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THE ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE:
PATTERNS OF ANTI-STATISM FROM
THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW LEFT

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * * * *

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CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE WELFARE STATE

The American, according to observers from Alexis de Tocqueville to D. W. Brogan, is a staunch individualist with a powerful distrust of government. Our traditional and enduring theoretical formulation of freedom is in the classical liberal sense--freedom from control, freedom from government. Recoiling against arbitrary European governments, the colonists resolutely determined to circumscribe government's powers and functions. From the Hamilton-Jefferson clash on the federal government's proper role to Senator Goldwater's crusade against the New Deal, America continually has debated the same fundamental political question: what should we allow government to do? This dialogue, between the Hamiltonian vision of a pre-eminent central government steering the nation to fulfillment and Jefferson's preference for the separate states retaining maximum power and restricting the central government to explicitly enumerated constitutional functions, represents a crucial aspect of "the genius of American politics." This debate is
interminable because resolving its tension "would of necessity mean the end of the federal system as we know it."^1

Though our ideology has apotheosized limited government, the free enterprise system and economic individualism, the nation's actual economic history demonstrates significant governmental participation and intervention. America never basked in a golden age of laissez-faire. Even in colonial America, Carlyle's proposition that the ideal state was "anarchy plus the constable" received no serious consideration. Whatever their fondness for Adam Smith's theories, the colonists rejected the idea of a self-equilibrating economic system. The intense regulation, supervision and control of personal and economic life indicated that the colonists valued community harmony more than unrestricted personal freedom. "In fact the network of statutes that controlled the day-to-day activities of many of the English colonists in the seventeenth and the eighteenth century had no parallel in America until the emergence of the modern 'welfare' state. Nor is this surprising because the assumptions have

been the same in both instances—namely, that the well-being of the community, or the 'common good' was more important than that of the individual."2

Governmental activity in education, public health, land reclamation, disposal of the public domain, creation of a banking system, canal and railroad construction, suggests that the role of government in stimulating economic growth did not originate in the Populist-Progressive era. Recent scholarship indicates that, throughout American history, there has been an "abiding pattern of American public support for economic growth."3 The nation's economic history reveals "that there was no field pre-empted by government; nor was there any, except religion, from which it was entirely excluded. It was never possible clearly to define two distinct spheres: the public, reserved for the state, and the private, for the voluntary association. Politically

2Page Smith, As a City Upon a Hill; The Town in American History (New York, 1966), p. 137; In explaining why laissez-faire ideas failed to take root in Massachusetts, Oscar Handlin states that "no large group or section found them compatible with its interests;" "Laissez-Faire Thought in Massachusetts, 1790-1880," Journal of Economic History, III (December, 1943), 56.

useful as that distinction may have been, whether for liberal or conservative ends, it had no basis in actual historical development. Whether the descriptive term be "intergovernmental sharing" or "collaborative federalism" or mixed enterprise, government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries "undertook the role put on it by the people that of planner, promoter, investor, and regulator."

In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, for example, the federal government "through the land grants, was a prime factor in making possible the most local of all so-called local functions: free public education." Alexander Hamilton's reports on the National Bank, the Public Credit and on "Manufactures" endeavored to


5Robert Lively, "The American System: A Review Article," Business History Review, XXIX (March, 1955), 81; Stuart Bruchey has concluded that in the American economy "of the early nineteenth century the shortage of capital funds constitutes a fact of central importance. If growth depended upon industrialization, the latter depended upon a national market, and a national market upon large capital sums for improved transportation. If these are valid assessments, I do not see how a place of central importance in American economic growth can be denied the role of government because of its contribution to the formation of a national market and the national credit." The Roots of American Economic Growth, 1607-1861: An Essay in Social Causation (New York, 1965), p. 213.

complement individual enterprise with government assistance. Thomas Jefferson's Secretary of Treasury, Albert Gallatin, in his Reports on Roads and Canals, argued that government financing and support for internal improvements was an absolute necessity. After the War of 1812, Henry Clay desired to unite the nation through protective tariffs, roads and canals and a national bank. To facilitate transportation of raw materials from the south and west to be exchanged for manufactured goods from the east, Clay recognized that government participation would be essential. Andrew Jackson's resistance to the extension of the National Road into Kentucky should not obscure his administration's achievements in fostering canal and railroad construction. Indeed, as Charles E. Merriam has contended, "down to the Civil War, no nation had done more deliberate national planning in experimental fields, both economic and political, than the United States..." 7

Post Civil War industrial expansion owed much to the federal government's powerful impetus. Cash loans in excess of one hundred and fifty million dollars were extended to railroads by federal, state and local governments.

Over one hundred and thirty-four million acres of public lands were granted to the railroads by the federal government and approximately forty-nine million acres donated by nine states. Land, loans, legislation and protective tariffs do not exhaust what laissez-faire government did for American business. "There was also something much more subtle," writes Carl Degler. "It was the warm, reassuring attitude of sympathy in which government in America bathed business enterprise. Such a friendly atmosphere was eminently conducive to investment and entrepreneurship, and was probably worth as much as all the gifts and loans put together. The degree of government beneficence displayed towards business is measured by outright hostility and suspicion displayed toward labor."9

When reformers demanded that government extend its solicitude more expansively and equitably, they were stymied by the courts who prohibited the states to legislate against business by construing the due process

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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a broad manner and by the federal government's restrictive interpretation of the interstate commerce and tax clauses. Oscar Handlin has shown that "opponents of economic regulation, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century argued against the power of the state while that was the primary instrument of control. They shifted their objections to the national government when that began to act. Thus they attempted to create a shadowland of inactivity between the two jurisdictions by stressing the limitations on the power of whichever seemed most threatening at the moment."10

Laissez-faire government, a pastiche of Social Darwinism, Manchester Liberalism, states rights and a strict construction of the Constitution, has been lucidly branded by Max Lerner as "opportunist antistatism."11 Devotees of laissez-faire decried governmental attempts to reform social and economic conditions caused by the upheaval of industrialism. They successfully merged Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner with Thomas Jefferson, economic individualism with liberty, laissez-faire capitalism with American democracy. What they

accomplished was the "Great Train Robbery of our intellectual history." By arguing that "Liberal democracy and laissez-faire capitalism were really one and the same thing," it was possible for the business community "to defend itself against the heirs of Jefferson with Jefferson's own words, to celebrate the struggle against social reform as a last-ditch stand for human liberty."  

Paradoxically, it was the celebrated, self-reliant, sturdy, independent farmer whose social discontent burgeoned into an assault upon the entrenched dogmas and certitudes of laissez-faire government. The farmer claimed that agricultural prices were depressed, that the railroads, grain elevator operators and middlemen were enriching themselves at his expense, and that inordinately high interest rates, in a period of falling prices, only aggravated his situation. By demanding government aid in the form of railroad regulation, cheap money, loans, subsidies on surplus produce and grants to improve roads, the farmers became "pioneers of the characteristic new policies of American government."

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in the twentieth century." The decline of laissez-faire in the United States ought to be at least partially ascribed to "those who wanted government aid for their own benefit."  

Granted that farmers constituted a resourceful pressure bloc in the struggle against laissez-faire government. We must, also, recognize that the "preliminary work of under-mining existing institutions, of familiarizing the masses with the idea of change, and of creating a receptivity to a new faith, can be done only by men who are, first and foremost, talkers or writers...." A formidable contingent of intellectuals, during the late nineteenth century, challenged the laissez-faire ideology. In 1885 the American Economic Association quietly announced that it intended to study actual economic behavior and conditions (institutionalist economics) and

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14 Harold U. Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez-Faire: 1897-1917 (New York, 1951), p. 365. Theodore Saloutos declares that the farmer has been "portrayed as a rugged individualist, the guardian of our liberties, and the avowed enemy of government aid. But the evidence seems rather conclusive that few occupational groups have been favored with as much governmental assistance as the agriculturalists, and that they have also enjoyed an influence in governmental circles that is in excess of what their numbers warrant." "Government and the Farmer Since World War I," Current History, XXXV (September, 1956), 149.

not explicate economic theologies (laissez-faire). Simon N. Patten, Edwin R. A. Seligman, John Bates Clark, Richard T. Ely and Thorstein Veblen were convinced that for "homo economicus, that amoral robot of classical economics, the sands of time were running out." They repudiated the Spencer-Sumner proposition that governmental reform would enervate the "social organism." They argued that government, as the people's agent, should not be feared as a leviathan, but rather utilized to promote the common welfare. Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbusch, in the Social Gospel movement, sought to infuse the social order with Christian principles and, like Henry George and Edward Bellamy, advocated solidarity, cooperation in place of competition and social justice. E. A. Ross, another critic of laissez-faire, articulated the basic insight all progressives shared. In his Sin and Society: An Analysis of Latter Day Iniquity, Ross delineated the extent of interdependence in American Society and concluded that modern sin was both imperceptible and impersonal. For Ross, the corporation loomed as "an entity that transmits the greed of investors, but not their conscience, that returns them profit, but not unpopularity."

Historians usually attribute the philosophic roots of the welfare state to a sociologist of the late nineteenth century--Lester Frank Ward. Henry Commager, for example, discerns a direct, linear influence from Ward to the New Deal. He asserts that under President Franklin Roosevelt "government resumed the road toward 'sociocracy' which Lester Ward had chartered half a century earlier."¹⁷ Ward, along with other progressive reformers, was animated by the belief that government regulation, that government "by all, for all" (sociocracy) could ameliorate social conditions. Such critics as Ward, Ross, Gladden, Rauschenbusch, Bellamy, George and Patten comprised the vanguard of the progressive movement. There emerged from these reformers the concept of the state "that seeks to promote the general welfare not by rendering itself inconspicuous, but by taking such positive action as is deemed necessary to improve the conditions."¹⁸

The origins of the welfare state are usually thought to lie in the Populist-Progressive era because,

¹⁷Henry S. Commager, The American Mind (New Haven, 1950), p. 220; He develops this theme at length in his edition of Lester Ward and the Welfare State (Indianapolis, 1967). In the foreword, Leonard W. Levy and Alfred Young state that "...the New Deal, Fair Deal, and New Frontier have now brought us to the edge of the Great Society that Ward would have found kin to his sociocracy."

it was during this period, that reform conscious intellectuals challenged the assumptions held by laissez-faire conservatives. For this reason historians have argued that "the seeds of the welfare state which were beginning to sprout in Populism grew under the forcing frame of Progressivism, to reach full flower in the hot-house of the New Deal." This line of thought has tended to obscure the persistent pattern of vital government participation in economic matters. Consequently, the periods prior and subsequent to the Populist-Progressive years have not received proper emphasis. William Jennings Bryan, Robert M. La Follette, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and scores of progressive political leaders contributed to the rise of a welfare state in America. No less important, however, are several developments during the period from World War I to the Great Depression.

"Times of war and danger," as James Madison predicted, offered the federal government opportunities to establish ascendancy over the states. Madison's dictum that war was "the mother of executive aggrandizement," proved valid for both the Civil War and World War I. When Woodrow Wilson enlisted the United States in the European war, a transformation occurred in our economic structure. Economic planning, the "conscious and deliberate choice of economic
priorities by some public authority,"20 became imperative to the conduct of our war effort. The Lever Act of August 10, 1917 empowered Wilson to establish agencies to regulate food and fuel production and to fix prices. During America's participation in the war, such government agencies as the War Industries Board, War Food Administration, War Finance Corporation, Capital Issues Committee and the United States Housing Corporation assumed control of and operated the railroads and water systems, allocated priorities in transportation and industry, regulated and prohibited exports and supervised the monetary supply. For self preservation America embraced economic planning. Planning enabled American capitalism to coordinate war production. "Every revolution," according to E. H. Carr, "though it has deep underlying causes, is the immediate product of an emergency. Historically, the emergency which hastened the transition from laissez-faire capitalism to planning was not social upheaval but war. The motive force behind the change was the demand not for social justice, but for national efficiency."21


The relationship between economic planning and the welfare state is intimate. Planning represents the key determinant in the welfare state's operation. Planning, in a real and plenary sense, creates the welfare state and, also, stimulates the opposition to it. The patterns of anti-statism in America since the New Deal exemplify the transcendent importance that economic planning assumes. It alienated progressives from Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, caused radical intellectuals to seek comfort in conservatism and provoked a revival of laissez-faire ideology.

"What we have learned in war we shall hardly forget in peace," wrote Walter Weyl. "The new economic solidarity once gained can never again be surrendered." Weyl articulated the sentiments of a group of intellectual progressives who insisted that a complex, interdependent technology should not be subject to the vacillations of an unregulated capitalism. By urging social and economic planning during the 1920's, John Dewey, Charles Beard, Rexford Guy Tugwell, George Soule and Stuart Chase contributed an essential ingredient to the New Deal and the welfare state idea.

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If the intellectual's motto during the Harding-Coolidge interlude was that "whatever is, is wrong," the example of Russia elated them. What enlivened intellectuals was Russia's utilization of experts to plan social goals and direct economic production. Russia seemed a vast social laboratory where imaginative economic and cultural experiments were being conducted. For American intellectuals Russia was "the most interesting place on the planet," the boldest experiment in history," and "the most extraordinary enterprise in the economic history of the world."

They contrasted an unregulated, chaotic America to a scientifically planned Russia. The enthusiasm elicited by social engineering in Russia stemmed from the intellectuals' penchant for action, doing and experimentation. John Dewey in *Impressions of Soviet Russia* had extolled Russian planning and exhorted America to emulate her example. His *Individualism Old and New* endeavored to prove that a new "collectivist age" had doomed laissez-faire capitalism. Only social democracy or "democratic collectivism" could liberate Americans from oppression by the forces of concentrated wealth. The *Nation* articulated

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Dewey's basic insight when it demanded "a recognition of the fundamental fact that our economic life is so inter-dependent that it must be controlled by some kind of government, either the invisible government of great corporate wealth, which is supreme today, or a democratic organization representing the people." Dewey, certainly as much as Lester Ward created a philosophical underpinning for the idea of government as a protector. His dictum of "learning by doing" and his emphasis on environmentalism and the plasticity of human nature did much to encourage extensive social reform.

While Dewey's ideas directly influenced the idea of a welfare state, other reformers, as well, rendered valuable critiques of American society that contributed toward the rise of an active, interventionist government. Three prominent economists of the 1920's, George Soule, Stuart Chase and Rexford Guy Tugwell, are especially noteworthy in this connection. George Soule in _A Planned Society_, which he dedicated to Herbert Croly, (Croly, in effect, had dedicated his _Promise of American Life_ to Alexander Hamilton) presented a thoughtful appraisal of America's "negative conception of liberty"

24_nation, CXXXVII (November 7, 1928), 466; John Dewey, _Individualism Old and New_ (New York, 1930), pp. 74-120._
and the reasons for substituting planning for unregulated and unsystematic capitalism. Following Edward Bellamy and Henry George, Soule pleaded the practical superiority of a planned society. "Instead of being individually at war with society, instead of being baffled and burdened by an irrelevant environment of social forces, we shall be at work through society, mastering our life and creating it as a whole. We shall have a warm and active bond with our fellows." Reformers had to educate the people to understand the necessity for extensive social planning. Because in the "coming American revolution" capitalism "must eventually retire and leave the field to collectivism." Soule noted that in the 1929 depression, capitalism almost completely collapsed because of the incompetence of its rulers to govern a complex industrial civilization.


27 Ibid., p. 302; For a characteristic attack from the extreme left wing on Soule's planning ideas see Earl Browder "Why Capitalism Can't Plan," New Masses, XIII (December 25, 1934), 17-19
Reinhold Niebuhr made the same point when he asserted that capitalism "ought to die because it is unable to make the wealth created by modern technology available to all." Soule disagreed with the Communists that only a violent revolution would make planning a reality. In his writings planning became "the traffic cop no one can do without," a transitional phase in the course towards socialism. In reply to the charge that planning extirpated freedom, Soule declared the "right question to ask—about a socially planned system as contrasted with ours is therefore not so much whether it offers more or less liberty, but what kinds of liberty it may offer."  

Stuart Chase, along with Rexford G. Tugwell, investigated conditions in Russia during 1927. Impressed with the Soviet Gosplan, Chase advocated an "industrial general staff" operating as a "Peace Industries Board" to eliminate the anarchy and waste enervating American capitalism. He maintained that the problem of distribution, rather than production, had to be solved. His

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planning proposals sought to refashion capitalism into a system that relegated profit to a subordinate position. Both Soule and Chase desired to "beat capitalism over the head with government planning." 30

In The Tragedy of Waste Chase preached that the rise of a machine civilization required extensive governmental planning and control to minimize technological unemployment. He could not suppress his fondness for what he judged, in Mexico: A Study of Two Americas, to be a superior, though supine, Mexican culture. 31 When the depression engulfed the nation in despair, Chase persisted in his belief that "the idea of economic planning must grow in people's minds as an educational process." "You see," he remarked, "it is too late for planning or anything else to prevent this depression, but it is not too soon to start preventing the next." 32 He concluded


31 Stuart Chase's thought is analyzed in James S. Saeger "The Social Philosophy of Stuart Chase" (unpublished Master's Essay, Ohio State University, 1963).

by asking, "Why should Russians have all the fun of remaking a world?" 33

Chase's planning ideas reflected a non-ideological approach. Since economic distribution assumed overarching importance, he refused to champion state ownership of the means of production. Moreover, he considered businessmen to be potential allies in the war against poverty. "As a matter of cold fact, the ablest businessmen in America today are committed to high wages, short hours, and admirable working conditions. They find that such measures aid mass consumption, provide leisure time to consume leisure-time goods and keep operating costs down. For the first time in history, businessmen have a genuine stake in the abolition of poverty. This hardly converts them into angels, but their horns and tails have visibly receded." 34 Chase's fundamental argument was stated quite cogently and simply in an article he wrote in 1942: "Collectivism is here to stay. We can take it in the form of great corporate groups without responsibility or in various


forms of government control with responsibility."\(^{35}\)

Chase's recommendations for redistributive taxation, public works projects and expanded government spending had an obvious effect upon New Deal policies. His dictum that "money is confidence"\(^{36}\) appealed to a certain segment of New Deal advisers who believed that poverty could be eradicated if enough money was allocated to support reform programs. It comes as no surprise, then, that at the outset of the New Deal one of Roosevelt's key advisers, Rexford Tugwell, requested Chase to "come to Washington and let us have the benefit of your wisdom."\(^{37}\)

Rexford Guy Tugwell, an economics professor at Columbia University, was another advocate of planning as the first step in the process of modernizing America. Tugwell, like Chase and Soule, regarded Soviet planning techniques as the indispensable ingredients in constructing an equitable economic system. Most American problems, according to Tugwell, could be solved by

\(^{35}\)Stuart Chase, "Collectivism is Here to Stay," Common Sense, XI (August, 1942), 277.


\(^{37}\)Rexford Guy Tugwell to Stuart Chase, October 23, 1933, Library of Congress, Chase MSS, Box 1.
applying Soviet methods. And how shall we settle our irrepressible agricultural problem," he asked, "except by some such series of devices as the Soviets use?"\(^\text{38}\)

Tugwell, along with Dewey, Soule and Chase, submitted that collectivism represented the "new progressivism." Strong, responsive government to direct production, regulate prices and wages, coordinate various industries and control financial credit seemed imperative. The time had come, explained Tugwell, when "private selfishness can no longer by economic legerdemain be erected into a desirable social policy."\(^\text{39}\) When the depression struck, Tugwell insisted that the nation was painfully learning that: "The jig is up. The cat is out of the bag. There is no invisible hand. There never was. If the depression has not taught us that, we are incapable of education."\(^\text{40}\) Through a colleague on the Columbia faculty, Raymond Moley, Tugwell became an important adviser to Franklin Roosevelt. His recommendations for national planning and government mastery of business were implemented during the New Deal. He persistently


\(^{40}\)Rexford G. Tugwell, "Design for Government," *Political Science Quarterly*, XLVIII (September, 1933), 330.
urged Roosevelt to move beyond the methods and goals of
pre World War I progressivism and to introduce a full
revision of the capitalist system. For Tugwell the
essence of the New Deal was the redemption of "people
whose wants are going unsatisfied, because of the failure
of the industrial and political institutions which they
have established in the hope of satisfying those wants."41
Tugwell's social thought, which influenced New Deal
policies was firmly rooted in "the tradition of the in-
tellectual progressivism of the twenties--the progressiv-
ism of national economic planning, developed by such men
as John Dewey, Thorstein Veblen, Herbert Croly, and Charles
A. Beard and finding inspiration as far back as Edward
Bellamy."42

Contributing to the intellectual ferment of
national economic planning was the historian who had
dared suggest, in 1913, that economic interests influence
political decisions--Charles A. Beard. He developed the
proposition that America desperately required "a new

41 Rexford G. Tugwell, The Battle for Democracy

42 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the
Old Order: 1919-1933 (Boston, 1957), p. 130. To
Matthew Josephson "Soule, Tugwell, and Chase were
Fabians: they hoped that America might gradually
adopt central economic planning without the evils of
the Soviet dictatorship," Infidel in the Temple: An
Science of Political Economy that transcends the everlasting battle of capitalism and agriculture for advantage—a science that has its points of reference...not in the bald interests of cotton spinners or wheat raisers, but in the very center of Planned National Economy."43

Beard tried to demonstrate that planning was ingrained in the American tradition. Business interests, especially, had sustained the "myth of rugged American individualism."44 His American Leviathan advanced the argument that government planning augmented liberty. Hamilton's desire to utilize government as a spur to economic progress was glorified by Beard into the essence of the founding fathers' wisdom.45 The very titles of the books on planning edited by Beard, (Whither Mankind, Toward Civilization, America Faces the Future) displayed his profound conviction that "the age of individualism and laissez-faire in economics and government is closing and that a new age of collectivism is emerging."46

45Charles A. Beard, The American Leviathan (New York, 1930).
"The challenge to capitalism and the effort to meet the challenge by a combination of individual liberty and initiative with collective planning, control and action seem to mark a new phase in the intellectual and moral development of mankind,"47 wrote Beard in 1932. He applauded the New Deal, early in its existence, for being "a break with the historic past and the coming of a future collectivist in character." He depicted the coming collective age as "a century of progress."48

What the writings of Dewey, Soule, Chase, Tugwell and Beard signified was considerably more than what Schlesinger termed the "tradition of the intellectual progressivism of the twenties--the progressivism of national economic planning...." Implicit in their social thought was the recognition that only unprecedented thought was the recognition that only unprecedented and extraordinary government involvement (what Walter Lippmann would describe as the "new imperative")49

49 Walter Lippmann, The New Imperative (New York, 1935), p. 1; Writing in 1935, in what he termed "the sixth year of the social crisis which began in 1929," Lippmann defined the "new imperative" as government holding itself, in the future, "consciously responsible for the maintenance of the standard of life prevailing among the people."
could achieve progress. They were harbingers of "a shift within liberalism from the reformism of the Progressive era to the more drastic societal revision of the 1930's." Though they did not share a unanimity of opinion, Dewey, Soule, Chase, Tugwell and Beard each desired "social democracy." Their ideas did much to shape the New Deal's creation of a welfare state in America.

Perhaps the New Deal may best be defined as being "simply and foremost evidence of the viability of democratic politics in an age of crisis." Franklin Roosevelt's repudiation of the assumption that the economic system functioned automatically, heralded a new epoch in American history. Despite the considerable continuity between Progressivism and the New Deal, government, for the first time, became a guardian. The New Deal established the "guarantor state." Under Franklin Roosevelt, government engaged in low cost housing projects,

50 Warren, Liberals and Communism, p. 25.


52 Degler, Out of Our Past, p. 414.
employed vast numbers of men and attempted to manage the economy; government acted to relieve unemployment, compel collective bargaining, support farm prices, redistribute wealth by a graduated income tax, control credit, regulate securities and through the Social Security Act to provide against interruption of earnings. "It was not until the Social Security Act of 1935...that the Federal Government participated in any major way in permanent welfare programs for the general population."53 The Social Security Act was a "turning point in American history" because "it marked a transfer of welfare functions from voluntary to public institutions, and from the local to the federal level...."54 Social Security and other reforms, especially those from 1935 on "launched the American welfare state, a brand new, large, ungainly infant, destined to survive all the hazards of childhood and a maladjusted adolescence, eventually to mature into the Great Society, still ugly

53United States Bureau of the Census Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, 1960), p. 188; "The implications of the Social Security Act were profound. It established a permanent machinery to distribute federal funds for health and medical purposes, and it took account of special needs and problems in the allocation of these funds." Roy Lubove, "The New Deal and National Health," Current History, XLV (August, 1963), 82.

but increasingly popular."\textsuperscript{55} There is virtually unanimous agreement that Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal established a welfare state. Norman Thomas, for example, believes that "between 1933 and the validation of the Wagner Labor Act by the Supreme Court in 1937, he securely laid the foundations of our present welfare state."\textsuperscript{56} And Henry Commager contends that "perhaps the best brief description of the New Deal is the term 'welfare state'."\textsuperscript{57}

If we may define the welfare state as one in which the central government seeks "to supplement the initiatives of private society" and accepts the "ultimate responsibility of guaranteeing 'floors'...below which it conceives tolerable living to be impossible,"\textsuperscript{58} then the New Deal did create it. Arthur Altmeyer has reported


\textsuperscript{56}Norman Thomas, "The Thirties as a Socialist Recalls Them," in Rita James Simon, ed., \textit{As We Saw the Thirties: Essays on Social and Political Movements} (Urbana), p. 111.


that Franklin Roosevelt discussed, with members of his Committee on Economic Security, proposals to have an "insurance policy" issued to every child "the day he was born to protect him against all the major economic misfortunes which might befall him during his lifetime. This is the reason that he displayed some irritation when Lord Beveridge was hailed in 1942 as the originator of the idea of 'cradle to the grave' insurance when he made his famous report, 'Social Insurance and Allied Services'."

When Franklin Roosevelt assumed the presidency, he was not certain precisely what measures would be necessary to counter the depression. He gradually became convinced that the nation's paramount economic problem was the equitable distribution of wealth. Roosevelt embraced economic planning and during the course of the New Deal he modified virtually every aspect of American life. As early as 1934, the New Deal had established almost fifty bureaus or commissions (responsible directly to the President) that dealt with implementing economic reforms. These bureaus and their sub-divisions represented the fruition of planning concepts and signified a change in the progressive tradition. "In his use of the bureau,"

Russell Nye observed, "Roosevelt went beyond the limits set by the early twentieth century progressives, approaching closer to the plans advocated by the intellectuals and the 'planned economy' thinkers...." 60

The attempt to trace the origins and growth of the welfare state in America by examining the pattern of government participation in the economy and discussing reform ideas that influenced the New Deal must not ignore some obvious considerations. Government expansion is, in a real sense, a "concomitant of economic growth." 61 Population changes, scientific and technological developments, industrialization, the commercialization of agriculture and urbanization certainly affected what functions government has assumed. When Americans began living in cities, health, educational and utility services, obviously, had to be regulated. What could be ignored in a rural area might very well jeopardize everyone's well-being in the city.

None of the reformers who agitated for more government did so for principle's sake or under the influence of any political philosophy. Most of them would have denied emphatically that they wanted what we call a welfare state.


All they saw was an existing evil or problem for which the obvious solution was the exercise of power by political society. That the United States has a welfare state form of government is undisputed. Indeed, the significance of this development is such that Allan Nevins regards the era since the New Deal as the "Age of Welfare Concern." New Deal reforms have been retained and extended and there is a consensus among the majority of Americans that government should exercise many economic functions to insure the nation's well-being. This development is nothing less than "one of the Great Divides of modern social history."


64 See, for example, the thesis of Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion (New Brunswick, 1957).

CHAPTER 2

GEORGE CREEL: THE PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE OF THE
NEW DEAL AND THE WELFARE STATE

Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the presidency in March, 1933, hoping to rally America toward reform and recovery. His invocation of a "new deal" for the American people inspired support from many imaginative and resourceful individuals. Belief in the viability of American democracy and the economy's recuperative powers, not in ideological consistency, animated the early New Dealers. Social workers, lawyers, businessmen, city planners, college professors and former "Bull Moosers" and Wilsonian progressives filled administrative posts. George Creel, Woodrow Wilson's chairman of the Committee on Public Information, devoted his service to the New Deal. Creel's participation in the New Deal and his subsequent reaction to it illuminate an interesting aspect of the American reform tradition.

George Creel came to the progressive movement from a poverty-stricken Midwestern background. He was born in 1876 in Lafayette County, Missouri and was raised in Independence and Odessa, Missouri. His father's excessive drinking and chronic unemployment drove him and
his three brothers to self-reliance at an early age. At
the age of twenty, Creel, who did not go beyond the eighth
grade in school, had won a reputation as a muckraking re-
porter for the Kansas City World. From 1899-1909 he
edited the Kansas City Independent. Creel battled the
political bosses and utility companies as well as agitat-
ed for women's rights and other reforms. He edited the
Denver Post from 1909 to 1910 and the Rocky Mountain News
from 1911 through 1913.1 In Colorado he worked with Judge
Ben B. Lindsey to eradicate child labor and other rapacious
business practices. Creel passionately committed himself
to Woodrow Wilson after listening to him address a Mis-
souri high school assembly in 1905. "I think I can safely
lay claims to being 'the original Woodrow Wilson man',"
he declared. Creel worked for the Democratic National
Committee in 1912 and 1916 and suggested to Wilson the
idea of propagandizing the American cause during World
War I. He proposed an agency that would inflame American
patriotism, seek the support of neutral nations and
vitiate Germany's resistance. On April 14, 1917, a week
after the United States entered the war, Wilson appointed
Creel chairman of the Committee on Public Information.

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1 The biographical information is taken from
George Creel's Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty
Crowded Years (New York, 1947).
The period from 1920-1932, which Creel termed the "black-out" years of the progressive movement, were spent writing for Everybody's and the Saturday Evening Post. In 1926 he accepted a permanent staff position at Collier's and moved his wife, the prominent actress Blanche Bates, and two children to San Francisco. This city represented, in his estimation, the best qualities of American life, and he anticipated a leisurely, comfortable existence. The stock market crash destroyed Creel's pattern of life and forced him "back against the grindstone, compelling more frequent and longer stays in the east...."

Franklin Roosevelt's acceptance speech at the 1932 Democratic Convention enraptured Creel. He, along with Walter Lippmann, had favored Newton D. Baker for the presidential nomination. The New York Governor, however, made Creel into an ardent admirer. "Every tone of his voice, every flash of his eye conveyed sincerity.... I left Roosevelt with an enthusiasm I had not known since the days of Woodrow Wilson."

He resigned from Collier's magazine to campaign for Roosevelt. Creel detected a firm correlation between Franklin Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Reform and recovery were certain if Roosevelt could oust the Republicans. "I am quite frankly one of those who have the deep conviction that there are

\[\text{Ibid., p. 274.}\]
festering inequalities in American life that shame and betray the noble phrases of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence," he intoned in a campaign speech. "I believe with all my heart that America's race is between refor-
mation and revolution, and not the least of my devotion to Roosevelt, Garner and McAdoo, is a firm faith in their progressivism, their human sympathies, their unflinching honesty and their will and courage to end the selfish and destructive rule of the privileged classes that con-
trol the Republican Party."3

In July 1933, George Creel became a New Deal official. President Roosevelt enlisted Creel's aid in administering the National Industrial Recovery Act on the Pacific coast. The N.R.A. of June 16, 1933, attempted to unite the interests of capital and labor through industrial codes, formulated by business in conjunction with government administrators. The N.R.A. hoped to effect industrial self-government. Creel sympathized with the desire to supplant competition with cooperation and particularly applauded section 7a which guaranteed the workers' right to organize and bargain collectively. He recognized that the N.R.A. represented an adherence to government planning and

3Copy of a speech delivered on September 14, 1932 in the George Creel Papers, Library of Congress, Con-
tainer 5.
organization. For Creel, the act served to "affirm the preeminence of humanity and to set forth the great truth that industry was made for man, not man for industry. It is, in effect, a gigantic effort to reorganize the whole industrial structure of the United States on higher, finer lines, substituting a cooperative order for an unlimited competitive order, a determined drive for the adoption of a planned, well-balanced, national economy as opposed to pep talks, high pressure salesmanship and other phases of the hit or miss, devil take the hindmost, dog eat dog plan under which America has been operating."^4

Creel served as a regional director of the N.R.A. for the west coast district and, also, as Chairman of the San Francisco regional labor board. After only six months service he resigned as a labor-management negotiator. He believed that the impotence of the regional administrators mitigated the N.R.A.'s effectiveness. The distance from Washington, D.C. necessitated extensions of authority to regional administrators. What really provoked him was the conviction that "the majority of national codes have had their preparation dominated by Eastern influences, often without reference to Far

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^4 Copy of a speech delivered on September 22, 1933, Creel MSS, Container 5.
western business or relation to it." Creel diplomatically refrained from conveying this sentiment in his resignation telegram to the President. He attributed his dissatisfaction to an "intense conviction that Pacific Coast should have authoritative agency out here due to distance from Washington." Creel made it clear that he had repudiated neither the New Deal or the N.R.A. He pledged Roosevelt his "continued devotion to N.R.A. as a soldier in the ranks."  

Creel's dedication to the New Deal did not diminish after he resigned the N.R.A. post. A fierce loyalty to the Democratic party had been instilled in him from his youth. The remainder of 1933 and 1934 were spent in militant campaigning for the New Deal in California. What is the New Deal, he asked, but "the dream of social justice that has filled the hearts of men for these two thousand years." Roosevelt's program sought goals that Woodrow Wilson desired. The New Deal complemented the New Freedom. It is "America's challenge not only to unemployment but also to insecurity. It is a frontal attack on poverty, 

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5 Creel to D. C. Roper, September 29, 1933, Creel MSS, Container 4.

6 Creel to Roosevelt, September 23, 1933, Creel MSS, Container 4.

7 Copy of a speech delivered on March 28, 1934, Creel MSS, Container 5.
rapacity, and injustice; an assertion of the public interest against selfish interest...a new Declaration of Independence, a new gospel of freedom...."  

George Creel's association, both with Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, endeared him to the faction in California's Democratic party seeking to defeat Upton Sinclair's "End Poverty in California" movement. Sinclair's espousal of socialist theories galvanized many Democrats into opposition. Creel readily accepted their offer to challenge Sinclair in the primary. However, even to close friends, he couched his decision in the terms of a reluctant, but dutiful party man. "Upton Sinclair was running away with the Democratic nomination," he confided to Newton Baker, "and nothing was more apparent than that his choice by the Democrats would mean an overwhelming swing to the extreme right, destroying progressivism in California for the next thirty years."  

Creel recognized the popularity of Sinclair's reform movement to those on relief. To blunt this

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8Copy of a speech delivered on March 28, 1934, Creel MSS, Container 5.

appeal, Creel attempted to pose as President Roosevelt's choice in the primary. He announced that "I consented to become a candidate for Governor because I wanted to bring the New Deal to California and put the state squarely behind F.D.R. in his fight to reorganize America on fairer, finer lines." Whatever force this strategy might have had was negated by Roosevelt's refusal, despite pressure by such advisors as James Farley and Raymond Moley, to intervene in the primary. Creel fought for the nomination, but was unable to counter Sinclair's popularity. Throughout the campaign, he contrived to elicit support from the President. "The Hearst papers are against me," he complained to the President's aid, Marvin H. McIntyre, "because I have refused to abate my championship of the New Deal...." Creel assailed Sinclair's socialistic solutions for unemployment and poverty. He depicted the New Deal as the proper mixture of individualism and government regulation and castigated the EPIC movement as extremist. The rampant poverty and despair engulfing California in 1934 enabled Sinclair to rout Creel.

He returned to Washington after his defeat and resumed work at Collier's magazine. Creel became

10Copy of a speech delivered on July 27, 1934, Creel MSS, Container 5.
11Creel to McIntyre, August 13, 1934, Creel MSS, Container 4.
Franklin Roosevelt's favorite reporter and the President utilized him as a source for releasing news relating to proposed legislative programs or other administration policies. Roosevelt would prepare articles in Collier's in conjunction with Creel to gauge public reaction. The President "would outline the laws and policies that he had in mind, and then sit back to see what happened. Although every article was preceded by an editorial blurb that boasted of its authoritativeness 'due to Mr. Creel's long and close association with the President', it was still in his power to repudiate me if the reaction proved less than favorable." Creel's articles in Collier's often reflected F.D.R.'s concerns. When the attacks of the Liberty League mounted, for instance, the President, speaking through Creel, announced his belief that the Constitution was not intended to be a "dead hand" blocking progress. "The New Deal's goal was to continue the Constitution as a truth and a hope, not as a mere collection of obsolete phrases." 


Harry Hopkins, in 1935, offered Creel the chairmanship of the National Advisory Board to the Works Progress Administration. Hopkins told Creel that he wanted this agency to contribute recommendations and "intelligent faultfinding."\(^1\) Creel accepted Harry Hopkins' offer and spent 1935 working with the W.P.A., writing for *Collier's* and boosting Franklin Roosevelt for a second term. If some progressives were growing increasingly skeptical about the President's New Deal by 1935-36, Creel continued as a passionate devotee. "What we call the New Deal," he declared, "as well as all other progressive thought, derives from Woodrow Wilson's vision of a fairer, finer world."\(^2\) Moreover, only the party of Jefferson, Jackson, Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, demonstrated any recognition that "what we witnessed in 1929 was no mere financial panic, but the end of an era, and that what we must have is a brand new economic order."\(^3\) A profound temperamental difference divided Republicans and Democrats. "With the Republicans politics is a business, with the Democrats it is an

\(^1\)Creel, *Rebel at Large*, p. 296.

\(^2\)Copy of a speech delivered on December 28, 1935, Creel MSS, Container 5.

\(^3\)Address of Creel to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, August 30, 1935, Creel MSS, Container 5.
emotional experience. The Republican party is an industrial plant, operated for revenue only; the Democratic party is based on ideals. Never at any time have we been practical in the sense of placing profit above principle." Creel registered his complete satisfaction with the New Deal. Every law Roosevelt secured had his "whole hearted approval" and signified "a forward step in humanity's advance." No true progressive could repudiate the New Deal. "I rejoice in the inspiring leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt and love him for the enemies he has made. I believe in the principles of the New Deal with all the force of my being...."

Creel spurned the criticism emanating from disillusioned Democrats. When Alfred E. Smith and John W. Davis, the party's presidential candidates in 1928 and 1924, and Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of State under Wilson deserted Roosevelt in 1936, Creel commented that the President's record and program made him the "ardent, uncompromising advocate of every one of those great principles that are the heart of the Democratic party and the hope of America."}

17 Copy of a speech delivered on August 24, 1935, Creel MSS, Container 5.
18 San Francisco Examiner, April 26, 1936.
19 Copy of a speech delivered on January 8, 1936, Creel MSS, Container 5.
Roosevelt's overwhelming victory on November 3, 1936 accentuated the New Deal's popularity. Creel favored the new farm and labor legislation of the administration's domestic reform program. Even the President's plan to reorganize the federal judiciary did not alarm him. He did not consider the "court-packing" plan either unconstitutional or menacing to the judiciary's independence. "Out of a long-standing conviction that no judge or set of judges had the right to nullify a law passed by the legislative branch and approved by the executive, I liked the court plan although I was dismayed by the manner in which the fight was handled." Creel discerned no leftist deviation in the New Deal during Roosevelt's second term. While many progressives who were active in the Bull Moose and New Freedom reform movements became alienated from the New Deal, as late as 1938-39, George Creel was insisting that it merited every progressive's total dedication. He exhibited irritation whenever the President and his program were lambasted as being "communist inspired."

Ask yourselves if it is 'red' to say that the burden of industry shall be lifted from the backs of little children? If it is 'red' to insure bank deposits? If it is 'red' to outlaw get-rich-quick scoundrels and fake investment bankers who made a business of stealing the savings of the poor? If it is

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20 Creel, Rebel at Large, p. 295.
'red' to pass a Social Security Act that recognizes the obligation of government to care for the aged, the orphaned, the widowed, the cripples and the blind?21

Franklin Roosevelt's second administration and his desire for a third term did not upset Creel. Indeed, in 1939, the President appointed him Commissioner of the Golden Gate International Exposition. The first public indication that Creel's estimation of the New Deal was changing appeared in the introduction he wrote on December 12, 1939 for an edition of Senator Edward P. Costigan's papers. Here he rather surprisingly lamented that contemporary liberalism "stands in danger of being pushed and shoved away from its real meaning."22 Nothing in his speeches or writings suggests that, during 1938-1939, New Deal policies offended him. Why this shift surfaced in December, 1939 is uncertain. It is clear, however, that even before America entered the war, George Creel had already become dismayed by the "new liberalism." The skepticism he displayed about American liberalism in 1939 eventually yielded to total disillusionment. In his autobiography, Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty

21 The Record (Berkeley, California), November 4, 1938, in the Creel MSS, Container 4.

Crowded Years (1947), Creel sneered: "'Liberalism'! Not in all history has a word been so wrenched away from its true meaning and dragged through every gutter of defilement." Such hostility to the "New Deal-Fair Deal philosophy of government" possessed him that his autobiography decries policies and programs he championed from 1932 to 1940. Rebel at Large is, ironically, cited by one historian as an important source for conservatism in the 1930's.

After spending part of 1940 advising Mexico's President Cardenas on establishing a ministry of public information and propaganda, Creel returned to Washington. His wife's death in December, 1941 depressed him. Then after "trudging from office to office in Washington" offering to serve in a war-time government post and being politely rebuffed, Creel grew more frustrated and resentful. A poignant moment in the autobiography is his encounter with Bernard Baruch in Washington's Lafayette Park. Baruch, like Creel, was unable to secure a position. Predictably, Creel belittled Elmer Davis' work at the Office of War Information and compared that agency unfavorably with his own Committee on Public Information.

23 Creel, Rebel at Large, p. 370.
For a man accustomed to influential and decisive roles, the World War II years were a disappointment. He spent 1942 assisting Earl Warren become Governor of California and in 1943 he remarried. He, also, continued writing and began preparing Rebel at Large.

When his autobiography appeared it became evident that yet another progressive from the Roosevelt-Wilson era had repudiated the New Deal. Rebel at Large is a classic example of how age can affect the interpretation of things past. The George Creel who had defended Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal against the onslaughts of Al Smith and Bainbridge Colby in 1936, and up until late 1939, now discovered a new pattern. While in 1932 Roosevelt "had done no more than to promise a proper balance of power between employer and employed," by 1936 "he was committed to courses that gave organized labor the status of a privileged class."26 Roosevelt's tragedy was in surrounding himself with "yes men." Creel did not attack F.D.R. beyond asserting that he was essentially an "adolescent" and had a "royalty complex." Roosevelt, also, pandered to the desires of certain groups such as the Negro and organized labor. He could only conclude with his friend Donald Richberg's analysis: the President sought "superior rights for inferiors."27 A coterie

26Ibid., p. 297.
27Ibid., pp. 332-339.
of advisers encouraged Roosevelt in extravagant schemes. "The trouble with Harry Hopkins as with so many others that Franklin Roosevelt gathered around him, and even with the President himself, was that he had never spent his own money."^{28}

George Creel, former intimate of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, through his autobiography became a hero to the American right wing.^{29} From the publication of Rebel at Large to his death on October 2, 1953, Creel struggled to purge the Democratic party of "socialism" and extirpate that insidious creation of New Deal and Fair Deal legislation--the welfare state. Creel's correspondence from 1947 to 1953 bulges with ideas and techniques explaining how "liberty-loving Americans" could reverse America's march toward socialism. His second wife, Alice M. Rosseter, died in 1948 and his last five years were spent denouncing the welfare state from a San Francisco hotel room. His correspondence during this period indicates that his closest friends were all

^{28}Ibid., p. 296.

^{29}Donald Richberg, a former New Deal advisor, expressed his delight with Rebel at Large, Richberg to Creel, December 29, 1947, Creel MSS, Container 4. William Henry Chamberlain, another reconstructed radical, informed Creel that "the passages on the O.P.A. and similar bureaucratic monstrousities warmed the cockles of my heart," Chamberlain to Creel, October 28, 1947, Creel MSS, Container 4. L. Martin Sears, a professor from Purdue University, commented that Rebel at Large might have been called "The Degradation of the Democratic Practice," Sears to Creel, January 13, 1948, Creel MSS, Container 4.
conservatives. He wrote frequently to Donald Richberg and Raymond Moley, two New Deal advisors, whose political thought underwent essentially the same revision as his own. Herbert Hoover, Senators Karl Mundt and Harry Byrd, novelist Louis Bromfield, Henry Hazlitt, Adolphe Menjou, and Carter Glass, Jr. were other correspondents. General Albert C. Wedemeyer appears to have been his best friend during these years.

Creel's disgust with Roosevelt's performance at Teheran and Yalta, compounded with his hatred for Harry Truman's Fair Deal, animated him to explore the possibility of political realignment. Conservatives and liberals should occupy separate parties. An effort to formally unite Southern Democrats and "real Republicans" ought to be made for the 1952 election. If all the opponents of the welfare state form of government could be brought together at some central point, Creel believed that a new document rooted in true progressivism would emerge. That document would surely be "as much of a clarion as the Declaration of Independence when it was first presented to those patriots who supported it by pledges of their lives, their fortunes

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30 Harry Truman remarked to Creel, during confidential talks in July, 1945 for an article in Collier's that the United States ought to abandon its Civil War political alignment and "divide into Conservative and Liberal camps," Creel MSS, Container 4.
and their sacred honor." To achieve this goal, Creel conducted a personal campaign to promote the feasibility of his idea. Primary emphasis was on Democrats who repudiated the Roosevelt-Truman philosophy. These estranged Democrats might then offer to support the "proper" Republican in 1952. Some Democrats, like James A. Farley and former New Jersey Governor, Charles Edison, were unimpressed with Creel's proposal. Edison considered the Democrats "twelve years late in trying to clean up our own house." Others, however, found Creel's idea stimulating. Louis Bromfield even suggested a name for the group—"Democrats for Decency." Senator Harry Byrd preferred "Constitutional Democrats," while Henry Hazlitt offered "New Jeffersonian Democrats," "Jeffersonian Democrats" and "States Rights Democrats." Creel usually alluded to dissident Democrats as "Anti-Welfare State Democrats." Whatever title they chose, advised Henry Hazlitt, "ought to suggest these Democrats represent the true Democratic tradition and are trying to preserve it against those who would destroy it." On

31 George Creel to "Dear Linn," August 1, 1951, Creel MSS, Container 4.
34 Ibid.
September 15, 1951 conservatives from both parties gathered in Washington to discuss a political realignment. This conference concluded that to insure America's return to constitutional government, conservative Democrats should not form a new party. The best strategy was to nominate a conservative Republican in 1952.

Most progressives and radicals, after passing through what Richard Hofstadter terms "deconversion," embraced the Republican right-wing. George Creel's congenital Democratic bias made such a transition gratifying. This is why he originally embarked on herding all the nation's "Anti-Welfare State Democrats" into a separate-phalanx. Conservative Democrats in California, in his view, provided the electoral victories of Senator Richard Nixon and William Knowland and the defeats, in congressional races, of James Roosevelt and Helen Gahagan Douglas. Conservative Democrats in California had been anti-administration "ever since Roosevelt broke the third term tradition and committed himself to the CIO--Collectivist wing...." \(^{35}\) These accomplishments convinced him that significant conservative strength existed and that neither he nor any other Democrat opposed to the administration would countenance the

\(^{35}\) Creel to Farley, August 11, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.
nomination of a liberal Republican. He delivered this warning to Republican Senator Karl Mundt:

All of us are convinced that Truman will be renominated almost by acclamation, and that a Welfare State platform will give us another strong push into outright Socialism.

If you write a platform with every plank bedrocked in the Constitution and courageous in its repudiation of New Deal-Fair Deal betrayals, and name candidates whose records leave no doubt as to their sturdy Americanism, you can count on our instant and enthusiastic support. Arguing from the showing we made in 1950, it is virtually a certainty that we will be able to swing California into the Republican column next year. But—and it is a resounding but—if you repeat the criminal stupidities of 1948 when both your platform and your candidates ducked every major issue, hitting new laws in cowardice and double-talk, it is likely that most of us will stay away from the polls, even as 40,000,000 disgusted Americans did in 1948. God! I still shudder when I recall the performances staged by Dewey and Warren.36

He reminded Donald Richberg that "the recapture and regeneration of the Democratic party--our declared aim--can only be brought about by a Republican victory in November. But again I say, as I have said from the first, that it is not a case of any Republican or any sort of platform. To my mind a Me Too jackal is worse than a Welfare Stater."37

36Creel to Mundt, August 21, 1951, Creel MSS, Container 4. Mundt earlier told Creel that unless conservatives united "Harry Truman and the Welfare State are going to completely wipe out our system of individual initiative, private enterprise and protection of rights of states and rights of individuals," Mundt to Creel, August 11, 1951, Creel MSS, Container 4.

A dramatic way to accentuate the discontent with New Deal-Fair Deal policies, Creel submitted, would be by assembling "four or five hundred outstanding figures in Monticello or at the Hermitage, and adopting a truly Democratic platform in the sense of being completely repudiative of unconstitutional government and the promotion of the Socialistic Welfare State...." This platform would denounce the Democratic party for relegating "principles to partisanship" and "inform Republicans the price that they must pay for our support, thus strengthening the Rightists in their battle against Me-Too fifth column." Even after learning that the Jefferson Memorial barred political meetings, Creel suggested that Charlottesville, Virginia would be an excellent substitute. Its proximity to Monticello would permit them to "make a pilgrimage to the shrine, and offer a prayer to that august shade." This romantic idea, while appealing to most of Creel's correspondents, never achieved fulfillment.

38 Creel to Oswald West, March 21, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4. See, also, his letter to Jesse H. Jones, January 25, 1952, Container 4. Richberg advised Creel to contact his good friend former Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy who is "as you probably know violently opposed to the administration on both foreign and domestic policies." Richberg gave Creel Kennedy's Palm Beach address and said that "some substantial financial support" might be forthcoming. Richberg to Creel, March, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.

some smaller conferences were held, but age, health, geography and other factors prevented the assembly of four to five hundred individuals.

The extent of George Creel's dissatisfaction with American liberalism is illuminated by his activity in the 1952 election. Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft excited many former progressives and radicals. Taft's artful resistance to Harry Truman's Fair Deal emasculated some significant legislative proposals the President submitted to the Eightieth Congress. Virtually all conservatives regarded him as a potential savior. George Creel's antagonism to the welfare state was so intense that Senator Taft's limited endorsement of certain social welfare measures rendered him suspect. "Mr. Hoover and General MacArthur keep urging me to take an immediate stand for Taft." Creel resisted this advice observing that "Taft's adventures in Me-Tooism" were reprehensible. "Why in God's name doesn't he come out for States Rights? Does he think for one moment that advocacy of FEPC will get one vote from the Democrats?" He concurred with Adolphe Menjou's appraisal that "Taft's references to Government Housing and aid to education, frighten me. The crushing burden of the social services ruined England.

Is this not clear to all? No government can support this financial drain to make life so easy for all." Creel eventually succumbed to the demands of Herbert Hoover, General MacArthur and Donald Richberg to publicly endorse Robert Taft for the Republican presidential nomination. When a close associate, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, accepted the chairmanship of the National Citizens for Taft Committee, he commenced working for the Ohio Senator in California.

Besides nominating a candidate who would be the antithesis of Roosevelt-Truman egalitarianism, Creel demanded that a forthright platform was imperative. States rights, significantly reduced government spending, and "some limitations of taxes on incomes" should constitute the core of domestic reforms. He, also, maintained that the Republicans, to dramatize their alienation from the New Deal-Fair Deal legacy in foreign affairs, should repudiate Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam, sunder diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and her satellites and withdraw America from the United Nations.42

41 Menjou to Creel, March 1, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4. Louis Bromfield expressed doubt to Creel that Taft would be a good executive and "how well he would get on with Congress." Bromfield to Creel, March 29, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.

What animated his hostility to progressivism in the United States was not only its creation of a welfare state. American liberals like Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman were blind to the dangers of international Communism. They ignorantly minimized the Soviet threat to American democracy. The Soviet Union emerged victorious from the Second World War, established hegemony over eastern Europe and even had it tentacles prying into the United States. The Republican Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, merited every American's gratitude for his heroic crusade against internal Communism. McCarthy's manners and methods might be irritating but "he has done, and is doing a highly necessary job." Senator McCarthy was not a persecutor. Creel contended that "when one considers the enormity of his single-handed crusade against Communists in the government, and the hates and hypocrisies that have pursued him at every step, the wonder is that he has not given even greater offense to those who hold that a college degree is indubitable proof of loyalty." Creel, also, related that he had sent so many donations to the McCarthy Club in Wisconsin that "if Ike and Adlai continue their attacks I am likely to go broke by reason of further donations. More than

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43Creel to Herbert Hoover, December 11, 1951, Creel MSS, Container 4.
that I may sound the call for a Society for the Protection and Preservation of McCarthyism, pointing out that it stems from the same sturdy Americanism that led plain men to risk all at Lexington and Concord while 'loyalists' raced for the Canadian border." When the Wisconsin Senator received appointment to the chairmanship of the Committee on Government Operations, Creel recommended that he examine the Ford Foundation.

Dwight David Eisenhower's entry into the Republican race in 1952 infuriated Creel. After being assured of Taft's political philosophy, he fought to effect his nomination. Eisenhower's presence augured an electoral contest devoid of any substantive differences. His antagonism to that "five star pig in a khaki poke" stemmed from "the fact that every 100 per cent Me-Too-er in the Republican party is for 'Ike' proves to me that he is of the New Deal-Fair Deal faith not only with respect to foreign policies but also domestically." Some former

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44 Creel "Letter to the Editor" 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.
45 McCarthy to Creel, March 17, 1953, Creel MSS, Container 4.
46 Creel to Richberg, April 28, 1952, Richberg MSS, Container 3.
progressives like Donald Richberg tried persuading him that Eisenhower would reverse the trend toward the welfare state. Richberg was slightly uneasy about Eisenhower himself, but felt that he would prove acceptable. He recommended that Creel obtain a recently published book against the welfare state which contained a speech by Eisenhower.\footnote{Richberg advised Creel to read \textit{The Welfare State and the National Welfare} (Cambridge, 1952), edited by Harvard professor Sheldon Glueck. This book contains speeches and essays opposing the welfare state by Bernard Baruch, Roscoe Pound, Raymond Moley, Donald Richberg, Dwight Eisenhower, Vannevar Bush and others. Richberg to Creel, April 5, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.}

Creel, however, agreed with the former progressive Senator from Montana, Burton K. Wheeler, who remarked that he could "...hardly see any reason why a Democrat should vote for Eisenhower in preference to Stevenson."\footnote{Wheeler to Creel, Creel MSS, Container 4, August 21, 1952.}

The Democratic party's right wing desired a serious alternative to Adlai Stevenson's liberalism. "Senator Taft's record leaves no doubt as to his stand on Me-Tooism," Creel wrote to Senator Richard M. Nixon, "but where is there warrant for the belief that General Eisenhower can be counted on to clean out the New Deal-Fair Deal 'stables'."\footnote{Creel to Nixon, June 27, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.} Especially upsetting to Creel were the prominent moderate Republicans influencing Eisenhower's
campaign. Henry Cabot Lodge, Thomas Dewey and Earl Warren signified that Eisenhower would perpetuate the federal government's active participation in social reform. Although Creel helped elect Earl Warren Governor of California in 1942, the latter's performance had subsequently proven that he was not a "real Republican." Governor Warren "consistently championed a kind of socialized medicine" and "has stood out from the first as a believer in the Welfare State."51

Subordinating ideology to electoral reality, the Republican party in 1952 dutifully applauded Senator Robert Taft's prudential speeches on constitutional government, but offered its presidential nomination to Dwight Eisenhower. This craven desire for victory rather than for immutable political principle confounded George Creel. An apocalyptic vision of the future possessed him. Now that Taft had been sacrificed, Creel's apprehensions were amplified. General Wedemeyer expressed Creel's sentiments when he wrote to him: "No matter what Ike and Nixon may say for election consumption, I think both of them are vastly overrated men, skillful opportunists who haven't the guts or the character or the background knowledge to really lead this country out of the morass. We change the label on the

51 Creel to General Albert C. Wedemeyer, December 4, 1951, Creel MSS, Container 4.
can but not the contents."\(^52\) Other friends wished to assuage Creel's fears. Donald Richberg lauded Eisenhower as "an individualist and a real libertarian who will exert a tremendous influence against the substitution of a socialistic tyranny for our constitutional government."\(^53\) Creel temporized throughout the summer of 1952. Finally, in September, he resigned himself to reality noting that "we will be forced to take Ike, but oh God, what a strain on the gullet."\(^54\)

Creel wielded formidable influence among conservatives in California's Democratic party. His association with Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, combined with an intense political activism made him a persuasive spokesman. Senator Robert Taft, for example, personally thanked Creel for lending his support to him in the California Republican primary. Taft promised Creel, after Eisenhower had received the Republican nomination, that he would "talk with the General, and I hope very much that before he gets through he may give some assurance to Republicans,

\(^{52}\) Wedemeyer to Creel, September 10, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.

\(^{53}\) Richberg to Creel, September 10, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.

and to Democrats like yourself, that he will not conduct a New Deal administration if he is elected."\textsuperscript{55} Any anxieties Creel had about Dwight Eisenhower were submerged by the recognition that Adlai Stevenson constituted an awesome menace to the American free enterprise system. Several weeks prior to election day, Eisenhower conveyed his gratitude to Creel for the valuable assistance he contributed to the campaign in California.\textsuperscript{56}

The General's massive victory in November derived not from his personal popularity, in Creel's opinion, but rather from the "outrage" of millions of Democrats and Independents.\textsuperscript{57} It was, he agreed with Donald Richberg, "a victory for anti-socialism, a turning of the road...."\textsuperscript{58} Would the Republicans really repudiate the welfare state? Would they purge inefficient and disloyal bureaucrats from Washington? Would the "proper" Cabinet appointments be made? Creel was plagued with misgivings. The new President's State of the Union address mollified him.

\textsuperscript{55} Taft to Creel, September 5, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.

\textsuperscript{56} Eisenhower to Creel, October 23, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.

\textsuperscript{57} Creel to Moley, November 10, 1952, Richberg MSS, Container 3.

\textsuperscript{58} Richberg to Creel, November 10, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.
but he remained perplexed over Eisenhower's refusal "to realize that the United Nations is history's worst failure and an increasing menace to our country and institutions." \(^{59}\)

The six years George Creel spent from the publication of *Rebel at Large* to his death in 1933 were dominated by the desire to preserve America from sinister forces. Attracted to social reform in the late nineteenth century by Henry George and Joseph Fels and then captivated by Woodrow Wilson,\(^6^0\) Creel endured through two world wars, a cataclysmic depression and witnessed the birth of a new progressivism. Early in his career as a reform journalist in Kansas City he had developed a fleeting passion for the form of socialism propagated by the British Fabian Society. This naive belief was shattered by developments in "... Russia, Italy, and Germany, where socialism paved the way for communism, fascism, and nazism.... There is no 'middle way' between collectivism and democratic processes...." \(^6^1\)

According to Creel many differences distinguished his brand of progressivism from that articulated by Roosevelt and Truman. Formerly, progressivism had emphasized

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\(^{59}\)Creel to "Dear Arthur," February 6, 1953, Creel MSS, Container 4.

\(^{60}\)Creel, *Rebel at Large*, pp. 47, 148.

\(^{61}\)Ibid., p. 46.
reforming political institutions, eliminating corrupt men from office, restraining business' preponderant influence and suffusing American democracy with augmented popular participation. At its core existed "a love of country and pride in our free institutions. Present day 'liberalism,' as it has the impudence to call itself is anti-American;" Capitalism is denounced, patriotism is ridiculed and Communism is tolerated. The capacity for moral indignation is gone. "I have never been able to accept nonresistance as a workable rule of life. Not to fight evil is to encourage evil. Neither in the first World War nor in the second did I have any sympathy for 'conscientious objectors'..." Such a temperament, quite naturally, found an emotional outlet in Senator McCarthy's war on subversives.

Creel's Middle West upbringing, his personal success, despite adversity and lack of formal education, inspired reverence for the American free enterprise system. "As for Independence and Odessa," he wrote, "those two blessed small towns, ...helped to drive home the essential meaning of Americanism." No class resentment divided people. Pride in one's work, self reliance and moral character enriched life. "All in all, a kindly, gracious existence."

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62 Ibid., p. 370.
63 Ibid., p. 98.
he sighed wistfully. "Life presented no soul tearing problems necessitating a call for psychiatrists, for there were things that decent people did and things they did not do. And all knew what they were."64

For Creel, America offered unlimited opportunities. Competition provided the means to determine who ought to prosper. Consequently, he judged the federal government's promotion of social welfare legislation as violating the spirit of American life. "My whole adult life has been devoted to criticism of the balanced faults of the American system; yet never once have I doubted the wisdom and rightness of the system itself."65 Creel could not comprehend why liberals accused him of apostacy. Didn't they see that the welfare state and international communism, and not American capitalism, were the new leviathans which warranted scrutiny? Creel's Jeffersonian distrust of the state, which many Wilsonian progressives had, made him reluctant to approve comprehensive social insurance programs.

It is difficult for the historian to explain a person's reasons for reorienting his political thought. Who can explain even his own past? George Creel, along with other men who questioned the course of American

64 Ibid., p. 24.
65 Ibid., p. 375.
liberalism, are not exclusively men of ideas. They have private lives, desires and anxieties. It is difficult to measure precisely whether the reputed conservatism of old age, personal aspirations and frustrations, or temperamental attitude causes a revised judgment. The temptation to psychoanalyze historical characters with facile and superficial interpretations must be resisted. Understanding why a man rejects former political beliefs is no easier than elucidating how he came to his original ideas. Self-interest, family, environment and the vicissitudes of life shape a man. Max Eastman, for example, thinks that Lincoln Steffens' move to the political left resulted because of his marriage to Ella Winter. Elevating a single factor to a position of primacy may seem more forthright than adopting a multiple hypothesis. It should, however, be rooted in cogent evidence.

George Creel never felt that he jettisoned his former beliefs. Like Raymond Moley and Donald Richberg and John Chamberlain and even John DosPassos, Max Eastman and Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Creel insisted that excessive power had to be opposed wherever it appeared. Several months before his death, Creel gave a comprehensive explanation of his dedication to original ideals.

Answering your moan that I have become a "reactionary," I stand today just where I stood in my early twenties when I began my search for a faith. Like Jefferson I believe that the best
government is the least government, and have always fought, and will continue to fight, any attempt to bring about that concentration of power in Washington that has statism as its aim and end. I believe in our free enterprise system, with its safeguards against abuse, that permits every citizen to climb as high as his abilities permit. The deadening levels of Socialism are abhorrent to me, and the hypocrisy of the "socializers," who mask their intent under the guise of "liberals," is no less hateful. There has never been a year of my adult life that I have not fought to take the cruelty out of the human struggle—provision for the orphaned, the widowed, the aged—but I resent passionately the shameless insistence of politicians, sewed by pressure groups, to penalize the decent and industrious that special privileges may be provided for the idle, incompetent and characterless. What started out as a determination to take some of the terrors out of life by the provision of social security has degenerated into vote buying on an ever-ascending scale. I believe in omitting no honest effort to bring about a world order based on law, but insist that the one sound approach to internationalism is through a sound nationalism. Like every other decent American I have stood against the prejudices in connection with race, color and religion, but today these prejudices are deliberately and systematically exacerbated by so-called "liberals" for political profit.66

George Creel's progressivism, to be sure, did not resemble Stuart Chase's or Rexford Tugwell's. It should not be surprising, then, that so many Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson progressives, as Otis Graham has shown, found the New Deal uncongenial.67 But, in George Creel's

case there is an important distinction—he supported the New Deal from 1932-39. The turmoil of the intervening years, between 1939 and the publication of his autobiography in 1947, affected him. World War II and the Soviet Union's appetite for power shocked many progressives into an uncritical analysis of all governmental power. In Creel's case, it actually uprooted the Wilsonian vision of cooperation among nations and elicited a hostile reaction to the United Nations.

George Creel's last governmental appointment was in 1939 when President Roosevelt requested his service as Commissioner of the Golden Gate International Exposition. Thereafter, he remained at the periphery of power. The death of his wife in 1941, the failure to obtain a governmental position during World War II and his remarriage, in 1943 seem to have affected his perspective. These incidents must be joined with his fear of power, confirmed by World War II and Soviet Communism, as well as an original Jeffersonian distrust of the state. George Creel's autobiographical account indicates that events during the 1940's motivated his revised estimation of the New Deal. At any rate, in Rebel at Large he condemned policies that he advocated throughout the 1930's.

It is impossible to ignore Creel's resentment over being disregarded in World War II. His animosity to Elmer Davis' Office of War Information exhibits personal
frustration. Indeed, although seventy-seven years old when Dwight Eisenhower assumed the presidency, he still thought that his experience, let alone his work in the campaign, merited an appointment in the new administration.

...I still believe that my experience in the first World War, followed by close and continuous study of the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Free Asia, should have entitled me to some consultative position, at least, with the President's Committee for the reorganization of our 'psychological warfare' mess. However, while truly grateful, I think it useless for you to continue your efforts in my behalf as long as John Foster Dulles has anything to do with appointments. You see, he is the nephew of Robert Lansing, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, and Lansing to the day of his death, looked on me as his hated and implacable enemy. By way of proof, look on page 322-23-24 of his WAR MEMOIRS and you will find this diatribe."68

Six months of President Eisenhower's administration was sufficient to evoke Creel's dissatisfaction. Eisenhower's refusal to dismantle the welfare state and launch a holy war on Communism meant that salvation would not be forthcoming. "But what's the use of torturing myself and you! I am sick to death--sick in heart, mind and body. But, by God, I am not too sick to know that we are in for four of the damnest years ever suffered by any people."69 On October 2, 1953 George Creel died in his San Francisco Hotel room certain of America's imminent destruction.

68 Creel to"Dear Arthur," February 6, 1953, Creel MSS, Container 4.
69 Creel to Wedemeyer, June 25, 1953, Creel MSS, Container 4.
Donald Richberg's political career offers an interesting insight into American progressivism. A leading Bull Moose progressive and an important labor reformer, Richberg served as general counsel and later director of the National Recovery Administration. He was, in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s estimation, "a key figure of the First New Deal." After several years as a New Deal administrator and adviser to President Roosevelt, Richberg grew increasingly apprehensive over the New Deal's liberalism and devoted his energies to protesting, what he deemed, its statist tendencies.

Donald Richberg was born in Knoxville, Tennessee in 1881 to a prosperous family. His grandfather, Louis Richberg, emigrated to the United States in 1849 and quickly established himself as a successful Chicago pork packer. Richberg's father was a lawyer in Chicago and his mother practiced medicine. He grew up in Chicago,

attending the University of Chicago where he received his B.A. in 1901, subsequently receiving his law degree from Harvard University in 1904. Upon graduation from law school, Richberg joined his family's law firm—Richberg, Ickes and Richberg. Chicago, at the turn of the century, seethed with corruption, misgovernment and injustice. Donald Richberg, like many pré-World War I progressives from a comfortable middle class environment, decided to enlist in the movement to reform social conditions. The preponderant power flaunted by business concerned him. He began fighting for municipal reform, limitations on business prerogatives and the election of a president who would infuse the nation with a sense of purpose. In 1912 he supported Theodore Roosevelt and participated in the Progressive movement of 1912—"a revolt of youth against age, of idealism against materialism." He advised Roosevelt during the 1912 campaign and subsequently directed the Legislative Reference Bureau of the Progressive Party. In 1916 after writing the keynote speech for the Progressive's national convention, he bolted the party when it endorsed Charles Evans Hughes' candidacy. Richberg believed Woodrow Wilson to be a better progressive. During the war years, Richberg served as a special

2Donald Richberg, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Unheroic Life (New York, 1954), p. 44.
counsel to the city of Chicago against the utility companies. After battling Samuel Insull in Chicago, he went on to work, in the 1920's, for the National Conference on Valuation of Railroads and railway labor organizations. The Railway Labor Act of 1926 was largely his accomplishment. He remained a vigorous Bull Moose progressive throughout the 1920's. In 1928 Richberg preferred Al Smith's urban progressivism to Herbert Hoover's "undue conservatism." When the Great Depression created an economic upheaval in American society and the Republican party proved unable to counter its ravages, he looked to the imaginative and resourceful Democratic Governor of New York for leadership.

Donald Richberg and Senator George Norris announced, on September 25, 1932, the formation of a National Progressive League dedicated to Franklin Roosevelt's presidential candidacy. The league consisted of Wilsonian progressives and Bull Moosers eager to accentuate progressive dissatisfaction with Herbert Hoover's nostrums for the depression. Richberg was appointed chairman of the league. When he offered to participate in the campaign, Roosevelt told him to "go to Columbia University

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Some prominent members of this league were Senators Robert LaFollette, Edward Costigan and Bronson Cutting. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Felix Frankfurter, Henry Wallace, Bainbridge Colby, Amos Pinchot and Claude Bowers also served on the league's national committee.
and see Ray Moley, Rex Tugwell and Adolf Berle. They are working up some material for me on all sorts of questions." Moley utilized Richberg's talents for speeches concerning steam transportation, industrial-labor relations and business recovery.

He was retained, after Roosevelt's victory, to assist in planning industrial recovery. Bernard Baruch recommended his War Industries Board associate, General Hugh Johnson, to Moley as an excellent candidate to marshall America's effort toward industrial reorganization. Johnson, Lewis Douglas, Senator Robert Wagner, Undersecretary of Commerce, John Dickinson, Frances Perkins and Richberg collaborated on the drafting of the bill which became the National Industrial Recovery Act. General Hugh Johnson, who popularized the bill with the symbol of a blue eagle bearing the slogan "We Do Our Part," announced that the N.R.A. would "eliminate eye-gouging and knee-groining and ear-chewing in business." President Roosevelt defined it, less graphically, as an attempt "to put people back to work, to let them buy more of the products of farm and factories and start out business at a living rate again."

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4 Richberg, My Hero, p. 155.
5 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1958), 98-100.
The Roosevelt administration endeavored, in the N.R.A., to foster industrial self-government. A special code for each industry was established after consultation with representatives from business, labor, the public and the federal government. The codes were designed to equalize competition, eliminate waste, regulate selling prices, protect labor's collective bargaining rights, limit production and, most importantly, infuse order into the chaos of American business. Seven hundred codes, filling eighteen volumes and thirteen thousand pages, were painstakingly drawn up by N.R.A. administrators to govern "minutely, the entire economic life of the nation." The N.R.A. borrowed from the business self-government plans developed in the trade association movements of the 1920's. It added a new dimension, as well, by exempting business from anti-trust action. This legislation characterized the attitude of the early New Deal--the concept of the "broker state" or "government acting for, and mediating among, the major interest groups." 


Richberg brought extensive experience in labor legislation and strong convictions regarding business-government relations to the N.R.A. Re-employing millions of idle workers and reconstructing the industrial system constituted a formidable task. Roosevelt's penchant for assigning overlapping responsibilities to several administrators, however, compounded by Johnson's temperament and Richberg's frequent snipes made cooperation between Johnson and Richberg difficult. By the summer of 1934, General Johnson's excessive drinking and rash public outbursts made him an "unsupportable burden."\(^\text{10}\) Roosevelt deftly began easing him out and by September, 1934 had manipulated Richberg's succession to the directorship of the N.R.A. Understandably, General Johnson suspected Richberg of conspiring against him. In June, 1934 Richberg suggested that the President release him from his post. Since Johnson "quite evidently regards me an engaged in undermining his position," Richberg explained to Roosevelt, the only course to follow would be resignation. "I cannot see that I can be of any future service to anyone if I permit my reputation to be destroyed and myself placed in the false position of being forced

\(^{10}\text{William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York, 1963), p. 68.}\)
out because of an intrigue against my superior."\textsuperscript{11} Although Richberg effusively praised Johnson's performance and informed him that any success the N.R.A. had achieved was "pre-eminently your own," he privately sneered at him. "Insanity in public performance, added to insanity in private relations," he complained to Marvin McIntyre, "is pretty dangerous."\textsuperscript{12}

Richberg's assumption of power in the N.R.A. in September, 1934 alarmed business leaders. What consequences would follow the appointment of the man who had drafted the Railway Labor Act (1926) which guaranteed collective bargaining to the railway unions? Richberg, however, like so many progressives "haunted by the specter of a private power far greater than the public power of the state,"\textsuperscript{13} only desired to effect an equilibrium in the social order. Government's role was to supervise, regulate and harmonize rather than to confer special favors on any single interest group. The federal government would aid business reorganization and stimulate a

\textsuperscript{11} Richberg to Roosevelt, June 26, 1934, Donald Richberg Papers, Library of Congress, Container 2.

\textsuperscript{12} Richberg to Johnson, June 26, 1934, Richberg MSS, Container 2. Richberg to McIntyre, September 15, 1934, Richberg MSS, Container 1.

new era of cooperation. It soon became evident that any fears plaguing industrialists about Richberg's intentions were unfounded.

Edward A. Filene, the distinguished Boston businessman and staunch New Deal advocate, complimented Richberg several months after he assumed the N.R.A. post for persuading conservative business leaders to support the New Deal:

The audience to which you spoke today is probably as conservative or as traditional minded as any audience of business men in the country. Your arguments were logical, non partisan and courageous, but properly diplomatic--so much so that all about me I heard conservative business men 'going' with you as you spoke....

I hope you can make many such speeches all over the country. I know of few things that would be more valuable to the New Deal, especially at this time when the heavy load of business conservatism is ready to move if it can get a little more help in getting properly started.14

Gerard Swope reported, in December 1934, that Richberg was "coming more and more into favor with the business interests."15 A writer for the New Republic lamented that Richberg had "forgotten all his former

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14 Filene to Richberg, November 23, 1934, Richberg MSS, Container 2.

sympathy for labor." Felix Frankfurter, according to Harold Ickes, excoriated Richberg for actually working against the administration's policies. Ickes, also, related that Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette was "heartbroken over Richberg."

What had happened to Donald Richberg is no impenetrable mystery. Before long it became apparent, especially to his former friends, that Richberg desired no governmental action unless business approved. Reflecting a distinct New Nationalist approach, Richberg, in his new administrative position, continually espoused democratizing American industry through enlightened


17 Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. 1, p. 247. Ickes was Richberg's law partner and close friend for many years. Both were appointed to New Deal posts by F.D.R. after their help in the 1932 campaign. Ickes seemed to resent Richberg's intimate association, as an adviser, with Roosevelt. Ickes' attitudes toward Richberg can be found on pp. 87, 94, 221, 375, 378 of Volume I of his Secret Diary. Richberg's comments on these criticisms are contained in his letter of May 10, 1954 to Frances Perkins. Richberg MSS, Container 37.

18 For a full development of this point see Christopher Lasch, "Donald Richberg and the Idea of a National Interest," (unpublished Master's Essay, Columbia University, 1955), pp. 71 ff. This essay is a study of Richberg's ideas on business-government relations.
business-government planning. While he repudiated laissez-faire as bankrupt and submitted that only an imaginative experiment in national planning could revivify the economy, he preferred business to be the prime mover and initiator. A pragmatic relationship between business and government that served to stabilize the social order and minimize conflict was Richberg's ideal. He espoused, as so many "T.R. progressives" did, a conservative trade union movement, "responsible" business behavior and government action to maintain social order. As a labor attorney for railroad workers, he represented a different class of men than the unskilled workers in the mass production industries. His labor philosophy (which would lead him into militant opposition against organized labor during the last twenty-five years of his life) was quite similar to Samuel Gompers' voluntarism. Richberg's preference for a conservative trade union movement, benevolently nurtured and supervised by business was analogous to the welfare-conscious National Civic Federation of Mark Hanna and Samuel Gompers. When unskilled workers in the Congress of Industrial Organization began winning attention from the New Deal, Richberg's dissatisfaction with the New Deal mounted. "Government should be regarded primarily as the instrument for maintaining social order," he wrote in 1943, "and not as an agency for making effective our charitable impulses or even compelling a generous
distribution of the rewards of individual work." Donald Richberg's social thought, then, did not undergo an abrupt reversal. A persistent longing to harmonize the industrial order always remained paramount. Moreover, even before Roosevelt's second term, he had aroused the enmity of former allies.20

On May 25, 1935 the United States Supreme Court, in Schecter v. U.S., unanimously declared the N.R.A. unconstitutional because it had usurped an exclusive congressional function--legislating. The Court held that the N.R.A.'s codes were legislative devices. Richberg argued the case for the government and became acutely sensitive to critics who charged that he presented a weak case to the Court. After the Supreme Court smashed the N.R.A., Roosevelt abandoned industrial self-government plans. Richberg resigned on June 16, 1935 and


spent the following two months preparing a book justifying
the concept of the N.R.A. and his personal performances.

The developing weakness of the N.R.A. lay
in the administrative mixture of democratic and
autocratic processes which developed rapidly the
evils and enmities of both without establishing
the strength of either. As one of those responsi-
ble in part for this maladministration of the
law, this weakness seems to me to have been in-
herent, not in the personnel of administration,
but in the intolerable responsibilities imposed
by the state of the nation.21

Franklin Roosevelt retained Richberg's services
after he resigned from the N.R.A. From 1935 through
1936 he assisted the Attorney General and, also, con-
tributed speeches and advice to the President. Prior
to Roosevelt's campaign for a second term, Richberg pub-
lished a defense of the New Deal. He delineated the
social philosophy animating the President's reform pro-
grams and informed his readers that Franklin Roosevelt
pledged "Guilty" to "undermining the Constitution as
re-written by the American Liberty League and 'Guilty'
of seeking to re-establish and maintain the Constitution
written by the people of the United States."22 Richberg

21Donald Richberg, The Rainbow (New York, 1936),
p. 16.

22Donald Richberg, Guilty: The Confessions of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1936), p. 76. Particu-
larly rewarding on this point are these articles by
Richberg: "Has the New Deal Aided Recovery?" Christian
Science Monitor Magazine, October 21, 1936, pp. 1-2, 14;
Magazine, December 5, 1937, 1-2, 26-27. It is significant
worked extensively on Roosevelt's second inaugural address and attempted to dissuade the President from using the sentence: "I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished." Roosevelt had absolutely no statistical evidence, in Richberg's judgment, to make such an assertion. "I only hope that in after years Roosevelt came to realize that he perpetrated an unworthy slander on the conditions prevalent in the United States."  

Following Roosevelt's massive victory over Governor Alfred Landon, Richberg proposed the original idea to reform the Supreme Court. A younger Court, he told the President in December, 1936, would possess progressive ideas regarding the judiciary's role and exercise a broad interpretation of constitutional limitations. He proposed legislation that "would have retired a Supreme Court Justice automatically at the age of seventy from active service."  

that Richberg, in the election of 1936, refused to join a group of Bull Moose progressives that included, William Allen White, Allen Shaw, James R. Garfield and Chester Rowell in opposing Roosevelt's re-election. Amos Pinchot remarked that "Mr. Roosevelt has followed a course which has made many sincere liberal minded people who voted for him 1932 believe that a radical change has taken place in his thinking." *New York Times*, October 19, 1936, p. 2.  


Richberg remained faithful to Roosevelt during his second term and often advised him. He entered private law practice, in 1936, forming the Washington firm of Davies, Richberg, Tydings, Beebe and Landa. He clung to the philosophy of the N.R.A. and exhorted Roosevelt to spurn the counsels of those who would dismantle large corporations. Public opinion had to be stimulated against those who equated liberty and irresponsible individualism as well as those who judged that size *per se* was dangerous.

The philosophy of the N.R.A. was wholly consistent with the New Deal. The philosophy of the fanatic trust busters, their hostility to all large enterprise, their assumption that cooperation is always a cloak for monopolistic conspiracy—this philosophy is wholly inconsistent with the New Deal.

This school of thought, of which Senator Borah is an outstanding exponent, and which has unfortunately, some support among persons otherwise having liberal, modern views, offers the greatest obstacle to the development of a sound, industrial system.25

Planned competition, not an excessively controlled economy, should be the New Deal's lasting achievement. The American people, he believed, "would certainly welcome a 'harmonized economy'—if such a program meant decentralized democratic planning for the greatest good

25Richberg to Roosevelt, April 23, 1938, Richberg MSS, Container 2; Richberg to Roosevelt, June 26, 1940, Richberg MSS, Container 2.
of the greatest number, and decentralized democratic controls responsive to the needs of the many and not exercised for the benefit of a few."26

Efforts to brand the New Deal as "socialistic" and as having prevented recovery, during the 1938 Congressional elections, elicited Richberg's impassioned support of Roosevelt's program.

The most futile, foolish propaganda of the hour is the effort to convince the American people that the restoration of a sound banking system, the saving of millions of homes, the employment and relief of millions of destitute people, the stabilization of business, the improved organization of agriculture, and the revival of self confidence throughout trade and industry has 'retarded recovery'.27

Despite his defense of the New Deal, certain developments upset him. Many Presidential advisers and associates, he noted, exemplified an elitist planning concept. These "juvenile misfits" who lacked training and practical experience regarded government as "a sort of divinely created autocracy ordained to rule an inferior and subject people."28 Dissatisfaction with this cult of planning led him to protest a third term for the

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26 Copy of a speech delivered on November 16, 1938, Richberg MSS, Container 22.
28 Copy of a speech delivered on May 11, 1939, Richberg MSS, Container 8.
President. A dangerous situation would materialize if the country remained dominated by a single personality. Richberg's role as an adviser and friend to the President made him reluctant to dramatize his opposition to Roosevelt's bid for a third term. "I must state that I made certain money contributions, which I felt I owed to the Democratic campaign," he explained to Wendell Willkie. "I made only one 'political' speech during the campaign, in which I endorsed no one, but criticised vigorously the new-fangled 'gospel' of the left wing New Dealers." Donald Richberg's crusade against governmental social amelioration and aid to the underprivileged commenced before America entered World War II. He announced, as early as 1940, that a perverted form of progressivism was enervating the nation's fibre.

In this almost universal demand for security all classes have a tendency to call upon politicians to do the impossible. They are expected to have a godlike wisdom and capacity for regulating human conduct. Every man wants his individual liberty preserved but wants a lot of other people compelled to render daily services to him. Businessmen, farmers and wage earners clamor for an economic system in which they can be guaranteed an ever rising standard of living

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30 Richberg to Willkie, November 4, 1940, Richberg MSS, Container 2.
and can unload all the risks of bad judgment
or misfortune upon someone else.31

He spent the war years in private law practice. In 1943,
he published an extended analysis of the necessity for
government and business to exist in an efficacious re-
lationship. Federal intervention in economic affairs
had to be rooted in a recognition of business' interests.
Government should not, in Richberg's opinion, foist de-
cisions upon business. He could not imagine any funda-
mental conflict between the goals of business and govern-
ment. Neither did he advocate any harassment of business
nor any reforms that undermined business' control of the
economy. Federal regulation should preserve existing
power and economic relations and not seek to control
business. Government's role was to make the free enter-
prise system technically more efficient. It should not
seek to appease every group that insisted upon legis-
late boons.

I'm afraid of a dangerous intensity of class
that may follow the war. There is a great
deal of resentment of organized groups such
as farm and labor--the so-called pressure
groups--which have rather intensified our
class conflict. Liberalism must show the
way to make private enterprise responsive

31 Copy of a speech delivered on September 27,
1940, Richberg MSS, Container 22. See, also, his
article, "Should the Power of the Federal Government
Be Increased?" Michigan Law Review, XXXIX (April,
1941), 845-855.
to obligations of public service without subjecting it to a domineering control. Government and Business Tomorrow revealed that Richberg, by 1943, had accentuated his hostility to certain New Deal policies. He urged that the Social Security system be rooted in a "healthy, natural economy, and not on any artificial economic order planned and maintained by government and taxation." Especially irritating to him was the increasing leverage that the Congress of Industrial Organizations and other labor groups were exerting upon Franklin Roosevelt. Labor and the federal government seemed to be coexisting in an unholy alliance against business. The criticisms he directed at Roosevelt's policies caused many readers of Government and Business Tomorrow to inquire what had led him to oppose the New Deal. In September of 1943 Richberg explained why he had become disenchanted with Roosevelt's policies:

Even in my most radical moods, I have never believed in state socialism, as will be evident in any careful examination of speeches, books, and articles that I have put forth during the last forty years. ...

So far as the New Deal goes, I was for years classified here as one of the conservative wing and I have been very critical of a great many programs and policies of the Administration. I did not resign public office for that reason and would have continued to assert what influence

32 Copy of a speech delivered on November 8, 1942, Richberg MSS, Container 22.
I could on the conservative side if it had not been for the pressing financial need of taking care of my numerous dependents. However, my well-recognized attitude has caused some of those close to the White House to do all in their power to reduce any influence I might have there as the years have gone by. I have a personal fondness for the President and for a great many of those close to him in the Administration. Though (sic) I think his underlying purposes are generally admirable and his far-sightedness of inestimable value, I have a deep disagreement as to the method or even desirability of moving toward certain goals.33

Franklin Roosevelt's State of the Union Message on January 11, 1944, offers an adequate example of what Richberg judged to be a disastrous form of "progressivism." In that address, Roosevelt declared that every American had:

- The right to a useful and remunerative job....
- The right to earn enough....
- The right of every farmer to...a decent living
- The right of every businessman (to have) freedom from unfair competition....
- The right of every family to a decent home
- The right to adequate medical care....
- The right to adequate protection from...fears of old age, sickness, accident and unemployment.
- The right to a good education.

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33Richberg to George Young, September 20, 1943. His contention that he resigned for financial reasons should not be casually dismissed. He was married three times. He believed that his marital misfortunes ruined his chances for political office. Richberg never berated Franklin Roosevelt after he became alienated from New Deal policies. Like Creel and Moley he always criticised the "visionary" intellectuals that were advising Roosevelt. For an interesting comparison of Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt see Richberg's speech "Working with the Two Roosevelts," Richberg MSS, Container 8.
The President vowed that "after the war is won, we must be prepared to move forward in the implementation of these rights..." Richberg recoiled in horror from this program. It was demagogic to titillate the masses by affirming their "rights" to a panoply of social welfare measures. Men earned such things. Government committed an egregious error when it endeavored to bestow them. "We of 1912 had preached the social responsibility of the government so successfully that the next generation had been converted easily to the idea that the government was responsible for much more than maintaining conditions in which self-reliant men and women could take care of themselves. Now it was being urged that the government must go on to assume a direct responsibility for the care of the people."34

When the presidency devolved on Harry Truman and he proclaimed his desire to secure health insurance, a minimum wage law, public housing reform, increased unemployment compensation, full employment legislation and an enlarged public works program, Richberg concluded that America had become a welfare state. "My desire to carry on a personal crusade for individual liberty against an advancing socialism," he explained in his autobiography, "happily coincided with a strong determination

34Richberg, My Hero, p. 337.
to retire gradually from the active practice of the law, which grew upon me during the year 1947." Richberg and his third wife moved to Charlottesville, Virginia in the summer of 1948, where in the shade of Monticello, he conducted, in much the same manner as George Creel in San Francisco, a bitter-end fight against the "socialistic-paternalistic" theories masquerading as progressivism.

From 1947 to his death on November 27, 1960 Donald Richberg struggled to repel the sinister forces threatening America. Except for the three years he devoted to teaching at the University of Virginia Law School (1947-1950), and successfully arguing four cases before the Supreme Court, his entire attention was riveted upon reversing America's course toward the total socialization a welfare state would create.

True liberalism or progressivism had been subverted, Richberg claimed, when the New Deal began exercising "such far-reaching and detailed controls of all living and working conditions, and even of private morals, that the resemblance of our government to a centralized rule of national socialism became alarming." During the last twenty years of his life, he became a celebrated figure of the American Right. He was depicted as "what

35 Ibid., p. 323.
36 Ibid., p. 320.
a liberal was before the New Deal borrowed the clothes of liberalism" and as "an exponent of traditional liberalism who is uniquely equipped to tell the genuine article from its modern counterfeit presentation." He produced numerous articles and speeches and several books inveighing against the welfare state, the monopolistic powers of American labor unions and the United States' refusal to pursue a militant anti-Communist foreign policy.

"More and more I had become possessed of the idea that my ordained job was to analyze and expose the trend of what was commonly regarded as political progress, but which was actually retrogression to socialism."³⁸

A welfare state was "nothing but Communism watered down for amateur consumption." Richberg denounced "paternalists" for expanding the benefactions and scope of the federal government. By pandering to the insatiable demands of labor and minority groups, the "new liberals" were nullifying individual liberty. President Truman's Fair Deal demonstrated an appalling ignorance of the differences between property rights and human rights. His social welfare schemes would decrease

³⁸ Richberg, My Hero, p. 327.
"individual initiative and self-reliance." They would "take all the romance and adventure out of life" and, also, "take away from mankind the impulse to save." Ultimately, they would cause our demise like the "downfall of Rome." If Richberg did not, during this period, completely assent to Calvin Coolidge's proposition that "four-fifths of all our troubles would disappear, if we would only sit down and do nothing," he did display a remarkable political quietism. The strictures fired at government planning were reminiscent of William Graham Sumner and his modern counterpart, Friedrich von Hayek.

If the politician...plans badly he will lay the blame for his faults on others still demanding confidence and importance on the basis that his objectives are always noble. Furthermore, because of his compulsory powers he may continue to make mistakes and to fail in his objectives for a long, long time, while still compelling support for his program instead of being forced promptly to accept failure and confess bankruptcy.39

This inherent defect in planning was not its only liability. Government planning was, invariably, a means "of satisfying some people at the expense of others."40

Richberg's decision to retire from law practice in 1947 and devote his entire force to opposing the welfare state delighted and reassured the American

39 Ibid., p. 349.
40 Ibid.
right-wing. Richberg's outspoken attacks on modern liberalism, like those of George Creel and Raymond Moley or John Chamberlain, Max Eastman and John Dos Passos convinced the conservative forces that New Deal-Fair Deal liberalism represented a malignant deviation in the American political tradition. We may conveniently mark Richberg's major assault upon the welfare state with the speech he delivered (as the Founder's Day address) at American University on February 24, 1949. This speech, "Liberalism: What and Where Is It?" expresses the basic insight which enlivened his antagonism to the welfare state. New Deal-Fair Deal progressives were socialists. Real liberalism had been left to the conservatives to defend. How could they do it? "As a surviving factotum of the great insurgent campaigns of Theodore Roosevelt and Robert M. LaFollette, as a retired staff officer of the original New Deal,...I venture to assert that a coalition of Democratic and Republican leaders against paternalism and in support of the liberalism of local self government could be achieved and take over the control of congress within a hundred days."41

41Richberg MSS, Container 24. This speech evoked some exceptionally favorable responses from significant political leaders. Senator Fulbright, for example, thanked him for sending to him a copy of the speech and said that "as usual, I find myself in agreement with your thoughts on the subject. I think it is an excellent speech." Fulbright to Richberg, February 26, 1949. See,
Richberg's contention that Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt would not approve of the modern liberal's "spending other people's money" and "giving away other people's rights," fulfilled a great psychological need of right-wing conservatives. If the New Deal could be discredited, if it could be shown how the typical New Dealer was an Alger Hiss, why, a speedy return to constitutionalism would ensue. Donald Richberg, an intimate Theodore Roosevelt adviser and a man who had witnessed Franklin Roosevelt's capture by socialists, spoke with awesome authoritiveness when he indicted the "new liberalism."

Those misnamed 'liberals' who look to the national welfare state to set mankind free from all the worries and hardships of self-support are strangely blind to the universal truth that concentrated power is the perpetual enemy of human society....

It seems to me that it should not be necessary to crack skulls in order to demonstrate that the Communists and Welfarists must ultimately arrive


42Copy of a speech delivered at the grave of Thomas Jefferson in Monticello, April 13, 1949, Richberg MSS, Container 35.
at the same goal—a society in which government insures economic security by controlling all productive work and distributing all the rewards.43

Since government "always demonstrates that for every ounce of security citizens must pay many ounces of liberty,"44 the basic question Americans had to confront was: "Are we paying too much in liberty for the amount of security we are getting from our government?"45 Conservatives, libertarians, individualists, "real progressives," whatever the term, had to fight for the presidential victory of a man who would restore America's venerable ideas on limited government. Initially, Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft appeared "the safest white hope today and we ought to do our bit to help him."46 When Taft faltered, Richberg, unlike Creel, quickly agreed that even Eisenhower would repudiate domestic socialism. The precise relationship between Eisenhower and Richberg is unclear. Eisenhower did indicate, though, when serving as president of Columbia University, that a speech he had received of Richberg's was "packed with a bunch

43Copy of a speech delivered on December 16, 1949, Richberg MSS, Container 7.
44Copy of an undated speech entitled "This Presidential Year" Richberg MSS, Container 8.
45Ibid.
46Richberg to Creel, April 16, 1952, Richberg MSS, Container 3.
of wise observations. Beyond this, I am so respectful of Donald Richberg's voice—he has been very kind to me in the past—that I shall read his talk for personal reasons if for no other.\(^47\) George Creel's insistence that Eisenhower hardly differed from Adlai Stevenson seemed absurd to Richberg. Stevenson had not only prostituted himself by defending Alger Hiss; he was allied with the ruling faction in the Democratic party who "want to socialize, and will continue to socialize and centralize the government.... Eisenhower and the great majority of Republicans and Southern Democrats are fundamentally opposed to the creeping socialism of the so-called 'welfare state'."\(^48\) Richberg worked diligently for Eisenhower in 1952. He attempted to persuade Southern Democrats in Virginia and other states, through many speeches and articles, that only a Republican success would stymie the welfare state's


incursions. Richberg attributed the Republican's massive victory to a burgeoning aversion of the welfare state. It was not a personal triumph for General Eisenhower. It represented "a victory for anti-socialism, a turning of the road...."

The Eisenhower administration, however, soon depressed and embittered him. The welfare state grew stronger; federal spending continued unabated; states rights were ignored; farm price supports persisted; in short, the pernicious counsel emanating from liberal Republicans prevailed over the proper instincts of Congressional leaders like Senators William Knowland and John Bricker. Particularly unnerving was the fact that Senator Joseph McCarthy suffered betrayal, at the hands of his own party, while valiantly pursuing traitors.

The prospect of another Stevenson-Eisenhower contest disheartened Richberg. With their candidacies

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His pro-McCarthy sentiments can be found in "McCarthy and His Critics," an article he prepared for the Richmond Times-Dispatch in September, 1951. Richberg MSS, Container 7. See, also, his letter to Senator Thomas H. Kuchel recommending that Owen Lattimore's books and "other pro Soviet and Communist books and periodicals" be removed from the United States' overseas libraries. Richberg to Kuchel, August 9, 1953, Richberg MSS, Container 37.
and "the absence of any vivid issue out of which a third party might be born," how could any "effective fight be waged in 1956 against a further advance of centralized government and welfarism?" Eisenhower's victory stemmed from his stance "as the champion of individual liberty and local self government. In view of the contradictory record of his administration--in such cases as social security and segregation, how can that vote be rallied again behind his leadership?" 51

Richberg's bête noire was the excessive power wielded by American labor unions. Welfare state policies, he argued, had permitted this new leviathan to expand until it threatened each American's personal liberty. Unions had replaced the corporations as forces destructive of liberty. Labor organizations bulged with "all kinds of vicious characters" who used the unions as "the cover for a criminal racket, an illegal monopoly, a political graft or a treasonable conspiracy...." 52 Compulsory unionism was a form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Why did labor oppose a "right-to-

51 Copy of an undated letter to the editor of the Richmond News Leader, Richberg MSS, Container 7.

work" law? Their insatiable desire for power constituted the "new slavery"—preventing a man from working without a union license. Unions, in his judgment, had exceeded their legitimate goals. They utilized intimidation and violence to prevent workers not opposed to a strike from crossing a picket line to work. They opposed payment on the basis of output and efficiency demanding exorbitant wages and other benefits without regard for the common welfare. Their "slowdown" and "featherbedding" tactics and their Luddite hostility to machinery marked them as subversive. Labor leaders had the arrogance to maintain that the supreme law is "the law which is not the law of God...but the law of the labor union..." He displayed, once again, the pre World War I progressive penchant for firm opposition to any group who menaced the social equilibrium when he explained his battle against the unions:

...I still have a profound interest in the welfare of those who do what I call "the hard work of the world." But...in both economic and political circles, far too many labor leaders of recent years have been so concerned with maintaining and increasing their own power and the coercive powers of their unions, without regard for the public welfare

53 Richberg, Labor Union Monopoly, p. 155. Richberg's papers contain considerable correspondence with Cecil B. DeMille concerning the drafting of a model "right-to-work" bill.

54 Copy of an undated speech entitled "The High Cost of Low Thinking," Richberg MSS, Container 8.
or even the welfare of the individual workers, that I have felt compelled to oppose in public forums and legislative halls their abuses of power to the full extent of my ability.\(^5\)

Quite understandably, on February 22, 1954 Donald Richberg received the George Washington Honor Medal from the Freedom Foundation at Valley Forge for exposing labor's unconscionable demands.

Perhaps equally imperilling to the nation, Richberg believed, was the "coercive" judgment rendered by Chief Justice Earl Warren's Supreme Court in 1954. Richberg had warned, as early as 1951, that efforts to eradicate discrimination and segregation would be nugatory. Men were equal only "in the sight of God." Stark differences distinguished the races.

By aeons of achievement Caucasoids, and Mongo-
loids have proved themselves superior to Negroids in all parts of the world. To maintain a superior culture a people must take pride in it and protect it from deterioration. It is a scientific fact that the breeding of a superior and an inferior degenerates the superior. Scientifically sound laws against miscegenation (as in Virginia)

\(^5\)Richberg, My Hero, p. 276. George Romney, for example, praised Richberg for his thoughts on labor unions. "My viewpoints have been greatly influenced and shaped by your viewpoints and I believe we really see things eye to eye as far as fundamentals are concerned." Romney to Richberg, February 7, 1958, Richberg MSS, Container 4. See, also, George Smathers to Richberg, January 27, 1953, Richberg MSS, Container 37; Roscoe Pound to Richberg, May 7, 1955, Richberg MSS, Container 4 and Eleanor Roosevelt to Richberg, August 11, 1958, Richberg MSS, Container 4. Mrs. Roosevelt told him that his views on "right-to-work" laws were "foolish."
demonstrate one reason for requiring certain racial segregations, particularly segregation in schools for impressionable children.\textsuperscript{56}

The court's decision in \textit{Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas} (1954) would compel "an undesired association" upon whites with Negroes.

These problems of labor union monopoly, enforced integration and other concomitants of the welfare state were practically impossible to overcome because public opinion had been corrupted by influential liberal propaganda. Richberg espied, as the Populists once did, a subtle network of ideological indoctrinators beguiling Americans. Former Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy, a close friend, articulated his own sentiments when he complained to him that "...when I look at most of the newspapers in this country and listen to the radio commentators, it is no wonder that the people haven't any real idea of what is going on."\textsuperscript{57} Richberg contended that ever since the end of World War II "socialist planners" had been "hogging the headlines" and dominating public opinion.

\textsuperscript{56}Richberg to "Letter to the Editor," September 7, 1951, Richberg MSS, Container 3.

\textsuperscript{57}Kennedy to Richberg, January 2, 1951, Richberg MSS, Container 3.
to pro-socialist writers, but one can hardly question the serious effect upon public opinion of the attitudes taken by labor, religious and educational organizations in favor of socializing programs, and discrediting the motives and purposes of all those seeking to maintain the integrity of our free institutions. I still believe that the vast majority of people are essentially individualists and that it is only a socializing minority which believes in socialist principles, but I do feel that a public opinion has been created and is still dominated by those who argue that both morality and self-service should induce men to work not for "selfish" advancement but for what is called the common good, and that the way to do this is through ever-expanding the powers of government to direct and regulate our lives.58

A specific example of Richberg's conspiracy theory came in 1954 when his autobiography, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Unheroic Life was published. He complained that the major newspapers and magazines deliberately chose left wingers to assail his book. The New York Times "ran true to form in selecting one of the most antagonistic reviewers they could possibly have chosen."59 He registered a protest directly with the New York Times managing editor, Turner Catledge:

why was it that "socialist minded lawyers get enthusiastic attention and a libertarian can only expect at best to be damned with faint praise. I was happy,

58Richberg to Virginius Dabney, December 9, 1952, Richberg MSS, Container 36.

however, to see that even Professor A. (D.A.) Schlesinger felt impelled to say a few good things about this backsliding New Dealer.\(^6^0\)

Richberg's autobiography, while not as contradictory as Creel's Rebel at Large, does amplify precisely how far Richberg had come from his progressive days. The Progressive party of 1924 had it attained victory would not have ushered in a reign of socialism.\(^6^1\) Herbert Hoover, whose "undue conservatism" made Richberg support Al Smith in 1928 had now become "an example of the fact that pure intelligence and a high idealism of public service are not the primary qualities for Presidency. The basic requirement is the ability to sell one's self to the public and to gain the confidence of the masses..." Frances Perkins, a close associate during the New Days, was "never fearful of the dangers of increasing federal control and socialization of industry..." Harold Ickes' ambition "blinded him" to the evils of a centralized

\(^6^0\) Richberg to Cattle, November 4, 1954, Richberg MSS, Container 15.

government. Perkins and Ickes like Henry A. Wallace, Harry Hopkins and other New Dealers refused to recognize that "compulsory collective action to improve society will never elevate but always degrade the individual." He concluded his comparison of traditional progressives and modern "paternalists" by noting, exactly as George Creel had, that "looking backward, I can see that one thing which influenced me, and which I think was a good influence, was that the progressives of 1912 did not question the fundamentals of the existing order...." The concept of social justice enlivening Theodore Roosevelt, William Jennings Bryan, Robert M. LaFollette and Woodrow Wilson "was not to establish a democratically controlled socialism."63

When Gerard Swope lamented that he was "losing some of your youth and vigor and your radical ideas--which I am still trying to hold on to," Richberg retorted that a fundamental consistency informed his entire career.64 His "religion" had always been to maximize individual freedom. He had not repudiated his former ideals. Defiance to all tyranny constituted authentic liberalism.

62 Richberg, My Hero, pp. 139, 151, 238, 245.
63 Ibid., pp. 46, 357.
64 Swope to Richberg, March 1, 1949, Richberg MSS, Container 2, Richberg to Swope, March 14, 1949, Richberg MSS, Container 2.
He was secure in the knowledge that other progressives, such as George Creel and Raymond Moley, had formed similar judgments. Moley in 1950, complimented Richberg for "making the best speeches of all in opposition to the show that is now ruling our destinies. Although Taft has all the facts and a lot of brains, I wish he had half your capacity to express the opposition." Others assured him that if he had done "any disservice to the American people when you were associated with the New Deal, you have more than made up for it by your efforts since." Conservatives could only echo Edward F. Hutton's cry: "God bless you for your return to Americanism."" Donald Richberg spent the last twenty years of his life repenting "the outcome of the movement he helped set in motion." Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman's creation of a welfare state and Dwight Eisenhower's reluctance to dismantle it confounded him. Americans would

65 Moley to Richberg, May 19, 1950, Richberg MSS, Container 35.
67 Hutton to Richberg, September 8, 1952, Richberg MSS, Container 36.
resist the allurements of the welfare state only when they came to realize that liberty rather than security is the paramount social necessity. Was it not evident that any concentration of power reduced freedom? Yet, he would not berate his countrymen for their inability to perceive this truth. "If I had seen this great issue and sacrificed my life for it, I might now be a hero to myself, if to no one else! But it took me a lifetime to see the issue clearly."69 Donald Richberg died on November 27, 1960 in Charlottesville, Virginia only several weeks after witnessing John F. Kennedy's victory and the inevitable expansion of the federal government's role. The welfare state seemed an immovable reality. Several months before his death, a correspondent announced that a potential savior had appeared.70 Richberg never commented, though, on whether he had read Senator Barry M. Goldwater's The Conscience of a Conservative.

Donald Richberg's hostility to the New Deal after 1938-1939 and his crusade for a politics of retrenchment during the last twenty-five years of his life is yet another indication of a prominent pre-World War I progressive's alienation from New Deal-Fair Deal reforms. Ideology alone cannot explain why a person chooses to reorient his political and social thought. Personality,

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69 Richberg, My Hero, p. 356.
temperament, economic interest, occupational influences and the impact of historical events all affect an individual's appraisal of his society. Richberg, like Moley and Creel, understandably maintained that a fundamental consistency animated his entire career. He repudiated the idea that he underwent a conversion from radical or progressive to conservative. And, in a very real sense, this is partially true. Richberg, along with many progressives, glorified class unity, social harmony and the free enterprise system. American progressives, whether they supported Woodrow Wilson or Theodore Roosevelt, had a distrust of governmental power that many New Dealers did not share. Richberg was preoccupied with the question of power. A perfectly synchronized social order with all the elements--business, labor and government--existing in balance was his goal. Consequently, he could assert, with some validity, that he had opposed business' preponderance of power during the first three decades of the twentieth century and had then begun protesting the increasing power of the federal government and organized labor.

Yet, there is something in Donald Richberg's reaction to the course of American liberalism that vitiates its validity. George Mowry, reviewing Richberg's autobiography, contended that he had simply "lost faith in the perfectibility of man and the concept of progress" and refused to admit "he has become a
conservative.⁷¹ While Richberg may have replaced his former optimism with despair, this does completely account for his antagonism to welfare state policies. Certainly most American progressives were conservative in that they accepted the existing social order and only advocated changes to perfect its operation. What may explain their, and Richberg's, resentment is a lack of empathy for those minorities that the New Deal cultivated. Richberg always affirmed that business values and the national interest were one. Business, in his estimation, ought to define the limits of political intervention. Government should, in effect, act as an agent for business in stabilizing the social order. His labor philosophy, as noted earlier, embraced a conservative trade union movement benevolently nurtured and supervised by business. When government began exercising more control over business than he deemed it necessary and when the unskilled workers in mass production industries forged an independent and powerful labor movement, he recoiled in horror. Moreover, his racism made him insensitive to the Negroes' desire for complete social equality. There is something especially poignant about those progressives who desired to freeze history and who lamented the manner in which new reformers attempted to meet the changing needs of an evolving nation.

⁷¹George E. Mowry, review of My Hero in Saturday Review of Literature, XXXVII (November 6, 1954), 21, 43.
CHAPTER 4

RAYMOND MOLEY: THE PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
OF THE NEW DEAL AND THE WELFARE STATE

Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal owed much to such institutions as the National Conference of Social Work, the Regional Planning Association, the War Industries Board and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. It is, also, important to note the creative functions performed by those individuals who counseled Roosevelt during the frenetic and ominous days of the early New Deal. Raymond Moley's role as the head of Roosevelt's "Brains Trust" and his contributions to New Deal reform policies represent an interesting aspect of the New Deal. His subsequent disillusionment with the New Deal and his repudiation of Roosevelt reveal an insight into the differences between pre-World War I progressivism and the New Deal. Moreover, Raymond Moley has become, since his disavowal of the New Deal, a leading conservative journalist-scholar and the most prolific antagonist of the welfare state. Over the last three decades he has produced more than sixteen hundred articles and several books decrying Franklin Roosevelt's "perversion of progressivism"--the establishment of a welfare state in America.

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Raymond Moley was born in 1886 in Berea, Ohio and grew up in the small neighboring village of Olmstead Falls. His father, a Dublin-born Irish Catholic, operated a men's clothing store, without much success, in Olmstead Falls.\(^1\) Roman Catholicism and the Democratic party were his father's prepossessions. Moley's mother, a convert to Catholicism, also had an intense interest in politics and faithfully supported the Prohibitionist party. Moley quickly imbibed his father's Democratic beliefs and in the 1896 campaign, at age ten, sold Bryan-Sewall buttons. Bryan's defeat so dejected him that he abstained from school for four days to avoid the taunts of his Republican classmates.

In 1906 Moley received a Ph.B. degree from Baldwin University (now Baldwin-Wallace College) in Berea. His collegiate days were spent reading Shakespeare, studying languages and repelling Protestant incursions on his Catholicism. After graduating from college, Moley attempted to secure a newspaper job in Cleveland. When all

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\(^1\)The biographical information is based on Moley's reminiscences during interviews on May 30 and June 1, 1968. Frank Freidel has a useful biographical portrait in his foreword to Moley's The First New Deal (New York, 1966), pp. vii-xiv. Moley has his own account on pp. 11-18. During the interviews Moley mentioned certain things that are not included in either of these accounts. Moley's papers are still in his possession. They will be placed during the next several years in the Hoover Library at Stanford University. At the present time, there are no interpretive articles on Moley's career and no biography of him.
his efforts proved futile, he resigned himself to a teaching position in Olmstead Falls. In 1907 Moley became the "superintendent" of the four teachers in the school system and, also, challenged and defeated the president of the school board in the election for village clerk. His consuming interest in politics animated him to attend law classes for a summer at the University of Michigan and evenings at Western Reserve. He won re-election in 1909 and was preparing to enroll in the Ohio State Law School in the fall of 1909 when he contracted tuberculosis. From 1909 to 1911 he resided in New Mexico and Denver, recuperating from tuberculosis. The reading and reflection he did during this period completely altered his life. Although his desire to pursue a career in law led him to defy his doctor's advise and take several courses at the University of Colorado, he eventually decided to embark upon formal study of politics and prepare for college teaching. His bout with tuberculosis, also, gave him a "radical" outlook on life. "People with no vested interests," he believed, "were eager for change." Moreover, his confinement in a Denver sanitarium provided him with an opportunity to follow the reform efforts of George

\footnote{Interview with Moley, June 1, 1968.}
Creel and Judge Ben B. Lindsey in Colorado politics. Moley recalls being enthused by Creel's reform articles in the Denver Post and pledging to commit himself to political reform in Cleveland.

Raymond Moley was, as Frank Freidel has written, "nurtured in the great Ohio school of reform that flourished in the early twentieth century." If George Creel stimulated Moley, Tom Johnson and Newton D. Baker of Cleveland and Brand Whitlock of Toledo had an even more profound impact. Upon his return from the west in 1911, he became mayor of Olmstead Falls. Moley then began graduate study in political science at Oberlin and received an A.M. degree in 1916. After directing "Americanization" activities in Ohio during World War I for Governor James Cox, he began graduate study at Columbia University. There Moley fell under the influence of Charles A. Beard and other professors espousing fundamental changes in American life. Beard directed his doctoral study and aroused his interest in political administration. He received his doctorate in 1918 and spent the next five years in Cleveland as a high school teacher and as a political science instructor at Western Reserve (where he upset people by assigning the New

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3 Freidel, Foreword to The First New Deal, p. ix.
Republic to students) and finally as the research director of the Cleveland Foundation. The Cleveland Crime Survey, a project of the foundation, was headed by Moley. He invited Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter to participate in this investigation of the administration of Cleveland's criminal procedures. Moley's study elicited such praise that he was asked to serve as a consultant in similar surveys in Missouri, Illinois, Virginia, Connecticut, Indiana, Pennsylvania and California.

In 1923 Moley became an Associate Professor of Government at Columbia and, also, was entrusted with recruiting a political science faculty for Barnard College. In 1928 Moley became a Professor of Public Law at Columbia. While at Columbia he served as a member of three faculties—the graduate school, the law school and Barnard College. In 1926 Governor Alfred E. Smith appointed him research director of the New York State Crime Commission. Moley's reputation as a promising young scholar grew with the publication, in 1928 and 1930, of two books that summarized his criminal research, Politics and Criminal Prosecution and Our Criminal Courts. In 1930 Judge Samuel Seabury requested Moley to serve on his staff committee investigating corruption in New York City magistrates' courts and the New York County district attorney's office. Louis Howe, Secretary of the National Crime Commission,
became acquainted with Moley and introduced him to Governor Franklin Roosevelt in October, 1928. The Governor asked Moley to prepare a speech on the administration of justice in New York state. Roosevelt soon began calling upon Moley with regular frequency and in 1931 appointed him research director of his Committee on the Administration of Justice. As late as the end of 1931, however, Moley was still a minor figure among the coterie of Franklin Roosevelt's advisers. Ernest K. Lindley, for example, wrote a biography of Roosevelt in 1931 and never referred to him.

Why was Raymond Moley, a specialist in penal administration, chosen to select policy advisers and speech writers (which came to be known as the Brains Trust) for Roosevelt's presidential candidacy in 1932? Although there is some controversy on this question, it is clear that the decisive reason for Roosevelt's selection of Moley is that he liked him and was quite pleased with the speeches he had prepared for him, at first in the field of judicial reform, and then more generally.

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4Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 2; See, also, Alfred B. Rollins, Jr., Roosevelt and Howe (New York, 1962), pp. 202-203.


6Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Crisis of the Old Order, p. 399.
Another important factor is that Moley had excellent relationships with Louis Howe and Samuel Rosenman. His ability to work with both these men, who were intensely suspicious of each other and constantly strove to be first in Roosevelt's esteem, was of crucial significance. After Roosevelt declared his presidential candidacy on January 22, 1932, he discussed with his counsel, Samuel Rosenman, the formation of an advisory committee to prepare policy papers for the campaign. Rosenman immediately suggested Moley as the ideal person to direct this operation. "He believes in your social philosophy and objectives," Rosenman told Roosevelt, "and he has a clear forceful style of writing. Being a university professor himself, he can suggest different university people in different fields." By March Moley had recruited a nucleus of advisors.

His selections were based upon what an individual could contribute to Roosevelt rather than on the basis of

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agreement with Moley's own ideas. He chose Rexford Tugwell, a professor of economics at Columbia, because agriculture appeared to be an important issue for the 1932 campaign. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. a young lawyer and economist was, like Tugwell, a resourceful and imaginative thinker. Prior to Roosevelt's nomination at Chicago, Moley, Tugwell and Berle prepared the bulk of the speeches. After the nomination Moley deliberately sought to balance the group's political thought by adding a more orthodox figure. He enlisted Hugh Johnson, Bernard Baruch's War Industries Board lieutenant, to counteract Tugwell and Berle's radicalism. "I greatly needed at that moment (after Roosevelt had been nominated) to dilute the leftist tendencies of my earlier associates with some doctrinal base of a more conservative nature. And I assumed that no radical would be advising Baruch." Subsequently, he added Senators James F. Byrnes of South Carolina and Key Pittman of Nevada to work with Democrats in Congress. While many others, especially Basil O'Connor, Roosevelt's law partner, and Samuel Rosenman, frequently contributed ideas, these six men "were the real Brains Trust."  

9 Moley, After Seven Years, p. 167. Freidel states that certain passages in the Commonwealth Club address, largely written by Tugwell and Berle, had upset Moley. Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph (Boston, 1956), p. 353.  

10 Moley, The First New Deal, p. 16.
Writing on August 30, 1932 to Newton D. Baker

Roosevelt defined Moley's role:

Professor Raymond Moley, of Columbia University, an old friend who has been assisting me in many ways, is acting as a sort of clearing house for me. This part of my task has nothing to do with those who are engaged in the strictly political management of the campaign, but has in a sense a more personal relationship. It would help me in a very practical sense if you would give me your thought on matters from time to time, and if Professor Moley calls you up or writes to you on any specific point, I hope you will feel that it comes from me and that you will confer with him.11

Moley was, in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s phrase, "ring-master of the experts."12 It was his responsibility as Roosevelt's key advisor to coordinate the activities and proposals submitted by Roosevelt's associates.

My job from the beginning--and this continued for four years--was to sift proposals for him, discuss facts and ideas with him, and help him crystallize his own policy. At the end of this process we were generally in agreement. But when we were not, and after I had stated my case as well as I could, it was my business to see that his ideas were presented as attractively as possible.13

Perhaps the most outstanding contribution Moley made to Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 was a brief ten-minute radio

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11 Moley, After Seven Years, p. 45; See, also, Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Preparation of a President," Western Political Quarterly, I (March, 1948), 22.

12 Schlesinger, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 399-400.

13 Moley, After Seven Years, p. 55.
speech that he wrote which Roosevelt delivered on April 8. This speech adumbrated the Agricultural Act reform, the Home Loan Corporation, banking reform and the reduction of tariffs that the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act established. It was in this speech that Moley had Roosevelt assert that government must remember "the forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid." "With the possible exception of 'the new deal'," wrote Ernest K. Lindley, "it became the most telling catchphrase of the presidential campaign." 14

Before describing Moley's relationship with Roosevelt after the 1932 election, it may be useful to consider the political and economic views that he possessed during his leadership of the Brains Trust. Moley was a Democrat by heritage. The political reform movements in Ohio that flourished in his youth captivated his imagination. William Jennings Bryan and Woodrow Wilson, but not Theodore Roosevelt, convinced him that America needed national reform. Moley disliked Theodore Roosevelt because he "doubted his sincerity and was repelled by his ham acting. I preferred Wilson's more intelligent approach to reform." Wilson became his inspiration. "All in all, it was Wilson who determined my occupation, and the

Progressive movement my political faith. Maturity came with the years after that, but these early influences were still alive when the exciting events of 1932 began.  

As a young school teacher and politician, Moley began studying politics seriously. The "greatest influence" upon his thinking was Charles Van Hise's Concentration and Control (1912). Van Hise, then president of the University of Wisconsin, argued that large corporations necessitated control. He espoused business regulation rather than indiscriminate trust-bustings. Moley completely accepted Van Hise's suggestions for economic readjustment and always persisted in the belief that government and business ought to exist in a "benevolent partnership." Government should coordinate, regulate, but not excessively supervise, business activity.

My philosophy conceived the function of government to be limited to making sure that there was fair competition and protection for the consumer. Government should not tell industry what to do. It should limit itself to decreeing what should not be done.  

16 Interview with Moley, June 1, 1963; See, also, Moley, The First New Deal, p. 225.
Max Lerner's observation that Roosevelt'sBrains Trust represented at least nine different schools of economic thought raises an important point.\(^\text{19}\) There was little similarity between Tugwell and Berle's ideas when compared with Moley's. Tugwell advocated a collectivistic approach to economic problems. Berle, too, favored a significant measure of economic planning. Tugwell states that he and Berle were more "insistent reformers." Moley "was much more devoted to means and much less interested in ends than either Adolph or myself." Moreover, Moley was, even in 1932, "constantly worried about Roosevelt's insouciance, and irritated by loose ends and half-materialized ideas."\(^\text{20}\) Reform through the regeneration of businessmen was Moley's approach. Despite his enthusiasm for Henry George and his study under Charles Beard, Moley espoused no unorthodox proposals. A clue to the nature of Moley's thinking may, also, be found in his attitude toward the Sacco-Vanzetti case in the 1920's. He was the only member of the Columbia faculty who refused


\(^{20}\)Tugwell, *The Brains Trust*, p. 154. Donald Richberg's opinion of the Brains Trust is interesting in this connection. He regarded Tugwell the "least practical minded, Berle the most imaginative, and Moley the most practical and sensible." Richberg to Franklyn Hoyt, April 20, 1953, Richberg MSS, Container 37.
to sign a petition protesting Sacco and Vanzetti's conviction.\(^{21}\) When Moley began advising Roosevelt in 1928, therefore, he was a practical, fundamentally conservative individual. In early 1933 he was quoted in *Time* magazine as saying: "I feel no call to remedy evils. I have not the slightest urge to be a reformer. Social workers make me very weary. They have no sense of humor. I am essentially a conservative fellow. I tilt at no windmills."\(^{22}\) John Franklin Carter and Ernest K. Lindley, two leading Washington journalists, also, detected a strong strain of conservatism in Moley. Writing in the early 1930's, Carter described Moley as "practical" rather than doctrinaire\(^{23}\) and Lindley reported that Moley had "an ingenious mind, but he probably never will create a doctrine, for he is as hardhearted a realist as Mr. Roosevelt himself."\(^{24}\) While Frank Freidel is correct in describing Moley as a "middle-of-the-roader,"\(^{25}\) it is, also, relevant to indicate that he was, even in 1932, a right-wing member of the Brains Trust. This relates an interesting aspect of the New Deal.

\(^{21}\) Interview with Moley, June 1, 1968.

\(^{22}\) *Time*, XXI (May 8, 1933), 10.


\(^{24}\) Lindley, *Roosevelt Revolution*, p. 278.

No unanimity among Roosevelt's advisors existed regarding what policies should be implemented. Such men as Lewis Douglas, Bernard Baruch and Jesse Jones recommended traditional solutions to stymie the depression. Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter hoped that trust-busting would flourish. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Rexford G. Tugwell wanted government economic planning. These diverse opinions confirm what Dixon Wecter contended in 1948. The New Deal was not "an explicit program drafted under Roosevelt's direction in 1932, but a general attitude toward government for the people...shaped by the urgency of circumstance."26 If the crisis situation that existed when Franklin Roosevelt assumed the presidency on March 4, 1933 enabled men from Tugwell on the left to Moley on the right to accomplish much during the next "hundred days," the following months and years would bring serious divisions and clashes among Roosevelt's advisers.

After the 1932 presidential campaign the Brains Trust disbanded. Precisely when the Brains Trust was evoking enormous publicity, it had been discontinued. Many individuals, especially Samuel Rosenman, pleaded

with Roosevelt to sustain the organization. Moley's reasoning, however, prevailed. He argued (and this, also, illuminates his conservatism) that there was "no place in a free government for an integrated group of men who had power without responsibility." Although the Brains Trust never again met as a group, Moley remained as Roosevelt's "alter ego--a whole cabinet rolled into one, trying to ride herd on all major issues of both domestic and foreign policy." He had little to do with selecting Roosevelt's Cabinet, but did accompany the new president, during the interregnum between the election and the inauguration, to two meetings with Herbert Hoover. Roosevelt's inaugural address was Moley's other responsibility. In a short time columnists began alluding to Moley as "the second strongest man in Washington" and "the power behind the throne." It was Louis Howe's jealousy of Moley (whom he regarded as his protege) that prevented Moley from being named as an

27Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 88.
28Moley, After Seven Years, p. 83.
administrative assistant to President Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{31} To mollify Howe and yet retain Moley's services, Roosevelt asked Moley to become Assistant Secretary of State. This is the only office, Roosevelt informed him, "that seems completely free of statutory duties. If you took that title--and you'll have to have some sort of official status--you could go on just as you have been. You could work in your own way, giving me confidential assistance. Your responsibility would be directly to me. There'd be no entanglements either with my secretariat or with any of the cabinet."\textsuperscript{32} Moley considers his acceptance of Roosevelt's offer the worst mistake of his life.\textsuperscript{33}

When the Roosevelt administration assumed control of the government in March, 1933, Moley was in the State Department "in quarters conveniently near the White House executive office."\textsuperscript{34} Literally every aspect of the administration's affairs received some of his attention. There was agreement, from all quarters, that he handled his

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31}Rollins, \textit{Roosevelt and Howe}, p. 453; Moley, \textit{After Seven Years}, p. 80; Charles Michelson, \textit{The Ghost Talks} (New York, 1944), pp. 52-53; Carter, \textit{The New Dealers}, p. 328.
\item \textsuperscript{32}Moley, \textit{After Seven Years}, p. 81.
\item \textsuperscript{33}Interview with Moley, June 1, 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{34}Lindley, \textit{Roosevelt Revolution}, pp. 300-301.
\end{itemize}
responsibilities adeptly. James Farley described him as "one of the ablest men around Roosevelt in the early days. He had a brilliant, analytical mind and a gift for marshalling ideas on paper."35 Charles Michelson, one of Roosevelt's speechwriters who specialized in Congressional affairs and who disliked Moley, found him to be "the most effective" Roosevelt adviser.36 Yet, within one year of his appointment, Moley resigned as Assistant Secretary of State. The reasons for this action stemmed from difficulties with Secretary of State Cordell Hull who felt uneasy having a prestigious Roosevelt adviser in his department. Moreover, Moley desired to raise tariff rates to repel foreign interference in America's domestic recovery. Hull, an influential Southern Senator quite


36 Charles Michelson, The Ghost Talks, (New York, 1944), p. 52. Norman Thomas has an interesting observation on this point: "I ran into R. Moley during the period of the election of 1932. Moley didn't play his cards very well. He never learned the first necessity for an adviser of the great, which is to efface yourself. He did too much talking about 'me and Roosevelt.' He did it even in his college classes. I had a daughter at that time who went to Barnard College of Columbia University where Moley was teaching government. She used to tell me rather amusing stories of the campaign of 1932. She wasn't in his classes, but other girls would tell her. Later, he did that sort of thing excessively. I never thought that he was a very great addition to the Brain-Trusters." Norman Thomas, "The Reminiscences of Norman Thomas," Columbia University Oral History Project, Vol. 1, p. 69.
naturally supported free trade and proposed that Roosevelt announce a ten per cent reduction of all tariffs. The inevitable clash between the two men came in July, 1933 at the London Economic Conference. Frank Freidel has succinctly related what occurred:

Moley, hurrying to the Conference on Roosevelt's orders, for several days was the center of world attention. He acted cautiously within the letter and spirit of Roosevelt's instructions to expedite a limited monetary stabilization arrangement. Then Roosevelt suddenly changed his mind, torpedoing the arrangement and thus the conference, Hull could not attack Roosevelt without relinquishing his prestigious position as Secretary of State; he vented his wrath on the only vulnerable target, Moley.37

Even though Moley resigned his position in the administration he continued assisting Roosevelt prepare speeches and formulate ideas. Moley has emphatically repudiated the theory that Roosevelt sacrificed him to appease Hull. He insists that well before the London Economic Conference he had made a commitment to collaborate with some friends on establishing a new magazine. His intentions were to resign from the State Department post to become editor of a new journal, Today, which evolved, in 1937, into the present Newsweek.38

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37 Freidel, Foreword to Moley's The First New Deal, p. xiii.

38 Moley, The First New Deal, pp. 508-514.
important about Moley's resignation is that it did not result in an estrangement from Roosevelt. In 1934 a journalist reported:

Moley is still a big force in the New Deal and is growing stronger. His magazine is read in Washington by the New Dealers and he has scores of friends among the younger members of the administration who keep in touch with him. He is welcome at the White House, though he never presumes to go there without specific invitation. His skilled services as a literary obstetrician are still in demand.39

But, Moley was no longer assisting in the formulation of detailed programs. He worked only "as a technician at speech construction" as if he were "a plumber and a pipe needed fixing."40 Until the summer of 1936 he was still assisting Roosevelt. The events from 1933 through 1936, however, gradually eroded the relationship. The climax occurred several months before Roosevelt's re-election in 1936.

Raymond Moley's apprehension over the course of the New Deal actually started at midpoint in Roosevelt's first administration. Although the weekly editorials he wrote in Today, from his resignation in 1933 through 1935, did generally support Roosevelt's policies, it was evident


40Moley, After Seven Years, p. 284.
that Moley did not envisage a New Deal program that would systematically reform almost every aspect of American life. Indeed, by the spring of 1934 he was maintaining that the New Deal's innovations were over.

With the passage of the Stock Exchange bill, the New Deal is practically complete. There is nothing that the President or any responsible member of the Administration has said to indicate that any important further development of governmental authority is contemplated. This will be reassuring not only to business, but to the vast masses of people who do not want democracy to undertake too much. The problem is now one of administration.41

Few individuals in the Roosevelt administration concurred with this appraisal. Most agreed with Rexford Tugwell that the "battle for a New Deal is not yet over, indeed, I suspect it has just begun."42 The only reason Moley's opposition to the New Deal did not begin before 1935-36 is that "at no time during these two years (1933-1935) did Roosevelt arrive at the point old Bob La Follette had reached in 1924."43 Moley believed that Roosevelt


42 Quoted in Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, p. 212. This quote comes from Tugwell's diary. It was written on February 24, 1935--two months before Moley's statement.

would simply extend the 1912 Progressive party platform. He regarded the 1932 victory as a return to "the trial abandoned two decades before."\(^44\) When the administration began in 1935 to move in new directions, Moley started his protest.

There was an unmistakable shift in the New Deal after "Black Monday," May 27, 1935. On this day the Supreme Court gave the deathblow to the N.R.A. In the next few months Franklin Roosevelt unleashed a flurry of legislative proposals upon Congress that marked the beginnings of the welfare state. Actually, there was no direct causal connection between the Supreme Court's ruling in May, 1935 and Roosevelt's new reforms. The President had adumbrated "the second New Deal" in his State of the Union Message of January 4, 1935:

> We find our population suffering from old inequalities, little changed by past sporadic remedies. In spite of our efforts and in spite of our talk, we have not weeded out the overprivileged and we have not effectively lifted up the underprivileged.

By the end of August, 1935 Congress had passed all of the President's proposals. The spate of legislation characterizing this "second New Deal" included the Social Security, National Labor Relations (Wagner-Connery)

\(^{44}\text{Moley, How to Keep Our Liberty (New York, 1952), p. 80; See, also, Moley's introduction to Jules Abels, The Welfare State (New York, 1951).}\)
and Public Utility Holding Company Acts. The Works Progress Administration was created with three new agencies -- Agricultural Resettlement, Rural Electrification and the Federal Theatre Project. In the Motor Carrier and Air Mail Acts, the Interstate Commerce Commission was empowered to regulate transportation rates and finances. The Wealth Tax Act of 1935 increased estate, gift and capital sales taxes, imposed an excess profits tax and raised the surtax to new heights. This act "created deeper business resentment than any other New Deal measure."

Roosevelt's Banking Act expanded the federal government's control of the banking system. Another concession to the underprivileged that the President had alluded to came in the Guffey-Snyder Act of 1935 that made coal a public utility, granted the miners collective bargaining and specified a standard scale for wages and hours. These reforms demonstrated, according to William Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt's "assumption that a just society could be secured by imposing a welfare state on a capitalist foundation." For many progressives, including Raymond Moley, they symbolized the "perversion of progressivism."

46Ibid., p. 165.
47Moley, After Seven Years, p. 399.
Moley regarded Roosevelt's "shift to the left" as a contrived attempt to perpetuate his personal power. The new welfare measures signified a demagogic radicalism and the abandonment of earlier endeavors to establish an effective business-government relationship. Roosevelt had become corrupted by "presidential megalomania." For Moley the new Roosevelt reforms meant that principles government had been sacrificed to government of, by and for specific organized vested-interest groups. True progressivism, he believed, had been embodied in the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act for they were rooted in "cooperation" not "conflict." Now, social harmony was impossible because Roosevelt had imperiously embarked upon exacerbating class divisions.

I discovered in 1935-36 that Roosevelt was seeking to create a new socialist-labor party under the name Democratic, and as a means to that end was willing to enlarge and excite class antagonisms. This was too much, and I thereupon publicly registered my opposition.48

Many factors, in Moley's judgment, explained Roosevelt's metamorphosis. The New York Times' Washington correspondent, Arthur Krock, felt that Roosevelt was

48Moley, review of The Democratic Roosevelt by Rexford G. Tugwell in National Review, IV (November 9, 1957), 428.
"frightened to death of Huey Long." Moley, also, insisted that Huey Long's growing political strength gnawed at Roosevelt. Long's "Share-Our-Wealth program" and "every man a king" slogan had attracted many discontented voters. This threat was compounded by Dr. Francis Townsend's old age revolving pension plan movement and Father Charles Coughlin's "Social Justice" crusade. Roosevelt knew from James A. Farley's poll-takers that Long, as a third-party candidate, would garner ten per cent of the vote in the 1936 election. When Long was assassinated in September, 1935 Roosevelt, in Moley's judgment, deliberately tried to seize his mantle.

It cannot entirely be coincidence that the whole direction and philosophy of the New Deal changed at about the time when Long went to his gaudy grave. Roosevelt, Wallace, Hopkins and others had become Kingfish disciples to a degree that they probably never realized.

Moley, also, cited caustic criticism by the Liberty League, adverse Supreme Court rulings, new advisers


50 Moley, After Seven Years, pp. 282. See, also, Basil Rauch, A History of the New Deal (New York, 1944), pp. 171-176.

and a new political strategy as contributing to Roosevelt's leftward shift. The real villain in this scenario, argued Moley, was the political boss of the Bronx, Edward J. Flynn. It was he who persuaded Roosevelt that permanent power could be sustained by dispensing welfare measures to urban wage-earners. Flynn's strategy emphasized catering to the desires of urban masses and opposing big business. Moley maintained that Flynn's cynically conceived stratagem to pander to the desires of the urban masses transformed the Democratic party into a vending machine where "votes are inserted and money pours out."

From the spring of 1935 on, Moley's articles in Today continually lambasted New Deal policies. In July of 1935 he ventured to halt Roosevelt's reforms by reminding him and his advisers, publicly, that America was unable to keep pace with the administration.

The man in the street believes in a new deal—this New Deal, in fact. He does not believe that all the evils that vexed him will be exorcised by the magic of law. But he believes that things are better than they were and that some particularly 'raw deals' of the Golden Decade cannot be repeated. He knows that the President has tried gallantly to give him a better break and he appreciates the extent to which the President has succeeded. But he does not believe that businessmen are all devils, and that unless crippled they will rise and smite him again. He is not concerned with abundance in the future. He wants a chance to enjoy the little additional abundance that he has now. Above all, he wants to get away from the strain of listening to so many people saying so many fierce things so many hours of the day. For the time being, he has heard enough about saving the world... .

Roosevelt's radical advisers (Moley had in mind, particularly, Harry Hopkins) had to "recognize that every social crusade, from Cromwell to Wilson, has sooner or later come face to face with the stubborn refusal of human nature to rise too high or stay high too long." Roosevelt seethed with anger at Moley's reproaches because Republicans were utilizing his articles to indict the administration. It was incomprehensible to the President how Moley could persist in his criticism when he realized what damage he was inflicting to the administration and the Democratic party. Despite this strained relationship, Roosevelt asked Moley to prepare

53 Today, IV (July 13, 1935), 12.
54 Ibid.
a draft of his acceptance speech at the 1936 Democratic national convention. Perhaps more bewildering than Roosevelt's request was Moley's compliance. Why he chose to prepare a speech for a man whose policies had alienated him is unclear. Nevertheless, Moley collaborated on the address, composing its more memorable lines:

"Governments can err. Presidents do make mistakes. But the immortal Dante tells us that divine justice weighs the sins of the cold-blooded and the sins of the warm hearted on different scales."

"Better the occasional faults of a government that lives in a spirit of charity than the constant omissions of a government frozen in the ice of its own indifference."

"There is a mysterious cycle in human events. To some generations much is given. Of others much is expected. This generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny."

Moley designed these paragraphs to accentuate Roosevelt's good intentions and conciliatory attitude. These sentiments, he trusted, would unify the Democratic party and

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55 Moley, How to Keep Our Liberty, pp. 97 ff. He derived the idea for the phrase "rendezvous with destiny" from a column written by Walter Lippmann that said America had an "appointment with destiny." Interview with Moley, June 1, 1968. Rosenman, in his Working With Roosevelt, p. 107, attributes "rendezvous with destiny" incorrectly to Thomas Corcoran. It was Moley who introduced Corcoran to Roosevelt for the purpose of having him assume some of his speechwriting duties. John T. Flynn insisted that Roosevelt "did not cut Moley off completely until he felt he had in Tommy Corcoran an able ghost to grind out his immortal utterances." Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (New York, 1948), p. 284.
"convey a message of national unity and sympathy for all groups." Although the President praised Moley's efforts and endorsed his draft, when he delivered the speech in Philadelphia several days later some changes were present. Other advisers succeeded in injecting such emotive phrases as--"economic royalists," "privileged princes," and "a new despotism in the robes of legal sanctions." These additions infuriated Moley. They inflamed class feelings and antagonized business. By making that speech Roosevelt had not only "betrayed" him, he proved that he was irretrievably committed to socialist policies. "Roosevelt's changes," Moley charged, "literally destroyed the impact of the speech and left only the frame.... It was then after he made that choice, that with no personal rancor I ended my association with his cause and never entered the White House again." In his recent book, The First New Deal (1966), Moley described his attitude toward Roosevelt after this incident:

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56 Ibid., p. 98.

I felt the same personal affection for him.
There was his infinite buoyance, and his kind-
ness and consideration in our joint efforts.

But there were divergent views now that I
could not resolve. And if I had continued,
with such differences gnawing in my mind, I
could but serve him badly.

I was approaching my fiftieth birthday, and
my political convictions had been shaped over
a good many years. As a professor and a writer
it had been my professional concern to teach
and write about politics and government. My
convictions were too mature, too deeply inter-
woven in my habits of thought and action to
change now. I was conservative by instinct.58

In the following year, 1937, Today merged with
Newsweek. Moley became a contributing editor of Newsweek
and wrote an article for nearly every issue of this weekly
magazine until 1968. He remained on the Columbia faculty
as a Professor of Public Law until 1952, but his interest
was in protesting, in Newsweek and several books, the
course of American liberalism. In 1939 he published
After Seven Years, a meticulous, restrained account of
his association with Franklin Roosevelt. He described
the origins of the New Deal, the Brains Trust's functions,
Roosevelt's political thought and the transfiguration of

58Moley, The First New Deal, p. 548. For a dis-
cussion of the impassioned argument that occurred be-
tween Roosevelt and Moley regarding this speech see:
Moley, The First New Deal, pp. 345-347; Moley, After
Seven Years, pp. 333-343; Alsop and Kintner, Men Around
the President, pp. 102-105; Burns, Roosevelt: Lion and
Fox, p. 265.
the New Deal that had occurred in 1935. Roosevelt by offering favors to every special interest group, in his opinion, had killed true progressivism. The "second New Deal" marked a violent repudiation of pre-World War I progressivism. He submitted that the federal government now possessed inordinate power, that the New Deal was predicated upon coercion rather than voluntary cooperation and that a whole series of New Deal reforms from 1935 on were socialistic. Moreover, Roosevelt's measures were actually retarding recovery, destroying private enterprise and unleashing an imperceptible, but wanton inflation. Yet, the one fundamental criticism that animates After Seven Years is the charge that, after 1935, Roosevelt exacerbated class feelings. Moley was willing to forgive Roosevelt for attempting to "subvert" the Supreme Court, passing "statist" reforms and for becoming an "internationalist" in foreign policy. One sin, however, was inexpungible: "An administration that leaves more rather than less consciousness of class had done the country a disservice."  

The President's past mistakes and his desire to seek a third term led Moley to join the Republican party in 1940. From Wendell Willkie to Barry Goldwater each

59Moley, After Seven Years, p. 400.
Republican presidential nominee has received some of Moley's advice or assistance. The World War II interlude confirmed Moley's worst fears. Wartime regimentation of the national economy through centralized planning meant that America would be transformed into a totalitarian collectivist order. Roosevelt's call for a further extension of the New Deal in 1944 and Harry Truman's Fair Deal legislative accomplishments convinced him that the nation had taken "the road to serfdom." During the 1940's Moley's articles exhibited strong conservative themes. Liberty is a whole, he asserted and to deny or eliminate economic liberty is to destroy all liberty. America had to recognize that planning was irreconcilable with freedom. His articles continually stressed individualism, constitutionalism and the superior virtues of state and local governments over the federal government. Hope flickered briefly in 1948 when New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey became a potent challenger for the presidency. Moley served as a minor adviser to Dewey and was distraught over his defeat. A year after the election he wrote that "the

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60 See, for example, his articles: "After Twenty-Four Years," Newsweek, CXXXII (August 2, 1948), 80; "Roosevelt and Dewey," Newsweek, CXXXII (August 23, 1948), 88; "How It Got This Way," Newsweek, CXXXII (July 12, 1948), 88; "Reappraising Hoover," Newsweek, CXXXII (June 14, 1948), 100; "1953 Will Not Be 1933," Newsweek, CXXXII (November 24, 1948), 88.
real tragedy of 1948 was that the nation needed just what Tom Dewey had in a superlative degree. 61

In 1949 Moley published another book on his experiences in the New Deal. *Twenty Seven Masters of Politics:* In a Personal Perspective contains vignettes of Al Smith, James F. Byrnes, Huey Long, James A. Farley, John Nance Garner and other political leaders he had known. While the book was not polemical in nature, Moley made certain that his readers realized that many former progressives had grown hostile to the New Deal and Fair Deal. He emphasized that Smith, Byrnes, Garner and others did not approve recent developments in American life.

John Nance Garner is not happy about trends in government and economic life. He believes that the public through reckless political promises has been led to think that government largess is unlimited. He fears the effect of further deficits upon the savings of the people. He believes that government is too big, too unwieldy and too incompetent. 62

Perhaps the most ironic paragraph in this book concerns Herbert Hoover. Writing seventeen years after he had helped Franklin Roosevelt vanquish the Republican president, Moley paid tribute to him. Hoover's political philosophy and beliefs "for which he was mistakenly

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61 Moley, *Twenty-Seven Masters of Politics*, p. 65.
62 Ibid., p. 75.
chastised in 1932," had been vindicated by the course of American history.\(^{63}\)

In 1952 Raymond Moley published his best book, *How to Keep Our Liberty*, a four hundred page, carefully conceived, scholarly work offered an analysis of American progressivism and the welfare state. The first two sections were devoted to excoriating the welfare state while the remainder of the book indicated "a road away from socialism." He censured the welfare state for robbing Americans of their liberties. Farmers, through acreage restrictions, marketing quotas and schemes like the Brannan Plan, were being reduced to serfs. Blue collar workers, as well, claimed Moley, had been deprived of their freedom by corrupt labor union practices. Union members were harassed and compelled to support liberal political candidates. The individual union member who disagreed with his local organization suffered reprisals. Masses of regulatory laws and taxes oppressed American business. Every group in American society possessed less freedom because of New Deal-Fair Deal policies.\(^{64}\) The right to use personal income for purposes determined "by the earner of that income" had vanished. Without


\(^{64}\) Moley, *How to Keep Our Liberty*, p. 174.
this freedom said Moley, there could be no meaningful liberty. Taxation penalized thrift and redistributed "the forgotten man's" earnings to the indolent masses who gratefully continued the Democratic party in office. American liberals, by distorting the general welfare clause of the Constitution, had managed to erect a "super-statism."

Progressivism in more recent years has moved far beyond its original scope, assuming that because a small amount of government intervention proved to be a healthy corrective for the evils of capitalism, more and more is needed. In this perversion, more than in an invasion of alien doctrines, lies our present danger.65

Moreover, Moley indicted these "misnamed progressives or liberals" for ranking the three rights of life, liberty and property in descending order. He lamented that this development was furthered by the Democratic party.

When Roosevelt was nominated the party stood for a series of traditional principles—the constitutional rights and powers of the states, economical government, reduction of the bureaucracy, and justice in industrial relations. It has gradually been transformed into a Federalist party, a collaborator with labor unions, with an unprecedented bureaucracy, an unbalanced budget as a first principle, and a welfare state as an objective.66

65Ibid., p. 75. This quote comes from his chapter on "The Perversion of the Progressive Movement," pp. 73-80.
66Moley, How to Keep Our Liberty, p. 86.
"The party in which you and I grew up," he told James A. Farley on many occasions, "is as dead as the Whigs and the Know-Nothings." 67

How to Keep Our Liberty warned Americans to resist economic planning because it symbolized "socialism in its initial stage." 68 If the intentions of the reformers appeared noble, one should not forget that bureaucrats had to administer these programs after they became law. His experiences in government had taught him a horrible lesson:

To anyone of even mildly conservative instincts, it was deeply disturbing to witness at first hand the activities of some of these innovators. The possession of power spurred them to new schemes for governmental action. An abundance of leisure, permitted by lax discipline of bureaucracy, offered them time for the exercise of fervent imagination. 69

Indeed, concluded Moley, some New Deal bureaucrats were admirers of the "great Soviet experiment" and some were "secret agents of Communism." 70

The United States could extricate itself from the morass he described by returning to timeless principles. A free market should be restored. Government had to cease harassing business. A "sound" fiscal policy,

68 Moley, How to Keep Our Liberty, p. 93.
69 Ibid., pp. 80-90.
70 Ibid.
meaning a balanced budget and reduced federal expenditures, was imperative. Efforts had to be made toward creating a free market in agriculture, returning certain functions to the state and local governments and amending the Wagner Act to define unfair labor practices of both employer and employee. He did not advocate indiscriminately repealing past legislation. An efficacious approach would be curtailting the power of pressure groups that had been nurtured by the New Deal. "We are not creators, we are trustees. We serve in an endless succession of watches at the citadel of liberty."  

Moley, like Creel and Richberg, felt bitter over the Republican party's rejection of Senator Robert A. Taft. Eisenhower's victory, he hoped, would at least halt America's steady drive to complete socialism. After the Republican restoration in 1952, Moley told George Creel that he would "keep hammering away at the idea that we are really entering into an era of sanity and reasonable conservatism, and that we are going to be tested by what happens." He also, intended "to keep Eisenhower and his Administration on the track by detached and honest criticism."  

The Eisenhower years, however, disappointed

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71 Ibid., p. 23.

72 Moley to Creel, December 4, 1952, Creel MSS, Container 4.
him. No substantive differences seemed to distinguish the Republican administration from its immediate predecessors. The party's liberal faction, to Moley's dismay, proved to be reluctant in reversing Democratic trends. Especially irritating was the fact that the Eisenhower administration, besides pursuing former New Deal policies had, also, betrayed a noble member of its own party--Senator Joseph McCarthy. These developments confounded Moley and gave him the idea for a new book.

Immediately after John F. Kennedy's election, Moley began preparing a work designed to dramatize the great role a revived Republican party could perform in American history. The Republican Opportunity (1962) attempted to bolster the argument for the necessity of a right-wing Republican resurgence. With a blatant espousal of conservatism, rather than "me-tooism," the Republicans would inherit the future. He conceded that it would be difficult to accomplish this task because:

Liberal demagogues still use the sins of business in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as campaign material to incite class hatreds. Pretending to be friends of the 'little man' against the rich...they generate the belief that through government they are the sole dispensers of what they call 'social justice.'

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Yet, there existed in "the forgotten man" the potential fulcrum of political power. Who was he? He was, once again, William Graham Sumner's middle class hero, not the man "at the bottom of the economic pyramid" as Moley had said thirty years prior. Since the burden of taxation fell most heavily upon the middle class, a Republican opportunity for power existed if it could transfer this class' frustration and resentment into Republican votes. Senator Barry Goldwater seemed the ideal candidate to lead this political revolt. Two years later Moley's dream reached fulfillment. Senator Barry Goldwater, an implacable foe of the last thirty-two years of American political history, won the Republican presidential nomination. Assisting him organize his Brains Trust and formulate campaign strategy was Raymond Moley. What


greater irony could be found than this development? Three decades after playing a significant role in Franklin Roosevelt's election, Raymond Moley was devising plans to insure the triumph of a man who vowed to govern America on a pre-New Deal basis.

What are we to say of Moley's career? Does his life have any significance for students interpreting American history? Should we accept at face value his judgments? Moley's career has direct relevance, first of all, to the anti-welfare state theme. Since his departure from the New Deal, he has compiled a massive indictment against the welfare state. His commentaries on American political affairs are perhaps only exceeded by those of Walter Lippmann, David Lawrence and Arthur Krock. Besides this obvious significance, though, there are some other insights that we can extract from Moley's career. Otis Graham, in his superb study of progressivism, An Encore For Reform: The Old Progressives and the New Deal, offers this analysis of Moley:

...the break with Roosevelt came in large part because of a deterioration of (his) relationship with the President (Roosevelt) and the intense disappointment which it brought to (his) political hopes. The timing of (his)

the American people of conservatism. Goldwater lost, because his campaign failed to present conservative ideas with force and cogency. See, the New York Times, November 5, 1964, p. 20.
break with the New Deal owed as much to (his) political fortunes as to the course of New Deal legislation, and only later did it appear ...that 1935 was the year when Roosevelt committed the great philosophical error.76

Moley's opposition to the New Deal, as we have seen, did not begin a decade or two after 1935. He was protesting Roosevelt's actions and recommending a gradualist, orthodox approach from the spring of 1934 on. It is not excessive sympathy for Moley, either, to point out that his deteriorating relationship with the President stemmed from his refusal to countenance Roosevelt's measures. Frank Freidel is quite accurate in submitting "that Moley, who had worked so long and skillfully for reform, fearing excesses, left Roosevelt's Democratic Party."77

We do no irreverence to Franklin Roosevelt by contending that the New Deal did differ, after 1935, in some very crucial respects from pre-World War I progressivism. Certainly, absolute discontinuities are rare in history. Granted, also, that there were affinities in "ideas, institutions and personnel" between early twentieth century progressivism and the New Deal. More than a slight difference distinguishes the two movements. Wilsonian and Theodore Roosevelt progressives glorified

77 Moley, The First New Deal, p. 362.
class unity, reform through education and government as a force to equalize competition. Government was a regulator, an umpire nothing more. Its function was to act as an impartial observer guaranteeing fairness. Progressives advocated legislation that did not confer special favors or privileges on certain interest groups. "The government's heightened power," says Richard Hofstadter, "was to represent not its more intimate linkage with any one of these interests, but rather its ability with greater effectuality to stand above them, and where necessary against them."78 Progressives, also, cherished the idea of self-reliance and had a profound reverence for American capitalism. John Morton Blum has observed that "there inhered in the New Freedom something of the spirit that was, years later, to lead many of its apostles to the Liberty League."79 There, also, existed a suspicion of power. It is interesting to note that George Creel, Raymond Moley and even Donald Richberg (who was a Theodore Roosevelt progressive, not a Wilsonian Democrat) all distrusted Theodore Roosevelt. Woodrow Wilson seemed eminently more suited to be entrusted with political power.


During the New Deal these three men and many former progressives, as Otis Graham has shown, were aghast at individuals, like Harry Hopkins, who were counseling Franklin Roosevelt. The New Deal's frenzied activity, its breezy spirit and methods and its numerous, and sometimes superfluous agencies, alarmed them. Russell Nye has caught the crucial differences in the two movements:

The Middle West progressive movement was sectional minded, perhaps provincial in its matter of thinking, concerned with immediate problems solved in local terms. The New Deal was sophisticated, nationalized and federalized, a combination of long-range planning and political expediency, rarely concerned with local and state prerogatives. The midwestern agrarians called in the federal government when they needed help, but not before. The Wisconsin idea of 'the new individualism' did not propose a leviathan state, or constant subsidization, or constant federal assistance. It had in mind instead the old Jeffersonian frontier ideal of a self-reliant individual living in an agrarian commonwealth.80

If the New Deal did not represent the "third American revolution," it did create something new—the welfare state. In discussing Oswald Garrison Villard's hostility to the New Deal, Otis Graham wrote that Villard wanted "all of the goals of the New Deal without a welfare state."81 The same judgment can be made of Raymond Moley.

81 Graham, Encore for Reform, p. 184.
Moley's Middle West upbringing, his preference for Wilson rather than Theodore Roosevelt and his belief that Ohio reformers like Tom Johnson and Newton D. Baker were "proper" reformers made him a traditional progressive. Graduate study with Charles A. Beard and other more radical scholars never altered these basic certitudes. His work in the 1920's with the administration of criminal justice seems to have imbued him with the spirit he expressed during the Sacco and Vanzetti trial and his statement (quoted earlier) at the outset of the New Deal about his conservative instincts demonstrate that he had more in common with pre-World War I progressives than with Rexford G. Tugwell and later Harry Hopkins. He was far more conservative, in 1932, than either Creel or Richberg. Consequently, he is on firmer ground when contending that he never altered his principles or beliefs. If "time is a taxidermist--he makes rebels stuffy" as Peter Viereck claims,\(^8\) we must note that in Moley's case he was never a rebel and as early as 1932 already "stuffy." We cannot explain his behavior by invoking the conservatism of old age theory. When the New Deal did move beyond its patchwork reforms of 1932-1934, he found it difficult to adjust. Taking but one example, the Wagner Act, we can see

that government from 1935 on began acting in a new manner. The federal government in this legislation went beyond the role of an impartial policeman. It actively participated in securing the unionization of the American worker. The Wagner Act and other reforms may not have represented, as James MacGregor Burns argues "a consciously planned, grandly executed deployment to the left," but they did mark the origins of a welfare state. Because Raymond Moley's social and economic views had hardened into dogma and because his own personal success seemed to demonstrate the superiority of American society's existing institutions and traditions, he could not accede to the transition to a welfare state.

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CHAPTER 5

THE RADICALISM OF JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

During the 1920's and 1930's many radical intellectuals espoused fundamental changes in American life. Some advocated replacing capitalism with socialism or communism. Others desired an extensive reform of American institutions directed by the federal government. Social planners, as well as more radical left-wing intellectuals, all agreed, however, that government had to exert preponderant influence over the nation's economy. Certain intellectuals of this period subsequently repudiated their radicalism and became devotees of a species of conservatism. The rehabilitated radicals would include, among many others, John Dos Passos, Max Eastman, James Burnham and John Chamberlain. Chamberlain's career as a literary critic and political journalist relates to the intriguing question of why some radical intellectuals have moved from the political Left to the political Right. It, also, raises a significant aspect of the anti-welfare state theme. Why is it that some former radicals like Chamberlain, or John Dos Passos or Max Eastman, who desired the revamping of American

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capitalism in 1930's now constitute a crucial element in the resurgent right-wing movement? Why does John Chamberlain, a representative figure of this group of intellectuals, regard the welfare state as a violation of those goals that radicals fought for in the 1920's and 1930's?^1

John Chamberlain was born in 1903 in New Haven, Connecticut. His father operated a retail furniture business in New Haven that was begun by the Chamberlains in the beginnings of the nineteenth century. After graduation from Yale University in 1925, he became a reporter in the "city room" of the New York Times and then an assistant editor of the Sunday book review section. In 1933, Chamberlain became the first daily book reviewer for the New York Times. Alfred Kazin recalls that Chamberlain (who helped him get his first writing job with the New Republic) was "the golden boy of a generation of ideologues." Chamberlain's columns left a heavy impress upon many young radicals. "Intellectuals in the subway,"

^1Chamberlain has received little attention from historians. Louis Filler has remarked that John Chamberlain's "transformation into a principal defender of Manchester liberalism was little noted nor long remembered." See his A Dictionary of American Social Reform (New York, 1963), p. 127 and his essay (which deals primarily with Farewell to Reform) "John Chamberlain and American Liberalism," Colorado Quarterly, VI (Autumn, 1957), pp. 200-211.

^2Chamberlain to writer, June 14, 1968, in writer's possession.
according to Kazin, "would open the Times first to Chamberlain's book column." ³

What catapulted Chamberlain to national prominence was the publication in 1932 of his condemnation of pre-World War I progressivism—Farewell to Reform. His thesis that the Progressive movement was a failure because its reforms reformed nothing had a compelling plausibility, but was seriously impaired by schematic oversimplifications. Because he treated an intricate, multidimensional problem in monistic terms, the nature and significance of the various pre-World War I reform movements eluded him. Besides denouncing Progressivism, Chamberlain also predicted the New Deal would recreate the futility of earlier reform movements. Its reforms would only "congeal" capitalism rather than inaugurate any fundamental alterations in the economic structure. This certainty derived from Chamberlain's axiom that "only conservatives and radicals claim to have complete truth. "What distinguishes the liberal
Farewell to Reform, Chamberlain derides Populism, Theodore Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" and Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom" because their reforms have worked against the "grain of Progressive or neo-democratic hopes; instead of 'freeing' the common man within the capitalistic system, these reforms have made the system, as a long-run proposition, more difficult of operation...." Borrowing from Harold Stearns, he described the liberals' "technique of failure" as the refusal or inability to pursue a sweeping revision of capitalism. Robert M. La Follette and Randolph Bourne were exempted from this indictment. "But liberalism in general," Chamberlain concluded, "couldn't stand the gaff." Progressivism accomplished "minimal results;" its only impressive reforms were the Federal Reserve Banking Act and the Adamson Act. "But in setting down these gains we have about exhausted the really important positive legislation

from the adherents of both these dogmatic and absolutistic camps is precisely his repudiation of such final truths." David Spitz, Essays in the Liberal Idea of Freedom (Tucson, 1964), p. 5.

5Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform, p. 311.

6Harold Stearns, Liberalism in America (New York, 1919), pp. 110, 146-147.
of thirty years." Progressivism's futility stemmed from its vision of restoring conditions which existed prior to the development of industrial capitalism and the trend toward combinations.

In the United States 'reform'...has always had a 'return' connotation. By 'reform' a host of political leaders, Bryan, La Follette, Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt at times and Franklin D. Roosevelt today, have hoped to 'return' to the ways of their fathers—to the methods and possibilities of a more primitive capitalism. ...that is why Progressivism and Liberalism in this country are, at the moment, preparing the ground for an American Fascism; they have been identified with the shopkeeper instincts of the common citizen, who is willing to trade with the 'big fellow' if he can retain a privilege or two.

Chamberlain exhibited especially acrid criticism, in his last chapter, for three intellectuals whom he accused of naivete for their belief in the possibility of a planned capitalism: Stuart Chase, George Soule and Charles Beard. "They have seen," he commented, "the 'laissez-faire' of William Graham Sumner failing bit by bit. They have grasped the need of control from a fixed point at the top. And so they have proclaimed the

7Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform, p. 309. Brand Whitlock, spoke for many pre-World War I progressives, when he said that "the trouble with people like Chamberlain is that they are obsessed by their theories, and become pedantic and doctrinaire about them." Allan Nevins, ed., The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock (New York, 1936), p. 538.

8Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform, p. 310.
virtues of a Central Planning Board. But they have not... examined the political incidence of their beliefs. They have not seen that fixed control requires a priesthood to administer it. And this fixed control entails a society of one consensus of aims." Chamberlain rejected the notion that capitalism's noxious aspects could be eradicated by economic planning while expressing concern over who would control a planning oligarchy.

What did John Chamberlain propose for America's troubles? "The situation begs for a demand politics along socialist lines, with propaganda playing a prominent part in the necessary political organization." Despite the strident and uncompromising terminology enlivening *Farewell to Reform*, Chamberlain's methods radiated gradualism. He did not experience the "psychological thrill which hopes of 'the revolution' send tingling through the born radical. I affirm the hope in bidding farewell to reform that parliamentary processes will not fail in the interim leading up to the necessary class shifts in control."

American radicals were restless and bored by Herbert Hoover's and Franklin Roosevelt's invocation of the

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traditional nostrums in the 1932 campaign. Roosevelt did indulge in sporadic outbursts of rhetorical radicalism to circumvent the uninspiring platform of the Democratic party, but this too failed to arouse them. Edmund Wilson glimpsed a "boy scout" strain in the New York governor and Lewis Mumford declared: "If I vote at all it will be for the Communists, in order to express as emphatically as possible the belief that our present crisis calls for a complete and drastic re-orientation." According to Chamberlain, "Progressivism today, if we are to revaluate the term, must mean either Norman Thomas or William Z. Foster, ineffectual though one or both of them may be."\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12}John Chamberlain, "A Hamiltonian Reformer," review of Beveridge and the Progressive Era, by Claude G. Bowers in the \textit{New Republic}, LXXII (September 14, 1932), 131. For an explanation of why many writers became Communists after the depression ensued see the reasons offered by Waldo Frank, Clifton Fadiman, Granville Hicks, Sherwood Anderson, Edmund Wilson and Michael Gold in "How I Came to Communism," \textit{New Masses}, VII (September, 1932), 6-9. Many intellectuals indicated their voting intentions in the 1932 election in "How I Shall Vote," \textit{Forum}, LXXXVIII (November, 1932), 258 ff; "Franklin D. Roosevelt, for all the publicity given his brain trust," writes Richard Hofstadter, "disappointed most intellectuals during his first presidential campaign, and remained an object of distrust and sharp left-wing criticism during the early years of the New Deal. The intellectuals did not greatly warm to him until the very eve of the 1936 campaign, and even then seemed to love him for the enemies he had made." Richard Hofstadter, \textit{Anti-Intellectualism in American Life} (New York, 1962), p. 222.
Unlike most radicals in the 1932 election Chamberlain did not sign the *Culture in Crisis* statement (signed by Edmund Wilson, Sherwood Anderson, Lincoln Steffens, Langston Hughes, Erskine Caldwell, Granville Hicks and John Dos Passos) supporting the Foster-Ford Communist ticket.

The reason I can't identify myself with Mr. Foster's party, or with the "proletariat", is, perhaps, misguided, since no movement grows without gaining adherents. But I'm not convinced—yet—that the American Communist party will be America's very necessary revolutionary party. And I can't see that the positive nucleus of this necessary revolutionary party (which will offer something better than despair) will begin to cohere and expand until a good many more Americans than voted for any minority group in the last election have been won to an economic pessimism, an acute dissatisfaction with the dividend and investment system, and willing to follow the leader. I am not urging the Krutch type of pessimism; I am urging the type that sowed the seed for the French revolution, which only came after a century of sapping tactics. No revolution comes, I am convinced, until the will power of the defenders of the existing order has been broken. If I choose to attack along this line, it seems to me that it should be permitted me. If I had any contact with the labor movement, I might feel different, but I haven't. I said, in my section on "The Iron Heel", that revolution is a complicated process, with success depending on a varied attack, both on the positive and negative sides. A pamphleteer, I think, should be allowed his choice, just so long as his objective is good. After all, Voltaire and Rousseau shared the blame for the French overthrow, and I daresay Russia's pessimists had a little to do with altering the intellectual climate which made for the thrust of Trotsky. I don't think one can be dogmatic about these things.\(^3\)

\(^{13}\)Chamberlain to Hicks, December 5, 1932, Granville Hicks MSS, Syracuse University Library, Box 5.
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal elicited slight approval from Chamberlain. He was aligned with a decidedly hostile, radical faction that expressed itself in journals like *Common Sense*. Though Chamberlain and other contributors to *Common Sense* (Lewis Mumford, Max Eastman, John Dos Passos, Theodore Dreiser and Edmund Wilson) dutifully acknowledged that Roosevelt's alacrity in experimenting surpassed Hoover's ineffectual policies, they berated Roosevelt for striving to revive a patently decaying system. A collection of articles from *Common Sense* was published in 1934 as, *Challenge to the New Deal*. John Dewey set the tone for this anthology of dissent with an introductory essay that stigmatized the New Deal as a "fraud" and a "sham" despite its avowed humanitarian intentions. "Roosevelt--Reformer or Revolutionary?" John Chamberlain's article, conceded Roosevelt's masterly political strokes, but reproached him for his shibboleths and sophistry and focused, unmercifully, upon the discrepancy between the President's promises and accomplishments. "The blank check made out to F.D.R.," warned Chamberlain, "has been filled in ostensibly by the social planners, and it reads positive political control. But it does not say who is to do the controlling, or for whose benefit. May we not have presented the check to
the business men?"  

14 The inherent logic of events would inexorably drag Roosevelt to the Right. Since the President was adamantly embarked upon controlling and repairing capitalism, his reform efforts had to be nugatory.

Capitalism is capitalism, even when it is blessed in the name of the New Deal. And reformers of Capitalism, once they have created the psychology leading to an upturn of the credit cycle, must inevitably change mentally or be replaced at the top by the Coolidges and Hoovers. Reformers, it may be said again, cannot stand capitalist prosperity. They must eat with the pigs or be trampled at the trough.  

There were many intransigent enemies of New Deal reformism. If to Herbert Hoover the New Deal symbolized a "bastard Soviet" and to Douglas MacArthur "socialism or even communism," to some radicals it had a fascist reek. For these critics the New Deal loomed, sinisterly, as more than a "fraud" or a "sham." I. F. Stone, for example, theorized that "Roosevelt's policies can be welded into a consistent whole only on the basis of one hypothesis... that Mr. Roosevelt intends to move towards fascism."  


15 Ibid., p. 91; In June, 1935 the New Republic concurred with Chamberlain when its editors demanded that America "must put up with the confusions of an essentially unregulated capitalism, or it must prepare to supersede capitalism with socialism." New Republic XXXIII (June 12, 1935), 118.  

Max Lerner espied the identical pattern that John Chamberlain had: "the essential logic of the New Deal is increasingly the naked fist of a capitalist state."\(^{17}\)

Having examined Chamberlain's thinking through 1935, we should discuss the crucial question of his relationship to the Communist Party. Did he join the party or was he merely in the intellectual and emotional orbit of Marxism? Despite Arthur Mann's reference to him as a "young Marxist of the 1930's" and Malcolm Cowley's satisfaction that he won "a hearing for proletarian novels"\(^{18}\) as The New York Times book review editor, Chamberlain, unlike many of his radical friends, never joined the Communist party and his intellectual allegiance to Marxism was tenuous. "If I am a Marxist (I've been calling myself that with perhaps no right to the term)," he told Granville Hicks in 1933, "it is in the Bernard Shaw sense: A Marxist that is able to commend the Russian method, given the conditions that call it forth, or the Fabian method,


given the requisite conditions.  

He did, to be sure, utilize certain Marxian concepts in his thought much in the same manner as did Charles Beard. But the relevant point is that his "flirtation" with Communism was momentary and that he was among the first American radicals to become disillusioned with the Soviet Union. He became one in a long procession of distraught radicals (that included Louis Fischer, Vincent Sheehan, Ralph Bates, Malcolm Cowley, Granville Hicks, Edmund Wilson, James T. Farrell, John Dos Passos, James Rorty, Sidney Hook and James Burnham) to oppose the Soviet reconstruction of Russia. Chamberlain rejected Earl Browder's cry that "Communism is twentieth century Americanism."

Internal repression within the Soviet Union appalled him. He spurned Stalin's injunction to writers to function as "engineers of the human soul" because he could not countenance for any writer subservience to "proletarian realism." Unlike many intellectuals, Chamberlain resisted becoming part of what Eric Hoffer has described as "a homogeneous plastic mass that can be kneaded at will." When, in February, 1934, New

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19 Chamberlain to Hicks, January 28, 1933, Granville Hicks MSS, Syracuse University Library, Box 5. See, also, his letter of December 5, 1932 to Hicks and Hicks' Where We Came Out (New York, 1954), p. 185.  

York City Communists upset a Madison Square Garden memorial meeting to "mourn the defeat" of the Austrian Social Democrats, Chamberlain along with Edmund Wilson, Robert Morss Lovett, Clifton Fadiman, Lionel Trilling, James Rorty and Meyer Schapiro signed an "Open Letter" denouncing the Communists' destructive tactics. This letter's significance has been emphasized by several students of the 1930's. Irving Howe and Lewis Coser submit that "for the Communists this meant the loss of the most distinguished group of intellectuals that had ever approached the party orbit. A few years later these writers were to form the nucleus of an important anti-Stalinist group that tried to mobilize opinion against the Moscow trials and, for a time, seemed on the verge of creating an independent left within the intellectual world." 21

Chamberlain reported pervasive skepticism with the Soviet Union engulfing many leftist intellectuals at the first Congress of American Writers in 1935. Militant revolutionary propaganda for Soviet Communism was missing. Precisely because American writers were acting more independently Chamberlain found the Congress "a very agreeable surprise...I felt more at home in

conversation with left-wing writers than at any time since 1932."22 By 1937, however, he found himself estranged from many colleagues because he did not share their buoyant enthusiasm for the civil war wracking Spain. Archibald MacLeish's exhortation to the "irresponsibles" failed to incite him. War meant distraction from impinging domestic problems and the inevitable rise of authoritarian policies by the federal government. MacLeish and others distressed him because they seemed oblivious that "we have to choose between fighting for democracy on the battlefields of Europe or at home."23

Chamberlain assailed the 1937 Second Congress of American Writers for prostituting itself as a pliant tool of Soviet foreign policy. What particularly infuriated him about the 1937 Congress were the diatribes hurled at Waldo Frank (who like Chamberlain, Edmund Wilson and James Farrell were not invited to attend the Congress) for his refusal to endorse Soviet policies. Chamberlain, personally, had drawn the ire of many radicals when, as a member of John Dewey's commission, he had voted to absolve Leon Trotsky from Stalinist


23John Chamberlain, "Was It a Congress of American Writers?" Common Sense, VI (August, 1937), 16.
charges. Smarting from gibes that he was a "reactionary," Chamberlain retorted that the most pernicious thing which could befall an intellectual was "intellectual absorption." It was ignominious to propagate a "party line." He asked radical writers to recognize that "if one differs with official Communist ideas about civil liberties in Russia, he could not be denounced as a Hearst, or an enemy of mankind, or a Fascist." In 1938 he complained that "the doctrine so popular on the Left, that the end justifies the means...has robbed the young--and necessarily radical--writer of all moral perspective. They cannot create a hero because they are uncertain about what are the "correct" radical values." The events in Europe were demonstrably affecting his social reform ideas.

Inasmuch as both the Communists and the fascists are willing to wipe out human beings when they get in the way of ideology, perhaps we need a real resurgence of the democratic idea against the claims of each extreme before we can get an enduring American fiction. For when the popular philosophy holds that the human being is made for the State, the corollary will be cheap and timid citizens and novelists too fearful of the consequences to write honestly of the debased personalities they find around them.

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24Ibid., p. 15.
26Ibid., p. 47.
When the Nazi war machine launched its systematic assault upon Europe, Chamberlain counseled against American intervention. Obviously disillusioned by World War I, he maintained that democracy suffered during war. To "collective-security liberals" Lewis Mumford, Archibald MacLeish, Reinhold Niebuhr and Max Lerner, who predicted that Europe's convulsions ultimately menaced American democracy, Chamberlain rebutted that "two gigantic moats" made us impregnable. He, also, disputed their contention that America had a "moral obligation" to defend other democracies. With unemployment rising since 1937, Chamberlain grew apprehensive that President Roosevelt might utilize the European war as a device to sustain his popularity. Before long he succumbed to the "conspiracy theory" that Roosevelt would contrive to embroil the United States in the war. Since "we can ill afford another moral crusade to save Europe," the President

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had to be repelled in his quest for a third term.29

An indication that Chamberlain's radicalism had tempered came during the 1936 presidential campaign when he, surprisingly, proclaimed his intention to vote for Roosevelt, "though without any enthusiasm." By not rallying to Norman Thomas, it is clear that, even as early as 1936, Chamberlain was moving toward the political center. Chamberlain's articles on the New Deal from 1936 to 1940 reveal that he no longer regarded it as evil incarnate. In fact, he chastised his friend, the fiery radical journalist, John T. Flynn (who subsequently became a right-wing Republican) for his vituperative attacks on the New Deal. Though certain modifications appeared in his estimate of the New Deal, his basic antagonism remained. "History will record that the New Deal trembled on the verge of a real New Deal and then drew back."30

The subtle shift in Chamberlain's thinking became markedly evident in his second book--The American Stakes (1940). Here he castigated "absolutists" who delude

29John Chamberlain, "Looking Forward to 1940," Common Sense, VIII (December, 1938), 15-17; "Should We Re-Elect Roosevelt?" Common Sense, LX (February, 1940), 8-12; "Candidates and Speeches," Yale Review, XXX (September, 1940), 45-61.

themselves into thinking there are definitive solutions to social problems. He, also, lambasted the Communist Party for sacrificing individual liberty at the altar of the "blueprint state." His growing disdain for ideology made The American Stakes considerably less dogmatic than Farewell to Reform. Many sobered radicals and liberals congratulated Chamberlain for his prudential advice. Commonweal, for example, sighed: "We sincerely hope Mr. Chamberlain keeps up the good work and converts all the remaining Marxists to at least partial sanity." Clifton Fadiman, too, welcomed The American Stakes' refreshing message: "John Chamberlain stands guilty of all the sins decried by strict evangelists of the Left and Right: meliorism, optimism, compromise-ism and reformism. He refuses to deal only in fatalities and he doesn't hate enough those who disagree with him. Mark you, he hath not a lean and hungry look. Such men are dangerous." In 1940 he, also, informed Granville Hicks that radical reformers should have become

31 Commonweal, XXXI (March 29, 1940), 496.
32 Clifton Fadiman, review of The American Stakes, by John Chamberlain, in the New Yorker, XVI (March 16, 1940), 105; See, also, Marquis Child's review in the Yale Review, XXXIX (June, 1940), 812-813. Charles A. Beard reviewed The American Stakes and announced that Chamberlain "does not want to see every piece of property, every privilege of education and publishing, turned over to a bureaucratic State run by a crowd of desperate politicians." Beard's review appeared in Common Sense, IX (May, 1940), 25.
chastened by the Soviet experience.

In other words, to hell with "Marxism-plus.' I want to go back to the radical Jeffersonian tradition, with a good look at all the dissident radical philosophies that build themselves on a distrust of the State. Not that I am an anarchist. But the Swedes (yes, and the Finns) have proved what can be done by a people who have the will to limit both political and economic power.33

Other examples of Chamberlain's mounting distrust of "power" which would gradually culminate in a militant anti-government attitude began appearing in 1941 and 1942. Even before the war had ended, he was recommending the need for an era of restraint and respite.

All I am trying to say is 'Let's not expect the future to differ markedly from the past.' Fight to contain Hitler, yes, fight until the zeal has gone out of Nazism.... But then remember that it is a tolerable society for which we are hungering, and that toleration precludes a demand for the perfectionism that must close its mind to the other fellow's equal and opposite idea of Heaven on Earth. This sounds like conservatism, but actual application of such a spirit would be revolutionary in a world that is tired of the total zeals of the Left and of the Right.34

When reviewing books being published during the war, Chamberlain was struck by the "marked resurgence

33 Chamberlain to Hicks, undated (Internal evidence suggests this letter was written in 1940.), Hicks MSS, Syracuse University Library, Box 5.

in America of the individualist anti-statist spirit."
The writings of Herbert Agar, Henry M. Wriston, Peter
Drucker, Sidney Hook and James Burnham manifested a
serious respect for conservatism and the "politics of
checks and balances."35 That Chamberlain was influenced
by this trend, can perhaps best be witnessed in his
critique of Louis Fischer's Men and Politics (1941).
Fischer's advocacy of a "middle way" economic system
with individualism and state control jostling in creative
tension won his approval. Strictures he had earlier
fired at George Soule, Stuart Chase and Charles Beard
for their effrontery in attempting a "controlled capi-
talism," now were replaced by glowing praise for
Fischer's "extremely good sense in his blueprint for
a non-Utopian Utopia."36 When Chamberlain reviewed Max
Eastman's Stalin's Russia and the Crisis in Socialism
in April, 1940 he not only applauded Eastman for being
"that rarest of human animals, an intellectual who is
willing to confess an error," he, also, stated that

35 John Chamberlain, "Readers and Writers in War
Time," Yale Review, XXXII (September, 1943), 5-6.

36 Harper's Magazine, CLXXXIII (August, 1941), ii.
Disenchanted with both the state and reform, even
before we entered the war, can be found in Louis
Fischer, Men and Politics (New York, 1941), pp. 653-657
and in William Henry Chamberlin, The Confessions of an
Individualist (New York, 1940), pp. 299-311.
Eastman's account proved "the star of freedom leads to the north to the Scandinavian countries." Other indications attesting to revisions in his political and social thought surfaced in his exultations over Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* (1941) and John T. Flynn's *Men and Wealth* (1941). He interpreted Koestler's meaning to be that people who "stick by their values, their ethics, their concern for human individualism, in brief the people who say 'to hell with History' make better history in the long run." Flynn's portrait of twelve capitalists, from Fugger to Rockefeller, persuaded him that "money must have been the root of all evil, but when money was power the human being had a better chance for a decent life, than he has in our epoch, when power is a monopoly of the politician."

Chamberlain's mounting distrust of "power," which would shortly culminate in a militant anti-statism, increased during the course of World War II. He recommended that post-war goals should include the creation of a decentralized economic order. Powers arbitrarily

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37 John Chamberlain, review of *Stalin's Russia and the Crisis in Socialism* by Max Eastman in *Common Sense*, IX (April, 1940), 25-26.


assumed by the federal government, or delegated to it, had to be revoked. Labor ought only to receive protection with regard to wage and shop conditions, but should be dissuaded from attempting to impose the "closed shop" upon American workers. Unless America achieved these ends, we might "surrender to perpetual autocracy on the day of the peace."

In the past decade many of us (myself included, *mea culpa*) became confused by special clamors. We forget that the two party or multiple party system depends on autonomous and divergent social forces that are anterior to political organization. Many of us went looking for a *samurai* class, or an elite either in 'labor' or in the 'manager,' or among the administrators. We tended to identify democracy with the extension of the power of a chosen group of *samurai*. In so doing we forgot the main thing: that you can't have a condition in which minority rights flourish unless people can make their living in spite of any *samurai*.

Chamberlain responded to criticism, in November, 1942, that he had become a "prophet of reaction" by insisting that "there are certain things which belong to the public, and certain things which belong to the individual and I believe in sharp distinctions between them. Ten

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years ago I wasn't worried about such distinctions. But...I hope I have learned something from the history of the past decade."41

The theme of power as a corrosive pervades Chamberlain's writings from 1940 on. Yet, before his metamorphosis into a doctrinaire apostle of Manchester liberalism, Chamberlain had yet to resolve whether economic planning would actually enhance or restrict individual liberty. The Soviet Union's forced collectivization program, England's Labour Party social reforms and the wartime regulatory agencies supervising the American economy impressed him as being tantamount to the extirpation of personal liberty.42 New Deal and Fair Deal economic planning was not the only source of his dissatisfaction. American foreign policy represented an unmitigated disaster. Franklin Roosevelt manufactured the Pearl Harbor "surprise attack,"43 subverted the war


effort and then cravenly permitted Soviet hegemony in eastern Europe. Indeed, by 1951 he was arguing that the American Right "could hardly have done worse" if they had been responsible for molding American foreign policy. Senators William Knowland and Robert Taft, he continued, possessed a "far better instinct for balance of power realities than the Democrats." 44

John Chamberlain formally united with the political Right in 1950 when he joined Henry Hazlitt and Susan La Follette, two former 1930-style radicals, in publishing a new conservative journal--The Freeman. This rabidly anti-communist magazine was rooted in what it called the country's noblest traditions: economic individualism, states rights and reverence for the Constitution. Chamberlain, as the Freeman's weekly book editor and columnist, inveighed against America's myopic liberals. In 1952 Chamberlain, along with Max Eastman and John Dos Passos, formed the "Arts and Letters Committee for Robert A. Taft for President." Chamberlain exhorted Americans to seize Senator Taft as their last hope to stem Communism abroad and statism at home. He, also, rather passionately and uncritically, endorsed Senator Joseph

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McCarthy's hunt for domestic "Communists." To substantiate precisely how enraged Chamberlain was over American progressives, it is necessary only to recall that after reviewing Freda Utley's *The China Story*, a blistering attack on Roosevelt and Truman for "selling China down the river," he thundered that it ought to be "stuffed down the throats of George Marshall, Dean Acheson and Harry Truman." 45

An acrimonious internal debate among the Freeman's financial directors induced Chamberlain to resign from the journal's staff in 1953. Whether the journal should support Eisenhower or Taft for the Republican presidential nomination in 1952 and other related problems caused dissension. The atmosphere at the Freeman became so charged that he decided to resign in January, 1953. Chamberlain was quickly reconciled with the Freeman, and points out that as a Taft supporter he encountered problems "not with my fellow editors" (Henry Hazlitt and Susan La Follette), but rather with the faction of financial directors wedded to Eisenhower. 46


46 Letter, Chamberlain to writer, January 30, 1967, in writer's possession. See, also, "Chamberlain Leaves the Freeman," *Newsweek*, LXI (February 2, 1953), 76;
Chamberlain accepted William F. Buckley, Jr.'s offer in 1955 to become a founding editor of a new conservative journal of opinion---National Review. His innumerable articles and book reviews written for National Review and other right-wing publications reflect the formidable demonology of the American Right. When not exorcising the welfare state, the federal government's predatory behavior, or the baneful concomitants of economic planning, he is extolling the virtues of the virtually unregulated free enterprise economic system. In the "conflict between the Social Engineers, who seek to adjust mankind to conform with scientific utopias, and the disciples of Truth and who defend the organic moral order," Chamberlain believed himself to be allied with the true heirs of liberalism---right-wing Republican conservatives. Authentic liberalism, in his judgment, had been destroyed by welfare statism:

The latter-day Liberal is a Fabian. He believes in a mind, constitutional movement toward more and more statism, toward more and more cradle-to-gave social security, toward an ever-increasing increment of government controls, supports and ownership. To him, a 'good' conservatism consists in a willingness to 'conserve' whatever 'advances' have already been achieved under the New and Fair Deals, plus a willingness to follow the Liberal lead toward socialist goals, though at a slower, more

"Writers on the Right," Newsweek, XXXVI (October 16, 1950), 60; "Pull to the Right," Time, LIX (March 31, 1952), 53-54.
sedate pace. What the latter-day Liberal rejects as 'bad' conservatism is any manifestation of a Fabianism-in-the-opposite-direction, a Fabianism which aspires to restore voluntary methods in place of the state compulsion advocated by the Liberals.\textsuperscript{47}

Clinton Rossiter considers him a "brilliant anti-Liberal intellectual" and one of the best-known contemporary exponents of pure individualism...who has about as much use for the state as did Jefferson or Sumner.\textsuperscript{48}

In 1959 he published a thoughtful plea for the proposition that freedom can only flourish in a free market economy. The Roots of Capitalism reveal Chamberlain's total absorption in laissez-faire economic theory. The New York Times reviewer complimented him for his artful philosophical and historical defense of capitalism, but correctly observed that the book's last chapter "explodes in something like anger at what has happened in this country since 1933--and in doing so impairs most


of its own merit." In 1963 he endeavored to refurbish the reputation of American capitalists, especially those of the late nineteenth century who his friend Matthew Josephson had branded as "robber barons." His book, *The Enterprising Americans*, was a meticulous appraisal of American businessmen from colonial mercantilism through modern industrialism. After cataloguing the tremendous accomplishments businessmen had achieved under the American free enterprise system, he echoed the advice Henry R. Luce had given in *The American Century*: "The free enterprise system offers a superior form of organization through freedom. Its success has been made plain through two and a half centuries on the North American continent. Given the right framework, that success could be extended everywhere."50

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Ardent devotion to the free enterprise system's enduring virtues became Chamberlain's prepossession.

Besides eulogizing William Graham Sumner's economic and political prescriptions, he, predictably, detected, in practically all American achievements, the beneficent influence of laissez-faire. After reading the letters of the Wright brothers in Miracle at Kitty Hawk, he declared: "Who can read these letters...and doubt that it is the laissez-faire system, not state planning, that has permitted America to keep ahead of coerced societies...."51

Perhaps no better insight into the John Chamberlain of the 1960's exists than his bitter outburst at John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society. The desire to enlarge the "public sphere" and permit the federal government to plan social goals, implicit in Galbraith's book, explains why Chamberlain spurned John Kennedy's candidacy and then staunchly boosted Barry Goldwater. "The reason


for preferring private to public spending," Chamberlain countered, "is that a preponderance of the first kind of activity creates a society of free patterns. It is a question of the kind of society one wants, not a question of a statistical economic aggregates. It may be true that individuals often spend their money foolishly. But is that any reason for imposing the tastes of Professors Galbraith and Schlesinger on everybody? In a democracy can't one have tailfins if one likes them?" 52

Having delineated John Chamberlain's thought from *Farewell to Reform* to the present, the question remains: what "happened" to him? Why does one go from voting for Norman Thomas in 1932 to Barry Goldwater in 1964? 53

52 John Chamberlain, "Adlai Stevenson: Twice Burnt Offering," *National Review*, XIII (June 4, 1960), 359. He embroidered the same theme in an essay on "The Morality of Free Enterprise" when he wrote that since the state is "a mechanism of control that shares in the innate viciousness or the original sin, of average mankind, it should follow axiomatically that the less power it has, to exert compulsion on human choices between good and evil, the less likelihood that it will be able to impose on a people a total mistake." Frank S. Meyer, ed., *What Is Conservatism?* (New York, 1964), p. 181.

53 Chamberlain voted for Norman Thomas in 1932, Roosevelt in 1936 and 1940, Dewey in 1948 and then Eisenhower, Nixon and Goldwater. He didn't vote in 1944 because he didn't have the required residency in Washington, D. C. Chamberlain regrets voting for F.D.R. in 1940 for he believed the President "was trying to keep us out of war." He, also, wishes he had voted for Harry Truman in 1948. "for he turned out to be a good President." He has apparently, fifteen years later, forgiven Truman for "losing" China. (See footnote 45.) Chamberlain to writer, March 8, 1968 and June 14, 1968, in writer's possession.
John Chamberlain's political thought was changing, almost imperceptibly, from the mid-1930's on. The fact that he reluctantly voted for Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 and his reappraisal of the New Deal in *The American Stakes* corroborate this. The persistent preoccupation in Chamberlain's writings, for three decades, has been "power." In the 1920's, and as late as 1940, he trembled over business' power and concluded that Progressivism was a palliative. Then, immediately before and during the war, he began decrying Roosevelt's tremendous accretion of power and the rise of statism. Chamberlain, like John Dos Passos and Max Eastman and George Creel as Raymond Moley and Donald Richberg, came to believe that progressivism had been perverted by the "socialist liberals" and had transmogrified into a "totalitarian" phase. Dos Passos, for example, has insisted that American liberals refused to stop when a "balance of power" had been attained in American society and imperiously "went on leading us in the direction of a slave state."54

54Hicks, *Where We Came Out*, p. 181. According to Daniel Aaron, the radicalism of John Dos Passos "simmered in the early twenties, boiled furiously between 1927 and 1932, and began to cool thereafter." See his *Writers on the Left: Episodes in American Literary Communism* (New York, 1961), p. 348. Matthew Josephson discusses Dos Passos' conversion to conservatism on pp. 432-433 of
To amplify exactly what John Chamberlain meant by his contention that an encroaching network of statist restrictions were stifling individual liberties, the sole personal statement we have from him, regarding his conversion to conservatism, is included below. Chamberlain made this summation in his review of Robert Green McCloskey's *American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise: 1865-1900*. If he had written a book on this subject twenty years ago, Chamberlain confessed that he would have come to the same conclusions. Why not in 1952?

But something has happened to me in the past two decades. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. may attribute my change of mind to "fear," but in all sincerity I do not think that mere visceral shock accounts for my shift in orientation. I have merely lived to see at least four major brands of Statism tried out. I have seen Leninist and Stalinist Statism murder its millions in Soviet Russia. I have watched Hitlerian Statism kill Jews by the hundreds of thousands in central Europe. I have been a witness (sometimes on the spot) to the destruction of vitality and initiative forced by Socialist Statism in Britain. And I have lived through eighteen years of New Deal and Fair Deal governments that have cut the value of every insurance policy in America at least in half. That is what has happened to me, and I wonder therefore at the insulation

*Infidel in the Temple.* Chamberlain personally explains Dos Passos' "switch" by insisting that he was a radical during the 1930's only because he hated injustice. Dos Passos was not "in love with the illusory order of collective organization." *Freeman*, I (November 13, 1950), 21.
of Harvard University, where Robert Green McCloskey fills a chair as Assistant Professor of Government.55

By casually lumping together Leninist, Stalinist and Hitlerian statism with the New Deal, Fair Deal and England's Labour party reforms, he has equated them. The significant question, of course, whether the power is absolute or limited is disregarded. Since power is toxic, all governmental regulation, despite fundamental distinctions, let alone nuances, is anathema. Isaac Deutscher, in discussing the mentality of former radical Marxists, perceived that the radical's "blind hatred of his former ideal is leaven to contemporary conservatism. Not rarely he denounces even the mildest brand of the 'welfare state' as 'legislative Bolshevism'."56 Quite characteristically, Chamberlain has confronted us with another dramatic dichotomy: either political liberty or economic security. Before extending this analysis, it may prove useful to revert to the John Chamberlain of the 1930's.

Malcolm Cowley, in 1939, requested Chamberlain to prepare an essay on an author whose book had "changed


our minds." Chamberlain chose William Graham Sumner's *Folkways*. The essay he wrote is replete with rich insights. He confided that his father revered Sumner and even segregated his own college courses at Yale into two categories: those taken with A. G. Keller, Sumner's apostle, and "the rest which were presumably a complete waste of time. Naturally, I took in a good deal of Sumner through the pores. Sumner has been since my adolescence not so much an author as a presence." Chamberlain did criticize Sumner, but not for reasons we might suspect. While elucidating how Sumner's "economic theology" marred his scientific method, Chamberlain admitted that "laissez-faire is convincing as an ideal, even though human beings seem constitutionally averse to letting it work out in practice." If nothing else, this signifies that Sumner's ideas had a certain cogency for Chamberlain. Why, then, one will ask, did he linger before succumbing to Sumner's laissez-faire ideal? Why was it in 1951, rather than in 1939, that he cheered Sumner's *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* as an antidote to the "fallacies of Welfare State thinking...?"

The 1920's was an era, which witnessed the "deflation of American ideals." Ralph Adams Cram, the famous American architect, bemoaned the "nemesis of mediocrity" and denounced democracy for its naive assumption that men had the intelligence to govern themselves. Irving Babbit and Paul Elmer More sought to infuse democracy with an "inner check." Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks and Henry Mencken questioned the quality and purpose of American democracy. Novelists satirized what Vernon Parrington termed the "flatus-lent reality that is middle class America" and harassed the "complacent denizens of the Valley of Democracy."58 Intellectuals blasted America "as a nation of boobs, Babbits, and fanatics. Those who were young and free expatriated themselves; the others stayed home and read Mencken."59 George Mowry has commented that from these reservations articulated about democracy and progress by intellectuals, "one might have expected the weaving of a rather thoroughgoing cultural and philosophical conservatism." This development did not materialize because they despised the conservative, materialistic


59Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, p. 213.
culture of America represented by Calvin Coolidge, Henry Ford and Andrew Mellon. In their fight against that stultifying culture, the intellectuals' "chief ally had been the economic and political radical. To expect them to say farewell to old friends and to join the enemy across the political spectrum was perhaps asking for too much too soon. Most men require a decent interval and a few way stations to cushion an intellectual jump of that magnitude." Mowry's observation seems especially relevant to John Chamberlain and is a meaningful contribution in understanding why certain intellectuals abandoned radicalism.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., grappling with this problem, ventures the psychological hypothesis that "fear" is responsible for causing many radicals to become right-wing conservatives. Schlesinger, in discussing the political philosophy of a former Trotskyite radical, James Burnham (author of The Managerial Revolution and presently a colleague of John Chamberlain on National Review magazine) postulates that the "panic stricken intellectuals of 1934...have remained in a state of panic ever since. For them, the capitalist system has always

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been a fragile thing on the verge of imminent collapse before a revolutionary conspiracy; but, whereas they looked on this situation with complacency in the 1930's, they looked on it with horror in the 1950's. Still, the suppressed hysteria, the sense of crisis, the conviction of impending catastrophe have remained constant. This doubtless explains why, for example, Mr. Burnham backed revolution in 1934 and Senator McCarthy, twenty years later. He had changed a good deal less than it might seem on the surface.\textsuperscript{61} This interpretation deprecates voluntarism and assumes that only an irrational motive could possibly impel men to jettison their certitudes and intuitions. Schlesinger's theory may have limited applicability to some former radicals, but not particularly for John Chamberlain.

Speculating about the reasons for the present political attitudes of some of his former radical friends, Granville Hicks suggests that they may be "trying to prove to themselves as well as to others that they have become one hundred per cent respectable?" Perhaps again, says Hicks, they may be "moved by a sense of guilt for their youthful indiscretions" or may simply be "absolutists by temperament."\textsuperscript{62} Hicks' supposition

\textsuperscript{61}Sclesinger, \textit{Politics of Upheaval}, p. 675.

\textsuperscript{62}Hicks, \textit{Where We Came Out}, p. 192.
that an absolutist temperament may be important is a valid insight. Recall that in *Farewell to Reform*, Chamberlain asserted that "only conservatives and radicals" comprehended capitalism. His antipathy for Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, Charles Beard, George Soule, Stuart Chase and later for John Maynard Keynes, Harold Laski, Franklin Roosevelt and John Kenneth Galbraith is animated by this unverified assumption.

John Chamberlain is a radical in the eighteenth century sense. He dreads the concentration of power in too few hands; of society being divided into what Roberto Michels called a "minority of directors and a majority of directed. A strong sense of individualism seems to have always been paramount in his thought. Even when he was proposing socialist solutions during the 1930's this spirit remained dominant.

Everyone has a formative decade which he finds it forever impossible to escape. My own happened to coincide with the decade of the nineteen twenties, a time in which the individual, far from belonging to a 'lost generation' had everything going for him. Try as I might throughout the thirties and forties to adopt myself to a period of collectivist aims and varying types of group-think, I could never feel comfortable about it. I never felt good about life in America again until the fifties, when individualism--or voluntarism--again started to rear its head.63

He consistently reveals a preference for a politics of checks and balances which he fancies will establish an equipoise or stasis of social forces in the political order. During the 1920's and 1930's, Chamberlain's radicalism is enlivened by the overwhelming power business possessed. Economic power entrenched in the hands of a few businessmen debilitates democracy. Consequently, his caustic criticism of the New Deal is directed at the "early" reforms which apparently proved that Franklin Roosevelt desired to inflate the power of those whom Chamberlain already considered to have preponderant power. By 1940 he perceives that the locus of power has swung from business to the federal government and, retaining a consistency of sorts, he begins to attack this new leviathan. Chamberlain is in rapport with the position articulated by another intellectual recoiling from his radical past, Max Eastman. In his *Reflections on the Failure of Socialism* (1955), Eastman beseeched intellectuals to stymie any group in society from garnering excessive power. Intellectuals had to "learn to shift their attack from one threatening concentration of power to another...to change their aims--and what is more difficult--their allies as the conditions change."64

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John Chamberlain, in invoking a theory of social equilibrium, is addicted to a static conception of power. His rage for order has ensnared him in a dilemma. Shrinking from the erection of preponderant power in any one sphere, he becomes unable to see that resolution of the problem, adjusting equilibrium, entails adding power to another sphere. He cannot fathom George Santayana's distinction between power as a generative force and domination as a destructive one. As a radical in the 1930's he clamored for the emasculation of business' prerogatives, but when an effective countervailing power is introduced—witness the New Deal and Fair Deal—he is distraught. Since the maintenance of balance requires the constant application of pressure, Chamberlain's timidity, or more precisely, his anxiety concerning governmental power renders him incapable of gracefully acceding to permanent increments of strength. To borrow one of his own terms, he can't "stand the gaff."

Chamberlain today pines for a government that is a scrupulous regulator or umpire rather than an active promoter of social welfare services. Was it not precisely this view which he condemned in *Farewell to Reform*? As one of today's more prominent "Goldwater-conservative" intellectuals, John Chamberlain has, ironically, reverted to the rigid either-or ideological construct he postulated
in Farewell to Reform, i.e., you can have either
capitalism or socialism, not an amalgam or a welfare
state. His absolutism on the immiscibility of the
two economic systems and his static conception of
power, enables us to understand why the ideologue's
penchant for purism can be tragic.
CHAPTER 6

DWIGHT EISENHOWER AND THE WELFARE STATE:
THE POLITICS OF ACQUIESCENCE

On January 20, 1953 the Republican party's twenty year exile from the American presidency ended. Dwight D. Eisenhower had, at last, given Republicans the opportunity to rescue the nation from what they considered the disastrous policies enacted during the Roosevelt-Truman era. The Republicans prepared to halt the reckless spending, bureaucracy and centralization, not to mention the homosexuality and disloyalty, that had characterized the Democratic party's "twenty years of treason." They intended to dismantle the welfare state and restore America to fiscal sanity, limited government and the free enterprise system. Many Republicans, especially those in Congress, would have preferred Senator Robert A. Taft to lead this politics of restoration crusade, but they were confident that even General Eisenhower would bring redemption.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, a professional soldier, war hero, statesman and university president seemed, at first
glance, an unlikely figure to direct a counter-revolution.\(^1\) He had, in fact, been asked both in 1948 and 1952 by certain prominent liberal Democrats if he would be interested in the Democratic presidential nomination. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., for example, told the Americans for Democratic Action in 1948 that "in times of crisis the Democratic party has provided such great leaders as Jefferson, Jackson, Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. In keeping with this tradition, I am convinced that the Democratic party will again mirror "the overwhelming will of the American people, when its leaders meet at the Democratic national convention in Philadelphia, and will draft Dwight D. Eisenhower for President."\(^2\) In December, 1951 when the county clerk of Abilene, Kansas was asked Eisenhower's party registration, he replied, "I don't think

\[^{1}\text{The only balanced biography of Eisenhower's life is Marquis Childs, Eisenhower: Captive Hero (New York, 1958). Childs suggests that two trustees of Columbia deliberately made Eisenhower president of that university to enhance his presidential appeal. Childs states that Douglas Black, president of Doubleday and Thomas J. Watson of International Business Machines had Eisenhower appointed for future political reasons. See p. 108 of his biography for this account. See, also, on the question of Eisenhower's appeal, Herbert Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Political Appeal of President Eisenhower," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVII (Winter, 1953-54), 443-460.}\]

\[^{2}\text{Quoted in Clifton Brock, Americans for Democratic Action (Washington, D.C., 1962), pp. 87-94.}\]
he has any politics." This encouraged eastern Republican leaders to consider Eisenhower as a candidate capable of defeating both Senator Taft and any Democrat in 1952. On January 6, 1952 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, a liberal Republican, announced that Eisenhower had assured him that he was a Republican. The following day Eisenhower, then serving as N.A.T.O. commander in Europe, confirmed that Lodge had given "an accurate account of the general tenor of my political convictions and of my Republican voting record." With this admission Dwight Eisenhower became the candidate of the eastern wing of the Republican party. While Eisenhower may not have been explicit about his political beliefs before 1952, there were certain clues to the temper of his thought. He had warned, in his inaugural address of October 12, 1948 as President of Columbia University that "human freedom is today threatened by regimented statism." "A paternalistic government," said Eisenhower, "can gradually destroy by suffocation in the

immediate advantage of subsidy the will of a people to maintain a high degree of individual responsibility and is inevitably followed by a further concentration of powers in the state." The decisive reason for Eisenhower's Republican candidacy in 1952 (as he fully explained in his memoirs) was a conviction that the federal government possessed inordinate power.

Indeed, I was disturbed by what seemed to be a trend in thinking among our people, particularly the young, which held that problems—all problems—confronting us fell within the purview and responsibility of the federal government, that hard work on the part of the individual was no longer the key to his own social and financial betterment.

It soon became evident, if not during the 1952 campaign, that Eisenhower did not desire to extend New Deal programs. The 1952 Republican platform attacked the Democrats' for "losing" China and ineptly managing the Korean war. Republicans pledged to balance the

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5Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change (New York, 1963), p. 33. Bernard Baruch has also provided an insight into what animated Eisenhower to accept the Republican presidential nomination: "General Eisenhower and I became close friends after the war. I saw him frequently at Columbia University.... One question which interested us both, one which we often discussed, was the relationship between the individual and his government—how to strike a balance between laissez-faire and paternalism," Bernard Baruch, The Public Years (New York, 1960), p. 406.
budget, reduce the national debt, initiate "progressive tax relief," retain the Taft-Hartley Act and allow "each state to order and control its own domestic institutions."

While Eisenhower attempted to overcome the limitations of the Republican platform with rhetorical references to a "broad middle way," he did denounce the existing level of government intervention. "If all that Americans want is security," he remarked during the campaign, "then they can go to prison." Eisenhower's conservatism, or what he once called "good Kansas Republicanism," manifested itself in his theory of presidential power, his cabinet appointments and in his views on taxation, finance, natural resources, public power, regulatory commissions, agriculture and atomic energy. Although his State of the Union Message on February 2, 1953 revealed a sharp break with the 1952 Republican platform, it, also, demonstrated marked differences with former Democratic programs. Eisenhower asserted that government's major role in the economy was to be that of a "stabilizer."

He pledged to reduce taxes and the national debt, curb government spending, oust the government from collective bargaining negotiations, introduce "flexible" price supports for certain agricultural products and develop
natural resources through a partnership of public and private enterprise.\(^6\)

Henry L. Mencken once remarked that "no man would want to be President of the United States in strict accordance with the Constitution. There is no sense of power in merely executing the laws: it comes from evading or augmenting them."\(^7\) Dwight Eisenhower, however, conceived the president's role as administrative rather than creative. He often complained that Franklin Roosevelt had "usurped" Congress' power and that Congress had been "deprived" of its proper constitutional functions for two decades.\(^8\) Eisenhower adhered to the McKinley-Taft rather than the Theodore Roosevelt-Franklin Roosevelt tradition of the presidency. This weak-president model of the executive office, or Whig conception of the presidency, maintains that the president is empowered to do only what the constitution specifically allows. Theodore Roosevelt, speaking for the expansive use of the presidential power, believed

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he could do anything except what the Constitution specifically prohibited. Eisenhower followed the Whig belief, drawn from Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, that the president merely executed the laws which Congress approved. The president was not properly the center of power nor did he impose his will on Congress. Consequently, in his administration Eisenhower acted like a team captain or chairman of the board. He ran the presidency on strict administrative lines with a line-and-staff organization which delegated most decisions to the men directing various agencies. Only top policy-making decisions and mediation were left for the chief executive.9 This Whig Conception of the presidency, as we shall see, has direct relevance to the idea of a welfare state because while executive power is swift and certain, power funneled through a fractious, unorganized Congress is invariably slow. It serves as a convenient way to frustrate change and emasculate

legislative innovations. With this understanding of Eisenhower's conception of the presidential office his performance and policies can better be understood.

During the 1952 campaign Eisenhower promised to enlist the "best minds" in his administration. His cabinet selections indicated a profound reverence for the "self-made man" and American business. Eisenhower's appointees were mostly businessmen. They displayed an animus against governmental regulation and a suspicion of "intellectuals." What the country needed, in their judgment, was contained in Warren G. Harding's epigram--"more business in government and less government in business." Charles E. Wilson, president of General Motors, became Secretary of Defense. George Humphrey, an Ohio industrialist and president of the M. A. Hanna Coal Company, accepted the Treasury post. The new Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, a wealthy businessman and one of the Twelve Apostles of

For an appreciation of Eisenhower's incredible naivete in selecting a Cabinet see his Mandate for Change, pp. 123-130. When Eisenhower announced his Cabinet appointments the Christian Science Monitor headlined on November 22, 1952, "Ike's Cabinet Choices Mark Team of Shrewd Staunch Individualists." A superb example of the American intellectuals' revulsion over the Eisenhower administration's appointments is Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s "The Highbrow in Politics," Partisan Review, XX (March-April, 1953), 162-165. Schlesinger lamented the "vulgarization which has been the almost invariable consequence of business supremacy."
the Mormon Church, glorified self-reliance and detested federal subsidies to agriculture. Douglas MacKay of Oregon, the Secretary of the Interior, was an automobile salesman with an overt hostility to conservation and public power projects. Eisenhower selected Arthur Summerfield, another automobile salesman, as his Postmaster General. Sinclair Weeks, a New England manufacturer and former head of the National Association of Manufacturers, became Secretary of Commerce and two New York corporation lawyers, John Foster Dulles and Herbert Brownell, served, respectively, as Secretary of State and Attorney General. The former commander of the Women's Army Corps and publisher of the Houston Post, Oveta Culp Hobby, was named head of the Federal Security Agency, or as it soon came to be known—\mbox{the Department of Health, Education and Welfare}. It is not surprising that Labor Secretary Martin Durkin, a Stevenson Democrat and president of the plumber's union, found this atmosphere uncongenial. Durkin, who had received Eisenhower's pledge that the Taft-Hartley Act would be modified, resigned his post when the administration's intentions developed. His replacement, James P. Mitchell of New Jersey, was a former personnel manager. Eisenhower's Cabinet, the quip went, consisted of "nine millionaires and a plumber," or as Harry Truman
gibed, Eisenhower was nothing more than a "front man" for an "unholy crew" of industrial lobbyists. All the Cabinet members, observed Emmet John Hughes, were individuals of "clean intent, sober commitment and patriotic purpose." Moreover, even though "they now were 'the government'--they steadfastly believed that the less the government did, the more the people would progress and prosper."¹¹ Eisenhower who never referred to the Cabinet as "my cabinet" is said to have informed them: "You have full authority. I expect you to stand on your own feet. Whatever you decide goes. The White House will stay out of your hair."¹²

Both Eisenhower and the Cabinet were animated by several principles they considered sacred and immutable. High taxes stymied economic growth. Federal spending was distinctly inferior to private spending. Inflation could effectively be restrained by restrictive credit policies. Price and wage controls were unconscionable. Government subsidies to farmers and other groups had

¹¹Hughes, Ordeal of Power, pp. 59-60.

to be curtailed. Indeed, Eisenhower believed that if he could only balance the budget during his presidency, "he would feel that his time in the White House had been well spent." These principles, especially during the first Eisenhower administration, became transformed into policies.

Among the first changes the Republicans made were the abolition of all wage and price controls, the reduction of taxes and the number of government employees and the sale of government-owned synthetic rubber plants to private industry. Herbert Hoover and James A. Farley were appointed by Eisenhower on July 24, 1953 to the Committee on Government Operations. Their task involved recommendations on the possibility of transferring various federal government functions to the states. In his first press conference, Eisenhower exhibited antipathy toward existing farm programs and related his intention to reduce and ultimately abandon farm price supports. Flexible price supports were introduced by the Republican administration in the Agriculture Act of August 28, 1954. The new law empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to support the prices of basic commodities at between $2.25 and 90 percent of parity in 1955 and at from

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75 to 90 percent in 1956 and thereafter. Even this modification from Democratic programs did not entirely satisfy many Republicans. Ezra Taft Benson insisted that farmers were being debased by government largesse. He further argued that high, fixed price subsidies stimulated enormous surpluses, priced American products out of foreign markets and prevented farmers from adjusting to market realities.\(^{14}\) The Eisenhower farm program, like many other early administration policies, endeavored to reorient the nation away from New Deal methods.

An important insight into the differences between the New Deal and Eisenhower Republican philosophy became evident in the issue of public versus private power. Herbert Hoover had once stigmatized the proposed Tennessee Valley Authority as a "negation of the ideals upon which our civilization has been based." Eisenhower echoed this judgment by referring to the TVA and other federal government projects on June 11, 1953 as proof that "for the past twenty years there has been a creeping socialism in the United States." The TVA would neither be destroyed nor sold to private industry, but future projects would involve the federal government

only as a "partner." The Eighty-third Congress, with a Republican majority, vetoed the TVA's appropriation request to build a new generating plant for the Memphis area. Although provision for this project had been made in President Truman's last budget, the Eisenhower administration preferred private enterprise to supply the hydroelectric power. The Atomic Energy Commission, recently reorganized by Eisenhower, contracted to have the generating plant built by two private utilities represented by Edgar Dixon and Eugene Yates. Alabama Senator Lister Hill subsequently disclosed (before the project was completed) that the contract had been formulated by a consultant to the Bureau of the Budget who was, also, the vice-president of the corporation financing the Dixon-Yates operation. The administration's preference for private enterprise surfaced again when the President scuttled the plans to have the federal government build and control a dam at Hell's Canyon on the Snake River in Idaho. Eisenhower granted the Idaho Power Company authority to build and operate a series of small dams. During 1955 Eisenhower, also, vetoed a

15See Aaron Wildavsky, Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics (New Haven, 1962). Between 1952 and 1960 appropriations for TVA fell from 185 million to 12 million dollars. The numbers of employees was reduced from 21,300 to 15,000.
bill that would have freed natural gas producers from regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission not because he disagreed with this principle, but because excessive sums had been spent in enlisting Congressional approval.

Private interests, also, gained from developments in the atomic energy field. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did provide for government financing of atomic research, but another dimension was added. The operation of new atomic energy plants went to private corporations: General Electric at Hanford (Washington) and Union Carbide at Oak Ridge (Tennessee). This provision turned over a twelve billion dollar investment to private industry and "was a milestone in government abdication from the public domain."16

The most dramatic demonstration of the Eisenhower Administration's desire to reverse New Deal-Fair Deal policies in the public versus private power area appeared in the fight to return the offshore oil rights to the jurisdiction of the states. President Truman in 1946 declared that the federal government had exclusive rights

to all mineral deposits in the nearly 800,000 square miles of the continental shelf to an offshore depth of 600 feet from the mainlands. Such states as Louisiana, Texas and California protested the financial loss this decision involved. The Republican platform in 1952 favored returning the oil rights to the states. After acrid debate the Republican-controlled Congress in April, 1952 passed the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Act which transferred most of the nation's tidelands oil resources from federal to state jurisdiction. Neither the Republican party nor President Eisenhower considered any of these decisions injurious to the nation's welfare. Charles E. Wilson, Defense Secretary, expressed the administration's underlying sentiment when he informed Senator Richard Russell, during a Senate Armed Services Committee meeting, that "for years I thought what was good for the country was good for General Motors and vice-versa." Under the new Republican administration sharp differences with the New Deal-Fair Deal approach surfaced. Six months after his inaugural, Eisenhower


18Wilson's remark is usually distorted to read as "what's good for General Motors is good for the country." Eisenhower's rage after this misquotation has not yet subsided. See, Mandate for Change, pp. 149-150.
boasted, with some justification, that his administration had "instituted what amounts to a revolution in the Federal Government as we have known it in our time, trying to make it smaller rather than bigger and finding things it can stop doing instead of seeking new things for it to do." ¹⁹

This revolution Eisenhower alluded to continued throughout his first administration. In 1954 Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, who had restored Andrew Mellon's portrait to the Treasury office, formulated a new tax bill. Humphrey had earlier tightened credit by raising interest rates on new issues of government bonds. While this helped curb inflation, it, also, decreased industrial production and increased employment. Now, in 1954, Humphrey succeeded in reducing wartime excise taxes, excluding the first fifty dollars a taxpayer received from stock dividends and allowing for faster business depreciation "write-offs." It is unfair to brand either Humphrey or Charles Wilson as "1920

businessmen," yet in this tax bill, as well as the entire Administration's economic philosophy, loomed shades of the "trickle-down" theory of prosperity.

There were some important respects, nevertheless, in which Eisenhower continued New Deal policies. One was in demonstrating a willingness to utilize the federal government's resources to counteract an economic recession. When distressing economic signals began registering in late 1953, Eisenhower insisted that the federal government prevent "another 1929." The President persistently urged during numerous Cabinet sessions in 1953 and 1954 that action be taken to secure economic prosperity. He instructed Arthur F. Burns and Gabriel Hague and other economists on his Council of Economic Advisers to abandon any notions of economic self adjustment. Eisenhower, also, stymied the drive by right-wing Republicans to disband the Council of Economic Advisers by not appropriating funds for its maintenance. If this move had succeeded, the Employment Act of 1946 would have been discontinued. In this instance as in some others, Eisenhower exhibited less suspicion of the federal government than either his advisors or congressional Republicans.

20 Donavan, Eisenhower, p. 209.

21 Ibid., pp. 210 ff.
The Republican president, also, expanded several other New Deal innovations. In 1954 he horrified many Republicans by recommending extensions of the Social Security Act. The Republican Congress reluctantly approved his bill to cover an additional ten million people (most of them domestics, farmers, state and local government employees and clergy) in the program. Old age pensions, too, were increased. It was, however, in 1956 at the urging of a Democratic Congress that women were allowed to retire and receive their pensions at age sixty-two and disabled workers to do so at fifty. In 1958 the Democratic Congress raised the benefits and tax rates and increased the amounts the federal government remitted to the states for maternal and child welfare and public assistance projects. During his first administration Eisenhower, also, proposed raising the federal minimum wage, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, from seventy-five cents to ninety cents. On March 1, 1956 the Congress, mainly through the efforts of Illinois Senator Paul Douglas rather than the administration, made the minimum wage one dollar per hour.22

22James Mitchell, "Government and Labor in the Eisenhower Administration." Current History, XXXVII (September, 1959), 129-132, 145. Mitchell does not indicate that Eisenhower favored an increase in the minimum wage to ninety cents per hour.
Several other developments, also, demonstrated that Eisenhower had more concern with social welfare programs than right-wing Republicans. The 1954 Housing Act did not incorporate Eisenhower's suggestion that the federal government aid in the construction of one hundred and forty thousand public housing units per year. Congress only approved the construction of forty-five thousand new public housing units a year for four years. Congress, also, killed his 1955 proposal to loan two hundred million dollars for the construction of schools. Similarly, both the Congress and the American Medical Association repudiated the administration's call for a health insurance plan that would have established a federal re-insurance corporation to provide funds and encouragements to private companies offering hospital and physician care.23

It became increasingly evident, during the course of the first Eisenhower administration, that the president was slightly more liberal than his party and that both he and his close advisers (Arthur Larson, Malcolm Moos, Sherman Adams and Milton Eisenhower) realized that the welfare state was an immovable reality. For

these reasons toward the end of his first term and during the 1956 campaign, Eisenhower began to define his political philosophy as the "middle way" between the "reactionary Right" and the "radical Left." He wrote to a friend in 1955, for example, that America suffered from two types of political extremists. There were those who advocated monopolistic powers for the federal government and others who desired to totally eliminate the federal government from most activities. His "middle way" surpassed both these positions.

At the other extreme we have the people--and I know quite a number of them--who want to eliminate everything that the Federal government has ever done that, in one way or another represents what is generally classified as social advance. For example, all of the regulatory commissions established in Washington are anathema to these people. They want to abolish them completely. They believe that there should be no trade union laws and the government should do nothing to encourage pension plans or other forms of social security in our industry.

It is significant to note that the first time Eisenhower used the phrase "modern Republicanism" was on election night (November 7) 1956. After trouncing Adlai Stevenson for the second time the President declared: "And now let me say something that looks to

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24Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 82.
25Ibid., p. 528.
the future, I think that 'modern Republicanism' has now proved itself. And America has approved of 'modern Republicanism'." At a press conference on November 14, 1956, a week after his re-election, Eisenhower amplified his cryptic reference to a "modern Republicanism":

Now, I think I can tell you in a few sentences what I think about 'modern Republicanism'. It is a type of philosophy that recognized clearly the responsibility of the federal government to take the lead in making certain that the productivity of the economic machine is distributed so that no one will suffer disaster, privation, through no fault of his own.

Several months after this statement at another press conference on January 30, 1957 Eisenhower again described his administration's philosophy: "When it comes down to dealing with the relationships between the individual in this country and his government, the people in this administration believe in being what I think we would normally call liberal and when we deal with the economic affairs of this country, we believe in being conservative." Both Eisenhower's second inaugural address and fifth annual message to Congress on January 10, 1957 displayed a willingness to acquiesce to the federal


27 Ibid., pp. 1102-1103.

28 Ibid., pp. 97-108.
government's role in American life. When the President announced his budget request for fiscal 1958, it was quite clear that Eisenhower desired to continue past social welfare policies. He would not attempt repealing New Deal legislation. By submitting a 71.8 million dollar budget request (the largest in peacetime) to Congress, Eisenhower proved that "modern Republicanism" was to be more than a slogan. No single act of the eight Eisenhower years had a more unnerving effect upon unregenerate anti-New Dealers and even certain Cabinet members than this budget request. It symbolized for many Republicans complete abdication to what they hoped would be only a passing phenomenon—the New Deal. Eisenhower's budget besides being unbalanced, also, left intact social welfare programs, foreign aid and high taxes. Despite his position in the administration, Treasury Secretary Humphrey predicted that unless spending were reduced we "will have a depression that will curl your hair."

29Donovan, Eisenhower, p. 61; Hughes, Ordeal of Power, pp. 236-241.

Nevertheless, President Eisenhower persistently reasserted his views on "modern Republicanism" and sought to persuade recalcitrant Republicans in Congress to endorse his program. While it is difficult to credit Eisenhower with a "political philosophy" or attempt to analyze his "political thought," many of his statements from 1956 on indicate that he was groping for some articulate expression of what the Republican party's role should be. In 1956 Arthur Larson, a speechwriter for Eisenhower and one of the few "intellectuals" who advised the administration, published his thoughts on progressive Republicanism. Larson's *A Republican Looks at His Party* conceded that essential New Deal and Fair Deal reforms must be retained and complemented. Old age security, disability pensions, unemployment compensation, medical care and improved public housing and education facilities were essential to the preservation of freedom in an industrial society. Larson espoused a shift in Republican ideology from stolid and sterile protestations against the New Deal to creative and positive alternatives. Emphasis upon local government and private enterprise, traditional Republican themes, remained prominent. The book's fundamental message, however, was that Republicans had to recognize the
permancncy of New Deal reforms. After reading Larson's plea for a reformed Republican party, Eisenhower told Sherman Adams that Larson had "expressed my philosophy of government as well as I have seen it in a book of that size."  

Although Eisenhower had defeated Stevenson by nearly ten million votes and was aggravated over reactionary proposals thrust upon him by right-wing Republicans, he did not propose any major reform program at the outset of his second presidential term. His State of the Union Message to Congress on January 10, 1957 repeated the traditional homilies on inflation, spending and the federal government's power. Only in two areas did Eisenhower advocate reform legislation. He urged passage of a school construction bill and a civil rights program. The administration's school-aid bill was defeated in 1957 by the conservative Republican-Southern Democratic alliance in Congress. The National Defense Education Act, signed by Eisenhower on September 2, 1958, while providing loans to students did not include federal


32 Adams, Firsthand Report, p. 298.

33 The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, pp. 3068-3075.
aid for new classroom's and teacher's salaries. As
Eisenhower evaluated Congressional opposition to edu-
cation reforms he began assuming a more active role in
convincing his own party to recognize social change.
"I happen to believe," he declared on April 11, 1957,
"that in this day and time we cannot use the govern-
mental processes that were applicable in 1890. We have
got to adopt the great principles of the Constitution
to the inescapable industrial and economic conditions
of our time, and make certain that our country is
secure, and our people participate in the progress of
our economy."\textsuperscript{34} One hundred years ago the agricultural
problem necessitated a federal Homestead Act. Today,
Eisenhower explained to a group of Republican workers
on June 11, 1957, price supports, the soil bank and
federal research are necessary. Education reform came
in the late nineteenth century through Justin Smith
Morrill, a Vermont Republican, in his Land Grant Act.
The problems of the 1950's could only be met effective-
ly by federal aid to education. "It is the problem
that has changed the principle has not."\textsuperscript{35} The

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D.
\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 447-458.
rhetorical pronouncements made by Eisenhower during his second term should not blind us to the actual record of his administration.

Besides education the only other reform the President advocated in his 1957 State of the Union Message was civil rights. In this regard, Eisenhower compiled a creditable record. His administration had earlier appointed forty-seven negroes to important positions, abolished racial segregation in schools serving military bases as well as in veterans' hospitals and naval bases. The armed forces were completely integrated and racial discrimination was abolished in restaurants and places of amusement in the District of Columbia. Eisenhower, also, endeavored to persuade firms with government contracts to end discrimination. Adam Clayton Powell, a Negro Democratic Congressman from New York City, supported Eisenhower rather than his party's nominee in 1956. Finally, on September 9, 1957 Congress passed the President's civil rights bill establishing a bipartisan Commission on Civil Rights to investigate denial of voting rights. In a real sense, this civil rights act, the first such piece of legislation in over eighty years, represents the most meaningful achievement of the second Eisenhower administration. The other accomplishments, which many historians
invoke as proof of Eisenhower's ratification of the welfare state, were not rooted in the New Deal social reform structure. In addition to education and civil rights reform, Eisenhower did, in his second term, extend the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act which reduced tariff rates by five per cent. He, also, created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, admitted Hawaii and Alaska to the Union, reformed illegal labor union practices and established, under the Kerr-Mills bill, a federal-state medical care program. Yet, none of these actions, and they represent the highlights of 1956-1960, are indicative of a broadly conceived social reform program. The 1948 Democratic platform, for instance, had advocated statehood for Alaska and Hawaii. The Russian Sputnik triumph in 1958 made space research and education reform imperative. Moreover, the increasing Democratic majorities in Congress from 1954 on compelled Eisenhower to confront various reform measures. Several policies that Eisenhower endorsed and which are adduced as evidence of his desire to extend the welfare state structure were imposed by Congress. It was Senator Hubert Humphrey in 1954 who revived Henry Wallace's soil bank idea of paying farmers to take their land out of production. Eisenhower reluctantly adopted it in 1956 after intense criticism
of his farm program. When he proposed a national interstate highway system in 1955, Congress defeated the legislation because it would have been financed by a federal bond issue which, liberals claimed, would enrich bankers. Then, and only after a Congressional veto, did Eisenhower consent to financing the highway program by new taxes on gasoline, tires, trucks and buses. Even the administration-supported Kerr-Mills medical bill, passed in September, 1960, displayed a spirited impatience with the federal government's role in fostering reform. This legislation introduced federal grants to states for the "medically needy," but invested plenary authority and responsibility with the individual states. It is significant that John F. Kennedy in the 1960 campaign demanded that a medical care program be based on the Social Security Act. Kennedy realized that the Eisenhower medical care reform would not involve the federal government's participation in any major sense. The only other action taken during Eisenhower's second administration which relates to the welfare state is the President's behavior during the 1957-58 economic recession. In that recession Eisenhower immediately utilized governmental remedies to invigorate the economy. "No administration before or since," wrote John Kenneth Galbraith, "has given the economy such a
massive dose of Keynesian medicine." 36 Yet, the crucial question that must be asked about this policy decision and many others is--what other options could the President have realistically embraced?

A remarkable unanimity exists among American historians on the significance of Dwight Eisenhower's presidency. Virtually all historians, in both textbook accounts and interpretive essays, have praised Eisenhower for "accepting" the welfare state. Frank Freidel maintains that Eisenhower did not violate the New Deal, but rather "accepted" and in some instances even expanded its reforms. 37 Eisenhower did not "repudiate" nor even "dare to repeal or emasculate," according to Carl Degler, the legislation which constituted "the vitals of the New Deal." 38 For Richard Hofstadter Eisenhower's primary historical function was in legitimizing what had been wrought by Roosevelt and Truman. Precisely because he left intact certain domestic reforms, "it made them


more generally acceptable by passing them, so to speak, through the purifying fire of eight years of Republicanism and thus confirming that they represented, after all, a bipartisan consensus.\textsuperscript{39} Some historians, in appreciation of this development, have bestowed "greatness" on Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{40} Is it proper, however, to acclaim Eisenhower as the savior of the welfare state? Is there any


evidence that he desired to achieve this effect? Does the fact that the welfare state survived a Republican administration mean that Eisenhower deliberately sought to insure its longevity? Eisenhower's failure to substantially revise or discontinue New Deal-Fair Deal innovations does not mean that he did not desire or attempt to do so. There is more than a semantic difference or nuance between acceptance and acquiescence.

There is little evidence to contend, as Arthur Mann has, that Eisenhower "took office on the claim that progressive Republicans could administer the welfare state better than liberal Democrats." Neither in the 1952 campaign, nor in the early days of his presidency did Eisenhower make any such assertion. The policies adopted from 1952-1954, as we have seen, were


hardly rooted in the New Deal reform structure. While the advocacy of a "modern Republicanism" in 1956 may represent a rhetorical shift in Eisenhower's presidency, there was no actual enlargement of the welfare state from 1956 through 1960. Granted that right-wing Republicans and former progressives like Creel, Richberg and Moley were clamoring for the demise of the welfare state. The question remains: could it have been done? Was it politically feasible to repeal social security, abolish farm subsidies, amend the Wagner Act, dissolve the TVA or cease regulating securities and security exchanges. Indeed, did American business desire a return to an unregulated economic system? Eisenhower's performance should not be judged by comparing his policies to the rantings of intransigent right-wing Republicans.\textsuperscript{43} Certainly, he behaved less drastically than we had reason

\textsuperscript{43}Certain intransigent right wing conservatives, to be sure, regarded Eisenhower as a Republican Franklin Roosevelt. Robert Welch, founder and director of the John Birch Society, believed that while Eisenhower "invariably came out with some bombastic phrase, to the effect that we must all work like dogs to stop creeping socialism, at the very time when he was most ardently those men and measures, of his own administration, which were actively helping socialism to creep upon us more insidiously and further than ever before." The Politician (Belmont, Massachusetts, 1963), p. 111. See, also, William F. Buckley, Jr., "Mr. Eisenhower's Decision and the Eisenhower Program," in John Chamberlain, ed., National Review Reader (New York, 1957), pp. 187-194.
to believe Senators Knowland or Bricker would. This is because he realized, to his dismay, that the welfare state had become an immovable reality. It could not be ignored, dislodged or annulled. There could be no major reversal. America had become irretrievably committed, during the New Deal-Fair Deal era, to a new role for government. Eisenhower, after some inept efforts to extirpate the welfare state, acquiesced to its permanency. There is nothing which demonstrates that Eisenhower deliberately sought to consolidate and amplify past social reforms. Perhaps the best way to corroborate this interpretation is by considering Eisenhower's own evaluation of his presidency:

If the nation should turn decisively, for instance, toward sound fiscal procedures in government, toward less intrusion into the business and individual lives of the nation, toward depending more, in pursuit of national objectives, upon the initiative and ambitions of its millions of citizens and localities and toward methods calculated to prevent further erosion in the value of our currency, then the future would hold encomiums for my administration as the first great break with the political philosophy of the decades beginning in 1933. The years of my two terms would be counted as some of the most meaningful during our national existence.44

CHAPTER 7

THE CONSERVATISM OF BARRY GOLDWATER:
THE REVOLT AGAINST THE WELFARE STATE

The welfare state concept developed during the
New Deal and subsequently extended and refined in the
Fair Deal, Modern Republicanism, New Frontier and Great
Society programs is putatively regarded as a permanent
institution in American history. Its acceptance is
attested to by "a consensus among a substantial majority
of the population that the government should continue to
perform a wide range of economic functions."\(^1\) Americans
no longer believe, historians contend, that that govern-
ment is best which governs least and laissez-faire
economics "survives more as a tradition than actuality."\(^2\)
Americans have endorsed the proposition "that in the in-
terests of the general welfare the state should restrain
the strong and protect the weak...."\(^3\) The "searing

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\(^1\)W. W. Rostow, "The National Style," in Elting E.

\(^2\)Nye, This Almost Chosen People, p. 160.

\(^3\)Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General Welfare State,
pp. 399-400.
ordeal" of our Great Depression "purged the American people of their belief in the limited powers of the federal government and convinced them of the necessity of the guarantor state." The New Deal symbolized "the crossing of a divide from which, it would seem, there could be no turning back." It has become so significant a part of "the American Way, that no political party which aspires to high office dares now to repudiate it."4

It is true that the Republican party from 1936 through 1964 refrained from directly challenging the New Deal's social welfare reforms. In the Congressional elections of 1934, they castigated Roosevelt's programs as "socialistic" and "un-American" and became the first party since 1866 which failed to augment its Congressional strength after losing the presidential election. Having absorbed this punishment, the Republicans pragmatically began emphasizing their progressive policies and leaders. In 1936 they chose a progressive Midwestern governor, Alfred Landon of Kansas, to battle Franklin Roosevelt on an unusual Republican platform. Landon, unlike Herbert Hoover, dismissed the Jeffersonian animus against governmental power. "As civilization becomes more complex," said Landon, "government must increase."

The Republican platform in 1936 endorsed the principle

4Degler, Out of Our Past, pp. 415-416.
of old age and unemployment payments. It pledged to protect the rights of labor to organize and bargain collectively, through representatives, of its own choosing "without interference from any source." It endorsed state minimum wage and hours laws for women and children despite the Supreme Court's rulings. Denouncing the New Deal only in the "generalities of campaign oratory," the Republicans concealed the "abandonment of traditional principles behind a smoke-screen of rhetoric." The United States experienced its first election in which no major political party espoused the philosophy of limited government. The surging popular acceptance of the New Deal awakened Republicans to political reality. The election of 1936, became a great watershed in American political history because the philosophy of the "abortive Bull Moose movement of 1912 had finally captured both major parties."

Other examples which illuminate the Republicans' acquiescence to the New Deal's ideological coup came in 1940 when they nominated Wendell Willkie, a former

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Democrat, for President. They repeated this approach in 1944 and 1948 when Thomas Dewey, a progressive governor of New York state, carried the party banner. Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the Republicans' recognition that social reforms insured electoral victory appeared in 1952 when the party claimed credit, quite correctly, for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation principle embodied in the Banking Act of June 16, 1933. The very fact that they felt compelled to indicate that it was progressive Republicans, led by Senator Arthur Vandenberg over President Roosevelt's opposition, who secured this financial reform demonstrated Republican understanding that governmental reform had been approved by the American people. Finally, neither Dwight Eisenhower's presidency nor Richard Nixon's candidacy in 1960, evinced a desire to repeal New Deal policies.

Senator Barry M. Goldwater's nomination in 1964, however, constituted a direct assault upon the welfare state and an attempt to govern the United States on a pre-New Deal basis. Goldwater's function in the American political tradition has been that of registering his complete dissent with the manner in which government has performed since 1932. An analysis of Goldwater's

philosophical and political response to the concept and reality of the welfare state will reveal the sheer weight, if not quality, of the indictment he has written. The election of 1964, it will be argued, was intended by Senator Goldwater and all the opponents of the welfare state to be a referendum on the question of the federal government's role in American life. That this issue became obscured during the campaign should not blind us to its transcendent importance. Thirty-two years after Herbert Hoover had solemnly warned that his struggle against Franklin Roosevelt was "more than a contest between two men and "more than a contest between two parties," but rather "a contest between two philosophies of government," Barry Goldwater came to ask whether America truly desired to continue this perhaps imperceptible, but destructive course "down the road to socialism." Astonishingly, Goldwater in presenting "a choice, not an echo" prepared to show that the New Deal hardly symbolized "a divide from which...there could be no turning back," only a temporary aberration in American history. What distinguished Goldwater from his Republican predecessors was not his ideology, rhetoric or even political philosophy, but his "willingness to put that philosophy into practice."8

Barry Morris Goldwater was born in the coarse western frontier town of Phoenix, Arizona on January 1, 1909. His grandfather, Michael Goldwasser, a Polish-Jewish immigrant arrived in the Arizona territory in 1863 and developed a successful dry-goods store. Goldwater had a comfortable middle-class upbringing. His mother, a pioneer from Nebraska, raised him in her faith—Episcopalianism. As a child in the frontier community, Goldwater imbibed the doctrines of self reliance and individual initiative that would become the foundation of his political credo. He attended a military preparatory school (Staunton Academy) in Virginia and then entered the University of Arizona in 1928. The onset of the depression in the following year forced him to withdraw from college and assume, along with his brother, active management of the family's department stores. He later married Peggy Johnson of Muncie, Indiana, an heiress to the Borg-Warner fortune. After World War II service as a fighter pilot, he returned to manage the family business.

In 1949 Goldwater ran for local elective office as a reform candidate. He served as a member of the bipartisan Phoenix Charter Committee which was responsible for desegregating certain facilities in the city. Goldwater, also, concerned himself with the plight of the
Indians in Arizona and, for a time, was a member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Eventually, Phoenix's "Man of the Year" in 1951 became the Republican candidate for the Senate. Dwight Eisenhower's electoral sweep helped Goldwater defeat the Democrats' Senate Majority Leader, Ernest W. McFarland. When questioned, after his victory, about what "kind" of Republican he was, Goldwater replied: "Well, I am not a me-too Republican.... I am a Republican opposed to the superstate and to gigantic bureaucratic, centralized authority."  

Goldwater respected and admired Dwight Eisenhower. He believed the President's political attitudes to be similar to his own. When the administration's specific proposals, however, began contradicting its rhetoric, Goldwater concluded that concessions to "the New Deal philosophy of government" were being made. Modern Republicanism, as we have seen, advocated a shift in the  

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9The following are all biographies of Goldwater: Edwin MacDowell, Barry Goldwater: Portrait of an Arizonan (Chicago, 1964); Frank R. Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater (New York, 1964); Fred J. Cook, Barry Goldwater: Extremist on the Right (New York, 1964); The most objective biography, though quite favorable to its subject, is Jack Bell, Mr. Conservative: Barry Goldwater (Garden City, 1962).  

party's strategy from vapid protestations against a "dead Roosevelt" to positive and creative alternatives. Liberal Republicans, like Arthur Larson, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Malcolm Moos and Milton Eisenhower, were advising the President that such goals as old age security, medical care, unemployment compensation, public housing projects and federal aid to education were essential to the preservation of meaningful freedom in an industrial society. Goldwater regretted that Eisenhower was not reversing the New Deal trend. Only a modified approach, not a substantive difference, distinguished progressive Republicans from Democrats. Their ideological affinities with New Deal collectivism meant disaster for the party and the nation.

Goldwater's ideas on political decentralization, economic individualism and a rigid interpretation of the Constitution placed him in the "Old Guard" wing of the Republican party. He drew assignments to the Senate Labor Committee on Public Welfare and to its subcommittees on Labor (1955), Veteran's Affairs (1955), Aging (1959), Education (1960), Migratory Labor (1960-62) and Railroad Retirement (1963). Along with Senators William Knowland and John Bricker, he fought to halt

11 Ibid.
the welfare state's incursions. On April 8, 1957 he rose on the Senate floor to protest President Eisenhower's budget request. With turgid language and absolute impartiality, he admonished his party's leader. Goldwater charged that twenty years of New Deal-Fair Deal experiments in socialism had made many Americans susceptible to the doctrine of federal paternalism. Republicans had an obligation to repudiate that approach and allow the free enterprise system maximum scope. Liberal Republicans were subverting the party's true function.

It is equally disillusioning to see the Republican Party plunging headlong into the dismal state experienced by the traditional Democratic principles of Jefferson and Jackson during the days of the New Deal and Fair Deal. As a result of those economical and political misadventures, that great party has now lost its soul of freedom; its spokesmen are peddlers of the philosophy that the Constitution is outmoded, that state's rights are void, and that the only hope for the future of the United States is for our people to be federally born, federally housed, federally clothed, federally supported in their occupations and to be buried in a federal box in a federal cemetery.12

Senator Goldwater's degree of support for the Eisenhower administration's programs ranged from a high of 63% to a low of 52%.13 Invariably, he voted against

12 *Congressional Record*, 85th Congress, 1st Session, April 8, 1957, pp. 52, 59-5255.

legislation that either initiated or continued the federal government's participation. Representing an arid state dependent for its prosperity on the federal reclamation system did prevent him, however, from opposing such federal works projects as the Colorado River Storage Program. He favored returning the tidelands to the states, exempting independent natural gas producers from federal control and the Bricker amendment. When the Senate voted on December 2, 1954 to condemn Senator Joseph McCarthy, Goldwater rallied to his aid. America would revere McCarthy's name in another era, he prophesied, when they understood the meaning of his implacable hostility to Communists. Several years later, Goldwater related that "because Joe McCarthy lived, we are a safer, freer, more vigilant nation...."14

His advocacy of national "right-to-work" legislation, mandatory secret union votes before strikes could begin and the application of anti-trust laws made him an anathema to labor organizations.

...I strongly favor enactment of State-right-to-work-laws which forbid contracts that make union membership a condition of employment. These laws are aimed at removing a great blight on the contemporary American scene, and I am at

a loss to understand why so many people who so often profess concern for civil rights and civil liberties are vehemently opposed to them. 15

The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations considered him their arch-foe and in 1958 they tried to defeat him for re-election. When the Senate approved the 1959 Kennedy-Ervin labor bill, by a vote of 90 to 1, Goldwater cast the lone dissenting vote because this labor reform bill did not eliminate "blackmail picketing" and secondary boycotts. Senator John Kennedy was moved to observe that his colleague "would be satisfied with no bill that did not destroy the organized trade union movement in the United States."16

Goldwater's voting record exemplified his conviction that the Republican party should present a distinct choice to the American voter. On January 24, 1959 at a meeting of the Republican National Committee, he reiterated his preoccupation: "Let the Republican Party quit copying the New Deal, seeking only for votes and remember that a two party system needs two


philosophies, not just one."17 At the Western Republican Conference, in November, 1959, Goldwater affirmed what the party's role in the 1960 election should be:

For twenty five years the apostles of the welfare state have been busy transforming that stern old gentlemen in a top hat, cut-away coat and red, white and blue trousers from a symbol of dignity and freedom and justice for all men into a national wet nurse dispensing a kind of patent medicine labeled 'something for nothing'--passing out soothing syrup and rattles and pacifiers in return for grateful votes on Election Day.18

The Republican platform in 1960 exhibited no "Old Guard" skepticism regarding the federal government's role in American life. An administration sponsored study of 1959, "Decisions for a Better America," influenced the Republican platform. Republicans pledged in 1960 to extend federal aid to education, double the rate of immigration, formulate a medical care program, propose extensive civil rights legislation and help labor win "closed shop" agreements. Eisenhower's "New Republicanism"


was to be sustained by the Nixon-Lodge administration.

Republicans believe in a central government vigilantly alert to the needs of the people and strong enough to defend the people, to help keep the economy in balance and to make certain that a life of dignity is within the reach of every American. ... The Republican Party stands for a strong responsive Federal Government opening and advancing economic opportunity for the American people ... rising its strength to ward off inflation and depression ... restraining and disciplining any who use their power against the common welfare regulating wisely when the national interest demands it.19

Goldwater, whose name had been placed in nomination, stifled a move by his enthusiasts to challenge Nixon at the convention. He exhorted Republicans to unite and ignore any heretical principles in the platform. Despite "individual points of difference, the Republican Party Platform deserves the support of every American over the blueprint for socialism presented by the Democrats."20

Conservative Republicans attributed the party's narrow defeat in 1960 to the startling similarities between the two parties. Millions of conservatives, they claimed, refused to vote because no real choice existed. Nixon and Lodge had devoted unnecessary effort to win Northern votes when the South and Midwest

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20 Quoted in Shadegg, Goldwater, p. 34.
were ripe for plucking. "We who are conservatives," Goldwater commented, "will stoutly maintain that 1960 was a repeat performance of 1944 and 1948, when we offered the voters insufficient choices...." The Republican right wing, in the aftermath of the 1960 defeat, asserted its views and counsels and gradually succeeded in securing strategic party positions. Senator Goldwater squelched the liberal Republican stratagem of Rockefeller, Javits and Keating to eliminate him from the post (to which the party had elected him for three two year terms) as Chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee. It was from this post that Goldwater, almost daily, preached the conservative gospel and literally enchanted both rank and file Republicans and important party leaders. "I am watching with growing hope and enthusiasm your political strategy," General of the Army Douglas McArthur wrote to him on February 3, 1961. "A great vacuum exists that you can fill. Never


22James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy (New Jersey, 1963), pp. 284-288; See, also, Donovan, Future of the Republican Party, 29-42; J. W. Daly argues in his "American Conservatism and Liberal Mythology," Dalhousie Review, XLVI (Summer, 1966), 172-185, that Republicans such as Nelson Rockefeller not Goldwater are the extremists in the party.
let up and never flinch. Dramatic and startling events lie just ahead."23

What enabled Goldwater to become the leading contender for the 1964 Republican nomination, however, was not a specific electoral strategy, but rather his slashing offensive assault against American liberalism. The Los Angeles Times induced him, in 1960, to become a syndicated columnist. With his column "How Do You Stand, Sir?" and his book The Conscience of a Conservative (1960), Goldwater attracted a significant following to his crusade against the federal government. From 1960 through 1964, Conscience of a Conservative sold over three and a half million copies. This book, which won him national prominence, displayed a vocabulary of criticism rooted in Jeffersonian principles. It is not hyperbole to maintain that Goldwater's entire political philosophy, as expressed in this book, could be reduced to Calvin Coolidge's proposition that "where the people are the government they do not get rid of their burdens by attempting to unload them on the government" and Grover Cleveland's similar declaration that "though the people supported the government, the government should not support the people."

23 Quoted in Bell's, Mr. Conservative, p. 195.
The farmer is told how much wheat he can grow. The wage earner is at the mercy of national union leaders whose great power is a direct consequence of federal labor legislation. The businessman is hampered by a maze of government regulations, and often by direct government competition. The government takes six per cent of most payrolls in Social Security Taxes and thus compels millions of individuals to postpone until later years the enjoyment of wealth they might otherwise enjoy today.24

Moreover, in no respect, did Goldwater indicate that American history since 1932 had affected him. His speeches could be interchanged, at will, with those of Herbert Hoover's. Pre-New Deal, rather than anti-New Deal, is the more apt description for his mentality. Conscience of a Conservative denounced domestic policies of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. Goldwater's extreme legalism, or his rigorous cramped interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, caused him to demand that any powers not specifically delegated to the federal government in the Constitution, should be exercised by the state.25 Federal aid to education was unconstitutional and unnecessary. All incomes should be taxed at the same rate. The graduated tax was a confiscatory tax.


25Ibid., p. 25.
The idea that a man who makes $100,000 a year should be forced to contribute 90 per cent of his income to the cost of government, while the man who makes $10,000 is made to pay 20 per cent is repugnant to my notions of justice. I do not believe in punishing success.26

A free market should be restored to agriculture because price supports not only debilitate the farmer's self reliance, they were, also, economically misconceived. He questioned the efficacy and value of another ingrained reform besides the progressive income tax--the Social Security Act of 1936. Franklin Roosevelt should have made it voluntary.

I'll say here that Social Security is a part of our American life. I wish that, when they framed it, they would have made it voluntary. If a man wants it, fine; if he doesn't, he doesn't have to take it. But this compulsion—you have to do it—is one of the denials of the freedoms that is very dangerous in this country....27

The pernicious aspect of the social welfare programs inspired by the New Deal was that they debased "the individual from a dignified, industrious self-reliant spiritual being into a dependent animal creature without his knowing it. There is no avoiding this damage to character under the Welfare State."28

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26Ibid., p. 61.


28Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, p. 73.
Goldwater spoke unequivocally about how America might be returned to free enterprise, individual initiative and the constitution "as it was written one hundred and eighty years ago, not as it is being interpreted today." Americans had to understand that government regulation and supervision was not a universal panacea for social problems. The federal government, in fact, should disengage itself from reform programs begun during the New Deal.

The government must begin to withdraw from a whole series of programs that are outside its constitutional mandate—from social welfare programs, education, public power, agriculture, public housing, urban renewal and all the other activities that can be better performed by lower levels of government or by private institutions or by individuals. I do not suggest that the federal government drop all of these programs overnight. But I do suggest that we establish, by law, a rigid timetable for a staged withdrawal.29

A conservative has been defined, facetiously, as a man who has grown fond of the order which liberals have forced on him. Conservatives, themselves, have always affirmed that if an institution existed, its existence was prima facie evidence of its validity and viability. Yet, in a real sense, Barry Goldwater's Conscience of a Conservative, and as we shall see, his 1964 presidential campaign, reflected the reactionary's revulsion

29 Ibid., p. 66.
against the status quo and a longing to return to the
status quo ante--America before the New Deal. "My aim
is not to pass laws," Goldwater wrote, "but to repeal
them. It is not to inaugurate new programs, but to
cancel old ones that do violence to the Constitution,
or that have failed in their purpose, or that have im-
posed on the people an unwarranted financial burden.
I will not attempt to discover whether legislation is
'needed' before I have first determined whether it is
constitutionally permissible."  

Goldwater, as Chairman of the Senatorial Cam-
paign Committee, best selling author of Conscience of
a Conservative and vigorous guardian of the "Old Guard"
faction's principles, became the New Frontier's nemesis
in the United States Senate. He was an important leader
of the right-wing Republican and Southern Democrat
forces that rejected major proposals submitted by the
Kennedy administration. Civil rights legislation,
medical care for the aged, tax reform and aid to education
all were rejected by the Congress. In 1962 Goldwater
boasted of how congressional conservatives had preserved
the national equilibrium from New Frontier radicalism:

...Congress has rejected plans for marked change
in our political and economic structure. It has
refused to open the way to federal management and

30 Ibid., p. 23.
control of the education system, except through the limited provisions of the National Defense Education Act. It has compelled both Republican and Democratic presidents to reduce ambitious and ill-defined foreign aid programs. It has declined to approve any large-scale expansion of the Social Security Act. It has kept a jealous eye on labor union power. It has refused to sanction federal intervention in local municipal affairs by rejecting a Department of Urban Affairs proposed by the President.31

On January 11, 1961 Goldwater delivered a statement on "Proposed Republican Principles" to the Senate. This manifesto differed sharply from the 1960 Republican platform and presaged the platform Goldwater Republicans would frame in 1964. He resurrected a phrase first used by William Graham Sumner and later suggested to Franklin Roosevelt by Raymond Moley--"the forgotten man." Goldwater meant to convey exactly what Sumner intended almost a century before. Diligent, dutiful, religious middle class Americans were being penalized by paternalists in Washington who redistributed their incomes to deprived Americans and, more importantly, to citizens speaking through powerful interests. The Republican Party in this era in which so many pressure groups are seeking

to dominate the 'total man,'" intoned Goldwater, "should be the voice of the ignored individual, 'the forgotten American'."\(^3\)

With the publication in 1962 of "Declaration of Republican Principle and Policy" by the Joint Congressional Committee on Republican Principles, a salient shift in the party's ideology became apparent. The progressive Republicanism suffusing the 1960 platform was absent. Clearly, the conservative Republicans were dominating the party's councils. This report criticised the Democrat's repudiation of the free enterprise system, its use of governmental coercion in the steel crisis and condemned the federal government's inordinate power.

"We believe as Republicans," the report stated, "in the individual's right and capacity to govern himself--to set his own goals--to make his way to them without the restraints of dictatorship or paternalism."\(^3\) It was a fitting prelude to the 1964 platform. "If you want to make American politics logical and clear and get a final clear-cut decision," Walter Lippmann remarked in 1963, "the Republicans ought to nominate Goldwater and

\(^3\)Congressional Record, 87th Congress, 1st Session, January 11, 1961, pp. 576-582.

at least get a Republican who is a Republican." While Lippmann's statement did not reflect a personal preference for Goldwater, it did express the desire of many different people. President Kennedy, for example, "fervently hoped" that Goldwater would oppose him. Kennedy anticipated routing what he considered right wing radicalism. On January 3, 1964 Barry Goldwater declared his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination promising to offer the American voter "a choice, not an echo." This pronouncement implied the strategic decision to redefine Republicanism and "to sharpen its differences from New Deal and post New Deal Democracy...." That Goldwater managed to wrestle the nomination away from the grasp of liberal Republicans, (thereby becoming the first congressional conservative to be nominated since Warren G. Harding) stupefied many people. While many factors caused Goldwater's nomination, it is crucial to recognize that his nomination did not represent "the ascendancy of an ideological faction alien to the party."  

35 Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 849.
If Goldwater failed to impress voters who considered themselves Republicans, he did reflect "the policy preferences of many party activists and leaders." Goldwater's Republicanism evoked spirited support from those in the party frustrated and enraged over "me-too" acquiescence to New Deal policies. He espoused a "fundamentalist conservatism" strong in the Middle and Rocky Mountain West among Republicans—not satisfied with the "moderate conservatism of the eastern states."

These Republicans gloat about being "the heart and soul of the Republican Party, uncorrupted by the liberalism that has softened the eastern wing, and are determined to recapture the conservative spirit of the 1920's and earlier times." They were a part of what Seymour Martin Lipset once called the "radical right"—individuals


trying "to eliminate from American political life those persons which threaten its values or its economic interests."40 "For twenty years, the controversy on the conservative position has hovered over our party like a menacing specter," cried Everett Dirksen placing Goldwater's name in nomination at the 1964 convention. In Dirksen's opinion, enough concessions to socialism had been made. At last the party had a Republican capable of extricating America from the morass. "Why is it that this man who so certainly has sounded the call to conservatism," asked Dirksen, "should be subjected to the abuse which has been heaped upon him? Is it because he offers a choice, a clear-cut choice, that the Democrat Party, as now constituted, does not dare face?"41


41 New York Herald Tribune, July 16, 1964, p. 8. It was particularly fitting for Dirksen to place Goldwater's name in nomination. It was Dirksen who, twelve years before, had blasted the liberal wing for leading the party to defeat. Dirksen expressed the view animating many Republicans since 1936: "Let the Republican Party take a fearless, unequivocal Right position, and reborn in the form of an American Conservative Party, it may find that it has inherited the future." Harold Lord Varney, "Autopsy on the Republican Party," American Mercury, XL (January, 1937), 12.
Barry Goldwater achieved the nomination because he convinced convention delegates that he could accomplish the obliteration of welfare statism. His ideas were "an expression of a very old streak in the American political character, the streak of anti-governmentalism, of would be anarchism." Goldwater became the symbol, if not the apotheosis of the "revolt against the whole modern condition as the old-fashioned American sees it—against the world of organization and bureaucracy, the welfare state, our urban disorders, secularism, the decline of American entrepreneurial bravura, the apparent disappearance of individualism and individuality are the emergence of unwelcome international burdens." 

Aguste Comte thought that in every political system there existed a party of progress and a party of order.

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Walter Bagehot made the same point when he said that there were always two forces operating in politics—an innovating or reform spirit and a conservative one. These propositions may not accurately describe the entire history of the Democrat and Republican parties in the United States, but in a general sense, at least since the New Deal, the Democrats have proposed innovations while the Republicans emphasized order. Goldwater's presidential candidacy, however, thrust a revolutionary function upon the Republican party. No longer would mere "braking" or thwarting welfare state reforms, as with Taft and Eisenhower, suffice. In nominating Goldwater, they gambled to discover whether it was possible to reverse and repeal American political history since the New Deal. Yet, by selecting Goldwater the Republicans repudiated their history because, as the New York Herald Tribune correctly noted, he was "an uncompromising crusader against not only the Democratic but the Republican record."44

The ideological purism animating conservative Republicans became truly manifest when they spurned amendments to the 1964 platform (on civil rights, the John Birch Society, tactical control of nuclear weapons, etc.) offered by the liberal wing. The complexity and diversity of American political parties and the necessity to embrace the political center for electoral victory usually dissipates extreme doctrinaire behavior. Both the Republican platform in 1964 and the refusal to concurate the losing faction by bestowing on it the vice-presidential nomination exacerbated the tension within the party.\(^\text{45}\) The Goldwater Republicans' intransigence exhibited a "churlish and paranoid desire

\(^{45}\text{For an understanding of the intensity of Goldwater's conservatism consider the reasons why he selected William E. Miller as the vice presidential candidate. Goldwater made these remarks to a private meeting (reporters were not present) of leading Republican party members at a conference in Hershey, Pennsylvania on August 12, 1964: "Bill is a tough fighter, not that we are going to wage that kind of campaign, but we can expect from the opposition certainly a lot of it. And I wanted a man with me who could return the fire, so to speak. He is very experienced in congressional matters. He is a lawyer, which offsets my lack of legal training. He has a very, very charming wife and family. And, too, he comes from New York and I come from the Far West." Hess, In A Cause That Will Triumph, p. 168. On Goldwater's refusal to adhere to coalition politics see, Richard Hofstadter, "Goldwater and His Party," Encounter, XXIII (October, 1964), 3-13 and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians and the Two-Party System," Review of Politics, XXVII (July, 1965), 386-413.}
for vengeance rather than for accommodation and a closing of ranks against the Democrats. 46 "I know we probably won't win in November," remarked a Goldwater aid after his nomination. "Winning control of one of the two major parties is victory enough for me." 47

When Barry Goldwater triumphantly intoned, in his acceptance speech to the Republican convention, that the "good Lord raised up this mighty Republic to be a home for the brave and to flourish as the land of the free--not stagnate in the swampland of collectivism..." 48 he was not displaying mere campaign phillipics or agitating


47 Joseph Sterne, "The Old Guard Returns," Reporter, XXXII (February 11, 1965), 28. F. Clifton White, a former Cornell University political science instructor, who directed Goldwater's drive to the nomination has explained that Goldwater supporters were determined to make and keep the Republican party a "conservative" party. "The Reminiscences of F. Clifton White," Columbia University, Oral History Project, p. 1.

party loyalists with political rhetoric. This militant posture dramatically conveyed his intention to campaign on the same ideological certitudes underlying Conscience of a Conservative and responsible for his nomination victory. Karl Hess, Goldwater's chief speech writer, has reported that the Senator knew the nature of his movement was not organizational, but ideological.49

Several years before Goldwater's nomination, a biographer explained that his appeal was to people's hearts, not their minds.50 Significantly, the most publicized Goldwater campaign slogan in 1964 was: "In your heart, you know he is right." Perhaps not since William Jennings Bryan had there been a presidential aspirant so determined to propagate a holy cause--in this case, the cause of conservatism. After carefully studying him during the 1964 campaign, Theodore H. White concluded that Barry Goldwater wanted "believers" more than he wanted the presidency.51 Precisely, because he was a


50Bell, Mr. Conservative, p. 62.

"partisan evangelist" reinforcing the original beliefs of his sympathetic audiences, Goldwater encountered staggering problems in transforming his ideological certitudes into a coherent political program with national appeal. He really believed that what he had espoused in *Conscience of a Conservative* and to innumerable Republican party workers during his tenure as Chairman of the Senatorial Campaign Committee constituted an adequate program for action. Goldwater was oblivious to the fact that "what sounds good on the banquet circuit may not make feasible policy, that statements, manifestos and polemics are very far from pragmatic programs...."52

What had exhilarated his loyal zealots would alarm all those Americans unattuned to his ideology. His demise was inevitable, for as long as he preached "ideology alone, he was able to ride high, wide and handsome. But the moment he was forced to discuss issues-programs he was finished."53 The tirades he fired at governmental tyranny in *Conscience of a Conservative* and in other speeches and articles returned to haunt him. Would you


discontinue Social Security? Would you sell the T.V.A. to private owners? Would farm subsidies be eliminated? Would the Sixteenth Amendment be repealed?

Although Goldwater did modify his position on several issues (thereby contradicting former pronouncements), he failed to assure voters that radical changes would not follow his election. Repeal of the Income Tax Amendment, he explained, was not his intention. "Our present tax burden is onerous, often inequitable and in need of reform." "I reject completely," he further declared, "the Administration position that the income tax is most useful as a means to redistribute wealth according to politically-conceived blueprints." Even though the Social Security Act had been a mistake, it would not be discontinued. The T.V.A. as well would not be sold to private owners, but some of its "white elephants" would be ditched. "As for Federal law in the areas of public accommodations and private employment, I have grave doubts on constitutional grounds. In my opinion, the Constitution grants neither a Federal responsibility nor Federal authority in these areas." He pledged to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if elected President, despite the fact that he had voted
against it for being unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, he did not wish to preside over a new era of laissez-faire. Government's chief economic responsibilities were to prevent inflation and deflation and regulate the quantity of circulating money through the Federal Reserve System. These functions, and no other, constituted the federal government's role. By providing a favorable climate for business through the adoption of the correct monetary and fiscal policies, a surging economic upswing would ensue. Goldwater specifically repudiated the federal government's responsibilities for economic stabilization that the Employment Act of 1946 had inaugurated.

\begin{quote}
It is no part of the government's business to tell an employer what he shall charge for his product or what wage he shall pay his employees. It is not part of the government's business to tell a worker that he should not ask for a higher wage than some government statistician calculates is proper. That way
\end{quote}

lie price and wage control, regimentation and stagnation.55

Such mild reconstructions of former statements did not, of course, conciliate liberal Republicans or move Goldwater towards the political center. Persistently, he delineated the enormous differences separating the Republican and Democratic parties. Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal were often used as prime strategic weapons. Lyndon Johnson, asserted Goldwater, was a direct descendant of the man who had first subverted America. "Well I say that Franklin Roosevelt gave him his programs, his political philosophy, his political compass. This Administration is a child of depression-born theories and its current family chieftain is a captive of those theories."56 Moreover, he deliberately sought to confront groups favored by New Deal policies and register his disapproval. For example, he chose Knoxville, Tennessee as the site to propose T.V.A.

55"Goldwater's Economics," Business Week, September 26, 1964, 180; See, also, Milton Friedman, "The Goldwater View of Economics," New York Times Magazine, October 11, 1964, 35. Friedman an economics professor at the University of Chicago and past President of the American Economic Association was Goldwater's chief economics advisor; Friedman received assistance from Warren G. Nutter of the University of Virginia and W. Glenn Campbell, Director of Stanford University's Hoover Institute. See, also, James C. Tobin, "Barry's Economic Crusade," New Republic, October 24, 1964, 13.

56Goldwater, Where I Stand, pp. 110-111.
reforms. In the Appalachian region, he condemned the poverty programs as "phony" and "irresponsible." If Roosevelt's 1936 assertion that one-third of the nation lived in poverty was accurate, why were his devotees claiming that the same, or even a larger percentage, were still suffering? This proved that the New Deal's approach to eliminating poverty had failed. By reducing the incentives for enterprise and abolishing the consequences of inertia, the situation had been aggravated.

"The cause of poverty, the condition which results from an inadequate income, is the inability on the part of a large number of Americans to qualify for the millions of adequately paying jobs which are going begging." 57

"The fact is that most people who have no skill," he once remarked, "have had no education for the same reason--low intelligence or low ambition." Throughout the campaign, Goldwater continued to accentuate his differences with existing policies. 58 At the National Plowing Contest in North Dakota he informed farmers that a "gradual decline" in subsidies "would be good


58 See Chapter 4 of George Mayer's The Republican Party (pp. 528-558) for a discussion of Goldwater's campaign.
for you." To retired people in Florida, he further obfuscated his position on Social Security and opposed the medical care bill. "If it is entirely proper for government to take from some to give to others, then won't some be led to believe that they can rightfully take from anyone who has more than they?" When certain advisors attempted modifying his statements and suggesting realistic compromises Goldwater remained adamant. The American people had to understand that he presented a distinct alternative. "I will not attempt to buy the votes of the American people. I will not treat any of you as just so many special interests. I will not appeal to you as if you were simply pocketbooks, surrounded on all sides by self-serving concerns." The Sunday before the 1964 election, the New York Times requested the candidates to describe the important issues at stake in the campaign. Here again it was evident that for Barry Goldwater freedom meant the absence of government. "Does anybody really believe," he asked, "that government can make us rich and happy and confident and secure?" Two days later Goldwater learned the answer to his question.

He polled almost seven and a half million votes less than Richard Nixon did in 1960 and became the first Republican candidate to lose Vermont. The Goldwater "undertow" cost the party innumerable congressional seats and over a five hundred seat loss in state legislatures. Even his vaunted penetration into the deep South does not insure future Republican allegiance from that region.\(^{62}\) Ironically, the very institution Goldwater wanted to destroy grew even stronger by his overwhelming loss. The liberal 89th Congress meaningfully extended the welfare state. They revised the House Rules Committee's operations, won the Department of Housing and Urban Development, liberalized immigration laws, doubled antipoverty funds, increased the minimum wage, included more workers in Social Security coverage and passed the medical care bill. Barry Goldwater made a "startling contribution to the first really significant and general extension of the New Deal since the 1930's. It was his campaign that broke the back of our postwar practical conservatism."\(^{63}\)

While Goldwater's opposition to the welfare state does not in itself explain his massive repudiation, it


\(^{63}\)Hofstadter, *Paranoid Style*, p. 115.
did convince many voters that he was the radical and not the conservative candidate. The authors of a recent study of the political beliefs of Americans suggest that Goldwater's candidacy was predestined to fail "for the simple reason that the great majority of Americans are operational liberals who will not tolerate an out-and-out operational conservative as President." Americans are schizoid, they submit, because while conservative in the ideological sense of fearing governmental power, they favor government sponsored reform. The 1964 election "was a referendum on whether Government power and resources should continue to be used to accomplish social objectives—and the outcome was never really in doubt." Whatever their doubts, noted James Reston, after the election, Americans "went along with the welfare state at home and coexistence with the Communists overseas rather than reverse the trend of the last generation."

64 Free and Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans, p. 161.

65 Ibid; Angus Campbell of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center contends that the election returns do not prove that Goldwater's conservatism "or any other particular feature of the Goldwater campaign was the cause of the Republican's overwhelming defeat." See his "Interpreting the Presidential Victory," in Cummings, ed., The National Election of 1964, pp. 256-

Barry Goldwater's reaction to the welfare state differed, in an important respect, from that of Dwight Eisenhower or Robert Taft. Both Eisenhower and Taft were advocates, if reluctant ones, of various aspects of the federal government's role in promoting social justice. The crucial difference between Eisenhower and Taft when compared with Goldwater is that they knew the welfare state could not be repealed. They attempted to brake, but not reverse America's drift to welfare state policies. If the rhetoric of the three men frequently appears indistinguishable, we should recall that Eisenhower and Taft never sought to repeal the Sixteenth Amendment or the Social Security Act or to deny the federal government's role in education. Senator Taft, like President Eisenhower, held a more sanguine view of government reform than Senator Goldwater. Taft recognized that the federal government had to secure every

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historians are Democrats. See his "The Bias of Historians" in the appendix to his Presidential Greatness (New York, 1966), pp. 337-339. However, an unabashed Goldwater supporter has written some unique and untenable explanations for Goldwater's defeat. See Forrest MacDonald, The Torch is Passed: The United States in the Twentieth Century (Reading, Massachusetts, 1968), p. 462.

family decent housing and provide medical care, welfare payments and subsidies to education. Taft did not oppose minimum wage laws as Goldwater did. He never asserted that farm price supports should be abolished. Indeed, Taft wanted to expand the Social Security program. He once informed President Eisenhower that the "best way" to stymie bureaucracy "and at the same time help people would be to have the federal government pay a flat fee to the states for every child in school, and automatically to send out a monthly pension check, also of a fixed amount, to every man and woman who reached the age of sixty-five."68 Eisenhower found him to be "twice as liberal as I am" and his views "miles away from those of some self-described 'Taft stalwarts'."69 The authors of the only study on Taft's political principles concluded that he "did not shrink" from required governmental action to preserve liberty.70

68Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 274-275; Hughes, Ordeal of Change, p. 333.

69Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 274.

Goldwater's doctrinaire ideological renunciation of the welfare state was not conservatism. It was not even the conservatism of Eisenhower and Taft. Goldwater could not accept the social and economic changes that have been incorporated in American life. His serious effort to dismantle the welfare state reflected a desire to restore America to a pre-New Deal level of government participation. He saw nothing in American social reforms worth conserving since 1932. Goldwater's Manchester liberalism, strict construction of the Constitution and angry polemics made him more a right-wing ideologue than a Burkean conservative. Edmund Burke's name abounds in Conscience of a Conservative and was frequently invoked by Goldwater. An authentic Burkean conservative would, however, recognize that a country without the means of change is a country without the means of continuity. The inability or refusal to distinguish between progressivism and radicalism, socialism and social welfare reforms and a regulated free enterprise system and nationalization bespeaks a conservatism of futility and petulance. If Barry Goldwater could not understand Edmund Burke's wisdom, he might have learned much from Robert Taft. "The truth

Reporter, I (October 11, 1949), 28-30; See, also, Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style, pp. 97-98.
is that though Taft fought history he never made the egregious error of supposing that history could be ignored or reversed."71

CHAPTER 8

THE NEW LEFT AND THE WELFARE STATE:

A RADICAL DISSENT

From the New Deal through the 1964 election opposition to the welfare state came almost exclusively from the political Right. During the early 1960's, however, a new radicalism emerged in American politics that was profoundly hostile to the federal government's role in fostering social reform. This "New Left" movement was significantly more than the typical generational protest of "beats" against societal conformity. Primarily, it was an indicator of acute social alienation or the distance between an individual and his society. Many young people exhibited their estrangement from "the American way of life," traditional partisan politics and, perhaps most importantly, from pragmatic liberalism. The various intellectuals and groups comprising the New Left movement have no formal ideology, no single major organization and no one reform program. They are united only by a common revulsion against such value-inculcating agencies as family, school and church. Their radical critique of the socio-economic structure is non-Marxian.
A vague non-ideological radicalism celebrating "commit-
ment," "bearing witness," "self-realization," "integrity," 
"community" and "participatory democracy" is paramount. 
Unlike radicals of another generation galvanized into 
reform movements by the depression and fascism, the New 
Leftists are predominantly young, affluent and outraged 
over the dehumanization, impersonality and purposelessness 
of American life. They rail against the "phoniness," 
"corruption," "police brutality," "brinksmanship" and 
bureaucracy" rampant in society. The new radicalism is 
distinctly eclectic. Conflicting elements of anarchism, 
socialism, pacifism, existentialism, humanism, populism 
and bohemianism can all be found in their statements and 
articles. Their inspiration is drawn from a wide range 
of heroes--Christ, Gandhi, Ernesto "Che" Guevara and 
Martin Luther King, Jr. They read the philosophy of 
Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown and Erich Fromm and the 
 writings of C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, A. J. Muste, 
Albert Camus, Regis Debray and Frantz Fanon. Their 
forebears in the American past, they maintain, were 
Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman and Joe Hill and "Big Bill" 
Haywood of the Industrial Workers of the World.

We who would basically reorient society... 
trace our heritage not to Dewey but Debs, not 
to Norris but Joe Hill, not to John Stuart 
Mill but Sam Adams and the Sons of Liberty. 
The liberals are indeed fine people. They
want much the same things we do—equality, freedom, justice. The issue is whether the present institutions are flexible enough to effectuate such goals, or whether we need new institutions.¹

The origins of this new radical thrust in American politics stem from certain developments during the 1959-1962 period. Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution, Caryl Chessman's execution, the investigations of the House Committee on Un-American Affairs and the first civil rights "sit-in" in Greensboro, North Carolina all excited the idealism of many Americans. John F. Kennedy's presidency, too, provided an additional impetus to social reform.² It is indisputable, though, that the major


cause of the New Leftists' growth was the civil rights movement. The Negroes' agonizing existence, rather than bureaucracy in government and universities, Castro or Mao, became their animating concern and their "moral equivalent of war."

Civil rights agitation stimulated the growth of new radical organizations and rejuvenated older left-wing groups. This New Left activity in American politics, due to its variegated and amorphous nature, defies precise description. In seeking to determine who are the New Leftists and what organizations they belong to, a basic distinction must be kept in mind. There is a Communist and a non-Communist political Left in the United States. An ideological reformulation of the "Old Left" of the Communist party and former Trotskyites has occurred simultaneously with a new radical growth. To the former category belong the Progressive Labor party, Youth Against War and Fascism, May Second Movement, W. E. B. possession. See, also, on the origins of the New Left--James P. O'Brien, "The New Left's Early Years," Radical America, II (May-June, 1968), 1-25.

DuBois Clubs and the Young Socialist Alliance. The New Left organizations and individuals analyzed in this essay, however, belong only to the non-Communist category. They include such groups as the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Racial Equality and the Students for a Democratic Society. This last group is the largest and most influential New Left group. SDS was founded at Port Huron, Michigan in June of 1962. The manifesto adopted at this convention is the best single expression of New Left beliefs. SDS has over eight thousand activists in one hundred chapters operating on a two hundred and fifty thousand dollar yearly budget. Its libertarian slogan—"Let the people decide," may be considered the representative sentiment of the non-Communist Left. It is this particular aspect of "participatory democracy," linked with a fierce antagonism against the welfare state that persistently recurs in the speeches, manifestoes, books and articles of the New Leftists. What accounts for their hostility to the welfare state? Why do they disdain the New Deal? Why

do they despise liberal Democrats more than right-wing Republicans? What is the nature and source of their radical vision? How do they seek to promote social justice?

Central to the New Left's estimate of American life is the conviction, taken from C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite*, that since World War II an interlocking directorate or ruling clique of business, military and political chieftains dominate the country. This triumvirate plus leaders from the churches, universities, and labor unions determine "not only the economy and policy but the standards and ideals of the nation."\(^5\) Economic power in the United States, according to Gabriel Kolko, "is dominated by a small class, comprising not more than one-tenth of the population, whose interests and style of life mark them off from the rest of American society. And within this class, a very small elite controls the corporate structure, the major sector of our economy, and through it makes basic price and investment decisions that directly affect the entire nation."\(^6\) This "Establishment,"


in effect, directs and controls every aspect of life in the United States. For the New Leftists real progress cannot come through the "Establishment" but only against it. They insist that the liberal's basic misapprehension is that power in America is dispersed among competing institutions which balance each other. No real power exists independently of the political, corporate and military elite. Neither the workers, the poor, the students nor any other group possesses any meaningful "decision-making power." America is a mass society manipulated by a mass media reinforcing the decisions made by "Big Business" and "Big Brother." William Appleman Williams has explained this development in these terms:

Our humanity is being pounded and squeezed out of us by the consolidated power of a nationalist corporate welfare capitalism. We are pummeled to the edge of insensibility by Big Brother and hugged to the threshold of suffocation by Big Daddy. We are being transferred into object-oriented beings whereas the essence of radicalism is to insist that we are people-oriented people.)

Williams' contention is that existing institutions from the Cold War to domestic social reform have been established and administered by political liberals who affirm

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7William Appleman Williams, (Address at the Seventeenth Annual Dinner of the National Guardian), National Guardian, November 27, 1965, p. 5.
that the large corporation is the most desirable means to organize social and economic life. "I would define America as a liberal state with conservative, corporate goals," declared Tom Hayden, president of the Students for a Democratic Society. American politics is the politics of "liberal corporatism." Authoritarian, hierarchical corporate structures decide what is to be done and the programs are formulated in the manner of modern corporate management.

Because the New Deal "turned liberalism into a set of administrative routines to defend rather than a program to fight for," the New Left scorns the achievements of the last three decades. "In the long run," Marc Shleifer asks, "What did the New Deal do? Besides the Smith Act?" Shleifer concluded this typical New Left plaint by noting that he was coming more and more

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"to hate my brainwashed childhood's beloved memory of Franklin D. Roosevelt."^10 They are disillusioned not merely over the New Deal's failure to eradicate racial segregation. Even specific reforms like the Wagner Act, Social Security, public housing and unemployment compensation elicit their ire.

But there is, in fact, little evidence to justify the view that the social reforms of the past thirty years actually improved the quality of American life in any lasting way, and there is much evidence which suggests that many of the reforms gained were illusory or token, serving chiefly to sharpen the capacity of the system for manipulation and oppression.11

The New Deal's perverse legacy was the welfare state with its destructive paternalism, bureaucracy and coercion. Liberals, by proferring palliatives and opiates to the poor, minimize social friction and subtly perpetuate class domination. If it seems preposterous to


attack a government which dispenses medical care, old age payments, unemployment compensation and a score of other benefits, we must realize, the New Leftists point out, that the "Establishment" does so because spending automatically increases its own profits and brings the class place which disarms any possible opposition to its imperialist foreign policies. Carl Oglesby, a founding father of SDS and described by a student of the new radicalism as the "archetypal New Leftist," has elucidated this New Left belief:

And as business and government cooperate to rationalize and dominate the world political economy, chanting 'peace, law, order' just as the old Romans did, so they cooperate to rationalize and dominate the domestic political economy. The ultimate demand is for nothing short of total order, total control--the total state of the total world.

American liberalism, they submit, is committed to a domestic policy designed to prevent meaningful change at home and an essentially analogous foreign policy. The welfare state rests upon "militarism and imperialism abroad and cultural despotism at home...."

struggles of the oppressed peoples of Santo Domingo, Cuba, Saigon, Selma and Watts are congruent. The New Leftists discern a basic characteristic in liberal intellectuals which explains their "despotic statism" at home and abroad. "At the heart of the welfarist mentality is an enormous desire to 'do good to' the mass of other people, and since people don't usually wish to be done good to, since they have their own ideas of what they wish to do, the liberal welfarist inevitably ends by reaching for the big stick with which to push the ungrateful masses around." For this reason, the New Left frequently refers to liberals with Harry Elmer Barnes' phrase--"totalitarian liberals." 15

Perhaps the most effective way of demonstrating the New Left's repudiation of the New Deal's reforms and contemporary liberal programs is to examine their views concerning poverty in America. The liberals' fundamental error, in their judgment, is that they regard poverty as a deviation from the American ideal, as a dysfunction of the economic order, rather than a permanent characteristic. As Robert Theobald, a New Left economist, maintains, both conservatives and liberals desire to preserve an "industrial scarcity socio-economic system in an era

of abundance." All efforts to eliminate poverty will be nugatory because "our present industrial system was not designed to distribute additional goods but to produce additional goods."\(^\text{16}\) Besides this basic flaw in the liberals' approach, there are other factors which account for the persistence of poverty in the United States. They concur with Michael Harrington's observation that the welfare state created in the 1930's "was created by, and for, the 'middle third' of American society: the liberal middle class and the organized workers." The poor were ignored. The fundamental paradox of the welfare state, for both Harrington and the New Left, was that it was not established for the "desperate," but for those who were "already capable of helping themselves."\(^\text{17}\) Nothing was done for impoverished sharecroppers, tenant farmers, migratory workers, farm laborers, slum dwellers or unskilled workers. American society has not attained, in their judgment, a substantial measure of social and economic democracy. They maintain that the basic distribution of income and wealth in the United States "is essentially

\(^{16}\text{Robert Theobald, "Political Necessities of Abundance," Liberation, IX (June-July, 1964), 32; Paul Jacobs, "Re-Radicalizing the De-Radicalized," New Politics, V (Fall, 1966), 17.}\)

\(^{17}\text{Michael Harrington, The Other America (Baltimore, 1963), pp. 16, 157-158.}\)
the same as it was in 1939, or even 1910." Moreover, the welfare state, actually, debauched those who did receive its benefits.

There is an American welfare state; but there is not much 'welfare' in America for the poor people it was to have served. Automation is accused of creating a human slag heap of useless people; but the welfare state has already done that. To the extent that welfare programs do reach the people who need them, their very 'professionalization' combined with the realities of American politics and class divisions in the corporate era, has created and maintained a dependency while suffocating political initiatives.19

What especially upsets the New Left is the "powerlessness of the poor," who are victimized, initially, by a brutal economic and social system and later abused by the government agencies which dole out their subsistence. They do not share in the decisions which affect their lives. They are left out of the planning and execution of programs designed to reform them. A pernicious dehumanization of the poor occurs because the


welfare state rehabilitates them by bestowing gifts from the powerful to the powerless. Like American students, the poor are "pushed around, itemized and processed..." In their contacts with various government agencies, they are "treated either punitively or in ways which reinforce their feelings of dependency, and frequently both." It is incontrovertible to the New Left that the poor are the major victims of the welfare state. They possess no power, work for slave wages and are conscripted, disproportionately, to fight in America's imperialist wars. A frequent example, which appears in New Left writings on the exploitation of the poor, is the federal urban renewal program. Federal bureaucrats, local business cliques and city governments decide what is to happen in every urban renewal program, while those most intimately involved, the poor, are disregarded. The bulldozer of urban renewal, the New Left asserts, enriches only real estate and


21Paul Jacobs, Prelude to Riot: A View of Urban America From the Bottom (New York, 1967), p. 8. Charles Silberman, who is not a New Leftist, has articulated one of their basic attitudes toward welfare agencies. Silberman maintains that "one sometimes has the feeling that welfare agencies almost welcome failure, for failure if repeated frequently enough only demonstrates the need to expand their services still more." See his Crisis in Black and White (New York, 1964), p. 311.
construction interests. It is interesting to note that what many young radicals sensed instinctively about the urban renewal program was corroborated by a 1964 study sponsored by the Joint Center for Urban Studies at Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Martin Anderson's *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962* indicated that the federal urban renewal program had been regressive. It benefited only high-income groups and "actually aggravated the housing shortage for low income groups."

What is the New Left's solution to poverty? The fundamental necessity is to discontinue the centralizing style of organization that characterizes the liberals' welfare state approach. Power must be given to the poor. They must have active and preponderant control over the decisions and institutions affecting their existence. All former anti-poverty programs have been ineffective and ruinous because "planners" insist upon directing and manipulating the poor, rather than delegating control to them.


The socialist radical, the corporatist conservative and the welfare state liberal are all equally capable of leading us into the totalized society. Whether central planning should be coordinated by government or corporate hands is a question whose realism has disappeared. The urgent question is about the locus of power in the community: Is it in the state or is it in the people? And in our American time, our American place, the main principle of the radically humanist politics is this: Any decision not made by the people in free association, whatever the content of that decision, cannot be good.

Various "community unions" with an anarchical decentralization, like those described by Paul Goodman in his People or Personnel, must be established. A real pluralism or variety of "local power centers" where decisions can be made at the lowest political level must supplant "coercion," "top-down direction," "central authority," "bureaucracy" and "excessive planning." "The core radical ideas and values of community, equality, democracy, and humaneness," argues William Appleman Williams, "simply cannot... be realized and sustained—nor should they be sought—through more centralization and consolidation. These radical values can most nearly be realized through decentralization and through the creation of many truly communities."25

24 Oglesby and Shaul, Containment and Change, p. 164.
A salient New Left belief is that local governments being closer to people are superior to the federal government in effecting social reform. They, also, share with "Goldwater conservatives" an enthusiasm for Milton Friedman's negative income tax proposal. Both groups are eager "to scuttle the social workers and the public welfare bureaucracy."26 This relates to the New Left's endorsement of Robert Theobald's guaranteed annual income plan. What is so appealing about Theobald's idea to the New Left is that income would be divorced from work. Each individual would have an absolute right to a specific sum. The poor would not receive their income as a gift of the welfare bureaucracy. Their dignity would not be violated. They would not be "lifted" to "our level." Yet, the negative income tax and guaranteed annual wage proposals must be supplemented by other programs in the New Left's opinion. A "community movement" like those established by the Students for a Democratic Society in Newark or Cleveland, or Saul Alinsky's Woodlawn Organization in Chicago, which emphasize organization of the poor, strikes, protests, community centers and cooperatives and insurgent political campaigns are examples of what the New Left means by "participatory

democracy."27 Unlike the welfare state's "manipulative democracy," "participatory democracy" fosters genuine community, humaneness and self-respect.

The New Left's opposition to the welfare state, as we have seen, derives from a different matrix than that of the right-wing conservative. There is, nevertheless, a strong similarity between the radicals of the Left and Right--les extremes se touchent. They both, although for different reasons, abhor the New Deal. They both decry the federal government's centralization, paternalism and bureaucracy. Neither discerns any substantive differences between the two major political parties. Both glorify local government and question the value of current social welfare programs. Many of their shibboleths are identical--depersonalization, dehumanization, individuality, big government, totalitarian liberalism and statism. Henry May, an American history professor at Berkeley, noted during that university's student upheaval that both the campus' conservative and radical political movements were "protests against bigness,

bureaucracy and official liberalism." Even their methodology, as Michael Harrington pointed out, is congruent. Just as "Goldwater conservatives" equate the liberalism of the moderate wing of the Republican party "with liberalism with socialism with Communism, so that Rockefeller becomes part of the Moscow conspiracy, in the Leftist version, the equivalent statement is that Walter Reuther is more dangerous than Senator Eastland." Indeed, New Left leaders like Carl Oglesby affirm that the two groups are, in some important respects, "morally and politically coordinate." William Appleman Williams thinks that while it is "a harmless convention to talk at cocktail parties about the Goldwaterites in terms of their status problems, ... it is a highly dangerous habit to think seriously about them in that fashion. They do not simply or primarily want status...most of them want


30Oglesby and Shaufl, Containment and Change, p. 167.
the welfare state cut down to human size, and structured in terms of community. And that is precisely what a relevant radicalism would offer as its bedrock appeal for a constituency."31

Jack Newfield, in his study of the New Left, contends that this small group of radicals (he estimates their strength at approximately two hundred and fifty thousand) constitutes a "prophetic minority" that will ultimately reorient American society and decisively affect American history. To be sure, America has in the past demonstrated a remarkable capacity to assimilate its critics and prophets. While it is dubious whether the dissenting radicals will eventually join the American consensus, it is already evident that their views are being seriously considered. Political liberals, reflecting an awareness of both conservative and radical critiques, are beginning to question, for example, the primacy of the federal government's role in social welfare programs. There is a new skepticism concerning "what can be accomplished by large hierarchical organizations."32 Irving Kristol submits that liberals are

coming to a realization that "the number of programs the political and sociological imagination is capable of inventing always exceeds the number of available people who can realize these programs as intended. You always end up with programs being carried out by a bureaucratic hierarchy that understands them only imperfectly and possibly may not even be much interested in them at all." \(^{33}\)

With their perhaps naive and relatively undefined call for a "participatory democracy," they have reminded us all that what happens to people in a democracy is of transcendent importance. What comes to mind in this connection is an observation made by Samuel Lubell in 1956. After studying American politics in the Eisenhower era, he concluded: "the New Deal generation once so zealous to make America over, devotes its evenings to wrestling with mortgage payments and inculcating a respect for tradition and discipline in overly progressive children." \(^{34}\)

It may well be the New Left's historic function to serve as the catalyst for a new reform era.

The New Leftists are, surprisingly, neither stridently self-righteous nor excessively doctrinaire. The eclecticism we have previously alluded to and Staughton Lynd's lament that they have a "taboo on socialism" explain this. However, their evaluation of the New Deal and the welfare state reveals a certain misunderstanding of American history. When they demand to know what the New Deal did--besides the Smith Act--it is clear that the voice of the ideologue is present. If the New Deal failed to include the Negro and other groups in its reforms or did not sufficiently redistribute the income and wealth in the United States, this should not lead to a categorical denunciation of the entire New Deal. Nor should a conspiracy of theory of history be invoked to analyze what occurred.

The welfare state did not come out of the Thirties as a result of a liberal plot to manipulate the dispossessed. It was created over the violent resistance of most men of property and wealth, and its creation required a major upheaval on the part of the workers, from the bottom up. Business did not begin its conversion to welfare statism until the World War II discovery that a federal agency staffed by corporation executives was not exactly a class enemy of the rich....


36Michael Harrington, "The Mystical Militants," in Thoughts of the Young Radicals, p. 71. Harrington who regards himself a "Social Democrat" is quite sympathetic
The welfare state launched in the Roosevelt years represents the hard-fought victory of the liberal-labor-Left over formidable opposition. It's creation ought not to be attributed to a devious Establishment.

There are other gaping inadequacies in the New Left's critique of the welfare state. Is it the welfare state that debauches the poor or the manner that Americans insist welfare be disbursed? Are social workers and other professionals really guilty of dominating and degrading the poor? Can an effective poverty program be run along anarchist, decentralist lines? Do the poor know what they want? Will an infusion of more political participation, direct democracy, solve all their problems?

to the New Left. See, for example, his introduction to Newfield's A Prophetic Minority, p. 13-19. Harrington's most recent work is in fundamental philosophical agreement with the New Left. He submits that "a welfare state which has generally followed corporate priorities in the name of the common good has furthered urban decay, intensified poverty and racism and left the middle class frightened and bewildered." Harrington, Towards a Democratic Left: A Radical Program for a New Majority (New York, 1968), p. 298. See, also, pp. 15, 33-35, 151.

Finally, are the evils of dehumanization, centralization and bureaucracy an exasperating fact of life in the twentieth century or a concomitant of the welfare state? The New Left's love of a radical democracy, its hatred of tyranny and its confidence in the mass of workers, has led Paul Goodman to affirm that they are descendants of "Congregationalists, town-meeting democrats, Jeffersonians and populists."

These elements are indeed evident, but memories of the Industrial Workers of the World, with its final goal of the workers controlling the instruments of production and its strong reaction against government authority, are also evoked. For all its limitations, the New Left may well be the origins of a new political movement articulating what Michael Harrington considers an imperative political program—"the democratic and conscious control of a technology that is already collective and bureaucratic."

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38 Goodman, Like a Conquered Province, p. 42.

CHAPTER 9

NEO-LIBERALISM

Four years before Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the American presidency a Spanish philosopher, Jose Ortega y Gasset, warned in his *Revolt of the Masses* that the greatest threat to western democracies was the increasing power of the state. Gasset submitted that the masses in Europe and America were captivated by the pernicious notion that whatever they desired could be obtained "without effort, struggle, doubt or risk--merely by touching a button and setting the mighty machine in motion. The mass says to itself, 'L'Etat C'est moi,' which is a complete mistake."¹ Society was coming to live for the state and man for the governmental machine. Gasset discerned the demise of western civilization unfolding from a inexorable process: "Society that it may live better creates the State as an instrument. Then the state gets the upper hand and society has begun to

¹Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York, 1932), pp. 120-121.
live for the state."2 According to those hostile to government-sponsored reform, Gasset's minatory prophecy seemed to be fulfilled in America in 1932 when Franklin Roosevelt initiated the New Deal.

The 1930's, a decade of hard times, was an era of disillusionment. The American people's mood was perhaps best defined by Archibald McLeish's poem of 1938 "Land of the Free." This poignant and eloquent piece had as its refrain: "we don't know, we can't say, we're wondering...." When Franklin Roosevelt confronted the decaying American industrial system--idle men and idle machines, poverty, anguish and festering resentment, he sensed need for "bold, persistent experimentation." Roosevelt's reforms systematically altered American life. The federal government assumed the responsibility for protecting the individual from the ravages of an unpredictable industrial order, for insuring maximum employment and production, and for securing the basic well-being of the entire society. Did this destroy the continuity of America's principles and institutions? Was the very spirit of American life violated by these social reforms? Could Roosevelt's reforms and innovations be justified by appealing to the challenges of a revised social order?

2Ibid., p. 122.
Did the establishment of a welfare state signify a repudiation of individualism and the making of a socialist revolution? To understand why some Americans regarded the welfare state as subversive of the American democratic tradition and tantamount to socialism, it is necessary to examine their basic certitudes and intuitions concerning the nature of liberty, the role of government and the possibility of social reform. Several themes underlie all the arguments against the welfare state. They include the theory espoused by Gasset (and before him by Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner) that the state and society are separate entities and that government can give either political liberty or economic security. Next is the supposition that economic planning undermines individual freedom by creating a collectivist social order. Planning, critics of the positive state submit, is an unnecessary interference with the organic structure of society. The "absurd effort to make the world over" comes from those reformers ignorant of the inherent limits of man's ability to alter his society. Finally, there is revulsion for crusading reformers or "virtueists" (as Vilfredo Pareto termed them) who do not perceive a level of human conduct where change is exceedingly slow. Those leading the attack against the welfare state assert that human beings are selfish and that no institution and no economic system or any
law can make them place public goals over private ends. These ideological assumptions explain why the battle cries of "regimentation," "bureaucracy," "unconstitutional," "paternalism," "dictatorship" and "perversion of progressivism" were resurrected against the New Deal and those movements seeking to complement and supplement its program.

Individualism is a convenient term to designate the views of those who desire to circumscribe government's functions to maintaining law and order, enforcing contracts and operating public services which private enterprise chooses not to perform. Individualists regard the state as the supreme coercive authority in society because it wields a monopoly of force. They equate the state with evil since it possesses power—-and power, they are certain, corrupts. Economic individualists, or classical liberals, support Jeremy Bentham's admonition to the state to "be quiet" and Herbert Spencer's dictum that "government is essentially immoral." The United States was born in a mood of hostility toward powerful government which has led to an apotheosis of individual initiative, state's rights and limited government. The Founding Fathers, utilizing John Locke's argument against monarchical prerogative, established
property rights as *sine qua non* of political freedom.\(^3\) 

The individual's rights became superior to the Crown and the Church and a new significance was imparted to property and prescription. Individualism remains the dominant element of the American myth. Free enterprise transcends economics. It gradually evolved into "a psychological/religious category."\(^4\) The animus against social reform from William Graham Sumner to Barry Goldwater is always rooted in the proposition that governmental regulation of the free enterprise system minimizes everyone's personal liberty. That government interference with the market economy must, by an iron chain of cause and effect, culminate in a totalitarian system is the crux of all arguments against social reform. The nexus between capitalism and freedom is fully developed in the writings of Milton Friedman, an economics professor at the University of Chicago and former president of the American Economic Association, and three European economists who have had a greater impact

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in this country than in their own—Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and Wilhelm Roepke.

Hayek's Road to Serfdom of 1944 is the classic rebuttal to arguments defending government regulation of economic affairs. Two anti-collectivist works written during the New Deal years, however, deserve some attention. Albert Jay Nock's Our Enemy, The State (1935) and Walter Lippmann's The Good Society (1937) both embrace the anti-welfare state theme. Nock edited the lively literary journal, The Freeman and wrote a competent, if controversial, biography of Jefferson. He was, unlike those individuals discussed in this study, an anarchic libertarian. Not merely the social service aspect of the modern welfare state, but virtually every governmental action alarmed him. Nock's Our Enemy, The State is an interesting work for several reasons. It initiated a series of criticisms against Franklin Roosevelt's presidency that have characterized many anti-New Deal arguments. In 1932, according to Nock, the United States underwent a "quiet coup d'etat" while

5This, of course, does not refer to the New Left. The point is that Nock abhorred all state activity, not only social services provided by the modern welfare state, that Creel, Richberg, Moley, Goldwater and others have objected to.
some European countries experienced violent ones. He considered government an elaborate hoax because it arose from confiscation and conquest and was not "created" by the citizen. Nock regarded the New Deal as an abomination incarnating "collectivism." The state, under Roosevelt, had enlarged its coercive powers and had forgotten the difference between treating people equally and endeavoring to make them equal. It was engaged in the socially destructive process of "robbing Peter to pay Paul." New Deal collectivism was disastrous because "man tends always to satisfy his needs and desires with least possible exertion." Nock saw in the New Deal the rise of an oppressive leviathan claiming omnipotent authority and crushing the civil liberties and rights of productive citizens to win the approval of greedy voters seeking bread and circuses. Following Gasset, he insisted that the masses were investing the state with the divine right of absolutism that liberals had wrested away from monarchs. Nock was not concerned with the question of economic planning. What suffused his polemic was the hypothesis that the world was divided into collectivists and individualists. Roosevelt's

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7Ibid., pp. 61-62.
New Deal constituted a sharp departure from the American individualist ethos and the beginnings of total socialization.

With Walter Lippmann's *The Good Society* (1937) we encounter the thesis (fully developed and elucidated by Hayek, von Mises, Roepke and Friedman) that economic planning is incompatible with a democratic society. *The Good Society* is a thoughtful, complex and long analysis of liberalism, socialism, communism, centralization, natural law and the "foundations of tyranny." Although *The Good Society* did not inveigh against social reform, it did question the propriety and efficacy of economic planning. Lippmann maintained that the "increasing ascendancy of the state" and the growth of "more officials with more power over more and more of the activities of men" represented retrogression.

Planning depended upon the martial spirit. "For it can be demonstrated, I am confident, that there is only one purpose to which a whole society can be directed by a deliberate plan. That purpose is war, and there is no other." Lippmann decried attempts at economic planning because he believed planning to be necessary and feasible only

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9Ibid., p. 90.
under war conditions. To have planning in peacetime meant conscripted labor and authoritarian, arbitrary officials harassing citizens. Consequently, a planning elite would control the people. There was no way, Lippmann declared, to guarantee that the planners would be "benevolent despots."\(^\text{10}\)

Such planners as Rexford Tugwell, Stuart Chase, George Soule and Lewis Mumford were, in Lippmann's judgment, "humane" rather than "authoritarian collectivists."\(^\text{11}\)

Nevertheless, they were forging a dangerous new liberalism. They insist that the people have foolish and vulgar desires, which may be true enough, and that altogether better standards...ought to replace them. I agree. But I do not see how the purification of the public taste is to be worked out by a government commission. I can see how and why the general staff can decide how soldiers should live under martial discipline; but I cannot see how any group of officials can decide how a civilian population shall live nobly and abundantly.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{10}\) *Ibid.*, pp. 103-105.

\(^{11}\) *Ibid.*, p. 57. Liberal intellectuals, who espoused planning, scorned Lippmann's argument. Max Lerner asked why he linked political dictatorship with a planned economy. Lewis Mumford remarked that Lippmann's error consisted of assuming that freedom and justice arose as a product of the free market. Mumford lamented the "reckless muddlement" of *The Good Society* and stated that Lippmann's "confusions and contradictions are so massive as to be intellectually discreditable in a man of his attainments." Lerner's review is in the *Nation*, CXLV (November 27, 1937), 589-590; Mumford's appeared in the *New Republic*, XCII (September 29, 1937), 219-220.

When the collectivist planner disregards the market place, said Lippmann, "all he really does is to locate it in the brains of his planning board." What is usually dismissed from consideration concerning *The Good Society* is that Lippmann did not condemn governmental reform or espouse a revived laissez-faire. In *The Method of Freedom* (1934) he advised that reforms could be achieved "without using the method of the planned and administered centralized state." Certain financial measures could create a "compensated economy" that would insure social stability. Reforms had to come from properly conceived laws, not through administrative fiat. In 1964 Lippmann described *The Good Society*, as a "philosophical basis" for the view that laws had to support governmental reform. The authoritarian "handing down of decrees" only debased democracy.

I was always in favor of regulation of all economic activities by law. What I didn't want was to do it by administration. I always think that's the main thesis of *The Good Society*—that there are two ways of doing this thing. One leads to a centralized state administered by government office holders, and the other leads to a great system of law in which corporations and everything else are accountable and can be sued and the judiciary decides the issues. It is the second which I

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14 A useful discussion of this point can be found in Henry Steele Commager's *The American Mind* (New Haven, 1950), pp. 221-226.
proposed as the change by which liberalism could disembarass itself of laissez faire and still remain liberal.15

What caused The Good Society to be misinterpreted and equated with such works as Herbert Hoover's Challenge to Liberty (1934) and Friedrich Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944) stemmed from Lippmann's ambivalent attitude. Indeed, in the introduction to The Good Society he acknowledged his debt to Graham Wallas for teaching him "to realize the pervasive implications of the Great Society" and to Professor Ludwig von Mises and Professor F. von Hayek, "whose critique of a planned economy has brought a new understanding of the whole problem of collectivism...."16 Lippmann did not resolve the tension between Wallas and the Hayek-Mises school in his book. His attitude toward the New Deal, for example, was approval of the bulk of its program and disapproval of its methods and techniques. Lippmann did not object to the social service aspects of New Deal government as Nock had. His hostility centered upon the viability of a planned economy. A fusion of the Nock-Lippmann critique came in the anti-Keynesian economics of Hayek, Mises, Roepke and Friedman. The writings of these neo-

liberal economists are primarily devoted to explaining the relationship between capitalism and freedom and exposing the "heretical" principles sustaining welfare statism.

Friedrich A. Hayek's *Road to Serfdom* (1944) is the classic treatise on the perils of economic planning and the welfare state. As early as 1935 Hayek was denouncing the new economic trends in Russia, Germany, England and America. He viewed the 1930's as the opening decade in the total socialization of Europe and America. Hayek repudiated Keynes' theory that capitalism had no automatic tendency toward full employment and that the economy could stagnate while unused human resources remained idle. Keynes said there existed a propensity to "over-save" and "under-invest" which causes cycles in the capitalist system. To counterattack this tendency the state must through certain measures, but not through public ownership of the means of production, equilibrate the economy. Keynes recommended deficit spending, significant public expenditures and the planning of economic goals by government or the public sector.

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Hayek considered Keynesian economics a veiled attempt to redistribute incomes. Moreover, the use of a planning elite meant the destruction first of economic and inevitably political liberty. With the publication of *The Road to Serfdom* he became the foremost critic of increased government regulation of economic activity. When the University of Chicago Press near the end of World War II published two thousand copies of *The Road to Serfdom*, it was unaware what an impact the book would have. "Hayek's volume was scarcely in the bookstores," Eric Goldman wrote, "before the University of Chicago discovered that it had published not only a scholarly monograph but a manifesto for American conservatism. Hailed by anti-New Deal publications, purchased in quantity by a number of American corporations, *The Road to Serfdom* promptly made its way to the best-seller list and stayed on month after month into the V-J period."^9

One idea permeates *The Road to Serfdom*. It is the contention that National Socialism in Germany, Fascism in Italy, Communism in Russia, and the British and American welfare state were the result of national economic planning. Hayek defined socialism as a "species of collectivism" and

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^18 Ibid., p. 15.

warned that planning produces collectivism.\textsuperscript{20} He dated the Fall of Man in the year 1870 when "German socialist ideas" began supplanting the "English idea of freedom."\textsuperscript{21} True individualism or "original liberalism," not its modern paternalist variant, came, in Hayek's opinion, from Bernard Mandeville, John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville and Lord Acton.\textsuperscript{22} These liberals had glorified individual rights. They did not favor extensive governmental regulation. If government comes to perform numerous functions, argued Hayek, it would become impervious to supervision and control. This is the theme that Bertrand de Jouvenel developed in Du Pouvoir (On Power). Jouvenel found the significant phenomenon of modern political evolution to be the burgeoning growth of the apparatus of coercion or force--the juggernaut of power.\textsuperscript{23}

For Hayek the world was a stage where the antithetical forces of individualism and collectivism clashed. Individualism by fostering competition dispensed with need for "conscious social control" that the planners

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{20}Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago, 1944), p. 33.
\item \textsuperscript{21}Ibid., pp. 13-27.
\item \textsuperscript{22}Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
advocated. All forms of liberty—political, economic and cultural—developed from the operation of a free market and were crucially dependent upon it for sustenance. Whenever government began interfering with the self-adjusting economic order, whenever planners tried to supersede the invisible hand, liberty was being extinguished. If the New Deal appeared totally unlike Soviet Communism, said Hayek, we must recall that "there is no justification for the belief that so long as power is conferred by democratic procedure, it cannot be arbitrary; the contrast suggested by this statement is altogether false: it is not the source but the limitation of power which prevents it from being arbitrary."24 A directed economy involved bureaucrats and had to be run "on more or less dictatorial lines."25

Economic control is not merely control of a sector of human life which can be separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends. An whoever has sole control

24Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 71.

25Ibid., p. 88. See Edwin G. Nourse's review, "Serfdom, Utopia or Democratic Opportunity," Public Administration Review, VI (Spring, 1946), 177-187. Hayek so upset his former English colleague, Herman Finer (who was then teaching at Harvard) with his Road to Serfdom that the latter rebutted with Road to Reaction (Boston, 1945). See, also, Barbara Wooton, Freedom Under Planning (Chapel Hill, 1945), especially pp. 158-180.
of the means must also determine which ends are to be served, which values are to be rated higher and which lower— in short, what men should believe and strive for. 26

During the last two decades, Hayek has reiterated the same themes. "We can still learn more about the behavior of men from the Wealth of Nations," he wrote in 1948, "than from most of the more pretentious modern treatises on 'social psychology'." 27 Lewis Mumford and other planners enamored of New Deal policies were "authoritarian socialists." 28 Historians, he charged in 1954, were guilty of propagating the myth that capitalism caused suffering among the working class during the industrial revolution. 29 The reasons why historians maligned capitalism was because they, along with all intellectuals, preferred telling the masses how to live. They resented the market economy for making their role as a planning elite superfluous. Businessmen offered the public "goods," while the intellectuals desired to

26 Ibid., p. 92.
28 Ibid., p. 207.
foist upon the ignorant herd their conception of what
was "good." Historians, by deliberately distorting
capitalism's accomplishments, had enabled socialism to
become a formidable political movement. Hayek condemned
all intellectuals, but especially historians, for creat-
ing what the authors of The Capitalist Manifesto (1958)
termed an "ambush"--allowing "socialism in a variety of
ways" to come in "by the back door...." 30 Hayek deemed
freedom to be "independence of the arbitrary will of
another." 31 The welfare state, by repudiating the free
market's natural operations, substituted coercion for
freedom. Meaningful freedom was the "absence of coer-
cion." Hayek considered any action coercive "when one
man's actions are made to serve another man's will not
for his own but for the other's purpose." 32

Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Roepke and Milton Fried-
man have, also, written extensively on the dangers of a
welfare state economy. Their critiques are essentially
similar to Hayek's. The state, for von Mises, is pri-
marily an "apparatus of compulsion and coercion" that

30Louis Kelso and Mortimer J. Adler, The Capitalist

31F. A. Hayek, "The Moral Element in Free Enter-
prise," in Adrian K. Laasen, ed., The Invisible Hand
(Chicago, 1965), pp. 69-77.

32F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago,
1960), pp. 133.
forces people to "behave otherwise than they would like to behave." 33 Von Mises, like Hayek, an Austrian born and educated economist, is a professor of economics at New York University. His writings deal primarily with the origins of the state, the reasons for the anti-capitalist mentality, and the totalitarian nature of socialism. Wilhelm Roepke, a German economics professor, usually credited with stimulating Germany's post war recovery, is another welfare-state antagonist. He, too, has exhorted Americans to recognize that one cannot deny freedom in the economic field and grant it in the remaining sectors of human activity...." The welfare state's reprehensible feature is its "compulsory" nature. Roepke concedes that some security against the vicissitudes of the modern industrial order is necessary. The crucial question, though, for him is: "Is it the same to you whether you have to stop at a traffic light as a free man at the steering wheel of your own car, or as a prisoner in a police wagon?" 34 Roepke has presented the basic reason for the conservatives' revulsion over the welfare state. We must admit, in his opinion, the


immorality of certain individuals "consuming without producing." The pump priming features of the "modern, insatiable State" produces an inflation or "camouflaged taxation" that is redistributing the savings and earnings of thrifty citizens and eroding their insurance policies. What right does government have to compel a productive citizen to contribute to the beneficences the modern welfare state distributes to unproductive members?

"The citizen...who is compelled by law to devote something like ten per cent of his income to the purchase of a particular kind of retirement contract administered by the government," says Milton Friedman, "is being deprived of a corresponding part of his own personal freedom." Friedman, who served as Senator Goldwater's chief economic adviser in 1964, is the leading neo-liberal economist in the United States. Friedman and several European economists consider themselves the rightful heirs to the term liberal. Nineteenth century liberals emphasized freedom while twentieth century liberals emphasize welfare and rely upon the state rather than private voluntary

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36 Ibid., p. 21.
arrangements to promote progress. Yet, this tendency of the welfare-conscious liberal concentrates, in Friedman's opinion, economic and political power in the planners' hands and "leaves all too few effective, independent foci of power to serve as a check on the irresponsible exercise of political power."38

If freedom is to be secure, power must be limited and it must be dispersed. The most effective way simultaneously to disperse private power and to limit government is to rely primarily on voluntary exchange through a free market--competitive capitalism--to organize economic activity. The most effective way to dispense the remaining governmental power is to rely on a constitutional system of checks and balances, and a federal system of decentralized political responsibility.39

Friedman, like William Graham Sumner, is willing to pursue his theories to their logical conclusions. The protective tariff and the oil depletion allowance, among other business privileges, would be abolished. This is peripheral to his central concern--dismantling the welfare state. Nothing less than a total repudiation of existing welfare programs will satisfy him. Social Security should be replaced by a voluntary system. "Though labeled 'insurance,' the system of old-age benefits is no such thing. It is a


welfare program that transfers income from some to others—notably from the young, rich and poor, to the old, rich and poor."\textsuperscript{40} Besides questioning the value of existing programs, Friedman has, also, proposed ideas that would achieve social reform by means consistent with the free market. Rather than permit government to inject massive transfusions of federal funds into the educational system, he has advocated tax deductions for parents financing a college education.\textsuperscript{41} His negative income tax plan would simply provide a subsidy to poor families, on a declining scale, until the family income rose to present poverty level of three thousand dollars a year.\textsuperscript{42}

The assumption made by Friedman, Hayek and other neo-liberal critics of the welfare state is that liberty is the absence of restraint and therefore all restraint curtails liberty. They state the problem as: "If you have more equality, you will have less liberty." The choice is either political liberty or economic security.


\textsuperscript{41}Milton Friedman, "A Free Market in Education," \textit{The Public Interest}, I (Spring, 1966), 107.

\textsuperscript{42}Milton Friedman, \textit{Capitalism and Freedom} (Chicago, 1962), pp. 177-195. This book is the best source for understanding Friedman. Here he develops the negative income tax idea, the "alleviation of poverty," the role of government in education and the proper role of government in a free society.
Government can either maintain effective order and true freedom or foster egalitarianism. Since there is this close correlation between the degree of government regulation and liberty, the free enterprise system should be unfettered. Without free enterprise all our other freedoms are imperilled.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

The goal of the welfare state is protection against deprivation, insecurity and threats to the community's well-being. In America, a welfare state has been established which preserves the capitalist nature of the economy--a free market, private property and no expropriation. Its salient principle, that a person's income should not be exclusively determined by what he produces, is what appalls conservatives. This is what Raymond Moley meant by claiming that liberty was vanishing in America because "the right to use personal income for purposes determined by the earner of that income" had been usurped by government. This is the meaning implied in Donald Richberg's scorn of "superior rights for inferiors." The New Deal had transformed the country, said Henry L. Mencken, until there were now only two classes of men--"those who work for their livings, those who vote for them."\(^1\) If objections to the welfare state are formulated in moving phrases concerning personal

liberty and individualism, the less theoretical aspects are quite often ignored. A very important reason for the anti-welfare state attitude, seldom expressed in bald terms, is resentment over the costs of social reform. It is significant that Chamberlain, Creel, Moley and Richberg each complained about inflation and taxation. The extraordinary success that a proposal to repeal the income tax amendment has had in many state legislatures attests to the "visceral resentment" elicited by the rates of progressive taxation. Social reform comes slowly because "prevention is expensive and...interferes with somebody's rights or liberties."²

The theory of liberty informing welfare statism is that what government does to promote education, public health, housing, increased wages or income redistribution can enhance personal freedom. The conservative axiom that an increase in government's power automatically reduces liberty is rejected by advocates of strong government sensitive to people's needs.

There are a great many areas of life in which the absence of state or social control means not freedom, but subjection to the most galling

of tyrannies. Liberty, after all, is a practical matter, not an abstraction. Men can be victimized as much by the economic law of supply and demand as by the arbitrary whim of a despot. 3

There is no simple totality, argues Robert MacIver, that may be named the liberty of the individual or the liberty of the people. 4 If every law "restrains some liberty for some it may well establish some other liberty for some others--or indeed for all." Welfare state proponents deny the validity of the "if you have more equality, you will have less liberty" syndrome. "The more equality there is in a State," contended Harold Laski, "the more use, in general we can make of our freedom." 5 Indeed, Gunnar Myrdal asserts that John Stuart Mill and Thomas Jefferson would approve of the welfare state because it is "the outcome of a social process, in the steering of which people are themselves participating." 6 Those favoring government sponsored reforms insist that the

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3 Bremner, From the Depths, p. 267.
6 Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State, pp. 85, 95-96.
relationship between liberty and security cannot be resolved abstractly. They demonstrate an empirical, anti-ideological approach and eschew a priori assumptions relating to the "inevitable" consequences of governmental actions.

How does one resolve the dilemma of whether governmental regulation and reform restricts or expands liberty? Why do we decide to concur with William Graham Sumner against Lester Frank Ward or dismiss conservative protestations against the New Deal as hyperbolic outbursts? Invariably, as with the men and groups studied in this paper, the decision is reached via ideology, or as Daniel Boorstin aptly described it, by a "flight into dogma." Conservative ideologues postulate two dramatic dichotomies, liberty or security, presumably obtainable from two distinct economic orders, capitalism and socialism. The conservative economists and John Chamberlain no less than the alienated progressives or Senator Goldwater are captive to abstract models of a perfectly constructed competitive order. Their theories of capitalism are more "real" than the empirical reality.
capitalists maintain that capitalism is self-equilibrating while doctrinaire socialists assume capitalism to be self-destroying. Ideology is a coherent, consistent, selective set of beliefs, values and opinions. Problems are not seriously analyzed. Preconceived solutions are imposed on such problems as whether government aid to education is desirable. It is characterized by an either/or approach. It is pure determinism.

Consider, for example, the New Deal. The New Deal is incomprehensible to conservative ideologues and New Leftists precisely because it was not an ideological scheme. As Reinhold Niebuhr discerned, the New Deal was "a characteristically pragmatic effort to resolve the debate between classical economics and Marxism...." In a crucial sense, the New Deal was not planned. Roosevelt's greatest gift was charisma, the ability to infuse the nation with a sense of purpose. The New Deal steered

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a middle course between an unmanaged capitalism and socialism. The nation's banks were not nationalized. Industry was encouraged under the N.R.A. to govern itself. Extensive regulatory codes and direct planning were not imposed upon business. The New Deal did attempt to regulate capitalism's "boom and bust" propensity. It did aid small businesses, regulate corporations through holding company legislation and anti-trust laws, equalize labor's bargaining power and seek to provide the underprivileged with a larger share of the nation's benefits. Yet, it aimed at these goals through "indirect" planning controls--"pressures, nudges and prods." Tax policies, Federal reserve interest rates, public works programs, credit control and price and wage controls became government's way of harmonizing the economy. The New Deal began "administering" or regulating capitalism. America evolved into a "mixed economy."

But, planning, we are told by conservative ideologues, is always repressive. The New Deal, therefore, must have been reactionary. American business, however, knew the difference between Franklin Roosevelt and Karl Marx. Within a decade after the New Deal, a significant segment of business demonstrated its approval for a

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federally "compensated" economy. If government has controlled business, "business has, also, sought and found answers to some of its problems through government, thus inviting further control." Business is not the only group that fails to see any close correlation between the degree of government regulation and the reduction of personal liberty. There is strong evidence to warrant the claim that Americans have endorsed the welfare state. The farmer understands the difference between being told how much tobacco he can raise and the loss of free speech. The laborer does not resent wage regulation or medical care provisions. Wilhelm Roepke branded Franklin Roosevelt's objective of "freedom

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from want" as demagogic. Many Americans regard it as a noble and attainable goal. Many groups, to be sure, are demanding economic assistance from government. "Is the old 'let me alone philosophy'" being replaced, Bernard Baruch asked a City College of New York audience, "by nothing better than a 'gimmie mine' philosophy?"

America may be a nation of "privilege-seekers" because, as Robert Bremner notes, "larger and larger sections of the public have come to appreciate useful functions to which a democratic government can be put." Yet, it is hard to deny that the New Deal did make men conscious of their special loyalties and attachments. This cultivated blocs of voters and led to an extraordinary reliance on the federal government.

If the New Deal did preserve American capitalism, it, also, nurtured a belief in government omniscience, the inevitability of progress and the search for a


17 Free and Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans, pp. 161 ff.


comprehensive social security. Oscar Handlin comments:

The weakness of the New Deal, which became apparent only in retrospect, had been to en-shrine security as the pre-eminent social value; liberty was a term all but abandoned to the reactionaries. If the needs of the decade dictated that emphasis, it nevertheless left the masses of people uneducated to the importance of issues wider than their own material safety and well being.20

Handlin's restrained, modified comment is not substantively different than the New Left's criticism of this development. "The whole burden of legislation from the New Deal to the Fair Deal to the Re-Deal, is that if anyone cries, the Government should come along, all warm, tender, and dripping milk and pick up the discomfited citizen and shove a nipple in his mouth."21

Rather than stressing this aspect of the New Deal or its procedural defects, conservatives, frustrated by their absence of power, grew so "uncontrollably angry" that they invented the term 'welfare state' as a term

20Oscar Handlin, Al Smith and His America (Boston, 1958), p. 187. See, also, Peter Viereck, The Unadjusted Man (Boston, 1954), 231-238; August Hecksher, "Where are the American Conservatives?" Confluence, II (September, 1953), 54-65. See, also, in reply to this Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Conservatism in America: A Liberal Comments," Confluence, II (December, 1953), 62-71.

of opprobrium. They repudiated social reform as an end, rather than suggesting alternative ways to meet what Arthur M. Schlesinger called the "crucial challenge" to America in the post World War II era—"the need somehow to combine the benefits of local creativeness and federal interposition without the drawbacks of either...." Moreover, in their rage, they, characteristically, substituted ideology for reality. The growth of government was not attributed to industrialization, population increase, or World War I and II. It stemmed from sinister foreign conspiracies such as British "Fabian Socialism" and Franklin Roosevelt's unholy appetite for power.

To the right-wing ideologues considered in this paper, the welfare state endangers liberty by delegating excessive power to the federal government. They are unable to accept the reality of government's actual role in American life. They refuse to understand that government

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22 Hecksher, "Where are the American Conservatives?" Confluence, II (September, 1953), 62.


24 See, for example, Philip M. Crane, The Democrat's Dilemma: How the Liberal Left Captured the Democratic Party (Chicago, 1964).

can be either absolutely neutral and do nothing for any interest group or it can, as during the New Deal, regulate conditions so that the power of certain groups will be equalized. The Wagner Act's adjustment of the labor union's power versus business is a satisfactory example. "Power has been out of balance before, and conceivably could be today. But it requires evidence--comparative and historical--and not ideology to prove that this is the case."\textsuperscript{26} There is a particular futility, as Max Lerner noted, "in inveighing against only one of the leviathans of American life--that of government--without recognizing that it has come into being to balance the other leviathans."\textsuperscript{27} The New Left, however, has seen that if there is a threat to individuality, autonomy and


\textsuperscript{27}Lerner, America As a Civilization, I, p. 401.
liberty, it stems not so much from the growth of "big government" as from the fusion of "big government and big business" into a welfare-warfare economic order. John Galbraith's concept of countervailing power seems plausible only if business and government are not seeking identical goals.

In 1950, after analyzing The American Mind, Henry Commager offered a sanguine interpretation: "If Americans had not yet fashioned the Good Society, neither had they taken the Road to Serfdom."28 There is, now, almost two decades later, a strong animus against the welfare state from conservatives, radicals and liberals. The New Frontier intellectuals speak pointedly about the need for moving beyond the welfare state. Daniel P. Moynihan, director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, and a former adviser to President Kennedy has informed his liberal colleagues in Americans for Democratic Action to revise many of their beliefs. Liberals had to abandon the notion that the nation could be "run from agencies in Washington" or that Republicans "do not know or care about the problems of the nation." Moynihan declared that "the Robert Taft's of the nation" are needed

28Commager, American Mind, p. 226.
"at the present juncture." Richard Goodwin, another adviser to President Kennedy, also, desires to halt the centralizing thrust begun by the New Deal.

One need only look at the fantastic labyrinth of welfare programs, the monstrous incapacities of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare--operated by one of the best teams of executives in government--as well as the foreseeable futilities of the new Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Transportation, to realize that something is wrong with the old approach.

The consensus appears to be that the welfare state created during the New Deal is obsolete because "it is exhibiting delusions of omnicompetence."

The famous pragmatic approach to government regulation and intervention, it has been discovered, has one slight drawback: the agencies and institutions that are created soon achieve a life of their own beyond all trial and error. Among new Frontiersmen in Washington today, the word "bureaucracy" is used with the same bitter despair that used to be the hallmark of a reactionary.

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31 Irving Kristol, "Is the Welfare State Obsolete?" Harper's (June, 1963), 40-41.

32 Ibid.
There is the growing recognition that "there are inherent limits to what can be accomplished by large hierarchical organizations." Libera ls are becoming less utopian and giving evidence of understanding that "government intervention in social processes is risky, uncertain--and necessary. It requires enthusiasm, but also intellect, and above all it needs an appreciation of how difficult it is to change things and people." Local, decentralized government is the new cry raised by radicals, conservatives and now liberals. It might be noted that the local governments which impressed de Tocqueville have not changed since James Bryce found them "the one conspicuous failure of the United States." The mere transferring of shibboleths or exhorting "local" government over the "central" government will not solve problems. We have a "heightened and unfortunate need for federal intervention precisely because our tradition of local organizations are inadequate and much inferior to those in many European countries." Centralization is not a matter of size, as David Lilienthal, T.V.A. administrator, wrote as early as


35Bazelon, Power in America, p. 44.
1944, but the degree and manner that the federal government involved local communities with the responsibility for solving their own unique problems. He affirmed that the T.V.A. effectively fused collectivism and individualism thereby strengthening democracy. \(^36\)

Welfare state goals will continue to be planned nationally. They seem destined, however, to become administered locally. Government will not cease subsidizing deprived individuals, as right-wing conservatives hope, but various social reform programs will be directed by local self-governing communities. An "independent sector" apart from the public or private sector that includes philanthropic organizations, labor unions, religious groups and fraternal orders may also begin assuming more control of certain social problems. \(^37\) These developments would not signify a revival of individualism nor the demise of the welfare state. The New Deal's response to the Great Depression permanently altered government's responsibility for the quality of life in America. Its legacy, the welfare state, has come to be considered less

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\(^{37}\)This theme is effectively presented in Richard C. Cornunelle, *Reclaiming the American Dream* (New York, 1965). See Saul Alinsky's endorsement of this idea in the introduction.
as a deviation from the "American way of life" than as the means to fulfilling the needs of the nation. Only technical modifications in the welfare state's procedural functioning appear imminent. Decentralization and the possible growth of an "independent sector" will not vitiate the welfare state. They may serve to perfect its operations. If these changes do develop, they will be the result not of the philosophical attack on the welfare state as being coercive or destructive of liberty, but rather from the need to meet and master the new exigencies of a technological and bureaucratic industrial state.
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