound by psychological and mystical ties. The white colonies had "grown up" and become sovereign dominions. The non-white colonies had not (India and Pakistan were simply ignored). Some of these had reached the "awkward age." It was Britain's "basic purpose" and "unremitting aim" to help them "up the ladder of self-government." But it would be harmful if they were

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advanced too quickly. The Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya proved this.

Guidance was still required. It would, for example, have been an abroga-
tion of the United Kingdom's "imperial responsibilities" if she had
awaited approval by the natives before inaugurating the Central African
Federation. It was enough that British officials felt the CAF to be
beneficial to the area. Moreover, federation was desired by the majority
of the settlers; "fellow countrymen who have devoted their whole lives to
the development of these backward countries." 2 Salisbury does not
sound too different from Lord Milner fifty years earlier.

Something of the paternalistic approach was still evident in the
second CCS pamphlet, published in the spring of 1955. By this time,
however, Britain was on the defensive. The pamphlet sounds like an
appeal to world public opinion. It was urged not to view the United
Kingdom as a nation desirous of keeping its empire either for prestige or
for the wealth it might bring. Independence would be granted to each
colony as soon as it became "practicable" to do so. All England asked
was "the time and freedom to carry on" towards this goal. 3

The fourth CCS publication came in 1958--after the psychological
blow of Suez had begun to be absorbed, after The Gold Coast had attained

2 Salisbury, "Commonwealth and Empire," pp. 4-6, 10-12, 16.

full sovereignty. By now the tone had greatly changed. Criteria for independence were still listed. Colonies must have adequate numbers of native civil servants to administer a government and an economy. The latter must be sufficient to at least present the probability there would be economic viability in a few years. Colonies must also be sufficiently advanced politically to have "leaders, not merely demagogues." In mixed racial societies there must be sufficient "national sense" to overcome the obvious strains. Colonies would not receive independence if deemed strategic to British or Commonwealth defense.

Two months later, the fifth pamphlet in the series was published. Its author still insisted on the need to maintain separate status for settlers, while increasing efforts to raise native standards. Until they were nearly equal, a universal franchise was "impossible." Conservatives thus remained well to the right of the official Labour position at this time, that every colony, even those deemed non-viable, ought to be "free to decide (its) own future." But official Tory thinking certainly had moved considerably left of its pre-Suez position. Dying, if not yet dead, was the philosophy of organic imperialism.


Standards were still being set. No part of the empire would be granted self-rule just because its leaders requested it; perhaps not even if its people voted for it. Yet all the above criteria were left vague and it was clear pragmatism and incrementalism would be utilized to determine actual policy. Each country's future would be considered on its own merits, "in accordance with local circumstances."\(^7\) Even settler colonies such as Kenya would now move more rapidly towards sovereignty (although there was as yet no clear policy as to whether this would be granted to a multiracial government or to one in which the majority ruled).

The change, says Epstein was not the sudden realization the Commonwealth was gradually losing its remaining obeisance to Britain. Almost all M.P.'s already knew this. Prior to Suez, however, a substantial number still believed the process could be reversed. After the humiliation of the British withdrawal, they realized the old order could not be resurrected.\(^8\) Whether it was Suez alone, or the pressure of nationalism throughout the empire, change after 1957 came more rapidly.

There were expressions of regret expressed in Commons during the final months before independence was granted to Ghana and Nigeria. As we indicated in Chapters V and VI, the objections came almost exclusively from some Labour M.P.'s who had once been in the vanguard of those

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\(^8\) Epstein, Suez Crisis, pp. 52-53.
demanding a more rapid pace of development towards sovereignty for these very colonies. This was primarily a reaction to the increasing opposition to independence from native groups within these colonies. Those Labourites who took up their plaint realized it was too late to halt the transition to full native rule. Especially in the case of Ghana, however, they were disturbed because they were not sure the colony would really have "leaders, not merely demagogues." These Labour M.P.'s still adhered to the old Fabian position the colonies were to be held in trust until democratic traditions had been firmly established. Theoretically the leaders of both parties also adhered to this position.

In practice the government knew independence could no longer be postponed, and took the pragmatic way out. It hoped for the best. The Labour front bench had initiated major steps towards developing self-rule—often against Conservative objections it was moving too rapidly. Now it did not wish to embarrass the Conservatives who had fulfilled Labour's goals in so brief a time. It said little to protect the decisions to grant independence to these colonies.

In a curious sense, those Labour leftists who still envisioned the empire as a trust had a position which was paralleled by right wing Tories. We mentioned the Salisbury 1953 speech. As late as 1959 Cabinet member Quentin Hogg (Lord Hailsham) could write a book praising the Conservatives for their organic view of the empire. He still referred to the "British Commonwealth," a term dropped in favor of
"Commonwealth" by Labour Party publications in the early 1950's and by Conservative Party publications after 1957. He still spoke of it as a "partnership," open to those of every religion and color, but based upon the "common spiritual attachment" to the British concepts of democracy and rule of law; opposed to communism; and dedicated to the belief there would soon be an emerging world order, founded on institutions similar to their own.  

Others in both parties were more pragmatic. The Hailsham position may be contrasted with that of articles written in the same year for Crossbow. These viewed the Commonwealth not as a mystical union but as a group of nations with common interests, united, as equals, in a voluntary association. In fact, this body was viewed as a paradigm for establishing multiracial societies in Africa.

In 1960 alone, sixteen British and French African colonies attained independence. In February of that year Prime Minister Macmillan delivered his "winds of change speech." The scene shifted to the settler colonies. From then on government policy moved rapidly towards

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providing independence under majority rule for all such colonies except
the Dominion of Southern Rhodesia.

The Times had been moving incrementally in roughly the same
directions, at roughly the same pace, as had the British government. Its
editors gave general approval to the "winds of change speech."^12 The
Guardian, generally to the left of the government, criticized the speech
for leaving the impression that "racial policies apart, Britain and South
Africa were good friends. . . ." There could be no doubt Britain must
side with the Asian and African members of the Commonwealth in a con­
flict with the white Republic.^13 The implication for Rhodesia is clear.

British inter-party cleavage towards Kenya was sharp in 1960.
Conservatives still supported special settler status. Official Labour
held that Europeans in Kenya could justly claim to have a stake in the
future of that country. Their contribution to its economy must be recog­
nized. But the government must also "recognize that the political fusion,
or alliance of the races cannot be forced by legislation but must be a
natural growth."^14

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^13"Inadequate," Guardian editorial, February 4, 1960, p. 6. This
was prophetic. The next year South Africa became the first country ever
to withdraw from Commonwealth membership. NCP expressed "deep
regret" at the action, but laid heavy emphasis on how this isolated event
contrasted with the great achievements in Commonwealth growth attained
by a decade of Conservative rule. NCP, Vol. XV #19 (October 9, 1961),
pp. 26-29.

^14British Africa, pp. 32-33.
It was Labour which was urged a remedial, serial, incremental movement towards majority rule with minority rights. The Tory leadership was still attempting to retain a peremptive position.

By 1962 the Conservative leaders would appear to have come around to accepting Labour's position. Clearly the Bow Group had. In its publication The New Africa it deemed it essential remaining portions of the empire be freed "swiftly yet honestly." The new Commonwealth must be based upon more than sentiment. It must emphasize practical issues over questions of abstract moral virtue. "Should we fail on these" it was suggested "through indifference, inadequacy or arrogance" the "admiration" Africans still retained towards Britain would be "irretrievably lost."

Independence must be granted, this publication continued, when a colony's people indicated they desired it and had attained minimal standards necessary for self-rule. Parliamentary democracy might not be functioning. This in itself was not necessarily justification for preventing independence. Indeed in some instances British democratic concepts might prove inapplicable. Attempts to impose them would be unwise. Part of the cause of Ghana's having become a dictatorship was attributed to Britain's overly zealous insistence on the need for an opposition party. This led to formation of an unnatural and weak coalition. Its political ineffectiveness was one reason it resorted to undemocratic tactics, which were met by similar tactics from the CPP. Similarly, in Kenya, British administrators had failed to realize that only an all-party
government was likely to prove capable of overcoming tribal hostility sufficiently to guide the new nation through the particularly difficult transition to an economically viable state.

In nations such as Kenya, tribal loyalty was likely to be transferred en bloc to a political party. Establishment of governments based upon party politics thus meant certain tribes were in power, others out. A few years earlier this was given as a reason self-rule could not be granted to these colonies. Now the phenomenon was analyzed quite differently. The solution was now seen to be an all-party coalition government. Surely, for all their drawbacks, national governments were preferable to dictatorship. For much of Africa these were now recognized as the only real alternatives. 15

As Kenya neared independence, a group of M.P.'s objected. Some right wing Tories still resented what they felt was their government's sell-out of the settlers. A larger group opposed their government's having backed down on its pledge to Kadu to introduce an independence constitution guaranteeing a federal form of government. 16 As was the case in west Africa, a group of M.P.'s took a peremptory view of minority rights in contrast to the government's pragmatic recognition of the realities of

15 The New Africa, pp. 7-9, 16.

16 The two issues were linked to some extent. Kadu, as the weaker of the native parties, was more willing to accept settler help and grant them special rights. It was also less closely linked to Kenyatta whose name was still anathema to many Conservative M.P.'s.
power. This time, however, the dissenters were not dissident Labour leftists who had once been in the vanguard of those supporting the early grant of independence. Rather they were Conservative party dissidents who still wished to postpone independence unless accompanied by guarantees of special status for settlers.

S. Rhodesia represents a different situation. Conservative Party policy supported granting greater autonomy to the Dominion so long as its government promised to move towards greater rights for the black majority. Labour would not support such a policy unless the pace with which those rights were granted was greatly accelerated. Later it demanded the goal of such policy be altered. Multiracialism must give way to majority rule. The Conservatives had the votes to carry out their policy. But their actions in east African and in the other two parts of the Central African Federation caused a majority of the S. Rhodesian settlers to lose confidence in their intent. A growing segment of the Conservative party grew cool to settler demands, exacerbating settler fears.17

Largely for this reason, the Rhodesian Front was voted into power. Since it refused to pledge even gradual improvement and integration for natives it could no longer win the support of either British party. British refusal to grant her even full internal sovereignty without a prior pledge

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for multiracialism led to the Front's unilateral declaration of independence.

We had hypothesized a general movement leftwards, starting in the backbench ranks of Labour, proceeding next to the Labour front bench, then to the Conservative leadership finally affecting even the most die-hard pro-settler Tories. We would conclude that our hypotheses have been at least partially validated by the evidence available. A series of tables might be drawn, indicating the movement of the stated attitudes various segments of the two parties over time. The poles of the tables are arbitrarily set; i.e. neither zero nor one hundred have any set scalar meaning. Deviations in scaler position indicate ordinal change, a movement towards or away from a previous position. The degree of change is based upon subjective analysis of the degree of deviation from a previous position. The government's position in 1946 is arbitrarily placed at fifty percent so as to establish a median around which other points may gain relative meaning.

For the years Labour was in office we may group attitudes toward the four colonies into a single table. Later, as differences toward settler and non-settler colonies emerge, sharper differentiation necessitates a breakdown by country.

For the 1946-1951 period the following table will be employed.
Zero indicates a maximal left position (immediate independence). One hundred indicates a maximal right position (natives will never be capable of self-rule).

The tables utilized from here on will retain the same numerical designations throughout. In special cases the representative individuals will be listed under each chart. Designations are as follow.

1. Colonial Secretary, Under-Secretary and/or Minister (Labour to 1951, Conservative thereafter).

2. Shadow Colonial Secretary, Under-Secretary and/or Minister (Conservative to 1951, Labour thereafter).

3. Labour moderate backbenchers.

4. Labour left backbenchers.

5. Labour special cases.


7. Conservative right backbenchers.

8. Bow Group or Conservative special cases.

9. Labour journals or NEC reports.

10. Conservative journals or reports.

11. The Times editorials.

12. The Guardian editorials.
3. Examples are Morgan, Guest, Skinnard, etc.

4. Examples are Wigg, Sorenson, Brockway, Hale, etc.

5. Thomas Reid, 1948.

6. Examples are Gammans, Lennox-Boyd, Lloyd, etc.

7. Examples are Ponsonby, Donner, Fraser, Craddock, etc.

The overall trend was leftward. There were deviations, however, especially the Conservative reaction to communist and nationalist advances in Asia and Africa between 1948 and 1950. After 1949 Labour moderated for similar reasons.

After the Conservatives took power debates on the fate of each colony became sufficiently frequent that it will facilitate our comprehension of attitude changes if we divide our future charts into four parts.

### TABLE 1

**GENERAL POSITIONS 1946-1951**

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<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 1947 | 4 | 3  | 1  | 2  | 7  |

| 1948 | 5 | 4  | 8  | 1  | 12 | 10 | 10 | 7  |

| 1949 | 9  | 1  | 10 | 2  |

| 1950 | 4 | 8  | 12 | 11 | 2  | 10 | 7  |
Each country shall hereafter receive separate treatment.

For the period from the Conservative victory of 1951 until independence was granted to Ghana, the charts appear as follows. (Since all groups by now generally supported independence the first half of the chart is expanded, the last half telescoped.)

**TABLE 2**

**GHANA, 1951-1964**

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1954-55</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Representative are Wigg (1952); Brockway (1953); Sorenson (1956).

5. Labour leftists who raised objections in 1956 (Wigg and Mallalieu).

8. Conservative moderates who raised objections in 1956 (Tilney and Pannell).

5a. George Mason, who raised objections, but recognized nothing could be done to prevent Ghanaian independence. Representative of the "pragmatic realist" position.
Some factors are immediately apparent. The Conservative front bench once in power, moved sharply left. Labour's leadership was further left, generally supporting the opposition's policy yet urging them on at a faster clip. The Labour back benches were further left still. The Conservative back benches no longer expressed opposition to the pace at which the colony was developing self-rule. These factors remained true until 1956. Then, in the final pre-independence debate, certain Labourites expressed regret the final decision could not be further delayed.

Labour is now shown to be to the right of the Conservatives. Certain former Labour leftists are now placed furthest right of any group.

Following independence, data on Ghana was scarce; for reasons explained in the text. We may lump our table into four time periods. This table does not directly correlate to pre-independence tables, since the question of whether or not to grant sovereignty was no longer meaningful. Instead, Table 3 indicates the degree of satisfaction with which the young nation was viewed. Zero indicates full support, one hundred indicates total hostility. Again the left hand side of the chart is expanded.
TABLE 3
GHANA, 1957-1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>80</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-64</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#2 & 9, 1957. The special line for Labour in 1957 represents the difficulty in charting the position there ought to be more British aid to the now independent state. This could be viewed as the maximal amount of support for Ghana's independence. It can also, however, be looked upon as representative of continuing paternalism.

#4 & 5, 1960-61. The two numbers here designate the split within the ranks of otherwise left-oriented Labour M.P.'s over the direction Nkrumah was taking: 4 is the pro-Nkrumah position (represented by Stonehouse and Brockway). 5 is the anti-Nkrumah position (represented by Mason and Mallalieu).

Official silence met the 1962-1964 period. Adverse comments were not heard in Commons or in either party's publications with the exception of Donnelly's remark we must assess British attitude by statements of the Bow Group and the press.

Similar reactions, as we have shown, may be found in the two party attitudinal changes, over time, toward Nigeria. These may be graphed as follows:
### TABLE 4

**NIGERIA, 1950-1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
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<th>40</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>pre-independence:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-52</td>
<td>2+9</td>
<td>1+0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1953-54</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2+9</td>
<td>1+0</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>1955-56</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>post-independence:</strong></td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>1963-64</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>11</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#10, 1950-52. *The Times* hostility to Azikiwe was the primary reason for its opposition to the independence movement in Nigeria at this time. As other leaders emerged its position altered. Gradually it softened its stance towards the Ibo leader as well.

For the settler colonies, the pattern is, as one might expect, more complex. We shall divide attitudes toward each colony into more than one table. For Kenya the logical dividing line came in 1959, the year the Macmillan government apparently decided multiracialism must be replaced by black domination as the end product of the colony's evolution towards independence. For the 1951-1957 period inter-party cleavage was therefore considerably greater than it was later on. By the time the colony became a nation bipartisan policy agreement was virtually complete.

In Table 5 the 1957 period is assessed. The further right the arrow, the more the attitude was one of support for the settler, coupled with rejection of the thesis there were legitimate underlying economic and social grievances to Mau Mau.

### TABLE 5

KENYA, 1951-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>30</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The government, in the face of Mau Mau atrocities, actually moved right as this period progressed. So did the Tory backbenchers. After Lyttleton retired, a gradual leftward movement may again be discerned.

#2, 2a, 1952. There are two notations for the Labour front bench in this year because there was a discernible shift leftward (towards its left wing) which began during the May 28 debate.

#4. Examples are White, Wigg, Brockway (1952); Castle (1956); Brockway, J. Johnson (1958); Foot, Stonehouse (1959).

#5, 1952. S. N. Evans.

#6. Examples are Hobson, Harris (1952).

#7. Examples are Teeling, Craddock, and Dodds-Parker (1952).

After 1959, the change in government policy came quickly, as the next table shows.
### TABLE 6

**KENYA, 1960-1963**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1961</strong></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


#7, late 1963. Wall.

#4. Brockway.

Finally, let us look at Rhodesia. Here we shall view the 1951-62 period, as it pertains to the CAF. From 1951-59 the Conservatives steadfastly supported CAF while Labour opposed with ever-increasing vehemence. Support for CAF was tantamount to support of the policy of the Rhodesian government. After 1959 the Conservatives rapidly retreated until, in December, 1962, they broke completely with Federation and Dominion leaders by announcing Nyasaland's right to secede. The extreme left of the chart thus indicates full support for the dissolution of the CAF.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
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<th>60</th>
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<th>90</th>
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</thead>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 July-Dec.</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<td>12</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2+9</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1+10</td>
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<td>1962 July-Dec.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus we can see the two parties grew further apart until 1962, although the government began to show signs of weakening its support for the Federation as early as 1960. After July, 1962 the government's position radically altered. By 1963 the CAF was dead.

In the 1958–64 period we may focus directly on British-Rhodesian negotiations. Table 8 graphs change in the relationship between these two countries. The extreme left represents, as with our other countries, support for independence. The extreme right is indicative of those wishing to prevent the colony from becoming independent.

### Table 8

**RHODESIA, 1958–1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>50</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(1+10) (2+9)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>2+9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Thus attitudes toward Rhodesia were, prior to 1963, the reverse of those toward the other three colonies. Labour, its left wing in the lead, grew increasingly adamant against the grant of independence unless the colony adopted policies which would insure rapid transition to majority rule. The Conservatives, arguing slow progress was preferable to no progress, supported granting greater autonomy as a reward to the Whitehead government (as well as a means to strengthen it by permitting it to show its policies were paying off). The Conservative attitude towards the Dominion could not survive its reversal of policy towards the CAF. The reaction to that change, and the increased militancy of the NDP, brought the Rhodesian Front to power. The British government's attempts to negotiate with Field had limited success; those with Smith, virtually no success.

What may be said of the strategy of disjunctive incrementalism? How often was it applied? When applied, how well did it work?

Admittedly there can be some argument about this. Di decisions are those which fit certain broad categories. They are pragmatic, flexible, disjointed, incremental, remedial, serial, exploratory, decentralized and tend towards "an adjustment of ends to means." One could no doubt argue over whether any single decision met all or most of these criteria. This is especially true since, by definition, the strategy need not be
consciously applied to be considered operational. Over a period of time, however, it should be possible to have general agreement whether policies approaching dr criteria were or were not employed.

It is our conclusion they were employed sometimes but not always. On some occasions the government tended to let policy drift until a crisis awakened it to the realization there was widespread unrest. On other occasions employment of strategy-like policy ran aground due to synoptically held ideological tenets which the government abandoned reluctantly, if at all. Opposition policy was sometimes more pragmatic and flexible than that of the government, and sometimes less so. We shall now be more specific.

Labour's policy decisions of the late 1940's in west Africa appear to us to have tended towards drift. Prior to the Christenborg Castle riots of 1948 in The Gold Coast there was a general belief changes were being introduced with sufficient rapidity to satisfy virtually all natives. The same was true of policy towards Nigeria prior to the Enugu riots in 1950. In both instances Royal Commissions were sent to investigate. Both found widespread unrest. Both urged incremental reform. In both cases the government heeded the reports and moved to implement more dynamic, albeit still pragmatic and disjointed, reform. The Conservatives objected to the rapidity with which some of these forms were introduced. After their 1951 victory they continued a similar policy approach and gradually accelerated the pace further (although not always so quickly as Labour.
would have liked).

There was general bipartisan agreement on policy towards both countries. There were pragmatic shifts, such as the decision to hold nationwide elections in both countries in 1954. When the opposition protested certain CPP actions a new general election was scheduled for The Gold Coast. Its outcome was a major factor in the British decision to grant Nkrumah's request for an independence constitution which created a unitary state. Britain used its remaining leverage to persuade the colonial leader to grant some of the demands for decentralization.

Similar examples of pragmatic, di adjustment can be found when one views British-Nigerian relationships. When, for example, the leaders of the Northern Region balked at granting universal suffrage by 1957 the British declared elections on this basis would be valid in any region choosing to permit them. There would be no grant of national sovereignty prior to 1960. It was hoped the regions could agree on basic election and governmental policy by this time.

In 1956 some Labour M.P.'s expressed regret The Gold Coast would soon become a sovereign nation. In 1959 a more muted but still clear protest was raised against the coming grant of independence for Nigeria. Those who raised such protests were taking a more synoptic position than that adhered to by either party's front bench. They were more strictly interpreting the position, theoretically adhered to by both parties' leaders, that no colony would be given its freedom until it had adopted
democratic procedures and proven its government respected minority rights and the rule of law. It was not enough for these M.P.'s that a majority of both colonies' electorates had approved legislatures which supported independence. In both cases the British dissenters recognized their government could no longer delay transferring power. But they wished it could, until they were more certain the minorities within the colonies would be protected after Britain withdrew. Had these M.P.'s been in power they might well have been more insistent than Her Majesty's government had actually been that the colonial leaders make policy decisions in accordance with ideals the British felt to be correct. This had been done to some extent while the west African colonies remained under British tutelage. Both were rewarded with greater power only after they had proven they could act responsibly.

Once the date for independence had been promised, however, there was little leeway left for incremental shifts in British policy. The Gold Coast's electorate gave Nkrumah sufficient support in 1956 so Britain felt it must grant his country its freedom along lines basically in accordance with those desired by the CPP leadership. However much it might have come to regret its position during the final months preceding transfer of sovereignty, the British had no choice but to proceed along the prescribed path. Failure to do so might well have led to violence in the colony. Violence is the very thing a di strategy is designed to render unnecessary.
There were critical statements about Ghana's internal policy raised during the 1960 debate on its application for republican status. Leaders of both parties warned this was useless if not harmful. Britain could antagonize Ghana. It could not, however, refuse in any meaningful sense to grant her the status her leaders desired and her people had voted for. There could be no use for di in such a situation. The same applies to the debate over republican status for Nigeria three years later. In this instance, in fact, the debate was almost ludicrous, since the country became a republic before the act approving the change reached Commons for Second Reading. There was absolutely no possibility that debate could do more than air respective M.P.'s views. Too much criticism could have harmed relations between the two countries.

Perusal of a di policy in the settler colonies was a more complex proposition. Both parties were initially, synoptically bound to the support of special status for settlers in Kenya as well as in Rhodesia. The Devonshire Declaration was viewed as a vague statement of ultimate goals. Paramountcy would be applied politically only after natives had attained economic and social parity with whites. This would be so far in the future it was not necessary to make political contingency plans to put it into operation.

Labour gradually abandoned this position after it left office. The Conservatives tempered all constitutional advance for blacks, prior to 1958, on the principle that European legislative representation must be
at least equal to the combined total of all other races. The "Lennox-
Boyd Constitution" of 1958 was hailed as a major breakthrough, since
Africans received parity with Europeans. (Non-whites thus outnumbered
whites.) But when official and specially nominated members were added
to the totals, Europeans retained forty-five of the ninety-two seats,
while Africans had only twenty-five seats. Africans also had but two of
the fourteen ministerial positions. It was for these reasons they boy­
cotted the newly elected Assembly.

By this time, as we have shown, Labour had come to support the
native cause. They urged opening of the Highlands to qualified blacks,
the release of Kenyatta, and political reforms which would give Africans
half the legislative and executive positions. In part this was a bow to
the emerging political realities within the colony. In part it was due to a
different ideological position. Labour had come to accept the correctness
of the belief blacks ought to rule Kenya. They respected the settlers' con­
tributions to the colony's economic, social and political growth. They
hoped their special talents would continue to be recognized by native
leaders. They not only demanded real parity at this time, but ever more
insistently came to demand parity be but a temporary arrangement to be
replaced, as soon as practicable, by incremental steps toward a one­
man, one-vote electoral system and a legislature with a clear native
majority. In a colony where blacks outnumbered whites 100:1 they argued,
no other system could be in accord with the democratic principles Britain
theoretically espoused.

Support for the black cause would seem to have been adopted ever more firmly by Labour as a principle. Many even came to see the Mau Mau rebellion as little more than a somewhat more brutal variant of nationalist revolutionary movements extant elsewhere in the underdeveloped world. Even if Kenyatta had been proven the leader of the rebellion, he ought not be denied ultimate access to political power, any more than it had been denied to Nkrumah or Gandhi.18

To a substantial segment of the Conservative party Mau Mau remained a special case: atavistic, anti-white, anti-Christ, cannabalistic, a reemergence of all things primitive and evil about the African. The Tory government would not, as Labour urged, initiate significant reform until the revolt was suppressed and unless the majority of settlers approved. Therefore Kenyatta and others linked to the movement ought not be permitted to take power even if it were expedient to permit them to do so. A di policy could not go beyond the limits imposed by this value system. Likewise, no constitution ought to be permitted if it gave Africans enough votes or power to deny settlers their special status. That status was itself viewed partly in pragmatic terms (settler wealth and skills were necessary if the colony hoped to retain its standard of life).

18The case for Mau Mau as a nationalist movement has been convincingly made in Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, Chapter nine.
Partly it was seen as the British obligation to uphold its pledges to settlers that, if they would undertake a life in Africa, their holdings would be protected for themselves and their posterity. Partly, no doubt, another peremptive variable was at work: one Caucasian ought to help another.

The Tory leadership gradually found it necessary to abandon the settler cause—first in the Highlands, then in the franchise system, finally with respect to Kenyatta. It would not seem they were necessarily won to the Labour point of view that such concessions were morally right. They simply came to realize they could not hold power for much longer unless they again wished to send British troops. This time the cause would be far less acceptable to the British people. Putting down Mau Mau had appeared to be an exceptional situation. Suppression of a nationalist uprising along more classic lines would not have gone over well among the British electorate forced to foot the bill. As certain Bow Group publications have indicated, a segment of the Conservative back-bench might well have revolted on such an issue.

Conservative reluctance to reveal its policy shifts (perhaps even to itself) resulted in greater dislocation in the colony than would otherwise have been necessary. An example was the failure to enunciate a clear policy for buying farms from settlers wishing to leave. Settlers feared they might be evicted or inundated by massive numbers of black farmers. The value of their land fell below the point where they could sell for a
profit. They felt trapped. Only towards the end did Britain provide sufficient funds so the colony could buy them out and sell to natives who lacked the collateral to purchase the farms with ready cash. Settlers were hurt more deeply, economically and psychologically, than if the Governor had frankly stated the Highlands would be gradually opened, and those who wished to could leave. Britain still need not have had a rigid timetable for opening the Highlands. She could have made incremental adjustments based upon such factors as the rate at which new farming techniques could be taught to black farmers, etc. The policy actually adopted tended towards reaction to events or mere drift. If the British goal was to prevent settlers from panicking, its failure to announce a clear policy had the opposite effect.

Similar tendencies toward drift and reaction were in evidence in the way the British and Kenya governments treated the Kenyatta controversy. Both governments had pledged Kenyatta would never hold high political office. Many settlers and not a few Conservative M.P.'s believed this to be a morally correct position. Even after it became clear, therefore that the elections of 1961 must result in either a Kenyatta-led government or rule by a non-representative minority the Governor procrastinated. Even after Kenyatta had been moved to a home built at government expense, and was granted permission to speak with both domestic and foreign officials, both British Cabinet members and Governor Renison insisted he was and would remain, a prisoner. When his release and instatement as
leader of government business finally came, opponents felt betrayed. Kanu got its way, but only after its hostility towards Britain had grown deeper than it need have if a more dynamic di strategy had been pursued. There was no need for Britain to become dogmatic. It was the dogmatic assertions that Kenyatta would never assume power which led to her awkward retreat.

The same may be said of Britain's pledge to support Kadu's demands for regionalism. Whitehall ought earlier to have realized the majority will must prevail. It should have left more options open so that, when the majority chose Kanu, Britain could retreat from the regional concept without having to break a formal pledge. Perhaps she could have persuaded Kanu to grant greater concessions. By refusing to meet Kanu half way she pressed its leaders towards a more inflexible stand. When they finally gained their goals, it was from a position of strength.

Policy towards Kenya that it was not always in accord with the di strategy. It was sometimes synoptic, sometimes drifting, sometimes both simultaneously. Had a di policy been followed Britain would almost certainly have still faced Mau Mau, but perhaps in a weakened form. She would also have almost certainly had to abandon the multiracial approach and relinquish her demand for special settler status. She might well have left less hostile native feelings towards the settlers who remained. She almost certainly could have made the departure of those settlers who could not stand the transition an easier one. Relations between Britain
and Kenya would have been better when independence came. Only the remarkable patience and temperence of Kenyatta saved the situation from much greater deterioration.

Inter-party relationships towards Rhodesia fit a different category. In hindsight it would appear Labour followed a more pragmatic, remedial and serial di policy towards the CAF, while the Conservatives followed a strategy more closely approximating the strategy with regard to the Dominion.

Labour recognized no federation could long work if the representatives of vast majority of the population believed it to be antagonistic to their best interests. The Conservatives were convinced the blacks were too ignorant to realize the benefits of federation, and would come to support it once its benefits became apparent. They accused Labour of failing to persuade blacks of its advantages, thereby permitting extremists to persuade them of its harm.

The charge is partially justifiable. Many native leaders were used to taking the administrator's word on what was good or bad. If Britain remained silent perhaps they felt something must be wrong with a scheme endorsed by white colonial leaders, but condemned by black ones. By the time the Tories took office much of the damage was done. Still, if federation had brought as many benefits to blacks as its British supporters had claimed, it would seem many black leaders would have been converted to its support during the seven year period when major constitutional
revision could not be made. Yet, by 1960, black hostility would appear to have been greater than it was in 1953.

Britain must give way, both on federation and on multiracialism, before growing black nationalist sentiment in the two Northern Territories. Contrary to peremptive pledges made to CAF whites, Nyasaland and N. Rhodesia were permitted to secede in 1962. This, coupled with events in Kenya, greatly weakened faith in British intent among the Dominion's settlers.

The Dominion was different from Kenya or the Territories. Settlers comprised almost ten percent of the population. They were in full control of the economy and the government. They had had virtual internal self-rule for many years. The British veto over native affairs may have been threatened but was never used. Even in strategic terms the Dominion was strong; surrounded on three sides by the settler ruled Republic of South Africa and the white-dominated Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique.

The best Britain could hope for was a government pledged to gradually integrate and improve the lives of the black majority. The UFP was never less progressive than was the majority of the electorate. The unceremonious dumping of Garfield Todd and his later eclipse at the polls validate this point. Short of British military intervention a black takeover was not possible. The only viable alternative to the UFP was the DP.

Labour's increasingly categorical support of the various black
parties led by Nkomo would appear to have been overly synoptic and unrealistic. They demanded the colony's leaders move more rapidly than the (white) electorate wished to go. Their support almost certainly fostered greater rashness by the native leaders, while simultaneously increasing hostility among European Rhodesians.

Labour insisted Britain make major policy changes, based on moral principle, which could only have had the effect of strengthening the DP within the Dominion. Perhaps the hard Labour position helped win some concessions from Whitehead. In general both the British and Rhodesian governments held firm against their demands.

We suggest that the British policy might well have worked. It consisted primarily of using persuasion or the vague threat of retaliation upon a government which felt close to the British Conservative Party leaders and wished to stay on their good side. The UFP policy was itself a reasonably good example of di. It offered gradual improvement to the natives. It offered to the settlers continued good relations with the mother country (at least so long as the Conservatives retained power). It offered sound financial investment opportunities to the developed world. Its policy towards blacks was sufficiently at odds with the apartheid of its southern neighbor that it could salve the consciences of leaders of the U.S.A. or the white Commonwealth states. It reacted to black militancy with a carrot-stick technique. It passed harsh laws against protestors while offering reform to peaceful blacks. What destroyed British chances
for success in S. Rhodesia was the necessity of policy reversal towards the Federation.

The UFP had pledged there would be neither secession nor black takeover of the CAF. The suddenness of Britain's policy reversal on secession gave the Whitehead regime insufficient time to repair its case before the electorate. The Front's unexpected victory ended any real hope for future British-S. Rhodesia accord. DI would appear to have gone into reverse, as the two nations, despite attempts to compromise, moved by incremental steps ever further apart. Gradually the Front remolded its policy into apartheid at home and withdrawal, by force if necessary, from remaining British controls.

The DI strategy is designed to satisfy the majority without unnecessarily antagonizing or harming the minority. It is, in a very real sense, a reformulation of Bentham's utility theory, without his attempts to develop a rigid calculus. The hope is that policy will remain flexible. Alternatives can be chosen which incrementally alter policy. The government possesses a high degree of understanding of likely consequences. When they err they can remedy their mistakes by making further disjunctive and incremental adjustments.

Bentham concluded those governments were best which did least. It would appear this was not necessarily the best policy towards colonies. Britain tended to do too little. It left too much to the colonial Governors, without necessarily having formulated even vague long-range plans. It
adjusted ends to means, but sometimes was forced to accept ends it did not feel were wise. Whitehall would appear to have greatly underestimated the speed with which black nationalism would grow. Having developed colonial political institutions quite slowly during the years it had firm control, it was forced to introduce them more rapidly than it felt they could be absorbed during the final years of British control. Certain ideals were prevalent among British officials which increasingly conflicted with the desires of the majority of colonials. Special status for settlers was the most glaring of these. This made it more difficult to make incremental adjustments acceptable to black leaders. When the settlers were abandoned the shift was more rapid than would have been necessary, causing the settlers more pain than need have been the case, and simultaneously causing greater antagonism between native leaders and British administrators. As we suggested, then, British policy would appear to have sometimes been more synoptic, sometimes more drifting, than the di strategy would permit. In part this was probably a fault of distance. British officials were not always in sufficiently close touch with the situation in African colonies. It sometimes required a crisis to stimulate investigation of grievances, or to abandon long-held but no longer valid myths. There was sometimes a considerable discrepancy between views held by constituents at home and those held by colonials. Conservatives tended to have too little contact with black leaders, especially in settler colonies. Labour lost contact, especially in
Rhodesia, with the realities of settler politics.

Backbenchers did not always simply approve their leaders' positions. They often provided new insights during the debates. They sometimes provided in-depth information not presented by either party's leaders. They suggested policy options which sometimes were later accepted by the leaders. On occasion they were prophetic predictors of future policy. The tone of their remarks suggests revolts were threatened on some occasions. In a few instances minor revolts took place.

The majority of vocal Labour M.P.'s were usually to the left of their leaders, i.e., they urged greater support for the black cause. After 1951 Labour's leaders tended to accept many of these arguments a year or two after certain backbenchers had first presented them.

Black nationalism was on the rise in Africa. Those who espoused the black cause often had their predictions proven correct. The Conservative governments were forced to make concessions they had earlier rejected. The Conservatives were on occasion unable to make such concessions (especially if they affected settler status) without facing potential revolt from a segment of their back benches. This perhaps accounts for why they sometimes permitted policy to drift until a crisis arose and they were forced to make an abrupt, non-di policy reversal.

In three colonies blacks won full control over their destinies. Only in Rhodesia did white power prevail. In this instance, those who rejected
gradual white instigated reform and demanded black control of the colony were unable, in the end, to save even the reforms. Rhodesia, in recent months has removed all black legislators from the national legislature, has strengthened segregation laws, and is moving towards that strict racial separation known as apartheid. Despite the UN embargo on goods, the settlers appear to be firmly in control.
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