URICK, Ronald V., 1936-
THE REFLECTIVE APPROACH TO SOCIAL
STUDIES EDUCATION AND HISTORICAL
EXPLANATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
TEXTBOOKS.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1965
Education, theory and practice

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
THE REFLECTIVE APPROACH TO SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION
AND HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of
The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1965

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer would like to express his gratitude to his adviser, Professor Robert E. Jewett, and to the members of his reading committee, Professors Virgil Hinshaw and Everett Kircher, for their assistance and encouragement in the writing of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary era is one of great significance for public education in the United States. A resurgence of public awareness of education and insistence on improvement in its quality, a renewed interest in secondary schooling on the part of many scholars from the academic disciplines, and the availability of significant amounts of financial support from both private and public sources provide ample grounds to expect meaningful improvement in our educational programs and procedures.

If what has been said above is true with respect to education generally, it is certainly true of social studies education in particular. With grants from the federal government and from various philanthropic foundations, academic scholars, social studies educators, and public school teachers are involved in a wide variety of projects and programs designed to "upgrade" the quality of instruction in the social studies.\(^1\)

There appears to have been, however, at least until recently, an error of omission in much of the research that has been done on the

\(^1\)For example, there are such projects underway at The Ohio State University, Northwestern University, and the University of Minnesota. See Social Education, XXX (April, 1965), for progress reports on these and other projects.
teaching of the social studies. After an examination of three surveys of research in social studies education, Metcalf concluded that almost none of the research has been guided by a framework or theory "that would make possible a distinction between basic and trivial investigations."  

On the other hand, Metcalf notes with concern that those involved in the theoretical aspects of instruction in the social studies have shown little inclination to develop methods of analysis by which their theories could be put to empirical tests. The obvious need, argues Metcalf, is a "wedding" of theory and research so that progress might be made toward improvement in the quality of social studies education.

To illustrate his claim regarding research not grounded in theory, Metcalf points to the large number of textbook analyses that have been undertaken:

McPhie listed 46 dissertations, written in the period 1936-56 which studied textual materials.

... almost every possible kind of bias that might appear in social studies instructional material has been studied.

But the difficulty with such studies, as Metcalf suggests, is that they do not make clear how a knowledge of textbook bias contributes to a theory of social studies instruction:

[It is] ... still ... necessary to develop a theory of

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3Ibid., p. 962.

4Ibid., p. 963.

5Ibid., p. 931.
method which would suggest how a teacher could use material for learning purposes regardless of the biases or purposes of those who produce materials of instruction. 6

This study is an analysis of textbooks in one area of the social studies that is designed to "wed" theory and research, thus meeting Metcalf's criticism and, hopefully, contributing in some measure to the advancement of social studies education. The remainder of this introductory chapter is designed, first, to indicate in a general way the nature of the study; second, to outline the organization of the thesis; and third, to review some of the analyses of social studies textbooks that have been reported in the literature in recent years.

The Nature of the Study

As we have just stated, this study is an analysis of certain selected social studies textbooks in terms of a theoretical approach to social studies instruction. A study reported by Gross in 1952 found the textbook at "the heart of most United States history courses taught in the senior high schools" at that time. 7 In view of the fact that there is no recent evidence that contradicts Gross's findings, there is little reason to expect 1965 to be any different in that regard. It thus seems appropriate for us to direct our attention to American history texts. The theoretical framework for this study is that set of ideas which, when taken together, constitute what we shall call the reflective approach to social studies education. More specifically, our

6 Ibid.

points of focus within that approach are (1) its logical and empirical elements, (2) the role within that approach of the analysis of historical explanations, and (3) the concept of the closed areas of American culture.

The methodological device that we use in this study is content analysis. Generally speaking, content analysis involves the application of a set of categories to the materials under study. In this study there are two phases in the analytical process. The first phase consists of the identification of explanations in the textbooks that we are studying; the second phase consists of the classification of these explanations according to their relevance to one or more of six categories based upon six closed areas of American culture.

Our intention in this study is twofold. First, we hope to provide teachers of the social studies who attempt to operate in terms of the reflective approach with information about certain social studies textbooks that might be helpful to them as they attempt to select a text for use in their classes. And second, we hope to provide writers of social studies textbooks in the future with information and suggestions that may be helpful in developing some guidelines to be followed as they prepare their texts. In view of this twofold purpose, we will be concerned with the findings of our analysis from the standpoint of each textbook analyzed and from the standpoint of any broad, general patterns that may have been uncovered by our analysis.
The Organization of the Thesis

Our discussion of the nature of this study was intended to suggest that, prior to the actual analysis, there are two major preliminary tasks -- corresponding to our effort to bring together theory and research in social studies education. First, there is the explication and elaboration of the theoretical framework in which the study is grounded. Second, there is the development of the methodological tools and analytical procedures that we are to use in the analysis.

It is in Chapter II that we undertake to spell out the theoretical basis of the study. There we describe in detail the major elements of the reflective approach to social studies education. Then, after discussing at some length several aspects of the nature of historical explanations and the relationship between them and their grounds, we suggest several roles that the analysis of historical explanations might play within the reflective approach. Since the analysis of explanations and their grounds is (as will be seen) essentially a logical and empirical process, in our discussion of the reflective approach we devote considerable attention to those two elements of that approach.

Chapter III is devoted to the methodological and procedural aspects of the study. In that chapter, after stating explicitly and in some detail the problem with which we are concerned in this study, we describe the important elements of the methodology of content analysis. We then develop and elaborate the system of categories that serve as our tools of analysis. Finally, we describe the procedures by which the analysis was conducted.
In Chapter IV we report our findings from each of the perspectives required by our twofold purpose. That is to say, we view the results of the analysis both from the standpoint of each textbook analyzed and from the standpoint of a broad survey of any patterns that may have been uncovered by the analysis.

In the final chapter, Chapter V, we discuss the meaning and import of our findings and draw those conclusions and make those recommendations that seem to us to be warranted by the findings reported in Chapter IV.

Review of Related Studies

Analyses of textual materials in the social studies have been quite numerous down through the years. McPhie reports 46 dissertations in the period 1936–56 that were concerned with such analyses. Generally speaking, these studies appear to fall into one of two broad classifications. Either the study was designed to detect the existence of bias or it was designed to learn whether certain specified content was to be found in the texts analyzed. As Metcalf reported in 1963, these analyses have apparently been conducted without any consid-


eration of what relevance they might have for a theory of social studies instruction.¹⁰

A study by Samford, published in 1954, purported to answer the question, "Can Social Studies Objectives Be Accomplished with Present-day Textbooks?"¹¹ Samford examined 50 secondary school texts to see how many offered "direct opportunities for the accomplishment" of each of 33 social studies objectives.¹² The list of objectives was compiled from those found in state courses of study, school system curriculum guides, periodical references, and social studies methods textbooks.¹³ Samford listed 48 of the texts as offering direct opportunities for "developing powers of critical thinking."¹⁴ Since he did not, however, define what he meant by "critical thinking," and since he offered no discussion of the criteria in terms of which that conclusion was reached, Samford's analysis offers us little help.

An examination of nine master's theses completed at Ohio State University between 1951 and 1964, which attempted analyses of social studies textbooks, revealed similar weaknesses. In 1951 Crane examined three United States history textbooks for their treatment of federal

¹⁰Metcalf, op. cit., p. 931.


¹²Ibid., p. 134.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 137.
legislation affecting organized labor. He did not, however, develop any explicit basis by which it would be possible to determine the adequacy of the treatment of the topic by each of the texts. Moreover, while he purported to place his study within the framework of the reflective approach to social studies instruction, his effort amounted to little more than a "bow" in the appropriate direction. The relationship between the reflective approach and his study was never made clear.

Shettler reported in 1955 the results of a study of six secondary school textbooks with regard to their treatment of certain "concepts" important in understanding Russian history. He also did not develop any criteria for determining the adequacy of treatment of his selected concepts. Nor did he provide any grounds for the selection of the concepts which served as the focal point of his study.

An evaluation of the treatment of Chinese history in secondary school textbooks reported by Barnes in 1959 suffers from the same weakness. He provided no defense for his selection of the "concepts" around which his study was built, nor did he develop any criteria for judging the adequacy of treatment of these concepts by the textbooks that he studied.


Both Hamblin's thesis, reported in 1960, and Cotsamire's thesis, reported in 1961, are open to the same criticisms. Hamblin studied the treatment of the "Peacetime New Deal" in three United States history texts, but he developed no explicit basis for judging the adequacy of that treatment. He also attempted to place his study within the context of the reflective approach but the attempt was only on the surface; there was no relationship established between the reflective approach and his study.

Cotsamire attempted to evaluate three junior high school Ohio history textbooks "according to their coverage of broad subject fields as well as . . . interesting historical anecdotes . . . ." Here again the attempt comes to naught; for it is never made clear what sort of criteria could possibly be used as a basis for such an evaluation.

In 1962 Miller reported on his examination of five American government and problems of democracy textbooks for their use of Supreme Court decisions. While he pointed to the reflective approach to social studies instruction as the framework within which his study was

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20 Ibid., p. vi.

conducted, he did not make clear just how his study was related to that approach.

The studies of Rhodes, reported in 1960, and Collier, reported in 1961, attempted to deal seriously with the methodological problems of textbook analysis. In both the former's comparison of United States and Australian history texts with respect to nationalistic bias and the latter's search for a tendency in social studies texts with respect to their teaching of "conformity" or "individualism," a systematic and careful attempt was made to develop categories and indicators that would make it possible to reach a grounded judgment in their respective tasks. In neither of these two studies, however, did the author give any consideration to the question of the relevance of his study for a theoretical framework for the teaching of the social studies.

Finally, Smith's thesis, reported in 1964, was clearly designed and conducted in terms of a theoretical approach to social studies education. Beginning with the reflective approach, Smith focused on one aspect of that approach — the necessity of an indeterminate or doubtful situation as the initiating phase of reflection. He then pointed to what he called "apparent internal factual disjunctions"


providing opportunities for the generation of indeterminate or doubtful situations, and examined two high school textbooks in American history for instances of these disjunctions.

Recently published analyses of social studies textbooks also vary with respect to the objectives of the study and with respect to the methodological rigor of the analysis. Most common are the informal, "humanistic," almost polemical studies of textbook bias. Examples of this approach are three studies reported by Krug. In the first of these studies, published in 1960, Krug examined three "popular" civics texts to determine whether they avoid or gloss over controversial issues. The second and third of Krug's studies were comparisons of, in the first case, East and West German textbooks, and in the second case, English and American textbooks, with respect to their treatment of certain historical events. Also included in this category is the analysis by Noah et al. of eleven high school texts in terms of their "fit" with current historical research and as sources of nationalistic bias.


The most rigorous study reported is that by Dimitroff. Using a jury of social scientists, she systematically selected a number of generalizations from the various social sciences. She then applied content analysis and statistical procedures to social studies textbooks to determine the extent to which these generalizations occurred in the selected texts.

Since McPhie prepared his guide there have been several additional dissertations involving textbook analysis in the social studies. But with these as well, Metcalf's criticism appears to be applicable. So far as can be determined from their abstracts, the studies have not been designed in terms of their relevance to a theory of instruction in the social studies.

In conclusion, then, our review of several related studies seems clearly to indicate that -- whatever might have been their underlying purposes -- (1) few textbook analyses have been conducted in terms of a theoretical approach to social studies education, and (2) no study has

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attempted to identify instances of explanations in social studies textbooks and to classify them according to their relevance to a set of categories based on the closed areas. Our study, which is designed to combine a theoretical framework and an identification and classification of explanations, would thus appear to offer a definite contribution to social studies education.
CHAPTER II

THE ANALYSIS OF TEXTBOOK EXPLANATIONS AND THE REFLECTIVE APPROACH TO SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION

We indicated in Chapter I that this study was set within the context of what was called "the reflective approach to the teaching of the social studies." This chapter is designed to develop more completely the nature of this context.

The first section is devoted to a general discussion of the nature of reflective thinking and the reflective approach to social studies instruction. In this section we will be concerned with some of the psychological, logical, and empirical aspects of that approach, as well as with some of the specific implications of that approach for teaching the social studies.

In the second section we distinguish between description and explanation in history and direct our attention to some of the aspects of explanation statements and their grounds. These latter considerations are developed in terms of the reflective approach to social studies education.

In the third, and final, section of this chapter we discuss the significance of the analysis of explanations found in history textbooks in terms of the reflective approach. This discussion is based on the
description of specific illustrations of explanation-analysis carried out within the context of that approach.

Before we move into these considerations, however, some preliminary comments are in order. First of all, it is clear that it would be beyond the scope of this study to attempt to build a defense of the reflective approach to the teaching of the social studies. It will serve our purposes merely to indicate its "legitimacy" as a way of coming at the problem of social studies instruction by pointing to its continuing appearance in the literature of educational thought generally, and of social studies education in particular. The elaboration of the basic elements of the reflective approach will follow these brief bibliographical comments.

The nature of reflective thinking and its implications for education have been discussed by several men periodically throughout this century. Perhaps the earliest, and classic, discussion of reflective thinking -- as we are using that term -- is Dewey's *How We Think*, published in 1910. In 1921, James H. Robinson issued his *The Mind in the Making*, which has been characterized as a "literary rendition" of Dewey's earlier work.

In the nineteen twenties and thirties, the position was described and defended by a group of philosophers from Columbia University, and by Boyd H. Bode, who approached the problem from the standpoint of

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research on the psychology of learning. Since that time there have been numerous publications dealing with reflection and education; perhaps the most prominent being the works by Bayles and, more recently, Hullfish and Smith. Some of the work of Smith and Ennis is complementary to the writings mentioned above. These two men have been concerned with spelling out specifically some of the constituent elements involved as an individual attempts to think "critically" or "reflectively."

The development of the theoretical position as it applied to social studies education was the task undertaken by Griffin. Metcalf comments that

Griffin stands almost alone in his attempt to elaborate in practical and theoretical terms what reflective theory means for teaching history. He has developed his

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theoretical position more completely and precisely than has any other student of method . . . .10

Jewett, working within the position outlined by Griffin and the earlier writers, used protocols of classroom activity to describe several aspects of the approach in operation, while Metcalf elaborated the theory of learning implicit in the reflective approach and used it in an experiment in the clarification of the social attitudes of students.11,12

Hunt and Metcalf have published for use with classes of prospective social studies teachers a text for which the reflective approach provides the basic framework.13 And, more recently, Metcalf has discussed the approach in the chapter on social studies in N. L. Gage's Handbook of Research on Teaching.14

Finally, the National Council for the Social Studies devoted its thirteenth yearbook to a discussion of the teaching of critical or reflective thinking in social studies, and, in two different yearbooks issued since that time, has attempted to place the notion of skill

10 Lawrence E. Metcalf, loc. cit.


14 Metcalf, "Research on Teaching the Social Studies," loc. cit.
development in social studies within the framework of the reflective approach to social studies education.\textsuperscript{15,16,17}

We have attempted to indicate that discussions of reflective thinking and its relationship to education have been a continuing part of educational thought throughout the twentieth century; we have not, however, indicated the breadth of support or the extent of agreement among social studies educators with respect to the reflective approach to teaching the social studies. Evidence of a sort that is relevant to this point was reported by Brodbelt in 1963.\textsuperscript{18}

Pointing to the work of Dewey and Robinson, Brodbelt referred to the reflective approach (which he called "critical thinking") as "the most singly emphasized idea in all areas of education today,"\textsuperscript{19} presumably meaning that it was "the most emphasized single idea . . . ." A major element in Brodbelt's study, which was concerned with contemporary social studies teacher-education, involved the sending of an extensive


\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 47.
questionnaire to over eight hundred individuals and institutions concerned directly with social studies education. One aspect of the questionnaire dealt with "emphasis placed on certain teaching functions by professors of secondary social studies"; one item under this heading referred to "developing critical thinking."20

Brodbelt reported that over 80 per cent of those who responded to this item indicated that they gave "much" emphasis to this function; the remainder indicated that they gave "some" emphasis to it.21 Unhappily, however, the questionnaire did not provide any specific referent for the notion of "critical thinking," so there is no way of knowing whether the respondents' conceptions fit that set forth by Brodbelt.22

It is unfortunate that Brodbelt missed the opportunity to clarify the extent to which the reflective approach is accepted by social studies educators. One way in which an answer to that question might be found would be to carry out a content analysis of the periodical literature dealing with social studies education to determine the extent to which such terms as "reflective thinking," "critical thinking," "systematic thinking," "creative thinking," "analytical thinking," and so on, are used in the sense implied by the theoretical writings mentioned above.

But that is another matter. It was our purpose to provide some basis for placing this study within the context of the reflective ap-

20Ibid., p. 49, table 16.
21Ibid.
22Ibid., p. 176.
proach to social studies instruction. We have attempted to do so by suggesting that the view is one that has had a continuing association with educational thought throughout the twentieth century and which may be very widely held by present-day social studies educators. We may now turn to a brief description of the basic elements of that position.

Reflective Thinking and the Reflective Approach
To Social Studies Education

As we have said, in this study our attention is directed toward an examination of textbooks in one particular area of the social studies. Since, however, the framework within which that examination will occur is the reflective approach, it is important that the nature of that approach be clearly understood. Accordingly, the following discussion is designed to make explicit (1) the general characteristics of reflective thought and its connection with learning; (2) some of the logical and empirical aspects of reflection; (3) some implications of reflective thinking for the teaching of the social studies; and (4) the grounds upon which rests the recommendation that the reflective approach be applied to social studies education.

General characteristics of reflective thought

There are several senses in which the words "think," "thinking," and "thought" are used. One sense of "thinking" refers to a "stream of consciousness," to the uncontrolled passing of ideas through our heads.

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23 This discussion, as will be obvious, generally follows Dewey's development of reflective thinking as put forth in *How We Think*, revised edition, 1933.
As Dewey notes, "More of our waking life than most of us would care to admit is whiled away in this inconsequential trifling with mental pictures, random recollections, pleasant but unfounded hopes, [and] flittering half developed impressions . . . ." 24

A second sense of thinking refers also to imagination and invention rather than observation; but this sense is distinguished from the earlier one on the grounds that "in this class are successions of imaginative incidents and episodes that have a certain coherence, hang together on a continuous thread," and thus are to be set apart from mere random recollections or flittering half developed impressions. 25

A third sense in which thought or thinking is used suggests a belief. 26 One might say, for example, "I thought you would arrive before 6:00 P.M." What is meant by this assertion is that it was the belief of the person who made it that the specified occurrence would take place as indicated.

The first two senses described above, as Dewey asserts, can make no claim to truth . . . . They may involve a kind of emotional commitment, but not intellectual and practical commitment. Beliefs, on the other hand, do involve precisely this commitment and consequently sooner or later they demand our investigation to find out upon what grounds they rest. 27

25 Ibid., p. 5.
26 Ibid., p. 6.
27 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
It is this investigation that constitutes reflective thought. It may be defined as the

... active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or purported form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends ... Once begun, it includes a conscious and voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of evidence and rationality. 28

Within this broad definition of reflective thinking, there are two elements which call for our explicit attention. First, the occasion calling for reflection arises when a state of doubt, uncertainty, perplexity confronts an individual with respect to some "belief or purported form of knowledge." 29 That is to say, when a person is functioning in a situation in which his responses (intellectual or other) are appropriate so far as he can see, then there is no intellectual motivation for him to examine the truth of those beliefs upon which the activity is based. On the other hand, when his responses no longer seem to be appropriate, he may come to doubt the meaningfulness and validity of those responses and of the beliefs on which they rest.

While the existence of perplexity is a necessary condition of reflection, it is not, however, sufficient. As Hunt and Metcalf point out, there are a variety of reactions (some highly unreflective) made by people confronted with unclear or doubtful situations. 30 The second

28 Ibid., p. 9.
29 Ibid., p. 12. See also Hullfish and Smith, op. cit., p. 35; Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., p. 44.
30 Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 50-60.
element which must therefore be added to the state of doubt or confusion is, as our definition suggests, "an act of searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity."31

Another way of looking at reflective thinking is in terms of the familiar five phases or aspects of a "complete act of thought."32 Given the existence of a doubtful or indeterminate situation, there are several elements which tend to be involved in a reflective resolution of it:

1. The occurrence of suggestions toward the possible solution of the difficulty;

2. The intellectualization of the perplexity into a problem more or less explicitly formulated;

3. The selection of one or another suggestion as a hypothesis to guide the search for evidence bearing on the problem;

4. The logical elaboration of the hypothesis in terms of its implications, premises, and presuppositions;

5. The testing of the hypothesis in action.

With this elaboration of a "complete act of thought" must come, however, a warning. It is not to be expected that any given instance of reflective thinking should necessarily proceed in terms of these five phases. Quite the contrary:

In practice, two of them may telescope, some of them may be passed over hurriedly, and the burden may fall mainly on a single phase, which will then require a seemingly dispropor-

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tionate development. No set rules can be laid down on such matters.33

The point is that the above breakdown is merely for the purpose of clarification, not for the purpose of laying down a model into which all "truly reflective" activity must fit.

Having thus indicated in a very broad way the general characteristics of reflective thinking -- as we are using that term -- and before we focus more directly on several key (for our purposes) aspects of that process, it is important that we discuss briefly the connection between learning and reflective thinking.

There is in the reflective approach an important distinction drawn between two forms or types of learning: "learning to," and "learning that." In the words of one writer on the subject,

There is a world of difference . . . between learning to say that Jefferson bought the Louisiana territory and actually learning that he did so. The distinguishing characteristic of the human animal is precisely his ability to "learn that" rather than merely to "learn to." A parrot may learn to say, "Jefferson bought Louisiana," but no parrot can conceivably learn that anything of the sort is true . . . .

Learning in this sense [i.e., learning that] means 'the establishment of meaning-relationships among one's experiences.' . . . Learning is either an elaborate counterfeit, or it is one of the by-products of an inquiry, simple or involved, carried on by the student himself.34

It should be clear from the above quotation that the conception of learning held by those who accept the view of reflective thinking


presented here is markedly similar to the view of learning described in
dfield psychology. That such is the case is made explicit by Hunt and
Metcalf:

Field theorists see learning as the discovery of meaning in
a perceptual field — commonly called insight. Tested in-
sights lead to generalizations which enable a learner to
behave more intelligently in similar confronting situations
in the future . . . . Within the framework of field psychol-
ogy, learning is always accompanied by understanding or
grasp of meaning . . . . According to field theorists,
problems are solved by bringing to bear meanings (insights)
gained in previous learning situations. But in the pro-
cess the earlier meanings are enlarged and refined, so
that the learner achieves a reconstruction of his con-
ceptual pattern. 35

Since, however, insights may be true or false, their validity must be
checked by their being subjected to reflective examination. 36

One particularly important point mentioned above bears additional
emphasis. Since, as Jerome Bruner has pointed out, "one of the princi-
pal objectives in learning is to save us from subsequent learning," the
generalizations which grow out of the tested insights are the primary
fruits of learning. 37 Or, to put it differently, learning defined as
the "establishment of meaning-relationships among one's experiences"
implies that, once established, these meaning-relationships become part
of our intellectual "baggage," in terms of which we can thereafter
function. A meaning-relationship, of course, is always open to re-exam-

36 Ibid., p. 28.
37 Jerome S. Bruner, "Learning and Thinking," Harvard Educational
ination if future experience calls it into question. Learning, then, "is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience." 38

Properly understood, this point about the relationship between learning and thinking leads to a further one:

Discrete or single insights or items of information . . . do not by themselves have meaning or usefulness. It can mean little to a student to memorize a statement such as "Aaron Burr killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel," unless its connection with some general principle or rule is made explicit. A fact can function in thought only when it comes to have evidential character — that is, the quality of supporting or casting doubt upon some general idea. 39

In the above description of the general characteristics of reflective thinking, the emphasis was placed on what might be called its psychological elements — e.g., the distinction between various senses of the terms "thinking" and "thought," the generating force of the doubtful or confusing situation, and the role of generalizations or principles in reflective activity.

At this point we shall turn our attention to some of the logical and empirical elements in reflective thinking. In so doing, however, it is important to keep in mind our definition of reflective thinking: the "active, persistent, careful consideration of a belief or purported form of knowledge in the light of the grounds which support it and the fur-
ther conclusions to which it tends ... Our attention will be
directed toward some of the operations which may be directly involved in
the examination of statements representing beliefs or knowledge-claims.

Some operations involved in the examination of beliefs and knowledge-claims

Ennis has claimed that "there are various kinds of statements, various relations between statements and their grounds, and various stages in the process of assessment" of these statements, and that therefore "we can expect that there will be various ways of going wrong" as one attempts to examine them. 41 The validity of Ennis's assertion is, perhaps, suggested by the following list of statements which might represent beliefs held by some person or knowledge-claims put forth by him.

1. Abraham Lincoln was assassinated on April 14, 1865.
2. Money is the root of all evil.
3. The First World War was the result of the arms build-up in Europe in the early 1900's.
4. Warren G. Harding was one of the poorest Presidents of the United States.
5. "Freedom means that the decisions in America's productive effort are made not in the minds of a bureaucracy but in the free market." 42

One operation that has been suggested by Smith as an essential

40Dewey, How We Think, p. 9.
41Ennis, loc. cit., p. 83.
part of the process of examination of statements of beliefs or knowledge-claims is the ability to distinguish between observations and inferences:

The individual who is aware of the distinction between what is observed and what is inferred, and who is further aware of the chain of thought connecting the two, has a broader basis from which to consider the truth or falsity of anything.43

An illustration of this distinction put forth by Smith is worth a brief examination.

We read, for instance, in a history text that the pilgrims came to the new world because they were in search of freedom to worship as they pleased. . . . . It is an observed fact, or at least in principle it can be observed, that the pilgrims did come to the shores of the new world. But it is an inference, and not an observed fact, that they came for religious freedom.44

It seems, however, that the distinction is not so clear and sharp as seems to be implied in this statement.45 Since it is impossible for a person in the twentieth century to observe the landing of the pilgrims, Smith finds it necessary to include that "in principle it can be observed." Such an inclusion, however, takes the distinction out of the context of the examination of statements of beliefs and know-

43Ibid., p. 133.
44Ibid.
ledge-claims. Assume, for instance, that a person set out to determine whether the statement, "the pilgrims came to the new world," was fit to believe. He could not, as we pointed out, observe this occurrence. What, then, could he do? Obviously, he could examine certain documents, records, artifacts, etc., which provide some evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of the statement. And, having examined this evidence, he then is in a position to infer whether or not the pilgrims did come to the new world. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that there are serious difficulties inherent in Smith's attempt to distinguish between observations and inferences, at least in connection with historical statements.

The fact remains, however, that there does appear to be some sort of discontinuity between statements like "the pilgrims came to the new world," and statements like "the pilgrims came to the new world because they were in search of freedom to worship as they pleased." It also seems clear that an awareness of the nature of this discontinuity would be helpful to an individual who was attempting to assess the truth or falsity of such assertions. Since, however, various aspects of this discontinuity play an important part in the framework of this study, further attention will be given to it later. Our purpose at the present time is rather to bring out, at a more general level, some of the operations involved in the examination of statements of beliefs and knowledge-claims.

Baus has recently attempted an extensive analysis of some of the pitfalls in the assessment of such statements. Hereafter are reproduced the basic aspects of his analysis. It should be emphasized first, how-
ever, that Ennis does not intend his analysis to be exhaustive. On the contrary, he explicitly omits from consideration the assessment of value statements. 46

As a root notion critical thinking is taken to be the correct assessing of statements. Since there are various kinds of statements, various relations between statements and their grounds, and various stages in the process of assessment, we can expect that there will be various ways of going wrong when one attempts to think critically. 47

Although the root notion calls for its inclusion, the judging of value statements is deliberately excluded . . . .

There are three analytically distinguishable dimensions of the proposed concept of critical thinking: a logical dimension, a criterial dimension, and a pragmatic dimension.

The logical dimension, roughly speaking, covers judging alleged relationships between meanings of words and statements. A person who is competent in this dimension knows what follows from a statement or group of statements, by virtue of their meaning. 48

The criterial dimension covers knowledge of the criteria for judging statements . . . , except for the logical criteria, which are covered by the logical dimension.

The pragmatic dimension covers the impression of the background purpose on the judgment, and it covers the decision as to whether the statement is good enough for the purpose . . . .

Inclusion of this dimension . . . constitute[s] recognition of the legitimate function played by the background purpose in making decisions about the acceptability of statements. 49

Ennis then elaborates twelve aspects of critical thinking or twelve

46 Ennis, loc. cit., p. 84.
47 Ibid., p. 83.
48 Ibid., p. 84.
49 Ibid., p. 85.
"pitfalls" in the correct assessment of statements under the following headings:

1. Grasping the meaning of a statement.
2. Judging whether there is ambiguity in a line of reasoning.
3. Judging whether certain statements contradict each other.
4. Judging whether a conclusion follows necessarily.
5. Judging whether a statement is specific enough.
6. Judging whether a principle establishes a statement that is alleged to be an application of it.
7. Judging whether an observation statement is reliable.
8. Judging whether an inductive conclusion is warranted.
9. Judging whether the problem has been identified.
10. Judging whether something is an assumption.
11. Judging whether a definition is adequate.
12. Judging whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable.

It seems safe to say that while there are several limitations to the analysis outlined above (the omission of value statements, for example), it nevertheless goes a long way toward an explicit development of many of the operations involved in reflective-thinking.

To summarize, then, at this point, in this chapter we have (1) suggested that the notion of reflective thinking and its relevance to education is very much a part of contemporary educational thought, (2) out-

50 Ibid., pp. 86-106.
lined the general characteristics of reflective thinking, and (3) de-
scribed one analyst's attempt to specify some of the operations involved
in the process. The next two matters for our attention are (1) a brief
description of the rationale underlying the recommendation that the
reflective approach be adopted in social studies education and (2) a
consideration of some of the implications of the prior discussions for
teaching the social studies.

Grounds for recommending the reflective
approach to social studies education

The question may well be raised, "On what basis do you urge the
adoption of the reflective approach for use in social studies instruc-
tion?" The following discussion outlines the answer that is generally
given to this question.

We have suggested above that the reflective approach draws heavily
upon the conception of learning put forth in field psychology. If it
were the case that field theory was overwhelmingly accepted among
psychologists, then that fact would provide considerable support for a
recommendation favoring the adoption of the reflective approach. Un-
fortunately, as many observers have reported, there is no widespread
agreement among psychologists; on the contrary, the state of affairs
with respect to learning theories has been described in one instance as
"chaotic."\(^5\) Whether or not that description is accurate is not the
point; the point is that psychology of learning does not at the present

\(^{51}\) Hullfish and Smith, op. cit., p. 169.
time provide adequate grounds for the recommendation in question, or for any other specific recommendation, for that matter.\(^{52}\)

It is rather on a broad social purpose that is based a justification of the reflective approach in social studies education.\(^{53}\) This purpose, in turn, finds its being in several distinctions which may be drawn between totalitarian and democratic societies.

First of all, societies may be considered as democratic insofar as no limits are set on what topics may be reflected upon.\(^{54}\) Second, whereas authoritarian societies achieve cohesion by instilling values and beliefs, holding them beyond question, and keeping out information that might cast doubt upon their soundness, democratic societies must rely on knowledge and rationality.\(^{55}\) Third, there is in every culture pattern a body of central values; in a democratic society the concern is not with the specific nature of these values but with the manner in which they are maintained and modified.\(^{56}\) Thus the recommendation that the reflective approach be adopted for use in the teaching of the social studies is based upon a prior commitment to a society that is open, a society that is based on knowledge and rationality, and a society that facilitates the intelligent and critical maintenance and


\(^{53}\)Metcalf, "Research on Teaching the Social Studies," loc. cit., p. 936.

\(^{54}\)Griffin, op. cit., p. 61.

\(^{55}\)Ibid., pp. 6, 7-8, 81, 96-99.

\(^{56}\)Ibid., p. 95.
modification of its central values. The development and survival of such a society, or the movement of a society in the "democratic direction," is held to depend, in large measure, upon that approach.57

Some implications of the Reflective approach for teaching the social studies

Having considered the general nature of reflective thinking and some of its specific elements, and having indicated briefly the nature of the argument which is advanced in support of its adoption in social studies education, we turn now to a brief discussion of some of the implications of the earlier commentary for (1) the role of the social studies teacher; (2) the function of the textbook; and (3) the selection of content for study.

If, as Dewey said, "all which the school can or need do for pupils, so far as their minds are concerned. . . . is to develop their ability to think," what part does the teacher play in this process?58 One thing is immediately clear — within the reflective approach the point of focus shifts away from the teacher toward the students. By this we mean that if learning is engaging in reflective activity, then the teacher's role is not that of teaching, strictly speaking; rather it is that of creating the conditions under which student reflection can thrive.

Perhaps the most fundamental responsibility of the teacher lies in the creation of a classroom climate in which inquiry into and examination

57Ibid., p. 61.

58Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 179.
of ideas can proceed. Hullfish and Smith refer to the importance of a "relationship of trust" within the classroom:

Whenever thinking goes on the chance for error is present . . . . But if students are to take the chance of being in error they must have the assurance, which only the quality of the situation can provide, that they will not suffer at the hands of the teacher when their answers differ from his . . . .

A teacher who views himself as a "pleasant collaborator" in a thoughtful experience will dismiss no answers arbitrarily, nor accept any perfunctorily. He will be sure, insofar as the complexity of the human relationship permits, that a quality of trust pervades his relationship with students.

The creation of an intellectually open and permissive atmosphere in the classroom, while a necessary condition for meaningful reflective activity, obviously is not sufficient. While it may happen that an open discussion or unit-study in such a classroom will generate a puzzling or doubtful situation with respect to a belief or knowledge-claim on the part of some students, in the interests of efficiency and expediency, the teacher should see to it that such situations do arise. As Hunt and Metcalf put it, "a teacher's job is to get students into an 'intellectual jam'." Again, however, the teacher's responsibility does not end with the

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60 Hullfish and Smith, op. cit., p. 203.
61 Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., p. 115.
generation of a situation the meaning of which is unclear for some (at least) of his students. It is true that

the pursuit of meanings . . . should be at the center of those situations of shared concern within which the teaching-learning act arises. But meanings found (that is, put forward as if valid) and not tested will leave students on levels of blind acceptance of authority, superstition, or credulity — in short, on levels of ignorance.62

Thus the teacher must assume the leadership in the "test of meanings" put forth by the students through directing an exploration of the implications of those assertions, and through directing, insofar as is necessary, an examination of the grounds on which those assertions rest. In other words, the teacher must assume the responsibility for helping the students develop their abilities in the areas of logical and empirical analysis outlined by Ennis and described earlier in this chapter.

We have suggested three aspects of the teacher's role within the reflective approach to instruction in the social studies: (1) the creation of an intellectually open classroom climate; (2) the generation of puzzling or doubtful situations with respect to beliefs held by students or knowledge-claims put forth by them; and (3) the assistance in the development of the critical and analytical abilities of students. Since it was indicated in Chapter I that the use of a single textbook as the foundation of teaching the social studies is almost universal among secondary schools in this country, it is appropriate to make a few

62Hullfish and Smith, op. cit., p. 204.
comments regarding the function of the textbook within the context of a reflective classroom.

Briefly, there are two broad functions with which we will here be concerned. First of all, textbooks might provide opportunities for the generation of the perplexity out of which arises reflective activity. These opportunities might arise in one of a number of different ways. Smith, for example, has shown that several senior high school textbooks in American history contain numerous apparently contradictory factual assertions which, when pointed out by the teacher, might occasion the need for reflection. Or, it may be possible to find assertions in textbooks which cast doubt on beliefs held by students, thus leading, perhaps, to an examination of the assertions and the beliefs in question.

A second function which textbooks might fulfill is that of a reference book or source of potential evidence bearing upon a particular assertion or relevant to a particular discussion. If, for example, a student contends that "our founding fathers" believed that the federal government should not become involved in the economic affairs of the country, the teacher might refer the student to the text's description of Alexander Hamilton's famous Report on Manufactures. It should be emphasized that this function does not imply the acceptance of the textbook writer's words on their face. On the contrary, statements taken

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64 See Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 343-350.
from textbooks are subject to the same analysis, insofar as is possible, as that undergone by statements made by students or by the teacher.

Now there is one problem which must be faced by virtually every teacher in any subject area: the problem of selection of the content to be studied. The teacher who operates within the context of the reflective approach to social studies education is not an exception. Beyond the obvious limitations imposed by the nature of the class with which the teacher is working, what grounds are available upon which he might base the selection for study of a particular belief or statement purporting to offer social knowledge? Two aspects of the approach have been combined to provide such grounds.

First of all, the reflective approach, as we have seen, is based, in large measure, on the motivating power of the "problem," i.e., the perplexity or doubtful situation with which an individual is confronted. In this connection the assumption is made that, within certain limits, "the more keenly a problem is felt the better will be the quality of learning which results." If such is indeed the case, then clearly, "the most effectual learning emerges from situations where cherished beliefs or attitudes are felt to be at stake." Moreover, an analysis of American culture, together with the conception of democracy suggested above (i.e., a society is democratic to the extent that it refuses to place limits on what may be reflected

65 Ibid., pp. 4-11, 43-48, 214-231.
66 Ibid., p. 43.
67 Ibid., p. 45.
American society, it has been suggested, is particularly conflict-ridden:

Settled by peoples of diverse origins and outlooks, the United States has been, ever since its founding, the scene of competing political, economic, and social beliefs. Furthermore, the rate of industrialization tends to generate conflict. It speeds change, with a result that from generation to generation beliefs undergo marked alteration. Industrialization also tends to fragmentize society into highly specialized occupational groupings, each with its own point of view and its peculiar interests.68

A second feature of American society is "the presence of closed areas -- areas of belief and behavior which are largely closed to rational thought. In these areas people usually react to problems blindly and emotionally."69 In the American society, it is reported, irrational responses commonly occur in the areas of morality and religion, sex, race and minority-group relations, social class, nationalism and patriotism, and economics.70

Hunt and Metcalf point out that these closed areas exist as islands of totalitarian thought and practice in the midst of a culture which is straining in democratic directions. The term totalitarian is appropriate here because the behavior of the American people with respect to their closed areas is akin to the behavior of the people of totalitarian states. That is, each closed area has a set of sanctioned (albeit often irrational or inconsistent) beliefs which we try to inculcate in the young through indoctrination and propaganda; people are not taught to rely for answers on independent reflection but on the

69 Ibid., p. 6.
70 Ibid.
authority of tradition, the church, or political leaders. And severe pressure — both social and legal — may be placed on persons who adopt beliefs or behavior contrary to those sanctioned.\(^7\)

Keeping in mind the broad social purpose underlying the reflective approach, it is clear why Hunt and Metcalf, therefore, recommend that the content selected for study in social studies classes be drawn from these closed areas.\(^{72}\) In addition, however, they point out that within these areas there will be found many of the beliefs held by students in social studies classes:

One reason why social studies education should focus on issues in closed areas is that it is here that personally felt problems . . . tend to intersect with pervasive and troublesome cultural issues. To study such problems provides a way of meeting both individual and social needs . . . .\(^73\)

Since the specific nature and content of the various closed areas of American culture will play an important part in the analysis of textbooks that constitutes the major portion of this study, a more complete discussion of the closed areas will be postponed until Chapter III.

At this point, having finished our discussion of the nature of the reflective approach to social studies education, we now turn to a consideration of (1) two sorts of knowledge-claims — description and explanation — commonly found in historical writing; (2) some comments

\(^{71}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{72}\text{Ibid., p. 223.}\)

\(^{73}\text{Ibid.}\)
regarding the structure of one sort of knowledge-claim — that of historical explanation; and (3) the place of historical explanation-analysis in the reflective approach to social studies education. When these tasks are accomplished we will have completed the laying of the theoretical foundations of this study.

Aspects of Historical Explanations and Their Grounds

Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, in pointing to one of the primary objectives of scientific inquiry, have placed their finger on a distinction which is of great importance for this study:

to explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question "Why?" rather than only the question "What?", is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates . . . .

Description and explanation in history

Historians, too, attempt "to go beyond mere description." W. H. Walsh distinguishes between "plain" and "significant" historical narratives and argues that it is in the latter that "history proper" consists. In language very much similar to that of Hempel and Oppenheim, Walsh asserts that "the historian is not content to tell us merely what


happened; he wishes to make us see why it happened, too." The historian thus is aiming at an "intelligent and intelligible" reconstruction of the past. The 1954 Report of the Committee on Historiography of the Social Science Research Council also recognized the distinction between description and explanation:

There are two kinds of contributions that historians can make to an understanding of human behavior. One is descriptive. In the descriptive function, events that actually took place and the order in which they occurred are identified. This function is "scientific" in the sense that it establishes credible evidence ("facts") by the critical use of documents. But if the investigator stops at this point and declines to analyze the how and the why of the temporal sequences that he describes, he is mistaking the initial task for the actual problem .... The scientific function involves not only identifying and describing temporal sequences; it also involves explaining them.

When we speak of explaining or understanding a given sequence of events, we mean that we undertake to give reasons for those particular events or, in other words, to explain why they occurred in that particular order ....

Now it will be recalled that in our earlier discussion of some of the operations involved in the process of examination of statements of beliefs or knowledge-claims, we had occasion to be critical of the distinction drawn by Smith between statements of the type, "The pilgrims came to the New World," and statements of the type, "The pilgrims came

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
to the New World because they were in search of freedom to worship as they pleased."

While his distinction — between "observations" and "inferences" — we held to be untenable, we nevertheless recognized that there was some important sense in which sentences of the two types differ. That sense is the distinction just drawn between descriptive and explanatory statements. Thus the first statement, in however vague and broad language, describes an occurrence that took place at a given time in the past. It offers information, of a sort, regarding that occurrence. When, however, as in the second sentence, "attention moves beyond the offering of information . . . to matters of meaning, relationships, causes, factors, and reasons . . .," then we may say that an explanation is being offered.79

Furthermore, it is a matter of some importance to note the relationship that obtains between statements of description and explanatory statements. In order to bring this relationship into the open, let us turn again to Smith’s examples. First, notice that the descriptive statement — "The pilgrims came to the New World" — is incorporated as an element in the explanatory statement. Notice also that a second element in the explanatory statement may also be stated as a descriptive assertion: "The pilgrims were in search of freedom to worship as they pleased." The force of the explanatory statement as an explanation, however, derives not from the mere assertion of these two

descriptive statements, rather it derives from the assertion of a relationship between the latter descriptive statement and the former.

Inasmuch as historians are concerned with both descriptive and explanatory statements as they go about their work, it would seem quite reasonable to assume that both kinds of assertions would occur in history textbooks written for use at the secondary school level. If such is indeed the case, then the distinction between the two sorts of statements and the specific features of each carry some import for the teacher operating in terms of the reflective approach to social studies instruction.

It will be our argument that the consideration and examination of statements purporting to offer explanations carry greater significance for the reflective approach to social studies education than do similar activities with respect to description-statements. Before developing this argument, however, it is necessary first to consider briefly some of the problems concerning the structure of historical explanations.

Explanations and their grounds.

In what we have said so far, we have used the term explanation in the sense that an explanation is said to be offered whenever an event, occurrence, or state of affairs is said to account for another event, occurrence, or state of affairs. Given an explanation, the former event, occurrence, or state of affairs may be referred to as "a cause of," "the reason for," or "a factor in" the occurrence of the latter event, occurrence, or state of affairs.

It is important to understand that the use of the terms event, occurrence, and state of affairs should not be construed as an attempt to
limit the application of the notion of explanation to single, unitary happenings. Rather, these terms are meant to be taken as broadly as necessary, as encompassing happenings from a single decision by an individual to the complex of events that we call the Renaissance.

Now if the reflective approach to social studies instruction involves an examination of statements purporting to offer social knowledge, some clear guidelines are needed for their examination when such statements offer explanations. As has been implied earlier in this chapter and as Swift explicitly states, the methodological rules from which the operations involved in the process of reflective thinking are derived: "are rules or canons of inquiry which are both logical and empirical . . . ." Thus the structure of explanations, and hence the basis for their examination, must conform to those rules.

In our discussion of the distinction between description and explanation statements above, we had occasion to indicate briefly several distinctive characteristics of explanations. Using the same illustration, let us now consider these and other characteristics in some detail.

As we have said earlier, an explanation is offered when one event, occurrence, or state of affairs is said to account for another event, occurrence, or state of affairs. In our illustration — "The pilgrims came to the New World because they were in search of freedom to worship

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81 Ibid., p. 21.
82 Ibid.
as they pleased" -- the pilgrims' search for freedom is offered to account for the pilgrims' trip to this country. The statement describing the latter occurrence, the-event-being-explained, we will call the explanandum. The sentence adduced to account for the explanandum may be called the explanans.

At this point it is possible to point to the first set of criteria upon which an examination of explanations may proceed. These first criteria are empirical ones. There must be sufficient evidence to warrant the assertions that constitute the explanandum and the explanans.

It may be argued, however, that evidence sufficient to warrant the assertion of the explanandum would of necessity be prior to and apart from even the assertion of the explanation, since unless there was some reason for believing that an occurrence took place it would be devoid of sense to speak of an explanation of that occurrence. While such may indeed be the case with respect to the operations of the historian as he goes about his work, it must be remembered that the context in which we are viewing the problem of explanation is that of the reflective approach to social studies education.

Our concern is with the development of certain analytical and critical abilities of students in social studies classes. Consequently,

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82 Hempel and Oppenheim, loc. cit., p. 321.

83 Ibid. This is a somewhat more restricted notion of explanans than that of Hempel and Oppenheim.

since failure to consider the warrant for asserting that the pilgrims came to the New World may lead students to be uncritical of the truth or falsity of explananda in other explanations (e.g., "the United States Army used lethal poisonous gas against the Viet Cong because of their hatred of the peoples of Asia"), it is essential that the empirical test be applied to both elements of the explanation.

However essential it is to the assessment of an explanation as "adequate" or "acceptable" that its constituent assertions be warranted, it is obviously not sufficient. For the force of an explanation as an explanation derives from the relationship obtaining between the explanans and the explanandum. And this relationship, the accounting for the latter by the former, does not grow out of the mere assertion that the two occurrences did in fact take place.

In the first place, if the event or state of affairs described in the explanans occurred prior to that described in the explanandum, the mere assertion of the fact of the occurrence of these events or states of affairs as grounds for asserting that the one accounted for the other opens that assertion to the charge that it is guilty of the commission of the notorious post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.

In the second place, even the presence of the explanans on the occasion of the occurrence of the explanandum does not establish the "accounting-for" relationship. That such is indeed the case can be seen from the following simple illustration. Consider the explanation: "He went home early because he was hungry." Assume that the truth of

his going home early and the truth of his hunger have been established. Are we warranted therefore in asserting the given explanation? Clearly not; he may have received an urgent telephone message, he may have forgotten an important document, he may have ripped his pants — any number of unstated occurrences may have resulted in his early trip home.

The point, as should be obvious by now, is that "the mere presence of a reason or reasons . . . is not sufficient for establishing an explanation . . . . The content of the reason and its relation to the . . . [explanandum] are both significant in ascertaining its acceptability . . . ." What is it, then, that serves as a basis for accounting for one occurrence by another? The statements in the explanans serve as reasons by virtue of recognition of other statements which are parts of the pattern of explanation-in-general but which are frequently omitted . . . . The omitted statements differ from the reasons in that the former are general statements, i.e., generalizations asserting a relationship between [the] two groups of objects, conditions, or states of affairs [that are described in the explanans and the explanandum] . . . .


68 Ibid., p. 24. This point is widely made throughout the literature on the philosophy of history. See, for example, Morris R. Cohen, The Meaning of Human History (LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1961), pp. 37-38; Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation (London: Oxford University Press, 1952); Isaiah Berlin, "History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History," History and Theory, I, #1 (1960), 1-31; Michael Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations," in Patrick Gardiner, Theories of History, pp. 443-475; Charles Frankel, "Philosophy and History," Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (September, 1957), 350-369. For additional discussions of this point see the issues of History and Theory since 1961, and the bibliography at the end of Gardiner's Theories of
Among students of historical explanation there is some controversy regarding the place of the generalization in the explanation. Thus Swift, following Hempel and others, asserts that an explanation may be viewed

as a group of statements: a generalization and a subsuming statement, from which follows an acceptance or a conclusion . . . . The statements altogether constitute the explanation . . . . In addition, the statements that are elements of the pattern of explanation may be seen as related in a significant manner. The generalization . . . may be thought of as one premise, the reason as a second premise, and the statement expressing the explicandum as a conclusion. The group of statements in this view becomes a line of argument with the explicandum following from the premises according to rules governing deductive conclusions. 89

While we will want to return later to the structure of explanations suggested in this last paragraph, the present concern is directed toward the assertion that explanations qua explanations contain the three sets of assertions.

Scriven, on the other hand, argues that such a view ignores the distinction between an explanation and its justification. 90 He notes that "just as we must distinguish a statement about the population of the ancient Greek city of Poseidonis (Paestum) from our grounds for be-

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89 Swift, "Explanation as an Aspect of Critical Thinking . . . .", p. 25. See also Hempel, loc. cit., pp. 344-356.

90 Scriven, loc. cit., p. 445.
ieving it, so must we distinguish the statement of an explanation from our grounds for putting it forward as such . . . .”

With respect to the possible sources of deficiencies in explanations, Scriven sees a "tripartite division":

It may be the case that we have insufficient grounds for the assertions actually occurring in what we normally call an explanation . . . . Or it may be that the statements offered are well supported and true but do not fully explain what they were supposed to explain . . . . And, thirdly, it may be that, through misunderstanding, the proposed explanation is not of the kind required . . . .

The grounds which are required for defense against each of these possible areas of deficiency Scriven refers to as "truth-justifying" grounds, "role-justifying" grounds, and "type-justifying" grounds, respectively.93

This dispute has been brought into our discussion not for the purpose of considering the legitimacy of the alternative views, but rather to facilitate the discussion to which we shall momentarily turn. As should become clear, the disagreement has little, if any, bearing on the direction of our discussion regarding the analysis of explanations and the reflective approach.

Heretofore we have written of an explanation in the sense in which Scriven speaks of it. While we shall continue to do so, it should be emphasized that this decision is based merely on grounds of

91Ibid., p. 446.
92Ibid.
93Ibid., pp. 446-447.
expediency and clarity and that our so doing in no way should be con-
sidered as committing us to the over-all position advocated by Scriven.

To summarize at this point, we have described the two elements
of which an explanation is constituted and we have indicated the tests
to which these elements must be submitted. We have also suggested that
the explanatory force of an explanation is grounded in or derives from
a general statement that asserts a relationship between the explanans
and the explanandum. The considerations to which we now turn are di-
rected toward the nature of the logical relationship between the state-
ment and the two elements of an explanation.

The position which we will first describe is the most rigorous
and demanding of those with which we will be concerned. This position
received its classic statement in 1942 by Carl G. Hempel. The follow-
ing quotations are taken from that statement:

By a general law, we shall here understand a state-
ment of universal conditional form which is capable of being
confirmed or disconfirmed by suitable empirical findings . . . .

The main function of general laws in the natural sci-
ences is to connect events in patterns which are usually re-
ferred to as explanation and prediction.

The explanation of the occurrence of an event of some
specified kind E at a certain time and place consists, as it
is usually expressed, in indicating the causes or deter-
mining factors of E. Now the assertion that a set of events —
say, of the kind C₁, C₂, . . . Cₙ — have caused the event
to be explained, amounts to the statement that, according to
certain general laws, a set of events of the kinds mentioned
is regularly accompanied by an event of kind E. Thus, the
scientific explanation of the event in question consists of
(1) a set of statements asserting the occurrence of
certain events C₁, . . . Cₙ at certain times and places,

9h "The Function of General Laws in History." Originally published
in the Journal of Philosophy in that year, it is reprinted in Gardiner,
Theories of History, pp. 344-356. References are to this source.
(2) a set of universal hypotheses \([\text{general laws}]\)

such that

(a) the statements of both groups are reasonably well confirmed by empirical evidence,

(b) from the two groups of statements the sentence asserting the occurrence of event \(E\)

can be logically deduced . . .

The preceding considerations apply to explanation in history as well as in any other branch of empirical science.

Historical explanation, too, aims at showing that the event in question was not "a matter of chance," but was to be expected in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous conditions. The expectation referred to is not prophecy or divination, but rational scientific anticipation which rests on the assumption of general laws.\(^{95}\)

Hempel points out that in most instances of explanatory analysis of historical events what is offered is not an explanation, "but something that might be called an explanation sketch." Such a sketch consists of a more or less vague indication of the laws and initial conditions considered to be relevant, and it needs 'filling out' in order to turn into a full fledged explanation.\(^{96}\)

In virtue of its distinguishing characteristics, Hempel's elucidation of explanation in history has been labeled the "covering-law model" or the "deductive model" of explanation. But by whatever name it is called, Hempel's formulation has been subjected to extensive criticism. When attempts were made to spell out the laws which, according to the covering-law model, must be presupposed by any historical explanation, "the resulting formulations showed a disturbing tendency either to be so vague and unspecific as to put in question their utility\(^{95}\)

\(^{95}\)Ibid., pp. 345, 348-349.

\(^{96}\)Ibid., p. 351.
or else to be so highly determinate and particularized as to appear no longer to qualify as statements of law at all."^97

The attempt to assert a credible and meaningful generalization, Nagel, among others, has suggested, leads to "at best only a statistical rather than a strictly universal form; it will assert, for example, that most men, or that a certain percentage of men, behave in the indicated manner."^98

If, however, the first premise is replaced by a statistical generalization, "the resulting argument is not a formally valid deductive one; and its premises entail the conclusion . . . only with some 'degree of probability' . . . ."^99 The conclusion to which we are forced is that in such cases, the occurrences historians succeed in explaining "could not have been predicted (in the sense of being strictly deduced) from the information . . . in the premises . . . ; that is, the truth of the premises . . . is entirely compatible with the falsity of . . . [the] conclusion."^100

Scriven, on the other hand, raises the question that if such is indeed the case, in what sense can we be sure that the probability statement provides the relationship necessary for the assertion of any particular explanation?^101


^99Ibid., p. 557.

^100Ibid., pp. 558-559.

^101Scriven, loc. cit., p. 464.
The alternative offered by Scriven is a description of a category of general statements containing "some universal features and some statistical features... The crucial common property of these statements... can be described as norm-defining; they have a selective immunity to apparent counter-examples."\(^{102}\) The distinction between these "normic statements" and statistical ones lies in the fact that "the statistical statement does not say anything about the things to which it refers except that some do and some do not fall into a certain category."\(^{103}\) The normic statement, on the other hand, "says that everything falls into a certain category except those to which certain special conditions apply."\(^{104}\) Thus, where "an event can rattle around inside a network of statistical laws," it is "located and explained in the normic network."\(^{105}\)

While it would be possible to pursue further discussions concerning the nature and logical status of general statements with respect to explanations of various types, enough has perhaps been said to provide some basis for the further consideration of the criteria in terms of which explanations may be analyzed. First of all, it should be obvious (in spite of Metcalf's recommendation to the contrary) that the covering

\(^{102}\)Ibid.
\(^{103}\)Ibid., p. 466.
\(^{104}\)Ibid.
\(^{105}\)Ibid., p. 467.
law or deductive model of Hempel cannot be used as a basis upon which explanations may be judged adequate or inadequate.\textsuperscript{106}

On the other hand, Swift, apparently recognizing some of the limitations of the covering law model, has suggested that it may serve, "not as a form against which every particular explanation may be placed for fit," but rather "as a source of criteria from which may be derived questions to direct inquiry about the adequacy of a specific explanation ...."\textsuperscript{107}

Accordingly, Swift outlines four types of criteria: (1) the presence of "lawlike statements or generalizations, ... statements ... in which many instances of one kind of phenomena are brought together in one term of the generalization and related to many instances of another kind of phenomena brought together in the other term ... ."\textsuperscript{108} (2) The criterion of internal consistency regards the relation between the generalization and the two elements of the explanation as a chain of reasoning which should be as logically tight as possible.\textsuperscript{109} (3) The third criterion refers to the empirical testability of the generalization: "The generalization must be testable by procedures which follow recognized canons of inquiry ... ."\textsuperscript{110} (4) The fourth criterion is the obvious one that there must be suffi-

\textsuperscript{106}See Metcalf, "Research on Teaching the Social Studies," loc. cit., p. 952.

\textsuperscript{107}Swift, "Explanation as an Aspect of Critical Thinking ... .", pp. 42-43.

\textsuperscript{108}Swift, "Explanation," loc., cit., p. 186.

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., p. 187.
cient evidence to warrant the assertion of the generalization and the two elements of the explanation.\textsuperscript{111}

Viewed in terms of Scriven's discussion of truth-justifying, role-justifying, and type-justifying grounds, the first three criteria may be considered as role-justifying grounds; the fourth criterion may be considered as truth-justifying grounds.\textsuperscript{112}

Type-justifying grounds, it will be recalled, provide the basis for judging whether the explanation is of the kind required; the basis for this judgment is the context in which the explanation is offered.\textsuperscript{113}

Since the context in which an explanation occurs in a history textbook is provided by the historian offering the explanation, it would seem that, in this connection at least, type-justifying grounds need not be considered as criteria in terms of which such explanation may be judged. This is not to say that in other explanation-situations -- e.g., the offering of an explanation of some occurrence by a student in response to a teacher's request -- type-justifying grounds are also irrelevant. Clearly in the situation just mentioned these grounds would take on great significance.

Ennis's analysis of operations involved in the assessment of statements, it will be recalled, was grounded in his assertion that "there are various kinds of statements, various relationships between statements and their grounds, and various stages in the process of as-

\textsuperscript{111}Tbid., p. 189.
\textsuperscript{112}Scriven, loc. cit., pp. 446-447.
\textsuperscript{113}Tbid.
The criteria that we have just outlined would appear to provide a sufficient base from which it would be possible to analyze a particular kind of statement -- an explanation -- to determine whether it was fit to believe. The level of generality of the criteria together with the pragmatic dimension inherent in many of Ennis's analytical operations would appear to provide the flexibility needed to cope with a number of different types of explanations. Consequently, it is possible for us to turn our attention to the question of the significance of the analysis of explanations found in history textbooks for the reflective approach to social studies education.

The Significance of Historical Explanation-Analysis For the Reflective Approach

That the analysis of explanations found in history texts is an appropriate activity in terms of the reflective approach to social studies education should, by now, be obvious. For the reflective approach calls for the examination of the grounds upon which statements of belief and claims of knowledge are based; and explanations are statements purporting to offer knowledge, and may be considered at least as candidates for belief by students in a history class.

Moreover, it should also be obvious that, in terms of the reflective approach, statements offering explanations are more significant subjects for examination that are description statements. Since explanation statements are comprised of description statements that are related to

Ennis, loc. cit., p. 83.
each other in a particular way, analysis of explanations, however com-
plex, provides all of the opportunities for the development of the
skills and abilities involved in the analysis of description statements.
In addition, however, they provide opportunities for the development of
the skills and abilities involved in the assessment of the adequacy of
the explanatory relationship.

Furthermore, the analysis of explanations provides several other
opportunities which carry considerable significance with respect to the
reflective approach to social studies education. Three of these oppor-
tunities are hereafter described and illustrated briefly in order to
indicate the role that explanation-analysis can play in the reflective
approach.

**Explanation-analysis may serve as a source of generalizations**

First of all, unlike description statements, explanations provide
a direct source of general statements of relationships among social
phenomena. Consider, for example, the following explanation which
might appear in an American history text: "In the Republican National
Convention of 1912, President Taft's renomination was hotly contested
by ex-President Theodore Roosevelt. Taft, however, was able to secure
his own renomination because he controlled the credentials committee of
the convention."

Now an examination of this explanation might well lead to the
formulation of the generalization that "in a hotly contested race for
the nomination of a party's candidate for the Presidency, the candidate
who controls the credentials committee will win the nomination." An
examination of the grounds for this statement, in turn, and a search for
instances which confirm or deny it (e.g., the elections of 1932, 1940, 1948, 1952, 1956, and 1960), could lead to an increasingly sophisticated understanding of American political life on the part of some students -- a sophistication which, incidently, in the early summer of 1964 could have been put to effective use in contributing to an understanding (even, perhaps, a prediction!) of the victory of Barry Goldwater in the Republican Convention.

**Explanation-analysis may serve to cast doubt on students' beliefs**

Secondly, the analysis of explanations may serve to generate uncertainty or doubt in students regarding a belief which they had held to be true, thus leading them to an examination and reconsideration of that belief and its grounds. Assume, for instance, that a considerable number of students in a history class were found to believe that the foreign policy of Communist nations is based on ideological rather than national interests. Assume further that their textbook explains Stalin's signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 as being the consequence of his concern for the security of his western border.

In this case, an analysis of the explanation may lead some students to question their prior belief, and could lead them to consider other manifestations of the policies of Communist countries in international affairs. Subsequently, a reformulation of the belief, were it found to be warranted, might provide a more adequate basis for understanding the current developments in Southeast Asia, as well as the situation existing within the Communist "community" of nations.
Explanation-analysis may serve as a springboard into the closed areas.

Finally, analysis of explanations can serve as a basis for the consideration of issues or beliefs falling within one or more of the closed areas of American culture. Since, however, the specific content and nature of beliefs and issues within any closed area will vary with a host of other variables, it is difficult to develop an illustration that differs greatly from the one just completed. Even so, a somewhat different illustration at this point may provide additional support for our contention that the analysis of explanations found in history textbooks carries considerable significance for the reflective approach to social studies education.

Assume, therefore, that, within the closed area of economics, a given community accepts, almost as a matter of faith, that the development of the great American prosperity and high standard of living were due to "free enterprise" or the absence of governmental involvement in economic activities. Assume further that, conversely, the community accounts for the economic difficulties of many other countries in terms of the extent of "socialistic planning" engaged in by the governments of those nations. One ground for these beliefs would, apparently, be a generalization like, "Increasing prosperity depends on free enterprise," or, "If a nation's government becomes involved in economic activities, then that nation will not improve its standard of living."

Now by definition a closed area is one fraught with emotional overtones such that rational analysis of the grounds of beliefs is extremely difficult. An attempt to approach this particular belief ex-
licitly and directly will thus be likely to generate considerably more "heat" than "light."

Consider for a moment, however, the opportunity presented by the following explanation which might be found in a history text: "As a result of the efforts by the monarchs of western Europe to encourage trade and commerce, the standards of living in their countries rose tremendously." This explanation could be examined by the students, leading, perhaps, to the formulation of a general statement like, "Governmental involvement in economic activities leads to improvement in the standard of living."

At this point, the teacher could point to the contrary belief (presumably held by many students in the class), emphasizing as he does so the impossibility of accepting simultaneously both beliefs. The resulting confusion, perplexity, or uncertainty could, perhaps, generate a serious and reflective consideration of both beliefs and lead, again, to the acceptance by some students of a belief that would be more adequately grounded than either of the prior beliefs before they were, in a sense, thrown against each other.

Thus far we have suggested, through the use of illustrations, three directions in which the analysis of explanations occurring in textbooks in history may point, each of which carries importance within the reflective approach to social studies education. Since these opportunities are not intended to exhaust the possibilities, there may well be, and indeed probably are, other functions which the analysis of textbook explanations might fulfill. Moreover, we have said nothing about the significance for the reflective approach of asking for and
analyzing explanations offered by students within the context of classroom discourse.115

Our purpose, however, was more limited. It has been served if the reader recognizes and acknowledges that the analysis of explanations found in history textbooks can play a part in fostering the development of some of the intellectual abilities and skills involved in the process of reflective or critical thinking.

Conclusion

With this discussion we conclude our consideration of the nature of the reflective approach to social studies education and of the role in that approach of the analysis of explanations that may occur in history textbooks.

Where this chapter was designed to provide the theoretical base for the analysis that constitutes the major portion of this thesis, the following chapter is concerned with the methodology of that analysis. In that chapter will be found: (1) a more complete and systematic statement of the problem with which the study is directly concerned than was possible in Chapter I; (2) a description of the methodology of content analysis, the analytical technique to be used in the study; (3) a description of the categories of the analysis; (4) a report of the procedures followed in the course of the analysis; and (5) an outline of the manner in which the results of the analysis will be reported in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER III

CONTENT ANALYSIS: TEXTBOOK EXPLANATIONS AND CLOSED AREAS

This chapter is designed to deal with the second set of considerations preliminary to reporting the results of the study. Where Chapter II was concerned with the theoretical framework for this study, Chapter III deals with its methodological aspects. Here we will develop explicitly the nature and scope of the problem, discuss some of the basic elements of content analysis and describe the categories used in the analysis, and indicate the procedures followed in carrying out the study. Finally, we will outline the manner in which the results of the study will be hereafter reported.

The Problem

In the discussion of the theoretical framework of this study the nature of the reflective approach to instruction in the social studies was outlined and the role of explanation-analysis within that approach was described. It was suggested that history textbooks might function as sources of explanations which could be the objects of study by history students, leading them, perhaps, to further develop the critical and analytical skills and abilities involved in reflective thinking. The question that may arise at this point is: What criteria are available
to guide the teacher in selecting textbook-explanations for student consideration and analysis? To this question we now turn.

Criteria for the selection of explanations for classroom analysis

It is evident that a major consideration is the nature of the student population with which the teacher is working. Depending upon the range of experience of the students in the class, the bases of some explanations may be so obvious as not to require explication. As Swift notes, for instance:

If the question arises, Why did Americans migrate in large numbers to California in 1849?, it can be met . . . by the answer: Because gold was discovered there. The generalization that people will flock to areas where minerals are newly discovered, or simply that many people are attracted by prospective riches, is probably not a new insight into social phenomena for most students. Here the process of detecting it as an assumption and formulating it as a generalization is not worth the time.¹

It is possible, however, to go beyond this criterion. The three illustrations of explanation-analysis in terms of the reflective approach that we outlined in Chapter II suggest three alternative tests or criteria for the selection of textbook-explanations for analysis.

The first illustration, it will be recalled, described how the analysis of an explanation found in a history text might lead to the formulation of a generalization of considerable significance in understanding American political life. It might, accordingly, be possible to

select for examination those explanations which seem to lead to the formulation of "significant" generalizations concerning societal phenomena.

The function of explanation-analysis in raising a challenge to students' beliefs was described in the second illustration. Thus the second criterion for selecting explanations to be analyzed would focus on the relevance of the explanation for beliefs held by students.

The third illustration indicated how explanation-analysis might function as a "springboard," leading to a consideration and examination of the issues and problems in one or more of the closed areas of American culture. Hence their relevance to one or more of the closed areas could serve as a criterion for the selection of explanations to be analyzed.²

The purposes of this study

There is, in addition, a different level of concern that calls for the development of criteria. A teacher of American history who, for example, attempts to conduct his classes in terms of the reflective approach will, perhaps, at some time be faced with the problem of the selection of a textbook for use in his classes. Moreover, a writer of textual materials for use in such American history classes will need to follow certain guidelines so that the completed textbook might make a significant contribution toward the achievement of the goals encompassed by the reflective approach to instruction in the social studies.

One set of criteria for textbook evaluation, that carries with it implications for some guidelines for textbook writing, is suggested by Metcalf, "Research on Teaching the Social Studies," loc. cit., p. 956.
the discussion of the criteria for the selection of explanations for classroom analysis. That is to say, an American history textbook would be considered as appropriate for use by a teacher who is operating in terms of the reflective approach insofar as it provides opportunities for the analysis of explanations that lead to "significant" generalizations, that challenge students' beliefs, or that serve as springboards into the problems and issues in one or more of the closed areas. In this connection, "opportunities" could be defined in terms of the incidence of explanations that could fulfill the indicated functions.

A study that analyzed the content of current American history textbooks in the light of one or more of these criteria would provide teachers of American history with information highly relevant to their attempt to select a textbook for use in their classes. Such a study would, in addition, provide information that would be helpful to writers of textual materials in the future. In this study we will attempt such an analysis, toward the end of providing a portion of that information.

The selection of the basis for the analysis of textbooks

It should be obvious that the first and third of the suggested criteria -- the incidence of explanations leading to "significant" generalizations and the incidence of explanations relevant to one or more of the closed areas -- are more appropriate for a broad analysis of a number of textbooks than would be the criterion that deals with the incidence of explanations that challenge student beliefs.

An analysis of textbooks with respect to the latter criterion would involve a prior determination of a list of specific beliefs, according
to which explanations might be classified. The problems surrounding the identification of the beliefs, however, place severe limitations on this approach.

In the first place, there are important regional, racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, age-group, and social class differences in beliefs. Moreover there is a further problem because the techniques for discovering beliefs suffer from a general lack of refinement. Hence if the study focussed on a wide survey of a number of beliefs, its meaningfulness would be limited to the extent that the list of beliefs was incomplete or inaccurate.

It would be possible, within the limitations of the instruments available, to identify the beliefs of a particular student population and analyze the textbooks to determine the availability of explanations relevant to those beliefs. Obviously, however, such a study would be of little general value, other than as an illustration of a kind of analysis that teachers could use as a preliminary to teaching American history within this particular aspect of the reflective approach. Consequently we must turn to a consideration of the other two criteria in our efforts to develop a basis for classifying explanations found in textbooks.

An analysis of American history textbooks to determine the incidence of explanations which lead to significant generalizations concerning social phenomena would be an interesting and fruitful study.

3Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., p. 229.

4Ibid.
There are at least two directions that such a study might take. The significance of generalizations might, for example, be defined in terms of their "standing" with respect to the body of knowledge of one or another of the social sciences. Alternatively, significance could be taken to refer to the "social importance" of a generalization, or what might be called its **contemporary relevance**.

Finally, it is clearly possible to classify explanations found in American history in terms of their relevance to one or more of the closed areas. The preliminary steps here would be to formulate each closed area in categorical terms, to elaborate the nature and content of each closed area, and to spell out the basis on which explanations may be defined as relevant to a particular area. The subsequent analysis and classification would provide information that would be helpful to reflective approach-oriented teachers of American history and, further, that would be helpful to the writer of textual materials who is working within the reflective approach to social studies education.

In this study we shall adopt as our basis for the classification of explanations found in American history textbooks the relevance of these explanations to one or more of certain closed areas of American culture. There are several reasons for making such a choice.

First of all, there is a sense in which the closed areas, by virtue of their definition and content, may be said to be concerned with socially important or currently relevant phenomena. Thus by using the closed areas as our basis for classification we apparently gain some of the value attached to that alternative approach — but we also avoid the difficulties that would be involved in the development of some warranted
basis upon which specific estimates of "social importance" might rest.

Secondly, by using the closed areas as our basis for classification we are able to avoid the problems that would be involved in the determination of the standing of generalizations in the various social sciences. The scope of this latter task is such that it would constitute a major study in and of itself.

Finally, the significance attached to the closed areas as a basis for selection of content within the broad framework of the reflective approach, and the grounds upon which that significance rests, suggest that there is a more immediate, direct, or "tight" linkage between our selected basis of classification and the theoretical context of this study than exists between that context and the alternative basis of classification.

**Statement of the problem**

We are now able to state explicitly the precise problem with which this study is concerned. We have already indicated that it is directed toward an analysis of American history textbooks. The problem can be specifically stated as follows: What is the incidence of explanations in selected American history textbooks written for use in the public secondary schools of the United States that can be classified as relevant to one or more of certain closed areas of American culture? The remainder of this chapter is designed to describe the methodology used in the study, to elaborate the categories of the analysis, and to indicate the procedures followed in carrying out the study and the procedures to be followed in reporting the results.
The Nature of Content Analysis

The methodology of this study is that of content analysis. It has been said that content analysis occurs whenever someone reads a body of communication content and summarizes and interprets it. The sense in which the term is herein used, however, is the sense in which Berelson uses it: "Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."6

Broadly speaking, content analysis consists of the application of a set of categories to the materials under study. The requirement of objectivity in Berelson's definition demands that the categories of analysis be defined with such precision that different analysts can apply them to the same content with basically the same results.7

The requirement of system demands that all of the relevant content must be analyzed in terms of all of the relevant categories: "This requirement is meant to eliminate partial or biased analyses in which only those elements in the content are selected which fit the analyst's thesis."8 This requirement also demands that the results of a content analysis have a measure of general application: "Thus a tabulation reporting the number of different kinds of books acquired by a particular

6Ibid., p. 18.
7Ibid., p. 16.
8Ibid., p. 17.
library in a given year would not represent a content analysis study (unless the results were used for a trend or comparative analysis ...)."9

The most distinctive feature of content analysis, however, is the requirement of quantification: "It is this characteristic ... which goes farthest toward distinguishing the procedure from ordinary reading."10 In content analysis primary importance is attached to the extent to which instances or exemplifications of items belonging to the analytic categories appear in the content.11

It should now be clear from the above presentation that a content analysis "stands or falls" by its categories. Berelson comments that although competent performance in other parts of the analytic process is also necessary, the formulation and the definition of the appropriate categories take on central importance. Since the categories contain the substance of the investigation, a content analysis can be no better than its system of categories.12

The categories of content analysis, according to Berelson, fall into one of two broad types: "Some kinds of categories (for example, subject matter) deal clearly with what is said and others (e.g., form of statement) with how it is said."13 Because we are concerned in this study with the incidence and with the kinds of explanations in certain

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 147.
13 Ibid., p. 149.
U. S. history textbooks, we will need categories of each type. Accordingly, we now turn to an elaboration, first, of the category for the identification of textbook-explanations, and second, to an elaboration of the categories according to which the explanations will be classified.

**The Category for the Identification of Explanations**

Our objective is the identification of explanations in textual materials. One method would be to establish a system of categories that would make it possible to identify and classify every assertion found in a textbook. Thus it might be possible to distinguish between, say, explanations, descriptions, definitions, and appraisals. While such a study would no doubt provide some very interesting data regarding the structure of textbooks, it goes much further than is necessary for the objectives at hand. For our purposes it is only necessary to be able to distinguish between explanations and non-explanations. The following discussion is an attempt to suggest the category and indicators that will make it possible for us to do so.

An explanation is an assertion of a relationship between two states of affairs such that one state of affairs can be said to account for the other. Given an explanation, the former state of affairs may be referred to as "a cause of," "the reason for," or "a factor in" the occurrence of the latter state of affairs. The use of *state of affairs* should not be construed as an attempt to limit the application of the notion of explanation to single, unitary occurrences. Rather, *state of affairs* is meant to be taken as broadly as necessary, as encompassing
occurrences from a single decision by an individual to the complex of
events that we call the Renaissance.

There are at least three common forms that indicate that a text-
book author is offering an explanation. First, and perhaps the most
obvious, there is an explicit indication of a cause, factor, or reason,
or causes, factors, or reasons.14 The following is an example of this
first form:

There were several reasons why Europeans explored and colo-
nized all over the globe during this period [1450-1550].
. . . A number of important discoveries enabled Europeans
to sail the great oceans for the first time . . . . The
new middle class of merchants and bankers . . . financed
many of the explorers . . . . Throughout Europe central
governments engaged in bitter rivalry . . . .15

Second, authors use certain key words or word-groups to assert
relationships of the kind with which we are concerned.16 One textbook,
for instance, after describing the Crusades and the travels of Marco
Polo concludes: "The result of these contacts and discoveries was the
development of a flourishing trade between Europe and the Orient."17
The underlined words in the quoted passage signal the occurrence of an
explanation. Textbook writers use a variety of words and word-groups

14Swift, "Explanation as an Aspect of Critical Thinking . . . .," p. 131.

15Henry W. Bragdon and Samuel P. McCutchen, History of a Free

16Swift, "Explanation as an Aspect of Critical Thinking . . . .," p. 132.

17David S. Muzzey and Arthur S. Link, Our American Republic
in their assertions of explanations. The following is but a partial listing of the various possibilities:

- influenced
- affected
- caused
- promoted
- stimulated
- encouraged
- in order to
- led to
- gave rise to
- resulted in
- brought about
- had an effect on
- consequently
- to
- because
- since
- therefore
- hence
- thus
- for
- such
- inasmuch as
- in order that
- as a result of
- owing to
- for the reason that
- thanks to
- so

Finally, some explanation passages are not indicated by explicit assertions or by word clues but by the import of a statement or series of statements. For example, in a discussion of the development of American commercial activity in the period 1789-1805, the authors of one text say: "Hundreds of foreigners, mostly British, became naturalized citizens of the United States. They wished to enjoy the better pay, better food, and more humane treatment found on American vessels." While there is no explicit attempt to connect the two sentences, it is obvious that the second is offered to account for the situation described in the first.

A second illustration of an explanation indicated by the import of a statement is the following: "Henry Clay, his heart set on winning the Presidency, tried to bring these two groups [western farmers and

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18 Swift, "Explanation as an Aspect of Critical Thinking . . .," p. 132.

19 Muzzey and Link, op. cit., p. 184.
eastern manufacturers] together in a permanent alliance." Here too, there is not a linkage of the two parts of the explanation through an explicit assertion of a "cause" or "reason." Nor is there a linkage established through the use of word clues. It is nevertheless clear that the meaning and significance of the clause "... his heart set on winning ...," lies in its accounting for Clay's efforts to unite the farmers and manufacturers.

It is important to note at this juncture several words of caution. First of all, the mere occurrence of one of the listed word clues does not mean that an explanation is being offered. The following illustrations should help to make this point clearer. Consider, for example, the following passage: "These lines ... are exceptional, both because they were written by a woman in the colonial period, ... and because they express human affection." What is being offered here, despite the use of "because," is an evaluation and its grounds, not an explanation.

Consider also this assertion: "Since 1864, there has ... been a college for the education of the deaf ... in Washington, D. C." The meaning of the word since in this passage is a temporal one; thus the passage may not be considered as an explanation.

The third illustration of the use of a word clue in a sense other than an explanatory (as we are using that term) one is a statement that

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22 Ibid., p. 274.
offers an interpretation or conclusion and its grounds, rather than an explanation: "The election was not a vote in favor of secession, for in the slave states as a whole Bell outran Breckinridge."23

The second caution that must be kept in mind is that it is not the case that if two contiguous statements are concerned with the same occurrence or state of affairs, there is necessarily an explanation being offered. For example, consider these statements: "In 1909... we withdrew our forces from... [Cuba]... We had shown to a doubting world that we were interested in preserving order in the Americas, not in acquiring new colonies."24 While there is a connection or relationship between the two statements, it is not an explanatory one.

The final word of caution points out that not all clauses or parenthetical expressions are included in statements to account for the situation being described in the main body of these statements. Thus in the statement, "Indians, accustomed to human sacrifice, were converted by the Spanish to Christianity," the clause functions in an informative rather than an explanatory manner.25

The point is that the context in which the statements, clauses, or word clues occur is an important factor which must be kept in mind in the attempt to identify instances of explanations in textual materials. Consequently, to the extent that the process of identification is not a mechanical application of a precise set of criteria -- that is, to the


25 Platt and Drummond, op. cit., p. 12.
extent that there enters an element of judgment in the process of identification — to that extent there is a possibility of error. It is the function of the discussion of the various forms that indicate when an explanation is being offered, and of this cautionary discussion as well, to reduce as much as possible that margin of error.

The Closed Areas: the Categories for the Classification of Explanations

In Chapter II we had occasion to indicate briefly what is meant by the term, closed areas. Before elaborating in categorical terms each of the several closed areas, we will discuss at greater length than was necessary earlier the meaning of closed areas, and offer some more explicit comments concerning those areas of American culture that have been designated as closed.

A closed area, as the term is herein used, refers to a segment of culture, an area of belief and behavior, which has traditionally been largely closed to reflective examination and within which are found irrationality, superstition, prejudice, inconsistency, confusion, and taboo. Hunt and Metcalf, for example, refer to the area of race and minority-group relations as a closed area. Within this area it is possible to find many contradictions and confusions in the thought and practice of persons in all parts of the United States. It is commonly believed, for example, both that some races are lower on the evolutionary scale and less capable of a high order of civilized living,

26 Hunt and Metcalf, op. cit., pp. xi, 230.

27 Ibid., pp. 250-269.
and that all human beings should have equal rights and opportunities.  

Hunt and Metcalf identify six areas which have been largely closed to reflective examination:

1. Economics. Although this area is "open" to most professional economists and to many laymen, there is a popular lay economic ideology which is fraught with great confusion and inconsistency and is influenced by certain taboos which make rational thought difficult. Some of the commonly used terms -- such as socialism -- are freighted with emotion.

2. Race and Minority-group Relations. This area is becoming increasingly open to reflective inquiry and in some parts of the country could scarcely be termed a closed area. But in the South objective study of Negro-white relations, though not impossible, is still difficult, and in other places beliefs about Indians, Mexicans, Armenians, Jews, or Poles are confused and inconsistent.

3. Social Class. This problem area is neatly ignored as a result of the widespread belief, "there are no social classes in America." Although objective study of class behavior is not regarded as sinful, it does make many persons uncomfortable. That social class is truly a closed area is demonstrated by the fact that people generally are highly inconsistent in their beliefs and behavior regarding class phenomena . . . .

4. Sex, Courtship, and Marriage. This area is much more open to inquiry than it was even a decade ago. Sex education -- of a sort -- is now fairly common in public schools, but it usually does not encourage the critical analysis of our sex ideology . . . .

5. Religion and Morality. It is generally felt that although one may be able to talk to a man rationally about any other subject, one cannot do so about his religion; this is personal and sacred. Yet religious beliefs are probably no more closed to rational inquiry than beliefs about free enterprise and communism, patriotism, certain aspects of sex, and miscegenation . . . .

6. Nationalism and Patriotism. Many persons feel that it is unpatriotic to question traditional beliefs in this area (even when they are demonstrated to be inconsistent). Yet

28Ibid., p. 261.
the area is characterized by many contradictions between beliefs and behavior, and between commonly held beliefs and the requirement of national survival.29

In their discussion of each of the closed areas, Hunt and Metcalf describe several illustrations of conflicting beliefs. The following are examples of contradictions in the respective closed areas:

1. Economics: ... it is believed that American businessmen like the idea of free competition and that most American industry is freely competitive; but it is also believed that much American industry is monopolistic, or tending in that direction, and that only by the vigilant enforcement of antitrust laws can we preserve free competition.30

2. Race and Minority-group Relations: ... it is believed that Jews control most industry and money in the United States; but it is also believed that most Jews tend to be radical and communistic in their political philosophy.31

3. Social Class: ... it is believed that the United States is a land of opportunity and that anyone can get ahead if he tries hard enough; but it is also believed that a person cannot move upward nowadays unless he gets lucky breaks or knows the right people.32

4. Sex, Courtship, and Marriage: ... it is believed that sexual experiences before marriage are always sinful; but it is also believed that sexual experience is good preparation for marriage.33

5. Religion and Morality: ... it is believed that persons should take their religion seriously and try to understand and believe its teachings in order to practice

29 Ibid., pp. 230-231.
30 Ibid., p. 244.
31 Ibid., p. 264.
32 Ibid., p. 278.
33 Ibid., p. 291.
them in daily living; but it is also believed that anyone who tried seriously to practice the philosophy of Jesus would not get very far in today's world, and besides, extremely pious individuals are usually a little queer. 

[6. Nationalism, Patriotism, and National Institutions:

... it is believed that as a nation we cannot protect ourselves adequately from subversion as long as we are hampered by due process of law; but it is also believed that a loss of traditional liberties would be equivalent to destruction of democracy itself.]

With the above discussion as background, then, we may turn to an elaboration of each of these six closed areas so that they may function as categories in terms of which explanations identified in American history textbooks can be classified.

The category of economics

We have indicated above the nature of a closed area and we have pointed out that the area of economics has been so designated. But for this closed area to function as a category by which explanations may be classified, it is necessary to be more precise about the boundaries of the category, and to suggest some specific aspects of economics that might provide assistance in the classification of explanations. Such is the task to which we now turn.

Economics has been described as:

the study of mankind in the ordinary business of life, or of the more material part of human welfare; it is concerned not merely with money, not merely with material objects of

34 Ibid., p. 312.
wealth, but with human enjoyments and satisfactions, and also with the toil and trouble which go into their making.36

More specifically, economics as a field of study is concerned with how man uses scarce resources in order that his needs or wants might be satisfied.37 As Wilhelm Röpke has put it:

On every hand we are hemmed in by scarcity; by scarcity of goods, scarcity of time, scarcity of physical strength. We cannot fill one hole without opening another somewhere else . . . . We are under the continual necessity of achieving some kind of balance between our unlimited wants and our limited means. This we do by making a choice among our wants and by limiting the extent to which any one of these wants is satisfied.38

This scarcity consists in the components or elements from which goods and services are produced: (1) natural resources, (2) human resources, (3) capital, (4) management.39 Because of the scarcity of the resources, as Röpke points out, in any given nation, there are certain decisions that must be made. For example,

1. It must be decided which goods and services shall be produced and how much of each;

2. It must be decided in what manner these goods and services shall be produced;


39 Lovenstein, op. cit.
3. It must be decided how the goods and services to be produced shall be divided among the population.\textsuperscript{40}

While the study of economics is concerned with the nature of these decisions, it is also concerned with the problems involved in relating the flow of goods and services and the flow of money in any given society.\textsuperscript{41} And finally, "economics is concerned with the social arrangements that enable a society to make the basic decisions and to relate the flow of goods and services and the flow of money ... \textsuperscript{42}

At this point it is possible for us to distinguish two general elements in the study of economics that help us to describe more explicitely the nature of the category: economic analysis and economic policy-making.

Economic analysis studies the behavior of people in obtaining income and spending it. These actions take place within an established framework of law, traditions, and institutions. Economists also direct their attention to the institutions themselves. Economic policy-making, as distinguished from economic analysis, involves the formulation of lines of action for meeting specific problems.\textsuperscript{43}

It might be said, therefore, that economic analysis provides the basic data regarding the resources, the flows of goods and services and money, and the institutional arrangements, upon which economic policy-making bases its recommendations regarding the basic economic decisions.

\textsuperscript{40}Carl Madden and Leonard Hall, Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1963), pp. 1-11.

\textsuperscript{41}Lovenstein, op. cit., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{43}Grey and Elliott, loc. cit., p. 4.
Hence, economic analysis is concerned with such topics as the level of prices, output, and employment; the phenomena of inflation and depression.\textsuperscript{44} It directs its attention not only to the state of business enterprise, competition, and markets, but to labor, agriculture, and consumer economics, to income distribution and living standards.\textsuperscript{45} And finally, economic analysis involves the study of foreign trade and aid, economic growth, and of the comparative study of different economic systems.\textsuperscript{46}

On the other hand, economic policy-making, building in part on economic analysis, involves making recommendations in connection with attempts to deal with particular problems. With respect to the role of the government in the economic system, for example, monetary policy is concerned with the volume, availability, cost, and types of money and credit.\textsuperscript{47} Fiscal policy involves the government's powers to tax, spend, and borrow, and the effects of these actions on the economy.\textsuperscript{48} Economic policy-making is, furthermore, involved in the scrutiny, control, and regulation of business, labor, and agriculture by governments at all levels.\textsuperscript{49}

Economic policy-making, however, also involves decisions in other

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., p. viii.
\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., pp. ix-x.
\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., p. xi.
\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 37.
\textsuperscript{48}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., pp. 136, 209-211.
sectors of the society. Decisions by industries with regard to expansion, for example, would fall into this class, as would wage demands by unions in negotiations with management.

Economics, then, can be said to be concerned with the production and distribution of goods and services within an economic system or between two or more systems, and with the conditions under which these activities occur. In order for an explanation to be classified as relevant to the closed area of economics, it must either contain explicit reference to some aspect of economic analysis or explicit reference to some aspect of economic policy-making. An illustration of an explanation placed in this category is: "The greatly increased output of silver from the mining frontier had caused its price in the world market to fall rapidly."

The category of race and minority-group relations

The clarification of this category will consist of two elements. The first element involves an explication of the meaning of "minority-group"; the second involves a discussion of the characteristics by which a minority group in the United States can be distinguished.

The term "minority-group" arose in Europe to indicate the social

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position of part of the population of a given country in relation to the rest of the population.\(^51\) As Arnold Rose reports:

In the course of many wars, conquests, and migrations, small groups of people frequently found themselves within the political boundaries of a nation in which the majority group was of a different nationality . . . . Since the modern conception of a political nation included a belief that it was to serve the interests of a particular nationality, the smaller groups within the physical boundaries of a nation became known as minorities.\(^52\)

In the United States, however, the concept of a single historical nationality has had little meaning. While the background of the American people in the early days of the Republic was overwhelmingly British, the tremendous tides of immigration in the middle and late nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth brought to this country a bewildering diversity of peoples from all parts of Europe.\(^53\)

Thus the term "minority-group," in the sense in which it has been used in Europe, does not "fit" in the American context. In this country, "the term 'minority-groups' has come to be applied to those groups in the United States who face certain handicaps, who are subject to certain discriminations, and who are the objects of prejudice from most other people."\(^54\)

In the United States, according to Rose, minority-groups can be


\(^52\)Ibid.


\(^54\)Rose, loc. cit., p. 4.
objectively distinguished by one or another of four different characteristics: race, nationality, language, and religion. Race, in its scientific sense, is a biological category. The members of a given race have certain inherited physical features that distinguish them from any other race. Included among the racial minorities in this country are the Chinese, the Japanese, the Filipinos, the Negroes, and the American Indians. These groups are not, however, pure biological races;

many of the members of each of them have some Caucasoid, that is, "white," ancestry. Also in the dominant white race in the United States there is a certain proportion of people with Negroid or Mongoloid ancestry. It is not strictly on biological grounds, therefore, that a person is classified as belonging to a racial minority.

Moreover certain people may be regarded as members of a racial minority even when they are not scientifically distinguishable on the basis of a certain combination of physical features. Thus, for instance, people may speak of the "Jewish race," or the "Italian race," although these are, respectively, religious and nationality, rather than racial designations.

And finally, a group that scientists call a race is occasionally not regarded by the general population as a racial minority: "there is

55 Ibid., p. 5.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
58 Ibid., p. 6.
59 Ibid.
a strong tendency in most parts of the United States to regard an assimilated person of Mexican ancestry as a 'Spaniard.'

The nationality groups are characterized mainly by "a distinctive culture and by a sense that they are a distinctive people with a distinctive history." And, interestingly enough, there is considerable evidence that this national self-consciousness was a product of the American experience of these peoples, rather than something which they brought with them from the "old country." Herberg notes of the arrivals in the late 1800's and early 1900's that

the immigrants were men of their village or region. In the Old World they had no conception of national belonging, certainly no understanding of, or interest in, nationalism as an ideology. They were not Italians, but Apulians or Sicilians. They were not Poles, but Poznaniskers or Mazhevoers.

Life in this country, however, was too fluid to permit the continuation of merely village attachments. Hence the immigrants came to identify themselves as Poles, Russians, Slovaks, and Greeks. While the original identification may have been in terms of language, it

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 7.
62 Handlin, op. cit., p. 60.
64 Handlin, op. cit., p. 60.
soon grew to include the idea of a common culture and nationality as well.65

The language minorities are similar in many respects to the national minorities. They can be differentiated, however, mainly by the fact that they are not composed of recent immigrants.66 They are distinguished by their continuing use of a language other than English over many generations.67 For example, "one of the largest of these groups is the so-called Hispano group, concentrated in New Mexico and southern Colorado."68

The last set of distinguishing characteristics refers to the members of certain religious groups. Within each of these groups will be found a heterogeneous composition of race, nationality, and language background.69 Consequently, the discrimination and prejudice against them is connected with their religious faith and with the historical background of that faith.70 Included in the religious minorities in the United States, according to Rose, are

the Jews, the Eastern Orthodox, the Mohammedans, members of certain small sects that have broken away from the major Protestant or Orthodox faiths, members of the major

67Ibid.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
70Ibid.
Asiatic faiths, and increasingly the Roman Catholics.\(^71\)

Minority-groups in the United States, as we have seen, are identifiable groups of people who are the objects of discrimination and prejudice from other people. These minority-groups can be distinguished on the basis of one or another of the characteristics of race, nationality, language, and religion. For an explanation to be considered as relevant to this category, it must contain explicit reference to a minority group or groups as distinguished by race, nationality, language, or religion, and explicit reference to the existence of handicaps, discriminations, or prejudice suffered by that group or those groups. An illustration of an explanation so considered is: "Moderate southerners, fearful of northern reaction and disgusted with the brutality\(^\) directed against the newly freed negroes, withdrew their support from the secret societies."\(^72\)

The category of social class

The term social class, used to designate a closed area, refers to the whole range of social inequality and stratification as it is found in American society. In order that we may use this notion as a category in our classification of explanations, it is important that the meaning of social class and the elements of which it is composed be made as clear as possible. The following discussion is an attempt to provide that clarification.

\(^71\)Ibid.

To begin with, a stratified society is one that is marked by inequality among people such that they may be evaluated as "higher" or "lower." One form of inequality, found in all but the smallest and most primitive societies, ranks families rather than individuals, and "if a large group of families are approximately equal to each other and clearly differentiated from other families, we call them a social class."74

The basis for this differentiation has historically taken several forms. Marx, for example, differentiated primarily on the basis of ownership of capital, and, of course, he described two fundamental classes in the 19th century industrial society: the capitalists or bourgeoisie, the owners of capital; and the proletariat, the working class, who did not own capital.75

Max Weber's view was a more complex one; he identified three merging and inter-related orders of stratification: class, i.e., "groupings of people according to their market position"; status, groupings of people according to their 'style of life'; and party, groupings of people according to their efforts toward the acquisition of social power.76

In the past thirty years empirical sociology has accumulated a great deal of knowledge about the stratification order in American

74Ibid.
75Ibid., p. 4.
76Ibid., pp. 5-7.
One outcome of this accumulation has been the recognition that stratification involves, as Weber suggested, several inter-related and interacting variables. One attempt to synthesize much of the earlier work sees six variables operating in the classification of groups of people:

First . . . some people have higher personal prestige than others. An individual has high prestige when his neighbors, in general, have an attitude of respect toward him . . . .

Secondly, we can stratify a population according to occupation . . . .

Occupational activities cannot be performed without tools and instruments. Furthermore, people who work get rewards in tangible form . . . . Consequently, we need another variable called possessions to cover capital and consumer goods . . . .

People who share a given life style tend to have more personal contact or interaction with one another than those who live differently . . . .

The degree to which people are explicitly aware of themselves as a distinctive social grouping is called their class consciousness . . . .

Finally, we must consider value orientations . . . .

People who perform the same activities or who occupy a given prestige level in a stratification system evolve a set of value orientations distinctive to themselves.\(^7\)

Social class, then, refers to the grouping of people in a hierarchy in society. The position of any individual or group can be determined in terms of the variables outlined above: personal prestige, occupation, possessions, interaction patterns, class consciousness, and value orientations. An explanation, therefore, to be considered as relevant to the closed area of social class must contain either explicit

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 8.

\(^8\)Ibid., pp. 8-10.
reference to the existence of the stratification of groups of people in society, or explicit reference to the position of an individual or group in a social hierarchy in terms of one or more of the indicated variables of social stratification. An illustration of an explanation placed in this category is: "Americans had come from Europe and Europeans laid great emphasis on class distinctions. As a result, Americans who gained wealth or held high office sometimes let it be known that they belonged to a higher class than the common people."^79

The category of sex, courtship, and marriage

This category is designed to encompass the whole range of beliefs and practices relating to heterosexual and homosexual activities. The discussion which follows is intended to indicate some of the kinds of activities included in this category.\(^80\)

We may take as one subclass the beliefs and practices which can be subsumed under the vague heading of sex. Included here would be such beliefs and practices as those relating to premarital sexual relations, homosexuality, incest taboos, adultery, and forms of extra-marital sexual privileges.

A second subclass would be concerned with courtship practices and patterns. Included here would be beliefs and behavior related, for example, to exogamy, i.e., the prohibition of marriage of the members of a particular group with certain out-groups, and endogamy, i.e., the re-

^79 Baldwin and Warring, op. cit., p. 72.

quirement of marriage within the membership of a particular group. Beliefs and practices with respect to the manner in which a husband or wife is selected would also fall into this subclass, as would those beliefs and practices with respect to the manner in which the wedding ceremony is performed.

The subclass marriage is concerned with the form and duration of the marriage relationship. First of all, with respect to size and form it is possible to draw the following distinctions:

There are four kinds of marriages. Monogamy refers to the marriage of one male to one female. There are two kinds of polygamy: (a) polygyny refers to the marriage of one male to more than one female and (b) polyandry indicates the marriage of more than one male to one female. Finally, group marriage signifies the marriage of several males to several females. 81

Another structural aspect of marriage would be the rules of descent, wherein a person is affiliated with a male kinship group (patrilineal descent), with a female kinship group (matrilineal descent), or with a group of relations of both sexes (bilateral descent). In this subclass we may also place the rules of residence which determine the location of a newly created family's dwelling place. Thus the couple might be expected to live with the husband's family (patrilocal residence), the wife's family (matrilocal residence), or apart from both sets of parents (neolocal residence).

Finally, we may include here the beliefs and practices regarding the dissolution of the marriage relationship. Aspects of this area

81 Ibid., p. 559.
would involve the manner in which the dissolution takes place, the dis-
position of any children that were a product of the marriage, and the
disposition of the property of the married couple.

This category, then, is concerned with the beliefs and practices
surrounding sexual relationships, courtship patterns, and the nature of
the marriage-situation. An explanation will be considered as relevant
to this category if and only if explicit reference is made to beliefs
or practices than can be subsumed under one or more of the three sub-
classes indicated above. An illustration of an explanation placed in
this category is: "In 1619 a shipful of single girls arrived to marry
the settlers. The subsequent development of family life gave the colony
a more solid foundation."

The category of religion and morality

In the category of race and minority-group relations we had oc-
casion to refer to various religious groups that could be considered
as minority-groups in the sense in which that expression was therein
used. The present category also contains, as a major element, reference
to religious groups. Here, however, our attention is not directed to-
ward these groups as minority-groups. Rather we are concerned with
these groups as associations of people with particular patterns of be-
liefs and practices.

More specifically, this category should be taken to include the
body of institutionalized expressions of sacred practices, beliefs, and
observances that may be said to constitute a religion. It refers to

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82 Platt and Drummond, op. cit., p. 22.
the way of life that is recognized as incumbent on all "true believers," as it is described in the accepted sacred writings or by the authoritative teachers of that religion. Religion, as we are using it here, may refer to membership in or the beliefs and rituals of relatively small sects or cults like, for instance, the Bahai. It may also refer to membership in or the practices and teachings of one of the "Great Religions," such as Christianity, Mohammedanism, or Shintoism.

This category is also concerned with morality. In a general sense, morality refers to the conduct of an individual or group with respect to customs or accepted standards of behavior within a particular culture. Thus behavior that is said to conform to the relevant standards is referred to as moral behavior or "right conduct," while behavior that violates the customs or standards may be referred to as immoral behavior.

Since sexual behavior generally involves certain customs or standards it falls within the purview of this category. Inasmuch, however, as there is a specific category that is devoted to it, sexual behavior (including courtship and marriage practices) is excluded from our present considerations.

Historically, in this country questions of morality have arisen — at different times and with respect to different groups of people — in connection with such items as the use of alcohol and tobacco, playing cards and shooting pool, and manner of attire. On a somewhat different level, such questions as the existence of corruption, conflict

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83 Joseph Gaer, How the Great Religions Began (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1958) is the source of the expression the "Great Religions."
of interest, influence-peddling, and collusion in official government circles have been defined as moral questions apart from any legal issues that might be raised in connection with them.

Finally, the moral issue is raised in connection with such things as the mistreatment of animals and children, social apathy, and the betrayal of a confidence.

The category of religion and morality, then, is concerned with religious beliefs, practices, and observances; with membership in religious groups; and with principles of conduct or particular acts -- excluding sexual behavior and courtship and marriage patterns -- that are relevant to cultural standards or customs. In order to be classified as relevant to this category, an explanation must contain explicit reference to one or more of these sub-categories. An illustration of an explanation so classified is: "Americans of Mexican descent . . . were torn between two cultures. As a result, their young people sometimes broke down parental and religious restraints and resorted to outlandish extremes in dress and customs[and]. . . juvenile delinquency."84

The category of forms and functions of government

The closed area that Hunt and Metcalf refer to as "nationalism, patriotism, and national institutions," we shall refer to as "the forms and functions of government." We do not intend, by using this alternative formulation, to shift the nature of this category away from that

84 Baldwin and Warring, op. cit., p. 725.
given it by Hunt and Metcalf. Our formulation merely facilitates the breakdown of the category into a series of subclasses of issues and problems that is designed to assist in the classification of explanations.  

The first question that may be raised is the question of the legitimacy of government: In virtue of what grounds can the exercise of political power be said to be proper? Answers to this question often are given in the form of considerations of the origins of government, which, in turn, lead into descriptions of the proper ends of government.

We may identify several different answers that have been given at different times in history. It has been argued, for instance, that a man may properly rule others only when he derives his authority from God and, therefore, serves the functions designated by Him. A second answer is that of Thrasymachus; government arises only through force and conquest. Might is said to make right -- "Justice is the interest of the stronger" -- because were it not for the exercise of force and power, there would be no stability.

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85 As we turn to a brief consideration of several of these subclasses we should enter a word of warning. While it may be true that, in the manner in which they are stated, some of the following problems and issues could very well become the objects of the attention of students in history classes, they are here intended merely as a system of indicators which should facilitate the classification of textbook-explanations.

86 I Samuel 8-10.


88 Ibid., p. 18.
To us, perhaps, a more familiar answer is that which is found in the Declaration of Independence: "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Men may contract together or consent to be governed in order to secure certain "inalienable rights," or (according to Hobbes) merely to stay alive.89

Secondly, we may consider some of the problems surrounding the proper functions of government in a more specific sense. The discussion here focuses on such questions as the relationship between political and economic power, and the role of the state in the maintenance of order and liberty. With respect to the first question, for example, since Adam Smith raised and answered it (in no uncertain terms) almost two hundred years ago, there has been a continuing debate, particularly in the United States, over the proper role of the government in connection with various aspects of the nation's economic system.

There are, again, several additional subdivisions of problems and issues. With respect to the relation between the state and the maintenance of order, for instance, it is possible to consider whether order may be best achieved through the cultivation of uniformity or through the encouragement of diversity with respect for differences. It is also possible to consider the relation between law and custom in the maintenance of order in a state.

With respect to the relation between the state and the maintenance of liberty, it is possible to focus on the different political implications of several widely disparate conceptions of liberty: (1) positive

liberty, or the freedom to do what is right; (2) negative liberty, or the freedom to do what you want; and (3) a conception of liberty based on a discussion of specific liberties and their concomitant restraints.  

A third subclass within the general category that we are discussing is explicitly concerned with the forms and institutions of government. Here our attention is directed toward a consideration of a rather general level of thought, of the alternative forms of government, along the lines of Aristotle's six forms of government or MacIver's more recent analysis of governments into but two distinctive forms.  

An alternative direction within the subclass of forms and institutions of government takes us into a more specific consideration of such subjects as federal or unitary governmental systems (the problem of division of powers), separation of political power and separation of governmental functions, and the nature of party systems.  

The fourth subclass is concerned with the problems involved in meeting the dual challenges of stability and change. This subclass is concerned with these challenges on an internal level, where attention is directed at the institutionalized means of maintaining the government in the light of shifting conditions and circumstances. Attention is consequently directed toward such problems as domestic crises (e.g.,

90These alternate conceptions of liberty were developed in a lecture by Professor David Spitz in a course on political theory at The Ohio State University during autumn quarter, 1963.


depressions), coups d'etat, and revolutions. Also falling into this subclass are international affairs, where such problems as imperialism, war, and international cooperation and organization are considered.

The control of the abuse of political power forms the fifth subclass, and here, as well, there are a variety of responses to consider. Thus, for example, the philosophical anarchist urges the elimination of all institutions of organized coercion, with the subsequent substitution of voluntary cooperation to attain "political ends."

There have been, however, numerous other responses to the problem of abuse of political power. There has been, for instance, the appeal to the right system, which through its structure minimizes the opportunity for abuse of power. Perhaps the best known illustration of the appeal to the right system is the argument in Madison's tenth and fifty-first Federalist papers. Walter Lippman's appeal to the principles of natural right in The Public Philosophy illustrates another type of response to the problem of abuse of power. And, finally, there is the appeal to the "best man," to Plato's Philosopher-King, as the way in which abuse of political power might be controlled.

The final subclass of this category is concerned with the problem of political obligation. One question here focuses on why men obey the law in any state; a second question focuses on whether men ought to


obey. There are, of course, a variety of answers that are given to this latter question. The argument for obedience may be found, for example, in the *Crito* and again in *Leviathan*. The argument for the supremacy of conscience is given in the *Apology* and by Sophocles in the play, *Antigone*. MacIver has, more recently, argued for what might be called qualified obedience, asserting that men are obligated to obey except when disobedience is considered to promote the greater welfare of the society as a whole.

This category, then, is concerned with origins and aims of government, and the specific functions fulfilled by it; with the forms and institutions of government and the maintenance of stability in the face of change; and with the control of abuse of political power and the problem of political obligation. In order that an explanation may be considered as relevant to this category, it must be explicitly concerned with one or more of these subclassifications of the category. An illustration of an explanation placed in this category is: "To prevent a military dictatorship and to guarantee against the seizure of power by small groups of people, the delegates agreed that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government must be separated."

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97 Hobbes, op. cit., pp. 262-266.
100 MacIver, op. cit., pp. 73-81.
101 Todd and Curti, op. cit., p. 166.
Nonclassifiable and multi-classifiable explanations

We have now completed the general description of the methodology of content analysis and the development of the analytical categories. Before turning to a report of the procedures of the study, however, two additional points need to be emphasized.

In our statement of the problem with which we are concerned in this study we indicated our interest in identifying explanations relevant to one or more of the closed areas. Since explanations may vary in their complexity, and since our categories were not designed to function in an exclusive manner, it is clearly possible -- even likely -- that a number of explanations may be placed in more than one category. For example, the explanation -- "To avoid persecution and to be able to worship as they pleased, many Puritans and Separatists, as well as some Roman Catholics, migrated to the colonies." -- must be placed both in the category of religion and morality and in the category of race and minority-group relations. Similarly, the following explanation must be placed in the category of economics and in the category of forms and functions of government:

In past depressions it had been the policy of each administration to consider a panic as a natural part of a normal business cycle. Since economics was not considered to be the business of government, the policy had led to the practice of looking on while the storm blew itself out.103

102 Platt and Drummond, op. cit., p. 21
103 Muzzey and Link, Our Country's History, p. 536.
And thirdly, the explanation — "For this reason [hope of bringing the benefits of civilization to the Indians], . . . the government encouraged intermarriage between its soldiers and Indian women." — must be placed in the category of forms and functions of government and the category of sex, courtship, and marriage.  

Finally, any explanation not classifiable in terms of one or more of the six substantive categories will be placed in a "residue" category.

**Procedural Aspects of the Study**

Before the analysis of textbooks could be started, it was obviously necessary for us to identify the specific textbooks which would serve as the subjects of this study. In this connection, there were several problems with which we had to deal.

There is a bewildering variety of published materials which purport to be secondary school American history texts. *Textbooks in Print: 1964*, for example, lists forty-two different entries as junior or senior high school American history texts. These books range from very brief summaries to two volume editions. Some are designed to fulfill specific needs, such as advanced placement courses or classes of slow learners. Some are newly published or revised, others were published as early as 1955 with no indicated revisions. Consequently, it was necessary for us to pare down the list of texts to be studied to a manageable figure. The following two sections report the manner in which the selection was made.

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104 Platt and Drummond, op. cit., p. 13.

The selection of the level of textbooks to be subjected to analysis

A course in American history is, generally speaking, required in the junior high school and again in the senior high school. As we noted above, Textbooks in Print: 1964 lists forty-two textbooks published for use in junior high and senior high schools. Thus, if an attempt were made to analyze this total population of American history texts, the scope of the study would necessitate the development of some sort of sampling procedure.

While a study based on sampling techniques might provide information that would be helpful to the textbook writer, such a study would not provide teachers with information on specific textbooks, unless those particular textbooks happened to be included in the sample. To provide the kind of information needed by the teacher, a one hundred per cent sample is essential. A study based on a one hundred per cent sample would, moreover, be more valuable for the textbook writer; there would be no assumption necessary regarding the validity of the sampling procedure.

The only approach that provides the kind of sample needed and reduces the number of texts to a manageable figure is to focus either on textbooks designed for use at the junior high school level or on those designed for use in senior high schools. The question which must then be answered is: Which of the two levels -- junior or senior high -- shall be selected for study?

The stated purposes of this study provide no help in answering this question; clearly information concerning junior high textbooks would be just as valuable to those concerned with that level as would
similar information to those concerned with senior high school textbooks.

One possible source of assistance in this matter might be the theoretical context in which this study is placed. The reflective approach to social studies education, however, is directed to all teaching of the social studies at all levels of the secondary school. None of the writers who discuss this approach suggest that it is more appropriate or desirable in either the junior or the senior high school. On the contrary, the point is suggested by several of them that the approach should be used throughout the educational program.\textsuperscript{106}

The basic purposes of the study, then, and the theoretical context in which it is placed, are indifferent to the question as to the level at which the study should be conducted. So far as they are concerned the choice is an arbitrary one. In view of this state of affairs we choose to direct this study to textbooks designed for use at the senior high school level.

It should be emphasized again, however, that such a choice does not in any way imply that it is more important or valuable to carry out the study on senior high books than on junior high books. The relevant data is equally necessary on both levels. The point is that there was a practical need to make a decision and that, in terms of the purposes of the study and its theoretical framework, the decision was, of necessity, an arbitrary one. We recommend that other analysts pursue the task of "filling in" the needed data on the textbooks excluded from this study.

\textsuperscript{106}See, for example, Hullfish and Smith, op. cit.
The selection of specific textbooks to be subjected to analysis

As we have just indicated, one criterion for the selection of the textbooks to be analyzed limits the study to textbooks written for use in senior high school American history classes. We shall now make this limitation more specific: Only those textbooks designed for use in general education senior high school American history classes shall be included in the study.

This further limitation excludes from the study those textbooks written to fulfill specialized needs in senior high schools. As we noted above, some texts are designed for use in advanced placement classes, while others are designed for slow learners' classes or for classes of students with reading difficulties. Inclusion of these texts would raise the question of the propriety of making a comparative analysis. Furthermore, it would again push the number of texts to be studied beyond the point of manageability.

The final criterion for the selection of texts for analysis limits the texts to those with an edition that has been issued since December 31, 1962, and prior to April 1, 1965. If this study is to be of value to teachers as they select a textbook for classroom use, and if it is to be of value to future textbooks writers, then it must focus on the most recent textual materials available. On the other hand, if the time limitation be too restrictive, then a meaningful population of textbooks could not be studied. As will be seen, setting the cut-off dates as indicated provides an extensive yet recent list of American history texts.
The basic sources of the data regarding the American history textbooks were *Textbooks in Print: 1964* and *Publishers' Trade List Annual, 1964*. In some cases, moreover, copies of the texts were examined. Where these sources did not provide adequate data, representatives of the appropriate publishing houses were consulted.

Based on the criteria described above, the following list of senior high school American history textbooks was prepared:


It is this list of texts that constitutes the subject of this study.
Analytical procedures

The analysis of the selected textbooks was conducted in two parts. In the first part we identified explanations offered by the textbook writers. In the second, we classified these explanations according to their relevance to one or more of the categories of classification described above.

A "trial run" of the identification analysis revealed the need for additional guidelines with respect to the identification of explanations. It was found, for example, that writers of textbooks tend to repeat the same explanation several times. Accordingly, only the first occurrence of an explanation was included in the list of explanations identified in any particular text.

Furthermore, the analysis was directed only at the body of the text. Questions and exercises at the ends of chapters and units, charts, graphs, tables, and pictures and their captions were excluded from the analysis.

Thirdly, in some instances textbook writers report an explanation of an event that had been originally offered by a participant in that event or by another writer about it. These explanations were included in the lists of explanations identified in the textbooks.

In some cases, textbook writers make statements like, "The war had a remarkable effect on slavery." These writers, however, do not go on to indicate the nature of that effect. Assertions of this sort do not offer an explanation, but merely suggest that there is an explanation which might be given in connection with the indicated states of af-
fairs. Assertions of this type were excluded from the lists of explanations.

Finally, there are cases where the writer of the textbook offers an explanation of his handling of a particular topic. For example, one writer states: "Because his idealism and great courage were not clearly seen until his second term, . . . we shall postpone our thumbnail sketch of him until the next chapter." Explanations of this sort were excluded from the lists of identified textbook explanations on the grounds that such explanations were of a procedural, rather than a substantive, nature and hence were not relevant to the concerns directing this study.

As each textbook was analyzed, the passages that we identified as explanations were either clearly marked in the body of the text or were placed on individual cards. To facilitate the tabulation of the explanations that were placed on cards we also placed there a number representing the particular text from which it came and the number of the page in that text on which it was found.

Once the explanations had been identified, we turned to their classification. The procedure that we followed here was to analyze all of the identified explanations with respect to a single category, and then to move to a second one, and so on through the six categories. When an explanation was found to be relevant to one of the six categories it was so labeled. After the classification had been completed the results were compiled and tabulated.

Estimation of interscorer agreement

Two graduate students and assistant instructors in the Department of Education, The Ohio State University, served as judges in our estimation of interscorer agreement with respect to both the identification and the classification of explanations. In the former case, each judge was given a thirty-eight page section from one textbook, the brief description of the several linguistic forms by which authors offer explanations, and the set of guidelines for the identification of explanations. Each judge was asked to familiarize himself with the latter two sets of materials and then to read the section from the textbook and identify those passages that appeared to be instances of explanations.

The results of each judge's analysis was then compared with our analysis and with that of the other judge. With respect to the total number of explanations identified, agreement between each of the two judges and us and between the two judges exceeded 92 per cent. More importantly, with respect to the particular passages identified as explanations, the first judge agreed with 85.7 per cent of the passages that we identified as explanations; the second judge agreed with 77.6 per cent of them. Agreement between the two judges was 77.4 per cent.

Turning to the estimation of agreement in the classification of explanations, each judge was given a packet of materials that included 151 explanations typed on individual slips of paper and the discussion of the categories, including illustrations of explanations considered as relevant to each of them. Here again the judges were asked to familiarize themselves with the categories and then to classify the explanations with which they were provided.
Again the analysis of each judge was compared with our analysis and with that of the other judge. The first judge agreed with 86.8 percent of our classifications; the second judge agreed with 82.8 percent. Agreement between the two judges was 74.5 percent.

It is important to point out several of the limitations of these estimates of agreement. First of all, in both cases the material subjected to analysis was a very small sample of the total material that we analyzed in our study. But the smallness of the sample itself would not be quite so serious a limitation were the sample either a random or a representative one.

The materials used by the judges in their identification and classification of explanations were taken from a single (though different for each operation) text. Since no attempt was made to make either the selection of the textbook section or the collection of the explanations on a random basis, the possibility of a "built-in" bias at this point is one that must be recognized.

It would moreover be highly dangerous to assume that the materials were representative samples of the texts subjected to analysis or of the explanations identified. As our own analysis proceeded, it became increasingly clear that there were variations in the styles of textbook writers, in the frequency of occurrence of explanations in any given number of pages, and in the frequency of explanations relevant to any given category in a given number of pages. These three discoveries, taken together, suggest that an assumption of the representative nature of the sample would, in all likelihood, be an erroneous one.

Even with these limitations in mind, however, the results obtained
in our estimation of interscorer agreement suggest that our analytical categories are sufficiently viable to warrant their use in this study. The results of their application to the textbooks that are the object of our attention in this study are reported in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV

REPORT OF THE DATA

It will be recalled that the two broad guiding purposes of this study were: first, to provide teachers with information regarding current American history textbooks that might prove helpful as they select a book for classroom use; and second, to provide writers of American history textbooks in the future with information about current texts that may suggest some guidelines for their work. These two purposes require that we examine our data from two different perspectives. For where the textbook writer will be more interested in what we might call the pattern of classification of textbook explanations, the teacher will be interested in the incidence of explanations relevant to each category in each text.

Accordingly, in the first section of this chapter we outline the findings from the standpoint of the categories. In the second section, then, we shift our frame of reference and view the results from the standpoint of the textbooks. More specifically, in the first section we indicate the extent to which the explanations identified fall into the various categories. In the second section we discuss the rank order of the texts in terms of each category and in terms of a composite ranking obtained by computing for each text the sum of its rank in each
of the classification categories (excluding, of course, the residue category). A complete report of the data is provided in Table 1.

Before we summarize our findings, however, there is an additional point that we should perhaps clarify. We pointed out in our discussion of the methodology of the study that it was possible for a single explanation to be considered to be relevant to more than one category. That such an occurrence did frequently take place in our analysis can be seen by noting in Table 1 that the sum of the percentages of the identified explanations classified in the various categories is more than one hundred per cent.

Summary of the data from the perspective of the categories

Even a cursory examination of Table 1 reveals a vast difference in the extent to which explanations relevant to the various categories appear in the textbooks analyzed. Thus large numbers of explanations in every textbook were found to be relevant to the categories of economics and forms and functions of government, while relatively few were found to be relevant to the other four categories.

More specifically, with regard to the government category, in five of the texts slightly over 50 per cent of the explanations were found to be relevant to this category, while in the other five texts between 45 per cent and 50 per cent of the explanations were found to be relevant to it. Of all of the explanations identified in all of the texts, 50.2 per cent were found to be relevant to this category.

1Hereafter in our discussion this category will be referred to as the government category.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors of Texts</th>
<th>Gov't</th>
<th>Econ.</th>
<th>Relig. &amp; Morality</th>
<th>Race, Etc.</th>
<th>Soc. Class</th>
<th>Sex, Etc.</th>
<th>Residue</th>
<th>Explain's Ident.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platt &amp; Drummond</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>1,717</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canfield &amp; Wilder</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>1,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin &amp; Warring</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harlow &amp; Noyes</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd &amp; Curti</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyman &amp; Ridge</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>591</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bragdon &amp; McCutchen</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>797</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graff &amp; Krout</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzzey &amp; Link</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steinberg</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,597</td>
<td>3,930</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>9,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent of Explan's Ident.</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Arranged in descending overall rank order.

b Due to multiple classifications the sum of the numbers in each category will exceed this number.

c Not of the number of classifications.
With respect to the category of economics, in eight of the texts between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the explanations were judged to be relevant to it. In the other two texts, between 33 per cent and 40 per cent of the explanations were placed in this category. Of all the explanations identified, 42.9 per cent of them were placed in the category of economics.

The incidence of explanations found to be relevant to each of the other four substantive categories (i.e., excluding the residue category) fell far below the number placed in the categories of government and economics. Thus with respect to the category of religion and morality -- the third ranking category in the number of explanations found to be relevant to it -- in nine of the texts between 2 per cent and 5 per cent of the identified explanations were placed in this category; in one text slightly over 5 per cent of the explanations were judged to be relevant to it. Just 3.8 per cent of the total number of explanations identified were found to be relevant to it.

With respect to the next most numerous category -- the category of race and minority-group relations -- in nine of the texts between 2 per cent and 5 per cent of the identified explanations were considered to be relevant to this category, while in one text slightly less than 2 per cent of the explanations were placed in it. Overall, 2.8 per cent of the explanations identified were placed in this category.

In one text slightly more than 2 per cent of the identified explanations were judged to be relevant to the category of social class, while in six other texts between 1 per cent and 2 per cent of the explanations were placed in that category. In the other three texts less
than 1 per cent of the explanations were considered to be relevant to it. Of all the explanations identified in all of the texts 1.4 per cent were placed in the category of social class.

Finally, in every text less than 1 per cent of the explanations were considered to be relevant to the category of sex, courtship, and marriage. The overall percentage of explanations identified that were placed in this category was 0.4 per cent.

Summary of the data from the perspective of each textbook

As Table 1 indicates, there is a wide variance among the textbooks both with regard to the total number of explanations identified and with regard to the number of explanations found to be relevant to each category. Moreover, as our discussion in the first section of this chapter pointed out, there is a wide variance in the number of explanations occurring in any one textbook that were found to be relevant to the various categories.

The text by Platt and Drummond ranked first with respect to the number of explanations identified and with respect to the number of explanations classified as relevant to each of the six categories.$^2$ That is to say, we identified in that text more explanations than we found in any other single text — more than one and one-half times as many as the second ranking text. And then, we found more explanations relevant to each of the six substantive categories than we found in any other textbook. Such consistency of position regarding the number of explana-

$^2$Complete bibliographic data for each text may be found on pages 107 and 123, or in the Bibliography.
tions classified as relevant to one or more of the categories does not occur in any of the other nine textbooks.

The text by Canfield and Wilder and that by Baldwin and Warring rank second and third respectively in the number of explanations found to occur in those texts. Neither of them, however, maintain those positions when we turn our attention to the number of explanations found to be relevant to each of our six categories. Thus the Baldwin and Warring text ranks second in the categories of government, race and minority-group relations, social class, and religion and morality; it ranks fifth in economics and in a tie for fifth in sex, courtship, and marriage. Canfield and Wilder's text ranks second in sex, courtship, and marriage and in economics; third in social class, religion and morality, and government; and fourth in race and minority-group relations. A composite of the rank of each text with respect to the six categories places Canfield and Wilder in second position with Baldwin and Warring a very close third.

The fourth and fifth ranking texts with respect to the number of explanations found to occur in them are the books by Harlow and Noyes and by Todd and Curti respectively. With these two books there is again a wide variation in their ranking in the number of explanations found to be relevant to one or more of the categories.

The text by Harlow and Noyes tied for third in the category of economics; ranked fourth in the category of government; placed fifth in race and minority-group relations and tied for fifth in sex, courtship, and marriage; tied for sixth in religion and morality; and tied for ninth in the category of social class. This text's composite rank with
respect to the classification of explanations places it in fourth position. The ranking of the book by Todd and Curti with respect to each of the categories is as follows: third in race and minority-group relations and tied for third in economics; fifth in government; tied for sixth in religion and morality; eighth in social class and tied for eighth in sex, courtship, and marriage. It ranks fifth in the composite ranking with respect to the classification of explanations.

Although the text by Wyman and Ridge ranks ninth with respect to the number of explanations identified, its composite ranking with respect to the classification of those explanations places it in sixth position. It achieved this position by ranking fourth in sex, courtship, and marriage and religion and morality, fifth in social class, eighth in economics and race and minority-group relations, and ninth in the category of government.

Ranking sixth and seventh, respectively, in the number of explanations identified, the texts by Bragdon and McCutchen and by Graff and Krout, in that order, rank seventh and eighth in the composite ranking with respect to the classification of explanations. The position of the book by Bragdon and McCutchen in each of the six categories is: fourth in the category of social class; sixth in economics, government, and race and minority-group relations; tied for eighth in sex, courtship, and marriage; and ninth in religion and morality. The book by Graff and Krout ranks fifth in the category of religion and morality; sixth in social class; seventh in economics, race and minority-group relations, and sex, courtship, and marriage; and eighth in the category of government.
The textbook written by Muzzey and Link ranks eighth with respect to the number of explanations identified and ninth in the composite ranking with respect to the classification of those explanations. Its position in each of the six categories is third in sex, courtship, and marriage; seventh in government; eighth in religion and morality; ninth in economics and tied for ninth in social class; and tenth in race and minority-group relations.

Ranking tenth both in the number of explanations identified and in the composite ranking with respect to the classification of those explanations was the text written by Steinberg. With respect to each of the six categories, it ranks seventh in social class; ninth in race and minority-group relations; and tenth in government, economics, religion and morality, and sex, courtship, and marriage.

This concludes our summary of the findings of our study. In the next, and final, chapter we discuss the import of these findings from the perspective of our two purposes and conclude with some more general considerations regarding the limitations and significance of the study.
CHAPTER V

COMMENTARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study we have been guided by the desire to bring together in a meaningful way a theoretical approach to social studies education and an analysis of certain textbooks used in the teaching of one aspect of the social studies in the secondary school. In Chapter II above we outlined the reflective approach to instruction in the social studies, described several aspects of the nature of historical explanations and their grounds, and suggested several roles that the analysis of historical explanations might play within the context of the reflective approach.

The extent to which various textbooks provide opportunities for explanation-analysis in the context of the reflective approach is one aspect of the potential utility of those texts to the teacher of the social studies who is working within that approach. Therefore information in that regard would presumably be of some assistance to that teacher as he goes about selecting a particular text for use in his classes. Moreover, such information would be of some interest and importance to the writer of textbooks who was attempting to prepare a text for use by teachers operating in terms of the reflective approach.

In Chapter III we described the methodological procedures and the analyt-
ical categories that we used in our effort to learn more about explanations occurring in textbooks.

We reported the results of the textbook analysis in the immediately preceding chapter. Thus it only remains for us to comment on our findings in terms of our twofold purpose, and to offer some more general concluding remarks on the limitations and significance of this study.

The data and textbook selection

The rank order of the textbooks with respect to the incidence of explanations relevant to the several categories is reported in Table 1. This ranking, however, should not be taken as a blanket recommendation for the adoption of any particular textbook. Presumably the teacher would have other criteria in the light of which each textbook would have to be considered.

For example, while we made no effort to study these elements systematically, it became increasingly apparent to us in the course of the analysis that the textbooks varied widely both with respect to the level of vocabulary used and with respect to the clarity and vigor of their writing. We would expect that the teacher would want to include these factors -- and others, as well -- in their evaluation of the textbooks.

1 This prima facie variation in vocabulary level is of particular interest in view of our efforts to select for study only textbooks designed for use in senior high school general education American history classes. Since the data for so classifying the textbooks was provided by the publishers themselves -- and if a systematic study substantiated our impressions -- it would seem clear that there is among publishers no clear and generally accepted conception of the reading level appropriate for a textbook that is to be used in that particular classroom situation. The natures of the varying conceptions, together with the grounds (if any) upon which they are based, would appear to be worthy of further study.
All that we intend to suggest is that where the teacher of American history is operating in terms of the reflective approach (including explanation-analysis) one consideration in the selection of a textbook for use in his class is the extent to which that text provides opportunities for the analysis of explanations relevant to the several closed areas. And with regard to this criterion, the ranking of the texts subjected to analysis in this study — as Table 1 indicates — is:


The data and textbook writing

The data reported in Chapter IV reveal at least one point of direct concern to the writer of American history textbooks. We learned that a wide variation exists in all the texts with respect to the incidence of explanations relevant to the various categories. This fact suggests that all of these texts have a limited utility insofar as several of the categories are concerned. For textbooks to be more appropriate from the standpoint of the reflective approach, they would need to provide a better balance with respect to the categories. Thus writers of textbooks might well devote attention to the offering of additional explanations in such categories as race and minority-group relations, religion and morality, social class, and sex, courtship, and marriage.

That such an imbalance was found to exist should not, however, occasion any surprise, since the textbooks studied were not designed in terms of the approach to social studies instruction that we outlined earlier in this study. Nevertheless, the existence of this imbalance and its corresponding limitations on the utility of the particular texts studied serve to point strongly toward the need for textual materials explicitly and specifically designed for use by reflective approach-oriented teachers.

Limitations of the study

While the information that we have gathered in this study may be interesting in and of itself, it should be obvious that its value is limited to the extent that the approach to social studies instruction upon which it is based is accepted by teachers of American history in
secondary schools, and to the extent that they (or their points of view) are influential in the selection of the textbooks to be used in their classes. The results of the study itself may suggest another limitation on its meaningfulness. The pattern of explanations relevant to the various categories was similar in all of the texts. Though exploration of the possible bases for this similarity is not within the scope of this study, we might suggest that it may be accounted for by the existence of certain conditions and circumstances in the publishing business that place restrictions on the nature of textual materials that may be accepted for publication. If such conditions do in fact exist, then the relevance of our study for the textbook writer may well be of little practical importance.

In the third place, the basic significance of the study rests on the extent to which the explanations classified in the several categories do in fact provide a specific teacher in a specific classroom with an opportunity to stimulate his students to an examination of some of their beliefs in one or more of the closed areas. While we assume that such would be the case, it must remain an untested assumption so far as this study is concerned. The testing of that assumption would constitute an extensive study in its own right and, as such, falls outside the range of our considerations in this study.

Finally, we should emphasize that the results of the study are valid only for the particular texts that were subjected to analysis — and then only to the extent that our estimation of interscorer agreement reported in Chapter III is an accurate one. While we may surmise that — in view of our findings — similar studies would reveal similar results,
this conjecture remains to be substantiated or denied by subsequent analyses.

Significance of the study

Apart from the value of the findings for teachers and textbook writers, the significance of this study lies in its attempt to bring together a theoretical approach to the teaching of social studies and an analysis of certain textbooks written for use in social studies classes. It is our hope that this example will encourage other more sophisticated efforts in bringing together theory and research in social studies education, for it is our conviction that it is only through progress in this direction that significant improvement in the teaching of social studies will be made.
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