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THE FRENCH CONQUEST AND PACIFICATION
OF MADAGASCAR, 1885-1905

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of
The Ohio State University

By
Donald Dean Leopard, B.S., M.A.

* * * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1966

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I am only a woman. But if anyone tries to take this country from me and my people, then indeed shall I become a man, and I will stand with you and be as one with you to defend our native land.¹

Thus spoke Queen Ranavalona III, last monarch of a royal house which claimed sovereignty over the whole of Madagascar.² On that day—February 11, 1895—the French were already in possession of extensive parts of the island and were preparing their forces for a drive to bring all Madagascar under French colonial rule³ but, at the capital, Tananarive, 300,000 loyal subjects gave the hasina, a monetary payment connoting fealty, and pledged their support to

¹The Queen, introduced by the Prime Minister, opened and concluded the three hour meeting with short speeches. Bennett Burleigh, Two Campaigns; Madagascar and Ashantee (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1896), p. 122.


the Queen. Ranavalona III concluded the kabary\textsuperscript{4} with these words:

If this is indeed your word, and the word of the army, of the officers, and of all the people, you give me confidence with regard to the safety of our country. I shall also do my share for its preservation. I believe in what you say and mean. God bless you and bless us, and preserve our native land from all disaster and peril. So be it.\textsuperscript{5}

Queen Ranavalona's native Madagascar is geographically linked to the African continent by a modern geographer who notes:

The eastern two-thirds of the island continually calls to mind the country of the Great Escarpment, for their narrow coastal plains are backed by high, broken walls that give access through their beaches to the central plateau beyond. The central plateau likewise has many suggestions in it of the neighboring continent, especially of the highlands of Ruanda-Urundi. The western third of the country consists of a series of gently seaward-sloping plains and plateaus, 60 to 120 miles across. The island's coastline likewise carries more than a hint of Africa in it, for it is remarkably compact, badly off for deep sheltered water and navigable inlets, and therefore inhospitable to shipping.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{4}An assembly officially called to promulgate government decrees, etc. They were continued by the French after the conquest. Madagascar, \textit{Journal Officiel de Madagascar et Dépendances}, No. 14 (Tananarive, 1897), p. 142.

\textsuperscript{5}Burleigh, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 124.

However, the island does have one of the finest natural harbors in tropical Africa, Diego-Suarez, located on its northern tip. Unfortunately, it lies far from main shipping lanes and the much less-favored ports of Tamatave, Majunga and Tuléar have long been the centers of the country's commercial shipping.7

Madagascar, separated from the African continent by the Mozambique Channel, covers the area from 12° to 25° south latitude and from 43° to 50° east longitude. The eastern mountains vary in height, with some peaks attaining heights up to 9,144 feet. The plateau region varies in elevation from 2,600 to 5,800 feet. The rivers flowing to the east, such as the Mangoro and Mananara, fall so precipitously as to be unnavigable. The western ones, the Sofia, Betsiboka and Iopa, are more languid and thus play an important role in communication and transportation.8

Climatically, the island parallels adjacent African lands. The monsoon influence is dominant during the warm season from November to April. During these months the eastern coast is swept by strong easterly winds, occasionally cyclonic in force, bringing heavy rainfall.9 This

7Ibid., pp. 379-380.


so-called dry or "fresh" period lasts from May to October, but seasonal variations are more "rule-of-thumb" indica-
tions than exact schedules of climatic change. As the
map indicates, the antipodal lands are marked by low rain-
fall. The southwestern region is arid and comprises a
larger desert area than that of the northern extremity.

Vegetation naturally varies with precipitation. Although forests once covered most of the island, human
occupation and the "slash-and-burn" method of cultivation have reduced the sylvan areas. Dandouau contends that
destruction of these forests gave rise to a prairie vege-
tation which now covers over seven-eighths of Madagascar's soil.

If the island's topography has features readily
discernible on the map of the continent proper, the ethno-
logical chart is less clearly associated with the main-
land's. It was long assumed that an indigenous popula-
tion, the Vazimba, had existed on Madagascar. These peoples were thought to have been a pygmy tribe inhab-
itng the interior of the island. It was held that this group eventually became assimilated by migrants from
Indonesia.

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10 Kimble, op.cit., I, pp. 53-54. The vegetation, climatic and precipitation maps below were taken from
Ibid., pp. 56, 60, 66.

11 Dandouau, op.cit., p. 21.

12 Ibid., p. 28.
Fig. 1.—Average Annual Precipitation of the African Continent and Madagascar.
Fig. 2- Vegetation and Climatic Belts of the African Continent and Madagascar.
These immigrants had arrived directly from Indonesia and had settled along Madagascar's western coast, but were eventually pushed inland by Arab traders and slavers who established themselves there during the fifteenth century. Though the island's population showed evidence of Arab and Bantu ethnic influence, the cast of the peoples of Madagascar was said to be basically Indonesian or Polynesian. Of the Vazimba, Oliver notes:

There are numerous indications of the previous occupation of portions of the central highlands by an early people, whose graves are attributed to the Vazimba and Kimos or Qumos. These races are said to have been of low stature, with woolly hair, long arms, and cunning in the use of the bow and assagye spear, but ignorant of metals; in fact, some thing like the Bushmen of South Africa. Remnants of these aborigines are perhaps to be yet traced in the remote tribes yet existing in Western Madagascar, known as the Kalio or Béhôsy.

The existence of an indigenous people has not been substantiated by archaeological investigation, and present theory holds that, though fossils of long-extinct

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mammals have been discovered on the island, there is no evidence that Madagascar was populated in the pre-historic period. Indeed, in ancient times, it appears to have been an empty land.\(^\text{15}\)

If this supposition is correct, from where and when did its present inhabitants come? Earlier theories maintained that the Indonesian peoples arrived from Java and Sumatra from the second to the fourth century A.D. Supposedly, they left their homeland to escape unrest caused by Hindu invasions. This theory afforded reasonable explanation for the migrations and the pre-literate state of the participants.\(^\text{16}\) This explanation has been disputed by recent anthropological research. George P. Murdock states:

Dahl (1951) has shown grounds for assuming an especially close relationship between Malagasy and the Maanyan language of south central Borneo, and Dyen (1953) has corroborated this conclusion by the application of recent lexicostatistical methods. These indicate that Malagasy has been separated from Maanyan for


\(^{16}\)Deschamps, op. cit., p. 14-19; Murdock, op. cit., p. 208.
about 1,900 years, whereas from 3,000 to 3,800 years must be allowed for its separation from the Indonesian languages, such as Malay, Toba Batak, and even the adjacent Ngaju Danyak, and almost as much time for the separation of any of these three from Maanyan. If accurate, these calculations indicate the early first century as the approximate time of the departure from Indonesia—even earlier, of course, if the emigrants maintained close contacts from the homeland.17

If the estimated time of this migration is the first century A.D., did these emigrants sail directly to Madagascar? Murdock questions this. He believes that these outrigger mariners traded along the so-called Sabaen Lane connecting Malaya, Sumatra and Java with Formosa. According to his calculations, these Maanyan peoples sailed from Borneo to the Nicobar Islands and then to Ceylon, the Laccadives, the West coast of India, southern Arabia and finally to East Africa (Azania). Once there, in his view, they mixed with the Cushitic peoples, then settled there and later mixed with the Bantu who began appearing in Azania in the second-half of the first Christian millennium.18

However, Deschamps postulates two possibilities respecting the migration: 1. The Indonesian "proto...

17 Murdock, p. 209. The author notes that south central Borneo was never touched by the Hindu invasions and dismisses them as causal factors for emigration from these areas.

18 Ibid., pp. 214-215.
malgaches" found the northern or eastern coast of Madagascar deserted. They settled there and then began raiding the coast of Africa to procure slaves. 2. Having sailed from India, they sojourned on the coast of Africa where they mixed or made an alliance with Africans who later accompanied them to Madagascar. 19

Deschamps feels that the latter theory fits what is known of ancient navigation and solves all the problems of "proto-malgaches" arrival. 20 He, however, places the migration much later, and cites thirteenth century Chinese and Arabic references to the fact of Malgache presence on the island. Such sources reveal that Madagascar was the base of raiders who periodically plundered the Indonesian chain. From these references, he argues that occupation of the island did not occur until the time corresponding roughly with Europe's Middle Ages. 21

Evidence indicates that certain heterodox Shiite 22

21 Ibid., pp. 26, 39-41.
22 The Shiite sect is one of a large body of Muslims who reject the first three caliphs and consider Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law, as the first rightful successor; and who do not acknowledge the Sunna, traditional sayings of the prophet, as any part of the law.
Fig. 3 - Map of the Indian Ocean with Respect to the Probable Path of Migration to Madagascar.
Arabs from Oman, Yemen, and Azania moved to the island in the ninth century. Be that as it may, major migration to the island is thought to have occurred around the twelfth century when Arab and Persian traders appear to have pushed out the Indonesians, causing many of them to seek refuge in Madagascar.

Murdock's hypothesis of a twelfth century move from Azania to Madagascar fits the approximate time noted by Deschamps. Certainly, the Chinese and Arab accounts of marauders present on the island a century later add credence to the possibility of a "proto-malgaches" movement there during the Christian Middle Ages.

Since no definite date for the occupation of Madagascar can be established, how can one determine whether the Malgache came from Africa or from Indonesia? Linguistic evidence has been the chief tool linking them with an Indonesian origin.

Deschamps notes:

In contrast to the African majority in the ethnic composition of its people is the Asiatic character of its language, which is

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indisputably of the Indonesian branch of the Malay-Polynesian language.26

A study of extant tribal groups also yields answers as to the ethnic origins and compositions of the Malgache. On his ethnographic map of Madagascar, Bandouau locates approximately eighteen major tribal groups and several sub-tribes found in various parts of the island. Kent's ethnographic map of Madagascar lists sixteen major tribal groups, but Murdock notes only eleven major ones with numerous sub-groups.27 Murdock links the Antanosy and five other tribes where names bear the "anta" prefix, and classifies the Bezanozana with the Betsimisaraksa as one tribal group. His list is as follows:

1. Antaisaka (Taisaka, Tesaki)
2. Antandro [y] (Tandroy)
3. Bara
4. Betsileo
5. Betsimisaraksa
6. Mahafaly (Mahafali)
7. Merina
8. Sakalava, including the Antankarana, Antiborina, Antifiherna, Antimarlaka, Antimaraka, Antimena, Antimilanja and Vezu.
9. Sihanaka
10. Tanala
11. Tsimihety28


27 Bandouau, Manuel, p. 31; Kent, op. cit., p. 20; Murdock, op. cit., p. 217.

Fig. 4 - Tribal Map of Madagascar.
Fig. 5 - Tribal Map of Madagascar.
Extensive investigations of these tribal groups by anthropologists have led to the garnering of many facts bearing on the physical characteristics of the various groups resident on the island. Deschamps has simplified the myriad measurements and gradations and has postulated three physical types as embracing all resident native groups. The first is a brown, Asiatic, type. Nearly 44% of the Andriana and Merina people fall into this category, and 4% of the Sihanaka, the Tsimihety, the Tanala and the Betsileo have these characteristics. With the Antanosy this trait is noted in only a few chiefs of the tribe. The second is a black African type. The Africans are divided into those of "small stature" (Antaisaka or Antesaka) and the "very tall" (Bara). Fifty four per cent of the Bara are African, but this group is present in all the tribes of the island. In Merina, they are called Mainty and constitute about 30% of that region's people and 51% of the Betsileo group. The third is a mixed type. Their characteristics are light brown skin, woolly hair, medium elongation of the head (dolicho-meso-

29 See footnote 13. It is interesting to note that, while the French have shown most interest in the Merina and Sakalavé peoples, the American anthropologists have done most of their work with the Tanala tribe. See Ralph Linton, "A Neglected Aspect of Social Organization," American Journal of Sociology, XLV (May, 1940), pp. 870-86; R.L. Beals and Harry Hoijer, An Introduction to Anthropology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953).
cephalic), thick lips slightly thinner than the African, and a short flat nose. This category includes those people of the southeastern and southwestern parts of the island who have physical characteristics attributable to Arab and Indian influence.\(^{30}\)

The mixed group forms the majority in most of the island's social units. Among those peoples where the first or the second type dominate, the third category constitutes an important minority. For example, Deschamps notes that, among the Merina, the mixed element constitutes 26% of the population, that 44% of the Bara people fall into this grouping. From these observations he concludes:

The three types (perhaps only two) coexist or are mixed together in diverse proportions. The Malgache, therefore, is neither an African nor an Asiatic but a juxtaposition or a mixture of the two, a unique people and one of great variety. \(^{31}\)

This conclusion is also reached by Marie-Claude Chamba who holds that the complex mixture of ethnic stocks which occurred on the island has made it difficult to detect evidence of distinct racial types. She concludes, "The

\(^{30}\text{Op. cit., p. 18.}\)

\(^{31}\text{Ibid., pp. 18-19.}\)
internal evolution actually led to the creation of a new mixed type which is uniquely Malgache. 32

The classification by the Rhesus system, the RH factor, the presence of sickle cells found only in Bantu blood cells, and other factors, such as the Mongolian "blue spot", have lent credence to the argument that the Malgache are a distinct type created by the fusion of African and Asiatic elements. 33 Thus, the idea that the people of Madagascar were a mixture of Melanesian, dark skinned, and Polynesian, brown skinned, peoples of Oceania has given way to the view of a mixed African and Asian heritage. 34

Culture traits also provide an aid in the attempt to determine Malgache origins. The use of the flat-bar zither, an Indonesian instrument used extensively in East Africa and Madagascar, is an example used to show contact and borrowing. The mtepe, a sailing craft made of planks lashed together with coconut fiber ropes, and the double outrigger canoe, are two more items traceable to Indonesian


sources, yet found in use along the East African coast, the Comoro Islands, Zanzibar and Madagascar.\textsuperscript{35}

The East African trait of equating cattle and wealth is readily discernible in Madagascar. Oliver quoted Mr. Tacchi, a newspaper man and interpreter for the Malgache embassy to Europe in the 1880's as saying:

A Malgasy is taught from childhood to invest his money in oxen. . . . In fact, cattle may be called the ancient current money of the island.\textsuperscript{36}

A Malgache practice, the so-called act of "walking the dead," an annual occurrence when the remains of family ancestors are removed from their tombs and carried about for a time, is seen as an Indonesian trait.\textsuperscript{37} Wood carving, the use of bamboo and taro root and banana cultivation are practices found throughout Indonesia and Africa.\textsuperscript{38}

Fay-Cooper Cole finds remnants of a Malaysian stone age culture in the form of megaliths in parts of

\begin{center}
\textsuperscript{36}Oliver, op. cit., p. 174.
\end{center}
India, Burma and Madagascar. The author notes:

... [These] range from simple, roughly cut up-right stones to double rows of granite pillars. Some are of evident antiquity, some bear symbols and names indicating Hindu and Mohammedan influence; while some, as in Nias, Flores, Sumba, parts of the Celebes, and Madagascar, are still in use. 39

The megaliths of Madagascar, called aloales, are piles of stones heaped up on Malgache graves. Some of these aloales are decorated and topped with a statue. 40

Another culture trait is that of divine kingship, a central feature of Sudanic civilization. Oliver and Page succinctly describe this type of state:

The typical 'Sudanic' state was not feudal. It was not based on hereditary position and power of great families within the state. It was in principle somewhat nearer to a bureaucracy—a bureaucracy without paper, ink, desks or telephones—in which power was wielded by officials, who held their offices during the king's pleasure, and who could be transferred from post to post, promoted, demoted, and even destituted, by a nod of the royal head or a syllable from the divine mouth. Around the royal person circled a galaxy of titled office-bearers, as numerous as the economic organization of each particular state was able to support. The permanent offices were nearly always those of the Queen Mother, the Queen


Sister, and of a limited number of titled 'great wives' of the ruler. At the head of the administration were a few high officials, often four in number. From these depended a descending hierarchy of provincial and district chiefs, often recruited from the pages, sons or nephews of the great who had been educated at the royal court. . . In a very real sense, therefore, the 'Sudanic' state was a super structure erected over village communities of peasant cultivators rather than a society which had grown up naturally out of them. In many cases such states are known to have had their origins in conquest, in almost all other cases conquest must be suspected.41

This distinctive culture with its characteristic divine king has been traced as far south as Great Zimbabwe, the ancient stone city of Southern Rhodesia.42

Murdock feels that the Merina of Madagascar reflect this Sudanic pattern. He notes:

The despotic monarchical government of the Merina, however, with its territorial administrative organization, its specialized ministers, and especially the prominence of a Queen Mother and a Queen-Consort, unmistakably reflects a widespread pattern in Africa, perhaps derived ultimately from Pharaonic Egypt. Possible immediate sources in East Africa include the kingdoms of southwestern

Ethiopia and Uganda. If the political institutions of the Merina are basically African, then this people must have entered Madagascar from Azania, as we have inferred from other evidence, not by a special late migration from Indonesia. 43

The nature of the Merina kingship system and its political organization will be covered shortly. 44 It is, however, apparent that the linguistic associations, physical characteristics of the various tribal groups and the cultural traits noted above indicate that the Malgache are a people of ethnic and cultural complexity. 45

The exact time of migration to the island is unknown nor is there unimpeachable evidence as to the racial composition of the migrants. But evidence points to a mixed Bantu-Indonesian heritage. Whether these people arrived via Indonesia or Azania has not been determined though accumulating data seems to point to the latter conclusion. As early as 1613, a Portuguese Jesuit, Luis Mariano, concluded that the Malgache were a combination

44 For a full account of the Merina monarchy see P. Malzac, Histoire du Royaume Hova depuis ses Origines jusqu'à la Fin, (Tananarive: Imprimerie Catholique, 1912).
45 Deschamps, op. cit., p. 19; Chamba, op. cit., p. 193.
of East African and Indonesian stock.\textsuperscript{46} Though Malgache
origins have yet to be fully explored,\textsuperscript{47} we may agree
with Raymond Kent that, "Whatever archaeological
evidence may be found regarding the origin of the first
settlers, it is infinitely more important to keep in
mind that the present-day Malagasy cannot neatly be
grouped along racial lines."\textsuperscript{48}

Thus it will be seen that the country and the
nation of which Queen Ranavalona III spoke in 1895 was
African in its physical aspects, but evidenced cultural
and social features only partially African in origin.
Whether or not Madagascar was a mere confederation of
tribes or a true national state will be weighed directly
but, nation or not, it was certainly viewed as such by
the speaker at the Great Kabary of February 11, 1895.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46}Deschamps, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{47}Reginald Colby, "Madagascar, The Great Island,"

\textsuperscript{48}Kent, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{49}Hubert Deschamps, \textit{Madagascar, Comores, Terres
82.
CHAPTER II

MADAGASCAR: ITS INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Many African nations are engaged in what Paul Bohannan calls, "A desperate search for identity; an identity that has roots in many traditions and reaches for unity with which to face a pleasant and honorable future."¹

The Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) seems particularly blessed in this regard. As the British political scientist, Kenneth Robinson, states, "In Madagascar linguistic and cultural unity coupled with the fact that the Merina kingdom already claimed domination throughout the island at the time of the French occupation, provided bases for nationalism absent elsewhere."² The nature of this identity or unity and the institutions of the Merina kingdom will be discussed here. Though one may speak of indigenous institutions, Madagascar did not exist in a


²"Constitutional Reform in French Tropical Africa", Political Studies, The Journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, VI(February, 1958), p. 68.
vacuum. It will be fruitful to note, therefore, the influence of outside agencies in the island's internal affairs. For it is the clash and conflict of French interests with those of the Malagasy which help make the French acquisition of Madagascar a study of interest, and one cannot understand the nature of the struggle between these variant interests without some awareness of the ideas and institutions of the island of Madagascar and the Merina kingdom.

On August 10, 1500, Diego Diaz, a captain in Alvarez Cabral’s Portuguese squadron, sighted Madagascar. About 1500, Rangita, whom Dandouau and Chapus consider to have been the first Merina king, laid down the rules of succession for his descendants. These two incidents, Western contact and Merina expansion, constitute the dominant factors in Madagascar's history after 1500.

"The next three centuries brought to Madagascar trading posts, missionaries and pirates, naturalists and

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3Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 59; André You, Madagascar-Histoire-Organisation-Colonisation, (Paris (Nancy); Berger Levrault and C, 1905), pp. 1-2. The name Madagascar is thought to be a misinterpretation of Marco Polo's Madeigascor or Megelasia. It is believed that Marco Polo was actually speaking of Somali. Another theory is that the name is derived from a mistranslation of the Arab word Dzerzereh, Zanzibar. Deschamps, op.cit., p. 59.
agents of France, Holland and England." Of the countries noted, France alone maintained an interest in the area through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Because of the Napoleonic Wars, and later because of the missionary activities of English subjects, Britain again became involved in the island's affairs in the nineteenth century.5

From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Europeans generally confined their contact with the island to the coastal areas, and J. Faublée argues that Merinas society, because of its geographical isolation, evolved without notable European influence.6 While Europeans were dominant on the coast, the Merina extended their control over the central plateau. A cattle raising people, they were nominally under the authority of a king. In practice, however, the nobles, members of the Andriana clan, chose the king from their own ranks, and, in combination

4Kent, op. cit., p. 3.


were stronger than the monarch. The two shared decision making powers, and intrigues among rival groups made assumption of the crown a perilous undertaking. 7

King Ralambo (1575–1610) took steps to order the succession by dividing the Andriana into four castes, designating his children the only legitimate successors to the throne. 8 Also Ralambo is credited with making the monarch the focal point of the annual Fandroana, the festival of the Bath, and with elevating this family celebration of contact with the dead into a national day of commemoration capped by the ritual bath of purification taken by the monarch in the presence of the nobles. 9 This action, attributed to Ralambo, helped enhance the prestige

7 The Andriana, the noble clan, was made up of the descendants of the ancient monarchs and constituted the dominant, privileged class. Dandouau and Chapus, op.cit., p. 97-98; Kent, op.cit., p. 51-52.

8 The four castes were as follows: The Andriantombokipokoindrinda, direct descendants of Rolambo; the Andrianamboninolona, descendants of his nephews; the Andriaranando, descendants of his companions-in-arms and the Znadralambo, descendants of his by non-Andrianan mothers. Dandouau and Chapus, op.cit., pp. 97-98. See P. Malzac, op.cit., pp. 1-150.

9 Molet sees the Fandroana as a syncretic creation of Ralambo made up of a series of rituals commemorating the end of the dry season and the beginning of the rainy one as well as a symbolic ritual of contact with the dead. Molet feels that the practice of visiting the tombs, re-wrapping the corpses in new lambas (bolts of white cloth) is a ritual substitute for the ancient Malay practice of eating the dead. Cattle, he notes, were the substitute for the bodies of the dead and, after the ritual purification on the night of the holy day of Fandroana,
of monarchy, but Ralambo and his successors could do little to impose their will upon the nobles.\textsuperscript{10} During this phase of its development, J. Faublée sees Merinan society as a series of social units led by great families who counted their wealth in cattle and exercised authority over limited geographical areas. Below the ranks of the disunified ruling class, the lesser ranks of society were rigidly stratified.\textsuperscript{11}

Occupying the second rung of the Merina social strata were the Hova. These freemen were the traders, artisans, and cultivators and, as such, comprised a Merinan middle class. They were divided into two groups: the Menable, vassals of the king who owed taxes and labors to the royal personage and the Manakely, vassals of the lords, who owed a double burden of taxes and labors to their immediate superiors, the lords, as well as the feasting and orgies, usually involving the suspension of incest taboos, were indulged in by the population. The practice of the Fandroana, called by Europeans the Festival of the Bath, was observed throughout the island, but its celebration was most elaborate in Merina and its environs. Tananarive, the monarch's abode, was, of course, the center of the celebration, but even remote areas followed in varying degrees the elaborate ritual practiced by the Merina people. Molet sees this as the essential unifying feature of the Merina monarchy. Molet, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 9-43, 57-70, 197-198.

\textsuperscript{10}Kent, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 51-52.

general taxes and labors due the king by all the Hova. They were divided into six tribes and inhabited scattered villages in Merina.  

A third class, the Maintienin-Dreny or Mainty, occupied a midway position between slave and freeman. They too, were cultivators, merchants, traders and artisans free to earn their livings much as the Hova, but were burdened with the necessity of furnishing taxes and labor to all their social superiors. By the end of the eighteenth century, most of them had either risen to the ranks of the Hova or had been forced into slavery.

The slaves, constituting the fourth group, were divided into three classes: the Zagahova (Zaza-Hova), free-men who had fallen into debt and had been sold to meet their obligations; the Tsiarondahy, royal slaves; and the Andevo, prisoners of war and imported servile workers from the mainland. The latter were the most numerous and constituted a group from which there was no chance of mobility or escape.

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12 By the nineteenth century, the noble families were subordinated to the royal power and the Hova, the middle class, rose to positions of control and power both in the army and the civil service. Many Merinan with whom Europeans were in contact were of this class, and the term "Hova", a class designation, came to be used by Europeans as a general term for all the Merina people. Dandouau and Chapus, op.cit., 97-98; Kent, op.cit., p. 52.

13 Ibid.

Discussing slavery in Madagascar, J. B. Piolet notes that this institution, while common, was not practiced by all tribal groups there. It was structurally quite different from the bondage imposed upon transported Africans by Western masters in the New World. Most of Madagascar's slaves were well treated. Property ownership, the ability to rise in service, the maintenance of a home and the joys of family life were open to many slaves. Some of the royal ones rose to positions of power and prestige and the African slaves, the Olo-mainty, constituted a separate body with almost as many privileges as the Hova. Those working in the mines or as porters were naturally less favored. It is this latter group which Piolet calls "true slaves" and which constituted the bulk of the fahavalo, runaway bondsmen existing by pillaging. Piolet concludes that the institution of servile labor was, for the majority of bondsmen, "no more than a survival of ancient times and is sort of a legal fiction." The persistence of fahavalo bands testifies that this was obviously untrue for all members of the group.

Although the Merina people of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had a complex social organization,

15"De l'esclavage à Madagascar" Le Correspondent, CLXXXII (February, 1896), pp. 447-448.
they were politically too disunified to impose it upon other tribes with ease. Their neighbors, the Sakalava, were similarly organized, and were known as a restless, war-like people, unequalled as slave traders and cattle raiders and the terror of the central plateau's borderlands. 16

The Sakalava began their territorial expansion in the seventeenth century under the leadership of Andriandahifotsy, "the White Prince." This monarch was known to the Frenchman Flacourt who, in 1658, wrote of him as Loaye Fouchy, his Sakalava name. He conquered the west coast of Madagascar from Sambirano in the north to Onilany in the south. Between 1680 and 1718, Sakalava influence was extended to such a degree that Merina recognized their suzerainty and paid tribute to the princes of Menabe and Boina for over a century. This hegemony was not broken until Radama I, king of Merina, forced the Sakalava to recognize his authority in 1815. 17

It was during the period of Sakalava suzerainty that Merina society underwent transition from the era of


great cattle-owning family dominance to that of sedentary and fortified agricultural villages dependent upon wet rice cultivation.\(^{18}\) This new way of life led naturally to the development of an embryonic artisan industry and the beginnings of commerce. Trade was, however, limited by Sakalava control in the West. Tribute payments and commercial restrictions on trade imposed by the Sakalava upon the weaker Merina reportedly prompted King Andrianampoinimerina (1787-1810) to unify his people.\(^{19}\) Starting about 1787, this leader spent a decade struggling to subordiate the nobility to royal authority. By the end of the century, the king had unified his kingdom, reduced the noble lords to royal administrators and facilitated the spread of rice culture. Land became more important than herds and control of the former and its disposition was to be the basis of royal power in Merina.\(^{20}\)

Andrianampoinimerina succinctly stated his ideas of property by declaring, "The lands of the kingdom are...

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\(^{18}\) Dry rice cultivation had long been known in Madagascar, but the new form, introduced by the Arabs, prompted the change from a cattle to agricultural economy. Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

\(^{19}\) Julien contends that he built upon the work of his predecessor, Andriamasinavalona (1675-1710). G. H. Julien, *Madagascar et ses Dépendances*, p. 78.

\(^{20}\) Faublée, *op. cit.*, pp. 470-472.
mine." Not only the soil but the people's lives were at the monarch's disposal, and obedience to him was complete. Though legally the ruler held absolute title to the soil, in practice, land use rights were granted to his subjects.

The Merina king divided his people into six tribes and gave each group lands termed Xanim-Perenena. The tribes were sub-divided into villages, Fokon'olona. Within the Fokon'olona, the chief distributed parcels of land to the heads of households. These allotments, the Zara-Tany, were for the use of the family, while Le Tany Lava Vola were blocks of common land reserved for use by the whole village. The family units were held by the village in perpetuity; the chief could redistribute units, but the user of the land could neither will his rights nor sell them outside the Fokon'olona without communal permission.

Village life required joint undertakings, and regulations were laid down to insure co-operation. For example, the law ruled that, in a co-operative endeavor,

22 Ibid., pp. 22-23; Gustave Julien, Institutions politiques, II, p. 4.
23 Zara-Tany could be used for rice cultivation and fields so exploited were termed Herta. Herta cultivators, called Mitondra-Herta, were obliged to pay a vary, three measures of rice, annually to the king, and were liable for labor service. Macé, op.cit., pp. 25-35.
such as raising a house or tomb, beneficiaries of such mutual endeavor were obligated to reciprocate. If they failed in this, their neighbors were free to remove all that they had contributed. Cases were noted where the very foundation stones of a house were reclaimed because of the failure of one villager to return the kindness of his neighbors.²⁴

Andrianampoinimerina also set aside lands for the royal line and the nobility. The Terres Menable was acreage belonging to the sovereign but assigned to a noble as a fief. The aristocrats (Vodivony) in turn held lands which were parceled out to their vassals, the Menakely. The king also gave land grants for service to the crown. These were called Lohembin-Tany, and were free from impediments as to use or sale. They were sparingly granted by the Merina monarchs until the reign of Ranavalona I (1828–1861), who gave her Prime Minister, Rainiharo, huge areas encompassing whole provinces. All such lands, however, were held only under temporary right, and were subject to taxation and labor exactions.²⁵

In 1881, the Malagasy Code of 305 Articles regularized property rights and put customary ones into a

²⁴Ibid.
²⁵Ibid., pp. 45–54.
written body of law. This was done to protect the Malgache from loss of their holdings to foreigners. Article 85 stated that no land could be alienated to foreigners while Article 86 declared that, in transferring property, all parties involved must be named. Violations of these terms could lead to sentences of up to twenty years in chains.26

Essential to the idea of property and the core of the state's social organization was the monarchy. The king's control and the obedience he commanded, though circumscribed by custom, were as all-embracing as in any oriental state.27 Andrianampoinimerina had forged Merina into a unitary state, headed by an absolute monarch, served by nobles and Hova and resting upon a firm socio-economic foundation of village units.28 To insure the continued stability of this ordering of society, Andrianampoinimerina established a strict matrilineal order of succession which was scrupulously followed until 1897 when the French


Governor-General Gallieni deposed Queen Ranavalona III and abolished the monarchy. Thus, by the time of his death in 1810, Andrianampoinimerina had established the organization of the Merina state shown below.

Andrianampoinimerina's son and heir, Radama I (1810-1828), built upon the work of his illustrious father. In 1817, he signed an agreement with Sir Robert Farquhar, Governor of Mauritius, to abolish the slave trade. In return for this pledge, Radama I received surplus weapons from the Napoleonic wars and British military advisers. The king used this Western aid to burst the narrow bounds of Merina and to extend his control over the entire island.

With army officers came representatives of the London Missionary Society. These zealots established schools, printed a Malgache grammar in Latin script and translated the Bible into that language. From 1818 to

29 The king traced descent through his maternal grandmother, Rasoherina. This line ran out with the death of Radama II (1861-1863), and the succession went to the issue of the king's maternal aunt, Ranavalonjanjanahary, Ranavalona II (1863-1883) and Ranavalona III (1883-1897) were of this line. P. Malzac, op. cit., pp. 631-633.

30 Kent, op. cit., p. 53.

This was essentially a system of dual control, as can be seen from the following rearrangement:

Table 1. —Organization of Merina Government and Society.
1835, they worked assiduously to gain converts and educate young Malgache students. Between 1820 and 1830, an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 were taught to read and write their native language, some Christian conversions were claimed and 1,000 to 1,500 apprentices were trained by Society artisans in the building trades, printing and other skills Radama I found useful for his ambitious plans.32

William Ellis, the organization's long-term representative in Madagascar, speaks of the Anglo-Malgache agreement as follows:

These were some of the most satisfactory results of the king's alliance with the English, and the settlement of English Missionaries in his country; and although the advantage of so sudden and large an increase in fire-arms among a people very partially civilized may have been questionable, the substituting of legitimate and honorable commerce for the degrading traffic in slaves, the opening of the way for frequent and friendly intercourse with foreigners, the teaching of useful arts, the introduction of letters, with the knowledge of Christianity by which this was followed will cause the treaty between Sir Robert Farquhar and the king Radama to be regarded as one of the most important events in the modern history of Madagascar.33


33 Ellis, op. cit., p. 19.
Radama's successor, Ranavalona I (1828-1861), continued her predecessor's policy of expanding the Merina kingdom territorially—the success of their endeavors is readily discernible by a glance at the accompanying map. The Queen was not at all sympathetic with either westernization or Christianity. Missionaries were driven out and idolatry, trial by poison and sorcery were again openly practiced at court. Christian converts were forced to participate in these pagan rituals, and refusal brought torture and death.

Ranavalona's successor, King Radama II (1861-1863), halted Christian persecution but continued his predecessor's expansion program. He attempted to replace the tradition bound administrators appointed by the late Queen with young, pro-Western sympathizers. Radama's policies brought a reaction proving fatal to the young king. In

34 It was during Queen Ranavalona I's reign that King Tsiorimeka and the Sakalava chiefs ceded the islands of Nossi-Bé and Nossi-Cumba to the French. They also abandoned their claims to the northern and western coasts of Madagascar in return for French protection from Merina invasion. Des Fosses, op. cit., pp. 428-9, Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 155-7. Map taken from Deschamps, op. cit., p. 157.

Fig. 6 -Map of Merina Expansion, 1787-1861.
1863, an epidemic of convulsions swept the country. The victims of this mass hysteria danced, gestured, and fell into trances. When awakened, they claimed to have communicated with the dead and made dire prophecies respecting the immediate future if the monarch continued to associate with Westerners and to accept their alien ideas. As a result of this mass hysteria, Radama II was apparently assassinated by the court nobles. His successor Rasoherina (1863-1868), sought to find middle ground between complete rejection of occidental influence, the former Queen's policy and the complete acceptance of their influence which Radama II had pursued.36

Rasoherina instituted a laissez faire policy toward the missionaries, especially medical men, and the island became a favorite new mission area. By 1867, the London Missionary Society, the Jesuits, the Norwegian Lutherans, the Society of Friends and the Lazarite Order were all busily establishing stations throughout the island. This widening of their activities prompted the sombre Edinburgh Review boldly to announce that Christianity had triumphed in Madagascar. In an 1867 issue, an unnamed writer declared "... nowhere, in modern times, has Christianity so

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fearlessly and so successfully grappled with brutal superstition and heathen fanaticism."  

In 1868, the coronation of Rasoherina's successor, Queen Ranavalona II (1868-1883), was marked by the use of the Bible and Christian symbolism in the installation ceremony. The new Queen and her Prime Minister, Rainilaiarivony were, in fact, converted, baptized and married according to the rituals of the Methodist Church.  

Ranavalona II's Protestantism was viewed by an English Catholic publication as a victory of "Ingliss" over "Fransoy." The Prime Minister was quoted as having said that under the Catholic system, "... the least of my slaves may be a saint..." but, under Protestantism, "If we embrace it, we shall have the Gospel and the whole system in our hands, and it will enable us to become spiritual as well as temporal rulers."  

In 1869, Rainilaiarivony, with the royal family's permission, organized the so-called "Palace Church" with the Queen as head. This religious institution functioned as the official Christian church of Merina. With Christian-

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38 Faublée, op. cit., p. 484; Fouquier, op. cit., p. 270.  
ity of a sort the state religion, the government began the destruction of idols, the suppression of sorcery and the outlawing of fetishism. Polygamy was officially condemned and European modes of dress were encouraged and required at court functions. Tananarive was practically rebuilt in stone because the time-honored restriction which forbade such construction for all but the royal family was abandoned. 40

European missionaries were by no means satisfied by these developments. Agents of the London Missionary Society saw the Palace Church as an infringement of their rights. One of them, Reverend Louis Stree, reportedly stated, "We are expected to preach not the Gospel after the New Testament, but the gospel after the Prime Minister. . . ." 41 Catholics complained of persecution, alleged to range from beatings by local ruffians to pressuring Catholic parents to send their children to Protestant schools. They attributed their woes to the government's equating Roman Catholicism with French influence, and blamed British Churchmen as the instigators of their persecution. Protestants in general complained

41 The Month, op. cit., p. 8.
that their authority and influence were being limited as the Palace Church, piloted by the Prime Minister, gained more power and authority in both religious and educational spheres. 42

Though some Westerners might protest discrimination, many observers would have agreed with the Reverend Joseph Mullens of the London Society who stated "... it is a happy thing that, by improving and elevating the customs and institutions of the country on their old lines, the stability and safety of the nation are secured." 43

With modernization so entwined with Christianity and missionary contact, it will be useful to appraise the extent of this influence over the population at large. Basically, this poses a serious problem for demographic estimates vary widely during this period. In 1828, Radama I judged the island's inhabitants to number 4,000,000. Others, such as William Ellis, suggested 4,500,000 as a more probable figure. Mullens, writing in 1875, estimated the island's people to number 2,000,000 while Jean Laborde, writing in the same decade, suggested 8,000,000. In 1881, the official figure was set at 5,500,000. This count stood

42 Ibid., pp. 9-16; Fouquier, op. cit., p. 271-72; Faublée, op. cit., p. 484.
until 1900, when Governor-General Gallieni called for a census. This officially established the population as 2,244,876. Census returns were, however, suspect because of the huge area covered and the suspicion of chieftains, particularly among the Sakalava, toward questions posed by central administration officials. Even with a large margin of error, it would appear that Mullen's estimate of 2,000,000 people was closer to actuality than those of 4,000,000 to 8,000,000.44

In the mission census of 1881-1882, Msgr. Cazet, S. J., Vicar Apostolic, submitted a religious return of 23,490 Catholics, 4,493 baptisms and 57,415 catechists for that year. The report also noted that 19,098 students were attending Roman Catholic schools. In 1886-1887, a Protestant religious census, conducted by the London Missionary Society showed 230,418 adherents, 61,732 church members, and 97,891 students in the organization's 1,043 schools.45

Although the general census figures were doubtful


and the religious ones are subject to grave reservations, we can safely assume that a fairly large percentage of the population was, in some way, touched by the Christianization-modernization process inaugurated by Radama I and accelerated by Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony.\textsuperscript{46}

Involvement in the process did not necessarily mean commitment, and evidence abounds that external conformity was the rule. Fetishism was openly practiced, and superstition dominated the lives of the villagers. People went to the churches and became nominal converts to please their chieftains or to gain educations for their children. Even though many Christians had stood firm during the earlier period of persecution, the missionaries generally conceded that the Malgache was superficial in his adherence to the Christian ideal. Visitors to the island were contemptuous of the skin-deep nature of native conversion and were highly critical of the obsequiousness of the people toward authority while, in private, they ignored government decrees and continued their old pagan practices. Missionaries bemoaned the lack of sexual morality and the looseness of the marriage vows. Drunkenness was common and alcoholic revels, sometimes involving the population of an entire village, were facilitated by the flow of

cheap Mauritian rum into the villages despite government decrees supposedly regulating alcoholic traffic.  

The Royal Court, the center of westernization, was not free from criticism. Life and etiquette there were patterned after European models, but Queen Ranavalona III was criticized for her taste in $5,000 Worth gowns which, according to one reporter, she ruined by eating rice with her fingers and allowing grease drippings to stain her magnificent attire. The court ladies were noted dipping snuff in church, and lampoons were made of the solemnity of court functions. 

Reverend Sibree noted that the future Queen Ranavalona III, while still a student at a London Missionary school, refused to join in the hymn singing at services because she believed it


was the duty of her slave girl to sing for her. 49

The court's acceptance of Christianity did not bring an abolition of many customs surrounding the monarchy. The Queen was rarely seen by her subjects and spent most of her time in the complex of eight palaces making up the royal residence at Tananarive. Her personal residence, termed "The Eye of the Day," was "... a frame building, surrounded by stone verandas; a tree trunk, about forty yards in height, occupied the center of the reception room." 50 Once each year the Queen left Tananarive to spend a month in the sacred city of Ambohimanga, the site of the Merina royal tombs and the source of the supernatural powers with which the monarchy was believed to be invested. 51

 Critics who castigated the Malgache people and their monarch for religious superficiality failed consistently to investigate the persistence of non-Christian practices in an officially Christian society. The


51 Malzac, op. cit., p. 632.
Christian, and particularly the Protestant, concept of personal salvation through grace and the emphasis placed upon an individual's relationship to God were both quite different from the traditional local view. The Malgache believed in a Supreme Being possessing Absolute Truth, but God was too far removed to play an active role in the life of the individual or community.  

Since God was too distant to be interested in the actions of men, the morality of one's actions were determined by the community. For it was there that the link between the material and the spiritual worlds was to be found. The bodies of one's ancestors, resting in the family tomb, were the links with the spirit world. To be lost to the community, to be driven out, or to die outside the Fokon'olona and not be buried in the family tomb, was the Malgache equivalent of the Christian concept of Eternal Damnation. This explains why the tombs were kept sacred, protected and, in turn, became depositories of family wealth. The tombs were regarded as the protectors of the whole community.  

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In such a society, conformity to community standards is imperative. Richard Andriamanjato, in his study of Malgache customs and beliefs, notes that, in order to attain status and place in such a society, the laws and taboos of the community must be followed. Failure to do so would bring tsiny (blame or censure) and risk alienation from the community. One must, therefore, avoid fady, dangerous or taboo things. Foreign, unclean elements were fady and must be avoided, or, if they proved impossible, one must determine if tody, absolution, could be obtained after contact with fady. The Malgache believed that the chief must be obeyed for, in him, hasina (mana) was to be found. To disobey risked diminishing the chief's hasina and incurring tsiny for which absolution, tody, could not be given.\textsuperscript{54}

The Malgache had to ask himself, would a particular action, if taken, possibly bring tsiny? If so, was tody then probable? In discussing the effects of this moral code upon the individual, Andriamanjato states, "Most of the time he is caught in the strict necessity of minimal action to insure minimal risk."\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{54}Andriamanjato, op. cit., pp. 87-97; Arnold van Genep, Tabou et Totémisme à Madagascar; Etude Descriptive et Théorétique, (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1904), pp. 13-23, 47-76.

\textsuperscript{55}Op. cit., p. 93.
In such a social system, restraints were dependant upon an elaborate system of things to avoid, as fady. Not included as fady were intemperance and promiscuity. In fact, regarding the latter, the Malgache believed, "Fecundity is, most assuredly, the mark of divine benediction." William Ellis said of the Malgache, "Indissolubility does not enter into their concept of matrimony and their immorality is proverbial."

It is no wonder, then, that the mission station became a community center and the church service a social event wherein the Malgache participated in what Mannoni termed a "social masque." It was simply a pleasurable and enjoyable experience involving the whole community. Seemingly, the Church, at least in the minds of many Malgache, became a part of the community, and did not displace the old beliefs and practices.

If the Malgache converts to Christianity were not

56 Chevalier, op. cit., p. 46.
57 The Month, op. cit., p. 23. Death, as long as it did not mean alienation from the community, was not a fearful occurrence. They believed that, in death, the body embraces the earth, the spouse of "Zanahary" the Creator, and that life is engendered by absorbing the dead. Chevalier, op. cit., p. 64.
58 Mannoni, op. cit., p. 46. In describing his travels in Madagascar and his discussions with some of the chiefs and shamans over the Tulear region, Ralph Linton wrote, "In their eyes the old ways were not the best but the only ones." "White Magic", The Atlantic Monthly, CXLII(November, 1928), p. 593.
living what their critics might term "the Christian life", it was not because of moral weakness. For the Malgache was constantly faced with difficult moral choices within the context of his community-oriented value system. The inadequacy, if any, stemmed from the attempt to wed the new with old ideas. This matching process was valiantly undertaken by men such as Rainilaiarivony who attempted to speed change without bursting the old fabric of his society. Unhappily, the reconciliation of a communal, relativistic moral order with an individualistic and morally absolute value system was a task surpassing the capabilities of the Prime Minister and his missionary advisers. 59

In the secular realm, Rainilaiarivony continued the policies credited to King Andrianampoinimerina—the expansion of the Merina Empire and the development of a bureaucracy dependent upon the throne for appointment and prosperity to administer their Empire. In March, 1881, the Malagasy Code of 305 Articles, which codified the customs and traditions of the Merina kingdom into a body of printed law, also established the administrative and bureaucratic structure of the kingdom. The Queen, in theory an absolute monarch, was served by the Prime

Minister and the heads of eight ministries which directed the affairs of the state. In practice, the Prime Minister was supreme. Husband to the Queen, he was also Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Chief Adviser of the Queen and Chief Judge of the Realm. He presided over and directed the Privy Council, composed of the members of the eight ministries, which served as the Queen's advisory council.  

This centralization of authority was a source of jealousy in court circles. William E. Cousins noted that there was a great deal of private grumbling at the Prime Minister's one-man rule but added that "those who are most ready to grumble in private, will, in public, be perhaps the most servile of any." Surrounded by jealous courtiers and mindful that too rapid change might arouse opposition from

60 It had become traditional that the Prime Minister be the husband of the Queen. Rainilaiarivony had been the husband of Rasotherina, married her successor Ranavalona II and, outliving this Queen, married Queen Ranavalona III. Faublée, op. cit., pp. 470-72; G. H. Julien, op. cit., p. 78; Pierre Launois, L'Etat Malgache et ses Transformations avant le Régime Français, (Paris: Editions Domat-Mont-chrestien, 1923), p. 120-22. The ministries noted in the Malgache Code were Interior, Foreign Affairs, War, Law, Treasury, Education and The Ministry of Industry, Arts and Manufacturing. G.W. Parker, "On the New Code of Laws for the Hova Kingdom of Madagascar, Promulgated at Antananarivo on March 29th, 1881," The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, XII(1882), pp. 308-10; Kent, op. cit., p. 57.

traditionalists, Rainilaiarivony continued the task of increasing the efficiency of the state.\textsuperscript{62}

Modernization, however circumscribed, requires money and manpower, and by the 1880's, the tax and labor obligations of the average Malgache had become onerous. Beside the traditional fealty payment, the \textit{hasina}, a poll tax of one-eighth of a dollar per slave was levied against each slave owner; one-fifth of the profits from the sale of goods were payable to the state; and a house tax, reportedly the equivalent of one-eighth its value, was collected. One-tenth of all goods produced were due the Queen; this was in addition to the yearly taxes paid to the monarchy by land holders. A customs duty of 10\% on all imported goods was imposed at the ports, and the monarchy likewise received the fines established in court cases plus one-third of the sale price of persons sold into slavery for debt.\textsuperscript{63}

In the provinces, a capitation tax was levied upon each married person, and a charge in kind or its equivalent in money was collected for each field a family cultivated. Villagers were liable for work service (corvée) such as the maintenance and construction of roads and

\textsuperscript{62}Chapus et Mondain, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 394-8.

\textsuperscript{63}Oliver, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 198.
forts, the transportation of goods, ferrying service and a myriad of other charges to be performed by labor. Freemen were likewise subject to military service for which they received no pay and poor victuals.⁶⁴

The exact revenues of the monarchy were not reported by the treasury nor was an itemized accounting of expenditures made public. In fact, the economic situation of Madagascar was markedly different from that of any modern state. No government agency minted and circulated coinage. Instead cut money, fractions of silver five-franc pieces and Mexican dollars, were the standard currency. Cut money made financial transaction difficult. E. F. Knight, writing in 1895, noted that scales must perforce be used to determine value of given cut pieces. He states, "... [S] o much spurious cut money and so many non-current dollars introduced by Europeans were in circulation, that no transaction with a native could be carried out without long haggling."⁶⁵

⁶⁴Oliver notes that coinage was introduced by the Arabs and that Arab terms were consequently used to designate the various pieces of cut money. A dollar was called an abiary; a half dollar, a lobso; a quarter dollar, a kirabo and an eighth of a dollar, a sikajy. One-twenty fourth of a dollar was called a bdamene, named for the haricot bean. Ibid., pp. 208-9.

Banks were unknown and money was kept buried in the tombs. Oliver states that cash for one consignment of guns and ammunition, reportedly costing 50,000 Mexican dollars, was paid for in cash taken from Queen Ranavalona I's tomb. 66

The state of the economy was but one of the many obstacles to modernization. The Prime Minister's increased power had prompted jealousies and, by the 1880's, a rift had occurred between the queen and him. The Premier was opposed by hostile provincial governors, by intriguers who sought advantages for French and English interest groups, by traditionalists who opposed religious and social reforms and even by Europeans with their own peculiar axes to grind. The consolidation of Merina power was far from complete and, in fact, retrogression was noted by observers and students of the period. Custom collections were misappropriated, soldiers deserted their posts, and discontent over increased taxation and work requirements was evident in the villages. 67

The apparent lack of firm, central control prompted Hubert Deschamps to note that "The Malgache nation was

not a state, nor did it foreshadow a developing state." Indeed, Deschamps contended that the so-called Malagache nation was a mere confederation of tribes and that the Merina Empire was but a faint copy of a European state. He and Launois saw the long struggle for power consolidation as stemming from the advice of Europeans, particularly missionaries, unskilled in the techniques needed to erect and operate a nation-state.

In discussing Rainilaiarivony's innovations, Kent notes:

They were, without question based on European models, but in terms of actual function, they operated clearly within the customs, mores, and structure of Malagasy society. After years in power, Rainilaiarivony realized that administrative modernization was the only way to preserve Merina supremacy, already severely taxed by rebellions and corruption.

Centralization of administration and expansion had been the Merina monarchy's principal activity since Andrianampoinimerina's days. The Prime Minister had merely sought to modernize and expand an administrative structure, based upon village communities of peasant

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68 *Madagascar, Comores, Terres Australes*, p. 82.
cultivators, the Fokon'olona. This administrative superstructure had many of the attributes noted by Oliver and Fage as those of a "Sudanic Civilization."\(^71\) In the case of the Merina Kingdom, the process was far from complete, and, outside the central plateau area, Merina control was more apparent than real.\(^72\) Even so, the people of the central plateau were well on their way toward establishing a Malagasy state. Had not the French intervened, the Merina might well have attained that goal. Certainly, many Malgache had come to think of themselves as members of an independent nation.\(^73\) However, as Chapus and Mondain note, Rainilaiarivony and the Merina kingdom became the victims of the 19th century.\(^74\) Nationhood, when it at length came, was under other auspices than that of the Merina Empire. None the less, to quote the British political scientist Kenneth Robinson, the existence of such a kingdom "... provided bases for nationalism absent elsewhere in Africa."\(^75\)

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\(^72\)Kent, op. cit., pp. 57-8.

\(^73\)William Cousins, writing of diplomatic developments in 1881, notes, "There has always existed among the people generally, but especially among the higher classes, an intense desire to maintain their national independence." Op. cit., p. 153.


\(^75\)Kenneth Robinson, op. cit., p. 68.
The events which led to the French acquisition of the island of Madagascar, the protectorate, the conquest and pacification and the organization of administration of the island under the auspices of the first French Governor-General, Gallieni, will be the subject of the chapters which follow.
CHAPTER III

MERINA SOVEREIGNTY AND FRENCH TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

The French acquisition of Madagascar was a mere episode of the nineteenth century scramble for Africa.\(^1\) The justification for this action however, antedates the era of the New Imperialism, having its roots in claims established by early explorers, traders and colonizers.

From 1642 to the nineteenth century varied French Governments in turn had organized, financed and

\(^1\) The partition of Africa occurred during the period 1875 to 1900 and was part and parcel of the "New Imperialism" era of post-1870 Europe. Nadel and Curtis describe the causes of this resurgence of expansionist interest as follows: "Behind this second outburst of Europe lay revolutions in political and economic organization, in science, and in the attitudes of men about their place in the universal order. What was new about the new empires was not so much the amalgam of motives and methods involved but the metamorphosis of European nations and societies into far more complex and powerful units." George H. Nadel and Perry Curtis, Imperialism and Colonialism, Main Themes in European History, Bruce Mazlish (ed.) (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), p. 12. Lowell Ragatz, March of Empire: The European Overseas Possessions on the Eve of the First World War, (New York: H. L. Lindquist, 1948), p. 1. Also see Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961).
ultimately abandoned numerous ventures to colonize and commercially develop this island. Eventually, these intermittent contacts came to be construed by some Frenchmen as historic justification for their country's territorial rights there. Let us here delineate these historic claims and trace events arising from French attempts to press them upon Queen Ranavalona II (1868-1883).²

In 1642, Louis XIV granted letters of patent to La Société de L'Orient for the colonization and commercial exploitation of Madagascar. Two years later, Fort Dauphin was erected on the southeastern coast. The colony enjoyed a decade of prosperity under the direction of Etienne de Flacourt, Governor from 1643-1653. Repressive acts by his successors led to a native uprising and, in 1671, Fort Dauphin’s residents were massacred and the colony was abandoned. In 1686, the French Crown

assumed title to the island, a step reaffirmed in successive decrees of 1719, 1720 and 1725.³

In 1810, during the Napoleonic Wars, the British occupied nearby Mauritius (Ile de France) and Bourbon (Réunion). Bourbon (Réunion) was returned to France in 1816, but Article VIII of the Treaty of Paris (May 30, 1814) gave Mauritius and its dependencies to Great Britain. Sir Robert Farquhar, Governor of Mauritius, counted Madagascar as one of the latter's dependencies and took possession of it in 1816. Within a year, Sir Robert ceded Madagascar to Radama I, and, in 1836, King William IV confirmed this act.⁴ The French, however, contended that Madagascar was a dependency of Bourbon (Réunion) rather than of Mauritius and protested the legality of Farquhar's action.⁵

³Report of a Commission appointed by the Chambre to examine the request for credits to assure French rights on Madagascar. Journal Officiel de la République Française; Chambre des Députés; Documents Parlementaires, 7 July 1884, Annexe No. 2949, p. 641.

⁴French sources quote a British diplomatic note of October 18, 1816 wherein the British Government agreed to return to France its possessions on the coast of Madagascar. Ibid., p. 642. Its full text and other historic documents may be found in annexe A-J of Annexe 2949. However, King William IV confirmed Farquhar's act and a Malagasy Embassy of friendship and gratitude was sent to London in 1837. British and Foreign State Papers LXXIV(1882-1883), (London: Ridway, 1890), pp. 160-1. Hereafter cited as State Papers. Also see Colby, op. cit., p. 35.

⁵Annexe No. 2949, 48 p. 642.
The impermanent nature of French colonial endeavors on the island and the disagreement regarding the legality of Farquhar's transference of title call France's actual rights there to question. But she had other claims to the island. Some of the more important of these were the July 30, 1750 cession of Sainte-Marie to France by Queen Beti, ruler of a Betsimisaraka tribe claiming ownership of the northeastern coast of Madagascar from Foulpointe to Antongil Bay, and the July 14, 1840 agreement with Tsioumeka, King of Boina (Bueni) and the Sakalave Chiefs, which accorded France the islands of Nossi-Be and Nossi-Cumba, and conceded to her sovereign rights over Madagascar's west coast from Passandava Bay to Cape Saint Vincent. Other important territorial grants were acquired by the April 1841, protectorate treaty signed by King Tsimiarou, ruler of Ankara and its island dependencies, placing the island's northern shore from Cape Masouala to Baly Bay under French

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6 M. Catellani, Professor of Law at the University of Padua, argued that France had never occupied more than a small part of the island and that she had completely abandoned it by 1674. He contended that most of France's claims rested upon unilateral actions and that her protestations of legal rights on the island had no more validity in law than did the claims of James I's descendants to the English throne. In his estimation, international law recognizes occupation and effective control as the only valid basis for territorial acquisition. "Les droits de la France sur Madagascar et le dernier traité de paix," Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée, XVIII (1886), pp. 151-58.
protection. In 1846, the Vohemar chiefs of the north-eastern coast signed a similar agreement and, in 1860, Admiral Fleuriot de Langle of the French navy and M. Desprez, the Admiral's agent, concluded a series of commercial understandings with various Sakalave chiefs of the western coastal region.7

A glance at the map discloses that several fine anchorages lie within this area of French protection. Diego-Suarez, on the northern tip of the island, is viewed by George Kimble as "The finest bay on the island, and one of the finest natural harbors in tropical Africa."8 Diego-Suarez, large enough for a battle fleet, seemed an ideal strategic base for control of a large part of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and was considered well situated for a repair and coaling station.9 The opening of the Suez Canal, 1869, gave such bases added importance.10 Though at least one naval expert later discounted Diego-Suarez' strategic worth,11 French negotiators were most

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7Annexe No. 2949, p. 642. Texts of these treaties may be found on pages 645-47, annexes A-J.
10Deuschamps, op. cit., p. 183.
11Commendant Z..., "Un arsenal maritime dans l'océan indien: Diego-Suarez-Mayotte," La Nouvelle Revue,
Fig. 7 Area ceded to France by the Treaties of 1740, 1840 - 1841.
insistent that their claims be recognized by Tananarive. 12

The question of French rights was further complicated when, on December 29, 1862, Louis Napoleon's Government recognized Radama II (1861-1863) as King of Madagascar and, in 1868, acknowledged Ranavalo II (1863-1883) Queen of the entire island. Under the latter agreement, France received most favored nation rights. Article IV of the treaty permitted Frenchmen to lease land and engage in any commercial or industrial enterprise not forbidden by local law, while Article XI assured French property holder's heirs the right of inheritance. 13

LXIV (Juin, 1890), pp. 847-50. The author felt that the port was too remote, too unhealthful, and difficult to defend.

12 France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883), (1884-1886), (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1885-1886), passim. Hereafter cited as Affaires de Madagascar. The Malagasy disputed France's historic claims to portions of Madagascar. Ravoninahitriniarivo, Officer of the Palace and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a report to Lord Granville, Britain's Foreign Minister, dated December 4, 1882, noted that the kings, queens and chiefs who had deeded sovereignty over the area to France in the 1840's had enjoyed no valid claim to the territories involved. Each of these local rulers had been subjugated by Radama I by 1824 and were not the free and independent agents the French thought them to be. Furthermore, the Malagasy official contended, the areas in question were under the direct administration and control of Queen Ranavalona's Government. State Papers, LXXV, p. 160.

13 State Papers, LVIII (1867-1868), pp. 190-95.
The agreement was almost identical with those entered into with Great Britain on June 27, 1865 and the United States on February 14, 1867. However, Article V of the 1865 treaty between Great Britain and Madagascar included the word "purchase" regarding buildings. Neither the French nor American treaties include this word.

The 1862 and 1868 agreements between France and Madagascar seemingly abrogated any anterior rights. The Chambre commission report commented on this as follows:

In two circumstances, in 1862 and 1868, the French Government seemed open to the accusation of not having sufficiently taken to heart French rights on Madagascar. In the treaties concluded on those two dates with the Hova, the Imperial Government consented to give to the chief of the Hova tribe the title of King or Queen of Madagascar. This title, too benevolently conceded, was not considered by the French Government as an abrogation of the secular rights of France on the island.

The body gives no proof that Second Empire officials did not intend to abandon prior claims and, as one writer

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16 Ibid., LV(1864-1865), p. 21.
17 Annexe No. 2949, p. 642.
notes, Napoleon III, whom he regards as ill-informed on Gallic rights in Madagascar, actually renounced French claims by the 1868 agreement. Further evidence that Napoleon III had apparently abandoned all French claims acquired prior to 1868 was shown by an agreement entered into in 1853-1854 between the Fourth Earl of Clarendon, Britain's Foreign Secretary, and the French. It stated "the two Governments should maintain an identic attitude of policy in Madagascar and act in concert in the matter. ..." Clarendon appeared unaware of any reservations France might have maintained regarding the Merina monarch's sovereign rights over the island of Madagascar and, in 1882, Gladstone's Foreign Secretary, Granville, was

18 Paul Gaffarel, Histoire de l'Expansion Coloniale de la France Depuis 1860 Jusqu'en 1905, (Marseilles: Barlatier, 1905), p. 277. Some writers contend that the French granted only partial sovereignty to the island of Madagascar to the Merina monarchs, reserving the areas claimed by France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as those areas covered by the several treaties negotiated between France and the coastal tribes. des Fosses, op. cit., pp. 413-446; Hallez, op. cit., pp. 649-672. Catellini argues that this was a specious argument for sovereignty cannot be recognized under reservations which makes it nonexistent. op. cit., p. 156.

19 The agreement is quoted as an Anglo-French guarantee for the continued independence of Madagascar. Great Britain, 3Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1881), p. 1626. Hereafter cited as Hansard's.

completely ignorant of any extant French protectorate over the northern and western coastal areas.  

The French Government's attitude toward these claims is illustrated by the instructions Charles de Freycinet, Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent to the French Consul at Tananarive, M. Cassas in July, 1880. He then informed Consul Cassas that his duty was to make certain that French rights guaranteed by the Treaty of 1868 be honored. He instructed him that the Republic was not yet prepared to insist upon any rights which might have been gained prior to 1868 but that, in no case, was the French Government prepared to use force to insist upon their recognition. He instructed M. Cassas to extend his regards to the French priests of the Tamatave mission but advised him that, in spite of their

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21 In reply to a query from Sir Ellis Bartlett, Conservative Party Member of Parliament, regarding the nature of French claims, Edmond G. Petty-Fitzmaurice, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, declared, "The Foreign Office is aware of whatever rights can be said to exist between France and Madagascar." [Hansard's, CCLXXVII(1883), p. 801. In reply to a similar question, Fitzmaurice noted that the protectorate treaties of 1840-1841 had never been officially published by the French Government and that the British Government had known only of the 1768 treaty. Ibid., p. 1490. See the correspondence between Earl Granville and Viscount Lyons, British Ambassador to Paris and Minister Plunkett and Charles Duclerc, French Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. State Papers, LXXV(1883-1884), pp. 149-151.
claims of religious persecution, they could not expect preferential treatment. The Premier concluded by commending Consul Cassas for his close co-operation with his British opposite, Thomas Pakenham and urged him to continue that relationship and to emulate Pakenham who seemed to have mastered the technique of securing favors for his country by flattering and capitalizing upon the vanity of the Hova officials.22

This letter indicates that pre-1868 claims, the validity of which has been seriously questioned, had not been abandoned by Third Republic officials. Paris was not, however, prepared to insist upon them in 1880, but they might well serve as a "pretext", as Deschamps termed it, when the French Government was assured of support for a colonial venture.23

In 1880, the immediate problem was not that of prior claims but of the guarantees of the Treaty of 1868. The friction between France and Madagascar was engendered by a dispute over French rights to inherit property on

22 Cassas had become embittered by what he considered Hova insults and the disregard for French rights evidenced by Tananarive officialdom. He desired the Paris Government to take a firm stand but, instead, was told to eschew threats and to espouse patience and tolerance. France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914, 1ère série, III(Paris:Imprimerie Nationale, 1931), p. 184-5. Hereafter cited as Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914.

23 Ibid., Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, pp. 183-4.
the island: specifically, the estate of C. Jean Laborde. 24

The Frenchman, Jean Laborde, came to Madagascar in the 1830's, a destitute, shipwrecked sailor and rose to wealth and power by winning Queen Ranavalona I's favor. He became a peer of the queen's Court, took a Malagasy wife 25 and established himself as a large landholder and industrialist. His factories, such as the one at Mantasoa, produced a variety of products "... from cannons (some of which are historical treasures of the Malagasy Republic) to pottery, from soap to rum." 26 Laborde adopted Rakoto, Radama I's son, who, in 1861, became King Radama II. As early as 1854, Laborde had sent a letter to Napoleon III suggesting that a French protectorate be established over Madagascar. 27 Rakoto was converted to this idea and, after coming to power, signed a commercial agreement with France and gave every indication of desiring that a protectorate treaty soon follow. This move was abruptly halted on May 12, 1863,

24State Papers, LVIII, p. 191-3.
26Kent, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
when Radama II was assassinated by some of his own mini-
sters.28

Queen Rasotherina (1863–1868) repudiated French
influence and eventually cancelled Radama II's concession
to the Lambert Company which had been granted monopoly
trading rights in the northern part of the island from
12° to 16° south latitude.29 Radama II's death brought an
end to plans for a French protectorate and Napoleon III
now turned his attention toward Mexico.30

Laborde became French Consul and augmented his
wealth, but his influence at court was severely weakened.
He died in 1868, directing that his considerable estate
be divided equally between his nephew, Edouard Laborde,
and M. Campan, Chancellor of the French Consulate at
Tananarive. The estate was valued at approximately
1,000,000 francs. However, French Consul and Commission-
er, Baudais, declared that the Soatsimanampiovana con-
cession, near Tananarive, was worth more than that.31

28 Ibid., Des Fosses contends that Rev. William
Ellis of the London Missionary Society helped plot the

29 Lambert had been one of Laborde's associates
and a friend of Radama I. Ibid., Queen Rasotherina reim-
burged the Company in 1865 by the payment of 48,000

30 Des Fosses, op. cit., p. 437.

31 France, Archives Diplomatiques: Recueil Interna-
tional de Diplomatie et d'Histoire, 2e serie, VIII(Paris:
Librairie de Fechoz et Letouzey, (?) p. 75.
The right of inheritance was not immediately at issue but, when the heirs began building an addition to the Laborde factory at Ambohitsorihita, the Malagasy Government protested. On September 1, 1879, Premier Rainilaiarivony declared that the French heirs could not inherit the land, and offered them 25,000 francs as indemnification.32 His action was based upon the local custom that land could not be inherited in fee simple. The Queen's Government argued that Laborde had recognized this fact in a notarized statement of March 3, 1835, when he wrote, "I declare to have purchased the house of Razakamana for the sum of (110 dollars) 110 piastres, and not the land."33 Therefore, the Queen's Government argued, the 1835 purchase and the concessions granted to Jean Laborde were subject to the restrictions against direct purchase imposed by the practices and laws of Madagascar. According to these usages, the heirs had a right to the buildings but could not add to them or claim the land on which they stood.34

32Ibid., p. 76. For the Franco-Malagasy correspondence on the Laborde case, see the Malagasy Red Books in Oliver, op. cit. II.
33State Papers, LXXV, p. 166.
34Ibid., pp. 166-7.
Property inheritance was a subject of negotiations and discussion until the establishment of the protectorate in 1885\(^{35}\) and is considered by some writers as one of the major pretexts used by the French to justify the extension of their control over the island.\(^{36}\) The Laborde case, in itself, did not bring about a change in the French policy of diplomacy, and it was not until claims to the coastal islands of Nossi-Be, Nossi-Mitsou and Nossi-Foly and the northern and western coastal areas were threatened that French policy assumed a more ominous tone.\(^{37}\)

On November 16, 1881, Baudais, the French Consul

\(^{35}\)Articles VIII and IX of the 1885 treaty required the Malgache to pay 10,000,000 francs indemnity, which would be used to pay claims such as those of the Laborde heirs', and damages resulting from brigandage, etc., during the 1883-1885 period. \textit{Affaires de Madagascar}, (1884-1886), No. 57, p. 176.

\(^{36}\)A writer in the Andover Review claimed that the Laborde case was a pretext used by the Jesuits who feared increased Protestant competition, and by Réunion planters who wanted to exploit the Malgache labor. S.P. Oliver employed a similar argument while Hubert Deschamps felt that the Laborde case and the land law (law 85) were the principal causes of the extension of a protectorate. "The Negotiations between France and Madagascar," \textit{V}(January-June, 1886), pp. 410-411; \textit{The True Story of the French Dispute in Madagascar}, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1885), pp. 246-7; \textit{op.cit.}, p. 187.

\(^{37}\)The action of the French warship \textit{Le Forfait} was under the command of Captain LeTimbre, in removing the Hova flags from the northwestern coast, and the withdrawal of the Consul from Tananarive. \textit{Archives Diplomatiques} VIII, p. 182-8.
at Tananarive, reported to Léon Gambetta, the Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, that, in May, some of the Sakalave chiefs in the northwest, all of whom received annual subsidies from France, had journeyed to the sacred village of the Merina monarchy, Ambohimanga, to pledge their allegiance to Queen Ranavalona III, and that they had then agreed to display the Hova flag in the coastal villages. Though the event had occurred in May, Baudais had not learned of it until November. He wrote Gambetta that, while there was great doubt whether the Hova could effectively occupy the area, the erection of the flags, in itself, constituted a grave threat to French claims in that area. 38

On December 1, 1881, Baudais again noted the seriousness of the situation to Gambetta. He dwelt upon the growing British influence in Madagascar and the concomittant development of anti-French sentiment. He wrote that the Hova had violated Gallic rights by the promulgation of Law 85 and that, motivated by pro-

38 Baudais stated that the Hova Government posts on the northeastern coast were woefully understaffed (8 men at Vohemar, 6 at Diego-Suarez and 25 at Maroansetra). Due to the high desertion rate, he doubted that any new posts could be established and manned. Archives Diplomatiques, VIII, pp. 73-4.

39 Law 85 was one of the Malagasy Code of 305 articles promulgated March 29, 1881. G.W. Parker, op.cit.; This placed upon the statute books an honored custom of the island "by which all land was declared to be the property of the Queen and its alienation to foreigners was forbidden." Frederick L. Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the
British sentiment, they were attempting to destroy every
vestige of French influence as well as to abrogate
France's territorial rights in the north and northwest.\footnote{40}

This fear of growing British influence in
Madagascar was not without foundation. In 1881, Admiral
Gore Jones visited the island of Madagascar and was cor-
dially received by the Queen with whom he discussed in-
ternal affairs. In his report to the Admiralty, that
worthy commented upon the "mild despotism" exercised by
the monarch over her subjects, adding that he had assured
the Queen that Britain and France wished to see her in-
fluence spread "over the length and breadth of the
island."\footnote{41}

The official view of this formal visit, as set
forth by Under-Secretary Fitzmaurice, was that its pur-
pose was entirely complimentary, and that any views ex-
pressed by Admiral Jones in his conversations with the
Queen were personal and did not reflect the opinion of

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\footnote{40}Archives Diplomatiques, VIII, pp. 78-81.

\footnote{41}Hansard's, CCLXVII, p. 460; CCLXXVI, pp. 837-838.
his Government. Whatever the intention of the British, some writers have viewed the visit as instrumental in causing the Hova to occupy the coastal areas inhabited by the Sakalave and have attributed the move either directly to Admiral Jones or to British subjects close to the Hova Queen and Court.

William E. Cousins, a Methodist missionary and keen observer of the Madagascar scene, noted that British residents hoped for the establishment of a British protectorate. He likewise observed that the Jones visit was construed by many British settlers as a move on Britain's part to learn whether the Malagasy desired such an arrangement. He concluded by stating:

Whether this is a correct surmise or not is known only to those who are in the confidence of the Foreign Office, but it is an undoubted fact that neither in 1881 nor at any other time has there existed on the part of the ruling classes in Madagascar

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42 The Admiral's report was requested by Members of the House of Commons and was presented by Under-Secretary, Henry Campbell Bannerman. Ibid., CCLXVII, p.460; CCLXXV, p.480; CCLXXVI, pp. 837-8.

any wish to obtain British guidance and protection. . .44

Baudais's fears of growing British influence, whatever the merit, were taken lightly by Gambetta, who viewed them as akin to those oft-expressed fears of Baudais's predecessors in the Tananarive post, but he did take a serious view of the Hova move to extend control over the coastal lands. In a letter to Maurice Rouvier, Minister of Finances and Colonies, he noted that the evidence of Hova encroachments there were as yet only circumstantial and had to be substantiated before a more energetic policy was to be assumed, but if true, they constituted a serious threat to French and British trade on the coast of the island.45

On February 3, 1882, Consul Baudais wrote to Charles de Freycinet, the new Premier and Minister of

44 Madagascars of To-Day, p. 153.

45 Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1870-1914, IV, p. 221. On January 3, 1882, Gambetta sent a secret dispatch to Rouvier, for Lord Lyons, suggesting that the British and French send ships to occupy St. Augustine Bay on the southwestern coast, where French and British commercial establishments were being threatened by brigands. Ibid. de Freycinet evidenced a similar concern for Anglo-French co-operation. Ibid., p. 261. The Réunion planters and traders were particularly fearful lest Hova occupation of the coast mean the systematic collection of customs, and that their heretofore unrestricted trade with the Sakalave might be subject to regulation or even curtailed. The Times (London), February 10, 1882, p. 23.
Foreign Affairs, that Queen Bervouny of Marambitsy, had invited the Hova to establish posts on the western and southwestern coast to protect her from the attacks of her Aunt and neighbor, Queen Safy-Ambala of Souhalala. Baudais contended that Queen Safy-Ambala was recognized as the legitimate ruler of that section of the coast and that the niece was merely intriguing with the Hova to gain control over some of her relative's domain.  

Premier de Freycinet was characteristically reluctant to attribute coastal developments to a Hova plot and did not wish to use force to safeguard French interests in Madagascar. Throughout February, March, and April, 1882, de Freycinet reiterated that Baudais's assignment was to defend French rights not incompatible with the independence of the Hova nation, and that such defense was to be effected by normal diplomatic means. Although investigations conducted by Minister of the Marine, Jureguiberry, indicated that both Hova forces and Englishmen were present in the Nossi-Bé area, de Freycinet informed Baudais that the evidence of a Hova plot was insufficient to justify the use of force.

46 Archives Diplomatiques, VIII, pp. 85-86.
47 Ibid., pp. 81-89.
The French Premier's caution in tempering the alarm sounded by his subordinate was at least partially conditioned by political affairs at home. Ferry's ministry had been turned out in 1881 over French involvements in Tunis and de Freycinet did not wish to risk a similar fate by embroiling French forces in Madagascar. Though the home government was circumspect, even legalistic, in its view of Malgache events, Baudais labored assiduously to protect what he considered to be French rights against the encroachments by the Tananarive Government.

Through March and April, Freycinet did little

48 Schuman, op. cit., pp. 106-7; Dennis W. Brogan, France Under the Republic: The Development of Modern France (1870-1939) (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1940), pp. 224-27; Shepard B. Clough, France: A History of National Economics, 1789-1939, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), pp. 246-247; Thomas F. Power, Jr., Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), pp. 197-8. Power contends that opposition to Ferry's policy of colonial expansion has been overrated and that Ferry's three-time loss of the Premiership in 1881, 1883 and 1885 was rooted in his vigorous colonial policy in Tunisia and Tonkin. He states: "Actually both defeats were accounted for chiefly by growing parliamentary dislike of Ferry's domestic program. Parliament, like the public, was not pleased by the cost in men and money of the expeditions to Tunisia, Madagascar and Indo-China but it supported Ferry until it tired of his domestic policies and found a convenient excuse to turn him out of office in a seemingly disastrous military reverse in Indo-China." (The defeat of the French at Lang-Son, March 30, 1885). Ib id.

49 Archives Diplomatiques, VIII, pp. 81-96.
more than call upon Baudais to be more insistent in asserting French claims and, though the cruiser, Forfait was sent to Tamatave, no show of force resulted. The Consul's continued demands for recognition of French position in the northern and northwestern coastal areas, and the pressure he exerted to secure guarantees of property rights for Frenchmen, none the less served to antagonize the Merina Government. Baudais was successful in securing compensation for the loss of the French registered dhow Touélé (Toale), but the Hova bitterly resented payment of the claim.

Malagasy officials were also angered by what they regarded as French interference in the affair of St. Augustine Bay, on the island's southwestern coast. Though Baudais blamed the Hova for brigandage in that area, the Malagasy Government claimed that the Sakalave had raided commercial houses there and had killed two American

50 Ibid.

51 The Hova contended that the dhow Touélé (Toale) was carrying guns and ammunition to Mohammed-ben-Abdoalah, husband of the Sakalave Queen Bervouny of Marambitsy. In May of 1881, the Sakalave chiefs of Baly, Souhalala and Boina invaded Marambitsy and conquered it. They then intercepted the dhow and destroyed it, killing the Arab-Sakalave crew. Baudais insisted that the vessel was under French protection and held the Hova liable for its loss, ultimately an indemnity of 9,740 dollars (48,700 francs), State Papers, LXXV, p.168. This affair prompted much controversy and is considered by some writers to have been a major cause for French intervention. Oliver, op.cit., and the Andover Review, op. cit.
merchants. A force was assembled to chastise the brigands but the vessel scheduled to transport both men and supplies to the area was detained in Tamatave harbor by Captain Le Timbre, commander of the French ship Forfait.\(^5^2\)

Franco-Malagasy relations suffered further deterioration in May, 1882. Consul Baudais reported that the Prime Minister would not reply to his insistent notes requesting that the Hova flags be removed from the northwestern coast and, on May 13, 1882, after an audience with Rainilaiarivony, Baudais wrote that the latter would make no oral reply though he had thrice asked for a statement on this matter.\(^5^3\) On May 16, 1882, Baudais presented formal demands for the recognition of full property rights for foreigners and the removal of the Queen's ensign from the northwest coast to Foreign Minister Ravoninahitriniarivo. The Minister's reply of May 17 repeated Malagasy claims that the French had no rights on the coast because the treaty of 1868 had abrogated all earlier claims. This fact was implicitly recognized when, in 1874, a French merchant had been obliged to pay custom duties to Queen Ranavalona II's customs agents in that area, and the then

\(^{52}\textit{State Papers}, \text{LXXV, p. 168. The vessel's name was the } \underline{\text{Antananarivo}}.

\(^{53}\textit{Archives Diplomatiques}, \text{VIII, pp. 92-96.}
Consul for France, Laborde, and the Commandant of the French naval station at Reunion, had both ruled that the charges levied were legitimate and must be paid.\textsuperscript{54}

By May 31, 1882, rumors were rife in the capital that the French meant to seize the Queen's land, that invasion was imminent and that slavery would be abolished if the French conquered the island. Baudais reported that the French Consulate was under constant surveillance and that the lives of Frenchmen residing in the capital were being threatened. He asked to leave the capital and, in fact, departed the first of June for Tamatave, where he sought sanctuary for himself and his family aboard the Forfait. The dispatch, in early June, 1882, of a French warship to the northwestern coast to force a lowering of the Hova flags erected opposite Nossi-Be' and Nossi-Mitsou, further disrupted relations between France and Madagascar.\textsuperscript{55}

On the fifth and sixth of June, Chancellor Campan reported that a placard had been nailed to the door of his

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 179-80, 194. The latter incident occurred on November 29, 1874 and involved French merchant Camoin who refused to pay a surtax on the goods he imported as demanded by Commandant Faralahy, Malagasy Customs collector at Ampaunbitiky (Passandava Bay).

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 174-75; Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1870-1914, III, pp. 340-41.
Consulate, bearing a warning signed "The Foloolindahy" (The Army) and threatening the murder of Campan and the throwing of his body to the dogs. On June 12, Baudais ordered Campan to evacuate the Consulate and to proceed to Tamatave. The head of the Catholic Mission there, Father Gauchy, and M. Cadière, a resident French merchant, had been threatened in similar manner by the Foloolindahy. Actual violence occurred outside the capital. At Mitinandry, two and one-half days from the capital, the French manager of a Roux, de Fraissinet and Company coffee plantation, was slain. Information on this death was sketchy and the Malagasy Government attributed it to fahavaloa, runaway bondsmen turned brigands. 56

Further deterioration was forestalled by the July 1st announcement of Ravoninahitriniarivo, Officer of the Palace and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that a mission was to be sent to France to negotiate existing differences between that Republic and Madagascar. Baudais forwarded the information to de Freycinet on July 3 and, nine days later, the Premier ordered a suspension of all defensive activities in Madagascar during the time of the official visit. 57 The emissaries arrived in Tamatave on

56 Archives Diplomatiques, VIII, pp. 182-85.
57 Ibid., p. 186-88.
August 1, 1882, boarded the French ship *le Touareg* on the 18th and arrived in France October 4. With the departure of the emissaries, relative calm returned to the island. Baudais noted that the Hova were still raising flags along the coast but the French took no action to remove them.

The dispatch of a delegation to Europe indicated the growing realization of Malagasy officialdom that national survival was less dependent upon the legitimacy of their sovereignty over the island than upon the support their Government could gain in Europe to counteract the French Government's growing tendency to adopt a strong activist program as urged by consular officers resident

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58 The delegation was headed by Ravoninahitriniarivo and included Ramaniraka, Officer of the Palace and a member of the Privy Council, Marc Rabibison, secretary and French translator, and one Tacchi, whom Baudais referred to as an English missionary but who was also editor of the semi-official newspaper, the *Madagascar Times*. The latter served as secretary and English translator. *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.

on the island. In short, the future of Madagascar was to be decided in Paris, London and Berlin, with assists from Rome and Washington, and was less dependent upon immediate issues between Madagascar and France than upon the broader basis of the needs of international politics as seen by the Western Powers.
CHAPTER IV

FROM SOVEREIGNTY TO AUTONOMY

1882-1885

The motive prompting the dispatch of the Malagasy mission to France in July, 1882 was fairly specific—recognition of Queen Ranavalona II's sovereignty over all Madagascar. French claims to the northwestern and western coasts could be legally disputed, but long continued untrammeled commerce between Réunion merchants and the Sakalave coastal tribes substantiated Gallic rights in the eyes of the French colonials. In a narrow sense, much of the difficulty between the French and the Malagasy was directly attributed to the high-handed actions of the French Consul and Commissioner, Baudais,

1The Réunion planters and traders looked upon this area as the "nursing mother" from whence they received their food-stuffs and plantation workers. Réunion residents were concerned lest this area be closed to them. A correspondent for The Times noted: "It is feared that if the expedition referred to is permitted that all the ports of Madagascar will be closed to Réunion, and that Mauritius will make the French colonists pay for it. Hitherto the French have had unrestricted intercourse with the Sakalave and other Western tribes, who, they claim, are quite independent of the Hova Government." Issue of February 10, 1882, p. 13.

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and the naval officer, Captain Le Timbre. The latter had acted upon Baudais's orders in removing the Nova flags from the coast and in interfering with ships entering and leaving Tamatave harbor. Satisfaction on these points was sought by the Malagasy Embassy.

The Malagasy representatives arrived in Marseilles on Thursday, October 4, 1882 and left for Paris four days later. The coolness of the reception afforded them was indicated by the fact that Mr. Tacchi, editor of the Madagascar Times, and the English translator for the mission, was not permitted to accompany them to the capital city. The delegation was lodged in the Grand Hotel where it was afforded the honor of having the Queen's ensign displayed. Its members, as usual in such cases, were under constant surveillance from the Quai

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2 Thomas Wilkenson, a Tananarive resident, wrote a letter to The Times wherein he noted the Malagasy attitude toward Baudais and Le Timbre and accused the former of seeking to convert Madagascar into another French colony. Issue of September 6, 1882, p. 5. See Chapter III footnotes 51 and 52, pp. 81 and 82.


4 Tacchi subsequently joined the delegation in London. The Times (London), November 21, 1882, p. 7; November 29, 1882, p. 10.
d'Orsay and were limited in their freedom to receive visitors.⁵

Premier Duclerc had appointed three representatives to meet and negotiate with the visiting statesmen. Pierre Louis Albert Decrais, Minister Plenipotentiary and Director of Political Affairs for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed this group. Admiral Alexandre Peyron of the Ministry of the Marine and Jean Baptiste Billot, Minister Plenipotentiary and Director of Continental Political and Commercial Claims for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were his associates.⁶

The barring of Mr. Tacchi and the surveillance and isolation imposed upon the Malagasy representatives while in Paris indicated that the Duclerc Ministry was not overly solicitous of the delegation's national sensibilities. Newspaper reports quoting from "good authority" stated that, if the Malagasy emissaries did not agree to Gallic demands, "energetic measures" by French forces

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⁵M. Revoil, a Quai d'Orsay official, was attached to the mission during its Paris sojourn. Reportedly it was he who refused to allow a representative from the Madagascar Committee, formed in London November 15, 1882, to communicate with the Malagasy Embassy. Ibid.

⁶Peyron served as Minister of the Marine and Colonies in 1883 and M. Billot became Minister of War, 1882-1883. Archives Diplomatiques, VIII, p. 192.
would result. The conference opened October 17 but, in customary manner, only formalities were then exchanged. Duclerc evidenced a reluctance to make demands until Britain's position in the matter was clarified, and he urged Tissot, the French Ambassador in London, to keep the British informed as to French rights in Madagascar.

On October 23, 1882, the Malagasy delegation presented a note which opened with a plea for French generosity towards a young and weak nation. The campaigns and conquests of Radama I were recounted and the delegation argued that the annual payment of the hasina and the varirainventy isan'alomaina (a 720th part of a ten franc piece) by every person on the occasion of the Fête of the Bain,9 were indication of the Merina monarch's sovereignty over the whole island. The representatives maintained that the treaties of 1862 and 1868

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7 The Times (London), October 9, 1882, p. 3.
8 Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1870-1914, III, pp. 522-523.
9 The Fête of the Bain was held each year at the end of the dry, "fresh" season, usually October or November, and was the culmination of two weeks of preparation. The attendant ceremony entailed ritual purification, contact with the dead and homage to the monarch. Molet, op. cit., p. 10-16.
had recognized such sovereignty and expressed astonishment at French claims to the northwestern coastal areas. The note pointed out that, in 1874, the Queen's right to collect custom duties at Passandava Bay had been recognized by French Consul Jean Laborde.  

In a second note, the Malagasy representatives protested the payment of an indemnity for the dhow Touéle (Toale), but pledged to give 25-year, renewable land leases to French citizens; to pay the Laborde heirs a sum of 25,000 francs; to establish a neutral zone in the area of Passandava Bay; and to accord Gallic citizens the same mining rights as the Malgache.

The French replied by stating that Queen Ranavalona II had falsely assumed sovereignty over the coastal regions and rejected the concessions offered as unsatisfactory. The third Malagasy note promised removal of their national flag from the coast upon receipt and

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10 The verbal process of the conference was not signed by the Malagasy delegation and only the notes were published. Archives Diplomatiques, VIII, pp. 191-4.

11 The Malagasy representatives stated that the indemnity was paid because Baudais based the claim upon the fact that the Queen's Government had not afforded proper protection of French property on the northwestern coast. Thus, by implication, Baudais had recognized the monarch's sovereign rights there. The Times (London), November 4, 1882, p. 5.

inspection of the treaties France had contracted with the Sakalave chiefs, offered leases with renewal guarantees and ended with an appeal to French good-will for the continued progress of civilization in Madagascar.¹³

On November 25, the French replied to the third note by asking that the Hova Government agree to withdraw from the disputed area within six months of the receipt of the aforementioned treaties, reserving the right to replace Hova with French garrisons and demanding 99-year leases for foreign property holders on the island. A reply came three days later. The delegation stated that any cession of the Queen's territory was beyond their competency, but offered 25-year, thrice renewable land leases. The note concluded with a further plea for French generosity and compassion for a weak nation struggling to attain modernity.¹⁴

French reaction to the note was immediate and clear. Duclerc informed the emissaries that their offers were unacceptable and ended the brief interview with a curt good-day. That evening, M. Revoil informed the delegation that its flag was to be removed from the hotel. Discussions having been terminated, members of the Malagasy Embassy packed for their trip to London.¹⁵

The dispatch of the Malagasy representatives had evoked interest in Great Britain and, from August through November, 1882, a series of notes were exchanged between French and British officials. Since the delegation had been accredited to Britain, Earl Granville wished a clarification of French claims and expressed a desire to maintain a common policy with France regarding Madagascar. However, Charles Dilke, Under-Secretary of State, noted that, at a dinner held at Granville's home on October 27, the Madagascar situation was discussed and, he added "it was decided against my strong opposition to put no difficulties in the way of the French." Dilke further declared that, at the Cabinet meeting of November 28, he learned that the Members, particularly Granville, were fearful of the prospect of trouble with France over Madagascar. The latter's account of this meeting was

16 An example of this was the formation in London of the Madagascar Committee, November 15, 1882, a group which sought to lay the Malagasy case before the British public and, thus facilitate the Malagasy mission to Europe. Officers of this organization were Alexander M'Arthur, Chairman, G. Palmer, M.P., Treasurer and M. Chesson, Secretary. The membership list included a high percentage of clergymen, military officers and members of the House of Commons. Ibid.

17 State Papers, LXXV, pp. 149-153.


19 Ibid.
noted in a letter to Queen Victoria of March 9, 1883. He wrote:

The conduct of the French Government is as bad as possible. But, when the question first arose, the Cabinet decided that it was not a case in which this country could forcibly interfere between France and Madagascar. Lord Granville obtained their sanction to his and his colleagues saying nothing which could give security to the French Government on this point, and he believes that this caution has been observed by all those who were at that time present. . . .

It is a most disagreeable matter, and not unlikely to prove so to the French themselves.20

On November 29, Granville received a delegation from the Madagascar Committee asking for his Government's support of the Malagasy cause. He informed the group that the British Government could not interfere and would not play the role of an international policeman. He gave a brief history of the Anglo-French agreements regarding Madagascar; Palmerston's 1850 recognition of Gallic claims to Nossi-Bé, the Clarendon agreements of 1853-1854; ending with a statement that though he was ignorant of any French protectorate over the island's northwestern coast he did not wish to become an arbitrator of the Franco-Malagasy dispute.21

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Though Granville was not publicly enthusiastic about interfering in Franco-Malagasy affairs, and the Government seemed privately committed to allowing France a free hand in its dealings with Madagascar, public support for the islanders was not lacking.  

In Parliament, the Government was asked to explain the extent of British economic and political involvement in the island's affairs and was queried on the safety of British citizens resident there. Charles Dilke, Under-Secretary of State, replied to all questions with non-committal answers, indicating that the Gladstone Ministry had yet to frame a definite policy in that area.

22 The previously-mentioned Madagascar Committee was active in its attempts to sway Government opinion to support Madagascar and so was the Aborigine's Protection Society. These two pressure groups hoped to secure British or American arbitration of the Franco-Malagasy dispute, but they had little success. Gwenn and Tuckwell, op. cit., I, p. 539. A group of Sheffield religious leaders sought British support for Madagascar; Dr. Parker addressed the Anthropological Institute on behalf of the Malagasy; Admiral Jones and Mr. Kingdon arranged and presented a lecture benefitting the mission hospital at Tananarive and used the occasion to influence the large audience in support of Madagascar's independence. See The Times (London), November 30, December 15, December 17, 1882, and January 7, 1883.

23 The Government was queried by such Members of the House of Commons as J.N. Richardson, Dr. Cameron and W.H. Smith, all of whom were members of the Madagascar Committee and/or the Aborigine's Protection Society. The official replies were lacking in substantial information and Dilke could only quote the Consular Report of 1879 which stated that 250 foreigners resided on the island. The report failed to indicate the extent of trade, noting
Exchanges of notes between Granville and Duclerc, via their respective Ambassadors, indicated that the French were only concerned with the recognition of prior claims and were not interested in altering unilaterally any existing Franco-British agreements.\(^24\)

The Malagasy mission arrived in London on November 30 and were received by Granville the next day. The delegates sought an audience with the Queen which was ultimately accorded,\(^25\) and agreed to submit to the Foreign Secretary a statement explaining the nature of their negotiations with France.\(^26\) Duclerc, via Tissot, informed Granville that the Malagasy representatives had accepted the validity of the 1840-1841, but that the negotiations had failed because they had not satisfied the French on the matter of safeguarding property rights.\(^27\)

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\(^{24}\) State Papers, LXXV, pp. 151-3; Archives Diplomatiques, VIII, pp. 203-211; Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914, III, p. 545.

\(^{25}\) The Malagasy delegation was received by the Queen at Windsor Castle, December 12, 1882. The Times (London), December 13, 1882, p. 9.

\(^{26}\) State Papers, LXXV, pp. 153-4.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., pp.154-5; Archives Diplomatiques, VIII pp. 203-211.
A Malagasy statement of December 4 observed that the major factor in terminating the Paris Conference had been the French ultimatum of November 26, demanding that the establishment of a French protectorate be permitted. On the issue of property ownership, they noted their agreement to a liberalizing of land arrangements by extending the lease period to 75 years, but refused to countenance direct purchase. 28

In a note to Lord Lyons, British Ambassador to Paris, Granville observed that the situation could be settled if the French would agree to accept leasehold arrangements in lieu of purchase. This procedure was accepted by Britain and the United States, whose nationals had the greatest economic interests in the island, and he recommended that the French be induced to accept this practice. Regarding the protectorate, he indicated that the French had persuaded the Malagasy to agree to a temporary withdrawal from Dalrymple (Passandava) Bay, opposite Nossi-Be', but that when the document had been drawn up, the French had substituted for the temporary and limited withdrawal an assertion of French protectorate rights over the entire island. 29

28 State Papers, LXXV, pp. 157-163.
29 Ibid., pp. 164-7.
Duclerc, via Lord Lyons, insisted that the protectorate matter was not the point of difficulty, rather that it was the issue of leases. Duclerc seemed disposed to discount any idea that France wished to change Madagascar's status without consulting the British. He assured Granville that an agreement suitable to all parties would be reached provided "the Malagasy Embassy came back from London with the conviction that they would not be supported by Great Britain in putting forward unreasonable pretensions."\(^{31}\)

The Gladstone Ministry had no intention of supporting the Malagasy in their dispute with France and this became painfully and publicly evident when Lord Derby, appointed Colonial Secretary on December 11, rather injudiciously made public statements indicating that Britain had no interest in Madagascar and would not interfere in the Franco-Malagasy dispute.\(^{32}\) Dilke noted that, when the Cabinet met on the 15th, Granville was in

\(^{30}\)The Times (London), December 6, 1882, p. 5; State Papers, LXXV, p. 169.

\(^{31}\)State Papers, LXXV, p. 170.

a rage over Derby's statement, not because he intended to do anything about Madagascar, "but he did not like Lord Derby saying so in public. It spoiled his play, by allowing his French adversary to look on his hand and see how bad the cards were." 33 This report of Granville's attitude was substantiated by the Foreign Secretary who wrote to Queen Victoria "the renunciation beforehand of title or intention to interfere was a matter of regret." 34 Granville continued by stating that the matter was not worth the difficulty intervention might have engendered. He was particularly fearful lest British intrusion might enflame French public opinion and result in serious complications with the Republic. 35

In his round of communications with Duclerc, Granville had been brought around to the view that the lease situation was the cause of difficulties. In a letter of December 19, the Foreign Secretary volunteered to use his position to induce the Malagasy to resume negotiations in Paris. 36 He, regrettably enough, said

33 Gwenn and Tuckwell, op. cit., I, p. 540.
34 Queen Victoria had requested information on this subject. Buckle, op. cit., p. 415. Italics his.
35 Ibid. 36 State Papers, LXXV, p. 171.
that the British Government had no desire "to press their good offices upon the French Government." Mistranslation or pique caused Duclerc to assume that the British Government was adopting a threatening tone. Duclerc's caustic reply to the letter prompted Gladstone to note:

I have been much surprised at the churlish tone of Duclerc's answer to your overture of good offices. As his office cannot even write the word press it is no wonder they cannot translate it but he need not have growled about it when he must have seen that the intent was friendly. 39

Duclerc's feelings were soothed and good relations were restored, but the French Premier made it clear that future correspondence on the subject would lead nowhere. The Malagasy delegation had, in his eyes, assumed an untenable position and should "have no illusions as to the consequences of the attitude they have chosen to take up . . .". 40

The Malagasy delegation had failed to gain British support, yet, in some areas, accomplishments could be

37 Ibid., pp. 171-2.
38 Duclerc held that the statement was unacceptable to his Government. Ibid.
40 State Papers, LXXV, p. 174.
credit it. A new Anglo-Malagasy treaty was signed,\textsuperscript{41} and temperence organizations, such as the United Kingdom Alliance, were gladdened by the agreement regulating the traffic in rum from Mauritius to Madagascar,\textsuperscript{42} while the presence of the emissaries had aided in the recruitment of personnel for London Missionary Society posts in Madagascar.\textsuperscript{43}

In February, 1883 the Malagasy representatives sailed for America. There, the emissaries received the support of Henry Ward Beecher, the famous Congregationalist pastor of Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, who urged American intervention to preserve Madagascar's independence.\textsuperscript{44} In Washington, a new commercial treaty was ratified\textsuperscript{45} and the delegation was treated with sympathy and afforded

\textsuperscript{41} The treaty was signed February 16, 1883, \textit{Ibid.}, LXXIV, pp. 17-18.

\textsuperscript{42} The agreement was negotiated in January and February, 1882 and was signed on May 25, 1883. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 60; \textit{Hansard's}, CCLXXVIII, p. 603-604, CCLXXIX, p. 894.

\textsuperscript{43} The\textit{ Times}(London) reported that a boatload of these missionaries left for Madagascar aboard the \textit{Taymouth Castle}, May 12, 1883.

\textsuperscript{44} The\textit{ New York Times}, March 28, 1883, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{45} The treaty was signed on May 13, 1883 and was ratified ten months later. \textit{State Papers}, LXXIV, pp. 566-70.
hospitality by private citizens and officials alike. However, the American attitude regarding the Franco-Madagascar dispute was best articulated by The Nation which reported:

The American people are not at all anxious for a quarrel with France or anybody else. It may confidently be said that they care very little whether the Queen of Madagascar governs the whole of the island or only a part of it. They would like to extend their trade that way, but it is, after all, a matter of comparatively small interest to them. They may come to the conclusion that the French are all wrong in their warlike enterprises against the Malagasy but they are not at all inclined to undertake the task of setting right every wrong in the world.

The mission returned to Europe in April, consulted with Premier Jules Ferry, concluded new treaties with Germany and Italy, and then proceeded home to Madagascar. The support which Duclerc had feared the

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47 "The United States and Madagascar," XXXVI, p. 249.
48 Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883), No. 16-17, pp. 23-24. Mrs. Waddington notes that the delegation stayed in the Grand Hotel in May, 1883. She met the members there and they talked of going to Russia but decided against it. Letters of a Diplomat's Wife, 1883-1900, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), p. 10.
49 State Papers, LXXIV, pp. 716-718; LXXVI, pp. 301-2. Bismarck informed the French, via Count Hatzfeldt, that the action was taken on the basis of the most favored nation, and was not intended as an action against Gallic interests on the island. Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1871-1914, V, pp. 22-23.
Malagasy emissaries would receive from the Western Powers had not materialized.

Though many Englishmen might have agreed with Queen Victoria who asked, "Are we to let the French go on taking what they like with impunity?", the British Government turned a deaf ear to those seeking intervention in the Franco-Madagascar dispute. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, in their recent book, *Africa and the Victorians*, note:

In Madagascar, Granville's policy of appeasing France prevailed. The Cabinet decided not to answer the islander's appeal for help against French subjugation, and British missionary and trading interests there were sacrificed in an attempt to mollify France.

The Malagasy delegation's inability to gain support in the West prompted the French to assume a more activist policy in securing their alleged rights in Madagascar. On January 29, 1883, Duclerc was succeeded by Armand Fallières. Though the latter's Cabinet was in power only a brief time, Francois Césaire de Mahy, then

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50 Buckle, *op. cit.*, p. 115. These authors contend that this incident was but one of many designed to placate the French over the Suez issue.

51 *op. cit.*, p. 217.

52 *State Papers* LXAV, p. 174.
Minister of Marine and Colonies, directed Admiral Pierre commanding the Indian Ocean Division of the French Navy to deploy his ships to protect national interests in northwestern Madagascar. These orders were supplemented by Charles Brun, Minister of Marine in Jules Ferry's second ministry. He directed Pierre to secure the coast from Majunga in the west to Antongil Bay in the east; to destroy all Hova posts in the area and to occupy Majunga. Upon completion of this action, an ultimatum was to be tendered the Queen's Government. This would order Queen Ranavalona II to (1) recognize French protectorate rights on the coast; (2) guarantee the right of property ownership to the island's French landholders; and (3) pay an indemnity of 1,000,000 francs to France. If the Queen failed to comply, the Admiral was instructed to bombard and seize Tamatave and to establish French

53 Fallières lost the Premiership February 21, 1883. Affaires de Madagascar (1882-1883), No. 3 (February 11, 1883), pp. 4-5.

54 Ibid., No. 5 (March 17, 1883), pp. 8-9.

55 Ibid.

56 Consul Baudais, who had been called to Paris for instructions, was given the task of delivering the ultimatum. Ibid., No. 8, pp. 13-16.
rights by force of arms. Thus, as Schuman points out, "The Ferry Cabinet, without consulting Parliament, was resorting to the diplomacy of war to gain its objectives in Madagascar."

By May 23, a series of cables from Zanzibar notified the French Government that Majunga had been taken and that the coast had been secured. Tananarive replied to Majunga's fall by ordering French residents to leave by May 30. Although transportation and protection were denied them, they all arrived safely and footsore at Tamatave after having been robbed by brigands along the line of march.

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57 Ibid., No. 4, pp. 8-9. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul Challemel-Lacour, doubted that a bombardment of Tamatave would be necessary, but Pierre and Baudais were authorized to proceed with whatever measures they deemed necessary. Ibid., No. 8, p. 15.


59 Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883), No. 10, p. 17.

60 Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony gave the order expelling Frenchmen from the capital on May 25 and evacuation was to be effected by May 30. Baudais contended that the Prime Minister had been induced to give this order by resident British missionaries. Ibid., No. 25, pp. 32-7, annex II, p. 39; No. 29, pp. 47-8. Baudais's interpretation of the expulsion of the French was countered by Mr. Chesson, Secretary of both the Aborigine's Protection Society and the Madagascar Committee, who produced documentation to show that various missionary groups did all they could to aid the expelled French. The Times (London), June 10, 1886, p. 10.
On June 1, Admiral Pierre had positioned his ships in the Tamatave area. Baudais that day presented the French ultimatum to the Hova Governor of Tamatave for transmission to the capital. Baudais instructed that official that, if an affirmative reply was not forthcoming in eight days, Tamatave would be shelled. European Consular officials were notified of the ultimatum and advised to take necessary precautions to safeguard their citizens.

The French ultimatum was received by the Hova Government on June 4 and Audriamifidy, Interim Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent his Government's answer to the French at Tamatave the next day. The reply stressed the fact that the Queen did not see any occasion to treat with the French so long as they refused to recognize her as ruler of the entire island. Both Pierre and Baudais

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61 The ships were la Flore, le Forfait, le Beautemps-Beaupre, le Boursaints, la Creuse and la Nièvre. Extract from Pierre's report Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883), No. 15, pp. 21-23.

62 British Consul Pakenham protested that not enough time was allowed him to secure protection for British subjects. Correspondence between the French and British Governments indicates that the French had informed consular officials to give ample warning to all European consulates. Ibid., No's. 25, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, and 45; State Papers, LXXV, pp. 447-448.
interpreted this as a rejection of the ultimatum and acted accordingly.\textsuperscript{63}

At 6:00 a.m. on June 10, Pierre's warships opened fire on Tamatave's defenses. According to his report, the Hova defenders did not return the fire and, in fact, deserted their defense works after the first French broadside. The city was occupied the next day and the French imposed martial law on all who remained in the city.\textsuperscript{64}

The French had secured Tamatave without casualties and with minimal effort,\textsuperscript{65} but the seizure of the port led to three incidents between British and French nationals and officials which might have had serious consequences if they had been pressed by the British.

The first incident occurred during the bombardment. The British ship Dryad, commanded by Captain Johnstone, refused Admiral Pierre's request to withdraw

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\textsuperscript{63}\textit{Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883)}, No. 25, annexes I-VII, Shaw reports that the Prime Minister told the people of Tananarive on June 7 that the French intended to invade the island and rob the tombs of their ancestors. This outraged the citizenry. George A. Shaw, Madagascar and France, (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1885), pp. 152-55.

\textsuperscript{64}\textit{Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883)}, No. 15, pp. 21-23.

\textsuperscript{65}On June 11, Pierre was able to divert four of his ships to Foulpointe, Fenerive and Mohambo. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 22.
\end{flushright}
from the line of fire and Pierre then intercepted and blocked Johnstone's communications with the shore. In his report of the affair, Pierre construed Johnstone's presence as encouraging the Hova to believe that the British were supporting their cause. After thrice warning Johnstone, Pierre cut his line of communication. Pierre's action was vehemently discussed and the British toyed with the idea of calling upon the French to censure the admiral. The latter was actually recalled to answer questions arising from the incident but died en-route of a fever contracted in Madagascar. The British Government officially contended that Johnstone had acted in the strictest tradition of neutrality, but publication of the correspondence subsequently revealed that Pierre had had some justification for his actions. With Pierre's death and the receipt of the correspondence between the French admiral and the British captain, the Gladstone Ministry dropped the whole matter. 66

The second episode developed because British Consul Thomas Pakenham refused to obey the June 16 order to remove the Union Jack from the consulate and to request

66 Ibid., No's. 15, 25, 37 and 40; Great Britain, Sessional Papers, Africa No. 1(1884), pp. 207-281; Africa No. 6(1884), pp. 484-499; Ramm, op. cit., pp. 80-83; The Times(London), September 11, 1863, p. 5.
official recognition of his consular status from the French authorities in Tamatave. 67 Pakenham was given twenty-four hours to evacuate the consulate but unexpectedly died before the order was effected. 68 His death, which first reports attributed to the French order, was, in reality, the result of a long illness, a disease of the spine. The order of evacuation was, in fact, never tendered him. Instead, upon hearing of his illness, a French doctor was sent to treat him but death overtook the Consul seven hours after the issuance of the order. After receipt of the French explanation, the British Government dropped the matter. 69

The arrest and imprisonment of Reverend George A. Shaw was another affair and much was written about this case. Gladstone, after long discussion on the issue, wrote to Granville, "Upon the whole this Shaw affair does not improve one's appetite for dinner." 70

67 Challemel-Lacour informed Consul Baudais that the action taken in ordering consular officials to remove their national flags was unjustified. He told Baudais that France had no claim to Tamatave, that the French occupation was only temporary and that Raffray, then acting as mayor of Tamatave, was to return to his duties as a French consular officer. Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883), No. 26, pp. 45-46.

68 Both Baudais and Pierre distrusted Pakenham whom they thought to be too close to the Hova and anti-French in sentiment. Ibid., No's. 25, 29 and 30.


70 Ramm, op. cit., p. 91.
Reverend Shaw, with quarters in Tamatave, operated a medical dispensary which he was in the process of moving to another location. On June 14, a squad of French soldiers was sent to guard the house in which Shaw resided. He was not home and, seeing bottles of what appeared to be claret in the courtyard, the soldiers began drinking the wine. Two immediately fell ill. The officer of the guard detail ordered the men to stop their tippling and broke the remaining bottles, save one kept for chemical analysis, and reported the incident to his superiors. When Reverend Shaw returned home, he was arrested on the charge of poisoning French soldiers. After his arrest, Shaw was imprisoned aboard the French ship la Nièvre and communication with the outside denied him for the entire forty-five days of his detention. 71

As with Pakenham, Shaw was suspected of aiding the Hova by hiding them from the French authorities in Tamatave and he was generally suspected of being anti-French in sentiment. 72 After considerable correspondence and an evaluation of the evidence, the case against him was dropped, he was released from custody on August 25, and

71 Oliver, Madagascar, pp. 336-344; Shaw, op. cit., pp. 166-181.

72 Ibid.; Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883), No's. 28, 30, 33 and 40.
was offered an indemnity of 1,000 by France for any inconvenience he might have suffered. Gladstone noted that the sum exceeded that offered in the Prichard affair; an incident in 1845 when the French had briefly imprisoned the British Consul in Tahiti. Upon his release Prichard was offered 880 indemnity and, though the British accepted the offer, the French never paid. No less than 10,000 was demanded by Shaw. Eventually, the lesser sum was accepted by all parties, and the Shaw episode was closed.

These incidents created a furor in the public press and raised many questions in Parliament, but the Gladstone Cabinet was extremely cautious in all its statements bearing on them. From July, 1883 to February, 1884, whenever queries were addressed to the Government, Edmund Fitzmaurice, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, offered the stock comment that all the facts were not yet available and the Government consequently had not yet formed an opinion.

Although Queen Victoria felt that the Government

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73 Ibid.; Nos. 38, 40, and 44.
75 Hansard's, CCLXXI-CCLXXIV (July, 1883-February, 1884), passim.
had not acted in the manner with "a proper spirit of chivalrous honor. ...,"76 and Ellis Ashmead Bartlett, Conservative Member of Parliament from Suffolk, unsuccessfully attempted to secure a vote of censure against the Gladstone Ministry for failure to protect British subjects and interests,77 the Granville policy of placating the French was maintained.78

The ease with which the French occupied Majunga and Tamatave gave scant hint of the difficulties they were to experience during the next thirty months. The Gallic objective, as set forth by Ferry on June 19, 1883, was to effect an agreement with the Hova whereby the latter were to pledge not to occupy nor exercise authority over the areas covered by the Franco-Sakalave agreements of 1840-1841. Occupation of the ports of Tamatave and Majunga and control of the coastline by the French fleet were to


77 Bartlett argued that the British had lost £750,000 a year in trade with Madagascar and had deprived 500 Chorah, Bombay merchants, of a livelihood. He likewise condemned the Government for abandoning the British missionaries in Madagascar and the British-oriented, Christian people of the island. The House of Commons voted 107 to 55 to close the debate. 3Hansard's, CCLXXXVII(1884), pp. 1220-1235.

78 Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., p. 127.
be the levers used to gain and maintain these rights.79

Both Ferry and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Challemel-Lacour, realized that a quick settlement was imperative. On June 24, 1883, the latter advised Ferry that the garrisons at the occupied ports were weak and subject to fever. He feared that, if the Hova attacked, the French forces would be driven into the sea.80 In June and July several minor assaults were actually launched against the French at Tamatave and, though they were easily repulsed, they indicated that the Hova controlled the interior and felt no immediate need to accede to Gallic demands.81

French officials in Madagascar, particularly Baudais and Pierre and the latter's replacement, Rear-Admiral Galiber, were hopeful that closing the island's ports would bring the Hova to terms82 but, as the months passed, it was proven ineffective. The British Consul

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80 *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914*, V. p. 63.

81 By August 1883, Challemel-Lacour was warning that time was on the side of the Hova. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-89. Baudais noted that they controlled all the internal lines of communication. *Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883)*, No's. 27, 29, pp. 46, 47-50.

protested that the blockade was a paper one and was particularly discriminatory against her shippers. Even the German merchants who had been most co-operative with the French became restive.

With only eleven ships to patrol and blockade hundreds of miles of coastline, neither Galiber nor his early successor, Admiral Miot, could effectively control the island's ports. Import houses in Tamatave began moving their headquarters to Vatomandry, Mahela, Mananzary, Fenerivo and Foulpointe because the Hova would not allow porters to go to Tamatave and because it was cheaper to deal directly with Hova held ports. Since the French levied customs at Tamatave and the Hova added 10% on all goods coming inland from there, merchants employing the usual channels were forced to pay double taxation. Baudais called loudly for more ships and additional troops to secure the roads into the interior, and by May,

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83 Consul Graves, Pakenham's replacement, noted that German, Danish and American ships were allowed to unload cargoes in supposedly blockaded ports, but that British ships such as the Orenoque and Eliza were ordered from the island's harbors. State Papers, LXXXVI, pp. 453-57.

84 Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914, V., pp. 154, 261, 436.

85 Affaires de Madagascar, (1884-1886), Nos. 24-25, pp. 122-23.
1885, both Miot and Baudais were convinced that the French Government could secure its rights on the island only by the employment of superior military force. Military occupation was unthinkable so long as naval blockade was ineffective. Baudais's and Miot's estimates that thousands of troops were needed for an effective campaign contrasted sharply with the number of French forces actually engaged in Madagascar. In 1883, 300 men, excluding naval crews, were garrisoned there and 800 more were sent in 1884. These included 600 volunteers from Réunion and a company of marine infantry some 150 men strong. However, Sakalave auxiliaries were recruited to supplement the French forces. By July, 1885, six additional companies of marine infantry had been sent to Madagascar but, as Oliver notes, "the effective strength of the French was never sufficient for any advance beyond the range of the ship's guns." 

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Ibid., No. 14, p. 100. Baudais asked for 10,000 troops plus ships and materials for the project. Ibid., No. 18, pp. 104-105. On May 9, 1885, Miot wrote Minister of Marine Galiber to request his superior to consider his plan for taking Madagascar. Miot estimated he would need 4,000 men to conquer the island. However, he believed that unless a protectorate were established, it would take 6,000 men to occupy the island and maintain French interests there. Ibid., No. 26, pp. 125-26.

Annexe No. 2949, pp. 643-44.

The Times (London), July 13, 1885, p. 6.

Oliver notes that the outbreak of cholera at Marseilles and the resumption of hostilities in Tonkin
While French officials were urging a greater military commitment on the island, the local Government was improving its defenses. In January, 1884, Queen Ranavalona III secured the services of two Englishmen, Digby Willoughby and Charles Shervinton, who brought with them skills acquired as army officers in South Africa. Willoughby became adjutant-General of the Malagasy forces and Shervinton, as Colonel, supervised the training of the island forces.

By August of 1885, the Malagasy forces were able to carry out an effective ambush of French and Sakalave troops at Andampy, near Passandava Bay. The most dramatic skirmish of the so-called police action occurred at


Ranavalona II died July 13, 1883, and was succeeded by Razafindrahety, daughter of the dead Queen's sister. She was 20 years of age, a widow and had been educated in a London Missionary Society school. She took the title of Ranavalona III and was officially installed as Queen November 22, 1883. Affaires de Madagascar (1882-1883), No. 35, p. 57; Oliver, op. cit., II, pp. 351-352.


Isàmahàfy. On Passandava Bay, opposite the island of Nossi-Bé, a force of 400 Malagasy soldiers commanded by Colonel Shervinton repulsed an attack led by 250 French regulars and several hundred Sakalave auxiliaries. Reportedly, the French lost 40 killed and over a 100 wounded; the Malagasy, 8 and 14 respectively.\textsuperscript{93} The latter celebrated this victory with a formal parade of the participants through the streets of Tananarive on October 1, 1885 and, like a victorious Roman Legion, the Malagasy displayed their prisoners and battle trophies to an appreciative Queen and an enthusiastic throng.\textsuperscript{94}

Thus, after more than two years of desultory conflict, the French had not stilled Malagasy opposition and, in fact, the island's defenders were displaying an increased ability to resist French arms. It was within this context of indecisive skirmishing and ineffective blockade that negotiations between France and the Malagasy Government got under way.

The move toward negotiation of the Franco-Malagasy dispute had its beginnings when, on October 15, 1883, Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony advised Baudais that the

\textsuperscript{93}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94}The Times(London), January 4, 1886, p. 6.
Malagasy mission had returned from Europe. He noted that, while in Paris, the delegation had discussed matters with Premier Ferry who had indicated a desire to resume friendly relations on the basis of a negotiated settlement. Baudais and Galiber agreed to November 19, 24, and 26 as conference dates, and Rainilaiarivony appointed Rainidriamanandrandry head of a four-man delegation to treat with the French representatives.

At the first meeting, November 19, the French refused to begin discussions because the Malagasy Plenipotentiaries did not present their credentials. On November 24, credentials in order, the conference opened with the Malagasy requesting to undertake talks on a basis other than those of the June ultimatum. The French

95 It had been rumored that the returning Malagasy delegation had been strangled and that the Hova were in revolt against the Prime Minister. These reports were, of course, untrue. The Times (London) November 13, 1883, p. 5; November 14, p. 5.

96 Ferry listed the French demands as follows: That the Hova agree not to occupy or exercise authority over the area covered by the 1840-1841 treaties; that property rights guaranteed by the treaty of 1868 be honored and that a sum of one million francs be paid the Laborde heir claims. Affaires de Madagascar, (1882-1883), No's. 16-17, pp. 23-26.

97 The other members were Andriantasy, Rainizianamango and Ramarosana, all of whom were officers of the palace and members of the Privy Council. Ibid., No. 48, p. 80.
refused and discussion of Article One, Malagasy recognition of the 1840-1841 Franco-Sakalave protectorate treaties, began. The conference covered the same ground as the Paris talks of November, 1882, and ended the same way with the French rejecting the Malagasy offer to guarantee renewable leases; to compensate the Laborde heirs by payment of 1,000,000 francs and to pay an unstipulated sum to France for yielding her alleged claims to the coastal lands. 98

On January 11, 1884, Premier Ferry, obviously anxious to resume negotiations, instructed Baudais to base future discussions along the following lines:

The Hova Government agrees not to occupy any territory nor exercise any authority in those regions which were the object of arrangements concluded by France in 1840 and 1841 with the Sakalave. 99

The Premier held that, in his opinion, the Malagasy were sincerely desirous of peace and declared that France had no desire to occupy the island. His only wish was to gain recognition for French rights on the northern tip and he expressed a willingness to limit Gallic demands in return

98 Ibid., No. 48, Annexes III-VII, pp. 82-98.
for a pledge from the Malagasy Government that the Sakalave tribes be protected.\textsuperscript{100}

Baudais and Galiber argued that the Premier's willingness to offer concessions would be construed as weakness and instead of conciliation, these French officials argued that demands be increased.\textsuperscript{101} Negotiations were carried on from February 21 to 23 with the same personnel representing the two Governments. This time, however, the French escalated demands beyond those of the June ultimatum. The Malagasy were asked to pay ten million francs indemnity to France\textsuperscript{102} and to concede the latters protectorate rights over the entire northern part of the island from $16^\circ$ to $12^\circ$ south latitude. Malagasy concession offers were the same as those of the November, 1883 conference and, again, suffered rejection.\textsuperscript{103} The conference's failure would seem to stem from the unwillingness of the French negotiators to present any compromises, even those expressly ordered by Ferry. Indeed, they

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100}Ibid., (1884-1886), No. 2, p. 2-4.
\item \textsuperscript{101}Ibid., No's. 3-4, 7. pp. 3-5, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{102}Galiber asked for one million for the Laborde heirs, two million for losses suffered by French nationals during hostilities and seven to cover navy expenses. Cablegram received March 1, 1884, Ibid., No. 5, p. 5. Ferry refused to allow such excessive demands, but Galiber none the less presented them to the Malagasy at the conference. Ibid., No. 6, p. 6-7; No. 7. Annex II, pp. 12-19.
\item \textsuperscript{103}Ibid., Annex IV, pp. 29-45.
\end{itemize}
had increased demands to such a degree that, had the Malagasy Plenipotentiaries accepted them, the Queen of Madagascar would have lost approximately one-third of the territory over which she ruled. 104

On March 27, 1884, the Madagascar question was laid before the French Chamber of Deputies by Jean de Lanessan, a political moderate who later became Governor-General of Indo-China and authored *Principes de Colonisation* (1895). 105 This deputy condemned the cabinet for launching a campaign without consulting the lower house. Perry admitted he had erred, but held that the action had been prompted by Hova bad faith. Upon receipt of this information, the Chamber agreed 436 to 26 to uphold French rights in Madagascar. 106

Ferry was elated by this vote of confidence and informed Baudais that knowledge of such a vote would certainly stimulate the Malagasy to renew talks. 107 Future discussion, the Premier noted, must take a different form.


107 April 3, 1884, *Affaires de Madagascar*, (1884-1886), No. 8, p. 49. Baudais was skeptical and observed that only a vote to send a full-scale expedition to Madagascar would lead the Malagasy Prime Minister to agree to French demands. *Ibid.*, No. 14, pp. 100-101.
He therefore instructed Baudais to delay negotiations until he received word on such a new basis. Perry's first move was to replace Galiber, whose conduct had not met with the Premier's approval, with Rear-Admiral Miot. The latter was directed to take vigorous action against coastal installations, to press for the voiding of Article 85 and to cut indemnity demands from ten to three million francs. These instructions were supplemented by a cable urging Miot to insist that the Malagasy agree not to cede any territory or grant a protectorate to any other European power.

Ferry's order not to resume negotiations and to await until new instructions were dispatched did not reach Baudais until April 11, 1884. From April 3 to April 8, the Consul had been engaged in a series of talks which traversed the familiar barren ground. The rehash proved fruitless, but Baudais argued that this vindicated his policy not to introduce concessions. For, during the last round of negotiations, the Malagasy Plenipotentiaries had

108 April 7, 1884, Ibid., No. 11, pp. 51-53.

109 Ferry was aware that French failure to impose meaningful sanctions against the Malagasy had hampered negotiations. The latter statement was prompted by fear that, now that French intentions were clear, the Malgache would turn to Britain for aid. Ibid., No. 16, p. 102.
admitted that they had no power to alienate any of the Queen's territory and that no French claim no matter how reduced, could be honored. 110

Admiral Miot arrived at Tamatave May 8. His attempts to implement instructions by a show of force brought no results since he had no force to show. 111 Dutifully, he delivered the new demands, but the fourth Tamatave conference was as sterile as the preceding three. 112 Repeated failure had convinced Baudais that the only way France could secure her rights was by employing a large expeditionary force to impose a protectorate over the island. 113

In Paris, the Commission formed to consider the request of Peyron, Minister of the Marine, for 5,361,000 francs credits for expenditures in Madagascar, stressed that the monies were to be used only to assure French rights in the island and not for its conquest. 114 Even so,

110 Ibid., No. 18, Annexes I–VII, pp. 103–10.
111 Ibid., No. 19, p. 110.
112 Ibid., No. 20, pp. 111–13.
113 Baudais urged the establishment of a protectorate on May 9, 1884 and his dispatches of June, August, and October, 1884 dwelt upon the need for firm action. Ibid., Nos. 18, 20–23, p. 104–105, 111–21.
114 Annexe No. 2949, pp. 642–43.
two members, Messrs. de Lanessan and Perin, were fearful that conquest would follow any involvement in Madagascar. Georges Perin, Radical Party member and anti-colonialist spokesman, held that French expenses would inevitably far outweigh the value of any acquisition.115

When in July, the Commission report was laid before the Deputies, both Perin and de Lanessan spoke against action. The latter argued that the Cabinet's intent was to occupy all of Madagascar. Perry denied this charge, noting that Baudais had urged such action and denying any personal sympathy with any such project.116 Perry closed the debates by assuring the Chamber that his Cabinet's sole object was to protect established French rights and not to add Madagascar to France's expanding colonial empire. With these assurances, the Chamber voted the credits 360 to 81.117

The Perry Cabinet's and the Parliament's expectations that limited military effort would be sufficient to win their objectives in Madagascar proved illusory. Perry lost the Premiership on April 6, 1885 but the

115 Ibid., p. 642.
117 Ibid., pp. 1790-1799.
Madagascar situation continued in stalemate. On May 9, after a year of attempting to blockade and occupy the coast, Rear-Admiral Miot admitted that no solution appeared possible unless a large military commitment be made. He reported to his superior, Admiral Galiber, the new Minister of the Marine, that France could not attain its objectives in Madagascar without establishing a protectorate.  

Galiber fell in with this reasoned opinion, as did de Freycinet, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, and they informed Miot that a plenipotentiary would be named to negotiate a protectorate agreement and that reinforcements would be sent to facilitate such an endeavor.

On June 25, Baudais wrote de Freycinet reporting the rumor that a protectorate was soon to be established. He assumed that this would require the establishment of a French resident to guide the Malagasy Government in its internal and external relations. What Baudais failed

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120 *Affaires de Madagascar, (1884-1886)*, No. 29, pp. 130-131.
to add was that the Prime Minister was anxious to resume negotiations, and that both Rainilaiarivony and Baudais had agreed to resume discussions using Desire Maigrot, Italian Consul at Tananarive, as intermediary.\footnote{Baudais had been in communication with the Prime Minister since June 1 but deliberately failed to inform de Freycinet of this fact. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 130. Consul Maigrot was Mauritian by birth but was a naturalized Italian citizen. A. Martineau, \textit{Madagascar en 1894}, (Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1895), p. 21.}

On June 13, he had informed the Prime Minister that the Malagasy must accept a protectorate, defining the term as meaning that France would control Madagascar's external affairs. He further declared that, under such a new political setup, the Malagasy Government would be obliged to grant property rights in fee simple, as well as to recognize France's rights to reorganize the local army, to develop and control communications and to exercise supervision over the levying and collection of customs.\footnote{Affaires de Madagascar, (1884-1886), No. 36, pp. 139-145.}

The Prime Minister found both the word "protectorate" and the terms unacceptable and sought to induce Baudais to modify his stipulations. When his adversary proved adamant, Rainilaiarivony declared that he could
not accept a protectorate because, in his eyes, this meant the abdication of the Queen's sovereign rights.\textsuperscript{123}

While these negotiations were in progress, the issue of granting additional credits to support efforts in Madagascar was debated in Parliament. Ferin led the attack against them and condemned colonialism in general as a drain upon the Republic's resources.\textsuperscript{124} During the four days of verbal conflict, de Freycinet painted the Government's action as merely an effort to protect acquired rights and refrained from mentioning the Cabinet's decision to establish a protectorate. Ferry rose to defend colonialism and although such men as Clemenceau, then leader of the Radical Party, rose in denouncing expansion, the Chamber, on July 30, voted the credits 291 to 142.\textsuperscript{125} The Senate concurred, 188 to 22, five days later.\textsuperscript{126} As

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} The correspondence between Baudais and Rainilaiarivony opened June 13 and terminated on August 25. It was transmitted to Paris on August 27, but did not arrive there until September 25. Ibid., No. 36, annexe I-IV, pp. 139-49.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid., July 29-30, 1885, pp. 1677-90. Ferry is credited by Rambaud, one of his biographers, with carrying the vote. Alfred Rambaud, Jules Ferry, (Paris: Plon, 1903), pp. 313-22.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Journal Officiel: Débats, Sénat, August 4, 1885, pp. 1716-30.
\end{itemize}
Schuman notes, the vote was carried "for the alleged purpose of maintaining the status quo and defending the established rights of France on the island, with Parliament in ignorance of the secret decision of the Cabinet to impose a protectorate." 

With the credits safely approved, de Freycinet moved to select a diplomat to negotiate the protectorate. S. Patrimonio, French Consul General in Beirut, was recruited for the operation and, in preparation, was given the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary and entrusted with a twenty article protectorate agreement. He was, however, ordered to reveal his mission only if Admiral Miot felt the time to be auspicious for a resumption of negotiations.

De Freycinet's cautious arrangements were disrupted when, on September 23, M. Ressmann, Italian Charge d'Affaires, informed him that Consul Maigrot had been engaged as an intermediary in the negotiations between Baudais and Rainilaiarivony. From London, Ambassador Waddington reported that he had received the same information from British sources.

\[127^{127} \text{Op. cit., p. 115.} \]
\[128^{128} \text{Affaires de Madagascar, (1884-1886), Nos. 31-34, pp. 133-134.} \]
\[129^{129} \text{Ibid., Nôs. 37-38, pp. 149-150.} \]
Freycinet was advised by Baudais respecting such activities and was shocked to find that this worthy's interpretation of "protectorate" implied direct intervention in Malagasy affairs. Baudais was recalled and, in the presence of the President du Conseil, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Marine and Colonies, was censured and dismissed for having adopted an unauthorized, independent line of conduct. Admiral Miot was criticized by his superior, Admiral Galiber, for taking part in the negotiations but was not recalled.

130 Ibid., No. 40, pp. 151-52.

131 The meeting was held October 10, 1885 and Baudais was given an opportunity to present his case. One of the most telling points made against him was that he was in communication with the home government on June 25, 1885 and yet failed to note that he had begun negotiations with the Prime Minister. Ibid., No. 41, p. 152. While evidence indicates that Baudais did, in fact, exceed his authority and acted in a way to compromise his superior's plans, Schuman contends that de Freycinet and Galiber might have suppressed evidence in order to justify his removal. Op. cit., p. 116. Martineau contends that de Freycinet was unaware of Baudais's actions until September and that Baudais had most certainly exceeded his authority. Op. cit., pp. 22-23. In the past, Baudais had generally acted upon his own initiative, sometimes ignoring instructions from superiors, so it is entirely possible that his last official action was unknown in Paris before September. Certainly, de Freycinet's correspondence with Waddington indicates that such was the case. Affaires de Madagascar, (1884-1886), Nos. 37-38, pp. 149-50.
The Italian Government was thanked for its assistance but, with seemly tact, the Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that Consul Maigrot's services were no longer needed.132

Baudais's dismissal did not remove the impediments raised by his interpretation of the word "protectorate". Patrimonio informed de Freycinet that the Hova took Baudais's views as official French Government ones and assumed that any protectorate negotiated with France would entail foreign intervention in the island's domestic affairs.133 This interpretation was viewed as such an impediment to possible negotiations that both Miot and Patrimonio asked that the word be struck from the proposed agreement.134

Rainilaiarivony wrote Admiral Miot the last of October, seeking a resumption of negotiations. The Prime Minister's request was prompted by advice he had received

132Ibid., No. 39, pp. 150-51. Maigrot was subsequently awarded the Cross of the Legion of Honor by the French Government. He also received a timber concession from the Malagasy Government in appreciation of his services. Martineau, op. cit., pp. 22-23.


134Affaires de Madagascar, (1884-1886), No. 43, p. 155.
from Madagascar's Consuls in London, Messrs. Proctor and Parrett. Both had been involved in discussions with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Marine. These led Proctor and Parrett to inform Rainilaiarivony that a reasonable settlement could be obtained. Digby Willoughby and Rainizanamanga, Rainilaiarivony's eldest son, were named Plenipotentiaries with full powers to act. Admiral Miot forwarded this information to Patrimonio in Zanzibar with the observation that no basis of negotiation had been presented by the Prime Minister.

Patrimonio received Miot's message on November 11 and immediately sought instructions from de Freycinet. The Foreign Minister replied two days later stating that the offending word could be deleted from the agreement. Concessions were likewise offered changing the French Resident General's military escort to a guard of honor, the Queen's Government was to be requested to give "benevolent treatment" to such Sakalave tribes as had been

135 Proctor and Parrett had cabled this information to the Prime Minister on August 24. Ibid., No. 47, annex II, pp. 160-61.

136 Ibid., No. 44, p. 156.

137 Ibid., No. 44, p. 156.
under French protection, and the French reserved the right to occupy and establish installation on the Bay of Diego-Suarez. De Freycinet informed Patrimonio that he was free to accept modifications of detail which would not change the general meaning of the document or imperil its ratification by the French Government. With these instructions, the French Plenipotentiary left for Tamatave, where he arrived on November 22.

Patrimonio at once met Malagasy representatives. On December 15, he and Miot conferred with Digby Willoughby, Rainizanamanga and Marc Rabiboasoa, the Prime Minister's secretary, and opened negotiations with them aboard the French vessel La Naiade, anchored in Tamatave harbor. No transcript of the meeting was kept but Patrimonio carefully noted the disputes and resultant modifications of the treaty articles. The word "protectorate" was immediately dropped. Conflict arose over the indemnity payment, but French demands were met here. The Queen's representatives agreed to give special consideration to such Sakalave tribes as had enjoyed French protection, and France was accorded the right to install

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138 November 13, 1885, Ibid., No. 46, pp. 157-58.
139 November 14, 1885, Ibid., No. 47, pp. 158-59.
140 Ibid., No. 49, pp. 163-64.
a base at Diégo-Suarez. This highly important con-
cession was gained only upon Admiral Miot's insistence
that a base was a strategic necessity for France. Agree-
ment was reached on all of the 19 articles of the treaty
on December 17. A secret understanding likewise was
signed, precluding the possibility of future Malagasy
cessions of territory to any foreign power other than
France.

The official French text of the treaty appears in
the appendix, but a synopsis is presented here:

1. France would represent Madagascar in all its exterior relations.

2. A Resident would preside over foreign affairs
but would not interfere in the internal administration of
the Queen's domain.

3. The Resident would have a military escort and
the right of direct audience with the Queen.

4. The Queen would not interfere in legal disputes
between French nationals, or between Frenchmen and foreign-
ers. In litigation between Frenchmen and Malagasy citizens,
cases would be settled by the Resident and a Malagasy judge.

5. Frenchmen would be tried under French criminal
law.

141 Ibid., Nos. 50-51, pp. 165-70.

142 The agreement referred to establishment of
ccoaling stations or military installations by foreign
powers. Archives Diplomatiques, XXI(1887), p. 94.
6. Frenchmen were accorded the right of freedom in their commercial activities, in hiring Malgache labor, in holding long-term leases, in inheriting leaseholds and were protected against illegal trespass.

7. Freedom of religion and conscience would be assured.

8. 10 million francs indemnity would be paid to France and France would regulate its distribution.

9. Tamatave would be occupied until the indemnity was paid.

10. No claims would be honored for damages caused by authorized military action by French forces.

11. France agreed to give military assistance to the Queen in protecting the state.

12. The Queen would continue to preside over the internal administration of the whole island.

13. The French Government would seek no further war indemnities.

14. France stood pledged to facilitate the island's progress by furnishing French instructors for military training, engineering, general education and technical training.

15. The Queen would treat the Sakalave with benevolence and grant France the right to occupy and build installations on Diego-Suarez Bay.

16. A general amnesty would be granted all prisoners of war.

17. All treaties extant between France and Madagascar not at variance with the present one were confirmed.

18. The treaty would be printed in French and Malgache, each version conveying the same terms and each would be an official text.

19. The treaty would be ratified by both parties within three months. 143

143 *Affaires de Madagascar, (1884-1886), No. 57, pp. 174-78.*
Information on the new treaty was immediately cabled to French Ambassadors in major capitals throughout the world.144

For the Malagasy, the process of ratification moved rapidly and was completed on January 9, 1886.145 In answer to queries from Digby Willoughby, Patrimonio and Miot explained certain clauses, which clarifications were destined to become sources of dispute in future Franco-Malagasy relations. The French area of occupation on the Bay of Diégo-Suarez was limited to 1½ miles to the south and west and 4 miles to the north.146 With the term "protectorate" having been eliminated from the treaty, the French representatives defined French control over "external relations" in the narrow sense of political ones. Likewise, the stipulation of "protection" was explained as meaning that French military aid to safeguard the Queen's territory would be given only at her specific request. The Resident's 50-man military escort would constitute a mere honor guard. In a postscript to this

144 Ibid., No. 52, pp. 170-71. On December 27, 1885, de Freycinet informed the ambassadors that the treaty would not change extant agreements between the Malagasy Government and other states. Ibid., No. 54, pp. 172-73.

145 Patrimonio stated that, while the treaty had been ratified, certain clarifications were deemed necessary. Ibid., No. 55, p. 173.

146 Ibid., No. 56, p. 173.
important letter, Patrimonio and Miot added:

You have asked us if the Government of the Queen may, as in the past, continue to negotiate treaties of commerce with Foreign Powers. Without doubt, as long as these treaties of commerce are not contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of December 17, 1885. 147

Patrimonio's and Miot's explanations of the words "protection" and "foreign relations" unhappily differed from de Freycinet's. In his dispatch of December 23, 1885, the latter noted that the Resident would stand as an intermediary between foreign powers and the Queen of Madagascar and that all such dealings would pass through that official's hands. The Cabinet had accepted this interpretation as official, 148 but Patrimonio's and Miot's explanatory letter held the door open for the Malagasy to deal directly with third nations, particularly in the area of commercial treaties. This view was repudiated by de Freycinet, who disavowed the Patrimonio-Miot letter, but the Malagasy accepted this explanatory missive as binding for themselves and for France. 149

148 Ibid., No. 52, pp. 170-71.
149 Henri Brisson served as Premier from April 6, 1885 to January 7, 1886.
The difficulties inherent in these divergent views respecting the exact nature of the treaty were not immediately apparent and it was initially praised by the French Government. De Freycinet's elation in announcing conclusion of the agreement is at least partially explained by the attitude of the French Chamber which had shown increasing reluctance to support colonial endeavors. The Brisson Cabinet had faced strong opposition in its request for 79,000,000 francs to carry on the Government's activities in Tonkin and Madagascar. De Freycinet's December 23, 1885 announcement respecting institution of the Madagascar protectorate was viewed by some deputies as a mere ruse to gain support for the Government's credit request. In the face of this opposition, Brisson was forced to cut his request to 30,000,000 francs and, even

150 Although de Freycinet may have been technically correct in his interpretation, the Hovan view had been that French officials' statements had the validity of official French Government pronouncements. Schuman contended that the Patrimonio-Miot addendum was sent to the Hova before ratification of the treaty; however, Patrimonio informed de Freycinet that the clarifications had come after ratification. In any case, one must agree with Schuman that "Miot and Patrimonio, by their eagerness for an agreement, had bungled matters as badly as had Baudais by his obstinacy. . . ." Op. cit., p. 119. Also see Joseph Dubois, "Les droits de la France sur Madagascar," Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée, XXVII (1896), pp. 493-94.
then, sustained such a small majority (274-270) that the Cabinet resigned. 151

The press' response to the news of the Madagascar treaty was generally favorable. De Freycinet was praised for his diplomatic skill, but the treaty's limitations proved disappointing to some. The lack of territorial acquisition was particularly galling to potential French colonists who desired an opportunity to exploit the highly vaunted wealth of the Red Island. It was, however, generally conceded that the French had received all that could reasonably have been expected. 152 The New York Times stated:

We may conclude that France cannot do much better than to ratify this treaty. It certainly favors her to an extent that would hardly have been surmised from her unsatisfactory military operations on the island. As for the Queen, she has kept her pledge not to give up sovereignty over a foot of her island. 153

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151 The project for the credits was introduced November 22, 1885, and the commission charged with reviewing them recommended their reduction. The lower figure of 30,000,000 francs, was introduced on December 24, and the project passed six days later. Journal Officiel: Chambre, November 22, December 23-24, 30, 1885, pp. 300-394.

152 Le Temps, December 24, 1885, pp. 1-2, January 31, 1886, February 1, 2, 3; 1886, p. 1; The Times (London), January 9, 19, 1886, p. 5; The New York Times, February 26, 1886, p. 4, February 28, 1886, p. 2, March 1, 1886, p. 4.

153 February 26, p. 4.
The Times (London) noted that, though many Frenchmen found the treaty contrary to their liking, "still the Tonquin experience is likely to make the Chamber think twice before rejecting it, lest the result be the renewal of hostilities."\(^{154}\)

Debates on ratification of the treaty began on February 25, 1886, with Dureau de Vaulcomte, Deputy from Réunion and an expansionist spokesman for the extreme Right, denouncing de Freycinet for failure to gain substantial territorial concessions in Madagascar but defenders of the treaty far outweighed its detractors. The theme of those advocating ratification was more in tones of resignation than of enthusiasm, the continuing refrain being that a better agreement could not be had unless the Chamber was willing to finance a full scale military expedition, conquer the island and govern it as a colony. Since the Chamber, obviously, had no intention of going to such expense, the treaty spokesmen carried the day. The Chamber voted ratification 436 to 28 on February 27, 1886. The Senate began discussing the matter on March 1 and, following a debate exactly along Chamber lines, voted ratification five days later.\(^{155}\)

\(^{154}\)February 10, 1886, p. 5.

\(^{155}\)Journal Officiel: Chambre, February 25, 27, 1886, pp. 304-39; Sénat, March 1, 6, 1886, pp. 337-46.
After more than three years of protracted negotiations and thirty months of conflict, France had succeeded in establishing a "primitive protectorate" over the island of Madagascar. The Queen had conceded little and Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony could be well pleased that the irresoluteness of the French Government coupled with occasional ineptitude shown by French negotiators had conspired to effect a settlement which scarcely dimmed the light of the Queen's sovereign power. However, the Queen could no longer claim full sovereignty over an island which she had only partially controlled and, more importantly, Madagascar stood alone. For though the future would show that the Queen's Government could flaunt French interpretation respecting the Resident's control over foreign relations, it was obvious that no other Western Power was interested in upholding her claims for either autonomy or sovereignty. Time and the irresoluteness of the French, prompted by the periodic rise and fall of cabinets and intermittent displays of anti-colonialism, had been the Queen's salvation, but Madagascar was now within the French sphere of interest and time was ultimately on the side of one of the greatest Colonial Powers of the West.

156Catellini, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
CHAPTER V
THE UNRESOLVED CONFLICT
1885 - 1895

The disguised protectorate treaty of 1885 had not given France a decisive voice in Malagasy affairs. The treaty's vague wording coupled with the Patrimonio Miot letter left little room for a French Resident with his miniscular force of fifty men to control the island's external affairs and supervise the actions of its Government. Naturally, the Malagasy gave the narrowest possible interpretation to the treaty provisions, while the French attempted to endow them with exceedingly broad authority. Schuman notes, "Under such unfavorable circumstances the unhappy history of the protectorate began, destined to culminate a decade later in a more costly war and the

1Upon request of Digby Willoughby on January 9, 1886, Patrimonio and Miot had defined the words "protection" and "external relations". They had given these words exceedingly narrow interpretation and had, likewise accorded the Queen's Government authority to negotiate commercial agreements with foreign powers without the French Resident's intervention. For a full discussion of the interpretation placed upon the protectorate treaty of 1885 see Chapter IV pages 135 and 136. In 1891, the Resident's military escort was raised to 75. Martineau, op. cit., p.55.

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complete extinction of the independence of Madagascar."²

M. Le Myre de Vilers, an experienced administrator with service in Algeria and four years as governor of Cochinchine, China behind him, was appointed French Resident at Tananarive in April. French residents considered him aloof and cold,³ yet he appeared to dominate the Prime Minister.⁴ Rainilaiarivony was however, a master of diplomacy and, as the missionary William Cousins points out, "Whilst outwardly treating the French officials with suavity and respect, the Prime Minister has managed, whether wisely or unwisely may be a matter of opinion, to outwit and disappoint all those who have hitherto had to enter into diplomatic relations with him."⁵

De Vilers might well have agreed with Cousins' statement, for he left Madagascar in June, 1889 without gaining either economic or diplomatic control over Madagascar's affairs for France.⁶

²Schuman, op. cit., p. 119.
³The Times (London), October 22, 1886, p. 3.
⁴Ibid.; Affaires de Madagascar, (1886-1895), No. 50, pp. 48-50.
⁵Madagascar of To-Day, p. 152.
The matter of financial control was of primary interest. De Vilers found that the Prime Minister had, in April, 1886, contracted with Abraham Kingdon, a business promoter and one-time associate of the English Society of Friends Mission in Madagascar, to secure a loan from British capitalists. Kingdon secured backing and established the Royal Bank of Madagascar. This institution was to lend £800,000 at 7% interest to the Malagasy Government on the security of customs duties. The French protested and insisted that the Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris float the loan. Rainilaiarivony agreed and the Paris house lent the Malagasy Government 15,000,000 francs at only 6% interest on the same security.

In 1885, Digby Willoughby, Commander of the Malagasy army, was sent by the Prime Minister on a European mission to secure funds for modernizing the Malagasy state's finances and communications. His mission enjoyed some success in Berlin and Rome but, upon his return, he found himself charged with misappropriation of funds and

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7 Grandidier, op. cit., p. 35; Martineau, op. cit., pp. 37-41; The Times (London), August 26, 1886, p. 4. For the complete list of stockholders of the Royal Bank of Madagascar see The Times (London) September 16, 1886, p. 3.

8 The agreement was signed December 17, 1886. Grandidier, op. cit., p. 35.
was dismissed. The Times (London), stated that Willoughby's removal had been engineered by the French Resident, but Martineau contends that the Prime Minister was jealous of the Englishman's prestige and fearful of his modernization schemes.

The rescinding of the Kingdon banking agreement and the dismissal of Willoughby were both favorable to French interests. Some progress was made in improving communications when two Frenchmen, Dechamp and Courtadon, were given 100,000 francs by the Malagasy Government to build a telegraph line from Tananarive to Tamatave. National economy was stimulated by the Malagasy Government's rapid payment of the indemnity, and the speed and fairness shown by the French commission in adjudicating and paying legitimate claims was a credit to France. In spite of the gains, de Viler's efforts to secure Gallic predominance in the island's financial affairs failed.

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9 Willoughby was dismissed in December, 1887. February 17, 1888, p. 4; May 29, 1888, p. 5.


11 The line was begun September, 1886 and completed one year later. Martineau, op. cit., p. 45.

12 A proclamation of March 18, 1886 established the method to be used in applying for claims justified under Article VIII of the December 17, 1885 treaty. A Commission was appointed February 7, 1887 and terminated its work on August 21, 1887, disbursing a total of 6,000,000 francs. State Papers, LXXVII(1885-1886), p. 1020; LXXVIII(1886-1887), pp. 7606, 708. Martineau, op. cit., p. 55.
Finances remained under the Prime Minister's strict control. No state bank was established, the revenues and expenditures of the state were not made public\(^{13}\) and Rainilaiarivony reportedly secreted millions in various hiding places.\(^{14}\) Since there was no strict accounting procedure, customs officials kept a good part of the duties they collected.\(^{15}\) Provincial governors, likewise, gouged the inhabitants of their districts and sent only a minimal revenue to the central government.\(^{16}\) Even staunch friends of Malagasy independence bemoaned the lack of financial organization which, by 1891, was

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\(^{14}\)Martineau contends that the Prime Minister had hidden ten to twenty million francs in various places, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-13; Oliver notes that money was often buried in the tombs of the monarchs. *Op. cit.*, p. 217.

\(^{15}\)From 1888 to 1893, custom collection averaged about 750,000 to 800,000 francs, reflecting annual importation of goods valued from 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 francs. Martineau contends that three to four times that amount was actually entered. *Op. cit.*, pp. 299-301. Consular Waller's report also points out this disparity. *Op. cit.*, p. 439. See the publication of British Consul Pickersgill's report printed in *The Times* (London), May 12, 1891, p. 12.

\(^{16}\)Income from taxation was estimated to yield from 15 to 17 million francs yearly, but it is stated that only about 800,000 francs reached the central authorities, the rest being absorbed by the bureaucratic hierarchy. Martineau, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-306. The rapacity of provincial governors is noted in a series of newspaper reports. See *The Times* (London), February 26, 1891, p. 6; March 5-6, 1891, p. 5, 11; *The New York Times*, March 5, 1891, p. 4, March 25, 1891, p. 1.
seriously affecting the island's economic growth. Rising prices and diminishing trade were the results of the Prime Minister's failure to modernize governmental fiscal practices, and British economic interests became less adverse to seeing the imposition of some sort of financial order even though this might entail French rather than British domination.

The granting of concessions for the exploitation of the island's natural resources was yet another facet of the struggle for control of its economy. Since no European could purchase land there, lease arrangements were necessary, and the Prime Minister held a tight rein over such matters. Occasionally, tracts would be granted to Europeans who had been of service to the Malagasy Government, but the most common way to gain control of an area of land for a plantation or for mining was through bribery

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17 Rising prices of staple items are noted in The Times (London), May 25, 1891, p. 12.

18 The Madagascar Syndicate, Ltd., formed in October, 1891 for the purpose of mining gold, expressed the belief that Englishmen had nothing to fear if the French took over. This company had secured a concession from the Malagasy Government and included Messrs. S. Proctor, Alfred Haggard and Abraham Kingdon, all of whom had had a long acquaintance with the island's affairs. The Times (London) October 21, 1891.

19 Concessions were given Maigrot and Shervinton and were of this type. Martineau, op. cit., pp. 151-52; The Times (London), January 10, 1895, p. 6.
of Malagasy officialdom, including the Prime Minister. After this complicated and expensive process, the Government levied a fee for the use of the land and furnished laborers for the European concessionaire. Since workers were compelled to render the service free (corvée), they often deserted. In at least one case, workers refused to perform labor in the mines and were bayonetted to death by Hova soldiers. A British mining syndicate found that payment of workers was more efficient than reliance upon forced labor, but the pattern of corvée predominated.

20 Martineau states that the bribes amounted to more than the profits accruing from the grant in the first few years. Op. cit., p. 138. U.S. investigation of Consul John L. Waller, consular agent from February, 1891 to January, 1894, revealed that he had spent over $2,000 in bribes to gain a rubber plantation concession in Madagascar. He misappropriated these funds from an estate left in his charge by an American named Crockett. U.S. Congress, House, House Documents, LVIII, 54th Congress, 1st sess., Doc. No. 224, pp. 3-4.

21 A registration fee of five francs was required of Europeans securing a concession and a yearly fee was exacted. This latter varied from 5% to 56% depending upon the concession. Gold mining concessions were supposed to pay 56% of their profits and other concessions from 5% to 10%. Martineau, op. cit., pp. 308-310; Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 53, pp. 52-53.

22 British Vice-Consul Knott of Majunga reported this incident involving seven leaders of the Makoas, African laborers, who refused to work in the gold mines operated by a French concessionaire. Hansard's CCCXXXII(December, 14, 1888), pp. 228-29.

23 Ibid., Martineau, op. cit., p. 60. The Malagasy termed this forced service fanompiana. Cousins, Madagascar To-Day, p. 57-60.
The rising demand for workers led to an increase in the slave trade between Portuguese Mozambique and Madagascar. The slavers, sailing dhows registered under the French flag, carried on a brisk trade with the Sakalave tribes on the northeastern coasts.\(^{24}\) The French were accused of aiding this traffic by granting French registration to Arabs who used the French flag to frustrate British ships sent to halt such nefarious trade.\(^{25}\) The French were, however, powerless to stop it. De Viliers did induce Queen Ranavalona III to reissue the proclamation of 1877 which stated, "All the Mozambiques who were sold in my domain are freed and become my free subjects."\(^{26}\) The proclamation had no effect and the trade continued because the French could not spare the ships to patrol

\(^{24}\) The Sakalave paid for the slaves in bullocks. No exact figures are available on the number of slaves imported but, in December, 1887, Consul Haggard reported that, in a two-month period, 582 slaves from Mozambique arrived at the east coast port of Maintirano. State Papers, LXXIX, pp. 403-26; Hansard's, CCCXV, CCCXVII(May-July, 1887), pp. 878, 73-74; Parliamentary Debates( Commons).

\(^{25}\) In a letter to Salisbury from Colonel Euan-Smith at Zanzibar, it was noted that "the flag can be obtained with great facility either at Mayotta, Nossi-Be', Comoro Islands or Madagascar at all of which places the difficulties regarding the supply of labor are very great and pressing, and at which it cannot be pretended that the authorities are entirely ignorant of what goes on." September 20, 1888, State Papers, LXXIX, pp. 424-25.

\(^{26}\) The proclamation was reissued at the demand of the French Resident General, March 8, 1889, Archives Diplomatiques, LXXX(1889), p. 222.
the waters and the Malagasy Government could not exercise control over the coastal Sakalave tribes.27

The dearth of laborers was only one of the problems confronting Europeans who hoped to profit by exploiting the island's natural resources. Like the 16th century Spanish adventurers, many European businessmen could think of nothing but gold. But mining, particularly gold mining, was strictly the perogative of the Government. Concessions, when granted, were extremely expensive, with 56% of all ore mined due the Tananarive Government.28

The most successful such enterprise was that of the Frenchman, Suberbie. His vast concession in the Betsiboka-Ikopa river basin required a large investment and, though fairly profitable, labor troubles and raids by bands of runaway bondsmen, fahavalos, seriously hampered operations.29 Nevertheless, despite the high cost of gold mining and the moderate returns from such endeavor, many mistakenly thought of

27State Papers, LXXIX, p. 417; Grandidier, op. cit., pp. 48-52; The Times(London), May 2, 1893, p. 10.


29Martineau, op. cit., p. 162; Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 47, pp. 41-42.
Madagascar in terms of being another Australia, California or South Africa. Great pressure was put on the Malagasy Government to liberalize its mining policies, but the Prime Minister would not yield his control over these or any other type of concessions.

Le Myre de Vilers and his successor were both unsuccessful in securing a voice in the granting of leases. French desirous of gaining economic predominance despaired of the Prime Minister's absolutism in this area but Rainilaiarivony had no intention of relinquishing any control over economic affairs.

The second and most important concern of the French Resident, the Republic's right to "preside" over Madagascar's foreign relations, was brought to a test in the fall of 1887. A change in American consular staff

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30 The Sakalave maintained illegal placer mining operations and a steady trickle of gold reached the coast. Australian, South African and American miners were attracted to the island, because of rumors of the great amount of gold to be found there. These prospectors were frustrated in their ambitions. Waller, op. cit., Martineau, op. cit., pp. 166-68; The Times (London), October 29, 1891.

31 Affaires de Madagascar (1885-1895), passim; Martineau, op. cit., pp. 132-45; Grandidier, op. cit., pp. 36-44; Cousins, op. cit., pp. 150-53; Mondain and Chapus, op. cit., p. 398-402; Faublée, op. cit., p. 488.

32 Ibid.

33 Article II of the 1885 treaty notes that a "Resident representing the Government of the Republic will preside over the external relations of Madagascar," Affaires de Madagascar, No. 57, p. 175.
necessitated the transmission of an exequatur to the Malagasy Government. The French Resident insisted that he should be the one to receive this authorization since, according to treaty, he was to be the intermediary between representatives of foreign governments and the Queen. Instead, the Prime Minister insisted that the credentials must be given directly to his government. Le Myre de Vilers argued that this was a direct violation of French rights and left the capital on September 19, 1887.

Eventually, a modus vivendi was established between the Resident and Rainilaiarivony whereby the former was to be informed of the exequatur.

Le Myre de Vilers had failed to secure French predominance in the economic affairs of the island and was unable to control the island's foreign relations in the matter of the exequatur. His successor, Louise M. Bompard, who had helped organize the Tunisian protectorate, was also unsuccessful in securing Malagasy recognition of

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34 Mr. Campbell was named American Consul in 1887. Martineau, op. cit., pp. 65-85; Grandidier, op. cit., pp. 42-45.

35 Ibid.

36 Quoted in a dispatch from Ribot to Lacoste, March 31, 1892, Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 17, p. 19.
the Resident's right to be the first to receive a con-
sular official's credentials. 37

By 1890, after some five years of French "pro-
tection" the Queen's sovereignty seemed undiminished. There
had, however, been rapid change. The economy had ex-
panded greatly and many islanders were restive under the
traditional restrictions regarding property and the
exploitation of mineral resources. Innovators, both
European and Malagasy, had much to be aggrieved about,
and Rainilaiarivony gave every indication of distrust
for anyone seeking to increase the tempo of modernization. 38
His hope of continuing Radama I's work had yet to be rea-
lized. The Sakalave were far from subdued, and the in-
adequacies of the Malagasy army were becoming apparent to
everyone. 39 The Prime Minister's control of power was

37 Ibid., Nos. 7-14, pp. 11-16.

38 Although 12 Malagasy students were sent to Paris
to study in 1886, when they returned in 1888 they were ig-
nored by the Government. Only one, a doctor, was used by
the latter. The others, teachers, customs officials, army
officers, artists and agriculturists were ignored.

39 Expeditions were sent against the Sakalave in
the Tulear area in 1889, 1890 and 1891. Desertion of
Malagasy soldiers was so great that Betsileo tribesmen
were employed in the campaign. These soldiers were kept
in chains until they were safely aboard the troopship in
Tamatave harbor. The Times (London) August 22, 1888, p. 5;
Le Temps, December 25, 1893, p. 1; Grandidier, op. cit.,
pp. 51-52.
exciting jealousy and fear in court circles and rumors of a rift between the Queen and him were common in Tananarive. Rainilaiarivony appeared able to handle venal bureaucrats, jealous nobles, and greedy concessionaires, but he failed to see that the real danger to Malagasy sovereignty came from without and, as Kent notes, "Internationally, the fate of Madagascar was sealed."^{41}

As early as January, 1888, Lord Salisbury, then Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, had hinted that Britain would recognize French authority in Madagascar in return for recognition of British authority in Zanzibar. Salisbury considered France's claims to Zanzibar fragile but thought that by conceding Madagascar, which he considered little more than recognition of an accomplished fact, he would "silence the anachronistic screaming of the French press and electioneering politicians."^{43}

^{40}Mondain and Chapus, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-402; Faublée, *op. cit.*, p. 486.


At the Brussels Conference in August, 1890, "a colonial arrangement was made." In an exchange of declarations between William Waddington, representing France, and Lord Salisbury of Britain, the British protectorate over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba was recognized by France. In return, Britain recognized the French protectorate over Madagascar, "especially as regards the exequatur of British Consuls and Agents, which must be applied through the intermediary of the French Resident General." Lady Gwendolen Cecil notes that her father considered these declarations as "advancing an already determined issue and would be accordant with Lord Salisbury's creed of undivided responsibilities." He was doing by France in Madagascar as he claimed that she in Egypt, and Germany in Zanzibar, should do by England.

News of this agreement caused consternation in Tananarive, the Queen went into seclusion and the British missionaries and their supporters were, seemingly, thunder-


45The agreement also stated that "In the territories in question, the missionaries of both countries shall enjoy a complete protection. Religious toleration and liberty for all forms of worship and religious training shall be guaranteed." France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents Diplomatiques, Afrique, 1881-1898, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1898), pp. 211-12.

struck by this declaration. Consul Bompard was embarrassed by Rainilaiarivony's astute query of how could Britain recognize a French protectorate when that word did not appear in the 1885 treaty?

Neither outrage nor wit could erase the agreement and the French moved quickly to secure German recognition of the arrangement. In a series of diplomatic exchanges between Berlin and Paris, the German government recognized the protectorate. In return, Alexandre Ribot, Minister of Foreign Affairs in de Freycinet's Cabinet, agreed that existing commercial treaties between Germany and Madagascar be continued in effect.

The exchange of declarations did not end the diplomatic correspondence between France and Britain respecting Madagascar's affairs. Waddington urged Salisbury to recognize French right to adjudicate legal

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47 The Times (London), September 15, 1890, p. 14, September 25, 1890, p. 13, November 3, 1890, p. 1; 3Hansard’s, CCCXLVIII (August 6-18, 1890), pp. 93-95.

48 Martineau, op. cit., p. 95.

49 This exchange between the French Ambassador to Berlin and Baron de Marschall, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, occurred in October and November, 1890. On July 7, 1891, the German Government informed its Consul, Tappenbeck, to use the French Resident General as the intermediary in presenting his exequatur. Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 5-6, pp. 9-10; Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914, VIII, pp. 186, 207, 268-69, 293, 412; E.T.S. Dugdale (ed.) Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, II, pp. 45, 51, 119-120.
disputes between Europeans, but he proved adverse to for­saking Britain's capitulary rights on the island. Supporters of British influence in Madagascar, the missionaries and their champions in Parliament and press had been adverse to the 1890 agreement, and Salisbury experienced this pressure. Further concessions would only compound his difficulties. From June 11, 1891 to August 8, 1892, Salisbury resisted French importunities on the subject. He argued that it was contrary to inter­national law and that, in any case, France did not control the island. He frankly told Ambassador Waddington, "Take Madagascar, establish yourself there as master, we demand nothing better, but it is your affair and none of ours."

In matters which Lord Salisbury construed as part of the 1890 agreement, compliance was forthcoming. Consul Pickersgill, whom the French considered as having advised the Malagasy Government to resist French influence, was removed from his post, and the letters forwarded by

50 The British Consul had the right to adjudicate disputes between British subjects and had great influence in cases involving litigation between British and Malagasy subjects. Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914, VIII, p. 501.

51 Ibid., IX, pp. 38-632, passim.

52 Ibid., p. 487.
Pickersgill from Rainilaiarivony, seeking British aid against French influence, and from Queen Ranavalona III, asking Queen Victoria to intercede on the exequatur matter, were not acknowledged by the British Government. One Porter was finally selected to replace Pickersgill and was sent to Madagascar in the summer of 1892. The French approved of the choice of the man and were delighted to learn that he was under instructions to conform to the letter of the 1890 agreement.

Rosebery, Archibald Primrose, 5th Earl of Rosebery, became Foreign Secretary on August 15, 1892. In his conversations with Waddington, Rosebery directed him to, "Tell M. Ribot that I want to resolve all the pending questions in the most amiable spirit for France." But on the matter of French tribunals in Madagascar, Rosebery took the same position as Salisbury. The ruling of the juriconsul of the British Crown was final—the demand that Britain recognize French judicial authority in Madagascar

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53 Salisbury decided to remove Pickersgill on November 27, 1891. Ibid., pp. 91-92, 122-25, 151. Rainilaiarivony dispatched his letter to Salisbury via Pickersgill. It arrived in March, 1892 and the Queen's letter in April. Ibid., pp. 369, 386.

54 Ibid., pp. 539-41, 554-59, 567-68; Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 17, p. 19; Martineau, op. cit., p. 115.

was not included in the agreement recognizing the French Protectorate. In any case, Rosebery argued, if he agreed, Salisbury would attack him in the House of Lords. As Salisbury before him, Rosebery felt that the French were seeking to gain control over the island without paying the price of an expedition. He bluntly informed Waddington, "Basically, what you want is that we pull the irons from the fire for you in Madagascar." 56

Indications were clear that France must, by necessity, effectively occupy the island. This had been the criteria established at the Brussels Conference of 1890 for the partition of Africa by the European Powers, 57 and neither Salisbury nor Rosebery had any intention of deviating from it to spare France the cost of a Madagascar campaign. By December, 1893, even missionary interests, which had been markedly hostile to French designs on the island, were less adverse to seeing Gallic control established. Xenophobia on Madagascar was rampant and any power which could restore order was welcome. Missionaries agreed that, if France lived up to the religious guaran—

56 September 1, 1892. Ibid., p. 19.

tees of the 1890 agreement, Protestantism had little to lose should France conquer the island.58

The Brussels understanding brought no change in the Malagasy Prime Minister's attitude toward the protectorate. When German Consul Tappenbeck presented his exequatur to the French Resident, Bompard, Rainilaiarivony refused to accept it59 but, when the new American Consul, John L. Waller, gave his credentials directly to the Prime Minister, they were immediately accepted. The American Government apologized for this action60 but, in January, 1894, when Waller's replacement, James Wetter, used the intermediary of the French Resident General, his warrant was not recognized.61 Neither did the British

58 Decrais, the French Ambassador to London, informed Premier Casimir-Perier that his was the prevailing attitude in London in December, 1893. Ibid., pp. 704-705. Yet Charles Dilke, who had long defended Malagasy independence and supported British missionary interests there, was denouncing the French Protectorate in December, 1893 and March, 1894. 4 Parliamentary Debates, XIX, pp. 1366-67, XXII, p. 315.

59 Bompard to Ribot, June 1, 1891, Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895) No. 7, p. 11.

60 Ibid., The American Ambassador in Paris, Mr. Houston, stated that Waller's instructions had been in error and that he had been directed to use the intermediary of the Resident General in future dealings with the Malagasy Government. Ibid., No. 14, pp. 14-16.

Consul Porter, sent in 1892, receive recognition when he honored the intermediary role of the French Resident in delivering his accrediting documents to the Queen's Government.  

Consul Bompard was recalled in October, 1892 "for reasons of health" and, though his period of service was not without accomplishments, the exequatur problem continued to haunt the acting Resident, General Lacoste.  

Lacoste had no more success than his predecessor in surmounting this obstacle and even found it difficult to gain an audience with the Prime Minister. The latter continually put off discussions, alleging ill-health. This may well have been true, for he was several times noted as being near death, and the French hoped that any successor might be more amenable to their influence. Rainilaiarivony's health was restored in time, and his attitude toward the French remained constant. After nine months of fruitless

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62Ibid., No. 17, p. 19; Ibid., No. 15, pp. 16-17.  


64Affaires de Madagascar (1885-1895), No. 17, p. 19; The Times(London) August 5, 1892. Rainilaiarivony seems to have been genuinely ill. Le Temps, October 3, 1883, p. 1, October 29, 1893.
attempts to settle the issue, a new Resident General arrived to take up the old exequatur problem. Monsieur Larrouy, late French Consul at Dublin, arrived to face an increasingly hostile Malagasy Government. Arms importation had grown in volume since 1890 and, in June, 1893, Larrouy indicated that 20,000 to 25,000 breech loading rifles had arrived in Madagascar the previous April. Artillery of various types was also being imported. The Malagasy Government averred that these weapons were to be used solely for internal security, though the French contended that most were shipped to coastal defenses to be used against possible French invading forces. The Republic's repeated requests to Britain, major supplier of these arms, to halt the selling of war material to the Hova, were met with the uniform answer that the British Government had no legal right to forbid these sales.

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65 Larrouy arrived at his new station in June, 1893. 
Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 18, pp. 19-20.

66 Ibid., No. 20, pp. 20-21. The Methodist missionary James Richardson noted that, by September 1894, the Malagasy army had 2 batteries of 7 lb. cannon, 4 pieces to a battery, and 2 batteries of 5-barrelled Gardner cannon, 6 guns to a battery. The Times (London), September 28, 1894, p. 7.

67 Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), Nos. 21-33, pp. 22-28.

68 Since the protectorate recognized the competence of the Malagasy Government in matters pertaining to internal security, it had every right to purchase and receive armaments for her police and army. State Papers, LXXXVI, pp. 1080-81; Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914, XI, pp. 572-73.
Other evidence of Francophobia could not be ignored. For example, 

**fahavalos**

were active in the northeastern and northcentral portions of the island. Georges Muller, a noted paleontologist and explorer, in the employ of the French Ministry of Public Instruction, was killed by such a group in August, 1893. French concessionaires reported that their plantations and mining establishments were under intermittent attack, but the Malagasy Government took no step against such bands. Larrouy could do little to influence the Malagasy Government and, from the beginning of his term as Resident, it was obvious that his was a holding action. By June, 1894 the Resident General reported that no European was safe, any white man or woman being subject to insult and attack. Even a member of his military escort was set upon and beaten by one of the Queen's nephews, Rakotemena and his companions. In spite of his strong plea that France break relations with Madagascar and evacuate the capital, Paris ordered him to stay. The home government was not yet in a position to seek Chamber credits for a military expedition. Gabriel Hanotaux,

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70 *Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895)*, Nos. 36, 38, pp. 30-34.
Minister of Foreign Affairs, felt that such an action could not be justified until an investigating mission had gone out to appraise the situation and had rendered a possible adverse report. In September, 1894, such a mission was set up and, on the 12th of that month, Le Myre de Vilers accompanied by M. Ranchot, an expert in Malagasy language and culture, set sail from Marseilles. The mission's objective was to determine if a military expedition were really necessary to secure French rights in Madagascar. 71

To European observers, it appeared that Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony had lost control. He had, however, been aware ever since 1890 that a confrontation between France and Madagascar was inevitable. His chief fault seemed to have been that he underestimated his European adversaries' power and tenacity. 72 When British recognition of the French protectorate became known, Rainilaiarivony readily gave credence to sycophants who told him that the French army was small and weak. 73 Certainly, his experience in dealing with the French had not

73 Rainilaiarivony, according to a widely circulated story, had gone to the French mission school of Saint-Maixent in September, 1891 to ask the students the true state of French military power. These students
conditioned him to regard the Republic's power too highly.

The Prime Minister had consistently used the French as a convenient scapegoat. Forced loans imposed upon the populace were justified as resulting from French demands and later as necessary to secure arms for protection against France. Increased taxation and work duties were explained in a similar manner. Xenophobia, a periodic occurrence in Madagascar, was a natural result, and this overt expression of hatred for the vazahas (Europeans) was not discouraged by the central administration. Animosity toward the outsiders and their innovations had been a potent force in island affairs in the 1850's and 1860's, and the Prime Minister freely used it again to protect Merina sovereignty. What he failed to appreciate was that the indiscriminating nature of this hatred of all foreigners would alienate his strongest supporters in

deemed it prudent to tell him that, at military reviews, the French circulated the same troops past the reviewing public again and again to give them a distorted view of the size of the French army. Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 13, p. 14; Grandidier, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

74 The indemnity payment required by the 1885 treaty was collected by the imposition of forced loans. Cousins, Madagascar To-Day, p. 60.

75 Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 38, 40, 42 and 44, pp. 32-37. Discussions between Le Myre de Vilers and Rainilaiarivony brought out this point. Ibid., No. 50, pp. 48-50.

76 See the discussion of the reigns of Radama II and Rasoherina in Chapters II, III, pp. 39-43, 82-86.
Europe. By 1894, attacks and insults on Westerners prompted the London Missionary Society and its articulate members and supporters to welcome the extension of French power over the island.  

After more than thirty years of virtually absolute power, the aging Rainilaiarivony was beginning to fear Court jealousies. Reportedly, Razafintsolama, the General who had enjoyed some success in pacifying the Sakalave tribes around Tuléar in 1859-1891, aroused his envy, and escaped poisoning only because he assiduously followed the orders of the Prime Minister.  

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77 The Times (London) April 4, 1895, p. 6. Cousins, a long-time London Missionary Society minister in Madagascar, concludes his book Madagascar To-Day, stating, "War is a terrible scourge. But we cannot read the history of the past without seeing how God has overruled this scourge of war to bring men to a more humble spirit, to teach them the great lessons as to His Government, and so to prepare them for a higher and better national life." Ibid., p. 159. The London Missionary Society census of 1894, covering the Anglican, Lutheran and Quaker missions, noted that there were 2096 stations; 88 missionaries, 75 wives and 16 unmarried women workers in them. There were also 934 native ministers; 5836 evangelists and teachers; 113, 910 communicants; 437,907 native Christians and 1750 schools with 135,067 students. Statistics for Roman Catholic missions revealed 130,000 adherents; 17,338 scholars; 641 native teachers and 114 European agents. The Missionary Review of the World, XVII (1894), p. 506.  

78 Grandidier, op. cit., pp. 49-52; Martineau, op. cit., p. 63; The Times (London), August 22, 1888, p. 5.
matter of succession became an issue when Rainilaiarivonibe, the Prime Minister's eldest son, died of alcoholism in 1891. Rainbow's subsequent selection of the third son, Ratelifera, as his heir, aroused the envy of his older half-brother Rajoelina. During the Prime Minister's illness, the latter plotted with Abraham Kingdon to depose him and assume power, but the father recovered and had his conspirator-son exiled. These intrigues intensified his distrust of the Court and even of his English advisers. The Prime Minister planned Madagascar's defenses with Parret and Shervinton, but was later to reject his British adviser's counsel. It was within this frame-

79 As is commonly the case, the immediate cause of death was pneumonia. Grandier, op. cit., p. 40.

80 The agreement called for Kingdon to use his influence to secure British backing for Rajoelina as Prime Minister and, in return, Rajoelina was to grant Kingdon a large gold mining concession. The agreement was signed May 28, 1892. The New York Times, October 14, 1892. During his illness, Le Temps reported that Rainilaiarivony suspected that he might be poisoned and took elaborate precautions to supervise the food served him. October 29, 1893, p. 1.

81 Strangely enough, though he punished his son by exile, Kingdon, whose name in Madagascar was synonymous with shady dealings and shoddy goods, was not banished until July, 1895. The Times (London), July 13, 1895, p. 17.

82 In January, 1894, Rainilaiarivony and his advisers made elaborate plans to establish several forts on the east and west coasts of the island. Affaires de Madagascar, 1885-1895, No. 34, p. 29. The Prime Minister's failure to carry out these defense plans and to recognize the gravity of Madagascar's position forced these English advisers to leave his service. Ibid., No. 54, p. 54; The Times (London), June 1, 1895, p. 12.
work of underestimating French determination and of inability to curb weaknesses and jealousies of the Malagasy Court, that negotiations between Rainilaiarivony and the French Plenipotentiary Le Myre de Vilers opened in October of 1894.\[^{83}\]

Le Myre de Vilers had arrived October 8th armed with a treaty proposal which would: (1) establish the French Resident General as the intermediary in all of Madagascar's foreign relations, (2) give France control over the granting of concessions, (3) establish France's right to intervene to preserve order on the island, (4) allow the Republic to develop the island's public utilities and to engage in public works and (5) in disputes regarding interpretation of the treaty, the French text would be definitive.\[^{84}\]

Le Myre de Vilers reached Tananarive on the 14th, formally called upon the Prime Minister the next day, on

\[^{83}\] The discussions were foredoomed to failure. After the conquest, Rainilaiarivony made a statement to the European press declaring that, if he had made any concession to the French, he would have forfeited his position, such being the Court's attitude, toward Gallic demands. The New York Times, March 26, 1896, p. 3. Certainly, William E. Cousins dwelt upon the courtiers' hatred of a French protectorate in his address to the London Missionary Society and in his book. The Times (London), June 1, 1895, p. 12; Madagascar To-Day, pp. 153-56.

\[^{84}\] Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 47, p. 46.
the 16th had an audience with the Queen and, on the 17th, presented the French treaty proposal. He had no intention of allowing the Prime Minister to delay negotiations. They discussed the issues on the 17th, 20th and 22nd and, on October 22, the Prime Minister submitted a 12 article counter proposal. Le Myre de Vilers rejected this document which gave France exequatur rights but failed to meet the other demands. In discussion and in an exchange of notes on October 24 and 26, each blamed the other should war result, yet neither would agree to any effective compromise.

His mission a failure, Le Myre de Vilers on October 27, 1894 removed the tricolor from the French Resident's headquarters and left for Tamatave. The Resident's adjudant D'Anthouard, and the military escort at the same time set out for Majunga. The latter's march, more difficult than the Tamatave route, was to test the

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85 Ibid., Nos. 49-50, pp. 47-50; Documents Diplomatiques, Afrique, 1881-1898 XIV, no. 55, pp. 54-55.

86 Affaires de Madagascar, (1885-1895), No. 53, pp. 52-54, No. 52, pp. 52-53.

87 Ibid.; Documents Diplomatiques, Afrique, 1881-1898, XIV, No. 55, annexe, p. 57. Le Myre de Vilers had been instructed by Hanotaux to stall an absolute break in Franco-Malagasy relations until credits for a military expedition against the Malagasy Government had been approved. Negotiations were to be considered still in progress until he had been informed that the credits had been passed by both the Chamber and the Senate. This was done by the Chamber of Deputies on November 27, 1894 and the Senate concurred on December 8. Ibid., Nos. 56-58, pp. 57-59.
effectiveness of what the Hovas considered their first and best defense, Hazou and Tazou, the forest and the fever. With the French departure, the long-expected break between the island Kingdom and the European republic was effected and each now looked to its resources for the pending struggle.

In Paris, the Dupuy Cabinet acted quickly and, on November 13, 1894, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hanotaux appeared before the Chamber seeking funds to finance an expedition. He informed his colleagues that, all else having failed, France must perforce depend upon military strength to secure her rights in Madagascar. He declared that national honor and prestige demanded the dispatch of a 15,000 man army and credits of 65,000,000 francs. A canny Chamber replied by creating a commission to investigate the call for credits. On November 23, Hanotaux again addressed the body, stressing noble and patriotic motives rather than material considerations as the most

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89 *Journal Officiel, Chambre*, November 13, 1895, 1841-1847.
important forces to consider in voting approval. In the ensuing discussion, Julien Dumas, spokesman for the extreme Left, by no means denigrating patriotism, sought to learn the practical, strategic and material value of the island. To him, a vote of 200,000,000 francs to secure Egypt was far more acceptable than one only a third as large to salvage Gallic honor and gain Madagascar. Dumas' hostile attitude won small support and, after further deliberation on November 24 and 26, the Chamber approved the credits 372 to 173 and the Senate concurred nine days later, 264 to 3.

General Duchesne was selected to head the Madagascar expedition and, with heavy shipments of men,
vessels and money committed to his use, there could be little doubt respecting the campaign's outcome. Duchesne's adversaries, the Malagasy army, numbered 45,000 riflemen supported by a few artillery batteries. In an emergency, the regular forces could be expanded to 80,000, and a levée en masse could call out thousands of spearmen. For the private soldier, life in the Malagasy army was distinctly unpleasant. The "ranker" served without pay and was often ill-fed and outfitted because his officers pocketed funds meant for supplies. Anyone who could afford three dollars could buy his way out of the service. Those who could not effect this release took advantage of any opportunity to desert. Thus, professionalism was not in evidence in the ranks of the Queen's army.

In contrast to the rank and file, the Malagasy

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93 Ibid. Schuman notes that again, as in the 1880's, the Republic was embarking upon a war with Madagascar without officially calling it such. Op. cit., p. 122. Since war was not formally declared, Britain naturally would not accede to French request by declaring her neutrality, by recognizing the blockading of Madagascar's ports and by placing an embargo on arms shipments. Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914, XI, pp. 572-73.


95 E.F. Knight, op. cit., pp. 190-95; Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 214-17. Grandidier gives a rather detailed account of the organization of the army and notes that every freeman over the age of 18 was expected to serve for a period of five years unless he could purchase a deferment or induce the village head not to select him for
army officers were affluent but ignorant of modern warfare, and their pride of class made them adverse to allowing Europeans to advise them in military matters. The Englishman, Charles Shervinton, whose role it was to train the army and advise the Prime Minister on military matters, was viewed with jealousy by the officers. Though Rainilaiarivony's English advisers, John Parrett and Shervinton in particular sought to convince him of the necessity for strenuous training and defense preparations to resist the French, the Prime Minister was not moved to act and gave ear to Malagasy officers who flattered him. He consistently underestimated French service. Ranks, called honors by Europeans, were designated by voninahitra, literally flowers of the herb plant, sewn on the tunics of non-comms and commissioned officers. For example: a corporal could display two voninahitra (honors), a lieutenant ten, a general of a division eleven and a field-marshall twelve, Radama I enjoyed the status of seventeen honors. The uniform was white pantaloons, a black vest, edged in red and a white turban-like headgear with the initials R.M.(Ranavalona Manjaka). Others showed the design of the royal crown. Op. cit., pp. 230-31.

96 Ibid., The Times (London), January 5, 1895.

97 The Prime Minister did consent to Shervinton's undertaking the recruitment of South African white mercenaries to help train the Malagasy army and to fight against the French. Advertisements for adventursome men were noted in Durbin and Capetown newspapers. Prospective mercenaries were offered 5 shillings a day and the promise of a grant after the war. This scheme was not too successful, partly because of the Malagasy army's reluctance to accept new advisers, but more importantly, because the French controlled most of the ports and made it clear that mercenaries would be dealt with severely. The Times (London), March 28, 1895, p. 5; The New York Times, October 4, 1894, p. 1.
determination, expecting that the expeditionary force would be content to blockade the coast and occupy a limited area. Since his advisers could not convert him to their view on March 18, 1895 they resigned, and the Prime Minister was left to his own devices to conduct the pending campaign which was soon to test the Malagasy army's resolve to fight for Queen Ranavalona III.

98 The Prime Minister felt that the French could not overcome the forest and the fever, Hazou and Tazou, and would content themselves with the coast. Martineau, op. cit., p. 125; Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 212-17.

99 Besides Shervinton, Major Richards, Lt. Walker, Captain A.E. Neate, Surgeon W.L. Abbott, Lt. P. Waddington, Lt. H. Weldon, Captain C. Hall, and Lt. W.H. Morse, all of whom had served under Col. Shervinton in training and leading units of the Malagasy army, resigned. Mr. Parrett, who had served the Prime Minister for thirty years now gave up his position as did Mr. Prendergast, another civilian adviser of much lesser status. The Times (London) June 1, 1895; Burleigh, op. cit., p. 217.

100 In September, 1895, as the French army approached Tananarive, the Queen was reported to have said to her military leaders, "You said you would fight for me, but you have not fought. I will not yield, I will die in the Palace". The Times (London), October 7, 1895, p. 5. But her resolution was no firmer than her army's. Ibid., October 21, 1895, p. 5.
CHAPTER VI

THE CONQUEST

After years of indecision and vacillation, the Third Republic at length embarked upon a large scale expedition to obtain by force those rights in Madagascar which the French had failed to gain after endlessly protracted negotiations.¹ For General Charles Duchesne, who was reassigned from his post as head of the 14th infantry division to command the expedition, and Ranchot, Adjutant to the Resident General in Madagascar, and Duchesne's political adviser during the campaign, the objectives of the expedition were spelled out in detail by Gabriel Hanotaux, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The goal was the imposition of the French protectorate in unequivocal terms. To facilitate this, the

¹"Rapport d'ensemble sur l'expédition de Madagascar (1895-1896)," Journal Officiel; Documents, Chambre, (September 12, 1896), p. 5106. The report was signed by Duchesne and delivered to the Minister of War on April 25, 1896 and published in the Journal Officiel on September 12.
If the Queen and her Government fled the capital, the expeditionary force was to remain in occupation of the city until the Government came to terms. If the Queen and the Prime Minister refused to agree to the protectorate, a new head of state and Prime Minister, compliant to French demands, were to be selected. Such action, if required, must honor the customs and conventions of the Malagasy in matters of succession. These orders specified that the French Government, realizing the limitations of the Malagasy structure of Governmental control, wished the Queen to continue to rule over the internal affairs of the island. French influence would, of course, bring changes favorable to Western commercial, agricultural and industrial enterprises, but no immediate sweeping changes were to be demanded. Duchesne's orders from the French Government were simply to "definitely

2 March 9, 1895, Affaires de Madagascar, (1895-1896), No. 60, p. 61.

3 The Queen must be a member of the Andrianampinimerina family, and Hanotaux instructed, the Prime Minister must be a man of sufficient personal authority to hold the office and yet be willing to accept French direction and promise concurrence in signing the new protectorate treaty. Ibid., p. 62.
assure the establishment of our protectorate on Madagascar." 4

The treaty which would assure French rights was similar to that proffered by Le Myre de Viliers in October of 1894. 5 The principal exceptions were incorporated in Article V, which stipulated that the Queen would promptly launch the reforms which the French deemed necessary for the island's economic development and the progression of civilization, and in Article VII, which called for a delineation of boundaries for the French naval installation at Diego-Suarez. 6 This treaty was almost immediately amended to include two other articles, one of which called for a revision of Article IV of the treaty of 1868 and Article VI of the treaty of 1885 with the object of assuring French nationals the right to acquire property in Madagascar. A second article gave French tribunals the authority to hear all of the cases involving foreign litigants. This latter provision would abrogate the rights of foreign consular officials to preside over cases involving their nationals. When the French later sought to implement this provision, it brought screams of

4 Ibid., p. 64.
5 Ibid., (1885–1895), No. 47, p. 46.
protest from those Western Powers enjoying capitulatory rights on Madagascar. 7

In his instructions to Ranchot, Hanotaux carefully explained the nature of the social reforms and changes in property laws envisioned. Corvée and slavery must be wiped out but Hanotaux wished them "phased out" rather than abolished by Governmental fiat. 8 On the question of property, custom must be maintained yet circumvented by the issuance of 99 year leases to property holders. The shattering effect of these reforms would be avoided by the application of evolutionary change and, so Hanotaux believed, France could enjoy the fruits of the land without the expense and difficulty of directly administering it as a colony. 9

Hanotaux foresaw no difficulty on the question of tribunals since he believed that the Western Powers would welcome honest French justice over the corrupt and capricious type dispensed by the Malagasy. 10

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7 Ibid., annex II, p. 66.
8 Hanotaux was fearful lest the French, because of incomplete knowledge of native customs and institutions, provoke disorder, chaos and insurrection, by the rapid introduction of reforms. March 28, 1895, Ibid., No. 61.
9 Ibid., p. 71. 10 Ibid.
Minister's vision of a protectorate which would:
(a) answer the needs of modernization, (b) maintain the essential stability of indigenous society and (c) avoid the expense of occupational forces, French administrators and the problem of suppressing xenophobic, quasi-nationalistic insurrections is reminiscent of the advice given by Baudais and Miot in 1884. This concept was not without its detractors, and arguments were already being presented casting doubts upon the efficacy of Hanotaux's program of preserving Malagasy integrity under a French protectorate. On the basis of these instructions, French expeditionary leaders were precluded from bringing in their baggage train the paraphernalia of a French colonial government and were to concentrate on the task of making the Malagasy Government aware that it was under

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11 Miot had said that, if the French tried to administer the internal affairs of the island, it would take twenty-five years and a permanent garrison of 61,000 troops to maintain order and exercise control. In the estimation of Baudais and Miot, the Malagasy Queen's autonomy should be maintained. Ibid., (1884-1886), Nos. 23, 26, pp. 117-121, 124-27.

the protection of France and such awareness was to be accomplished by force of arms.\textsuperscript{13}

Planning for the expedition had been initiated in August, 1894 by representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Colonies, War and Marine. On August 29, the joint committee recommended that the expedition consist of 12,000 combat troops who would proceed from Majunga, using the Betsiboka River as a water highway, to the point of its confluence with the Ikopa, and thence to Andriba and overland to Tananarive. Flat-bottomed boats for carrying supplies and troops were urged as were small gunboats to defend the water route and to check harassment from Hova shore positions. For the land route over the central plateau, Lefebvre wagons were chosen to carry provisions.\textsuperscript{14} Drivers and laborers to build roads and perform unloading operations were to be recruited in Africa, Indo-China and among the Sakalave of the coast. Mules were to be purchased in Ethiopia, Algeria and elsewhere in Africa.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13}Affaires de Madagascar, (1895-1896), No. 60, p. 64; "Rapport d'ensemble sur l'expédition de Madagascar (1895-1896)," p. 5106.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., The Lefebvre wagon was a high-wheeled Algerian type of vehicle which proved unsuitable for the terrain of Madagascar. Unsigned article, "Les Fautes commises à Madagascar," La Nouvelle Revue, XCVI(September-October, 1895), p. 619.

\textsuperscript{15}A cholera epidemic blocked the transportation of 2,000 Indo-Chinese coolies to serve as laborers on the cam-
The expedition was to have been largely the responsibility of the Ministry of the Marine using the forces of the French Colonial Army. On November 15, however, the Chamber placed control of the expedition in the hands of the Ministry of War with the Ministry of Marine arranging transportation. Senegalese, Dahomeian, and Algerian combat units were to be used, as were Marine and Foreign Legion regiments, and certain units of the Metropolitan Army were to be assigned participation.

Campaign. About 3,500 Kabylea, Algerian drivers, were recruited and workers from Somali and Algeria were hired to a total of about 7,300. In Algeria and Ethiopia 6,630 mules were purchased. "Rapport d'ensemble. . . , pp. 5109-5110. Diverse commentators agree that three to four times as many workers, drivers and animals as were provided were needed on the campaign. See "Les Fautes commises à Madagascar," pp. 600-601; "L'Expedition de Madagascar: Journal de M. Ranchot, 11 avril-8 octobre, 1895," Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises, XVIII(1930) p. 340-45, 337-506, passim. Journal Officiel: Débats, Chambre, Session extraordinaire de 1895, November 27, 1895, pp. 2559-61.

"Rapport d'ensemble. . . ." p. 5106. This late change in the organization of the expedition was used as the principal excuse of the Minister of War to answer the campaign's critics in the Chamber of Deputies. Journal Officiel, November 27, 1895, p. 2559-60.

The expeditionary force was officially listed as totalling 14,773 men led by 658 officers and "assimiles" (native officers). Thirteen infantry battalions, 10,400 men were assigned to the expedition. The battalions were garnered from the following sources: 4 battalions from the Metropolitan army, 3 battalions of marine infantry, 1 battalion of legionnaires, 2 battalions of Algerian infantry, 1 battalion of Réunion volunteers, 1 battalion of Malgache infantry and 1 battalion of Haussa(Dahomey) infantry made up the total. Cavalry, artillery, engineer and service units brought the expedition to its full strength.
A regiment of volunteers, given the designation of the 200th, was formed largely at the urging of the Chamber and was assigned to the expedition.  

With authorization to proceed, granted by Parliament early in December, 1894, the Ministry of War formally set up the expeditionary force. By March 1, 1895, General Metzinger, in charge of the advanced guard, had disembarked at Majunga. The Minister of War, General Mercier, made no appreciable change in the route established by committee recommendations the previous August.

The selection of Majunga as the launching point was subject to immediate criticism. It deserved its reputation as a poor harbor for it was inadequate in wharf facilities, subject to treacherous currents and a


19."Rapport d'ensemble..." p. 5132.

20. *The Times* (London) printed an interview with an unidentified long-time resident in which the French choice of route was typified as incredible. The health hazards were great, particularly during the rainy season, and the informant felt that the Tamatave route would have been much better. November 13, 1894, p. 7. One writer felt that the French chose this route to avoid the seasonal hurricanes of the east coast and to enlist Sakalave support. Francis C. Maude, "The Situation in Madagascar," *The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art*, LXXX(1895), p. 105.
pilot's nightmare of shifting sandbars and obstructions. Majunga and the whole Betsiboka region was a breeding ground for malaria, dysentary abounded and tropical diseases of every sort were to exact a frightful toll from the French forces. The government banked upon local residents, the Sakalave, to facilitate matters by furnishing supplies, manpower for labor and fighting forces to help in the destruction of their hated Hova overlords. Ranchot felt that this expectation of Sakalave support was the determining factor in selection of this particular route.

D'Anthouard had successfully led a large party to Majunga from Tananarive in October and November, 1894, thus braving the two great weapons of the Hova arsenal, Hazou (forest) and Tazou (fever). This band of 201 Europeans, including 24 women and 6 children reached Majunga...
without a single fatality. The evacuation demonstrated that a European force, observing the discipline in matters of health so necessary in the tropics, could safely traverse the route. D'Anthouard wisely recommended, however, that any military expedition should rely upon on animals to transport their supplies and should have a large force of native laborers to serve the combat troops. In fact, D'Anthouard, who had observed the lassitude of the Hova army, was convinced that a lightly armed, raiding force of French troops could travel the route and conquer Tananarive without great difficulty.

Planners of military expeditions cannot rely upon the pacific character of the defending army and the French mounted a large-scale heavily armed force for the march on Tananarive. The planners' failure to realize the difficulties of the land route and the mediocre success of the purchasing and recruiting commissioners in securing adequate numbers of workers and animals, led to the universal curse of the Lefebvre wagon. The reason

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23 Strangely enough, the soldier entrusted with administering quinine to the party did his job well, but took none himself so died of fever three days after the party reached Majunga. "Journal de M. D'Anthouard," pp. 270-76.

24 Ibid., p. 277.

25 Eugène David-Bernard, La Conquête de Madagascar, (Paris: Bibliothèque de L'Institut Maritime et Coloniale, 1943), pp. 111-13; R. de Comte, Des différentes phases de l'occupation française à Madagascar; avec une introduction
for the choice was obvious—a wagon can carry more than a pack mule, but soldiers weakened by the grueling labor of roadbuilding and racked by fever failed to appreciate the crisp logic behind the vehicle's selection.\(^{26}\)

The decisions to give the Ministry of War supreme authority for the conduct of the campaign, the selection of the Majunga-Tananarive line of march and the use of the Lefebvre wagons for land transport provoked lively, often acrimonious discussion. No European doubted that the French would reach their objective, Tananarive. The conduct of the campaign, therefore, became the focal point of interest.\(^{27}\)

\(^{26}\) David-Bernard reports that the young soldiers of the metropolitan army, exhausted by laboring, were too tired and indifferent to take even elementary health precautions. \textit{Op. cit.}, pp. 111-13. Letters from officers and men in the campaign note the state of exhaustion and misery engendered by overwork, heat and fever. Letters quoted during the Chamber debates of November 27, 1895. \textit{Journal Officiel}, pp. 2556. See also \textit{The Times}(London) July 1, 1895, p. 5; July 6, 1895, p. 9 and September 9, 1895, p. 3.

\(^{27}\) M. Pierre-Alype brought cheers from the extreme Left when he launched a vituperous attack upon the Ministry of the Marine. Henri Brisson, presiding over the debates, felt constrained to caution him that his language was intemperate. \textit{Journal Officiel}, Chambre, November 27, 1895, pp. 2554-55. Inter-service jealousies are discussed fully in \textit{Guerre et Marine}, and "Les Fautes commises à Madagascar."
In Tananarive, the Malagasy Government deluded itself into believing that natural defenses and the army would forestall a French conquest, and a general paralysis of decision was evidenced by Madagascar's rulers. Defeats were termed victories to avoid the onus of responsibility, the Queen was flattered and deluded by her advisers, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet avoided decisions and the Queen gave serious credence to sorcerers who promised victory. The army's resolute pledge to fight to the death faded with the first glint of the sun from advancing French bayonets and the island troops, so ferocious at the capital, often abandoned their elaborate defense.

\[28\] E. F. Knight, op. cit., pp. 130-85; Bennett Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 105-81.

\[29\] E. F. Gautier notes that the reports of the Malagasy Cabinet meetings were filled with trivia, that the Cabinet was unable to make any decisions, and that it seemed incapable of distinguishing the important from the unimportant. "L'Ame Malgache", Revue de Paris, VII (1900), pt. 1, pp. 400-13; 623-44.

\[30\] Rainijaonary, commander of the Betsileo tribesmen, had his men anointed with "magic fat" and equipped with wood and leather collars to make them bullet proof. He promised the Queen that his soldiers would cast a spell over the French which would blind them. Then his men would bind the helpless French with ropes and stab them to death. The Queen actually furnished ropes and knives to accomplish this "magical" mission. Knight, op. cit., p. 251.
works with the first crash of the melinite shell. No Radama I emerged to lead the Hova and Rainilaiarivony, despite his many qualities, was altogether unable to rally his people to any effective resistance.

While the troops and their equipment were being assembled in France, naval units and detachments of marine infantry were occupying and holding the principal ports on Madagascar. Tamatave was taken over on December 12, 1894, Passandava Bay was cleared of Hova forces in January, 1895 and, on January 14, the French ships Rance and Romanche bombarded Majunga. The next day two companies of Marine infantry seized the port without encountering resistance. General Metzinger, commanding the expedition's advance guard, arrived at Majunga on March 1, 1895. His mission was to prepare the harbor facilities for troop debarkment and landing materials of war and to destroy Hova defense installations at the mouth of the Betsiboka.

31 William E. Cousins quotes General Rainianjalaky's dispatch to the Prime Minister which stated, "I can do nothing. My men will not stand. They run away as soon as they perceive that two or three of their friends have been killed." "The Recent War in Madagascar and Some of Its Consequences," The Missionary Review of the World, IX (new series)(1896), p. 425. Cousins feels that the army's undependability was due to poor leadership, training, and provisioning and, more importantly, to the lack of "a general feeling of contentment with the existing government." Ibid., p. 426.

32 "Rapport d'ensemble . . .", p. 5131-32.
River and those around Bombetoke Bay. From March 1 to March 24, troops of the advanced guard spent their time unloading the materials and animals necessary for the campaign. On March 25, under cover of the gunboat Gabès, action was begun on the Hova installation at Mahabo on the left bank of the Betsiboka near Marovoay.

Mahabo, site of the Sakalave kings' tombs, fell on the 27th. This minor action was deemed important since the freeing of the Sakalave tombs from the Hova army would supposedly assure Sakalave co-operation. A small force, two infantry companies and a section of artillery, was sent along the right bank of the river to secure Miadane and Mivarano, villages near the principal Hova fort of Marovoay. But difficult terrain and resistance by a larger Hova force necessitated the retreat of these troops on March 30.

By April 25, 1895, sufficient numbers of troops from the main expeditionary force had arrived to launch

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33 Ibid., p. 5132.
34 His troops had to unload the Shamrock and the Notre Dame-du Salut. Limited dock space and acute labor shortage hampered operations. Ibid.
35 General Metzinger then had approximately 3,000 men under his command. Ibid.
36 Ibid., pp. 5132-33.
an attack upon Marovoay. A three pronged assault was planned, with a naval bombardment and a direct assault upon the fort (rova), an infantry and artillery column attacking the enemy's right flank, and a third column cutting off the line of retreat. From 3,000 to 5,000 Hova troops were in the area, but the fighting, termed "vigorous" by the official campaign report, was little more than skirmishing, with close combat and sustained resistance virtually non-existent. The Hova avoided encirclement, but lost much of their equipment, food supply and even the correspondence of the Hova commander Ramazombazaha, Governor of Boeni. This action cleared the mouth of the Betsiboka and, by May 19, the advanced guard was ready to move towards Maevatana and Suberbieville,  

General Duchesne and party disembarked at Majunga on May 6. Ranchot, who accompanied the General, describes the scene there as one of chaos. Twenty-seven ships waited in the harbor for unloading. The dock, which was

37 The French losses were 2 infantrymen killed (one Algerian and one Malagasy) and four Algerians wounded. The Malagasy left 16 dead on the field with no estimates of the wounded noted. Ibid., p. 5134, Ranchot notes that 60 Malagasy were slain. "Journal de M. Ranchot", p. 356.

38 "Rapport d'ensemble . . .", p. 5134.
to be doubled in capacity, had not yet been expanded. Not enough labor force was available to facilitate unloading and troops were dragooned into service. Naval and army officers blamed each other for the delays while unacclimatized metropolitan troops sickened and died in the heat and fever of the port.

The river craft which were essential for maintaining supply lines and transporting troops up the Betsiboka were delayed when the English ship, *Brinckburn*, suffered damage enroute to Majunga by a sea accident.

The delay in the delivery of river craft and the shortage

39 "Journal de M. Ranchot," p. 345. Minister of War Cavaignac later explained that currents and the sandy, shifting bottom of the harbor precluded the possibility of expanding the wharf facilities. *Journal Officiel, Chambre, November 27, 1895*, p. 2559-60.

40 Reports on the health of the expedition began reaching Paris and London in July, 1895. Correspondents estimated that 10% of the troops were down with fever and dysentery. The African troops also suffered from the cold of the nights and General Duchesne had to order heavier clothing for them. *The Times* (London) July 1, 1895, p. 5. July 6, 1895, p. 9, and July 16, 1895, p. 13.

41 The *Brinckburn* was obliged to put into Malta for repairs. "Rapport d'ensemble. . . .," p. 5111. The use of English ships was a subject of concern to French critics of the campaign, but the harsh fact was that not enough vessels were available to supply the expedition. Further, the English shipowners submitted lower bids than the French shippers. *Ibid.*, p. 5111; *Journal Officiel, Chambre, November 27, 1895*, pp. 2559-61.
of workmen contributed to the turmoil and intensified the recriminations evidenced among the French staff. Land transportation became difficult and the Lefebvre vehicles were soon criticized. Road building plus the scarcity of animals and laborers meant much additional labor for unacclimatized troops, and the illness and death rates soared.

Logistics became the bane of the expedition, and the Maevatana-Suberbieville march was delayed by difficulties of supply and transport. Communication with the

42Ranchot notes that statements such as "The Ministry of the Marine is inept," or "The Ministry of War is good for nothing", were frequently voiced at Majunga by officers blaming each other for the bottleneck at the port. "Journal de M. Ranchot," p. 345.

43Part of the trouble was the indifference of some men toward normal sanitary discipline. (David-Bernard, op. cit., p. 111-13.) Also, the quinine supply was short. Though adequate medical supplies had been dispatched, some of these were improperly marked. Cousins notes that vast quantities of quinine had been shipped in boxes labeled "nails" and the troops naturally suffered grievously from this mistake. General Duchesne's staff found that it had to rely on quinine from the 800,000 pill supply the commander had brought in his personal medicine chest. The medical officer at Maevatana later complained that they had only thirty grains of quinine for 100 sick men. "Rapport d'ensemble. . .", p. 5108; Cousins, "The Recent War in Madagascar. . .", p. 425; "Journal de M. Ranchot", p. 358; Journal Officiel, Chambre, November 27, 1895, p. 2556. In any case, illness increased and, by the last of May 1,300 men were loaded aboard a hospital ship for return to France. "Journal de M. Ranchot," p. 365.
advanced guard had been assured by ample telegraphic equipment. However, the insulators, wires and batteries did not stand up under the heat, and optical telegraphy was, of necessity resorted to. Small detachments of telegraphers maintained contact between the advance party and the main force, but the isolation, heat and fever posed a problem for these detachments, and their mortality rate was high.  

Suicide became a significant factor on the campaign. 

Military resistance along the Betsiboka River was light, with the Hova troops withdrawing before any serious engagement. Captured reports and letters of Hova officers indicated that outrageous falsehoods were being sent to Tananarive claiming victory. Ramasombazaha even claimed to have burned Majunga. In reality, the ill-led, ill-fed, and ill-trained Hova army lacked the will to fight. Malagasy officers, embittered by court jealousies, homesick and afraid, were seemingly overawed by 

44 "Rapport d'ensemble..." p. 5137-38, Optical telegraphy was difficult because of the numerous night thunder storms. Ibid. 

45 M. Ranchot was almost killed by the ricochet of a suicide's bullet and he notes that some officers as well as enlisted men chose this way to end the misery they experienced in Madagascar. "Journal de M. Ranchot." pp. 400-502, passim. 

46 Ibid., p. 354. 

47 Knight, op. cit., p. 264-65; Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 179-81.
the audacity of the French troops, who advanced under rifle fire unmindful that their comrades fell in the attack. French bayonet charges proved particularly demoralizing to the Hova while the tremendous roar of exploding melinite shells was enough to send troops scurrying from the field. 48

Skirmishes were fought and losses were sustained on the move up the Betsiboka. David-Bernard tells, too, of the problems of supply, particularly the harassment of the fahavalo who raided supply trains at night, wrecking the sleep of the exhausted troops and contributing generally to the misery of the campaign. Raw troops in the metropolitan army failed to protect themselves from the sun, preferred wine to quinine as a fever remedy, and drank unboiled water. 49 By June, Ranchot was noting that the 200th regiment would never make Tananarive, and his prophecy proved correct. 50 Fever victims found little


50 The 200th regiment was badly constituted. Though many were legitimate volunteers, some had reportedly been given the alternative between service with the 200th and court martial. In short, it became a dumping ground for misfits of the metropolitan army. Out of 2,600 men in the regiment, only about 3% to 4% remained in fighting shape at
comfort or succor in the inadequate medical facilities at Majunga. Naturally, as the column advanced, the trip to the hospital lengthened progressively, eventually to almost 500 kilometers.\(^5^1\) At Majunga, many of the sick were put aboard ships to return to France. Some 600 fever-racked men were loaded aboard home-bound ships and left virtually unattended on the long trip back to France.\(^5^2\) A French cemetery at Suez testifies that many never reached Marseilles.\(^5^3\)

The news of casualties caused anxiety at home and Duchesne, already pushing his exhausted troops, was angered by instructions from the home government to press harder.\(^5^4\) His own staff, particularly General Torcy, the second-in-command, contributed to the jealousies between the army and marine forces and wanted to divert forces to capture Fianarantsoa, capital of the Betsileo province. Paper work abounded and the Commanding General, himself subject to the end of the campaign. See "Journal de M. Ranchot", pp. 345-502, passim for a progressive account of this unit's deterioration. The unsigned article, "Les Fautes commises à Madagascar," pp. 621-23, notes that the regiment was virtually wiped out, but Minister of War Cavignac contradicted evidence when he reported to the Chamber that the 200th lost only 26% of its personnel through illness. Journal Officiel, Chambre, November 27, 1895, pp. 2559.

\(^{51}\)Ibid., pp. 2555-63. \(^{52}\)Ibid.

\(^{53}\)A letter signed by J. de la Noë, President of the Société de Bienfaisance de Suez and dated September 13, 1895, testified to these circumstances. Letter reproduced in "Les Fautes commises à Madagascar," p. 627.

\(^{54}\)Journal de M. Ranchot, p. 362.
fever and dysentery, found it necessary to take on duties which a more co-operative staff could have carried out.\textsuperscript{55} Journalists felt discriminated against because Duchesne did nothing to facilitate their coverage of the campaign, but the dearth of conveyances rather than the aloofness or disdain were the root of the problem. This did not stop the newsmen from filing adverse reports.\textsuperscript{56}

The advance guard reached Maevatanana on June 8. Ramasombazaha had evacuated the main defense force, estimated at 8,000 men, from the fort, leaving only a force of 300 to 400 defenders.\textsuperscript{57} The latter departed after a few rounds of melinite had been directed against the fort, leaving behind three new Hotchkiss cannon, some older artillery pieces, large quantities of powder and ammunition, as well as rifles, tents and provisions.\textsuperscript{58} A company of Algerian infantry contacted a retreating band of Hova on June 10 but, after a brief fire-fight at the

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., pp. 363-82.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. Throughout the entire campaign, Duchesne did little to aid newsmen and, during the advance on the capital from Andriba, he left them cooling their heels at Suberbieville. Ibid., pp. 465-500.

\textsuperscript{57} "Rapport d'ensemble...," pp. 5135-36.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 5135.
village of Bezatrana, the enemy force retreated toward Andriba. Bivouac was made at Suberbieville, near Maevatanana, and work began almost immediately to develop Suberbieville as a supply base for the march on the Hova strongpoint of Andriba. The advance guard was reinforced and General Duchesne arrived on June 17 to organize the area as a depot for supplies and replacements, and a staging area for overland provision convoys.

Captured Hova documents had revealed that the Government was advising military commanders to foster partisan war against the French. Destruction of villages, fields and cattle as well as raids on supply columns were recommended, but neither the commanders nor the Hova people responded. However, Rainianzalahy, named commander-in-chief of the army in mid-June, planned a counter attack on the French advance post at Tsarasotra. With nearly 5,000 men at his command, Rainianzalahy hoped to envelop the French advance guard and to reconquer the Maevatanana-Suberbieville area.

On June 29, 1300 Malagasy troops attacked Tsarasotra. The French fended off the attack and launched

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59 Ibid., p. 5136. 60 Ibid.
61 "Journal de M. Ranchot...", pp. 396-98.
a bayonet counter-assault which caused the enemy to withdraw.\textsuperscript{63} Thirty Malgache dead were left on the field. One French officer and a corporal were killed while six other soldiers were wounded. The next day reinforcements, infantry, cavalry units and artillery, arrived. The Hova forces were defeated and withdrew from the field.\textsuperscript{64}

The defeat at Tsarasotra demoralized the Malagasy army and, on its advance toward Andriba, the French column encountered ample evidence of a precipitous retreat. Resistance, in fact, was negligible, but supply was a constant problem.\textsuperscript{65} The Sakalave had proven undependable in providing the French expedition with beef and the Sakalave regiment, recruited at Diego-Suarez, deserted on June 16.\textsuperscript{66} The village populations feared the French, and

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{64}The French reported that they had inflicted an estimated 200 casualties at the cost of 10 of their men. Ibid. The action at Maevatanana and Tsarasotra had a profound psychological effect on the Malagasy soldier as evidenced by Rajestera's memoirs. G. Mondain, (ed.), "Des Soldats Francaise chez Ranavalona III," p. 75-77.


\textsuperscript{66}"Journal de M. Ranchot," p. 380. Ranchot had never trusted the Sakalave and Msgr. Cazet, Roman Catholic Bishop of Madagascar, told an audience at Lyons that the Sakalave were undependable, indolent, and untamable, and would never be good for anything. \textit{The Times}(London), August 15, 1895, p. 3.
although such locals offered no resistance, it was diffi-
cult if not impossible to purchase food en route. 67

Supplies had to be carried overland from Suber-
bieville to Andriba. In this difficult terrain, it be-
came increasingly evident that rapid advance was im-
possible. Heat and labor took their frightful toll and
it soon appeared that a lightly armed, rapidly moving,
raiding column might well be the only French force capable
of reaching Tananarive before the October and November
rains. 68 Some staff members, particularly General Torcy,
feared that such a "flying column" would be cut off and
annihilated by the Hova. This was certainly a risk, but
previous Hovan fighting performance scarcely warranted
serious concern on that score. 69

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67 Reportedly, the Hova had taken Sakalave women and
children as hostages. It was also reported that they were
holding Sakalave relics to assure their non-co-operation
Whatever their reasons, the non-Merina peoples of Madagas-
car did not flock to the French banner as M. Grandadier,
President of the Comité de Madagascar had predicted. "Bull-
etin du Comité de Madagascar", (Paris: Comité de Madagas-
car, March, 1895), pp. 5-10.

68 General Metzinger raised the possibility of such
388, Duchesne began planning such an action August 4,
"Rapport d'ensemble...," p. 5137.

69 Torcy felt that the expedition needed heavy re-
forcement and that it would not reach Tananarive before
1896. Ranchot notes that illness had begun to color
Torcy's judgment and feared that the General would not
Andriba was reached on August 22. The camp, which had recently held 5,000 Hova troops, was now deserted. Documents found on the site and a Malagasy officer's diary show that the camp had been riddled by disease and that the average death rate was 30 daily. Neither officers nor men desired to stay and fight, and the desertion rate was extremely high. Reports noted that Ramasombazaha, the commander, was in a state of despair, and that his officers made no attempt to offer resistance to the French advance.70

The French themselves were in poor shape. Replacements arrived, but Ranchot estimated that there were less than 7,000 effectives out of a total French force of some 14,000 troops.71 The unfortunate 200th regiment, the volunteer one from the metropolitan army, was practically out of the campaign.72 Though faring better than that hapless unit, the marine and colonial army elements were also hit by exhaustion and fever.73 The situation called

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70 Prisoners reported that Ramasombazaha constantly sobbed and prayed for release from his punishment. "Journal de M. Ranchot," p. 494.


72 Less than 800 of this 2600 man regiment were considered in good enough health to qualify for the "flying column". "Rapport d'ensemble. . . .," p. 5158; "Journal de M. Ranchot," p. 459.

73 Illness in the various batallions varied from 20% to 40%. The colonial army suffered less than the metro-
for quick action and General Duchesne abandoned any attempt to maintain supply lines, and equipped a self-sustained "flying column" of infantry, artillery and cavalry forces to march on Tananarive in a desperate attempt to seize the capital before the rains came. On September 14, 237 officers and 4,013 troops marched from the supply depot at Andriba in a grueling trek through Merina territory toward Tananarive. Once on home territory, the large Malagasy army might have enveloped the French, but Duchesne, while recognizing the danger, felt the chance worth taking.

Pressures from Paris had helped in forging this decision. Critical reports on the campaign made the Home Government anxious for a quick conclusion and, on September 18, Hanotaux went so far as to instruct Duchesne to

politian army and it was generally conceded that older, more seasoned troops fared better than the young conscripts. See "Journal de M. Ranchot," pp. 468-502; "Les Fautes Commises à Madagascar," pp. 621-25; Guerre et Marine, p. 277.


75 See Duchesne's address to his troops, "Rapport d'ensemble. . .," p. 5158.
moderate the treaty demands if such modification would hasten the cessation of hostility.76 As Chamber debates and the journals of the participants indicate, Duchesne was under pressure from the army.77 Service rivalry and the Ministry of War's hopes to secure control over the French colonial army, then administered by the Ministry of the Marine, necessitated bold action to attain the campaign objective mapped by the military planners in Paris.78

76 Hanotaux noted that Duchesne could make a unilateral announcement of the Hova submission to the French protectorate, without first obtaining the Queen's signature to the treaty. He was also willing to moderate the treaty demands: The rights of intervention and the control of concessions could be eliminated, and Article VII, dealing with the delineation of the boundaries of the Diego-Suarez naval base could be scrapped. Affaires de Madagascar, (1895-1896), No. 63, p. 72. Ranchot later informed him that the Hova would not have understood a unilateral decree and that, in any case, the expedition had reached its objective and that such actions and concessions proved unnecessary. Ibid., No. 66, p. 74.


78 The goal was to seize and occupy Tananarive and then secure recognition of the French protectorate. This was to be reached by the first part of September. "Rapport d'ensemble..." p. 5112.
While the French column marched on toward Tananarive, engaging in small, insignificant skirmishes along the way, cursing the heat and fever and tortured by hunger intensified by odors from the cooking fires of the ever-retreating Malagasy army, a state of fear permeated the Malagasy capital. At Tananarive, the Queen and the populace came to realize that the war was going badly. Long deluded by reports of triumphs and engaging in fantasies of victory encouraged by charlatans, Ranavalona III began to fear that the French could not be halted. Foreigners, suspect since the beginning of hostilities, found their lives and property threatened. Private soldiers arrested as deserters were burned at the stake while officers who betrayed their command purchased immunity from punishment. The Prime Minister hoarded guns and ammunition in the Treasury although the troops in the

Ranchot notes that the hungry French troops were tormented by the smells of cooking rice and beef emanating from Hova encampments. "Journal de M. Ranchot," p. 471

Ranchot cites numerous captured documents which show that Malagasy army officers were not reporting the truth to the Government in Tananarive. "Journal de M. Ranchot", pp. 345-502, passim. Two British correspondents who spent most of the war in Tananarive note that, toward the end of the campaign, the Queen was becoming fearful of the turn of events. Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 319-30. Knight, op. cit., pp. 275-300.


Knight, op. cit., p. 190-95.
field were without proper equipment, and intrigue was ever present. Pro-French courtiers were singled out and killed for treason, while others impudently cheated the army of its supplies and monies. Even funds raised by church groups for medical and food supplies were diverted to the personal coffers of high officials.

Still the Queen and the Government held on to the false hope that effective resistance around Tananarive would check the French advance. Once the French tide was stopped, the rapidly-approaching seasonal rains would wash the French invaders back into the sea.

83 Knight gives a graphic description of his trip in the Prime Minister's company through the Tananarive Treasury and arsenal where decay and mold were destroying supplies and materials so desperately needed by the armed forces. Op. cit., p. 251.

84 Knight and Burleigh both note that there were many pro-French officials in the court. Some were caught and sentenced to death, some purchased their freedom. One case is cited where a member of a French party was promoted and given command of a distant village. Actually this was a death sentence, for his escort was instructed to murder him somewhere along the way. Strangely enough everyone knew the appointment's design but this manner of execution was preferred because it did not require Government officials to assume responsibility for the public execution of a nobleman. Knight, op. cit., p. 234-55; Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 304-305.

85 Burleigh, op. cit., p. 297.

86 Had the Hova mounted an effective resistance the Queen's hopes might have been realized. Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 328-29; Knight, op. cit., p. 267; Cousins, "The Recent War in Madagascar...," pp. 425-26.
By September 28, the French column was within sight of Tananarive. Carefully constructed fortifications ringed the city, with 6,000 troops concentrated at the western and northeastern approaches to the city. Reportedly, 2,000 more formed a roving defense force hidden outside the city to flank the invaders. 87

At a staff meeting on September 29, the French, who had approached the city from the west, decided to march eastward to secure the northeastern heights dominating the city. There was some fear that the Malagasy might envelop the small rear-guard, a battalion of Hausa (Dahomey infantrymen) led by a Colonel de Lorme, 88 but the Hausa battalion stood firm. Flanking action by Hova forces was avoided and the commanding heights of Ankatso and Ambatomara fell by 9:30 A.M. on September 30. Artillery fire was heavy and hand to hand fighting was necessary to dislodge the defenders. A Hova counterattack forced the Algerian regiment's Third battalion to retreat, but artillery dispersed the skirmishers and a bayonet charge cleared the area. By 1:45 P.M., the French were in firm

87 "Journal de M. Ranchot," p. 489.
control of the high ground and the Malagasy forces were retreating into the city. 89

Many Malagasy soldiers and civilians flocked to the Queen's palace for protection. The sanctuary was, however, a veritable powder magazine for the Queen had vowed to blow herself and the palace to bits if her forces could not defend the city. At 2:44 P.M., the French opened fire on the royal palace and the Prime Minister's residence. 90 Three melinite shells struck the buildings, a fourth exploded in the palace courtyard, killing many refugees and destroying the red velvet upholstery of the Queen's throne with shrapnel fragments. 91

At 3:30 P.M. on September 30, a white flag was raised over the palace, the shelling ceased and Marc Rabibisoa, Secretary and interpreter to the Prime Minister, appeared before the French commander to ask for a cease fire until qualified emissaries could be sent to seek terms. 92 The Malagasy official was given forty-five

90 Ibid.
91 Burleigh, op. citl, p. 342. Under the French, the larger royal palaces became museums and the throne, with its ripped upholstery was placed on display. E. Alexander Powell, "Through the Land of the Malagasy: An Expedition into Madagascar," The Century, CIX(December, 1924), p. 246.
92 "Rapport d'ensemble...," pp. 5164-65.
minutes to produce someone qualified to accede surrender before the French troops stormed the city. At 4:30 P.M., Andriamifidy, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Radilifera, Rainilaiarivony's son, yielded Tananarive.\[93\]

The exhausted French troops occupied the city without clamor or incident.\[94\] At 8:00 A.M. on October 1, the French commander and Ranchot met with Malagasy officials to sign the treaty. The proceedings were over by 9:00 A.M. but it had become apparent that Rainilaiarivony must be replaced. While Malagasy reaction to the terms was one of awe at French leniency, the Prime Minister circulated rumors that, when the main body of French troops withdrew, the Hova would rise and drive the remainder from the country. It was therefore urgent that he be deposed and sent into exile.\[96\] Anti-French courtiers were removed from positions of power and on October 7, Rainitsimbasafy, fat, senile and "a sort of humanised Malagasy rice-pudding,"

93 It is interesting to note that, at the time of the cease fire, the French soldiers had less than 80 rounds of ammunition each and the artillery had only 200 shells left. *Ibid.*

94 For the campaign route, see the map on the next page.

95 *"Journal de M. Ranchot," pp. 500-502; Affaires de Madagascar, (1895-1896), No. 64, p. 73.*

96 *Ibid., Nos. 66-67, pp. 73-76.*
Fig. 8

Areas of French occupation and the main line of march

Advance of the *colonne légère* (light or flying column)

† French attacks on Hova defense positions

200 kilometer scale
was installed as Prime Minister. Queen Ranavalona III at first objected to this choice but her objections were allayed by the French and outward quiet was quickly restored to the land. The restoration of peace was promptly undertaken by disarming the remnants of the Malagasy army and by the opening of trade routes.

The march on Tananarive had been accomplished at high cost. Monetary expenditure reached 64,000,000 francs, but the loss of lives was more surprising. Of the 21,680 men involved in the campaign, 5,592 lost their lives.

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97 Burleigh, op. cit., p. 351; The Times (London), October 21, 1895, p. 5; Le Temps, October 15, 1895, p. 1.

98 Schuman notes: "The Queen objected to him supposedly because of his obesity and senility, in view of the old Madagascar custom of making the Prime Minister the spouse of the ruler. He was finally accepted on condition of the temporary lapse of the quaint old folkway." Op. cit., p. 124.

99 Affaires de Madagascar, (1895-1896), No. 67, annexes II-III, pp. 77-79.

100 The capture of Tananarive was accomplished at the cost of 10 French dead and 56 wounded, 12 of them seriously. "Rapport d'ensemble...," p. 5165. No list of Malagasy casualties were reported but estimates of observers would place the number killed in the hundreds. David-Bernard, op. cit., p. 154; Burleigh, op. cit., p. 342. The low French casualty rate was partially due to the fact that Hova ammunition rounds often proved to be bad. Ibid. "Rapport d'ensemble...," pp. 5163-65.
lives.101 A break-down of these fatalities shows that 3,417 were officers and men of the metropolitan army, 772 were marines and 1,403 were colonial troops.102 This heavy death rate is all the more shocking when a break-down of causes reveals that only 20 died in combat or from wounds sustained in combat. The rest succumbed to illness: 72% died from malaria, 12% from typhoid, 8% from dysentery, 4% (mostly Algerians or West Africans) from tuberculosis, 3% from sunstroke and 1% from diverse causes including accident and suicide.103

An English writer termed the mortality rate "the highest known in modern warfare."104 Yet Minister of War Godefroy Cavaignac compared it favorable to that of the Tonkin action and of the British campaign in Ethiopia in 1867. However, he listed only the casualties of the metropolitan army and excluded the deaths of legionnaires and native infantrymen.105

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102 Grandidier, op. cit., p. 116; David-Bernard, op. cit., p. 166.
103 Ibid. 104 Knight, op. cit., p. 299.
105 A total of 4,500 dead was cited for the Tonkin action. The British expeditionary force was much larger and employed three times the number of laborers and pack animals used by the French in the Madagascar campaign. Journal Officiel, Chambre, November 27, 1895, pp. 2159-61.
The appalling death rate from disease led to much soul-searching and many recriminations, but attempts by the parties of the Left to launch an investigation failed. The Chamber of Deputies was more interested in the nature of the 1895 treaty and what France had gained from the expedition, than exposing the mistakes of the campaign.  

No accurate statistics are available for Malagasy army losses. Its combat casualty rate was, however, much higher than that of the French, and the Hova army also suffered from malaria and other diseases. Their overall casualty rate was, therefore, probably higher than that of the French. One Malagasy writer's estimates indicate that tens of thousands were killed. This figure seems too high, but a crude estimate of 10,000 to 15,000 dead might not be too farfetched.

106 Ibid., pp. 2551-67.
107 "Rapport d'ensemble..." pp. 5131-65. See also Annuaire de Madagascar, Année 1898 (Tananarive: Imprimerie Officielle, 1898), pp. 1-32.
108 "Journal de M. Ranchot," passim; Burleigh, op. cit., passim; Knight, op. cit., passim.
109 A vague and seemingly exaggerated count of their losses may be found in a recent book by a Malagasy writer. But no more than a rough estimate can be made. See Jacques Rabemananjara, Nationalisme et Problèmes Malgaches, (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1958), pp. 36-37.
What had the expedition accomplished? Dominique O. Mannoni, in his provocative interpretation of the psychology of colonization contends that the French acquired the aura of authority once held by the monarchy by conquering the Queen's forces. He uses the Malagasy epic poem, Sova momba ny Vazaha, descriptive of the whites, to show that "the blue eyed strangers are truly strong." By conquest, the French had become the new authority symbol of the Malagasy psyche. This idea, however, needs some clarification, for the conquest did not remove the Queen from power. The outbreak of a small insurrection on November 22, 1895, during the observation of the Festival of the Bath at Arivonimamo, 40 kms. southeast of Tananarive, illustrates that xenophobia was still strong. Though the French saw it as an anti-Hova, anti-Christian demonstration, it seems to have symbolized the unconquered spirit of the Merina people.

Rainilaiarivony, removed from power and exiled to Algeria, illustrated the Merina psyche when he declared, immediately after the conquest which had failed to destroy the fabric of monarchy, that the Vazaha (foreigners) would

withdraw as they had in the past, and that the Merina Kingdom would again be paramount.\textsuperscript{112} Events of the next few months would reveal that the French could not establish sufficient power to assure tranquility in Madagascar.

The Queen, who had "trembled" before French might,\textsuperscript{113} still sat upon the throne, and events were soon to show that the expedition had not brought unequivocal recognition of French authority. Getting the Malgache to recognize their defeat was central to the problems encountered by the French in establishing their new position internally and internationally.\textsuperscript{114} The successes and failures of their efforts will be discussed in the following chapters.

\textsuperscript{112}Affaires de Madagascar, (1895-1896), No. 67, annex I, pp. 75-76.

\textsuperscript{113}From Sova momba ny Vazaha. O. Mannoni, op. cit., p. 168.

\textsuperscript{114}Article I of the protectorate treaty of 1895. Affaires de Madagascar, (1895-1896), No. 60, annex I, p. 65.
CHAPTER VII

FROM PROTECTORATE TO COLONY

Since the days of Flacourt, Madagascar had been viewed as one of the jewels of the Indian Ocean. With the conquest, the expectations of generations of French adventurers, missionaries and expansionists appeared to have been realized.¹ The New York Times noted:

The big shipping towns, Marseilles, Havre, and Toulon, are celebrating the conquest of Antananarivo with illuminations and banquets on the explicit understanding that they are to control the incidental [trade] and have no competition with the English, Americans, Germans, and Norwegians to fear, and the Clerical Party is rejoicing with quite as much fervor that the Protestant missionaries in the island are to receive their congé. The few cynics, like Clemenceau and Richfort, who say that this is only the beginning of a terrible, costly and futile adventure, get no listeners.²

²October 13, 1895, pp. 1-2.
The Edinburgh Review noted dourly:

Mankind are slow to learn that the acquisition of a wild uncultured territory, and the conquest of a sparse and barbarous people are not desirable objects, and entirely fail to repay the sacrifices by which they are purchased. 3

The unheeded voices of disenchantment were prophetic, and the campaign's cost in men and monies were to be but a down-payment for the great Red Island.

The French conquest had been justified as an expedition to suppress a rebellion. The action in itself brought no adverse response from the Western Powers, but a few incidents naturally arose as a result of the campaign. 4

At Tamatave, an altercation between officers of the American gunboat Castine in August, 1895, led to a minor Franco-American disagreement. 5 Arrest of the American Negro ex-Consul to Madagascar, John L. Waller, in March, 1895, created more difficulty. 6 Waller, who had

3CLXXXII (July-October, 1895), p. 523.
4Journal Officiel, Chambre, November 27, 1895, p. 2551.
5The American ship Castine supposedly refused to salute the French flag and her officers were barred from landing at Tamatave. Captain Lavoisat, the French officer who blocked the American landing, was censured and the matter was dropped. The New York Times, August 28, 1895, p. 16, September 1, 1895, p. 9; Joseph Dubois, "Les droits de la France sur Madagascar et le dernier traité de paix," Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée, XVIII (1896), p. 632.
6House Document 225, p. 4.
misappropriated funds given in his trust while Consul, had become a large rubber plantation owner. He had remained in Tamatave after the occupation and had sent letters avoiding the French censor to the Malagasy capital. These messages noted the weakness of the French garrison, commented that small pox and fever had struck there and reported that the French were cruel to the Malagasy in Tamatave. He also informed Malagasy officials that two Americans in Tananarive, Draper and Purdey, were French spies, apparently seeking revenge on them for their past actions in some unspecified business venture. French officials arrested Waller for circumventing censorship and transmitting information prejudicial to France. He was found guilty by a French court and sentenced to twenty years hard labor. The American Government concurred that Waller was obviously guilty, his own letters indicting him, but he was released after ten months imprisonment and returned to America.

7Ibid., pp. 4-9
8The United States Government spent $1,317.14 to furnish transportation and aid to Waller's family in their return to the United States. Ibid., p. 9. Waller was released from Clairvaux prison in France, an act of grace due to his supposed illness. He returned to America to raise funds for an indemnity suit. The Government's report clearly indicated that he deserved none. Ibid., pp. 12-147; James D. Richardson, (ed.) A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1910), Vol. VIII, pp. 6060-98. Waller was singled out by The New York Times
These incidents were minor compared with those of 1883, yet international complications plagued French officials as they began reorganizing the island's administration.

Pierre Berthelot, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Premier Bourgeois, announced to the Deputies on November 27, 1895 that the Hova rebellion against the protectorate had been crushed and that "the island of Madagascar is today a French possession." He noted that a more precise treaty would be concluded with Madagascar and pledged France to honor her commitments regarding Madagascar with foreign powers. Schuman noted:

Madagascar thus became an unparalleled juristic monstrosity—not so much because of a chemist's ignorance of the fundamental legal concepts which he handled so cavalierly, as because of his desire to placate all shades of opinion in the Chamber by a purposely ambiguous statement of the situation.

as an example of the supposed fact that "the better class" Negroes were not taking appointments in Government service. February 22, 1896, p. 41.

Léon Bourgeois was Premier from November, 1895 to April 29, 1896. He took over the office of Foreign Minister on March 28, serving in this dual capacity until his ministry fell in April.

Journal Officiel, Chambre, pp. 2551-52.

Ibid.

France had justified her actions on the basis of the protectorate agreement which recognized the validity of pre-existing Malagasy treaties with other Western Powers. The enthusiastic but vague Berthelot statement could be interpreted to mean that Madagascar had been annexed.  

On December 11, 1895 the island's administration was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Colonies and the Resident General's powers were delineated on the same day. That official now became the depository of French authority in Madagascar and the deciding voice in matters relating to internal and external affairs, except for the disposition of troops under the authority of the local French military commander.  

By the order of December 28, 1895, a French judicial system was organized and established in Madagascar. Reorganized on June 9, 1896, the Gallic system retained native courts but unilaterally abrogated the capitulary rights which had been held by other Western Powers in Madagascar.

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13 Berthelot's statement that Madagascar was a French possession certainly gives this connotation. Ibid.; Journal Officiel, Chambre, p. 2551; Affaires de Madagascar, (1896), No. 3, p. 7.

14 Affaires de Madagascar, (1895), Nos. 70-71, pp. 81-83.

The statements and decrees of November and December indicated that Hanotaux's concept of a protectorate had been modified to favor more direct administration. The vision of the island as an Eldorado had persisted in spite of contrary statements by knowledgable "old Madagascar hands" and, almost as soon as the shooting stopped, hundreds of impecunious but hopeful colons from Reunion, Mauritius and elsewhere came to Madagascar.

Hanotaux's idea of indirect rule and the evolution of the Queen's Government toward a more acceptable Western form had succumbed to the pressure for direct control. Colonial demands were important in forming this

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17 Chinese and Arab immigrants were likewise reported coming to the island and, in spite of the advice of the Madagascar Committee that prospective colons would need sound financial backing, most seemed to have more hope than cash. The Times (London), October 26, 1895, p. 10, May 9, 1896, Bulletin du Comité de Madagascar, pp. 1-2.

18 Messrs. de Mahy, Brunet and Dureau de Valenty, all Reunion representatives, led the move for annexation. The Chamber commission established to report on the matter was headed by de Mahy. Granddier, op. cit., p. 129; Journal Officiel, Chambre, June 21, 1896. Hanotaux notes
policy, but one cannot ignore the obvious fact that the Malagasy Government was still unco-operative. Continued turmoil in the island helped convince the French Government that direct control was the only way to assure French interests in Madagascar.  

In December, 1895, Hippolyte Laroche was named Resident General of Madagascar and instructed to receive Queen Ranavalona III's acceptance of modifications of the October 1 treaty. On January 18, 1896, the Queen announced from her Silver Palace in Tananarive that, "after having taken cognizance of the declaration of taking possession of the island of Madagascar by the French Government Her Majesty declares her acceptance of the following conditions...." The provisions called for the surrender of internal and external control over the island's affairs to the Resident General. The Queen's

that the issue was decided in favor of direct control when Duchesne and Ranchot were replaced by the new Resident General, Laroche. "Madagascar et le Regime du Protectorate", p. 477.

19 Hanotaux became Foreign Minister in April, 1896 and in May instructed de Cource, the French ambassador to London, that the continuing state of unrest on the island necessitated the move toward direct control. Documents Diplomatiques Francaise, 1871-1914, XII, p. 611-12.

20 Ibid., Affaires de Madagascar, (1896), No. 1, p. 5; Schuman, op. cit., p. 124.

21 Affaires de Madagascar, (1896), No. 2, pp. 5-6.
Government was also enjoined to promulgate reforms recommended by the French Resident and was constrained from contracting any debts without the latter's authorization. Though the Malagasy Government continued to exist, all real authority had passed to the Resident General. Schuman aptly terms this Queenly declaration "a one-sided capitulation rather than a contractual agreement." 23

There soon followed a series of measures which abolished Malagasy restraints on property ownership in fee simple and restrictions on mining operations, particularly gold extraction, which had been so vexing to Europeans. This westernization of land titles and mining regulations was soon administered in such a way through licensing, registration and control as to favor French owners and exploiters over other Western country owners.

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24 The property law was promulgated on March 9, 1896 and the decree regulating the mining of gold, precious metal and stones was issued on July 17, 1896. State Papers, LXXXVIII, 1224-32, 1240-42.
nationals. Thus, by the simple expedient of using the Malagasy Governmental organization to promulgate French law, the Republic seemingly avoided the proliferation of functionaires so deplored by Hanotaux. In avoiding one pitfall the French opened other, deeper ones. The Queen's Government proved less than a compliant vessel for the French helmsman, Laroche, and international complications arose over France's vacillations between direct and indirect administration of Madagascar.

Minister Berthelot soon sent a general notification to Western capitals that France had been forced by circumstance to take definite possession of Madagascar. The American Secretary of State, Olney, was shocked to find that this French decree constituted a unilateral nullification of the treaties the United States had made with Madagascar. The establishment of French court jurisd-


26 Actually, a Corps de Residents was established by a decree of December 28, 1895 and many functionaires reportedly, flocked to Madagascar during the Laroche residency. Archives Diplomatiques, LVI(1895), pp. 300-302; The New York Times, July 12, 1896, p. 1; July 24, 1896, p. 3, August 20, 1896, p. 4.

27 February 14, 1896, Affaires de Madagascar, (1896), No. 3, pp. 6-7.
diction over all litigation in Madagascar, annulling the authority of consular courts, likewise irritated the American State Department. Washington argued that there had been no formal announcement that Madagascar was a French colony and vigorously protested French actions regarding judicial and property regulations there.

Lord Salisbury likewise lodged strong protests against the French action. The Prime Minister argued that the Third Republic had justified its military expedition on the basis of securing Malgache recognition of the protectorate and then had unilaterally acted to abrogate that protectorate and Britain's treaties with Madagascar.

28 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896, pp. 119-33.

29 Salisbury's position is best expressed in his own words of August 4, 1896. He stated: "Her Majesty's Government have no wish to embarrass France in her task of developing the resources of Madagascar, and they have already expressed their readiness to abandon their judicial rights in the island simultaneously with the surrender of the extraterritorial privileges claimed for French citizens in Zanzibar. But they cannot but feel that to reserve the annulment of their Treaty rights till the expedition, undertaken with the assurances above cited, had made France mistress of the country, and then to declare those rights to have lapsed in consequence of a declaration of annexation, would be a proceeding for which no countenance can be found in the practice of international law." State Papers, LXXXIX(1895-1896), p. 1072.

*Salisbury put forth this association in his conversation with de Courcel on May 22, 1896. Ibid., p. 1055.
To help still the voices of protest, French President Félix Faure on August 6, 1896, signed a law making Madagascar a French colony.  

This decree helped curtail American opposition, though the State Department made a formal complaint against later French decrees regarding land registration in Madagascar, but Britain was far from satisfied.

When French tariff regulations were instituted in Madagascar in 1897, Great Britain was much upset. Throughout 1897 and 1898, diplomatic correspondence on this matter was exchanged between France and Britain and Salisbury was vigorously criticized for allowing

30 The law was approved by the Chamber on June 30. The Senate concurred on July 11. Annexation also meant that slavery in Madagascar was to be immediately abolished by virtue of the fact that the island was now a French colony. Journal Officiel, Chambre, June 30, 1896; Sénat, July 11, 1896; State Papers, LXXXIX(1895-1896), p. 486. The decree was not promulgated in Madagascar until September 27, 1896. Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. 13, (September-December, 1896), p. 241.

31 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896, p. 133-35; Ibid., 1897, pp. 152-54. See footnote 29 for the British attitude toward the annexation.

32 French goods had been freed from the 10% ad valorem tariff on August 6, 1896, but in September, 1897 Gallieni had placed an export duty on exported goods, animals, animal products, vegetable and fabricated products. Archives Diplomatiques, LXV(1898), pp. 215-18.

33 Correspondence on this matter is found in Africa No. 8(1897), pp. 273-99.
France to take over Madagascar.\(^3^4\) The British Prime Minister was less concerned with the French takeover than with the manner in which it was done.\(^3^5\) British recognition of French rights in Madagascar had long been tied to French claims on Zanzibar and the issue became a perennial one, blowing hot and cold depending upon the international situation.\(^3^6\)

The Fashoda Crisis and all other events, including the Boer War, which saw a strain in Anglo-French relations, brought mention of the Madagascar situation.\(^3^7\) It was not

\(^3^4\) In 1898 restrictions against British trade and French regulations directed against British merchants in Madagascar and the marketing of British products were discussed and protested. This correspondence is found in *State Papers*, XC(1897-1898), pp. 394-514.

\(^3^5\) Dilke attacked Salisbury for his policy of concession which Dilke saw as "selling us out". Admiral Field, member from Sussex, Eastbourne, replied in defense that the French acquisition of Madagascar "is ancient history, and we need not trouble our minds with it". Parliamentary Debates, LVIII(June, 1898), pp. 1324-40. Discussion on the French annexation of Madagascar and the state of British trade there may be found in *ibid.*, XL-LXI, passim.

\(^3^6\) Salisbury told his colleagues that his administration and the previous Gladstone administration had accepted French predominance in Madagascar, his only objection was the way France had acted and had introduced tariff measures adverse to Great Britain. *Ibid.*, LIII (February, 1898), pp. 35-37.

until 1904 when Britain and France settled their overseas differences through the Entente Cordiale that the Madagascar-Zanzibar dispute was closed. In fact, as late as 1910, French procedures in annexing Madagascar were cited as constituting bad precedent in the annals of international diplomacy.

The fairly large expeditionary force which had been dispatched to Madagascar did not long remain on the island. By December, only a garrison force of 39 officers and 1,777 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Belin were left. Through October, November and December ships left Tamatave and Majunga harbors bearing troops, sick and healthy, homeward to France or

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38 The declaration between the United Kingdom and France concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides archipelago was signed in London on April 8, 1904. The final text noted: "In view of the agreement now in negotiation on the questions of jurisdiction and the postal service in Zanzibar, and on the adjacent coast, His Britannic Majesty's Government withdraw the protest which they had raised against the introduction of the Customs tariff established at Madagascar after the annexation of the island to France..." State Papers, CX(1904) p. 397; Archives Diplomatiques, XC(1904), pp. 435-36.

39 Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 was compared with France's takeover of Madagascar. Sir Edward Grey did not protest the fact that annexation abrogated previous treaty rights, but was careful to insist that tariff rates then existing should remain in effect for ten years. Documents on the Origins of the War, VIII, pp. 489-98.

40 The garrison was made up largely of infantry units with light artillery support. "Rapport d'ensemble..." p. 5166.
North Africa. This dissipation of the expeditionary force seemed to the Malagasy as fulfilling their ex-Prime Minister's predictions. On October 1, 1895, Rainilaiarivony had circulated rumors that France would soon withdraw most of its troops, and that the Malagasy people could then drive the remainder from the island. The French, of course, acted quickly to disarm the population and reports from Dúchesne indicate that the order was being executed by Hova officials, but the too rapid reduction of French forces in Madagascar proved to be a serious error. At first all seemed calm. On the first Sunday after the fall of Tananarive, the church sermons stressed the benefits of peace and the new order. Transportation was restored as the recruiting of porters became easier, and the reopening of trade with the coast was soon accomplished. Vague rumors of unrest were

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41 Over 5,200 sick and convalescent troops were evacuated between August 15 and November 19, 1895 and, in December 6,219 able-bodied officers, troops and laborers were repatriated. Ibid., pp. 5168-69.

42 Affaires de Madagascar,(1895-1896), No. 67, annex I, pp. 75-76.

43 Ibid., annex II-III, pp. 77-79.

44 Dúchesne noted that, at the church services attended by the Queen, the pastor made reference to the "Divine Grace" which willed the Malagasy defeat so they could enjoy the magnanimity of their conquerors. Ibid., annex II, p. 78.
denied by Duchesne who felt that they were more talk than fact or, at worst, merely the lawless actions of brigands flourishing during unsettled times.\textsuperscript{45}

By late November news from the east coast revealed that anti-foreign sentiment had led to an attack on an Anglican mission station at Ramainandro.\textsuperscript{46} On November 22, 1895 the uprising at Arivonimamo led to the death of the Johnston family. Two companies of French troops arrived on the scene and dispersed the so-called fahavalos after a brief battle but Razafinivoavy, the insurgent leader, escaped, and anti-European sentiments continued to ride high.\textsuperscript{47}

Sporadic outbursts of violence were also directed against Hova officials outside the Merina and Betsileo areas. In December, Sakalave tribesmen took vengeance upon Hova officials in the Majunga area and Betsimisaraka insurgents attacked the Hova around Tamatave.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., p. 78; "Rapport d'ensemble...," p. 5166-67.

\textsuperscript{46}Article sent November 30, from Tananarive. The Times(London), December 14, 1895, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{47}Johnston, a Friends Society missionary, his wife and child were killed and mutilated by a mob which, reportedly, included students from their mission school. "Rapport d'ensemble...," p. 5166; The Times(London), February 18, 1896, p. 13; February 29, 1896, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid.
attacks were, however, not confined to Malagasy officials, Europeans were also objects of Malagasy wrath. Violence blossomed in widely separated parts of the island, mission stations being raided and churches burned, while tales of native return to sorcery and witchcraft were reported. Evidently, the xenophobia which had been such a part of Malagasy history was again bubbling to the surface.49

Some writers contend that the violence of non-Merina peoples was solely vented against the Hova or the French. Supposedly, the Hova were attacked because of their past crimes against these captive peoples and the French were set upon because they had failed to grant tribal independence to these ex-Merina subjects.50

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50 Some Frenchmen blamed the English missionaries for much of the difficulty. This was an unfair accusation since the English Protestant missionaries were as vulnerable to attack as were the French and were disillusioned by the desecration of their mission churches and the alacrity with which many of their "converts" espoused the old practices of fetishism and witchcraft. V. d'Yerville, "Le régime civil et le régime militaire à Madagascar, Laroche et Gallieni," Le Correspondent, CLXXXVII(1897), pp. 615-38; Christian Schefer, "La Question de Madagascar," La Nouvelle Revue, XCII(1895), pp. 660-78; Pierre Mille, "Les hovas et l'insurrection de Madagascar", Revue Bleue, XXXIV(1897) 4e Série, pt. I,
Actually, these October, November and December, 1895 outbursts were neither solely anti-French nor anti-Hova, but were mixed in motive, the only constantly discernible features being a general xenophobia and a tendency to revert to old religious practices. While the arrival of armed and disciplined troops was sufficient to put down such scattered outbursts, garrison units were small and the territory vast. To maintain order on the island, the French needed the co-operation of the Queen's Government. Yet, to many of the Governing elite, the French were enemies of their traditions and, more particularly, of their perogatives of power and wealth. Rather than co-operate with the French, the Malagasy ruling elite sedulously fostered and led these insurgent elements in a

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52 Gregory notes that "The insurgents have not the remotest chance of being able to resist even a small body of disciplined troops..." Op. cit., p. 355. Duchesne's report of the first few encounters with rebel bands bore this out. "Rapport d'ensemble..." p. 5166.
consistent attempt to rid the land of the vazaha and to reinstate the old order. 53

Despite the great power accorded him, Resident General Laroche attempted to cultivate the illusion that the Queen still ruled the island. He became a student of Malagasy language and showed deference for their customs, and the court protocol of the Merina Monarch. 54 Such actions on his part brought criticism from Europeans in Tananarive who felt that Laroche was being duped by the Court. 55

53 The ruling elite feared the loss of the positions in the government and its members were also convinced that the French intended to abolish slavery. Both developments were viewed with dread. Ibid.; Grandidier, op. cit., pp. 120-23. A modern Malagasy nationalist argues that the Hova middle class supported the French. He views the actions of the elite as an attempt to rally national conscience to free Madagascar from foreign rule. Raymond W. Rabemananjara, Madagascar sous la Rénovation Malgache, (Paris: Petites Imprimeries, 1953), pp. 11-13. Certainly, some Malgache officials co-operated with the French in putting down the insurgents, others, however, led rebel bands in attacks upon Europeans. Ibid.; The Times (London), January 28, 1896 - September 30, 1896 passim; Le Temps, January 28, 1896-September 30, 1896, passim; The New York Times, January 28, 1896-September, 1896, passim.


55 A Protestant, Laroche was suspect by some for his deference to the Malagasy Court. Ibid.; The New York Times noted: "There is a concerted effort on the part of the small French colony of office seekers and contract mongers out there to get rid of the Resident General, Laroche, whose double offense is that he is learning the Hova language, so as to be able to deal intelligently with the urgent native problem, and is resolutely extending fair play to the English-speaking missionaries of the
From January through March, the island experienced a period of tranquility. This quiet seemed to justify Laroche's cultivation of the ruling elite, yet it seems likely that the calm was more the result of the rainy season, a time of great activity for the rice-growing villagers, than of any increased acceptance of the French administration. 56

Grandidier noted that, in February, royal couriers were sent out to the provincial governors of Merina with unsigned messages ordering the staging of an insurrection. 57 March saw a renewal of violence against European property, institutions and individuals. 58 Insurgent groups easily intimidated the unarmed villagers into joining in the attacks partially because the peasant feared for his own life and property if he did not, and partially because of grievances against French rule, coupled with the traditional xenophobia and conservatism of the rural populace. The villagers had good reason to complain for, in

56 Gregory, op. cit., p. 355.
58 Ibid., The Times (London), April 8, 1896, p. 3.
their efforts to hasten communications, the French had instituted roadbuilding projects which involved condemnation of the rights-of-way. These had not been accompanied by adequate compensation and landholders became understandably angered by this loss of tillable acreage. Taxes and forced labor on these projects likewise bore heavily upon the people and rumors that the French would conscript their young men for military duty outside Madagascar also kept the rural population in turmoil. 59

North of Tananarive, Rabezabana, Governor of d'Antsatrana, and Rabozaka, the Governor of Ambohidrazana, declared war on the French and, in March, 1896 took up the old fetish symbols, the **sampy**, and began attacking mission stations and outposts. 60 Laroche chose to regard these

59 Gregory, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-60. The fact that the French used troops recruited from recently acquired colony Dahomey in conquering and later in garrisoning Madagascar had not been wasted on the observant Malagasy. See "Journal de M. Ranchot," *passim*.

60 The red *lamba* was also displayed when the rebels entered a village. Grandidier, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-21. There were various *sampy*, the most famous being the Rakelimalaza which consisted of three slivers of wood from a sacred tree. These pieces were wrapped in a silk cloth anointed with the oil of the castor bean and kept in a wooden box. A temple was erected to house this charm and priests watched over it. When carried, it was kept in the box and shaded by a red umbrella. James Sibree, *The Great African Island*, (London: Trubner & Company, 1880), pp. 297-301.
attacks as the actions of isolated bands of outlaws and argued that Franco-Malagasy co-operation would eventually bring peace and stability to the island. By the end of March, the uprising had spread to the south. Three Frenchmen were killed by rebels at Manarisoa on March 29. By April guerilla bands in the north and south linked forces on the eastern borders of Merina. Commercial convoys, mission stations and isolated villages were attacked. Franco-Malagasy troops sent against these mobs-in-arms usually forced them from the field, but the Government forces were neither large nor mobile enough to maintain order. The insurrection gained momentum and, by May, four of the six Merina provinces were in open revolt. In the west, Sakalave tribesmen co-operated with the Hova rebels in attacking isolated outposts and even caravans of travelers were subject to ambush.

Rataizambahoaka, chief of Ambohitrondrana, led insurgents against mission stations and even attacked a

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61 The Times (London), July 11, 1896, p. 7.

62 Grandidier, op. cit., pp. 120-23. A Belgian couple, Mercier, and an Irishman, Molyneaux were also murdered. The Frenchmen killed were MM. de Brie, Michaud, and Grand. The Times (London), May 11, 1891, p. 8.


64 The garrison numbered less than 2,000. Ibid., The Times (London), May 11, 1896, p. 8.
caravan of prospectors traveling under military escort.65 Reports in July indicated that Europeans had been fired upon as they had ventured out of the gates of Tananarive. The capital was nearly surrounded and armed caravans found it increasingly difficult to march from Tamatave to Tananarive. By August, rumors were rampant that the rebels planned to launch a three-pronged attack on the city and thus destroy the French.66

In her public statements, the Queen made repeated pleas for a return to peace, but her advice was ignored and the rebels argued that, privately, Ranavalona III was sympathetic to their cause.67 This was probably true and few Europeans doubted the words of Dr. Forsyth Major that "the strings of the present revolution are being pulled by high Hovas at the capital, men who are trusted by the French."68 Resident General Laroche, a perpetual optimist, was convinced that the situation would ease once the people realized the benefits of the new order, but

65Grandidier, op. cit., p. 124.
68The Times (London), September 9, 1896, p. 3.
Paris did not agree. Annexation and strong pacification methods seemed the only way out of France's double difficulty of securing international recognition of her innovations in Madagascar and of stilling the rebellion within the island.

On August 6, 1896 Madagascar became a French colony. To pacify the recalcitrant Malagasy, Minister of Colonies Lebon now called for the services of General Joseph-Simon Gallieni, stationed in Tonkin. Gallieni had enjoyed a long and brilliant career in pacifying rebellious colonial areas and he had perfected a technique of pacification which had recently been successfully applied in the Sudan and in Tonkin. This method, which he termed the "drop of oil" technique, consisted in securing a small sector, pacifying it and radiating outward from this base in ever enlarging circles. Beside military pacification, Gallieni was an advocate of providing tangible reasons for accepting French rule. Schools were immediately established in pacified areas, medical services were provided inhabitants of the circles, and autonomous local

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69 d'Yerville, op. cit., pp. 624-29.

70 This fact is stressed in *Journal Officiel, Chambre*, June 30, 1896.
government, conforming to local customs and utilizing indigenous chiefs, was immediately instituted. From sector to circle and larger territories, the area of pacification expanded until the entire country was brought under control. French military officers were given responsibility for areas under their command together with authority to administer them but, eventually, military authority would give way to civilian administration. Flexibility was maintained in each area, tribal customs were religiously observed and indigenous governmental machinery was utilized in administering pacified districts. The technique of observing tribal equality, termed the politiques des races by Gallieni, was to be most effectively followed in Madagascar where Hova hegemony had been imposed upon diverse tribes.

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Gallieni arrived in Tamatave on September 16 and found new orders from Minister of the Colonies, André Lebon, awaiting him. The instructions authorized him to take over the position of Resident General as of September 28. Both military and civil authority were to be combined in the person of Governor-General Gallieni. The latter reached the capital on September 18. He declined Laroche's offer of an audience with the Queen at her palace and insisted that she come to him. Ranavalona III dutifully visited Gallieni on September 19. His abrupt departure from protocol convinced the Queen and her Court that Gallieni was intent upon forcing the Malagasy to recognize French pre-eminence in Madagascar.

73 Hubert Deschamps and Paul Chauvet, (eds.), Gallieni Pacificateur: Ecrit Coloniaux de Gallieni, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949), p. 184-85; Grandidier, op. cit., p. 131. This combination of powers in the hands of Gallieni made him the Governor-General in fact, a title not formally bestowed on him until July 30, 1897. The decree was signed by Félix Faure, President of the French Republic and by the Minister of Colonies, André Lebon. Archives Diplomatiques, LXIII(1897), pp. 343-44.

The Laroche era was over but, before he relinquished authority, the Resident General promulgated a decree abolishing slavery in Madagascar. This measure had long been dreaded by the island's slave-holding elite. In Tananarive alone, two-thirds of the townsfolk were slaves and the nobles received a great part of their income from servile labor. Hanotaux had feared the social consequences of emancipation and this was one of the important reasons in his advocacy of the protectorate plan over annexation. Actually, this great reform brought little further disruption in a land almost totally given over to rebel control. One could argue that the anticipation of emancipation was more important than the event itself and life actually was little changed since most hands stayed with their former masters.

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75 This decree was signed by the French President in August, 1896 but was not officially promulgated in Madagascar until September 27. Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. 13, p. 241. Slave owners were not compensated.


Upon assuming power on September 28, Gallieni envisaged his function as that of a Gallicizer. The power of the Queen and the ruling elite had to be broken and the influence of the British missionaries, a group he suspected of encouraging Hova resistance, must be destroyed in order to secure the territory for France. Of course, he lacked the power to accomplish these objectives immediately, but wasted little time in progressively implementing measures designed to effect his goal.\(^7\)

His speech to the Queen of September 28 clearly stated that Madagascar was a French colony and would be treated as such. Though he conciliated the Queen with a closing paragraph calling for an amicable settlement of differences, he left little doubt that he looked upon Ranavalona III and her courtiers as the fount of rebellion.\(^8\) He began to chip away at the Queen's power and prestige by ordering that she surrender her royal seal, returned to her by Laroche as an indication of reconciliation. Visits to the Queen were strictly regulated and the format of the official government publication was changed to indicate the primacy of

\(^7\) Gallieni, *Lettres*, pp. 11-15; Gallieni, *Pacificateur*, pp. 185-86. Gallieni began the pacification with less than 2,000 troops and never had more than 12,000 at his disposal. Gheusi, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

\(^8\) Gallieni, *Pacificateur*, pp. 175-76.
French influence. In October, the monarch's title was changed from Queen of Madagascar to Queen of Merina.

The equality of French justice was emphasized by the trials and executions of the Minister of the Interior, Rainandrianampandry and Prince Ratsimananga, the Queen's uncle, for actively aiding the rebellion. Princess Ramasindrazana, the Queen's aunt, was exiled for the same reason. Any individual found guilty of participating in the rebellion was subject to confiscation of property and death by a firing squad. By executing members of the Court, Governor-General Gallieni hoped to intimidate the rebels of all classes and, although he informed Le Myre de Vilers that he would use this method of arrest and execution with restraint, the firing-squad deaths of

81 Commander Gérard, Gallieni's Chef d'Etat Major, took charge of the seal on October 16, 1896 and, by an order of December 9, 1896, passes were required before one could be admitted to visit the Queen. Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. 14, p. 53, 92. On September 27, 1896, the journal's title was changed from Ny Gazety Malagasy to Journal Officiel de Madagascar et Dépendances. The practice of printing Malagasy and French text in parallel columns was abolished and the bulk of the Journal was printed in French with only a small section of each issue printed in Malgache. Ibid., pp. 1-12.

82 Gallieni Pacificateur, p. 185.

83 Ibid., p. 194. Prime Minister Rainitsincazafy resigned and the General announced that there would be no successor to this office. The Times (London), October 31, 1896. Rainandrianampandry was something of a scholar and published a book, Histoire des Coutumes des Ancêtres, shortly before he was shot. Gautier, op. cit., p. 623.

84 Gallieni Pacificateur, p. 194.
hundreds of rebels won for Gallieni the nickname of "the rifleman" and island-wide hatred.85

Gallieni likewise moved rapidly to counter the prestige and influence of the British by launching an attack on the quality of education administered in the mission schools. In a special meeting with the missionaries, he told his audience that the Merina-Betsileo mission educators should spend less time on religious doctrine and more in teaching. To supervise these educational facilities, Gallieni assumed control over education and insisted that French replace English as the European language taught. This decree, though impossible to implement because of the lack of qualified teachers, indicated to the missions that they must aid in the Gallienizing of the Malagasy or cease to function.86

85 William Cousins, "Military Rule in Madagascar," The Missionary Review of the World, XX (1897), pp. 675-78. A Malagache nationalist writer accuses Gallieni of killing nearly 700,000 people in his first four years as Governor-General. Since the population of Madagascar was less than 2.5 million, this would mean that one-third of the population was exterminated by the 12,000 troops under Gallieni's command, a patent impossibility. Rabemanjara, op. cit., pp. 11-15. Actually, amnesty and parole were more widely used than firing squads in the pacification of the island. Gallieni was naturally attacked for his use of repression. Gallieni Pacificateur, p. 197. Cousins estimates that executions ran into the hundreds seems fair though it, too, is disputed by a recent writer who notes that executions were not characteristic of Gallieni's methods. Kent, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

86 There were 2,150 free mission schools, 400 of these being Roman Catholic enrolling 126,000 students. Gallieni Pacificateur, pp. 177-92. M. Georges Pillias
Gallieni's distrust of the mission schools was not rooted in any anti-Protestant bias but in the fact that he, like many another Frenchman and Malagasy alike, equated Protestantism with the British and British Protestants with British national interest.\(^8\) He underlined this distinction by his October 5 decree ordering all French officials to observe neutrality in religious matters. He nonetheless appropriated the London Missionary Society's hospital in Tananarive, and several English missionary buildings in the various villages of Merina and Betsileo were taken over for official use by local French officials.\(^8\)

To avoid confiscation of property and to preserve Protestant interests in Madagascar, the London Missionary report on Education in Madagascar details Gallieni's philosophy of education and details the difficulties encountered in changing the schools from a British to a French curriculum. *Congrès de L'Afrique Orientale (Madagascar et Dépendances-Côte Française des Somalis)*, Congrès Coloniaux Périodiques, October 14, 1911,(Paris: L'Union Coloniale, Française, 1912), pp. 39-51.


\(^8\) Ibid.
Society temporarily turned its holdings over to the Paris Missionary Society. Both English and French observers noted, however, that some Jesuit fathers in Betsileo and Merina villages organized groups of Malagasy youth to pressure families not to send their children to Protestant schools and, reportedly, equated Catholicism with French interests.

By January, 1897, Gallieni had confided to Le Myre de Vilers that he would like to see both Protestant and Catholic missions expelled from the island. Their bickering interfered with the operation of his subordinates in the various sectors and, were it not that the missions provided useful schools, he would gladly be rid of all of them. Eventually, Gallieni became convinced that the

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90 Allier, op. cit., pt. I-II, pp. 322-27; 98-105. Also see the articles by Cousins, letters and newnotes from The Missionary Review of the World, XX, XXI. The Month, an English Roman Catholic publication, argued that many of the stories of Jesuit intrigue against the Protestants were fabrications of imaginative natives and cites Bishop Cazet's order to all members of the Society of Jesus to abide by the instructions of religious neutrality promulgated by the Governor-General. LXXXIX (January-June, 1897), pp. 467-74. The decree was published February 13, 1897, Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. 14, p. 141.

91 Gallieni Pacificateur, p. 198.
British Protestants were not an inimical influence to French control of the island. He, however, never became reconciled to what he considered the inferior education of the mission schools, nor did he understand or sympathize with the doctrinal disputes between the Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries. To Gallieni, these inadequacies and differences were vexating and unwelcome additions to the many problems he faced in pacifying and administering the island.

Gallieni's frustrations in handling the various religious sects were partially allayed by the efficiency of the military pacification. Beginning with Tananarive in Merina and Fianarantsoa in Betsileo, the Governor-General established a line of post 15 kilometers from Tananarive. Within this line his troops began ferreting

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92 Gallieni had merely attempted to lower British prestige in Madagascar. He felt it was missionary influence that had flattered the Court's and the Queen's pretensions. After he deposed the Queen, Gallieni felt that, as long as they co-operated with the administration, the British missionaries posed no counterweight to French authority. Ibid., pp. 199-202. It should be noted that the London Missionary Society had early pledged their loyalty to the new regime, but Gallieni refused to trust the British until he was strong enough to overthrow the monarchy. The Times (London), March 12, 1896, p. 5. William Cousins, "Brighter Days in Madagascar," pp. 272-72. See p. 638 of the same volume.

93 Gallieni's religious neutralism and his approval of the policies of the Socialist Party was unusual for a French military man and his views were construed by some to mean that the General was either an agnostic or an atheist. His family assembled documentation to show that the General was religiously-minded and died within the
out rebels and reorganizing village administration. Local leaders acceptable to the French and to the villagers were selected, educational and medical services were established, and calm was restored. In Betsileo, Hova officials were replaced by native chiefs and, in Merina, leaders sympathetic to the new order were named to serve as local administrators under the direction of French sector and circle commanders. 94

As order was restored, the French forces moved outward to establish a new line of strong points within rebel territory. In the pacified areas, blockhouses where small forces could respond to any rebel incursions, were built. 95 By 1897, Gallieni noted that the pacification of Merina and Betsileo was near completion. Rebel bands still ranged the forests and hills on the periphery of these provinces, but the Governor General felt by then


95 Gallieni Pacificateur, p. 192.
that French control was strong enough to set aside the monarchy, the last symbol of Merina hegemony in Madagascar. 96

Without waiting for official approval from Paris,97 the Governor-General on February 28, 1897 deposed Queen Ranavalona III and abolished the Merina monarchy with the statement that, since Madagascar was a French colony, the institution had ceased to serve a useful function. Therefore, the decree read:

I have invited the Queen to resign her functions and, on her demand, I have authorized that she be conducted to the island of Réunion, where she will be received with the greatest hospitality by the French authorities.98

Gallieni not only exiled Ranavalona III and wiped out the monarchy,99 but he also ordered that the tombs of the

96 Ibid., pp. 200-203.
99 Ranavalona was sent to Réunion and from there to Algeria where she died in 1917. In 1932, her body was returned to her native land to rest with those of her ancestors. The best account of the Queen's exile is that by Alfred Durand, the French officer charged with escorting her to Reunion. Les derniers jours de la Cour Hova: l'exil de la Reine Ranavalona, (Paris: Société de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises, 1933), pp. 28-110.
ancient kings of Merina be moved from the sacred village of Ambohimanga to Tananarive where they rested under the shadow of the French tricolor. 100 Even the celebration of the Festival of the Bath was changed to coincide with Bastille Day. The elimination of the monarchy and the destruction of the relics and festivals surrounding this Merina institution took the fight out of the rebellious Merina elite. On March 29, 1897 Rabezavana surrendered his forces to the French, and Rainbetsimisaraka, the last Merina nobleman to resist the French, capitulated in June. 101

The throne of Andrianampoinimerina became a curiosity for view by Sunday spectators visiting the palace-museum in Tananarive. 102 The expanded ambitions of this great king, who had sought to unify the whole island under Merina rule, seemed relegated to the dust bin of history, but the Queen's mantle was taken over by Gallieni. As Kent notes, "Although Gallieni was born on a different island, it was he who, in the final analysis,

101 Malzac, op. cit., p. 632.
102 Powell, who visited Madagascar in 1924, described the royal tombs as follows: "On the elevated terrace which forms one side of the palace courtyard stand the royal mausoleums, curious wooden structures, brilliantly painted, which look like sublimated dog-kennels." Op. cit., p. 246.
carried out the political mandate of King Andrianampoinimerina.\textsuperscript{103} This dynamic Governor-General's activities and policies in pacifying rebellious groups, unifying diverse tribes and organizing the political, economic and cultural life of Madagascar will be the subject of our final chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PACIFICATION AND ORGANIZATION
OF THE MADAGASCAR COLONY

The abolition of the Merina monarchy and the
shattering of Hova hegemony in Madagascar was but one
step in the pacification and organization of the island
of Madagascar. There remained for Gallieni the tremendous
task of "pacifying" the Sakalave tribes of the west, the
various southern ones such as the Bara, Mahafali, Antandroy,
Tanala, and those of the southeastern and eastern coastal
areas. Many of these had never recognized Hova control and
were adverse to outside authority. Some, such as the
Tanala, lived in areas where troop movements were made
difficult by rugged terrain, thick jungles and inadequate
or nonexistent avenues of communication.1

Pacification, in the strict military sense, was no
real assurance against the perpetual "lawlessness" evi-
denced by these fiercely independent tribal groups.2

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2 Lyautey contended that brigandage was a "way of
life" for many of these tribes. Maréchal Lyautey,
"Lettres du Tonkin et Madagascar," Revue des Deux Mondes,
Gallieni's technique called for definite military action coupled with the practice of tribal equality. Defeated in battle, the various groups would then be organized under the authority of a recognized tribal leader who would look to the French for advice and direction.\(^3\) By maintaining tribal separateness, the Governor-General sought to avoid the danger of bursting the fabric of traditional tribal life and fomenting perpetual discontents and possible insurrections.\(^4\) Tribal separateness was eventually to give way to island unity as customs and institutions were modified and westernized under the pressures of education and economic change. To Gallieni, flexibility rather than rapid innovation and bureaucratic centralism were the ideals of colonial pacification.\(^5\)

French colonies, however, must pay their own way. This policy, certainly not unique to French Colonialism, meant that every effort be exerted to make Madagascar self-sufficient and hopefully, a profitable overseas possession. The French Republic displayed little interest in spending millions of francs to develop the potential of

\(^3\) Gallieni, *Lettres*, p. 15.

\(^4\) Gallieni *Pacificateur*, p. 342.

her colonies and colonial administrators were expected to
develop local resources with as little expense to the
metropole as possible. 6

Gallieni's method of pacification was based upon
economic penetration. From garrison commanders to private
soldiers, the military organizations afforded every poss­
ible assistance to the development of the island's econ­
omy. Soldiers were directed to use their individual
skills to foster modern techniques of craftsmanship.
Carpentry shops, metal working skills, and modern methods
of agriculture were employed by the military garrisons to
demonstrate by example the benefits of modernization. 7

Military posts were instructed to open shops dis­
playing French merchandise, to familiarize local peoples
with western products, and to build a consumer demand for
French products. 8 Military pacification, the policy of
tribal equality, politiques des races, and economic pene-

6Launois, op. cit., p. 245; Shepard Clough, France:
A History of Nation Economics, 1789-1939, pp. 250-53. See
also statements of the Chamber commission reporting on the
request for credits to build a railroad in Madagascar.
Journal Officiel, Documents, Chambre, Annexe No. 1295,
December 18, 1899, pp. 561-78.

7Gallieni, Lettres, p. 22; Gallieni, Pacificateur,

8Gallieni praised Lyautey's action in opening such
a shop when he was in command of the circle of Maintriano,
Lettres, p. 22.
tration involving the totality of Malagasy life were the essential aspects of Gallieni's tache d'huile. 9

The Governor-General applied these concepts systematically, yet the goals he followed were not those of merely exploiting a new French acquisition for the benefit of the motherland. A duality of purpose seemed inherent in his policy. 10 He had every intention of Gallicizing the population, yet made every effort to preserve the unique qualities of Malagasy life. He insisted upon the teaching of French in the schools but was just as assertive that Frenchmen learn Malgache. 11 He fostered


10 Most writers note Gallieni's empathy with the Malgache. Certainly his actions as Governor-General illustrate his awareness of and sympathy with many Malgache institutions. Kent sees Gallieni "as a man whose conscience was torn between policies that would primarily benefit metropolitan France and those that would keep Malagasy interests uppermost." Op. cit., p. 66.

11 Order 311 of January 30, 1897 commanded all native functionnaires to be prepared to pass an oral examination in French within six months. Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. XIV, p. 93. In November, 1897, he established a brevet of Malgache linguistics for French functionnaires and established a chair of Malgache at Le Myre de Vilers school. In September, 1899, a circular letter was published encouraging all French officers and functionnaires to learn Malgache. Ibid., No. XIV, pp. 1193-95; No. XVII, p. 3659.
a colonization policy, but was careful to preserve the property rights of the indigenous population and even revivified the Fokon'olona as the social and political center of Malagasy community life. Gallieni brought the railroad and the automobile to Madagascar and, at the same time, was a prime mover in preserving the history and tradition of Madagascar by forming the Académie Malgache in 1902.

By May of 1897, Gallieni's forces had sufficiently pacified Merina to turn their attention to the Sakalave tribesmen along the western coast. These tribesmen, one-time supposed allies of the French, had reverted to their traditional practice of harrying the border country.

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12 A Guide to Immigration was published at the expense of the colony and Gallieni established a Bureau of Immigration. Gallieni Pacificateur, pp. 33-36; Guide de l'Immigrant à Madagascar, III (Paris: Armand Colon et Cie, 1899). In 1903 he admitted that the Guide was perhaps too sanguine in its view of Madagascar's resources, but financing for an exhaustive survey of the island's potential was lacking. Gallieni Pacificateur, p. 131.


14 The first scheduled motor trip in Madagascar occurred in January, 1901. It took nearly 70 hours to drive from Tananarive to Mahatsara. Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. XVIII, p. 5271. The first meeting of the Academy was held in February, 1902. Ibid., p. 7173-74.
between Merina territory and their own, stealing cattle and attacking caravans of traders and travelers. Sakalave territory was divided into a series of military circles and various commanders sought to subject the rebellious peoples. Commander Gérard pacified and organized the Manambolo territory and occupied Menabe. From April to September, 1897, various French units subjected recalcitrant tribesmen in the coastal areas. Trade was resumed between Tananarive and the west coast and the important territory of Boueni, in the northwest, was pacified. In the south, Captain Genin gained control over the Tulear area, Bulard established French authority at Fort Dauphin, Clerat defeated the Bara and Tanala tribesmen, and Lyautey encircled and contained dissident east-central Sakalave "brigands" in the forests of Tamboharano.


17 Charles Condamy, La Conquête du Ménapé à Madagascar, (1898-1900), (Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1944), pp. 6-33. Condamy contends that Gallieni's method of pacification was the same as used by General Hoche in the Vendée in 1796.

In October, 1898, the Antankaras and the Sakalaves revolted, but the rebellion was largely under control by March, 1899\(^1\) and, by May of that year, Gallieni felt it safe to journey to France. In less than three years, he could report to the Ministry of War that with only 12,000 troops (approximately 2,000 white and 10,000 native infantrymen, including 6,000 Malgache) order and tranquility reigned over most of Madagascar.\(^2\)

The pacification cost 1,500 European and African casualties and over 40,000,000 francs,\(^2\) yet much work remained undone. The southern military territory, encompassing a large part of Betsileo, most of the Tanala's homelands and all territory south of the Mangoka River contained large rebel groups.\(^2\)


\(^2\)Annexe No. 1295, pp. 576-77.

\(^2\)The specific listing of casualties shows that 12 officers were killed and 13 wounded and that 201 European and native soldiers were killed, with 422 wounded in battle. A total of 21 officers, 380 European soldiers and 478 indigenes died from disease. Gheusi, op. cit., p. 58; Condamy, op. cit., p. 325. The cost in francs was in excess of 40,000,000. For a breakdown of the military expenses of the pacification see Annexe No. 1295, p. 575.

Colonel Lyautey, who had served under Gallieni in Tonkin and had accompanied him to Madagascar, was given command of the area in September, 1900 and spent two years subjecting the rebellious Baras, Tanalas, Mahafaly, Antandroy, Antanosy and Sakalave. Jungle and desert, bad roads or none at all made pacification difficult.\(^2\) Gallieni and his subordinates complained to the home government that not enough funds were forthcoming and bitterly resented the Ministry of War's policy of continually reassigning army officers, thus robbing the military circles of men experienced in Gallieni's technique of pacification.\(^3\) In spite of such obstacles, the effective destruction of rebel stores and the practice of advancing military posts and of erecting forts deep in rebel territory led to the surrender of the dissident southern tribesmen.\(^4\) By March, 1902, Lyautey, Gallieni's star pupil of the technique of the tache d'huile, left Madagascar for Sud-Oranais.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) Gallieni, Lettres, passim; Gallieni Pacificateur, passim.


\(^5\) Ibid., p. 301; Lyautey, Paroles d'Action, pp. 23-24; Gallieni Pacificateur, pp. 88-89.
Thus, the military pacification of the island was complete. While rebellion broke out in the southern territory in November, 1904, it was brought under control by the next August.\(^{27}\) The rebellion was described by Gallieni and Augagner as arising more from the exactions of corrupt French administrators and general discontent over increased taxes than from any desire to restore the old order.\(^{28}\) As late as the 1920's, the occasional petty venality of a minor French official brought vengeance in the form of assassination and destruction of property in the isolated villages of the Tulear region, but, to all intents and purposes, military pacification was an accomplished fact in Madagascar by 1902.\(^{29}\)

As the machinery of pacification moved well, Gallieni's administration facilitated economic penetration of the island. The Governor-General made no attempt

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\(^{28}\)Augagner specifically charged two minor French officials, Vigny and Choppy, with extorting money from the Amparihy villagers. He also notes that the raising of the capitation rate from 5 to 10 francs stimulated discontent. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-213. Though Gallieni does not blame specific officials as does Augagner, his findings agree with Augagner's. *Gallieni Pacificateur*, p. 361.

at disguising his intent to change Malgache consumer practices. At kabary's held in all the military territories, circles and sectors, the Malagasy were told that loyalty to the French regime meant loyalty to French products. The administration's official Malgache-language newspaper, Vaovao in May, 1898 printed the trade marks of French cottons and noted:

When the people see you, Malagasy, who have recently become French people, buying these cottons, they will know you are really faithful sons of France, and that you are true in your hearts to her.

French control of trade was strengthened when the dominance of British Indians in the island's coastal trade

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30 Gallieni worked closely with Joseph Chailley, Secretary General of the Union Coloniale and with representatives of various French textile concerns, to replace American and English cottons with French ones in the Madagascar market. Lettres, pp. 20-24.

31 The British Consul in Madagascar, Sauzier, and representatives of the Procter Brothers and the Trouchet Company dealing in English products, reported in February, 1898 that, in Betsileo province, the French advised all Malgache not to trade with foreigners. At a kabary in Mananjary, the people were told they must buy only from French merchants. Gallieni's orders to encourage villagers to buy French products was interpreted by some officials as an order to coerce and cajole the Malgache to do so, and created a good deal of correspondence between France and England. There was, however, really little the British could do about it and, by 1905, French products dominated the Malagasy market. State Papers, CX (1897-1898), pp. 457-917.

32 Extract from Vaovao quoted in Ibid., p. 470.
was broken by Gallieni's order, effective January 1, 1899, that all future coastal trade be carried on in French registered bottoms. In the southern part of the island, the problem was less that of supplanting non-French trade goods with those of Gallic manufacture than of training the southern tribesmen to be consumers of European products. Lyautey found it particularly difficult to break down the culture concept which saw cattle as wealth. Herd owners usually refused to part with parts of their livestock for money to buy goods which were not really needed.

Elsewhere in Madagascar, the French found that the simple needs of most of the Malagasy could be attained without long or difficult labor. This did not mean that the Malgache was lazy but that, for the bulk of the population, life could be sustained without undue exertion. Some peoples, like the Merina tribesmen, showed marked ability in business, but were loathe to engage in hand

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33 These merchants had been accused of furnishing arms to the Sakalave and of encouraging them to resist the French. The merchants and British officials denied these allegations but Gallieni's orders were carried out. Ibid., pp. 494-514; Lettres, pp. 25-26.

Most people were rice farmers and/or cattle raisers and were unwilling to work for wages when there were no outside goods they really needed. In part, the task of educating peoples to consume became one of the responsibilities of the educational system. For immediate needs, the French administration, by taxation and labor dues, secured the reluctant co-operation of the Malagasy in the projects so necessary for the economic development of the island.

After the freeing of the slaves, Gallieni had ordered that the corvée system of the former Malagasy Government be continued. This decision was designed in part to facilitate the breaking of the former slaves' dependence upon their masters but, more importantly, to secure the labor desperately needed for the private and public economic development of the island. Labor service was limited to thirty or forty days annually depending upon

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38 The numerous decrees regulating taxation and labor service may be found in Annuaire de Madagascar et Dépendances, Année 1899, (Tananarive, Imprimerie Officielle, 1899), pp. 375-768.
39 Ibid., p. 375-76.
local circumstances, and extensive regulations as to treatment, wages and sustenances were enacted to protect the worker. Naturally, corvée was abused by officials and concessionaires alike, and Gallieni was severely criticized for continuing compulsory labor service. Occasionally, laborers were kept longer than the stipulated days of service and concessionaires, mine and plantation owners were often guilty of extracting money from the Malagasy in lieu of work. Some concessionaires were accused of making more money from such exactions than from legitimate endeavor.

In December, 1900, Gallieni ordered labor service abolished and instituted instead a poll tax, varying from 20 francs per person in the central plateau to 5 or 10 francs in the coastal areas, and established a minimum

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40 Richard, op. cit., pp. 633-36. Any Malgache who contracted to work for a French concessionaire as an agricultural or industrial laborer for a period of five years (three years in certain cases) could secure exemption from military service. Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. 15, (1898), p. 2595.


wage for laborers. The Malgache now found that he was obliged to work in order to pay the tax. This did not however, solve the labor shortage, and Gallieni secured the passage of legislation to limit the recruiting of Malgache labor for work outside Madagascar.

None of these measures could solve the real problem, which was the paucity of available human resources on the island. Recruitment of Indian and Chinese labor was undertaken and proved of limited success in the building of the Madagascar railway system. A guide to encourage French immigration was published by the administration, but Gallieni did not view Madagascar as an island for settlement and appealed only to select groups of colons who could bring capital to Madagascar. The

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43 The minimum wage was established at 1 franc per day in Tananarive and the central plateau area and 75 centimes per day elsewhere on the island. Gallieni, Lettres, pp. 67-70.

44 The first such decree was promulgated June 10, 1897. This measure proved not to be strong enough to halt the drain of Malgache labor to Réunion and elsewhere so another order was forthcoming on May 6, 1903. Archives Diplomatiques, LXIII(1897), pp. 211-13; LXXVI(1903), pp. 147-49.


46 Gallieni noted that "Madagascar was not a rich nor heavily populated country." Lettres, p. 128. Yet, he did not view it as a colony which would lend itself to colonization. What he desired to see was the arrival of industrialists, entrepreneurs and skilled craftsmen who would aid in the development of the island's economic life.
Governor-General was particularly careful to disuade European and colonial adventurers from coming and insisted that the highlands were adequately peopled by indigenous agriculturists. Alienation of land to attract colonists was not part of the administration's plan for the economic development of the island.\textsuperscript{47} Agricultural land was made available to French soldiers who wished to settle on the island after their service terms expired. However, this effort netted only about forty-three colonists. These largely drifted into the cities and, by 1911, only four or five of these ex-soldiers remained on their concessions.\textsuperscript{48}

The dearth of population was evidenced when the official census of 1900 revealed that Madagascar had a population of only 2,244,876.\textsuperscript{49} Gallieni blamed the low population upon the lack of proper medical facilities and in areas other than agriculture. \textit{Gallieni Pacificateur}, pp. 369-71.

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid. The law of February 10, 1899 guaranteed any French concessionaire at least 100 hectares of land at a very low cost per hectare. The central plateau area was, however, closed to such grants, and only about 102,811 hectares were sold to foreigners. Henri Juivelle, "Agriculture son état actuel," \textit{Congrès Coloniaux}, pp. 370-72. A hectare is equivalent to 2.4 acres.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., p. 372. The soldier-colon, reminiscent of the practices of Imperial Rome, was an important feature in Lyautey's "Du Rôle Colonial de l'Armée," pp. 317-18.

\textsuperscript{49}Chevalier, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 33.
popular ignorance of modern sanitation. Syphilis was considered the great killer of adults and the cause of much infant mortality.\(^{50}\) From 1896 to his departure in 1905, Gallieni fostered public health measures designed to stamp out venereal diseases and to control endemic diseases such as smallpox, cholera and diptheria. Government institutions to train midwives were established, medical schools and hospitals were erected and doctors and nurses, products of the Government's medical schools, were sent into the provinces to raise the general health level of the population.\(^{51}\) Vaccinations en masse, were staged in the villages, leprosoriums were established for those suffering that dread disease. The isolation of lepers had not been attempted by the previous Malagasy Government and this gruesome disease was common on the island because of such neglect.\(^{52}\) Because of the administration's program of education and treatment, the venereal rate dropped from 20 per 100 in 1897 to 4 per 100 in 1905, and the general

\(^{50}\) Docteur Losnet, "Assistance medicale," Congrès Coloniaux, pp. 117-60.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., Chevalier, op. cit., pp. 52-64; Gallieni, Lettres, p. 158-59.

\(^{52}\) Losnet, op. cit., pp. 122-25.
health level of the population rose as a result of the numerous administration programs in the area of public health.\textsuperscript{53}

The depressed status of women was greatly improved by Gallieni's passage of a divorce law which made it increasingly difficult for a man to shed his spouse. The status of motherhood was enhanced by annual ceremonies of recognition.\textsuperscript{54} Alcoholism, so bemoaned by missionaries, also became the subject of government regulation. The importation of spirits was strictly regulated, and the distillation of betsa-betsa, a rice-based intoxicant, was outlawed.\textsuperscript{55} The sight common to travelers through native villages in the 1890's, the open

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., pp. 153-54. Chevalier notes, however, that as late as 1920, 43 of 100 babies born in Madagascar suffered hereditary syphilis. Op. cit., p. 54.

\textsuperscript{54}Losnet, op. cit., p. 120. Before the Gallieni administration made divorce a complicated process, all a Malgache had to do was say to his wife "Misaotra anoa aho Tompokovavy (I thank you, madam)," and the woman was dismissed from the household without appeal. Sibree, The Great African Island, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{55}Control of alcoholic beverages had been introduced in 1897, but the law regulating the import and sale of them as a "hygienic control" measure was promulgated in Madagascar in January, 1901 and approved by Paris in August of that year. Archives Diplomatiques, LXXXVII (1901), pp. 125-27; Lasonet, op. cit., p. 156; Augagneur, "Exposé de la situation à Madagascar," Revue de Madagascar, XII-XIII (1910), pp. 97-124.
rum pot and gourd dipper beside native huts, now became a thing of the past.\textsuperscript{56}

Since population statistics for the period before the French takeover were mere estimates, and exaggerated estimates at best, it is difficult to say what effect Gallieni's emphasis upon public health had on demographic trends. Statistics quoted by Chevalier do indicate however, that the population of Madagascar increased at an annual rate of approximately $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ during the first 18 years of French administration. This certainly indicates a good average health and a low average infant mortality rate among the islanders.\textsuperscript{57}

In the area of finance and monetary policy, the Governor-General's administration regularized the currency and called in all cut money in 1899. French currency then became the standard for the island and regular banking services were extended to the principal ports and cities of Madagascar.\textsuperscript{58} The imposition of a tariff on exported

\textsuperscript{56}Knight noted this on his travels through the villages of Madagascar. \textit{Op. cit.}, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Op. cit.}, p. 33. Madagascar's population growth rate was considerably higher than that of the United States for, between 1900-1920, the U.S. population grew at the rate of slightly less than 2\%.

\textsuperscript{58}Old currency was redeemed at 30 grams of silver for 5 francs new currency. Charles Martin, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 320-21.
items helped bring about a treasury surplus in 1897, with the administration taking in over 9,000,000 francs and spending only 7,500,000.\textsuperscript{59} The French Government, however, bore the tremendous cost of the military occupation and the profit of the island's administration was soon dissipated in Gallieni's efforts to develop public services and the utilities of the colony.\textsuperscript{60} In 1898-1899, loans were floated on the security of the colony's revenues to build highways, expand port facilities and develop telegraph communications.\textsuperscript{61}

The vast distances of the island necessitated the development of better communications to make the French administration successful. For, in spite of all his efforts, Gallieni could not keep in constant touch with the various territorial officials. His philosophy of administration relied heavily on "the right man in the right

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61}These transactions are recounted in Annexe No. 1295 (1899). See also Journal Officiel, Documents, Chambre, Annexe No. 3027, February 12, 1898, pp. 674-75.
\end{itemize}
place,"^{62} and the ability of subordinates to accept and handle responsibility. In most cases, this faith in subordinates proved justified. Occasionally, however, Gallieni found that administrators did not perform their duties adequately and occasional ones were corrupt.\(^{63}\) In his travels to the various government posts, Gallieni soon learned that the island's primitive communications not only complicated administration but, more importantly, that they hampered economic development. For example, it cost 1,200 francs to transport a ton of goods from Tamatave to Tananarive and internal marketing was adversely affected by the lack of adequate communications.\(^{64}\) Highways and railways thus became necessities for the island's economic and administrative unity.

In 1900, Gallieni received support from a Chamber commission and the French Government agreed to finance a

\(^{62}\) This is the phrase used by Lyautey in explaining Gallieni's idea of individual authority and responsibility. "Du Rôle Colonial de l'Armée," p. 309.

\(^{63}\) Gallieni Pacificateur, p. 189. Augagneur contended that Gallieni's visits to various administrative posts, though well-intentioned, did not serve as an adequate check on officials who staged events to make themselves look efficient and thereby impressed their superior. Erreurs et Brutalités Coloniales, pp. 138-39.

\(^{64}\) It vexed Gallieni that Tamatave had to import rice at 25 francs per hundred kilograms while this same measure of rice was selling for 5 francs in Merina. Lettres, p. 107-108; Julien, "Madagascar après 8 ans d'occupation française," pp. 200-201.
railway construction project for Madagascar. Work began in 1901 and, though private contractors sometimes proved dishonest, absconding with funds and mistreating native and imported labor, work steadily progressed. The road was not completed during Gallieni's administration but, by the time of his departure in 1905, the project, requiring several tunnels and bridges, was moving along well.

Over three hundred highways were built during Gallieni's term of office. Mules and horses were put to extensive use, automobiles were imported, and transportation costs between Tamatave and Tananarive were lowered to an average of 125 francs per ton. Using these highways, rice shipments from the central plateau were sent to the coastal ports, and Madagascar eventually became an exporter of this basic commodity. Telegraph lines were

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65 60,000,000 francs were appropriated for this purpose. Annexe No. 1295(1899), p. 578.


67 Grandidier, op. cit., pp. 207-208; Gallieni, Lettres, pp. 162-64.


69 Augagneur notes that while, in 1904, Madagascar imported 1,200,000 francs worth of rice from India, in 1909 the island exported 800,000 francs worth of rice to Asia and Africa. "Expose de la situation à Madagascar," pp. 110-18.
built and, by 1905, direct communication links were established between Tananarive and Paris.\textsuperscript{70}

The period 1900 to 1905 was not one of constant economic progress. Exports during this period averaged some 16 million francs per year, two-thirds of which went to France, while imports, nine-tenths of which came from France, averaged about 24 million francs.\textsuperscript{71} The great disparity of imports over exports is explained by the heavy importation of railroad and other construction materials during this period.\textsuperscript{72} Because these years were ones of world price fluctuations in tropical products, many concessionaires gave up their schemes to build


\textsuperscript{71} Colby, (ed.) \textit{International Yearbook, 1907}, p. 470.

\textsuperscript{72} Mager, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 229-33.
fortunes on the Red Island.\footnote{Renseignements coloniaux et documents," pp. 214-15.} Gold mining proved risky and expensive and, generally, Madagascar gained a reputation as a place where one was as likely to lose money as to make it.\footnote{Ibid., Augagneur, "Exposé de la situation à Madagascar," pp. 100-101; Julien, op. cit., pp. 208-16.}

Some disputed the worth of the island for France. Approximately 200 million francs had been spent on Madagascar during the period 1895 to 1905, but most of this money was expended in conquering and occupying the island, plus 60 millions spent in building the railway.\footnote{Congrès Coloniaux, p. 11.} Since Republic leaders held that colonies must pay their own way, economic development on the island was not as great as Gallieni would have liked and he often complained of the short-sightedness of the Republic's penurious policies.\footnote{Gallieni, Lettres, passim; Gallieni Pacificateur, passim.} Iyautey noted acidly that "colonies are not for poor nations" and concluded that France acted as if she were one.\footnote{"Lettres du Tonkin et Madagascar," p. 14.} Yet colonial revenues had nearly tripled and
economic progress was obvious even though lack of capital was destined to long hinder the realization of the island's real value and wealth. Even today, lack of capital is still the reality of Malagasy existence.

Gallieni had early evidenced an interest in education for he saw that the Gallicization, economic growth, modernization and unification of Madagascar were inexorably connected with the learning process. Missionary schools had been the mainstay of education under the Merina monarchy and continued to be so under the French administration. The administration, however, established training schools for functionnaires and medical and technical training institutions not within the existing missionary educational system.


79 Kent wrote in 1962 that the Malagasy Republic was beginning to move ahead economically, but the Republic has a long way to go before it approaches the Eldorado that colonial enthusiasts once thought her to be. Op. cit., pp. 151-53. Kimble notes that, in highways particularly, the island remains much as it was in 1894 when Martineau remarked, "There is nothing like the paths of Madagascar to discourage a traveler from having anything to do with the country." Kimble, op. cit., I, p. 405. Also see Hildebert Isnard, Madagascar (Paris: Armand Colin, 1955) p. 395.

80 Gheusi, Gallieni, p. 61.

81 Pillias, op. cit., pp. 39-115. The Queen's Government had actually established laws making education compulsory for all boys ages between 8 and 16 and girls from 7 to 15. Ibid., p. 42.
The mission schools had very definite limitations, and the Governor-General was quick to criticize the tendency of these institutions to teach more doctrine than practical knowledge. However, he allowed them to continue to function under Government supervision. In fact, the Brothers of the Christian Doctrine were accorded a contract to develop more schools, particularly in the Tananarive area in 1897 and, in 1903, the Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny and the Brothers of the Christian Doctrine were given government subsidies to maintain and develop elementary education throughout the colony.

In part, Gallieni's support of religious education was an attempt to break the British missionary hegemony in education. Gradually, Gallieni grew more sympathetic towards the Protestant orders, but did not find mission school standards to his liking. The academic course offerings were not practical enough for a realistic administrator who understood Malgache needs in developing

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82 Gallieni Pacificateur, p. 179.

83 Pillias, op. cit., pp. 43-44. Protestant schools also received a subsidy but Protestant mission ones were largely financed by the London Missionary Society and other societies and the local congregations. Ibid., Lettres, pp. 137-52.

84 Gallieni Pacificateur, pp. 197-99.
basic technological and agricultural skills. He was wearied by the doctrinal bickering between Protestants and Catholics and often expressed irritation over those who accused him of taking sides in island religious differences. To Gallieni, the Malgache showed little real interest in religion and he would have been content to see missionaries of all persuasions banned from the island. Though in practice he maintained a neutrality in religious affairs, he remarked in a private letter that he was much upset by the attitude of the Catholic orders. He stated categorically "We do not speak the same language. I speak of French influence, of the organization of the economic life for the benefit of France. They respond to me of religion and Catholicism."  

Doctrinal controversy plagued every action the Governor-General took regarding educational policy in the colony. To avoid this vexation and to promote a more

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85 In a letter to Grandidier on June 1, 1904, Gallieni noted that what was needed in Madagascar was emphasis upon practical education and that he had therefore decided to eliminate further subsidies to both Protestant and Catholic schools. *Lettres*, p. 153.

86 *Lettres*, passim; *Gallieni Pacificateur*, passim. In a letter to Le Myre de Vilers of January 13, 1897, he noted that the religious question was a knotty one and that he would prefer to expell all missionaries from the island. *Gallieni Pacificateur*, p. 198.

87 Gallieni to Grandidier, June 1, 1904, *Lettres*, p. 153.
practical curriculum for the Malgache, Gallieni decided in June, 1904, to drop the subsidy to mission schools and to concentrate upon the development of secular institutions. 88 By the time of his departure in 1905, 212 such lay institutions enrolling a total of 20,635 students were in operation. The colony, under Gallieni's administration, had taken a long step toward the creation of a modern, secular educational system. 89 Yet, strange as it may seem from Gallieni's frank dislike of missions and religious bickering, the Gallieni era was to be fondly remembered by the Protestant pastors. Though their influence, particularly that of the British societies, had been severely limited by Gallieni, his neutrality and fairness were long recounted and favorably contrasted with the anti-missionary policy of his successor, Victor Augagner. 90

Coupled with Gallieni's interest in education was his concern for the cultural life of the island. The Académie Malgache, founded in January, 1902, was a Gallieni

creation. Its membership, largely European, included men of diverse interests and background, and its investigations ranged over a wide variety of topics. Geographical and zoological findings, as well as sociological and anthropological data were subjects of investigations for its membership.\footnote{Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. XVIII (February, 1902). Items listed for formal discussion covered the scholarly fields of law, ethnology, linguistics, history, botany, zoology and geology, \textit{Ibid.}} With the Académie one must also note the dedication of the complex of monarchical palaces at Tananarive to house the museum of Merina culture, and the founding of the Le Myre de Vilers school. Both were Gallieni's creations.\footnote{Pillias, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 43-58.}

Gallieni fostered reconciliation and, in October 1900, he presided over the enternment ceremony involving placing the remains of ex-Prime-Minister Rainilaiarivony in his ancestral tomb. The Governor-General stressed the fact that he had "no argument with a corpse," an old Malagasy saying, and lauded the achievements of the Prime Minister as leader of the Merina people.\footnote{Gallieni commented that Rainilaiarivony had misjudged his personal prowess in deciding to oppose the French, but he held that if, the Prime Minister were then alive, he would be pleased with what had been accomplished in Madagascar. \textit{Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. XVII} (October, 1900), pp. 4853-54.} Honoring the
customs and traditions of Malagasy life and the ceremomal practice of reconciling the old and new orders became a common practice with him. Before he left the island in May, 1905, the former rebel chiefs were assembled, a general amnesty was extended and a recognition ceremony was held. Most observers noted that Gallieni treated the former Merina overlords with magnanimity.

In his nine year rule, Gallieni modernized the economic structure and educational setup of the island, established peace and tranquility, and destroyed slavery.


95 The Queen was paid a stipend of 30,000 to 50,000 francs annually until her death in 1917. The Times (London), October 3, 1905, p. 5; Durand, op. cit., p. 84. Bibiassy, the Sakalave Queen of Maintirano, was also kept in exile on Nossi-Bé, and was given a far more modest pension of 360 francs a year. Journal Officiel de Madagascar, No. XIV (December, 1897), p. 1265. Most rebel leaders were granted an amnesty, but two atrocities marred Gallieni's reputation for magnanimity. Rainitavy, the Sakalave chief of Menabe was murdered after he had surrendered, and Kotavy, a leader of the 1904-1905 rebellions in the south, was reportedly poisoned by his French jailers while awaiting trial. Condamy, op. cit., pp. 323-35; Augagneur, Erreurs et Brutalités Coloniales, p. 127. These deaths were exceptions to the customary treatment accorded rebels who surrendered.

He also strengthened the Diégo-Suarez naval base.\textsuperscript{97}

Unhappily, his policy of tribal equality did not long survive his term of office. Administrative economy led to the abandonment of all but one of the several schools created to train fonctionnaires from the various tribes.\textsuperscript{98} Centralism likewise replaced regional responsibility. But the old Hova hegemony had been sufficiently displaced so that nationalism, when it did come, did not aim at the restoration of Merina hegemony.\textsuperscript{99}

Two and one-half centuries of intermittent effort, coupled with the expenditure of hundreds of millions in francs and the loss of tens of thousands of lives both French and Malagasy, culminated in the establishment of

\textsuperscript{97}After the Fashoda crisis, Gallieni secured funds to strengthen Diégo-Suarez. In December, 1903 he noted that the base was strong enough to hold off an entire squadron. \textit{Lettres}, pp. 129-130; \textit{The Times}(London), August 22, 1902, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{98}Under Augagneur's administration, the training schools were consolidated into one institution at Tananarive. Marius and Ary Leblond, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 851-72. Faublee considers this centralizing trend as one which actually allowed the Hova to regain the political and social control of the island which they had lost under Gallieni's tribal equality policy. \textit{Op. cit.}, pp. 487-88.

\textsuperscript{99}Rabemananjara, who despised Gallieni's memory and looked upon his policy of tribal equality as "designed to create docile hands, immobile arms and hearts resigned to defeat," admits that he effectively destroyed the previous Merina hegemony. This nationalist writer notes that the young people of Madagascar had to look elsewhere for ideas and leadership. He holds that Malagasy nationalism had its start in 1940-1941 and moved rapidly forward when the British, who took the island from Vichy France, introduced various reforms. \textit{Op. cit.}, pp. 12-15.
Madagascar as a French colony. Nadel and Curtis note: "Whether imperialism is good or an unmitigated evil is beside the point. Such judgments belong to individual conscience." The same could be said of the balance sheet: was the trophy worth the course? This question is perhaps unanswerable. Certainly, the trophy, the colony, did not long remain under French control as independence came to Madagascar, reconstituted the Malagasy Republic, in 1960.  

In large part, independence was the result of the very values the French system of education and administration had imparted to her colonial peoples. René Maunier investigates this paradox and concludes that, "It is the tragedy of all expansionism." Actually, it seems less the tragedy than the nature of European expansion which inevitably introduces the tools, techniques and ideas which, intelligently employed, may be used to secure equality for all men and nations.


101 On April 2, 1960, agreements respecting the independence of Madagascar were signed in Paris by Tsiranana and French Premier Debre. On June 26, 1960, the Malagasy Republic's independence was proclaimed in Tananarive. Kent, op. cit., p. 151.

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A general account more interesting for its point-of-view than its scholarship. Cousins stood close to the Queen and to Court officials.

Basically a discussion of the campaign and of the Hova's widespread disinclination to fight the French.

This article states that, while the French administration would doubtless benefit the people, the Catholics, backed by the French, might well drive the Protestants, many of whom were English, out of the island.

Personal experiences of one involved in the evacuation of the French Resident's staff from Tananarive to Majunga in 1894.

An officer's account of the campaign and of the Gallieni administration.

Particularly valuable are the materials dealing with the Malgache reaction to France's invasion force in 1895.


A collection of reports on all aspects of Madagascar life and activity, written by those involved in administering and implementing the various programs.


Selected writings of Gallieni on his activities in Madagascar. An outstanding work in every way.


An account of the passing of Hova power by the French officer who escorted her into exile.


The author was a member of the London Missionary Society, out on an official tour of duty.


Very revealing on the great Republican statesman's interest and actions on the question of French expansion in Madagascar.


These very human communications cover the problems and rewards of his command in Madagascar.


Embraces the General's experiences and decisions in his pacification and administration of the island.
A detailed account of the successful operation against one of the most capable of the rebel leaders.

A discussion by an observer of Malgache art and a student of the Malgache language. His translations of Malagasy Cabinet meeting records are of great interest.

A physical description of Madagascar and a detailed account of the island's resources, published to attract French immigrants.

A personal account by a civil engineer who was a member of a scientific-political expedition to the Sakalaves to explore the territory and to announce that the French were now masters of the island.

A travel account covering Madagascar after the conquest.

Writings and speeches of Lyautey reflecting his experiences in Madagascar and his attitude toward Gallieni.

A monumental study of Malgache institutions, useful for its material, but important because of Julien's long association with the colony.


"White Magic," *The Atlantic Monthly*, CXLI(June, 1928), 721-35. This article illustrates the essential lawlessness and superstition existing among these "pacified" tribes.

Lyautey, Louis Hubert G. *Choix de Lettres, 1882-1919.*
Includes correspondence dealing with the writer's experiences as a circle commander on the island's western coast.

In this article, Lyautey delineates the Gallieni-Lyautey method of colonial pacification and organization.

A complete collection of Lyautey's correspondence with friends and superiors regarding his term as commander of the southern territory of the island. It contains the details of pacification by means of the triangulation of military posts as well and gives insight into the application of the techniques of economic penetration.

Selected correspondence dealing with the island's pacification and administration.

Correspondence dealing with his arrival and initial duties in the island's pacification.

Speeches of Lyautey to colonists, merchant groups and various societies which, among other things, reveal his attitude toward Madagascar.

Accounts of things as they were in 1897 and gives sketches of events from 1892.

Rajestra, a Lieutenant in the Malagasy Army, wrote this diary of the campaign in which he contrasts the intrigues and inefficiencies of his leaders with the resolute advance of the French.


In a letter to the editor, the writer, a resident of Tananarive, declares that the French were blaming the British for stirring up rebellion against France in Madagascar.


A translation of the Song of Rabibivato; The Hova Warrior's Last Lament.


A general account, useful as a reflection of Oliver's attitude toward the island. The writer was close to the Prime Minister and had financial interests in the island.


The book condemns the French as instigators of conflict. Interesting as a biased account by a resident partisan of British interests.


A reprint of the laws with running comment.


Includes material relative to Madagascar.
A detailed account of the preparations for the campaign as well as the latter itself by the Resident-General.

A personal account of life in Madagascar by a French functionnaire. Particularly useful for its insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the Merina state.

An account by a long-time missionary in Madagascar who became inadvertently involved in international intrigues. Of particular value on his arrest and imprisonment by the French.

A general account of the history of missionary activity on the island since 1816 by a man who had served the London Missionary Society there for nearly fifty years.

Governor-General Augagneur is accused of fostering an anti-Christian policy in Madagascar and Gallieni is remembered for his neutrality by the writer who bemoans the island's religious decline.

Sibree gives an account of the Malagasy religious mystics, their activities and their usefulness for the spread of Christianity in Madagascar.
The author contends that, under Augagneur, Christianity was being suppressed by the French administration.

This long-time missionary gives a pro-Merina, pro-Protestant missionary argument against French claims to the island.

Covers wide experiences and deep insights into life in Madagascar, devoting much space to the Queen, whom he knew well, and to the Franco-Malgache dispute.

An account of the customs and practices, particularly useful for its discussion of fetishism and other practices of the Malgache.

The personal experiences and reflections of a man who began his career in Madagascar as an aide to Resident General Laroche.

Contains signed affidavits attesting the lack of planning and mistakes made in the campaign.

An observer notes the continuation of fetishism in Tananarive although the Government had long since outlawed the practice.
Accounts, treaties and letters dealing with the history of French interests and relations with the island are found here.

"Impressions d'un Sous-Officier," Revue Bleue, XXXIII(1896), 254-56.
An unsigned account expressing a soldier's penetrating views of the campaign.

Good for mission statistics, the number of stations, pastors, converts, etc.

M. Delord of the Paris Missionary Society reports on the condition of the missions and developments in Madagascar.

Mrs. Waddington's reaction to the Hova mission to Europe and how its members were treated.

Covers the training of the Malagasy army and the skirmishes it was involved in during 1884-1885. Willoughby, an English mercenary soldier, was commander of the Malagasy forces and signed the protectorate agreement of 1885 for Madagascar.
Secondary Works

Books and Articles:

An account of the customs, traditions and practices of the islanders, useful for its illustrations and descriptions of tombs.

Cultural and religious attitudes of the Malagasy are discussed here.

Contains an account of Tanala tribal life illustrating anthropological interest in Madagascar's tribal diversity.

Useful for its information on the Republic's fiscal policy towards colonial possessions.

Article on the legal and historic rights of France in Madagascar. The author disputes the legality of French claims.

A sympathetic biography of the great Merina Prime Minister.

Deals with the ethnic composition and possible origins of the Malgache.


A friend of Lyautey uses information furnished through correspondence to present a general account of the pacification method employed by Lyautey in the southern territory.


A discussion of the island's economic development since 1895.


Embodies useful information regarding Madagascar's population and the island's demographic trends.


Useful for its discussion of the French Republic's fiscal policies regarding colonial possessions.


A general account of British interest in the island in the 19th century.


Deals with the Malaysian megaliths in Madagascar.


This unidentified article urges the overthrow of the Hova and the establishment of French control in the island.
A sound discussion of the deterioration of Franco-Malgache relations.

A good source of information on the island's physiographic features and resources.

Present essential information on the various tribes of the island and their historical development.

A study of Anglo-French diplomacy bearing on the Madagascar affair.

Useful for its discussion of the Zanj and their trading interest with Madagascar and the possible colonization of the island by such traders.

Contains a good discussion of the costs of the campaign in men and material.

Useful for its discussion of colonial administration in Madagascar and the economic progress of the island under the French.

Describes France's historical-legal claims to the Madagascar coast, and presents legal justification for them.
An article explaining France's rights to certain parts of the island and discussing the events leading to the establishment of the protectorate.

Urges the colonization and build-up of Madagascar for the glory and benefit of France.

The best book on the history of the island. Especially useful for its discussion of the various origin theories.

A general account of the island's history. Interesting for its dismissal of "national status" for the Merina Empire.

An impersonal discussion of Lyautey's career, his ideas on expansion and his methods of colonial pacification and administrative organization.

d'Yerville, V. "Le Régime Civil et le Régime Militaire à Madagascar, Laroche et Gallieni," Le Correspondent, CLXXVII(1897), 615-638.
A comparison of these two men's techniques. The article is favorable to Gallieni's activist approach.

Interesting for its discussion of the island's strategic importance in preserving French interests in the Indian Ocean.

This article devotes most of its space to a discussion of protectorate status versus annexation for Madagascar.


Good for its general account of the Merina Empire, the conquest and Gallieni’s achievements on the island.


A study of the character, culture and psyche of the Malgache.


A discussion of Semitic influences in Madagascar from its earliest beginnings.


A general account of missionary activity in Madagascar in the 19th century. The author sees Protestant missionaries as representative of British interests there.


An anti-imperialist article. France would find the wild land of Madagascar more costly than valuable.
An account of pioneer attempts to develop a colony in Madagascar, illustrative of France's early and continued interest there.

A general history of Lazarist missions in Madagascar from the 17th century.

An account of Flacourt's efforts to establish a profitable colony.

Useful for its discussion of the mistakes made in the 1895 campaign.

Presents Lyautey as an empire builder. Of particular interest for its information on his actions in southern Madagascar.

A general account of the island, useful for its discussion of the Malagache language.

An article favoring annexation over continuation of the protectorate.

The standard biography of this great personality.

An account of the men instrumental in gaining Madagascar for France. Grandidier was himself long connected with island affairs.
A discussion of the campaign and pacification, the author being favorable to French control because it would, in his opinion, halt the regression toward anarchy which he saw as the dominant trend of Merina affairs.

This detailed account of Salisbury's policies is particularly useful for its information on the Delgado Bay-Portuguese Loan affair with its bearing on Madagascar affairs.

Valuable for its discussion of Dilke's attitude toward Madagascar as well as for his defense of British Missionary influence there.

A general discussion of the background of French rights and interests.

A general account of France's move toward acquiring the island by a man who played a large part in securing Chamber approval for its conquest.

An argument for Hanotaux's plan to maintain Merina hegemony as a means of cutting the cost of administering and exploiting the protectorate.

An account of the pacification of the Merina, Sakalave and Betsileo tribes, taken from official reports and government decrees.
A discussion of his basic policy of encouraging tribal equality as a means of breaking Hova hegemony and pacifying the rebels.

The author links the Malagasy method of boat construction to those techniques used by peoples of Java, Sumatra and Borneo.

A general account of the island, particularly useful for its discussion of the actualities of its economic situation in the 1950's.

A survey of the French policy to divide and rule as applied to the tribes of Madagascar.

The discussion of Gallieni leads to a succinct explanation of his methods of pacification and organization. Lyautey is dealt with in similar fashion.

Useful for its discussion of French interest in the islands, the history of the Merina peoples and its account of the island's conquest and pacification.

A general survey of Madagascar emphasizing the move toward national independence; definitely the best such book to be found in English.

Useful for its maps, discussion of topography and general geographic and economic discussion concerning Madagascar.
A description of the organization of the Merina Empire, particularly useful for the period of Rainilaiarivony's Ministry.

Lists and discusses the island's population groups and geographic areas.

A popular discussion of Malgache society.

A sound article on the art, aesthetic ideals and interests of the Malgache.

Deals with difficulties encountered in recruiting and training Malgache administrators and discusses the impact of Western ideas upon Malgache behavior and attitudes.

A discussion of the agricultural developments under French administration. Describes the areas most suitable for settlement.

An article dealing with the politics in France centered around the question "protectorate or annexation?" for Madagascar.

A consideration of the techniques Gallieni used to pacify the island.
Argues that annexation was the best policy and urges that Frenchmen settle the island.

Useful for the list of Merina monarchs and information on the court life and customs of Merina royalty.

Useful for its study of the Malgache concept of community.

A study of the history, government, economic potential and society of the island on the eve of the conquest.

An able discussion of the progress of French Conquest.

A study of the Western impact upon Malgache society and culture.

Reports that Gallieni was employing the firing squad to excess in seeking to crush the rebellion.

A detailed study of the Festival of the Bath, its probable origins and its significance.

These annual volumes present statistical information on economic development, railway building, highway construction and trade figures for the island.


Useful for Cabinet changes during Anglo-French discussions on Madagascar during 1882 and 1883.


A synopsis of theories respecting Malgache origins and a discussion of Madagascar's inhabitants and their varied cultures.


Deals with farming developments, the potential of the island and French economic innovations since the conquest.


Useful for its information on the origins and compositions of Madagascar's population groups.


Rich in social data, useful because it summarizes what was then known of the Malgache.


A two-part article urging French acquisition of the island.
Piolet, J. G. "De l'Esclavage à Madagascar," Le Correspond­
pondant. CLXXII (February, 1896), 447-450.
Deals with the slave classes of Madagascar, their
status and their rights.

Mondes, LXIII (3° période) (1884), 916-934.
A resume of diplomatic negotiations between the
two countries with respect to the establishment of
a protectorate.

Postal, Raymond. Presence de Lyautey. Paris: Alsacia,
1938.
Useful for its references to this empire
builder's work in southern Madagascar.

Powell, E. Alexander. "Through the Land of the Malagasy:
An Expedition Into Madagascar," The Century, CIX
(December, 1924), 237-247.
A travelogue, interesting for its descriptions
of the royal palace and the French-created Palace-
Museum at Tananarive.

Power, Thomas F., Jr. Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of
French Imperialism. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1944.
A useful study of a key statesman who played a
major role in establishing the protectorate.

Rabemananajara, Raymond W. Madagascar Sous la Rénovation
A nationalist critic of Gallieni's methods de­
nounces the suppression of the Malgache national
spirit by their conqueror.

Rabemananjara, Jacques. Nationalisme et Problèmes
A criticism of Gallieni's pacification program
by a modern island nationalist.

Rakoto-Ratsimamanga, A. "Tache Pigmentaire Hereditaire et
Origines des Malgaches," Revue Anthropologique,
(Janvier-Mars, 1940), 5-128.
A discussion of the origins of the Madagascar
peoples on the bases of skin pigmentation, the
Mongolian "blue spot" and other indications.
A biography of the great imperialist with important information on his actions respecting the acquisition of Madagascar.

The author notes that the heritage of independence held by the Merina peoples was helpful in fomenting nationalist sentiment among the Malgache.

Of value for its discussion of British policy toward the French acquisition of Madagascar.

Urges colonial rather than protectorate status for Madagascar.

A travel-guide approach to the island, but interesting because of the German view of France's acquisition of the island.

The section dealing with the extension of a protectorate over Madagascar and its later annexation is a revealing and informative discussion of internal French politics as applied to colonial expansion.

This article urges colonial officials to encourage French immigration to countermand British missionary influence on the island.


The author contends that British missionaries and merchants were plotting to make Madagascar an English colony.


Useful for its information on the British decision respecting what to do with Madagascar.


Excellent for its description of Madagascar's geography, its climate and resources.


Contains enlightening statistics on the number and types of missions, the conversions and general missionary information.


Dwells on the backward state of the economy and Hova cruelty and doubts whether France would benefit by acquiring the island.


An article discussing the alleged triumph of Christianity in Madagascar.


Intelligence of mass conversions on the island. The author questions the depth of the islander's faith.

An analysis of reports from Madagascar indicating a growing rapport between the Gallieni administration and the Protestant missionaries.


Contains material on the campaign, particularly the mistakes made during its course and the service rivalry which sadly complicated affairs.

"Lettre de Madagascar; la Culture et l'Elevage dans l'Imerina," Revue Bleue, XXXIII(1896), 560-563.

Extolls the virtues and wealth of Madagascar. An articulate appeal for French investment and immigration.


Notes that Britain and France were developing rival interests in the island.


Bibliographical information and information on published Malagache language dictionaries in Dutch, French and English.


Quotes from German and French observers in Madagascar. The article states that French Jesuits were attempting to stamp out Protestantism there and blames the British Government for its failure to protect British interests.


The thesis: French distrust of English missionaries had come to an end. The article is optimistic about continued influence.
An article on the Prime Minister, the Palace Church and the equation "Protestantism meant British interests, Catholicism, French ones."

Discounts Protestant claims of religious persecution by French Jesuits in Madagascar.

Contains general information on the Laborde-Toulelé affair.

A discussion of the island's economic progress since its annexation by France.

A lampooning account of the strict protocol and pomp of Merina court life.

A discussion of T.T. Matthew's book on his experiences as a Madagascar missionary with the reviewer's comments and opinions respecting the then current state of island affairs.

Sketches the American attitude toward Madagascar.

Accuses the British of inciting the Hova to oppose the French. The Malgache are described as deceitful and treacherous.


Villebois-Mareuil, M. "*Gallieni et Madagascar,*" *Le Correspondent,* CXCI(1898), 708-721. An article lauding the Governor-General's accomplishments in pacifying most of the rebellious elements of the island and in facilitating the island's economic development.


Z . . . , Commendant. "*Un Arsenal Maritime dans l'Océan Indien, Diego-Suarez -- Mayotte,*" *La Nouvelle Revue,* LXIV(1890), 847-850. This anonymous author discounts Diego-Suarez's strategic importance. He finds Mayotte to be a better location, but has many reservations in general concerning Madagascar's strategic value.

Newspapers:

**The New York Times,** 1882-1906. A useful source of general news on events in Madagascar. Editorial comments on the Waller case were extensive and events in Madagascar which involved Americans were well covered by this newspaper.

**Le Temps,** 1882-1906. This French newspaper gave detailed coverage of Madagascar news items and proved an abundant source of information regarding the varying French attitudes toward Madagascar during this long and important period.
The Times (London), 1882-1906.
A valuable source of news on all aspects of Anglo-French relations regarding Madagascar. In the comprehensiveness of its coverage and the objectivity of its reporting and editorials, The Times proved to be superior to all other newspapers. Used.