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A COGNITIVE RESPONSE ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERATTITUDINAL ROLE PLAYING

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of
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By

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* * * * * *

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Counter-attitudinal improvisation and role-playing are of considerable interest to social psychologists partly because these procedures have at times been singularly effective in producing attitude change, and partly because the reasons advanced to account for this change have been so varied and sometimes even contradictory. Few explanations presumed to relate role-playing and opinion change have been conclusively disconfirmed, several have not received test, and others need to be made more explicit before experimentation is warranted.

For purposes of exposition, the review of the pertinent literature will be divided into two parts. The first section will contain a review of the empirical findings. The second section will discuss the major theories (notably incentive theory, dissonance theory and Cognitive Response Analysis) that are particularly relevant to the problem of providing an explanation of the persuasive impact of role-playing procedures. Discussion will focus on those aspects of each theory particularly relevant to introducing the research presented in Chapters II and III.
Section I. Review of the empirical literature

Active Participation vs. Passive Exposure

One of the variables most commonly investigated in the role-playing literature has been whether the subject has undergone the role-playing experience as an active or a passive participant.

Evidence that active as opposed to passive participation in role-playing is superior in producing opinion change has been provided by Janis and King (1954), King and Janis (1956), Greenwald and Albert (1968), Watts (1967), Culbertson (1957), Janis and Mann (1965), Mann and Janis (1968), and Zimbardo (1965). Negative findings have been reported by McGuire (1964), Stanley and Klausmeier (1957), Greenbaum (1966) and Jansen and Stolow (1962).

Janis and King (1954), in one of the first experimental studies of the effect of role-playing on attitude change, reported the general finding that subjects who actively participated in giving a talk demonstrated more opinion change than a control group of subjects who passively listened to these speeches. Active participation produced greater amounts of opinion change in the case of two of three topics employed in the experiment (movie theaters and meat supply), but not for the topic concerning a cure for the common cold.

The results indicated that active participation in comparison to passive exposure resulted in a significant gain in confidence in the post communication opinions expressed on each of the three attitude topics, particularly for subjects whose opinions were markedly influenced by the communication dealing with the common cold.
Although King and Janis (1956) were primarily concerned with pitting an improvisation explanation of role playing against the hypothesis that satisfaction with the role playing performance accounts for change, their procedures and results are also relevant to the active-passive dimension. King and Janis found that subjects required to play the role of an impromptu speaker, (interpreted here as active participation) exhibited significantly greater amounts of opinion change than subjects who merely read the script silently. A second group, however, who performed the task of reading aloud from a completely prepared script (interpreted here as intermediate on the active-passive dimension) did not evidence significantly more attitude change than did the passive control group who read the script silently. In fact, there was a non-significant trend in the opposite direction. Unfortunately, the evidence regarding active participation versus passive exposure from this experiment is difficult to interpret because the active-passive variable is confounded with the amount of improvisation and satisfaction.

Greenwald and Albert (1968), utilizing a within subjects design, obtained support for the superiority of active participation vs. passive exposure. Greater opinion change was obtained on a topic for which subjects improvised their arguments than for a topic on which they read another subject's communication. In addition, arguments produced during active improvisation were better recalled than were those improvised by others (passive exposure) despite approximately equal exposure to each set. Although Greenwald and Albert interpreted their experimental procedures as contrasting improvisation with passive exposure
and concluded that subjects tend to have an enhanced regard for their own arguments relative to others, their findings as presented also demonstrate the effect of active participation vs. passive exposure.

Jansen and Stolurow (1962), however, failed to demonstrate superior persuasion as a result of active participation. Rather, imitation of a role in contrast to actual improvisation resulted in significantly more attitude change. These results are difficult to compare with most of the role playing literature because of a large number of differences in experimental procedure, as noted by the authors.

Watts (1967) examined the relative persistence of opinion change induced by active participation (writing an argument) versus passive exposure (reading an argument). By means of pilot research on the topics used, the immediate effects of active vs. passive participation were equated. Both subjects who read, and subjects who improvised their own communication, demonstrated significant changes in opinion (compared to a control group of subjects who did not receive a persuasive communication). Over a period of six weeks the opinion shifts produced by active participation were sustained to a greater degree than those produced by passive exposure; subjects in the passive condition tended more to revert back to their pre-experimental attitudes. Active participation also resulted in greater involvement (subsequent discussion of, and reading about, the topic) and superior recall of the topic and side supported.

Culbertson (1957) found greater amounts of attitude change in favor of Negro integration in housing and toward the Negro in general
on the part of subjects who had actively role played than on the part of controls. Furthermore, subjects who had actively participated in role-playing evidenced significantly greater change than did role-observers. Culbertson attributes these results to the greater involvement induced by active participation.

A study by Janis and Mann (1965) provides further support for the previous findings that active participation results in greater amounts of opinion change than does passive participation. Women who had played the role of a lung cancer patient who had just received bad news from their physician changed their attitudes toward smoking and diminished the amount they were smoking significantly more than an equivalent group of controls who listened to a tape recording of the role-playing session. Janis and Mann attribute the superiority of active participation to the high level of fear and vigilance aroused by the experimental setting. Mann and Janis (1968) provide evidence as to the long term effects of the emotional role-playing experience.

Stanley and Klausmeier (1957) failed to obtain a significant opinion effect as a result of counterattitudinal advocacy. Groups of students varying in initial opinion argued in favor or against world government. Analysis of before-after change scores revealed that subjects who argued against their own point of view, argued in support of their own point of view, or simply observed the role-playing of other subjects, did not differ significantly from each other. Failure to demonstrate an effect of active role-playing might have been due to the extremity of subjects' initial views on this topic and consequent resistance to change.
An additional limitation of the presumed superiority of active participation is pointed out by McGuire (1966). McGuire demonstrated that, at least in the case of cultural truisms, passive reading of a defense of one's own position strengthens it more than does actively writing a defensive essay from an outline provided by the experimenter. McGuire's results may be due to the failure on the part of the active participation subjects to improvise arguments as effective as those passively received by control subjects.

Thus, subjects whose active participation in counterattitudinal role-playing is restricted either through inexperience or through extremity of initial opinion cannot be expected to change substantially more than passive subjects. Moreover, the difficulty in having subjects meet the requirements of active participation is amply attested to in a later section of this paper in which several of the studies reviewed reported that subjects find it difficult to generate substantial amounts of improvisation. It should be noted, however, that the amount of improvisation resulting from role-playing is only one index of the extent to which subjects actively participate in the role-playing task. Effort, for example, would be another means of assessing the active vs. passive variable.

Overt vs. Covert Role-playing

Related to the active-passive variable is the distinction between overt and covert role-playing, presumably because not actually carrying out the role playing task could be interpreted as a form of passive exposure while actually performing the role playing task could be
considered active participation. Overt vs. covert role-playing has been investigated in three studies (Janis and Gilmore, 1965; Elms and Janis, 1965; and Rabbie, Brehm and Cohen, 1959) with inconsistent results.

Janis and Gilmore (1965) assessed the effects of overt vs. covert role-playing by measuring the opinions of overt role players after they had carried out the role-playing task and of covert role-players after the subjects had accepted the role-playing assignment, but before the role-playing task was carried out.

The results indicated that overt role-playing proved to be significantly more effective than nonovert role-playing, provided the sponsorship (perceived source of the request to role play) was favorable (i.e. attractive). There was little difference in the amount of attitude change induced by the two types of role-playing if the sponsorship was unfavorable.

Results by Elms and Janis (1965) also supported the conclusion "that nonovert role-playing was relatively ineffective as compared with overt role-playing carried out under favorable incentive conditions" (p. 58). Lack of appropriate control groups did not allow a test of the hypothesis that nonovert role-playing could produce opinion change. Research presented in Chapter II will address itself to attitude change under conditions of nonovert role-playing.

**Improvisation**

In one of the first systematic studies of role-playing and opinion change Janis and King (1954) proposed that attitude change resulting from active participation "may occur primarily because the active
participant tends to be impressed by his own cogent arguments, clarifying illustrations, and convincing appeals which he is stimulated to think up in order to do a good job of selling the idea to others" (p. 218). King and Janis (1956) stated that "the critical variable has to do with the inventive aspect of improvising . . . the spontaneous additions and elaborations of the arguments contained in the communication." These two statements have come to be called the improvisation explanation of role playing. It is not always easy to determine whether improvisation is best considered a descriptive or explanatory variable or both since little role-playing can occur without some kind of improvisation. Even reading a prepared communication (e.g., King and Janis, 1956, Oral Reading Group) enables the subject to inject variations in emphasis and inflection. At the opposite extreme, is the procedure employed by Janis and Gilmore (1965) which required subjects to generate persuasive communications on the basis of little or no external aid.

The concept of improvisation does deserve the status of an explanatory variable, as well as of a descriptive variable, first because the procedures which constitute role-playing are not completely described by the dimension of improvisation, and secondly because it is a matter of empirical evidence whether variations in the amount of improvisation during role-playing result in differing amounts of attitude change.

Evidence in support of the improvisation explanation of attitude change is provided either from procedures designed to vary the extent to which the subjects can construct their own persuasive communications or from within-condition analyses based on various indices of the magnitude of improvisation. Data relevant to the relationship between
the amount of improvisation and attitude change will be reviewed first and will be followed by the evidence relating the quality of improvisation and attitude change.

Amount of Improvisation

Janis and King (1954) found greater attitude change for those subjects who actively improvised a talk based on an outline prepared by the experimenters, than for a control group of subjects who listened to these speeches.

King and Janis (1956) provided additional support for the improvisation hypothesis. Their findings indicated that subjects required to formulate a communication in their own words, and who introduced new arguments or original elaborations into a prepared script, demonstrated significantly more opinion change than subjects who engaged in substantially less improvisation. An alternative explanation of opinion change in terms of a positive relationship between satisfaction with the role-playing performance and attitude change was disconfirmed.

Greenbaum (1966) assessed the effects of improvisation on opinion change by constructing an index of the magnitude of improvisation for subjects delivering a speech on civil defense under conditions of high and low choice and varying reinforcement of their performance. Each subject was assigned a score representing the sum of the number of original arguments plus the number of original illustrations contained in his speech. The difference in mean attitude change between high and low improvisers (based on a median split) was not significant nor were differences between high and low improvisers within the choice and no
choice conditions significant. Within-cell correlations relating the degree of improvisation and opinion change were consistently low in all conditions. Moreover, Greenbaum points out that only $34\%$ of the subjects managed to produce any new arguments at all. Part of the reason for the apparent lack of substantial improvisation may have been due to the confusing, if not contradictory, nature of the experimental instructions. Subjects were told their speeches would be evaluated both on "use of materials" (materials consisted of seven $3 \times 5$ cards each containing an argument) and on "originality". This probably had the effect of inducing subjects to alternate their improvisations with the materials provided by the experimenter, so that they could obtain a high score on the "use of materials" criterion.

Zimbardo (1965) also failed to find support for the improvisation explanation. Subjects who actively improvised a counterattitudinal speech under conditions varying in effort as a result of delayed auditory feedback did not experience significantly more opinion change than subjects who were passively exposed to an opinion-discrepant essay. Appropriate within cell comparisons also failed to implicate improvisation as a critical factor in accounting for change. As was the case in the experiment reported by Greenbaum (1966), Zimbardo found most subjects unable to improvise to any significant extent. Zimbardo comments that "in the present study, $28\%$ of the Ss were unable to improvise even to the minimal essential of providing a single new argument, while a mere third of the Ss improvised to an extent that might be considered significant" (p. 118). Zimbardo concludes that "it would appear that
successful improvisation demands experience, adequate preparation, intelligence, and perhaps even a special aptitude for role-taking" (cf. Sarbin and Jones, 1955).

It would appear then, that quantity of improvisation is neither a necessary nor sufficient determinant of change.

Quality of Improvisation

While the absolute magnitude of improvisation need not be related to change, it is possible that the quality or nature of improvisation is of more importance. The existing evidence, however, is inconsistent and at best confusing. Kelman (1953), for example, found that essays written by the group which showed the greatest amount of opinion change in his study tended to be longer, to include more improvisation, and to be of better over-all quality.

Janis and Gilmore (1965) found that the quality of the improvised essays (defined as explicit pro arguments) was significantly affected in the positive direction by the favorable vs. unfavorable sponsorship variable, and by the high vs. low monetary reward variable, results consistent with the pattern of attitude change observed.

On the other hand, Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmreich (1966) state that high incentive essays were not superior to low incentive essays as would be expected on the basis of incentive theory. Contrary to Carlsmith et al., however, Elms and Janis (1965) found a non-significant trend in the direction of a greater number of "good quality" arguments being produced in the $10 condition relative to the $.50 condition. The only significant relationship reported by these authors was that subjects
in the $10 condition wrote more than subjects paid $.50.

Cohen, Brehm and Fleming (1958) found a positive relation between the number of original arguments and the amount of attitude change only for the condition in their experiment that represented low dissonance.

In a between condition comparison, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) found that the conditions producing the greatest dissonance were also characterized by relatively inferior verbalization of the discrepant position (reported in Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen, 1959).

Rabbie, et al. demonstrated a negative relationship between the number of arguments written and the amount of attitude change for subjects within conditions. Rabbie et al. suggest several explanations for this negative relationship including the intriguing possibility that attitude change reduces the pressure to write arguments in favor of a discrepant stand. If this explanation proves correct, content analysis as a procedure for examining mediational variables has been dealt a serious blow since essay content may not be a cause but rather an effect of change.

Self vs. Other as Source

The hypothesis that a self-generated message is more persuasive than one for which the source is external has been suggested by several authors including King and Janis (1956), Hovland, Janis and Kelly (1953), and Greenwald and Albert (1968). The finding that self-generated messages are more persuasive than externally generated messages would have considerable explanatory power in a wide variety of situations as well
as help to explain the general finding that active participation is superior to passive participation in producing change.

Unfortunately, previous research has confounded the self-authorship variable with other variables (for example, with levels of improvisation in Janis and King, 1954). Research conducted to test this hypothesis will be introduced in a later section of this paper dealing with cognitive response analysis.

Effort

The only study that has attempted to explain role-playing in terms of effort is Zimbardo's (1965), and since this study was conducted within a dissonance framework, detailed consideration is postponed until the following section.

Reviewing the maze of studies dealing with role-playing and attitude change, one is struck by the need for a systematic theory to organize the empirical generalizations and low-level hypotheses that have been advanced to account for change. The next section deals with the question of theoretical explanations.
Section II. Review of theoretical interpretations of role playing effects

Handtailoring

Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) have proposed that attitude change resulting from role-playing be accounted for by a process of handtailoring. According to Hovland et al.,

Improvised role playing could be viewed as a technique whereby the communicatee is stimulated to help make the communication as effective as possible, to think up exactly the kinds of arguments, illustrations, and motivating appeals that he regards as most convincing. In effect, the communicatee is induced to 'hand-tailor' the content so as to take account of the unique motives and predispositions of one particular person—namely, himself (p. 237).

Unfortunately no literature is available to assess the viability of handtailoring as a mediator of change. A series of studies designed to test the handtailoring hypothesis are presented in Appendix D.

Dissonance and Incentive Theory

The two most prominent theories that have concerned themselves with attitude change induced by role-playing are incentive theory and dissonance theory. Confrontation between these theories has generated considerable discussion and has been the subject of review and comment by many authors (McGuire, 1966a, 1966b; Aronson, 1966; Rosenberg, 1966; Pepitone, 1966; Elms, 1967; Janis & Gilmore, 1965; Brehm, 1965).
Dissonance Theory

Dissonance theory predicts attitude change as a function of advocating a discrepant opinion. According to Festinger's (1957) statement the magnitude of dissonance and therefore attitude change as a process of dissonance reduction is proportional to the number and/or importance of the dissonance elements in the situation. The 1962 statement of the theory by Brehm and Cohen introduces the additional variables of choice and commitment.

Attitude change as a process of dissonance reduction is predicted to occur provided that the subject voluntarily engages in (high choice), and commits himself to, the advocacy of a position at variance with his own beliefs.

With reference to the role-playing literature two applications of dissonance theory have been particularly notable. The first is a study by Zimbardo dealing with opinion effects of role playing effort, and the second is the prediction of attitude change following a disconfirmed expectancy which has acted to arouse dissonance.

Zimbardo (1965) tested the hypothesis that "the greater the physical effort required in publicly reading and understanding a communication discrepant from one's own attitude, the greater will be the resulting dissonance and consequent attitude change in the direction advocated by the role performance" (p. 106). Effort was varied by delayed auditory feedback. In the low effort condition subjects gave a speech while hearing their talk with a delay of .01 seconds while in the high effort condition this delay was .25 seconds. The results confirmed the hypothesis that significantly more attitude change occurred
here under conditions of high effort.

The disconfirmation of expectancies can also be productive of dissonance (Aronson and Carlsmith, 1962). A series of studies, to be reported in Appendix C, was conducted to examine the possibility that attitude change could be explained as a process of dissonance reduction resulting from a disconfirmation of expectancies regarding one's performance of a counterattitudinal role-playing task.

Dissonance theory, by restricting itself to a relatively small number of concepts—choice, commitment, and discrepancy—and by invoking only one major process of psychological implication, has often been praised for its parsimonious explanation of a variety of phenomena. The ultimate simplicity of the dissonance analysis is now open to question, however, due in part to a statement by Brehm (1965). Brehm states:

The application of dissonance theory to role-playing must take into account not only the decision to play the counter-norm role but also the effect of inventing, and perhaps publicly stating, the arguments themselves. If the decision to comply arouses relatively low dissonance because the force to comply is great, the behavior of inventing or stating arguments, or both, may in itself arouse further and significant amounts of dissonance and consequent attitude change. However, where a considerable amount of dissonance is aroused by the decision to comply, the invention or statement of arguments could on the one hand contribute to the dissonance, but may, on the other, simply help to reduce dissonance by facilitating attitude change.

Incentive Theory and Reinforcement Theory

Compared with the simplicity of the previously mentioned dissonance analysis of role playing, incentive theory has provided a series of explanations of considerable complexity. The application of incentive
theory to role playing has been the subject of four conceptual statements and it is worthwhile to consider each one separately if the logic of future experiments is to be well understood.

Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) summarized the incentive position as follows:

We assume that acceptance (of a new attitude position) is contingent upon incentives, and that in order to change an opinion it is necessary to create a greater incentive for making the new implicit response than for making the old one. A major basis for acceptance of a given opinion is provided by arguments or reasons which, according to the individual's own thinking habits, constitute 'rational' or logical support for the conclusions. In addition to supporting reasons, there are likely to be other special incentives involving anticipated rewards and punishments which motivate the individual to accept or reject a given opinion (p. 11).

This most rudimentary statement of incentive theory describes change induced by role playing in terms of some kind of calculus of incentives in which positive incentives for change are weighed against negative incentives for change, the results of the weighing process determining the direction, and presumably the magnitude, of change. Cognitions are judged to be incentives in proportion to their logical or rational properties, although a second class of "special incentives" can consist of incentives which need not have strongly developed cognitive components, namely, the anticipation of rewards or punishments.

The second statement of incentive theory as it applies to role playing was made by Janis and Gilmore (1965). According to these authors, a subject engaged in counterattitudinal role playing,
becomes temporarily motivated to think up all the good positive arguments he can, and at the same time suppress thoughts about the negative arguments which are supposedly irrelevant to the assigned task. This 'biased scanning' increases the silence of the positive arguments and therefore increases the changes of acceptance of the new attitude position. A gain in attitude change would not be expected, however, if resentment or other interfering affective reactions were aroused by negative incentives in the role-playing situation (p. 18).

Compared to the 1953 statement the Janis and Gilmore formulation makes specific reference to processes which not only motivate the development of positive incentives but also "suppress" negative incentives. This joint process of augmenting the positive reasons while minimizing negative reasons for change is labeled biased scanning. It is doubtful that the reference to a process of "suppression" is to be taken in its technical Freudian sense; perhaps the preferred mode of expression would be in terms of a process of selective attention.

The most detailed statement of the biased scanning hypothesis has been given by Elms and Janis (1965). They state:

According to the 'incentive theory', the attitude changes produced by role-playing are mediated by intensive 'biased scanning' of positive incentives, which involves two types of verbal responses: (1) fulfilling the demands of the role-playing task by recalling and inventing arguments that are capable of functioning as positive incentives or accepting a new attitude position, and (2) appraising the recalled and improvised arguments with a psychological set that fosters open-minded cognitive exploration of their potential incentive value rather than a negativistic set. . . (pp. 55-56).
Earlier references to suppression are absent; rather Elms and Janis choose to concentrate on the processes by which positive incentives are developed. These include processes of memory, i.e., selective retrieval of those arguments most likely to provide positive incentives, processes of invention, and processes of selective attention and evaluation of incentives. The latter process of evaluation could alternatively be described as an expansion in the subject's latitude of acceptance or as an increased predisposition to evaluate discrepant information in a relatively unbiased fashion.

Of greatest importance, however, is the fact that the empirical evidence cited in support of incentive theory remains ambiguous as to exactly which of the several component processes is being confirmed or disconfirmed.

The exact process by which certain aspects of the environment become defined as incentives (dissonance reduction could be considered as an incentive, for example) and the way in which different kinds of incentives become combined and weighed, have not been clearly specified. Money, for example, acts as a positive incentive provided that it does not engender feelings of guilt or suspicion which then act as negative incentives.

As a result of the preoccupation of the dissonance-incentive theory controversy with the direction of predicted change, steps of conceptual clarification have largely been omitted. This omission is particularly harmful for incentive theory, since dissonance theory is conceptually much simpler and more precisely defined.
A study by Janis and Gilmore (1965), for example, was largely designed to test the opposing predictions for the direction of change that were derivable from dissonance theory and from incentive theory. As the authors indicate, subjects were assigned to one of eight conditions in a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ design in which the factors were overt role playing vs. passive exposure to the same instructions and information; unfavorable vs. favorable sponsorship of the role-playing assignment; and small ($\$1$) vs. large ($\$20$) monetary reward. The greatest attitude change was predicted and obtained for subjects engaged in overt role-playing under favorable sponsorship conditions. The prediction was based on the reasoning that "actually carrying out the task of verbalizing new arguments in support of the objectionable position would elicit more biased scanning . . ." (p. 19) and that "signs of exploitative intentions in the behavior of the sponsor would also be expected to operate as negative incentives" (p. 18).

Whether these procedures of negative sponsorship and overt role-playing operationally defined all of the relative constructs of incentive theory is seriously open to question. In addition, it is not at all obvious, for example, that overt role playing should result in "a set that fosters open-minded cognitive exploration" (Elms and Janis, 1965, p. 56) more than would covert role playing. In fact, it might be easier to entertain privately arguments that were previously objectionable than to do so in the public arena. Evidence that would bear on the question of whether the biased scanning process was actually induced by the experimental procedures employed in Janis and Gilmore (1965) and Elms and Janis (1965) was inconclusive. Elms and Janis attempted to
provide evidence about the existence of the biased scanning hypothesis by having judges rate the quality of arguments produced by subjects in each experimental condition. At best, such ratings of overall quality could only provide indirect evidence that a process of biased scanning was operating to mediate opinion change. But, in fact, such ratings carried out by two independent judges indicated "a difference . . . in the expected direction and [that] roughly parallels the attitude-change findings, [although] an analysis of variance indicated that the interaction effect was not strong enough to be statistically significant at the 10% confidence level" (Elms and Janis, 1965, p. 59).

The most recent statement of incentive theory given by Janis (1968) is, in its statement of the theory itself, no different from the basic position taken by Janis (1959); namely, "that attitude change can be considered in terms of a decisional conflict and that decisional conflicts are conceptualized in terms of a balance sheet containing weighted positive and negative values corresponding to the potential gains (positive incentives) and potential losses (negative incentives) that are anticipated by the decision maker when he evaluates each alternative open to him" (Janis, 1968, p. 2).

Certain consequences of this decisional model are almost trivial and more suitable as post hoc explanations than as testable hypothesis. For example, Janis states that attitude change should not be expected to occur unless "the new incentives that emerge . . . are powerful enough to create a challenge to their present position" (Janis, 1968, p. 4).
The most important aspect of Janis' 1968 statement is the attempt to delimit the range within which incentive theory predictions can be expected to apply. The first restraint is that incentive theory should be upheld only when the attitude topic is of high interest to the subject, since if the subject had little interest in the topic, "the person is unlikely to think up any new relevant incentives no matter how conscientiously he tries to execute the role-playing task" (p. 13). The second limitation to the conditions under which incentive predictions should be valid derives from those role-playing procedures in which there is "low opportunity for genuine contemplation of the issue during the role-playing performance" (p. 14). According to Janis, if the role-playing procedure prevents the subject from evaluating the arguments he is generating, no new incentives could be introduced into the person's internal balance sheet, and therefore no self-persuasion would result.

Greenwald (1968b) demonstrated that attitude change was possible in the absence of overt role-playing provided that the subject agreed and expected to perform a counter-attitudinal role-playing assignment. In the experiment conducted by Greenwald, subjects first expressed their own position on whether college education should be general (liberal) or specialized (career preparatory) and were then led to expect that they would write essays in favor of an arbitrarily assigned position later in the experiment. Dependent measures assessed the extent to which subjects judged as valid a set of topic-relevant statements representing both sides of the issue, and whether opinion change occurred as a result of anticipated role playing. Greenwald found that subjects tended to
strongly accept those statements that supported their own position and to reject statements opposing their own point of view in the condition in which subjects were expecting to write essays in support of their own point of view. When subjects anticipated arguing against their own viewpoint, they tended to accept equal numbers of arguments on both sides of the topic. Final opinion sources also reflected the effects of assignment with subjects demonstrating change in the direction consistent with their assignment. Greenwald concluded from these results that "the effectiveness of role playing in inducing opinion change may be due in large part to its success in getting subjects to evaluate information opposing their own position in an unbiased fashion."

Because of the importance of this finding, it was decided to conduct an additional study which would employ control groups otherwise absent from Greenwald (1968b) as well as to replicate the finding using a different opinion topic. This experiment is presented in Chapter II.

Reinforcement Explanations of Role-playing

The conceptual statements of incentive theory are to be understood as falling within the general framework of reinforcement theory which has been reviewed by Insko (1967). The reinforcement position, as stated by Insko, considers that "opinions like other habits, tend to persist unless the individual undergoes some new learning experience. Exposure to a persuasive communication which induces the individual to accept a new opinion constitutes a learning experience in which a new habit is acquired" (p. 12).
A number of studies have attempted to explain the persuasive effects of role-playing in terms of reinforcement or differential social reward (Scott, 1957, 1959; Bostrum, Vlandis and Rosenbaum, 1961; Goldstein and McGinnies, 1964; Sarbin and Allen, 1964; Wallace, 1966; Greeribaum, 1966).

In an experiment conducted within a debate format, Scott (1957) found that subjects who were judged as "winners" changed their opinion in the direction of the position that they had presented regardless of their own initial opinion, while losers did not change their attitude significantly more than a control group of non-debaters. Change was still evident 10 days after the debate. Scott interpreted these findings as resulting from response reinforcement.

Bostrum et al. (1961) randomly assigned grades of A or D to essays written by subjects on the topics of legalized gambling and socialized medicine. A control group that received no grades was included to control for the possibility of attitude change without explicit reinforcement but solely on the basis of having written a counterattitudinal essay. The results indicated that subjects who had received an "A" changed significantly more than subjects who had received a "D," and significantly more than the control group. Those who received a "D" showed the least change, although a comparison of the amount of change of the "D" group with the control group was of marginal significance (p .10). The results reported by Bostrum et al., however, should be interpreted with caution. Assignment to condition was made on the basis of which topic was most discrepant for the subject as indicated by pre-assignment attitude scores and, therefore,
change might simply reflect a process of regression toward the mean.

Based on an analysis by Doob (1947) that attitudes are implicit anticipatory responses which mediate overt behavior, Goldstein and McGinnies (1964) conducted an experiment to provide evidence that differential social reinforcement can act as a major variable to control the direction of attitude change. In order to produce change, Goldstein and McGinnies arranged for pro-church subjects to deliver a predetermined anti-church communication in front of a three person audience holding either a positive, negative, or neutral attitude toward the church. Following the speech subjects discussed the topic with their audience. Analysis of the attitude scores for each of the three groups revealed that change in the direction of the communication was greatest for those subjects subsequently discussing the topic of their speech with neutral or anti-church groups.

Subjects who participated in the experiment as speakers changed their attitude significantly more than did members of the audience. The results are interpreted as favoring a reinforcement theory of attitude since the greatest change occurred for those subjects receiving audience support for their role playing position, although Goldstein and McGinnies admit the possibility of an alternative explanation in terms of dissonance theory.

Wallace (1966), arguing that the mechanism underlying opinion change due to reinforcement of counter-attitudinal advocacy (Scott, 1957, 1959; Goldstein and McGinnies, 1954) remained unclear proposed that reward be considered as serving the cognitive function of providing
the subject with information about the impact of his behavior upon others. In this way, Wallace contended, the subject would be receiving information that could markedly affect the interpretation he placed on his own behavior and thus directly influence the magnitude of dissonance associated with his discrepant behavior.

To test this interpretation of the effects of reinforcement on attitude change, Wallace employed a debate format in which subjects delivered counterattitudinal speeches on the topic of capital punishment.

On the basis of rigged audience feedback, subjects were told that the intellectual content of their speech was superior (content reward), or that the manner in which they gave the speech was superior (role reward). Control groups were given neutral feedback and two additional control groups were employed in which the subject defended a position with which he was in agreement.

The results indicated that the effect of reward was primarily due to the superior persuasive impact of the role reward condition. This finding was interpreted as being due to greater dissonance, although Insko has suggested that role reward might simply be more hedonically satisfying (1967, p. 17).

Greenbaum (1966) tested the hypothesis that within high-dissonance conditions, attitude change should be more likely to take place under negative than positive reinforcement; but the reverse should hold under conditions of low dissonance. Levels of dissonance were created by giving the subject high or low choice to improvise a counter-attitudinal speech on civil defense. Reinforcement was varied by having a taped
recorded "speech professor" give the subject's speech a rating ranging from strongly negative to strongly positive together with reasons for the particular rating given. In contrast to other studies, Greenbaum found no effect of differential reinforcement, although levels of dissonance were satisfactorily manipulated and he attributed the effects of reinforcement found in previous research to possible experimenter bias artifacts.

Having considered both dissonance and incentive-reinforcement approaches to attitude change induced by role-playing, the present author is discouraged that the hoped-for integration of a diverse set of empirical results on the basis of systematic theory has remained elusive. In fact, dissonance theory as applied to role-playing (Brehm, 1965) has lost some of its appealing simplicity, and incentive theory, as it has evolved over the last ten years, has attained only a metaphorical precision implicating a plethora of mediating processes.

There is little likelihood that one framework can be developed in the foreseeable future to organize all the relevant literature and account for the conditions necessary for a role-playing effect.

The research presented in Chapters II and III, therefore, has the modest goal of further clarifying some of the variables that might contribute to ultimate theory construction, rather than introducing and attempting to test a new theory. All three experiments to be presented were conducted within an analysis of role-playing provided by Greenwald (1968), although the hypotheses under consideration have been referred to in previous sections dealing with other theories and explanations where appropriate.
Cognitive Response Analysis

Greenwald (1968a) has recently provided an interpretation of attitude change, in terms of cognitive responses to persuasion that has suggested the research to be presented in the next two chapters. According to Greenwald:

the persuasion situation is usefully regarded as a complex stimulus that evokes, in the recipient, a complex cognitive response. The essential dimensions of the recipient's cognitive response are, at the least, (a) response content, i.e., degree of acceptance versus rejection of the position advocated in the communication, and (b) intensity, or vigor, of response. . . . The essential components of the persuasion situation as stimulus— that is, as determinant of the cognitive response content—are setting, source, and communication content.

Particularly with respect to role-playing, attitude change would be expected if "agreement to advocate a view opposing one's own entailed adopting a disposition to react cognitively in a fashion more than usually favorable to information supporting that opposing position" (Greenwald, 1968b).

One aspect of the persuasion situation which might provoke a favorable response might result from merely accepting the experimental instruction to present a discrepant opinion. The hypothesis that the acceptance of a counterattitudinal role-playing assignment (1) facilitates the positive evaluation of discrepant information and (2) results in attitude change in the position consonant with the role-playing task, is tested in Chapter II. The research to be presented in Chapter II is an expanded replication of an earlier study by Greenwald (1968b).
A second aspect of the situation which might predispose subjects to respond favorably to discrepant information is the self-authorship of counterattitudinal statements. This hypothesis is tested in Chapter III. It is predicted that messages believed to be self-authored will (1) be judged more favorably, and (2) are therefore more likely to be accepted than messages which are believed to be authored by another person.
CHAPTER II

THE EFFECTS OF ANTICIPATED ROLE-PLAYING OF THE UNBIASED EVALUATION OF CONTROVERSIAL INFORMATION

The present experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that the acceptance of a counter-attitudinal role-playing assignment is sufficient to produce attitude change. While the experiment was formulated in terms of the Cognitive Response Analysis of Greenwald (1968a) and is an expanded replication of Greenwald (1968b), dependent variables were also selected to help elucidate the component processes of the biased scanning hypothesis.

The basic procedure was to assign subjects the task of constructing a persuasive essay on one side of an issue but measure their attitude and their evaluation of a series of topic-relevant statements prior to the actual writing of the essay. In this fashion, any attitude change that occurred would be a function of anticipated and not actual advocacy, thus reflecting the processes presumed to occur during the period when the subject was preparing himself to write such an essay.
EXPERIMENT I

METHOD

**Subjects.** Two hundred twenty-three college sophomores at the Ohio State University participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Four subjects were discarded because of missing or unscorable data.

**Procedure.** The experiment was conducted in three large groups in which the experimental treatments were administered to the subjects by means of different booklets. The first page of the booklet introduced the experiment as a study of expository writing and assess the subject's initial position on the topic of increased military involvement in Vietnam as follows:

This study is concerned with an analysis of expository writing abilities. In it, you will be writing expository statements relevant to the issue of whether increased or decreased U.S. military involvement in Vietnam is preferable . . . Increased military involvement should be understood as a 25-50% increase in men and materials above current levels. The increase should be considered to be executed gradually over the course of one year. Decreased military involvement is defined in an opposite manner indicating a 25-50% decrease in men and materials over the course of the coming year.

Considering these two mutually exclusive alternatives regarding our policy in Vietnam, please indicate with a check mark which of these positions you think has more merit . . . ___ increased military involvement; ___ decreased military involvement.

Expository writing was then defined and the subject was assigned to write in favor of either increase or decrease in military involvement as follows:
Expository writing ability is the ability to present, forcefully, persuasively, and originally, a position on one side or another of an issue. We are therefore asking you to write on only one side of the issue. You have been assigned, arbitrarily, to write in support of increased, decreased /either increased or decreased was crossed out according to the experimental condition/ U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.

Following the assignment to advocate either an increase or a decrease in military involvement in Vietnam, subjects were supplied with four questions which they expected to answer later in the experiment. A sample question was: "In what way would increased, decreased /
one word was crossed out according to the experimental condition/
military involvement facilitate the eventual establishment of stable democratic government in Vietnam?"

Dependent measures. After reading the four questions, subjects filled out the two dependent measures, the order of which was counterbalanced. One dependent measure consisted of six Likert type items that served to measure opinion on the experimental issue. Three items were worded in favor of a decrease, and three were worded in favor of an increase in involvement. Each item was answered on a six point scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". High scores on the resulting opinion measure represented a position favoring increased military involvement.

The second dependent measure consisted of a rating task comprised of 10 statements, 5 favoring a decrease and 5 favoring an increase. For each statement the subject was to decide whether it supported an increase or a decrease, and whether the statement was logically and empirically
valid. The subject had the option of stating reasons in support of these judgments. Subjects were instructed that:

Your task for these statements will be to evaluate each, to the best of your ability, in terms of its objective merits, regardless of whether it supports your assigned position or not. Try to judge each statement as a valid or invalid statement about the military involvement issue. A valid statement is one that should be taken into account in forming an intelligent opinion on this topic; it is one supported by reasoning and evidence. An invalid statement is one that need not be given detailed consideration either because of lack of evidence or because of errors in reasoning.

A sample statement was: "If America does not honor her treaty obligations to South Vietnam, other allies will lose confidence in her determination to keep other treaty commitments.

Supports: Increase ___; Decrease ___. Statement is: valid ___; invalid ___. Reason for validity judgment:

Design. The above procedure resulted in a $2^3$ factorial design. The factors were: assigned position (whether the subject expected to write in favor of an increase or decrease in military involvement); own position (whether the subject initially favored an increase or a decrease); and order of dependent variables (whether the Likert type measure of opinion preceded or followed the rating task).

Four control groups received no anticipated role-playing assignment and were defined by the factorial combination of the own position factor and the order of dependent variables factor.
RESULTS

Validity Judgment Dependent Variable. The effect of assigned position on the judged validity of 10 statements comprising the rating task was obtained by constructing a score for each subject in the following way: each of the 10 statements was given a score of +1 (indicating a judgment favoring increased involvement) if the subject either felt that the statement supported an increase in military involvement and was valid, or supported decreased involvement and was invalid; similarly, a statement was given a score of -1 (indicating a judgment opposing increased involvement) if it was judged to support decreased military involvement and was valid or to support an increase in involvement but was invalid. A score of zero was assigned to those items left blank or otherwise unscorable. (Fewer than 20% of the subjects had any blank or unscorable items.) A composite index for each subject ranging from -10 to +10 was then computed, representing the sum of scores over all 10 statements, with high scores representing judgments favorable to an increase in military involvement.

The means and standard deviations for these scores are given in Table 1.
TABLE 1

Means and Standard Deviations of Validity Judgment Scores as a Function of Experimental Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject's Initial Position</th>
<th>Favors Increase in Military Involvement</th>
<th>Favors Decrease in Military Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Order of Dependent Variables</td>
<td>Order of Dependent Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rating-Likert</td>
<td>Likert-Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N  ( \bar{X} ) S.D.</td>
<td>N  ( \bar{X} ) S.D.</td>
<td>N  ( \bar{X} ) S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>12  1.583  3.569</td>
<td>18  4.166  3.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Assignment</td>
<td>18  3.333  2.788</td>
<td>18  1.277  3.461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of variance (least squares solution) of the validity judgment scores (with the four no-assignment control groups omitted from the analysis) results in a significant main effect of own position ($F = 19.82$, 1/136 df, $p < .01$) and of order of dependent measures ($F = 8.43$, 1/136 df, $p < .01$). The predicted effect of assigned position was not significant ($F < 1$). These results are summarized in Table 2.

**TABLE 2**

Analysis of Variance (Least Squares Solution)
Summary Table for Validity Judgment Scores
Omitting the Control Groups Given No Assignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned Position (A)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.435</td>
<td>11.435</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Position (B)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>297.351</td>
<td>297.351</td>
<td>19.821*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of Dependent Variables (C)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>126.535</td>
<td>126.535</td>
<td>8.434*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.655</td>
<td>2.655</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.369</td>
<td>3.369</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.941</td>
<td>13.941</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B x C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30.604</td>
<td>30.604</td>
<td>2.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within cell</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>2158.978</td>
<td>15.874</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .01$
When the no-assignment control groups are included in the analysis as a third level of factor A, a significant A x C interaction (see Table 3) is obtained ($F = 8.78, 2/207$ df, $p < .01$) as well as a main effect of own position ($F = 41.39, 1/207$ df, $p < .01$).

**TABLE 3**

Analysis of Variance (Least Squares Solution Summary Table of Validity Judgment Measures Including Control Groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned Position (A)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88.162</td>
<td>44.081</td>
<td>2.926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Position (B)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>623.625</td>
<td>623.625</td>
<td>41.395*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of Dependent Variables (C)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.406</td>
<td>10.406</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.750</td>
<td>7.875</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>264.562</td>
<td>132.281</td>
<td>8.780*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.393</td>
<td>3.393</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B x C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52.818</td>
<td>26.409</td>
<td>1.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within cell</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>3118.649</td>
<td>15.065</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .01$
As can be seen from Table 1 the significant interaction of assignment with the order in which the dependent variables were administered is primarily due to the fact that the subjects given no assignment were especially in favor of a decrease when the validity judgment task was completed after the Likert measure.

An unweighted means analysis of variance omitting the control groups as a level of Factor A, and using only those cells in which the validity rating task preceded the Likert-type measure, resulted in a significant main effect of assigned position \( (F = 4.46, 1/66 \text{ df}, p < .05) \). The effect of own position was also significant \( (F = 14.61, 1/66 \text{ df}, p < .001) \). These findings are summarized in Table 4. This result confirmed the prediction that mere assignment to a role-playing task was sufficient to affect judgment in the direction consistent with the assignment.

### TABLE 4

Analysis of Variance of Scores Indicating Selective Evaluation of Arguments as a Function of Experimental Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned Position (A)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase vs. decrease</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66.441</td>
<td>66.441</td>
<td>4.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Position (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase vs. decrease</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>217.137</td>
<td>217.137</td>
<td>14.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.371</td>
<td>7.371</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within cell</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>980.895</td>
<td>14.862</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \( p < .05 \)
** \( p < .001 \)
Attitude Change (Likert Measure). The effects of anticipated advocacy on attitude change were tested by means of a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ analysis of variance (unweighted means solution). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 5, and the analysis is summarized in Table 6. The predicted effect of assigned position was significant at the .001 level ($F = 10.76, 1/137 \text{ df}$). Thus, the anticipation of having to write in favor of one position or another had the effect of moving subjects toward that position even in the absence of overt improvisation. The effect of own position was also highly significant, as might be expected ($F = 64.09, 1/137 \text{ df}, p < .001$). The order in which the dependent measures were administered had no effect on the subject's attitude as measured by the Likert type items. There were no interactions.
TABLE 5
Means and Standard Deviations of Attitude Scores as a Function of Experimental Condition

Subject's Initial Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order of Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Favors Increase in Military Involvement</th>
<th>Favors Decrease in Military Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rating-Likert</td>
<td>Likert-Rating</td>
<td>Rating-Likert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The greater the score the more in favor of an increase in military involvement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned Position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase vs. decrease (A)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>144.277</td>
<td>144.277</td>
<td>10.76*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase vs. decrease (B)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>859.076</td>
<td>859.076</td>
<td>64.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rating vs. no rating (C)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29.498</td>
<td>29.498</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.649</td>
<td>1.649</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B x C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.335</td>
<td>6.335</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Cell</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1836.150</td>
<td>13.403</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .001

In addition, an unweighted means analysis of variance of the attitude scores was conducted in which the no-assignment conditions were included as a third level of factor A. Such an analysis, reported in Table 7, revealed a significant main effect of assigned position (F = 5.32, 2/207 df, p < .005) and a significant effect of own position (F = 91.26, 1/207 df, p < .001). There were no interactions.
TABLE 7
Unweighted Means Analysis of Variance Summary
Table for Attitude Scores (Likert Measure)
Including the No Assignment Control Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned position (A)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>144.399</td>
<td>72.199</td>
<td>5.321*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own position (B)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1238.488</td>
<td>1238.488</td>
<td>91.268**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of Dependent Variables (C)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.295</td>
<td>1.295</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.901</td>
<td>2.451</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>62.410</td>
<td>31.105</td>
<td>2.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.106</td>
<td>5.106</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B x C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.814</td>
<td>4.407</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within cells</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>2808.936</td>
<td>13.510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .005

**p < .001
DISCUSSION

The results overall support the cognitive response analysis of the role playing situation and replicate the findings of Greenwald (1968b). The expectancy of counterattitudinal role-playing seems to engender a cognitive set that enables the subject to evaluate discrepant information in a more unbiased manner. Evidence for this interpretation was obtained from the validity judgment dependent measure when it preceded the Likert measure. Specifically, it was found that judgments of the controversial information were less biased in the direction of initial position (i.e., closer to zero) for counterattitudinal than for consonant role playing assignments.

The pattern of means for the Likert measure was more in accord with the experimental predictions than the pattern of means for the validity judgment dependent measure. For the Likert measure the control group of no-assignment fell between the two assignment groups: the overall mean for the assigned increase condition was 23.33; for the assigned decrease condition 21.19; and for the no-assignment control condition 22.08. In the case of the validity dependent measure these means were 2.25, 1.08, and 0.16 respectively. Thus, while the overall means for the assigned increase and assigned decrease conditions on the validity judgment measure were order in the precited direction, the no-assignment control groups were most unexpectedly in favor of a decrease.

The fact that assigned position predictably influenced both the Likert-type attitude measure and the validity judgment measure raises the general question of the relationship between the two measures.
Product moment correlations between the two measures within each of the assignment conditions were positive and significantly different from zero: 0.19 (p < .05, one-tail) for subjects expecting to write in favor of an increase; 0.44 (p < .001, one-tail) for subjects expecting to write in favor of a decrease; and 0.37 (p < .001, one-tail) for subjects given no assignment.

There are three possible relationships between the dependent measures: (a) both are measures of the same process of cognitive response; (b) they measure mutually distinct processes of opinion change; or (c) one measure could be considered to be the mediator of the other. The present experiment does not provide data which could select among these differing interpretations. In the context of the present experiment, there is however a certain intuitive appeal to the idea that the scanning and evaluation of topic relevant information (the validity judgment dependent measure) is one of the most likely cognitive processes engaged in by the subject anticipating subsequent role-playing. It should be noted, however, that the pattern of means for the attitude scores and for the validity judgment scores are not identical, nor are the differences that exist easily interpretable.

The finding that subjects expecting to role play a counterattitudinal position will adopt a cognitive set of impartial evaluation of controversial information, and that this process might plausibly account for opinion change, does not rule out explanations of change in the role playing situation in terms of incentive or dissonance theory for example. In fact, the findings on the cognitive response (validity judgment)
measure do not implicate any specific underlying dynamic process and remain subject to interpretation in terms of dissonance or incentive and perhaps other processes.
CHAPTER III

THE EFFECT OF PERCEIVED
SELF AUTHORSHIP ON ATTITUDE CHANGE

This experiment is designed to test the hypothesis that subjects are more persuaded by their own persuasive communications than equivalent messages attributed to an external other.

It was difficult to interpret previous attitude change studies in the light of this explanation of role-playing due to a confounding of the self-authorship variable with other variables (e.g., improvisation, satisfaction, message content). Therefore, two experiments were conducted to provide a direct test of the effects of perceived self-authorship on attitude change. The requisite experimental design called for the perceived authorship of the communication to be manipulated independently of the length, quality, and content of the persuasive communication. In addition, it was necessary to equate exposure to messages of different sources as well as to equalize the effort in receipt of the message across the two conditions of attributed source. To meet these requirements the same general procedure was employed in both experiments.

In the first experiment (Experiment II), subjects improvised persuasive messages during session 1 of a two part experiment and returned at a later session to be readministered either their own or someone
else's message. The original source of these readministered messages was systematically disguised. Half of the subjects were led to believe that they were the original source of the session 2 essay, when in fact, only half of these subjects were the original author. The other half of these subjects were induced to attribute the authorship of the returned essay to someone else, when, in fact, for half of these subjects the returned essay was actually their own. Thus, the resulting design consisted of a two by two factorial with two levels of actual source (own vs. other), and two levels of attributed source (own vs. other).

In Experiment III, subjects were readministered two messages; one of these messages was presumably their own while the other was attributed to another subject.

For Experiment II main effects of actual and attributed source as well as an interaction are predicted. The rationale for expecting a main effect of actual source in Experiment II is provided by the hand-tailoring hypothesis. Self-authored essays should be more persuasive than those written by someone else because the content is more hand-tailored to the individual's needs and personality, etc. Thus, the greatest amount of change is expected for subject receiving back their own essay in session 2 and perceiving that it was written by themselves, while the least change should occur for subjects receiving another person's essay and identifying another person as the author.

Dependent variables are described in detail within the procedure sections of each experiment. In general, however, the first experiment was concerned with measuring pre to post changes in attitude by means
of two self-rating scales and a content free measure of attitude, while
the second experiment was concerned with changes in the judged validity
of topic-relevant arguments and employed a measure suitable for this
purpose.

EXPERIMENT II

Subjects. The experiment was run in two group sessions three
weeks apart with the same subjects participating in both sessions.
Eighty-three college sophomores participated in the first session in
partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Seventy-seven of these
returned for the second session.

Session 1. Procedure

Subjects received an experimental booklet which introduced the
experiment as a study of computer speech as follows:

Considerable work is presently being done in the area
of artificial intelligence and computer speech. However,
before we can teach computers how to recognize and gen-
erate human speech, much more must be known about human
speech itself. As part of this continuing effort, you
will be asked to write an expository essay which will
then be submitted to a computer. The computer will attempt
to 'understand' the essay and write one exactly like it in
meaning. To get started, we would like to obtain a record
of your thought processes in formulating an opinion on a
given topic, in this case, the question of whether or not
tuition should be doubled at OSU.

Premeasures of subjects' attitudes toward the topic of doubling
tuition were then obtained by means of two self-rating scales, and by
a content-free attitude measure. The latter procedure developed by
Cullen (1968) required subjects to write down all the thoughts that
occurred to them that were pertinent to forming and expressing an opinion on the topic of whether or not tuition should be doubled. Each thought was then coded by the subject on a six-point rating scale ranging from strongly favorable to strongly opposed to doubling tuition. An attitude score ranging from -3 to +3 was assigned to each subject by summing the ratings given to each listed thought for the subject and dividing by the number of such thoughts.

Following listed thoughts procedure outlined above, subjects completed two 65 point self-rating scales. The first scale asked, "To what extent do you agree with increasing tuition to $330 per quarter?" and was labeled in six equally spaced points: not at all, moderately not, slightly not, slightly, moderately, completely. The second scale read, "How confident are you of your ability to refute arguments in favor of increasing tuition?" and was labeled in six equally spaced points: not at all confident, not very confident, slightly confident, moderately confident, quite confident, completely confident.

Following the premeasures the booklet continued:

As we indicated earlier we would like you to write an expository essay which will then be submitted to the computer. Expository writing typically involves the forceful and persuasive presentation of a position on one side or another of an issue. We are therefore going to ask you to write on only one side of the tuition issue. You have been assigned, arbitrarily, to write in support of (no change), (doubling) -- (the words no change were blacked out) -- of tuition. Since there are many valid arguments to be made on both sides of this issue, we feel that no one will be disappointed by this arbitrary assignment.

For the sake of standardization of form and to facilitate computer processing, we have provided five questions (next page) pertinent to the tuition issue. Your task will
be to answer each of these questions with a brief paragraph, no more than three sentences in length. Please remember that you are to answer each question with a statement supporting no change doubling of tuition (no change was again blacked out).

Subjects had 15 minutes to respond to the following five questions:

(1) "In what ways could the quality of undergraduate teaching improve if tuition were doubled, stays the same." (2) "In what way would there be an ultimately favorable effect on the student's financial position if tuition were doubled, stays the same." (3) "In what ways could the number and variety of course offerings be improved if tuition were doubled, stays the same." (4) "In what ways could OSU attract better qualified undergraduate and graduate students if tuition were doubled, stays the same." (5) "What future improvements in university facilities can be anticipated if tuition were doubled, stays the same." (The words "stays the same" were blacked out for all subjects.)

The procedure of writing an essay in response to the five questions was introduced by Greenwald and Albert (1968) and was intended to insure partial standardization of essay length and content, as well as facilitate the improvisation task for subjects who might otherwise be unable to advocate raising tuition.

Before subjects were dismissed they were instructed to assign themselves and their essay a 12 digit identification number which would be used to keep track of their essay when it was allegedly in the computer.
Session 2. Procedure

Returning subjects were given an IBM card with their name and the twelve-digit identification number they had assigned themselves during Session 1, an experimental booklet, and a pack of IBM cards containing the "computer essay." The computer essay consisted of between eight to twelve sentences each on an IBM card except when the length of the sentence required two cards.

Subjects were assigned to one of four experimental conditions in a two by two factorial design where one factor was the perception of authorship of the essay they were receiving on IBM cards (self vs. other), and the other factor was the actual authorship (self vs. other).

The experimental booklet explained that the essay written in Session 1 had been edited and processed by the computer. The subject was then asked to identify the source of the computer essay by comparing the identification number of the computer essay with the number he had assigned himself during Session 1. If the numbers were identical and if the subject's name appeared in the first ten columns of every card in the computer essay, he was to conclude that he was the author of the original essay. Having made this comparison, subjects indicated in a space provided in the booklet that (1) the essay was their own, or (2) that it was written by someone else.

Subjects in all conditions were informed that while the computer had made minor changes in all essay, the meaning had remained exactly the same. In actuality the essays readministered to subjects during Session 2 had been systematically transformed by the experimenter. In
general, the editing carried out by the experimenter scrambled the order of the sentences in the Session 1 essay as well as eliminated specific references and other idiosyncratic features of the original essay. The resultant style of the computer essays was short and choppy conjuring up the image of a machine mentality.

Subjects copied the computer essay from the IBM cards into their booklet prior to answering several questions that they were told would aid in the understanding of computer speech.

The same series of attitude measures administered prior to Session 1 was readministered with the addition of a 65 point self-rating scale intended as a check on the manipulation which read, "How similar was the computer essay to the one you originally wrote?" This scale was labeled in six equal points as, identical, almost identical, substantially the same, somewhat different, moderately different, extremely different.

As a further check on the manipulation subjects were informed of a possible computer error in which an essay may have become separated from its correct identification number and subsequently reassigned to an incorrect one. The subject was asked to help spot a possible error by indicating whether he or someone else was the author of the computer essay, regardless of the purported authorship of the essay. Finally, space was provided for general comments regarding the similarity of the computer essay to the subject's own. Subjects were thanked for their participation and dismissed.
RESULTS

Check on the Manipulation of Perceived Source

In order to determine the success of the two experimental conditions in which the authorship of the Session 2 essay was disguised, two separate checks on the manipulation were employed. The first check on the manipulation of perceived authorship utilized the data obtained when subjects were informed of a possible computer error. To the extent that the subjects' judgments as to the authorship of the computer essay were consistent with the manipulation of perceived source, the manipulation could be judged successful.

Table 8 presents the number of subjects in each experimental condition who did not perceive the alleged authorship of the essay to be veridical, i.e., thought they were the author when the essay was attributed to someone else, or thought the essay was written by someone else even though it contained their name and identification number.

TABLE 8

Number of Subjects for whom the Manipulation of Perceived Authorship Was Not Effective by Experimental Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributed source</th>
<th>Actual source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Number in parentheses represents total cell N.
As can be seen from Table 8, it was easier to give a subject someone else's essay and convince him it was his own than to deceive him regarding the authorship of an essay he himself wrote. This finding probably reflects the subject's ability to identify his own intellectual productions on the basis of subtle and idiosyncratic clues.

The second check on the manipulation of perceived authorship asked the subject to judge the similarity of the Session 2 essay to the one he had originally written during Session 1. Essays which were believed to be written by the subject should have been judged more similar to the Session 1 essay than an essay believed to be written by someone else. The means and standard deviations for the judged similarity scores are presented in Table 9.

TABLE 9

Means and Standard Deviations for Scores Indicating the Judged Similarity between Session 2 and Session 1 essays

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Actual Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38.95</td>
<td>11.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33.63</td>
<td>14.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A two-way unweighted means analysis of variance on the similarity scores (summarized in Table 10) demonstrated a significant main effect of attributed source \((F = 6.77, 1, 70 \text{ df}, p < .05)\). The effect of actual source was not significant.

**TABLE 10**

Unweighted Means Analysis of Variance Summary
Table of Judged Similarity of Session 2 Essays to Those Written by the Subject During Session 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual source (A)</td>
<td>60.63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60.63</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributed source (B)</td>
<td>1597.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1597.01</td>
<td>6.77*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>215.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>215.03</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within cell</td>
<td>16493.00</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>235.61</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Three subjects were omitted because of missing data

*\(p < .05\)

**Dependent Variables**

The test of the major prediction of a main effect of perceived source as well as the prediction of a main effect of actual source and an interaction were carried out by means of three separate two-way analyses of variance (unweighted means) using pre-to-post change scores for the listed thoughts, and the two self-rating scales. The means and standard deviations for these dependent measures are presented in Tables 11, 12 and 13. The analyses of variance for these measures are summarized in Tables 14, 15, and 16. None of these analyses yielded any significant findings.
TABLE 11
Means and Standard Deviations of Attitude Change Scores Using the Listed Thoughts Procedure by Experimental Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Source</th>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 12
Means and Standard Deviations of Attitude Change Scores Using Likert-Type Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Source</th>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>15.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-1.31</td>
<td>12.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>17.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>11.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 13
Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-to-post Changes in Confidence in the Ability to Refute Arguments in Favor of Doubling Tuition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th></th>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>$\bar{X}$</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>$\bar{X}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
<td>17.59</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-6.15</td>
<td>8.81</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-11.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greater the confidence in the ability to refute arguments in favor of an increase, the less likely a subject was to favor such an increase.

TABLE 14
Analysis of Variance of Attitude Change Scores Using the Listed Thoughts Procedure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual Source (A)</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributed Source (B)</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within cell</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2.767</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because subjects were matched across diagonals of the 2 x 2 design, the F Tests of the main effects tend to be slightly conservative.
TABLE 15
Analysis of Variance of Attitude Change
Using Likert-Type Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual Source (A)</td>
<td>292.203</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>292.203</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributed Source (B)</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>153.700</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>153.700</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within cell</td>
<td>15705.22</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because subjects were matched across diagonals of the 2 x 2 design the F Tests of the main effects tend to be slightly conservative.

TABLE 16
Analysis of Variance of Pre-to-post Changes in Confidence in the Ability to Refute Arguments in Favor of Doubling Tuition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual Source (A)</td>
<td>657.47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>657.47</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributed Source (B)</td>
<td>249.49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>249.49</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>41.60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41.60</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within cell</td>
<td>17688.63</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because subjects were matched across the diagonals of the 2 x 2 design the F Tests of the main effects tend to be slightly conservative.
DISCUSSION

The uniform lack of support for the hypothesis despite the success of the manipulation of perceived source is potentially attributable to several factors in addition to the possibility that the self-authorship hypothesis itself is incorrect. First, the topic of a tuition increase might not have been the most suitable one for the experimental design used. Since attitude change was assessed by means of scores obtained at the beginning of Session 1 and at the end of Session 2 the design was subject to invalidity due to history (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). The fact that tuition was a topic of high salience for the subject population made such an invalidity especially plausible. Thus, it seemed advisable to replicate the procedure with attitude topics for which communications outside of the experiment would be unlikely. Secondly, it was possible that the hypothesized differences resulting from perceived authorship would be small. In order to increase the sensitivity of the experiment it was decided to employ a within-subjects rather than a between-subjects design. Finally, it was possible that the effect of attributed source was insufficient to produce attitude change, but nonetheless would result in a more positive evaluation of one's own message. To investigate this possibility the validity judgment procedure which constituted one of the two dependent variables of Experiment I (reported in Chapter II) was utilized. It was hypothesized that persons judging arguments that they believed were their own would consider them more valid than the same argument attributed to someone else. To incorporate these changes in design and dependent measures, a second experiment was carried out.
It should be noted that the lack of a main effect of actual source casts doubt upon the validity of the handtailoring explanation since self-authored arguments should be handtailored to a greater extent than arguments which have been written by someone else. Appendix D presents several further studies relevant to the handtailoring explanation.

EXPERIMENT III

Summary of Procedure. The same two-session format of Experiment II was retained as well as substantially the same techniques for manipulating the attributed source variable. During Session 1, described as a study of student opinion, subjects improvised essays on one of three topics: the desirability of raising the voting age to 24; the desirability of increasing foreign aid, or the advantages of a general as opposed to a specialized college education. Subjects returned during Session 2 to be readministered two essays on their topic, one alleged to have been written by themselves and the other by another student.

Following the same procedure as in Experiment II during Session 1 subjects assigned themselves and their essay a 12-digit identification number and were informed that their essays, which would be processed by a computer, would be returned in two weeks during Session 2 of the experiment.

Because it was found in Experiment II that the manipulation of perceived authorship was most effective when the actual essay was written by someone other than the subject, all subjects during Session 2 received two packs of IBM cards both containing brief essays written by the experimenter, although they were told that they were the author of one essay
and that someone else was the author of the other.

Subjects. Eighty-six college sophomores participated in the first session of the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Seventy-eight of these returned for the second session.

Design of Session 2

Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions in a $3 \times 2$ factorial design, one factor being attitude topic, (voting, education, or foreign aid), and the other perceived source (self vs. other). For each topic two essays were composed by the experimenter. Within each condition, the source (self vs. other) attributed to a particular essay was counterbalanced; the sequence in which the essays were judged was also counterbalanced as well as whether the subject judged what he believed was his own essay first or second.

It was predicted that arguments which were attributed to self would be judged to be more valid than those attributed to another.

RESULTS

Check on Manipulation

Similar to Experiment II, subjects were asked to judge the similarity of each of the two essays they had received to the one they had originally written during Session 1. The manipulation was successful if subjects gave significantly higher ratings of similarity to the essay which they had allegedly written. The means and standard deviations of these similarity scores are presented in Table 17.
### TABLE 17

Means and Standard Deviations for Scores Indicating the Judged Similarity Between Session 2 and Session 1 Essays

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>( \bar{X} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The higher the number, the more similar the essay.

Analysis of variance of the similarity scores (summarized in Table 18) testifies to the effectiveness of the manipulation, as indicated by a significant main effect of attributed source (\( F = 8.53, 1/72 \text{ df}, p < .01 \)).
TABLE 18
Analysis of Variance on Judgments of Perceived Similarity between Each of the Session 2 Essays and the Ones Written by the Subject During Session 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between Subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic (A)</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj. W. Groups</td>
<td>79.40</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within Subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source (own vs. other) (B)</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>8.53*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x Subj. W. Groups</td>
<td>47.32</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .01

Note: Two subjects were discarded because of missing data.

Subjects were also, as in Experiment II, appraised of the possibility of a computer error and asked to indicate such an error by putting an "x" next to the essay(s) which were incorrectly identified. Only one subject so indicated.
Judgments of Validity of Essays

The effect of perceived authorship on the judged validity of each essay was tested by an analysis of variance on the number of statements in each essay rated as valid by the subject. Since each essay consisted of five statements, each subject received two scores ranging from 0 to 5, one representing the number of arguments judged valid in the essay attributed to him, and another score representing the number of arguments judged valid in the essay attributed to someone else. The means and standard deviations for these scores are presented in Table 19.

TABLE 19
Means and Standard Deviations for the Judged Validity of Arguments as a Function of Experimental Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Attributed Source</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>( \bar{X} )</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The means are based on the number of arguments judged valid out of a possible five.
An unweighted means analysis of variance summarized in Table 20 was carried out. The predicted main effect of attributed source was not obtained ($F < 1$).

**TABLE 20**

Analysis of Variance of the Judged Validity of Essays Readministered in Session 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Ms</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between Subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic (A)</td>
<td>22.76</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.38</td>
<td>5.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj. W. Groups</td>
<td>148.28</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within Subjects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source (own vs. other) (B)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x Subj. W. Groups</td>
<td>52.59</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .01$

Note: Data consists of the number of statements out of a possible 5 for each essay judged valid.
DISCUSSION

In view of the substantial success in manipulating the perception of source, it is possible that the present lack of support for the hypothesis may simply mean that self-authorship is a minor determinant of persuasion, or that it is only important under conditions not met in the present experiments.

In Experiment III one factor which may have diminished the chances of confirming the hypothesis was that all subjects were the source of a message during Session 1. It is possible that the Session 2 procedure of identifying the source of the computer essay was sufficient to remind the subject of his own authorship of a very similar essay and thus attenuate the effect of the manipulation. In addition, measurement of the effect of self-authorship took place at a time far removed from the period during which self-authorship should have been most effective, namely, during the actual composition of the counter-attitudinal essay.

This delay between the composition of the essay and the measurement of attitude change might plausibly account for difference in results between the present experiment and Greenwald and Albert (1968) since in the latter, attitude measurement occurred shortly after subjects wrote their essays.

Additional specification of the conditions under which the self-as-source hypothesis is most likely to be confirmed remains unclear. It is possible that to the extent information about the message itself is either lacking or of uncertain validity, information about the source may become especially important. In Experiment II all subjects probably
felt well informed about the topic of tuition. Therefore, even though the authorship of the experimental essays was made especially salient, the subject may have concluded that little new information was obtained by knowing whether he or someone else was the author. Research might profitably explore the self-as-source hypothesis in settings where the source is a greater determinant of change than is the message.

In a sense, the non-support accorded the hypothesis is testimony to the subject's fairness in evaluating information and his willingness not to be swayed by an appeal just because it is his own.

The failure to confirm the self-authorship hypothesis in the present experiments does not disqualify a related hypothesis from operating in a variety of settings other than counterattitudinal role-playing. In international bargaining situations, for example, it is known that antagonists sometimes simultaneously issue the identical formula for a settlement, each claiming authorship and thus preventing the loss of face which would have resulted from accepting the other side's proposal. It seems likely that the investigation of the effects of perceived self-authorship in other settings would prove valuable.
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Empirical findings and theoretical analyses of the persuasive effects of role-playing were reviewed. Findings were organized according to several traditional distinctions and variables including active participation in vs. passive exposure to communication, the amount and quality of improvisation, the degree of effort in advocacy, and the effects of self vs. other authorship of arguments. Incentive and dissonance theory as they apply to role-playing were briefly reviewed. Incentive theory in particular seemed to invoke a multiplicity of mediating processes which had been neither well articulated nor adequately tested thus far.

Cognitive response analysis was offered as a framework for investigating several explanations of the persuasive effects of role-playing. Attitude change by role playing would be facilitated, according to cognitive response analysis, by the presence of any element in the role playing situation that predisposes the individual to develop a cognitive response set of increased favorability toward information supporting a discrepant view.

Chapter II focused one element of the stimulus situation constituting the role-playing task, namely, the role playing instructions
through which the subject accepts his role playing assignment. It was hypothesized that acceptance of the role-playing assignment serves to develop a cognitive response set that fosters the impartial evaluation of discrepant information.

A test of this explanation of the effectiveness of role playing in producing attitude change was provided by Experiment I, in which subjects accepted a role-playing assignment but did not actually perform the role-playing task. Opinion and cognitive response measurements which were obtained after subjects had been led to expect future role-playing served as the dependent measures.

Specifically, subjects were assigned to argue in favor of increased or decreased U.S. military involvement in Vietnam (control groups received no assignment), and indicated their initial opinion as favoring either an increase or a decrease. Order of presentation of the opinion and cognitive response dependent measures was counterbalanced. The opinion measure consisted of a series of Likert-type items relevant to the experimental topic. The cognitive response measure employed judgments on a series of ten topic-relevant statements; each statement was to be judged according to whether it supported an increase or a decrease in involvement and also whether it was valid or invalid.

Cognitive response set scores were computed by taking (the number of the ten items judged as valid and supporting an increase + the number of items judged as supporting a decrease but considered invalid) - (the number of items supporting an increase, but invalid + the number of items supporting a decrease and valid).
The results indicated that opinion shifts occurred for the Likert-type dependent measure as a function of assigned position, but that a similar effect of assigned position was obtained for the validity judgment (cognitive response set) measure only when that measure preceded the Likert. Thus, final opinion judgments were modified in the direction of the assigned position despite the fact that the role-playing task was not carried out. It was concluded, in agreement with the conclusion of Greenwald (1968b), that the persuasive impact of role-playing may be interpreted in terms of a cognitive response set that enables the subject to become more impartial in his evaluation of controversial information.

Chapter III reports two studies focusing on another aspect of the role playing process that may contribute to the development of a positive response set toward opinion-discrepant information — namely, the source of the persuasive message. It was hypothesized that subjects would be more likely to develop a favorable cognitive response set to persuasive messages that were self-generated than to messages that originated from an outside source. It was therefore predicted that messages believed to be self-generated in contrast to externally generated were more likely to produce opinion change (Experiment II) and were more likely to be judged as valid (Experiment III).

Both experiments utilized a two-session format in which subjects wrote a persuasive communication during Session 1 of the experiment and were readministered a similar essay during Session 2. The procedural variations for Session 2 of the first experiment are described
by a 2 x 2 factorial design in which one factor was the actual source of the read ministered essay (i.e., whether it was written by the subject or by another person during Session 1), and the other factor was the attributed source of the message (self vs. other).

Disguising the actual message source for half of the subjects during Session 2 was accomplished by means of an elaborate procedure in which subjects identified their Session 1 essay by means of an identification number which they assigned to themselves during Session 1, and by seeing their name or someone else's name printed next to each sentence in the Session 2 essay. Both the identification number and the author's name were systematically manipulated according to the experimental condition.

In both experiments the manipulation of perceived source was successful. Those subjects who were led to attribute the Session 2 essay to themselves judged it to be significantly more similar to their Session 1 essay than subjects who were led to believe that their Session 2 essay was written by someone else.

In Experiment II, three analyses of variance using pre to post changes in attitude on two self-rating scales and a content free measure of attitude as the dependent variables failed to reveal any significant findings.

Experiment III, while retaining the same two-session format and method of manipulating the perceived source as Experiment II, employed a within rather than a between subjects design for the perceived source variable and utilized a variety of attitude topics. In addition, a
different dependent measure was used, based on the judged validity of five topic-relevant statements. Each subject was given two essays in Session 2, one attributed to him and one attributed to someone else and was asked to judge the five statements comprising each essay as valid or invalid. Thus, each subject received two scores, one representing the number of arguments judged valid for the essay attributed to him, and the other for the number of arguments judged valid for the essay allegedly written by someone else. Analysis of variance of these scores did not confirm the hypothesis under test.

It was proposed that information obtained from the source of a message may be of little importance in cases in which adequate information on which to base an opinion is available from other places, in this case from the content of the communication itself. It was suggested that the self-as-source hypothesis may prove to be true in cases in which little reliable information can be extracted from the communication itself.

It is possible that the self-as-source hypothesis may be influenced by personality variables, although where personality variables have been employed in the role-playing literature they have either resulted in no effect (Greenwald & Albert, 1968) or have resulted in contradictory findings when two studies have employed the same variable (Salman, 1962; Greenbaum, 1966; Culbertson, 1957; Harvey & Beverly, 1961).

It was also proposed that the dynamics of the self-as-source hypothesis might be profitably explored in other settings such as
those involving the negotiated process of conflict resolution.

Research reported in Appendix C and Appendix D served to test two additional explanations of attitude change occasioned by role playing. Experiments IV and V manipulated (successfully in Experiment IVs, but not in V) the extent to which subjects exceeded their expectancy regarding the number of arguments they believed they could produce while role-playing a discrepant position. According to an analysis by Bem (1965) the observation of performance in excess of initial estimates should cause subjects to revise their opinions in the direction favoring their role playing assignment. The results of both experiments failed to confirm the predictions.

Experiments VI, VII, VIII and IX tested an explanation of attitude change from role playing suggested by Hovland, Janis and Kelly (1953). According to these authors, change may be a result of a process of handtailoring in which the role playing subject selects the content of his communication so as to take account of his own needs and personality. It was hypothesized that handtailoring and hence self persuasion would be maximized during attempts to persuade an audience (a) of similar rather than of different opinion (Experiment VI), (b) of similar rather than different personality (Experiment VII), (c) of similar rather than dissimilar motivation for holding an opinion (Experiment VIII), and (d) that the subject liked rather than one he disliked (Experiment IX). No significant differences were observed except for the fact that significantly more self persuasion occurred for subjects who addressed their communications to an audience holding a different, as opposed to a similar, opinion. Several explanations
for this result were discussed. It was concluded that the handtailoring hypothesis was neither supported nor refuted by the evidence of these experiments since no adequate check was available to determine whether a handtailoring process was successfully aroused.
EXPOSITORY WRITING STUDY

This study is concerned with an analysis of expository writing abilities. In it, you will be writing expository statements relevant to the issue of whether increased or decreased U.S. military involvement in Vietnam is preferable. Due to the controversial nature of the topic and to insure anonymity it is not necessary to sign your name to this booklet unless you wish to do so.

"Increased military involvement" should be understood as a 25-50% increase in men and material above current levels. The increase should be considered to be executed gradually over the course of one year. Decreased military involvement is defined in an opposite manner indicating a 25-50% decrease in men and material over the course of the coming year.

Considering these two mutually exclusive alternatives regarding our policy in Vietnam, please indicate with a check mark, below, which of these positions you think has more merit. It is understood that this judgment may not be based on detailed consideration of all of the complexities of the Vietnam issue and that the terms "increased military involvement" and "decreased military involvement" have been defined only at a general level. Nonetheless, your judgment at this stage will be of use.

Check the alternative which comes closest to your own preference. It is important that you check one or the other.

________ increased military involvement

________ decreased military involvement

PLEASE CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE
Expository writing ability is the ability to present, forcefully, persuasively, and originally, a position on one side or another of an issue. We are therefore asking you to write on only one side of the issue. You have been assigned, arbitrarily, to write in support of decreased U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Since many valid arguments have been made on both sides of this issue, we feel that no one will be disappointed by this arbitrary assignment.

For the sake of standardization of form, we have provided some questions (below) pertinent to the issue of increased vs. decreased military involvement in Vietnam. Your task will be to answer each of these questions with a paragraph. Please remember that you are to answer each question with a statement supporting decreased involvement in Vietnam. You must do this, for the purposes of this study, even if you are aware of valid arguments supporting the opposite side.

You will be writing your answers to these questions later. At this time please read the questions carefully and begin thinking about answers that can support your assigned position.

Do not write anything yet, however,

A. In what way would decreased military involvement facilitate the eventual establishment of stable democratic government in Vietnam?

B. In what way would decreased military involvement reduce the possibility of future war with Communist China?

C. In what way would decreased military involvement increase the effectiveness of other aspects of U.S. foreign policy?

D. In what way would decreased military involvement ultimately contribute to the status of the U.S. as a world power?

PLEASE DO NOT TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.
The statements on the next two pages are related to the topic of increased versus decreased military involvement in Vietnam. They are for the purpose of giving you a preliminary period to examine this topic prior to writing your essay answers to the questions given on the preceding page.

Your task for these statements will be to evaluate each, to the best of your ability, in terms of its objective merits, regardless of whether it supports your assigned position or not. Try to judge each statement as a valid or invalid statement about the military involvement issue. A valid statement is one that should be taken into account in forming an intelligent opinion on this topic; it is one supported by reasoning and evidence. An invalid statement is one that need not be given detailed consideration either because of lack of evidence or because of errors in reasoning.

The blank spaces below each statement are to be used as follows. First indicate which side you think the statement favors--increased or decreased military involvement--by checking next to "Incr" if you think it favors an increase, "Decr" if you think it favors a decrease. Then indicate your overall judgment of the statement--by checking either "valid" or "invalid". Finally, indicate in a brief sentence your reason for judging it as valid or invalid. It will be of use to us to have your reasons for making these judgments, so please write them whenever it is possible for you to do this.

Try not to spend more than about a minute on each statement. While you need not feel obliged to write a reason for each and every statement, nonetheless, please do not refrain from expressing any relevant thoughts, favorable or unfavorable, that occur to you.
If America does not honor her treaty obligations to South Vietnam, other allies will lose confidence in her determination to keep other treaty commitments.

Supports: Incr ; Decr . Statement is: valid ; invalid .
Reason for validity judgment:

Surveys in government-controlled areas of South Vietnam indicate that the peasantry regard the war not as their own but as an American one.

Supports: Incr ; Decr . Statement is: valid ; invalid .
Reason for validity judgment:

America cannot afford to ignore the opposing tide of world opinion, set into motion by the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

Supports: Incr ; Decr . Statement is: valid ; invalid .
Reason for validity judgment:

American withdrawal from Vietnam would seriously weaken our ability to defend the rest of Southeast Asia (for example, Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines) against communist subversion.

Supports: Incr ; Decr . Statement is: valid ; invalid .
Reason for validity judgment:

The military activities of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese have been largely a response to American intervention, not the cause of it.

Supports: Incr ; Decr . Statement is: valid ; invalid .
Reason for validity judgment:
Allowing communist aggression in South Vietnam to go unpunished would only serve to increase Red China's expansionist appetite.

Supports: Incr ____; Decr ____. Statement is: valid __; invalid __.

Reason for validity judgment:

More American troops should be sent to Vietnam as long as this is necessary to match the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam.

Supports: Incr ____; Decr ____. Statement is: valid __; invalid __.

Reason for validity judgment:

America undermined the 1954 Geneva agreement by subsequently establishing military bases, stopping general elections, and placing Diem in power in South Vietnam.

Supports: Incr ____; Decr ____. Statement is: valid __; invalid ____.

Reason for validity judgment:

North Vietnam's support of the Vietcong is an attempt to deny the South Vietnamese people the right to build their own form of government.

Supports: Incr ____; Decr ____. Statement is: valid __; invalid ____.

Reason for validity judgment:

American Special Forces in Vietnam may preach freedom and democracy, but they have practiced a vicious suppression of democratic protest against a series of dictatorships.

Supports: Incr ____; Decr ____. Statement is: valid __; invalid ____.

Reason for validity judgment:
Please complete the brief questionnaire on this page. Respond to each of the statements by indicating the extent of your agreement. Do this by checking the blank space that best indicates the extent of your agreement with the statement.

1. Increased military involvement in Vietnam seems to be preferable to decreasing our military commitment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly agree</th>
<th>Slightly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. Decreasing our military involvement in Vietnam would facilitate the eventual establishment of stable democratic government in Vietnam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly agree</th>
<th>Slightly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Increased military involvement in Vietnam would increase the effectiveness of other aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly agree</th>
<th>Slightly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. The possibility of war with Communist China would be reduced if our military involvement in Vietnam were decreased.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly agree</th>
<th>Slightly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

5. Increased military involvement in Vietnam would contribute to U.S. status as a world power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly agree</th>
<th>Slightly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. Decreased military involvement would ultimately contribute to world peace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly agree</th>
<th>Slightly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

PLEASE WAIT FOR FURTHER MATERIALS AND INSTRUCTIONS
This experiment is part of a continuing program carried out by the Psychology Department designed to provide an understanding of current student attitudes on a variety of topics. To obtain information on student opinion we have found it helpful to have students write short essays on one side or another of a given issue in addition to indicating their attitude by answering a series of questionnaire items. To begin today's experiment we would like you to write a forceful and persuasive essay on the topic of whether foreign aid should be increased or decreased.

You have been assigned, arbitrarily, by having received this particular booklet, to write in support of increasing the amount of foreign aid to be given by the U.S. By foreign aid is meant, military, economic, and technical assistance to the underdeveloped nations of the world. Since there are many valid arguments to be made on both sides of this issue we feel that no one will be disappointed by this arbitrary assignment.

For the sake of standardization of form, we have provided five questions (next 2 pages) pertinent to the issue of increased versus decreased foreign aid. Your task will be to answer each of these questions with a brief statement of no more than a few sentences.

Please remember that you are to answer each question with a statement supporting an increase in foreign aid. You must do this, for the purposes of this study, even if you are aware of valid arguments supporting the opposite position.
Please answer the following questions. You will have 15 minutes.

A. In what way would INCREASED FOREIGN AID facilitate the eventual establishment of stable democratic governments in underdeveloped countries?

B. In what way would INCREASED FOREIGN AID reduce the possibility of future wars among nations?
C. In what way would INCREASED FOREIGN AID increase the effectiveness of other aspects of U.S. foreign policy?

D. In what way would INCREASED FOREIGN AID ultimately contribute to the status of the U.S. as a world power?

E. In what way would INCREASED FOREIGN AID benefit the U.S. economically?

PLEASE WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS
Session II of this experiment, to be held two weeks from now, will deal with the topic of computer speech and artificial intelligence. The essays written during this session of the experiment will be submitted to a computer. The computer will attempt to "understand" the attitude expressed by the essay and write one exactly like it in meaning.

In order to keep track of your essay once it is in the computer we would like you to assign a code number to it. In the space next to the words "code number" on the two pages on which you wrote your essays, write any 12 digit number. Do not use 1's or 0's. On the IBM card we have given you, write your name, and the same 12 digit number any place on the card. Be sure the number of the IBM card and the number on this booklet are the same.

This completes the first session of this experiment. Please wait until the experimenter asks you to pass your booklets in. All participation cards will be signed at the end of the second session. Thank you for your participation.
COMPUTER SPEECH

Several weeks ago you wrote an essay which has been subsequently processed by a computer. Today you will be receiving back your own essay as well as one written by another student.

The first thing to do is to check the identity of the two essays you have received. The name of the author and his or her code number should appear on the first card followed by the essay written by that person. Check to see if your name and the exact code number you assigned yourself appear on the first card of one of the two packs of IBM cards you have received.

When you read over your own essay (not yet please) you will notice that the computer has made minor changes in grammar, organization, and punctuation, although the meaning of the original essay has remained the same.

To contribute to our understanding of computer speech we would like you to judge the validity of each of the statements comprising your own essay and the essay written by someone else. We have provided space on the next two pages for you to do this.

For each statement comprising the essay we would like you to indicate whether you regard that statement as valid or invalid. By valid we mean logically consistent and likely to be supported by evidence. By invalid we mean either faulty in logic or that the statement is not likely to be supported by relevant evidence. A valid statement is one that should be taken into account in forming an intelligent opinion on the topic to which it is relevant, while one that is invalid need not be given serious consideration. Read each statement and then immediately fill out the validity judgment before proceeding to the next statement. Continue until you have completed making your judgments for both essays. Turn the page and begin.

DO THE ESSAYS IN THE ORDER YOU HAVE RECEIVED THEM
**EVALUATION FORMS FOR COMPUTER ESSAY**

**EVALUATION FORMS FOR COMPUTER ESSAY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Invalid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statement 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for validity judgment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for validity judgment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for validity judgment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for validity judgment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for validity judgment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE PLEASE
EVALUATION FORMS FOR COMPUTER ESSAY WRITTEN BY: ____ myself (check one) ___ other person

Statement 1 valid ___ invalid ___
Reason for validity judgment: ______________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

Statement 2 valid ___ invalid ___
Reason for validity judgment: ______________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

Statement 3 valid ___ invalid ___
Reason for validity judgment: ______________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

Statement 4 valid ___ invalid ___
Reason for validity judgment: ______________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

Statement 5 valid ___ invalid ___
Reason for validity judgment: ______________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE PLEASE
We would now like to know how similar each computer essay is to the one you originally wrote.

The essay written by ____________________________ (fill in name) was:

____ identical to mine
____ almost identical
____ substantially different
____ somewhat different
____ moderately different
____ extremely different

The essay written by ____________________________ (fill in name) was:

____ identical to mine
____ almost identical
____ substantially different
____ somewhat different
____ moderately different
____ extremely different

During the processing of the essays, there is always the possibility that an essay becomes separated from its identification number and subsequently gets reassigned to an incorrect number. When this happens, an essay written by one person is mistakenly thought to be written by another. To help alert us to such a malfunction put a large "X" next to the name or names above if you feel that one or both of the essays was written by someone else other than the person whose name appears on the computer cards. Thank you for your help.
THE EFFECTS OF DISCONFIRMED EXPECTANCY ON ATTITUDE CHANGE INDUCED BY ROLE-PLAYING

A common initial response of subjects to a role-playing task that involves counterattitudinal advocacy is the feeling, sometimes overtly expressed to the experimenter, that it is difficult to argue in favor of unacceptable positions. The unpleasantness of arguing against one's own beliefs moreover, is often accompanied by a pessimistic evaluation of one's competence to do so. In the course of advocacy, however, most subjects are often able to successfully argue against their own beliefs. In this process, the actual performance of counterattitudinal advocacy disconfirms the subject's original expectancy as to his inability to produce an acceptable discrepant communication. This phenomenological description of a typical counterattitudinal role-playing experience may be interpreted in terms of the views of Bem (1965) or in terms of dissonance theory.

In terms of Bem's (1965) analysis, the subjects' self-observation that their performance is superior to initial expectancies might lead them to conclude that they misjudged their true feelings on the attitude issue. Based on the premise that one can effectively argue a
position only to the extent that one holds that opinion, subjects might then conclude that they were more in favor of the discrepant position than they had originally thought.

Shifts in opinion as a result of the disconfirmation of prior expectancies are also interpretable within a dissonance framework (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962), although a series of studies by Brock, Edelman, Edwards, and Schuck (1965) reveal that a complete understanding of the effects of disconfirmed expectancies has yet to be achieved. In essence, however, the disconfirmation of expectancies regarding the adequacy of one's performance in a task of counter-attitudinal role-playing should arouse dissonance, which can then be reduced by attitude change.

Two studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that attitude change occurs during counterattitudinal role-playing to the extent that a subject exceeds his initial expectancy regarding his ability to argue in favor of a position at variance with his own beliefs.

The procedure and results are presented for each experiment separately followed by a common discussion section pertinent to both experiments.
EXPERIMENT IV

The first experiment was designed to commit subjects to various expectancies regarding their ability to argue counterattitudinally. One group of subjects was then encouraged to exceed their stated expectancies, while the other was allowed to perform the counter-attitudinal role-playing task consistent with their initial expectancies.

Subjects

Twenty-six introductory Psychology students participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.

Procedure

The experiment was introduced as a study of student attitudes and was administered by means of booklets to two large groups. The first page of the booklet introduced the experiment as a study of student opinion and obtained the student's initial expectancies regarding his ability to argue in favor of a tuition increase as follows:

In this study we would like you to write an essay in favor of doubling tuition at OSU. Since most persons are opposed to doubling tuition, writing an essay in favor of an increase is a difficult task.

How many different arguments do you think you can produce in favor of an increase? _____ (give the number)
How long an essay do you think you could write?
_____ words, and in about _____ minutes.

How persuasive an essay do you think you could write? Subjects indicated their response by circling a number from 1 to 9; numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 were labeled "strongly persuasive", "moderately persuasive", "somewhat persuasive", "slightly persuasive", "not at all persuasive", respectively.

In one condition, subjects were then asked to write an essay incorporating three times their predicted number of arguments. In the other condition subjects were asked to write an essay using the same number of arguments as they had indicated on page 1 of their booklet. A maximum of thirty minutes was given for subjects to write their essays.

Dependent measures

A series of five 65 point self-rating scales were employed as dependent measures of attitude toward doubling tuition. A typical item asked "to what extent do you agree with increasing tuition to $330 per quarter?" The scale was labeled in six equally spaced points as: "not at all", "moderately not", "slightly not", "slightly", "moderately", "completely". In addition to the attitude dependent measure the subject was asked how many arguments he had written, and whether the essay he wrote was a more persuasive one than he originally thought he could write. Responses to these questions were obtained on two 65 point self-rating scales labeled in 6 equally spaced points.
Results

Between-condition comparisons for each of the five self-rating scales yielded no significant difference. Subjects who were asked to write three times as many arguments, however, did write a significantly greater number of arguments \((p < .05)\) and a significantly greater number of arguments in excess of their initial expectancy \((p < .05)\). These subjects, however, did not rate their essays as being more persuasive than their initial estimates to a greater extent than subjects who wrote as many arguments as they had expected \((t = 0.50,\)

EXPERIMENT V

An alternative manipulation of the degree to which initial expectancies were disconfirmed was carried out in Experiment V. This manipulation, to be presented, had the virtue of unconfounding message length with the degree to which subject expectancies were disconfirmed. In the previous experiment subjects who wrote three times their initial expectancy and who would therefore be expected to change the most, also produced a substantially longer persuasive essay. Thus, had change been observed it would not be known whether the change was due to expectancy disconfirmation or to the length.

These two factors were unconfounded by a procedure which induced subjects to raise their initial expectancies by different amounts. By this technique subjects who had been induced to raise their initial
expectancies, and who were requested to perform in accordance with their estimates, produced essays of considerable length under conditions in which their performance was congruent with their initial expectations (i.e., low disconfirmation).

**Subjects**

Fifty-four introductory Psychology students at Ohio State participated in the experiment as part of a course requirement.

**Procedure**

The experimental instructions intended to manipulate subjects' initial expectancies were administered by means of three sets of booklets. After subjects were informed that the experiment concerned student attitudes, and that they would be expected to write an essay in favor of doubling tuition at Ohio State the booklet stated:

We have found that most persons are able to write about (3) (6) (12) arguments /depending on the condition/ in favor of doubling tuition even though they themselves may not believe tuition should be increased.

How many arguments do you think you can produce in favor of an increase? ______

How persuasive an essay do you think you could write? /Subjects responded on a 1-9 scale, the odd numbers of which were labeled: strongly persuasive, moderately persuasive, somewhat persuasive, slightly persuasive, not at all persuasive./

For all three conditions the instructions continued as follows:
During the next time period your task will be to write an essay in favor of doubling tuition. We would like you to try and write an essay incorporating as many arguments as you can. If you felt you couldn't write any arguments, try to think of at least three and write an essay on the basis of those. Try to make the arguments different from each other. However, if you really can't think of a sufficient number of arguments, then instead clarify, exemplify or elaborate an argument already used. If you complete an essay before the maximum time for this section is up (30 minutes), please go on to the next section.

Subjects then composed and wrote their essays and then filled out the dependent measures.

**Dependent measures**

Four 65 point self rating scales labeled at six equally spaced points comprised the dependent measures. For example, "How valid do you think the arguments are in favor of doubling tuition?" (not at all, moderately not, slightly not, slightly, moderately, completely). As a possible check on the manipulation subjects were asked, "How much more persuasive an essay did you in fact write than you originally thought you could; and, "How easy is it for you to think up arguments on just about any side of an issue regardless of whether you happen to believe in that side?" In addition subjects were asked how many arguments they actually wrote in their essay. (Both scales were 65 points, and labeled at six equally spaced points.)
RESULTS

Check on the manipulation

Subjects who were told that most persons could write about 12 arguments indicated that they thought they could write a more persuasive essay than subjects who were told that others could produce 6 arguments, who in turn believed themselves capable of writing a more persuasive essay than subjects who believed that most people could write only 3 arguments. (F = 4.76, 2/50 df, p < .05)

Subjects in the 3 argument condition indicated that they could write an average of 1.7 arguments; subjects in the 6 argument condition an average of 4.42 arguments; and subjects in the 12 argument condition an average of 3.8 arguments. (F = 7.84, 2/50 df, p < .01)

The number of arguments actually written conformed to the same pattern. Subjects in the 3 argument condition wrote on the average 2.72 arguments; subjects in the 6 argument condition 5.2 arguments, and subjects in the 12 argument condition an average of 4.2 arguments. (F = 3.18, 2/50 df, p < .10)

Mean difference scores between the number of arguments the subject judged he could write and the number he actually did write did not result in a significant difference between conditions. (F < 1). Furthermore, subjects in the three conditions did not differ in the extent to which they wrote more persuasive essays than they originally thought they could. (F = 1.96, 2/50 df)
Dependent measures

None of the four dependent variables yielded significant F's. Only one dependent variable resulted in an F greater than one; namely, in answer to the question, "To what extent do you agree with increasing tuition to $330 per quarter?" the means for the 3, 6 and 12 argument conditions were: 7.8, 11.9, and 14.6 (F = 1.12, 2/50 df). The scale had a potential range of 0-65 with the higher number representing more agreement with an increase.

Discussion for Experiments IV and V

Subjects in Experiment V did not significantly differ in the extent to which they exceeded their initial expectancies as indicated either by the number of arguments written or by their response to the question, "How much more persuasive an essay did you write than you originally thought you could?" Thus, the negative results obtained in Experiment V cannot disconfirm the hypothesis since subjects did not differentially exceed their expectancies regarding the adequacy of their role-playing performance.

In Experiment IV subjects differentially exceeded their expectancies regarding the number of arguments they thought they could write. Subjects who exceeded the number of arguments they thought they could write, however, did not conclude as a result that they had exceeded their expectancies regarding how persuasive an essay they could write. Therefore,
it seems that the manipulation of the number of arguments in excess of an initial estimate is only minimally related to persuasion. Perhaps this is due to a process of dilution in which the total persuasive impact of a large number of arguments is attenuated because of the inclusion of many arguments which are weak and easily refuted. Indeed, subjects who were instructed to write three times as many arguments as they had originally predicted they could, no doubt included many arguments that were not very effective, especially toward the conclusion of their essay.

If the hypothesis of disconfirmed expectancies regarding future role playing is to account for change, research must focus on discovering exactly which expectancies in the experimental situation are crucial and the consequences of varying magnitudes of disconfirmation.
Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) proposed that attitude change under conditions of role playing may result from a process of hand-tailoring in which the subject selects and modifies the content of his communication so as to take account of his own personality and needs.

As a test of the handtailoring hypothesis, it was proposed that subjects who attempted to convince an audience similar to themselves would engage in substantial handtailoring, while those trying to persuade a dissimilar audience would be less likely to select arguments that would also be maximally handtailored and self-persuasive. Four dimensions of similarity were employed in a series of four experiments. The first experiment manipulated whether the subject believed he was trying to convince an audience holding the same opinion vs. one holding a different opinion on the attitude topic; the second experiment whether the subject attempted to convince an audience of similar or dissimilar personality; the third experiment whether the subject thought he was to convince an audience holding an opinion for the same or different reasons as himself. The fourth experiment manipulated whether the subject attempted to convince someone he liked versus someone he disliked. All experiments were
group administered with the experimental inductions carried out by means of booklets. A common discussion section is included after the procedures and results of all four experiments have been presented.

EXPERIMENTS VI, VII, VIII AND IX

Subjects

Thirty-seven subjects participated in Experiment VI, forty-one in Experiment VII, thirty-six in Experiment VIII and twenty-eight in Experiment IX. All were introductory Psychology students at Ohio State University and were participating in the experiments in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.

EXPERIMENT VI

The experiment was introduced to the subjects as being a study of student opinion. On the first page of their booklet subjects were instructed as follows:

We want you to write five paragraphs about why it is desirable to impeach the President of the United States. Take impeach to mean forceably remove the President from office.

In one condition the instructions continued:

We want you to try to convince someone who agrees with your personal opinion. We want you to write a persuasive essay in favor of forceably removing the President. Imagine that you are trying to convince someone who believes just as you do about this issue. You will have 25 minutes.
In the other condition the instructions continued:

We want you to try to convince someone who does not agree with your personal opinion. We want you to write an essay arguing that it is a good idea for the President to be forceably removed from office. Imagine that you are trying to convince someone who holds a different opinion from you on this issue. You will have 25 minutes.

After writing their essay, subjects completed the dependent measures designed to assess their attitude toward the attitude topic. The first three experiments utilized the same dependent measures.

Dependent measures

Attitudes toward impeaching the President were obtained by means of a seven point self-rating scale which read: "How desirable do you think it would be to impeach the President of the United States?" The seven equally spaced points were labeled: very desirable, moderately desirable, somewhat desirable, neutral, somewhat undesirable, moderately undesirable, not at all desirable.

The subject also responded to the item, "How similar are the five arguments you just wrote to the ones that you personally would find most persuasive?" on a seven point scale that was labeled: very similar, moderately similar, somewhat similar, neutral, somewhat dissimilar, moderately dissimilar, not at all similar.

A remaining question asked, "How did you try to write an essay that would convince the future reader?" The seven equally spaced response categories were labeled: very hard, moderately, somewhat, neutral, a little, not very hard, not at all.
Results

A *t* test of the mean difference in opinion as to the desirability of impeaching the President demonstrated that subjects attempting to convince an audience who disagreed with their own opinion changed significantly more in favor of impeachment than subjects attempting to convince an audience of similar opinion. (*t* = 4.12, *l/35* df, *p* < .005) Analysis of the question on which subjects rated the similarity of the arguments they had written to the ones they would find most persuasive resulted in a significant difference between the two conditions. (*t* = 2.68, *p* < .05) This difference, however, was in the opposite direction from that predicted. Thus, subjects who attempted to persuade an audience which held a different opinion from their own wrote arguments more similar to the ones that would persuade them the most than did subjects who attempted to convince an audience which held an opinion similar to their own.

There was no difference between conditions for the item that measured how hard the subject tried to write an essay that would convince his intended audience.

**EXPERIMENT VII**

Experiment VII operationally defined the dimension of subject-audience similarity in terms of the similarity of the subject's personality to that of his audience. This was accomplished by having the
subject write a 20-minute description of his personality and then write an essay in favor of impeaching the President.

He was instructed as follows:

We now want to enlist your help in composing an essay which will convince another person. The essay you are going to write will be used in an experiment at the University of Michigan. We want you to write an essay which will convince the people who read it that it is a very good idea to impeach the President of the United States . . .

The people who read your essay will be carefully selected. These people will be matched with you so that, as far as possible, they will have the (same kind of personality profile that you have) /or in the other condition/ (a different kind of personality profile than you have). We will look at the personality description you provided, and will give your essay to someone who provided (a very similar description) (a very different description).

Subjects were then instructed to write a 15-minute essay composed of five paragraphs, each containing one major argument about why the President should be impeached.

After completing the essay subjects filled out the same dependent measures as in Experiment VI.

Results

The manipulation of similarity in terms of personality had no effect on opinion as measured by the dependent measures.
EXPERIMENT VIII

Experiment VIII manipulated subject-audience similarity in terms of the reasons for holding a position on the attitude topic as follows:

As you know, people hold certain beliefs and attitudes for many different reasons. In fact, it is often the case that several persons will agree about a given attitude or belief but will have very divergent, and sometimes even opposite reasons for holding it. Consider, for example, the topic of impeaching the President of the United States . . . Many persons might agree that this would be inadvisable, yet their arguments might differ greatly.

Think about what you feel about the desirability of impeaching the President of the United States. On the next page we would like you to list four reasons why you believe as you do about this topic, reasons that particularly apply to the way you feel about it. Try to be your own psychologist. Do not state your own view on the topic, only why you hold it. You will have about 10 minutes to list your reasons.

Depending on the experimental condition subjects were then asked to write either in favor of impeachment to an audience holding their opinion for the same or for different reasons. Subjects were given 25 minutes to write their essays, after which they completed the same dependent measures previously described in Experiment I.

Results

No effect on attitudes toward impeachment was observed as a function of experimental treatment on any of the dependent measures.
EXPERIMENT IX

Experiment IX attempted to manipulate the amount of handtailoring by having subjects persuade either someone they liked or someone they disliked. It was hypothesized that a greater amount of handtailoring would occur when the subject was trying to persuade someone he liked.

Subjects were run as a group with the experimental instructions administered by means of booklets. The first page introduced the experiment as one dealing with liking and persuasion. Subjects in the disliking condition read:

For the purposes of this experiment, it is important that you be able to visualize someone (an actual person) you particularly dislike. Select a person who typically (a) does thinking that you disapprove of, (b) tends to arouse your anger, and (c) appears generally obnoxious to you. Write the initials of this person you dislike in the following blank _______. The reason for doing this will be apparent shortly.

Subjects in the liking condition were asked instead to:

Select a person who typically (a) does things that you approve of, (b) tends to arouse your best feelings, and (c) appears generally pleasant and congenial to you. Write the initials of this person you like in the following blank _______.

Subjects were then arbitrarily assigned to write in favor of doubling tuition. Identical to the procedure described in Experiment II (Chapter III) the subject wrote his 15-minute essay in response to five questions such as, "In what ways could the quality of undergraduate teaching improve if tuition were doubled?"
After the subject completed his essay, his attitude toward an increase was obtained by means of the listed thoughts procedure described in Chapter III. Two self rating scales were also used. The first 65-point scale asked, "To what extent do you agree with increasing tuition to $330 per quarter?", and was labeled in six equally spaced points as: not at all, moderately not, slightly not, slightly, moderately, completely. The second scale asked, "How confident are you of your ability to refute arguments in favor of increasing tuition to $330?", labeled in six equally spaced points as: not at all confident, not very confident, slightly confident, moderately confident, quite confident, completely confident.

As a check on the manipulation subjects were asked, "How much do you like the person you tried to convince?", to which they responded on a 65-point scale labeled in six equally spaced points as: like very much, like moderately, like slightly, dislike slightly, dislike moderately, dislike completely.

**Results**

None of the three self-rating scales designed to elicit the subject's attitude toward a tuition increase revealed any difference between the two experimental conditions. The check on the manipulation, however, indicated that subjects did select their target audience as instructed—either someone they liked or disliked.
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF
EXPERIMENTS VI, VII, VIII AND IX

It was originally expected that handtailoring and opinion change would be greatest for subjects trying to convince a similar audience. The only experiment, Experiment VI, in which significant findings were obtained, however, yielded the opposite results. Subjects who attempted to convince an audience holding a dissimilar opinion exhibited significantly more attitude change than subjects who attempted to convince an audience of similar opinion.

One possible interpretation of these results is in terms of motivation. Subjects attempting to convince an audience already in agreement may have lacked motivation to think up compelling arguments and present them in a forceful and persuasive manner. No significant difference was observed, however, between the two conditions in the ratings of how hard the subject tried to convince his intended audience. Thus, differences in motivation as measured by this question cannot account for the results of Experiment VI.

Little guidance in interpreting these results can be obtained from the existing literature since all of the studies that have manipulated communicator-audience similarity have been concerned exclusively with
measuring the amount of attitude change on the part of the recipient of
the communication rather than the communicator (Mills & Jellison, 1967;
Berscheid, 1966).

One explanation of these results is that subjects might have
found it more satisfying to attempt to convince an audience that they
knew would be receptive to their arguments; that is, the subject who
was against impeachment, but argued in favor of impeachment to a dis-
similar audience, was in fact trying to convince people who easily
accepted his arguments. Thus, it is possible to understand attitude
change on the part of such a subject as indicating a process of antici-
patory reinforcement.

Regardless of how this result is interpreted, however, the present
series of experiments cannot confirm or disconfirm the handtailoring
hypothesis since no evidence is available to provide assurance that a
handtailoring process was invoked and manipulated.

An examination of the content of the essays written under each
condition did not reveal any noticeable differences in style or content.
In fact, given the difficulty of arguing counterattitudinally it is
likely that subjects were unable to generate a large number of arguments,
thus making a process of selection and handtailoring less likely than if
the subject had available a large pool of arguments.
Future research might profitably explore the handtailoring hypothesis with subjects, such as journalists or politicians, who are especially adept at selecting arguments according to the intended audience. Using these subjects, it might be possible to develop a satisfactory measure of the amount of handtailoring present, a prerequisite to assessing the explanatory hypothesis that handtailoring can account for change.
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