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THE CONCEPT OF THE SENSE-DATUM IN
THE PERCEPTUAL ESSAYS OF C.E. MOORE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree Doctor of
Philosophy in the Graduate School of
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By

John McLellan Titchener, A.B., M.A., M.A.

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Approved by

Robert L. Campbell
Adviser

Department of Philosophy
PREFACE

This dissertation has grown out of a seminar led by Professor Morris Weitz on G.E. Moore. During the course of the seminar I became convinced that no one of Moore's arguments for the existence of sense-data was a sound one but felt that I did not understand why Moore employed the notion. I was not, and am not, sure that he intended the introductions of sense-data to be good arguments. The dissertation attempts to place the concept of the sense-datum in a larger framework which will explain the uses to which Moore put the notion.

I am indebted to Professor Weitz whose encouragement got me started on what has turned out to be a most interesting project. I am also indebted to Professor Robert Turnbull who, during Professor Weitz's leave of absence, took on a half-finished dissertation and unstintingly gave me his time and the benefit of his criticism. To my wife who has with great patience awaited the completion of this work I am most deeply indebted for her help and encouragement.

J. F.

June 1966

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June 10, 1937  Born--Columbus, Ohio

1958  A.B., Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio

1960  M.A., The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

1960-1961  Graduate Study, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia

1961  Full-Time Teaching Fellow (Junior Tutor) Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia

1962-1964  Graduate Study, The Ohio State University

1963-1964  Graduate Assistant, The Ohio State University

1964-1966  Instructor, Depauw University, Greencastle, Indiana

1965  M.A., The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia
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CHAPTER I

THE INTRODUCTION OF SENSE-DATA

Introduction to the Problem.—Many contemporary British philosophers no longer display the interest shown by their predecessors in questions concerning sense-data. In fact one reading the essays of such philosophers as Gilbert Ryle or the late Professor Austin comes to expect an argument or two directed against what is called the "sense-datum theory." George Edward Moore did not follow this change of fashion. An essay of his published in 1957 contains what looks, at first sight at least, to be an unequivocal assertion of the existence of some thing or event called a sense-datum.

Nevertheless I find it exceedingly difficult to argue that Moore had a "sense-datum theory." That he was interested in philosophical questions raised by people who talked about sense-data is indisputable. Some of his essays deal with the sense-datum directly ("The Status of Sense-Data," "Some Judgements of Perception,"

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"A Reply to My Critics," and "Visual Sense-Data"\(^2\) while others discuss larger issues which involve sense-datum questions. His "A Defense of Common Sense" and "Proof of an External World"\(^3\) are good examples of essays the content of which includes discussions of sense-data.

Usually a man with a theory about pterodactyls or substance or prime numbers starts off by telling us what he will talk about and then goes on to talk about it. Or perhaps he might start by telling us the burning question which his theory is designed to answer. Moore does not do either of these things clearly—if at all.

In the essays mentioned above (which I shall call the perceptual essays) he attempted in a number of different ways to indicate just what it was that he wanted to talk about; he then went on to raise a number of quite different sorts of question about that subject matter. It seems to me that the perceptual essays present us with a peculiarly philosophical problem—the specification of the problem. We do not know just where to begin, what


questions to ask, or what would count as an answer to a proper question. I shall attempt to provide an interpretation of the perceptual essays which will explain these difficulties by showing how they arise.

The Need for a New Approach.—But in doing this I obviously walk on a trail blazed by my betters. One could ask what I might say that has not been said more astutely by some of the very able critics who have written about these essays. To this question I would offer two answers. In the first place some of the critics, such as O.K. Bouwsma, feel that they have specified the problem and found Moore's answer wanting. But often this specification of the problem is based on only one of the essays. In such cases not all the evidence is in. I shall, for instance, argue that Bouwsma's reading of Moore is incompatible with a number of essays in which Moore deals directly with questions about sense-data. Then I would suggest that, to the best of my knowledge, there has been only one attempt to specify the problem or problems which considered all of the perceptual essays. A.R. White makes this attempt in his recent book G.E. Moore: A Critical Exposition. Although I believe that White


has failed some of his ideas are worth saving. Indeed much of what I have to say takes the form of a three-cornered conversation in which Moore, White, and I take part.

The contemporary reaction against sense-datum theories usually takes one of two forms. Sometimes people say, as Bouwsma does, that a sense-datum theory really is not a theory at all because it Pretends to talk about a thing or event called a sense-datum as though it were the proper object of a scientific study. But when we investigate this claim we find out that this simply is not the case for no conceivable evidence would count against an hypothesis asserting the existence of sense-data. Thus the hypothesis is subject to the death of a thousand qualifications and turns out not to be an empirically verifiable claim. Nevertheless sense-datum hypotheses masquerade as empirical claims for people ask questions about the existence of, or properties of, sense data just as they might ask about the nature of or past existence of pterodactyls.

The other contemporary reaction is quite different. I shall call it the synonym view for reasons which I hope will become clear. The philosopher who accepts this viewpoint explains sense-datum theories away by maintaining that they merely say in a technical way something which we have non-technical ways of saying. The
locus classicus of this view is G.A. Paul's excellent essay "Is There A Problem About Sense-Data?" Paul argues that 'sense-datum' is a technical philosophical term. Its introduction has been defended on the grounds that it makes possible the precise formulation of views which can not be stated without it. In that sense the term allows its user to get "closer to the facts." If vague terms lead to vague theories then one should look for precise terms. Paul does not believe that the term 'sense-datum' can be used to say anything which cannot be said without it and suggests that one might speak instead of "appearances." We shall see that this is an overly simple account of a very subtle argument; but for the moment I shall characterize the synonym view in this way and cite Paul's essay as an instance of it.

I shall argue that most of Moore's critics have adopted one or the other of these two reactions to his writings on sense-data. Consequently they think that Moore is talking about either a thing or event the existence of which is empirically ascertainable or the viability of a piece of technical terminology which is alleged to help promote solutions to certain traditional problems. One of these is the problem of illusion—how can an object known to be white appear to be blue? I

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hope to show that Moore did not distinguish between these approaches; consequently a proper interpretation of the perceptual essays ought not to assume the infallible applicability of the distinction. But surely there is a difference between asking if there exist things of a certain sort and asking if a word is worth using? To give a simple and unqualified 'Yes' to this question simply will not do. Why Moore thought so is something I hope to show. For the moment I can promise to show how Moore sometimes looks as though he is raising questions about the existence of things and at other times looks as though he is doing something remarkably different. Any interpretation which does not allow for both kinds of endeavor has not gotten to the bottom of Moore's problem.

The initial ambiguity obviously makes the specification of the problem more difficult. An adequate interpretation must show what the question or questions Moore sought to answer were, and then evaluate the answers he seems to have given. Ultimately I will argue that the conclusions of former critics are at best provisional for they contend that if, for instance, Moore thought of sense-data as things or events then his theory is wrong. But my question concerns the antecedent of this conditional, or of similar ones construing 'sense-datum' as a technical term.
Specification of the Problem.--Now the question arises as to how one is to obtain a proper interpretation of the perceptual essays. Initially we should be warned against prejudging the issue by deciding precisely what the questions are with which we think Moore ought to be concerned. Then, I think, one should appreciate two approaches to sense-datum problems. Moore shows himself to be concerned with both. In some cases he shows us the questions with which he is concerned by speaking about them directly and developing what appear to be positive answers to them. But he also examined and rejected certain views concerning sense-data and thereby revealed his adherence to standards in terms of which remarks about sense-data led to the conclusion that when we say that a material object exists we do not really mean what we say. But Moore did mean what he said and thus rejected this particular view. I believe that too little attention has been paid to Moore's remarks about the sense-datum theories of others; this is unfortunate for his own views are clarified by this contrast.

I must now attempt to formulate two different sorts of question both of which worried Moore. They are these: Q1: Do there exist things or events called 'sense-data'? Q1 is the question Bouwsma asked. It looks like an empirical question to be settled by empirical means. The second question is much harder to formulate and
must here be put in a rough way. Q2: is it necessary to have the concept of the sense-datum in order to offer philosophic explanations of certain phenomena? To understand Q2 clearly it will be necessary to go into the question of Moore's views about the nature of philosophica analysis. For the moment I shall suggest that the word 'philosophic' in Q2 means simply 'non-experiential.' Q2 might be explained a little by analogy. Suppose I asked if it were necessary on physical or logical grounds to have the concepts of energy and classes in order to provide explanations. If I say 'Yes' there is an odd sense in which I might mean "Yes, both energy and classes do exist" but the notion of existence seems to be more appropriate to Q1 questions involving such things as pterodactyls. On the other hand I might suggest that although no one sees energy or classes in the way in which they see material objects the concepts do help me to give explanations. In one case I can give a rational explanation of the motion of billiard balls. In the other I might suggest that the concept of the class is necessary for it allows me to give a theoretic explanation of the desired sort by building a bridge between logic and elementary number theory.

It might be better to suggest that Q2 actually represents a group of questions which have been asked of sense-datum theories. The conditions for membership
in this group are difficult to specify but have to do with the philosophical analysis of concepts or ideas central to a discussion of sense-data. Perhaps an example of a Q2 type question might help. The distinction between the material and the formal modes of speech approximates the distinction between Q1 and Q2 questions. Thus "Is a sense-datum a thing" is a Q1 question while "Is 'sense-datum' a thing word" is a Q2 question. The possibility that an affirmative answer be given the latter question and a negative one the former demonstrates the importance of keeping these types of question distinct.

So I shall argue that an acceptable interpretation of the essays must consider both Q1 and Q2 as well as Moore's critical and constructive remarks about sense-data. In terms of these conditions I shall defend the three following propositions:

A. By failing to see just how Moore is concerned with both Q1 and Q2 past critics have failed to see the basis of Moore's essays about sense-data.

B. An interpretation which reconciles the seeming opposition of the empirical and the synonym views of sense-datum theories can be found.

C. This interpretation is ultimately based upon Moore's developing views on the analysis of concepts and propositions.

A will be discussed in Chapter I; B and C will be defended in Chapter IV.

Some Terms Defined.---Perhaps the warning against prejudging has shown that, unlike the lecturer on pterodactyls, I can not straightforwardly say what a sense-datum is and thus explain what a theory about sense-data does. Still it behooves me to attempt to provide explanations for some terms that will inevitably arise in this discussion. Most of these have been given technical uses by philosophers which may be confused with their more common employments. In providing the following explanations I am not trying to set up definitions from which I might argue but merely to remove possible ambiguities. The terms are philosophically loaded ones but I shall not argue from them. Some of these terms could possibly be used in quite different senses without loosing the consistency of the argument.

The most slippery of these terms are those involved in Q2, 'concept' and 'proposition.' Professor Copi's Introduction to Logic defines 'proposition' as the meaning of a sentence. 'John loves Mary' and 'Mary is loved by John' express one and the same proposition. Similarly 'It is raining,' 'Il pleut,' and 'Es regnet' also express one proposition. It is important to distinguish between the sentence which expresses the

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meaning or proposition and the proposition itself. Just how one determines that two sentences express the same proposition is a matter of contention among philosophers; I do not think that it is necessary now to plead the case for one of these views rather than another if the distinction between propositions and sentences is admitted. One might do a similar thing with the notion of the concept by saying that 'bachelor' and 'unmarried male above a certain indeterminate age' express the same concept. Again just how this sameness is to be determined is not the issue provided that the difference between a word and the concept it expresses is accepted. It could be said that a proposition is the meaning of a sentence and a concept is the meaning of a word. This will need refinement when we turn to Q2 questions but these tentative characterizations will do for the moment.

The other terms which may provoke difficulties are 'material object' and 'sensation.' In chapter IV we shall look closely at the way in which Moore used these terms; for now I shall employ their customary meanings.

Senses of 'See'.--But there is one word the precise definition of which is crucial to this endeavor. Moore carefully sifted out three different concepts expressed by the word 'see.' I shall speak of these different concepts as 'senses' of the word 'see' and attempt to
show how Moore distinguished them. The first sense, which I shall call 'see 1,' is the usual or customary, Moore calls it the "ordinary," sense of the word. The sorts of things which may be seen in this sense of the word are material objects, and such things as reflections, shadows, the sky etc. If one attempted to specify this sense of 'see' by characterizing the things seen he would provide a list of things all of which could be seen, in the usual sense, by more than one person. Thus tables and chairs, shadows and clouds are seen 1 while the point of a joke or an after-image are not so seen. The seeing the point of a joke is not a visual happening; the seeing of an after-image is not the seeing of a thing which more than one person can see. Instead of getting at this sense by talking about the things which are seen 1 I might attempt the harder task of defining the sense directly. Moore did not do this. To do so he would have had to provide us with a set of words which has the same sense as 'see' when it expresses see 1. It is only when 'see' is used in the third sense, see 3, that Moore offers us a definition of the sense. Senses see 1 and see 2 are differentiated only by their objects, the things seen.

The object seen when 'see' expresses sense see 2 is simply a surface, or a part of the surface of a
material object. The distinction between see 1 and see 2 is hinted at in 1905 in "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception." Moore there attempted to answer the question "What kinds of things do we observe?"

This is his answer:

Most of us are familiar with the experience which we should describe by saying that we have seen a red book and a blue book side by side upon a shelf. What exactly can we be said to observe or directly perceive when we have such an experience? We certainly observe one colour, which we call blue, and a different colour, which we call red; each of these we observe as having a particular size and shape; and we observe also these two colour patches as having to one another the spatial relation which we express by saying that they are side by side. All of this we certainly see or directly perceive now, whatever may have been the process by which we have come to perceive so much. But when we say, as in ordinary talk we should, that the objects we perceive are books, we certainly mean to ascribe to them properties, which, in a sense which we all understand, are not actually seen by us, at the moment when we are merely looking at two books on a shelf two yards off. And all such properties I mean to exclude as not being then observed or directly perceived by us. When we speak of what we observe . . . I mean to limit the expression to that which is actually seen.

I have said that Moore hints at the distinction in this passage for, clear as it may seem, it contains an ambiguity which later formulations do not. The red and the blue which I see—are they surfaces or might they be merely illusory? If they are surfaces then perhaps

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several of us can see them simultaneously. But if I am having an hallucination you would not see the red and the blue which I see.

In 1905 Moore had not yet begun to talk about sense-data. He does use the term in 1910 in the lectures published as Some Main Problems of Philosophy but it is not until 1914 that our questions are clearly answered. In SSD, published that year, he indicated that an hallucination is to be thought of as a sense-datum which, in this instance, means as a member of a class of mental events of a certain sort. The members of this class are "directly apprehended" but this direct apprehension is not the direct apprehension of NROP. Moore wanted to distinguish between seeing an object and seeing its surface; both of these were to be distinguished from the direct apprehension of a sense-datum. In the case in which I see a half-crown

we have also to distinguish at least two different senses in which we can be said to perceive physical objects, different both from one another and from "directly apprehend." For it is obvious that though I should be said to be now seeing the half-crown there is a narrower, and more proper, sense in which I can only be said to see one side of it—not its lower side or its inside, and not therefore the whole half-crown.

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12Moore, Studies (SSD), p. 188.
Moore stuck to this distinction in DCS for he there said that there is a "different and more fundamental sense" of 'perceive' in which that which is perceived is not a thing but its surface. I shall use 'see 2' to indicate this sense in which that which is seen is not the whole of an object but a surface, or a part of a surface, of it.

The third sense of 'see,' which I shall call 'see 3' was isolated by Moore in two different ways. Sometimes, as in SSD, he attempted to explain what he meant by the term 'sense-datum' and then said that the sense of 'see' in which visual sense-data are seen is the sense see 3 or, as he called it, direct apprehension. If you have ever had an hallucination or an after-image the sense in which you saw it was this particular sense of 'see.'

But when Moore first began to talk about sense-data he used a slightly different way to explain the third sense of the word. He offered as a synonym the phrase "direct apprehension" and maintained that this direct apprehension was a way of having something "before the mind" which was neither thinking about the thing nor remembering it. One directly apprehends pain and heat as well as visual sense-data. But this method may collapse into the first for the acts of consciousness involved in this direct apprehension are the same in
quality and differentiated from one another only by
the kind of sense-datum involved.

Moore thought that the word 'see' can express
these three different concepts. This belief is inex-
tricably bound up with the various questions he raised
about sense-data for the sense-datum is that which dis-
tinguishes sense see 2 from see 3. Since the thesis is
a philosophic one in the sense that it deals with the
concepts expressed in a language rather than the facts
stated by it the various sense-datum questions may also
reflect this concern for concepts. I point this out
because Moore came to accept a distinction like the one
I have drawn between Q1 and Q2 questions. After DCS of
1925 he often asked about the meaning of sentences the
truth of which was not in doubt. Whether or not a given
sentence expresses a true proposition is, for Moore, an
empirical question (a Q1 question). But what that pro-
position means is something else again, that something
having to do with Q2 questions. Obviously the notion
of meaning is used here in a technical sense. The
meaning of a sentence or a word is expressed by an
analysis of that sentence or word. I must insist upon
the importance of the connection between the one question
"What concepts are expressed by 'see'," a question
seemingly about language, and the other question, "Are
there sense-data?," a question which seems to be about
the world. I want to be able to raise as clearly as is possible the following question: when Moore talks about sense-data is he attempting to get at the sense expressed by the words 'sense-datum' or is he arguing, or presupposing, the existence of a referent for the word? There is no reason to think that we shall always find the same answer given to this question.

The Method of Restriction.—In his book on Moore White presents an exhaustive catalogue of what he calls "methods for introducing sense-data." I shall accept the catalogue with the following reservations. As I shall show these methods are not arguments the conclusions of which demonstrate the existence of a thing or event called a sense-datum. It might be better, as J.J. Ross has recently put it, to say that these are methods for "introducing the concept of the sense-datum." Perhaps it is best to say that 'sense-datum' is a technical term and that the methods are stage setting devices preparatory to the introduction of the term.

The first, the Method of Restriction, is a favorite of philosophers of perception and appears in such places

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as Descartes' *Sixth Meditation* and Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*. Moore used the method in SSD when he suggested the following experiment. Let us suppose that I place upon a flat surface two coins of differing diameters, the larger being put farther away than the smaller from a given point. If I stand on that point and look at the coins I will see that the larger is farther from me than is the smaller. Let us also suppose that the bigger of the two coins, a half-crown, looks smaller. The other, a florin, is nearer and thus looks bigger even though it is smaller. You would probably understand me if I said that the coins appear to me to be elliptical even though I know that they are not.

Now that the stage is set we might expect Moore to rush in from the wings, give me a pencil and paper, and ask me to draw the coins I see. Then, presented with a drawing containing two ellipses, the larger of which represents the florin and the smaller the half-crown, we might think that Moore would say that I have drawn what I actually saw, what I directly apprehended. Since one and the same thing cannot be both round and elliptical, larger and smaller than a thing similar to

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it, I have drawn the sense-data directly apprehended, and those sense-data are not qualitatively identical with the round coins. This would make the method into a poor argument for the existence of some seen entity other than the coins and might lead to the conclusion that what I had drawn was not the coins but rather the objects of my direct apprehension.

But this is not what Moore does with this stage setting. SSD opens with the simple statement that there are several classes of mental events which consist of the experience of images, dream images, after-images, hallucinations, and "sensations proper." Moore calls all of these images entities and simply says that they are sense-data. The method does not argue for the existence of sense-data for this is posited at the outset. It does show that the sense-data, the entities which are the objects of my mental events, are not qualitatively identical with the surfaces of the coins. These entities might perhaps belong to the class of sensations proper as opposed to after-images etc. Although we might object to calling sensations 'entities' it seems impossible to deny that I had visual sensations while drawing the coins. Here again there is another traditional move which Moore does not make. Let us suppose that the sensation or the entity is a Humean impression; we might try to argue that the drawing incident shows that I
do not really see the coins at all. Moore would object strenuously to the suggestion for he says that in the "ordinary sense of the word 'see' I am really seeing two coins." I cannot overemphasize the fact that this familiar argument is used by Moore, in SSD and again in PEW, to show that the description of the sense-datum need not be the description of the physical object. The argument is not used to draw any existential conclusions about sense-data but rather to support the distinction drawn between see 1 and see 3. Moore says that the experiment shows that we must draw this distinction:

In a proposition of the form "I see A," where A is a name or description of some physical object, though, if this proposition is to be true, there must be some visual sensible B, which I am directly apprehending, yet the proposition "I see A" is certainly not always, and probably never identical in meaning with the proposition "I directly apprehend B."10

But what about the claim that there must be a visual sensible B? In this context it sounds as though B might well be a sensation. There are no grounds, in any of the places in which the method is employed, for thinking that B is necessarily other than a sensation and no reason for attributing to it any mysterious ontological status.

Thus the method admits of interpretations on two

16Moore, Studies (SSD), p.188
different levels. If one has independent ways of showing that there are sense-data the method can be used to show something about those sense-data—that they are not qualitatively identical with the surfaces of which they are sense-data. Or it could be said that the method really shows the necessity of distinguishing between two concepts expressed by the word 'see' and is thus a technique which deals with words, and the concepts they express, and not things. In the quoted passage Moore evinces his interest in the question as to whether "I see A" and "I see B" can ever have the same meaning. Which of these sorts of concern really bothered Moore is unclear. Perhaps the best answer is both. He assumes, in SSD, that there are sense-data and then attempts to indicate what they are—either mental events or the entities experienced in those mental events. Then he seems to feel that this state of affairs makes necessary the distinction between see 1 and see 3.

**The Method of Selection.**—The Method of Selection is the one for which Moore is best known. The method is put forward in DCS in a passage made famous, or notorious, by O.K. Bouwsma's attack upon it. It goes this way:

> But there is no doubt at all that there are sense-data, in the sense in which I am now

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using the term. I am at present seeing a great number of them, and feeling others. And in order to point out to the reader what sorts of things I mean by sense-data I need only ask him to look at his own right hand. If he does this he will be able to pick out something (and, unless he is seeing double, only one thing) with regard to which he will see that it is, at first sight, a natural view to take that that thing is identical, not, indeed, with his whole right hand, but with that part of its surface which he is actually seeing, but will also (on a little reflection) be able to see that it is doubtful whether it can be identical with the part of the surface of his hand in question. Things of the sort (in a certain respect) of which this thing is which he sees in looking at his hand, and with regard to which he can understand how some philosophers should have supposed it to be the part of the surface of his hand which he is actually seeing, while others have supposed that it can't be, are what I mean by "sense-data." I therefore define the term in such a way that it is an open question whether the sense-datum which I now see in looking at my hand and which is a sense-datum of my hand is or is not identical with that part of its surface which I am now actually seeing.

On p. 206 with the following words:
And in order to point out to the reader what sorts of things I mean by __, I need only ask him to look at the cook's right hand. If he does this he will be able to pick out something with regard to which he will see that it is at first a natural view to take that that thing is identical not indeed with the cook's whole right hand, but with that part of the surface which one is actually (?) seeing but will also (on a little inspection) be able to see that it is doubtful whether it can be identical with that part of the hand in question. Things of the sort of which this thing is, which he sees in looking at the cook's hand, and with regard to which he can understand how some kitchen visitors should have supposed it to be a part of the surface of the cook's hand at which he was looking, while others have supposed that it can't be, are what I mean by rubber gloves.

18Moore, Papers (DCS), p. 54
Moore's first sentence suggests that he believes that there are sense-data, in the sense to be specified. This follows for Moore saw some of them. This does not really help for we do not know in what sense of 'see' this seeing took place. If, as seems to be required, it is sense see 3 which can be distinguished by its object then the question may be begged. That the passage contains an argument is hard to believe. Moore does not set up the premisses from which he wished to argue and then list possible conclusions which might be supported by them. He explicitly says that he is defining "sense-datum"; he seems to me to believe that once the definition is understood the reader will see that the words do have a referent.

But what sort of definition does the passage contain? White thinks that it is an ostensive definition—as do the authors of a recent logic text.19 The simplest sort of ostensive definition is one in which I show you an object while mentioning its name. You then connect the name with the object and, in that sense, come to know what the name means. But all this clearly depends upon the existence of the object which I show you. If

there were no such object I could not display it and, as it were, baptize it in your presence.

Another one of Moore's examples might help here. Let us suppose that I want to provide an ostensive definition for the phrase 'negative after-image' for you. I instruct you to look intently at a light bulb for a certain period of time, and then to look at a plain surface. If all goes well you will, perhaps for the first time, have a negative after-image and also know what to call it. As a result of the experiment you might be able to say (a) I know that negative after-images exist, and (b) I know what 'negative after-image' means. This seems to be more like the experiment Moore asked his reader to perform with regard to his right hand. But even here the definition will fail if you are, for instance, congenitally unable to have after-images.

But perhaps the most startling difference between the after-image experiment and Moore's instructions is seen in the extraordinary amount of thinking which the instructions demand. Do notice that Bouwsma's parody substitutes 'inspection' for 'reflection.' According to Moore I must, after looking in the right direction and doing the "picking out" (let us suppose that I have got this far), also understand that it would be "natural" for me to take that which is picked out to be the surface of my hand. Then I must perform an act of reflection,
of an unspecified nature, which enables me to understand that the natural view is incorrect. After that I have to know enough about philosophy and philosophers to understand how some philosophers could have made the natural move and how, and perhaps why, others have denied that this can be done. This ostensive definition presupposes a thorough familiarity with a particular philosophical problem. That seems to involve an understanding of the notion of the sense-datum which notion is to be explained by the definition. This experiment could not be performed with a child as the negative after-image experiment might. I will hazard the guess that the "little reflection" called for might well involve another of these methods. If this is an ostensive definition it is a most esoteric one. But even esoteric definitions of this sort depend for their success upon the existence of the referent of the word to be defined.

The method does not look like an argument for the existence of the sense-datum; but if one reads it as an ostensive definition other problems arise. On the other hand the passage does not embody the kind of definition which Moore looked for in Principia Ethica. He there distinguished between arbitrary and proper verbal definitions both of which he dismissed as philosophically

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The important kind of definition is that which states that

a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in a certain manner: that it has [parts] . . . all of them arranged in definite relations to one another.  

This is the sense in which Moore took 'good' to be indefinable. Since he thought that the word denoted some thing which is simple, it cannot be defined in the desired way. In *Principia Ethica* Moore subscribed to the view that it is a necessary condition for a word's having meaning that it denote. Thus it might be the case that 'sense-datum,' being for Moore a meaningful expression, denotes a simple and unanalysable something. If this were the kind of thinking which lies behind this method we could understand why the attempt at an ostensive definition was necessary. After all, Moore says that sense-data, like pains, are directly apprehended. So the way to explain what 'pain' means is to get some one to have one; the way to explain what 'sense-datum' means is quite similar. But now we are right back where we started!

The Method of the Ultimate Subject.—As opposed to the others White takes this method to be a "purely logical" one. Unfortunately he does not describe it carefully. I shall paraphrase his description and then point to the

texts which give rise to it. He thinks that the method is a way of "defining a sense-datum as the ultimate subject of a judgement of perception."\(^{22}\) This is misleading for although it may be the case that Moore does offer an implicit definition of 'sense-datum' and he does take the sense-datum to be the ultimate subject of a perceptual judgment it is not obvious that he defines the sense-datum as the ultimate subject of such a judgment. All of this involves a rather intricate theory concerning the analysis of a proposition expressing a perceptual judgment. The crucial idea is that of the logical subject, an idea Moore seems to have borrowed from Russell's theory of descriptions.\(^{23}\) If I say "The author of Waverly was Scotch" what have I said? I seem to have meant the following:

(1) At least one person wrote Waverly.
(2) At most one person wrote Waverly.
(3) Whoever wrote Waverly was Scotch.

I do not want to become embroiled with the question as to whether my assertion strictly implies (1), (2), and (3) or with any of the refinements Moore suggested.\(^{24}\) But


\(^{23}\)In "Russell's 'Theory of Descriptions'" Moore questioned Russell's use of 'implies,' insisted upon the distinction between sentences and propositions, and noted that the author might have dictated Waverly.
notice that the original grammatical subject, 'The author of Waverly,' has disappeared. Or consider "The average American worker earns 6000 dollars a year." If one holds a denoting theory of meaning must there be an average American worker? Here the actual logical, as opposed to the grammatical, subject is not the average American worker but rather a great number of American workers.

The sense in which White wants to call this a purely logical method can now be explained. If I attempt to analyse a definite description such as "the inkstand which I now see" I may list as logical subjects some thing or things in addition to the inkstand. In the various places where White takes Moore to use this method (DCS, SJP, Problems, and REP) Moore attempted analyses of definite descriptions. In texts White fails to cite (SSD and PEW) Moore states or implies that he is directly concerned with the analysis of a proposition expressed by a perceptual judgment. That analysis is a reductive one but not in an ontological sense. By that I mean that Moore does not want to dispense with physical objects in favor of clusters of sense-data. The new logical subject is the sense-datum. The quotation from SSD appearing on page 20 shows how it is introduced. The proposition to be analysed is 'I see A' (where A is the name or description of a physical object). If it is true then another proposition
is also true, namely "there is a visual sensible B which I directly apprehend." The two propositions do not have the same meaning as the latter is clearly weaker than the former. But it looks as though Moore thought that if the former is true then the latter must be true just as if "The author of Waverly was Scotch" is true then (1), (2), and (3) must be true.

Although this concern for the ultimate logical subject is reflected in a number of the essays two of the clearest places appear in SJP and DCS. In SJP Moore is worried about the sentence "This (which I now see) is an ink-stand." It stands in need of analysis for the word 'this', the grammatical subject, lacks a clear denotation. Suppose that we replace a part of the description with the phrase "the inkstand of which this is a part of the surface." Is the 'this' now the ultimate subject? Moore thinks not for he holds that the thing about which the judgment is made, perhaps it is better to say without which it could not be made, is the sense-datum. So perhaps the form of the complex analysis parallels the development of the senses of 'see' in the following way.

1) "This which I now see 1 is an inkstand" is true so

2) "This surface, which I now see 2, is the surface of an ink-stand" is true so
3) "This sense-datum, which I now directly apprehend (see 3), is related in some (now inexplicable) way to this surface which is seen 2 and which is the surface of the inkstand which I now see 1."

In this way the ultimate subject term of the original proposition refers to a sense-datum. I must repeat my contention that the analysis ought to carry no ontological overtones. Moore does not intend to dispense with the inkstand. We should also notice that the status of the sense-datum is still quite vague. It might be the case that we could read for 'sense-datum' 'sensation' in this analysis while preserving its truth, its use of the three concepts expressed by 'see' or their synonyms, and its viability.

In DCS Moore contended that he knew that a human hand existed and thus knew that "A human hand exists" was true. In the ordinary sense of 'meaning' one must know what a proposition means before he can know that it is true. But Moore could not provide an adequate analysis of a proposition the truth of which he took to be indisputable. His problem could be put this way. What other propositions must be true before Moore can know that 'a human hand exists' is true? He says that he must know how to explain the proposition expressed by 'I know that a human hand exists'; but this demands an explanation, an analysis, of the proposition expressed by 'This is a human hand.' This problem is not an empirical or a factual one. The questions are Q2 questions. I know
that "This, which I now see, is a hand" is true. I understand the sentence. But Moore seems to think that I may not understand it in the more esoteric sense of being apprised of all the concepts expressed in the assertion.

It is a mistake to think that this method is similar to the others in that respect or respects which allow White to call these techniques methods. He has a hard time describing this approach because it is not really a method for introducing the concept of the sense-datum at all. The various texts which employ these considerations emphasize the analysis of propositions and not questions about the existence of sense-data. The texts cannot be construed as arguments for the existence of the sense-datum nor can they be seen as definitions of the sense-datum. If the notion of the sense-datum has made its entrance by means of the other methods then one can see how it might be employed in this kind of propositional analysis. But the analysis seems ultimately to ride upon the notion of the sense-datum. White has got the cart before the horse. This method is not a method like the other ones; it does, however, reflect Moore's developing interest in the analysis of perceptual judgments.

The Linguistic Method.--The Linguistic Method is easily exhibited since it appears only once in the
perceptual essays. "Visual Sense-Data" of 1957 contains these words:

For it seems quite plain to me that what is meant by saying that the same surface 'looks' different to two different people is that each is seeing, in a sense which I have called 'directly see' an entity which really is different from what the other is seeing.25

This does look like a claim that an entity of some sort exists. Let us start with the sort of proposition Moore has in mind. As an example consider the sentence uttered by Jones when he says to Smith "it does not look that way to me" in response to Smith's description of what he, Smith, sees. We shall assume that the sentence is true—we have no reason to think that one could not cook up cases in which it would be. We might say "The same things look different to Jones and to Smith." This sentence, and the proposition expressed by it, are readily understandable by those who are not acquainted with the terminology of sense-datum theories. This is the point of the synonym view. So it appears that Moore used the phrase 'is meant by' in an unusual way. Perhaps he intends, as in the previous method, to suggest that a proper analysis of the proposition would refer to the entities seen by Jones and Smith.

But questions about the existence of the sense-datum cannot be simply avoided by maintaining that Moore

25Mace (VSD), p. 208
is interested only in the analysis of the perceptual judgment. The analysis suggested would take the form:

There is a thing having a surface such that Jones and Smith both see one and the same surface of that thing; from this it follows that Jones and Smith each directly apprehend (see 3) a sense-datum of that surface, and since the surface 'looks' different to Jones and Smith the sense-datum directly apprehended by Jones is not the same as the sense-datum directly apprehended by Smith.

So the analysis demands that reference be made to two numerically different sense-data. Do they, or in what sense do they, exist?

Perhaps a parallel might help. Taking a tip from Bouwsma I might construct a similar passage:

For it seems to me that what is meant by saying that the same surface 'feels' differently to two different people is that each is feeling, in a sense which I have called 'directly apprehend,' an entity which really is different from what the other is feeling.

What is this entity? I shall call it an X. Smith and Jones each directly apprehend an X. If the X is a sensation then it seems to follow, on other grounds, that they do not both feel the same X. When we talk about feeling the same sensation we mean feeling sensations thought to be qualitatively identical but not numerically so. Moore contends that the entity is different in the case of Smith as opposed to that of Jones but he does not tell us what makes him say this. It looks as though the passage reiterates our original method for there, if sense-data be admitted to exist,
one can obviously say that qualitatively different sense-data are numerically distinct. Now does the contention that the entities are different depend upon the different descriptions of what Smith and Jones see or does it depend instead upon the fact that Smith cannot have Jones' sensations, and thus cannot have his visual sensations? Moore opts for the former alternative; but in doing so he may tip his hand somewhat. We generally admit that one and the same object can look different to two different people. Moore, of course, assents to this but thinks that this state of affairs demands a logical explanation of the propositions expressing it. But what if one and the same sense-datum could appear differently to different people? If Moore admitted this possibility he would undercut his method by means of a vicious regress. A sense-datum could look different to Smith and to Jones but we could explain this phenomenon only by speaking of sense-data of sense-data and thus start the process again. The way to terminate the regress is simply to deny that two people can see the same sense-datum. This, of course, is a significant difference between see 1 and see 2, on the one hand, and see 3 on the other. So perhaps it is the nature of the sense-datum, as thing seen 3, rather than its description, which guarantees that Smith and Jones see different sense-data. This last argument has a certain suggestive power
going beyond the construing of X as a sensation. It might be possible to say that I could not see a sense-datum which you see, and vice versa, while refusing to identify a sense-datum with a sensation. One might hold that sense-data could exist unsensed. Moore did for a time refuse to rule out this possibility; however in 1939 he admitted that it made as little sense to say that sense-data could exist unsensed as it did to hold that sensations so exist. Still if whenever one sees he sees 3 and sense-data can only be seen by one then the difference between the entities is guaranteed.

A.J. Ayer's The Problem of Knowledge contains an argument similar to Moore's. It can be put this way.

1) I see a cigarette case.
2) I seem to see a cigarette case.
3) I see a seeming cigarette case.
4) I see a sense-datum.

If 'see' is used in the same sense throughout then one would think that 4) is a statement of fact of the sort we all understand. We might ask if I see two things--a cigarette case and a sense-datum. But there are many people who do not know that they see sense-data and seeming cigarette cases but who do know that they see cigarette cases. Ayer feels that the moves from one step to the next can be justified by a sort of linguistic

26 See REP, Schilpp p. 653

transformation. Perhaps the later steps say less than the earlier ones but they say nothing which is not, in some sense, contained in the earlier ones. The absurdity of the suggestion that I see a cigarette case, a sense-datum, and a seeming cigarette case may help to explain why Moore differentiated the three senses of 'see'.

But let us now consider the possibility that 'see' is used in different senses in 1) through 4). Perhaps the first move is to say that Ayer equivocates. He would reply that these linguistic transformations are not equivocal for there is at least an 'if-then' relation between the propositions expressed by each sentence. That is, if 1) is true then 2) is true; if 2) then 3); if 3) then 4) and so, by the transitivity of the if-then relation if 1) is true then 4) is true. If I may use the word 'implies' to cover this relation such that when a proposition is true another proposition is true I could say that the proposition expressed by 1) implies that expressed by 4). Moore does accept this; in fact he would go farther and say that the implication holds by virtue of the concepts expressed by the word 'see'. He thought that a dummy sentence such as "... sees 1..." implies the concept expressed by the dummy sentence "... sees 3..." If I put the name of a person and the name of a physical thing in the first of these I will get a sentence expressing a proposition. If I
fill in the second with the same person's name and the name of a sense-datum (related in some way which Moore did not explain to the physical object) I will get a sentence which expresses a proposition which is true if the first proposition is true. Thus I can say that the dummy sentences, perhaps even the concepts themselves, stand in the relation of implication. Moore not only talks this way in some places; he goes so far as to claim that the implicative relation is really one of entailment. So it is logically impossible for me to see an object without seeing a sense-datum. It is this claim which lends credence to the occasional feeling one has that Moore has brought the sense-datum into existence by definitional fiat.

On the other hand if we limit ourselves to talking about the concepts expressed in these sentences it now looks as though, to paraphrase Ryle, the concept of observation carries with it, implies, or perhaps even entails, that of sensation. Is this all that Moore means? It is quite hard to say for, as the Ayer argument shows, Moore works with concepts and the logical relations holding between them. At the same time he insists upon talking about an entity which really is different, and which seems to exist.

One final observation may help. Moore admitted that one cannot see a thing unless that thing exists.
The truth of a perceptual judgment implies that that which is seen exists. Now, if Moore admits this for the concept we have been calling see 1 he may be tempted to make the same admission with regard to see 3. If the object of see 3 is an hallucination we might agree that there is a perfectly normal sense in which people do see hallucinations. But we don't believe that hallucinations exist when no one sees them. It might be more proper to talk of having hallucinations but the former locution is understandable. Perhaps we can summarize this discussion with these comments. Moore has failed to keep distinct his Q1 and Q2 questions for he begins to talk about the relations between concepts and concludes with the assertion that a mysterious sort of entity exists. On the other hand if the sense-datum be taken to be a sensation we can make the jump from Q2 to Q1 questions for the existence of sensations is not in question.

The Method of Intentionality.—The textual basis for the Method of Intentionality is seen most clearly in SSD and "The Refutation of Idealism," essays about which Moore later expressed grave doubts. The distinction crucial for the method is that Moore drew


29 See the preface to Studies, especially p. viii, where Moore says that RI is "very confused."
between the mental act and its object. In SSD he discussed five sorts of mental event such as the having of perceptual images, dream images, hallucinations, after-images, and "sensations proper." In discussing the mental events he says:

Any event of any one of these five classes consists in the fact that an entity, of some kind or other, is experienced. . . . But, whatever be its nature, the entity which is experienced must in all cases be distinguished from the fact or event which consists in its being experienced; since by saying that it is experienced we mean that it has a certain kind of relation to something else.30

This passage, like the one quoted on page 32 as the basis of the Linguistic Method, is curiously ambiguous. Is this experienced entity an entity in the way in which a class is—or perhaps in the way in which a pterodactyl is? Or is it more likely that these are entities of the same kind as pains and sensations? One can not really say. But I think it would be misleading to think that 'entity' means anything like 'physical object.' The passage tells us only that the entity, whatever it may be, is experienced.

On the other hand Moore also says that when we say that an entity of this sort is experienced we mean that it stands in a certain kind of relation. We can again ask about this sense of meaning for it is not the common or ordinary sense of the word. It is rather

30Moore, Studies (SSD), p. 169.
this particular kind of meaning which I shall call "analytic meaning" which tells us about this relation. Again we feel a sort of tension between the Q1 and Q2 questions. The material mode question might be "Are there such entities?" Or perhaps it is "What is the nature of these entities?" The formal mode questions would be something like these: Can 'image,' 'hallucination,' 'sensation proper,' etc. fit in the dummy sentence 'I experience...'.

The Q2 question has the merit of forcing us to see a possible motive for the passage. If we assume that Moore is concerned with analytic meaning it might be possible to turn the Method of the Ultimate Subject upside down and get a method of the ultimate object. Suppose that the proposition expressed by 'I see 1 this x' demands some sort of analytic resolution paralleled by the resolution given for 'This, which I now see, is an ink-stand.' We might say that if 'I see 1 this x' is true then 'I see 2 this surface' is true and if the see 2 proposition is true then 'I see 3 this image proper' is also true. The Linguistic Method reflects the same concern for an ultimate object—the only difference is that it, like the Method of Restriction, requires that the object seen 1 have a property which the image proper does not appear to have.

Let us try to construe the passage in another way.
Is there a basis for arguing that what Moore wanted to say is that an entity called a sense-datum does exist unsensed? We admit that both physical objects and their surfaces exist, continue to do so unperceived, and are ready to say that they have certain qualities and do not have others. These things we take to be true of things seen 1 and seen 2. But what about things seen 3?

To show that these things might be true of things seen 3 we can try to drive a wedge between the experience of seeing 3 and the object experienced. In this instance this would mean starting with the thesis that perceptual images, dream images etc. are sense-data and then asking if they can be separated from the experience of them. Moore much later denied this possibility in his reply to Ducasse's analysis of RI which essay initiates the distinction between mental act and the object of that act.

RI is difficult to interpret because Moore had not, in 1903, clearly distinguished the various senses of 'see.' He thus uses the expression 'directly aware' in a somewhat imprecise fashion. The particular part of RI which seems to allow one to drive the wedge between the experience and its object comes toward the end of the essay in Moore's concluding remarks.

If, on the other hand, we clearly recognize the nature of that peculiar relation which I have called "awareness of anything"; if we see that this is involved equally in the analysis of every experience--from the merest
sensation to the most developed perception or reflection, and that this is in fact the only essential element in an experience—the only thing that is both common to and peculiar to all experiences—the only thing which gives us reason to call any fact mental; if, further, we recognize that this awareness is and must be in all cases of such a nature that its object, when we are aware of it, is precisely what it would be, if we were not aware; then it becomes plain that the existence of a table in space is related to my experience of it in precisely the same way as the existence of my own experience is related to my experience of that. Of both we are merely aware; if we are aware that the one exists, we are aware in precisely the same sense that the other exists; and if it is true that my experience can exist, even if I do not happen to be aware of its existence, we have exactly the same reason for supposing that the table can do so also. . . . I am as directly aware of the existence of material things in space as of my own sensations; and what I am aware of with regard to each is exactly the same—namely that in one case the material thing, and in the other case my sensation does really exist.31

One might try to drive the wedge by pointing to the middle of the paragraph where Moore says that the thing would be precisely what it is even if I were not aware of it. Since this relation called "awareness of anything" holds for all the senses of 'see' a sensation or an hallucination would be just what it is even if I were not aware of it. So esse is not percipi for such objects and the wedge has been driven.

This presents two difficulties. The first involves a consideration of the whole nature of the argument for the act-object distinction. Moore denies

31Moore, Studies (RI), pp. 29-30.
that the object is an inseparable part of the experience; our question then concerns the way in which this notion of separation is to be taken. Moore's avowed purpose in RI is to show that 'esse is percipi' is not necessarily true. If he has been successful he has shown that no inconsistency is involved in the assertion that objects or entities, including those which can be seen 3, exist when they are not perceived. The objects can exist separately. But that they actually do so is another and separate question. Is 'esse is percipi' perhaps a contingently true proposition? The most that the argument in RI allows one to affirm is that the act and the object are logically separable. If one accepts the argument he admits that Moore has refuted idealism; but it is difficult to construe these remarks about the logical independence of two propositions, 'X exists' and 'X is perceived,' to be an argument for the independent existence of entities like sensations.

This is the other difficulty. If 'esse is percipi' is contingently true or false for objects of experience how could one ever determine that it is false? Could this be done? It is perhaps this sort of difficulty which later led Moore to admit that 'esse is percipi' does hold for sensations and sense-data. But by that time he had distinguished the various senses of 'see' and could forfeit this ground without yielding to the
idealism. Once again a method does not turn out to be an argument for the existence of an entity called a sense-datum. If this argument is a good one it says something about the independence of two propositions but nothing about the existence of the sense-datum.

The Method of After-Images.—Moore used the Method of After-Images more and more, especially after 1939. At that time he stopped talking about sense-data which might be conceived of as copies or representations of material objects. The Method of Selection allows that one might naturally take a sense-datum to be the surface of a hand; it appears in DCS where Moore does say that the sense-datum "in a suitable sense represents" the hand. The coin experiment also turns on the possibility that something which could represent the coins quite accurately does not do so in certain circumstances. None of these considerations arises with this quite simple method.

Moore said that if you want to know what a sense-datum is like you should look at a light bulb and then close your eyes. In 1939 (REP) he said that this was the easiest way of explaining his use of the term 'sense-datum.' In VSD he used the method to support his contention that one who sees 3 sees an entity. But we have already noticed the significant difference between things seen 2 and things seen 3.
But now that the sense is established and we can say both "one sees 3 after-images" and "'after-image' can take the direct object place in dummy sentences like 'I see 3..." the question arises as to the way in which this sense is to be extended. Moore wants other sorts of entities to be seen 3 as well as after-images. We might consider the sorts of things talked about in the other methods. I do not see Macbeth's hallucinatory dagger but he does; he must see 3 the dagger. We might do the same thing with dream images, memory images etc. So far there is no room for argument; we admit that people do have hallucinations and after-images. If Moore simply wants us to consider these things to be sense-data perhaps he is merely suggesting that we apply a common name to these various objects of experience.

But a problem arises if we attempt to define 'sense-datum' as the name of a class which contains subclasses named 'hallucinatory images,' 'after-images' etc. How do we define the word except by reference to these various subclasses? Moore was most interested in this problem and often looked for a way of defining the class in terms of a certain property which each member of each subclass has. Believing that all sense-data are alike in a certain but unspecified respect he was inclined to say things like "things of the sort" of
which the sense-datum is which one apprehends in looking at his hand are also sense-data. I believe that the after-image examples are supposed to serve a similar function; that is, one is to see not only that after-images are sense-data but also that things like them are also sense-data.

If Moore had been able to specify this mysterious respect in which all sense-data are alike he would have solved a part of his problem. But the closest he ever came to such a specification is the thesis defended in his reply in the Schilpp volume. He there says simply that if a thing is directly apprehended then it is a sense-datum. This does not help for our problem lies in the specification of the boundaries of the class of sense-data independently of the distinction between see 2 and see 3. The specification must be independent if Moore is to avoid circularity.

So the Method of After-Images is not a factual argument leading to the conclusion that a new sort of thing or event exists. It looks rather like an attempt to call things we know by one name by another. Unlike the other methods this one does not embody a search for an ultimate subject or an ultimate object and thus does not rely on any particular view concerning the nature of philosophical analysis. The problem raised by the method does not concern the status of
after-images but is found in the contention that the after-image is one example of a class of things. The class is important because it is thought to contain, in addition to hallucinations and after-images, the sorts of sense-data Moore talked about in the Methods of Restriction and Selection—representative sense-data. That one and the same class contains both after-images and representative sense-data seems to be Moore's belief; that it does not is the belief of his critics.

Comments on the Methods.—Although I shall disagree with the interpretation White places upon these methods I believe that he has collected the various ways in which Moore introduced the term 'sense-datum' in a reasonably complete fashion. All of Moore's devices are included under one or more of these headings. What conclusions can be drawn, at least initially, about the methods?

The obvious first conclusion is that no one of these methods constitutes a good argument for the existence of a mysterious entity called the sense-datum—unless that entity be a sensation or an after-image or hallucination etc. The methods do not provide us with empirical evidence in favor of the thesis that a sense-datum, as something other than an hallucination etc., does exist.
The second conclusion is clearly related to the first. In many of the cited passages Moore claims not to be talking about the existence of an entity but rather to be explaining what we mean when we say, per ex., 'That, which I see, is an ink-stand.' It seems that Moore is just as worried about Q2 questions as he is about Q1 questions. But he raises the different sorts of question side by side, often in one and the same paragraph. Consequently, if it were somehow possible to convince Moore that sense-data did not exist not all his problems would evaporate.

White often claims that Moore assumed that sense-data exist. This remark is likely to be misleading; I shall try to show why. Still, a cursory examination of some of the relevant texts shows why one might make such a claim. In 191032 (Problems) Moore introduced to his students the notion of the sense-datum by holding in front of himself, and his listeners, a white envelope. He went on to describe in baldly psychological terms what happened to him when he saw the envelope. His description of that mental process which he called 'seeing' involved the notion of the sense-datum. He felt that the sense-datum in question was introspectively given, a piece of psychological fact. Then he

32Moore, Problems, pp. 30-34.
went on using considerations reminiscent of the Method of Restriction to argue that the sense-datum could not be identical with the surface of the envelope. In SSD and PEW the method is used in the same way. That is, given that sense-data exist Moore attempted to prove that they are not identical with physical surfaces.

The opening sentence of SSD shows Moore talking about sense-data as though it were common knowledge that they existed:

The term "sense-data" is ambiguous; and therefore I think I had better begin by trying to explain what the class of entities is whose status I propose to discuss.33

Moore may have been writing for an audience which accepted the proposition that sense-data exist and thus felt no need to justify what looks like a blatant assumption. He did not begin either to justify or to explain this assumption until 1925. From then on each of the perceptual essays contains some explanation of how he proposes to use the term 'sense-datum.' These explanations make up some of White's methods. Still, in SSD Moore recognized the possibility of ambiguity in this commonly accepted notion.

In 1918 (SJP) he explicitly said that judgments of perception involve in some way the sense-datum when

33 Moore, Studies (SSD), p. 168
he talked about the assumption this way:

I will try to express this very fundamental assumption, which seems to me so very certain, by saying it is the assumption that, in all cases in which I make a judgment of this sort, I have no difficulty whatever in picking out a thing, which is, quite plainly, in a sense in which nothing else is, the thing about which I am making my judgment; and that yet, though this is the thing about which I am judging, I am quite certainly not, in general, judging with regard to it, that it is a thing of that kind for which the term, which seems to express the predicate of my judgment, is a name.34

This is the kind of passage which White makes into the Method of the Ultimate Subject. Moore goes on to make it clear that he is not talking about physical surfaces (and thus the difference between see 1 and see 2) by adding the following:

The object of which I have spoken as the object, about which, in each particular case, such a judgment as this is always a judgment, is, of course, always an object of the kind which some philosophers would call a sensation, and others would call a sense-datum.35

Although Moore admits to making the assumption it does not seem to be a questionable one if he is really talking only about sensations. Perhaps the picked out thing is a sensation and the complete analysis of a perceptual judgment must refer to it.

After 1925, and especially after 1939, the way in which Moore talked about sense-data did change

34Moore, Studies (SJP), p. 229
35Moore, Studies (SJP), p. 231
significantly. In DCS (1925) he claimed that the sense-datum was, "in a suitable sense," representative of the surface of which it was a sense-datum. But after that essay Moore employed a concept of the sense-datum which was, to put it metaphorically, parasitic upon the concept of sensation. The things he called sense-data were more similar to sensations than they were to material objects or to surfaces. He generally did not talk in essays like REP, PEW, and VSD about the sense-datum as though it were the sort of thing which could be a representation. The example of the hallucination is the only instance counter to this. There is a shift in these later essays away from that sort of sense-datum which could be a representation or an appearance of a material thing to that sort of sense-datum which does not, and perhaps cannot, be a representation.

Moore's last words on sense-data are found in VSD. There he used both the Method of After-Images and the Linguistic Method. The use of the latter method is rather odd. He said:

And it also seems to me plain to say that e.g. if I am wearing blue spectacles, a wall which is white but not bluish 'looks' bluish-white to me, is merely another way of saying that I am really directly seeing an expanse which really is of a bluish-white colour, and which at the same time has to the surface which is not bluish-white a specific relation which, for the moment, I will call 'R'—a relation which entitles me to assert that, in directly seeing the bluish-white expanse, I am seeing the surface of the wall which is not bluish-white.
If I am not directly seeing a bluish-white expanse which has some such relation to a wall which is not bluish-white, how can I possibly know that the wall is looking bluish-white to me.\footnote{Mace, p. 208}

This passage is, as it were, quintessential. It shows more strikingly than do any of the others the extent to which Moore is worried both about Q1 and Q2 questions.

The first paragraph turns upon this notion of being "merely another way of saying" which suggests that Moore is really after the meaning, in some sense, of statements of the kind we make about the example he cites. A critic like G.A. Paul could take the passage to embody Moore's admission that he is merely proposing or perhaps uncovering an alternative way of speaking. Thus the question seems to be about the senses expressed by words and has little if anything to do with existence of sense-data. If, for instance, saying that the wall which is white etc. is just another way of saying that one directly sees an expanse etc. is just another way of saying that a white wall may look bluish-white. If these are merely alternative ways of saying the same thing how could one decide which way to use? If one of the ways is problematic or looks as if it might breed problems we might as well use the other way. This, it seems to me, is the gist of some of the criticism
directed against Moore. But it does not explain why Moore spent so much time worrying about something which is merely another way of speaking.

On the other hand the second paragraph sounds much different. Here Moore says that if there is not an existent bluish-white expanse then we cannot explain how one knows that the wall looks bluish-white. By inference, of course, if we cannot explain that then we cannot explain why the two ways of speaking are merely alternative ways of saying the same thing. In this second paragraph Moore is not talking about meaning but about the conditions for our perceptual knowledge. He asserts that two conditions are necessary for a phenomenon we know to exist. These are: 1) the existence of a bluish-white expanse, and 2) that expanse standing in a certain relation to the white wall. Since the phenomenon occurs the conditions are satisfied.

Two other features of the passage call for brief comments. Moore did not ever satisfactorily describe the specific nature of the relation 'R.' In the earlier essays it looks as if R might be a relation of copying or representation. But aside from this vague clue we are told little about it.

We should also notice that the second paragraph uses the concept see 3 in a way parallel to see 1. One cannot see 1 something which is not there; Moore
seems to take this to be true of see 3 also. Thus this problem arises. Moore agrees that material objects exist whether we see them or not. He later agreed that this was not true of sensations and sense-data. Does the seeing 3 of a sense-datum guarantee the existence, at that time, of the sense-datum, or is it the other way around?

I shall conclude by using the passage to exemplify the central problem besetting the interpreter of the perceptual essays. The question is not "Why does Moore treat sense-data as physical objects?" nor is it "Why does Moore introduce a particular technical term?" Critics have asked one or the other of these questions but have failed to see that what we need to know is why Moore so often asks both sorts of question simultaneously.
CHAPTER II

MOORE ON HIS PREDECESSORS

The Lockean View.—Moore's criticism of other sense-datum theories may help us to understand this ambivalent attitude. I find it puzzling that those who have attempted to interpret or criticize the perceptual essays have overlooked the careful examinations Moore offered of traditional theories containing notions which function much like the notion of the sense-datum. The much criticized constructive texts seem to suggest that Moore assumed that sense-data exist. But his remarks on his predecessors show clearly that he was aware of many of the arguments which could be used against sense-datum theories. The hesitant nature of many of his comments and his desire to leave open certain questions arises from his awareness of the shortcomings of previous theories. He used some of these arguments often used against sense-datum theories himself.

I shall also try to exhibit a significant change in Moore's criticisms of his predecessors, a change which sheds light on the problem with which
we closed the last chapter. To put it briefly, but obscurely, Moore started by taking Bishop Berkeley to deny the existence of material things but later concluded that while Berkeley did think that such things did exist he analysed the proposition expressing this truth in a way Moore found objectionable.

Moore critically discussed various ways in which a sense-datum might be related to a material thing in a number of the essays. Of these the more important are Problems (1910), SSD (1914), SJP (1918), and DCS (1925). In these places he discriminates a number of possible positions which, in effect, comprise the positions taken by British philosophers from Locke to Russell.

He dealt directly with what he called the Lockean view in SSD. The view is summarized by him; I shall divide the summary into the following propositions:

1) Material things really did exist ("in the natural sense") before one saw them.

2) They really have approximately the primary qualities ("again in the natural sense") they seem to have.

3) "Therefore, they are not composed of sensibles which I or others should directly apprehend under other conditions."

4) Neither those sense-data which one does apprehend, nor those which one might apprehend, are "in the same place as" the material object.

5) Material objects "do really resemble some sensibles in respect of the primary qualities which they have."

6) Thus no sense-data are ever parts of material things or physical objects.
7) Finally, "there is no reason to suppose that any parts of the [physical objects] have any of the secondary qualities" which any of the sensible have.

SSD was written in 1914; in DCS (1925) and PM (1939) Moore went to great pains to defend propositions 1) and 2). He also rejected the implicit logical constructionism involved in the denial of 3). But the remaining propositions embody a problem which is both the source of Moore's criticism of Locke and of his own difficulty concerning the relation of the sense-datum to the physical object—the relation R. He sometimes thought it possible that the sense-datum is identical with the surface of the physical object and consequently would view 4) and 6) with suspicion. For the Method of Restriction to work with secondary qualities he would have to affirm 5) and deny 7). But if that method works and if it introduces the sense-datum as a screen between the percipient and the physical object then Moore's criticism of the Lockean view would apply to the method as well. The criticism is not really an argument as it consists merely of these questions:

A) How does one come to know that the sense-data have a source?

B) How does one come to know that the source has the primary qualities it has, in terms of which there is a resemblance between sense-datum and object?
Although these sound like Berkeleyian objections one must remember the fervor with which Moore defended 1) and 2). He says that his questions rest upon an assumption which he is unwilling to defend, the assumption that there are only certain facts which one can know immediately. By this I think he means that there are only certain states of affairs which one can directly apprehend. These would include facts about the existence and properties of sense-data. He goes on to say of the assumption that it may be mere prejudice and that he knows of no way of showing that it is not. I believe that the assumption is necessary to keep one from answering question A) by saying that he knows the sensibles have a source in just the same way that he knows the sense-datum to have the properties it has. That is, he sees both source and sense-datum. This would lead back to the absurdity of the man who sees a cigarette case, a seeming cigarette case, and a sense-datum all at once. Moore would accept the thesis that one sees both the source and the sense-datum if the distinction between see 1 and see 3 be invoked. Question B) also rides on the shoulders of the assumption for one cannot, in the same sense of 'see,' see both the sense-datum and the object and then compare them with respect to the primary quality in question. Moore is a
little hesitant at this point because he wants to avoid either of two possibilities. He does not want to affirm the Lockean position which seems to demand that the existence of the source be inferred and not, in any sense, seen. But if he leans too far the other way he falls into the Berkeleyan camp and cannot distinguish between judgments of perception expressed in sentences using see 1, and statements of direct apprehension, expressed in statements using see 3. So he must steer a course between the two, a course which will allow him to distinguish between see 1 and see 3 without committing him to the view which questions A) and B) are designed to embarrass.

An adequate defense of his assumption would make such a course possible. But the closest thing to a defense Moore offered was written considerably later; in 1939 he thought that the assertion that a thing was directly apprehended entailed the assertion that that thing was a sense-datum. This seems to make the see 3 part of the problem true by definition. The same essay, PEM, argues for the existence of the external world and this makes possible uses of see 1.

Source Views.—The problem about the relation of the sense-datum to the physical object also appears with what Moore, in SSD, called "source" views. One cannot,
Moore thought, simply take the thing seen 1 to be the thing which caused the percipient to have the experience of the sense-datum for there are many other things which play a necessary role in that experience e.g. optic nerves, intervening media, events in the eye and brain etc. But perhaps the thing seen 1 stands in some special relations, which these other things and events do not, to the apprehension of the sense-datum. He called the object the source of the experience and discussed variant theories as to the nature of the source. If the source is taken to be a material object then the difficulties of the Lockean view crop up again. These difficulties are now joined by the new question concerning the sense in which the object is the cause of the experience.

But it might be suggested that the source is not at all like a material object for it is either spiritual in nature or else it is "something whose nature is utterly unknown to us." Berkeley might fit into the first category; those epistemic sceptics who claim that we can never know anything about the nature of the external world, or who think that we must always suspend judgment about it, might be defenders of the second variation.

One wants to say two sorts of things about the sources. He must say that they exist and that they have
some properties or other. Moore thinks that it is possible for one to claim that the sources exist but he has doubts about attempts to predicate anything of them. Any attempted predication must be interpreted in one of two ways. One might simply deny that the ascribed predicate was true of the source because the source was simply not the kind of thing to which that predicate applied. The source, for instance, is not the sort of thing which even could or could not be round. In SSD Moore did not carry the argument to what seems to be its logical terminus; that is, one might ask if the source is such that any property whatsoever could be predicated of it. If the answer is no then scepticism results. If it is yes then one is entitled to know what sort of perceptual experience justifies the ascription of the predicate.

The second way of construing a remark to the effect that a source has some property is a rather complicated one. The suggestion is that a sentence like "This coin (source) is round" expresses a number of propositions. One of them is contained in the words "the coin (source) exists" which form a categorical sentence. The other propositions, expressing the predication, are not categorical but hypothetical. If, for instance, I turn towards the coin then I would have a certain sort of visual experience; if I move
away from the coin then I would have another kind of experience. What is expressed by the original assertion is consequently not just "about" the coin but rather about the relations between the coin and actual or possible percipients.

Moore's objection to this view takes this form:

To this view my objection is only that any reason there may be for saying that the sources exist in other than a Pickwickian sense, seems to me to be also a reason for saying that they are "circular" in a sense that is not Pickwickian. I have just as strong a propensity to believe that they are really circular, in a simple and natural sense, as that they exist in such a sense; and I know of no better reason for believing either.¹

The second sentence of the passage looks like it presages Moore's famous defense of common sense. But we must not overlook the first sentence which does two things. It suggests that whatever reasons there are for taking the existential implication of the remark in the usual way hold equally well for the predicative part of the assertion. Are there any reasons for not accepting this claim? Moore also points out that this reading uses the notion of predication which is neither simple nor natural but "Pickwickian." I shall try to explain what a Pickwickian sense is in the next section; for the moment we can see that this is the sort of reply which Moore might make.

¹Moore, Studies (SSD), p. 193.
to a defender of Bishop Berkeley. In Problems Moore noted that Berkeley did not take himself to be denying the existence of physical objects. But Moore added that most philosophers, including Moore, have thought that this is precisely what Berkeley was doing. This mention of Pickwickian senses in an essay written four years later marks the beginning of a change in Moore's attitude towards Berkeley, and towards source views. But this change, hingeing as it does on the notion of Pickwickian senses, is best discussed in connection with the Mill-Russell view.

The Mill-Russell View.---In 1909 Moore showed why he disagreed with a Humean analysis of perception but he continued to examine a view much like Hume's. Sometimes he called it the Mill-Russell view, sometimes he attributes it to Mill only, and sometimes he does not associate it with any particular philosopher or philosophers. I shall call it the Mill-Russell view. Moore examined it closely in SSD, SJP, and DCS. These texts show that he had three major objections to the view.

The 1914 exposition (SSD) is the earliest and simplest of the three. Again Moore is interested in the relation between the sense-datum and the physical object. The discussion is initiated by the statement

of two principles of which Moore felt sure although he admitted that the arguments in favor of them may not be conclusive. They are these:

C) The upper side of the coin which I am said to see is not simply identical with the visual sensible which I am directly apprehending in seeing it.

D) My knowledge of propositions about the coins [physical objects] is based, in the last resort, on experiences of mine consisting in the direct apprehension of sensibles and in the perception of relations between directly apprehended sensibles.

Principle C) is defended on the basis of the Method of Selection read as an argument which is, I think, dubious at best. We saw that the method establishes not that sense-data exist but merely that if they exist then they are not identical with physical surfaces. But there is another problem about C) which the drawing experiment may bring out. If the person who draws the coin should look at it "head on," so to speak, and draw a circle, not an ellipse, this circle might turn out to be the same size as the coin. Why cannot se say that the drawing and the upper side of the coin are qualitatively identical? Perhaps we can if we specify the properties. But now what about the sense-datum, allegedly that which the drawer draws? If it is said that the sense-datum and the upper side of the coin are still numerically different then one seems to beg the question in favor of the existence of the sense-datum by admitting that, in this instance, there is no visually detectable
difference between the sense-datum and the surface. One might try to suggest that just as one can see two pennies which are qualitatively identical so he can see that the sense-datum and the surface are qualitatively identical. But, of course, this won't do for this again involves the man who sees the cigarette case, the seeming cigarette case, and the sense-datum. The sense-datum and the upper side of the coin are not seen in the same way; we reflect the difference by distinguishing between see 2 and see 3. Moore has an odd way out of this problem; he merely suggests that we can so arrange things that the sense-datum one directly apprehends is not identical with the upper side of the coin. This can be done by putting one in a position such that he draws ellipses and not circles.

My point is that the argument, based on the Method of Restriction, has two possible conclusions: 1) some sense-data are numerically different from the surfaces of which they are sense-data, and 2) all sense-data are different in this way. Moore has not proved 2) but he can arrange the situation so as to make 2) true of it.

Principle D) again reflects the assumption that there are only certain things which Moore may know directly or immediately. It also might be seen as a basis for White's Method of the Ultimate Subject.
Given these two principles Moore thought that he could "rather vaguely" indicate the position to be discussed. He did this by taking a remark such as "the coin is round" and showing how it would be interpreted in terms of this view. Moore says of propositions like this that all of them express only a kind of fact which we should naturally express by saying that, if certain conditions were fulfilled, I or some other person, should directly apprehend certain other sensibles. For instance the only true thing that can be meant by saying that I really see coins may be some such thing as that, if I were to move my body in certain ways I should directly apprehend other sensibles e.g. tactual ones, which I should not directly apprehend as a consequence of these movements, if these present visual experiences of mine were mere hallucinations or mere experiences of "images."

The view differs from the source view in that it construes both existential and predicative functions of the assertion in this hypothetical way. The statement about the coins, which looked like a simple categorical statement is now construed as a hypothetical.

Moore first objects to the view by pointing out that if one attempts to specify those hypotheticals which must be satisfied in order that the requisite sense-datum be apprehended he must refer to other

3Moore, Studies (SSD), p. 189.
bodies, that is, other physical objects. One must, for instance, move his eyes towards the coins in order to apprehend the sense-datum. So these references to physical objects must be eliminated. The ultimate interpretation of a proposition referring to any physical object will be immensely complicated as it must eliminate all references to physical objects in the specification of the various hypothetical propositions. Moore admits that such an interpretation of a simple proposition would be immensely difficult but he does not think that it is impossible.

His strongest objection, in SSD, accepts the theoretic possibility of such an interpretation and then questions the sense in which the notions of predication and existence are employed in that interpretation. It is best to let him speak for himself:

It is obvious that, on this view, though we seem still to be allowed to say that the coins existed before I saw them, are circular etc., all these expressions, if they are to be true, will have to be understood in a Pickwickian sense. When I know that the coins existed before I saw them, what I know will not be that anything whatever existed at that time, in the sense in which those elliptical patches exist now. All that I know will be simply that, since the elliptical patches exist now, it is true, that, if certain unrealised conditions had been realised, I should have had certain sensations; or, if certain conditions, which may or may not be realised in the future, were to be so, I should have certain experiences. Something like this will actually be the only true
thing that can be meant by saying that the
coins existed before I saw them. In other
words, to say of a physical object that it
existed at a given time will always consist
merely of saying of some sensible, not that
it existed at the time in question, but some-
thing quite different and immensely complicated. 1

The "something . . . immensely complicated" would not
necessarily identify the coin with a sense-datum but
rather would identify it with a group of sense-data.
This then seems to involve the logical constructionism
which Moore thought that the Lockean view denied (see
proposition 3) of the summary of that view). We might
take this objection merely to say that, as a matter of
fact, physical objects are not made up of sense-data.
But this is not quite the thrust of the objection.
The second sentence might be taken piece by piece so
as to make this more clear. Moore suggests first that
in these sentences "The coins existed yesterday" and
"The elliptical patches exist now" the word 'exist' is
not used in the same sense. The first 'existed' has
been given what Moore called a Pickwickian sense; the
second 'exist' is used in the usual sense. We might
think that Moore accuses the view of equivocating.
As a result of the equivocation the "only true thing
that can be meant" by the sentence about the coins
turns out not to be what we thought it was. This is

1Moore, Studies (SSD), pp. 190-191.
not quite the case, as we shall see in our discussion of DCS. But we can agree that Moore took the Mill-Russell view to deprive some uses of the word 'exists' of their customary sense. The same sort of thing, of course, holds true of predicates like 'round' ascribed to the coin. Simply stated the objection to the Mill-Russell view is much like the objection to the source views except that now Pickwickian senses are given both to predicates and to 'exists.'

In 1918 (SJP) Moore linked the view with Mill's thesis that Matter is the Permanent Possibility of Sensation and suggested that Russell's position in Our Knowledge of the External World also exemplifies the view.

In this essay Moore's real problem concerns what exactly it is that he does when he makes a perceptual judgment like "this is an ink-stand." The most important feature of his treatment of the problem is the technique of explaining which he uses. He is not worried about physiological or psychological questions; nor is he even worried about the existence of sense-data. Instead he concentrated on propositions entailed by the (true) proposition "this is an ink-stand." Here he begins to be worried about the logical analysis of the proposition expressing the perceptual judgment. I do not think that one can take this too strongly.
however, for the clean-cut distinction between knowing the truth of a proposition and being able to provide an analysis of it does not appear until 1925. Still, Moore is on the trail of that distinction in 1918.

He notices that there is a sense of 'material object' such that the truth of the proposition expressed by "that is a pipe" entails the truth of the proposition expressed by "a material object exists." He has moved from talking about things to talking about propositions. If this kind of explanation involves an analysis of a perceptual judgment then the analysis will consider propositions entailed by the analysandum. Or so it would seem. Moore does insist that one has only these propositions entailed by the truth of the perceptual judgment with which to work when he sets out to explain the judgment.

Given this limitation, and the nature of the task at hand, Moore felt inclined toward the Mill-Russell view as the only one which was "tolerably clear." It did provide some sort of answer to the question "What is it that I am judging, when I judge, as I do now, that this is an ink-stand?" This clarity comes from the Mill-Russell view of matter. As a result of it Moore thought that he knew what sorts of answers this position would give to his question. Still he was not at all sure that the view was correct. But
when it comes to criticizing the view he does not raise the Pickwickian senses objection again but concentrates instead on the familiar problem of the relation between the sense-datum and the surface. This is rather curious for he is feeling his way towards an explanation of perceptual judgments which does not deal in entities but in propositions. Yet when he criticizes the view he does so in terms of entities and the relations which do, or do not, hold among them. The tension between the Q1 and Q2 questions appears again for the desired explanation of the judgment involves Q2 considerations while the criticism of the relation between one entity, the sense-datum, and another, the surface, is a Q1 criticism. He is nevertheless aware of the paradoxical nature of the view as it interprets propositions about physical things as he says:

They hold . . . that though there are plenty of material things in the universe, there is nothing in it of which it could be truly asserted that it is a material object.5

If the defender of the Mill-Russell view believes that "this is a material object" never expresses a true proposition while Moore thinks that there is a sense in which "This is a pipe" entails "a material object exists" and, one would think, "this is a material object" he comes close to saying that the Mill-Russell view

5Moore, Studies (SJP), p. 250.
does not use the word 'exists' univocally. Still we should remember the similarity of these questions to a factual debate.

The Mill-Russell View Again.—This similarity is finally overcome in DCS of 1925. Moore there states his objections to the Mill-Russell view distinctly and also draws the distinction between knowing the truth of a proposition and being able to provide an analysis of it. I shall quote his objections to the view:

Though, in general, when I know such a fact as "This is a hand" I certainly do know some hypothetical facts of the form "If these conditions had been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense-datum of the same surface of which this is a sense-datum," it seems doubtful whether any conditions with regard to which I know this are not themselves conditions of the form "If this and that material thing had been in those positions and conditions • • • " So positions and conditions which does away with references to material objects is possible.

The second objection is now put this way:

The sense in which a material surface is "round" or "square," would necessarily be utterly different from that in which our sense-data sensibly appear to us to be "round" or "square."

Finally there is no mincing of words; Moore says that

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6Moore, Papers (DCS), pp. 57-58.
7Moore, Papers (DCS), p. 58.
predicates cannot, on this view, be applied univocally to sense-data and to material objects. But oddly enough there is no mention in the objection of Pickwickian senses; I shall have more to say about this.

The third objection is somewhat complex and thus requires a thorough introduction. In Section IV of DCS Moore claimed that two and only two things seemed to him to be quite certain about the analysis of propositions expressed in sentences like "this is a hand." He says that "there is always some sense-datum about which the proposition in question is a proposition." The sense-datum is a subject and, in a certain sense, the "principle or ultimate one." Moore did not say that the sense-datum is the subject or, in an unqualified way, the ultimate one as Ayer\(^8\) seems to have thought he did. Moore then says that what he is knowing or judging about the sense-datum is not that "it itself is a hand." I think that the 'is' is that of identity; thus Moore means "this sense-datum is identical with this human hand" is always false. The hand and the sense-datum are numerically distinct. Then of course the familiar question as to the relation between the hand and the sense-datum arises.

The third objection is aimed at one possible way of construing that relation. This is the objection:

It seems again very doubtful whether there is any intrinsic relation, such that (under these conditions) I should have been perceiving a sense-datum of this kind, which would have been a sense-datum of the same surface of which this is a sense-datum, is equivalent to a knowledge, with regard to that relation, that I should, under these conditions, have been perceiving a sense-datum related by it to this sense-datum . . .

This is the whole of the objection. The complex description is made necessary by the nature of the Mill-Russell view for if one asks about the analysis of the proposition expressed by "this is a human hand" that view leads to an extraordinarily complicated answer. We must take the 'this' to refer to a sense-datum and the 'human hand' to refer to a collection of sensed sense-data which collection might also include unsensed sensibles, or sense-data. So the relation between the apprehended sense-datum and the hand of which it is a sense-datum is really a relation holding between one sense-datum and a group of them. Perhaps this is why Moore uses the word 'intrinsic.' The relation does not seem to be internal, in the sense in

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9Moore, Papers (DCS), p. 58.
which Moore used the word,¹⁰ for the defender of the view might say that the hand is what it is whether or not this particular sense-datum is apprehended. But there is a difference of an odd sort between this relation and a purely external one for if no sense-data like this one were ever apprehended or, even worse, if they did not exist then the hand would not exist. Perhaps Moore means that the relation is intrinsic in the sense that all the things related by it are constitutive of the hand.

The next question is harder. Does Moore doubt that there is any such relation or does he doubt only that the equivalence holds? The latter alternative is sufficient for the objection and perhaps easier to explain. In order to speculate as to the reasons for the doubt we must try to understand the nature of the equivalence. Let us say that the equivalence holds between two pieces of knowledge which might be expressed in propositions, call them P₁ and P₂, and then doubt this equivalence: P₁ ≡ P₂. The material equivalence sign may be weaker than necessary. But I

¹⁰See G.E. Moore, "External and Internal Relations," Studies. Moore says (Studies, p. 284) that one thing meant by the assertion that all relations are internal is that "in the case of every relational property, it can always be truly asserted of any term A which has that property, that any term which had not had it would necessarily have been different from A."
shall use it, and the horseshoe, with the reservation
in mind. Now let us try to put Pl first into English.

Pl: if unfulfilled conditions had been fulfilled
then Moore would have stood in the cognitive
relation of direct awareness to a certain
sense-datum (sd 1) and sd 1 would stand in
the relation S to a surface (s), and that
same s would stand in the relation converse
S (S) to sd 2, the presently apprehended
sense-datum.

The material equivalence and implication signs will
not do justice to the counterfactuals in Pl. But
I do not think that Moore objected to this feature
of the proposed equivalence (although others11 certainly
did). Now let us try to symbolize Pl: Conditions 1 ⇒:
Moore DA (sd 1), and . (sd 1) S s , and . s S (sd 2).
P2 is more simply stated in English although it is
harder to symbolize. An incomplete symbolization which
will serve our purposes follows:

P2: There is a relation such that Moore, under
different conditions, should have been di­
rectly apprehending a sense-datum related
to another sense-datum by that intrinsic
relation.

P2: Conditions 3 ⇒: Moore DA (sd 3) . and . (sd 3) I.R.
(sd 2). Now it looks as though Moore doubted that one
could establish an equivalence between Pl and P2 by
replacing the relations S and S by the intrinsic rela­
tion I.R. I.R. relates one sense-datum to another;

11See The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 134-135 for
Ayer's discussion of the problem.
S and S connect a sense-datum and a surface. Remembering the analysis suggested by the Method of the Ultimate Subject and the various concepts expressed by 'see' we should be willing to accept another less complicated relation holding between a surface and the object of which it is a surface. Call this relation S'. Moore may be saying that a complete specification of P1 would involve a unique reference to the s of P1. The way to do that would be to specify the object of which s was a surface; that is, to suggest that s is the s which stands in S' to this human hand e.g. 's S' h.' If all this goes well then the objection is like the first one. The underlying assumption is that one specifies the relation by taking it to be the relation holding between two things to which unique references can be made. Even this assumes the uniqueness of the relation with regard to the two things. In P2 I.R. is specified to be the relation connecting (sd 3) and (sd 2). But only (sd 3) is specifiable for it is the one which Moore directly apprehends. (sd 2) cannot be so referred to. However, on P1 one can specify (sd 2) by talking about the surface, s, and the relation S. S is the converse of S, Moore sees 2 the s, and sees 3 the (sd 1). So S is specifiable. The point can be made by simply ignoring the counterfactual aspect of the conditionals, assuming that conditions 3 are satisfied, and then
asking about the specification of I.R. If I.R. cannot be specified the proposed equivalence fails.

There is another possible objection. In the absence of S and S', which do not appear in P2, one could not tell which sense-data were sense-data of material objects and which were not. In theory I.R. should make this possible, but in fact it does not seem to work out that way at all. In P2 one has only (sd 2); perhaps if he could uniquely refer to (sd 3) and assume the uniqueness of that relation relating (sd 2) and (sd 3) he could specify I.R. If I.R. could be specified by some other means one could refer to (sd 3) as that sense-datum related to (sd 2) by I.R. But it appears that I.R. must be specified before reference can be made to (sd 3); and (sd 3) must be specified before reference can be made to I.R.

There is still another way of taking this objection which is perhaps more significant as it is tied to the distinction in DCS between knowing the meaning of a proposition and being able to give an analysis of it. Section IV of DCS begins with Moore's statement that he is not the least bit sceptical about the truth of many propositions of the sort he called commonsensical. Examples of such truths are "a human hand exists," "the earth has existed for many years past," etc. But then he goes on to say that he is
"very sceptical as to what, in certain respects, the correct analysis of such propositions is." He contrasts this attitude with that of others this way:

Many seem to have held that there is no doubt at all as to their analyses, nor, therefore, as to the analysis of the proposition "material things have existed" in certain respects in which I hold that the analysis of the proposition in question is extremely doubtful; and some of them, as we have seen, while holding that there is no doubt as to their analysis, seem to have doubted whether any such propositions are true. I, on the other hand, while holding that there is no doubt whatever that many propositions are wholly true, hold also that no philosopher, hitherto, has succeeded in suggesting an analysis of them, as regards certain important points, which comes anywhere near to being certainly true.12

The third objection holds against the analytic equivalence alleged to hold between P1 and P2. P2 does not have the same analytic meaning as P1. Moore knows that "This is a human hand" is true and does not think that an analysis constructed along the lines of P2 is a satisfactory one. Now, if the defender of the Mill-Russell view will admit the truth of the proposition "this is a human hand" the disagreement is not about the truth of the proposition but about its analysis. In this instance Moore seems to feel that the complete analysis must refer both to a physical object and a sense-datum while the Mill-Russell analysis omits the reference to the object.

12 Moore, Papers (DCS), pp. 852-53
Comments on the Objections.—Now I should like to draw this together a bit. We have seen that Moore was critically aware of the attempts made by Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, and Russell to indicate the connection between a sense-datum and the material object of which it is a sense-datum. The arguments he used against these views are by now common ones. If we go farther by asking if these arguments reveal any common basis or show us what Moore thought that a successful sense-datum theory should do there is room for speculation. Any theory has got to admit that there are material objects and that, in some sense, there are sense-data. In addition, both of these sorts of thing must be shown to exist in a direct or noninferential way. Locke's problem lies in the move from the sense-datum to the object. Moore thought there was no problem in saying that this took place—he was never sceptical about the existence of at least some things external to his mind. Arguments directed against allegedly sceptical conclusions drawn from sense-datum theories would be supported by Moore. Any adequate view must accept the unqualified existence of both sense-data and

13 For Moore's arguments against scepticism, and against arguments for it see G.E. Moore, "Four Forms of Scepticism" and "Certainty," Papers. The essays are revised versions of lectures Moore delivered in this country between 1940 and 1944.
material objects and must resist attempts to reduce
either to the other.

Apart from these conclusions another facet of Moore's
attack finally becomes clear in DCS. In the earlier
essays Moore detected something amiss in certain views
concerning the relation of the sense-datum to the object;
he called the senses of predicates and 'exists' which
resulted from such views "Pickwickian" but did not
clearly explain what he meant. Considerably later in
a notebook¹⁴ not meant for publication he says that a
word is used in an "outrageously Pickwickian" sense
when it is "not [used] in the sense in which we use the
word." But he later dropped the expression; I believe
that what takes the place of the notion of Pickwickian
sense is the clearer notion of the analysis of a pro-
position or concept. When Moore says in DCS that he has
no doubts whatsoever that there are material objects
he suggests that now he and Berkeley agree; where they
disagree is as to the nature of the proper analysis of
propositions expressing this knowledge. Pickwickian
senses are, in effect, seminal, but bad, analyses. So
when Moore used the expression he was pointing at
features of the views in question which puzzled him
but which, at that time, he could not specify.

¹⁴G.E. Moore, Commonplace Book 1919-1953, ed.
Casimir Lewy (London: George Allen and Unwin
Moore's attacks on the traditional theories raise two kinds of objection. The Lockean view suffers from an internal difficulty such that he who points it out does not need to advance any particular thesis of his own. The Lockean says that the primary qualities of the object and the sense-datum are similar but cannot explain how this is known to be true. Moore's objections to the Mill-Russell program of translating statements about material objects into hypothetical sentences dealing with possible experiences are often similarly neutral. He merely asks if the program can, in its own terms, be carried out.

But there is another set of objections in which Moore does take a stand. The Pickwickian sense objections are applied both to the source view and to the Mill-Russell position. If the Pickwickian sense is a sign of an implicit analysis gone astray then the issue no longer involves empirical facts. Moore seems to think that we all accept the facts. There are physical objects. But if the argument is not about facts but analyses Moore ought to tell us what the criteria for a successful analysis are and thereby show what is wrong with the particular Pickwickian senses.

Unfortunately Moore was not able to say what conditions would be sufficient for a correct analysis. But there are certain possible misapprehensions which
ought to be discussed and dismissed now. The first has to do with what has been called "ordinary language." Malcolm's essay "Moore and Ordinary Language" overstates the importance of ordinary use as a criterion for judging the correctness of an analysis. The essay concludes:

Moore's great historical role consists in the fact he has been perhaps the first philosopher to sense that any philosophical statement which violates ordinary language is false, and consistently to defend ordinary language against its philosophical violators.

One knows that ordinary language has been violated when Moore points the paradoxical nature of something a philosopher says with the utmost gravity. For instance it is said that time is unreal. Moore replies:

If you mean that no event ever follows or precedes another event, you are certainly wrong; for after lunch I went for a walk, and after that I took a bath, and after that I had tea.

Malcolm also says that the "essence of Moore's technique of refuting philosophical statements consists in pointing out that these statements go against ordinary language." Malcolm does show nicely that when Moore and another disagree they may not be arguing over

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16 Schilpp, p. 368

17 Schilpp, p. 346
facts and hence the issue is not an "empirical one." So Malcolm thinks that what they are arguing over is a matter of linguistic propriety. It would be better to put this in another way. Moore's paradoxes are ways of highlighting Pickwickian senses, implicit analyses. What the paradox gets one to see is that the statement is not or cannot be empirically true. So, and especially when the other agrees that Moore took a bath before tea, facts are not the issue. But linguistic propriety is not the issue either for two reasons. In the first place the Pickwickian sense and the resultant paradox show only that one and the same sense is not being expressed by the same word. Which of the concepts expressed by the term is the correct one? Malcolm elects to have ordinary language arbitrate for we do say that Moore had a bath before tea etc. The paradox does not itself say which of the concepts is preferable. It is not at all obvious that Moore took this additional step of electing ordinary language to act as arbiter. But I believe that the decision between conflicting analyses is not to be settled by appeal to the arbiter.

This last may need support. I shall provide this while giving my second reason for thinking that linguistic propriety is not the issue. If we go back to those places in the discussion of the methods where Moore said that such and such is meant by such and
such an expression we find a number of places where ordinary language says nothing whatever about the issue. Consider, for instance, the distinction concerning the senses of 'see.' Ordinary language may recognize the distinction between see 1 and see 2 but it certainly does not insist upon it. Or consider those places in the discussion of the Methods of Restriction, Selection, Intentionality, and the Linguistic Method in which Moore claims to explain what we mean by invoking distinctions, definitions, or even words themselves which the normal speaker of ordinary language does not employ and which are simply not in the language to be employed. The paradoxes go against ordinary language but their resolutions go beyond it. If the resolution takes the form of a correct analysis then clearly ordinary language cannot be appealed to as that which decides between conflicting analyses going beyond ordinary language. The paradoxes advocated by the later Moore in essays like PEW and "Four Forms of Scepticism," are foreshadowed by the Pickwickian senses of the earlier essays. Both paradoxes and Pickwickian senses testify to a difficulty

18 These are not logical paradoxes but rather statements the implications of which are obviously puzzling. Examples are "Time is unreal" (does this mean that statements about temporal relations are false?) and "We can never know that another is conscious" (Who does the 'we' refer to?).
with an analysis but neither demonstrates the correctness of one over the other.

The other misapprehension about analyses is easier to dispel as Moore himself clearly shows his view in DCP. The possible trouble spot comes with the suggestion that common sense be applied as a criterion for correct analyses. If ordinary language won't do what about common sense and those propositions which Moore called commonsensical and said he knew to be true? In fact he went so far as to say that if a proposition was a commonsensical belief it was true. If we remember that although Moore knew these propositions to be true he could not provide analyses for them we have our answer. Commonsensicality may or may not be a criterion for truth; Moore clearly does not take it to be a criterion for correct analyses.

In this chapter I have tried to show that the ambiguity of purpose which we noticed in the methods runs through the critical passages as well. We have seen that some of Moore's criticism stands on neutral ground while other arguments take off from the developing notion of conflicting analyses. If it is remembered that the majority of the perceptual essays were written before 1925 and the distinction between questions of truth and questions of analysis this ambiguity is easier to understand. We don't know yet just what an
analysis is and we have no guarantee, as VSD shows clearly, that Moore will switch his guns to questions of analysis only. Nevertheless Moore and Berkeley may now agree about the facts.
CHAPTER III

FOUR CRITICS

G.A. Paul on Sense-Datum Problems.--In order to show the relevance of my concern for the dual nature of Moore's essays I shall look at some of the better known attacks upon sense-datum theories to see if they do justice to the complexity of Moore's work. G.A. Paul's attack is contained in his essay "Is There A Problem About Sense-Data?"¹

Paul begins with a note in which he says that Price, Broad, Russell, Ayer, and Moore (in RI, NROP, SSD, SJP, and DCS) express a belief in sense-data. The main problem--are there sense-data?--strikes him as odd for it is not a problem which one can both understand and fail to answer. By this he means that the understanding of, the determination of, the problem constitutes the difficulty. This stems partially from the

¹Paul's essay has become the classic example of this particular attack. Since the essay is general in nature and aimed at no one particular philosopher it is not surprising to find that it contains mistakes. Moore did not talk about sense-data in RI as Paul alleges. He did not use the term much, if at all, until 1910.
introduction of the technical term 'sense-datum.' To show the difficulty Paul contrasts the question "Are there sense-data" (Qs) with "Are there foveas?" (Qf).

When it is explained what a fovea is—a depression on the eye directly behind the iris—we know both what it would be like to find one and what it would be like not to do so. Qs differs in this respect for Paul says that "we need make no experiment and no experiment of any kind will help us" to answer it. If these philosophers are right we cannot help seeing sense-data and so would have no idea of what it would be like not to see them. We have consequently no notion of what would count against an affirmative answer to Qs. Then Paul suggests, by the use of the argument known as the argument from excluded opposites,² that if we have no idea what would count against the sense-datum thesis we really have no idea of what would count for it. Since Qf is the kind of question which admits of negative answers and Qs does not seem to Paul concludes that Qf is an empirical question to be settled by observation while Qs is not.

But what about the Method of Restriction which looks like an argument from experience? When Moore looked at the tilted florin he said that he saw

²For a recent discussion of the argument see John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd, 1961), Chapter Six.
something which was elliptical, a sense-datum, and something which was round, the coin. Paul says he sees only the coin. If we ask what it would be like to find a sense-datum so that we could help Paul to discover one we are usually told that not only is Paul seeing them but that it is logically impossible that he not be doing so. To show that the logical impossibility claim does enter Paul asks if there is any empirical test which shows that there is something round and something elliptical. The absence of such a test confirms his suspicion that Q's is not an empirical question.

Why then have people thought it to be one? Paul says that when the technical term 'fovea' was introduced it fell into a "fully prepared scheme for its usage as a word for a physical object." Since the word names an object, or the modification of a physical object, we already know certain things about the fovea. This prepared scheme suffices to answer questions about the fovea which have baffled philosophers asking the same questions about sense-data. For instance, there are good prima facie reasons for saying that foveas exist through periods of time during which they are not observed.

But the sense-datum theorist takes with one hand while giving with the other. He introduces the term 'sense-datum' as if it, like 'fovea' were the name of a physical object; then he seriously entertains questions
which ought not to be taken seriously if 'sense-datum' really is a physical object name. Questions like "Can a sense-datum be pointed at?" are not really empirical questions. Paul thinks that such questions are really about the use to which the term is to be put. If the term is to be used as a physical object name, we would have answers to some of the questions and might be able to show how they are derived. If, for instance, 'sense-datum' is to be used in the way that 'surface' is, we would agree that one can point to a sense-datum which can be seen by more than one. But we are not so agreed. So Paul argues that Qs cannot be established by an appeal to experience and, in addition, the term 'sense-datum' is not subject to the criteria guiding the use of physical object names.

Although 'sense-datum' may not fall into a well-prepared scheme for its use, that use is not completely arbitrary for it is tied to the usual use of words like 'looks,' 'appears,' 'appearance,' and sometimes to certain uses of 'this,' 'image,' and 'after-image.' Apropos of 'appears' and 'appearance,' Paul considers something which looks like Moore's Linguistic Method for he says that the rule of use which is usually adopted is that the sense-datum has the properties which the physical object appears to have. The rule is parasitic upon the usual use of these words. Paul says that
the adopted rule makes the following implicit claims:

1) The existence of the sense-datum cannot be doubted.
2) It is possible to doubt the existence of the object.
3) It is impossible to doubt that the appearance or sense-datum should have looked, say, elliptical without its being so.

How Paul mines these claims from the perceptual essays is hard to see. Moore would have denied 2; he often did so in various contexts. There are a few places in which he refuses to deny the possibility that a sense-datum might have properties other than those which it appears to have. I think that Paul is correct in questioning this possibility if the sense-datum is introduced by means of the Linguistic Method. But since Paul's real target is Wisdom who in effect denied 3) we can let this pass.

Even if Moore did not seriously question 3) Paul's attack is relevant to Moore's position. Paul argues that the effect of 3) is to turn the sense-datum into a sort of public object. If 3) is accepted then we have a test for determining what properties a sense-datum has; it is not an empirical test, of course, but it lends objectivity to the statement that the

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3See Paul, p. 109, where he says that Wisdom admitted that "it makes sense to say that such and such a sense-datum appears to have qualities it does not in fact have." According to Ayer Moore accepted this contention; see Ayer's The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p. 74.
sense-datum is elliptical. That objectivity tends to
disguise the real nature of the issue which is not
empirical.

The most interesting feature of 3) concerns the
conjunction of 'appearance' and 'sense-datum.' Paul
argues that both words do the same job; when one talks
about appearances he could be talking about sense-data
and vice-versa. The Linguistic Method does not introduce
a needed technical term. The sense-datum philosopher
will deny this charge and defend 'sense-datum' on the
grounds that the term somehow gets us closer to the
facts. A re-examination of the VSD passage which intro­
duces the Linguistic Method will uncover Moore's atti­
tude toward this theory of synonyms. Paul simply
denies this. If the philosopher claims that the term
allows him to point to the similarity between the per­
ception of a real penny and the hallucinating of a penny
Paul denies this as well. He maintains that "I only
thought I was seeing a penny which looked elliptical
but really there was not anything there at all" de­
scribes the hallucinatory case equally as well as any
answer involving the sense-datum. So the criticism is
simple. 'Sense-datum' is an unneeded expression without
which we can do nicely.

Paul also considers the Method of After-Images.
Suppose that one whose eyes are closed senses a red
image. It is then said that anything seen in the same sense in which the image is seen is a sense-datum. The move runs from the detected image to sense see 3 and then to the class of sense-data implicitly defined as those things which are seen 3. Paul has two comments of particular interest:

4) It is not certain that when one sees a physical object he sees any other object in any sense of 'see.'

5) If an object looks red to one there is nothing to prevent him from saying that an object which is red corresponds to the object which is the physical object and nothing to prevent him from saying that he sees the object.

4) requires a word of warning. Moore sometimes used the words 'object' and 'entity' when he talked about sense-data. We have seen that it is possible that the sense-datum might be a sensation according to some of the methods. So 4) need not multiply entities; it does raise the question of the propriety of saying that one sees these entities, even if they are sensations.

5) is the crucial comment for it sums up the whole attack. Paul says that one is free to say that there are sense-data if the assertion means only that we understand how the term is used and recognize that sometimes statements containing it express true propositions. However, we may be misled by the term and think that sense-datum questions are factual ones. We are led to ask questions for which we have provided
no way of determining the truth, or even relevance, of an answer. 'Sense-datum' is supposed to act like 'appearance' but we think that it acts like 'fovea' and thus ask questions for which there are no answers.

Paul concludes with two observations. He notices that many seemingly empirical questions about sense-data are actually questions about "different notations for describing the same observations." The second observation is a warning. We must not select criteria, find them fulfilled, and then contend that the entity in question, say an unsensed sense-datum, exists. A further fact is not gained by this quasi-inference for, of course, it is not an inference. All we have done is to decide to use certain words in certain ways.

O.K. Bouwsma on Moore's Theory. Perhaps the most famous of the attacks on the perceptual essays is found in Bouwsma's essay "Moore's Theory of Sense-Data." Bouwsma takes off from the DCS passage which White called the Method of Selection. Quoting the paragraph in question he says that he has difficulty following the directions it contains. There are three problems facing Bouwsma.

In the first place the object to be picked out is not described. Secondly, Bouwsma does not know

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"Bouwsma's essay was written for the Schilpp volume and appears on pp. 201-222."
from what it is to be picked out. And, lastly, he does not understand how one comes to doubt that what he has picked out is the surface of his hand. Of these difficulties the first and last are the more serious; the second points to a lapse which Moore admitted and corrected without damage to his position, or to Bouwsma's.

Bouwsma's first difficulty is rather complex. He complains that

one who is unacquainted with sense-data, and so has no information with regard to what to pick out, must resort to random picking and wish for luck.6

Coupled with this remark is a series of examples which purport to show that Moore's language is applicable to gloves, hands, and mirror images as well as sense-data. He then produces the parody of the method by which he introduces the expression 'rubber glove.' The success of the parody depends upon the hearer's familiarity with the expression 'human hand.' Then the argument becomes hard to follow for it goes in several directions. Bouwsma wants to stress the fact that the method presupposes a familiarity with the physical object language containing such expressions as 'human hand,' 'rubber glove' etc.

5The lapse is discussed below.

6Bouwsma, p. 205.

7For the parody see p. 22 above.
Moore would not find this objectionable; his attacks on the Mill-Russell view point to the same conclusion. The argument also goes after the nature of the doubt involved in the method. The familiarity with a physical object language carries with it tests of the sort stressed by Paul for determining if a given thing is a hand, a rubber glove etc. If we know how to use the physical object language we are, in principle, able to resolve doubts as to whether this which I see is a hand or a rubber glove. Like Paul Bouwsma suggests that the problem appears to be an empirical one. Is it?

This takes us to Bouwsma's third objection. Again he is intent on making two rather different points. The first deals with an attempt to reconstruct those considerations which, coupled with Moore's "little reflection," led him to doubt that what he directly perceived was identical with the surface of his hand. Since Moore disagreed, I think fairly, with Bouwsma's analysis of Moore's reflection, I shall not consider this point. The major part of the third objection lies in the contention that Moore's doubt is not an empirical one. This time Bouwsma makes the claim explicit:

For what distinguishes the doubt in terms of which Professor Moore defines the sense-datum, is that it cannot be resolved. Once the doubt arises, there is no way of settling the question

\footnote{For Moore's reply to Bouwsma see Schilpp pp. 627-648.}
whether the thing one can pick out is identical with the surface of one's hand or not.\footnote{Bouwsma, p. 207}

We have seen that it is not at all clear that Moore succeeded in defining the sense-datum in DCS. Perhaps it is not clear to Bouwsma who, in the absence of a description of the sense-datum, must resort to random picking. If the method involves an attempted definition it is, as it were, a nondescriptive attempt.

The third objection hangs upon two questions which Bouwsma believes should be given affirmative answers. "Is the doubt empirical?" is the first; "are only empirical doubts resolvable?" is the second. Much of the early part of Bouwsma's essay is given over to the consideration of examples in which one finds such expressions as "X can (cannot) be identical with the surface of my right hand" used. Like Paul he suggests that the examples are empirical in the sense that we know what would count for or against the identity thesis in question. If one doubts that A is really B he knows something about A and B in terms of which the doubt can, in principle, be resolved. But Bouwsma moves from the example to the implied thesis that only empirical doubts are resolvable. So if the doubt is not resolvable it is not empirical. Moore's doubt is not resolvable,
thus nonempirical, and finally, being irresolvable, perhaps meaningless.

Bouwsma's attack is quite similar to Paul's. Both believe the initial credibility of a sense-datum theory to come from its similarity to an empirical one. But when this is seen not to be the case and the theory is cut loose from its quasi-empirical foundations it becomes either meaningless or useless. Bouwsma seems to take it to be meaningless, Paul to be useless. Since the attacks are as similar as this I shall discuss them together. Moore replied to the Bouwsma essay; I shall read that reply with both Bouwsma and Paul in mind. Even more generally I shall argue that Moore's reply to Bouwsma can be directed against any attack on Moore which maintains that his discussions of sense-data borrow their credibility from the assimilation of talk about sense-data with talk about empirical theories.

Comments on Paul and Bouwsma.--In his reply to Bouwsma Moore first considered the charge that his directions for determining how, and for what, he used the term 'sense-datum' are unclear. He admitted that when one does the picking out there must be something in the visual field in addition to that which is picked out and thus accepted Bouwsma's second objection. But he went on to say that in another respect his directions
were unclear for they failed to show that he had made a vital assumption. This is the assumption:

I was assuming that whenever a person is seeing his own right hand as well as something else (e.g., a black background) he must be directly seeing at least two objects: he must, in fact, have a whole visual field, all the objects of which are directly seen by him.\(^1^0\)

What is assumed is not only that whenever one sees 1 he must see 3 but also that whenever he sees 3 he sees a sense datum or sense-data. Here at least there is no priority of sense-data coming before see 3 or vice versa; both are assumed simultaneously.

Moore realized that he had to explain see 3 and said that the only way he could do so was by means of examples. The sense of ‘see’ in which one sees an after-image or Macbeth saw the dagger—that is sense see 3. So Moore is again pushed back to the kinds of examples he used 25 years previously in SSD where he spoke of images, sensations, after-images etc. Echoing Paul we can ask the now familiar questions as to why one should find it helpful (1) to call after-images sense-data and (2) to maintain that they are seen in a sense different from that in which objects or surfaces are seen. (1) is strengthened by the realization that neither after-images nor hallucinations are involved in the perception of a hand.

\(^{10}\) "A Reply to My Critics," Schilpp p. 631.
Some explanation is forthcoming. Moore said that whenever one sees a physical object he must see a sense-datum. Why 'must'? The necessity is not empirical but logical for Moore thought that this was "a part of the very meaning of the assertion." He said:

the propositional function "X is seeing at least two objects" entails the propositional function "X is seeing directly at least two objects."

Of course this notion of meaning has got to be analytic meaning unless we want to admit that many users of 'see' don't know what they are saying. The strength of this assertion is easily shown. By Modus Tollens it follows that he who denies that he sees sense-data denies that he sees at all.

Since Bouwsma takes off from DCS it is obviously fair to draw upon other parts of the essay in assessing his attack. We remember that there he distinguished between the truth and the analysis of a proposition. An example may help. I may know that X is a triangle. I may not know that the truth of the proposition expressing this knowledge entails the truth of another proposition e.g. that lines drawn from each angle to the midpoint of the side opposite will cross at a point. I might ask if this latter proposition is true, or perhaps even deny it, while steadfastly believing that

\[\text{Moore (REP), Schilpp p. 631.}\]
X is a triangle. Analytic consequences and contradictions need not be obvious. Moore may be saying that although "I see 1 a material object but do not see 3 a sense-datum" may not appear to be contradictory, it really is. The contradiction may not appear immediately for we may not have performed the requisite analysis. So what Moore has in mind is not just a theory about sense-data but something rather different. He has assumed that a particular analysis, in terms of which a propositional function mentioning see 1 entails one mentioning see 3, is a viable analysis.

Moore repeated this line; we cannot doubt his purpose when he says things like this:

the function "X is seeing a physical object" entails "X is seeing a sense-datum" (X is seeing some object directly), or, in other words, that the sense in which we use "see" when we say that we see a thing which is a physical object, is such that the seeing of a physical object necessarily involves the seeing of a sense-datum.\(^{12}\)

Once again it is the senses which make this involvement necessary. The equals sign inside the parenthetical is puzzling; but it is reasonable to think that whatever relation the sign stands for that relation is symmetrical. Thus we can conclude that the seeing of a physical object can be described in a proposition. That proposition entails 1) that one sees something directly,

\(^{12}\)Moore (REP), Schilpp p. 644.
2) that the thing so seen is a sense-datum, and 3) that the sense-datum exists. Curiously enough this is consistent with the possibility that the sense-datum be identical with a surface or a sensation. These passages show Moore admitting to making an assumption without which his directions are unclear. The assumption is clearly about an analysis involving concepts expressed by 'see.' What is it to express? If, as seems likely, the analysis is concerned with the various senses of 'see,' and the logical relations holding between them, we should notice that the senses can be distinguished in two ways.

It is assumed that see 1 is a concept different from see 3; the difference grounding the assumption can be expressed by the technique Moore used in SSD where he distinguished the senses by means of the different natures of the objects seen. Or, this being the other way, one can ignore the objects and concentrate directly upon the concepts themselves. In order to keep this approach separate from the first and earlier one Moore must not distinguish between seeing and directly seeing upon the basis of what is seen, but rather upon the basis of the logical relations in which he thinks the concepts stand. It begins to look like talk about sense-data and talk about the various senses are merely different ways of marking the same distinction. Paul's criticism applies because the talk about sense-data allows one to raise
questions about the nature and properties of this mys-
terious entity. The way of drawing the distinction which
involves propositional functions is less problematic.
Here we can see how Moore has not kept separate Q1 and
Q2 questions. Perhaps what he is really looking for is
a concept which might be expressed by the (deliberately
hyphenated) words "directly-seeing-a-sense-datum."
When Moore admitted, in this same essay in which he
replies to Bouwsma, that "esse is percipi" is true of
sense-data he admits the cohesion of the parts of the
concept. Nevertheless, even though Moore's language
sometimes leaves him open to criticism of the sort
levelled by Paul and Bouwsma it does not follow that
the distinction is not to be drawn.

Bouwsma first objects that the object to be picked
out is not described; he then says that he does not know
from what it is to be picked out. Moore admitted the
force of the second objection by stipulating the back-
ground. But he has not really answered the first for
he has not described the sense-datum. Instead it begins
to look like this concern for the sense-datum is mislead-
ing; it points to a distinction which ought to be drawn
between the concepts see 2 and see 3. If Moore had used
Macbeth's dagger in this passage the problem would not
arise. Bouwsma, playing Macbeth, notices that he does
see 3 an object. The resulting soliloquy asks if he
also sees a real material dagger. "Is this a dagger . . ." has the force of "Am I really seeing 1?"

The issue as to the proper way of differentiating these concepts arises also with Bouwsma's third objection. Moore admits that his doubt is not an empirical one but is less disturbed by this than is Bouwsma. He says that it is a philosophical doubt and contends that although it has not been resolved that does not mean that it cannot be resolved. I think that by "philosophical" Moore meant analytic; the context of DCS shows that he is concerned with the analysis, not the truth, of perceptual judgments.

The difference between empirical and philosophical problems turns up also in Moore's motives for writing DCS. He says that DCS was intended to

1) show what sorts of things he meant by sense-data,  
2) show that there are such things,  
3) show that functions of the first sort[using see 1] entail functions of the second sort[using see 3],  
4) and to show that there are good, but not conclusive, reasons for taking sense-data not to be identical with surfaces.

Moore says that if he had wanted only to accomplish 1) and 2) he could have done so by getting some one to experience an after-image. This is misleading for we should remember that for Moore the sense-datum is involved in all instances of perceptual experience. 3) is obviously a logical point and not an empirical one. But 4), which seems to be the crucial point, is much harder to classify. In the first place it seems to be
presupposed by the method which Bouwsma attacks. It might be read as an empirical thesis which holds, for instance, that there are good but not conclusive reasons for taking the author of the *Iliad* not to be the author of the *Odyssey*. Or it could be read in a way suggested by Paul's criticism e.g. should we adopt the rule that what we will call a sense-datum in cases of normal perception is identical with the seen 2 surface? Moore might reply that this would be a bad rule for it is inconsistent with the purposes for which the rule is introduced. It is implicitly introduced to distinguish see 1 from see 3.

Sometimes we want to talk about two appearances of the same material object. And sometimes we want to talk about the double vision experienced by a person putting his finger in his eye. The rule does not seem to work here. We might try to get around such problems by amending the rule to hold out for qualitative identity but not numerical identity; but then Moore would put on his blue sunglasses and look at the white wall. I suspect that Moore would also object to the assumption that the arbitrary rule can be amended as we see fit. He felt that see 1 does entail see 3; it is not just accidental. Perhaps 4) is a confusing attempt to distinguish see 2 from see 3. But its thrust is inapplicable to some instances of sense-data. When one has a memory image or suffers an hallucination Moore would agree that there is no
necessary application of 'see' in senses 1 or 2. In some cases the question "What sense of 'see' is intended?" is answered by specifying the object seen. But this does not hold for cases involving experiences of the kind Bouwsma has in viewing his hand. And it is just this case which creates the problem. Nevertheless we can see that Moore is partially aware of the distinction between Q1 and Q2 questions. If the matter were simply an empirical one then, as he says, the admission of after-images would satisfy Moore. But we must admit that it still carries with it the ambiguity which allows it to be construed as an empirical question. It is not one but it does look like one.

These considerations also show something rather peculiar about Paul's attack. It is based upon his implicitly held thesis that questions about sense-data are either empirical or else they are slightly disreputable arguments about terminology. Paul holds the belief that the introduction of 'sense-datum' is either arbitrary or parasitic upon uses of words like "appearance." Some critics take it to be arbitrary by suggesting that Moore is merely making a linguistic recommendation to the effect that we use this term rather than some other. But suppose Moore thought that there were facts which were logical and not empirical. They might be discovered empirically as it might be found
empirically that the lines drawn from the angles to the
midpoints of the opposite sides of a triangle cross at
a point. But the proposition expressing this knowledge
states a necessary truth. What we call a triangle may
be arbitrary but what happens to what we call a triangle
is not. If Moore is concerned with logical truths of
this kind the contention that his technical terms do not
figure in empirical descriptions is strangely beside the
point.

The point can be made another way. Both Paul and
Bouwsma take Moore to be arguing for an empirical thesis;
since he does not satisfactorily demonstrate the thesis
they criticize his position. They mistake his means to
the desired end, the distinction between the senses of
'see,' for the end itself. But it is not that simple.
Moore uses some arguments from experience in an attempt
to get his reader to see an analytic distinction just as
Socrates drew diagrams for Meno's slave boy. But the
diagrams do not constitute the proof. That the means
for explaining the distinction are unclear is one com­
plaint; but that the distinction is not necessary or
cannot be drawn is quite another.

Ryle on Conceptual Elucidation.—There is another
quite different line of attack upon sense-datum
theories. It recognizes the concern for analytic
distinctions in the essays of people like Moore but maintains that the analysis has gone astray. In The Concept of Mind Ryle\textsuperscript{13} offers a general characterization of sense-datum theories and then criticizes the theories on just these grounds. According to Ryle a sense-datum theory is actually an attempt to elucidate some of the concepts involved in perceptual problems. The theorist notices that verbs like 'see' are used with direct objects and are not used to designate sensations "neat." Since we need a way of speaking about sensations, or about that which does stop when one closes his eyes, we speak of "looks," "glimpses," and "appearances." We must speak this way if we are to separate the contribution made to observations by sensations from those made by "tuition, inference, memory, conjecture, habit, imagination, and association." The theory takes the having of a sensation to be describable as the getting of a "momentary look" or a "visual appearance" of something. The momentary look is not a publicly observable thing or event but is, in a special sense, a color patch in the percipient's field of view. The special sense must be invoked in order to make it clear that this is not a colored patch of something; it is simply a colored

patch "proprietary" to the percipient although not necessarily "in the mind."

When the percipient apprehends or "gets" a sense-datum the theory holds that he perceives or observes it, again in a special sense of 'perceive' or 'observe' which makes it permissible to say that one observes such items. Sometimes this is extended to suggest that we really do not observe physical objects but only sense-data.

To have a visual sensation is thus to "intuit or espy a proprietary patchwork of colours." This is not the whole story for sometimes disputes rage over the nature of the link between sense-datum and the object of which it is a sense-datum. The theory is put forward in the hopes that it will clarify certain difficulties and traditional problems, such as the problems of illusion.

Ryle is not attacking a straw man. In order to see this we can examine a summary of the propositions he ascribes to the theory and then see which ones Moore defended. The theory maintains (1) that there is a difference between immediate awareness or sensation and "tuition, inference . . . etc." It holds (2) that that which is immediately detected is not publicly observable, but (3) it is not necessarily "in the mind." It also maintains (4) that it is necessary either to attribute a special sense to 'observe' or to introduce
another expression such as 'directly apprehend.' And (5) there is a relation of a disputable nature between the sense-datum and the object. Moore, in a manner more or less qualified depending upon which essay one reads, did subscribe to all of these propositions.

Ryle's initial objection to what he admits is an elucidation of certain perceptual concepts is simple. The theory mistakenly assimilates two logically dissimilar concepts, sensation and observation. This can be shown in the following way. On the basis of the theory when one has a visual sensation he catches a glimpse of something; so the having of a sensation consists in the finding or intuiting of a sense-datum. But this sense-datum, or patch, is also glimpsed and thus there is a sensation involved in the glimpse of the sense-datum. The imputed regress is not only infinite but vicious as well for the sensation, as end product, is never reached in the series of glimpses of glimpses of glimpses. But the use of a perceptual verb like 'see' implies that he who sees has some appropriate sensation. The implication becomes clear when one attempts to deny it in an odd sentence like "he saw a bird although at the time he was having no visual sensations." Since the having of a sensation is a part of what is meant by a perceptual verb the sentence is self-stultifying. Ryle
concludes the attack with these words:

Sensations then are not perceivings, observings or findings; they are not detectings, scannings or inspectings; they are not apprehendings, cognisings, intuitings or knowings. To have a sensation is not to be in a cognitive relation to a sensible object. There are no such objects. Nor is there any such relation.\textsuperscript{14}

There is a curious facet to all this. Although Moore accepts the five propositions characterizing Ryle's version of a sense-datum theory Ryle's objections do not contradict Moore. There are a few differences which I shall try to point out but let us first see where, or if, there is real disagreement between Ryle and Moore. Has Moore committed this logically disastrous assimilation of concepts? Obviously not for he clearly distinguishes between observation, see 1, and sensation, somehow involved with see 3. It must be admitted that in attempting to explain the distinction Moore sometimes appears to treat the sense see 3 as though it takes as its direct object the name of a sensible object. Questions such as "Can sense-data exist unsensed?" do not make sense if only hallucinations and sensations are to count as sense-data. If the sense-datum is treated as a physical object the question does make sense. We have, however, seen that Moore abandoned the view that sense-data could exist unsensed. Once again we are up against the

\textsuperscript{14}Ryle, p. 214.
complaint that the means to the end are misleading; the end—the distinction between see 3 and see 1, sensation and observation—is precisely that which Ryle wants. Paradoxically we find that Moore talks about sense-data in order to draw the distinction which Ryle thinks sense-datum theories deny.

In the summary paragraph Ryle claimed that sensations are not perceiving. He does not say what they are. In SSD Moore made the same claim for he was careful to distinguish between the having of a sensation and the sensation itself.\(^{15}\) If a sensation is not equivalent to the having of a sensation it is clearly not the same thing as a perceiving. Again there is substantial agreement. But the end of the paragraph is something else again. Ryle flatly denies that there are sensible objects. What is a sensible object? Moore's examples include after-images and hallucinations. Ryle surely does not intend to deny that people hallucinate or have after-images. If we consider the possibility that a sense-datum might be a sensation the situation becomes even worse. We must conclude that Ryle and Moore do not take the same things to be sensible objects or sense-data.

But one difference remains. Ryle denies that any relation between a sensible object, if there are any,

\(^{15}\)The distinction is discussed in Chapter IV.
and a percipient is a cognitive relation. This may be ambiguous. Can there be more than one sort of cognitive relation? If Ryle means by "cognitive relation" that he who stands in such a relation is a knower in the sense that he believes that he knows, that what he knows is true, and that he has evidence for the true belief then this sort of relation will not do for the cognitive relation between sensible object and percipient. It is difficult, in one's own case at least, to ask for evidence that he has a sensation. One just has them. This is the point of Moore's talk about direct apprehension. But it is also absurd, as Moore came to admit, to suggest that one has a sensation and does not know it. If we object to the word 'know' we can replace it with Moore's phrase 'being aware of.' If Ryle ties 'know' to the evidence claim then he must say that there are things of which he is aware that he does not know to be true. Moore might be happy with this for he would say that he knows this object to be a pipe when he sees it; he is aware of the relevant sense-datum, whatever be its nature, because he directly apprehends it. Ryle's attack does not mean either that there are no hallucinations or that one is not aware of them.

Ryle then considers two possible objections to his attack. One might say that "having a sensation" is merely a vulgar and inaccurate way of referring to
a sense-datum. But this move avoids the regress by the heroic expedient of saying that when one observes he is in no way sensitively affected. The elucidation, then, is not the elucidation of the concept of sensation for that has completely disappeared. Moore does not make any moves of this sort. Nor would he for the heroic expedient denies the distinction which both he and Ryle are anxious to preserve.

The other ploy is one which might apply to Moore. Ryle suggests that the sense-datum theory might be defended by saying that, whatever be the logical rules governing the concepts of sensation and observation, when one sees he simply is directly presented with color patches. Sense-data are simply given. Although he does not say so explicitly he seems to be attacking the view that sense-data are hard data of the Russellian sort. Moore did do something like this in VSD when he said that there must be something which is bluish if he sees the white wall to be bluish. We have seen, of course, that that passage is not simply an appeal to one's experience in order to get him to see that sense-data are given. It is far more complicated. A better instance of this contention that sense-data are simply given might be found in Moore's appeal to the examples of after-images and hallucinations. But again we
have no reason to think that Ryle wants to deny that people hallucinate.

Ryle attacks this general line of defense by asking what requires us to say that something which is seen must have the properties which it appears to have. Moore went from the wall, known to be white but appearing to be blue, to the existence of something which is, and does not merely appear to be, bluish. Ryle's analysis is reminiscent of Moore's experiment with the coins and goes this way. When one sees a round plate which has been tilted what makes us say that there is something which is elliptical? The sense-datum theorist is supposed to say "Well, there it is--you see it." But how does one justify this move from "looks elliptical" to "is elliptical?" By experience only? In VSD Moore said that he could not explain the truth of the 'appears' statement without relying on a statement about that which does the appearing. Thus he may be after an analysis of the sort implicitly requested as early as SSD16 (1914) in which an answer to the question as to "in what sense" a perceptual proposition was true demanded that one refer to something having the apparent quality. It

16See Studies (SSD), p. 187, where Moore says that propositions about the coins are propositions about physical objects, says the propositions are true, and then asks "in what sense are these propositions true?"
looks as though we are once again moving from an experience to an explanation, perhaps an analysis, of that experience or propositions describing it. Ryle says that he can explain the 'appears' statement without relying on a statement which claims that something is either bluish or elliptical. To say that a round plate (or coin) looks elliptical is to say something both hypothetical and general in nature for it is to say that the plate looks like an elliptical, but untilted, plate would look to most people were they looking at it. Nevertheless Moore has a perfectly respectable rejoinder—why do the statements say the same thing? Can Ryle explain this sameness of meaning without referring to something else e.g. an appearance? Let's try this on the hallucination case. To say that Macbeth saw an hallucinatory dagger is to say that he had an experience quite like that normal non-hallucinating people would have if they looked at a dagger hung in the air by a piece of very thin, almost invisible, wire. Let us also suppose that Moore plays the role of Macbeth. Ryle explains to him what Moore sees, and then explains how Moore can express that knowledge without referring to a sensible object. Moore asks if the Ryilian analysis has the same meaning as his original statement about the dagger. Ryle replies that it does. Moore then asks how Ryle can know this to be the case and requests
grounds for accepting the equivalence. Ryle's first reaction is to say that Moore could not have described the dagger in the way that he did, or, for that matter, called it a dagger unless he had at other times seen daggers or had them described to him. Moore would reply that he had never denied that one could, in a perfectly straightforward sense, see material daggers. That is not the difficulty. Ryle might then reply that, putting aside the equivalence question, his view has the merit of not asking us to accept the existence of mysterious sensible objects. Moore would answer by saying that the dagger is either real or hallucinatory; there is no mystery about either alternative. Ryle would then be driven back to the coin case. If Moore remembered that his use of the coin example did not show that sense-data existed but only that if they exist at least some sense-data are not numerically identical with physical surfaces he would have a handy reply.

Moore does not argue that sense-data are given when he talks about physical objects. This line of criticism, consequently, does not apply directly to Moore. However, if this conversation continued I believe that Ryle could embarrass Moore by asking about the respect in which all sense-data are alike. Moore could not specify that similarity although he believed that there was one.
Ryle's argument is directed against sense-datum theories in general. It must be admitted that Moore's essays fit the caricature of the sense-datum theory which Ryle offers. But I think that Moore escapes much of Ryle's criticism, for he does carefully separate sensations from observations. The difficult question for Moore is the simple one concerning the existence of sensible objects other than after-images etc. If sensations count as sensible objects Moore has an out in cases of veridical perception. There does seem to be disagreement between Moore and Ryle as to just what is to count as a sensible object. Moore also attempts to provide a justification, which Ryle does not offer, for the equivalence of meaning defended in Ryle's analysis of appearance statements. This will, I hope, become more obvious in our discussion of White's position.

A.R. White's Interpretation.—White's discussion is more comprehensive than those we have so far examined. He carefully examined all the essays bearing upon sense-datum problems, attempted to interpret Moore consistently and evaluate the interpretation. Warnock\(^\text{17}\) found the interpretation was obscure; Malcolm found the whole

book unclear.\textsuperscript{18} I think that White's interpretation does fail but believe that it is important that it be given a chance. So I shall both state and criticize White's view. It may have merits which he does not appreciate; his statement of it has defects which need to be pointed out.

White notices that one question often led Moore to talk about sense-data. The question, I shall call it $Q_w$, is "What do you see?" $Q_w$ can get two sorts of answers which White calls descriptive (D answers) and identifying (I answers) ones. The identifying answer is, in most cases, "given in terms of a material object or a part of a material object." The I answer quite often classifies the thing seen as a material object, a part of one, or perhaps the surface of an object. But the D answer "is given in terms of traditional sense-data." The examples make this more obvious. A possible I answer to a particular $Q_w$ might be "I see a book" while the relevant D answer is "I see something blue, rather like a foreshortened rectangle, with a yellowish smudge at one end." But we are not to conclude that the 'something' in the D answer refers to a sense-datum for peculiar reasons. To say that the something was a sense-datum would be, for

White, to say that that thing could be classified. Classification appears to be the distinguishing characteristic of I answers. Even though Qw elicits these two sorts of answer we are not to think that 'see' is used in different senses in I and D answers. Why not is not made clear. However White thinks that the distinction between I and D answers shows the

problem, therefore, [to be] not one about the relation of two objects, a sense-datum and a material object, to each other, but about the mutual logical relations of two kinds of answer to the same question. 19

Little is said about these mutual relations; one gathers from White's remarks that they would be difficult to specify. The source of the difficulty is perceptual experience for one can consistently find different I answers given to the same Qw, and conjoined with the same D answer. This is Macbeth's problem for although he can, and does, give a good enough D answer he is perplexed about the proper I answer. On the other hand arguments from differing perspectives to the existence of sense-data rely on our desire to give different D answers, and the same I answer, to one and the same Qw. The Method of Restriction, when used as an argument as by Russell, exemplifies this situation.

19White, p. 177.
Warnock complained that although White relies heavily on this distinction he is not able to make it clear. He thinks that White might be taken to imply that the D answer is a "purely visual, or visually phenomenological" description of what is seen. If so then the D answer is to be one which classifies in no way whatsoever. White admits that "neither pure description nor pure identification is very common; the former less so than the latter." But it seems that a pure D answer would involve no substantive which functions like the word 'something' in the example; if so then a pure D answer is grammatically impossible. If the one sense of 'see' is a transitive one then when one sees he sees something; whenever he reports he follows the word 'see' with a name, or a substantive, in the accusative. White has not given, and perhaps cannot give, either examples of or criteria for pure I and D answers. If all answers are mixed ones Warnock is entitled to ask how the distinction is to be applied. He has an example which may show a way out of the problem. Suppose that one identifies, upon seeing a bright speck in the sky, a Comet IV airplane. The D answer to the relevant Qw is "a bright speck in the sky;" the I answer is "A Comet IV." Then Warnock asks about "I see a large airplane"--is this an I or a D answer? He feels that White should call it a D answer as it is both more descriptive and less
classificatory than the I answer. I think that White would argue that this new answer is still an I although less precise than the former I answer. Still Warnock's purpose is satisfied for he has shown that we do not know how to draw the distinction. White does present it in terms of examples which he seems to admit are impure. Warnock concludes that if White cannot say where description stops and identification begins because there may be no one right answer then White cannot provide one correct account of sense-data.

This attack is a little strong for Warnock asks for something like a statement of the difference between winter and spring and a rule for the application of the distinction. Suppose that we adopt his suggestion and treat D answers as pieces of visual phenomenology. We shall say that a D answer dimply describes an experience but does not make any explicit or implicit claim that anything whatsoever (besides the experience) satisfies the description. While it is grammatically necessary for D answers to contain words like 'something' these words do not refer to anything in addition to the experience. D answers make no ontological commitments. Instead of words like 'something' and 'speck' I shall use 'X' in the following way: I see a bluish . . . X. Suppose that this will shore up the distinction enough for us
to get on with our discussion. The move made here is, oddly, one which Moore might approve and White may not. Moore thinks that to say that one sees an object is to say that there is an object to be seen. When I introduce the X I may be distinguishing between see 1 and see 3. If sense-data do not exist unsensed the distinctions are quite similar. Now the sentence about which both White and Moore worried is this: This which I now see is a hand (Comet IV). The words 'this,' 'see,' and 'hand' may all serve to mark the same distinction. 'Hand' indicates an I answer and if that answer is true Moore's sense sec 1 is implied. Moore would mark the distinction with 'see' instead of with the names of the objects. We shall discuss the 'this' in a moment. White has now set for us two problems; we don't yet know what he takes a sense-datum to be, and we do not know how he would analyse the problem sentence. The latter is easily, if superficially, answered:

When we put our problem in the form in which Moore often did, of what is being asserted about the sense-datum when we say 'This, which I see, is a material object,' the answer in my view is that we are identifying what has been described. The word 'this' here is not, as Moore thought, ambiguous, but refers to the sense-datum; we do literally say of it that it is a material object, meaning that it is to be identified as a material object. When we say 'this is a part of the surface of a material object' we are identifying the sense-datum more precisely.20
Let us fill out the example a little and suppose Moore said 'I see a bluish, elliptical ... X' and 'This, which I see, is a material object which I take to be an inkstand.' I answers might come after or presuppose D answers; this being the case we could explain how the I answer classifies. After all, Warnock said that it was a Comet IV because it looked like one. But something has gone wrong. What is the it which looks like one? If, in the ink-stand example, Moore had been led to classify the object seen I as an inkstand because it was round while the D answer contained the word 'elliptical' is there any guarantee that the I and D answers are talking about the same thing? We are led back to the contention that, whatever else may be said of it, we cannot say that the sense-datum is always identical with the seen 2 surface.

Apparently in response to this sort of objection (which seems to treat the sense-datum as a something which could be identified) White contends that the I answer does not identify the sense-datum with the material object but only identifies it as a material object. The sense-datum is to be classified as a material object or a surface. But if the sense-datum is to be classified as a material object it is reasonable to think that it must be some material object or other.

There are three possible alternatives. Either the
sense-datum is a material object, or it is not a material object, or, most importantly, it is a mistake to think that either of the former alternatives makes sense. White needs to argue for this third view. If the sense-datum is assumed not to be material then, as with the Mill-Russell view, the object ceases to be material. Moore said that according to that view it can be truly said of nothing that it is a material object. But if the sense-datum is taken to be material, and classified as a material object then the material and elliptical sense-datum is to be classified as, or as a part of, the round material surface. It also looks as though D answers on this hypothesis will have nothing to do with sense-data but will talk instead about surfaces. So the third alternative looks like the promising one.

White does not say what a sense-datum is; he does say what 'sense-datum' does in these words:

For 'visual sense-datum' is only a generic word for whatever gives an answer to the question 'What do you see?,' it has no other being or quality than this.21

'Sense-datum,' as a generic word for anything whose verbal expression can occupy the grammatical object place in 'I see A,' where 'A' furnishes a description of what is seen, is of a logically different type not only from 'material object' but also from 'hallucination,' 'after-image,' 'illusion,' etc. which are generic words for anything whose verbal expression can fill the

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21 White, p. 189.
grammatical object place in 'I see B' where 'B' is an identification of what is seen.22

White has fallen into the trap of failing to keep talk about things distinct from talk about words. He has failed to separate the using of a word from the mentioning of it; ironically this seems to be precisely what he thinks Moore has done. Perhaps one example will demonstrate the confusion. The quotation numbered 20 on page 124 maintains that the 'this' in the disputed sentence refers to the sense-datum which is identified as a material object. But the later passages, numbered 21 and 22 on page 126-27, indicate something else. 'Sense-datum' is the name of some sense-datum or other; and a sense-datum is a kind of answer to a certain kind of question. White cannot mean that a kind of answer to some Qw is to be classified as a material object. The only sense one could make of this—that the answer is a particular physical token such as a typewritten sentence—is not the one he wants.

So here he needs to be saved from himself. If we take the later passages, 21 and 22, seriously then when we talk about sense-data we are really talking about a kind of answer which carries no existential commitment but merely describes an experience. Thus 'sense-datum' refers neither to things nor to surfaces nor to after-images or hallucinations etc. It refers to something
logical, as opposed to physical in nature, a type of answer. Passage 22 also shows how White has become trapped. The 'it' which initiates the second clause refers back to 'visual sense-datum.' If 'visual sense-datum' is mentioned in the first clause, as the single quotation marks suggest, then the exhibited marks have no being or quality other than that which attaches to them as marks on a page. But if White means that these marks can be used as the name of a type of answer then the thesis can be made consistent. An example will clarify this and reveal an ambiguity which can be settled by fiat.

'I see a bluish . . . X' is an expression, a set of marks in this instance. This set of marks has a particular function which we can call the D-function of language. The phrase 'bluish . . . X' makes the D-function explicit as the 'I see' is common to both I and D-functions. Actually, according to the convention adopted earlier, the 'X' does this. The construction of the I-function is obvious. Is a sense-datum a part of a description or a part of a particular kind of description? This is the ambiguity. Suppose I invoke the type-token distinction by saying that the phrase 'bluish . . . X' has three occurrences on this page, all the tokens belong to the same type, and the type is defined in terms of the shape of the letters. Just how this is done is
not that important. By fiat I shall end the ambiguity by suggesting that the sense-datum is now a token of a phrase serving a D-function. A sense-datum is a particular instance of written or spoken language differentiated by its peculiar D-function. The D-function withholds any existential commitment or suggestion from the word used as the grammatical direct object in the sentence containing the sense-datum. This roundabout locution is necessary for now 'I think I see a cow but I am not at all sure' might be a sentence which contains a sense-datum. It would be a better candidate if the cow thought to be seen were described. We should notice that sentences like this containing sense-data do not make reference to them.

Several consequences are immediately apparent. It is now absurd to say that one sees sense-data unless this means that he sees marks on a page. Thus White's contention that 'see' has but one sense is served. My fiat has also guaranteed the privacy of the sense-datum as I am the only one who can answer when I am asked what I see. However, if we had decided that a sense-datum should be a type and not a token then 'bluish . . . X' would be a repeatable type. Several people might use the expression when asked the relevant Qw. One odd consequence of this is that the privacy of the sense-datum comes from nothing more mysterious than my inability to say more
than one thing at once. Suppose that I attempt to perform this D-function for a deaf oculist: "I see a reddish . . . X," "What?," "I see a reddish . . . X."

Even though the descriptions are exactly alike the arbitrary fiat guarantees the numeric difference of the sense-data. This shows in a way seen more clearly by Paul than by White the extent to which rules about the use of 'sense-datum' may be arbitrary.

On this interpretation White's thesis turns out to be an extraordinarily complicated one. That the interpretation is the only possible one is not something for which I shall argue. But it does have the merit of consistency, a feature I find lacking in White's exposition; it will allow us to understand White's criticism of Moore; and it makes possible an assessment of White's answers to traditional questions about sense-data.

In discussing the Method of the Ultimate Subject White and Ayer notice that Moore claimed that the 'this' in 'this which I see is an inkstand' is ambiguous. It has more than one referent. Ayer thought, and Moore denied, that Moore meant there to be but one subject, the sense-datum. If one says of an inkstand that it is

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23 See Chapter II, note 8.

24 See Mace (VSD), p. 208.
an inkstand he says something logically similar to "A is A." Ayer argued that if the 'this' referred only to the inkstand then the sentence is tautological. So it must refer to, and only to, the sense-datum. White wants to argue that the whole sentence identifies what has been described. But there is a real sense in which nothing has been described—except, perhaps, one's experience. Again we must reinterpret White's argument. The sentence has several functions. Its I-function should be subdivided into (1) an existential assertion, and (2) a classification of that the existence of which is asserted. If the sentence is "This, which I see, is a blue inkstand" there is an implicit D-function for whenever one identifies he does so on the basis of a visual experience which could be described.

An example which Ayer used against Moore attracted White's attention as well. What happens if Moore were to have said "This, which I now see, is a penny" when in fact he had hallucinated the penny. Ayer thought this showed that the 'this' refers always and only to a sense-datum. White has a different opinion:

I want to say that the word 'this' denotes the same kind of thing in the hallucination case as in the other, namely, a sense-datum in the sense of that which a person would describe if asked to give the description answer to 'what do you see?'

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25White, p.178.
Whatever one may say about the existential aspect of the I-function the classificatory function has gone astray if the hallucinated penny is said to be a real one. White's point is that the D-function is the same as it would be if Moore had seen a real penny. The passage also shows the ambiguity which allowed the arbitrary decision about the sense-datum. "The same kind of thing" might mean either a thing (perhaps the same one) of the same kind, or a kind of thing. Once again the passage needs to be reworked; the 'this' cannot denote a D-functioning answer for one simply does not see, in any usual sense, such things. White's remarks can be made acceptable if we construe them as suggesting that the sentence can have different functions. It is not the 'this' which is or is not ambiguous; the proper question concerns the number of roles played by the sentence.

The last consequence to be drawn from passage 25 concerns 'hallucination' and similar words which, for White, perform I-functions. Thus, Moore to the contrary notwithstanding, 'I see an hallucination' does not entail or is not equivalent to 'I see a sense-datum.' White has backed himself into a corner; if all words which, like 'hallucination' etc., can function as grammatical direct objects indicate the I-function of a sentence then, of course, 'see' has but one sense. Whenever the word is
used it is used transitively and thus figures in sentences having I-functions. The cramped nature of the corner becomes apparent when we try to employ the D-function by saying 'I see a bluish . . . X.'

White criticizes Moore by saying that

his grand mistake would appear to be his assumption that the most natural way of taking the 'is' in 'This, which I see, is an inkbottle(sic)' is as the 'is' of identity.  

He then explains his belief that one identifies an A as the B, or as a B. When one identifies in this way he puts the A in a class which could be a one or a many-membered class. White thinks that Moore attempted to identify the sense-datum with the physical object. I hope that I have provided grounds for thinking that this simply is not the case. He sometimes spoke of afterimages as being sense-data; there is no question about such things being physical objects. Sometimes he did leave open the possibility that the sense-datum might be identical with a surface but he did not affirm this position categorically. Finally, in a passage which will prove difficult later, Moore said that he had decided that the relation between sense-datum and object was not one of identity. That passage appears in VSD which is included in White's bibliography. Given

26 White, p.180.
White's position, as reconstructed, we can say that a sentence describing an object and one describing an experience might be tokens of the same type. So there is a complex but viable way in which the identity thesis could be held.

White also thought that Moore took the sense-datum to be a kind of object. He does not say if this is to mean that Moore took sense-data to be material objects. And he does not support the accusation with any evidence; a footnote mentions Professors Broad and Marc-Wogetau but no mention is made of Moore. We shall have to look at this question later; for now we can say that White has failed to substantiate the charge.

His third major criticism concerns the distinction among the various senses of 'see;' he feels that there is no such distinction. The accusation is handled in much the same way as is his view that the 'this' in Moore's problematic sentence is not ambiguous. I suspect that the dispute is more verbal than real. We noticed earlier that the distinction between the two functions of the sentences answering Qw could be drawn in terms of the referent of the 'this,' the sense of 'see' employed, or perhaps through the nature of the object seen e.g. an X on the one hand or a Comet IV or an hallucination of it on the other. White obviously needs the distinction between I and D answers. If we transform that
distinction into the more workable one distinguishing I-functions from D-functions we must ask for a criterion for the differentiation. I have suggested that the existential commitment, or its suspension, may differentiate the functions. But this might be expressed just as easily by the distinction between see 1 and see 3. The question about the senses of 'see' is really a question about how the difference between functions is to be marked. White does not like Moore's way of distinguishing but, as Warnock points out, cannot replace it with a better way. If they both draw the same distinction how it is drawn is perhaps not so important as White takes it to be.

White can, on his reading of Moore and his mistakes, provide answers to the traditional questions asked about sense-data. They do not exist unperceived because a sense-datum is, in effect, a D answer. D answers work only as answers to Qw's. So if an answer is an answer only with regard to a question a D answer requires a Qw. Then, of course, sense-data do not have properties other than those which they are observed to have. This must be taken to mean that, in a curious sense, the properties of a sense-datum are actually the descriptive terms involved in the answer. A D answer not containing such a term cannot appear to do so nor can one containing such a term appear not to do so. Once again the possible, and trivial exception, contains the deaf occultist who
did not hear all that I said. But this exception could probably be removed by tightening up the description of a D answer.

The champion of the Mill-Russell view might object that this last contention should be modified to accommodate a consideration of what might be called counterfactual descriptions. If I ask you what you would see if you put your finger on your eye, pressing in such a way as to cause double vision, you might reply with an answer White would call a D answer. The merit of the Mill-Russell view appreciated by Moore is that it allows one to talk about descriptions which no one ever gave but which might have been given. If anyone had been on the top of Mochrum Hill he would have seen a superb sunset, could have described it, and could have described his experience of it. But we can incorporate this feature into the White view by a simple change in the relevant Qw. If we distinguish between present tense indicative Qw's ("What do you (now) see?") and past or future subjunctive Qw's ("What (will you, would you have seen, would you) see if . . . ?") the corresponding distinction between indicative and subjunctive I and D answers makes it possible to talk of unsensed sense-data. Such talk is, of course, really about possible answers and not mysterious objects. If the sense-datum is a particular token there is another relevant consequence. When Warnock
looked at the sky and said "an airplane" and then "A Comet IV" he provided I answers. If he said "a moving something" and then "a long shiny cross shaped silvery something" he would give us two D answers, one more precise than the other. But there is no question as to which is right. If the sense-datum is the description and Warnock offers two descriptions he has seen two sense-data. It is not the case that both are more or less accurate descriptions of the same thing for this does not follow even if the sense-datum is taken to be the type and not the token.

Although these four lines of criticism are quite different we can, by paying more attention to logic than chronology, develop a pattern of change in them. Bouwsma seems to argue that a sense-datum theory is an empirical hypothesis which suffers certain methodological difficulties which prevent its being a factual theory. Paul, to an extent, agrees but contends that the real issue concerns not the facts so much as the notation used to describe the facts. Ryle takes a different tack for he sees that quite often sense-datum theories are analytic as opposed to empirical in nature. So he concludes that the methodology appropriate for the investigation deals in the elucidation of concepts. But most sense-datum theorists have not employed the methodology properly and hence arrive at startling conclusions. White's
position is the hardest to characterize. Like the others he would like to be able to attribute to Moore some single and simple mistake the rectification of which will solve all the sense-datum mysteries in the perceptual essays. But unlike the others he has thoroughly investigated all of the essays before he comes to his conclusions. His remarks are at the same time the most confused and the most fruitful ones. The confusion is, I hope, obvious. The fertility of White's work lies in his suggestion that Moore's problems may stem not from the relation of one object to another but from the logical connection between one kind of answer and another.
CHAPTER IV

THE LARGER PICTURE

Sensation in R.I.--The examination of the methods, Moore's criticisms, and his critics has sufficed to answer some of the questions sometimes raised about a sense-datum theory. It has also shown that we cannot hope for one simple trick or distinction which will tie all the essays together into a neat and coherent interpretation. It is simply too easy to claim, as White and Bouwsma seem to do, that Moore made one grand mistake the rectification of which solves all problems. To provide answers to the remaining questions we shall have to go further afield and look for a larger picture. I shall start by examining two concepts which may well help answer some of our questions.

The first of these concepts which hovers around the periphery of a number of the essays but which is of more than peripheral importance is the concept of sensation. Since I have suggested that some of the methods might introduce either 'sensation' or 'sense-datum' we should examine Moore's discussions of sensation.
In RI Moore attacked the proposition "esse is percipi" which he thought to be necessary for any statement of the idealist position. He decided that it must mean "whatever is experienced also must be experienced" and that the notions of 'being' and 'being experienced' are necessarily connected. Having said earlier that the idealist confuses the yellow which he sees with the sensation of yellow, thereby making the proposition necessarily true, Moore asked what a sensation was.

He begins to answer the question by denying that "esse is percipi" is necessarily true. So he asserts that a thing can continue to exist while it is not being experienced. But he must show what that connection is which obtains when the thing is experienced and does not when the thing is not experienced. If the thesis is not to be trivially true, as a bad definition, there must be some unmentioned element, an x, which combines with the esse to make up the complex which is percipi. Upon pain of tautology the esse cannot entail the percipi so the x must. In an attempt to establish the connection between the x and the percipi Moore draws the distinction between the act of sensing and the object of that act. Suppose that this is what "esse is percipi" means:

"Esse is percipi," we have seen, asserts of two terms, as distinct from one another as 'green' and 'sweet' that whatever has the one has also the other: it asserts that 'being' and 'being experienced' are necessarily connected: that
whatever is is also experienced. And this, I admit, cannot be directly refuted. But I believe it to be false; and I have asserted that anybody who saw that 'esse' and 'perципи' were as distinct as 'green' and 'sweet' would be no more ready to believe that whatever is is also experienced than to believe that whatever is green is also sweet.¹

In 1903 Moore did not have either the tools of analysis or the distinctions he later drew with which to examine the view. Instead he launched into a long discussion of sensation which he called an analysis of the notion. It concludes:

The true analysis of sensation is as follows. The element that is common to them all, and which I have called 'consciousness' really is consciousness. A sensation is, in reality, a case of 'knowing' or 'being aware of' or 'experiencing' something. When we know that the sensation of blue exists the fact we know is that there exists an awareness of blue. And this awareness is not merely, as we have hitherto seen it must be, itself something distinct and unique, utterly different from blue: it also has a perfectly distinct and unique relation to blue, a relation which is not that of thing or substance to content, nor of one part of content to another part of content. This relation is just that which we mean in every case by 'knowing.' To have in your mind 'knowledge' of blue is not to have in your mind a 'thing' or 'image' of which blue is the content. To be aware of the sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental image—of a "thing," of which parts in the same sense in which blue and blue glass are constituents of a blue bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of blue; awareness being used in both cases in exactly the same sense.²

In any experience then three elements are involved: consciousness, the relation of awareness, and the object of

¹ Studies (RI), p. 16.
² Studies (RI), pp. 24-25.
consciousness. The same elements are found whether one is aware of his experience or of the object of that experience. We can picture it this way: Rcx or cRx. Moore apparently thought that this picture—Rc or cR—was necessarily incomplete. One sees the source of Ryle's contention that sense-datum theorists take the having of a sensation to be the standing in a cognitive relation. Moore says only that when one is aware there is something of which he is aware.

This makes R a powerful relation for it guarantees the object of consciousness a place in any analysis of sensation. But that the object of consciousness must be a sort of phantom object, a mysterious sense-datum does not follow. Moore's analysis is not just arbitrary. If we do take sensing to be a kind of knowing, although not one demanding evidence of the usual sort, then when one senses he senses something. He does not just sense nothing in particular for, as White points out, he can give D-answers. I believe that the distinction here between act and object, and especially the relation R, constitutes the basis for the Method of Intentionality. All the cases White cites are merely instances of the act-object distinction.

But we have to handle the argument carefully. We have seen that, in Moore's sense, the object is separable from the act. But this means only that the sentence
stating this possibility is internally consistent. The
separability concerns propositions or concepts, not
necessarily existing entities or phantom objects. Moore
was not as careful as he usually was; he leaves the point
about the separability vague as the following passages
demonstrate:

And what my analysis of sensation has been
designed to show is, that whenever I have a
sensation or idea, the fact is that I am then
aware of something which is equally and in
the same sense not an inseparable aspect of
my experience.

If, further, we recognize that this awareness
is and must be in all cases of such a nature
that its object, when we are aware of it, is
precisely what it would be, if we were not
aware: then it becomes plain that the existence
of a table in space is related to my experience
of it in precisely the same way as the existence
of my experience is related to my experience of
that.

The first passage suggests that "my hallucination exists
unsensed" is consistent but may be, as it happens, always
wrong. But the second seems to make the stronger claim
that the proposition is consistent and that the object
of consciousness, the hallucination, does exist unsensed.
This ambiguity in the initial use of the act-object dis-
tinction may carry over to the Method of Intentionality

\[3\text{Studies (RI), p. 27.}\]
\[4\text{Studies (RI), p. 29.}\]
as well. If there is an ambiguity it is built into the formula $Rsc$ and could be avoided by subdividing the $x$ into subclasses which do and do not exist unsensed. Moore does not do this here.

We should also notice that the kind of analysis offered here is the sort requested in PE published the same year. He does not ask about the entailments holding between propositions or concepts but seeks to break up a complex into its simple constituents. This sort of analysis, I think, disappears with the development of the Pickwickian sense objections. So the act-object distinction must be used with great care for it appears in a context which Moore later modified and is derived by a technique he abandoned.

**Later Accounts of Sensation.** Moore talked again about sensations in 1910 when he used the white envelope example to introduce to his listeners the concept of the sense-datum. He suggested that the term 'sense-datum' was a problematic one for many philosophers who fail to distinguish between that which is sensed and the act of sensing it. They confuse the sense-datum with the sensation. This is rather peculiar for we are now reintroduced to the act-object distinction in such a way that the act is the sensation and the object the sense-datum. Moore felt that if the white patch was a sensation then one
could see sensations; but sensations are had and not seen. But either that which is had or that which is seen is the object of the act and not the act itself. Moore outflanked the problem by pinning the ambiguity on the term 'sensation' which can mean either the act or the object. So 'sensation' names either the relation R, which will become see 3, or the sense-datum as object of see 3. Moore thought that there were a number of reasons why the ambiguity should be noticed but named only two of them.

It is conceivable that the sense-datum might exist after the act of apprehension ceased. It is also conceivable that the sense-datum be in the same place as the object while the act of apprehension takes place somewhere in the percipient's body. The first reason was explicitly abandoned in 1939 with the admission that sense-data do not exist unsensed; Moore says little more about the second reason dealing with the objective location of sense-data. In 1939 the distinction he drew in PEW between objects presented in and those to be met with in space seems to remove the grounds for the second reason.

The 1910 discussion of sensation adds little to the act-object distinction of RI except for the recognition of the possible ambiguities on 'sensation.' Moore did take the weaker of the two lines offered in RI by suggesting that it is conceivable but not necessarily true that the object exists unsensed.
Four years later Moore overlooked the distinction in SSD and ignored his previous concern for the ambiguity of 'sensation.' The introductory paragraph of SSD lists five types of mental acts one of which is the class of "sensations proper." Since the list distinguishes the kinds of act by means of their objects a sensation cannot be both an act and an object.

This may be merely a lapse on Moore's part for he talked about 'sensation' again in 1918 (SJP) and reiterated his contention that the word was ambiguous. Some think that the object of a perceptual judgment is a sensation; Moore thought it was a sense-datum. An important shift occurs here for, with the introduction of sense-data, the act-object distinction has become the distinction between the direct apprehension and the apprehended sense-datum. The way in which this shift takes place demands our attention.

Moore talked about sensations and sense-data immediately after using the Method of the Ultimate Subject; he asked if that subject was a sense-datum or a sensation. Those who took it to be a sensation attributed properties to the subject which it did not necessarily have. But Moore admitted that those who call the ultimate subject a sense-datum attribute to it properties it is doubtful that it has. Unfortunately he did not say why this is doubtful. He did say that it is necessary to specify
the ultimate subject in a way which does not determine the issue in favor either of the sense-datum or of the sensation. So he said that sense-data or sensations were the sorts of things about which perceptual judgments of the form "That is an inkstand" are made. He spoke this way in order to leave questions about the nature of the sense-datum open.

Still there is a certain tension which arises from this attempt to assimilate sense-data and sensations. Moore asked if one who makes a perceptual judgment about a material object also makes a judgment about the sense-datum. Those who take the ultimate subject to be a sensation think not. Moore disagreed because he felt that this would allow one not only to pass judgment upon the object and not the sense-datum but also to pass such a judgment when no sensation was present. This, of course, is absurd. So he maintained that the perceptual judgment is dependent upon the sense-datum in the following way:

It is dependent upon it in the sense that, if there is anything which is this inkstand, then in perceiving that thing, I am knowing it only as the thing which stands in a certain relation to this sense-datum.5

This is rather confusing for the defender of sensation can reply that his knowledge of the inkstand is

5Studies[SJP], p.233.
dependent upon some sensation; it makes no difference which way the word 'sensation' is taken. He could say:

... if there is anything which is this inkstand then that thing is certainly not given to me independently of this sensation ... .

I think that Moore has confused the question as to whether the apprehension of a sense-datum is necessary for a perceptual judgment with the different question as to whether a judgment about a sensation or sense-datum is necessary for a perceptual judgment about a material object. The confusion leads to his contention that the relation of direct awareness is a cognitive one and leaves him open to Ryle's objection. But if we separate kinds of judgment as we separated kinds of cognitive relation then there is no problem. The judgment to be passed is passed upon either the sense-datum or the sensation; what is expressed is merely the percipient's awareness of the apprehension of either. There must be either a sensation or a sense-datum for there to be an observation; there must be an awareness of the sense-datum or sensation which could be expressed propositionally for there to be a propositionally expressed perceptual judgment. Moore's argument does not show that a sensation cannot be a sense-datum; it shows only that a sensation or a sense-datum must be apprehended if a perceptual judgment about a material object is to be made. Once again Moore argues for Ryle's point. Their language differs significantly.
Moore says that he knows the inkstand "by description." It is the thing which stands in a certain relation to the sense-datum. This, I believe, means that one does not apprehend in precisely the same way an inkstand and a sense-datum. Moore is trying to distinguish between two sorts of judgments, one about such things as inkstands, and the other about sensations or sense-data. He may be wrong in calling the second sort a judgment but we can avoid problems by keeping the two sorts of judgment distinct. Macbeth described his vision and, in that sense, passed judgment upon it.

But then Moore did make the mistake which led White to say that Moore assumed that sense-data were objects. In discussing the coin example Moore said:

It will be plain to everybody, I think, that when I identify the one as "This one" and the other as "That one," I identify them only by reference to the two visually presented objects, which correspond respectively to the one and to the other. But what may not, I think, be realised, is that the sense in which I identify them by reference to the corresponding sense-data, is one which involves that every judgment which I make about the one is a judgment about the sense-datum which corresponds to it, and every judgment I make about the other, a judgment which corresponds to it: I simply cannot make a judgment about either which is not a judgment about the corresponding sense-datum. But if the two coins were given to me, in the sense in which the corresponding sense-data are, this would certainly not be the case. I can identify and distinguish the two sense-data
directly, this as this one, and that as that one: I do not need to identify either as the thing which has this relation to the other thing. But I certainly cannot thus directly identify the two coins.6

Perhaps it does not make any difference whether the ultimate subject be called a sense-datum or a sensation. But sensations are not usually thought of as "visually presented objects." Moore says that sense-data are visually presented objects. So we can see the basis for White's charge.

The passage also illustrates the same problem we met a moment ago concerning the judgment made about the sense-datum. But it is possible to read it as arguing (1) that one does not apprehend sensations and inkstands in the same way, (2) that one makes judgments directly about sensations in the sense that he can give D answers, (3) the having of the relevant sensations is a condition necessary for a perceptual judgment about the coins, and (4) the coins cannot be directly identified for this would mean that they were observed without being sensed. Moore wants to describe the conditions necessary for the identification of the coin as a coin; so he has got to find a referent for the 'this.' That condition is satisfied by either a sense-datum or a sensation as propositions (1) through (4) above will show. I think that so

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far at least we could say that Moore's purposes would be served equally well if we replaced 'sense-datum' at each occurrence by 'sensation.' The force of the argument would not be lost. The reasons why Moore sometimes wanted to keep them separate he later gave up.

Ducasse’s criticism of RI reintroduced the topic of sensation. In reply to Ducasse Moore admitted that there is a class of cases for which 'esse is percipi' is true and finally subdivided the x in 'Rox.' Moore's example is a toothache which "certainly cannot exist without being felt." He went on to say that if a thing is directly apprehended it cannot exist unsensed and thereby suggests that 'esse is percipi' is true of all sense-data. The admission is made with a certain amount of regret for, after reading the Bouwsma piece, Moore would have liked to say that the sense-datum was identical with a physical surface. But he cannot say this if, like sensations, sense-data cannot exist unsensed.

The response to Ducasse looks as though it should finally subdivide the x in a clear cut fashion; but it does not. Instead of talking about the object itself Moore speaks of the adjectives which qualify the object, the x in Rox. Following Ducasse's suggestion he

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differentiates between properties and qualities. A property adjective can name anything whatsoever, mental or physical, while a quality adjective serves as a name for mentally dependent characteristics only. Thus the issue in RI was the thesis that all characteristics were qualities. \textit{Esse is percipi} holds for qualities but not for properties. But Moore then admitted that in RI 'blue' was used in two quite different senses, as the name of a quality and as the name of a property. Now that the distinction has been drawn Moore admits that the quality blue cannot exist unsensed while the property blue can.

The admission wreaks havoc with the Method of Selection for, given this distinction, there is no difficulty in saying that the property roundness characterizes the coin while the quality of being elliptical characterizes Moore's apprehension of it. If 'blue' is used in two different senses in "the glass is blue" and "Moore's apprehension of the glass is blue" the 'blue' expresses two different concepts. If the \( x \) in \( Rx \) is blue, say 'Bx,' the 'B' is now ambiguous. Moore still ought to address himself to the various statuses of the \( x \)'s. His most helpful remark still leaves the issue open to interpretative argument for he says:

And though, so long as we are talking merely of sensible qualities, there seems to be a certain plausibility in suggesting that when we see such a quality it may be related to
our seeing of it, in the way in which a "cut"
in cricket is related to our hitting of it,
all such plausability seems to me to vanish
as soon as we realise that any experience
which is a seeing of a visual quality must also
be a seeing of something which is not a quality,
--a patch, or a speck, or a line, or a spot etc.,
in the sense in which an after-image may be one
of these things. How is such an object as this
--the sort of object I am now calling a "sense-
datum"--related to my seeing of it? Any complete
account of how the sensible quality "blue" is
related to my seeing of it, must include an
account of how a blue after-image, seen with the
eyes closed, is related to my seeing of it. 8

There is an absurdity in suggesting that the after-
image, as sense-datum, continues to exist while each
and every characteristic it has, as qualities, do not
exist unsensed. Moore is not entertaining the possibility
that 'esse is percipi' holds for qualities but not that
which they qualify. He is, I think, in a rather confus-
ing way making the same point he argues for again in
VSD which is that, in White's terms, D answers must con-
tain substantives. He showed the same concern in 1952
when he corrected the lectures published as Problems for
he distinguished between the sense-datum and the charac-
teristics. We must be able to refer to after-images and
sense-data, but neither the bearer or the qualities

8Moore, Schilpp (REP), p. 659
exist unperceived. The problem of how one talks about the bearers is really the one which bothered Moore.

A quick review will tie these remarks about sensation together. Moore's initial discussions of sensation are tied to the act-object distinction of RI which is usually used to show only that it is not logically impossible for an object of consciousness to exist unsensed. Moore did not say that they did so exist. But by refusing to rule out the possibility he opened the door to some peculiar questions such as "Where are sense-data?," "Do sense-data have properties other than those which they appear to have?," etc. These questions are later either answered in the negative or ignored. The act-object distinction appears again in *Problems* and *SJP* (with a momentary lapse in *SSD*). Moore claimed to be worried about the possible assimilation of sense-data and sensations. When the argument of *SJP* is sorted out we discover that the threatened assimilation would blur distinctions which he sometimes ignored, as in *SSD*, and later abandoned, as in his reply to Ducasse. In short Moore has not demonstrated a positive difference between the sense-datum and a sensation and has, in addition, argued in a way which shows that one must distinguish between a sense-datum or sensation on the one hand and an observation on the other. Ultimately the distinction backing this up is that drawn between
see 1 and see 3 without which Moore—cannot attack the Mill-Russell view. If a sense-datum is not a sensation it is nevertheless very much like one.

Kinds of Object.--Our four critics have argued either that Moore assumed sense-data to be phantom physical objects or that he applied concepts to the sense-datum which are appropriate only when applied to material objects. There is some truth in the latter claim for some of the questioned contained in the earlier essays are peculiar ones later admitted by Moore to be nonsensical.

The claim that Moore took sense-data to be some sort of odd material object is much harder to defend. Part of the problem stems from Moore's habit of calling sense-data 'objects' and 'entities.' His careful talk about various kinds of object in FEW came after the bulk of the perceptual essays were published. We can, however, show that White's charge is without foundation.

In 1910, for the purposes of his lectures, Moore gave a rough definition of a material object as a thing having a position in space, being in no way composed of a sense-datum or sense-data, and being neither a mind nor an act of consciousness. The definition is not a good one for it includes such things as shadows.

The second defining condition is the important one for it is a simple denial of White's charge and a refusal
to sanction the Mill-Russell view in any form. But this denial has a consequence of a paradoxical nature. Moore introduced the term 'sense-datum' and then distinguished between sense-data and material objects. He then deliberately extended the application of the term in a hypothetical way by saying if any sense-data should exist unsensed they would not be material objects or parts of material objects. I say that this is paradoxical because the possibility that sense-data exist unsensed is what makes them take on the status of phantom objects and look as though they might be material objects. Moore extended the application of the term to show that the real difference between sense-data and physical objects is not necessarily grounded in the mental dependence of sense-data.

The 1952 revision of Problems adds a new condition to the definition of material objects: they must have volume. If a sense-datum were a physical object it would have to have volume and thus different sides and perhaps even undetected properties. If the sense-datum were thought of as a physical object then Ryle's infinite regress argument would apply. But from the very beginning Moore was anxious to distinguish two kinds of things seen, sense-data and material objects, as well as differing senses of the verb.
But now suppose that there are other sorts of object besides physical or material ones and that White meant that sense-data belonged to one of these other groups. Moore showed himself to be aware of this possibility in a number of ways and drew distinctions which allow us to classify rainbows, shadows, inkstands, and sense-data.

The simplest way of showing that Moore did not think that a sense-datum was an "external object" is found in his reply to Miss Ambrose. She thought that Moore used the phrase "external object" in such a way that it could not be taught. One could not, according to her, point to anything which was not an external object. Moore replied by showing one or pointing out what sort of thing a sense-datum was by getting the percipient to have an after-image. An after-image qua sense-datum is not an external object and one can, in a curious way, point at it. In any case Moore's reply shows that he thought the Ambrose argument from excluded opposites did not apply in this case because a sense-datum is not an external object.

A more complex exposition appears in PEM where

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Moore dealt with possible senses of the expression "things outside of us" which one might take to mean something like "external object." Moore thought that the phrase could mean "things external to us," "things external to our minds," or simply "external things." He thought these conceptions were different and attempted to show how.

The first sort of object which is not a material object is, like the material object, to be met with in space. The class of things to be met with in space is broader than that of the class of material objects for it includes such things as shadows and inkblots which are not physical objects. These things are to be met with in space, have spatial locations, but do not have volume. For neither physical objects nor objects to be met with in space is 'esse is percipi' true; and both sorts of object can be seen by more than one individual.

The second sort of object different from physical objects is presented in space but is not to be met with in space. Examples of such objects are the examples Moore used when talking about sense-data. The whole catalog of SSD appears again e.g. waking and dream-images, sensations and after sensations, double images etc. To these are added pains and toothaches. These things are presented in space in the sense that they stand in spatial relations about which the percipient may speak.
He can describe what appears on the left of his visual field and indicate just where his foot hurts. This is obviously the class to which sense-data belong. We might clarify the distinction between things to be met with in space and things presented in space by recalling the problem about the cognitive relation in which the sense-datum stands. One may make what Moore called judgments about things presented in space but he has no evidence with which to support the judgment. But when he judges things to be met with in space one may be able to use, for instance, yardsticks to measure shadows or he may get corroborating testimony from others etc.

Moore did not assume that sense-data were physical objects nor, I think, did he ever say that they were objects to be met with in space. There are two senses in which a sense-datum can be an object. It can be an object presented in space or it can be an object in the more esoteric sense of being something to which a reference can be made in a sentence expressing a true proposition. If the ultimate analysis of a perceptual judgment contains a true proposition the subject term of which names a sense-datum then the sense-datum might be called an object of reference. This latter sense is the one which leads White to say that the sense-datum is a linguistic entity.

Analytic Techniques.—Now that we have some idea of
the content Moore gave to the concepts of sensation and object we should look at the techniques he used in handling those concepts. The analytic technique is hard to describe for, as is so often the case, Moore's theory develops after his practice. In this instance I believe that what little Moore said about what an analysis should be is less helpful than is an examination of his actual practice.

We have seen, in different contexts, most of the various features of Moore's analytic practice; they need now to be consistently developed. In *Principia Ethica* Moore called for a real definition which indicates the parts of a complex and specified their relations. This is the kind of analytic definition in terms of which 'good' is indefinable. At the same time he worked on the parts of the 'esse is percipi' thesis and attempted to show that the complex called 'percipi' is made up of 'esse' and 'x.' He did not specify the relation between the 'esse' and the 'x' but did attempt to show that the x entailed the 'percipi.' This conception of analysis as a kind of division into ultimate logical constituents fades away in the later essays.

In 1905 Moore initiated the line which I believe, terminates in the clear cut distinction between meaning and analyses seen finally in DSM. Then Moore thought that Berkeley used 'exists' to express two
different concepts for he did not, according to Moore, use the word to mean the same thing when applied to perceptions and to that which is not a perception.

Moore thought that 'exists' expresses only one concept. He does not ask for the pieces of a logical complex called 'exists' but rather for the senses of the word. His concern for Berkeley starts with the claim that Berkeley equivocates and is thus led to deny the obvious truth that material things exist. By 1925 this claim is transformed through the Pickwickian senses objections into the explicit distinction between questions of truth and questions of analysis. Moore's technique at this time does not involve the resolution of a complex into simples but rather the specification of senses expressed by a word. How do we know that a Pickwickian sense has been given to a word? There is, as the name suggests, the oddity of the locution. But Moore was a little more explicit than this in 1918 when he spoke briefly about senses and analyses in SJP. He discusses the term 'material thing:'

And, if we agree to use the term in this sense, then it is obvious that no more can be necessary for the truth of the assertion that there are material things, than is necessary for the truth of judgments of the kind with which I propose to deal. But no more can be necessary for the truth of these judgments than is actually asserted in or logically implied by them.10

10Studies (SJP), p. 233.
The first sentence is true because Moore thought that when one truly claimed to see 1 something the seen thing had to exist. The proposition asserting the existence of the thing is entailed by the truth of the see 1 claim. If we say that a set of conditions C is necessary for the truth of a perceptual judgment J then, if J is known to be true C has been satisfied as J is sufficient for C. We may not know what all the members of C are but if we know that c is a member of C and J is true then c is true. The last sentence of the passage shows that in practice at least Moore took the c to be logically implied by J. One way, then, of showing that a judgment uses a word in a Pickwickian sense will be to show that some c entailed by the true J is denied by the person asserting J. Just what c's make up any G is a theoretic problem for which quite probably no general answer can be given. But each problem makes certain c's important. In this case the relevant c might be the contention that a material object exists when no one perceives it. Berkeley thought that contention either to be contradictory or meaningless; Moore thought it to be true.

But then how does Moore know that he and others have disagreed over the analyses of certain propositions as opposed to their truths? The other fellow acts as though he accepts the truth of the proposition--this is the point to all Moore's paradoxes--but he does not
accept in theory the entailments of the J in question. Or, like Berkeley, he may accept a c which Moore does not think follows from the truth of J. For Berkeley the c would be: the existence of the perceived object about which the judgment is made is dependent upon its being perceived by some one or other.

Moore's reply to Bouwsma's comments on DCS again emphasizes this view of analysis as the expression of entailments of concepts or propositions. His third goal of the essay has the entailment holding between the concepts expressed by 'see' in sense 1 and 'see' in sense see 3. That statement of tasks which Moore set for himself in DCS reminds us of the necessity of the binocular attitude.

VSD, the last of the perceptual essays, shows Moore operating in much the same way. The first line of the other essay having 'Sense-Data' in the title, SSD, claimed that the status of sense-data was ambiguous. The first line of VSD contends that the most common sense of 'see,' see 1, is a perfectly respectable one. Moore says that he once met a philosopher who claimed that he did not see material objects; Moore replied that the philosopher had unduly limited this respectable sense. The limitation, I suspect, took the form of denying a particular c, a statement entailed the use of see 1 in
a true sentence. Moore now wants to know how the word 'see' is being used in this common usage. His request looks like one for which some contemporary philosophers have called the logical grammar of the concept expressed by 'see' in its normal employment. Moore attacked the problem by using the Method of the Ultimate Subject again. In "That is a penny" he took the 'that' to be short for the definite description "the object of which this is a part of the surface" and then asked about the 'this.' Is it short for a description? To provide an answer Moore relied upon the Linguistic Method while simultaneously raising the problem about the object which looks different to two different people. The initial sentence should probably take this form: that which I now see is a penny. The 'see' expresses see 1. When the 'that' is replaced by the description the surface must be seen in sense see 2. We are willing to admit that whenever one sees a material object he sees a surface. So we admit that the concept see 1 entails the concept see 2. Now I believe that Moore wanted to show that see 3 is similarly entailed. So he must justify the introduction of see 3 which carries with it the sense-datum and sense-datum problems. To do this he uses the methods mentioned above and falls back on the after-image example as a way of explaining the sense of the entailed concept see 3. In this context ability to justify the
analysis dealing with the entailments holding between see 1 and see 3 is found as a part of the function of the methods.

VSD is a most curious essay which absolutely demands the binocular attitude. Perhaps we can now see why. I think that Moore works with two slightly different notions of analysis. His first model is Russell's theory of descriptions which, as the analysis of 'The author of Waverly was Scotch' shows, has an explicit existential proposition as a part of the analysans. The other model is a mathematical or geometrical one which carries no such existential implications; it is the one which Moore reveals when he states what he wanted to do in DCS. Whether or not there are any triangles if T should be one then T has its greatest angle subtending its greatest side. This is a proposition which follows from the analysis of the concept 'being a triangle.' When Moore spoke of the relation of entailment which held between concepts or propositional functions he often spoke in this hypothetical way. But besides the existential implication there is another important difference between the patterns of analysis. The Russellian analysis is always particular; the mathematical one is always general. And it seems to be the case that the sentences expressing perceptual judgments always seem to be particular. The
examples are of the form "This which I now see is an inkstand," "That is a penny" etc. In practice Moore's analytic technique operated on particular propositions and traced their existential implications.

Our best source for Moore's theory of analysis is found in his reply to Langford who raised a number of questions about Moore's technique. Moore replied:

If you are going to "give an analysis" of a given concept, which is the analysandum, you must mention, as your analysans, a concept such that (a) nobody can know that the analysandum applies to an object without knowing that the analysans applies to it, (b) nobody can verify that the analysandum applies without verifying that the analysans applies, (c) an expression which expresses the analysandum must be synonymous with an expression which expresses the analysans.

He also subscribed to the following conditions: (d) the analysans and the analysandum are concepts, (e) their verbal expressions must differ, (f) the analysans must explicitly mention concepts not mentioned in the analysandum, and (g) the analysans must explicitly mention the method of combination relating the concepts in it. A last condition, (h), holds that the concept analysed must not be mentioned in the analysans.

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12 Schilpp (REP), p. 663.
Conditions (d) through (g) are actually ad hoc ones adduced to avoid the paradox of analysis which, in essence, holds that the analysans and the analysandum are either the same or different. If they are the same then "X ≡ X" is a good analysis; if they are different then it is hard to see how the analysans can be an analysis of the analysandum. Conditions (f) and (g) seem to be reminiscent of the conception of analysis as real definition by division which we saw in Principia Ethica and RI. Condition (a) is poorly stated for we can obviously construct cases in which some one does not know the meaning of both members of a pair of synonyms and thus fails to know that the analysans applies while knowing that the analysandum applies. Condition (c) offers a harder problem for Moore did not suggest any criterion for synonymy. If we admit that the expressions 'A' and 'B' are synonymous and we know that, say, 'X is A' is true we would admit that, in normal cases, the conditions entitle us to affirm 'X is B.' This is, I think, what Moore wants condition (c) to guarantee. The theory does not answer the problem as to just which c's we are to put in the analysans so we still have to resort to the pragmatic solution.

The theory does not deal with demonstratives and is clearly hypothetical in nature. The concept 'being griffon' is as easily analysed as the concept 'being a
Neither analysans asserts the existence of griffons or brothers. This partially explains why Moore's theoretic account does not get at the problems besetting the analysis of a perceptual judgment. The passage from SJP, numbered 10, which we looked at earlier considers analyses of the proposition "material things exist." If we look again at the particular examples it becomes hard to see what concept Moore is analysing. The problem is seen most clearly in DCS where the argument goes this way. Moore says that material objects exist. The critic asks how he knows. Moore replies that he sees them. The critic asks Moore what he really sees. Moore answers "I see this" and "This is a hand." A sentence starting with a demonstrative always appears some place in the chain of questions. That is the sort of sentence which the mathematical pattern of analysis will not handle for we cannot understand which concept in the sentence is to be analysed. Some sentence of this form appears in the analysis because Moore wanted not only to argue for the truth of "material objects exist" but also to provide analyses capable of showing that conflicting analyses were wrong.

Sense-Data and Realism.—If there is a key to all of the sense-datum problems Moore's defenses of realism may uncover it. I shall now try to show why.
Moore's problem is spotlighted by a comment Ayer made in his contribution to the Cambridge symposium which included VSD. He said:

That phenomenalism has commanded so strong an allegiance has been due not to its intrinsic plausability but rather to the fact that the introduction of sense-data appears to leave no other alternative open.\(^{13}\)

Moore's manipulations of the notion of the sense-datum are best seen in this light for, as the methods show, he wanted to talk about sense-data and had ways of doing so. The essays also show that he is determined to preserve a realistic vision of the world. By this I mean that the world contains minds and bodies, space and time and that these things exist in a perfectly normal sense of the word. Moore has to worry about the relation of the sense-datum to the material thing for his world includes both sense-data and material things. He also wants these things to be independent of each other in the sense that material things are not to be created out of, analysed into, constructed from, or inferred to exist upon the basis of apprehended sense-data. For the sake of an example let us call the sentence "Moore's inkstand exists" the principle of

realism. The principle, or some variant upon it, is defended in a number of essays from RI through DCS and PEW. Moore defended it when he lectured in this country during the second war in the lectures published as "Four Forms of Scepticism" and "Certainty."

Moore's defenses of the principle placed him in the position of a man playing King of the Mountain for he is attacked from all sides. Different attacks require different replies. If we can sort out the attacks we may begin to see how the various defenses of realism make the binocular attitude necessary.

The first attack is the idealistic one. Moore's defense includes two counter moves; the one about the nature of relations need not concern us here but the other, concerning the nature of sensation, is clearly important. We must remember that this defense is logical, as opposed to factual, in as much as it challenges the necessity of the proposition 'esse is percipi' and to that extent breaks the argument of the idealist. If we remember that the idealist may be one who equivocates on 'sensation' we can see that the arguments against idealism are concerned with the senses of concepts and the logical status of propositions.

The second major attack Moore considered was the Mill-Russell view. It maintained that material things were composed of or constructed out of sense-data. As
a view about the nature of physical things it has the look of an empirical theory. Moore's objections differ from the anti-idealist objections by being more explicit about the Pickwickian senses attributed to predicates and 'exists.' In response to the Mill-Russell view Moore distinguished between questions of analysis and questions of fact.

The third attack is like the second only it shifts modes of speech; I shall call it linguistic phenomenalism. This time the analytic interest of the attacker is obvious as the linguistic phenomenalist says nothing directly about physical objects. But he maintains that sentences which mention physical objects can always be fairly translated into sentences which mention only sense-data. The Method of the Ultimate Subject, for instance, would be used by Ayer to show that there is only one subject of a perceptual judgment. Moore's objections to this view can be culled from his objections to the Mill-Russell view. He also replied particularly to Ayer's contention that there is but one subject. He didn't dispute the matter with arguments but simply denied it. The most serious charge that Moore could level against the linguistic phenomenalist is simply that he cannot adequately distinguish see 1 from see 3.

The distinction between the two kinds of phenomenalism is hard to draw precisely as one can see by
examining Moore's reply to the Mill-Russell view. Since the two are run together by both Moore and Russell, whose analyses of propositions, a theoretically logical procedure, often had distinctly ontological overtones the binocular attitude is needed again. I am not so interested in precisely where one draws the line between logic and ontology because that line may be drawn in different places by different people. I do however wish to emphasize Moore's defense of the Q1 thesis that material objects do, in the usual sense of the word, exist and his contention that the analysis of a perceptual judgment must refer both to a physical object and to a sense-datum.

The fourth and last attack is not so much of an attack as it is a series of problems arising out of the problematic relation between the sense-datum and the physical object of which it is a sense-datum. The problems may be found in the Lockean view. We know what Moore thought about Locke's position. But to keep his own views immune to his criticisms of Locke Moore had to consider the notions of scepticism, inference, and representation.

The essays against sceptical positions are later ones which, in part at least, I believe to have been written as a consequence of Moore's concern for the existence both of physical objects and sense-data.
The three essays most important are PEP, "Four Forms of Scepticism," and "Certainty." Although Moore's target in these essays is often Russell he does take a look at the kind of scepticism which results from a detailed scrutiny of the Lockean position.

If Moore did think in the way in which he is sometimes pictured as arguing—as waving a hand in the external world and claiming that since it is a material object it exists—the thesis that he was again merely defending common sense in PEP might be more palatable. But I think that the problem goes deeper than that; the Ayer passage with which this section opened underlines Moore's problem. If he admits that there are sense-data and maintains that there are existent material objects he must show how these objects are known to exist. What Berkeley did to Locke Russell might have done to Moore. The essays against scepticism show how Moore tried to head the Hume-Mill-Russell combine off at the pass.

Nevertheless Moore has got to face up to the problem of how he knows that his hand exists. The problem about the relation R, the recurrent problem, is really Moore's problem of justifying his knowledge of his hand.

From 1918 on Moore argued that one does in at least some cases simply know propositions to be true of external objects. But the essays do not explain the
process by which one comes to know about the world and may, in fact, leave the reader with a most confused picture of what seems to be an inferential connection between propositions like "I see this" and "This is a hand."

We can start by asking if Moore, a sense-datum theorist of some sort, is, in the traditional sense, a representational theorist as Locke was. Reasons militating against this view come from Moore's criticism of Locke; he insists that according to the Lockean view one might not know that a sense-datum had a source while he himself does know that he has a hand. On the other hand Moore said in DCS that there is a sense in which he is a representationalist. By this he means (1) that he does not directly perceive his hand, and (2) that he does perceive something which is, "in a suitable sense," representative of it. (1) can be explained in two ways. If Moore is so using the notion of direct perception that only sensations are directly perceived then it is clear that, as opposed to the Mill-Russell view, his hand is not a sensation or a group of actual or possible sensations. Or (1) could be explained by invoking the volume filling property of material things. Moore did not simultaneously perceive all the surfaces of his hand and consequently differentiated see 1 from see 2. Even if sense-data were identical with physical surfaces
and we did not, in cases of veridical perception, differentiate between see 2 and see 3 these senses would still be distinct from see 1. When Moore says that he does not see his hand directly he does not imply that there is no sense in which he sees his hand.

(2) might be explained in a similar fashion. If sense-data were numerically identical with physical surfaces then the seen thing which represents the object to Moore would be its surface. This is, perhaps, the reason which inclined him to think that the relation R was one of identity. But suppose that the sense-datum is not identical with the surface which is, of course, not identical with the object. The ensuing problem does not arise in DCS where Moore used the phrase "representative theory of perception" for he thought that the surface represented the object. On the other hand the Method of Restriction demands that the sense-datum engage in some kind of representing activity. Now there seem to be two sorts of representation. When Moore uses the term he talks about the relation between the surface and the object. The other sort, holding between the sense-datum and the surface, is not called "representation" but, according to some of the methods, it would have to be. I do not think that Moore found a clear way out of this difficulty; as opposed to Locke he did say that he saw the object. His knowledge of material things does not involve a move
from the seen to the unseen. Consequently if there is a relation of representation between the sense-datum and the surface it is not a relation which justifies an inference. The inference is unnecessary because Moore sees the source.

To this extent the notion of representation is involved in the perceptual essays. If we ask how one passes from a see 2 statement to the appropriate see 1 statement there is another kind of problem. Moore claimed that a true see 1 statement entailed a proposition asserting the existence of the object seen 1. He claimed to know, on the basis of seeing it to be so, that a particular object existed and had a particular property. Is this knowledge really, after all, inferential? It is admitted to be indirect.

The notion of inference is being put to two different uses here; it is important to keep them distinct. In what sense might perception be inferential? Moore thought that there was a perfectly respectable sense in which one sees, as opposed to "merely inferring," that something is the case. But in SJP he found that he could not, except by example, distinguish between judgments based on perception and those based on inference. If, for instance, I claim that the animal I see in the field is a sheep and it turns out to be one I am
justified. But if what Moore called my "perceptual judgment" turns out to be false then, of course, I did not see the sheep since "I cannot possibly see a thing to be a sheep unless it is one." He wants to distinguish between cases in which I know the animal is a sheep because I see it to be one and cases in which I inferentially conclude that it is a sheep because, for instance, all the other animals in the field are seen to be sheep and I know that this is a sheep farm.

But suppose that perceptual judging is somehow inferential in a way which differs from that exemplified above? I am not sure how this question could be answered. Moore did use the phrase "the evidence of the senses" in a way which suggested that one passes from the evidence to the judgment. In normal cases when one sees 3 he sees 2 and thus sees 1. But again there are two different problems. Moore was not interested in the physiological problem of getting from the sensation to the observation but was most interested in the logical questions concerning the analytic connections between the concepts of sensation and observation. How the transition from sensation to observation happens is a physiological question; that it happens Moore claims to know; how it is to be logically explained is the question he raises. It is logically necessary that when I mistake a pig for a sheep I have
not made a correct perceptual judgment; the question as to the distinction between perceptual judgments and inferences which require some seeing may be a question for a psychologist.

The issue can be put another way. If one asks what is necessary for the truth of a perceptual judgment he is, Moore thought, asking what is "actually asserted in or logically implied by" the judgment. The making of a perceptual judgment does imply certain things about the physiological status of the observer; but the making of this particular judgment has certain specific implications. These are the ones in which Moore is interested.

Moore has got to steer a course between Locke and Russell. Against Locke he must say that his knowledge of the external world is based upon non-inferential perceptual judgments. Moore saw that this is an inkstand. His analysis of the proposition expressing this knowledge must ultimately refer to a sense-datum. So he must argue against Russell that the material things which he knows to exist are neither sense-data nor are they composed of sense-data. It begins to look as though Moore has put himself in the position of seeing a cigarette case, a seeming cigarette case, and a sense-datum. He gets around the absurdity by saying that one does not see all these things in the same way and makes this clear
by claiming that 'see' expresses three different concepts. Moore sees 1 a cigarette case; when he sees the seeming cigarette case he may be seeing 1 something which he cannot identify or he may be seeing 3 an hallucination. This reading is somewhat obscured by some of Moore's language for by contrasting see 1 with direct apprehension he encourages us to think that see 1, being indirect, is inferential. On the other hand by using 'see' in such a way that the word can take as direct objects names of sense-data and hallucinations the implication of see 1 to the effect that the seen 1 object exists appear to rub off on see 3. As a result we want to raise the odd questions which are not grounded in the methods. We must conclude that, in spite of his language, Moore did not think that perception is inferential in the way Locke thought it was.

Concluding Comments.—We have now seen why I said at the beginning that a part of our problem is found in the specification of the problems and the raising of the proper questions. The six methods differ from one another in significant respects as some of them take the sense-datum to be the ultimate residuum of an analysis while others treat the description of the sense-datum simply as a piece of visual phenomenology. One might believe that the methods introduce six slightly divergent notions of the sense-datum and not merely one. I should not want
to go that far for the proliferation of concepts would require that we be able to specify the characteristics in terms of which the concepts differ. The methods are simply not sufficiently precise to permit such discrimination. That lack of precision, however, does make possible a certain kind of confusion creating some of the critical comments directed against Moore's exposition. We should distinguish between the concepts of the sense-datum introduced by the methods and those manufactured by the reader who pays more attention to some of the questions Moore later admitted to be nonsense. Questions like "Do sense-data exist unsensed?" and "Do they have properties other than those they appear to have?" may allow the reader to construct for himself the notion of the sense-datum as a phantom object. That notion is not one supported by a careful reading of the texts.

On the other hand it is now quite clear that we must separate two sorts of claim Moore made about sense-data and, to that extent, consider two rather different conceptions of the sense-datum. The first of these construes the sense-datum as a piece of directly apprehended visual experience; the second takes the sense-datum to be a referent necessary for a certain kind of analysis of perceptual judgments.
I should be delighted if I could claim that Moore began the essays with the first conception and either argued for or assumed the existence of sense-data and then gradually switched to the conception of the sense-datum as analytic residuum. But the texts show that this is not the way in which the notion evolved. Moore's analyses did become more explicit and precise. But his favored pattern of analysis crossed the distinction between Q1 and Q2 questions. Perhaps if he had talked simply about the senses of 'see' Moore could have analysed the concepts necessary for an explanation of visual perception in the mathematical way. He could have said that propositional functions using see 1 entail similar propositional functions using see 2 etc. This is, in part, what the essays do. This is the facet of Moore's work which precludes much of Ryle's criticism for Moore's senses of 'see' do distinguish between sensation and observation. But most of the time Moore used the Russellian pattern of analysis which demanded the existence of the ultimate referent. The binocular attitude turns out to be absolutely necessary if one is to understand the essays at any stage in their development. Since the problem has become so complex critics often consider only one aspect of it or attack only one method. That eclecticism results in a somewhat misleading picture.
The last problem which makes getting a firm hold on the whole corpus of the perceptual essays difficult can be seen in the chronological development of Moore's conception of the sense-datum. That development takes place in a curious and backhanded way for the methods, the positive and expository texts, are not repudiated. What happens instead is that Moore either answers or dismisses some of the questions which made the phantom object conception possible. He admitted that sense-data do not exist unsensed, that they do not have properties other than those they seem to have, and he simply stopped talking about their spatial locations. They are presented in space but are not to be met with there. I believe that this means that, for instance, the sense-data of the two coins are directly apprehended as standing in spatial relations the one to the other but they are, as it were, nowhere in particular in and of themselves. These admissions do much to weaken the phantom object conception and the attacks of those who, like Bouwsma, take the sense-datum to be a material or quasi-material thing.

Moore did leave two questions unanswered. He did not ever say exactly what the respect was in which all visual sense-data are alike. He provided the basis for an answer in REP when he said that saying that a thing is directly apprehended is saying that it is a sense-datum.
To say that all visual sense-data are directly apprehended is to say that the name or description of the sense-datum can figure as the direct object in a proposition which expresses see 3. So there is a logical respect in which all visual sense-data are similar. I think that Moore could not specify any experiential similarity because he thought that such a similarity should be seen 3. What is seen 3 can be described and, as White points out, what is seen 3 can be quite similar in terms of its visual description to what is seen 1. This is Macbeth's problem again. But there is something odd about asking what Macbeth's hallucinated dagger and an after-image have in common if the request is one for a quality which is seen 3. What sensations or sense-data have in common is no particular property or quality but rather their mode of apprehension. The, so to speak, material mode answer to the problem of similarity will be similar. 'Sense-datum' can be the direct object of 'directly apprehend' and all visual sense-data are similar in that they are all directly apprehended or, more specifically, seen 3. Ducasse's term "quality" may mark the same distinction for each and every visual sense-datum has qualities and only qualities.

The distinction may provide an answer to the other problem concerning the relation of the sense-datum
to either the surface or to the material thing of which it is a sense-datum. Since surfaces and objects have properties that relation relates a quality bearer and a property bearer. As such it is not independent of the percipient. The logical explanation of the relation is simple; it is the relation between I and D-answers. The experiential connection between the sense-datum and the surface, or the material thing itself, is the kind Ryle talked about when he said that we know that a round and tilted plate looks like an elliptical but untilted plate. We do learn how things look from different angles and we learn how to give D-answers to various Qw's. Moore did not see this way out of the problem because, as VSD so clearly shows, his request for the logical analysis of a perceptual judgment demanded reference to an ultimate subject. For this reason Moore might find Ryle's analysis incomplete. Since Moore's analytic technique does not always allow him to separate Q1 and Q2 questions he is pushed towards the phantom object conception.

What place, then, does the concept of the sense-datum have in the perceptual essays? There is no one place, there are places. In some the sense-datum is that to which reference is made at the final level of the analysis explaining what we know when we know that there are material things in the external world. Here
the sense-datum is rather like a sensation and Moore's account, despite obvious terminological differences, is more similar to than different from Ryle's. Sometimes the sense-datum is like an after-image or an hallucination. In these places it is that which is seen; it is the object of sensation when Moore means by 'sensation' perceptual experience. Ultimately I think that a sense-datum is a piece of a visual field which can be discriminated by the percipient from other pieces of that field by virtue of its different qualities. It is not, as White says that it is, a linguistic entity except in the sense that it can be referred to and described. It is not a material object but rather a facet of one's perceptual experience about which he can talk.

The one constant function displayed by the sense-datum in all the essays is as that which makes possible the discrimination of the senses of 'see.' If we ask why this is necessary or why we should not agree with White's contention that 'see' expresses one concept always only Ryle has a part of the answer. The implications of the proposition that states that Moore sees a cow are different from those of the proposition asserting that he directly apprehends an hallucination. Even White is forced to draw a similar distinction in a different manner. While Moore found the 'this' ambiguous
White implicitly finds any Qw ambiguous as it can demand two different kinds of answer. Moore knew that he must draw the distinction if he were to defend the real world against Russell's logical constructionism on the one hand and the scepticism lurking behind Lockean inferences on the other. The concern for senses arises before the perceptual essays which, through the concept of the sense-datum, helped to draw the distinctions more precisely. They also developed the problem of the analysis of perceptual judgments again in terms of the sense-datum. Moore knew that there was an external world and that propositions expressing that knowledge were true. But he had trouble explaining what he meant when he said so.
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