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ASPECTS OF THE HERODOTEAN CONTEXT

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * * *

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1966

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This paper grew from one of much briefer compass on Herodotus' philosophy of history; prepared for a graduate seminar at the suggestion of the author but under the stimulation and inspiration of his dissertation adviser, Robert J. Lenardon. I can indirectly indicate the quality of guidance afforded me by saying that a lover of Thucydides inculcated a love of Herodotus. Whether such fair-mindedness and high-minded objectivity derives more from the example of Herodotus or of Thucydides is a moot point which the two of us resolve in quietly opposed ways.

This continually growing interest then in why Herodotus wrote what he wrote in the way he did produced the present study. I do not of course presume to furnish the definitive answer to these questions. I have rather chosen simply to reflect upon important aspects of these topics in an organized fashion. The emphasis of my own studies has been literary and philosophical; and accordingly the present work represents this emphasis. From these two vantage
points I have dealt more with Herodotus the historian than I have the history of Herodotus. While organizing materials for this project I was introduced to the name of Marshall McLuhan. He begins his prologue to *The Gutenberg galaxy* by acknowledging an otherwise barely visible debt to Albert Lord's *The singer of tales*. My debt to McLuhan is in only slightly greater evidence. But my concern with influences relative to the oral tradition are dependent upon him for their existence if not their development. The sources used by him, primary and secondary, were very useful in helping me reach at time quite different emphases or conclusions. A more complete list of the printed sources upon which I drew is contained in the bibliography.

I am also greatly indebted to the sharp, editorial eyes and aid of my other readers, Professors W. Robert Jones and Clarence A. Forbes.

In all ways possible I must acknowledge gratitude to my wife and family for their active assistance, encouragement, patience, and numerous sacrifices.
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iv
INTRODUCTION

"... The Greek historian's method precludes him from choosing his subject. He cannot, like Gibbon, begin by wishing to write a great historical work, and go on to ask himself what he shall write about. The only thing he can write about is the events which have happened within living memory to people with whom he can have personal contact. Instead of the historian choosing the subject, the subject chooses the historian."¹

G. T. Griffith quotes Collingwood's statement and curtly rejects it: "This is probably wrong just because it is modern."² Rather than playing logician and noting that Griffith's insertion of the word "probably" renders the opposite view equally valid, we prefer to suggest that Collingwood's statement is not so much "wrong" as it is incomplete—at least as far as Herodotus is concerned.

¹R. G. Collingwood, The idea of history, 26-27.
²"Greek historians," in Fifty years of classical scholarship, ed., M. Platnauer, 154 (author's italics).
Herodotus has followed as Collingwood observes the regular—but not inviolable—pattern of classical Greek writers of history and on historical subjects, and has chosen an at least partially contemporaneous subject. But he has rejected the comparatively easy task of investigating strictly contemporary events. Herodotus indicates in his proem that in addition to a history of the Persian Wars, he has written δι' ἡν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοις. In thus extending his concerns historically beyond the battles of Books Seven through Nine, he has already surpassed the limitations imposed by Collingwood. But Herodotus proposes to go even further. Again in the proem, he tells us he will deal not only with the ἔργα μεγάλα but ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἐλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις. The ἔργα θωμαστά extend Herodotus a good deal beyond the confines of what Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Plutarch and other historians, each in varying ways, understood by history. The dramatic devices and perspectives, the techniques of the logoi, the philosophical, theological and mythological currents all point to purposes beyond but not at odds with "scientific" history. Herodotus considerably extended his view without forsaking his radical concern.

Herodotus' adjectives θωμαστός and θωμάσιος are as
conceptually alive and varied in significance as the English word "marvelous," a word itself able to conjure up myriad images and only in part equivalent to the Greek adjectives. These Greek and English adjectives, however, do permit some generalizations about their approximate significance. We readily associate them, for example, with the miraculous, the mythical, the "outlandish": "Whatever is seen or felt by mythical perception is surrounded by a special atmosphere--an atmosphere of joy or grief, of anguish, of excitement, of exultation or depression. Here we cannot speak of 'things' as a dead or indifferent stuff. All objects are benignant or malignant, friendly or inimical, familiar or uncanny, alluring and fascinating, or repellent and threatening."\(^3\) For Cassirer then wonder is most conspicuously associated with myth, and the result is a drunken subjectivism. Margaret Mead associates wonder with that which is literally outlandish:

Shock and wonder at the differing ways of other peoples have been part of our human tradition since nomad tribes became willing to pause between flight to the fastnesses of the forest or fight so immediate that the practices of the enemy were only seen as they appeared in cicatrices on a dead body or the shape of a weapon held by a lifeless hand.

\(^3\)E. Cassirer, *An essay on man*, 102-103.
As men learned to tolerate the presence near them of others different from themselves, their wits were sharpened by contrast; they came to admire the ways of their neighbors, or to fear them and shape their own customs as defenses against the alien and the strange. A new kind of objectivity, a new dimension of historical consciousness is born when men cease to call themselves simply "human beings," naming others as "eaters of snakes" or "dweller farther inland," and instead apply to themselves names by which other men may speak of them. Slowly through history this process has developed—through the curiosity of the Greeks, to whom we owe our roots for the science of ethnology, the study of the barbarous, the non-Greek where, although observation flourished, ethnocentrism still reigned.  

For Buess wonder represents not the geographically remote but the intellectually removed. He equates "all die Begriffe, mit denen wir das Jenseits des logischen Erkennens bezeichneten" with "das Wunderbare, das Schicksalhafte, das Heilige, das Damonische." 

Each of these three sources has described wonder as a product of the mythical awareness of antiquity. Presumably the tools of our twentieth century, scientific consciousness led them to these conclusions. In considering, however, the testimony of antiquity we must say either that the conclusions of Cassirer, Mead, and Buess are incorrect or at

4M. Mead, Primitive heritage, xxii-xxiii.
5E. Buess, Die Geschichte des mythischen Erkennens, 69.
least that their thinking better represents the twentieth century than it does antiquity.

The two Greek adjectives above are correlative with θαυμάζειν derived in turn from θεάοθαι. Through this etymological tracing we see that "wonders" and "marvels" have close association with the process of scientific inquiry. One of the first wonder-workers in Herodotus' history, Solon, travelled, we are told, τῆς θεωρίης εἶνεκεν. And in the Theaetatus (550D) Socrates represents philosophy as the offspring of wonder: μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τούτῳ τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλῃ ἄρχῃ φιλοσοφίας ἡ αὕτη, καὶ ἐσικεῦ ὃ τὴν Ἰρίν θαυμάντος ἔχονον φῆσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. Aristotle echoes and extends Socrates' statement in noting the role of wonder as central to the development of scientific inquiry. Aristotle regards the association of wonder with myth as secondary in importance:

διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἀνέρωποι καὶ υἱοὶ καὶ τὸ πρώτον ἦργαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόξειρα τῶν ἀτόμων θαυμάσαντες, εἰτὰ κατὰ μικρὰν οὕτω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἶον περὶ τέ τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τῶν ἠλίου καὶ <τα> ἄστρα καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. δὲ δὲ ἀπόρων καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἄγνωσειν

These passages from Herodotus, Plato and Aristotle re-establish a balanced attitude toward the "marvels" of Herodotean history. The span of time and space in Herodotus takes him through the marvels of Greek and non-Greek worlds; and the Homeric world of Greek divinities proves more recent than the pre-Homeric world of men in Egypt. Herodotus proceeds through the time of the Homeric gods, the skepticism and postulations of the presocratics, the probings seminal to the varied inquiries of Plato and Aristotle. Throughout these times and places the motivating force is wonder, in various guises and with shifting emphasis. Goethe is perhaps echoing the three Greeks we have quoted in this introduction when he affirms, "Das Höchste, wozu der Mensch gelangen kann, ist das Erstaunen. . . . "

The key words, then, in Herodotus' proem which suggest his intent are ἔργα θαυμαστά. In our first two chapters we will consider, respectively, the scientific and artistic

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7 J. P. Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe, February 18, 1829.
aspects of these words. In chapter three we shall place Herodotus, with respect to these two words, in his cultural context; and in the final chapter, having refined our approach to the Herodotean temper and tradition, we shall illustrate our findings through an examination of chosen themes and structural details.
CONTENTS

PREFACE ................................................ ii
INTRODUCTION ........................................... v

Chapter

I. HERODOTUS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY .... 1
II. HERODOTUS AND MYTH ............................... 21
III. HERODOTUS AND HIS WORLD ..................... 43
IV. STRUCTURAL AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS ........... 122

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................... 184
CHAPTER I

HERODOTUS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

In considering Herodotus and historiography it is important for us to make a distinction between historical events and historical record. We are discussing not the object of the study but the study itself, not the events or data from which the historian draws but "that imaginative reconstruction which it is the special office of the historian to provide."¹ Our concern is with history as a process of recapturing the essence of the past; a concern not with historical material itself but with how the historian uses the available material. Our interest is not with the historian as court recorder or logographer or economist or scientist, but as autilizer of these and many other materials. In this chapter then we are concerned with Herodotus as a historiographer, with the way in which

he presents λόγορης ἀποδεξεῖς θόε. But the word "historiographer" is ambiguous, and in the case of Herodotus appropriately so. It may refer either to the "historian," the writer of history, or the "historicist," the philosopher of history.

The question of a philosophy of history would seem to presume that its possessor is a philosopher of history and accordingly it should be apparent that the historian and the philosopher are distinct personalities, who do not use the same material in the same way. Since the historian and the historicist would be different personalities, it would seem clear that they are different individuals as well. This separation, however, of historicist from historian quickly runs into a temporal difficulty: the notion of a philosopher of history is only a few centuries old. Two possibilities therefore confront us; either historians before the eighteenth century did not know what they were doing, since there were no historicists around to tell them;

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2Proem. H. R. Immerwahr ("Aspects of historical causation in Herodotus," TAPA 87, 1956, 247-248 n.11) gives a selective bibliography on the proem. One excellent treatment which he fails to mention is H. Erbse's "Der erste Satz im Werke Herodots," in Festschrift Bruno Snell, 209-222. L. Pearson (Early Ionian historians, 25-108) notes that λογορη in Herodotus means genuine "historical inquiry" while no such praise can be assigned to his predecessor, Hecataeus of Miletus.
or the reality of historicism existed long before the name. Contemporary historians tend to accept the latter alternative viewing themselves as historians and historicists.

Collingwood before establishing his definition of philosophy of history gives a brief description of the development of the term "historicism" or "philosophy of history":

The name "philosophy of history" was invented in the eighteenth century by Voltaire, who meant by it no more than critical or scientific history, a type of historical thinking in which the historian made up his mind for himself instead of repeating whatever stories he found in old books. The same name was used by Hegel and other writers at the end of the eighteenth century; but they gave it a different sense and regarded it as meaning simply universal or world history. A third use of the phrase is found in several nineteenth-century positivists for whom the philosophy of history was the discovery of general laws governing the course of the events which it was history's business to recount.³

The philosophy of history can be traced in fact, if not in name, to a very remote past:

Historicism is a very old movement. Its oldest forms, such as the doctrines of the life cycles of

³R. G. Collingwood, The idea of history, 1; he established his own definition as sharply divergent. R. Aron, a historian, begins his Introduction to a philosophy of history (9) with a similar statement: "The title of this book runs the risk of misleading the reader who might identify the philosophy of history with the great systems of the beginning of the nineteenth century, so discredited today."
cities and races, actually precede the primitive
teleological view that there are hidden purposes
behind the apparently blind decrees of fate. . . .
Modern historicists, however, seem to be unaware
of the antiquity of their doctrine. They believe--
and what else could their deification of modernism
permit?--that their own brand of historicism is the
latest and boldest achievement of the human mind, an
achievement so staggeringly novel that only a few
people are sufficiently advanced to grasp it.4

While detailed formulations of a philosophy of history are
comparatively recent, the antiquity of the idea is con-
siderable. A modern distinction between the study of
historical events and the study of its underlying principles
is given by D'Arcy: " . . . the philosopher of history
would, I suspect, claim that the formal object of his study
differs from that of the historian in that he is trying to
find there certain laws or tendencies, repetitions in the
rise and fall of nations, constant aims and conditions of
progress and decay.5

Maritain expands upon D'Arcy's distinction between

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4K. Popper, The poverty of historicism, 159-160. We
assume no responsibility for the arrogance of Popper's tone.
The less familiar word "historicism" is used by him pre-
cisely because it is comparatively unusual. The word seems
to have been most commonly used in reference to the
philosophy of history of Benedetto Croce and his Italian
philosophical school of idealism.

history and historicism from the viewpoint of their formal objects, and adds that the two disciplines are united by subject matter. D'Arcy (66-67) takes note of this identity of subject matter and similarity of approach in a way particularly appropriate to Herodotus:

History looks for causes, for motives and purposes, and relying upon a common human nature it can succeed in making sense out of a flurry of human actions. To do this the historian relies upon a power of the mind to discern a unity and a theme. . . . Now in addressing himself to this task the historian brings into play not only the power to weigh evidence and select the relevant facts; he must also use his talent of the artist. So near, indeed, is the historian to the artist that it has been debated by historians themselves whether they are not nearer to the artist than to the scientist.

The uniqueness of Herodotus' historical achievement is obscured by such modern descriptions of him as the end of the epic evolution, and as Aeschylus' prose counterpart. Those with such a limited and condescending view of Herodotus have failed to regard the elementary caution of Aristotle (Poetics 1451b): ὅ γὰρ ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἡ ἐμετρα λέγειν ἡ ἀμετρα διαφέρουσιν, εἰτ

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6J. Maritain, On the philosophy of history, 3-4.
Herodotus is the Father of History in an age that is decidedly anti-historical in its philosophical orientation. The rigorously anti-historical metaphysics of such Eleatics as Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno is largely responsible for this attitude. The indeterminacy of reality is summed up by Heraclitus (DK 22 B49a): 

\[
\text{ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομεν τε καὶ οὔκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἴμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἴμεν.}
\]

The indeterminacy of motion is "observed" by Zeno (DK 29 B4):

\[
\text{τὸ κινούμενον οὔτ' ἐν ψ' ἑστὶ τόσῳ κινεῖται οὔτ' ἐν ψ' μὴ ἑστὶ.}
\]

Plato felt obliged to deal exclusively with this problem in the epistemological terms of the Theaetetus (in specific reply to several of the presocratics), return to it briefly in the Sophisticus and again give attention to it in the mathematical terms of the

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7 For a brief discussion of "Aristotle's absolute neglect of Thucydides" see G. Else, Aristotle's Poetics: the argument, 304 n.9.

8 See Collingwood, 20-21; Snell, The discovery of the mind, ch. 7, esp. 143-144. Collingwood makes general observations upon this tendency; Snell relates this movement to its temporal and cultural context.
Aristotle in his own *Physics* and *Metaphysics* took up these problems, raised by the presocratics and dealt with by Plato, and attempted a resolution of the extent and nature of the world's and the mind's determinancy. The topic has been argued ever since in less exalted terms under a variety of headings, such as, interpretation, objectivity and bias, scientism, sources, judgment, and unity. All these terms have reference to Herodotus as critical historian and historiographer.

In this age of scientism, it is paradoxical that the description "critical historian" should cause some misgivings; the source of distress is that the critical historian has a point of view. Now this in itself is serious (especially if others differ with one's view); but even more objectionable is the natural outgrowth of a critical attitude, often labeled as historical bias. And, thus, through this oblique process of reasoning we can see how the critical historian comes to be described as

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9 Popper (33) similarly relates Plato and Heraclitus: "Methodological essentialism can accordingly be based on the historicist's argument which actually led Plato to his metaphysical essentialism, the Heraclitean argument that changing things defy rational description."
"unscientific."\textsuperscript{10} Our own "bias" against such a conception is quite clear. Truly scientific history would be utterly objective, uncolored, unbiased, and irrefutable. All this would be fine, if it were realistic, but unfortunately it is not. Aristotle called this attitude a category mistake, the erroneous translating of methods suitable to one subject matter to another for which they are ill-suited.\textsuperscript{11} Our modern scientific historians are required to cautiously guard against permitting the adjective "scientific" to overwhelm the noun in their title. The opposite emphasis must prevail. Since the historian deals, for example, with physical causation only in a very incidental and never primary way, he can never be fully scientific. That is to say, in history the shifting, mercurial human factors are always paramount. Huizinga rightly urges us to treat the material of history "as events, not as organisms."\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10}E.g., M. White, "Can history be objective?" in The philosophy of history in our time, ed., H. Meyerhoff, 188-202.

\textsuperscript{11}Prior analytics, 43b-45a.

\textsuperscript{12}J. Huizinga, "Historical conceptualization," in The varieties of history, ed., F. Stern, 291.
The necessity of "bias" in historical writing is well argued by Whitehead:

The historian in his description of the past depends on his own judgment as to what constitutes the importance of human life. Even when he has rigorously confined himself to one selected aspect, political or cultural, he still depends on some decision as to what constitutes the culmination of that phase of human experience and as to what constitutes its degradation. For example, considering the political history of mankind, Hegel saw in the Prussian State of his date its culmination: a generation later Macaulay saw that culmination in the English constitutional system of his date. The whole judgment on thoughts and actions depends upon such implicit presuppositions. You cannot consider wisdom or folly, progress or decadence, except in relation to some standard of judgment, some end in view. Such standards, such ends, when widely diffused, constitute the driving force of ideas in the history of mankind. They also guide the composition of historical narrative.13

D'Arcy (51) takes a position, generally characteristic of Herodotus, between unrestrained prejudice and the over-restraints of misapplied scientism:

... history is a halfway house between science and art. The historian has to use his imagination and his sympathy to reconstruct the lives and works of past fellow men... The chaotic mass of facts have to be interpreted and brought into some kind of unity, and this means that he has to select and give a personal and to some extent original view of the historical science he is looking at. But this selection and this interpretation cannot be arbitrary

13 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of ideas, 12.
or ruled by his taste. He is an artist subject to the laws of evidence and concerned exclusively with truth.

The past provides the historian with hints about its nature. The historian refines, correlates, and interprets these hints. Shotwell (9) describes this process as "the research which is science and the narration which is art."

One must admit, then, the reality of the problem posed and re-posed from the time of the presocratics to our own: the historian who is a historicist must deal with the transitory or dynamic but do so within the fixed, static confines of his discipline. While the historian must recognize the metaphysical ambiguity of his position, the theoretical question must be left to the metaphysician. The practical level of involvement with this issue is very real for the historian, but less so for the contemporary historian who has more adequate tools for momentarily fixing the movement of history than had his ancient counterpart.

But even the modern historian cannot stop the world and fix upon a previous condition in its totality and reproduce it definitively. His view is inevitably partial and inadequate.

Hecataeus (F Gr Hist 1 F la) begins his history by saying, τάδε γράφω, ὃς μοι δοξεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι: "seems" not "is," "true" not "correct." The historian who manages to
recapture the past with some degree of success will be at least as much artist as laboratory technician. The successful painter is more "true" to his subject than the literal photographer. The so-called scientific historian is in great danger of capturing appearance, names and labels, rather than essences. The historian with an appreciation of his partially artistic task puts forth names and labels tentatively rather than conclusively; the name and label are the beginning of his process, not the end-product.

The problem of accuracy is greater for the ancient historian with less developed tools and techniques. The ancient historian who writes about the past rather than contemporary events multiplies the obstacles confronting him. The problem can be viewed in an analogous fashion by considering a twentieth-century commentator on Persian history.

Cameron discussed "Father Cyrus and history rewritten" and subsequently "Huckster Darius and history remade." These titles used by Cameron (88-89) in his discussion of

ancient Persia vividly indicate the nature of the problems confronting a modern historian who attempts to discuss a portion of the history of the Achaemenids. In a moment of appropriate frustration Cameron remarks, "Too often that which is significant in the minds of men is not what really happened but what they believe or wish others to believe has occurred." Besides indicating in this comment the bold task of mind reading which the most conscientious historian faces, Cameron pinpoints a concern of Herodotus which renders his historical inquiries necessarily equivocal. The father of history was bold enough to relate not only what did happen, as far as he could discover, but also—and just as important—the poet-philosopher-historian undertook to depict as accurately and vividly as possible what others believed or wished to believe happened. Herodotus tries when possible to separate fact from fancy; but inevitably his sources may prevent this distinction.

Herodotus is not merely the scientific historian sifting and distilling material until the pure, rarefied fact is uncovered for our scrutiny; Herodotus is also the philosophic and artistic historian presenting to us "the minds of men" in which fact and fancy are intermingled. For this reason a superficially revealing but essentially
artificial separation of fact from fancy may be a violation of comprehensive historical integrity. As Aron (265) observes, "the theory of history is one with a theory of man, that is, a philosophy. History and philosophy are doubly inseparable: on the one hand, the evolution of historical interpretations would be subject to the philosophical interpretation; on the other, social changes would determine conceptions of the world, changes which are both causes and in part object of these conceptions."

It is clear then that for a variety of reasons Herodotus cannot adhere to Hegelian norms of historical objectivity. Herodotus may be writing, as Thucydides, in the new age of reason, intellectual relativity, and sophism; but he is not writing about such an age. Herodotus presents to us the dynamic, mercurial, ambiguous, and equivocal Heraclitean reality of men inextricably intertwined with their events. For Herodotus a historical Truth can unflinchingly combine truth and propaganda. The minds of his men may dictate this necessity. To take this view to an extreme, if Herodotus' documents or oral informants lie, Herodotus may be forced to do the same. We assert that this step may not make Herodotus credulous, naive or equally culpable, but rather an honest historian.
When fact and fiction (this is not to say, truth and falsehood) are intertwined in a single narrative, we hope to see presented to us the life and spirit of a person, people, nation, or period, not something more dull, more lifeless and less intelligible than the artifacts that the descriptive narrative purports to re-vivify.

We have noted an anti-historical tendency in sixth and fifth century Greece to which Herodotus implicitly took exception the moment he began his proem. 15 This should not be viewed as representing in Herodotus' time a unified movement. The reactions of Plato and Aristotle were based on broader, epistemological issues having, at most, their genesis in statements of some presocratics; and Plato's primary philosophical opponents were the Sophists. Historical skepticism did not permeate the age of Herodotus to the extent that it has other times and places. We may safely presume, for example, that Herodotus was not inclined to follow the example of Sir Walter Raleigh, who reportedly consigned his newly-finished History of the world to the fire.

15 This remark should not be construed as indicating our adherence to a specific theory concerning Herodotus' mode of composition.
We may consider, then, a specific union of thought that existed between Herodotus, and his Ionian predecessors and contemporaries. The following two fragments from Anaximander and Heraclitus respectively might be, if read without citation, readily identified as sentence-extracts from Herodotus:

1. . . . ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶν τοῖς οὐσί, καὶ τὴν φύσιν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρῆμα διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίς ἀλλήλων τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. (DK 12 Bl.)

2. εἰδέναι δὲ χρῆ τοῦ πόλεμου ἐστὶ εὐνύμου, καὶ δίκην ἔριν, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ’ ἔριν καὶ χρῆμα. (DK 22 B80.)

Herodotean parallels in thought are many. Croesus advising Cyrus not to attack the Massagetae, observes: ὡς κύκλος τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐστὶ πραγμάτων, περιφερόμενος δὲ οὐκ ἔδει τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐτυχέειν. (I.207.2.) Amasis King of Egypt writes to Polycrates, ruler of Samos, concerning the latter's good fortune, οὐδένα γάρ καὶ λόγως οἶδα ἀκούσας

Anaximander (DK 12 A10) provides a useful corrective to the view that he adhered to a purely impersonal ontogeny. See also F. M. Cornford, From religion to philosophy, 7-13 and W. Jaeger, The early Greek philosophers, 23-37.
When Darius is about to attack Sythia, the Scythians appeal to their neighbors for help and are told, νῦν δὲ ὑμεῖς τε ἐς τὴν ἐκείνων ἐσβαλόντες γὴν ἄνευ ἡμέων ἐπεκρατέετε Περσέων ὅσον κρόνον ὑμῖν ὁ θεὸς παρεδίδου, καὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ἐπεὶ σφεας ὡτὸς θεὸς ἔγειρε, τὴν ὅμοιῃν ὑμῖν ἀποδίδοσι. (IV.119.3.)

This similarity of thought between Herodotus and the Ionian philosophers does not result from a judicious sampling of quotations, but from genuine correlation in thinking. Even where the formulation varies, a substantial identity of meaning may be present. If the presocratics are groping toward a scientific materialism in advance of the mentality Herodotus describes in Greece and Asia, nevertheless they are still groping and have not arrived at their goal. Herodotus is temporally and intellectually contiguous with them even when the earlier cultures he revives are not. Cornford (123) notes this transitional status of early Greek philosophers when he says, in effect, that the new stress upon φύσις is little more than a rephrasing of the earlier concern with θεὸς.  

17 Cornford elaborates his point with a quotation from O. Gilbert, Meteor. Theorien, 703: "Diese Auffassung der
These comments naturally lead us from Herodotus' philosophical preconceptions to his theological ones. One cannot say that the philosophical and theological aspects are, for Herodotus, two sides of the same coin; for there is not even this separation between the two concepts. If even a conceptual distinction can be made, this is all; the distinction is logical rather than real. When a sympathetic view is extended toward Herodotus' use of myth, the sympathy is more often in the nature of an excuse than a reasonable justification; or the explanation being: Herodotus is the product of his age. Regardless of the specific motivation for this criticism, it is again founded upon scientism's jaundice, i.e., the historian deals with facts not with ideas and if ideas must be admitted their function is secondary, for they are dangerously intangible and the historian is a scientist, not an artist.

Materie (in Ionian monism), nach der die anderen Elemente Erzeugte des einen sind, bedarf keiner besonderen göttlichen Kraft, die über dem Stoffe als solchem stehend, ihn ordnet und bestimmt, bewegt und leitet: der Stoff selbst, als der Grundstoff und als die abgeleiteten Einzelstoffe, lebt: und als lebend und persönlich gedachtes Wesen bewegt er sich; der Stoff ist die Gottheit selbst, welche, in ihm wahtend, eins ist mit ihm."

18 Even How and Wells (vol. 1, introd., passim) regret they cannot do so.
The prudent historian must adopt a mediate position between scientific positivism at one extreme and a school of idealism at the other. Applicable, properly transferred techniques of science must form the substrate of historical analysis, but as Meinecke observes, science must reach out to the tools of art: "Only a path no longer purely scientific, that is, no longer purely causal, can lead us a step further into the depths of reality. And although it, too, can never fully reveal these depths, it can give us an intuitive understanding of them, can give us a sympathetic sense of them through unmediated seeing. Where science fails it is wiser for history to use these supra-scientific means than to apply scientific means where their application must lead inevitably to false results."¹⁹

Herodotus' historicist elements will be, as we have implied, intuitions, suggestions or statements presented informally, occasionally visible threads woven into the fabric of his history. Voegelin declares that Herodotus' historicist formulations are not presented discursively and

then proceeds to assert that, in part, they are:

"Herodotus has set forth his theory of history, not des-
cursively, but in brief formulations of principles
scattered through the work. His theoretical intentions
must be derived from these formulations in juxtaposition
with content and form of the historical relation. Some
of the principles are delivered as programmatic declarations
by the historian himself, others are pronounced by persons
of the story, closely interwoven with the narrative. Some
are placed at the main incisions of the work, others at
high points of action, still others appear to be inci-
dental."

We have reached in this chapter a description of the
two aspects of historiography, history and historicism; on
the one hand, the composed record and on the other, how it
came to be composed in a certain way. We have compared and
contrasted the modern with the ancient concepts as necessary
preliminaries to a treatment of one ancient historian,
Herodotus. This step is necessitated by our desire to
provide a responsible appraisal of Herodotus. Since he is
an ancient historian, it is unrealistic to make univocal

\[20 E. Voegelin, \textit{Order and history}, vol. 2, 334.\]
judgments of his achievement in terms of modern methods and concepts. And yet he is a representative, the first in fact, of the disciplina which antiquity and modernity call "history." Our discussion will accordingly contain elements both of comparison and of contrast. When we discuss in the latter half of the twentieth century A.D. this history of the fifth century B.C. we of course proceed from the modern perspective; but we must judiciously apply our own languages, tools, traditions, and concepts.
CHAPTER II

HERODOTUS AND MYTH

To reach a proper understanding of Herodotus' mind and methods we should first consider the influence and character of myth in the transitional world of Herodotus. This transitional world looks backward to its Homeric heritage and in the opposite direction anticipates its Sophistic future. Within the Herodotean context are the new "myth-makers," les hommes de lettres of the fifth century B.C. As a part of this class we must include the philosophers of the age, for they too were viewed as littérateurs. And all of the groups within this class—the philosophers, the poets, and, to an increasing degree, the utilizers of the new medium of prose composition—were regarded as the new communicators of the tradition and thought of Greek religion. The new myth-makers then wore several hats, not on different occasions, but all at one time. For this is the character of myth: to develop, to contain all reality simultaneously. All variant—and, in
modern terms, at times contradictory—aspects of reality find harmonious accommodation within the world of the myth. In order to see how this comes about we will examine in some detail the characteristics of myth and its applications to Herodotus.

Greek myths of the late sixth and fifth centuries have little in common with the naturalism documented or hypothesized as characteristic of ritually oriented myth.¹ Post-Homeric myth was no longer the primary concern of a tribe or cult; its "authors" were not priests of an Orphic cult, but intellectual leaders of society—men with "names," men of literature and philosophy who appropriated the

¹S. E. Hyman ("The ritual view of myth and the mythic," in Myth and literature, ed., J. B. Vickery, 53) briefly summarizes formulations of this naturalistic approach to myth: "In its nineteenth century forms, the theories that myths were personifications of nature, or the weather, or the sun and moon, it seems substantially to have died out; in various insidious twentieth century forms, the theories that myths are designed to answer etiological questions about how death came into the world or how the bunny got his little furry tail, or that taboo is primitive hygiene or primitive genetics, it is still pervasive." On the excesses of Hyman's ritual-oriented approach see J. Fontenrose, The ritual theory of myth, Folklore Studies 18. M. P. Nilsson (A history of Greek religion, 77-78) wisely takes considerable exception to totemistic explanations of Greek religion. J. E. Harrison incorporates totemism into her theories, acknowledging her debt to E. Durkheim, J. G. Frazer, et al. (Themis, ch. 5.)
mythical material of an anonymous past (or, in isolated cases, of an anonymous cultic present) and employed it for highly individualized ends. Transitional man of the world of Herodotus has progressed considerably beyond cult-identification in his mode of belief, but he has not yet advanced to the point of appreciating the dichotomy between subjective and objective knowledge which we take for granted. As Frankfort observes:

The basic distinction of modern thought is that between subjective and objective. On this distinction scientific thought has based a critical and analytical procedure by which it progressively reduced the individual phenomena to typical events subject to universal laws. Thus it creates an increasingly wide gulf between our perception of the phenomena and the conceptions by which we make them comprehensible. . . . Primitive man cannot withdraw from the presence of the phenomena because they reveal themselves to him. Hence the distinction between subjective and objective knowledge is meaningless to him.\(^2\)

Just as myth incorporates and subsumes all categories that it finds useful, so did the peoples of whom Herodotus writes. The generations subject to Herodotus' scrutiny were scarcely interested in the logical distinctions we try to make real. The Ionian philosophers combined myth and science as readily as their counterparts in history. The

sixth century Father of Natural Science, Thales, is quoted by Aristotle as observing \( \text{οὶ δ' ἐπὶ ῥοδατος κεῖσθαι (sc. τοῖς τῆς γῆς).} \) The context of this "scientific" statement is described by Wilson in his analysis of cosmogonic myths of the Near East, and Egypt in particular. One who has seen the Nile in floodtime, as had Thales (DK 11 All) and Herodotus (II.92) can appreciate the basis for this view of water as a first principle of existence. Another citation ascribed to Thales by Aristotle might pass as an exceedingly elementary prelude to modern physics: καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ
de τιμαίς αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) μεμείθειαν φασίν, οὗ
tὸς καὶ θαλῆς ὑζῆν πάντα πληρηθεὶςθεῶν εἶναι. The physical aspect of Thales' reported view is more conspicuous if we place the emphasis of our thought upon πάντα (as meaning "all material things") rather than upon θεῶν. In this case we can interpret Thales as viewing matter as ensouled, alive, and possessed of a vital principle or ψυχὴ. Kirk and Raven

\(^3\)De caelo 294a (DK 11 A14).

\(^4\)J. A. Wilson, Before philosophy, 51-70.

\(^5\)For another reference by Thales to water as the material cause of existence see Aristotle Meta. 983b (DK 11 A12).

\(^6\)De anima 411a (DK 11 A22).
couple this passage with others attributed to Thales and conclude: "Thales was giving an explicit and individual statement of a broad presupposition common to all the early physicists, that the world was somehow alive, that it underwent spontaneous change. . . ."  

Anaximander, described by the Suda as a student and successor of Thales (DK 12 A2), secularized the Hesiodic cosmogony and brought Greek thought one step closer to a scientific description of the universe:

Only a modern critic accustomed to describing the pioneer efforts of sixth century Greek physics with the pejorative word "myth" would so falsify Aristotle's formulation of Anaximander's postulates. But we could not be wrong in


8Aristotle, Physics 204b (DK 12 A16).
asserting that the origin of these postulates is undoubtedly a transformation of cosmological myth. Nor would we be rash in detecting the gods and goddesses behind the concepts of two fifth-century "Ionians": the Νοῦς of Anaxagoras, and the Φίλότης and Νεῖκος of Empedocles.

Rose speaks of some manifestations of myth in this transitional period as "poetic theology," products of a combined literary consciousness and religious tradition but, as his description indicates, non-dogmatic in character. The context of the above quotation (23) from Frankfort provides a description of the "logic" of mythopoetic thought. The myth, in itself non-analytical and combining subjective and objective modes of thought, cannot be dogmatic, if we mean by dogma an objective, analytic codification of religious belief. Only at the hands of later allegorizers can myth assume a quasi-dogmatic character. Vis-à-vis literature and religion, myth is neutral. Its context determines the emphasis. In earlier, cultic contexts myth became, by virtue of its context, religious in character. At the hands of late sixth and fifth century littérateurs, its orientation, and thus its

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characteristic qualities, changed accordingly. As Eliade observes, "Myth expresses in action and drama what metaphysics and theology define dialectically."\(^{10}\) The religious factor is possessed by myth \textit{ab origine} rather than \textit{per se}.

Rose speaks from the vantage point of our twentieth century scientific heritage when he notes, "In the pre-scientific days of classical study it was the received opinion that myths formed the creed or dogma of paganism. Nor is this idea surprising, however erroneous, for it could quote good ancient authority. . . . The nineteenth century saw the end of this misconception, although traces of it lingered on for a long time, and today we have rather to fight against the opposite error, namely that myths and religion have nothing to do with one another."\(^{11}\) Thus Rose disassociates himself, at least to a certain degree, from early twentieth century correlators of myth and ritual.

While we may justly acknowledge the pioneer work of scholars such as Harrison and Frazer in establishing a correlation between myth and ritual, we must also heed the more recent qualifications of this correlation by later

\(^{10}\)M. Eliade, \textit{Patterns in comparative religion}, 418.

\(^{11}\) \textit{Modern methods in classical mythology}, 5.
archaeologists. James summarizes the refinements: "... it has to be recognized that however closely myth and ritual may have been allied, the myth has been by no means always or merely the spoken part of a rite; and when the two have occurred together as an entity an aetiological element often can be detected. Though on the whole it would seem that the ritual aspect is the earlier and the more fundamental, a considerable corpus of myths has occurred in a non-cultic context."\(^\text{12}\)

Kluckhohn emphasizes this point when he observes: "Rose quite correctly says 'among myths there are many whose connection with any rite is a thing to be proved, not assumed.' ... [There are] instances (like classical Greece) where a ramified mythology appears to have existed more or less independent of a comparatively meagre rite-system. For example, in spite of the many myths relating to Ares the rituals connected with Ares seem to have been few in number and highly localized in time and space."\(^\text{13}\)

In Greek literature from the *Iliad* onward the cultic


character of myth has, at best, a vestigial existence. Murray refers to the development already found in Homer as reflecting the Olympian conquest and suggests: "We may analyse the movement into three main elements: a moral expurgation of the old rites, an attempt to bring order into the old chaos, and lastly an adaptation to new social needs." Myth and ritual are no longer complementing and serving the social, moral, and religious interests of one another. From the time of Homer, the literary molders of Greek thought were increasingly skeptical of the literal authenticity and moral value of the old, traditional once sacred Olympians. Homer scarcely hesitated to portray Zeus and his associates as vengeful, unethical, and capricious in their divine and human relationships. But Herodotus' partial and qualified belief in divine judgments is closer to that of Aeschylus (δράματι παθεία) than to that of Homer. Herodotus, then, restructures the characteristic vengeance of earlier tradition and descriptively reaffirms moira, tisis and nemesis as ethical principles. Plato went one step further and ejected poets such as Homer and Hesiod from the Republic, echoing the condemnation of Xenophanes

14 G. Murray, Five stages of Greek religion, 59.
(DK 21 B 11) and others:

πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὁμήρῳ ὁ Ὅμηρος τε,
ὅσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγως ἐστίν,
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεῦειν.

Myth in the fifth century existed as a hierophantic event in the mimetic mode of literature. And, again, while the hierophantic quality persisted, the littératour chose to ordain himself hierophant. While it is certainly true that "the characteristic feature of religious thought is essentially mythological," the reverse is not always true. One must radically constrict one's view of myth in order to conclude that it is necessarily overtly religious. To arrive at a definition of myth which concludes that a clearly visible religious element is consistently present is to fabricate an a priori definition which is as naive as it is neat, and unverifiable.

While Herodotean belief was post-naturalistic, then, it was also non-dogmatic. It was not invested with the dogmatic character Varro assigns to myth in describing the three types of theologia. St Augustine (De civitate Dei, VI.5) gives a paraphrase of Varro's teaching:

Deinde illud quale est, quod tria genera theologiae dicit esse, id est rationis quae de diis explicatur,

15E. O. James, 15.
One reason for the absence of dogma in myth Cassirer briefly suggests: "We cannot reduce myth to certain fixed static elements; we must strive to grasp it in its inner life, in its mobility and versatility; in its dynamic principle. Langer, who acknowledges a considerable debt to Cassirer, adds that myths are "not propositions to which one says yea or nay; but neither are they literary toys of a mind that 'knows better.' The Homeric Greeks probably did not believe in Apollo as an American fundamentalist believes in Jonah and the whale, yet Apollo was not a literary fancy, a pure figment, to Homer, as he was to Milton."17

The question of belief can be an unfruitful approach to an analysis of myth unless one considers the nature of

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16 E. Cassirer, _An essay on man_, 102.
17 S. K. Langer, _Philosophy in a new key_, 163.
the belief and associates the content of the belief (rather than the mere fact of it) with the one recounting the myth. The myth truly lives only in a specific context, and certainly not in a hypothesized reconstruction by a would-be ethnographer working backward in time from a known narrative to an unknown ur-myth. While something new may be gained from this latter approach, each myth so reconstructed has been destroyed in its form and thus in its essential nature. When the form is destroyed, so is its content; for the two elements have been isolated from one another. Those in quest of the ur-myth, the archetype hunters, are little interested in the individual myth.

Because Herodotus relates a myth, we then conclude that he believes the myth. But his mere assertion of belief is as unrevealing as it is misleading. For example, what is important is the nature rather than the fact of Herodotus' belief. To examine the nature and degree of Herodotus' credence in the myth we must first distinguish between the content of the myth and his use of it. The content may be thoroughly "religious," while his purpose may be thoroughly "secular." By virtue of the fact that he is a historian, Herodotus' narrative stance is at base a scientific, detached one. Herodotus is therefore less
likely to present the myth as a picture of his own belief than as a representation of a belief and a reality integral to the world of his historical subjects. In this case he "believes" in the myth in a quite different way from that of his historical subjects. He believes in myth (his myth or their myth?) as a historian's valid reconstruction of a time, people, and place.

Herodotus may thus be presenting a religious myth which serves a secular purpose. Are we then to conclude that the myth is religious or secular? We may conclude in this case that we are viewing a secular myth. For Herodotean myth is truly intelligible only in the form in which it is presented by Herodotus, not in some unverifiable ritualistic form encountered elsewhere.

Perhaps we can bridge the distinction between religious and secular myths by defining certain myths as preternatural rather than supernatural: " . . . the word 'supernatural' is often used in discussions of myth, sometimes with the necessary qualifications, oftener without. But there are at least two objections to 'supernatural': it implies a philosophical distinction between two realms of being which are unknown to the myth-maker and it has certain misleading theological overtones. I therefore use the word
'preternatural' to indicate no more or less than is conveyed by the Melanesian word mana; whatever has impersonal magic force or potency and is therefore extraordinarily beautiful, terrible, dangerous, awful, wonderful, uncanny or marvelous has mana and is, in our sense of the word, preternatural." In the above passage Chase is in large part describing the θωμαστα of Herodotus. But Chase's emphasis upon the "impersonal" is too restrictive for his distinction to be fully applicable to Herodotus. The wonders, terrors, and marvels of Herodotus are also personal, and thus at times preternatural, at others supernatural.

We must bear in mind that this bridge which Chase has furnished us is a bridge, as Herodotus is a bridge between a religious past and his Sophistic present. Herodotus is not presenting the myth as a priest of a religious cult or as a Melville. Yet, as Tillich observes, in myth there is


19 An excellent brief treatment of mana is found in M. Eliade, Patterns in comparative religion, 19-23. He cites recent research on the subject and concludes (23), "There seems in fact to be no justification for seeing mana as an impersonal (italics added) magic force."
inevitably a conflict between the secular and the sacred. Herodotus, as a transitional figure, clearly represents this conflict.

The distinction between belief in the myth and the function of the myth is a particularly important one in Herodotus because of the constantly shifting way in which he approaches mythical elements. Herodotus may accept a myth or describe it agnostically (i.e. use it without comment as a depiction of a reality) or reject it altogether. But if he rejects it, he must do so on terms other than those of the myth itself, either by questioning the details (in an extra-mythical, i.e. scientific way) or by impolitely questioning the foundations of the myth.

Myth presents, at least by implication, the contradictions, the multi-faceted nature of reality, together with a resolution of the contradictions. The myth itself cannot be questioned on its own terms, for it is an affirmation, a belief, beyond reason: a combination of reason, emotion, and intuition, a complex assertion, not a reasoned, propositional statement of "fact." It is an artistic whole whose

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nature scientific exegesis can only benevolently hint at or benevolently ignore.

The myth is somewhat like an enclosure with a lock. Scientific exegesis can peek through the keyhole of the enclosure but it cannot be the key, for there is none. If scientific exegesis regards itself as a sufficient key trying confidently to insert itself into the lock, it will fail; if it forces the lock, the key will break. The lock cannot be opened.

A myth is a unique conception, or better, a vision; one can report it, perhaps talk around it, or one can reject it. But one cannot tamper with the myth in the hope of improving it. Should one try to change the myth, the result is a totally new vision, not a new version. The Empedoclean tension between *φιλόστης* and *Νεῖκος* illustrates the multidimensional aspect of myth. While myth provides a synthetic view of reality, it will not of itself yield a system of dogmatic creeds. While the myth presents an immediate, specifically detailed narrative picture of a reality, the meaning, or better, the signification of the myth is not a static, fixed one, but a dynamic, horizontally and vertically extended mode of understanding
that looks out of itself. This is true of any art form: "Thus the platitude that great art is universal, although true in a special sense, is misleading: for the integral meaning of a work of art (whatever its component meanings may be) cuts across experience in a different dimension from that of any logical universal whatever, and establishes its own quality of universality—a more concrete and more alive universality than that represented by a dictionary definition."²¹

An analogy between the specific and generic aspects of myth and the two central components of a sentence, subject and verb, may be helpful at this point. The specifying factor of myth then is the subject, the present thing, immediate, self-contained, possessed; since it is "present," there is no extension or duration. But the myth, as the noun, is extended beyond itself by the addition of time. The verb, as Aristotle observes (De Interpretatione 16 a-b), is a noun with the additional determining factor of time. The verb (time) allows the noun (myth) continuity of expression beyond itself and provides the possibility of saying several different, but

²¹P. Wheelwright, The burning fountain, 66.
of course related, things about a single subject. The noun is analogous to the subject matter of the myth; the verb or time adds a continuity of predication into the past and future.

The analogy may be extended to literal and metaphorical sentences. The myth can be conceived of as a metaphorical sentence rather than a literal one. In a literal sentence there is an identity of meaning and saying, while a metaphor says "one thing and means another . . . for in a metaphor there is an assumed union of two modes or levels of truth or causality which necessitates a similar union in the levels of psychic activity to which corresponds the verbal substitution of terms indicating a union of levels in the subject matter." The analogy of a metaphorical sentence helps to indicate the nature of the difficulties facing an interpreter of myths. A literal sentence lends itself to scientific analysis because both the literal sentence and scientific analysis employ propositional statements with univocal signification. The myth, however, like the metaphorical statement, must provide its own

internal criteria of interpretation in which the external observer must acquiesce. The metaphor, as the myth, is something uniquely individual; the observer must rely upon the clarity of the author, or conveyor of the metaphor or myth, to furnish the observer with opportunities for actively extending intuitive insights, leaps of association to the truth of the artistic conception.\footnote{Ibid., 433-435.}

One should not, however, conclude that these statements lead one into either an interpretive relativism or interpretive nihilism. We have said the myth was not univocal; we must add that it is not ambiguous, rather it is ambivalent. There are intended, satisfactorily conveyed levels of meaning in the myth. Proper understanding cannot come about by an instrumentally programmed method of autopsy. For the language of the metaphor and of the myth is not the language of the scientist. Myth, then, incorporates the elements of belief, frequently expressing itself in a religious mode and frequently in the context of literature; and yet the myth maintains its own, autonomous existence. Both the elements of belief and art are present in myth, but myth cannot be assigned exclusively either to
the sphere of religion or to that of literature. David Bidney emphasizes the cautiousness of our qualifications: "Myth differs from art precisely in the fact that the mythical imagination and intuition imply a belief in the reality of its object. The mythopoeic mind does not regard myth merely as a symbolic expression or representation of some independent reality; the mythic symbols are identical with the reality. Hence mythical reality is accepted as given and is not subjected to critical evaluation."\(^{24}\)

The unitive, anti-analytical (and thus, in a sense, anti-scientific) function of myth enables it unflinchingly to embrace, as a part of its synthesis, mutually exclusive elements illustrative of the Empedoclean tension. The scientific irreconcilables become harmonized in the wider perspective of the myth. Elements which are inconsistent in linear, logical analysis find mutual accommodation in the reality of the myth. From the world of the myth come the tensions of Empedocles, the opposition of Heraclitus' divided reality to Parmenides' totally unified reality, and the paradoxes of Zeno. From one perspective there is

synthesis, from another there is analysis without hope of the re-unification of parts. But the situation does not resolve itself finally into a simplistic opposition of art, or religion, to science. The irony of a scientific approach to myth is noted by Langer:

There is the silly conflict of religion and science, in which science must triumph, not because what it says about religion is just, but because religion rests on a young and provisional form of thought, to which philosophy of nature—proudly called "science" or "knowledge"—must succeed if thinking is to go on. There must be a rationalistic period from this point onward. Some day when the vision is totally rationalized, the ideas exploited and exhausted, there will be another vision, a new mythology. . . . The epic is the first flower—or one of the first, let us say—of a new symbolic mode, the mode of art. It is not merely a receptacle of old symbols, namely those of myth, but is itself a new symbolic form, great with possibilities, ready to take meanings and express ideas that have had no vehicle before.\(^\text{25}\)

The word "science" is partisan, scientia is not. The myth can contain the linear tensions and oppositions, for it is a multi-dimensional view of reality. In paratactic modes of thought, which oral communication makes incumbent upon a people, the mythos and logos inevitably blend into one another. As hypotactic modes take hold, that is to

\(^{25}\text{S. K. Langer, 173-174.}\)
say as a written tradition deepens and exercises a more pervasive influence, verbal and mental schizophrenia can set in; at that point and in that way the logos, "scientific" thought, can achieve ascendancy:

Any phonetic alphabet culture can easily slip into the habit of putting one thing under or in another; since there is constant pressure from the subliminal fact that the written carries for the reader the experience of the "content" which is speech. But there is nothing subliminal in non-literate cultures. The reason we find myths difficult to grasp is just this fact, that they do not exclude any facet of experience as literate cultures do. All the levels of meaning are simultaneous. Thus natives, when asked Freudian questions about the symbolism of their thoughts or dreams, insist that all the meanings are right there in the verbal statement. The work of Jung and Freud is a laborious translation of non-literate awareness into literary terms, and like any translation distorts and omits. The main advantage in translation is the creative effort it fosters, as Ezra Pound spent his life in telling and illustrating. And culture that is engaged in translating itself from one radical mode such as the auditory, into another mode like the visual, is bound to be in a creative ferment, as was classical Greece or the Renaissance. But our own time is an even more massive instance of such ferment, and just because of such "translation."  

This multidimensional view of reality is a description of the world of the Herodotean μονόθεος and λόγος of the time in which he lived and, to a much greater degree, of the times and places about which he wrote. Throughout the next chapter we shall consider this world in detail.

26M. McLuhan, The Gutenberg galaxy, 72.
CHAPTER III

HERODOTUS AND HIS WORLD

Diligent examination of all relevant extant information has produced weighty comment upon the Quellenfrage of Herodotus with generally negative results.¹ Nestle has failed to find that the Sophists significantly influenced Herodotus.² Wells notes the surprising lack of contemporary Athenian influence on Herodotus: "On the whole then his treatment of literature corresponds to his treatment of art; on both subjects it is pre-Periclean work which fills his mind." He adds, "To turn from the subject matter of Herodotus to his style, there is no doubt that here he is no borrower from Athens or Athenian models."³ Bruns makes a similar observation:

Wenn man alle diese Beobachtungen zusammenfasst, wird man es fast als unbegreiflich empfinden, dass

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¹See summary statements by Jacoby (RE, cols. 393-394); on stylistic influences (and lack thereof), 491-504.
²W. Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos, 509.
³J. Wells, Studies in Herodotus, 188 and 198.

Es ist schwer, Herodot in dies Athen einzuordnen. Asiat von Geburt, ist er erst in späteren Jahren mit ihm in Berührung gekommen. So mächtig ihn diese Cultur anzog, er war fertig und ist nicht mehr innerlich umgestaltet worden. Er war und blieb ein Fremder auf diesem Boden. Er repräsentirt ein früheres Jahrhundert, dessen Bildung dialektisch gebunden und wesentlich unpolitisch, viel unmittelbarer noch, als die des damaligen Athen, aus dem Ideenkreise des Epos schöpft.  

Jacoby (col. 491) echoes Bruns' observation that the Homeric influence is clear, "Deutlich ist es, dass in der Komposition der Einfluss des Homerischen Epos ... eine gewisse Rolle spielt." But we must be careful to realize that Herodotus' debt to the Homeric epic is similar to his debt to tragedy, one of inspiration and technique rather than of specific borrowings.

The literary and cultural influences upon Herodotus are primarily anterior to his time rather than contemporary with it, on the basis of subject matter alone. Just as Herodotus is "Asiat von Geburt," so in large part is his subject.

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4 I. Bruns, Das literarische Porträt der Griechen, 108.
Herodotus' own tradition is nearly as oral or "pre-literate" as that of the peoples he investigates. The influences of the spirit of Homer and his age upon Herodotus cannot be reduced solely to preferences of artistry or temperament, but are illustrative in a much broader way of the pre-literate influences and sources upon which he necessarily relied. Even while Thucydides was writing a documentary history of a newly and very incompletely literate Periclean Athens, fifth century Athenian and non-Athenian vase-painters were depicting contemporary rhapsodes reciting with staff in hand. Kirk represents the rhapsodes as a transition between oral and written poetry and "provisionally" fixes their floruit between 624 and 575. Herodotus himself (V.67) mentions Homeric rhapsodes in early sixth century Sicyon: Κλεισθένης ἀρχή Ἀργαίοισι πολεμήσας τοῦτο μὲν βασιλεῖς ἔπαισε ἐν Σίκυων ώς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τῶν 'Ομηρείων ἐπέει.

The oral tradition in history is most readily observable in the epic cycle; and we should be giving way to an extreme, modern prejudice if we failed to regard the epic poets as the first historians of the Greek world. Jacoby

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5G. S. Kirk, The songs of Homer, 312-315.
speaks of the Panhellenic epic as "the nucleus and the main sources" for the history of the Greek people. But we may go further and add tragedy to this literary family. Aristotle sets forth at considerable length basic poetic doctrines applicable to both epic and tragedy and only briefly distinguishes the two in a later postscript. The correlation by Aristotle of epic and tragedy possesses a great deal more clarity than does his elliptical statement of relationship between tragedy and history. Historical evaluation of tragedy as superior to history has produced prolonged, serious controversy.

Defenders of Thucydides take considerable exception to Aristotle's condescending attitude toward history. Had

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6Atthis, 202.


9See J. H. Finley, Thucydides, 321-325; F. M. Cornford, Thucydides mythistoricus, for a book-length refutation.
Aristotle foreseen the fire his lecture notes would ignite, he might have dampened some of the flames by a more complete explanation. In any case, we may note without reading Aristotle's mind that he has not allowed the effect (history) to be greater than its cause (poetry) and has not permitted the primarily written genre to be greater than its primarily oral predecessors.

The most conspicuous debt that the major historians of Greece owe to the first historian, Homer, is reflected intermittently throughout Herodotus, in subject matter, in mentality and in a variety of formal elements; in Thucydides the most conspicuous debt to Homer is in the former historian's reconstruction of the Heroic Age, that age "which poetry considered alone worthy of being treated." As Walbank observes: "A good reason why tragedy and history were from their beginnings regarded as akin was their employment of the same subject matter. Thucydides, for example, in his review of early Greek history in Book i is dealing up to a point with precisely the same facts as Homer or


11Jacoby, Atthis, 199.
Euripides. His purpose is of course different; but it does not occur to him any more than it occurs to them, to question the historicity of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, of Minos and his thalassocracy, of Achilles, Pelops, Tyndareus, Atreus, Agamemnon and the rest.\textsuperscript{12} While an occasional person puzzles over the poetical qualities of Linear B, we shall confidently accept the oral mode in which the \textit{Iliad} and the \textit{Odyssey}, the earliest extant Greek historical documents of any length, were transmitted across the centuries.

It is the custom of Greek historians to provide us with footnotes indicating their poetic (oral) sources, but with puzzling regularity to remain silent about their prose sources.\textsuperscript{13} The poets cited by Herodotus include Aeschylus, Alcaeus, Archilochus, Aristeas, Hesiod, Homer (ten references), Phrynichus, Pindar, Sappho, and Simonides.\textsuperscript{14} Prose sources, however, are not so well represented. Herodotus names one, Hecateus, and in the single reference to him as

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Historia} 9, 1960, 221.

\textsuperscript{13} The fourth century historian Timaeus of Tauromenium, a minor continuator of Thucydides, broke this tradition of silence so notoriously that within a century he was branded \textit{Ἐπιτιμαίος}.

\textsuperscript{14} See J. E. Powell, \textit{Lexicon to Herodotus}. 
a historical source takes at least tentative exception to his report. While argumenta ex silentio must be at best highly speculative, we suggest as likely reasons for this state of affairs 1) the familiarity of audiences with the poets, for educational reasons and 2) the absence of written sources to cite.

Furthermore, we suggest that this puzzling situation is somehow related to the oral tradition. Let us consider some related factors in order to suggest with greater clarity the role of this oral tradition as it relates to myth and Herodotus. Our concern then is not with the fact of the influence of oral tradition upon Herodotus, which we must accept, but rather with the effects of its influence upon him.

15 Hecateus makes three other appearances, not as a source, but as a passing figure on the Herodotean stage: II.143.1; V. 36.2; 125. Thucydides treats Herodotus with total-silence, naming only one source, Hellanicus, in a disputed passage (I. 97).

16 Jacoby (col. 393) states: "... die Frage, ob H. schriftliche oder mündliche Quellen gehabt habe, in dieser Form überhaupt nicht gestellt werden darf, ... dass man vielmehr allein fragen darf, ob und für welche Dinge H. überhaupt schriftliche Quellen haben konnte und ferner, in welcher Weise er sie benutzt hat..." See also W. Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, 7 ed., part 1, vol. 2, 627.
Lionel Pearson, in his article "Real and conventional personalities in Greek history," focuses his attention almost exclusively upon Herodotus. In his view the conventional characterizations we find in Herodotus are largely due to the influences of his oral sources. He sharpens his discussion of this phenomenon by first noting a contrasting situation. Pearson observes that the "real" personalities in the fifth century are found in drama and oratory, but qualifies even this view. In reference to oratory Pearson notes:

The contrast with the Attic orators of the following century is striking; they allude frequently to certain famous characters of the past and expect their listeners to have a distinct, if not necessarily an accurate notion of their importance. Political principle or literary fashion is not enough to explain a refusal to mention great historical characters by name. An orator who understands his audience chooses those arguments and instances which have a direct appeal to them; but if the public has no distinct picture of its past heroes, if no vivid idea, no genuine patriotic sentiment is attached to their names, there is no point in alluding to them. The general public in the fourth century knew little enough history; but in the fifth century (one is forced to believe) it knew even less.

18 Ibid., 137.
Correlative with this point is Denniston's observation that in the last quarter of the fifth century political and legal orators disapproved of poetic diction which made itself conspicuous, and therefore they restricted this technical artifice to epideictic oratory.\(^{19}\) The principle here is once again that of conceptual familiarity, a desire by the orators to communicate with their audiences in ways that are most "real" to them. Under influences which we may here broadly label as Sophistic and reserve for discussion later, the most real is that which is current; and allusions to antiquity are eschewed. Accordingly Pearson (138) reminds us in speaking of Aristophanes' late fifth and early fourth century comedies that Aeschylus is the only historical figure of a previous generation who appears.

The phrase "historical figure," then, indicates the type of "conventional personality" one confronts in the otherwise realistic characterizations of drama. Ironically the realistic personalities are those derived from myth, as Pearson points out (137):

The literary education of the Athenian before the age of the sophists made it inevitable that he should

\(^{19}\)J. D. Denniston, Greek prose style, 18.
know more about mythology than history. If he read Homer and became familiar with the Homeric heroes, he would not be contented with conventionalized versions of them, and the tragic poets of the fifth century knew better than to offer him such versions. Historical dramas, on the other hand, were not popular, and the only one which has survived (the Persians of Aeschylus) is not concerned with characterization and does not put Greeks on the stage at all. Thus Attic drama does not offer us—as modern drama does—imaginative interpretations of historical characters. Theseus might be claimed as a borderline character between history and mythology, since the Athenians adopted him as a national hero, built him up after the model of Heracles with similar labors and exploits, and finally (in the fourth century) tried to explain away the supernatural and disreputable elements in his story and transform him into a respectable Father of his Country. But in the Attic drama, though Euripides sometimes finds him useful as a symbol of Athenian ideals, he is treated no differently from other mythological characters and with equal freedom.

We must pause at this point in our argument to consider the preceding paragraph in greater detail. In attempting to explain the Greek context by means of contemporary distinctions we must be careful that misconstruction does not result. The distinction between conventionalized historical figures and realistic mythological figures would be unrecognizable to a Greek. As we shall see at greater length later, the sublime truths of myth were valued more highly than the prosaic facts of history. The most explicit statement to this effect is Aristotle's
Poetics. To put it another way, the mythical was genuinely historical. The Oresteia was history, a part of the collective traditional memory of its Greek audience.

How, then, was the Persae classified? One did not construct a separate genre from a notable exception. That Aeschylus was awarded first prize for the play has little to do with its minor value as drama or history. Lattimore asks, "Why did Aeschylus deliberately present the distortion of history?" 20 Golden offers a contemporary classification of the play as "patriotic drama." 21 That classification contains the answer to Lattimore's question and the explanation of why the Persae received first prize. 22 For its


21 L. Golden, In praise of Prometheus, 31-41. "Patriotic drama" is a thematic classification; in considering broader aspects of the play he calls it an "epideictic tragedy."

22 Relevant to this point is the date of the play, 472, the year between Themistocles' ostracism and exile (see R. J. Lenardon "The chronology of Themistocles' ostracism and exile," Historia 8, 1959, 23-48). Through Herodotus' account in Book Eight of the battle of Salamis we are able to observe the disproportionate emphasis Aeschylus gives this portion of the conflict (see Lattimore, Classical studies in honor of Oldfather, 93 and C. J. Kirk, Aeschylus and Herodotus," CJ 51, 1955, 83-86) and the subtle devices by which the author of the victory of Salamis, Themistocles, is put in a much more favorable


merit lies neither in depth of plot nor characterization. In discussing the *Persae*, Else asks, "Why do we hear of only three historical plays, and why was the experiment not repeated?" And answers, "Not out of aversion to historical subjects as such, but because the one thing absolutely essential to a tragedy was a pathos of heroic quality and scope, and fifth-century history in Greek lands provided just two such: the fall of Ionia and the defeat of Persia." We may also reply that a certain portion of the blame must be shared by Mnemosyne. The oral tradition affected both poet and audience. In Phrynichus' *Capture of Miletus*, Mnemosyne produced a bitter reaction from the audience. But more importantly, the working and re-working of the mnemonic tradition--an

light than that accorded him by Herodotus. A J. Podlecki (*The political background of Aeschylean tragedy*, 8-26 and 131-141) stops little short of viewing the play as propaganda for Themistocles. The first prize brings fame to both Aeschylus and the choregus, Pericles.

In the archonship of Themistocles, 493/2, Phrynichus' play *The capture of Miletus* was performed. No fragments are extant, but Herodotus says (VI. 21) that the author was fined and the play banned. The hypothesis to the *Persae* tells us Aeschylus is indebted to Phrynichus' *Phoenissae* (produced in 476). See Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, 7 ed., part 1, vol. 2, 170-176.

active and creative as well as a passive, static force—enabled its creators and performers, as well as its aural respondents, to rise above the stereotypes and conventions which would and did characterize events of recent occurrence.

One cannot emphasize too much the fact that, although a Sir James Frazer, a Carl Jung, a Maud Bodkin, or a Joseph Campbell can brilliantly examine the types and archetypes of mythology, the specific myths from which these generalized studies are drawn usually possess a real viability rather than conventional impersonality. The myth may be traditional without becoming conventional, can contain a dramatic probability and human plausability devoid of stereotype. At the apex we may observe Homer; at the nadir, the perfumed pennings of Ovid.

The conventionalized figures in oratory and drama, as Pearson has shown us, are those derived from history. But other branches of art and literature were similarly affected: "The truth is that in the various branches of literature which flourished in the fifth century before Herodotus finished his history, in political oratory, tragedy, and comedy, and we may add to these the various types of lyric poetry, serious characterization of historical personages was not attempted (the sketch of Croesus by
Bacchylides is no exception); and there were no realistic portraits by sculptors available."^24 Pearson's observation about early fifth century sculpture finds elaborate development in Gombrich's tracing of Greek art from "the priority of conceptual modes" to the "conquest of naturalism."^25 The emphasis upon "the concept" rather than "the thing" in Greek art is easily traced. Aristotle's judgment of the superiority of poetry to history on the grounds of greater universality comes quickly to mind as arising from the same Greek condition. "The concept" is the universal; "the thing," the inconsequential particular. Likewise in the Republic, "Socrates" objects to the foolish painter who, instead of painting a couch qua couch and capturing the very essence of couch, its couchness, insists absurdly upon painting a couch from the front, side or some other way.^26

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^26^ 597-598; Plato's remarks are here taken out of context. He has deliberately chosen this oversimplified example as the slightest refraction of a complex point. Nevertheless we may with some appropriateness use this example as representative of an aspect of his aesthetics, even though it is a few steps removed from the very essence of his thought.
In looking at the kouros from Tenea one sees the essence of kouros, stiffly erect, head level, hair in a pattern of ringlets, hands to sides and cupped, left foot advanced, displaying all the patterned formalism expected of this frozen type. Loewy notes that this particular kouros represents an advance; it is plurifacial and relatively well developed from three aspects, the front and sides, with the back given less artistic attention. But "each view came independent and entire into the artist's mind, and presents itself now independent and entire in the completed work." The parataxis which we shall later see demonstrated in other aspects of Greek thought and literature is thus represented in Greek sculpture. The disregard of spatial relationships in the fine arts is correlative to the paratactic modes of Greek literature.

That Greek art is "executed under absolute authority

27E. Loewy, The rendering of nature in early Greek art, 58.

28See T. B. L. Webster, Greek art and literature, 530-400, B.C., 28-29. J. White (The birth and rebirth of pictorial space, 238) states: "Just as the rapid succession of the photographic frames produces movement on the cinema screen so there the rapid shuttling of the planar forms almost induces a diagonal compromise within the mind of the spectator." See also R. Carpenter, The esthetic basis of Greek art, 130-140.
of opinion imposed by the particular conventions of their
day" is clear even when the rigid, abstract, ideological
kouroi give way to figures in motion. Figures running,
failing or fighting continue to be rendered according to a
restricted number of formulas. But the reason for these
mannerisms and the Greek reluctance to render concrete
nature is more important to our point.

Aristotle's and Plato's dicta concerning Greek art are
no more than a posteriori statements of what has happened,
rather than a priori dictates of what should happen. The
reason for the abstract condition of Greek art (called
"classic purity" by the nineteenth century and "bloodless
stasis" by the over-reaction of the twentieth century to
nineteenth century aestheticism) can be diagnosed in various
ways, all of which point to the same end. But the descrip-
tive diagnosis which is most appropriate to our vantage
point is the oral tradition. Since the progression from
conceptualism to naturalism is parallel to the regression
of the oral and the succession of the written tradition,
the conventions of Greek art are at least as much the

\[29\] C. Seltman, Approach to Greek art, 32. On the
political motivations of styles in Greek art, see A. Hauser,
The social approach to art, vol. 1, 68-100.
products of necessity as they are of choice. The visual sense was dominated by the audile-tactile perspective. The aural sense has an affinity for the universal which the visual sense does not possess. The particular, considered as the natural appearance of an isolated object, has as minor a role in the Greek arts as in Aristotelian logic.

The absence or distortion of visual perspective is most explicit in the primary missing ingredient of Greek painting, foreshortening. The presentation of multiple figures on an amphora complicated several times over the problem of anatomical accuracy and added the burden of presenting three-dimensional accuracy in a primarily two-dimensional medium. The result White exemplifies in his

30 W. M. Ivins (Art and geometry, 33) extends the application of this remark on Greek art to a point that may be extreme, but one at least worth attention if not acceptance: "Except for a few white-ground pots which, perhaps, show evidence of having been drawn from models, the Greek forms give every sign of having been drawn from memory of standardized objects seen from standardized positions."

31 Gombrich (131) parallels the gradual development of foreshortening with the refinement of illusion-techniques in the theater.
description of typical warrior and four-horse chariot scenes:

From the earliest times two standard horse and chariot compositions had been handed down. The first, and the more common, was the purely profile view, whether with stationary, with walking, or with galloping horses. The other is the frontal view, in which the horses are invariably shown as standing still. These compositions represent the front and side elevations of a chariot and four, and are the counterpart of the pure frontal settings which are always used for the more simple solid objects. . . . All the forms lie in a single plane. All the movement is in one direction. . . . In horses, as in human beings, no attempt is made to give an anatomical explanation of this swift transition from a front-view to a side-view. The result is consequently not foreshortening in the accepted sense."

32J. White, 237-238. He supplements his specific demonstrations of the limited spatial design in antiquity with a discussion of the corresponding absence of developed perspective theory (236-262) and reminds us that the first references to perspective in pictorial art were delayed until Vitruvius' De Architectura. Ivins (40-42) finds the presence of no more than an embryonic theory of optics an inhibiting force in the development of Euclidean geometry: "To any Greek the ideas that parallel lines could be said to meet at infinity, that two straight lines could be a curve, or that $A \times B$ is not necessarily the same as $B \times A$, would have seemed sheer madness. The meaning of all these things is quite simply that Euclid's geometry was based on the tactile-muscular intuitions. It is further important to notice that neither Euclid nor any of his Greek successors made any use in proof of the idea of infinity. The tactile-muscular awarenesses of things are awarenesses of things here, literally at hand. Infinity, wherever it is, as [sic] by definition escapes handling and measurement. Intuitionally it belongs in the field of vision." See also F. M. Cornford, "The invention of space," in Essays in honour of Gilbert Murray, 215-235.
When a greater sophistication characterizes the artistic crater and hydria, the figures formerly in a row on one level now are depicted on several levels. But foreshortening is still absent or inadequate. The multi-level figures tend to be of the same size. We can bring another sense to the fore to explain this absence of visual perspective: "When we look at a shelf or table covered with objects of the same size, those in the back rows are visually overlapped by those in the front rows and appear to be smaller than they are. But if we shut our eyes and reach out with our hands and feel the objects, not only are all the objects tactually of the same size but there is no overlapping of further objects by nearer ones."\(^{33}\) The most tactile art was celature. As Seltman says of this art mode, "The most admired artists among the Greeks themselves were not the masons, nor even the modellers, casters and finishers of fine bronzes--but the celators."\(^{34}\)

The high quality to which Greek art could rise is slighted in our remarks by our emphasis upon its conventional

\(^{33}\)Ivins, 30-31.

\(^{34}\)C. Seltman, 72.
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33Ivins, 30-31.

34C. Seltman, 72.
aspects. The fifth century was the golden age of Greece in all aspects of its artistic life, fine art and verbal art. But as each person reflects upon his choice of the superior example of Greek fine art, simultaneous attention might be given to whether or not its date corresponds to the more literate second half of the fifth century. Celature above all other Greek art maintains the most consistently high quality in its development. A familiar theme of celature, the hero riding on a dolphin, enables us to illustrate Herodotus' ability to take a static theme and give it a creative development.

Herodotus (I.23-24) injects the traditional and popular story of Arion and the dolphin into his first chapters on Periander, sovereign ruler of Corinth (I.20-25). On the one hand, the mention of Arion is secondary to Herodotus' initial characterization of Periander, and on the other hand, the legendary boy on a dolphin story is secondary to Arion's importance as a historical figure. Herodotus (I.23) apologizes for his inability to be more precise about Arion's artistic achievements, but reasonably feels no compulsion to enter a similar plea for the Arion mythos. The mythos is presented for what it patently is and not as objective historical fact. The credibility of
the story to the Corinthians and Lesbians, however, receives appropriate emphasis. Herodotus' description of the importance to Corinth and Lesbos of this conventional entertainment provides an unconventional twist to the stock narrative. If Herodotus signals his audience that he puts no credence in the legend, he nevertheless makes the story historical by indicating that others do believe the account. Herodotus is not able in his history to assume the role of the New Rationalist who is infallibly capable (in a way none of his sources is) of stripping away the mythos and laying bare the logos for his nearly as enlightened audience and readers. Herodotus recognizes that such a task is impossible. The prejudices of his historical subjects would be replaced by the prejudices of the historian. Herodotus realizes that subjective history is the beginning of objective history. History as it was viewed by the peoples he investigates must be the first step in the process of uncovering history as it was. As Herodotus proceeds in his narrative he indicates his belief or disbelief, if possible

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35 I.23-24.8. The myth surrounding Arion and his historical contribution to Greek letters are discussed by How and Wells, vol. 1, 63-64; and by A. H. Sayce, The ancient empires of the East, Herodotus I-III, 13-14.
indicating reasons for his position or, as we have said, remaining agnostically silent when he must. Herodotus can be a historical policeman of the prejudices of others more easily than of his own.

The first value of the Arion mythos or logos, then, is as subjective history. But Herodotus has given the stock account a still more unconventional dimension. He has used the story to establish the close, politically and commercially important relationship between Periander, sovereign of ἀδελφὸς Κόρινθος (II. 2.570), and Thrasymachus, astute ruler of Miletus. As Myres describes this episode in Herodotus, "Periander not Arion is the hero, a great sea-lord, punishing misdemeanour on the high seas, even in one of his own ships and at the expense of a passenger from Lesbos; the right sort of friend to keep the seaways clean, and Miletus supplied with corn." 36 This is the initial portrait of Periander, a patron of the arts, 37 on good terms with Delphi, a ruler who has entered Corinth as

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37 Periander's court is the setting of Plutarch's Septem sapientium convivium.
an inventive military, political, and commercial force. These last three characteristics qualify Periander for inclusion in the traditional stereotype of a tyrant.

In the Republic Plato repeatedly pictures the tyrant as a lawless parasite upon society (e.g. 587d) and mentions Periander by name as an adherent to Thrasymachus' doctrine of might makes right (336a). In the Protagoras (343a) Plato gives his list of the Seven Sages and, consistent with his beliefs, excludes the name of Periander. In the Politics (1313a-b) of Aristotle, the models for the traditional form of tyranny, that which governs by universal repression, are Periander and "the Persians." Herodotus is bound to be seriously handicapped by this stereotype. Herodotus is handicapped by the historical traditions available to him, and this means to the conventions of that tradition as well. Before returning specifically to Periander we need to consider other applications of τυραννος in Herodotus, in particular its usage in the debate on constitutions (III.80-82).

38 For the traditional inclusion of Periander in the list, see Diog. Laer. I.13; 40-42; and also DK 10.1.

39 Aristotle's extensive comments on tyranny and democracy in the Politics are briefly summarized in the Rhetoric 1365b-1366a.
Otanes' objections to tyranny are rather concise and thorough. Here are three attributes of the tyrant among those cited by Otanes. In order to illustrate more fully the conventional quality of the Persian commander's words, they are followed by similar expressions drawn from Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*.

1. The tyrant is by nature autocratic:
   a) καὶ δ' ἄν εἶναι χρηματητημένοι μοναρχὶς,
      τῇ ἔξεστι ἀνευθύνω ταί βοθλεταί; (III.80.3)
   b) τραχύς μόνορχος οδώρ ὑπεθύνως (Oceanus, 324).

2. The tyrant is by nature treacherous:
   a) καὶ τοιοὶ ἄνδρα γε τύραννον ἀφθονον ἔδει εἶναι,
      ἑξούτα γε πάντα τά ἁγαθά· τὸ δὲ ὑπεναυτίου τούτου
      εξ τούς πολιτήτας πέφυκε. (III.80.4)
   b) τοιάδ' ἔξ ἐμοῦ
      δ' τῶν θεῶν τύραννος ἀφελημένος
      κακαίσι ποιναις ταῖσθε μ' ἐξημελψατο.
      ἔνεστι γάρ πως τούτο τῇ τυραννίδι
      υδάμα, τοῖς φίλοις μὴ πεποιθέναι. (P., 221-225)

3. The tyrant's most distinguishing characteristic is his ὑβρις:
   a) ἐγγίνετε μὲν γάρ οἱ ὑβρισὶν ὑπὸ τῶν παρεόντων
      ἁγαθῶν (III.80.3).
b) οὖτως ἄβριξεν τοὺς ἄβριξοντας χρεών. (Prometheus to Hermes, 970c). 40

In Otanes' brief speech ἄβρις and θέμμος, or variants, appear four times each as descriptive of tyranny. In this passage τυραννίς is opposed to ἴσονομία not to δημοκρατία, 41 although the latter word appears on two occasions elsewhere in Herodotus' text. 42 The word democracy is new. 43

The imprecision in the concept is revealed by variations in the description. Otanes also uses the phrase πλήθος ἀρχον (80.6) and Darius in his consideration of the various speeches speaks of δῆμος ἀρχων (82.4). Elsewhere ἴσοκρατία (V.92a2) and ἴσηγορία (V.78) are used to express the same sense. 44 There is little confusion in the use of

40 On the stock descriptions of tyranny in Greek thought, see G. Thomson, "A note on Prometheus Vinctus," CR 43, 1929, 3-5 and Aeschylus and Athens, 452 n.9.

41 G. Vlastos ("Isonomia," AJP 74, 1953, 337-366) distinguishes these two abstract nouns.

42 VI. 43-3; 131.1. The former word is used four times: III.80.6; 83.1; 142.3; V.37.2.

43 For "early" signs of the concept in Aeschylus' Suppliants see V. Ehrenberg ("Origins of democracy," Historia 1, 1950, 517-524). It is important, but not essential, to Ehrenberg's thesis that the play be dated in the 490's. Since the publication of Oxy. Pap, XX.2256, fr.3, it seems very likely that the play's production was in the spring of 463. See discussion of Podlecki, 42-62.

44 See Ehrenberg, 526-547; T. A. Sinclair, A history of Greek political thought, 33-42.
the word tyrant; he is known only too well. And there is a strong prejudice surrounding the word, as is revealed by the identification of τύραννος with μοδύαρχος (E.g., III. 82.1).

Given the stereotyped concept of tyranny among peoples groping toward the details of popular government, we should scarcely be surprised by the next picture of Periander (III.48-53). In Book One Herodotus was discreetly faithful to the conventional account, and yet possessed of sufficient historical genius to rise above it without falsifying either the history or the legend. In Book Three he is similarly adept. Herodotus now discusses the details of Periander's reign. In doing so, however, he must portray Periander τύραννος. And as expected, the traditional material tends to overwhelm the historical reality behind it. The sensational details come thick and fast. Periander orders Corcyrean boys castrated (ch. 48-49); puts to death his

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45 For an examination of the facts and theories surrounding Herodotus' personal objections to tyranny, see Jacoby, cols. 216-224.

46 Herodotus softens the savagery of this deed by noting (49.2) that Periander acts in retaliation for murder of his younger son by the Corcyraeans. On the chronological problems posed by this passage, see H-W vol. 1, 269 and 441; Sayce, 251-252.
wife (ch. 50); banishes and harasses on mere pretext his younger son Lycophron (chs. 50-52); conquers and takes captive on similar, thin motives his grandfather, Procles, tyrant of Epidaurus (ch. 52), and when the Corcyraeans slay Lycophron, conquers the island (ch. 53). The mode of presentation closely resembles a moralistic romance warning against the evils inherent in tyranny. A too swift glance at the narrative suggests that Herodotus has done no more than present an entertaining story.

The reality behind the appearance, however, gives us as much historical detail as could be gathered, and writers after Herodotus do little more than confirm his information. The historical details provided are: 1) Corinth breaks her former alliance with Samos; 2) Periander has dealings with Alyattes of Lydia; 3) Periander was allied with Procles of Epidaurus; 4) Periander conquered Epidaurus; 5) Periander reduced Corcyra; 6) Lycophron may have ruled Corcyra; 7) there were no offspring to succeed Periander. If Periander's domestic life is reported in a fashion more

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\( \text{One of the details added to Herodotus' account is the name of Periander's successor, his nephew Psammetichus (Aristotle, Politics 1315b).} \)

\( \text{See H-W, vol. 1, 270.} \)
akin to fact than to fiction we may add: 1) Periander killed his wife, Melissa;\(^4\) and 2) ostracised his younger son.\(^5\)

Periander reappears twice in Book Five (92 and 95). The earlier passage affords a grotesque view of Periander which in its conventionalism is somewhat similar to the general tone of the portrait in Book Three; the latter passage resembles the tone and manner of characterization in Book One. This first description of the Cypselids in Book Five comes toward the end of Herodotus' retrospective view of Athenian history (55-96), which in form is a digression from his consideration of the Ionian Revolt (V.28-V.48). The speaker is Socles, a Corinthian, who feels his people's history well qualifies him to describe the evils of tyranny and thus the ills which would beset Athens should Sparta's plan to restore Hippias be accepted.

The speaker then is not Herodotus, and it is important

\(^4\)In 52.4 Periander speaks of the death of his wife as συμφορὴ τῆς. This reference combined with the passage in V.92n suggests that his killing her may have been a bit less cold-blooded than it first appears. Diogenes Laertius (I.94) says her given name was Lyside, Melissa being Periander's name for her, and that he killed her in a fit of anger.

\(^5\)See I. Bruns, Das literarische Porträt der Griechen, 113-114.
to emphasize this fact. For there is a tendency to read this section too literally and dismiss it as "the fairy-tale which occupies the main part of Herodotus' chapter on Cypselus" and then to point up brilliantly the inconsistencies of the speech as though the speech were by Herodotus rather than by Socles.\textsuperscript{51} How and Wells in usual fashion hand down dogmatic conclusions without supporting them. They are on the right track in expressing puzzlement over incongruities in the chapter, but blissfully assign their own naivete to Herodotus: "We may further note his light-hearted assurance that he gives the actual words spoken (τὰ δὲ) in contrast with the more cautious phrases of Thucydides (τοιαύτα, τοιόδε)."\textsuperscript{52} Herodotus has quite naturally prefaced this speech with the words Σωκλέης ἔλεξε τὰ δὲ. He has no desire to be identified with the contradictions and grotesque details Socles volunteers, but is convinced of the accuracy of his own report of Socles' incredible, self-refuting narrative. Herodotus is not the fool some would make him who assert his belief in the literal accuracy of an account which first offers a long

\textsuperscript{51} A. Andrewes, 46.

\textsuperscript{52} Vol. 2, 51.
and irrelevant but sympathetic portrait of Cypselus from birth to the time he assumes power, and then in curt fashion stitches to the end of this story the absurd conclusion that the moment Cypselus became tyrant he banished many citizens, robbed some and killed more. Herodotus wishes Socles, not himself, to be identified with the statement that Periander, of a milder temper than his father, communicated long-distance with Thrasybulus and thereupon became more blood-thirsty than Cypselus. 53

In his final description of Periander's rule, Herodotus (V.95) points to the Corinthian's position of prestige and importance vis-à-vis Mytilene and Athens. A dispute between these two powers over Sigeum in the Troad was arbitrated by Periander and resolved in favor of Athens.

Pearson's understanding of Periander in Herodotus results from the over-literal reading we have described above and the corresponding failure to evaluate the context of Herodotus' report:

In fact, the Periander whom Herodotus offers us is bloodthirsty, suspicious, a man without feeling who sends boys to be made into eunuchs, who murders his

53 Aristotle (Politics 1284a and 1311a) reverses the roles of Thrasybulus and Periander. Diogenes Laertius (I.100) adheres to Herodotus' version.
wife and quarrels with his sons; there is not a single redeeming feature in his character. Yet he also tells us that when the Athenians and Mytilenians wanted someone to arbitrate their quarrel about Sigeum, they choose Periander as arbitrator (V 95)—clear evidence that he held a position of respect in the Greek world, and Herodotus makes not the slightest effort to explain why he should have been respected in this way. He offers us this conventional melodramatic portrait of a black-hearted villain, and then shows him acting as international arbitrator. 54

In this description Pearson has overlooked his own distinction between the real and conventional elements in character-portrayal. As we have shown, this distinction is essential to a proper evaluation of Herodotus' achievement. Pearson partially corrects himself when he later (144) describes Periander's portrait as the product of "popular memory, colored by prejudice and hatred." We may reasonably conclude that it is this factor, the weight and cloud of tradition, which precludes Herodotus from expanding upon Periander's role as international arbitrator.

Bruns (114) describes the disparate elements in Herodotus' account together with the reasons for them and renders a judgment upon Herodotus' success: "... jener Periander ist ein Ungethüm, dieser eine ächt tragische Figur. Wer unvermittelt so Verschiedenartiges vereinigen

54JHI 15, 1954, 142.
konnte, der hat über die innerliche Zusammengehörigkeit der Überlieferung nicht nachgedacht. Die Urheber der einzelnen von Herodot benutzten Stücke haben ganz verschiedene Vorstellungen von Periander gehabt. Herodot war ihm nicht wohlgensinnt, sein Wesen hat er sich nicht klar gemacht." While Bruns concedes a certain subtle unity to Herodotus' portrait and admits the difficulties Herodotus faced, he nevertheless concludes with an unduly negative evaluation of the result. As we have tried to show, Herodotus has done an amazing job of finding the flickering lights in the darkness of his sources and their traditional view of a tyrant. Rather than say Herodotus has tried hard but failed, we should say he has done well but not the impossible, which would be the presentation of a lucid and consistent artistic whole. In a similar way we note the flaws in King Lear and Faust but in the final analysis offer a positive critique.

Herodotus is indebted to his oral and written traditions as Shakespeare's King Lear is to Saxo Grammaticus and Goethe's Faust is to the Faustbuch. The debt is a mixed one. The sources provide valuable inspiration and approaches; but their fixity causes a twofold restriction. In a direct way the bias of these sources is inhibiting and indirectly
the popular tradition represented by these sources is fixed in audience-attitudes and inhibits both accuracy and the free play of artistry. Our final judgment, however, in these three instances is not essentially negative but one of success with reservations. And the reservations serve to verify the genius of the final products.

A major reason for the conventional elements in Herodotus is overlooked or minimized by Pearson. The oral tradition is a conventionalized mode of communication. Not even the gifted Homeric singers of tales operated without a mental storehouse of stock epithets, stock phrases, stock lines and stock passages. Because of the absence of written records, Herodotus undertook his ἱστορία on the basis of ὄψις and ἀκοή. 55 Herodotus' historiographic technique of utilizing ἀκοή or "hearsay," even when this limited source of information was accompanied by a sharp critical sense of the plausible or probable, forced him to acquiesce in 1) the inevitable prejudices of informants more faithful to their own sympathies than the truth and 2) the even more

55 This point if frequently noted by Herodotus (e.g., proem; II.19; 44; 75; 113; 118). Powell's lexicon cites seventy-nine instances of ὄψις, and two hundred appearances of ἀκοή and ἀκοω. See related discussion in Jacoby, cols. 395-400.
stereotyped mode of expression of a semi-official or official informant. The latter would not utter random thoughts over a campfire, but deliver the interpretation consonant with his office and position, whether that position be political or religious. 56

The task of source-evaluation was a problem of great magnitude for Herodotus. This can be emphasized by recalling the considerable difficulty Thucydides faced. Herodotus' contemporary wrote from a much more restricted temporal and spatial perspective, even further limited by his political preoccupation. And yet the meager written sources available to the slightly later historian presented similarly crucial problems of criticism and evaluation. Jacoby expands upon this point: 'I have tried to prove that the 'Atthis,' i.e. the history of Athens, as written by Athenians between c. 350 and 263 B.C., does not derive from an old and semi-official chronicle kept by the priestly board of Exegetai, but was created in the lifetime of

56 Bury would call Herodotus' necessary reliance upon his informants the naiveté of an uncritical mind. Bury's would-be compliment that this quality makes Herodotus a second Homer is an appropriately gross overstatement, but it is relevant to our general point. See J. B. Bury, The ancient historians, 74.
Thukydides by a learned man, the foreigner Hellanikos of Lesbos. He, while relying on living memory and to a certain extent on documents (among which the archons' list seems by far the most important), had in the main to use his imagination in order to fit a mass of isolated, often contradictory, and most undatable evidence into the framework of a continuous history." 57 Without uncritically accepting Jacoby's speculations about Hellanicus' sources, we may safely affirm this much: the documentary sources of Hellanicus and Thucydides were extremely restricted in quality, quantity, availability and breadth. And as frustrating for Thucydides as must have been the limitations in sources for immediate and local Athenian affairs, we can only guess at how much more complicated the problem was when he extended his historical investigations beyond that sphere. When we read Thucydides' chastisement of Hellanicus for not treating more satisfactorily the Pentecontaetia (1.97.2), we are tempted to urge him to be grateful rather than annoyed. We know enough about Hellanicus of Lesbos to be certain that he represents a measurable advance upon the quality of his predecessors. As Jacoby says of earlier

57 F. Jacoby, Atthis, v.
specimens of local history: "Hekataios and Herodotos speak of these last histories as "ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ, as though they were persons, and they regard the epic poets as the representatives of the species."58

Out of sheer necessity, then, and not only out of a credulity or naivete Herodotus records a variety of θωμαστά. At times he relates a fabulous narrative without finding any necessity to so label it. And at other times he will comment: for example, upon completing his record of marvelous tales concerning Rhampsinitus, he feels obligated to justify his procedure and does so convincingly (II.123). At a later point he tells us with rich brevity (IV.195.2): ταῦτα εἰ μὲν ἔστι ἀληθέως οὐκ οἶδα, τὰ δὲ λέγεται γράφω.

Hutton quotes this passage from Herodotus and is led to say:

But he was saved from writing lies solely or chiefly by another element in his nature more fortunate than his passion for reporting; he was not an historian only, but a poet. He looked at persons and events in the large; he saw men and facts in masses; he generalized life and history.

And this brings me to a new point; I have said Herodotus was a poet as well as an historian. I now say he was an historian also: for the true

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58 Atthis, 2; also see 228 n.9.
historian, as we well know, does not write much of accessions, coronations, royal births and deaths and marriages, wars and rumors of war, campaign and march and counter-march, laws, and lawyers, but of what people in the mass said and thought; of their religion and ideals of life, of their habits, their habit even, their general make-up. Measured by this standard, Herodotus is the truer historian than Thucydides.59

Quite clearly there is a tension in Herodotus between the artistic and scientific or, in terms of the discussion above, between mythos and logos, that is to say, between the world of Homer and the world of Callicles, the Sophist. Herodotus, as both Hutton and Pearson have noted in quite different fashions, is at least as interested in portraying real people in a "cluster configuration" (to use McLuhan's phrase) as he is in reporting about conventional persons in a linear progression. McLuhan obliquely expands upon his interpretation (cited in the previous chapter) in this excerpt from his prose-poem: "Until WRITING was invented, we lived in acoustic space, where the Eskimo now lives: boundless directionless, horizonless, the dark of the mind, the world of emotion, primordial intuition, terror. Speech is a social chart of this dark bog.

"SPEECH structures the abyss of mental and acoustic space, shrouding the race; it is a cosmic, invisible architecture of the human dark. Speak that I may see you." 60

Thucydides (I.22.4) wished to make a decisive break from the oral litterateurs of his past: μνημά τε ες α|ει μάλλον η αγωνίσμα ες τα παραχρήμα ακούειν ξυγκείται.

Thucydides thus wishes to produce a history quite different from the entertainments and quasi-histories of earlier poets, mythographers and "logographers," 61 who sang, recited or recorded their composites of fact and fancy. But almost immediately Thucydides slightly qualifies this indictment of some of his predecessors. While Thucydides regards his own methods as a monumental improvement, nevertheless the grotesque improbabilities of the Peloponnesian War force him to caution against uncritically rejecting the verbal record of seemingly incredible events in earlier times (I.23.3): τα τε πρώτερον ακοή μεν λέγομενα, ἔργο δὲ

60 "Five sovereign fingers taxed the breath," in Explorations in communication, eds., E. Carpenter and M. McLuhan, 207.

61 On the mutability of this term see L. Pearson, Early Ionian historians, 1-24.
In this passage Thucydides has acknowledged his own debt to the oral tradition and upheld its authority. The scientific tendencies of his contemporary context are at odds with the more conspicuously oral society of his past. The result is the natural ambivalence Thucydides expresses in these two quotations. As Parke observes: "In the fifth century education still consisted in a knowledge of Homer and the other poets. Prose had not yet taken any place among the works of literature with which every cultured man could be expected to be acquainted. It would follow that when Herodotus or Thucydides referred to a passage in poetry they might reasonably expect the place to be known to their public and need only cite a few words to waken a familiar echo in the mind."  

Parke, however, has slighted an obvious but important point. The audience, aural or optic, was in no position to be familiar with prose sources which did not exist. Thucydides wished to live in his Sophistic present but reluctantly acknowledged its debt to a Homeric past, a past important to his society and

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62 H. W. Parke, "Citation and recitation: a convention in early Greek history," Hermathena 67, 1946, 84.
important to his writing from its first chapter onward. In examining τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν Thucydides quickly comes upon King Minos (I.1.2-4).

We have discussed in chapter one the anti-historical tendency in early Greek philosophical thought and have just observed in fifth century literary modes the necessary avoidance of an appeal to written historical records (because of a dearth of records and because of the oral mimesis of authors and audience) and the correlative deafness of the time to a "scientific" approach to history. If Thucydides is then to be judged the first scientific historian we must balance this label, which is often used casually, against the conscious archaizing of his speeches, his defense of this practice (I.22.1), and his employment of it.63 In chapter twenty-two Thucydides tells us that if literal accuracy is impossible in his report, at least the norms of historical probability and accurate verisimilitude will be observed. A speech is particularly dependent upon oral rather than written record and, as Thucydides complains, the inattentiveness or partisanship of those present

63 See J. D. Denniston, Greek prose style, 17 and 28-31; J. H. Finley, Jr., Thucydides, 250-288, esp. 273-274.
produced varying accounts. To take a specific example, when Thucydides relates the speeches made to the Athenian Assembly by the Corinthian and Corcyraean embassies in 434 B.C., he employs one oral record which cites another oral report as proof of the validity of the first report. A Corinthian ambassador notes the historically consistent services of his nation to Athens and urges reciprocity (I.42.1): Ου ευθυμηθέντες καὶ νεώτερος τις παρὰ πρεσβυτέρον αὐτὰ μαθὼν ἄξιουτω τοῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν ἡμᾶς ἀμύνεσθαι. As Parke notes in citing this passage, "The earliest service which they had mentioned was described by Herodotus (VI, lxxxix), but it would not at this period have been common form for an orator to have told the Athenians that they had read such things in the λογογράφοι. And of course it would not have been common form for Thucydides to report this speech with such a reference.

Herodotus and Thucydides represent a mentality more advanced than that of the mythographers and logographers,

64 I.22.3. Our modern visual bias is evident in the Loeb translation (C. F. Smith, vol. 1, 39) of oì παρόντες as "eye-witnesses" rather than "ear-witnesses."

65 Hermathena 67, 1946, 84-85.
but each in his own way owes a heavy debt to these and like influences. Prose and literacy were new, less popular than poetry and oral tradition, and undeveloped. Before the Sophists initiated a formal educational system, the fathers of oratory, Corax and Tisias, provided the initial impetus which relied more upon voice and ear for educational communication than upon pen and eye. Rather than objecting to the Homeric tradition or attempting a reconciliation with it, as presocratic philosophy had done, the Sophists turned their backs on the Homeric tradition. The time was more amenable to such a stance, but positions of the Sophists still brought them a certain notoriety, as Plato frequently attests. Plato, however, was defending an old world of aristocratic ideals, a world in which the masses, by definition, were at best a subjugated part. Protagoras' democratic statement (DK 80 B1), πάντων χρημάτων μέτρου ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, was a rudimentary principle of this social and educational revolution.

Forsdyke says of sixth century Greece that "the old epic, works of Homer, Hesiod and the Cyclic poets, had biblical authority for the ordinary Greek citizen. These poets were the inspired prophets of the nation, and the subject-matter of the poems was at once religion and
ancient history." To this list we should add Solon, who as prophet and historian reportedly anticipated the rise of Peisistratus: εκ νεφέλης πέλεται χιόνος μένος ἣδε χαλάζης, βρουτῇ δ' έκ λαμπρᾶς γίγνεται ἀστεροπής· ἀνδρῶν δ' έκ μεγάλων πόλισιν ὄληται, ἐς δὲ μονάρχον δήμος ἀδρέετη δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν· λήνη δ' εξ<ά>ραυν′ <ο> δάδιον ἐστὶ κατασχεῖν ὕστερου, ἀλλ' ἤδη χρῆ <περὶ> πάντα νοεῖν. Oral education before the Sophists was a stabilizing rather than a revolutionary force. Marrou describes this continuing tradition of Greek education in the first half of the fifth century: "Any child who wished to take his place one day at the banquets as an educated person had not only to learn a certain amount of Homer's poetry—which had no doubt quickly become a 'classic'—but also to set about acquiring a repertoire of what were essentially lyrical poems.

"Athens attached just as much importance as did Sparta

66 J. Forsdyke, Greece before Homer, 138.

67 E. Diehl, fr. 10.

68 On Solon's self-awareness of these elements in his poems see F. Will, "Solon's consciousness of himself," TAPA 89, 1958, 301-311.
to the moral quality of these songs and to their value as moral training." But during the interlude between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars an intellectual rupture occurred. An educational "system" which had been aristocratic and tribal was replaced by systems which were less aristocratic and more intellectually fragmented. The foreigners who represented presocratic philosophy prepared the way for the foreigners of the sophistic; but only the latter were able to blend revolutionary pronouncements with revolutionary action and even effect institutionalization of their views. As Lesky observes, "No other intellectual movement can be compared with the sophistic in the permanence of its results." We may also take note of the apparent suddenness of the sophistic movement. An "intellectual revolution" appears to be a contradiction in terms, but this is virtually what happened. Political conditions aided the sophistic and made it appear the normal course of events.

Plato's Socrates was placed in the position of a reactionary objecting to what to many did not seem so very

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69 H. I. Marrou, A history of education in antiquity, 70.
70 A. Lesky, A history of Greek literature, 341.
new. Marrou (91-92) summarizes the Socratic objections to the pragmatism:

In the first place, Socrates appears as the mouthpiece of the aristocratic tradition; politically, he seems to be "the centre of an anti-democratic clique" that includes people like Alcibiades and Critias and Charmides. When he charges the Sophists with being too exclusively concerned with political virtù, with effective action, and thus in danger of relapsing into an attitude of cynical amoralism, he takes his stand on the traditional values. . . .

Secondly, faced with the fundamental utilitarianism of the Sophists' education, the narrow anthropomorphism which sees every branch of study as an instrument, a means to increased power and efficiency, Socrates asserted the transcendent claims of Truth. . . . It is by Truth and not by any power-technique that he will lead his pupil to ἄρετή, to spiritual perfection, to "virtue": the ultimate aim of human education is achieved by submitting to the demands of the Absolute.

Copleston rightly notes that the Sophists have transferred the concerns of Greek philosophy from the object to the subject.71 With the Sophists, philosophical attention shifts from the presocratic interest in the cosmological principle underlying all things to the individual man acting, rather than existing, in not given but self-determined circumstances. In the Theaetetus (161D), for example, this philosophical subjectivism and relativism can be observed

when Socrates quotes Protagoras as asserting, ἀυτὸς τὰ ἀυτοῦ ἐκαστὸς μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὁρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ.

Protagoras, the most distinguished of the Sophists by Plato's report, claims wryly that the Sophists' teachings, or better we should say "method" (τέχνη) is ancient, but that its earlier practitioners, fearing oppression, disguised themselves, for example, as poets and prophets and musicians. Homer and Orpheus are cited among others as early crypto-Sophists. Protagoras' humorous point is well taken, however, on at least two grounds. Plato well mirrors the fears of many that the Sophists were advocating cultural and political innovations. And, in addition, as Protagoras says with some disdain later in the dialogue under his name (318D–E), many of the Sophists are educational specialists rather than generalists. Protagoras teaches ἀρετή he insists, but it is political rather than religious. His virtù can exist within a variety of religious, or non-religious, cultural environments; for its concerns are purely human, with microcosmic not macrocosmic man. In

72 Protagoras 316D. E. Zeller (Outlines of the history of Greek philosophy, 94) calls the sophistic method "empirico-inductive."
his mythical account of the origins of society (320C-323D), which is almost as Socratic as it is Protagorean, and in his explication of the myth, Protagoras reveals the literary aspect of his person but employs the story for a quite different reason. Protagoras repeatedly insists that he is not to be identified with those lesser Sophists who teach specialized disciplines and that his educational task is (318E-319A) εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὡς ἄν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικεῖν, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὡς τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατάτατος ἄν εἶη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.

Protagoras used the Prometheus myth to demonstrate the appropriateness of the task he assigned himself. Specialized skills may be possessed by men in varying degrees, or not at all. But through the process of human evolutionary development, which he traces, men have now reached the point where all have something of value to contribute socially on questions of political and moral conduct. This basic substrate of political and moral wisdom is acquired.

73 See E. Havelock (The liberal temper in Greek politics, 91-103) on the Socratic, or Platonic, aspects of the Prometheus story. See also 338E-348A, the debate over the meaning of the poem by Simonides.
rather than innately possessed (323C-324C). Protagoras views his task to be the developing and perfecting of these civic virtues in others. The central conflict of the dialogue is over the question, Can virtue be taught? At the end of the dialogue discussion ceases in typical fashion without a resolution of the main issue. The parting decision is that a future conversation between the two primary interlocutors should concentrate on an examination of the essential nature of virtue (361C).

Socrates' point is well taken as usual. This is the heart of the conflict between the aristocratic tradition represented by Socrates and the democratic tendencies of the different Sophists. Incipient democracy at home and developing foreign involvements were producing changes and needs in Athenian social structures and responsibilities, which Socrates found most unattractive. As Protagoras would have it, civic virtue is no longer the birthright of nobles, but the acquired and trained quality of every citizen. If the ideal of καλοκαιρίνα "maintained itself even in the democratic regime,"\textsuperscript{74} the content of the concept has certainly changed from its former character in the old

\textsuperscript{74}W. Jaeger, \textit{Paideia}, vol. 1, 318-319.
Athenian education. While formerly the ideal was artistic, it is now literary; where it was once athletic it has become intellectual.75

The Sophists introduced the world to humane letters. But that very pursuit which is to us somewhat holy was at that time a subtle heresy. "For with us the aura of solemnity which distinguishes the terms 'humane' and 'humanity' derives from the fact that man is thereby set off against the barbarian, or against the unreasoning beast. But the Greeks of the early and classical periods used the term 'human' in contradistinction to the notion of divinity: the human being is a mortal (brotos, thnetos) thing, whereas god is immortal (athanatos). Man is a frail and feeble being, the shadow of a dream."76 Gorgias converts this received wisdom of an oral society into the intellectually fragmented nihilism of a literate rationalism in his treatise Περὶ φύσεως. By means of clever dialectic, he argues to the nonexistence of all reality, laying initial stress upon the nonexistence of eternal reality:

εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν, ἦτοι ἀξεῖν ἔστιν ἡ γενετῶν ἡ ἀξεῖν

75 Marrou, 72-75.

76 B. Snell, The discovery of the mind, 246.
While we must observe Grote's caution against trying to squeeze the Sophists into a system, it is possible to speak of them collectively as representing a movement or tendency. Hence we can represent the above passage from Gorgias as indicating one route away from the old aristocracy's concept of man and at the same time speak of Lycophron as reaching the same destination, even if from a different starting-point. Lycophron, in a manner at least similar to that of Gorgias, objects to the religious sanction of Greek life in describing justice as grounded in a social rather than divine contract: ο νόμος συνθήκη καὶ, καθ'εὖ Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστὴς, ἔγγυητὴς ἄλληλοις τῶν ἐκαλών. And in his next fragment he attacks the old aristocracy directly: εὐγενείας μὲν οὖν ἀφανὲς τὸ κάλλος, ἐν λόγῳ δὲ τὸ σεμεύν. (DK 83.4.)

The presophistic age would have better understood

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78 Aristotle, Politics 1280b; DK 83.3.
Cicero's statement (De legibus, II. 27), "Antiquitas proxime accedit ad deos." Aeschylus would easily assent to many things which Euripides denied. Herodotus and Sophocles would be transitional figures between the mythos of Aeschylus and the logos of Euripides and, in large part, Thucydides. The mythos is aetiological and chronological (in one direction: to the past), the logos is fixed only in an instant rather than in a temporal continuity; the one looks to τὰ γεγενημένα, the other to τὰ ὠντα. The one looks for an extra-terrestrial ἀρχή, the latter may seek a temporary τέλος.

Van Groningen notes that "The Greek did not like anything totally new; real revolutions were exceedingly rare in his public as well as in his cultural life. His first inclination is to accept the past, not to reject it. He starts by being a pupil and a disciple. Everybody knows

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79 Compare, e.g., Agamemnon 160-183 and Hippolytus 373-430. In the former speech by the chorus, Zeus is life's comfort and wisdom; in Hippolytus' great speech, conscience, rational and irrational, is her sole, noble guide.

80 This sense of τέλος is Aristotelian or Stoic rather than scholastically subservient to eschatology, i.e. immanent, not transcendent, teleology; see van Groningen, In the grip of the past, 74ff. and 114ff.
how strong the cohesion was within the schools and how close the relation between pupil and teacher in all professions and sciences." Thrasymachus in an oratorical exercise (παράδειγμα) twice takes note of the grip of the past and concludes by relating it to the force and nature of the oral tradition: ἐβουλόμην μὲν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοί, μετασχεῖν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου τοῦ παλαίον [καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων], ἴνα οιωπέν ἀπέχῃ τοῖς νεωτέροις. (DK 85 Bl.) Gorgias describes the sacred truths of the oral tradition in terms of mephistophelean magic and seduction:

(10) The inspired incantations of words can induce pleasure and avert grief; for the power of the incantations, uniting with the feeling in the soul, soothes and persuades and transports by means of its wizardry. Two types of wizardry and magic have been invented, which are errors in the soul and deceptions in the mind.

(11) Their persuasions by means of fictions are innumerable; for if everyone had recollection of the past, knowledge of the present, and foreknowledge of the future, the power of speech would not be so great. But as it is, when men can neither remember the past nor observe the present nor prophesy the future, deception is easy; so that most men offer opinion as advice to the soul. But

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81 Van Groningen's comment (5) that real revolutions were exceedingly rare in Greek public life should not be read to exclude the fact that Greek states frequently underwent radical political reorientation.
opinion, being unreliable, involves those who accept it in equally uncertain fortunes.

(12) (Text corrupt) Thus, persuasion by speech is equivalent to abduction by force. . . . 82

Gorgias had played Faust and turned away from the past which his ancestors turned toward; as Faust, he had decided to live in time rather than in opposition to or heedless of it. In the Encomium, however, he displayed a superficiality characteristic of Faust's alter ego; here Gorgias trivialized a part of his past, the myth of Helen, and made it εὐνοῦν θαύματον. 83 In contrast to the attitude of Gorgias is that of Pindar: "when Pindar wants to consider an event of the day, a victory in the games for instance, sub specie aeternitatis, he does so sub specie mythi, i.e. temporis praeteriti." 84 Van Groningen goes on to record the conventionalizing effect of the past upon Greek literature:

. . . to feel agreeably at home with old, familiar things, with the deeds and traditions of the past, was normal in Greece. In literature: the Homeric epic is founded stylistically for a considerable

82DK 82 B11, parts 10-12 of "Encomium on Helen"; tr. K. Freeman, Ancilla to the pre-Socratic philosophers, 132.


84Van Groningen, 4.
part on the charm of the frequently recurring epithet and expression, the _cliché_ verse. The proems make immediately clear what part of the cyclic material the poet is going to produce; there is no need of mentioning or introducing either the essential facts or the important persons; the listener knows after the first words what subject will be treated, and he expects variation rather than creation. Tragedy follows the same course: apart from a very few striking exceptions, it confines itself, when choosing its subject, to the fixed mythical heroic material and goes to ruin aesthetically when the ability to vary the themes disappears. The different styles keep their fixed characteristics of languages, meter, motifs and sentiment. There are, of course, differences between Homer, Apollonius and Nonnus, but the element of imitation remains evident; there is nothing essentially new, although there is renovation, and new wine is always put into old vessels.

To reverse van Groningen's new wine and old vessels metaphor, the audience finds primary interest in the new form of the myth, the new bottle, and secondarily in the old wine, the old content and its conventional accretions. For the Greek audience was at least as concerned about the "how" of the narrative as the "what." The Herodotean motif of the Wise Adviser provides an illustration of this point: "... the wise adviser is a familiar figure in the pages of Herodotus. He recurs again and again throughout the work under a variety of names, brilliant and obscure, sometimes without a name at all; he appears as a king's counselor, or as a king himself; or he takes the name and
guise of a groom, or a little girl. In some cases the advice which he is recorded as having given has been accepted as historical fact; in others it has been dismissed as fabulous."85

One of van Groningen's "old vessels" is the conventional Greek sense of time. Greek secular time grows out of mythic time. Myth speaks of "transcendent time," a combination of noun and adjective which at first sight seem incompatible. Just as myth begins with the specific data of material reality but extends itself beyond concern for this "matter," so it extends itself beyond the events themselves and their concomitants, including action, process, and time. Time is that which primarily determines the dynamic rather than the static character of myth. As with all the other aspects of myth, the temporal one is relational (we avoid juxtaposing "relative" and "absolute"), not only ab origine and ontologically but--and this is more important--functionally. In this fashion myth operates in

85 R. Lattimore ("The wise adviser in Herodotus," CP 34, 1939, 24) regards his article as a supplement to H. Bishchoff's Der Warner bei Herodot (Marburg, 1932), but distinguishes more clearly the Warner and Berater, the tragic warner and practical adviser, and carefully designates the relevant passages in Herodotus.
history without distorting or abridging its purpose and value.

Myth in history can function in either or both of two ways. It can serve anthropologically to provide data for the reconstructor of history and it can serve perspectivally to provide the historian with a vantage point for the consideration of data. Every historian has certain "myths," either "secular" or "religious," which at least subconsciously influence the development of his historical reconstruction. In Herodotean myth has both a very clear, scientific, anthropological character and a rather clear—often freely admitted—perspectival character that influences and even directs his attitudes and approaches. Myth serves Herodotus anthropologically with data from which he can extract scientific understanding, and perspectivally with opportunities for an elucidation not of things, but of people, of life; to borrow a term from Cassirer without an unqualified acceptance of his meaning, with opportunities for the conveyance of "numinous," extra-scientific understanding.

Myth in Herodotean history goes beyond mythology, just as divine history and in its speculations superseded eschatological and cosmogonic myth. Herodotus and the
philosophers of his time are seeking the source, the principle, the arche, the essential element in human existence and time. Occasionally this concern with the arche takes Herodotus beyond the realm of fact and into that of speculation about the substrate underlying the facts; the arche inevitably touches upon the divine, as when Herodotus' Solon observes (I. 32.1), ἐν θεοὶν
πᾶν . . . φθονερὸν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες. This concern intrudes upon Herodotus' concept of causation. As Immerwahr observes:

The notion of causality in history, which has exercised historians particularly since the last century, is really a metaphorical notion taken from natural science. Herodotus, although he is an empiricist, is certainly not a scientist in the modern sense, and it is dangerous to apply to him scientific notions developed only in our own time. The observations Herodotus made in ethnology, geography, and history were not simply factual, but they included a great deal of what we today would call speculation: the workings of the divine, of abstract forces like custom, virtue, presumption, and others, as well as the observation of general laws, or rules, like the idea of balance, or the mutability of fortune.86

Time in myth is not a linear progression but a sacred state which incorporates all time or, if one chooses, is

timeless. We have noted Pindar's association of myth, the past and eternity. The past is the time-span closest to eternity by reason of aetiological regression. For the Greek mind the future in a secular context gives rise to a fear of the unknown. The present is not a referent of equal distribution with the past and the future, but an instant, a mere point, unenduring and therefore of itself, unintelligible. Aristotle (Meta. 983b) succinctly phrases the Greek point of view when he sets down in the shape of an aphorism the general norm that τιμώτατον . . . τὸ πρεσβύτατον. The present and past, then, coalesce and future cannot be easily discussed. Herodotus, however, in his proem and Thucydides in his historiographical remarks do suggest that there is a certain predictability about the future. Thucydides (I. 22.4) admits, ὃσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τὰν τε γενόμενων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ αυθρώπινον τοιοῦτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεθαι, ὥστε λίμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκοῦντως ἐξεί. Herodotus is less precise when he says he is writing ὡς μητὲ τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἔξειτηλα γένηται, and so that great deeds may not lack acclaim (ἀκλεα). We must be

87 Van Groningen, 109-120.
careful, however, not to overstate our interpretation of these passages. They imply in a very limited sense a certain predictability about the future. Herodotus and Thucydides are not writing exemplary history in the manner of a Polybius or Plutarch; rather they are describing themselves as scientific historians aware of the uncertain continuity and complex causation alive in historical time. This element of predictability is that which is proper to the scientific historian whose task is to "read" and correlate events in time. Herodotus, who wants splendid achievements worthy of record not to lack celebration in the same manner as Homeric poets, united the Greek present and future to the past in νλέα δυνατάν. 88

Interest in the future was viewed as both utilitarian and speculative. Aristotle (Meta. 980a-983b) places the artist above the craftsman: the man of leisure who knows the causes of things and has wisdom above the man of experience who does not have knowledge but merely habituation. The former men are the closest to divinity, the latter are slaves of the quotidian. Sambursky relates this attitude to the Greek lack of technical achievements. "The ancient

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88Il. 9.189, 524; Od. 8.73.
Greek believed fundamentally that the world should be understood, but that there was no need to change it." The presocratics, the philosopher-scientists of Greece developed the scientific method, but hindered its technological implementation. One exception to this scientific regression is astronomy: "... scientific method had ... fully achieved in astronomy the functional task of science—which of fitting man to foretell the future with the greatest possible confidence." A reason for the contrast between the feebleness of Greek earth-physics and the comparative sophistication of astronomy is suggested by a view attributed to Alcmaeon of Croton (DK 24 A12), who is likened to the Pythagoreans in his concern with the attunement (ίσονουμία) of the parts of the body and with the harmony between man and the cosmos: 'Αλκμαίων θεοῦς ζετό τῶν ἀστέρας εἶναι ἐμψύχους ὄντας.


90Sambursky, 263 (author's italics).
Presophistic continuity in thought, tradition and cultural development found complementary verification in nature herself and speculation by the natural philosophers—until the atomists of the latter half of the fifth century. In science this hampered a sophistication of the laws of causality:

Knowing of only natural, and not artificial, repetitions, they were unable to appreciate the great advantage of the latter over the former in the study of causality: in repeating an experiment we can change the initial conditions and test the effects of this change on the results, thus deepening our comprehension of causality. . . . These two processes—breaking up nature into isolated phenomena and repeatedly changing their course in an arbitrary way—have together speeded up our understanding of nature to an incredible extent. When set beside this breath-taking rate of advance, the progress of the Greeks in this field seems to us almost non-existent, based as it was on the study of things as they are in their entirety, but not as they may be when regarded as the sum totals of combinations of many factors.91

Natural causation is by no means identical with historical causation. Of immediate concern is the temporal correlation of the two. The shortcomings of Herodotus' analysis of cause and effect were not so crucial since historical causation cannot attempt to solve as many

91Sambursky, 268.
problems as can scientific causation. While the modern scientist puzzles over causality in relation to what Einstein calls the relativity of simultaneity, the historian is necessarily content to deal with classical time. On the other hand, while the scientist solves his problems by logical analysis abstracted from emotional content, the historian must attempt to cope with the emotional aspect in his analyses and accordingly reaches more tentative conclusions—or is forced to content himself with the mere exposition of a historical problem. How and Wells echo Plutarch in observing that Herodotus "continually confuses the mere occasion and the cause"; but frequently

92 Collingwood (214-215) offers a concrete distinction: "When a scientist asks 'Why did that piece of litmus paper turn pink?' he means 'On what kinds of occasions do pieces of litmus paper turn pink?' When an historian asks 'Why did Brutus stab Caesar?' he means 'What did Brutus think, which made him decide to stab Caesar?' The cause of the event, for him, means the thought in the mind of the person by whose agency the event came about: and this is not something other than the event, it is the inside of the event itself." Scientific causation then can be more inclusive and, dealing with fixed phenomena, more predictive.

93 H. Reichenbach, The rise of scientific philosophy, 144-156.

94 Vol. I, 45. The most offensive part of this quotation is the word "continually." A thoughtful corrective on this point is Immerwahr, TAPA 87, 1956, 239-280.
Herodotus' information prevents him from doing more than concluding that X (reportedly) came before Y or hypothesizing that the priority of X is causative of Y. If X and Y were physical events isolated from a human aspect, more precise conclusions could be reached about them. But purely physical causation is of no interest to a historian.

How and Wells (Vol. I, 46) conclude their objection to Herodotus' treatment of causation by lamenting, "In fact with Herodotus everything is personal. . . ." Ignoring the absurd overstatement created by the word "everything," we suggest that How and Wells are not objecting to Herodotus but rather to an element inherent in historiography. Earlier (Vol. I, 45) they take exception to Herodotus on the grounds that he "understands little of the great movements of which persons are only the expression." This suggests an approach which superimposes historical doctrine upon

95 An example of the former is I. 1-5.3. Without oversimplifying Herodotus' point in these chapters too severely, we may note that he has attempted to trace the beginnings of the Greek-Asiatic conflict to its remotest possible origins. In doing so he has found the dubious tradition more representative of occasions for the conflict than feasible causative factors. In V. 91.1 Herodotus suggests that Sparta's plan to restore Hippias is probably grounded in a political cause, her fear of growing Athenian power.
historical action. Images of class conflict and Spenglerian cycles come to mind, and How and Wells are left opting for irrational determinism in control of men and events. History gives an account of res gestae, actions of men in the past, and this fundamentally is what we find in Herodotus.

The shortcomings that affected causation in Greek physics were overcome in part by Herodotus through his personalization of events. He was able to intrude upon the natural flow of events by extracting an agent who could interpret or regulate the temporal passage without halting its development. Scientific method, on the other hand, dictates the sufficiency of its internal explanation, and the Greek view of time and nature imposed an added interpretive restriction.

From the temporal perspective natural and historical causation may differ in still another way. While history is oriented to the past, is descriptive of it and only implicitly and in part predictive of the future, natural causation may be explicitly directed to the future and predictive of it. Additionally, natural causation can refine its concern to a single causal relationship, while the complexity of human events requires the historian to deal with
multiple causation. As Bloch puts it, "history seeks for causal wave-trains and is not afraid, since life shows them to be so, to find them multiple."\(^96\)

We maintain that the element of human causation in Herodotus is not a deficiency. But, as we observed at some length in discussing Pearson's examination of real and conventional personalities in Herodotus, specific applications of human causation show defects. The fault, then, is in those applications not in the method itself. Perhaps the oral tradition and related factors made these shortcomings inevitable. But they did exist.

Immerwahr, summarizing the limits of historical causation in Herodotus, notes its temporal and extra-temporal aspects:

We have found that causation plays indeed a large part in the thought and construction of the Histories, but it would clearly be wrong to claim that causation could explain the total structure of the work. The basis of Herodotus' use of causation is rather the belief that it cannot be completely known by the historian. In this respect again, causation is merely one aspect of events, and events in general are only incompletely known to tradition and thus the historian's knowledge is also incomplete. . . . All of these are ultimate realities so far as history goes, and their description constitutes the true mythical element

\(^{96}\)M. Bloch, The historian's craft, 194.
in Herodotus. The workings of these forces is understood by the historian primarily by means of intuition, but Herodotus' approach is not therefore an irrational one. While they cannot be explained causally, they can be clarified by various analogies and mutual relationships with other elements in history.97

The conclusions of Immerwahr concerning mythical or, as he says, metaphysical causes in Herodotus, viz necessity, retribution, change of fortune, and balance, find an unwitting echo in Cassirer's discussion of time and religious consciousness:

And side by side with this logical concept of ananke, a new ethical concept of necessity arose more and more clearly and consciously. It is true that this concept developed primarily in Greek poetry, that a new meaning and power of the individual, of the ethical self as opposed to an all-powerful fate were for the first time discovered in tragedy; yet Greek thinking not only accompanied this process, this gradual breaking away from the mythical-religious source in which tragedy is originally rooted, but gave it its true foundation. Like the oriental religions, Greek philosophy in its beginnings saw the temporal order as at once physical and ethical. It looked upon time as the fulfillment of an ethical law.98

The above observation by Cassirer is much more applicable to Herodotus than the same author's contrast

97TAPA 87, 1956, 278-279.
between mythical time and historical time:

Thus myth knows nothing of that kind of objectivity which is expressed in the mathematical-physical concept or of Newton's absolute time which 'flows in and for itself, without regard to any outward object.' It knows historical time no more than it does mathematical-physical time. For even the historical consciousness of time contains very definite objective factors. It is based on a fixed chronology, a strict distinction of the earlier and later, and the observation of a determinate, unequivocal order in the sequence of the moments of time. Myth is aware of no such division of the stages of time, no such ordering of time into a rigid system where any particular event has one and only one position. As we know, it lies in the essence of mythical thinking that wherever it posits a relation, it causes the members of this relation to flow together and merge; and this rule of concrescence, this growing together of the members of a relation, prevails also in the mythical consciousness of time. The stages of time--past, present, future--do not remain distinct; over and over again the mythical consciousness succumbs to the tendency and temptation to level the differences and ultimately transform them into pure identity. 99

In this latter quotation Cassirer in a quite modern fashion places historical time in closer relationship to mathematical-physical time. But the fixed chronology of the scientific historian of today and his strict distinction of the earlier from the later in a univocally ordered sequence of the moments of time are historiographic qualities

99 Ibid., 110-111.
that could only be pointlessly imagined by Herodotus and Thucydides; for adherence to these norms in terms of modern historiographic standards would have been impossible. The absence of a "system" of chronology, the variety of calendars in various Greek states (e.g. the Attic year beginning in midsummer and the Spartan in autumn), the use of lunar calendars and, the most comprehensive factor, the oral tradition\(^{100}\) cause both Herodotus and Thucydides to be improperly criticized for inadequate chronology and causality. In these remarks we considerably qualify Cassirer's analysis and place the temporal consciousness of Greek history much closer to that of myth.

Two other descriptions of mythical time by Cassirer are much more applicable to Greek history:

In general, the mythical intuition of time, like that of space, is altogether qualitative and concrete, and not quantitative and abstract. For myth there is no time "as such," no perpetual duration and no regular recurrence or succession; there are only configurations of particular content which in turn reveal a certain temporal gestalt, a coming and going, a rhythmical being and becoming. . . . For the mythical-religious world

\(^{100}\)See Jacoby, (Atthis) for tireless detailing of the scientific effect of the oral tradition upon Herodotus' history of the Peisistratids.
view, time never becomes a uniform quantum of this sort; however universal its concept may ultimately become, it is and remains given as a peculiar quale. 101

The description in this last clause of the universal aspect of myth as firmly grounded in a peculiar quale is the key observation.

From a contemporary perspective, we may insist upon historical time as being characterized by a peculiar quantum. But, again, Greek historical, philosophical, and scientific approaches are not those of our contemporary age. McLuhan indicates reasons for the Greek perspective in the light of the oral tradition:

As might be expected, the new Greek sense of chronological order and a one-way movement of events was an overlay on the older mythical and cosmic idea of simultaneous time, which is common to all non-literate communities. . . . This visualizing of chronological sequences is unknown to oral societies, as it is now irrelevant in the electric age of information movement. The "narrative line" in a literature is immediately revealing in the same way as the painterly or sculptural line. It tells exactly how far the dissociation of the visual from the other sense has proceeded. Erich Auerbach confirms in literature all aspects of the Greek development as it has appeared thus far in the other arts. Thus Homer's Achilles and Odysseus are presented in flat vertical planes by

101 *The philosophy of symbolic forms*, vol. 2, 108 and 118.
"fully externalized description, uniform illumination, uninterrupted connection, free expression, all events in the foreground, displaying unmistakable meanings, few elements of historical development and of psychological perspective. ..."

The visual makes for the explicit, the uniform, and the sequential in painting, in poetry, in logic, history. The non-literate modes are implicit, simultaneous, and discontinuous, whether in the primitive past or the electronic present, which Joyce called "eins within a space." . . . The pre-Socratic or pre-literate philosophers like the post-literate scientists of our day have only to listen to the inner resonance of a problem in order to derive it and the universe from water or fire or some single "world-function." That is, the speculators of our time can as easily fall unawares into the auditory bias of "field" theory as the Greeks leapt into the flatland of abstract visuality and one-way lineality.102

Time in Greek scientific philosophy is not conspicuously at variance with time in myth. As we saw above, the greatest advance in Greek science was in astronomy. The Greek association of divinity with the heavenly spheres is too obvious to need much elaboration.

For Aristotle,103 time is the continuous, measurable extensity of movement, ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶ κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὑστεροῦ, καὶ συνεχῆς. Since time is

102 The Gutenberg galaxy, 56-58.
103 Physics 220a; 223b; see also 217b-224a and Meta. 1074b.
continuous it is a circular motion, ultimately measured by the heavenly spheres: 

 Plato\textsuperscript{104} is more explicitly mythological in describing time as measured by the planets, or \textit{άλλοι θεοί} as he calls them: \ldots ἵνα γεννηθῇ χρόνος, ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ πέντε ἄλλα ἀστρα, ἐπίκλην ἔχουσα πλανητά, εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ὑπερμῶν χρόνου γέγονε. Cornford in his translation of and commentary upon the \textit{Timaeus}, notes the traditional nature of Greek time: "Plato's view of Time as inseparable from periodic motion is no novelty, but a tradition running throughout the whole of Greek thought, which always associated Time with circular movement."\textsuperscript{105}

In recording these two excerpts from Plato's \textit{Timaeus} and Aristotle's \textit{Physics} we have incompletely considered

\textsuperscript{104}Timaeus 38c; see also 47a-b, \textit{Politicus} 268d-247d, and \textit{Parmenides}, passim.

\textsuperscript{105}F. M. Cornford, \textit{Plato's cosmology}, 103; see Sambursky, 270-276.
their conceptions of time and ignored the relationships between their separate attitudes toward time and the broader perspectives of their respective philosophical contexts. But our limited objective has been satisfied: an indication of the origins of the Greek concept of time in mythical cosmology and a suggestion of the unscientific character—by modern standards—of Greek time in the thought of the two most distinguished philosophers of classical Greece.\textsuperscript{106} What scientific qualities Aristotle's and Plato's explanations of time possess are due in large measure to the influence, as we have noted, of astronomy. Ortega y Gasset takes note of this reality and in speaking of "reason" adjusts our contemporary usage of the word "scientific":

For over a century now we have been using the word "reason," giving to it a meaning that has become more and more degraded until today it signifies in effect the mere play of ideas. That is why faith appears as opposed to reason. We forget that at its birth in Greece, as at its rebirth in the sixteenth century, reason was not the play of ideas but a radical and tremendous conviction that in astronomic thought man was in indubitable contact with an absolute order of the cosmos, that through the medium of

\textsuperscript{106}See the excellent treatments of Plato and Aristotle on this subject in J. F. Callahan, \textit{Four views of time in ancient philosophy}, 3-37 and 38-87.
physical reason cosmic nature loosed within man its formidable and transcendent secret. Reason was, therefore, a faith.107

All these remarks lead us to extend our description of history as res gestae, or actions of men in the past. For even in Greek scientific tradition man was not alone. Nilsson concludes a chapter on "Homerian anthropomorphism and rationalism" by observing:

Homer's anthropomorphism gave rise to the first criticism of religion, and for the development of the Greek mind it had an importance the full extent of which has never been realized. For this humanizing of the gods served to ward off the conception of divine power as the magical, wonder-working agency which prevails in many religions, for instance, the Egyptian. Under this all-compelling magical power of the gods man bows in fear and terror, but from its fetters the Homerian humanization of the gods delivered the Greeks. They could henceforth of their own accord and by their own efforts find order and coherence in the world. From this origin came Greek science. The Ionian rhapsodist paved the way for the Ionian philosopher of Nature, the latter building up where the former pulled down.108

Nilsson's remarks illustrate well the gradual evolution of Greek rationalism out of Greek religion and the gradual development of Greek science from its source in the Greek philosopher-poets. The primary characteristic

107 History as a system, 225.
108 M. P. Nilsson, A history of Greek religion, 179.
of Greek thought and development is its unity, and hence its complexity. The Darwinian principle, *natura non facit saltus*, is an ideal caution to those who without labored qualifications would trace the development of Greek thought through "stages," from mythos to logos and the like. At the other extreme, equally incautious would be a suggestion that conservatism of thought or TRADITION produced a Greek world in intellectual immobility for centuries. The task of reconciling the One and the Many plagues latter-day interpreters of Greek thought as surely as it plagued classical Greek thinkers themselves. We do, however, maintain that the attraction of the Monad was more influential and that this flirtation was not seriously compromised until the pluralistic education of the Sophists. Even the atomists soon found a new underlying unity to all things.

We discussed in Chapter One the influence of the Eleatics upon Greek historiography. And as we saw in considering other aspects of their teachings, they are principal expositors of the unity of Greek thought and life. The scholastic restatement of Eleaticism, *ens et unum convertuntur*, finds its most precise sources in Parmenides' *Way of Truth*. The κέλευθος Ἀληθείς is also described as Ἀληθείς εὐκυκλέος, indicating the spherical norm of
reality which we also observed in passages from Plato and Aristotle. The following passage from the Way of Truth illustrates with precision the Parmenidean conception. The richness of the thought and the taut, interdependent threads of the argument force us to record the passage in its entirety (DK 28 B8):

 Parmenides boldly sets forth in this passage his ahistoric view of reality. Time is construed as a perpetual present without past or future and Being as uncreated and imperishable. Ortega y Gasset observes (192): "Ever since Parmenides, the orthodox thinker in search of an object's being holds that he is searching for a fixed, static
consistency, hence something that the entity already is, which already composes or constitutes it. The prototype of this mode of being, possessed of the characteristics of fixity, stability, and actuality (a being already what it is), was the being of mathematical concepts and objects, an invariable being, a being-always-the-same. Since observation showed that the things in the world around were changeable, were 'movement,' he begins by denying their reality."

The Spanish philosopher illuminates the view of Sambursky noted above, that while early Greek philosophers produced the scientific method, philosophical and religious preconceptions prevented implementation of this discovery. In the words of Sambursky (270), "the 'dissection of nature' by experiment (to use Bacon's happy definition) was foreign to the Greek. . . ."

While Plato and Aristotle refine considerably the speculations of Parmenides, they nevertheless have in common a lack of concern for the historical individuality and uniqueness of temporal events. This remark is not

109 Plato does so specifically in the Parmenides; see Aristotle, Meta. 986b.
intended as criticism for what they did not do, but a judgment upon what they did do: inhibit the development of history as a respectable and self-sustaining intellectual concern. For Plato history falls into the realm of δόξα, incapable of producing knowledge proper, ἐπιστήμη. The passage from Aristotle's *Poetics* cited above (1451b) indicates his view of history as limited by the unintelligibility of its subject matter: "History tells us that Croesus fell and that Polycrates fell; poetry, according to Aristotle's idea of it, makes not these singular judgments but the universal judgment that very rich men, as such, fall."110 We must add, however, Aristotle's seeming preference for Herodotus to Thucydides, perhaps on the basis of a closer association with Aristotelian poetic norms.

It is this concern of Greek philosophy and science, then, with Being, Reality, Man, Essence, and Unity that caused the historian from Ionia to take artistic comfort in the epic and the tradition of tragedy. While the Greek philosophers respected the universal and made suspect the particular, literature and history reversed this

110 Collingwood, 24.
Nevertheless the scientific influence upon Herodotus was a thoroughly pervasive one, and for Plato's word ὅξα, Herodotus substituted γνώμη. For both historical and philosophical reasons there could be a lack of certainty about individual past events.

The world of Forms, the world of universals and the world of the One were outside of time and thus most knowable. If we remain cautiously aware of a radical difference in context, we may profitably juxtapose the timelessness of

Contemporary historiography is similarly described:

"Now if this analysis is correct, it is clear that the historian in effect reverses the means-end relationship between fact and theory that we find in science. For the historian is interested in generalizations and does concern himself with them. But he does so not because generalizations constitute the aim and objective of his discipline, but because they help him to illuminate the particular facts with which he deals. History seeks to provide an understanding of specific occurrences, and has recourse to such laws and generalizations--largely borrowed from the sciences, but also drawn from ordinary human experience--which can be of service in this enterprise. But here the role of generalizations is strictly instrumental: they provide aids towards understanding particular events. The scientist's means-end relation of facts to laws is thus inverted by the historian."

the philosophers and the timeless state of the gods in Greek religion. Whitman in his brilliant Homeric study points up this correlation: "The superiority of the gods lies in the absoluteness of their being, which, since it is free of time, immortalizes the processes and actions of the world, and necessitates their final results before they take place."\(^{112}\) The Homeric soil contained the seed which later pushed above the earth a secular, "rationalized" shoot. Herodotus was on hand to trace development of the hybrid strain.

CHAPTER IV

STRUCTURAL AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS

In Herodotus' story of Solon and Croesus and their evaluation, are not measurable in terms of \( \tau \alpha \pi ε ρε δυτα \) and \( \epsilon υ τυχι \) in order to reach a firm judgment. The present moment was viewed as an absurdly inadequate measurement. But much more important, Solon's answer to Croesus required an ultimate span of time as a basis for reply. Croesus' foolish evaluation of himself as the happiest of men produced exemplary catastrophe (I. 30-34): \( \epsilon \kappa \theta ε ου \) \( ν \epsilon \mu ε \sigma \iota \) \( Μ ε γ \alpha \lambda \eta \).

The ultimate fixity of Time is noted by Cassirer in a comparison of Zoroastrian and Greek attitudes:

This system, in which "time" and "destiny" are expressly equated--the Greek reports render Zruvan by \( τ \upsilon \chi \eta \)--shows the peculiar twofold character of a conception which sometimes rises to the most difficult and subtle abstractions and yet fully preserves the color of the specifically mythical feeling of time. Here cosmic historical time is never what it is for theoretical and particularly mathematical cognition: a purely ideal, ordering form, a system of reference.
and coordinates; it is the basic power of history itself, endowed with divine and demonic, creative and destructive forces. To be sure, its order is apprehended as universal and inviolable, but on the other hand, this order seems to be decreed—the law of time to which all change is subservient appears as a law ordained by a half-personal, half-impersonal power.¹

Greek religious sense in Herodotus is of such a nature that consistent distinctions between personal and impersonal concepts of divinity are impossible. Accordingly one cannot feasibly look upon the Tellus story as illustrative of a progression from sacred myth to secular, from mythos to logos. For in the above mythos or logos the sacred and the profane interpenetrate one another. And the sacred view of Solon suppresses the profane, ephemeral one of Croesus. We must be careful, however, to observe the two sides of Solon's position, the atemporal and the temporal, corresponding to the sacred and the profane. Both aspects are present. Solon has justified the claims to happiness of Tellus, and of Cleobis and Biton² on the basis of a relationship between

¹The philosophy of symbolic forms, vol. 2, 117-118.

²Van Groningen ("L'exploit de Cléobis et Biton et la véracité d' Hérodote, Mnemoysyne 12, 1944, 34-43) confirms the historical accuracy of Herodotus' account of the two brothers on the basis of archaeological and epigraphic evidence.
fixity of the atemporal, and the variability of the temporal.

A case is made for Tellus in a historiographical way. Tellus' country, children, children's offspring and death in battle at Eleusis are the temporal components of Solon's decision. Neither the temporal aspects nor the universal, exemplary importance of this man are of themselves sufficient to Solon's argument. The biographical details justify the--in our terms--atemporal conclusion. An exemplary life yields to a paradigmatic death. The greater importance and illustriousness of his death are underscored three times in the space of approximately six lines (1.30.4-5.):

1) τελευτὴ τοῦ βίου λαμπρότατη ἐπεγένετο . . .
2) ἀπέθανε κάλλιστα . . .
3) ἐπεσε καὶ ἔτιμησαν μεγάλως.

There is no negation of time in the "historical" account, merely a perspectival implementation of its specificity.

The extent of Croesus' misunderstanding is revealed in his description of Solon as τὰ παρεῖναι ἀγαθὰ μετελεῖς. The participle is the problematic word. It contains the

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3 The occasional ambiguity of the English word historical is illustrated by the German distinction between historisch and geschichtlich. This particular ambiguity, however, is not without its virtues.
blindness of Croesus, not that of his Athenian adviser. Croesus is confusing \( \tau \chi \eta \) with \( \varepsilon \upsilon \tau \chi \rho \chi \eta \),\(^4\) and is blind to the cycles of human existence.

The refinements of \( \tau \chi \eta \) in Thucydides\(^5\) are not those of Herodotus, where the ominous noun has a much broader sense. Van Groningen describes \( \tau \chi \eta \) in Pindar in a fashion suggestive of the Solon-Croesus drama and reminiscent of Herodotus throughout:

Pindar is convinced that the future is completely the domain and realm of the powerful gods; from that mysterious storehouse the present comes forth in the shape of uncertain and capricious fortune (\( \tau \chi \eta \)). On the narrow edge between the unknown future and the unchangeable past man must show his excellence, his \( \alpha \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \tau \delta \). . . . In Pindar's conception of life and mankind there is hardly

\(^4\)Harpagus (I. 118.2) makes a similar error in misjudging the cruel and partially unconscious irony of Astyages, who ambiguously describes the failure of his lieutenant to do away with Cyrus as \( \tau \eta \zeta \tau \chi \varsigma \varepsilon \upsilon \mu \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \vartheta \omega \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \). For Harpagus the incident results in \( \delta \nu \sigma \tau \chi \rho \chi \eta \), with the brutal end of his son's life.

\(^5\)See J. H. Finley, Thucydides, 312-15. In Thucydides \( \tau \chi \eta \) is viewed as "the incalculable element in human affairs," and "what is external to man and is unpredictable." (C. H. Cochrane, Thucydides and the science of history, 163 and W. C. Greene, Moira, 270.) For Thucydides then this concept possesses a very limited scope; \( \tau \chi \eta \) is the final residue of events which cannot be explained directly in a causal manner or indirectly through a prognosis of social or political circumstances.
any chronological perspective to be found. The present itself is always a crisis; man stands in the breach made by the attacking future, not as one who fights to penetrate into a besieged fortress, but on the defence. He protects his past and the past of his clan, while these two in their turn support him. He needs this backing in order to hold his ground successfully. It is the past which determines the nature, the behaviour and the task of those who stand in the present.⁶

Just as one reaches highly artificial distinctions in separating the secular from the sacred in Herodotus, the logos from the mythos, so it is pointless for identical reasons to sharply isolate the religious from the philosophical. When one selects one of these polar elements rather than another to describe a specific passage in Herodotus' history, one does so out of verbal convenience rather than verifiable conviction. Herodotus tells us that nemesis befell Croesus, "perhaps" (ὡς ἐξάσθη) because of his hybris (I.34). This isolated phrase suggests a theological agnosticism; but the logos as a whole belies this brief demurrer. To protest that tradition required Herodotus to call upon the gods in discussing virtue and ethics is to affirm our point rather than to reject it.

In the context of the total work these polar distinctions

⁶In the grip of the past, 81. See also O1. 1; Isth. 1.
do not exist, either for Herodotus or for the personae of his history. 7

The temporal and atemporal aspects of Herodotus' work, as represented in the dialogue of Solon and Croesus, can be approached in another way: the two levels of meaning in the story. Historically, this logos is a self-contained narrative whose temporal significance is self-revelatory. 8 Historiographically, it is an atemporal exemplum with points of reference throughout the nine books. 9

7 G. de Sanctis (Studi di storia della storiografia greca, 69-71; also Storia dei Greci, vol. 2, 210 and 216-218) expresses an almost identical view in relating the Croesus-logos to Herodotus' proem: "Se vogliamo dire che la storia d'Erodoto ondeggia tra un polo divino e un polo umano, conviene precisare che nel proemio egli piega decisamente verso il polo umano... La pragmaticità teologica e la umana prevalgono alternativamente secondo che l'interesse dello storico piega verso l'uno o l'altro dei poli cui abbiamo accennato; ma è caratteristico che, mentre la teologica prevale in modo quasi esclusivo nel logos di Creso, la umana prevale del tutto nel proemio, dove parrebbe invece che la mossa epica dovesse indurre Erodoto ad insistere sull'azione divina. Onde anche per questo rispetto si conferma quel che altrove inducemmo studiando il rapporto del proemio con gli altri due poli dell'opera erodotea, l'etnologico e lo storico, che esso rappresenta le ultime esperienze e i propositi definitivi dello scrittore."

8 See K. Löwith, Meaning in history, 6-7.

9 See de Sanctis, Studi di storia della storiografia greca, 47-71; Bruns, Das literarische Porträt der Griechen, 108-112.
The historical and historiographic meanings are combined when one considers the Croesus logos in its broader, immediate context, the rise and fall of Lydia. Myres relates the philosophical character of the Lydian story to its formal structure in terms of his theory of the pedimental composition of the entire work: "This 'Lydian story' is not only the historical occasion of the collision between Persians and Greeks, but a first exemplification of the 'cycle in human affairs,' and of the responsibility of man for his use of wealth and power, which it is Herodotus' purpose to investigate. The historical frieze of narrative is subordinated to a tragic peripateia, rising and falling fortunes, weak and strong characters, divine providence and human will, centred on the offence of Croesus, from which the greater tragedy is to proceed."\textsuperscript{10} Thus the historical approach of Herodotus illustrates the assimilation of mythos with logos. As a part of this assimilation he has mingled scientific causation with mythological, cosmic "laws."

Another aspect of causation which blends the human and the divine is genealogy. This mode of material causation serves to illuminate the amalgam of myth and history

\textsuperscript{10}J. L. Myres, \textit{Herodotus, father of history}, 92.
into a single time-concept. Herodotus provides us with five full genealogies of historical figures,\textsuperscript{11} three of whom are Greeks, descended from Heracles. It has been argued many times that Heracles is at base a historical figure with mythological accretions to his personality. With this position Herodotus indicates some agreement, for he alternates between explicit treatment of Heracles as a god and explicit treatment of him as a hero. In Book Two (44.5-45) he anticipates his later discussion by telling us that his findings clearly point to a dual Heracles. The Greeks sacrifice (θυσία) to one Heracles as a god and honor (εὐγενεία) the other as a dead hero.\textsuperscript{12} Heracles the god is of secondary importance to Heracles the hero, and the former is mentioned only for the sake of the latter. Herodotus' stress, then, is upon the human element rather than the divine. He has tried to wrest an aspect of Greek genealogy from its mythological accretions and assign to the Greeks a greater human antiquity than is otherwise

\begin{itemize}
\item Xerxes (VII.11); Leonidas (VII.204); Leotychides (VIII.131); Alexander of Macedon (VIII.139); Pausanias (IX.64).
\item See the comments of Linforth, "Named and unnamed gods in Herodotus," CPCP 9, 1928, 206-207.
\end{itemize}
supposed. Eratosthenes is similarly motivated in his attempts to date figures and events in the mythical period of Greece (F Gr Hist 2B 241 F2). The devices of Eratosthenes and Herodotus exemplify the major problem of early genealogical time-reckoning: the attempt to objectify subjective time-concepts. To be fair to Herodotus we must isolate genealogy from genealogical time-reckoning and regard them as separate categories. The former category is represented by genealogists such as Acusilaus and Pherencydes, and the latter by Herodotus. The milieu of these two "mythographers," as Bury rightly called Acusilaus and Pherencydes, is purely and simply the mythical period. As Mitchel observes (58), the orientation of the genealogist and the historian are in opposite directions: "in Pherencydes' list of the Philaidai the focus was Zeus, Aiakos, Telamon, Aias and Philaios; Herodotus' orientation, however, was in his own time and, when he gave the genealogy of the Alkmeonidai, the focus was Perikles." Herodotus uses

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14 F. Jacoby ("The first Athenian prose writer," *Mnemosyne* 13, 1947, 62-63) contends that "Pherencydes had an even stronger liking than Akusilaos for what we must term fairy-tales."
genealogical chronology out of necessity rather than choice. The earlier in time his investigations lead him, the less accurate and available is his historical information. The family to which Lycurgus is assigned illustrates a limitation in Herodotus' sources. Herodotus is a victim of political manipulation of time-reckoning when he makes Lycurgus an Agiad rather than a Eurypontid. As Herodotus makes clear, genealogical chronology also contains an internal limitation; for it establishes only a relative chronology, relative to other figures and events whose temporal fixity is equally devoid of the absolute calculation of time, which becomes increasingly possible as Herodotus advances in the historical period toward his own time.

The Greek interest in genealogy persisted for a long

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15 J. B. Bury, The ancient Greek historians, 18-20. Hammond ("Studies in Greek chronology," Historia 4, 1955, 391 n.1) attempts to pinpoint the earliest dates at which Herodotus was able to cease genealogical time-reckoning and offers the tentative suggestion that: "Herodotus did not reckon in genealogies in order to calculate intervals of time or dates for Greek affairs from the seventh century onwards."

16 I.65-4; VII. 204. See discussion of W. den Boer, Laconian studies, 30; D. W. Prakken, "Herodotus and the Spartan king lists," TAPA 71, 1940, 460-472.
time. Marrou gives an example from the treatise on grammar by Dionysius Thrax, the third century student of Aristarchus, on the "historical" study of Homer. The passage consists of questions and answers which trace the relations and associates of the Homeric heroes. Homer is still regarded as a historian in the third century treatise and genealogy still represents a genuine scholarly pursuit. Objective and subjective time had not at this late date filed suit for divorce.

Van Groningen (107) returns us to our earlier observation about the relevance of Greek philosophical concepts to an understanding of time in Greek history:

Practically all Greek philosophers share with each other and accordingly with most of their compatriots a fundamental, intuitive, monistic conception, according to which reality is essentially one. But at the same time they distinguish, as a rule, two different aspects: one based upon observation, the world of the phenomena, of matter, of actuality, of the unexplained; a second based upon interpretation, valuation and explication, the world of the form, the idea, the essence behind the appearance. . . . To the Greeks things were not only what they seemed. And as soon as man sees the world in a dualistic way—no matter in virtue of what theory or of what creed—as soon as he holds that reality has two different dimensions, all his conceptions will bear the mark of this duality. The world is alive and

17A history of education in antiquity, 233.
in movement; movement also will have a double character and will be bound to a double conception of time.

It is the past which can be (in part) interpreted, evaluated and explicated. The zone of the past contains the possibility of fixing on reality and separating essence from appearance. Past time considered qualitatively is the realm of myth. Herodotus was so bold as to quantify the past and step gingerly among appearances, for that is the stuff of history. He was so daring as to trace back quantitatively the proximate past to the remote past of the Heroic Age of Heracles, Theseus, and others.

Marrou (232-233) in describing fifth century education in Greece observes that the very little we know about the role of history in the Greek educational process consists in its utility for lexicographical study. There seems, however, little more to know. What other pedagogical exempla could be derived from the prose-ephemera of Herodotus and Thucydides? The exemplary history of Greece was contained in the sacred time of poetic myth. And the greatest poet-historian of all was, of course, Homer.

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18See M. Eliade, Patterns in comparative religion, 394-397, 407-408, and 429-430.
By the time of the Sophists there was a new, oral source of education, rhetoric. Jaeger briefly traces the development:

In the old-fashioned system, made up of music and gymnastic training, there was no such thing as independent historical knowledge and historical thought. The past was known only as narratives of heroic deeds done by single nations or great heroes, and there was still no clear distinction between history and myth. These traditions were kept alive to provide heroic models to be imitated as the sophist Protagoras expressly says in Plato's dialogue when he is describing Athenian education in the Periclean age. But he says nothing of studying history in the deeper sense, for the political study of history did not yet exist. The philosopher was educated by investigating the eternal laws of nature or of morality, but in his training there was no place for history.¹⁹

Literary myth, then, was the first Exemplar History, using the past to cope with the present and future. Herodotus restricted his attention to the earliest time-dimension and used the remote to explain the proximate past.²⁰ Thucydides restricted himself to the proximate past, seeking to make it intelligible in itself. It took the Hellenistic period to displace myth as Exemplar History. The development of the disciplina of history as


²⁰E.g. proem.
a source of lessons and examples for the present and future found conspicuous expression in Xenophon; Thucydides' continuator, Theopompus; and, in the second century, Polybius.  

The cyclic absoluteness of time which is an indispensable presupposition of Exemplar History finds dramatic, mythical statement in Sophocles. As Antigone and Ismene are led offstage prior to the stichomythic exchange between Creon and his son Haemon, the chorus reflects upon the folly of man's temporal state and the awesome timelessness of time's fickle director Zeus:

τεάν, Ζεύ, δύνασιν τις ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι,


22 For a discussion of the pervasiveness of this concept in Greek thought see R. B. Onians, The origins of European thought, 442-466; a vivid personification of the year as a cycle encompassing all of time is Hermippus' character Eniautos in his comedy, The birth of Athena (J. M. Edmonds, The fragments of Attic comedy, vol. 1, fr. 4).

23 604-614. The mystery of time is a more conspicuous motif in the remaining plays of the Oedipus "trilogy." Perhaps the most important passage is O.C. 607-623.
This passage readily calls to mind Solon's cautious remarks to Croesus about the transience of man's condition and the importance of a perspectival view in judging one's lot. Here as in Herodotus the Deity is ϕθονερὸν τε καὶ ταραχόδες.24

By this use of the static view of time in myth Herodotus is able to fulfill a double obligation. He accurately characterizes the sacred outlook of the peoples in his history and simultaneously takes cognizance of the secular view of time in Ionian philosophy. The view of time in sacred myth as dependent upon eternity and cyclic time in secular philosophy contributed greatly to the evolution of an exemplar theory of history.

We must not, however, permit this emphasis to tip the

24E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the irrational, 29. He properly adds (51 n.3), "All Herodotus' wise men know this: Solon, 1.32; Amasis, 3.40; Artabanus, 7.10." See de Sanctis, Studi di storia della storiografia greca, 47-71.
delicate balance in Herodotus' narration between the mythos and the logos. Mythical time was absolute and independent of transitory events, while historical time—in its details at least—was fixed and contingent upon specific occurrences. Historical time was not self-explanatory, in fact only partially knowable and possessed of vexing lacunae. Both the mythical event and the historical were retained by human memory, by ἐπεμνημόνεια. The mythical was remembered principally for reasons related to its sacred character. The less important historical event was perhaps forgotten, or perhaps forgotten only in its secular characteristics.

A passage in Book Seven provides us with an illustration. Approximately the first half of this book is

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25 The myth is also mobile in a related spatial sense. Dionysus' birthplace, for example, shifts ahistorically from one telling to another. Does his name tell us he is the god-from-Nysa? In any event the Homeric hymn assigns him to Nysa. Is this a town or mountain? Is it in Thessaly or Thrace or Ethiopia or India? The absurdity of asking these questions in a historical fashion quickly reveals itself. But the mythical mentality has a precise answer. Each possibility is correct. One must settle upon a relevant individual myth for the answer. In the closed form of each myth there is an indisputable absoluteness giving it, internal to itself, an indisputable "accuracy" of detail.

26 Book Seven begins with details of the accession of Xerxes and our perspective is not switched to the Greek side until the transitional remarks of ch.138.
devoted to an analysis of Persian preparations and advance to Thermopylae. Chapters twenty and twenty-one serve as a prologue to Herodotus' analysis of the military preparations. The following two chapters describe the natural obstacles to the expedition in correlation with the natural obstacles later noted at Thermopylae itself (128-131). In the midst of this latter discussion Herodotus describes Tempe and notes the reported origin of the gorge through which the Peneus runs (129). He indicates the Thessalian tradition that Poseidon made the passage. Herodotus agrees with the myth, but does so with a rationalistic qualification: Poseidon is the earth-shaker and it is quite obvious to a viewer of the past that the split between the mountains resulted from an earthquake.

From the mythoi Herodotus tried to extract the logoi. In the example above he succeeded in reconciling sacred and secular explanations in such a way that the integrity of the myth was preserved along with the integrity of his historical purpose. The chapter not only furnished details of consequence to natural history but vividly represented the mind of Thessalians in earlier generations.27

27See the excellent summation of Herodotus' attitude toward the supernatural in Ph.-E. Legrand, Hérodote, introduction, 84-88.
A much more subtle extraction of temporal history from atemporal myth was attempted in the Atys and Adrastus story. Atys, the son of Croesus, is distinguished from the son of Manes (I.34-45; I.94). We are not so inclined as other observers to doubt any genuinely historical association of an Atys with one or both of these Lydian beings, but it is beyond reasonable dispute that the Atys of Herodotus is the Attis, or Attes, of Phrygio-Lydian mythology. Meyer notes the tradition of Attis' daughter which Herodotus (while rejecting the form of the legend employed by Catullus) has adopted in the Atys and Adrastos story: "Noch deutlicher tritt der Einfluss der syrischen Culte, vor allem der AdonisTammûzsage, in dem in Lydien geläufigen Mythos hervor, Attis sei auf Veranstaltung des Zeus durch einen Eber getötet (Hermesianax bei Pausan. VII, 17,9), eine Sage, die uns in historisierender Umbildung in der Erzählung Herodot's (I. 34) von Adrastos und Atys, dem Sohne des Kroesos, entgegentritt."  


29Loc. cit. Meyer later adds (487, section 400n.): "Die Dynastie der Atyaden, welche Herodot den Herakliden vorangehen lässt, ist rein mythisch und besteht aus einem Stammbaum, der die Eponymen der einzelnen lydischen Stämme an den Urmenschen Manes und seinen Sohn Atys anknüpft."
Grene interjects two additional factors important to an understanding of the manner in which Herodotus has structured this story: "Anyone who reads the story of Adrastus, the purified murderer who accidentally kills the son of his purifier, can hear the sound of the actor's voice in the last sentences. Indeed the story that Herodotus "published" his history in a series of readings is very strongly supported by the nature of the stories." 30

We may too casually observe that Herodotus has again, as is his frequent custom, rationalized a myth. But there are a number of relevant considerations which considerably qualify such a view. He seems at first glance to have demythologized or displaced the historically incredible elements of a legend which he believes have an actual historical foundation. But this may be too quick an estimate of Herodotus' method and intention.

It is this sort of judgment which would contend that Herodotus also places personal rather than cultural importance upon what Myres calls the cherchez la femme and

the east and west theories of the origin of the Greco-Persian conflict in the opening chapters of the work.31 Rather than asserting that both of these passages (I. 1-5; 34-35) vividly display Herodotus' naivety, we interpret them as examples of his lack of historical credulity. With supreme irony Herodotus attributes the "history" of Io, immediately after his superb proem, to Persian λόγος and thereafter ascribes the would-be causational account of Europa, with more subtle disdain, to 'Ελληνων τίμας.

Mythos decreases and logos increases as Herodotus' work progresses, in large part according to the proportion each of these elements plays in the lives of his historical subjects.32 As we indicated earlier, the role of each


32 "Herodotus reduces it [this novelistic element] where the stream of genuine historical tradition flowed more copiously. . . . " (C. Hignett, Xerxes' invasion of Greece, 34; echoing Jacoby, col. 472.) Another relevant factor, lending weight to our view, is suggested by L. Solmsen ("Speeches in Herodotus' account of the Ionic revolt," AJP 64, 1943, 194): "The almost complete absence of direct speeches in the earlier books of Herodotus contrasts with the free use of them in Books VII-IX. . . . The speeches Herodotus inserted in the later books are, as I hope to show, his means of passing judgments, conveying opinions, in short of interpreting the
element in the minds of his informants is also determinative
and contributes to his necessary, but tempered, reliance
upon myths as bridges across historical lacunae. And
for the sake of greater accuracy and diversity variant
traditions of an episode may be presented.

Both of these considerations are essential to an
understanding of Herodotus' retrospective "digression" upon
events which he reports. The relative strangeness of the
materials treated in Books I-VI, their remoteness from the
historian's own experience, may have prevented his formu-
larizing opinions and passing judgments as he does in the
later books by the direct speeches. This explanation is,
I think, supported by the fact that Herodotus inserted
speeches similar to those in Books VII-IX, that is speeches
which accompany the narrative and interpret it, in the
account of the first historical event near to his own time,
namely in the account of the Ionic revolt." See also, by
the same author, "Speeches in Herodotus' account of the
battle of Plataia," CP 39, 1944, 241-253; and PAPA 70,
1939, xlv.

One of Herodotus' greatest merits, although some may
prefer to call it a demerit, is his ability to utilize the
minimal available information to maximal advantage. Two
minor examples, but illustrative of Herodotus' insatiable
quest for explanations and origins of all that he in-
vestigates (names, customs, activities and like) are his
parenthetical assignments of the names "Persian" and "Median"
to Perses and Medea (VII.61-62). A.D. Godley (Loeb, vol. 3,
377) takes advantage of this passage to assign in a gentle
way, a modern man's label of naiveté to Herodotus for a
quite natural suggestion: "Herodotus is always prone to
base ethnological conclusions on Greek legends and the
similarity of names. . . ."
the regal predecessors of Croesus (1.7-26). Croesus is of primary importance, historical as well as philosophical, to Herodotus' history; and accordingly Herodotus begins his account with Croesus. In themselves the kings before Croesus are of incidental importance, but are still of twofold relevance. They place the chief Lydian king in perspective and provide as thorough and coherent a development of the period as sources permit. Herodotus clearly indicates the worth of the earlier Lydians by introducing Croesus before his predecessors and outside of what we would regard as a "normal" linear chronology.

We cannot refer to Croesus' predecessors as "ancestors" for a reason vital to the proper appreciation of a Herodotean narrative technique. A link clearly relating these chapters to the historical characterization of Croesus is established at the very beginning of chapter seven. Croesus' family, the Mermnadae, received Lydian sovereignty from the Heraclidae. We cannot overlook the genealogical character of this passage and its pro-Greek emphasis.34 The Croesus logos is the closest Herodotus will

34See A. E. Wardman, "Herodotus on the cause of Greco-Persian wars," AJP 82, 1961, 146.
come to presenting exemplary history, and the genealogical correlation of Croesus with his predecessors is a central link in this account. The Greek Heraclidae will secure revenge upon the Lydian Mermnadae. Gyges is the instrument by which power is transferred from the Greek family to Lydian rulers, but not until Croesus was the power-transfer fully implemented. Not until Croesus did Lydia subdue the whole of Ionia and demand tribute from the Greeks (I.6; 26-29).

Gyges is the transitional figure; and through the device of an entertaining story, the role of this violent usurper is stressed. The Heraclidae lose power because of Candaules' inordinate attitude toward his wife, her virtuously motivated homicide, and the forceful opportunism of the king's bodyguard. The first contact of the Lydian world with the Greek mainland at Delphi is carefully emphasized. Gyges' usurpation is confirmed by the oracle, but an attendant curse upon the Heraclidae is dangerously forgotten.

Vengeance for Gyges' hubris was prophesied as the lot of the king in the fifth generation.\textsuperscript{35} Herodotus later

\textsuperscript{35}F. Mitchel (Phoenix 10, 1956, 54) notes that the calculation by generations is for the sake of
notes the correctness of the oracle (I.91.1), but at the time the prophecy went unheeded and the calculation unmade. Had there been counting by inclusive reckoning from Gyges, the post eventum discovery of Croesus as victim would have been anticipated. Gyges thus proves to be of crucial importance to the fortune and fate of Croesus.

The prosperity of the Mermnadae continues to accumulate after Gyges, reaching its zenith—and nadir—with Croesus.

We must pause to remind ourselves of the two temporal levels along which Herodotus is proceeding, the time of the mythos and that of the logos. Childs says of mythical time:

There is no actual distinction in mythical time between the past, the present, and the future. Although the origin of time is projected into the past, to the primeval act of becoming, this is only a form in which an essentially timeless reality is clothed. Time . . . transcends the modern categories of empirical time. . . . It moves in a rhythm of critical periods in which the content of the time waxes and wanes. The calendar marks these 'times' (kairoi) as moments of primeval power and value. Nevertheless, the oscillation brings nothing new in essence since the substance appropriateness. The exact number of years is not important to the account, but the generations from Gyges to Croesus are. On the novelistic element in the Gyges story, see H. Erbse, "Tradition und Form im Werke Herodots," Gymnasium 68, 1961, 253-257.
remains unchangeable. Its content was determined in the primeval act. In the cultic repetition of the myth this act is relived.36

At the philosophical level, then, Croesus' life-course is influenced by the hubris of Gyges and the falsely acquired prosperity of his successors. Time at this level of the narrative is transcendent. The mythical time does not replace, contradict, or nullify empirical time, but rather complements it. The temporal historical achievements of Gyges, Ardys, Sadyattes,37 Alyattes, and Croesus could

36B. S. Childs, Myth and reality in the Old Testament, 74. Greek mythical time of course does not have the eschatological quality of Hebraic myth. While Greek myth looks to the past, Biblical mythos and logos look to a sanctified future. For the latter, see Löwith (Meaning in history) for full discussion. There is, however, one very important respect in which the Greek and Hebraic concepts of time are similar: "the Hebrew concept of time was primarily interested in the quality of time rather than its temporal succession." (Childs, 76, italics added.)

Childs objects strongly to modern, foreign categories of cyclical and linear time (75-84). We readily agree that these modern categories can constrict our understanding of the Greek and Hebraic views if we fail to recognize the limitations of these contemporary rather than ancient terms. And yet if we appreciate the anachronistic quality of the linear-cyclic distinction, we can still use it to our own enlightenment. To re-capture earlier time-concepts and the cultural intelligibility they provide, we must, of necessity, at least begin with our own conceptual modes. We cannot impose our own concepts, but we must judiciously use them.

37H. J. Rose ("Some Herodotean rationalisms," CQ 34, 1940, 78-81) compares Herodotus' version of the Gyges story with those of Plato and Nicolaus of Damascus, noting that in the latter account the role of King Candaules is assigned to Sadyattes.
not be related through a linear empiricism. We may justly criticize Herodotus for not telling us more, for overlooking important historical details concerning these kings; but it is inappropriate to object that he should have told us less. Grene cogently elaborates upon our point:

Herodotus saw cause and effect as reaching back much further than we are inclined to, in historical works anyway, and embracing many factors of which we would not take account. He is inclined to believe in the close connection of a man and his country or community, between the country or community at a given time and its past, between the marvels or miracles that happened at a certain moment and the central actions he is recording as history. He does not abandon all notions of relevancy, but he extends relevancy very far, and at times his sense of the involvement of the individual and the external factors of place and time is brilliantly mysterious. He feels it necessary to describe the customs, geographic and economic oddities of a country or society, and often the marvels of the place and the time as the background out of which his dramatic theme grew. His history, in its shifts from the personal observation to the folktale (described as such), to the sober chronicle of events, to the overpowering clarity of the dilemma of the central figures, is Herodotus's image of the transition between the elements of unordered reality and the artistic certainty of the universal law.38

Croesus makes his first physical appearance on stage as late as Molière's Tartuffe and yet each character is just as surely the center of his respective drama from its

earliest moments. Upon the death of Alyattes, Croesus comes into his own and briefly struts the Herodotean stage alone majestically, as the conqueror of all Greek cities in Asia. This power tempts the king to hubris in the form of a desire for insular extension of his empire. But Bias—or was it Pittacus?—subverts this particular temptation by clever turns of phrase possessed of a nearly aphoristic quality, which have the added advantage of being reasonable.39

While Croesus accepts the wisdom of this Sage, he does not, as we observed earlier, accept the monitions of Solon and suffers the loss of his one physically whole son, Atys. Croesus' personal tragedy is compounded by the political tragedy which has "simultaneously" befallen his son-in-law, Astyages. The blood-guilt initiated by Gyges finds

39 Jacoby (col. 420) assigns this chapter, 27, to an Ionian source and discusses the entire Croesus logos in terms of its sources (cols. 418-423). Moses Hadas ("Utopian sources in Herodotus," CP 30, 1935, 119-120) adds the Arimaspeia of Aristeas as a possible, but unlikely, source for portions of the Croesus logos. Zeller (Outlines of the history of Greek philology, 35) numbers the Seven Sages at twenty-two, noting that Bias and Pittacus appear in every list along with Solon. Herodotus, of course, sees no need to underline the traditional character of this narrative; it is clearly recognizable as such.
political resolution for both kings at the hands of Cyrus. At this point (1.46), Herodotus anticipates and telescopes, for dramatic effect and in accordance with his philosophical overview, events which he will later narrate in detail.

The nemesis visited upon Croesus, then, is a slowly developing one whose full meaning will not be overtly recalled and extracted from its temporal course until Croesus has become, by his own description (1.89), a slave of Cyrus and challenged Delphi to justify his miserable lot (1.90). The priestess recalls the moira of Croesus, the major stages of its evolutionary fulfillment, and Apollo's merciful attitude toward Croesus. The god of Delphi delayed the capture of Sardis as long as possible, saved the Lydian from Cyrus' pyre and repeatedly warned Croesus not to attack Persia (although the king in his blindness misinterpreted the warnings).

From this summary of the priestess' statement we can see that Croesus is in a sense a free agent who has caused his own downfall. Herodotus' Pythian source affirms Croesus' personal and free decision to attack Persia. This attack is the human cause of Croesus' fall and the purely human determinant of when Croesus would fall. As Immerwahr notes, "the situation is similar to that of the
Persians of Aeschylus: the Moirai saw to it that the dynasty would come to an end with Croesus, but the fact that it happened in the fourteenth year of his rule, and through his war against Cyrus, was Croesus' own fault. "The thread of events in the Croesus narrative follows closely the course of development prophesied by Delphi. Herodotus has perforce relied upon a priestly tradition, but has managed to keep the human aspect of the historical events paramount and restrict the influence of his sources to the dramatic and philosophical aspects of his narrative.

The portrait of Apollo in chapter ninety-one is not one of an envious god whose nemesis has fallen with a swift and harsh stroke, but rather the picture of a just god who has tempered his necessary action with mercy. Croesus was not guilty—in either a mythical reading or historical reading—of the enormities which motivated, for example, Cambyses and Oroetes. Lattimore, in fact, refuses to charge Croesus with hubris, as we may safely presume he would charge Cambyses and Oroetes:

Hybris is indeed charged to Xerxes, but Xerxes had actually spoiled the shape of the world by hewing in two what God had made one and binding into one

40 TAPA 85, 1954, 36.
what God had made two, and in destroying the temples of the gods. Plainly, *hybris* requires a violence more effective than pride, or mere arrogance of opinion. Herodotus does not, of course, apply it to Croesus; his haunting and delusive spirit was not this, but *elpis*, hope, the staff and comfort of the weak, but the perilous siren who deceives the strong.

But though *hybris* was not Croesus' offence, he did offend, and the *nemesis* of God overtook him. 41

It is not so plain to us that "*hybris* requires a violence more effective than pride, or mere arrogance of opinion." As Lattimore points out, Croesus did offend, and nemesis overtook him. On this ground we describe Croesus' offense as *hubris*, while noting the more serious offense of Cambyses and Oroetes.

Croesus has lost power, the delusive drive for which in his own person and that of his ancestors caused his political downfall and that of the Mermnadae; but compensatory qualities in his character have spared his life and gained him wisdom. Croesus has lost his own supreme position of political distinction, but has not lost all political importance. Crahay observes, "relevons que le conseiller qui prône la modération dans le gouvernement et signale les dangers de l'ambition est généralement

41 R. Lattimore, *Story patterns in Greek tragedy*, 24.
lui-même un homme qui a détenu l'autorité mais que les circonstances ou sa propre volonté ont libéré des pièges du pouvoir: Solon, Bias, Pittacos, Créus." Croesus will continue to serve an important political, and philosophical, function under his conqueror, Cyrus. In his Croesus narrative, Herodotus has not simply rationalized a mythos and thereby converted it into a logos. He has taken the available information from a variety of sources, traditions, and contexts and reshaped it into a new—what we must call for want of more precise phraseology—mythos-logos. Herodotus clearly intends the events involving Croesus to serve 1) as the beginning of his historical narrative and 2) as a self-contained coherent unit of historical narrative intentionally linked to the statement of purpose in the proem that offers itself within its microcosmic whole as a dramatic and philosophic

42 R. Crahay, La littérature oraculaire chez Hérodote, 209. For a more thorough discussion of the Delphic elements in the Croesus logos, see The Delphic oracle, H. W. Parke and Wormell, vol. 1, 126-140.

43 Lattimore (CP 34, 1939, 24-35) classifies Croesus as a tragic Warner (I.207; III.36) following in the tradition of Gyges (I.8), Bias or Pittacus (I.27), Solon (I.32), Chilon (I.59), Sandanis (I.71) and as a practical adviser on three occasions: I.88-89; I.155; I.207.
prototype of all that we will hear and see in the macrocosm of the work. This second point is rather well stated by Grene:

In Herodotus, these roles, the wise counselor and the tempted man, are first of all played by Solon vis-à-vis Croesus. But the situation is described a number of times and always at crucial moments in the History. It is only necessary to stress the obviously generic character of the temptation to understand that what we have here is a dramatic device, not a historical event as we understand it. For Herodotus, however, the truth of the historical development lies in the hybristic attitude and acts of Croesus. The meeting with Solon is an appropriate and powerful image for conveying this. It does not have to be true. Its recurrence in the History marks it as conventional and belonging purely to the representational aspect of the History, as the typical commonplaces of the chorus belong to the theme of the tragedy.

The structure of the History corresponds to the development of the temptation. . . . Herodotus characterized these acts of aggression as the typical expression of hybris, and the first man who committed acts of aggression against the Greeks was Croesus. The act of aggression becomes the typical example of hybris through the history of the Near East and its relations to Europe.44

When Grene refers to "a historical event as we understand it" the context of his phrase implies that while Herodotus is dramatic as we know drama, in this instance Herodotus is not historical as we know history. Our paraphrase emphasizes the vagueness of his remark. In addition his statement is

44 JPh 58, 1961, 482-483.
misleading. Regardless of what "a historical event as we understand it" may mean, Grene tells us that Herodotus has jettisoned what he means by history in favor of his and our conception of drama. On the contrary, Herodotus intends fidelity to both aspects of his history; he has not deliberately introduced a historical anachronism in the Solon and Croesus episode—or elsewhere—for the sake of dramatic effect; and he nowhere intentionally relegates "what we mean by history" to a secondary position in favor of realizing an artistic or philosophical purpose.

Herodotus, then, intends 1) as his historical point, that Solon visited Croesus at the time indicated and 2) as his dramatically structured philosophical point, the conversation between these two men. These two points

45 The meeting of Solon and Croesus is historically credible. If one wishes to question Herodotus' statement that they met, the greatest reduction which is scientifically arguable—not provable—is that they did not meet at the time Herodotus says. The issue is properly subject to historical scrutiny in the framework of these two basic questions: 1) how accurate is Herodotus' chronology for the events relating to Solon and Croesus; 2) when could the meeting have occurred? M. Miller ("The earlier Persian dates in Herodotus," Klio 37, 1959, 29-52) answers the second question—they met when Herodotus says they met—in terms of the first question: Herodotus' Athenian informants did not know the 594/3 date for Solon's archonship; this date was established between c.440-425. Herodotus' chronology vis-à-vis Solon and Croesus is internally
co-exist and Herodotus had no intention of subordinating the first to the second.

Except for this one qualification, then, Grene well represents our point that the Croesus logos in its dramatic and philosophical aspects is a prototype of the entire work. We have described the hubris-nemesis theme consistent and rests upon firmer authority; Herodotus' dating finds support a fortiori in external evidence. The archonship falls in the later 570's and Solon's visit in the 550's.

For an elaborate explication of the "traditional" view, see T. J. Cadoux, "The Athenian archons from Kreon to Hypsichides," JHS 68, 1948, 70-123. N. G. L. Hammond (Historia 4, 1955, 394-395) says of Herodotus' chronology: "When one considers the complexity of the inter-state relations which Herodotus treated in his history, it is indeed a sign of his genius that his narrative of Greek affairs is so consistent internally and accords so well with external chronological data. There are indeed cases where Herodotus, or his text, is at fault, but they are remarkably few. The outstanding case is the reign of Croesus." This exceptional case is then examined with Herodotus represented as fully intending, although with less than total success, to date the reign of Croesus with scrupulous accuracy (395-396). The entire article (371-411) provides an excellent description and assessment of Herodotus' and Thucydides' chronologies. One leaves the article with a firm respect for the chronological accuracy and precision of both historians.

as a dramatically structured philosophical point coexisting with the more precisely historical narrative. This theme, therefore, has more than a formal existence in Herodotus; it maintains an essential existence in the content of his history in the manner explained earlier. At times this aspect of Herodotus's philosophy of history is quite explicit, at other times it is almost forgotten. But never is the history bent to fit the philosophy, even though his philosophical views are set forth as, in the sense we have described, historical conclusions, with a right to our tolerance if not acceptance.

An example of this technique and attitude outside the Croesus logos can be quickly given. In Book Seven prior to the battle at Thermopyle messengers from the Greeks in

46 T. S. Brown observes (Historia 11, 1962, 269): "In one sense Herodotus became the Father of History by providing the first historical plot. And in that respect Thucydides and Polybius were both his true followers. But Herodotus' plot, like that of the epics from which it sprang, was not the main thing." Brown well indicates the simultaneous historical and artistic character of Herodotus' "plot," which Herodotus initially delineates in his proem. The same article (257-270) comments suggestively upon the breadth and depth of Herodotus' sense of history in contrast with that of his more parochial successors. See also, by the same author, "Herodotus and his profession," AHR 59, 1954, 829-843.
the pass successfully secure the assistance of the Locrians and Phocians against Xerxes. While the words of the envoys are not authentic, they are true. Two basic points are made, both of which are expected to secure the loyalty of these two Greek states: an appraisal of the military situation and a pragmatic presentation of the theme of the inevitable fall of great men.47

Once again a historical point is made, the Locrians and Phocians should join the Greek forces at Thermopylae because, as the Greek envoys maintain, the Hellenes hold a military advantage from which Locris and Phocis can only profit. This argument is then buttressed by a philosophical appeal, which is assigned equal weight and

47VII.203. See Aristotle, Poetics 1453a. How and Wells (vol.1, I.31.3n; vol.2, VII. 203.2n.) note that this sentiment is common in Greek literature and cite several examples.
importance. The twin appeals complement one another; and if we may presume to read Locrian and Phocian minds, the second appeal was more persuasive. It represented a known quantity certifiable by any Greek.\textsuperscript{48}

Herodotus presents an extraordinary complexity of original and borrowed ideas, techniques and attitudes that are intricately woven together and difficult to examine in isolation. In the last example, Herodotus has again structured dramatically an aspect of his philosophy of history. It is not enough to say that Herodotus reflects the mentality of his age. The significance goes much deeper than such a bold statement indicates and reveals several interrelated points: the reasons for Herodotus' style, the nature and importance of myth to Herodotus and the historical period he traces, the Greek concept of time vis-à-vis history, and the structure of Greek thought. In order to represent properly these considerations they must be emphasized or implied on an alternating basis rather than treated sequentially in separation from one another.

We proceed in this way in an attempt to pass from our

\textsuperscript{48} How and Wells (vol.2, 222) offer as variations on Herodotus' philosophical theme, Pindar, \textit{Pyth.} 3.81; Antigone 610-625.
hypotactic world to Herodotus' paratactic one. These
grammarians' terms are used by Perry to describe, as the
title of his article reads, "the early Greek capacity for
viewing things separately." As Perry explains (408-409):

... such authors as Homer and Herodotus show more
interest in the man than in the cause he represents
and concentrate their artistic efforts more upon
the episode per se than upon the connection between
one episode and another, or upon the effect of the
sum total of episodes; and finally, to pass over
geography, politics, and freedom of speech, we find
a similar independence in the Greek language itself,
whose syntax, not to mention the rule-defying
variety of its morphology and accent, shows a
marked fondness for coordination rather than sub-
ordination, especially in the early period.

If we may extend Perry's remarks to our earlier observa-
tions, we see how different historical emphases are sub-
served rather than dominated by recurrent Herodotean themes.

To take an instance from another field, in philosophy
Eleaticism and Platonism represented a hypotactica tendency
in opposition to which paratactic Atomism reasserted
itself.

Perry designates the oral tradition as causational in
explaining the paratactic mental processes and style of
Homer (410-411): "Since epic poetry is oral in origin and

49B. E. Perry, TAPA 68, 1937, 403-427.
early, its syntax and style of composition are consequently more spontaneous and less logical in many respects than the syntax and style of later authors. Anacoluthon and various forms of parataxis are especially frequent and familiar to every reader of Homer." Herodotus in style and mentality is assigned a transitional position between Homer and the intricately stylized periods of Isocrates, with a greater affinity to the former author.

It is paradoxical that this paratactic quality is what facilitates Herodotus' ability to record the \( \theta \omega \mu \alpha \sigma \tau \delta \) of different peoples, cultures, and times with such a spirit of scientific detachment while receiving the chastisement of antiquity for being in countless ways un-scientific. From the hypotactically ordered idealism of Plutarch comes self-refuting malice. 50

The Thorntons divide the paratactic mode of expression into the basic categories of linear and appositional parataxis. Before coming to Herodotus, the appositional

50See Plutarch's De malignitate Herodoti, where almost every manner of evil imaginable is assigned to Herodotus as a historian or as a person. The latest edition is that of L. Pearson in the Loeb series, Plutarch's Moralia, vol. 15. Also see the discussion of Ph.-E. Legrand, "De la 'malignité d' Hérodote," in Mélanges Gustave Glotz, vol. 2, 535-547.
mode is exemplified in poetic samplings from Homer through Pindar. They initiate their discussion of Herodotus by noting that in general his sentence is not appositional. "But if we look beyond the single sentence, in passages whether short or long, the sequence of thought is often characteristically appositional." The bulk of their attention to Herodotus is centered upon the Croesus story as stylistically and conceptually related in appositional structure to the proem. The first appositional cluster fills the first five chapters; the second cluster proceeds through chapter ninety-two. They sum up by observing (42-43):

Everything else comes in as expansion and explanation. The stories of Kroisos and all the rest are

51 H. and A. Thornton, Time and style, 35.

52 Herodotus' use of the proem to state his theme and summarize the content of his history reflects the practice and purpose of the epic proem whose existence, as Van Groningen (In the grip of the past, 42) notes, is "the result of the practice of public recitations where the public or the reciter himself fix the theme before starting." In a later work (La composition littéraire archaïque grecque) van Groningen describes the practice in early Greek composition of initiating a work with a fairly elaborate beginning (62-69) and, in sharp contrast (70), "la fin abrupte est très usuelle." He observes Herodotus' adherence to this standard practice and warns against drawing unwarranted conclusions from it: On sait que cette fin abrupte, cette absence complete de quelque chose qui ressemblait à une péroration, a donné lieu à des hypothèses non fondées.
not told as a stretch of events moving chronologically from beginning to end, but the central idea of Kroisos as aitios is immediately grasped and held, and all the rest moves out from it and comes back to it in expansion after expansion. Figure 3, in which the sequence of the narrative is indicated as a movement starting from the top downwards, and the sequence of events in time as a movement on the horizontal, shows once again that, as in Homer, the events are, for the most part, not related in their chronological order, but according to how the intrinsic interest of the material lures attention from item to item and is yet brought back again and again to the central item which carries the greatest weight and interest, the result of it all being the pattern of the appositional mode of expression.  

On the following page we reproduce "figure 3" as a vivid exemplification of this concept and its influence upon Herodotus.

The introduction to Thucydides' history (I. 1-23) likewise forms an extensive appositional cluster, with a similar displacement of linear chronology. The Archaeology, to describe it briefly, is an appositional and temporally regressive gloss upon Thucydides' statement at the end of chapter one. His digression is justified by a desire to show the lesser importance of events prior to the

53 It is, of course, in accordance with Herodotus' manner of thought that ὁ αἰτίος, "origin," as well as "cause," is personal rather than abstract.

54 See H. and A. Thornton, 43-49.
Peloponnesian Wars: οὔ μεγάλα νομίζω γενέσθαι οὔτε κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἄλλα. At the end of chapter twenty-one Thucydides returns to his own historical concern: ὁ πόλεμος οὗτος ... ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων σκοποῦσι δηλώσει ὅμως μείζων γεγενημένως αὐτῶν. "In both cases [the introductions of Herodotus and Thucydides] it is plain that it is high emotional intensity and the consequent strong emphasis on one main initial idea which produces these extensive appositional expansions. The chronological sequence of the events referred to is left aside by Thucydides as much as it is by Herodotus. The archaic elements of Thucydides's style are then not formless and arbitrary, but appositional in structure and character."55

With this much said we can briefly return to Perry and add a qualification to his remarks. We believe that Perry goes too far in one respect in describing the Greek, and the Herodotean, capacity for viewing things separately. He says:

Like Solon, Herodotus travelled and gazed upon the world's bazaar ἄεῳρής εἶνεκεν --not in order to interpret it, but for the joy of seeing what was

55H. and A. Thornton, 50.
there. Passing from one exhibit to another he con­
centrates his attention upon each with an intellectual
curiosity, a sense of wonder, and a singleness of
vision that belong rather to the cultural childhood
of man than to the somewhat age-weary and academic
outlook of the average modern thinker. Things that
Herodotus delights to contemplate for their own
interest often present themselves to our minds as
merely so many data out of which to shape wider or
secondary conceptions."56

This description is kindly phrased and yet gives us a
partial picture that may be misleading. Like Solon,
Herodotus is not looking at anything that passes, but
into that which he sees with his mind's eye, along a care­
fully planned and structured journey. Perry rightly sug­
gests there is a certain naiveté, if the word be properly
understood, about the ἑωρία of Herodotus and Solon: a
naiveté that implies openness rather than emptiness of mind,
a naiveté that Plutarch was incapable of understanding.

Herodotus' attempt to detach himself from the past and to
see ἑωρίης εἴνεκεν is well described by van Groningen (124):

[Herodotus passes] from μῦθος to λόγος, from myth
to reason, and out of his knowledge of what has
happened (τὰ γεγενημένα) he tries to reach the
knowledge of that which is (τὰ ὄντα, τὸ ὄν ). In
the development of his philosophy we see the Greek
liberate himself from the burden of reminiscences
and tear his eyes away, almost violently, from the
past in order to view the everlasting. Here he

56TAPA 68, 1937, 420.
exchanges for the recollections, which, as a poet, he so often charms into beauty, a contemplation of the essence (θεωρία). In both aspects his passionate desire for truth reveals itself.

Herodotus has managed to arrest men and events, to place them momentarily in the foreground of his and our consciousness and then to return them to their context by means of a carefully structured paratactical arrangement. Herodotus thus observes men and things separately, in a sense, while also managing "to shape wider or secondary conceptions." But he achieves this effect in large part outside the hypotactic mode which Perry would describe with a gentle smile as characteristic of "the somewhat age-weary and academic outlook of the average modern thinker."

Before considering further the paratactic mode and its influence upon Herodotus' treatment of time we must consider the foundation upon which this relationship arose and in so doing correlate some earlier observations. We will again stress aspects of the character of time in Greek thought and its influence upon Herodotus. Our return to this topic should recall rather than repeat our earlier discussion; our argument is here presented in the context of the paratactic mode, an embodiment of the oral tradition in written record.
As we saw earlier, the two primary attributes of time in Greek thought are its qualitativeness and hence its concreteness. Both of these aspects are emphasized in Herodotus in relation to causation from the first lines of his history when he points to the earliest source of the conflict between Greeks and Barbaroi as being the influence and example of an αἰτίας and not an αἰτίη. While the theme of the fall of great men has its causational aspect, it can be more satisfactorily described as philosophically thematic. Whether the hamartia is of psychically modest magnitude, as with Croesus, or of greater proportion as with Astyages, Cambyses, and even the clearly heroic Xerxes, the theme always has the concreteness, and final inexorability, of tragedy. The personal quality working out variations of the theme prevents the causative factor from becoming a mechanical, abstract, lawlike function of the universe. It is in the universe functioning not under given, but individually determined, conditions. Jacobsen in speaking of the Mesopotamian attitude toward myth and nature declares: "It was said of primitive man that 'any phenomenon may at any time face him not as "it" but as "Thou."") In this confrontation "Thou" reveals individuality,
qualities, will."  

Mutatis mutandis, this attitude persists in the Greek mind and in any personalist mode of communication, which is to say that it persists to varying degrees in any Greek "literary" art.

Related to this theme in Herodotus, we can note the equation in Homer of fate with a most vividly subjective and qualitative conception of time. In deciding the fate of Hector, Zeus balances upon his scales δῶρον νηρεὶς ταυτελεγέος; the result points to "Εκτόρος αἰὼν ἡμαρ.  

The task of Herodotus was to describe time as his historical subjects viewed it, both secularly and sacraIly. In visiting Egypt, a peaceful Persian province and nation extraordinarily conscious of its own antiquity, Herodotus  

57 T. Jacobsen, Before philosophy, 142.

58 Iliad 22, 210; 212. We noted above similar examples from Sophocles and Plato. The Latin language reveals the qualitative aspect of tempus in its offspring tempestas, the former noun deriving perhaps from τέμνω and τέμνως. See Augustine's description of time in terms of the ego's perception and measurement of it, Confessions, 10.16; and discussion of Augustine's view of time in Callahan, who cites the latter passage, Four views of time in ancient philosophy, 154.

59 E.g. II. 2; 58. At the beginning of the Timaeus (22B) Critias relates a story told him by Solon of the latter's visit to Egypt. Solon, boasting to an Egyptian priest of Greece's antiquity is chided: Ο Σόλων, Σόλων,
observed several of their τεμένη. He speaks at length with the Egyptian priest and makes a surprising historical discovery. The guardians of Egyptian religion had a more satisfactory awareness of their secular antiquity than the Greeks of theirs. Using his predecessor Hecataeus as a Greek straw-man, Herodotus points to his inevitable shortcomings:

60

"Εκαταλψ δὲ γενελογήσαντι ἐσώτερον καὶ ἀναδήσαντι ἔς ἐκκαλεδότα παρ' αὐτῷ ἀπὸθεοῦ γενέσθαι ἀνθρωπον. ἀντεγενελόγησαν δὲ ἱδε, φάμενοι ἐκαστον τῶν κολοσσῶν πίρωμιν ἐκ πιρώμιος γεγονέναι, ἔς ὁ τοῦς πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τριήκοντα ἀπεδεξαν κολοσσοῦς [πίρωμιν ἐκ πιρώμιος γενόμενον], καὶ οὐτὲ εὔθεν οὔτε ἡρως ἀνεδήσαν αὐτούς. πίρωμις δὲ ἐστι κατ' Ἕλλαδα γλῶσσαν καλὸς κάγαθός. ἡδη ὅν

"Ελλήνες ἀεὶ παιδές ἐστε, γέρων δὲ Ἕλλην ὁυκ ἔστιν.

Herodotus, IV.5.1, mistakenly describes Scythia as the youngest nation; see K. von Fritz, TAPA 67, 1936, 329-330.

60. On this passage see J. L. Myres, Who were the Greeks? 299. On Herodotus, Hecataeus and Egypt, one should approach with trepidation W. A. Heidel's monograph, Hecataeus and the Egyptian priests in Herodotus, book II, Memoirs of American Academy of Arts and Sciences 18.2, 1935, 53-134. Heidel mysteriously cites as the major inspiration for his fascination with Hecataeus H. Diels and his exceptional article, "Herodot und Hekataios, Hermes 22, 1887, 411-444. The master would disagree with much more than the tone of his student's remarks. See also, L. Pearson (Early Ionian historians, 81-90) on Hecataeus and Egypt.
Book Two is perhaps the best lone illustration of how Herodotus manages to discuss in a historical way both τὰ θεῖα and τὰ ανθρώπηθα. Throughout this book he is very cautious to discuss the sacred only when it is necessary to his explanation of the profane history of Egypt. The passage cited above is central to one of broader compass (142-146), which we describe only very inadequately as a digression concerned with the birth of Heracles, Pan, and Dionysus. As the passage cited suggests, and its broader context relates in detail, Herodotus' concern is, positively, the establishment of an accurate Egyptian chronology;
negatively, "the purpose which led him to touch the subject of mythological history on this one occasion was the desire to demonstrate the folly of treating such material as historical." By means of such "digressions" Herodotus does not ramble from the point at hand, but rather secures a greater unity for his work. By weaving into his text brief synopses of the early history and chronology of his historical subjects he manages to unify Hellenic and Eastern history and tradition. It is no mistake that these chapters (142-146) are located within the historical, as distinct from what modern specialists would call the earlier geographic and ethnographic, sections of Book Two; for Herodotus' purpose is specifically historical and, by virtue of his sources and traditions available to him, his approach is of necessity as we have described it.

If we take exception to the imprecision of genealogical chronology and find it a curious practice, we would do well he could use for all his work. However, he realized full well that a volume such as he contemplated writing must have a systematic chronological history of those nations with which he was concerned."


66 See S. Toulmin and J. Goodfield, The discovery of time, 29-32.
to consider the conversation on this subject in Plato's *Hippias Major* (285 D-E) and to note the oral aspect of such time-reckoning:

Socrates: What is it that they hear from you with pleasure, and applaud? Tell me, since I do not find it.

Hippias: They listen most eagerly to stories of the races of heroes and of men; to accounts of colonization: how formerly cities were founded; and in short to all ancient lore. Hence because of them I am compelled to learn thoroughly and perfectly all such things.

Socrates: By Zeus, Hippias, you are fortunate that the Lacedaemonians don't like to have someone enumerate for them our archons from Solon down. Otherwise you would have trouble learning them.

Hippias: Why, Socrates? Just hearing them once I shall remember fifty names.

Socrates: True, but I did not keep in mind the fact that you possess the mnemonic art.67

The reality alluded to by Socrates' and Hippias' remarks is explicated by Toulmin and Goodfield (24):

In early societies, then, the place of history was occupied by the collective memory of "the ancestors"; and the time-scale along which these chronicles were ordered was provided by the names of the ancestors themselves. In a pre-literate or newly literate community, genealogy was not a matter of snobbery or personal curiosity: it was a social art of the first importance, establishing a community's roots in the past, and spinning the lifeline which joined it back to earlier times. . . .

Tribes which possess no written records have, accordingly, strong motives for cultivating the

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powers of memory. It is the business of the elders of the tribe to keep the inherited histories and genealogies fresh and accurate in their minds, and to pass them on—with any necessary additions—to the rising generation of newly-initiated adults. So on solemn occasions they meet together under the leadership of those with the most tenacious memories and chant in unison the legends of their forefathers. In this way, they fix the inheritance of oral history more deeply in their minds.

Herodotus' pause in his narrative to discuss Egyptian chronology is intended to indicate his desire to break from the mentality and tradition of his sources, while maintaining a partial, tentative reliance upon them. The ritual myth that we do not find in the mind of Herodotus we do find behind him in the world of his historical subjects. Herodotus' approaches to time-reckoning present us with another way to describe personal but not historical withdrawal from the atmosphere of his narrative time and context. That Herodotus' work can be the source of many diverse judgments and on occasion violently opposed attitudes is due in large measure to the way in which he makes this transition in mentality and transcribes historical reality.

68 Hammond (Historia 4, 1955, 391 n.1) holds to a severely restricted use of generational reckoning in Herodotus. He lists the occasions when it is used for non-Greek areas; II. 142 is naturally included in the list.
Herodotus has maintained an extraordinarily delicate balance between the mythos of his past and the logos of his present. The uniqueness of his achievement is revealed negatively by the absence of historical successors and continuators. Thucydides employed still other approaches to other circumstances and found a variety of emulators, whose quality is in part determinable by the degree of their emulation.

In his treatment of time Herodotus has judiciously balanced himself between the metaphysic of time of the philosophers and the political time of his "national" sources. In both the logos of the one and the mythos of the other there were serious pitfalls. We may imagine Herodotus transported to our own century and reflectively observing in contemporary phraseology:

In truth, facts, as a realistic theory of history imagines them independent of the thought which has to ascertain them, facts in their multiplicity, particularity and chronological order, are absolutely non-existent and as irrational and unintelligible as the so-called phenomena of nature. A fact is by definition quod factum est (perfectum); that is to say, it is something past and no longer real. To

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69E. Meyer (Forschungen, vol. 1, 158-188) considers this factor in discussing the chronology of Herodotus' Sagengeschichte.
know it, in the only way that is possible, is to make it live again, to actualize it; and that means to take it out of time and free it from its chronological character, in order to transfer it from the abstract world of facts to the concrete world of the act (the historian's act) of thought, to which all facts belong in the synthesis of self-consciousness. 70

While not all historians would subscribe to this view, the emphasis upon "the synthesis of self-consciousness" is illustrative of the creative quality of the historian's re-creation (which makes for the uniqueness of his techniques and achievement) and suggestive also of Herodotus' autobiographical quality. By the latter we mean the explanations and evaluations by which Herodotus injects his own person into the narrative. For Herodotus this overt and personal involvement of himself into the texture of his work is not peripheral or parenthetical but central to the nature of his approach (Proem): Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνασσέως ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἦδε.

In discussing Herodotus' appositional style and its paratactic quality in structure and thought we saw the way in which the Croesus logos released itself, over-all and internal to itself, from a strictly sequential chronology.

In the view of the Thorntons, this is not an isolated phenomenon, as their generous samplings from Greek and Latin literature reveal. They conclude (87-88):

Two points emerge from our analysis of the appositional style. Time as implied in it is not yet clearly or necessarily differentiated into past, present and future. What differentiation there is, is rudimentary and partial. Expectation, as we have said, spans a minimum of the future, and the past is felt and experienced so vividly that it seems little removed from the present. The temporal succession characteristic of the appositional style is determined by affect, by the positive feelings of delight and intense interest in the speaker and listener. Such is the time-notion implicit in an appositional utterance.

Another example from Herodotus not cited by them will serve to further emphasize this point. The most conspicuous is the entirety of Book Two. It is not necessary to trace the development of Book Two in detail, but it is essential that we consider the following passages:

1) I.77. 1-2. Κροίνδος δὲ μεμφθέεις κατὰ τὸ πλήθος τὸ εὼντον στρατεύμα (ἡν γὰρ οἱ δοιμαλῶν στρατῶν πολλὰν ἐλάσσων ἡ δι Κὺρου), τοῦτο μεμφθέεις, ὡς τῇ υποτεληθῇ οὐκ ἐπειράτῳ ἑπίων τοῦ Κὺρος, ἀπήλαυνε ἐς τὰς Σάρδις, ἐν νῦν ἔχων παρακλήσας μὲν Ἄγυπτος κατὰ τὸ ὅρκιον (ἐποιήσατο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς Ἁμασίν βασιλεύοντα Ἄγυπτος συμμαχήν πρὸτερον ἡ περ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους) ....

2) II.1. Τελευτάσαντος δὲ Κὺρου παρέλαβε τὴν βασιλήν Ἡλλάδος, Κὺρου ἐὼν παῖς καὶ Κασσανδρᾶς τῆς φαρμάσεως ὑπουργῶς, τῆς προαποκαταρασίας Κὺρος αὐτοῦ τῆς μέγα πένθος ἐποίησατο καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις προεὶπε πάσι τῶν ἕριχε πένθος ποιεῖσθαι. τούτης δὴ τῆς γνωαικῆς ἐὼν παῖς καὶ Κὺρου Ἡλλάδος "Ἰωνᾶς μὲν
Chapter one of Book Two informs us of Cambyses' intended invasion of Egypt. The rest of the book is a rupture of sequential chronology. It is Herodotus' custom to provide background on a new people at the point where he begins detailed treatment of them. But the usual extra-chronological glance at a nation's earlier period encompasses in this instance an entire book.  

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71 J. L. Myres (Herodotus: the father of history, 96) places this book in the tradition of the earlier Ionian logographers: "It is a logos, a scientific survey, the main topics of which are arranged on the same general plan (p. 73) as for Scythia and Libya in Book IV, and less fully for Persia (i. 131-40), Babylonia (i. 178-87), the Massagetae (i. 201-3, 215-16) and Thrace (v. 1-8)." On the page cited by him Myres schematically correlates Herodotus' logoi of the various peoples mentioned in the quotation. The Egyptian logos is of course the most detailed, but, as Myres shows, the topics are discussed according to "a system already conventional" and even "tend to occur in the same order."
The stimulus for Cambyses' projected invasion, Amasis, does not reappear for detailed consideration of his reign until chapter 169. The age of Amasis is the subject of the last chapters (169-182).

At III.1 we return to the chronological point we left at II.1, Cambyses' aggression against Egypt, with his own forces supplemented by Greek troops, principally Ionian and Aeolian. The only indication that Herodotus has in any way diverged from the narrative theme of II.1 is the particle δή (second passage 1.1). The weight of II.2-182 depends heavily but not entirely, for support upon the strength and clarity of this particle. Amasis was not mentioned by name in II.1, but he had appeared earlier in Book One as an enemy of Cyrus (first passage). The beginnings of the enmity between Persia and Egypt, indicated by Herodotus in Book One, became active in II.1 and are merely recalled and verified in III.1.

The full description of the immediate motivation of the conflict in III.1 is appositionally dependent upon ἐκ ‖ αἰτήσει τοιούτην and, predictably, the hostility between Persia and Egypt is personalized: Cyrus and Cambyses versus Amasis, for highly individual motives.

The clearest links among these passages are
genealogical: I.77) Croesus allied with Amasis; ergo, Cyrus at odds with Amasis.

II.1) Cambyses' Persian parentage stressed, Cyrus and Cassandane; Cambyses versus Amasis; Cambyses' Ionian and Aeolian forces.

III.1) Cambyses versus Amasis; Cambyses' Ionian and Aeolian forces; Cambyses deceived by Amasis.

III.2) Cambyses' parentage as in II.1, not son of Nitetis, the daughter of Apries in II.1.

In each of these links the importance of the present is determined by the past. The most important cause of the war is the most remote; the most proximate cause, III.1, which we have referred to but not recorded, is the least important. 72

As Croesus was the heart of the Lydian story and all previous events acquired their importance from the importance of Croesus, so the history of Egypt achieves its prominence from Cambyses' attack on the country. Time is not important but the historical figures who dominate it

72 To discuss fully the causational aspects of this narrative, "expansionism" should be added. See I. 153.4 and Immerwahr, TAPA 87, 1956, 259-261, and 274.
are. They are crucial and time is dependent upon them.

This aspect of Herodotus' style is described by Goethe and Schiller in their correspondence on Homer as "das Retardierende."73 Auerbach comments upon the term and its significance: "Das Retardierende, das 'Vor-und Zurückgehen' durch Einschübe scheint auch mir in den homerischen Gedichten im Gegensatz zu stehen zu dem gespannten Streben nach einem Ziel, und zweifellos hat Schiller für Homer recht, wenn er meint, er schildere 'uns bloß das ruhige Dasein und Wirken der Dinge nach ihren Naturen'; sein Zweck liege 'schon in jedem Punkt seiner Bewegung.'"74 This rejection of tension and suspense

73 For examples of the retarding element traced from Homer through Thucydides, see van Groningen, In the grip of the past, 35-46. J. Gonda ("A remark on 'periphrastic' constructions in Greek," Mnemosyne 12, 1959, 97-112) documents the ways in which Herodotus uses the periphrastic construction to achieve a psychological retardative effect.

74 E. Auerbach, Mimesis, 9. Auerbach proceeds to object to Goethe's and Schiller's elevating of their description of Homeric procedure to a norm canonically applicable to all epic poetry. The exception is well taken and his own explanation of "das Retardierende" is revealing (9-80): "Aber die Ursache der Erscheinung des Retardierens scheint mir in etwas anderem zu liegen, nämlich in dem Bedürfnis des homerischen Stils, nichts von dem was überhaupt erwähnt wird, halb im Dunkel und unausgeformt zu lassen." Auerbach's explanation is illuminating but incomplete. "Die Erscheinung des
places the meaning of mythos or logos, in which the para-
tactic and appositional technique predominates, at odds
with the modern "story" and its reliance upon a linear
sequence filled with artificial suspension of information
about factual details and a final resolution of the con-
flict. The tragic dénouement is also impossible.

The element of suspense must to some degree be absent
from the Herodotean logos, whether paratactically or hypo-
tactically structured, because of the context of the logos.
"The Herodotean logos, as a unit of narrative, is to a
large degree self-contained, but nevertheless related to
its surroundings by overt references and thematic con-
nections." 75 Immerwahr adds to Myres' description of the
conventional character of the logos (n.70 above) by
describing it as "a reproduction of tradition," i.e. as to
some degree already known. Because it is the record of a
tradition, then, the Herodotean logos is forced to combine
the fiction of the "story" with the facts of history:
"Despite this, the logos is intended to be a reproduction

Retardierens" is too strong a phrase in an otherwise per-
ceptive observation. The retardation, correctly understood,
is real. The mistake of Goethe and Schiller begins with
their failure to distinguish oral from written epic.

75H. Immerwahr, TAPA 87, 1956, 276.
of tradition accessible to the historian by opsis and historiē, and criticized by him on the basis of gnōmē. Herodotus conceives of the art of the historian in the metaphor of the judicial interrogation of witnesses. Now it is characteristic of witnesses that in telling a fact they also have an opinion about it, and therefore the modern distinction between a diplomatic fact and its analysis is alien to Herodotus. Just as tradition reflects the events (ta genomena), in the same manner the logos reflects the tradition."

Immerwahr's observation that the recording of diplomatic (or political) "fact" in the logos prevents Herodotus from adequate "analysis" of the logos is not untrue, since Immerwahr has prefaced this comment by indicating that he is speaking from the viewpoint of "the modern distinction." But if approaching Herodotus from a contemporary standpoint is helpful, in this instance it is also misleading. The logos, to be sure, "reflects the tradition"; but Herodotus is writing a history and not 1) cutting and pasting sources and 2) doing so at random. Within conventions appropriate to Herodotus, his sources, and his audience, he is reflecting, or selecting, a tradition which he had judged most accurate. Lacking the possibility of
that judgment he presents the one that is most feasible.

As an alternative, Herodotus will on occasion parrot a tradition, and then indicate its unsuitable character (e.g. III.2). By this description of Herodotus' historical process, we mean to indicate that he judiciously balances himself between his twin obligations as a historian: 1) to re-present the tradition he has decided to encompass and 2) to provide an "analysis" of it, i.e. to present the tradition from his own perspective and according to his own judgments upon its accuracy and worth. Herodotus cannot achieve this goal in a "modern" way, but according to his own lights.
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