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LOUIS ANTONINUS RYAN, O.P.

1958
VALUE JUDGMENTS IN SELECTED AMERICAN INTRODUCTORY
SOCIOLOGY TEXTBOOKS, 1947-1950

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
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University

By

*****
The Ohio State University
1957

Approved by:

[Signature]
Adviser
Department of Sociology and
Anthropology
Ad animam unam

et

cor unum

in Deo
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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. PRESENTATION OF VALUE-JUDGMENT DATA DERIVED FROM SELECTED INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY TEXTBOOKS, 1947-1950</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank Order of Items According to Content Categories and Types of Value Judgments for the Total Body of Readings (Five Textbooks)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samples of Value Judgments in Eight Content Categories</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Value Positions in Eight Content Categories</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derivation of Central Attitudes Revealed in the Content Analysis</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. CRITIQUE OF CENTRAL ATTITUDES TYPICAL OF THE TEXTBOOKS AS A WHOLE</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critique of Ten Central Attitudes</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of This Research with Other Surveys of Sociology Textbooks</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. TOWARD A SOCIOCULTURAL INTERPRETATION OF VALUE JUDGMENTS IN THE SELECTED TEXTBOOKS</strong></td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Components of a Sociology of Intellectual Behavior</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of the Central Attitudes with Qualities Ascribed to the American Ethos, &quot;Mind,&quot; &quot;Character&quot;</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Observations and Hypotheses on Socio-cultural Factors Likely to Affect the Production of Introductory Sociology Textbooks</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Statement to Chapter IV</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. SUMMARY AND SUGGESTED RESEARCH</strong></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggested Research</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX II</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOBIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

At the inception of this research six years ago it was entertained as a general hypothesis that a documented presentation of the role of value judgments in selected sociological writings might contribute to the clarification of sociology as a science by a) delineating the role of value judgments as subject matter of the science; b) examining the methodological principles or assumptions of the science in this area; c) indicating the relation of scientific sociology to the so-called normative sciences, thus clarifying its position in the broader scheme of human knowledge.

During the intervening years, with the reading of rather extensive materials on values and sociology, and after making a content analysis of selected sociology textbooks, this hypothesis has undergone refinement and, in the process, has acquired a certain measure of confirmation. This dissertation is an attempt to record the steps of this sometimes painstaking, oftentimes fascinating, and always interesting investigation. The appearance of several major works by individual sociologists in the last few years, the several recent UNESCO reports on sociology and social science, and abundant periodical materials have confirmed the validity of the writer's interest in this problem; not
infrequently, they corroborate his conclusions.¹

This research might be described as an exercise in the sociology of sociology. More specifically, it involves a content analysis directed toward securing a body of data and interpreting it intrinsically so as to ready it for extrinsic (sociological) analysis in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge or intellectual behavior. It is an effort to allow sociology, rather than its critics, interpret itself—a sort of adventure in professional introspection, an academic attempt to follow the dictum basic to all science as well as to all scientists—"Know thyself."

Any incursion into the realm of values and sociology not only exposes one to the prevailing differences of opinion with regard to the natures of value and sociology, and into controversy with vested interests involved in the maintenance of certain status quo positions or interpretations. It also puts upon the researcher the burden of

spelling out, in somewhat more detail than in less contro-
versial projects, the methodology, postulates and value
positions relevant to the selection and interpretation of the
data. This task is discharged first by laying open to
inspection as many procedural details as limitations of
space permit; second, by making explicit the scientific
principles and value premises affecting the steps of the
research.

The first chapter deals with the rationale and
methodology of the project; Chapter II presents the data
obtained through the content analysis procedure according to
the types and content of value judgments; Chapter III con-
tains a critique of the authors' central attitudes revealed
by the content analysis; Chapter IV attempts briefly to
relate the central attitudes and the sociological textbooks
to such sociocultural factors as may be presumed to influ-
ence the authors of the textbooks under study; and the brief
concluding Chapter V presents a summary and suggestions for
further research.
CHAPTER I

RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY

Rationale

The Value Problem and Scientific Sociology

The scientist, as scientist, seeks to acquire ordered knowledge in his field of specialization; the scientist as teacher endeavors to communicate this knowledge to others. Thus the sociologist as a scientist who is interested in the ordered knowledge of social life, draws upon the accumulated social experience of humankind as best he can—whether by means of the history of social thought and action, contemporary sociological theory and research of all schools, or by utilizing the wealth of his own personal experience of the realities of social life.

Sociology, to be effective as an academic discipline, depends upon the completeness and thoroughness with which the investigation of society is undertaken. An inquiry into its academic status requires a clarification of the requisites for scientific investigation. Generally, these may be said to be three: (a) a suitable terminology, so that symbols (verbal or graphic) will accurately reflect the concepts of the scientist and permit adequate communication
to others studying the science; (b) a methodology comprising research techniques proportioned to the data of the science; and (c) a conceptual and procedural teleology which organizes the data and concepts in the systematic way proper to scientific knowledge.

With regard to terminology, the problem in sociology is to a great extent a semantic one. The proliferation of new sociological terms and the varying usages of commonly accepted terms make both research and the teaching of sociology an adventure in nomenclature. A comparative analysis of historical and contemporary word usages in sociology should yield a descriptive and classificatory array of sociological concepts. The problems involved in the use of the one word "value," frequently employed in sociological literature, are illustrated in the present study; and the resolution of these problems would represent a contribution to the clarification of the symbol system of sociology.

With regard to methodology, i.e., the means or devices or procedures for securing adequate knowledge of social data, the relative merits and use of the inductive and deductive aspects of the scientific method, the functions of qualitative and quantitative analysis, the feasibility and value of the historical and psychological approaches to social data, constitute legitimate inquiries for the student of scientific sociology.
Since order is basic to science,—order both in the
discovery of data and in their presentation to others—a
teleological aspect of sociology needs to be considered.
Scientific order involves a decision as to what data come
first, second, third, etc., either in the investigative
process or the communicative process. The choice of any
such order is predicated on a system of goals or values
explicitly stated or implicitly assumed by the scientist.
It is therefore essential to an understanding of the science
of sociology that an inquiry be made into the reasons why
certain data are included and others excluded, why some
aspects of society are treated first and others after, why
some social situations are given more prominence and emphasis
than others, why certain assumptions and theories are intro-
duced to interpret the data, and why, whenever this occurs
in sociological writings, certain goals are deemed "desir-
able," "normal," "adjustive," and others not.

This research focuses upon the value problem in
sociology as affording an important key to the understanding
of the discipline, in that it permits an analysis of socio-
logical literature in its structural aspects with wide
implications for its functional use.

Contemporary Social Theory and Values in Sociology

Any survey, however, cursory, of contemporary socio-
logical literature in the United States and abroad
underscores the relevance and importance of research into value judgments in sociology. Whether one read within the field of general sociology itself, or in related areas, such as the sociology of intellectual behavior, history of social thought, anthropology, social psychology, social philosophy, and philosophy of science, the preoccupation with values is significant. In their essay on the development of modern sociology in the United States, the Hinkles maintain that the preoccupation with values is more noticeable in the recent period (1935-1954) than in the preceding one (1918-1935), which, in the quest to make sociology scientific, tended to eschew value considerations.\textsuperscript{1}

In American sociology, the writings of Angell, Bain, Becker, Bowman, Cuber, Dodd, Furfey, Hart, Kolb, G. A. Lundberg, Lynd, Merton, Mukerjee, Myrdal, Parsons, Shils, Sorokin, Robin Williams Jr., Melvin Williams, Wolff and Znaniecki reflect a persistent preoccupation with this subject of values. All of the items listed in the bibliography (covering most of the relevant books in English as well as the magazine literature drawn especially from the leading American journals in sociology and philosophy of science) were studied and extensive extracts made to provide conceptual and interpretative tools for this investigation.

All of these sources strengthened the conviction of the worthwhileness of an investigation into value judgments in sociology.²

This research is directed to the investigation of values in sociology, whether they be value judgments as objects of sociological research, value judgments as assumptions or postulates of sociology or of certain sociological writers, or value judgments on methods of sociological research.³ Any scientific clarification in these areas may contribute to the resolution of the dilemmas in the social sciences described by Wilbur M. Urban:

... It is admitted that the social political sciences contain both fact and value-factual propositions and value propositions. Either these value propositions are subjective or they are not. If they are subjective, then they are merely the expression of liking or disliking, whether individual or collective—and the notions of truth and falsity are irrelevant. If they are objective, as I believe, and judgments about them can be true or false, then this is possible only if there are objective values and an objective order of values. In that case there is a science of ethics or axiology, with its own problems and methods. That such a science has also its own


difficulties I am well aware, but there is no other alternative and that is all with which I am here concerned.

. . . This leads us to a second and most fundamental of all the dilemmas that face us at the moment. Either there is a science or knowledge of the good or of value, or there is not. If there is not, if there is only knowledge of fact—of individual and collective desires and interests—then all attempts of the sciences to pronounce on values are either irrelevant or impudent . . .

Benefits Anticipated and Difficulties Involved

Any delineation of the nature and role of value judgments in sociology should prove beneficial:

first, by making more precise and intelligible the concepts of "value" and "value judgment" as they are employed in and applied to sociological writings;

second, by making more explicit the basic hypotheses, assumptions, postulates, and relative merits of each of these in sociological research and teaching;

third, by indicating more precisely the value positions and premises of sociological writers, to stimulate a critical appraisal of sociological data and interpretations of various schools of

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thought. From this may be achieved a more comprehensive frame of reference for scientific sociology integrative of all worthwhile social research.

To the extent that the above mentioned results are achieved by sociologists as scientists, the communication of sociological science to others through teaching will be facilitated. Semantic difficulties will be the more easily resolved; a more sympathetic, useful, and continuous exchange of opinions and research between sociologists employing different methods and hypotheses will be effected, thus making available to students a broader range of data unrestricted by ethnocentrism and an "in-group" mentality; and with the differences of value premises made more explicit, there can be more effective communication of sociology to students subscribing to different value systems.

That an investigation of this kind involves difficulties has become even more apparent than when the project was initiated.

First, there is the problem of formulating a suitable working definition of "value" and "value judgment." Not only are the terms variously used by different sociological authors, but oftentimes they are used differently by one author in the same work. The axiologists and social theorists themselves are not at all agreed in resolving the objective-subjective, absolute-relative, ultimate-instrumental and
other such dichotomies involved in the clarification of value theory.\(^5\)

Second, there is the difficulty of selecting socio-logical data which will lend themselves to adequate and fruitful value analysis within the compass of a doctoral dissertation and which will be sufficiently representative of the field to permit some useful generalizations and additional research hypotheses.

Third, an investigation of this kind, which involves a critique of fundamental assumptions and hypotheses employed in sociology, is likely to arouse antagonisms where


A survey made of the Journal of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, 1937-1956, reveals continuing debate as to the meanings and applications of fundamental axiological terms. Cf. items listed in bibliography,
differences occur in psychological, philosophical, and theological points of view, or where vested interests are concerned.

Fourth, since there is not, to the best of the author's knowledge, any comparable study which could be used as a guide or model, the adventure of pioneering is tempered by the dangers of unfruitful explorations, retraced steps, the introduction of methodological procedures which, though useful in themselves, suggest further refinements once they are formulated and applied.

Fifth, there is the problem of reliability. The very complexity of the instruments of content analysis, involving a range of disciplines (psychological, historical, epistemological, ethical, etc.) over and above sociology itself, limits the comprehension of the reliability of the thesis to those whose academic competence includes these related avenues of knowledge. All the present researcher can do is to formulate the stipulations under which the various phases of the project were conducted, realizing that the full cogency of the thesis will be evident only when differences of opinion in these other, and sometimes more fundamental, areas are satisfactorily resolved.

Sixth, the matter of verifiability is one which has to be considered. The sociological sources of data selected for analysis and the method of content analysis employed are such that they can easily be checked by other analysts,
though at some expense of time. Moreover, the interpretative materials have, whenever possible, been furnished in direct quotation, or, if paraphrased, with adequate bibliographical references.

None of the above difficulties, great though they may be, have discouraged this investigation so fundamental for scientific sociology and its communication. The probing of concepts, the questioning of common assumptions, the contrasting of divergent points of view can have a happily prophylactic effect.  

Methodology

Introduction.—Since this research was conceived in the spirit of the sociology of intellectual behavior, in which mental and literary productions are analyzed both according to an immanent or intrinsic interpretation and a transcendent or extrinsic (sociocultural) interpretation, a twofold methodological consideration has affected the selection of the research steps. On the one hand, an effort


7 Because of the extensiveness of the specific research procedures, only a summary of the methodology of the project will be presented here. Details of each of the steps (see footnotes below) will be found in Appendix I.

was made at each stage of the research to let the data yield their own categories and conclusions, thus providing an empirical and intrinsic basis for subsequent interpretation. On the other hand, the sources of social and axiological theory (extrinsic certainly to the textbooks and quite possibly sociocultural influences in their production) were drawn upon to furnish theoretical constructs. These latter, presumably, would reduce the limitations of the empirical data and provide a broader foundation for the interpretation of the data—a foundation extrinsic to them. By juxtaposing and interrelating the empirical categories and the theoretical paradigms, it was possible to obtain various operational procedures and thus to apply combined contributions of empirical research and social theory.

Selection of Data for Analysis

With the general topic of investigation being value judgments in sociological writings, a number of approaches to the subject were considered. Certain general limitations on scope were first imposed. It was decided to study contemporary rather than earlier sociological writers, since the primary interest is in present-day scientific sociology. Area-wise, it was decided to limit the study to sociologists writing in English, because of the difficulties of translating and comparing various textbooks, as well as the sheer extensiveness of the data. Furthermore, due to the
differences in continental and other non-American sociological orientations, it was decided, in the interests of intrinsic comparability of data, to focus on sociological writings in English in the United States.

A study of value judgments in American (United States of America) sociology could be made in various ways. One might analyze articles in professional journals on values and sociology; study books or monographs by American sociologists especially dealing with values; or undertake a content analysis of a particular sector of sociological textbooks (introductory, family, social problems, etc.). After weighing the various alternatives, it was agreed that introductory sociology textbooks would be suitable data, lending themselves more readily to content analysis because of accessibility, relative uniformity of presentation, representativeness of sociological viewpoints, and finally (though somewhat tangentially) because of their immediate influence on persons making their first formal acquaintance with sociology.

In an effort to select specific introductory sociology textbooks for analysis, a survey of the ten-year period (1940-1950) preceding the beginning of this project disclosed that 34 American (United States of America) introductory textbooks were published (in case of various editions, only one—the latest—was counted). Since this number of
textbooks seemed too extensive for a thorough analysis, it was decided to limit the textbooks to 20 published in the time period 1947-1950.9

To estimate the feasibility of a content analysis of these textbooks, an exploratory survey of the 20 books was made. The selective principle in making extracts was neither exhaustive of value-judgment material in the books nor was it exclusive of other items of potential interest to the investigator in his summary of the volumes.10

Preliminary to and during the exploratory survey mentioned above, the literature in English on values in sociology and social science was thoroughly surveyed and extracted.11 On the basis of these readings12 the following areas for concentrated analysis were selected for a more precise survey of the American introductory sociology textbooks:

9Cf. Appendix I (a).

10The following information was sought from each textbook: central viewpoint of the author or authors, principle for organization of textbook material, basic assumptions and objectives, concept of value and value judgments, author's estimated of sociological methods, a rough sampling of value statements to determine availability of data for the projected research.

The typed extracts from the 20 textbooks were coded separately and sorted into categories which grew out of the items themselves. These empirically derived categories, totalling 86, were scrutinized for similarities and relationships; and as a result were grouped under 13 main headings, such as social problems, philosophical positions, methods of study, etc. Cf. Appendix I (b).


12Cf. Appendix I (c).
Basic Assumptions and Values. This includes the concept of science, its relation to non-science, assumptions (epistemological, ontological, psychological, etc.), objectives, and system of values.

Sociology as a Science. This includes the concept of sociology, nature of social reality, and methods of studying social data.

Social Organization and Progress in General.

Social Institution Selected for Special Analysis: Religion and the Church.

The reasons for selecting the above areas of concentration are as follows:

Basic assumptions and values. Exploration of this area, as represented especially in the introductory chapters or prefaces of the textbooks, provides a picture of the general intellectual orientation of the writer and the underlying convictions with which he approaches the study of sociology.

Sociology as a science. The many and varied discussions in current sociological literature on the scientific nature of sociology, the character of social phenomena, the relative merits of particular methods of studying social life, all suggest the fruitfulness of investigation of value judgments in this area.

Social organization and progress. The examination of the textbooks in these areas yields value judgments indicative
of the preference of the sociologists flowing from (or interpretative of) their study of society.

Religion and the Church. Since it was not possible to analyze in detail every social institution covered by the textbooks, the institution of religion and the church was selected for special analysis. First of all, the specialized training of the analyst in both theology and sociology provides an interest and intellectual orientation sympathetic to the aims of both disciplines. Furthermore, the preoccupation of both religion and sociology with the social life of man, and their frequent lack of unanimity in analysis of it, recommend an investigation into the value judgments involved in the treatment of this social institution. 13

After the determination of the four above-described areas of concentration, the next step was to arrive at a principle for selection of passages in these areas which would fairly represent the positions of the authors, and a procedure which could be applied by other analysts desirous of verifying such a study, or of applying the method to other material. A list of key words most frequently found

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in each area was sought; then, in accordance with the techniques of content analysis, all statements containing these key words were extracted from the textbooks. These statements constitute the rough sociological data for value-judgment analysis. By a somewhat detailed procedure the following words, their synonyms and related adjectival and adverbial forms, were designated for the respective areas of analysis:

**Basic Assumptions and Values:** "science," "assumption," "value (personal)," "man," "evolution," author's imperatives expressed in words like "must," "ought," "it is necessary, essential."

**Sociology as a Science:** "sociology," "social science," "methods of sociology," "social reality, phenomena," author's "major idea, fundamental notion, basic principle," "basic (sociological) concepts."

**Social Organization and Progress (social)** "order," "organization," "progress," "value," "norm," "equilibrium."

**Religion and the Church:** "religion," "church," "supernaturalism," "God."

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The Technique of Content Analysis and Its Application to the Data

As defined by Bernard Berelson, content analysis is "... a research technique for the objective, systematic, 

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\(^{14}\)Cf. Appendix I (d).
and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. Berelson notes three general assumptions in content analysis: first, that inferences about the relationship between intent and content or between content and effect can validly be made, or the actual relationships established; second, that study of the manifest content is meaningful, an assumption which requires that the content be accepted as a common meeting-ground for the communicator, the audience, and the analyst; third, that the quantitative description of communication content is meaningful.\(^1\)

While the exploratory survey of the 20 introductory sociology textbooks revealed a wealth of material for content analysis, the study of Berelson's work indicated the need of a choice with regard to the data to be analyzed and the intensity of the analysis.

It seemed that with material such as introductory sociology textbooks, the major unit of analysis would be the "theme," that is, the main idea in a group of words or closely related sentences. Employing Berelson's distinction between the "recording unit" and the "context unit," acceptance of the paragraph as the context unit and the sentence as the recording unit would have been the easier method of content

\(^{15}\)Bernard Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), p. 18.

\(^{16}\)Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 18-20, 133-134.
analysis. However, since the broader units might do violence to the texts, make verification more difficult, and facilitate the introduction of biases, it seemed more in the interest of scientific research to consider the sentence as the context unit and the word as the recording unit. The first analytical tool thus was a word list (indicated above) derived from the exploratory survey and paradigm.

Since the application of the word lists line by line for each of the books would yield a more thorough understanding of the data, it was decided, in order to keep the project within practicable limits, to reduce the number of textbooks to be surveyed in such detail. Three criteria operated in making this decision: (a) adequacy of analysis; (b) representativeness of the textbooks and authors for American introductory sociology; (c) the time factor. When various criteria for selecting fewer textbooks (circulation figures, adoptions, teacher ratings, successive editions, author's prestige) singly yielded no definite basis for selection, five textbooks were chosen by one or more of these criteria as fairly representative of the more widely used American introductory sociology textbooks published between 1947-1950. These five textbooks were surveyed, page by page, according to the area-and-word-list procedure described above, yielding extracts totalling 557 single-spaced typewritten pages. The five textbooks, all of which

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17Cf. Appendix I (e).

The typewritten extracts from these five textbooks were then prepared for categorization and cut up into separate numbered and labeled items.\(^{19}\) The total of 4070 items were broken down into value-judgment and non-value-judgment categories according to the working definitions of "value" and "value judgment" described in the following section of this chapter. After some experimentation with classifying the value-judgment items, eight general categories descriptive of the contents of the value judgments were derived and

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\(^{19}\) Cf. Appendix I (f).
found adequate. These categories, grouped in relation to the sciences and the focus of this research, are as follows:

Concerning science in general
1) "Science"

Concerning sociology proper
2) "Sociology" (methods, importance, organization of, etc.)
3) "Society" (social organization, particular social institutions, etc.)

Concerning other social sciences
4) "Social Science" (history, anthropology, education, political science, etc.)

Concerning disciplines specially related to sociology
5) "Psychology" (social psychology, personality, man, learning, etc.)
6) "Philosophy" (epistemology, metaphysics, etc.)

Concerning special aspects of this research
7) "Value" (author's values, social values, progress, ethnocentrism, etc.)
8) "Religion" (churches, theology, supernaturalism, etc.)

The value-judgment items of each author were then separated into one of the eight content categories.

The next phase of the analysis was to examine systematically each of the content categories of each author to determine precisely the value-judgment element of the items; and then to classify the elements thus isolated.

\[20\text{Cf. Appendix I (g). The item, typed directly from the textbook, often comprised several sentences or a whole paragraph in order that the value judgment might better be seen in context. By a subsequent operation, described below, the core value judgments were isolated and recorded on work sheets.}

\[21\text{For a fuller description of items contained in these categories cf. Appendix I, (h).}

\[22\text{Cf. Appendix I (i).} \]
according to one or several of the ten types of value judgments which will be explained in the following section.\textsuperscript{23}

**Working Definitions of "Value" and "Value Judgment." Types of Value Judgments**

The search for working definitions of "value" and "value judgment" constituted a coordinated phase of this research. An acceptable definition of "value judgment," it was thought, should be broad enough to disclose, within a sociological frame of reference, the more significant evaluations, explicit and implicit, of the authors of the textbooks under study; and to permit of a critique of these evaluations in terms of the canons of science in general and of the philosophy of value.

Two possible criteria are suggested by the first of these objectives: the definition of value judgment should be derived, at least in part, from the actual usage of the words "value" and "value judgment" in the sociology textbooks themselves; the definition of value judgment should be phrased in terminology related to the usage of the word, not only by authors of introductory sociology textbooks, but also by sociologists who have specially concerned themselves with the problem of values in sociology.

The second objective, i.e., a critique of these evaluations in terms of the canons of science and of the philosophy of value, suggests additional criteria: the

\textsuperscript{23}For details, see Appendix I (j).
definition of value judgment should be phrased in terms which would allow an adequate distinction of types of evaluations amenable to scientific classification; the determination of types of value judgments should be accomplished through specified techniques, e.g., value-laden words, numerical or spatial or logical emphasis; and since the research involves also interpretation of the data, the definition should lend itself to analysis in terms of the value theory of representative schools of thought impinging upon contemporary sociology.

In order to satisfy these criteria, the following steps were undertaken: a survey of the usage of the words "value" and "value judgment" in the five introductory sociology textbooks selected, and an analysis of definitions of these terms of some social and axiological theorists, American and European. From these investigations the following definition was concluded to be sufficiently representative of any consensus found among the various schools of thought and suitable for an analytical tool in this research:

A value judgment is the expression of an attitude of desire, interest, or preference. For purposes of content analysis, the attitude must be expressed symbolically, either by word or other visual aids.

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24 Cf. Appendix I (k).

25 Cf. Appendix I (l).
Continuing the procedure of approaching the major stages of the research from both an empirical and a theoretical point of view, an examination of the introductory textbooks themselves and the writings of social and axiological theorists led to the designation of ten types (subdivisions) of value judgments. Attitudes of desire, interest, or preference were found to be expressed symbolically in a literary medium in at least the following ways:

1) by words connotative of desire (e.g., "should," "wish"), interest (e.g., "interesting," "significant"), or preference (e.g., "better," "more," "useful");

2) by juxtaposition of items in a word array which cumulatively constitutes a classification with value implications;

3) by designation of an idea, theory, assumption, or hypothesis as "acceptable," "plausible," "worthwhile," and the like, or the negative forms of the same; or by the statement of a premise or assumption or hypothesis which, judging from the context, is apparently accepted or rejected without evidence by the author, even though no explicit evaluative words are attached;

4) by focusing on particular aspects of a problem without indicating the limitations as well as the benefits of such procedure;

5) by deriving a generalization from data without stating conditions under which the relationships hold and the universe to which they apply;

6) by selection of references or citation of authorities which are not adequate representatives of the literature or major viewpoints relating to the problem at hand, at least when it is to be presumed that literature representing variant or more tenable viewpoints is available for the asking;

\[26\text{Cf. Appendix I (m) regarding principles for derivation of these types.}\]
7) by the order of treatment of topics, and the space assigned to each, on the assumption that topics given first place or more detailed treatment are more important in some way;

8) by the espousal of particular goals or values expressed explicitly or inferentially by the author;

9) by the creation of dichotomies and antitheses which carry value implications or undertones;

10) by the definition of a concept or area or a problem about which there is not evident consensus in scientific sociology.

The data obtained through extracts from the books were, as explained above, separated and classified according to the above definition and types of value judgment.

**Analyst's Postulates and Sociological Principles Affecting Selection and Interpretation of Data**

In view of the role of implicit and hidden, as well as explicitly stated assumptions and postulates in the composition of a literary product, the communication of scientific ideas demands that the stipulations under which an investigation proceeds be expressed as explicitly as possible. Sociology, due to the very complexity and extensiveness of its data, is especially subject to the influence of postulated or assumed principles—psychological, epistemological, ethical, and otherwise. Since this investigation of the value judgments in introductory sociology textbooks focuses upon the implicit as well as the explicit assumptions and postulates, it is fitting that the analyst make clear his intellectual principles as they impinge upon the
selection and interpretation of the data. These principles are capable of explication and documentation did space but permit the exposition of each. The following principles and postulates represent the stipulations in light of which this value-judgment research proceeds.

Science and value.- This writer holds that science, insofar as it attains to the real reason for things, is certain and evident knowledge derived through demonstration. It is knowledge obtained from sense data through the process of the abstractive powers of the intellect. Insofar as verified observations of phenomena achieve a high degree of universality and probability, generalizations based on such observations may be called science in a less strict and more dialectic, opinionative sense.

Science as systematized knowledge is not opposed to common sense, understood as the experiential knowledge of reasonable men. However, insofar as science employs special instruments of observation and tests more rigorously the processes of concept derivation, judgment and reasoning, its findings are more refined and more certain.

Values are not purely subjective, emotive states or attitudes. For this reason, they are amenable to scientific scrutiny. A usable concept of value involves consideration of the objective referents (goods) for the subjective attitudes.

Sociology and the social sciences.- This writer maintains that sociology is a cultural science rather than a natural science, such as biology or physics. Its methodology is such as will adequately attain the formal object of the science, namely the interrelationships of men and social groups. It is an autonomous science, yet dependent on other sciences for principles dealing with reality beyond its purview.

The aim of sociology is the understanding, not necessarily the prediction, of social reality. The goal of sociologists, qua sociologists, is the understanding rather than the control of society, and the communication of this knowledge to others.

Man the social animal.- This writer maintains that the application of biological evolution to the origin and
growth of social institutions and the doctrine of progress, as in unilinear social evolution, is academically hazardous in light of known historical facts. Multilinear social evolution has a more substantial foundation in history and social science.

Human knowledge is different in kind as well as degree from the knowledge attained by the lower animals.

Man possesses the power of freedom which, under certain circumstances, enables him to act or not to act (freedom of exercise), to choose this or that (freedom of specification). Constitutional and situational factors affect but do not strictly necessitate certain forms of human behavior.

Society and man.- This writer holds that personality, defined as the complex of qualities of the individual, is acquired through the individuating principle which is the psyche. While social life makes the individual aware of his personality and influences its growth, society does not confer personality as such. Normality of personality is related basically to the satisfaction of the needs of the human composite, not to the degree of conformity to the group.

The natural moral law, as the inner direction of rational beings toward adequate goals and values, is expressed in a variety of precepts. The more remote these precepts are from the primary and universal precept "Do good
and avoid evil," i.e., the more they involve the exercise of reason upon complex matters, the greater the divergencies among peoples of various cultural levels. There can be cultural variability without moral relativism as an axiological principle. Moral relativism neglects consideration of the stability and universality of primary and secondary moral precepts. (By secondary precepts are understood naturally known moral truths such as are summarized in the Decalogue.)

**Goal of society.** - This writer maintains that social progress consists in the realization of the common good or social order most conducive to the development and happiness of the individuals comprising the society. Social progress is not inexorable, nor does history disclose a steady and progressive unilinear social evolution. Any scientific explanation of social change and social control in terms of progress requires an explicit formulation of the goal or value system proposed as the criterion of interpretation.

**Social institutions.** - This writer holds that the fundamental goal of social institutions such as the family, education, government, economic organization and religion is the happiness of their respective members, not the welfare of the group or institution as such.

To the extent that democratic liberalism facilitates the attainment of the above goal, it is a worthy social ideal.
Supernatural religion, based upon revealed truths supported by historical referents, is not based on myth or feeling. Supernatural faith is not opposed to reason; it supplements it. Nor does divine grace suppress or destroy human and social nature; it perfects it.

While at first sight the above listed postulates and principles may seem to represent a variety of viewpoints, they may be reduced to a basic approach to reality. This approach to reality, as will be seen in the critique (in Chapter III) of the central attitudes discovered in the textbooks, is at variance with some of the prevailing assumptions of the textbook authors under study.

Briefly stated, a fundamental unity of approach to reality may be represented as three points on a continuum which includes the knower, the knowing process, and the objects known and sought. Any appreciable variation in one of these will, following the strain toward consistency, affect the others. It is difficult to determine, in analyzing particular frames of reference, which factor initiates the change in the others. The analyst submits, a hypothesis, that in the analysis of an academic discipline (such as sociology), the concept of the knowing process (the epistemological aspect) is central. The concept of the knowing process is, of course, conditioned by the concept of the knower (the psychological aspect); yet the
concept of the knowing process more immediately affects the objects known and sought (content of the science). If this be true, then different approaches to social reality may well originate in epistemological differences. The critique in Chapter III will explore some aspects of this problem.

The cause of scientific sociology and its communication will be advanced when the elements of the frames of reference of the textbook writers, the analyst—and the readers—are taken out of the realm of assumptions and singly investigated. That task, involving an inquiry into the historical, religious, philosophical, epistemological, psychological, sociological and ethical assumptions of textbook writers and analysts, can only be introduced in a project of this sort.

The history of social thought records many and varied attempts by men to understand society and social order, predicated on frames of reference ranging from a simplistic monism to exaggerated dualism which separates aspects of reality when it should only distinguish them. Neither extreme, it seems, does full justice to the understanding of the individual and society. The need seems to be for an epistemology which adequately accounts for the universal idea and the particular instance, the substance and the phenomena of things; a psychology which gives due weight to the individual and the group, the freedom and the determinations of human behavior; an ethics which reckons with the
whole man, his uniqueness and his social solidarity, his capacity for happiness through both material and spiritual goods. Aided by such disciplines sociology can chart a course avoiding extreme monism and dualism, giving due place to the one and the many, freedom and control, the universal and the particular, change and stability, material and non-material culture.

Orientation of This Research Within the Field of the Sociology of Knowledge and Intellectual Behavior

A content analysis of sociology textbooks from the viewpoint of one specializing in this field might be termed, as was suggested before, an exercise in the sociology of sociology.

As in the general field of the sociology of knowledge or intellectual behavior, the sociology of sociology also employs the distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic interpretation of intellectual products.28 Research in the sociology of sociology must begin with an intrinsic analysis of the data—in the present case, letting sociology speak

28 This distinction has been suggested by Karl Mannheim. The interpretation is intrinsic in the sense that the ideas to be interpreted are sought to be understood and interpreted "from within"; the interpreter participates in the ideology of the thinker whom he interprets. Extrinsic interpretations of an intellectual product are characterized by the fact that they evaluate intellectual phenomena on the basis of sociocultural influences, posited outside the range of its intrinsic meanings. (Cf. Mannheim, op. cit., pp. 264-296; Kurt H. Wolff, The Sociology of Intellectual Behavior (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1947), p. 74. (Mimeographed)
for itself through sociologists who write leading sociology textbooks. The elements of this phase of intrinsic understanding are attained through the content analysis procedures described in this Chapter and the data reported in Chapter II.

A further step in intrinsic interpretation is taken when the value-judgment material attained through the content analysis is reduced to ten central attitudes. These central attitudes are then criticized in light of the principles of sociology and related sciences (Chapter III).

With these two steps taken, namely the content analysis and the critique of the central attitudes, the introductory textbook material is readied for extrinsic analysis in terms of sociocultural influences presumed to affect the authors of the textbooks. In Chapter IV some ways in which such an analysis might proceed are indicated. It is hoped that the data acquired through the content analysis and the critique of the central attitudes have made available more precisely formulated materials and critical tools upon which a realistic and fruitful extrinsic analysis of these intellectual products might be based.
CHAPTER II
PRESENTATION OF VALUE-JUDGMENT DATA DERIVED FROM SELECTED
INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY TEXTBOOKS, 1947-1950

Introduction.- The extracts (557 typewritten single-spaced pages) drawn from the five introductory sociology textbooks were broken down in separate items, coded according to author and area. These items, totalling 4070, were separated into non-value-judgment and value-judgment items according to the definition of value judgment explained in the preceding chapter. Each of the value-judgment items was then classified into one of the eight content categories, namely Philosophy, Science, Social Science, Sociology, Psychology, Values, Society, Religion, and then according to the ten types of value judgments. (These categories and types were explained in the preceding chapter.) The limitations of space prevent a reproduction of all or even a major part of the value judgments thus derived. It has been deemed sufficient to indicate briefly the approximate rank order of items according to content categories and types of value judgments for the whole body of readings, and then to introduce samples in each of the eight content categories according to the types. These breakdowns will provide an outline of the material found in the textbooks, and thus an
awareness which is sufficient to render intelligible the central attitudes subsequently derived from the value-judgment material.

**Rank Order of Items According to Content Categories and Types of Value Judgments for the Total Body of Readings (Five Textbooks)**

**Rank Order according to Content Categories for Five Textbooks**

The order ranges from the category of "Philosophy" with the lowest frequency to the category of "Society" with the highest frequency. In decreasing order of frequency, the items arranged by content categories are as follows:

1) Society (social organization, culture, social change, particular social institutions, etc.)
2) Values (value and progress, author's personal values, ideologies, etc.)
3) Religion (religion, the supernatural, theology, particular religions or churches, etc.)
4) Sociology (methods, fields, goals, concepts, etc.)
5) Psychology (personality, human nature, learning, evolution, etc.)
6) Science (science and non-science, faith and reason, epistemological assumptions, etc.)
7) Social Science (particular social sciences and postulates, etc.)
8) Philosophy (metaphysics, logic, cosmology, etc.)
Insofar as the content categories are somewhat broad, the rank order presents a limited picture of the incidence of value judgments in the textbooks. A more adequate realization can be obtained by checking with the full descriptions of each category in Appendix I (g).

Rank Order According to Types of Value Judgments for Five Textbooks

The approximate rank order of the items in decreasing order of frequency is as follows:

1) Type Three (acceptance or rejection of idea, theory, or assumption)

2) Type Five (generalization without appropriate qualification)

3) Type One (words connotative of desire, interest or preference)

4) Type Ten (definitions)

5) Type Nine (dichotomies and antitheses with value implications)

6) Type Four (focus on particular aspects of problem)

7) Type Eight (espousal of particular goals or values)

8) Type Six (limited references or authorities)

9) Type Two (juxtaposition of items with value implications)

10) Type Seven (order and space given to topics)
Thus, the greatest frequencies occur in the types dealing with assumptions or theories and generalizations (Types Three and Five) and the type involving the use of value-laden words (Type One). This is to be expected in textbooks for beginners. What is of greater moment than the frequency of these types, however, is the scientific tenability of presenting assumptions and hypotheses as affirmative statements and proven principles. This problem will be dealt with in the critique of the central attitudes in Chapter III. With regard to the generalizations which have been selected as having value implications (Type Five), it was not expected that the authors qualify in detail every statement they made. Items indicated as falling into this category were statements which could easily have been qualified by the addition of a quantifying adjective like "some," "frequent," or "many," or qualifying adjectives or brief phrases which would have insured more accurate as well as brief communication of ideas. The tendency to reify ideologies and institutions such as "democracy," "education," and "religion," without specifying a sociologically discernible referent, accounted for many items in this category.

**Samples of Value Judgments in Eight Content Categories**

**Introductory note.** - In adducing samples of the value judgments discerned in the textbooks, the analyst has selected relatively few from each content category; and
these are such as are more likely to secure consensus among a variety of readers. More subtle, and perhaps more fundamental, value positions cannot be reported verbatim because of limitations of space.

The citation of an author as presenting a value judgment is not to be interpreted as indicating approval or disapproval. The analyst makes no assumption that textbook writing should be value-free. The significance of the item cited is directly related to the working definition of value judgment and the types of value judgments explained in Chapter I. Where the value-judgment element is not evident from the context, it will then be necessary to weigh the item in relation to the principles and postulates laid down by the analyst as stipulations of this research. Moreover, commonly accepted judgments of fact may often be found to be really judgments of opinion, which opinion, in face of evidence to the contrary, may well be swayed by a judgment of value. The significance of any one value-judgment item can, of course, be better estimated by a reading of the complete textbook and the total data secured through the content-analysis procedures employed in this research.

The material will be presented according to each of the content categories in rank order, with some types of
value judgments indicated. From these illustrations an idea of the value positions reflected in the categories can be gleaned.

**Content Category "Society"**

(Theories and estimate of social organization, culture, cultural variability, social classes, social change, social order, socialization, particular social institutions, etc.)

**Type One** (words connotative of desire, interest or preference)

But above all, social organization means greater efficiency in achievement over unorganized collective action and over what a lone individual can do by himself. (O & N - 368)

We anticipate that better instruments of measurement will be developed as sociological research improves. (Y - 347)

**Type Two** (juxtaposition of items with value implications)

There are those, of course, who view such conditions [regarding marriage] in terms of prejudice patterns such as one's "duty" to marry or his "obligation" to have children or of the "sinfulness" of artificial control of the timing and number of children. (C - 526)

**Type Three** (acceptance or rejection of idea, theory or assumption)

It appears that with the passing of time, more and more rational control is entering into social organization. (C - 513)

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1In the interests of space, the descriptions of the types of value judgments will be abbreviated. (The fuller statement of each is contained in Chapter I.) References to particular textbooks will include textbook author's or authors' initial and the number of the page where the item occurs, viz., B - Bogardus, C - Cuber, O & N - Ogburn and Nimkoff, S & W - Sutherland and Woodward, Y - Young. All the items listed under "Types" are direct quotations. Italics are as in the original textbooks.
Morals that will carry through changing conditions must of necessity be very general, such as "the greatest good to the greatest number," a maxim too general in fact to be of any help to a non-intellectual person. (O & N - 557)

We assume that the socialization of the child and adolescent will determine his adult personality. (Y - 56)

Type Four (focus on particular aspects of problem)

We have also discussed the fundamental paradox inherent in the nature of both culture and society—the illusion of stability and the fact of constant change. (C - 61)

Type Five (generalization without appropriate qualification)

A bureaucratic organization makes the individual an automaton, while an industrial type makes him a slave to the day's tasks. (B - 123)

Social organization, through socialization, creates the person's social needs and wants. (C - 515)

The social heritage . . . has grown more in the last few hundred years than in all the long stretches of tens of thousands of years before. (O & N - 29)

Type Seven (order and space given to topics)

The reason [for placing the chapter on disorganization in the section on social change] is the thesis of this chapter: that social disorganization is caused by rapid and extensive change. (O & N - 555)

Type Eight (espousal of particular goals or values)

Eugenic knowledge plus a mutually thoughtful decision by all the parties concerned is a goal beneficial to the race but not easily obtained. (B - 70)

Which, then, democracy or dictatorship, looks better to the sociologist? The highly centralized pattern seems at first glance to have the advantage . . . but there are important considerations
that weigh against it and in favor of some partly
decentralized democracy. (S & W - 824)

**Type Nine** (dichotomies and antitheses with value implications)

Rural life reflects in a larger measure the life-giving and health-restoring advantages of outdoor existence. The city tears down nerves and wears people out, while giving them superior opportunities in countless directions. (B - 147)

A stationary society is one where there is no notion of progress or of reform . . . . In a stationary society, the hopes of humanity center around such interests as marriage and children, a good food supply, and a heavenly abode after death, rather than around improving living conditions here and now. (O & N - 556)

. . . the two most significant cultural systems today are the authoritarian, totalistic on the one side and the democratic, individualistic on the other. (Y - 49)

**Type Ten** (definitions)

A socialized group would be one acting on the basis of rational sympathy in behalf of the common welfare. (B - 10)

. . . social organization results from both the symbiotic needs and the common values which the person learns through socialization . . . (C - 507)

This splitting of a society into conflicting units is the essence of the process of disorganization. (S & W - 759)

**Content Category "Values"**

(Definitions of value and progress, author's personal values, social planning, ideologies, norms and motives, etc.)

**Type One** (words connotative of desire, interest or preference)

Urban society is notorious for its haughtiness, its cocksureness, its night life, its wastefulness, and its uselessness. (B - 137)
It would seem that the best prospect for eugenics in the near future is the denial of offspring to persons obviously carrying certain defective genes. (O & N - 578)

Birth control is undoubtedly one of man's greatest inventions. . . . (S & W - 721-722)

**Type Three** (acceptance or rejection of idea, theory or assumption)

Once a person accepts a value, he becomes somewhat biased or prejudiced thereby. (C - 21)

The scientist seeks scientific truth because he accepts, on faith and faith alone, that out of the quest for accurate knowledge will eventually come some good for human kind. (C - 21)

Since values are personal and subjective, we cannot well have an objective ranking of cultures. (O & N - 522)

The doctrine of progress assumes the advancement from a lowly state to a higher one, not a return to a previous state of perfection. (Y - 578)

**Type Four** (focus on particular aspects of problem)

Economic needs and activities are fundamental in society. . . . The pursuit of a liberal education in our colleges sometimes obscures the great importance of economic activities. (O & N - 370)

**Type Five** (generalization without appropriate qualification)

. . . this American standard of living . . . is so highly valued in fact, that it supersedes another value, also highly held, namely, that of early and more frequent parenthood. (C - 312)

Practically, a group of people, like a single person, can make choices and exercise will power. (O & N - 588)

The whole development of education, propaganda, advertising, and other social methods runs counter to the "Thou-shalt-not" devices of punitive justice. . . . They make unnecessary the fear of wrong-doing. . . . (Y - 546)
Type Six (limited references or authorities)

However, one of the most insightful and long-accepted listings [of motives] in sociology was that of W. I. Thomas . . . (Y - 103)

Type Eight (espousal of particular goals or values)

After all, the socialization of human attitudes is the highest goal. (B - 210)

In summary, then, the method of science disavows values and seeks to eliminate them, but the eventual goal of science is itself a value, the faith in the ultimate good of knowing the truth. (C - 21)

Today we accomplish through organization. If a young person wants to do something for the world or for himself, he would do well--despite Thoreau--to join organizations and operate through them. (O & N - 358)

. . . there is work for . . . sociologists, and others . . . to enlighten the common man as well as the leaders . . . toward world organization for peace. (Y - 450)

Type Nine (dichotomies and antitheses with value implications)

. . . compare the loose family life of the best peoples among primitive tribes with the developed forms of love and affection that now characterize family life at its best. (B - 45)

Moral relativism means the recognition that there are many different moral-ethical-religious-political systems, each of which has its own logic and justification, none representing a corner on the whole or sole "truth." It is easy for the liberally educated person to become a moral relativist. . . to lose at least some of his cruder ethnocentrism. (C - 471)

In contrast to the patterns of authoritarianism as they set the stage for education under dictatorship are those traditionally associated with democracy. (Y - 352)
Type Ten (definitions)

An attitude and a value are parts of the same process. The person or object toward which one has an attitude is a value. (B - 24)

... certain ideas ... are called "values." These ideas contain or express the prevailing estimates which people have of the relative worth of things. (C - 20)

A value is any object or objective which a person or group considers desirable and strives to obtain or preserve, or considers undesirable and strives to avoid or destroy. (S & W - 646)

Content Category "Religion"

(Concepts of religion, the supernatural, theology; attitudes toward religion in general and particular religions and churches, etc.)

Type One (words connotative of desire, interest or preference)

A religion that leaves a person satisfied with saving his own soul is socially obstructive... (B - 301)

The informed leadership of churches is aware of this change [from supernatural explanations to acceptance of scientific findings] and has attempted to retain the allegiance of members by deemphasizing supernaturalism. (C - 493)

Unfortunately, religious faith is generally coupled with a specific creed, and the shattering of the latter by new knowledge means for many persons the shattering of their faith as well. (O & N - 453)

The church remains one of the oldest and most important of the integrating forces in the community. (Y - 261)

Type Two (juxtaposition of items with value implications)

Man ... creates a sort of "surplus of adaptation" through his social heritage and then ... he
proceeds to spend the surplus on cultural gewgaws and folderol that provide an exercise for his creative faculties. It is these same gewgaws—arts, ceremonies, etiquettes, religions, class distinctions, secret societies—that make man most truly human and of which he is likely to be most proud. (S & W - 79)

The psychological components of play, esthetic experience, and religion have much in common. They combine fantasy, logic, and motor reactions in orderly and meaningful ways. (Y - 401)

Type Three (acceptance or rejection of idea, theory, or assumption)

Out of the early emphasis upon the family group came two universal principles of the Jewish and Christian religions. The role of patriarchal father seems to have suggested the concept of the Fatherhood of God. The social responsibility developed within the Hebrew family is the apparent antecedent of the ideal of brotherhood of man. (B - 62)

If, for example, one's religion is the "only true religion revealed to man by God," then there is not only no good reason to consider another religion, but every reason to shun and ridicule the others. (C - 92)

But religion is not all feeling. It seeks answers. The answer to primitive hunters was . . . sometimes called mana. In the course of time this force evolved into more definite spiritual beings or into one deity or supreme force. (O & N - 438)

The biblical story can now be taken for what it is, the work of the creative imagination of a gifted but prescientific people . . . (S & W - 44)

Thus, the Christian ideal tolerates sex relations for procreation but not for pleasure. (Y - 329)

Type Four (focus on particular aspects of problem)

All that a person needs to do is to live in communion with man and God on a socially responsible level. (B - 296)
Contemporary religion presents a comparable [to economic disorganization] panorama of change and confusion. (C - 522)

The general principle regarding social organization which obviously derives from our study of the church . . . is that institutions which originated in one situation when confronted by ecological and cultural changes either remain static and gradually lose status or try to maintain their status by making adjustments in their organization. (S & W - 549)

As a concrete experience, moreover, religion is accompanied by emotions, especially of fear, awe or reverence. (Y - 371)

Religion has frequently been a powerful factor in lending emotional support to the moral code. (Y-376)

Type Five (generalization without appropriate qualification)

The churches are beginning to recognize that wholesome play activities are normal. (B-241)

It has been one of the weaknesses of religion that it moves persons as individuals, but does not affect their behavior vitally in their group or social relationships. (B-301)

Organized religion frequently strives in one way or another to rationalize its pre-scientific conceptions, because only by so doing can it retain its prestige and its reputation for being correct. (C-486)

Type Six (limited references or authorities)

As Paris [E. Paris, The Nature of Human Nature] points out . . . there can be no compromise on religious fundamentals. (O & N-182)

Durkheim argues that the group can make any object sacred. For this reason religion is said to be essentially social. (O & N-440)

. . . history is full of conflicts of church and theology with scientific findings. [Footnote reference: "The Classic study is Andrew D. White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom. . ., X, 1896." (Y-382)
Type Eight (espousal of particular goals or values)

Only in these two principles ["brotherhood of man" and "Fatherhood of God"] when integrated can a person realize his complete emergence; nothing less is satisfactory to the whole person. (B-297)

There are those who feel that we can get along without religion. But they reckon not with the value of religious experience. (G & N-453)

Certainly without faith man cannot carry on, and it is doubtful indeed if mankind will dispense with some form of religion. (Y-383)

Type Nine (dichotomies and antitheses with value implications)

Think of the animistic superstitions of early man in connection with the highly rational and broadly social interpretations of the finest current religious life. (B-46)

The rise of science and the increasing average level of education have no doubt been important factors in forcing churches to moderate their more extreme supernaturalistic dogmas and doctrines. (C-496)

Science also [as "religion"] works with the unknown, but in a methodical, objective manner . . . (G & N-438)

There is no doubt that education and practical technology have served to alter many of man's views about God, sin, immortality, and other features of traditional theology. (Y-382)

Type Ten (definitions)

Religion is a pattern of behavior made up of (a) sacred beliefs, (b) emotional feelings accompanying the beliefs, and (c) overt conduct presumably implementing the beliefs and feelings. C-485)

. . . Although the word liberal is a term of varied meaning, it tends to mean (when applied to religion) that supernaturalism is being deemphasized in favor of some other program and teaching. (C-493)
While ... it is possible to define religion as an emotional reaction to the mysterious or to a belief in a higher power, it is well to supplement such a definition with the idea that organized religion may be a complex of functions relating to many aspects of social life. (O & N-441)

In other words, the folkways of belief and ritual concerned with (1) supernatural force, (2) the feelings its effects inspire in man, and (3) man's efforts to direct it into socially and individually beneficial channels may be said to be religious. (S & W-141)

For the present it seems preferable to keep the definition of religion within the narrower limits of an emotional, worshipful, or reverent reaction to supernatural powers. (Y-385)

Content Category "Sociology"

(Concept of sociology, methods, fields, goals, order, concepts, data, emphases, etc.)

Type One (words connotative of desire, interest or preference)

The stockpile of sociology, of which this book is an indication, may even at the present time be viewed with pride. (O & N-10)

Better, it seems, to present quantitative data in verbal form. . . . (C-xiv)

The changing personality . . . is considered to be the central dynamic core of sociology. (B-viii)

Type Two (juxtaposition of items with value implications)

Students . . . are luckier than they know in being presented with the stock of knowledge we now have in sociology rather than with a pile of speculation, hodge-podge theories, and old wives' tales. (O & N-10)
Type Three (acceptance or rejection of idea, theory or assumption)

For the sociologist normal men and women everywhere deal with each other chiefly in terms of group membership. (Y-1)

... Social processes are neither good or bad, only natural. It is natural for men to work hand-in-hand, and it is also natural for man's hand to be turned against his brother. (O & N-167)

The behavior patterns of the culture determine both the behavior and the organization of the persons of the society ... (C-60,61)

... The measure of sociology depends upon how far sociology can predict human behavior under given conditions. (B-572)

Type Four (focus on particular aspects of problem)

There is one fundamental attribute of culture: the fact of unending change. (C-55)

The major emphases [in the whole book] are on three variables: groups, processes and institutions. (Y-v)

This [the concept of adjustment] is a key idea in the structure of the book ... (O & N-587-588)

Type Five (generalization without appropriate qualification)

Most sociologists ... hopeful ... they will be able to travel further along the natural-scientific road. (S & W-8)

... The preponderant evidence would seem to indicate that sociology does qualify as scientific ... (C-18)

Sociology is amoral. ... Amoral means simply that the matter in question is outside the scope or realm of morals or is perhaps not concerned with morals. (C-11)

The mores can make something right at one time and wrong at another. (O & N-55)
As a scientific discipline sociology is too new to have developed a compact and closely woven body of facts and generalizations or laws . . . (Y-1)

**Type Six** (limited references or authorities)

Sumner's analysis of the content of culture . . . has become one of the accepted sociological classics. (S & W-24)

Since [W.I.] Thomas' classification has elements of fundamental worth it may be kept . . . (B-20)

**Type Seven** (order and space given to topics)

We suggest . . . that each teacher adapt this book to the particular pattern of his college. The device for doing this is the omission of chapters . . . some can be omitted without impairing the understanding of others. (O & N-vi)

This book is so organized . . . that the instructor may open the course with the approach to the field which he considers the most closely related to the interests of his own students and most logically related to the other subjects which they have studied. . . . (S & W-xi)

**Type Eight** (espousal of particular goals or values)

Sociology gives to troubled persons as effective a key to the problems of personal and associative life as has yet been made. (B-571)

. . . to restore to the individual the "sense of inner satisfaction" and feeling of "spiritual mastery". . . . will continue to be a major emphasis in any sociologist's program for social reform. (S & W-81)

Perhaps the effectiveness of his [the students'] citizenship will be his ultimate "grade" in the course. (C-579)

The sociologist turns to the biologist to learn how man has evolved from the anthropoids and whether he may evolve still further into a superman. The society of such super-men would, the sociologists hope, be better than our present society. (O & N-60)
we shall not avoid, on occasion, giving
attention to proposals for improvement . . . (Y-11)

**Type Nine** (dichotomies and antitheses with value implications)

Many students, unfortunately, approach the study of sociology too much disposed to reach "logical" conclusions instead of correct ones. (C-37)

Sociology is growing more scientific. It is moving away from metaphysics on one hand and from social reform on the other . . . (B-566)

**Type Ten** (definitions)

**Culture** is the continually changing patterns of learned behavior and the products of learned behavior . . . which are shared by and transmitted among the members of society. (C-49,50)

**Socialization** . . . this process whereby the individual in growing up acquires the values of the group, and in the course of acquiring these values develops personality. (O & N-193)

Interaction may be defined as a reciprocal contact between two or more persons. From the standpoint of behavioristic psychology it consists of interstimulation and response. (Y-59)

**Sociology** is the study of the social processes which function through social groups in the developing and maturing of personalities (B-3)

Sociology may be defined as a body of scientific knowledge about human relationships. The word relationships is a key word. (C-5)

Sociology is a systematic and orderly study of man in society, that is, of group life and of the customs, traditions, institutions, and ways of thinking and living which are linked to group life. (Y-1)
### Content Category "Psychology"

(Concepts of man, personality formation, intelligence, human nature, freedom, learning, emotions, human evolution, etc.)

**Type One** (words connotative of desire, interest or preference)

It is futile to argue whether the symbiotic ties or the cultural ties are more "important" or more "fundamental" in the maintenance of social organization. . . . Raising such an issue as this seems almost like a modern version of the trite and meaningless question whether man's "physical or mental" nature is the more important. (C-506, 507)

When an individual loses status he loses his most precious possession. (S & W-276)

. . . society or group life is older than man and his culture . . . an extremely important point. (Y-18)

**Type Two** (juxtaposition of items with value implications)

The collective results of all these searchings [regarding the beginning of man] are the tribal myths of origins . . . which recount the actions of creator-gods back when the world was young. (S & W 43, 44)

**Type Three** (acceptance or rejection of ideal theory or assumption)

When an individual is born . . . he is an inchoate mass of impulses . . . (B-12)

In turn organic evolution . . . has its most important expression in mental evolution. (B-389)

A second irrefutable fact is that basic capacity for learning is a biological trait, and the person has little control over it. Refusal to recognize facts like these is evidence of a lack of objectivity. . . (C-25)
The self does not exist at birth but arises in social experience... (0 & N-224)

Though the difference between man and ape in ability to learn may be only a matter of degree... (O & N-21)

... what the superorganic will be like 20,000 years hence, or even 2000 years hence, is staggering to contemplate. (O & N-48)

... we must emphasize that... there is no reason to believe that homo sapiens alone first developed culture. At least he must share with other human species the early steps in cultural development... (Y-172)

**Type Four** (focus on particular aspects of problem)

The stress is thus laid on conformity to the expectations and wishes of some group of associates. (S & W-276)

[Regarding man's needs, goals, etc.] The fundamental ones... have to do with sustenance, sex and protection... (Y-34)

**Type Five** (generalization without appropriate qualification)

The individual is virtually powerless to resist indoctrination as he participates in his culture. (O-105)

... feelings like shame, troubled consciences, or disgust constitute no evidence whatsoever that any given organic act is any more natural or unnatural than another. (C-170)

Indeed it might be said that we are simians but with a very large brain and the ability to talk. (O & N-60)

... Their [the scientists'] search [for real cultural origins] has been really under way for only two generations... met with bitter resistance from adherents of older accounts... (S & W-45)

**Type Six** (limited references or authorities)

One of the great contributions of Freud... personality is shaped largely during infancy and childhood... (O & N-227)
Type Eight (espousal of particular goals or values)

The effort has to be made to change him [man], or rather to get him to change himself, so that he can fulfill his present social obligations in his present environment more successfully. (S & W-281)

Type Nine (dichotomies and antitheses with value implications)

Compare ethical conduct dictated by a thousand years of custom to . . . rational processes of socialized thinking. (B-46)

. . . human beings, and not some supernatural or mystical agency, have built up culture's imposing edifice and are responsible for any alterations therein. (S & W-256)

Type Ten (definitions)

Personality is the integrated totality of an individual's reactions to his social groups. (B-15)

Conscience consists, largely, of the personalized application of what we have already termed culturally patterned behavior. (C-128)

. . . we may formally define personality as the sum total of the observed or observable characteristics of a person. (C-184)

. . . personality . . . may be defined . . . as the integration of psychological behavior in the individual, including sentiments, attitudes, ideas, habits and skills. (O & N-194)

A normal personality is one whose physiological and psychological functioning is not so inefficient and whose social behavior is not so unconventional or bizarre as to prevent social adjustment. (S & W-277, 278)

The self is that part of the human personality which has attitudes that are reflexive, that are directed toward itself as an object or value. (S & W-230)
Properly speaking, original nature means the make-up, the combination of physical and behavior traits with which the individual begins life at birth. Human nature is sometimes used as a synonym for original nature, but human nature is more correctly used to refer to those personality traits which the individual develops and acquires as a member of society which has a given culture. (Y-84)

Content Category "Science"

(Concept of science and non-science, faith and reason, methodology and goals, epistemological assumptions and postulates, etc.)

Type One (words connotative of desire, interest, or preference)

Cases are valuable—almost invaluable—for the purpose of illustration. They make theoretical points more vivid and graphic. They add interest—even drama—to the study process. (C-34)

The first edition of this book, we now know, needed sharper orientation toward fundamental concepts. The most important of these, we think, deal with science. (O & N-v)

Science and scientific method furnish the greatest protection against emotional and irrational conduct. (O & N-122)

He [the expert] occupies a position of dominance absolutely vital to the ongoing of our complex culture. . . (Y-508)

Type Two (juxtaposition of words with value implications)

Scientific data pertaining to sex and to birth prevention have made far-reaching inroads upon the belief in "the sanctity of marriage." (B-67)

And the significance of science lies in the significance of knowledge as compared with beliefs, superstitions, and misinformation. (O & N-3)
Type Three (acceptance or rejection of idea, theory, or assumption)

Scientific methods that are reliable in developing factual social theory cannot be used in establishing normative social theory. (B-557)

Knowledge . . . is dynamic and ever changing. Today's truth may be tomorrow's error. (C-14)

Science . . . is based on certain assumptions . . . . We assume, first, that items in the universe . . . show uniformities and regularities which man can discover if he searches ably enough . . . . A further assumption of science is that we learn the uniformities in the universe through observation . . . . It is the method of verification. . . . (C-16)

The only certainty is uncertainty . . . (C-56)

The purpose of science is to add to our knowledge by describing reality accurately. (O & N-7)

. . . the function of science is often to furnish the means for achieving more effectively the goals set by our values. (O & N-8)

Science tells us the real reasons for things; in popular slang, "what makes them tick." (Y-2)

While the ideal is quantification of data, in many fields, especially in much of social science, we must deal in qualitative analysis for some time to come. (Y-3)

The essence of science is prediction and control. (Y-581)

Type Four (focus on particular aspects of problem)

Science is man's most fruitful way of observing, classifying, and interpreting the world and himself. (Y-8)

Type Five (generalization without appropriate qualification)

The scientific method . . . strives to know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. (B-256)
We have not been trained to be objective. As a matter of fact, most persons are actually trained not to be objective. (C-25)

Every group with which we are affiliated indoctrinates us with prejudicial views of many things. (C-26)

Yet when we try to be scientific about our personal and social problems most of us are loath to apply the viewpoint and methods of objective study. (Y-1)

It is only science and the scientific method that have made any real dent in the "mountain of error" that is primitive supernaturalism. (S & W-159)

Type Eight (espousal of particular goals or values)

The ultimate purpose of this knowledge [scientific] is to enable us to predict for the future on the basis of the observations of the past. (C-18)

... in sociology we certainly hope to use much of our knowledge for control purposes. (O & N-9)

Type Nine (dichotomies and antitheses with value implications)

No one quite knows how to define it [common sense], but is forced to conclude that the trait must indeed be very uncommon, else its results would be more in evidence than they seem to be. (C-31)

Of course other areas such as religion and art are not very amenable to scientific method. (O & N-18)

After all, it is not what scientists say is true but what people believe to be true that determines their behavior. (S & W-392)

Type Ten (definitions)

Science is a method of discovery of the uniformities in the universe through the process of observation and re-observation, the results of which eventually come to be stated in principles and arranged and organized into fields of knowledge. (C-18)
The briefest definition is: Science is knowledge. (0 & N-3)

The term science may refer either to established and verifiable knowledge about the world and man or to the manner of arriving at such knowledge. (Y-2)

Content Category "Social Science"

(Concept of social science, particular social sciences and postulates borrowed from these)

Type One (words connotative of desire, interest or preference)

... social studies need to be given a primary place in high schools and normal schools. Training in the public welfare viewpoint is more important than training in individual success and efficiency. . . (B-259)

The student should guard against exaggeration of the importance of the difference between the so-called "exact" natural sciences and the "inexact" social sciences. (C-19)

... there are many reasons to applaud the movement [for one science of human behavior integrating sociology, psychology, and anthropology] as a step in the right direction. (C-12)

Unfortunately, its [mechanization] study has been neglected by the social sciences. . . (O & N-552)

... historical analyses are extremely valuable in building a body of social-science content and systematic generalization. (Y-5)

Type Two (juxtaposition of items with value implications)

The findings of social scientists are usually not partisan enough to capture any group's enthusiasm. . . Thus the charlatans, or the pseudo-scientists, or the opportunistic politicians with their simple cliches and dramatic oversimplifications of the facts usually have an initial advantage . . . (C-566)
Type Three (acceptance or rejection of idea, theory or assumption)

Culture is fundamental to the understanding of the human being and of groups. Most of the other social science ideas grow out of it or are dependent on it. (C-49)

... believers in the likelihood of natural scientific forecasting on any large-scale bases need to have a good deal of faith in the future development of research techniques that are not now available. (S & W-7)

Type Four (focus on particular aspects of problem)

The basic discovery of social science, not just of sociology, is the phenomenon termed culture. (C-48)

Certainly in the matters which concern social science the social act is basic. (Y-66)

Type Five (generalization without appropriate qualification)

The people of no society appear as yet to be willing to entrust to any group of experts the sole or even major responsibility for determining in the social realm what is good and bad, and what is to be done about it. It is possible that the time may come when the expert social scientist may be permitted to exercise his competence in this way, but at present that time seems remote. (C-565)

Lately the anthropologists have discovered personality, and the psychologists culture. (O & N-236)

Unfortunately much of our earlier educational psychology failed to recognize that all learning is essentially social. (Y-361)

Type Six (limited references or authorities)

While Dewey and his followers also have a faith, it is not focused on any absolute truth but rather on the central value and usefulness of a combination of science and liberalism which is by definition never fixed and final. ... While the standpoint of the present book is in general agreement with the Dewey view, we must recognize the strong appeal of the other philosophy [Hutchins and Adler]. (Y-369)
Type Eight (espousal of particular goals or values)

. . . a natural social science probably represents the aspirations of most anthropologists, economists and sociologists today. (S & W-7)

Social science as science is not equal to the task before it. Increased moral power is needed. . . (B-375)

In fact, there is and should be constant communication between scientist and engineer and vice versa. This should be as true of the social sciences as it is of the natural sciences. (Y-3)

Type Nine (dichotomies and antitheses with value implications)

As to degree of certainty in comparison with the natural sciences, the social sciences are in their infancy. (Y-2)

A controversy of wider significance, especially as regards higher education, is that between the rationalist-absolutist and the relativist-liberal views. (Y-368)

Type Ten (definitions)

Sociology is one of the social sciences, together with economics, cultural anthropology, political science, social psychology, jurisprudence and (possibly) history. The general subject for the investigation of the whole group is human society in all its manifold phases . . . (S & W-3)

Content Category "Philosophy"

(Metaphysics, logic, cosmology, social philosophy, etc.) The paucity of items (7) falling into this category explains why only three types of value judgments are represented.
Type Three (acceptance or rejection of idea, theory, or assumption)

In summary, we see that logicalness, like naturalness, is a mode of thinking which one derives from the cultural stream in which he functions. (C-125)

Type Five (generalization without appropriate qualification)

Neither science nor philosophy will commit itself in final terms to the question of what constitutes a superior culture . . . (S & W-385)

Type Nine (dichotomies and antitheses with value implications)

Science is one logic. Religion is another logic. Mathematics is a logic with a formal language of its own. Each is quite logical—but each is different. (C-125)²

Summary of Value Positions in Eight Content Categories

While the preceding illustrations provide some picture of the spread of value judgments in the textbooks, the following summary, based on the complete content analysis data, can serve to round out and integrate the items separately reported in this chapter. The summary will proceed according to the content categories in the rank order followed in the preceding section.

²The analyst understands logic to involve simply rules of right reasoning, whether from true principles or false, whether applied to the fields of science, religion or mathematics. The textbook author does point out that the problem arises out of the misuse or at least the vulgarization of the ideas of "logical" and "natural."
"Society"

The breadth of this category makes it difficult to isolate the leading value judgments. The social organization-disorganization-reorganization idea is to be found in all textbooks, with an emphasis on change almost to the exclusion of the stable elements or functional prerequisites of societies. Ogburn's theory of culture lag is often invoked. Cultural relativity, following on the emphasis on change, underlies the evaluations, explicit or implicit, of social institutions. Sumner's concepts of "folkways" and "mores" are often introduced, quite uncritically, as factors explaining both social organization and social change. There is a general tendency among all authors to reify either "society" or its sub-groups such as the family, the state, the school; and to formulate conclusions with regard to these conceptual entities without specifying their space-time location and the empirical or historical data upon which some generalizations might be based. Short shrift is made of cyclical explanations of the growth of societies. Social evolution is assumed to explain the change in basic societies such as the family, school, church, economic organization, and government. In Bogardus, there is emphasis on the social processes; in Cuber, on symbiotic interdependence; in Ogburn and Nimkoff, on the interrelationships (especially biological and technological) of institutions.
In no textbook is there a clearly defined conception of social order.

"values"

The authors not only vary in their definition of value, but within the same textbook there are often usages suggesting subjective concepts (e.g., personal attitudes) or objective connotations (e.g., social values or goals). In addition to science as a value, such goals as democracy, progressive education, humanitarian religion and material prosperity are indicated by the authors as being acceptable and desirable. Science itself is expected to be value-free in the opinion of most authors. Outside of science, no ultimate values are proposed. Yet there is an emphasis on change and adjustment to the prevailing group standards and a correlative depreciation of any insistence on stability or absolute standards. The identification of social values with the authors' own values through an impersonal but somewhat hortatory method of exposition makes it often difficult to distinguish between the two.

"Religion"

The tendency to reification of social groupings is very evident in the authors' treatment of religion. Magic, animism, superstition, and supernaturalism are often categorized as "religion." The explanations of the growth of religions and religious institutions are often made to fit
the theory of unilinear social evolution. The social origins of religions are stressed. Suggestions of supernatural intervention, when mentioned, are represented most often as myths, unscientific, emotional—products of fantasy thinking. When Christianity is spoken of in favorable terms, the references and sources generally pertain to the Protestant churches. Historical documentation and authoritative knowledge of the teachings of specific denominations and sects are conspicuous by their absence, evidencing little familiarity with the data of the sociology of religion. The contraposition of religion and sociology as related to human progress is reflective of an assumed contrariety between faith and reason, revelation and science.

"Sociology"

While the definitions of sociology by the various authors show a certain similarity, the different wordings and subsequent applications in the textbooks strongly indicate that each individual author is, for the most part, his own authority in defining and delineating the subject matter of sociology. The position taken by Sutherland and Woodward that it is not necessary to define the science, but rather to let the textbook speak for itself, does not escape this academic individualism. All five authors agree that prediction is an aim of sociology, a position which is related to the concepts of science, natural science, statistical
reliability for social data, and human determinism discussed in other sections of the books. The status of sociology as a natural or a cultural science is not uniformly determined, though most authors at least verbally incline to the natural-science ideal. As befits an introductory volume, the textbooks show an orientation towards the needs of the students. The emphasis is on practical rather than speculative considerations; in two textbooks it is suggested to the teacher that a start be made at a place in the book which best suits the need of the group.

Along with apologies for the present state of sociology there are statements promising great things from sociology. With but few exceptions such as Sumner and Cooley, there is little acknowledgment of traditional influences upon contemporary sociology. There is discernible also an apologetic or defensive attitude which is frequently associated with the depreciation of "common sense," "ethnocentrism," and of emphases on unchanging truths or sociocultural stabilities.

"Psychology"

The differing concepts of personality, self, learning, intelligence, freedom, which have characterized social psychology are reflected in these sociology textbooks. If

any one psychological frame of reference may be said to prevail, it is that of social behaviorism, with great dependence on the writings of Mead, Cooley, Dewey and W. I. Thomas. The biological nature of man is stressed by all authors, and only Bogardus refers with any explicitness to the spiritual character of human nature.

Biological evolution, oftentimes introduced as a theory, is generally implied in later sections as being corroborative of unilinear social evolution. The evidence adduced for human evolution is not always abreast of the current findings in this area.

The combination of social behaviorism and biological evolutionism tends to obscure the differences between animal and human, the distinction between the influence of the group and freedom of choice. The perhaps unintentional substitution of the "idea of self" for the "self" in explaining the origin of the self often results in a group-mind or "groupthink" psychology which confuses the looking-glass image with the looker-into-the-glass.

"Science"

Science is extolled by all authors, and implicitly proclaimed by some as the ultimate goal. Science is generally defined as knowledge of sensible phenomena derived through empiric methods, although the use of the word "scientific" in relation to much material in the textbooks is
hardly confined to this connotation. The amorality of science is stressed, as is also its opposition, à la Comte, to theological and metaphysical thinking. The objectivity of science, completely divorced from all personal wishes and values is likewise emphasized.

"Social Science"

Certain differences of opinion are evident with regard to the interrelations of the social sciences. Most authors, in word or in deed, claim a rigid autonomy for sociology with limited borrowings from other disciplines. Some stress the need of cross-fertilization of the sciences of human behavior. Anthropology is most often called upon to complement sociological analysis; and of course, social psychology if it is numbered among the social sciences. History is seldom utilized except in relation to theories of evolution and social progress.

"Philosophy"

Reference has already been made to the paucity of items in this category. Six of the seven items are concerned with logic as a cultural creation or invention, in judgments which made it difficult to determine whether the author was speaking of material or formal or symbolic logic.
Derivation of Central Attitudes Revealed
in the Content Analysis

To take each of the numerous value judgments, or even the many value positions found to summarize the data of the eight content categories, and criticize them individually would result in an analysis which would be diffuse conceptually, somewhat repetitious and fragmented, and lengthy. The procedure which seemed more within the compass of this research was to select from the value-judgment data of the separate categories such central attitudes as seemed to be most typical of the whole body of readings. The term "central attitude" is employed by K. H. Wolff to describe that attitude which during the process of understanding a given unique reveals itself as the one that renders understandable all single attitudes.\(^4\)

The central attitudes, so derived, lend themselves to a more thorough critique than would be possible if numerous

\(^4\)Kurt H. Wolff, "The Unique and the General: Toward a Philosophy of Sociology," *Philosophy of Science*, XV (1948), 199. Wolff maintains that each culture possesses psychologically irreducible phenomena, or unique components, which the individual in the culture usually takes for granted but which often impress the outsider precisely as uniques. The scientific understanding of the unique can be obtained by studying the central attitudes. Terms closely related to "central attitude" are "pattern," "configuration," "ethos," and the like. Wolff believes the concept of central attitudes provides a basis of a methodology for the scientific study of cultures, personalities, and intellectual products because it combines the highest degree of identification with the object of understanding which is compatible with testable communicability. Cf. the whole article, *ibid.*, 192-210.
individual value judgments had to be analyzed. While the procedure involves somewhat of an amalgam of many of the value-judgment positions and thus has less specific referents in the individual textbooks, its typicality permits certain generalizations about the whole body of readings. It seems necessary to arrive at these generalizations if any group of American textbooks is to be interpreted against the sociocultural background of American life. The typical value positions represented by the central attitudes would provide the immediately manageable data upon which the extrinsic interpretations characteristic of the sociology of knowledge would be exercised. Since this research aims to supply material for such a type of interpretation, the device of formulating central attitudes seems appropriate and useful.

A further advantage may be claimed for this procedure. Rather than seeming to indulge in personalities or to criticize specific passages without allowing the author to defend his position textually and contextually, the method will minimize the semantic difficulties involved in any critique of particular passages. The reader is enabled to judge for himself, by comparing the central attitude and the critique with the individual textbook, the extent to which the central attitude is typical of any one author and the extent to which the critique affects his evaluation of a sociological textbook.
The analyses of the eight content categories were surveyed, item by item, in an effort to detect the central attitudes. The selection of items or phrases comprising the central attitude was governed by the following criteria: what ideas are most basic, i.e., presupposed to or involved in other items in the category under study; which ideas are more frequently found in the five textbooks; which ideas are most relevant to the scientific character of sociology, either by way of assumptions, hypotheses, or interpretations? Wherever it could be done with an economy of words, an author's own phrasing was retained; in such cases, that element of the central attitude would not be equally typical of all authors, yet properly part of the central attitude.\(^5\)

Doubtless the analyst's preoccupation with the literature on value judgments and sociology, as well as the experience of studying (in securing the original data) the complete textbooks so minutely four times line by line have caused a sensitivity in detecting central attitudes which could be supplied by the reader only through similar experiences.

The following, arranged under six headings, were judged to be central attitudes or value positions typical of the whole body of readings:

\(^5\)Cf. Appendix I (n) for an example of this procedure.
Science and Value

1) Science is the organization of knowledge of phenomena obtained through empirical observation of sense data. It tells us the real reasons for things. It is man's most fruitful way of interpreting the world and himself. Knowledge is ever changing. Today's truth may be tomorrow's error.

2) Common sense knowledge is not to be trusted, for most people are actually trained not to be objective. Man feels considerably more than he thinks.

3) Values are essentially subjective attitudes, emotive states of feeling, without ontic referents and status; and therefore values are not amenable to scientific analysis.

Sociology and the Social Sciences

4) Sociology is, or at least should be striving to become, a natural science. As a science, it is opposed to

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\[6\text{In an essay on the scientific outlook, Herbert Feigl states and makes a critique of misconceptions with regard to science and the scientific method. It is interesting to relate these misconceptions to some of the central attitudes listed above, with the result that the concepts of science presented by the textbook authors are seen to reflect somewhat popularized, dated, and uncritical conceptions. Some of the misconceptions cited by Feigl are the following: Science arises exclusively out of practical and social needs; science changes its views constantly; science can deal only with the measurable; science and the scientific method are incompatible with religion and the religious attitude; science cannot determine values. Cf. Herbert Feigl, "The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism and Humanism," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953), pp. 14-17.}\]
metaphysics and theology. It strives for a methodology which is "detached," "objective," "free from ethnocentrism," "amoral," "quantitative" rather than "qualitative."

Man the Social Animal

5) Human intelligence varies in complexity from that of animals, but it is not essentially different. Man's conative activity, directed toward satisfaction of his fundamental needs of sustenance, sex and protection, is so thoroughly determined either by environmental influence or subconscious factors that free will is not a significant factor in societal or personal analysis.

Society and Man

6) Society or the group confers personality upon the individual. The self does not exist at birth, but arises in social experience. The social group creates values and remolds attitudes. The mores can make anything right at one time and wrong at another. Normality of personality involves, over and above the satisfaction of biological needs, conformity to the expectations and wishes of the group. Any one of a variety of social organizations meets human needs because it creates human needs.

7) The variations in cultural and moral patterns observed through the study of societies and cultures confirm the fact that cultural variability and moral relativism are essentially characteristic of social life.
Goal of Society

8) Progress is the comprehensive goal of society. It consists in the social evolution or advancement of man from a lowly condition towards a social organization in which the ideology of the rational control of society is achieved. The social heritage has grown more in the last few hundred years than in all the thousands of years before. Adjustment to change, which involves taking up the cultural lags, is a criterion of progress.

Social Institutions

9) In American family life, education, government, economic organization and religion, the ideal of democratic liberalism is more and more to be sought.

10) Traditional religion is non-rational and non-scientific, based on myth or feeling rather than objective facts. Its influence is in inverse proportion to the state of rationality and scientific research. It is only science and the scientific method that have made any real dent in the mountain of error that is primitive and contemporary supernaturalism. Religion should be essentially social. A religion that leaves a person satisfied with saving his own soul is socially obstructive.

Each of these separate attitudes will be submitted to a critique in Chapter III.
CHAPTER III

CRITIQUE OF CENTRAL ATTITUDES TYPICAL OF THE
TEXTBOOKS AS A WHOLE

Introductory note.—In the critique of the central attitudes which follows, use will frequently be made of citations or references from varied sources. There are a number of reasons for this procedure. The areas involved in making the critique, e.g., metaphysics, anthropology, psychology, history, etc., are so extensive that no one person can be presumed to speak authoritatively on them all; hence the introduction of available sources. Moreover, in areas where intellectual backgrounds and value positions would seem to indicate differences in interpretation of the facts, citation of points of convergence can show that the position taken by the analyst is not peculiar to himself but is shared by others of different intellectual backgrounds. Because of limitations of space, the arguments and critiques have been abbreviated. Recourse to the materials indicated in the footnotes will supply fuller explanations.
Critique of Ten Central Attitudes

Science and Value

Central Attitude 1

Science is the organization of phenomena obtained through empirical observation of sense data.\(^1\) It tells us the real reasons for things. It is man's most fruitful way of interpreting the world and himself. Knowledge is ever changing. Today's truth may be tomorrow's error.

In a critique of this basic theme, the discussion will first center around the definition of "science." This definition will be considered in its semantic and in its epistemological aspects. Second, the phrase "real reasons for things" suggests an analysis of the philosophical assumptions behind this universality of truth claimed for science. Third, the concept of "change" will be examined. Fourth, the value ("man's most fruitful way") of science will be considered.

Definition of "science."- Semantically, the word "science" is sometimes used in the introductory sociology textbooks to refer to a method;\(^2\) and sometimes to the

\(^1\) Note: The first sentence in the above statement about science is the only one of the group which is not cited verbatim from one or another of the authors. But the fundamental elements found in the concept of science, viz. "phenomena obtained through empirical observation of sense data" are applied by all the authors to their concept of science as used in their textbooks.

content of knowledge. James B. Conant has observed that "there is no agreement whatsoever as to the definition of the words science, scientists, or scientific method."^4

In view of the variant uses of the term "science,"^5 it is incumbent upon the textbook authors to define the concept precisely and to indicate its different connotations by divisions or adjectival forms. The acceptance of any one definition, in view of the very diversity of opinions, itself indicates a value preference; moreover, assigning the concept a function by opposing science to, say, "common-sense," "practical experience," "fear of damnation," "dogmas," further indicates a preferential factor. Unless a term is defined with an objective referent which can be clearly communicated, it is not possible to oppose it to anything else real save by way of a subjective attitude with more emotive than cognitive basis.

Epistemologically, to conceive of science as restricted to the organization of the knowledge of phenomena obtained through empirical observation involves assumptions which may be brought into question. The schools of idealism

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^3Young: "Science tells us the real reasons for things." (p. 2).


and empiricism have repeatedly sought to explain the origin and process of knowledge. Attempts to answer the question "What does man know?" and "How does he acquire what he knows?" have given rise to numerous theories of knowledge, the implications of which are important for the understanding of what the authors mean by "science.""^6

While it is not to be expected that the author of the introductory sociological textbook fully explicate his epistemology, it is necessary for the science of sociology that its criteriological foundations be made clear.^7 Examination of the presuppositions of both the idealist and the positivist traditions in contemporary science shows considerable disagreement, so that the acceptance of one position or the other is on some other basis than objective, "self-evident" facts. Some implications of these disagreements will be indicated later when the concept of sociology as a science is analyzed. Whitehead has observed that "the very groundwork of a fruitful methodology is to start from those clear postulates which must be held to be ultimate so far as concerns the occasion in question."^8


Philosophies of Science. - The claim for science that it tells us "the real reasons for things" is grounded in certain philosophical assumptions which, again, bear investigation in the interests of scientific truth. Historically, the system of positivist philosophy devised by Auguste Comte and given sociological application in his *System of Positive Polity* is related to the present universality claimed for science. Comte's rejection of theological and metaphysical knowledge in the interests of social progress has influenced social theory to the present day. George A. Lundberg, a leading neo-positivistic sociologist, writes:

In short, we all apparently agree with Comte's appraisal of the situation as he saw it almost a hundred years ago. Speaking of the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive scientific approaches, he said: "Any one of these might alone secure some sort of social order; but, while the three co-exist, it is impossible to understand one another upon any essential point whatever." 9

Positivism is one of the three general types of modern naturalism, the other two being materialism and evolutionism. 10 As a philosophical system, naturalism finds itself constrained to reject supernaturalism as a theory;

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and naturalists profess a humanism and meliorism which is prompted by great zeal for human welfare and achievement. A persistent weakness of modern naturalism has been its attitude towards teleology. It has rejected teleology as a fundamental distributive principle or first principle of fact, motivated partly by an imitation of the sciences employing mechanistic assumptions, and partly in reaction to the teleological emphasis in supernaturalism.  

While the authors of the textbooks in this content analysis do not delve into the philosophies of modern naturalism, their stress on science as the way of knowledge, coupled with the characterization of supernaturalism as "fantasy thinking," "feeling," "imagination," strongly indicates the influence of these philosophies. The analyst does not find the claims of naturalism to be solidly grounded and persuasive, for reasons suggested in his statement of postulates and principles in Chapter I and in light of some current critiques of this position.  

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analyses back to philosophical beliefs may seem unnecessary to some. Yet, as Benjamin observes:

... it would be fair, I think, to say that to the degree to which a scientist shows concern for the presuppositions of his subject, and for its interrelations with other areas of experience, he exhibits that broader understanding which transforms science as specialized knowledge into science as an important enterprise of the human spirit.\(^1^3\)

**Science, Change and Certainty.**—To state that knowledge is ever changing, not in the sense that the stockpile of knowledge is increasing, but with the implication that today's truth may be tomorrow's error (the only certainty is uncertainty), is perhaps a logical corollary from the idealistic and empiricist epistemologies which root reality either in the states of the mind or in the evidently changing phenomena of external reality. The denial of substance (noumena) leaves science with only the appearances of things, or phenomena, to study; and the observation of change, plus the assumption that science captures the whole of knowable reality, easily leads to the conclusion that all is change and relative. Moderate realism\(^1^4\) renders comprehensible the mind's ability to abstract the essences of things from observation of sense data, substances which endure and

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\(^1^4\)Based on the substantial union of body and soul rather than the psychological parallelism of idealism and empiricism.
continue amidst the accidental changes in phenomena. To state that the only certainty is uncertainty is to make an absolute truth of relativism.

In his essay on "The Dialectical Character of Scientific Knowledge," J. M. Marling explains that a study of current writings on the nature of science reveals that false distinctions have abetted the quarrel between philosophy and science. He maintains that the problem is not really one of philosophy and science, but of science (which includes metaphysics, mathematics, and physics) and dialectics (which embraces opinion, probability, faith and doubt) as a type of knowledge below the level of science. Russell, Eddington, Jeans, Margenau, Frank and others do not claim certainty for science, but only opinion or probability. Again the degree of certitude claimed is related to the epistemology.\(^{15}\)

\[\ldots\] What the mind does, in fact, in the act of science is to look for the necessary reasons behind contingent things. When the mind achieves merely opinion, the will intervenes to determine the intelligence, for then there is an act of choice.\(^{16}\)


\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 5.
The act of choice in the above-mentioned quotation suggests how the value positions or central attitudes of the positivist scientist influence his knowledge. If "science" gives the "real reasons for things," then its claim to superiority rests in its certitude. But if opinion and uncertainty and probability are its characteristics, then dialectical knowledge is subordinate to science which begets certitude.\textsuperscript{17}

The Value of Science.- The description of science as "man's most fruitful way of interpreting the world and himself" should be related to the earlier paragraphs of this critique. If science be limited to the phenomena and never attains the essences of things, if it be constantly changing, if it begets only uncertainty, then it is difficult to see its superlative fruitfulness. Yet Lundberg concludes his book on the value of science in these words:

When we give our undivided faith to science, we shall possess a faith more worthy of allegiance than many have vainly followed in the past, and we also shall accelerate the translation of our faith into actuality.\textsuperscript{18}

The expectation from science that it will permit prediction of the future and social control of society has

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 13. Cf. also J. Nogar, "The Integration of Science," printed in The Works of the Province of St. Albert the Great (River Forest, Ill.: Privately printed, 1951), pp. 3-13.

\textsuperscript{18}Lundberg, op. cit., p. 115.
provoked criticism of the power claimed for science. The humanist position has been forcefully stated by George Simpson:

... By avoidance of moral issues science reigns supreme. The only problem is the diversity of moralities all of which seem able to show themselves conformable to scientific truth. Science becomes universal by permitting morality to be particular.19

J. W. N. Sullivan points out that of the great "values" that condition our activities and make our lives worth living—Goodness, Beauty, Truth—science has been chiefly concerned with truth. His consideration of the useful, intellectual and aesthetic values of science is much more comprehensible than the acceptance of science as a cure-all, or a morality in itself.20 From the intellectual point of view, it is only one of several ways of attaining the truth; and unless one holds for an intellectual determinism at the cost of human freedom, there is no guarantee that knowledge of the right means living rightly, though without a doubt it can help living rightly.21

Karl Jaspers points out that science has still given no answer to doubts and despair, but rather has created

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weapons able to destroy in a few minutes that which science itself helped to build up slowly over the years. He specifies certain limits which are characteristic of the greatness of modern science:

1. Scientific, objective knowledge is not knowledge of Being. This means that scientific knowledge is particular, not general, that it is directed toward specific objects and not toward Being itself.

2. Scientific knowledge or understanding cannot supply us with the aims of life. It cannot lead us.

3. Human freedom is not an object of science, but is the field of philosophy. These are clear limits, and the person who is scientifically minded will not expect from science what it cannot give.

In discussing the origins of modern science, Whitehead has shown how science came to be divorced from philosophy through Berkeley, Hume and Kant, and how modern philosophy has been whittled down to psychology and epistemology, the study of the mental cogitations rather than external reality. The undoubted benefits of modern science would be guaranteed if a suitable rapproachement with an adequate philosophy could be established. In such a

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synthesis science would take its place with philosophy to provide an ordered conception of man and the universe in light of human reason; and if the supernatural order would be recognized, theology could be claimed as a partner, and a unity of truth be restored which was destroyed by the Comtean rejection of theological and metaphysical knowledge in favor of positive scientific knowledge.\textsuperscript{24}

Central Attitude 2.

Common sense knowledge is not to be trusted, for most people are actually trained not to be objective. Man feels considerably more often than he thinks.

There is, in the textbooks under study, frequent depreciation of "common sense" knowledge and great emphasis on the biases and prejudices and ethnocentrism of the non-scientist. Sometimes science is contrasted with "belief," which is grouped with "superstition and misinformation." "Optimism," for some reason or other, is considered to be one of the most common biases. Numerous persons are said to be unhappy about the great stride in knowledge. More persons are considered as "actually trained not to be

objective." Facts which "everyone knows are true" are really false. Common sense is unfavorably contrasted with "expert" knowledge.

In interpreting this depreciation of common sense and the ability of common people to be objective, the first problem is a semantic one, viz., the notion of common sense. It may well be that the authors have in mind by the term simply the prejudices and biases of unthinking people; but the sharp contrast of common sense with science suggests that the term may refer to all that is non-science in the technical sense. Carl C. Taylor provides a definition useful in this matter:

"By common sense I mean the knowledge possessed by those who live in the midst and are a part of the social situations and processes which sociologists seek to understand. . . . Common sense is a body of knowledge possessed by groups of persons who generally have spent years, sometimes generations, in the processes of living, making a living, and planning for the future. It may in many cases be quite logical and even quantitative knowledge but not rigidly so as in the case of science." 25

In an essay dealing with the respective frames of reference of common sense and science, John Dewey, after stating that only by direct active participation in the "transactions of living" does any one become familiarly

acquainted with other human beings and with "things" which make up the world, says this:

. . . While "common sense" includes more than knowledge, this acquaintance knowledge is its distinguishing trait; it demarcates the frame of reference of common sense by identifying it with the life actually carried on as it is enjoyed or suffered. I shall then first state why the expression "common sense" is a usable and useful name for a body of facts that are so basic that without systematic attention to them "science" can not exist. . . .

Taking the Oxford Dictionary's definition of common sense as "the general sense, feeling, judgment of mankind or of a community," Dewey summarizes the matters which fall within the common-sense frame of reference as those of "the uses and enjoyments common to mankind, or to a given community." It is his conviction that the intellectual enterprise which turns its back upon the matters of common sense does so at its peril.

Since members of the sociological fraternity as well as its outside critics have shown concern for the divorce between sociology and common sense, it seems relevant to

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27 Ibid.

inquire into the factors, historical and otherwise, which may account for this distrust of common sense.

Historically the influence of Comte and Pareto may be said to have engendered a distrust of common sense. In his *Introduction to the System of Positive Polity*, Comte explains that he had come to realize that feeling was more socially significant than thought; and that the function of the leaders of positivism, the priesthood of the religion of humanity, would be to guide the emotional life of the people toward socially constructive goals. Positivist science was the privilege of the elite who were to direct the destinies of more emotional men.\(^{30}\) Pareto's attempt in his *Sociologie Générale* to construct a theory of non-logical actions of men perhaps influenced American sociological thought when in the 1930's his work was translated into English. The theories of the relationships of the residues and derivations, while calling attention to the non-logical aspects of human behavior, might well have resulted in overshadowing the rational capabilities of men in society.\(^{31}\) In this connection

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Arnold M. Rose observes that sociology emerged as a separate discipline partly in an attempt to account for certain non-rational factors in human behavior.\(^{32}\)

The impact of three other thinkers upon contemporary social science is even more clearly discernible, and has recently been given interesting documentation. As Bendix points out, many writers from Francis Bacon to Sigmund Freud have reflected on the errors arising from bias and human emotions. Bacon explained biases in human thought through his theory of idols--idols of the tribe, the cave, the market-place, the theatre; nevertheless these idols were looked upon as accidental impediments which can be overcome, since they are temporary blemishes and not inherent defects. Because he believed that man and nature were created by God and that the intellect and nature were in preestablished harmony, Bacon maintained confidence in human reason.\(^{34}\)

Karl Marx abandoned the optimism of the philosophers of the Enlightenment, holding that neither logic, epistemology,


\(^{34}\text{Cf. Bendix, op. cit., pp. 3-6.}\)
nor education will enable men to free their thinking from the ideological distortions growing out of the class struggle. According to Bendix, he yet retained a belief in the constructive power of reason, through which men in the future would control their social relations in accordance with a "settled plan."

Nietzsche went further than Marx: he abandoned the belief in reason. He held that man's intellectual faculties are useful only because they create illusions. He began by attributing reason and the search for knowledge to man's will to power, and in his revolt against the culture of his time he denounced reason as decadence and extolled the strength of the beast.

While Marx had reduced ideas to a reflection of the class struggle and Nietzsche to weapons in the quest for power, Freud attempted to show that they are the individual's means of rationalizing or sublimating his basic organic drives (sex and aggression). 35

The popularization and vulgarization of the teachings of Marx and Freud have pushed the doctrines beyond the originators' intention, resulting in a profound distrust of reason. Whereas Marx and Freud had tried to show how men can overcome biases, believing that all men could acquire

By staking their claim to objectivity as the method of science, social scientists have frequently abandoned the attempt to make men more rational. The more widespread bias is, the more difficult it becomes to escape it. As a result, many regard a general education with much skepticism; only specialized scientific knowledge can really guard a person against bias. Hence people should place their trust in the social scientist and accept his findings. If they do, they will be free from bias, though they cannot share in the inquiry which leads to objective knowledge. In abandoning the traditional faith in reason, social scientists have inadvertently subscribed to an elite-theory of knowledge and society.36

In fairness to the authors of the textbooks under study, it should be said that they do not evidence many direct borrowings from Freud, much less from Marx, in their comments on science vs. common sense. However, the description by Bendix of the general conclusions of social scientists in this matter, whatever be the intellectual currents operating in individual cases, does apply to the authors, to some more than others.37 An elite-theory of knowledge and society renders intelligible the great emphasis on rationality and scientific method in scientists,

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coupled with the distrust of reason and common sense in the common man, who is presumed to operate on the level of common sense.

Other than the historical and ideological factors which may account for the depreciation of common sense, the very complexity of the scientific method renders science likely to be misunderstood. Science is concerned with abstractions, separate elements of actual objects which are treated in isolation from the actual objects. Furthermore, the abstractions with which natural science deals are quantitative and structural, and thus the more removed from the affective level of ordinary experience, the level of "common sense." However, variations in levels of knowledge do not imply oppositions between forms of knowledge. Perhaps the problem is one of intercommunication between the levels of concrete social life, common sense, and scientific formulations which are "abstractions from abstractions, or even abstractions from abstractions from abstractions . . ." 38

In summary, then despite the biases and the idols and the emotions of men, it has not been demonstrated that common sense is necessarily opposed to the scientific method;

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that the attacks on the rationality of men by Comte, Pareto, Freud, Nietzsche and Marx warrant the distrust of the reason of ordinary people such as suggested by the elite-theory of knowledge and society; that common sense, intuition, and other forms of enlightenment of the human mind limit the range of human knowledge.

Central Attitude 3

Values are essentially subjective, emotive states of feeling, without ontic referents or status; and therefore values are not amenable to scientific analysis.

In listing the above statement about "values" as a central attitude in the textbook, the analyst is aware that there is not the same agreement among the authors as in the two previous central attitudes. First of all, the authors' definitions of "value" (presented in Chapter II) vary considerably. One author speaks of value as the person or object toward which one has an attitude; another describes values as certain ideas which contain or express the prevailing estimates which people have of the relative worth of beings; a third says human values are objective data like all other phenomena; the fourth speaks of value in terms of any object or objective; while the fifth author defines it as a combination of ideal and attitude which gives a scale of preference, a priority to motives and goals, etc.

Over and above the difference in definitions, the term "value" is used sometimes with subjective implications
and at other times as referring to objective goals such as health, power, wealth. One author states that the method of science disavows values, but the essential goal of science itself is a value, the faith in the ultimate good of knowing the truth. Here both objective and subjective aspects are involved. Furthermore, the word "value" is often linked with irrational and strongly emotionalized habits, or an objective in the visible future thought by the general group to be desirable; and where cultural variability is being treated, the subjective character of values is stressed, since values, moral or otherwise, are said to be personal and subjective. Along with these descriptions of value, however, reference is made to the monogamous family, beauty, progressive education, rural life, the cooperative movement, democratic government and the like as values, obviously with an objective connotation.

If the analyst has selected the authors' use of "value" in the subjective sense as more characteristic, it is because this subjectivism is emphasized in the textbooks. Although there is a marked tendency in current sociological thought to bring values within the purview of social science, the

The variant usage of the concept of value is not peculiar to the social sciences. Even a limited reading of the literature on value theory and the philosophy of value dramatizes the wide differences of philosophic and ethical opinion on this subject. This critique will have justified itself if, after showing some of the divergent aspects of value theory, it renders intelligible the variant definitions and usages in the textbooks under study, showing that the authors have preferred one theory to another and thus have made value judgments regarding value. It will also be useful to show that among sociologists today there are developments in value usage which afford a basis for a sociological, as well as a philosophical, interpretation of the textbooks in this regard.

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Semantic aspects. - The extensiveness of recent publications by philosophers and sociologists (cf. Bibliography) attests not only to an active interest in the problem of value but also evidences the semantic problems involved in unifying value terminology. It is the contention of H. D. Aiken that, although it would be idle to expect complete agreement on ethical questions from Platonists, Kantians, and Humeans, a great deal of the disagreement stems not from such preethical antagonisms, but rather from confusions, equivocations and failures of analysis within a framework of assumptions upon which there is already broad agreement. 41

Another author, writing on definitions in value theory, points out the chief perplexities with regard to definitions of value concepts:

(1) being definitions, they are not, strictly speaking, verifiable or conformable, and
(2) they may have an imperative function, i.e., they may operate normatively or regulatively. 42

A very useful introduction to the current discussions on the value problems is a volume entitled Value: A Cooperative Inquiry. 43 It is prefaced by a statement from John Dewey indicating his discouragement in connection with the


discussion of values, stemming from "the feeling that little headway is being made in determining the questions or issues fundamentally involved ..." After reading the original essays, the criticisms and rejoinders, the clarity of value theory still seems an objective rather than an attainment.

With regard to the area of social science itself, two out of the five major methodological difficulties analyzed by Marion J. Levy, Jr., involve the meaning of "value." George W. Hartmann speaks of value as the unifying concept of the social sciences--"Values are both the basic data and the explanatory tools of all the social sciences." The necessity of a clear concept of value is evident. Perhaps the most ambitious recent attempt to delineate value and valuation for the social sciences is an essay by C. Kluckhohn and others. From the viewpoint of sociology

44 Ibid., p. 4.
46 George W. Hartmann, "Value as the Unifying Concept of the Social Sciences," Journal of Social Psychology, X (1939), 567.
and sciences related to it the authors found this definition useful:

A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of the action.\(^{48}\)

The commentary on each element of this definition, as well as the attempt to classify values and value-orientations\(^{49}\) provide indicators of the relevance of value as applied to sociological science.

**Historical aspects.**—The wide differentiations in the interpretation and application of "value" have origins deep in the sources of modern philosophical schools. A complete critique of value theories necessitates pushing back into the philosophical assumptions of Locke, Kant, Hume, Descartes and others. The roots of the contemporary philosophy of value are grounded in the Kantian system which denies the power of the speculative reason to transcend human experience. If the mind cannot attain truth, philosophy has one resource left, and that is to accept as true what seems to be true and to become interested in the value which things may have for people. If the idea and not the object is the

\(^{48}\) Kluckhohn and others, op. cit., p. 395.

first thing known, man must content himself with the value which his beliefs have for action and practical conduct.  

Subsequent to the dualism of Descartes, the idealism of Kant, and the positivistic theories of the nature of man, philosophers of value have proposed cognitive and non-cognitive theories of value which depend on certain psychological as well as ethical assumptions.

After considering the various usages of the word "value" in the introductory sociology textbooks, as well as the various philosophies of value which may either have influenced the authors (or perhaps the teachers of the authors of the sociology textbooks) or are now influencing sociological theory, it would seem that scientific sociology

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still needs a clearly explained usage of "value." This would involve an investigation of the epistemological, psychological and ontological bases of axiological theory. The satisfactory solution of the problem has bearing on the nature of sociology as a science, its relation to natural science, its use of value judgments as criteria and as data.\(^\text{52}\)

The thesis of Vivas, which bears study, is that value has ontic status or is ontologically objective, and that the theories are fallacious that accept the bifurcation of nature into two classes of objects, i.e., independent objects known by positive science and subjective experience which include "value experiences;" finally he maintains that the objects introduced by the bifurcation have a methodological status and not an ontological one, as both Galileo and Descartes led men erroneously to believe.

\[\ldots\] Values are somehow entangled in physical objects, and this proposition holds for all values, whether moral, aesthetic or any other kind you choose to mention. On the face of it, they are objective because they reside in the object which

they qualify or characterize and in which we perceive them.53

A basic research on values has been initiated at the University of Washington under Professors George A. Lundberg and Stuart C. Dodd. It is their contention that values as real social factors can be measured and therefore brought within the scope of sociology as a natural science. The authors define their factors in popular language (commonsense definitions), in technical language (operational definitions) and in dimensional language (logical or mathematical definitions). Lundberg and Dodd have listed their assumptions underlying this theory of values.54 Whether this attempt to objectify and measure values is adequate for sociological purposes depends partly on the validity of the authors' assumptions, especially the inductional assumptions, e.g., that the function of science is prediction and control of phenomena; and partly on the level of analysis of societal behavior that one considers proper to sociology.

It should be evident from the study of value usage and value theory that the denial of some ontic or objective status to value is neither in accord with actual use of the


54Stuart C. Dodd, A Formulation of Values Theory, Appendix A to the Second Quarterly Report to the Operations Research Office of John Hopkins University (December, 1959), pp. 9-12. (Mimeographed)
term in the sociology textbooks, nor with any clearly demonstrated theory of values. An adequate explanation of the authors' preference for the subjectivistic approach to values is not available from the textbooks themselves. It could be that examination of their philosophical background would shed light on this factor.

Sociology and the Social Sciences

Central Attitude 4

Sociology is, or at least should be striving to become, a natural science. As a science, it is opposed to metaphysics and theology. It strives for a methodology which is "detached," "objective," "free from ethnocentrism," "amoral," "quantitative" rather than "qualitative."

Most sociologists, some textbooks claim, are hopeful they will be able to travel farther along the natural-scientific road. Only by getting outside one's culture and all cultures it is said, can one really understand the life of man. The sociologist has to lay aside all ultimate questions of truth and falsity of belief and efficacy of ritual.

The relation of sociology as a science to metaphysics and theology has been considered somewhat in the critique of the first central attitude, and will be treated more fully in the discussion of the attitude dealing with religion. Negative comparisons involving fantasy-fact, wishful-real, speculative-practical, and ideas-knowledge dichotomies are found in numerous textbooks in this connection.
Before proceeding to a critique of this central attitude concerning the nature of sociology, it is necessary to consider the limitations under which an introductory sociology course operates, and *a fortiori*, limitations involved in the composition of a textbook written for the introductory course. It can reasonably be assumed that the main objective of the introductory course and textbook is to introduce the student to the science of sociology. Such an introduction would involve orientation of sociology in the whole schema of human knowledge, exposition of basic concepts and methods, orderly presentation of the areas of study and their interrelationships, and formulation of such sociological principles as would act as bases for subsequent studies in sociology. It is not to be expected that comprehensive demonstrations of all of these points be attempted; but clarification and documentation should be sufficient to induce intellectually sound, rather than mere opinionative, assent.

With regard to the orientation of sociology in the whole schema of human knowledge, there is a noticeable lack of perspective in the textbooks under study. This is due perhaps to a number of factors, among which might be counted the positivistic conception of sociology as the most important of the sciences, a restricted or vague concept of science which does not permit a clear comparison with other
disciplines, as well as lack of awareness of scientific aspects of philosophy and theology whose principles are, consequently, often uncritically assumed, controverted, or rejected.

The exposition of basic concepts and methods again imposes severe restrictions on the textbook authors. Charles H. Page has pointed out that "sociologists have reached no firm consensus concerning the basic concepts."55 If, with regard to methods, sociology is conceived as a natural science, the teacher's and author's obligation is directed to the communication of a body of objectively observed and quantitatively verified social knowledge.56 While the authors generally expose a list of concepts which they consider basic, the divergencies are noticeable. However, it is in the area of methods that the differences and deficiencies are more apparent. Either there is little specification of methods beyond the statement of the requirements of "scientific method," or where methods are specified they are, with some exceptions, unexplained; and very importantly, documentation is noticeably lacking. In one study of


textbooks, the author contends that the main sources of data for the introductory sociology textbooks were other introductory sociology textbooks.57

In 1931, Ray E. Baber said of the introductory course in sociology:

A study of 20 of the more commonly used texts, from a list of 45 used in over 500 colleges that were checked, shows how dangerously near we are to the claims of Heinz [57 varieties of food products]. While admitting that boundary lines between the social sciences must be flexible enough to adjust to changes in thought, is it too much to expect that the central body of each be autonomous enough to constitute a reasonably differentiated field of social research? We have thus far found so little agreement that a text written by one reputable sociologist is said by another, equally reputable, to be entirely outside the field of sociology . . .58

The Kennedys in their study of college sociology, 1939-1941, observed that sociologists are still feeling their way to an integrated science. Of Jessie Bernard's characterization of earlier college sociology as a sort of catch-all course which should consider all the problems that could not find room in political science, economics, jurisprudence, history, or other disciplines, the Kennedys stated: "This would seem to be still true, and the sociologists themselves

57 Cf. A. H. Hobbs, The Claims of Sociology, p. 8. However, much one might differ with the procedures and interpretations of the author, some of the basic data are significant.

are apparently anything but reluctant to go even further and
think up new kinds of courses on their own initiative.\textsuperscript{59}

The textbooks selected for this content analysis
exhibit varying conceptions of the content of the field and
the order which should characterize it as a scientific
discipline.

The formulation of sociological principles or laws
upon which the student might base further studies in soci­
ology is a task variously discharged by the separate authors.
In no instance is the student presented with a systematic
array of principles or laws clearly connected and applicable
to the fields studied. This may be due to the youthfulness
of the science, as well as to the various schools of social
theory and research which are utilized, variously, by the
individual authors. The names of Pareto, Durkheim, M. Weber,
Mannheim, W. I. Thomas and Znaniecki, Cooley, MacIver, Sumner,
Ward, E. A. Ross, Lundberg, Becker, Ogburn, Parsons, Sorokin,
and Merton suggest conceptual approaches which are reflected
in the introductory sociology textbooks.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{59}Raymond Kennedy and Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, "Sociol­
ogy in American Colleges," \textit{American Sociological Review}, VII
(1942), 669-670. Cf. also Kaethe Mangelberg, "The Subject
Matter of Sociology in College Education," \textit{American Journal
of Economics and Sociology}, V (1946), 351-363; N. Cantor,
"The Teaching and Learning of Sociology," \textit{American Journal

\textsuperscript{60}For a recent treatment of some of these theories,
cf. Roscoe C. Hinkle, Jr., and Gisele J. Hinkle, \textit{The Devel­
opment of Modern Sociology: Its Nature and Growth in the
United States}, pp. 9-69; also S. Timasheff, \textit{Sociological
Theory: Its Nature and Growth} (Garden City, N.Y.: Double­
Sociology and Natural Science. - In the recurring discussions about the nature of sociology as a science, it is interesting to note that the most detailed analyses in contemporary American sociological literature come from the pens of scholars who represent, seemingly, the extremes of supra-empirical sociology and neo-positivistic sociology., i.e., P. H. Furfey in The Scope and Method of Sociology: A Metasociological Treatise (1953), and G. A. Lundberg in Foundations of Sociology (1939), respectively. Furfey maintains that to construct a system of sociology, to carry on sociological research, or even to study sociology intelligently, it is necessary to have some systematic method for determining whether a given proposition both possesses scientific quality and is relevant to sociology. He terms this special science "metasociology" and defines it as follows:

... an auxiliary science whose function is to determine for sociology criteria of scientific quality and criteria of relevance together with their practical application. In other words, it is necessary for carrying out sociological research, and constructing sociological systems, and criticizing such research and such systems after they have been completed. 61

Comte, this author maintains, was a metasociologist rather than a sociologist, i.e., he was concerned primarily with

the nature of sociology and its methods and very little
with the actual study of society itself.\footnote{Ibid., p. 27.}

Comte's metasociological postulate that the methods
of the physical sciences were more or less directly appli-
cable to the study of society was challenged by those like
Rickert, Dilthey, and Windelbrand, who maintained that the
"mental" or "moral" sciences or "sciences of the spirit"
\textit{(Geisteswissenschaften)} should be sharply distinguished
methodologically from the "natural" sciences \textit{(Naturwissen-
schaften)}. This tradition has had less influence in America
than the Comtean tradition, which defines sociology as a
purely empirical science that studies social phenomena
objectively in order to derive general laws. Lundberg,
following upon the revival of Comtean positivism, has
written what Furfey terms "the only complete metasociologi-
cal treatise in existence" \footnote{Ibid., p. 41.} (comprising the three fields of
metasociology: criteria of scientific quality and criteria
of relevance in \textit{Foundations of Sociology}, and the practical
procedural rules in \textit{Social Research}).

Since the publication of their treatises, Lundberg
and Furfey have maintained discussions through the
sociological journals and conventions. Most recently the controversy has been narrowed down to metaphysical principles: a dualistic metaphysics which recognizes both mind and matter as equally fundamental realities is at the basis of the Geisteswissenschaften position, whereas a monistic metaphysics which recognizes only matter as the fundamental reality and thus would reduce all science to physical science (Naturwissenschaften).

Natural and Human Science. - The contrast between the natural-science and human or cultural science conceptions of sociology has been drawn by K. H. Wolff:

a) The natural-science conception postulates that sociology can and should study its subject matter as other natural sciences study other parts of nature which are their subject matters. However this subject matter is defined . . . it exists outside the sociologist, is external to him, and he has but to discover, study and learn about it. Thus, perhaps the most outstanding assumption of the natural-science approach . . . is the axiom that the subject matter of sociology, inasmuch as this subject matter is "natural" or part of "nature" is given, and given alike to all investigators . . .

b) This other conception may be called human or the human-studies conception. Its postulate, which corresponds to that of the common-giveness of the natural-science conception, may be formulated by saying that the subject matter of

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sociology is given only in the sense that it emerges in the process of understanding, a process which (according to this conception) is, both individually and historically, never completed or completable. . . .

It is the author's contention that, in spite of the difference in the conception of science and the scientific method which distinguishes the two approaches, the human approach, where it has not yet developed scientific methods, endeavors to do so; that "in terms of creativity, i.e., in terms of the perception of problems and the finding of methods for solving them, and in the breadth of interests—hence in its function in the development of the study of man—it is more scientific than the natural-science approach.

The interpretation of sociological terms in light of metasociological assumptions accounts for the variant methodologies of natural and human science. Admittedly, it is possible to apply the methods of natural science to some problems in the field of sociology, e.g., to plot the growth of population. It is possible to develop sociology purely

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as a natural science. But, as Furfey asks, "Is it profitable"? He maintains that phenomena involving human behavior can best be studied by methods inapplicable elsewhere. The point might be proved on a philosophical level by demonstrating that the most characteristic human activities involve free acts, and the fact of freedom differentiates them essentially from all occurrences in the sub-human world. But since many sociologists (theoretically, but not practically, since it would rob them of justification for teaching sociology) deny that the will is free, the same point can be proven on an empirical level, i.e., from the empirical facts that many human actions are accompanied by the double consciousness that they are being performed and why they are being performed.

Addressing himself to this same problem, MacIver points out that every social situation consists in the adjustment of an inner to an outer system of reality. The inner system is a complex of desires and motivations; the outer is a complex of environmental factors, insofar as these constitute the means, opportunities, obstacles, and conditions to which the inner system is adjusted. The relationship between an inner and outer constitutes, in

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67 Furfey, The Scope and Method of Sociology, p. 117.
68 Ibid., p. 118.
respect to the problem of causality, the essential difference between the social and the physical sciences. Moreover, each system, the inner and the outer, is coherent in itself and the two together form also a single coherence. The outer is never, as in the physical sciences, a mere outer; it is always seen under an aspect of significance. 69

The stress on sociology as a natural science is found explicitly in the textbooks under study, or implicitly by the praise of natural-science methodology without showing its limitations for sociological data, or by adversely contrasting supra-empiric knowledge with empiric knowledge as found in the natural sciences. It is thus seen to involve preferences for scientific methods and levels of interpretation which are not quite adequate to the full understanding of social life expected from sociology. It is interesting to note that what is perhaps the most enthusiastic claim for the beneficent effects of sociology comes

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from the pen of a sociologist who, methodologically, restricts the science to quantitative data.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{Sociology vs. Metaphysics and Theology.} - The opposition between sociology and metaphysics and theology has its origin in the three-stage theory of August Comte. Whether that tradition is sufficient to explain the similar attitude revealed in current introductory sociology textbooks is difficult to say, especially since little or no explicit reference is made to Comte’s theory. If "science" be accepted in the natural-science sense, and furthermore if sociology be seeking the natural-science ideal, it is understandable that differentiation, but not opposition, be noted between these branches of learning. If "science" be accepted as the only way of attaining truth, then obviously the claims of metaphysics and theology to contain truth are spurious. It is not at all evident what the authors mean by metaphysics and theology; in the analyst’s conception of these fields, no real opposition is possible.\textsuperscript{71} The traditions of early American sociologists, such as Small, Sumner,\

\textsuperscript{70}Cf. G. A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us?; also same author, "Some Convergences in Sociological Theory," American Journal of Sociology, LXII (1956), 21-27, in which Lundberg maintains that there is an evolution of the principles schools of thought in the direction of the theory and methods of natural science.

\textsuperscript{71}Chap. I, Analyst’s Postulates and Sociological Principles; also the critiques of the central attitudes concerning "science" and "religion."
Giddings, and Ward, may be factors which have influenced contemporary writing. Robert L. Sutherland, after a survey of the college sociology textbook field, advances a number of reasons—the prestige of science, the "discoveries" of cultural anthropology, ideological and personal factors in the sociologists themselves—why this may be so. 72 Talcott Parsons concludes his essay on religious perspectives in college sociology and social psychology with these words:

Like the historian, the sociologist can now say unequivocally, that the fairly recent popular positivistic view that religion was essentially grounded in the ignorance and superstition of a pre-scientific age, and could be expected rapidly to disappear in our era, is definitely in error. The proponent of this view is the victim of his own ignorance and counter-superstition. . . . What purports to be the abolition of religion is really only a new form of it; in exactly the same sense in which it has been rightly said that the philosopher who purports to abolish metaphysics is only indulging in a naive and uncritical brand of metaphysics. By implication he is making assumptions about the nature of ultimate reality which will not stand up to sophisticated philosophical criticism. So it is with religion. 73

Sociology and value judgments. When the textbook authors speak of the method of sociology as being "detached," "objective," "free from ethnocentrism" and "amoral," the


73 Talcott Parsons, Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in Sociology and Social Psychology, p. 47.
problem of value judgments and their relation to scientific sociology is raised. Howard Becker has pointed out that the slogan "No value-judgments in sociology" has been misused by its adherents (and he includes himself) and misunderstood by its opponents. Becker holds that "No value judgments in science, which derive from sources other than the supreme value judgment that control is ultimately desir able, are ethically permissible by the scientist in his specifically scientific capacity." In 1938, Hornell Hart reviewed somewhat systematically the recently published writings on this subject and among the areas of "seeming agreements" is the following:

... Sociologists, like other human beings, are ordinarily motivated by valuations which have been acquired unscientifically, through emotional experiences, subconscious suggestion, uncritical acceptance of traditions or conventions, and the like. If a sociologist wishes to conform to the generally accepted ideas of science, he must take measures systematically and scrupulously to prevent these personal valuations from distorting his selection or interpretation of data.

Gunnar Myrdal points out that our whole social science literature is permeated by value judgments despite prefatory

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74 Howard Becker, op. cit., p. 293.
75 Ibid., p. 297. Italics his.
77 Ibid., p. 863.
statements to the contrary. These practical judgments are not presented as inferences from explicit value judgments plus the data, but actually as part of the data, often introduced by loading part of the terminology with valuations which are kept vague and undefined, and this often is what is called "pure" fact-finding research.78

After a rather extensive survey of the literature on values in social science,79 this analyst finds Furfey's division of value judgments in sociology as the most useful


at the present time: (1) value judgments as objects of sociological research, i.e., the investigator studies as empirical facts the value judgments made by the individuals whom he is studying; (2) value judgments as postulates of sociology, i.e., propositions from other sciences which serve as premises in a chain of sociological reasoning; and (3) metasociological value judgments which ascribe some value either to sociology in general or to some particular way of studying sociology or to some particular application of sociological methods—e.g., sociology is an important and valuable science, sociology should be rigorously confined to use of inductive methods.\textsuperscript{80}

Whether sociology be thought of as a natural or a human science, it can study scientifically the first type, i.e., value judgments as objects of sociological research. The previously mentioned experiments of Dodd and Lundberg in measuring values are illustrative of what might be done employing natural-science methodology. The second type, i.e., value judgments as postulates of sociology, may be more carefully analyzed when sociology is scientifically defined and its relation to and borrowings from other sciences are more explicitly indicated. Metasociological

value judgments, i.e., the third type, may be discerned through careful content analysis of sociological writings.

**Summary.** - The emphasis on the natural-science ideal for sociology is influenced by philosophical assumptions with regard to the structure of human living, and represents a choice between schools of sociological thought, i.e., the natural-science and the human-science positions. The opposition posited between sociology and metaphysics and theology is a value position either inherited from Comte, or derived from restricted and somewhat selective conceptions of these various disciplines. Finally, the emphasis on "detachment" and "objectivity" and "amorality" in sociology may arise either from the dubious premise of the natural-science ideal, from a purely subjective theory of values, or from an unwillingness or an inability to formulate the metasociological value judgments and other postulates involved in the selection of projects, data, and interpretation of data. One of the problem areas revealed by the Hart study on value judgments in sociology, cited above, may well be considered:

The content of our sociology courses is determined by value judgments. Should these judgments be based on (1) tradition, blind except for crude trial and error selection; (2) propaganda by enthusiasts for one or another type of course; (3) dialectical metaphysics; (4) systematic study of social objectives; (5) some other criterion; or (6) some combination of these or other criteria? 81

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Central Attitude 5

Human intelligence varies in complexity from that of animals, but it is not essentially different. Man's conative activity, directed toward the satisfaction of his fundamental needs of sustenance, sex and protection, is so thoroughly determined either by environmental influence or subconscious factors that free will is not a significant factor in societal or personal analysis.

Though this central attitude and the one immediately following both deal with the psychology of human behavior, the emphasis in the first is on the constitution of the individual, while in the second the impact of the group and society upon the individual is more closely studied.

In this section of the critique, the points to be considered are the following: human nature, human intelligence and learning, man's conative activity, its determining factors and its freedom.

Human nature in general.- It is difficult to locate through the method of this content analysis succinct descriptions of "human nature" as employed by the various authors. Two of the authors enumerate the factors of what one calls "original nature" and another refers to as "fundamental factors of human structure and function," while another author emphasizes that the term "original nature or heredity" is an abstraction.

The analyst subscribes to the concept of human nature as comprising a material principle (body) and a non-material
principle (mind or soul) which are substantially united to form the individual person. On the basis of the various functions performed by human beings, three levels of activity may be distinguished: the vegetative, the sensitive or animal, and the intellectual or rational. Since the inner principle of activity (the soul) is not immediately operative, its diversities of functions are accounted for by the "faculties" through which the soul operates. The principle for distinguishing the various faculties or potencies, e.g., intellect, will, imagination, is: the acts of man are specified by their proper objects, and the faculties are specified by their proper acts. Faculties are proximately differentiated by acts, but ultimately differentiated by formal objects. Such a delineation of "human nature" is clearer than the descriptions in some of the textbooks.

These psychological principles were sometimes misinterpreted by earlier sociological writers but have become understood again through the work of Charles Spearman and the factorialists. As Mortimer Adler has pointed out, the misinterpretation was due to the conception of faculties as if they were agents rather than principles of operation, with the consequent restriction of psychological subject matter to "states of consciousness" or the "association of

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The extent to which earlier writers in American sociology may have influenced the authors under study may be measured not only by an investigation of the citations and references in the textbooks themselves, but also by a comparison of the illustrations in the "psychology" category with the recent research focusing on the nature of man in American sociology.

**Human intelligence and learning.** The following are some of the positions on human intelligence and learning expressed in the textbooks under study.

- The basic capacity for learning is a biological trait.
- Though the differences between man and ape in ability to learn may be only a matter of degree, the difference is substantial and of the greatest significance. [In a later part of the same book, it is said that differences in kind of learning, as well as in degree, distinguish man from the lower orders.]
- It must be assumed that the greater capacity to learn is inborn.
- The conditioned response, rather than instinct, is a major factor in learning.
- The ability to form generalizations is found especially in human beings.

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The ability to think is a tool which man uses sparingly.

Man's life, infinitely more complex than that of the apes, is due primarily to his greater brain capacity.

The continuum of thinking ranges from highly logical and scientific thought which is impersonal, to fantasy thinking, which is illogical, wishful, highly personal, and equally essential.

Generally, the authors of the textbooks studied do not identify themselves wholly with any one school of general or individual psychology. However, behaviorism in some form or other may be found recurrently in the psychological areas of the textbooks. The names of G. H. Mead, Dewey, Thomas and Znaniecki, and Cooley, are most frequently cited with approval by the authors. The extent to which the above-mentioned and other psychological notions are directly traceable to these psychologists, or are reflective of their acceptance of the theory regarding evolution of the mind, or are dictated by metaphysical prepossessions, is difficult to determine. With modern psychology divided between the positions of the behaviorist, the structuralist, the functionalist, the Freudian, the Jungian, the "Gestaltists," and the mental tester, the use of any particular school or schools involves a preference on the part of the sociologist which, unless demonstrated scientifically, constitutes a value position which should be made explicit for the scrutiny of
the reader. Following the observation of Burtt that some scientific investigators have, perhaps unconsciously, their private uncritical prepossessions which affect the interpretation of their experimental data, Peter Groen makes application of Burtt's three sources of unwarranted assumptions to modern psychology. The sources of unwarranted assumptions are indicated as these: first, the ideas of the scientific age on ultimate questions; second, the scientist's tendency to make a metaphysics out of a method; and third, the researcher's vigorous extra-scientific interests, such as religion. A formulation with reference to sociology which, because of its completeness, might be submitted to an analysis of assumptions is the psychological model proposed by Tolman in the volume by Parsons and Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action.

In view of his own psychological position on human intelligence and learning—based on the evidence of self-consciousness, the capacity of the intellect to obtain

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abstract ideas, the distinctive human function of meaningful language, and the growth of cultures based on the communication and accumulation of ideas—the analyst considers the learning distinctive of human beings as different in kind as well as degree from that of the lower animals.\footnote{89} It would seem that the tendency, at least in strictly experimental psychology, to confuse human intelligence and learning with that of lower animals is due to the focus of research on animals, children, or non-literate, in whom the power of rationality is not developed.\footnote{90}

As Tolman once observed,

\dots I myself have learned most of my psychology from rats. Yet \dots if we can accept the assumption of some basic social drives in man which act in much the same manner as do the viscerogenic hungers in rats, then our studies of the hunger-and thirst-driven activities of these latter animals may after all contribute something to our understanding of the social behavior and the social learning of homo sapiens.\footnote{91}

It is not the function of this critique to resolve the differences between the schools. It is sufficient if it be shown that the very divergencies in psychology necessitate some selectivity and preference on the part of sociologists, and that the validity of their sociology depends on

\footnote{89Cf. Brennan, \textit{op. cit.}, Chap. 7, pp. 169-209.}

\footnote{90Cf. Clarence Leuba, \textit{The Natural Man} (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1954).}

the scientific nature of the psychology they employ, including any metaphysical or historical prepossessions which may characterize it. Rather than proposing any psychology as definitive without adequate evidence, writers might keep in mind the observation of George Simpson:

... Despite the ability to use experiment and laboratory techniques, individual psychologists are divided on fundamental approach to subject matter. In psychology as in the social sciences generally, these differences are often rooted in philosophical differences concerning the meaning of human behavior and the place of mind in human activity...92

Man's conative activity and its determining factors.- In describing the conative activity of man, the textbook authors generally approach the matter from the viewpoint of satisfaction of fundamental wishes or needs. Here the four wishes of W. I. Thomas are most frequently cited as basic, although one author postulates a second group of "urges." In one textbook, though admitting that there are many ways in which the activity of man could be studied, the co-authors restrict their consideration to the biological aspect, to the neglect of the intellectual or rational aspect of human behavior. In another book, the author maintains that man's fundamental needs and goals have to do with sustenance, sex and protection. While the four wishes of Thomas--the desires for new experience, for security, for

92George Simpson, op. cit., p. 35.
response, for recognition—are cited, there is no systematic attempt on the part of the authors to detail man's social behavior in these terms. Thomas himself in 1938 (the "wishes" made their first appearance in 1917) said: "They are not four wishes, they are four fields, regions within which the wishes fall."\textsuperscript{93}

The sociological description of man's conative activity may take the form of indicating either the subjective interests and urges or of specifying the objective goods which are calculated to satisfy these desires. The latter aspect returns us to the matter of specific goals, whether personal or social, material or immaterial. Emphasis on sustenance, sex, and protection as fundamental goals obviously assumes a materialistic concept of human nature. Consideration for the mental and moral nature of man would add to these the intellectual needs for truth and love and beauty and liberty.

The problem of human conative activity is related to human cognition, and the resolution of the character of intellectual knowledge influences the nature of the dynamic behavior of man. Since the intellect can attain the

knowledge of various realities and particular goods and compare them with the concept of universal good, there exists in the conative side of man a freedom of choice between the goals proposed by the intellect, so that in light of his rational knowledge man may act or not act (freedom of exercise) or he may choose this or that (freedom of specification). This freedom of choice, however, is not without its determining factors. Because of the influence of the passions or emotions upon the cognitive process itself, as well as its possible opposition to the will in the conative sphere, the exercise of choice is limited and may even be destroyed by the contrariety of the passions or the emotions. All external or environmental stimuli, moreover, have an influence insofar as they are mediated to the personality by sense knowledge and sense appetites or emotions.  

Among the textbook authors studied, the measure of freedom in man is not clearly stated and is not seldom minimized. This suggests an assumption in favor of behaviorism and the determinism of environment, or in favor of Freudianism and the determinism of the subconscious. The

former position is more general, especially with regard to the group determination of personality, which will be studied in the critique of the next central attitude. Some of the ideas illustrative of the authors' positions in this area are:

At every step personality is being made, unmade, or remade by group stimuli.

The individual is virtually powerless to resist cultural indoctrination.

Instead of speaking of a total and responsible self, one can with much greater certainty speak of the multiplicity of selves.

The range of "freedom of the will" is rather narrow, and many of our choices are but illusions.

There is no doubt that now man possesses the power to interfere in his own process of biological evolution.

Deliberate choice is not to be reckoned among the factors explaining individual variations in conduct.

A certain ambivalence is to be detected in the authors' positions on human freedom, which has its roots deep in the history of psychology. Bendix has spelled out the implications of this paradox in his examination of the basic assumptions of present-day research. He states that two contradictory views of the nature of man are asserted simultaneously in the social sciences today: one holds that it is possible to know more and more about man and society and for man to use this increasing body of knowledge to improve his condition; the other position regards man as
a creature of his drives, habits and social roles, in whose behavior reason and choice play no decisive part. A popular resolution of the dilemma is the attitude that some men are rational, but most men are not; and that the few (the social scientists) can use their knowledge for the benefit of the many.

No more important task faces the social sciences today than to determine by which "image of man" they are led. . . . In their eagerness to make the social sciences more scientific, social scientists persuade others and themselves that human advancement is identical with the advancement of scientific knowledge— with their scientific knowledge.95

Summary.— The need of a clear and solidly founded psychology for sociology is evident. The proposal of one particular psychology out of many available without making explicit the assumptions involved and appropriate evidence constitutes a preference or choice which is a value judgment.

Society and Man

Central Attitude

Society or the group confers personality upon the individual. The self does not exist at birth, but arises

in social experience. The social group creates values and remolds attitudes. The mores can make anything right at one time and wrong at another. Normality or personality involves conformity to the expectations and wishes of the group. Any one of a variety of social organizations meets human needs because it creates human needs.

While the formulation of this central attitude is lengthy, the elements of it are so interrelated that they can conveniently be criticized together. Some positions, in addition to those cited in Chapter II and in the preceding critique, which have been found in the textbooks, are the following:

Groups exist prior to the individual.

To appreciate the nature of the self, each person through his imagination takes a position as if he were outside of his own personality--the "looking glass self" of Cooley.

The self does not exist at birth, but arises in social experience.

In considering normal personality, the sociologist stresses conformity to the expectations and wishes of the group.

The person and the group are two aspects of the same thing; one does not exist without the other.

The mores determine what is "right" and what is "wrong" for the members of a social group. The real authority behind the mores is the group itself.

The problem of individuality and sociability, of ego-alter, I-Thou, the one and the many, the person and the group has long been the concern of social philosophy and social psychology. The emphasis of Comte on the organic character of society to the detriment of the individual has
given to sociology a focus on the group rather than the
person.\footnote{Cf. A. Comte, \textit{A General View of Positivism}, trans. J. H. Bridges, Reprint (Stanford, Calif.: Academic Reprints, n.d.), Chap. II, "The Social Aspect of Positivism," pp. 64-139.} The magnifying of this focus in some social science literature has provoked a loud protest against what one writer labels "groupthink," referring not to a mere instinctive conformity, but a "rationalized conformity—an open articulate philosophy which holds that group values are not only expedient but right and good as well."\footnote{William H. Whyte, Jr., "Groupthink," \textit{Fortune}, XLV (1952), 114. Italics his.} It will be the burden of this section to investigate and criticize the sources for the authors' emphasis on the group as determinant of personality. The analysis will cover the following points: the origin of the self according to Cooley, G. H. Mead, John Dewey and W. I. Thomas, sources most frequently cited by the textbook authors; the conformity of the self to the norms of the group.

\textbf{The origin of the self.}—While Durkheim with his concept of group mind has been undoubtedly influential in American sociology, the sources more evidently affecting the thinking of the textbook authors are Charles H. Cooley, George H. Mead, John Dewey and W. I. Thomas.\footnote{For an analysis of many various positions, cf. M. D. Hayes, \textit{Various Group Mind Theories Viewed in the Light of Thomistic Principles} (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1942).} Since Cooley
antedates Mead, Dewey and Thomas, and was corrected some­what by them, his theory of the self will be considered first. For Cooley, "the social self is simply an idea, or system of ideas, drawn from the communicative life, that the mind cherishes as its own."99 The idea of self seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judg­ment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.100

Those who have evaluated Cooley's social psychology are generally agreed that his philosophical orientation was idealistic in the tradition of Kant, Fichte and Hegel. His introspection and psychological method carries with it the implications of complete solipsism, i.e., society has no existence except in the individual's mind, and the concept of the self as in any sense intrinsically social is a product of experience. In addition to stating that Cooley's may be the last strong voice of the neo-Hegelians in soci­ology, Jandy indicates the strong influence of Emerson's humanitarianism and optimism as well as Spinoza's pantheism upon the sociologist.101

100 Ibid., p. 152.
Cooley's idealistic view of mind, as well as his confusion of mind with imagination can be challenged today not only from a philosophical but also from a scientific point of view. The denial of the individual as such, the characterization of imaginations or ideas as the real social facts, the conception of society and the individual as one thing, illustrate how thoroughly a philosophical assumption can distort the interpretation of social data.\footnote{102}

The influence of George H. Mead upon American social psychology and sociology has been profound, through his own writings, the continued influence of his associate, John Dewey, and his students, among whom may be numbered W. I. Thomas. It is Anselm Strauss' opinion that the major dimensions of Mead's thinking are perhaps best grasped in relation to several intellectual antecedents, for from his predecessors Mead took "his basic problems, some of his terms, and parts of his suggested solutions."\footnote{103} Among these influences may be included the idealism of the German Romantics with whom the group, folk, spirit and collectivity

\footnote{102}{As Mead puts it: "He is committed in his psychology to a subjectionistic and idealistic, rather than an objectionistic and naturalistic, metaphysical position." Cf. Anselm Strauss (ed.), The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 258.}

\footnote{103}{\textit{Tbid.}, Introduction, p. vi.}
take precedence over the autonomous individual, and who stressed social evolution and made the environment in some sense dependent upon the acting organism; the role of reason is emphasized in human action, after the rationalists and political liberals, rather than made subordinate to faith and intuition; the Comtean rejection of metaphysical thought and the adulation of scientific method is taken over almost entirely; the work of Darwin was accepted as providing the empirical underpinning for the revolutionary but inadequate romantic notions of evolution.  

An even more detailed critique of Mead's social psychology is to be found in the sympathetic study of Paul Pfuetze.  

According to Pfuetze, Mead's effort was to state a pragmatic philosophy and social psychology, reinterpreting the concepts of mind and self in the biological, psychological, and sociological terms which post-Darwinian thought made prominent, a theory which might be called "symbolic interactionism." Mead's distinction between the "I" and the "me," as two phases of the self, is central to his whole social psychology; and it is this distinction that focuses on Mead's attempt to bridge the gap between idealism and

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104 Cf. ibid., p. ix.
behaviorism, between personality and society. Lacking an adequate metaphysics which could integrate oneness and diversity, Mead, for all his efforts to escape the Cartesian dualism, does not seem to have succeeded. As Pfuetzé points out, his naturalism and pragmatism are not entirely consistent, and there is evidence of a tendency in the direction of idealism.¹⁰⁶

This fundamental idealism of Mead, adapted from Hegel, lends itself to crude determinism if Mead's concepts of sociality and the social act are taken in an objective rather than in the essentially subjective sense in which Mead employs them. For him, the ultimate unit of existence is the act—the self-caused, self-sustaining, ongoing behavior of the organism. To identify this act with social interaction as conceived in natural science terms and approached by positivist methodology is to effect a transition from the inner to the outer world which is not consistent with the premises either of idealism or a dualistic psychology or behaviorism itself. Between the idealistic "I" and the behavioristic "me," man is rather hopelessly divided against himself. Hegelian idealism plus the materialism of Feuerbach led to the economic determinism of Marx; Hegelian idealism plus the behaviorism of Watson has resulted

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 102.
in what might be called societal determinism.\textsuperscript{107} The observation of Pfuetze with regard to Mead's teaching is indicative of the unresolved foundations of his social psychology:

Mead's distrust of metaphysics appears to commit him to a positivism or operationalism. Mead declines to consider or defend whatever metaphysical assumptions may be involved; and he justifies his stand as being legitimate for the scientist who, allegedly, does not maintain a worldview. . . . But in this connection one recalls the warning of Peirce: "Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics . . . and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with which they are packed . . ."\textsuperscript{108}

The writings of W. I. Thomas, also cited frequently by the introductory textbook authors, share the idealistic frame of reference of Mead. Thomas' development of the definition of the situation, while allowing on the one hand for factors common to both the observer and the actor,

\textsuperscript{107}For an understanding of other influences affecting Mead's thought, cf. Pfuetze, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 39, 51, 77, 115, 341-343 on his metaphysics and epistemology; \textit{ibid.}, p. 55, on evolution; pp. 99-100 regarding Mead's faith in teleological social intelligence and progress.

emphasized the factors that exist only for the actors, i.e., how they perceive the situation, what it means to them, what their "definition" of the situation is. While he states that there are two fundamental practical problems which have constituted the center of attention of reflective social practice in all times, i.e., the problem of the dependence of the individual upon social organization, and the problem of the dependence of social organization and culture upon the individual, in the textbooks it is his emphasis on the determination of the individual by society which is reflected more thoroughly.

Summary. - While the consideration of the positions of Cooley, Mead, and Thomas does not exhaust the socio-psychological influences which account for the central attitude attributing the conferral of personality to the group and the origin of the self to social experience, the parallel, if not the connection, between these writers and the textbook authors is reasonably clear. Gordon Allport, in treating of the "group mind" and also in surveying the textbooks in social psychology, documents the contemporary variations of approach to the self-group problem and


repeats the warning of L. L. Bernard that "ultimately deep epistemological decisions underlie the building of social psychology as a science."

With social psychology today still not offering definite solutions to the problem of self, the choice by a textbook author of the position of Cooley, Mead, Thomas or any of the more contemporary social psychologists is understandable indeed. It would not be scientifically amiss, however, to represent to the reader of the textbooks the postulates and assumptions upon which the particular position rests. More fundamentally, the metaphysical foundations of the various positions might be investigated in order to sift the hypothesis from the fact in the theories accepted. Instead of studying the individual in relation to a reified "group," it might be profitable to study the social interactions of friendship and love between definite individuals. Sorokin cites G. H. Maslow's observation that the word "love" is not, as a rule, even indexed in

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112 Mary F. Niemeyer, The One and the Many in the Social Order (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1951), which includes a critique of Dewey and Mead.
psychological and sociological works.\textsuperscript{113} Investigation of the phenomena of love as described by Guitton may yield significant generalizations with regard to interpersonal behavior which can, in turn, be expanded to estimate the reciprocal influences of the individual and society without ascribing determinism to either one or the other.\textsuperscript{114}

Conformity of the Self to the Group: The Folkways and Mores.- The foregoing discussion of the relation of the self to the group renders intelligible the corollary that, if society confers personality upon the individual, then the social group can be said to create values and remold attitudes. The conclusion that the mores can make anything right at one time and wrong at another follows quite easily from this. However, the chief source cited in the introductory textbooks for the influence of the mores is not Cooley nor Mead, but W. G. Sumner, whose \textit{Folkways} is commonly adduced as authority for the determining effects of group customs and habits, the folkways and the mores. The currents of philosophical idealism are not so clearly discernible in Sumner's writings as in Mead's, though doubtless his early training in Geneva and Gottingen must have brought him in contact with German idealism. What both Sumner and Mead


accepted was evolutionary theory. For Sumner, the basic social law was the law of evolution, a spontaneous, unilinear, and irreversible process which cannot be changed by social effort. He proceeds on the assumption that men begin with acts, not with thoughts. The folkways are not the creation of human purpose and wit, but are developed somehow through trial and error from the various ways of acting, the best and the fittest ways surviving. The folkways are the "right" ways to satisfy all interests, because they are traditional and exist in fact.\textsuperscript{115}

Evolutionism, determinism, and materialism may be said to characterize Sumner's philosophy, though he advocated the elimination of metaphysics from the entire domain of sociological investigation. Uncritical acceptance of the doctrine of materialistic evolution led Sumner to deny the intellectual and free nature of man. Conceiving of man bound by a law of nature such as lower animals, dominated by instinct and emotion, it was quite logical to conclude to the determining effect of the folkways and mores. Sumner does not prove, and from his assumptions could not scientifically prove, that thoughts do not precede acts; he was not clear about the force producing the folkways; nor can his observation that men are sometimes dominated by

custom or habit be scientifically generalized to state that
men are at all times thus determined. However great
Sumner's contributions to analytical sociology and to
investigation of the normative aspect of social life, the
determinism in his doctrine of folkways and mores is neither
consistent with sound metaphysics nor valid social psychol­
ogy. 116

In the introductory textbooks, Sumner's theory of the
mores is qualified if not explicitly, at least implicitly,
by the assumption of some control over the direction of
social change; and the role of personal ideas and attitudes
is stressed more than by Sumner. However, as may be seen
from reading the textbooks, the language inclines still
towards group determinism, prompted perhaps by a mitigated
evolutionism and a behavioristic psychology which denies the
intellectual nature and freedom of man. Empirical researches
since Sumner are generally less sweeping in their estimate
of group influence upon the individual, though the assumptions
regarding the constitution of man are still weighted against
rationality and human freedom. 117

116 Cf. Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 66-71; John Chamber­
lain, "Sumner, How the Man Appears to One Who Never Knew
Him," in Sumner Today, ed. Maurice Davis (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1940); Robert S. Hartnett, "An Appraisal
of Sumner's Folkways," American Catholic Sociological Review,
III (1942), 193-203.

117 Cf. Musafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms
(New York: Harper and Bros., 1936); S. E. Asch, "Effects of
Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judg­
ments," in Harold Guetzkow (ed.) Groups, Leadership and Men
The concluding element in this central attitude
(which states that any one of a variety of social organiza-
tions meets human needs because it creates human needs) is
introduced in this critique, and its implications and
applications are traced in the critique of the next central
attitude.

Summary.—Perhaps the briefest characterization of
this central attitude toward the self-group, ego alter, I-
Thou problem is that the origin of the self is one thing,
and the origin of the consciousness of the self is another.
Where idealism prevails as a metaphysics, the consciousness
of self is identified with the self; and the origin of the
consciousness of self, with the origin of the self. Where
behaviorism or some other form of materialism prevails
(usually not without an implicit idealism), the mores of
the group are thought to determine the consciousness of the
self, and thus the self. Because both idealism and materi-
alism do not attain the complete man (mind and body), and
because they both tend to make man something less rather
than something more than he really is, they conclude to the
subservience of man to the group. Both represent the social

(Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie Press, 1951); George C. Homans,
The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc.,
1950); A. R. Lindesmith and A. L. Strauss, "A Critique of
Culture Personality Writings," American Sociological
Review, XV (1950), 587-600.
psychology of the masses, instead of men; and may, if pushed far enough, conclude to what might be termed "sociological totalitarianism," the rule of the masses by a self-constituted elite—the dream of Auguste Comte.  

Central Attitude 7

The variations in cultural and moral patterns observed through the study of societies and cultures confirm the fact that cultural variability and moral relativism are essentially characteristic of social life.

Obviously there is a dynamic and a static aspect to social life, as there is to individual life. A person may walk, study, sleep or eat; and while a multiplicity of actions is involved, it is one person who is performing them. To speak of one aspect and not the other, or to emphasize one to the practical neglect of the other, indicates a preferential judgment as to the relative importance of talking or writing about one rather than the other, if not its relative value. In the introductory sociology textbooks under study, the analysis of societies and cultures generally stresses change rather than stability, the variability of cultures and the relativity of morals rather than the uniformities and consistencies. Some of the

Unending change is the one fundamental attribute of culture.

Group activities, group controls, even group organizations, are continually subject to change.

The fundamental paradox inherent in the nature of both culture and society is the illusion of stability and the fact of constant change.

There is seemingly no end to culturally formed variations in how, when, and where the basic biological processes are to be carried out.

The unfortunate emphasis on cultural stability leads often to the erroneous notion that constancy in human affairs is normal and change abnormal.

The concept of development from simple to complex or of gradual evolution remained largely a literary idea until modern times.

Generally the points of emphasis illustrated by statements located in the above content categories include the lack of significance between human feelings and what is "natural;" the peripheral and somewhat incidental nature of cultural "gewgaws and folderol" such as the arts, political and religious views; the impermanence of institutions thought to be enduring; the illusion of stability and the fact of constant change, and change as a particular characteristic of modern times. Since the evidence for many of the authors' generalizations is not indicated, the question of "Why such emphasis on change?" might be raised.
Theoretically an emphasis on social change as opposed to social stability may be due to a number of factors. It might be due to the actual frequency, in a particular society, of social interactions involving the processes of conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. It might be due to the weight of anthropological and ethnological evidence which points up the varieties in the cultures of any one era and the changes involved in the development of any one specific culture. The emphasis on change could have resulted from an epistemological position which limits knowledge of the changing phenomena or appearances of things, without attaining to the underlying and enduring noumena or substances. It might be due to the metaphysics of idealism which, after the manner of Hegel, perceives a recurring dialectical process, with its theses, antitheses, and syntheses. It might be due to the psychology of social behaviorism which sees the individual constantly molded by his social milieu. It might have grown out of ideological position involving commitment to a theory of progress, whether away from something or progress toward some specified goal, or simply a cyclical fluctuation which alternates between progress and retrogression. Finally, an emphasis on change might be due to personal factors, such as a bias against tradition, or resistance to a stability which conflicts with one's desires.
While it is not possible to trace in detail the operation of these factors in the formulation of any one author's position, a general critique of these factors may pave the way for analysis of particular textbooks.

The sociological factor. - An emphasis on social change would be justified when, in a particular society at a particular time, there was found to be an increase in the number and intensity of social interactions; where the solutions involved the introduction of new and the destruction of old but accepted institutions; where the accumulation of social products and the incidence of inventions were beyond the normal developmental expectancy, however that would be computed; and where, if change be given a melioristic connotation (as it generally is), it is evident that variations from the accustomed and the usual are beneficial both to the individual and to the society. It is not clear from the evidence and documentation in the introductory textbooks that change, in the larger sense of embracing all sociocultural objects such as technology, law, religion, literature, arts and sciences, crafts and customs, is appreciably greater and more destructive of social stabilities than it was, say, in the Greek city-state, the Roman Empire in the period of decline, or 13th-century European civilization. There may be more changes in one area than another, either within the culture, or compared to the same area in
another culture or to some culture at another time, e.g., technological advances in modern Arabia or atomic development in the United States. Yet along with the change there is stability, which has to be reckoned in the whole picture of social reality; that which has changed or is changing or may change does not, by the fact of change, cease to be.

The very persistence of the basic social institutions such as the family, the work group, the school, religion, the political community, and each with certain uniform characteristics despite the time-space variables, attests to sociological stabilities despite change.

The epistemological factor. As has been pointed out earlier, an epistemological position which limits human knowledge to phenomena or accidental and material aspects of reality is not capable of attaining the noumena or substances which underlie alteration and change. The positivistic concept of science, partly because of its rejection of metaphysics and partly because of its truncated psychology, is committed to this position, and is thus limited to the empiric, dialectical and and hypothetical, transitory aspect of things.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{119}Cf. Albeft Blumenthal, "The Nature of Culture," American Sociological Review, I (1936), 875-893, for a study of twenty definitions of "culture" along with six definitions of "the social" involving the genuine and false forms both of "sociological nominalism" and "sociological realism."
The metaphysical factor.- Idealism as a metaphysic does not attribute substantiated and known reality to objects outside the mind, and is therefore in no position to reckon with the continuities of things in se, i.e., in the external world. The Hegelian dialectic, positing a constant change from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, is by its very nature a philosophy of change. While the influence of Hegel is not directly manifested by citation in any of the textbooks under study, the impact of this form of idealism, as was pointed out in the preceding critique, has penetrated contemporary sociology through the intermediacy of G. H. Mead and social behaviorism.

Bidney's contrast between the extremes of naturalism and culturalism illustrates the influence of a metaphysics on the interpretation of sociocultural facts. Naturalism, as he conceives it, tends to attribute to innate human nature, taken individually and collectively, modes of thought and action which are in fact cultural products and achievements. The culturalists, on the other hand, tend to attribute to culture a role which minimizes or ignores the element of nature. This position which is crystallized in the notion that culture is a transcendental, superpsychic process which molds the individual while developing according to natural laws of its own, and in the view which regards cultural phenomena as if they were autonomous, efficient agents of themselves. Culturalism would logically lead to a denial of
the possibility of any universal social psychology, since it is meaningless to distinguish natural from cultural processes once nature has been reduced to culture. In Bidney's polaristic concept, culture is to be understood primarily as a regulative process initiated by men for the development and organization of his determinate, substantive potentialities; human nature is genetically prior to culture, and while the determinate nature is manifested functionally through culture, it is not reducible to culture. This position seems reasonable, in that culture is directed by man and is oriented toward the development and organization of human nature. The significance of culture is thus not caught in the vicious circle of cultural and moral relativity, which is even more inconclusive than the chicken-egg controversy. With man as a measure of culture, cultural systems, while in a sense relative to the needs of different men, nevertheless involve certain functional prerequisites which are common to all men as possessing human nature.

The psychological-moral factors.—As has been indicated in the preceding critique, the psychology of social behaviorism leaves little if any room for personal, cultural,


and moral behavior independent of group pressure, save that which might be termed abnormal or antisocial. Cultural and moral standards cannot thus be weighed in relation to the satisfactions of the complete nature of man, but simply accepted insofar as they show a certain consistency within themselves and are accepted by members of the society. If, however, social behaviorism and cultural relativism be fully accepted as general principles, then the behavior of the sociologist is determined as well as that of the non-sociologist; and it then appears presumptuous of the sociology textbook writer to attempt to persuade others, directly or indirectly, that their ideas or behavior should be changed. If it be maintained that through science the sociologist overcomes his ethnocentrism, it might be argued that the emphasis on science and a particular type of science is culturally conditioned.

122 A study of the references used by the textbook authors reveals a somewhat limited orientation of their reading, confined largely to sociological writers in the United States. While histories of social thought and sociology, as well as current technical journals, report sociological contributions in other parts of the world, very little of this is introduced into the textbooks. For a statement of K. Mannheim's position on the determination of knowledge, cf. Ideology and Utopia, p. 274; for a criticism of Mannheim on this point, cf. Virgil Hinshaw, Jr., "Epistemological Relativism and the Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy of Science, XV (1948), 4-10, cf. also the criticisms of K. H. Wolff, "The Sociology of Intellectual Behavior: A Survey and Appraisal of the Sociology of Knowledge" (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1947), pp. 84-90, mimeographed.
Lindesmith and Strauss made an analysis and criticism of what have come to be known as "culture and personality" writings, including those of authors frequently cited in our textbooks. They maintain that while the interdisciplinary nature of this approach is often stressed, it is, in actual fact, sharply limited; virtually the only hypotheses which are generally regarded as worthy of checking are the modified Freudian ones. The authors draw this conclusion:

... These criticisms seem to us to indicate quite clearly that available evidence offered by the writers in support of their conclusions is inadequate and does not justify their conclusions. Positive generalizations made in this area are generally based upon unwarranted confidence in rather loose unscientific methods of interpreting data, and upon a relatively uncritical acceptance of a particular conceptual scheme. ...123

While the psychoanalytic orientation is different from that of the social behaviorism spoken of above, both have tended to concur in maintaining the position of cultural variability and moral relativism.

In showing the psychological weaknesses of the conception of cultural relativity, the problem of variability in societal and personal behavior patterns is not overlooked. Rather with an adequate psychology of man, in which the interrelations of reason, will, and the emotions are

more realistically delineated, cultural stability and cer-
tain universals of moral behavior might be seen as socio-
logically relevant. This is perhaps best brought out in the
concept of the natural law. Natural law, as here employed,
is not to be confused with the natural law of Adam Smith and
his successors;\textsuperscript{124} it refers rather to the inner reason of
man directing his actions to their proper goal. This natural
law is not a matter of legal codes or statutes; its efficacy
depends upon the development of man's reason in understand-
ing, directing, and controlling his actions. The less
reasonable man is, the more he is influenced by his emotions,
and consequently his environment. It is thus understandable
why children, or illiterate peoples, or even literate
peoples who distrust or neglect to follow reason, are found
by experiments to evidence more conformism to group pres-
sures. The three types of precepts of the natural moral law
account for differences in cultures and moral practices
without denying the existence of universals which are charac-
teristic of men as human, i.e., reasonable.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{125}These three types of precepts are primary, second-
ary and remote. The primary precepts, "Do good, avoid
evil," are a universal cultural and moral imperative, how-
ever much men may vary in their conceptions of what is good
and evil. The secondary precepts are the basic deductions
of reasonable men regarding their orientation toward the
goal, the self and society. The Ten Commandments, revealed
not because they told men something new but because men had
become unreasonable and forgetful of their perfection,
embody the secondary precepts of the natural moral law.
The variability found in the history of mankind with regard
to these precepts is accounted for by the development of
Another aspect of the problem of cultural diversity is in the consideration of the means-end relationship. Because human reason is the directive power in man, it involves an ordering which implies an end or goal and means to this end or goal. Since social life provides a variety of means to some goals, e.g., one man may derive happiness from fishing, another from art, another from sociological reason in various men and different societies, not by the determinism of the group. The remote precepts, finally, are further conclusions from the secondary precepts, e.g., the injunction regarding abortion or craniotomy in relation to the secondary precept "Thou shalt not kill"; and here more divergencies are to be expected among men and societies, depending on the development of the power of reason. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, English trans (first American ed., New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1951), I-II, QQ. 18-21, Norms of Morality; QQ. 22-48, The Passions in General; QQ. 90-108, Law. also Walter Farrell, The Natural Moral Law According to St. Thomas and Suarez (Ditchling, England: St. Dominic's Press, 1930); Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and the Natural Law (New York: Chas. Scribners and Sons, 1943); H. A. Rommen, The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy, trans. T. R. Hanley (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947); J.V.I. Casserley, Morals and Man in the Social Sciences, p. 58.

research, the reasonable goal still allows for a variety of means, which introduces another whole range of cultural diversities.\footnote{\textit{It would be an interesting study to institute a comparison and analysis between the three types of precepts of the natural moral law, Ralph Linton's theory of culture universals, particulars, alternatives, and specialities, and the findings of the most scientific anthropological and ethnological research.}}

One more point can be made here in connection with the psychological factors in cultural and moral relativity. The textbook authors generally advocate the development of a world community of nations and men. If group determinism and moral relativism are accepted as sociological principles, it is difficult to see how one culture can be brought to prevail without coercion, and how an international law can be found to respect the moral diversities of peoples.

\textbf{The anthropological factor.} - The argument for cultural and moral relativity from anthropology is conditioned, in addition to the factors listed above, on some circumstances within the field of anthropological research itself. As in other sciences, the problems are getting adequate facts, and scientific interpretation of the facts. Lévy-Bruhl's confession that he had made a mistake "to make the facts speak, instead of letting them speak by themselves,"\footnote{\textit{Cf. "Les carnets de L. Lévy-Bruhl," Revue Philosophique, LXXII (1947), 258.}} instances one anthropologist who recognized the implications of untenable preconceptions.
The works of Briffault, Westermarck, MacLennan and others in the early controversy with regard to the origins of marriage graphically illustrate how anthropological data can be marshalled to support contradictory hypotheses.\textsuperscript{128} Kroeber's \textit{a priori} postulates that all anthropologists "wish to study men's physiques and men's cultures as other natural scientists study stars or rocks or lightning . . . " and that "man, to every anthropologist, is an animal in a given world of nature: that and nothing more--not an animal with a soul or immortality or destiny or anything else attached to him beforehand,"\textsuperscript{129} involve a number of assumptions with regard to data and methods which could seriously prejudice the accumulation and interpretation of anthropological facts.\textsuperscript{130}

With regard to the quality of the facts adduced by anthropologists to prove cultural and moral relativity, the conclusion of Lindesmith and Strauss quoted above with regard to "culture and personality" writings is significant. Moreover, a comparison of the issues of \textit{Primitive Man}.\textsuperscript{131}


now *Anthropological Quarterly*, with widely quoted deterministic anthropological writers, would show interesting selectivity of data, possibly influenced by varying meta-anthropological positions.

With regard to the interpretation of the data, one of the difficulties cited by Rudolf Allers is "subjectivism," the habit of considering, almost exclusively in psychological and anthropological analysis, the way the mind is supposed to function without regard to the contents with which this mind is occupied:

... In other words, the differences one observes in human conduct may as well spring from differences in mental operations as from differences of the world in which individuals or peoples exist.

For a man to be fearful when he lives in a world of relatively great security is probably a symptom of his somehow abnormal mentality; but to be fearful if one is actually surrounded by a number of dangers, especially without the possibility of either foreseeing them or of warding them off effectively, is not a "symptom" but a perfectly normal form of behavior... .

The efforts of anthropologists to avoid "ethnocentrism," however well-intentioned, may easily lead to the conclusion of cultural and moral relativity, unless a sound axiology is employed. As Allers points out, it may happen that one's preference for his own civilization is objectively correct, although its statement rests on a purely

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subjective factor. Subjectivity and objectivity are not simply correlated to falsehood and truth—

... The mere fact of preference has no direct relation to the goodness of the thing preferred. It is a logical error to assume that a thing cannot be better than another only because I happen to like it. . . .

The position of Melville Herskovits, and other American anthropologists persuaded of cultural and moral relativity, has been subjected to severe criticism by Vivas. In answer to the cultural relativist's denial of moral nihilism, a consequence of the theory, Vivas maintains that the problem is not whether or not men set up goals for themselves but how to choose from among those goals that offer themselves to them as beckoning alternatives. With regard to the seeming impossibility for the anthropologist to make comparative judgments of value of cultures as a whole and to place cultures in an order of rank, Vivas observes that

... to dismiss the truth of a statement on the grounds of the conditions of its origin is to commit the genetic fallacy. How we come by our judgments is irrelevant to the truth which they may contain. The question that needs to be tested is whether the judgment is correct or not.

The same author maintains that an anthropologist's contention that there are no universally acceptable criteria may

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133 Ibid., p. 250.
135 Ibid., p. 33.
be taken to deny the metacultural validity of truth as well as the metacultural validity of moral judgments. Were this so, science would be valid only intraculturally, not transculturally; and if an author expects his readers to agree with him and not merely to tolerate his ethnocentrism, he will have to establish the universality and objectivity of his doctrine in a way that transcends all cultural determinations of its truth, and this would be self-contradictory.  

Summary.—While consideration of change and relativism is expected in sociology because change and relativism are found in social life, an emphasis on them without due weight being given to cultural stability and moral universals represents a distortion of social facts, a pre-judgment which might be traceable to any one or a combination of the ideological factors discussed above, or to personal, subjective factors, too numerous to mention and too elusive to discuss. Between the extremes of moral absolutism and cultural relativism, there is available a theoretical framework for anthropology and sociology which accounts adequately for stability and change, for unity and diversity, for structure and functions, without reifying the social group or denying the autonomy of the person.  

\[^{136}\text{Ibid.}, p. 35.\]
Goal of Society

Central Attitude

Progress is the comprehensive goal of society. It consists in the social evolution or advancement of men from a lowly condition towards a social organization in which the ideology of the rational control of society is achieved. The social heritage has grown more in the last few hundred years than in all the thousands of years before. Adjustment to change, which involves taking up the cultural lags, is a criterion of progress.

To speak of progress or any other objective as the goal of society obviously involves valuation since it introduces a teleological consideration, a direction or finality extrinsic to societies as they exist here and now or in the past. It is not the function of this critique to dispute the propriety of stating societal goals; rather, considering the necessity of postulating some direction and finality, the critique will concern itself with the authors' formulations of the goal or goals and the means of realizing them.

As indicators of the positions taken by the authors of the introductory textbooks surveyed in this research, the following themes taken from the "Values" and "Society" content categories are representative:

The socialization of human attitudes is the highest goal.

Telic or purposeful activity has begun its work only recently.

That a society must or ought to be consistent and integrated around common transcendent values may well be incorrect; symbiotic relationships among individuals and groups may be sufficient.
Perhaps the chief value which modern man espouses is the ideology of the rational control of society.

Sociologists who are interested in making the world a better place in which to live may work for a society which gives good adjustment, as they see it, to a maximum of man's biological functions; it may well afford us a life-time goal.

The adjustment in non-material culture, such as the family or the church, is often not so conspicuously good as it is in technology.

Conceptions of progress, like general ethical principles, are of great value.

Man's vision is too limited to plan for eternity; it is possible to act successfully in accordance with short time advances.

Insofar as scientific knowledge of man, society and culture develops, and is applied, planning will be successful, and we shall increasingly achieve the harmonious social adjustment for which we strive.

The social heritage has grown more in the last few hundred years than in all the long stretches of tens of thousands of years before.

Our assumptions concerning common goals of human activity, even though they are largely implicit and unformulated, must be reasonably well founded.

The idea of progressive self-development is recent in human thinking.

The doctrine of progress assumes the advancement from a lowly state to a higher one, not a return to a previous state of perfection in the Christian thesis of the Fall of man and the Redemption.

Progress is a movement toward an objective in the visible future thought by the general group to be desirable.

As will be observed from these items and the many others derived from the textbooks, progress is often mentioned in general terms, e.g., as an assumption which must
be true. The emphasis on progress in the last few hundred years, and the statements with regard to the recent origin of telic activity and progressive self-development, as well as the denial of return to a previous perfection, suggest the influence of the unilinear evolutionary hypothesis.\(^{137}\)

The conception of goals as this-worldly and short-range, reflect a naturalistic and pragmatic position. The stress on sustenance ties and the satisfaction of man's biological functions, as well as the characterization of non-material culture as "lagging" behind material culture, indicates a biological materialistic orientation. Science is seen to be the key to progress. Some aspects of these value positions have already been discussed in the critique of the earlier central attitude, naturalism. In this section, three concepts involved in the above central attitudes will be examined with a view to improving their interpretation as they appear in the introductory textbooks: the concept of progress; the concept of social organization; the concept of cultural lag.

The concept of progress.- One of the best known definitions of progress is given by J. B. Bury:

... It is based on an interpretation of history which regards men as slowly advancing ... in a definite and desirable direction, and infers that this progress will continue indefinitely. ...

The process must be the necessary outcome of the psychical and social nature of man; it must not be at the mercy of any external will; otherwise there would be no guarantee of its continuance and issue, and the idea of Progress would lapse into the idea of Providence.138

A rather extensive survey of the concept of progress in social philosophy, sociology, social problems and social control textbooks up to 1948 was made by De la Vega. It is summed up in the following observations:

1) Progress, particularly social progress, though not inevitable or necessary, yet is possible to man through the medium of social planning, social engineering.
2) The goal of this social progress is social betterment, social improvement, social achievement—perhaps best covered by the term "happiness."
3) Happiness is generally considered in the framework of a naturalistic, materialistic, "sensate" culture and hardly rises above it. Generally, the subjective side is emphasized and happiness is considered as either a seeking after pleasure, sometimes sensual, sometimes intellectual, or rest and satisfaction in that pleasure.
4) Values are proclaimed relative. The existence of an ultimate and absolute is hardly admitted, most often denied.
5) The various goods that go to make up or condition happiness are many and vary with individuals. No hierarchy among them is recognized. 139

It is apparent that metasociological considerations enter into the use of the term "progress," whether they have to do with the origins of society, the nature of man, or the goals of men and society. In order that the use of the concept progress be adequate to the scientific nature of sociology it is then necessary to make explicit and to test, if possible, the assumptions on which a particular theory of

progress is based. The studies of K. Mannheim and C. Dawson, as well as the earlier works of A. J. Todd and J. O. Hertzler provide numerous leads in this matter. Dawson considers in separate chapters, the traditions of sociology, history, and anthropology in relation to the idea of progress.\textsuperscript{140} Mannheim contrasts the chiliastic and the normative-liberal ideals of progress; and in speaking of the latter, which approximates more the value positions discovered in the textbooks under study, he says that the normative-liberal mentality

\begin{quote}
... holds in contempt as an evil reality everything that has become part of the past or is part of the present. It defers the actual realization of these norms into the remote future and, at the same time ... it sees it as arising out of the process of becoming in the here and now, out of the events of our everyday life. From this has developed ... the typically linear conception of evolution and the relatively direct connection between a formerly transcendental and meaningful goal and present actual existence.\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

It is evident that the whole concept of unilinear progress has not only to stand the test of clarification but also the test of verification which, in light of the facts of history, is exceedingly difficult. The writings

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{140}Christopher Dawson, \textit{Progress and Religion: An Historical Enquiry} (London: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1933), Chaps. I-III, pp. 3-69.
\end{itemize}
of the cyclical theorists, such as Toynbee, Northrop, Schweitzer and Sorokin, who draw from historical data, represent a distinct challenge to the unilinear, deterministic concept. It is the contention of Sorokin in his study of contemporary social philosophies that practically all the significant philosophies of history of our critical age reject the progressively linear interpretations of historical process and assume either a cyclical, creatively rhythmical, eschatological, or Messianic form.\textsuperscript{142}

It is evident that the concept of progress, as an assumption, requires considerable explication if the descriptions of dynamic culture, social change, social control and social planning are to be scientifically relevant. The observations of Carl Becker that the doctrine of progress "makes a virtue of novelty and disposes men to welcome change as in itself a sufficient validation of their activities"\textsuperscript{143} is not without basis as long as this task is not performed.

In the textbook instances where the societal goals or components of progress are specified in terms of health, housing, freedom and the like, it is not sufficient that specific goals be indicated; their relationships to one another, and all of them to some ultimate must be clarified,


if they are to be meaningfully coordinated. Every man, as human, acts for an end as known, i.e., as perceived by reason; and beyond the succession of means and proximate or immediate ends there has to be some ultimate, however vaguely conceived, which explains the initiation of human directive activity.  

The concept of social organization. — The term "social organization" has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent sociological theory, especially in relation to what had been for a long time accepted as its conceptual counterpart, "social disorganization." In a sociological system where a certain concept of progress and social order is assumed, the elements comprising a society are thought of as disorganized if they do not contribute to the realization of the stipulated societal goals. But the author of one of the textbooks in the survey questions whether a society must or ought to be consistent and integrated around some common transcendental values; symbiotic relationships among groups and individuals may be sufficient. If this be so, then the same author's preference for the term "social organization" has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent sociological theory, especially in relation to what had been for a long time accepted as its conceptual counterpart, "social disorganization."  

reorganization" rather than "social disorganization" is understandable. More recently, through the writings of such diverse analysts as Nisbet, Mumford, Pope Pius XII, and Riesman, the term "over-organization" is likely to enter the sociological vocabulary. The clarification of these terms in sociological literature depends on the resolution of the metasociological positions compatible with a scientific sociology, in light of which the concepts of common good, general welfare, social order, anomie and social integration will be given connotations precise enough to facilitate adequate knowledge of the social system. Some of these metasociological positions have already been considered in the preceding critiques (e.g., critique of central attitudes 1, 2, 4). Some of the sociological literature which may be reviewed on this matter is listed below.


The concept of cultural lag.—The word "lag" has a value connotation since it indicates that one thing has failed to keep pace with another as it ought to; furthermore, the contrasting of items as ahead and lagging indicates an order which is intelligible only in relation to some principle which has the function of a terminus or goal or value. The distinction between material and non-material culture, and the implication in many authors that the non-material generally lags behind the material, again indicates a value position. The original formulation by Ogburn has been modified by the author himself and has been subjected to a number of criticisms. In the introductory textbook of this study of which Ogburn is co-author, there is some attempt to document and interpret the hypothesis; but in the other textbooks, it is rather uncritically accepted. Though the concept is popularly used, little effort has been made to test its validity or to relate it basically to

fundamental sociological principles. The assumption of technology as the "pace-setter" indicates a conception of culture which is materialistically oriented. This is consistent with Ogburn's emphasis on the biological aspects of culture in his introductory textbook.

The description of cultural advances and lags becomes scientifically meaningful only when the concept of culture is clear and valid. The widely different uses of the term "culture" have been noted earlier. When the constitutive elements of culture have been made precise, then the explanations of adjustment and social problems will have concrete significance. As it is now, the question often arises, "Adjustment to what?"

Summary.- The concept of progress involves valuation preconceptions which need to be stated explicitly if


148Cf. Albert Blumenthal, _op. cit._

the sociological application of the concept is to be meaningful. The concepts of social organization, disorganization, reorganization and overorganization similarly have value and teleological implications which need to be spelled out in the interests of scientific communication. "Cultural lag" is a relative concept and the clarification of the terms of the relation is required for its fruitful use in analysis of social structure and social change.

Social Institutions

Central Attitude 9

In American family life, education, government, economic organization and religion, the ideal of democratic liberalism is more and more to be sought.

The use of the term "democratic liberalism" to cover the authors' estimate of the goals of particular American social institutions involves a generalization which cannot be adequately documented here for lack of space. Examinations of the textbooks will, however, reveal numerous passages contrasting liberalism with tradition and conservatism, democracy with authoritarianism and dictatorship, passages so presented as to favor the liberal and democratic views. A few of the value positions will be cited here to illustrate the textbook usage. Then an attempt will be made to clarify the meanings of the words "democratic" and "liberalism." Finally a critique of the textbook usage will be made in terms of the above-mentioned clarifications.
"Liberalism" and democracy in the textbooks.

It is easy for the liberally educated person, such as the sociologist, to become a moral relativist.

Although the word liberal is a term of varied meaning, it tends to mean (when applied to religion) that supernaturalism is being deemphasized in favor of some other program and teaching.

Nothing superior to or as good as the educated democratic family has been found for the training of children.

A democratic and national welfare plan is needed to forestall the day of dictatorship.

The modern alternative to totalitarian dictatorship seems to be a more decentralized and more democratic control system which seems to conserve better human values through scientific planning.

Representative democracy, its correlated system of free-economic enterprise as well as Protestantism, have produced highly significant basic human values in America.

Not until we have made further efforts to make democracy work should we abandon the philosophy of science and democratic liberalism.

Though progressive education is informal and democratic, there is a danger that some essential knowledge will be sacrificed. However, as it matures, it will be able to overcome some of its weaknesses.

According to our idealized culture patterns, American education is and ought to be free, that is, not influenced by other institutions such as church, state or economic groups.

As Dewey and Childs maintain, education should become consciously integrated with all social organization to the end that educational objectives may determine the direction of social change.

Democracy rather than dictatorship looks better to the sociologist.
Viewed broadly, the American family is passing from a somewhat authoritarian type to one more democratic, based on companionship.

Meanings of "liberalism" and "democracy."- To define "democratic liberalism" is an exercise in semantics as well as in the analysis of ideologies. Some suggestions towards clarifying the terms can be made only briefly to prepare for the critique section which follows.

H. M. Kallen maintains that liberalism is not so much a doctrine or a substantive body of beliefs as it is a method or spirit. Not affirmation but "doubt is . . . the inner condition of the liberal spirit. It acknowledges every doctrine and discipline, and it denies the claim to special privilege of any."¹⁵⁰ It is thoroughly anthropocentric: "The record shows that man can live anywhere, eat anything, move anywhere, do anything and undo anything."¹⁵¹ Vivas, in pursuing his critique of John Dewey's instrumentalism as naturalistic and secularistic, maintains that Dewey has encouraged the conceptual dichotomy of men and ideas into "liberal" and "reactionary," a procedure alien to the true philosophy whose whole view precludes partitioning of all men into the evil and the good.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 45.
In his study of the history of nineteenth century liberalism, Neill attempted to eliminate those things which are associated with liberalism only occasionally but which today are popularly thought to be essential to it; to enumerate those attitudes and ideas with which it is most frequently associated; and to arrive at some kind of provisional definition or description. Neill maintains, first of all, that liberalism is not an unchanging creed or set of beliefs; nor is it identical with democracy, nor is it a theory of liberty, for liberals are divided between emphases on freedom from something and freedom for something; nor is it correct to equate liberalism with tolerance and with a sympathetic understanding of every point of view. He finds that the constant tendencies that have inhered in liberalism through its variations include the following: close association with the middle class; relation to capitalism through the middle class; affinity for certain types of Protestantism; strong respect for property rights; an intellectual temper which has been empirical, mundane, and more or less skeptically-minded; trust in the goodness and rationality of the individual; belief in the supreme social value of intelligence, faith in progress, and an inclination to favor change of any kind.\footnote{Thomas P. Neill, \textit{The Rise and Decline of Liberalism} (Milwaukee, Wisc., The Bruce Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 3-22.} Neill further distinguishes
between ecumenical and sectarian liberalism. Ecumenical Liberalism, a generally accepted idea, which includes "at least half the human race," is identified with generosity of spirit or liberality of mind. Sectarian liberalism, reserved to the relatively few, is a precisely defined and rigidly held body of doctrine, a secular religion.

. . . Liberalism has tended to make the individual person absolute master and final judge of all things. It stands for the subjection to individual judgment of all claims—political, intellectual, and spiritual—and it therefore regards with hostility organized churches, party discipline, or philosophical systems. 154

Failure to distinguish between the ecumenical and the sectarian sense of liberalism accounts for much of the confusion surrounding the use of the term today. It is to be noted that the term itself does not often appear in the textbooks as a noun, though it is this adjectival sense, e.g., "liberally educated sociologist," "liberal clergy," which closely parallels the above description of sectarian liberalism as a state of mind and attitude toward existing institutions. It is in this sectarian sense that liberalism is here considered as a central attitude. The component factors making up the sectarian liberal state of mind are many, including the ideas of empiric science, moral relativity, constant change and value, considered in preceding

critiques—all value judgmental at least in their meta-sociological status. Insofar as the sectarian liberal attitude directs its consideration to certain social changes in achieving a liberal democracy it becomes more obviously value judgmental.\textsuperscript{155}

The meaning of "democratic" as qualifying liberalism is not easy to determine, any more than that the term "democracy" itself has a commonly accepted meaning. Herbert Agar maintains that there are three parts to the democratic ideal: "the spiritual affirmation on which it rests, the economic order which it demands, and the political machinery which puts it into effect."\textsuperscript{156} The Jeffersonian slogan "Equal rights for all, special privileges are none," while customarily interpreted in its legal and political sense, and probably meant to be so interpreted, may be used as a "spiritual affirmation" which is related to what has been described as sectarian liberalism. As some of the value positions found in the sociology texts indicate (and the full context of which could not be reproduced in this


content analysis), such an association is made by the various authors. Reinhold Niebuhr has pointed out that there are secular theories of democracy—stemming from French rationalism, English liberalism and utilitarianism, romanticism and idealism in general—and a Christian theory of democracy. The emphases on democracy and change, democracy and the pursuit of science, democracy and the secular society, democracy and freedom from restraints, democracy and social religion, democracy and cultural relativity vs. absolutism, suggest, at times, the use of the word "democratic" in an idealistic, secular sense qualifying a concept of sectarian liberalism. More frequently, the references are to democratic processes of government or social and economic life, in which cases economic or political democracy is assumed as a preferred goal or value.

Critique of "democratic liberalism." - W. A. Orton, in The Liberal Tradition, states that the crying need of modern liberalism is for a clearer perception of principle:

... a great tradition—the oldest and richest in political history—is all but lost in a fog of careless words and empty phrases. Particularly in America, the term "liberal" is being used to cover policies varying from nineteenth century laissez-faire to dictatorial collectivism; moreover, it is

being deliberately misapplied by persons whose programs, whatever their merits, are in temper and outlook, as to means as well as ends, radically alien to the liberal tradition. . . \textsuperscript{158}

The same author points out that the goal of liberalism has always been something more than the vague "liberty" to which every demagogue appeals to; it is "liberty-within-community, expanding liberty within expanding community."\textsuperscript{159}

Liberalism—and ecumenical liberalism—has a firmer foundation in the nature of man than the sectarian liberalism characterized by Neill above, and for that reason is more useful to sociology both as a way of thinking and as a social goal to achieve.

Liberalism, as a way of thinking, involves freedom of thought. If freedom of thought be interpreted in terms of philosophical idealism, in that the mind is the measure of reality, then the mind is free from the obligation of submission to reality. It enjoys the full liberty of creating its own world. If that alone is true which seems to be true, that alone is good and lawful which seems to be good and lawful. Because the mind makes its own truth, it is completely free to make whatever it cares to be truth in both the speculative and the practical orders. No authority need be consulted, for none is greater than man's own mind;


\textsuperscript{159}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.
no limits can be placed on this freedom of thought for there is no one and no thing to impose any limits. On the contrary, to say that reality measures the mind, imposes definite limits upon freedom of thought. To perfect itself with truth, the mind must first subject itself to reality; and this subjection, dictated by the objectivity of things, brings the true freedom of thought for the mind to range within its proper fields without fear of destroying itself. Truth establishes a limit to freedom of thought.160

Insofar as liberalism refers to the life of extra-mental activity rather than thought, it involves the liberty or freedom of the human will to select and use the means necessary to develop the potentialities of the human person. In this process the individual draws from and is, in a sense, limited by the reality of the common good or society around him; on the other hand, he contributes to the advancement of the general welfare by perfecting himself through work and products of his work.

The acceptance of inadequate epistemologies, whether of idealism or materialism, gives to the use of liberalism a slanted meaning. Similarly, where through determinism of human activity, whether by environmental processes or

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unconscious or subconscious constitutional factors, it
denies the deliberate choice to man, liberalism becomes a
contradiction in terms.\textsuperscript{161}

Since the common good, as a condition of liberty,
needs a directive power to attain the goal of the group,
legitimate authority is in no wise opposed to liberty. The
unfortunate use of the word "authoritarian" in recent
sociological literature, especially where it is combined
with the advocacy of "liberalism," tends to suggest an op­
position between authority and liberty.\textsuperscript{162}

Democracy adds to liberty the element of the govern­
ment of the majority by the majority. If the word "democrat­
ic" be used to describe a way of thinking, i.e., a way in
which the mind of the majority obtained through consensus
prevails, then it could be closely related to public opinion
as a norm of prevailing attitudes. In view of the differ­
ences in public opinion, "democratic" might conceivably be
applied to liberalism as indicating that form of sectarian
liberalism which finds expression in the free manifestation
of personal opinions as a segment of public opinion, aided
by the climate of political democracy.

\textsuperscript{161}Cf. Rudolf J. Harvey, The Metaphysical Relation
Between Person and Liberty and Its Application to Historical
Liberalism and Totalitarianism (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 1942).

\textsuperscript{162}Cf. T. Shibutani, Review of the Authoritarian
Personality, American Journal of Sociology, LVII (1952),
527-529. Cf. also M. St. Catherine Sullivan, The Concept
of Authority in Contemporary Educational Theory (Washington,
This position of democratic liberalism has been under attack in recent years, and any sociological use of the concept, however implicit, is to be evaluated in light of critiques such as those by Orton, Hallowell, and Lippmann. These studies and others afford documentation of the involvement of some contemporary forms of liberalism in questionable assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge, man, science, value, mores and morals, assumptions which have been examined in preceding sections of this critique of central attitudes.

Summary. - Whether the proponents of democracy, or liberalism, or democratic liberalism, however defined, can defend their positions or not, the textbook writer who employs them is introducing a metasociological factor which indicates a value position. It is not to be inferred from the tone of this critique that the introduction of such value positions is alien to the functions of the introductory sociology textbook; nor does it indicate that the analyst is any the less committed to the values of democracy or liberalism as he understands them. It is maintained, however, that the metasociological character of these positions must be made explicit for the reader; and furthermore,

that the more firmly rooted in the truths of other sciences and disciplines these assumptions are found to be, the more meaningful and fruitful the sociology based on them.\textsuperscript{164}

\textbf{Central Attitude 10}

Traditional religion is non-rational and non-scientific, based on myth or feeling rather than objective facts. Its influence is in inverse proportion to the state of rationality and scientific research. It is only science and the scientific method that have made any real dent in the mountain of error that is primitive and contemporary supernaturalism. Religion should be essentially social. A religion that leaves a person satisfied with saving his own soul is socially obstructive.

The concept of "religion" as employed in the introductory textbooks is so broad that it is difficult to compose a critique which would be at once sociologically relevant and adequate. The central attitude, as formulated above from positions expressed in the textbooks, contains a number of elements which reflect some of the usages of

\textsuperscript{164}To attempt a critique of the democratic liberalism concept in relation to particular areas of social organization would involve too lengthy a treatment. Lines of possible investigation can, however, be indicated for certain sociological fields.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] \textbf{In marriage and the family}, the concepts of institution vs. companionship, divorce, birth prevention, companionate marriage, democratic vs. authoritarian child-rearing patterns.
  \item[b)] \textbf{In economic life}, the relative social efficiency of individualism, collectivism, cooperatives, enterprise capitalism.
  \item[c)] \textbf{In education} traditional and "progressive" approaches.
  \item[d)] \textbf{In political organization}, democracy, authoritarianism and totalitarianism on the national level; oneworldness on the international level;
  \item[e)] \textbf{In religion}, community churches, socialization of religion, denominationalism and tolerance, universal church.
\end{itemize}
"religion" disclosed through this content analysis. After illustrating some additional value positions from the textbooks, this critique will consider the following points: the definition of "religion"; religion as non-scientific, as myth based on feeling; the impact of science on religion; and the social aspects of religion.

**Value positions from the introductory textbooks.**

Out of the early emphasis upon the family group came two universal principles of the Jewish and Christian religions, the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man.

The social principles of Christianity lay dormant for centuries, until about 1885 when they began to be re-interpreted.

The tendency of religion everywhere is both socially and personally conservative.

Since science makes more changes than does religion, the more scientific members of a religious group change more rapidly in their ideas about religion than do other members.

Every group with which we are affiliated indoctrinates us with prejudicial views of many things. This is true of our church.

It is erroneous to conclude that there is something about human beings *per se* which requires belief in a personal Deity.

Religion has traditionally offered people some of the most satisfying rationalizations for life's greatest frustrations.

What may be regarded as "irreligious" and "pagan" from the viewpoint of traditional theology may be commonplace theology and practice in a short time.

Science, as religion, works with the unknown, but in a methodical, objective manner.
Religious experience, the essence of religion, is fundamentally independent of any particular belief.

The church lags greatly in adjusting its creed to new facts and viewpoints.

The biblical story can now be taken for what it is, the work of the creative imagination of a gifted but prescientific people.

Perfect gods are long in coming because man is long in developing a concept of perfection.

The universality of religious experience gives clear proof that it is deeply rooted in man's needs.

The messiah is the creature of the people themselves. The most outstanding was Jesus Christ.

As science permeates the masses, the notions of God and future existence change and there is more emphasis on the social gospel.

The world is governed by social forces and not by mysterious leadership.

The definition of "religion." - Some of the authors' definitions or descriptions of "religion," "religious experience," "religious folkways," have been indicated. While certain similarities are to be found in these descriptions the statements clearly are not synonymous.  

However religion in general be defined, religion as an independent, objective entity does not exist; and consequently any generalizations about "religion" by sociologists are founded on an unwarranted universalization. Religion

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has no existence save as an abstraction; and even where it be defined in terms of a particular religion, or religious institution, generalizations can be made only insofar as the sociological methods are adequate to the data under scrutiny. The textbooks in this content analysis often do not distinguish clearly between magic and religion, between belief and practice, between dogmas and private interpretations of dogmas by theologians and others, between natural and supernatural religions, and finally, among the religions claiming to be supernatural, e.g., Christianity, between doctrinal and denominational differences. Because of this lack of distinctions, it is possible for the analyst to criticize only their religious positions from a point of view which is specific and familiar to him, viz., Roman Catholicism. This procedure has the advantage of approaching the value judgment data from the position of a religious institution which, explicitly or implicitly, is reckoned to be a "traditional" religion in that it possesses a long history, maintains an orthodoxy of central beliefs, claims a definitive body of revealed knowledge and ecclesiastical definitions or clarifications of this divine revelation, and teaches the existence of a supernatural God, not a man-made or evolving deity. Insofar as the Roman Catholic Church has had an outstanding institutional existence, it is an appropriate subject of socio-historical analysis in relation to which
sociological statements about religion in general can be interpreted.\textsuperscript{166}

Operating from the broad definition of religion as denoting the sum total of the relationships between God and man, the differences in religions can generally be explained in terms of varying concepts of man and God, with the resulting variants in the relationships between the two terms.

It is sufficient to indicate here that from the analyst's concepts of man and God\textsuperscript{167} two general principles emerge with regard to the relationships between the two. These principles, which are relevant to the sociological discussion of religion, are these: grace (supernatural life in man) perfects nature (the natural in man); it does not thwart or destroy it; faith and reason are both intellectual lights acquainting man with the truth of things. Though above reason, faith can never be opposed to it; for both spring from the creative power of God, one in the supernatural order, the other in the natural order. Sociological references to religion as fantasy thinking, to the

\textsuperscript{166}Although no thorough sociological study of the Catholic Church has been done, at least in English, a suggestive analysis from a socio-economic point of view is available in the Institute of Business Management Audit, "The Roman Catholic Church," (New York: The Institute, 1955).

supernatural as unnatural, to the progress of science at the expense of religion, are founded in theological assumptions alien to this position.\textsuperscript{168}

Religion as non-scientific, as myth based on feeling.- While none of the authors studied refer explicitly to religion or theology as being unscientific or irrational, the association of religion with fantasy thinking, with origins in fear, with the lack of objectivity, with subjective feeling or emotion, with rationalization, with bias or ethnocentrism or superstition, carries a pejorative implication. Where there is the inference that religion has been marked historically by an unwillingness to test assumption by evidence, to examine means before assigning causes, to check the subjective feelings by objective facts, the label of superstition is applied to religion. However, as the Protestant writer Hedley points out, these very inferences may indicate superstitions on the part of those who so judge religion generally.\textsuperscript{169} The same author argues that if those


who belittle religion are devotees of science, they are required to examine all the evidence, not only the bits of evidence which seem to support their own views; if they are socially conscious members of human society, they are obliged to study that society in terms of its real history, its real structure and motivations, rather than to retreat into the intellectual abstractions ("or rather, the intellectual creations ex nihilo").

Until the declared foemen of religion meet these requirements, they stand condemned as being superstitious indeed.170

The observation of Talcott Parsons might be recalled here, viz., that the sociologist, like the historian, can now say unequivocally that the fairly recent popular positivistic view that religion was essentially grounded in the ignorance and superstition of a pre-scientific age, and could be expected rapidly to disappear in our era, is definitely in error. "The proponent of this view is the victim of his own ignorance and counter-superstition."171

A number of factors might be suggested as accounting for the tendency to think of religion as unscientific,

170Ibid., p. 4.

irrational, or mythical. Among these are the following:

a) The anti-intellectualistic tenor of early Protestant theology, especially exemplified in Luther's concept of human nature corrupted by original sin, and the consequent distrust of the reasoning process.

b) The positivism of Auguste Comte, maintaining the inadequacies of theology and metaphysics.

c) The early theories of evolution which ascribed the origins of religion to the irrational fears of primitive man.

d) Value theory which made of values, including religious values, subjective states of feeling with no ontic referents.

e) Freudian and Marxian interpretations of human behavior which associated religious tendencies with less than rational behavior.

f) The cult of science as the only valid approach to truth, which makes all other approaches unscientific and irrational.

g) The methodology of natural science as applied to human affairs and hence being ill-equipped to probe religious ideas and sentiments.

Some of these factors have been dealt with in preceding critiques. Here mention can be made of two sociological examinations of current conceptions of religion by
sociologists. One study, by O'Dea, points out that the Parsonian sociology of religion, which is typical of contemporary sociology, is constructed on the basis of Pareto, Malinowski, Durkheim and Weber, and remains essentially positivistic and Comtean.\footnote{172}

And Kolb criticizes the functional theory of religion in terms of a moral dilemma, which

\[ \ldots \text{can be stated briefly as follows: A sociologist who believes that people must believe in the validity of values (functional theory of religion) but that such values actually have no validity (moral and ethical positivism) must either deceive his public or help in dissolving the forces which hold society together. The choices involve a dilemma because neither is morally satisfactory . . .} \footnote{173}

Kolb shows how the influences of Max Weber, cultural relativism from anthropology, and philosophical positivism, have variously converged to induce an agnostic or irreligious attitude in sociological thinking. Positivism is seen as transforming Weber's attitude of humility toward values into one of arrogance:

\[ \ldots \text{The syllogism is simple, Science is the only valid mode of cognition. The validity of values and other superempirical ideas cannot be demonstrated by science. Therefore values have no ontic} \footnote{172} \text{Thomas F. O'Dea, "The Sociology of Religion," American Catholic Sociological Review, XV (1954), 91, also 73-103, including bibliography.} \footnote{173} \text{William L. Kolb, "Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of Religion: The Growth of a Moral Dilemma," Social Forces, XXXI (1955), 305.} \]
status. The conclusion takes two forms, one mod­
erate, the other radical. The first conclusion
states that one must of necessity be agnostic con­
cerning the ontic status of values. Since science
is the only mode of knowing reality, any reality
which cannot be known scientifically is unknowable
and therefore we can say nothing about. The
second conclusion presses its logical attack
harder and simply categorizes all statements about
values and other superempirical ideas as non­
sense.\textsuperscript{174}

Only one of the textbook authors studied might be
said to emphasize favorably the importance of traditional
religion for individual and social life. While here and
there in the other textbooks there are passages which speak
approvingly of traditional religion, the general tenor of the
treatment of religion is at best patronizing and not seldom

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{174}Kolb, ibid., 306. Cf. also Edwin R. Goodenough
"Needed: Scientific Study of Religion," Commentary, V
(1948), 272-277; Everett C. Hughes, "The Early and the Con­
temporary Study of Religion," American Journal of Sociology,
LX (1955), Editorial Foreword to Special Issue on the
Sociology of Religion, i-iv. "When we sociologists are
mature enough to study ourselves and our works with the
combination of objectivity with curiosity which we achieve
so easily in studying other lines of work, the chief theme
of our study will be the relation of emancipation to knowl­
edge and inquiry. Some grow emancipated from the faith of
their fathers just enough to want to run from it and to
tear from their clothing all the name tags of the past;
others, just enough to turn in bitter attack upon the very
faith that gave them the energy to make their mark in the
world, and sometimes, in not accidental error, to turn
poisoned weapons upon themselves. Still others, having
somehow conserved the energy and the spirit of the move­
ments in which they were bred, have combined the sensitive
knowledge of participation with a detachment which lets
them see even dear things in their universal aspect . . . ."
\(1\).
agnostic toward any belief save that of naturalistic humanism.\textsuperscript{175}

\textbf{The impact of science on religion.} - The assertions that it is only science and the scientific method that have made a real dent in the mountain of error that is primitive and contemporary supernaturalism, and that as science permeates the masses the notions of God and future existence change, assume interpretations of science and the supernatural which are neither clear nor generally accepted.

Not only are there semantic difficulties in such opinions, but the statements are not backed up by adequate illustrations, much less conclusive historical evidence. It is true that science has helped to correct magical or superstitious practices; but the identification of these with supernaturalism is hardly in accord with the scientific use of terms. "Supernaturalism" may mean a number of things dependent on how it is defined by the authors in accordance with accepted usage. If the term is employed to mean that which is above the powers and capabilities of nature, and depending upon divine assistance for its activity, it is

difficult to see how, short of an atheistic, materialistic assumption, human science could contradict supernatural truth. However, the term is probably meant to cover a more loosely conceived area of practices contrary to "religion" not apprehended by particular scientific methods; in the former case, intellectual humility would recognize the limitations of the scientific method so narrowly conceived. The reference of one author to the scientific absurdity of restoring health by kissing old bones or relics is an example of the erroneous statements stemming from unscientific analyses of religious phenomena. In judging of the meaningfulness of religious practices, it is useful to keep in mind, in addition to the formulated doctrine of a Church, the variant acceptances of that doctrine by the adherents of the religion. In his study of a southern, urban Catholic parish, Fichter has distinguished four types of members—nuclear, modal, marginal and dormant—and has indicated the empirically derived characteristics of each.\(^176\) It is quite possible that the dormant member might hang on to a relic as a superstition whereas the nuclear member may accept it in accord with the defined Church doctrine.

At least as far as the defined doctrine of the Catholic Church is concerned, the analyst knows of no change in the concept of God or future existence brought about by

scientific discoveries. However, the opinions of some theologians and religious thinkers have been disproved by scientific research; in which case it is necessary to distinguish between the defined doctrine of the Church proposed as infallible, and the opinions of theologians which have been in error. Although the rationalist trends in Biblical criticism claimed to have disproved much of the supernatural interventions recorded in the Bible, subsequent historical and archaeological research have demonstrated the a priori character of these rationalist criticisms.\textsuperscript{177}

The positing of a conflict between science and religion is due not only to the semantic confusions indicated above, or to the assumption of conflict between faith and reason considered earlier, but also to historical biases\textsuperscript{178} which, while corrected by contemporary, historical research, have not yet been generally corrected in the sociological treatment of religion and religious institutions. As Barber points out in his study of science and the social order, many have felt that empirical rationality and science are both uniquely modern, partly out of historical


ignorance and partly out of a rationalistic bias about the nature of earlier and other societies. "For at least three or four thousand years and even beyond that, the record of the evolution of science runs fairly continuously without unbridgeable gaps."\(^{179}\) With regard to the medieval period, considered by some sociologists to have been unmindful of or hostile to reason and science, Barber observes that the power of rational thought was developed to a high level, and that "there is probably no greater single achievement in the history of rational thought than the monumental system of writings of St. Thomas Aquinas."\(^{180}\) The same author explains that "our superficial knowledge" of the medieval world has made us exaggerate its rigidity, its lack of change, and progress, a distorted picture" which new work in the history of science is changing . . .\(^{181}\) Further, contrary to the common insistence on Protestantism as fostering the growth of science, it was, as Merton points out, Calvinism and not Protestantism as a whole that had the beneficial influence on science, and Calvinism only necessarily at a given stage of its development where it brought the great forces of medieval rationalism into everyday life.\(^{182}\)


\(^{180}\)Ibid., p. 45.

\(^{181}\)Ibid., p. 47.

\(^{182}\)Ibid., pp. 57-59.
When the historical perspective of science is corrected by the study of the works of Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon and their religious successors through Mendel and Pasteur, the inference that science is hostile to and destructive of supernatural religion, at least as embodied in Catholicism, will be demonstrated to be a bias conditioned by certain unwarranted theological, philosophical and historical assumptions.\textsuperscript{183}

The social aspects of religion.- Emphases on the social aspects of religion might well be expected from sociologists, since it is these aspects which most directly fall within the province of sociological study. However, to state that religion is essentially social, or to depreciate the concern of the individual for his eternal salvation and happiness, is to allow the sociological aspect of religion to obscure the totality of religious belief and practice. Brewton Berry pointed out in his study of religion in sociology textbooks that if one relies on these books the basic function of religion is that of helping man adjust himself to a capricious, unfriendly, unpredictable universe;

or it is man's invention for dealing with the problem of bad luck; or it functions to conserve the status quo or dominant social values, and to support the mores and institutions of society.  

To the extent that positivism, in the tradition of Comte, and naturalism and pragmatism in the tradition of John Dewey, have influenced the writers of the introductory textbooks, the stress on the social nature of religion is comprehensible. As is well known, Comte conceived of positive religion as sociologically oriented.  

The Humanist Manifesto, to which Dewey was a signer and which is listed among Dewey's authentic writings in the official Bibliography of John Dewey, contains the following tenets regarding religion:  

Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted by modern science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values. . . . In the place of the old attitudes involved in worship and prayer, the humanist finds his religious emotions expressed in the heightened sense of personal life and in a cooperative effort to promote social well-being.  

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184 Cf. Berry, op. cit., 1302.  
The emphasis of positivist religion and religious humanism or social welfare is understandable in terms of their respective creeds.

The implication that traditional religion in general must become socially oriented, if it is to survive, introduces several problems which can be indicated only briefly here, respectively, as historical, personal, and theological problems.

A reading of history of Western civilization and Christianity, which neglects to consider adequately the social effects of Catholicism in early and modern times, is noticeable in the textbooks studied, despite the availability of considerable evidence.

Wach distinguishes the integrating power of doctrine and the integrating power of worship. If the elements of these phases of religious activity are related to types of members such as those distinguished above by Fichter, the sociologist would be better able to determine whether the particular lack of social activity exists because of religion or despite it.

Both Luther's concept of faith without works and the Calvinist theory of predestination minimize the religious significance of social action on behalf of one's fellowmen.

The Catholic doctrine on the order of charity maintains that the love of neighbor is an essential condition of salvation. This is not a doctrinal innovation but simply the theological formulation of the admonitions of Christ, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," (Matthew, 22:39); and of St. John "If anyone says 'I love God,' and hates his brother, he is a liar." (I John 4:20.)

Comparison of This Research with Other Surveys of Sociology Textbooks

While individual studies of article length examining trends in American sociological textbooks have occasionally appeared in professional journals, only two detailed book-length studies have been published in recent years.

The most comprehensive survey of sociology textbooks is Hobbs' *The Claims of Sociology* (1951).\textsuperscript{189} While there are considerable differences between the methodology of this analysis and the Hobbs' study, a comparison of his findings with the illustrations of value judgments and the central attitudes indicates certain areas of agreement. In particular, these are with regard to the textbook treatments of the sociological viewpoint, personality and cultural conditioning, liberalism, democracy, cultural lag, cultural relativity, traditional religion, progress, science, and social planning.\textsuperscript{190} The author's conclusion with regard to textbook sociology may be seen to concur with certain aspects of this research:

Textbook sociology may be defined as a discipline in which only certain aspects of quantitative data and only certain types of objective studies are selected so that a particular point of view in relation to society can be emphasized. The sociological point of view is "humanitarian" if this term involves lamentation about war, economic maldistribution, and individual unhappiness. It appears, however, to be a secular, materialistic, short-term humanitarianism. It is "liberal" if this term applies to doctrinaire criticisms of economic maldistribution, of inequalities between sexes, classes and races, and of social controls which inhibit each person's full expression of his personality. It is not completely

\textsuperscript{189}Hobbs, *op. cit.* One hundred twenty-nine textbooks published between 1926 through 1945 were originally examined; after certain exclusions, the analysis was confined to 83 non-sectarian textbooks comprising 33 introductory ones, 28 in social problems, and 22 in the family field. Cf. pp. 4-7.

\textsuperscript{190}Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 168-170, for a summary statement of the author's findings.
liberal, however, if this term implies a tolerant historical perspective and a balanced and unbiased presentation of controversial issues in society. It is "objective" if this term applies only to critical emphasis against institutions and traditions. It is lacking in objectivity, however, in uncritical acceptance of platitudeuous remedies and goals for society. It is "scientific" if this term includes a process of selection of only certain aspects of quantitative data and certain types of studies. It is not scientific if the term excludes the use of unverified hypotheses in proceeding from unwarranted assumptions to untenable conclusions.\textsuperscript{191}

Sorokin's \textit{Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences} (1956)\textsuperscript{192} proceeds from the author's long and extensive teaching and writing experience as a sociologist and social theorist, rather than from a formalized procedure for analysis of certain textbooks. After prefacing his criticisms by the confession that he himself is one of the sociological "sinners," he lists the following fads and foibles as characteristic:

"Amnesia and the Discoverer's Complex." Amnesia—nothing important discovered during all the preceding centuries; real scientific era began with recent researches (p. 3, Chap. 1).
"Verbal Defects: Obtuse Jargon and Sham-Scientific Slang": substitution of vague, cumbersome, and imitative terms for clearer and more comprehensible ones (p. 21, Chap. 2).
"Illusion of Operationalism": only operational method can yield valid results (p. 32, Chap. 3).
"Testomania": tests as strictly scientific, precise, operational and unerring (p. 52, Chap. 4).
"Quantrophrenia": pseudomathematical imitations, applied to non-quantifiable data (p. 103, Chap. 7).

\textsuperscript{191}Ibid., pp. 175-176.
\textsuperscript{192}Sorokin, \textit{op. cit.}
"Social Physics": construction of a natural-science sociology and psychology (p. 187, Chap. 9).
"Mental Mechanics": robot or physicalistic psychology (p. 195, Chap. 9).
"Social Atoms and Small Groups": social counterparts of units of physical sciences (p. 213, Chap. 10).
"Predictability": criterion of scientific theory (p. 251, Chap. 11).
"Obsolescent Philosophy and Theory of Cognition": empiricism in positivism, instrumentalism, operationalism, etc. (p. 279); denial of intuitional or supersensory way of cognition (p. 281, Chap. 12).
"Hearsay Stuff": speech-reactional operations rarely checked for accuracy (p. 298, Chap. 13).
"Negativism": negativistic, pathological, "dirty," interpretations of man, social phenomena (p. 301, Chap. 13).

Despite the obvious differences in approach between Sorokin's and the present study, certain agreements may be noted, particularly in the areas labeled "social physics," "mental mechanics," "predictability," "obsolescent philosophy and theory of cognition," "hearsay stuff," and "negativism."

Indication of similarities between this research and the Hobbs and Sorokin studies admittedly has a limited corroborative value because of the significant differences in methodology, data, and norms of interpretation involved. A paralleling of the specific findings of each survey might, however, yield focal areas of investigation for future researches.
CHAPTER IV

TOWARD A SOCIOCULTURAL INTERPRETATION OF VALUE
JUDGMENTS IN THE SELECTED TEXTBOOKS

As stated in the introductory pages of this dissertation, this research is conceived as an exercise in the sociology of sociology, an investigation suggested by the area known as the sociology of knowledge or intellectual behavior. The content analysis and interpretations in the preceding chapters represent an effort to understand a segment of American sociological writing from an intrinsic point of view, i.e., letting sociology speak for itself through sociologists who write leading sociology textbooks. With the value-judgment data categorized and typed, and certain value orientations specified in terms of central attitudes, the authors through their textbooks are seen as a somewhat homogeneous group possessing certain broad characteristics. Their sociological identity thus established, these writers may be further analyzed in relation to the sociocultural areas presumed to exercise an influence on them. This task, falling under the heading of extrinsic interpretation as described by K. Mannheim and others, can be touched upon only in this project.
The elements of a thorough study would include (in addition to specified data truly representative of the textbooks), a comprehensive pattern of sociocultural factors, American or otherwise, likely to influence textbook writers, and also a theory of the sociology of knowledge or intellectual behavior capable of rendering intelligible the reciprocal influences between the textbook data and the sociocultural factors.

The value-judgment data of this research and the central attitudes derived from them constitute a body of material which should facilitate such an extrinsic interpretation. The tasks of formulating an adequate theory of the sociology of intellectual behavior and a workable pattern of American sociocultural factors can be sketched only roughly in a project as limited as this. What can be done is first, to indicate briefly some components of a sociology of intellectual behavior, i.e., of sociocultural factors generally presumed to exercise an influence on intellectual behavior; second, to institute a comparison between qualities frequently ascribed to the American ethos, value orientation or character, and the central attitudes discovered in the content analysis of the textbooks, in an effort to discover similarities and dissimilarities which might suggest areas of reciprocal influence; and finally, in the tradition of the sociology of intellectual behavior to offer some observations, interpretations, and hypotheses.
on the American sociocultural factors likely to influence
the production of American introductory sociology textbooks.¹

Some Components of a Sociology of Intellectual Behavior

The sociology of knowledge or intellectual behavior,
under the influence of Karl Mannheim and other students, has
recently produced a group of ideas and a body of literature
which already may be said to constitute a separate field of
sociological investigation. This field, as conceived by
Robert K. Merton, is "primarily concerned with the relations
between knowledge and other existential factors in the
society or culture."² Noting that the coexistence of con­
flicting perspectives and interpretations within the same
society leads to an active and reciprocal distrust between
groups, Merton points out that in such a situation, one no
longer inquires whether beliefs and assertions are valid or
not, but rather asks how it happens that these views are
maintained—what psychological, economic, social, or other
factors account for them?³ Merton explains that the soci­
ology of knowledge came into being with the signal hypothesis

¹Cf. Kurt H. Wolff, "Notes Toward a Sociocultural
Interpretation of American Sociology," American Sociological
Review, XI (1946), 545-553.

²Robert K. Merton, "The Sociology of Knowledge,"
Chapter XIII, in Twentieth Century Sociology, ed. by Gurvitch
and W. E. Moore (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc.,

³Cf. ibid., pp. 368-369.
that not only error or illusion or myths but even "truths" were to be held socially accountable, were to be related to the historical society in which they emerged; he further explains that the discipline is

fast outgrowing a prior tendency to confuse provisional hypothesis with unimpeachable dogma . . . it focuses on those problems which are at the very center of contemporary intellectual interest.

Merton has drawn up a paradigm designed to introduce a basis of comparability among the welter of studies which have appeared in this field, the chief approaches considered being those of Marx, Scheler, Mannheim, Durkheim, and Sorokin. The main elements of this paradigm, useful in providing an overview of the field, are the following:

1. WHERE is the existential basis of mental productions located?

2. WHAT mental productions are being sociologically analyzed?

3. HOW are mental productions related to the existential basis?

4. WHY are manifest and latent functions imputed to these existentially conditioned mental productions?

5. WHEN do the imputed relations of the existential base and knowledge obtain?

\[\text{Cf. ibid., pp. 370-371.}\]

\[\text{Cf. ibid., p. 404.}\]

\[\text{Cf. ibid., pp. 371-372.}\]
In one of his essays on "The Sociology of Knowledge," Karl Mannheim indicates that the older method of intellectual history, which was oriented toward the *a priori* conception that changes in ideas were to be understood on the level of ideas, blocked recognition of the penetration of the social process into the intellectual sphere. The flaws in the above-mentioned assumption and the analysis of concrete cases made it evident, to his mind, that

. . . (a) every formulation of a problem is made possible only by a previous human experience which involves such a problem; (b) in selection from the multiplicity of data there is involved an act of will on the part of the knower; and (c) forces arising out of living experience are significant in the direction which the treatment of the problem follows.  

Mannheim maintains that the basic task of research in the sociology of knowledge is to determine the various viewpoints which gradually arise in the history of thought and are constantly in process of change. The method of imputation determines these various positions, provides a clear conception of the perspective of each product of thought and brings the perspective thus established into relationship with the currents of thought of which it is a part. These currents of thought must be then traced back to the social forces determining them. There are, he holds,

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two levels on which the task of imputation may proceed. The first deals with general problems of interpretation. It reconstructs integral styles of thought and perspectives, tracing single expressions and records of thought which appear to be related back to a central Weltanschaung, which they express... The second level of imputation operates by assuming that the ideal types built up are indispensable hypotheses for research into the thinking of the individuals under consideration.8

Despite some telling criticisms of Mannheim's teaching in this area9 the observations on perspective and imputation can be helpful in formulating the mode of analysis and criticism of intellectual products such as the sociology textbooks under study. The content analyses and formulation of central attitudes are somewhat related to the first level of imputation described by Mannheim. The second task would then be to trace the currents of thought or central attitudes back to sociocultural factors presumed to influence them. The writings of Child, Scheler, Maquet, Sorokin,

8Ibid., p. 272.

G. Allport, and Wolff, in addition to those of Mannheim and Merton, should be of help in such a project.\textsuperscript{10}

Since a sociology textbook, like any literary or artistic product, is the concretization of a series of human acts, it can be studied not only in itself, but in relation to the circumstances surrounding its production. Human

actions, and the products of human actions, may be considered circumstantially: in their causes, i.e., in respect to the person acting (Who?), the purpose (Why?), and the means used (By What Means?); in themselves, i.e., in respect to the time factor (When?), the space factor (Where?), the mode of acting (How?); in their effects, i.e., results (What?).

In summary, it may be stated that the components of an adequate theory for the sociology of intellectual behavior should give due weight to the sociocultural factors or circumstances affecting the personality of the thinker and also explain sufficiently the influence of the thinker upon the sociocultural data presented to him. The psychological and epistemological assumptions of the various writers in this field deserve special consideration, insofar as presuppositions in these areas affect greatly the interpretation of the reciprocal influences of culture and personality.\textsuperscript{11} While waiting upon the development of a more comprehensive theory in the sociology of intellectual behavior it is possible to employ the available insights in interpreting such data as are reported in the following section.

\textsuperscript{11} Cf. Chap. III, critique of central attitudes on personality and culture.
Comparison of the Central Attitudes with Qualities Ascribed to the American Ethos, "Mind," "Character"

The significance of any comparison depends upon the specificity of the items compared. In this instance, the central attitudes, derived from the value-judgment data of the introductory sociology textbooks, are reasonably precise for comparative purposes. The delineation of the sociocultural patterns in the American ethos, "mind," "character," or value-orientation is bound to be limited, due to the scarcity and unevenness of the data available. The literature on studies of "national character" points up some of the pitfalls as well as the advantages of this type of investigation.\(^{12}\)

Although the published observations of Americans and foreigners, sociologists and otherwise, may be somewhat

lacking in the sophistication expected for a science of national character, they nevertheless represent considered approaches worthy of study. Accordingly, a number of the better known studies of American culture, embracing various points of view (historical, political, literary, philosophical, and anthropological, as well as sociological) were investigated for elements of American sociocultural patterns which might serve for comparison with the central attitudes.  

Qualities Ascribed to the American Ethos, "Mind," and "Character"

Although the viewpoints and the methods of analysis represented in these sources are varied, a sufficiently wide

reading reveals a limited agreement on factors descriptive of the American ethos.

Brogan, for instance, uses these phrases to depict the American character: "a good deal of lawlessness" in early American history along with "a real respect for law," "the need for overstatement," "growth as everybody's business," "passion for dealing in futures," "often hard on dissenters," "religion more and more lost its supernatural and other-world character," "the worship of the Constitution," "absolutes in ethics," "masterial optimism."\(^\text{14}\)

Myrdal distinguishes the following ideological roots and related cultural traits of the American creed: a humanistic liberalism, Protestant Christianity, English law, conservation and cult of the Constitution, relatively low degree of respect for law and order, tendency to regulate human behavior, puritanically moral optimism.\(^\text{15}\)

Commager, continuing in the tradition of Parrington, cites the following as descriptive of the "American mind": optimistic, culture predominantly material, thinking quantitative, genius inventive experimental and practical, careless, good natured, extravagant, little respect for authority, puritanical, idealism as philosophy, faith in democracy, in religion less orthodox than early Americans.\(^\text{16}\) The same

\(^{14}\)Brogan, op. cit., passim.

\(^{15}\)Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 8-25.

\(^{16}\)Commager, op. cit., pp. 410-411.
author adds as twentieth century modifications: less confidence in the validity of the concept of progress, greater concern for the past, an instinct for conformity, a growing intolerance for independence and dissent, greater class consciousness, a steady decline of taste, a growing artificiality, in short, a progressive atrophy of the creative instinct of the average American.¹⁷

Margaret Mead sketches American behaviors in terms of sex, progress, aggressiveness, boasting, the Puritan mixture of practicality and faith in the power of God and sense of righteousness, social engineering, democracy as the mother of science, the value of hard work and enterprise, a flexibility and willingness to tackle any task, learn any new skill, quickly, easily, without any deep involvement. The words which include the title of her book express the goal worth fighting for, that goal

phrased in American terms; in that mixture of faith in the right and faith in the power of science:
Trust in God—and keep your powder dry.¹⁸

Lynd describes American culture as a pattern of opportunity and frustration, of strength and of careless disregard for patent weaknesses, a pattern which presents a large measure of inversion of emphasis between means and end, a pattern of competitive individuals and of rootless people.

¹⁷Cf. ibid., pp. 411–421.
¹⁸Mead, op. cit., p. 262.
"It is in the main a pattern of lack of pattern."¹⁹ Lynd's position affords interesting comparisons with Riesman's description of America in terms of three types of social character, "tradition-directed," "inner-directed," and "other-directed."²⁰

Because his work draws liberally from the writings and researches of many commentators on the American "character," Robin Williams' delineation of American value orientations has a summary, as well as a sociological, usefulness not found in many other sources. After citing Coleman's list of traits imputed to American society in all major historical periods,²¹ Williams presents his own series of value patterns characteristic of American society, involving these factors: achievement and success, activity and work, moral orientation, humanitarian mores, efficiency and practicality, progress, material comfort, equality, freedom, external conformity, science and secular rationality, nationalism-patriotism, democracy, individual personality, racism and related group-superiority themes.²² Concluding his discussion of this aspect of American culture, Williams lists the following as more general "dimensions" or "orientations":

¹⁹Lynd, op. cit., p. 105.
²⁰Riesman, op. cit., p. 23.
1. American culture is organized around the attempt at active mastery rather than passive acceptance. Into this dimension falls the low tolerance of frustration; the refusal to accept ascetic renunciation; the positive encouragement of desire; the stress on power; the approval of ego-assertion, and so on.

2. It tends to be interested in the external world of things and events, of the palpable and immediate rather than in the inner experience of meaning and effect. Its genius is manipulative rather than contemplative.

3. Its world-view tends to be open rather than closed: it emphasizes change, flux, movement; its central personality types are adaptive, accessible, outgoing, and assimilative.

4. In wide historical and comparative perspective, the culture places its primary faith in rationalism as opposed to traditionalism; it de-emphasizes the past, orients towards the future, does not accept things just as they have been done before.

5. Closely related to the above, is the dimension of orderliness, rather than unsystematic ad hoc acceptance of transitory experience. (This emphasis is most marked in the urban middle classes.)

6. With conspicuous deviations, a main theme is a universalistic rather than a particularistic ethic.

7. In interpersonal relations, the weight of the value system is on the side of "horizontal" rather than "vertical" emphases; peer-relations, not superordinate-subordinate relations; equality rather than hierarchy.

8. Subject to increased strains and modifications, the received culture emphasizes individual personality rather than the group.\textsuperscript{23}

These descriptions of the American ethos are but illustrative of the many sources consulted. They serve, however, to render intelligible the accompanying chart and the following comparison of each of the central attitudes with qualities ascribed to the American ethos, and thus suggest possible sociocultural factors affecting the production of introductory textbooks.

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 441-442.
Central Attitudes Compared with "American" Characteristics or Sociocultural Factors

Despite the differences in the descriptions of the American "mind," "character," or "value-system," certain common denominators or notes are indicated by the several observers. These common denominators, as well as a number of the characteristics specially attributed to the American mind by individual authors, have, in turn, certain parallels in the central attitudes listed and criticized in Chapter III. Chart I illustrates these relationships. 24

Keeping in mind the impressionistic quality of the descriptions of the American "value system," "mind," or "character," as well as the generalized nature of the central attitudes, a comparison suggests significant sociocultural factors which bear a relationship to the textbooks as intellectual products. It should be noted, of course, that similarities between the sociocultural factors and the central attitudes are not causal relationships. These could be demonstrated, if at all, only on the basis of a much more precise examination of the sociocultural factors characterized as American, the proof that these factors alone operated to influence the textbook authors, and, even more difficult to demonstrate, that they wholly determined the composition of the textbooks.

24 R. Williams, Commager, and Brogan have been cited specially because their treatment is more detailed and extensive than that of other authors studied.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V-J Central Attitudes</th>
<th>R. William’s American Society</th>
<th>Commager The American Mind</th>
<th>Brogan The American Character</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Science - Empirical, changing, real reasons for things</td>
<td>Science and secular rationality, Material comfort</td>
<td>Culture predominantly material, Thinking, experimental and practical</td>
<td>Passion for information</td>
<td>Technology and science (Cuber-Harer-Kenkel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Common-sense knowledge isn’t to be trusted</td>
<td>Efficiency and practicality, Orderliness rather than ad hoc acceptance of transitory experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Puritan practicality (Mead)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Values essentially subjective</td>
<td>Moral orientation</td>
<td>Idealism</td>
<td>Like “absolutes in ethics”</td>
<td>Merged in German idealism (Santayana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Sociology a natural science</td>
<td>Thinking quantitative</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>V-J Central Attitudes</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Human knowledge not essentially different from that of animals. Activity determined by environmental and psychological factors</td>
<td>Moral orientation Freedom Individual personality</td>
<td>Neither sense of sin or evil. Happiest and most virtuous of all societies</td>
<td>Identification of worldly prosperity with virtues</td>
<td>Puritan regulation of human behavior by formal laws (Myrdal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Society confers personality - creates values</td>
<td>External conformity. Individual personality rather than group identity and responsibility</td>
<td>Cherished individualism but less sure of non-conformity. Instinct for conformity</td>
<td>Often hard on dissenters. Law-respecting without being law-abiding</td>
<td>English law. Relatively low degree of respect for law and order (Myrdal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Cultural variability and moral relativism. Change</td>
<td>World view open rather than closed. Emphasis on change</td>
<td>Most favored of all countries - growing intolerance for independence and dissent</td>
<td>Like &quot;absolutes&quot; in ethics. A decent respect for the opinions of mankind</td>
<td>Encourages conflict between patterned roles (Lynd) Moral materialism (Santayana)</td>
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### CHART I (continued)

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<tr>
<th>V-J</th>
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<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8)</td>
<td>Progress, goal of society. Adjustment to change criterion of progress</td>
<td>&quot;Achievement&quot; and &quot;success.&quot; &quot;Progress&quot;</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>American passion for dealing in futures. Growth as everybody's business</td>
<td>Progress (Mead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Point life into future (Lynd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9)</td>
<td>Ideal of democratic liberalism</td>
<td>Equality, Democracy. Interpersonal relations - horizontal rather than vertical. Nationalism, Patriotism, Universalistic rather than particularistic ethic</td>
<td>Greater class consciousness. Greek democracy</td>
<td>Worship of own institutions</td>
<td>Humanistic liberalism (Myrdal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10)</td>
<td>Traditional religion - non-rational and non-scientific. Religion should be essentially social</td>
<td>&quot;Humanitarian mores.&quot; Rationalism as opposed to traditionalism</td>
<td>Puritanism Less orthodox than their fathers</td>
<td>Religion &quot;emotional, uncritical, unintellectual&quot;</td>
<td>Christianity, especially various Protestant lower class sects (Myrdal) Puritan practicality and faith in God (Nead) Adrift on religion (Santayana)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each central attitude discussed in Chapter III will be considered in relation to the relevant sociocultural factors indicated by the various authors surveyed, and available interpretive materials will be cited.

Central attitude 1. - Science is the organization of knowledge of phenomena obtained through empirical observation of sense data. It tells us the real reasons for things, man's most fruitful way of interpreting the world and himself. Knowledge is ever changing. Today's truth may be tomorrow's error.

M. Mead, Commager and Brogan refer in one way or another to the American conception of science as related to material, practical, technological things. Robin Williams indicates "science and secular rationality" as one of the major value orientations in America, and emphasis on science as reflecting the values of the rationalistic-individualistic tradition. Technological growth, so characteristic of American life, is at once reflective of the emphasis on empirical science and at the same time calculated to intensify the stress upon such science in the name of practicality. The constant quest for material comfort, which Williams likewise lists as a major American value orientation, similarly accentuates the role of experimental science and the correlative depreciation of the humanities. It is significant that the culture-lag theory, which attaches a priority to technology and empirical science and inclines

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to attribute lag to non-material culture, should have been given sociological expression in America.

The prestige value of empirical science may further explain the theoretical emphasis placed upon it by the textbook authors, even when the books contain much material which cannot meet the rigors of the scientific method or qualify as empirically demonstrable data. A current characterization of science as a "sacred cow," and the analysis of "scientism" as the belief that science can furnish answers to all human problems, may tend to lessen the prestige value of science so narrowly conceived.26

It would seem that the textbook use of "science," however rooted in the American cultural pattern of technological success and material comfort, is predicated on the assumption, of which Lynd writes, that achievement of man's values will follow automatically from material advancement, and is calculated to result in what the same author terms

"a larger measure of inversion of emphasis between means and end."\textsuperscript{27}

Gerard de Gré lists the following cultural values which, in his opinion, are of particular importance in helping to understand the emergence of the modern scientific world view: rationalism, empiricism, skepticism, and individualism.\textsuperscript{28} A broader appreciation of the role of science and secular rationality in American culture and its relation to the textbook authors' use of "faith in science" must await on an exploration of each of these (and perhaps other) cultural values with reference to American life and the lives of American sociologists.

Central attitude 2.- Common sense knowledge is not to be trusted, for most people are actually trained not to be objective. Man feels considerably more often than he thinks.

There seems to be no close parallel between this central attitude and the characteristics of the American mind indicated by the sources surveyed. R. Williams, on the contrary, lists among the more general "orientations" of American society the dimension of orderliness "rather than unsystematic \textit{ad hoc} acceptance of transitory experience,"\textsuperscript{29} though he adds that this emphasis is most marked in

\textsuperscript{27}R. S. Lynd, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 363.


\textsuperscript{29}Cf. R. Williams, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 442.
the urban middle classes. It may be that the textbook authors are expressing a judgment on the knowledge of people in the lower classes, a position which may reflect either a sociological conviction or a middle class attitude. The general American tradition, from the colonial town meeting to the contemporary extensions of political suffrage and free speech, shows profound confidence in the common sense of man. It is true, as Myrdal has pointed out in *An American Dilemma*, that irrational behavior in some areas of American life also exists and somewhat negates a rational creed. Similarly, ethnocentrism of other forms, religious, political and the like, may give to "common sense" the quality of bias or prejudice. But to say that people are actually "trained" not to be objective is either pressing the group determination of personality too far or is assuming an intellectual elitism which confines rational behavior to a selected few. Another factor which may account for the distrust of common sense may be the disillusionment in the power of unaided reason after the experience of the two World Wars and related social upheavals. The effectiveness of some forms of propaganda does seem to challenge the rationality of group impressions and expressions. Furthermore, education viewed sometimes by the authors as indoctrination rather than the "leading out" of intellectual

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capabilities, may indeed not show the reason of man and his common sense at their best. However, such a concept of education is itself ideologically and culturally colored, and to generalize from it is another form of ethnocentrism.

In conclusion, it seems that this central attitude is not reflective of American culture as generally described in our sources. It may well be that the attitude is defensive of sociology as an institution, presumably as performing a service that "common sense" did not accomplish.

Central attitude 3.- Values are essentially subjective, emotive states of feeling, without ontic referents or status; and therefore values are not amenable to scientific analysis.

The usages of "values" by the textbook authors as subjective states of feeling are not consistent; in the same textbook values may be described as having objective status. If one seeks an explanation for this ambivalence in the backgrounds of American culture, the emphasis on the subjectivity may be traced to the influence of philosophical idealism upon American thought. Commager has pointed out that the idealism of the nineteenth-century American flourished in the twentieth century, in its popular rather than its philosophical form.31 As was suggested in the critique of the Mead-Dewey psychology and axiology, the roots of social behaviorism in Kantian idealism are not

31 Cf. Commager, op. cit., p. 341. Santayana mentions the influence of idealism also; cf. op. cit., pp. 102-118.
hard to discover. Vivas' examination of the "interest," "postulational," and "instrumentalist" moral theories of value shows a subjectivism which is common to these forms of naturalistic moral philosophy "which at present dominate our culture." 32

Commenting on the developing social science at the beginning of the twentieth century, Louis Wirth indicates that its character was significantly shaped by the dominant philosophy of the period with its empirical and pragmatic temper, its revulsion from "doctrinaire metaphysics and armchair speculation," and its "accent upon observation and experimentation for which William James and John Dewey might serve as representatives." 33 Whether the idealism was that derived from the Kantian-Hegelian or Comtean traditions, it tended to ground or support the naturalism characteristic of the pioneers of American sociology. This naturalism, in turn, through its contempt or neglect of philosophy and theology, has not entertained any ontological basis for values. 34

32Cf. Vivas, op. cit., p. 175.


That the value-fact dichotomy is still not resolved may be gathered from the discussions in current sociological literature, by such authors as Lundberg, Hart, Simpson, Purfey, and Znaniecki. Among others, Simpson, in *Science as Morality*, traces some sad implications for social science of the denial of the scientific objectivity of values. He places great blame on the prevailing American philosophy which has accepted the bifurcation of science and values.

On the other hand, the insistence of writers like Robin Williams, Jr. and Brogan that Americans have a definite "moral orientation," that they like "absolutes in ethics," raises the question whether the sociological acceptance of subjectivism in values is due to the cultural influence of America as a whole or of an academic sub-group of which the sociological writers are members.

**Central attitude 4.-** Sociology is, or at least should be, striving to become a natural science. As a science, it is opposed to metaphysics and theology. It strives for a methodology which is "detached," "objective," "free from ethnocentrism," "amoral," "quantitative" rather than "qualitative."

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35 Cf. Bibliography.


37 Cf. George F. Kennan, op. cit., pp. 95-103 regarding the "legalistic-moralistic approach to international affairs," which has characterized American foreign policy of the last fifty years.
The above central attitude, since it concerns the field of sociology itself, is less likely to have analogues among the sociocultural factors listed in the studies on the American value-system. Commager does speak of the emphasis on "quantitative" thinking. The importance and prestige value of the natural-science ideal in America has already been mentioned; and it is understandable that sociology would like to enjoy a similarly high status. Crossman contends that the social scientist's attempts to classify societies or political institutions have been imitated from botany and zoology, and his "social laws" have been little better than adaptations of the natural science prevalent in his age. Whether the recent minor trend in American sociology away from the ideal of natural science to that of cultural science is reflective of a greater awareness of the limitations of the natural sciences, particularly in coping with the larger problems of society, it is not possible to determine.

The science-theology antithesis will be considered in comments on the central attitude toward traditional religion.

It is difficult to determine the extent to which the textbook authors are themselves "detached" and free from

ethnocentrism. The histories of American social theory and sociology show the influence of the various sociocultural forces on the growth of sociology in America. The recent study of American sociology by the Hinkles points out that while European influences are noticeable in the origins and growth of the science, "the intellectual characteristics of American sociology are still manifestly American."  

Wolff has called attention to two aspects of American sociology relative to sociocultural factors—its attitude toward the status quo, and the problem of its selective character, i.e., the absence of the recognition of a trait of man to which other cultures and disciplines have given a paramount place, namely, man's greatness or meanness, and spiritual suffering. Bowman has noted some biases in American sociology in terms of polarities, i.e., conditions of marked cleavage and opposition presumed to exist in American society. He lists the polarities of "practicality and scholarly detachment," "the opposition to ethnocentrism


and anti-conventionalism," "prejudice versus humanitarianism," "the conflict between religion and irreligion," "two biases that are twin-born: anti-communism and ethnocentrism," and suggests that sociology writers have at times uncritically introduced these polarities into their textbooks. These polarities are reflected in the introductory textbooks under study; and it would be profitable if a comparative analysis of the history of American sociology could be made in terms of these, the aspects distinguished by Wolff, and the central attitudes disclosed by this content analysis.

Central attitude 5.- Human intelligence varies in complexity from that of animals, but it is not essentially different. Man's conative activity, directed toward the satisfaction of his fundamental needs of sustenance, sex and protection, is so thoroughly determined either by environmental influence or subconscious factors that free will is not a significant factor in societal or personal analysis.

The American emphasis on universal education, on freedom and liberty, and individual initiative and collective responsibility contrasts sharply with this central attitude. It is true that Commager mentions the American lack of the sense of sin or evil; Brogan, the identification of worldly prosperity with virtue; and Myrdal, the excessive Puritan regulation of human behavior by formal laws, all of which suggest elements of doubt about the rationality or the liberty of man. But the other qualities of the American

mind listed by these same authors, such as freedom, success, democracy, more strongly indicate an American cultural conviction of man's rationality and freedom.

The presence of this central attitude in the sociology textbooks may better be explained, first, in terms of the corrolaries of the early evolutionary theory which confused the biological and cultural aspects of man's development; second, in light of the prevailing American psychologies of behaviorism, introspection, situationalism, psychoanalysis and Marxian psycho-economic determinism which have tended not only to a distrust of reason but also of free will.

Since some attention to this problem has already been given in the critique of this central attitude in Chapter III, it need only be indicated again that this value position is reflective of a sub-group of sociologists and psychologists rather than of American culture as a whole.

Central attitude 6. - Society or the group confers personality upon the individual. . . . The social group creates values and remolds attitudes. The mores can make anything right at one time and wrong at another. . . .

While the American culture patterns would not be expected, as such, to define academically the psycho-social relationships between culture and personality, they might contain mores which would lend plausibility, if not

\[43\]Cf. Roback, op. cit., for details of these psychological positions and their influence. Cf. also Bendix, Social Science and the Distrust of Reason.
credibility, to one personality-culture theory over another. The American emphasis on freedom and the importance of the individual personality, mentioned by the major commentators, would not, however, seem to support the central attitude in which society is conceived as conferring personality upon the individual. Robin Williams does maintain that American freedom is compatible with causality and determinism, that it does not imply uncaused behavior but rather behavior that is not subject to external and arbitrary restraints. ⁴⁴

While pointing out the American stress on individual personality and freedom, Brogan observes that not infrequently early Americans were hard on dissenters. Similarly, Commager explains that while individualism was cherished, there was also in the American mind an instinct for conformity; and that the twentieth-century American is less sure of the idea of nonconformity. Williams cites De Tocqueville, Siegfried, Laski, and Muller-Freienfels on the American tendency to external conformity, which Williams himself considers one of the major value orientations in America. Individual nonconformity is largely restricted to sanctioning technological innovation; but in the field of so-called personal morals, there is a tendency to legislate conformity; and in the field of intellectual heterodoxy,

⁴⁴ Cf. R. Williams, op. cit., pp. 417-419.
really radical nonconformity in speculative thought has not been outstanding.\(^45\)

The thesis of Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd* is relevant here. He characterizes recent American culture as "dependent on other-direction," in which the society develops in its typical members a social character whose conformity is insured by their tendency to be sensitized to the expectations and preferences of others.\(^46\) Other-directedness may be destructive of personal autonomy, and result in "group-think." Similarly, Whyte maintains that many Americans are losing their sense of individual values in their reliance on the group; they do not want to be themselves, so much as to "belong"; they are all for "the organization."\(^47\)

An explanation of this emphasis on the group among hitherto individualistic Americans has been offered by Thomas, noting the recent warnings that American youth are "conventional and gregarious" and their elders possessed of a "groupthink" mentality.

\[...\] When a society does not clearly define behavioral patterns or institutional norms and leaves its cultural goals loosely integrated and somewhat nebulous, it is left to the individual to formulate his own "design for living" by wisely choosing among the various patterns society offers him. The present danger arises from the fact that when a group lacks a consistent ideology, group

\(^{45}\) Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 422-423.


\(^{47}\) Cf. William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man*. 
values are regarded not only as expedient—doubtless a human failing—but as right and morally good . . . 48

The melting-pot theory, some aspects of the Americanization program, mass education and propaganda on the one hand and lack of integrated curricula on the other, may all be related to the increased emphasis on "groupthink." 49 A study of these factors with specific reference to American society could throw light on the presence of "groupthink" or conformity influences within the general culture.

On the other hand, the emphasis on the group may reflect the patterns of American sociology comprising a subgroup in the national scene. Some factors which might explain the central attitude relative to group determination of personality are the following: The sociological emphasis on group life as the formal aspect of its study, with the tendency to reify the group; some closely related psychological themes concerning the "group mind" which have influenced contemporary sociology; the quantitative methodology of many American sociologists which tends to lose sight of individual differences; the widespread acceptance of social behaviorism as explicative of personality-group interaction;


49Cf. Corbett, op. cit., pp. 53-95, a study of the sociological process of secularization which traces the decline of an integrating ideology and the transition of members of a society from autonomous persons to "the masses."
and the prevailing influence of idealism and nominalism reflected in culture-personality writings.50

Central attitude 7. - The variations in cultural and moral patterns observed through the study of societies and cultures confirm the fact that cultural variability and moral relativism are essentially characteristic of social life.

The emphasis on cultural change in sociological writings could hardly fail to evoke a certain acquiescence in a country like America where political, economic, technological, social and even religious change has characterized its relatively short existence in the family of nations. The adjustments of the colonial period, the pushing forward of the frontier, the absorption of countless immigrants and foreign ideas, meeting the social revolutions occasioned by the two World Wars and the economic revolution precipitated by the technological age—these and other changes may have made change itself into something to be expected. Williams notes the American world view as being "open" rather than "closed," with great emphasis on change as one of the major value orientations of the society. Commager observes that Americans themselves fail to realize how deeply engrained is their habit of change and reform; he cites Lewis Mumford's point that the settlement of America was the unsettlement of Europe.51


The emphasis on change provides a key to the understanding of cultural variability; and the American experience of admitting and settling, if not absorbing, immigrants quite understandably has produced an attitude of understanding and toleration of, and often respect for, varied cultural heritages. Brogan refers to the American's "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Yet along with the acceptance of different cultures, there can be detected a certain insistence that the entering peoples be "Americanized," a position buttressed by the American faith in democracy and the conviction, described by Commager and others, that America is the most favored of all countries.

That the acceptance of change and cultural variability is paralleled by an equally profound conviction of moral relativity is not evident from the observations of those who have attempted to analyze the American character. Authoritative writers from De Tocqueville through Bryce, Siegfried and others down to such recent studies as those of Parrington, Margaret Mead, Myrdal, and Laski, have agreed on at least one point; namely that Americans tend to see the world in moral terms. This attitude goes beyond questions of expediency or immediate utility, and beyond purely traditional or customary criteria of behavior, to test conduct against some systematic ethical principles.52

The interpretation of the degrees of absoluteness and relativity in the American moral sense depends upon an understanding of the amorphous phenomena known as secularism and the American theology or quasi-theology of life. The sociology textbooks, with but one exception (Bogardus, *Sociology*), seem to take moral relativity more for granted than does the American temper as indicated by the prevailing estimates of it. Whether this position on the part of the sociological writers is reflective of a social change which has eluded many observers, or is directive of a tendency towards greater moral relativity among American students of sociology, is a question to be answered through comprehensive analysis of the American scene and the motives of the textbook authors.

**Central attitude 8.** - Progress is the comprehensive goal of society. It consists in the social evolution or advancement of man from a lowly condition towards a social organization in which the ideology of the rational control of society is achieved. The social heritage has grown more in the last few hundred years than in all the thousands of years before. Adjustment to change, which involves taking up the cultural lags, is a criterion of progress.

The concept of "progress" as characteristic of the American culture is indicated by all of the authors studied. It is closely related to the "achievement and success" theme listed by Williams, along with "progress," as a major value orientation. Commager speaks of the American optimism which is more instinctive than rationalized. Brogan speaks of the American passion for dealing in futures and its
conviction that growth is everybody's business. Lynd cites the American tendency to point to the future.

"Progress," according to Williams, is a broad theme which has no unitary value such as would tangibly regulate specific individual behavior, "but is rather a certain 'set' toward life that has permeated a wide range of behavior patterns."53 The idea of progress, imported from intellectual circles of Europe, was given great impetus by social Darwinism, though it is not evident in any of the commentators that it is as closely wedded in the general American mind to biological evolution as some of the textbook writers would suggest. The doctrine of progress currently seems to derive its strength from the technological and economic advances in America. In the intellectual and moral realm, as is seen in an analysis of some prevailing forms of American liberalism and religion, "progress" is more likely to stand for movement away from the past than movement toward the future.

Sociology's direct relation to humanitarian reformism and meliorism, as based on the rationale of the belief in progress, has, in the opinion of Roscoe and Gisella Hinkle, "been replaced by an explicit or implicit utilitarianism. "54 The extent to which the Comtean emphasis on progress still

53 Ibid., pp. 404-405.
54 Hinkles, op. cit., p. 73.
characterizes the thinking of American sociologists might, with interest and profit, be weighed against the transvaluation of "progress" in contemporary American mores as pointed out by Commager.

Central attitude 9. - In American family life, education, government, economic organization, and religion, the ideal of democratic liberalism is more and more to be sought.

Some of the meanings of the terms "liberalism" and "democracy" have been indicated in the analysis of this central attitude in Chapter III. Williams, Commager, Brogan, Lynd, and Myrdall, all stress the factor of democracy, whether as an ideology or as the "worship of an institution." The notes of "secular rationality," "open world-view," "democracy," "national-patriotism," "interpersonal relations--horizontal rather than vertical," listed by Williams among major value orientations in American society, are pertinent here. Hartz, in his study of the liberal tradition in America, refers to the great vagueness of the word "liberalism," clouded as it is by all sorts of modern social-reform connotations. He maintains that American liberalism is at bottom riddled with paradox; while as a Lockian doctrine it is a symbol for rationalism, in America the devotion to it has been so irrational that its specific nature has never been described properly. ⑤⑤

⑤⑤Cf. Hartz, op. cit.
Once the difference between freedom as a value and the particular historic definitions of freedom in terms of special institutional forms is made explicit, an analysis of American culture and liberalism in sociological writings can be undertaken. George Counts' social interpretation of education (embodying the principles of faith in education, governmental responsibility, local initiative, individual success, democracy, national solidarity, social conformity, mechanical efficiency, practical utility, and philosophical uncertainty)\textsuperscript{56} suggests some facets of the problem to be explored, using the educational system as a focal point either as reflecting or directing the cultural heritage. Most relevant to our inquiry is the principle of philosophic uncertainty, described as characteristic of American educational theory, "dominated in its ideology by a strongly positivistic and agnostic position."\textsuperscript{57}

This principle of philosophic uncertainty, in all its epistemological, psychological, ethical and even theological aspects, seems indeed central to the paradoxes which characterize not only American education in general, or American sociology in particular, but also (though to a lesser degree) the broad cultural patterns of Americans who more and more seem to be forsaking individualism (at least the "rugged"

\textsuperscript{56}Cf. Counts, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Tbid.}, p. 192.
variety) for conformity, "groupthink," "groupset," and "other-directedness." The contemporary political quest for United Nations may have its ideological counterpart in the search for "United Notions," rational or otherwise.

Central attitude 10.- Traditional religion is non-rational and non-scientific, based on myth or feeling rather than objective facts. Its influence is in inverse proportion to the state of rationality and scientific research. It is only science and the scientific method that have made any real dent in the mountain of error that is primitive and contemporary supernaturalism. Religion should be essentially social. A religion that leaves a person satisfied with saving his own soul is socially obstructive.

The references by the commentators to religion as formative of American culture are as diverse as are the elements of the above central attitude. Williams speaks of the "humanitarian mores," or "rationalism as opposed to traditionalism." Commager mentions the influence of Puritanism and the current Americans as being less orthodox than their fathers. Brogan refers to a religion which was "emotional, uncritical, unintellectual." Myrdal discusses the influence of Christianity, especially the various Protestant lower class sects; Mead, the combination of Puritan practicality and faith in God. When the introductory textbook references to religion are coupled with depreciation of dogma and infallible authority, they seem to refer to Catholicism as typically "traditional," though when an overly stern moral code is involved, some of the pristine forms of Protestantism or orthodox Judaism may be indicated. Insofar as the sociologists may
be presumed to have been influenced by the American mores, the allusion to Catholicism as more properly and pejoratively "traditional" religion is more clear, since all observers of the American cultural scene are agreed on its Protestant character.\textsuperscript{58}

Brewton Berry, in the only previously published study made of the treatment of religion in American sociology textbooks, found that while only one text failed to treat the subject, the general coverage of the others was inadequate for intellectual understanding, and in all textbooks that have any influence, religion is treated as a purely natural phenomenon.\textsuperscript{59}

There seems to be no definite parallel between the attitude of these selected textbook authors and the prevailing cultural estimate of religion in America, if one were to


study the available statistics on the membership and activities of the three major denominations.\(^{60}\)

The position that only science and the scientific method has made any real dent in the mountain of error that is primitive and contemporary supernaturalism has already been treated in Chapter III. Pertinent here is the possibility that the attitude toward religion, while not reflective of American culture as a whole, may not be proper to sociologists only but rather to scientists as an American cultural sub-group. From his *Religious Beliefs of American Scientists*, Long concludes that natural scientists hold no religious view uniquely their own. Among them is found the same range of religious philosophies that appears among the populace as a whole.\(^{61}\)

If a comprehensive survey of sociology texts should disclose a percentage of attitudes comparable to those detected in the five textbooks of this content analysis, the incidence of religious disbelief or hostility of sociologists towards organized religion would seem to be higher


than that for the population as a whole or natural scientists as a sub-group. The hypothesis has been advanced that sociology, insofar as it derives from the Comtean tradition, itself constitutes a religion of humanity; and following the positivistic opposition to all forms of theological and metaphysical knowledge, such sociology would logically be hostile to traditional and supernatural religions.\footnote{Cf. Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity or Treatise on Sociology, Instituting the Religion of Humanity, Vol. IV, trans. Richard Congreve (Paris: Carilon, Goeury and Von Dalmont, 1854), Chap I. "A Conspectus of the Religion of the Race," pp. 8-75; Chap. II, "Definitive Systematization of the Positive System of Worship," pp. 76-141; Chap. IV (the same title with description of the priesthood of positivism), pp. 219-272; A. Salomon, op. cit.,; Thomas C. Hall, op. cit., Preface, x; Sperry, op. cit., especially pp. 6-17.}

The stress on the social in religion by the textbook authors is akin to the humanistic tendency in American theology and the humanitarian mores of Americans. However, the amount of stress may be sociologically rather than theologically or even culturally induced, due to the focus of sociology on the social. If religion be conceived as regulating the order of the relationships between God, self, and neighbor, varieties of religious attitudes may be determined according to the emphasis placed on one or the other of these elements. Thus "tradition-directedness" might be related to a religion focusing on God; "inner-directedness" on the self; and "other-directedness" on the neighbor.
An hypothesis worthy of investigation in relation to American society might consider the extent to which man in his religion focuses on his neighbor when he is unsure of his God, and dissatisfied with himself.

Concluding Observations

The presence of a similar quality in American culture and in sociology textbooks demonstrates no causative relation between the two, yet the correspondence and the divergencies between them give rise to interesting speculations for the sociology of intellectual behavior. Where correspondences or close parallels exist, researches may be instituted to verify them. Where significant differences between American sociocultural patterns and central attitudes of sociologists persist even after more detailed analyses, it may be possible to get at a core of subculture patterns characteristic of the thinking of sociologists and in this way to achieve a deeper level of interpretation.

It is tempting to seek a unifying theme in the numerous value orientations of American society, as well as among the central attitudes of the textbooks. Williams has stated as a definite impression of his study that the unity of American value-systems is seriously underestimated; underneath the external flux are "substantial common themes
and basic cultural axioms."\textsuperscript{63} One central constellation seems to him to give coherence to a wide range of others. "This nuclear or focal theme we shall call the value of individual personality."\textsuperscript{64}

Three trends or emphases may be suggested as permeating the central attitudes revealed by the content analysis. These are ranged on a continuum which includes the knower, the knowing process, and the objects known. These are at best only emphases which distinguish in degree, probably, rather than in kind, the authors from the general culture patterns. They are (1) on the part of the knower, individualism, inasmuch as the authors themselves express highly individualized conceptions of the science of sociology, sociological data, and the construction of sociology manuals; (2) on the part of the objects known, secularism, in that the authors generally posit naturalistic, positivistic data and goals as the objects of their investigation; and (3) on the part of the knowing process, scientism, insofar as science is conceived of as the only or the most fruitful way of attaining the real reasons for the things in the world. In light of these three tendencies or emphases, a certain consistency among the central attitudes of the textbook authors emerges.

\textsuperscript{63}Williams, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 545.

\textsuperscript{64}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 434. Cf. also Mosier, \textit{op. cit.}, Preface, i.
Some Observations and Hypotheses on Sociocultural Factors Likely to Affect the Production of Introductory Sociology Textbooks

Introduction

It is proposed in this final section to sketch some elements of a research design which might profitably be employed to trace the reciprocal influences between an intellectual product, such as a sociology textbook, and the sociocultural factors which impinge upon the thinking and activity of its author. Such a research design may point the way to the solution of certain problems raised by this content analysis. Among these are the following: Is it "good" (how good or bad) for sociologists to have values; explicit values; implicit values; no values? Can a textbook devoid of values be written at all? Would this merely be a question of building values into a permanent bias and then saying that there are no values involved? With regard to the interpretation of the sociologist's intellectual behavior: Is it fundamentally a matter of the audience; that is, can the sociologist's words be related to the nature of the communicative process and the agents involved in it? Or is it a matter of social compulsions exerted upon the sociologist through efforts to raise a family, keep a job, and the like? Or is the sociologist to be seen simply as an enculturated individual, speaking the language of his
Then there is the practical question: how can the sociological writer detect the hidden value positions in his own work and avoid those which detract from its scientific nature?

The basis of this research design is the principle that the composition and publication of a book is a human act and a social fact, that is, a humanly motivated activity, occurring in a time-space situation and having a social impact.

The act of composing and publishing a book may be analyzed from three points of view: (1) the composition and production of the book itself; (2) the circumstances under which it is composed and produced; and (3) the author's motives for its production. The first point of view involves an intrinsic or immanent interpretation of the literary product. The second and third approaches involve extrinsic interpretations of the social fact. The second entails an analysis of the sociocultural factors which circumstantially have affected the production of the book; the third considers the motives of the author, expressed or imputed, which prompted the production of the book.

Applying these points of view to the analysis of introductory sociology textbooks, the research thus far has concentrated on the first point, an intrinsic interpretation.

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65 These questions suggested by Dr. John W. Bennett, personal letter, October 5, 1956.
of the textbooks through the method of content analysis. Elements of the second, and thus of an extrinsic interpretation, have been indicated in the analysis of the sociocultural factors considered characteristic of American society and likely to influence a sociologist writing in that society for members of the society. A thorough analysis would involve an investigation into the relevant sociocultural factors insofar as they affect the author with regard to ethnic membership, social class, nationality, religious affiliation, occupational role, political party, educational level and ideological preference, a venture which would make any exhaustive analysis also exhausting. More within the realm of possibility would it be to analyze those sectors of the society which presumably have influenced the author most. One of those sectors would undoubtedly be the family, because of the initial and enduring impact of the familial group on the life patterns of the individual. For authors writing within a particular scientific field, the academic group, however, would seem to furnish a more manageable factor for analysis, a group in which many other sociocultural factors are reflected and into which they are funneled.

The third point of view from which a book production may be considered involves the personal reasons of the author for accomplishing the task. These motives may or may not be evident from the textbook itself, depending on the explicitness and thoroughness with which the author
states his objectives. Moreover, propriety demands that some motives be unstated, though they are perhaps known to those familiar with the particular academic field, such as publication to attain or maintain academic security, or financial remuneration. So complex are the ways of motivation, that some motives may not be clear to the author himself, much less (though perhaps also more) to others. But for all the difficulties involved, it would seem that the study of motives, at least insofar as they are either explicitly expressed, discreetly inferred, or given some specificity through roles assumed or ascribed, would contribute rich insights for the sociologist of intellectual behavior.66

The sociologist of intellectual behavior can only isolate as best he can the sociocultural influences which are more evidently related to an author's expressed and inferred motivations (these latter can be suggested in part by the central attitudes detected in a content analysis of the book produced).

In the remainder of this chapter, an attempt will be made to pursue the analysis of an intellectual product such as a sociology textbook beyond the intrinsic interpretation of the published material to a consideration of first, some

sociocultural factors operating in the academic spheres which presumably exercise the most direct, constant, and observable influence upon a sociological writer; second, the motives which may possibly enter into the production of a sociology textbook, and some observations on motives and the central attitudes revealed by this content analysis.

The Academic World As a Focus of Sociocultural Influence

Logan Wilson's observations on the various usages of the term "academic man" suggest the difficulties of making reasonably precise a working concept of the "academic world." His decision to focus on professional life as it exists within the social organization of the contemporary American university may profitably be followed here, provided the university be considered as the academic crossroads of ideological and sociocultural patterns with origins far from, as well as close to, its academic structure and functions. The influence of the American university as the immediate and enduring environment of the sociological writer in America (since all the textbook writers are or were college teachers) may be considered psychologically, and sociologically. Psychologically, the frequency of contacts, the specialization of the sense impressions received especially through speech, hearing and the printed word, the

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stimulus to research and analysis, and an atmosphere more or less conducive to intellectual activity, all conspire to provide a range of sense and intellectual impressions calculated to affect deeply the personality of the author.

Sociologically, the influences of the American culture as a whole, the ideology of educators in general as a subgroup, the peer influence of the sociology profession (international and national), the academic cross-currents reflecting other professions on campus, as well as the state and local community mores, are all focalized in relation to the individual author.

The estimate of the psychological aspect, basic to the appreciation of the sociological, depends upon the adequacy of the psychology and epistemology employed. As far as the sociological aspects are concerned, the data in the immediately preceding section of this chapter delineate some of the characteristics of American culture as a whole affecting the author. It now remains to adduce some observations on more specific sociocultural and academic influences: the ideology of American educators in general; the peer influence of the sociological profession; influences of other professions in the university which may reasonably be expected to effect sociological writers. The influence of state and local community mores, while relevant, will not be discussed here because of the difficulty of evaluating the various communities in which the authors reside or teach.
The ideology of American education in general. - Curti speaks of the need for educators to realize that they have been influenced by a point of view which they have unconsciously absorbed from their social environment, "by a frame of reference which constantly limits their thought."

"...Only by recognizing this source of error in their work, only by analyzing the influences which have determined this frame of reference, can they hope to rise above the limitations of their class and personal backgrounds and the more or less obsolete ideas and emotional attitudes related to these. Only by so doing can they become wholehearted pioneers in the building of a better social order..." 68

Of American education, with all its groups and subgroups, it is difficult to make binding generalizations. Robin Williams lists the following cultural themes in his analysis of the general characteristics of American education.

a. Emphasis is put upon the practical usefulness of formal education. Contemplative or speculative thought, art, highly abstract theoretic work are relatively little valued.
b. Emphasis is put on competitive success.
c. Continuous and widespread stress is put upon conformity to group standards, largely those of broadly middle-class strata.
d. Great attention is paid to the creed of democratic values, and teacher-student relations are supposed to be "democratic."
e. In practice public schools attempt to develop patriotic values and beliefs...69

69R. Williams, op. cit., p. 279.
Maritain, in his lectures addressed to American educators, speaks of seven misconceptions which have affected the contemporary educational process: a disregard of ends, false ideas concerning the ends, pragmatism, sociologism, intellectualism, voluntarism, and the misconception that everything can be learned.\(^7\)

Some of the currents in American education distinguished by Williams, Maritain and other commentators studied have been disclosed in the content analysis of the textbooks and discussed in the critique of several of the central attitudes. It is perhaps a safe generalization to state that all the authors, implicitly and often explicitly, subscribe to the pragmatic, instrumentalist, "democratic,"

voluntaristic, sociologistic themes considered typical of American education in the last 25 years or more. 71

The peer influence of the sociology profession.- When C. Wright Mills published his study of the professional ideology of social pathologists in 1943, his was the first in a series of inquiries into the socio-historical and sociological bases of American sociology. Most of the subsequent studies have likewise focused on the ideology of social pathologists rather than sociologists as such, although a few have dealt with the latter problem. Such studies as are available can provide helpful insights for the sociologist of intellectual behavior who wishes to estimate the influence of a particular academic profession on its members. Many of the trends discussed by Mills in textbooks in the field of social disorganization are reflected in, if they have not influenced, the introductory sociology textbooks under study, namely: the low level of abstraction; the informational character of the texts; lack of systematization; emphases on problems of "everyday life" defined in terms of deviation from norms; vague use of "socialization," a tendency to be either "apolitical" or to aspire to a "democratic" opportunism; the situational approach of W. I. Thomas; emphasis on the "processual" and "organic" character of society (a la Cooley); terms representing undifferentiated

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entities such as "society," "the social order," "the mores and institutions"; an urban bias; the "cultural lag" hypothesis; slow, "evolutionary" change as normal and organized, with discontinuity as problematic; adjustment through conformity to the norms and traits ideally associated with small-town, middle class milieus.\textsuperscript{72}

A more recent study, based on a survey of articles in the journal \textit{Social Problems}, disclosed that 63 percent of the articles were found to contain one or more value postulates which, taken together, constituted a fairly comprehensive fragment of social philosophy. This social philosophy might be called "humanitarianism," a term definite enough to characterize that which is most distinctive in the social philosophy of American social pathologists.

The social philosophy of the social pathologist is not unrivalled. It is not unique. It is not obvious. It is only one of many alternative social philosophies.\textsuperscript{73}

Furfey points out, furthermore, that believers in Christianity who constitute a comfortable majority of the citizens of the United States, would criticize humanitarianism not for what it contains, but for what it omits, namely, that the chief purpose of human activity should be the attainment of happiness in the life to come.\textsuperscript{74} The stress

\textsuperscript{72}Cf. C. Wright Mills, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," op. cit.


\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 74.
on "humanitarianism" and the omission or depreciation of the matter of supernatural goals is also found in the introductory sociology textbooks. Insofar as the writers for Social Problems are often professional sociologists, the Furfe study offers some insights into the ideology within the field of sociology affecting textbook writers.75

An intensive study of social problems textbooks by Chisholm disclosed that while the many textbooks surveyed may be said to present fairly accurate and comprehensive digests of facts under similar headings, the meaning and interpretation of these identical or similar facts show a remarkable lack of consistency. The possibility of a certain common core of peer-group ideas affecting the composition of the text, despite the differences, is suggested by Chisholm's conclusion:

Each author, according to his own viewpoint or purpose, proposes on a theoretic level to study something quite different from any other author, and then tends to formulate a general over-all definition of a social problem to fit his study. . . . The logical formulation of a theory of a social problem ought to be based on an abstraction from the facts at hand. Nevertheless, in most social problems texts, the opposite procedures appear to have been followed; namely, that the authors began with a theory, often imposed or ill-founded, such as that of dynamic process or of a culture lag explanation, or any one of the

subjective value systems found in modern texts, to which theory they fitted in the available facts. . .

A. H. Hobbs, in his study of the influence of "scientism" in and on social science, maintains that it is no accident that the recommended solutions to a wide variety of personal and social problems center around moral relativity, internationalism, economic determinism, governmental collectivism, pacifism, and "a group of other beliefs which constitute what is currently called liberalism." Some of the patterns of scientism as specified by Hobbs may be seen paralleled in the central attitudes derived from the introductory sociology textbooks. For instance: we should abandon moral and ethical codes and be guided by "rationality," whereby, however, the advocates of scientism delegate to themselves the knowledge necessary to determine what is, or is not rational; religion should discard supernaturalism and ritual and "adjust to the conditions of modern society"; the social-science experts possess sufficient knowledge to enable us to engage in broad programs of social planning; the principal reasons we refuse to accept the benefits of such planning lie in our archaic beliefs; etc. 78

78Ibid., pp. 364-365.
While a previous book by the same author, *The Claims of Sociology*, has severe methodological limitations and reveals evident (though not necessarily invalid) value premises, it contains useful points for the sociology of sociological textbook writers. Hobbs' conclusions with regard to the sources of data in the sociological textbooks bears thorough investigation in any estimate of peer-group influence within the profession, especially his contention that "introductory sociology texts are the major single source of data for introductory sociology texts."79

An even more recent and telling critique of American sociology has been made by Sorokin who considers twelve fads and foibles in modern sociology as mentioned before.80 His


criticisms are not, as one reviewer put it, to be "simply dismissed as an intemperate, spiteful or irresponsible attack" for two reasons: first, because many of the criticisms are justified; and second, Sorokin's many significant contributions to a science of society entitle him to a careful hearing. A related reason could be that Sorokin's sociological background, rooted in the European tradition and yet widely conversant with American sociology for many decades, equips him to make contrasts which an in-group analyst could not (or would not) make. Sorokin's criticisms involve numerous writers and studies cited as authoritative by our introductory textbook authors.

As more studies of American sociological writers and writings appear, it will be possible to sketch a more complete picture of this academic peer-group and to estimate more fully the in-group influences likely to affect individual writers. The studies cited here suggest interesting parallels between their findings and the central attitudes typical of the textbooks of this content analysis.

Influences of other university professions and disciplines upon sociological writers.- A separate study would be required to trace the influences of other disciplines upon sociologists. Hobbs' estimate of the sources for introductory sociology textbooks provides some clues as to the university disciplines more closely related to sociology as presently written. Cultural anthropology is second to sociology textbooks as a source of data; social theory (not defined by Hobbs), though third, appears to be decreasing as a source of data or a basis for interpretation; government, psychology and biology follow in that order as sources; the largest single group of psychological references related to behavioristic psychology; only two per cent of the references are devoted to each of the fields of history, philosophy, religion, law and geography. The general impression derived from the present content analysis is that the textbooks are much committed in psychology to the theories of Cooley, Mead, and Thomas, with little mention of psychological schools before or after them; in anthropology, to cultural relativism; that there is little or no evidence of philosophical theory formally considered, the main tendency being a broad commitment to pragmatism and naturalism; and

that there is even less awareness of scientific theology, even when religious and ethical matters are being discussed. In a sense, textbook sociology seems little affected by the current status of any of the related university disciplines except anthropology and possibly psychology. The recent ventures in interdisciplinary departments and approaches may affect the complexion of subsequent textbook writing.

Looking at the university world in an ideologically broader but ecologically narrower sense, the sociological writer is affected by his relations to the administration, to the student body, and to the public served by the university, factors which may influence his mental conceptions in some ways. As Znaniecki points out, upon men's participation in a certain system of knowledge often depends their participation in some social system and their conduct within that system; and on the other hand, the participation in certain social systems often determines in part in what systems of

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83 By "scientific theology" is here understood the study of God and all things in relation to God according to the light of revelation and reason and organized according to principles and specific demonstrations. It is contrasted with Biblical, patristic, and synodic theology. The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas is considered a classic of scientific theology.

84 Here it might be noted that a certain tradition in sociology may account for the retention of conceptions of human nature, scientific procedure, etc., which are not subjected to critical analysis.
Motives and the Production of Sociology Textbooks

However precise an awareness one might secure of the sociocultural factors, national, academic, or otherwise, impinging upon a sociological writer, the effect of these is contingent upon the degree of acceptance or rejection (whether conscious or not) of these influences by the individual. The extent to which the standards of a culture are interiorized and accepted as a basis of literary activity depends on many factors within the individual—cognitive, normative and motivational. Cognitively, the individual's intellectual frame of reference exercises a selective function in absorbing and integrating, or discarding as of little import, the impressions derived from sociocultural influences. In the normative sphere, the impact of cultural norms is relative to the person's system of values. This system derives its order from some ultimate value or goal, however vaguely conceived, in light of which social values and cultural norms are weighed and accepted or rejected. The motivational factors are related to and dependent upon the

cognitive and normative elements, and of the three seem to provide a more immediate basis for extrinsic interpretation of literary products.

Cognitive and normative factors. - Before approaching the subject of motivations of sociological writers, a few observations can be made on the cognitive and normative factors as they seem to affect the introductory textbook writers. The lack of evidence of philosophical and theological learning in the introductory textbooks, the somewhat provincial knowledge of sociological theory and social research (references to theories and studies other than American are infrequent), as well as an empiricist, pragmatic orientation, and a limited knowledge of several other social sciences, especially history— all these suggest a somewhat limited frame of reference tending to exercise a restrictive influence upon the reception of concepts and principles other than those corresponding with the pre-existing cognitive configuration.

On the normative side, the only ultimate value explicitly expressed in any of the textbooks is science or knowledge (that is, scientific, empirical knowledge). For sociologists, however, the Comtean goal of the religion of humanity attained through the positivist society may not be too unlike the secularist humanitarianism that is suggested by American sociological emphasis on material, social goals and depreciation of spiritual, other-worldly goals.
Secularist humanitarianism is reflective of such basic ideas and aspirations of Comte as the following:

... It follows that Morals, and this is true even of practical morality, are objectively dependent on Sociology—on statical Sociology in the first place, then on dynamical—as determining the primary direction of all our tendencies without exception. Its foundations laid in Social Statics, the Positive religion has already irrevocably taken possession of the Past in its whole range, which never was within the cognizance of the earlier and absolute synthesis. As a sequel of this decisive step the priesthood of Humanity must now take possession of the Future also, that it may impart to the Present the combined impulse of its predecessors and its successors.

... To know in order to improve... will
... be the expression habitually used to indicate the bounden duty of the intellect to devote itself continuously to the service of society. ...
... science, no longer separable from philosophy will, as disciplined by Sociocracy, enter on wider fields and acquire a greater power than it could acquire under the undisciplined anarchy which, in the course of events, replaced the oppressive yoke of Theocracy. 86

Motives and roles of sociologists.—In addition to the cognitive and valuational frame of reference of an author which filters, as it were, the influence of sociocultural factors upon the sociologist's intellectual behavior, there is the problem of his motivation. Without entering into the elaborate discussions of motivation in relation to social

action such as those initiated by Parsons, Shils and Olds, some indications can be given here of the complexity of motives which may enter into the composition of an introductory sociology textbook. Were these motives capable of being fully understood, a more adequate appreciation of the intellectual product itself would result. As it is, some motives may be unconscious or subconscious. Other motives on the conscious level could possibly be correlated with the normative and cognitive frames of reference discussed above. But there may be still other conscious motives which resist the scientific scrutiny of the sociologist of knowledge and are only explicable by the author himself, if he chooses to make them known. Parsons, Shils and Olds have indicated some of the dilemmas that enter into the motivational structure of the actor--the dilemmas of gratification of impulse versus discipline, of private versus collective interests, of transcendence versus immanence, of object modalities, of the scope of significance of the object.88

The admixture of motives is more acute for the social scientist than the natural scientist. The latter, while subject to the ordinary human involvements of personal wishes

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88 Cf. ibid., pp. 80-84.
and concerns, finds these involvements in many cases counterbalanced and checked by institutionalized procedures which compel him, more or less, to detach himself from the urgent issues at hand. The social scientist, on the other hand, forms part of the very patterns he undertakes to explore, and the greater the strains or stresses to which he or his group is exposed, the more difficult it is for him to perform the mental operation of detaching himself from his role of immediate participant and from the limited vista it offers.\textsuperscript{89}

Since motives, insofar as they are discernible through observation, are related to role assumptions or role expectations, the motives of sociological writers can be correlated with their known roles as (a) individual personalities; (b) bread-winners or family men; (c) citizens of a particular community or state; and (d) as academic men, and particularly as sociologists.

(a) Other than what might be learned through personal revelations of the author's mind, his conception of his role as an individual personality could be inferred from his normative frame of reference and especially his ultimate value, be it religious, humanitarian, scientific or otherwise.

(b) The motives of the sociologist as family man could to a certain extent be discerned through a study of the existing domestic situation and such information as may be volunteered by its participants.

(c) As citizen of a particular community or state, the sociologist may be animated by a variety of motives, depending on the complexity of the roles he envisions for himself as voter, civic reformer, molder of public opinion, legislator, administrator, social welfare worker.

(d) The roles, and therefore the discernible motives, of the textbook writer as academic man and particularly as sociologist come more immediately within the purview of the sociology of intellectual behavior, insofar as the homogeneity of the academic group and author's literary productions lend themselves to direct and more comparable observations.

The initial difficulty in assaying the motives imputable to a sociologist as an academic man is the definition of a sociologist. Nettler argues that his academic colleagues as well as the public at large give repeated evidence that they do not understand what sociologists are up to. He assigns several reasons why sociologists are presently an "ill-defined lot": 1) the broad scope of the subject matter; 2) the "inchoate status" of the techniques developed for the study of society; 3) probably the outstanding reason, a confusion of roles, that is, whether the sociologist is supposed to be a delineator of what is or an
advocate for some conception of what should be.\textsuperscript{90} Nettler further maintains in reading the works of any sociologist "an analysis of the possible attitudes and motives functioning in the writer is not only unfeasible, but irrelevant"; and that it is necessary only to inquire what the thesis is and what evidence is brought to bear on that thesis.\textsuperscript{91}

If it be agreed that the lack of definition of "sociologist" is due to the broad subject matter, the inchoate status and the confusion of roles, it is not at all clear that an analysis of the attitudes and motives functioning in the writer is unfeasible and irrelevant. As has been pointed out, an individual's frame of reference acts as a selective agent in the selection and retention of ideas. If conscious motives be understood as directions


towards goals bearing some relation to the frame of reference on the one hand, and affecting observable behavior on the other, they can be studied and be seen as exercising some influence. To argue otherwise would be to deny human freedom.\footnote{Cf. F.S.C. Northrop, "The Neurological and Behavioristic Psychological Basis of the Ordering of Society by Means of Ideas," \textit{Science}, CVII (1948), 411-417. C. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," \textit{American Sociological Review}, 7 (1940), 904-913. Mills states: "This imputation and avowal of motives by actors are social phenomena to be explained. The differing reasons men give for their actions are not themselves without reasons" (p. 904).}

The most immediate and obvious motive activating a writer of an introductory sociology book is to furnish a textbook suitable for the introductory sociology course. A (regional) survey revealed the following opinions in regard to the desirable objectives of the introductory course (in order of frequency):

1. To help the student to understand the society in which he lives.
2. To lead him toward objective thinking about social situations.
3. To acquaint him with sociological terms and concepts.
4. To assist him to analyze his own experiences through the use of sociological concepts.
5. To acquaint him with the sociological approach to social problems.
6. To employ the scientific method in studying social problems.
7. To stimulate attitudes of social responsibility.
8. To present verified knowledge designed to change the student's attitude toward current social situations.
9. To prepare students to take advanced sociology courses.
10. To elaborate upon the principles of social behavior.
11. To give an overall view of the major areas of sociological study.
12. To assimilate verified social facts about the United States.
13. To synthesize scientific approaches to the study of man.
14. To study sociological theories.
15. To present a unified sociological system.
16. To present the rational form and technique of social reform.

An individual textbook writer might be motivated by any or all of the above course motives, or by still others. In their prefaces or introductions the authors analyzed do give some rationale for their publication which can qualify under the heading of academic motivation. It is possible for the sociologist of intellectual behavior to measure the textbook against the stated motives of the author; and after areas of correspondence and divergence are noted, to seek for explanations of correspondence either with regard to the author's frame of reference or the known sociological data; and to seek explanations of divergence between motives and textbook material in unstated but inferred motives of the author (also as above, in his frame of reference or known sociological data).

93Cf. A. L. Ferriss, "Introductory Sociology in the Southeastern States," Social Forces, XXIX (1951), 295-301. The survey was conducted among the faculties of 110 colleges and universities in the southeastern United States.
Motives can be reasonably inferred from patterns of value judgments in the textbooks which involve an action emphasis; for instance, the general tendency to deprecate religious belief and activities coupled with an exhortatory position toward the cultivation of science and naturalistic social reform may indicate the motive of the author to be the discouraging of religious belief in his readers. That such a motive may affect the composition of the finished textbook through selectivity of sources, false assumptions and unwarranted conclusions should be evident from the content analysis and critique areas of Chapters II and III. Not only the study of value judgments themselves, but also the study of word choices as value indicators can prove useful in the discernment of motives.\(^9\)

Other motives which are possible to introductory textbook writers can be related to their general role as sociologists. The motives will depend on what they think the role of a sociologist is; what they think other sociologists think a sociologist is, or should be; and what they think readers of their textbooks think a sociologist is. Znaniecki discusses the different roles within a profession--

the discoverer of truth, the systematizer, the contributor, the fighter for truth, the eclectic and the historian of knowledge, the disseminator of knowledge (which includes popularizers and educating teachers)—all of which may affect the motivational structures and the product of the individual writer.\(^{\text{95}}\)

However varied may be the sociological roles envis-aged or practiced by the sociological textbook writer or his contemporaneous peer group, a unifying and motivating factor is suggested by the tradition of sociology stemming from its origin and recurring in various intensities throughout the history of sociology. It is the prophetic, messianic, totalitarian role, which may easily be noted in the writings of Comte and Saint-Simon, reflected strongly in L. F. Ward for American origins, and refracted in different degrees in the central attitudes of the social reorganization, social control and social progress sections of current sociological

writings. Salomon has delineated some of the elements of this traditional sociological role. He points out that sociology, in its origins, was a unique philosophical effort: the daring venture to construct a scientific philosophy of social revolution and of total human transformation, a new mode of interpreting the historical process scientifically and foreseeing the future development of mankind objectively.

The first sociologists . . . constructed the first theoretical systems that contained at the same time a scientific philosophy, a myth of the saving elite, and a religion of social redemption. In merging these diverse elements, the founders of sociology created the pattern of total societal organization. . . .

The extent to which this tradition exists today in American sociology, and the extent to which its existence has motivated the emphases and deemphases, incorporation and omission of data, in current textbook writing may be inferred from materials presented in Chapters II and III. There are definite indications that the tradition persists, though in mitigated form.

In addition to the motives indicated by the objectives of the introductory sociology course or the role conceptions and expectations of the sociological profession itself, still other motivations may be involved in the production of a textbook. Wilson has pointed out the

function of economic motivations in this regard. He indicates that though the elite in the academic world "scorn" the mere textbook writers, there are outstanding writers who use this means of financing other activities while incidentally exerting a vast disseminating influence.\textsuperscript{97} He concludes however:

\begin{quote}
Despite the disseminative utility of an optimum number of good textbooks, the mass production of them tends to substitute lower motives for higher ones and leads to the establishment of rival and unnecessarily bizarre points of view. Collective enthusiasm for the genuine advancement of learning is diminished in the struggle for adoptions. . . \textsuperscript{98}
\end{quote}

The extent to which the economic motivation is operative in individual instances is not possible to ascertain unless the authors choose to reveal this information. The work of popularization, at least in the case of recognized sociological scholars, may be further tied in with other motives such as meeting the university demands to "publish or perish," the desire of both the academic institution and the individual to secure public support (sentimental as well as financial) for expansion or research, and the basic quest for recognition and prestige.\textsuperscript{99}

It is necessary, Wilson points out, to secure more organized information about those persons whose professional

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{97}Logan Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 200.
\item \textsuperscript{98}Ibid., p. 201.
\item \textsuperscript{99}Ibid., p. 213.
\end{itemize}
function it is to preserve, disseminate, and add to the higher learning information which may be lacking, at least explicitly, to the professional persons themselves who seem to assume that the main factors affecting scientific and scholarly enterprise are "those stated in published methodological prefaces and introductions." Not only are the manifest conscious intellectual and motivational factors relevant for the sociologist of intellectual behavior, but also the subconscious and concealed factors, if somehow they could be detected. As Watson put it:

... what goes on within the personality of the discoverer (often without his knowledge) and in his interaction with his social setting, is just as important—sometimes much more so ... the passions and self-deceptions which scientific men share with the rest of mankind are supremely relevant to the real human worth of the "scientific truth" they create. Scientific institutions are founded just as much on ambition, hypocrisy, fear of economic penalties, and urbane plagiarism as they are on a love of truth.

Conclusion.—While the imputation of motives is decidedly risky, it would seem possible when the sociologist of intellectual behavior is able first, to construct from an intensive study of an author's intellectual background the main components of his frame of reference or philosophy and theology of life; second, to derive from a content analysis of the published textbook the central attitudes and other

100 Ibid., p. 222.

value judgments contained therein; and third, to institute a comparison between the frame of reference, the central attitudes, and the scientific truths of the discipline itself. He should also be able to detect motivational indicators which could then be tested for validity by autobiographical and biographical data, psychoanalysis, and peer-group interviewing. The more precise the knowledge of motives, the more light can be thrown upon the selectivity exercised in the learning process, with consequent influence of this selectivity upon the cognitive and normative frames of reference and the role conceptions derived therefrom.

Summary Statement to Chapter IV

The investigation by the sociologist of intellectual behavior of the above-mentioned phases in the acquisition, integration, motivation and dissemination of knowledge can yield fruitful conclusions with regard to the influence of sociocultural factors upon intellectual behavior. Because of the seemingly inexhaustible potentiality of the human mind to form new patterns out of given concepts and principles and because of the unpredictability of deliberate choice in the selection of alternative modes of action, explanations of intellectual behavior, however precise the investigative procedure, will always have a tentative and hypothetical tenor, unless the author under study supplies the missing links through corroborated autobiographic revelation.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND SUGGESTED RESEARCH

Introduction

At the outset of this study, it was hoped that a documented presentation of value judgments in selected sociological writings might contribute to the clarification of sociology as a science by delineating the role of value judgments as subject matter of the science; examining the methodological principles or assumptions of the science in this area; indicating the relation of scientific sociology to the so-called normative sciences, thus clarifying its position in the broader scheme of human knowledge.

Each of the four chapters explores certain aspects of these tasks.

In Chapter I, specification of sociological data and a methodology suitable for their analysis are described. Introductory sociology textbooks are indicated as representing a segment of sociological writings likely to provide a useful picture of the situation; and this research decision, with a series of progressive limitations of scope, eventuated in the designation of five American introductory sociology textbooks published between 1947-1950 as the specified data
for a content analysis. The methodology, employing the technique of content analysis, involves an effort to provide an intrinsic interpretation of textbooks which, in turn, readies the data for an extrinsic interpretation in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge or intellectual behavior.

In Chapter II, the rank order of distribution of the value-judgment items extracted from the five textbooks is indicated; and illustrations of value judgments according to types are cited according to the eight content categories, viz., Science, Philosophy, Social Science, Sociology, Psychology, Values, Society and Religion. A summary of value themes detected in the textbooks is then presented, to serve as a basis for the formulation of central attitudes typical of the books analyzed.

Chapter III contains a critique of each of the central attitudes, grouped under six headings: Science and Value, Sociology and the Social Sciences, Man the Social Animal, Society and Man, Goal of Society, Social Institutions. These attitudes represent basic value orientations disclosed by the analysis of the content categories, formulated as composites of the specific value judgments located in the various textbooks. The individual critiques employ principles and norms derived from sociology itself, or from such relevant fields as anthropology, epistemology, psychology, philosophy, axiology, and theology.
Chapter IV supplements the intrinsic interpretations of the data in Chapter III by suggesting some elements of extrinsic interpretation. After sketching the areas of the sociology of knowledge or intellectual behavior, it presents some sociocultural factors considered typical of American society and then institutes a comparison between these factors and the central attitudes revealed in the textbooks. It concludes with some observations and hypotheses on the influence of sociocultural factors on sociology textbook production.

**Findings**

The method of content analysis applied to the selected introductory sociology textbooks yielded a sufficiently large number of items (4070) to insure a certain representativeness of data for analysis. While the illustrations recorded under each content category represent but a fraction of the material obtained through the content analysis, they suggest the documentary foundation of the following generalizations which, while not equally applicable to all authors, are yet sufficiently prevalent to be said to characterize the group of textbooks selected:

Sociology, however variously defined, should strive for the natural science ideal.

Science is an ultimate goal, yet it does not provide intellectual certainty.
Science, whether described in the restricted sense of natural science or in a broad sense, is more certain than metaphysics and theology on the one hand, and untrustworthy common sense on the other.

The aim of sociology as a science is prediction and control.

Values are subjective states and not amenable to scientific investigation.

There is no established scientific order according to which introductory textbooks are constructed. Teachers can start the text at a point which best suits student interest.

Human intelligence varies in complexity from that of animals, but it is not essentially different. Man's conative activity is so thoroughly determined either by environmental influence or subconscious factors that free will is not a significant element in societal or personal analysis.

The group confers personality upon the individual, creating values and remolding attitudes. Normality of personality involves conformity to the expectations of the group.

The variations in cultural and moral patterns observed through the study of societies and cultures confirm the fact that cultural variability and moral relativism are essentially characteristic of social life.

Progress is the comprehensive goal of society. It consists in the social evolution or advancement of man from a lowly condition towards a social organization in which the ideology of the rational control of society is achieved.

In American family life, education, government, economic organization, and religion, the ideal of democratic liberalism is more and more to be sought.

Traditional religion is largely non-rational and non-scientific, based on myth or feeling rather than objective facts. Its influence is in inverse proportion to the state of rationality and scientific research.
These basic attitudes were found, upon critical examination reported in Chapter III, to suffer from lack of precision, and at times contradictions due to the presence of implicit and questionable assumptions regarding the nature of social reality, the process of human knowledge, and the validity of postulates borrowed from other disciplines such as psychology, philosophy, and axiology. Where specific goals are espoused by the authors (ofttimes with enthusiasm), a certain inconsistency with the avowed aim of scientific sociology (to consider only means to ends) is noted. While definite autonomy is claimed for sociology as a social science, there appears to be no general consensus on definitions, hypotheses and postulates among the authors. Nor are there regularly to be found applications or citations of methods of research deemed acceptable for sociology in the light of the natural-science emphasis. Unsupported generalizations abound; these are the more questionable because they are not simply due to the understandable limitations of an introductory textbook, but because they are often contradicted by available evidence.

The attempt in Chapter IV to relate these central attitudes to sociocultural patterns of American life and thought suffers from the inadequacy of data on constitutive factors of American culture and of modes of interpreting reciprocal influences of culture and personality. Some correspondence between the general characteristics of
American culture and the central attitudes of the textbook authors is noted; but the inadequacy of the data explained above prevents it from being conclusive. Some of the central attitudes seem more germane to American sociologists as a subgroup of American society. The ascertainment whether these latter, as well as those attitudes reflective of American culture in general, are ultimately explicable in terms of sociocultural influences or individual choice depends upon the development of an adequate and more generally acceptable theory of the relations between culture and personality, and on a sociology of intellectual behavior applying this theory. Of equal if not more importance is the need of extensive and intensive research on the characteristics of American culture, or at least of such subgroups as are more immediately related to the conception and production of types of literary items, including textbooks in sociology.

Suggested Research

In the course of this investigation, further research along certain lines was often indicated as necessary to complement the present study. References to some of these research needs have been made throughout the report, and still others have been suggested by those who have commented on the project. All of these may now be assembled:

Application of this method of content analysis to other selected literary products, outside as well as within the field of sociology itself, to test its wider usefulness.
An examination of writings of American sociologists other than introductory textbooks, whether by content analysis or some other method, whether by the same or other authors, to determine the representativeness of the introductory textbooks in respect to American sociology.

A comparison of the value judgments and central attitudes disclosed by such a study with those revealed by this research to determine the extent to which value judgments in introductory sociology textbooks may be occasioned by semantic needs in presenting abstract sociological concepts in a way intelligible to the beginning students.

An analysis of American introductory sociology textbooks by some other method than the content analysis here employed, to determine whether this method of content analysis is as useful as others as far as objectivity of data and facility to corroborate research are concerned.

An investigation by this same method of American introductory sociology textbooks other than those selected for this analysis to determine the typicality of the latter.

A comparative analysis of historical and contemporary word usages in sociology to yield a descriptive and classificatory array of sociological concepts to clarify the symbols system of sociology.

Necessary decisions with regard to the order or sequence of sociological data both in the investigative process and the communication of sociology to students.

Detailed examination of the underlying assumptions and postulates borrowed by the sociologist from other sciences and disciplines.

An examination of the epistemological, psychological, and ethical assumptions contained in culture-personality writings.

Critical examination of concepts of social organization, disorganization, reorganization and cultural lag in relation to progress and social order.

A comparative analysis of the history of American sociology in terms of the central attitudes disclosed by the content analysis.
The establishment of a methodology (probably interdisciplinary) for the construction of a profile of American cultural life, to provide a more substantial sociocultural pattern against which American intellectual products may be assessed.

The analysis of the family and academic background of particular authors, and the constitutional factors (physiological and psychological) relevant to the understanding of their intellectual productions.

A systematic sociology, drawing upon these and other researches, combining an adequate conceptual scheme, methods of research best suited to sociological data, a psychologically defensible order of parts, orientation within the other areas of human endeavor, clear formulation of basic problems, principles and proofs, and explicit statement of value orientation, postulates and hypotheses.
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX I

Chapter I: Methodological Details

Note: Only the main research steps were listed in Chapter I. In this appendix, in sections corresponding to the footnote references for the various steps, the specifics of method as well as some of the problems encountered in application will be reported.

a. Preliminary Survey of American Introductory Sociology Textbooks (Cf. Chapter I, p. 16.)

In an effort to determine the textbooks for analysis, a survey was made of publishers' announcements, library catalogs, and the book review sections of the following journals between January 1940 and July 1950: American Journal of Sociology, American Catholic Sociological Review, American Sociological Review, Social Forces, Sociology and Social Research. This survey disclosed 34 American (U.S.A.) introductory sociology textbooks published during this period. To facilitate a more thorough analysis, it was decided to limit the textbooks analyzed to those published in the time period 1947-1950, which included the following 20:

Bennett, J. and Tumin, M. Social Life: Structure and Function (1948)
Bogardus E. Sociology (1949)
Carr, L. J. Situational Analysis: An Observational Approach to Introductory Sociology (1948)
Cuber, J. F. Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles (1947)
Davis, J. Human Society (1949)
Dawson, C. A. and Gettys, W. An Introduction to Sociology (1948)
Eldridge, S. and others   \textit{Fundamentals of Sociology} (1950)
Gillin, J. T. and Gillin, J.  \textit{Cultural Sociology} (1948)
Jones, M. E.  \textit{Basic Sociological Principles} (1949)
Hiller, E. T.  \textit{Social Relations and Structures} (1947)
Landis, P. H.  \textit{Man In Environment} (1949)
McCormick, T. C.  \textit{Sociology} (1950)
Murray, R. W.  \textit{Sociology} (1950)
Odum, H. W.  \textit{Understanding Society} (1950)
Ogburn, W. and Nimkoff, M.  \textit{Sociology} (1950)
Sutherland, R.L. and Woodward, J. L.  \textit{Introductory Sociology} (1948)
Timasheff, N. and Pacey, P.  \textit{Sociology} (1949)
Wilson, L. and Kolb, W.  \textit{Sociological Analysis} (1948)
Young, K.  \textit{Sociology} (1950)

b. \textbf{Description of Procedure in Classification of Extracts From Twenty American Introductory Sociology Textbooks, 1947-1950 (Chapter I, p. 16)}

As a first step in the preliminary survey, each paragraph of each set of extracts (totaling 319 single-spaced typewritten pages) was identified in the right margin of the page by a code letter or letters identifying the author or authors of the book from which the extract was selected.

After the coding, each paragraph of the extracts was numbered consecutively, the numbers being placed in the left margin of the page. Where a paragraph overlapped a typed page, the same number was given to each page required. It was thought that this system of enumeration would facilitate interpretation of selections in context. The number of items arrived at totaled 1631.
The pages of extracts were then cut up into the items thus initialed and numbered. Where several items dealt with the same topic, and were not extensive, they remained together. The clipped items were then placed in separate envelopes, according to authors.

After the extracts were broken down into items, the items from each book were classified by placement in separate envelopes. The classification grew out of the items themselves as the sorting progressed. The designation of a category depended on the main emphasis of the item as indicated either by the topical sentence, the most frequently recurring word, or the phrasing of the conclusion if there was one.

Where items suggested it, synonymous or antonymous terms were grouped together.

The categories arrived at by this process were as follows:

1) Basic Urges - Drives
2) Behavior Patterns
3) Beliefs
4) Birth Control
5) Central Point of View of Author(s)
6) Community and Neighborhood
7) Conformity
8) Conscience
9) Crime
10) Cultural Lag - Adjustment, Conflict
11) Cultural Origins
12) Culture: Civilization
13) Custom
14) Democracy, Democratic Way
15) Determinism
16) Deviant Conduct, Behavior
17) Divorce
18) Ecology
19) Economic System
20) Education: School
21) Empirical Method
22) Environment: Modification of Environment by Man
23) Ethical Standards: Valid Judgments
24) Ethnocentrism: Central Relativism
25) Eugenics
26) Evolution - Social, Organic Cosmic, Cultural
These empirically derived categories were studied for similarities and relationships; on this basis they were grouped under thirteen main headings: methods of study, science in general, social science, sociology, sociological concepts, philosophical positions, social structure, physiological factors, psychological factors, cultural factors, social groups and institutions, goals, social problems.
c) Preliminary Paradigm for the Study of Value Judgments. 
Theoretical Formulation (Chapter I, p. 10)

In accordance with the procedure of this analysis in approaching the main steps from both an empirical and a theoretical point of view, the empiric analysis described in Appendix I (b) above was accompanied by an attempt to construct a theoretic paradigm for the study of value judgments. This paradigm, suggested by Robert K. Merton’s well-known paradigm for the sociology of knowledge, derives from the various readings on values and sociology cited in the bibliography (cf. Becker, Ellwood, Furley, Hart, Lynd, Merton, Mukerjee, Myrdal, Parsons, Sorokin, M. Weber, M. Williams, Znaniecki), and the awareness of the introductory sociology textbooks achieved through the exploratory survey described above in Section (a). This paradigm, it was thought, might serve as a theoretical construct which could be used in connection with the series of categories empirically arrived at through the exploratory analysis of the textbooks. It could function to suggest areas of value judgments which possibly were not disclosed by the preliminary exploration of textbooks and might also serve to refine the order and grouping of the areas and categories of analysis. The four areas of content analysis—Basic Assumptions and Values, Sociology as a Science, Social Organization and Progress, Religion and the Church—represent a blending of
the topics disclosed by the preliminary survey and the following theoretical paradigm.

**Basic Assumptions and Values**

(1) Concept of science. Relation to non-science (faith, opinion, etc.)

(2) Assumptions (explicitly or implicitly stated)
   - Epistemological
   - Ontological
   - Psychological

(3) System of values, philosophy of life, etc.

**Sociology as a Science**

(1) Subject matter
   - Postulates from other sciences (e.g., anthropology, biology, etc.)
   - Basic concepts (e.g., group, social self, etc.)
   - Fundamental principles (e.g., relation of culture to personality, etc.)

(2) Methods of studying data (quantitative, qualitative, verstehen, statistical, etc.)
   - Theoretical value of each method
   - Actual use as illustrated by textbook, documentation

(3) Classification of social data
   - Selection of major categories
   - Relative importance of major categories
   - Determination of sub-categories
   - Relative weight of sub-categories within proper categories and the field as a whole

(4) Interpretation of data
   - In relation to systematic sociological theory
   - In relation to social science in general
   - In relation to the whole field of human knowledge
   - In relation to the ideal for the existing social order
d) **Construction of Word Lists for the Four Areas of Analysis** (Chapter I, p. 19)

The following steps were employed to derive key word lists for each of the four areas, *viz.* Basic Assumptions and Values, Sociology as a Science, Social Organization and Progress, Religion and the Church.

The list of categories of extracts from the exploratory survey of the textbooks described above (b) was studied for categories more pertinent to each of the above-mentioned areas. After the categories were selected, the items in each were studied for frequently recurring words. These were noted on a worksheet.

The subject indices of some of the textbooks were also studied for terms related to the title of the area to be studied. This sometimes resulted in new words being added to the worksheet.

Major sections of the textbooks devoted to the area to be studied (e.g., Social Organization and Social Progress) were read to detect significant terms.

As a result of these procedures a list of words varying roughly from twenty to thirty-five for each of the four areas was obtained. These lists were then studied to derive the most significant terms, thus cutting down the number of words for each area a number less than ten which could be used in selecting the sentence units for content analysis. (The following directions for each area explain these larger and smaller lists in some detail.)
Area One--Basic Assumptions and Values: Concept of Science in General

The theoretical paradigm previously constructed (Cf. Appendix I, c) was consulted for basic items.

The extracts from the exploratory survey of the textbooks (Cf. Appendix I, b) were consulted, i.e., those categories which seemed relevant: Order--Rationality, Scientific Method, Empirical Method, Man, Evolution, Ethnocentrism, Ethical Standards--Value Judgments, Value (General--Value Systems), Social Science (in general). It was thought that these items would disclose frequently used terms descriptive of the three areas mentioned in the paradigm: concept of science; assumptions (epistemological, ontological, psychological); system of values, philosophy of life, etc.

The indices of several textbooks (randomly selected--Bogardus, Sutherland and Woodward) were consulted to help in selecting related terms.

The introductory sections of these textbooks were surveyed for frequently recurring words which related to the topics in this area.

From these four procedures, a list of the following 28 basic words was derived: science, scientific method, assumption, value, belief, postulate, standards, evolution, man, ethnocentrism, prediction, causation, truth, error, induction, deduction, empiricism, logic, major idea, fundamental fact, basic principle, personality, attitude,
rationality, "must"-"ought"-"necessary," cultural relativism, objectivity. In order to have a list that would be briefer and more useful for the survey of the textbooks, the frequency and relatedness of the above 28 words were considered in light of the four areas, resulting in the five basic words. These, with their related forms, are as follows:

Science: scientific, scientifically, scientist (not social scientists, scientific sociology, etc.; these will be considered in another area). If the above words are used in an example or illustration they are generally omitted.

Assumption: presumption, presumes, of course, assumes, etc. (The words should refer to positions of the author or someone with whom he is in agreement; not to the position of someone with whom the author is not in agreement or whom he is citing without any judgment).

Value (personal): value system, value judgment, valuation, evaluation, etc. The value factors here indicated are the author's personal values, value system, or evaluation of persons, problems, or things. Included here would also be the author's definition of "value" and "value judgment," but not the items dealing with social aspects of values (these latter will be considered in another section).

Man: human nature, human personality, homo sapiens (not "men" or "human" or "human life" or "a man"). The word "self" in the definition of human nature or human personality is also to be included.

Evolution: evolutionary, evolving, evolve, developed out of, emergent.

Author's imperatives expressed in these words

"The writer" "The author" "I" "We" "Man" "Men" "Students" "Readers" "One" must, ought, should, can - cannot
It is necessary: it is essential it is better, best (or equivalent) it is very (highly) important, it can never be—and equivalent judgmental phrases (exclusive of adjectives such as "hardly," "possibly," etc.), etc.

Phrases like "care must be exercised" are to be included. When the words listed are joined with verbs referring to logical processes only, e.g., "we must analyze," they are to be omitted. When examples or illustrations contain these words the items are ordinarily not to be recorded. Nor are the items generally to be included if they are preceded by conditional clauses, unless the context indicates that the author, by use of value-laden words or exclusion of alternatives, is implicitly indicating a preference.

While these words will probably not catch all assumptions or expressions of the author's value positions, they should catch many of them. The word "science" should bring out the concept of science; the words "assumption," "man," "evolution," the epistemological, psychological, and ontological assumptions and the words "value" and the imperative and necessitous phrases, the author's system of value, philosophy of life, etc.

Area Two—Sociology as a Science

The word list for this area was derived in a manner similar to that employed in obtaining the word list for "Basic Assumptions and Values: Concept of Science in General," namely:

Consideration of items in the theoretical paradigm.
Study of extracts obtained in the exploratory survey of the textbooks. These categories were consulted: Science: Social Science (in general), Order of Treatment of Topics, Scientific Method, Empirical Method, Social Phenomena, Sociology (purpose), Sociology (Value of), Sociology (methods), Social Science Methods, Sociology (Definition), Sociology (Concepts).

Indices of textbooks checked in preceding section, i.e., Bogardus, Sutherland and Woodward.

Survey of introductory sections of Bogardus, Sutherland and Woodward books.

From these four procedures a list of the following 20 basic or frequently recurring words or phrases was compiled: sociology, social science, social theory, social phenomena, conceptual framework, sociological method, social research, group, social interaction, sociological principles, social causation, social processes, social structure, social function, sociological point of view, social behavior, main or major divisions, social needs, basic concepts, areas of social life. After rechecking the extracts from this exploratory survey, this list was simplified to contain the following words which appeared to be utilized most in expression of the position of the authors (all as surveyed in the exploratory study and the random two textbooks selected in this recheck):
Sociology: sociologist, study of human society

Social science: social scientist (including political, economic, historical, educational scientists)

Method(s) of sociology: sociological method, methodology of sociology and of social science, social (sociological) research. This would include statements where the word "method" appears even without qualification by "sociological" or "social," but nonetheless contextually referring to sociology or social science, e.g., empirical method, case-study method, statistical method, etc.

Social (societal) phenomena (on): social fact, social relationship, social behavior

(Author's) major idea, fundamental notion, fundamental fact, primary social needs, the essential thing, fundamental problems, important conclusions, basic (sociological) principle, primary consideration, main point of view. These items may be expressed as author's personal opinion, or impersonally, as "it is a fundamental fact . . . ."

Basic (sociological) concepts: basic factors, major (main) divisions

Area Three--Social Organization and Progress

To determine the words to be used for the recording units in this area, the following procedures were employed:

The extracts from the exploratory survey were scanned to indicate the various words employed by the individual authors to describe social organization, social progress or related goal-orientations. The categories of extracts thus surveyed were those labelled: Progress, Social Norms, Goals, Democracy-Democratic Way, Social Organization-Disorganization, Integration, Social Policy-Social Planning, Values (Human)-Needs, Social Problems.

The subject indices of several textbooks (Cuber, Ogburn and Nimkoff, Sutherland and Woodward) were surveyed
for related terms under the headings of Social Norms, Social Organization, Organization, Integration, Social Order.

Major sections of the above authors were also surveyed in an effort to locate related terms which might be useful in compiling an effective list of key words for recording units.

As a result of these steps, a list of 33 terms was derived, words which occurred frequently in one or many authors when discussing social organization and social progress. These terms were the following: social order, social organization, progress, cohesion, value-systems, anomie, welfare, social planning, common-ultimate ends, democracy, freedom, liberalism, adequate society, well-organized society, social equilibrium, harmonious adjustment, happiness, maximum benefits, normative order, socialization, welfare, social structure, common good, social change, social problems, social control, social policy, readjustment, social disorganization, social reorganization, purposive planning, and social system.

Since it would be impractical to manipulate this lengthy word list in surveying the textbooks, an effort was made to simplify the list, guided by the authors' use of the terms in the extracts previously made (often the same author uses several of the terms in the same context, synonymously or relatedly), the universality of occurrence in the textbooks, and the stress an author places on a dis-
tinct concept (e.g., Ogburn and Nimkoff regarding "harmonious adjustment"). As a result of this process, a list of nine items was derived, which with the root words and their adjectival, and adverbial and negative forms, could be employed in the survey of the textbooks. This list comprised the following root words: (social) order, (social) organization (including reorganization, anomie), (social) progress, (social) integration, (social) value, democracy, (social) norm, (social) equilibrium, (social) planning.

As this list still seemed too extensive to manipulate satisfactorily, a further reduction was made. "Integration," though a useful concept, was eliminated because it is so often expressed in some of the other words retained; "democracy" was dropped because it connotes a specific ideal or goal, and its general aspects are likely to be caught up by other key words; "social planning" was omitted because it is more a technique than a goal or form of society.

With the following six key words and their related forms, the five textbooks were then surveyed, page by page, and all sentences containing these words were recorded:

(Social) order: orderly, disorder, disorderly

(Social) organization: disorganization (of society), reorganization (of society), organized (well, poorly, etc.), anomie

(Social) progress: progressive, backward, retarded
(Social) value: valuable, value-systems, valuation, devaluate

(Social) norm: normative, normal, abnormal, abnormality

(Social) equilibrium: disequilibrium, adjustment, readjustment, maladjustment

Where the author has paraphrased another's study of social organization, it will be sufficient to indicate the first reference to the study or the organization described, omitting subsequent paraphrasing or clearly descriptive sentences containing key words, but selecting sentences which express the judgments of the author of the textbook.

Area Four—Religion and the Church

To derive the word list for the "religion" analysis, the extracts derived from the exploratory survey and classified under the heading of "Religion-Churches" were scanned for key words, and the indices and sections on "Religion" and "Religious Organizations" in the Cuber, Sutherland and Woodward textbooks were checked. A list of 24 significant words was thus derived, comprising the following terms: religion, religious experience, church, ecclesiastical, supernatural, unseen (in sense of supernatural), God, god, deity, divine, worship, belief, sect, denomination, myth, sacred, spiritual, theology, magic, inner life, animism, priest, ritual, Christianity. As this list was too lengthy to manipulate in the content analysis, the following four words with their corresponding adjectival, adverbial and
negative forms, were selected as being more generally used to express the basic ideas of the authors on religion and the church:

**Religion:** religious, religious experience  
**Church:** churches, ecclesiastical, ecclesiasticism  
**Supernaturalism:** supernatural, unseen (in sense of supernatural)  
**God:** god, deity, divine

Application of Word Lists

Each textbook was surveyed four times (once for each work list of the four areas) page by page of text, for each occurrence of these words in accordance with these directions:

If a preceding or following sentence was essential to the understanding of the sentence selected, it was included. An effort was made to keep the units as small as possible. If succeeding sentences carried key words, they were grouped as in the textbook rather than as separate units.

No quotations from other authors were included, although the reference may be cited if the author did so, either in his textbook or in a footnote.

Phrases such as "This means," "It is," etc., if referring to key words as antecedents, were considered as key words in subsequent sentences.

All sentences containing the words on the lists for the four areas were, with the exceptions noted, bracketed and typed out to constitute the basic data for the content analysis.
e) Selection of Representative Sociology Textbooks for Definitive Content Analysis (Cf. Chapter I, p. 21)

Representativeness may involve consideration of the author's prestige, the scientific accuracy of the textbook, the number of schools adopting it, or the number of copies sold. Since the number of copies sold seemed to be an index lending itself most readily to empirical verification, an attempt was made to use it.

Though confidentiality was assured, the replies from the publishers of the 20 introductory sociology textbooks published between 1947-1950 were not complete enough to establish a rank order of copies published or sold. An attempt was then made to secure the information from the authors whose textbooks were, in the judgment of two representatives of Long's Book Store, Columbus, Ohio, most in demand, and for which the publisher had not produced publication or sale figures. The wide usage of the Cuber volume had already been established by Long's and the author. Letters were addressed to W. F. Ogburn, C. A. Dawson, R. L. Sutherland, K. Young, T. McCormick and P. Landis. Replies were received from all but Young. No author claimed to know how many copies had been circulated.

Because of the seeming impossibility of getting exact figures on circulation, an attempt was made to select eight textbooks which probably were most widely used judging from available publishers' figures (Bogardus, Gillin, Davis,
Bennett, and Tumin) or Long's Book Store estimate (Cuber, Sutherland and Woodward, Ogburn and Nimkoff, Young). While all of the eight above-mentioned textbooks could not be proven to be leaders in the introductory sociology field at the time (1951), it can be said that either because of known circulation figures, successive editions (e.g., Young), author's prestige (e.g., Ogburn), or as reflective of a school of thought (e.g., Bennett and Tumin, Davis), the eight textbooks are fairly representative of the more widely used American introductory sociology textbooks published between 1947-1950.

Though the eight textbooks selected were surveyed, page by page, according to the methodology indicated, it was later (1953) decided to limit further the number of textbooks to facilitate completion of the analysis and the interpretation of the data. The authors whose textbooks were the subject of complete analysis are: Bogardus, Cuber, Ogburn and Nimkoff, Sutherland and Woodward, and Young. It is significant that three of these textbooks, and few of the others published in the time period 1947-1950 have been issued in new editions (as of 1957).

f) Categorization and Separation of Textbook Extracts According to Four Areas of Analysis (Cf. Chapter I, p.22)

The extracts for the five textbooks selected were prepared for categorization in each of the four areas [cf. (d) above] by the following steps: first, the paragraphs or
sentences on the typed pages were numbered consecutively in each area; second, abbreviations were indicated in the margins opposite each item to indicate the author (e.g., SW for Sutherland and Woodward) and the area from which the extract came (e.g., SS for "Sociology as a Science") to facilitate identification when the pages were cut up and the items separated. In some instances where it was thought the contextual arrangement would facilitate classification later, several items closely related were left joined together. The resultant items were then gathered for each author in each area and stored in envelopes until the sorting process began.

g) Derivation of Content Categories (Cf. Chapter I, p. 23)

Following the general procedure of this research of letting the data themselves suggest the categories and method of analysis, the items extracted from the textbooks were examined for words or constructions indicative of value judgments. It was thought that these words or constructions in the items could then be labeled "evaluation devices," e.g., "ultimate good"; and then labels could be attached to each item which would indicate more specifically the type of value judgment. After experimenting with several sets of extracts, it was decided that two labels for each value judgment would be more useful, one descriptive of the content of the value judgment, the other descriptive of its type.
e.g., assumption, hypothesis. It was further suggested that the items be numbered according to the ten types of value judgments (Cf. Chapter I, pp. 26-27).

To facilitate the handling of the extracts, a worksheet was set up to record and classify the numbered items of extracts with the following headings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Number</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Contentual Value Judg-</th>
<th>Type of Author of Textbook</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Device</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>ment (number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The limitations of the above procedure soon became evident. The formulation of the "evaluation device" which involved the selection of a few words from the textbooks to describe the item, and the attachment of the contentual label to the evaluation device thus derived, both ran the risk of getting away from the author's full expression of the idea. Furthermore the problem of verification of the procedure was made the more difficult. Definite categories, into which the contents of the value judgments might be distinguished, would seem to facilitate subsequent comparisons between the items of the authors in the various areas under study.

Method of Deriving Categories of Content of Value Judgments

In accordance with the methodology which seeks to combine the empirical and the theoretical approaches to content analysis, the designation of categories for the contents of the value judgments was approached in two ways. First, the
contentual labels already derived from the analysis of some textbooks in some areas were examined for similarities and identities which would admit of more general classification. The second approach simply involved an enumeration of the various categories suggested by the titles and main subdivisions of the four areas of the textbooks specified for study, i.e., Basic Assumptions and Values: Science in General, Sociology as a Science, Social Organization and Progress, Religion and the Church. The categories yielded by the empirical analysis of the contentual labels were compared with those suggested by the four areas under study; and the resultant synthesis is thought to provide a useful set of categories for the contents of the value judgments.

Eight general categories seemed sufficient to classify the contents of the value judgment material obtained through this survey (Cf. Chapter I, p. 23).

h) Description of Content Categories (Cf. Chapter I, p. 23)

(1) **Science**: this category includes value-judgment items on: definition and division of science, relation of science to non-science (i.e., faith, opinion, etc.), importance and role of science, methodology of science in general; non-social science, philosophies of science, goal of science, epistemological (criteriological) assumptions and postulates.

*Note:* This category excludes items proper to the categories labeled "Sociology," "Social Science," "Philosophy."

(2) **Sociology**: this category includes value-judgment items on: definitions and divisions of sociology, fields of sociology, importance or value of sociology, goals of sociology, essence of sociology; sociological point of view, relation of sociology to other sciences, order in sociology; conceptual framework, methods in sociology, preference among
sociological authors or sociological schools of thought (basic), sociological principles, definitions of sociological concepts (as group, social progress, socialization, culture, society), role of sociologist, data of sociology; social phenomenon, social fact, emphases in sociology.

Note: This category includes all sociological definitions of, or accepted by, the author, even though the definition may also pertain to another category. Definitions pertinent to other areas can either be transferred or may be caught in other word lists.

(3) Society: this category includes value-judgment items on: judgments or theories regarding forms of social organization, disorganization, culture, social processes, social equilibrium, population trends, cultural variability, social classes, social stratification, social change, cultural change, social heritage, social order (as is); social roles (as operative), culture (as is, exclusive of values, attitudes), public opinion, cultural accumulation, socialization.

Note: These subcategories are to contain items descriptive of society as is, to be distinguished from ideals, attitudes, and values which go under "Values" (below No. 7).

(4) Social Science: this category includes value-judgment items on: definitions of social science, history, anthropology, education, political science, economics, authorities accepted from these fields, postulates borrowed from these areas.

(5) Psychology (exclusive of social roles): this category includes value-judgment items on: definitions of man, personality, attitudes, intelligence, will, emotion, body-soul, human nature, theories on origin of man, theories on intelligence, will personality, etc., authorities accepted either in psychology, social psychology, learning theory, stereotypes, cultural influences on personality formation, normal personality, adjustment (personal) and maladjustment, original nature, behaviorism, roles, man, woman (distinction between person and role), origin of self, Darwinism, sex differences, sexuality, conscience, emotions, evolution, theories on origin of culture.

(6) Philosophy (exclusive of psychology, ethics, epistemology): this category includes value-judgment items on: metaphysical assumptions or postulates (modes of being), cosmological assumptions or postulates (concept of universe, nature), positivism, pragmatism, social philosophy, naturalism, determinism.
(7) **Values**: this category includes value-judgment items on: definitions of value, social value, progress, author's own personal values, social deviation, cultural standards, valuations of social groups, social organizations, social philosophies such as democracy, fascism, totalitarianism, cooperation, liberalism; cultural relativism as principle, social planning, social reform, social welfare, ethnocentrism, nationalism, social problems, social integration, social order (as ideal), value-system, adjustment (social) and maladjustment, social contract, norm and deviation, motives and wishes, cultural determinism, ideology, values of particular groups as family, and race.

(8) **Religion**: this category includes value-judgment items on: definition of religion, theology, supernatural, attitudes toward religion in general and particular religions or churches (exclusive of role of sociologist regarding religion); theory of origin of religion, authorities accepted, superstition, relation between religion and science, magic, faith, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Islamism, etc.

1) **Sorting of Items into Content Categories** (Cf. Chapter I, p. 23)

In the process of sorting the items into value judgment and non-value judgment items, and the former into one of the eight content categories, one general rule was kept in mind for locating and recording items which could fit into two or more categories:

The item was placed in the category indicated by the subject of the sentence, or the main topic of a group of sentences in a paragraph if the item was composed of more than one sentence. Since the item may involve key words listed for other areas than the one under study (e.g., the word "sociologist" would place the item in the area of "Sociology as a Science," whereas the words "social order" in the same sentence would result in the item being repeated
in the area of "Social Organization and Progress"), the item was still classified according to subject and, if necessary, could be compared with other areas later when the data were analyzed more minutely.

Numerous problems of classification arose as the sorting process proceeded, and these have been indicated in research notes made during the analysis of the sets of extracts. It is in light of the analyst's stipulations, formulated in Chapter I, that the selection and classification of items is scientifically defensible. The ultimate scientific justification of the selections depend upon the resolution of the differences between his epistemological, psychological, and ethical positions, and those of analysts whose choices may differ from his.

Some procedural generalizations can be noted here. It was decided that while definitions generally would be located in the "sociology" category (since they represent concepts either proper to sociology or, if borrowed from another science, related to sociology), it would facilitate later analysis if the authors' definitions of psychological terms would be placed in the "psychology" category; and similarly with the definitions for the categories relating to "religion" and "science."

Semantic difficulties were often involved; e.g., whether the author was using the word "evolution" in a human biological sense or in a social sense, necessitating
a decision of the location of the item under the "Psychology" or "Society" categories. The general procedure was to determine the appropriate category from the context of the item.

Another difficulty occurred in determining whether an item dealing with a social theory or social institution should be classified under "Society" or "Values." If the author was simply describing the theory he accepted, it would go under "Society"; if he was specifically evaluating it, it was placed under "Values."

j) Specification of Value-Judgment Element from Items Extracted from Textbooks. Classification According to Types (Cf. Chapter I, p. 24)

A value-judgment analysis worksheet was drawn up and mimeographed on which were recorded the following data for each content category of each author surveyed: (1) code number of item indicating area of analysis, rank order of items among original extracts from the textbook, and page in textbook (e.g., BA 21-18 on worksheet headed Young, "Psychology," signified that the item is from the original survey area of "Basic Assumptions and Values," the 21st. item to appear in the pages of extracts made from Young's Sociology, occurring on page 18 of that textbook; and the item has, in the previous differentiation between value judgment and non-value judgment items, been placed in the category of "Psychology"); (2) the theme of the item, i.e., the value-judgment aspect
phrased as succinctly as possible in the author's own words;

(3) **numerical designation of the type of value judgment**, i.e., types 1 to 10 (explained in Chapter I). A representative selection of these worksheets is found in Appendix II.

k) "Value and "Value Judgment" According to (1) Introductory Textbook Authors and (2) Social and Axiological Theorists (Cf. Chapter I, p. 25)

(1) "Value" and "Value Judgment" According to Authors of the Five Introductory Sociology Textbooks

Bogardus, Sociology

Every attitude is accompanied by a value. An attitude and a value are parts of the same process. The person or object toward which one has an attitude is a value. An attitude is subjective; it is a part of the mental equipment of a person. A value, however, is a part of a person's environment. Neither without the other would have any significance. All of human life that has any meaning may be included under attitudes and values. Personal experiences are the whirlpools in which attitudes change regarding values. As environmental objects help or hinder a person they rise or fall in his scale of values (P. 24). Cf. also pp. 25, 26.

Cuber, Sociology

People cherish certain ideas which are called 'values.' These ideas contain or express the prevailing estimates which people have of the relative worth of things (p. 20).

Once a person accepts a value, he becomes somewhat biased or prejudiced thereby (p. 21). Cf. also pp. 110, 144, 167, 289-290, 487, 560, 570, 579.

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1These definitions or references are taken from the extracts made from the textbooks in the areas entitled "Basic Assumptions and Values," and "Social Organization and Progress," in both of which sections the words "value" or "social value" are key words in the content analysis.
Ogburn and Nimkoff, *Sociology*

It is not possible to speak of progress without reference to standards, and standards, are eminently subjective. For value, like taste, there is no measuring stick (p. 573).

Because values are subjective... Human values are, to the scientist, a system of data to be considered objectively like all other phenomena (p. 586). Cf. also pp. 69, 70, 226, 533, 562, 573, 574.

Sutherland and Woodward, *Introductory Sociology*

Social values often become formalized in the institution of a society... There is a close connection between the values which thus become objectified in social patterns and the attitudes of the people who support those values... Both attitudes and values may, therefore, be considered the elements or the basic forces in interaction (p. 646).

A value is any object or objective which a person or a group considers desirable and strives to avoid or destroy (p. 646). Cf. also pp. 167, 217, 645, 657, 823.

Young, *Sociology*

We must realize that human values and beliefs make up some of the most stubborn of all social-cultural facts. We shall make no advance if we shut our eyes to the place that irrational, emotionally colored attitudes and values have in group as well as individual action (p. 9).

A most important feature of personality is the value system. A value is a combination of idea and attitude which gives us a scale of preference or priority to motives and goals as well as to a course of action from motive to goal. The values high in one's scale tend to be emotionally charged (p. 110).

Value. The equality of desirability (or undesirability) believed to inhere in an idea, object or action. Values are accepted, in time by the group in certain orders of priority (p. 620, glossary). Cf. also pp. 2, 3, 5, 349, 369, 466.
(2) Definitions of "Value" and "Value Judgments" by Social and Axiological Theorists

Value judgments are judgments made in relation to something, either in "behalf of determining what is to be done," what has been done, or what is to be given by future action, itself conditioned upon (varying with) the judgment.2

By value judgments are to be understood, where nothing else is implied or expressly stated, practical evaluations of the satisfactory or unsatisfactory character of phenomena, subject to our influence.3

Value judgments as objects of sociological research are judgments made by the individuals whom the sociologist is studying. Value judgments as postulates of sociology are axiological propositions affirmed by the sociologist himself and incorporated into his system. . . . Metasociological value judgments . . . may assign values either to sociology or to some part or aspect of sociology or to some sociological method or procedure.4

We shall avoid using the term "value." The term attitude has the same connotation of solidity. Too, it is often used to denote beliefs as well as valuations. When used in this book, "attitude" should be understood as simply a convenient synonym of valuation.5

Value judgments: Generalized conclusions reached on the basis of facts summarized by statements of types (f) and (h).

(f) Inventories of value preferences
(h) Value causation and instrumentality statements—that given objects, actions, or

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4Furfey, The Scope and Method of Sociology, pp. 91-92 passim.

methods did or will produce or promote specific results regarded as desirable, undesirable or important, or being used or suggested as means to such ends.6

A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action. . . . A value is not just a preference but is a preference which is felt and/or considered to be justified "morally" or by reasoning or by aesthetic judgment, usually by two or all three of these. . . .7

A value is any object of desire, whether material or abstract. It is anything desired by someone: a desideratum.8

1) Working Definition of Value Judgment (Cf. Chapter I, p. 25)

To derive a definition of value judgment which would be acceptable to all sociologists and all philosophers of value presupposes a unanimity of conceptual framework one cannot dare to assume. However, after considering the various definitions and usages cited in the preceding sections, the following was submitted as a possible working definition for the purpose of this research (repeated here from Chapter I, p. 25).

A value judgment is the expression of an attitude of desire, interest, or preference.

The genus of the definition—"attitude"—is found explicitly among many of the authors cited, e.g., Myrdal, Kluckhohn, Cuber, Bogardus, Sutherland and Woodward, Young, and implicitly among the others. The words "interest" and "preference" are to be considered more as appositives of "desire" than as contrasts to it.

This definition as such does not involve commitment to any particular school of value theory, objectivistic, subjectivistic, or otherwise. It is broad enough, however, to permit a critique of value judgments from the viewpoint of different value theories, the only condition being that the basic assumptions be made explicit. The definition does not seem to do violence to any of the conceptions of valuation held by the authors of the textbooks under study. Furthermore, the definition lends itself to the development of various categories of value judgments, on the basis of actual usage by the textbook authors or the social theorists. Finally the definition should insure a sufficiency of items to make the categories representative, comparable, and suited to sociological interpretation.

4) **Specification of Types of Value Judgment** (Cf. Chapter I, p. 26)

The empirical analysis of the textbooks plus the literature describing types of values and value judgments
established the following principles in the determination of types of value judgments for this research. Because value is of its nature partially objective and partially subjective, the identity of judgments in the same matter is dependent not only upon the perception of the objective reality but also the subjective value orientation of the observer. This value orientation may or may not be verifiable in terms of sciences other than the one under consideration, i.e., it may be composed of valid principles, postulates or axioms borrowed from other sciences, or it may reflect the biases, rationalizations, unwarranted assumptions, tentative hypotheses, or emotional overtones of the observer.

For the purpose of content analysis, a value judgment (as far as a particular science is concerned) may therefore be a proposition which is either not self-evident, or is not a matter of common acceptance by all scientific observers in the field, or whose terms (i.e., subject, predicate, verb) are not evidently verifiable in light of the accepted principles of the particular science.

The presence of a value judgment in any scientific work can be detected by isolating (1) subjects or predicates which are not proper matter of, or adequately defined by, the particular science; (2) verbal or adverbial forms which express a connection between subject and predicate which is not indicated by the objects themselves and by the
canons of scientific procedure, or which clearly express an emotional state or the acceptance of a value system in terms of which alone the judgment can be understood.

To distinguish judgments of value from judgments of fact presupposes an adequate knowledge (a) of grammar; (b) of logic; (c) of scientific proof in general, (d) of the accepted principles and facts of the particular science under consideration. Familiarity with the first three areas will enable the general analyst to locate possible value judgments; training in the fourth area will permit of scientific determination of value judgments in the particular science.

A problem may arise as to the relation of erroneous judgments to judgments of fact and judgments of value. Admittedly, it is difficult to determine whether an erroneous judgment is due simply to ignorance, a lapse of logic, or a tendency to rationalize. Certainly if the judgment of fact is to be contrasted with the judgment of value as an opposite, then the erroneous judgment cannot be classified with the judgment of fact, and therefore should be considered as a possible value judgment. This can then be further analyzed by studying first the context in which the judgment occurs and then its subsequent use.

With these thoughts on value judgment in mind, and with the experience of the exploratory survey of the introductory sociology textbooks and readings in value and social
theory, ten types were indicated as useful divisions of the working concept of value judgment.

Chapter II—Methodological Details

n) Example of the Procedure in the Derivation of a Central Attitude (Cf. Chapter II, p. 72)

The steps undertaken and the criteria employed in the determination of the central attitudes in the textbooks have been described in Chapter II under the heading "Derivation of Central Attitudes Revealed in the Content Analysis." To illustrate this procedure, the textual bases can be indicated for one of the central attitudes, viz.:

Society or the group confers personality upon the individual. The self does not exist at birth, but arises in social experience. The social group creates values and remolds attitudes. The mores can make anything right at one time and wrong at another. Normality of personality involves, over and above the satisfaction of biological needs, conformity to the expectations and wishes of the group. Any one of a variety of social organizations meet human needs because it creates human needs.

Although the analyses of the eight content categories were surveyed, item by item, to detect the central attitudes, the "Psychology" category, by its very nature, contributed largely to the formulation of this central attitude. Related value statements, however, are found in other categories, particularly "Society." Within the "Psychology" category containing all the appropriate value judgments derived through the content analysis, the items were first
classified by author according to repetitious or related value positions, and the frequency of the items was noted. Frequency, relevance to scientific sociology, plus relatedness and applicability to other areas of sociology operated to determine the centrality of the attitude. Wherever possible, the phraseology of the authors was retained. Some of the value positions in the "Psychology" category, with the frequency of occurrence indicated in parenthesis, are as follows:

Bogardus, Sociology

At every step personality is being made, unmade, or remade by group stimuli. (11)

Groups exist prior to the individual. (3)

Culture and personality are one and inseparable. (3)

Cuber, Sociology

The individual is virtually powerless to resist cultural indoctrination. (7)

The human being is molded by three separable sets of influences—"original nature," culture, unique personal experiences. (6)

Instead of speaking of a total and responsible self, one can with much greater certainty speak of the multiplicity of selves. (3)

A personality can be conceived as a collection of group-related roles. (2)

Ogburn and Nimkoff, Sociology

The degree of change is influenced not only by group norms, but also by the degree to which the individual identifies and by the amount of pressure to conform exerted by the group. (8)

The self does not exist at birth but arises in social experience. (5)
"Constitutional factors," "group experience," and "culture" are the principal determinants of personality. (9)

If we are to change human nature, we must first change the culture. (3)

Sutherland and Woodward, *Introductory Sociology*

In considering normal personality, the sociologist stresses conformity to the expectations and wishes of the group. (7)

The person and the group are two aspects of the same thing; one does not exist without the other. (5)

Through contacts we become persons. (3)

The self is always a social self. (2)

Young, *Sociology*

No one is born with a personality. It develops and operates on the basis of biophysical structures and functions as these are influenced by society and its culture. (6)

Culture imposes moral values upon the individual. (1)

The fundamental explanation of any differences between men and women, aside from the purely sexual, rests on cultural conditioning. (2)

Society or group life is older than man and his culture. (3)

The integration of personality is made possible by reason of the relation of the individual to persons and symbols of the in-group and the out-group. (1)

In addition to these value positions which are evidently reflected in the formulation of the central attitude illustrated above, the wide acceptance and frequent citation of Sumner's *Folkways* justifies the inclusion of the statement of the Sumnerian thesis that the mores can make anything right at one time and wrong at another. Bogardus explicitly
states so twice, Ogburn and Nimkoff once, Sutherland and Woodward three times, and Young once. Cooley's "looking-glass self" is also generally, and quite uncritically, accepted.

The proposition that any one of a variety of social organizations meets human needs because it creates human needs is simply a corollary of the preceding items. Cuber emphasizes this point five times. It is expressed in the emphases on change and adaptibility of social institutions made by all authors and in warnings against "ethnocentrism."

In fairness to the textbook authors, it should be pointed out that there are many passages in their volumes which attribute some importance to other than environmental or group factors in the formation of personality. Generally, however, their references are to "biological" or "constitutional" or "original nature" factors in personality development, a situation which still leaves unaccountable the uniqueness of the human individual. Cuber, for one, does speak of "the unique personal experience factor" as "indispensable" (p. 158). Yet, despite qualifying and sometimes contradictory statements obtained by the content analysis, the emphasis in all the textbooks is on group determination of personality. Mention of the "biological" and "constitutional" and "original nature" elements of personality (all determined by environment because material), without
accounting for the spiritual and free factors within the individual, weights the presentation still further in favor of group determinism.

The centrality of this attitude becomes the more evident as particular social institutions are analyzed, and the adaptations of individuals to group living estimated in terms of normality.9

9Specific passages related to this central attitude may be found in the textbooks as follows: B--12-20, 26, 39, 41, 46, 51, 475, 534; C--105, 132, 144-145, 156-164, 178-179, 196, 220-225, 231-233, 240, 249, 257, 344-345, 467, 515; C-N--57, 73, 91-99, 103, 106-107, 113, 115, 194-198, 214-217, 222-250, 265, 361, 557; S--W--26, 32, 176-179, 265-269, 270-281, 296; Y--39, 92-111, 124-129, 347, 483, 491.
APPENDIX II

Samples of Pages of Extracts from Selected Introductory Sociology Textbooks and V-J Content Analysis Worksheets

Note A: As explained in Chapter I, under the heading "The Technique of Content Analysis and Its Application to the Data," each of the five introductory sociology textbooks were surveyed, line by line. All passages containing words from the area word lists were bracketed and later typed from the textbooks, thus constituting the raw data for the content analysis. [Cf. also Appendix I (d), (3)]. Sample pages of this data are presented here to illustrate the procedure.

Bogardus: Sociology
Area: Social Organization and Social Progress

The urban group is a loose organization of people living compactly in a limited area and possessing a relatively high degree of intercommunication. Industrial and business pursuits and social life comprise the main activities. Inasmuch as the people are removed from agricultural enterprise and from direct contact with nature, they live in a somewhat artificial, man-made world. They are subject to a superficiality which leads them to assume to be what they are not. Urban society is notorious for its haughtiness, its cocksureness, its night life, its wastefulness, and its uselessness. Urban society often defeats that industry, frugality, and satisfaction in work well done which is essential to national welfare (p. 137).

The rural group furnishes deeply genuine attitudes, nerve stability, indifference to luxury, and vast undeveloped ability; the urban group offers social stimulation, chances for personal advancement, opportunities for superior creative efforts, and the advantages of a developed social life. Rural life reflects in a large measure the life-giving and health-restoring advantages of an outdoor existence. The city tears down nerves and wears people out, while giving them superior opportunities in countless directions.

The history of mankind seems to indicate that any people which is chiefly rural or chiefly urban is at a disadvantage. In the first instance the people are understimulated and subject to inertia; in the second, they are in danger of being smothered by numbers, of being overstimulated, or of being exhausted nervously. A nation somewhat equally representative of healthy rural and healthy urban groups is likely to prove in the long run to be the strongest (p. 147).
3. The Role of Culture

Certainly there was once a time when there was no life on the planet. In the beginning all was inorganic matter. In the course of a long span of time, life appeared. To the inorganic sphere an organic realm was added. Life assumed a multitude of forms.

For a time the behavior of animal life was a simple chemical response to stimuli. There was in these early beginnings no learning. (p. 33).

Animals developed gradually the capacity to learn, not only in a random way through experience, but systematically from those of their own kind through imitation and communication. Certain gregarious animals seem to transmit continuously through their group life some behavior which the young learn by imitation such as methods of the hunt and of the stampede, and possibly some slight modifications of fighting and sex behavior. It is common knowledge that mother cats teach their kittens how to catch mice and rats. (p. 34).

These long beginnings of learning are thus dependent upon biological evolution: the more elaborate the nervous system, the greater the learning capacity.

Relation of learning to culture. With the transmission of behavior by learning, and especially by established learning through the group, a really new order of phenomena begins. It is called the superorganic. From such simple beginnings has grown the magnificent superorganic of today which we call civilization. (p. 35).
While it is easy though often misleading to divide complex cultural data into two parts, there is some basis in fact for assuming that, in the by and large, the two most significant cultural systems today are the authoritarian, totalistic on the one side, and the democratic, individualistic on the other.

Table 3 is a tentative first approximation to a comparison of the modal democratic and the modal authoritarian political, economic, and social orders. Included are brief but highly tentative statements regarding aspects of personality make-up which seem associated with these culture systems. This latter has bearing on the growing interest in the relation of culture to personality, a matter to which we shall refer at various points later (p. 49).

The divergences are reflected in the contrasting views regarding the individual. Such views, too, have their roots in the respective cultures. We assume that the socialization of the child and adolescent will determine his adult personality. And we assume that the culture will largely determine the form and content of said socialization. On the basis of these two assumptions, we may examine the contrasting systems for clues to the values each puts upon the individual (p. 56).

In contrast, the ideal of democracy is the integrity and inviolability of the person. He is supposed to stand on his own feet by taking on duties as well as privileges. He is assumed to be capable of voluntary participation in policy-making as well as in the execution of the affairs of his community, large or small. If he wishes to have a private life tied in with non-community or non-political affairs, this is also his own business, not that of others to interfere in except in the interest of public security and morality. While, in actuality, this ideal is not often fully attained, it is nonetheless the basic value and the one toward which the dynamic of any democratic system must move (p. 57).
APPENDIX II (CONTINUED)

Note B: The items comprising the extracts from the textbooks were separated into value-judgment and non-value-judgment categories. The value judgment items in the various content categories were then examined systematically to determine precisely the value-judgment element. These items in each content category were then classified according to the types of value judgments. [Cf. Chapter I, "The Technique of Content Analysis and Its Application to the Data," and Appendix I (j).] Sample worksheets which recorded this data are reproduced here to illustrate the procedure.
V-J Content-Analysis Worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Type No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SOP6-14</td>
<td>It is from differences that progress arises.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) SOP8-20</td>
<td>People cherish certain ideas which are called &quot;values.&quot; These ideas contain or express the prevailing estimates which people have of the relative worth of things.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) SOP8-20</td>
<td>In America we characteristically value highly success, beauty, a high standard of living and education.</td>
<td>5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) SOP9-21</td>
<td>Once a person accepts a value, he becomes somewhat biased or prejudiced thereby.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) SOP9-21</td>
<td>Thus, one cannot escape having some values, and once he has them they operate as prejudices or biases in his thinking.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) SOP10-21</td>
<td>... we have said ... that science of all kinds seeks truth, irrespective of what or whose values may be jeopardized by the results.</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) SOP10-21</td>
<td>... science might seem to have nothing to do with values whatever. While this is true, for the method of science, it is not true for the goal of science.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) SOP11-21</td>
<td>In summary, then, the method of science disavows values and seeks to eliminate them, but the eventual goal of science is itself a value, the faith in the ultimate good of knowing the truth.</td>
<td>3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item No.</td>
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<tr>
<td>41)SS54-244</td>
<td>When the sociologist undertakes the task of generalizing on human purposes, he proceeds more systematically and more cautiously.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42)SS54-244</td>
<td>These precautions are necessary . . . wherever dogma of uncertain accuracy is to be replaced by reliable knowledge. . .</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43)SS54-244</td>
<td>. . . it must be remembered that the social scientist's conclusions arise not out of casual experience but out of a lifetime of study.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44)SS60-294</td>
<td>. . . the suggestion of studying groups objectively and scientifically may appear a novel undertaking, and yet it is the principal task of sociology.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45)SS63-300, 301</td>
<td>Fortunately . . . a sociologist can find a fairly satisfactory middle ground. Zimmerman has pointed out that a society should be conceived as a set of culture consistencies. . .</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46)SS65-305</td>
<td>One of the most interesting projects in sociology consists in tracing the history of a given group from the early days of its intimate, personal relations to its institutionalized adulthood. . .</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47)SS67-310</td>
<td>. . . we. . . will discuss in greatest detail those types of social groupings which, historically, have come to be of value to the sociologist and in relation to which he has carried on the greater part of his research.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48)SS68-318</td>
<td>The sociologist is interested in studying this form of mob action both because it has been an important social problem and also because it illustrates so many of the characteristics of mob behavior. . .</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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I, Louis Antoninus Ryan, was born in Utica, New York, July 8, 1913. I received my secondary school education at St. John's College Preparatory School, Brooklyn, New York, and my undergraduate training at Providence College and the College of St. Thomas Aquinas, receiving the Bachelor of Arts degree from the latter institution in 1937. In 1934, I entered the Order of Friar Preachers (Dominicans), and was ordained a Priest in 1940. In 1941, I received the degree Lector in Sacred Theology from the Dominican Faculty of Theology, Washington, D.C. and the Master of Arts degree in Social Science from the Catholic University of America. Between 1941-1947 I taught Sociology at the College of St. Mary of Springs and Moral Theology from 1947-1950 at Trinity College, Washington, D.C. From 1950-1953 I was granted a leave of absence to complete doctoral studies at The Ohio State University. Since 1953 I have been Professor of Moral Theology and Sociology at Providence College and part time Professor at Emmanuel College and the Archbishop Cushing School of Theology for the Laity, Boston, Massachusetts.