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A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS.

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STABILITY AND CHANGE IN PARTY IMAGES: A
LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

by

Ronald Joseph Busch, B.A., A.M.

* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1969

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The data utilized in this study were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The data were originally collected by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. The tabulations for this research were conducted by the Computer Center of Miami University (Ohio).

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary political research of American electoral behavior has been, by and large, concerned with the individual, his predisposition to vote, his choice of vote, and reasons undergirding this choice. The product of this research expenditure has been, by any measure, remarkable. We now possess considerable knowledge about how a voter's age, sex, race, religion, social status, and partisan affiliation influence his voting behavior. We are not as well endowed with data on the motivational factors underlying this electoral behavior; but it too is impressive. But simultaneously, the discipline is confronted with some of the pitfalls commonly associated with periods of rapid growth—intellectual spurts, if you like—in our knowledge and understanding.

Clearly, political research has been directed and structured (in terms of both units of analysis and the kinds of questions asked about them) by a conformity to what Abraham Kaplan has called "the law of instrument"; that is, the tendency of social scientists to overrely on those methodological devices that have achieved worthy results and, thus, the recognition and respect of the community of scholars. A strong case can be made for identifying "the instrument" of contemporary political behavior research with those units, procedures, and techniques characteristic of survey research.

This does not mean, however, that documentary or institutional
studies have been displaced as the prevailing mode of inquiry among political scientists, but rather reflects a growing scholarly conviction, and McClosky is probably typical on this point, that "among the new research techniques employed by political scientists survey research is perhaps the most common and, up to now, the most useful." A headcount of American social scientists, and especially political scientists, now trained and using survey techniques would provide a crude indicator documenting this trend.

The survey research conducted over the past two decades has contributed to a marked increase in the attention paid the individual as the fundamental unit in political analysis; much, if not all, of our data and understanding has been limited by the responses survey researchers were able to elicit from sample respondents. The questions asked were those that the individual could answer. And the concepts and constructs generally were based on individual referents. It is no revelation, then, to say that much of the thinking about political problems (perhaps also much of the grant-giving and dissertation direction proffered) that has taken place has been deeply influenced by our interest and expertise in survey methods. As Kaplan has observed:

It comes as no particular surprise to discover that a scientist formulates problems in a way which requires for their solution just those techniques in which he himself is especially skilled.

Under the circumstances of the "law" in operation, one may legitimately ask, how does one account for these oscillations in our attention to, and utilization of, particular methodological contrivances? No doubt, these methodological fluctuations are affected,
in part, by the characteristics of the rewards available to political scientists. The nature of the rewards for the social scientist (one is moved to include those who dispense them) and the personal ego-needs of the scholar have both contributed to a pendulum-like movement in our attention to basic units of analysis. There has been a movement from a primary concern with the legal, the institutional, and the normative, to a focus on "the behavior of man as the root of politics," if we may borrow a phrase coined by Eulau. It is not so much a case of one succeeding in the profession without really trying, but rather succeeding by following those who have been successful.

Nonetheless, obedience to the "law" need not in itself be pernicious, that is, there is nothing inevitable about it; it becomes insidious only as it tends to reduce our autonomy of inquiry.

One consequence of our focus on political phenomena in which "the root is man" has been a neglect of the dynamic aspects of his behavior. There is a lamentable absence of research on man's political behavior in terms of the historical and social forces that have affected his political thoughts, attitudes, predilections to act, and actual behavior; with some exceptions to be sure, this comment is also applicable to the environmental context in which the individual responds to political acts, actors, and information. Some social scientists attribute this neglect of the dynamic and contextual dimensions directly to the primacy of survey methods in our handbag of research tools. Survey research based on national samples has "randomized," claims Ennis, the community context of voting. And in those community studies such as Lazarsfeld and his associates have conducted, the
effects of community context as a variable are precluded by focusing on a single community, presumably because the possibility of comparative survey analysis based on two or more communities is absent.6

Some time ago, V. O. Key admonished the discipline about the trends in survey research; and his words have not gone unheeded.7 His concern was twofold: first, social surveys had been dominated by social scientists with sociological and psychological proclivities. The result of this, according to Key, was that most of the politically relevant in surveys had been either excluded or neglected.

Both the characteristics of the survey instrument and the curiosities of those with a mastery of survey technique have tended to encourage a focus of attention on microscopic political phenomena more or less in isolation from the total political process.8

His second concern had more to do with the technical characteristics of the survey tool than with the characteristics and interests of the investigators themselves. Surveys, and Key was undoubtedly directing his attention to the cross section survey, up until that time of reading had been notoriously static. They had produced, with sophistication and ingenuity, graphic portrayals of a single cross section, a snapshot, of an enormously complex flow of events that constitute reality. But reality is a composite of the present as well as those antecedent conditions of the past, both shaping and thrusting the configuration of forces into the future. It is this time perspective, the historical dimension, that had been neglected in many of our best efforts.

In perhaps the most exhaustive presentation in behalf of survey methods in political science, Herbert McClosky makes a case for survey
analysis as a tool for investigating. As McClosky views the time di-

mention,

It is not necessary to conduct panel studies in order to docu-
ment trends, for this can also be done by surveys repeated on dif-
ferent samples of the same universe. Surveys conducted in se-
ries can reveal important changes in beliefs, practices, 
life styles, social characteristics, and patterns of response 
to given stimuli.

And he concluded, that "while a single survey may furnish a portrait of 
political life at a given moment in time, successive surveys on para-
lel questions become the equivalent of a moving portrait."10

As appealing as this notion of a "moving portrait" may seem, 
the application of similar (or even the same) stimuli, questionnaire 
items and questions, has not heretofore much enhanced our capacity to 
discern changes over time.

Be that as it may, it is possible, as McClosky suggests, to 
identify and describe change through several cross section surveys of 
the same universe. It is equally true that our observations are re-
stricted to the net changes, most evident in marginal analysis, and 
that we cannot isolate the phenomenon of "turnover."11

For example, Samuel Stouffer, in his 1954 study of American re-
ponses to non-conformity found that women tended to be less tolerant 
of non-conformists than men. This relationship prevailed even when 
controlling for such factors as education, region of interview, and 
interest in news about Communists, atheists, and socialists.12 Al-
though the percentage differences between sexes were not always nota-
ble the conclusion required no qualification: women were less tolerant 
than men at the time of interview. Table 1 depicts the relationship.

For the purpose of illustrating the limitations in McClosky's
TABLE 1
SEX DIFFERENCES TOWARD NON-CONFORMISTS: 1954*

<table>
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<th>Less tolerant</th>
<th>In between</th>
<th>More tolerant</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2632</td>
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*The data in this table are adapted from Chart I, p. 133 of Stouffer's study Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Wiley & Sons, Science Editions, 1963).

A superficial examination of the percentage changes permits at
least one observation: women in 1984 are more liberal than they were in 1954. The net changes are apparent, as they would be should we focus on electoral outcomes for the two political parties or, for that matter, the number of alcoholics.

In our effort to better understand the reasons for these changes we must locate the incidence of these changes. In the hypothetical data for 1984, for example, a number of questions come to mind: Is the increasing tolerance among women merely a function of age and/or experience? Or is the increase the result of a change in the universe sampled, a change brought about by the introduction of large numbers of younger, better educated women? Or were the less tolerant in the earlier study to be found largely in the upper age categories, subject in consequence to the higher rates of natural attrition? Or is the change attributable both to increasing numbers of young women (reflecting new and different patterns of political socialization) and to the depletion of the older age groups? Without some refinement in both our thinking (and methodological devices) about net change based on one-shot samples of the same universe the quest for theoretically relevant relationships will be limited.

It is one of the contentions of this research that cohort analysis offers a methodological technique for refining some of these obviously important questions necessary to understanding (and ultimately explaining) political behavior and attitudes over time.

**Methodological Considerations and the Cohort Technique**

The desire to establish a reliable body of political general-
izations has engaged political scientists in a search for the universal aspects of political behavior as opposed to the "accidentals" occurring in the political environment. Consequently, increasing numbers of political scientists have attempted to be systematic in their examination of large numbers of cases. The conviction, of course, is that adherence to large numbers representative of a population universe will reduce markedly the likelihood of the "accidental" being used as evidence from which inductively established propositions ensue.

Our concern in this dissertation is with party images in the American electorate, their pervasiveness, substantive themes, and finally, changes in these images over time. It is the last of these concerns--changing party images--that requires some explanation since we resorted to cohort analysis, a technique that has not been widely used in political research. What follows is a discussion of the cohort technique for examining changes in party images and the methodological considerations underlying this technique.

By cohort we mean any aggregate of individuals who have experienced the same event during a specific interval of time. The most common event for establishing cohort is birth year, a procedure now conventional among population demographers.

This research uses cohort technique in terms of an age-specific event, the 1952 general election. We established cohorts on the basis of age at the time of this election. We then intend to examine these age groups over the next three general elections by incrementing the age cohort with each subsequent quadrennial election, 1956, 1960, and 1964. (Cohort structure for the twelve-year period
Any attempt to tap the dynamic component of political variables and their relations involves the analysis of change. Customarily, three modes or techniques of inquiry have been recognized in this endeavor: the classical experiment based on a before-and-after analysis; the analysis of marginal differences over time for independent samples; and in the past few decades, the panel technique.

The before-and-after exponents are large in numbers; but the complex nature of socio-political relations make difficult, if even possible, the conditions of control so commonly found in the physical sciences as they test and measure the impact of some carefully specified independent variable. Because of this obstacle, social scientists more frequently engage in an analysis of marginal differences in scores for two or more independently drawn samples from the same population universe. McClosky's prescription for survey research in the social sciences, alluded to above, and his belief that these marginals provide a "moving portrait" cogently illustrates one mode of inquiry into the phenomenon of change. The panel technique is in its inception a deliberate attempt to explore and describe changes by focusing attention on the same respondent over time for the dependent variable under investigation.

The cohort technique has special utility in that it allows the secondary analysis of data gathered over time and the samples are independent. Both cohort analysis and the analysis of marginals permit the identification of changes, but the cohort mode of inquiry, in my judgment, permits greater refinement in our description of political
phenomena.

The above comments should not be construed to mean, however, that the cohort focus is without limitations. Since the data used in this research are survey research data, the limitations of survey research stand with equal force in our secondary analysis of that data. Furthermore, cohort analysis has problems which are generally intrinsic to the technique itself. We address ourselves to these problems later in this section.

We have suggested that the "cohort" method of analysis may have special significance for examining non-panel type data. To the extent that, like data derived from a panel, it permits the identification and description of change in a particular variable, or the relationship between variables, it is a worthy methodological contrivance. Before we consider the peculiar problems of the cohort method it is appropriate to note the similarities between the panel and the cohort techniques—similarities so striking as to move one scholar to describe the cohort method as a "quasi-panel" device. 13

Despite the variations in sample selection, size, and problems considered, there is agreement on the primary contribution of the panel mode of analysis: it better equips us for examining change. It permits a more refined discrimination in the analysis of the changes that occur over time, since it permits an examination of internal variation over time on a specific variable. Furthermore, the panel increases our capacity for analyzing prior political behavior and mental states that might otherwise be based on the recall of the respondent. Finally, panel data on observed changes tend to have higher statistical
significance than a change of equal size found in repeated cross sections of the universe, this owing to the fact that panels, unlike independent samples, do not compound the sampling error with each successive sample.

On the other hand, to interview repeatedly the same people over time does produce some unique problems for the social scientist. In the first place, panel studies are costly. And these costs mount rapidly with increases in sample size, the geographical area from which the sample is to be taken, and the number of interviews ("waves") called for in the research design. Inherent also is the problem of sample loss, that is, the loss of respondents due to lack of cooperation (increasingly the case with older persons), geographic mobility, disease, and death. Third, we know now that there is a "residual" effect in repeated interviews of some people. In the course of an interview something is learned; respondents become more aware of an issue that previously had little importance for them; or they might come to note inconsistencies in their position and attitude on a particular issue, institution, or question. To the extent that earlier interview experience affects subsequent interview response, the likelihood of spuriousness increases also. In his critical review of the panel technique, Jacob Goldstein has written:

Unless some means are used to estimate the effects of such prior experience (the interview situation) on subsequent responses there is the logical possibility that the obtained differences among the results of the successive interviews might be a spurious function of pre-conditioning by the earlier interview experience (or, conversely, that the pre-conditioning might result in a spurious similarity between the initial and subsequent responses).

This problem is the problem of re-interviewing bias; and the greater
the number of re-interviews prescribed in the research design, the greater the likelihood of this kind of bias creeping in to distort the final results. Finally, there are the technical problems of measurement involving both the type of scale used and errors in actual measurement.

This brief commentary on the panel technique serves as a preface to our discussion of the technique used in this research—cohort analysis—and, again, this because of the similarities between the two techniques. Both techniques utilize trend data; both have a primary interest in the process of change; both focus on units that, "age" with each timepoint in the analysis (though admittedly the potential for differences here may be large since one method is more frequently concerned with short-term analyses and the other with long-term changes). In short, both suffer the general problems inherent in dynamic or developmental analysis. The counterpoise to these similarities is that they differ fundamentally in their units of analysis.

While the individual remains the primary unit of analysis in panel studies, the unit of our attention is the cohort—an aggregate of individuals that has been made analytically distinct through some specific cohort-defining event. As Norman B. Ryder describes it, "the cohort is the aggregate of individuals within some population who experience the same event within the same time interval." Once the cohort-defining event is established it is possible to categorize large numbers of subjects on the basis of whether or not they experienced the event. This distinction having been made, it becomes possible to examine these groupings for specific differences over extended periods.
The cohort as a unit of analysis has been most frequently utilized by demographers as they focus on birth cohorts in order to determine, among other things, population increases, fertility, labor-force participation, and life experience. As a concept, it has been the subject of suggestive theoretical pieces as well as the focal point for some with empirical interests. It has been useful in examining such diverse and politically relevant problems as increasing conservatism with age (Crittenden, 1960), political participation patterns among members of a minority group (Oravets, 1967), basic legislative career patterns of National Assembly deputies in Turkey (Frey, 1965), long-term opinion changes on a particular issue (Evan, 1959), changes in the voting behavior of German women (Verba, 1965), and the effect of the political climate at the time of first vote on subsequent political behavior of an electorate (Dix, 1930).

In each of the above instances, the researchers focused not on a single individual at one point in time or over a period of time, but rather on aggregates made distinct through some identifiable commonality, that is, a cohort-defining event: time of birth, time of entry into a legislative body, time of first vote, and the differences in the environment at the time of legal maturity.

The concern of the panel analyst is with the attitudes and behavior of individuals over time. Those using cohort analysis are concerned with the same kinds of questions, but for different units of analysis. This being the case, it would be foolish to claim that one method is preferable to the other. On the other hand, cohort analysis
does have certain advantages over the panel when one has access to large banks of data that have been collected over time for the same universe of persons and the samples are independent of one another. This is the present situation. A cohort emphasis allows us to examine large bodies of data collected over time (and through independent election-year samples). Panels, conceived differently, offer little solace to the student who wants to do secondary analyses of data bank holdings.

Whether cohort analysis will prove to be the tool for offsetting our past, and perhaps current, inability to assimilate as quickly as we collect the massive amounts of data is yet another question. The fact that, as a tool, cohort analysis provides an alternative method for examining the existing data seems sufficient reason for its being given careful thought by students seeking further insights into the dynamic aspects of American electoral behavior.

Implicit in our discussion of the panel method is the idea that the advantages of the panel are the advantages of the cohort mode and vice versa. Such is not quite the case since there are some important distinctions between the two methods of analysis. First, except in very small samples from a limited universe, the problem of reinterview bias is drastically reduced in cohort analysis. It is highly unlikely that individuals sampled in, say 1956, will also be sampled in 1960 or 1964. Second, the issue of sample "mortality" (losses or alterations in sample units) also varies somewhat. As in the panel design, one can assume that some losses will occur in the aggregate membership of the age cohorts through normal pathological processes and, of course,
death; however, the redeeming compensation is that neither geographic mobility, at least in the national samples, nor respondent disenchantment with additional interviews seriously affect an analysis based on age cohorts.

Reliance on cohort analysis reflects, at least implicitly, a conviction as to its merit for the secondary analysis of extant data; a belief in its utility should be evaluated and tested in terms of research outcomes. This conviction ought not, however, obscure the fact that assumptions and problems exist for those who intend on using the cohort as their organizational focus.

Since our cohort focus is based on data collected through survey research techniques, it is obvious that the problems and limitations of survey research will have some bearing on our study. We know, for example, that all data generated through surveys have particular kinds of biases attributable, in turn, to different kinds of error factors. To begin, all samples of a population universe, regardless of the size—and of course assuming that the sample does not exhaust the universe—suffer the stigma of "sampling error." Another type of error results from the interviewer, his ability to establish rapport with the respondent, his mannerisms, diligence, and experience. The respondent is also a source of error or bias in survey research to the extent that he reports inaccurately (the question of intention aside). Beyond these error sources are those errors that occur after the information has been collected in questionnaire form. Errors in the codification, tabulation, measurement, and analysis phases of research round out the major categories of sources of errors that contribute to what is called more
generally the problem of reliability, that is, anything which tends to create different results under theoretically identical conditions.\textsuperscript{19}

It is the naive, if not foolish, individual who does not interpret survey data with these errors in mind. We have assumed, for purposes of this research, that these errors exist; and they invariably and especially do when sample sizes run into the thousands and there are hundreds of workers contributing to the final product.

While these kinds of errors in survey research doubtless take their toll, research on the problem of survey data reliability suggests that the emphasis on cohorts and cohort consistency in terms of averages and frequencies, aggregate scores, will be more reliable than the scores for individuals. As Campbell and Katona have reported, an analysis of scores for aggregates rather than scores for individuals, tends to make for greater reliability.\textsuperscript{20}

The implication of this methodological finding is that the reliability of aggregate scores and frequencies is greater than the reliability when individuals serve as the basic unit of analysis over time. For our party images, then, one might conjecture that despite the shifts in particular images, and their salience for individuals, the aggregate scores might better reflect the general environment of the total cohort as that environment, and the perceptions of the party in it, is experienced by the cohort membership.

What conclusions as are drawn from this research can only be
made for our age aggregates. We err in thinking that somehow individ­
uals and their behavior and party images can be explained on the
basis of our data. What we can generalize too are the age groupings
which we have called "cohorts."

Although the seriousness of the problem of "mortality" in panel
studies is reduced by a cohort emphasis, a cohort focus produces a
problem uniquely its own, namely, the "infusion" of new individuals
into the original cohorts. Just as new birth cohorts provide the im-
petus for structural transformations in a society, so also new cohort
members may be thrust into our cohort structure and thus become an
extraneous source of change. To the extent that these newly infused
cohort members actually become the source of data there is increased
likelihood that contamination of the data will occur. The contamina-
tion is attributable to the fact that the original groups (cohorts),
defined by some cohort-defining event, has been altered through the
intervention of individuals who were not included as cohort members
initially.

The objectives of this research, then, are several: first,
we want to examine and describe the popularly-held images of the two
major parties during the period 1952-1964. In his critical survey of
the voting literature, Peter Rossi noted two reasons for the authors of
the Elmira study not having grappled adequately with the impact of
party organization and activities on the electorate, one of which was
that "the effects of the political activities of organizations are long
run rather than short run in character." An assumption of this re-
search is that the four election studies used are consistent enough
In terms of item continuity and span a period of time sufficiently long to allow a systematic exploration of the perceptions and attitudes of parties, and thus to better suggest the nature and characteristics of this long run effect.

Second, and more analytically, we will examine the relation between these popularly-held party images (attitudes toward the major parties) and party identification, party vote, and other important variables over the same period.

A third purpose of this research is to suggest and explore the cohort technique as one alternative for bridging the gulf between mass electoral behavior as depicted through cross sectional surveys and the historical and socio-economic forces underlying these political activities and attitudes. A cohort focus utilizing the cohort as the unit of analysis (dependent variable being party image) allows a measure of continuity that was missing in even the two earlier voting studies based on a panel design.  

Finally, we are interested in the residual question of "timing" in research strategy. The logic of the argument takes the following course. The array of stimuli in a presidential election year (usually the mass media are pointed to as evidence) are exceptional and excessive and, thus, tend to distort the "real" attitudes and feelings about political organizations and personalities. And insofar as presidential elections reflect but a miniscule proportion of the total number of elections in the United States, we have more to gain from examining the elections of a less conspicuous nature. Donald Mathews and James Prothro, who suggest the same type of "halo" effect in their study of
party images in the South, provide a standard (non-election year sample) against which the party images of this research (presidential election year samples) may be compared and evaluated.

The election year studies analyzed in this research are those conducted by The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, for the years 1952, 1956, 1960, and 1964. The discussion to follow will focus on two concerns: the relevance of the party image variable for political analysis; and consideration of the cohort technique as it specifies our unit of analysis.

**Party Image Variable**

That the two major American parties have so long endured, and continue to flourish, is evidence of both the popular acceptance of them in the nature of things and also the scholarly consensus about their instrumentality for a viable democratic society. In fact, there is scarcely an area of scholarly interest which excludes party as either a key organizing concept (if not the key concept) or as a variable having considerable explanatory significance.

Political scientists have examined the relationship between the individual and the political party in a number of ways. A detailed discussion, or even a survey, of the ways in which party has had application to political institutions, actors, constituents, and the electorate would carry us far beyond the limits of our concern here. Suffice it to say that the range of the application has been broad and the conceptions numerous. More recent conceptions would have to include party as the primary aggregative agency as it mobilizes supports and demands in campaigns and government; party as primary "cue-giver," issue
simplifier, and opinion maker for the citizen confronted with a bewildering variety and number of political stimuli issuing forth from the arcana of modern government; for yet others, party stands as a symbol, an object of both commitment and veneration. As Graham Wallas long ago observed the needs of the average citizen:

... something is required simpler and more permanent, something which can be loved and trusted, and which can be recognized at successive elections as being the same thing as was loved and trusted before, and a party is such a thing.

It is unnecessary to delve into the array of forces that moved increasing number of political scientists into the ranks of the behavioralists. Among the many scholars who had been discontented with what we knew and where we were going, several charted the terrain that had been traversed in reaching the present ground.

For those few forerunners of behavioralism who attempted to quantify political phenomena, aggregative data analysis was the prevailing model of inquiry. The advantages of gross data analysis were obvious. Data were derived largely from public record, roll-call votes, census counts, and precinct voting statistics. The availability of the data made it a primary target for exploitation; the data were sometime, as in the case of precinct voting statistics, exhaustive and thus not jaundiced by sampling errors; moreover, the idea that class (income), sex, race, age, and religion somehow influenced political behavior was a priori reasonable enough to make the reservoir of officially collected statistics more than welcome as a substitute for some of the normative concerns of the day. This legacy is reflected in the first panel study by Lazarsfeld and his associates. But the
discipline has advanced substantially beyond the dicta of the Erie County Study, that "... a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially." And that "social characteristics determine political preference." To put it bluntly, the problem for subsequent research was that these same "social characteristics," while changing very slowly and sometimes at glacial speed, frequently contributed very little to our understanding the provocative shifts from one party to another over the short run.

Rather than merely a person's income, his religion, his social status, and education, political scientists under the influence of Angus Campbell and his colleagues are wont to look at, in addition to the aforementioned, party identification, issue orientation, attitudes toward the parties and their candidates, and the underlying processes of motivation, perception, and identification.

Perhaps at no single point is this shift from strictly sociological to social-psychological interests more evident than in the primacy attached to the concept of party identification. It is said, with some justification, that if one knows the party affiliation of a voter, or a judge, or a congressman, he is better able to predict the person's political behavior than with any other variable. While party identification presently stands as the most fruitful indicator for an individual's voting behavior there is still a measure of scholarly uneasiness. In large part this is due to our awareness that partisan attachments tend to be far more durable than the immediacy of a vote for either of the candidates in a presidential election. In other words, while a person's identification with a particular party is
stable and durable over time (perhaps unshakably so) his voting be-
behavior is more susceptible to the vagaries of more transient stimuli
and, thus, less stable and durable when it comes time to cast a ballot
for one presidential candidate or the other.

While concurring in the assumption that a person's standing
party loyalties and his position in the social structure have a pro-
found effect on his voting behavior, it is equally true that these
fixed party loyalties and the sociological variables may not always
satisfactorily account for the vote. In 1952, as in 1956, party
identification proved to be less salient for voters as one of every
five Democratic identifiers moved into the Eisenhower ranks. Though
there was no significant decline in the numbers of voters identifying
with the Democratic party, large numbers of these "Democrats" voted in-
consistently by casting a ballot for the attractive candidate of the
Republican party. Moreover, the distribution of the population by sex,
age, race, occupation, and other important sociological variables
changed very little between 1948 and 1952, yet the Republican propor-
tion of the two-party vote increased in nearly every category. 30

It is contended here that these electoral movements producing
"deviant" elections (or elections reflecting a lack of confidence in
the administration) may be further illuminated by attaching greater
significance to the public attitudes toward the major parties, their
candidates, and party issues. Although there were discernible differ-
ences between the electorate of 1948 and that of 1956, the popular re-
sponse to the Republican incumbent in 1956 was much to the advantage of
the Republican party, just as the issues and candidate in 1948 worked
to the disadvantage of the party. On attitudes and images, Campbell and his colleagues have written:

If we are to understand what leads the voter to his decisions at the polls we must know how he sees the things to which this decision relates. In casting a vote the individual acts toward a world of politics in which he perceives the personalities, issues, and the parties and other groupings of a presidential contest. His image of these matters may seem exceedingly ill-formed, but his behavior makes sense subjectively in terms of the way these political objects appear to him.31

This conviction about the relevance of attitudes and attitude-objects is not without some empirical support. Using data from the presidential elections of 1952 and 1956, Stokes, Campbell and Miller obtained a multiple correlation of more than .7 for voting choice and a set of attitudes immediately supporting voting choice.32 As indices of partisan attitudes these authors utilized six dimensions; the attitudes toward the two candidates (2); attitude toward domestic issues; attitude toward group-party relationship; attitude toward foreign issues; and attitude toward the two parties as managers of government.

Less allied to our interests is the study of political perception and partisan images for two generations conducted by Richard Dodge and Eugene Uyekl. These authors addressed themselves to two related issues: the "image which respondents held of the two parties with respect to their ability to handle current issues"; and the 'attitudes toward events of the present day and recent past. . . ."33 The concept of party image was operationalized through responses to questionnaire items on fourteen issues. Six of these issues were designated and perceived as being clearly Republican, and five were considered Democratic. When the issues were ordered by rank from the two generations (college students and parents) according to the greatest percentage credited to
the Republicans and Democrats, the rank order correlations obtained between generations were .91 and .93, respectively.34

More recently, one finds the image research of Donald Mathews and James Prothro.35 They too were dissatisfied with the imperfect relationship between the mainstay concepts of party identification, party registration, and the party vote. Their objective was to explore party images in the South, using measures and tests quite different from those used by Dodge and Uyeki, but similar to the formulations of the earlier Survey Research Center studies under Angus Campbell's direction. Two rather remarkable findings were obtained from their research. First, and contrary to much of the folklore of politics, they found that southern images of the parties were not substantially different from the images outside of the South. Second, and the prospects suggested by this are intriguing, they found that party image appeared to have an effect on voting over and above that of party identification.36

The Survey Research Center, beginning with its 1952 election study, has consistently used open-ended questions for establishing party images in the electorate.37 Thus, data are available for an analysis of both the content of these party images and also the frequency of the references made for the four presidential election year studies. We know, for example, that sixty-five per cent of the 1952 sample made favorable references to the Democratic party, while only forty-eight per cent offered something they liked about the Republicans.38 And that in terms of both positive and negative references to the two parties, the Democratic party was the object of most commentary --good and bad alike. The evaluative themes are critical to understanding these mass precepts. For instance, we know that the
Democratic party was viewed as the "party of prosperity," good times, the party of the little man and the poor, and that it evoked a very favorable response in terms of domestic policy of the New Deal-Fair Deal coloration. The responses favoring the Republican party, when there were differences, were pronounced in terms of its ability to handle foreign affairs (thirteen per cent to three per cent) and the favorable impressions made by the party leadership (thirteen per cent to seven per cent),\(^{39}\) while the most pronounced image liability for the Republicans focused on the group associations of the party (two per cent to thirty-two per cent).\(^{40}\)

Of greater theoretical interest is the attempt by Campbell and his associates to plot the changes in these attitudes at the terminus of Eisenhower's first administration.\(^{41}\) They found a decline of fifty per cent in the number of prosperity and depression references; a closing of the gap between the parties on social welfare issues; a further enhancement of the Republican image as the party that knows how to manage foreign affairs and keep the country out of war. And it comes as no surprise to see the increase in the popularity of the General in the mid-1950's. These findings and the assumptions will be recapitulated in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

Convention dictates that some prefatory remarks about the primary substantive focus--party images--be included. Rather than hazard the pitfalls and controversy common to definitional debates, party image has been conceived in a very broad and workable fashion. For purposes of this research images may be thought of as perceptions, or attitudes, or in Harold Isaac's graphic phrase--"scratches on our
mind. Like an attitude, an image must have an object; it is nonsense to speak of images without objects. Like an attitude, an image embraces both affective and cognitive components; and inclusion of the former makes an image distinct from an opinion. The question of object perception becomes critical. In the study of the political we assume that those elements of politics that are perceived, are both seen and evaluated.

An image may be thought of as an intermediate phenomenon between an attitude and some activity, either behavioral or mental (evaluative). Images, like opinions, may express or reflect larger, more highly structured attitudes and, like symbols, they may reflect more or less of what actually exists. In other words, it is not essential that images of either of the two major political parties (or anything else for that matter) have ties to the real world. Some party images undoubtedly correspond to the objective position of the party on a particular issue or set of them; but other images may have precious little, if any, correspondence with real-world phenomena and the party with which they identify. Under the latter situation, of course, the opportunity for "reality testing" is either absent or totally ignored as the individual sustains pre-existing notions. It is important to note, however, that for those individuals holding party images void of empirical referents, the images may have a psychological import that over-rides the obvious incongruity perceived by the trained observer.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have tried to do a number of things. First, some of the limitations inherent in survey research were noted.
Special mention must be given to the problem of discerning and describing change through the use of cross section surveys. Second, noted also was the growing concern of scholars for the attitudinal components underpinning political behavior. Third, it was suggested that cohort analysis—with its focus on groups of individuals over time—provided an element of continuity absent in all but the panel study. It is this element that allows the researcher to describe change more accurately and systematically. It is this cohort emphasis that makes the prospect of secondary analysis of the single variable of party image so attractive.

Indigenous to cohort analysis are problems that ought not to be begged, problems with which the methodologist can justifiably take issue. However, the shortcomings, such as they are and turn out to be, ought not in themselves be a priori evidence for not making an attempt. With the single exception of Crittenden's unpublished dissertation, the cohort mode of secondary analysis of political data has not been put to the test. The data are available in abundance, and the time is ripe for those who take encouragement in Kaplan's words that "Excessive effort can be diverted from substantive to methodological problems, so that we are forever perfecting how to do something without ever getting around to doing it even imperfectly."
CHAPTER II

PARTY IMAGES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

The importance of man as a social and political animal has been recognized for at least the last two thousand four hundred years. That *Homo politicus* is also a very discriminating entity is a conviction of relatively recent times. The individual in modern industrialized society, to an unprecedented degree, is subject to a vast number and enormously complex array of stimuli.

This multitude of stimuli, potential and real, impinging on the individual's sensory mechanism takes on special significance when one remembers that organisms have a highly limited span of immediate memory. The systemic limitations of the individual as the receptor of environmental stimuli and messages, that is to say, the relatively low threshold for handling the available stimuli in the individual's milieu, makes imperative some kind of shorthand and short cut process(es) in managing, and thus making more meaningful, this same milieu. To cope with his environment the individual indulges in the process of perception, an activity that comes usually with ease and little, if any, noticeable discomfort. The individual but samples the universe of available stimuli and invariably this sample has relevance to his existing frame of reference. These limiting activities of the individual involve two steps: (1) perceptual selectivity insofar as what is perceived is largely determined by what already exists, and (2) information analysis
or decoding, that is, the attempt to locate incoming information, with respect to one's storage of past information and thus give it meaning. 49

One conclusion from this, then, is that men see what they look for and with some consistency observe that which they anticipate seeing. There is not necessarily a paradox here. This phenomenon is simply a function of the systemic capacities of man confronted with an overwhelming universe. In part, too, it is a result of man's being a purposeful creature who attempts to make sense, at the lowest level, of his life space.

Political man, thus, is disposed to see the better side of those objects to which he is favorably oriented; and he tends to play down or ignore information contrary to his predilections. The individual disposed to one political party will more frequently note the good works of that party than will he the shortcomings. This holds equally for particular politicians, political issues, and symbols. This does not mean, however, that all incoming information of a percept-disturbing quality will be ignored. To infer this would truncate the process of political socialization to the time at which political images, opinions, percepts, and attitudes were first formed. Such is simply not the case; and to assume that it is would contradict much of what we know about the learning process. 50

Party images in the electorate is the focus of this dissertation. Some images or percepts held by the electorate are undoubtedly more critical than others. By critical we mean they are both more widespread in the electorate and that they have a certain degree of
stability over time. If it were possible to examine the impact on particular "critical" images for the individual, one would doubtless find that they are much like the construct attitude, as defined by social psychologists.

An attitude is the predisposition of the individual to evaluate some object or aspect of his environment in a favorable manner. An attitude reflects an enduring organization of "... motivational, emotional, perceptual, and cognitive processes with respect to some aspect of the individual's world." An attitude differs from a belief in that it embraces affective properties, the emotional dimension. An opinion is the verbal expression of an attitude (though as any student of interaction analysis knows, an attitude may be expressed in non-verbal ways also). In their study of the American voter, Angus Campbell and his colleagues at the Survey Research Center employ the terms attitude and image interchangeably.

While a sampling of the views of the parties at a single point in time certainly reflects immediate party images or percepts, it is equally plausible to argue that these immediate images may not be anything more than an immediate impression in which case an important distinction is neglected. That is, party images may not have the qualities of durability and affect so necessary to attitudes.

Newcomb, Turner, and Converse employ a useful distinction in making clear the idea of durability as a property of attitude structures. The distinction turns on the spatial location of the object of the attitude for the individual, namely, whether the object is salient or central. Object salience refers to that which, owing to immediate
circumstances, the individual has become sensitized to; while centrality refers to a durable and generalized salience for an attitude object.

. . . salience is a short-term phenomenon that is a function of the immediate situation; centrality refers to a much more durable interest on the part of the individual in certain objects or kinds of objects, with these objects remaining important for him through many differing specific situations.55

Consider the public disclosure of graft, corruption, and immoral conduct of party officials in office. Depending on the spatial location of the object, party office-holders, for the individual, one can see how differences in the perceptual process occur. For those irrevocably hostile and ambivalent toward the "politician" as political object, the interpretative process may end with the conclusion that, as suspected all along, politicians are a corrupt breed of men and this is just additional evidence of their venality. In this case the incoming information about public venality is compatible with well-established attitudes (negative) toward the parties and politicians. The attitude object in this situation is quite central given our definition above. On the other hand, if these attitudes toward party do not exist variations in the perceptual process occur.

The public disclosure of graft may be uppermost in the minds of the electorate in an immediate sense (and probably sustained so long as the news media play it up). One may, on the basis of positive attitudes toward politicians (or on rare occasion their absence) imagine that the receiver of this item of information interprets it to mean that graft sometimes occurs among politicians and, of course, those who pay them. With the passage of time the salience of the image becomes diffuse. Thus two different interpretations of essentially the same information by and large a result of the dimensions of object centrality for the
individual.

In summary, a percept that has durability may fruitfully be thought of as an attitude. And for that part of the electorate that has fairly well established configurations of percepts about the party of their choosing, and obloquy, percepts and images of the parties are indeed attitudes.

A full-blown objectively rational perceptual structure of, say, the Democratic Party, in order to mirror reality would have to include such diverse and occasionally contradictory elements as the following: the party of the "poor," "the little man" and the worker; the segregationist party in the South; the boss-ridden party in the Urban North; the party of prosperity, profligate spending, high prices, and such personages as Jefferson, Jackson and the second Roosevelt. Real properties of the above kind can merely suggest the richness and complexity of these partisan attitudes in the United States.

We have briefly indicated those activities involved in the perceptual process and noted the importance of the object, whether central or salient, for the individual receiving incoming information. We have further suggested that these perceptual activities produce a discrepancy between attitudes and images of political objects and the objects objectively viewed. We now turn our attention to those characteristics of the perceptual process regardless of the information, the affect direction, and evaluative aspects.

The extent to which party attitudes reflect a single item, or two, points up one of the most common characteristics of the perceptual process: the tendency to view objects as wholes and thus simplify
reality. As incoming information about political objects, events, and situations is received the individual invariably is confronted with less-than-complete information. There is a tendency for the individual under these circumstances to make sense out of the information by evaluating it as though it were complete. For example, when one reads the following words—republican, reactionary, radical, Democrat—he is unlikely to catch the deliberately misspelled words on the first reading. Some party followers of the Democratic standard may well view the Democratic party as the party of F. D. Roosevelt, and the party of the worker, the ethnic and racial minorities. A satisfactory phenomenological approach will emphasize the fact that for these persons the party perceived is indeed the party. But in our example the Democratic party is that, and then some. In the instance cited both a tendency to completeness and oversimplification took place.

Despite the tendency to selectively perceive in wholes, the individual perceiver scarcely begins with a Lockian tabula rasa. The primacy of information, the vividness of the stimuli, and the frequency of these stimuli all contribute to cue perception—and all are at work in determining the items for selection from the innumerable stimuli in the environment.

A second characteristic of the process of perception is the tendency to categorization and classification. The perception of object information is deeply affected by the existing mental categories and structures which aid the individual in making sense of his environment. The absence of categories, stereotypes, and attitude structures may well
mean that the information "out there" will not advance appreciably beyond the receiver's perceptual screen. Furthermore, the information that is assimilated has valid meaning for the individual. The literature on the phenomena of prejudice, crowd and rumor psychology is replete with examples of individuals fitting the facts to their needs and mental predispositions at a moment in time. An example of how students could be moved to view a particular issue with the introduction of an additional property of the percept is available in Chapter I footnote 25. In this case, the congressional party alignment was made known to the students; once the initially neutral incoming information was coupled with the party cue, the information as well as the object issue became much less an academic question for the class members.

In the now-classic study of students' evaluation of character traits, Asch showed the impact of a single word on the perception of a number of personality traits. Asch gave two groups identical trait lists save for a single item. To one group the traits given were: intelligent, skillful, industrious, warm, determined, practical, and cautious. The second group was given the same list with words in identical order, but in the position of the word warm the word cold appeared. The findings showed that, despite the similarities, two drastically different personalities emerged from the students' descriptions. Hence, on the basis of a single word— one having considerable centrality, in Newcomb's terms, all of the other traits had been changed in quality. It is neither coincidental nor surprising to find, thus, the invocation of particular symbols in campaign oratory as the major contestants try to maximize their appeal to the general elector-
"Creeping socialism," "deficit" spending, "buy American," "law and order," "corruption" in government have all had their day as campaign themes and, given the proper circumstances, will doubtless again be marshalled into service by those who calculate it to their political advantage.

Another dimension of perceptual organization involves the liking of disliking, the acceptance or rejection of the object to be categorized. Republicans are more at home with Republicans and, assuming they do not live in a predominantly Democratic community, tend to feel fewer constraints on their social relations. One dislikes, or at least has a healthy skepticism of that which is unfamiliar and untried, and especially that which stands opposite to what exists as goal values. A corollary to this is that people are favorably oriented to individuals who share a particularly liked object or who in some other way relate to the esteem for certain commonly valued ideas. A penchant for expensive oriental rugs, like an affinity for "bird-watching" tends to predispose one to favorably perceive others from which (or about which) similar and complimentary information is forthcoming.

A third tendency in perceptual organization is to persist in established views. This tendency is related to the primacy of the party images, that is, the tenure, so to speak, of them for the individual. Those percepts and cognitive structures formed early and nurtured for a number of years are cherished sometimes despite considerable information to the contrary. Admittedly, some persons have shown a remarkable facility for explaining away contrary evidence. But there remains a threshold beyond which only an aberrant individual ventures in support
of his illusions.

Finally, in the organization of percepts and cognitive structures there is a tendency to consistency. The notion of consistency refers to the "fit" of incoming information with the entire cognitive net, or "mapping," extant in the individual. This tendency has been well documented in experimental research and has been useful to students of social perception. A person who is prejudiced toward one minority group tends to be potentially prejudicial toward other minority groups. The process of political socialization of the individual probably not only predisposes the individual favorably toward one party but also predisposes him negatively toward the opposition party. One might say that this phenomenon of consistency is a necessary aspect in the perceptual process whereby incoming information leads to percepts with meaning and ultimately the more complex, the more comprehensive attitudes.

Factors Influencing the Perceptual Process

If political behavior and the perception of political objects and situations are functions of the interaction between the individual and the environment at a point in time, then it is probably true that a number of forces must be working on the individual as he takes in politically relevant information and gives it some meaning since both behavior and perception have shown marked variations for sub-groups and individuals in the short run.

At the most fundamental level one can point to the personal needs, physiological and psychic, of the individual. It is now commonplace to recognize that subjects experimentally deprived of food over varying periods of time will consistently see more food
or eating related images than those less deprived and viewing the same ambiguous stimuli. The physical needs for sex and shelter may equally affect the interpretation of stimuli from the individual's universe. Personal too, but intra-psychic, are those tension states produced or reduced with feelings of dependence, ego-enchantment, aggression, and self esteem, all of which also affect perceptual activities at one time or another. Furthermore, both physiological states (especially age and sex differences) and more pervasive personality traits shape the ways in which political objects, events, and experiences are viewed.

More generally, one might cite the social and political culture as they orient the individual to certain kinds of information and also disorient him to other information in the environment. The impact of the political culture may be viewed in terms of how the voter perceives the political system, the regime, the political parties, his self-image, and his image of others. In the United States, for example, an important cultural artifact would surely be the color of a man's skin. Race is a property or characteristic quickly noticed in political objects and events, and one to which one can almost immediately assign meaning.

In their study of political culture in five nations, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba sought to probe the issue of partisan feeling. Two measures were used to show the "feeling" toward the parties in the five democracies: a comparison of "self" and "other" images, views of one's own party and of the party of the opposition; second, was the indicator of depth and severity of partisan cleavage; this was tapped by
examining attitudes toward marriage across party lines. All respondents were presented with a list of attributes and asked to choose those items most descriptive of supporters of the opposition party. American respondents were found to be least hostile and antagonistic toward members of the opposition. They had more positive things to say about members in the opposition party; and they had fewer negative responses in describing membership of the opposition. A reflection of the coolness of partisan attitudes in the United States, the absence of partisan cleavage—if you will, may be seen in the overwhelming majorities in both parties expressing indifference to the partisan affiliations of the future mates of their children. As we shall see below the data of this dissertation does not substantially alter their conclusion.

Somewhere between individual needs and general cultural forces influencing perceptual activities lie group related, or social, variables. The nature of the individual's identification and affiliation with groups, whether primary (face-to-face), secondary, or reference, has also been found to have a decided impact on the ways in which the individual partakes in perceptual activities.

Despite the more general importance of the political culture for determining the context of political behavior and perceptions, in a more immediate and direct sense the impact of the family has equal if not greater significance as a carrier of opinions, attitudes, and identifications for the individual. The impact of the family and early upbringing on the individual's perceptual activities is generally recognized as one of the most decisive forces in the structuring of his
cognitive and affective orientations toward the political world. What evidence we have suggests that one of the earliest items assimilated by young people is party affiliation. Greenstein found, in his classic study of New Haven school children between the ages of nine and thirteen, that as early as age nine the children could accept as a matter of faith one party or the other, and invariably the association was with the party of their parents. More generally, his data also indicate that the affective, or feeling, dimension for the children was far more central and prevalent in these early years than the cognitive properties so common to adolescents.

Another finding of interest focused on the orientation of the children to politics and politicians. Children, prior to adolescence, did not share the ambivalence towards politics and politicians, cynicism, and distrust, so characteristic of their elders. Authority figures, especially the President and the Mayor of New Haven, were perceived as benign individuals filling public roles, a perception that changes drastically during adolescence to correspond more closely with adult views.

Although the pre-puberty child may have little difficulty in identifying and sustaining meaningful images of political personalities, and the donkey and elephant as party symbols, the importance of his experiences ought not to be excluded as factors influencing his psychological frame of reference. Indeed, a common finding among analysts of political socialization is the increasing degree of issue identity and salience beyond the "formative" years. Though the inculcation of particular images, attitudes, and beliefs may come later, they are
critical to an understanding of political behavior. On sources of perceptual information, David Krech and Richard Crutchfield say that

What is true about our experiences with objects and people is also true about our experiences with events and ideas. Strange and new social mores, taboos, are not seen by us as meaningless but are immediately perceived with meaning. We cannot help doing this. Man is an organizing animal.65

Although the correlation is usually positive and high, the fact that there is no one-to-one relationship between the attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of children and parent on all issues is evidence that other factors contribute to the individual's mental make-up, factors which subsequently influence the perceptual activities of the person in later life. Among these secondary forces, one finds members of the extended family, church, peer groups, reference groups, occupational associates, education experiences, and generational events (experiences peculiar to the person's age and social-economic status).66

Despite the importance attached to the family as agent affecting the perceptual activities of the person, it would be hazardous to assume anything like a deterministic relationship. The impact of the family varies with the number and importance of other socializing agencies in society. And when other important primary and secondary agencies take part in the person's life we can expect the influence of the family to decline. It is quite probable that, as Dawson and Prewitt suggest, as an individual moves into later life the influence of the family decreases while the influences of other forces correspondingly increase.67 Thus the objects perceived, the way in which they are perceived, and the situation surrounding them are more deserving of our attention than, say, a focus on agents affecting perceptual activities simply in terms of
their "sequence" or chronological order in the life span.

We have defined perceptual activities in terms of both perceptual selectivity and the decoding of that information and the extent of acceptance and rejection by the individual receiver. Ultimately, our interest should move from the question of "how" individuals view political phenomena to "why" they do. The present research intends to systematically examine the former question for American political parties.

Political objects, as objects of perception, important to the student of electoral behavior and mass percepts would have to include the political parties, party nominees, symbols, and issues. In light of the corpus of scholarly literature, it is neither gratuitous nor fanciful to view the party as the primary object of perception in the person's political world. The complexities of the American political parties, however, with their federal structure, cooperation by mutual consent, and the absence of the sanctions necessary to insure party conformity, cohesions and discipline, make for a view of the party as an entity highly fragmented and kaleidoscopic.

Party candidates and office holders may also serve as focal points for the electorate. The attractiveness of a candidate like Eisenhower to the electorate is obvious. That lesser party notables may also have a contingent of support in the electorate is a fact too frequently ignored. The names of Taft, Vandenberg, Thurmond, and Wallace point up additional objects to which positive and negative valences are often attached, feelings often instrumental to the voter as he filters and selects out information in preparation for the act of voting.
On the basis of our knowledge of the voter's ideological uncertainty, his cognitive structures related to political institutions, persons, and events, his sophistication in matters of public policy, it would be gratuitous to entertain great expectations about either his doctrinal purity or understanding (or even identification) of issues of public import.

Implications, Political and Other of the Perceptual Process

To suggest the characteristics of perceptual organization and some of the variables affecting perceptual activities, does not shed much light on the relation between these activities and the individual. On a higher level of concern, for example, one is hard put to understand the relations between the perceptual process, party-related attitudes, and the conditions of, and for, the stability or instability of democratic political systems. Research evidence suggests that we all partake in perceptual activities, willingly or unwillingly. But until we are in a position to better specify and refine our understanding of attitudes as they work for the individual perceiver we are bound to continued speculation and less understanding.

One can say that attitudes are critical to the activities of the perceptual process. That is, they determine, in large part, that which is selectively taken in; and they also influence heavily the way in which sense is made of that selected from the environment. It stands to reason, then, that the perceptual process is vitally linked to attitudes as they serve the needs of the individual.

There is no pat answer to the question of what functions
attitudes fulfill for the individual. Daniel Katz, in an excellent synthesis, surveyed the problems and prospects of attitudes on the basis of four functional categories: the adjustive, the ego-defensive, the value-expressive, and the knowledge function. These functional categories lend themselves as a useful starting point.

The adjustment function reflects the person's "minimax" strategy in pursuit of the pleasure-pain principle. We mean by "minimax" that the individual strives to maximize his gains and minimize his losses, the cost and benefits being calculated in terms of the satisfaction or deprivation of needs and desires resulting from a particular attitude object. Attitudes are often instrumental to some preferred end state or goal. A favorable attitude toward the Democratic party (the object) as the instrument through which the individual receives benefits (pleasures) in reducing need states epitomizes this function. The obvious association of the Democratic party with the interests of minority and ethnic groups since 1932 suggests the kinds of attitudes toward the Democratic party one might expect from these people (whether this still holds is, of course, an open question and ought not to be begged by assumption).

Attitudes serving to reduce threats to an individual's ego are a second function. Any form of threat to the individual's ego may be countered by attitudes which help to protect the individual from internally induced anxieties as well as from facing up to external dangers. When high expectations are confronted with low-achievement, the low achiever may well harbor attitudes in defense of his low performance. The son from a professional family who settles for a manual job
may find the attitudes of loyalty to the company, excessive emphasis on quality work, and excessive conscientiousness in the performance of the day to day work tasks quite useful in defending him from the "achievement" norms of middle class society.

Bernard Berelson and his associates documented this "tension-avoidance" function in their study of upstate-Republican Elmira, New York. Berelson found that when mis-perception of a candidate's stand on an issue occurred, it varied consistently in favor of the respondent. Issue inconsistencies between the presidential candidates and the respondents were reduced in the extent of that inconsistency. Most Republicans and Democrats agreed that Truman was for price controls, and public housing, and against Taft-Hartley; and that Dewey favored Taft-Hartley and opposed the other two. But when differences did appear they revealed a tendency to perceive the candidates' positions in terms of their opinions on these issues.71

Among those Republicans who favored price controls seventy per cent also perceived Dewey as favoring price controls; and among those who oppose price controls eighty-six per cent tended to see Dewey in opposition to price controls.

In almost every instance respondents perceive their candidate's stand on these issues as similar to their own and the opponent's stand as dissimilar—whatever their own position.72

Moreover, these analysts found that the number of "don't knows" was higher among partisans who themselves took a different position from their party candidate or the same position as the opponent.73

Displacement, rationalization of political acts and opinions, projection, denial, and withdrawal (complete and partial) are commonly
employed defense mechanisms utilized in protecting the ego from anxiety producing situations. The commonality of all these devices is that they either function to reduce tension-states occurring within the individual or they safeguard the ego from some external threat.  

Attitudes may also allow the expression of particular values, what Katz has called the "value-expressive" function. The quest for self-identity, recognition, prestige, is critical to this function of attitudes.

Satisfactions . . . accrue to the person from the expression of attitudes which reflect his cherished beliefs and his self-image. The reward to the person in these instances is not so much a matter of gaining social recognition or monetary rewards as of establishing his self-identity and confirming his notion of the sort of person he sees himself to be.

Attitudes, finally, not only take shape and verbal expression in order to meet a specific need, but also may help to make comprehensible the world in which the person lives. People need attitudes, frames of reference, and standards whereby information "out there" has some meaning for them. The criticism of stereotyping may well enamor those concerned with being objective and rational; the absence of stereotypes is well-nigh impossible to dismiss as a requisite to perceptual activities. Jerome Bruner has cast this need in a telling phrase: the need to "minimize surprise." The perceptual activities of selectivity, recoding, storing, and recalling, all contribute to our capacity to anticipate and forecast so as to minimize this element of surprise.

These are some of the functions of attitudes in general for the person. In aggregate terms, it is conceivable to view the distribution of certain attitudes as they provide the matrix within which elites
must operate in their day-to-day activities. The content, extent, and
distribution of opinion on an issue may contribute to an environment
for the governors that is permissive, supportive, or demanding.\footnote{77}

A permissive environment is one in which there is little popular
consensus and interest in a particular object, program, or policy.
There is little or no crystallization in public opinion on a particular
issue. In this kind of political world the elites and decision-makers
have considerable latitude in their policy formulations, prescriptions,
and decisions. An area in which this kind of amorphous environment
exists is the use of atomic energy for civilian purposes. There are
neither strong popular feelings in favor of civilian use of this kind of
energy source nor resistance to it.

A supportive political world for the decision maker exists when
there is considerable support for a particular program (whether in
force or not). Political decision makers may look at this opinion sup­
portive of a particular existing program or consider it a reservoir of
political support to be mobilized at a later, more optimum time. For a
number of years before the passage of the Medicare amendment to existing
social security legislation, the pollsters documented extensive public
support for governmental guarantees against rising medical and hospital
costs. The political environment on this issue was definitely support­
ive but organized interests had been able to withstand the somewhat be­
nign attempts to get organizational endorsement in a fluid situation.
The absence of an insistent and well organized demand characterizes
this type of supportive distribution of an opinion. The presence of a
well articulated demand for governmental action on a particular object
program produces the third kind of environment: the demanding one.

There is an increasing consensus on, and understanding of, the sources of our political images. There is, on the other hand, far less agreement on the substance of mass percepts involving the two major political parties. The scope of this research prohibits an elaboration of the sources of party images (a problem stemming in part from the characteristics of the data collected by the Survey Research Center). But an examination of party images over time does permit some refinement in our thoughts about some of the following issues: Do party images serve as a kind of carrier of attitudes first associated with issues or with candidates? Are party images residues of a past candidate, the great man of the party? Does a party which has become identified with hard times and depression necessarily have to gain power in times of prosperity to change this image? Will a party associated with war be able to modify its image without regaining the presidency? How long can a party continue its courting of special vested interests when an overwhelming electoral majority look upon that association as a liability to be shunned? Furthermore, how long can a party preserve its image as a vehicle of these interests if the issues from which the image developed moderate with time and the adoption of new strategies by the opposition? These are but a few of the lines of thought having obvious theoretical import, avenues of concern which heretofore have been given scant attention.

The implications of our understanding these theoretically relevant questions have significance for political scientist and political practitioner alike. Which groups are positively disposed to the
Republican stand on foreign policy? Which to their stand on governmental spending? How durable are these images? Are particular images more prevalent in one region of the country than another?

For those with an interest in the degree of rationality among the citizenry, the question is what images and attitudes aid an individual in casting his lot with one party or the other. Regardless of the argument assumed, this question has obvious theoretical importance for the issue of voter rationality might be inextricably tied to the ways in which the mass electorate view the parties. To be sure, if one views the rationality underlying voter behavior in terms of the voter's level of information, concern with abstract issues, or concern for consistency between held opinions, images, and attitudes, one finds little evidence of comfort to the analyst who longs for the ideal posited for Athenian democracy. If one entertains the possibility in party images, attitudes, or focuses on party related issues over time, it is apparent that the identification of voter rationality in terms of cognitive levels obscures the fact that there are alternative ways of conceptualizing the phenomenon of rationality. Perhaps Key's assumption that the voter is no fool is valid; and that our earlier image of voter rationality based on cognitive sophistication and ideological commitment has been too narrowly drawn. Perhaps the voter, rather than be enlightened and ideologically oriented, views political parties in a way such that political behavior has personal meaning and is considered rational to the beholder.

In fact, in a report frequently cited as illustrating the lack of ideological sophistication and low levels of political information,
there is interesting evidence that the American voter may not be as unresponsive to events and his "self-interest" (as he perceives it) as we had been led to think. Angus Campbell and his colleagues have gone to some pains to determine the electoral images of the major parties. Both the described decline in class voting and the decline in certain negative images of the Republican party over time suggest that there may be, after all, some redeeming possibility for a self-centered political man.

The extent and nature of the responsiveness of man to his milieu have been questions of enduring import. Have the circumstances of modern society reduced man and electorate to the position of a public out of touch with the situation: a public knowing the situation only through the symbols that engage it? In a lucid treatise on mass responses to political symbols, Murray Edelman concludes about system demands that it is

... political action(s) that chiefly shape men's political wants and "knowledge" not the other way around. The common assumption that what democratic government does is somehow always a response to the moral codes, desires, and knowledge embedded inside people is as inverted as it is reassuring. This model, avidly taught and ritualistically repeated, cannot explain what happens; but it may persist in our folklore because it so effectively sanctifies prevailing politics and permits us to avoid worrying about them.

In one sense it defies credulity to assert that the individual simply registers and responds to those symbols manipulated by competing elites in the political process and that he does not in some way respond to his environment. It would be fatuous to suggest that slogans (symbols) such as "private enterprise", laissez-faire, and "individualism" could have been further advanced to the advantage of the Republicans
during the Great Depression.

The difficulty in establishing the impact of an event or experience on individuals or groups is at the core of our methodological concerns as social scientists. By and large the problem is one of delimiting the impact of an event. Social scientists have not yet been able to satisfactorily anticipate events. Thus, the measurement of events in terms of before-and-after examination of classes of respondents, has not been a feasible alternative. In those cases where before-and-after data were available it was due to the fortuitous intervention of events, as was the case in James C. Davies' secondary analysis of data collected by the Survey Research Center almost two decades ago.

Davies examined a number of hypotheses in his analysis of the relationships between events and attitudes. The hypotheses were:

1) The general public does react meaningfully, sensibly, rationally, to objective events having broad political or economic significance.

2) The more relevant an event is to an individual's attitude, the greater will be his reaction to it.

3) The more relevant an event is to an attitude, the greater will be its influence in changing or strengthening that attitude.

4) The highly educated individual will respond more sharply to an event, because such an individual sees the relevance of a happening more readily than the ignorant individual.

5) The highly educated individual, because he exposes himself more broadly and deeply to news and news interpretation, will more accurately appraise the impact of an event than will the slightly educated individual.

With these working hypotheses, Davies examined attitudinal data collected during the slump in the grain commodity market in February
1948, and the proposal for a Korean Truce negotiation that was made by Ambassador Malik in June, 1951. The small size of the sample made findings for hypotheses 4 and 5 on both issues inconclusive. The first hypothesis was sustained on both the price slump and Malik speech: sizeable shifts in popular opinions about a) the direction of prices downward subsequent to the slump and b) the prospects and expectations toward American-Soviet relations (significant at the 1 per cent level) and "toward the locus of blame for our international troubles and toward the administrators of American foreign policy," (significant at the 5 per cent level).

The second hypothesis, examined in terms of the responses of farmers who most certainly were going to feel the economic pinch first, and housewives, skilled and unskilled workers who devote a proportionately larger share of their income to food stuffs, was rejected. Neither farmers nor other occupational categories had price expectations much different from those in the white collar occupations.

Though most of the hypotheses showed inconclusive results and are in need of further testing, the substantial mass response to these two events can neither be ignored nor accounted for without further refinement and research. With our refinement in research techniques and procedures for examining the relations between the individual and his world, and especially his reaction to it, we will surely be better able to understand some of the subtle relationships that underlie the dire and almost fatalistic description of mass behavior proffered by Edelman. The collection of this kind of data in conjunction with long-range trend data will permit the extrapolation of future events against which
we can test our theories and hypotheses. Until then the question of the role of symbols in politics remains moot. And until then, our capacity to examine the degree of reality testing by the electorate is highly limited.

A third implication, as V. O. Key so aptly observed, deals with the relationship between the form of the distribution of values, attitudes, opinions, and images and the degree of consensus and cleavage in American society. It is probably also true, to extrapolate from Key's findings, that the distribution of prevailing party images in certain occupational groupings, class identifications, and party identifiers, also contribute to the degree of consensus and discord in the electorate. Party images of the Republican party as the party of the businessman, big business, industry, "Wall Street," and the rich, should it fit the j-curve (an indication of distribution unimodality), may well mean that whatever the payoff to these interests in pelf and perquisites is, they must be cloaked in such neutral terms as the general good and the common defense in order to sustain a consensual environment. To make the beneficiaries' legacy known, under the unimodal distribution of attitudes, may well be conducive to social and political conflict, and possibly political upheavals of great magnitude.

The unlikely probability that party images will coincide with class lines under the above situation would doubtless aggravate the latent class antagonisms common to any society in which the have-nots outnumber those who are measured affluent by even the most niggardly standards.

Finally, there are strategy implications of mass party percepts.
For the politician, the problem is one of discerning the appeal having the greatest potential for attracting the great middling majority, the weak party identifiers, the Independents, the less informed, and frequently the least interested in campaigns and their outcomes. Does an increasingly educated and interested electorate dictate a change in the role of the party as "broker" in the political system to one more oriented to philosophical considerations and a politics of principle? The long-neglected question of trends in mass precepts and party strategies. How and in what way do mass precepts of political phenomenon, including the party, shape the considerations of those responsible for writing the quadrennial party platforms, if they do at all?

It is patently obvious that just any campaign oratory will not pass muster simply because it is espoused by the party. What the party must do in its endeavor to amass an electoral majority is to search out those issues that will ring true for a sufficient number of groupings and thus, hopefully, permit the formation of the necessary electoral coalition. Whether the appeal is communism, corruption, Korea, or war, in large part, is determined by the responsiveness of the electorate.
CHAPTER III

THE EXTENT OF PARTY IMAGES IN THE ELECTORATE

The data for this research are derived from open-ended questions used by the Michigan Survey Research center in four successive opinion surveys beginning with their 1952 study. It will be remembered that in each of these surveys the SRC attempted to maximize item continuity by asking the respondents the same questions about their likes and dislikes for the major political parties. As we might have guessed, the freedom allowed the respondent in answering open-ended questions and also the universe of the sample (nationwide) tended to produce among the elicited responses a vast variety and diversity in party perceptions. Having anticipated such an outcome, the SRC established major theme categories for each of the respective election year studies; and they attempted to maintain category similarity as much as possible so as not to disturb additionally the question of comparability. These major party image categories, as well as the sub-categories thereof, provide the point of focus for this research.

When confronted with thousands of these catalogued responses the researcher must first decide whether to use the aggregate or the frequency count of image items. In the first place, the analyst simply counts the actual number of party images as they reflect an item of relevance. Or, using the latter alternative, calculating the number of references made to a specific category of images so that no more than
one reference is counted for a category of images for each respondent.

Using the aggregate option we counted each image without regard to the possibility of a respondent having made more than one reference to the coding category. This actual count produces a score that doubtless is a better indicator of the "intensity" with which certain feelings about the parties are held by the electorate.

The frequency alternative for scoring the image data by computer is to simply up by one a category count the first time that a respondent makes reference to it. A content category, using this frequency option, is referenced once and only once even though two or more images may fall into a single content category.

The second alternative, a frequency count, was selected for this research. Although the aggregate option provides a better indicator of the intensity of a particular party image, it also places a disproportionate weight on the best informed, most politically involved, highly interested, and socially central individuals in the sample. It places an over-emphasis on those whose thoughts and perspectives are dominated by a single concern, such that they register intense interest and partisan orientation for this single area and nothing else. The highly involved partisan, for example, might register as many as four related image themes, all coded under the same rubric. On the basis of this, one might be led falsely to believe that four times as many people were concerned with a particular issue when in fact only one was. The aggregate option, thus, appears to be a more satisfactory index of individuals and not national samples, or as is the case here, of cohorts based on age differences.
The result of using the frequency option for purposes of analysis is that the description of electoral images as well as the conclusions derived therefrom are based on the more conservative set of figures. If we err in our descriptions, it is more likely that the error is on the side of understating the case as it is rather than an error attributable to exaggeration and perhaps a tortuous interpretation of the data at hand.

It should be noted, however, that the likelihood of distortion resulting from this kind of high involvement and issue focus, so far as the data are concerned, is not great. The differences between the frequency and aggregate scores are not great, and in some election years even small.

The range of these differences is 49 and 30½, the difference found in terms of things disliked about the Republican party in 1960, and the upper limit occurrence for the positive images registered for the Democratic party in the 1952 election.

What evidence we have on electoral behavior in America more often than not leads to a rather discouraging, and for some disturbing, portrait of the citizen voter. He has been described as one who lacks sophistication about domestic and foreign issues; lacks any set of integrated and coherent political principles that permit our typing him as an "ideologue"; and finally, one who evokes little interest in the campaigns and their outcomes, and the executors of them—the political parties. To add to the woes of those who nostalgically look back to the model of the "philosophical citizen," to use Gerald Pomper's apt phrase,—one finds that even when some support of issue awareness
exists there is precious little evidence to suggest that these issue
stances are regularly transferred to the appropriate political party.
The incongruity between the norms for the "philosophical citizen" model
and actual behavior and attitudes contributes at least in part to a now-
enormous body of literature on alienation in American society.

In light of the above considerations our party image data ap-
pears to be somewhat paradoxical. The data do not comport with the
idea of irrational man or the "manipulated citizen" model implicit in
Murray Edelman's theoretical insights. Nor do the data comport with
the rational voter notions of some others. The evidence more closely
approximates or fits Pomper's conception of the "meddling citizen." By
fit we mean that the image data are meaningful given the conventional
assumptions about the importance of party for the individual. And, as
we shall see, it is difficult to find support for the position of those
critics who equate "mass democracy" with government directed by the
motor of man's irrational impulses.

This analysis shows that there are indeed few who have no feel-
ings or attitudes toward the major political parties. And for those
who do, there does not seem to be any hesitation in expressing them in
interview situations. It is now commonplace among social scientists to
recognize the difference between recognition and recall. Many more in
the population are able to respond to given information on issues, pro-
grams, and people than are able to address themselves to free response
questions soliciting the subject's attitudes, cognitions, and feelings.
One expects higher return rates on items of recognition than on recall
items.
This makes the high levels of response to the political parties all the more remarkable. As Table 3 shows, over the four elections spanning a period of 12 years, an average of slightly more than 90 per cent of the electorate was willing and able to articulate their feelings toward one or the other party.

In strictly numerical terms, the point of interest lies in the extent to which one finds party images in the electorate. Furthermore, as Figure 1 makes clear, the percentage having no partisan images whatsoever never exceeds the 1956 figure of 17 per cent for the youngest age cohort (25 to 28 years of age).

Worth noting, too, is the curvilinear nature of these images over time. All age cohorts show increases in the number who have nothing to say about the parties during the Eisenhower years and then in 1964 all cohorts except F move toward their 1952 levels. It appears almost as though there existed a kind of moratorium on politics, partisan strife, and the parties during these years and as the data in the above table show, the phenomenon is apparent even among those who have something to say about the parties. Moreover, and contrary to the findings of numerous survey analysts, sizeable numbers of each cohort have registered at least five or more images for the two parties. Thus, it would appear that not only does the average respondent hold favorable images of "his" party, but also that he can articulate part of his dislike for the opposition (see Figure 2).

Another way of illustrating this willingness to express party-relevant attitudes and the level of intensity is through mean image scores by cohort as is done in Table 4. Again, an inspection of the
**TABLE 3**

**EXTENT OF PARTY IMAGES IN THE ELECTORATE: 1952-1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Images</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1952</strong></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>(89)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(5 )</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1956</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(86)</td>
<td>(74)</td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(8 )</td>
<td>(4 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1960</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(87)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(8 )</td>
<td>(3 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1964</strong></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>(84)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(8 )</td>
<td>(3 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers in parentheses are cumulative percentages.*
Figure 1.—Per cent of electorate by cohort without party images: 1952-1964.
Figure 2.—Per cent of age cohort with five or more party images: 1952-1964.
average number of images for each cohort member yields essentially the same results: highest mean scores in 1952 followed by a doldrum period during the Eisenhower years, and then movement toward the 1952 levels after the General's departure from office.

TABLE 4

MEAN PARTY IMAGE SCORES BY AGE COHORT: 1952-1964*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*To insure adequate numbers, adjacent cohorts were consolidated. These larger age categories are evident in Appendix A.

The fact that the sample size varies considerably for the four election studies means that simple weighting is not possible without adjusting for sample size differences. To do this would have increased enormously the computer programming and also the actual processing time consumed. Because of limited resources, net image scores were used. A net image score reflects the difference between positive and negative scores for each cohort. For instance, should cohort A in 1964 have 200 positive images of the Republican party and 400 negative ones, our overall score for this cohort would be -200. Should the positive images totaled surpass the number of negative image references then the difference would be one favoring the party. Thus, these net image scores are not distorted by either variations in the sample size or the size of
the cohorts over time. The score reflects the difference between the two sets of scores, the positive and the negative, and we focus on the algebraic sums remaining. This "net image score" is used to examine the following variables: party identification, region of interview, sex, and age.

The relationship between party identification and party image was predictable: the stronger the partisan affiliation, the greater the tendency to have favorable image scores, in terms of net scores, of the party identified with. Table 5 provides cogent support for what we already know about the importance of party as a lens through which much of what is perceived is perceived politically. There is not a single exception to this general finding in the 48 statistics of this table.

Self classified "Independents," however, show some interesting variations. For those who are "true" independents, that is, those who avow independence from either party and also do not think of themselves as being closer to either of the two parties, there was no pattern or trend discernible in their image scores. "Independent" democrats, as was to be expected, show an increasing tendency for the negative images of the Republican party to outweigh the positive ones. The same trend for Independent Republicans exists as they view the Democratic party, that is, a surplus of negative images for the Democratic party. Among Independent Republican identifiers, however, and unlike the stability of net positive images that independent Democrats have toward the Democratic party, there is a strong decline in the number of positive images toward the Republican party beginning in 1956 and through 1964.

In terms of the "lesser of two evils" lament so frequently heard
TABLE 5

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND NET PARTY IMAGE SCORE: 1952-1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1952 $^b$</th>
<th></th>
<th>1956</th>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Dem.</td>
<td>-277</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>-173</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>-131</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>-209</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-671)</td>
<td>(920)</td>
<td>(-455)</td>
<td>(677)</td>
<td>(-317)</td>
<td>(476)</td>
<td>(-444)</td>
<td>(690)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Dem.</td>
<td>-83</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>-41</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>-93</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-198)</td>
<td>(453)</td>
<td>(-109)</td>
<td>(261)</td>
<td>(-165)</td>
<td>(291)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-66)</td>
<td>(109)</td>
<td>(-47)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td>(-65)</td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
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<td>-17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(71)</td>
<td>(-72)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(-6)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(-3)</td>
<td>(-11)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(-27)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(-61)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Rep.</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>-164</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(815)</td>
<td>(-587)</td>
<td>(240)</td>
<td>(-91)</td>
<td>(159)</td>
<td>(-102)</td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>(-103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Rep.</td>
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<td>-129</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>-84</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-84</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(288)</td>
<td>(-194)</td>
<td>(236)</td>
<td>(-122)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$Figures in parentheses are aggregate totals and reflect the total number of positive or negative references made.

$^b$The Survey Research Center did not begin using the seven-point party identification scale until the 1956 general election study. Thus the 1952 net image scores reflect scores for only the three categories: Democrat, Republican, and Independent.
during the 1964 presidential campaign, the true independents were the only group that had negative margins for both political parties and hence appear to be the only group who indeed had misgivings about both parties in 1964.

The actual numbers are not as important as the consistency in the direction of image scores predicted in terms of partisan attachments. The importance of party identification as a variable suggesting the direction of affect toward party is supported when we examine a more personal variable, that is, images of the candidates of the two political parties. Again the direction predicted by our assumption about the importance of party identification is strong. There are but three exceptions in the pattern comprising 48 different statistics, and one of these—the weak Republican category—occurs in the peculiar 1964 election. Weak Republicans at that time had a surplus score of minus 11, while those who professed Independence, but leaning toward the Republican party, had a plus 1 score toward the Arizona senator. Given the seven point party identification scale, and the characteristics and utility of scales in political analysis, we should have expected a reversal here (see Table 6).

Noteworthy, too, is the unusually large reservoir of positive images for Eisenhower in both 1952 and 1956. In his report of the Eisenhower years, Emmet John Hughes relates the substance of a conversation between Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, and his friend of long standing, the poet, Robert Frost.90 Frost had returned to Washington from a trip around the country and had expressed to Hughes grave concern for the public uneasiness resulting from the indecisive-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Strong Dem.</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>-85</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>-103</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>-272</td>
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<td>(466)</td>
<td>(-196)</td>
<td>(476)</td>
<td>(-674)</td>
<td>(887)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak Dem.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-163</td>
<td>166</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(216)</td>
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<td>(503)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep. Dem.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-86</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(70)</td>
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<td>(85)</td>
<td>(-199)</td>
<td>(192)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(433)</td>
<td>(315)</td>
<td>(206)</td>
<td>(-60)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(-81)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep. Rep.</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>-59</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(350)</td>
<td>(-127)</td>
<td>(159)</td>
<td>(-39)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Rep.</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>-133</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1006)</td>
<td>(-241)</td>
<td>(529)</td>
<td>(-156)</td>
<td>(296)</td>
<td>(-66)</td>
<td>(-28)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Rep.</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>-148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>-93</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(730)</td>
<td>(-319)</td>
<td>(424)</td>
<td>(-210)</td>
<td>(243)</td>
<td>(-207)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in parentheses are aggregate scores.
ness of President Eisenhower in the early years of his first term of office.

Given these overwhelmingly positive percepts toward Eisenhower, with substantial increases in 1956 over the 1952 figures, one can only conclude that the exposure of the good poet must have been limited to a particular segment of the public. In terms of national sample data one finds that the incumbent President in 1956 not only had more positive margins among Republican identifiers, but also a decline in the negative scores (for both weak and strong Democratic identifiers), though the latter was not marked.

It was more probably true that Frost had taken stock of a group that in no sense could be taken as representative of the electorate, though it is fair to say that this apparently disparate finding might be a function of the time difference in his sounding of the electorate and the time at which the SRC began its field work for the 1956 study.

A second variable that was examined in terms of net image scores was region, or more accurately, the place of interview. National data for party images were broken down into four geographical regions: The Northeast, the Midwest, the South, and the West. (Appendix B notes the states included in each region.) It was felt that in a nation having such significant sectional differences as are found in the United States, and in which there is considerable evidence of one-party political systems as exist in certain New England states and much of the South, there should be large differences in their views of the two major parties, and, of course, the two candidates for the presidency.
The initial premise was that in those regions of the nation in which one party had been dominant there would be, predictably, more favorable net image scores for that party. We anticipated that in the one-party South we would find especially favorable net scores for the Democratic party and/or more negative scores for the Party of Lincoln and the hated Reconstruction. A reasonable expectation given the fact that even with the candidacy of the charismatic Eisenhower, the South for the most part stood fast and alone for the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, in both 1952 and 1956. Only with the exacerbated issue of race and the unique personality and candidacy of Barry Goldwater in 1964 did the South show any idiosyncratic shifts from the norm of allegiance to the Democratic party. It was also thought that in traditionally bedrock Republican New England, the Republican party would be more positively viewed given our net image scores.

It comes as no surprise, then, to find that in the traditionally Democratic South the Republican party receives a negative margin (and thus a minus score) in three of the four elections surveyed (see Table 7 for these net image scores). The 1960 election also provided the only instance in which the candidate had equal numbers of negative and positive references producing the indifference score of "0". This occurrence coupled with the fact that Kennedy won the South (except, of course, where electoral votes were cast for Senator Byrd) may mean that, contrary to the general gains accrued to him because of his religion, Kennedy was hurt more in the "fundamentalist" South by his religion than perhaps in other areas; however, the only conclusion that one can draw in light of his capturing so much of the South is that the variable
### TABLE 7

**NET IMAGE SCORES FOR PARTY AND CANDIDATE BY REGION: 1952-1964***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>12 (64)</td>
<td>76 (158)</td>
<td>13 (32)</td>
<td>-56 (-74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>38 (64)</td>
<td>19 (85)</td>
<td>60 (127)</td>
<td>74 (173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Candid.</td>
<td>175 (505)</td>
<td>211 (738)</td>
<td>70 (259)</td>
<td>-247 (-341)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Candid.</td>
<td>91 (270)</td>
<td>-41 (-55)</td>
<td>72 (275)</td>
<td>140 (456)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mid West</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>39 (171)</td>
<td>34 (65)</td>
<td>15 (41)</td>
<td>-36 (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>8 (-53)</td>
<td>33 (150)</td>
<td>62 (155)</td>
<td>98 (182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Candid.</td>
<td>128 (484)</td>
<td>166 (625)</td>
<td>97 (300)</td>
<td>-166 (-366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Candid.</td>
<td>82 (269)</td>
<td>-39 (-57)</td>
<td>27 (112)</td>
<td>155 (428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>-48 (-67)</td>
<td>-4 (-40)</td>
<td>3 (27)</td>
<td>-60 (-108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>131 (255)</td>
<td>141 (354)</td>
<td>89 (170)</td>
<td>96 (222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Candid.</td>
<td>70 (305)</td>
<td>128 (411)</td>
<td>65 (252)</td>
<td>-99 (-193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Candid.</td>
<td>129 (275)</td>
<td>28 (65)</td>
<td>0 (58)</td>
<td>107 (376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>-1 (31)</td>
<td>-14 (-50)</td>
<td>-23 (-63)</td>
<td>-50 (-101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>18 (12)</td>
<td>58 (185)</td>
<td>31 (84)</td>
<td>37 (98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Candid.</td>
<td>40 (229)</td>
<td>38 (196)</td>
<td>19 (68)</td>
<td>-80 (-190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Candid.</td>
<td>20 (59)</td>
<td>11 (88)</td>
<td>13 (98)</td>
<td>65 (218)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in parentheses reflect aggregate totals.

of party has greater significance in Dixie than in any other area, even more so than the personality and religion of the candidate.

Since the border states have not manifested the same degree of party regularity as has the remainder of the South (Kentucky, Tennessee
and Virginia went Republican in 1956 and 1960), we examined the image scores of the border states to determine whether there was a growing predisposition of these border state respondents to look favorably on the Republican party. We find that although the numbers working against the Republican party in the South are greatest in the deep south (including Florida) the data suggest that the Republican party has not made any marked inroads into the Democratic party’s strength. An inspection of the intra-regional image scores shows that the direction of image scores in the border states is consistent with the image scores of the deeper South, with but one exception. And it is this exception that makes for the Kennedy “0” score in 1960 (Table 7). The general rule is that the direction of party image scores in the border states will be consonant with the direction of party image scores in the South.

The candidacy of John F. Kennedy in 1960, a new Englander, and a Catholic, and in 1964 Senator Goldwater, for whom Eastern Republicans reflected little more than "me-tooism" politics, makes difficult any firm conclusions about party images in the Northeast. These states had characteristically a negative surplus of party images for the Arizona Senator in 1964, the largest. And for the 1960 campaign they tendered narrow margins favoring Kennedy over Nixon. Both the 1952 and 1956 elections followed national and regional patterns.

A more unusual finding, however, may be seen in the net image scores for the West. This region, too, shows similarly negative sums for the Republican party. And this despite the fact that in three of the four elections the West (with the exceptions of Arizona in 1964,
Goldwater’s home state, and New Mexico and Nevada in 1960) went with the victorious party nationally. Again we attempted to determine whether differences were intra-regional, between mountain states and the pacific states, and again at least in the case of the Republican party’s negative -1 in 1952 this was the case. One finds that the mountain states were more disposed to view the Republican party negatively while the Pacific states were more favorable. The 1964 election, for obvious reasons, did not comport to this general tendency. However, one must be cautious in the interpretation since it may be that this anomaly is a function of the sampling procedures used in the West to assure adequate numbers from particular states, and within states particular areas.

What conclusions might one draw from the data in Table 7?

The first deals with the objects of political perception. In general, the candidates of the parties command more attention in the electorate outside the South than do either of the parties. In the 32 possible pairing arrangements between party and candidate for the data in Table 7, one finds the candidates having larger surpluses than their parties (whether positive or negative images) in 26 instances. In the remaining six possibilities, the party is given primacy, in terms of the magnitude of party image scores. And the South accounts for three of these six pairs in which the party surpluses are larger than candidates’. The exception to this occurs when a candidate is running in opposition to an incumbent president, as Adlai Stevenson did in 1956. In all regions Stevenson was viewed far less favorably in 1956 than he had been in 1952; somewhat of a paradox when one remembers that Stevenson’s problem in 1952 was the lack of a national image.
This decline in the popularity of the out-party candidate may well be a manifestation of the more pervasive problem of reaching the middling majority of the American electorate, less interested in campaigns, their outcomes, and politics generally; yet who attach additional merit to the incumbent regardless of his party, program, and performance. A more likely explanation lies in the charisma of "Ike." Of course, both circumstances are affected by the nature and characteristics of the "short-term" forces that work against either the individuals normal party attachments or the incumbent administration.

For one reason or another, it appears that the party standard bearers draw more attention from the electorate than do the parties in their day-to-day campaign activities, and that the incumbent has a decided if not decisive advantage merely by being in office.

A second conclusion concerns the direction of popular affect. It appears that the electorate not only focuses more extensively on the candidates rather than the parties but also the attention and attitudes tend to be considerably more positive and benign rather than negative. This finding adds fuel to those observers who argue that there has been a "personalization" of American politics at the national level.92

A third note on the data from Table 7 is the general tendency of the public to view both candidate and party in favorable terms. Most would agree that the candidacy of Senator Goldwater was a unique benchmark in American electoral history (though as we shall see his nomination may not be as atypical as liberals have heretofore believed).93 Thus it may be the case that American cynicism toward politics and politicians is directed, for the most part, to those at municipal and state
levels, those closest to the citizenry. If we discount temporarily the 1964 image data and examine only the scores for the three preceding elections, we find that of the 48 possible chances for registering negative surpluses for either or both candidates or parties, there are only seven negative surplus scores. And four of these scores occur in Eisenhower's second campaign. The 1964 election notwithstanding, it would appear that a more benign view of the motors of a democracy exist than many had been wont to grant or recognize.

Finally, the lesson of the 1964 election ought to be clear. Like the final vote in all but six states, the images in all regions ran against Goldwater. The negative image scores of Goldwater in the South which he carried alone indicates one of the problems in this kind of secondary analysis. We require and as yet do not have sufficiently refined data to make distinctions between issues in terms of the intensity with which they are held. It is highly plausible that the issue of race—for which many in the South may have found Goldwater attractive—has far greater centrality and salience than the host of other items for which he was criticized, a centrality that over-rides the negative scores. That his candidacy affected the party in general, and pervasively so, may be seen in the consistently negative margins posted for the Republican party in all regions in 1964—yet in all regions the party was held in higher esteem than was the candidate. This failure of the candidate to evoke even equivalent numbers of positive images relative to the party is in itself unique and counter to the general pattern of responses to political objects shown.

Philip Converse and George Dupeux provide additional insight
into the nature and content of candidate images in their comparative analysis of Generals DeGaulle and Eisenhower. Both men were charismatic leaders and both had come from careers in the military to the highest political stations in their respective governments. One of the commonalities between the two leaders was that men more than women tended to identify the candidates with the political parties and the parties' programs and policies. The women in their study reflected deeper attachments and significance to the more "personal" traits of the two men. If this finding proves to be highly general so far as women are concerned, we expect that this will add further to the "personalization" phenomenon taking place in American politics. We hasten to add, however, that Eisenhower did not get disproportionate support from women in 1952 and 1956; his strength came from all classes and men as much as women within classes. One must be chary of any simplified interpretation of data that offers an explanation of Eisenhower's unusual success in terms of his being a father or grandfather image. Hasty conclusions invariably lead one to an over-simplification of an extremely complex process.

The data in Table 8 indicate some additional points of departure between men and women in our national samples. In the first place, the consistent negative scores for men to the Republican party makes inescapable the conclusion that they are generally more suspicious of that party than are women.

Second, one should note the general tendency of women more than men to be more generous toward both political parties. It is simply not true that men are more positively oriented to the Democratic party and
TABLE 8

NET PARTY IMAGE SCORES BY SEX: 1952-1964*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1952</th>
<th></th>
<th>1956</th>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>-103</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(115)</td>
<td>(-93)</td>
<td>(424)</td>
<td>(-38)</td>
<td>(246)</td>
<td>(-179)</td>
<td>(229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>-99</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(152)</td>
<td>(163)</td>
<td>(226)</td>
<td>(412)</td>
<td>(75)</td>
<td>(290)</td>
<td>(-123)</td>
<td>(446)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in parentheses reflect aggregate net scores.

against the Republican party with women just the opposite. Our data suggest that women have a more benevolent view of politics and the parties. This may be a function of the early differences in patterns of socialization into politics for boys and girls long before they come of legal age. An interesting point for speculation, then, is the extent to which one finds this benevolence directed to the candidates. Table 9 presents data on the net image scores for each of the party's candidates in the four elections. In two cases out of four women were less responsive and vocal about the virtues of the democratic candidate (in both cases Stevenson was the candidate). In 1964 they were both more positive about the democratic candidate Lyndon B. Johnson and more negative in their images of Senator Goldwater. The 1960 election remains the only election that fits the generalization that the weaker sex tends to be more generous to the parties. In that year they again showed this tendency. But with the candidacies of Eisenhower and Goldwater, new considerations enter. Not only do women have large surpluses for the candidates in terms of net frequencies, they also have
much to say about them as witnessed in the unusually high aggregate figures for Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 and the 1964 race between the incumbent President Johnson and Senator Goldwater.

TABLE 9
THE RELATION BETWEEN SEX AND NET IMAGE SCORES FOR PARTY CANDIDATES: 1952-1964*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(620)</td>
<td>(450)</td>
<td>(762)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(986)</td>
<td>(423)</td>
<td>(1208)</td>
<td>(-6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in parentheses reflect aggregate net image scores.

It may be that the Converse and Dupeux finding, that women have and sustain images of a more personal nature, has a more general applicability for understanding American electoral behavior, as well as past and present processes of political socialization. The sex differences in the data might be attributed to differences in patterns of political socialization for men and women in the United States. The implication of these differences in socialization patterns may be that women may not yet have been fully emancipated from the notion that "politics is a man's business." If the process of political socialization can be thought of as primarily a process of inculcating the political system norms, than differences in the patterns of socialization of boys and girls, so far as the girls are concerned, may reflect a discontinuity in the socialization process to the extent that women
sustain the idea that politics is a "man's business" and the place and concern of the women is the home (although among women of higher SES and education this certainly does not apply with equal force).

The reasoning is this. Available evidence suggests that children begin with generally tolerant and sheltered views of politics and political officials, and do not until early teens begin to attain the general cynicism and ambivalence toward "politics" so prevalent among adults. Since boys, more than girls, have traditionally been more interested in foreign affairs, wars, public officials, history, and the idea that politics is the *forte* of the male of the species, one suspects that they come earlier to adopt the cynicism about politics from their adult environment. Girls, on the other hand, increasingly exposed to the idea that politics is a man's game may simply direct (or redirect) their attention and activities to the socially acceptable kinds of concerns for young and adult women, and thus, not fully receive the impact of the norms to which their male cohorts are exposed. Consequently, much of the early attitudes about politics and politicians--Greenstein's finding of a generally hospitable and benign view of the Mayor and the President for their good works--exist as residues into adult life for women whereas in men these same views may be thought of as naive and perhaps childish.

The line of thought at least allows us to make some sense of the conclusions based on the image data on hand; namely, women show a surplus of positive images for both parties that is larger in every instance than scores for men; and with but a single exception when candidate image scores are examined by sex, women are both more positive and more
negative when the direction of scores is observed (the exception occurs in the 1952 election and the candidacy of Adlai Stevenson [see Table 9]). Women under these circumstances may well tend to be more interested in the candidates of the parties and especially their personal characteristics than in the more mundane issues of public policy and the party's position on them. The discontinuity in the process of inculcating citizen norms for women may have as a by-product an over-reaction or an exaggerated concern with the candidates themselves. Women may predictably avoid the subtle questions of programs, platforms, and public issues; but the candidates, on the other hand, allow careful scrutiny as individuals and consequently one finds considerable variation at this point, something absent from the party image data for the sexes.

An examination of our data for party images as they exist in age groups shows that net party image scores for age cohorts are consonant with general findings documented by students of electoral behavior (see Table 10): First, the tendency to conservatism with age and thus increased Republican voting; and, secondly, the increasing tendency of young people to be Democratic.

In 1952, age cohorts B and C (age grouping 25-44) are easily the most disposed toward the Democratic party and fit our logical expectations by also being the age group most negative about the Republican party. Furthermore, whether a result of early socialization into the dominant political dogma of the pre-depression Republican era or the lessened impact of the depression effects, older age groups (cohorts E and F) tend to be most favorably disposed to the Republican party while cohort F alone scores a debit for the Democratic party.
**TABLE 10**

THE RELATION BETWEEN NET PARTY IMAGES AND AGE COHORTS BY YEAR*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>R - Score</th>
<th>D - Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>E</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
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<td>19</td>
</tr>
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<td>F</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-44</td>
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<td>-9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cohort age groupings during each of the election years may be reviewed in Appendix A.

In 1956, one finds further evidence for the impact of Eisenhower's candidacy, as all age cohorts show a surplus of positive party
images toward the Republican party. Cohorts B and C are still the most positive toward the Democratic party; and all cohorts show a larger surplus of positive scores for the Democratic party save for the age group 59 to 68, our cohort E.

The 1960 scores show little variation from the trend discernible in the 1952 and 1956 data. Cohorts B and C, now age grouping 33 to 52, are the only age grouping that reflect negative images, although it is worth noting that these image scores are less than half of those registered against the Republican party during Eisenhower's first campaign in 1952. While cohort C shows a fall-off in the extent of pro-Democratic images, cohort D in this year and 1956 indicates sizeable shifts in favor of the Democratic party.

The 1964 election image scores for age groupings suggest further the folly committed by the Republican party in choosing Senator Goldwater as their standard bearer. All age groups except cohort F (77 years and over) now reflect negative scores for the Republican party, with cohort C having a score three times more negative than that for the next most hostile cohort to the Republican party, cohort B. The increasing age and increasing conservatism hypothesis gains some support in that the only positive net score for the Republican party in 1964 came from the oldest age group in the sample (77 years and older, cohort F).

Four conclusions may be derived from our party image data found in the age cohort Table 10. In the first place, the electorate (that is, all age cohorts) in all four election years had more things they liked about the Democratic party than things disliked. Only cohort F in 1952
with a minus score of two, varied from this trend. Secondly, with again a single exception occurring in 1956, the age grouping of 25 to 44 in 1952, cohorts B and C, in each election year until they are the 37 to 56 age category in 1964, appear to be the most suspicious and irrec-
cilable to the Republican party and the most irrevocably committed to a positive view of the Democrats. Thirdly, not only were there generally favorable image surpluses for the Democratic party, but there was sub-
stantially more good will and feeling toward the Democratic party than toward the Republicans. Republican plus scores never exceed the score registered for cohort E in 1956 (plus 36) while the Democrats have mar-
gins frequently surpassing that high water mark for the opposition.
Finally, one finds that with increasing age there is a decline in the number of plus scores for positive images of the Democratic party.

In sum, this section has dealt with the extent of partisan images in the electorate. Party identification was highly related to the images that respondents verbalized about the two major parties, and predictably so. An examination of quantities and surpluses (algebraic sums of positive and negative images for each party) of party images disclosed considerable variation between the regions. As to be ex-
pected, the South was found to be quite negative in terms of image scores, toward the Republican party. That the South was not the region with the highest negative scores toward that party was one of the more unusual findings. The West, having registered the most anti-Republican scores, was something of a paradox in that the West went with the tide of victory in most elections.

A less peculiar finding, but one of the more interesting, dealt
with the variable of sex. Women were found to have more positive scores toward both political parties; or, when the direction of image scores was negative, as it was for Republican images in 1964, the women were less negative. This consistency in party-related images of women did not appear when candidate images were examined. Both phenomena appear to be reflections, in part, of the actual differences in patterns of political socialization for men and women in America.

In terms of age, one finds that older age cohorts were more likely to have a surplus of positive images toward the Republican party. The cohort members who were most vigorously against the Grand Old Party were those in the age group of 24 to 44 years in 1952. During the decade of the 1930's, the youngest member of this age group was in his 5th to 15th year and the 77 year old in 1952 in his 24th through 34th years. This is probably the period of highest susceptibility in terms of the political socialization process. And this age group is doubtless the group most severely hit by the deprivations of the depression in the 1930's. Moreover, while there is a decline in the surplus positive images for the Democratic party with age (again the aging conservatism hypothesis) this is counterbalanced to a degree by increasingly positive surpluses for the Democratic party among the youngest members in the sample.
CHAPTER IV

THE CONTENT OF PARTY IMAGES IN THE ELECTORATE

Up to now, party images have been discussed in sheer quantitative terms as they exist in four independent national samples. The prevalence of these electoral images was examined using the mean image index score and the "net" image score, both based on the algebraic sums for the individual's positive and negative party images. So far, party images have been examined merely in terms of the direction of the affect toward the two major political parties. Nothing, as yet, has been said about the content or substance of these party images.

Accurate description requires a consideration of both the direction of affect in party images as well as the substantive characteristics of party attitudes. Beyond this, the ultimate objective is the explanation of these affective and cognitive dimensions. Initially, our attention focuses on two questions: What is it that the electorate "sees" as relevant to one or the other party; and secondly, what correspondence, if any, is there between the commonly-found attitudes in the electorate and the perspectives articulated by the more politically interested, active, and involved.

Much of the welfare-labor orientation in the New Deal through the Great Society has resulted in a positive feeling toward the Democratic party in terms of group benefits. On the basis of 1952 and 1956 data one can conclude that nothing is more important to the electorate
in their attitudes toward the party of the Democracy. Yet the incidence and durability of this image remains somewhat obscure. How durable is this attitude toward party? Do Republicans share it? If so, to what degree? Another illustration of a popular perception in need of systematic examination is the assumption that much of the support of the Republican party is firmly under-girded and motivated by a strong isolationist impulse. Available evidence overwhelmingly attests to the fact that there has been a conversion in American thinking about the role of the United States abroad. Gallup poll data collected prior to World War II convincingly documents the extent of pre-war isolationism. Even on such an issue as collaboration with Great Britain and France in order to maintain world peace and security there was a solid negative response. Post World War II data reflect an about-face in our feelings of responsibility for world peace and cooperation. Yet, despite this, one finds again that many are wont to attribute Taft-like thinking to supporters and leaders of the Republican party. These kinds of questions can be resolved with an investigation of popular images of the two major parties.

As we have seen in Chapter III, one cannot simply assume that the general electorate is without attitudes, images, feelings, and opinions of the political parties. Rather, the fact seems to be that the individual without party images--good or bad--is the exception in the American polity. Even the truly apolitical individual, in his resplendent isolation from party and undisturbed indifference to politics and things political, has difficulty avoiding the multitude of messages of approval and disapproval for the two political parties in
the American system. The themes are legion. The more common among them are now well imbedded in the matrix of our political culture. The Republican party is the party of the rich, the well-born, business, laissez-faire, and free private enterprise. The Democrats receive homage as the party of prosperity, good times, the "common man," and criticism as the party of war, inflation, governmental controls, and high taxes. While it is indeed difficult to see how any but the most abysmally ignorant and alienated could somehow manage to totally evade these partisan perceptions, the fact of political life is that a small number do.

The question of what in the party attracts or repels the reason and caprice of the electorate has drawn the attention of many, scholars and popular commentators alike. The policies and traditions of the past, the nostrums for the problems of the present, candidates (good and bad), great historical moments, and the kind of a campaign being waged are but a few suggestions of the response range and diversity that one may anticipate.

In the aftermath of the Truman victory of 1948 and the Democratic losses in the off-year 1950 congressional elections, Samuel Lubell surveyed the election scene and suggested some reasons for both the 1948 Dewey loss and the off-year Republican gains in Congress. The explanation advanced by Lubell was that the traditional Republican majority, having existed almost uninterrupted for the seventy-five years preceding the Great Depression, had been balanced by urban and immigrant populations having come of age during, or after, the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt. This counter-balancing of traditional electoral
forces increased the significance of the farm vote as it determined the direction of the swing in the pendulum-like movements of the electorate. The farmer, claims Lubell, had also been affected by the economic climate during the Depression. In his view, the farmer's vote was best understood by examining his view of the economic climate prevailing at election time:

... the new key to the farmer's voting appears to be his attitude toward the role that government should play in economic life. In popular imagination the Democrats have become the party of government controls and government spending while the Republicans symbolize economy and opposition to government controls. When fears of depression are in ascendancy, the tendency to look to the government for help is stronger and with it comes a Democratic trend. When fears of inflation are uppermost, resentment against all forms of government spending grows and with it comes a Republican trend.100

The extension of these economic fears throughout the electorate in 1950 was ultimately the reason for the Republican successes seen by Lubell. At every level of income, the Democrats lost support. And at every level it was viewed and reported by Lubell as "anger against rising prices and higher taxes."101 That Lubell was not reflecting a transient conviction is apparent in the works of some more current authors writing in behalf of Senator Goldwater's candidacy in 1964. According to ex New-Dealer Raymond Moley, Republican success in 1964 hinged on the ability of the Republican party to mobilize a) the conservatives with little or no Republican affiliation, and b) Democrats by tradition who have had little or no sympathy for the liberal policies adopted by the majority of their party.102 Lubell's interpretation agrees with Raymond Moley's to the extent that both view taxation and inflation as critical questions for the electorate in its evaluation of program. Moley goes one step further with his assumption that there is
a majority in the electorate that reflects anathema toward these items in sufficient intensity to find comfort in the Republican party.

Assuming that the observations made by Lubell and Moley are not wholly gratuitous, there should be evidence for these concerns in the electorate at large.

We expect to find that the Republican party is viewed as the party in favor of economy and efficiency in government, reduced federal spending, reduced federal intervention in state and local affairs, and a reduction of American involvement in foreign affairs, especially in terms of American aid. On the other side of the coin, we expect to find that the things most disliked about the Democratic party are its spending, inefficiency, and waste, willingness to expand federal activities at home, and generosity abroad.

A survey of the political literature would doubtless reveal that all of the above issues have some support in the electorate. In a direct sense support for these issues in the mass public requires that these percepts be both cognized as political objects and transferred to the appropriate political party. Available data suggest that these distinctions are valid for "elites" and the most politically involved segment in the population; that they also exist in the mass public is an open question. Assuming a perfectly rational voter, the process might be quite direct. An issue is evaluated in terms of the interest of the individual. Then the issue position of the parties is determined and the party is praised or condemned according to the issue pre-disposition of the voter.

There may also be other less direct processes at work. Before
discussing the data relevant to image characteristics for the electorate a word of caution seems in order: It is quite possible, perhaps probable, that voter inconsistencies exist. For example, a voter may bitterly condemn the Democratic party for its lack of fiscal responsibility and parsimony and at the same time hold the party in high esteem for its assertion of a strong domestic program involving billions of dollars. This objectively-established "inconsistency" appears to be, happily, generally confined to the ranks of the independents rather than among those who affiliate with one or the other party.

In any systematic analysis of party images there are three considerations: first, the extent and directionality of party images; second, the characteristics and substance of party images; and finally, an examination of electoral responses in terms of the degree of specificity and generality and whether they are primarily "style" or substance in chief characteristic.

The question of style or substance turns on the degree or extent to which a particular party image is procedural rather than substantive. By procedural we mean that the image relates more to the activities of the party. Claims such as inefficiency in government, general corruption, and the kind of campaign waged are illustrations of "style" dominant images. Substantive images are defined in terms of the presence of beneficiaries of some particular program or policy. Positive and negative images of such issues as aid to education, Medicare, minimum wages and hours legislation, and more generally the responses focusing on group benefits to be derived from a particular party are all examples of "substantive" images. Within these categories characterized by style
emphasis or substantive concern we should want to determine what, if any, specificity exists. This distinction will be further elaborated in Chapter V. The immediate concern is with the content of party images.

1952 Republican Images

The campaign slogan for the Republicans in 1952 was a call for a vote against "Communism, Corruption, and Korea." The party image for 1952 amply attests to the effectiveness of the latter two, corruption and Korea, for the Republican party. The content of both positive and negative attitudes toward the political parties indicate a pervasive concern in the electorate for a war (Korea) that seemed beyond resolution by the incumbent Democratic administration; and also that the charges of corruption and malfeasance in high places in the Government moved many to feel that indeed "it was time for a change."

When respondents were asked what they liked about the Republican party in 1952, Government Management (images) was the single most frequently mentioned asset of the Republican party (see Figure 3). And, rather than a profusion of image themes for this category, one finds two dominant. Some ninety per cent of this category was accounted for by either references directed to the Republican party as the party that will spend less, balance the budget, or be more economy minded (50 per cent), or the party that will clean up corruption in government (40 per cent). Next in importance for the electorate, and for various and sundry reasons, was the conviction that after two decades of Democratic administration it was "time for a change." The traditional vote refrain and the people in the party were tied for third rank among the positive
Figure 3—1952 Electoral Images of the Republican Party
Republican images in 1952. The attachment to particular people in the party was not unexpected given the candidacy of General Eisenhower, the popular war hero to whom both parties had made overtures.

As a counterpoint to the negative references made to the Democratic party as the party of war, and especially the Korean war which ultimately came to be viewed by many in the electorate as Truman's war, the Republican party was perceived as the party of peace or the party most capable of bringing the Korean conflict to a successful conclusion (11 per cent of the total positive images of the Republican party; Figure 3). It would appear, then, that the candidacy of "Ike," the short-run impact of the "police-action" in Korea and the public disgust over the "mess" in Washington all contributed to the advantage of the Republican party.

However, in 1952 the most notable image of the Republican party was negative. References to the policies and programs (or lack of them) of the Republican party as they contributed to the conditions leading the nation to the Great Depression was the single most frequently cited category of public concern as seen in our image data. There was a numerically larger count for the negative images of the Republican party as the party of depression, "bad times," fewer jobs, lower wages, and poorer working conditions than for any other category of references. (See Appendix C for a rank ordering of categories and the frequencies mentioned.) Of those negative images posted for the Republicans in 1952, fully one in five cited this feature as that which they disliked about the GOP (see Figure 3).

The second most disliked item about the Republican party, an
image not unrelated to the "bad times" and depression themes and one with some degree of saliency for all four elections, centers on the group associations of the Republican party. The Republicans were viewed as the party of business, industry, the rich, Wall Street, and the upper classes by 15 per cent of those who expressed a dislike for the Grand Old Party. On the other hand, only two per cent of the positive images of the Republican party focused on the beneficiaries of party policy. On the surface, one might view this as a paradox when a full 25 per cent of the electorate are willing to identify with the Republicans. But in terms of the individual's purposive behavior and his attempt to rationalize his activities, one might imagine a more subtle interpretation of this phenomenon. It may not necessarily be true that, say, strong Republican identifiers, do not know where their interests lie. It may be that the stigma of the Depression has considerably dampened, albeit subconsciously, their memories. It may also reflect an attachment to the Republican party for its ideological stance rather than its position on operational programs. Available evidence shows decidedly great diversity in the rationale underlying partisan identifications and it also illustrates differences between party leaders and followers, and this is especially the case for Republican identifiers.

As Figure 4 makes clear, the Democratic party was best thought of for its "group associations." It was viewed as the party of "the people," equitable policies for all, the common people, the working man, the working class, poor people, and labor. More than one of every four favorable images registered touched on these related themes. The "good times" theme was iterated by one of every five who gave positive
**Figure 4.**—1952 Electoral Images of the Democratic Party
responses to the Democratic party. The image of the Democrats as the party of prosperity doubtless had its genesis in the experiences of the Depression. Eighty-seven per cent of those who cited "good times" focused on either the idea that the times were better under the Democrats or that working conditions were generally more favorable. This, of course, comes as no surprise when one remembers that the New Deal produced the Wagner Act, minimum wages and hours legislation, and workmen's compensation and unemployment benefits.

The positive images of the Democrats as the party of the people and prosperity run far ahead of the third ranked reference item: of importance, the traditional party support response (12 per cent of the total positive responses).

The negative images of the Democratic party suggest that the Republican campaign slogan for a Republican victory, and an end to "Communism, corruption, and Korea," was, in part, successful. As the image data demonstrate, the latter two symbols were recalled convincingly by many in the general public. Almost one in four negative images focused on the category of Government management as something disliked about the Democrats in 1952. While the electorate demonstrably favored the Republican party for these kinds of image themes, the party of the democracy was viewed in most critical and jaundiced terms. The images of corruption, graft, and dishonesty in government were echoed by 51 per cent of those citing this major theme category while 43 per cent cited disapproval of the Democrats for their governmental spending, deficit spending, or an unbalanced budget.

While the SRC had anticipated responses to the way the Democrats had handled communism at home and abroad, certainly high voltage
issues among partisan elites during the early 1950's, there is little evidence that these concerns had assumed any importance in the general public. For the domestic scene this finding further substantiates the conclusion of Samuel Stouffer in his book *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*: The issue of subversion by internal communism in the United States was not central or even salient among public concerns. Under the category of Foreign Policy the SRC had a sub-category for coding hostile images of the Democratic party because of the way it had handled international communism. Thirty-six per cent of the negative foreign policy responses had been made against the Democrats for their part in the Korean war; the characteristic kinds of images were the respondent's opposition to the Korean war, a view that the war was Truman's doing, that it was being handled badly, or that it could have been avoided entirely. One in three who made negative references to the Democrats in foreign policy terms gave general criticism for its being the "war party." Of interest is the low priority given to the issue of communism, an issue that appeared critical to competing elites, and the lack of interest among the electorate in 1952.

1956 Republican Images

The four year normalcy of the first Eisenhower administration contributed to a reduction in the negative feelings toward the Republican party as the party of "hard times" and economic deprivation. Yet the Republicans were unable to successfully cultivate a more positive image profile for their party and the economic conditions in the country. To have achieved this would have been an accomplishment of considerable value as it would have provided a base, a reservoir, from
which the party could draw sustenance at some future time of need.

In 1956, as in 1952, the popularity of the incumbent President Eisenhower was incontestable. A phenomenon obviously related to the sharp increase in the electoral attention and attraction to the "People in the Party" category for the Republican party (Figure 5). In 1952 the people in party category constituted eight per cent of the total number of positive references to the Republican party. By 1956 the frequency with which the populace noted this aspect of the GOP made this category first in order of ranking; while in 1952 it had been in the fifth rank position. Moreover, in terms of numbers one finds that this category accounts for almost one of every four individual references to the party, and within this almost 80 per cent indicated a liking for the popular General-President. 107

Foreign policy responses directed to the Republican party for their having sent Ike to Korea and terminating the conflict there constituted 15 per cent of the foreign policy responses. The overwhelming majority of foreign policy images (65 per cent) indicated a more general approval of the Republican party as the party of peace. Thus, it would appear that for some in the population, the fact that the Democrats were in office during every major violent conflagration in this century has not gone unnoticed. The Republicans by accident or design have managed to be in office at more auspicious times and, when the opportunities for committing our armed forces were present, as in the case of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the Anglo-French intervention in the Suez in the same year, American forces went uncommitted.

On the negative side, one finds two points of interest. In the
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>'Good Times'</td>
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<td>Party Will Check</td>
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<tr>
<td>General or Self-Interest Issues</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Specific Domestic Pol.</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 5—1956 Electoral Images of the Republican Party
first place, as Angus Campbell and his colleagues have pointed out in *The American Voter* study, there occurred a distinctly sharp decline in the number of percepts of the GOP as the party of "hard times," depressions, and poor working conditions. From a high of 22 per cent in 1952, these images fell to nine per cent of the total negative images in 1956. One cannot discount the possibility that this decline is attributable to the relative stability of the economy under the first Republican administration in a generation. Yet one must be careful not to accept this as conclusive evidence for a decline in class voting in the American electorate. What one finds in the image rankings is that when one category of negative images shifts markedly down another category moves upward. The upshot of these patterns in the image data is that about 37 per cent of all negative responses to the Republican party are accounted for by two kinds of image themes. The decline in prosperity images is accompanied by notable increases in the negative attitudes toward the Republican party for its "group associations."

It may be that as partisan democrats can no longer propagandize about the economic evils of a Republican administration they look for other reasons and rationalizations for their opinions and behavior.

If one assumes that the voter is a rationalizing purposive creature we expect to find for the aggregate electoral view of the Democratic party a decline in party images more appropriate to the party in office (the Republicans having been the incumbents in 1956). As the data show, this is precisely the case. For those issues and images more related to the activities of those responsible for the direction of government--foreign policy, specific domestic policies,
and government management—there are perceptible, if not always substantial, decreases in the percentage scores for the Democrats in 1956.

There are, however, important increases in style images or images neither clearly substantive nor style in dominant characteristic. In 1956 the "people in party" category as a negative category increased to 17 per cent, an increase of seven per cent over the 1952 figure. The kind of campaign waged by the Democrats also drew fire from the electorate. It almost seems that the Republican victory in 1952 signaled a shift in the strategy of contestants in their continuing war for votes and public office.

On the positive side, the increase in the favorable perceptions of the Democratic party in terms of group associations is marked. Whether this is a by-product of popular evaluations of the concessions of the incumbent Republican administration, given the data on hand, is impossible to determine. An equally plausible interpretation for this upward shift in this image category is that it reflects shifting party strategy, the next redoubt, for Democrats who had previously condemned the GOP as the party of depression and bad times. As suggested above, it may simply reflect a shift in the terrain over which electoral battle will take place.

To sum the notable facts, we can say that with the charismatic General-President still in office, the number of responses favorable to the group associations of the Democrats peaks (Figure 6). And in the absence of anything more serious than mild recessions in 1954 and 1955 there is a decline in the favorable "prosperity" images of the Democratic party by a full 10 percentage points.
Figure 6.—1956 Electoral Images of The Democratic Party
While the four-year normalcy of the first Eisenhower administration tended to reduce the generally negative feeling that the Republican party was the party of "hard times" and economic deprivation, the GOP was unable to successfully translate this into a more positive image profile of the party in terms of economic conditions; an accomplishment that would have provided a reservoir of electoral support from which the party might have drawn sustenance in time of future need. This further suggests the tenacity with which beliefs and convictions, once established in the everyday world of hard experience, are maintained. And, as we shall see, the Republican party is never viewed by more than 10 per cent of the total giving positive responses to that party in terms of economic prosperity under their guidance.

In 1956 the popularity of the incumbent President Eisenhower was incontestable; a fact readily observed in the meteoric increase in popular attraction to the "people in party." In 1952 this category constituted eight per cent of the total positive references to the Republican party; by 1956 it had moved up from a rank order of five to one and accounted for almost one of every four individual references to the party (see Figure 5). Of the total number who had cited this category of reference images, almost 80 per cent indicated, to be sure, for a number of reasons, the popular General-President.

Party Images in 1960 and 1964

Foreign policy references make up the single most frequently found positive attitude toward the Republican party in 1960 (Figure 7). In 1956 and again in 1960, the positive attitudes toward the Republican party for its foreign policy were directed to general objects of focus
Figure 7.—1960 Electoral Images of the Republican Party
rather than a specific policy component. Significantly, the evidence for the contention that the American population was much enamored with fairly specific issues is scanty. It is not the implacable position of Secretary Dulles toward foreign communism, or foreign policy pronouncements to defend the perimeter islands of Quemoy and Matsu, or Taft isolationism, that the electorate finds attractive about Republican foreign policy. Overwhelmingly, the electorate found appealing the notion that the Republican party is the party of peace, or the party best able to keep the nation out of an all-out war. No doubt, the eight years of relative quiescence in the international political arena (from an American perspective) probably contributed to this as seven of ten in this category came to see the Republican party as the party of peace.

For some, the fact that Ike went to Korea and brought the boys home probably had an effect; for others it might have been the recognition of a peace sustained by the crusading righteousness of the then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who, despite the contradictions inherent in his "brinkmanship," managed to keep America out of "foreign entanglements." This apparently appealed to a substantial number of those who saw something good in Republican foreign policy. From the 1952 base year, one notes a steady increase in the attractiveness of Republican foreign policy with a distinct drop in 1964. But again, the candidacy of Senator Goldwater and his ill-timed and frequently injudicious remarks about foreign policy doubtless accounts for this loss. Certainly the Senator's remarks must have delighted the managers of the Democratic campaign as they capitalized on his intemperateness.

The interesting facet of the image data for the 1960 and 1964
election years, and for both political parties, is the increasing importance attached to party philosophies. Although there is nothing as refined as operational concepts for such terms as "conservative," "liberal," and "socialistic," the major category does permit some interesting distinctions. Below are the categories as they were used in the 1964 coding procedures. The respondent either liked or disliked the party for its stand on the following issues:

a. ideas, policies, stands, or domestic policies (all unspecified)

b. government economic controls, planned economy, control of private enterprise or business

c. government economic and/or social welfare activity. Government's role vis-a-vis the states or private enterprise

d. government activity--individualism, individual initiative, private enterprise, state-local rights

e. stand on communism

f. social reform, social changes or progress. Will change things for the better, improve conditions

g. their socialistic philosophy

h. their liberal philosophy, like liberal (Northern) wing of the party

i. their conservative philosophy; conservative wing of party; states' rights position.

In 1964, interest in the Republican party focused on the party's "philosophy and activity" category. From a rank position of third in 1960, and 15 per cent of the total positive images counted, government philosophy during 1964 assumed a position of highest rank for the Republican party, reflecting a percentage increase of 11 per cent over the 1960 figure (see figures 7 and 8). Within this category for 1964 almost one half of the images centered on the "conservative" philosophy item,
Figure 8.—1964 Electoral Images of the Republican Party
the conservative wing of the party, or their states rights position (item i), while 32 per cent registered favor toward the party's stand on "individualism," individual initiative, and private enterprise. Thus for four out of five the questions of the proper scope of government and "conservatism" had some personal meaning. Howsoever the electorate had interpreted these two categories for the Republican party, the fact remains that, at least for those who respond to the political parties, these "ideological" concerns existed in reasonably large numbers.

Figure 7 shows that the eight years of the Eisenhower administration accomplished little of substance in improving the negative image of the party as the spokesman and guardian of the wealthy and privileged in the country. A total of 36 per cent of all negative responses were focused on the Republican party in terms of group associations, or, the more general complaint, that the party was bad for the common people, the working man, and the poor. By 1964, this lament had shifted but slightly, but the capture of the Republican convention by the Goldwater forces rocketed the anti-party responses couched in such phrases as "don't like campaign," or the campaign platform, or more generally, the party organization.

There is no change in the rank order of group association images favorable to the Democratic party in 1960 and 1964. The party is best liked for the beneficiaries of its activitists. It remains in the minds of those who have partisan attitudes of the party as the party of the common man, poor people, and the "people." In fact, there is no variation in the ranking of this cluster of attitudes over the 12 year period.
The second best-liked thing about the Democratic party in both 1960 and 1964 was the domestic policy and conditions items. Within this category for 1960, the "good times" theme is iterated by almost one of every two respondents. Twelve per cent of the Democratic party for its stand on minimum wages and hours (23 per cent), unemployment programs (also 23 per cent), and medicare and national health insurance programs. There is no reduction in this salience of domestic policies and conditions for the electorate in the 1964 election year, as Figure 9 makes clear.

In light of the increased attraction to the Republican party for its "philosophy and activity," the increase in the number of negative references to the party of the Democracy's "government activity and philosophy" assumes special importance.

**Summary Contents**

Table 15 in Appendix C, presents a rank ordering of the positive and negative images for both parties over the 12 year period. An inspection of the general pattern in the data allows the following general conclusions: The first item to note is the singular attachment to the Democratic party for the "group associations," the general beneficiaries, of that party. Of the total number of pro-democratic images an average of 30 per cent responded favorably to the Democratic party in these terms.

The "good times" image of the Democratic party, with the single exception of 1956, was consistently the second best liked asset of the Democrats. The assumption by the SRC staff that the Eisenhower years had dampened the memories of the Depression led to their placing the
Figure 9.—Electoral Images of the Democratic Party 1964
"good times" theme under the larger rubric Domestic Policy and Conditions. Yet the "good times" theme, despite their expectations, remained unabated when 1960 and 1964 election data are considered. This particular image constituted 74 and 82 per cent of the Domestic Policy and Conditions category in 1960 and 1964, respectively.

An examination of the graphs in this chapter suggest further that the electorate in fact evinced concern for the issues that had dominated the rhetoric of the two parties. As Figure 4 makes clear, the 1952 Republican campaign slogan of "Communism, Corruption, and Korea" did not fall on wholly deaf ears. Moreover, if the general concerns and issues of the four campaigns are identified one finds that the electorate does respond in predictable ways—a response that not only reflects the issue of concern, but one that also is articulated in party terms.

As might be expected, the fact that the democrats have been in office during every significant violent conflagration involving American troops since World War I has not gone unnoticed by the electorate. The onus of war was perceived and articulated by a number of respondents in each of the four elections. The most significant aspect of this concern has to do with the nature of the response. It was not a question of isolationism. It was not dominated by a concern for levels of foreign aid. The question of communism was minor. The democrats were seen in more general terms as the "party of war."

While the Democrats enjoyed support based on sentiments toward the party for its group associations, the Republicans for precisely the same reasons are at a distinct disadvantage. Despite the extension by
Eisenhower of many of the welfare programs of the New Deal-Fair Deal administrations, there is no evidence that this had had a substantial effect on the negative percepts of the Republican party in terms of group associations.

The most interesting phenomenon for the student of ideology occurs in the changes in the rank order of the Government and Philosophy category. While the rankings in the positive democratic images for the "activity and philosophy" category move upward from a position of sixth in 1952, seventh in 1956, fifth in 1960, and fourth in 1964, the percentage increases are negligible. Thus, although there has not been an increase in absolute terms, it would appear that in terms of the relevance criterion these images have become more central.

However, the rank ordering of negative images of an ideological nature shifts markedly over the period. The negative images of the government activity and philosophy for the Democratic party follow rank changes beginning in 1952 from seventh position to positions six, three, and one in the successive election years. Moreover, the negative image percentages, unlike the positive ideological ones, show marked increases over the same period.

Again we see evidence for the existence of a marked interest in the Republican party in terms of "governmental activity and philosophy." The four year rank positions of this theme in the electorate is seventh in 1952, and 1956 with rather abrupt shifts upward to the third rank in 1960 and into the first rank in 1964. This latter emphasis comes as no surprise for the Republican nominee, the Arizona Senator, was unique for his emphasis of the virtues of the conservative way and philosophy in
American life. The interesting occurrence is not that the Grand Old Party is viewed favorably in these terms by a segment of the electorate but rather that there was a trend discernible in the data for both parties in the 1960 race between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon. The 1964 election year did not depict many surprises in the ideology images of both parties once the 1960 data are made available for perusal.

The trend apparent in the data for positive ideological images toward the Republican party suggests that perhaps the Goldwater candidacy reflected something more than a fluke in the nominating process. The McCarthy movement (1968), unprecedented student unrest, the New Left horror of bureaucracies, Black Nationalist demands for decentralization and local control, and Governor Wallace's American Independent Party may be surface manifestations of a more general and pervasive dimension or thrust in the direction of a politics of principles and ideologies. This phenomenon over time would correspond more closely to the style of politics prevailing in, say, Italy, France, or Japan, than to the traditional style of American politics in which the parties serve preeminently as compromising institutions, brokers, working from bases of broad electoral coalitions. The data suggest that perhaps such movements as those mentioned above are illustrations of what to expect in the future rather than idiosyncratic occurrences to be accounted for in terms of party structures, strategies, and mis-calculations of the various intra-party factions. The existence of these ideological distinctions between the two parties takes on greater importance in light of the burial given to the concept by Angus Campbell in the American Voter study. The availability of data for the 1968 and subsequent elections
will permit more refinement in the trends such as they occur and might in the not-too-distant future call for a resurrection of the concept "ideology" as a fruitful variable in discussing mass political behavior.

In light of these ideological electoral images, running against the Democrats and in favor of the Republicans, the data presented in Figures 7 through 10 should be given careful consideration by the student of electoral movements. These data may well reflect an upsurge in GOP fortunes and, thus, a distinct shift in the position of dominance maintained by the party of F. D. Roosevelt for a full generation.
Beginning in 1960 the SRC included the 'good times' responses under the category 'Domestic Policies and Conditions.'

Figure 10.—Electoral Images of the Democratic Party, 1960
CHAPTER V

IMAGE DURABILITY AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF PARTY

Chapter III was devoted to a discussion of the extent of party images and the direction of image affect. Chapter IV spelled out the substantive content for the four elections for which data were available. This chapter will focus on the fluctuations in image salience for our age cohorts over the 12 year period. We hope to show both image centrality for the electorate, to determine which ones are more durable, and finally to examine those rooted in the depression of the thirties.

The initial assumption of this research was that the impact of the depression affected disproportionately those age groups in their most formative period, the same age groups that were most exposed to the vagaries and ills of the depression. It was further assumed that the effect of the depression would be visible even when controlling for such variables as occupation, race, party vote, party identification, and region of interview.

Moreover, we want to know whether Americans are becoming more interested in ideological concerns and less interested in the more specific issues of public policy. On the basis of data reported in Chapter IV we noted the increased electoral interest in ideological images for the political parties. A sharp rise in the rank order of these images occurred. Of interest now is the incidence of these images. Are they more prevalent among the young? Whites more than Negroes?
Democrats more than Republicans? The long run implications of a politics of "principle" can scarcely be forecast at this time. The data demonstrate a thrust in this direction but barring additional data, a "long term" trend is merely a suggested possibility and not a demonstrable phenomenon.

This chapter, then, is concerned with three questions: First, shifts in electoral images in terms of kinds of images, style images as opposed to substantive ones; second, image salience by cohorts; and finally, an examination of the increasing ideology hypothesis.

In order to focus on only the most critical party images, the two major categories of images (likes and dislikes) were further investigated for each party. To facilitate analysis and also maintain sizeable "n" in our cells, certain variables were collapsed into more manageable categories.

In any discussion of party images, symbols, percepts, and attitudes, one has need of information for the extent of images, their distribution, content, themes, functions for the individual, and the degrees of specificity and generality.

In considering the themes of particular images, including the specificity and generality dimension, it is helpful to make a distinction between different kinds of referent objects. Are electoral images predominantly "style," that is, based on procedural kinds of objects and concerns? Or are they more frequently directed toward programs and policies, items reflecting predominantly substantive interest? Are prevailing party images more concerned with the "methods" and procedures for achieving specific goals or with the goals themselves?
In our search for patterns of relations over time we want to know what changes, if any, occur in the kinds of image issues—their specificity and generality over time. To explore this question we categorized, in terms of a "style-substance" continuum, the two most frequently cited image categories for each party (negative and positive) in each election. Having established an image issue as being predominantly "style" or substance in characteristic, we then further refined the classificatory scheme by making a distinction on the basis of the specificity of a particular image issue. The categories in the classification were specific style, general style, specific substance, and general substance.

Style images were defined as those which reflect the voter's response to the style of operation of the party. Negative references to the Democratic party for its "corruption" or the kind of campaign waged are examples of this kind of image issue. The style image is specific if the empirical referents are immediate; "kind of campaign waged" being perhaps the most obvious style image of some specificity. Deficit spending, conservatism, and socialism are style images, too, but they reflect higher levels of abstraction or distance and thus would be tallied under the category "general style." These procedural images are more direct and immediate and more specific than images of the two parties for their "socialistic" philosophy, emphasis on individualism, and states rights' position, that is, the more abstract kinds of style images.

While the sharp rise in the "ideology" category for 1960 does not show up in the data reflected in Table 11, the 1964 increase in the
general style, i.e., ideological images, is markedly visible. As suggested above, it is hazardous to infer any ideology-phenomenon or future trend given the limited number of surveys used in this research. It is quite possible, however, that the increasing importance attached to ideological concerns found in both 1960 and 1964 is a manifestation of things yet to come.

### TABLE 11

**STYLE VERSUS SUBSTANCE KINDS OF PARTY IMAGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Specific Style</th>
<th>General Style</th>
<th>Specific Substance</th>
<th>General Substance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Style = 18  
Total Substance = 27  
Unclassified = 11

There exists perhaps no better illustration of the aphorism "politics makes strange bed-fellows" than the ideological congruence between New Left liberals, Black Nationalists, States Rights' advocates such as Governor Wallace, less-liberal northern Republicans, and now-prosperous ethnic minorities in urban areas, on the question of the proper role and scope of federal governmental activities. The convergence of these forces, some old some new, demanding decentralization of government and a slow down in the expansion of the federal government are responsible for what appears to be a new style of politics.
Southerners have long advocated states rights' position in order to perpetuate the Negroes' status in the South. Many northern Republicans, having been out of the White House for a generation, and over-represented in rurally dominated state legislatures, find equal appeal in the cry for decentralization and local control. The Black Nationalist Party now advocates local control (by Blacks) of schools, police, and the economy in all black communities. The New Left's concern for the threats posed by giant government bureaucracies and the increased affluence of traditionally democratic, urban, ethnic minorities who now view the federal government's concern for the Negroes with an unhealthy measure of anathema also attest to this increasing ideology dimension. The coalescence of these political movements suggests our data reflect the genesis of a new kind of politics and political behavior in America.

Images having more substantive referents may be divided further into those more immediate in their impact. Programs such as unemployment compensation, minimum wages and hours, and aid to education, and those more general and distant from the beneficiaries involved, are classified as substance images. Examples of images of greater generality are the Democratic party as the party of the rich. Generally, the Group Association themes epitomize these general substance themes, as do also the "prosperity" and "depression" images of the two parties.

Taking the two most important image categories for each party in each year (positive and negative categories) we then examined the two most important sub-categories and classified them in terms of (a) the style-substance characteristic and (b) the specificity generality continuum. Table 11 portrays the electoral emphasis by kind of image
The middle column reflects those images that were thought to be generally neither substantive nor style. Traditional-party-vote responses, attraction or repulsion to people in the party, and "time for a change" themes were the kinds of images categorized here. No distinction was made between image issues being positive or negative to the parties.

The most outstanding feature of the data displayed in Table 11 is the consistency in the emphasis placed on the general substance kinds of images. Evidently the party strategist who emits hortatory language in search of electoral support makes some sense given the kinds of image issues found in the electorate. The substance side of the continuum suggests also that the public is little moved by specific programs and policies at least to the extent of attributing them to one party or the other. However, the low salience attached to specific substantive images over the 12 years is not totally unexpected when one recalls that the available evidence cogently documents low levels of issue awareness for the average voter and that, even when awareness of particular issues exists, it is not customarily transferred to the appropriate political party.

The category "specific style" images was the reservoir of negative images toward one or the other of the two parties. When substantial numbers of references of a specific style were made, invariably they were negative. Something was disliked about the Republican or Democratic parties. Images of corruption, the kind of campaign waged (especially 1964) and deficit spending were subsumed under this category.
An initial hypothesis of this research was that depression age cohorts (the collapsed cohort CD) would not only have a disproportionate concern with issues arising from their depression experiences, but also that they would transfer these depression-based fears and anxieties to the appropriate political party.

In order to examine the extent of these kinds of party images and the degree of their durability over time, we selected specific party images which appeared critical in at least three of the four elections surveyed. Some images had what Philip Converse would term "low centrality." They occur once under the impetus of more transient events and simply fail to register as important in the electorate at other times. The sentiment in 1952, that it was "time for a change" in administrations is typical of these more evanescent occurrences. Other images, based on tradition, customs, and grave historical moments, proved far more salient and thus can be thought of as images more central to the concerns of the electorate.

Our image data agrees generally with the findings of other scholars of American electoral movements. The party images with the highest centrality were those whose roots lie deep in the depression, including the historical stance of the major parties, and those related images focusing on the perceived group beneficiaries of the party's program.

In light of the finding reported in the American Voter study, that there had been a dampening of the memories associated with the depression (a function of Eisenhower's first administration and the general levels of prosperity), our task was twofold: To determine
whether this finding, based on two samples, could be sustained with
evidence from additional surveys; and secondly, to explore the implica­
tion of our hypothesis that, though there may be a decline in depres­
sion images of the two parties, the decline will not occur for those
who experienced the depression during their most formative years. If
one can show that a depression cohort, regardless of occupation, race,
party vote, and party identification, consistently registers a higher
concern (centrality) for these party images he indirectly illustrates
the impact of the depression on the electorate.

A recurring problem for secondary analyses of large amounts of
data collected over time is comparability in figures. It would be non­
sense to note that a particular age group had become twice as concerned,
in terms of frequency with which an image theme is indexed, with a par­
ticular image from Time\textsuperscript{1} to Time\textsuperscript{2}, without considering the possibility
that increases are attributable to an increase in the size of the age
group. It is possible that the age group size may have doubled in the
second sample; this would mean that there was, in fact, no relative in­
crease in the salience of the image in question for the cohort. The
problem is compounded in this research by the different sizes of the
samples selected in each of the four election years by the Survey Re­
search Center.

Because of the cohort size differences over time, and the ex­
tremely involved task of adjusting for a base cohort size and then con­
verting all image data to square with the adjusted cohort proportions,
we focused on relative proportions. Our concern was for the differen­
tials between proportions. The first step was to calculate the propor­
tion or percentage of the cohort to the total sample. We then
determined the proportion of the image score attributable to the cohort. If the cohort, for example, constituted 40 per cent of a sample we might expect that 40 per cent of the image scores ought to come from this cohort. With these two figures, it is possible to claim for specific images that a certain cohort did, or failed to, reflect its numbers in the image scores.

Figures 11 through 18 portray the differentials between proportions for cohorts over the 12 years. The "0" mid-line reflects total congruence: that is, the cohort proportion is also the proportion of the image score. A trend line located consistently above the "0" mid-line in these figures would indicate a significance beyond expected proportions and thus high centrality. A line generally below the mid-line suggests an image of low centrality for the age cohort. Though there exist some visibly erratic movements in the trends plotted, there nonetheless are some interesting consistencies. As we shall see, the data by and large do not fit neatly the notion that some images are of high centrality while others score low.

Those images which occurred only once or twice were omitted from our consideration; those images that were salient in three or four elections were plotted by cohort to determine centrality. A total of eight party images for the 12 years showed some durability in the electorate, four were positive and four negative. The Republican party was the object of three of the four negative party images and none of the positive ones.

For purposes of analysis, we have assumed that the prosperity image of the Democratic party and the depression and "bad times" image
of the Republican party are direct reflections of the individual's experiences during the depression years, roughly the 1930's.

To be sure, a good case can be made for such images as the positive affect and opinion toward the Democratic party for its worker welfare programs, and both parties for their group associations. Our feeling was that the two images selected were the ones least subject to controversy and different interpretation.

Our depression-impact hypothesis predicts that the depression cohort (CD) would show a disproportionate concern (high centrality) for both the image of the Democrats as the party of prosperity and the Republicans as the party of hard times.

The eight images having more than passing interest to the electorate are depicted in Figures 11 through 18 of this chapter. The depression images of the two parties, a negative image of the Republicans and a positive affect toward the Democrats, are pictured in Figures 11 and 12. Support for the hypothesis is evident in each of these figures. And this is especially the case for the positive images of the Democrats. But in both cases, the depression cohort over time tends to rank above the other cohorts in terms of our proportions measure. As Figure 11 makes clear, with the single exception of cohort EF in 1960, the oldest age category, the depression cohort stands firm and markedly different in its adherence to the Democratic party as the party of favorable economic conditions.

Furthermore, the gradual but steady decline in the 1952-1960 cohort lines (trends) for the cohorts negative image of the Republicans as the party of the poor economic conditions suggest that the trend
Figure 11.—Pro Democratic image for prosperity and "good times," by cohorts.
discerned by Campbell and his colleagues was indeed a trend of more than superficial substance. AB and CD, the two junior cohorts, reflect a decline of substantial size for 1956 and again in 1960. But the candidacy of Goldwater in 1964 was probably more than sufficient in provoking dormant party images as cohort CD surpassed their 1952 level of concern for this negative image of the GOP (see Figure 12).

The centrality of depression images for cohort CD may also be seen in the emphasis given to the Democratic party for its worker welfare programs; and also, with the exception of 1956, to the image of the Democrats as the party of labor and the working class (Figures 13 and 14).

Interestingly, one finds that these depression images for the youngest cohort (AB), though not absent, are not indicative of the cohort size. Hence, in aggregate terms one may conclude that these images have low centrality for the young voters during this 12 year period. The single exception, a one time occurrence in eight possible scores, occurs in the 1952 response to the Republican party as the party of hard times (Figure 12). The fact that members of this cohort were simply too young to remember the deprivations of the 1930's and too unsophisticated to place the blame, rightly or wrongly, is probably the reason for this low centrality among the young. The 1952 score may be a reflection of the effectiveness of the agents of political socialization as they had existed since the Roosevelt years; and with the failure of the first Eisenhower administration to produce the great depression anew, these images were further eroded by the actual experiences of the younger people in the samples.
Figure 12.—Negative image of Republican party for depression and "Bad Times" by cohorts.
Figure 13.—Pro Democratic images for party group associations (Labor, the Working Class), by cohorts
Figure 14.--Pro Democratic image for Worker Welfare Programs, by cohorts.
The young also manifested positive concern for the Democrats in terms of group associations (Figures 13 and 15), negative images of the Republicans for the same reason (Figure 16) and little emphasis (low centrality) for the worker welfare programs of the Democrats (Figure 14).

An issue of equal interest for the young cohort is the radical fluctuation in the trend, or lack of same, for the image of the Democrats as corrupt, dishonest, and overly prone to considerations of patronage. Again, it is difficult to dismiss the high centrality of this image in 1964 from the moral crusade mounted by Goldwater.

The oldest age category appears to care least about the group associations of the Republican party (Figure 16), at least for the first three years in this survey. This agrees with much of our data reflecting Republicanism among older aged individuals and this especially for those who came of age prior to the 1932 election. This Figure also supports the general finding reported by many other students of electoral behavior and attachments; namely, the increasing trend of younger people to move to the party of the democracy.

The oldest age cohort (EF), in light of this finding above, ought logically be least impressed with the Democratic party for its group beneficiaries. Such is the case when we consider the group associations based on "labor" and "working class" images (Figure 13). For an unexplainable reason, the cohort trends for group associations in terms of the "people", the poor, and the common man do not square with those trends based on a labor kind of response. For the common people image of the Democratic party, one finds the oldest cohort showing considerable emphasis in 1952 and 1956, a sharp drop in 1960, and a peaking
Figure 15.--Pro Democratic Images for Party Group Associations (the common people, the poor, the "people"), by cohorts

Cohort:

AB
CD
EF

1952 1956 1960 1964

DEM. (+)
Figure 16.--Negative image of the Republican party for group associations, by cohorts
in 1964 (Figure 15). Again, like the escalating movements in the younger cohorts on image positions in 1964, the oldest cohort members (EF) may also be moved to increased interest and articulation in images of the party that had waned in recent years.

What we can say about the oldest age grouping, cohort EF, the people who came of age prior to the Depression, is that they are more concerned with the corruption and graft of the Democrats (Figure 17), "Bad Times" image of the Republicans (Figure 12); but less concerned with the Republicans for the more substantive issue of poorer working conditions, fewer jobs, et cetera (Figure 18), group associations (Figure 16), the good times image of the Democrats (Figure 16); and indicate an increasing concern for the positive aspects of the Democrat's worker welfare program (Figure 14).

It is possible that these cohort trends are open to a different line of interpretation. Rather than their being influenced by the Great Depression, as is suggested in this dissertation, they may simply reflect differences in class or party alignments. Following this argument, our image score is a function of the working class or those who identify and vote for the Republican party, rather than some unique historical experience.

Because of this possibility, the incidence of these salient images was determined for the variables, occupation, party identification, party vote, race, and region of interview. The assumption was that if among, say, white collar workers, Republican identifiers, and Republican voters, we find that cohort members who evoke these depression images of the two political parties consistently fall into our
Cohort:

AB
CD
EF

Figure 17.--Negative image of the Democrats on Issues of Corruption, Graft, and Dishonesty, by cohorts
Figure 18.—Negative image of Republicans for working conditions, jobs, etc., by cohort.
depression cohort CD then it is indeed the depression that counts most.

Appendix D contains the tables picturing these relationships. Footnote 112 discusses the procedures followed in collapsing original codes into those column headings for Occupation (Table 16), Party Identification (Table 17), and Party vote (Table 18). Although one must use caution in inferring relationships from such small numbers as occur for some occupational categories, the incidence of these images is obvious. In almost every listing for which sizeable numbers are present one finds roughly that about one half of all responses come from members of cohort CD. This occurs for both blue collar and white collar occupations over the period of time examined (Table 16, Appendix D).

Moreover, this pattern prevails more or less when we consider party vote, party identification, race, and region of interview (Appendix D, Tables 16-20). An examination of the negative "depression" image of the Republican party finds essentially the same occurrence.

Some time ago Daniel Bell wrote a book titled The End of Ideology. Some observers of the American scene tended to extend this theme to American politics since it did not conflict with the prevailing view of American politics as being chiefly non-ideological. I would urge that Bell's conception of ideology was far too narrow; and further that he has been misinterpreted by these persons. Bell, if correct in my reading, argues the swan song of those belief systems that were total in every respect. Ideology in the Marxist sense, the socialist, or the chiliastic millenia of other intellectual perspectives epitomize this
kind of perspective. It may well be that these all-consuming total
value perspectives are waning. However, if one conceptualizes ideology
in a different manner, the status of ideology is yet open to debate and
examination. Joseph LaPalombara registers a cogent dissent to the end-
of-ideology school of thought.  

The body of scholarly literature on ideology is heavily influ­
enced by the thinking of Karl Mannheim. Mannheim equates ideology with
the perspective of the individual, the value predisposition. The im­
plication in this interpretation is that everyone has an ideology which,
by and large, is a product of the individual's life circumstances,
social, political, and economic.

This conception of ideology as rooted in the individual's ex­
periences contributes to the Marxian conviction and forecast of class
war based on great disparities in the value distribution for a society.
It is this conception of ideology as an omnipresent phenomenon, when
coupled with a situation of an increasingly affluent working class, that
makes the end-of-ideology argument so plausible in terms of American
politics. Lasswell and Kaplan borrow extensively from Mannheim and
make a distinction between ideology as it sustains the current political
situation and ideology as utopia, when it attempts to supplant the pre­
vailing political structures and priorities. Our interest lies in
the extent and characteristics of these individual "perspectives"
(images) of the parties for aggregate populations. It is not the rela­
tive intensity that we are discussing, but the frequencies in the
occurrence of particular themes.

I have suggested that an integral aspect of ideology is its style
emphasis. Content, to be sure, ought not be deprived of scholarly attention; but our understanding of political behavior and mass political movements is more likely to be enhanced through increased attention to the instrumental means (values) by which goals (values) are sought in the political system. The difference between western democracies and the sundry "peoples' republics" infused with the ideas of Marx and Lenin, it seems to me, are more questions of style and procedure than content. There is a kernel of truth in the late Justice Frankfurter's comment that the history of liberty is largely the history of due process and procedural safeguards. The true "ideologue" is the person who views his values so superior to others that compromise and conciliation are out of the question. This element of irreconcilability becomes more important than the actual content of the initial goal values of the person in question. One might note here Eric Hoffer's commentary on one of Hitler's organizers in the thirties who said that if someone could show him a good communist he would make a good fascist out of him in two weeks. 116 Closer to home, one may point to the often noted datum that the two major American parties share many ends and differ chiefly in the alternatives posited for attaining them.

An examination of party politics in such countries as Japan and France (in which ideological considerations play a relatively larger role than in the United States) provides little comfort for the individual who in some way had viewed the peculiarly pragmatic brokering role of the parties in the American system as the genius of American politics.

There are few students of political movements and symbols who
are willing to write off ideology as a concept of some utility in our efforts to understand certain kinds of political phenomenon. In terms of the two major parties and their followings we have systematically established a number of reliable generalizations. We know, for example, that ideological differences tend to be greater among the political activists in the two major parties. That is, the activists in the Republican party differ most from the activists in the Democratic party. Furthermore, the leadership of the two parties are markedly more ideological than the self-placed party identifiers who are less active. The hard core of the parties do not show much variation, they are groups of like-minded men. These are expected relationships when one recalls that ideological sophistication is strongly related to education and political activity (activities such as campaigning, contributing, attempts to persuade others, et cetera). An unexpected finding, however, is that the difference between the Republican leadership and the following of that party is greater than the difference between the Democratic leadership and the Republican following. This apparent paradox is more comprehensible given the finding of Free and Cantril, that there is a sizeable majority of "operational" liberals, and yet also substantial numbers (often overlapping) of ideological conservatives.

Over the period of time under examination there were five party images that can be considered ideological, three for the Democrats (all negative) and two for the Republicans (both positive). The Democratic images generally had greater durability while the images for the GOP tended to become more critical during the last two of our elections. The images were:
For the Republican party, a favorable view of its

a) conservative philosophy, conservative wing of party, states rights position, and

b) less government activity--for individualism, individual initiative. For private enterprise, state-local rights.

For the Democratic party, a negative view on the following items:

a) too much government activity--against individualism, individual initiative. Against private enterprise, state-local rights.

b) socialistic philosophy. Too radical.

c) too much for government spending, deficit spending, increasing the national debt.

For purposes of analysis, we have collapsed the three negative Democratic images into one, a procedure also extended to the two positive ideological images for the Republican party (an occurrence in the 1964 election but not 1952 and 1956). We use again the relative proportions index, the difference between cohort size and the amount of image score accounted for by cohort. The cohort CD (the depression cohort) trend line for the negative democratic images moves from a 1952 level of -.5 rapidly upward in both 1960 and 1964 to the extent that the differential is 18 in the 1964 election (Figure 19). Cohort AB, the youngest age grouping, did not reflect its size in the sample in either 1952 or 1960. But the 1964 election reflects an enormous increase over the 1960 level, a 23 per cent differential change to the disadvantage of the Democratic party.

Cohort EF, the age group that came of age during a period of Republican ascendence, prior to the Depression, predictably, showed greater concern for these negative ideological images of the Democratic party in 1952. For this cohort in 1952, these negative images were most
Figure 19.—Negative ideological image scores for Democratic Party, by cohort
central. These same images had scarcely any impact on the youngest people in the sample. It is interesting to note, however, that while cohort CD manifests in 1960 and 1964 higher levels of concern (greater centrality) for those images of the democrats, the greatest change in our proportions index occurs between 1960 and 1964, and for our youngest cohort, AB.

Figure 20 shows the cohort position on positive ideological images of the Republican party in 1964. Cohort AB the youngest cohort reflects a greater salience of these positive images than do either of the other two. Thus, for those who did register ideology images, the younger individuals reflected in fact the greatest degree of centrality. The significant point about this figure is that all age cohorts score disproportionately in favor of these ideological images favoring the Republican party.

One might conceive of this increasing emphasis on "style" kinds of party images (ideology) as a phenomenon peculiar to, say, Republican identifiers and voters who are being mobilized in a particularly heated campaign. If this is the case, then we would expect to find it among certain occupational income and education groups in the population. With the exception of the Negro this does not square with the data on hand. There was but one Negro in the 1964 study who made reference to these ideological themes, and this was a person under age 32 who cited the "deficit spending" and unbalanced budget themes as something disliked about the Democrats. For American Negroes, then, despite the increasingly ideological stance of the aggregate population, these style and procedural party images cannot be deemed significant (Black Nationalist Party notwithstanding). It also suggests the possibility
Figure 20.—Positive ideological image scores for Republican party, by cohort: 1964.
that Negro demands, like the demands of organized interests in general, are now less satiable than they were a generation or two ago.

Inspection of Table 12, breakdown by occupation grouping, shows that the younger people are more responsive to these style images favoring the Republican party as they also tend to support a more unfavorable perception of the Democrats. And this seems to be the case when the cell numbers are not so small as to make comment hazardous, as in the case for "agricultural" occupations.

**TABLE 12**

**PARTY STYLE IMAGES, BY COHORT AND OCCUPATION: 1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative Dem. Images</th>
<th>Housewife</th>
<th>White Collar</th>
<th>Blue Collar</th>
<th>Agric.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CD</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EF</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EF</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>156</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of party identification, one finds again that these images are not unique to solely Republicans. Table 13 illustrates that younger respondents are more disposed to accepting these ideological themes. There are differences, however. Among Democrats one finds that the emphasis is on the perceived evil in the "spending" policies of Democratic administrations; while among Republican identifiers the Democrats suffer the stigma of their "socialistic" doctrine.

**TABLE 13**

**PARTY STYLE IMAGES, BY COHORT AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION: 1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
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</tbody>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The acid test in the study of electoral behavior lies in our ability to explain voting behavior. Again one finds that the distribution of these images, though heaviest among Republican voters, as was to be expected, is spread in the array of cells. There can be little question of the relevance of ideological style images for the youngest group
in the national sample for 1964. Among Democratic voters they outnumber all other age cohorts (Table 14). Furthermore, a more detailed inspection reveals that what the Democratic voters liked about the Republican party was its "conservatism." Thus, while those who identify with the Democratic party appear to be more concerned about the "spending" habits of the party, those who in fact cast their lot to the party of the democracy evoke an interest in the virtue of Republican conservatism.

TABLE 14
POSITIVE IDEOLOGICAL IMAGES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, BY COHORT AND PARTY VOTE: 1964

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-32 years</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the end-of-ideology argument may be valid for those all-consuming belief systems for Western industrialized nations, our data on party images, especially that for 1960 and 1964, suggest that there indeed has been a renaissance in procedural or style images of the two political parties; and that this change tends to be unfavorable to the Democratic party.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

This dissertation was concerned with public percepts of the two major American political parties. In a democratic society it behooves those who govern, as well as those who proffer counsel, to take count of the anticipated popular reaction to issues of public policy. It is no longer the case, and has not been so since that time when our beliefs about the ultimate repository of power were expressly stated in the Constitution, that men may rule by virtue of their birth, status, wealth, or the wisdom of a platonic philosopher king. Legitimacy is determined by the people; and thus, it is of prime importance for political practitioner and student of political behavior alike to attempt to discern the characteristics and trends in the images which the public hold of the major connecting links between the public and government, the parties. An assumption of this research was that our capacity to discern long term trends in popular images of the parties would contribute further to our understanding of the ebb and flow of party fortunes, a capacity necessary to the growth of theory.

This chapter will summarize the findings of our research on party images for the period 1952-1964.

Despite the general absence of high levels of issue awareness and conceptual accomplishment for the American electorate, this investigation indicates that, toward the major connecting links between the
institutions of government and the citizenry, the parties, there are large numbers who have attitudes toward them. Not only are there few persons who have no percepts of either party, but one finds, furthermore, that sizeable numbers have as many as six images of the parties, in terms of their good and bad points. Thus, though the electorate has not manifested high levels of cognitive sophistication or concern for such conceptual dimensions as liberalism and conservatism, certainly alone this is insufficient evidence for voter alienation, irrationality, or isolation; in fact, they show considerable concern and affect toward the political parties.

Chapter III was devoted to an examination of the extent of party images. We found that not only did large numbers in the electorate show affect toward the parties but that they also had large surpluses of positive images toward them. The populace seemed to be both generous and benign as they registered many more positive themes than negative ones. Whatever ambivalence the American electorate may have toward "politics" and "politicians," a demonstrable phenomenon, it appears that the political parties are viewed in a more favorable light than some have presumed. Moreover, the political party with the largest surplus of favorable images in every instance achieved victory in the upcoming elections.

If the political parties are elevated to a plane above the nitty-gritty of "politics" and patronage, their being more distant would appear to enhance this trend. The fact is that the candidates of the parties tend to attract more attention in terms of electoral images. This occurrence lends support to those commentators who see a personalization of national politics and an active search during the
nomination process for the man most likely to draw affection of the electorate, charisma if you will.

The significance of party identification may be illustrated in terms of such variables as party vote, levels of information, and evaluation of public policy. The importance of party identification may also be witnessed in our aggregate scores for party and candidate images over the period of time. The relationship was predictable. The stronger the party affiliation, the greater the number of favorable images for the party identified with and the stronger the identification the larger the number of negative images of the party of the opposition.

Region of interview was also examined. As expected, the Democratic party had a surplus of positive images in the South, comprising both border and deep states. This was accompanied by the logically expected surpluses of negative images of the GOP. Despite the projected trend toward increasingly competitive party politics in traditionally one party areas, our finding may mean that, for the South at least, the renaissance of the Republican party will take a long time in coming, if yet borne.

One of our more interesting findings occurred when we examined party images by sex. Stouffer has documented the fact that women, more than men, tend to be less tolerant of deviants in society, and this is so when controlling for a number of variables. The image data showed that women on the whole were more favorable to both political parties while the men in the sample distinguished themselves by their surplus of negative images of the Republican party. Women also tended to react more strongly to the candidates; they were both more positive
and more negative than were the men. A hypothesis that comports to the data is that women in general tend to have a more benevolent view of politics, politicians, and the parties. It is further hypothesized that this phenomenon is a function of the differences in the patterns of socialization during early adolescence.

We know, for example, that young children are sheltered from many of the more sordid aspects of political life. But sometime during early adolescence, boys assume many of the more cynical attitudes common to the adult population. Girls, given this hypothesis, are quickly exposed to the idea that politics is a man's business and thus their orientation is directed to more socially acceptable interests—frequently and characteristically non-political. What remains implicitly for adult women is a residue of those earlier and more benign attitudes towards things political. But the fact that they shift their interest to non-political phenomena does not mean that they become apolitical. Their focus, we would argue, becomes much more personal and much more concerned with the personalities and characteristics of the individuals who run for the presidency.

An examination of the content of party images reveals that the public does not simply respond robot-like to the symbols manipulated for strategic purposes by competing party elites. Assuming that aggregate populations are a legitimate universe about which one may venture generalizations, the image data suggest that the American electorate is neither as feckless or as manipulable as Murray Edelman and some others think.

Rightly or wrongly, the Democrats were viewed as the party of
war; and the virtue of the Republican party lay not in its "isolationism" but in its being the party of peace. Notwithstanding the possibility of coincidental occurrences, the Democrats have, in fact, been in charge during every major confrontation involving armed conflict in the last half century. This means that for many in the electorate the emphasis on a bi-partisan foreign policy has not equally tarnished the Republican party, as the Democrats have suffered the anathema of "war party." Moreover, the situation in Vietnam will probably further aggravate this negative image of the Democrats in years to come.

The ability of competing party elites to manipulate the electorate is largely restricted to capitalizing on those things that the electorate is receptive to discuss and consider. The issue of communism in the 1950's, abroad and at home, serves as notice to those who think that there is by necessity a congruence between the concerns of the elites and those of the general electorate on the issues over which cudgels will be taken up. Stouffer found that communism was not a salient issue for the general public shortly after the McCarthy hearings (sample taken in 1954); our image data for the parties agree with his finding.

The experiences of the mass public in such crisis situations as the Great Depression leave deep imprint on their attitudes toward the major political parties; and these same experiences serve as constraints on the electoral strategy and rhetoric in any single campaign.

Furthermore, there is some evidence that the electorate responds according to which party controls the White House and which is relegated to the role of opposition in anticipation of the next battle. With the departure of the Democrats from office in 1953, one finds a marked
decline in those images of the Democrats as they were responsible for administering the matters of state. While this does not affirm Key's notion of a "responsible electorate," neither does it refute it. Sufficient numbers (and not only the slim percentage of "ideologues") act accordingly when one party is in control and the other stands in opposition.

The group associations of the parties appeared to be the most durable of party images, perhaps as durable as party identification itself. This too, is probably related to the programs and experiences arising out of the Depression of the 1930's.

One of the more intriguing findings concerns the increase in ideological or style images of the two political parties. The shift in the rank order of these images in 1960 and further in 1964 was sharply upward from the 1952-1956 periods examined. The fact that these movements were one-sided, i.e., favored the Republican party, is equally important. The shifts might have been registered across the board, with Republicans and Democrats becoming more ideologically attached to their respective parties. Such was not the case. The Democrats were condemned for their "spending," emphasis on federal activities, "socialism," little sympathy for states' rights and localism, and lack of a balanced budget. The Republicans gained largely from the views of their party as the party to cut federal activities, to emphasize states' rights, and "conservatism." Furthermore, one finds that the incidence of these changes lies with the young, frequently the youngest segment in the sample.

This increase in ideological party images may mirror increasing
resistance of the bulk of the population to elite sponsored programs generally beneficial to the yet deprived segments in the country. As such they do not represent the utopian doctrines of those whose primary intention is to reshape society. These images might nevertheless be reflections, in part, of a massive backlash in defense of the present system and established priorities. If ideology in a generic sense does serve to impel people to political behavior, then perhaps the Nixon election victory of 1968 is better understood as a popular protest to federal expansion into new areas in the domestic sphere rather than as a vote of protest to the nation’s involvement in Vietnam.

Herbert Kaufman delivered an insightful overview of the shifting value priorities in the administrative process. The theoretical implication of his views have relevance to the ideological party images here described. According to Kaufman, the administrative history of our governmental machinery reflects a concern for three kinds of values, values which succeed one another in a cyclical fashion over periods of time. Representativeness, characterized by a period when great emphasis is placed in representative mechanisms; politically neutral competence, as witnessed in periods in which politics and administration are deemed better isolated from one another; and executive leadership, with its stress on efficiency and development of organizational structures aiding the executive.

Kaufman does not say that these values are sought as abstract ends in themselves; or that there is universal agreement on which value should be emphasized at a particular time; or that one value exists alone . . . until new priorities are made. His thesis is simply that
when one value has been ascendent for a period of time it is to the advantage of some and disadvantage of others. And that over time the disadvantaged and discontented become a dynamic force that attempts to opt for new forms, forms which are more responsive to their needs.

Much of the history of this century has been a history of professionalization and neutrality among bureaucrats and increasing growth in the executive. Today's concern is for the seeming unresponsiveness of institutions (political, economic, educational, and religious) in twentieth century life. The discontented are increasingly giving special attention to the mechanisms of representation as modes of rectifying the perceived and real inequities in the present system for allocating what there is for distribution. Two manifestations of this discontent are discussed by Kaufman, education and the anti-poverty program. In both there have been drastic proposals for reform and thus greater representation of the interests affected.

The most sweeping expression of the unrest over lack of representativeness is the growing demand for extreme administrative decentralization, frequently coupled with insistence on local clientele domination of the decentralized organizations. The specific recommendations made by Kaufman for administrative reform need not detain us here. Of importance, however, is the structure of ideology images as they reflect these same concerns for less governmental activity at the national level (heretofore an activity readily acceptable to liberal Democrats confronted with parochial state legislatures and, on occasion, an equally parochial Congress) and the conservatism, states' rights, and localism virtues of the Republican party.

Our data do not permit us to make a distinction between the
demands of those who are discontented and thus seek more of what society has to offer (political, social and economic) and the demands of the traditional "ideologue" who envisages confrontation as the means of achieving a series of concessions without regard to the cost. The former interpretation, appropriate to Kaufman's thesis, would suggest that once the demands have been met there would then result the conventional status quo which in its turn would generate, in dialectical fashion, sufficient discontent to make for the elevation of one or both of the neglected values of administration. The concerns of the latter group, on the other hand, are far less satiable. These people are more convinced of the propriety of their position and thus each issue becomes a new crusade and as such non-negotiable in the conventional give and take of the political order. The data for this dissertation does not allow an answer to the question of intensity, a dimension important to any discussion and understanding of ideology. We can offer a few observations, however.

In the first place, the increase in "style" images of the two parties in the elections for 1960 and 1964 has been alluded to above. It is my suspicion that the significance of party images lies less in the content and substance than in the procedural emphases so characteristic of our style images. Drastic shifts in these style images would imply a shift from policy substance to an emphasis on "means," with the possibility that these means could become more significant than the end values.

Secondly, one cannot discount the possibility that we may be entering into a new era of party politics, an era characterized by a
politics of program guided by principles, "confrontation" in terms of less conventional kinds of political behavior,\textsuperscript{125} and an increase in the importance of third parties in the galaxy of American political life.\textsuperscript{126}

It is highly unlikely that a single factor alone contributes to the characteristics of the politics of the 1960's. The two most immediate (and perhaps critical) factors are the enormous costs of our engagement in Vietnam, with the meaning of this for our domestic priorities and the rising expectations of American black people and their demands for general decolonization. Rising levels of education in the population may also be important for understanding the political behavior of the sixties. Higher levels of education and thus sophistication, may mean that the traditional ploys and symbols of party activity will be increasingly unacceptable to larger numbers in the population.

In his well known treatise on working-class authoritarianism, Seymour Lipset concludes on an optimistic note. For Lipset, education and rising standards of living have the potential for redeeming the working class member from the evils of authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{127} Given the nation's commitment to universal education, a truly remarkable and unprecedented phenomenon in the history of mankind, we may find our party system heir to consequences not wholly compatible with the conventional generalizations about American politics. The greatest threat lies, if we may paraphrase, in a citizenry motivated to political activity with too little knowledge and much conviction in the righteousness of their case. There may indeed be something as frightful as ignorance in action, a little knowledge and much certainty.
That the party strategists are deeply concerned about the kinds of images, impressions, and attitudes held by the electorate is obviously apparent as they take special soundings of the popular mood as well as take heed of the polls independently conducted during a campaign.

Given the pervasiveness and content of party images examined in this dissertation, is there an optimum strategy for each of the two major parties? The answer would appear to be in the affirmative.

There appear to be several constraints or limitations on what activities and rhetoric the parties can engage in. In the first place, we saw that the incumbent has a decided advantage in terms of party images. Though generalization would be better served with image data for a large number of elections, Stevenson's decline in 1956 suggests that the generally positive affect shown toward all presidential candidates may require qualification when a campaign with an incumbent occurs. A second constraint exists in the traditional voting habits and partisan attachments of the population. We know that fully 75 percent of the population is moved to identify with the party of their parents; and they vote consistently barring the presence of an acute issue or charismatic candidate on the electoral scene.

To note the general favor attaching to the Democrats for their domestic policies is now a commonplace observation. The Democratic party has been the party of the underprivileged, the party most willing to move into the social welfare field, and the party most responsive to the needs in general of the "people." The Republican party, on the other hand, is perceived positively for its foreign policy, its capacity to more efficient government management, and less government spending.
The fortunes of the two parties have waxed and waned in a
cyclical manner, an occurrence that has been documented and commented
upon by numerous scholars of parties.128 As Lubell has described it:

The usual pattern has been that of a dominant majority party,
which stayed in office as long as its elements held together,
and a minority party which gained power only when the majority
coalition split.129

Lubell envisages this metaphorically as a solar system with a sun, the
dominant party, and a moon, the minority status party. The majority
party problem is to maintain the coalition over the time of ascendence,
while the minority party must determine which "element in the majority
coalition can be split off most readily."130 Since the 1932 election of
Franklin Roosevelt, the Democrats have been the majority party, the sun,
so to speak.

If the ideology kinds of party images found in 1960 and 1964
are not merely accidentals and continue to endure in the electorate then
one of two possibilities, in my judgment, seems quite possible: There
will be an increase in the likelihood of third parties; or the Repub­
llican party will benefit from the present discontent in the nation and
assume its turn at guiding the ship of state.

The probability of third party movements enduring is obviously
a function of the willingness of the major parties to absorb platform
and program of these movements. Such has been the fortune, or misfor­
tune, of third party movements in past history.

A more plausible case can be made for the Republicans wittingly
adapting their strategy to the needs, desires, and frustrations of those
segments in the population having moved upward socially and economically,
and who resist federal intervention in behalf of other less-privileged
elements in the population. The status of the Negroes in America touches to the quick the membership of both parties. The possibilities of a sizeable backlash among urban-ethnic populations would seem to be to the advantage of the Republican party. Whether this segment of the Democratic coalition can be wrenched free is at this time impossible to determine. The kinds of images and concerns reflected by our ideological image suggest that an optimum strategy for the GOP would focus on the following themes.

The Republicans are likely to gain with an emphasis on their foreign policy; not a foreign policy based on "isolationism" and disengagement from the United States' commitments, but one which sings praise to the periods of peace under Republican leadership. The Republicans have been traditionally at a disadvantage in the domestic sphere. If the present discontent continues, and there is an increase in the demands for "de-centralization" and states' rights, their usual emphasis on limited federal intervention in local and state issues (despite their national significance) will continue to serve them well. The possibility of employing symbols effectively is distinctly an advantage of the Republicans in the 1960's.

The Republicans can gain on two fronts. Firstly, they can pay lip-service to the ideals of equality and much of the New Deal through Great Society programs instituted by the Democrats and at the same time, and almost with impunity, cut back these same programs because of the twin needs of economizing and yet maintaining a strong defense posture. The present emphasis by the Nixon administration on a "safeguard" system, an anti-ballistic missile system which no qualified scientist has
yet endorsed, and the de-emphasis of various domestic programs is in-structive. Second, they can appeal to the pocketbook of the more affluent working class, a segment greatly aided by the Democratic programs in the past, and cloak the situation of millions with symbols such as equal opportunity. The only plausible reason for some groups not having attained what there is to have, some would say, is that they have simply not taken advantage of the opportunities available, the Negro's case foremost. That this approach has some basis in the public may be seen in numerous sample findings in which overwhelming numbers of white citizens feel that the situation of the poor man, in general, is much his own doing. 131

However, the above does not mean that the Democrats are lost for the next generation of elections. The Republican party, in order to appeal to many of the more rank prejudices motivating blue collar political behavior, must also mollify the more liberal elements in their party--no easy task.

In retrospect, the Nixon election reflects largely the schisms within the Democratic party, a fragmentation that began full force with President Johnson's 1965 decision to send additional troops to Vietnam. The Democrats now divided, have their work cut out for them. The task can be summed up in the phrase "unification through reform."

The success of Mr. Nixon in 1968 serves as notice both as to the fact that the Republicans can win and, indirectly, what the Democrats must do to gain victory. Nixon's strategy was apparent to the casual observer--to capitalize on the discontent among Democrats and at the same time sustain the rank and file Republican following by means of a
subtle and pervasive emphasis on keeping divisive issues out of politics. In light of the Republican priority now being given to "issue-less" campaigns, the task of the Democrats is to make politics a discussion of issues; to not insult the population with platitudes but to inform them of the costs of every program demanded; to absorb the temporarily alienated, and above all, to mobilize the young as a counter to the losses destined to occur among the blue collar workers for whom the extension of the social welfare programs of Democratic administrations are an unacceptable cost for party loyalty. Above all, the Democratic party, as the party of the "people," the common man, and the working class, has an advantage that the Republicans, given their present concerns, will not have for some time to come.

Hopefully, these speculations on optimum party strategies will not be taken as though there were no constraints. For the Democrats, the South will be the cost as also many traditional Democrats among blue collar workers. The Republicans who have been able to wrest the White House away from the Democrats with the first avowed partisan in a generation, President Nixon, can either attempt to forge a more durable coalition--one embracing black people--or hope to continue on in the wake of the divided Democratic party.

The salvation of the Democratic party exists in the now commonplace observation that though the American population be enamored with symbols such as the "American way," individualism, private enterprise, and laissez-faire, it has invariably been pragmatic in the last analysis. When principles and programs conflict, the programs emphasis has prevailed.
After examining those party images having some durability we focused on cohorts to determine the relative centrality of certain of these images over time. It was hypothesized that the depression cohort CD, age group 35-54 in 1952 and 47-66 in 1964, reflected greatest concern for the depression images of the two major parties. That this centrality of depression images is not simply a function of aging may be seen in the 1952 scores for the oldest cohort EF. Cohort EF, coming of age in the pre-depression era of Republicanism appeared to be most against the Democratic party and least concerned about the evils perceived by others for the GOP. Cohort AB, the youngest cohort, reflected greatest centrality for those more "ideological" images, in terms of our relative proportions index. That there are drastic changes occurring in the electorate may also be concluded from an inspection of the very youngest age grouping, those under 32 years of age in 1964, a group falling outside of our cohort structure in 1952, the first cohort defining event. The cohort technique does allow us a closer analysis of changes.

This research was exploratory in its search for relevant party images. We prefaced this endeavor with a statement calling for a close examination of the cohort technique for analyzing data collected over time, but not panel in characteristic. The primary objective of this research was descriptive. We found some images far more durable than others. Future research would prove more fruitful if cohorts were examined for particular categories of party images, images found to be both more salient and more durable. This might be done regardless of the rank order of certain images in successive years. The reader will
recall that the rank order position of categories of party images was used in selecting those given further analysis.

While the impact of critical events on the citizenry may be obvious to the lay observer of American politics, the student of American politics is hard put to attribute party images to either events or the normal process of aging. Not that either events of some moment or aging do not affect party images in the electorate; but rather how much of what we are interested in examining can be attributed to one independent variable and how much to the other. We have seen that the most durable and salient of party images appear to come from the experiences of the depression of the 1930's; and also that certain age groups—our cohorts—were far more likely to sustain these party images than others. And this is consistently the case when factors such as occupation, education, party vote, and party identification were examined.

Having identified those images most critical to the electorate, future research seems required on specific kinds of party images. The utilization of the cohort technique still remains the most attractive mode of inquiry in our examination of large amounts of data collected over extended periods of time. Future research, however, should focus on party images (or categories thereof) while controlling for matched segments of the sample. Let us assume, for example, that we are interested in the comparative differences in party images for members of different races. Following our cohorts, we might take all Negro respondents and then construct a comparable White sample through matching procedures involving income, occupation, party identification, region of interview, sense of political efficacy, involvement and so on. We thus
control for a number of significant variables in our search for a better understanding of party images and reasons for them.

Attendant to our use of data from archival holdings is the problem of sample size differences. There are total sample size differences and thus also cohort size differences from one election to the next. Future analysis using large scale computers would be more beneficial if large programming routines were available so that the adjustment of differences between cohort size and image scores can be more easily accomplished. This research relied on a proportions index that had been calculated by hand from large listings of data. The future addition of subsequent surveys to our cohort structure would perforce require large capacity computers where we conducted manual tabulations in this research.

As I see the future direction of research, three issues stand out: the question of intensity of party images, the issue of political socialization differences between the sexes, and finally, the trend toward a more "ideological" era in American politics. We have seen that party images are significant to the electorate. But barring the use of aggregate image scores, the question of intensity remains open. We desire to know more about the degree of conviction with which certain images of the parties are held. We found, in one instance, that a simple frequency count did not square with the aggregate behavior of the electorate. Presumably, this occurs when smaller numbers (frequencies) of party images exist but they are far more intensively sustained and consequently produce a deviant situation given our normal expectations. The question of race in the South may be far more
critical to a party's image in that region than, say, a half dozen other more peripheral images of the party. Research on party images will demand closer consideration of this intensity dimension.

While the corpus of literature on sex differences in political socialization is increasing in size and reliability, our research findings suggest that party images examined by sex and cohort will contribute further to our understanding of changes in the process of political socialization. Fruitful soundings can be taken on questions such as differences between sexes on particular categories of party images: Are women less disposed than men to an "ideological" perspective of the two parties? Are their views of parties, like their images of candidates, more personal and more emotion-laden and, thus, less cognitive? Another issue involves the differences, if any, which exist between women in different age cohorts. The answer to these questions will surely contribute to both a refinement in our knowledge about prevailing patterns of socialization as also our identification of new questions for research.

Finally, it would seem incumbent on students of political participation and parties to clarify the phenomenon of "ideology" in the 1960's. The extent to which the American electorate now view party life as a question of principles is critical to our efforts to build a more reliable body of knowledge in this area. Are younger people, those coming of legal age in the 1960's, more prone to ideological interpretations of the major parties? If so, what are the substantive bases of these ideological images of the parties? Are these kinds of party images importantly related to kinds of political behavior such as
voting, campaigning, psychological feelings of involvement and efficacy?

We want to know not only the popular percepts of the parties but also the significance of these percepts for subsequent political behavior.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter I


4. For a complete discussion of the ramifications of this focus, see Heinz Eulau's The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963).


6. This comment does not mean, however, that the literature of community politics is barren of comparative concerns. The fruits of several comparative studies attest to the potential of more refined analysis through survey research techniques; by and large, though, these studies are based on gross data, especially election returns by counties and precincts for particular offices. See V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Random House, 1964), vintage edition and John Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).


8. Ibid., p. 55.


10. Ibid., p. 127.

11. In an empirical analysis of the "turnover" phenomenon, Patricia Kendall conceives "turnover" as the degree of internal variation accompanying similar marginal totals over time. As conceptualized by Kendall, turnover is equivalent to the inconsistency, over time, in responses to a particular questionnaire item. A second use of the term suggests the idea of mobility or loss. For example, among economists, turnover frequently denotes the percentages of newly employed and those in the organization who have left
employment. This dissertation follows Kendall's notion of turnover as variations occurring over time for age cohorts. The term "mortality" refers to the conception of turnover in terms of losses in cohort membership. See Patricia Kendall, Conflict and Mood (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954).


14. The higher depletion rates for older persons from research samples is recognized by gerontologists as being one of the more critical problems and, of course, the problem exists also for political scientists desiring more information about the political behavior of these people.


16. Eleanor Maccoby and Ray Hyman conduct a corrosive examination of these problems using data and tables from the Elmira study by Berelson and his colleagues. Interestingly enough, some of their observations and conclusions are quite at odds with the conclusions of the authors of that study. "Measurement Problems in Panel Studies," in American Voting Behavior, eds. Eugene Burdick and A.J. Brodbeck (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 68-79.


20. Campbell and Katona, ibid., report interesting variations in reliability patterns. Variables such as age, religion, and country of origin have been shown to have high consistency. Reports of annual income have been found far less consistent. The problem of distinguishing true change from simple inconsistency in reporting for attitudes makes for even greater problems of reliability. Despite these findings reliability has been greater for frequency scores than for individuals interviewed in successive surveys, and this holds for such disparate items as income, education, and psychological data, pp. 43-44.

21. On the societal implications of the cohort focus, see the theoretical piece by Norman Ryder cited above in footnote 17 and below in footnote 23.


25. In lectures to students in the introductory course for American national government, this author has received ample evidence, albeit impressionistic, of the role of party as "issue simplifier." Students have been consistently in favor of a particular principle, for example, adequate product information to the consumer; when further information is given about the congressional party alignments on this particular issue, the students, who were almost unanimously in favor in principle, quickly separated along party lines. On this point, see also V. O. Key's Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf), pp. 449-52.


27. This quotation may be found in Neil McDonald's The Study of Political Parties (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 20.

29. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The

30. The 1952 exceptions to this were the Negroes, the college edu­
cated, and the professional and managerial groups, all of which
showed a slight increase in the proportion voting for the Demo­
cratic candidate. A comprehensive picture is presented by Camp­
bell, Gurin and Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peter­

31. Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes,

32. Donald Stokes, Angus Campbell, and Warren Miller, "Components of
Electoral Decision," American Political Science Review, V, LI
(June, 1956), No. 2, p. 368.

33. "Political Affiliation and Imagery Across Two Related Generations,"
Midwest Journal of Politics, V, 6 (1962), p. 273. Also in Poli­
tical Opinion and Electoral Behavior, eds. Edward C. Dreyer and

34. Ibid., p. 274.

35. Donald R. Mathews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New
Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966),
pp. 377-90; an earlier report of some of the research on images by
these authors is noted in footnote 24, above.

36. Mathews and Prothro, "Southern Images of Political Parties,"

37. Our data for party images comes from these same open-ended ques­
tions asking for the "likes" and "dislikes" of the two major
parties. With lead, the queries were: "I'd like to ask you what
you think are the good and the bad points about the two parties.
Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic
party? (What is it?)" --- "Is there anything in particular that you
don't like about the Democratic party? (What is it?)" --- "Is there
anything in particular that you like about the Republican party?
(What is that?)" --- "Is there anything in particular that you don't
like about the Republican Party? (What is that?)"

38. Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, op. cit., p. 42.

39. The first percentage figure in parentheses is for the Republican
party, the second figures are for the Democrats. The percentages
reflect the number of respondents making favorable references to
the two parties.

40. Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, op. cit., p. 45. The point is also
made in Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, op. cit., p. 45.
41. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, op. cit., chap. iii. As tempting as it is to elaborate here detailed findings, these are postponed till later chapters of this dissertation.

42. H. Isaacs, Images of Asia (New York: Capricorn Books, 1962); Ross Stagner in his Psychological Aspects of International Conflict (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1967) establishes the relevance of these "scratches on the mind" for national decision-makers. But they appear as something more than the imprint that Isaacs envisions; for Stagner, images are equivalent to structures of attitudes which permit the holder to organize and evaluate the sundry stimuli to which he is exposed.

43. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, op. cit., p. 42.

44. One caveat seems in order given the number of comparative ideas presented here. We assume that images differ from attitudes in terms of both the measure of centrality and the salience. Though the assumption is that images and attitudes embrace both cognitive organization encountered. For example, one may conceivably speak of images of China, as Isaacs does, but might be better served to think of attitudes in a broader context—as say, an attitude toward orientals or Asians. On the definition and similarities between our images and symbols, the reader is urged to review Murray Edelman's the Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

45. Cited above in footnote 18.

46. Abraham Kaplan, op. cit., p. 25.

Chapter II

47. The number of systematic studies of perception has increased notably under the impetus of the Gestalt school of psychology. And though we are indebted to this school for much of our understanding of how people view their environments and personal relations, there is a paucity of hard analysis of how people view political phenomena. Of the more significant studies for political scientists the following stand out: Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960); Donald Mathews and James W. Prothro, The Negro and New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1966).

48. This concept is used as first conceived by Muzafer Sherif, as a series or structure of standards, set up in, and derivation from an individual's experience which in turn are used in judging and evaluating stimuli in an individual's environment.

50. Two excellent surveys of the corpus of political socialization literature may be found in Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959); and more recently, the monograph-length summary by Richard E. Dawson, "Political Socialization" in The Political Science Annual: 1966, ed. James A. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 1-84.


54. Much of the following discussion is based on the insight of James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), especially pp. 104-140. The principles of grouping, "field" implications, and assimilation and contrast characteristics of the perceptual process, conceived by Gestalt psychologists are roughly equivalent to Davies' principles of organization. On these similarities in social psychology see the cogent analysis of Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Kraus, Theories in Social Psychology (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. 14-36.

55. This illustration comes from Davies' Human Nature in Politics, p. 112.


58. An excellent summary of this out-group phenomenon and much of the relevant research is reported by Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1958), chap. v.


60. While the evidence for definitive conclusions about the relationship between perception and commonly used political variables such as race, ethnicity, and religion is sparse, there is evidence that age and sex may be factors systematically affecting the ways in which people perceive political phenomena. Relative to these points see Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Wiley Science Edition, 1966) and on age see John A. Crittenden (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of North Carolina, 1960).

62. Ibid., pp. 97-98.


64. Ibid., pp. 32-35.

65. David Kretch and R. Crutchfield, op. cit., p. 86.

66. Even the most articulate argument for a generational focus has been largely intuitive and prescriptive. The inherent difficulties in isolating and identifying specifically unique factors, forces, and occurrences to a particular generation have been doubtless in part responsible for the dearth of scholarly energies in this area of concern. (Some of the literature is cited in footnote above.)


68. D. O. Hebb and his colleagues at McGill University conducted the original experiment. The results are published and summarized in numerous social psychology primers, one of which is the work of Kretch and Crutchfield cited above.

69. The discussion which follows is heavily influenced by the thoughts and functional typology used by Katz in "The Functional Approach to Attitudes" in the Public Opinion Quarterly, V, XXIV, No. 2 (Summer, 1960), special edition devoted to attitude change; pp. 163-204.

70. Ibid., p. 180.


72. Ibid., p. 220.

73. Ibid., p. 222.

74. The idea of 'displacement' is fundamental to Freudian thought. The most persuasive argument for the application of Freud's thinking to political analysis appears in the works of Harold Lasswell. See especially Power and Personality (New York: Viking Compass Books, 1963) and Psychopathology and Politics (New York: Viking Compass Books, 1960). The 'rationalization' function as it serves in de-
fense of the individual's ego is well documented by Berelson and his colleagues in their study of Elmira; while the withdrawal phenomenon in political studies has been the focus of Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," Public Opinion Quarterly (Winter, 1954-55), and also to be found in The American Party System: A Book of Readings (New York: Macmillan, 1965), eds. John R. Owens and P. J. Staudenraus, pp. 337-350.


78. Just before his death, V. O. Key focused his attention on the question of voter rationality. From a sizeable body of evidence painting a rather dismal picture of the American voter, Key attempted a different tack and suggested that the voter may not be as feckless and irrational as many have assumed. His final thought will never be known as his untimely death left the manuscript unfinished. It was completed by Milton Cummings and subsequently published. See The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). V.O. Key, Jr. with the assistance of Milton Cummings.


82. As it happened, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan was conducting a survey of consumer finances for the Federal Reserve Board during January and February, 1948 (the slump occurred February 4th). The SRC was also interviewing before and after Jacob Malik's speech in June of 1951. These fortuitous circumstances allowed Davies to examine sub-samples before and after in order to evaluate the impact of these two events.


85. V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, see especially chaps. ii and iii.
Chapter III

86. Campbell and his associates in the University of Michigan conducted an exhaustive examination of public awareness of domestic and foreign issues of more than passing interest. One of their major conclusions was "that people know the existence of few if any of the major issues of public policy." *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1960), p. 170.

87. Pomper presents an excellent survey of prevailing models of electoral man with a discussion of the empirical support for each. Interestingly enough, his interpretation of the evidence suggests that the model that best fits the available data is that of the "meddling partisan," a model in which partisanship and party are crucial. See his *Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1968), pp. 68-96.

88. Campbell et al. have found that even among the most "informed" element in the population, that is, those individuals who are aware of issues of public import, about one in two is unable to make differences on these issues. However, on issues touching New Deal-Fair Deal programs, this ratio increased. On these concerns two out of three were found able to note differences between the major political parties. *The American Voter*, pp. 179-180.

89. In perhaps no single tome is the message of irrational man so cogently put as in Edelman's *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1964). In this respect see especially his chapter 9, "Mass Responses to Political Symbols."


91. In a close scrutiny of the Catholic vote in the 1960 election, Philip Converse concludes that Protestant Democrats were more likely to behave as Democrats and Republican Catholics were more liable to behave as Republicans. See his *Religion and Politics: The 1960 Election* in *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 92-124.

92. The election successes of General Eisenhower in the 1950's and more recently the victory of Richard Nixon attest to an increasing tendency to rely on the strategems and artifices of "Madison Avenue. The fact that some news commentators had cited GOP National Chairman Ray Bliss' lack of a telegenic style as a critical factor in President-elect Nixon's thoughts about a new Chairman merely adds fuel to the conviction of some pundits and political professionals that "issues" might well be kept out of politics and the electorate will be little the wiser for it.

93. The differences and peculiarities of the 1964 election proved to be sufficient enough to warrant a re-writing of one of the better


95. Fred Greenstein in his now-famous study has documented marked differences in young boys and girls when items of public concern are examined. See his Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). Obviously, the socialization process begins early. That it extends beyond the influence of the family and the first eighteen years has not been so readily recognized. Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt present an exhaustive report of the agencies and conditions that work on an individual throughout life. See their Political Socialization (Boston: Little Brown, 1969.)

Chapter IV


97. In a discussion of the party-populace nexus, one Miami University historian was firmly inclined to the position that "isolationism" would indeed be one of the more, if not the most, significant image for those individuals identifying with the Republican party. As we shall see, his estimate was incredibly wrong.

98. The consistency of this desire to keep America out of foreign lands is apparent in numerous of Gallup's pre-World War II polls: Below are but a few of the questions put to the public:

Q. Would you like to see the United States join the League of Nations? (October 18, 1937)
   Yes (33%)
   No (67%)

Q. Do you think it was a mistake for the United States to enter World War I? (April 4, 1937)
   Yes (70%)
   No (30%)

Q. If Germany and Italy go to war against England and France, would it be better for the United States to help England and France or not help either side? (February 16, 1939)
Help (30%)
Not Help (65%)
No opinion (5%)


99. This is not the place to critically examine Lubell's research technique. Suffice it to note that his procedure of selecting specific districts on the basis of past political history and then going to them to get a "sense" of the political climate through informal interviews is not systematic. The people finally polled are not polled in proportions reflecting the population parameters from which they are drawn. *The Future of American Democracy* (New York: Anchor Doubleday, 1956).


103. Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril found that the independents were the only respondents who had a majority who were both "operational liberals" (a program orientation) and at the same time a majority who were ideological conservatives. If this finding has general applicability, the ambivalence of the independent voter as he tends to be more of a vote-switcher and ticket-splitter is more understandable. Free and Cantril, *loc. cit.*, p. 138.

104. Unless otherwise specified, all percentage figures parenthetically included in this and the following chapter denote the proportion of the major category under discussion, and not proportions of the larger sample population.

105. In fact this tendency of Republicans more than Democrats to focus on ideological concerns rather than "bread and butter" programs for the domestic scene is one of the more intriguing findings of Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril in their 1964 Study. *The Political Belief of Americans* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968).


109. Robert Alford makes a good case against the interpretation that there has been a decline in class voting in America, or a lessening of "status polarization." *Party and Society* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 62 - 71. On this point see also Don R. Bowen, *Political Behavior of the American Public* (Columbus: Charles Merrill, 1968), pp. 70-73.

110. The thesis that American politics is becoming more "ideological" must be viewed with caution. With a decline in the demands for "bread and butter" issues one might expect a re-orientation of concern to more ideological questions. This may ultimately be a function by the general increase in the levels of education in the society. But whether the candidacy of men such as Goldwater, Eugene McCarthy, John J. Gilligan, and Adlai Stevenson, and the reform movements and Clubs constitute a bellweather of things to come has not satisfactorily been established. The data for this dissertation suggest that presently the issue of a principled politics has some support in the general public; however, the question must wait on additional data collected for the 1968 and subsequent elections before the long run question for the future, and hence the implications of this for the political parties can be answered.

111. In their post-mortem of the 1964 election, Clausen, Converse, and Miller attribute, in part, both the Goldwater nomination and subsequent loss to intra-party jockeying in which the opposition to Goldwater, being disunited, could not present a united front and thus deprive him of the nomination. Thus they were left with no alternative save to aid in fulfilling their prophesy that he would lose by a landslide by staying at home or temporarily bolting the party. "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election,"Aage R. Clausen, Philip E. Converse, and Warren Miller, *The American Political Science Review*, V, 59, No. 2 (June, 1965), pp. 321-336.

112. The states were coded following the breakdown in Appendix B. Four regions resulted: The Northeast, the Midwest, the South, and the West. The seven-point party identification scale was reduced to three. Democrats embracing both strong and weak identifiers; Independents comprising "true" Independents and those who lean to one party or the other; and Republicans comprising "strong" and "weak" categories. Occupation was the variable most distorted in this procedure of reducing numbers of categories. All white collar occupations, managerial, professional, self-employed, and sales and clerical were coded under the occupation category "White Collar." The "Blue Collar" category contained both semi-skilled and unskilled and service workers. Housewives were not considered in terms of occupation of spouse. Agriculturally employed was not sufficiently refined to warrant any simplification.


120. Samuel Stouffer, op. cit., pp. 131-155, passim.

121. The research on patterns of political socialization is sparse. Nevertheless, that which we have indicates that there are sharp differences in what the general adult expectations are for boys and girls. One scholar reported that girls were much more likely to have interest in personal stories and novels while boys tended to focus on history, biographies of leading political and military figures.

122. The beacon call to the banner of "localism" is epitomized in Governor Rhodes' pledge against any kind of state income tax but willingness to authorize county or municipal levies on the basis that "those who are taxed will be those who spend it." The irony of this feeble position is that those who are taxed by the state government of Ohio for gasoline, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco --the cities-- have relatively little to say on how these revenues will be allocated.


124. Ibid., p. 4.

126. This posited likelihood of third party movements runs counter to the trend discerned by Sorauf, that minor parties in the United States are clearly in a state of "advanced decline." See Frank J. Sorauf, American Party Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 47. In fairness to Sorauf, however, it should be added that Governor Wallace did not appear to be as strong as he ultimately proved to be in the November Election, 1968.


130. Ibid., p. 214.

131. The question of culpability was put to the public on one occasion by Free and Cantril:
"We should rely more on individual initiative and not so much on governmental welfare programs."
The answer was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>79%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, op. cit., p. 30.
## APPENDIX A

### AGE COHORTS

(Percentage figures are for individual election years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COHORT</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>18-24 (N,118;7%)</td>
<td>-24(133;8%)</td>
<td>-28(87;7%)</td>
<td>-32(392;25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>25-34 (N,429;24%)</td>
<td>29-38 (N,466;26%)</td>
<td>33-42 (N,290;25%)</td>
<td>37-46 (N,339;22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>35-44 (N,426;24%)</td>
<td>39-48 (N,397;23%)</td>
<td>43-52 (N,271;23%)</td>
<td>47-56 (N,306;19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>45-54 (N,338;19%)</td>
<td>49-58 (N,276;16%)</td>
<td>53-62 (N,208;18%)</td>
<td>57-66 (N,143;9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>55-64 (N,253;14%)</td>
<td>59-68 (N,206;12%)</td>
<td>63-72 (N,148;13%)</td>
<td>67-76 (N,143;9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>65 and over (N,138;8%)</td>
<td>69 and over (N,138;8%)</td>
<td>73 and over (N,85;7%)</td>
<td>77 and over (N,57;4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
N = 1798 \\ N = 1762 \\ N = 1181 \\ N = 1571
\]
APPENDIX B

REGION OF INTERVIEW BREAKDOWN: 1952-1964

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<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Colorado</td>
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<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>California</td>
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<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
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<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
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<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>Montana</td>
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<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
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### APPENDIX C

#### TABLE 15

**RANK ORDER OF PARTY IMAGES: 1952-1964**

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<td>RK Order</td>
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<td>Party (12%)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>'Good Times' (11%)</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>People in Party (7%)</td>
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<td>People in Party (8%)</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Party (16%)</td>
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<td>People in Party (4%)</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Gov. Mgt. (4%)</td>
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<td>Party will chk. (-)</td>
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<td>Other For. Pol. (-)</td>
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TABLE 15—Continued

NEGATIVE DEMOCRATIC IMAGES

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<td>3 Other Spec.Dom.Pol. (13%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Other (12%)</td>
<td>4 Party (11%)</td>
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<td>5 People in Party (10%)</td>
<td>5 Gov. Mgt. (9%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Party (9%)</td>
<td>6 Gov.Act.&amp; Phil. (9%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>7 &quot;Bad Times&quot; (5%)</td>
<td>8 &quot;Good Times&quot; (5%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>8 Spec. Dom. Pol. (3%)</td>
<td>9 Spec. Dom. Pol. (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10 Party Restrains (3%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>12 Issues (1%)</td>
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<td>13 GP or Self Int. (-)</td>
<td>13 GP or Self Int. (-)</td>
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<table>
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<td>RK Order</td>
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<td>1 Gov. Act.&amp; Phil (19%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>2 Gov. Mgt. (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Govt.Act.&amp; Phil. (15%)</td>
<td>3 Party Responses (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Foreign Policy (12%)</td>
<td>4 Foreign Policy (12%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>5 Dom. Pol. (0) (11%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Dom.Pol.&amp; Con. (0) (9%)</td>
<td>6 Other (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 People in Party (7%)</td>
<td>7 Likes People (7%)</td>
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<td>8 Other (5%)</td>
<td>8 Dom. Policies (6%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Controlled by (5%) (too good for)</td>
<td>9 Controlled by (4%) (too good for)</td>
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<td>10 Bad for, will chk. (2%)</td>
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### Table 15—Continued

**POSITIVE REPUBLICAN IMAGES**

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<td>5</td>
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<td>95</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>&quot;Good Times&quot; (6%)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>47</td>
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</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Issues (3%)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>GP or self int. (-)</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tbody>
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### Additional Data Points

- **1952**
  - People in Party (23%)
  - Foreign Policy (15%)
  - Other (11%)
  - Good Times (9%)
  - Party (6%)

- **1956**
  - People in Party (23%)
  - Foreign Policy (15%)
  - Other (11%)
  - Good Times (9%)
  - Party (6%)

- **1960**
  - Gov.Act.& Phil. (26%)
  - Party (15%)
  - People in Party (12%)
  - Govt. Mgt. (12%)
  - For. Policy (9%)
  - Other (8%)
  - Group Assoc. (6%)
  - Other Dom.& Con. (5%)
  - Dom.Pol.& Cond. (5%)

- **1964**
  - Gov.Act.& Phil. (26%)
  - Party (15%)
  - People in Party (12%)
  - Govt. Mgt. (12%)
  - For. Policy (9%)
  - Other (8%)
  - Group Assoc. (6%)
  - Other Dom.& Con. (5%)
  - Dom.Pol.& Cond. (5%)
  - Party will chk. (1%)

---

*Note: The table continues with similar data points across different years.*
TABLE 15—Continued
NEGATIVE REPUBLICAN IMAGES

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<th>1956</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;Bad Times&quot; (22%)</td>
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<td>Party (13%)</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Bad for, will chk (12%)</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Other (8%)</td>
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<td>People in Party (6%)</td>
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<td>12</td>
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1960

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<td>Bad for (16%)</td>
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<td>Dom.Pol.(G.Wel) (14%)</td>
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<td>Foreign Pol. (9%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Party (9%)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Gov.Act.&amp; Phil. (6%)</td>
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<td>Other (6%)</td>
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<td>Gov.Mgt. (5%)</td>
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1964

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<td>Too good for (14%)</td>
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<td>People (13%)</td>
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<td>Other (9%)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Act.&amp; Phil. (8%)</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>9</td>
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APPENDIX D

TABLE 16

DEPRESSION IMAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, BY OCCUPATION (IN PER CENT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Prof. &amp; Self Emp. Managers</th>
<th>Clerical &amp; Sales</th>
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<th>Agric.</th>
<th>Housewife</th>
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*Percentages may not total 100 since cohort A is no longer youngest age group sampled after 1952 sample year.
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DEPRESSION IMAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, BY PARTY VOTE (IN PER CENT)

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Articles


Davies, James C. "Some Relations Between Events and Attitudes," American Political Science Review, XLVI, No. 3 (September, 1952), 777-78.


