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WILFRID SELLARS' PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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** ** ** **

The Ohio State University
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CM - The Concept of Mind

MSII - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II

SM - Science and Metaphysics

SPR - Science, Perception, and Reality
INTRODUCTION

Since the publication of Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*, few discussions in the literature concerned with the philosophy of Mind have been free from its influence or from the influence of views similar to Ryle's, notably those of P.F. Strawson and/or the later Wittgenstein. As G.E.M. Anscombe has said, philosophers of Mind have for some time been living in a post-Ryleian age. Whether or not one wishes to conclude from this observation that, thanks to the efforts of Ryle and others of persuasions similar to his, we can be assured of some certainties in the philosophy of Mind, it would be blind of one to deny that such Ryleian expressions as "category mistake", "ghost in the machine", and "mongrel categorical-hypothetical" have been in high philosophical fashion for some time. Indeed, subsequent to the appearance of CM, a great many philosophers have been directing their efforts along lines which are either explicitly Ryleian or, at least, along lines which take some of Ryle's arguments to be conclusive—in particular, those of his arguments which are attacks on what I shall call Cartesian dualism. I take Cartesian dualism essentially to involve the following claims:

(1) Both bodies and minds exist in the same sense of "exist".
(2) Minds are entities which are different in nature from bodies.

(3) Bodies are both spatial and temporal, while minds exist only in a temporal dimension.

(4) One has direct and incorrigible access to the events transpiring "within" one's own mind, whereas it is impossible that one might enjoy this same direct access to the events transpiring "within" the mind of another person.

(5) Minds and bodies interact (in happily appropriate pairings) with one another. Intelligent behavior is caused by, and would be impossible without, certain activities of the mind. Besides being active in this sense, the mind also "does" such things as build general concepts by abstracting them from the characteristics of particular things.

There is a feature central to Cartesian dualism which is exhibited in the following pattern of reasoning:

There are physical substances, for example, human bodies, in which certain processes such as respiration and digestion occur. Minds are obviously not physical substances, and the processes which occur "in" them such as thinking and imagining must be nonphysical processes -- functions of the mind as opposed to functions of the body.

Minds, whatever else they may be, clearly are not physical substances. But it will not do to conclude from this common sense truth that they are nonphysical substances any more than it would do to infer that

There are non-aquatic animals in this box.

from the proposition that

None of the things in this box is an aquatic animal.

The box, after all, may contain things which are neither
aquatic animals nor non-aquatic animals, or it may contain nothing at all. The claim that minds are non-physical or psychic substances is one against which Ryle argues most powerfully and, I believe, successfully. But, even if Ryle has settled this point in the philosophy of Mind, he has not thereby settled them all.

After having shown what thinking, intelligence, and perception are not, namely the machinations of a spectral thing, Ryle says

... a number of the words which we commonly use to describe and explain people's behavior signify dispositions and not episodes. To say that a person knows something is not to say that he is at a particular moment in process of doing or undergoing anything, but that he is able to do certain things when the need arises, or that he is prone to do and feel certain things in situations of certain sorts ...

There is, however, a special point in drawing attention to the fact that many of our cardinal concepts in terms of which we describe specifically human behavior are dispositional concepts since the vogue of the para-mechanical legend has led many people to ignore the ways in which these concepts actually behave and to construe them as items in the descriptions of occult causes and effects.

One philosopher who sympathizes in great degree with this part of Ryle's analysis of thinking is Wilfrid Sellars, so much so that, in most of his writings having to do with the philosophy of Mind, he takes the Ryleian view that thinking is a matter of manifestating behavioral dispositions to be right-headed, and as being so familiar a story as not to warrant reiteration.

But Sellars also differs crucially from Ryle in
certain points. Though it may sound strange to say after having just classified Sellars as being basically sympathe­tic to Ryle, Sellars maintains that mental verbs like 'thinks' and 'imagines' refer not only to dispositional capacities, but to episodes. Ryle, of course, considers the notion of an "inner thought-episode" to be as much a category-mistake as that of a "causally active spiritual thing". Sellars does not so consider it, but just how much this difference really separates the two men philosophically is matter for further discussion. The difference itself, though, is real enough. Sellars says

... the term episode is elastic enough to cover a great deal of territory. If anything which occurs or takes place is to count as an episode then, whenever an object changes from having one disposition to having another, the change is an episode...

Clearly the episodes in which we are interested are not shifting behavioral propensi­ties; they are connected with such shifts, but the connection is synthetic, as is the connection of molecular motion with the shifting propulsive propensities of a gas?

But then he adds that

... it should not be assumed that one who defends the notion of mental episodes in a non-Ryleian sense is thereby committed to the view that their character as conceptual is, so to speak, of a purely categorical character. On the contrary, I shall argue that almost everything that can be said about the conceptual character of conceptual episodes is as mongrel, as fraught with hypothe­tical would-be's, as Ryle could wish. But not everything, for to bear the burden of these hypothe­ticals they must have a determinate epi­sodeishness ...3

Sellars' intellectual relationship to Ryle is not
as such my concern. My purpose in making a comparison be-
tween the two is merely that of laying some groundwork for
an examination of Sellars' view. To this end, yet another
comparison between Sellars and Ryle may prove valuable.

The efforts of both men are strongly determined by
intellectual motives to destroy certain "myths". For Ryle,
of course, it is the myth of The Ghost in the Machine. For
Sellars, it is the myth of The Given. Sellars rejects the
myth of The Ghost in the Machine as does Ryle, but he
makes little reference to it. While tacitly acknowledging
Ryle's efforts, and making copious use of what he evidently
takes to be their fruits, Sellars concentrates on givenness
as being a different, though related, source of error in
philosophy generally and in the philosophy of Mind in parti-
cular. While the two myths are not exactly spun from the
same (wil-o-the-wispish) fiber, they resemble one another
in certain respects, specifically in respect of the "privi-
leged access" idea expressed in (4), and with respect to
the abstractionist concept-formation idea expressed in (5).
But we must concern ourselves primarily with Sellars' atti-
tudes toward such ide-ės. Thus, like Sellars, I shall assume
that the full story of Ryle's attack on the "Ghost" myth is
familiar enough that reiteration of it here would not serve
any vital purpose. My main task in Chapter I is to discuss
givenness as Sellars construes the notion and then sketchily
to indicate the structural directions in which reaction to
his bête noire will lead him. Also included in Chapter I is a somewhat independent, but obviously related, examination of Sellars' critique of sense-datum theories. Following this are some critical remarks which make the transition to Chapter II.
CHAPTER I

The Given

Consider the following famous passage,

Meno. And how will you inquire, Socrates, into that which you know not? What will you put forth as the subject of your inquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is what you did not know?
Socrates. I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot inquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for he knows and has no need to inquire about that -- nor about that which he does not know; for he does not know about that into which he is to inquire.

This, the celebrated "Meno problem", states briefly an issue, or rather a nest of issues, which have concerned epistemologists since Plato's time. The Meno problem, moreover, can be viewed as being one of the earliest expressions of puzzlement over the issue of givenness. For Plato, (in the context of the Meno) the worry is in connection with how it is that one can come to know what virtue is. But it can be extended to cover every concept, e.g. of redness or of triangularity.

If one says, somewhat simplemindedly, that we acquire our concept of triangularity by seeing, and perhaps touching, triangular things, it may be replied: "Very well. Suppose that one has no concept of triangularity. Then he
sees a triangular thing for the first time. He may subse-
quently remember having seen the thing, but he observed only
one particular thing. To have the concept of triangularity
one must know what it is for any triangular thing to be tri-
angular. Must not our observer be exposed more than once
to a triangular thing in order to acquire the concept tri-
angularity?" To this one may counter, "Suppose that this
second exposure occurs. It would seem that a further neces-
sary condition for his acquiring the concept is that he be
able to notice that the second thing resembles the first
in a certain respect, namely, in being triangular. But how
could he notice this resemblance of respect unless he al-
ready knew what it was for something to be triangular? Are
we to say that one has the concept prior to any exposure to
things to which it applies? The difficulty would still re-
main. To acquire a concept on this alternative would still
be impossible. But this is an absurd result. Would we
not do better to drop one of the assumptions and say that
simply to have an experience of a triangular thing is suf-
ficient to acquire the concept? Are we not forced to say
that knowing what it is for x to be Ø is something given to
an observer merely by his observing a Ø-thing?

So one strand of the dialectics which leads to given-
ness might proceed. There are others which lead to the
same destination, and some of these will be explored. As
Sellars says
Many things have been said to be 'given': sense-contents, material objects, universals, propositions, real connections, first principles, even givenness itself. And there is indeed a certain way of construing the situations which philosophers analyse in these terms which can be said to be the framework of givenness. This framework has been a common feature of most of the major systems of philosophy, including, to use a Kantian turn of phrase, both 'dogmatic rationalism' and 'skeptical empiricism'. It has, indeed, been so pervasive that few, if any, philosophers have been altogether free of it; certainly not Kant, and, I would argue, not even Hegel, that great foe of 'Immediacy'.

But, though many things have been said to be "given", things such as Sellars refers to in the above quotation have also been said to be (a) radically different kinds of things, and (b) "given" in a number of different senses. Many philosophers have held that (some version of) the principle of non-contradiction is both a first principle and "given". Whatever this sense of "given" may be, it is clearly different from the sense in which philosophers have alleged that sense-contents, for example, are "given".

Kinds of Givens

Sellars speaks, somewhat cryptically, of "the framework of givenness" (my italics), as being "a certain way of construing the situations which philosophers analyse."

One wonders, first, just what are the "situations" which philosophers "analyse", and second, what is and is not to be included in "the framework of givenness". At one point Sellars says
If the term 'given' merely referred to what is observed as being observed, or perhaps, to a proper subset of the things we are said to determine by observation, the existence of 'data' would be as non-controversial as the existence of philosophical perplexities. But, of course, this just is not so. The phrase 'the given' as a piece of professional -- epistemological -- shoptalk carries a substantial theoretical commitment ...\(^5\)

It seems to me that what is tacitly being acknowledged in the above passage is that sometimes the term "given" is (or could be) used in a perfectly non-controversial way. How? By using it to refer to "what is observed as being observed, or, to a proper subset of those things which we are said to determine by observation". In this harmless sense of the term, then, what is "given" are certain "things" which we "determine by observation". It would also have to be the case that this use of "given" carried with it either no degree of "theoretical commitment", or, if it may be permitted some degree of that commodity, it must be less than "substantial" such that it would not qualify as being a piece of "professional -- epistemological -- shoptalk". Sellars spends much time criticising what he considers to be mistaken uses of the term "given", those which carry with then substantial theoretical commitment, and which are therefore "mythical". He is meanwhile almost completely silent about the possible non-controversial use of the term, and, what would go with it, about the "things" which we "determine by observation". Before pursuing the point any further, however, it must not only be admitted, but emphasized, that
Sellars is certainly right in calling attention to the epistemological danger of so specifying what the "data" are that no theory except one's own could possibly be consistent with them. The effect of such a proceeding is that, not only does one construct an ontology which countenances certain items as "existents", one constructs it on the basis of certain things being "given" to one -- which things are themselves more or less disguised versions of the items countenanced by the theory. One accordingly "theorizes" about what there is by having had a pre-analytical peek at what there is. Such "givens" are not only mythical, they are cheats. I do not mean to accuse any philosopher of deliberately stacking the deck in his own favor. All that I wish to call attention to is the difficulty of talking about what is given without falling prey to one's own ontological bias. Caution would seem to demand that, if we specify some domain of things as being given, such things must not themselves be considered as affording any ontological clues whatsoever. Speaking in a similar vein, Virgil Hinshaw draws a useful distinction:

Provisionally ... the empirically given will at least encompass what we shall call the perceptually given. Whatever is consciously given in some actual perception to some person is to be included here... Perceptually speaking, prior to the adoption of a psychological set, we see things and people in particular relationships and in definite situations. We most certainly see tables and chairs, not qualities devested of context.6

In all likelihood, it is this sense of "given" (if any) that
Sellars would be willing to allow as noncontroversial. The "perceptual given" is one sense of the term falling under the general heading of "empirical given", according to Hinshaw. The other sort of empirical given which he distinguishes is what he calls "the phenomenal given". Finally, for Hinshaw, there is another quite different sort of given which he calls "the philosophic given". Hinshaw's three senses of "given" are terms which are the results of his efforts to sort the vast number of "givens" which have been bandied about in the history of philosophy, especially in recent times, into some kind of understandable and workable order. Regardless of whether there are phenomenal and philosophic givens in additions to the non-controversial perceptual given, Hinshaw's classification, as historical-structural analysis, is essentially correct and I shall make use of this terminology.

Most philosophers who have in recent years attacked the idea of givenness, Sellars tells us in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (EPW), have only been attacking sense-datum theories. He agrees that such theories deserve attack, but adds that, besides rejecting this specific variety of givenness, one can "without flying in the face of reason" deny in general "the entire framework of givenness". He begins this program with his own critique of sense-datum theories, a critique which I shall explore. But I will preface that exploration with some historical examples and
discussion of them which hopefully will illuminate the relationship between the dialectics of givenness and the dialectics of the philosophy of Mind.

In EPM, Sellars points out that sense-datum theories "characteristically distinguish between an act of awareness, and, for example, the color patch which is its object. The act is usually called sensing." Now for our examples.

One finds Hume saying

Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such that they admit of no distinction or separation. The complex are contrary to these and may be distinguished into parts. Tho' a particular colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united together in this apple, 'tis easy to perceive that they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from one another.

To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions. ...

'tis a principle generally received in philosophy that every thing in nature is individual and that 'tis utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this therefore be absurd in fact and reality it must also be absurd in idea ...

... the belief or assent which always attends the memory and the senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present ... To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory. 'Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, which constitutes the first act of the judgement...

... the idea of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and what when after the simple conception of any thing we wou'd conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea ... But as 'tis certain there is a great difference between the simple conception of the existence of an object, and the be-
lief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea which we conceive; it follows that it must lie in the manner in which we conceive it.12

One could consider the following passages from G.E. Moore to be a direct comment on some of the above quotes from Hume.

... we can and must conceive the existence of blue as something quite distinct from the existence of the sensation. We can and must conceive that blue might exist and yet the sensation of blue not exist ... no philosopher has ever yet succeeded in avoiding this self-contradictory error: that the most striking results both of Idealism and agnosticism are only obtained by identifying blue with the sensation of blue; that esse is held to be percipi because what is experienced is held to be identical with the experience of it.13

Moore's own view is that

We have, ... in every sensation two distinct elements, one which I call consciousness and another which I call the object of consciousness. This must be so if the sensation of blue and the sensation of green, though different in one respect, are alike in another: blue is one object of sensation and green is another, and consciousness, which both sensations have in common, is different from either.14

Furthermore, he says

... though philosophers have meant something distinct by consciousness they have never yet had a clear conception of what that something is. They have not been able to hold it and blue before their minds and to compare them, in the same way in which they can compare blue and green. And this for the reason ... that the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what distinctly it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous.15
Finally, consider Russell

We will define a 'subject' as any entity which is acquainted with something, i.e. 'subjects' are the domain of the relation 'acquaintance'. Conversely, any entity with which something is acquainted will be called an 'object', i.e. 'objects' are the converse domain of the relation 'acquaintance' ... A fact will be called 'mental' if it contains either acquaintance or some relation presupposing acquaintance as a component. Thus, any instance of acquaintance is mental, since it is a complex in which a subject and an object are united by the relation of acquaintance.16

Before leaving the analysis of experience, we must take account of a widely held theory according to which our acquaintance with objects involves not only subject and object, but also what is called 'content'...17

The argument which has probably done more to produce a belief in 'contents' as opposed to objects is the last of those adduced by Meinong, namely that there must be some difference between a presentation of one object and a presentation of another, and this difference is not to be found in the 'act' of presentation.18 But in fact the difference of object supplies all the difference required... from the fact that the complex 'my awareness of A' is different from the complex 'my awareness of B', it does not follow that when I am aware of A I have some intrinsic quality which I do not have when aware of B but not of A. There is therefore no reason for assuming a difference in the subject corresponding to the difference between the two presented objects.19 The subject attending to 'this' is called 'I' and the time of the things which have to 'I' the relation of presence is called the present time. 'This' is the point from which the whole process starts, and 'this' itself is not defined but simply given. The confusions and difficulties arise from regarding 'this' as defined by the fact of being given, rather than simply as given.20

Consider a certain visible item whose name shall henceforth be 'a' and which has among its properties those of being green and square. Commonsensically, one distinguishes each of the following:
(1) the particular green thing, a
(2) the fact that a is green,
(3) an awareness of a,
(4) knowing that a is green.

Assuming that these distinctions are indeed commonsensical, let us see in light of them what can be made to stand out from the Hume, Moore, and Russell quotations.

Hume does not distinguish (1) from (2). a and a's being green are, for him, one and not two. Facts collapse, so to speak, into particulars as Hume construes the matter. Even more interesting, however, is his not distinguishing between a and an awareness of a. Simple impressions "admit of no distinction or separation". The terms 'object' and 'impression' are used interchangeably. Nor, lastly, does he distinguish between (3) and (4). But I postpone discussion of this temporarily. One reason for this is that Hume is not alone in not making the distinction; another is that it will be of considerable importance in examining Sellars' critique of sense-datum theories. Be it noticed in passing that since, for Hume, (1), (2), (3), and (4) implode into one another, his theory represents what might be considered in many ways to be the most extreme example of an allegiance to givenness. The mere existence of an item in Hume's scheme implies knowledge of it.

Moore, on the other hand, explicitly and emphatically distinguishes between act and object. But, upon reflection, one begins to wonder whether his way of doing so leaves one any the wiser about act or object. In "Being
and Being Known", \(^{21}\) Sellars contrasts what he refers to as the "Thomistic account of the intellectual act" with two other accounts, which he says have "successively dominated the philosophical scene since the Renaissance". He says

The first of these found its classic expression in the philosophy of Descartes; the second in the early stages of contemporary British and American realism. \(^{22}\)

Sellars holds that both of these accounts are "radically mistaken," but are interesting for what they have in common and for those respects in which they differ.

They have in common the idea that intellectual acts differ not in their intrinsic character as acts, but by virtue of being directly related to different relata... The two positions construe the status of these immediate relata differently. For the Cartesian, the immediate relatum is an item having 'being-for-mind' (objective reality)... \(^{23}\)

To use Arnauld's analogy, acts are like similar purses which differ only qua containing different kinds and numbers of coin. \(^{24}\)

On the other hand, Sellars says, the two accounts differ in that

The extreme realists of the present century expanded the real order to include all the items which had puzzled previous philosophers into the theory of contents. Thus, non-existent objects and states of affairs found their place in the real order by means of a distinction between existence and subsistence and ... other devices ... \(^{25}\)

Sellars sympathizes with the Neo-realist's rejection of "objectively real" Cartesian contents on the ground that talk of such entities is more in the nature of a re-statement of the problem than an explanation or solution of it.
But he also wishes to reject the subsistents and fictions of the so-called Neo-realist. For, he says

... it is only if we assume that intellectual acts are identical in species, differing only by virtue of their different relata, that we are committed to this alternative ... the notion that acts of the intellect are intrinsically alike regardless of what they are about is so odd that one can understand the temptation of many recent realists to abandon the very notion of intellectual acts and to flirt with naive forms of sensationism and behaviourism.26

No doubt Moore would qualify as a Neo-realist in Sellars' book. For Moore, the difference between an awareness of a and an awareness of b consists solely in the fact that a and b are different. Acts in themselves are, to use Moore's word, "diaphanous".

This same pattern is also quite explicit in Russell. Indeed, his rejection of Meinong's "contents" makes his analysis of the act one which is perhaps even more firmly committed to their being diaphanous than is Moore's. Moore only goes so far as to say that introspection does not reveal consciousness as being anything other than diaphanous. One could in principle keep the essentials of Moore's analysis but build into the act a factor which individuates it "internally" (corresponding to differences among objects), and stipulate that such factors are to be regarded as perceptual id quo's and not id quod's. One might thereby avoid the stigma of the diaphanous act. Russell assiduously avoids this strategy. And it is, after all, quite unlikely that Moore would have tolerated either. For both philosophers, a scheme which included an isomorphism between act and
object would have given sufficient comfort to the doctrine of Internal Relations to make the threat of Idealism too great to bear. Eventually, we shall see that Sellars does opt for an alternative which is somewhat reminiscent of the one just described.

Sellars refers to the sort of act countenanced by Descartes, Moore, and Russell as being quite "odd" in being different not intrinsically, but only extrinsically on the basis of having different relata. He does not elaborate his reasons for thinking this to be odd. He also rejects both accounts for the way in which each construes the status of the immediate relata of such acts. For the Cartesian, once again, the status of the immediate relata of acts is that of "being-for-mind", or "objective reality", as opposed to "formal reality" or mind-independence. For the Neo-realist, every immediate relatum of an act belongs to the "real order". But some of these relata are merely subsistent reals, not existent reals. Hence the difference between true and false judgements.

Sellars rejects the Cartesian account as leading to "skepticism and idealism ... a cancer at the heart of modern philosophy". He does not clearly indicate why he rejects the Neo-realistic account. I suggest that the fundamental underlying reason why he is moved to reject both accounts is that each in its own way involves an acceptance of some kind of given. Indeed, I shall repeatedly maintain that Sellars' entire strategy in the philosophy of Mind is determined by
his rejection of givenness.

If one construes mental acts as being intrinsically similar, as differing solely in virtue of having different relata, one may feel himself driven toward acceptance of an idea which is in a way the very paradigm of givenness, viz. there is not, and cannot be, a difference between being aware of a green thing and knowing that something is green. To suppose otherwise would be to go against the basic principle of the account, viz. all mental acts are intrinsically similar. If some acts were of an irreducibly cognitive or judgemental form, they would differ from one another intrinsically, not just extrinsically. Hence, being true to this account requires one to acknowledge that being aware is knowing. Merely to be aware of a thing is to know a fact about it (though we need not suppose, with Hume, that the mere existence of an item implies knowledge of it.) Some factual knowledge, in other words, is given to one, merely by one's being conscious. In this way, then, the Cartesian account of mental acts leads to an acceptance of givenness.

There is, of course, much more to Sellars' rejection of "the framework of givenness" than his rejection of sense-datum theories. Assuming, with Hinshaw, that it is appropriate to classify the givens of sense-datum theories as phenomenal givens, such givens would be of a sort which are supposedly given to one through inspection as opposed to givens which (to continue Hinshaw's terminology) philosophers have said to be given through introspection.28 The
chief bases for the contrast between the two supposed kinds of phenomenal givens are (a) the difference in the modes of their apprehension, and (b) possible differences in the status of their existential independence. With respect to items supposedly given to one through inspection (percepts, qualia, sensibilia), philosophers have typically been concerned to preserve the possibility that such items may very well continue to exist when not perceived. By contrast, they agree fairly well that introspectively given items (feelings, thoughts, desires, volitions, memories, imaginary scenes, etc.) are rather transient episodes which would cease to exist along with a cessation of consciousness. In fact, this would seem to be a tautology.

Finally, there is yet another class of items which philosophers have held to be given, rather special kinds of items which, one would tend to suppose, are given to one in a rather special way. Consider what Russell once said concerning "our acquaintance with universals".

It is obvious, to begin with, that we are acquainted with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc., i.e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch: but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are learning to become acquainted with whiteness. A similar process will make us acquainted with any other universal...

Between universals, as between particulars, there are relations of which we may be immediately aware ... Our knowledge of such relations, though it requires more power of abstraction than is required for perceiving the qualities of sense-data,
appears to be equally immediate and (in at least some cases) equally indubitable. Thus there is immediate knowledge concerning universals as well as concerning sense-data.30

Russell, as is well known, was by no means alone in holding such a view -- at least during the period in which he himself held it. G.E. Moore, at about the same time, held a similar view not only with respect to sense-data, but also with respect to a class of entities ontologically related to Russell's universals. According to Moore,

... absolutely everything that is at all, may be divided into two classes -- namely into propositions on the one hand and into those things which are not propositions on the other hand ... I do not mean by a proposition any of those collections of words which are one of the things that are commonly called propositions. What I mean by a proposition is rather the sort of thing which these collections of words express ... Whenever I speak of a proposition, I shall always be speaking, not of a mere sentence ... but of what these words mean.

Twice two are four. Now, when I say these words, you not only hear them -- the words -- you also understand what they mean ... That is to say, something happens in our minds -- some act of consciousness -- over and above the hearing of the words ...31

This understanding of the meaning of written or printed sentences which occurs when we actually read them, is I think obviously an apprehension of propositions in exactly the same sense in both these cases ... so obviously we very often apprehend propositions in exactly the same sense, when we neither hear any words nor see any words which express them... No doubt when we do thus apprehend propositions, without either seeing or hearing any words which express them, we often have before our minds the images of words, which would express them. But it is, I think, obviously possible that we should apprehend propositions in exactly the same sense without even having in our minds any images of words which would express them. We apprehend the proposition and desire to express
them. We apprehend the proposition and desire to express it but none of the words we can think of will express exactly the proposition we are apprehending and desire to convey. The Russellian universal with which we may become "directly acquainted" (after sensing $\emptyset$-items), the Moorean proposition, an extra-linguistic item which we "directly apprehend", I shall say belong to a class of entities which philosophers have said to be "given" in various senses, and to exhibit a contrast, I shall speak of such items as "givens ante res" as opposed to such "givens" as qualia, sense-data, thoughts, feelings, memories, etc., which I shall call "givens in rebus".

Sellars, as we shall see, professes to reject every form of givenness and every kind of given. He says

There is a source of the Myth of the Given to which even philosophers who are suspicious of the whole idea of inner episodes can fall prey. This is the fact that when we picture a child—or a carrier of slabs -- learning his first language, we, of course, locate the language learner in a structured logical space in which we are at home. Thus we conceive of him as a person (or at least as a potential person) in a world of physical objects, coloured, producing sounds, existing in space and time. But though it is we who are familiar with this logical space, we run the danger, if we are not careful, of picturing the language learner as having ab initio some degree of awareness --'pre-analytic', limited, and fragmentary though it may be -- of this same logical space. We picture his state as though it were rather like our own when placed in a strange forest on a dark night. In other words, unless we are careful, we can easily take for granted that the process of teaching a child to use a language is that of teaching it to discriminate elements within a logical space of universals, particulars, facts, etc. of which it is already undiscriminatingly aware, and to
associate these discriminated elements with verbal symbols.33

While, on the one hand there is obviously a considerable number of givens and modes of givenness which Sellars will emphatically and categorically reject, we shall see that, in addition to the noncontroversial perceptual given mentioned earlier, there is another sort of given which we shall find him acknowledging, however tacitly. For lack of a better phrase, I shall term it "The Commonsensical Given".

It seems to me that it is entirely without point to suppose that one can, as it were, "philosophize in a vacuum". To say the same thing differently, the idea of a "presuppositionless philosophy" is meaningless. One must start somewhere in the philosophy of Mind. I suggest that there is no better starting-point than those kinds of things which are commonsensically true of the knowing situation and that the following are examples of such truths.

(A) Knowers and what they know are in some sense distinct.
(A') Experiencing and what is experienced are in some sense distinct.
(B) Knowledge is in some sense intersubjective.
(C) We often know that (and what) we are thinking (imagining, remembering) even when we are silent.
(D) A large part of our knowledge depends in a strong sense upon experience. (Even one who embraces a doctrine of innate ideas will admit that experience is necessary to knowledge.) That is, at some stage in our careers, we acquire knowledge, concepts which we did not have previously.

I submit that Sellars not only acknowledges such parts of
common sense as having a claim on any philosopher worth his salt, but also that he attempts to make his peace with them. The conjunction of these commonsense truths with his rejection of nearly every other kind of given is a problematic conjunction. Sellars thus attempts to construct a theory such that although rejection of the Given is its fundamental premise, there is preserved in the theory some sense in which we may be said to "apprehend propositions", some sense in which we may be said to be "aware of universals", some sense in which we may be said to know when and what we think, imagine, and remember, even when silent.

Before examining the theory proper, we must explore the more important aspects of his arguments against the Given. We shall first consider his polemic against one kind of given in re, namely sense-data. Thereafter, we shall turn to the polemic against givens ante res, or, as Sellars calls them, abstract entities. To reach this point, I propose constructing and crossing one more bridge.

Suppose that (a) one wishes to reject givenness and, (b) one considers the act-object dichotomy to be somehow responsible for the generation of this mythical monster. One might envision the following as among his alternatives:

One. In order to effectively reject givenness, one must (at least) reject the sort of analysis which has it that mental acts differ only extrinsically not intrinsically. One must, accordingly, endorse a new analysis of the act such that the act is said to "contain" an irreducibly epistemic or judgemental component, thereby avoiding the absurdity that awareness simpliciter is
knowing. On the object-side of the analysis, let us suppose that there are particulars only, and that the only sense in which facts could be said to exist is a derivative one according to which their existence is dependent upon the existence of factual knowledge.

As we shall see in connection with nominalism, such an analysis would be a kind of Idealism.

Two. In order to effectively reject givenness one must eliminate the act-side altogether from his analysis of the situation. Upon the new analysis, one will characterize perceptual situations solely in terms of items which previously were said to exist on the object-side. Thus, for one to be aware of something green is for him to be a standard observer in standard circumstances having a green item before his eyes and having his eyes open. For one to know, e.g., what it is for something to be green is to be disposed to behave in certain ways in the presence of green items, i.e., to be able to sort out the green ones from others which are not green, to be disposed to say "This is green" when in the presence of green items, to be disposed to reason-out-loud (Sellars' locution), "This looks to be $\emptyset$. But the circumstances are abnormal. Green things look to be $\emptyset$ in such abnormal circumstances. Therefore, this is green", when in the presence of green items in such abnormal circumstances, and so on.

This alternative is, of course, Metaphysical Behaviorism. Most philosophers have by nor rejected the first alternative, whereas there is currently a strong move in the direction of the second. There are still others, including myself, who regard the first as Scylla, the second as Charybdis, and who live in hope of finding safe passage between them.

It would seem, at first, that the two just-mentioned alternatives mutually exclude one another. Once I have
brought Sellars' view into overall focus, I believe it will become evident that, mirabile dictu, it is at once a rejection of both alternatives in one family of senses, while in yet another family of senses, it is an endorsement of both.

**Given in rebus: Sense-Datum Theories**

One may state (for Sellars) the form taken by the myth of the Given with respect to empirical knowledge as follows:

There is a stratum of empirical knowledge which (a) is in some sense a direct result of perceiving, (b) is the foundation on which all other empirical knowledge rests, (c) is incorrigible, (d) is the stuff from which concepts are formed, and (e) itself requires no prior concept-formation as a condition of its acquisition.

Sellars' basic criticism of sense-datum theories is to be found in the paper "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." Much more than this is to be found in EPM, however, and we shall be making constant reference to it. Indeed, EPM is in many ways the result of Sellars' first attempt to systematically adumbrate the philosophy of Mind which he has defended ever since it was written. In *Science and Metaphysics*, the view is more fully elaborated, but the difference in the form of its appearance in the latter work is mostly a matter of difference in linguistic garb. Later, I shall examine the view as it appears in SM to see how it figures in the general epistemology and ontology whose construction is therein attempted.
Sellars' critical views (in EPM) concerning sense-datum theories may be summarized as follows.

(1) The main goal which sense-datum theorists have sought is to secure the position that empirical knowledge rests upon a foundation of knowledge which is non-inferential.

(2) Characteristically, however, one finds them asserting both (a) that the objects of sensing are particulars, and (b) that what is known are facts.

(3) But it would seem that the sense datum theorist must choose between saying (c) Sense-data (particulars) are sensed. Sensing is not knowing. So the existence of sense-data does not logically entail the existence of knowledge (any more than "x is pleasurable" logically entails "x is good"), and saying (d) that sensing is a form of knowing. It is facts rather than particulars which are sensed.

(4) Even so, a sense-datum theorist might be imagined attempting both to have and eat his epistemological cake by saying something like the following:

The non-inferential knowing on which our world-picture rests is the knowing that certain items, e.g. red sense contents are of a certain character, e.g. red. When such a fact is non-inferentially known about a sense content I will say that a sense content is sensed as being, red. I will then say that a sense content is sensed (full stop) if it is sensed as being of a certain character. Finally, I will say of a sense-content that it is known if it is sensed (full stop) to emphasize that sensing is a cognitive or epistemic fact.35

But these stipulations demand that the following statements express necessary entailments:
(i) sense content $s$ is sensed $\rightarrow$ $s$ is sensed as being $\emptyset$.

(ii) $s$ is sensed as being $\emptyset$ $\rightarrow$ that-$\emptyset(s)$ is non-inferentially known.

To this demand Sellars objects that such a sense-datum theorist would be using 'know' in a purely stipulative way, which use of the term happens to receive (undeserved?) aid and comfort from such ordinary language expressions as "Do you know John?" which are equivalent to expressions like "Are you acquainted with John?". This, he says, is the plot-line of the story of how 'acquainted' became a technical term.

(5) The objection which Sellars most vigorously states is that, irrespective of how sense-datum theorists have dealt with the "sensing-knowing gap", they have taken sense contents to be fundamental givens in another sense, viz. as presupposing no learning, no forming of associations, no setting up of stimulus-response connections. In short, they have equated sensing sense contents with being conscious (simpliciter). They admit that, while such conceptual abilities as, e.g. those having to do with persons, time, feeling, and causality, must be acquired, certain other, "simpler" ones such as those for seeing colors, smelling odors, etc. are unacquired. How, Sellars asks, can this be made consistent with the empiricist tradition that classificatory consciousness (knowledge that $x$ is thus-and-so) involves learning, concept-formation, even mastery of a language?
Classical sense-datum theories are confronted, he says, by an inconsistent triad:

A. "X senses red sense content s" entails "x non-inferentially knows that s is red."
B. The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired.
C. The ability to know facts of the form \( \emptyset(z) \) is acquired. (Presumably, this is meant to indicate that 'z' ranges over such items as persons as well as sense contents.)

According to Sellars, any two of these entails the negation of the third. Can any of them be abandoned and still retain the essentials of a sense-datum theory? Sellars does not think so. If, he says, one abandons A, thus denying that sensing entails having non-inferential knowledge, he then denies that sensing itself is a cognitive fact. One might continue to say that sensing is some kind of condition for knowing, even a necessary one, but he can no longer say that sensing itself constitutes the having of non-inferential knowledge.

Suppose that one attempts to abandon B, thus saying that the ability to sense sense contents is acquired. According to Sellars, the result of this would be to divorce the concept of a sense-datum from ordinary talk about such things as sensations, feelings, after-images, tickles, itches, etc., the very things which sense-datum theorists hold up as paradigm cases for what they mean by "sense content". Imagine a sense-datum theorist arguing for B. "Surely it would be ridiculous," he might say, "to suppose that a new-born babe, screaming after having been smacked on the behind by the
doctor, did not feel anything just because he has no concepts about physical pain! Well, such things as what the infant of our example surely felt are just what we sense-datum theorists mean by 'sense-data". Sellars, perhaps with some such speech in mind, cannot imagine a sense-datum theorist abandoning B.

What if he tries to abandon C? Sellars is rather mysterious here. He says only that to abandon C would be to "do violence to the predominantly nominalistic proclivities of the empiricist tradition".

Summing up his analysis, Sellars argues that the classical account of a sense-datum is a "mongrel" which results from the cross-breeding of two ideas:

(α) The idea that there are certain inner episodes, e.g. sensations of red or of C# which can occur to humans without prior process of concept-formation; and without which it would in some sense be impossible, for example, to see that the facing surface of a physical object is red or hear that a certain physical sound is C#.

(β) The idea that there are certain inner episodes which are the non-inferential knowings that, e.g. certain items are red or C# and that these episodes are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as providing the evidence for all other empirical propositions.

The first idea, Sellars maintains, results from an attempt to explain the facts of perception "in scientific style". That is, one may wish to explain how such experiences as are described by one's saying, "It is as though I were seeing a red and triangular object", are possible when the situation is either such that he cannot be seeing anything
(He is blindfolded), or the things perceptually available to him are non-red, non-triangular, or both. Thus, one infers the existence of a certain sort of item, a red and triangular sense-content, of which one is said to be aware in order to account for such situations -- much as one would infer the existence of an unobserved planet in order to account for orbital deviations of an observed one.

There is a certain core-idea which guides one in attempting such explanations as the above, Sellars says: namely the idea that it is only for the most part that the proximate cause of such a sensation is brought about by the presence in the perceiver's neighborhood of a red and triangular physical object. In the case of adults, one says that there "looks to be a red and triangular physical object" when they are caused to have sensations of red triangles, but, without these sensations, no such (sophisticated) experience would be possible. On the other hand, infants are said to have "sensations of red triangles" without seeing or seeming to see that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular.

The second idea, Sellars says, is the result of a certain well-known pattern which may be described as follows:

(a) There is no discernible mark which distinguishes veridical from non-veridical experiences.

(b) It would be excessively precarious to suppose that the non-inferential knowledge on which our world-picture rests consists of experiences which just happen to be veridical.
(c) Though there are some means for distinguishing veridical from non-veridical experiences, the possibility of an experience's being non-veridical can never be completely discounted.

(d) Therefore, the foundation of our empirical knowledge cannot be limited to the class of such experiences as seeing that the facing side of a physical object is red and triangular.

The point at which mongrelization between the two ideas (\(\alpha\) and \(\beta\)) begins to take place is that at which one may be misled by the similarity in surface-grammar between

X is a sensation of a red triangle

and

X is a thought of a celestial city,

the mistake being the supposition that, as the latter is a cognitive or epistemic fact, so is the former. Finally, the process is completed in being reinforced by the idea (e) that sensations are far more "intimately related" to mental processes and therefore are more "easily accessible" and with the idea (f) that it does not make sense to speak of a sensation's being non-veridical.

Commentary

Provisionally, I take it that (4) constitutes the initial set of objections to sense-datum theories, and that the "necessary entailments"

\[(\text{i}) \text{ sense content } s \text{ is sensed } \rightarrow \text{ s is sensed as being } \emptyset\]
(ii) $s$ is sensed as being $\emptyset \rightarrow$ that-$\emptyset(s)$ is non-inferentially known,

allegedly demanded by the "having-and-eating version" of a sense-datum theory are the most important items therein to be discussed.

Concerning (ii), I confess I cannot see exactly what difficulty it creates. Just what it would mean to "non-inferentially know that-$p$" is so indeterminate to begin with that one could with a clear conscience treat it as being another way of saying that something is "sensed as being $\emptyset$". Thus, (ii) might not have the status of an entailment at all, but that of a stipulative definition. If so, the only claim to be reckoned with is (i). With regard to it, then, it seems to me that what Sellars must be up to in treating it as being problematic is something like the following:

There is an ostensible similarity between (i) and

(iii) Jones is acquainted with Smith $\rightarrow$ Jones is acquainted with Smith as being (among other things) a person (or dog, etc. -- as having some property or other.)

This similarity is put in question by the consideration that such propositions as (iii) do not stand by themselves but presuppose the truth of propositions having the form

(iv) Jones knows that Smith is the individual having properties $\emptyset_1, \emptyset_2, \ldots, \emptyset_n$, and Jones knows that the subset $\{\emptyset_1, \ldots, \emptyset_k\}$ of these properties is essential to being a person (or dog, or, etc.)

The aid and comfort which the sense-datum theorist's
technical term 'acquaintance' seems to receive from such ordinary language truths as (iii) is specious according to this line of thought because, whereas the sense-datum theorist says that "knowledge by acquaintance" is epistemological rock-bottom, the "logic" which is exhibited in the functioning of 'acquainted' in ordinary language is not of this primitive sort. To use Russellian language in a decidedly anti-Russellian spirit, knowledge by acquaintance is possible only in conjunction with knowledge by description. To express the matter differently, talk of being acquainted with one or more things is sensible only if it can be backed up with criteria in terms of which one could successfully re-identify those things. Moreover such criteria will very likely include statements asserting generalities having such a form as

\[(x)\left[\text{person}(x) \left[\left(\emptyset_1(x) \& \ldots \& \emptyset_k(x)\right)\right]\right].\]

The main point of these remarks would thus be that analysis reveals the ostensible similarity between 'sensed' and 'acquainted' to be similarity in surface structure only, and that any analogy between their "real logics" requires that "sensing" (insofar as the concept is intelligible) presupposes having already acquired knowledge of another sort -- of criteria, rules, and so on. Even such allegedly "simple" situations as one's seeing that x is green, far from being non-inferential knowledge, presuppose that a battery of concepts has already been acquired and are
resources for one's coming to know, e.g. that x is green.

Now, rather obviously, what I have been leading up to in pursuing this line of thought is the claim that it is one which Sellars embraces. That this is the case I am prepared to document fully and shall do so presently. Notice, however, that to embrace this line of thought, (i.e. be critical of taking (i) as primitive,) means that Sellars' main objections to (the emended version of) a theory of sense-data are those expressed in (5). In order to understand the spirit of these, we must come to grips with Sellars' reasons for distinguishing between what he considers to be fundamentally different perceptual situations: Those which are 

eridical (seeing that x, over there is red), those which are 

qualitative seemings (Its seeming to one that x, over there, is red), and existential seemings (its seeming to one that there is a red object over there).

While Sellars deplores the mongrelizing of (α), which expresses the idea that there are sensation-inner episodes, and (β), which expresses the idea that there are non-inferential-knowing inner episodes, he does not dismiss what is common to them, namely, the idea that there are inner episodes: sensations of red, for example, or thoughts, to which one has direct and privileged access. What is to be rejected, he says, is the idea that "knowledge of these episodes furnishes premises on which empirical knowledge rests as on a foundation". Some philosophers, he says have rejected this idea on the grounds that such episodes
are private, whereas the logic of the language we speak is publicly based. To a degree, such philosophers are immune to sense-datum theories, but, he says, they may nevertheless fall prey to that form of the myth of the Given which takes such facts as that physical object *x looks red to person S at time t* as givens.

Sense-datum theorists, Sellars notes, have often insisted upon the givenness of such facts, and have claimed accordingly that they are analysable in terms of sense-data. That is, they have taken the logical form of "A looks $\emptyset$ to S" to be the same as that of "X is between Y and Z", namely, "R(x,y,z)". They have, in other words, supposed that the statement "x looks red to S" has as part of its meaning the idea that S stands in some relation to something that *is* red. It is this sort of supposition that Sellars most vehemently denies. That something *is* red is, he says, in no way involved in the situation of something's looking red. The mistake which is responsible for the contrary supposition is taking 'looks' to be the name of a relation which is on a logical footing parallel with 'between' -- that both stand for triadic relations. Sellars' counter-claim is that "x is red" cannot be analysed in terms of "x looks red to S", that being *red* is logically prior, is a logically simpler notion than looking red. But, Sellars does take

\[ x \text{ is red} \equiv x \text{ looks red to standard observers in standard conditions} \]

to be a necessary truth. At first glance, this seems directly
opposed to his claim that being-red cannot be analysed in terms of looking-red. Sellars explains this apparent incongruity by saying that the reason why the statement expresses a necessary truth is "not because the right-hand side is the definition of 'x is red', but because 'standard conditions' means 'conditions in which things look what they are". Furthermore, (Sellars adds in 1963)

... the non-trivial character of the above formula emerges when we replace 'standard conditions' by the mention of a certain kind of condition (e.g. daylight) and add that daylight is the standard condition of perception, i.e. the condition in which colour words have their primary perceptual use.

Hence,

... the concept of looking green, the ability to recognize that something looks green presupposes the concept of being green, and that the latter concept involves the ability to tell what colors objects have by looking at them -- which in turn involves knowing in what circumstances to place an object if one wishes to ascertain its color by looking at it.

But now the mind begins to boggle

... since one can scarcely determine what the circumstances are without noticing that certain objects have certain perceptual characteristics -- including colours -- it would seem that one could not form the concept of being green, and ... of the other colours, unless he already had them.

Indeed,

Not only must the conditions be of a sort that is appropriate for determining the colour of an object by looking, the subject must know that conditions of this sort are appropriate. And while this does not imply that one must have concepts before one has them, it does imply
that one can have the concept of green only by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element ... that while the process of acquiring the concept of green may -- indeed does involve a long history of acquiring piecemeal habits of response to various objects in various circumstances, there is an important sense in which one has no concept pertaining to the observable properties of physical objects in Space and Time unless one has them all -- and, indeed, as we shall see, a great deal more besides.

We have been led to the point of supposing that knowledge by acquaintance demands prior concept-formation which is to serve as a source of criteria in terms of which it can be decided whether or not a perceptual situation is veridical or is a qualitative or existential seeming. But apparently these criteria are possible only as a result of previously acquired concepts. Where will the regress end, if at all? Already one can discern what Sellars' final reply will be like. If there is no epistemic ground for the house of empirical knowledge which supports all others while requiring no epistemic grounding itself, what can serve as the ground of such knowledge? A non-epistemic ground? Possibly the causal conditions necessary for its acquisition?

At any rate, we see that the demand for a criterion for veridical experiences systematically forces one in the direction of Sellars' Conceptual Holism (as I shall call it). The "great deal more besides" at which Sellars so far only hints, he will eventually refer to as "the conceptual framework of the Scientific Image of Man".

Criticism

I wish to take note of a certain matter which will prove of some importance at a later stage. Sellars' "necessary truth", viz.

\[ x \text{ is red} \equiv x \text{ looks red to standard observers in standard conditions.} \]

seems, on its face to be unassailable. Understood in a certain way, it is; namely, when one takes the values of its variable to be physical objects. It would, of course, require a separate argument to show that the variable in 'x is red' can only take physical objects for its values before one would be justified in claiming (as Sellars does)\textsuperscript{45} that the "fundamental grammar" of 'red' is

\[ \text{physical object } x \text{ is red at place } p \text{ at time } t. \]

There is a sense in which it is quite correct that the dichotomy "veridical-nonveridical" makes sense only as applied to awarenesses of a public domain of objects. But one is not justified merely on that ground in supposing that nothing which is not a physical object can be red, and, moreover, that only physical objects can have properties. This comes to saying the same thing as that, in a fundamental sense of 'exist', only physical objects exist, for in this sense of 'exist', nothing exists which fails to have some property.
As against this idea, it would not seem absurd to maintain that one may be said to be aware of a particular entity and know that it is red, whether or not one happens at the moment to know that the entity in question is (a constituent of) a physical object. Thus, one could define "non-veridical awareness" as follows:

'x is a non-veridical awareness' =df 'x is an awareness the object of which is not a (constituent of a) physical object'

Such a definition would have to be supplemented with an account of what conditions must be fulfilled in order that something be a constituent of a physical object. No doubt such conditions would closely resemble what traditionally have been called "coherence criteria". By allowing the variable in "x is red =df x looks red to standard observers in standard conditions" unrestricted range over all domains, Sellars attempts to build coherence criteria into the notion of what it is for anything whatever to be red.

Speaking of C.I. Lewis' view, he says

(For Lewis) all classification of objects, however confident and pre-emptory, is a venture, a venture which at no point finds its justification in a presymbolic vision of hearts on the sleeves of the objects of experience... While (Lewis) writes in this manner of the interpretation of the given by means of concepts whose implications transcend the given, he also holds that the sensible appearances of things do wear their hearts on their sleeves, and that, we do have a cognitive vision of these hearts which is direct, unlearned, and incapable of error -- though we may make a mistake in the expressive language by means of which these insights are properly formulated. In other
words, the assumption to which we are committed requires to extend to all classificatory consciousness whatever the striking language in which Lewis describes our consciousness of objects.

I am claiming that this urge can be resisted without absurdity, and without falling prey to the myth of the Given. One can cheerfully grant that it is impossible to apply a concept to anything before one has learned to apply it to physical things and events. But this alone does not commit one to the view that there are no non-physical entities. One can agree with the spirit of Sellars' antipathy to givenness but at the same time disagree with his alternative to it. Nor need such a strategy commit one to the idea that such non-physical things would be mental. It would be odd indeed to suppose that something mental could be colored. Even the Idealist Berkeley shrank from saying that, when the mind perceives color, the mind is colored.

What of the thesis that the primary application of a language is to a realm of public objects? Let us grant it, but at the same time be careful not to beg the question with respect to the possibility of non-physical entities. If one grants this possibility, he grants ipso facto that it would be sensible to speak of them as having some properties. What then is to stand in the way of the possibility of a physical and a non-physical thing exemplifying the same property, e.g. red? None of this interferes with the idea that the "primary" application of 'red' is to physical objects.
And there seems not to be any obvious reason why sentences containing non-primary applications of 'red' should not be considered true or false.

Would adoption of such a strategy make one a victim of the myth of the Given? "After all" it may be objected, "you will surely grant that concept-formation in human beings seems to depend vitally upon their acquisition and mastery of a language; and it is essential to the notion of a language that its primary application is to a realm of public objects".

It is, of course, well-established scientific fact that concept-formation in human beings does not take place independently of linguistic training. But as scientific fact it is neutral with respect to the philosophical question of what the sorts of things are to which concepts can sensibly be applied. Naively mentalistic theories of concept-formation deserve to be condemned, but not so much perhaps for the feature of givenness which is typical of them as for their being armchair psychological speculation in the guise of philosophical "theory". So, one's alternative to such theories should not take the form of one more theory of concept-formation, no matter how sophisticated -- even if it does avoid givenness. But, as we shall see, this is what Sellars does. The difference is that Sellars' theory is behavioristic rather than mentalistic.

As I see it, concept-formation is not a topic for
philosophical inquiry. The only sense in which it is a meaningful issue is when it is posed as a matter for scientific investigation, say, in the psychology and/or sociology of how concepts come to be acquired by the individual and how they fare in the society at large. In philosophy, what one starts with is a full-blown conceptual framework -- or, if one prefers, a living language -- and the philosophic task consists in exhibiting the way in which the conceptual elements within the system are related to one another. If one wishes to say that this is to be accomplished by paying attention to the structure of a language, well and good. But one should be careful meanwhile to realize that what he is talking about is not language in the sense of sheer marks or noises, or gestures per se, but language-as-meaningful, language as being about the non-linguistic. If one wishes to call this a kind of givenness, he is free to do so. I for one can make no sense of what is distinctive of the philosophical enterprise unless the idea is taken as fundamental. Of this, much more later.

These last remarks are primarily intended to set the stage for an examination of what, for Sellars, constitutes the nub of the entire controversy.

The Heart of the Myth

It is a truism that language is conventional in nature. For example, there is obviously nothing sacred, as
it were, about the English word 'green' which gives it some sort of special relationship to the color which green objects have. The same is true of the French word 'vert', the German word 'greun', and so on. English-users could be imagined to accomplish their purposes in conversing about the color of green objects by using any sort of item, procedure, or technique (say, whistling in a certain way or wagging one's finger) just as well as they do by using the word 'green'. Or so, at least, one feels. English could have been different, could have evolved in such a way that, while it did not contain 'green', it afforded one another item or technique by means of which English users could accomplish the same purposes in communicating and thinking about the color of green objects just as well as they in fact do with 'green'.

In light of such reflections as these, one is tempted to conclude that having a language at one's command is a matter of convenience, great convenience, no doubt, but still a convenience by means of which (to cite another truism) we express our feelings, desires, doubts, beliefs, and our knowledge. Commonsensical as this line of thought seems, it takes one to a point but a few steps removed from what Sellars calls "the heart of the myth of the Given". This will be discussed directly. Consider a passage which, for Sellars, might well have been drawn from a source entitled "Popular Philosophical Superstitions".
It is obvious that knowing a language consists in using words appropriately, and acting appropriately when they are heard. It is no more necessary to be able to say what a word means than it is for a cricketeer to know the mathematical theory of impact and projectiles. Indeed, in the case of many object-words, it must be strictly impossible to say what they mean except by a tautology, for it is with them that language begins. You can only explain (say) the word 'red' by pointing to something red. A child understands the heard word 'red' when an association has been established between the heard word and the color red; he has mastered the spoken word 'red' when, if he notices something red, he is able to say 'red' and has an impulse to do so.\(^7\)

This quotation is an almost perfect preparation for introducing two ideas which Sellars considers radically mistaken, and which together constitute what he calls "The heart of the myth of the Given".\(^8\) Both can be seen as misunderstandings of the seemingly innocuous semantical sentence

'\text{Red} \text{ designates red}.\]

Such misunderstandings, moreover, can be seen to generate our two main sorts of givens, those which are \text{in rebus} and those which are \text{ante res}.

Sellars sees the errors as being generated by taking the form of

'\text{Red} \text{ designates red} to be

(\text{linguistic object}) R (\text{non-linguistic object}).\]

Let us see how this could be so.

It is fairly clear that what 'red' means does not belong just to English, or to French, or to Urdu, etc. From
this fact it is tempting to suppose that what classes of synonymous words, e.g. 'red', 'rouge', etc., all mean is a general something-or-other which is not itself a word in any language, but is some sort of entity. Voila! An abstract entity: redness. Thus baldly stated, Sellars rejects this line of thought, but he also thinks that there is something to it and attempts to capture what is sensible in it without being led to the result seen above.

Sellars claims that "concept-empiricism" denotes

... two radically different lines of thought which agree ... in concluding that the basic concepts in terms of which all genuine concepts are defined are concepts of qualities and relations exemplified by particulars in what is called 'the given' or 'immediate experience'.

In its more traditional and conservative form concept empiricism distinguishes sharply between the intellectual awareness of qualities and relations and the formulation of this awareness by the use of symbols ... (it) conceives of such symbols as 'red' and 'between' as acquiring meaning by virtue of becoming associated with such abstract entities as redness and betweenness, the association being mediated by our awareness of these entities...

Pointing to another theme in what he calls 'concept empiricism' Sellars says

... it is characteristic of the concept empiricist to be convinced that an essential role in the process whereby we come to be aware of universals is played by particulars which exemplify these universals... the primary ground of this conviction is to the effect that abstract entities exist only in rebus. This was usually coupled with the claim that... in the last analysis all awareness of universals is derived from the awareness of particulars, together with a more or less crude attempt to fill in the psychological details.
What is common to all forms of concept empiricism, according to Sellars, is an underlying presupposition of a distinction between

(a) the pure awareness of an abstract entity, and
(b) the linguistic or symbolic expression of this pure awareness.

The idea that there are such facts as the pure awareness of an abstract entity (where this process is understood as a non-linguistic affair) for Sellars, constitutes what he calls the "Metaphor of the Mental Eye".

But, he says, even philosophers who have been sophisticated enough to see the absurdity of explicit mental eye-type theories have unwittingly been taken in, hypnotized, by sentences of the form

'Red' means red

in such a manner as to have effects as disastrous as those of "the most naive mental oculists", because

such theories which appear to present meaning as a tete-a-tete relation between a word and a universal have been misinterpreted as entailing what might be called a 'matrimonial' theory of the meaning of primitive or undefined descriptive predicates according to which the fact that these terms have meaning is constituted by the fact that they are associated with (married to) classes of objects.

The Heart of the myth of the Given, Sellars says, is to be found in the idea that

... observation 'strictly and properly so-called' is constituted by certain self-authenticating non-verbal episodes, the authority of which is transmitted to verbal and quasi-verbal performances when these performances are made 'in
conformity with the semantical rules of the language."54

With this reference to semantical rules, we come to Sellars' most basic reasons for rejecting givenness.

A rule is always a rule for doing something in some circumstances. Obeying a rule entails recognizing that a circumstance is one to which the rule applies. If there were such a thing as a semantical rule by the adoption of which a descriptive term acquires meaning, it would presumably be of the form "red objects are to be designated by the term 'red'". But to recognize the circumstances in which this rule has application one must already have the concept of red! Those who speak in this sense of semantical rules, therefore, are committed to the view that an awareness of abstract entities is a precondition of learning the intelligent use of symbols.55

Hence, concept-formation could not be a matter of learning to obey a system of semantical rules. Yet Sellars thinks that, in some sense, it certainly is a matter of learning to do things in accordance with rules. What sort of rules? Sellars finds his clue56 in the efforts that some empiricists have made to account for how concept-formation precedes in the learning of mathematics and logic. Rather than make the sensational sort of claim that one learns the meaning of √16 in the same way that one learns the meaning of 'red', they have modified their theory so as to construe the logical basis for learning the meaning of such terms as being the process of learning to obey syntactical rather than semantical rules, where one is thinking of such rules as being parallel in logical structure to such a rule as

The pawn captures en passant.
The direction of Sellars' next move is not difficult to guess. It amounts to a rejection of "semantical rules" and extension of the importance of syntactical rules to the point of holding that it is the latter and only the latter which constitutes the basis of concept-formation.

...even those terms such as 'red' which are supposed by the theory to gain meaning by association share in the second mode of concept-formation, for only by being used in accordance with the rules of logical syntax can they perform the functions by virtue of which a concept is a concept... the conceptual status of descriptive as well as logical ... predicates is ... completely constituted by syntactical rules.

More accurately, Sellars rejects a certain conception of semantical rules, i.e. one which has it that

'...' means ---

has the form

(linguistic object) R (non-linguistic object).

What he will endorse is a different conception of semantical rules, one which other philosophers would call a form of syntactical rule. I am getting ahead of my story, however, and it will be profitable to dwell on certain issues which have just been brought out.

Comment: Structural Sources

Sellars chooses a particular tradition, concept empiricism, for attack on the grounds of its involving the Mental Eye metaphor; but, as he mentions, this metaphor is one which crops up again and again in various degrees of dis-
guise in many epistemological traditions. I think that he is right in this claim, and, for reasons which will emerge presently, I should now like to discuss some main structural sources which lead in different ways to covert reliance upon the metaphor.

My suggestion is that, what is responsible at the deepest level for its generation and for many other forms of givenness can be traced to a certain application of the oldest of all dialectical dichotomies: Realism versus Nominalism.

Nominalism may be expressed in the classical slogan that whatever exists is individual. The Realist holds that, besides individuals, their properties also have ontological status. Let us apply these two ideas to the perceptual situation. We will find the Nominalist asserting that perception is always of the individual, of a this. The Realist will attempt to torment him by asking what it is that constitutes the difference between two or more perceived thises, between this and that. "If you wish to hold that this is different from that, you must either say that you perceive individuals simpliciter, which are devoid of what I would call differences of character -- bare individuals? -- or else side with me and say that they are different in such and such respects -- properties, if I may so put it. To go this far would also amount to agreeing that the properties of individuals are just as perceptible as are the individuals which exemplify them, would it not? How can you say that you see two different
things -- one red, the other green -- but then deny that you see the respects in which they differ, namely, the color-properties, red and green?"

To this the Nominalist may reply, "what you suggest is unintelligible. On your account, when I say that I see two different things, I must be seeing at least three, depending on how many of your "properties" are involved. If I see two red things, I would not only be seeing thing a, and thing b, but also the property red. On your view, furthermore, if I see two things, one red the other green, I see a, b, and the properties red and green. I say I see two things. You conclude that, in the latter case, I must be seeing four. That simply isn't so; not just because it's factually false, but because it is logically absurd. Furthermore, your view is fantastic in that it rests upon the idea that, in addition to our physical eyes, by means of which (you will surely admit) we see concrete individual things, we have a "mental eye" by means of which we can have a glimpse at abstract non-individual things -- at your "properties", as you call them. And is this not an absurd result?" The Nominalist's speech may cause the Realist to resort to a partial concession followed by a sophisticated tu quoque somewhat as follows.

"I admit that there is something in what you say in regard to the absurdity of the "mental eye" approach and that it constitutes a danger to my position. But, were I to condemn "mental oculism" for the dangerous metaphor that it is, I
would of course not be forced to desert my position that properties have ontological status. That is a story for another time, however. Since you have made me sensitive to this misleading metaphor, though, a number of things occur to me which you have perhaps not considered.

What can your position be concerning the analysis of the perceptual situation be if it is to conform strictly to your Nominalistic proclivities? Let me put the problem this way: On what is the perceptual judgement, 'This is red', based? It is impossible for you to answer that 'this' refers to one perceptual thing and 'red' to another. No doubt you recognize my suggestion that it is predication which is the crucial problem for both of us. I say that predication is a function of one thing's exemplifying the other -- where the two things in question are of radically different status. Once again, this is an alternative which you will not accept. But if not this, of what can predication be a function for you? It cannot be a relation between items which, in Cartesian terms, are formally real. If what is directly presented to you in perception is always and only thises, how are you to understand the ground of the judgement, 'This is red'? I submit that the only alternative open to you is Conceptualism, according to which you must say that predication involves not properties but concepts, that predication involves thought rather than things only. The ground of the judgement, 'This is red' would be the mind's subsuming this
under the concept red. But what is the result? You will be hopelessly trapped in the very danger of which you warned me: The Mental Eye.

What, according to the Conceptualist, does the mind "do" in subsuming an individual under a concept? An individual is presented to the physical eye, and the mind, obligingly, subsumes it under the appropriate concept. In short, the conceptualist scheme, according to which perception is of the individual "neat", but conception of the individual "labelled", dialectically entails the invidious feature (the "labelling" Mental Eye) which you, unsuccessfully I believe, allege belongs to Realism. Realism, furthermore, has another option. A Realist can deny that we ever perceive these simpliciter or properties simpliciter; he can maintain instead that perception is propositional. One perceives, for example, (that) this is red. He will not fall victim to the metaphor of the Mental Eye. By contrast, it does not seem to me that the Nominalist has any avenue of escape from it."

Sellars is moved by considerations coming from both sides of this discussion. He will agree with the Nominalist's criticism of the (naively) presented version of Realism. Thus, he says,

(This) naive realism ... construes the meaningfulness of perceptual predicates as a relation between person, sign-designs, and attributes construed as independent entities. Naive realism conceives of this relation as brought about by a learning process in which
acquaintance with facts involving these attributes enables sign-designs to be associated with them.\textsuperscript{58}

He would likewise be chary of any sort of Conceptualism according to which concepts are "grasped by the minds eye". But he is friendly both to the basic insight of Conceptualism that predication is a matter of bringing individuals under concepts and to the more sophisticated version of Realism, according to which all (perceptual) awareness is propositional -- provided this does not lead to the supposition that

$$S \text{ sees that } a \text{ is } F$$

is ultimately to be construed as

$$S \text{ sees that } a \text{ exemplifies } F\text{-ness}.$$  

For the latter supposition is a relapse into the superstition.

On could sum things up at this point with the following: Both Nominalism and Realism as ontological theses applied to the perceptual situation can lead, in their separate ways, to the myth of the Given. Conceptualism (Nominalism’s child) leads to the idea that the mind in its own way has a grasp of \textit{abstracta}, \textit{givens ante res}, we might say. Naive Realism, meanwhile, involves the idea that the senses themselves are presented with non-individual, intelligible entities (qualities, relations) existing \textit{in rebus}. Sellars’ way out is to banish the Mental Eye metaphor totally and to distinguish even more sharply than did Kant (as Sellars reads him) between Sensibility and Understanding.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1Gilbert Ryle, CM, pp. 116-117
2SW, pp. 72, 73
3SM, p. 73
4SPR, p. 127
5ibid.
6Virgil Hinshaw, "The Given", p. 317
7SPR, p. 128
8David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 2
9Hume, Treatise, p. 5
10Hume, Treatise, p. 19
11Hume, Treatise, p. 86
12Hume, Treatise, pp. 94, 95
13G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 19
14Moore, Studies, p. 17
15Moore, Studies, p. 24
16Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge, pp. 162, 163
17Russell, L & K, p. 169
18Russell, L & K, p. 171
19Russell, L & K, p. 172
20Russell, L & K, p. 168
21SPR (2), pp. 41 -- 59
22SPR, p. 41
23ibid.
24SPR, p. 42

25ibid.

26SPR, pp. 42, 43

27SPR, p. 42

28See Hinshaw, p. 319 for these distinctions.

29Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, page 101

30Russell, Problems, p. 103

31G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 72

32Moore, Main Problems, pp. 75, 76

33SPR, pp. 161, 162

34SPR,(5), pp. 127-196

35SPR, p. 129

36SPR, p. 132

37The emphasis here is important since it calls attention to the basic idea in sense-datum theories to which Sellars objects.

38SPR, p. 140

39ibid.

40SPR, p. 147

41ibid., fn.

42SPR, p. 146

43SPR, p. 147

44SPR, pp. 147, 148

45SPR, p. 153

46SPR, pp. 310-311; my italics on last sentence only.


48SPR, p. 169
49 SPR, p. 309
50 ibid.
51 SPR, p. 310
52 ibid.
53 SPR, p. 314
54 SPR, p. 169
55 SPR, pp. 312, 313; note the structural similarities here to the "Meno Problem".
56 SPR, p. 312
57 SPR, p. 316
58 SM, p. 144; italics in original.
CHAPTER II

Sellars' Kantian Way Out: The Structured Act

A Prologue

"There is," says Sellars

a widespread impression that reflection on how we learn the language in which, in everyday life, we describe the world, leads to the conclusion that the categories of the common sense picture of the world have, so to speak, an unchallengeable authenticity. There are, of course, different conceptions of just what this fundamental categorial framework is. For some, it is sense contents and phenomenal relations between them; for others, physical objects ... But whatever their points of difference, the philosophers I have in mind are united in the conviction that what is called the 'ostensive tie' between our fundamental descriptive vocabulary and the world rules out of court as utterly absurd any notion that there are no such things as this framework talks about.straße

The "ostensive tie" which he mentions is just one more device used by philosophers who, for Sellars, have been taken in by givenness. We have just seen, in a cursory way, how a certain conception of "semantical rules" is typically responsible for this "widespread impression". In his critique of sense-datum theories, he attempts to expose what he takes to be the flaws for which the Myth is responsible. Yet there is, he acknowledges, a genuine problem which sense-datum theories were (unsuccessfully) introduced to solve. Though he rejects the sense-datum solution as such, he nevertheless admits that
a solution somehow remotely analogous to it is necessary. The problem, briefly, is how one is to understand the "similarity" and the differences between experiences such as

(a) seeing that an object over there is red,
(b) its looking to that an object over there is red (when in point of fact it is not red), and
(c) its looking to one as though there were a red object over there, (when in fact there is nothing over there at all).

The similarity, he says, has two parts, (1) the idea that "Something over there is red", and (2) that aspect which others have characterized by the notion of impression or immediate experience. Furthermore, there are, as Sellars sees it, two ways of explaining the similarity: one may claim that in comparatively scrutinizing such situations as (a), (b), and (c) one discovers that they have certain components in common, or one may introduce impressions (immediate experiences) as theoretical entities.

The former alternative Sellars believes involves givenness and dismisses it summarily. The later carries with it the difficulty of explaining how the idea that there are such "theoretical entities" could ever occur to us. Once we have rejected the myth of the Given, we recognize that concept-formation is essentially a public process involving systematic reinforcement. The concept of a sense-impression, however, is that of an inner episode such that each of us has privileged access to his own sense-impressions, yet also such that, in principle, we can know about each other's sense-impressions. How, even if there are such things, could
the concept of something which is, in one sense, "private"
have been introduced into a publicly based conceptual scheme
in a way which avoids the snare of givenness?

It is in order to solve this problem that Sellars begins his discussion of thoughts in EPM. For it is by ar­
iving at a proper understanding of this topic that, acord­
in to Sellars, we will best be able to solve the problems surrounding impressions.

It is in Science and Metaphysics that Sellars pre­
sents his entire philosophy of Mind in complete and (one
wants to say) baroque detail. Hence, what I propose at this
juncture is to summarize quite briefly the view he sketches
in EPM as a kind of sprinkling of the reader in preparation
for his total immersion into the depths of Science and Meta­
physics. Thereafter, we shall be in a position to begin to
decide whether our baptism has made believers of us.

The Nature of Thought:
Classical and Recent Views

Sellars points out the differences between what he
calls "recent empiricism" and the "classical tradition" with
respect to the view of each concerning the status of thoughts.
Recent empiricism, he says, shifts between conceiving thoughts
to be verbal or linguistic episodes on the one hand, and con­
ceiving of them as dispositions on the other. According to
the latter view, not only are certain kinds of verbal behavior
intelligent, many kinds of non-verbal behavior are likewise
intelligent. The dispositional account would also have it that these forms of intelligent behavior are not manifestations of (inner) episodes. Instead, on the dispositional account, the intelligance of intelligent (verbal or non-verbal) behavior is captured by talk of hypothetical and mongrel hypotehtical-categorical facts about such behavior.

In the classical tradition, thoughts were taken to be episodes -- not overt behavior and imagery -- to which overt behavior and imagery owe their meaningfulness by virtue of expressing them. Thoughts are not only introspectively available to the thinker; if he is thinking, he ipso facto knows that he is thinking.

Sellars has two fundamental objections to the recent empiricist view. First, he says, there are obviously many kinds of occasion on which it would be unreasonable to suppose that a person was not thinking, merely because he was not talking at the time. (Consider the "Grand Silence" of monastic life). Nor would it be adequate to suppose that it is simply the occurrence of certain verbal imagery which constitutes disengaged thinking.

Secondly, with regard to the dispositional account, Sellars objects that it is inadequate to account for the fact that some forms of intelligent behavior are non-habitual. The dispositional account is not limited to verbal behavior as being the only sort which may be considered intelligent. Yet, what ever the behavior in question, -- playing a game,
acting a part, painting, -- it does require that all such behavior must be manifestations of dispositions.

Sellars chooses to defend what he calls a "revised classical analysis" of thoughts. What he objects to in the classical analysis is, as we might expect, the idea that thinking is a kind of "immediate experience" such that, if one is thinking, he could not fail to be aware of the fact. On such a view, one would have to say of children that, prior to a certain point in their lives, they never have any thoughts, but at that point begin to think, are ipso facto aware that they are thinking, and, forever after, never think without being aware of the fact -- no matter how "instantaneously" they may be alleged to forget having been aware of this fact.

Part of what is responsible for this aspect of the classical view of thoughts, according to Sellars, is a confusion between the nature of thought and the nature of sensation. But his main objection can be seen when we look at this part of the classical analysis in the light of what is perhaps the most strongly emphasized passage in EPM,

... instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing and cannot account for it. 2

The point, of course, is that this principle applies to the concept of a thought as much as it does to any other concept. On the classical account, we must say that thinking, noticing
that one is thinking, and having the concept of a thought are as inseparable as the Persons of the Holy Trinity and, it might be added, the one doctrine is no less mysterious than the other.

Sellars revised version of the classical analysis can be stated briefly, but without explanation, as follows:

To each of us there belongs a stream of episodes (1) to which (in a sense to be discussed) we have privileged but neither constant nor infallible access, (2) which can occur without being expressed overtly, (3) which may be and often are accompanied by verbal and other imagery, but are no more constituted by such imagery than they are by the overt behavior in which they naturally culminate, and (4) which are (in a sense which needs careful explanation) linguistic episodes.

Baldly stated, Sellars' view is a highly sophisticated version of the ancient notion that thought is "inner speech". But we must be careful, for, as we shall see, Sellarsian "inner speech" is a far subtler matter than we might at first imagine it to be.

I have stressed repeatedly that Sellars' entire strategy in the philosophy of Mind is structurally determined by his rejection of givenness. Since this rejection carries with it a rejection of thoughts as items given to a consciousness innocent of the concept of any such thing, everything concerning the nature of thought hinges, for Sellars, on how
the concept of a thought comes to be constructed. Moreover, since thoughts are inner episodes, as anyone possessing the concept will tell you, they are obviously not the sort of thing which one could observe, whereas, by contrast, we can observe dancing, talking, and jousting. Sellars concludes that they must therefore be theoretical entities. To understand this point and what Sellars believes follows from it is to understand much of the essential in his philosophy of Mind.

The Myth of Our Ryleian Ancestors

How are we to understand the contention that thoughts are "theoretical entities"? What is meant here by theory? Simply stated, Sellars' problem, as he sees it, is to give a plausible account of how the concept of a thought could, with rational warrant, come to be an integral part of a conceptual scheme which was previously altogether lacking in any such concept, and how it could come into the scheme in a way which does not smack of the myth of the Given. It is for this purpose that he invents what he calls "The Myth of Our Ryleian Ancestors".

In creating this piece of "anthropological science fiction", Sellars asks us to imagine a community of human beings existing at a stage in pre-history whose linguistic resources are what he calls "purely Ryleian". Let us refer to such a language by the abbreviation 'RL'. By stipulation,
RL must possess the following characteristics:

1. It makes use of such logical operations as conjunction, disjunction, negation, quantification, and, very importantly, of the subjunctive conditional. Thus, "If it were to rain within two weeks, the corn would not die.", is both well-formed and meaningful in RL. The importance of this stipulation is that the Ryleian ancestor, by means of this resource is able to describe the behavior, including the verbal behavior, of his fellows in hypothetic and mongrel-hypothetical categorical terms. Sofarforth, he is able to describe the behavior of his comrades as being (more or less) rational.

2. The crucially important resources which RL must contain, are the RL-equivalents of 'means' and 'is true'. Thus, the inhabitants of this hypothetical community (which I shall henceforth call Ryleville) must have linguistic resources which enable them to assert the RL-equivalents of

"'Red' means red" and "'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white".

The central problem in the philosophy of mind is commonly known as the problem of "intentionality". Thoughts are the sort of items which, unlike anything which is not a thought, have the intrinsic feature of being about something. Indeed, it has traditionally been insisted that, for something to be a thought and not about anything, is a contradiction in terms. Now compare the following sentences:
(a) My thought that horses are quadrupeds was about horses.
(b) (The sentence) 'Horses are quadrupeds' means that horses are quadrupeds.
(c) Smith was talking about the fact that horses are quadrupeds.

The importance of (a), (b), and (c) above is that they exhibit a seeming closeness between the meaningfulness of sentences and the aboutness of thoughts. Clearly, both thoughts and sentences can be "about" (the characteristics of) horses.

As against the classical tradition, according to which thoughts are the antecedant causes of meaningful speech, and the former, not the latter are about things, one might want to hold that talking as such can be about something in a sense which is just as clear as that in which we think about things. Moreover, one might say, the feature of "being about something" does not belong to overt speech in a merely derivative way, i.e. in the sense that it expresses thoughts (thoughts being in the primary sense "about" things). One might say instead that it is to overt speech that the aboutness feature belongs in the primary sense, and it is the aboutness of thoughts which is derivative.

Roughly, this is what Sellars does. Taking advantage of the (surface?) structural similarities between the language of intentionality (e.g. 'thinks', 'believes', 'remembers', 'imagines', etc.) and semantical language (primarily 'means' and 'is true'), he attempts to show how the former could be construed to be a special case of the latter. To do this he first argues that the intentional feature of overt language
is captured completely in semantical discourse about it, and secondly contends that the concept of a thought is a concept by analogy -- by analogy with overt speech. Let us see how this is supposedly accomplished by speculating about the citizens of Ryleville.

In its early stage, it never occurs to anyone in Ryleville that there are such things as (inner-episodes) thoughts, which is not to say that they do not think (innerlich).

They simply do not know that they think. Their concepts of rationality at this stage pertain solely to overt behavior -- to "thinkings-out-loud".

The next stage in the lingua-cultural history of Ryleville dawns with the appearance of a certain genius whom Sellars calls "Jones". One day, Jones notices a novel occurrence in Ryleville: silent rational behavior, i.e. behavior which normally is accompanied by thinking-out-loud, noticing-out-loud, concluding-out-loud, etc., and which is exactly what it was in all previous cases of rational behavior except it is now silent. Thus, we may imagine Jones to happen upon a certain apple-picker who is the first person to pose the problem for him. All apple-pickers whom Jones or anyone else has ever observed have, while picking and sorting their apples by color into different baskets, accompanied their activity by such monologues as

Lo! This is red. So it belongs in this basket. Thus I shall put it in this basket right now. Lo! This is yellow ..... etc.
Heretofore, Ryleians have always "talked their way through" their rational behavior. (Remote comparison: Consider how a tower operator may "talk" a fog-blind pilot down onto a runway.) Jones' problem, then, is how to reconcile the obvious rationality of the apple-picker's behavior with the fact that he makes not a sound while picking, sorting, etc. To solve his problem, Jones develops a theory to the effect that overt speech, thinking-out-loud, is a process which is the culmination of certain inner episodes. Moreover, he conceives these theoretical entities by reference to a certain model, namely, overt speech. Jones thus concludes that the cause of intelligent behavior is "inner speech".

Two closely related questions: What manner of man is Jones? In what sense of 'theory' does he "construct a theory"?

Sellars' answer to the first question is explicit: Jones is "an unsung forerunner of the movement in psychology, once revolutionary, now commonplace, known as Behaviourism". The sort of "theory" which Jones develops is explained by the following:

... science is continuous with common sense, and the ways in which the scientist seeks to explain empirical phenomena are refinements of the ways in which plain men, however crudely and schematically, have attempted to understand their environment since the dawn of intelligence.

... the second stage in the enrichment of (the) Rylean language is the addition of theoretical discourse. Thus, we may suppose these language-using animals to elaborate, without methodological sophistication, crude sketchy and vague theories to explain why things which are similar in their
observable properties differ in their causal properties, and things which are similar in their causal properties differ in their observable properties.°

Frankly speaking, then, Sellars conceives Jones to be a scientist, or ur-scientist, and his theory that there are (inner) thought episodes is a scientific, or ur-scientific theory.

Some things must be said now concerning how Sellars conceives the nature of theories, in particular, how he conceives the nature of theories in psychology, since this is the sort of theory we are asked to imagine Jones constructing.

Sellars rejects what he calls the "logistic picture" of theory-construction as giving a "highly artificial and unrealistic picture of what scientists have actually done in the process of constructing theories". According to the logistic picture,

... to construct a theory is ... to postulate a domain of entities which behave in certain ways set down by the fundamental principles of the theory, and to correlate -- perhaps in a certain sense to identify -- complexes of these theoretical entities with certain non-theoretical objects or situations which are either matters of observable fact or are, at least in principle, describable in observational terms.°

One is reminded of the "unchallengeable authority" of the "categories of the commonsense picture of the world" attributed to these categories by certain philosophers whom Sellars claims are misled by taking their fundamental descriptive vocabulary to be irrevocably connected with the world by an "ostensive tie". Once more, the myth of the Given. According to Sellars' conception of the nature of
theory-construction, one develops the fundamental assumptions of a theory "by attempting to find a model",

... i.e. to describe a domain of familiar objects behaving in familiar ways such that we can see how the phenomena to be explained would arise if they consisted of this sort of thing. The essential thing about a model is that it is accompanied, so to speak, by a commentary which qualifies or limits -- but not precisely nor in all respects -- the analogy between the familiar objects and the entities which are being introduced by the theory.

What has this to do with Jones? It is unclear what Sellars is doing at this point. Is his argument that, since scientific theorizing is essentially of the model-finding type, (rather than the logistical type) we must imagine Jones to have constructed a theory which was based upon a certain model? Or is his argument that, since a close examination of how scientists past and present (and thus including a host of non-mythical Joneses) have in fact engaged in theory-construction reveals that their theories have been of the model-finding type, scientific theorizing is to be thought of in this way? It would seem that, in a sense, Sellars must be propounding both arguments. Fortunately, we need not settle the issue here.

In accordance with the foregoing requirements, then, we are to conceive of Jones' theory as being akin to what Sellars terms "Methodological Behaviorism" as opposed to "Analytic" or "Philosophical Behaviorism". The latter is behaviorism formulated "in logistical style". The Philosophi-
cal Behaviorist proceeds in accordance with the idea that common sense psychological concepts are analysable into concepts pertaining to overt behavior; that "properly introduced behavioristic concepts must be built by explicit definition ... from a basic vocabulary pertaining to overt behavior".\(^9\) Sellars thinks that the behavioristic program thus conceived is "unduly restrictive". Indeed, were Jones a dyed-in-the-wool Philosophical Behaviorist of this sort, he could not (consistently) construct the sort of theory that Sellars imagines him to construct. The sort of behaviorism that Jones assumes is, as Sellars says, "compatible with the idea that some behavioristic concepts are introduced as theoretical concepts".\(^10\) i.e. concepts not definable in terms of overt behavior.

Jones, then, is a Methodological Behaviorist in this sense. And the model in terms of which he develops his theoretical concepts pertaining to thoughts is overt verbal behavior. Thus his theory is that "overt verbal behavior is the culmination of a process which begins with 'inner speech'".\(^11\)

Built in accordance with such a model, Jones' theoretical "inner episodes" will be describable in terms of the semantical categories which apply primarily to overt speech. But, since the model is only an analogy, they are not to be described in every way appropriate to overt speech. Thoughts are not, for example, the manifestations of the
wagging of a hidden tongue. At this point, the "commentary" which is said to accompany a model, limiting it and qualifying it perspicuously, supposedly saves one from such absurdities. Two more stipulations must be made about Jones' theory.

(A) The theory must have been formulated in a way which was broad enough to allow for diverse forms of interpretation and development. Thus it must be conceived in such a way as to allow for the possibility that certain of Jones' successors might understandably (albeit mistakenly) have supposed the "inner speech-thoughts" of his theory to be the product (or state) of a separate (mental) substance.

(B) Jones' "thoughts" are "theoretical" entities in the simple sense that they are not definable in observational terms. Hence, in speaking of them as inner episodes, neither Jones nor his successors is committed to viewing them as being non-empirical in the sense of "spiritual" or "otherworldly", any more than is a physicist so committed to viewing the status of subatomic particles in classifying them as "theoretical" entities. Though Jones need not introduce them as physiological entities, his theory need not be stated in such a way as to preclude the possibility that thoughts might, at a later stage in the development of the theory, turn out to be, say, brain states.

Two facilitate exposition, two sets of questions may now be posed.
One. If thoughts are entities the concepts of which are constructed in Jones' theory about how silent rational behavior on the part of his fellow Ryleians is possible, how are we to understand the fact that we (the progeny of Ryleians) have "privileged access" to our own thoughts? How does speculating about how a Jonesean theory might have been propounded by and about Ryleians explain the development of privileged access in such a way that we are not once again to be taken in by another form of the myth of the Given?

Two. Assuming that the general program is correct, namely that the intentionality of thoughts is to be construed by analogy with the meaningfulness of overt speech, how much has really been accomplished? Even if semantical categories apply primarily to overt speech, how does this fact weigh against the "immediacy" which some have claimed for the relation between thought and its object? Moreover, if the relation (meaning) which holds between language and the non-linguistic order is of an unmediated and direct nature, and intentionality is construed as being analogous to this feature, how significant is the difference between Sellars' account and the classical one according to which thoughts are "about" their objects in a direct and unmediated way? Must not Sellars be in just as perplexing a situation as a Meinong, struggling to explain how it is that one can think about non-existent golden mountains? It may or may not be the case
that in supposing thought to be a kind of inner speech (a supposition arrived at through theorizing) that we succeed in avoiding givenness. Even granting the success of this move, in what way does it handle the traditional "hard core" problems, for example, non-veridical awareness and false judgement? One may illustrate the way that Sellars answers the first set of questions as follows:

After formulating his theory, Jones begins to teach his compatriots how to interpret each other's behavior in terms of the theory. Thus, Jones teaches Dick that Tom's behaving in a certain way warrants describing him in such theoretical terms as "Tom is thinking that p." So equipped, Dick learns, with continued help from Jones, to describe himself in similar terms based upon observation of his own behavior. Must Dick always look to his own behavior for evidence to correctly describe himself as thinking that-p? No, for

... it now turns out -- need it have?-- that Dick can be trained to give reasonably reliable self-descriptions, using the language of the theory, without having to observe his overt behavior. Jones brings this about, roughly, by applauding utterances by Dick of 'I am thinking that p' when the behavioral evidence strongly supports the theoretical statement 'Dick is thinking that p'; and by frowning on utterances of 'I am thinking that p', when the evidence does not support this theoretical statement. Our ancestors thus begin to speak of the privileged access each of us has to his own thoughts.12

The point demands clarification. Like the apple picker, Dick must be supposed to have learned how to keep (at least some
of) his thoughts to himself. But suppose, further, that this is the only change in his behavior. That is, whereas on all previous occasions of being in such-and-such circumstances, Dick's behavior has included thinking-out-loud that p, Dick somehow gets the trick of remaining silent in such circumstances. The circumstances in question might, for example, be those of turning toward the opening of his cave to face the spectacle of a heavy downpour. Whereas it used always to be the case that Ryleian Dick noticed-out-loud "Lo! It is raining," on such occasions, and, subsequently decided-out-loud, "So I shall build up the fire now.", Dick now on similar occasions says not a word, but otherwise behaves in exactly the same sort of way. Before developing his theory, this was the sort of phenomenon Jones found puzzling, but which, in terms of the theory, he now renders intelligible. Jones then calls Dick's attention to the fact that certain kinds of verbal behavior have disappeared from his habit-patterns, and then explains to him how the theoretical concept of inner speech renders this situation intelligible. At first, Dick picks up the use of theoretical terms in contexts of describing himself and others by their means when his and their overt behavior warrants such description. The next stage in the process is that of training Dick to describe himself in theoretical terms without necessarily having to observe his own behavior. We may imagine this to take place somewhat as follows: When confronted by a downpour, Dick silently scans the scene. Jones, instead
of prodding Dick's (now latent?) tendency to think-out-loud, "Lo! It is raining.", teaches him to respond in the theoretical terms, "I have the thought that it is raining", by asking, "A penny for your thoughts", applauding when he correctly responds in theoretical terms, and frowning when he does not. "What began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role."13

What Sellars thinks he has achieved by means of the Jonesean myth is a reconciliation between the idea that language is "essentially an intersubjective achievement", and the idea that there are inner episodes which are private, though not "absolutely private", since the way in which overt behavior is evidence for their existence is something which is "built into the very logic of" the concepts of such episodes.

We may now proceed with an exploration of Sellars' response to our second question. We have already been given some idea of what Sellars' reply will be like in our consideration of that form of the myth of the Given which has it that the logical basis of learning a language is learning to obey "semantical rules". Supposing that the intentionality of thoughts is a feature analogous to the meaningfulness of a publicly based language, the matter to be discussed at this point clearly is: how to construe the nature of linguistic meaning.

What is it for 'X' to mean Y? Consider:

(a)'Rot', 'rouge', 'rojo', etc. mean red.
One might be tempted to suppose that the way to understand such non-controversial truths as (a) is to construe them as reporting a certain relation as obtaining between certain sorts of linguistic entities (referred to by the terms appearing on the left-hand side of (a)), and the color which a certain class of non-linguistic objects have -- objects such as fire-engines, roses, and flags from the U.S.S.R. Such an analysis seems straightforward enough until we realize that the

'...' means ---

rubric can also be correctly "filled in" in such manners as

'Und' means and
'Helas!' means alas!
'Da' means yes.

Whereas we may have felt comfortable with taking the form of

'...' means ---

to be

(linguistic object) R (non-linguistic object),

in the case of such sentences as (a), our comfort quickly disappears if we try to understand the latter three instantiations of the rubric after the same fashion. Meaning, then, cannot sensibly be taken to be in every case a relation between words on the one hand and non-linguistic entities on the other, according to Sellars. But, if not, what is the nature of linguistic meaning?

Sketchily, Sellars maintains that to say that 'X' means Y is to say that a class of terms in a certain language
functions in a manner parallel to the functioning of the term appearing on the right-hand side of the "means-rubric", provided that the term appearing on the right-hand side belongs to the language in which the entire means-rubric happens to be formulated. Thus, while a speaker of English would find it easy to understand that "'Rot' (in German means red," and a speaker of German could easily cope with someone's saying "'Red' (auf Englisch) meint rot", each might well be left completely in the dark if they were asked to exchange sentences. Likewise, a speaker of English might understand the point of the translation exercise, but would be left just as much in the dark by such a sentence as "'Rot' (in German) has the same meaning as 'rouge' (in French)" if he happens to understand nothing of German or French.

Thus, to say what an expression means is to give its "job classification", or convey information about the role which it plays in the language to which that expression belongs. The form of the means-rubric, then, is

'...'(in L) plays the same role as is played by --- (in our language).

As Sellars says,

The rubric "..." means ---' is a linguistic device for conveying the information that a mentioned word ... plays the same role in a certain linguistic economy ... as does the word ... which is not mentioned but used -- in a unique way; exhibited, so to speak -- and which occurs on the right-hand side of the semantical statement.14

A number of matters can now be put into their proper place rather quickly. We have seen that, for Sellars, the idea
that learning to use the word 'red' involves an antecedent awareness of redness, is the heart of the Myth of the Given, whether one supposes that redness is something in re which presents itself to the "mind's eye", or is something purely mental. Yet he will, of course, not leave out of account the fact that one could not come to use 'red' correctly without having sensations of red, and he also wishes to insist that having a concept of redness -- "knowing what redness is" -- is a necessary condition of seeing that something is red, its seeming to one that something is red, and its seeming to one that there is something (over there) which is red. The crucial matter then becomes "knowing what redness is". For Sellars, this comes down to a matter of knowing the meaning of 'red', and this in turn to a matter of learning to use the word in a manner which conforms to the role it plays (in English).

But what about sensations of red? Doesn't the force of this expression clearly indicate that the quality red is something which is presented to our senses? We have reached the point at which, it was promised, an understanding of the Jonsean theory of thoughts would help us to understand the nature of "sense-impressions".

Analogy, Sellars tells us, plays an essential role in theoretical concept-formation. This would appear to follow from his contention that theory-construction is, where perspicuous, of the model-finding type. The fruit of Jones' theory about "thoughts" is that, being entities which are
conceived by analogy with a certain model (overt speech) the attributes of these theoretical entities will be conceived as being the analogues or counterparts of the attributes possessed by the entities in the model. Hence, the "aboutness" of thoughts is to be understood as being a counterpart of the "aboutness" of overt speech. One important implication of the whole notion of "counterpart attribute" for Sellars is that we must be careful to note that attributes which are the counterparts of each other may be conceptually linked but must never be mistaken for one another. With these points in mind, we may imagine Jones to construct a theory of sense-impressions which is parallel to his theory of thoughts, for common to both is the notion of "inner episode".

Just as, in the pre-Jonesean era, the only concepts current in Ryleville having to do with thinking were those pertaining to overt verbal behavior, we may suppose that, at this same time, their only concepts pertaining to perceptual episodes were those of overt verbal reports having to do with the seeing, hearing, etc. of public objects. Having enriched the conceptual resources of Ryleville with the theoretical concept of thought, and hence with the general concept of inner episode, Jones possesses nearly all the tools he needs to introduce into the conceptual framework one more theoretical concept, that of a sense-impression.

The problem-situation which we may imagine Jones to
encounter at this stage is that of explaining how it could be that there is something common to the situations of

(a) seeing that \( x \), over there, is red and triangular,
(b) its seeming to one that \( x \), over there, is red and triangular,
(c) its seeming to one that there is a red and triangular \( x \) over there.

To solve his problem, Jones formulates a theory to the effect that there are certain inner episodes, viz. states of perceivers which are normally brought about by the impingement on perceivers of objects in standard perceptual circumstances but which may be brought about by other sorts of objects and in different kinds of circumstances as well.

Let us suppose that Jones dubs these inner episodes "sense-impressions". The model on the basis of which Jones may be supposed to conceive of sense impressions is, once more, a domain of public objects. Thus Jones would be supposed to theorize that an impression of a red and triangular object is something analogous to a replica of something red and triangular.

Much more could and will be said on these points later. What has been said so far gives the general idea. The main thing to see in connection with Sellars' Jonesean myth is that, if it accomplishes what Sellars believes it accomplishes, then we can understand how the concepts of thought and sense-impression could have come to be a part of our conceptual scheme in a way which avoids the myth of the Given and which makes sense of the (at first paradoxical) idea
that these concepts are theoretical concepts in one sense, even though, in another sense, the entities which these concepts are concepts of are "private" and "introspectible".

One more important point must be made about the concept of a sense-impression. Jones (who seems to become more and more sophisticated each time we hear of him) has a proper understanding of the "means-rubric" or, perhaps this should be put as the point that he has only one notion of the means-rubric. Thus he, unlike certain of his philosophical progeny, is not tempted to suppose that, to say of one item that it means another, is to be understood as saying that there is a certain relation, namely meaning, which holds between some part of language on the one hand, and certain non-linguistic items on the other. Rather, he understands that it is to say of two linguistic items that they have certain common characteristics, i.e. that they play (more or less) the same role in the languages to which they respectively belong.

In a similar manner, he formulates his theory of sense-impressions in such a way that, in speculating about "an impression of a red rectangle", he is not misled into the notion that 'of' is the name of a certain relation which may be said to hold between a certain inner state, namely being impressed, and certain red rectangle. Being thoroughly conscious as he is of all that is contained in the notion of "inner episode" qua theoretical entity, he understands that,
though the entities of the model may be particulars, the concept of a sense-impression need not be so tied to the entities of the model that sense-impressions themselves must be conceived as either being or involving particulars. As inner episodes, Jones conceives of sense-impressions as being states of perceivers, and therefore that the locution impression of a red rectangle is properly to be understood as having the form impression of the $\emptyset$-sort.

Or, we may even imagine Jones to have invented such a locution as

(an) of-a-red-rectangle impression,

from which we inherited our somewhat misleading expression an impression of a red rectangle.

The same kinds of considerations determined the way that Jones conceived of thoughts. To say of someone that he is thinking about lions is, in Jonesean terms, to say that there is a certain inner episode belonging to him which is "about" something in a way which is analogous to the sense in which a thinking-out-loud means something. The latter comes to the idea that such overt linguistic utterances as "lions are tawny" play a certain role in the language to which they belong. To say what a piece of overt language means is to classify it with respect to the job or function it fulfills in the structure of the language as a whole.

To illuminate this somewhat further, Sellars is fond
of comparing language with certain features of games, such as chess. To say of an object that it is a pawn is not necessarily to specify that it is an object of a certain size, shape, color, or material. We may, for example, (Sellars' example) imagine Texans to invent a game called "Texas chess" in which Volkswagens are pawns, Cadillacs are queens, Rolls-Royces are kings, and counties are squares on the "board". Essentially, to say of an object that it "is a pawn" is to classify it as being subject to certain rules of correctness regarding the configurations it may form in relation to certain other pieces in the game.

Similarly, Sellars claims (and conceives Jones as theorizing) that, to say of a certain overt linguistic episode that it "means" that Two plus Two equals Four is to say that it functions in accordance with certain rules of correctness ("rules of criticism" Sellars calls them) with respect to such configurations and combinations as it may permissibly form with other overt linguistic episodes. Carrying out the analogy with Texas chess, just as one would say of Volkswagens that they "are pawns" (in Texas chess), one could characterize diverse overt linguistic episodes as being "Two plus Two equals Four"s. Thus,

'Two plus Two equals Four's (in English),
'Deux et Deux font Quatre's (in French), and
'Zwei und Zwei gleich Vier's (in German)

are all "Two plus Two equals Four"s.

To emphasize that the item surrounded by the last use of double-quotetion marks (though an English expression
gets at the role played by expressions in any language). Sellars prefers to use a dot-quoting device. Thus, '...'s (in L) are \( \text{"Two plus Two equals Four"} \).

Correspondingly, items appearing within single quotes are thereby designated as belonging to particular languages in the sense that Volkswagens (in Texas Chess) are pawns, tin cans (in Alley Chess) are pawns, etc. involves particular sorts of items playing analogous roles. Thoughts, being the analogues of overt linguistic episodes, are to be understood as being "about", "of", or "that" so-and-so in a sense which is modelled upon the foregoing way of construing the about-ness or meaningfulness of overt speech. Thus, the inner-speech episodes which Jones theoretically attributes to his Ryleian compatriots are understood by him to be

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{\"Two plus Two equals Four\" thoughts}, \\
\text{\"Lions are tawny\" thoughts}, \\
\text{\"It is raining\" thoughts, etc.,}
\end{align*}
\]

thereby indicating, for example, that \( \text{"Two plus Two equals Four"} \) thoughts function within a person's inner-speech economy in a way which is the counterpart of the functioning of overt speech episodes which are \( \text{"Two plus Two equals Four"} \) in the economy of overt speech, and are therefore subject to analogous rules of criticism.

Yet, we may also imagine that, in training his Ryleian compatriots to talk about their own thoughts and those of their fellows, Jones teaches them to use (the RL-equivalents of) such locutions as
I have the thought that Two plus Two equals Four,
I am thinking about the condition of the crops,
I am thinking of the girl next door,
and thereby to have (unwittingly?) prepared the way for
later generations who, being of a more metaphysical bent,
mistakenly suppose that acts of thinking are one thing,
their objects another, and that the two are related asymme-
trically and irreflexively by the aboutness characteristic
of thinking and of all mental acts generally.

It is fairly clear that Sellars holds that such
philosophers as Moore and Russell subscribe to the notion of
the diaphanous mental act as a result of, among other things,
analyzing sentences containing mental verbs in the preceding
way. What, by contrast, are the intellectual acts counte-
nanced by Sellars like? They are as far from being diaphan-
ous as one could imagine. Not only do they differ from one
another intrinsically by virtue of what one might call their
"internal structure", they might, in a Pickwickian sense,
even be said to contain their own "objects". Here is part
of the detail for the broad-brushstroke remarks made earlier
to the effect that Sellars' theory, seen in one light, amounts
to a sort of Idealism. To fill in the detail for the other
set of broad-brushstroke remarks which accompanied those
mentioned on pages 27 and 28 above (namely those concerning
behaviorism) is my next task.

In passing, though, it is worth observing that, in
light of the above, Sellars, like Leibniz, might well be
imagined to add to the classical slogan, "Nihil in intelectu
The ways in which the classical traditions have tended to regard the status of mental acts have been diverse indeed. To remain with the Cartesian and Neo-realist traditions for a moment, we are told by a Descartes or a Moore that the "intentional feature" specific to mental acts and to nothing else bids us see them as being "of" or "about" items in the real order (whether objective reals, formal reals, or reals some of which exist while others merely subsist) where the "of-ness" or "about-ness" is itself alleged to be as real a relation as one could wish for. So understood, mental acts whether as produced by a separate mental substance, or as parts of an epiphenomenal or parallelistic stream of events, were held to be items of a sort very different from those which were spoken of as being their "objects". We are presented, in one way or another, with a picture of a "two-storey world" in these traditions, the "upper rooms" being occupied, so to speak, by the mental, the "downstairs" by the objects of thought.

There is, however, another tradition in the philosophy of Mind which would have it that the world has but one storey, and that our concepts of what is mental and what is not are both to be constructed within the bounds of this one
level. What are the consequences? Somehow, thoughts, rememberings, imaginings, etc. must be understood as being parts of the world's furniture in the same way that trees, chairs, earthquakes, and clouds are parts of this one realm which is the world. Another way of putting this is that the intellect is to be construed as being itself a part of the natural order.

In one way, explicitly insisted upon by Sellars, mental acts have just this status in his overall view. From what has been said so far we can get an idea of how this is the case for him. Being theoretical entities conceived on the model of overt speech, thoughts are taken to be inner episodes analogous in certain important respects to the entities of the model. Moreover, the sense in which the theory requires that we understand them to be "inner" episodes does not require that we think of them as being the productions of a spiritual substance or as being in any way spiritual entities. Indeed, what the theory does demand of us is that we think of them as being states of persons and as indefinable in terms of overt behavior. It is only in this very minimal sense that we are to view mental acts as being "inner" episodes.

We have just seen Sellars' strategy vis-a-vis the idea that mental acts are "about" things in the real order where this is alleged to be a fact having the form

(mental act) R (object)
Being conceived by analogy with overt speech, mental acts are not "intentional" in this sense. This parallels Sellars' insistence that the meaningfulness of overt speech is not constituted by facts having the form

(linguistic item) R (non-linguistic item).

Here is the first of the senses in which Sellars' philosophy of Mind is Behavioristic (or Naturalistic). That is, "inner" in "inner episode" means "inward state (of a person)". The second of the senses in which it is Behavioristic is to be found in confronting the question of what, if not "intentionality", the relation is between mental acts and the rest of the world in Sellars' view. Nearly all philosophers who have taken intentionality to be relational (whether a descriptive relation or not) have taken it to be an unanalysable, non-natural relation. While, in a curious sense, Sellars agrees that it is not analysable and that it is non-natural, we shall see that this is ultimately because he construes intentionality as not being something relational at all -- for the aboutness of thought is something which, for him, is modelled after the meaningfulness of language, and the latter is to be understood in terms of role or function rather than as a dyadic relation.

No philosopher would feel comfortable with the view that the intellect is totally "cut off" from the rest of the world, and Sellars is no exception. One can and must discuss mental acts for Sellars from two distinct, though closely related, points of view from which mental acts are, in his
sense, "intentional". From this point of view, mental acts are said to belong to the "order of Signification", according to which there is an isomorphism between mental acts and what they "signify". These expressions ("order of Signification") are drawn from "Being and being KnowWhat (SPR(2)). It is the term he uses therein for the "pseudorelation" between mental acts and their "objects". Once again, it is a pseudorelation in that it is modelled after the meaningfulness of overt language, which is, as we have observed a number of times, a non-relational matter. In SM, we shall find him using such terms as "standing for" and "intends" in this sense.

From the second point of view, mental acts are items belonging to the "natural order", and are related to non-mental items in the sense of there being an isomorphism between them as one part of the natural order and items in other parts of the natural order which, by impinging upon the intellect, give to it its "second nature". This relationship Sellars calls picturing. At a later stage, we shall discuss picturing at length. Right now, I shall limit myself to simply giving a general idea of what it involves. For this purpose, I shall rely on another of Sellars' illustrations.16

Conceive of a fairly complicated robot, capable of receiving, storing, retrieving, and responding to information it "gathers" from objects and events in its environment. It has photosensors such that, whenever a red object comes within range of them, electronic impulses travel within its circuits to a computer-center which, in turn, activates a print-
out unit which spews forth a slip of paper with some such inscrip-
tion on it as 'Rx. 9, 15.', and also stores information relevant to the "sighting" in its memory-banks. We may im-
age how an electronic engineer would explain the robot's functioning to us. In regard to such things as the inscrip-
tion which appear on slips of paper emanating from an aper-
ture in the machine, the engineer might say to us that

The inscription "R" (as printed out by the robot's mechanism) means red.

If we ask the engineer to explain the how and why of this, he will tell us that basically it comes down to the fact that the robot's wiring diagram and the rest of its mechanism is so structured that, if operating properly, it responds by (among other things) printing out designs of the form 'R', whenever it detects objects which are, as we say, red. Moreover, as such a robot roams about the world, scanning, recording, responding to more and more objects and events, we may say that the fund of information which it stores in its memory-banks becomes an increasingly complete picture of the environment with which it has interacted, where this sense of 'picture' is to be explained in terms of the rela-
tions between the robot's mechanism and its environment. But it must be added that

This picturing cannot be abstracted from the mechanical and electronic processes in which the tape is caught up. The patterns of the tape do not picture the robot's environment merely by virtue of being patterns on the tape. In Wittenstein's phrase, the 'method of projec-
tion' of the 'map' involves the manner in which
the patterns on the tape are added to, scanned, and responded to by the other components of the robot. It is a map only by virtue of the physical habitus of the robot, i.e., by virtue of mechanical and electronic propensities which are rooted, ultimately, in its wiring diagram.\(^1\)

We can appreciate a sense, then, in which one could say that there comes to be an isomorphism between the physical state of the robot and the environment which has come within range of its detection, an isomorphism which holds between two sets of elements, both of which belong to "the natural order". Roughly, this is the sort of thing Sellars means by picturing. The implication it has for human beings, (and hence for the philosophy of Mind) is that, qua belonging to the real (natural) order, the human intellect pictures the world—though in a manner vastly more complex than that of our Simple Simon-ish robot.

Return once again to the engineer's remark that

The pattern 'R' means (signifies) red.

Here, remember, another sort of isomorphism is being elaborated, one between the robot's tape patterns, treated as a language, and our own language. This is an isomorphism belonging to the order of signification. These two isomorphisms, picturing and signifying, while distinct, are nevertheless closely related in that

... our willingness to treat the pattern... as a symbol which translates into our word ('red') rests on the fact that we recognize that there is an isomorphism in the real order between the place of the pattern... in the functioning of the robot and the place of (red objects) in its environment. In this sense we can say that is-
... But what sort of thing is the intellect as belonging to the real order? I submit that as belonging to the real order it is the central nervous system, and that recent cybernetic theory throws light on the way in which cerebral patterns and dispositions picture the world.19

Let us enumerate the behavioristic themes to be found in Sellars' theory which have been covered so far. The meaningfulness of overt speech he analyzes as being the role or function played by the various kinds of overt speech episodes within the language to which they belong.

The aboutness of thoughts he analyzes as being a feature analogous to the meaningfulness of overt speech. That is, whereas signification-statements pertaining to overt language are of the form

"•••'s (in L) are •••••••••'s,

signification statements pertaining to mental acts would be of the form

The kind of inner state which finds its overt expression in an utterance which signifies •••••••••, plays a role in 'inner speech' which is analogous to that played by the design •••••••••• in our language.20

Then, we are told that the intrinsic character of thoughts qua belonging to the real order classifies them as inner states---of the central nervous system.

Finally, it is claimed that what isomorphisms there are in the order of signification depends somehow upon there
being certain kinds of isomorphisms between the kinds of cerebral states which find their overt expression in utterances which signify red and the spatiotemporal location-patterns of red objects in the environment.

What is signified depends on what is pictured. The aboutness of thoughts is a matter of items belonging to the economy of inner speech (cerebral states) playing a role analogous to that played by a certain sort of speech episode in overt language. \(^{21}\) And what ultimately stands behind a claim that a part of overt speech "means red" is the fact that certain cerebral states of the utterers of that word (which are associated with the uttering of it?) are isomorphic with the spatiotemporal location-patterns of red objects in their environment. One recalls that Sellars chose to defend what he called a "revised version of the classical account" of mental acts. It is so "revised" one can hardly help feeling that the patient died under Sellars' scalpel, was buried, and then raised from the dead with an entirely new body. Here is Behaviorism—Materialism—of the completest, most thoroughgoing and sophisticated sort. But the sophistication does not end here. Sellars will claim that what separates him from being a behaviorist of a sort with whom even he disagrees -- the "logical behaviorist" -- is a distinction on which he will insist between language (and hence thought) as conditioned response and language as rule-governed behavior. This is a matter which will naturally occupy a good deal of our attention. But notice that we have
already brought out the fact that Sellars thinks of language qua rule-governed as in some sense presupposing language qua conditioned response. The sense of "presuppose" as used here is strong. So strong that we shall find it something of a struggle to see how what is presupposed can be kept from ultimately absorbing that which presupposes it.

We shall speak more of this later. I have remarked that, seen in one way, Sellars' theory is Idealistic, distantly comparable with that of Leibniz. That is, there is a sense in which both embrace the doctrine that thoughts are states of substances, which stand in no "real" relation (intentionality) to their objects, although the structures of thoughts are "isomorphic to" the structures of their objects. I have also just brought out a number of extremely strong senses in which it is Behavioristic -- where the term applies to thoughts both as belonging to the natural order and as belonging to the order of signification. If we think for a moment, though, we can see how, even qua belonging to the natural order, Sellars' analysis of thoughts is strikingly reminiscent of that of yet another Idealist, David Hume.

Whereas Leibniz construed perception to be a degenerate or limiting case of conception, Hume, topsy-turvy-wise, treated conception to be a variety of perception. Perceptions are of two sorts for Hume: Impressions and Ideas. Every simple idea is derived from and exactly resembles a corresponding Impression. Thus, in an interesting way, Hume's theory
could be taken as a paradigm of one which finds an isomorphism between thought and the world, of which it could be said that the Humean intellect pictures the Humean world. This is reinforced by the fact that, for Hume, all objects are "perceptions", Ideas being different from Impressions solely in terms of their "force and vivacity" -- a matter of degree. Hence the isomorphism between the intellect and the rest of the world as one finds it described by Hume could fairly be said to be an isomorphism in the (Humean) real or natural order. It is thus a "picturing" sort of isomorphism par excellence.

The point of this short exercise in structural history is that Sellars' theory can profitably be understood as being the result of embracing some themes central to the Idealistic theories of Leibniz and Hume, specifically, the structured mental act countenanced by Leibniz and the way in which the intellect pictures the world for Hume. But, just as importantly, Sellars' theory is the result of his rejecting a pattern common to Hume and Leibniz, namely the attempt to assimilate the nature of thought to that of sensation (and vice versa). Sellars sees any attempt to assimilate the nature of the one to the other as leading, finally, to the myth of the Given. Exactly how this is so I shall not take the time to explain now. The two must be seen as being of intrinsically different natures; yet Sellars, like Kant, also realizes that a reconstruction of the everyday world in which we live, move, and have our being requires both sensa-
tion (Sensibility) and thought (Understanding) and thus demands an account of how the two are joined.

This sounds the Kantian theme to which Sellars resounds. All is not in perfect harmony, however, for Sellars finds that even Kant is guilty to some extent of the same original sin which he considers intolerable. While basically in tune, then, the theme requires variation. The result is *Science and Metaphysics*.

**Critical Discussion**

It seems to me that Sellars succeeds in much of his polemic against "the framework of givenness". The idea involved in it, in all the various forms it takes, that we have an awareness of objects as being of this or that kind or sort independently of our having conceptual apparatus appropriate to picking out kinds and sorts, is fundamentally troublesome. It is hard not to agree with Sellars that it leads to explicit contradictions. Whether we should be frightened by such phrases as "The Metaphor of the Mental Eye" is, of course, another question.

At any rate, suppose that the basic feature of givenness just alluded to is to be rejected. What is the result? What alternatives are we forced to choose among after we have rejected this one? Specifically, does rejection of this one idea logically force us to endorse Sellars' account of the nature of thought? Consider the following as possible
alternatives.

(1) Our entire conceptual apparatus belongs to us from birth. It exists embryonically "within" us and is stimulated into growth by the impinge­ment of the world upon us. Thus, our conceptual ability for recognizing red objects as such is awakened in us by our eyes being stimulated by red objects. Similarly, we suppose our concept­ual ability to identify our own thoughts as thoughts was awakened simply by the occurence of our thoughts.

A marvellously fortunate, if not necessarily pre­established, harmony among things. Theories of innate ideas have been severely criticized from so many angles and so thoroughly that there is little point in re-telling the his­torical fate of such theories here. It is worth noting how­ever, that such theories are even today not completely dead. Witness the stir caused lately by Chomsky's Cartesian Lin­guistics. It seems sufficient to comment at this point that, whether the situation ultimately turns out to warrant accept­ance of such an account, consideration of the matter may fairly be shelved at least until some other possibilities have been considered. It certainly does not have the sort of prima facie plausibility which can make us exclaim "Of course!"

(2) Linguistic ability is constitutive of ability for thought. We do not think at all independently of acquiring a language. We learn to think as a function of our learning to speak (write, etc.)

If this alternative carries with it the claim that, other than overt linguistic behavior, it is logically impos­sible that there be such a thing as thinking, we are justified in dismissing it out of hand. It is simply common sense that
we often know that and what we think even when silent, or are the victims of paralysis.

The alternative need not be interpreted thus strongly. It may be taken to assert that, while our ability for thought is the result of learning a language, it is not identical with overt linguistic behavior. We can "hear ourselves think" in that our ability for overt language has resulted in the occurrence of "inner verbal imagery" to which we have privileged access. Yet, even so interpreted, this alternative must be rejected on several grounds. First, there is the fact that many linguistically competent persons simply "find" no such thing as verbal imagery. Secondly, the alternative would force us to the claim that "higher" animals and infants do not think. This may or may not be the case. The alternative makes it inconceivable. Thirdly, there is the fact that one may be thinking intensely and brilliantly about matters which are highly abstract (in mathematics for example) but be, up to a certain point, unable to verbalize what it is that one is thinking about, let alone verbally image it. Finally, there are even more familiar examples, such as mentally solving problems while in dreamless sleep. Surely it would be overly dogmatic to say in any of these cases that no thinking occurred simply because either the overt language, the verbal imagery, or both, were lacking.

(3) We do think about things prior to acquiring a language. Indeed, unless we did, we could not
learn anything at all. But, until we become linguistically competent, we do not recognize, we are not aware of the fact that we think. Once we have acquired competence at communicating with our linguistic peers, we learn to be aware of the fact that we have all along been thinking about things.

Though this alternative may seem to be the one for which Sellars opts, it is consistent with far more than he is willing to grant. Specifically, it is consistent with an account of thoughts according to which it is thoughts that are, in a primary sense, "about" things, and language is "about" something only in the derivative sense that it is the expression of thought. As we have seen, Sellars would reverse this order, have intentionality belong primordially to language and to thought only in an analogical sense. Which way this order goes forms the brunt of the controversy between Sellars and Roderick Chisholm in a correspondence which took place between them shortly after the publication of EPM. It will serve our purposes at a later point to review the substance of that correspondence.

A further set of critical remarks must be formulated at this point. They have to do, first, with the significance of "The Myth of our Ryleian Ancestors", secondly, with Sellars' treatment of the "'...' means ---" rubric.

At one point, Sellars describes his story of Jones and the Ryleians as being "a myth in the platonic sense", at another he muses that it is reminiscent of "contract theories in political philosophy". Typically, contract theories
make no pretense to being history. But at the end of EPM, Sellars becomes rather frank about what he really takes the significance of his myth to be.

I have used a myth to kill a myth— the Myth of the Given. But is my myth really a myth? Or does the reader not recognize Jones as Man himself in the middle of his journey from the grunts and groans of the cave to the subtle and polydimensional discourse of the drawing room, the laboratory, and the study, the language of Henry and William James, of Einstein and of the philosophers who, in their efforts to break out of discourse to an arché beyond all discourse, have provided the most curious dimension of all.\textsuperscript{22}

Clearly, Sellars considers his myth to be something more than heuristically valuable fiction; he seems to think of it as being a way of understanding what the facts of anthropological history must have been like, even if the similarity be quite remote. The pattern of argument standing behind his creation of the myth is perhaps something like, "Since we know on independent grounds that nothing, including thoughts, is given, we know that the classical account of the nature of thoughts is mistaken. But though the classical account has misconstrued the concept of thought, it could not have done so unless the concept of a thought were part of our conceptual scheme to begin with and were sufficiently vague as to allow for the possibility that it could be misconstrued in the manner which is characteristic of the classical account. Hence it is necessary to construct a way of understanding how such a concept could have become a part of our conceptual scheme, but not \textit{via} givenness".
However indirectly, then, Sellars would seem to be committed to the idea that the human race, at one point in its history, had to have been both fairly sophisticated in the art of communication, and totally Ryleian. This point would correspond to the pre-Jonesean era of the myth.

To be significant for an understanding of the concept of a thought (as it exists in "our conceptual scheme"), we cannot forever avoid the necessity of de-mythologizing our ancestors. Though the story of Jones may be a myth, the story of which we are presently a part is obviously not. However uncomfortable it may be, taking the Jonesean myth seriously seems to force us to become more than fanciers of anthropological science fiction, it requires us to speculate about anthropological history as such. Yet must we go very far back into history in order to serve our purpose in understanding how the concept of a thought comes to be acquired? Need we even move from the present? Today's child should be just as fruitful a subject for study on this point as the cave-dweller of pre-history for, prior to a certain point in his life, the child is just as innocent of the concept of a thought as are Ryleians of the pre-Jonesean era. And since we have exposed givenness for the sham that it is, we may rest assured that no child, even today, acquires his concepts of thought in so strange a manner. Rather than armchair anthropologists, why not become sober experimental psychologists instead? For there is a clear sense in which each of us is
his own Ryleian ancestor. (One might say, with apologies to Wordsworth, that the Ryleian child is father to the Strawsonian man). Yet even if one would rather not be so direct about the matter, it would seem that the point is bound to come at which we must ask, in relation to the Jonesean myth, whether ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. It would seem that it must, and so we shall be squarely faced with a number of questions belonging to psychology.

But perhaps this is not quite how matters stand. One might instead take Sellars' myth-making as not just a cover for armchair anthropologizing. Some of Sellars' own remarks to the contrary notwithstanding, the Jonesean story could be regarded as sheer myth in one sense, as not in any way requiring the supposition that there ever was a time in history at which all men were Ryleian. On this alternative, however, the myth must still be taken to have some sort of cash-value -- that being, perhaps, its power for clarifying the learning situation of today's child, and thus suggestive of hypotheses to be tested. But the result is substantially the same. We are led through a process which, at its dialectical inception is philosophical argument against givenness, but at its terminus is a demand for constructing and testing certain hypotheses in psychology.

One feels that something has gone very wrong. Philosophically, we have agreed to reject givenness, and so, any philosophy of Mind which has this feature is to be rejected also. For Sellars, this has the result that children must
acquire their concepts of what thoughts are by first learning the ropes of overt language, and then learning to respond in the theoretical vocabulary of "thought" instead of always just thinking-out-loud. It seems to me that what is required for an adequate philosophical account would be an analysis which (a) succeeds in avoiding givenness, and, in the wake of this rejection, (b) renders the concept of a thought coherent with the rest of common sense, where "common sense" is here meant to include all of science as well as the more "familiar" parts of common sense. At this point, we would do well to recall that, for Sellars, common sense does not include science, the latter is "continuous with" common sense. Science is a "refinement" upon the ways in which "plain men" have sought to explain their environment from the crudest beginnings of intelligence. That is, he thinks of science as replacing common sense.

From the fact that thoughts are not given entities, Sellars concludes that they are theoretical entities, the sense of 'theory' here being that the concept of a thought is arrived at through scientific or quasi-scientific reasoning. And as a concept of theoretical science, it is one which is subject to "refinement", change. Put linguistically, terms like "thinks", "remembers", "imagines", and "believes" can have their meanings altered and emended as the sciences, specifically, neurophysiology and psychology progress.

In one way, this is a perfectly non-controversial idea. Of course science broadens and betters our understand-
ing of the world and the human community. It is the methodology of science to "define" common sense mentalistic concepts in terms of (a combination of) overt behavior, neurophysiological facts, etc. Thus defined, it is possible to design experiments and possibly discover laws which connect intellect, will, etc. (so defined) with the "non-mental" world. To say this is one thing. It is quite another matter to suppose that, outside the context of co-ordinating definitions in scientific theory, common-sense mentalistic terminology has no meaning of its own. It seems to me a hopeless matter to be asked to choose between saying that it is scientific terminology which is meaningful and common-sense terminology meaningless, or vice versa. Philosophically, it would be incoherent to exclude one in favor of the other. It must be taken as basic to the very nature of the philosophical enterprise that the meaningfulness of both scientific and "more commonsensical" terminology is not open to question. Sellars considers it necessary to a philosophical account of the nature of thought that we face the issue of how such terms as 'thought' can come to be about something. It is no wonder that his account of this matter is scientific in tone. It is only in a scientific spirit that one can properly take the coming-to-be of the relation between language and what language is about to be a genuine problem in the first place. That the relationship exists is a ground-rule for philosophers, not a matter for further investigation.
This brings us to a consideration of the "meaning of meaning" in Sellars' view. It is his conception of linguistic meaning which is Sellars' most basic tool in analysing the intentionality of thought. In large measure, it also makes it possible for him to think of the meaningfulness of common sense terminology as being subject to change by dint of refinement in scientific theory.

Once more, Sellars sees the essence of meaningfulness as being captured in the rubric

'...' means ...'.

Sellars takes it that this is a sense of 'meaning' in which every part of speech -- from "red", "square", "cold" and "between", to "Yes", "not","every", and "Hurrah!" -- is meaningful. I shall take it for granted that there is an intelligible sense of "meaning" so generic that it applies indifferently to all parts of speech and every size of linguistic unit. It would be fruitless to quibble over the point, for, even if there had been no such sense of the term, someone would have found it necessary to have invented it.

What this sense of the term unpacks into is the idea that a term's meaning is its role, function, or use. The "logical place" of an expression within a linguistic system is its meaning. To give all the rules for the correct employment of a term is to give its meaning, just as to say of a certain item that it is subject to such-and-such rules is to say that it is a pawn. In this sense of the term, it would
be quite intelligible to say of a string of symbols in an uninterpreted calculus that it was "meaningful", provided only that the calculus be governed by rules of formation and transformation.

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein remarks that the language we speak "is not a calculus". Whatever else Wittgenstein wishes to make of this claim, it seems to me that, understood in one way, it is uncontroversially true. The implication which I would take it to have is that language as used is meaningful, not merely because the elements making it up function with respect to each other in accordance with (more or less) specifiable rules of syntax, but also because it logically must have an extra-linguistic base. It does not seem to me (pace Sellars) that this carries with it the additional implication that the logical basis of the learning of a language are rules such as

Red objects are to be designated by the term 'red'.

This would indeed be a form of the myth of the Given. On the other hand, it seems quite innocuous, even a truism, that rules such as the above are the logical basis for the use of (the descriptive parts of) language. And we need not take this to imply that we are always "checking with the rules" when we use descriptive terms referentially. Unless the use of descriptive terms has some such logical basis, it is a completely unintelligible fact that we use color-words, for example, to report differences and similarities in the colors
of objects. Sellars thinks that this is a fact which is to be explained by the hypothesis that these are certain theoretical entities, namely sense-impressions, inner states of persons which are somehow linked with propensities for various sorts of linguistic behavior. Nous n'avons pas besoin de cette hypothèse. Something like it may very well be needed in a psychological account of the color-word learning process, though this, too, may be a matter for some (scientific) debate. At any rate, it is irrelevant and out of place in a philosophical account, for philosophical purposes, the commonsensical way in which color- and other descriptive words in use-contexts refer to objects as being of this or that kind is perfectly straightforward, and in need of no further analysis. The rest is science.

At this point, Sellars will no doubt object that I have violated my previous agreement that the myth of the Given is to be banished. In particular, I expect that he would reproach me for having just proffered what he considers one of the main forms of the Myth, namely, the "Matrimonial theory of Meaning", according to which there is a "tete-a-tete relation between a word and a universal such that the meaning of primitive or undefined descriptive predicates consists in the fact of their being associated with (married to) classes of objects".\(^{24}\)

If the "Matrimonial theorist" with whom Sellars disagrees is claiming that language qua sheer marks or noises is
systematically connected, by some mysterious arrangement with classes of objects, then Sellars is certainly right to dismiss his case as absurd. But this case is not the one which I am presenting. Notice, first, that I am not claiming that being "associated" with a universal is what constitutes the logical basis for learning a language. This would mean that learning a language is essentially a process of hanging labels on "seen" abstract entities -- givenness and psychologism at their worst. This amounts to an attempt, from a philosophical direction, to give an account of a matter (how we learn language) which is properly a matter for scientific investigation. The philosophical direction from which this misguided attempt comes might be termed "mentalistic". We have already seen, to some extent, how one may attempt to give another account of the matter, equally misguided because also from a philosophical direction -- one which might be termed "materialistic".

Nor am I, in claiming that such rules as the above constitute the logical basis for the use of descriptive terms thereby also maintaining that, in this context, we "see" or are "acquainted with" universals or any sort of abstract entity. This would simply let the Given in via the back door. What we see is always an "ordinary object", (or array of same) such as a chair, tree, person, microbe, or star. It seems to me that all my "logical-basis-of-language" claim might commit me to is the idea that assessment of the
referential use-context of descriptive terms will lead one to the position that there are certain entities, namely universals, which are not commonsensical entities, and which need not be conceived as "standing alone" like The Cheese, but, perhaps, as existing in rebus. A defense of this commitment is a task for another occasion, however.

Secondly, the class of marks of which 'red' is one member does not by itself have some sort of special relationship to the class of red objects. But neither are descriptive terms meaningful solely on the basis of their being subject to syntactical rules. In this sense, it is not words which mean, but people who, by means of words, mean.

To this claim much commentary must be added. Again, the referential use of descriptive terms is not something which is an expression of a pure, pristine, or "diaphanous" awareness of an abstract entity, be it in re or in mente. I should rather say that the referential use of descriptive language is grounded in the fact that the awareness of which it is the expression is conceptually or propositionally structured, though this structure is not that of which one is aware. It is that by means of which one is aware of things. Like Sellars, I am convinced that, without a conceptual scheme, no such thing as "classificatory consciousness" is even remotely possible. Or, as Kant put it, "Objects without concepts are blind. Concepts without objects are empty".

Unlike Sellars, I do not consider investigation or speculation in the matter of how concepts are acquired to be philo-
An extremely complicated issue which is raised by embracing such a position has to do with the status of the "objects" of which one is aware by means of such a conceptually rich consciousness. Are there as many systems of objects as there are conceptual schemes? Is there only one world-order, a realm which, following Kant, we must say exists an sich, but is not directly accessible to us; that the objects of which we are aware are therefore "phenomenal"? Sellars has his own opinions on these matters, many of them quite similar to Kant's, others remarkably different. Naturally, I must say what my own are as well. The most appropriate occasion for this task will be during and after our consideration of Science and Metaphysics, which is just around the corner.

Our present ambience is well-suited to a review, promised earlier, of the central topics of discussion to be found in the Chisholm-Sellars correspondence. To this we now turn.

The Correspondence Between Sellars and Roderick Chisholm

EPM was originally delivered as a series of lectures at the University of London in 1956 under the title "The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." Shortly thereafter, it was the basis of a philosophical correspondence between Sellars and Chisholm.
The correspondence was published under the title "Intentionality and the Mental", and appears in volume II of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science.25

Chisholm begins the correspondence by posing two exploratory questions: "(1) Can we explicate the intentional character of believing and other psychological attitudes by reference to certain features of language? Or, (2) must we explicate the intentional characteristics of language by reference to believing and to other psychological attitudes?" Chisholm answers (1) in the negative, and (2) in the affirmative. Sellars replies with a summary of his own views which he hopes both clarifies those set forth in EPM and exhibits the extent to which they are in agreement with Chisholm's views. It will be useful to quote the summary in its entirety here.

A-1. Unlike Ryle, I believe that meaningful statements are the expressions of inner episodes, namely thoughts, which are not to be construed as mongrel categorical-hypothetical facts pertaining to overt behavior.
A-2. I speak of thoughts instead of beliefs because I construe believing that p as the disposition to have thoughts that p...
A-3. Thoughts episodes are essentially characterized by the categories of intentionality.
A-4. Thought episodes ... are not speech episodes. They are expressed by speech episodes.
A-5. In one sense of 'because', statements are meaningful utterances because they express thoughts...
A-6. Althought statements mean states of affairs because they express thoughts which are about states of affairs, this because is not the because of analysis ... physical objects move because the subatomic particles which make them up move; yet obviously the idea that physical objects move is not to be analysed in terms of the idea that subatomic particles move.
A-7. Thoughts, of course, are not theoretical entities. We have direct (non-inferential) knowledge, on occasion, of what we are thinking...
A-8. Yet if thoughts are not theoretical entities, it is because they are more than merely theoretical entities.
A-9. ...I picture the framework of thoughts as one which was developed 'once upon a time' as a theory to make intelligible the fact that silent behavior could be as effective as behavior which was (as we should say) thought through out loud step by step.
A-10. But though we initially use the framework merely as a theory, we came to be able to describe ourselves as having such and such thoughts without having to infer that we had them from the evidence of our overt, publicly accessible behavior.
A-11. The model for the theory is overt speech. Thoughts are construed as 'inner speech' -- i.e. as episodes which are (roughly) as like overt speech as something which is not overt speech can be.
A-12. The argument presumes that the metalinguistic vocabulary in which we talk about linguistic episodes can be analysed in terms which do not presuppose the framework of mental acts; in particular that 
'...\' means p
is not to be analysed as
'...\' expresses t and t is about p
where t is a thought.
A-13. For my claim is that the categories of intentionality are noting more nor less than the metalinguistic categories in terms of which we talk epistemically about overt speech as they appear in the framework of thoughts construed on the model of overt speech.
A-14. ... the role of 
'...' means ---
can be accounted for without analysing this form in terms of mental acts.26

Chisholm finds that he can agree with A-1 -- A-5, A-7 and A-8. He disagrees with A-6 and A-9 -- A-14 on the grounds that they depend on A-12, the latter being the main source of disagreement. Chisholm maintains that, in order to substantiate A-12, it will be necessary to show that the
metalanguage contains only locutions which are "not inten­
tional" and which can be "defined in physicalistic terms". 
Such an effort is doomed to failure, according to Chisholm; 
we must, he says, introduce into the metalanguage some prim-
itive term which, however remotely, makes reference to 
thoughts, and which is not required in either "physics or 
behavioristics".

Sellars agrees with the latter point, but his can­
didate for the mentalinguistic primitive term requisite to 
the analysis of "the kind of meaning that is involved in nat­
ural language" is none other than 'means' (or 'designates').
He claims that the latter cannot be constructed from the re­
sources of behavioristics or physics any more than can 'ought'.
Yet Sellars, as we have seen elsewhere, also insists that 
'means' is neither a descriptive relation-word nor a logical 
term. Chisholm agrees that the needed metalinguistic primi­
tive would not stand for a descriptive relation, but reminds 
Sellars of the fact that Brentano said essentially the same 
thing about the intentional feature of thoughts.

To decide whether it is A-12 or its converse that is 
true we must decide where this "funny characteristic" of 
aboutness belongs -- to living things or to marks and noises. 
Stated this way, Chisholm thinks it is obvious that it must 
be the living things to which the characteristic belongs, for, 
just as the moon sends light to us because of its relation to 
the sun and would not do so if the sun did not exist, so marks
and noises are meaningful because of their relation to living things and would cease to be so if the living things did not exist. But, if the moon did not exist, the sun could shine all the same; and, likewise, if living things had no language, they could still think about things, though "not nearly so well, of course".

Sellars objects to Chisholm's dichotomy (living things vs. marks and noises) as being a false one.

... while these 'sign-design' characteristics of marks and noises make it possible for them to function as expressions in a language, they do not constitute this functioning. Marks and noises are, in a primary sense, linguistic expressions only as 'nonparrotingly' produced by a language-using animal.

Secondly, he objects to Chisholm's claim that the 'means' of '...' means --- must stand for a characteristic, even if a "funny" one. If it did, we would have to conclude that, there is something, namely means, since,

'Bedeutet' means means is true. But, on this pattern, one would have to conclude that there is some sort of entity answering to every part of speech -- even 'or' and 'yes'. Sellars agrees with Chisholm that marks and noises are meaningful only in virtue of being "living" verbal episodes which are the direct expression of thought -- that overt language is meaningful because it is the expression of thought. But rather than the because of "analysis" (which Sellars interprets Chisholm as using in the
latter claim), Sellars thinks that this *because* has the sense which belongs to its occurrence in the language of *theoretical explanation* (See A-6 above). Sellars argues (via the Ryleian myth) that it is in principle possible that a people might have concepts and principles relating to the meaningfulness of language but be ignorant of the fact that they think. He also argues that they could consider verbal episodes to be the expression of their thoughts in much the same sense that a pre-molecular theory chemist might have an extremely thorough grasp of the principles of the molar behavior of gases as what it is *because* (n.b., the sense of 'because': theoretical explanation) of the motions of the populations of molecules which make up gases. And, in much the same manner that molecular theory explains the molar behavior of gases, so a Jonesean theory explains the meaningfulness of overt speech as being the expression of inner episodes --- thoughts.

Crucial in Sellars' argument is his contention that the pre-Jonesean era in Ryleville could have witnessed the employment of semantical discourse while still remaining untouched by the idea that overt verbal behavior is the culmination of inner episodes. To grant that Ryleians could get this far, Sellars thinks, it to grant everything necessary to the development of Jones' theory.

Chisholm responds by focusing on some points having to do with Sellars' use of 'analysis' and 'explanation'. Consider, he says
(B-1) The meaning of thoughts is to be analysed in terms of the meaning of language and not conversely.

(B-2) Language is meaningful because it is the expression of thoughts -- of thoughts which are about something.

(B-3) The people in your fable "come to make use of semantical discourse while remaining untouched by the idea that overt verbal behavior is the culmination of inner episodes, let alone that it is the expression of thoughts".28

Chisholm says that he had originally considered (B-1) and (B-2) to be inconsistent, whereas Sellars it would seem, affirms both and takes (B-3) to imply (B-1). Chisholm, however, accepts (B-3) and denies (B-1). The difficulty, he suggests, may spring from the fact that (B-1) contains the term 'analysis' and asks what a reformulated version of (B-1) would come to. As a further point of disagreement, Chisholm notes that Sellars' reliance on what he takes to be the unique status of the rubric '...' means --- (expressed in his insistence that it is distinct both from descriptive and prescriptive modes of discourse) is suspect.

Now it is important to Sellars that such sentences as

'Hund' means dog in German.

are not to be considered descriptive truths, formulating information about the way that German-speaking people use 'Hund'. This would imply that semantical discourse is constructible from the resources of behavioristics. On the
other hand, as Chisholm points out, they do not seem to em-
body prescriptive language since such sentences as the above,
unlike

Do not cross the street.
I advise you to stay home.

are true (or false).

Chisholm declares that he is weary of harangues hav-
ing to do with whether some piece of language is or is not
descriptive. The only sense clear to Chisholm in which lan-
guage is not descriptive is that in which one would say that
it is neither true nor false.

But since

'Hund' means dog in German.
certainly is true, it is on this ground descriptive discourse.

Sellars agrees that such terms as 'analysis' are
"dangerous unless carefully watched". But he objects that he
has not really asserted the equivalent of (B-1). The closest
he thinks he has come to asserting such a proposition is in
(A-13). "... the categories of intentionality are nothing
more nor less than the metalinguistic categories in terms of
which we talk epistemically about overt speech as they appear
in the framework of thoughts construed on the model of overt
speech.\(^{29}\) Sellars says he does not wish to define the about-
ness of thought in terms of language, but is claiming that
this feature of thoughts is to be "explained or understood
by reference to the categories of semantical discourse about
language". Hence, only if 'analysis' were "stretched to the
breaking-point" would Sellars accept (B-1). Yet he is willing to accept a "first cousin" of (B-1). It is only if the 'because' in (B-2) is the 'because' of theoretical explanation that he will accept it. He takes Chisholm to interpret it as the 'because' of analysis.

Then he reminds Chisholm of the latter's willingness to accept A-1 -- A-14 completely if only Sellars could persuade him of A-12. Chisholm accepts (B-3). Sellars then asks him "But doesn't (B-3) entail A-12"?

(B-3) amounts to an admission on Chisholm's part that something like Sellars' Ryleian fable is in principle possible. (A-12), however, makes reference to the possibility of analysing metalinguistic discourse in terms which exclude reference to mental acts. Chisholm says that, since (A-12) contains the technical term 'analysis', the question, "Doesn't (B-3) entail (A-12)?" needs reformulation. Chisholm says he would not have taken (B-3) to imply (A-12) and hence that he and Sellars are "using 'analysis' in different ways".

After this, Sellars explains how he was using the term 'analysis' in (A-12): "... to say that X is to be analysed in terms of Y entails that it would be incorrect to say of anyone that he had the concept of X but lacked the concept of Y". So understood, in (A-12), Sellars is denying that "the fact that a person lacked the concept of a statement's expressing the thought that p would be a conclusive reason against supposing him to have the concept of a statement's
meaning that p". Accordingly, he reformulates (B-3) as follows,

(B-3.1) It is conceivable that people might have made semantical statements about one another's overt verbal behavior before they arrived at the idea that there are such things as thoughts of which overt verbal behavior is the expression.

Chisholm concedes that, so paraphrased, and given Sellars' account of 'analysis: (B-3) does entail (A-12). He does not express complete willingness to go along with this account of analysis, but neither does he undertake to debate the issue. He concludes the correspondence (not all of which has been covered here) with two remarks. Since I consider them to be important, I shall present them in a more expanded fashion than does Chisholm.

One can concede that something like (B-3.1) might describe part of the social history of the concept of a thought; that is, one can grant that people might have come to be able to describe each other's verbal behavior in semantical terms without its occurring to them that such behavior is the expression of thought. We can concede that the concept of a thought came into their worldview as part of a theory designed to explain silent rationality. But where would this take one? On Sellars' grounds, this is to admit that "x means p" is not to be analysed as "x expresses the thought that p" since (B-3.1) entails that one could have the concept of the former but not necessarily the latter. This means that Sellars so uses 'analysis' that fitting candidates
for substitution-instances of "to be an X is to be a Y", (where X is the analysandum and Y the analysans) are such propositions as

To be a bachelor is to be an unmarried male.

To be an earring is to be a piece of jewelry worn in the ear.

To be a satellite is to orbit around a larger astronomical body.

If these propositions show what 'analysis' covers, then Sellars is victorious in this part of the argument. But is he? Aren't the following propositions also "truths of analysis"?

To be a cube is to have six sides.

For a watch to be running accurately is for it to stand in certain relations to the movements of the earth with respect to the sun and the "fixed" stars.

The point to be made in connection with the latter is that people might have referred to things as 'cubes' long before they thought of anything as having six sides. People might have had sophisticated standards about the performance of watches without connecting these with the movement of the earth, and, to add another example, might have spoken of the moon's shining and of the sun's shining without realizing that the moon's shining is a matter of its reflecting the sun's rays. Does it follow from this that the Moon doesn't really owe its luminosity to that of the sun? That to be a cube is not really to have six sides? On Sellars' grounds it must. Yet it seems evident that people can have certain con-
cepts while lacking those which are their correct analysantes. Perhaps it is only in view of this that we should be willing to accept Sellars' fable as a possibility. It is in this spirit that Chisholm accepts (B-3). And, so understood, A-12 does not follow from it.

The other remark is little more than a corollary to the one just made. It would be very strange to suppose that, prior to his developing an analysis of numbers in terms of the logic of classes, Russell did not understand what it was for twice two to be equal to four. By Sellars' definition of 'analysis' it would seem that we are forced to agree with such embarrassing ideas as this one. Or must we deny that Russell's definition of 'cardinal number' is an analysis? Perhaps it would be far less troublesome to insist that, while the meaningfulness of overt speech is to be analysed in terms of its being the expression of thought, the sense of 'analysis' used here is not Sellars', but one according to which one might have the concept of X and lack the concept of Y, even though Y is the correct analysis of X. To say this is not, of course, to say that none of our concepts are related in a manner which is captured by Sellars' definition of 'analysis'.

In some places, Sellars seems to have a notion which is similar to the sort of "analysis" which has just been described. With respect to such sentences as

'Hund' means dog in German.
Chisholm says his "natural temptation" would be to say that their "business is to tell us that German-speaking people use the word 'Hund' to express their thoughts about dogs". Sellars agrees that the sentence does tell us this, that there is a "very intimate relation between 'Hund' means dog in German" and "German-speaking people use the word 'Hund' to express their thoughts about dogs". There is, he thinks, a "legitimate sense" in which

\[ x \text{ makes meaningful assertions} \]

logically implies

\[ x \text{ has thoughts.} \]

Yet, clearly this is not the same as the relation mentioned in his account of 'analysis' earlier --the one which holds between being a bachelor and being an unmarried male. Otherwise, the Ryleian myth could not even get off the ground. He thinks that there is a sense in which

\[ x \text{ is a piece of water} \]

logically implies

\[ x \text{ consists of molecules of } H_2O. \]

provided that the former sentence appears in the framework of molecular-theory chemistry, whereas, when used in contexts prior to the development of this theory, the implication did not hold, and, one might add, could not even have been formulated. It is in this sense that Sellars is willing to say that "x makes meaningful assertions" logically implies "x has thoughts", i.e. within the context of a developed theory--
relating to thoughts, whereas, prior to its development, the implication would not hold.

But is this "logical implication" the same sort of affair as the "analysis" which Chisholm has in mind? It seems doubtful. Chisholm appears to maintain that, even if the concept of a thought was originally introduced as part of a theory to explain silent rationality, it is not because the concept belongs to a theory (modeled on overt speech) that "x makes meaningful assertions" logically implies "x has thoughts". Chisholm seems to regard the connection between the latter as being, so to speak, theory-independent; as being true independently of how the facts of anthropological history stand concerning the development of the concept. These differences in their notions of analysis and logical implication reveal a more fundamental difference between Sellars and Chisholm, a difference in their concepts of truth. This suggestion is borne out by examination of Sellars' views expressed in other pieces he has written, e.g. "Truth and Correspondence" and Science and Metaphysics. Roughly, the idea is that, for Sellars, there is no such thing as a proposition's being true -- "contingently" or "logically" -- simpliciter; rather, a proposition is said to be true ("semantically assertible") relative to a conceptual scheme. At this point it would be premature to delve into the details of this matter. All I have sought to accomplish in the last few paragraphs is to bring out a feature which is basically
responsible for a profound disagreement between Sellars and Chisholm.

A final matter. In maintaining that such sentences as

'Hund' means dog in German.

are true and therefore can reasonably be said to be descriptive in nature, Chisholm attempted to blunt Sellars' strategy in using 'means' as his metalinguistic primitive term. Chisholm's argument was that so-called semantical statements really just describe the linguistic behavior of the users of the terms to which semantical categories are applied. Hence semantical categories could not be "intentional" in a primitive sense.

We are now in a position to round off discussion of the third alternative which avoids givenness (presented on page 100 above). Sellars' reply is that sentences of the form

S (in L) means p

"as used by one of Jones' contemporaries imply but do not assert certain Ryleian facts about the place of S in the behavioral economy of the users of L.

They imply these facts in that "S (in L) means p" said by x would not be true unless the sentence named by 'S' plays the same Rylean role in the behavior of those who use L, as the sentence abbreviated by 'p' plays in the behavior of the speaker. They do not assert Rylean facts, for "S means p" is not (re-)constructible out of Rylean resources. The Rylean facts which, in this sense, 'underlie' semantical statements about the expressions of a language ... are (roughly) correlations between (a) environmental situation and verbal behavior, (b) verbal behavior and other verbal behavior, and (c) verbal behavior and non-verbal behavior.
And when semantical discourse about overt speech is taken as the model for the inner episodes which Jones postulates ... it is these correlations --- more accurately, these correlations as they would be if all such behavior were thought through out loud --- which are the effective model for the roles played by these inner episodes. It is these roles --- though not, of course, the framework of intentionality which conveys them --- which today we (reasonably) expect to interpret in terms of neuro-physiological connections, as we have succeeded in interpreting the 'atoms', 'molecules', etc. of early chemical theory.30

When I have said that semantical statements convey descriptive information but do not assert it, I have not meant to imply that semantical statements only convey and do not assert. They make semantical assertions. Nor is 'convey', as I have used it, a synonym for 'evince' or 'express' as emotivists have used this term...31

...as philosophers have used the term ('descriptive') today, it means little that is definite apart from the logician's contrast of "descriptive expression" with "logical expression"... and the moral philosopher's contrast of "descriptive" with "prescriptive". According to both these uses, "S means p" would be a descriptive statement.

It is, then, the ordinary force of "describe"... on which I have wished to draw when I have said that 'Hund' means dog in German" is not a descriptive assertion. I have wished to say that there is an important sense in which this statement does not describe the role of 'Hund' in the German language though it implies such a description.32

There are a number of matters attending to this part of Sellars' argument which require discussion. Consider

(D) S (in L) means p.
(E) 'S' plays the same Ryleian role in the behavior of those who use L as 'p' plays in the behavior of the speaker.

Sellars says that

1. (D) implies (E), but
2. (D) does not assert (E), because
3. (D) is not (re-)constructible in terms of (E).
There is a sense in which "x is a bachelor" does not assert "x is an unmarried male", however strongly it may imply or convey the latter. But because "is a bachelor" and "is an unmarried male" are predicate expressions which can be substituted for one another in all sentential contexts salva veritate, and because whatever is described by the one is described by the other, we could reasonably say that "unmarried male" reconstructs "bachelor". Sellars says this pattern does not apply to (D) and (E).

Now why isn't meaning re-constructible in terms of playing identical roles in a behavioral economy? In the correspondence with Chisholm, Sellars gives no recognizable answer to the question, and one feels puzzled as to why Chisholm does not try to make anything of it. It would simply beg the question to say that meaning is not so reconstructible because our requisite metalinguistic primitive term must not be capable of being constructed from behavioristic resources. Chisholm could cheerfully agree with (3) on the grounds that (D) is instead to be analysed as

\[(F) \ S \ (\text{in } L) \ \text{expresses } t \ \text{and } t \ \text{is about } p.\]

Sellars says that (D) implies (E) because (D) would not be true unless (E) were true. This makes (E) a necessary condition for (D). Isn't it also a sufficient condition? If so, then, (D) and (E) would be equivalent assertions, and there would not seem to be anything left on which (3) could stand. Is playing identical roles in a behavioral economy sufficient
for the synonymy of two expressions? Sellars cannot answer in the negative on such a ground as (F). If he answers in the affirmative, he is in the company of the Logical Behaviorist, and thus vulnerable to attack from one such as Chisholm who will argue that "aboutness" and "intentionality" do not appear in behavioristics, are unessential to it, and therefore, (F) cries out for adoption as the analysis of (D). To avoid both alternatives, Sellars must maintain that something is expressed in semantical assertions which cannot in principle be captured by descriptions of the role played by expressions in the behavioral economy of users of language. In this regard, we find Sellars saying

...if the charge that our conception of language as a game is "overly syntactical" because it neglects the 'semantical dimension of meaning' can be overcome by a proper analysis of the nature and function of the rubric, '...means---, there remains the more penetrating accusation of the pragmatist. He argues that to conceive of a language as a game in which linguistic counters are manipulated according to a certain syntax is to run the danger of overlooking an essential feature of languages—that they enable language users to find their way around in the world.

Now I would urge that Pragmatism, with its stress on language (or the conceptual) as an instrument, has hold of a most important insight—however, which the pragmatist has tended to misconceive as an analysis of 'means' and 'is true'. For it is a category mistake . . . to offer a definition of 'S means p' or 'S is true' in terms of the role of S as an instrument in problem-solving behavior. On the other hand, if the pragmatist's claim is reformulated as the thesis that the language we use has a much more intimate connection with conduct that we have yet suggested, and that this connection is intrinsic to its language, rather than a 'use' to which it 'happens' to be put, then Pragmatism assumes its proper stature as a revolutionary step in Western Philosophy.
We may attempt to explain this by the following.

Sellars takes such sentences as

'Hund' means dog in German.

to be among what he calls metalinguistic rules, analogous in
important respects to the rules of a game. Thus, for example,

Cadillacs are queens in Texas Chess.

Knowing the meaning of a word is something analogous to understanding what it is for such-and-such an item to be a certain piece in a game. Hence, understanding the meaning of a word involves behaving in obedience to the rules of a language.

... in an object game played as rule-obeying behavior, not only do the moves exemplify positions specified by the rules of the game (for this is true of mere pattern governed behavior where even though a rule exists the playing organism has not learned to play it) but also the rules themselves are engaged in the genesis of the moves. The moves occur... because of the rules.34

... typically a rule sentence enjoins that such and such be done in such and such circumstances. (Of course, not all sentences in a rule language do this; 'one may do A in C' is also a sentence in the language of rules.) Thus rules contain words for mentioning circumstances and enjoining actions. In the latter respect, they contain action words ('hit', 'put', 'run') in such contexts as '...!' or '...ought to'35

... syntactical relations do not give a complete interchangeability to... 'x is a bishop' and 'x is a (bishop)-shaped piece of wood', for the former has a syntax in chess language which the latter does not -- a syntax by which it is related to action-enjoining contexts, and hence... to such normative words as 'ought', 'permitted', 'may', etc....36

What lies in the background of Sellars' position that (D) implies (E) but does not assert (E) (because (E) is not suffi-
cient for (D) and therefore cannot reconstruct it) can now be put in a relatively clear way. Suppose that Jones, Smith, Robinson, et. al., when sitting together over chess boards, always move the bishop-shaped pieces of wood on the board in manner \( \emptyset \). We could say that

Bishop-shaped pieces of wood play a certain role in the chess-behavior of Jones, Smith, Robinson, et. al.

Now consider the rule-sentence

In chess, bishop-shaped pieces of wood are bishops, and the bishop is to be moved in manner \( \emptyset \).

The latter implies that, usually, chess-players do in fact move the bishop in manner \( \emptyset \) (along diagonals), where this is to be nothing more nor less than a description of the behavior of these persons in this type of situation. Indeed, the bishop-rule would be groundless unless chess-players normally did move their bishops in manner \( \emptyset \). But that chess players do behave in this manner does not by itself tell us that they do so behave because of the bishop-rule. Truthfully put, rules have normative force, descriptive generalizations do not. Monkeys could, by some selective process of reward and punishment, be trained to manipulate bishop-shaped pieces of wood on checkered boards in manner \( \emptyset \). Yet it would not be correct to say that they had learned to play —any part of— chess, even if, by a still more complicated process, they could be trained to manipulate all the pieces on a board in a way which was the behavioral duplicate of a game between two chess masters. The behavior of these simians could be said
to follow a certain pattern, but not therefore to be rule-governed behavior, even though this exact same pattern occurred in the game between the two chess masters.

The analogy for the use of language — playing the language-game — is instructive. We might train a parrot to say "Rover is a dog" as well as "Rover ist ein Hund", and to respond with the former when someone utters "What is Rover?" and with the latter whenever "Was ist Rover?" is uttered. The parrot, of course, does not behave in this way because it understands that 'Hund' (in German) means dog. But a person fluent in English and German (often) does so because of this "semantical rule" (One is reminded at this point of Kant's distinction between actions which are done in accordance with duty and actions done from duty).

While descriptions of linguistic behavioral uniformities inform us of what is the case, the relevant semantical rules promote this behavior by telling language-users what sort of linguistic behavior is permissible, obligatory, or demanded in such and such circumstances. Thus, an instance of (D) might be

In German, one ought to use 'Hund' in the same manner as we use 'dog'.

Whereas the corresponding (E)-sentence would be

'Hund' plays the same Ryleian role in the linguistic behavior of Germans as is played in our linguistic behavior by 'dog'.

Sellars thinks that, while semantical metalanguage presumes certain behavioral uniformities, what they assert cannot
be captured by descriptions of those uniformites. The irreducibility of the former to the latter is parallel to the alleged irreducibility of 'ought' to 'is'. Hence, (for Sellars) the "primitive" status of 'means' and the possibility of conceiving the intentionality of thought by analogy with the meaningfulness of language. Recall also that the behavioral uniformities (Ryleian facts) which semantical rules imply or convey are, specifically, "correlations between (a) environmental situations and verbal behavior, (b) verbal behavior and other verbal behavior, and (c) verbal behavior and other (non-verbal) behavior". These "correlations" more fully present what was spoken of earlier as being an isomorphism in the natural order between intellect and object, viz. picturing. It is also to be remembered that this isomorphism in the natural order is the ground, in some sense, of what isomorphisms there are in the order of signification. What we have just explored regarding the way in which semantical rules imply but do not assert Ryleian facts ((a), (b), and (c)-type correlations) is a more expanded and specific discussion of the idea that what is signified depends on what is pictured.

Now let us provisionally grant Sellars the point that semantical categories are not reducible even in principle to descriptions of behavior patterns. What will he have gained? He gains the point that "'...' means ---" is the metalinguistic primitive which is fundamental to intentionality only if we also grant everything which he claims goes a-
long with his conception of analysis. If X is not to be ana­
lysed in terms of Y, then X is primitive with respect to Y
and it would be correct to say of someone that, while he had
the concept of X, he might lack the concept of Y. The raison
d'etre of the Ryleian myth is to show that people might have
had concepts and principles relating to the meaningfulness
of overt speech while remaining untouched by the idea that
there are thoughts (about x) which overt speech expresses.
The meaningfulness of overt language cannot be reconstructed
from resources which merely describe linguistic behavior.
Therefore, the meaningfulness of overt language is primitive
with respect to the aboutness of thought.

So the argument goes. What is still open to dis­
pute, however, is Sellars' conception of analysis, and there­
fore also the entire argument which the Ryleian myth was de­
vised to support. We have already seen some difficulties
with this conception of analysis which were presented by
Chisholm. Now suppose that Chisholm's (rather than Sellars')
conception of analysis is taken seriously. We can still
grant that the history of the human race's conceptual scheme
could have proceeded in a fashion analogous to that of "our
Ryleian ancestors". We can still grant that the "normativity"
of semantical discourse cannot be captured by descriptions
of linguistics behavior. But, we could also say that the
former point granted is consistent with the Chisholmian sense
of 'analysis' -- according to which "S(in L) means p" is to
be analysed in terms of "S expresses t and t is about p".
Moreover, one could say that the ground of the normative character of semantical discourse is to be found in the fact that this (Chisholm's way) is the way that the analysis is to be conceived and, therefore, it is ultimately the fact that the intentionality of thought is primitive which is responsible for the irreducibility of semantical discourse to "behiorese". If Chisholm is aware of these possibilities, he barely hints at the fact when he says

If the people of your myth were to give just a little bit of thought to the semantical statements they make, wouldn't they see that these semantical statements entail statements about the thoughts of the people whose language is being discussed?37

One suspects, however, that the difference between Chisholm and Sellars over the nature of analysis is symptomatic of underlying differences so deep that they involve their conceptions of the very nature of the philosophical enterprise.

It will be recalled that the purpose of what has been done so far is that of portraying a background against which the theory as presented in Science and Metaphysics can be more readily understood. The occasion for the latter attempt is now at hand.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1SPR, p. 173
2SPR, p. 176
3Sellars' stipulation. Vide: SPR, p. 178
4SPR, p. 4
5SPR, p. 182, 183
6SPR, p. 183
7SPR, p. 181
8SPR, p. 182
9SPR, p. 184
10SPR, p. 185
11SPR, p. 186
12SPR, p. 189
13ibid.
14SPR, p. 163
15SM, p. 69
16df. "Being and Being Known", SPR (2), pp. 41-59, passim.
17SPR, p. 53
18SPR, p. 57
19SPR, p. 59
20Vide: SPR, p. 57, fn.
21ibid.
22SPR, p. 196

24 SPR, p. 314

25 op. cit.

26 MS II, pp. 521, 522

27 MS II, p. 525

28 MS II, p. 529

29 MS II, p. 530, No italics in original

30 MS II, p. 530

31 MS II, p. 531

32 MS II, p. 532

33 SPR, pp. 339-340

34 SPR, 341

35 SPR, 342

36 SPR, 344

37 MS II, p. 537. My italics on 'entail'.
CHAPTER III

Science and Metaphysics:
Variations on Kantian Themes

Sellars says that SM is "in a sense a sequel to (his) essay on 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'". In a larger sense, though it is the result of his attempt to present "in systematic form the views (he has) developed and modified in paper after paper over the past twenty years". Not everything contained in SM will be considered here. As always, my prime interest is in Sellars' philosophy of Mind. Nevertheless, it will be necessary at least to summarize and explain to some extent some matters which are more or less relevant to my main concerns.

The book is divided into seven chapters, the last of which deals with ethical theory. While chapter seven is structurally continuous with the rest, it will occupy none of my attention here. The first two chapters contain a good deal of exegesis of Kant's views as found in A Critique of Pure Reason. This approach is used by Sellars as a foundation on which to build discussion of his own views. With the Kant exegesis I shall not be much concerned. But, for reasons relating to continuity and clarity of exposition, it will be necessary at least to mention some of the most im-
portant comments Sellars makes about Kant.

I. Sensibility and Understanding

We have seen in the preceding chapters how the dialectics of givenness lead Sellars to deny both the sense-datum theorist's thesis that to have a sensation entails having some factual knowledge (however dim or minimal) as well as the classical view of the nature of thought, according to which to think is ipso facto to realize that and what one is thinking. It is therefore hardly surprising that Sellars turns out to be a keen student of a philosopher who at least proclaims to drive an immovable wedge between "Sensibility" and "Understanding". However, Sellars is disturbed by the fact that, while Kant considers them radically different in role, he (Kant) nevertheless considers both Sensibility and Understanding to be "in a broad and ill-defined sense, faculties of representation". Whereas Kant characterizes Sensibility and intuition as being essentially receptive in nature, and Understanding as spontaneous (in production of concepts), Kant "allows for 'intuitions' which belong to the 'intellect' (and hence spontaneity) rather than to sensibility (and hence receptivity), though he emphasizes that 'intellectual intuitions' are not enjoyed by human minds..."

...Kant clearly commits himself to the view that some representations of individuals are intuitions and yet involve a 'synthesis' which if not a function of the understanding in its role of subsuming
representations under general concepts, is certainly no matter of sheer receptivity, but rather of that interesting meeting-ground of receptivity with spontaneity which is the 'productive imagination'.

(This leads) to a distinction between intuitions which do and intuitions which do not involve something over and above sheer receptivity. It is the former, Kant tells us,...(A78; B104) which the understanding subsumes under general concepts. 4

Such intuitions must have a form illustrated by

this-cube

"which, though not a judgement, is obviously related to the judgement

This is a cube" 5

What Sellars finds implausible is the idea that general concepts, specifically those pertaining to Space and Time are "genetically posterior" to such representations as

this-line
this-surface
this-cube
etc.

The hyphenated phrase 'this-cube'

expresses a representing of something as a cube in a way which is conceptually prior to cube as a general or universal representation...in a way which is conceptually prior to predication or judgement. 6

From these observations, Sellars formulates a thesis that

...Kant's use of the term 'intuition' in connection with human knowledge, blurs the distinction between a special subclass of conceptual representations of individuals which, though in some sense a function of receptivity, belong to a framework which is in no sense prior to but essentially includes general concepts, and a radically different kind of representation of an individual which belongs to sheer receptivity and is in no sense conceptual. 7
Thus Kant uses the term 'intuition' "ambiguously" according to Sellars, when he applies it to both those representations which "are formed by the synthesizing activity of the productive imagination and the purely passive representations of receptivity".  

The purely passive representations Kant calls "impressions" and says that they are not "of" anything complex. That is, receptivity "provides us with a manifold of representations but not with a representation of a manifold (as a manifold)". Given this, however, Sellars thinks that Kant's idea of Space as the form of outer sense is "incoherent".

Space can scarcely be the form of the representations of outer sense; and if it is not the form of its representeds, i.e. if nothing represented by outer sense is a spatial complex, the idea that space is the form of outer sense threatens to disappear.

Sellars' way out of the difficulty is to maintain that...the distinctions...between the impressions of sheer receptivity and the intuitions of the productive imagination must be paralleled by a corresponding distinction between two radically different senses of spatial terms, in one of which we can speak of impressions as having a spatial form, while in the other we can speak of the objects of intuition as having a spatial form.

Sellars thinks that, to preserve what is right-minded in Kant, we must say that those "intuitions" which are representations of a manifold as a manifold constitute a special class of representations of the understanding. They belong, as such, to spontaneity. Their 'receptivity' is a matter of the understanding having to cope with a manifold
of representations characterized by 'receptivity'
in a more radical sense, as providing the 'brute
fact' or constraining element in perceptual ex-
perience.\textsuperscript{11}

Sellars proposes that we call these purely passive represen-
tations "sense impressions" and urges that it be realized
that it is by "postulation" on general epistemological
grounds rather then discovery through careful attention that
we assert the existence of sense impressions.

Under Sellars' guidance, we have moved by subtle
degrees from exegetical remarks on Kant to exposition of
Sellars' own views. Section II -- VI of Chapter One consist
of discussion by Sellars of his own ideas concerning sense
impressions, their nature, and the reasonableness of "pos-
tulating" their existence. The term just double-quoted may
well make one suspect (rightly) that talk of "theoretical
entities" is once more in the offering.

There are three themes, Sellars says, in the "clas-
sical treatment of sense impressions", viz.

(a) Impressions of a red rectangle are states of
consciousness.
(b) Impressions of a red rectangle are brought
about in normal circumstances by physical objects
which are red and rectangular on the facing side.
(c) Impressions of a red rectangle represent, in
a sense to be analysed, red and rectangular physi-
cal objects.\textsuperscript{12}

Sellars is willing to accept (a) as long as it is not under-
stood as saying either that sense impressions are objects of
consciousness or that they are conceptual states of con-
sciousness. Like Leibniz, he finds "nothing absurd in the
idea that states of consciousness are not apperceived. He also accepts (b) and (c) with appropriate qualifications. These we need not discuss.

Why is it "reasonable to postulate" their existence? What sort of move does "postulation" amount to? As if in anticipation of such questions, Sellars writes the following plea:

There are, of course, many who would say that it is the business of science to introduce hypothetical entities, and therefore not the business of philosophers to do so. The pragmatically useful division of labour, reflected in the proliferation of academic departments and disciplines, has been responsible for many necessary evils, but none more pernicious than this one. Philosophy may be the chaste muse of clarity, but it is also the mother of hypotheses. Clarity is not to be confused with insight. It is the latter which is the true final cause of philosophy, and the insight which philosophy seeks and which always eludes its grasp is total insight. If the maxim hypotheses non fingo had captured classical and medieval philosophy, there would have been an abundance of clarity but no science, and, in particular, no theoretical science as we know it today.

As should be evident by now, I am among those (chaste ones?) who object on metaphilosophical grounds to the introduction of "hypotheses" in philosophical contexts. But I will refrain from stirring up this controversy for the moment.

Sellars notes that classical philosophers have tended to treat sense impressions as being conceptual episodes, however thin, which somehow invariably accompany richer conceptual episodes. He considers this idea "odd", but also thinks it important to realize that verbal reports, in certain perceptual circumstances, tend to become "minimal", as
for example in the report

(I grant that) it looks to me as if there were a red and rectangular physical object over there.

Sellars thinks it a mistake to suppose that even the most "conceptually rich" perceptual reports are invariably accompanied by "unverbalized minimal conceptual representations". But, he says, "the idea that visual perception always involves sense impressions properly described by a special use of a minimal physical vocabulary does seem to me eminently capable of defence, once the confusion of sense impressions with minimal conceptual representations which do occur in extremely guarded perception has been overcome".\(^{15}\)

What requires the hypothesis of sense impressions? Could we not say that "receptivity" consists in nothing more than physical capacities and processes which in turn culminate in conceptual states of consciousness? The sense impression inference amounts to supposing it necessary that there be a tertium quid, "neither physical nor conceptual".\(^{16}\)

What does this inference explain? Not qualitative or existential perceptual errors. Not "discrimination behavior". It is

an attempt to account for the fact that normal perceivers have conceptual representations of a red and rectangular physical object both (a) when they are being affected in normal circumstances by a red and rectangular physical object, and (b) when they are being affected in abnormal circumstances by objects which have other but systematically related characteristics.\(^{17}\)

It is important to notice the occurrence of the word 'both' in the preceding quote. We can and must ask, concerning
standard as well as abnormal conceptual representations, "What is the ground of their possibility"?

The answer would seem to require that all the possible ways in which conceptual representations of color and shape can resemble and differ correspond to ways in which their immediate non-conceptual occasions, which surely must be construed as states of perceivers, can resemble and differ.

Thus, these non-conceptual states must have characteristics which, without being colours, are sufficiently analogous to colour to enable these states to play this guiding role.18

It will be remembered that, for Sellars, it is analogy which plays the key role in the business of theoretical concept-formation. Now since the sense-impression inference is a move into the language of theory, this naturally suggests that "the analogy between the attributes of impressions and the perceptible attributes of physical objects is but another case of the role of analogy in theoretical concept-formation".19 Hence the use of the terms 'red' and 'rectangle' in

an impression of a red rectangle

is to be understood as being derivative from the use of these terms in the corresponding context

a physical object, the facing side of which is a red rectangle

such that a perspicuous, if clumsy, rendering of impression-talk would take such a form as

(an) of-a-red-rectangle impression.

What holds for the attributes of sense impressions holds for the "relations" in which they stand to one another.
Thus, there being an impression of a green square adjoining a red square no more involves the idea that two items in the realm of impressions literally adjoin one another than it requires that an impression be literally red. Accordingly, we could make use of "relational" sortal predicates as applying to impressions in a way which would make this idea stand out, e.g.

a green-square-adjoining-a-red-square impression.

Having such an impression entails having an impression of a green square and an impression of a red square, but not that these impressions literally adjoin one another. Yet it does entail that the relation in which they do stand is the "counterpart" of adjoining. "Succinctly put, impressions have attributes and stand in relations which are the counterparts of the attributes of physical objects and events."20

This is Sellars' way of putting into (what he thinks is) perspicuous form the Kantian idea that receptivity provides a manifold of impressions but not a representation of a manifold. Put in another way, the idea would be that "an impression of a complex is a complex of impressions".21

Sellars concludes Chapter One with these observations.

With respect to the manifold of outer sense, Kant does not seem to have found the happy medium between saying that Space is a form of outer sense in that the manifold of outer sense is literally spatial, and the overly strong claim that the only way in which spatial relations enter into perceptual states is as contents of conceptual representations...

If, per impossible, Kant had developed the idea of the manifold of sense as characterized
by analogical counterparts of the perceptible qualities and relations of physical things and events he could have given an explicit account of the ability of the impressions of receptivity to guide minds, endowed with the conceptual framework he takes us to have, to form the conceptual representations we do of individual physical objects and events in Space and Time.22

II. Appearances and Things In Themselves: Material Things.

Probably with himself in mind, Sellars says that contemporary philosophers who have been "influenced by formal semantics" draw certain distinctions in the philosophy of mind which are more or less the counterparts of those drawn by DesCartes. They are, for DesCartes, between

(a) a representation qua act, i.e. qua representing, or operation of the Mind.
(b) The character by virtue of which it represents what it represents.
(c) Where appropriate, the substance or modification of which the representing, qua representing what it represents, is true.

Following closely on the heels of these is a distinction between "two ways in which things or substances and their modifications can exist".

(a) They can exist 'in' mental acts of representing -- i.e. they can be, in DesCartes' phrase, the 'objective reality of an idea' by which, he tells us, he understands 'the entity or being of the thing represented by the idea insofar as the entity is in the idea'.
(b) They can ... exist simpliciter. In DesCartes' terminology, 'the same things are said to be formally in the object of the ideas when they are in them such as they are conceived'.23

The first set of distinctions is related to the second in that
(1) For a thing or modification to exist 'in' a mental act is for the latter to represent it.
(2) A mental act representing a modification is true of a substance which exists simpliciter if and only if the modification exists simpliciter as a modification of the substance.24

"Ideas", then, in the sense of "entity capable of existing 'in' a representing", are capable of two relations: being 'in' a mental act, and being true of things and their modifications which exist simpliciter. This generates two puzzles:

(a) With respect to the 'in' relation, somehow one and the same idea can be 'in' many acts
(b) With respect to the 'truth' relation, one and the same general idea can be 'true of' many things.

Now mental acts themselves are, for Descartes, intrinsically all alike, apart from the various ideas they "contain". Representings as such are not characterized by any particular form. This notion, Sellars says, confronts the Cartesian tradition with the problems, discussed in the previous chapter, of "whether a complex representing is complex qua act, or qua representing a complex, where 'representing a complex' is construed as a matter of 'containing a complex idea'.25

Sellars next applies these Cartesian distinctions to a Kantian framework. As contrasted with existing as represented ('in' a representing), there is existing simpliciter: This is the root notion of 'existing in itself'. What Kant adds to the latter is "a theme of unknowability", but which he takes to be compatible with the transcendental knowledge that there is an in-itself and that it "accounts for the
existence and character of experience". Sellars reminds us at this point of the result of the preceding chapter, viz. that "Kant's argument requires a distinction between conceptual representings (of which intuition is a special case) and non-conceptual representings. This calls for a corresponding distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual contents."\(^27\)

What is the nature of Kantian "physical appearance"? It is "an individual" which exists primarily as represented, secondarily as representable, but cannot exist simpliciter. Sellars notes that the usual account of the nature of Kantian appearance lays heavy emphasis on the fact that Kant thought it a necessary truth that, if there are appearances, then there are things-in-themselves. What is usually overlooked is that this point is not just the superficial one that 'appearance' implies 'something appears'. Sellars takes Kant's underlying and more interesting argument to be that, "if there are representeds, there must be representings,"\(^28\) is an analytic truth. But he also notes that this does not by itself establish everything Kant wanted. Specifically, it does not establish that there are an sich non-representings, nor that what exists an sich is unknowable, nor that "represented individuals can only be "appearances of" rather than identical with items which exist in themselves".\(^29\)

Did Kant maintain that what we know is appearance
or that we know things in themselves as they appear to us? Sellars thinks that Kant opts "on the whole" for the former alternative. Kant was willing to accept the idea that the in-itself might have features somehow analogous to those of appearance, but considered the idea "empty". Spatio-temporal schematization is endemic to the mind's conceptualizing. Space and Time are transcendentally ideal. Hence, "anything we determinately conceive of in spatial or temporal terms must be transcendentally ideal". What, by contrast, would a "Transcendental Realist" say? He "interprets the obtainability of intuitions of spatial structures as grounded in the an sich existence of such structures". Kant would agree that this obtainability is "grounded in the in-itself". What he would deny is that being so grounded requires that the in-itself be the "spatiotemporal structure we conceptually represent". But Sellars does not think that this denial need be interpreted so strongly as to take Kant to be maintaining that the in-itself is "in no sense akin to the spatio-temporal structures". Not only is the alternative of maintaining that the structure of the in-itself is analogous to that of the spatiotemporal world open to Kant, Sellars thinks that Kant can even be read as (implicitly) opting for it. Yet even if this much could be ascribed to Kant, it would have to be added that, for Kant, any analogy in structure between appearance and the in-itself could only be "cashed" by God.

This brings us to the most important part of Chapter
Two and, in a sense, of the entire book. It is at this point that Sellars chooses to delineate his general thesis. Thereby, he hopes to clarify in a preliminary fashion at least the extent to which he agrees and the extent to which he differs with Kant.

The thesis I wish to defend, but not ascribe to Kant, though it is very much a 'phenomenalism' in the Kantian (rather than Berkeleyan) sense, is that although the world we conceptually represent exists only in actual and obtainable representings of it, from a transcendental point of view, not only that existence-in-itself accounts for this obtainability by virtue of having a certain analogy with the world we represent but also that in principle we rather than God alone can provide the cash. For, as I see it, the use of analogy in theoretical science, unlike that in theology, generates new determinate concepts. It does not merely indirectly specify certain unknown attributes by an 'analogy of proportion'. One might put this by saying that the conceptual structures of theoretical science give us new ways of schematizing categories.33

If ... we replace the static conception of Divine Truth with a Peircean conception of truth as the 'ideal outcome of scientific inquiry', the gulf between appearances and things-in-themselves, though a genuine one, can in principle be bridged.34

This is our overture. It contains both theme and variations. The remainder of Chapter Two is primarily occupied by a discussion of Kant's arguments for the transcendental ideality, rather than reality, of Space. As usual, Sellars' treatment of this matter is at once sympathetic and critical. As such, however, it is not directly relevant to the business with which we must get on, though some mention of Sellars' views on this head will come out eventually. The position we now occupy is most convenient for making the tran-
sition to consideration of the problem of intentionality sub specie Science and Metaphysics.

III. The Conceptual and the Real: Intentionality

Two or more thinkers may think the same thought. Two or more things may have exactly the same characteristic. These sentences express two of the most familiar parts of common sense, and, as such, are in no way controversial. That they are also grist for the philosopher's mill is another matter. To question whether or not they are true is not his business; his task is essentially that of "unpacking" them, or expanding upon them in such a way as to give as adequate an account as possible of how they fit together with the rest of all commonsensical truths (and falsehoods) and, of course, with each other. Those who are of a more or less Platonistic bent make this attempt by appeal to such categories as 'universal', 'proposition', 'fact', etc. The Platonist's working companions are often Cartesians of one stripe or another. According to the latter, the intersubjectivity of thought is a fact which can only be understood by appeal to such notions as 'private mental episode', 'mental activity', and, to a category dear to himself and the Platonist, "direct" (or "immediate") awareness.

The Nominalist and the Behaviorist, also frequent working companions, typically eschew all appeal to such categories. To whom is Sellars a companion worker? At first,
it seems difficult to say. Looking at the surface, one sometimes feels that he is in the company of a Platonist and/or a Cartesian. But, with a reasonable amount of attention, this impression soon fades. The same impression rises and fades in reading many of Sellars' works, but nowhere does this happen in a more striking way than in Science and Metaphysics.

Arising from the discussion contained in the first two chapters were some contrasts between

(a) representings
(b) contents of representings, i.e. that which exists 'in' representings as so existing
(c) that which exists simpliciter as so existing.

Prior to Kant, the kinds of contents which were said to be capable of existence 'in' intellectual acts were all general contents, e.g. triangular, wise, cube, red, etc. Kant's contribution to this setting was twofold. Arising from the need for a meeting-place between Sensibility and Understanding were those special intuitions of the productive imagination which, without being judgements, were conceptual representations of individuals. Accordingly, Kant saw the need for individual contents, e.g. an intuitive representing of this-cube, or Socrates. Secondly, and even more important, Kant saw that judgemental contents were not reducible to non-judgemental contents. Hence, "pride of place" had to be given to such contents as This cube is made of wood and All bodies are heavy. Sellars wishes to extend the list of permissible kinds of contents to include logical contents (not,
all, some, necessary). His reasons for this desire will be explained soon.

What sorts of an sich existents correspond to general contents, e.g. the content triangular? To answer this question, we must first consider how intersubjectivity of thought is possible. Sellars' answer to this question seems Platonistic, initially. One and the same content can be 'in' many representings. But if intersubjectivity of thought demands this sort of answer, does not an account of how thought can be objective require a similar one? That is, besides being "sharable" by many minds, it would seem that one and the same content must be capable of being true of many an sich existents. Hence, why not Platonism for things as well as for thoughts? Then, the an sich existent corresponding to the content triangular would be triangularity. Indeed, could we not go even farther along these lines and proclaim that it is one and the same entity which is 'in' things as modification and 'in' representings as content? Sobriety seems to prevent us from going so far. Clearly, the sense in which a thing is triangular is different from the sense in which triangularity can be 'in' our thoughts. But, assuming that the former idea is clear, what of the latter? What is it for a content to exist 'in' a representing if it does not suggest the absurdity of triangular thoughts? One possibility would be to change the 'in'-metaphor to 'of' and that representings are 'of' their contents, rather than that their contents are
'in' them. Suppose we take this alternative. From what we have learned in the chapters preceding this one, it now comes as no surprise to learn that Sellars does not construe representings per se (as opposed to the contents 'of' which they are representings) as being "diaphanous" acts, a la G.E. Moore. Instead, he claims that they differ intrinsically in systematic accordance with the differences among their contents. Hence, just as in the previous case with sense impressions, we are again led to the notion of counterpart attribute. That is,

... corresponding to triangularity as an attribute of things there is an attribute of mental acts which is such that mental acts which have it stand in the 'of' relation to triangularity, and, hence, are representings of triangular things.35

Let "Øf" be the predicate of mental acts which corresponds to "f" as a predicate of material things. We then obtain the schema

\[ \text{Øf-ness} \rightarrow \text{counterpart of} \rightarrow \text{f-ness} \]
\[ \downarrow \text{Øf acts...} \rightarrow \text{'}of' \rightarrow \text{...f-things}^{36} \]

Sellars' next step is to adopt some new terms to serve purposes he evidently feels cannot be well served by the old. First, he exchanges 'content' for 'intension', distinguishing individual intensions, e.g. Socrates, universal intensions, e.g. wisdom, and state-of-affairs intensions, e.g. that Socrates is wise. Corresponding to these are counterpart intensions applying to mental acts. Thus
Not all contents are re-christened as intensions. Left behind are "logical contents". For his second terminological emendation, Sellars turns all contents into "senses". He wants, thereby, to indicate that, while all contents are senses, not all are intensions. The reason for this is that 'intension' is a logician's term, the complementary of which is 'extension'. Thus, one says that the totality of all triangular things is the extension of the class determined by triangularity. Some senses must not be supposed to have extensions, according to Sellars. For example, there is nothing in the actual world corresponding to the senses not, all, or, necessary, etc.

The most important reason Sellars has for making use of the term 'sense' is that he wishes to ally his views on these matters to those of Frege, who coined it originally. Specifically, Sellars is in agreement with Frege's idea that

(While)... the entities he calls senses have a being which is independent of being conceived by particular minds on particular occasions -- thus correctly insisting on their public character -- he does not seem to take the tough early Russell line that they are independent of thought altogether.
Sellars thus moves away from what seemed at first to be an explicitly platonistic direction in his first set of moves. The "job" of intensions "is to be 'in' representings... their esse is *concipi vel concipi posse*". 39

Even more important in Sellars' Fregean meditations is the fact that it was to *linguistic* expressions that Frege allied the term 'sense'. After a rather long detour, we can now begin to recognize the Sellars of whose general views we have already given a limited exploration and who, in the early portions of SM, drew about himself the mantle of Kant.

"... our original idea-contents turn out to be the sort of thing which can serve as the sense of linguistic expressions." 40

From this point on through the end of the chapter we are back in familiar territory. Sellars frankly announces that the idea which "gives his programme point" is that "conceptual episodes are analogous to speech". The corollaries of his program are, first, an attempt to "construe the relation between mental acts and their intensions or senses as a form of the relation between linguistic episodes and their senses... conceptual episodes... as in their way standing for senses or intensions". 41 Second, that "the counterpart attributes of conceptual episodes, by virtue of which they, in their own way, stand for their senses, are to be construed on the analogy of whatever it is about linguistic episodes by virtue of which they stand for their senses". 42

A philosopher of Mind whose problems have him bewildered and who tries to explain them to someone who has not
been heretofore exposed to them is likely to be "assured" by his uncorrupted interlocutor of the soundness of two ideas which (though they may seem incompatible to the philosopher) live together harmoniously in his unphilosophical friend's breast. The first idea is that mental goings-on are quite different in nature from physical things and physical processes. The second idea, more likely revealed in what the plain man practices than in his preachings, is that, normally, observing your neighbor's behavior (including his linguistic behavior) is an unquestionably adequate source of knowledge concerning his mental states. Assuming that he is committed to the first idea, the philosopher finds himself in one way unable to live with the second idea, and, in another way, unable to live without it. To embrace it seems to crowd out the first idea. To reject it seems to send one headlong into the morass of skepticism. Sellars' way of avoiding the predicament is to propose that we consider "the idea that there are conceptual episodes" as

a means of explaining what people say and do, and, since it is clear that the models of instan­
tial induction or of the 'corroboration' provided by surviving instan­tial tests do not work, the suggestion naturally arises that the relation of the framework of conceptual episodes to what people say and do can be compared...

to that of a framework of micro-physical enti­
ties to such perceptible things as trees.43

The strategy in explaining the connection between overt be­
havior and conceptual episodes exactly parallels that in the theory of sense impressions. Just as sense impressions are
held to be theoretical entities in being conceived of as (1) inner states, not definable in behavioral terms, and (2) as having properties analogous to those of public things, and thereby as explaining

... the correlations of our perceptual responses with the environments to which they respond -- so certain predicates which apply to linguistic episodes are given a new use in which they form sortal predicates pertaining to conceptual acts and are imbedded in informal principles which contribute to the explanation of rational and irrational behavior.\textsuperscript{44}

As in the theory of sense impressions, Sellars considers the idea that there are thoughts as most understandable when viewed as an explanatory hypothesis. Whose hypothesis? Perhaps our own. Suppose that, once upon a time there was a community of language-using beings whose concepts of rationality were purely Ryleian...

With this story we are already well acquainted. In the (re-) telling of it, however, Sellars goes into somewhat richer detail concerning the more abstract aspects involved. It will be profitable to consider these.

The guideline of "our" theory is that the "standing for a sense" characteristic of conceptual episodes is an idea to be constructed on the analogy of the way that overt linguistic episodes stand for their senses. Thus, it is first necessary to be clear about the latter.

What is it for a linguistic episode to "stand for a sense?" Not merely that it is made up of such-and-such marks or noises. It stands for a sense "by virtue of the patterns
(it) makes (when produced in a language using frame of mind) with other designs, with objects ... and with actions...

Particular linguistic configurations are correct or incorrect (in that they are subject to criticism) in a way which is illuminated by, though not defined in terms of, these general patterns or correlations.

One is reminded of the discussion of the "irreducibility" of semantical rules to descriptions of linguistic behavior discussed earlier.

But, what is a "sense" in the first place? If we can understand what sort of beast a sense is, perhaps the rest will fall into place of itself. Sellars thinks that the "key to the status of senses generally, both those senses which are intensions and of those senses which are extensions" is ours if we can get clear about the abstract singular terms 'not' and negation.

It somehow seems undeniably true that 'Not' stands for negation, yet odd to the point of absurdity that 'not' is related to some non-linguistic entity. Clearly, 'not' neither names nor denotes anything. Hence, what is 'negation'? A singular term of some sort; not a proper name; not a description. Its status, Sellars thinks, is much more like that of the distributive singular term

The bishop.

For, just as one says

The bishop moves along diagonals

and this is equivalent to
(In chess) bishops move along diagonals, and we realize that anything from a pearl to a battleship may "be a bishop", we might say that "to stand for negation" is to be an item which is subject to rules of correct employment which parallel those for 'not' in our language. We can then form linguistic distributive singular terms (by means of a quoting device) to parallel non-linguistic distributive singular terms like the bishop. Thus, in the case of negation,

The "neg."

In the case of particular classes of linguistic configurations, another quoting device may be used, e.g.

'not'

which enables us to speak of 'not's as standing for the "neg."

in a fashion parallel to that in which one might say that (in the land of Nod)

pearls are bishops.

Analogously, it could be said that (in English)

'not's are "neg's."

Result:

... we get an interpretation of abstract singular terms which is a powerful tool for dealing with problems in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. For to make this move is to construe 'stands for' as a specialized form of the copula 'to be', the surface features of which (a) indicate that the subject matter is linguistic rather than, for example, military or religious; (b) make possible such constrasts as those between 'stands for', 'connotes', 'refers', and 'names'...47

To say what an expression (in L) stands for is to classify
it with respect to the rules of correctness to which it is subject, and thereby to convey information having to do with the behavioral patterns of I-speakers in which the expression crops up.

Besides such senses as negation we can also speak of others which are intensions in this manner. Thus, individual intension: \textit{Socrates} = the \textit{Socrates}; attributive intension: \textit{Wisdom} = the \textit{wise}; state of affairs intension: \textit{that Socrates is wise} = the \textit{Socrates is wise}.

If one feels little difficulty in accepting Sellars' analysis with respect to such sentences as

\begin{quote}
\textit{Niet} (in Russian) stands for negation. \\
\textit{Dreieckig} (in German) stands for triangularity.
\end{quote}
i.e. that their form is not

\begin{quote}
\text{(linguistic) R (non-linguistic),}
\end{quote}

he may nevertheless feel that denoting, referring, and naming are issues which remain untouched by it. Surely such sentences as

\begin{quote}
\textit{Rational animal} (in English) denotes featherless bipeds. \\
\textit{Plato} (in English) denotes the teacher of Aristotle.
\end{quote}

must have the form just mentioned.

Sellars' reply to this demand is difficult to follow and is presented (in SM) in the sketchiest of fashions. The most crucial step involved in it is the adoption of a convention for speaking of material equivalence among senses (individual, attributive, and state-of-affairs). Even a
partial understanding of it will require that we delve into
the next chapter ("Truth") for, as we know,

\[ p \text{ materially equivalent to } q \]
is defined as

if \( p \) is true then \( q \) is true and **vice versa**.

Assuming delivery of payment on this note, however, the gen-
eral programmatic corollary of construing the relation be-
tween thoughts and their objects on the analogy of the
"relation" between linguistic episodes and their senses be-
gins to materialize. Yet to say that 'standing for' is a
relation, in any sense, now sounds extremely odd. The schema

\[ \text{x stands for y} \]
does not have the form

\[ xRy. \]

Instead one would say that

\[ x \text{ is an } *Ry* \]
a locution which easily recalls the doctrine of Internal
Relations, Leibniz' contention that all sentences are ult-
mately of the subject-predicate form, and, applied analogi-
cally to thoughts recalls Leibniz' formula, "The monads are,
so to speak, windowless". Yet Leibniz' companion slogan
that, from its own point of view, every state of every monad
reflects every other, will come to mind with equal force
when one examines Chapter V of SW, "Picturing".

**IV. The Conceptual and the Real: Truth**

On the one hand, intersubjectivity of thought seemed
to demand the conclusion that many conceptual episodes could be 'of' or 'stand for' the same sense. On the other, the objectivity of thought seems to demand the conclusion that, qua standing for the same sense, many conceptual episodes can be true of the same object. What this suggests to Sellars is the possibility "at least in connection with general contents" of identifying

the ones which are shared by many representings with the ones which are shared by many things, the content triangular with triangularity. To do so... would have the virtue of ensuring the closest of connections between the intersubjectivity of contents with respect to representings and their objectivity with respect to things.48

But wouldn't identifying general contents with attributive intensions result in making thoughts, e.g. triangular? It seemed so earlier, but Sellars now considers how the hypothesis might be saved. One must distinguish, he says, two modes of in-esse. Thus, one distinguishes the mode in which representings "share" in triangularity, from the mode in which things "share" in triangularity.

For this hypothesis to work, though, not only general contents (intensions) but individual, and state-of-affairs intensions must be assimilated into this scheme. Accordingly,
three sub-modes of *in-esse* would be required. Thus one says of an individual intension, e.g. *Socrates*, that it is *real*, a general intension, e.g. *Wisdom*, that it is *exemplified*, and of a state of affairs intension, e.g. *that Socrates is wise*, that it *obtains*. Since we are talking about intensions, it must follow that the latter set of statements could be so reformulated as to make this explicit. Thus

The 'Socrates' ...
The 'wise' ...
The 'Socrates is wise' ...

But how are these schemata to be completed? The last one provides the clue, according to Sellars. Put back into its previous form, it is

That Socrates is wise obtains

We use 'obtains' or 'is the case' in much the same way as we use 'is true'. We can say just what we want to say with

That Socrates is wise is true

as we can with the preceding (indented) sentence.

Contemporary philosophers of logic and semantics have expended much energy in discussing the significance of such equivalences as

'Snow is white' \(\iff\) snow is white,

insisting that a definition of truth is adequate only if such equivalences follow from it. Sellars considers it important to realize that the statements appearing on the left-hand sides of such equivalences are *interlinguistic*, and thus should be put in such a manner as
The *snow is white* is true → snow is white.

He "wishes to recommend" that

...these equivalences 'follow' from the definition of truth in that for a proposition to be true is for it to be assertible, where this means not capable of being asserted (which it must be to be a proposition at all) but correctly assertible, assertible, that is, in accordance with the relevant semantical rules, and on the basis of such additional, though unspecified, information as these rules may require. 'True', then, means semantically assertible ('S-assertible') and the varieties of truth correspond to the relevant varieties of semantical rule.50

This requires some explication. The sentence

All bachelors are unmarried males.

is not only true, it could not be false. What this would come to for Sellars is that "All bachelors are unmarried males" is true, i.e. the *all bachelors are unmarried males* is unconditionally S-assertible. Its being S-assertible involves its being assertible in accordance with the relevant semantical rules. In this case, the semantical rule might be expressed as

'bachelor' means unmarried male

or

'bachelor's are *unmarried male*s

and, in this case, it would seem necessary to add that

'unmarried male's are *bachelor*s.

Here is a fairly clear case of what it might mean to say that a sentence's being true is a matter of its being assertible in accordance with a semantical rule. But to extend such a definition of truth to apply to sentences not customarily
considered "logical truths" seems odd to the point of being ludicrous. Sellars' theory clearly seems to require, assuming that the following are true, that

Smith is wearing a red necktie today.
Water, if heated, boils.
London is north of Brighton.

are "correctly assertible in accordance with semantical rules". But what semantical rules? It seems almost transparently clear that it is facts, state of affairs, which are the basis of the truth of such statements, whether or not we translate 'true' as 'correctly assertible'. In one sense of 'basis', however, to say that a fact is the basis of the truth of a statement Sellars considers a form of the myth of the Given -- however indirectly or unintentionally. In a way which is reminiscent of Leibniz' distinction between Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact, Sellars construes the truth of all propositions as being warranted in one sense or another, ex vi terminorem.  

The principal matters to be considered in this chapter, however, relate to abstract entities, existence, exemplification, and obtaining. Sellars' object is to show that "the primary member of the family of abstract entities, the member the understanding of which brings with it the understanding of all others, is the proposition... the key predicate 'true', and thereby to demonstrate that

...the reality of individuals, the exemplification of universals, attributes having extensions, the obtaining of states of affairs, propositions denoting the actual world... etc., are all to be explicited in terms of truth."
Once this is done, the 'in-esse' relation will have been explicated. For this purpose, a closer look at Sellars' analysis of the nature of truth is needed.

He arrives at his explanation of this matter by, in effect, asking himself what sort of move is involved in the transition from

That snow is white is true

to

snow is white.
The former is, in his terms to be rendered as

The *snow is white* is true

which in turn becomes

*Snow is white*'s are semantically assertible.
The move to

snow is white

...(is)... a consequence of the above in the sense that the assertion of ('snow is white') is a performance of the kind authorized by the truth statement...53

The situation is somewhat analogous to what is involved in a person's action of moving a Monopoly-piece to the "Jail"-space on the basis of having picked up and read a "chance" card reading "Go to Jail". An even better comparison would be a game in which the instruction on the back of the card read "Put this card in the 'Jail' space". Somewhat awkwardly one might say (as Sellars does) that the force of 'true' in

'Snow is white' is true

is to say that "the quotation marks together with itself,
may be erased". Rather than a relation between a statement and a state of affairs, truth in this sense is a matter of the correctness of a certain performance, "roughly, the de-quoting of a quoted expression".

The matter is still far from clear, however. What is the status of these quoted expressions? What has the move from "The fa is true" to "fa" got to do with the "relation" (in-essep) between intensions and things?

The platonic tradition considers singular predicative statements to be correctly analysable in terms of a relation (exemplification) and two relata (a particular and a universal). Thus 'fa' becomes "a exemplifies f" or "f is exemplified by a". But this seems intimately related to the statement

That a is f obtains (is the case, is true)

which bears reformulation as

that it is f is true of a,

which, in Sellars' notation, becomes

The •it is f• is true of a.

Putting some flesh onto these rather dry logical bones, one would have, e.g.

That he is wise is true of Socrates.

Sellars thinks that the 'he' in this sentence is functioning as a variable, such that, qua linguistic rule, it could ultimately be construed as

The result of replacing the •x• in an •x is wise• by a 'Socrates' is true (i.e. S-assertible).
Sellars expresses uneasiness at his own handling of this point. Perhaps he has good reason to feel uneasy, yet, he lets it go, saying that it is "close enough to the truth to serve my purpose on the present occasion". At any rate, the general position he wishes to take is anti-platonistic, as I have just used the term. He denies that

Wisdom is exemplified by Socrates

asserts that "a certain relation, nexus or tie, holds between the objects Wisdom and Socrates..." For one thing, "exemplification", properly understood, is not a relation. For another, Wisdom is not an object. Shifting the example to Triangularity, Triangularity is an "object" only in the highly Pickwickian sense in which a distributive object, such as the pawn, is an "object". The important difference is that, while the pawn is not, Wisdom is a linguistic distributive object. Indeed, all "singular subjects of predication" are distributive singular terms, according to Sellars.

The above thesis, if correct, has the corollary that just as all statements beginning with

The pawn...

could, in principle, be eliminated in favor of statements beginning

Pawns...

and these, in turn, in favour of statements about permissible configurations of objects satisfying certain general conditions of distinguishability and combinability -- statements which define a mode of rule governed activity called a game -- so all statements beginning with expressions such as

Triangularity

that Socrates is wise

etc.

could, in principle, be eliminated in favour of a system of statements about permissible configur-
ations of inscriptions and utterances with other inscriptions and utterances, with objects and events and with non-linguistic behavior -- statements which define a mode of rule governed activity which it is illuminating to call by, analogy, a language game.58

Having had a look at Sellars' views on truth we can perhaps see to some extent how he thinks he can analyse "...' denotes ---" in such a way that it does not have the form

(linguistic) R (non-linguistic).

To give a complete understanding of all the details involved would take me too far from those areas I have chosen for examination.

First, let 'S' be a variable ranging over senses, and which takes common nouns formed by dot-quoting as its substituends. Thus

(∃S) 'niet's (in R) are S's

or

(∃S) 'Plato' (in E) stands for S
(∃S) 'rational animal' (in E) stands for S

Next the notion of material equivalence among senses is introduced. Thus

S_i ≡ S_j

such that

'Rational animal' ≡ 'featherless biped.

is true if and only if

(x) (Rational animal (x) ≡ featherless biped (x)).

and

'Plato' ≡ 'the teacher of Aristotle'.
is true if and only if

\[(f) \ (f(\text{Plato}) \equiv f(\text{the teacher of Aristotle})).\]

Thus

'Man' (in E) denotes featherless bipeds

is explicated as

\[(\exists S)(\text{"rational animal" (in E) stands for S)} & (S \equiv \text{featherless biped.} )\]

and

'Plato' (in E) denotes the teacher of Aristotle

as

\[(\exists S)(\text{"Plato" (in E) stands for S)} & (S \equiv \text{the teacher of Aristotle} ).\]

Let us expand these last two explication statements more fully. "'Rational animal' (in E) denotes featherless bipeds" can be put as

'Rational animal's (in E) function in such a way that, where the result of replacing the '∅. in an 'x is ∅. by a 'featherless biped. is semantically assertible, the result of replacing it by a 'rational animal.' is also semantically assertible, and vice versa.

"'Plato' (in E) denotes the teacher of Aristotle" can be rendered in the same manner.

Thus, "x exemplifies f", "∅. denotes ψ s", "a denotes the so-and-so" are all lumped by Sellars under the heading of "notions explicable in terms of the concept of truth". Moreover, truth is, for him, to be considered a matter of the semantical correctness of a certain linguistic performance, i.e. asserting p in accordance with the rule "·p·s(in L) are true (semantically assertible)".
One still remains unsatisfied, and deeply so. Doesn't the language we speak "hook up with" the non-linguistic order in any way? What determines the makeup of the semantical rules of a language? Isn't the correctness of some assertions a matter which, in some strong sense, depends on how the world happens to be? The correctness of asserting that x exists and/or that x has certain properties surely cannot be a sheer matter of conventions about which noises and marks it is proper for one to make. Mention must at least be make of the kinds of circumstance in which it is proper to say this or that, or else we could not be talking about rules for rational discourse in any sense. And isn't the knowledge that x exists and is that to which we refer with the name 'Socrates' something which shows that, whether it is governed by "rules of correct assertibility" or not, language is at some points "incontact with" the nonlinguistic order?

So one may find himself muttering frantically at this point. But, while Sellars' remarks on the analysis of semantical terms may seem to warrant such frustration, he is also conscious of the need to provide a sense of 'because' in which it is undeniable that our (matter-of-factual) assertions are correct because of the way (non-linguistic) things stand. Needless to say, he is as watchful as ever to make sure that this sense of 'because' carries with it no hint of givenness.

His efforts in this direction take place in the
next chapter, "Picturing".

The Conceptual and the Real: Picturing

The idea that our factual knowledge, being of highly complex states of affairs, can be "reduced to", or "shown to rest on" a level of "simple" or "basic" knowledge elements is an old idea, but one which has been no less intensely debated in our own century than in any other. Witness the energetic search in the heyday of Positivism for the "verification base" of empirical statements. As Sellars points out, though, it is an idea which, in nearly all of its expressions, is a form of the myth of the Given. Nevertheless, Sellars maintains that something like it is true. Taking his cue from Wittgenstein's Tractatus, he says that an "understanding of the distinctive functions of first-level matter-of-factual discourse" is to be gained from a discussion of "language as a means of constructing 'logical pictures' of the world."59

"Picturing" is capable of correctness or adequacy relative to the objects pictured. As such, it is a form of truth. Indeed, "correct picture" is the "primary concept of truth", whereas S-assertibility is the "generic" concept of truth. This means, among other things, that all true propositions, whether belonging to, e.g., ethics, aesthetics, arithmetic, or the language of empirical fact, are S-assertible (definition). Hence, S-assertibility does not admit of degrees. But correctness of picture is a matter of degree.
Moreover, what degree of correctness a picture has is to be decided "in terms of the semantical rules of the framework within which they are statements. They are true (S-assertible) if correct, false if incorrect". The primary concept of truth is that of correct picture in that it "makes intelligible" all other (non-factual) truths. The Semantical assertibility of a statement is not, as such, a matter of its being appropriately related to anything non-linguistic. Picturing, however, does essentially involve relations between the linguistic and the non-linguistic.

Let us explore what has been said. Suppose that a man named Smith has never before seen a purple cow and, on his first encounter with one exclaims "Yonder cow is purple". For the sake of convenience, assume that Smith is the last of the inhabitants in the land where he dwells to learn of the existence of purple cows, but is familiar with, say, purple plums. On the one hand, his statement is true in the sense of being semantically assertible (in Smith's language). On the other, it is semantically assertible (somehow), because it "pictures" said cow. To see what is involved in this, suppose for a moment that, rather than a human being, Smith is a robot. To say that Robot Smith's utterance "Yonder cow is purple" pictures the cow in question is to say that the robot's utterance is a correct response to the presence of this kind of object in its environment. The matter to bring into as clear a focus as possible, then, is that which constitutes the "correctness" of such correct re-
sponses. Briefly, it involves something like the following.

Given that Smith's sensory receptors, wiring diagram, memory banks, and audio output units have such-and-such structures, and are in working order, if a purple cow should come within distance $d$ of Smith, he ought to respond with a "Yonder cow is purple".

Here is a possible candidate for the kind of thing which Sellars calls a "semantical rule" in the framework (Cybernetics, in this case) in which the utterance in question is a statement. Notice that such an 'ought' as occurs in it, would not have the same meaning as the 'ought' in such a responsibility ascription as "You ought to help those less fortunate than yourself". The latter belongs to a class of rules which Sellars calls rules of performance. These have to do with the correctness of actions, i.e. behavior "done on purpose". These "rules for doing" are, he says, to be carefully distinguished from what he calls "rules for criticizing".

The distinction is essentially akin to that which has been drawn between 'ought to do' and 'ought to be'. Thus the two kinds of rule are internally related in a way which parallels the fact that ought-to-be's imply (with additional premises) ought-to-do's and ought-to-do-s imply ought-to-be's.

Indeed,

...(the) sense... in which we contrast the ethical 'ought' with the matter-of-factual 'is' does not bring us to the end of the series of Chinese boxes which make up factual truth. For the domain of 'is' also has its 'oughts'. Thus...law-like propositions tell us how we ought to think about the world. They formulate rules of criticism, and if, as such they tell us what ought or ought not to be the case, the fact that it is what ought or ought not to be the case with respect to our beliefs about the world suffices to distinguish them from those rules of criti-
cism which tell us what ought or ought not to be the case in the world. Consequently, ... it follows that law-like statements are... 'semantical rules', and are, ceteris paribus, reflected in uniformities pertaining to the verbal behavior (and conceptual acts) of those who espouse them.

Among other things, this entails that we cannot sensibly apply the category of truth (in the sense of S-assertibility) to the robot's utterances. Asserting is a doing rather than a "mere response". No rules of performance are applicable to the robot; only rules of criticism.

Linguistic picture-making is not the performance of asserting matter-of-factual propositions. The criterion of the correctness of the performance of asserting a basic matter-of-factual proposition is the correctness of the proposition qua picture, i.e., the fact that it coincides with the picture the world-cum-language would generate in accordance with the uniformities controlled by the semantical rules of the language. Thus the correctness of the picture is not defined in terms of the correctness of the performance but vice versa.

The robot's responses would be S-assertible only in the derivative sense that they are analogous in important respects to our responses in similar circumstances, and such responses on our part are S-assertible. In the case of persons, one and the same episode must somehow be considered as being both a learned physiological response to an external stimulus and a (semantically assertible) conceptual element in a logical system. It is S-assertible only if it is a correct picture, and its correctness consists in its being in accordance with relevant natural laws. In what sense are these
laws ture? Not in the sense of being correct pictures. Rather, they are S-assertible on the basis of supported by correct pictures of particular objects. This seems to give us the paradox that there are laws only if there are correct pictures and correct pictures only if there are laws, and so on. Sellars once wrote an article entitled "Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable Without Them". He might well have added "and vice versa". We must, he says, "understand the distinctive functions of matter-of-factual statements belonging to the level below that of law-like statements" in order to "understand the point of inductive reasoning" and thus the nature of law-like propositions". Fact- ual truths are "empirical" in the sense that their "authority ultimately rests on perceptual experience". Nevertheless, they also "involve the complex techniques of concept-formation and confirmation characteristic of theoretical science".

That there are no worthwhile theories pertaining to matters of fact without supporting observational data is a truism. Sellars wishes to press for the not-so-commonsense converse, namely that observational data are not obtainable from what might be called a "theory-free" point of view. This is a thesis which both entails and is entailed by his overriding view that all awareness is "structured" and the latter view is a direct consequence of his complete rejection of givenness. I shall not, however, discuss Sellars' ideas on the move involved in going from the acceptance of n state-
ments picturing a particular objects to acceptance of the corresponding covering law.

If the sense in which Robot Smith's utterances are correct pictures of his environment can be assumed to have been illuminated somewhat, one need only see that it is by analogy to the behavior of human beings as language users that it is sensible to consider the noises the robot makes as being linguistic episodes, in order to understand that the "picturing" metaphor applies to human beings primordially --- to "ordinary language robots" as Sellars in one place describes the lot of us.

In other words, the "distinctive function" of basic matter-of-factual statements would be shown most clearly in a "cyberneticized" version of neurophysiological psychology. Sellars attempts to informally describe what the principles of such an account would be like.

(1) Non-demonstrative referring expressions must belong to the 'natural order' and be connected with objects in a way which involves language-entry transitions, intra-linguistic moves (consequence uniformities) and language departure transitions (willings-out-loud).

(2) There must be a relatively stable, if skeletal, framework of propositions (involving the referring expressions) which describe the spatiotemporal locations of these objects with respect to each other.

(3) A proper part of this skeletal framework must specify the location of the language user in his environment.

(4) Rehearsings of this skeletal framework must gear in with the use of demonstratives to 'specify the location with respect to the here-now of the objects with which the referring expressions are correlated'.67
From these considerations it is at least clear that a basic
matter-of-factual statement (picture candidate) can be deter-
mimed to be a correct picture only by means of highly complex
checking procedures on the part of a number of investigators
other than the reporting subject himself. It was once com-
mon philosophical coin that no one could sensibly be said to
have better knowledge of one's experiences than oneself.
But, as things stand currently, Sellars' position (and posi-
tions similar to his) in these matters is firmly in the phil-
osophical mainstream. Ou sont les neiges de'antan?

It is to be recalled that Sellars takes

\[ x \text{ is red} \implies x \text{ looks red to standard observers}
\text{in standard circumstances}. \]

to be a necessary truth. We now have a better idea of all
that this involves. Specifically, the "necessary truth" can
be reformulated as:

\[ x \text{ is red} \implies x \text{ is red} \text{'s are S-assertible}. \]

\[ x \text{ is red} \text{'s are correct pictures, i.e., are nor-
mal responses on the part}
\text{of standard observers in standard circumstances}
\text{(where 'standard' is to be spelled out in terms}
\text{of the laws to which ob-
server and circumstances}
\text{conform).} \]

Not for Sellars the "Robinson Crusoe" view of epistemology
according to which the most "certain" matters of fact are
those which each of us can determine for himself. Not only
do I need my neighbor's opinion to know whether or not my
(spontaneous) noticing-out-loud, "a is red" is a correct re-
sponse, he and I can come to no trustworthy decision in such matters apart from having been educated to general standards of correctness, e.g., those relating to conditions of luminosity, optics, optometry, laws of (visual) psychomotor response—and ultimately, to carry things to their highest court of appeal, to the best-established parts of current scientific theory (e.g., the most widely accepted axioms of physics). But to say this is not to say that we cannot make decisions adequate to ordinary purposes on the basis of relatively few and rough standards.

Lest it be supposed that considerations relevant to the philosophy of Mind have been left far behind by now, we need only be reminded of the contention that what is true of overt language, linguistic response, as picturing the world is analogically applicable to the inner episodes we call thoughts. The latter are considered by Sellars to be necessarily analogous to overt language since they are theoretical entities, the very conception of which is formulated by reference to the model of overt language. Hence, "inner speech" episodes are, in their own way, candidates for being correct pictures of objects.

Language, and hence thought, is far from being unrelated to the extra-linguistic order, contrary to the suspicions raised when Intentionality and S-assertibility were discussed. Language qua basic matter-of-factual picture is a phenomenon brought into being by the extralinguistic ob-
jects which it pictures. Language as correct picture, moreover, is the sine qua non of the S-assertibility of matter-of-factual statements.

An *x is red* uttered by one of us is true (Semantically assertible) only if it a correct picture, i.e. a linguistic response to a red object. But its S-assertibility is not constituted by the fact that it is a correct picture. S-assertibility requires further conditions, especially that the sentence has purely intralinguistic consequences. For example, from an *x is red* such further sentences as *x is colored*, *x is a spatio-temporal structure* logically follow. (Or, this might be put by saying that *x is red* semantically entail the latter sentences.) Participation in such uniformities as these is as relevant to a statement's standing for the sense that it does as is its participation in the picturing (response) uniformities.

That there is something inappropriate about a locution like

"Snow is white" is true in English.

Sellars is the first to agree. In the sense of 'language' which refers to the specific materials (marks, noises, etc.) which differentiate, say, French and German (the differences among which could be discerned even by a person who understood neither language) Sellars denies that truth is language relative. Statements in particular languages are, of course, true or false, but not because they belong to this
or that language. Yet there is another sense of 'language' in which it could be said that, when Jacques says "La neige est blanche" and Fritz says "Die Schnee istweiss", they are speaking the same language, or, perhaps, two dialects of the same language. To capture this sense of the term, Sellars characterizes Jacques and Fritz as sharing a conceptual structure, and insists that the "fundamental form" of 'true' is

true in conceptual structure \( CS_i \)

But he also recognizes the commonsensical idea that truth is in some sense not subject to qualification; that, if true, a statement is true absolutely. As he sees it, though, this idea is compatible with truth in the "absolute" sense being in its own way language-relative, namely relative to our language. Hence, where \( CS_i \) is our conceptual structure (abbreviated \( CS_0 \)),

true = \( S \)-assertible in \( CS_0 \).

Now, besides pointing out the sense in which the same conceptual structure may be embodied in different languages, Sellars wishes to explain a sense in which there can be different conceptual structures.

The point stands out most clearly in the evolution of a scientific theory. Here it makes obvious sense to say that a certain concept belonging to the theory at one stage is a development of a concept belonging to the theory at an earlier stage.68

Let us focus on what it is for one concept to be a "development" from another. In some sense, it is clear that terms like 'simultaneity', 'inertia', 'space', 'electron', etc.
have taken on meanings in today's science considerably different from those which attached to them in times past. But perhaps "considerably different" is a misleading characterization. If the meanings of the term are different, are they not different concepts altogether? Are we to think of Newtonian simultaneity and Einsteinian simultaneity as two variations on one unchanging simultaneity? Or are the two notions as different from one another as chocolates are different from sheep? Sellars tries to find a middle ground between these alternatives. Returning once again to the analogy of languages with games such as Chess, he asserts that

... it can make very good sense to say that a piece in a certain game is a pawn without implying that it works in exactly the same way as pawns do in standard Chess. Is a pawn which cannot capture en passant a pawn? Is the game in which it belongs Chess? There is room here for a decision... One may decide,... to say 'no', but in the same breath say also that a common noun 'prawn' could be introduced such that 'standard prawn' and, supposing the nonstandard game to be Jess, 'Jess prawn' would be subordinate classifications.69

"Pace Plato", he says, abstract entities change. Just as Euclidean and Riemannian triangularities are different triangularities, but triangularities nevertheless, so 'oxidation', 'simultaneity', 'space' are predicates which play roles "generically like" yet specifically different from the role played by 'f' in the base language (the CS we currently accept). The predicates 'f' in Galilean mechanics, 'F' in Newtonian mechanics, and 'g' in Einsteinian mechanics can all be said to stand for f-ness, i.e. be ·f·s.
To be an *f* (stand for f-ness) does not require in this context that the expression to be classified plays the identical determinate role currently played by 'f' but that its function in the earlier stage of the language is sufficiently similar to the current functioning of 'f' to warrant classifying them together.70

Expressions (senses) which do warrant such classification, Sellars calls "counterparts", and classes of counterpart senses he calls "families". Thus, a family of propositional senses (PRFAM) are "counterparts of each other at different stages in the development of the theory".71 Families are rather like class-intersections where the "classes" they intersect are different conceptual structures. An example of a family of propositional senses might be

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{The } x \text{ is straight* (in Cartesian physics)} \\
\text{The } x \text{ is straight* (in Newtonian physics)} \\
\text{The } x \text{ is straight* (in Einsteinian physics).}
\end{array}
\]

The notions of "counterpart" and "family" are tools with which Sellars thinks he can define a sense in which propositions belonging to different conceptual structures can be said to be absolutely true (S-assertible in CS0). Let CS\textsubscript{1} be an earlier stage of the theory we now accept (CS0), and PROP\textsubscript{j} be a proposition belonging to CS\textsubscript{1}. We can define the sense in which PROP\textsubscript{j} is true by means of the formula

\[
\text{PROP}_j \text{ and some PROP belonging to CS0 belong to the same PRFAM and PROP(in CS0) is true.}
\]

In simpler terms, the truth of the proposition in the "less developed" conceptual structure is defined in terms of the truth of its counterpart in CS0.

But besides this way of defining the truth of a
proposition belonging to a conceptual structure other than our own current one, he thinks in necessary to introduce

...a sense in which a proposition in one conceptual structure can be true not only with respect to our current conceptual structure but with respect to any suitably related conceptual structure. Thus we can define a sense in which a proposition in ... (CSO) is true quoad ... CS₁.72

I assume that 'quoad' as Sellars uses it here simply means "with respect to".73 His definition of the sense in which a proposition in CSO can be defined as true quoad CS₁ is as follows

PROPₖ (in CSO) and some PROP in CS₁ belong to the same PRAFAM and the latter PROP is true quoad CS₁.

Sellars thus distinguishes "between the conceptual structure to which a proposition belongs and the conceptual structure with respect to which its truth is defined".74

The richer the set of semantical rules in terms of which a picture is correct, the more "adequate" the picture is said to be. Truth, this sense, admits of degrees. Accordingly, whole conceptual structures can be said to differ in degree of the adequacy of their depiction. But, Sellars says, the putative concept of a linguistic structure which permits a more adequate picturing of objects that we are able to raises the question: In which framework are these objects conceived? If in CSO then how can they be more adequately pictured than they are in CSO, i.e., by its method of projection? How, it might be asked, can a common-sense object be more adequately pictured than in common-sense terms?75

For Sellars, the answer can be seen once one understands "a distinction drawn between the logical or 'formal' criteria of individuality which apply to any descriptive conceptual
framework, and the more specific (material) criteria in terms of which individuals are identified in specific conceptual frameworks. Not only can we thereby conceive how one conceptual framework can be more adequate than another; according to Sellars we can go a step further and "conceive of a language which enables its users to form ideally adequate pictures of objects, and let us call this language Peirceish". The reference is, of course, to Charles Sanders Peirce's dictum that truth is what the continuing scientific community would ultimately accept. It is in terms of a Peirceian conceptual structure (CSP) that the concepts of "ideal truth" and "what really exists" are to be defined. We thus come to a fuller spelling out of Sellars' programmatic contention that, in principle, we (rather than God alone) can acquire a knowledge of things-in-themselves by means of the concept-formation procedures characteristic of theoretical science. To return to the question at hand, however, and assuming that Sellars' distinction between the "logical" and the "material" criteria for identification of individuals in specific conceptual frameworks can be made clear, how is one to decide which material criteria (method of projection) would enable us to more adequately depict objects than we do in our current conceptual scheme? One obvious answer comes to mind, namely that, in advance, we can't possibly say what such criteria would be, since the ability to specify such criteria would mean that we speak a more adequate language than we in fact speak. We seem to be limited
to examining (previous) conceptual structures less adequate than our own and noting what kinds of changes in material criteria have counted as providing improved conceptual structures. Yet Sellars clings to the hope that, by means of the 'counterpart' notion, we can at least envision the general outlines of CSP or, failing this, show how we could relate absolutely true (S-assertible by us) propositions and ideally true ones.

The goal which gives this program point is that of explaining how the world of common sense (of colored, textured, noisy, solid objects) described by CSO can be said to be "phenomenal" in something like the Kantian sense, but related to a world of an sich existents (described by CSP) which are not metaphysical unknownables, but "scientific objects".

The particular interest of this for a philosopher of Mind is that, being theoretical entities, the only characteristic which we (earlier and today) must assign to thoughts is that of playing roles analogous to those played by overt speech episodes. What specific, ("material") characteristics these inner episodes must have is, initially at least, a completely open matter. Sellars does not think that (in CSO) we can give a satisfactory characterization of the specific attributes of mental acts. Yet he sees no reason why, in principle, CSO could not be replaced by a "successor" conceptual framework in which mental acts could be ideally described in something analogous to neurophysiologi-
cal terms. The notion that neurophysiological episodes can sensibly be said to "play roles" causes Sellars relatively little worry. As he never tires of reminding us, anything from a pearl to a battleship can "be a pawn". What being so classified involves is being subject to rules essentially like those to which pawns in standard chess are subject. In parallel fashion, to be a thought is to stand for a sense, which means being an inner episode subject to rules (of criticism) analogous to those to which overt speech episodes are subject. Since the rules of criticism in this case are natural laws, rather than rules of performance covering, say, how chess is played, what "playing a role" comes to is being an item which (given certain conditions) ought to be involved in configurations and combinations of other items. In this sense of 'playing a role', it would be sensible to speak of anything describable in lawlike terms as playing a role --- from lightning-flashes and disintegrations of nuclei to patterns of events in the central nervous system. Hence, Sellars sees no unremovable barrier to the eventual development of a conceptual structure in which the counterparts of such propositions in CSO as

Jones (at t) believes that it is raining

would be a complex and systematically related set of propositions describing Jones' physiology at t, and ideally, would be made up of propositions which were pictures of the particular objects ultimately making up Jones' physiological state at t. In such a conceptual structure, mental acts would
essentially be conceived in such ideal scientific terms in a way analogous to that in which physical objects from a common-sense viewpoint are, Sellars claims, essentially conceived as being colored, noisy, odorous, textured, etc.

The question which naturally arises at this point is how there could be pictures of ideal scientific objects, i.e. correct linguistic responses to theoretical, unobservable, entities. The particular objects making up Jones' physiological state at t may be of considerably less than microscopic dimensions --- perhaps not even very "thingish" objects. Sellars is aware of the question and attempts to say something in response to it. But he considers the problems attaching to this matter to be so highly intricate that he feels capable only of "looking them in the eye" and then going on to other matters.

Sellars sees the intellectual history of the race as being a series of successive replacements of entire conceptual frameworks in accordance with the development of the best science of the day and as conceivably culminating in a total replacement of such relatively commonsensical frameworks as CSO by an ideally complete framework of theoretical science. That this ideal functions for him as a regulative rather than a constitutive principle is what differentiates his view from that of a philosopher such as Paul Feyerabend. That is, Sellars thinks that, in CSO, it is not true, not S-assertible that, e.g., tables and chairs are not really colored or solid or that thoughts are nothing but patterns of
neurophysiological events. With respect to CSO, propositions asserting such identities are false. But in an ideally complete scientific framework (CSP), he envisions the formulation of propositions which are the 'successors' or counterparts of these and which, quoad CSP, are S-assertible. Science can be conceived to replace all common-sense frameworks like CSO, but, for Sellars, only when it is ideally complete, not piecemeal and "day by day". Thus, he thinks that the possibility of eventual total replacement of all previous conceptual structures by CSP can be taken as signifying that the objects conceived in terms of these pre-CSP conceptual structures do not really exist. On the other hand, he thinks that a kind of sense can be defined in which even these objects can be said to really exist.

He says

The claim that the common-sense framework is transcendentally ideal, i.e. that there really are no such things as the objects of which it speaks, can now be reassessed and reformulated. We must distinguish carefully between saying that these objects do not really exist and saying that they do not really exist as conceived in this framework. For they do really exist as conceived in what... we have called the Peircean framework...79

Should I say that the esse of the common-sense world is concipi? It is not too misleading to do so provided that this is taken to be a vigorous way of stressing the radical differences in conceptual structure between the framework of common-sense and the developing framework of theoretical science. Yet, according to the picture I have been sketching, the concepts in terms of which the common-sense or 'manifest image' are identified have 'successor' concepts in the scientific image, and correspondingly, the individual concepts of the manifest image have counterparts in the scientific image which, however different in logical structure, can legitimately regarded
as their 'successors'. In this sense, which is not available to Kant, save with a theological twist, the objects of the manifest image do really exist.

At this point, one is so vividly reminded of ideas central to Leibniz' metaphysics that, in view of the number of times his name has come up so far, it is very tempting to declare that the "variations on Kantian themes" which constitute Science and Metaphysics are quite Leibnizian in their overall tenor.

Parallel to Leibniz' realm of noumenal things, the infinites of simple metaphysical individuals he calls 'monads', are Sellars' objects which are countenanced as basic by an ideally complete science. Like monads for Leibniz, basic Peirceian entities are what "really exist" for Sellars. Both Leibniz and Sellars have a doctrine of individual concepts. Both speak of individual concepts as applying in one way at the common-sense or phenomenal level and in another way at the noumenal level. For example, in Leibnizian terms, the individual concept Socrates at the phenomenal level denotes an "individual" having a large num-
of observable properties such that you and I could be extremely knowledgeable about him through observational means, i.e. come to have a fairly good grasp of his individual concept. At the noumenal level, however, the concept Socrates does not denote just one individual but an infinity of them, infinitesimal, and in principle unobservable (by finite minds). In the sense that he is not identical with this plurality of
monads, i.e. is not literally a plurality of infinitesimal
spiritual substances, the phenomenal Socrates does not "real­ly exist". Yet in the sense that this plurality of noumenal
entities can be related systematically (by God) to the phe­
nomenal "entity" as its ontological ground, the phenomenal
individual Socrates does exist, for though he is a phenome­
nal being, he is a phenomenon bene fundatum.

It is tempting to say that Sellars' theory is a ma­
terialistic version of Leibniz' spiritualistic one. The
crucial difference is that, for Sellars we (rather than God
alone) can in principle obtain a complete grasp not only of
the concepts of phenomenal individuals but of the pluralities
of basic entities which are the ground of their being, and
can obtain also a grasp of the relation between noumenal
(basic) things and phenomenal things.

While a considerable amount of detail and discussion
of related issues appearing in Science and Metaphysics has
not been covered in these pages, enough has been covered to
serve my present purposes. To reiterate every detail of SM
could scarcely be imagined to serve any worthwhile purpose.
"Philosophy" as Sellars says, has as its aim an understanding of

...how things in the broadest possible sense of the
term hang together in the broadest possible sense of
the term. Under 'things in the broadest possible
sense' I include not only such radically different
items as 'cabbages and kings' but numbers and duties,
possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience
and death. To achieve success in philosophy would
be... to 'know one's way around' with respect to all
these things, not in that unreflective way in which
the centipede of the story knew its way around before it faced the question, 'how do I walk?', but in that reflective way which means that no intellectual holds are barred.

With this (metaphilosophical) view I am in fairly close agreement. Indeed, I think that a cousin to it expresses the most perspicuous way of understanding the views of particular philosophers. Besides presenting a philosopher's views in systematic fashion, one must discuss what their main structural features are and how these features are logically related. One hopes thereby to achieve as much clarity as the subject matter admits of in his critical remarks. But, besides this, one may even hope to thereby achieve some "insight" into the issues themselves. This will be my aim in the next, concluding, Chapter.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1SM, p. vii.
2SM, p. 2
3SM, p. 3
4SM, p. 4
5SM, p. 5
6SM, pp. 7-8
7SM, p. 7
8ibid.
9SM, p. 8
10SM, ibid.
11SM, p. 9
12SM, p. 9-10
13SM, p. 10
14SM, p. 12
15SM, p. 15
16SM, p. 17
17SM, p. 18
18SM, p. 18
19SM, p. 21
20SM, p. 26
21SM, p. 27
22SM, p. 30
23SM, p. 33
24ibid.
25SM, p. 35
26SM, p. 38
27SM, p. 39
28SM, p. 41
29SM, p. 42
30SM, p. 43
31SM, p. 48
32ibid.
33SM, p. 49
34SM, p. 50
35SM, p. 64
36ibid.
37SM, p. 65
38SM, p. 66
39SM, p. 65
40SM, p. 66
41ibid.
42SM, pp. 66-67
43SM, p. 69
44SM, pp. 69-70
45SM, p. 76
46SM, p. 77
47SM, p. 81
48SM, p. 91
49SM, p. 92
50SM, p. 101
51This notion is discussed at length in "Is there a Synthetic a Priori?" (SPR) (10), pp. 298-320, passim.
52SM, p. 110
53SM, p. 101
54SM, p. 102
55SM, p. 110
56SM, p. 103
57SM, p. 104
58SM, p. 107, all italics mine.
59SM, pp. 118-119.
60SM, p. 76
61SM, p. 117
62SM, p. 118
63SM, p. 136
64SM, p. 118
73 Vide Harpers' Latin Dictionary.
74 SM, p. 134
75 SM, p. 139
76 SM, p. 139-140
77 SM, p. 140
78 cf. "Scientific Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism: A Critique of Nagel and Feyerabend" in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Wartofsky ed.).
A picture according to which Philosophy consists of a certain number of "areas of inquiry", each concerned with its own questions and problems, is bound to appear suspicious to anyone having more than a nodding acquaintance with the subject. "In philosophy", as Sellars says, "one thing always leads to another". Nowhere is this a more familiar fact than in the philosophy of Mind, and there is no more splendid example of a philosopher of Mind who travels far into "other" philosophical areas as a result of his original inquiries than that of Wilfrid Sellars. My object in this concluding section will not be so much to discuss the matters which come up in the peripheral areas into which his inquiry takes him as it will be to concentrate on the main things which are originally responsible for his coming to be occupied with them.

Quintessentially put, the structural pattern of reasoning making up Sellars' philosophy of Mind is somewhat as follows.

(1) There is nothing given. It is impossible to recognize something as being $\varnothing$ (and/or that it stands in such-and-such relations) unless one has the concept $\varnothing$ (and/or the
concepts of these relations). This holds as much for allegedly "simple" properties and relations like being red or being between x and y as it does for complex ones like being a man or being an uncle of ...

(2) Hence, we either do not acquire concepts at all (they are innate) or we acquire them through experience. Assuming that a doctrine of innate concepts is to be rejected, the experiential acquisition of these concepts must either be (a) a matter of the mind's "abstracting" them from features of the environment, e.g. abstracting the concept red from the redness of apples, roses, blood, etc., or (b) a process in which the mind is, so to speak, passively enformed by the characteristics of objects and events.

(3) Alternative (2a) strongly involves givenness. How does the mind "sort out" the redness of this from the greenness of that (such that the process of abstraction is systematically in accordance with the characteristics of objects and events) unless it is by means of the appropriate conceptual capacities? If it is not by this means, then we must suppose that the characteristics of objects and events simply "stand out for what they are", even to a mind lacking all seemingly requisite conceptual abilities. The latter supposition straightforwardly involves givenness. Therefore, (2a) must be abandoned and some version of (2b) endorsed.

(4) Assuming that cartesian dualism is false, that the mind is not a kind of non-physical substance, but is instead a stream of events or acts (in the Aristotelian sense)
and which are, (in accordance with the foregoing line of reasoning), manifestations of acquired conceptual abilities, we must ask what it is to acquire a conceptual ability for recognizing something as being, e.g., red.

One answer to the question which avoids givenness is that, at the most basic psychological level, it is a matter of a behavioral response pattern's being built up in the individual, beginning at a level of sheer discrimination-behavior, and going "up" through a systematic process of selective reinforcement by other persons. As a result of this kind of process, a child acquires the habit of uttering (say) 'red' when in the presence of red objects. (and/or when in the presence of non-red objects in non-standard lighting conditions). This is one half of the story (language as correct picture). The other half, (language as intentional), which presupposes the first, concerns the ways in which the child acquires abilities for such intralinguistic moves as the inferences "This is red, therefore it is colored; therefore it is not green; therefore it is a spatiotemporal structure", etc., and for such language-exiting moves as "The light is red, so I shall put on the brake now". Once again, procedures of selective reward and punishment are operant in instilling these abilities, though they may well be of a sort considerably different from the preceding ones. (Consider: "No, dummy!" and "Good boy!").

A sufficient amount of this kind of training brings a person to a level at which his behavior is no longer to be
considered just a collection of habits, but is said to be rule-governed behavior, the rules in this case being those pertaining to redness (in CSO). At this stage, he is said to have the concept of something's being red.

(5) If the arguments in (1)-(3) are sound, what holds for the concept of something's being red holds with equal force for the concept of something's being a thought. In one sense, the acquisition of this concept could be constructed along exactly the same lines as those just sketched for the concept of something's being red. That is, in the sense that thinking is a matter of being disposed to say and do now this, now that, in so-and-so circumstances, one may suppose that concepts pertaining to thinking are acquired in a manner not intrinsically different from that in which concepts of color, shape, motion, etc. are acquired.

But, (pace Ryle) there is another, genuine sense of the term 'thought' which has not to do with dispositions but with occurrences (episodes, acts). Consider the expression, "Just then, the thought struck me that I had left the water running". Such mental episodes, moreover, are not overt verbal occurrences (such as someone's saying, "I do believe it's raining"), they are, in some sense, "inner" goings-on pertaining to persons. Finally, thoughts in this sense are such that each of us has privileged access to his own thoughts.

(6) The best way to understand what (inner-episode) thoughts are would seem to be by discovering how the concept
of an "inner thought-episode" could have come to be a part of our (indeed any) conceptual structure in view of our general remarks concerning concept-formation (viz. that it is by nature a public process), and especially in view of our rejection of givenness. To this end, consider the Myth of Our Ryleian Ancestors...

The essential notion in Jones' theory is that thoughts are inner episodes which are analogous to, because modeled after, overt speech episodes. But all this really tells us is that thoughts are some kind of an inner state of a person. While some of Jones' philosophical progeny added all sorts of embroidery (e.g. the idea that thoughts are states of a spiritual substance) to this innocuous idea, nothing in the essentials of Jones' theory demands that this be done. Insofar as his theory gives a characterization of thoughts, it is the purely formal one that they play roles analogous to those played by overt speech episodes. This leaves open the issue of what kinds of items might actually play these roles, just as being told that, in Texas Chess, there are items which play roles analogous to those played by so-and-so-shaped pieces of wood in standard Chess leaves open the matter of what the Texas Chess items might actually be.

There is consequently no barrier in principle to the identification of these inner speech role-players with patterns of events in the central nervous system, though this
identification cannot be made at present since (micro-level) neurophysiology has not developed sufficiently to enable us to see how this program is to be carried out.

Before developing some final concluding remarks, I should like to summarize a number of criticisms which I have made, and, hopefully, bring them into some kind of order. First, I shall recount the points on which I find myself in complete agreement with Sellars.

(1) I agree completely with the Ryle-Sellars rejection of cartesian dualism.

(2) I agree with Sellars' rejection of the Moore-Russell analysis of mental acts as "diaphanous".

(3) I agree with Sellars' rejection of givenness in the following senses:

(a) There is no "ontological given". That is, what are presented to us in awareness are without exception common sensical things: tables, chairs, people, clouds, microbes, stars, tickles, itches, after-images, memories and thoughts. Such common-sensical things are neither part of an ontology nor can one by "having a hard look at them", gain any sort of awareness of non-commonsensical things. The sense in which items countenanced by an ontology "exist" is toto caelo different from the sense in which there are such common-sensical things as tables. (It is doubtful that Sellars would agree with this last point, however.)

(b) Directly in line with the previous point, there
is no non-sensory awareness (Mental Vision) of abstract entities such as universals, or propositions whether these are supposedly in rebus, ante res, or in mente. Such an "intellectual vision of abstracta" is involved neither in learning a language nor in the (sophisticated) use of language.

(c) Perhaps most important, (although Sellars does not say this) theories of concept-formation which somehow involve a "mental eye" are to be rejected not just on the grounds that they carry with them the paradoxes of givenness, but because they are attempts to account in essentially philosophical terms for matters properly left to scientific investigation. If this is correct, moreover, it carries with it the strong suggestion that scientific hypotheses are likewise out of place in the business of solving philosophical problems. The philosopher is interested in dialectical connections and what sorts of categories must be appealed to in order to make them -- not in theoretical, (i.e. causal) explanation from a scientific point of view. Now for a reckoning of some previous criticisms.

(1) Sellars' views on the nature of linguistic meaning are greatly important in their consequences for his views on many other matters. He is correct in his rejection of a conception of language-learning as proceeding in accordance with "semantical rules" such as

Red objects are to be designated by the term "red" since the conception involves the paradoxes of givenness.
On the other hand, he seems to suppose that givenness would also be involved in considering the logical basis, not of the learning, but of the use of language to be conformance (of referential use) to "semantical rules". It seems to me that this simply does not follow. Sellars thinks that a rejection of semantical rules as the logical basis of the learning of language entails that linguistic meaningfulness could not be of the form

\[(\text{Linguistic}) R (\text{non-linguistic})\]

but must instead be construed as being a matter of conformance to \textit{syntactical} rules, rules pertaining to the correctness of various configurations, combinations, and moves of linguistic items, thus making the meaningfulness of a word something comparable to being a certain sort of piece in a game such as Chess. He is led to this position by an unnecessarily categorical rejection of semantical rules as the basis of meaningfulness. The result, for Sellars, is a conception of meaning which would apply to sign-designs in an uninterpreted calculus as well as to the language we speak. I oppose this conception of meaning on the ground that the meaningfulness of the language we speak obviously involves something more than mere conformance to syntactical rules. Indeed, it seems clear that, from a philosopher's point of view, the idea that an essential aspect of the meaningfulness of our language is its being connected with the non-linguistic order. The connection is rock-bottom. It is, so to speak, a frame-
work truth of common sense. In his own way, Sellars is conscious of the fact that a connection between language and the non-linguistic order is impossible to deny. But, owing, once again, to his worries over givenness, he feels that it is necessary for a philosopher to investigate and reconstruct this relation in a way which avoids the Given. That his discussion of the nature of this relation (Picturing) is highly scientific in flavor should come as no surprise; at least it does not surprise me, for I am convinced that an investigation of the connection between language and what language is about (like investigation into the nature of concept-formation) is sensible only in a scientific framework. For the philosopher, the matter is out of bounds.

(2) Similar remarks can be made concerning Sellars' critique of sense-datum theories. From the fact that there are similarities between veridical and non-veridical experiences, the sense-datum theorist concludes that there must be certain particulars which exemplify what is common to both kinds of perceptual situation and that we must be in some sense aware of these in both kinds of perceptual situation. In certain fairly straightforward ways, such theories involve givenness and are, in those respects, to be rejected. From this, Sellars thinks it follows that the sense-datum theorist's idea that there must be things exemplifying the same properties in both sorts of situation is likewise to be rejected. I disagree, but it does not seem
to me that I am therefore a victim of the myth of the Given. One knows that there are similarities between one's veridical and non-veridical experiences, and if he concludes from this fact that there must be things exemplifying the same property in both situations, he is not perforce committed to the claim that he is also aware of the property (simpliciter) or that which exemplifies it (simpliciter). Nor is he committed to the views of some sense-datum theorists that awareness of sense-data is something unlearned, "simple", or somehow more "certain" than more "complex" levels of awareness. In a manner similar to that of other mentalistic concept-formation theorists, sense-datum theorists have often constructed their theories in their attempts to account for matters (how our knowledge of physical objects is acquired) which properly belong to science. It does not seem to me that a "sense-datum inference" must entail any of these notions. Sellars thinks that, since learning to use words such as "red" is necessarily an intersubjective, public process, not only do we learn to apply words like 'red' to physical objects and physical processes first (in a psycho-genetic sense of "first"), but from this fact he thinks it must follow that it is impossible that anything but a public object could be red, and, in general, that property-words have no correct application other than to public objects. While it is undeniably true that we do learn language in this fashion, it does not seem to me that
Sellars' conclusion (which ultimately is that there cannot be any non-public, non-physical things) follows. Nor does it follow, as it seems to me, that one must be aware of such (non-physical) things as could be inferred to explain the possibility of similarity between veridical and non-veridical awareness. That one may nevertheless sometimes be aware of such things is another matter. The point is that nothing in the inference demands that one must be aware of such things whether in veridical or non-veridical awareness. Nothing in it implies that such things are given to one independently of his having certain conceptual abilities. Nor does the view entail that they are the "simple" building-blocks with which our empirical concepts are formed. Such a theory as the one at which I can only hint in the present context (barely recognizable as a sense-datum theory) must provide cogent distinctions between the sense in which physical things "are red" and the sense in which non-physical things "are red". This is a task which would take me too far from the business at hand. I ask the reader not to simply dismiss the possibility in advance, but to at least retain an agnostic attitude toward it until a more fitting occasion for undertaking this task arises. For now, I refer the reader to Nelson Goodman's *The Structure of Appearance* (pp. 136-142, 232-244) which I think deals effectively with certain key parts of this problem.

(3) As may be seen from Chisholm's remarks, the
Ryleian myth does the job that Sellars believes it does only if one agrees with Sellars' notion of "analysis" (Y is the correct analysis of X only if it would not be sensible to say of someone that he had the concept of X but lacked the concept Y). Since there seem to be "truths of analysis" which do not fit Sellars' notion, the possibility is open that one may concede the plausibility of the Ryleian myth, but, nevertheless, sensibly maintain that semantical sentences analytically entail "mentalese" sentences.

(4) However, one may on other grounds feel dubious as to the philosophical value altogether of the Ryleian myth. Is it sheer fiction? If not, what evidence is there to warrant our taking it to be an accurate reconstruction of anthropological history? Is it a disguised way to talking about the learning-situation of today's child? If so, then one is entitled to demand evidence of the appropriate sort which substantiates the theory that children acquire the concept of a thought in a manner analogous to that of the mythical Ryleians who are indoctrinated by Jones.

I wish to now pose some criticisms which have not arisen previously. The first set of these will be "internal" in nature, the second, with which I shall bring this dissertation to an end, "external".

It should come as no great surprise to find Sellars making a special plea for the place of "hypotheses" in philosophy, (SM (12), quoted above on p. 143) for his sugges-
tion that sense-impressions and thoughts are theoretical entities makes one realize that the sense of 'theoretical' here is the same as that belonging to the term when one speaks of, say, subatomic particles as theoretical entities. Does one argue in a purely dialectical way for the existence of sense-impressions and thoughts according to Sellars? It is difficult to say. A physical theorist does not argue for the existence of, say, neutrinos in such a "pure" fashion. In addition to his dialectical arguments, the physical theorist specifies ways of testing his hypothesis. He arrives at conclusions regarding what sorts of evidential situation would either confirm or count against it. (Rough illustration: If there are neutrinos, bombardment of substance X by y-particles ought to result in a certain sort of trace-pattern in a cloud chamber.)

The postulational introduction of imperceptible entities to explain the behavior of perceptible ones is, according to Sellars, a procedure most characteristic of contemporary science and coincides with its accelerated rate of growth.

...the 'scientific' image of man-in-the-world (as) contrasted with the 'manifest image', might better be called the 'postulational' or 'theoretical' image.1

The 'hypotheses' made by medieval philosophers, without which there would have been no contemporary science, were of course, scientific in nature. Philosophers have, as a matter of fact, advanced the progress of science. Sellars' key
move in the philosophy of Mind seems like a turnabout-is-fair-play idea, namely, to advance the progress of philosophy by making some hypotheses which are essentially scientific in nature. One explains the rational (including perceptual) behavior of persons by means of the hypothesis that there are certain imperceptible entities which cause such behavior.

It seems to me that such hypotheses are inadmissible in philosophical contexts on certain general grounds of principle which I will discuss presently. But, even if they were admissible, I shall maintain that Sellars' Thought and Sense-Impression hypotheses fail on their own grounds. First, to the latter claim.

There are, as I see it, two levels of structural difficulty with Sellars' hypotheses. Following Sellars' terminology, I shall refer to them as (i) the Ryleian level, and (ii) the Peircean level. To explain what I am about, I must fill in some background. Much heat (and light?) has been generated, especially in recent years, over the nature of the distinction between Observation and Theory. That there is a distinction, no one denies. Moreover, it seems clear that, somehow, the distinction between observation and theory coincides with the distinction between occurrent states or episodes, on the one hand, and the dispositions, tendencies, or natures of things, on the other. That is, no matter how richly colored by a background of theory, observation is of states or episodes (of things), and, no matter
how dependent on observation, theories are about the dispositions or natures of things. It is hopefully not too homespun a point to bear reiteration that a theory about things-in-the-world is significant only if it is somehow confirmable by observational means.

The nature of Sellars' hypotheses presents one with a very curious blending of observation and theory. Besides entertaining theories about the dispositions of things, Sellars would have us give credence to the notion of theoretical episodes. In one way, the notion seems harmless. After all, one may say, don't physicists consider it legitimate, indeed necessary, to discuss the states of subatomic particles? That talk about the states of theoretical (because unobservable) entities is scientifically respectable should not be denied. But neither should one lose sight of the fact that talk about theoretical entities is bound to be no more scientifically significant than a bear-story unless it is essentially connected with possible means of empirical confirmation of existence of the entities in question.

Sellars wishes to claim that there are theoretical episodes (thoughts and sense impressions) which are unobservable, and not definable in dispositional terms. Were he to suppose that thought-episodes are observable, i.e. that they are overt verbal utterances, his view would not be significantly different from Logical Behaviorism. Nor can he bring himself to suppose that thinking is unobservable (and a
fortiori something theoretical) because completely analysable in dispositional terms, for the same result ensues. On either alternative, there never would have been a Jones in Ryleville. Now for the first level of difficulty.

Let us give all the credit to Ryleians which it would not be absurd to suppose they are due. In particular, let us credit them with an avid interest in understanding themselves and their environment and with considerable sophistication concerning the nature of scientific theorizing. Indeed, we may suppose that they are the progeny of a recent cultural revolution whose effect was radical banishment of theories, once considered scientific but which now fail to live up to the standards of their New Way of Science. In this connection, it is to be recalled that their "purely Ryleian" language has the following characteristics (vide: p. 66 above):

(1) The fundamental descriptive vocabulary of RL is limited to terms for public things, properties, and processes in Space and Time.

(2) RL makes use of the standard logical operations, and of the subjunctive conditional.

(3) RL contains semantical discourse ('means', 'true', 'designates'). Let us suppose that the language spoken by Ryleians has come to have the above characteristics as a result of recent sweeping changes in their conception of what is and what is not good science. These suppositions do not
carry us much beyond the ones which Sellars himself makes concerning his legendary Ryleians. Moreover, if Sellars can use myths to kill other myths, he can scarcely object to someone else's using a speculative variation on his own myth and considering the latter's consequences for the view which Sellars hopes is strengthened by his own myth. With Ryleville put in this somewhat more flattering light, how should Ryleians react to the theory proposed by Jones? When the charm of its first telling has faded, it would seem that Ryleians (as we are presently conceiving them) would be most interested in knowing whether Jones' theory is true. We may accordingly imagine a tribunal of sorts to take place in Ryleville and that Jones, after presenting his theory to the assembled, is required to answer the following sorts of questions and objections posed by Ryleville's leading citizen, Gilbertus Magnus.

"Your theory, while not without some interest, is one which is difficult to make coherent. I can well understand what it means to say that thoughts are entities whose existence demands recognition because this result follows from a certain theory, provided that 'theory' means 'organized body of propositions having to do with the ways in which \( f_1 \ldots f_n \) things are apt to behave when in circumstances \( C_1 \ldots C_n \). In this sense, we can say that there are certain unobservable episodes, "silent thoughts" if you like, in order to make intelligible our concepts of rationality. But, given that
thinking, properly so called, is a matter of being disposed to do and say now this, now that, in such-and-such circumstances, the only kind of "episode" demanded by a legitimate theory of Thought would be those constituted by shifts from one (verbal) disposition to another. In this sense, the connection between intelligent speech and "thoughts" would be analytic. The episodes demanded by your theory, on the other hand, are not nearly so unexciting as the ones of which I have just spoken. Thoughts as dispositional shifts need not be considered as needful of categorical description. In particular, one would not characterize them as causing changes in disposition-manifesting, since they are such changes. You, however, maintain that, in order to make intelligible the phenomenon of silent rationality, we must suppose that there are certain unobservable states of persons which are the causes of such behavior, in a sense of 'cause' which is quite categorical. But you neglect to consider that our sort of (theoretical) "thought-episodes" are adequate to explain this phenomenon in a way something like the following. What the fact of silent rationality should make us realize is that our previous concepts of rationality, pertaining as they did to overt speech, were much too restricted. We should, expand our conception of "Intelligent Behavior" to include non-verbal as well as verbal behavior. Accordingly, we shall no doubt expand our notions of thoughts in the "episodic" sense of the term, such that we will speak
of speech-thoughts (i.e. shifts in verbal dispositions),
apple-picking thoughts (i.e. shifts in apple-picking dispo-
sitions), and so on. There is no question as to what sorts
of confirmation-procedures would establish a theory pertaining
to thought-episodes as we would conceive them, for, once
again, the connection between such thought-episodes (of all
sorts) and rational activity (of all sorts) is not causal
but logical.

But this is not the end of the criticisms which can
be made of your theory. The sort of thought-episodes of
which you speak demand categorical description of some sort;
yet you seem either unwilling or unable to provide this de-
scription. Thought-episodes, you say, are the causes of
meaningful speech. How could we go about determining whether
or not this is the case? What would have to happen such
that the theory would be in some measure discredited? Per-
haps if we were to find a person whose behavior (including
speech behavior) was unquestionably rational, but who never
had a single thought (in your sense of the term), we would
be justified in rejecting the theory. But how could we ever
determine that this person did not (in your sense) think?
Your stipulation that thought-episodes are unobservable makes
such a discovery impossible. Or would the fact of rational
behavior in itself guarantee that the person was thinking?
If so, I do not understand what this would mean except that
the behavior itself (or accompanying shifts in behavior) con-
stitutes thinking. Now this is exactly our position. If it is yours also, then you are wasting our time here. I assume that you are maintaining something different from our position, and yet what can you say regarding the connection of these thought-episodes of yours with rational behavior such that you can sensibly construe the connection as being causal rather than logical, and give us information which is specific enough to furnish some clue how to either confirm or disconfirm your theory? Could it be that you can give us no more of a characterization of thoughts and their connection with rational behavior than something like, 'Thoughts are episodes such that their occurrence normally culminates in rational behavior?' No doubt you recognize that such a characterization would be closely akin to the "theory" which has it that the sleep of persons who imbibe opium is due to opium's dormative power.

In sum, if your theory does not construe the connection of thought and rational behavior as logical (as we Ryleians do), but causal, you must be able to give us a specific enough characterization of your "thoughts" as would allow for the theory's testibility, or else face the consequence that your "thought-episodes" belong in the same category as phlogiston, occult powers, and so forth. Since you do not seem to be able to supply us with this information, what reason could we have for adopting your theory? Or could it possibly be the case that you, Jones, are not the
innocent proponent of a theory which happens to be weak, but are instead the would-be perpetrator of a clever hoax?"

Such are the difficulties which the theory can be imagined to encounter at the Ryleian level. Now for the next level: the Peirceian ideal. The points to be made here are mostly in connection with some of the ground-rules of Sellars' hypotheses. We find him stressing two points repeatedly: (a) The distinction between Observation and Theory is not such that Observation should be considered entirely "theory-free", as an illumination of a pristine intellect by the natures of things and events. (b) Sense-impressions and thoughts are unobservable, but not unobservable because they are either dispositions or disposition-changes. They are episodes which, however closely connected with dispositions, are not themselves definable in dispositional terms.

Now, in the conceptual structure of Peirceians, the observation-theory distinction would seem in danger of total collapse at certain points. In particular, there no longer seems to be any sort of episode or occurrence which would have to be classified as "unobservable by Peirceians". Once again, Sellars is committed to the position that there is no such thing as "pure observation", that observation is always conditioned by a particular conceptual structure. One quite literally sees things differently in accordance with differences in conceptual structure. While we do not have a sufficiently advanced micro-level neurophysiology to enable us to
give categorical descriptions of those kinds of inner states which play roles analogous to those played by overt verbal episodes, Peirceians, by definition would be this advanced. There is consequently no reason to suppose that thoughts would be in principle unobservable to Peirceians. In their case, this could only be said of thoughts on the supposition that Peirceians would conceive of thinking along purely dispositional lines. Indeed, how could Peirceians draw any sort of distinction between Observation and Theory except one which restricted Theory to occupation with the dispositions of things? In a curious sense, Peirceians and Ryleians would be in agreement on this point. Both, moreover, would find the notion of an "in principle unobservable episode" passing strange. One might say that, for Peirceians, thoughts are commonsensical rather than theoretical entities. Or would there any longer by any distinction between what is commonsensical and what is theoretical for them? But perhaps this crisis would occur sooner than the advent of the Peirceian era. Since there is no Given at any stage of Man's intellectual history for Sellars, it would not seem that unobservability is a matter of principle in any conceptual structure, (except with respect to the sense in which dispositions are not observable). If we follow Sellars' rejection of givenness, is it not appropriate to some degree for us to say that we see collections H₂O molecules as well as that we see water? Perhaps the relatively primitive state of our neuro-
physiology does not allow for quite the same degree of prop­riety in our supposing that we can observe a person's thoughts, but is this **nonsense**, even from our point of view? There are those who would say that it is nonsense from any point of view because it is simply contrary to common sense. But if Sellars' idea that common sense is to be replaced by theoretical science is correct, there would not seem, even now, any reason for holding it a nonsensical idea that thoughts are observable occurrences. Nowhere in SM does Sellars explicitly consider the breakdown in distinction between Observation and Theory which seems inevitable for a Peirceian conceptual structure, let alone the implications this seems to have for the distinction in less developed conceptual structures. But, if I am correct in thinking that these implications do exist, it would seem that Sellars owes us a better argument than he in fact propounds when he maintains that the common sense framework or "manifest image" cannot be replaced piecemeal or part by part in accordance with daily advances in theoretical science. He maintains that this can only be done simultaneoulsy (so to speak) for the entire framework of common sense when science is "com­plete". The alternatives would instead seem to be that common sense either is "inviolable" and not, in any sense, to be replaced, or else is replaceable, and this on a "bit-by-bit" basis.

Some remarks concerning Sellars' ideal of the simul-
taneous replacement of the common sense or "manifest image" framework by the framework of completed science (CSP) are in order. Can our common sense concepts pertaining to perceptual objects (their characteristics and propensities) be replaced by a scientific framework pertaining to systems of imperceptible objects (their characteristics and propensities)? The answer to this question (since it is the more general one) will, it seems to me, also be the answer to the question of whether it is possible, in principle, to replace the common sense mentalistic concepts we have employed in everyday contexts for long ages by a framework pertaining to neurophysiological phenomena. Sellars argues vigorously that such replacement is in principle possible.

I, too, consider such replacement to be possible -- nay, more, I consider this an accomplishment which, barring catastrophe, will eventually come to pass. For Sellars, this idea has the ontological implication that there really are no such things as the perceptual objects of which the manifest image framework speaks. For me, the possibility of such eventual total replacement of the common sense perceptual framework by a scientific one pertaining to imperceptibles has no such implication whatsoever. Moreover, as I conceive the significance of such replacement, it is already underway. Sellars thinks that this cannot sensibly be done except "all at once". Hence, everything concerning an understanding of the differences between Sellars and myself
hinges on an understanding of the differences between his and my uses of the term "replacement", or, as I shall sometimes say, "identification".

It is no longer disturbing to us to hear a physicist say that physical objects, as he speaks of them, are not colored, are mostly empty space, produce no noise, have no taste, etc. At the same time, we consider it almost too obvious to be worth mentioning that there are colored, solid, noisy, odorous things in the world about us. The latter fact is not one which stands in need of explanation. Hence, what is in need of explanation is the sense in which we are willing to accept, with equanimity, the physicist’s assertion that physical objects are not colored. Presumably, we are not guilty of holding to contradictory propositions when we admit to the truth of the hum-drum assertion as well as to the truth of what the physicist says. Hence, let us suppose the physicist to be saying something like, "Physical objects are not really colored". How is 'really' being used in this context?

In her article, "Mental and Physical: Identity versus Sameness", May Brodbeck discusses this issue insightfully and clearly. Since I find her arguments persuasive, I can do no better than to cite and explain them here. For the physicist, she says,

What 'really' exist are those entities whose behavior explains the occurrence and behavior of perceptual objects and characters... The basic existents of the external world are those
things that are mentioned in the ultimate physical theory, that theory which explains everything else, including the behavior of perceptual objects. That is how 'exists' is being used in this context. The theory contains no terms referring to the perceptual qualities of things. That is the literal meaning of 'There are no colors'.

Moreover, as she says, not only do colors and sounds "disappear" in physics, so do all the qualities of perceptual objects. "Indeed, the entire perceptual object disappears."

Brodbeck thus maintains that the physicist is quite within his rights to say that perceptual objects are identical with clusters of invisible particles. But she denies that we are therefore the victims of illusion in our unquestioning belief that there are perceptual objects. The physicist's use of 'identical' is, she says, a special one, one which needs explaining. His use of the term, according to Broadbeck, is much the same as the logician's use of it when the logician maintains that arithmetic is "identical with part of pure logic". Since logic contains neither numerals nor the operations belonging to arithmetic, in what could such an "identity" consist?

The 'identity' is established by coordinating an undefined term, say the numeral two, in the language of arithmetic with a defined term in the language of logic. The result is an interpretation of arithmetic such that, to every true arithmetical statement, there is a corresponding true statement of logic. An interpretation that meets this condition is called a model. Logic is thus a model for arithmetic... We are... tempted to identify the arithmetical and their co-ordinated logical terms because... the interpretation permits us to say, without using number-words everything we can say using them. Numbers become expendable. I shall call this use model-identity. Accurately speaking,
nothing is literally identified with anything else, if only for the very good reason that the language of logic does not contain numerals.\textsuperscript{5} In a similar fashion, Brodbeck says, talk about physical (imperceptible) states replaces talk about perceptual objects. The physical theory of gases, for example, is a model for the perceptual theory. The former is confirmed if, "via the co-ordinations, it successfully explains and predicts the behavior of perceptual objects".\textsuperscript{6} That, she says, is the literal meaning of "Perceptual objects are identical with clusters of invisible particles" or "There really are no perceptual objects". The same holds for the "identification" of mental states and neurophysiological states.

But, to suppose that, in a sense of 'identical' according to which one would say such things as

Cicero is identical with Tully.

one could likewise say that a certain perceptual individual was identical with one or more imperceptible individuals (or, for that matter, with any individual(s) other than itself) would be as unintelligible as saying

Cicero is identical with Rome.

Brodbeck calls this sense of 'identity', \textit{sameness}. This sense of the term is, for her, the strongest possible.

By the customary definition of 'identity' two characters are identical if and only if they are extensionally equivalent, that is, if and only if any individual that exemplifies the one also exemplifies the other... If two characters are thus extensionally identical, then one and the same individual exemplifies both of them. Identity of characters presupposes identity of indi-
viduals. Literally, identity means sameness, either qualitative or numerical. I shall call this literal use, for either characters or individuals sameness, and the technical logical use identity. "Model-identity" is still a third notion... If two individuals are logically identical then any character the one has the other also has. We obviously need an independent explication of what it means for two characters to be the same before we can say that two individuals have all the same characters. Being a man and being a featherless biped are identical but discernibly different characters, hence they are not the same. Identity is weaker than sameness. If two characters are the same then they are also identical, but not conversely.7

How does one know when two things have the same character? For Brodbeck, this question has no answer, in one sense. In another, it is answered by giving examples. One has principles, rules, criteria, for determining whether two compounds are the same sodium salt, or whether the Angstrom unit length of the light waves which they transmit in standard circumstances is the same. But by what criteria does one tell that two things are the same (shade of) color? Brodbeck thinks that the answer to the latter question is "By no criteria whatsoever". I think that she is right in this claim, but only if it is legitimate to use 'thing' in a sense which is broad enough to allow the intelligibility of the locution "non-physical thing". I have argued earlier that this is a legitimate sense of the term, Sellars' critique of sense-datum theories to the contrary notwithstanding. I have also argued that this idea does not necessarily lead to an acceptance of givenness. Nor does Brodbeck's plea for cases of knowledge without criteria necessarily brand her as a
partisan of givenness. Calling the things which one knows without criteria primary things, she goes on to say that, "Anything for which we need criteria is nonprimary. All scientific knowledge is of nonprimary things." That a certain perceptual thing is of a certain color we may know without criteria. That an imperceptible thing or system of things puts forth light waves of a certain length is a complex matter for which one needs criteria. Being of a certain perceptual color and being an imperceptible light wave are unquestionably different characters. Hence the individuals which exemplify them cannot be the same. Physical individuals have no color. Thus, whereas the perceptual and the physical (and the mental and the physical) can be spoken of as being model-identical, they cannot sensibly be considered either (extensionally) identical or as being the same, any more than a color could be the same as a shape.

For Sellars, the sense in which a completed science replaces perceptual objects with physical ones is a sense which implies that there really are no perceptual objects. If this is taken to mean that the perceptual qualities of objects do not enter into a causal explanation of the behavior of physical objects, and therefore, "do not exist", I agree. The perceptual object is, in this sense, model-identical with the physical one. Sellars, however, would attach a much deeper significance to the disappearance of the perceptual object from the terminology of a complete science.
As I understand him, he would have it that the possibility of eventual total replacement of perceptual by physical terminology implies that perceptual objects exist only in the sense that they are one and the same as systems of imperceptible scientific entities. I, for one, can make no sense of this notion. A complete science would "replace" perceptual objects only in the sense that it would altogether bypass them in its explanation of the physical world's causal order. To make perceptual objects disappear by means of terminological emendations requires either a belief in the occult, a leap of faith, or both. Sellars substitutes the sense of 'exist' which would be used by a complete science for the ontological sense of the term. More simply, for Sellars, the results of a complete science would be the true ontology. One frequently finds ontologists alleging that perceptual objects (tables and chairs) "do not exist". What they have usually means is not that one who thinks he sees a table is suffering some fantastic hallucination, but that perceptual objects are capable of reconstruction in terms of a logically more rigorous terminology. Such "rational reconstruction" of common sense terminology pertaining to perceptual objects claims no effect on the reality of perceptual objects. It is with the perceptual object that the ontologist begins and ends. His rational reconstruction of it may be in terms of universals and particulars, perfect particulars, classes of qualities, real and nominal essences,
etc., etc. In no case does he claim that there are no such things. His saying that they do not "exist" means only that the terminology in which they are ordinarily discussed can be replaced by a systematic terminology which rationally reconstructs the former -- but not in the sense of giving the causal explanation for its behavior by co-ordinating it with systems of imperceptible scientific entities. The latter task constitutes the enterprise of theoretical science. Ontology, by contrast, is phenomenological from start to finish.
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER IV

1SPR, p. 19


3Brodbeck, p. 42

4Ibid.

5Brodbeck, p. 43

6Brodbeck, p. 44

7Brodbeck, p. 47

8Brodbeck, p. 46
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