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PARTY, CONSTITUENCY, AND ISSUE SALIENCE IN CONGRESSIONAL VOTING.

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CONGRESSIONAL VOTING

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Peter Alexis Goudinoff, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1969

Approved by
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FOREWORD

In studying the policy process in Congress one may reinterpret existing studies of the legislature and perhaps shed new light on the process. Or, one can observe the Congress in action, either at first hand or through the mass media, and arrive at relevant generalizations. However, data gathered in these ways are subject to varying interpretations. For example, the observation that a legislator receives a heavy volume of mail on a given subject might lead one observer to claim he is being pressured while another investigator might contend that the mail is virtually without effect.

Accordingly, the investigator needs some sort of "hard" data, data that will mean the same things to different individuals at different times. This requirement considerably narrows the sources available to a researcher. One might undertake some variety of survey research, either of constituents or of members or of both; content analyze relevant documents; simulate selected aspects of Congress; or analyze roll-call votes. In political science the status of roll-calls as data is virtually unique. While scholars may disagree as to the basic meaning of a given vote, all must agree that it does exist. Moreover, each roll-call vote is deliberate behavior in large quantities by individually identifiable actors over a period of time and may be analyzed as such.

To be sure, one may dispute the relative importance of any or all roll-call votes. Political scientists are well aware of the importance
of teller and voice votes as well as the informal bargaining procedures of Congress. It is also well known that "Congressional government is committee government"—that the legislator's most important behavior takes place in the committee room, often behind closed doors. Hence, some critics might denigrate the whole thrust of roll-call analysis, pointing out that it has little to do with the policy process in Congress.

One must concede that a great deal of Congressional business is conducted outside the confines of floor voting. But this does not render roll-calls unimportant. Indeed, it seems inconceivable that they be deemed insignificant. At the very least voting indicates prior behavior. Just as the vote cast by a citizen on election day is the product of immediate pressures and his political socialization, so the legislator's roll-call vote results from the political pressures of the moment as well as his perspectives of the American political system. Hence, it can be said that roll-call votes are epiphenomenal. That is, they manifest some larger, more complex phenomenon much as temperature readings indicate the phenomenon known as heat.

In this study 3,250 separate roll-call votes are analyzed from twenty parties in ten houses and five Congresses. When we began we hoped to undertake a systematic analysis that would explain this aspect of the policy process with brevity, clarity, and finality. As an undergraduate we had taken a biology course wherein the professor said that if a natural process seemed to the observer to be too complicated, that there was an

easier way to do it, then it was safe to say that the process was not fully understood. In other words, nature finds the most efficient means to accomplish her ends.

We felt that this precept of natural science could be applied as well to political science. Accordingly, we made this research design as simple as possible. There are no epicycles in the design; control for type of issue, whether domestic or foreign, procedural or substantive, being voted upon. There is no attempt to control for geographic region, no seeking of generalizations that exclude the South. Moreover, there is no effort to select certain votes, whether deliberately or randomly, for analysis. All votes are used to find generalizations through aggregation.

A slavish imitation of physical science by political scientists usually draws rebukes, and rightly so. After all, a physicist can control for temperature and pressure, a political scientist can at best allude to the heat of the moment and the press of events. Gravity is a constant to engineers, but to a political scientist the gravity of an issue may be but rarely measured with precision and then only in retrospect. A chemist may duplicate the phenomenon under his observation without practical limitation, for the political scientist the opportunity for replication is rare and duplication is virtually impossible.

Yet physical science is not nearly as exact as popular beliefs often have it. The uncertainty principle as manifest in quantum mechanics has

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2The Encyclopedia Britannica presents a cogent review of Ptolemaic theory under the heading "Ptolemaic System."
been a fact of life for all scientists for more than a half century. In essence, it is empirically impossible to prove cause for any event. At base, particles are so small that observing them destroys them, hence cause may be only inferred. If it cannot be stated with certainty that there is cause, then it is only natural that scientists--behavioral and physical--will turn to probability in making predictions.

While it may be personally satisfying from an emotional as well as intellectual point of view to understand and explain phenomena, all that is necessary for complete systematic analysis is the ability to predict the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of phenomena. The situation is analogous to that of an aviator guiding his craft on takeoff; an understanding of how surface pressure on a body decreases as fluid velocity across that body increases is insignificant compared to the prediction of the airspeed at which he will "rotate the nose" and become airborne.

With respect to this study, the goal is to establish under what conditions certain political behavior transpires. The dependent variable is the roll-call vote, or some manifestation thereof. The independent variables will be party and constituency and the intervening variable is visibility of the issue. Larger questions as to the fundamental nature of the policy process in Congress are certainly of worthwhile interest to political scientists. As a matter of fact, aviators routinely are taught the principles of aerodynamics before they are taught to fly. But it should be clear at the outset that such basic questions will not be the focus of this effort; our modest goal is the simple correlation of phenomena in an attempt to predict behavior.
CHAPTER I

Roll-Call Analysis, 1901-1969

Because the primary methodology of this study is analysis of legislative roll-call votes, we first survey similar studies already in existence. To facilitate review, the author has constructed a graphic display that reveals at a glance the author, title, year of publication, Congress(es) studied, house of Congress studied, the independent variable(s) and dependent variable(s).

In all cases the dependent variable is a roll-call vote or set of votes, a roll-call being a vote on which the roll of members is read and each replies "aye" or "nay". However, few writers take the raw vote alone as a variable. Most often a scale is created using a series of related votes. These scales are either borrowed from conventional sources, such as the old New Republic Scores or Congressional Quarterly Scores, or are constructed by the author on an ad hoc basis. If scaling is not employed, it is usual procedure to combine directionally related votes (e.g., towards "liberalism") and take a percentage score for that category.

Independent variables usually involve either party or constituency or both. However, various manifestations of the constituency phenomenon are used. These are noted in the table.
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Following the table, this chapter continues with a brief discussion of each of the works enumerated. Summaries are reported chronologically so that one may appreciate the order in which ideas entered the body of legislative studies. Some works receive more attention than others, indeed the reader will discover that some require only a mention.

Although earlier studies exist, A. Lawrence Lowell's analysis is surely the appropriate starting point for a review of existing roll-call studies. Lowell's purpose was to compare party discipline, as manifested on roll-call votes, of American parties in Congress with that of their British counterparts in the House of Commons during the Nineteenth Century. He designated any vote on which ninety percent of one party opposed ninety percent of the other a "Party Vote." Not surprisingly, he discovered that a higher proportion of Parliamentary roll calls were "Party Votes" than Congressional. Indeed, if one were to use such strict criteria today, one should think the disparity in party loyalty between Commons and Congress would be greater than in the Nineteenth Century.

The next boost to roll-call analysis had to wait nearly a quarter-century. Stuart Rice discovered the existence of voting blocs within the parties and measured their effects on voting. Most noteworthy, however, were the techniques he developed for handling the dependent variable, the roll-call vote. Rice constructed statistical indices of "cohesion" and

1See for example S. E. Moffett, "Is the Senate Unfairly Constituted?" Political Science Quarterly, vol. 10 (June, 1895), pp. 248-256.

of "likeness." In this way, individual roll-call votes could be aggregated; moreover, sets of actors along with sets of their votes could be analyzed. In addition, both individuals and votes could be assigned ordinal numbers and interval values could be inferred.  

The same year that Rice's article was published Hannah Grace Roach wrote "Sectionalism in Congress." In retrospect, one can see the overlapping of the passing of one era and the emergence of another. Roach selected roll calls relevant to sectional disagreement within the nation and discovered that Congressmen from one section did indeed vote differently from representatives of another region on certain issues. Her methodology was quite simple, a physical correlation really, and her main illustrative tool was a map of the United States with the various areas shaded to reflect their representatives' vote on given issues.

The next year Carroll H. Woeddy published "Is the Senate Unrepresentative?" in which he investigated the frequency with which the votes of a majority of Senators voting represented a minority of the American population. This was a unique use of roll-call analysis, but not one that bears relevance to this study.

On the eve of the Second World War, L. E. Gleck wrote "96 Congressmen Make Up Their Minds." Concentrating on the vote on the repeal of the

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5Carroll H. Woeddy, "Is the Senate Unrepresentative?" Political Science Quarterly, vol. 41 (June, 1926), pp. 219-231.
embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act, Gleeck assessed the influence of assorted factors, including peer group influence, constituent pressure, party, and one's individual judgment on the outcome of that vote.⁶

After the War several studies appeared using dependent variables obtained from secondary sources. Three of these used the "Progressivism" index published by the magazine, New Republic; a fourth used votes deemed significant by the League of Women Voters. The first of these, "Consistency of Voting by our Congress," written by Brimhall and Otis, is unique in that it has no independent variable. The article consists of a scale ranking of all Representatives and Senators based upon the New Republic scores.⁷ Using the same score as a base for constructing a scale, Gage and Shimberg correlated "progressivism" with party, age, seniority and region.⁸

Chester Harris wrote "A Factor Analysis of Selected Senate Roll-Call, 80th Congress" using a dependent variable constructed from roll-calls selected by the League of Women Voters. He hypothesized that three main factors operated on a Senator's vote: his attitude toward foreign affairs, his attitude toward business, and a third factor that

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Harris could not precisely identify. 9

Samuel P. Huntington employed the New Republic scores in "A Revised Theory of American Party Politics." But roll-call analysis was only a means to an end in this case. Using district competitiveness, region, and degree of ruralism as independent variables, Huntington fashioned a set of hypotheses that are worth noticing today. He discovered that members with the most competitive districts (measured by amount of partisan turnover as well as margin of victory) had the most extreme scale positions; Democrats were highly "progressive," Republicans were anti-"progressive." However, one-party, non-competitive districts showed little scale divergence, regardless of the party of the incumbent. Because one-party areas tended to be rural, and competitiveness was more likely to be found in urban districts, Huntington hypothesized that as America became more urban, competitiveness would increase and with it a larger ideological gulf between the parties. He wrote, "the parties will strive to win not by converting their opponents but by effectively mobilizing their own supporters, not by extending their appeal but by intensifying it." 10

Until 1950 the science of roll-call analysis had been created by Lowell and given its basic methodological tools by Rice. Yet these were


the major contributions of half a century, and they were a quarter century apart. But as the second half of the Twentieth Century began, two students of V.O. Key at The Johns Hopkins University published roll-call studies that today stand as benchmarks for political science.

In *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy*, George Grassmuck carefully assessed the internationalist-isolationist dichotomy with respect to political party and region of the nation. His major findings was that party was the dominant independent variable. "Indeed the political parties create and motivate cohesive, responsible action on foreign affairs, and without party or some similar unified faction or association, placing responsibility for success or failure in foreign policy might prove difficult."11

Grassmuck acknowledged that party was not the sole determinant of foreign policy (military policy included) votes. He produced data that "...established sectional characteristics which transcen party lines on several issues."12 For example, he demonstrated that Representatives from the Northeast section of the country were more prone to favor increased military appropriations than were those from other regions. Moreover, Grassmuck indicated that Representatives from the Great Plains were rather consistently opposed to military appropriations.

In the same year, Julius Turner's *Party and Constituency* appeared. Today this work is the starting point for most roll-call studies. Turner


12Ibid., p. 141.
used Rice's indices for independent variables and took up his work where Lowell had left off. He affirmed that parties in Congress showed less unity than the parties in Commons and even the parties in the French Chamber of Deputies. He also demonstrated that parties in Congress were less unified then (1950) than in the McKinley era.

Turner observed that parties display greater cohesion on votes concerning procedural matters than on roll-calls relevant to substantive legislation. He found that "... a party's opposition to bureaucracy was almost entirely dependent on whether or not it controlled the government." He also found that Democrats favored labor unions, public power, and low tariffs. Republicans were pro-business, wanted a high tariff, and were less likely than the Democrats to favor financial support when wooing the farm vote. He also discovered that urban-rural conflict was far more pronounced among the Democrats than among the Republicans.

Turner maintained that "... representatives of the same kind of district, whether Republican or Democrat, tended to vote alike." He found that districts with a large foreign-born population had a higher correlation with voting for Democrats than Republicans; moreover, in the years 1921 to 1931, Democrats with a high percentage of foreign-born voters manifested less party loyalty than did Democrats with primarily native-born constituencies. In the years 1937 to 1944, however, ...

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14Ibid., p. 87.
the Representatives of the high foreign-born districts supported the Democratic Administration more often than other Democrats.

Turner's work is most notable for the fact that in an era in which the prescriptive literature of the field bemoaned the lack of disciplined parties in Congress, its author contended that party was the single most important determinant of Congressional roll-call behavior. He demonstrated that "... in spite of the small degree of party voting in the modern American Congress compared with other countries and other times, party continues to be more closely associated with Congressional voting behavior than any other discernible factor."15

A few years later H. Bradford Westerfield's *Foreign Policy and Party Politics* appeared. The author discovered that Republicans manifested a consistent "Coast vs. Interior" cleavage on their foreign affairs roll-calls. He also found that these coastal Republicans who had dissented from the party most on foreign aid legislation were more likely to support their party on other issues. Moreover, he observed, within a given region, no significant difference between urban and rural Republicans with respect to their votes on foreign aid.

Westerfield noticed that within the Democratic party the foreign-policy cleavage divided north from south and that midwestern and eastern Democrats displayed great solidarity. He also found that dissident southern Democrats tended to be less recalcitrant than dissident Republicans in expressing disagreement with party policy. In general,

15Ibid., p. 34.
Westerfield discovered that before Pearl Harbor, foreign policy had been an arena of sharp, partisan conflict, with Republicans opposing internationalist legislation. Then during the War and its immediate aftermath, foreign policy became a bipartisan subject in Congress. Following the elections of 1948, as the Republican party split over Far East policy, American foreign policy again became a matter of partisan conflict.  

In 1956 J. Roland Pennock presented "Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price-Support Legislation." Using roll-call votes on farm legislation as his dependent variable, Pennock found that legislators would bow to constituent pressure even if it was contrary to Administration policy; moreover, he found that Democrats were more susceptible to this constituent pressure than were Republicans. He also found that Senators manifested a greater response to constituency pressures than did Representatives.  

In an article devoted mainly to the exploration and dissemination of methodological devices, Charles D. Farris published "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress." In brief, he found

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that by creating a scale from roll-call votes, an investigator could classify Congressmen into ideological sets.\(^{19}\)

In "Are Southern Democrats Different?" Hugh Douglas Price used scales constructed from roll-calls as his dependent variable. His basic finding was that Southern Democrats do not form a monolithic bloc in the Congress. He conceded that as an aggregation they tended to vote more conservatively, but he pointed out that on only two of the fifty-six scales he had constructed did the Southerners approach unanimity.\(^{20}\)

In 1958, Duncan MacRae's *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* appeared. This work, like Turner's, has become a standard of reference for those engaged in roll-call analysis. MacRae constructed a series of scales from the relevant roll-calls to use as his dependent variables. He discovered that "... congressmen find it easier to be liberal and support underprivileged groups when these groups are far from their own districts."\(^{21}\) He also found that "...Democrats show a consistently greater advocacy of foreign aid than Republicans."\(^{22}\) He observed that urban Republicans who were liberal in "welfare-state" legislation were more likely to be drawn from the East Coast, that urban Republicans from


\(^{21}\)Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1958).

\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 240.
the midwest and west were more likely to be liberal with respect to labor legislation.

He found that when using the state (as compared to the congressional district) as a unit of reference, southern Representatives increase their opposition to race-relations legislation in proportion to the number of Negroes in the state. He discovered that urban Republicans were more likely to vote for civil rights legislation if the average income in their district was relatively low. He discovered that urban Republicans favored foreign aid more than their rural counterparts; moreover, he determined that participation in policy-making (i.e., membership on the relevant committee) made one more likely to support the relevant legislation. MacRae observed that "...Republicans...showed some indication of heightened responsiveness to constituency characteristics when they had narrow election margins, but...the Democrats did not."23

In 1959 George Goodwin wrote, "The Seniority System in Congress." Using Party Unity Scores from Congressional Quarterly, he discovered that Democratic committee chairmen supported their President less than did Republican committee chairmen.24 In "Evaluating the Decline of Southern Internationalism Through Senatorial Roll-Call Votes" Malcolm Jewell compared pre-war with post-war roll-calls, thus documenting the rise of Southern votes on foreign aid measures were markedly more negative than votes on other foreign affairs issues. Hence, he concluded that the root

23Ibid., p. 286.

of Southern isolationism was to be found in a basic fiscal conservativ-
ism. 25 "The Voting Behavior of Freshmen Congressmen" was found by
Theodore Urich to be not significantly different from the voting behavior
of other, more senior members when roll-calls of the two groups were com-
pared. 26

In The Congressional Party David B. Truman provided his fellow
political scientists with another milestone in the study of Congress in
general and roll-call analysis in particular. His primary assumption was
that power has shifted, in the last century, from the Congress to the
President. He attributed this mainly to the increasing complexity of
political realities coupled with the disparity between America's
heterogeneity and the relative parochialism of most legislators.

He found in the Senate that "The Republicans... were... less uni-
fied than the Democrats in both sessions [of the 81st Congress]." 27 He
discovered that legislators who vote against Administration proposals
form blocs to do so; the Democratic blocs had a more stable membership
than Republican. Truman endorsed the "middleman hypothesis" with respect
to floor leadership, maintaining that party leaders are substantially

25 Malcolm E. Jewell, "Evaluating the Decline of Southern Inter-
nationalism Through Senatorial Roll-Call Votes," Journal of Politics,
vol. 21 (August, 1959), pp. 624-646.

26 Theodore Urich, "The Voting Behavior of Freshmen Congressmen,"

27 David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York:
unallied from any particular bloc. He found that "As a group the elective leaders among the Senate Republicans were much less cohesive than were the Democrats."\(^9\)

Truman discovered that, while neither party's policy committee displayed a high degree of cohesiveness, the Democratic policy committee was more cohesive than the Republican. He also observed that committee chairmen manifested less party cohesion than other Congressional leaders and that "The Democrats in the House... were generally less cohesive than the Republicans."\(^30\) With respect to House Democratic voting blocs, he noted that ".... the Northern wing of the party was a good deal more cohesive... than was the Southern."\(^31\) He also observed that the dissident Southern Democratic bloc was divided into two sub-blocs, the "die-hards" and the moderates. Among Republicans he observed ".... no single and sharp line of cleavage such as that which divided the Northern from the Southern wing of the House Democrats, but rather a series of non-congruent lines which... reflected shifting and fluid bases of

\(^8\)See Eulau and Hinckley's "Legislative Institutions and Processes," in Political Science Annual, 1966 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966) pp. 106-108, for a discussion of the "middleman hypothesis" versus the "extremity hypothesis" for legislative leadership. In brief, there is evidence that indicates that leaders are more extreme than their followers; Republican leaders more conservative than their fellows, Democratic leaders more liberal than theirs; as well as evidence that leaders are in between extremes and act as brokers, or middlemen, when making policy with their fellows.

\(^9\)Truman, op. cit., p. 122.

\(^30\)Ibid., p. 147.

\(^31\)Ibid., p. 159.
agreement and, presumably, of association.\textsuperscript{32}

Truman noticed that younger, less senior Democrats in the House tended to vote in accord with the preferences of their floor leader and that Democrats who had endured close elections also tended to imitate the leader's voting patterns. He found that Republicans who had first been elected to the House in years when a Democrat had won the Presidency showed a tendency not to conform with the positions taken by their floor leader and had more extreme scale positions. He felt that one reason party voting lacks cohesion is that on a large number of issues the party position is not communicated to the more junior members. Truman also reported that state party delegations display a greater cohesion in the House than does the party as a whole. Moreover, the state delegations display greater cohesion than do House committee in their roll-call votes.

In retrospect it must be said that in the years between 1950 and 1960 political scientists were most prolific with respect to roll-call analysis. The works of Turner, MacRae, and Truman today form the starting point for any effort of roll-call analysis. Indeed their findings are taken as given when theorizing about the policy-process in Congress. In addition, the findings of Urich, Jewell, and Goodwin answer some of the many subsidiary questions raised by the overarching theoretical achievements of MacRae and Truman.

In the decade of the 1960's, in an unpublished manuscript by Francis M. Carney titled, "Ideological Groupings in the U.S. Senate 1953-1958 as

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., p. 173.
Indicated by Scale Analysis," the author reported that Democrats favor larger Federal efforts in housing and utilities than do the Republicans.33

A paper presented at the 1960 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, by Holbert N. Carroll, included a foreign-aid roll-call scale. Carroll discovered that the partisan base of American policy had been broadened by the simultaneous effect of increasing Southern isolationism and Republican internationalism under Eisenhower.34 Charles Lerche also investigated "Southern Congressmen and the New Isolationism." His effort was unusual in that his focus was on negative roll-calls rather than the "ayes," which are typically studied.35

1960 also saw the appearance of one of the most notable books on Congress, Donald R. Matthews' U.S. Senators and Their World. Although this work transcends simple roll-call analysis, of those findings that depend upon roll-call data as a dependent variable one was the observation that among Senators "...the Democrats achieved a little more party unity than the GOP."36 Matthews discovered that party unity is higher


34Holbert N. Carroll, "Congressional Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1960's" paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 8, 9, 10, 1960.


when the party has a majority in Congress, and that it is greatest when the party has a President in the White House. Matthews also found that "...once a Senator becomes a committee chairman and obtains all the power which goes along with it, he usually becomes an even less 'regular' party member than before."$^{37}$

When comparing roll-calls of Senators from the same state, Matthews noted that if they are of the same party they tend to vote the same way; if they are of different parties they often diverge, presumably because each has founded his constituency in a different part of the state. He also found that "...pairs of Senators from one-party or modified one-party states are far more likely to diverge in their voting than those from the same party in the two-party states."$^{38}$ Moreover, "Senators from the same party vote together more often if their state is highly urban or highly rural than if it is a state containing substantial numbers of both urban and rural voters."$^{39}$ The author concluded, "...there is a decided bandwagon effect in Senate voting. Most non-unanimous roll-calls are won by relatively slim margins; the losing side is usually quite large."$^{40}$

David N. Farnsworth, in "A Comparison of the Senate and Its Foreign Relations Committee on Selected Roll-Call Votes," found that members of the Committee tended to be less isolationist than the Senate as a whole.

$^{37}$Ibid., p. 164.
$^{38}$Ibid., p. 233.
$^{39}$Ibid., p. 234.
$^{40}$Ibid., pp. 254-255.
Interestingly enough, individuals become less isolationist after joining the committee than they were before. In "Presidential Leadership in Congress on Foreign Policy," Mark Kesselman observed that Congressmen tend to shift their foreign policy positions with a change in the Presidential party. Democrats who were internationalist under Truman became more isolationist, and Republicans who were isolationists became more internationalist when Eisenhower took office. (Four years later, when John Kennedy became President, Kesselman published additional data showing a similar position shift in the opposite direction.)

In 1962, Riker and Niemi published "Stability of Coalitions on Roll-Calls in the House of Representatives." This was an ambitious effort to bring together the descriptive literature on Congress (which has not been discussed in this chapter) with the roll-call literature. The authors felt that a perusal of the descriptive literature would give one the impression that policy-making in Congress is anarchic, while a reading of the roll-call literature leaves one feeling that Congress is a system of relatively cohesive blocs opposing to each other most of the time. The

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authors felt the truth was somewhere in between.\footnote{For a further discussion on this, see Eulau and Hinckley, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 112-114.} Treating the blocs as coalitions, the authors sought to discover the "swing" member of a winning coalition. (In Riker's coalition theory, such a member is the most "powerful" since it is his joining that brings victory.) Unfortunately the authors are forced to admit, "...the need for some revision of the model."\footnote{William H. Riker and D. Niemi, "Stability of Coalitions on Roll-Calls in the House of Representatives," \textit{American Political Science Review}, vol. 56 (March, 1962), pp. 58-65.}

At the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1962, Warren E. Miller presented a paper entitled "Majority Rule and the Representative System." Using the relevant roll-calls for his dependent variable and the degree of competition in the Congressional district as the independent variable, Miller maintained that "Legislative acts of congressmen from competitive districts are associated almost exclusively with their own policy preferences. The behavior of congressmen from safe districts reflects a more even balance between the two factors, but their perceptions of constituency policy positions are clearly more highly related to their roll-call decisions than are their personal policy attitudes."\footnote{Warren E. Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System," a paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 5, 6, 7, 8, 1962; p. 28.}

The following year Miller, together with Donald Stokes, published "Constituency Influence in Congress." It should come as no surprise that
the propositions presented were identical with the conclusions stated above. The works of Miller and Stokes are unique in that they have the opportunity to present survey research data on the district while doing roll-call analysis on that district's representative. Their work will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.

In 1963, Lewis Froman's *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* was published. A good part of the book is devoted to a comparison of election returns and demographic data. With respect to Congress, he first concluded that the Senate is more liberal than the House because Senators usually have more heterogeneous constituencies than Representatives. He observed that "Northern Democrats have more liberal voting records than do Republicans." Froman used roll-call voting scales from *Congressional Quarterly* to represent most of his dependent variables.

Froman discovered that when different Representatives of the same party represented the same district over a period of time their votes were decidedly different. Thus, he concluded each individual legislator's personal characteristics affects the way he votes. He saw that legislators voted most closely to the party's desires when they came from the most competitive districts. He also noted that "... the more competitive

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the district, the less likely are straight conservative or liberal positions."\(^{49}\)

1964 drew a flood of articles employing roll-call analysis. Lee Anderson replicated and reaffirmed Froman's observations on the changability of a congressmen's votes when different men of the same party represented the same district over time in "Individuality in Voting in Congress."\(^{50}\) In "Variability in the Unidimensionality of Legislative Voting," Anderson compared the controversality of issues with the scalarity of the votes. He found that the "...scalarity of congressional voting...increased as the controversality of the issues increased."\(^{51}\)

John Kessel in "The Washington Congressional Delegation" used survey data on the relevant constituency attitudes in comparison with the representative's vote. He found that constituents rarely have ideas as to how their Representatives should vote but that Representatives make every effort to discover constituent attitudes on issues so that they can vote their constituent's wishes.\(^{52}\) Brody and Tufte found that when Congressmen mail polls to their constituents, they follow the constituent

\(^{49}\)Ibid., p. 117.


sentiments that are reflected in the results.\

When Charles F. Andrian undertook "A Scale Analysis of Senator's Attitudes Towards Civil Rights," he observed that "Democrats cluster around more extreme scores (10 to 0), whereas Republicans make more moderate scores (6, 5, 4). Those with moderate scores tend to be somewhat older than those with higher or lower scores. There is a general inverse relationship between number of years in the Senate and scale scores. . . . as senator's margins of electoral victory increase, they become less sympathetic toward protection of Negro rights."\

Murray Havens, in "Metropolitan Areas and Congress," found that urbanization was second only to party in determining a Congressmen's vote on foreign affairs and defense and that urban areas were more favorable towards reciprocal trade and foreign aid.\

The following year Duncan MacRae published "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions From Legislative Votes." Although primarily methodological in content, the author reported that "... the Democratic party in the House was more consistently divided than the Republican. The degree of organization of the internal cleavages of the Democratic party increased from the 80th to the 87th Congress. Party control of the

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presidency and congress was related to the degree of dominance of the Democrats' major scale [or major issue-area], but not to the Republicans.

Clarence Stone rebutted Huntington's observations of fifteen years earlier. It will be remembered that Huntington hypothesized that the major determinant of roll-call behavior was the competitiveness of the district and that competitive districts had more extreme scale positions than did safe districts. Stone discovered that safe, non-Southern districts had extreme liberal scale positions. Moreover, "Republican Representatives from swing districts are conservative, but less so than those from safe districts. . . . Thus the 'two cultures' thesis does not explain the records of Representatives are more moderate in their policy position than are Representatives from noncompetitive areas." 57

In 1966, Leroy Rieselbach published The Roots of Isolationism. He concluded that Congressional isolationism could only be discerned with respect to the issues of foreign aid and trade. He found that these had, during a long period of time, evolved from a partisan to an ideological base. He also found that "... representatives of both parties from competitive districts have been more internationalist and less


isolationist than those from safe districts. He found that East Coast representatives of both parties were more internationalist on foreign aid than members from other regions.

Rieselbach noted that "Southern Democrats have shifted steadily toward greater isolationism and less internationalism relative to legislators from other regions on both aid and trade." He discovered that urbanism, ethnicity, high social status and educational level of constituents led to greater internationalism.

In Party Loyalty Among Congressmen, David R. Mayhew investigated the differences between Republican and Democratic legislators on issues involving agriculture, labor legislation, urban problems, and concerns unique to the American west. He discovered that not all Congressmen are interested in the same issues and that the two parties have different views of how to deal with this selective indifference. In brief, he found that Democrats deal in "inclusive" compromise, that is, members of the party with minority interests are accommodated by the rest of the party. On the other hand, he discovered that Republicans use an "exclusive" form of compromise. They regularly oppose the desires of isolated members of their own party. The implications of Mayhew's hypotheses will be further discussed in a later chapter.


59 Ibid., p. 113.

Flinn and Wolman found "...that Southern Democratic representatives reflect the demographic and electoral characteristics of main constituencies to an important degree." They discovered that Congressmen from districts that had voted for Kennedy in 1960 had higher Kennedy support scores in *Congressional Quarterly*. Moreover, districts that had not voted for the state's rights ticket in 1948 were represented by men who earned higher Larger Federal Role scores than members from other Southern districts.

Loren Waldman assessed the "Liberalism of Congressmen and The Presidential Vote in Their Districts" and found that "Congressmen tended to vote more liberally where the percentage size of their own vote was less than that of the President... This was found to be true of Southerners and Northerners, and freshman and non-freshman." However, he found this phenomenon to be true only of Democrats; Republicans elected to the 83rd Congress in the Eisenhower landslide of 1952 did not manifest such behavior.

In a factor analysis titled "Party, Region and The Dimensions of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949-1954," Gerald Marwell was impressed by "...the remarkable consistency of congressmen in their legislative voting over a seemingly broad range of issues, and..."

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through time." He concluded that the major factors affecting roll-call voting over a period of time were the decline of the Northern Democratic bloc, the Korean War, and the Republican resurgence under Eisenhower.

Joel Silbey is an historian who used roll-call analysis to assess the quality of historical politics in the period 1841-1852. In brief, he found that in the period studied, party influences were stronger than sectional influences. This contradicts the findings of Avrey O. Craven, a student of Fredrick Jackson Turner's, that, in the 1840's American politics polarized along sectional lines under the prodding of John C. Calhoun.

Another historian, Thomas B. Alexander, published a similar study the same year Silbey's work appeared. Alexander's effort was methodologically more sophisticated and covered a slightly larger period of history--1836 to 1860. Nevertheless his findings were the same:

The roll-call responses analyzed in this study point toward a remarkable continuity and consistency in political behavior over the years between 1836 and 1860. The effectiveness of the two-party system in ordering the work of the national legislature is evident. Although Democrats and Whigs differed with regard to certain aspects of this structuring role, the similarities outweigh the differences. Both major parties maintained a high level of cohesion and inter-sectional comity as long as a varied fare of public business could be served to the representatives. Only when sectional matters overwhelmed a session, as in

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1850, was party discipline impotent. As the Republicans supplanted the Whigs, some confusion was an attendant circumstance; but as soon as the new party organization was firm, the function it performed in the House came to resemble very closely that discharged by the Whigs before it. 65

The place of the works of Silbey and Alexander in political science is far from clear. However one thing that should be clear is the endurance of party as a variable in roll-call voting. Hardly a study exists that does not use some aspect of party as an independent variable. Silbey and Alexander show political scientists that this variable was equally strong a century ago.

W. Wayne Shannon could find "few straight forward relationships" between constituency characteristics and roll-call outcomes. Hence, he concluded that, "The behavior of congressmen is...much more complex than a simple reaction to constituency characteristics." 66 Shannon saw that sectionalism is a dominant variable in congressional voting as, of course, is political party. What interested him most were historical fluctuations in overall party cohesion. He noted that in some periods cohesion was quite high while at other times, including the Congresses he studied, cohesion was relatively low. He concluded that this was due to fundamental "party realignments" in the national electorate.


In Representatives and Roll Calls, Cleo Cherryholmes and Michael Shapiro built a computer model of the Congressional voting process. Using propositions gathered from the foregoing literature on roll-call analysis the authors found that, "The key dimension along which theories can be evaluated is, of course, the prediction criterion. On this basis our theoretical model has acquitted itself quite well." 67

The work of Cherryholmes and Shapiro highlight the fact that in the years following 1960 roll-call analysts have followed three basically different paths. One group has continued in the footsteps of Turner and Grassmuck, further refining the basic theory that rests on the correlation of party and roll call. Matthews and Reiselbach are the best examples of an approach that might best be thought of as "filling in the cracks:"

A different trail is followed by Stone and Mayhew. These scholars engage more in "armchair" theorizing. That is, they use roll-call data to arrive at conclusions that are not empirically verified or, in some cases, verifiable. The findings of Stone give one insight into the changing patterns of the American electorate. Mayhew's hypothesis that Democrats practice "inclusive" politics and Republicans are "exclusive" certainly gives one a different perspective.

The third course is drawn into the nether regions of theory-building. Riker and Nemi apply game theory to the politics of Congress. Cherryholmes and Shapiro build a computer model of the congressional process. Keeping in mind that the goal in either case is the prediction of behavior, one can easily see that success in either endeavor will be a big step towards the realization of a significant goal. Computer simulation seems especially promising. While political scientists regularly use computers to analyze data, in this case the computer creates data. Engineers commonly use computers to build and "fly" aircraft that exist only on paper, it would be significant if political scientists could "pass" bills through a simulated Congress before they were introduced in reality. 68

All in all, one is struck by the consistency of the findings of the various authors. All find party to be a significant, if not the most significant, independent variable. Of those who investigate the effects of geographical region, all find it to be of major significance. Where differences occur, they are usually quite minor. Urich finds that freshmen tend to vote like any other (non-freshmen) legislator, while Truman finds that a new member is more likely to heed the dictates of the party leadership. One might conclude that Turner and Truman's finding that Representatives from the same type

of district tend to vote alike is contradicted by Anderson's and Froman's observation that different House members representing the same district over a period of time differ in their voting patterns. In this case the difference is most probably of focus, and not of substance. That is, those who focus on similarities will find things to be similar, those who look for differences will find them.

One disagreement between authors cited in the foregoing review is that between Stone and Huntington. In this case, roll-call analysis was an aid to discovering a larger theory. The reader will recall that Huntington felt that urbanism guaranteed high electoral competitiveness and that this was related to a liberal voting record. Stone found that there were safe urban districts that had liberal voting records. What probably happened is that the nature of American society changed significantly between the time of Huntington's work and the time Stone wrote. What Stone saw was the emergence of the safe, liberal, urban district, a phenomenon virtually unknown to Huntington. The problem of sociological and ecological change often appears to baffle political scientists engaged in roll-call analysis.

It is normal to take demographic data, such as per-cent urban, and employ it as previous authors have used it. While it is laudable to replicate and build upon prior work so that comparisons are facilitated, in so doing one often ignores the changes that have taken place that alter the meaning of the data. For example, urbanism has, since Turner, been an independent variable in roll-call analysis. Usually it is operationalized by taking the percent urban data from
the census. The census defines urban as any incorporated place with a population of more than 2,500. It is not hard to imagine a day in the relatively near future when nearly all Americans will live in such circumstances.

More important is the fact that the fundamental nature of urbanization is changing. When one considers urbanism as an independent variable, one implies that there is a basic difference between urban and rural life styles. Until recently it was a tenent of the sociology of life styles that urbanites were educated, sophisticated, and wealthy while ruralites were uneducated, provincial, and poor. Political scientists inferred that metropolitan voters would elect a different kind of representative from that elected from the rural areas. But recently it has become apparent that the majority of city dwellers are ignorant, poor, and black. Hence, it is necessary to re-operationalize the concept of urbanism on two fronts: on one front, urbanism must be statistically redefined so as to make it theoretically meaningful; on the other the basic concept must be re-thought so as to make it relevant to the implications it has for the fundamental idea of representation. Yet the latest work cited in this review, by Cherryholmes and Shapiro, uses the same familiar demographic indicators of constituency without questioning their contemporary applicability.

Nonetheless, the foregoing works provide a firm foundation for building theories about the legislative process. In addition to the
aforementioned findings on party and constituency as independent variables, much work has been accomplished with intervening variables, that is, those variables that operate within the larger framework of party and constituency. One of the most prominent examples is sectionalism or geography. The writings of Grassmuck and Rieselbach are the most significant in this respect, but Westerfield and Turner make important observations as well.

Closely tied to the foregoing is the separation of certain types of issues as intervening variables. Those who focus on sectionalism also see foreign policy as an issue area. In addition to Grassmuck, Westerfield, and Rieselbach, Kesselman and Harris researched this field. Also related to issues are Anderson's and Marwell's findings with respect to the general controversality of the issue being considered on the floor. Andrian's efforts were directed at the specific issue of civil rights.

The influence of the President and his party was explored by MacRae (1965), Kesselman, and Matthews. An individual's position in Congress, and his committee membership, seniority, and status in the hierarchy, were considered by MacRae (1958), Goodwin; Farnsworth, Truman, and Matthews, among others. Survey data from Congressional districts played a part in the findings of Kessel, Miller and Stokes, and Brody and Tufte.

Hence, it should be clear that systematic analysis of Congress using roll-call votes as a dependent variable has come a long way
since A. Lawrence Lowell addressed the American Historical Association at the turn of the Century. Many questions remain unanswered, and even unasked. Yet we must take time to see where we have been before deciding where we are going. The stage is now set for an addition to the roll-call literature.
Building a Theory of Congressional Voting

The roll-call literature continually stresses the relationship between roll-call vote and party and roll-call and constituency. As the foregoing review of the literature has made clear, it is a fairly well established principle of empirical political science that party is the most important influence on a legislator's roll-call behavior and that constituency factors explain the variance. Since we were first exposed to the literature several years ago, and because of basic, democratic notions of representative government, we have doubted that validity of these findings. In brief, we felt that constituency is the single most important indicator but that this was never demonstrated in research owing to the inadequacy of the various indicators of constituency that researchers used.

To this end we searched for several years for an indicator, or set of indicators, that would correlate more reliably with roll-call indicators than did the variable of political party. In this endeavor, we were unsuccessful; some of our efforts will be discussed at greater length in Chapter III. But while looking we came to appreciate the obvious, that both party and constituency are instrumental in roll-call voting. The question then became, under what circumstances would one be more important than the other.
To find good evidence of constituency influence one must consult the descriptive literature. This is because of the aforementioned difficulty in inventing a valid and reliable empirical measure of constituency. The indicator for party is obvious, the participants are so labeled before they arrive in Congress. To be sure, the discovery and identification of voting blocs both within and across party boundaries does take a bit more intellectual effort (although this phenomenon is always documented on a post hoc basis). The fact remains that he who would correlate roll-call votes with constituency characteristics has a most difficult task. Correlating age, race, sex, seniority, committee membership, leadership position, or geographic region of the nation represented is child's play compared to the problem of correlating constituency with congressional voting. Indeed, the only legislative research more difficult to operationalize would involve correlating an individual legislator's personality with his vote.

In perusing the descriptive literature, the first work to be scrutinized is Lewis A. Dexter's classic, "The Representative and His District." Dexter felt that in general the constituency influence was paramount but that this phenomenon was tempered by the fact that a Congressman sees in his constituency principally what he wants to see. "A congressman's conception of his district confirms itself, to a considerable extent, and may constitute a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy."¹

He gives examples of members from adjacent, similar districts who take opposite positions on the issue to reciprocal trade, while each feels that he is accurately representing his districts' wishes. Dexter also points out that by announcing his position a representative affects the pressure he will receive, that only those favoring the announced position will approach him and that the opponents will not bother.

He also gives examples of men who changed their positions after hearing the views of constituents on the issue. For example, Lanham of Georgia turned against reciprocal trade after learning of the textile interests' opposition to the measure. Perhaps Dexter's most relevant comment was that "On numerous important policy matters [the congressman] hears nothing from his constituency."\(^2\) The same phenomenon was observed by Charles Clapp, who said, "Those legislators who decide that the best way to ensure continued success at the polls is to adhere closely to district sentiment on issues often discover that ascertaining the preferences of the constituency is not always an easy task."\(^3\)

Yet so strong is the wish to follow the wishes of the constituency that "In recent years, an increasing number of legislators are turning to scientific samplings of district sentiment undertaken by professional

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 3.

polling organizations."\(^4\) Clapp continues by pointing out that while the lack of a definite constituency sentiment on a given issue may give the representative some freedom of action, he runs the risk of unknowingly voting against a strongly held value of his constituents and thereby bringing an abrupt end to his career. Hence, the member's main problem becomes one of deciding how far to deviate from the standard interpretation of the district's position.

"In the lore of political science," observes a basic text, "as well as of everyday politics the belief is strong that legislators are heavily influenced by constituencies; in addition, at least among political scientists, the opinion is widespread that many of the difficulties of the political system are the result of the misplaced power of constituencies."\(^5\) No doubt some of the best statements relevant to the influence of constituency on Congressional behavior are to be found in works calling for Congressional reform. These books decry the lack of responsible party government in the legislature and lay a good part, if not complete, blame for the situation at the door of constituency influence.

For example, the provincialism of Congressmen is regretted by Samuel Huntington, who points out that "Congressmen tend to be oriented

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 179.

towards local needs and small-town ways of thought." He feels that this affects the quality of national leadership offered by the Congress and isolates Congressmen from the mainstream of American Thought. He quotes Senator Richard Neuberger as saying: "If there is one maxim which seems to prevail among members of our national legislature, it is that local matters must come first and global problems a poor second--that is, if the member of Congress is to survive politically."7

The main point made by these critics is that if a man must satisfy his constituency to maintain his political career, then he who does so will be secure in his position. Enter the safe district. In effect the Representative is hired and fired by his constituents; the leadership is powerless to enact the ultimate sanction of purging the recalcitrant member from the legislature. Concomitant with safe districts is the seniority rule in Congress. There can be little doubt that if the seniority rule did not exist, critics would have fewer complaints to direct at the "provincial" influence of constituency.

It should also be kept in mind that Congress's critics who cite the influence of constituency have as their target the weakness of party. As has been mentioned, and will be mentioned frequently in this study, it is apparent that the relationship between party and

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7Ibid., p. 15.
constituency influence on Congress resembles in some ways a zero-sum game. As party influence declines, constituency influence increases, and vice-versa. Hence, to enhance the concept of party government, the partisan must denigrate the influence of a member's constituency.

The call for more responsible parties issues most clearly from the late Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association. The authors of the report desired coordination among national, state, and local parties, binding caucuses, and the abolition of the seniority system among other things. They wanted the leadership to be in charge of the calendar and cloture to be invoked by a simple majority. Most important was the concept of coherent, cohesive leadership that would elicit loyalty from members of the party.\footnote{Committee on Political Parties, "Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System," supplement to the American Political Science Review, vol. 44 (September, 1950).}

Identical sentiments were echoed by E. E. Schattschneider who derided party organization by saying, "[I]t is like a Mexican army, everyone takes care of himself. When the enemy appears he may fight or parley as he thinks best. This is the kind of army that can be overwhelmed by one man assisted by a boy beating a dishpan."\footnote{E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), p. 196.} James MacGregor Burns sounded a similar complaint:

\[...\]in the United States we do not enjoy these benefits because our two-party system breaks down in the legislative
branch. What we have in Congress might better be called a multi-party system. Instead of a grand encounter between the rallied forces of the two great parties in House and Senate, the legislative battle often degenerates into scuffles and skirmishes among minority groups. On matters of vital public policy the major parties fail to hold their lines. They leave the field in possession of the pressure politicians and other members of Congress who are faithful to a locality or to a special interest but not to the national platform of their party.10

Party responsibility is not an end in itself for these writers; they want Congress to take action on specific programs. Were there in reality responsible parties that sought to block or dismantle programs valued by these authors, there can be little doubt that a great hue and cry would be raised about the "partisan steamroller."

Indeed, a further search of the older literature bearing on party and constituency influence in Congress reveals that such was once the case. Writing before the First World War, P. Orman Ray felt that the party leadership was too powerful: "Considerations of party expediency frequently appear in the enactment of . . . legislation of a distinctly and offensively partisan character."11 W. M. Sloan repeated Ray's sentiments on the power of party in the legislature more forcefully when he wrote:

This party organization. . . is constantly abused in the most shameless way. Service and reward, patron and client, protection and aid, the relation indicated by these antiquated


terms is itself not antiquated. In its modern shape, . . . the abuses arising from it are not noticeable. . . . Where this is true the party organization is known as the "machine," both place and money bribery abound, and the slime of the serpent is on every political and social institution. . . . It is therefore manifest that in both Houses of Congress the control of party organization is vastly more powerful and immediate. . . .

A more specific influence cited by party responsibility partisans is that of pressure groups. While it is true that pressure group influence is not the same as constituency influence, it is also true that most pressure groups operate on individual legislators through constituents. Dexter has illustrated such channels with respect to the Farm Bureau lobby; other examples abound. Milbrath refers to the phenomenon as "communication through intermediaries" and quotes a lobbyist as saying, "I'm convinced that the grass-roots support is the important thing rather than my contacts."

These partisans attack the influence of pressure groups as vociferously as they attack the influence of constituency. One author felt that if party responsibility failed to become a reality, the influence of business interests would continue to be dominant. Burns makes an

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intellectual leap that combines the roles of legislator and lobbyist. "Most congressmen do not wait for pressure from home. They take the initiative, moving to protect the interest group before any pressure is in sight. . . . They are in fact lobbyists, but they work at the core of government rather than at the periphery. They are the makers of pressure, not merely the subjects of it." 16

Although today the muckraking approach to lobbying is nearly non-existent in political science, Milbrath points out that " . . . the public and the press have a very lively distrust of lobbying. So colored is the emotional charge on this topic that few public servants would defend lobbying publicly. . . ." 17 Yet Milbrath's work demonstrates the legitimate nature of the lobbying process. Moreover, Representative Emanuel Celler defines lobbying " . . . as the total of all communicated influences upon legislators with respect to legislation. . . . Even if we restrict our definition to direct importunings of Congressmen, however, lobbying still includes all the messages by which citizens, individually or in groups, . . . notify the Congress of their needs and wishes. After thirty-six years as a target of such messages, I still regard them as the bloodstream of the democratic process and a sine qua non of effective legislation." 18

16Burns, op. cit., p. 19.

17Milbrath, op. cit., p. 6.

The reader can doubtless appreciate the substantial body of evidence that constituency, whether conceived of as a general phenomenon or specific pressure, has a major role in determining the behavior of legislators. But more systematic evidence as to the influence of constituency is also available. Miller and Stokes identify two ways in which the constituency may influence the Representative. One way is for the district to elect men of certain views on important issues, views that coincide with those of the voters. Another way is for constituents to communicate their views on legislation to their Congressman.

The authors found that "...the evidence of our research indicates that members of the House do in fact vote both their own policy views and their perceptions of their constituent's views, at least on issues of social welfare, foreign involvement, and civil rights." However, they find little support for the notion that constituency influence is strong in the form of constituent communications with the incumbent. In short, the Representative receives few instructions from his constituents on pending issues. This last should come as no surprise in that it agrees with Clapp's observations cited earlier in this chapter.


Worthy of note in passing is Miller and Stokes' reference to the Representative's perception of his district's wishes. It will be remembered that Dexter noted that members see what they want to see. This phenomenon is a general trait of human beings, one not restricted to members of Congress. The question here is, is it a member's perception of his constituency that determines his vote or is it truly his district that is affecting him? Is the influence really nothing less than the legislator's personality that affects his perception and guides his vote?

A critic might claim that the distinction is fatuous, that actual constituency and perceived constituency are the same in that any Representative who misperceives his constituency will soon be jobless; hence, a process of natural selection will ensure that all Congressmen accurately perceive their constituents' wishes relevant to legislation. Yet Miller and Stokes found that "The electorate sees very little altogether of what goes on in the national legislature. . . . Although perceptions of individual candidates account for most of the votes cast by partisans against their parties, these perceptions are almost untouched by information about the policy stands of the men contesting the House seat. The increment of strength that some candidates, especially incumbents, acquire by being known to their constituents
is almost entirely free of policy content." Hence, it would appear that a Representative could misperceive his constituency and survive.

In perusing the literature on party influence on legislative voting behavior, we see that just as it is ironic that a body of evidence relevant to the effectiveness of constituency emerges from literature urging greater party influence, it is equally ironic that empirical evidence of the dominance of party also provides evidence for the importance of constituency. The reader will remember that Turner found that party was most significant in predicting roll-call behavior and that constituency explained the variance. It will also be recalled that we felt that if a better indicator of constituency could be found, it would become the most important indicator and that party would then explain the variance. Yet even if Turner's findings are taken at face value, the variance is in itself sizable enough to serve as evidence for constituency influence in Congress.

Recently, political science has been blessed with a significant work on the party leadership in Congress. Since it must be assumed that party cohesion is at least in some way related to the influence of the leadership, it is to this work this research now turns.

Randall Ripley points out that "Most members...think of party before they think of anything else, particularly at the state of voting

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on the floor. Even if a member often votes against his party, he is still concerned with retaining the good will of the leaders and members." Ripley refers to this manifestation of party influence as "psychological preferment" and gives a few vivid examples of the discomfort experienced by deviant members.

In addition to psychological preferment the leadership has other tools available. For one thing leaders usually know the formal rules of the legislature better than the average member. Hence, they can take advantage of loopholes or certain quirks in the rules to further their goals with greater ease than can most. The leadership also has a rather large voice in the appointment of members to standing committees. They can affect the progress of a member's pet bills through committees and on the floor. Moreover they partially control the allocation of office space. Party leaders can also be a help in winning re-election; they may actively campaign, issue endorsement, or supplicate potential contributors on behalf of the member.

Ripley also feels that the leadership's central role in internal congressional communication is important. He says, "...Those who supply the largest number of congressmen most consistently with useful and reliable information...have a large advantage." Yet Clapp


23 Ibid., p. 8.
indicates that one of the most severe criticisms members made of the leadership is the lack of communication. He quotes a ten-year veteran Democrat as saying: "One disturbing thing is the lack of communication which seems to characterize the whole congressional operation. In both parties there is a lack of communication between the leadership and the other members." Clapp points out that this paucity of communication is bi-directional, that just as members are deprived of the leadership's views on pending legislation, the leaders are often ignorant of the membership's feeling on pending issues. It is a moot point as to whether or not Clapp and Ripley contradict each other on this point. It is quite possible that Ripley refers to that communication which exists while Clapp's respondents tacitly acknowledge the existence of that communication but wished for still more. With respect to party influence on voting, Clapp says:

In recent years both parties have been led in the House by men (Rayburn and Martin particularly) who firmly believed that the first obligation of a congressman is to himself and his district, rather than to his party. ("Vote your district first.") This has resulted in marked reluctance to enforce discipline against recalcitrant members, particularly if the latter can plead plausibly that their district's interests run counter to the party stand. The party encompasses many diverse elements, this reasoning holds, the future of some of which might be jeopardized if they were forced to conform to certain official positions. It is recognized that individual congressmen have more flexibility on some issues than on others and that the substantive areas of flexibility vary from one district to another.

24 Clapp, op. cit., p. 329.
25 Ibid., p. 325.
In addition to the varying flexibility from district to district on substantive issues, party discipline (or cohesion) varies as to the type of issue and/or the type of parliamentary procedure being used to record the vote.

The leaders of both parties generally have greater control over the behavior of their members on votes that have relatively low visibility to the voting public, the press, the political leaders at home, and other members of the House. Roll call voting on final passage of measures is the most visible. Roll calls on recommittal motions, which send a bill back to a standing committee, often with instructions to make specific changes and report the bill back to the floor, are somewhat less visible, especially if the motions do not include specific instructions, because the implications of such votes are more obscure to the electorate. Roll calls on specific amendments and procedural questions are even less visible.

Division and voice voting are often simply party votes because they happen so quickly, and because few members know the nature of the choice being made. As the members scurry from the cloak-rooms, many Democrats only want to know the position taken by the floor manager (usually the committee or subcommittee chairman); Republicans ask for the position of their contingent on the committee.

Teller voting, because it takes longer (and it is therefore easier to identify members are notified by bells located in their offices and throughout the Capitol and House Office Buildings, is subject to more strenuous efforts by the leaders to keep members in tow. More members are likely to vote on teller votes than on division votes are reversed because the leaders have time to call members to the floor. These exertions are rewarded by a substantial amount of party unity on most teller votes even by members who, if forced to a roll call, would vote against the leaders.26

26Ripley, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
So it can be seen that an individual wishing to devise a theory of congressional voting is faced with two strong competing independent variables. The influence of party has been extensively documented by the systematic, empirical works (e.g., Turner, MacRae, Froman) cited in Chapter I. The influence of constituency in addition to explaining the variance in the aforementioned systematic efforts, has been amply documented in the empirical, descriptive studies as well as the normative works discussed in this chapter.

Clapp and Ripley give a clue for the resolution of the problem. It is established that the leadership will not pressure a member to conform if his district demands otherwise. It must be assumed that the district will be aware of the issue at hand in order to pressure its representative. Hence, one can conclude that the *visibility of the issue* is a necessary condition for constituency influence to come into play. Ripley says as much when he indicates that party influence is greater on less visible matters. Hence, one can see the hypothesis emerging—that as visibility increases, party influence decreases.

To recapitulate then, one would theorize that:

1) Party is the dominant influence in Congressional voting.
2) Constituency explains the exceptions from this rule.
3) The determinant of whether party or constituency will dominate is the visibility\(^{27}\) of the issue at hand.

4&5) As the visibility of an issue increases, constituency influence increases and party influence decreases; conversely as visibility declines, party will increase its influence and constituency will fade in importance.

\(^{27}\)Visibility in this case is self-defining; that is, that which is visible is what the participants in the process think is visible.
Verifying the hypothesis next requires operationalization of the variables. Riker's Index of Significance was chosen to represent the concept of visibility. This index combines two factors, voting turnout and the closeness of the vote, and it also produces a discrete numerical value for each vote. Appendix A includes the formula for the index together with the computer program, devised by James D. Ryan, which was used to analyze the data in this effort.

The Riker Index was not chosen lightly and other avenues were explored before settling upon it. It may be worth enumerating these and briefly explaining the reasons that we by-passed them. Their difficulties, if nothing else, will make our selected indicator, more acceptable.

Approximately one-tenth of the bills voted on in the House of Representatives are considered under "Special rules" recommended by the Committee on Rules. These rules stipulate the conditions of debate, including amount of time set aside for speeches in the Committee of the Whole. Anyone with experience in the House recognizes the kind of rule reported by the Rules Committee as a sign of the importance of a bill. Eight hours' debate signifies a controversial issue, one
hour indicates a relatively routine matter. A "closed rule," one that prohibits amendments, usually indicates more controversy than an "open rule".

Our reluctance to rely on the kind of rule derives from several considerations. First, the measure excludes a few roll-calls taken under other procedures, e.g., District of Columbia Calendar, Suspension of the Rules, or privileges of certain committees. Second, most bills receive open rules and one or two hours of debate, hence this indicator would not yield an unique value of significance to every roll-call. Another way of stating this limitation is to say that it leaves lots of ties. Third, some rules are given for days rather than hours of debate, a maneuver that allows parliamentary tricks quite apart from other elements of importance. Fourth, the decisions about form of rules turn largely on the preferences of the Rules Committee, the leadership, the Committee requesting the rule, and previous forms of rules governing the same subject. Individual legislators do not participate in deciding the rule. Finally, whatever virtues the kind of rule possesses as an indicator of significance, they are limited to the House. The Senate has no comparable procedure, and we were anxious to test our hypothesis with data from both chambers.

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Another measure of significance might be derived from relative attention in the mass media. Construction of such an index certainly would be difficult, however. Congress is briefly treated by television. The newspapers that maintain extensive coverage of Congress have apparent regional biases. The New York Times is more interested in resolutions affecting Arab-Israeli conflict then in agricultural bills. The Washington Post spotlights District of Columbia affairs and bureaucratic organization and reorganization. The Baltimore Sun is attentive to issues controversial in Mid-Atlantic and Southern states. To undertake "content analysis" of attention to issues in local and state papers presents an obviously formidable task, and if the experience of the Survey Research Center in 1958 is a guide, a fruitless effort also. When Warren Miller and Donald Stokes began their national study of Congressional representation, they contemplated using local coverage of Congressional campaigns as a measure of communication about issues. The rare mention of candidates and issues, however, led them to forego any such attempts, even when they were working with a sample of 150 districts rather than with the universe of 435 House and 100 Senate seats.

The Congressional Record offers a single national source that offsets some of the regional bias of newspapers. Its content also is

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determined by the legislators' themselves. Nevertheless, the use of the Record varies greatly among numbers. Scholarly efforts to apply "content analysis" sometimes have necessitated excluding some members from consideration simply because they did not speak often enough or introduce enough entries for analysis. To the extent that Matthews' "folkways" of specialization and apprenticeship continue to operate "speaking space" in the Record over-weight the attitudes of senior members and under-weights those of newer members.

We also considered using public opinion data, as Brody and Tufte have done. However, polls are not taken on many issues, on so many in fact that one could hardly regard the absence of a poll as a sign of low visibility; some are phrased quite broadly and hence do not reflect the parliamentary situation, which critically affects visibility; and, owing to sampling and cost considerations, at best polling data can be examined region by region, virtually never state by state or district by district.

Among remaining alternative sources of information are questionnaires to or interviews with staff members or legislators. Whatever the limits on mail or person-to-person surveys in a legislature, such methods are too gross for recalling significance of many bills in several congresses extending over many years. Likewise, participant-

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3Matthews, op. cit., ch. 5.
4Brody and Tufte, op. cit.
observers were unavailable either for contemporary or retrospective rating of the significance of roll-calls.

Given these unattractive measures, we restored to Riker's Index of Significance, which combines two elements--attendance and closeness of vote. It yields a unique value for every vote. It depends on every legislators' decisions to vote or abstain, and if to vote, to cast an "aye" or a "nay". It is applicable for both historical and contemporary research.

While we must acknowledge that what is visible for one member may not be so for another, it is nonetheless assumed that such differences will be submerged in the aggregation of large numbers. The Riker Index enjoys an intuitive or face validity in this regard.

Consider the Senate and its 100 members. A vote that evenly divides the Senate, 50-50, would seem to bear many signs of importance. It would have the unusual effect of eliciting a vote from every Senator--no absences, no passes, no pairs. And the closeness of the outcome would suggest controversy. It is a truism of political science that controversy generates attention and raises the salience of the subject. Partisan elections and close elections ordinarily induce a large number of voters than nonpartisan or one-sided elections. Similar processes are likely to operate in bringing legislative decisions to the attention

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of various publics. The greater the size of the vote, and the closer the vote, the more likely individual and collective decisions of Congressmen are to catch and hold the attention of elites and non-elites across the country.

To be sure, occasional one-sided, even unanimous, votes—a declaration of war or an appropriation for defense—may bring out virtually every Representative or Senator. All want to be on record, and the near unanimity of the vote offers some protection to all who constituted the majority ("misery loves company" and "safety in numbers").

Yet such a vote lacks the widespread, cross-cutting effects of competitive pressures. It may be socially vital, it may be fraught with moral implications, and it may also possess other elements of importance and significance. And yet one doubts that a measure that combines the twin factors of size and closeness will overlook many significant votes. Conversely, without them, some highly visible issues are likely to escape scholarly observation because other ideas about significance are not easily operationalized.

There was no problem in selecting which roll-call votes would be analyzed; all were used. In this way the conscious or unconscious bias of the researcher in choosing relevant roll-calls was avoided (moreover, there is little need for tests of statistical significance.
when the sample comprises the universe). Discretion, however, did enter into the selection of Congresses that were to be studied. The 80th and 83rd Congresses were chosen because they were the only Congresses since the New Deal that had a Republican majority in both Houses; the 80th had a Democratic Executive as well. For an example of a Democratic majority with a Republican Executive, the 86th Congress was selected; no special reason suggested this Congress, the 84th or 85th would have done just as well. The 90th Congress was selected to represent a Democratic Congress under a Democratic President. It was the most recent complete Congress, but the 87th or 89th would have sufficed.

The 88th Congress was used as an hypothesis-generator when the research design for this work was under construction. That is, prior to commencing the principal research effort various hypotheses were checked using the 88th Congress as a test bed. We prefer this procedure to processing vast amounts of data and then gleaning hypotheses in a post hoc manner. Our goal is prediction; not post-diction. Results from the 88th Congress will be displayed along with the rest of the findings, but the reader should realize that as evidence their role is strictly subordinate to that of the other Congresses.

6A perusal of some basic statistics books will reveal that tests of significance are performed upon samples of data. Our focus is upon a universe of data, for a discussion of "Universe and Sample" see, Wilfred J. Dixon and Frank J. Massey, Jr., Introduction to Statistical Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), pp. 30-47.
Most of the roll-call data were supplied by the Survey Research Center through the Intra-University Consortium for Political Research. Using the Ryan-Riker program, the computer was instructed to print-out four columns of data. The first column gave the Democratic cohesion for each vote, the second one Republican cohesion, the third the significance score for the vote and the fourth column noted the identification number of each vote. The votes were arranged in reverse order of significance, with the least significant first, the most significant last.

After the votes were ranked in serial order of significance they were divided into three sets. They were trichotomized rather than divided into more numerous sets because the total number of votes varied from one Congress to another. Some Congresses (for example the 83rd House) have too few roll-calls (N=147) to allow a larger number of categories. While it is true that some Congresses (such as the 90th Senate) have enough votes (N=575) to warrant a breakdown into five or six subsets, others are strained when trichotomized. Hence, the lowest common denominator rule operates and all Congresses are trichotomized.

The breakdown was accomplished by displaying all votes on a continuum, ranked by significance. Then physical and numerical thirds

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7 We used the following formula for cohesion:

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\frac{(\text{yes votes} - \text{no votes})}{\text{yes votes} + \text{no votes}}
\]

The calculation is a part of the computer program in Appendix A.
were approximated. Next a natural break was found in the general vicinity of the exact third. Such a break refers to a gap in the series of significance ratings; for example if the numbers are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, the break comes between the 5 and the 8. Needless to say, this procedure usually resulted in groups that were of unequal size. As a rule deviations were permitted up to ten votes from the exact third dividing line. Usually efforts were made to make the middle, or medium significance group, larger than the other two.

Finally, the average cohesion for each political party in each set was tabulated and displayed graphically.

Throughout the foregoing operations the underlying working hypothesis has been that as significance increases, party cohesion will decrease. This is derived from the basic hypothesis that the influence of the party leadership on individual behavior will become stronger as the visibility of a given issue is diminished, and *vice versa*. In this case visibility is manifest in significance, and it is assumed that the leadership plays a dominant role in the creation of party cohesion.

It was originally thought that the corollary of the basic hypothesis, that constituency influence increases as visibility increases, could be tested as well. Unfortunately it gradually became apparent that it was impossible to operationalize the concept of constituency within the given framework. Virtually every conceivable demographic indicator was tried in the search for a constituency indicator for roll-call voting. As was mentioned in Chapter I,
the data for percent urban is obsolete because the census defines an urban area as any incorporated place with a population of more than 2,500.

The basic difficulty is the Congressional districts are not communities; sociological notions that are operationalized through demographic data lose their applicability when applied to Congressional districts for purposes of roll-call analysis. For example, a most common factor in this respect is the misleading data on population per square mile. It is not at all unusual to find districts with high urban populations and low density owing to the inclusion of vast tracts of empty land in what is fundamentally an urban district. By the same token, basically rural districts often have small areas of high urbanism, an apparent effort to drain some electoral strength from the urban area.

While doing research for an unpublished M.A. Thesis, this author explored many avenues in search of an indicator of urbanism. In addition to the standard per cent urban, population density, and owner occupied dwelling units; such arcane data as the number of bathrooms per person were correlated with the roll-call vote. In addition, the index of urbanism devised by Eshref Shevky and Wendell Bell was investigated.

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Briefly, this index combines the fertility of the area with the percentage of women in the labor force and the number of single family dwelling units. It proved unworkable, probably because Shevky and Bell were dealing with compact, homogeneous units, not Congressional districts.

Another effort involved correlating the percentage of women in the labor force with the larger Federal Role Score from Congressional Quarterly. It was tentatively assumed that working women would be of two basic types, women who wanted to work and women who had to work. In either case we felt that the life styles caused by or resulting from this condition would be reflected in Congress through pressures for legislation that requires a larger federal role. While it is true that in this instance there was a distinct positive correlation, it was so slight (.222) as to be unconvincing. What probably happened is that the difference between the district with the most working women and the district with the least is too small to be significant.

Another ambitious effort attempted to adopt the NORC Prestige Index. This index takes the percentage of people earning more than the United States median income and multiplies it by .59, adds to that .56 of the percentage of persons who had graduated from high school and then subtracts six. The purpose of this exercise is the correlation of demographic (objective) data with survey (subjective)

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data relevant to social status. It failed to correlate with roll-call voting, probably because of its incompatibility with the concept of Congressional district.

Initial explorations for the work now at hand included assessing data on the percentage of the labor force using public transportation, the percentage living in the same residence for the last five years, and the percentage of the labor force engaged in public administration. None proved meaningful. The limitations of this index, and of data on owner-occupancy of dwelling units also, is the incredible diversity of America. The incidence of mass transit usage might be a viable indicator in the Northeast, but throughout the rest of the nation, especially the south and west, the cities are newer and have reached maturity in the automobile age. Statistics on the percentage of public administrators in the labor force were tried as indicative of urbanization because urban areas presumably need more administration than do rural areas. Certain areas had abnormally high percentages; for example, any district that encompassed a state capital, the districts surrounding Washington, D.C., and districts that had large federal installations, quite apart from their indigenous characteristics.

The concept of mobility was operationalized through the measurement of the proportion of citizens who lived in the same residence at the time of the census as they had five years previously. We quickly learned the extent of our fellow Americans' physical mobility. The most stable district had sixty percent living in
the same residence for five years. Alaska had less than twenty-three percent who had not moved in five years. Districts in California manifested the influence of the suburban subdivider by having but a third of its citizens living in the same place for more than half a decade.

The relevance of mobility, fertility, and working women as well as ideal on average incomes and education all come from suggestions by Louis Wirth. He not only felt these indicated urbanism, he claimed that city people were fundamentally different in their attitudes towards government, morality, tradition, religion and in their tolerance of ambiguity. Succeeding political scientists, and some sociologists, have taken these assumptions as given. Yet today the nature of the city has undergone a complete change. For example, the observation that cities have lower birth rates than rural areas is belied by the population explosion in the Black ghettos. The higher median incomes and education once found in the cities have disappeared as the white middle class has fled to suburbia. Urban and urbane are no longer synonymous in America.

This change is amply documented in the popular as well as scholarly literature. Indeed, the nation's most popular news


12For example see, Robert S. Friedman, "The Urban-Rural Conflict Revisited," Western Political Quarterly, vol. 14 (June, 1961), pp
magazines, *Time* and *Newsweek*, have recently added sections on urban affairs. The problem for political scientists then is to re-evaluate the use of urbanism as a variable in a roll-call analysis. If it is not disregarded in favor of something as yet not thought of, at the very least it must be re-operationalized.

Insofar as this research is concerned the implication of the foregoing observations is that any constituency influence on the roll-call process must be inferred. As has been pointed out in Chapters I and II, the literature in the field of roll-call analysis presents a decisive body of evidence to indicate that party is the single most important indicator of Congressional voting and that constituency forces explain most of the variance. Thus it is reasonable to assume that as party influence, as manifest in party cohesion, decreases constituency pressures explain in large part of that decrease.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\)In passing, reference must be made to one other, non-demographic, constituency characteristic, that is, inter-party competition. Froman, Huntington, MacRae, and Miller use district electoral competitiveness as an independent variable in roll-call analysis. Caution must be used in adopting electoral data as indicators of constituency. It would seem that one short step would have one designating the propensity to vote Democratic as a constituency characteristic. Of course, these authors have demonstrated that competitiveness is correlated in some way with Congressional voting. But one wonders if the competitiveness itself is not a manifestation of some demographic variable. And even if it is not, it would seem that the major effect on a Representative is emotional rather than intellectual--he is scared. Builders of theories of Congressional voting should act as if they were creating a theory of war; do not focus overmuch on the fear of warriors.
Keeping in mind that the working hypothesis contends that as significance increases, party cohesion will decrease, focus is first directed upon the most recent Congress, the 90th.

Figure 1
U. S. Senate, 90th Congress

Average Cohesion: Democrats .675; Republicans .671. (N=575)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significance</th>
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<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>(N=204)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.505</td>
<td>.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=189)</td>
<td>(N=189)</td>
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<td>.825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=202)</td>
<td>(N=202)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Graph showing Cohesion vs. Significance for Democrats and Republicans]
Figure 2

U. S. House of Representatives, 90th Congress

Average Cohesion: Democrats .557; Republicans .565. (N=478)

High Significance: Democrats .445; Republicans .537. (N=150)
Medium Significance: Democrats .641; Republicans .566. (N=173)
Low Significance: Democrats .925; Republicans .917. (N=155)

Democrats

Republicans

Cohesion .6

Cohesion .6

1.

1.

.9

.9

.8

.8

.7

.7

.6

.6

.5

.5

.4

.4

.3

.3

.2

.2

.1

.1

high—medium—low

high—medium—low

Significance

Significance

It is obvious that if this Congress were to be the proof of the pudding, so to speak, the hypothesis would be completely vindicated. The
90th Senate especially displays the type of conformity that can only gladden a scholar's soul. However, the reader is invited to devote closer attention to the data for the 90th House. In so doing he will no doubt discover that while the House Democrats continue to manifest remarkable conformity to the working hypothesis, their Republican counterparts evince a separation of but .29 between their average medium significance votes and their high significance votes. Hence, the reader should be alert to the possibility of an emergent tendency on the part of the Republicans to deviate from the hypothesis.

Turning to the 88th Congress, it becomes apparent that this possibility has become reality. (See Figures 3 and 4) The Senate Republicans of the 88th Congress repeat the pattern of the House Republicans in the 90th. More importantly, the 88th House Republicans display a deviance so great as to shake the very foundations of the basic Hypothesis. While it is true that both Senate and House Democrats manifest conformity, it is the deviance that naturally attracts the attention of even the casual observer.

What causes this deviance? One should not be surprised if one's first inclination is to abandon the hypothesis. Yet this cannot be so. Not only is there a firm, albeit non-empirical, foundation for the hypothesis, there is also a demonstrated conformity to it, a conformity that is more frequent in its occurrence than nonconformity. Moreover, the Republican deviance in the 88th House is centered around the votes of medium significance. Hence, if one were to ignore the data
For medium significance votes, one would conclude that the House Republicans in the 88th Congress conform to the hypothesis.

**Figure 3**

U. S. Senate, 88th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohesion Level</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Cohesion</td>
<td>.521</td>
<td>.578</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Significance</td>
<td>.388</td>
<td>.507</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Significance</td>
<td>.463</td>
<td>.523</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Significance</td>
<td>.697</td>
<td>.705</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Graph showing cohesion levels for Democrats and Republicans](image)
Figure 4

U. S. House of Representatives, 88th Congress

Average Cohesion: Democrats .729; Republicans .666. (N=232)

High Significance: Democrats .621; Republicans .724. (N=70)
Medium Significance: Democrats .670; Republicans .451. (N=83)
Low Significance: Democrats .909; Republicans .804. (N=79)
So the question remains, why do the Republicans not conform? Perhaps the Republicans are simply unaware of what is significant. Perhaps they are still fighting battles of the New Deal while history and the real world have passed them by. However much this explanation might be supported the popular media, it smacks a bit too much of partisanship to be cited as a primary factor in any scholarly discussion. Another explanation would hold that the Republican leadership, cognizant of its minority position, would attempt at time and places of its own choosing to gain an occasional minor legislative victory. In effect, the leadership would marshall its forces at opportune times for major push. (When such times might occur would not necessarily be bound by the parameter of issue visibility.) Hence, such thrusts might easily upset the predictions of political scientists relevant to the relationship between significance and cohesion. A final possibility would hold that the Republicans are far more "doctrinaire" than are the Democrats; they display high cohesion under conditions of high significance while their pragmatic foe follow the dictates of their constituencies.

In any event, someone wishing to solve the riddle of the Republican deviance will have to investigate the content of the specific roll-calls involved. It should be kept in mind that there are two facets to this non-conformity: on the one side, the Republican cohesion for votes of high significance is higher than predicted, on the other the average cohesion for votes of medium significance is
abnormally low. Any examination of the roll-calls in question will have to focus on measures of low cohesion as well as high.

Turning first to those votes of high significance on which Republicans displayed higher than average cohesion (overall cohesion is .666 in this case), one first observers that 43 out of a possible 70 measures meet this criterion. An enumeration of all 43 issues will be found in Appendix B. In perusing this list one sees that seven of the votes were directly related to the raising of the ceiling of the national debt. Another three involved measures to refuse trade or aid to nations that were considered to be dominated by communist governments. There can be little doubt that the foregoing measures have little substance but have symbolic import; yet they comprise nearly one quarter of the deviant Republican votes.

Another ten votes embodied a Republican wish to cut government spending for foreign aid, space exploration, library construction, and aid to higher education, as well as efforts to block funds for a food stamp program. So it can be said that another quarter of the non-conforming Republican votes were devoted to cutting federal expenditures. While it is obvious that these votes have more substantive significance than votes on the national debt, it should be equally obvious that they manifest a dominant Republican norm more than they indicate substantial disagreement over policy alternatives.

Mayhew alludes to this norm in his discussion of the "exclusive" strategy of the Republicans in Congress. He observed that "...
Republican leadership responded to the legislative demands of each [Republican] minority by mobilizing the rest of the party to oppose them. City Republicans joined colleagues from the traditional 'heartland' in voting against farm bills; Farm Belt members joined members from the 'heartland' in opposing housing bills. . . .

Of course, there are 23 votes of high significance on which the Republicans displayed a higher than average cohesion that do not fall into the above categorization: For instance three votes involved the enlargement of the House Committee on Rules, a contentious issue of substantive political impact. Other votes involved agricultural policy and one would expect those measures to fall into traditional patterns suggested by Jones and Pennock. While these last are indeed traditional behavioral patterns, they are more of substance than of style.

Yet one cannot avoid the feeling that if nearly one-half of the roll-calls in question have largely symbolic meaning in the context of American politics, the Republican deviance can be explained in terms

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14Mayhew, op. cit., p. 155.

of perspective. No doubt the term "ideology" is not applicable in this instance; ideology connotes a consistent, stable, and comprehensive belief system, something akin to Marxist communism or any other formal religion. In the case of the House Republicans, the phenomenon is better seen as a system of beliefs and norms that approaches Weber's Protestant Ethic. Nonetheless, whether ethic or ideology, sentiment or perspective, there is a recognizable pattern to the Republican deviance.

Of course, one can also say that only half of the deviant votes could be explained in this manner. Since the significance of the phenomenon in this case rests within the judgment of the investigator and empirical measures of significance are not applicable, the concept of significance becomes purely relational. Hence, one must compare this group of issues with another, one which does not reflect deviance in the direction of high party cohesion. To this end, a list of these votes of medium significance on which Republican representatives displayed a lower than average cohesion is found in Appendix C.

There are 83 votes in the medium significance group and on 58 of them the Republicans displayed a lower than average cohesion. In

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16In Lasswell and Kaplan's Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), "perspective" is defined as "a pattern of identifications, demands, and expectations" (p. 25). In this instance, identification refers to group possession of, or desire for, a set of values. Demands are directed towards those values, as are expectations. In terms of our research them, the Republicans possess a certain perspective or expectation towards government that manifests itself on roll-call votes that have little but symbolic importance.
scanning this list, one finds few of the purely symbolic measures that were sprinkled through the high significance group of votes; no cohesive stands on the national debt's ceiling, no issues made of any form of aid on trade with communist countries. Moreover there were few attempts to cut funds for existing programs. In the high significance group, cutting usually took the form of a motion to recommit with instructions to resubmit the bill with a lower appropriation or authorization, yet there were no such votes in the medium significance group. To be sure, there were votes on final passage of important bills, as well as votes on adoption of conference reports and motions to recommit entire bills.

It would seem that non-partisanship dominated this group; probably the most controversial measures involved the importation of Mexican labor, the Housing Act of 1964, and The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. In this medium significance group, the norm for non-procedural measures appears to be embodied in the Clean Air Act or the establishment of a National Council on the Arts. Hence, it seems safe to say that the Republican deviance towards high cohesion on votes of high significance is related to measures of high doctrinal content, while the deviance towards low cohesion on matters of medium significance can be correlated to the virtual absence of symbolic, sentimental issues.

Now that the deviant votes have been identified as to type, it behooves us to identify the cause of the deviance. One alternative
would hold that the representatives in question are the recipients of a particular confluence of constituency pressure and leadership demands. In other words, the Republicans have constituencies that demand they do all in their power to stop the rise of the national debt, prevent any aid or trade with communist countries, and cut governmental expenditures as much as is possible. There is no way at present to assess the true temper of the constituency in this respect. It would seem that survey research of the district or the Congressman would be most relevant, with Congressional mail running a distant second. In any event, this avenue is closed, owing to the physical limitations imposed upon this research.

This author feels that the source of the nonconformity lies in the Republicans' minority status. In Congress a minority has no responsibility for producing policy. The majority party is charged with the burden of making policy for the entire United States. A member of that party is subject to cross-pressure from his leadership and his concept of duty to the nation. While it would be grossly unfair to claim that minority members lack a sense of national duty, the fact remains that such members have more options than do the members of the majority.

17 The limitations on assessing the impact of the mail on a Representative's behavior is amply documented by Dexter, op. cit.

18 An unpublished article casts doubt upon the continued effectiveness of survey interviewing in Congress because of the increasing crush of business coupled with legislators' increasing antipathy towards interviews; Robinson and Ryan, "Survey Interviewing Among Members of Congress: A Supplementary Note on Comparative Merits of Professional and Non-Professional Interviews," Columbus, 1969.
The minority member first, of course, serves his constituents; but then he is free to adopt either the mantle of the loyal opposition or of the political gadfly. Free of the responsibility of governing, the minority member may wave the flag, criticize policy, or make virtually any new recommendation without fear of having to suffer the consequences.

We regard the Republican votes on the national debt as a particularly good manifestation of this phenomenon. A certain central Ohio Republican Congressman regularly calls for the retirement of the national debt. He can do so without fear of the realities of the American economy because he is not now, and probably never will be, responsible for Treasury policy. The phenomenon of an opposition party coming to power and learning to regret its criticisms of the policies of its late opponents, while at the same time wishing it had never proposed some of the alternatives that it did, is not rare to the American scene. The best example of this is probably the Eisenhower-Dulles critique of the Truman Administration's policy of containment and their advocacy of "rollback." Upon assuming office containment suddenly seemed eminently practical and rollback a bit too expensive.19 Similar examples would include Kennedy's complaints about a Republican "missile-gap" and Nixon's promise to abolish Johnson's 10% surtax.

19 For an example of this phenomenon in Congress see Kesselman (1961 and 1965), opus. cit.
Both the 90th and the 88th Congresses were led by a Democratic majority serving with a Democratic President. The 86th was a Democratic Congress serving with a Republican Administration.

For this period the data for the Senate conformed to the hypothesis for both parties. However, the Republican Senators have almost identical cohesion scores for votes of both high and medium significance. It seems likely that this phenomenon is a result of the same factors that are related to the extreme deviance of the House Republicans in the 90th and 88th Congresses.
Figure 5

U.S. Senate, 86th Congress

Average Cohesion: Democrats .547; Republicans .624. (N=422)

High Significance: Democrats .352; Republicans .517. (N=127)

Medium Significance: Democrats .502; Republicans .518. (N=157)

Low Significance: Democrats .863; Republicans .835. (N=138)
Figure 6

U. S. House of Representatives, 86th Congress

Average Cohesion: Democrats .625; Republicans .623. (N=180)

High Significance: Democrats .438; Republicans .635. (N=58)
Medium Significance: Democrats .581; Republicans .529. (N=65)
Low Significance: Democrats .854; Republicans .716. (N=57)
Likewise in the 86th House data, one sees that the pattern of the 88th House repeated; hence, one can conclude that the party of the President bears no relation, at least in this case, to conformity to the basic hypothesis.

However, the substance of those votes of high significance on which Republican Representatives display higher than average cohesion is quite different under a Republican President than it is with a Democratic Chief Executive. (A complete list of these bills will be found in Appendix D.) The most striking thing about this list is the absence of those purely symbolic measures that peppered the deviant votes of the 88th Congress. That is to say, there were no votes on aid or trade with communist countries. This is probably to be explained by the fact that the Eisenhower Administration rarely sent such measures to Congress. However, eight of the 33 votes involved the familiar Republican perspective of cutting appropriations or authorizations.

In this set of deviant votes, substantive, contentious issues appear more frequently than they did in the similar set for the 88th Congress. Restrictions on the Tennessee Valley Authority are at issue in three of the roll-calls. Farm policy is the focus of five of the votes. The Landrum-Griffin Labor Act is the subject of two divisions, and the Area Redevelopment Act is at the heart of two votes. These last two issues, along with votes on the Emergency Home Ownership Act and changes in the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 would seem eligible to be included under the heading of "doctrinal measures."
Also of substantive significance are votes on three attempts to override the President's veto. These measures cannot properly be called sentimental or relevant to dominant Republican norms. It has already been shown that the fact that a Republican is in the White House does not alter House Republican voting patterns with respect to the relationship between party cohesion and roll-call significance. Yet there can be little doubt that the motivating factor here was a wish to support the party and the President.

Yet one may wonder whether these votes have the degree of significance that is assigned to them by the Ryan-Riker program. It will be remembered that the Riker formula employs the closeness of the vote with the number voting; however, this is predicated upon a simple majority being needed for passage. To override a veto, pass a treaty, or suspend the rules, a two-thirds majority is necessary. Hence, a 100 member Senate could divide 49-51 and have a high significance rating, which would be accurate for a bill but not as accurate an indicator of an attempt to override a veto. By the same token a vote of 67-33 would fulfill all the requirements for being most significant if the vote were to override a veto, yet it would not earn as high a significance rating as it deserved.

No doubt the Ryan-Riker program could be modified to accommodate this phenomenon, but measures requiring a two-thirds vote would have to be submitted separately. For purposes of this research the problem will be ignored because the examples are too few in number to affect
the results of aggregation. All votes requiring a two-thirds vote will be treated as if they needed a simple majority for passage.

It would appear that the House Republican deviance in the 86th Congress can be explained in the same terms as it was in the case of the 88th. That is, the Republicans deviated because they were not responsible for policy-making in the House of Representatives, because they were free to take positions on issues before the House that they could not have taken had they been responsible for governing the nation. In the 86th Congress, even more than in the 88th, it is apparent that to classify these measures as "doctrinal" is to miss the mark by a considerable degree. The reader should understand that what is reflected in the deviance is a dominant Republican norm or set of norms. In the case of the 86th House, this is manifest in the body of votes that involve budgetary reductions in one form or another and voices opposing federal programs on housing, education and electric power generation.

As was true of the 88th Congress, a skeptic might contend that the deviance was located in the votes of medium significance not in the votes of high significance, that the average cohesion on votes of medium significance was too low rather than too high on votes of high significance. Accordingly, to cross-check the contention that the deviance on votes of high significance was related to a dominant Republican ethic, the votes of medium significance on which the Republicans displayed a lower than overall average (.623) cohesion were gathered and are displayed in Appendix E.
Briefly, it would appear that the skepticism is not supported. The medium significance group shows few issues that could be regarded as doctrinal. To be sure, there were five of the 36 votes in this group that involved parliamentary maneuvering about the Area Redevelopment Act, an issue that also appeared in the high significance group. There were also two housing acts, but one pertained to veterans and hence would be expected to be non-partisan. It is also interesting to note that one of the measures in this group was a bill to raise the national debt ceiling. It will be recalled that in the deviance of the 88th House votes on the national debt were assigned the quality of symbolism. The reduced Republican cohesion on the same measure in the 86th Congress is no doubt owing to the fact that a Republican President requested a rise in the ceiling, not a Democrat.

But by and large it can be said that this set of votes fails to manifest issues reflecting dominant norms on the part of either party. The tone seems to be set by a bill appropriating funds to help pay for the Pan-American Games to be held in Chicago. Bills relating to public works "pork" projects, pay raises for civil servants, water pollution, and mutual security tend to dominate.

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20V. O. Key observed that veterans' measures were subject to unanimous roll-calls. He felt this was due to the fear of appearing to be anti-veteran on the part of the Representatives; "Veterans and the House of Representatives," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 5 (February, 1943), pp. 35-48.
Hence, it seems safe to conclude that the hypothesis is supported by the 86th Congress as well, that deviance is related to the minority's lack of responsibility for legislation.

The 90th, 88th, and 86th Congresses all had Democratic majorities; the focus now turns to the 83rd Congress, which had a Republican majority.

Figures 7 and 8 indicate that the deviance has now shifted to the Democratic party in Congress. Hence, it is logical to conclude that deviant high cohesion on votes of high significance is allied with minority status and is not the particular preserve of the Republican party. Turning first to the Democratic deviance in the Senate, one sees the by now familiar pattern. (A complete list is found in Appendix F.) Briefly, ten of the 44 votes in this group involved the raising of appropriations. It will be remembered that in the case of the Republicans, the tendency to cut appropriations was regarded as a manifestation of a dominant Republican perspective more than it was an indicator of serious concern over the policy in question. It seems logical to assume that the converse is true of the Democrats, that they possess a dominant norm to increase federal spending as a means of increasing the role of the federal government in American life. Of course, it is also possible that the Democrats in this case are seeking to embarrass the Administration by forcing a veto on a popular bill.
**Figure 7**

U. S. Senate, 83rd Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohesion Level</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Cohesion</td>
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<td>(N=87)</td>
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<td>Medium Significance</td>
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<td>.669</td>
</tr>
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<td>(N=107)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Significance</td>
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<td>.897</td>
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<td>(N=77)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Cohesion vs. Significance for Democrats](Image)

![Cohesion vs. Significance for Republicans](Image)
**Figure 8**

U. S. House of Representatives, 83rd Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
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<td>.736;</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>.515;</td>
<td>.638;</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>.382;</td>
<td>.675;</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>.881;</td>
<td>.690;</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cohesion: 1. High -- medium -- low

Significance: 1. High -- medium -- low
The other deviant votes included votes relevant to the outlawing of the Communist Party in America, the censure of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, as well as a series of votes involving federal control of atomic energy and production of electric power from that energy. Although these issues cannot be considered to be purely symbolic, the perspective of the intervening years make it clear that all of these issues had high doctrinal hues.

Democrats in the House replicate the vote pattern of their Senate colleagues. (A full list of the 20 votes of high significance on which House Democrats had higher than average cohesion will be found in Appendix G.) As one might expect by this time, one quarter of the roll-calls deal with efforts to increase appropriations or authorizations. As in the case of Republican efforts to cut funds, this maneuver is usually accomplished through a motion to recommit with instructions to raise, or lower, the dollar amount. Also in this set of votes were roll-calls on atomic power and reciprocal trade, both issues of substance with sentimental overtones. It is interesting to note that one of these votes, HR 6772, was on raising the ceiling on the national debt. In this instance the Republicans had a cohesion index of 1.000, being unanimously opposed to attempts to recommit the measure. No doubt had the double burden of majority status and tenancy of the White House not been theirs, the Republicans would have displayed a pattern similar to their votes on identical measures in the 88th Congress.
If pressed, we would have to admit that the House Democrats of the 83rd Congress do not manifest strong normative symbolic behavior on their roll-calls of high significance and above average cohesion. True, a tendency is there, but in relation to the tendencies shown by the Republicans in similar circumstances, it seems weak. Of course, this calls to light the imprecise nature of the process that brands minority deviance from the original hypothesis as being related to perspective or doctrine.

It is inherent in virtually any type of content analysis that the researcher may miss the point entirely. When Mark Anthony said, "Brutus is an honorable man," he did not mean that Brutus was an honorable man. A high degree of interpretation is already implicit in the analysis of those roll-calls that have been subject to individual scrutiny; a recommittal motion would probably be taken at face value by the average citizen, yet all political scientists know what meaning to attach to such a maneuver. A more intensive analysis of the facts surrounding the deviant roll-calls that apparently have no ideological significance would probably reveal that a goodly number of them had such meaning to those who voted.

The final Congress subjected to analysis if the 80th. In looking at the data it (See Figures 9 and 10) should be apparent that had this been the first Congress studied, the whole avenue of investigation might have been written off as unfruitful.
**Figure 9**

**U. S. Senate, 80th Congress**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Cohesion:</th>
<th>Democrats: .576; Republicans: .688. (N=248)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>High Significance:</td>
<td>Democrats: .657; Republicans: .660. (N=82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Significance:</td>
<td>Democrats: .487; Republicans: .638. (N=86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Significance:</td>
<td>Democrats: .586; Republicans: .769. (N=80)</td>
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**Democrats**

```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.6</td>
<td>High—medium—low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.5</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Republicans**

```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low—medium—low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 10

U.S. House of Representatives, 80th Congress

Average Cohesion: Democrats .570; Republicans .594. (N=163)

High Significance: Democrats .528; Republicans .481. (N=50)

Medium Significance: Democrats .437; Republicans .548. (N=61)

Low Significance: Democrats .760; Republicans .751. (N=52)
In the Senate, neither party conforms to the hypothesis. The Democratic deviance is so pronounced that the average cohesion of the high significance votes is higher than the low significance roll-calls. The majority Republicans replicate a minority pattern, although it would appear that this particular phenomenon is a sympathetic reaction to the extreme Democratic deviance. The 80th Congress is the only Congress since 1919 to have a Republican majority serving with a Democratic President. A look at the list of deviant Democratic votes (to be found in toto in Appendix H), reveals that the expected dominance of normative, symbolic votes is virtually non-existent.

To be sure, ten of the deviant have to do with attempts to increase, or to fight off attempts to decrease, appropriations. But in this case there are 54 deviant votes, more than any other group included in this study. Today the contentiousness of the 80th Congress is a part of American folklore; this is probably best exemplified by the six roll-calls involving Truman Administration appointments. Such measures are virtually absent from succeeding high significance roll-calls of high cohesion. Three votes are concerned solely with the individual sugar ration to American citizens, contentious perhaps, but hardly doctrinal.
Moreover, there are several roll-calls that retain their substantive importance today. One vote was on the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution limiting the President to two terms. Three others involved the issue of presidential succession in case of the incapacity of the President and Vice-President. Four votes are related to the creation of the National Science Foundation. In addition, there are two votes on resolutions regarding the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. In short, there is no way one can conclude that the Democratic deviance in the 80th Senate derives from a minority's freedom to vote according to the dictates of dogma. Indeed, if it were not for the fact that the Republican cohesion on measures of low significance is higher than it is for high significance, there would be no support whatever in the 80th Senate for the hypothesis.

On the other hand, the 80th House conforms to the hypothesis in the now expected manner. That is, the majority conforms while the minority deviates in that it displays higher cohesion on issues of high significance than it does on measures of medium significance. In surveying those deviant votes (the full list of which will be found in Appendix I), one sees that half of them were related to appropriations or authorizations. Interestingly enough, nine of these votes involved parliamentary maneuvering about the Department of Agriculture appropriations for the next fiscal year. Other votes with ideological tendencies included two votes relevant to the reciprocal trade authority of the President and a vote on the ending of rent controls.
Two votes were of lasting significance. One was a bill involving military assistance to Greece and Turkey, a part of the Truman Doctrine; and another, H. R. Res. 342, was on a demand that "... all executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government [were] to make available to any and all standing, special, or select committees of the House and Senate information which may be deemed necessary to enable them to properly perform the duties delegated to them." This last is a manifestation of a problem that still bedevils congressional-executive relations. Students of the matter are doubt aware that the fact that the executive possesses a monopoly of relevant information makes that branch dominant over Congress.  

To recapitulate this discussion, first it is clear that the hypothesis that predicted that party influence would be greater on votes of low visibility than it would be on votes of high visibility has been convincingly affirmed. Out of twenty cases, nineteen showed that high significance votes had lower cohesion than did low significance votes.

Second, it was demonstrated that the majority party in every case but one manifested a positive linear relationship between high significance and low cohesion. To be sure, on occasion the relationship was just barely linear, as with the 83rd House and Senate Republicans. That is, in those cases the gap between high significance and medium significance cohesion was markedly smaller than the

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21 Even the most popular of the world's magazines documents this fact; see Eugene H. Methvin, "Is Congress Destroying Itself," Reader's Digest, vol. 94 (May, 1969), pp. 65-70.
gap in the cohesion ratings for votes of medium and low significance. This may be a reaction to the relatively severe Democratic deviance in both houses, or perhaps the Republicans were unsure of how to behave while in a majority.

Third, it was found that minorities generally conformed to the hypothesis but that their relationship between significance and cohesion was curvilinear. Votes of high significance have a greater average cohesion than votes of low significance, but high significance votes have a higher average cohesion than votes of medium significance. This phenomenon was attributed to the fact that minority members are free from the burdens of Congressional policy-making, hence they have a variety of options open to them. One option includes the freedom to vote according to normative conceptions of the proper relationship of man and his government. An example would be an individual who felt that deficit spending was morally wrong; as a member of the minority he could vote his convictions, as a member of the majority he would be pressured to support his government that was facing economic reality.

We acknowledge that the hypothesis that perspective determines minority deviance has a much less firm foundation than do the other hypotheses. For one thing the concept of ideology is elusive. It has already been said that the phenomenon is difficult to define. Moreover, the drawbacks inherent in this type of content analysis have already been alluded to. Indeed, it may be that the deviance is simply a manifestation of opposition trying to score "points" on the
majority. While it is clear that those votes comprising the deviant groups tend to have a doctrinaire cast, it is impossible with the resources at hand to subject this phenomenon to the strict empirical scrutiny undergone by other phenomena.

The final point proved by this research involves the methodological validity of the Riker Index of Significance. We must admit that at the beginning of this effort we were highly skeptical of the validity of the Index in this application. It seemed to be too great a jump from the subjective concept of visibility, with its implications of publicity, notoriety, and sensationalism, to the highly rational, carefully measured concept of significance that was expounded by Riker. Yet the proof is in this research. Indeed, if someone were conclusively to demonstrate that there was absolutely no relationship between Riker's Index and real-world visibility, this work would stand. The relationship between index of cohesion and index of significance is consistent enough to be an important phenomenon in and of itself.
Afterword.

Before closing, we should like to address a few words to the basic impact of the foregoing study. Often a reader is left with the feeling "so what?" upon finishing a scholarly work. We hope that the reader of this dissertation will not hold such a feeling, and if he does, that the following few paragraphs will dispell some of his ennui.

We believe that, at the very least, we have proved that party influence, as manifest in the index of cohesion, decreases as visibility of the issue, as manifest in Riker's Index of Significance, increases. This finding is relevant and important to a politician devising strategy and inventing tactics for use in parliamentary arenas.

In the first place, visible issues imply a policy process that is to a large degree open. Assuming that political actors have some control over the relative openness of the process, then the position of the actor in that process will determine whether he will attempt to open or close the process on any given issue.

For example, let us assume that Congress is writing a farm bill that has the enthusiastic support of the Congressional leadership. Then let us assume that the Department of Agriculture or someone outside Congress seriously disagrees with the substance of the proposed legislation. From the foregoing research we know that the influence of party, hence the party leadership, declines as issue visibility increases. Thus, it would be wise for the men opposing the policy to do everything in their power...
to make the issue visible. By the same token, the Congressional leadership would be well advised to attempt to keep their policy from public view; that is, if they wish to maximize their influence in the matter. In the same vein, individuals outside Congress who endorse the leadership's position would help their cause by trying to keep the issue from gaining visibility.

Of course, if the Congressional leaders are losing a fight, they might feel that they have nothing further to lose by making the issue visible. Although their power would be diminished, the issue might still be carried through the influence of outside pressures.

It should also be kept in mind that members of Congress may use issue visibility as a tactic in their struggles within the legislature. In his article on the contest for House Majority Leader in 1962, Nelson Polsby demonstrated that Carl Albert, the eventual winner, used an "inside" strategy as opposed to Richard Bolling's "outside" strategy. In this case, the former strategy involves working exclusively within the House, using personal contact to persuade members while the latter refers to using outside groups, such as the AFL-CIO and NAACP, to pressure members for their votes.

Polsby feels that the major reason the "inside" strategy was effective in this instance was that the heart of the conflict took place out of public view.

The caucus at which voting for Majority Leader was to have taken place provided no opportunities for outside surveillance. No spectators were admitted. Congressmen were even protected from the scrutiny of their colleagues; Representative Francis Walter, chairman of the caucus, sent word that the balloting for Majority Leader, when the time came, would be secret. The rules
of the caucus say nothing about a secret ballot; rather, general
parliamentary law governs the caucus meetings, and there is a
special provision that "the yea's and nay's on any question shall,
at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the
journal"—all of which did not alter the fact that the balloting
would be secret.

In spite of the interest which Mr. Bolling had stirred up
among outside groups, these groups were operating under an in-
superable handicap. The voting procedure maximized the chances
that a congressman cross-pressured between the demands of "local
agency" and his own personal feelings could vote his private
preferences with impunity. ¹

To take this concept further, one may gain a clue as to a reason
why politicians are often loath to state publicly their positions on
certain issues. The simple statement of a position by a visible figure
gives the subject of that statement increased visibility. For example,
while many people may be aware of the nation's problem with air and
water pollution, the problem becomes even more visible if a public figure
calls attention to it. In rhetoric this is known as the appeal to
authority; instead of "I saw the river and think it is polluted," we
have "Senator Smith says the river is polluted." Hence, a Congressional
leader jealous of his power, will keep his peace to avoid giving visibil-
ity that will dilute that power.

Individuals who desire "responsible" parties in America must by
now be aware that there is an inherent contradiction in their prescrip-
tions. On one hand, the call is for powerful party leaders, leaders who
can discipline recalcitrant members in Congress; on the other hand, there

¹Nelson W. Polsby, "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a
Majority Leader, 1962," New Perspectives on the House of Representatives,
Robert Peabody and Nelson Polsby, eds., (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963),
p. 267.
is a wish for a clear, public delineation of the party's program. Yet we can see that one precludes the other. If the party program is public, and concise, it will be visible; if it is visible, it will reduce the power of the party leaders.

To those who are not Congressional leaders, it should be clear that if they desire to thwart legislation being supported by the leadership, publicity is one of their most effective weapons. It arouses constituents in districts in which they would otherwise remain inactive, and these articulate constituents may cause their Representative to think twice about following the leadership.
Appendix A

The Formula

1) The formula for Riker's S is given by the following:

\[ S = 1 - \frac{v(a_{ij}) - v(a_{11})}{v(a_{dg}) - v(a_{11})} \]

where \( v(a_{ij}) \) is the value of outcome \( a_{ij} \),
\( v(a_{dg}) \) is the value of the least significant outcome, and
\( v(a_{11}) \) is the value of the most significant outcome.

2) The calculation of \( v(a_{ij}) \) is obtained as follows:

\[ v(a_{ij}) = n - q_{ij} - m - 2 - \frac{n - r_i - 1}{n - t - 2} \]

where \( v(a_{ij}) \) is any possible outcome
\( n \) is the number of members of the legislature
\( r_i \) is the number voting on a roll call in which the outcome is \( a_{ij} \)
\( q_{ij} \) is the number on the losing side of \( a_{ij} \)
\( m \) is the minimum necessary for victory when \( r_i \) participate, and
\( t \) is a quorum.

C PROGRAM TO COMPUTE RIKER'S S VALUE AND PARTY COHESION VALUES

C PROGRAMMED AND CHECKED BY JAMES D. RYAN (MARCH, 1969)

C CONTROL CARD FORMAT IS AS FOLLOWS ....................................

C COLUMNS 1 THROUGH 4 ARE THE NUMBER OF VOTES ..........................

C COLUMNS 5 THROUGH 8 ARE THE NUMBER OF CASES FOR THIS RUN. ...........

C COLUMNS 9 THROUGH 12 ARE THE NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN IN THE CHAMBER.

C COLUMNS 13 THROUGH 16 ARE THE NUMBER OF THE CONGRESS: ..............

C


READ (5,69) NVOTE,NCASE,MEMBS,NCONG

69 FORMAT(4I4)

DO 1000 I = 1,NVOTE

VOTEY(I) = 0.

VOTEN(I) = 0.

DEMY(I) = 0.

DEMN(I) = 0.

REPY(I) = 0.

REPN(I) = 0.

1000
1000 CONTINUE

C START COMPUTATION FOR YES AND NO TOTALS

DO 91 M = 1, NCASE

READ (5,100) IPARTY, (K(I), I=1, NVOTE)

100 FROMAT(9X, I1, 70I1/10X, 14I1/10X, 70I1/10X, 9I1)

DO 90 I = 1, NVOTE

IF(K(I) - 1) 90, A, 3

A VOTEY(I) = VOTEY(I) + 1.0

GO TO 5

3 IF(K(I) - 2) 5, 6, 5

6 VOTEN(I) = VOTEN(I) + 1.0

5 IF(IPARTY .EQ. 1) GO TO 13

8 IF(K(I) - 1) 90, 9, 10

9 REPY(I) = REPY(I) + 1.0

GO TO 90

10 IF(K(I) - 2) 11, 12, 11

12 REPN(I) = REPN(I) + 1.0

11 GO TO 90

13 IF(K(I) - 1) 90, 15, 16

15 DEMY(I) = DEMY(I) + 1.0

GO TO 90

16 IF(K(I) - 2) 90, 17, 90

17 DEMN(I) = DEMN(I) + 1.0

90 CONTINUE

91 CONTINUE
C START COMPUTATION FOR RIKER'S S VALUE

DO 50 I = 1,NVOTE
   A = FLOAT(MEMBRS)
   IF(A .EQ. 435.0) GO TO 23
   IF(A .EQ. 100.0) GO TO 24

23  VA11 = 2.005
    VADG = 327.995
    GO TO 18

24  VA11 = 2.020
    VADG = 76.980

18  RI = VOTEY(I) + VOTEN(I)
    IF(VOTEY(I) - VOTEN(I)) 20,20,21

21  QIJ = VOTEN(I)
    GO TO 30

20  IF(VOTEN(I) - VOTEY(I)) 30,30,22

22  QIJ = VOTEY(I)

30  B = (RI/2.0) + 1.0
    T = (A/2.0) + 1.0
    VALJ = A - QIJ - B + 2.0 +((A-RI+1.0)/(A-T+2.0))
    S(I) = 1.0 - ((VALJ-VA11)/(VADG-VA11))

50  CONTINUE

C TOTAL DEMOCRATIC YES AND NO VOTES

DO 60 I = 1,NVOTE
   DIVID(I) = DEMY(I) + DEMN(I)

60  CONTINUE
C COHESION FOR DEMOCRATS
    DO 66 I = 1,NVOTE
    COHD(I) = ABS(DEMY(I) - DEMN(I))/DIVID(I)
66 CONTINUE
C TOTAL REPUBLICAN YES AND NO VOTES
    DO 70 I = 1,NVOTE
    DIVIR(I) = REPY(I) * REPN(I)
70 CONTINUE
C COHESION FOR REPUBLICANS
    DO 77 I = 1,NVOTE
    COHR(I) = ABS(REPY(I) - REPN(I))/DIVIR(I)
77 CONTINUE
C COMPUTE AVERAGE COHESIONS FOR DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS
    TOTCOD = 0.0
    DO 80 I = 1,NVOTE
    TOTCOD = TOTCOD + COHD(I)
80 CONTINUE
    AVGCOD = TOTCOD/FLOAT(NVOTE)
    TOTCOR = 0.0
    DO 81 I = 1,NVOTE
    TOTCOR = TOTCOR + COHR(I)
81 CONTINUE
    AVCOR = TOTCOR/FLOAT(NVOTE)
    DO 400 I = 1,NVOTE
WRITE(6,300) COHD(I),COHR(I),S(I),I
300 FORMAT(2X,F5.3,4X,F5.3,4X,F5.3,4X,F5.3,4X,F5.3,4X,I3)
400 CONTINUE
   DO 500 I = 1,NVOTE
   PUNCH 160, COHD(I), COHR(I), S(I), I
160 FORMAT(2X,F5.3,4X,F5.3,4X,F5.3,4X,F5.3,4X,I3)
500 CONTINUE
   WRITE(6,199) NCONG
199 FORMAT(10X,44HDATA ANALYSIS PERFORMED FOR CONGRESS NUMBER,I4)
   WRITE(6,200) AVGCOD,AVGCOR
200 FORMAT (10X,22H AVERAGE COHESION DEM=,F5.3,10X,22H AVERAGE COHESION
1REP=,F5.3)
   CALL DUMP
   STOP
END
Appendix B

Votes in the 88th House of High Significance on Which Republicans Displayed Higher than Average Cohesion.

The Election of the Speaker.

H Res 5  Permanently enlarge the House Rules Committee from 12 to 15 members. Motion to consider previous question, cutting off debate and precluding amendments.

H Res 5  Adoption of Resolution.

HR 5517  Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal 1963. Amendment to add $450 million for the Accelerated Public Works Program.

HR 4997  Authorize a voluntary feed grains acreage diversion program. Motion to recommit.

HR 4997  Final passage.

HR 5517  Supplemental Appropriation for Fiscal 1963. Motion to recommit conference report with instructions that House conferees disagree to a Senate amendment providing $65,000 as a U. S. contribution to the International Peace Corps Secretariat.

HR 5517  Motion ordering the previous question on amendment to the Senate's Philippine War Claims rider.

HR 6009  Increase the temporary National Debt limit to $307 billion from time of enactment to 30 June and to $309 billion from July 1 to August 31. Motion to recommit with instructions to extend the existing $305 billion ceiling indefinitely.

HR 6009  Final passage.

HR 3496  Extend for two years the Reorganization Act of 1949. Amendment to prohibit the President from creating a new executive department by reorganization plan.

HR 4996  Area Redevelopment Act amendments of 1963.
HR 4955 Vocational Education Act of 1963. Motion to recommit with instructions to amend it to provide that programs assisted by funds appropriated under the Act be operated on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.

HR 7824 Extend the existing temporary $309 billion national debt limit. Motioned to recommit with instructions to amend by reducing the temporary limit $307 billion and to extend it for two months.

HR 7824 Final passage.

HR 7885 Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Amend foreign aid law and authorize appropriations of $4,087,075,000 for foreign aid in fiscal 1964. Motion to recommit with instructions to reduce appropriations.

HR 8363 Revenue Act. Motion to recommit with instructions to amend to prevent the tax reductions from taking effect unless the President specified that the administration budget spending for Fiscal 1964 was not expected to exceed $97 billion and for 1965 was not expected to exceed $98 billion.

HR 8969 Extending the existing temporary $309 billion national debt limit for the rest of the Fiscal year and further increase the temporary limit by $6 billion from 31 November through 29 June 1964. Motion to recommit to establish a smaller increase in the ceiling for the remainder of the fiscal 1964.

HR 8969 Final passage.

HR 8747 Motion to concur in a Senate amendment requiring the administrator of the Veterans Administration to issue a previously appropriated and earmarked $1,722,000 for construction of an addition to the Veterans Hospital at Bay Pines, Florida.

Motion to adjourn to proceed to consideration of bills under Calendar Wednesday procedure.

HR 4955 Authorize New Funds For an Expanded Vocational and Education Program, and Extend NDEA and Aid to Federally Impacted School Areas. Motion to recommit the conference report with instructions to delete authorizations of $150 million over four years for work study programs and residential vocational educational schools.

HR 9499 Foreign Aid Appropriations. Motion to recommit and insert an amendment designed to bar the export-import bank from guaranteeing credit to Communist countries or their nationals for the purchase of U. S. commodities.
S 2265  Amend the 1956 Library Services Act. Amendment to delete construction aid and aid to services in urban areas, and to double the existing population and authorization limits on aid to rural areas.

S 2265  Motion to recommit to Education and Labor Committee with instructions to delete provisions for library construction aid.

HR 7152  Civil Rights Act of 1964. Motion that the House adjourn until Monday, 10 February, rather than move immediately to consideration of final titles of the bill and a vote on passage.

HR 10222  Food Stamp Bill. Motion to adjourn for the day without completing action on the bill.

HR 10222  Motion to recommit and add a provision requiring the state to pay half the cost of food stamp programs set up under the bill.

HR 10222  Final passage.

HR 6196  Administration Wheat Cotton Bill. Adoption of a resolution (H Res 665) to agree to the Senate version of the bill.

HR 11202  Motion to recommit with instructions to amend to prohibit the use of funds for export payments or export subsidies on agricultural products shipped to Communist nations.

HR 11380  The Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Motion to recommit with instructions to reduce the Fiscal 1965 authorizations for development loans by $750,000,000 and the President's continuancy fund by $50,000,000.

HR 11375  Increase the Temporary National Debt Limit to $324 billion through 30 June 1965. Final passage.

HR 11812  Motion to recommit to the appropriations committee with instructions to reduce economic aid funds by $247.8 million.

HR 11377  Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Motion to strike the enacting clause.

HR 11377  Substitute amendment embodying the Senate passed bill and providing a veto power to State Governors over public and private projects under the community action program and deleting authority for the Director of the Poverty Program to cancel repayment of certain loans.

S 2642  Passage of the Anti-Poverty Bill which incorporated the text of HR 11377.
HR 12175  Housing Act of 1964. Motion to recommit to the Banking and Currency Committee with instructions to report it with an amendment extending indefinitely the insurance authority of FHA beyond the expiration date of 1 October 1965.

HR 8864  Enable U. S. to implement the enforcement of the international coffee agreement of 1962. Motion to adopt the conference report.

H Res 845  Rules for consideration of HR 11926, limiting debate on the bill to two hours.

HR 12298  Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. Motion to recommit with instructions to add an amendment prohibiting the sale of surplus U. S. farm goods under Title I of PL 480 to nations controlled or dominated by a Communist government.
Appendix C

Votes in the 88th House of Medium Significance on Which Republicans Displayed a Lower than Average Cohesion

HR 5389 Authorize the issue of $1 and $2 federal reserve notes to replace silver certificates; change silver purchase legislation.

HR 12 Authorize program of matching grants for construction of medical, dental schools. Also loan program for such students.

HR 5517 Supplemental Appropriation for Fiscal 1963. Motion to adopt the conference report.

HR 2497 Extend program for recruitment of Mexican labor.

HR 6754 Department of Agriculture appropriation.

HR 6868 Legislative Appropriation bill for Fiscal 1964.

HR 6755 Extend for one year temporary excise and corporation income taxes.

HR 7063 Appropriation for State, Justice and Commerce Departments, the Judiciary and related agencies; including the Civil Rights Commission.

HJ Res 247 Suspend, for the 1964 Presidential campaign, section 315a of Communications Act requiring equal time for presidential candidates.

HR 3179 Appoint judges to the U. S. Court of Military Appeals for life tenure instead of 15-year terms.

HR 5279 Adoption of conference report appropriating for Interior Department.

HR 5171 Authorize the GSA to coordinate the purchase, lease and maintenance of data processing equipment. Motion to recommit.

HR 6518 Clean Air Act, to initiate and strengthen programs for the prevention and abatement of air pollution.

HR 7500 NASA authorization.

H Res 477 Providing a closed rule for consideration of bill to raise limit on national debt.
HR 6143 Authorize grants and loans for construction of higher education facilities.

HR 7500 Adoption of conference report on NASA authorization.


HR 8195 Extend Mexican labor recruitment program one year.


S 777 Authorize $20 million for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

HR 9124 Suspension of the rule to pass revisions in ROTC.

HR 6518 Adopt conference report on Clean Air Act of 1963.

HR 4955 Adoption of conference report on vocational education additions to NDEA.

HR 9499 Passage of Foreign Aid appropriation for Fiscal 1964.

S 1153 Motion to recommit matching grant authorization for airport construction.

S 2265 Passage of Library Services Act amendments.

HR 6041 Allow Secretary of Labor to include fringe benefits in determining wages to be paid on federal construction projects.

HR 7381 Revise existing regulations on employment and compensation of retired military personnel. Motion to recommit.

HR 8363 Conference report on Revenue Act of 1964 reducing personal and corporate income tax.

S 2455 Motion to recommit Peace Corps authorization.

HR 5838 Amendment to increase Coast Guard appropriations.

HR 10546 Authorizations for NASA in 1965.

Motion to dispense with further proceedings after a second Republican demanded quorum call.

HR 11202 Passage of Department of Agriculture appropriation for Fiscal 1965.
HR 5130 Motion to recommit bill to raise FDIC insurance coverage.

HR 7152 Civil Rights Act of 1964. Adoption of a resolution providing for House approval of the bill as amended by the Senate.

H Res 795 Authorize special committee to sit during adjournment to investigate campaign expenditures of candidates for nomination and election to the House.

HR 11611 Establish a commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress authorized to report legislative recommendations to Congress.

H Res 803 Resolution disagreeing to Senate amendments and calling for a conference on a bill to raise the salaries of federal career employees.

HR 1096 Suspension of the rules to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to cooperate with Wisconsin in designating and administering an Ice Age National Scientific Reserve.


S 1627 Enable the U. S. to pay its share of Fiscal 1964 operating expenses of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos.

HR 11296 Motion to recommit appropriations for 16 federal agencies including NASA.

HR 12175 Passage of the Housing Act of 1964.

S 1006 Revive and expand the 1960 U. S. Fishing Fleet Improvement Act.

HR 9000 Suspension of the rules to pass mandatory federal inspection and safety requirements on previously exempt small coal mines.

S 1007 Conference report to guarantee electric consumers in Pacific Northwest first call on electric energy at federal hydro-electric plants in that region.


HR 9586 Establish a National Council on the Arts.
HR 4487  Motion to suspend the rules in passing coordination of Interior and Agriculture Department programs designed to minimize the effects of insecticides and pesticides on fish and wildlife and increase Interior's authorization for pesticide research.

S 2220  Authorize forgiveness of up to 50% of student loans made, for doctors subsequently practicing in an area in which there was a certified shortage of health personnel.


HR 1096  Authorize the Secretary of Interior to cooperate with Wisconsin in running an Ice Age National Scientific Reserve.

S 3060  Motion to recommit extensions of NDEA and federal aid to "impacted" school areas.
Appendix D

Votes in the 86th House of High Significance on Which Republicans Displayed Higher than Average Cohesion

Election of the Speaker of the House for the 86th Congress.


HR 1011 Extension of Federal Airport Construction Act. Amendment to provide that funds not be made available until appropriated by Congress.

S 144 REA bill identical to HR 1321. Failed to pass over President's veto.

HR 3460 Authorized TVA to issue revenue bonds to finance new power facilities. Motion to recommit with instructions to increase control by executive agencies and Congress over issuance of bonds.

HR 3460 TVA Bond Issuance Authorization.

HR 7175 Fiscal 1960 Appropriations for Department of Agriculture. Motion to recommit with instructions to add language limiting Commodity Credit Corporation price support loans.

S 57 Housing Act of 1959. Amendment to make additional funds available only upon the enactment of appropriations bills.

S 57 Housing Act of 1959. Motion to recommit and substitute HR 7117 authorizing no public housing, and cutting total authorizations.

HR 7086 Amend and Extend Renegotiation Act of 1951, enabling government to recapture excessive profit on defense contracts. Motion to recommit.

HR 3610 Bill to amend 1948 Water Pollution Control Act to double federal contributions for sewage plant construction. Motion to recommit with instructions to amend to require states to match federal grants.

HR 7509 Public Works Appropriations for Fiscal 1960. Amendment to provide funds for water hyacinth eradication program in the South.

123
HR 7509 Fiscal 1960 Public Works Appropriations. Amendment to add funds for flood control projects on Eau Galle River, Wisconsin.

HR 7509 Fiscal 1960 Public Works Appropriations. Motion to recommit and reduce each construction item of $5 million or more by 5%.

HR 7426 Offer wheat growers a choice between reduced acreage with high support and unlimited production with low support.


H Res 326 Resolution providing for House concurrent and Senate Amendment to HR 3460, TVA Revenue Bond Bill. Motion to order the previous question on adoption of resolution.

HR 8342 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Substitute for committee bill Landrum - Griffin Bill including provisions to curb secondary boycott and organizational picketing, and give states power to handle "no man's land" labor disputes.

HR 8342 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Motion to recommit.

S 2539 Revised Housing Act of 1959. Motion to recommit with instructions to amend to spread urban renewal funds over two years, and delete funds for college classroom construction.

HR 3610 Amend the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act by raising to $90 million annually the federal contribution for sewage plant construction. Vote is to override President's veto.

HR 10213 Final passage of the Emergency Home Ownership Act.

S 722 Motion to recommit the Area Redevelopment Act.

S 722 Final passage of the Area Redevelopment Act.

HR 7155 Amendment to delete 160 acre limit on land irrigated by Federal Irrigation Project.

HR 10128 Antidiscrimination amendment to School Assistance Construction Act of 1960.
HR 10128 Motion to agree to the bill as amended in the committee of the whole.

HR 12261 Farm Surplus Reduction Act of 1960. Amendment to recommit with instructions to substitute S 2759.

HR 12261 Final passage of the Farm Surplus Reduction Act of 1960.

HR 10569 Amendment to Treasury and Post Office Appropriations.

HR 8860 Authorize federal subsidies for lead and zinc production.

HR 12677 Increase minimum wage protection under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
Appendix E

Votes in the 86th House of Medium Significance on Which Republicans Displayed a Lower than Average Cohesion.

HR 2256 Final passage on a Veterans Housing Bill.

HR 1011 Final passage of extension of Federal Airport Construction Act.

HR 2575 Authorize appropriations for Pan American Games in Chicago.

HR 7007 Fiscal 1960 authorization of funds of National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

HR 7343 Appropriations for Departments of State and Justice. Amendment to add $2 million to federal prison system funds to build maximum security penitentiary in the middle west.

HR 3610 Amend the Water Pollution and Control Act.

HR 77490 Public Debt Act of 1959. Authorize increase in permanent national debt ceiling.

HR 8385 Mutual security and related agencies appropriations bill for Fiscal 1960.

HR 7740 Continue program to preserve acreage history for farms not planted to full allotment, and provide for reapportionment of unused cotton allotments.

HR 1341 Direct the Secretary of Commerce to develop safety standards for all civilian vehicles purchased by the government. Motion to recommit.

HR 5421 Authorize subsidies for construction of fishing vessels.

HR 3151 Authorize federal government to withhold city payroll taxes from salaries of federal employees. Suspension of the rules. Two-thirds majority required.

HR 4729 Authorize funds for lower Rio Grand Rehabilitation project. Suspension of the rules. Two-thirds of the majority required.

HR 9015 Revised Fiscal 1960 Public Works Appropriation Bill. Provide 2½% cut in funds of vetoed bill, HR 7509, but retain the 67 project not in President's budget.
H Res 468 Closed rule for deliberation on HR 5, the Foreign Investment Incentive Tax Act.


S 722 Motion to table the second motion to dispense with further proceedings and vote on the Area Redevelopment Act.

S 722 Motion to call the question on dispensing with further proceedings.

S 722 Motion to dispense with further proceedings.

S 722 Motion to call the question.


HR 12326 Motion to recommit part of the Public Works Appropriations Bill.


S 1892 Amendment to lower the interest charges on Public Works Project.

HR 9883 Postal and federal employees salary increase act of 1960.


HR 12740 Motion to recommit supplemental appropriations for 1961.

S 1508 A bill to place the Alaskan railroad under ICC jurisdiction.

HJ Res 596 Adoption of a resolution providing House consideration of the Senate amendment to the 1961 Supplemental appropriations act.

HR 2467 Authorize the FAA to pay allowances to citizens forced to move from land acquired by the FAA.

HR 2467 Final passage.

H Res. 607 Cite S. Sloan Colt for contempt of Congress.

SJ Res 170 Authorize appointment of private citizen U. S. Commission on NATO.
Appendix F

Votes in the 83rd Senate of High Significance on Which Democrats Displayed a Higher than Average Cohesion.

S 1081 Amendment to eliminate language for providing for exemption and adjustment of ceiling in certain cases.

HR 5227 Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture. Amendment to increase by $30 million funds for agricultural conservation program.

HR 5227 Amendment to reduce by $40 million funds for agricultural conservation program.

S 1081 Provide authority for temporary economic control. Motion to proceed to consideration of the conference report.

S 1081 Motion to table motion for reconsideration of vote agreeing to take up conference report.

S 1081 Adoption of the conference report.

S 1901 Provide for the jurisdiction of the U. S. over the submerged land of the outer continental shell, and authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease such land for certain purposes. Amendment to provide that revenue rather than being applied toward national debt, would be applied toward national defense expenses during national emergencies, but thereafter would be applied toward grants in aid of education.

S 1901 Amendment to apply revenue leases during national emergency toward expenditures for national defense and security, and after termination of national emergencies to several states and territories for educational purposes of a ratio basis according to school enrollment.

S 2128 Amendment providing that the President shall make available certain amounts for military assistance to eligible countries through concurrency conversion agreements involving the purchase of U. S. Agriculture commodities.

HR 5246 Appropriations for the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare. Amendment increasing by $15 million funds for hospital construction, for the public health service.
HR 5246 Amendment increasing by $1,300,000 funds for grants-in-aid for TB control.

S 2407 Amendment permitting congressional approval in whole or in part of any disposal plant.

HR 5969 Amendment increasing by $400 million funds for the Air Force.

HR 5969 Amendment increasing pilot training to the extent of $18,200,000 additional for materials procurement, $29,200,000 additional for maintenance and operations, and $1,720,000 additional for military personnel requirements.

HR 5134 Amend the Submerged Land Act. Adoption of the conference report.

SJ Res 1 Amendment to committee substitute adding to Clause 2, Article 6, on the constitution a provision that no treaty shall be the supreme law of the land unless made in pursuance of the constitution.

SJ Res 1 Motion to adjourn.

S 49 Enable the people of Hawaii to form a constitution and state government and to be admitted into the union on equal footing with the original states. Amendment to add new title so as to also grant statehood to Alaska.

S Res 220 Resolution declaring the judgment of the Senate to be that no person was elected as a member of the Senate from New Mexico in 1952 and that a vacancy exist. Amendment that the vacancy should be filled only through an election held pursuance through the laws of New Mexico.

S Res 220 Final passage.

S 2650 Amend the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. Motion to recommit.

S 1461 Amend the Interstate Commerce Act concerning requests of common carriers for increased transportation rates. Motion to recommit.

HR 8779 Amendment to increase by $35 million the loans authorizations for the rural electrification program.

HR 8779 Motion to table motion to reconsider the above vote.

HR 8779 Amendment increasing by $10 million funds for school lunch programs.
HR 8873 Appropriations for the Department of Defense and related independent agencies. Amendment to increase by $150,466,000 funds for army military personnel, and to increase by $200 million funds for army maintenance and operations.

HR 8300 Revise the internal revenue laws. Amendment allowing credit for additional personal exemption of $100 applicable to the first $2,000 of taxable income, effective 1 July 1954.

HR 8300 Amendment to increase annual personal income tax exemptions from $600 to $700.

HR 8300 Amendment to make certain changes in the depreciation schedules of the bill.

S 2759 Amend the vocational rehabilitation act. Amendment authorizing the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to cooperate in financing of a pilot demonstration rehabilitation center in Washington, D. C.

S 3690 Amendment providing for AEC disposition of the electric power and other forms of energy produced from nuclear fusion, with preference to public bodies and cooperatives.

S 3690 Motion to table above amendment.

S 3690 Motion to table substitute amendment for Section 124 creating an international atomic pool.

S 3690 Motion to table amendment to retain patent licensing features of the present AEC Act.

S 3690 Motion to invoke cloture.

S 3052 Amendment to apply flexible price supports of 82½ - 90% of parity on certain basic crops.

S 3052 Amendment adding a new title on the National Forestry Administration.

S 3052 Amendment prohibiting limitation upon the number of terms for which members of county committees may be re-elected.

S 3052 Motion to table the above motion to reconsider vote on the above amendment.

HR 9757 Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 on the adoption of the conference report.
S 3706 Amendment respecting knowing and willful membership in the communist party or other subversive organizations, and establishing 14 criteria for guidance of the courts in determining evidence of Communist Party memberships.

S 3706 Motion to table motion to reconsider the vote on the above amendment.

S Res 301 Motion to table committee amendment providing that the Senate disavow and condemn the denunciation by Senator Joseph McCarthy of General Zwicker.

Confirmation of the nomination of Albert Beeson to be a member of the National and Labor Relations Board.
Appendix G

Votes in the 83rd House of High Significance on Which Democrats Displayed a Higher than Average Cohesion.

Election of the Speaker of the House.

HR 3053 Bill making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1953 on motion to recommit.

HR 3575 Enable the people of Hawaii to form a constitution and state government and to be admitted into the Union on equal footing with the original states. Motion to recommit.

HR 4828 Appropriations for the Department of the Interior. Motion to recommit.

HR 5495 Extend the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930. On motion to recommit.

HR 5690 Appropriations for additional executive independent bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, and offices. A motion to recommit.

HR 5969 Appropriations for the Department of Defense and related independent agencies. On motion to recommit with instructions to increase the Air Force to 143 air wing.

HR 5141 Create the small business administration and preserve small business institution and competitive enterprise. On motion to recommit the conference report.

HR 6672 Increase the public debt limit. On motion to recommit.

HR 3300 Authorize the state of Illinois and the sanitary District of Chicago, under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, to help control the lake level of Lake Michigan by diverting water from the lake into the Illinois waterway.

HR 4646 Provide for the exchange of certain public and private land. Motion to recommit.
HR 8224  Reduce excise taxes. Motion to recommit.

HR 8300  Revise the internal revenue laws of the United States. Motion to recommit with instructions to add a $100 additional exemption.

HR 8583  Appropriations for the executive office and sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commission, corporations, agencies, and offices. On motion to recommit with instructions for the Federal National Mortgage Administration will sell all mortgages at par value.

HR 8649  Authorize the admission into evidence in certain criminal proceedings of information intersected in national security investigation.

HR 9245  Establish a joint committee of Congress to study postal field service reclassification, to increase the rates of basic compensation of postmasters, officers, and employees in the postal field service pending reclassification pursuant to recommendation of such joint committee. Motion to suspend the rules.

HR 9757  Motion to recommit the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

HR 9757  Final passage.

HR 8300  Revise the internal revenue laws of the United States. A motion to recommit the conference report.

H Con Res 265  Concurrent resolution providing for Sine Die. Adjournment of the second session of the 83rd Congress.
Appendix H

Votes in the 80th Senate of High Significance on Which Democrats Displayed Higher than Average Cohesion.

S Res 46 Resolution continuing the authority for the investigation of the National Defense Program. Amendment to provide for investigation to be made by the committee on expenditures in the executive department.

S Res 46 Agreement.

S Res 20 Resolution to appoint a special committee to study the problems of small business. Amendment to substitute to committee on banking and currency.

S Res 20 Agreement.

S Con Res 7 Amendment to strike: "but any such reduction in the fiscal year 1948 may be counted as part of the $2,600,000,000."

S Con Res 7 Motion to table motion to reconsider above vote.

H J Res 27 Amendment limiting the Office of the President to no more than two successive terms.

HR 2157 Define and limit the jurisdiction of the court, regulate actions arising under certain laws of the United States.

HR 2157 Amendment to strike all provisions relating to the Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts.

HR 2157 Amendment to provide against certain claims being banned for activities which are normally engaged in during the working day.

S J Res 58 Amendment providing for the allocation of sugar.

S J Res 58 Amendment to increase the allocation of refined sugar for home consumption to 40 pounds with limitations for the 3rd quarter of 1947.

S J Res 58 Motion to table the above motion to refer with instructions to report back tomorrow.

S 1126 Amendment to outlaw secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes and to provide injunctive and other relief through the courts.
S 526 Amendment to provide for the apportionment of funds apportioned to the National Science Foundation.

S 526 Motion to reconsider vote on amendment to the National Science Foundation Act.

S 526 Amendment to provide and control of appointment to the National Science Foundation shall rest with the President.

HR 1 Reduce individual income tax payment. Motion to postpone further consideration until 10 June.

HR 1 Amendment to exempt from income tax tuition and incidental expenses incurred by teachers.

HR 1 Final passage.

S Res 81 Resolution authorizing the committee on civil service to investigate the appointment of postmasters.

S 564 Provide for the performance of the duties of the Office of the President in case of the removal, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President. Amendment to provide for the succession of the President pro tempore of the Senate ahead of the Speaker of the House.

S 564 Amendment to make the act effective on 20 January 1949.

S 564 Final passage.

H Con Res 49 Concurrent resolution against adoption of reorganization plan #2.

HR 3311 Appropriations for the Department of State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary. Amendment to increase appropriation for federal aid to the airport program from $32,500,000 to $50,000,000.

HR 3311 Amendment to increase the appropriation for federal aid to the airport program from $32,500,000 to $50,000,000.

S J Res 145 Joint resolution authorizing commencement of action by the United States to determine interstate water rights on the Colorado River. Appeal from a decision of the chair in referring the resolution to the Judiciary Committee.

HR 3839 Appropriations for the Executive Office and Independent Offices. Amendment to increase the appropriation for the FTC.
HR 3756 Appropriations for government corporations and independent executive agencies. Amendment to strike provision prohibiting the payment of local taxes on housing projects in excess of the amounts specified in the original contract with the federal public housing authority.

H Con Res 51 Concurrent resolution against the adoption of reorganization plan #3.

S 526 National Science Foundation Act. Motion that further consideration of the conference report be postponed until 8 January 1948.

HR 4075 Regulate commerce among the states, with the territories and possessions of the United States, and with foreign countries; protect the welfare of consumers of sugar and those engaged in domestic sugar producing industries; promote the export trade of the United States.

S J Res 167 Amendment to provide for priority allocation and inventory control in lieu of voluntary agreements and approval by the Attorney General of a plan of a voluntary action without prosecution under the Anti-Trust Law.

S J. Res 167 Amendment to strike the section relating to voluntary agreement and freedom from prosecution under Anti-Trust Laws.

Nomination of Joe Dooley to be the U. S. Judge for the northern district of Texas. Motion to recommit.

Confirmation of the above nomination.

Nomination of David Lilienthal to be a member of AEC. Motion to recommit.

Nomination of Philip Perlman to be solicitor general of the United States. Motion to adjourn.

Perlman Nomination. Request that the clerk be directed to read a certain extract from the congressional records.

Perlman Nomination. Motion that the reading of the excerpt from the congressional record be discontinued.

S 2202 Amendment to reduce the first year authorization of the funds for the Marshall Plan.

HR 5883 Amendment to increase the authorization for expenditures on soil conservation, including salaries and other administrative expenses, by $50,000,000.
HR 5883  Amendment to increase funds authorized for expenditure on forest products experiments, investigation, and tests by $125,000.

HR 5883  Amendment providing for distribution of AAA funds on basis of 1947 program rather than conservation need of the state.

HR 6556  Extend the authority of the President over Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Amendment to extend provisions for three years rather than one.

HR 6556  Amendment to extend provisions for two years rather than one.

HR 6556  Amendment to maintain status quo of provisions of Tariff Act, and extending it by one year.

HR 6481  Appropriations for government corporations and independent executive agencies. Amendment to increase appropriations.

S 2318  Provide for an coordinated agricultural program. Amendment proposing the level of price support at 90% of its parity price as of beginning of marketing year to cooperators for any crop of tobacco for which marketing quotas are in effect.

S 2318  Motion to table motion to reconsider above vote.

HR 6481  Appropriations for government corporations and independent agencies. Motion that the Senate recede from its amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3 increasing appropriations for TVA.

S J Res 157  Joint resolution to provide for the temporary regulation of consumer installment credit. Amendment in the structure of a substitute bill.

H J Res 445  Joint resolution for the appropriations for the housing and home finance agency and the Veterans Administration. Amendment providing for authorization of funds for the Columbia River Basin Project.
Appendix I

Votes in the 80th House of High Significance on Which Democrats Displayed Higher than Average Cohesion.

Election of the Speaker of the House.

H Res 103 Resolution providing for the consideration of H Con Res 20, to establish the ceiling for expenditures for the fiscal year 1948 and for appropriations for the fiscal year 1948.

H Con Res 20 Establishing the ceiling for the expenditures for the Fiscal year 1948 and for appropriations for the Fiscal year 1948. On motion to recommit.

HR 2700 Appropriations for the Department of Labor, the Federal Security Agency, and related independent agencies on motion to recommit.

HR 1 Reduce individual income tax payments. Motion to recommit.

HR 2123 Appropriations for the Department of the Interior. On motion to recommit.

HR 3203 Rent control relative to maximum rents on housing accommodations; to repeal certain provisions of Public Law 388, 79th Congress. On motion to recommit.

HR 2616 Provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey.

H J Res 153 Joint resolution providing for relief assistance to the people of countries devastated by war. On motion to recommit.

H Res 218 Resolution waiving all points of order against HR 3601, a bill making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture.

HR 3601 Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture. Motion to recommit.

HR 3950 Reduce individual income tax payments. Motion to recommit.

HR 3601 Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture. Motion to recommit the conference report.

HR 3601 Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture. Motion that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate #42.
HR 3601  Motion that the House concur the Senate amendment #42.

HR 3601  Motion that the House recede from its disagreement to Senate amendment #43 and concur.

HR 3601  Motion that the House recede from its disagreement to Senate amendment #50 and concur.

HR 1602  Motion to recommit to the committee on public land.

HR 4269  Supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1948. Motion to recede from disagreement to the Senate amendment #41 and concur.

S J Res 167  Aid in the stabilization in the commodity prices, aid in further stabilizing of the economy of the United States.

HR 4790  Reduce individual income tax payments. Motion to recommit.

HR 6481  Appropriations for government corporations and independent executive agencies. Motion to recommit.

H J Res 342  Joint resolution directing all executive departments and agencies of the federal government to make available to any and all standing, special, or select committees of the House and Senate information which may be deemed necessary to enable them to properly perform the duties delegated to them. On motion to recommit.

H Res 608  Resolution for providing for the consideration of HR 6556, a bill to extend the authority of the President under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

HR 6556  Extend the authority of the President under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Motion to recommit with instructions to extend further.

H Res 624  Resolution providing for the consideration of HR 5883, a bill making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture.

HR 5883  Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture exclusive of the farm credit administration. Motion to concur in Senate amendment #33 with the additional amendment inserting $262,500,500 in lieu of $300,000,000 for soil conservation.

HR 6935  Appropriations to supply deficiencies in certain appropriations for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1948. Motion to recommit.

HR 6771  Appropriations for military functions administered by the national military establishment.
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