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THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
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FREEDOM, FACTICITY, AND EDUCATION
THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SARTREAN EXISTENTIALISM

DISSSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

George Elwood Overholt, B.Sc., in Ed., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1969

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ABSURD. It is that which is groundless, and therefore meaningless. Man's life is absurd because it is contingent; that is, unjustified. Man's projects are absurd because they are directed toward an unattainable goal, the desire to become a self-conscious thing, a fulfilled being, God. This is man's impossible ontological status.

ANGUISH. The realization of individual freedom and responsibility, the apprehension that the nothingness of one's being creates a gap between the self, its past, and its future. Nothing relieves one of the necessity continually to choose himself, and nothing guarantees the validity of the values thus chosen. It is the apprehension of the meaning of freedom; complete responsibility for choosing in the face of ultimate uncertainty. Anguish occurs only when one confronts himself; fear, on the other hand, occurs when one confronts something external to himself which he finds fearful.

AUTHENTICITY. Good faith; complete honesty in the face of undeniable facts. It is the recognition and affirmation of freedom and responsibility in the broad senses of both words. Authenticity is the opposite of bad faith.

BAD FAITH. This refers to any attempt to deny freedom and responsibility; a lie or self-deception within the totality of a single human consciousness. This is a futile effort, for freedom and responsibility cannot, in fact, be denied. Consequently, it is a form of deception which never completely succeeds in deceiving the self. It is a form of dishonesty with oneself.

BEING. This concept refers to all of the objective facts of the world. Being is what it is, and is what is. It is independent reality, that which is all-embracing rather than individual or subjective. It is a major portion of the "givens" of any man's existence. But, it must be apprehended by the individual human consciousness which attaches human meanings to it. It can never be known just as it is.
COGITO. Descartes' famous formulation, "I think, therefore I am." Even if I doubt everything, what could be the agent of that action other than my mind? Thus, ultimate doubt suggests a proof of my existence. Even if I doubt my own existence, how could it be doubted other than by my own mind? Therefore, I (my mind) must exist, if my mental activity (doubting) exists. I exist by virtue of the fact that I think.

CONSCIOUSNESS. This refers to individual mental activity; the process of apprehending, judging, feeling, comprehending, predicting, etc. Sartre insists that all such activity has an object. It is consciousness of something either external or internal to itself. This latter distinction is described by Sartre as two levels of consciousness:

(1) Pre-reflective consciousness. This is also called non-theletic or positional consciousness. This level, in Sartre's opinion, precedes the cogito and forms the hypothesis for it. Here there is no explicit knowledge, there is just an implicit awareness of being conscious of something external to oneself, such as a tree, or another person. This consciousness is directed to the outside, toward the table, to use Sartre's example.

(2) Reflective consciousness. This is also called thetic consciousness. It is consciousness split from itself, turned back upon itself. At this level, one becomes aware of himself as being conscious of a table, a tree, a person, etc. In other words, this level of consciousness has only one object; pre-reflective consciousness. It is the explicit awareness of one's own pre-reflective state which results from the act of reflecting upon it.

COUNTERFINALITY. This is the unintended and, often, unforeseen consequence of any human activity which results from the way in which matter strikes back at man whenever he modifies it. "Man is mediated by matter to the extent that matter is mediated by man." Examples are: air pollution, over-production, inflation, land erosion, etc.

DESIRE. This is consciousness of a lack of being. It is a "hole" in one's own being which calls for fulfillment.

DIALECTIC. This is the process of reciprocal exchange, which produces an on-going creation of syntheses. It is the interaction between any two existents. At the microscopic level it can be between a man and any object of
his perception. At the macroscopic level it can be between "forces of history" such as social classes, modes of production, etc. The classic formulation is Hegel's "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis," so extensively utilized by Marx (and Sartre) in formulating a theory of history and mental activity. Dialectical reason can be seen as analytical reason which posits a thesis in confrontation with the unknown, or a not-yet-accomplished end which represents the antithesis; the final result of the interaction thus produced being the synthesis.

**ESSENCE.** This refers to whatever a man makes himself be fundamentally. For Sartre, it always lies in the past at any given moment. Since there is no pre-set mold for human nature (there is no human nature as such.), each man lives his life as an on-going process of creating his own essence.

**EXISTENCE.** This refers to the mere fact for any individual that he lives without there being any particular meanings attached to that realization. It is the bare fact that one thinks, acts, etc., that he is. According to Sartre, existence precedes essence. Every man simply is prior to becoming anything in particular.

**FACTICITY.** This refers to the totality of necessary conditions of any individual's life, the inescapable "facts" of his situation. It is those objective factors represented by a man's material conditions--his constraints, his circumstances, etc. It is the factual environment within the context of which an individual lives at any given time. All of those factors which the consciousness necessarily apprehends and with which it is forced to concern itself in the process of making choices. For example, the facticity of freedom is that it cannot not exist. Thus, the ultimate facticity of man is that he cannot not choose under any circumstances. The remainder of his facticity is made up of all those objective factors present to his consciousness which his freedom utilizes as materials in the process of choosing an essence and its concomitant behaviors. Of course, any individual may choose to live in bad faith by engaging himself in the futile effort to persuade himself that the case is otherwise.

**FINALITY.** This is the intended result of any human action; the desired and planned-for goal when accomplished. It is the foreseen event.
FINITUDE. Since man is the product of his own free choice of essence, he is finite by virtue of the fact that he cannot help excluding possibilities which do not fall within the range of his preferences. The process of choice and selection necessitates finitude. This concept does not refer to death or mortality. Man would be finite even if immortal, for he could never choose everything. At every moment he must make a selection based ultimately on nothing but his own values and preferences. Man is subjective, and this expresses his finitude. In addition, he cannot be objective for being as it is can never be known as it is, and neither can it be known comprehensively. Even for an immortal being, the case could never be otherwise.

FOR-ITSELF. For Sartre this term refers to the individual human consciousness, specifically, its inner nothingness. It is the agent of the mental act of identifying itself as not, or as other than, its objects of perception. It is simply consciousness in action, a negation of all of its objects. It nihilates the world, identifying itself negatively by separating itself from all that it perceives. This is the process of negative self-identification through reflection—in simple terms, it is the mental act of perceiving oneself as that which perceives, not that which is perceived. Being substantially nothing, the for-itself fills in its own content for itself.

FREEDOM. This is the "empty" substance of the for-itself. Because it is a "nothingness" it is forever forced to choose itself, to define itself on the basis of nothing. Freedom implies not only the possibility but also the constant necessity of choice. It does not imply successful attainment of any particular chosen ends.

IN-ITSELF. This term is used to signify fulfilled being. It refers to all of the existents of the world, physical objects, which are completely fulfilled, lacking nothing. It is that which exists in itself, as it is. It is those existents which lack consciousness and nothingness, which are completely constrained by those causal laws peculiar to their specific natures. In general, it refers to material existence.

INSTITUTION. This refers to the practico-inert organizational structure of practice and beliefs characterized by a given group. Broadly speaking, it is what social
scientists refer to as a society or culture. Constituent elements of the above which provide more specific examples of an institution are bureaucracy, the military, the church, educational systems, etc. See "practico-inert."

LABOR. This signifies man's effort to fulfill his needs.

METAPHYSICS. This is the study of that which is beyond the physical aspects of experience; prior to experience. It is the study of the dimensions and structures of being itself as a concrete and particular totality.

ONTOMETRY. This is a description of being itself—that which everything of a kind has most fundamentally in common. A description of the conditions by means of which "there is" a world, a human reality. See "metaphysics" and "being."

PAST. This is what the for-itself has made of itself. It is an important element of any individual's total facticity at any given moment. It is the already accomplished, and therefore factual, aspect of the for-itself's essence. It can only be summed up after the fact. By the same token, a man's essence in total can only be identified after his death, when no further choices are possible—when his entire life has become a part of the past. For Sartre, death is the only ultimate finality.

PHENOMENON. This is any aspect of being as it appears or is revealed.

PHENOMENOLOGY. Generally, this is a method of study which describes phenomena from the point of view of a single consciousness. Sartre does not agree with Husserl (to whom the theory is originally attributed) on all points of phenomenological methodology. When he refers to phenomenology, he has in mind his own approach, which corresponds essentially to the above definition.

PRACTICO-INERT. This refers to all of those man-made restrictions to freedom which have resulted from man's creation of viable ways to fulfill his needs. Specific examples are traditions, folkways, mores, etc. A general example is culture; a group's total complex of inherited and rigidified practices and beliefs.

PROJECT. This is the basic concept of existential psychoanalysis. It refers to the structure of ultimate ends and
intermediate means which constitute the essence the for-itself chooses for itself. It is the ultimate choice of oneself; the transcendent goals and values in the light of which one orders his beliefs and actions.

RESPONSIBILITY. This is the consciousness of being the incontestable author of all that is--both of oneself and of the world of which one is aware.

SCARCITY. This refers to the fact that there is not enough of what it takes to fulfill all of man's desires and needs. It most often refers to a shortage of material goods, but also illuminates man's finitude by revealing him as a creature with lacks to fulfill in the face of a situation which precludes the possibility of equal fulfillment for all.

SERIALITY. This is a loose collective structure of people characterized by impersonality. Individuals are identified, within a serial structure, only as numerical units rather than in terms of their intrinsic or individual qualities, and are held together by some object or definition which they need, in the former case, or accept, in the latter case. Sartre's example of the first type is that of bus passengers--they are only passengers identified by their relationship to the bus (what Sartre calls a collective entity), but are not seen as individual human beings in this case. Examples of the second type would be Jews or Negroes, groups of people which constitute in themselves a collective entity defined by outsiders--a definition which they accept for themselves, or, at least, in terms of which they act.

SITUATION. This is the for-itself's engagement with the world. It is the totality of particular ways in which it interacts with its facticity. It is the ideal relation to facticity posited by the for-itself.

TRANSCENDENCE. This refers to the act by which the for-itself goes "beyond" given conditions, changes its project, overcomes the "givens" of its facticity, modifies its situation, etc. Transcendence reveals the dialectical nature of human history which is based on the fact that men interact with facticity, in such a way as to change it and themselves. History is the story of the dialectical process of change caused by the fact that men continuously transcend themselves and their conditions.
INTRODUCTION

Sartre's prominence in the intellectual world is well established. That he is not only the most popular but also the most prolific existentialist writer of our times is undeniable. Of course, the validity of his concepts has been hotly debated within scholarly circles. Professional philosophers, especially those on the opposite side of the English Channel, have tended to consider him as less than technically competent, and more often than not, have been quick to point out that his work is marred by exaggeration, inconsistency, and a point of view which is often narrow. To some extent, these criticisms are justified, for it seems clear enough that Sartre frequently sees only what he wants to see.

On the other hand, all of this is perhaps understandable by virtue of the fact that Sartre purports to be using the phenomenological method, which he learned under Husserl at Berlin. According to this school of thought, things in the world are assumed to be "there" just as they appear to be. The objects of perception exist in and of themselves independently of human perceptions of them. But, they can never be apprehended just as they are because they are only illuminated by individual human perception; through it, the
givens of the world are filtered, analyzed, restructured, and interpreted. Individual human consciousness is seen, in this view, as the source of all meaning for men. As a result, the phenomenologist claim is that the world can only be described, not apprehended as it is, and that this describing can only be done from the specific point of view of a particular individual. In this way, phenomenology purports to avoid the pitfalls of both idealism and realism by refusing to see the universe exclusively in terms of spiritual or conceptual abstractions on the one hand, or in terms of material or "natural" determinism on the other. Rather, phenomenology attempts to achieve a synthesis of the two by regarding the individual human consciousness as a filter through which men interact with their environments.

Of course, neither realists nor idealists are willing to grant such basic assumptions as these. Thus, the differences between more traditional philosophers and the Sartrean approach to existentialism are fundamental; they do not accept his premises, and he repudiates theirs.

Be that as it may, there is one thing they cannot deny--Sartre has had wider popular impact on the contemporary world than they! His Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason have given us a whole new philosophic terminology, and his views have elicited widespread praise and blame on both sides of the Atlantic. He is undoubtedly a spokesman for our times--a Descartes who has lived through
World War II, France's Algerian problems, the cold war, and the emergence of the nuclear and electronic ages. What he has to say has the peculiar ring of the mid-twentieth century. It is to us he speaks and about us he philosophizes. Though his intellectual debts reach far back into the history of European thought (Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx, and Husserl being among the most prominent of those who have influenced him), he is primarily a modern who has learned from the recent past. He is a worshipper at the idol of relevance, and is, in addition, a very perceptive writer capable of searching criticism of the society he sees around him.

Neither his literary nor his philosophical works are products of cold logic. Rather, they are the expression of a passionate and sensitive personality—a personality that is involved in its epoch. He is in the forefront of those of our time who have insisted upon social responsibility and personal commitment as an ideal for human conduct. He deals with the problem of the individual in a society which constantly threatens to snuff out man's uniqueness. As a result, he writes of alienation and determinism. He speaks to us of the oppression of industrial, technological, and bureaucratic societies, outlines the condition of man in his present milieu, and protests the evils he sees there. His ideas are different, at least from those usually heard on this side of the Atlantic, and, as such, offer a certain novelty. But novelty alone does not constitute sufficient justification for a life's work or for a study such as this one.
What is more important about Sartre is the fact that his descriptions and analyses at both the microscopic and macroscopic levels are of practical value for those who wish, for whatever reason, to gain a more comprehensive and fundamental understanding of themselves and the world in which they live. Even for those who stand in a different philosophic tradition, or are unable to grant the basic premises of Sartrean existentialism, there is value to be found in his pages, for they are consistently punctuated with striking insights and illuminating illustrations. Sartre's widespread appeal rests at least as much upon these elements of his work as any other, for they are not only cogent, penetrating, and illuminating, but also are aimed at the real lives of individuals, groups, institutions, and societies. Furthermore, his basic concepts, when integrated, reveal a coherent world-view which attempts to embrace the twentieth century, and, in addition, offers something of particular relevance to every concerned and socially aware individual. Sartre might well be regarded as a reincarnation of the sixteenth and seventeenth century system builders in philosophy, for his aim is to describe and analyze the human condition in its totality. But, in contrast, his methodology is to describe its elements in terms of concrete particulars. Thus, to the extent that he has been successful, he is speaking to all of us. In addition, he is calling for action. On that point, his intention is unmistakably clear. This is no esoteric, ivory-tower philosopher. Rather, we have here a concerned and aware human being who
has turned the spotlight of philosophy onto the most pressing problems of our world; he has made philosophy "bake-bread," so to speak. Whether what he does can be called philosophy in the technical sense of the word is a matter of secondary importance. As a result, to know Sartre is to know something important about our times. For he is in a very real sense the embodiment of them. Such a claim would not likely be disputed by even the most intransigent of his critics.

But Sartre is little known on this side of the Atlantic, either by philosophers of education or educators in general. This can be attributed to several factors. One is the fact that he is very difficult to read, especially for American scholars who stand in a tradition drastically different from his. Another is that, at first glance, he appears to have said little or nothing which directly pertains to education as such. It is this writer's hope to demonstrate that the above is not, in fact, the case. And, third, is the fact that his ideas are probably disquieting to many or so novel as to seem ridiculous. Sartre rightly warns of "anguish," for to read him with sensitivity and perception is an emotional experience which can hardly be described as pleasant. The apparent pessimism and somberness of his views may have been such as to discourage many who would have otherwise embraced him. Only a handful of American educators, such as, for example, Professors Kneller, Harper, Van Cleve Morris, and Hedley, have dealt with Sartre's ideas at all, and then usually only within the larger context of a discus-
sion of existentialism in general. Detailed efforts on the part of educators to investigate the totality of Sartre's philosophy have been few indeed! This seems a sad lack, for Sartre does, in fact, talk of education though he doesn't use the word. Rather, his terminology consists of words like freedom, facticity, responsibility, the for-itself, the in-itself, the practico-inert, the project, the seriality, the institution, and scarcity, among others. In addition, he specifically discusses the way in which a child born into a particular group becomes transformed into a member of that group. That Sartre is, in fact, talking about what goes on in schools as well as elsewhere; that he is, in fact, describing or attempting to describe the educational process in its totality comes clear to one who acquaints himself with these concepts. That these concepts taken together form a structural whole is a major point which, it is hoped, will be corroborated by the investigations undertaken in this study. And, that a structured, viable, empirically defensible, and relevant view of education lurks here is a possibility too strong to be ignored.

The chief purpose of this study, then, is to take a first tentative step in the direction of filling the gap between the implications suggested by Sartrean concepts, and their meaning in the context of educational theory and practice.

Thus, this study consists of an attempt to establish the relevance of basic Sartrean concepts to education. The
effort has been divided into two parts. First, an exegesis has been undertaken; that is, Part One of the study consists of a detailed and hopefully clear explication of those Sartrean concepts which most critics consider fundamental to his overall view, and which, as well, seem to be speaking directly to or about education in its broadest sense—as planned change of behavior, formal, and informal, within schools and outside of them. In turn, Part Two consists of an attempt to draw out the major implications of these selected concepts for educational theory and practice. Both a descriptive and a prescriptive analysis has been undertaken. For the purposes of clarity, these have been presented in separate chapters.

First, it has been the intention of this writer to suggest a descriptive theory of education based on Sartre's fundamental concepts; to see education as Sartre thinks it is, as opposed to that which he thinks it ought to be. Following this chapter is one intended to demonstrate that Sartre does, in fact, offer viable prescriptions; that, for him, there are definite "goods" and "bads" in the world. Then, on the basis of the prescriptions thus identified, a prescriptive analysis of education is presented. This part of the work is divided into three chapters dealing with the specific topics of objectives, methods, and curricula.

In addition, these implications are delineated in two ways. First, an attempt is made to outline those descriptive concepts of existing educational conditions which follow most directly from Sartre's conceptions of the human condition in
general, and his description of the way the child becomes a member of the group in particular. By way of contrast, an attempt is made to note those theories of education which in Sartre's view would have to be considered fictional, mythological, or unrealistic; that is to say, those educational ideals and practices which do not follow from Sartrean concepts and, on that basis, would have to be considered inappropriate. Then, the same kind of investigation is attempted in terms of prescriptions for education—to point out what education ought to be on the basis of a Sartrean perspective. It goes without saying that the order in which these demonstrations are attempted do not in every case correspond to the above. At times the demonstrations occur in reverse order. Demonstrations of what does not follow precede those concerned with valid implications. Or, in many cases, it has seemed advantageous to this writer to intertwine the two approaches while, at the same time, relating each to the specific category of educational theory or practice in question. In the opinion of this writer, greater clarity and precision have been achieved by allowing the nature of the ideas under investigation to dictate the structure of their explication. It is perhaps not the wisest course to force any analysis of Sartrean thought into a pre-set mold. The difficulties of descriptively and prescriptively relating it to specific areas of education pose problems which can best be dealt with when encountered. As a result, the methodological approach taken by this study is primarily pragmatic, as logical as the abili-
ties of the author will permit, and to some extent, intuitive. Throughout, the primary purpose is to concentrate on those implications for education which clearly follow from Sartre's concepts, as opposed to those which do not, but to allow the organization and structure of the arguments to be dictated by the nature of the ideas involved. At all times, the criteria of selection have been the greatest clarity and precision available.

The major source used for this study is Sartre himself. Among his writings, two are of fundamental importance. These are his two major philosophical works, Being and Nothingness and the Critique of Dialectical Reason. The views expressed in these two treatises represent the ultimate sources of everything said in this study. In order to supply a broader view and provide necessary background, this writer has considered it of value to refer to a number of Sartre's additional philosophical writings as well. And for the purpose of providing checks and balances for the interpretations presented in this study, the reader is referred to the views of such critics as Wilfrid Desan, Anthony Manser, Norman Greene, Robert Denoon Cumming, and Hazel Barnes. It will be noticed that contrasting interpretations found in the works of these and other critics at times have been brought to the attention of the reader both within the body of the text and through the use of appropriate references. In addition, the views of such educators as George Kneller, Ralph Harper, Van Cleve Morris, and Eugene Hedley have been consulted by this
writer.

The reader should be warned that this study necessarily admits of several important limitations.

First of all, no attempt has been made to consider Sartre as novelist, playwright, political figure, or artist. Neither is any detailed biographical investigation of his social and intellectual debts undertaken. The focus of this study is not intended to encompass Sartre per se. It concentrates, rather, on a selection of basic Sartrean concepts. Consequently, only Sartre's major philosophical works are directly considered in this study, though relevant literary passages have been noted from time to time where they appear to be helpful.

Second, this study must admit of a fundamental shortcoming. One of its two major sources, the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, has to this writer's knowledge not yet been translated into English. As a result, it has been necessary to rely heavily on the interpretations of Wilfrid Desan and the excerpts translated by Robert Denoon Cumming in studying the views presented by Sartre in this work. In an effort to partly overcome this lack, the author has had numerous passages from the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* graciously translated for him by David Wolfe, a Ph.D. candidate in Foreign Language Education at The Ohio State University. Several of these excerpts appear in the first chapter of Part Two, and a complete translation of the relevant passage is included at the end of this study.
Third, since clarity and precision are among this writer's primary goals, he has felt that no attempt should be made to either defend or attack Sartre. All of Sartre's basic premises have been granted in the hope of facilitating deeper insight and clearer communication, and little criticism has been attempted. Where it occurs, it is confined to those cases which seem to require it for the above-named purposes. In short, the intention of this writer is to describe Sartrean ideas and their implications for education; this study is intended as neither an apologetics for, nor a denunciation of, Sartre himself.

Fourth, it should be emphasized that the immensity of Sartre's work as well as the depth of his ideas precludes any claims to definitiveness on the part of this study. If it serves to clarify some of the more common confusions regarding Sartre, and suggests a number of implications for education that Sartre himself would endorse, this study will have achieved its major purpose. Little, as yet, has been written on several of the topics herein considered and, as a result, this study incorporates a degree of tentativeness on the part of the writer. However, it is hoped that even a less than completely adequate attempt to deal with problems of this kind may prove to be of value. If this study can stimulate additional scholarly, and more conclusive, work on this subject, its purpose will have been doubly achieved.
Finally, it must be admitted that these efforts are based on a faith that Sartrean existentialism is not inimical to the concepts of universal, public, and compulsory education. It is further hoped, as a corollary objective, that this faith may be clearly vindicated by the results of this study.
PART ONE

BASIC SARTREAN CONCEPTS
"Man is condemned to be free." This statement, pregnant in its implications, constitutes the basis of Sartre's thought. Man does not choose freedom according to him. Neither does he achieve it or possess it. Man is freedom, and cannot, in fact, choose otherwise. In order to deny his freedom, man must deny the one irrefutable fact of life and the very nature of human existence itself. In denying his freedom, man must deny his own existence, and, if we are to have any confidence in either common sense or Descartes' cogito, that is impossible.¹

Man is the creature who is never ultimately forced to do anything! He faces no situation lacking alternatives. Where alternatives exist, freedom exists, for choice is thereby necessitated. Thus, there is no escape from freedom, for freedom is ultimate reality. One may deny reality, but in so doing he is deceiving himself for he is acting on a premise which is factually false as opposed to one which is factually true. For Sartre, one can deceive himself about the truth, if he chooses to do so, but he can never ultimately deny it. And the truth of the matter is not only that man is free, but
that human existence is freedom. They are one and the same. To deny one's own inescapable nature is to deny one's own identity and, as a result, to embrace self-alienation. Such is Sartre's basic contention. Freedom is man, and man is freedom. They are one and the same, and inseparable. As a result, man does not choose freedom, he is freedom; he is condemned to it by virtue of the fact that it comprises his very nature and definition.

Sartre's way of affirming freedom is to deny that man ever faces situations in which there are no alternatives present. This, in fact, might be said to delineate what is often referred to as the "existential situation" or the "human dilemma." Man, facing alternatives, is aware of them as such. He is not what they are; he is not of the world outside himself. This negation of the world, which is man, is in one sense the "Nothingness" to which Sartre refers in *Being and Nothingness*. The physical world, completely constrained by causal laws, contains a lack. There is an area in which causal laws do not operate as determinants. This area is man, except to the extent that he inhabits a physical body. Man contains "nothingness" in himself in the sense that he alone among the existents of the world is contingent; he is neither explained nor determined by causal laws. He is the exception to all the rules; a being which is ultimately unjustifiable, unexplainable, and uncontrollable. He is "a hole in being."

This nothingness, this negation of being by man (he is identified in his own consciousness as that which is not the object
of his consciousness.), separates him from the physical world and leaves him groundless and unjustified. There are no causal laws which ultimately determine him; and, as a result, the void can only be filled by the process of making choices. Thus, the concomitant of human consciousness is choice—ultimately undetermined choice—and not any set of deterministic laws. In conclusion, then, this void can only be filled by human action based on nothing. Undetermined and unjustified, human consciousness must posit, it cannot discover! It must create its own actions and the world in the face of ultimate uncertainty.  

Thus, the individual constantly faces decisions which only he can make; to face the realization of his own responsibility which arises from this situation is more than unpleasant, it strikes terror into his heart. Sartre's term for this, anguish, has become relatively common among European intellectuals by this time, and it is not too strong a word to describe the emotional situation he has in mind. As Erich Fromm, one of the most prominent of contemporary social critics, has suggested, freedom is man's greatest fear. It is freedom, above all, from which man strives to escape—by finding justifications somewhere in the world outside himself.  

But, what is the nature of this freedom that it strikes such terror into the hearts of men, yet allows for Sartre to claim it as the one irrefutable fact of human existence? Upon what basis does Sartre make his claim for the factual nature of freedom? Let us now take up that question in greater de-
tail by looking at Sartre's concept of consciousness.

All knowledge, he claims, is intuitive and immediate. It comes to be in action and operates from a certain point of view.

All consciousness is positional in that it transcends itself in order to reach an object, and it exhausts itself in this same positing. All that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, toward the table; all of my judgments or practical activities, all my present inclinations transcend themselves; they aim at the table and are absorbed in it. Not all consciousness is knowledge (there are states of effective consciousness, for example,) but all knowing consciousness can be knowledge only of its object.4

Thus, for Sartre, all knowing consciousness has an object; it is consciousness of something. The reader can notice here Sartre's attempt to avoid the pitfalls of subjective idealism by insisting that there is a world of objects which exist independently of human consciousness. He wants to assume that things are there, that they exist in themselves just as they appear to be. That, to him, is obvious, and he wishes to engage in no metaphysical speculation about it. Though we may grant him this, it should be noted that he has not proved his case for the independent existence of the physical world—in a sense he has posited it.5 However the case may be, his formulation gives us two separate yet interacting realms of existence, consciousness and the objects of consciousness. That is to say, Sartre's world is made of minds and things. Both a Cartesian influence and Sartre's attempt to deal with the problem of the separation of mind and matter become obvious here.
It is for these reasons that Sartre introduces the now famous terms, for-itself and in-itself. The for-itself refers to human consciousness, the in-itself to the things in the world apprehended by consciousness. Yet, despite his best efforts, the for-itself occupies the center of the stage in Sartre's thinking, and the in-itself comes off rather second best. The world in-itself cannot be described as it is, even for Sartre, for it is human consciousness (the for-itself) which does the describing. The danger of talking about the in-itself any other way lies in the fact (for Sartre) that it might lead the reader to the mistaken belief that a neutral description of the world is possible. But, that cannot be the case, for all consciousness is positional; it describes from a certain point of view! A belief in the possibility of neutral descriptions might even lead someone to view other people as parts of the world in-itself and to feel that they may be neutrally described as well. Such an attempt could lead to a locking of human beings within the constraints of observable "causal laws" supposedly analogous to those of the physical world in-itself. This would constitute, in effect, not only an attempt to deny freedom, but also would be a factual mistake about the nature of human existence. As such it would be doomed to failure. This seems to be the crux of Sartre's criticism of authoritarian political regimes and scientific efforts to turn man into an object of study. These are dangers which he constantly strives to avoid, and, by implication, to warn us against, as we shall
Thus, in introducing the for-itself and the in-itself, Sartre feels that he is making a distinction of crucial importance. He is trying to argue that the world, except for the mind, is the realm in which causal laws operate. The world has no secrets; the causal laws are not hidden. That is not to say that the causal laws are all known; obviously they are not. But they can be discovered by use of the appropriate techniques. The picture of the world, or the in-itself if you prefer, is one of a realm of existence which is fulfilled. Being-in-itself is plenitude to the fullest possible degree for Sartre.

However, such is not the case with the for-itself. Human consciousness is a realm of existence of a different order. Man's consciousness is directed outside himself for some purpose posited by him. Thus, the term for-itself as opposed to that which exists only in-itself. Consciousness aims at the situation present at any given moment in time. It is posited both temporally and spatially. The necessary and sufficient condition for such a positing is that consciousness be aware of itself as consciousness of something. That is to say, human consciousness must be known to itself—it must be consciousness which is conscious of itself as consciousness of a tree, for example. Otherwise, it would be an unconscious consciousness, an obvious absurdity. Whether the tree is actually there in-itself is a moot question. For con-
sciousness of the tree can only be such for a for-itself, or, if you prefer, for me. Thus, Sartre is claiming that, despite the fact that things exist independently in-themselves, there is no possibility for a complete and accurate neutral description of them; for consciousness of the world is positional—located in a situation and operative from a particular point of view in time and space.6

Thus, we have two functions of consciousness. The positional consciousness is incapable of judging itself because it is directed in its entirety to the outside. Only the reflective consciousness turned back on itself has this particular capacity. But, the positional or non-reflective consciousness is primary and makes possible the reflexive consciousness which arises in the act of positional consciousness. That is to say, one must be conscious of a tree, not before, but in order to be conscious of his own consciousness of a tree; one must see the tree in order to be conscious of himself as seeing it. The act must be directed outward in order to make the turning back inside possible—for all consciousness must have an object and that includes the reflexive consciousness. It must have a consciousness to be conscious of in order to come into being. Reflexive consciousness, like positional consciousness, must be consciousness of something. But, unlike positional consciousness, it is that consciousness which is conscious of another consciousness—not of an object. Thus, the positional consciousness, on the other hand, could be described as a pre-reflective act. It is
a pre-reflective cogito (to use Cartesian terminology) which makes the cogito possible. In other words, Sartre might say, "I think (of the world), therefore I think (of my awareness of the world), therefore I am (I have become aware of my own existence as consciousness of the world.)" In the Cartesian sense, Sartre's pre-reflective cogito constitutes the foundation of, or hypothesis for, the Cartesian cogito.

So, for Sartre, consciousness is logically prior to self-consciousness and to the world in-itself. For it is through consciousness that both come to be. Consciousness is human existence, and, as such, is groundless. This is where, according to Sartre, the infinite regress of "whys" must come to rest. Nothing is the cause of consciousness. Consciousness is the cause of its own way of being. 7

In the light of the above, it seems necessary to conclude that consciousness is not related to the experience of being conscious, it is this experience. There is in it nothing substantial, it is pure appearance—it emerges in the world and exists precisely to the extent that it appears. It is pure appearance, but it is also absolute in the sense that within it existence and appearance are one and the same. Since it is pure appearance, and what appears to it is nothing other than appearance, it is pure subjectivity. Therefore, it is not constrained by the laws of the in-itself for it is pure spontaneity. For consciousness there is, and can be, no laws other than those it freely posits in the act of apprehending the world and itself!
Consciousness, then, is not conditioned by the givens of the world. However, it is unable to exist without them since it needs something to be conscious of in order to come into being. But, its existence is purely subjective, and thus, in relation to the givens of the world, acts as that which negates and transcends them. It acts as a negation of an already existing given and a positing of a not yet existing end. Thus, "it is what it is not, and it is not what it is," as Sartre puts it.

Moreover, it acts as its own negation when it becomes reflexive. It is then withdrawing from itself—splitting in two. If it did not act in this way, it would be a pure and simple given of the world (an in-itself) and could not relate to any other given. In simpler terms, one rock cannot relate to another, only a self-conscious consciousness (a man) can do that. No choices could be made, no objects perceived, and no actions undertaken if consciousness did not withdraw from consciousness of an object thereby making consciousness of an object (positional or pre-reflective consciousness) capable of directing and focusing its attention according to some goal or plan. Only in this way is the positing activity of consciousness possible; because it is aware of the negation, or, as Sartre terms it, the nothingness, of its own being. Thus, it is a hole in being, not a part of being; it is nothingness as opposed to being.

\[ \sqrt{\text{Consciousness}} \] is because it makes itself. \[ \sqrt{\text{It}} \] has to be its own being; it is never sustained by being; it
sustains being in the heart of subjectivity, which means once more that it is inhabited by being but that it is not being. Consciousness is not what it is.

Because it is not what it is, in this sense, it is freedom. It is a negation of all the causal laws of the world of the in-itself. However, it can only exist as a negation of being-in-itself because it possesses no sufficiency of being (the plenitude of being-in-itself, a pure given). Since it negates being-in-itself, it is other than being-in-itself. But it possesses no sufficiency of being since it is also other than itself when it becomes reflexive—it splits into two realms when it reflects upon itself. Only consciousness can be constituted thus, as an internal negation. Therefore, self-consciousness acts as more than a negation of objectivity. It excludes it, for objectivity demands explicit negations. The object is what consciousness makes itself not be, while consciousness is that which makes itself be. That is to say, consciousness is not the tree, but it is what apprehends the tree. Even if consciousness were to attempt to become an object (to become one and the same as the tree, for example), it could never do so for the very attempt requires consciousness to remain other than the object it is apprehending. The relationship is one of subject to object. Should this relationship disappear, consciousness would also disappear—only the object would remain.

In short, the for-itself (self-conscious consciousness) can never become one with the in-itself (in this case, a tree).
Even should it attempt to define itself in terms of the causal laws governing the world of the in-itself, or subject itself to those laws in an attempt to become "determined" by them, it could do so only as a part of a reflective act, in other words, by freely choosing to do so. But, as pointed out above, such an attempt is doomed to failure. It cannot be accomplished in fact. Thus consciousness can deny everything but its own nature. Or, in other words, freedom is the one irrefutable fact for human existence.

At this point, it seems clear that, granting all the above, yet another question arises. We have seen how the for-itself affects the in-itself. But it is obvious that this relationship is reciprocal. That is to say, the in-itself also affects the for-itself. In order to describe this side of the picture, Sartre introduces his concept of \textit{facticity}.\footnote{\textit{facticity}}

Basically, facticity is the same concept that Sartre means by situation. That is to say, man does not exist alone, but in a situation which he has not chosen. This is the \textit{positional} aspect of consciousness. A man is who he is, and where he is, with certain external circumstances that he must consider despite the fact that he has not chosen them. They are simply there, according to Sartre. Any man is necessarily born into a certain society, as a member of some particular social class, in some part of the world, and so on. Thus, he is faced with certain brute possibles in the world around him. This total complex in Sartre's terms is the individual's \textit{facticity}; at any given moment it is one's past with all of its
component elements.

There are two elements of this facticity which appear, at first glance, to delimit freedom. One is what men have commonly called passions, and the other is composed of the circumstances of the external world.

Passions have most commonly been seen as emotions, drives, instincts, or desires which constitute internal entities which are supposed to push and pull individuals in various directions. Whether these are a part of the individual's past or not is still a debatable question. Usually the traditional notion states that there are motives which incline men to act in particular ways. But, the trouble with this, according to Sartre, is that it makes the mind into an object which appears to be swayed by external forces. If his concept of consciousness is to be accepted, this is factually impossible. Furthermore, this view amounts to treating motives as if they were things, when they are, in fact, formulations of human consciousness. Sartre wants to argue that motives are not things like trees, high winds, acceleration, or inertia—such a concept of motives amounts to little more than an analogy drawn from the world of causal laws. In other words, the trouble with this concept of motives is that it sees them as psychic forces analogous to the forces of the physical world. But, if we are to accept what has already been postulated about human consciousness, it becomes clear that motives are not psychic forces but rather particular ways of dealing with the world. Violent emotions may in fact be seen as magical and sometimes irrelevant attempts to attain a goal
when rational means have failed, or where faith in rational means has failed. For example, a man faced with great danger may do something irrelevant such as lighting a cigarette or fainting, a man faced with a "psychic" disturbance such as, for example, frustration, may do physical violence to some inoffensive person or thing--beating his wife, kicking the dog, or smashing his fist through the wall. Emotions less violent may cause him to project "qualities" onto the world rather than admitting that they are due to his own attitudes. One may say that, "I am frustrated because the teacher, or my boss, is authoritarian," when in fact the case is that the teacher or boss in question is seen as authoritarian because the individual is frustrated, often for some entirely irrelevant reason.

Sartre's argument is that in all cases of emotion we have chosen to act in the way we do. We have not been forced--though, of course, he admits that once habit patterns are fixed they are difficult to break. But difficulty is not the same thing as impossibility. Sartre seems always anxious to make that point. He is saying that what is "seen" as threatening appears such because of a set of attitudes, and these are ultimately under the control of the individual. The teacher in the classroom with upraised ruler and stern countenance may be seen as reassuring or challenging to the good student, but as threatening to the bad student. By the same token, the new Pontiac may be seen as attractive while it is sitting in the showroom, but as object of envy or frustration when
sitting in the neighbor's driveway. It all depends not just on the situation, but also on the attitudes of the individual who is apprehending the situation. The reaction is not the result of a bare stimulus, but of a set of attitudes related to a situation; and the reaction may be either rational or irrational. But no particular reaction is forced on the individual. There are no passions, Sartre would argue, which exist in their own right and which serve as determinants of human actions.

Neither do the external facts and circumstances of the situation require any particular behavior on the part of the individual. Despite the fact that most of us are in the habit of pointing to things in the external world as reasons for our actions, nothing in the external world (being-in-itself) constitutes a reason.

In a word, the world only advises us if we ask it questions, and we cannot ask it questions except on the basis of a predetermined aim. Far from the motive determining the action, it only comes to light in and through the project of an action. 

In Sartre's sense, then, motive, both as passion and as circumstance, depends on the aims of the individual. One does not first recognize a motive and then use it as a standard by which he chooses his aims. In fact, it sounds very odd to say that one recognizes a motive, unless it is conceded that an aim precedes it. Else, upon what could the recognition be based? Thus, Sartre's view of motives comes clearer, for they appear to resemble attitudes which are
chosen in the light of some greater end or project.

So then, what, more particularly, does Sartre mean by the term facticity and why is it important to his view?

It is simply that freedom and facticity are inter-dependent. Without facticity there would be no freedom for there would be nothing for freedom to negate or choose. In other words, if I were not an oppressed worker, I would have nothing against which to rebel. The case is the same for the hen-pecked husband, the slave in chains, and so on. My consciousness must have an object for it to function; it must have something to transcend. By the same token, without consciousness, facticity could not be apprehended or assigned a meaning. Being an oppressed factory worker, for example, would simply be a fact of the world analogous to the assumption that grass is green. This, in fact, is not the case; even the latter is an assumption. It is something which must be apprehended by consciousness. Without freedom, facticity not only would have no meaning, it could never be discovered or come to exist in the consciousness of man.

Thus, according to Sartre, freedom is not a part of human life. It precedes it and makes it possible. The freedom of a man cannot be separated from the being of a man—for freedom is not a human attribute but rather the raw material of existence. Freedom is existence, and it precedes essence. All of us owe our being to consciousness; which is to say the same thing as freedom. We are freedom and without it we would not be! Freedom is complete and absolute; to it
we are condemned. This is probably the most radical concept of freedom to appear in the two-thousand-and-some-odd-year-old history of philosophy in western society!
CHAPTER II

RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility is co-extensive with freedom! It is complete and absolute. The relationship between the two is in the nature of a direct and not an inverse ratio, as many people seem to think. They fear that complete freedom implies no responsibility at all, or perhaps anarchy, and that some limitation on freedom is required as a necessary condition for responsibility to exist. However, such is not the case for Sartre. He tells us that since freedom is complete and absolute, the same is true of responsibility! Where there is no freedom (were that possible), no responsibility could be possible. To the extent that anything is determined, the responsibility for that thing lies in forces external to it. If a man has no choice, he cannot be said to be responsible for what he does. Such is, in fact, the excuse often used by men in order to evade responsibility for their actions, and claim at the same time that they are acting responsibly. But since men are free and face no situations which do not necessitate choice on their part, such talk is worse than the logical contradiction inherent in it—-it is hypocrisy! Responsibility finds its necessary and sufficient condition in freedom, and is the logical corollary of it. Thus responsibility, like
freedom, is complete, absolute, and inescapable.

As has been seen, the for-itself is the first cause of itself and of the world. It is the origin of all that is for man, for everything comes to light as the objects of consciousness. Thus, it is responsible for the world in the sense that one would use the term in stating that a painter is responsible for his painting, a sculptor for his statue, or a writer for his novel. That is to say, in Sartre's sense of the word, responsibility is authorship. One is responsible for what he has made come to be. And what he has made come to be is the entire world of which he is aware. His own consciousness makes itself be in whatever way it is, and simultaneously the world as he apprehends it. Each man is condemned to be free (to create himself and his world), and thus to bear the weight of his whole world on his shoulders. Since his consciousness is the author of all that is for him, he must assume complete responsibility for himself and his situation.

Thus, the responsibility of the for-itself is a crushing burden. Since the individual is the one through whom it happens that there is a world, and is also the one who makes himself be, he cannot escape responsibility for his situation. As Sartre puts it:

He must assume the situation with the proud consciousness of being the author of it, for the very worst disadvantages or the worst threats which can endanger my person have meaning only in and through my project, ultimate choice of oneself, one's need of existence—This will be explored more thoroughly in a later chapter; and it is
on the ground of the engagement which I am that they appear. It is therefore senseless to think of complaining since nothing alien has decided what we feel, what we live, or what we are.  

Thus, whatever one is, it is his own project—it is himself as he has chosen to be. And, it is his own responsibility. Is one kind or cruel, gentle or violent, honest or deceitful, competent or incompetent? All of these are matters of the individual's choice of himself for the very meaning of these terms is posited, interpreted, accepted, or assigned by him. No one else can do it for him! Everything which happens to him is his. Even to be a scientist, with the concomitant assumption of detached objectivity about the world, is the individual's selection of one mode of being from among many which are equally possible. It is no less subjective than any of the other possible choices such as, for example, being a writer, a poet, or a man with an inferiority complex. It is one of many possible ways of being freely chosen and posited by the for-itself. Thus, whenever a man looks at himself, he encounters not only his freedom, but also his responsibility. And he cannot escape either, no matter how much he may try or wish to do so!

One criticism which might come to mind at this point, is that all of this sounds suspiciously like an enjoinder to resign oneself to one's fate. But such is not the case, for Sartre. He argues that responsibility is simply the logical requirement of one's freedom. It is inescapable precisely because one is free. For Sartre, man's fate consists of only two components; he is condemned to be free and mortal. Noth-
ing else in human existence is certain! Each person constitutes an absolute choice of himself through a world of knowledges and techniques which his choice both assumes and illuminates. For example, if one has chosen to dislike boredom he will presumably reject anything which he apprehends as boring. It might be mathematics, history, politics, or anything else which his particular interpretation of boredom leads him to reject. Or, to cite another example, if he has chosen to "get attention," to be a figure to be reckoned with, he may choose to learn those techniques which prepare him to be a doctor, lawyer, politician, general, social deviant, or incorrigible youth. It all depends on his project, his interpretation or choice of himself. The knowledges and techniques he appropriates are chosen freely by him in the light of his own ultimate ends. In the act of being chosen by the for-itself, knowledges and techniques emerge in the consciousness of the individual—as well as their meanings to him. Choice makes the existence and meaning of the world possible for man. Thus the for-itself is the author of all, and, far from resigning itself to some sort of predetermined fate, must on the contrary assume the responsibility for everything it produces.

It follows, then, that the responsibility of the individual extends beyond himself to embrace the whole world of which he is conscious.

Thus, there are no accidents in a life; a community event which suddenly bursts forth and involves me in it does not come from the outside. If I am mobilized in a war, this war is my war; it is in my image and I deserve it. I deserve it first because I could always get out of
it by suicide or by desertion; these ultimate possibles are those which must always be present for us when there is a question of envisaging a situation. For lack of getting out of it, I have chosen it. This can be due to inertia, to cowardice in the face of public opinion, or because I prefer certain other values to the value of the refusal to join in the war (the good opinion of my relatives, the honor of my family, etc.). Any way you look at it, it is a matter of choice. This choice will be repeated later on again and again without a break until the end of the war.3

And, of course, even the end of the war need not be accepted. One can go on fighting it, in one form or another, as long as he chooses to do; this seems to have been the case with some Germans and French after both world wars, and with some Americans after the Civil War.

Thus, the individual is at one with his epoch, and his epoch is at one with him. He is a man of his times, but his times are also "of him." The for-itself integrates elements into its situation (wars, social problems, personal problems, etc.), and engages itself with those elements stamping its seal on them. As Sartre describes it:

I must be without remorse or regrets as I am without excuse; for from the instant of my emergence in being, I carry the whole weight of the world by myself alone without anything or anyone being able to lighten it.4

Responsibility is co-extensive and co-existent with freedom. Like freedom, it knows no constraints and there are no boundaries beyond which one may go in order to escape it—-for everything that it, is chosen.

Under these conditions every event in the world (including the existence of other people) can be revealed to the individual only as an occasion or an opportunity to be utilized or neglected. Since other human beings are appropriated
in the consciousness of the individual in this way, the responsibility of the for-itself extends to the entire world of which it is aware as a peopled world. The predicament of the for-itself, then, stems from the fact of its complete freedom. It is, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, neither the cause nor the foundation of its own being. That is to say, it is groundless and unjustified; it simply "up-surges" in the world. By the same token, the brute existents of the world are simply there as elements of being-in-itself. And, the for-itself is not the cause of that. Yet, it is condemned to apprehend, and in so doing, to decide the meaning of all that it apprehends, both within itself and outside. It is in this sense that the for-itself is the first cause of the world. Its dilemma lies in the fact that it has no grounds or guidelines according to which it may make its decisions, yet it must decide—continuously! For Sartre, man is nothing but a freedom which appears in the world and whose existence is comprised of this revelation.

Now a reader who has to any significant extent absorbed the meaning of the foregoing paragraphs may have begun to feel a certain sense of disquiet. He may possibly have found some of the above statements rather disturbing, and have begun to adopt a critical attitude toward them. Perhaps he may already have begun to think of objections which would enable him to refute Sartre's statements as factual descriptions of the human condition. There might be formulating in his mind an attempt to choose against these arguments and
deny the awesome responsibility with which Sartre charges him. And, underlying all of this in the reader might be the emergence of a vague desire to escape the consequences of accepting these views as valid. This, for Sartre, would be a very understandable, or at least common, reaction, and he would probably reply to it on two levels.

First, the very fact that the reader can choose to repudiate these arguments substantiates them. Sartre's main point is that it is up to the reader to first interpret and then to accept or reject any arguments (as well as other things) that he apprehends. And, if Sartre is right, the reader will do so on the basis of personal values which he has freely chosen in the light of his own ultimate choice of himself. There are other interpretations of the human condition which the reader may prefer to Sartre's, and prefer is the correct term here for both evidence and argument are given their meanings by the individual consciousness. There are no constraints in any argument or body of evidence. Thus choice is not only possible, but inevitable. For Sartre, his arguments are not irrefutable because of their logic; in fact they are not primarily arguments. They are, rather, descriptions of observable phenomena which all men are bound to see if they but direct their attention to them, and as such may not conceivably be denied. In order to convince the reader, Sartre would simply ask him to observe himself in action. In relation to the above statements, there are only three courses of action open to the individual. He can accept, reject, or
ignore them. But, he must choose; none of these alternatives ultimately forces itself upon him. And, in choosing among them, he runs head first into his own responsibility. In short, anything may be denied except one's own responsibility, and that, of course, is the whole crux of Sartre's thinking here.

Second, Sartre would by no means be surprised if the reader felt inclined to reject his arguments. The realization of the crushing weight of one's responsibility is an occasion for anguish. And (naturally enough, Sartre would probably concede), one seeks to flee this kind of experience. All the various modes of flight which people take in this particular case are what he calls bad faith.

At the most primitive level of analysis, Sartre's concept of bad faith seems to be composed of those characteristics of behavior which mark the attempt of individuals to escape the recognition of their own responsibility. It is any attempt to get out of or deny the responsibility which freedom necessitates—thus it necessarily constitutes an attempt to deny or escape from freedom as well. But such attempts are doomed to failure; they can never be more than deceptions for they do not correlate with the factual truth. They attempt to accomplish the impossible by denying the irrefutable; that is to say, freedom. Such faith is bad, not simply on moral grounds, but much more importantly, for Sartre, because it is a false view of the world which does not recognize the factual truth. Possibly the worst thing that could be said
of such flights from freedom and responsibility is that they
are doomed to failure because they are unrealistic.

Bad faith appears to operate in two different ways.
One way is the attempt to become like a thing (an in-itself),
and the other is the attempt to become an object for others.
(to play a role assigned to, and defined for, oneself by
others). Let us look more closely at both types in terms of
the examples Sartre provides.

The first pattern of bad faith is that type of behavior
in which a person tries to protect himself from his own
freedom by pretending to be a being-in-itself which has no
choices. It is an attempt to become as nearly like a thing
(a physical object, perhaps a machine) as possible. This is
ultimately futile, of course, for reasons already enumerated
at some length, and, since it flies in the face of fact, con-
stitutes self-deception. It is an attempt to become inert
on the part of a consciousness which could not even undertake
such an effort if it were in fact inert, and which would pass
out of existence if it succeeded. As already pointed out,
only the object would remain. Sartre illustrates this pattern
of bad faith with an example of a girl on a dinner date:

She knows very well the intentions which the man who
is speaking to her cherishes regarding her. She knows
also that it will be necessary sooner or later for her
to make a decision. But she does not want to feel the
urgency; she concerns herself only with what is respect-
ful and discreet in the attitude of her companion. . . .
This time, then, she refuses to apprehend the desire for
what it is; she does not even give it a name; she recog-
nizes it only to the extent that it transcends itself
toward admiration, esteem, respect and that it is wholly
absorbed in the more refined forms which it produces, to the extent of no longer retaining any prominence except as a sort of warmth and density. But then suppose he takes her hand. This act of her companion risks changing the situation by calling for an immediate decision. To leave the hand there is to consent in herself to flirt, to involve herself. To withdraw it is to break the troubled and unsteady harmony which gives the hour its charm. Her aim is to postpone the moment of decision as long as possible. We know what happens next; the young woman leaves her hand there, but she does not notice that she is leaving it. She does not notice because it happens . . . that she is at this moment wholly spiritual. She draws her companion up to the most lofty regions of sentimental speculation; she speaks of Life, of her life, she shows herself in her essential aspect--a personality, a consciousness. And during this time the divorce of the body from the soul is accomplished; the hand rests inert between the warm hands of her companion--neither consenting nor resisting--a thing.

So the hand, then, has become a thing--an in-itself quite separate from the for-itself. It has been disowned and what happens to it is no longer the responsibility of the individual. Of course, Sartre is implying that the process need not, and usually does not, stop with the hand. The for-itself cannot completely accomplish this transformation, however, because it must separate from itself--become reflective--in order to make the attempt. It can never overcome its own consciousness of itself as acting in this way. Thus, the young woman in Sartre's example, no matter how hard she may try to deceive herself, is aware of exactly what she is doing. There is an internal tension here for she cannot help being conscious of her attempt to convince herself of her own innocence or lack of responsibility. This is the first pattern of bad faith, and it seems plausible to claim, as Sartre does, that it is a common enough occurrence to be recognizable.
The identical claim could be made for the second pattern of bad faith—which consists of one's playing a role, or, in other words, attempting to become in fact what others hypothesize about him. Once again, responsibility is being attributed to outside forces rather than the positing of the for-itself. Sartre's example here is that of a waiter in a café:

His movement is quick and studied, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightrope walker. . . . All his behavior seems to us a game. He is trying to link his movements together as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms; he is imitating the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things.6

He is playing the role which society has defined for him, in Sartre's view. As such, he is required to limit his being to his function as a waiter, just as the soldier at attention:

. . . makes himself into a soldier-thing with a look straight in front of him, which does not see at all, which is no longer meant to see, since it is the regulation and not the interest of the moment which determines the point on which he must fix his eyes (the look "fixed at ten paces"). There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man in what he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape from it, that he might overflow and suddenly elude his condition.7

But, of course, neither the waiter nor the soldier can in fact become the role he is playing for he is representing himself to others on their terms. And he is quite well aware that this is what he is doing. Once again, for such acts to occur
in the world, the reflective consciousness must separate from the non-reflective consciousness. The waiter must "see" himself playing at being a waiter in order to engage himself in the attempt to become a waiter. In other words, he knows full well that a waiter is what he is supposed to be, even what he is attempting to be, but what he is not. For the individual in question, being a waiter is a representation not only to others but also to himself! If he represents himself to himself as a waiter, he is not the same as the waiter he represents himself to be. Else, what and who could do the representing? He (the for-itself) is separated from himself (the objectification of himself for others as a waiter) as subject from object. The two are separated by the internal negation of the consciousness (I am not the waiter.). Thus, he can only play at being the waiter, and cannot escape awareness of what he is doing no matter how hard he may try to do so. This pattern of bad faith, like the first one, is doomed to ultimate failure even if pursued throughout a lifetime. For it is a self-deception which can never completely deceive. He pretends to be nothing but what people label him, yet he apprehends what people label him and chooses to accept and act on these labellings.

Thus it appears that there is a hidden moral injunction here. Sartre is clearly calling on us to avoid acts of bad faith. The implication seems obvious in the light of the term "bad" with which he has chosen to label this concept. We are being enjoined to avoid these acts and live an "authen-
tic" life. But what, in a Sartrean context, could that mean?

First of all it would seem to mean that the authentic life consists in the continuous affirmation of individual freedom and responsibility; or, in another sense, the authentic individual would seem to be one who continuously avoids the tendency to deceive himself about his own freedom. He avoids bad faith as an ongoing way of life by constantly recognizing and reaffirming his responsibility. As pointed out, most of us try to evade our responsibility by attempting to become thing-like through persuading ourselves that we are determined by causal laws analogous to those of the physical world. In other words, if my hand is a thing, then forces external to it push and pull it around; I have no responsibility in the matter. I may regard my whole body and even my "psychological states" in the same way by the mere process of generalization. Or, in the second mode of bad faith, I may think of myself as constrained within the limits of some social function or role. For example, I may think of myself as a professor and treat myself as if I were determined in my behavior and attitudes by the view others take of that role. I may play the role of professor (though, of course, I have chosen to do so) by arguing to myself that I am required to do so. I may even persuade myself that it is my responsibility (though it comes from forces external to me) to do so. Such are the two patterns of bad faith. In order to be authentic, I must avoid both.
Sartre's clearest treatment of the latter pattern of bad faith and the way in which one man saved himself from it appears in his description of the life of Genet.

Jean Genet was an abandoned child raised by a peasant couple who took him in. Early in life he began to steal and, as a result, was labelled a thief. When he discovered this labelling, he decided that the opinions of others must be right; that he was, in fact, what they had labelled him. Consequently, his foster parents placed him in a reform school where this self-image was reinforced and amplified to include homosexuality. He so assiduously lived up to these social labels through the years that he eventually became internationally known to the police as a thief and homosexual. The end of the story was his own salvation through literature. He was enabled to save himself when he realized that he had chosen to live as he had in order to represent to society the role it had prescribed for him. When he did this, he realized his freedom and, thus, the fact that there were no constraints to force him to continue as he had in the past.

So, salvation is always possible if men will but realize it, Sartre seems to say. However, Genet, in realizing that he was free and unconstrained, presumably exchanged one mode of life for another. He converted. For example, one might describe the situation in the following way. He realized that it was possible to stop being a thief and homosexual and to start being a writer. He exchanged crime for literature and achieved a new fame which, it goes without
saying, was of a type more acceptable to society.

Here is a dilemma, and it is one which Sartre himself has apparently failed to reconcile with any real measure of success. On the basis of his description of the way consciousness splits between the pre-reflective and the reflective for-itself, it is impossible for bad faith to achieve its objectives—to become a thing or an object for others. In other words, it is not possible for the for-itself to be anything but freedom. It cannot be a thief, homosexual, or writer any more than it can be a physical object or a waiter. It must always be a subject as opposed to an object. Thus, the for-itself always contains a nothingness, a gap within itself, which transcends what has been toward what it posits. It cannot fulfill itself (achieve plenitude of being; the state of a being-in-itself) for it would lose its reflective consciousness and no longer be a for-itself. It would be God, Sartre says, but obviously no longer a human being, for human beings are finite. But such a being as a for-itself-in-itself would be completely self-sufficient, filled with the plenitude of being, yet conscious of itself in all of its infinite completeness. It would lack nothing, and nothingness could never exist within it.

It seems then that bad faith is inevitable, at least at this deeper ontological level. For if the for-itself can never coincide with itself, how can it be said that a man ever does anything other than play a role—either one chosen
by himself for himself or one chosen for him by others? Are we then to say that if he chooses his own role for himself that he is acting authentically, but that if he plays a role chosen for him by others he is in bad faith? But, how are we to differentiate between the two? For, can it not be said that Genet merely exchanged one societal role for another? In what way does redefining himself as a writer get him out of bad faith? Perhaps he only exchanged roles because one was more acceptable to society than the other, or perhaps it was the case that he got tired of being subjected to society's "punishments" and discovered a viable way to put himself in line for some of society's "rewards." How does he know, and how do we know, that he is not simply accepting an alternative societal role and still living in bad faith? In addition, so long as he is playing any kind of role at all, no matter whether self-chosen or imposed on him, how can it be said that he is truly authentic? For, he can never be at one with himself or his behavior no matter how sincere his attempt. It is for this reason that man, as Sartre has somewhere put it, is a futile passion.  

In the light of the above, it seems that the best we can do is to recognize our freedom and the necessity to take full responsibility for it. While we cannot avoid acting freely, in order to avoid bad faith we must fully realize that this is what we are doing. If we value certain kinds of behavior we must act on these values allowing for no contradictions or hypocrisy, but in the full realization that we
could have chosen otherwise and that we can never fulfill ourselves—for we can never become one and the same with our behavior or our values even if we manage to keep the two consistent in our actions. In addition, we can never believe that any set of values or way of life is intrinsically better than any other. On both of the latter two counts, we would be acting in bad faith.

It appears then that Sartre is implying a contradictory moral injunction—that we must strive to achieve something which we must recognize as unattainable; to avoid bad faith in the clear realization that authenticity is neither definable nor attainable. In place of a concept of authenticity, Sartre has left us a vacuum. For on his terms there seems to be no positive criteria for choosing any one way of life as preferable to other possibilities. But, we are in bad faith if we do not recognize this and choose in spite of the fact that our choice must be ultimately groundless. For, if we are to accept what Sartre has said thus far, in what possible way could it be argued that Genet has achieved salvation? In what way could it be claimed that being a writer is any better than being a criminal?

All we can say is that Genet presumably exercised his freedom in choosing another way of life and, in so doing, freely chose himself and the world in the full realization that he was doing so. If this was in fact the case, and this is in fact what Sartre is recommending, then the only value being offered is the exercise of freedom, not for its own
sake, but rather in the realization that it is inescapable. However, we are still left with a vacuum. For, Sartre offers no criteria for exercising freedom, and neither does he indicate any concrete ways to identify authenticity other than the introspective realization that one could always have done "otherwise" without having any way to know whether "otherwise" would have been better or worse.

Thus, we are left with a negative, or empty, moral injunction which leaves even the most sympathetic reader at somewhat of a loss. It appears that Sartre, at this point in his thinking, was rather stymied as well. What he does in terms of finding a solution will be left to a later chapter. Yet, it seems to this writer that Sartre has never fully or satisfactorily managed to resolve this problem. However, it is a useful topic for a student of Sartre because it is an impasse which throws some light on his later move toward a relatively more materialistic and group-centered notion of the world--and his concomitant adoption of Marxist views. That this is a turning point in Sartre's thought should come clear in subsequent chapters.
CHAPTER III

EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

In an apparent attempt to solve some of his problems, Sartre turns to an "existential psychoanalysis" of man in the world. Fundamental to his investigation of man's "psyche" is his distinction between three types of psychic operations which are strikingly different from those ascribed to man by Freud. These three postulations refer to what Sartre calls basic desire, original project, and authentic existence. Each of these had been touched on briefly in Sartre's earlier chapters of Being and Nothingness. Now he presents them in greater detail as parts of a structured psychological theory.

The first of these, basic desire, has to do with the split between the for-itself and the in-itself which the for-itself constantly strives to overcome. The for-itself wishes to take on the being of the in-itself without losing its own identity and capacities in the process. This is, in Sartrean terms, an aspiration to become God—to become a being which is fulfilled, yet maintains self-consciousness. In other words, human consciousness strives toward its own appropriate end, a totality in which existence would be structured by consciousness and in which consciousness and existence would be identical. This "oneness" of consciousness and existence
could not lead to the destruction of either of them; existence would continue in its materiality, and consciousness would retain its awareness. In such a case as this, there would be no lacks, nothing left to fulfill, and no potentialities. This is the desire to become God mentioned in the previous discussion of bad faith. As already pointed out, it is a futile passion. Man cannot become God; he cannot overcome the negation within himself. In order to become a role in society or a physical object, man would have to lose the self-consciousness which separates him from those things. Should he succeed, nothing would remain but the things. But man cannot negate himself that way, he can only negate the world; for self-consciousness is necessary to the act of negation. For these reasons, Sartre claims that it is inconceivable for a man to become God—to become a being-in-itself-for-itself.

Thus, man negates the world. His consciousness sees the world as both factual and valuable—the latter because all he apprehends appears as aids or hindrances to the attainment of the ultimate value—to become God. In this sense, then, all men are united by virtue of the fact that they all project ideal relationships to the world. Existence takes on meaning in the light of this basic and universal desire.

Desire is a lack of being. As such it is immediately directed toward the being of which it is a lack. This being, as we have said, is the in-itself-for-itself, consciousness become substance, substance become the cause of itself, the Man-God. Thus, the being of human reality is originally not a substance but a lived relationship. The terms of this relationship are first the original in-
itself, concealed in its contingency and its facticity, its essential characteristic being that it is, that it exists; and second the in-itself-for-itself or value, which exists as the ideal of the contingent in-itself and which is characterized as beyond all contingency and all existence. Man is neither the one nor the other of these beings, for strictly speaking, we should never say of him that he is at all. He is what he is not and he is not what he is; he is the nihilation of the contingent in-itself insofar as the self of this nihilation is its flight forward toward the in-itself as self-cause. Human reality is the pure endeavor to become God without there being any given substratum for that endeavor, without there being anything which undertakes the endeavor. Desire expresses this endeavor.1

Or, in short, man's basic desire is an expression of himself as a pure endeavor to become God.

Nevertheless, while Sartre considers this theory to be descriptive of human realities (as he does all of his theories), he by no means suggests that any individual is motivated by a desire to become God. It is, rather, the individual's ontological status; a generalized description of what all individual desires have most basically in common. This point in Sartre's thinking has led some to consider him a humanist; that is, as one who believes that all men hold a "nature" in common. However, it may be stretching the point a bit to include Sartre in this category.2

This brings us to the second theory of motivation; what Sartre calls the original project. As noted, the desire to become God is an ontological status, as Sartre conceives it, but not a project. For him, individual projects are not, and could not be, projects of being because man invents himself through action and he is nothing but what he has become through his actions. Therefore, individual projects are pro-
jects of doing, making, and having. There is a wide variety of possible projects for they are ultimately nothing other than each man's fundamental choice of himself, despite the fact that there are some projects which appear to be characteristic of certain social milieus, historical periods and so forth. Thus, identical projects (assuming that it is possible for any two individual projects to be identical) pursued in different situations can result in diverse behaviors; and the same can be true if they are pursued in similar environments. But the infinite behavioral variety of individuals becomes intelligible when their projects are known. Knowledge of projects of different general types furnishes the basic information necessary to an explanation of human conduct.

This original project Sartre talks about consists of the attempt on the part of an individual to realize certain transcendent values; namely, his own! Sartre's claim is that every man has chosen himself in action; that is to say, each man in acting chooses some ultimate value or values for himself—he appropriates them as his. The specific values of everyday conduct are thus to be seen as intermediate goals, or means, leading to the realization of transcendent ends. This is the case not only with what Freudians would call conscious motivations or rational goals, but with impulses and emotions. All are equally determined by the individual's goal, and his essence is constructed by him in the pursuit of it. That is, he is determined only by his own project in the
attempt to realize it. Thus, personal growth is seen as a movement toward a totality in unity; a progressive realization and integration of all the means at hand in everyday life in the light of a transcendent goal. For this reason, no one can consistently act in contradiction to his original project for such behavior would imply and eventually necessitate a change to a different project. If a significant change does occur, it is seen by Sartre as a new project resulting in a different way of life. This is what he calls a radical conversion, and he believes it to be a perennial potentiality for man which he can actualize at any time as Genet did.\(^3\)

The major criticism often leveled at Sartre's concept of the original project is that it cannot be the product of a free choice on the part of the individual.\(^4\) In other words, how can an individual be said to have freely chosen something which is original in its relation to him? This seems to imply that the project is prior to the individual. Of course that will not do for Sartre because such a claim amounts to little more than turning project into essence and making it prior to existence. In such a case man would merely be the prisoner of his project rather than the one who created it. Sartre argues, on the contrary, that the way in which the for-itself separates both from itself and from the in-itself necessitates the choice of an original project. Each man, loosely speaking, must have an essence, but he can only have it by choosing it. Any particular essence is contingent (none was programmed into him, or imposed on him.); a different one
could have been chosen. And, at any given moment in a man's life, another can be chosen. Thus, Sartre establishes the possibility of radical conversion. Since man is originally nothing but pure subjectivity, a groundless consciousness which "emerges" in the world, his essence comes to be in his free choice of action. And his essence becomes known to him in the same process. Because of this, there are no constraints. A man can become anything he chooses, and this will happen whenever he chooses to do so. Thus, whatever a man has chosen to become will be final only when he can no longer change his essence. That is, when he is dead. For Sartre, death is the only finality.

At this point Sartre runs into a problem. He must maintain that the original project is freely chosen and therefore conscious. Yet, he cannot hold that the choice is deliberate--that would obviously be absurd. As a result, he is forced to reject the Freudian theory of the subconscious and substitute for it an evaluative awareness which is prior to reflection. That is, he must ascribe the function of evaluation to the pre-reflective consciousness. Thus, in order for a choice to be conscious but not deliberate, it is necessary that the pre-reflective consciousness be an evaluator. Sartre posits this evaluative function of pre-reflective consciousness in his claim that to be conscious of ourselves and to choose ourselves are one and the same act. Yet the choice is still free, for it is never the only one possible. In this way, the two level theory of consciousness
enables Sartre to preserve the traditional notion of freedom (the possibility of conscious choice among alternatives) while at the same time doing away with the Freudian concept of the subconscious by substituting for it a claim for the existence of pre-rational evaluation.\footnote{5}

However, the concepts of the original project and of freedom both stand on shaky ground unless Sartre can undermine the Freudian hypothesis of the subconscious mind. Thus, Sartre finds himself forced into a joust with Freud. For, if the subconscious can be accepted as an accurate description of a psychological mechanism, freedom can never be complete. The original project can never be thought of as consciously chosen. Let us look closely at Sartre's argument on this point. He says:

Considered more closely the psychoanalytic theory is not as simple as it first appears. It is not accurate to hold that the "id" is presented as a thing in relation to the hypothesis of the psychoanalyst; for a thing is indifferent to the conjectures which we make concerning it, while the "id" in contrast is sensitive to them when we approach the truth. Freud in fact reports resistance when at the end of the first period the doctor is approaching the truth. This resistance is objective behavior apprehended from without: the patient shows defiance, refuses to speak, gives fantastic accounts of his dreams, sometimes even removes himself completely from the psychoanalytic treatment. It is a fair question to ask what part of himself can thus resist. It cannot be the "ego," envisaged as a psychic totality of the facts of consciousness; this could not suspect that the psychiatrist is approaching the goal since the ego's relation to the meaning of its own reactions is exactly like that of the psychiatrist himself. At the very most it is possible for the ego to appreciate objectively the degree of probability in the hypothesis set forth, as a witness of the psychoanalysis might be able to do, according to the number of subjective acts which they explain. Furthermore, this probability would appear to the ego to border on certainty, which he could not take offense at, since most of the time
it is the ego who is committed by a conscious decision to the therapy. Are we to say that the patient is disturbed by the daily revelations which the psychoanalyst makes to him and that he seeks to remove himself, at the same time pretending in his own eyes to wish to continue the treatment? In this case it is no longer possible to resort to the unconscious to explain bad faith; it is there in full consciousness, with all its contradictions.

Of course, Sartre does not stop here. He presses on from this example to further observations, and points out that it is impossible to explain the resistance of the patient as stemming from a complex which the analyst is trying to bring to light. According to Sartre, the complex could be nothing other than the collaborator of the analyst for it plays tricks on the censor and seeks to elude it in order to express itself in clear consciousness. Or, in a slightly different sense, it may be said that if the complex is a thing or a cause-in-itself, it cannot and does not seek to elude the analyst's attempts to discover it. It is either passive—in which case it is camouflaged by the censor—or it is active—in which case it seeks to elude the censor in order to present itself to consciousness. Neither explanation accounts for the fact that the patient resists the therapy!

So, what then can explain the fact of the patient's resistance to the therapy other than the activity of the censor? Only it, even in Freudian terms, can comprehend the analysis of the therapist as approaching the drives it seeks to repress, because only the censor has the capacity to know what it is repressing. As Sartre explains it:

If we reject the language and the materialistic mythology of psychoanalysis, we perceive that the censor in order to apply its activity with discernment must know what it is repressing. In fact if we abandon all the metaphors representing the repression as the impact of
blind forces, we have to admit that the censor must choose and in order to choose must be aware of so doing. How could it happen otherwise that the censor allows licit sexual impulses to pass through, that it permits needs (hunger, thirst, sleep) to be expressed in clear consciousness? And how are we to explain that it can relax its surveillance, that it can even be deceived by the disguises of the instinct? But it is not sufficient that it discern the condemned drives; it must also apprehend them as to be repressed, which implies in it at the very least an awareness of its activity. In a word, how could the censor discern the impulses needing to be repressed without being conscious of discerning them? How can we conceive of a knowledge which is ignorant of itself . . . ? Thus, the resistance of the patient implies on the level of the censor an awareness of the thing repressed as such, a comprehension of the goal toward which the questions of the psychoanalyst are leading, and an act of synthetic connection by which it compares the truth of the repressed complex to the psychoanalytic hypothesis which aims at it. These various operations in their turn imply that the censor is conscious (of) itself. But what type of self-consciousness can the censor have? It must be the consciousness (of) being conscious of the drive to be repressed, but precisely in order not to be conscious of it. What does this mean if not that the censor is in bad faith?

Thus, according to Sartre, psychoanalysis has not really helped us as much as we had thought. For all it has done has been to hypothesize an apparently independent consciousness in bad faith which stands between the conscious and the subconscious. Consequently, the effort to establish a trinity of a subconscious Id, an autonomous Ego as a censor, and a conscious Superego has resulted in little if anything more than a verbal terminology. For Sartre, the act of hiding anything from oneself necessitates conscious self-deception; a double operation within a psychic totality. On the one hand, there is the attempt to locate and maintain the thing concealed, and, on the other hand, there is the attempt to repress and disguise it. Each of these two activities implies
the presence of the other. They are complementary, and, as such, comprise a psychic totality. Freudian psychoanalysis has not succeeded in dissociating the two; rather it has succeeded only in locating both activities at the level of the censor.

Furthermore, by rejecting the conscious unity of the psyche, Freud is forced to assume what Sartre calls a magic unity linking distant phenomena across both obstacles and distance--just as sympathetic magic links the "accursed" victim with the voodoo doll. It is exactly the same form of reasoning, according to Sartre. The voodoo victim is accursed only because the practitioner has defined him as such, gone through the appropriate rituals and chants, and thus taken advantage of the fact that the victim's belief in the efficacy and veracity of voodoo results in his choice of himself in terms of what the practitioner postulates about him. Thus, voodoo is no myth. It results in concrete psychic and physical realities for people. It postulates qualities across time and space which color the person at which it aims; consequently the victim in fact becomes "accursed" and sickens, dies, or whatever is called for. By the same token, a man with an inferiority complex is such because psychoanalytic theory (in the person of the psychiatrist, or in more impersonal forms of communication in society) has defined him that way--and he, of course, accepts and believes it. He assumes qualities which color him symbolically. This seems to be what Sartre is implying at the level of the practical relationship between the analyst and the patient. But, more
fundamentally, the same is true of the psychic relationships among Id, Ego, and Superego. As Sartre describes it:

The unconscious drive through magic is endowed with the character "repressed" or "condemned" which completely pervades it, colors it, and magically provokes its symbolism. Similarly the conscious phenomenon is entirely colored by its symbolic meaning although it cannot apprehend this meaning by itself in clear consciousness.

Thus, for Sartre, the psychoanalytic theory has established a verbal terminology (the trinity of Id, Ego, and Superego) which amounts to little, if anything, more than a "magical" explanation. Proponents of the theory have reified bad faith, but they have not escaped it. In support of his views, Sartre refers to the Viennese psychiatrist Wilhelm Steckel who reported (Sartre claims) that whenever he had been able to carry his investigations far enough, he had found the core of the psychosis to be conscious. In such a case, psychoanalysis no longer provides the proper grounds for explanation. In order to get out of these difficulties Sartre insists that we must turn our attention to patterns of bad faith, and attempt a description of them. It is the project, not the complex, which lies at the heart of the patient's resisting or contradictory behavior, and thus it is through recognizing patterns of bad faith that we must seek to discover the meaning of the patient's behavior. Examples of these patterns of behavior described by Sartre are those already noted in the discussion of bad faith; the young woman on a dinner date, and the waiter. Another example which Sartre claims to have been reported by Steckel is that
of female frigidity. In each case, what Sartre sees here is a conscious pattern of bad faith characterized by a refusal to recognize the freedom to choose one's own values and behaviors. Perhaps more important is the patient's refusal to recognize his own responsibility for his past values and behaviors. Sartre's faith is that such recognition by the patient will affect a "cure" as, for example, occurred in the case of Genet.

This brings us now to the third of Sartre's three types of psychic operations: the possibility of conversion from patterns of bad faith to those of an authentic life. The question which arises here is whether the kind of freedom Sartre talks about is significant in a practical sense. Can a man really be said to be free to change his original project when it was not chosen deliberately? Sartre maintains he can by means of a radical conversion. Yet the original project is prior to all motives, and a change in it could not then be motivated in the ordinary sense. So, what does Sartre mean by a radical conversion? If we can get that clearer, we ought also to have a better picture of what he calls an authentic existence.

To attack this question we must reiterate briefly some points which have already been made. Consciousness makes man not only a creature with given characteristics, but defines him as that being which constantly separates himself from his characteristics and views them from a distance. Because of this split within himself, no man can be himself
at any given instant; he can only be himself looking at his past in terms of the future he posits for himself. He can never be his characteristics; rather, at every instant his characteristics comprise what he was and possibly, but not necessarily, what he is to be in the future. His past is not what he is, neither is his future. Man is always a nothingness standing between a completed past and an open future. Nothing is guaranteed except the past—and even the meaning of that can be changed. In order for a man's characteristics to continue to be manifested through time, he must constantly reaffirm them. Each individual decision is either a renewed choice of the same ultimate goal, or a choice of a new goal. By the same token, each decision requires an orientation in terms of an original project or ultimate end which the individual must continue to choose if it is to continue as his project. A decision fundamentally inconsistent with the original project supposes a new transcendent goal, and constitutes the choice of a new meaning for the future and of oneself. The transformation will be complete, then, when the new decision has been reaffirmed often enough through time to result in a consistently new pattern of behavior.

"Fundamental" seems to be the key word here. How do we know that any conversion is a change in the original project, and not just a subordinate change in means or intermediate goals? On Sartre's terms no radical conversion could be predetermined or predestined. Why did Genet choose as he did, for example? Strictly speaking, this question cannot be
answered, and that is an important point to note! For, if the decision could be explained away in any terms whatever, it would not constitute a change of the original project— for the originality of the project precedes motives, causes, and desires. It appears to be Sartre's contention that a radical conversion can only be characterized as a practically significant and fundamentally contingent change in behavior. If the change in behavior were not contingent, that is, if causes could be found for it, it would be a change in intermediate goals or means in the light of the original project, but not a change in the original project itself—which, after all on Sartre's terms, is itself the basis for all explanation of individual behavior. Thus it appears (though Sartre doesn't say so explicitly) that there are two levels of behavioral change— one which can be explained and one which cannot. In other words, there is the level of change which operates only in terms of intermediate goals, which, for purposes of clarification, we might designate as a conversion. And, second, there is a change in the original project itself which we can designate in compliance with Sartrean terminology as a radical conversion. It is the obvious but ultimately unexplainable change in a man's choice of a way of life and of himself!

Thus, though we cannot explain radical conversion on Sartre's terms, we can describe the three basic conditions under which he thinks it occurs. The first of these is the
recognition of freedom not only as a fact, but also as a value. While a man cannot deny the factual truth of his freedom, this by no means necessitates that he affirm it as a value. He may try to escape from his freedom in bad faith. In so doing, he will be reaffirming his past and no radical conversion will occur. Genet, for example, must have visualized an open future by recognizing his own freedom and affirming it as a value. Second is the recognition of the past as freely chosen; contingently based on personal decisions and, ultimately, nothing more. To use the example of Genet once more, he must have recognized his past as a thief and homosexual as freely chosen by himself. In other words, a man must come to see his past as "transcendable." And, third, is the recognition of complete responsibility. Genet must have recognized the consequences of his behavior only for himself, but for others as well, that his behavior was justified only by his own purposes, and that he thus bore complete responsibility for it—not only in terms of its meaning for him, but also in terms of its meaning for others! Only under these conditions can a radical conversion take place on the part of any individual, and only in terms of these conditions may an authentic existence be defined. 10

This, of course, does not imply that radical conversion is a necessary condition of authenticity. It does not follow that one must change his original project to become authentic. It means, rather, that the only authentic alternative to radical conversion is the recognition and acceptance
of one's original project under these conditions and on these terms! One must recognize and affirm his freedom, recognize and affirm the personal responsibility which is a corollary of it, and take into account the consequences--and his responsibility for them--of his behavior, not only for himself but also for others! For Sartre, man lives in the world, in a situation, and cannot be isolated from it. Rather, he must always transcend it, and is therefore both affective and affected within his context.

Now a clarification of the problem raised at the end of the preceding chapter may be attempted. There the question was raised as to whether it is possible for man to avoid bad faith. The answer Sartre seems to be implying is both yes and no. It appears that he is talking about two different levels or statuses of existence. These might be distinguished, for want of any better terms, as the ontological and the practical. If we are understanding Sartre correctly, we would have to say that he claims an ontological status for man (the desire to be an in-itself-for-itself, as already explained), as differentiated from a practical level of behavior which is characterized by adherence to a conscious project. The ontological status of man seems to deny his freedom and define him as a "futile passion." But, Sartre would be anxious to point out, on the contrary, that at the practical level it necessitates freedom--for it expresses a goal which behavior can never achieve. It is the very impossibility of becoming an in-itself-for-itself which guarantees the freedom of man!
It is what makes man a contingent inventor of his own essence at the practical level. Thus, man cannot escape bad faith as an ontological status. But, it does not follow, for Sartre, that this is the case at the practical level. For, man cannot transform his ontological status into a project, though he may attempt to combine the two levels by acting in bad faith. On the other hand, it is by recognizing his project as freely chosen by him at every instant that a man keeps the two levels distinct. By continuously and obstinately refusing to engage in the futile attempt to transform his ontological status into a project he acts in good faith rather than bad.

Thus, Sartre is telling us that bad faith can be avoided at the practical level. An authentic existence is possible—so long as we avoid the impossible pursuit of being-in-itself. But, if we slide from the practical to the ontological by trying to play a role or become a thing, we are in bad faith at both levels!

It has been objected by some critics, one of the most outspoken among them being Mary Warnock, that Sartre is a philosopher and not a psychologist. In treading on Freud's ground, he is an amateur among professionals. Furthermore, they object that he is attacking traditional psychoanalysis on the wrong grounds for it purports to be a therapy, and not a metaphysics or an ontology. Its virtue lies in the fact that it has been observed to work—at least some of the time. One explanation for this has already been presented by Sartre in his description of the "magical" function of psychotherapy.
However, if it is the case that traditional therapy can affect real cures, rather than pseudo-magical cures as Sartre implies, can the same be said of Sartre's theories? Or are they to be dismissed as only another set of interesting philosophical speculations unfounded in empirical fact and lacking in therapeutic value?\textsuperscript{11}

The answer to the above question might well be in the negative for such criticisms seem to overlook the fact that there is a growing movement among psychoanalysts in Europe which is referred to by them, as often as not, as existential analysis--Sartre's own terminology! The extent to which they have been influenced by Sartre, and/or other existentialists, or the degree to which Sartre has been influenced by them is a moot question since they are all contemporaries. But their similarities in basic tenets and methodologies are too striking to be lightly dismissed. It might be suggested here that it is not too implausible to suppose that, to the extent that existential analysis has been found to work, Sartre's theories find some empirical vindication.

One of the most prominent members of, and spokesmen for, this new movement in psychoanalysis is Victor Frankl, a well-known Viennese psychiatrist and founder of the "Third Viennese School of Psychiatry" which he has named logotherapy. The basic tenet of logotherapy is that man's existence is founded on a will to meaning which he must find and realize for himself. Dr. Frankl refers to himself as an existential

\textsuperscript{11}
psychoanalyst and holds a number of basic tenets in common with Sartre. In addition, their methodologies do not seem to differ to any significant extent. Obviously Dr. Frankl has read Sartre, for he refers to the existentialist philosophy at one point—though for the purpose of disagreeing with him.12

Some of the basic tenets of logotherapy will be presented here in Dr. Frankl's own words. The reader may judge for himself what appears to be the case—that Sartrean concepts echo here in the credo of a prominent psychotherapist.

On the subject of freedom, Dr. Frankl states that:

Man is not fully conditioned and determined; he determines himself whether to give in to conditions or stand up to them. In other words, man is ultimately self-determining. Man does not simply exist, but always decides what his existence will be, what he will become in the next moment.13

On the subject of transcendence he says:

By the same token, every human being has the freedom to change at any instant. Therefore we can predict his future only within the large frame of a statistical survey referring to a whole group; the individual personality, however, remains essentially unpredictable. The basis for any predictions would be represented by biological, psychological, or sociological conditions. Yet one of the main features of human existence is the capacity to rise above such conditions and transcend them. In the same manner, man ultimately transcends himself; a human being is self-transcending being.14

Dr. Frankl also seems to believe in something like Sartre's concept of radical conversion. He claims that man can, and does, transcend himself and his conditions; and in an extreme way! He describes, as an example (which it is suggested here appears to be analogous to Sartre's description
of Genet's conversion), the case of a Nazi official infamous for his zealous administration of Hitler's genocide program.

Let me cite the case of Dr. J____. He was the only man I ever encountered in my whole life whom I would dare to call a Mephistophelean being, a satanic figure. At that time he was generally called "the mass murderer of Steinhoff," the name of a large mental hospital in Vienna. When the Nazis started their euthanasia program, he held all the strings in his hands and was so fanatic in the job assigned to him that he tried not to let one single psychotic individual escape the gas chamber. After the war, when I came back to Vienna, I asked what had happened to Dr. J____. "He had been imprisoned by the Russians in one of the isolation cells of Steinhoff," they told me. "On the next day, however, the door of his cell stood open and Dr. J____ was never seen again." Later I was convinced that, like others, he had by the help of his comrades made his way to South America. More recently, however, I was consulted by a former Austrian diplomat who had been imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain for many years, first in Siberia and then in the famous Ljubljanka prison in Moscow. While I was examining him neurologically, he suddenly asked me whether I happened to know Dr. J____. After my affirmative reply he continued: "I made his acquaintance in Ljubljanka. There he died, at about forty, from cancer of the urinary bladder. Before he died, however, he showed himself to be the best comrade you can imagine! He gave consolation to everybody. He lived up to the highest conceivable moral standards. He was the best friend I ever met during my long years in prison.15

If this is not an example of radical conversion, it is at least a striking illustration of man's transcendental capacities.

On the subject of the basic credo of existential analysis, Dr. Frankl cites the following beliefs:

There is nothing conceivable that would so condition a man as to leave him without the slightest freedom. Therefore, a residue of freedom, however limited it may be, is left to man in neurotic and even psychotic cases. Indeed, the innermost core of the patient's personality is not even touched by a psychosis. . . .

For too long a time, for half a century in fact, psychiatry tried to interpret the human mind merely as a mechanism, and consequently the therapy of mental disease
merely as a technique. I believe this dream has been dreamt out. What now begins to loom on the horizon are not the sketches of a psychologized medicine, but those of a humanized psychiatry. . . .

A human being is not one thing among others; things determine each other, but man is ultimately self-determining. What he becomes—within the limits of endowment and environment—he has made out of himself. . . . Man has both potentialities [good and evil] within himself; which one is actualized depends on occasions but not on conditions.16

Perhaps Sartre is not quite so much of an amateur dabbling in psychiatry as some of his critics have made him out to be! It might even be suggested that his existential psychoanalysis has been empirically vindicated to some extent—perhaps even to a great extent. According to Harvard psychologist Gordon Allport:

In Europe today there is a marked turning away from Freud and a widespread embracing of existential analysis, which takes several related forms—the school of logotherapy being one.17

It should now be plausible to claim that Sartre has something important in common with contemporary psychoanalysts. And that includes the Freudians, for he does not refute Freud's theory in toto. The problem seems to be that his preference for philosophical terminology obscures his concurrence with the tenets of psychiatry. A brief overview of Sartre's points of agreement with contemporary psychoanalysts should clarify the meaning of some of his concepts and give credence to the claim that they are supported by a considerable amount of factual evidence.

As has been generally accepted, the three most basic concepts of current psychoanalysis are those of the uncon-
scious, psychic determinism, and the significance of early childhood in individual development. First, Sartre disagrees with the concept of the subconscious by introducing his two level concept of consciousness—the reflective and the pre-reflective. This, in fact, resembles the Freudian concept of the subconscious by positing a level of activity which allows for unpremeditated motives. For both Sartre and Freud the pre-reflective level is the origin of desire, and the defense against desire is to repress it. The difference here is that Sartre insists that such activity is conscious. Unlike Freud, he holds that self-deception is involved because, when one represses a desire, he must know the desire to be present within him—otherwise he could not repress it. It is a voluntary act rather than, as Freud would hold, an occurrence over which one has no conscious control. Second, psychic determinism indicates that behavior is not a random reaction to a variety of external stimuli. It is, rather, a reflection of some basic internal structure. For both men this internal structure is expressive of a basic attitude toward life. But, for Sartre it comes to be in the light of the individual's projected goals; for Freud it stems from early childhood experiences. Third, both Sartre and Freud seem to agree that in infancy no individual personality is present. In Sartrean terms, there is a lack of conscious separation from the environment; the child has not yet become reflective enough to establish his identity through negating the external world. The project, then, would seem to arise
in conjunction with the emergence of self-consciousness (the reflective for-itself). In Freudian terms we would perhaps have to say that the Id is present from birth while the Ego and Superego gradually emerge through experience. It might be noticed here that those points on which Sartre disagrees with Freud are points of basic concurrence with views of Frankl previously cited. To the extent that Frankl's views may be representative of the contemporary "existential" movement among psychiatrists, it could be claimed that Sartre is in agreement with them.

In summary then, we can cite the following points as basic to Sartre's theory of existential psychoanalysis. Man is his project and this is the ultimate key to all of his behavior. He is free to change his behavior and even his project at any time. On the other hand, if he is not to change his project, he must continuously reaffirm it in action. His project is the product of both his own consciousness (realized in action), and his situation—for he must transcend his environment in terms of what it means to him. Here there is no definition of human nature as such. It is rather a description of the human condition in terms of the materials men use to construct themselves. For Sartre, there is no such thing as man (except as an ontological status); there are only men. And each man is what he makes himself be in his situation.
CHAPTER IV

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The most final of all obstacles to the individual's project, as we have seen, is neither his internal psychological state nor the external circumstances of his situation; it is other people. The freedom of the other is the antithesis to the freedom of any given individual. Whenever one looks at another, or is looked at by him, he encounters a freedom which is not his own. To be obstructed by physical objects is much less problematic and a good deal more "transcendable" than to be confronted with the freedom of another. When one confronts physical objects, he may make judgments about them, assign them their meanings, and, in so doing, exercise his freedom in transcending them. But, when he confronts others, the situation is more immediately reciprocal. While he is making his judgments and attempting to objectify the other in terms of his own project, the other is doing the same to him. What is more, both participants realize the situation—that they are acting upon one another, and thus impeding one another's freedom. That is to say, both realize that the situation is one of interaction between them. Of course one may act as though the other were a mere object,
but such would be only a pretense. For, the other is in fact free. To objectify him would constitute a flight into bad faith.

For Sartre, man is a pure subjectivity, but the situation of an individual is not purely subjective for man lives not only in the world, but also in society, among other men. He is a subjectivity among other subjects with whom he must interact. To some extent this situation is reflected in the structure and usage of language; in our use of pronouns, and the attitudes we tend to attach to them. Things are symbolized by impersonal pronouns, people by personal pronouns. Yet the tension between two subjectivities is reflected in the way even a personal pronoun may take an objectified form.

To paraphrase Sartrean expressions, when we look at or act upon another we refer to him by the use of the objectified form of the pronoun; we say "him" or "whom." On the other hand, the recognition of the other's free status in the world vis-à-vis ourselves is reflected in the pronouns "he" or "who." We use this latter terminology when, so to speak, we see the other as acting in the world--perhaps on us.

Thus, Sartre is telling us that man is in society as a subject among other subjects, and he is in the world as a subject among objects. The human situation is made up of all these elements simultaneously. None can be overlooked in any attempt to paint a complete and accurate picture of man.

Human consciousness is without content except for
that derived from awareness of objects and other consciousnesses among which it "finds" itself. Thus it always exists "in situation," as Sartre puts it, and its project is always a certain postulated relationship to its situation. Individual consciousness, then, is an organization of a situation from its own point of view, and it can only develop by progressively acting on and reorganizing its situation. Note that this concept is a good deal more complex and reciprocal than those usually advanced by environmentalists and determinists, for it is more than the sum of environmental factors or deterministic influences in a man's life. It includes not only geographical location, social class, economic conditions, family background, chronological age, and other such factors which impede the individual, but also the meaning-assigning and knowledge-organizing activity of the individual consciousness which imposes itself on the situation in pursuit of its own project. To Sartre, the situation is an ongoing historical synthesis of the individual and the objective conditions within which he chooses himself. As a result, Sartre is enabled to deny that there is any room for solipsism or subjective idealism in his view.¹

However, there is a part of every individual's situation which he can never completely synthesize. It is that part which is made up of other people. For, he can never really get hold of the other's freedom--it always escapes him. The other can never be successfully objectified for he is never what he is, and is always what he is not. The other represents possibilities which constantly escape from
one, for the other's possibilities can only be realized, circumvented, or ignored by him. Thus others are more than mere objects with which one comes into contact. Certainly they may appear to the consciousness as objects, as persons having a certain character or personality, and the consciousness passes such judgments on them in terms of its own project. But, the others do likewise. They constitute us as objects in their turn for they are free subjects, too. In so doing, they create our being-for-others. This dimension, for Sartre, is of great importance, for it is another element of man's ontological status comparable to his desire to become God. This aspect of one's being is revealed to him by the look of the other, yet he is still responsible for the judgments the other makes about him because his behavior and observable characteristics make up the raw material for the other's appraisal. One recognizes himself in the look of the other.

By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the other. Yet this object which has appeared to the Other is not an empty image in the mind of another. Such an image, in fact, would be imputable wholly to the Other and so could not "touch" me. I could feel irritation, or anger before it as before a bad portrait of myself which gives to my expression an ugliness or baseness which I do not have, but I could not be touched to the quick. Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me. There is however no question of comparison between what I am for myself, and what I am for the Other as if I found in myself, in the mode of being of the for-itself, an equivalent of what I am for the Other. In the first place this comparison is not encountered in us as the result of a concrete psychic operation. Shame is an immediate shudder which runs through me from head to foot without any discursive preparation. In addition the comparison is impossible; I am unable to bring about any
relation to what I am in the intimacy of the for-itself, without distance, without withdrawal, without perspective, and this unjustifiable being-in-itself which I am for the Other. There is no standard here, no table of correlation. Moreover the very notion of vulgarity implies an inter-monadic relation. Nobody can be vulgar all by himself! Thus the Other has not only revealed to me what I was; he has established me in a new type of being which can support new qualifications.2

In short the situation seems to look something like this. When two individuals confront one another, they each made judgments about the other in terms of their own respective projects and immediate goals. Yet, the raw material, one fundamental source for these judgments, is provided by the externally observable behaviors and characteristics each "shows" to the other. Both aspects of a man—the way he sees himself and the way he appears to others—are factual elements of his existence.

Thus Sartre has added another dimension to his description of man: being-for-others. Now what we are being told is that man is a for-itself-for-others. There are two modes of existence of the human consciousness: namely, being-for-itself and being-for-others. The for-itself sees itself reflectively not only in terms of its own project, but also in terms of what it realizes others think about it. While these two modes of consciousness often become intermingled in everyday thought, they are in fact separate. However, both are aspects of the individual which are equally true. Neither of them repudiates the other even in those cases where they are contradictory. For, both are revealed through the behavior of the individual. As an example, one may be for-himself a
benevolent man, but in the mode of being-for-others, he may be a tyrant. Both of these aspects are equally true of him and the latter of the two is revealed to him through the look of the other. Of course, both modes of existence are "transcendable"; they may be changed. Although one is called upon by Sartre to recognize his own responsibility as a meaning-assigner in both modes of existence, there is no room here for considering either one as other than factually true of oneself. Although one assigns the meaning "waiter" or "shameful" to another's look at him, there is nothing arbitrary in the other's judgments or in one's own "grasping" of those judgments. It is an act of recognizing oneself in the look of the other, for one's own behavior provides the raw material for the other's judgments. Thus, something factually true about oneself is revealed to him in the look of the other, for he is responsible for the behavior and characteristics which provide the external stimuli for the other's appraisal as well as for his own interpretations of the situation. As Sartre puts it, one cannot be vulgar all by himself. He can only be vulgar in the mode of existence of being-for-others; thus, this dimension of the "truth" about himself comes to him only as a for-itself-for-others.

So, man, as Sartre sees him, is a being-for-itself-for-others. Consciousness embraces both modes of existence precisely because man lives in society, among other men. It is, as Sartre has suggested, a kind of inter-monadic existence. This is his concept of man as a social being.
It seems to be the case, then, that conflict is inevitable in society. One is not just perceived by the other, he is also appraised and, thus, objectified. Because the other is free to judge him, one faces the constant danger of being stereotyped in some way or, even worse, of having his innermost secrets revealed in the look of another. One may try to deal with this situation by wholly assuming the other's appraisal as the truth about himself, as did Genet or the waiter in Sartre's example. Or, on the other hand, one may try to escape the predicament by "turning the tables" on the other fellow. One may try to objectify the other, and see him only as a thing or as a social definition. But, this is not satisfactory either. For, in so doing, one is defending his own freedom at the expense of another's; it is to become blind to the other's transcendence. In other words, one regards the other only as an object, occasion, or opportunity to be utilized or neglected for one's own ends; the other's free possibilities are taken away from him. Thus, others become mere objects that act "at a distance," so to speak, and upon which one can act under certain circumstances. Thus, one allows contact only under those particular conditions in which he feels he is free and the other is objectified. This leads to the appraisal of the other as wholly a waiter--one who can be affected by, for example, ordering a meal. It also leads one to avoid contact with the waiter under any other conditions, for these would be dangerous. To interact with the waiter under any other conditions (for example, when
he is a father, the owner of the restaurant, etc.) would endanger one's own freedom by allowing the other to escape from the confines and meanings of his role as waiter, thereby becoming a free agent in the world—quite as free as oneself. Though one may derive a feeling of security from acting in this way, he is in bad faith by so doing for his appraisals are factually false. When one is looked at, he experiences the objectifying power of that look. He experiences (in fact Sartre would claim he consciously realizes) his objectivity for others as well as his responsibility as the agent who objectifies them. That is to say, he experiences the freedom of the other. Thus, his attitude is factually false, in either case. He is in bad faith whether he tries to objectify himself or the other, for he is not recognizing and accepting the consequences of the freedom of both.

For all these reasons, one always has a comprehension of the freedom of the other. But, in addition, if one denies the objectifying power of another's free look at him, he becomes defenseless against it. He will be merely a victim of the other, if by denying the other's freedom, he fails to recognize the other's power over him. He will take no action in the world that will falsify the other's appraisal of him. Thus, he will be in even greater danger from the other even though he may not clearly realize it. For, by choosing to ignore the other's judgments about him, he passes up the opportunity to transcend them. The result of all this is likely to be a vague feeling of uneasiness and insecurity. As
Sartre describes it:

Everything which holds for me in my relations with the Other holds for him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations. The ... descriptions of concrete behavior must therefore be envisaged within the perspective of conflict. Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others.3

Of course, no one can actually possess the freedom of another and neither can he give up his own. Thus, the conflict which lies at the heart of this situation is one in which neither participant can fully succeed. For, a free and conscious being cannot be possessed in the mode of being of the for-itself. What he thinks, feels, and plans can never ultimately be controlled by anyone else. The existence of the other necessitates the escape of some of my possibilities for I cannot ultimately possess him even if I am able to control his behavior. And I am in the same relationship to him—some of his possibilities escape through the affectiveness of my being. For Sartre, even love is such a conflict for one can never possess the freedom of another while demanding his free love in return. This is an impossible contradiction—for no one can be both free and enslaved simultaneously. In fact, no one can ultimately be enslaved at all! Freedom may never be possessed or controlled. As has been pointed out, it is not correct to say, even, that the individual possesses his own freedom. He does not! He is his freedom; he exists it. He cannot possess or control it. By the same token, he
cannot give it away, and no one else can possess it. For Sartre, to think of having or possessing freedom, either one's own or another's, is simply misleading. It doesn't square with the facts, and is impossible of accomplishment. To try to do so would be an example of man's futile passion to become God.

Since these contradictions make any attempt to possess freedom futile (either one's own or another's), conflict is necessitated. For, it would seem to be the case that, under these conditions, only three general patterns in regard to interpersonal relationships are possible. One of these, which Sartre refers to as masochism, is that type of behavior characterized by one's consent to become nothing but an object for the other. This is impossible for reasons already enumerated at some length. Another is the attitude of detachment by which one regards the other's behavior at a distance and keeps interaction within certain safe boundaries. This is to try to deny the other's freedom by defining him as nothing but a waiter, at least in terms of his contact with oneself. But, of course, the other is much more than the definition which has been assigned, and such an attitude may result in one's becoming more victimized by the other than he realizes; since he is taking a passive role vis-à-vis the other's look at him. And, finally, there is the attempt to possess the other's freedom by overtly dominating him, perhaps through physical violence. Sartre refers to this pattern of behavior and attitudes as sadism. Just like the others, it is doomed to ultimate failure, for all that can be possessed of another
is his body, but not his freedom. What all three of these patterns of behavior have in common is that they are in bad faith. For Sartre, shame, fear, pride, vanity, love, hate, and all other reactions to the other may be explained in these terms.

In the light of all this, it appears to Sartre that there are only two authentic attitudes possible for man-in-society. These are shame and arrogance. Since these terms have misleading negative connotations in relation to what Sartre has in mind, it will be helpful to refer to his own explanation of them.

In short there are two authentic attitudes; that by which I recognize the Other as the subject through whom I get my objectivity. This is shame; and that by which I apprehend myself as the free object by which the Other gets his being-other—this is arrogance or the affirmation of my freedom confronting the Other-as-object.

Thus, Sartre is calling on us to recognize freedom in general. To be authentic we must recognize, accept, and value not only our own freedom, but also the freedom of others—and the absolute reciprocity which that implies! Conflict in personal relationships is inevitable, but inauthenticity is not. Recognition and affirmation of absolute freedom with all its reciprocal implications is possible. It seems, perhaps, that Sartre is telling us that conflict and tension between people are inevitable, but that these apparent evils might take an inconceivably different form from that usually observed if each man comes to recognize and accept his own responsibility for his situation as well as for himself. The implication seems to be that the recog-
nition of one's own freedom entails the recognition of everyone's freedom. If I wish to avoid bad faith, it is not sufficient to value freedom for myself alone; I must also value it for others! His description of the two authentic attitudes possible for social man is probably the closest that Sartre ever comes to offering a positive moral axiom. In his words (italics mine):

Shame, fear, and pride are my original reactions; they are only various ways by which I recognize the Other as a subject beyond reach, and they include within them a comprehension of my selfness which can and must serve as my motivation for constituting the Other as an object.

To recognize the other as a subject beyond reach and to comprehend one's own selfness as that which can and must serve as the motive for objectifying the other sums up the two authentic attitudes through which Sartre feels that men may avoid bad faith. Both imply the elevation of Sartre's concept of freedom to the status of a transcendent moral standard entailling a categorical moral axiom. But, as a standard, it is a negative or empty one—as pointed out in a preceding chapter.

Whether an "open" morality such as this would result in a better world is, of course, highly debatable.

Whether this is the most valid interpretation of a thinker who has been known to denounce morality as a bourgeois subterfuge is also debatable. Some critics doubt that Sartre seriously intends to offer any ethic and claim that no such ethical implications as the above may be reliably extrapolated from his overall philosophy.
But, to this writer, a close reading of *Being and Nothingness* suggests a trend in Sartre's thinking which is paralleled by the structure of this chapter. It is a trend which, in addition, appears to be continued in Sartre's latest major philosophical work, *The Critique of Dialectical Reason*. It is this work upon which the following chapters are primarily based. Thus, it is to the *Critique* that we must look for further vindication of what has been suggested here.
CHAPTER V

SCARCITY

Hherefore the discussion has centered on Sartre's early views as presented in *Being and Nothingness*. From now on our attention will be directed to his more recent work, *The Critique of Dialectical Reason*, which he published in 1960. There is a significant change in emphasis and approach between the two works which reflects the evolution of Sartre's thought over the years since the publication of his earlier treatise. While the change in Sartre's views is most often described as consisting fundamentally of a conversion to Marxism, it may also be viewed as a shift from an introspective and metaphysical investigation of man to that of a sociologically centered analysis. The trend of Sartre's thought in *Being and Nothingness* led inevitably to a progressive burying of man in materiality and constraint. While the for-itself remained an absolute throughout, it did not retain the complete autonomy Sartre originally claimed for it. It became increasingly limited by materiality, the world of things and of others as objects and objectifiers, as this writer hopes should have been clearly reflected in the foregoing chapters. This trend led Sartre to turn his attention to an investigation into all aspects of constraint on the for-itself. Thus,
he became concerned with man's relationship to his situation as a member of a group, and his emphasis shifted toward an attempt to describe those material and sociological conditions which affect man not only as limitations to his freedom, but also as threats to his very survival! Sartre saw that if he wished to describe the totality of the human condition, he would have to enter the realms of economics, social science, and history. Reflecting on this modification in his thinking, Sartre stated in 1964 that:

I discovered suddenly that alienation, exploitation of man by man, under-nourishment, relegated to the background metaphysical evil which is a luxury. Hunger is an evil: period. . . . I believe, I desire, that social and economic ills may be remedied. With a little luck that epoch may arrive. I am on the side of those who think that things will go better when the world has changed. ⁴

That Sartre's conversion included a whole-hearted embracing of Marx is clear by his own admission. He has accepted most, if not all, of the basic tenets of Marx, especially where the latter was concerned to describe human reality. That he is in agreement with Marx on all points concerning the world which is to come after the classless society is established, or on the means of accomplishing it, is not so clear. He has often criticized Marxist theoreticians for forgetting that freedom lies at the source of human activity rather than modes of production. It is for this reason he has claimed that Marxism needs Existentialism--to remind it of the central role of the individual in history. Whatever may be the case, the question of the extent of Sartre's
Marxism is a highly controversial one, and is an issue around which much debate still centers. Obviously, it is far beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate the relationship between Sartre and Marx, or to undertake a detailed discussion of their similarities and differences. Let it suffice to suggest that, for our purposes here, the change in Sartre's thinking (for all of its Marxist content) may yet be seen as a development of, rather than a shift from, his earlier philosophical views. More fundamentally than a conversion to Marxism, it is a conversion to a belief in social activism, a faith that collective action can be effective, and that it can change both the individual and society. It constitutes a recognition on Sartre's part that introspective philosophy and metaphysics, no matter how true their observations may be, do not significantly affect the "real" world.  

Henceforth, Sartre's philosophy is to be no longer a private creed but a public and political position on relevant issues. In other words, it appears that he has been driven by his concern to defend man's freedom to argue for the possibility of radical conversion at the social level, for at the individual level such conversions bring about only individual results which have very limited effects on society. What is worse, the being-for-others dimension of man's consciousness seems to imply that no radical conversion is likely to occur for most people unless it can be at the level of cooperative group action. Thus, Sartre seems to be trying to raise his
concept of radical conversion to the group level to see if it can and does occur there. As a result, his first concern is to see what could constrain it at that level. And what he discovers there as the most fundamental of constraints is the fact that there is not enough of the material goods of this world to go around; that is to say, economic scarcity.

In reidentifying scarcity, Sartre is bringing back a Marxist concept, but one which he expresses with a different emphasis and in different language. It is different on both counts because the free activity of the for-itself is included as fundamental. The individual acts and makes his decisions in a field of economic scarcity which poses a threat to him. Here, Sartre is adding still another dimension to those already described with which the for-itself must deal and within which it must act. For human conduct is not the mere result of scarcity; it acts in the light of scarcity as the fundamental aspect of its situation. Human life and history may not so easily be explained by mere reference to problems of production, as Marxist theorists are wont to do. Since man is free, he may not ultimately be explained in terms of economic forces. The for-itself remains on the center of the stage. Human relations result from human activity, and history results from both. For Sartre, history presupposes man, not economics or modes of production—for man was prior to both!

Yet the for-itself "finds" itself acting in a field of economic scarcity and makes its most fundamental choices in
the light of need. Thus, need is at the origin of human decisions, not as a form of determinism but as an aspect of the practical world with which any man must deal successfully if he is to survive. And physiological needs are most fundamental to the human condition because they are objective factors of man's materiality. Man is sunk in materiality (an inhuman dimension for Sartre) because lack of food, water, or sleep are needs which are not subject to metaphysical interpretation and are thus not chosen. They are simply there. Thus man's materiality is evidenced by virtue of the fact that he has physiological needs which he may not deny. His choices, while free, are founded on these needs both as actualities and potentialities at any given time. Freedom is not dead here, though, for in fulfilling any particular need men yet choose among alternative means. And in certain extreme cases, men may even choose not to fulfill a physiological need (hunger strikes, economic boycotts, and industrial strikes, for example) in order to accomplish some higher purpose. In so doing, they may risk and even suffer death. In the latter case, the choice not to fulfill the need in question will have become a permanent fact. Thus, need does not deny freedom, but it limits the number of free acts possible to any individual by constituting the field of action within which or in the light of which he must make his choices—including his choice of himself. This concept of need, as will be remembered from a comparison with earlier chapters, is a more detailed development of the concept of facticity or situation. The
original project of the individual is now seen as unifying and synthesizing its situation in terms of present needs and future possibilities for fulfilling them—though, of course, some needs (physiological) are inescapable while others (psychological) are posited desires. Thus, the field of need constitutes a passive obstacle to man, but one which comes to light in his consciousness only as the result of his own actions. That is to say, man discovers his needs by acting in the world, by living. It is thus that he discovers hunger and all the other elements of scarcity. Because he then acts to fulfill his needs, his actions are constrained within the field of need. Yet his labor (his efforts to fulfill his needs) not only has impact on the surrounding field of need, it constitutes yet another form of mediation between the individual, the other, and the physical world in-itself. For this reason, the totality of the human condition is illumined, Sartre thinks, within the field of need. He states that:

Everything is discoverable in need: this is the first totalizing relation between that material being, a man, and the material group to which he belongs. This relation is unilateral, a relation of interiority. Through need, as a matter of fact, there appears in matter the first negation of negation and the first totalization. Need is negation of negation to the extent that it exposes itself as a lack inside the organism; it is positivity to the extent that, through it, the organic totality tends to conserve itself as such. . . . In the last analysis, what is lacking can be reduced to unorganized or less organized elements or, simply, to dead flesh, etc. From this point of view, the negation of this negation comes about by transcending the organic toward the inorganic. Need is the link of unilateral immanence
with the surrounding materiality, insofar as the organism is seeking to feed itself. It is already totalizing, and doubly so: for it is nothing but the living totality, revealing itself as a totality and disclosing the material environment, to infinity, as the total field of the possibilities of satisfaction. On the level that concerns us, this transcending through need holds no mysteries, since the original behavior of, for example, the need for food repeats the elementary behavior of nutrition: chewing, salivation, stomach contractions, and so forth. Transcendence is evinced here as the simple unity of a total function. Without the unity of elementary behavior within the whole, hunger would not exist; there would be only a scattering of distracted and disconnected actions. Need is a function which presents itself for what it is, and which totalizes itself as function, because it is reduced to becoming a gesture, functioning for itself and not within the integration of organic life. And, through this isolation, the organism as a whole runs the risk of disintegration—that is, the danger of death.⁴

Thus, what Sartre is describing for us here is a dialectical process; that is to say, a kind of bouncing back and forth, or rebounding, between the for-itself and the materiality within which it "finds" itself—and by which it sees itself threatened. Scarcity is the term Sartre uses here, but it is more than a simple lack of consumer goods to which he refers. It is an expression of the finitude of man. In a world of scarcity, it is impossible for man to escape competition with his fellow men and with matter because he is dependent on his labor to wrest his needs from both. This finitude of man lies at the heart of all human history for the original project of each man is an apprehension of himself not only as the metaphysical negation outlined previously, but also, and more importantly in a practical sense, as a material lack; that is, as a creature with needs to fulfill. In this world, in the light of human history, the scarcity of
that matter which man needs in order to live is a predominant force. However, Sartre makes it a point to note that scarcity need not be considered a necessary condition for all history. He says that we have no way of knowing whether other creatures on other planets may not undergo a different experience. If, in some other environment, technical and social transformations had destroyed the context of scarcity, a different kind of history could be conceivable.

But, in our world, scarcity founds the possibility of history though other conditions must also be present in order to produce it. That is to say, scarcity alone is not enough to explain or produce history; it only makes history possible. Sartre notes that there are pre-literate societies which have no history in the sense that they have remained static for centuries. They have not evolved to any significant extent. Yet they live in even greater scarcity than most societies which have become more "advanced." Thus scarcity in itself is not sufficient to produce historical development. The ingredient which must be added is the free decisions of men within the context of scarcity; the desire to transcend or "go beyond" present needs as opposed to the acceptance of them as the limits of endeavor. History arises from moments of social imbalance caused by the efforts of men to transcend existing needs. Thus, scarcity founds the possibility of history as we know it, but it reflects reality only in the sense that it is a lived relationship to the world. In a world of economic scarcity, the adaptations of individuals
are of central importance—for those adaptations may operate entirely within certain limits as an equilibrium (thus producing the static, history-less society), or they may operate as efforts to transcend given needs thereby producing imbalances which fissure society. Out of these fissures and imbalances evolution emerges as societies seek new equilibriums, thus producing those evolutionary developments which make up the raw material of history.$^5$

It is abundantly clear that, even now, Sartre has not given up on the for-itself. It is for him the source of all human activity, and consequently, of history. But, it is now defined within the context of economic scarcity in the sense that the original project of each individual in a world in which there is not enough for everyone includes an apprehension of himself as a material lack, or, in other words, as one with material needs. And he necessarily sees others as competitors for their needs potentially and actually overlap his own. Thus, competition and struggle are necessary components of man's life on this earth not only because there is a scarcity of material goods, but also by virtue of his own finitude. That is to say, the other's free project impedes mine not only at the material but also at the metaphysical level, as will be remembered from the previous chapter.

According to Sartre:

Abstractly, scarcity can be considered as a relation of the individual to the environment. Practically and historically—that is, insofar as we are situated—the environment is an already constituted practical field, which reflects for each person the collective structures . . . of which the most fundamental is precisely scarcity,
as the negative unity of the multiplicity of men. . . . This unity is negative in relation to men, since it reaches man through matter, insofar as it is inhuman (that is, insofar as his human presence is not possible without struggle on this earth). This means, then, that the first totalization by materiality/effect on men's thinking of the fact that there is not enough for all appears. . . as the possibility of their common destruction, and as the permanent possibility for everyone that this destruction by matter/through lack of enough of particular forms of it/may happen to him through the praxis/free projects of other men. particular forms of it/may happen praxis/free projects of other restrained by more than the projects of other men. He is also constrained by matter itself to the exact extent that men before him have modified it. Man is mediated by things, Sartre tells us, to the extent that things are mediated by man. There is a dialectic discoverable in history which includes not only reciprocal cause and effect relationships among men, but also between men and their forefathers through matter which has been formed by human labor. For example, when one confronts a tool or a machine, one is confronting matter, but it is matter which embodies the intentions and wishes of other men. It is something which must be used in certain ways and for certain purposes. One is constrained to operate a machine the way it was intended to be operated, else it will not "work." And, one is constrained to use it for the purposes for which it was intended, else its instrumental value to the individual will be negated. Thus, the individual is mediated by things to the extent that other men's intentions and instrumental values have been "embedded" in them. Human intentions constrain the individual not only as they manifest themselves in freedom
(as already described), but also as they manifest themselves in matter. It is a dialectical process; a cause and effect rebounding. And it is, in Sartre's view, the process which history follows. He provides several descriptions of this particular dimension of the dialectic. The following may be clearest of them all.

To grasp the meaning of any human performance we must employ what German psychiatrists have called "understanding." But this involves neither a particular talent nor a special faculty of intuition; it is simply the dialectical movement which explains the act by arriving at its terminal signification from its starting conditions. The movement is originally progressive. If my companion suddenly goes toward the window; I understand this gesture in terms of the material situation in which we both are. It is, for example, because the room is too warm. He is going "to let in some air." This action is not inscribed in the temperature; it is not "set in motion" by the warmth as by a "stimulus" provoking a series of reactions. There is present here a synthetic mode of behavior which, in unifying itself, unifies before my eyes the practical field in which we both are. . . . In any case, if I am to transcend the succession of gestures and perceive the unity which they give themselves, I must feel myself the overheated atmosphere as a need for fresh air; that is, I must myself experience the transcending of our material situation. Within the room, doors and windows are never entirely passive realities; the work of others has given them their meaning, has made out of them instruments, possibilities for an other (any other). This means that I understand them already as instrumental structures and as products of a directed activity. But my companion's movement makes explicit the crystallized indications and designations in these products. . . . His behavior unifies the room, and the room defines his behavior.}

Here Sartre has given us a striking description of the way men are constrained in their apprehension and appropriation of instruments by the way matter has been formed into tools by other men.

This is one fundamental dimension of what Sartre calls the practico-inert; a concept basic to all of his sociological
views. Actually, it is not too different from what he earlier meant by facticity---the point of distinction being that the practico-inert is that part of man's situation which has been made by other men. It refers to all of the man-made constraints, obstacles, and instruments with which the for-itself must deal. But, the practico-inert is a concept which differs very clearly from the views of environmentalists, behaviorists, materialists, and the like. For, all the constraints to which it refers are seen as manifestations of freedom. Individual freedom is constrained, within the dimension of the practico-inert, only by the free decisions of previous generations of men. The particular dimension which has been described thus far is constraint by matter which has been "forged" into tools of one sort or another by others. In this way individual freedom is constrained and thus threatened by the computer, the automobile, the assembly line, and the television set, among others. It is a simple fact of life that human beings are limited and directed in their actions and attitudes by such things; there is nothing mysterious about it. Yet each of these things embodies the intentions of other men. They are themselves manifestations of freedom. At this level, then, freedom is constrained only by freedom as it becomes inertly embedded in matter. Man is mediated by mediated things, but only to the extent that those things have been mediated by man. Thus, through matter, man's free efforts to fulfill his needs rebound on him and result in constraints to his freedom.
But there is another dimension of man's relationship to matter with which Sartre must deal. That is the relationship between man and matter not yet mediated by others; matter in its original state, so to speak. Here there is also a dialectic at work, a rebounding of matter back upon man. That is to say, when man modifies matter, he does so with a certain end in mind; he has an intention. However, the results obtained may not be what was intended; something unforeseen happens in addition to that intended. Sartre here uses the term *praxis* to indicate a general direction observable in the free actions of men; specifically it is that which indicates the intentions of men at both the individual and group levels. He is describing a kind of deadly interplay between human praxis and matter. It is a process which steals freedom from man and breathes life into matter. For the action of human praxis on matter empowers it to strike back at man.

Thus, once again, even at this level, man is affected by things to the extent that he affects them, thereby giving them power over him. In order to demonstrate this dialectic impact of man upon matter and matter upon man, Sartre uses the example of the Chinese peasants who for years practiced a policy of deforestation in order to increase the arable land area available to them. In its positive aspect, the praxis of the Chinese farmers accomplished its end by increasing the available amount of arable land. But, in its negative aspect, it deforested the mountains thereby resulting in disastrous floods.
Thus the whole process of the terrible Chinese floods appears as a deliberately constructed mechanism. If some enemy of mankind had wanted to persecute the workers of Great China, he would have ordered mercenary troops systematically to deforest the mountains. The positive system of cultivation is transformed into an infernal machine. Now, the enemy who brought the loess, the river, the gravity, the whole hydrodynamics into this destructive apparatus—-is the peasant himself. But his activity, taken in the moment of its living development; does not warrant, by intention or in reality, this reversal: in this place, for this man who is farming, there exists only an organic link between the negative (elimination of the obstacle) and the positive (enlargement of the arable sector).

It appears, then that Sartre is reminding us of an earlier point--that the world of matter is a realm of existence wholly constrained by causal laws. When man interferes with the laws of physics governing the equilibrium of matter, he sets into motion a chain of events which strike back at him, or which escape his original intention.

This unintended result, this striking back by matter is what Sartre calls counterfinality; as opposed to finality which refers to the intended ends of human activity. In the case of the Chinese peasants, the act of deforestation constitutes a systematic attempt to conquer nature. This group praxis in action effectively blocks the active interference of any individual farmer who might have foreseen the consequences. In this way the individual becomes alienated from his own best interests and his labor produces the factors which threaten to ruin him. In other words, as soon as human praxis becomes crystallized in matter, it escapes human cause and control by virtue of the fact that it sets in motion physical processes which operate according to material and not
human laws. Human labor, then, becomes loaded with meanings, the meanings imparted to it by the laws of nature. There is a danger here in that the correction of nature by man produces an anti-human reaction. To the extent that man negates matter, matter in turn negates man. Man must then undertake new activities in order to combat and correct this revolt of matter. For example, he must construct dams to combat the floods, levees to hold the waters in check, and bridges to provide transportation across the barriers produced by the floods. Or, to cite some examples a little closer to home, he must deal with the "counterfinalities of industrialization" by finding ways to combat urban overcrowding, slums, air pollution, water pollution, and carnage on the freeways. All of these above processes through time build up a great deal more than a mere story of man combatting matter; they result in a culture, a way of life for the members of any given society. The ways in which men have learned to deal with matter both directly and indirectly, as both finality and the correction of counterfinality, result in the mores and folkways of a society. As Sartre describes it:

Matter alone carries meanings. It retains them in itself, like engravings, and gives them their real effectiveness: in losing their human properties, man's projects are engraved in Being—their translucency becomes opacity, their superficiality becomes density, their volatile lightness becomes permanence; they come into being as they lose their character of lived event.

...The meaning of human labor is that man reduces himself to inorganic materiality, in order to act materially on matter and to change his material life. Through transubstantiation, the project that our bodies engrave in the thing assumes the substantial characteristics of
that thing, without entirely losing its original qualities. Thus it comes to possess an inert future, within which we shall have to determine our own future. The future comes to men through things, to the extent that it has come to things through man. Meanings as passive impenetrability become, in the human universe, the surrogates for man.

Thus, it appears that matter retains meanings which have been "written into it" by the laws of physics on the one hand, and by the intervention of man on the other. It has been invested with quasi-human qualities by man's labor, and has acquired an inert future which in turn constrains man. Man reaches out in his need and discovers other men in matter as though human consciousness had been engraved in the things it handles. This mind of man in matter then becomes destiny. Matter is humanized. And man is materialized.

We have here an illustration of the oft-heard complaint that human beings are becoming slaves to technology. There is nothing mystic about this state of affairs, however, for the machine is in essence a conditional command passed along from men to their brothers. "If you want to produce such and such an object, you must use such and such technological apparatus, and in the following ways." However, when life is at stake, this command is no longer conditional. Under such circumstances, the proper use of the means of survival becomes an unconditional order. So the worker is, in fact, the slave of the machine with which he works. He is "taken over" by the commands of his machine and his function is to obey. This situation both confuses and frustrates man for, although he must be something more
than matter, he is required to hang on to it. It is a threat to his life, a limit to his knowledge, and in society an inert future which binds him. Yet he cannot do without it. For, though man is not matter exclusively, yet man and matter taken together constitute all there is, in Sartre's view. To him, any theological addition would be superfluous, for to talk of deities or supernatural entities is to talk of the unknowable for man.

In conclusion, we may sum up Sartre's concept of scarcity in the following way. Man is a creature who apprehends himself as a lack; that is, as a creature of need. Most fundamentally his needs are physiological and material, but they also include psychological needs such as, for example, the need for recognition. Man also apprehends himself as in a situation of scarcity. There is not enough of what it takes to satisfy his needs to go around. Someone is going to have to do without or, at least, less! Thus, to the individual both matter and other men are actual threats to his survival at certain times and under certain conditions, and they are potential threats to his life and to the fulfillment of his needs all the time. It is in this way that human history is seen by Sartre as containing an inhuman dimension. Man must attempt to fulfill his needs through labor, and his labor throws him into inevitable and deadly conflict with men and matter--both of which are thus empowered to strike back at him. As a result, history discloses itself as a dialectic of finality and counterfinality. Every finality produces a
counterfinality which then must be countered by further efforts toward a corrected finality. And all of this occurs within the context of scarcity.

Thus, to the extent that man is a material being, his ontological status in this world is defined by scarcity. He is a creature of material need; though, of course, he has other needs which refer to his metaphysical ontological status—the desire to become God previously discussed. It appears then that man is both mind (a for-itself-for-others) and matter (one who apprehends himself correctly as a material lack). In our world, in the light of the human history which we are, it looks as though more profitable explanations of man may be derived by looking at him as a creature of need—for scarcity founds history as we know it on this planet.

This is obviously the direction in which Sartre is now pointing. He is emphasizing materialism much more than he did in earlier writings. Yet one thing has not changed! There is no claim for economic determinism being made here. At the source of everything the for-itself still operates, more greatly hindered and limited than before, but still surviving. Sartre is still insisting on that. If our celebrated conquest of nature turns out to look more like the conquest of man, it is only because man have chosen it that way. All the constraints on individual freedom built up by man's mediation of matter and of his fellows constitutes the dimension of the practico-inert. But, the practico-inert is itself a manifestation of freedom, for it was created by the free decisions
of men. In other words, it is the complexity of practical results produced in the world by the activity of human consciousness. The ultimate cause of the practico-inert in all the many and diverse forms it takes is the on-going activity of the for-itself. As a result, all the dimensions of the practico-inert which limit men now are transcendable; they may yet be repudiated, rejected, corrected, or "gone beyond" by the free positing of human consciousness toward something different or better. But this is a great deal more difficult than Sartre originally thought. It appears that some sort of radical conversion at group, societal, and national levels is required. And, Sartre seems to feel that such conversion is still possible, though unlikely. At this point in his writing, his pessimism discloses itself again. But, he is still insisting on the possibility of a widespread conversion which could reverse the process he sees eating away the uniqueness and freedom of individual men.
CHAPTER VI

THE SERIES

Sartre has told us that scarcity founds the possibility of all human history. As a result, it may be seen as underlining all the various structures of human activity as well. Since the former point has been established, Sartre feels that he is now ready to examine social structures in greater detail. And, since there are two basic types of social structure which he identifies, it is necessary to distinguish between them right from the start. The first of these, the series, may be described as a loose collection of people characterized by personal isolation each from the other, lack of organization, and impotency for action on the basis of any common purpose. It is an inert and passive social phenomenon. The second of these, the group, is on the contrary a collection of people which is highly organized, embodies a definite purpose or set of purposes, and which aims at preserving itself as though it were a social entity by eliminating inertia in the person of those individuals who deviate or tend not to contribute to its aims. In this chapter, we shall attempt to see exactly what the series is, in Sartre's terms, and how he describes its transformation into a group.
As Sartre describes it, the series is fundamentally a juxtaposition of people around some thing which constitutes a collective entity; that is, a material instrument or symbol around which individuals gather for the purposes of utilization or identity, but which fails to unify them. Each individual remains in solitude, in isolation from the others. And all of them together are defined as "other," with no further distinction referring to their unique or internal qualities as persons. In order to illustrate this concept, Sartre turns to the example of a number of people waiting for a bus.

What strikes Sartre here is the solitude of the individual. These people waiting for the bus neither know nor care about one another. Each man is alone despite the fact that he is present as a member of a collection of people standing around the bus stop. All of this is produced by the practico-inert, in this case the entire social milieu of institutions (we shall see later what an institution is, in Sartre's terms) called urban. They all live in the city. They maintain their separation from one another by turning their backs on one another, by hiding behind their newspapers, and so forth. Yet each knows he is tied to the others by a common expectation. (They are all waiting for the bus.) The bus itself is the central link, what Sartre has termed a collective entity. It is a thing which escapes its inert materiality and becomes loaded with meaning for the future of the passengers. It dictates the seriality itself, and through it alienation comes to be in the lives of human beings
who "need" it. Through the bus, people become merely passengers. They are interchangeable—each is simply another among others. All recognition based on individual or internal qualities is thus negated. The serial collectivity, in other words, is not made up of a factory foreman, a college professor, a cleaning woman, a laborer, and so on. Each is interchangeable, for each is simply a passenger. And each is thus interchangeably expendable, for there are only so many seats on the bus. Each occupies only a numerical position in the line which is strictly contingent to him as an individual.

One who happens to be at the end of the line may not get a seat; he is expendable. Thus, all are potentially expendable, and they are bound together by this multiple negation. One may try to overcome this scarcity by "bucking the line," but in such action the inevitable competitiveness of human existence which always exists for all as potentiality becomes an actuality. Such is the nature of man's finitude, as will be recalled from the preceding chapter. Sartre describes the situation thusly:

The particular scarcity, then—-the number of people in proportion to the number of seats—would designate without any particular practical arrangement, each person as in excess; that is, the Other would be the rival of any other by the very fact of their identity; the separation would turn into contradiction. But, except in cases of panic—where, indeed, everyone fights against himself in the Other, turning in panic from an abstract unity and a concrete but unthinkable singularity—the relation of of reciprocity, being emerging or re-emerging in the in the exteriority of identity, establishes the interchange-ability as the impossibility of deciding, a priori, who is in excess; it encourages an arbitrary procedure whose only purpose is to avoid, through some order, conflicts or unfairness. The passengers, waiting for the bus, have lined up in the order of arrival. This means that
they accept the impossibility of deciding who is in excess in terms of the intrinsic qualities of the individual; in other words, they remain on the terrain of the common interest, of the identity of separation as meaningless negation; positively, this means that they seek to differentiate each Other from the Others without adding anything to his character of Other as unique social determination of his existence. The serial unity, then, as common interest, imposes itself as requirement and destroys all opposition.

The individuals who compose a series, then, are human beings who are forced to take on an inhuman aspect of identity; that by which they are constituted simply as inert and interchangeable serial objects by their relation to and dependence on a collective entity which is itself a thing.

A collective entity may be seen as an inert entity which gathers a series of individuals about itself and holds them there as inert objects alienated from themselves and from one another. Thus, the series is not just an ethereal concept. There is to be seen in it a visible unity resulting from some more or less contingent circumstance—in this case the bus stop around which people are gathered—and from the fact that each individual constitutes himself as a member in the series thereby becoming nothing but an objective element of the series. This being a member of a series is a way of being for the individuals concerned. But, the serial unity itself is loosely held together, since each is alienated from the other, and exists as a group not structured enough to take any action other than that prescribed by the serial situation in which they are. In more general terms, they are in solitude to the extent that all exist simply as others for each other. They are thereby powerless to do other than con-
form to their serial milieu. If the bus riders somehow joined together to protest the bus fares or the service, they would no longer constitute a seriality. They would become a group with self-identification, common purposes, and a hierarchical structure, all of which function to transcend the limits of their serial situation.

Thus, the series can hardly be described as a structure. It is, rather, a unity which tends to disperse in apathy, yet is identifiable enough for outsiders to identify the members of the series as such. It is not just an empty concept, but rather a very real aspect of social life. This comes clear in the case of oppressed minorities. Though Sartre uses the example of Jewishness, his concept fits the problem of Negroness quite as well.²

In a society which persecutes Negroes it is no joke to be black. That loose yet clearly identifiable proportion of the population which is Negro constitutes a collective entity in the minds of both Negroes and whites, and on that basis founds a seriality. The seriality here is a real relationship characterized by the fact that each Negro is considered as other by his fellows. Individual Negroes exist in isolation from one another and are interchangeable. They belong to the seriality only by virtue of their Negro-ness; their intrinsic qualities matter little, if at all. It is their serial status which defines them. There is a reciprocity among them, but it is one which always refers to and comes to be in the light of others who are not Negroes. Each Negro
sees himself and his black brother as Negroes because there is a non-Negro community (the white one) which identifies them both as Negroes. Thus, like the bus passengers, they define themselves in terms of their serial status in reaction to the social stereotypes of whites. What "we" feeling Negroes might have at this level is weak and unorganized since it comes to them from the outside in the look of the others. For the bus riders, the collective entity which holds them is the bus. For Negro bus riders, there is another collective entity which must be added, Negroeness. It is an inorganic yet material entity--the Negro proportion of the population which is the collective object of contempt and persecution. Here we have another example of the many forms taken by the practico-inert. This collective entity, this dimension of the practico-inert, founds the serial structure in which most Negroes live. It is a collection of people related to one another only through common otherness, interchangeability, and the state of being an object of contempt and persecution--not only in the eyes of the others, but also in their own. Just like the bus riders who line up in order of arrival, thereby "accepting" their serial status as nothing more than passengers, the Negro accepts his serial status and becomes nothing more than an interchangeable and expendable serial unit, but no longer a unique human being.

Thus, the seriality can be very powerful indeed, despite the fact that it is loose, unorganized, and passive. Perhaps another example, that of the university student, would help to further clarify this point, and, in addition,
demonstrate the ready applicability of Sartre's concept of
seriality to other real-life situations.

While students each have unique personalities, desires, goals, and abilities (in Sartre's terms, each is his own project), they nonetheless exist in the majority as a serial collectivity bound to that collective entity commonly referred to in society as a university. As a collective entity, the university in many if not most of its aspects embodies the practico-inert. The university, in other words, is like the bus in Sartre's example. It is a thing which embodies the inert intentions of others thereby escaping its materiality and becoming a dimension of the practico-inert. It becomes full of meaning in the lives of students, and dictates the serial structure which they are. It gathers individuals about itself, and holds them there as inert and alienated from themselves. As students, they have become no longer individuals, but interchangeable and expendable serial units. Like the bus riders, they go through a process of waiting to get on, then riding to destinations predetermined not by their individual projects, but more fundamentally by other historical factors such as entrance requirements, academic standards, the needs of society, and so forth. For both bus riders and students, the ultimate causes of the process are far removed from the individuals engaged in it.

In addition, scarcity and the resulting expendability of certain individuals becomes even more pressing and
apparent in the lives of students than in those of bus riders. For, there are not enough slots in the university's educational process to accommodate all those who wish to enter. Someone must be eliminated, perhaps through entrance examinations or by lining them up in the order of their educational arrival (ranking in high school graduating classes, for example). Of course, one may attempt to "buck the line" in various ways— cramming for the entrance examinations, cheating, or seeking the aid of influential relatives and friends—but, in so doing, one is only affirming the serial status which he is in by competing with his fellows. He is brought to them as others, as competitors who may eliminate him if he does not eliminate some of them by outperforming them in meeting the entrance requirements of the university. This situation continues throughout the educational process for each student is required to withstand the rigors of the ride in order to reach the destination predetermined for him. For the bus riders the rigors of the ride might be the swaying motion of the bus, a bumpy and jarring ride, or the fumes from the bus' engine. For the student, these rigors most often take the form of academic standards (another dimension of the practico-inert) and are usually encountered as an avalanche of term paper assignments, periodic arbitrary objective examinations (usually either true-false, or multiple choice), heavy workloads, vague, ambiguous, and sometimes disinterested instruction, and curricula which are irrelevant to their individual
projects. If at any point a student fails to withstand the
rigors of the ride at least as successfully as most of his
fellows, the educational process will stop just long enough
to "let him off"—often in an unfamiliar part of town. His
success or failure in reaching the destination predetermined
for him often depends not so much on his individual qualities
as on practico-inert traditions carried down from other cen-
turies and other societies which have little to do with the
student, his intrinsic qualities, his situation, or even the
world in which he lives.

Caught in this seriality (or if you prefer, this con-
text of otherness), the student must compete with his fellows.
There is no other way to conform to the situation. For, in
determining the type and intensity of his efforts, the stu-
dent must also take into account the fact that instructors
and classmates are there as other than himself. He faces Joe
Jones who is a "C" student, but he is always potentially
facing Sally Smith who is an "A" student. By the same token,
when he faces Professor Brown who is an easy grader, he is
potentially facing Professor Green who is a hard grader. For
Sartre, there is an otherness embedded in every living rela-
tionship, and it seems to be clearly exemplified in this case.
The university is a totality—one is in touch with it through
attending classes, reading books, or even by telephone or
television. But, it is of the dispersing type. No single in-
dividual may clearly affect it. It disperses in otherness,
to paraphrase Sartre. No individual student can affect the
requirements of the educational process because these requirements impose themselves on him precisely by virtue of the fact that they impose themselves on his classmates. And they impose themselves on his classmates because they impose themselves on their classmates, and so on ad infinitum. 3

Now if we are understanding Sartre rightly, what such examples as these teach about his concept of seriality, is that any collective entity, including a university, is characterized not by a consensus or organized unity, but rather by disunity, a flight into otherness. The individual student is a powerless member of the series gathered around the university. Yet he helps to constitute it because of his isolation from the others, and it is precisely this which renders him powerless and characterizes his serial status. Thus, when the individual student sees academic standards rise, for whatever reason, without being able to raise the level of his own performance accordingly—perhaps for lack of adequate academic background or because he has moral qualms against cheating by using files of past departmental examinations kept by fraternities and various other groups—he does not rebel, he just feels trapped. If he is eliminated from the educational process, he may complain, but he is likely to do little else. And, even if he does rebel, he cannot accomplish anything alone. His powerlessness stems from his isolation from others of his kind. Consequently, he is prevented from joining with them to form a group which could have the power to do anything about the situation. The power of the seriali-
ty, then, is a power which belongs to no one. It disperses
in otherness producing an inertia which is everywhere and
nowhere. This, Sartre feels, is a fundamental characteristic
of seriality. He generalizes the situation in the following
way:

To be alienated, or simply altered, the individual
must be an organism susceptible of dialectical action;
and it is through the free praxis that necessity is
revealed as a transformation of his product and himself
by his product in the Other. The constraints of need,
the requirements of the processed thing, the imperatives
of the Other, his own powerlessness—his praxis reveals
all these to him, and interiorizes them. His free activi-
ty, in its freedom, takes upon itself everything that
 crushes him: exhausting work, exploitation, oppression,
rising prices. This is tantamount to saying that his
freedom is the means chosen by the Thing and the Other
to crush him and to transform him into a processed Thing.

A page further on Sartre adds:

When the free individual praxis develops as an undert-
taking that is temporalizing through the course of a life,
its motivations are never "psychical" or "subjective":
they are the things, the real structures, insofar as they
are revealed by the project through its concrete ends
and from the standpoint of those ends. . . . But precisely
because the Others are brought into operation through
things, and because their freedom is relevant to my free-
dom as Other—that is, as freedom-thing, or as freedom
of this thing or that—the structure of the situation re-
mains, nevertheless, requirement. . . . This authoritarian
structure of passivity has a variable and sometimes major
importance, depending upon the extent to which the free
praxis of the individual re-actualizes this structure by
constituting itself, and exhausts itself by surrendering
its own sovereignty to this piece of matter—which, as
we have seen, turns his sovereignty against itself and
converts it into inertia, because the matter cannot be
transcended. But this inertia itself alters the praxis,
insofar as it is praxis; it gives its status of thing to
a free activity, not to another thing.

In the above paragraph, it should be pointed out that
where he refers to the "authoritarian structure of passivity,"
Sartre is describing what he later calls an institution. We
shall see more in detail about this concept in the next chapter. To return to the topic at hand, it appears from what Sartre has told us, that seriality is a powerless disunity which colors its members with its own characteristics thereby rendering them vulnerable to manipulation by things and others. Nevertheless, this vulnerability must be accepted in the light of the individual's free praxis. Thus, for Sartre, seriality may be seen as the result of various forms of conditioning, but not of any form of ultimate determinism. An example of what he means here might be found in the oft heard apology in our own society that only a small percentage of college students are causing trouble; the vast majority are, the argument goes, peaceful, law-abiding, and mainly concerned with getting an education. The implication, of course, is that the vast majority of students are on the side of the "establishment" (the university and the society), and against such groups as the Students for a Democratic Society which take overt action in opposition to the cherished values of the institution. 6

But, it would seem, in the light of a Sartrean analysis, that such is not the case. The majority are not characterized by any consensus in the nature of a freely given support for the university and the larger society in which it has its being--such an interpretation as that would surely be considered naive by Sartre. Rather, the majority are characterized and rendered impotent by their serial status. Each is isolated from the other while at the same time existing
through him. Each is thus powerless to do anything—so he does nothing. He simply stays out of trouble. Such an analysis might not be so far from the truth for campus moderates nowadays are often heard to say that they too disapprove of the establishment, and agree with the grievances of the Black Student Union, Students for a Democratic Society, and other such militant groups. But, they disagree with their methods (demonstrations, taking over buildings and the like). In other words, moderates such as these do not apparently approve of the institution, but they take no action against it. Such is the characteristic structure of serial behavior. Yet it is clear that students are not ultimately determined by their serial status because some of them do rebel. They step outside the structures imposed on them, and out of their serial status as well—by forming groups. Thus, this passive majority is also a potential group—a collectivity that can transform itself and take action. But, in most instances, students choose to remain in their serial status out of a combination of fear, impotency, and apathy. Such would seem to be the conclusion of a Sartrean type of analysis.

At any rate, the result of all this is that man, caught in seriality, has lost much of the freedom Sartre once claimed for him. As a member of a multiplicity of serialities, he has become trapped in his own inertness. The various structures of the practico-inert which he himself has created have engulfed him. Almost! However, behind all the commands of the practico-inert hides the other reaching out at him. And,
it is his "willingness" which endures and accepts it all. But, what if he gets "fed up" and decides to accept it no longer? This is the final affirmation of freedom left for man in Sartre's opinion. He can decide to accept it no longer. However, in order to do so, he must transcend his seriality and form groups.

But how does a group emerge from seriality? And under what conditions? In order to answer these questions Sartre turns to a description of what he calls the group-in-fusion.

It will be recalled that at the base of all change is scarcity. It is what makes human history possible. Man's labor comes into the world in order to fulfill his needs, and his project upsurgings in a field of scarcity impels him always beyond himself and what has been toward what is not yet; toward a future. One is always required to go beyond and to choose what is not yet the case. He cannot simply be what he is. This has already been enumerated at some length. But, in itself, it is not a sufficient explanation for change because there are two general but different courses of action that any individual may take. He may choose to "project" the past; that is, to continue living according to the same rules and principles and under the same conditions as in the past and, thus, to remain in his serial status. Or, on the other hand, he may choose to attempt to change his life and conditions, to brave the forbidden.

The crucial question at this point is why, and under
what conditions, does a man or group of men choose one path
of action in preference to the other? The question is a
central one for Sartre because it is this particular existen-
tial dilemma, the decision of the individual in the light of
his own praxis, which lies at the very heart of all that
happens. No matter how adequately one may describe the
social and economic conditions under which people do certain
things (and Sartre is also attempting that), he cannot fully
account for change in this way. At the source of change and
of all social structures lies this dialectic between the in-
dividual for-itself and the things and others which impose
practico-inert structures on it. Ultimately, it is the
decisions made by individuals as they live this dialectical
process which produce change and, thus, history. Of course,
since the process is dialectical, the individual's freedom
may yet be described as ultimate or perhaps absolute, but
certainly not complete. All is circumscribed within the
field of scarcity; the fact that man exists for himself and
others as a creature of need. It is on this basis that his
choice to conform or rebel may be illuminated. That is to
say, if a man's needs are in his own eyes at least minimally
satisfied, or if his fear (which itself refers to some need,
perhaps the need to survive) overrides his dissatisfaction
with other elements of his life, he is not likely to choose
rebellion. Defeatism, resignation, fatalism, optimism, and
cynicism are all modes of existence in seriality. They are
ways of choosing one's serial status. But, on the other hand,
if the situation presents the individual with the impossibili-
ty of fulfilling his most fundamental needs as he perceives them, if perhaps his very survival is threatened by conforming to his situation, he sees no other way out than to attempt to change that situation. He can dare the impossible when the situation is threatening enough. Perhaps he could be described as desperate, as one who sees himself threatened, oppressed, and downtrodden to the point that he faces just one choice--change or extinction. Thus, he must attempt the change no matter how great the cost or risk involved for the alternative is completely untenable. Or, more fundamentally, it is unlivable. It might be that this particular kind of human experience is reflected in the opinion heard often nowadays that violent rebellion (strikes, demonstrations, riots, etc.) are to be decried, yet are acceptable--as a last resort. The more militant segment of our society often claims that they are in exactly the sort of position that Sartre describes. They argue that their situation, or some situation about which they have taken a moral stand, has become intolerable, that all forms of negotiation and non-violent protest have been exhausted, and that nothing remains to them except the last resort--violent rebellion. Violence, they claim, is unavoidable for there are no alternatives left except acquiescence, and that would be both unthinkable and morally untenable. Whether such claims are in fact justified or not, that is the way militants often seem to see themselves vis-à-vis society. At least, that is the way they describe their situation.

Here is Sartre's description:
The upheaval that rends a collectivity of individuals by the lightning stroke of a common praxis obviously originates in a synthetic—and consequently, material—transformation which occurs in the context of scarcity and of existing structures. For organisms whose risk and practical movement, and suffering as well, reside in need, the driving force is danger, at every level of materiality. . . . In other words, without the original tension of need as a relation of interiority with Nature, the change would not take place; and, conversely, there is no common praxis—at whatever level it is situated—whose regressive and descending meaning does not relate directly or indirectly to this original tension. Thus one must understand above all that the origin of any restructuring of collectivity into groups is a complex fact that occurs simultaneously at every stage of materiality. . . . But the event, universal as it may be, cannot be lived as its own transcendence toward the unity of all, its universality is objective for each person; or, if you prefer, unless it creates in each person a unifying structure of objectivity. Up to this point, in fact—in the dimension of the collectivity—the real had defined itself by its impossibility. Indeed, what we call the meaning of realities refers precisely to the meaning of what is, by its principle, forbidden. The transformation, then, is effected when impossibility itself is impossible—or, if you prefer, when the synthetic event reveals the impossibility of changing as impossibility of living. This has the direct result of making the impossibility of changing the very object to be transcended, in order to continue life.

But this is still not sufficient for there is another question Sartre must answer. How is it that need, which drives men to think of themselves as opposed to one another, can also drive them to join together in groups with common objectives? How can individual praxis become a common praxis on the basis of the very need which Sartre has told us drives men apart? He summarizes the situation and raises the question this way (italics mine):

In other words, we have emerged into a vicious circle; the group constitutes itself on the basis of a need or a common danger and defines itself by the common objective that determines its common praxis. Yet neither the common need, nor the common praxis, nor the common objective
can define a community, unless the latter makes of itself a community by feeling individual need as common need, and by projecting itself, in the internal unification of a common integration, toward the objectives that it produces as common. Without famine this group would not have constituted itself; but how is it that it defines itself as common struggle against a common need? Why do not the individuals—as also happens—in a particular case quarrel among themselves over food like dogs?

The answer, for Sartre, lies in the collective object through which the seriality receives its dictates. The serial structure is tied together by the collective entity (bus, profession, university, social stereotype, and so on), and the dictates of the others come to the serial collectivity through it. Now if this entity becomes a threat to the members of the serial structure, making it appear to them impossible to continue their lives in the mode imposed on them as serial unity, they will be driven together. But, this will happen only on the condition that they perceive the threat in this way. The "we" feeling or solidarity of the collectivity thus emerges dialectically—partly from the outside, and partly from the inside! Their solidarity comes to them from the outside in the form of some oppression which threatens them as a group, thus giving them a common danger and a common need. Their solidarity comes to them from the inside when each man sees that the situation is such that he cannot rebel or survive alone. The situation of common danger and common need makes the members of the collectivity interdependent.

"They will all hang separately if they do not all hang together!"
Perhaps a more personal example might help to further clarify this decision of the individual Sartre is trying to describe. Let us suppose that I am a pacifist, one who is committed to non-violence. Like Socrates, I believe it better to suffer an injustice than to do one. Like Christ, I would rather be struck than to strike another, and am thus committed to the policy of turning the other cheek. Now, if someone approaches me with violent intentions, I will try to talk him out of it. If I must oppose him, on whatever grounds, I will do it with reasons and arguments, but not with force. If he uses force, employs violence against me, I may still remain non-violent. If he punches me in the nose, I simply take it or perhaps run away. However, let us suppose my back is to a wall and I cannot escape. Then, I must absorb the beating and not retaliate, and I may yet choose to do exactly that. After all, I have been punched in the nose before, and have survived quite well, thank you. I have never been ashamed of that, but only of the harm I inflicted on others when I struck back. Thus far everything is all right. I can accept my fate. But, suddenly I notice something which changes the whole situation. Something in the intensity of the other's efforts, the dirty tactics he uses, the epithets he mutters, and the wicked gleam in his eye tells me that this man is out to kill me! It is now a matter of life and death. Moral considerations have become a luxury for he threatens my very survival. At the moment that I internalize this situation I am transformed from passive to active, from
defensive to aggressive, from tolerant to ruthless. I throw all the rules out the window, and become more relentless than my attacker, for I see my own extinction as the only alternative to such action. It will be a fight to the finish, and though I may not kill him or even want to do so, I must render him incapable of any further violent action. Thus, while my actions are dictated through some collective entity (we may be fighting over a seat on the bus, a promotion at the factory where we both work, because we are members of opposing social stereotypes such as rich or poor, worker or college student, black or white, etc.), my retaliation will not take place until I interiorize the situation in the light of my own praxis. In this case, praxis is identical to project.

This overly simple example may then be generalized by the equally simple process of multiplying the number of people involved. I and a number of my acquaintances are attacked by an already constituted group. In this case, we are not in danger as individuals, but all together. Divided we fall, together, if we multiply our strength, there is hope for survival, perhaps even victory. But, we must all realize this as individuals! Thus, there is a dialectic process involved; this is not a positivistic doctrine Sartre is offering. For, conditions "A" do not necessarily produce conditions "B". No group emerges out of seriality to oppose or resist the thing or the other until each individual has interiorized the situation as common danger, common need,
common purpose, and hope for success through unity—and all in the light of his own praxis! Thus, it was a long while before Martin Luther King's bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, or the riots in Watts and Hough actually took place, despite the fact that the oppressive situations against which they were rebelling had been in existence for many years.

At the structural level, what Sartre is talking about is a struggle between an already constituted group acting as oppressor, and a seriality which emerges as a group under the pressure of danger. The interiorization of each individual is at the heart of the process, but it occurs within these general structural limitations. The example Sartre provides is a description of the events of July 12, 1789—the French Revolution. The realization which comes to individuals is described by him in this way:

It is thus, by the coexistence of the two structures (the army, an already constituted group, and the people of Paris, who are yet constituting a seriality), the one being the possible and future negation of the other (and simultaneously the negation of all in each), that each person continues to see himself in the Other, but he himself there as himself—that is, here, as the totalization in himself of the Parisian population, by the saber slash or the gunshot that will wipe him out. And this situation establishes what is improperly called contagion or imitation, etc.: in this behavior, indeed, each sees in the Other his own future, and discovers, on that basis, his present act in the act of the Other. To imitate, in these still inert movements, is to discover, simultaneously, oneself in the process of performing one's own action over there in the Other; and performing here, in oneself, the action of the Other, fleeing in one's own flight and that of the Other, attacking with a single attack in the Other and with his own fists; with agreement or accord (in fact, exactly the opposite of an agreement), but realizing and living the otherness on the basis of the synthetic unity of a totalization, organized and to come, of the gathering of the group to come.
Obviously at this point there is no particular hierarchical structure present; some elements of the seriality remain for everyone is yet acting spontaneously and individually. The group is still in fusion and everything is structured by the more or less accidental dictates of the situation. There is now a common purpose apprehended by all, perhaps something akin to what Rousseau called the general will. No man is a leader, yet potentially every man may lead in response to the fluctuations of the situation, and in the light of their common purpose. A man, any man, may shout a command ("follow me," "storm the barricades," etc.), and be followed, but not because he is recognized as a leader or holds any particular rank among them. Often, they may not even for the most part know who he is. But they follow his command because they recognize that it expresses something necessary to their common purpose. Thus, that any particular man might shout a command is quite accidental, for he is every man. A few minutes, or hours, later, at a different place, faced with different circumstances, another man will spontaneously recognize what must be done (perhaps because he is in a better position to see what is happening than the others), shout a command or warning, and thus exemplify the common purpose of all the others.

In describing the events of July 12, Sartre notes a number of important factors. At the beginning of the day, the people of the city, despite their hunger and other griev-
ances, are still existing at the serial level. They have pleaded for an opportunity to alleviate their misery and have gone unheeded. In fact, the government is against them, and has thus provoked a sort of unity-in-misery among them. But, no move has yet been made. Then, they discover that the army has surrounded Paris—they are sealed off! All of these factors strengthen their cohesion and their mutual fear. To paraphrase Sartre, everyone begins to see himself in the other, and the other in himself. They are all in danger together and have thus acquired a common future. Suddenly, driven by desperation augmented by old miseries, a number of people loot the arms depot. A concerted action against the oppressors has now taken place. In their fait-accompli the seriality is enabled to see itself as a group which has acted. These people have discovered themselves; they are a group which has translated common danger, need, and purpose into an accomplished fact. In reaction, government officials attempt to form a militia from within the newly-formed group. But the people react violently against the militia and become more unified than ever. This tactic only serves to accelerate the fusion of the group. The seriality is clearly dissolving now—into unity! And, it is occurring most rapidly where the danger is greatest, in the sector of the Bastille. Here the people are trapped. The army is in front of them, the Bastille behind. Pressed together in this way, they must act as a group if they are to survive. Some sort of elemen-
tary organization begins to take shape. There are arms in the Bastille with which they may defend themselves, and the walls of the Bastille can provide a defense against the approaching army. Plans and objectives are laid out; the Bastille must be taken! Orders and actions are undertaken on the basis of necessity—particular identities of individuals are contingent. The first man to go over the wall does so because he happened to be in front. And the Bastille is taken.\(^{10}\)

Thus, what Sartre has described here is the process by which the group has fused, acted, and succeeded. Seriality, under threat, has stepped out of its ineptitude and looseness to become a unified force. This operation has revealed to everyone an urgency which resulted in the discovery by each of a terrible common freedom and responsibility. Here freedom has been restored in the act of transcending the practico-inert, and what is more, it is a common freedom between men. It is the freedom of the individual and the other realized together in group action. At last Sartre seems to have found what he was looking for; the radical conversion at the group level, freedom multiplied in strength and become a force in the world! Here he seems to see genuine human relationships, people overcoming the otherness by joining together in a fight for common freedom. As he describes it:

The essential characteristic of the group in fusion is the sudden restoration of freedom. Not that freedom has ever ceased to be the condition of the act, and the
mask that dissimulates alienation; but we have seen that it has become, in the practico-inert field, the mode in which alienated man must live his own servitude in perpetuity, and, finally, the sole means he has to reveal the necessity of his alienation and his powerlessness. The explosion of the revolt, as liquidation of the collectivity, does not directly draw its sources from the alienation, revealed by freedom, nor from freedom suffered as powerlessness; a conjunction of historical circumstances is needed; an historical change in the situation, a risk of death, violence.11

Thus, the group has fused, not as an organism, but as a common praxis. The unifying activity of each individual's freedom has resulted in a united freedom. This is to the advantage of each individual for it is himself as freedom which is united with the others as freedoms; each individual is the end, and not merely the means. In turn, the group as common praxis for freedom, is the means, not the end. It exists and functions for the salvation of the individual! The group-in-fusion, then, is a common praxis, multiply interiorized in freedom in the presence of the concomitant realization of risk and responsibility. It is clear that the group which has just fused can by no means be seen as an organism or ontological totality in any sense. The individual synthesis through the other is practical. It is not a state of mind, matter, or affairs. Neither is it, strictly speaking, a stage of history which must precede or follow other stages. It is an action, a praxis which through the group and/or the object produces a common event. One's freedom is thus realized in the world by recognizing itself in its own action, and in the action of the other. No one is forced to act on the basis of any praxis which is alien to
him; there are no impositions on him. Thus, for Sartre, the group in fusion is a rebellion in, of, and for freedom, and a conquest of alienation and otherness. He cannot emphasize this point too much for this is his lodestone—the common freedom which makes genuine human relationships possible! It might be noted that it is on this point that he most squarely opposes himself to current Leninist interpretations of Marx, with their emphasis on materialistic and mechanistic forms of determinism.
CHAPTER VII

THE GROUP

Now Sartre must leave his discovery of common freedom, which he found exemplified in the group-in-fusion, and press on. History does not stop at any particular point (unless the bomb is dropped, which hasn't happened yet), and, as a result, neither can be. He must ask what happens to the newly formed group. How can it maintain itself in the world after its initial victory? And, if it survives, can it remain an expression and defender of freedom?

The answers to these questions are rather tragic ones for Sartre, or for anyone who has begun to sympathize with his particular fight for freedom. For, Sartre sees that once the initial victory has been achieved, the immediate reason for the fusion of the group no longer exists. When the immediate threat is gone, the group is likely to disperse, to dissolve into seriality once more. Everyone will go home and take up the patterns of his previous life. The struggle then will have to be taken up again at some time in the future with all the risk of failure and death which that implies. In other words, the group is immediately threatened by a relapse into seriality, and, if it is to preserve itself, must take steps to prevent a flight into otherness.
While taking the Bastille, to use Sartre's example, the group needed only a unity sufficient to undertake that particular action. There was no necessity for it to reflect on its own status. Only after the heat of the battle was over did the group find it necessary to reflect upon itself as such. For it was not until then that the threat of dispersal into seriality began to appear, and the need for some new form of consolidation become urgent.¹

As a result, the purpose of any new organization of the group must be to consolidate itself by finding ways to hold on to the individual freedoms which have been given over to it. The main threat to the group now comes from within in the form of individuals who want to go home, to disperse and return to pre-group patterns of life. The threat may even appear in the form of traitors—those who would betray the group to an enemy. The means taken to meet this threat of disintegration is the oath. By means of the oath, each individual recognizes the necessity of combating any further outside threats of extinction by guaranteeing the permanence of the group through pledging his continuing loyalty and membership. Thus, he formally disengages himself from his former seriality, and from his former inert and passive role as victim of the others outside the group.

The oath is the positive aspect of group organization. Loyalty and permanent membership on the part of each individual is affirmed through it. Of course, it may take many different forms such as swearing on the Bible, calling upon
God as a witness, voting "yes" to a group commitment, and so on. The form makes little difference! It is a commitment, and if the group remains in being long enough, it becomes a commitment not only for those who take the original oath, but for their children as well. This is an interesting point we shall take up later. And, neither is the oath in any way a social contract. Here there is no basis in any societal or political entity; it is simply an expression of individual decisions which mark a transformation in status from seriality to permanent group membership for each of them. In other words, the group is not made into a thing by the oath. It does not exist independently of its members. Rather, it exists only as their common praxis precisely to the extent that they freely posit their own self-interests in it.

When freedom becomes a common praxis in order to establish the group's permanence, producing its own inertia by itself and in mediated reciprocity, this new status is called the oath. It stands to reason that this oath can take many different forms, from the explicit act of swearing (the Tennis Court Oath, the oath as a synthetic link among members of the medieval community), to the oath implicitly assumed as an already existing reality of the group (for example, for those who are born into the group and grow up among its members). In other words, the historical act of taking an oath in common—although it is in universal practice, and in every case corresponds to the surviving group's resistance to the separating action of differentiation and (spatio-temporal) estrangement—is not the necessary form of the common oath, insofar as the latter is a warranty against the future, an inertia produced in immanence and by freedom, a basis of all differentiation. If, for example, we examine it as a communal link in the Middle Ages—in its explicit reality as an historical act—it simply presents itself as such, and reveals its structures more easily.²
In other words, the oath is simply an agreement among men for the purpose of guaranteeing the permanence of their group. And, it can be discovered historically in the form of structures, the shapes taken by the various groups to which men have belonged, such as trade and labor unions, medieval knighthood, professional organizations, civic organizations, religious denominations, and the like.

Behind each and every social organization stands, explicitly or implicitly, the oath. According to Sartre:

The oath is a mediated reciprocity. All its derivative forms—for example, the legal oath of the witness, the individual oath sworn upon the Bible, etc.—acquire meaning only on the basis of that original oath. But one must beware of confusing it with a social contract. Here it is by no means a question of seeking any basis whatever in this society or that . . . but of showing the necessary transition from one form of the group, immediate but in danger of being dissolved, to another form, one that is reflexive but permanent.3

Thus, the oath itself is basically nothing more than a mediated reciprocity among free men.

It is important to point out that the reciprocity of the oath noted above must be mediated throughout the group. For, any individual's oath is futile unless it is taken for granted as a guarantee by the others, and affirmed by each of them in turn. But, when this happens, it marks a definite change. For, prior to this, while the group was in fusion, individual action was dictated by common danger, need, and purpose emanating from the outside. Now it is dictated by a threat from within. For the oath is a guarantee against defection, a defense against traitors. It is the
way the group combats a relapse into seriality and it implies that anyone is potentially a traitor. Thus, each member of the group, as potential traitor, threatens the group and threat comes back to him from within the group. Once the oath has been taken, freedom is limited from the inside and is opposed to the freedom of the other. Each man becomes an other to the others—as potential traitors. Although this is not the type of otherness which characterizes seriality (for there is affective unity in the group), there is no doubt that a dimension of the practico-inert has reentered the picture. Through the oath, individuals themselves (within the confines of the oath) become practico-inert. In contrast to the group-in-fusion, a certain amount of ossification has set in. The group, now organized in terms of the oath, limits freedom once more.

In the light of all this, Sartre concludes that there is a deeper intelligibility of the oath, one which might for purposes of contrast be considered the negative aspect of group organization. This is the threat that is implied in the oath; that traitors will be punished. This is what Sartre refers to as the terror. In order to avoid the danger of dissolving into seriality, the group exerts pressure on its own members, and they are in this way in danger from within the group. In other words, the deeper intelligibility of the oath is violence which threatens from within. The oath protects the individual's freedom at the risk of his own life. One may not defect except at the risk of death. Thus, this
state of terror becomes an explicit fact exactly when there is a real danger of the dissolution of the group. At other times it exists as "implied." In other words, the oath becomes a guarantee which may be taken for granted by all members of the group precisely because it implies within itself a promise, that it will be enforced. And Sartre takes pains to point out that it is enforced whenever necessary. Violence and death are the ultimate realities which put teeth into the oath and guarantee the permanence of the group. Such a state of affairs is necessary, Sartre feels, because the group is a common praxis, not an organism. If it did not act in this way, it would dissolve! It lives under terror, but it is a terror which unites, in contrast to the dispersing fear characteristic of seriality which separates. This form of organization is concrete and obvious in the lives of individual members of the group and results in a unification here and now. There is no flight into otherness. Unity in freedom comes from free choice consolidated into a common praxis which continues through time by means of the risk of violence—the state of terror in both its implied and explicit aspects. Yet, this does not upset Sartre for it is free praxis, common freedom, which is being preserved, and some limitation on unconditional individual freedom is necessitated. Freedom is not denied by group membership at this level; it is simply restructured into a unity for freedom which yet leaves some freedom to the individual as a member of the group. As Sartre describes it:
The fundamental modification consists in the total transfer of the common being of the group—regulative freedom and the impossible ontological unity—to the praxis of the group as such. The group praxis, and this alone, creates the common unity, and the group claims ontological status all the more forcefully as the reawakening seriality risks dissolving the group. Consequently, each person's reciprocal work consists in projecting the ontological unity onto the practical unity: the praxis becomes the group's being and its essentiality; it will produce in the praxis its men as the inorganic instruments it needs for its evolution. And freedom lies in the praxis, not in each individual action. This new structure of the group is simultaneously the practice of the Terror and a reaction of defense against the Terror; it consists in a double negation of mediated reciprocity. Each person is construed by the Other, through everyone, as the inorganic tool by means of which action is realized; each person constitutes action as freedom itself, in the form of terror-imperative. It is this freedom that gives a little borrowed freedom to its own tools. Yet this borrowed freedom is not disturbing; rather, it is the reflection of the common freedom upon a particular inorganic object, not the practical freedom of a single agent.

Let us attempt a further clarification of these points.

The term inorganic tool refers to the individual human being as a member of the group. Freedom is the common purpose, or praxis, of the group. The individual, then, is a tool for freedom in the sense that it is his actions which embody and carry out the common praxis. Through him, purpose becomes reality and the end is accomplished. And the common praxis is affirmed by the oath and enforced through terror. Thus, "each person constitutes action as freedom itself in the form of terror-imperative." Yet each person, in carrying out the specific function assigned to him by the common praxis, exercises his own initiative and unique talents. There is a great deal of freedom left to him in carrying out his specific responsibilities. In this way, each person has "a little
borrowed freedom" conferred on him by the common praxis. His freedom is the reflection on him— as an individual instrument— of common freedom.

Perhaps the example of a football team would help us at this point. As a group, the team has a common praxis (to win the game), and has structured itself in terms of that end. Each individual plays a certain position, and has individual responsibilities to carry out as a halfback, quarterback, or tackle. The leaders (the coach and his staff) are such because their experience and demonstrated capabilities qualify them for these positions. There is no question of wealth, family, influence, or other such irrelevant criteria entering here. The team takes on a structure dictated only by its common praxis; each individual occupies the position in the overall structure for which his capabilities best fit him— and where he can contribute most to the team's efforts. Strategy and tactics are devised. "We will control the ball." "We will run at their weak spot." "If we win the toss, we will elect to receive." If each player does his part, the team should win. But the common praxis and all of its derivative strategies call on each individual to exercise his own freedom and initiative within the confines of the responsibilities assigned him at his position. How he plays his part is up to him. The halfback may run hard or his style may be of the more elusive sort. The quarterback must decide in crucial third-down situations
whether to run, as called for in the game plan, or to risk a pass. The tackle must block the defensive end out of the play, and adjust his blocking patterns to overcome the stratagems of his antagonist. Each must succeed in carrying out his own assignment, and his individual initiative as well as his unique talents are here called into play by the requirements of the common praxis.

Now a group of revolutionaries would present an example parallel to that of a football team, and one, it goes without saying, that Sartre would consider a great deal more fitting. In both cases, nevertheless, we can extrapolate the basic principles of Sartre's concept of group organization. Both groups look to a common future to be fulfilled, and are called upon by necessity to divide the labor and organize individuals according to specific functions. At the same time, the individual remains of crucial importance for his actions condition the actions of his fellows, and each individual action is justified in the light of the common future they are all seeking to fulfill. The truth of any individual action lies in the fulfillment of the group's future. Thus, when the tackle successfully blocks his opponent, his action is fulfilled only if the play goes for a respectable gain or, ultimately, a touchdown. If someone else failed to carry out his assignment successfully, and as a result the play is thrown for a loss, the tackle's efforts have been annulled. The same would be true of a group of revolutionar-
ies. Each individual must carry out his duties as a member of the revolutionary group, and his efforts find their fulfillment or annulment in the success or failure of the group effort. All common purpose is accomplished through the individual and his differentiated actions.

Thus, group organization, as Sartre is talking about it here, is not only a subordination of individual freedom to common freedom, it is also a distribution of functions which calls for individual initiative. "Freedom leaves a little borrowed freedom to its inorganic tools." Each individual function creates a situation within the group in relation to the functions of all of its members. All are tied together in solicitude of each toward each within and throughout the group. The functions of one person may be specified only with an eye to the functions of another, and so on. There is solicitude, and even perhaps fraternity, here, but it is one which is ultimately based on terror. Traitors, and sometimes failures, will be eliminated in one way or another. They will be cut from the team---perhaps by death. Clearly, then, it is the function which has become indispensable at this level of group organization, not the individual. Yet it is only the individual who can actualize the function. It is through the specific functions "acted out" by individual human beings that the common praxis is realized. In this sense, the group is a set of fluid reciprocities. Individual freedom operates through the mediation of common freedom, which, in turn, is realized in the
world through the exercise of individual freedoms toward the common end.

All of this solicits Sartre's approval for freedom is still the ultimate value he seeks to establish. He is not disturbed by this fraternity-in-terror-for-freedom because freedom must be defended against all enemies. If one wishes to relapse into the passiveness of seriality or to "sell out" to the enemy, thereby endangering the very survival of the group, he will get little sympathy from Sartre. If purges are necessitated, then so be it!^5

It should be noted that this is a particular kind of group Sartre has in mind. It is not just any group at all! There are other kinds, and he will describe them, too. What he is referring to here is that kind of group which exemplifies common freedom in its praxis. Of course, individual freedom is more limited at this level of organization than it was while the group was in fusion. But still the organizational structure which has evolved in the group is for the purpose of realizing and protecting that freedom which may be mediated through a number of people. It is team freedom, and the team's objective is freedom! The latter is a freedom which supercedes individual freedom; yet individual freedom within the requirements of the common praxis is indispensable. In other words, this kind of group exists in such a way as to make its end coordinate with such freedom as may be allowed to each individual member. The individual is the end and the means. The group itself is not
the end; it is only a number of people engaged in an effort to establish and preserve freedom for themselves as a group. It is collective life—for freedom.

Some events which would seem to exemplify this kind of group in action would be the French revolution (as described), the Cuban revolution (at least in its early stages), Martin Luther King's bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama in 1964, the Algerian revolt (which Sartre himself supported), and the French resistance during the German occupation (of which Sartre was a prominent member). Obviously, not all of these are revolutionary groups. Some of them protest, rather than revolt. They seek to join the already existing structure of society rather than to destroy or restructure it. But, what these groups all have in common is the realization of individual freedom in the service of common freedom, and the concomitant awareness of the terrible individual responsibilities inherent in such struggles. Some of the feeling that Sartre has for such collective fights for freedom may be revealed by referring to one of his earlier writings (Situations) in which he describes the French resistance.

In these passages, in addition, are implied the common praxis, oath, terror-imperative, and individual responsibility characteristic of such activities. His words are striking enough, in this writer's opinion, to be quoted at some length.

We were never more free than under the German Occupation. We had lost all our rights, above all the right to speak; we were insulted daily and had to remain silent. We were deported, because we were workers, because we were Jews, because we were political prisoners.
I am not speaking here of that elite who were actual Resistants, but of all those Frenchmen who by day and night, for four years, said "No." The cruelty of our enemy drove us to the limits of our condition, forcing us to ask those questions which can be avoided in peace. All those who were aware--and what Frenchman was not, at one time or another--of some information about the Resistance, asked himself anxiously, "If they torture me, can I hold out?" Thus the question of freedom was posed, and we were brought to the edge of the deepest knowledge a man can have of himself. For the secret of a man is not his Oedipus complex or his inferiority complex, it is the limit of his freedom, his ability to resist torture and death.

For those involved in underground activity, the circumstances of their struggle were a new experience: they were not fighting in the open as soldiers; hunted alone, arrested alone, they resisted torture in the most complete abandonment; alone and naked before torturers who were clean-shaven, well-fed, well-dressed, who regarded this wretched flesh with contempt--torturers whose smug consciences and enormous social power gave every appearance of their being right. Nevertheless, at the depth of this solitude, others were present, all
the comrades of the Resistance they were defending; a single word was enough to trigger ten, a hundred arrests. This total responsibility in total solitude, is it not the revelation of our freedom?

So, what Sartre is describing to us now is a kind of collective fight for freedom; it is teamwork in and for freedom. It is no longer the metaphysical freedom of the individual with which he is primarily concerned. As noted in a previous chapter, Sartre had decided that metaphysical evil was a luxury, and he seems to have reached the same conclusion about metaphysical freedom. The freedom that counts now is freedom from hunger, thirst, disease, and all forms of oppression. However, the for-itself is not thereby refuted. On the contrary, it remains the indisputable basic fact of human existence—it is human existence and nothing can change that! But, Sartre seems to feel that it is a luxury in the sense that by itself it is not efficacious in the world of practical human relationships. Alone, in the sense of being a single human consciousness, it cannot significantly affect the world of the practico-inert and the context of scarcity. It is only when it freely gives itself to a group—a common freedom—that it acts in such a way as to make a real difference in the lives of people. That is to say, it must be multiplied in strength in order to affect practical changes in the world. Otherwise, the for-itself can make a difference only in terms of a single given individual at best, or, at worst, it becomes that which assumes the burdens imposed on it by the thing and the other. Thus, we can conclude
with some assurance that, for Sartre, the context of scarcity requires that common freedom transcend individual freedom. Scarcity, and the elements of the practico-inert created by men in their efforts to fulfill their needs, results in a burden too heavy to be thrown off by the efforts of lone individuals.

Now this burden on men, and on groups which fuse in opposition to it, often takes the form of already constituted groups. And these are groups of a far different kind from those which Sartre has heretofore been describing. The German army of occupation was not the same kind of group as the French resistance, and neither is the Ku Klux Klan the same kind of group as Martin Luther King's bus boycotters. Some groups incorporate themselves in a common fight for freedom; other groups—already constituted—have different justifications and purposes. There is a struggle between groups as oppressors of seriality, and groups which emerge from seriality by rebelling in the name of freedom. Since the original fusion of the group is a dialectical process, it needs an already constituted group of outsiders against which to rebel. It is from the outside, as well as from the inside that the newly-formed group gets its identity, and we have already described this process in some detail. Thus, it becomes clear why there would have been no French resistance without a German army, no Negro rebellion if there were not a white community, and so on. In short, it is a necessary condition
of the fusion of the group that some already constituted
group act as oppressors of, and be seen as oppressors by, the
members of the newly-forming and newly-formed group. 7

If we are understanding Sartre rightly, what he seems
to be saying here is that the already constituted group which
oppresses serialities and groups in fusion is simply an older
form of group organization, a more advanced stage in the evo-
lution of groups. It has become an inertia-centered collec-
tion of people, an organization which seeks self-preservation
as its end rather than freedom. It seeks to actually become
its own ontological status and exists for that purpose alone.
As a result, the individual member becomes non-essential and
interchangeable. As we have seen, the attempt to become an
ontological status on the part of any individual is impossible
(no one can be what he is, become God, etc.). By the same
token, no group can become an ontological status for no
group is anything more than a number of individuals acting
within the limits of some form of mediated reciprocity. Thus
even group efforts to become an ontological status are in
bad faith, for the individual is in the group, but he can
never become one with it. As a result, the group can never
become one with itself, and its efforts to do so transform
its members into inauthentic individuals. In a group which
has common freedom as its praxis, this paradox can be toler-
ated for the cohesion of its membership is reinforced by some
outside threat to its praxis. But, after the outside threat
has disappeared, it becomes imperative that the group strive
to maintain itself by making its ontological status paramount. It must make its members assume that ontological status and become institutionalized men, such as army officers, party members, delivery boys, students, and so forth, rather than individual men, women, and children. In such a case, the ontological status of the group becomes the end and individuals are only the means—and they are interchangeable means at that!

The rigidity and passivity which come to characterize the group's ontological status (Sartre calls it an ossified praxis.) are reflected in the structure of positions and functions which emerge as organization. Now, the unique talents and initiatives of the individual are no longer of any significant importance. Each man's identity becomes a group identity; he is simply a function, a position, or a role in the organizational structure which supports the group's ontological status. Each individual becomes an interchangeable part of the machine and his freedom is no longer required or desired. For, it does not matter who fills the position or carries out the function so long as the former is filled and the latter is satisfactorily performed. "If you can't do the job, we shall find someone else (anyone else, it doesn't matter who in particular it might be) who can!"

A group such as this is what Sartre calls an institution. Some examples of institutions which seem to fit his description are large corporations such as General Motors, North American Aviation, and the like, armies, school systems,
and governments. The plight of the institutionalized human being has been ably delineated by William Whyte, Vance Packard, David Reisman, Paul Goodman, Erich Fromm, and a host of others. All of them agree, in general, with Sartre's contention that the member of the institution is interchangeable, isolated from but mediated by his fellows, and held powerless in the grip of the organization. He becomes little more than a prisoner of the position which he occupies. Thus, he accepts the role "laid out" for him, for he is likely to see himself as powerless to effect any significant changes even if he would desire to do so. Of course, such a desire is itself unlikely to arise in the breast of a man who was born and raised a member of the group within which he functions. And, if called upon to oppose or oppress outsiders which he is persuaded to see as threats to his own institutional group, he will probably do so. Indeed, he may not even be aware of the praxis of his own group for the "authorities" may not communicate it to him. They "mystify" him with slogans which sound like causes (to fight the war to end all wars, to stop the Jews from taking over, to make the world safe for democracy, to hasten the Marxist utopia, and so on). Thus, the individual acts. And, in his action—not as a free agent but rather as a function, status, or role—the purposes of the institution are realized despite the fact that they are foreign or even unknown to him. In this way, he is alienated from the praxis for the sake of which he acts.

For the institution has that contradictory characteristic, often pointed out by sociologists, of being
both praxis and thing. As praxis, its teleological meaning can be obscured, but this is because the institution is nothing but a carcass, or because those who are institutionalized have a real apprehension of the institution's end, and cannot or do not want to communicate it; indeed, every time we have the means of deciphering it (for example, every time we examine those institutions of a contemporary industrialized society), we discover its teleological characteristics, that is, a solidified dialectic of alienated ends, liberating ends, and the alienation of these new ends. On the other hand, however, the institution as such possesses a considerable force of inertia, not only because it is a part of an institutional whole, and cannot be modified without all the other parts being modified, but particularly, and in itself, because it posits itself, by and in its inert-being, as essentiality, defining men as the inessential means of its perpetuation. But this inessentiality comes neither from the institution to the individual, nor from the individual to the institution; in actual fact, what becomes isolated is the practice, insofar as it is produced in a common setting defined by new human relationships. These relationships are quite simply based upon serial powerlessness: if I apprehend the institution as fundamentally unchangeable, it is because my praxis itself is determined in the institutionalized group as incapable of changing the institution; and this powerlessness originates in my relation of circular otherness with the other members of the group.

It appears, then, that when individual freedom is given over to a function to the extent that only the function is left, we have the essential characteristic which differentiates the institution from the organized group. In the institution there is neither common freedom nor individual freedom. For common freedom can be nothing other than the joining of individual freedoms in common cause. But, in the institution, group praxis and individual praxis are alienated from one another. This situation presupposes two transformations at which we have already hinted. These are the introduction of desired inertia through internal seriality (as opposed to
the seriality of those outside the group), and the appearance of authority as a consolidation of power in the hands of a few individuals—in the absence of understanding or consent on the part of their fellows.

As a result, the institution is a more stable and rigid collectivity than the organized group. It has a greater power of inertia because it sees its ultimate purpose and the organization of functions necessary to the realization of that purpose as essential, while the individuals who carry out those functions are deemed nonessential. Thus a group becomes an institution when its praxis becomes so ossified and its organization so rigid that individual freedom is impotent to alter it. Each man becomes "other," that is, an institutional man embodying the function in which he finds himself as well as the institutional values which have become internalized by all his fellows. Though he may be singled out through institutional prerogatives (the privileges of his rank, awards given him for outstanding service, etc.), he is recognized only in his "institutionality," not his "individuality." He is seen only as a cog in the machine, and wants to see himself in this way—in this sense, to become a thing. To Sartre, this is the ultimate degradation of the human being.

What is worse, the individual is destined for such a fate even before his birth for he was born into a particular society, and, as a result, cannot avoid being included in certain institutional groups. This is especially clear in the case of
many military, civic, and religious categories which come easily to mind. It is for this reason that Sartre speaks of the institution as a prefabricated inertia.

The second transformation which occurs concerns the emergence of authority. The original foundation of authority lies in the group-in-fusion in the person of everyone and no one simultaneously. During the duration of the group's formation the man who gives the commands and provides the leadership can be any one. Power lies in the hands of the group as a whole; it is a power which is common to every individual as common praxis. This stage is followed by the oath and the fraternity-in-terror which acts to solidify the group. But, as the group grows, dispersing across space, and the group praxis (partly as a result of spatial estrangement) becomes alienated from individual men, the power of individual synthesis and unification within the group tends to break down. Thus power, at the final stage of institutionalization, becomes a function embodied not in an individual or individuals, but rather in a position or status in the organizational structure. And that function, status, and position all rolled into one into which power is deposited is given a label—king, sovereign, the state, etc. The man, or men, who occupies these positions becomes (or, strictly speaking, tries to become) those positions. The man who was once David becomes King David, an institutional man—in particular, the power man! In this way the mediated reciprocity which is
characteristic of the organized group is broken up. The circle is broken. Now there are leaders and followers, conditioner and conditioned, those who command and those who obey. All commands come from the power man, and all grievances end in him. No orders can ultimately come from any other but he, no protest can go beyond him or above his head. He is the end and the beginning. He blocks the cycle. In this sense he is supreme and, in his status, embodies authority. As a result, the sovereignty of all characteristic of the organized group becomes a quasi-sovereignty. For, each member of the group has given a part of his power to the men who embody the authority which was once vested in them all. Thus, the individual becomes alienated from the purpose of the group to which he belongs for he no longer takes a direct part in formulating it. The praxis is no longer common; it exists for itself (to perpetuate the institution), and not for individuals. Or, in other words, the institution no longer serves its individual members, they serve it and exist for its sake. Each man's purpose becomes "to do his duty" as outlined to him by the "authorities."9

In contrast to the institution, each member of the organized group comprehends the meaning of his own functions in terms of their relationship to a common praxis with which he identifies. But, in the institution, the individual does not comprehend the meaning of his "duty" in terms of the larger picture. He does not "know" the ultimate purpose for which he acts. As Sartre puts it, he is "mystified."
Indeed, at this level the mystification is easily achieved. . . through the power-man, who reveals himself--through familiar rituals and dances--as institution being, the organized individual believes he apprehends himself as integrated into the group through the institutional whole (and, as a matter of fact, this is what every citizen believes and says). . . . Powerlessness and imperative, terror and inertia, are reciprocally established. The institutional moment, in the group, corresponds to what might be called systematic self-domestication, that of man by man. The end is, in fact, to create men such that (as common individuals) they are defined in their own eyes and among themselves by their fundamental relation (mediated reciprocity) to institutions. More than half the work is done by circular seriality; a systematic activity of each person upon himself, and of each person through all, will result in the creation of the rigorous correlative of the institution--man, that is, the institutionalized man. . . . But the moment of common degradation at which the institution appears is precisely that in which each person claims to reject freedom for himself, in order to realize, as a thing, the imperiled unity of the descending group. Thus at this level of involution (under the pressure of external circumstances), the common individual wants to become a thing held against other things by the unity of a seal; the model of the institutional group will be the forged tool. And each person, as such, is an accomplice of Institutionality. But, conversely, this is also because he is its victim, even prior to his birth. The previous generation had defined, even before he was born, the institutional future of his generation, its exterior and mechanical destiny. . . . Military, civic, professional, etc., 'obligations' constitute, in advance, an untranscendability deep inside each person (if he is born within the group). . . . These births into the group are oaths (reiterated by rites de passage), and these oaths become an assumption of the institutional inertia with which the others have marked the child under the form of the free commitment to realize the institution. From this point of view, the institutional being is, in each person, a prefabricated inertia of inorganic being, which will be transcended through a practical freedom whose sworn function is to objectify itself in that same being as the inert determination of the future.10

Despite the fact that a summation of the above points risks oversimplifying Sartre's views, such would seem to be called for here. Some attempt at an organized comparison and
contrast of groups versus institutions should be helpful for
the purposes of clarification. However, such an effort need
not result in distortion if the reader will keep in mind the
tremendous complexity of dialectical processes and mediated
reciprocities implied by each of the concepts enumerated.

The contrasting structures of the two groups look
something like this. In the organized group, the end is
common freedom; in the institution the end (while taking
many different forms of expression) is ultimately to preserve
the structure. For the group, self-preservation is for the
sake of common freedom; it is the freedom of individuals
as members of the group which is being preserved. For the
institution, self-preservation refers to the structure of
practices which constitute it, not to individuals. They
are nonessential and thus expendable. In the group, each in-
dividual is an \textit{inorganic tool}; in other words, he is seen
as human, and his unique talents and initiatives are required
by the common praxis for its own fulfillment. The preserva-
tion of common freedom requires that amount and type of in-
dividual freedom appropriate to it. In the institution, the
individual becomes a \textit{forged tool}. Freedom, of both the com-
mon and individual types, is irrelevant! It is the structure
of practices (what Sartre earlier referred to as the practico-
inert) which is to be preserved— for its own sake! Its only
justification lies in the fact that it \textit{is} and \textit{has been}. In
the group, alienation of the individual from himself and
from others is overcome. He acts, and in so doing, he freely
and knowingly posits his individual project in a common
praxis which he makes his own. It is an organized structure
which reflects a reciprocity between individual and common
freedom, and the structure is of secondary importance. Unique
contributions to the common praxis are valued even if they
effect changes in the organizational structure, for common
freedom is the end, and the structure of the group is the
means. In the institution the opposite case holds true. The
structure is the end in itself; it is the institution's im-
possible ontological status. The institution, in other words,
is an ossified praxis and no individual deviations which
would tend to alter its structure may be allowed. Thus,
freedom is rejected in favor of inertia, and the individual
is alienated from both his own individuality and the praxis
of the institution. As a result, men become involved in the
attempt to become "thinglike"—mere roles, functions, and
positions in the structure. They embody the structure, but
no longer their individual projects, insofar as they exist
as institutionalized men. And they guarantee the permanence
of the structure by imposing it on their children.

In the light of the above it might be said in con-
clusion that the adjective which describes life in the organ-
ized group is "collective," while that which describes life
as a member of an institution is "alienated." It is clear
which of these wins Sartre's approval, and it is equally
clear why his celebrated pessimism begins to appear again at this point. For history reveals to him an evolutionary process from group-in-fusion to organized group to institution. What is more, this process appears to be inevitable within the context of human history—that is to say, scarcity. So long as scarcity remains the basic context of history, the fate of common freedom will be to relapse into seriality or to evolve into an ossified praxis as was the case with the French resistance and the French revolution respectively. The former dispersed into seriality and the latter became a complexity of institutions—the French government.
CHAPTER VIII

A LOOK AT SARTRE'S WORLD

In Sartre's world the self is supreme. Continuously encumbered, blocked, and victimized by the thing and the other, it ebbs and flows through its life-long project creating the world in which it moves. Originator, first-cause, and prime-mover of the human universe, it colors everything through its own filters and stands illuminated in its own reflections. Intrinsically nothing, a hole in being, it negates the thing and the other and finds itself negated in return. And the only irrefutable facts of existence it encounters are freedom and death. It does not, and cannot, refute either for it is itself freedom and cannot deny its own nature and existence. And neither can it refute its own mortality. For both freedom and death are daily observable phenomena of every life; as such they are inescapable.

Freedom and death; those are a strange pair of facts on which to found a description of human consciousness. In them is a bitter irony for both are ultimate mysteries to man. Although they constitute the only certainties, the questions "What is freedom?" and "What is death?" must remain forever unanswered. And necessarily so! To supply either with a content would result in a contradiction in terms as
well as a false description of reality. The former would be a contradiction in terms because a definable freedom could be nothing other than another set of rules which enjoin men to act or believe in such and such a way in order to be free. Such a freedom as that would be no freedom at all. And similarly death, if it could be given a definable content, would be no longer death, but rather a different form or order of existence. It would lose its meaning as death. But, more importantly for Sartre, a defined freedom would not fit the phenomena; that is to say, the observable and describable fact that choice is always necessitated in every human situation. And the same would be true of death for there is nothing observable or definable about it except its finality as the end of the choice-making process.

Thus man lives in a world of ultimate uncertainty. But, that is precisely because he is free. Ultimately, the only things he cannot be are immortal and unfree. As a result, he is condemned to freedom, to make his choices in the light of ultimate uncertainty until the day he dies. It is only then that the meaning of his life can be summed up—because no more choices can be made, except for those made of him by others. Since his existence precedes his essence, he is an ultimate mystery, a paradox. He may only be described after the fact, but not predicted for he is the product of his own free choice of himself. He creates his own essence.
It is clear, then, that no simple definition of man may be found in Sartre's work. For man's essence is a product of his existence and the two are not identical. Man's nature and purposes may not be reduced to any neat formula and thus no reliable explanations of man may be offered other than explicit, painstaking, and thorough descriptions of the projects of individuals. And since a man may radically convert his project at any time he chooses, even an existential psychoanalysis is reliable only after the fact—as hindsight or therapy perhaps, but not as prediction.

Thus, for Sartre, there is no such thing as man, there are only men. Descriptions of men do not define a universal human nature except to the extent that they postulate freedom. Nevertheless, a description of the general human situation is possible! That is to say, it is possible to describe all those elements of the human condition which make up the materials the for-itself utilizes in its process of self-construction. Thus, a Sartrean description of human reality in general would include the for-itself, as both freedom and a project toward the accomplishment of the goals it posits, and the in-itself, as the individual's facticity. This latter would include one's past actions as well as the social and material conditions in which he is situated.

A man's past is his project up to any given moment in time. It consists of the ideal relationship to the world which he has projected or posited, as well as objective de-
criptions of his patterns of behavior. And it is observable in two distinct but related modes of consciousness; his being-for-himself and his being-for-others. Both modes reveal objective elements of the essence which he has made himself come to be. For example, in the introspective and intimate mode of existence of the for-itself, he may have always been a benevolent and kindly human being, one who has chosen to "love his neighbor as himself" and be forgiving. But in the mode of his existence-for-others, he may have been an "easy mark," someone to be "taken advantage of" or "imposed upon." Or he may even have been one whose strict moral standards made him into a man condescending or even contemptuous toward those less benevolent than himself. Even though contrary or even perhaps contradictory, both modes of existence are factual, both are true of him and he knows it. As Sartre has said, a man cannot be vulgar all by himself, and neither can he be benevolent in isolation. The mode of being-for-others necessitates an intermonadic relationship. Thus a man's past is worked out as a dialectic process between himself and the others.

In addition, the other restricts the self in the sense that he is the ultimate antithesis of the self's freedom. The for-itself can appropriate and transcend everything that it apprehends except the freedom of another. That is to say, when two for-itselfs or freedoms, if you prefer, confront one another, conflict is inevitable. This is the orig-
inal meaning of all human relationships and expresses the ultimate finitude of man. In order for any two men to relate, in whatever way, one or the other or both must surrender some of his freedom for neither is free to possess the freedom of the other. And this is the case because fundamental to human existence is the fact of freedom as that which man is. No man may possess another's freedom because he may not even possess his own. Freedom cannot be possessed in any way whatsoever for it is what man is, he exists it. Thus the freedom of every man poses a potential threat to the freedom of every other man and it looks as though sadism, masochism, and insulation from one's fellows are the only possible patterns which human relationships may take. Even love suffers from this paradox!

Behind this inevitable state of conflict lies man's futile passion, as Sartre has put it—his impossible desire to become an in-itself which retains self-consciousness. It is this ontological status, this universal desire to become God which drives men to bad faith in the attempt to objectify the self. Men degrade themselves and one another in the attempt to become "thinglike" or to regard others as things. In the process, men choose themselves as though they were objects determined by forces analogous to those of the physical world, or they try to objectify others in this way. All the time they are failing to acknowledge the fact of freedom; and they are conscious of their failure. Thus their actions are in bad faith because they consist of self-deceptions or
mystifications of others which can never fully deceive or mystify. They are futile because they fly in the face of undeniable facts of which all men are aware. Their knowing attempt to deny these facts can result, then, in nothing more than a form of lying to oneself or others—a rationalization, or a hypocrisy.

It seems, then, that the self, in fleeing the anguish of its own freedom, is jumping from the frying pan into the proverbial fire. For, in running away from freedom it enslaves itself by flying toward acceptance of a state of subjugation to all the constraints of the material and social world. Or, in other words, the self need not accept material and social conditions as constraints upon its own freedom; it can always see them as "to be transcended." And it often does. But, the self's flight from freedom explains its tendency to accept the elements of its situation as determinants. Of course, nothing in the situation is ultimately determinant since the self can always transcend it. However, in this sense, it is possible to refer to the situation as conditioning the for-itself since the self tends to accept its situation as impossible to change. An element of traditional hedonism would seem to be implied here for it appears to be the case that acceptance of constraint is usually more comfortable and less painful than recognition or affirmation of freedom.

Now we can see how it is that the self may be described as conditioned, but not as determined. Fleeing from
freedom and anguish, the self becomes constrained by its own choice! Its tendency is to accept the material and social conditions of its situation in preference to the anguishing responsibility of rebellion. It is because of this that men have been enabled to describe psychological, sociological, economic, and historical conditions as determinants of man. But, this is the case only because men have chosen these conditions as determinants. Thus, the self enslaves itself!

In order to complete Sartre's picture, it is necessary to point out the major material and social constraints with which the self must deal. Probably the most pressing of them all is scarcity. This constraint is pressing because it comes to be in the light of physiological needs which the self cannot deny. It can choose not to fulfill such needs as hunger, thirst, sleeplessness, and the like, but it cannot deny that it has those needs. That is to say, to the extent that man inhabits a physical body, an irrefutable fact of his life is that he is a creature of physical need. He is a material lack, and desire expresses that lack. As a result, he acts to fulfill his lack and in this way his labor comes to be in the world. Unless he refuses to fulfill his material need for the sake of some transcendent value, he will try to modify matter in order to satisfy his wants. In such an attempt, he encounters three additional constraints. The first of these is the fact that there is not enough food and other material goods to go around. Thus, he is thrown into inevitable compe-
tition with other men who are trying to fulfill their needs. Now the other is more than a threat to one's freedom; he is a threat to one's survival, for, in a context of scarcity, someone is going to have to do without, or, at least, considerably less than others. The self sees the world as a survival-of-the-fittest situation. And far from being his brother, the other is his antagonist. The second constraint is the way that matter strikes back at man whenever he intervenes in nature. Matter modifies man to the extent that man modifies matter. Whenever man interferes with the natural world, he sets off causal chains of reactions which are governed by the laws of physics rather than human planning. As with the case of the Chinese peasants cited by Sartre, the intended goal of man is not the only result accomplished. For every finality there is a counterfinality. Industrialization, for example, has produced air pollution, slums, and its own particular forms of human alienation as well as factories, and rising standards of living. In modifying matter, man sets off processes which result in further adumbrations of his future—usually ones which he did not foresee. And, third, once man has formed matter in some way, it embodies his intentions and values. Matter carries meanings as if they were engraved in it. Thus, through matter which has been formed into instruments for man, men dictate to their contemporaries and their descendents. The machine is a man-made constraint on the self, an example of the practico-inert. Through the
mediation of mediated matter, men are dictated to by previous
generations. As a result, in the material world the self is
constrained by scarcity, matter (as counterfinality and the
practico-inert), and the other.

The same is true of the social world, for sociological
conditions are nothing more than mores and folkways which
have come to be as a result of the ways men have learned to
fulfill their needs. Their efforts produce not only tools,
but also values, attitudes, and rules for behavior which pro-
vide the basis of, and support for, those need-fulfilling
techniques which they have developed, and which experience
has convinced them are successful. Thus, man's efforts to
fulfill his needs in a context of scarcity have resulted not
only in modes of production, but also in the structures of
society. All of these are examples of the practico-inert,
man-made constraints to freedom. As such, they are themselves
manifestations of freedom for they were all created by the
for-itself; technology, economics, society, and the like.

Thus, man has created social structures, and those
groupings of people which make up their constituent elements.
All of them are constituted of the practico-inert. As will
be remembered, Sartre has identified three general types of
social structures within which men group themselves; the
series, the organized group, and the institution. The first
of these, the series, is a loose and unorganized collectivity
of people held together by some collective entity such as,
for example, a bus, a school, an occupation, a social stereotype which sets them apart, or a geographical proximity which singles them out to others in some way (i.e., they all live in a particular suburb.). As members of a series, they have no individual identities. They are merely bus passengers, students, factory workers, and so on. They have become interchangeable and expendable serial units, mere numerical positions in a series. They are isolated from one another since it is impossible for them to know one another except as serial units. It is only through the collective entity that they get their identity as members of the series. Their identity comes to them always from the outside; from the collective entity which embodies the intentions of others or from the opinions of them held by outsiders. Since there is no internal organization in the series, it is a passive and inert social identity. Each man being isolated from the other and getting his serial identity from the outside makes it inevitable that the series be characterized by inertia and a flight into otherness. As a result, the members of the series are capable of taking no action to change the serial situation in which they are, and they are easily victimized and oppressed by more organized, unified collectivities.

However, it is the individual who accepts all of this. And, he need not. If he sees that his needs can no longer be minimally satisfied under existing conditions, he may decide to attempt the impossible, to change things. For it is his survival which is at stake. Thus he may get fed up and de-
cide to "take it" no longer. But, he can do little to change his situation alone. He must join with others to form a group. The strength of a single man must be multiplied into the strength of a hundred or a thousand. With this strength it is possible to fight back, to resist or revolt. When this happens, a group is forming; people are stepping out of their serial isolation by deciding to act in cooperation with one another on the basis of common need, common danger, and a resulting purpose which each posits as his own—common freedom. In this way a group capable of taking action comes into existence. At this point, the seriality has disappeared and in its place stands a unified group which can, and does, go on strikes, initiate boycotts, conduct demonstrations and protests, and engage in violent revolt. We have seen how all of this occurs in Sartre's description of the French revolution, and how such new groups, after achieving their initial victories, must take steps to combat a relapse into seriality once the initial threat of outside oppression is gone.

Thus the organized group comes into being. In order to combat the threat that its members may disperse, the group constructs an organization for itself based on the oath and terror. Through the oath each member affirms his own loyalty to the group and guarantees its permanence. And the oath is enforced through terror; the fact that defectors will be punished, perhaps put to death. Thus, the oath and terror found a new organization which becomes a part of the practico-
inert for the members of the group, and for their children. If the group survives. But all this is justified by the fact that it is common freedom for which the group exists. Its end is common freedom—that freedom which may be mediated through all of its members—and not its own perpetuation. Such a group exists not for its own sake, but for the salvation of its individual members. It fights for and defends common freedom. The individual gives up some of his freedom in common cause, and his unique contributions are necessary and important to that cause. Since the cause is his own as well as that of his fellows, alienation is overcome and genuine human relationships (at this practical level) become possible. Each man is a valuable member of the team and contributes to the team's efforts according to the limits of his own unique abilities. And he is free, because common freedom as the purpose of the group is also his own purpose. As a result, common freedom has come to transcend individual freedom in Sartre's view, for it is only the common efforts of groups of men which can effect radical conversions at more than the individual level. It is only in this way that the world may be changed and social ills overcome. In addition, Sartre is now able to claim that sadism, masochism, and inter-individual isolation are not the only possible patterns of human relationships. There is a genuine focus—a common fight for freedom wherein each man acts in himself and in the other. It is a mediated reciprocity; a collective life. But
common freedom is the only end which can make such genuine relationships possible and enable man to overcome his otherness. Of course this is confined to the practical level of freedom from hunger, thirst, oppression, and the like. It does not affect the inevitable conflict inherent in human relationships at the ontological level. There, individual freedoms still obstruct one another, but if they cooperate in a common fight for freedom they may relate in an authentic manner, and relegate metaphysical evils to the background. This seems to be Sartre's conclusion for, as the reader will remember, he has stated that "hunger is an evil: period," and that in a world of scarcity metaphysical evil is a luxury. It is clear, then, that practical matters have assumed the position of dominance in Sartre's thinking since the time that he published Being and Nothingness.

Unfortunately, for Sartre, this happy state of affairs cannot last long. The ossification of purpose and estrangement through space which necessarily results from the growth and survival of the group renders freedom impossible by giving rise to authority. As the group becomes large, powerful, and complacent, the original cause of its birth (the oppression of freedom) is forgotten. That is to say, when the group has become powerful, it no longer needs to fight for freedom; it needs only to preserve itself. And when it has become large, it is no longer possible to mediate its purposes reciprocally through all of its members. Prob-
lems of communication, persuasion, justification, and enforcement become too great. Thus authority emerges as the power which was once vested in all members of the group and becomes consolidated in the hands of a few. Ultimately, power will come to rest in some ultimate authority which breaks the cycle of mediated reciprocity. All commands, either explicitly or implicitly, will come from the power-man, not from the dictates of mutually recognized necessity. And no grievances will be able to go beyond him. Thus the man or men in whom authority comes to be vested break the cycle, and, by so doing, introduce alienation into the group; the alienation of the individual from the purpose of the group and concomitantly from his fellows. For at this level the purpose of the group will become the perpetuation of those practices which embody its organizational structure. The structure is to be perpetuated, not the individual who has become only a means to that end. As a result, individual actions are impotent to change the structure. It is at this level of organization that the institution is defined. It is an organizational superstructure for an ossified praxis—it seeks only to perpetuate itself, to become (and force men to embody) its own impossible ontological status. Thus men once again become victims of the practico-inert for their institutional identity lies only in the definitions of the functions they carry out, the roles they play, and the positions they occupy. They become only institutionalized men; bank tellers,
army officers, college professors, party members, and so on. What is more, they do it willingly for they have been told that it is their duty. They are all, like the waiter in Sartre's earlier example, in bad faith. In Sartre's opinion, this is the final human degradation!

It seems, then, that Sartre is leaving us little hope. As history marches on continually being created by men, the dialectic interplay of the for-itself with others, economic scarcity, things in themselves, and the practico-inert structures of society paint a picture of frustration for freedom. All along, the for-itself is the origin and prime-mover of all that happens, but in a context of scarcity the historical processes in which men have engaged make it appear that conflict and exploitation of man by man are unavoidable. Sartre seems to be telling us that freedom enslaves itself because scarcity forces it to choose between conflict and death--and it usually prefers conflict--and because the dictates of pleasure and pain force it to choose between anguish and comfort--and it usually chooses comfort. As a result, men in general tend to domesticate themselves according to the dictates of the thing and the other in an effort to fulfill their needs, despite the fact that no particular individual is ultimately constrained by any of those factors of his situation which have been described. In Sartre's world, nothing external is killing freedom; it is choking itself to death.
PART TWO

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION
CHAPTER I

A DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF EDUCATION

Education is, and nearly always has been, in bad faith! In the light of those concepts most basic to Sartre's philosophy, no other conclusion seems warranted. In his view, education considered in broad terms must be seen as a process by means of which cultural heritage and social structure are transmitted from one generation to the next. It follows from this view that formal schooling is only one part of the whole and that informal types of education must be added to it in order to make up the process in its entirety. The molding of the individual to a set of practico-inert rules of conduct and belief by means of which he becomes a member of the group comprises the aim of education not only in simple societies, but in more advanced ones as well. As long as the aim of education is the perpetuation of the group for its own sake rather than the realization of the freedom of individuals, the process, as we have seen, is in bad faith. Sartre appears to feel that this is usually the rule and that it would be difficult to find more than a few scattered exceptions.*

*Note. A major portion of the material presented in this chapter is drawn from the writer's article, "A Structural Concept of Mind and Learning as Reflected in Selected Anthropological Data," published in Educational Theory, Champaign-Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, Fall, 1968.
A number of studies of education among pre-literate peoples have been carried out by social scientists. Sartre has been interested in these studies--especially the work of Claude Levi-Strauss to which he refers at several points. The upshot of all these studies for Sartre seems to be that education can only be described as a process by means of which the child is transformed into a socially efficient entity. Social efficiency, in fact, emerges as the aim of nearly all educational practices described in pre-literate societies and is also an educational objective espoused by John Dewey and others as the overriding aim of education in our society. It would seem, then, that the finished product must be an individual who embodies in his activities and utterances at least (even if not within the intimate mode of being of the for-itself) a complex and numerous set of rules—that is, a structure of values which corresponds very closely to the social structure in which and for the sake of which he was educated. Sartre considers this formulation to be a universal; that is to say, in his terms, it might be described as the ontological status of education. As he has said:

To be born is to produce oneself as a specification of the group and as an ensemble of functions (burdens and powers, debts and credit, right and duty). The common individual puts himself forward as a new oath in the heart of the group.

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"Note. All quotes from Sartre in this chapter are appearing in English translation for the first time. All occur on pages 490-493 of the Critique de la Raison Dialectique. The complete translation of the passage may be found at the end of this study. The translation was done for this writer by David Wolfe, a Ph.D. candidate in Foreign Language Education at The Ohio State University. Since I proofread the passage, I must assume full responsibility for any errors."
For Sartre, every man is born into a group and must go through the process by which the group integrates him into membership, thereby perpetuating itself. This is the universal function of education, and thus comprises an important part of the situation in which every individual "finds" himself.

If we divest ourselves of Sartre's esoteric terminology for the moment and take a close look at education according to his view, it may be seen as a process by means of which the child is transformed from a non-participating or peripheral link in the social structure to a participating and central link. He is transformed from an economic burden into a producer; from a merely biological unit into a social personality. It is a dialectical process of teaching and learning by which the individual gradually acquires a full compliment of culturally acceptable and defined behaviors. To return to Sartrean terminology, the individual becomes "institutionalized." He describes the process at some length:

... if the son of a marriage ... is constituted with a double character /he is both debtor and creditor, contributor and beneficiary in relation to his group/  

even before being born and whatever he may be, it is because he is at first--even before his mother's getting big--a determined possibility of the father and mother, that is, a limit which is still only their limit and will remain theirs as long as the future is only their possibility.  

From birth, the upsurge of the child in the milieu of the oath is equivalent for him to a payment of oath; each individual who becomes integrated into the attested group finds himself not so much a passive object receiving his stature from the outside, but rather a free common agent placed in possession of his freedom (baptism, initiation, etc., have for a real function the reinteriorization of the attested function as a free oath).
shall return to this later for this second oath has some characteristics to bring to light and, more importantly, it is infinitely more widespread than the first. What is certain is that the birth is an oath precisely to the extent that the oath is a birth. It will suffice to reproduce birth artificially (in the initiation the group takes it up accordingly in such a way that the young initiate no longer distinguishes between his social birth, his birth according to the flesh, his powers and his oath): as a matter of fact the initiation is accompanied originally by proofs and sufferings, at the same time it is waited for and promised. The organic individual freely supports expected sufferings in order to pass to the stature of a communal (common) individual (that is in order to have and exercise practical powers). This assumption—manifested by its endurance—is precisely the second oath; it is certain that the individual lives it as an acquisition of merit; but it is no less certain that adults see in it the mark of an involvement, as if they planned on telling him: "Your impatient waiting for the initiation, your courage during the ceremony brought us close to you, you had the right to ask us to make you a common individual in the community. But, reciprocally, in embracing us so warmly, you bound yourself to us: your ardor was a free determination of your future and you took up on your own the burdens (exogamies, etc.) which have been waiting for you since the marriage of your parents." Thus the rites of passage, like marriage, are bi-lateral and symmetrical ceremonies: they bring a reciprocity up to date. It is therefore impossible that the child would not interiorize this anterior future that has been constituted a priori, and that he would not interiorize it by means of positive acts (initiation conduct, choice of a wife, prowess in war, or, if there is peace, fight for power).3

Thus, we can extrapolate a neat definition of education in Sartrean terms. It is an anterior future constituted a priori which the individual necessarily internalizes by means of positive acts such as, for example, studying hard, getting good grades, conducting himself "properly," assimilating and exemplifying the "proper" values, attending graduation ceremonies (rites of passage), and so forth. In other words, education is seen here as a process by means of which
the society (adults) and the student (the child) interact in such a way that the student learns the structure (basic beliefs, practices, and values) of his society; but he does more than learn these things intellectually, he comes to embody them in his person in one way or another. It goes without saying that this formulation holds true for the social deviant quite as much as for the well-adjusted personality.

But it might be asked here whether this dialectic of anterior structure and the individual is anything more than philosophical speculation. Can it be observed in practice? Is there empirical evidence to support such a view? The answer is in the affirmative. Here the reader can be referred to the writings of the French social anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, which were cited earlier in this chapter and on the basis of which Sartre apparently founds much of his analysis. But a more striking example can be found in the work of Meyer Fortes, a social anthropologist working independently of Sartre, who has formulated a theory of learning based on field studies of the Tallensi. His description of learning among these people so parallels Sartre's views that it can be cited as an example which further illuminates and supports them. Fortes claims that what the Tallensi learn are categories of social behavior apprehended as patterns in which interests, skills, and values are combined. That is to say, the young Tallensi come to embody anterior social structures! In his own words:
These total patterns which constitute the texture of Tale cultural behavior are not built up bit by bit, by addition, during the course of a child's life. They are present as schemas from the beginning. My observations suggest that the course of development is somewhat as follows: at first the child acquires a well-defined interest associated with a postural diagram of the total pattern. The postural diagram is, as it were, a contour map, extremely simplified and crude but comprehending the essential elements and relations of the full pattern. Further experience strengthens and amplifies the interest at the same time as it causes the details of the postural diagram to be filled out, making it more and more adaptable and controllable, producing more discriminating responses to real situations, and linking it up with other patterns and norms of behavior. The total pattern is not built up brick by brick like a house, but evolves from the embryonic form.4

Fortes provides quite a number of examples from his studies of education among the Tallensi to illustrate his point.

One he discusses is the way in which children learn to dance. A favorite amusement of women, he points out, is to let infants dance who are hardly yet able to walk. Youngsters just beginning to walk are set upright and encouraged to dance by calls, instructions, hand clapping, and demonstrations of a few basic steps. Tale infants respond with pleasure to such stimuli and by the age of three have learned, in a sketchy and diagrammatic way, the rhythms and main steps of the festival dances. The six-year-old is sometimes advanced enough to join in the real dancing of older children and adolescents. Though his dancing is still extremely crude, his sense of rhythm is accurate, he learns the songs quickly, and he exhibits a clear comprehension of the pattern of the dance. But his dancing is still elementary, tending to be
mechanical and monotonous, and lacking in the improvisations, variations, and delicate tracery of step and gesture with which the adult fills out the formal pattern. Though every year the child's style improves, even at adolescence, he has not usually perfected his technique. Yet dancing ability grows from infancy to maturity.

Fortes claims that the child's knowledge of kinship structure evolves in much the same way. The schema, rudimentary and as yet unstable, can be detected in the three-to-four-year-old. He discriminates kinsfolk from non-kinsfolk, and equates the former chiefly with people living in close proximity to him. He identifies his own father and mother quite clearly, and already calls his mother's co-wives "mother." He knows not only that "father" is his own biological father, but extends the term to include other men of the same joint family. And he discriminates other kinsfolk he frequently sees as brothers, sisters, grandfathers, and grandmothers. He groups people by generation and spatial proximity, but is still incapable of perceiving genealogical differences. For example, an adult brother may be mistakenly called "father." According to Fortes, these children learn fundamental kinship terms and acquire the ability to distinguish relatives according to generation and genealogical distance long before they have acquired the ability to relate this information to differential behavior toward kinsmen. The six-year-old knows the correct terms and appropriate behavior for his relations
with members of his own paternal family, and has grasped the principle of classification according to descent. However, in practice he confuses spatial proximity and relative age with kinship beyond the limits of his own family. By the time he has reached the age of ten to twelve, he has mastered the schema, except for some collateral and affinal kinsmen, the terms for whom are known though he cannot describe the relationships.

At age nine to ten, a child's schema of ritual and religious ideology includes all the main structural principles of the system, according to Fortes. Since such knowledge is acquired by attending at sacrifices, the child knows most about the ritual acts and conventional formulas connected with sacrifice and least about the beliefs and theories. He tends to be cognizant of all the concepts of Tale religion and magic but cannot assign them accurately to their relevant contexts. Fortes claims the child knows that ancestor spirits and medicines are different, and can describe some of the medicines in terms of their functions, but cannot explain the differences. The child also knows and believes that health, prosperity, and success depend on mystical agencies, and that sacrifices must be made to placate them. He knows what different types of shrines look like and what are their purposes. But it is superficial knowledge, confused in detail and full of gaps. It is a grasp of structural elements as yet not filled out with the appropriate details of belief and behavior.
Such examples as these could be multiplied tenfold, and, in fact, Fortes' entire study could be elicited in such a way as to make it appear to support his theory of learning. That is, of course, what Fortes himself does. Doubtless much the same could be done with the ethnographic data of most other field investigators as well. Someone who holds a different theory of learning might well claim that the data support his position as well, and it is usually the case that the investigator tends to "find" what he is looking for among data. From a Sartrean perspective, the human consciousness interprets the data in the light of its own original project. As a result, no final claims could be made here on the basis of strictly empirical data of this kind. But they can be elicited as examples or illustrations suggestive of the empirical validity of Sartre's views about education.

Moreover, Sartre presents a more telling argument when he describes the expectations adults normally have of children. Adult expectations, which embrace the outlook of parents, teachers, and other adults on children's present and future, and their attitudes toward schools and education in general are world-wide— they know no national frontiers. The aim is always the same: to integrate the child into the group into which he was born. The process has already been described in some detail (the oath, terror, institutional self-domestication of man by man, etc.). As a result, Sartre's faith is that when he talks of the oath, of terror, of the process of socialization and institutionalization, everyone everywhere
will immediately recognize the validity of what he says in their own experience. When parents and teachers from different countries talk with one another about questions of education, they immediately understand one another. They can understand one another's problems in general terms, though they must explain to one another the specific cultural forms in which these problems appear. The situations and problems are structural, their content relative to the culture in question. As Margaret Read, another social anthropologist who has been interested in education, states in words that echo Sartre:

No one can, of course, control a child's inner response to direction and training, but more often than not a child can and does learn, for a variety of reasons, to show the overt response expected by the adults who are bringing him up. 

Thus, for Sartre, learning appears to be the process by which overt responses to expectations come to be. That is to say, as will be remembered, the individual is creating his own essence, but he must use the materials provided him in his own situation. Learning in this sense is characterized by the leap from expectation on the part of the adult (or the peer) to overt behavior on the part of the child in accordance with the expectation in question. Sartre would hold (and Fortes would probably agree) that what is happening here is not education in the common or traditional sense of the word as usually described by educational theorists. What the child is expected to grasp and what he does, in fact, grasp when teaching is successful, is a rule of some sort; that is,
a structure of relationships under which sense data and, in turn, overt behavior can be ordered. It is a set of structural relationships of concepts which he extends into his new experience and through cognizance of which he is enabled to respond correctly.

It is implied, then, that mental activity is seen by Sartre as a free process of comprehending patterns and relationships. Mental activity is, in itself, structural in nature and the form it takes is reflected in the grammatical structure of language. The structural relationship of subject, verb, and object in a sentence is a purely formal type of relationship; a formal rule, so to speak, though one that was originally created by men. Thus it is a manifestation of freedom and an example of the practico-inert. Any conceptual content can be applied to or utilized in accordance with such a rule. This is part of what students are expected to do, and what they actually do, when asked to "fill in the blanks" on a test. This is essentially what students do (in accordance with the practico-inert structure of numerical relationships) when they count up to high numbers which contain no practical content in terms of their past experience. This is what children do when they react to their social environment in the expected or acceptable ways; that is, in terms of those norms of behavior which comprise the social structure in which they operate--and for the perpetuation of which they are being educated. In common sense language, this is the kind of theory of mental activity and learning process which
seems to follow from Sartre’s most fundamental concepts. And the theories of social scientists like Fortes and Levi-Strauss seem to correspond to it in great measure.

The major implications are these. Mental activity is free and undetermined. But it is fundamentally structural in terms of what it apprehends (it is conditioned but not ultimately determined by social, natural, and mechanical structures). Consequently, the same may be said of the learning process. As was pointed out earlier, the aim of education in most, if not all, pre-literate societies tends to be a structure—the structure of society as that which is to be perpetuated. In other words, the man who "knows" all or most of the rules and applies them "correctly" is the ideal end product of education. It is by grasping elements of social structure (rules) and learning to apply them (through observation, imitation, and participation, as well as formal instruction) that the individual is transformed from a "peripheral" to a "central" link in social structure.

This is the way Sartre appears to formulate the problem and this is the type of explanation he provides within the larger context of his overall description of the human condition. If he is right, we would expect to find this sort of process in operation in all societies—the complex as well as the simple ones.

Such a theory might tend to clarify certain observed phenomena in education. For example, if mental activity and learning process consist of the free apprehension of
structures, it appears that the expectations which adults "normally" have of children are justified—as well as their fears! The fact that children can learn and apply rules, appropriately extending their responses beyond a given point at which formal teaching stops, ("leaping" to the adult expectation) would be "normal" in such a case. Conversely, the fact that children can do this implies their capacity to do otherwise. They cannot be ultimately forced to react in these ways—because they are free. Thus, adult fears of not only the deviant, but also the gifted, are justified.

It would be so much more convenient in the eyes of many adults if children could be determined rather than conditioned, but that is not the case. Since children are free, none fit the mold pre-set for them exactly, and some deviate in extreme ways. In addition, such a theory seems to go a long way toward explaining why drill, repetition, and memorization are such frequently occurring types of teaching methods in all educational systems both past and present. For these are the most effective means of directioning or conditioning the child's overt responses. Also, it is chiefly by these means that formal patterns and structural relationships are grasped by the mind. And last, but certainly not least, they constitute society's first line of defense against the freedom of the individual!

Thus, on the basis of Sartre's views, education all too often can be described as a specialized endeavor. The formal teacher is usually a technician concerned with im-
parting the structures of knowledge, values, and behaviors appropriate to the community of which he is a member. He is an institutionalized man bent on duplicating himself in children. Except for specialized purposes under limited conditions, he is not creative and does not desire creativity in his students—though he may pay lip service to such ideals. His social duty is to protect the status quo and his professional duty is to confine himself to the classroom and be an objective scholar. If he has any opinions which are critical of the pre-set structure of values and behaviors he is supposed to reproduce in his students, he is to keep them to himself. Students emulate the teacher (and their parents) by striving to realize in overt behavior the expectations which the latter have of them. Thus, the cycle is completed. Whenever, under the status quo, truth is being attacked, voices of freedom are being silenced, tyranny is prevailing, the teacher has the obligation to acquiesce, apologize, or keep silent. He is a public servant and it is his "sacred" duty to protect, defend, and preserve the status quo. He is called upon to be nothing more than the social role of teacher and to the extent that he does so he is in bad faith just as were the soldier who fixes his gaze at ten paces, the waiter who copies the pitiless rapidity of things, and so on. In the light of all the above, neither the teacher nor the schools can be seen as friends of freedom—freedom is their greatest enemy! They are among the things and the others (to which Sartre has referred) that utilize the freedom of the individ-
ual as the means by which to mold him into a forged tool. Thus they are the transmitters of culture (the practico-inert) from one generation to the next. For Sartre, history in one sense is a progressive accumulation of practico-inert constraints on men—-it is a progressive choking of freedom. And, education is the primary means by which this is accomplished.

In conclusion, all of this leaves us with some very pressing questions. If education as it is must be described as a process in bad faith, what, on the basis of Sartre's fundamental concepts, could be prescribed in place of it? And, on what basis could any Sartrean prescriptions for education be made—-or, in fact, any Sartrean prescriptions at all? These are questions we shall take up in the following chapters.
CHAPTER II

A PRESCRIPTIVE IDEOLOGY

It seems quite clear in this writer's opinion that, while one may look for an ethics in Sartre's work, there is none to be found. At least, there seems to be little or nothing there capable of founding an ethics in the conventional sense of the word; that is, as any set of rules or criteria for identifying what is good or for measuring one's actions in order to establish their moral content. The possibility of an ethic of that sort is explicitly and implicitly denied by Sartre. True, he did hint in the last pages of Being and Nothingness that he would some day write an ethics, but he has since changed his mind. No specific work on ethics has come from his pen. There is one exception to this statement--Sartre's published speech on existentialism. Some who feel that Sartre does present an ethics found their claims on this speech, but they find the views expressed there inconsistent with the rest of his philosophy and conclude that it is an afterthought bearing little essential connection to the description of man in Being and Nothingness. The identical claim, in this writer's opinion, could be made regarding the Critique of Dialectical Reason. And Sartre himself has admitted that speech to have been a mistake.
It looks as though the above critics were right, for a close study of Sartre's two major philosophical works leaves one with little justification for claiming that any system of morality in the ordinary sense may be found in them. After all, there, the theme is the inevitable isolation of man from man, the conflict arising between men being presented as the original meaning of all human relationships. Man is there described as a futile passion, one who is ontologically doomed to live in freedom as a separation within himself unable to overcome the gap between being-for-itself and being-in-itself. Furthermore, Sartre apparently was trying neither to present nor imply any moral system for he was reported not to have seriously considered writing an ethics until around 1950. And at that time, he decided against such an attempt. His reasons were presented by Simone de Beauvoir quoting from unpublished notes. There Sartre reportedly stated that:

... moral attitudes appear only when social and technical conditions forbid positive conduct. Morality is nothing but a lot of idealist gimmicks allowing us to accept a life imposed by the lack of resources and the scarcity of techniques.

To Sartre, then, morality appears to be nothing more than another example of bad faith. As a result, he turned his attention away from morality as such and became interested in the Critique of Dialectical Reason in an attempt to grasp the meanings of man at the group level; that is to describe human history in its totality.

However, the prior reasons why Sartre turned away from any ambitions he might have had to write an ethics also
seem clear. On the basis of the fundamental concepts he formulated, it is impossible for this writer to see how any system of morality in the ordinary sense of the word can be seen as meaningful or perhaps even possible.

First, one must consider Sartre's concept of freedom. According to this view, as the reader will remember, human consciousness upsurges in the world and creates both its own essence and the world in which it "finds" itself. It chooses itself in action, and in so doing chooses its own values. Thus, the individual project is prior to any set of values--including moral ones! To say that one has a morality would be identical to saying that one has an original project, for what is chosen as moral comes to be only in the light of that project. A man's life can only be good or bad to him in terms of the extent to which he sees himself as successful or frustrated in the pursuit of his project. And, since there are as many projects as there are men, there are as many moralities as there are men. And, what is more, if one's morality can be said to be made up of a consistent choosing of what one values as opposed to what one disvalues, then it follows that all men are moral. In creating his own essence, each man creates his own morality as well; the two are insolubly related. Thus any man's project is also the basis of his ethics. Since each man is free, he is an individual project and the responsibility for creating his essence lies entirely with him. In this way, projects and systems of morality are interdependent. While on the surface there ap-
pears to be a limited and generally classifiable number of each, within the intimate mode of existence of the for-itself dwell externally unknowable nuances which make each unique.

As a result, it seems clear that no man could be immoral if by morality we mean the act of choosing what one sees as good. Man is condemned to be moral precisely by virtue of the fact that he is condemned to be free. Of course, this extreme form of relativity renders the terms "moral" or "ethical" meaningless, and they become impotent to provide any criteria for preferring any one way of life to another. Thus, each man chooses the ethical life as it appears to him in the light of the transcendental values he has posited. Whether or not he is in opposition to established conventions of society is beside the point. There is never any question of choosing the unethical or the immoral except in relation to the standards of others, or of society. What appears to be immoral or unethical is simply those prescriptions which a man posits for himself which are in opposition to the preferred values of most other men—as, for example, in the case of Genet.

All of this is corroborated by another basic Sartrean concept; that there is no impersonal or independent criteria for choosing values. There is no God, there are no absolutes existing independently of human consciousness, and there is no predetermined human nature. There is no such thing as a set of a priori values. If a man wishes to justify his life,
he has nowhere outside himself to look for guidance. Though of course he may try to deceive himself, he cannot escape the fact that he is forced to create his own ethics on the basis of criteria and definitions which he himself has chosen. Even if he chooses to pretend that he has found justifications, guidelines, or constraints outside of himself, he is still moral—he is acting in the light of what he has chosen to value. On the basis of traditional concepts of morality, one cannot condemn him for that. On the contrary, conventional morality is precisely the device of which he is taking advantage by seeing some form of it as "outside" or "independent" of him—all he has to do is follow it. In this way he is relieved of much of his responsibility and much of the anguish that goes with it. Thus, morality as we usually think of it is that which more often than not praises a man for acting in bad faith; it can hardly condemn him for it. In this sense, a man can even choose to live in bad faith, to be inauthentic, without being at odds with conventional morality. Judged on the basis of the above two concepts (freedom and the lack of independent absolutes), it seems impossible to claim that morality in the ordinary sense is of any use to us for it provides no reliable criteria by means of which a man may judge his life or by means of which others may judge him. It can only be a tool of mystification and indoctrination for those who would choose to live in bad faith and/or encourage others to follow their example. This seems
to be the essence of Sartre's objection to morality as a lot of "idealist gimmicks."

But, this is not all. It is also necessary to take Sartre's concept of human relationships into account. This view denies the possibility of genuine communication among men. The subject-object relationship always remains intact. No matter how great the empathy or clear the communication, no man may directly apprehend another's being-for-itself; that is, his inner life. And, since he exists rather than possesses his freedom, there is no way in which any man may ultimately control or possess the freedom of another. Even the sadist is doomed to failure, as we have seen. Consequently, the freedom of every man poses a threat to the freedoms of every other man. The freedom of one is a limitation to the freedom of the other, and conflict is inevitable whenever two or more individuals confront one another. If we are to speak conservatively and overlook Sartre's tendency to exaggerate, we must still insist that the only possible patterns of behavior on this view are dominance, subordination, or indifference. And all of these, it will be recalled, are patterns of bad faith.

Thus, on all of the above counts we are forced into one or the other of two conclusions; one, that a Sartrean ethic is an impossibility or, two, that such an ethic would be of no practical use. If the original project is prior to all moral judgments, if there are no absolute values on which a morality might be based, and if human beings are inexorably
separated from themselves and one another by the very nature of human consciousness, all possibility for an ethics is thereby negated. Or, on the other hand, if we are to grant that each man freely creates his own ethics, we simply wind up with a relativity so extreme as to remove all objective content from morality and stretch its traditional meaning beyond all bounds of usefulness. For then we should have to say that all men are moral in exactly the same sense in which we say that all men are mortal. And that, of course, will not do; it cannot suffice as an ethics which claims to have any practical implications for human conduct.  

Here we run head-on into those impasses and problems raised in the second, third, and fourth chapters of Part One of this study. The for-itself and the in-itself cannot be reconciled; any attempt to do so only points to man's futile passion to become God. There are no objective criteria for making judgments independent of human consciousness. Thus, man is groundless and must create himself and his world in the face of ultimate uncertainty until the day he dies. And, finally, no genuine human relationships are possible, for, when one freedom confronts another, there is no way for them to interact except by reciprocally impinging on or obstructing one another. All of these represent problems which Sartre has never yet resolved. Indeed, he could not, for at the ontological level they are impregnable. It is a somber world which he presents us, and it seems to this writer that there is no particular reason for doing other than taking Sartre at
his word when he denies that he is presenting an ethics. Such, in fact, would be in contradiction to his own concept of freedom. For, if our above observations are valid, ethics and absolute freedom are mutually exclusive. No universally applicable moral values may be imposed on men without denying their freedom. Where freedom exists, no ethics of more than individual validity may exist. And even a personal moral code need not be binding on the individual for each is free to change his project and, consequently, his morality at any given time.

But, if we are not to oppose Sartre to himself, as some critics do, by insisting that the outline of an ethics lies embedded in his views despite his protestations to the contrary, we must ask exactly what it is that he is doing. For, if we can take him at his word, he is not presenting us with an ethics. Yet, he is presenting us with something that looks very much like it. Clearly his philosophy is not a neutral one. He repeatedly condemns some things and recommends others for our approval. There are "goods" and "bads" in his world but he seems reluctant to use the term "ethics" in relation to them. It seems to this writer that Sartre is implying an important distinction between ethical values and those things he labels as "good" or "bad." He does not want to found his choice of "goods" and "bads" on moral grounds since the latter presuppose individual projects. Nevertheless, it is clear that when he expresses his approval or disapproval he intends the reader to agree with him, to accept his choices
as universally applicable. As a result, he cannot found
his selection of "goods" and "bads" on any claims pertaining
to their moral or ethical content—for in his view there are
no moral criteria independent of the individual human con-
sciousness.

Thus, when Sartre either explicitly or implicitly
approves of one thing and disapproves of another, on what
grounds is he making his judgments? How can he claim univer-
sal applicability for what he recommends and condemns in a
universe which he has defined as morally relative? It seems
to this writer that the answer is a rather straightforward
one; it is only a problem of semantics which obscures it.
When Sartre approves of something, it is not because it is
good, it is because it corresponds to the truth. When he
disapproves of something, it is because it flies in the face
of undeniable fact. In other words, it is false. For Sartre,
the term "good" appears to refer to what is true or in corre-
spondence with the facts, the term "bad" is linked to what is
false or does not correspond with the facts. It must be remem-
bered that Sartre purports to be using the phenomenological
method; that he is describing phenomena which are as they ap-
ppear to be. He feels that he is describing facts which others
cannot help seeing if they but take an honest look. As a
result, Sartre's world is not one of complete relativity.
There are practical absolutes in it, and he regards it as
wise to recognize and act in accordance with absolutes but
foolish to try to deny them in either thought or conduct. And, as we have seen, there is one metaphysical absolute which Sartre can claim (which is not independent of human consciousness and yet retains its absoluteness)—and that is freedom. For Sartre, that which recognizes and corresponds with freedom is also in correspondence with absolute truth. And, that which attempts to deny or escape freedom is in contradiction to the truth. It is on this basis that Sartre makes what appears to be his choice of morality. But it could be described as a morality only if virtue and vice are to be correlated with wisdom and truth in the former case, and folly and falsehood in the latter case. In simpler terms, Sartre has chosen to insist that we must recognize the truth and act in terms of it (freedom); conversely, we must avoid the attempt to escape or deny freedom—that is folly, for any attempt to deny ultimate truth is doomed to ultimate failure.

If we are interpreting Sartre correctly here, it now becomes possible to claim that he does in fact offer a set of prescriptions and condemnations, and it should be clear why he does not want to refer to these views as an ethics. In the first place, the connotations which the terms "ethics" or "morals" have accumulated in the past would tend to mislead the reader as to Sartre's intentions. And, in the second place, his prescriptions are not based on any traditional notion of ethics as such. They are of a different sort—based on phenomenological descriptions. Now it might be ob-
jected at this point that, if this is what Sartre is doing, he has fallen into an age-old logical fallacy; the mistake of trying to derive prescriptions from descriptions. But that would not, strictly speaking, be the case. For Sartre's prescriptions, while based on described fact, are not derived from them. That is to say, it does not follow that a man ought to affirm or value freedom just because it is the only undeniable fact of human existence. On the contrary, Sartre insists that freedom necessitates nothing other than choice—ultimately undetermined choice. Everyone is free to deny his freedom and live in bad faith if he so chooses. The real weight of Sartre's argument lies in the fact that man may choose to deny his freedom and in so doing he is in reality actualizing it. There is nothing a man can do or think which constitutes other than a choice and, thus, another demonstration of his freedom. The fact that freedom necessitates no particular prescription is just another expression of its absoluteness. It is the inescapable absolute. Thus, Sartre is not telling us that his prescriptions are logically necessitated. On the contrary, they are simply chosen by him, and like all choices they are ultimately groundless. Were he to claim otherwise, he would himself be in bad faith, and we would have to doubt his ability as a philosopher.

Furthermore, though freedom's absoluteness does not logically require that it occupy the top rung of any individual's hierarchy of values, it does recommend itself as being
of practical value. That is to say, if one recognizes his freedom and affirms it as the absolute value which transcends all others, he does not know beforehand what the results will be or whether he will like them. The future is open. But, on the other hand, if he attempts to deny his own or another's freedom, the results are certain. He is doomed to failure and bad faith for he will be engaged in an attempt to deceive himself about the truth, and, as already pointed out, he will never be completely deceived. Furthermore, such a situation sets up a number of possibilities such as alienation, mental illness, oppression, exploitation, through economic and social stereotypes, and the like. The man who recognizes his freedom as the absolute fact of his existence and affirms it as the highest value can never be the victim of anything but his own choices! The man who denies his freedom is also victimized only by his own choices at the ontological level, but, in addition, at the practical level he is almost certain to be victimized by others and things. The only alternative to this self-contradictory self-exploitation is the recognition and affirmation of freedom. Only in this way can a man transcend his situation and those factors in it which oppress him.

In another sense, freedom may be recommended as the base for prescriptions by virtue of the fact that any value at all presupposes it. That is to say, freedom is the source of all value in the sense that it is only through freedom that values come to be. Thus, the proposition concerning the neces-
sary link between freedom and the act of valuing it may be reversed. Values necessitate freedom! In order for any values to exist, freedom must exist. Prescriptions depend on freedom for their very existence, but freedom does not necessitate particular prescriptions which hold it as the highest value. This paradox makes it clear that ontology cannot in and of itself impose particular imperatives--as Sartre has admitted in the latter pages of Being and Nothingness. Yet, at the same time, since freedom is the only absolute, it is the only thing which can in truth be valued absolutely. All other values must fail at the practical level for there are no absolutes to which they may refer. Thus, Sartre's ideal can be nothing other than freedom's choice of itself as the only absolute value--the creator of the nothingness between itself, its objects, and its own project. As Sartre puts it:

... if man has once become aware that in his forlornness he imposes values, he can no longer want but one thing, and that is freedom, as the basis of all values. That doesn't mean that he wants it in the abstract. It means simply that the ultimate meaning of the acts of honest men is the quest for freedom as such.

Thus, it appears that freedom is the only end proper to the life of a free man! And, since all men are in fact free, it is the only end proper for human life.

It seems, then, that what Sartre is concerned to present us is an explanatory system of conduct which he does not want to call an ethics. For purposes of clarification we shall refer to it as an ideology of action (praxis) based on freedom. In doing so, we shall be in accordance with what
Thomas Molnar reported to have been Sartre's intention.

Molnar explains Sartre's formulation this way:

"... Praxis, a term used by Hegel and Marx, is nothing but action, so that Sartre's search for an ideology prescribing praxis means, in reality, that he was looking for a theoretical system, a moral system if you wish, from which certain actions would logically follow. His definition of praxis as a "positive conduct" is designed (as also for Marx) to emphasize the negativeness, the sterility, of the conventional ethical system of action and to replace it with a system of action supposedly following from the material conditions of existence. The assumption is that in this way ethics will lose both its subjective variability and its arbitrary character and will become non-controversial, imposing itself on us with the force of demonstration of a mathematical formula or physical law.

So for obvious reasons, Sartre cannot afford to speak either of a "moral system" since he previously discredited the expression, or of "action" with its Christian connotations: good actions, actions commanded by God. On the other hand, an ideology which describes praxis is a kind of square circle unless one admits, as Sartre does not, that there are considerations superior to individual choice, dictating individual choice."

This writer cannot help but disagree with Molnar on two of the above points. First, regardless of what Marx may have thought about it, it is clear that Sartre's ideology of praxis does not ultimately follow from the material conditions of existence. It follows from the fact of freedom which chooses its essence in a context of material conditions. Freedom transcends the material situation in which any individual exists. Thus, he chooses among those alternatives present to his consciousness and may be said to be conditioned, but not determined by any particular set of them. For Sartre, action expresses freedom, not material conditions which are themselves modified by freedom. As pointed out in previous
chapters, freedom and facticity are reciprocal, they are in a dialectical relationship to one another. Second, Molnar states that Sartre claims there are no considerations superior to individual choice which can dictate to it. But that is not exactly the case. Freedom is an absolute which for Sartre supercedes individual choice because it makes choices not only possible but inevitable. It is the source of choices though it does not dictate that any particular choices be made by any particular individual. Sartre merely wants to say that choices ought to follow from the fact of freedom viewed as an absolute. That is his existentialist choice. If we may grant it, the rest of his ideology follows.

Now that we have got these points clear, it should be possible to outline Sartre's ideology by briefly listing the "goods" and "bads" of which it is constituted.

The only positive value is freedom. Freedom is man's only absolute and as such represents the highest value and the only proper end for human action. All of Sartre's "goods" and "bads" are based on this proposition. All those actions which recognize freedom and accept the responsibility that it entails are good. Everything which attempts to deny freedom and escape responsibility is bad. In this sense, the good corresponds to facts, while evil is that which is factually false.

Clearly then we are left with an empty injunction. The only absolute good is freedom in action; its recognition
and affirmation by men who act in its light. Thus, no particular prescriptions of a positive nature may be found in it. It must remain an open concept. Thus, one could hardly call it "ethical." But, on the other hand, it is possible to assign content to evil. It is simply all of those things, actions, and attitudes which try to deny or tend to constrain freedom; or, in terms of human behavior, evil is identical with bad faith in all of its various manifestations.

Let us briefly list these evils. In such a way we can arrive at a fairly specific outline of what is bad as opposed to what is good in Sartre's view. First of all, there is man's impossible ontological status—his desire to overcome the gap in his consciousness, and thus become a being-for-itself-in-itself, or God. In this attempt, man can never succeed, and, at this level it appears that bad faith is unavoidable. For, he is constantly desiring to be what he can never be, a self-conscious thing. Consequently, man is described by Sartre as a futile passion. This might be regarded as Sartre's original sin. Men are born into it by virtue of the fact that their freedom stems from the "nothingness" of their consciousness. And, there is no way they can escape it for no man can ever become himself, as we have seen.

Another aspect of Sartrean original sin is simply the presence of the other as a subject beyond reach. No intersubjectivity and thus no genuine human relationships are possible at the ontological level of human interaction. As we have seen, no genuine interaction between people can occur
except at the practical level, and it would be repetitious to present Sartre's arguments on these points here. It should suffice to point out that human relationships at the ontological level can only be described as a confrontation, and in terms of conflict. This situation is also inescapable; it can be seen as a form of existentialist original sin by virtue of the fact that men are born into it, and cannot absolve themselves by their own efforts. And, of course, on Sartre's view, there is no God to provide a state of grace by means of which men may be absolved.

Thus, at the ontological level, man's fate is to be in bad faith. The best he can do is to adopt an authentic attitude by means of which he honestly recognizes his lot and accepts full responsibility for it. But, he cannot change his lot. All we can say here, as pointed out in the chapter on interpersonal relationships, is that if men would adopt an authentic attitude toward themselves and others, the practical results, while inconceivable at present, might be better. If men recognized and valued their own freedom and the freedom of others, despite the anguish such revelation brings, perhaps they might be kinder and more tolerant toward one another. Perhaps they would be less inclined to self-deception, and, consequently, less likely to oppress and exploit one another. Perhaps, if they recognized their common ontological status and obstinately refused to translate it into practical action by attempting to objectify themselves and others, the world of practical affairs would become a better
place. Of course, the details of such a world are unknown, and no predictions can be made. It is an open concept, as are most positive aspects of Sartre's ideology, and, in this writer's opinion, expresses a faith which Sartre harbors somewhere deep in his heart. But, it must be remembered that such a faith, even if realized, could have effect only on the practical level; it cannot change man's ontological status. For, no matter what one does—whether he is tolerant, kind, or laissez-faire—he necessarily imposes constraints on the freedom of others, and takes away some of their possibilities!

But these evils pale when compared to those found at the practical level. This is what Sartre meant when he stated that metaphysical evil is a luxury when compared to practical evil, and concluded, in reference to the group-infusion, that common practical freedom is superior to individual metaphysical freedom. So, at the practical level freedom once again appears as the highest value, but it is now common practical freedom, and no longer the radically individualistic freedom of the for-itself to which Sartre is referring. Once again, it is an open concept, and may not be described except negatively. Right at the outset all sociological and material conditions which restrict freedom are condemned! It is freedom for all, freedom in general, with which Sartre is concerned now. The implication is clear that the responsibility which accompanies individual freedom requires one to recognize and value the freedom of others and work for its practical realization in the world! The content
of this common freedom may perhaps be described as a *tabula rasa*; a blank slate from which men may start anew to create a different and hopefully better world. Thus, Sartre's injunctions at the practical level consist of a list of evils which men are called upon to resist and eliminate. The reader will recall that these have been enumerated at some length in Part One. Thus, Sartre's position may be summarized here by pointing out that scarcity and all the elements of culture (the practico-inert) which men have created in response to it must be eliminated in order to clear the way for a world in which practical freedom for all men can be realized.

Therefore, all men are called upon by Sartre to fight for common freedom by opposing themselves to existing conditions which constrain their freedom and individuality. The greatest barrier to the accomplishment of such a goal at the practical level is the context of scarcity. It must be eliminated through a restructuring of modes of production. All class consciousness which supports the status quo, and consequently tends to preserve the context of scarcity through practico-inert social structures, must be eliminated. Man most thoroughly degrades himself, and denies his own nature, when he submits himself to such conditions. As Sartre puts it, he denies his own individuality and uniqueness by "domesticating" or "institutionalizing" himself. And his only alternative is to wipe the slate clean in preparation for a better (but presently inconceivable) world in which freedom
can be sovereign. Specifically, then, men are called upon to join together in a common struggle against institutionalization, oppression, alienation, indoctrination, hunger, thirst, disease, poverty, and the like in an effort to open up the future, and expand the possibilities of human life now so rigidly delimited by mediated matter and past traditions which men have created and since come to see as determinants. Sartre is calling upon men to open up the future and dare the inconceivable!

It is important to emphasize here that this latter philosophy of practical freedom is not the one with which Sartre began. He has opted for the practical ethics of Marxism, but with a correction which he himself has added. As Hazel Barnes describes it:

... Sartre envisions a dialectical movement: First, existentialism will modify Marxism from within by restating at its heart the "existential project," thus conferring upon Marxism once more the "human dimension" which the heirs of Marx have all but destroyed. Then existentialism will cease to exist in its own right but will live on, "absorbed, surpassed, and conserved by the totalizing movement" of the revitalized neo-Marxism it has helped bring into being. Finally, when the world's inhabitants have been freed from economic pressures induced by the "problems of production," Marxism itself will be surpassed and conserved in the new "philosophy of freedom."  

Thus, Sartre is pointing to a new philosophy of freedom as a possibility for the future which is at present inconceivable in detail. His faith is that it will transcend both existentialism and Marxism; both of the latter are seen as steps along the way. The function of existentialism is to keep the realization and actualization of human freedom alive in the
world. And the function of Marxism is to show man how to overcome the context of economic scarcity. After that comes the open future! Sartre's faith is an indication that he has really never given up on his claim that human consciousness is a continuous self-transcendence, that there is no fixed human nature, and that man makes his own essence by a process of constant choice. And he is not willing to conclude that a philosophy of freedom applicable to an age dominated by economic scarcity and the need to compete for survival would be appropriate to a world in which technological and social changes had rendered those factors obsolete. Thus, Sartre may be best described as a conditional neo-Marxist. For, his ideology rests fundamentally on his premise that men are free to choose their own essence in whatever situations they find themselves, and that they may choose to transcend those situations with some hope of success by joining forces in common cause for freedom.

Sartre's ultimate vision, then, is more than existentialism or Marxism. Both are stages along the way toward a world of practical freedom which is at present beyond his ability to comprehend in detail. Obviously, this is not an ethics; it is a faith in the potentialities of the human race. Sartre is simply a man who is saying that he believes the task can be accomplished, and he has a good idea of what steps we ought to take in order to begin the effort. But, as yet he cannot envision the details of the final solution. And perhaps there is no final solution. To envision such might
result only in another constraint on freedom. Perhaps freedom must always be an on-going project! It may be that what Sartre is requiring is that men recognize the truth of the human condition, and take the responsibility for developing something like a capacity for moral sensitivity in relation to it—a sensitivity that can make positive changes for the better a real possibility. Clearly, a new set of rigid moral rules would be out of place. Rather, a blueprint which can be scrapped or modified as we learn more about our techniques and building materials is what we need. Flexibility and creativity are required in the construction of practical freedom—else we shall defeat our own purposes. The only guideline is the fact of freedom, and the injunction to value and work for its realization. It would appear that morality, to Sartre, is something like a creative process or a set of aesthetic judgments. As he has somewhere remarked, the moralist is like the cab driver, he watches the curves in the road.10

After all, a philosophy of man which defines him as a self-transcendence would be in contradiction with itself were it not also self-transcending! Despite all of the philosophic difficulties which lie behind Sartre's prescriptions, perhaps we have reason to listen to him—perhaps even to applaud his honesty and modesty. He would rather give up anything than the possibility of common practical freedom, and, if Marxism is the best road to that goal, we can see viable
reasons for his choice. And besides, what could a morality of freedom be other than an ideology of action? That is, so long as it remains open-ended!
CHAPTER III

A SARTREAN OBJECTIVE FOR EDUCATION

H erefo re, we have been dealing with education as it is and has been. Our efforts have been to establish the foundation of a description of education which follows from Sartre's philosophy. Hopefully also, it has been satisfactorily demonstrated that prescriptions are possible on the basis of Sartre's views. With these tasks behind us, we can now turn our attention to ideals rather than descriptions. In effect, we can now ask what kind of prescriptions for education Sartre would have to present—were he ever to make such an attempt—without being inconsistent with the rest of his views. Thus our task from this point on will be to deal with education as it ought to be in the light of Sartre's basic concepts. The intention in these chapters will be to sketch those major implications which seem to follow most directly from a Sartrean view of the human condition. And all will be seen, of course, in the light of Sartre's ideology of action. Specifically, in this chapter, we shall take up the question of proper objectives for education. In succeeding chapters we shall investigate the topics of teaching methods, and curriculum. Evaluation, standards for teachers, existen-
tialist classroom requirements, the role of the existential teacher, and other related topics will also be noted, for these are so interrelated with the topics of objectives, methods, and curriculum that it would be neither possible nor desirable to avoid mentioning those particulars which are implied by such enquiries.

In terms of proper objectives for education, the implications of Sartre's concept of freedom seem obvious. Freedom is the only proper end for the lives of human beings; thus it is the only proper end for education! For Sartre, there could never be a multiplicity of educational objectives; there could be only freedom. To it, all else must be subordinated. All other possible ends must be relegated to the status of means toward the end of freedom. And freedom, even as an educational objective, would have to remain complete, open-ended, and undefined. Any other formulation would be inconsistent with Sartre's philosophy, and would constitute a denial, rather than an affirmation of, freedom.

This kind of objective for education is necessitated by the whole of Sartre's philosophy, and especially by his description of the nature of human consciousness. As will be remembered, man is free by virtue of the fact that the form itself negates the in-itself and also engages in reflection upon itself. Man is always what he is not, and not what he is. His situation is always his past at any given time and his future is open; he is called upon to create it. Thus he is a self-transcending creature, one who is condemned to be
free. In all the human universe this is the only inescapable and untranscendable fact. Man is freedom, he exists it. It is his very nature. Consequently, it is the only really viable end for human life. For any man to seek anything other than freedom is to act in violation of his own nature, to be involved in an impossible contradiction, and to embrace self-alienation. It follows that, though there can be secondary goals for education, there can be only one primary objective in the light of which all else is to be judged— that, of course, is freedom.

The concept of responsibility found in Sartre's work implies itself as a necessary corollary of freedom. Responsibility must be realized and assumed by both student and teacher for the two are inseparably combined. Freedom and responsibility are co-extensive. Both are absolutes; they are complete and universal. Contrary to usual views on the subject, the relation between the two is direct, and not inverse. Where there is no freedom (were that possible), there could be no responsibility. In fact, it is responsibility that individuals seek to escape by giving up their freedom to one form or another of authority. On the other hand, where freedom is complete (as Sartre thinks the case to be), responsibility is complete. There is no escape, except in bad faith.

All objectives of education other than freedom and its concomitant responsibilities seem to be in bad faith in the
light of Sartre's descriptions. Creativity (when it is only a lip service ideal rather than one realized in the light of freedom), development of individual potential (when it is only a disguised code for social adjustment), adjustment to society (the socialization process, elevating of society above the individual), development of vocational skills (when these are seen as human resources development—for the sake of the needs of society rather than the needs of the individual), assimilation of "different"individuals and groups into society (nationalism, amalgamation of immigrants, racial integration, etc.) are all attempts to "mold" the individual in terms of practico-inert standards. As a result, all of these are unacceptable as objectives for education because all refuse to recognize the truth of human nature, and all impose restrictions on freedom. In various ways, each is a denial of both freedom and responsibility! To the extent that restrictions are successfully imposed on students, they are relieved of their responsibility. In such a case, the student is enabled to claim that whatever he becomes is the responsibility of society rather than himself for he has only done what he was commanded to do, and believed what he was told to believe. His personality and behavior, so to speak, have been imposed on him, and he has become nothing more than a product of society. This situation represents a vicious cycle in which both society and the individual stand condemned by Sartre's concept of bad faith. Doubtless, then, to the
precise extent that responsibility may be desired as an objective for education, freedom must be allowed. And, if we want complete responsibility from students, we must hold complete freedom as the transcendent goal of their education.

In addition, it will be remembered that the nature of responsibility is to act in good faith—to be authentic. Complete honesty with oneself, as well as with others, is necessitated only by the valuing of freedom and responsibility. All other ideals require loyalty, obedience, acquiescence, or perhaps, apologetics—but not authenticity. For, each of them in these various ways command men to relinquish some part of their responsibility to choose. But, of course, no man can refuse to choose or really deny that responsibility. Both are inescapable, and all attempts (both imperatives and actions) which seek to do so are in bad faith. If we want authentic people, we must hold to complete freedom as our only objective. For, responsibility flows only from freedom, and it is solely on the basis of responsibility that authenticity can be recommended as the preferred or preferable way of life. Each follows from, and depends on, the other. They may not be separated.

Sartre's concept of interpersonal relationships implies that we must make a distinction between the ontological and practical levels of human existence. For, at the ontological level good faith is impossible; man is a futile passion. No
genuine human relationships are possible, for when freedoms confront one another, they can interact only by reciprocally impinging on and obstructing one another. As a result, the teacher-student relationship can never be completely successful. Neither can each ever thoroughly comprehend the "inner life" of the other, and the only patterns of behavior their relationship can take are reciprocal dominance, subordination, or indifference. No matter how democratic, laissez-faire, or dedicated to freedom a teacher may be, he necessarily imposes certain limits on students, and excludes from them a multitude of their possibilities simply by virtue of the fact that at any given time he is directing their attention to one or a complex of things to the exclusion of all others. By the same token, and in the same way, students restrict the freedom of the teacher. Each gets his "being-for-others" from the other. Thus, the relationship is reciprocal, and, at the ontological level, it is doomed to fall short of perfection. Because man is free, education can never be completely effective. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that it ought to be. For, it is by virtue of this fallibility of human relationships that freedom is guaranteed. If the communication between teacher and student were direct, complete, and perfect rather than reciprocal, dialectical, and open-ended, all freedom would be crushed, and the student would, in fact, be only a determined possibility of the educational process. On the other hand, since all human relationships are fallible at the ontological level,
education must remain in bad faith even if it takes freedom as its objective. As a result, the only real chance for successful authentic education seems to lie at the practical level. Therefore, it is the practical with which education ought most urgently to concern itself!

Sartre's concept of existential psychoanalysis reinforces the above observations; it also implies freedom as the only viable objective for education. On this view, each man is defined as his own original project—he is the product of his own on-going choice of himself. His secret is not his inferiority complex or his Oedipus complex, as Sartre has pointed out. Rather, it is his own freely created essence; the project which comprises the definition of his very being in the world, and the limits of his resistance to torture and death. Obviously, one's project is unlikely to be realized or transcended, if that is to be desired, except in an environment which embodies, expresses, values, and nurtures freedom. Such a conception of education and human nature makes transcendence and self-creation possible (in fact, it requires it.), and, ideally at least, results in a continuous, consciously planned growth on the part of the student. In this way, both mental and emotional stagnation are averted. For, on this view, living itself is seen as a creative process, a process of freely constructing a life, a personality, and, just as importantly if social responsibility is to be valued, a world. By becoming aware of himself in terms of his project, the
student is forced to recognize both his freedom and the scope of his responsibility for himself and the world in which he lives. Thus, he arrives at self-identification, and is enabled to locate himself in his situation; to see how and where he is fitting himself into the overall scheme of things, and to assume responsibility for choosing the particular types of relationships to his environment which he will enjoy. It is clear that this type of schooling implies an education in practical wisdom—not metaphysical speculation, abstract reasoning, or any form of narrow specialization.

Sartre's concept of scarcity raises implications entirely at the practical level. According to him, economic scarcity is the fundamental evil of the world of practical affairs. All of the evils of the so-called "real" world stem from scarcity, and can be understood only in its light. It represents the greatest of all obstacles to freedom at the practical level, and since it is, for Sartre, a negative value which appears as the antithesis of freedom, it implies practical freedom as the positive value for the sake of which men should act. Sartre's claim that scarcity is a real evil in the world is supported by his proposition that it is the ultimate practical cause of competition, conflict, exploitation, alienation, oppression of minorities, and violence—all of which are recognized by most men as "real" evils. Since it is the cause of practical evils such as these, it relegates metaphysical evil to the background. In a world dominated by the fact that there is not enough of what
it takes to fulfill men's material needs, metaphysical evil and metaphysical freedom are both luxuries. Thus, scarcity implies freedom as its antithesis--but it is practical, not metaphysical, freedom which follows from this formulation.

If scarcity ought to be eliminated for the sake of freedom, that freedom must be practical in nature; that is to say, it must be freedom from scarcity and the resultant material lacks which characterize man's current state of affairs.

Thus, it is necessitated that practical, not metaphysical, freedom must become the primary goal of education!

In addition, there is another implication which the concept of scarcity seems to impose. It is that all educational objectives other than practical freedom tend to support and conserve the context of scarcity--for, they tend to support the status quo. All objectives of education which ultimately result in the socialization of the student reaffirm economic scarcity and all of the evils of the world which stem from it. Any educational ideal which turns men's attention to abstract or theological concerns, metaphysical speculation, or narrow vocational and professional pursuits diverts them from any attempts they might otherwise have made to overcome economic scarcity. Or, on the other hand, such ideals enjoin men to accept their lot--thus encouraging them to live with the practical evils they find around them. But, if it is good to eliminate hunger, thirst, disease, exploitation, and violence from the lives of men, it follows that it must be evil to entertain any ideals or objectives which tend to
support the context of scarcity—or, what is the same thing in Sartre's opinion, the status quo.

Thus, practical freedom is recommended as the highest of educational values. If it is necessary to eliminate the practical evils of human life before we can have a better world, and if all educational objectives of the past have tended to support and conserve these evils by transmitting culture from one generation to the next, practical freedom emerges as the only viable goal for education. It is the only one that can work. For, it is the only objective of human life (and, thus, for education) which can give man a fighting chance to overcome the context of scarcity—to engage in practical efforts to reorganize modes of production and redesign the methods of distribution of the world's goods. If education is to work for the betterment of man's material conditions, if it is to adopt material well-being as a value in general and for all, it can entertain only one transcendent value and final end—practical freedom for all!

For Sartre, as for Rousseau, society as it now exists is evil. This is made clear by his descriptions of social structures. For, both the seriality and the institution emerge from, and are necessitated by, the context of scarcity. As a member of a seriality or an institution, man lives at his most degraded level. As a mere serial unit or social status he becomes an objectified thing for the others—who are also in the same boat. Each man actually cooperates with the
things and the others which mold him into a forged tool for
the sake of the group, or into a victimized thing if he is a
member of an oppressed seriality. He accepts his conditioning,
and, consequently, lives for the sake of the organizational
structure of his society. That structure is to be preserved
even at the cost of the lives of men—through degradation in
bad faith, or even through physical death. If the individual
is called upon to sacrifice his life in order to perpetuate
his group, that is thought of by everyone involved as both
necessary and honorable in most cases. And, of course, in
Sartre's opinion, the individual who lives as a serial unit
or an institutionalized man is sacrificing himself all of his
life even if he dies a natural death. By so doing, he gives
up his own unique individuality—the aspirations, dreams, and
characteristics he might otherwise have chosen for himself—
for the sake of fitting into the pre-set mold society had
prepared for him even before his birth. Thus, he lives in
bad faith; he denies the truth of the human condition, and
the very nature of his own humanity. He embraces and is re-
ciprocally victimized by alienation from himself, alienation
from others, and sometimes by extreme mental and emotional
disturbances. He supports and acts in terms of the context
of scarcity, and thus engages in, or at least acquiesces to,
competition, conflict, exploitation, oppression, and violence.
It is in this way that human history has been written by the
free acts of men; by the dialectical process through which man
relates himself to the context of scarcity by choosing himself and his behavior in its light. Thus, history is a story of the proliferation of practico-inert standards and practices resulting from men's efforts to fulfill their material needs, and by means of which practical freedom and material well-being are denied to the majority of the world's population. For, in a competitive world, it seems to be inevitable that the proportion of those who "succeed" will always be minute in comparison to the proportion of those who "fail."

Throughout history men have espoused every conceivable ideal, but there is one upon which they have seldom acted and that one is freedom. In this sense, then, the practical evils of the world have been rendered inevitable, for nearly all if not all of the ideals upon which significant numbers of men have acted, in effect, have called upon them to compete for success within the context of scarcity, to adjust themselves to it in one way or another rather than to make any significant effort to transcend or eliminate it. Thus, the fear, guilt, anxiety, poverty, and conflict ridden world in which we now live is of our own making! We have no cause for complaint for we have created it by obstinately refusing to recognize the only transcendent value that could make a better, or, at least, a different world possible, and by just as obstinately refusing to act on it. For, the only transcendent goal in the light of which men
are in fact enjoined to change the world for the betterment of all is practical freedom and its corollary imperative of practical responsibility. It is only from these premises that social responsibility as an imperative for men directly follows. Thus, common practical freedom is more than the only proper end for human life (and thus education); it is the only viable objective for those who are unwilling to be satisfied with the human condition as it is!

A summary of this chapter would seem almost redundant. In this writer's opinion, little more need be said. Common practical freedom has emerged as the only proper and the only viable goal of education. On the basis of Sartre's view of the world, such an objective must be insisted upon to the exclusion of all others. All educational objectives of the past must be reformulated as means to the end of practical freedom for all men. Consequently, all other objectives must be superceded by freedom, and educators must consistently insist upon that in their own behavior and teaching. The necessary corollary of such an educational ideal must be the assumption of responsibility leading to social awareness and social action on the part of the student. Each student (and each teacher, as well) is called upon to take the responsibility for social involvement on his own shoulders, and engage his own unique capacities in a fight for the well-being of men in general—a fight for freedom from practical evils. As will be remembered from Sartre's description of the way
the revolutionary group fuses and evolves into an organized
group, men are called upon to join forces in common struggle.
Common freedom is the sole end which both validates such
behavior and justifies the organizational structure of the
group. For the sake of such freedom as may be mediated among
men, it is proper to prevent individuals from defecting or
slipping back into serial and institutionalized habits. Bad
faith cannot be allowed if common freedom is to prevail at
the practical level. In other words, it is justifiable and
even necessary to force people to be free, in Sartre's opinion.
Thus, if the objective of education must be practical freedom
for all, the fact that it necessarily impedes the metaphysical
freedom of students need not be excused.
CHAPTER IV

SARTREAN IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGY

In a system of education which holds common freedom as its highest value and primary objective, which teaching methods would appear to be most appropriate? It will be the task of this chapter to explore that question by pointing out those major implications for teaching methods which appear most obviously to lie hidden between the lines of each of Sartre's basic conceptions. And all will be selected, of course, on the basis of the assumption of common freedom as the primary goal of education.

The concept of freedom which Sartre has provided does more than imply itself as a fundamental principle of educational method; it requires that no teaching method which "molds" the child to any pre-set patterns other than those designed to encourage recognition of individual and common freedom and acceptance of responsibility can be appropriate. Any method appropriate to a theory of education which values freedom above all else must be open-ended. There can be no predetermined "right" answers at which the student is required to arrive. Since there are no absolutes (other than freedom and its corollaries) in Sartre's view, there can be
no "right" answers to which children must adhere. Any type of teaching which persuades students that there are "right" answers independent of their own judgments and interpretations would be entirely out of place in a Sartrean system of education. The only requirements appropriate to teaching must be freedom and responsibility. To the extent that it may be possible, those students who would try to escape in bad faith should be prevented, and, on Sartre's view, any method of teaching, evaluation, or discipline which works for these ends would be appropriate—including corporal punishment. On these standards, the only failures would be those students who obstinately refuse to make their own decisions and stand responsibly behind them. In other words, the failures would be those students who insist on "parroting" the teaching, their parents, and others. The student who assimilates everything the teacher says would always be suspect.

Thus, it is implied that proper teaching would have to be characterized by a teacher-student relationship which is dialectical in nature. There should be no impositions involved in it. It must consist of an interaction which is open-ended in terms of everything except the objective of freedom. In this context, the teacher must be seen as only one part, among many, of the students' situation. In other words, the teacher is one element of the students' facticity, the meanings of which must necessarily be chosen by the student. By the same token, the student emerges in the con-
sciousness of the teacher as a part of his facticity. Thus, the relationship is reciprocal—it can never be regarded as one-dimensional, or as a direct cause and effect relationship. As a result, it is implied that only those methods of teaching which not only allow, but also require, the student to arrive at his own decisions are appropriate. No "right" answers can be given the student. Everything must be undertaken in the light of ultimate uncertainty. It is only in this way that any teaching method can correspond to Sartre's view of the truth of the human condition, avoid misleading or deceiving the student, and support the objective of freedom. Admittedly, these are demanding requirements (on both the teacher and the student), but on Sartre's views nothing less will suffice.

The concept of responsibility supplements the above observations by implying that teachers must carry a crushing burden. For their responsibility to students is of tremendous extent. Their "sphere of influence" is great for they have both immediate and remote, intended and unforeseen, practical and psychological effects on students. In a system of compulsory education, the students are a captive audience and may not avoid the influence of teachers. Thus, teachers cannot avoid the responsibility for influencing students who are in the process of creating their own self-images and their own views of the world. In addition, teachers must remember that they can never ultimately control these processes and that the practical consequences of even their best
intentions are unpredictable. As Sartre has stated, for
every finality there is a counter-finality. Thus, a jealous
guarding of freedom, eternal vigilance regarding the possible
consequences of even the slightest of one's words or actions,
and unflinching courage in the face of ultimate uncertainty
emerge as fundamental personality characteristics of the
responsible teacher. Every aspect of the child's being—emotional, social, psychological, intellectual, and practical—
must be regarded as part of the teacher's responsibility.
Therefore, he must always see himself as in interaction with
the whole child, and as being involved with children as com-
plete human beings, as subjects ultimately beyond his reach.
If he defines students in any other way, he will be denying
a part of his responsibility, and, thus, acting in bad faith.
In addition, he will be cheating the students by unnecessarily
taking away some of their practical possibilities, and he will
be deceiving them by providing an example in his own behavior
that encourages them to act in bad faith, to define people as
being other than free.

In addition, the teacher is called upon to take moral
stands concerning social issues. He cannot confine himself
to the classroom and become an objective scholar. Rather, he
is called upon to exercise social responsibility, to stand up
publicly for what he thinks is right and to denounce that
which his convictions tell him is evil. In other words, the
teacher is called upon to be authentic, and, in this sense,
become a moral exemplar for children. What he wants children
to learn, he must exemplify in his own attitudes, emotions,
and conduct. If we want courageous and authentic students,
we must have teachers who can show them the way! If we want
students to honestly recognize and denounce the practical
evils of the world, we must have teachers who do the same.

For the student, the concept of responsibility implies
that all education is, in fact, self-education. Just as he
must accept the responsibility for creating his own essence,
so must he accept the responsibility for creating his own
education and its meaning to him. He only learns by in-
volving himself in his educational experiences, by making
decisions and judgments regarding what he is being presented,
and by making use of the materials provided him in his educa-
tional environment. The implication is, then, that educa-
tion (from the point of view of the student) must be defined
as a self-creating, self-created, self-help project. Thus,
any method which imposes "right" answers constitutes an
attempt to deny the student his freedom, and take away from
him the opportunity to create himself through his own unique
learning experiences. Once again, then, an open-ended,
dialectical, and reciprocal method of teaching is implied.
The emphasis of proper teaching methods must be on clarifica-
tion of the details of individual and social responsibility
and the encouragement of its assumption by students. As a
result, the construction of "existential situations" in the
classroom seems to be suggested. In such situations, students would be required to arrive at decisions among alternatives, take stands, and assume responsibility for their ideas and behaviors in interaction with the rest of the class and with the teacher. In this way, it is to be hoped that the existential realities of life could be duplicated in the classroom, thus providing students with viable opportunities to prepare for an authentic life through living experiences. Such a method might be described as a learning-through-experience technique. But, within this context, what would be learned would be authenticity as a mode of practical behavior; or, in other words, as a way of life!

Sartre's conception of the fundamental nature of interpersonal relationships raises implications related to his distinction between the ontological and practical levels of human existence. Clearly, at the ontological level, no teaching method could be completely successful by virtue of the fact that no human relationships can be completely genuine. It is thus at the practical level that teaching is more likely to be significantly effective. As a result, proper teaching methods must be primarily, though not exclusively, concerned with the practical, concrete in their approach to ideals and facts, and relevant to the larger world outside the classroom. Even as Dewey insisted, education and life are inseparable; they may not be isolated from one another. Proper methodology in education must recognize this, and bring the "real"
world into the classroom experiences of children. Thus, a methodology characterized fundamentally by a dialectical interaction between teacher and student is once again implied. But, it must be a type of interaction which is based on the authentic attitudes of "shame" and "arrogance," for it is only by means of these attitudes that good faith may be approximated at the level of individual interaction. Thus, each must be for the other a subject beyond reach, and each must be for himself the object by which the other gets his being-for-others. Such dialectical methods must be concerned with the limits to which genuine interaction between free individuals can be pushed, and should be urgently concerned with exploring the ways in which individuals may be enabled to make the best of a world in which conflict constitutes the original meaning of all human relationships. But, they must retain practicality as their primary emphasis.

Sartre's theory of existential psychoanalysis implies that the original project is prior to all teaching. So, in the light of this view, education is once again seen as a self-created project which takes shape in the light of each student's original project. Education supplies the materials (some significant part of them, at any rate) which the student utilizes in the pursuit of his own project—or in its conversion. Thus, the methodology of education must be such as to lead the student to create his own essence, to become effectively aware of the nature of his own project, and of the fact
that it is possible, though admittedly difficult, for him to change it at any given time. The methodology should be such as to help the student realize that he is not ultimately determined by anything the teacher, the school, or the larger society says of him. As a corollary, the student should be helped to understand the nature of radical conversion.

Sartre's work on Genet might make a worthwhile text for this purpose if rewritten in language understandable to students at differing levels of comprehension. In addition, literature abounds with other works that would make worthwhile sources for use in such situations.

It is implied again, then, that the methodology of teaching should be both dialectical and situational in nature. In addition, it should take an analytical approach to the relationship between teacher and student in order to lead the student to self-analysis through a combination of interaction and introspection stimulated by his participation in artificially constructed learning situations. And, of course, it is absolutely essential that these situations correspond as closely as possible to those found in the "real" world which makes up the student's total situation. Students must become aware of the truth about themselves and their world no matter how harsh or painful these truths may be. There is no room for mythology, tender-heartedness, or any form of escapism on Sartre's views. Education must "tell it like it is"! Just as the psychotherapist guides the patient toward a coming to grips with himself and his situation, so must the teacher do
likewise for his students. Over-protectiveness would be simply another form of bad faith on the part of the teacher, and would constitute a type of cheating of students by keeping from them those facts they need in order to effectively integrate their own personalities.

The concept of scarcity raises implications for educational methodology at the practical level. According to Sartre, everything is illuminated by the context of scarcity; human behavior is explained by man's efforts to fulfill his material lacks. Thus, the metaphysical conflict original to all human relationships emerges at the level of man's practical affairs. In other words, scarcity is the fundamental element of man's practical facticity. As a result, it is a practical evil, and, as already pointed out, its consequences in the world are conflict, competition, exploitation, oppression, violence, and the like. Since they have been enumerated at length elsewhere, it would be repetitious to outline the details of this argument here. Suffice it to say that the implications raised by these points are quite in accordance with those previously pointed out in this chapter. For, if we can assume that students best learn the meaning of a life context by acting in that context--by experiencing it--once again we must suggest that teaching methodology should be made up of artificially constructed classroom situations. And the context of scarcity should constitute an important element in the content of such existential learning experiences. It is further implied that learning situations should be con-
structured in such a way that the interaction in which the student engages will help to clarify for him the meaning of his own original project in terms of its relation to the context of scarcity. In other words, the student should be led to grasp both the immediate and remote meanings of his efforts to satisfy his needs—both psychological and material. For, as will be remembered, in Sartre's view scarcity is more than an expression of man's material lacks, it is also an expression of his finitude.

Sartre's conceptions of the social structures of seriality and the institution seem to imply that the student should become aware of the realities of life for men who live as serial units or as institutionalized forged tools of society. The meanings of such lives should be explored and clarified. Since these structures may also be seen as life contexts resulting from the larger context of scarcity, they should be studied through interaction within situations constructed for the purpose of helping students to realize the meaning of life in society; as a member of an institutional group or a serial structure. The structure of the seriality and of the institution should be reflected in the design of experimental classroom learning situations. In them, the aim should be to make the student as fully aware as possible of the internal workings of such social practices as the oath, the terror-imperative, indoctrination, conditioning, and the like. It is in this context that educational methodolo-
gy would be most urgently called upon to present the facts fully and honestly; nothing could be held back. For, the student must be made aware of the meanings of the world in which he lives at both the personal and the general levels.

Sartre's descriptions of the process by which the revolutionary group fuses and becomes organized implies another dimension essential to existential learning situations. On the basis of these views, it appears that learning situations should also include a significant amount of experimentation with and investigation into possible ways and means of realizing practical freedom at the group level. Appropriate relations to and attitudes concerning various forms of oppression should be discussed. Ways and means of organization and grouping which do not violate the ultimate objective of common freedom should be explored. The meanings of death, and the terror-imperative should be clarified. In other words, the student should be led to arrive at a viable conception of the relationship between the individual and society in terms of his own original project, and in the light of common freedom and responsibility. The methodology suggested here might best be described briefly as a process of existential interaction and analysis operating within the context of artificially constructed situations. The minimum content of such an approach should include individual and group level interaction, group forming experiments, and individualized projects leading to individual growth toward authenticity at both the group and individual levels.
In addition, the design of the learning situation, the presentations of the teacher, and the discussions in which he engages the students should all be such as to push the learning experiences of students to their existential limits; to expose the "either-or" aspect of real life decisions in real life situations. If it is change of behavior which is desired (and obviously it is, in this case), education must boldly explore the existential dilemmas of human life. In this way, students would be allowed no equivocation, or means of escape through rationalization, objectivity, scholasticism, or evasion. They would be forced to choose in the classroom just as they will be forced to choose in life.

It is suggested, then, that the role of the teacher is to be an architect of existential learning situations within the context of which he acts as a guide, reference, source of information, moderator, arbitrator, psychoanalyst, and concerned human being—though not a friend in any sentimental sense of the word. For, the truth is harsh, and freedom is a demanding requirement! He will not protect students from either of these realities. On the contrary, it is his responsibility to lead students through the anguish and despair that accompany existential realizations. Within constructed learning situations, the teacher will be the students' equal, not their superior. He will interact with them and the environmental structures imposed by the situation. He will influence them, but he will also be influenced; he will provide an example, but he will also learn from others; he will gen-
eraly know more than the students, but there will be areas in which students can be more authoritative than he. And he will recognize such situations when they arise. He will be non-defensive, non-status-conscious, non-directive, non-authoritarian (though, of course, he should be authoritative in the sense that he will know what he is talking about), and thus egalitarian. He will insist on nothing but freedom and its corollaries. These will be his only absolutes and where they are concerned he will be adamant. Thus, the picture of the teacher which seems to emerge from the above considerations appears to be that of a combination master of ceremonies, architect of learning experiences, and guardian of freedom. His standards will be high, and his requirements will be demanding. His classroom will be, ideally, like life—open-ended, flexible, unpredictable, problematic, and sometimes traumatic. It will be as electric and vital as life itself pushed to its existential limits!

In conclusion, then, there are several statements that might be made in summarizing the general view of teaching methodology presented in this chapter. First of all, it must be insisted that no educational methodology which imposes any pre-set patterns on the student (other than those designed to foster the realization of freedom) can be acceptable in the light of Sartre's view of the human condition. But, on the other hand, any method which leads to recognition and affirmation of freedom and the acceptance of complete personal
responsibility would have to be considered both appropriate and valuable. Thus, no particular teaching method may be prescribed or condemned out of hand. The approach to teaching and the selection of specific methodologies must be pragmatic in nature. What "works" in the light of freedom is both good and true; what does not is to be scrapped. And, Sartre has provided us with no reliable criteria for deciding a priori what methods will work with any particular student or in any particular classroom. The methods to be used must result from intelligent and sensitive reactions on the part of the teacher to the needs, interest, and ever-changing problems of students involved in the process of self-creation. In this light, methods should always be regarded as to be used for the sake of the student and his freedom--it can never be considered acceptable for the teacher to subordinate the freedom and individuality of students to any other end.

This does not mean, though, that suggestions might not be made regarding those teaching methods which would seem to offer the most promise for success. Existential learning situations, experimentalism and problem-solving, group discussion and all other forms of interaction, individualized student projects, and a one-to-one student-teacher relationship paralleling the method of existential psychoanalysis seem to recommend themselves here. It might be noted that the last method would probably look in detail much like the Socratic dialogue. For, essentially, it would consist of a question and answer method by means of which the
student (and often the teacher as well) is led to self-examination and consequent change of behavior. The lecture method would seem to be the one offering the least promise of success in such a theory of education. Though, of course, it could have its uses too—especially when the teacher is called upon by his students to act as an information source or to provide new or additional "tools" for their own use in solving problems of self-creation.

At any rate, no matter what particular teaching method is to be utilized at any given time, it is clear that it must be open-ended and existential in its approach. That is to say, it must always force the student to make a choice among plausible alternatives, and require him to accept responsibility for his decisions in interaction with others. And, no specific choice in any particular situation will be insisted upon by the teacher—as long as it is arrived at authentically!
CHAPTER V

AN EXISTENTIAL CURRICULUM?

The title of this chapter takes the form of an interrogative for obvious reasons. For, at first glance, it appears to constitute an internal contradiction. The question inevitably arises as to whether an existential curriculum is even possible, let alone desirable. If existence precedes essence and men create their own being, how can the choice of any particular subject matter or organization of concepts be justified as content for a curriculum which is to be imposed on children? On Sartre's view, children are condemned to be free, to make their own choices of themselves and their own interpretations of the world in which they live. As a result, it seems contradictory to assume that any specific subject matter or intellectual principle should be chosen for them, or imposed on them, as educational requirements. Existentialism in general, and Sartre's unique variety of it in particular, would seem to be at odds with the concept of compulsory public education.

If we were to concern ourselves exclusively with Sartre's thinking up to the time he published Being and Nothingness, we would be forced to agree with the above ob-
jections to the possibility of a viable curriculum based on his views. But, if we concern ourselves with Sartre's philosophical work in its entirety, we can see, as will be remembered, that he has changed his mind. If the interpretation presented in this study is correct, Sartre has opted for the practical ethics of Marxism as a means to the end of common freedom! To him, human freedom is too valuable a commodity to be left to chance. His analysis of history has demonstrated that our fear and repudiation of freedom has resulted in most, if not all, of those practical evils with which we are now beset. Obviously, he has concluded that we ought to act in order to change the world for the better. And, in his opinion, freedom is the only transcendent value which can make such a change possible for it is the only one that, in fact, calls on men to transcend the status quo and the context of scarcity. As a result, Sartre is quite willing to impose freedom on men, and seems to see no necessary contradiction between that kind of proposition and his metaphysical views. In a very real sense, it is the imposition of freedom that he recommends to all men. He is calling on them to impose freedom on themselves and others; to take individual and collective action in order to make practical freedom a reality in the world. As a result, it seems quite plausible to suggest that a curriculum designed to foster and nourish freedom in students would be both acceptable and appropriate in Sartre's view. For, a system of education which
forces people to be free would be in full accordance with his
latter philosophy of practical freedom. But, no pale facsimiles or rationalized substitutes would suffice. It would
have to be real and practical freedom which was being
produced. If any curriculum were to fall short of that ob-
jective, it would have to be modified or discontinued in
favor of another designed to achieve more authentic results.

In the light of these views, freedom emerges as the
subject matter of education. Just as, for Sartre, freedom
is always the subject of the writer, so must it always be
the subject taught and learned in the schools. All other sub-
jects must be seen as ramifications of freedom—to be used
only to the extent that they can be incorporated into the
curriculum for the purpose of furthering the study of free-
dom in all of its various implications. To the extent that
it facilitates this purpose, any subject may be incorporated
into a Sartrean based curriculum. But, any which fail to
meet this test would be eliminated, and none would be studied
for its own sake. Reading, writing, and arithmetic, for
example, would be seen as tools which students may utilize
to facilitate the realization and practice of their own free-
dom. The study of all subjects would necessarily be approached
in this way. On no other basis could any subject be justi-
fied as an element of a curriculum which holds practical fre-
dom as its highest value and final end.

It seems to be implied, then, that the most appropri-
ate design for an education in freedom would be represented
by the core curriculum. With freedom as the core subject, other areas of technique and knowledge could be intelligently chosen and related to it. They would be the spokes of the wheel, and freedom would be at the hub. The spokes of the wheel might represent both the constituent elements of freedom (as Sartre defines it), and all those aspects of human life and personality which tend to act as constraints to freedom. But, in a system like this, it would always be necessary to remember that the whole is infinitely greater than the sum of its parts. The total picture provided by an integrated study of specific subjects as elements of, or constraints to, freedom could never be regarded as a definition which encompasses freedom in its totality. Rather, they would be seen as constituent elements and factual constraints which cluster around freedom, and lead to an ever-growing sensitivity and insight regarding it. But freedom itself, especially as a core subject, must always remain open-ended and undefined. It must always be an open concept. To "fill it up" with content would be to deny and subvert it, for true freedom can never survive if definitions are imposed on it. Thus, the final end, highest value, and core subject of education must always remain an empty concept devoid of specific content. In this way, if consistently applied, education, hopefully, could open the future, and expand the potentials of the human race by leading students to recognize and develop their own infinite possibilities. Thus, education, contrary to most practices of the past, would encourage the student to
grow and flower into a variety of blooms, many of which are at present unpredictable and inconceivable, rather than expending all of its efforts in an attempt to prune the branches.

Sartre's concept of responsibility strongly implies that the curriculum ought to be child-centered in nature. Since each student interprets and chooses himself as well as the world in which he lives, the meanings of his education result from his own efforts. Any curriculum which refuses to recognize this by elevating subject matters, the good of society, or any set of absolute values to a rank superceding the freedom, responsibility, and welfare of students would be entirely missing the point of Sartre's thought. For, all such curricula inevitably deny freedom. Any curriculum compatible with the radical view of responsibility held by Sartre would have to be one which requires involvement, initiative, self-creation, and choice on the part of the student. It would have to regard the process of student choice as primary. As a corollary, it would have to lead the student to a realization of the consequences of his own decisions to himself and others. The student would be encouraged to gain a clear insight into the effects, both immediate and remote, of his words and actions. He would be helped to realize the meanings of his "sphere of influence," and, thereby, the extent and nature of his responsibility at the practical as well as the metaphysical level. And, in terms of his "sphere of influence," he would be required not only to accept, but
also to **exercise** his responsibility in interaction with others.

Sartre's concept of interpersonal relationships seems to imply that the curriculum should contain a high proportion of sociological, anthropological, psychological, and historical content. But, each of these studies should be seen as dialectical processes of human interaction ultimately determined only by the free choices of men. The fact that all human relationships are incomplete communications which incorporate dominance, subordination, and indifference should be made clear. The fact that all such relationships are reciprocal should also be clarified, and it should be emphasized that the "inner life" of every human being is thus guaranteed. In this way, the dialectical structure of human history and society would become clear to students, and they would be enabled to achieve a level of understanding unavailable to those who only assimilate the "facts." Thus, it is further implied that the interrelationship of various subjects within the curriculum should be designed in such a way as to interact with and intertwine around one another. The purpose, of course, would be to enable the student to approach education through a well integrated give-and-take process of interaction between himself, his teacher, his classmates, his subjects of study, and his own needs. In essence, interaction and integration would be the key elements in the design of the curriculum, and should characterize the relationships between different elements of the curriculum and between those who teach
and learn within its context.

The concept of existential psychoanalysis seems to require that a major subject of study in an existential curriculum be oneself! In order to study freedom, the student must look into himself; knowledge of oneself is fundamental to the knowledge of freedom. Thus, self-examination must occupy an important place in the curriculum, and should be singled out for particular emphasis at propitious times. It goes without saying that opportunities for, and encouragement of, introspection must be provided within the larger context of learning. The student must be exposed to opportunities to be by himself and to work on his own, as well as to participate with others. Thus, the curriculum must include opportunities for each student to examine the nature of his own original project, its constituent elements, the history of its growth, and its contingency in the light of the possibility of radical conversion. Examples of different projects and conversions could be presented, perhaps through the study of appropriate biographies, psychological case histories, and narrations of personal experiences by the students and the teacher. An abundant supply of appropriate reading materials would seem to be readily available in the fields of literature, existential psychology, and even philosophy. Existential novels and plays, such as those by Sartre, Camus, Dostoyevsky, Conrad, Ibsen, Kafka, and others would seem to be especially valuable for these purposes.
Sartre's concept of scarcity suggests that the curriculum should include economics and economic history. If education should provide students with a conscious understanding of the context of scarcity, and encourage them to make efforts to transcend or eliminate it, economics would appear to be a necessary area of study. The way in which material goods are produced and distributed should be studied. Successes and failures in men's attempts to overcome scarcity should be investigated, and students should become acquainted with the current status of the world in these regards. Thus, the histories of the rise of agriculture, feudalism, guilds, colonialism, industrialization, and electronic technology are suggested, among others, as appropriate subjects of study. As a result of these studies, students should become cognizant of the various ways in which economic modes of production come to be reflected in the ideals and practices of such social institutions as the religious, social, political, and educational—as well as in the structures of economic systems. And, they should also be led to recognize the all too frequent results: competition, class differences, economic exploitation and the like, as well as the more encouraging aspects of man's economic struggles. For, as will be remembered, the Sartrean view of history is scarcely one of "progress" in the positive sense.

In addition, the meaning of work should be made clear. Students should understand Sartre's (and Marx's) definition
of labor as man's efforts to fulfill his material needs in a context of scarcity. Immediately integrated with this concept should be that part of the curriculum devoted to the development of marketable skills, be they vocational, professional, or technological. After all, it would be immoral (and a violation of the responsibility of educators) for any school system to send students into the world unequipped to "make a living." In this writer's opinion, Sartre would surely agree.

Sartre's analysis of social structures seems to imply that the origins, dimensions, and organization of the seriality and the institution should become the basic subjects of the "social studies" area of the curriculum. A functional analysis of the institutions of society would seem to be in order here for the purpose of helping the student to "locate" himself, and understand the meanings of his actions in relation to society at large. But, he must be guided toward an understanding of such in terms of concrete particulars relevant to him. In a Sartrean based curriculum, no teacher can justify stuffing students with empty abstractions or vague generalities. 

A number of specific topics of study could be suggested as possibilities here. For example, the study of the seriality and the institution, in addition to the basic definitions and characteristics of these social structures, could

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*Note. Functional analysis is a particular school of theory and methodology in the fields of sociology and cultural anthropology. The works of leading scholars in these fields offer promise as an abundant source for educational materials to be used in this context.*
include such topics as comparative studies of particular examples of each, problems of oppressed minorities past and present in the student's own community and elsewhere, the structures of social classes and their interrelationships, the history of class struggle, and the history of education itself as the social process by means of which men throughout history have been transformed from mere biological units into productive members of the groups into which they were born. The conservative tendencies of social institutions could be investigated, and education as the transmitter and preserver of cultural heritage and social norms could be discussed. And, in connection with the above, Sartre's concept of the practico-inert could be investigated and analyzed for its potential value in illuminating all these various aspects of man's facticity.

Sartre's descriptions of the way in which revolutionary groups form and preserve themselves appears to imply a "shocking" suggestion: that the curriculum ought to include an area on the history of revolutions and social reform. His views indicate that investigations into the details of collective action taken in the name of freedom should be carried out, and that this particular area of the curriculum should look into the ways in which oppressed minorities have attempted to change their lot. Their successes and failures should be noted, and an analysis made of the authenticity of their efforts. After all, any revolution or reform at all will not do, in the light of Sartre's analysis of the group-in-fusion.
They must be carried out by people who honestly hold to common practical freedom as their transcendent objective. Social actions undertaken for the sake of self-aggrandizement, revenge, power, or material gain can not be justified on the basis of Sartre's concepts. The instant that an individual's or group's actions reflect any objective other than common practical freedom, they are in bad faith. It would be a mistake, in this writer's opinion, to think that Sartre romanticizes revolutionary groups. For, all individuals and groups are bound by the requirements of authenticity. Meaningless protests by the merely disaffected would probably not win his approval of the persons involved—though he might approve of their collective efforts if he thought the practical results were for a greater good.

Thus, the activities of current revolutionaries and reformers should be analyzed and plausible suggestions made concerning the practical consequences of their efforts. If education ought to encourage students to take social responsibility upon themselves and act for the elimination of practical evils, this area of the curriculum should acquaint students with the specific ways in which men both past and present have attempted to do so. Thus, the raw materials necessary to the inevitable choice that each must make between the only forms of social responsibility which appear to be possible in Sartre's view—reform or revolution—would be provided the student. But, the final choice would be his; neither alternative could be insisted upon by the teacher.
Though, of course, if the choice of either alternative were in bad faith; that is to say, if it appeared to be a rationalization disguising the decision to avoid responsibility for social action, or to indulge one's own whims or emotions at the expense of common freedom, it could not be accepted by the teacher as authentic. For, on Sartre's view, neither reform nor revolution can be undertaken for the sake of any end other than practical freedom for all, or, at least, as many as possible. Freedom must be extended to as many men as possible, and ultimately to everyone. That is the Sartrean ideal! If this interpretation of Sartre's latter philosophy of freedom is correct, neither reform nor revolution could be justified on the basis of any other objective!

In conclusion, then, it seems that a curriculum based on Sartrean concepts is, at least, a possibility. And, it is suggested here that the particular variety which seems to follow most directly from Sartre's views could be summarized in the following way. First of all, it would probably have to resemble a liberal arts curriculum in the sense that it would be designed to "liberate" the student, and help him to actualize his own freedom. It would also be "liberal" in the double sense that it would cover a wide range of subjects comprising a general type of education, and it would necessarily stress creativity. Of course, it would incorporate the natural and social sciences and vocational training in the broadest meaning of those terms, but these would be seen as peripheral necessities relating to the subject which occu-
pies the center of the stage—common practical freedom. It would most likely be a core curriculum incorporating as constituent elements all of those subjects necessary to the total study of freedom. As a result, it would emphasize flexibility and open-endedness; it would be dialectically structured and approached, and it would be child-centered. The subjects it would present as sub-categories making up a structural approach to the study of freedom might minimally include self-examination (each student's own original project), responsibility (including all of the ramifications of each student's "sphere of influence"), interpersonal relationships (their dialectical nature as reflected in such studies as psychology, sociology, history, literature, and the like), economics (economic history and the meaning of work in relation to the context of scarcity), development of marketable skills (vocational, practical, professional, and technological—with emphasis on the aptitudes and inner choices of the student, not the needs of society), social studies (sociology, anthropology, history, and psychology—with emphasis on problems of oppressed minorities, class structures, and the history of class struggle), history (study of revolution and reform both past and present), and, last but not least, all of those fundamental skills such as reading, writing, and arithmetic which make all of the above studies possible.

Of course, this list is minimal and tentative, not exhaustive. Other areas of study might also be considered appropriate. For example, the fine arts might be a possibili-
ty which definitely should be included in a Sartrean based curriculum. The creative process, as experienced in painting, drawing, sculpture, music, and literature provides a close analogy to the process of self-creation central to the Sartrean concept of freedom, and might well be a more effective device than any other for effecting existential realizations on the part of students. And there are probably many additional possibilities which would come to the attention of others who concern themselves with this question.

Suffice it to say, at any rate, that the purposes of this chapter have been to sketch an outline of a particular number of curricular elements which seem to follow more directly than any others from those concepts basic to Sartre's total philosophy; and, in the process, to offer tentative suggestions that might stimulate more detailed work on this subject by scholars more sophisticated in the area of curriculum planning than this writer. However, perhaps more fundamental than any of the above objectives, has been the hope to satisfactorily demonstrate that a Sartrean variety of existential curriculum is not only possible, but clearly conceivable! If this latter hope has been vindicated, then the major purpose of this chapter will have been accomplished.
CHAPTER VI

A PERSONAL SUMMARY

In concluding this study it seems to this writer that there are several points which should be briefly noted.

For example, it appears that the view of education which has emerged in these pages differs in several respects from most of that which has been written on the subject in the past. A Sartrean conception of education stands clearly in opposition to all of those scholastic, platonic, and behaviorist doctrines which have so dominated educational theory to the present day. Sartre's views most fundamentally repudiate these mainstreams of educational tradition by virtue of the fact that they refuse to recognize any a priori human nature or essence while at the same time rejecting all claims to ultimate determinism in the form of environmental, hereditary, or psychic stimuli. For Sartre there are no forces either external or internal which inevitably push or pull men in particular directions. To him, and to any theory of education based on his views, it is essential to insist that both knowledge and the self are created by each individual. There is nothing which exists independently of human consciousness and judgment; therefore, there is nothing--with the exceptions
of freedom and mortality—which ultimately imposes itself on men. In this view knowledge is seen as the on-going historical synthesis which results from the dialectical exchange between the individual and his facticity, or environment if you prefer. Education, like life, is an individual project which finds its origins in the freedom of the individual.

However, education in the past has usually failed to recognize or act on the above premises. Its conservative tendency has usually predominated and this comes clear in a Sartrean analysis. There is no nonsense in Sartre's description of education. To him it is the process by means of which the child becomes a member of the group into which he was born. The message is clear and unmistakable. Education as it exists for the sake of the institution, not the individual; its function is to institutionalize the individual. Its end is to transform each human being into a forged tool for his society, and it is aided in its mission by virtue of the fact that the individual freely cooperates in domesticating himself and his fellows. It is at this level that man becomes most thoroughly degraded in Sartre's opinion. Whether he realizes it or not, Sartre has condemned nearly every system of education which has yet existed. The implications of Sartre's views result in the most radical condemnation of education's theory and practice ever encountered by this writer.

At first glance there appear to be two major exceptions to the above description of education. These are John
Dewey's progressive philosophy of education and the practical ethics of Marx. For example, the educational prescriptions derived from Sartre's views as presented in this study seem to find a close analogy in Dewey's philosophy of education. But, even there, there are important differences which should be noted. Like Dewey, education and life are equated in a Sartrean perspective; they are seen as co-extensive and inseparable. In addition, the on-going interaction between the individual and his environment is posited as central in both views. But Dewey diverges from Sartre in that he insists on scientific method, or the method of intelligence as he terms it, as the criterion in the light of which men should order and evaluate their experience. Unlike Dewey, a Sartrean perspective sees both life and education as completely open-ended and creative endeavors which are always undertaken in the light of ultimate uncertainty. The only criterion is the extent of practical freedom being actualized. As a result, the method of science and the pragmatic mode of evaluation are seen as only two among many possible modes of life and learning, but not as the right or only ones.

If man is condemned to be free, it seems clear that education must be seen as art, not as a science or a profession. Neither life nor education can be seen as fundamentally other than a creative process. On the basis of Sartre's views one must say that man creates himself not through learning as such, but rather by means of the process of choosing what he will learn and how he will learn it. The inner process
of choice in which each student engages is forever beyond the reach of the teacher or even of the society in which he lives. There are no objective standards residing in either which necessarily impose themselves on the child, or which should be imposed on him—other than the dictates of freedom. There is no warrant for founding education on a democratic or any other clearly defined political formulation as does Dewey, for there are no political forms which are seen as intrinsically better than others. The only criterion for selection is the extent to which they not only allow but also encourage the actualization of common practical freedom. For Dewey the implication is clear that men ought to adjust themselves to their society and live for its sake—so long as that society fits his concept of Democracy. To him the "right" kind of society appears to supercede the individual. However, for Sartre the opposite is the case. In his view the individual is always seen as prior to his society and, as a result, is never called upon to live for the sake of anything other than common freedom. And to Sartre it is clear that the structures of society must themselves be judged in the light of the same standard. This is true for Sartre even if the social structures in question be Marxist in nature. He has by no means adopted an uncritical stance towards Marxism. In his view, Marxism must be corrected by existentialism in such a way as to place the individual back on the center of the stage. To him Marxist ethics are useful only to the extent
that they actualize and extend common freedom. It is on this basis that he has opted for his own corrected view of Marxism.

Thus, on Sartre's view, both Dewey's progressive philosophy and Marx's practical ethics must be seen as in bad faith if either is posited as an intrinsically true or valuable standard which is to be imposed on human beings. To him the only thing which can justifiably be imposed on people is freedom. For the fact of the matter is that while students can be guided and conditioned, they can never be ultimately determined. To attempt to force them into any pre-set mold, including those of Dewey or Marx, would be to attempt to teach them inauthenticity. In Sartre's view, it must never be forgotten that each and every student is a subject beyond reach by virtue of the fact that each and every human being is free. Thus, education is doomed to fail if it envisages anything other than common practical freedom as its ultimate end. Both the end and the means must be left open in order for freedom from practical evils to be intelligently pursued. In other words, any individual may opt for Dewey's method of intelligence, the practical ethics of Marx, or any other system; it is up to him. But it will not do to posit any system as being of intrinsic worth for such are valuable in the light of their contribution to practical freedom. No other criterion will suffice because, as will be remembered, freedom is the basic and inescapable fact of all human existence. Any view which works for this end and in correspondence with this
fact of life is appropriate, but it must also be self-transcending in the sense that it must ultimately become absorbed in a new conception suitable to a world in which the context of scarcity has been abolished. This is the status of Marxism in Sartre's view. To him, nothing that we now know is likely to be appropriate to such an inconceivably different world. All that he can envision now is that the new philosophy will be fundamentally a philosophy of freedom for that is the only perennial truth known to man. Nothing which can occur in the future evolution of the human race is capable of ever changing that for Sartre.

Finally, this writer must admit that, despite a somewhat pro-Sartrean bias, there is one aspect of Sartre's thought which he finds deeply disturbing. That is Sartre's insistence on the necessity for violence. Make no mistake about it, Sartre is calling for violence. He believes it is necessary because to him it is only through the efforts of men who form groups and fight for it that common freedom can be realized in the world. Sartre is talking about violent revolution and, like Marx, believes it to be absolutely unavoidable because those with vested interests will never give up their privileges without a fight. If he is right all chance for fundamental social change in the absence of bloodshed seems lost, but this writer is not yet willing to give up the hope for peaceful social revolution. Such an attitude might be in bad faith according to Sartre's definitions, but
on the other hand it seems difficult indeed to condone the cruelty which so often accompanies all-out civil strife. To this writer, it seems that self-defense is the only justification for violence. When the impossibility of changing becomes the impossibility of living, as Sartre has put it, then violence seems justified. It is survival which is at stake for the individual or group involved. But, in fighting for survival and common freedom, when does one step over the boundary between self-defense and oppression? Furthermore, is common freedom so noble an end as to justify the sacrifice of even a single human life?

Perhaps such doubts reflect an unrealistic and overly sentimental view of the world. Sartre would probably think so. However, students of existentialism will remember that it was over these issues that Sartre and his old friend Camus found themselves in bitter opposition. To the latter no cause could be considered sufficient to justify the sacrifice of a human life. This writer cannot help but feel a certain amount of sympathy with Camus' position on this point.

However, regardless of how any of us may feel about it, this issue is far from resolved. The questions of revolution versus reform, violence versus all alternative means of protest, and liberalism versus radicalism are all central problems for contemporary society. And, their echoes are being heard throughout the land. In fact, the very points over which Sartre and Camus tussled might be said to constitute the existential dilemma of the twentieth century. For,
the opposition between individual moral conscience and the dictates of law and order is probably the most fundamental moral issue of our times. Whether violence can be justified by either side is the ultimate question that must be answered. How it will be resolved is anyone's guess.
APPENDIX A

A TRANSLATION OF THE CRITIQUE

OF DIALECTICAL REASON,

PAGES 490-493

The son is born with an untranscendable future, that is with an untranscendable limit on certain of his possibilities: he is designated from a free act (the father has chosen this one or that one from among women) from the former generation and as a consequence from a linking of determinations which can be the object of a type of ordinate algebra. Does this really have to do with alienation? Obviously not--in effect the free choice of a wife in the first generation implies like its freely accepted condition the inert negation of certain possibilities (or if one prefers, the acceptance of the inert necessity of exogamy under such and such a form), and this negation itself is founded on the free production of a certain kind of mediated reciprocity. It is obvious that those characteristics (inert negation, inert possibility, lived reciprocity) do not explain themselves, at least not necessarily. In the very freedom of the choice of a wife, one reactualizes them and they are supported. And the debt as a constituted rapport of said man to woman B is the free production by means of the choice of a medi-
ating function between A and B. By a, A and B--debtors and creditors--are bound, and, in a certain degree, the power of B over a is power of a over A, that is, that he has the right to require from the group that the engagement taken by the common individual, who has--in his person--married a woman from B, be maintained. Therefore, it is concerned with truly free and human relationships (involvements, oaths, powers, rights and duties, etc.). And if the son of a marriage ab is constituted with a double character even before being born and whatever he may become, it is because he is at first--even before his mother's getting big--a determined possibility of the father and the mother, that is, a limit which is still only their limit and will remain theirs as long as the future child is only their own possibility. From birth, the upsurge of the child in the milieu of the oath is equivalent for him to a payment of oath: each individual who becomes integrated into the attested group finds himself not so much a passive object receiving his stature from the outside, but rather a free common agent placed in possession of his liberty (baptism, initiations, etc., have for a real function the reinteriorization of the attested function as a free oath).¹ We will return to this later: for this second oath has some characteristics [For us] to bring to light, and, more importantly, it is infinitely more widespread than the first. What is certain, is that the birth is an oath precisely to the extent that the oath is a birth. It will suffice to reproduce birth
artificially (in the initiation the group takes it up accordingly in such a way that the young initiate no longer distinguishes between his social birth, his birth according to the flesh, his powers and his oath: as a matter of fact the initiation is accompanied originally by proofs and sufferings, at the same time it is waited for and promised. The organic individual freely supports expected sufferings in order to pass to the stature of a communal (common) individual (that is in order to have and exercise practical powers). This assumption—manifested by its endurance—is precisely the second oath; it is certain that the individual lives it as an acquisition of merit: but it is no less certain that adults see in it the mark of an involvement (obligation). Everything goes on as if they reserved for themselves the right of punishment—in the case where he would want to leave the group—on the basis of this involvement, as if they planned on telling him: "Your impatient waiting for the initiation, your courage during the ceremony brought us close to you, you had the right to ask us to make you a common individual in the community. But reciprocally, in embracing us so warmly, you bound yourself to us: your ardor was a free determination of your future and you took up on your own the burdens (exogamies, etc.) which have been waiting for you since the marriage of your parents." Thus the rites of passage, like marriage, are bi-lateral and symmetrical ceremonies: they bring a reciprocity up to date. It is therefore impossible
that the child would not interiorize this anterior future
that has been constituted a priori, and that he would not
interiorize it by means of positive acts (initiation con-
duct, choice of a wife, prowess in war, or, if there is peace,
fight for power). That is what this very correct and often
repeated sentence still means today: "no adult can say: 'I
didn't ask to be born.'" Thus, finally, the organic individ-
dual grasps his contingency from each movement of his life:
that means that he is not his own product; rather for a com-
mon individual, his birth is lost in the upheaval of his libe-
ry, and the determination of it by itself. To be born, is to
produce oneself as a specification of the group and as an en-
semble of functions (burdens and powers, debts and credit,
right and duty). The common individual puts himself forward
as a new oath in the heart of the group.2

Footnote 1 - pages 491-492

That is what explains, in our time, the strange atti-
tude of many lukewarm catholics or skeptics (and even free-
thinkers). I call them catholics after their origin and not
their faith; but if a couple married in this category come to
have children, they have them baptized while holding the
following reasoning: "It is important that they be free:
they will choose when they are twenty years old." For a long
time I was surprised, I thought that this reasoning was hiding
a sort of conformist timidity, I don't know what fear. In
fact, it is a reasoning which, from the point of view of the
group, is true. Personally, baptized but without real attachment to the catholic group, it seemed to me that baptism was a mortgage on the future liberty (so much that very often by virtue of the same arguments, a child is given a religious education, he has his first communion, etc.). I thought that total indeterminism was the real base of choice. But from the point of view of the group (and these lukewarm catholics or still respectful non-believers make a part of it, the cousin is in seminary perhaps, the maternal aunts are pious, etc.) it is the opposite which is true: baptism is a means of creating liberty in the common individual at the same time that it qualifies him by his function and his reciprocal rapport with the others; he interiorizes common liberty as the real power of his individual liberty. He is carried, if you wish, to a higher level of efficacy and of capacity. It is then at this superior level that the parents wish to place him, so that he may be able, in all of his power and in all knowledge of cause, to decide if he will remain in the group, if he changes his function there (lukewarmness) or if he secedes. It seems to the unbelieving Christian that "the atheist from birth" is only an individual and that he can not raise himself to the level of faith as common liberty, in order to choose it or to criticize it, to the place of the believer who will have at the same time the experience of religious power in the Christian community and, from these doubts—if he has any—the experience of the inferior state of soli-
I recognize today that truth is neither in my reasoning nor in that of the respected free thinker. In fact, whatever one does, one prejudges: in the eyes of Christians atheists are lonely people, characterized by a simple negation; in fact atheists are also a group (with other laws, more lax liens, etc.) and the child must undergo the atheist or christian baptism. The truth, harder for the more liberal—but all truth is hard for the tender souls of liberals—is that it is necessary to decide, for the child and without power to consult him, on the meaning of faith (that is of the history of the world, of humanity) and that he will overcome whatever one does, whatever precautions one takes, the weight of this decision all of his life. But it is also true that it can only be marked in terms of the extent to which he will have freely interiorized it and to the extent that it will become not the inert limit that his father assigns to him, but the free limitations of his liberty by itself.

Footnote 2 - page 493

It goes without saying that we envisage the abstract case (or the elementary group) where the problems of exploitation or of class struggle are not manifested. We go slowly and find the concrete at the end of the trip, that is, simply, the complex ensemble of practical organizations interfering with the practico-inert and the alien-
ation of common action constituted in the passiveness of the series. Only at this level do the struggle of classes, exploitation, etc. take on their real meaning.
APPENDIX B

NOTES

Part One

Chapter I

1 See "cogito" in the key to special terms, preceding the introduction of this study.


3 Ibid., pp. 40-43.

4 Ibid., pp. 11-111.

5 Ibid., p. 111.


7 Ibid., p. lv.


9 See "facticity" in the key to special terms, preceding the introduction of this study.

10 Sartre, op. cit., p. 424.

Chapter II


2 Ibid., p. 530.

3 Ibid., p. 530.
Chapter III


3 Cumming, op. cit., p. 261.


5 Cumming, op. cit., pp. 266-268.

6 Ibid., pp. 142-143.

7 Ibid., pp. 143-144.

8 Ibid., p. 145.

9 Ibid., p. 145.


13 Ibid., p. 206.
Chapter IV


2 Ibid., p. 198.

3 Ibid., p. 340.

4 Ibid., pp. 341-388.

5 Ibid., p. 266.

6 Ibid., p. 267.


Chapter V


3 Ibid., p. 435.

4 Ibid., pp. 415-416.

5 Ibid., pp. 451-452.

6 Ibid., p. 452.

Chapter VI


2 Ibid., pp. 461-462.

3 Ibid., pp. 463-464.
Chapter VII

2 Ibid., pp. 474-475.
3 Ibid., pp. 476-477.
4 Ibid., pp. 233-234.
5 Ibid., pp. 477-478.
6 Ibid., pp. 478-480.

Part Two

Chapter I

2 Ibid., p. 492.
3 Ibid., p. 492.

Chapter II

3For a contrasting interpretation, see Hazel Barnes, An Existentialist Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 3-98. Professor Barnes argues that these strictures do not deny the possibility of an existentialist ethics.


7Molnar, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

8For this particular interpretation, the writer is indebted to Hazel Barnes, op. cit., pp. 69-97.

9Ibid., p. 33.

10For an interesting discussion of this possibility, see Anthony Manser, op. cit., pp. 263-265.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


