THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY IN
RECENT ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

DISSERTATION

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By

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DEDICATION

To Professor Robert G. Turnbull

to whose inspiration, criticism, and direction
it owes whatever worth it has, this dissertation
is respectfully dedicated.
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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. LA PROBLEMATICA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonsense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Axioms of Intentionality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonsense Involute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. CHISHOLM: INTENTIONAL LANGUAGE</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brentano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapping &quot;Minds&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. RYLE: THE RESPONSE OF BEHAVIORISM</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Former Self</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purgatorio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Concept of Mind</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. SELLARS: THE SOLUTION OF SCIENTISM</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chisholm-Sellars Correspondence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Myth of Our Rylean Ancestors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Structured Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. BERGMANN: BY MEANS OF A MEANS</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Proposal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iv
CHAPTER I

LA PROBLEMATICA

Commensense

A. There are minds (e.g. yours, mine, Charles De Gaulle's).

B. There are physical objects (e.g. calendars, harmonicas, cabbages).

C. Sometimes minds are aware of (e.g. see, hear, imagine) physical objects.

One would think that if someone were to deny any of these statements, that person either would be mad (or just perverse) or would not have understood what he pretends to deny. Yet, at one time or another each of these statements has been denied by some philosopher or other. Presumably, philosophers are not mad; nor do they really, as Gilbert Ryle never tires of pointing out, have any more difficulty in understanding statements than do butchers, bakers, and candlestick makers. How then are we to construe their denials? The answer is that they deny them, but only in a sense. I am tempted to explicate that sense immediately by means of, say, Gustav Bergmann's distinction between commonsense and philosophical uses of terms, but I resist the temptation, however, wishing here
at the outset to remain within commonsense—to give a commonsense appraisal, as it were, of the Bergmannian distinction. For that purpose, the phrase 'in a sense' will do as well as any other.

Though ultimately such statements as C will be my main concern, statements A and B will for obvious reasons provide better examples of the peculiar denials that philosophers sometimes make. To get at the sense in which these denials are made, consider the following:

1) The (commonsensical) claim that there are minds and that there are physical objects.

2) The (what will later be seen to be, scientific) claim that statements which mention minds are truth-functionally equivalent to statements which do not mention minds, but which mention, say, only physical objects.

3) The (metaphysical) claim that statements that mention minds can be translated *salva veritate*, and without *remainder*, into statements which do not mention minds, i.e. that the meaning of the former is that of the latter.

The first claim is a member of the class the denial of any member of which brands the nay-sayer a liar, idiot, or perverter. The privileged position of the claim, however, is not that of a noninferential piece of knowledge serving as an incorrigible basis for all empirical knowledge. But this is to say only that the rationalists' scheme cannot be grounded in the incorrigibility of commonsense. My
suggestion is rather that common sense provides a given which cannot be rejected in toto, or in parte, as a result of philosophical analysis. This, in fact, is the mark of a common sense claim.

Suppose now that a psychologist, employing a technique similar to that of the analytic introspectionists, were to elicit from his subject and write down in a list various statements mentioning (the subject's) awarenesses. Also, employing the most sophisticated of neurophysiological apparatus, the psychologist determines and writes down in a list the various physiological states undergone by the subject while he describes his awarenesses. On the basis of the second list, the psychologist tries to construct a third list which is such that from any statement or description on it a statement or description on the first list can be inferred, and from any statement or description on the first list, a statement on it can be inferred. That the psychologist can be successful is the programmatic corollary of the thesis of psychophysical parallelism, an important notion which in this work will be understood as the claim that to every mental state there is a corresponding and characteristic physiological state, which for the sake of simplicity, I will take to be a brain state. Of this theme, more later. Meanwhile, suppose that seizing upon this claim one were to conclude that minds can be said
not to exist. If one were to understand the principle 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate' as an injunction to theoretical frugality achieved by recognizing of two truthfunctionally equivalent statements the statement committing one to the fewest kinds of entities (by means, say, of its referring expressions) as the ontologically significant statement, then since ex hypothesi there is for every statement about minds a truthfunctionally equivalent statement about brains, and since presumably there are independent reasons for admitting the kinds of entities which are brains, minds can be said not to exist. I have just described a structural daisy path from the second claim, a scientific claim, to the third, a metaphysical claim, which for convenience I shall call the thesis of metaphysical behaviorism. Later on, I shall try to argue that the move from the second claim, or a claim very much like it, to the third, or a claim very much like it, structurally explains a great deal of what both Ryle and Sellars have said about intentionality and the philosophy of mind in general. Right now I wish to begin to argue that the move is mistaken.

To give the ontological ground for a commonsense claim is to give the categorial features of the world in virtue of which the claim is true. To give the categorial features of the world is to answer the question: "What
exists?" Not by giving a list of entities, however, but by giving kinds of entities. The botanist also gives kinds rather than lists of entities, but his purpose is not at all like the ontologist's. The latter gives kinds of entities which are invoked in solution to problems generated by the involution of commonsense. If one says of two yellow patches, "This is yellow," "That is yellow," both his claims are true, and there is no problem. Suppose now that someone is struck by an oddity about these two claims, viz. that the patches are asserted to be the same and yet different. Consider the sameness. Two accounts that will not count as its ontological ground are the following: (a) they are the same because they have the same molecular structure. This account gives the causal condition for the sameness whose ground is sought, not the ground itself. Also, it only pushes the problem back a step: what is the ground for the sameness of the molecular structure? A second account is: (b) the problem is solved by pointing out that 'this' and 'that' are different proper names, hence name different things, and that 'yellow' is a predicate, hence can modify different subjects of true sentences. This won't do as an ontological account either, because presumably the ontologist is to tell us something about the world in virtue of which a given predicate can be truly said to modify two different subjects. To this
end, philosophers traditionally have invoked such categories as universals, perfect particulars, qualia, sermons, etc. The thesis I wish to defend is that for each of two truthfunctionally equivalent statements, there can be a different ontological ground.

Consider a universe in which all green objects are to the right of a square object and all objects to the right of square objects are green objects. 'This is green' and 'This is to the right of a square' are in this universe truthfunctionally equivalent statements; yet I wish to suggest that each has a different ontological ground. When Jones remembers something which is green and then remembers something which is to the right of a square object, he is having two experiences different in a sense in which when he remembers a green object on Tuesday and again on Wednesday he is not having different experiences. This is the case even if one's ontological assay should yield the result that an object is nothing but a collection of qualities and that predication is to be understood on the model of class inclusion; that is, even if the object is nothing more than the collection of (a) green and (a) to-the-left-of-a-square-object,

\[(\text{Green}) \in [(\text{Green}), (\text{To-the-right \ldots})]\]

might have an ontological ground different from that of

\[(\text{To-the-right \ldots}) \in [(\text{Green}), (\text{To-the-right \ldots})].\]
This point will become more important when later on the notion of the text of awareness. Meanwhile the problem at hand is that Jones in each case remembers, and in each case remembers what is in fact both green and to the right of a square; yet the ground for each case is different. One is tempted to locate the difference that makes the difference on the side of Jones, e.g. by suggesting that perhaps Jones for whatever reason simply did not focus his attention on one or the other property, or that perhaps Jones simply had not yet acquired the concept of to-the-right-of-a-square-ness at the time of the first remembering, and that by the time of the second he had lost the concept of greenness. Taking this gambit one could say that while truthfunctionally equivalent statements have the same logical meaning, they might yet have a different intentional meaning, viz. that of which one is aware, which is nonetheless in need of an ontological ground. I for one wish to resist this tack, which is patently mephitic with psychologism, and instead appeal to an already constituted difference suggested by the logical-intentional meaning distinction, rather than invoking in its defense a genetic account of the difference in terms of acquaintance or concepts or whatever. Surely there is a level on which we all must agree that, even though all green things are to the right of squares, the claim that this is green is different from the claim that
this is to the right of a square, and on this level the account of why they are different is irrelevant. Furthermore, I want to say that this difference cannot be denied, as a result of philosophical analysis, without absurdity.

What has been said above was not intended to instigate a metaphilosophical revolution. I think that this viewpoint has been held, either explicitly or implicitly, in one form or another by many philosophers. C. I. Lewis, for example, in Mind and the World Order maintains that all the factual knowledge needed to do philosophy is already available, or if it is not then philosophy, at least, will not provide us with it.\(^1\) In philosophy, as he says, we investigate what we already know; however, "to know in the sense of familiarity and to comprehend in clear ideas are, of course, quite different matters."\(^2\) "Just this business of bringing to clear consciousness and expressing coherently the principles which are implicitly intended in our dealing with the familiar, is the distinctively philosophic enterprise."\(^3\) Look at morality, he suggests. We all know the difference between right and wrong; but if we don't, philosophy won't tell us. What philosophy can provide, he


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 3.

\(^3\)Ibid.
says, are the adequate and consistent grounds of moral judgment. Perhaps one can disagree with the cognitivist ethics he implicitly assumes; but one cannot disagree with the general claim. Else, how could there be meaningful disagreement and argument between, for example, the teleologist and the deontologist? That is, unless the question of what is right and wrong is not already decided, the notion of a counter-example, for instance, to an ethical system would be incomprehensible: to the teleologist's objection that he cannot account for the moral obligation to lie to the crazed killer asking the whereabouts of an intended victim, the deontologist could simply answer that there is no such obligation.

Again Lewis:

If, for example, the extreme behaviorists in psychology deny the existence of consciousness on the ground that analysis of the "mental" must always be eventually in terms of bodily behavior, then it is the business of philosophy to correct their error, because it consists simply in a fallacy of logical analysis. The analysis of any immediately presented X must always interpret this X in terms of its constant relations to other things—to Y and Z. Such end-terms of analysis—the Y and Z—will not in general be temporal or spatial constituents of X, but may be anything which bears a constant correlation with it. It is as if one should deny the existence of colors because, for purposes of exact investigation, the colors must be defined as frequencies of vibratory motion. In general terms, if such analysis concludes by stating "X is a certain kind of Y-Z complex, hence X does not exist as a distinct reality," the error lies in overlooking a general characteristic of logical analysis—that it does not discover the "substance" or cosmic constituents of the phenomenon whose nature is
analyzed but only the constant context of experience in which it will be found. 4

Four comments and this metaphilosophical adventure will be concluded. First, certainly Lewis is correct in asserting that the behaviorist has erred in denying the existence of consciousness; and I doubt that he would disagree with my claim that the question of the existence of consciousness does not lie within the province of behavioristic psychology. Second, Lewis' claim, generalized, that the analysandum is never to be rejected, on the basis of analysis, in favor of the analysans in effect expresses the principle which I have invoked in prohibiting the move from methodological to metaphysical behaviorism. Third, I must finally disagree with Lewis that the end product of logical analysis is a matter of contextual correlation of phenomena. Such a view is an invitation to scientism. While it is not the case that metaphysics can reveal a priori the substance or cosmic constituents of the analysandum, it does not follow that the metaphysician must therefore empirically correlate phenomena. With this understood we can agree with Lewis' conclusion that

so far, then, as the divergence of psychological theories, from behaviorism which interprets mind in terms of physical behavior to theories of the subconscious which assimilate much of the physiological activity to mind, represents no dispute about experimental fact but only disparity of definition and methodological criteria, psychology and metaphysics have a common ground. 5

4 Ibid., p. 5. 5 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
Fourth, it must now seem that the question has been begged against anyone who would, in his move from methodological to metaphysical behaviorism, employ Ockham's razor as it was characterized above. And, in a sense, it has and will continue to be. But this is no more surprising than it is unjustifiable; when the issue lies so deep, as I have tried to show that it does, one cannot directly argue for one case or the other. Instead, one for example in this case, must (a) assume that minds, or claims about minds, stand in need of a radically different ground from that which grounds claims about physical objects; (b) delineate the involutions of commonsense that produce puzzles about minds and suggest the ground for what in claims about minds cannot be caught by claims about physical objects. Shortly I will be discussing what I take to be commonsensical claims about intentional situations and the puzzles they can be made to produce; (c) point out the structural reasons why someone might be led to deny the categorial features of the world which ground minds. This consideration will be the guide through most of what I have to say about Ryle's views on intentionality as well as a considerable amount about Sellars'; (d) meet the arguments against the assumption for both the view that the categories which ground physical objects ground minds, and the view that the intentional-logical meaning distinction is bogus.
The Axioms of Intentionality

I shall now list and discuss several commonsensical claims about intentional situations which I take to be so inviolable as to be properly called, the axioms of intentionality. Naturally, as there are any number of such claims, the list will be limited to those which, when involuted, yield philosophical problems.

1. *Consciousness is always of or about something.*

Certainly there is something very odd about responding to the question, "What are you thinking about?" with "Nothing." Every thinking, imagining, perceiving, is a thinking about something, an imagining something or that something is the case, a perception of something. Let it be clear that this axiom is not intended to be the claim about language that every description of consciousness is such that it can be said to be of or about something, which is anyhow false, but rather that every instance of consciousness has directionality or transitivity toward some object, which object may be a thing, state of affairs, etc. Furthermore, the notion of "consciousness" is not, on this commonsense level, intended to prejudge the issue of what it is that has this directionality and should be understood as compatible with any number of different grounds for mental acts. Finally, there is one notable case the description of which is phrased almost word for word as an
exception to this axiom. Camus describes the situation in which "Nothing" counts as a sincere answer to a question about what one is thinking of as a "first sign" of that intractable divorce between a man and his niche in the world which he calls the absurd. However, the absurd, as Camus himself never tires of pointing out, is a non-cognitive state, and is rather a feeling which accompanies consciousness and precipitates for consciousness the question of its resolution. As such it no more violates this axiom than does thirst or hunger.

2. The object of consciousness, at least sometimes, does not depend for its existence upon consciousness. The stone that Jones sees lying in the street continues to exist after Jones ceases to see it. The non-continued existence of the stone after the seeing ceases is not sufficient to the establishment of its dependence upon the seeing, but its continued existence is, I should think, sufficient to the establishment of its independence.

3. The connection between consciousness and its object, which might be called the intentional relation, is not the causal relation; nothing is done to what one is conscious of. Clearly there is a difference between Jones' kicking a stone and Jones' thinking about a stone. The scholastic John of St. Thomas, however, held a view according to which at least some objects are causally
dependent upon, what he called, reason. These objects fell into either one of two categories: (a) those objects in whose production reason figures in as an efficient cause, e.g. works of art, or those things whose material cause is reason itself, e.g. mental acts. Neither of these kinds of thing causally depends for existence upon consciousness qua object of consciousness, hence may be dismissed. The second category is (b) those objects which have existence "only in cognition," "beings of reason" which exist "only as an object of the intellect." Here the relevant idea is that when reason makes a judgment of any sort about "an object devoid of existence in the real," reason produces an object "of fictitious existence."

Perhaps, then, this axiom ought to be modified to read that if not always then at least sometimes the intentional relation is not the causal relation, for it would seem that John's thesis is well-founded in commonsense. There is a perfectly straightforward sense in which Jones causes something when he imagines, i.e. pictures to himself, a green horse. Still, there is a radical difference between Jones' producing a green centaur and Jones' producing motion in a stone (viz. Jones' being ipso facto conscious of the centaur), which is all this axiom is intended to suggest. Finally, as to whether the stone of which Jones is aware causes any change in Jones, commonsense would
rule under the aegis of modern physiology in the affirmative, the difference between Jones being hit on the head with a brick and his being affected by the object of which he is aware, being a difference of the degree of change rather than of kind. As I shall try to show in a later chapter, however, the question is irrelevant to the solution of the problem of intentionality.

4. The intentional relation is not a descriptive relation; for it to obtain, real existents are not required as relata. No one will deny that it can be true to say that Jones is imagining a green horse even though, as we ordinarily speak, there are no green horses, whereas for Jones to be to left of, there must be something which he is to the left of. The term 'relation' is not, of course, intended to beg any questions, though it has been deliberately used. Impressed by the connection of directionality in instances of awareness, philosophers have sought the ground for such instances among descriptive relations, the most obvious category of connection. However, if such be the ground of the intentional relation, then in the case of non-veridical awareness, one of the relata, the object, does not occur, which consequence is a denial of the first axiom. What, then, is the strictly commonsensical force of this axiom? I shall return to this question in the third section below.
5. Consider Jones who sees a friend called Smith. Smith is the intentional object of Jones' awareness. The object of any awareness is the intentional object, never an image or representation of the intentional object. This is not to say, however, that a [mental] image of Smith cannot be the object of Jones' awareness. In this case, however, Smith figures no longer as an object for Jones' awareness. If this axiom is readily acceptable in the case of seeings, consider the case of Jones imagining Smith who is absent. A moment's reflection reveals that even here the object of Jones' awareness is the intentional object Smith and not an image of Smith, though, again Jones can, by a different awareness, become aware of the image of Smith, say in order to describe it or compare it with other images.

This axiom should seem incontrovertible; yet it has in a sense been denied, I shall argue, by Ryle, Sellars, and Bergmann, each for his own dialectical reasons. Since it is so important, I propose to spend the rest of this section investigating how one philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, in trying to dialectically secure this axiom, is led insidiously by other considerations to structurally deny it in the end. The example of Sartre is particularly instructive since in the passages we are about to examine, Sartre claims to be doing nothing more than the "phenomenology of the image," giving a description of [mental] images innocent of any psychological theory, which description
is presupposed by any theory of imagination. We can read him, in fact, as attempting to give the counterpart to our commonsense appraisal.

He begins his *L'imagination* with the encouraging observation that

> it is certain that when I produce the image of Peter, it is Peter who is the object of my actual consciousness. As long as that consciousness remains unaltered, I could give a description of the object as it appears to me in the form of an image but not of the image as such. To determine the properties of the image as image I must turn to a new act of consciousness: I must reflect. Thus the image as image is describable only by an act of the second degree in which attention is turned away from the object and directed to the manner in which the object is given. It is this reflective act which permits the judgment "I have an image."\(^7\)

To suppose that when I imagine Peter, the object of my imagining is an *image* of Peter is to be taken by what he calls the illusion of immanence. He cites as an especially clear case of this illusion Hume's thesis that ideas are faint images of impressions, between which ideas and impressions there is "but an extraneous relation." He concludes that for Hume, "the idea of a chair and the chair as an idea are one and the same thing."\(^8\) Regardless of the Hume exegesis--perhaps a better example of the illusion of immanence would be Locke's stand on ideas--Sartre's claim seems to be phenomenologically well-grounded; for when I

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\(^7\)Ibid., p. 3.

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 5.
imagine a calendar on the desk before me, I am not thinking about an image, but rather about a calendar in a certain position, though it might be by means of an image that my thinking gets at the calendar. And Sartre would agree with this suggestion, though with explanation. When I see the calendar and when I imagine it, the objects are identical; what differs is the relation between consciousness and the object. He concludes: "The word image can therefore only indicate the relation of consciousness to the object; in other words, it means a certain manner in which the object makes its appearance to consciousness, or, if one prefers, a certain way in which consciousness presents an object to itself." The different relations, then, are explicated in terms of either (a) the different ways objects appear, or (b) the different ways in which objects are constructed by consciousness, or perhaps (c) the different acts by which the objects are grasped. For the idealist Sartre, the three are synonymous. Not surprisingly, the confusion is an important one.

Perception, or the perceptual relation, or yet more accurately, the perceptual manner in which consciousness gets at its object, is characterized for Sartre by its limitation to a point of view. The perceptual object is a synthesis of all its possible appearances. "In the world

9Ibid., p. 7.
of perception every 'thing' has an infinite number of relationships to other things. And what is more, it is this infinity of relationships--as well as the infinite number of relationships between the elements of the thing--which constitute the very essence of a thing. At any given moment of perception, then, there is always something more of the object to be perceived; the object "overflows" such that we must continually "learn," and I suppose, relearn the object. The object of imagination, on the other hand, is presented as already fully constituted. "The image teaches nothing: it is organized exactly like the objects which do produce knowledge, but it is complete at the very moment of its appearance." There seems to be at least initial plausibility to such a difference between perception and imagination, for when I see a calendar something is (potentially) available to me which is not available when I only imagine it--for example, I can imagine in black and white a calendar which in fact is multi-colored and no matter how long I direct my attention to this imagined object, I cannot determine its actual colors, which determination is easily achieved in perception. But the plausibility is specious for the reason that just as in perception I need a new act to get the further determinations of the object, so in imagination, by a new image.

10Ibid., p. 10.  11Ibid.
or relation, I can get at say the colors of the calendar. Sartre himself seems to be taken by the illusion of immanence as he suggests that if I imagine a cube to be turned around revealing all its sides, I have learned nothing. In a sense I've learned nothing, for in order to imagine (truly) it as turned around, I must already have perceived it as turned around. Sartre, on the contrary, seems to believe that I've learned nothing because there is something peculiar about the object, viz. that it is determinate. "The different elements of an image have no relationship with the rest of the world . . . "12 whose essence is those very (infinite) relationships. But remember that the image is the manner either in which the object appears or in which consciousness apprehends it, not the object itself, so that the determinancy of the image is irrelevant as a differentia between imagination and perception on the basis of their objects. In short, their objects, as he had pointed out but now seems to have forgotten, are the same.

The source of the above difficulties, I suggest, is the synonymity pointed out above that follows from Sartre's idealism. While it is true for Sartre that all consciousness is consciousness of something, that consciousness, as he says, rises out of itself, transcends itself toward

12 Ibid., p. 11.
an object, the object of which it is conscious is constituted, at least in part, by that consciousness. There is, as part of every consciousness, a positional element, and it is here that the crucial difference between perception and imagination is clearest. While perception posits its object as presently existing at hand, imagination posits its object as non-existent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere, or in a state of suspended belief vis-a-vis existence. (I take the first to mean 'never-existent,' the second 'once-but-no-longer-existent,' and the third, 'now-but-not-at-hand-existent.') Starting from the commonsensical claim that the object of a seeing and then an imaging can be one and the same, Sartre is led dialectically, in trying to ground the difference between a seeing and an imaging of the same thing, to deny that the imaging and the seeing are of the same thing.

Commonsense Involuted

We saw briefly above how starting from commonsensical claims about shaped and colored things, one could involute these claims producing puzzles to the solution of which the dialectic of the one and the many must be mobilized. I want now to show how the commonsensical claims I've called the axioms of intentionality can be involuted so as to yield the knot of puzzles known as the problem of intentionality.
1. Consider the following drama:

**Smith** (who, let us say, wishes to test the effect of a drug he has just administered): Have you been aware all this while?

**Jones:** Yes, I've been aware.

**Smith:** Of what have you been aware?

**Jones:** Oh, of nothing.

Clearly Jones has revealed his fatal flaw (idiocy, stupidity, or perversity) with this odd response; and not merely because in order to know he was aware he had to be aware of something, but to be aware at all he had to be aware of something. This, in fact, is our first axiom above. Now let us suppose that the denouement had been rather as follows:

**Jones:** I've been aware of griffons and centaurs.

**Smith:** If you have been aware, you have been aware of something; but since there are no griffons or centaurs, you could not have been aware of them. Now come, come, Jones, what have been aware of?

**Jones:** ?

Jones doesn't know what to say, and of course has every right to be puzzled, for Smith's questioning has taken a radically different turn. Smith has been struck by an apparent inconsistency between our first axiom and the claim that centaurs and griffons do not exist; he has in fact discovered an oddity of a genre with the oddity
surrounding sameness and diversity. Let us call Smith's discovery, the problem of intentional nonveridical awareness.

2. Caesar was the husband of Calpurnia. One would think that everything that is true about Caesar would be true also of the husband of Calpurnia: if it is true that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, died in the forum, etc., it is true that the husband of Calpurnia crossed the Rubicon, died in the forum, etc. If we let \(a\) stand for 'Caesar,' \(b\) for 'the husband of Calpurnia,' the following claim should be true:

A. \((R)(x) [a R x \equiv b R x]\)

If, however, we are allowed to substitute for 'R' with 'is believed to have crossed the Rubicon by' we see immediately that there might very well be counter-examples to A. That is, Jones might very well believe that Caesar crossed the Rubicon without believing that the husband of Calpurnia crossed the Rubicon. If one remembers that Caesar was the husband of Calpurnia, one may be struck again with an oddity, which might be called, the problem of intentional, non-extentional contexts. And it is not an oddity which can be dismissed by pointing out that Jones does not believe that Caesar was the husband of Calpurnia. To put the oddity in a way that shows this, there is no logical inconsistency in the following claims: (a) Jones believes
that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. (b) Jones believes that the husband of Calpurnia did not cross the Rubicon. (c) Jones believes that Caesar was the husband of Calpurnia.

As another symptom of this oddity, consider the following. "It is raining and it is Tuesday." "If it is red, then it is square." "The sun shines or children play checkers."

These sentences are truthfunctional, i.e. their truth or falsity is a function of the truth or falsity of their components. "It is raining and it is Tuesday" is true if and only if "It is raining" is true and "It is Tuesday" is true. But the truth or falsity of "Jones believes that Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is independent, it is plain to see, of the truth-value of "Caesar crossed the Rubicon."

3. In piling up the oddities which surround awareness, one is finally struck by the fundamental oddity of awareness itself. How, one might puzzle, can something be about or of something else? There are chairs and harmonicas in the world, calendars, cabbages, umbrellas, etc.; but none of these things can be said to be about or of any of the others. The solution to this problem, which may be called the problem of the transcendence of awareness, will be seen to entail and be entailed by the solution to the problems above.

In the next chapter, which deals mainly with the considerable work done on intentionality by Roderick M. Chisholm, we shall be investigating in some detail the
problem of intentional, non-extentional contexts. Then, in a chapter on Gilbert Ryle, which chapter is essentially an attempt at a structural reconstruction of the early works which adumbrated *The Concept of Mind* along with a critique of *The Concept of Mind* from the point of view of intentionality, the focus will be on the problem of intentional, non-veridical awareness. Following that, a chapter on the views of Wilfrid Sellars will bring to the surface the larger problem of the transcendence of awareness. The strategy of these three middle chapters is to further specify the problems of intentionality—with a view to determining what might count as the solution—by proposing both philosophical and metaphilosophical criticisms. Finally, the last chapter, employing as a foil the views of Gustav Bergmann, outlines in rather sketchy fashion what I take to be the kind of solution called for. I offer no apology for the sketchiness of my proposed solution since my purpose will be to specify the problem, which is at any rate the most difficult and most valuable part of philosophy.
CHAPTER II

CHISHOLM: INTENTIONAL LANGUAGE

From his earliest articles on intentionality, Chisholm has been concerned with formulating and trying to defend a linguistic version of the Brentano thesis that intentionality is the mark of the psychic. Roughly put, that version serves as a criterion for distinguishing descriptions of psychological phenomena from descriptions of physical phenomena, though Chisholm is careful to deny that the criterion divides the world as the dualists would have it. Unfortunately, he is extremely reticent about to what the success of his criterion does commit us. In the first section below, I shall explore a number of meta-philosophical considerations which might explain his reticence. I shall then in the second section outline and discuss Chisholm's treatment of Brentano's two-pronged theory of intentionality and Chisholm's modified version of that theory; then, what I take to be the real significance of Chisholm's thesis will be adumbrated. Finally, in the third section I shall at some length attempt to show by constructing and attempting to defend a competing thesis that Chisholm's thesis on intentionality is false, and that
even if it were true, for all its other merits, it would be irrelevant to a solution of the problems of intentionality.

**Ineffability**

Consider two spots, both of which are red and square, and one of which is to the left of the other. They are the same, in the sense that is expressed commonsensically in saying that they both are red and square. Yet, they are different, in the sense that is expressed commonsensically in saying that the spots are two and not one. What is it in virtue of which they are the same? What is it in virtue of which they are different? These are the two correlate questions of the age-old and most fundamental of all philosophical problems: the problem of the One and the Many.

Or, to ask what I take to be the same question, what is (a) thing, what is (a) quality? (My question commits me to a particular usage of terms, not, as you may suspect, to a philosophical view.)

What is (a) thing? The question, if asked of one of the spots, might elicit such answers as "a spot," or "it is red," "it is square." The first kind of answer gives what might be called the quiddity or essence of the thing, while the latter two give only qualities of the thing. A little reflection, however, reveals that both kinds of answer attribute qualities to the thing, the distinction
lying in the kind of qualities that are attributed: the first attributing what might be called essential qualities, viz. those without which the thing would not be a spot, the latter attributing what might be called accidental qualities, without which the thing would remain a spot. If asked of the right person, however, the question might elicit such answers as, "it is a material substance," "a bare particular," "a collection of universals." These answers are alleged to be telling us what the thing is in sense in which the first set of answers does not, i.e. here we are not being given qualities of the thing, at least not in any straightforward sense. Yet, when it is specified what a material substance is, for example, the second set of answers is seen to be expressible only in terms of qualities: "a material substance is a continuant, is natured (i.e. has dispositions), is located in space and time, etc."; and the same holds true for the other answers in this set. One asks about the thing and is told about its qualities.

A similar situation arises when one asks about its qualities. The question might elicit such responses as, "it's a color," or "it's a shape," each of which answer places its qualities in a class, or as a determinate under a determinable. But one might, again if asking the right people, elicit such responses as "a universal," "a perfect particular," "a flatus vocis." Here we are asking about
qualities, but in order to understand the answers, we are asked to treat qualities as things.

Consider the red spot again. Bergmann's analysis yields two "things": a bare particular and a universal, and three "subsistents": individuality, universality, and a nexus of exemplification. The last named subsistent, the nexus, breaks the Brådleian regress before it starts. It ties qualities to individuals without itself being tied to what it ties. The nexus, like individuality and universality, is termed a subsistent because it is a part of the world's form. As part of the world's form it cannot be expressed, but shows itself when matters of fact are expressed. Suppose that we represent 'this spot is red' by 'F(a).'

Everything that will be said about the latter can, with obvious but unimportant modification, be said about the former. Bergmann wants to say that 'a' names an individual, that 'F' names a quality, and that what are named are tied by exemplification. But can this be said? In order for any of his claim to be expressed and understood, what is allegedly being expressed must already be understood. The oddity of trying to say these things is reflected in the fact that they cannot be otherwise stated by a well-formed formula of P.M. If 'is an individual' is represented as 'I,' then 'I(a)' tells us no more than does F(a). Individuality, universality, and exemplification are shown by the lower case letter, the upper case letter, and by
juxtaposition, respectively. So far Chisholm, I think, would agree. When Bergmann, however, goes on to speak about what can only be shown, Chisholm must demur. "What more than that the spot is red do you tell me, when you tell me that redness is tied to the spot by the nexus of exemplification?" I agree that nothing more has been said, i.e. I agree that no new factual knowledge has been imparted. But then I disagree with Chisholm that philosophy ever concludes by saying something factual. As has been expressed in the first chapter above, my view is that philosophy investigates the categorial features of the world in virtue of which factual claim about the world are true. We saw that an implication of this view is that no factual claim could ever be rejected on the basis of philosophical analysis, and the reason is this: philosophical analysis yields no new factual knowledge.

There are a number of responses to these paradoxes of ineffability. One might argue that since it does not make factual statements, metaphysics is ipso facto a delusion, and that if a role yet remains to the philosopher, that role is to show how other philosophers have deluded themselves. This is the response of the author of the Tractatus, who was the first to be fully conscious of these paradoxes. Or, having been in a sense cut off from the world, and groping for something factual to say, one can talk about language. This is the gambit taken by
several who would move philosophy toward empirical linguistics. Or, one can bravely trod on, insisting that what philosophers say can be factual, though taking cognizance of the paradoxes by putting the factual claims in an extraordinary way. Properly understood, this tack, I shall suggest, is the one taken by Bergmann, who claims that the philosophical enterprise consists of the construction of and talk about an ideal language in which everything commonsensical can, in principle, be said, and that resolution of philosophical problems is achieved through commonsensical talk about the syntactical and semantical interpretation of the ideal language. Or, one might agree that there are no metaphysical statements which are factual, but resist the further claim that they are ipso facto delusive. One approach consonant with this gambit is that suggested in the first chapter of this work. Or, one may argue that philosophy is factual, and factual in the sense in which a physical science is factual. This view, I shall now begin to argue, in very indirect fashion, is Chisholm's.

Chisholm has written a great deal carefully pointing out the distinction Brentano made between genetic or experimental psychology (Psychologie) and descriptive psychology (Psychognosie, or as Brentano for awhile
tellingly called it, Phänomenologie).\(^1\) The former was understood as a causal study, concerned with the causal conditions for the states and processes described by the latter. The descriptions given in the latter discipline provided psychic elements which constituted the matter for the psychological laws given in the former. Chisholm sees Brentano's talk about intentionality as part of his descriptive psychology, which provided ontological categories for the satisfaction of the intentionality thesis. My suggestion is that Chisholm sees Brentano as giving--more than just a philosophical method--a subject matter which is peculiar to philosophy: there are some phenomena which the experimental scientist cannot account for, in the sense that there are some descriptions, viz. intentional statements, which cannot be translated into a physicalistic language. Furthermore, I suggest that reason why Chisholm defends this linguistic version of the Brentano thesis is that he too takes the intentional (i.e. the psychic) to be an irreducibly philosophical concern. In explicating and defending my claim, I shall be leading to an explication and defense of the claim that Chisholm views philosophy in a sense as factual as the physical sciences, for example, are factual. Again the route is circuitous.

\(^1\)Cf. for example, Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm (Glencoe, Ill.: The Library of Philosophical Movements, 1960), introduction.
Recently, Chisholm has asked the question, "Are there some characteristics that some things have necessarily?" The view which is an affirmative answer to this question and which he calls moderate essentialism, he defends against the views either that every characteristic which everything has is had necessarily (which he calls Leibnizian essentialism) or that no characteristic that anything has is had necessarily (extreme inessentialism, or existentialism). My concern here is not with the essential characteristics but with a certain oddity about the question itself. It strikes me as a metaphysical question in medias res, as it were, in that it cannot intelligibly be answered unless the ontological character of the thing that has the characteristics is first specified. If, for example, the subject of predication is analyzed as nothing more than a collection of characteristics, then every characteristic is had by every thing necessarily, for the reason that predication must be based on the model of class inclusion. To say of your dog Melampus that he is shaggy is to say that shagginess is a member of the collection: shagginess, brownness, having four legs, etc. Generally, that \( a \) (the name of a thing) is \( \phi \) (a characteristic) is analyzed: \( \phi \in (\phi, \ldots) \) which is of course analytic.

\(^2\)He raised this question in the course of three lectures on "Persons" delivered at The Ohio State University during January, 1968.
If, on the other hand, the subject of prediction is taken to be a bare particular, for example, i.e. an unnatured, momentarily existent, mere individuator, then it follows that no (simple) characteristic is had by anything necessarily; not even, as we shall see eventually, the property of being mental or physical. But now suppose that one takes the thing to be a bare particular-cum- (at least one) characteristic (for which supposition there is good reason: just as there are no characteristics which are not had by some particular or other, so, one might argue, there are no particulars which do not have some characteristic or other). One can then ask whether a red spot, for instance, is necessarily shaped, or whether a tone necessarily has a pitch. On this reading, Chisholm's question is seen to be the question of the synthetic a priori. Viewing the three structural possibilities and their issue outlined so far, one might suggest that structurally, Chisholm's question really is: what is a thing (i.e. the subject of predication)? But when the very question is put to him (for the reasons above) he replies that we all know quite well what a thing is, that we couldn't begin to philosophize if we didn't. I agree, but only in the sense that diversity (and sameness) is primary. What we do not know about are the ontological categories which ground what we already know, and this is the force of the question: what is a thing?
Let us put the matter a different way, a way which will bring us closer to Chisholm's treatment of intentionality. Later we shall investigate in some detail the two keys to Bergmann's philosophy of mind, viz. the idea that mental acts are facts and not things, and the means operator. Suffice it to say for now that, very roughly put, according to the first key, every awareness consists of a bare particular exemplifying two universals, the first called the species of awareness which distinguishes an instance of remembering, for example, from an instance of imagining, the second called the proposition which distinguishes on the side of the awareness an instance of being aware of a red spot, for example, from an instance of being aware of a yellow spot. The second key is the idea that the ontological ground for the connection between the proposition exemplified by an awareness (i.e. the particular) and an extramental state of affairs, is an analytic connection such that the awareness can be said to intend, be about, or mean that extramental state of affairs. If Chisholm were to criticize this kind of view, I suggest that the gist of his criticism would be as follows. You tell me that the awareness has a peculiar kind of characteristic called a species. What more are you telling me than that there is a difference between remembering and imagining? You tell me that the awareness has a peculiar characteristic called a proposition and that the proposition (and hence, the
awareness) means an intentional object in virtue of a means operator. What more are you telling me than that awarenesses are intentional, are directed toward an object, and that there is a difference between an awareness of the Brooklyn Bridge and an awareness of the Chrysler Building? Again I agree with Chisholm, but only for the reason that nothing is ever said as a result of metaphysical analysis which is informative in the sense that it is factual. This is the significance of my agreement above with Chisholm on the unanalyzable character (i.e. the primacy) of thing vs. characteristic. Chisholm, on the other hand, apparently thinks that when he discusses intentionality, he can give us information which is factual. (I've not forgotten that this is a question in a question.) Let us now turn to that discussion.

Brentano

Throughout his writings on intentionality, Chisholm has taken as his point de départ Brentano's general thesis that directionality toward an object is a characteristic peculiar to psychic phenomena. Most recently he has sharply distinguished between what he calls the ontological thesis from the psychological theses of Brentano. As Brentano states the ontological thesis, "Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the middle ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence of an
object, and what we would call, although not in entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are not to understand a reality), or an immanent objectivity. This theory is attractive for a number of obvious reasons. First, and most important of all, it preserves the difference between Jones' thinking about a unicorn and Jones' thinking about nothing at all, i.e. it explicitly recognizes the truth of our first axiom. The difference between a man who is thinking about a horse and a man who is thinking about a unicorn, says Chisholm, lies in the objects of their respective thoughts, not "in the fact that where the first man has an object the second man does not, for this is not a fact." Brentano's doctrine of intentional inexistence, moreover, "... seems to tell us three different things. It tells us, first, that the object of the man's thought is a unicorn. It tells us, secondly, that this unicorn is not an actual unicorn (for there are no actual unicorns). And it tells us, thirdly, that this unicorn has a certain mode of being other than actuality. Whatever has this mode of being--called "intentional inexistence" or "immanent objectivity"--is an entity that is mind-dependent and therefore appropriately


4Ibid., p. 7.
called an ens rationis, in the traditional sense of this term. The intentionally inexistent unicorn is an entity that is produced by the mind or intellect; it comes into being as soon as the man starts to think about a unicorn and it ceases to be as soon as he stops.  

Chisholm thinks this ontological theory to be if not obviously false, at least problematic. He first argues phenomenologically, that when Diogenes looks for an honest man, he looks for an actual honest man, not an ens rationis. I suspect that Brentano would answer, but there is no actual honest man, so Diogenes cannot look for one; since, however, there must be an object for lookings-for, Diogenes' looked-for object intentionally inexists. It would seem, then, that if Chisholm is right, then lookings-for need not have an (actual or otherwise) existent object. I think that Chisholm is right, for the reason that lookings-for can be analyzed neurophysiologically such that lookings-for need not involve awarenesses. If, however, we take as our example of (putatively) intentional phenomena a seeing, then Chisholm's phenomenological objection appears to fail, for it is not prima facie obvious that what Diogenes sees (when there are no unicorns) "when he sees a unicorn" is not an ens rationis.

He also raises two what might be called logical objections. First, the theory seems to provide "us with

5Tbid., pp. 7-8.
a literal interpretation for the traditional dictum, "Veritas est adaequatio intellectus rei." One could say that an affirmative judgment is true provided only that the properties of the intentional object are the same as those of the actual object.

... But the very statement of this advantage betrays the fact that what the true affirmative judgment is directed upon is the actual object and not the intentional object."6 One structural alternative open to Brentano is to deny that the intentional object is ever an actual object, but rather is always an inexistential or immanent object, and while there is textual evidence to support the claim that this was the gambit Brentano in fact took, the above Scylla is being avoided only for the Charybdis of representationalism. The objection (one among others) then is, how is the judgment directed toward the actual object? A second structural alternative would have it that only in the case of false judgment, or as I prefer to put it, of non-veridical awareness does the object have a different mode of existence. Properly understood, this is the alternative I find most plausible and the one which I shall be discussing in the chapter on Bergmann.

The second logical objection is that the theory must countenance objects which violate the laws of

6 Ibid., p. 11.
non-contradiction and excluded middle. As Brentano puts it: "If there are such intentionally inexistent objects, in the strict and proper sense of the term are, then, whenever anyone thinks of anything that is contradictory, there comes into being an object that is contradictory." Furthermore, the ox that I imagine need not be 817 pounds, nor not 817 pounds. This second logical objection is, as Chisholm would say, more a matter of detail than of principle, the force of the objection being inversely proportional to one's acceptability of "odd entities." From where I stand, the theoretical entities of philosophy are all or none of them odd, and if a given kind of entity should appear odd extra-systemically, as it were, that oddness is due to the oddness of the set of commonsensical facts of which the theoretical entity was introduced as a ground and does not of itself litigate against theoretical entities. If I were to attempt a defense of Brentano, I would argue that here the oddness of certain (contradictory and including middle) intentional objects is traceable to the very intentional situation, the commonsense description of which is particularly amenable to the involution which produces philosophical puzzles. The question to be answered is whether such situations as: Jones is now thinking of a round square, require as an ontological ground objects which

7As quoted by Chisholm, ibid., p. 12.
can be said to be contradictory. To tip my hand, this is the direction, though with infinite care, in which I shall eventually argue.

We can now turn to an investigation of the psychological thesis on intentionality. According to Brentano, intentionality, presumably a complex characteristic of consciousness, is the differentia between psychic and physical phenomena. Chisholm, however, gives a linguistic reformulation of Brentano's thesis such that the intentional use of language is asserted to be the criterion for psychic, or psychological, phenomena versus physical phenomena. The last statement is vague on purpose because Chisholm, throughout and in spite of all he has written on intentional uses of language as a peculiar criterion, is himself vague precisely on of what it is such uses are a criterion. Shortly we shall have to achieve some clarity, first for the obvious reasons, and secondly because by means of this issue we will begin to tie together the metaphilosophical issues above.

More precisely stated, the Chisholm thesis is the twofold claim that intentional language is not needed for the description of non-psychological phenomena, and that for the description of psychological phenomena either intentional or some other language not needed for the description of physical phenomena is required. The actual criteria for intentional statements are as follows. First,
a sentence is intentional if it contains a substantial expression such that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that the expression has a referent or that it does not. On this criterion, such statements as "Jones is thinking about the planet Vulcan" would be judged intentional. The statement "This car lacks a spare wheel" which he would not want to say is intentional might appear to be intentional on this criterion since it does not commit us either to the existence or non-existence of spare wheels. As Chisholm points out, however, its contradictory does commit us to the claim that there are spare wheels. Secondly, a sentence is intentional if it contains an object phrase with a subordinate verb such that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies that the object phrase is true or false. On this criterion, such statements as "Jones believes that the mongoose is a bird" would be intentional since whatever Jones believes is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the claim that the mongoose is a bird. It would also seem that on this criterion a statement such as "it is possible that there are mongooses" would be intentional (since obviously it does not commit us to the truth or falsity of the claim that there are mongooses); but I should think that its denial, "it is not possible that there are mongooses," commits us to the falsity of the claim that there are mongooses. Thirdly, a statement is said to be intentional
if it contains an indirect reference such that its replacement by another name or description results in a different truth-value. Thus, while "Jones believes that Caesar was murdered in the Forum" might be true, "Jones believes that the husband of Calpurnia was murdered in the Forum" might very well be false.

Let us suppose for the moment that Chisholm's criteria are successful, at least to the extent that according to them no sentence we would want to call intentional is not intentional and that every sentence we would want to call intentional is intentional. And let us now try to answer the question, what is the significance of Chisholm's supposed success? At first blush it would seem that Chisholm has presented a theory about language to the effect that there is a class of statements each member of which cannot for whatever reasons be translated salva veritate into a statement which is a member of the class complement. This impression is generated by his repeated insistence on linguistic criteria. It must be noticed, however, that the criteria putatively differentiate descriptions of psychological phenomena from descriptions of non-psychological phenomena. Notice well that the basis for the radical difference in description is a radical difference in what is described. If Chisholm is right, then the "psychologist" and the physiologist are simply not talking about the same thing: the former is talking about
something which is peculiarly mental and which cannot be "reduced" to what the latter talks about, *viz.* the physical. From where I stand, the psychologist and the physiologist talk about the same thing, *viz.* the physical, in the same sense in which the chemist and the physicist talk about the same thing, and the question of the reducibility of psychology to physiology is understood on the model of the reducibility of chemistry to physics. Further, the peculiarly mental is indeed immune to science, but it is no more the unique province of philosophy than any other part of commonsense. At any rate, the reducibility of psychology would appear to be an empirically decidable matter only, whereas Chisholm from the armchair has ruled out its possibility. That what Chisholm is arguing for is a scientistic if not scientific thesis, *viz.* the inevitable failure of a scientific methodological program, is further buttressed by the fact that each of the alternatives to his theory that he considers, is itself a scientific theory or a scientific theory in ontological clothing.

The question to be pursued now is, what significance does Chisholm attach to this impossibility? Since Chisholm is content to state and defend one criterion, an answer must be reconstructed for him. Philip Nochlin takes

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Chisholm to be arguing\textsuperscript{9} for, if not the fact, then at least the plausibility of dualism: either the necessity for intentional language is proof of the existence of mental events or the behaviorists are right and there are no mental events; but the behaviorists have failed to reduce intentional terms to non-intentional terms, hence the former thesis is presumed true. Against this alleged view of Chisholm's he raises a number of "minor" objections, only one of which is of present interest. He agrees, he says, with Chisholm's contention that intentionality characterizes psychical phenomena \textit{vis-a-vis} physical phenomena, but only in the trivial sense that only objects having psychological attitudes can expect, hope, etc. People do not have leaky roofs but can have psychological attitudes; houses do not have psychological attitudes, but can have leaky roofs. "Nothing of great import seems to follow from the fact and nobody (not even a reductive behaviorist) would deny the fact that people, houses, light rays, and mountains have various properties that make them different sorts of things and eventually subject-matters of different actual or possible sciences."\textsuperscript{10}

His main objection is against the assumption that irreducibility is a "reason for believing is the existence


\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Loc. cit.}, p. 629.
of any kinds of entities. If this general assumption is mistaken then there is reason for doubting whether in particular the irreducibility of intentional statements is in itself a reason for believing in the existence of psychical phenomena.\textsuperscript{11} The irreducibility of intentional terms, he suggests, might be a result, not of some peculiar phenomena they are used to refer to, but of some other use to which they are put. Physical laws, for example, are not reducible to statements about observed phenomena, but do not describe; they are rules of inference. Philosophers, instead of positing entities, ought to investigate the roles intentional words have such that they cannot be reduced to non-intentional contexts. "Seeking," for instance, cannot be reduced to statements about peering around, looking here and there, etc. because all "seekings" imply over and above such descriptions a "certain dramatic structure or plot" which makes the question "Did he find it?" appropriate.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 630.

\textsuperscript{12} Nochlin apparently shares what we shall later see is Ryle's implicit view that the only justification for ontologizing mental entities is in (causal) explanation of intelligent behavior. "The point of theorizing is to enable us to predict, explain, and modify observable actions and reactions of individual things and not to describe hidden structures or entities." (Ibid., p. 637.) Since science, specifically physiology, is, at least in principle, quite up to the task of predicting, explaining and modifying behavior, what we have called scientific behaviorism will suffice as a theory concerning the structure of mind. What remains to the philosophy of mind is a peculiar kind of language.
Nochlin claims that at any rate, the psychic/physical distinction cannot be made on the basis of Chisholm's criterion because such a distinction would depend upon the reducibility of psychology to physics. According to Nochlin, Chisholm's thesis represents an unjustifiable a priori answer in the negative. The philosopher's role, in such matters is, he says, not to provide answers, but, if anything, to clarify the question. But again,

Nothing that the criterion of intentionality says provides an answer one way or another to these questions. The criterion of intentionality proves that certain descriptive psychological terms—the intentional ones—are not reducible to certain others. But this has nothing to do with the reducibility of psychological theories which would presumably employ both types of terms. Certainly I must agree with Nochlin that Chisholm has rules a priori, and hence unjustifiably, on the question of the reducibility of psychology. However, I must disagree that the dualism-monism issue hangs in the balance. The philosophical question as to whether there are mental as well as physical entities is the question as to whether the ontological ground for commonsensical facts about minds requires a category radically distinct from the categories which ground facts about physical objects. At least we can say that Chisholm himself does not take the success

\[13\] Ibid., p. 636.

\[14\] Ibid., p. 637.
of his thesis to be sufficient to the establishment of dualism.

I think that, if our linguistic thesis about intentionality is true, then the followers of Brentano would have a right to take some comfort in this fact. But is someone were to say that this linguistic fact indicates that there is a ghost in the machine I would feel sure that his answer to our question [viz. the question we have been considering: what is the significance of the Chisholm thesis?] is mistaken.  

What, then, does Chisholm take to be established by the truth of the psychological theory of intentionality? Since what is quoted immediately above has, disappointingly, been his most explicit and comprehensive remark on the matter, the reconstruction job must continue. It might be suggested with a certain amount of initial plausibility that the program in which Chisholm is engaged is in fact a kissin' cousin of that suggested by Nothlin, that Chisholm really is investigating a particular role of language which is carefully demarcated by criteria, that Chisholm's irreducibility is the same sort of notion as Nothlin's dramatic plot, in short that Chisholm would direct our attention not to the world but only to a part of it, language. Chisholm I think would vigorously resist this interpretation, insisting that what is under discussion are uses and not mentions of words and that in classifying...
Intentional uses of language he is no more telling us something merely about language than is the botanist, whose classifications are certainly not linguistic reflections. (Later we shall see that Sellars holds that, in a sense, scientific classification as well as laws are linguistic instructions, but not in a sense in which language is amputated from the world: scientific laws would yet hold if there were no language.) I have given above what I think are the considerations that Chisholm takes to preclude the possibility of an explicit ontology. I then suggested that Chisholm makes and tries to defend a number of factual claims which are not really different in kind from those made by a psychologist. But there is a twist. The factual claims that Chisholm makes differ from those of the psychologist or botanist in that they reveal an implicit ontology which presumably solves the traditional ontological puzzles. For example, the question of the analysis of things as bare particulars or as natured substances cannot for Chisholm be stated or answered as such for reasons of ineffability. It can be pointed out, however, that some things appear to have some characteristics necessarily; and if among those characteristics are such non-trivial characteristics (vs. being $\phi$ or not $\phi$) as being human, then perhaps it is revealed or shown implicitly that individuals are not bare. What is revealed by Chisholm's factual claims vis-a-vis intentional
situations is very surprising indeed. I shall not reveal it now, however; it is the surprise ending to this chapter.

**Mapping "Minds"**

Chisholm considers and dismisses as inadequate three alternative views with regard to statements about beliefs, each of which has it that a truthfunctionally equivalent extensional translation can be made of every intentional context, or as Chisholm alternatively puts it, that the phenomena Brentano would have called "intentional" can be described by a non-intentional vocabulary. The "specific response theory," which he attributes to the American "New Realists," has it that beliefs can be expressed by the sign-response language, the general translation rule for which is: \( S \) is a sign of \( E \) for \( O \) provided only \( S \) calls up \( O \)'s \( E \)-responses. Smoke, fire, and fire-responses are the most intuitive examples. If Jones can be said to believe that there is fire (say in the presence of smoke) then smoke calls up Jones' fire responses. This theory allegedly founders on what he takes to be the insurmountable task of specifying non-intentionally the nature of \( E \)-responses, in this case of fire-responses. They cannot be responses that only fire can call up because it must be the case that smoke alone can call up such responses, i.e. in the case of false belief. Now it can be said that the sign calls up all
the responses that the signatum calls up (the bell is a sign of food for the dog, but the dog does not eat the bell) and some responses are common to all signs. The suggestion is, of course, that what is missing is Jones' (irreducible) belief that smoke is a sign of fire, such that when in the presence of smoke, his fire-responses are called up.

According to the second theory, the clearest expression of which he takes to be promulgated in Ayer's *Thinking and Meaning*, statements about beliefs can be translated *salva veritate* into statements which do not mention beliefs but only actual uses and dispositions to use words. Since I think that this view is, though ultimately mistaken, useful as a foil to another view (somewhat similar to the "specific-response theory") which, when properly understood, I take to be correct, I postpone discussion of this view.

The third theory mobilizes notions which he takes to be the essentials of William James' pragmatic theory of truth, *viz.* "fulfil" and "fulfilment," or "satisfy" and "satisfaction." On this theory, 'S believes that E will occur within a certain period' translates as 'S is in a bodily state which would be satisfied if and only if E were to occur during that period,' where satisfaction is a matter of fulfilling "a motor set" such that S could be said to have what is suggested by the Russelian "yes-feeling"
or "quite-so feeling." Though Chisholm himself holds out for this approach the greatest hope of success, to me it seems to be the least plausible. As Chisholm himself points out, the conditions under which the satisfaction is achieved must be specified without appeal to intentional uses of language and without letting in 'James is in a state which would be satisfied if and only if there are tigers in India, or which would be disrupted if and only if there are no tigers in India' as a translation of 'James believes there are tigers in India.' I should think that, secondly, if the satisfaction described by the "yes-feeling" of "quite-so feeling" is itself to be explicated as a bodily state, then there is no essential difference between this view and the "specific-response" view, or rather, the objections to which the "specific-response" view is open apply to this theory as well, i.e. they both at base assert belief about a state of affairs can be defined in terms of a response to that state of affairs. Or, if it is not a bodily state, then appeal must be made to intentional phenomena, e.g. to what the believer takes to be the significance of the "yes-feeling," etc.

Against Ayer's view (which is, again, that belief is a matter of actual uses and dispositions to use words) Chisholm directs three arguments, the first two of which he takes to be of detail, the third exposing a difficulty in principle. Take as a paradigm case of belief Jones'
belief that Madrid is the capital of Spain. On Ayer's analysis (it doesn't matter if what I am about to describe really is Ayer's view, one that he would hold, or even one to which he is structurally committed; for convenience, however, I shall continue to call the view 'Ayer's'), in saying that Jones believes Madrid to be the capital of Spain, we are saying no more than that Jones as a matter of fact says such things as "Madrid is the capital of Spain," "Yes" (in answer to the question, "Is Madrid the capital of Spain?"), etc., and, more importantly, he would say such things if similar circumstances should obtain. Perhaps we ought to expand on this view a bit and say that Jones' behavior constitutive of belief is not confined just to verbal behavior but includes many other kinds, like pointing to Madrid on the map when asked to point to the capital of Spain, etc.

But now suppose that Jones is an international spy who is captured, and that, for some reason, the fact that Madrid is the capital of Spain is of great importance and that this fact is unknown to his captors. Now when asked "Is Madrid the capital of Spain?," Jones may answer "No," and go on to say such things as "Barcelona is the capital of Spain," etc., although we still might say that he continues to believe that Madrid is the capital of Spain. This situation is generalized by Chisholm into the following kind of objection: presumably in the dispositional
analysis of belief, some mention must be made of Jones' wanting to tell the truth, the description of which on Chisholm's criterion is an intentional use, or of his not wanting to lie, or to say what he does not believe is the truth, etc., all of which are, or upon analysis turn out to be, intentional uses. But now no one who would want to defend the view that belief is a matter of (certain kinds of) actual and possible behavior would ever suggest that his translations of statements mentioning beliefs are a simple and straightforward affair. In the above case, it would have to be a part of the specification of the circumstances that Jones not be questioned by enemy soldiers when expected to reply "Madrid is the capital of Spain." To exhaustively define Jones' belief, it might even be necessary to give a complete description of the universe, though of course, for the practical matter of determining his beliefs, information far less than that will do.

Now suppose that Jones is asked by his son about the capital of Spain, but that Jones takes his son to be asking about the capital of France. Jones, although he believes that Madrid is the capital of Spain, might very well in this case answer "Paris." Chisholm seizes upon this kind of situation to point out that part of the dispositional account of Jones' belief must specify that he understands
the question put to him, or takes this questioner to be asking what in fact he is asking, which specification again would be, on Chisholm's criterion, an intentional use of language. As against the more general behavioristic account that we are considering, the same objection might be put as follows. Part of the behavioristic translation of any statement mentioning beliefs must specify that the subject to which the actual and possible behavior is attributed takes the behavioral environment to be what it in fact is, and that the description of this phenomenon of "taking to be" is an intentional use of language. When Jones is commanded to point to the capital of Spain on a map, he must understand the command for what it is. I should think that the behaviorist could reply that such descriptions could themselves in turn be analyzed into descriptions only of actual and possible behavior. In the present case, Jones' taking the question to be, "What is the capital of France?" is taken to mean that Jones, if asked, "What was just asked you?," would reply, "What is the capital of France?," and that having so taken it (given no extraordinary circumstances), did reply with "Paris." As in answer to the first objection, I am again suggesting that though the behavioral translation of belief may be indeed complex, this complexity is not a difficulty in principle.
Chisholm takes this second kind of objection, however, to be suggestive of another objection, this one of principle. On the narrower Ayerean view that belief is a matter of actual and possible uses of words, it would appear that believing Jones must speak some language (L). But, argues Chisholm, the specification of L would require statements about the meanings of words, which statements, of the form

(1) "'ψ' (in L) means X,"

he takes to be elliptical for

(2) "Speakers of L in the presence only of X would make the noise 'ψ'"

Yet even this is not quite accurate, for the qualification must be added that the speakers must take X to be X, else there would be no mistakes by the speakers of L such as calling Y 'ψ,' or X 'φ.' That is to say that "'Cavallo' in Italian means horse" cannot mean "Speakers of Italian would in the presence of horses make the sound 'cavallo'" because it would follow then that they could never mistake a cow for a horse and call it 'vaca,' or mistake a horse for a cow and call it 'cavallo.' In short, what is required for completion of the elliptical statement is a qualification which cannot be framed, apparently, except in language which on Chisholm's criterion is intentional. Several comments are called for.

1. Later on in a chapter on Sellars' views on intentionality, the crucial difference between Chisholm and
Sellars will be seen to center on a question of ellipsis parallel to the one above. The issue is most clearly stated in the Chisholm-Sellars correspondence on intentionality. From there I take it that Sellars would insist that (2) is elliptical for, or at least is analyzable in terms of (1). I shall argue later on that Chisholm defends the better cause in this dispute. I raise the issue now as a kind of promissory note that must be made good eventually if our case for the behaviorist is to stand. Once mentioned, it can be set aside.

2. Chisholm is quite correct in suggesting a connection between intentionality and meaning. As will be seen in the chapter on Ryle, the cluster of problems of intentionality can be viewed as the cluster of problems about meaning (and understanding). It will also be seen, however, that our concerns are not just with linguistic meaning, but with any meaning which we might describe as referentially directional. That our expanded version of Ayer's view can at least initially account for such diverse intentional phenomena is an argument in its favor. It also points up the following oddity in Chisholm's argument.

3. If Chisholm's argument against Ayer's position is viable, then Ayer's view must be understood as having as a consequence that only those people who have linguistic capabilities have or can have beliefs, that dumb people,
or better yet, the man living alone from birth, does not have beliefs, or that the thesis is almost trivially true. Two points: (a) later, again in the chapter on Sellars, another issue central to the Chisholm-Sellars disagreement is the question of logical dependence between conceptual and linguistic capabilities. Sellars argues that linguistic capabilities are logically prior to conceptual capabilities, Chisholm the converse. Again I shall side with Chisholm. Though I shall argue Sellars is in the final analysis and in spite of himself a behaviorist, it does not follow from this option alone that he is a behaviorist. If Chisholm's option is correct, however, then it does follow that Ayer's view, in its original formulation, is mistaken, for, given that conceptual abilities are defined in terms of linguistic capabilities, one obviously cannot have the former without the latter. Hence, (b) in adopting the expanded version we have avoided the above peculiarities and have made the question of the logical priority of linguistic vs. conceptual capabilities irrelevant, for the class of capabilities in terms of which beliefs, for example, are defined is large enough to account for all conceptual capabilities.

4. As it happens, I believe that the behaviorists' analysis of belief is very near to being correct, at least insofar as it insists that in claiming Jones believes P, one need not be claiming anything actual about Jones; I
should hold only, and this is quite a reservation of principle, that ascribing belief is ascribing dispositions not to behavior but to having mental acts. The serious defender of behaviorism, however, would want to say that the same kind of analysis given belief can be given any mental phenomena. As will be seen in the chapter on Ryle, I disagree with this general thesis since there are some relevant differences that the molar concepts of behaviorism, even of our expanded variety, cannot reflect. That is, while there may be no differences between my believing that it will rain, and my believing that today is Tuesday other than dispositional differences, there are differences between my remembering that it is raining and my remembering that today is Tuesday, other than dispositional differences, for which the behaviorist cannot account because my overt behavior may be in both cases identical. The move of expanding Ayer's view is suggestive of the following move that can be made for the behaviorist.

5. Just as Ayer's view was expanded, so we might expand the expanded view such that not only the concepts of overt behavior but also, and theoretically, entirely, the concepts of neurophysiology (ultimately: only those of physics) can be mobilized in the physicalistic translation of mentalistic discourse. Roughly put, that Jones remembers that the book is on the shelf will on this view translate
as Jones' brain in a certain state $\psi$, which brain state is correlated with a certain state of affairs $\phi$. The correlation must be made; otherwise it will be asked why characterize Jones' brain state as an instance of remembering that the book is on the shelf rather than an instance of remembering that today is Tuesday or of imagining the Tower of Pisa fallen. Now the astute defender of Chisholm might immediately object, saying that while there might be a correlation of sorts between brain states and some other states of affairs, nonetheless the scientist in order to specify those correlations must ask his subject what it is that he is remembering at that time and the answer will presumably be an intentional use of language. This kind of objection, by the way, could also be raised against my answer to Chisholm's second argument of detail above.

To meet this objection, begin by considering two maps, each of which is of the Eurasian railroad network with each station marked with a point, but only one of which has attached to its points the names of the various stations. Suppose, further, that both maps are distorted such that they do not represent the metrical, but only the topological properties of the network. The question is whether on the basis of the labeled map and nothing more we can assign labels to the points on the unlabeled map. You recognize the situation above as that described by Carnap as the
problem of the purely structural definite description, in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. The question that he is asking is, is it possible to give a definite description which is purely structural?, i.e. whether it is possible to specify an object within a given domain without ostensive definition and without referring to any object outside that domain, but only by giving the formal properties of the relations in which it stands. Let us agree to understand by analogy the labeled map as Jones' brain state and the unlabeled map as the state of affairs to which Jones' brain state is correlated and which we would ordinarily call the object of his remembering. Thus understood, the question Carnap raises is the one raised above; or more precisely, we have one labeled map and many unlabeled maps only one of which is the correlate of the labeled map: how does one pick out that map?

What one does is locate the points on each map with the highest number \( n \) of lines intersecting it, and then count the number of stations between it and the next point with \( n \) intersections. If this does not serve to distinguish each of the points of \( n \) intersections (and in practice when one is distinguished, all are distinguished, and the rest of the map can be labeled) then one considers the

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connections between the \( n \) intersections and number of points between them; if failing again, one moves to the connections between these intersections, and so on.

But now suppose, following Carnap's suggestion, that after having surveyed the entire network, there are yet two points which cannot be structurally distinguished. These homotopic points must be distinguished by appeal to other similar kinds of relations, such as "next to each other on the highway" or "on the telephone line," etc., on which the same operation as described above would be performed. If all these relations should not suffice—an almost incredible situation—then appeal is made to dissimilar relations such as relations of climate, economic processes, etc. If in the end all fails, then these two stations are indistinguishable for science in general. Though they may be subjectively different in that I could be in one but not the other, "... this would not amount to an objective difference, since there would be in the other place a man just like myself who says, as I do: I am here and not there."\(^{17}\)

Now while we might agree with the Carnapian conclusion that "a definite description through pure structure statements is generally possible to the extent in which scientific discrimination is possible at all";\(^{18}\)

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 27.  
\(^{18}\)Ibid.
nonetheless we can hold out the possibility that there are two different states of affairs which do not allow of scientific discrimination. And, for what matters here, suppose that they are two of Jones' brain states, one of which he reports to be a remembering that the gas bill has not been paid, the other a remembering that yesterday was his wife's birthday. That this is a possible state of affairs points up only that the thesis of psychophysical parallelism is a scientific thesis, is always open-ended as it were, and that all we can do is experiment and try to determine whether such a state of affairs does obtain. Apparently, what is taken to be evidence on the contemporary psychological scene is all in favor of our thesis.

If the above approach is feasible, then a defense can be made for Brentano's later reistic theory in terms of which he tried to account for intentional phenomena. The later Brentano abandoned the view that 'unicorn' in, "Jones believes that there is such a thing as a unicorn," refers to an intentionally inexistent object, to something which has immanent objectivity, for the view that in such a sentence, 'unicorn' in some way describes Jones. Against this view, Chisholm proposes two arguments. The crucial premise of the first is that Brentano does not/cannot specify how it is that 'unicorn' describes Jones. Jones, obviously, is not a unicorn, nor is his thought a unicorn
(it is, as we say, of a unicorn), nor is the object of his thought a unicorn, for there simply are no unicorns, intentionally inexistent or otherwise. Secondly, the following argument:

Jones believes that there are unicorns.

All of Jones' beliefs are true.

.'. There are unicorns.

is a valid argument, suggests Chisholm, and it cannot be valid unless 'unicorn' is used univocally. Since on the realistic theory 'unicorn' describes Jones in the first premise, and in the conclusion refers to horse-like animals with a single horn, the validity of this argument cannot on that theory be accounted for. (It might be suggested that such an account would be difficult on any theory.) Since in my fourth step above, I opted for an account of belief much like the behaviorists', perhaps for accuracy we ought to be considering cases of remembering, say, rather than of belief. This difference does not matter here—as long as there are some intentional statements that are substitutable into the above argument—and since the case above is the example which Chisholm as a matter of fact uses, we shall stay with it.

Both of Chisholm's arguments can be met, it would seem, if it could be shown that—ignoring for a moment the problems of false belief—'unicorn' in "Jones believes
that there are unicorns" refers both to Jones' brain state and to an extramental state of affairs. This, I suggest, is precisely what the theory developed above would achieve. The argument would now read:

Jones has a brain state of type B which is correlated with the fact that there are unicorns.

Whenever Jones' brain state is of type B, the fact to which it is correlated obtains.

'. There are unicorns.

This suggestion will perhaps be better understood when read against Chisholm's most recent criterion for intentional uses of language, *viz.* that proposed in "Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional." 19 There he allows an expression to be termed intentional if it is a substitution instance for 'R' in the following scheme:

(1) (\exists x) (\exists y) (y = a \& xRa)
(2) (\exists x) (\exists y) (y = a \& xRy)

and it is the case that neither (1) implies (2), nor (2) implies (1). As an example, suppose that Senator Kennedy is the next President and that Lindsay is the Mayor of New York. If we understand 'R' as 'believes that the mayor of New York is,' and 'a' as 'the next President,' then (1) can be read:

(A) 'Some one believes that the mayor of New York is the next President,'

and from this, (2):

(B) 'Some one believes that the mayor of New York is Senator Kennedy'

does not follow, for that some one may be a supporter of Lindsay and not someone who mistakes Kennedy for Lindsay. Nor does (2) imply (1), for even if some one does mistake Kennedy for Lindsay, it does not follow that that someone believes that Kennedy will be the next President. Certainly Chisholm's scheme with the attendant qualification would appear to make a radical distinction between 'believes that . . . .' and a relation like 'to the left of' which is such that if it is substituted for 'R,' then (1) does imply (2), and (2) implies (1). The attendant qualification, however, begs what would be at issue between Chisholm and a defender of the neurophysiological behaviorism sketched out above, viz. that putatively intentional statements are to be expressed relationally. Presumably the latter would insist that the proper schemata are the following (very roughly):

\[(1) \ (\exists x) \ G(x)\]
\[(2) \ (\exists x) \ F(x)\]

where 'F' and 'G' designate very complex predicates modifying brain states which are correlated with "extra-mental" states of affairs. If all that is required is a truthfunctionally equivalent, non-intentional statement, then since (1) does not imply (2), nor (2) (1), the
scientific behaviorist can, at least in principle, account for the failure of material equivalence between (A) and (B), without committing himself to peculiarly intentional phenomena.

Finally, there are two matters of some import which are obscured by the symbolic notation. Notice, first, that Chisholm would have us understand 'R' as "believes that the mayor of New York is . . .' ; that is, packed into the relation is at least a part of what would be the intentional object. A standard opening gambit in the ontology of intentionality has been to construe awarenesses as a relation between a subject and an object or state of affairs, called an intentional object. We have seen that it is, at best, a very odd kind of relation. Now it is suggested that there is a difference not only in the intention, but also in the intentional relation in the following cases:

(A) Jones believes that the fourth Elector of the Rhine Palatinate was Otto the Bald

and

(B) Jones believes that the eleventh Margrave of Brandenburg was Otto the Illustrious.

If there is such a difference, then as I see it, that difference has either one of two ontological grounds. Either such relations as 'believes that the fourth Elector of the Rhine Palatinate was . . .' are logically simple in
which case the difference between (A) and (B) is primary, as is the difference between 'to the left of . . .' and 'taller than . . .'. If such is the case, however, then differences in mere, what will later be called, species of awarenesses, are impossible and at least one of Ehrlich's operations with identity is ruled out of court. This will be seen in the chapter on Ryle. Or the relations expressed by (A) and (B) are complex, and the difference is due to differing components, as is the difference, for example, between (a) 'to the left of . . . and . . . above . . . ' and (b) 'to the left of . . . and . . . below.' However, I can understand differences in relations due to components only if those components are, as in the examples (a) and (b) above, themselves relations. The relational difference between (A) and (B), on the other hand, seems to be attributable more to a modification of the relation, if such it be, of 'believes' than to another relation. Perhaps this modification can be explicated; my intention is merely to point out that the need for such an explication tends to be obscured by Chisholm's symbolic notation.

The second matter concerns the universalizability of Chisholm's schema as a criterion. Presumably he wants to say that a sentence is intentional if it contains an intentional expression, and an expression is intentional if it is a substitution instance for 'R' with the
qualification concerning the implication relation. While the criterion works admirably for such cases as 'Diogenes looks for an honest man,' and perhaps can be made to work for those cases of a kind discussed immediately above, it is apparently inapplicable to the class of what might be called existential intentions, such as 'Jones believes that there are unicorns.' Here, either 'there are' is a modification of 'believes,' or 'there are unicorns' is a substitution instance for the individual constant 'a,' both of which alternatives are for obvious reasons unattractive.

But now let us suppose that the two above objections, which are anyway objections of detail, as Chisholm would put it, can be met. Let us suppose that the Chisholm criteria are successful at least in that according to them no sentence we would want to say is intentional is not, and no sentence we would not want to say is intentional is intentional. Let us finally suppose that the scientific program of "reducing" the mental to the physical cannot, for whatever reasons, be carried through such that the intentional statements differentiated by the Chisholm criteria cannot be translated into non-intentional statements. Given all these suppositions, the question which must naturally arise is, what are their relevance to the problems of intentionality? One of the earlier criteria we saw above was that a sentence is intentional if it contains a substantival
expression such that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies that the substantival expression succeeds in referring. On this criterion, "Jones is thinking about the Fountain of Youth" would be judged intentional. Qua intentional, it is descriptive of a mental phenomenon which cannot be reduced to a physical phenomenon. This is Chisholm's factual claim. Nobody would disagree with it, moreover, for it is at base the claim that only minded individuals, which exemplify mental phenomena, can have propositional attitudes coupled with the commonsense claim that there is a difference between minds and bodies. The ontological thrust of Chisholm's claim, however, at least insofar as this criterion is concerned, is that mental phenomena are of a peculiar sort, *viz.* that the truth or falsity of the descriptions of such phenomena does not imply either that all the objects referred to by the descriptions exist, or that they do not exist. But is this claim to count as an ontological ground for intentional situations, or is it rather to be construed as a partial account of what is ontologically *problematic* about intentional situations? In short, isn't this criterion essentially a *restatement* of what we above have called the *problem* of (intentional) non-veridical awareness? Or consider the criterion which is concerned with the failure of material equivalence. Isn't this criterion essentially
a restatement of what we above have called the problem of (intentional) non-extensional contexts? We have seen that in a way Chisholm's philosophical method is to point out in a peculiar fashion factually true claims which are such that they particularly reveal ontological commitments. What his mental-physical distinction reveals, I suggest, is that, peculiarly fashioned, the distinction can generate philosophical puzzles. Indeed, we are closer now than at the end of the last chapter to a solution of those puzzles only in the sense that we have perhaps a clearer formulation of the puzzle and have acquired along the way a number of tools and distinctions which will later prove invaluable.
CHAPTER III

RYLE: THE RESPONSE OF BEHAVIORISM

The Former Self

In his second earliest publication, "Are There Propositions?"¹ (hereafter: ATP), Gilbert Ryle is content with the Brentano thesis on intentionality at least insofar as it states that the essence of consciousness is that acts of consciousness are always of objects.

This intrinsic intentionality or "transitivity" of acts of consciousness is, it is alleged, self-evident. It is not a mere hypothesis or a mere empirical generalization, but a property which can be directly ascertained to belong to the very nature of consciousness. And we can grant, I think, that it would be both paradoxical and in conflict with the evidence of language to assert that there may be some forms of consciousness which are not consciousness of something.²

He stipulates only that an intentional object need not be a thing, i.e. a real physical substance, but may be "an imagined something, a past or future something, an ideal or abstract something (like a number or a law) or a negative something."³ This supposed difference between the mere

²Ibid., pp. 92-93.
³Ibid., p. 93.
Objekt and the more comprehensive Gegenstand Ryle proposes to reflect by referring to the intentional object as the intentional accusative of acts of consciousness.

Within two years, however, Ryle with the publication of "Phenomenology"⁴ (hereafter: Phen) gives up even this much of the Brentano thesis. In a passage actually aimed at curbing the threat of Husserlian idealism but which can be read as an attack on Brentano, he says: "If, then, the doctrine of intentionality implies that to every case of mental functioning of whatever sort there must be correlative a special something describable as an 'intentional object,' then this doctrine seems to be false."⁵

This abandonment is, I think, mistaken; and I think that I can best argue my case by first pursuing the question: What happened, structurally, in the interim that led Ryle so radically to alter his views? Roughly put, my answer will be as follows. Throughout the series of articles ATP, "Systematically Misleading Expressions"⁶ (hereafter: SME), Phen, and "Imaginary Objects"⁷ (hereafter: IO), the

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⁴Phenomenology, Goodness and Beauty, Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XI (Harrison and Sons, Ltd., 1932).
⁵Ibid., p. 80.
⁷Creativity, Politics and the A Priori, Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XII (Harrison and Sons, Ltd., 1933).
problem of intentionality is the problem of non-veridical awareness, insofar as the analysis of such awareness renders extraordinary the status of its intentional accusative. But there is a shift. In ATP the problem is posed: "When I am thinking of X as being Y or of P as being R to Q in terms of the sentence 'X is Y' or 'P is R to Q,' of what is the statement presentative—when it is not the statement of a fact known to me and is very likely not the statement of a fact at all?" 8 In the later articles, the problem is rather: given that (false) statements are not presentative of anything at all, what leads us to believe that they are presentative of something? Or, to ask differently what Ryle takes to be the same question, given that some acts of consciousness have intentional accusatives, what leads us to believe that all have intentional accusatives? That some do not is now taken as almost self-evident by Ryle. The evidence of ordinary language, that fickle witness first summoned by the defense, is now invoked by the prosecution in damnation of Brentano. In IO we read about "the crucial reason why imagining cannot be correlative to an imaginary object—namely, that it is a tautology to say that imaginary objects do not exist. So there could be no such correlates." 9

8LOC. CIT., p. 118.
9LOC. CIT., p. 30.
This shift, I insist, is crucial, though it is not, of course, so straightforward as is suggested above. The move from the one question to the other is blurred by the vestige of the Brentano thesis that at least some acts of consciousness have intentional accusatives. Not until the outright behaviorism of The Concept of Mind, where the accusative drops out of the analysis of every "awareness-situation" (I say 'awareness-situation' because the act is also dropped), does Ryle completely abandon the transitivity of acts of consciousness. Now for some details.

In a passage quoted above from ATP, Ryle speaks of thinking in terms of a sentence which is presentative of something. Here, thinking, which is a momentary occurrence, first is to be distinguished from knowing and believing, for example, which are enduring conditions. It is interesting to note in passing that at this time Ryle believes that

the evidence of ordinary language, anyhow, is against the view that "having knowledge" is analogous to "having a bad temper" . . . and seems to denote something more akin to the possessing of a property than to the liability or propensity to act or react in a certain way in certain circumstances. "Knowledge" and "belief" seem to denote deposits rather than dispositions.10

Ryle's most reliable witness, ordinary language, perjures itself again, for in The Concept of Mind (hereafter: CM) it delivers just the opposite testimony. A second and, to

10Tbid., p. 116.
my main concern, a more crucial distinction is that thinking is always in terms of images, or more commonly, of words. These images and words he calls "presentatives"—meaning by 'presentative' that which when itself directly present (in some way or other) to consciousness enables the mind to think of some other object specially connected with it which is not itself directly present." With the introduction of these presentatives, Ryle himself approaches just that indefensible representationalism for which he himself had criticized proposition theories and for which Addis has criticized him in Ryle's Ontology of Mind. In another place I would argue that if there is anything admirable about representationalism, it is the attempt, by structuring awarenesses with ideas, to show how awarenesses can be about something else. Its disastrous mistake is to let the idea become itself the object of awareness. Here Ryle will be seen to totter on the brink of just this kind of mistake. Finally, the presentative is important because Ryle believes that by means of it he has a dialectical bridge--fully transversed only in SME--to at least a partial solution to the problem of non-veridical awareness; for, given that all thinking is in terms of symbols, the question: "What am I thinking about when I think falsely that X is Y?" is really the question: "What is the

11Ibid., p. 117.
statement 'X is Y' about?" The move is a quite subtle one, the dialectic of which constitutes the greater part of SME and 10. To say much about it now would be confusing, so I merely label the move, as a place-marker, "the thought-statement blur," and add two comments. First, we shall see eventually that Bergmann holds that all awareness is propositional in that the text, i.e. what refers to the content, of every awareness could be stated by a sentence. 13 When I am aware of a red spot, for example, the content of my awareness is the red spot, which content can be stated as 'this spot is red.' This claim is to be radically distinguished from Ryle's theory of presentatives, first, because for Bergmann when I am aware in any way at all of the red spot I am not "presented with" the sentence 'this spot is red,' and secondly, because the sentence 'this is a red spot' has meaning, i.e. refers to the red spot, because I use it to refer to the red spot, or put aphoristically, not sentences but people by means of sentences mean. We shall see shortly that Ryle, unaware of the thought-statement blur, and for a number of other reasons, suffers the tortures of the damned over meaning. Second, even if Ryle were able to avoid the problematic aspects of representationalism, his theory of presentatives, at least

as a means to the solution of the problem of non-veridical awareness, is a dubious one; first because it is not obviously true and he nowhere argues for, but assumes, it's truth, and second, because even if true, it seems to be nothing more than a psychological claim about the way people as a matter of fact think. Whether in thinking about my dead grandmother I do in fact summon a mental picture of her or have "directly present to my consciousness" some symbol of her is here an irrelevant question. What Ryle must, but does not show, is that it is of the nature of any thought about anything to have directly present to it some symbol of what is thought about.

With the above distinction between "knowing" and "thinking," Ryle feels himself in a position to answer the (transmogrified) main problem of ATP by first answering a "simpler" one, viz. "What am I apprehending when I understand some one else's statement without knowing whether or not it states a fact."14 What I apprehend is a meaning, but a meaning is not an odd entity like a proposition--the whole point of the article is to avoid ontologizing propositions. So there are just statements, substances, and perhaps facts at his disposal. (This claim, of course, is a kind of promissory note: it will have to be shown that these and only these are initially at his disposal.)

14ATP, p. 118.
"In the strict sense, only those statements mean something, which state a fact to some one who knows the fact."\(^{15}\) So only true statements are meaningful; but some statements differ from mere linguistic nonsense in that they have a grammatical form which would reflect the logical form of a fact they could state if there were such a fact. Whether or not it is raining, the statement 'it is raining' would state a fact—mirabile dictu—if it were raining. Ryle now answers his question. When I understand a statement which is not a statement of fact, what I understand is what he calls a "hypothetical fact" about the statement, viz. what would make it true if it were a statement of fact.

Even if they were not peculiar enough by themselves, hypothetical facts nonetheless seem little more than a verbal dodge of these odd entities like false facts or propositions; for in the case of knowing (i.e. for the moment, thinking truly) that X is Y and in the case of thinking (falsely) that X is Y, what makes the former true and the latter false is the same thing, viz. that X is Y, except that in the latter case there is no such fact—which lack leaves Ryle precisely where he started, viz. "What am I apprehending, etc.?" The perhaps all too natural temptation is to qualify the latter in opposition to the

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 120.
former as a possible (vs. actual), or false (vs. real) fact. These facts of the "third realm," like the propositions they replace, cannot be countenanced by Ryle; hence the odd hypothetical facts.

A minor difficulty with hypothetical facts deserves mention here since it is a harbinger of a later, major difficulty in The Concept of Mind. Although he does not explicitly say so until Phen, Ryle throughout the early articles uses 'to know x' after J. C. Wilson to mean not a species of awareness but rather a unique act (in terms of which all other awarenesses are at least partly defined) the occurrence of which guarantees the independent existence of x. Now at one point in ATP, Ryle tells us that to understand the (false) statement 'X is Y' is to know what would obtain if 'X is Y' were true. But if 'X is Y' were true, what would obtain would be X is Y; and if I know that X is Y, then 'X is Y,' which is ex hypothesi false, must be true. This would be a mere terminological objection and indeed picayune were not terminology later to become so apparently important. In The Concept of Mind, when the intermediary presentatives had long since been rejected, the difference between veridical and non-veridical awareness could be located only in the awareness or in the accusative. The latter is ruled out in CM, for in the case of

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16 Ibid., p. 121.
non-veridical awareness, there is, as we shall see, simply no accusative. Indeed, this is what it means for the author of CM to say that an awareness is non-veridical. The difference, then, must be on the side of the awareness. When I am hallucinating a tree, therefore, I only 'see' it, whereas when there is a real tree before me, I see it. In the imprecise terminology employed so far, 'seeing' and seeing are different species of awareness. Now aside from the objection that differences in species of awareness seem to be, if you will, phenomenologically presented, whereas the difference between seeing and 'seeing' is not presented, we might, and later will, ask: What is there about any awareness that guarantees the independent existence of its accusative? I postpone discussion of this question until my treatment of CM.

Given Ryle's answer to this "simple" problem of understanding, his answer to the question, "What am I thinking when I am thinking of X as being Y?," is not at all surprising. "It means to think of X as if it is (or were) Y, i.e., to think of X in the same way as one would think of it if it were Y and--we must add--one knew it."\(^{17}\) In the case of veridical awareness, the statement is presentative of a known fact. In the case of thinking falsely of... as ..., the statement is a constituent of a hypothetical fact.

Following what has been said above about hypothetical facts, my last sentence, which is a paraphrase of Ryle, is very unsettling. At first, hypothetical facts were said to be what would make a statement true if that statement were a statement of fact. We saw that this gambit fails. Now false statements are said to be constituents of hypothetical facts, but unfortunately Ryle is none too assertive in his explication of this new sense of 'hypothetical fact.' Apparently, he means something like this: the false statement 'X is Y' is a constituent of the hypothetical fact that if X is Y were a fact, 'X is Y' would be a statement of that fact, in a sense like that in which X is a constituent of the fact that X ⊃ Y. But this gambit won't do either. Remember that the whole concern with false statements is really the concern with the accusatives of my false thinking; and whether or not I must always think in terms of presentatives like sentences, when I think falsely that X is Y, I am decidedly not thinking that the statement 'X is Y' could stand for the fact that X is Y if there were such a fact.

I wish now to announce a theme to which I shall return over and over again in these sections on Ryle. I raise it now because I believe it to be a main source of Ryle's difficulties over hypothetical facts. Ryle is (throughout his career) a substance ontologist. I pick
a quote to give the gist of what I mean, though the
evidence for the claim abounds in ATP: "Anything which is
and does not depend for its being upon anything else is a
substance . . ." Here is exhibited what might be called
the "independence pattern": roughly, only what is inde­
dependent exists, and only substances are independent. Addis,
in his above-mentioned work, has pointed out several other
"patterns" which yield Ryle his radical substance ontology.
The substance theme, however, seems to me to be so obvious
throughout Ryle's writings that I hardly need documentation,
much less argument, to show that it is operative here.

I said above that perhaps facts are at Ryle's
disposal as candidates for "meanings"; but since there are
only substances, facts, if there are any in Ryle's ontology,
must be substances (as Ryle himself argues that if there
are propositions, propositions must be substances).19 And
initially at least, this seems to be Ryle's position
precisely;

The word "fact" does not denote any new entity or
substance; if, for instance, I know that Julius
Caesar is dead, the fact that he is dead is not a
new substance side by side with the substance we
call "Julius Caesar." Julius Caesar's being dead
in 1930 is simply part of the being of Julius
Caesar and not an entity on its own account. So
the sentences, "It is a fact that Julius Caesar is
dead" and "Julius Caesar is dead" are equivalent in
meaning; only the former needs more breath or ink.20

18 Ibid., p. 105. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid., p. 111.
Notice first that even if, per impossibile, facts about Julius Caesar were different from the substance Julius Caesar, they would themselves be substances. Ryle's claim, however, is yet more radical: facts are identical with the substances they are "about"—Julius Caesar and the fact that Julius Caesar is dead in 1967 are the same entity. But now, I ask, is the fact that Julius Caesar is dead in 1967 identical with the fact that Julius Caesar had an epileptic seizure in 52 B.C., or, more embarrassingly, with the fact that he was the husband of Calpurnia? What is afoot, it seems, is an incipient theory, a la Strawson, of different ascriptions to the same entity, which ascriptions do not refer and do not, therefore, introduce new entities. In another place I would argue against the adequacy of such a theory. Here, more to the point is Ryle's confusion about facts, for later in ATP, knowing that London is bigger than Bristol is analyzed not merely as knowing the nature of a pair of entities plus a relation, but as knowing a fact about those entities in that relation. Also later, "when a statement states a known fact about, say, Julius Caesar, Julius Caesar is a constituent in the fact. . . ."21 If facts about London and Bristol, and Julius Caesar are identical with those substances, what are the further entities of which they are constituents? Or,

21Ibid., p. 121.
to ask what I am really concerned about, what is the further entity, i.e. the hypothetical fact, of which a false statement is a constituent? Ryle seems to be placing incompatible demands on his substances; they must on the one hand be simple since they serve as individuals, but on the other hand, since he refuses to countenance facts, they must be complex, in the sense that they have natures. The force of the article is that if one demand must be eliminated, it is the first. Now suppose again that a hypothetical fact is a fact about a statement that the statement could stand for a fact. We have already seen that hypothetical facts will not do as a solution to the problem of non-veridical awareness, for the phenomenological consideration that when I think falsely, I'm just not thinking something about a sentence. Here we can see another reason— even for Ryle, as will be seen, there is nothing in the nature of any sentence according to which it states one fact and not another. How then, can the fact (i.e. the hypothetical fact) be collapsed into (the nature of) the substance (i.e. the marks or noises which are a sentence)?

Purgatorio

A systematically misleading expression is an expression couched in a syntactical form improper to the fact recorded and proper to a fact of another "logical"
form. It misleads in that it leads the philosopher and the philosopher only, into thinking that it records a fact proper to its syntactical form. Thus, such statements as "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction, is a non-entity, does not exist, etc.," only seem to be about an unreal person Mr. Pickwick. Such statements, which Ryle calls quasi-ontological, are really disguised predicative expressions asserting that nothing Mr. Pickwicks, or that nothing is Mr. Pickwickish. But there is a catch. The questions "What am I thinking about when I think (falsely) that X is Y?" and "What am I thinking about when I think that Mr. Pickwick is a fiction?" transmogrified into the questions "What is 'X is Y' about?" and "What is 'Mr. Pickwick is a fiction' about?" both seem to Ryle yet to demand a reference. I suggest that the structural reason why Ryle should think so is a second vestige of the thesis of the transitivity of acts of consciousness, viz., that the meaning of a statement is its reference, coupled with the phenomenological difference between a false statement and a string of nonsense, viz. that one can understand the former but not the latter. The dialectical force in the direction of entities of the third realm is indeed great; so much so that Ryle, in SME, vacillates between repeating his doubtful solution by hypothetical facts and rejecting reference as the meaning of meaning. Though he shows a
decided attraction for the latter alternative in SME, Phen, and IO, he never fully embraces it until CM. The details that follow essentially revolve around his vacillation and the difficulties it produces.

A statement is a sentence in the indicative. If true, it "records" a fact. To know it to be true is to know that something is the case and that the sentence "records" it. False statements are pseudo-records. The question "What do they state?" is meaningless if by 'state,' "record" is meant. If it means "What would they "record" if they were true statements?," the question contains its own answer. To understand a false statement is to know what would obtain if that statement were a true statement. This is the first position taken in SME. Gone is the embarrassing terminology, but the position is essentially the same as that taken in ATP. Nor is the criticism of it any different. However, one matter, though of detail yet of no small significance, deserves comment. Remember that in ATP all thinking was said to be in terms of symbols between which and what is thought about there was alleged to be a "special connection." Nowhere did Ryle spell out what this connection is. Now, in SME, (true) sentences are said to "record" facts. The introduction of this quasi-technical term serves only to emphasize the need for an explication of the meaning relation. Though such an
explication is, I believe, crucial to a satisfactory solution to the problem of intentionality, even, and perhaps, especially, as it is construed by Ryle, none is forthcoming. After a fashion, Ryle himself raises, but leaves unsolved, the problem: "Given that an expression of a certain grammatical form is proper (or anyhow approximates to being proper) to facts of a certain logical form and to those facts only, is this relation of propriety of grammatical to logical form natural or conventional?" That the relation is natural he takes to be the view of Wittgenstein and the "school of logical grammarians," and is ruled out by Ryle on account of the bugbear over facts. Sentences cannot be like facts, "For a fact is not a collection— even an arranged collection— of bits in the way in which a sentence is an arranged thing." The alternative is unsatisfactory as well, for "customary usage is perfectly tolerant of systematically misleading expressions."

Ryle's second position in the above-mentioned vacillation begins the attack on reference as the meaning of meaning. Consider such descriptive phrases as "the present queen of England," "the present king of France," "the path of this arrow," "the moment Churchill died," "the thought that I'm getting old." According to Ryle, if these phrases are taken as being logically alike in

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22 *SME*, pp. 166-167.  
that if meaningful they demand a reference, then certain antinomies or paradoxes arise involving there being moments, non-existent kings, paths, etc., alongside of queens, calendars and harmonicas. (That it should lead to antinomies or paradoxes is the mark of a systematically misleading expression; that there should be a non-existent king is, I take it, prima facie paradoxical for Ryle.)

The fly is out of the bottle, however, as soon as it is realized that descriptive phrases, though they may have referential uses, are not by themselves referential of anything, but merely "signify" an idiosyncratic character without asserting that anything has it. (The use of double quotes again marks the use of an unexplicated technical term. Though ultimately unintelligible, it would be explicated, as far as is possible I think, by my talk about Ryle's 'facts' above.)

The lingering importance of reference, however, is still felt, albeit sotto voce, due to a confusion which was made much of above. Without knowing whether or not there was a place called Troy which had a king, I can nevertheless understand the phrase 'The Trojan King.' If it has meaning, it must be about something; but what? "The proposition 'Mr. Pickwick is a fiction' is really, despite its prima facies, about Dickens or else about Pickwick Papers."25

25 Ibid.
Thus, when I thought myself to be talking about an individual having a certain character familiar to any reader of the *Iliad*, I was in fact talking either about a writer about whom I know virtually nothing—not even if "he" was one person—or else about some document he wrote. With any statement about Priam, I can, quite literally, be talking meaningfully without knowing what I am talking about. But this has the ring of absurdity. When I am thinking about Priam I am not thinking about Homer or about marks on a piece of paper. Yet I would not know how to convince someone who disagrees that such is really the case, any more than I would know how to convince someone who wishes to solve the universals issue by denying that two things are qualitatively identical, that they are qualitatively identical.

The last passage quoted from SME Ryle spells out in detail. Statements which are grammatically about Mr. Pickwick are divided into three sorts. First, there are Dickens' in *Pickwick Papers*. These, since they are fictional, are about nothing, not even hypothetical facts. But why are they meaningful? This is a hard case; and Ryle, at least until *CM*, is silent. Second, there are statements by readers of *Pickwick Papers*. These are about the statements in *Pickwick Papers*. When I say that Mr. Pickwick was goodhearted, presumably what I mean is that
the sentence 'Mr. Pickwick is goodhearted' appears under certain conditions in Pickwick Papers, or that certain sentences in Pickwick Papers in a loose sense imply this sentence, or some such thing. Third, there are statements made by philosophers. Examples are those with which I began this section. Statements of this sort are about the first two sorts. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction," then, means that 'Mr. Pickwick' is used by a writer of fiction, or that when people talk about 'Mr. Pickwick,' what they mean is that a certain set of sentences recorded in Pickwick Papers is of a certain sort. Notice the lingering transitivity of consciousness under the guise of transitivity of statements: statements to be meaningful, except, perhaps, those of a kind with the hard case above, must be about something, though not necessarily about what they pretend to be about. Nonetheless, in distinguishing meaning qua reference on the one hand, and referential and non-referential uses on the other, a major step has been taken, which, when joined with a strand of another dialectic, will produce the behaviorism of CM.

I have claimed above that Ryle's is a substance ontology. The other strand I just mentioned is part and parcel with his dialectic of substance, and to it I now turn, though in indirect fashion by four steps.
First. In ATP, Ryle insists that if knowings, believings, wonderings, rememberings, etc., are to be classed together as acts of consciousness, they must at least be understood, not as cases of doings, bits of activity as opposed to passivity, i.e. not as actiones, but rather, as actus, i.e. as the actualizations of potentialities. Addis sees in this insistence by Ryle an attempt to avoid idealism by rejecting the active "doing" of a mind which "creates" or "contributes to" its intention, for the more "neutral" actualizations of potentialities. If when the mind is aware, it does something (to that of which it is aware), then, presumably, that of which it is aware depends, at least in part, on the doing and hence on the mind. Addis is quite correct in holding that for Ryle idealism was never a viable position; but I fear that he has read too much into Ryle's quite brief statement. Yet there is a connection of sorts.

Second. The contemporary custom of denoting an awareness by the term 'act' derives from Brentano, who resurrected and made current the medieval terminology on intentionality. In that ambiance, a thing is said to be in act (to be actual) in a given respect if it exemplifies a given universal, or form. A harmonica is actually green if it exemplifies the form greenness. A mind is in act with regard to greenness if it jointly exemplifies greenness
with the object of which it is aware. But there is a crucial difference; whereas when the harmonica exemplifies greenness, it itself is green, the mind, when it exemplifies greenness, is not. The mind is said to be only "virtually" green. That the mind should have this peculiar capacity is a result of its primary form, which defines its nature, i.e. which demarcates the actualization of potentialities to which it is susceptible. My aim is, of course, not to defend the above schema, but to get at, first, some sense in which Ryle could understand awarenesses as acts, and second, given that it is the nature of the mind which determines that in certain circumstances it will have a certain awareness, i.e. when it will "virtually" exemplify a certain form, the sense in which for a substance ontologist the mind could ever "create" its intention.

Consider the substance, our harmonica. It is green and shiny, but if moistened and left to dry slowly, it will be rust-colored. It is almost perfectly rectangular, but if struck sharply with a heavy object like a hammer, it will have a dent in it. If blown, it will emit a certain sound, but if plugged, it will produce a different sound, or perhaps none at all. The capacity for these changes is what I have above been calling its potentialities. That the potentialities should be actualized under the conditions mentioned is a result of the nature of the substance, which
nature is expressed by a very complex set of contrary-to-fact conditionals. A solid piece of nickel could also be made to have a dent in it, but since its nature is different from that of a harmonica, the conditions under which the change might be effected would be different. Also, certain changes are precluded by its nature; for example, it could never rust. The case of the mind, which is a substance, is not very different. As we shall see much later, many substance ontologists construe thoughts or awarenesses as standing to the mind as quality to thing qualified, i.e., in the relation of exemplification. The occurrent properties that a mind has are determined by its nature, which spells out which of its potentialities are actualized under what conditions. Thus, roughly put, when there is a calendar before me and I am facing it with my eyes open, my mind has the property of seeing-a-calendar. Here confusion generally sets in, for the quality of the mind is often taken to be that with which the mind is directly presented as an object. But then idealism is the result as that of which we are aware depends for its existence upon the mind, first, simply as quality to thing qualified, since substances are taken to be independent in a sense in which qualities are not, and second, because had the mind had a different nature, it might have a different thought when faced with a calendar. With his theory of presentatives, Ryle is structurally close to such a result. By
CM, however, Ryle has avoided this confusion with its unfortunate result by embracing what I shall argue is just as unfortunate a confusion, viz. the elimination of the embarrassing thoughts by eliminating the mind that exemplifies them.

Third. Suppose, now, that for whatever reasons, Cartesian dualism is not a viable position, and that, as a candidate for the role of a self, the only score on which an immaterial would be preferable to a material substance, indeed the only reason why it should even be ontologically contemplated, as it were, is in explanation of intelligent behavior, in that the immaterial substance's acts, i.e. awarenesses, explain, i.e. cause, the acts of a material substance, the body. Suppose further, with something like the above substance schema in mind, that this preferability is eliminated by construing awarenesses as identical with the actualized potentialities, now call potentialities 'dispositions,' of a material substance, with the result that the explanatory function of the immaterial substance is usurped by the law-like statements of science expressed by the counter-factual conditional. Our suppositions have encapsuled the materialism of CM. They have also collapsed the actus-action distinction Ryle sought to establish in ATP. But the collapse of that distinction would be part of his materialistic program.
Fourth. The materialism of CM leaves no room for the transitivity thesis, either as first framed by Brentano or as transmogrified by Ryle; in the first case because there are no mental acts—to say that there are is the mistake of the "official" theory, which treats mental concepts as thing concepts whereas they are in fact event-disposition concepts; in the second case because people do not engage in the unverifiable practice of meaning and understanding by apprehending meanings, or generally, if you will, of intending an object, but they mean and understand by overtly behaving in certain ways. Here we have encapsuled the behaviorism of CM. Now for the details.

The Concept of Mind

The Rylean interest in "understanding" and in meaningful statements vs. linguistic nonsense persists into CM. "What is this difference between merely witnessing a performance [of a chess game] and understanding what is witnessed? What, to take another example, is the difference between hearing what a speaker says and making sense of what he is heard to say?"26 In one sense, one with which Ryle seems to be all too concerned, the question is one for the psychologist. In another, it is a demand for an

analysis of awareness. The analysis that won't do, according to Ryle, is that of the "double-life legend," according to which a verbal performance is meaningful if there is correlative to it a private, mental act, and understanding is a matter of inferring from the overt verbal performance to the mental act. Since every mind, the seat of mental acts, but one's own is inaccessible, all inferences that one bases on an inductive correlation between verbal performances and mental acts are "fallacious"; hence this analysis is subject to the reductio "that no one has ever yet had the slightest understanding of what anyone else has ever said or done." 27

The Rylean analysis is that understanding is a part of knowing how. The knowledge that is required for understanding intelligent performances of a specific kind is some degree of competence in performances of that kind. The competent critic of prose-style, experimental technique, or embroidery, must at least know how to write, experiment or sew. . . . The one necessary condition is that he has some mastery of the art or procedure, examples of which he is to appraise. 28

Ryle's aim is to show that "understanding," be it of verbal performances, experimental techniques, embroidery or whatever, and "meaning" are of the same "type"—namely, dispositions—though these dispositions may admit of a wide variety of actualizations. In the case we are most interested in, when a speaker means, i.e. says, X is Y, he

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 54.
behaves and, we shall see, would behave in certain ways, and when I understand him, I in turn behave, and would behave in certain other ways.

His main objection to the "double-life legend" is that even if true it does not explain such intelligent behavior; for as the consideration of propositions ("knowings-that"), the alleged correlative which is proposed as the explanation, is an operation which can be performed intelligently, an infinite regress of "knowings-that" is generated. If an operation such as the making of certain noises is intelligent because of another operation called a mental act, one must ask, suggests Ryle, what it is in virtue of which the second operation can be said to be intelligent. From where I stand, the question is an invitation to confusion because making noises of a certain sort and mental acts such as considering propositions are not at all operations of the same kind, hence cannot be intelligently performed in the same sense. One way of reflecting the difference, though not the one I shall defend, is by means of the actus-action distinction suggested in ATP. We have seen that in CM, however, this distinction must be collapsed, and hence Ryle can answer only that it is by means of a third operation of a kind with the first two that the second operation is said to be intelligent. Raising the question again necessitates a
fourth operation and so on. If, on the other hand, "understanding" (and "meaning") is a "knowing-how," then, suggests Ryle, no such regress results; first, because we learn how by practice, criticism, example, i.e. by stimulus-response reinforcement, not by theoretical considerations. Trying to understand a complicated piece of discourse is not radically different from learning how to make a fullback plunge or to tie a square-knot; there is nothing "mental" which attaches to the former but not the latter. Now given that this something: "mental" is in the "double-life legend" an occult mental act, and that the seat of such acts is the mind, minds can be eliminated. Or, put aphoristically, though more precisely since "mental" or "mind" concepts yet have legitimate, i.e. ordinary language, applications, minds are (actual and possible) behavior. The second reason why the infinite regress is avoided is, obviously enough, that one "knows-how" when one can perform in a given way— not when one's actions are accompanied by an occult act. To speak intelligently is one thing, viz. an action, not two things, viz. an action-cum-actu.

We are now in a position to understand Ryle's answer to the question with which we began this section.

Their problem [i.e. the spectators'] in distinguishing intelligent from non-intelligent chess-behavior. But this is really the same as the problem of distinguishing "understanding" a chess game from merely witnessing it; or of "understanding" a speaker from
merely hearing what he says.] is not not of the occurrence or non-occurrence of ghostly processes, but one of the truth or falsehood of certain 'could' or 'would' propositions and certain other applications of them. For, roughly, the mind is not the topic of sets of untestable categorical propositions, but the topic of testable hypothetical and semi-hypothetical propositions. 29

About the semi-hypothetical, or mongrel-categorical, propositions, a great deal later. For now we can see that the straightforwardly hypothetical propositions, at least, can be made sense of only as unpacking the nature of a material substance:

A statement ascribing a dispositional property to a thing has much, though not everything, in common with a statement subsuming the thing under a law. To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realised. 30

What is important about the above substance ontologist's account is that it is invoked as an explanation of how Jones comes to remember his dead grandmother as well as how a piece of iron comes to be rust-colored. Furthermore, when the condition of, say, his being presented with a photograph of the grandmother is realized, the state to which Jones is liable is not that of exemplifying the unobservable property of remembering-the-dead-grandmother, but rather, that of exhibiting the public, behavioral features characteristic of rememberings, such as a dreamy

29 Ibid., p. 46. 30 Ibid., p. 43.
look, a tear in the eye, perhaps a scowl, or whatever. For Ryle, of course, such features are more than characteristic of rememberings, for together with what is got at by the mongrel-categoricals, they are constitutive of them.

Before moving on, I wish to treat briefly of the theory of presentatives which early on in CM rears its head, and, given what has passed above--immediately as well as in earlier sections--quite unexpectedly. According to Ryle, theorizing, or "knowing-that," or "apprehending truths," is an activity which most people can and normally do conduct in silence. It is done in terms of sentences said not aloud but to oneself, or in terms of diagrams or pictures which need not be graphically expressed. "Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquoy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph show of visual imagery."\textsuperscript{31} However: "This trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired neither quickly nor without effort; and it is a necessary condition of our acquiring it that we should have previously learned to talk intelligently aloud and have heard and understood other people doing so."\textsuperscript{32} Three comments will say what needs to be said.

First. From the penultimate passage above, "Much of . . . ," one might be led to believe that there is at

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p. 27. 
\textsuperscript{32}Ibid.
least some "thinking" which is not done in terms of symbols. What thinking is not done silently in symbols, however, is done aloud—as opposed to the view that the silence of thinking in silence is a defining property of thought. All thinking, at least in this early part of CM, is in terms of something, words—spoken or silent, or pictures—graphic or not, or whatever.

Second. The view expressed in the second passage is not an uncommon one, especially among those before behaviorism looms. In his Mental Acts, Geach attempts to defend Wittgenstein from the allegation that he denies "the obvious truth that people have a 'private' mental life, in the sense that they have for example thoughts they do not utter and pains they do not show; [and that he tried] to analyze away this truth in a neo-behavioristic fashion." Descriptions of such private thoughts are not meaningless because unverifiable; they are meaningful, however, only because of their "connection with a wider, public, language-game of describing people's thoughts." This interpretation is, I think [at least partially], mistaken, though I shall not argue so here. Sellars, too, has a view similar to the one suggested by Geach. In his

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, concepts pertaining

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to private episodes like thoughts are said to be built upon and to presuppose an intersubjective use of those concepts. Language, beginning as a public tool, can acquire a theoretical, i.e. explanatory, role with regard to intelligent behavior, and then the role of reporting inner episodes. He seems to suggest that the addition of roles represents an historically factual progression; it is at least designed to show their order of logical dependence. No such gambit is open to Ryle, however, for whom there are no such private episodes to report.

Third. If any sense is to be made of the rest of CM, theorizing must be the activity of a material substance, describable by law-like statements. It is "one practice amongst others and is itself intelligently or stupidly conducted." But now, if it is the case, as it is for Ryle, that a sufficient condition for ontologizing immaterial substance (the 'substance' matters not. The idea is that there should be an individual which is not a material substance, or in the Rylean jargon, that there should be a legitimate use of a thing concept which pertains to something that is not publicly observable.) is that there should be covert, unobservable thoughts, and further, that there simply are no such things as immaterial substances, how are silent soliloquy, for example, and

\[34\text{CM, p. 26.}\]
concepts pertaining to silent soliloquy to be construed? Unless he adopts the absurd Watsonian view that unexpressed thoughts are really visceral or laryngeal movements, Ryle must be embarrassed. To his credit, Ryle is embarrassed. To his discredit, he tends to ignore the problem by construing thought concepts as event-disposition concepts. When Jones thinks of his dead grandmother, he has a tear in his eye, etc., and is disposed to such behavior as answering, "my dead grandmother," when asked, "What are you thinking of?" etc. But his actual behavior is compatible with many other thoughts, say, of his dead grandfather, or of the lost souls in hell; only the behavior to which he is disposed differs. Hence, the latter aspect of "event-disposition" tends to be emphasized at the expense of the former. There seems to me, however, to be an actual difference between my thinking about a harmonica and my thinking about a calendar. Again, I do not know how to convince one who disagrees that such is the case. Nor do I believe that Ryle, even with the mongrel-categorical, has a means of reflecting this difference. Instead, he gives a behavioristic account of "aboutness." Given the early thought-proposition blur, the account naturally shifts to linguistic "aboutness."

It does, unfortunately, need some argument to show that there are lots of significant (affirmative and negative) indicative sentences which have functions other than that of reporting facts. There
still survives the preposterous assumption that every true or false statement either asserts or denies that a mentioned object or set of objects possesses a specified attribute.\textsuperscript{35}

We have seen in the first two sections above at least four reasons why, structurally, the author of the early articles should hold such a view. First, there was the cauchemar over facts. How can any, much less every, sentence report a fact, when there are no facts to be reported? Second, sometimes I believe falsely. The analysis of my false belief that \( X \) is \( Y \) is that the presentative in terms of which I believe—"\( X \) is \( Y \)"—fails to report a fact. Third, following from his radical substance ontology is Ryle's nominalism. How can any, much less every, sentence assert or deny that an object possesses a specified attribute, when there are no attributes? Of this I shall have something more to say shortly. Fourth, on the issue of significance or meaning, we saw Ryle holding first that sensu strictu only true statements are significant, then that false statements are meaningful because of their "connection" (I use a vague term on purpose) with hypothetical facts, then that some statements are meaningful because they report facts, though not the facts they pretend to report, and finally, in those hard cases of fiction, that some statements are meaningful though about nothing. The CM account of significance will be seen to

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 120.
be a behavioristic conglomerate of all these views. To these four reasons we can now add a fifth, viz. that dispositional statements, though about individuals, do not report the states of affairs of those individuals; they are like laws in that they are used as inference tickets. The statement 'Jones knows French,' says nothing about Jones' possessing an attribute; it merely allows inferences from certain circumstances in which Jones might find himself, like being spoken to in French, to certain kinds of behavior by Jones, like responding in French. Now there is a use of the term 'to know' for which the above sort of analysis seems to ring true, viz. that with which, by definition, the behaviorist psychologist is concerned. As such, it is of only passing interest to the ontologist. But there is another use, of more central interest here, according to which the term denotes generically every species of awareness. Thus, by remembering, by imagining, or, in the early Rylean terminology, by "merely thinking of" the Boule' Miche', Jones can be said to know the Boule' Miche'. To say that Jones knows, even in this sense, is for Ryle not to report any state of affairs of or about Jones, but to state what Jones would do if . . . , with the unacceptable consequence that there need not be any occurrent difference between Jones' remembering the Boule' Miche' and Jones' remembering the
Gare St. Lazare, or between Jones' remembering the Boule\' Miche\' and Jones' imaginging the Boule\' Miche\'. A clever substance ontologist might try to reflect these differences by construing knowing as an actualized potential in virtue of which the substance is determined with regard to other potentialities of a certain kind, as, say, a branding iron of room temperature has the potentiality to have a temperature of 900 degrees when placed in a fire, which potentiality, if actualized, gives the iron the potentiality of turning grey when placed in water. As the state of a substance in a given circumstance is mediated by the built-in potentialities which are its nature, so the state of a substance (answering "the five rivers of the Punjab are . . . ." or remembering the Boule\' Miche\') in a given circumstance (when asked "What are the five rivers of the Punjab?," or when presented with a certain photograph) could be mediated by the actualization of a potentiality (to know the five rivers of the Punjab, or to remember the Boule\' Miche\'). Thus, the substance ontology could be bought without having to abandon the actual differences between remembering and imagining, or between rememberings of different things. (This move is attractive also as a beginning of an analysis of the act, which Ryle, far from analyzing, is led to deny.) Such a move, however, is not open to Ryle for two reasons, one, deep-lying and implicit;
the other, explicit but shallow. **First.** Throughout his career, Ryle sees the realism-nominalism issue as the controversy over whether there are Platonic, i.e. separated, universals. Given such a view, it is not difficult to predict the nominalism to which Ryle is foredoomed, nor the arguments by means of which he thinks it to be established. Addis\(^{36}\) has illuminated a number of arguments from Ryle's early papers, especially "Plato's Parmenides," which, stemming from his extreme realist's view of the universals issue, commit him to the position that in a radical sense, there are no properties, occurrent or otherwise. This result is astounding, for not only is Ryle thereby cut off from the aid of our clever substance ontologist, but even his own behavioristic account is jeopardized. **Second.** The introduction of unobservable occurrences commits one, Ryle thinks, to the two-worlds legend. The fledgling mental acts of the clever substance ontologist are, except in the case of one's own if there were such things, unobservable, hence must be rejected. Again and again in CM, Ryle in criticism of the dualists poses for them this dilemma in one form or another: if occult mental occurrences are the explanation of intelligent behavior, how, when we are presented only with the latter, could we ever infer the existence of the former? But we

\(^{36}\)Loc. cit., p. 64 ff.
do recognize intelligent behavior, etc. From where I stand, "How do we know . . . ?" questions either are meat for the psychologist, hence here irrelevant, or are posed by the skeptic, hence absurd. That is why I called this second reason shallow.

Not surprisingly, we come 'round again to the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent behavior, which distinction Ryle must be hard put to ground. Yet, even rejecting dualism, he thinks it can be done.

It must be noticed from the start that certain human actions and reactions exhibit qualities of character and intellect; it is, by an unfortunate linguistic fashion, quite another thing to say that there occur mental acts or mental processes. The latter expression traditionally belongs to the two-worlds story, the story that some things exist or occur "in the physical world," while other things exist and occur not in that but in another, metaphysical place. Rejection of this story is perfectly compatible with retaining the familiar distinction between, say, babbling and talking sense, or between twitching and signaling.37

But now a pair of overt actions, such as babbling and talking sense, or twitching and signaling, can be photographically and gramophonically identical. Yet the one action is said to be done carefully, intelligently, "mindingly," while the other is said to be done carelessly, mechanically, "mindlessly." For the dualist the difference lies in an occult mental occurrence which attaches to the

37CM, p. 135.
one but not the other. Ryle, of course, must find another account. Consider:

(H) John is playing a harmonica, and thinking about it.

According to Ryle, John is not doing two things, playing and thinking about what he is playing, but one thing, as the adverbial form suggests, viz. playing carefully. (H) is a semi-hypothetical, or mongrel categorical—"to say that someone has done something, paying some heed to what he was doing, is not only to say that he was, e.g. ready for any of a variety of associated tasks and tests which might have cropped up but perhaps did not; it is also to say that he was ready for the task with which he actually coped."38 That Jones was ready for the task of playing the harmonica is made a fait accompli by his doing it. Whether or not he is ready for a variety of associated tasks and tests which might but do not crop up seems to me to be a question every bit as undecidable as whether or not there is a mental act which attaches to his action. Furthermore, suppose that Jones' concentration on his playing be so intense, that when interrupted he immediately forgets what he is playing and cannot even name the piece, much less give its key, hum the next line, or appropriately respond to any test Ryle might devise for him. Again, there seems to be an occurrent or actual difference between careful and

38 Ibid., p. 141.
careless performances which might be gramophonically identical. My interest in the mongrel-categorical, however, lies somewhat deeper. Consider:

(A) This bird is migrating.

Like (H) above, (A) is a mongrel-categorical in that it tells not two stories but more pregnantly the one story that it is flying south. Perhaps you will think that we have come quite afield of the problems of intentionality. We haven't. Consider:

(I) When Jones says 'the book is red,' he means that the book is red.

(H), (A), and (I) are all mongrel-categoricals. How does (I) differ from (H) and (A)? Ryle is silent. But (I) and (H) differ from (A) in that they get at intelligent behavior. Given the assumption that questions of "aboutness" are raised only in the context of explanation of intelligent behavior, then structurally, if Ryle can ground the difference between (H) and (I), and (A), he need not bother with any difference between (H) and (I). Yet even this he fails to do.

For Ryle, a sufficient, though not a necessary condition for an action's being intelligent is that it should be "connected with" other actions in the sense that the performance of the one involves the "thought" of the latter. The customer-behavior, for example, of one person involves the "thought" of the seller-behavior of
another person, and cross-examination-behavior involves the "thought" of evidence-giving-behavior. These actions, the description of which involves the oblique mention of other actions, Ryle calls 'higher order actions.' Since being higher-ordered is not necessary to intelligent behavior—in fact, higher-ordered behavior presupposes lower-ordered, but intelligent behavior—the notion is not particularly helpful as a differentia. However, it is interesting for two other reasons.

There are many kinds of dealings which are concerned with subsequent, or even merely possible, or probable, action. When I bribe you to vote for me, your voting has not yet taken place and may never take place. A reference to your vote enters into the description of my bribe, but the reference must be of the pattern "that you shall vote for me," and not of the pattern "because you did vote. . . ."39

The dealings of which Ryle speaks are higher order actions. Their containing reference to what may not exist is the criterion for intentional uses of statements according to that version of the Brentano thesis which Chisholm was seen to formulate and defend. For Brentano, such reference is the differentia in the radical distinction between merely physical, and psychological phenomena. However, even if Ryle were to realize the added significance of higher order actions, he cannot help viewing the import Chisholm attaches to the physical-psychological distinction as an invitation to the absurdities of the two-worlds legend.

39Ibid., p. 191.
Secondly, Ryle's talk about higher order actions resurrects a whole nest of issues raised but inadequately answered in the early articles: How is reference to what is only possible, does not exist, etc., possible?

We said above that the performance of a higher order action involves the "thought" of some other action. I use double quotes around the term 'thought' here because the term is Ryle's, not mine. As such, the term should rub. Somewhat later in CM we get the news that "the phrase 'involves the thought of' does not connote the collateral occurrence of another, cognitive act."40 'Thought of' here connotes merely the oblique mention of another action in the description of a higher order action. An example he gives of a higher order action is my pretending to growl like a bear. In order to describe my action, mention must be made of how bears as a matter of fact do growl. Ryle seems to be content to differentiate at least this kind of intelligent behavior by differentiating the means by which we describe it. The importance which he allots to the description is symptomatic of his general practice of shifting to purely linguistic considerations the full burden of ontological considerations. As an ontologist, he ought to be interested in those features of the world which are the ground for such descriptions as those of

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40 Ibid., p. 263.
higher order actions. One might ask, for example, what it is about me in virtue of which my action is said to be a pretending to growl like a bear. In light of the difficulties over occurrent qualities, the question is yet more poignant if, because I'm not sure how bears growl, I must think about how they growl when I'm pretending to growl like a bear. Ryle gives us only false hope when he says that my pretending involves the thought of actual growling, for the thought of actual growling says nothing about me, but rather is about the description of my action. Instead, he talks about language, actual behavior, and the as-occult-as-any-mental-act possible behavior.

We began this chapter with a rather detailed analysis of Ryle's early treatment of the general problem of non-veridical awareness. Then we dealt with the problem under the vague description of "thinking falsely of X as Y." Now at the end, appropriately enough, we return to the general problem, this time concentrating on the specific problem of non-veridical perception, for it is here that Ryle's behaviorism as well as its inadequacy are most apparent.

One way of distinguishing between veridical and non-veridical perception is to ground the difference in the perceived object, the species of awareness remaining the same. Ryle, having abandoned the transivitity thesis,
is precluded from this gambit and is naturally led to ground the difference in the awareness itself. Hence we find in CM that while with our eyes open and the surroundings illuminated we can see calendars and harmonicas, when we have delirium tremens we only 'see' snakes. The view that the difference lies on the side of the awareness is supposedly reinforced by the evidence of ordinary language: "A person who says that he 'sees' the home of his childhood is often prepared to describe his vision as 'vivid,' 'faithful,' or 'lifelike,' adjectives which he would never apply to his sight of what is in front of his nose."\textsuperscript{41} The adjectives 'vivid,' 'faithful,' and 'lifelike' are construed adverbially, modifying 'sees.' (Later, in a chapter on Bergmann, we shall see that if one takes the gambit suggested at the beginning of this paragraph, such adjectives can be construed as modifying the object, indicating that the object, though existent, is unreal.) Furthermore, "when a person says that he 'sees' something which he is not seeing, he knows that what he is doing is something which is totally different in kind from seeing, just because the verb inside the inverted commas and the vision can be described as more or less vivid."\textsuperscript{42} First something must be said about the last part of this quote since it might invite confusion. The term 'vision,' like

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., p. 246.  
\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.
'perception' or 'sensation,' has at least the two meanings of (a) an awareness of a certain kind, and (b) the object of that awareness. If the term is taken in the second sense, then a vision cannot be described at all for Ryle, because there is no object—that is what it means to say that one is having a vision. When one describes a vision, then, what one is describing is an "awareness" that one is having. Secondly, one might well ask whether—as this quote seems to suggest—I can tell phenomenologically, as it were, that my experience is one of 'seeing' and not of seeing. Ryle answers, correctly I think, in the negative. Such inability to distinguish phenomenologically 'seeing' from seeing is the basis on which he criticizes Hume for relying on force and vivacity to distinguish impressions from ideas. Now comes an interesting question.

It will be asked, "How can a person seem to hear a tune running through his head, unless there is a tune to hear?" Part of the answer is easy, namely that he would not be seeming to hear, or fancying that he heard, a tune, if he were really hearing one, any more than the actor would be simulating murder, if he were really murdering someone. But why can't I, in 'hearing' a tune running through my head, be actually hearing an existent though non-real tune, or when 'seeing' snakes in delirium tremens, actually see non-real snakes? Does this commit one to the absurd view that if an actor simulates murder, there must be an

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 251}\.]
existent, though unreal, someone there whom he murders? Not at all, for in the former two cases I seem (to myself) to be having an experience which I need not have in the last case, namely, of having an object presented to me, or perhaps more precisely, the object of cognition is in the first two cases an unreal tune or the unreal snake; in the second, the action itself of simulating murder. Such an *occurrent* difference, however, would be available only to me--given only my 'murder'-behavior, you could not tell whether I was acting or having the appropriate, though non-veridical, sensuous components of the experience of murdering someone--and, therefore, would be for Ryle, more than irrelevant, "invalid," for there are no such private deliverances. My 'seeing' snakes, 'having' a tune in my head, simulating a murder, and hallucinating a murder, then, are all, aside from the differences of my present and future behavior, of the same sort: either every one or none of them has an object.

Due to his stand on the issue of private deliverances, Ryle is faced structurally with either the absurd view that when I simulate a murder, there is someone there being murdered, or the denial of an object in every case of non-veridical experience. He opts for the latter, of course, and without hesitation. This option is encouraged by the evidence of ordinary language. Suppose that transported to the smithy
I frequented as a youth, I can 'smell' a singed hoof. "How should we describe this 'smelling' in the mind's nose? Ordinary language provides us with no means of saying that I am smelling a 'likeness' of a singed hoof."\footnote{Ibid., p. 252.}

The other part of the Rylean answer is not so straightforward, and must be reconstructed. Consider the following argument, which though not Ryle's is one to which he is structurally committed. (1) If imagining (or hallucinating, or whatever) is an act, then it must have an object (a mental picture, an unreal tune, an imagined smell, etc.). (2) If there are such objects, then they must be located somewhere. (3) Since they cannot be in the physical world (else, they would be real), they must be in phenomenal space, or, if you will, in the mind. (4) But "the mind" is not even a thing concept, much less a place concept. Hence, there are no imaginings. If this result is counter-commonsensical, the mongrel-categorical is summoned to the rescue. While there are no imaginings, there is nonetheless imaginative behavior ('imaginative' here does not, of course, mean 'clever' or 'novel,' but describes the kind of behavior which is the overt counterpart to the dualist's mental act of imagining). Yet, there seems to be a difference between acting as if there were a snake before me, and imagining, i.e. picturing, a snake
before me, between a sailor's moving his fingers as if he had a piece of cord with which to demonstrate how a certain knot is tied, and visualizing Helvellyn—an occurrent difference about which much has been made above, and which I shall not tire of emphasizing. What difference does Ryle see?

This difference between the two varieties of make-believe is, however, nothing but a consequence of the difference between perceiving something and bringing something about. This difference is not a difference between bringing something about privily and bringing about something overtly, for perceiving is not bringing anything about. It is getting something or, sometimes, keeping something; but it is not effecting anything. Seeing and hearing are neither witnesses nor unwitnessed doings, for they are not doings. It makes no sense to say "I saw you seeing the sunset," or "I failed to watch myself hearing the music." And if it makes no sense to speak of my witnessing, or failing to witness, a piece of hearing or seeing, a fortiori it makes no sense to speak of my witnessing, or failing to witness, a piece of fancied hearing or fancied seeing. No hearing or seeing is taking place. 45

Five comments and I shall be done. First. The slight ordinary language argument aside, Ryle is compelled to deny that even seeings (vs. 'seeings') are acts. Given the analysis by the mongrel categorical, if there are no acts in the non-veridical cases of perception, then there are none in the veridical cases. Second. 'Way back we saw Ryle make the actus-action distinction. By now it must be long forgotten. If a perceiving is not a bringing about

or an effecting of something, then it just is not. Third. What is it that perceiving gets or keeps? I confess that I am not sure. I only suggest that it is a behavioral state in a given environmental circumstance. At any rate, perceiving is not an action, and certainly not an actus, which is directed to an object. Fourth. Perceiving, like seeing, is a "success verb." If I am truly said to be perceiving, then I am perceiving truly. When I first alluded to the "success verb" above, I raised the question, what is it about any awareness that guarantees the independent existence of its accusative? Now the question no longer makes sense, but is superseded by the question, what is it about any perceiving-situation that guarantees its veracity? The answer, I suggest, is in terms of the substance ontology. Suppose that it is the nature of our Jones to have his potentiality for perceiving a calendar actualized only when, among other things, there is a calendar before him to be perceived. Again according to his nature, when he has been taking psychedelic drugs and he is stimulated in a certain way, his potentiality for hallucinating a calendar is actualized. Due to the circumstances under which they are effecting, the former case is termed veridical, the latter non-veridical. However, what is effecting does not at all differ, for what is actualized in both cases is a potentiality to overt behavior, and in
both cases Jones behaves as if there were a calendar before him. Again that presented, occurrent difference surfaces, and the notion of success verbs must founder on it. This comment also makes clear why I was disturbed by Ryle's employment of the Wilsonian sense of 'to know.'

Fifth. If I had to summarize the final Rylean position on the most general problem of intentionality, how thoughts can be about objects, I should respond as follows. There are no thoughts, but only bits of actual and possible behavior; there are no objects, but only environmental circumstances which determine behavior; "aboutness" is a matter of behaving appropriately to the environmental circumstances; and the appropriateness is determined by the ordinary language description of the behavioral-environmental situation.
We saw in the last chapter the really ingenious ontological move by which the early Ryle tried to account for aboutness. Merely by accounting for the intentional feature of language, specifically vis-a-vis the transmogrified problem of non-veridical awareness, the intentional feature of consciousness would ipso facto be accounted for. As Ryle himself came to realize, the program was doomed to failure. Nevertheless, he never gave up the original insight into the intimate connection between linguistic and cognitive aboutness; but, driven by the theretofore insoluble problem of non-veridical awareness, Ryle was led to deny linguistic aboutness, first in certain cases of fiction, then gradually for all language. The concomitant drive in the cognitive sphere was, of course, toward the behaviorism of CM. The tack of my criticism of these moves has been to try to preserve the insight into the connection between the intentionality of thought and language without being led up the daisy path to behaviorism as a solution to the problems of intentionality. I would indeed agree with Ryle that to account for linguistic aboutness is to account for cognitive aboutness, not
because consciousness is somehow dependent upon language or some other symbolic apparatus, but only in the sense that the ontological account of the former is entailed by that of the latter. The present chapter can be read as an elaborate defense and explication of this thesis, viz. that the intentionality of consciousness is primitive and that of language derivative; or rather, it is a partial defense of this thesis and an explication of and attack on, at length and in detail, a view which might not too inaccurately be summarized as the thesis that the intentionality of language is primitive and that of consciousness derivative.

There took place in 1956 an important correspondence between Chisholm and Sellars on intentionality. That correspondence is of import here for four reasons. First, of Chisholm's remarkably incisive and insightful analytical powers we have already seen ample evidence. Here those powers are brought to bear not so much in defense of his own views on intentionality as in criticism of those of Sellars', such as they were at the time. Second, the views under discussion were expressed in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,"¹ a work as difficult as it is important. In the correspondence we have an account of

his treatment in that work of the main themes of intentionality in as popular and readily comprehensible style as will ever be Sellars' wont to give, and while these characteristics are certainly neither sufficient nor necessary to a noteworthy philosophical piece, indeed if demanded can sometimes be prohibitive conditions, nonetheless such an account will provide an excellent introduction to Sellars. Third, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (hereafter: EPM), and hence the correspondence, has been the launching pad as well as the touchstone for all of what Sellars has had to say on intentionality since 1956. Sellars' more elaborate later theses are a remarkably consistent development of themes first sounded in EPM. Fourth, the exchange focuses on the issue of the primacy of linguistic vs. what we have called cognitive intentionality, Chisholm arguing for the latter, Sellars for the former.

The Chisholm-Sellars Correspondence

Chisholm begins by posing the question: "(1) Can we explicate the intentional character of believing and of other psychological attitudes by reference to certain features of language; or (2) must we explicate the intentional characteristics of language by reference to believing and to other psychological attitudes?" Sellars opts for

\[2\text{Ibid., Vol. II, p. 521.}\]
(2) and believes that this option depends on there being a specifiable metalanguage for talking about a model for intentionality in general without appealing to psychological attitudes, or as he puts it, to mental acts. The model for the intentionality both of mental acts and of language is, as we shall see, language itself. Suffice it for now to say that "Sellars' claim is that the categories of intentionality are nothing more nor less than the metalinguistic categories in terms of which we talk epistemically about overt speech as they appear in the framework of thoughts construed on the model of overt speech."\(^3\) Specifically, he claims that

\begin{align*}
(A) & \text{ ".. ." means } p \\
(B) & \text{ ".. ." expresses } t \text{ (a thought) and } t \text{ is about } p
\end{align*}

but rather that the converse is true. Moreover, the schema (A), which Sellars calls the translation rubric, does not express a descriptive relation, but rather a unique mode of discourse which is as distinct from descriptive as from prescriptive discourse.

We saw in the second chapter above that against the Ayerean analysis of belief, Chisholm raises the objection of principle that the specification of the reference of any language involves intentional uses of

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 522.
language or at least a use of language which is not involved in the description of physical phenomena. Here Chisholm naturally enough argues that the specification of the metalanguage, in spite of the disclaimer that the translation rubric is a unique mode of discourse, involves reference to thoughts, though perhaps disguised as a "primitive term of semantics," which is at any rate a concept not needed in physics or behavioristics. Chisholm finds Sellars' characterization of the "means" relation as a non-descriptive unique mode of discourse quite irrelevant to the issue of deciding between (1) and (2); one would think that Chisholm would construe Sellars' appeal as vindication of his, i.e. Chisholm's, acceptance of (1); for remember that his affirmative thesis was the disjunctive claim that in describing psychological phenomena either intentional language or some language not needed to describe physical phenomena. Sellars' translation rubric presumably would not be needed in descriptions of physical phenomena; but even this claim we shall see is not so unproblematic as it might seem. In any case, what Chisholm thinks does matter to the issue of deciding between (1) and (2) is where what he calls the "funny characteristic," i.e. meaning, belongs: to certain living things, or to certain marks or noises? Thus asked commonsensically, one must agree with Chisholm that while both
thoughts and language have meaning, the meaning of the latter is somehow dependent on or derivative from that of the former. Agreement here, however, does not settle the ontological issue, which I take to be the following. Do the same ontological categories which ground claims about language qua meaningful also ground claims about thoughts qua meaningful such that the former claims can be grounded without explicit reference to the latter claims, or do the same ontological categories which ground claims about thoughts qua meaningful also ground claims about language qua meaningful such that the former claims here can be grounded without explicit reference to the latter claims? Or, to ask the same question differently, is the grounding of the intentionality of language logically prior or posterior to the grounding of the intentionality of thoughts? Asked this way, Sellars would opt for the latter course. His reasons for this option are very surprising.

Notice first, however, that Sellars' option does not commit him to a rejection of the claim that linguistic meaning is dependent on cognitive meaning; language, he admits, is meaningful because it expresses thoughts. Nevertheless, he thinks, it is possible that there be a people meaningfully using a language without (a) their knowing that their language is meaningful because expressing thoughts, or (b) their knowing that they have
thoughts. (This people of course appreciates the syntactical norms of the language as well as how the language is to be applied.) I suggest that Sellars now takes the questions I have asked above to be synonymous with the following question: Can this people, without realizing the role of thoughts in meaningful language, come to use semantical discourse, specifically the translation rubric? To give an affirmative answer to this question, thinks Sellars, is to say that (A) ("..." means p) is not to be analyzed as (B) ("..." expresses t (a thought) and t is about p), or as I have put it above, that the intentionality of language is prior to that of thoughts. Furthermore, the affirmative answer, he thinks, is part of his rejection of the "myth of the given" (about which, much more below); suffice it for now to say as a rough approximation of Sellars' quite sophisticated view that in order to know non-inferentially (i.e. without inferring from meaningful language) that one has a thought, one must (in an increasingly problematic sense of 'must') first construct the concept of what it is to be a thought, and that in order to construct this concept, one must first have the conceptual apparatus of the translation rubric.

Chisholm quite rightly realizes that the issue between Sellars and him of the analysis of (A) vs. (B) depends in large part on the notions of "explication"
and "analysis" itself. This is the way he puts it 4:

consider

(1) the meaning of thoughts is to be analyzed in terms of the meaning of language and not conversely,

(2) language is meaningful because it is the expression of thoughts--of thoughts which are about something, and

(3) without realizing the role of thoughts, a language-user can come to use semantical discourse.

Chisholm takes (1) and (2) to be inconsistent, yet both to be affirmed by Sellars; (1) to be false and (3) to be true, but Sellars as claiming (3) implies (1). A good part of the purpose of this chapter is to show in what sense Sellars' stand on these two questions is correct, or at least could be correct, and to investigate the significance of his stand in view of the problems of intentionality. To accomplish this two-part goal, we shall first have to explore in some detail Sellars' account of the meaningfulness of language, including that part of the account which is a critique of what might be called the classical account, as well as his own positive account. This exploration will be attempted in following second section, the eminence grise of which is the myth of the given. In the third section we shall see how it is, according to Sellars,  

4Ibid., p. 529.
that (a) people could have come to speak a language at all when cognitive intentionality is to be analyzed in terms of linguistic intentionality, and (b) granting the priority of linguistic intentionality, that what Sellars calls the framework of mental acts should ever be employed. The fourth and last section focuses the conclusions of earlier sections on the problems of intentionality; it also adumbrates a main theme of our last chapter.

Before moving on, one last point made in the correspondence needs to be made here. Chisholm points out that there is a perfectly straightforward sense in which the sentence

\[(D) \ "\text{"Hund" means dog in German.}\]

is true. However, he asks, can it properly be described as non-descriptive? Sellars replies that (D) is of course true, but that other, non-descriptive sentences such as "Jones ought to do X" are also true or false. At any rate, (D) is peculiar in that it does not simply assert what is asserted by the sentence

\[(d) \ "\text{"Hund" plays in German the same role that 'dog' plays in English.}\]

for one cannot understand an expression of (D) unless he knows what is expressed by (d), whereas one could understand an expression of (d), without knowing what is expressed by (D), i.e. in the latter case he might simply
not have learned the meaning of 'dog.' Questions which will have to be settled along the way are, (a) Why it is that only the meaning of (d) is considered as a candidate for the meaning of (D), (b) what the connection between (D) and (d) in fact is, and (c) what the relevance is of sentences of the form (d) to the translation rubric and hence to Sellars' understanding of intentionality.

The Myth of Our Rylean Ancestors

In the article called "Is There a Synthetic A Priori?," Sellars argues that the view that it is by means of semantical rules that linguistic expressions acquire extra-linguistic meaning involves a radical mistake. Consider the rule

(R-1) Red objects are to be designated by the term 'red.'

Sellars suggests that this, like every other rule, is a rule for doing something in certain circumstances; but, in order to recognize the circumstances in which (R-1) has application, one must already have the concept of red, i.e. to correctly apply 'red,' one must already know (something to be) red. Hence the term 'red,' Sellars concludes, does

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not, and in fact cannot, acquire its extra-linguistic meaning by means of semantical rules.

As it stands, the argument embodies what I think is a confusion, to which I shall return shortly, and which as a placemarker I shall call, the "use-mention blur."

Meantime, consider a rule which demarcates all red objects, by enumeration if need be, and then stipulates that they are to be designated by the term 'red.' Perhaps the following would do.

(R-2) Any object satisfying any of the following spatio-temporal specifications is to be designated by the term 'red.'

Suppose now that blind-folded and having never seen a red thing before, Jones applies (R-2) correctly. Either Jones has the concept of red ipso facto, which is odd, since he has never seen an instance of red; or, Jones recognizes the circumstances for applying (R-2) without the concept of red.

To the above line of counter-argument, there are at least two natural replies. The first would have it that (R-2) fails to satisfy what presumably would be a requirement of all semantical rules, viz. of covering all possible designata. This requirement is satisfied by

(R-3) Any object of wave-length L is to be designated by the term 'red.'

The second reply would be that in any case, (R-2) and even (R-3) are of no practical use in the acquisition of
empirical concepts. To this reply I reply that presumably Sellars has tried to exhibit premises the truth of which entail the conclusion that linguistic expressions do not acquire extra-linguistic meaning by means of semantical rules and that I have exhibited semantical rules the application of which does not presuppose the concept in question. Whether and in what sense the concept in question is ever in question is an issue to be raised again below. Meanwhile another theme must be sounded.

Traditional empiricists, as the story goes, have often nested their epistemology in observation reports as the foundation of empirical knowledge. In EPM, Sellars argues that the "foundation of knowledge" is a misleading metaphor in that, while there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another dimension in which the latter rest on the former. Observation reports are said to be both non-inferential and authoritative (not self-authenticating); Sellars agrees that they are authoritative. Their authority is due to the fact that from the observation report "This is green," for instance, the existence of a green item appropriately related to the perceiver can be inferred. However, for this inference to be made, and it must be makeable by the reporter if his report is to be

6Loc. cit.
authoritative, the concepts of green, of uttering "This
is green," and of standard perceptual conditions are
required. According to Sellars, in short, the possibility
of observation reports is a function of inductive corre-
lations between what he calls signs or symptoms of states
of affairs and states of affairs.

But now make a crude distinction between "knowledge"
and its (linguistic) expression. Epistemic notions are
particularly exacerbating to the problems of intentionality,
but no harm will result if 'knowledge' and its cognates
are explicated in terms of the less powerful and hence
less problematic notion of an awareness. As for an
expression of knowledge, take it to be any true statement
which reports an awareness. Now what Sellars says about
observation reports is clearly true for expressions of
knowledge; indeed, it is true even for analytic statements,
for at base all that is asserted is a contingent connection
between a word and its referent. I take it, however, that
the more exciting claim Sellars wants to make is that the
knowledge expressed by observation reports rests on other
concepts and is impossible without them. I think that this
claim is false, for presented with an object of any color,
say green, under any circumstances, say a normal perceptual
environment, I can call it as I like, say 'green,' and
given that I employ the term 'green' consistently, I can
have a non-inferential item of knowledge as well as a non-inferential expression of knowledge at my disposal. Three comments are called for.

First. I said above that Sellars' argument against semantical rules as the endower of extra-linguistic meaning contained a confusion which I called the "use-mention blur." Reconsider the semantical rule

(R-1) Red objects are to be designated by the term 'red.'

The first occurrence of 'red' in (R-1) is a use of the term, the second a mention. In the trivial sense exhibited immediately above, the applicability of this rule is contingent upon a correlation between 'red' and red. But if one does not realize the first occurrence of 'red' already gets at red-in-the-world, one might be led to believe that the extra-linguistic meaning of 'red' is a function of the apparatus governing the acquisition of the concept of red rather than of rule which connects it to red-in-the-world. 'Red,' it should be pointed out, is the name of the designator, which may as well be 'green,' 'square' or 'plaid,' and not of the designatum which is in any case, red(-ness).

Sellars, of all people, should be alive to the use-mention distinction, especially in the translation rubric. And he is. He explicitly says that the translation rubric conveys information of a connection between a mentioned word and a used word. But, the used word is used "in a unique way"; it is 'exhibited." (Cf. EPM, p. 292.) I don't know what 'exhibited' can mean in the present context if not
Second. The question of how the empirical concept of red(-ness) is acquired is irrelevant to the question of how the linguistic expression which is used to refer to red(-ness) acquires that use. One could insist that the latter question is answered in terms of semantical rules, while yet admitting that 'red' would not mean red unless people had the conceptual abilities to distinguish red. On this schema, the meaning of a linguistic expression is what it used to refer to, not the concept of what it is used to refer to, and the specification of the concepts involved merely spells out the conditions under which an expression can acquire a referential use. That such conditions should have to be satisfied is a consequence of the truism that not words but people by means of words mean, i.e. refer.

Third. If extra-linguistic meaning is achieved through semantical rules, the translation rubric need not be characterized as a new and unique mode of discourse. Remember the difficulties involved in saying that what is asserted by

(D) "'Hund' means dog in German."

'mentioned.' What else but mention does one do when exhibiting a word? Certainly an extra-linguistic item is not being talked about. The more important point I wish to make, however, is that Sellers' arguments against the rule-semanticists rest at least in part on a structural collapse of the use-mention distinction.
is asserted by

(d) "'Hund' plays in German the same role that
'dog' plays in English."

It might be suggested that just as one cannot understand an expression of (D) unless he knows what is expressed by (d), whereas one could understand an expression of (d) without knowing what is expressed by (D), so one cannot on the semantical rule schema understand (D) unless he knows what is expressed by

(d-1) "Germans use 'Hund' to refer to what English speakers use 'dog' to refer to."

Whereas one could understand an expression of (d-1) without knowing what is expressed by (D). The parity breaks down, however, as soon as it is realized that (d-1) is elliptical for

(d-2) "Germans use 'Hund' to refer to dogs."

such that there is a material equivalence between understanding (D) and (d-2), between knowing (D) and (d-2). (d-1) is elliptical for (d-2) because semantical rules, once again, always assert a relation between a linguistic item and an extra-linguistic item. 8

8"Extra-linguistic" at least in the sense that what is being named is not itself an item in the language in which its name occurs, i.e. is used. No dog occurs in the language in which 'dog' occurs. "Dog" means 'dog,' nevertheless, is a legitimate semantical rule which asserts that the meaning, i.e. referent of the name "dog" is another name 'dog'; "dog" and 'dog,' however, cannot be used in the same language. The former presumably belongs to a language which is used to talk about the language to which the latter belongs.
distinction is clearly made, this should be an immediate and obvious consequence.) At any rate we can now turn to Sellars' own account of extra-linguistic meaning.

According to Sellars, it is not by means of semantical rules but by means of syntactical rules and syntactical rules alone that descriptive terms acquire meaning. He makes\(^9\) the rough distinction after Carnap between "P-rules" and "L-rules," but differs with Carnap in holding that "Material rules are as essential to meaning (and hence to language and thought) as formal rules, contributing the architectural detail of its structure within the flying buttresses of logical form."\(^{10}\) Let us now investigate this claim in some detail.

Consider the sentence:

\((S_1)\) "'und' (in German) means and."

Sellars claims, plausibly enough, that \((S_1)\) informs us that the rules for the use of 'und' in German are analogous to the rules for the use of 'and' in English. Now consider the sentence:

\((S_2)\) "'rot' (in German) means red."

At first blush it might appear that \((S_2)\) asserts an empirical connection between 'rot' as used by Germans and red objects. He suggests that a natural inference is that.

\(^9\)"Inference and Meaning," loc. cit.

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 317.
this connection is a learned response with 'rot' to red objects, but whatever the connection is reputed to be, including those sketched in paragraphs above,

the truth of the matter is that neither S1 nor S2 makes an empirical assertion, though both convey empirical information about Schmidt's use of language. The "means" of semantical statements (idealized as "designates" in the Pure Semantics of Carnap and Tarski) is no more a psychological word than is the "ought" of ethical statements or the "must" of modal statements, even though it is correctly used, and gains application through being used, to convey psychological information about the use of language. 11

The distinction between 'asserts,' and 'conveys' clearly is important here, and will become increasingly more important, so I shall pause on it.

Jones' early morning utterance, "The sky is clear," asserts something about the weather; it also conveys something about the state of Jones' mind. 12 This, Sellars' example of the difference between asserting and conveying something, is still not very helpful, for it still might be claimed that what is conveyed is either (a) what Beardsley has called the special meaning of metaphor or (b) some kind of emotive meaning which can be "evinced" or "expressed" by factual claims; that is, Jones' early morning utterance might convey something about the state of Jones' mind in the same sense in which Jones' utterance, "That miserable cur just stepped on my foot.," might

11 Ibid., p. 335. 12 Cf. Ibid., p. 333.
convey something about Jones' state of mind. Sellars explicitly rejects (b) in such fashion as would rule out not only (a) but also (c) what Carnap has generically called expressive meaning. Perhaps then what is conveyed is (d) what we above have said can only be shown, e.g., logical form; but I think that we must rule out (d) for what is conveyed can without futility be asserted. Other possibilities are (e) that conveyed information is what is causally presupposed by the truth of what is asserted, as the assertion that this water is boiling might convey the information that this water has been heated; and (f) that conveyed information is what is logically entailed by the truth of what is asserted, as the assertion that this is red might convey that this is colored. I should think that Sellars himself would find (f) a not quite accurate but at least congenial approximation of the meaning of his "conveys"; I am inclined to take (e) as the actual root notion, though the reasons for my inclination will become apparent only later.

We can be sure that what is not asserted is a semantical rule of the kind discussed above; and once we cease to be hypnotized by the form "'rot' means red" into taking for granted that the

13 Cf. correspondence, p. 531.
psychological fact (conceptual meaning) corresponding to \( S_1 \) is a dyadic relation between Schmidt's "rot" and red, and realize that since the fact in which we are interested is conveyed rather than asserted by \( S_1 \), so that the logical form of the latter is no guide to the form of the fact for which we are looking, we see that "rot" might well owe its conceptual meaning to Schmidt's using "rot" in accordance with rules analogous to our rules for "red."\(^{15}\)

In fact, Sellars commits himself to just this position, though, as indicated above, holding vs. Carnap that the rules to which the meaning of descriptive terms is owing include material as well as formal rules. If the line of argument suggested above is correct, he suggests,\(^{16}\) descriptive meaning is constituted entirely by the material transformation rules of the language.

"Where ' \( \psi a' \) is P-derivable from ' \( \phi a' \) (in modal language, \( \phi \) a necessitates \( \psi a \)), it is correct to say that ' \( \phi a \vdash \psi a \) ' is true by virtue of the meanings of ' \( \phi \) ' and ' \( \psi \) ', as it is to say this where ' \( \psi a' \) is L-derivable from ' \( \phi a' \)."\(^{17}\) Sellars' last statement of his position might appear very odd, especially to the radical empiricist who, as Sellars realizes,\(^{18}\) finds the whole notion of material transformation rules suspect for the reason that they would appear to warrant the a priori discovery of the laws of nature. That is, if Sellars is

\(^{15}\)"Inference and Meaning," p. 335.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 336.

\(^{17}\)Ibid.

\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 315.
correct, it would appear that synthetic necessities could be created by linguistic rules. As Sellars himself points out, however, 'ϕ a necessitates ψ a' would be true even if there were no language users, since tokenings of 'ϕ a necessitates ψ a' do not assert but convey the existence of the relevant linguistic rule. Three comments will conclude this section.

**First.** I will cheerfully concede as many meanings of 'meaning' as the next philosopher. I will even grant that there is a sense of 'meaning' according to which the meaning of a (descriptive) term is what can be inferred from it, or more precisely, that the meaning of a descriptive term is determined by the syntactical rules which govern the statements which imply and are implied by the statements in which the term occurs. I might further grant that (A) if 'red' means, i.e. refers to, red, then it follows that 'red' is governed by both formal and material rules of inference. But I do not think that this is to say that "'red' means red" is not true in virtue of a semantical rule. To insist that it follows from (A) along with the fact that syntactical rules are required on independent grounds that syntactical rules alone constitute the descriptive meaning of a term would be an instance of an illicit use of the truthfunctional equivalence criterion.

19Ibid., p. 333.
under the guise of Ockham's razor. We have seen in the
first chapter the inherent dangers of this principle.

Second. On the view that it is by means of
semantical rules that descriptive terms acquire extra-
linguistic meaning there is no question of how language
comes to be applied to the world. Its application consists
in a relation between linguistic and extra-linguistic items,
without which relations the language is meaningless. Or,
if you want a slogan, its meaning is its application.
For Sellars, however, who sees the meaning of all descrip-
tive terms as constituted entirely by syntactical rules,
there is a problem of linguistic application. His answer
is that some descriptive predicates, "observation
predicates," are conditioned responses to a situation,
more generally to an object, of the kind it is correctly
said to mean. However, to say that a necessary condition
for hooking language up, as it were, with the world is
that there be such observation predicates is not to say
either that non-observation descriptive predicates are
definable in terms of observation predicates, or that the
correct analysis of "'φ' means k," where 'φ' is an
observation predicate and k an extra-linguistic situation,
is in terms of "'φ' is evoked by k," even though 'φ'
may be a conditioned response to k.

20 Cf., ibid., pp. 334-335.
Third. To know a language (L) is to know what others mean when they employ (L) and to be able to use (L) to let others know what one means, or, to be able to mean by means of (L). Perhaps you will object to this incredible simplification, insisting that over and above these (actually rather limited) functions, one must also be able to use (L) to suggest, recommend, praise, condemn, condone, etc. I can of course recognize the multifarious uses to which our natural languages are put and to which one would want to put any language designed to carry on our daily business. Nonetheless, for the point I wish to make, matters can be simplified yet further such that our attention is given only to that part of (L) which may be called "descriptive," and such that to know (any expression of) (L) is to know the meaning of (any expressions of) (L). The question I now wish to raise is, What is the logical basis for learning (L)? For the rule-semanticist one learns the meaning of the term 'red' by a conjunction with its referent; one literally is presented with its meaning. In the Sellarsian scheme, while 'red' might be a response to red, this response as we have seen is not to be construed as the meaning of 'red.' The meaning of 'red' is constituted entirely by the syntactical rules which govern its use. One would think that on this syntactical rule gambit, to learn (L) would be a simple matter of learning
the syntactical rules of (L). Certainly this would be
the case if I who know English wanted to learn Dutch; main
tools for my education would be such sentences as ". . . ." in Dutch means red.," which anyhow conveys the appropriate
information. But now suppose that speaking no language I
wish to learn English. For the rule-semanticist there is
still no problem; the second occurrence of the term to be
learned is a use, not a mention, of that term so that
instead of employing semantical rules as expressed by
sentences, he can token the word while presenting its
referent. The rule-syntactician, on the other hand, has
a problem, for he lacks a language in which to express the
rules which govern its use. Sellars' treatment of this
problem begins the next section.

Initially, at least, we can say that for Sellars
"language is a system of expressions, the use of which is
subject to certain rules."21 But, learning a language,
however, cannot be a matter of simply learning the rules
for the use of its expressions for the reason that the
rules of any language are sentences in a metalanguage, the
rules of which are sentences in a meta-metalanguage, the
rules of which . . . . etc. Sellars concludes that from the

21 "Some Reflections on Language Games," Philosophy
of Science, Vol. 21 (3 July 1954), pp. 204-228. Revised
version, Science, Perception and Reality (New York: The
thesis that learning to use a language is learning to obey its rules it follows that a vicious regress of hierarchic languages must be presupposed as learned. This is in effect a more formal way of stating the problem we just adumbrated.

Against this argument it might be suggested, first, that a distinction be made between "conforming to the rules" and "obeying the rules" such that one could play the language game, even without a language to formulate its rules. Granted that the expression of rules may be pragmatically indispensable, it can yet be denied that "playing a game logically involves obedience to the rules of the game, and hence the ability to use the language (play the language game) in which the rules are formulated."\(^{22}\) Sellars rejects this account for the reason that while it avoids the above criticism, its account of the language game itself is inadequate. In language as in any other game, one must make this move as a move in the game. Accidental conformity is not the same as playing. At this point we can ask only: why is it that if a conforming to and an obeying are, in Ryle's phrase, gramophonically and photographically identical, Sellars is in a position to distinguish them--given that his self-imposed task is to explain intelligent behavior? Or, put another way, how

\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 322.
can he claim that "Surely the rules of a game are not so 'externally related' to the game that it is logically possible to play the game without 'having the rules in mind!'" when a "having the rules in mind" or "thought" is a theoretical apparatus designed to explain such differences as that between conforming to and obeying rules? Or, how is this difference given? Of this, much more later.

A second suggestion is that a distinction be made between the rule qua meaning of a linguistic expression and the rule qua linguistic expression itself. On such an hypothesis, one could take account of rules before one is able, as he says, to give them a verbal clothing. On this account of rules, to learn a game could be "to become aware of a structure of demands (which may or may not have found expression in a language) and to become able to realize these demands and motivated to do so." To learn a language, then, is "to become aware of a set of demands concerning the manipulation of symbols, to acquire the ability to perform these manipulations, and to become motivated to do them as being demanded." This account

\[23^{\text{Ibid.}}, \text{p. 323.}\]

\[24^{\text{As an inaccurate but adequate-for-here approximation of the distinction, say that rules stand to rule-sentences as facts, or perhaps better, propositions stand to factual sentences.}}\]

\[25^{\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 323.}}\]

\[26^{\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 324.}}\]
won't suffice either, according to Sellars, for "becoming aware," while not a move in a language game, is nonetheless a position in the "game" of reasoning (as in indicated by the use of 'correct,' 'mistaken,' etc. in commenting on its "positions" such as the awareness of propositions, properties, relations, etc.). What must be noticed now is that the infinite regress has at least been relieved of its linguistic trappings and is now revealed to be at base an instance of Sellars' much larger concern with the account according to which linguistic items acquire extralinguistic significance by means of semantical rules. If I am right on the use-mention blur then this second suggestion for breaking the regress is unaffected by Sellars' objections.

According to Sellars, the merely conforming-obeying dichotomy is wrongheaded. Sellars himself suggests an account which permits us to say that learning to use a language is coming to do A in C, A' in C', etc., because of a system of "moves" to which these acts belong, while yet denying that learning to use a language is coming to do A in C, A' in C' etc., with the intention of realizing a system of moves. In short, what we need is a distinction between "pattern governed" and "rule obeying" behavior, the latter being a more complex phenomenon which involves, but is not to be identified with, the former.27

The "involvement" is of the following sort: pattern-governed

27Ibid., p. 327.
behavior is of the sort that would be specified by a metagame of rules if it were rule obeying behavior. The pattern-governed behavior is itself learned through S-R reinforcement (based on the model of the dance of the bees).

Notice first that there is no difference between "conforming-to-rule" behavior and "pattern-governed" behavior except in respect to an already constituted rule-governed behavior, i.e. at the time when there were both bees that danced and those that didn't (i.e. before natural selection took hold) the behavior of the former, vis-a-vis rules for behavior, was merely accidental. What I am suggesting is that even if Sellars has succeeded in his self-appointed task of showing how an individual can come to learn an already-constituted language without having to immediately obey its rules, yet he has not told us anything about the evolution of the language itself. Or is he to say that it, like the dance of the bees, has survival value?

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28 The bee returning from the clover field goes through certain movements because the movements are part of a complex dance, though the bee of course does not envisage the dance. The 'because' is to be understood causally in the following evolutionistic scheme:

(a) The pattern (dance) is first exemplified by particular bees in a way which is not appropriately described by saying that the successive acts by which the pattern is realized occur because of the pattern.
(b) Having a "wiring diagram" which expresses itself in this pattern has survival value.
(c) Through the mechanism of heredity and natural selection it comes about that all bees have this "wiring diagram." (Ibid., p. 326.)
value? Secondly, learning a language would seem to be not only a matter of learning to respond linguistically, but of learning to mean by responding linguistically (though the public criteria may be the same for both). And here we are at the heart of the matter. Meaning, at this stage of the "pattern-governed" behavior game, is not a matter of uttering 'a is F' when one observes that the situation is such that a is F (for the reason that "observing that the situation is thus and so already involves the use of a conceptual frame"29), but rather of so responding in such a situation because one has been conditioned (by S-R reinforcement) to so respond in such situations.

Remember that ultimately Sellars wants to say that language is meaningful because it expresses thoughts. The thrust of my discussion of Sellars' account of how language is acquired will be not only to exhibit the logical difficulties contained therein, but also to shed light on his account of the role of thoughts. At the present stage of our history, we have on our hands a language-user, let's call him Jones, whose linguistic behavior is in the logical limbo between accidental conformity to what would be rules of a language if there were such a language, and full-fledged obedience to the

29Ibid., p. 333.
rules. That he has progressed so is, as we have already seen, somewhat problematic; none-the-less if he has somehow achieved this level of behavior, in order to progress to rule-obeying behavior he must have thoughts, at least in that he recognizes rules as rules. Here his utterances are meaningful because expressions of his thoughts are in accordance with the rules of the language.

Now if what Sellars suggests is essentially sound, a most remarkable character has been met in our history of language-users. Jones has thoughts and speaks a language which is meaningful because it expresses those thoughts; but nowhere in the long account of how Jones learns that language is mention made of any fact that Jones knows that he thinks. Nor, if Sellars is right, as I think he is, need the account presuppose any such knowledge on Jones' part. The question to be pursued now is, how does Jones come to know that he thinks? The answer is the larger part of the Sellarsian account of intentionality.

Suppose that the language Jones speaks is the physicalistic language (L). The descriptive terms of (L) get at (I use a vague term to achieve whatever neutrality possible) public objects, specifically objects located in space and time, and their properties. Next supplement (L) with the distinction between observational and theoretical discourse. Sellars qualifies what he calls the classical

\[EPM\], p. 311 and ff.
account of Jones' theoretical discourse, according to which account the construction of a theory is an elaboration of a postulational system tentatively correlated with observational discourse, by insisting, first, that as a matter of fact theories are usually constructed by finding a model, rather than an uninterpreted calculus, which model is both entirely familiar and has certain positive analogies with the phenomena to be explained, and second, that theoretical explanations are of a piece with the explanations of commonsense and are not limited to the sophisticated model of the classical account. Finally, let Jones assume the thesis of methodological behaviorism.

Sellars makes the distinction, quite rightly but I don't think clearly enough, between what he variously calls logical or analytical or philosophical or metaphysical behaviorism, and scientific or methodological behaviorism. The former is the thesis that commonsense psychological concepts, expressed by "mentalistic discourse," are analyzable into concepts pertaining to overt behavior. The latter thesis, according to Sellars, need make no commitment with regard to such an analysis, but requires only that "properly introduced behavioristic concepts must be built . . . from a basic vocabulary pertaining to overt behavior,"31 which requirement should be understood

31Ibid., p. 315.
as being compatible "with the idea that some behavioristic concepts are to be introduced as theoretical concepts."\(^{32}\)

Two points need to be made. Notice, first, that the thesis of methodological behaviorism appears to be, according to Sellars, true by definition. The appearance is as it should be, for methodological behaviorism is more properly termed a program, rather than a thesis, such that its evaluation is really in terms of success or failure. This point leads to the second, which concerns behavioristic analysis. Isn't the method of the scientific behaviorist to propose rules for the translation of mentalistic statements into truthfunctionally equivalent statements which mention nothing mental, but rather particularly though not only, overt behavior? From what has passed above, we can see that this program is fairly well doomed to failure, one reason among others being that there are some phenomenological differences expressed by mentalistic discourse for which the behaviorist with his limited vocabulary cannot account. This failure, however, does not mean that the psychologist is forced to abandon his more general procedure (or perhaps, goal) of incorporating non-mentalistic counterparts to mentalistic discourse into causal laws employing the apparatus of S-R reinforcement. Most psychologists have in fact abandoned

\(^{32}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 316.}\)
the molar concepts of behaviorism in favor of the concepts of physiology. If the thesis of psychophysiological parallelism be true (pace Sellars), then this program will at least in principle allow of success. The point I wish to make is that there is a sense in which the psychologist—whether we still call him a behaviorist, I don't care, any more than I wish to cavil with Sellars over mere terminology; what matters is the basis for the terminological distinction—in fact does try to analyze mentalistic discourse. Thus engaged, the psychologist is immune to whatever might be said by the philosopher, and his success or failure is a matter to be decided in the laboratory. On the other hand, the metaphysical behaviorist is to be understood from where I stand as claiming that the commonsense claims expressed by mentalistic discourse are ontologically grounded by the same categories which ground commonsense claims about behavior, or if he is au courant in psychology, by the same categories which ground certain commonsense physiological claims. Sellars is a metaphysical behaviorist in the extended sense in which I have explicated 'metaphysical behaviorism.' I think that metaphysical behaviorism is mistaken; but I shall not argue that it is mistaken due to the nature of the issue. Instead I will now try to show that Sellars in fact is a metaphysical behaviorist, and that his metaphysical
behaviorism is given only specious support by the one success of scientific behaviorism, i.e., that while the success envisioned by Sellars for the physiologist might be a necessary condition for the success of metaphysical behaviorism, it is far from the sufficient condition Sellars apparently takes it to be.

We can now return to our Jones who has meanwhile been left in the lurch with the physicalistic language (L) enriched by the distinction between observational and theoretical discourse and the thesis of methodological behaviorism. The Jonesean saga is now at its most critical point, so I cite Sellars directly.

Suppose, now, that in the attempt to account for the fact that his fellow men behave intelligently not only when their conduct is threaded on a string of overt verbal episodes—that is to say, as we would put it, when they "think out loud"—but also when no detectable verbal output is present, Jones develops a theory according to which overt utterances are but the culmination of a process which begins with certain inner episodes. And let us suppose that the model for these episodes which initiate the events which culminate in overt verbal behavior is that of overt behavior itself. In other words, using the language of the model, the theory is to the effect that overt verbal behavior is the culmination of a process which begins with "inner speech."33

I now add four pairs of comments. The first member of each pair is my reconstruction of Sellars' comments on the Jonesean saga; the second member of each pair is my comment, consisting of expansion and criticism, on Sellars' comments and hence on the saga.

33Ibid., pp. 317-318.
1. The inner episodes postulated by the Jonesean theory are thoughts. Though they are not introduced as such, it is quite possible that at a different methodological stage, they could be construed as physiological entities.

1a. Almost ten years after the publication of EPM, Sellars undertakes in "The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem" to show that Feigl's thesis that raw feels universals are identical with brain state universals is either true but trivial, or exciting but false. The following three remarks block out what we must know of that thesis: (a) raw feels are impressions and images pertaining to the external senses, as well as sensations and feelings; (b) "... a universal is 'discovered' or comes to be 'known' in the course of coming to know what use a predicate would have to have in order to stand for or express it. The universal is effectively taken account of by our language if our language contains a predicative expression which actually has this use"; (c) two universals are identical if the predicates which stand for them have the same use, or if one is a definitional abbreviation of the other. The thesis is exciting but false, according to Sellars, if raw feels universals are taken to be


\[35\] Ibid., p. 432.
identical with microphysical universals to be discovered in brain theory, for two reasons. First, the brain state universals would be theoretical entities such that the predicates which would stand for them would not have the reporting use that the predicates which stand for raw feels universals have. (Sellars does not place too much weight in this objection as he responds that we could be trained to respond to brain states with the predicates of the theory. To Sellars' response I respond, (a) that we could be so trained seems to presuppose the success of the very theory in question; and (b) there seems to be a difference between merely responding and directly observing, or if you will, between a reporting role and reporting— but of this, more later.) The second objection, which is as he says, the heart of the matter, is that a predicate which is defined in terms of neurophysiological primitives cannot have the same use as a predicate which is not so defined. Abandoning the "giveness" of raw feels universals (how this is achieved is spelled out in detail in comments below), however, a reduction of raw feels universals analogous to the reduction of the predicates of current chemical theory to microphysical primitives in an envisioned unified physical theory can be effected, Sellars thinks, if the raw feels universals are primitive, not defined, universals in the unified theory. They would be physical
(belonging to a spatio-temporal nomological framework of scientific explanation) but not physical$_2$ (just adequate to the description of non-living matter, as Feigl apparently would have it). The condition expressed in italics is necessary, according to Sellars, because raw feels universals are theoretical constructs to explain, not white rat discriminative behavior, but perceptual propositional attitudes. The question I wish to raise now is: given that conceptual episodes are (originally) theoretical constructs introduced to explain intelligent (non-verbal) behavior, and that raw feels universals are theoretical constructs introduced to explain conceptual episodes, what is the genesis of the distinction between behavior that can be explained by merely physical$_2$ universals and that explained only by conceptual episodes, i.e., given the abandonment of the giveness of both raw feels universals and conceptual episodes, whence the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent behavior which precludes the possibility of both (a) the reduction by definition of raw feels universals to micro-physiological primitives, and (b) a comprehensive physiological theory which does not employ the theoretically constructed conceptual episodes? The question of course is a question in form only; its real significance will be clearer after the next two pairs of comments.
2. Lest the crudest sort of materialism result, a sharp distinction is to be drawn and maintained between Jones' theoretical construction and the model for that construction, i.e. thoughts qua "inner speech," are in no way to be construed as the wagging of a hidden tongue. From this distinction, however, it does not follow that the individual to which thoughts attach need be different from the individual to which verbal behavior attaches, i.e. dualism need not result.

2a. According to Sellars, the Feigian identity thesis is either exciting but false, or true but trivial. The former disjunct we have already investigated, and have found it to be exciting indeed. The latter is no less so. We ordinarily think of a person, says Sellars, as a nervous system, plus flesh and bones; the "core person" as just the nervous system.

In this sense most scientifically oriented philosophers think of raw feels and thoughts as brain states. But while the thesis that raw feel universals are, in this sense, brain state universals is almost undoubtedly true, it is relatively non-controversial and unexciting. (He compares it to the trivial move from 'shapes are properties of physical objects' to 'shapes are identical with certain properties of physical objects.') Given this conception of persons, it is not difficult to see why dualism is not a result of the model-modeled

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36Ibid., p. 441. 37Ibid., p. 442.
distinction in the Jonesean theory. In fact, Sellars has ruled out dualism on grounds of commonsense, one of whose claims, apparently, is that a person is at most a physical body. From where I stand, the dualism-monism issue hangs on the question as to whether the same categories which ground claims about minds also ground claims about bodies, or on the converse question, depending on the brand of monism (idealism, materialism). That dualism should be ruled out by Sellars on commonsense grounds is not surprising because for him such issues as the dualism-monism issue are to be understood as factual questions, not as I would have it, a question of categorizing putative facts. The question as to whether the category of mind is different from that of body is, for Sellars, the question whether science, specifically physiology, requires such a category. There is no distinction to be drawn between scientific and ontological accounts:

What is it to describe? In my opinion, the key to the answer is the realization that describing is internally related to explaining, in that sense of "explanation" which comes to full flower in scientific explanation—in short, causal explanation. A descriptive term is one which, in its basic use, properly replaces one of the variables in the dialogue schema.

What brought it about that x is φ?

The fact that y is ψ.

where what is requested is a causal explanation.\(^{38}\)

One could agree withSellars were he not to think that it is the philosopher's office, except in cases of semantical and hence derivatively, also of mentalistic discourse, to describe. There is, in short, no distinction between ontology, which asks, what is?, and science, which asks, what is?, or, science is his ontology. "In the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not." Here we have arrived at my deepest lying and most fundamental disagreement with Sellars, viz. over what might be called scientism. Disagreements at this level, which involve one's very conception of the philosophical enterprise, of course cannot be settled directly. Instead one exhibits the fruits of philosophizing under a given conception in defense of that conception. Thus, this whole work is in partial argument for that view of philosophy outlined in the first chapter. I here crystallize its disagreement with Sellars' because this disagreement illuminates others which occur at levels such that they can be argued about directly.

3. Since Jones has constructed thoughts on the model of overt speech, the semantical categories which apply to the latter can now be applied to the former, such

39 EPM, p. 303.
that now thoughts can be said to mean or to be about. None-the-less, the primary use of semantical categories is the characterization of overt speech such that it cannot be said that the intentionality of speech is to be analyzed in terms of the intentionality of thoughts.

3a. We have come 'round at last to the issue with which we introduced this chapter, viz. whether

(A) ". . ." means p

is to be analyzed as

(B) ". . ." expressed t (a thought) and t is p or conversely. It should be clear by now why it is that Sellars insists that (B) is to be analyzed as (A) and not conversely. It should also be clear that the analysis on which he insists is really of a peculiar sort. The analysis is a causal account: the translation rubric expressed by (A) is a necessary condition for the truth of a claim expressed by (B); or more precisely, a necessary condition for wielding the conceptual apparatus of (B) is the conceptual apparatus of (A). As Sellars himself puts it in the Correspondence, "that X is to be analyzed in terms of Y entails that it would be incorrect to say of anyone that he had the concept of X but lacked the concept of Y. (The converse does not seem to hold.)" Now Sellars might be quite correct in holding that it does not.

40 Loc. cit., p. 534.
follow from someone's lacking the concept of a statement expressing the thought that-\( p \) that he also lacks the concept of a statement meaning that-\( p \). The question, as well as the context in which it is discussed, however, seems to me to be a matter for the psychologist. To take the psychological analysis of (A) vs. (B) as an answer to the ontological question involved is a symptom of Sellars' general scientism. Once again I shall not argue that the move is a mistake; instead I shall point an odd consequence of Sellars' view and then add two short remarks. It follows from Sellars' view on (A) vs. (B) that one cannot have the concept of a statement expressing the thought that-\( p \) without the concept of a statement meaning that-\( p \). That is to say, according to Sellars, unless one had a language, or more precisely, unless one had the concept of a language, which was about the world, one could not have the concept of a thought, which is about or of the world, even though one might be having thoughts all the while.

Prima facie, the most remarkable result of Sellars view is that there cannot be a thought which is not of or about something, for the reason that the model on which thoughts are conceived has as its essential feature directionality toward an object. The price for this dialectical coup is the oddity that the concept of a thought is a concept only by analogy with the concept of the translation rubric,
even though the translation rubric expresses a thought. Some of the oddness is removed when it is remembered that the one we are talking about is not any of us, to whom there is imparted from a very early age a conceptual framework which is already equipped to deal with thoughts, but rather the Jones of our anthropological history, who represents many men who over a long period of time gradually acquired that framework. However: (i) it should be clear enough by now why I was at such length in the second section above to drive a wedge in Sellars' arguments against the rule semanticist. It should also be clear that the nature of the wedge is not to invalidate these arguments, but as it were, to redirect them; in fact, the two views expressed in that section are compatible to the extent that the one is construed as an anthropologico-psychological account of what is ontologically grounded by the other. (ii) Sellars tells us at the end of EPM that the Jonesean saga is a myth designed to kill a myth; but of course for him more than a myth it represents a more plausible bit of anthropological reconstruction, an important condition for which, as we have had occasion to note several times, is the distinction between intelligent and unintelligent behavior. The myth he would like to send to its grave is, of course, the myth of the given. I shall now try to show that the intelligent/non-intelligent behavior distinction must die with it.
4. The denouement of the Jonesean saga has it that such theoretical sentences as "Jones is thinking that-p' (or, 'Jones has the thought "that-p"') which are warranted by certain behavioral evidence can be replaced by Jones with such further theoretical sentences as 'I am thinking that-p' (or, 'I have the thought "that-p."'), which are warranted by the same behavioral evidence. Through S-R reinforcement Jones can be trained to respond with sentences of the second sort without having to check his own behavior. "Our ancestors begin to speak of the privileged access each of us has to his own thoughts. What began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role." 41

4a. Let us re-mobilize the thesis of psychophysical parallelism and let us suppose for the sake of an example that Jones is trained to respond with 'I think that this desk before me is rectangular.' Jones' mental state can be described as \( \Psi \) (thinking-that-this desk . . .); his physiological state can be described as \( \Phi \) (the brain state which occurs only when mental state \( \Psi \) occurs). Now let us ask the question, to what is Jones trained to respond? Or, the question which raises the same point, with what is Jones trained to respond? A clue is provided by the questions themselves, because strictly speaking,

41 EPM, p. 320.
Jones is not trained at all. Jones, remember, is a certain ancestral conglomerate for whom there are no trainers. Instead, it should be said that the reporting role evolves out of a theoretical use of language, an evolutionary advance which like the advance from rule-conforming behavior to pattern-governed behavior might be understood on the model of the dance of the bees. This suggests that Jones is responding to a causal apparatus of a perhaps very sophisticated nature, whereas Smith when he thinks, if he can thus be said to be responding at all, is responding to an object of awareness, and that Jones is responding with a physiological change (of the sort that produces such noises or marks as 'I think that this desk before me is rectangular') whereas Smith responds with the thought that one can grant I think that the causal apparatus necessary for mental state evolved, and perhaps evolved as Sellars reconstructs it, over a long period of time, without denying the giveness of the mental state itself. The rejection of the myth of the given is, once again, the rejection of the view that there is an indubitable, incorrigible foundation for all of empirical knowledge. I too reject this myth, but only as the myth of Cartesian science. Sellars, on the other hand, rejects all immediacy and instead invokes a causal account.

Remember that the intelligent behavior with which we have round and aboutly been concerned since our treatment
of The Concept of Mind is of a very special sort, viz. of that sort which occurs if and only if an awareness occurs. Some activities properly described in ordinary language as intelligent can occur with or without awarenesses. (There are stories of a famous pianist of the last century who sometimes gave concerts in such a state of inebriation that he could not remember after the concert what pieces he had played. Here we have a man who was quite literally unaware of what he was doing, though what he was doing could be described as intelligent.) Now if it is the case, and this is the fly that I've been trying to bring to the surface of the ointment, that intelligent and non-intelligent behavior can be photographically and gramophonically identical in the sense that Smith, for example, cannot tell whether a succession of noises produced by Brown is the expression of an awareness on Brown's part or is just an accidental batting of the breeze, how then does the anthropological conglomerate called Jones ever come to make the intelligent/non-intelligent distinction such that states like state $\psi$ are needed to explain the former sort of behavior while states like state $\phi$ suffice for the latter? Even granting, as I do not, that states like state $\psi$ could turn out in the physiological theory of the future to be predicates of that theory, states like state $\psi$ would not be needed in that theory. While
the Jonesean saga can in a sense account for the reporting role of language, it cannot account for the reports language is used to make.

The Structured Act

In accounting for intentionality, a classical gambit has been to structure the mind, or the mental act, or at any rate that which is thought to carry, as it were, the awareness such that it conforms to that of which it is aware. Historically, there has been no way to effect this structure but by appeal to mental (intrinsically or extrinsically) properties. This, as we have seen briefly above in Chapter III, is most clearly the tack taken by the Scholastics, according to whom the mind, the object of which it is aware, as well as, we must now add, the senses all jointly exemplify, though somehow in different modes, the same form or universal. Sellars has a variation on this time-honored theme such that conceptual awareness and sensation are each structured by a property counterpart to the property(ies) of the object. We shall investigate Sellars' theory of counterpart properties since it focuses the conclusions of the last section more clearly on the problems of intentionality.

Sellars' notion of a counterpart property gets somewhat fully spelled out in "Being and Being Known."42

There his expressed purpose is to secure the "profound truth contained in the Thomistic thesis that the senses in their way and the intellect in its way are informed by the natures of external objects and events," by defending a view according to which an isomorphism obtains at both these levels, but which does not involve what he takes to be the main drawback of Thomism, the abstractive theory of concept formation.

He begins by siding with the Thomists against Descartes and his followers and the realists of the first part of this century over the issue of whether different mental acts differ intrinsically or only extrinsically by virtue of their different relata, i.e. objects. The alternative is "to hold that acts of the intellect differ intrinsically qua acts in a way which systematically corresponds to what they are about, i.e. their subject-matter." The Thomistic scheme has it that the intellect, the senses, and the object in the real order are all isomorphic in virtue of a nature or form by which they all are informed, the former two in the immaterial mode, the latter in the material mode. Natures informing in the immaterial mode are mental words.

While agreeing with the Thomists that "unless the sensation of a white triangular thing were in some way

\[43\text{Ibid., p. 41.}\] \[44\text{Ibid., p. 43.}\]
isomorphic with its external cause, knowledge of the physical world would be impossible," that the sensation is, of course, not itself white and triangular and that whiteness and triangularity are somehow involved in the sensation of a white and triangular thing (and not just as its object), Sellars nonetheless emphatically resists the Thomistic gambit of construing sensations as cognitive, at least in the sense of being intentional. Before considering Sellars' alternative proposal, I wish to dwell a moment on the Thomistic scheme which I take to be in its way already an invitation to scientism.

An even cursory perusal of the literature shows that the model which was used by the scholastics and which has persisted to the present Thomists, in explication of the intentional relation has been the causal relation. For a crude example of a sophisticated doctrine crudely put, consider a white, stabile billiard ball: it is in actu with regard to whiteness, i.e. is informed by the nature, whiteness; with regard to mobility, it is in passu, i.e. it is only potentially a mobile ball. Now consider another billiard ball which is moving; it is in actu with regard to the nature mobility. If the conditions were appropriate, e.g. if the balls should come into contact, the potentiality of the first would be--to use Thomas'
term—"reduced" to act in virtue of the second's being already in act in that respect. This in fact is the notion behind the dictum, "nothing is moved which is not moved by another," viz. that nothing is in act, i.e. is informed, in any way, except by something else which is already in act in that respect, such that Thomas' first proof could have been stated employing green objects instead of moving objects without being any the less manifestior for it.

The relevance of the above schema, it should be obvious, is that in accounting for aboutness the Thomist suggests that the intellect and the object of which it is aware jointly exemplify or are informed by, though in different modes, the same form. That is, the intellect and its object are in act in the same respect, though again in different modes. But nothing is in act except...

How the object is in act is relatively unproblematic. As an account of how the intellect is in act, however, there seem to be two structural possibilities, neither of which is very attractive. First, it could be that Jones' awareness of a green object is actualized in virtue of another of his awarenesses which is actual in that respect. This gambit is dismissed by the Thomist for the reasons, (a) that it must ultimately violate his tabula rasa view of the intellect, and (b) that since it helps to make expendable the object, this move opens the way for
the idealism he so vigorously eschews. The second alternative, and the one for which the Thomist inexorably must opt, is that the intellect is in act in virtue of the object's being in act so that the object, in the literal and most generic sense of the term, acts upon the intellect. It has been pointed out by Bergmann and others that the scholastic notion of a mental act became suspect in the post-Newtonian period and was ultimately rejected in favor of a causally closed universe, the idea being that the Newtonian scheme would not permit the mind to effect changes on physical things, which can be affected only by other physical things according to laws of nature. My suggestion is that a more plausible structural account of the post-Newtonian rejection of mental acts, though one not incompatible with Bergmann's suggestion, would be that mental acts qua effects of physical causes were thought to be inconsistent with the Newtonian scheme in which effects of physical things must be changes in other physical things. At any rate, in response to this dialectical tension one can buy Cartesian dualism, part of which bargain is the Hydra of the mind-body problem, or one can embrace materialism with the felicitous consequence that mental acts, far from being an embarrassment to the Newtonian scheme, are in fact the very sorts of things which are governed by physical laws. Sellars sees
no other alternatives; without espousing any form of crude behaviorism, he, of course, takes the latter course. But this last remark is at once a recount of a tale already told as well as an adumbration of the retelling of the role in terms of counterpart attributes, which tale was interrupted during a discussion of sensation.

Sellars' concept of a sensation of a white triangular thing is the concept of a state of the perceiving organism which

a) is of a kind which is normally brought about by white and triangular objects,

b) is of a kind which differs systematically from those states which are normally brought about by objects of other colors and shapes,

c) is a kind which is brought about in abnormal circumstances by objects of other colors and shapes, and hence contributes to the explanation of the fact that objects viewed in abnormal circumstances seem to be other than they are.46

We have thus far systematically avoided the thorny issue of the intentionality of sensations; the realization that at least some aspect of awareness must be construed as intentional has sufficed for our purposes. I venture to raise it now only because it helps us to understand by contrast Sellars' conception of the intentionality of thoughts.

46 Ibid.
Recall that "most remarkable result" of the Jonesean saga, viz. that there cannot be a thought which is not of or about something for the reason that the model on which thoughts are conceived has as its essential feature directionality toward an object. The model on which sensations are conceived, on the other hand, is clearly a causal model. Though he characterizes the isomorphism that obtains between sensations and "objects" of sensations as a picturing relation, that relation is explicated in terms of the logic of relations, an explication certainly suggestive of and perhaps compatible with the theory developed in great detail as a counter-thesis to Chisholm's thesis in the third section of Chapter II. The essential point here is that, like the map of the Eurasian railway system and the railway system itself, like the brain-states of the theory developed as a counter-thesis and the objects to which they are correlated, sensations as well as objects, i.e. causes, of sensation are for Sellars members of the "real," i.e. non-intentional order. Given the model on which they are conceived, sensations could not be otherwise.

The relata of the relation of signification, on the other hand, both belong to the "logical order, i.e. the order of intentionality."\textsuperscript{47} We have seen that there

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 50.
are two forms of this relation: mentalistic discourse expressed by such sentences as, 'the thought that-\(p\) is of (the fact) that-\(p\)' and the model on which such discourse is based, the translation rubric expressed by the sentence schema, "..." means \(p\)." If there is an isomorphism between any of the linguistic entities mentioned by the translation rubric and the object of awareness, it is in virtue of a shared logical form, not the counterpart property we are now investigating. The problem at hand is the isomorphism of thoughts.

From a more penetrating point of view, signification statements are of the form

\[
\text{The design '***' (in } L_1 \text{) plays the role played in } L_2 \text{--our language--by the design '...'}
\]

and refer to two designs as role players. Thus in the case of signification statements about intellectual acts, we would have

\[
\text{The kind of inner state which finds its overt expression in an utterance which signifies '...', plays a role in 'inner speech' which is analogous to that played by the design '...' in our language.}
\]

Thus, the 'relationship' of the logical to the real order is, in the last analysis, a matter of certain items in the real order playing roles.\(^48\)

That "most remarkable result" is remarkable indeed. When Jones is said to be aware of a tree, or, as one might say, when Jones is said to have an awareness of a tree, what is asserted is not that a relation (of some sort) obtains

\(^48\) Ibid., p. 57n.
between a mental state of Jones and some extra-mental object, both of which relata are ipso facto isomorphic (in some sense), but rather that his of-a-tree awareness stands to his other awarenesses as 'tree' stands to the rest of the English language. As one can move from certain linguistic expressions in which 'tree' occurs to certain others in virtue of the syntactical rules which govern the use of 'tree,' so presumably one can make analogous moves from of-a-tree awarenesses to certain others. That an of-a-tree awareness is of a tree, or as one might say, that an of-a-tree awareness intends a tree, is only in the derived sense that the order of role-playing linguistic items on which model the conceptual order is understood, has as members (observational) predicates which are straightforward responses to perceptual environments. The thought of a tree no more involves a tree than does the fact that 'tree' means tree. The importance of semantical rules is again underlined: even if one is willing to play the scientistic game in so far as the concept of a thought is a concept by analogy with the translation rubric, still the thought of a tree could be said to involve a tree directly, if you will, if the translation rubric is taken as a semantical rule, i.e., if the second occurrence of 'tree' in "'tree' means tree" is a use, not a mention of the term. Finally, the radical nature of the difference
between Jones' and Smith's responses we worried about above, is also underscored. Here, even if one concurs with Sellars' account of the translation rubric, one can still insist that whereas Smith uses language to make reports of his thoughts, Jones only satisfies the causal conditions for thoughts and has a language which could make reports of his thoughts. But again, who disagrees cannot be refuted, only persuaded.
CHAPTER V

BERGMANN: BY MEANS OF A MEANS

If one is taken by the Scholastic dictum, nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu, a natural gambit is to suggest that the intentional object is in the mind qualitatively, while insisting as a hedge against idealism that the particular which is the mind and the particular(s) which is(are) the body are different. Now of course one doesn't want to say that the mind is red when it perceives red; so the following courses present themselves. Either (1) the particulars in question are of a radically different sort, such that only the particular which is the body is red when it exemplifies redness while the particular which is the mind being what it is, might be said to know red when it exemplifies redness. This is an exceedingly interesting gambit, but one which involves the very complex dialectic of the one and the many and which therefore will not be pursued here. We can see immediately, however, that its success must depend ultimately on (a) there being a close enough parallel between the axioms of exemplification and the axioms of intentionality such that the categories which ground the one ground the
other as well, and obviously enough, (b) the suitability of natured particulars as individuators. Or, as another course (2) the modes of exemplification between the particular which is the mind and redness, and between the particular which is the body and redness, are different. This, as we have seen above, was Aquinas' view. When a physical object exemplifies, or as he would put it, is in act with regard to redness the mode of exemplification is such that the object is red; when the mind is in act with regard to redness, the mode of exemplification is such that it is only virtually red. When I, for one, hear talk of different modes of exemplification, only words reach my ears: I just do not know what different modes could be like, unless what is meant is (3) a melange of the first two courses, which has it that the virtual or real exemplification, if you will, is a function of the exemplifying particular, i.e. the particular which is the mind and the particular which is the body are such that the modes of exemplification to which they are susceptible are different. Indeed this is probably a better estimation of Aquinas' and the Scholastic tradition's view. It suggests a fourth alternative, which I shall introduce after two comments. Notice, first, that I have carefully born the stylistic burden of specifying in each case "particular which is the mind," "particular which is the body," instead of "mental
particular," "physical particular." The reason has been to leave open the question whether mental/non-mental is an intrinsic or extrinsic determination, i.e. whether the particulars are natured so as to be mental or non-mental. Secondly, contrasted to the particular which is the mind has been "particular(s) which is(are) the body." The reason for this has been that I wish to continue as far as possible to avoid worrying about the role of sensations; for 'body,' then, understand 'one's own body particularly the sensory apparatus,' or, 'the physical object which is the intentional object,' or as you wish. We may now state the fourth course, which is that a quality exemplified by the particular which is the mind, rather than this particular itself, is peculiarly mental and is that in virtue of which the mind can be said to intend an object. This, in fact, is a rough approximation of Bergmann's view.

Before turning to that view, however, we shall first investigate one of Bergmann's arguments against materialism for the twofold reason that it affords a remarkable exemple of his philosophical method as well as a structural introduction to his own dualistic position, and that the alternative to be proposed at the end of this chapter is essentially materialistic.
Materialism

During the period roughly 1950-1964, there seemed to be hardly a philosophical contribution from Bergmann which did not begin "First a few words must be said about my method . . .," or "The method is indispensable . . .," or "To recall a few features of the method . . .," so that apposite here will be a few words on the method. Bergmann's method is to construct the ideal language. The ideal language is a formalism that has two properties: (a) everything commonsensical that can be said at all can be said in the ideal language, and (b) by discoursing about the ideal language, we can solve all philosophical problems. For our purposes, Bergmann's ideal language, which of course is not a language to be spoken but a language schema, can be taken as the schema of Principia Mathematica plus certain classes of descriptive constants, and two additional syntactical categories, of which a great deal more later.

A second crucial aspect of the method is the distinction between commonsensical and philosophical uses of words. The latter simply are those that lead to paradox or absurdity. "There are no minds," "There are no physical objects," are absurd or paradoxical; hence, in order to be transcribed into the ideal language, they must be reconstructed.
Commonsense holds that there are minds and that there are bodies; yet some philosophers have in a sense denied that there are minds, others that there are bodies. We have investigated the sense of such denials, which apparently contravene commonsense, in terms of the ontological categories which ground commonsense. Bergmann construes such denials in terms of the undefined descriptive terms of the ideal language, which for him is the vehicle of ontological commitment, and the distinction between the philosophical and the commonsensical use of 'exists.'

The descriptive terms are the inventory of what there is or . . . could be. But in a sense we all agree on what there is or . . . could be. To interpret ontology as an attempt to construct, in some fashion, a catalogue of all descriptive terms does not, therefore, enable us to understand the disagreements among the classical ontologists. This suggests the following interpretation. When these philosophers asked themselves what existed, they really asked for the entities that were named by their undefined descriptive terms. For how, I wonder, could they otherwise be sane and differ.1

What is named, then, by the undefined descriptive terms of the ideal language is stipulated, as a term for the philosophical use of 'exists,' to exist. The commonsensical use, on the other hand, is stipulatively expressed by the expletive 'There is(are) . . . ,' which is to be

understood in terms of the Russellian definite description.

The gist of the matter, as I see it, is that these statements have no ontological significance. They are ordinary nonphilosophical statements of fact. In the nature of things they are often made before we know whether they are true or false; for this reason they are sometimes spoken of as existential hypotheses.2

Thus, on Bergmann's scheme, the materialist is he who (structurally) claims that the undefined descriptive terms of the ideal language refer to physical objects, or, depending on the outcome of the continuants issue—an issue which is not directly relevant here—a time slice of physical objects. The materialist does not, of course, deny the (commonsensical) claim that there are minds, but does deny that minds exist. The question of the adequacy of materialism is for Bergmann, then, the question whether the ideal language contains as undefined descriptive terms only terms that refer to (time slices of) physical objects, i.e. whether the language whose undefined descriptive terms are such that can (in principle) express all commonsensical claims. We turn now to my reconstruction and elaboration of Bergmann's argument that it cannot.

Suppose Jones to have a physiological disorder such that he sees as green what is in fact a yellow patch.

2 Ibid., p. 136.
before him. For many reasons, many philosophers have wanted to maintain that the object of Jones' awareness is a nonphysical, intermediary entity which is yellow. The early Bergmann is one such philosopher: what Jones sees is a green sense datum. And, "this is a quite commonsensical thing to say. People sometimes do see as green objects which they know or later learn are of a different color. This alone establishes sense data as more than philosophical moonshine." If it is a commonsensical claim, then if the schema the materialist proposes is the ideal language, it ought to be expressable by that schema. 'Green,' as an undefined descriptive term, must ex hypothesi refer to a physical quality, or, if you insist, to a quality exemplified only by physical objects, hence it cannot refer to the object of Jones' awareness. The materialist instead resorts to a defined predicate which when combined with the materialistic reconstruction of "Jones" is the reconstruction of 'Jones has a green sense datum.' (Presumably the defined predicate 'has-a-green-sense-datum' would be defined in terms of physiological primitives causally correlated with other states of affairs.) But now suppose that Jones himself wants to report that he Jones has a green sense datum. He makes the commonsense claim 'I have a green sense datum.' As a commonsensical

3 Ibid., p. 138.
claim, it too must be expressible by the schema the materialist proposes as the ideal language. Bergmann argues that it is not expressible by his schema and that his schema is therefore not the ideal language. First notice the sense in which the third-person claim about Jones, which the materialist expresses, and the first-person claim by Jones, which he cannot, are taken by Bergmann to be similar. "When I say once that I have a green sense datum and once that Jones does, I mean exactly the same thing, in the sense in which I mean the same thing when I say that two objects, with only one of which I happen to be acquainted, exemplify the same character." The italics, mine, give the clue. When I say 'I am having a green sense datum' I am acquainted with something with which I am not acquainted when I say 'Jones is having a green sense datum.' Now for the all but most recent Bergmann, a necessary condition for the introduction of undefined descriptive terms is that one be (have been) directly acquainted with their referents. I don't wish to become embroiled here in the myriad of exacerbating issues surrounding acquaintance; suffice it for now to say that the Principle of Acquaintance, the principle which embodies the above necessary condition, is the guarantee for Bergmann of the reference of a proposed ideal language,

\[4\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 142.}\]
whose properly introduced undefined descriptive terms ipso facto get at what "is."5 (Let us agree for the moment to surround with double quotes any instance of 'is,' as this last, which is commonsensical-philosophical indeterminate or indiscernible.) Now if when I say 'I am having a green sense datum' I am acquainted with something with which I am not acquainted when I say 'Jones is having a green sense datum,' then there should be in the ideal language transcription of the first claim an "existential" clause which is not in the ideal language transcription of the second. But, argues Bergmann, the transcriptions the materialist proposes differ only in that the first has in the subject place a reconstruction of 'I,' i.e. a reconstruction in terms of neurophysiological primitives that relate to my body, while the second has a reconstruction of Jones.

The gist of the argument is that there is a commonsensical claim about sense data, the sense of which is that they are sometimes known in such a way that it follows that they "are," which claim cannot be embodied by

5The Principle of Acquaintance stipulates "1) that a particular is to occur in a statement only if its referent is immediately apprehended—in perception, memory, or imagination—by the speaker; and 2) that an undefined predicate is to occur in a statement only if at least one exemplification of it is known to the speaker." "Remarks on Realism," Philosophy of Science, 13 (Oct., 1946), p. 264.
the schema the materialist proposes, and that materialism is therefore inadequate. Clearly, the sense of "are" in which it follows from being acquainted with them that sense data "are," is of the utmost importance to the argument. If it follows from the way in which sense data are (sometimes) known that there are sense data, then Bergmann's argument is really no argument at all, but in fact the claim that materialism is Commonsensically mistaken. Remember we said that when Jones is aware of a sense datum, the object of his awareness is a nonphysical entity. If a sufficient condition for there being such entities is that one be directly acquainted with them, and if there are X's is the sense of X's "are," and if finally we are sometimes directly acquainted with sense data, then materialism, which ex hypothesi is the claim that nothing but physical objects "are," is inadequate. We have seen above in the chapter dealing with Ryle how a philosopher in dialectically securing the ontological ground for one group of common sense claims might be led to deny (Commonsensically) another group. This is an entirely different story, however, from the positive assertion (to which Bergmann, on the hypothesis that 'X's "are," is to be understood as "there are X's," is structurally committed) that some philosophical theory which embodies nonphysical entities (i.e. sense data) must be correct (and that all
which do not must be inadequate). From where I stand, the latter story is very odd indeed: philosophers ought not be disputing about what there is, i.e., about matters of fact (commonsense and, perhaps, science), but rather about the grounding of what there is.

If, on the other hand, it follows from the way in which they are (sometimes) known that sense data exist, then the question has most patently been begged against the materialist. If sense data exist, then, in the way I would express it, the categories which ground claims about physical objects are not sufficient to ground all claims: there are some claims, specifically claims like "I now see as green what I know is red," for the grounding of which at least one other category is needed. Or, as Bergmann would have it, if sense data exist, then the undefined descriptive terms of the ideal language have, at least some of them, as referents nonphysical objects. Surely, then, it does not follow from the fact that "people sometimes do see as green objects which they know or later learn are of a different color," that sense data exist. Expressed in either way of the two ways, the consequent of the claim that sense data exist is precisely what the materialist denies.

Let us suppose for the sake of an argument that there is a way out of the above dilemma concerning the
sense in which it follows from direct acquaintance with them that sense data "are." How does the materialist attempt to transcribe those statements for which Bergmann would have us invoke sense-data? The general method is, as we have already seen, to propose a materialistic reconstruction of such statements as 'Jones has a green sense datum,' i.e. to give an ideal language transcription each (non-logical) term of which either is an undefined descriptive term which refers either to a particular which is a physical object or to a quality of a physical object, or is a predicate the reference of whose definiens are qualities of physical objects. At least at the present stage of our investigation, the materialist has no difficulty (in principle) in transcribing such statements as 'Jones sees a green object,' when 'sees' is taken to be a success verb, i.e. when there is a green object that Jones sees. Nor, even, does he suffer if burdened with the Principle of Acquaintance. The problem arises when 'sees' is taken to describe Jones' experience when he reports (truly) that he sees while there is no green object, and the problem will be recognized as an old friend, the problem of intentional non-veridical awareness. Seen in this light, Bergmann's argument can be given a different twist to read as follows. (A) Since seeing is a species of awareness and all awareness is of something, Jones when he
sees must see something. (B) What Jones sees is a green object. (C) The green object that Jones sees is not a physical object, for *ex hypothesi* Jones' seeing is a case of non-veridical awareness. (D) But according to materialism, all objects are physical objects; therefore, (E) materialism is inadequate. Thus, the problem of non-veridical awareness becomes a pivotal issue in any defense of materialism. An argument against phenomenalism, also taken from "Minds, Bodies and Acts," completes the structural prelude to the later dualism. To it we now turn.

Phenomenalism, reconstructed in terms of the method, is the view that the undefined descriptive terms of the ideal language refer either to sense data or to qualities of sense-data. Phenomenalism has at least the advantage over materialism that the existential clause involving sense data can be supplied in cases of non-veridical awareness; but, suggests Bergmann, the schema proposed by the phenomenalist "does not contain two different sentences to express what commonsense distinguishes by saying once 'This is green,' once 'I see (know) that this is green,' or, similarly, 'This is a tree' and 'I see (know that, doubt whether) this is a tree.'" To adequately reflect the difference between the claims, (A) this is green, and (B) I see that this is green, according

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to Bergmann, the phenomenalist's schema must be supplemented by (at least) one more undefined descriptive term whose referent is neither a sense datum nor a quality of a sense datum. The additional term, which reflects the difference between (A) and (B), refers to the generic awareness, called by Bergmann "knowing," whose species are hearing, seeing, imagining, etc. But to introduce into a proposed schema a term for knowing, is, as he says,

to introduce not only a new undefined term but also a new syntactical category. To see that, consider that its other undefined terms are all either particulars or predicates, nonrelational or relational. And a predicate combined with a sentence yields gibberish such as, in the nonrelational case, "Red (that) this is green." It does not, as in ordinary grammar, yield another sentence.\(^7\)

That is, since what is known is of the form 'F(x),' adding 'knowing' as a predicate entails changing the formation rules of PM such that for the ideal language 'K(Fx)' is well-formed. For Bergmann, while changing the formation rules such that the form 'K(Fx)' is accommodated as a transcription for '(it is) known that x is F' has the virtue of explicating what certain philosophers have meant by calling an awareness of something a complex fact, viz. a fact which contains (at least) one other fact as an ingredient, nonetheless this

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 150.
move is unattractive due to the "notorious perplexities" generated in the cases of memory and imagination. The perplexities to which Bergmann refers are, I take it, centered around the fact that in cases of memory, what is remembered, i.e. what is supposedly a constituent fact of the awareness, often is no longer a fact, and in cases of imagination, the supposed constituent fact is never a fact, at least as the term 'fact' is used commonsensically. The reason for the italicized qualification will become clearer later. Meanwhile, we can say that Bergmann, at least at the relatively early date of "Minds, Bodies, and Acts," thinks that "the only way out is to construe 'knowing' in L [i.e. in the supplemented phenomenalistic schema he proposes as the ideal language] as a nonrelational predicate and the name of what is known as a particular." This proposal was doomed to be rejected since, as particulars function for Bergmann as mere individuators: (a) no two people could have the same thought, and (b) given the bareness of particulars, there is no ground for the connection between the awareness and its object.

8Ibid., p. 151.
In a later article called "Intentionality," Bergmann joins camp with those who would construe an awareness as a complex fact. The sentence he proposes to transcribe is, (A) 'There is a) direct acquaintance with this being green.' The sentence (A) is a circumlocution designed to avoid the issue of the Self engendered by the sentence 'S is directly acquainted with this being green.' The species of awareness is limited to direct acquaintance, which Bergmann apparently takes to be the root notion for the reconstruction of any awareness, merely to simplify matters.

The following is first presented as a candidate for the transcription of (A)

\[(1) \, \text{aw (gr (a))}\]


For Bergmann every awareness is propositional in that the text, i.e. what refers to the content, of every awareness could be stated by a sentence. This is the unpacking of his formula, the content of every awareness is propositional. The notion supports and is supported by his recognition of the principle of exemplification—the principle, namely, that every quality is exemplified by at least one individual and each individual exemplifies at least one quality. This takes care of a thread left hanging in the third chapter. Here, since we have waived difficulties in the analysis of the intentional object, any difficulties in the notion of propositional awareness except as a solution to the problem of non-veridical awareness, can be ignored.
but is rejected for two reasons; first, the quality which is the species of awareness is exemplified by the particular which is the awareness, not by the fact of this being green, which is the object of the awareness, not the awareness. The second reason, which involves the long story of the historical downfall of the mental act, is not so simple. The transcription (1) is an invitation to construe awarenesses in the fashion of the classical act, i.e. as a relation, thus combining the physical and the mental in a way that generates the exacerbating difficulties of interactionism. The first reason is for our purposes compelling enough to reject (1) as the transcription of (A). Now consider

\[(2) \text{aw(b) } \cdot \text{'}gr(a)\text{'}(b),\]

which at once eludes the first objection above and reflects the kind of awareness which is mentioned in (A). On the other hand, the predicate symbolized between the corner quotes\(^{11}\) "is not, as a syntactically introduced undefined descriptive term ought to be, wholly innocent of its interpretation."\(^{12}\) That is, unlike the connection...

\(^{11}\)The entities to which the corner-quoted predicates refer Bergmann calls 'propositions.' The term, as Bergmann himself realizes, can be quite misleading, for 'proposition' has been used by the tradition to refer to the content of awarenesses. Yet he uses the term, it being "as good as any other." I should think that aside from the above possibility of confusion, the term is attractive in that it reminds us of the intimate connection between intentional meaning (of thoughts) and referential meaning (of sentences).

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 25.
between 'green,' or 'gr,' and green, which is contingent in the sense 'green' could as well refer to what 'red' now refers to, 'gr'(a) must refer to that quality of an awareness in virtue of which the awareness is of gr(a), whatever 'gr(a)' may refer to. The connection between 'gr(a)' and the interpretation given to 'gr(a)' Bergmann explicates in terms of a new syntactical category the relevant features of which are expressed by the following three points.

(a) I introduce into the ideal language the sentence 'gr(a)M gr(a)' as the transcription of what we sometimes mean when we say that the proposition (or sentence) this is green means that this is green. (b) I so extend the notion of a logical sign that 'M' becomes logical and not descriptive. (c) I so extend the notion of analyticity that 'gr(a)M gr(a)' and all similar sentences become analytic.13

The first point is essentially an explication of 'mean' in the truism that not sentences but people by means of sentences mean. The second point, which we have anticipated with one of our axioms of intentionality, becomes crucial to the discussion of the problem of non-veridical awareness, to which problem we shall be turning shortly. The third point builds into the formation rules of the schema proposed by Bergmann as the ideal language two additional (to PM) primitive signs, one logical, one descriptive, such that what is surrounded by the corner-quotes is to be treated as a non-relational first-order

predicate, and sentences of the form, ' \( \forall f(x) \forall M f(x), \)'
are well-formed, and redefines the notion of analyticity such that sentences of this form are added to the class of statements which by \( \text{PM} \) are analytic. The extended definition of analyticity is the ground for the oddness inherent in saying that an of-a-tree awareness could be of a chair; in this regard Bergmann reminds us of a claim that we have already discussed: that to be an awareness of a certain kind and to have a certain content is one thing and not two. That is, since the specification of the content of object of an awareness is the specification of the kind of awareness, that an of-a-tree awareness should have as its object a chair is a contradiction.

One final remark needs to be made concerning Bergmann's explication. It might seem that given the introduction of the new syntactical category the following

\[ (3) \text{aw}(b) \cdot \text{gr}(a) (b) \cdot \left[ \text{gr}(a)^\forall \right] \forall M \text{gr}(a) \]

would be a more suitable transcription of (A) than would (2). Bergmann thinks, however, that since the third conjunct of (3) is analytic, and (2) and (3) therefore have the same logical meaning, i.e. are logically equivalent, the difference between (2) and (3) makes no difference. I shall insist on (3) as Bergmann's transcription of (A) for two reasons. First, (3) more perspicuously exhibits Bergmann's ontological machinery,
specifically the corner bracked predicate and the syntactical features of M. Second, if the sole criterion of transcriptional adequacy be truthfunctional equivalence, then the transcriptions, or what amounts to the same thing, the ontological ground, for the claim (i) Jones believes that today is Tuesday, and that it is raining or it is not raining, and for the claim (ii) Jones believes that today is Tuesday, could be the same. That they cannot be the same is dramatically shown by the fact that (i) could be false while (ii) is true.

We have already seen at least one reason why the intentional relation cannot be a descriptive relation. To it Bergmann adds two others. First, every descriptive relation, he thinks, is "causally effective." Whether this sheet of paper is on my desk or on a hot stove (causally) affects the sheet of paper. "If an act is a descriptive relation between a mental and, say, a physical thing, then the fate of physical things should at least sometimes be directly affected by their being the intentions of acts. That clashes with the thesis of psychophysiological parallelism."14 I find little weight in this argument. Either all relations, including the intentional relation,

are causally effective: certainly it makes a difference
to duck A if it rather than duck B is perceived by Jones
who gets an irresistible urge to kill a duck; or, no
relation, including the intentional relation, is (causally)
effective: the most significant advance of this century
in the logic of relations has been to construe not on the
stove or on the desk as the relation, but rather on
simpliciter so that properly speaking, not relations but,
if anything, relata are (causally) effective. Second, no
descriptive relation, suggests Bergmann, expresses the
"intimate and close" connection between an act and its
intentional object. The "closeness" of the intentional
relation he takes to be a "stark fact" of phenomenology.
As such it should be as apparent to me as the difference
between this pen and its color; yet I find no such
closeness. But, as a fact, phenomenological or otherwise,
"the closeness" is ontologically unproblematic: what is
problematic is its ground. Discussing this "closeness"
he says concerning the descriptive relation to the left of:
"The chair to the left does not 'inexist' in the one to the
right, or conversely, as its intention does in the act.
The descriptively relational nexus is thus not strong
enough."\(^{15}\) If all that is meant is that what grounds
claims involving descriptive relations does not also

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 26.
ground claims involving awarenesses, no one should disagree. The pen is on the paper, but the pen is not aware of or about the paper.

I turn now to the reason which I find most compelling and which we anticipated long ago with an axiom.

For a (binary) relation to be exemplified, its terms must both exist. There are no centaurs. Yet I now think of one. If the intentional nexus is descriptively relational, what in this case corresponds to the existing chair which I perceive? There is no need to bring in centaurs. I mention them merely because, like Meinong's golden mountains, they are spectacular. Ordinary perceptual error will do; so will false beliefs. 16

Now suppose that Jones thinks that this (painted patch) is red; suppose that this is not red, but some other color. The text of Jones' awareness is 'this is red,' so that schematically we have at least the following:

\[ T(b) \land \text{"this is red"}^{(b)} \]

But what of the third conjunct which I promised to reproduce each time? One would expect to find \[ \text{"this is red"}^M \text{this is red}, \] but I hesitate to include it since the fact that this is red, which would attach by means of the M-operator to the propositional character referred to by \[ \text{"this is red"}^7, \] simply does not obtain. On this score Bergmann wants to say at least four things. First, the sentence 'this is red' as, if transcribed into the ideal language,

16 Ibid., p. 25.
in accord with the Principle of Acquaintance. We are acquainted with this, and have been acquainted at least in memory presumably with at least one exemplification of redness, such that at least the undefined descriptive terms of the transcription are guaranteed reference. But what of the expression taken as a whole? Second, the sentence 'this is red' refers to a fact. Third, this fact does not obtain. Fourth, even in this case of non-veridical awareness, the character this is red is exemplified by Jones' awareness. The second and third points raise once again the problem of intentional non-veridical awareness; the fourth illuminates it: to what is the propositional character attached? The key for Bergmann is the analyticity of sentences of the form, $^P M P$. What Jones' awareness is about is exactly what the second disjunct of 'this is not red or this is red' is about, viz. a possible fact. The key to an understanding of a "possible fact" is his article called "Meaning."¹⁷ There Bergmann distinguishes four uses of 'possible': (1) what is represented by synthetic statements not contradicting known laws of nature; (2) what is not the negation of a formal truth; (3) the world whose logic is three-valued; and (4) a mode of

existence, or ontological possibility. The last and crucial use distinguishes between, for example, "This is square and round," which is possible, and "This is square and or," which is not possible. The key is clearly the well-formedness of its ideal language transcriptions, and later he expresses it in precisely these terms. "To say that what a false sentence represents is an entity in the mode of possibility is merely another way of saying that its being well-formed has an ontological ground." Two comments will say what needs to be said. First. The question of recognizing possible facts as intentional objects for (at least some) non-veridical awarenesses is, we see, really the much larger question of recognizing a mode of existence for the world's form. Second. At the end of this work I shall make a proposal as to the ground for the intentional features of mind, which proposal will be seen as essentially materialistic. Let it be clear that the recognition of possible facts, if it be necessary, is not in violation of the materialistic thesis, which makes no claim about the modes of existence needed to ground commonsense.

We are finally in a position to characterize fully the means-operator. "The nexus between an act's intention and the proposition which is one of its ingredients is

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18"Realistic Postscript" to Logic and Reality, p. 324.
logical, analytic, and specific. ¹⁹ We have already noticed the first two features. The last feature indicates that the means operator is specific with respect to mind, i.e. that there is at least one logical feature in a world with minds, or more precisely, in a world with mental acts which is not found in a world without mental acts. Nor is it surprising that the M-operator should be in this sense specific. In a world otherwise like our own except that there are no mental acts, there are no features of intentionality.

A Proposal

If one is convinced, as I of course am not, that both materialism and phenomenalism are mistaken on grounds of commonsense alone, then, as for Bergmann, dualism is the only structural alternative. Mobilizing a number of themes that we have already investigated, we can construct the following dualistic account of the claim that Jones is aware of, say by perception, a red patch. First, there are (at least) three particulars; one which is the patch, one which is Jones' awareness, and one which is the brain-state to which Jones' awareness is correlated. I realize that the Bergmannian transcription of (the fact which is) the brain state, as well as of the color patch—depending on whether it is construed as phenomenal or physical—would

employ constants for many more than one particular, as well as operators; nonetheless, nothing of importance here will be lost and a lot of time will be saved if we continue to speak of just the three particulars. Second, there are (at least) four characters; the species of awareness (perceiving) and the propositional character ('this is a red patch'), both of which are exemplified by the particular which is the awareness, a character exemplified by the particular which is the brain state, and redness which is exemplified by the patch. Again, in the interests of simplicity we can waive niceties of detail and speak as though the brain state were characterized by one simple quality. Third, there are four ties; the tie of exemplification between each of the particulars and its character(s), which tie until now has been unmentioned and which once mentioned for the record can be ignored, the intentional tie between the propositional character and the intentional object, the fact that this (the patch) is red, and two causal ties of two different sorts, one—as straightforward as any causal tie can be—between the intentional object and the brain state; the other—the parallelistic link the psychologist attempts to establish—between the brain state on the one hand and the awareness, either qua exemplifying the proposition or qua exemplifying the proposition and the species, on the other.
As an initial move toward the construction of an alternative scheme, an attack on the propositional character would seem the most plausible. Consider the claim that Jones imagines a red spot vs. the claim that Jones perceives a red spot. At present we have no means of grounding the difference between the two claims other than the simple character which is the species of awareness. Let it stand for the moment. Now consider the claim that Jones imagines a red spot vs. the claim that Jones imagines a green spot. Here the species of awareness is the same, but the intentional object differs. But that is not all that differs; the propositional character which grounds the first claim is different from the propositional character which grounds the second claim. I wish to suggest that the proposition, which we already have seen to be a very peculiar sort of character, is an unnecessary extravagance, or anyhow that it is not as obviously necessary as the species of awareness. Remember Bergmann telling us that to be an awareness of a certain kind and to be an awareness with a certain content is one thing and not two. Why must the awareness differ in the sense that it has a different property when the content differs? Besides grounding such differences as differences in species, however, properties of awarenesses, as we know, serve another, at least historically very important,
function. How this function is to be filled by a means other than the propositional character is a problem we shall return to shortly. Meanwhile we have the constructional problem of providing a relatum for the means operator, having dispensed with the proposition. A likely candidate is the species of awareness. If the form 'imagining means this is red' is unsettling, remember that 'means' here is not the referential "means" of "'this is red' means this is red," but rather the intentional "means" upon which, for Bergmann, the referential "means" structurally depends. Also, the move of (intentionally) tying the species to the intentional object is merely a temporary port in a gathering storm.

We said also that there are three particulars involved in the account of the claim that Jones is aware of a red patch. My next proposal is to dispense with one of them such that the particular which exemplifies the quality in virtue of which it is said to be a brain state of a certain sort, and the particular which exemplifies the species are the same particular. Four comments are required.

First. The ideal language transcription of this proposal introduces the question of the self, which so far has been carefully avoided. To what does the individual constant refer? We can continue to avoid the question of
the self by suggesting that the answer to this question—
be it in terms of many (bare) particulars, qualities, and
existential, universal and means operators, or in terms
of a (natured) substance—is irrelevant to the problems
of intentionality; for the question is really the for us
unimportant one whether the species of awareness is a
first level or higher level predicate. I shall therefore
extend the notion of particular to cover not only the
complex construction, as was stipulated above, but also
any other entity that may be required to ground claims
about the self.

Second. It will be asked whether the elimination
of a particular constitutes any improvement, even with a
view to parsimony, since Ockham's razor, as I have
insisted on above, is applied not to entities but to
kinds of entities. My answer has two parts. First, even
for Bergmann, whose particulars are bare and mere indi-
viduals, there is an exhaustive division between mental
and non-mental particulars according to the kind of
qualities they exemplify. Although he insists that the
determination of mental or non-mental is merely extrinsic,
nonetheless he maintains that it is synthetically a
priori true that no particular exemplifies a mental and a
non-mental quality. For the sake of an argument I shall
take an affirmative stand on the synthetic a priori issue;
there is something intuitively acceptable in construing nothing is green and red all over at the same time, as a synthetic a priori claim. There is nothing intuitive, however, about the claim that a thing cannot exemplify a mental quality and a non-mental quality, unless that thing is an awareness. But that makes mental particulars close enough to being an ontological kind to be worth excising. The second part of my answer has to do with strategy. Shortly the species of awareness, or rather the category which grounds the difference made by the species of awareness, will be given a radical twist such that the particular which exemplifies the quality in virtue of which it is said to be a brain state of a certain sort, and the particular which exemplifies the species could not plausibly be different.

Third. We have said above that the monism, specifically materialism, vs. dualism issue is the issue whether the categories which ground claims about physical objects also ground claims about minds. If the issue were quite as simple as that, materialism would be foredoomed for the almost obvious reason that at least one category not needed for grounding claims about physical objects is needed to ground the intentional feature of minds. This, of course, is the ontological force of the Brentano thesis. On the other hand, for the ideal language philosopher the
issue is whether the undefined descriptive terms refer only to physical objects and their (first level) qualities. Thus construed, the issue is cut across by the present proposal which has it that the particular exemplifies both a mental property, the species, and a physical property, viz. that in virtue of which something is said to be a brain state of a certain sort. A sensitive area is thus exposed. What is a mental property?

Fourth. In a recent article, Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim have undertaken to provide a clear formulation of the Identity Theory—that theory, namely, according to which "phenomenal or conscious events . . . are physical occurrences in the body of the person to whom the phenomenal events belong." An "event" is defined as some logically contingent property being "instantiated" at specific time and "location." ("Location" merely specifies the individuator.) The crucial identification the Identity theorist must make is between the phenomenal and physical properties. The only evidence at all relevant, they suggest, is in favor of the identification—that evidence being a variant of our thesis of psycho-physiological parallelism. According to Brandt and Kim,


21Ibid., p. 515.
however, it does not follow from the truth of the Identity Theory that materialism is true; while it might be the case that all events are physical, it need not be the case that there are no mental events—some could be both. Some could be both. I confess that in reading this I could see only marks on paper, until I remembered how they defined 'phenomenal' and 'physical.'

We shall call an event "phenomenal" if and only if two conditions are satisfied. First, the property instantiated must be a phenomenal property, which is a property designated by a phenomenal predicate, where a "phenomenal predicate" is one which the person in whose experience the phenomenal event occurs might define for himself ostensively, to refer to the features of events of which he is directly aware. . . . Second, the instance of the property must be one of which exactly one person is directly aware. 22

"We so use the term 'physical property' that the non-logical terms of these [physical and biological] sciences stand for physical properties." 23 Remembering these definitions I decided that either no property could be both phenomenal and physical, or else that I have lost what little intuitive grasp I had on the meanings of 'phenomenal' and 'physical.' Yet, in an effort to explicate the notion of a property that grounds the species of awareness, I wish to maintain that there is (at least) one property that is phenomenal in that it is not available to scientific investigation.

22Ibid., pp. 518-519.  
23Ibid.
The way out of the difficulty is provided by the Carnapian notion, already discussed somewhat, that science deals only with structure statements, i.e. only with the formal properties of the relations of things. That very complex property which we have been calling "the property in virtue of which something is said to be a brain state of a certain sort" is really, in this view, analyzable into a complex of relations. Taking the cue, let us propose to collapse the means operator into the species of awareness, such that the species is itself the (ground for the) intentional relation. On this proposal, the differentia between the physical and the mental is extensionality; the intentional relation as a non-extensional relation is entirely subjective\(^{24}\) and hence outside the scope of science. We remember Bergmann’s ground for the intentional relation is specific, analytic, and logical. The proposed ground is also specific, i.e. it would not occur in a world otherwise like our own but without minds. That much, at least should be obvious. The question whether it is analytic is one I don’t understand. Structurally, Bergmann’s extension of the notion of analyticity is designed to guarantee that an of-a-tree awareness could not be of a chair, for example, i.e. it is logically impossible that the particular of an awareness the intentional object of which is a chair should

\(^{24}\text{i.e. in the Carnapian sense. Cf. Aufbau, p. 27.}\)
exemplify the character this is a table. The demand for this guarantee is like the demand for the guarantee that the windmill won't tilt back. The propositional character is an ontological category invoked specifically to answer the question, what is it in virtue of which an awareness is said to be of a chair? As such it establishes the deepest lying necessity, viz. ontological necessity, such that 'this is red' means this is blue, is no more "possible" than that there should be a Bergmannian bare particular which does not individuate, or for that matter, than what would be referred to by 'red and or.' Finally, the proposed intentional relation is logical in that it does not require real existents as relata; but it is also descriptive in that the difference between, say, imagining and perceiving is not, as Bergmann would have it, like that between red and blue, nor yet like that between and and or, but rather like that between under and to the left of. Thus we end by agreeing with Brentano that the intentional relation is "etwas 'relativliches.'" More important is our agreement with Brentano, or more precisely, more important is the proposed ground for our agreement with Brentano that intentionality is the essence of thought: we have suggested the structure of how a thought could not be otherwise than intentional.