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TRADITION AND EDUCATION:
A STUDY IN UNDERSTANDING

DISSERATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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* * * * * *
The Ohio State University
1962

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Conditions as well as causes are necessary for the academic life.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This study is intended as a paradigm of educational philosophy. It will attempt to delineate the kinds of questions that arise in the philosophy of education and the kinds of activity involved in a meaningful examination of these questions.

The philosophy of education shares with general philosophy a spectrum-like character: It commences with the practical problems of human existence and moves to a direct concern with intellectual problems of the highest generality. What distinguishes it from general philosophy is the kind of problems which form its starting point: Educational philosophy commences with the practical difficulties involved in determining what we are doing in education and why. The determination of curriculum content, for example, is clearly a concern of educational philosophy, or the determination of appropriate methodology, or discerning the meaning of various learning theories. What I hope to show is that the activity of the educational philosopher, while commencing with these practical problems, inevitably leads to the more fundamental issues concerning the meaning of human existence and education as one aspect of that existence; and that the educational philosopher must necessarily deal with these deeper problems as foundational to all educational theorizing. Thus a proposal concerning the proper subject matter for the secondary schools must not only be asserted but
justified as well; and its justification necessarily involves the educational philosopher in determining its legitimacy as a proper end of the educative process as an aspect of human life. Again, a learning theory which centers in the instinctual and social interests of the individual may show that a child learns more readily when his attitudes and current activities are taken into account; and it is the task of the educational philosopher to determine whether these attitudes and activities are just and whether the knowledge gained by these means is worth-while.

I proceed on two fundamental convictions. First, that every educational theory implies a view or views of the educative process, which in turn is an aspect of a view or views of human nature. The very beginnings of philosophical reflection were rooted in educational concerns, and since, the deepest problems of knowledge have largely been taken also as problems of learning and thinking. Epistemological and ethical problems are two obvious examples. The second conviction is that one of the most important tasks of the philosophy of education is to make explicit these implications concerning the educative process and human nature and to evaluate their worthiness. This should dispel any thought that I conceive of educational philosophers as mere concept-jugglers, analyzing conceptual apparatus for its meaning. Such analysis is certainly an important aspect of their task, but educational philosophers are also men, and their humanity must be taken into account in their philosophizing. Right or wrong, educational philosophers must adjudge as well as explicate, that is, they must philosophize.
Certainly there is some philosophizing going on in education today; but I doubt there is enough. We find a good deal of significant work in Catholic philosophy of education, for example, or in the investigation of the possibilities latent in the analytic school of philosophy in relation to educational philosophy. But generally there is a failure on the part of the educational philosopher to take account of the many levels of inquiry and many dimensions of meaning inherent in his field of study. All too often he is suggesting that the schools increase or decrease academic subject matter but he is not explaining why they should; he is proposing that the schools become more democratic or more aristocratic but he is failing to substantiate his assertion with other than expeditious reasons; he is asking that the community have a greater or lesser voice in determining school policy but one searches his writings in vain for reasons as to why it should.

Perhaps the best current example of this failure is the "Great Debate" in education. Judging from the educational literature of the past decade, the ostensible issue is the determination of curriculum content: What subject matter should be included in the educative process? Several answers have been proposed: the traditional liberal arts, academic subjects for intellectual discipline, those subjects immediately relating to the interests of the students, those subjects which help the student adjust to his society, and others. Throughout the debate there has been a consistent failure to examine a number of presuppositions concerning the meaning of education as a human enterprise. To take but one example, life
adjustment education is a theory which claims to solve the problem of content determination by asserting that the knowledge most appropriate to the educative process is that information relating directly to the activity of the individual at any given moment. Accordingly, the task of education is simply to prepare individuals to deal with immediate life situations, the school presenting enough diverse experience to youth to ensure that all future kinds of situations may be met expeditiously and successfully.

A possible assumption of this theory is a behavioristic theory of learning: Life is a series of immediate situations, each comprised of a complex of social and physical stimuli and the resultant responses. This assumption, in turn, may be grounded in a mechanistic view of human nature: The response of the organism is invariably tied to the immediate stimulus. Thus, acceptance of the theory of life adjustment education could necessitate acceptance of the idea that human beings are inextricably bound to the immediate situation and are unable to discern other directives in human life than hedonistic impulses for expanded experience. Adherents to the theory of life adjustment education seem neither to examine these assumptions nor show an awareness of them or others like them. Yet the theory stands or falls on the legitimacy of such assumptions. If it can be found that man is a mere mechanism the theory may prove fruitful; if not there may be grounds for seriously questioning not only its fruitfulness but indeed its worthiness as a concern of educators.
What has been said of life adjustment education is true, though perhaps to a lesser extent, of many other theories current in educational thought. In recent years the majority of theorists have tended to carry on their speculation at a practical and technical level of inquiry, ignoring or overlooking the fundamental issues that are inevitably involved. It is with this thought in mind that the present study is presented as a paradigm of educational philosophy.

The particular problem I will raise is that of determining curriculum content. While this choice of a problem is essentially arbitrary, and any educational problem could have served as paradigmatic, it seems timely in light of the current "crisis" in education as well as the previously noted "Great Debate."

In Part One of the study, Chapters II and III, I examine a group of theories which claim to resolve this problem. In essence, these theories assert that tradition, defined as certain kinds of cognitive knowledge contained primarily in the "classics," should form the basis of the school curriculum since it is only by acquiring this knowledge that man can become better and progress toward a humane and humanistic society. Arguments that favor the inclusion of the classics in the curriculum are presented in summary form in Chapter II together with objections to these arguments. The objections are raised, not to disprove the arguments themselves, but to show

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1 Further justification for this statement will appear in Chapter II where another group of theories are examined in order to show their failure to raise the philosophical issue concerning the relation of learning and doing.
that the theories do not explain how and why the reading of the classics will make us better men. Chapter III then expands the concepts of tradition and education in order to show that the problem of how and why the classics will make us better men is part of the larger issue of the relationship between learning and doing, between the acquisition of cognitive knowledge and individual action.

The expanded problem of Chapter II is examined in Part Two, Chapters IV and V, where two possible solutions are suggested. The first solution, suggested by John Dewey (Chapter IV), is seen to pose a further question: What kind of knowledge can we expect to gain from asking for a delineation of the relationship of learning and doing? The second solution, immanent in the thought of Plato (Chapter V), commences with suggesting a solution to the latter epistemological problem and consequently envisions a different kind of resolution to the philosophical issue of the relation of learning and doing. This Platonic resolution, in turn, affects the original conception of education set forth in Chapter III, and thus also affects the kind of answer we can expect to give to the educational question of curriculum determination.

A final note must be added on the precise nature of the study. I have stated that it is meant as a paradigm of educational philosophy. As such, it is intended as exemplary of the activity of philosophizing in relation to educational concerns. The series of questions examined is quite arbitrary for my present purpose, contingent only upon the original educational question. The choice of solutions to the root problem which emerges from this
educational question is also arbitrary: Descartes' proposals could have been used instead of Dewey's, Kant's instead of Plato's, and so on. I mention this only to dispel any thought that the ideas dealt with and the conclusions arrived at are in any sense absolute in regard to educational philosophy. The central theme of the study is the kinds of questions asked and the activity involved in examining them.
PART ONE

TRADITION AND EDUCATION

In accord with the intent and design of the study, Part One will examine certain educational theories concerning curriculum determination and suggest a few shortcomings of these theories. One of these shortcomings will then be developed within the context of the educative process in order to show the kinds of issues that must be examined in order to resolve it.
CHAPTER II
TRADITION AND EDUCATION - I

1) Preface

The determination of curriculum content has long been an educational problem. It has been especially vexing in this country since the turn of the century. With the appearance of John Dewey and the rise of the progressive education movement many educators came to feel that the curriculum should be a flexible tool in the hands of the teacher, encompassing vocational and social subjects as well as the 3 R's and the liberal arts. Progressive education was not without its opponents, however, and others insisted that the schools should continue to concentrate their attention on the basic academic subjects of language and literature, history, science, and mathematics. This debate over the appropriate curriculum content for American schools has continued down to the present day; and during the past decade especially, advocates of the academic subjects, often called traditionalists, have become quite vociferous and loquacious in their insistence that the schools should return to a traditional curriculum. In this chapter I will examine certain of the traditionalistic proposals for curriculum determination in an attempt to ascertain their meaning for the educative process.
In order to clarify the intent of the chapter two points should be noted. First, I propose to deal only with contemporary formulations of traditionalism, those which have appeared in the past decade or so. In these recent writings we find ample illustration of the failure, already noted in the Introduction, to take account of the many dimensions involved in educational philosophy. I do not mean that other instances of this failing cannot be found in the history of educational thought, but for our present concerns current theories will suffice. Thus, everything said about traditionalism refers specifically to its present-day forms. A great deal of misunderstanding will be avoided if this fact is kept foremost in mind as we proceed.

The second point concerns my mode of presenting the theories and its meaning for the study as a whole. It will develop in the course of the study that traditionalism divides itself into several camps according to the kind of arguments used in its defense. Dealing with each of these arguments in turn, I will first expound or represent the argument and then briefly analyze it. The analysis will consist of raising certain issues, the solutions to which are implied in the argument but have not been explicated for their educational and philosophical meaning. Counter-solutions are then briefly mentioned in order to show that the issues in question are far from settled. It is important to realize this purpose in proposing

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1 See Part II of the Bibliography and the bibliographical note on p. 156.
counter-solutions: The critical portions of the analysis are intended neither to disprove the arguments nor to represent them as essentially incorrect. The only point is to show that the arguments, as they stand, are open to question since they are based on unresolved philosophical issues. This opening of the issues to question is intended to carry the major thesis of the study, viz., that inquiry of a more fundamental character is needed in order to ground educational theorizing in principles concerning the nature and meaning of human existence. I am not suggesting, of course, that educational philosophers must resolve these philosophical issues; only that they must realize their existence and examine them as an integral and necessary part of educational philosophizing.

2) Traditionalism

I will use the term traditionalism in much the same sense as Adler and Mayer, as a rubric encompassing a number of similar current theories which propound the appropriate methods and content of education. Traditionalists have many differences, a few of which will be noted shortly. But in spite of their differences they all share a deep conviction as to the purpose of the educative process and the appropriate content of education. The content is that of tradition, generally defined as a body of vested knowledge produced within and definitive of the Western heritage. And the primary purpose of education is to pass on this knowledge.

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The body of knowledge comprising tradition is usually characterized as the classics, the greatest works produced in the history of the Western world. Homer, Dante, and Eliot; Sophocles, Shakespeare, and Ibsen; Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Kant; Archimedes, Galileo, and Einstein -- these are the sort of men who produce tradition. Within the works of such men, it is argued, are found studies of the essential aspects of the life of man. They define man as man; they show what he is capable of doing and being at his best and his worst, in his most rational and his most irrational moments. In a word, tradition is humanistic in the broadest sense of the term. It is the great heritage of every modern age, the giant that we all stand on -- although only Horace, Bernard Sylvester, Newton, and a few others have realized it.

In general, the function of education is to pass on intact tradition to each succeeding generation since it is only by studying what has come before that a person can hope to deal with what will come after. It is only by learning his heritage that a man becomes something more than an animal groping in the dark. This does not mean that traditionalists are pedantic; they do not emphasize the past simply because it is past. Rather they are forward looking, and the concern with the past is warranted only in so far as it helps us in the future to improve ourselves and our society. In the camp of traditionalism are found some of the most active modernists of the contemporary world.

While there is general accord among traditionalists about the basic composition and use of tradition, there is some disagreement
on what contemporary man is supposed to gain from it as a result of his education. Three general categories appear to exhaust the current theories of tradition, although they certainly do not exhaust all the theoretical possibilities: Tradition is essential in the educative process because it furnishes us with (1) maxims or commandments for governing our actions, and (2) models of moral and intellectual excellence, and (3) a disciplined intellect achieved by virtue of our studying the classics. As a result, one of three arguments is usually employed to justify the relevancy of tradition to education: The argument for the relevancy of tradition as precept or maxim; the argument for the relevancy of tradition as model or archetype; and the argument for the relevancy of tradition as disciplinary. It will be understood that I do not intend these categories as mutually exclusive. Most current theories embody aspects of all three arguments. Rather the categories are intended as analytic in character, postulated solely for the sake of inquiring into the traditionalist position. Each of these will be treated in turn.

3) Tradition as Maxim

The argument for tradition as precept or maxim claims that tradition furnishes every age with moral and intellectual precepts for guiding social and individual action. The position was stated earlier in this century by Bagley, Breed, and Horne; and in more recent years it has been reiterated by Ligon, Henle, and Kirk,
among others. According to this point of view human problems are eternal and unchanging. In the classics we find that the greatest minds of the Western world have struggled with essentially the same social, political, moral, and intellectual problems from the dawn of the intellect to the present day. As a result, many solutions have been proposed, among which are appropriate solutions for today. Since modern man cannot hope to match the wisdom of the ages in his brief lifetime, it is expedient and indeed necessary that he look to this heritage for guides to thought and action. The task of education is to teach these guides, which may be termed maxims or precepts, to each new generation, so that when a problem confronts the individual he will have at his disposal appropriate solutions, at least in outline form.

The crux of the argument is that the maxims embedded in tradition are intrinsically normative. The Ten Commandments or the social and political theories of Dante and Machiavelli, for example, are precepts that are valid and applicable in all eras. If we want to know what we should do, we need only consult the appropriate...
book or expert for a directive for action. The criterion for attaching value to these precepts may differ considerably according to the precept in question: In one instance the criterion may be its pragmatic value; and in another case the precept may have been stated by a person of indisputable authority. But regardless of the criteria for the judgment the argument is based on the assertion that tradition, past answers, is inherently normative.

Several questions arise from this theory of tradition. The argument seems to assume that the essential roots to human problems are the same for all ages. Bagley, for example, claims that human precepts such as trust, courage, perseverance, and clear and honest thinking "may not be eternal values, but one may venture a fairly confident prediction that they will be just as significant a thousand years from now as they have ever been in the present."^ This seems to assume a root source to all human problems, although the specific problem may vary from one generation to another. We no longer need fight the Inquisition but we have similar instances of man's inhumanity toward his fellow man. Thus, if the same kind of courage displayed by Bruno during the Inquisition will aid in fighting contemporary Hitlers, then these problems must in some way be aspects of the same source. But what are the grounds for this assertion? Ultra-modernists would claim that the contrary is true, that the mid-twentieth century is a unique era, and part of our problem is that we are unable to find answers anywhere,

^Bagley, op. cit., p. 156.
past or present, for our new problems. Again, even granting that there is a degree of commonality in all human problems, on what grounds is it claimed that previous solutions are applicable to the present formulations of these problems? May it not be the case that the conditions surrounding these problems have altered so drastically that historical solutions are simply inapplicable and could not be implemented?

There also appears to be a need for justifying the claim that tradition is inherently normative or prescriptive for the modern world. Even if it can be shown that there is a certain universality to human problems it does not necessarily follow that historical solutions to these problems should be used today. It may well be correct to accept Jefferson's thought as directive for contemporary political action but why is this correct? Or it may be right to accept Benjamin Franklin's moral precepts as directive for contemporary moral action but why is this right? In other words, there would seem to be a need for some kind of criteria for asserting the applicability of the past to the present and a justification of these criteria.

The preceding questions are illustrative of the kinds of questions that the preceptual theory of tradition could be expected to answer but which apparently it does not. The final one which I will raise and examine more thoroughly concerns not why tradition is inherently normative or prescriptive but how it is. Granting for a moment all salient features to the argument, precisely what is the relationship between the learning of maxims and daily human
activity? Tradition, as a transmitted body of knowledge, is of a cognitive nature and therefore only descriptive as far as the learner is concerned. From the learner's point of view the transmission of tradition is not the intellectual or practical formulation of solutions to problems but the describing of previous maxims asserted to be eternal. But the passive absorption of these precepts is something entirely different from living by them: One entails mere memorization while the other is doing something in light of certain criteria. Thus the question arises, what is the relationship between precepts which have been memorized and the immediate activity of the individual?

The argument for tradition as maxim seems to assume that there is no problem in relating the learning of something to human action. The relationship is that of any antecedent cognitive rule of procedure to its consequent implementation: We learn what to do and then, if we wish, we simply do it. If we wish to become logical we read Aristotle's maxims and prescriptions for the art and subsequently employ them in our thinking; if we wish to become moral we memorize the Ten Commandments and subsequently check our daily activity against these absolute criteria.

The idea that the necessary, if not sufficient, grounds for purposive and intelligent human behavior are the cognitive concepts underpinning this behavior is such an obvious and natural assumption of human life that it is difficult to see how it can be questioned. It is part of what Ryle has polemically characterized as the
'intellectualist legend' concerning human activity. According to Ryle, it has been the tendency on the part of philosophers and laymen alike to

... treat intellectual operations as the core of mental conduct; that is to say, they tend to define all other mental-conduct concepts in terms of concepts of cognition. They suppose that the primary exercise of minds consists in finding the answers to questions and that their other occupations are merely applications of considered truths or even regrettable distractions from their consideration.

Thus, "according to the legend, whenever an agent does anything intelligently, his act is preceded and steered by another internal act of considering a regulative proposition appropriate to his practical problem."

Ryle's purpose in this characterization is destructive: He wishes to replace the intellectualist legend with what he believes is a more reasonable explanation of intelligent human activity. Whether his attempt is successful is of no concern for our present purpose. What is important is the objections that Ryle raises to the idea that maxims or precepts can be or are the primary directives of human action. Two of these objections will be quoted in order to show how the relationship between learning and doing assumed by the preceptual theory of tradition can be called into question.

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5 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Chapter II, passim.


7 Ibid., p. 31.
But what makes [a person] consider the one maxim which is appropriate rather than any of the thousands which are not? Why does the hero not find himself calling to mind a cooking-recipe, or a rule of Formal Logic? Perhaps he does, but then his intellectual process is silly and not sensible. Intelligently reflecting how to act is, among other things, considering what is pertinent and disregarding what is inappropriate. Must we then say that for the hero's reflections how to act to be intelligent he must first reflect how best to reflect how to act? The endlessness of this implied regress shows that the application of the criterion of appropriateness does not entail the occurrence of a process of considering this criterion.

Next, supposing still that to act reasonably I must first perpend the reason for so acting, how am I led to make a suitable application of the reason to the particular situation which my action is to meet? For the reason, or maxim, is inevitably a proposition of some generality. It cannot embody specifications to fit every detail of the particular state of affairs. Clearly, once more, I must be sensible and not stupid, and this good sense cannot itself be a product of the intellectual acknowledgment of any general principle. A soldier does not become a shrewd general merely by endorsing the strategic principles of Clausewitz; he must also be competent to apply them. Knowing how to apply maxims cannot be reduced to, or derived from, the acceptance of those or any other maxims.

From Ryle's point of view it seems that cognition is neither the necessary nor sufficient condition for purposive human activity. Indeed, Ryle is convinced that the contrary is the case:

"...methodologies presuppose the application of the methods, of the critical investigation of which they are the products. It was because Aristotle found himself and others reasoning now..."
intelligently and now stupidly and it was because Izaak Walton found himself and others angling sometimes effectively and sometimes ineffectively that both were able to give to their pupils the maxims and prescriptions of their arts.

If this is the case then the act of understanding Aristotle's Organon is itself a function of the very thing that the learner is attempting to gain by studying the Organon; or the act of understanding the Ten Commandments is itself a function of being good. But if intelligent practice is the prior condition to cognition and if knowing a precept or a series of precepts is not the 'cause' but the 'effect' of a particular human activity, then activity and not cognition would seem to be the central concern of educators bent on the improvement of the individual and society. Questioning the intellectualist legend does not throw doubt on the fact that maxims and precepts may be consulted in human life: We certainly do things in light of certain criteria and act according to cognitive rules of procedure. But if Ryle's criticisms are correct, the important questions of learning center in the immediate activity of the student. Correct or incorrect, Ryle's position points up in a striking manner that an important foundational question for educational theory is how and why the affective mechanism linking cognition to activity operates.

9 Ibid., p. 30.

10 Also see John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 32: "Only the man whose habits are already good can know what the good is."
Thus, if the preceptual theory is to be validated it must first establish, among other things, the kind of relation that can and does exist between tradition as a body of precepts and the activity of the individual participating in tradition. It must ensure this relationship and, if the theory is to stand without qualification, it must ensure that cognition is the primary directive to intelligent human action. The relation of tradition to education may well be the relation of precepts and maxims to an individual's activity, as the theory suggests, but the viability of the argument is partly contingent upon explaining the precise nature of this relationship.

4) Tradition as Model

The argument for the relevancy of tradition as model or archetype is intimately related to the first in that both find in tradition ideas for guiding human life. One is rarely encountered without the other, and thinkers who propound the preceptual argument generally may serve as representative of the archetypal argument. In recent years we find it stated in the writings of such men as Broudy, Cuninggim, Horne, Livingstone, and certain Catholic philosophers of education. The archetypal argument for tradition

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11 See supra, p. 14, n. 3. In addition see H. S. Broudy's article in Phenix, op. cit., and his Building a Philosophy of Education; also Merrimon Cuninggim's article in Phenix; Herman H. Horne, The Philosophy of Christian Education and his article in the Forty-first Yearbook, op. cit.; the educational writings of Sir Richard W. Livingstone, especially Plato and Modern Education; and much of Catholic educational philosophy, for example Pius XI's "The Christian Education of Youth" in the Catholic Education Review for March, 1930.
may be distinguished from the previous one, however, in so far as it
insists that tradition furnishes us with the best and most perfect
ideals of action and rules of practice rather than specific maxims
and precepts against which we check these actions. Consequently,
it will be seen that in this theory there is a measure of creation
or formulation of personal values involved in the life of the
individual.

The argument for tradition as model has a lengthy and noble
history, stemming at least from the fifteenth century humanists
and perhaps earlier. A contemporary form, delineated by Broudy
under the title of classical realism, may serve as illustrative
of the general purport of the argument.

I would not say that [classical realism] is
wedded to the past, if this means that classical
realism has promised to love, honor, and obey,
in good times or bad, for better or for worse.
It is a kind of love affair, but it involves a
selective loyalty. We use the past, but we
use it as a source of models of excellence
rather than revering it for its own sake. There­
fore, it is really not a marriage as such and
probably never will be. It is a one-way appre­
ciation of the past.12

Broudy seems to claim that while the exact precepts and maxims
that guided a Socrates throughout his life are obviously inappli-
cable to a complex technological society such as ours, there is
something universal in the way in which Socrates approached life.
What can be got from Augustine, John of Salisbury, and Erasmus
are not particular answers for particular situations, but a general

12 H. S. Broudy, "A Classical Realist View of Education"
method of living and solving problems. The important thing about Jesus the Nazarene is not the recording of the Sermon on the Mount, but the way in which he lived -- and died. Models of moral excellence are not meant to serve as a referent in order for us to decide the right thing at any given moment; rather they serve as archetypes of how men can live their lives fruitfully and to the fullest extent.

The argument for the relevancy of tradition as model claims that tradition lays down the rules of the game of life, and by learning these rules all men can become better. In a particular situation I do not ask myself what answer Socrates gave to the problem and then proceed to act on this answer. Instead, I attempt to understand how Socrates would have gone about solving it, in what way he would have approached the problem. In light of this general methodology I then have a means of confronting the situation and gaining my own solution. This is the sense in which there is a measure of creation and formulation: The past is emulated rather than revered. At a more sophisticated level this is the same as claiming that we study previous eras not for the solutions they gave to problems, but for the formulation of the problems themselves. The universal in man is not the particular answers he has given to questions, but the questions themselves. From the dawn of the intellect man has faced the same problems concerning himself and his universe. What can be gained from history is the way in which these problems were formulated, to aid us in our own formulation and the consequent creation of individual and unique answers.
The argument for tradition as model shares certain difficulties with the preceptual argument, for example postulating that human problems are eternal and unchanging and maintaining that tradition is inherently normative. The questions surrounding these difficulties need not be repeated. But there is a more crucial difficulty in the argument centering in a clear understanding of the kinds of knowledge that can result from studying tradition. The archetypal argument claims that we should study the way in which previous men approached life in order that we may profit by employing their correct methods and rejecting their insufficient ones. This seems to overlook the consideration that the thing to be gained from studying the way in which other men solved problems cannot be, for the learner, a way of learning and doing in the sense of an immediately manifested act of knowing or doing. Rather it is a cognized rule of procedure. It is the distinction between reading how Socrates philosophized, for example, and thinking logically when confronted with an immediate problem; or the distinction between a cognitive methodology and a mode of doing. Socrates certainly lived his life in a certain way; but the most we can ever know is that he lived it in this way and not how he did it. The experiential how is quite beyond us simply because Socrates is Socrates, you are you, and I am I. Socrates had something that can roughly be called an 'approach to life.' But this is not something he had in the sense that he had a toga and we can have one too. He 'had' it in the sense that he 'was' it -- the approach is Socrates; and since we cannot be Socrates we cannot know it in the sense of its actual doing. The
most that can be gained is a learned methodology, a cognitive outline for action. And the simple learning of a methodology in no way ensures its implementation, nor does it explain how it can be implemented. Granting that one has learned something the philosophical question arises as to how one goes about using it.

Consequently, the argument for tradition as model is in the same class with the argument for tradition as a maxim. Arguing for learning the methods of approaching life which are embedded in tradition is essentially the same as arguing for learning universal solutions to human problems; in both instances we are dealing with cognitive knowledge, bits of information gained from books and lectures. Thus, the major objection to the preceptual argument is equally applicable to the archetypal argument: There can be no warrant for its assertion until it is shown how models of moral and intellectual excellence are vitally linked with the activity of the learner. The archetypal argument, as the preceptual one, is in part contingent upon examining the relation extant between learning and doing, between knowledge and action.

5) Tradition as Disciplinary

The disciplinary theory of tradition is by far the most widespread traditionalistic theory of education. In previous centuries it has counted among its proponents some of the greatest figures in the history of educational thought: Cicero, Augustine, John of Salisbury, Ignatius, Locke, and Newman, to mention only a few. Today we find among its supporters men eminent in education as
well as other fields of study: Livingstone, Adler, Barzun, Hutchins, Van Doren, Bestor, and Fadiman may serve as representative thinkers. Partly due to the work of these thinkers and partly due to the intrinsic merit of the argument, the disciplinary theory of tradition is more fully explicated than the previous theories. It will therefore be necessary to dwell a while longer on the arguments in favor of the theory, later attempting to raise certain questions about them. Again, however, I will deal only with contemporary formulations of the theory. It is especially important to keep this in mind in dealing with the unresolved issues implicit in the disciplinary theory. I am in no way suggesting that all proponents of the theory, historical as well as contemporary, fail to deal with these issues.

Contrary to the preceptual and archetypal arguments, the argument for the relevancy of tradition in education as disciplinary vehemently deprecates any position which emphasizes tradition for its own sake. Instead, it sees in tradition a means of attaining a further and more important end: intellectual dis-

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13 See as examples Mortimer J. Adler, How to Read a Book; Mark Van Doren, Liberal Education; Jacques Maritain, Education at the Crossroads; Albert J. Nock, The Theory of Education in the United States; the writings of Mortimer B. Smith, especially The Diminished Mind; the educational writings of Sir Richard W. Livingstone; the works of Robert M. Hutchins, especially The Higher Learning in America and The University of Utopia; the articles by James K. Feibleman and Jacques Maritain in the Fifty-fourth Yearbook, op. cit.; the articles by Eugene B. Borowitz and Arthur Bestor in Phenix, op. cit.; also by Bestor The Restoration of Learning; Jacques Barzun's The House of Intellect and Teacher in America; and The Case for Basic Education edited by James D. Koerner, especially the article by Clifton Fadiman.
cipline. Intellectual discipline is that state of mind which enables it to grasp the connections and relationships of things because of its trained and controlled structure. The person with a disciplined mind can attack and solve any and all problems that may confront him. Bestor, for example, claims the following for the disciplinary theory:

The man with a disciplined mind is a man equipped to deal, by intellectual means, with the problems that are bound to confront him in the complex, rapidly changing world of today. Because he has learned to analyze a situation, instead of being taught merely to adjust to it, he can go to work at once, efficiently and without panic, when he finds himself in a new and unexpected situation. He can summon up resources from the past. He can put to use intellectual skills he has already mastered. Thanks to intellectual discipline, he will use his head, not lose it, in an emergency.14

The man with intellectual discipline is the man of common sense and reasonableness regardless of the particular situation. He is temperate and self-controlled.

In addition, intellectual discipline will allow the individual to enter any and all areas of thought and practice with comparative ease. He may become an acute businessman or a virtuous political leader with the ability to lead men and the sagacity to use that ability for the better cause. He may become a scholar, intellectual discipline having evoked a philosophical habit in him leading to the highest study of man and his universe. But whether he is butcher, baker, or philosopher, the man with intellectual

discipline has his wits about him; he is aware of what is happening and why it is happening. He is a man prepared to live successfully, regardless of the particular content of that life.

How does one go about acquiring such a polymathic discipline? According to the disciplinary argument, it is inculcated through the long and arduous study of subject matter contained within certain disciplines of knowledge, especially languages, mathematics, the natural sciences, and history. Fadiman, for example, believes that these particular subjects have a certain "generative power" that others lack.

Basic education concerns itself with those matters which, once learned, enable the student to learn all the other matters, whether trivial or complex, that cannot properly be the subjects of elementary and secondary schooling. In other words, both logic and experience suggest that certain subjects have generative power and others do not have generative power. When we have learned to tie a four-in-hand, the subject is exhausted. It is self-terminating. Our knowledge is of no value for the acquisition of further knowledge. But once we have learned to read we can decipher instructions for the tying of a four-in-hand. Once we have learned to listen and observe, we can learn from someone else how to tie a four-in-hand. It has, up to our time, been the general experience of men that certain subjects and not others possess this generative power. Among these subjects are those that deal with language, whether or not one's own; forms, figures, and numbers; the laws of nature; the past; and the shape and behavior of our common home, the earth. Apparently these master or generative subjects endow one with the ability to learn the higher, more complex developments of the master subjects themselves.15

15 Clifton Fadiman, "The Case for Basic Education" in Koerner, op. cit., p. 6.
It is important to realize that for the disciplinarian the content or subject matter of particular disciplines of knowledge is by and large contingent on time and place. In contradistinction to the previous arguments for tradition, the third argument insists that there is simply no way of determining or predicting the relevancy of any particular bodies of information for any particular individual. The relevancy of subject matter can be defined only situationally which is predictively indeterminable. There are, of course, broad areas of predictability which may be discovered by investigating the background of the child, his possible and proposed future plans, his capabilities and, on a broader scale, the general tenor and movement of contemporary civilization. Yet even if these areas were amenable to precise prediction, which they are not, no one would attempt in light of them to predict the precise bodies of knowledge a child should be taught in order to meet every life situation. Again, assuming someone was foolish enough to claim this occult knowledge in a single instance, it is quite inconceivable he could generalize from this case and say that every child should be taught the same bodies of information. For the disciplinarian the prescription of subject matter on the grounds of its relevancy to the particular life activity of an individual is quite impossible. Contingency can never show necessity.

According to the disciplinary theory, therefore, the crucial thing about tradition and the basic disciplines embedded in this tradition is not the subject matter but the intellectual training that this subject matter affords the mind. Specific educational
content can never be absolutely definitive of a particular discipline since the knowledge within it is being continually altered in the light of researches and new discoveries. From the standpoint of the argument for the relevancy of tradition as disciplinary, what is absolute in the various disciplines is the particular framework in which subject matter resides; it is this framework which makes a body of interrelated facts and theories a true discipline. As regards the educational analogue of such a framework there is nothing inherent in the fact that $2 + 2 = 4$ that makes it disciplinary; rather it is the kind of thing that the mind is required to do in order to work arithmetical problems that sets it on the path to intellectual discipline. If one learns arithmetic and geometry he is more likely to be logical in other situations; he will be better equipped to meet a wide variety of situations that require, perhaps not mathematics itself, but a cool and reasoning intellect, a disciplined intellect. And the same holds true for the power of the other major disciplines.

The argument for tradition as disciplinary overcomes many of the shortcomings of the previous arguments. Contrary to the preceptual argument, the present one accepts no maxim or precept as absolute and refuses to elevate any part of antiquity to a position of inherent goodness. It also seems to overcome the difficulties of the argument for the relevancy of tradition as model. As I have already suggested, the latter argument claims the absoluteness of antique methodologies: A Socrates' approach to life is a paradigm for contemporary man to follow. The third argu-
ment, while neither affirming nor denying this claim, looks not to the man Socrates for a methodological paradigm but to the subjects which were studied by Socrates. The emphasis shifts from an individual manifesting certain areas of knowledge to the areas of knowledge themselves. This shift, incidentally, is what allows the proponents of the disciplinary argument to insist on the contingency of subject matter. Adherents to the archetypal theory must accept at least the givenness of subject matter or content since the individual who manifested a particular method did, in fact, deal with specific content. The third argument, by extricating itself entirely from the individual, is able to free itself from any consideration of content as necessary, thus placing it at the furthest remove from the preceptual argument. Practically, this allows for more open-endedness in scholarly research and a greater impetus to the further evolution of the various disciplines. A proponent of the archetypal theory, for example, might argue that in order to truly understand Aristotle and what he was attempting to do it is necessary at some point to come to grips with his cosmology. The disciplinarian, on the other hand, would probably have no qualms about deleting his cosmology from the curriculum, save for a few future philosophers and historians of science. There is quite enough to learn from the Copernican revolution on, and since the Aristotelian and Copernican cosmologies, as well as others, are all issuances of the same kind of disciplined activity, the more immediately useful one is better studied, if for no other reason than educational expediency. In another light, a person arguing from
the preceptual theory might insist that Newton's *Principia* is an essential ingredient of any liberal arts program, whereas the disciplinarian might not stick too long on the point. What is important is not the specific book that Newton authored, although this has its place, but the discipline of Physics and Newtonian Physics as a part of it. Thus, a truly good text dealing with the subject would in all likelihood do the job just as well. There are, of course, proponents of the disciplinary theory who believe that studying the classics is the best means of attaining intellectual discipline. It seems fair to say, however, that for the disciplinarian the classics are not necessary to the acquisition of a disciplined intellect, although such books are the best means presently at our disposal for attaining this end. The disciplinary theory does not require that tradition be viewed as intrinsically normative.

It is clear that in many respects the third argument for tradition is much more forceful than the previous two. There is a question, however, as to its restrictive prescription of educational content. Granting for the moment that learning mathematics will instill a logical habit of mind, upon what warrant is the curriculum limited to this and similar studies? Is it not possible that other subjects will have a similar effect, for example learning how to diagnose the causes of mechanical difficulties in an automobile? Again, assuming that we could all agree on the purposes of education -- to teach young people to be logical, creative, well-adjusted, or whatever -- could there
ever be any justification for asserting that only particular subjects will accomplish these purposes? As previously noted, Fadiman claims that up until our time it has been the general experience of men that the basic subjects of mathematics, science, language, and history possess "generative power," and by studying them we are enabled to do lots of different kinds of specific things. Because of this, he argues, we should accept the educational experience of the past and continue to teach these basic subjects regardless of the particular experience of the individual being taught. But it is doubtful if there can be a necessary warrant for this claim. Dewey also believes that education should impart a certain discipline of the mind to the student; but he would claim that this purpose could be accomplished without dealing with subject matter that is meaningless to the immediate interests and activities of the student. Simply because a disciplined mind has in a few cases resulted from the study of certain subjects is no reason to assume that the same thing cannot be accomplished with other subjects as well, and according to Dewey on a much broader scale.

This criticism neither proves nor disproves the argument for tradition as disciplinary. It does suggest that the theory is in need of further examination in at least two areas. First, an investigation would seem in order to ascertain the relation between a discipline of knowledge and a disciplined mind. What is the logic and structure of a discipline which fits it for disciplined human activity? Is a disciplined mind an educational or perhaps psychological analogue to a discipline of knowledge? Or are they
the same thing? Or aspects of the same thing? It would seem that an explication of the entire concept of discipline would be crucial to vindicating the disciplinary theory of education.

Second, even granting an understanding of these questions, what is the relation between the content or subject matter of a discipline of knowledge and the activity of the individual in the sense of the immediate doing or knowing of a disciplined mind? The theory of intellectual discipline is concerned more with the student's intellectual competencies and skills than with his cognitive repertoires, with the operations he can perform than with the precepts he has learned. Yet an emphasis on the activity of knowing and doing does not circumvent the problem of relating bodies of subject matter to the activity of the individual as well as the disciplining of the mind. The disciplinary theory wishes to prescribe particular kinds of curriculum content that will evoke certain acts of knowing, thus formulating within the student's mind dispositions for activities which will be proper for subsequent experience, such dispositions comprising the structural framework of the disciplined intellect. But surely the prescription of subject matter -- language, literature, history, mathematics, science, or whatever -- requires not only the assertion that these subjects will accomplish a certain end but an examination of why and how they will as well. It may be correct to say that it has been the "common experience of men" that certain "master subjects" possess "generative power," but until such an empirical generalization is grounded in an examination of the nature of knowledge and action, and specifically the relation
of an object known as subject matter to the immediate act of knowing it, there can hardly be a confirmation of the assertion. It is therefore incumbent upon the disciplinarian to examine the relation between human action and cognitive knowledge, including the special instance of the relation between the immediate act of knowing and the object known (subject matter), as propaedeutic to asserting that the same kinds of activities may be involved in apparently dissimilar contexts and that only certain disciplines of knowledge will evoke these activities.

We have seen that the disciplinary argument makes an advance over the previous arguments for tradition by claiming that the same kind of activity or knowing is involved in learning mathematics or other subjects and in handling certain problems that will confront the individual during his lifetime. While this view tends to mitigate the criticisms of the previous theories, we have seen that the argument for tradition as disciplinary still only asserts that something occurs and fails to explain how it operates or what conditions are necessary for its occurrence. Thus, while the argument for tradition as a means of imparting discipline is the most fully explicated theory for traditionalism yet encountered, at least in recent years, it still leaves a residue of unresolved problems. And as with the previous theories, one of the crucial problems is in explaining the relation of learning and doing.
6) Summary

Proceeding from the assumption that tradition is some kind of educational content -- maxims, models of moral and intellectual excellence, or disciplines of knowledge -- I have tried to show in this chapter that contemporary traditionalist theories of education fail in large measure to account for their underlying assumptions. In the case of the preceptual and archetypal arguments it was seen that one of these assumptions necessitated an examination of the relation of cognitive precepts to human action in order to vitally link tradition with contemporary education. A similar problem emerged in the case of the disciplinary argument except that the relationship in need of examination was that between an immediate act of knowing or doing and the subject matter acted upon as a known object. Both of these were seen to be integral aspects of the problem of the relationship between learning and doing. It therefore appears so far as the study has progressed that a meaningful understanding of the relation of tradition and education as one answer to determining curriculum content is contingent upon examining the more fundamental issue concerning knowledge and action. It will be realized that it has not been suggested that educational theory depends on the resolution of the problem. For the present I only insist on the need for the inquiry.
CHAPTER III

TRADITION AND EDUCATION - II

1) Preface

Chapter II posed a problem that must be examined. Before dealing with the relation of learning and doing, however, it will be well at this point to interject a further examination of tradition and education. The previous chapter dealt only with a cognitive view of tradition and its current meanings for education. While this was sufficient for pointing out certain shortcomings in contemporary traditionalist educational theory, it will not suffice for a clear and distinct understanding of all aspects of the concepts of tradition and education. In the present chapter I propose therefore to examine these concepts in order to ascertain their possible meanings in relation to one another. It will develop in the course of the chapter that this investigation brings the problem of the relation of knowledge and action into sharper focus and suggests a hierarchy and priority of questions for dealing with it.

A word of caution is in order at this point. The concepts I am presently dealing with, as well as those which follow, are very broad and meaningful in scope and lend themselves to innumerable aspectual analyses. To take but one example, a myriad of questions surround the educative process and according to one's immediate concern it may be approached from the standpoint
of logic, epistemology, psychology, educational technology, ethics, ontology, sociology, and so on. And the same is true for the other conceptions. It is obvious that in the few pages that follow I cannot hope to deal adequately with even one of these approaches. I would beg reprieve from these inadequacies on the grounds that my present concern is primarily with how the study progresses, rather than the specific investigations and their conclusions. The latter are certainly fundamental, and for the furtherance of educational philosophy they are of far greater importance than our present concern. But at the same time it can be argued that a paradigm of educational philosophy is essential today, not in its own right certainly, but for what will hopefully follow from it. In regard to the inadequate examinations, therefore, it must be realized that the study is intended only as suggestive and not as complete.

2) Tradition as Transmission

In the cognitive view of tradition examined in Chapter II tradition was a body of vested knowledge, the product and heritage of Western culture. Apart from traditionalist educational theory, this conception of tradition may be expanded to include more than specific bodies of knowledge as long as it retains its cognitive character, for example, customs and mores, tales, and legends, sagas and songs, beliefs, institutions, and practices. Practices, customs, and mores may be cognitive in the same sense that a paradigm of
moral excellence is cognitive. By the same expansion this conception of tradition may be the product and heritage of the ages, an age, a culture, a tribe, a clan, or a family. For the sake of brevity this general conception of tradition may be termed tradition in its first aspect.

The common usage of the word tradition suggests another aspect which denotes not a heritage or cognitive product but a process or processes in some way connected with this product. This may be termed tradition in its second aspect. In its simplest formulation this connotation of tradition means a process of carrying over or transmission; it is the passing on of customs and beliefs, tales and songs, and knowledge. While words synonymous with tradition in its first aspect are descriptive and denotative nouns or phrases -- various bodies of knowledge, the liberal arts, professions and beliefs, and articles of faith -- words synonymous with tradition in its second aspect are active verbs such as transmitting, handing over, carrying on or over, giving up, passing on, and reappraising. The second aspect of tradition is often characterized in its adjectival form: If a ballad is traditional we

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1 See supra, pp. 21-25.

2 The etymology of the word suggests especially this connotation. Tradition is derived from the Latin verb tradere, meaning to place in the hands of or to give up; thus, to hand over, to hand on, to deliver, or to betray. Words bearing a close etymological relationship to tradition include traitor, treason, traditor, betrayal, and extradition, all of which denote a particular kind or kinds of processes.
mean that it has been passed on to succeeding generations in a clan, a tribe, or a culture; and to speak of the tradition of the ballad is to say that there is a certain history to it.

Tradition in its first aspect may stand without qualification in light of its definition; if it means the liberal arts then we can either say 'the liberal arts' or 'tradition' as long as the context is understood. Tradition in its second aspect, on the other hand, requires a qualifying word or phrase. A function or a process requires things which do the kind of thing denoted; the second aspect of tradition is always of something. In this sense there are traditions of sporting events, such as the Harvard-Yale football game and the Oxford-Cambridge boat race; or traditions of certain branches of the military, so that members of the Black Watch play bagpipes when going into battle; or traditions of certain families, wherein the Barrymores are theatrical performers and the Rockefellers make money; or traditions of educational institutions, so that Oxonians are gentlemen and graduates of the Sorbonne are erudite.

Consider for instance the tradition that Oxonians are gentlemen. This statement refers to certain sorts of dispositions possessed by a man which are manifest in his everyday activities: He holds the door for the gentler sex, he makes lively conversation at tea, he is rarely caught off guard in an embarrassing situation, and he exhibits fairness and integrity in his dealings with other people. When we refer to someone as a gentleman we mean that he has done and would do these and many other kinds of things in particular situations.
A tradition of gentlemanliness at Oxford simply asserts that the majority of men who emerge from the walls of Balliol, or Trinity, or Christchurch, or any of the other colleges, exhibit the demeanor and manner of a gentleman in their everyday activity. The word tradition only says that contemporary Oxonians have learned to do the same sorts of things that have characterized Oxonians for a long time; that the dons, or others, impart or teach or transmit a way of acting to the younger members of the institution. This particular example does not, of course, exhaust the kinds of things that tradition in its second aspect can refer to. There are traditions of lots of things as lots of things are traditional: chairs and tables and rings and watches, dispositions and events and occurrences and practices, bodies of knowledge and articles of faith and tenets of belief, occupations and military units and educational institutions, and a plethora of other things.

The transmissive character of tradition may be stated differently by noting its aspect of temporality. A great many educators feel that sheer age has something to do with tradition. We hesitate to speak of a recent book, drama, ballad, institution, practice, or custom as traditional; and in those instances where we do venture this epithet it is usually intended as a prophecy rather than a description. Things instituted or invented or written or living in the modern world have not had the opportunity to ripen with age or live on in spirit since both these kinds of things require time. Modern things, in other words, have not had time to be adjudged of their value. Old things, on the
contrary, whether these are ships or dispositions or poems, have lived in spirit and in fact long enough for communities and societies and cultures to ascertain their relative merits. With age comes the accruing of judgments; and with the accruing of positive judgments comes value. This connotation of value is a general characteristic of the concept of tradition. To term something traditional is to esteem it and to say that this thing is worthy and worthwhile. In this sense, tradition is something that surrounds and envelopes a thing and literally infuses it with worth. Tradition is the assertion of a value judgment; and the maintenance of tradition is the continuing assertion of a value judgment. Tradition in its second aspect is precisely this continuing assertion; it is the valuation of a thing by virtue of its transmission.

3) Further Inadequacies of Tradition as an Educational Concept

A few contemporary traditionalists, especially disciplinarians, apparently realize the transmissive character of tradition. Fadiman, for example, seems aware of the distinction between tradition in its first and second aspects when he claims that "the primary job of the school is the efficient transmission and continual reappraisal of what we call tradition. Tradition is the mechanism by which all past men teach all future men."\(^3\)

Regardless, it would be wrong to imagine that the simple delineation of the second aspect of tradition overcomes the difficulties of meaningfully relating tradition to education. First, 

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\(^3\) Koerner, op. cit., p. 5.
the transmissive aspect of tradition asserts nothing as to the relation of such transmission itself to the educative process. It is true that teachers have always engaged in passing on bodies of information as well as other things to their students. Considering the historical role of education it might even appear that the major functional feature of education is transmission, the distinction between the educational systems of various societies and periods being in what was transmitted. But surely the equation of the educative process with the process of transmission can be questioned on theoretical, if not empirical, grounds. There are many educators even today, for example, who feel that the transmission of anything in education — knowledge, attitudes, interests, etc. — is to be deplored since it detracts from what they conceive as the true purpose of education, namely, allowing the student to develop and create meaning in his life free from the arbitrary impositions of teachers and other authority figures. This suggests that the determination of whether the second aspect of tradition, or transmission generally, is a part of education, is education, or is entirely unrelated to education, is at least partly dependent on determining the envisioned purposes of education as a human and social enterprise. The realization that tradition may refer to the process of transmitting certain cognitive products as well as the products themselves, therefore, does not necessarily clarify its relation to education. As before, we see the need for examining other and more fundamental issues as propaedeutic to discerning the relationship between tradition and education.
A second difficulty with relating the transmissive aspect of tradition to education returns us to the major difficulty encountered in examining the cognitive view of tradition. In other words, the mere realization that tradition may refer to the transmitting of bodies of knowledge or other things still fails to explain how these things in turn can relate to human activity. A teacher may transmit a good deal of information to students during a lecture but this in no way guarantees that the students will use the information; nor can any act of passing on a body of cognitive knowledge establish how this knowledge may be used within the context of contemporary civilization. Thus, even if it could be shown that education is but the transmission of certain kinds of things from one generation to another, there would remain the problem of the relation of knowledge and action, of learning tradition as a result of its transmission and using it in human thought and action.

4) An Approach to Education

Thus far in the study we have seen that among other things understanding the relation of tradition to education hinges on examining the general problem of the relation of human learning to doing or, in one instance, the specific problem of the relation of an act of knowing to the object known. In concluding the investigation the concept of education must be examined. It will develop in the course of this examination that an approach is suggested, both to educational philosophizing generally and to the specific issue of the relation of learning and doing.
In its modern usage education can refer, among other things, either to the process of education or to a body of knowledge about this process. The latter sense of education as pedagogics has come into vogue in recent years and has posed many important problems for the educators, such as determining the possibility of education being a discipline of knowledge, determining proper procedural techniques, and discerning principles definitive of appropriate subject matter for education conceived as a body of knowledge. However, since the primary concern of the present study is with curriculum content relative to the process of education, and not the subject matter of the discipline of education, we may pass over this meaning of the word and deal directly with education conceived as the educative process.

Education may be divided into three analytic, though by no means unrelated or discrete, components. These are: first, the actual process of education, the activity of the student engaged in education; second, the content or subject matter dealt with in the educative process, that which the student operates on; and third, the consequences which emerge from acting upon the content, the results of the educative process. For reasons that will become apparent as we proceed, these components will be examined in inverse order.

5) Educational Consequences

An educational consequence may be broadly defined as something an individual is enabled to do as a result of engaging in education.
Appropriate educational consequences are defined by educational aims. While educational aims vary between societies and from one historical period to another, there is one such aim, the achieving of intellectual competency, that has overarched all other aims throughout the entire history of Western culture. Because of the importance of this aim, we may use it as illustrative in order to talk about educational consequences.

Generally, theories of education in the Western world envision the ideally educated man as a person with the skill to deal intelligently with any and all problems that might confront him. There are, of course, certain popular views that would tend to treat the acquisition of information as the end of education; but even here more often than not an ulterior motive is envisaged: vocational or professional advancement, egoistic aggrandizement, etc. Historically there is no educational thinker who propounds that the educated man is a walking storehouse of information. From Plato to Montaigne to Newman, from Aristotle to Comenius to Dewey, the educated man is the man with certain competencies; and the teaching concern is with the student's ability to do things, especially intellectual things, rather than with his cognitive repertoire. This is not to say that the acquisition of such repertoires has not been of great importance. In societies lacking a written language

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4 The quote from Bestor (supra, p. 27) is a typical if somewhat popularized version of this viewpoint. One of the best recent statements I have seen is in Mark Van Doren's little book, Liberal Education, Chapter II.
the memorization of bodies of content was the basis of the culture. Yet the importance of memory work was not in itself but in the preservation, fecundation, and transmission of the culture. The purpose of memorization was for something else; and in this respect it was the secondary and not primary aim of education. In all instances, at least in the history of educational thought in the Western world, the theoretical justification for the acquisition of cognitive knowledge is what it enables the individual to do as a consequence. The aim of education has never been defined by the student's ability to repeat facts but by his capacity to find out truths for himself, and when they are discovered to use them in the sense of organizing and exploiting them. This is the kind of thing behind Whitehead's insistence that only evil is wrought by inert ideas in education; and his definition of education as "the acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge."

To be educated is to have at one's disposal certain kinds of skills, primarily intellectual skills, although other kinds are of greater or less importance according to the particular emphasis of the educational theorist, the culture, or perhaps the situation of the learner.

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5 On this point see Eduard Nielsen, *Oral Tradition*, passim.; and Edward D. Myers, *Education in the Perspective of History*, especially Chapter II.

That such skills and competencies are passed from one generation to another will not be doubted. In its broadest formulation there is cultural and historical continuity and legacies of past eras; and more specifically there are dispositional traditions such as the tradition of gentlemanliness at Oxford and a son learning his father's skill in cobbling. There is, in other words, education which serves as the cultural cement of society. Yet the question remains as to how this is possible: How are such skills and competencies transmitted by the teacher and achieved by the learner?

Certain empirical generalizations apply to this question. Skills and competencies are not imparted and acquired in the same manner as bodies of information. The latter may be imparted rather suddenly while the former require a greater or less amount of time for their acquisition. One may learn that $2 + 2 = 4$, for example, in a relatively short period of time. But it is quite another matter to learn to be logical, or creative, or whatever. Moreover, educative experience in general suggests that the gradual inculcation of skills and competencies is a result of active involvement on the part of the learner. If a person desires to be logical he may or may not read Aristotle's prescriptions for the art; but he certainly must apply these rules, whether he is aware of them or not, in his daily activity if he is to accomplish his purpose. Skills and competencies are therefore gained by active engagement rather than passive absorption, by reaching out and doing something to the content of education and experience rather than simply allowing this content to be affective. Consequently, the acquisition
of such things as skills depends upon and is the result of activity and the content of activity. In regard to educational consequences specifically, skills and competencies are contingent upon educational content and what the learner does to the content. And a moment's reflection makes it obvious that the same is true for all possible educational consequences, although the mode of acquisition may vary considerably from one consequence to another. Thus, the possibility of the acquisition of educational consequences requires examining both the content and process of education.

6) Educational Content

Educational content or subject matter is that which is acted upon within the educative process, that which is dealt with in one or more ways in order to produce one or more results. In the strictest sense, therefore, educational content is cognitive in character. If it is objected that a good deal of education is concerned with non-cognitive elements contained within certain kinds of curricula, for example vocational education where the 'content' is the actual building or producing of something, we need only recall the objections raised to the preceptual and archetypal arguments for tradition. It was therein shown that regardless of the envisioned consequences of education the content qua content was cognitive, whether such content was comprised of maxims or rules of procedure or whatever. In some instances, for example in the learning of history, the knowledge is factual and theoretical. In other cases it is preceptual and procedural, such as learning
the rules for playing chess or operating a machine. In both cases, however, the actual content is cognitive. Thus, while the purpose of education may be to develop and impart skills, and the best means for accomplishing this end may be by actively engaging the student in doing something, that which is acted upon is an object of knowing or cognitive entity.

Since the whole of educational content is cognitive, we may re-affirm the objections to the three arguments for tradition for the entire problem of curriculum determination, regardless of the specific proposal as to the appropriate subject matter for the schools, and insist again that an educational theory which proposes to determine the curriculum must find at its base an examination of the relation of this subject matter to human activity. In specific terms, such an educational theory must relate content to consequences.

Now it can be seen that the relating of content to consequences is in effect the result of the educative process, or better, such relating is the educative process. We are thus confronted with a prior question which entails the examination of the educative process itself. In terms of the issue posed in the previous chapter, when we ask about the relation between knowledge and action, we are asking not about what knowledge can relate to what action since we can easily discern this on simple empirical grounds. Rather we are asking how knowledge can relate to action and why, which is to ask a question about the process of relating, not the subject matter or content of the relation. Similarly, when the problem arises in
education as to what content relates to what envisioned educational consequence or the future activity of the individual, the prior question necessarily concerns how such content relates to consequences, which is a question of the process of education and not its content or consequences. Learning certainly occurs, and therefore education exists as a human enterprise. But the question now becomes one of determining how this is possible: What conditions are requisite for human learning to occur? As a result, education retains its original integrity by virtue of the priority of the process of the individual participating in education. In this sense the delineation of the process of education is antecedent to the delineation of the content dealt with or the establishing of suitable criteria for attaining certain results in education.

7) The Educative Process

The preceding section suggested that neither educational content nor consequences can be meaningfully discussed until there has been an examination of the educative process. It was also seen that examining this process is one with approaching an understanding of the relationship between knowledge and action, the latter being a more general formulation of the relationship extant between educational content and the ensuing consequences. We thus have a general and specific formulation of a fundamental and prior issue underpinning the determination of curriculum content, the first concerning the process of relating involved in relating knowledge to action and the
second concerning the process of education involved in relating content to consequences.

It is to be wondered that more educational philosophers do not realize the prior position occupied by the educative process since it may be stated on empirical as well as analytical grounds. Any teacher will testify that education rests on the student's ways of doing things. The child does not first learn to inquire and then implement this learning; he simply inquires from the very beginning. This is but another way of saying that the child is more or less ready and eager to learn; he is curious and he brings this curiosity with him to life. Thus, his way of doing things is prior to the actual doing.

It must be realized, however, that the basis for both assertions of priority, the analytical as well as the empirical, is founded in a priority of things dealt with in our study in understanding rather than in an antecedency of things done within education. This is due to the fact that the educative process is prior, not because the individual first has this means of doing things and later applying it in education, but because all education presupposes it and without it education is meaningless and futile. The progression of the study has therefore driven us to the point where a fundamental examination of the educative process is required in order to determine curriculum content, this examination being one aspect of understanding the relation between knowledge and action. This examination will be the task of Part Two of the study.
8) Terminology

It will be best at this point to introduce the terminology I will use in Part Two. Current use of the phrase, the educative process, often denotes curriculum content and teaching methodology as well as the process of the learner involved in education. Since the major concern of Part Two is with the latter component I will refer to it as the subjective process of inquiry. The connotations which have recently accrued to the phrase, process of inquiry, will set the reader's mind solidly within the framework of education. I prefix the word, subjective, so that the concept will not be confused with specific methodologies consequent upon particular subject matter, such as the scientific method of inquiry. Subjective also denotes the priority of the process of inquiry from the standpoint of the individual involved in education. Other reasons for choosing this particular phrase will appear as we progress through Part Two. For the present it will suffice to realize that by the subjective process of inquiry I refer to that component of education which denotes the student's immediately manifested way of doing a thing as characteristic of his modes of doing and knowing generally. The subjective process of inquiry, in other words, is what the student does when he is engaged in education.
9) Summary

In this chapter I have completed, if cursorily, the investigation into the concept of tradition as well as the educative process as an aspect of the human enterprise in an effort to relate one to the other. While the investigation did not establish the nature of this relationship it did suggest that the difficulties in relating tradition to education are not to be resolved with an examination of the concepts in question alone, but are contingent upon examining the very process of relating itself. I have termed this process of relating the subjective process of inquiry.
PART TWO

THE SUBJECTIVE PROCESS OF INQUIRY

Part One of the study was concerned with taking certain traditionalist proposals for curriculum determination and showing how the vindication of these proposals involves examining a number of issues of a philosophical nature. One of these issues concerned the relation between tradition and the process of education, or more generally between learning and doing or knowledge and action. A further investigation of tradition and education suggested that the resolution of this issue entailed examining, among other things, the very process of relating involved in relating knowledge to action. In educational terms, the discerning of possible relationships between educational content and consequences requires examining the psychological process of education, what may be called the subjective process of inquiry in order to avoid certain confusions.

Part Two will examine this problem both in terms of the process of education specifically and the process of relating as an aspect of human activity generally. This end will be achieved by examining in some detail the theories of Dewey and Plato as they relate to explicating what I have termed the subjective process of inquiry. It will be realized that since the primary purpose of the study is to exhibit the ways in which educational philosophizing should proceed, the choice of Dewey and Plato is no more necessary than
the original educational problem chosen for investigation. Nonetheless, it seemed fitting to use Dewey in light of his tremendous influence and significance in contemporary American educational thought, and Plato because the nature of his thought lends itself to innumerable interpretations, allowing for a richness of understanding of the human enterprise, perhaps unequalled in the history of man.
CHAPTER IV

THE SUBJECTIVE PROCESS OF INQUIRY - I

1) Preface

John Dewey is perhaps the most significant philosopher of education in the contemporary Western world; not necessarily for his specific conclusions concerning education, although there may be a measure of intrinsic merit to them, but for his remarkable insight into the kinds of things that must be dealt with and the kinds of questions which must be asked in order to come to an understanding of the educative process. It is his approach to the study of education that sets him off as a unique guide for students of the philosophy of education. Moreover, it is now commonplace that the result of this unique approach was itself the delineation of an approach, viz. a functional theory of inquiry. In the description of this common pattern of inquiry, an integral part of his logical theory, Dewey claims to describe the way in which human beings operate intelligently, whether within the educative process or human experience in general. It is to his theory of inquiry we must turn, therefore, in order to examine a possible understanding of the subjective process of inquiry.

2) "The Supremacy of Method"

In Dewey's writings there is a continuing polemic against the traditional dichotomy between theory and practice, the former
involving mental gymnastics which deal in the higher realms of pure thought and the latter remaining tied to the mundane world of immediate experience. According to this dichotomy, which has held sway over men's minds for better than two thousand years, inquiry and the employment of intelligence is entirely divorced from the experiential world available to all men. In Dewey's view, this traditional separation is untenable because it fails to take account of the fact that all inquiry is functional in character; that is to say, inquiry consists of certain kinds of operations performed on certain kinds of things, whether these things are actual physical objects, such as tables and chairs, or symbolic representations, such as mathematical formulae. That inquiries actually exist is not a matter of doubt. "They enter into every area of life and into every aspect of every area. In everyday living, men examine; they turn things over intellectually; they infer and judge as 'naturally' as they reap and sow, produce and exchange commodities."¹ Due to this 'naturalness,' this 'publicness' if you like, inquiry is as open to objective study and determination as any other human activity. "Because of the intimate and decisive way in which inquiry and its conclusions enter into the management of all affairs of life, no study of the latter is adequate save as it is noted how they are affected by the methods and instruments of inquiry that currently obtain."²

² Ibid.
Since inquiry is like all other human activity, they all share certain common characteristics. Chief among these are operations which bring about changes in existential situations. Inquiry, in other words, transforms natural situations. The transformation, however, is not haphazard or hit and miss, since the primary characteristic of the human animal, as distinct from his lower order brethren, is directedness and purposiveness. Human activity is thus directed activity; it is directed toward specific ends.

Observation of the human scene also discloses that human actions are instigated by the desire to attain a state of greater satisfaction and comfort; in Dewey's terms, they are directed toward resolving an indeterminate situation into a settled and determinate one, one in which the parts are in order and function to the satisfaction of the individual and society. In this way Dewey is led to his formal definition of inquiry: "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole."\(^3\)

Or in more general terms, the end of human inquiry is the transformation of a less satisfactory situation into one that is more satisfactory.

For purposes of analysis this transformation may be formally characterized in five stages of inquiry. The first of these is the antecedent condition to inquiry, that is, an indeterminate situation

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 104.
or felt difficulty. The location and definition of the specific difficulty Dewey refers to as the second logical step of inquiry: the indeterminate situation becomes problematic. Until it is realized that a problem exists, which ensues within the very process of its being subjected to inquiry, a situation remains merely indeterminate. Third, since inquiry is progressive and on-going in character, the statement of a problem suggests possibilities for its solution. Within this stage of inquiry occur such things as observation of existential conditions and perhaps the collection and collation of data. The determination of such conditions in themselves suggest possible solutions relevant to the problem at hand. Next there is a development of the bearings of these suggested solutions on the problem in order to determine as nearly as possible the one which will more successfully accomplish the end sought. Dewey calls this the stage of reasoning; and while in many instances this might consist in existential operations, it is usually conceived to be a stage wherein the operations of the suggested solutions are placed in relation to the problem in thought only. It is the stage where we attempt to determine what means should be tried in order to resolve the difficulty. Finally there is the point where we actually try out the envisioned means of solution and either accept or reject them according to their effectiveness and expediency. The fifth step culminates in belief or disbelief, in the discovery of an adequate mode of action or the realization that inquiry must proceed further. If the former, then we have attained the level of knowledge or, as Dewey prefers to call it, warranted assertibility.
In summary, all inquiry for Dewey commences with doubtfulness or indeterminateness, an undesirable quality extant in a situation. Recognition of such indeterminateness is itself the formulation of a problematic situation. The institution of a problem in a situation outlines, almost by implication, a plan of action for resolving the difficulty. The plan may, of course, be altered as inquiry proceeds, depending on the new factors that come to light; but the important point is that the plan is tested, in symbolic form and in existential operations. The inquiry then terminates when the problem is solved by transforming the prior indeterminate situation into an actual determinate one, that is, into one where there is no need for doubt. It is in this way that we gain knowledge or warranted assertions.  

The knowledge or warranted assertion which emerges from any given inquiry is therefore a knowledge of means, that is, a functional knowledge of relations which tells us, on another but similar occasion, how we may go about resolving doubt and indeterminacy. This point is crucial to understanding Dewey's entire philosophical orientation. Indeed, it succinctly defines the subject matter of the whole of philosophy. Ideas are plans of action for existential performance; they have "an empirical origin and status. But it is that of acts performed, acts in the literal sense of the word, deeds done, not reception of sensations forced

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on us from without." This is not to say that sensory qualities are unimportant, but to these gross qualities are added "another type of experience, the product of deliberate art, of which relations rather than qualities are the significant subject matter." Thus, the knowledge or warranted assertion of which Dewey speaks is not, in the strict sense, cognitive, but is itself a practical activity.

If we frame our conception of knowledge on the experimental model, we find that it is a way of operating upon and with the things of ordinary experience so that we can frame our ideas of them in terms of their interactions with one another, instead of in terms of the qualities they directly present, and that thereby our control of them, our ability to change them and direct their changes as we desire, is indefinitely increased. Knowing is itself a mode of practical action and is the way of interaction by which other natural interactions become subject to direction.

Or stating the same thing from the other side, "thought is not a property of something termed intellect or reason apart from nature. It is a mode of directed overt action. Ideas are anticipatory plans and designs which take effect in concrete reconstructions of antecedent conditions of existence."

In this sense then, the act of knowing and the ensuing knowledge is not the act of a spectator but is the activity of an

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5 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 112.
6 Ibid., p. 125.
7 Ibid., pp. 106-107.
8 Ibid., pp. 166-167.
integral participant in the natural world. This preclusion from being a spectator in the human enterprise is most forcibly brought out in Dewey's view of the objects of experience which are consequent upon and integrally related to the theory of inquiry.

... experienced objects have a double status. They are individualized, consummatory, whether in the way of enjoyment or of suffering. They are also involved in a continuity of interactions and changes, and hence are causes and potential means of later experiences. Because of this dual capacity, they become problematic. Immediately and directly they are just what they are; but as transitions to and possibilities of later experiences they are uncertain. There is a divided response; part of the organic activity is directed to them for what they immediately are, and part to them as transitive means of other experienced objects. We react to them both as finalities and in preparatory ways, and the two reactions do not harmonize.

This two-fold character of experienced objects is the source of their problematic character. Each of us can recall many occasions when he has been perplexed by disagreement between things directly present and their potential value as signs and means; when he has been torn between absorption in what is not enjoyed and the need of altering it so as to prepare for something likely to come. If we state the point in a formal way, it is signified that there is an incompatibility between the traits of an object in its direct individual and unique nature and those traits that belong to it in its relations or continuities. This incompatibility can be removed only by actions which temporally reconstruct what is given and constitute a new object having both individuality and the internal coherence of continuity in a series.  

In other words, true objects of knowledge are "produced and ordered in settled form by means of inquiry."  

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9 Ibid., pp. 236-237.

10 Logic, p. 119.
terminology, objects are objectives of inquiry, that is, they reside in the consequences of directed activity; objects of knowledge are eventual, they are the "outcome of directed experimental operations, instead of something in sufficient existence before the act of knowing."\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, the subject matter of logic is relations. As relations, they arise within the process of inquiry. By examining the relations which exist between existential means employed and the conclusions attained as their consequences, we are able to discover the reasons why some methods succeed and others fail.\textsuperscript{12} By realizing the ways in which we do, in fact, operate, and the things which do, in fact, succeed, we are able to add to our knowledge of the kinds of means which may be used in the future to attain further consequences, that is, resolve future indeterminate situations. It will be realized that there is no hint that logical forms or the relations which actually work in existential situations are in any sense prior to inquiry. Rather, "all logical forms (with their characteristic properties) arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions."\textsuperscript{13} Or stated differently, "logical forms accrue to subject-matter when the latter is subjected to controlled

\textsuperscript{11} The Quest for Certainty, p. 171.

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Logic, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 4.
inquiry." Logic is concerned with the canons of inquiry. These canons emerge within the inquiries themselves, and there is no justification for going outside to find a priori principles fixed antecedently to inquiry.

From this point, Dewey proceeds to delineate the autonomous and self-corrective character of logic and the process of inquiry and repudiates claims for the need of an ontological foundation to logic and science. Thus, method is supreme for Dewey because method is all that there is; but more than this, it is all that is needed. Man's quest for certainty in absolutism is spurious since he can have his certainty in the very on-going enterprise of human inquiry.

3) Inquiry into Inquiry

Proceeding under the hypothesis of Dewey's theory of inquiry (for without habituation to hypothesis there will be no advance at all), there is yet a question concerning the inquiry into inquiry: How is it that Dewey came upon his theory of inquiry? Was it also a movement from indeterminacy to determinacy? If so, is the theory of inquiry itself held in continual suspension, contingent upon further inquiry? Or is inquiry into inquiry a different kind of inquiry? Or is it not an inquiry at all, but simple recollection of actual inquiry, that is, reflection on inquiry?

The latter alternative would seem to furnish the most obvious and facile solution to the problem: Reflection on actual inquiries

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14 Ibid., p. 101.
allows for the delineation of the theory of inquiry. Unless one insists on viewing the mind as a secretive box wherein occur processes available only to its possessor everything in inquiry is overt and open to public inspection. Each step is aboveboard and capable of being observed: There is a specified antecedent state of existential things; and a specifiable operation of physical and symbolic means which are exhibited and reported by the inquirer.

The entire process by which the conclusion is reached that such and such a judgment of an object is valid is overt. It can be repeated step by step by anyone. Thus every one can judge himself whether or not the conclusion reached as to the object justifies assertion of knowledge, or whether there are gaps and deflections. Moreover, the whole process goes on where other existential processes go on, in time. There is a temporal sequence as definitely as in any art, as in, say, the making of cotton cloth from ginning of raw material, through carding and spinning to the operation of the loom.\[15\]

Thus, simple observation of these proceedings will allow anyone not only to recheck the operations, but to delineate, as rules of procedure, the actual operations themselves.

But this simple resolution of the difficulty seems open to question. For example, if reflection is not inquiry, then within the terms of Dewey's theory there can be no warrant for asserting the theory of inquiry as knowledge. If on the other hand it is inquiry, then we are involved in an infinite regress, since there is a need for reflection on the inquiry into inquiry, and so on. These objections may be mere sophistries, however,\[15\]The Quest for Certainty, p. 289.
elusive and perhaps meaningless. We may deal with them within the context of two assumptions implicit in questioning Dewey's inquiry into inquiry: (a) in order for Dewey to delineate the theory of inquiry he must have inquired, thereby attaining warranted assertibility; and (b) in this prior inquiry there was involved but one assumption, namely, that modes of knowing are as objective and publicly determinable as any results of knowing.

a) In Dewey's own account, "inquiry into inquiry is the causa cognoscendi of logical forms, [while] primary inquiry is itself causa essendi of the forms which inquiry into inquiry discloses." In other words, while logical forms accrue to subject matter within the process of inquiry, these forms usually become available to the public domain as rules of procedure and the like only upon inquiry into inquiry, which in effect is the delineation of these rules. Yet granting with Dewey that such forms are held in a continual hypothetical state, open for reformulation and dismissal when outworn, the question still arises as to why the inquiry into inquiry does not itself give rise to logical forms in a like manner, and these used as hypothetical canons for future inquiries into inquiry. The theory of inquiry is after all itself a warranted assertion, that is, it is knowledge, otherwise its statement is mere fancy. But if this stage is reached, there seems to be no warrant for stopping: There is a need for an inquiry into the inquiry into inquiry in order

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16 Logic, p. 4.
to disclose the logical forms which accrued to the latter, and so on ad infinitum. It would therefore appear that Dewey is unable to write a logic; nor can he teach us how to learn. Every time he says something concerning inquiry, he becomes involved in an infinite inquiry in order to substantiate it.

This kind of an argument appears to be spurious for Dewey, since according to his theory there are not several disparate kinds of inquiry, but a common structure to all inquiry; there are not several methods, but one, namely, the scientific method. Whether we are involved in building a bridge, driving a truck, figuring out mathematical equations, or inquiring into inquiry, we are doing essentially the same kind of thing, moving from indeterminacy to determinacy. Now if it is argued that the very thing we are trying to find in inquiry into inquiry is there from the very beginning, Dewey would rejoin that this is perfectly correct, since the method is self-applying. The method employed by the natural sciences is the only method where the canons of criticism are built in as a result of its essentially hypothetical character.

The idea that the theory of inquiry is self-applying is an interesting one and warrants attention. In asserting that the scientific method is self-applicable it would seem that the inquirer is either engaged in describing his immediate act of describing, which in addition to other absurdities involves an infinite regress again, or he is describing a previous stage of describing. If the latter, then the inquirer will never be in a position to catch hold of the immediate act of describing, and his
propounding of a theory of inquiry must be based on historical evidence and statistical inference. This is quite all right, but difficulties arise when it is stated that the canons of criticism are built into the method, that is, there is no apparent warrant for this assertion since inquiry into inquiry is descriptive rather than normative. The only way out of the difficulty would be to deny, or at least seriously question, the dichotomy between the descriptive and normative realms of inquiry. This is precisely what Dewey attempts to do, especially in his description of the common pattern of inquiry. His meaning seems to be that while we cannot learn how men inquire simply by observing extant modes, it is only by observing those modes which lead to successful results of warranted assertions, and discriminating the general features of those modes, that we can acquire functional norms for future inquiries. Yet even if this is assumed to be the case there remains a serious problem of inference. If we rely for a theory of inquiry solely on the description of previous states of describing, it is only through a statistical inference of sorts that there is warrant for asserting that logical forms will continue to accrue to subject matter within the process of inquiry, even if this is an on-going process. As a result it is necessary to place our faith in the human enterprise in mathematical probability -- which seems at the very least unusual. Moreover, this faith, in

conjunction with the impossibility of describing the immediate act of describing, would appear to have the effect of fixating the pattern of inquiry. It is highly doubtful if Dewey would want this, yet such seems to be the consequence of his writing about inquiry.

There is another possible understanding of the self-applicability of a method, not strictly in line with Dewey's thought, but perhaps an advance upon it. Rather than claiming that inquiry into inquiry is the describing of previous acts of inquiry, it might be claimed that such inquiry presupposes itself. In this case there is no problem of being involved in an infinite regress, although there may be a serious difficulty in cognitively formulating the results of the inquiry. We will return to this important idea in the next chapter.

b) Dewey's inquiry into inquiry rests on the fundamental assumption that "knowings are observable facts in exactly the same sense as are the subject matters that are known."¹⁸ Without this assumption there could be no assertion of the common structure of inquiry, nor could there be a theory of inquiry whatsoever. This in turn is grounded in the inseparability of modes or processes and the products that ensue therefrom; that is to say, in the repudiation of a dichotomy between knowings and knowns, excepting perhaps an analytic separation for purposes of ease in inquiry. This is a statement of fact rather than hypothesis; it is to say that one cannot know something without knowing it. In this sense, Dewey

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¹⁸ John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known, p. 50.
and Bentley are entirely incorrect in following their first statement of assumption with another assumption: "We proceed upon the postulate that knowings are always and everywhere inseparable from the knowns — that the two are twin aspects of common fact." It is not at all postulational; it is by their own admission a fact or, as the authors would have it, Fact. Yet this statement of fact is not to say that knowings can be known in the same sense that knowns are known, which seems to be the implication of the assumptive assertion. If it is claimed that knowings are retrospectively known, then certainly the knowings are no longer knowings but are themselves knowns; that is to say, they are known, and this is something entirely different from knowing. It is equally questionable that immediate knowings can also be known in the sense of knowns. If this were the case, there would seem to be no knowings at all, but a world of immediate and retrospective knowns. And I am not at all sure I can conceive of this state of affairs, since every time I conceive it I seem to negate it. What this means for the present inquiry is that Dewey's assumption for inquiry into inquiry is quite all right as long as it is realized that he is saying nothing about the knowings that went into the inquiring into inquiry. And by the same token, he is unable to say anything about the knowings of primary inquiry, as knowings rather than knowns. Certainly knowings are objectively knowable, as long as they are of other people or of myself.

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19 Ibid., p. 53. The first italics are mine.
retrospectively. But in this case they are not knowings at all, but
knowns, at least so far as the individual is concerned.

The scholarly enterprise furnishes an excellent example of
the generic incompatibility\(^{20}\) of immediate knowings with knowns.
I am presently sitting at the typewriter, attempting to examine,
evaluate, understand, and communicate certain facets of the human
enterprise in understanding. This is literally a painful undertaking
-- there is great difficulty in understanding, organizing, and
communicating. At times I am sure I have penetrated into Dewey's
meaning; tomorrow I come back and turn the same pages and they seem
either meaningless or absurd -- I have completely lost the insight.
The same is true of my writings: at one time meaning seems to
-gush forth; at other times, as anyone who as attempted seriously
to deal with a problem in writing knows, I sit and stare at the
empty page without a sentence or even a word forthcoming. Yet
eventually the task is completed: first a section, then a chapter,
and finally the entire study. And at each of these points there
is an overwhelming joy; not so much at completing the task, but a
joy of anxiety, to be at it again, to inquire again. This is what
I understand by Dewey's insistence that inquiry is a movement from
the indeterminate to the determinate; indeed, it is the only thing
I can understand by inquiry. Yet when I look back and reflect on
the writing of a section or a chapter, I do not see such a movement;
rather I feel a longing to be engaged into inquiry again; I feel

\(^{20}\) This does not, of course, exclude other kinds of compatibility,
for example aspectual and analogical.
an uncontrollable urge to read and write and to do and engage in the process. This is what I understand by the on-goingness of the process of inquiry — it is an engagement and an immediate doing; it is knowing but it is not known. When I reflect on inquiry I can in no sense delineate its mode; it is too pervasive and all-encompassing; it defies my grasp. I can, however, define as things now known certain steps taken within the inquiry; but this is something entirely different than defining my examining, understanding, organizing, and communicating.

In other words, when I concern myself in any way with myself, I am performing what might be termed a higher order act in retrospect, as when I concern myself with what someone else is doing at any given moment. When I describe what I have just done or am now doing, I am commenting upon a step which is not itself one of commenting, unless by happenstance it is an act of commenting. But the operation which is the commenting is not, and cannot be, the step on which that commentary is being made.21 Similarly, when I am inquiring into inquiry, I cannot inquire into the immediate inquiry, but only into either a previous inquiry of my own, or a contemporary or historical one of another person. Inquiry into inquiry is a higher order operation than primary inquiry, and a higher order operation cannot be the operation upon which it is performed. My inquiry into my inquiries must always be silent about one inquiry, namely itself, and this inquiry can only form

the materials for a future inquiry. No inquiry, of course, can escape possible future inquiry, but once it is temporally finished it can no longer become inquiry again; it can only become that which is inquired into. Knowings qua knowings systematically elude our inquiries simply because they are the wrong sorts of things to be known qua known. This is the dilemma of any would-be methodologist; and it is the dilemma he must realize before taking his pen in hand.

Because of the nature of this discussion, and its centrality to a later understanding of the subjective process of inquiry, a series of quotations from two of Dewey's major works may serve as a summary and as illustrative of the problem intrinsic in any attempt to inquire into inquiry.

[A] suggestion becomes an idea when it is examined with reference to its functional fitness; its capacity as a means of resolving the given solution. 22

The check upon immediate acceptance [of any given conclusion in inquiry] is the examination of the meaning as a meaning. This examination consists in noting what the meaning in question implies in relation to other meanings in the system of which it is a member, the formulated relation constituting a proposition. 23

In controlled inquiry, the entire object of reasoning is to obtain that meaning or conceptual structure which is best adapted to instigate and direct just those operations of observation that will secure as their consequence just those existen­tial facts that are needed to solve the problem in hand. 24

23 Ibid., p. 111. My italics.
24 Ibid., p. 133. My italics.
The first effect of experimental analysis is to reduce objects directly experienced to data.²⁵

Given data which locate the nature of the problem, there is evoked a thought of an operation which if put into execution may eventuate in a situation in which the trouble or doubt which evoked inquiry will be resolved.²⁶

The distinction between sense-data and interpretive ideas is deliberately instituted by the process of inquiry, for sake of carrying it forward to an adequately tested conclusion, one with a title to acceptance.²⁷

The point to note in these instances is that while Dewey describes what he believes is the pattern of inquiry common to all men, there is no attempt either to describe or operationally delineate examining, noting, obtaining, reducing, evoking, deliberating, etc. This is not intended as a criticism; rather it is a statement of fact that it is one thing to define observed methods employed in actual inquiry, and quite another to even talk about how one goes about examining, noting, etc. Put in another way, it is not an oversight on the part of Dewey for failing to define these things; but it is a failure on the part of the student of Dewey if he does not realize that noting, obtaining, etc., within the contexts quoted, are different kinds of things from what is delineated as the common structure of inquiry. The distinction is again one of kind rather than of degree; and until

²⁵ The Quest for Certainty, p. 123. My italics.
²⁶ Ibid. My italics.
we are fully aware of this distinction there can be no further inquiry into the educative process *qua* process.

4) Habit

The preceding has not been an attempt either to question or to substantiate Dewey's claim as to the origins of logical forms. Rather it was intended to examine briefly the kinds of questions intrinsic in any theory of logic -- although it is manifest that these questions become especially pressing when logic is equated with methodology. Thus, as Dewey questions the origin and use of logical forms, so I have attempted to pose the prior question of the origin and use of the theory. But the point of departure of the two attempts is that Dewey will not allow the validity of the latter investigation; that is to say, for him there is no essential distinction between the two -- they are the same kinds of things, and indeed, self-applying. If the investigation of Dewey's theory of inquiry is to advance, therefore, we must accept this assertion on hypothesis and proceed to ferret out the assumptions inherent in the fundamental statement of his logical theory.

In asserting that logical forms accrue to subject matter within the process of inquiry, Dewey, by his own statement, is neither denying the "existence nor the indispensability of primary logical principles." Rather the question concerns the origin and use of these forms. In the formulation of the theory, Dewey follows

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28 *Logic*, p. 12.
Peirce states: "That which determines us, from given premisses, to draw one inference rather than another, is some habit of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired. The particular habit of mind which governs this or that inference may be formulated in a proposition whose truth depends on the validity of the inferences which the habit determines."\(^{29}\) Dewey insists that at the outset these habits operate at the purely biological level, without our being aware of them. Later in the evolution of the human animal attention is given not only to what he is doing but to how he is doing it as well. That is, attention is given to the modes of operations themselves rather than merely to the immediate act and its particular consequences. Man discovers that if he draws inferences, for example, in one way rather than another, he can count on the results of the inference being warranted and usable. Thus, "the idea of a method of inquiry arises as an articulate expression of the habit that is involved in a class of inferences."\(^{30}\) The resultant guiding principles\(^{31}\) or principles of inference are formal in nature. They state habits which are operative in every inference that tends to yield warranted assertions, that is, results that are stable and

\(^{29}\) Charles S. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," in Essays in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Vincent Tomas, p. 8. The quote should be compared with William James' assertion that temperament is determinative of philosophical position.

\(^{30}\) *Logic*, p. 12.

\(^{31}\) Guiding or leading principles is Peirce's terminology.
usable in further inquiries. They are free from any particular subject matter and therefore are pure logical forms.

According to both Peirce and Dewey, the validity of the principles is determined not by their universal applicability nor the unerring correctness of the consequences which follow upon all inquiries. Rather "an inference is regarded as valid or not, without reference to the truth or falsity of its conclusions specially, but according as the habit which determines it is such as to produce true conclusions in general or not."\(^{32}\) That is to say, the validity of the principle is determined by the results produced by the immediate manifestation of the habit. If it usually produces warranted assertions, that is, results that are sustained and developed in further inquiry, then the principle which articulates the habit is also valid. It is the consequences in action that are determinative of validity rather than the mere internal coherency of the relations of propositions or the assertion of their \textit{a priori} status. And this holds true even when a case arises in which the conclusion is found to be invalid. Unless there are a significant number of such instances, it is the material dealt with that is at fault rather than the form imposed on that material.

\(^{32}\) Peirce, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 8.
Guiding or leading principles are therefore generalized rules of procedure or laws which govern action. They are . . . conditions to be satisfied such that knowledge of them provides a principle of direction and of testing. They are formulations of ways of treating subject matter that have been found to be so determinative of sound conclusions in the past that they are taken to regulate further inquiry until definite grounds are found for questioning them. While they are derived from examination of methods previously used in their connection with the kind of conclusion they have produced, they are operationally a priori with respect to further inquiry.33

In Dewey's view therefore habits, which are articulated by these guiding principles, are ways of acting rather than particular acts; they are dispositional, or better, dispositions such that the environment is as determinative of their specific manifestations as are the propensities which are the actual embodiments of the habits. Thus, while habits are "ways of using and incorporating the environment," it is essential to note that "the latter has its say as surely as the former."34 This is not to say, however, that a habit is the interaction of a particular doing of things with the environment. Habit is a generalized concept; it refers to dispositions and propensities rather than particular acts. Thus, in its broadest formulation, "the essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response. Habit means special sensitiveness or

33 Logic, pp. 13-14.

accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts." As such, a habit may be characterized as a filter of perception and thought but a filter which adds something to the raw materials: "It is a reagent which adds new qualities and rearranges what is received. Our ideas truly depend upon experience, but so do our sensations. And the experience upon which they both depend is the operation of habit." In other words, habits are literally organizations between potential external materials, means and energies, and the means of the human organism, such as the eye and the hand. They are the conditions of operation and, more specifically, what allow us to operate; in a very important sense, they are us, when the human organism is properly defined operationally. Habits are organizations of means and that beyond the means; and in this sense habits are aspectual and, of course, aspectually inseparable.

Although general, habit is yet dynamic and evolutionary. And this holds true for both the habit itself and its active manifestation. Of the latter, any given habit or set of habits (since they are organically and intimately interconnected) may be determinative of action in widely disparate situations, as far as the habit is an aspect of the situation. On the other side, habits

35 Ibid., p. 42.
36 Ibid., p. 32.
are not mere blind repetitions, but are themselves controlled by
intelligent operation. Intelligence discovers the best possible
means which go to comprise habits; it tests and checks, formulates
and reformulates, and issues in a hypothetical mode of action. Dewey's
chief complaint against primitive magic and religion is that they
fail to take account of intelligently controlled habits, means by
which envisioned results may be attained.

Apparent difficulties arise in Dewey's conception of habit.
Among other things, there is a good deal of ambiguity and indef-
initeness as to precisely what comprises a habit. By and large
Dewey conceives them to be dynamic and forceful units, fluid and
capable of multifarious manifestations and evolutions. At other
times, however, he seems to assume an almost common sense under-
standing, viewing habit as mere repetition and the duplication of
previous acts. At a further point habit becomes nearly synonymous
with choice and will. Moreover, Dewey's conception of habit is
the very foundation of his ethic -- and any reasonable student of
the philosophy of education realizes that a just treatment of his
theory of morals is one of the most difficult tasks that can be
undertaken.

Yet these may well be sophistical objections of hair-splitters
and others who insist on infinitesimal distinctions -- rather
than meaning. But it seems there is a real point of difficulty
concerning this question of the determination of habit; for while

38 See especially Human Nature and Conduct, passim.
intelligence may determine habit, it is also true for Dewey that disciplined habits are determinative of the intelligent searching for proper means, and in certain instances these means sought are themselves habits. Thus, habits determine intelligence, and conversely, at least in an advanced stage of civilization, intelligence determines habit to a considerable degree. As a result, Dewey apparently becomes involved in an impenetrable circle.

For Dewey, however, the difficulty is only apparent. The point is noted in an entirely different context in Knowing and the Known; and in a beautiful tour de force, Dewey and Bentley continue to inquire in spite of their circularity. The passage is worth quoting in full.

We have adopted circularity -- procedure in a circle -- openly, explicitly, emphatically. Several ways of pretending to avoid such circularity are well known. Perhaps at one end everything is made tweedledum, and perhaps at the other everything is made tweedledee, or perhaps in between little tweedledums and little tweedledees, companionable but infertile, essential to each other but untouchable by each other, are reported all along the line. We have nothing to apologize for in the circularity we choose in preference to the old talk-ways. We observe world-being-known-to-man-in-it; we report the observation; we proceed to inquire into it, circularity or no circularity. This is all there is to it. And the circularity is not merely round the circle in one direction; the course is both ways round at once in full mutual function.39

For the present context, Dewey will continue to insist on intelligence determining habit, and habit directing intelligence.

39 Knowing and the Known, p. 63.
But there is a more crucial difficulty encountered, and one that cannot be overcome by the acceptance of circularity. It is simply that Dewey allows no movement between the general habit and the specific activity; or at least he fails to delineate a mechanism linking the two. As in the case with knowings and knowns, habits are not immediate doings but generalized modes. In the Logic for example he states that "when it is found that there are habits involved in every inference, in spite of differences of subject-matter, and when these habits are noted and formulated, then the formulations are guiding or leading principles." In this instance, that is, in the movement from habit to guiding principle as previously discussed, the problem as before is with the finding and noting and formulating. How do we find habits are involved in every inference; and how do we note and formulate them? When these processes are occurring something is happening; when observations of methods employed are made, something is done to the observed materials, elsewise they would not be observed; when habits are formulated there is an occurrence left undefined. And what makes the difficulty crucial is not the mere failure at definition -- for indeed, it is not a failure at all -- but the fact that noting and finding and formulating are not publicly shared experiences. That is to say, they may well be overt in one sense of the term, but they are not common to all men. However it may be phrased, there are levels of noting and formulating and finding.

and each higher level leaves a considerable number of men behind. Immediate notings, formulatings, and findings may not be secretive occurrences on the stage of the inner man, but they are certainly esoteric. And this is a statement of fact, not of conjecture. Thus, while there is no objection to Dewey's conception of habit, there is a crucial difficulty. And the difficulty is not in mere ambiguity or inconsistency; it is intrinsic -- perhaps in the nature of man.

5) The Educative Process

We are now in a position to commence the movement back toward the major problem. Education for Dewey is the educative process. Technically it is "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience." Concerning the first aspect of education, "the increment of meaning corresponds to the increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities in which we are engaged." The latter aspect, on the other hand, is "an added power of subsequent direction or control. To say that one knows what he is about, or can intend certain consequences, is to say, of course, that he can better anticipate what is going to happen; that he can, therefore, get ready or prepare in advance so as to secure beneficial consequences and avert

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41 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 76.
42 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
undesirable ones." In other words, Dewey's view of the educative process

... identifies the end (the result) and the process. This is verbally self-contradictory, but only verbally. It means that experience as an active process occupies time and that its later period completes its earlier portion; it brings to light connections involved, but hitherto unperceived. The later outcome thus reveals the meaning of the earlier while the experience as a whole establishes a bent or disposition toward the things possessing this meaning. Every such continuous experience or activity is educative, and all education resides in having such experiences.

These quotations from Dewey's educational writings point up in a striking manner that he was acutely aware of the priority of the methodological question. He was convinced that the question of content was entirely redundant until the problem of inquiry was resolved. This is what is sometimes alluded to in the now hackneyed expression that Dewey was so intent on method that he overlooked content. Such a charge is, of course, another of those half-truths so often encountered in educational theory. Although it is true that he rarely dealt with the specific content of education he did not, strictly speaking, overlook it; he just never quite got to it since he was preoccupied with the resolution of the antecedent question of inquiry. He left it to his followers, that is to trained educators, to carry out the subsequent phases of his theory. Interestingly enough, however, many of these educators have

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43 Ibid., p. 77.
44 Ibid., p. 78.
continued to emphasize process to the detriment of content. It is perhaps an irony of contemporary American educational thought that the true followers of Dewey's philosophy are often found in one or more of the camps of traditionalism.

The criticism is unwarranted on another and much more important ground. It implies that Dewey assumed that method was in some sense prior to content or subject matter. That this is not the case has been clearly shown in the previous discussion. Rather method and subject matter are concomitant within experience; they are aspects of experience with no connotation of priority whatsoever. What was prior for Dewey was the question of method; in his view method had to be brought into its proper focus in order for philosophy to become reconstruction of experience, that is, in order for the human race to advance.

But the aspectual compatibility of method and subject matter presents a further difficulty, namely, the problem of penetrating into the on-going process of experience as knowings and knowns. This may be seen best by referring again to the concept of Fact.

The primary consideration in fulfilling the desired condition with respect to Fact is that the activity by which it is identified and the what that is identified are both required, and are required in such a way that each is taken along with the other, and in no sense as separable. Our terminology is involved in fact, and equally 'fact' is involved in our terminology. This repeats in effect the statement that knowledge

45 In contradistinction to generic incompatibility. Cf. supra, pp. 72-75.
requires and includes both knowings and known. Anything named 'fact' is such both with respect to the knowing operation and with respect to what is known. We establish for our use, with respect to both fact and knowledge, that we have no 'something known' and no 'something identified' apart from its knowing and identifying, and that we have no knowing and identifying apart from the somewhats and somethings that are being known and identified.  

To borrow Dewey and Bentley's analogy, when chopping occurs there is always something that is chopped; one without the other is meaningless. Knowing and identifying are ways of acting, and are as much ways of doing and making as are "chopping wood, singing songs, seeing sights, or making hay." This being the assumed case, there are several closely related points which stand in need of clarification.

a) If knowings and knowns, process and product, are inseparable, whence method? i.e. the reflective rules of procedure describing knowings and processes. Obviously subject matter cannot determine method, nor can the converse be the case; they are concomitant. There is thus no ground for asserting any given method, scientific or otherwise. Rather, a new method would seem to arise with each unique situation, and reflection on knowings would seem to be futile. For this difficulty there would appear to be only two hypothetical answers. First, the subject matter may be assumed to be one rather than many, in which case the method remains the same. Reflection

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46 Knowing and the Known, p. 54.

47 Ibid.
would then determine the method common to all subjects which are in essence one. There must, however, be a substantiation of such a claim, such as a refusal to admit the distinction of the theoretical and the practical, and the like. This Dewey does, of course, by way of aspectualizing the whole of the world out of experience; but by the same token he does not refuse to distinguish subject matters. His distinction of science and common sense is one such example. A second approach would be to admit the disparity of subject matters but not the disparity of the whole of experience. In this case there would be several sciences, but at the same time several methods, according to the particular science in question. Dewey will admit the disparity, but not the distinction of methods; there is only one, the scientific.

This may seem unfair to Dewey's position since he professes not the commonality of method as unique to a given subject matter, but a common pattern of inquiry which upon investigation, that is reflection, turns out to be the methodology common to the natural sciences. This does not, however, escape the difficulty. Science, for Dewey, is the knowledge of the relations between changes which enable us to connect things as antecedents and consequences. Now relations are not merely objectively existential characteristics between things, but involve as well the interaction of the organism with the existential things. Thus, in a sense the knower determines relations as much as the knowns; or better, neither determine them

\[48\] Cf. The Quest for Certainty, p. 274.
but both do, since the knower in this instance is the knowings as inseparable from the knowns. Thus, a common pattern of inquiry is not merely what the individual does to his environment, but is as surely what the environment does back to him; one cannot exist in any meaningful sense without the other, and it is therefore nonsensical to speak of a common pattern of inquiry qua the individual. It is rather the individual in interaction with his environment. In this event, subject matter, which is the materials of experience reflected upon, is an intimate part of the pattern of inquiry and therefore must be considered in any delineation of method, that is, knowings and doings reflected upon. We are thus still left with the question of the determination of method -- apart or in conjunction with subject matter.

b) The same kind of thing can be said in conjunction with Dewey's conception of the indeterminate situation, the antecedent to inquiry. According to Dewey, the antecedent indeterminate situation is inherently indeterminate.

It is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful. Personal states of doubt that are not evoked by and are not relative to some existential situation are pathological; when they are extreme they constitute the mania of doubting. Consequently, situations that are disturbed and troubled, confused or obscure, cannot be straightened out, cleared up and put in order, by manipulation of our personal states of mind.49

49 Logic, p. 106.
But in spite of Dewey's caution in guarding against pathological states, there can be no indeterminacy without cognition, that is, without knowing a situation as indeterminate. Without attempting to say states of doubt are wholly personal, we must, in line with Dewey's thought, admit the complete situation, one involving knowing and knowns alike. In this sense, the individual does not come to the indeterminate situation, but is as much a part of it from the beginning as are all its other aspects. In at least one sense it is true to say that the individual, that is the knowings, literally creates the indeterminate situation; and this creation is the movement from the indeterminate to the problematic situation. While admitting, in other words, that there can be no indeterminacy without an aspect of indeterminacy intrinsic in the existential materials, it is not at all correct to say that knowings are separate from this indeterminacy. Rather they infuse indeterminacy from one aspect, and within the process create problemata.

But now the problem becomes one of reflectively discerning the knowings involved in defining indeterminacy and the doings involved in the movement to the problematic situation, that is, the determination of problemata. Dewey would assert that these determinations are habitual, and the reflective discernment would be the setting up of leading principles. This is quite all right, but as I have previously shown, it does not answer the question; although on the other hand, of course, any polemic to the contrary of what Dewey asserts does not thereby negate his claim. To say these determinations and movements are habitual is the only thing he can
say, although other theorists would make analogous but apparently
different claims -- such as inviting one to participate in a discussion,
or write a book, or deliver a lecture. In other words, the claim that
leading principles are operationally a priori does not settle the
question since the priority referred to is temporal in character.
These principles are prior in the sense that they have emerged in
prior inquiries and are implemented in present instances because of
their success in resulting in warranted assertibility. But this does
not explain the immediate knowing, that is determining and moving, in
any sense other than a scientific one, namely, in the subsumption of
an immediate relation in both its aspects (knowing and known, for
example) under a general or abstract principle. This kind of explana-
tion, of course, cannot account for the immediacy of the act involved,
nor can it give us any knowledge which would enable us to establish
criteria for suitable materials to be dealt with in the educative
process. Guiding principles can account for everything except the
immediate knowing qua doing. Dewey was preoccupied with the question
of the process of inquiry, but he seems to have mistaken its prior
or subjective aspects, what I have called the subjective process
of inquiry, as a temporal or operational priority.\(^{50}\)

\(^{50}\) This confusion is especially obvious in his criticism of
Kant. Dewey attempts to show that for Kant, sense and thought exist
independently and originally (temporally prior); whereas the valid
criticism within the context of Dewey's thought is in questioning
the purported exhaustiveness of the Table of Categories. Cf. The
Quest for Certainty, pp. 171ff; and John Dewey and James H. Tufts,
Ethics, passim.
c) The same criticism concerning Dewey's theory of inquiry may be stated in a third and final form, and this to ensure a clear and distinct understanding of the last point in the previous statement. Dewey commenced his philosophy with the implicit assumption -- and I am unsure whether he was aware of it or not -- that the process of inquiry in all its aspects is determinable. This is manifest in all his writings, that is, he writes about inquiry. Put in another way, Dewey's preoccupation with determining the nature of the process of inquiry is possible only on the assumption that the nature of the process is, in fact, determinable. But this is not at all a settled question. It may or may not be determinable, as we shall presently attempt to discover; but even if it is, there is no evidence as to how far it will allow of such determination. Thus, Dewey required a prior inquiry into the determinableness of the process of inquiry in order to set his theoretical speculations on a sound foundation. This he did only by the assertion of the public verifiability of the process of inquiry and its self-applying nature, and through the admission of circularity. These will stand for the process of inquiry in the aspect of its knowns, but not for its knowings, that is, its subjective aspects. For once the assertion is made that the possibility of the determination of the process of inquiry must be determined there can be no apparent warrant for stopping, short of an academic fiat: An inquiry is also needed into the determinableness of the determinability of the process in its knowing aspects, and so on ad infinitum. It is in this sense that regardless of the aspectual compatibility of method and subject matter, there seems
to be no means of penetrating into experience: Either you are there, in which case nothing could be said about it; or you are not, in which case nothing would be said about it.

6) **Summary**

In this chapter I have examined Dewey's theory of inquiry in an effort to determine the functioning of the subjective process of inquiry, the subjective or knowing aspects of Dewey's postulated process of inquiry, in human experience. It was seen that contrary to the belief of many, Dewey fails to delineate this functioning as a functioning. Rather he describes rules of procedure or methodologies, while it remains a mystery as to how these rules enter into human experience. It was suggested that one of the reasons Dewey fails to deal with this problem is because of a fundamental misconception of the kind of priority the subjective process of inquiry occupies in relationship to human experience. This may lead him to believe that the process is determinable. The point of the criticisms was to show that from Dewey's own approach to the problem, the subjective process of inquiry is not necessarily determinable, and indeed may be ultimately indeterminable in certain respects. We may assert that inquiry occurs, that men learn, and that human history exists, but this tells us nothing as to how or why they do. Dewey's theory of inquiry therefore leaves us with a further question: How far and in what way is the subjective process of inquiry determinable? Or stated differently, what kind of knowledge can we expect to gain in investigating the meaning of the subjective process of inquiry? For one possible solution to this question we turn to Plato.
CHAPTER V

THE SUBJECTIVE PROCESS OF INQUIRY - II

1) Preface

Not everything is wholly objective, although everything has an objective aspect. The same is true of questions. When an objective inquiry does not yield complete results there is warrant for adopting another mode of approach, which is tantamount to saying that some questions require other than objective solutions. Examples of such questions would be the problems of the structure and integrity of the self or of cosmology and cosmogony. We have seen from the previous chapter that another example may be determining the meaning of the subjective process of inquiry in human experience, that is, inquiring into certain aspects of the process of inquiry. While Dewey's theory of inquiry is important in many respects, for example in emphasizing the concomitancy of subject matter and process in education or in stressing the open and infinite character of the human enterprise, it fails to deal with the prior question of the subjective process of inquiry. Immanent in Plato's thought there appears to be an awareness of the difficulties intrinsic in inquiring into inquiry, an apparent realization that there must first be an understanding of what kind of knowledge can be expected in or as a result of such an inquiry. In this chapter I investigate this question and its envisioned solution in an attempt to ascertain the meaning of the
subjective process of inquiry. This will necessitate a somewhat lengthy delineation of the problem in order that we may fully comprehend its solution.

2) Knowledge of Knowledge — The Charmides

The problem of knowing or inquiring is posed in one of Plato's earlier writings, the Charmides. The ostensible theme of this delightful little dialogue is a search for a suitable definition of sophrosyne, temperance or moderation. Socrates has just returned from the army at Potidaea, and anxious to inquire about the youth and the current state of philosophy, he visits the palaestra. There he encounters Critias and his beautiful cousin, the youthful Charmides. Soon the three are engaged in a discussion of temperance.

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1 No single English word carries the richness of meaning of the Greek sophrosyne. It has been variously translated as wisdom, discretion, self-respect, moderation, chastity, temperance, prudence, and self-control. In many contexts it has a religious significance. For our purposes the more usual translations of temperance and moderation will suffice. See T. G. Tuckey, Plato's Charmides, pp. 5-9, A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and His Work, pp. 47-48, et al.

2 It is regrettable that the intent of our inquiry will not allow a detailed consideration of even one of Plato's dialogues in its entirety. This is especially unfortunate in the present instance since the opening passages of the Charmides show Plato the dramatic artist at his best: the erotic setting in the palaestra, for example, and the sophrosyne of Socrates in restraining himself; or the reference to the daimon Zamolxis (compare Socrates' deimon at Phaedrus 242c, Apology 31e, etc.) and the centrality of the belief in the immortality of the soul in Thracian religions — to mention only a few. Due to the nature of the present study, these and similar aspects of the Dialogues can be mentioned only as they relate to understanding the arguments and doctrines of Plato. The same practice will be followed with regard to the participants in the discussions.
makes two unsuccessful attempts at definition and finally presents one that he has heard from someone else: temperance is doing our own business. Socrates is on his way to refuting this claim when Critias, who later turns out to be the fond author of the definition, enters the discussion in an attempt to maintain it against Socrates' penetrating questions. While the attempt is not successful, Critias goes on to suggest a fourth definition: **sophrosyne** is the doing of good actions. Under cross-examination he admits that the temperate man may not always know that he is acting temperately; but then digresses, in a typically sophistical manner, into an explanation of the Delphic motto 'Know thyself' as an exhortation to 'Be temperate.' As a result of his discourse, Critias presents the fifth definition of temperance as self-knowledge. The arguments which follow (165b ff) deal with the possibility of having knowledge of knowledge.

Critias has claimed that **sophrosyne** is self-knowledge. Socrates, upon reflection, finds that if it is knowledge, it must be a knowledge or science of something, in this case of oneself. But it is not comparable to certain of the other sciences, for example medicine and architecture, since it does not produce a concrete result such as health or buildings. Critias answers that while this is correct, Socrates is attempting to make an invalid analogy between **sophrosyne** and the other sciences; neither do arithmetic and geometry produce such results. And yet, replies Socrates, even these 'abstract' sciences have a unique subject matter which is distinct from the science: The art of arithmetic has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to each other,
and the art of weighing concerns itself with the lighter and the heavier. What subject matter does sophrosyne deal with, which is different from the science itself? Critias answers by again accusing Socrates of incorrect analogizing: While the other sciences are of something else, sophrosyne is unique in being a science of other sciences as well as of itself. Sophrosyne, in other words, is the knowledge of all knowledge, which includes itself since it is also knowledge. This being the case, Socrates continues to question Critias as to the possibility of there being this knowledge of knowledge, and assuming its possibility, whether such knowledge is of any use. Critias is unable to resolve either problem satisfactorily, and the dialogue ends with only the continuing conviction that wisdom and temperance must be great goods in spite of the negative results of the arguments.

3) Commentaries on the Question Posed at Charmides 165a-166c

The opening stages of the main argument are highly ambiguous, and have been variously interpreted by commentators. At first Critias states only that "temperance is self-knowledge" (165a),\(^3\) as a result of his understanding of the Delphic command to 'know thyself.' A little later in the conversation he agrees with Socrates' expansion of this definition to mean the "science of oneself" (165c), that is, temperance is the knowledge which has oneself as its object or subject matter. Finally, at 166c Critias seems

\(^3\) Unless otherwise noted, I use the standard translation of the Dialogues by Jowett.
to shift ground entirely by claiming that "wisdom alone is a science of other sciences, and of itself."^4 Taylor sees in this passage a confusion linked with a shift of position on the part of Critias.

Critias is unconsciously assuming first that self-knowledge is episteme or techne, knowledge of universal rules or principles of some kind, and next that it is 'speculative,' not 'practical' science. The result is that he is virtually confusing the direct acquaintance with one's own individual strength and weaknesses really meant in the Delphian inscription with the 'science' of the psychologist. He is taking it for granted, as too many among ourselves still do, that to know psychology and to have a profound acquaintance with your own 'heart' are the same thing.

Thus, according to Taylor, Critias commences by asserting that wisdom or temperance is the science of psychology. When questioned as to the object of this science, however, he shifts his position from psychology to epistemology:

The self-knowledge of which he had spoken . . . is quite literally a knowing which 'knows itself and all other knowledges,' and the virtue sophrosyne is no other than this 'knowing which knows itself' (166c). In effect this amounts to identifying sophrosyne with what is called in modern times 'theory of knowledge.'

^4 Jowett fails to do justice to the translation in this section. Critias first claims that temperance is gignoskein auton eauton, literally, self-perception of oneself. At 165c he agrees with Socrates that it is therefore episteme eauton, science of oneself. In the last section (166c) he amends this to episteme eauter, a science of itself, as well as other sciences. Jowett translates both as science of itself.

^5 Taylor, op. cit., p. 53.

^6 Ibid., p. 54.
In this view, the remainder of the dialogue is concerned with establishing the possibilities of an epistemology, and the negative conclusion would indicate that Plato was either unwilling or unprepared to state his theory of Ideas at the time he wrote the dialogue. In either event, Critias is guilty of a radical shift of position between the fifth and sixth definitions of *sophrosyne*, and Socrates allows it to pass unnoticed.

Tuckey's explanation of the passage is based not on Critias confusing self-acquaintance with psychology, but on his misunderstanding the way Socrates is using the word *episteme* at 165b. Critias originally said that temperance was the knowledge or recognition (*gignoskein*) of oneself. But when Socrates replies that it must therefore be *episteme*, he means to imply that it must be knowledge in the sense of a science, thus calling attention to his familiar equation of knowledge (*episteme*) with virtue (*arete*). Critias does not pick up the new connotation, and continues at 166c as though the knowledge under consideration is still a recognition of something, rather than a science. This clearly precludes Taylor's idea that at this stage the science of science is identified with epistemology, but it leaves the further problem as to why Critias added 'and other sciences as well' to the new definition of temperance as the 'knowledge of itself.' Tuckey explains this away by suggesting that Critias possesses the usual sophistical love of antithesis.
Clearly love of antithesis has led him into a dubious if not false affirmation. He begins by saying 'whereas all other epistemei have something else as their object, and not themselves . . .', and this naturally leads us to expect him to continue, 'yet this particular episteme has as its object not something else, but itself'; but instead of ouk allou he puts in ton te alon epistemon, to establish a verbal parallelism between the two parts of the antithesis.7

As a result, we must infer that the remainder of the dialogue, which deals specifically with the possibility of a science of itself as well as other sciences, is based on an arbitrary sophistical interjection that Socrates allows to pass unnoticed. While this seems highly unlikely, Tuckey's interpretation does have the advantage of suggesting that the resolution of the difficulty with the passage may depend on a proper understanding of its equivocal terminology.8

4) The Ambiguity of the Question

I have suggested that the question of the possibility of a knowledge of knowledge is highly ambiguous. In essence it is dealing with the 'knowability' of knowledge; but this can be understood in several senses. Thus a knowledge of knowledge could simply be a scientific knowledge of what knowledge is, that is, an intellectual comprehension

7 Tuckey, op. cit., p. 39.

8 In addition to Taylor and Tuckey, perceptive interpretations can be found in G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, pp. 218ff, and John Gould, Plato's Ethics, pp. 38ff. Grube has nothing new to add to Taylor and Tuckey, and Gould's unique interpretation is based on his earlier analysis of other dialogues. We will have occasion to refer to Gould later.
of the nature of knowledge and how it differs from belief, opinion, sense-perception, and the like. In other words, it could be, as Taylor suggests, epistemology; and in this sense knowledge is certainly 'knowable.' There would be some warrant for imputing this meaning to Plato's question if Critias had claimed that sophrosyne was only the science of other sciences. He is insistent, however, that one of its objects is itself, and surely the contemporary science of epistemology does not claim to study and know itself. Again, a knowledge of knowledge could mean that one knows an art or craft, such as the art of building, and he knows that he knows it. If I claim to be a carpenter or cobbler I am saying that I know how to do something, and when I assert it I am saying that I know I know how to do it. In the common idiom I would say that I have 'confidence' in my knowledge. But clearly the problem of a science or art being its own object is not raised here, for it is only a question of having a knowledge of a science. Along this same line the craft or art in question might be knowledge, rather than cobbling or carpentry. In this case a knowledge of knowledge would be an art of knowledge. It is possible that Plato intended this as one understanding of a knowledge of knowledge when later in the dialogue he speaks of a scientific knowledge about knowledge and ignorance. The possessor of this science would be able to detect whether he or another had knowledge or not, the same as the possessor of the science of medicine is able to detect whether a person is sick or healthy. This scientific knowledge about knowledge, however, is contingent upon Critias'
addition at 166c that wisdom is the science of all other sciences, and it is difficult to believe that it is the source of the problem concerning knowledge being its own object.

Another possible understanding of a knowledge of knowledge has already been suggested by linking it with the command 'know thyself.' Tuckey adopts this interpretation and renders 'knowledge of knowledge' as 'recognition or awareness of knowledge,' as one can recognize that he sees or hears. Socrates deals with this later in the dialogue (170a-172c) and concludes that if this is the correct definition of sophrosyne then it can only mean that we know or recognize that we have knowledge; but we will never be in a position to know what we know. This would seem to be a near-tautology, and it is difficult to see if there is any advantage in such a recognition. Yet it does suggest another possibility: A knowledge of knowledge could mean that one knows how to know, that is, how to learn. Thus, to possess a knowledge of knowledge would mean that one was aware of the processes surrounding the act of learning and knowing, and we may assume that as a result it would be easier and more fruitful to learn. Certainly such knowledge would be highly advantageous to the individual possessing it — if it is possible.

Finally, a knowledge of knowledge may be understood as meaning knowing the act of knowing. It will be recalled that Critias introduces the definition of sophrosyne as self-knowledge by interpreting the Delphic motto as a moral exhortation. Regardless of the correctness of this interpretation, we must surely agree with Tuckey that
this is not an invitation to study psychology or construct a science of the self. Rather it at least refers to a recognition of one’s limitations, an awareness and perception of what one can and cannot do as a human being. Critias conveys such an understanding when he uses the phrase *gignoskein auton eauton* -- self-perception of oneself. In the light of this, Socrates' suggestion that since it is *gignoskein* it must be *episteme* ('science') seems quite out of place; for the recognition of something does not necessarily mean that an academic discipline is involved. But Critias is certainly no fool, and it is hard to believe that Plato would represent him as making an elementary error in understanding the meaning of a word set in context. Yet such is the case if Critias is allowed to agree with the equation of *gignoskein* and *episteme*. This seems even more unlikely in that such an interpretation of this passage would also entail making Socrates into a mere charlatan and player on words. Socrates is not above such play, but since there has been no hint so far of chicanery, and a few minutes later in the conversation the participants agree to maintain their integrity and pursue the argument wherever it may lead (166d), all this seems highly improbable.

The difficulty is overcome, and a more fruitful understanding of the central question in the *Charmides* emerges, if a slightly different connotation is attached to the word *episteme*. Often times *episteme* means 'science' in the modern sense of an organized body of knowledge. Aristotle uses the word in this sense. But *episteme* can also refer to a way of doing or using things. According to
Gould's analysis, from the time of Homer the true epistemon was the one who knew how to use whatever was in question. Accordingly, episteme could mean a kind of knowing how to do something. In reference to the passage in question, this understanding of episteme renders the discussion meaningful to both participants without accusing either of stupidity or sophistry. First, when Socrates asserts that if temperance is knowledge it must be a science, he could mean that if self-knowledge is a knowledge, it must be a kind of knowing, and as with all knowings qua knowings, a knowing of something. Critias readily agrees that it is a knowing, and in line with his earlier definition adds that it is a knowing of oneself. This overcomes the problem of saying that Critias has confused psychology with recognizing the limits of one's capacity. Second, if episteme is not only a knowing, but a knowing how, it is possible to go beyond claiming that self-knowledge is a mere recognition. From 165d to 166b, Socrates means to at least tentatively imply that a knowledge of knowledge is a knowing how to do something. Medicine is a knowing or science, and a knowing how to do something -- produce health. The same is true for architecture, where the one possessing this knowledge is able to build houses. Socrates may be

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9 See Gould, op. cit., Part I, passim.; also Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, Chapters 1, 7, and 8.

10 Even this is a distortion since, as Gould suggests, "knowing how and knowing that, to us different, were at one in the Greek word episteme" op. cit., (p. xii). The distortion may be forgiven, however, since my intent is to deal with only one aspect of Plato's thought.
suggesting that wisdom or temperance is a similar kind of knowing, although nothing is yet said as to what he knows how to do.

We are reminded here of Socrates' familiar analogy between the craftsman and the virtuous man: As the cobbler knows how to make shoes, so the man of virtue knows how to be good. Perhaps Socrates had this in mind when he made the statement; and certainly the analogy was familiar to Critias. But Critias goes on to suggest that the analogy breaks down at this point, since the knowing of oneself has no concrete result in the same way as medicine and architecture. This may be a warning on Plato's part not to accept Socrates' craftsman analogy at face value -- it is still only an analogy, and an imperfect one at that. Concomitantly, Plato may be suggesting that virtue is itself some kind of a creation -- a point more fully discussed in later dialogues, and to which we will have occasion to return later when the question arises as to precisely what the man of wisdom knows how to do. Regardless, Critias has made a justifiable point so far as the discussion has progressed, and Socrates accepts it for the time being: Some sciences, like medicine and architecture, have a concrete result while others, such as arithmetic and geometry, do not. Although this is not meant to imply that only the former are useful and advantageous.

5) The Meaning of the Question

At 166a Socrates goes on to say that even the 'abstract' sciences have objects or subject matters different from their respective
The object of arithmetic, for example, is numbers and their relations. If Critias insists that sophrosyne is a science, what is its object? If we understand Critias to mean a knowing how when he uses episteme, his apparently curious answer makes more sense: Sophrosyne alone is a science of itself, that is, wisdom is the knowing of itself or, more loquaciously, knowing knowing itself as a knowing. In the latter formulation the problem of searching for a suitable definition of temperance clearly becomes a question of the possibility of knowing the mind in certain of its functional aspects. In other words, the central question of the Charmides is an aspect of the problem of self-consciousness, and ultimately becomes linked with the more general problem of the Socratic conception of the soul.

While it is beyond the scope of the present study to deal with this important problem in detail, we must note that the evidence indicates that Socrates conceived of the soul primarily as a principle of intellectual and moral activity. Taylor furnishes an excellent summary of the point.

11 Also see Euthydemus 278d-282c and 288c-292e where Socrates presents a similar distinction in greater detail.

12 Tuckey, op. cit., p. 46, reaches the same conclusion, but only by insisting that 'knowing' must mean 'recognizing' or 'awareness.' This is unnecessary. Whether it is a question of knowing the self or recognizing the self, it is still a problem of self-consciousness, since it is the object of the inquiry that defines the inquiry. The distinction Tuckey makes will only account for the mode of inquiring and the kind of answer anticipated as a result of the inquiry.
[The] Socratic doctrine of the soul, we must note, is neither psychology, in our sense of the word, nor psycho-physics. It tells us nothing on the question what the soul is, except that it is "that in us, whatever it is, in virtue of which we are denominated wise and foolish, good and evil," and that it cannot be seen or apprehended by any of the senses. It is no doctrine of the "faculties" of the soul, any more than of its "substance." The thought is that the "work" or "function" of this divine constituent in man is just to know, to apprehend things as they really are, and consequently, in particular, to know good and evil, and to direct and govern a man's acts so that they lead to a life in which evil is avoided and good achieved. What Socrates is concerned with is thus neither speculative nor empirical psychology, but a common principle of epistemology and ethics.13

13 A. E. Taylor, *Socrates: The Man and His Thought*, pp. 139-140. It will be realized that by invoking this segment of Taylor's understanding of the Socratic doctrine of the soul I am in no way suggesting that the issue is either simple or closed. Indeed, the conception of the soul in Plato is perhaps one of the most difficult problems continually confronting Platonic scholars, running from Jaeger's idea that "the only way to understand the soul of which Socrates speaks is to take it as two different sides of one human nature" (Werner Jaeger, *Paedeia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. II, p. 44), to the apparently radical dualism of the *Phaedo* and the elaborate psychology of the *Republic*. Nonetheless, this does not affect the obvious point made by Taylor that Plato does not define the soul in the sense of telling us what it is, and therefore does not distinguish between the mind as a substantive entity on the one hand, and its activity or manifestations as expressed in principles on the other, whether such activity occurs within the public or private realms of human existence. It is quite possible to ascribe either a dualism or a non-dualism to Plato without his distinguishing between a mind-substance and its activity as expressed in one or more principles. Even in the *Phaedo*, where it appears that Socrates creates a complete breach between the physical and the spiritual realms of human life, he argues at one point (104b-107a) for the immortality of the soul on the grounds of an equation of the life-principle with the soul. For further commentary see, in addition to Jaeger and Taylor, Snell, *op. cit.*, Chapter 8; Gould, *op. cit.*, Part I; John Burnet, "The Socratic Conception of the Soul" in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, viii, and his *Greek Philosophy*, pp. 333ff; Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chapter V; et. al.
In light of this conception it is clear that the knowings or other activities of the human individual cannot be separated out from that which does the knowing; something knows only in the sense that knowing occurs. In regard to the Charmides, if knowing is the subject in one of its aspects, it follows that there can be no essential distinction between claiming that there is a science of oneself and a science of itself since the latter must also be understood to refer to knowledge as a subjective phenomenon. In other words, knowing oneself is one with knowing itself since 'oneself' and 'itself' refer to knowing rather than to a ghostly substantive entity on the one hand and a body of knowledge or a science on the other. The object of knowing is identical in both cases: the act of knowing. This approach will also aid in understanding Critias' seemingly surreptitious addition that sophrosyne is the science of other sciences as well as itself. It will be recalled that Tuckey suggested this addition was due to Critias' sophistical love of antithesis. While this may be an ingredient of the artistic perfection of the dialogue, if episteme is understood as knowing, then the translation may read: "wisdom alone is the knowing of other knowings as well as itself." Sophrosyne is the knowing of all knowing, which obviously includes itself since it is also a knowing. A major aspect of the problem in the Charmides is therefore to investigate the possibility of knowing an act of knowing, and to attempt to discern the use of such knowing.
6) **Further Ambiguities**

To frame the question in this way still permits a great deal of ambiguity, since the meaning of the knowing of knowing may be understood in one of several ways. These senses will have to be disentangled to some extent if we are to be sure of the meaning of the question Plato is discussing. It may be immediately dismissed that he intended to ask if the knowing subject as subject could be the object of knowing. It can hardly be questioned, for example, that the subject knows that he sees and hears, if we mean that he is aware of his seeing and hearing. Every act of sensory perception is tantamount to the realization of sensory perception; and the same is certainly true for the act of knowing. When this question is posed by Socrates, he does not intend to question the mere awareness of knowing, but the object of the awareness. It is in this sense that the analogies with sensation and emotion are unsatisfactory (167c-169c). The question is not whether I, the knowing subject, can be the object of my knowledge, but whether my act of knowing can be the object of my act of knowing.

Yet even this is confusing; for knowing knowing could be interpreted as asking whether one of my acts of knowing could be the object of another of my acts of knowing. Now Plato could have had this in mind. If so, then he is guilty of the same kind of confusion as Dewey, that is, confusing an immediate act of knowing with an act of knowing known in retrospect, or confusing knowings with knowns. On this assumption, Plato would have done better to merely delineate
a process or processes of inquiry, rather than invoking the elaborate mechanism of the theory of Ideas. Moreover, there is no excuse for his mythical representation of the doctrine of Reminiscence -- he should have described it in precise and succinct terms. Finally, even if we can see our way clear to accepting all this as arbitrary on the part of Plato, it also follows that the Ideas must be understood not as mythical, but as objective, static entities enjoying absolute ontological status in a realm foreign to the everyday experience of human beings. I hope to show later that neither of these views can be excluded from a complete understanding of the theory of Ideas.

It should now be clear that I am suggesting that Plato's real problem in the *Charmides* was the possibility of an immediate act of knowing being its own object as an immediate act of knowing, which is the problem of knowing or understanding the subjective process of inquiry. This meaning may be further elucidated by asking why Plato would concern himself with the question. Was it only intellectual curiosity? Or was it an aspect of a much more fundamental problem that was bothering Plato? The answer to these questions will aid in justifying the interpretation.

Among other things, Socrates and Plato were reformers -- social, political, ethical, philosophical. Both were searching, in their own ways, for the good life; and both were interested in imparting this life to all men regardless of station. In a word, they were searching for *eudaimonia*, perfect happiness -- for beauty and goodness and justice. It is, of course, an open question whether
Socrates ever 'found' the Good for which he stalked through Athens searching -- and the same may be asked of Plato. Nonetheless, a very important practical question arises when a man sets himself on this, the highest task of humanity: If the Good is to be found, will it be possible to impart it to others? Can goodness be shared with society at large or at least a segment of society, or must it forever remain individual? In other words, can virtue be taught? Ostensibly, the question rests on Socrates' familiar idea that arete is episteme, that virtue is in some way equatable or identifiable with knowledge, since only knowledge can be known and certainly that which is teachable is knowable. It is perhaps fair to say that in Plato's view this was the only starting point for philosophizing. But stating it as an assumption is hardly enough, for the fact still remains that "the wisest and best of our countrymen are unable to hand on to others the virtue which they possess" (Protagoras, 319e). Plato was thus led to the more fundamental question which is involved in and presupposed by the possibility of teaching virtue: If arete is episteme, how can I know that I possess this knowledge? Note that the question here is not what knowledge is in the 'category' entitled virtue; to ask Plato to answer this is to distort his intent and misunderstand the meaning of the equation of knowledge and virtue. Rather he is asking how can anyone ever recognize or be aware that he is virtuous; can he ever reach the point in life where he can say with certainty that he is a virtuous person?
We have seen from Gould's work\(^\text{14}\) that the knowledge that is virtue is \textit{episteme} in the sense of knowing how to do something, how to be good and just and temperate: \textit{Episteme} is that "in which making and the ability to use what one makes are combined in one" (Euthydemus 289b). Since a knowing how can only be expressed in its immediacy of doing something -- for otherwise it is a knowing that or a known -- the linkage of this with the possibility of knowing and therefore teaching virtue, renders the question of the Charmides as one concerning the possibility of an immediate act of knowing being its own object as an immediate act of knowing. In Plato's view, to ask if it is possible to know the immediate act of knowing is the same as asking whether a man can ever know he is virtuous.\(^\text{15}\)

7) The Aspects of the Question

There is one more point to be noted in the Charmides before approaching a solution of the problem. At 167b Socrates delineates two aspects of the question of knowing the immediate act of knowing: What is the possibility of knowing knowing? What advantage would there be to possessing such knowledge? In subsequent sections I

\(^{14}\) On this point see especially Gould, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 17f.

\(^{15}\) The foundational problem in this series of questions concerns the determination of the nature or essence (\textit{ousia}) of \textit{arête}, as repeatedly pointed out in the Protagoras and the Meno. Failing in this, however, \textit{ex hypothesi} the question becomes the teachability of virtue, and thus the possibility of knowing the immediate act of knowing. I am not trying to say that the question posed in the Charmides is the fundamental problem. See R. S. Bluck's discussion in his recent edition of Plato's Meno, pp. 17-19.
will attempt to show that Plato resolves both aspects of the question with the theory of Ideas. Before we can understand this, however, it is important to have clearly in mind precisely what Plato is trying to do. To repeat, he is first interested in establishing the possibility of knowing the immediate act of knowing as a result of asking whether virtue can be taught, and all that underlies this question. In effect, this is an attempt to discern the conditions necessary for a knowledge of knowledge, since to establish its possibility is one with delineating its conditions. Furthermore, the conditions for knowing are the objects of the inquiry into knowing, that is, they are the subject matter in knowing knowing. Thus, the task within the first aspect of the question is to discern the objects of the inquiry -- to search for, or perhaps create, the subject matter. Plato called these objects Ideas or Forms. For him, the possibility of knowing anything was identical with the possibility of knowing the Ideas. Without Ideas there could be no knowing. But if we accept this within the context of Plato's thought, it is obvious that it is impossible to know the Ideas without presupposing them in the very act of inquiry; Ideas are both the conditions for the inquiry and the objects of the inquiry. This is of fundamental importance for understanding the kind of answer that Plato sets forth to the question in the Charmides. In the first place it suggests a mode of approach to the answer which will be distinct from other modes, such as proving a geometrical theorem or constructing a science of Physics. It is in this

16 See infra, pp. 119-120.
sense that the question with which we are dealing can be called 'subjective' rather than 'objective' — and this is all I mean to imply by these terms. It is a subjective mode in that both the process of inquiry and the object of inquiry are processes, sequential and occurring in time. Second, this fact suggests that the answer will be a different kind of answer from those encountered, say, in history books or scientific treatises. We may anticipate by noting that the kind of answer Plato suggests is involved in the very process of discerning the answer; that is to say, he answers the question by inquiring into it.

8) The Theory of Ideas

I have suggested that Plato solves the question of the Charmides in the theory of Ideas. Before attempting to substantiate this claim, it will be well to introduce it with a few general remarks concerning Plato's theories and doctrines. I use the words theory and doctrine advisedly in relation to Plato's thought. The caution is necessary since it does his thought harm to rigidly staticize it into a certain number of doctrines and theories, in other words, into a system. Plato defies systematization: A simple testimony is the richness of interpretations which have emerged from the Dialogues. In this respect we could almost use the word myth in place of theory or doctrine. Plato created myths, but he created many more than we usually realize. The Myth of Er, the Myth of Atlantis, the Myth of Diotima, and others, are only the formal myths, ones which Plato identified and specified. He also created myth
when he created the theory of Ideas, the idea of Participation and Reminiscence, the Pre-Existence of the Soul, and so on. And these are as truly mythical as the elaborate conclusion to Book X of the Republic.

To call these ideas mythical is to enrich rather than pervert their meaning. A myth is antithetical to a lie or falsehood; it imputes and imparts truth and wisdom rather than falsity. A myth is not a mere fable or legend or fairy-tale; although all three of these aspects may be found in a myth. A true myth is as many-sided as human life and death; it tells us as much as we are capable of knowing about human existence. The beauty of a myth is that it may communicate to all people, thereby serving as the unifying cultural cement of an entire society. Indeed, it serves as a cement just because it has so many aspects, all pointing in the same direction. The uniqueness of a myth is that everyone may approach it and, according to capacity and propensity, draw from it life's sustenance. Now I am not suggesting that all of Plato's myths are complete in this sense -- perhaps none of them are. But I would say that his theories and doctrines are at least 'intellectual' myths, that is unifying forces for an intellectual community.

I mention these points only in order to clarify what follows. Due to the methodological nature of the present study, I have systematically avoided the metaphysical questions surrounding the theory of Ideas. Our concern will center in understanding the Ideas as emergent in human experience. Thus I draw from the theory
of Ideas and the doctrines of Participation and Reminiscence only those aspects pertaining immediately to methodology. I am not suggesting that this is all there is to the theory or the doctrines -- certainly this is beyond the furthest reaches of intellectual arrogancy. Similarly, I do not wish to suggest that the interpretation of the theory of Ideas which follows is the 'correct' or 'true' one. The richness of Plato's thought defies singular understanding. The subsequent development of Plato's ideas is only one possible understanding that may be gathered from one aspect of the theory of Ideas and the doctrines of Participation and Reminiscence.

The theory of Ideas may be introduced by briefly considering the word eidos, idea or form. The form of a thing is ostensibly its structure and shape. Form is not the parts of a thing, its matter or content, but the way in which these parts are put together. The form of a plate, for example, is not china but roundness, or the form of a rubber ball is not rubber but sphericity. Form and matter are thus different kinds of things: correlative as aspects of experience, but analytically irreducible.

Since form is distinct from matter, it must be known in a different way. We do not literally 'see' sphericity in a rubber ball in the sense of perceiving it as an immediate object of sensation. Rather we see rubber in the shape of a sphere. The distinction is not only academic. It is one thing to conceive sphericity and another to perceive something that is spherical.
The potter conceives circularity prior to his making the plate, which is but another way of saying that he knows what he is going to do with the undifferentiated lump of clay. Or the artist knows 'where he is going' with his painting, and except in unusual instances of inartistry, putting color on a canvas is not a haphazard affair. In this sense, form is the wrong kind of thing to be perceived: Matter is perceptible while form is intelligible. Form defines the intelligibility of an object.

Perceptibility and intelligibility are aspects of human experience. Matter is of the former while form is of the latter. Thus, matter and form comprise the objects of experience. From the aspect of perceptibility, matter or the material world is the precondition for form, since without the materials there could certainly be no shape to them. But it is conditional only for what is required for raw sense-data. On the other hand, without form the bare material world would be a senseless and undifferentiated mass, like the potter's lump of clay. Thus, while matter is the precondition for form from the aspect of perceptibility, form is equally the precondition for matter from the aspect of intelligibility. An example will help clarify my meaning. At *Phaedo* 97c-99c, Socrates expresses his disappointment with the writings of Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras had promised to show that "mind was the disposer and cause of all" (97c), that is, he proposed to explain the activity of the cosmos in terms of its intelligibility: "If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place" (97c).
When he approached the task, however, he had "recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities" (98b); that is to say, he 'explained' the cosmos only in terms of the perceptible conditions for its activity rather than the reasons for it. But Socrates wanted not conditions but causes; he wanted not tables and categories of perceptible entities but intelligible reasons as to why things are the way they are. Anaxagoras had approached experience from the aspect of perceptibility whereas Socrates wanted to approach it from the aspect of intelligibility. He wanted to discover the form, not the matter of things.

Now from the aspect of intelligibility, form is an imposition in the same way that circularity is an imposition by the potter on the undifferentiated mass of clay. But we have already seen that this is but another way of saying that the potter is doing something to the clay, making it into a round plate. Form may therefore be better characterized as an imposing rather than an imposition. It was previously stated that form is ostensibly structure. This may now be rephrased to convey its dynamic character: Form is structuring and shaping. Moreover, as an imposing, form is obviously functional and relational, which repeats that it is structural. Form is not another 'thing' which takes its place alongside the rest of the material world; it is of the material world and is the relations and functions of the world. The form of an object, in other words, is the functioning of and relating of its parts. As an organismic totality, the form of a body is the relations of its
parts and the continuation of their relating to one another. Function and relation are thus aspects of form: Functioning relates and relating functions -- they are two sides of the same term. Clearly then, form is process involving function and relation. If we substitute Idea for form in this definition, we have the briefest possible statement of what I understand Plato to mean by saying that there are Ideas of certain kinds of things, such as beauty, justice, and the Good.  

The attempt to define knowledge in the Theaetetus proves futile. However, it does succeed in clearly distinguishing between perceptibility and intelligibility, that is, between sensation and knowledge or sensing and thinking; as well as suggesting by

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17 In main outline this understanding of the Ideas follows Natorp and perhaps Gould, although aspects of it may be found in Collingwood, Cornford, More, Stenzel, and Boodin. It is necessary to emphasize, however, that I use this interpretation only because it aids in explicating the subjective process of inquiry. If the interpretation seems unusual, it must be remembered that I only claim it is immanent in the thought of Plato. It will be seen that its seeming unconventionality is due to my setting aside for our present purposes the question of the metaphysical status of the Ideas. Important in its own right, the latter question may be overlooked for the essentially methodological considerations of this study. For a panorama of the commentaries on the theory of Ideas see Grube, op. cit., Chapter I; Taylor, Plato, passim.; Julius Stenzel, Plato's Method of Dialectic, passim.; P. E. More, Platonism, Chapter VI; W. F. R. Hardie, A Study in Plato, passim.; J. A. Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, passim.; Paul Friedlander, Plato, vol. I, Part I; Sir David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, passim.; R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, pp. 55-72; as well as various commentaries by Cornford, Burnet, Grote, Robinson, Shorey, Demos, et al. J. E. Boodin has an enlightening article on "The Discovery of Form" reprinted in Philip Wiener and Aaron Noland, eds., Roots of Scientific Thought, pp. 57-72.
implication that Ideas must be understood as intelligible. But the failure to define knowledge does not preclude its existence. In the Parmenides Plato is insistent that Ideas must exist if there is to be intelligible discourse: "If a man . . . does away with ideas of things and will not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning" (135b). To understand the Ideas is therefore to save the power of reasoning and avert utter chaos. For this understanding we turn to a crucial passage in the Phaedo.

At 78c Socrates asks:

Does the being, which in our dialectic we define as meaning absolute existence, remain always in exactly the same state, or does it change? Do absolute equality, absolute beauty, and every other absolute existence, admit of any change at all? Or does absolute existence in each case, being essentially uniform, remain the same and unchanging, and never in any case admit of any sort of change whatsoever? 

Cebes readily admits that absolute existences must remain the same. Simmias and Cebes have previously agreed with Socrates that Ideas certainly exist. Cebes' agreement with the statement is therefore agreement to a particular understanding of the Ideas. I believe this understanding is evident from the context of Socrates' question.

The ostensible question of the Phaedo is the possibility of the soul being immortal. In attempting to answer the question, several
lines of argument are followed, based primarily, though not solely, on analogical reasoning. But the direction of the discussion, the questions and answers and difficulties and conclusions, are contextually determined by the reasoning powers of the participants. When Socrates is questioned as to the meaning of the doctrine of Recollection, for example, he answers the question; he does not give an extended exposition of a poem by Simonides. As with all true dialogue, the private opinions of individuals are taken as starting points and shaped into a public discussion as a result of the powers of reasoning possessed to a greater or less extent by all the participants. Moreover, it is only within some kind of a dialogic process, whether it is with oneself or others, that the rational powers of men are manifested. Consequently, it is only in a dialogue that men realize that their means of 'figuring things out' are essentially one with the means of others. In this very restricted sense rationality is objective or the same for all men. For example, granting a reasonable degree of intelligence, any man can follow the proof for one of Euclid's theorems. In the *Meno*, to which we will return later, Socrates shows that even a slave boy, rational but untutored, can reason through the Pythagorean theorem with a degree of clarity and conviction.\(^\text{19}\)

The point to all this is seen when Socrates refers to the "being, which in our dialectic we define as meaning absolute existence." When Socrates appeals to dialectic, or more simply

\(^\text{19}\) The point is proven by granting the possibility of the experiment with the slave boy; its actual occurrence is irrelevant.
dialogue,\textsuperscript{20} for the meaning of absolute existence, he is among other things appealing to the reasonableness of all men -- a reasonableness that cannot be denied without at the same time denying one's humanity. This fact itself is a truth, found in rather than by the mutual search for truth. In other words, the 'being' which means absolute existence is the very process of dialectic; and it is intelligible to the extent that each man pursues the argument carefully and with integrity, that is, so far as reason is maintained as the unsaid and perhaps unrecognized directive of the discussion.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, absolute existences "remain in the same state" and are "uniform" because men know and inquire alike. Later on, when Socrates asserts that the soul is unchangeable (80b), he does so on the grounds that all men share in the rational processes. This helps to explain Socrates' continual insistence that the Ideas are intelligible rather than perceptible, that they are invisible, or more accurately, not-visible: "you can

\textsuperscript{20} I do not mean to imply that dialogue can always and everywhere be equated with dialectic. In the case of the \textit{Phaedo}, the intensity of at least this part of the discussion warrants its identification with dialectic, although this may not be true for other parts of the dialogue.

\textsuperscript{21} This is one reason Plato insists that the participants in a dialogue must answer according to the dictates of reason, rather than simply to please one another. Socrates urges Protagoras to test himself rather than to accept a proposition because it pleases Socrates (\textit{Protagoras}, 331b); he asks Thrasymachus to speak his own mind rather than that of another (\textit{Republic} 349a); he tells Callicles it will be impossible to proceed unless he makes statements that he really believes (\textit{Gorgias} 495a); etc. Even Nicias criticizes Laches for keeping his eye on the rest of the world rather than himself (Laches 200b). This is one of the reasons that Socrates tells Cebes that he will hardly find a better person to charm away his fears than himself (\textit{Phaedo} 78a).
grasp the unchanging [Ideas] only by the reasoning of the intellect" (79a). Indeed, for the purposes of the present study we may say that the unchanging is the reasoning of the intellect. It is in this sense that the Ideas are not objects of experience nor are they like objects of experience only beyond the sphere of human perception. So far as man is concerned, they are not objects at all, but processes which emerge within human experience as aspects of that experience. This is the reason the Ideas are so difficult to define, since we have no objects with which to compare them. We can only analogize with other processes, such as cobbling and navigating a ship. It is also the reason why Socrates and others are characterized as searching for the content of an Idea, or for a suitable definition, but never find it. There is no more of a 'content' to the Ideas within human experience than there is to any other process qua process.

9) Ideas and Participation

In light of this conception we may next ask how the Ideas emerge in human experience. The problem of the relation of Ideas and experience, what Plato terms Participation, is usually treated as the relation of the universal to the particular. As a result, the majority of interpretations fall into one of two categories: Either it is claimed that Plato does not resolve the difficulty, and the relation of Participation remains undefined and mysterious; or it is believed that Plato envisioned a quasi-Kantian answer to the problem, in which case the Ideas are fundamentally equatable with Kant's Table of Categories. While there is a measure of merit in both
approaches, the difficulty may be overcome more simply and more meaningfully for our present concern by thinking in terms of relating rather than relation. Moreover, in light of our present understanding of the theory, Ideas can only be characterized as 'universals' in a very special sense, perhaps best termed the commonality of the rational processes of mankind although in a more fully developed understanding of the theory they would certainly mean more than this. Because of the connotations surrounding these terms, it will be best to by-pass the distinction between the universal and the particular for the present, and proceed solely on internal evidence in the Phaedo and the Symposium.

At Phaedo 100d Socrates says:

> If anything besides absolute beauty is beautiful, it is so simply because it partakes of absolute beauty, and I say the same of all phenomena. If I am told that anything is beautiful because it has a rich color, or a goodly form, or the like, I pay no attention, for such language only confuses me; and in a simple and plain, and perhaps foolish way, I hold to the doctrine that the thing is only made beautiful by the presence or communication, or whatever you please to call it, of absolute beauty -- I do not wish to insist on the nature of the communication, but what I am sure of is, that it is absolute beauty which makes all beautiful things beautiful.

Several important points come out of this passage. First, Socrates specifically declines to define the nature of the process of Participation. Taking into account the entire Platonic corpus, especially Epistle VII (342a-344d), this may be taken as a refusal on Plato's part to talk about what Participation is or how it operates.
Second, while he refuses to talk about it, Plato is just as certain that the process operates. This may be inferred by combining Phaedo 100d with the statement at Parmenides 135b that Ideas are requisite for meaningful discourse and the fact that meaningful dialogue does occur. Plato's Dialogues are sufficient testimony for the latter assertion.

Next, in light of our perhaps limited understanding of the theory of Ideas, Socrates' refusal to discuss the nature of Participation is tantamount to refusing to define rationality. We cannot say what an act of reasoning is, nor can we know how it operates, although we do know that it operates. As will be shown later, this is one dimension of the doctrine of Reminiscence: that right reason operates. Socrates does not want to talk about rationality; he wants to talk rationally.

Fourth, as evidenced in the latter part of the statement, Participation is some kind of communication; but a communication which comes from the side of the Idea rather than from the object ("it is absolute beauty which makes all beautiful things beautiful"). This clearly shows, contrary to many commentators, that it is not the object qua object, whether it is a stone, a plate, or a man, that does the participating. According to Plato this places the cart before the horse. Participation is something which comes to the objects from the side of knowing; it is a function of intelligibility rather than perceptibility.

Finally, the terminology of the statement suggests that the kind of communication in question is a creation. It is not a mere
imparting of beauty or justice or whatever; it is a molding of beauty and justice. This understanding gains added strength in light of another famous passage. When Diotima introduces Socrates to the greater mysteries of love in the Symposium, she concludes her speech on an enigmatical note:

But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty -- the divine beauty, I mean, pure and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life -- thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine? Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. (212a).

Participation is literally an act of creation, and a continuation or "nourishing" of this act. An object participates in absolute beauty when the beautiful is created in it by an act of beauty. In a perhaps restricted sense, Participation may be seen as the justifiable attributing of a characteristic to an object. The statement that something is beautiful, for example, is justified by the "simple and plain, and perhaps foolish" assertion that it has beauty in it; that is to say, it is an instance of a rule for assigning predicates, in this case, the Idea of absolute beauty.

The relation between an Idea and its particular instance is therefore the relation between a law or rule and its immediate manifestation. Ideas are not objects of thought but ways of thinking;
they are modes or ways of knowing. In other words, for our present purposes we may equate the theory of Ideas with the subjective process of inquiry. But a way of thinking can be 'known' only in its manifestations, and since such immediate acts are sequential or spread out over a period of time, they can never be given once and for all as mental content. Ideas as manifested are the relating and functioning of objects of thought; they are the immediate processes of thought as acting upon objects of thought. Similarly, the subjective process of inquiry is relating and functioning within human experience; it is processes of thought immediately manifested.23

The theory of Ideas and Participation may be summarized by noting again that Ideas, as they enter into existence, are functionings and relatings. As emergent in experience, Ideas are therefore the assigning of relations where assigning is understood as a continuing process rather than an instantaneous act of assignment which is completed at any given moment. In this way, and in this way only, Ideas are subjective mental forms. But Plato is insistent that they are not merely subjective, the sole possession of an individual. Among other things, ordinary human experience shows them to be at least inter-subjective, that is, shared or participated in by the

23 Parts of this and the previous paragraph are paraphrased as closely as my notes and short memory will allow from a paper by Gwendolyn D. Bowne comparing Ross' and Natorp's interpretations of Plato's theory of Ideas. The paper was delivered in a graduate class at the Ohio State University, 1961. I am deeply indebted to Mrs. Bowne for my understanding of the theory of Ideas, and I have borrowed freely and unashamedly from her brilliant scholarship and erudition.
great majority of men. Most men can follow a mathematical proof and affirm its validity; and there are many who find beauty in the music of Bach and the art of El Greco. On these grounds Socrates becomes convinced that the Ideas exist, that thought operates in an orderly manner in imposing meaning on experience. As existents, Ideas are a dynamic and essential aspect of experience as human experience. We may also note that viewing Ideas as processes as they enter into experience is not incompatible with viewing them as objects of knowledge from a position outside time, that is, from an atemporal point of view. While this important metaphysical aspect of the theory of Ideas is beyond our present concern, it should be noted that Plato was convinced on grounds other than inter-subjectivity that the Ideas are objective. Ideas may be given once and for all as entities of knowledge -- but only under the aspect of eternity.

10) Ideas and Reminiscence

For our present purposes Ideas have been characterized as entering into experience as relatings. They are the human aspect of experiencing, that aspect which creates experience into human experience. It still remains to ask how we can know that experience is truly human, that is, how we know the Ideas or know knowing, in the sense suggested in the Charmides. Before delineating Plato's solution to this problem, let me reiterate what was previously noted: Since the Ideas as emergent in experience are processes of thought, the knowing involved in knowing the Ideas in experience will necessarily be a function of the envisioned object of the knowing, so that
according to Plato we are presupposing and employing the very thing we are trying to get at. This does not necessarily mean we cannot know the Ideas in experience, but it does imply that our knowing of them will be of a very special sort. If Plato's solution of the problem seems strange and indeed no answer at all, we must remember the kind of thing he is trying to accomplish.

The doctrine of Reminiscence, Plato's answer to knowing the Ideas, is discussed in the *Meno*. The question of the possibility of knowing anything arises in the discussion between Socrates and Meno in their mutual attempt to define the possibility of teaching virtue. Meno has been reduced to a realization of his own state of ignorance; and as a result challenges that it may not be possible to know anything, since a "man cannot try to discover either what he knows or what he does not know. He would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not even know what he is to look for" (80e). Socrates believes this to be a mere sophistry, an eristic, and proposes to show Meno that man can learn. One of Meno's slaves, an untutored individual but presumably of average intelligence, is called into the conversation. In the subsequent discussion, Socrates leads the boy into discovering the Pythagorean theorem by means of a diagram in the sand and a series of directed questions. He does not tell the boy the answer to the problem of doubling the area of a square; he only leads him to the point where he can give the correct answers and realize that they

24 All quotations from the *Meno* are from Guthrie's translation.
are correct. While the experiment is familiar enough, it will be well to repeat the last part in order to add emphasis to the point being made, and perhaps refresh our own recollection of it. The diagram is omitted.

Socrates: Tell me, boy, is not this our square of four feet?

Boy: Yes.

Socrates: Now we can add another equal to it like this?

Boy: Yes.

Socrates: And a third here, equal to each of the others?

Boy: Yes.

Socrates: And then we can fill in this one in the corner?

Boy: Yes.

Socrates: Then we have four equal squares?

Boy: Yes.

Socrates: And how many times the size of the first square is the whole?

Boy: Four times.

Socrates: And we want one double the size. You remember?

Boy: Yes.

Socrates: Now does this line going from corner to corner cut each of these squares in half?

Boy: Yes.

Socrates: And these are four equal lines enclosing this area?
Boy: They are.

Socrates: Now think. How big is this area?

Boy: I don't understand.

Socrates: Here are four squares. Has not each line cut off the inner half of each of them?

Boy: Yes.

Socrates: And how many such halves are there in this figure?

Boy: Four.

Socrates: And how many in this one?

Boy: Two.

Socrates: And what is the relation of four to two?

Boy: Double.

Socrates: How big is this figure then?

Boy: Eight feet.

Socrates: On what base?

Boy: This one.

Socrates: The line which goes from corner to corner of the square of four feet?

Boy: Yes.

Socrates: The technical name for it is 'diagonal;' so if we use that name, it is your personal opinion that the square of the diagonal of the original square is double its area.

Boy: That is so, Socrates. (84d-85c.)

With this, Socrates turns to Meno and asserts that men learn by recollecting.
Several points concerning the doctrine of Reminiscence may be noted from the slave-boy experiment. On the negative side, we may dismiss, with the majority of commentators, the idea that Recollection is literally the remembrance of true propositions, of 'innate ideas,' or facts in the sense that something is recalled from memory. The boy does not remember the Pythagorean theorem in the sense that he had previously learned it and is simply recalling it. Nor does Socrates literally furnish the boy with answers to the questions by repeating a series of facts or propositions. By directed questions Socrates leads the boy to resolving the problem. But what is of paramount importance in the experiment is that while Socrates is formulating his leading questions, the boy is also doing something, and just as important a thing as Socrates. The boy is not passively absorbing information; he is following Socrates' questions and answering them to the best of his ability. The boy is doing the same kind of thing Socrates is doing; he is exercising the same kind of competency, namely, the competency to be reasonable. Neither Socrates nor the boy could understand the gist of the mathematical proof if both were not engaged in doing the same kind of thing in the process of the proof, applying the same rules and criteria within the discussion. It is getting on and staying on this same track of discourse that Plato calls Reminiscence.

For the present study Recollection may therefore be characterized as an act of recollecting or a mode of knowing. It is not a process which we describe other than to say that it occurs; it is a process which we do. The point is made even more forcefully at Phaedo 73ff.
Cebes calls attention to Reminiscence and characterizes it as Socrates' "favorite doctrine." Simmias, however, is unable to remember it (this is now a 'loaded' word), and the discussion immediately following is an effort on the part of Cebes and Socrates to recall the meaning of Recollection to Simmias. Now certainly this is a bit of artistic play on the part of Plato. But it is also much more subtle and meaningful. Simmias remembers Recollection by carefully following the reasoning of Cebes and Socrates when they delineate the doctrine and present evidence in its favor. Simmias himself must do this; neither Socrates nor Cebes can do it for him. He must grasp what is being said and reason it through to see if it seems acceptable and justifiable. Simmias learns of Recollection only by recollecting, that is, by following a line of reasoning and realizing its validity; and it is the realization of the act of reasoning involved that finally convinces him of its efficacy. Thus, at 77a Simmias agrees with Socrates:

> The reasoning has reached a place of safety in the common proof of the existence of our souls before we were born and of the existence of the ideas of which you spoke. Nothing is so evident to me as that beauty, and good, and the other ideas which you spoke of just now have a very real existence indeed. Your proof is quite sufficient for me. 25

25 The italics are added. In the same vein we may note Meno 81b, where Socrates claims to have learned the doctrine of Reminiscence from "priests and priestesses of the sort who make it their business to be able to account for the functions which they perform." Recollection is a function, and a function of the self doing the accounting of it; it is something we do in the very process of talking about it.
With these points in mind we may now return to the problem of knowing knowing or knowing the Ideas. I have already suggested that the Ideas might well be considered immediate objects given once and for all as mental content from some standpoint outside time, that is under the aspect of eternity; and that there is nothing incompatible between this conception and the view that the Ideas as they enter human experience are sequential modes of knowing. We may postulate a similar dual aspect to the doctrine of Reminiscence. First, while I have systematically avoided the metaphysical questions in the theory of Ideas for our present methodological study, it will be realized that the metaphysical purpose of the doctrine of Recollection is to establish the possibility of knowing the Ideas as objective, real entities, immanent within yet transcendent to experience. It is in this way that Plato establishes ontological roots to the meaning of human existence; and as such, the objects of recollecting in the inquiry are truly objectives of inquiry, namely, the Ideas as ontological entities. From the aspect of temporality, however, an Idea as a mode of knowing cannot be given once and for all as an object of inquiry, at least as we usually conceive of an object of inquiry. Rather, from the standpoint of sequential existence the doctrine of Reminiscence may be seen as the instigation of modes of knowing as immediate acts. In other words, the doctrine is perhaps intended as an invitation to learning and philosophizing generally.

To repeat, forms of thought emerge within the process of thinking; they are modes of knowing immediately manifest in acts of
knowing. Such forms or Ideas can be temporally known only in the sense of engaging in knowing and not in the sense of known rules of procedure antecedent to or consequent upon such active engagement. Modes of knowing are therefore knowable only as and in acts of knowing; Ideas are knowable only in the sense that they are the knowing of something. As a result, Plato's answer to the subjective process of inquiry is not at all telling us how to do something; his 'answer' is to invite us to participate in a dialogue. Indeed, from the temporal point of view, he is quite unable to describe the Ideas or tell us how we might achieve them, i.e., recollect them. The only thing he can do is actually engage in inquiry and invite us as readers and participants -- "reader-auditors" as Koyre so aptly phrases it -- to go along with him. The doctrine of Reminiscence is therefore a doctrine of active engagement in learning and thinking. Plato's resolution to knowing the Ideas as emergent in experience is thus not the delineation of rules of procedure for proper ways of knowing; rather his 'resolution' is an invitation to philosophize. Among other things, the doctrine of Reminiscence is simply the explicit expression of this invitation to a philosophic life.

27 Cf. Alexandre Koyre, Discovering Plato, pp. 1-7, especially p. 7: "As a matter of fact, for Plato real science, the only kind worthy of the name, is not learned from books, is not imposed upon the soul from without; it is attained, discovered, invented by the soul in solitary travail. The questions formulated by Socrates, that is to say, by the one who knows, stimulate, fecundate, and guide the soul (the celebrated Socratic maieutic consists in just that); the soul itself, however, must furnish the response to the questions."
11) Summary - A Resolution of the Problem

Plato posed the question of the possibility of knowing the immediate act of knowing in the Charmides and resolved it in the theory of Ideas and its concomitants, Participation and Reminiscence. According to one understanding of the theory of Ideas, the delineation of the immediate act of inquiry is impossible if concisely explicated rules of procedure for further inquiry are envisioned as the result of such a delineation. Contrary to Dewey, therefore, Plato implicitly rejects the idea that the subjective process of inquiry is cognitively determinable, at least from the standpoint of temporal existence. Instead, Plato appears to suggest that since the objects of the investigation of the subjective process of inquiry are themselves modes or ways of thinking, the investigation is necessarily an inducement to these modes. The kind of 'knowledge' we gain from examining the subjective process of inquiry, in other words, is an exhortation to the philosophic life, to realizing and implementing the human propensity for learning and philosophizing. And the subjective process of inquiry is itself the molding of human experience; the acting upon the undifferentiated mass of tradition or educational content or whatever, thereby creating human knowledge.

But what can it mean to say that the determination of the subjective process of inquiry is an exhortation to the continuation of learning, while the subjective process of inquiry is the molding of human experience? Surely this does not resolve the original problem of determining curriculum content, nor does it appear to
suggest a possible relationship between tradition and education. Our original difficulties are still open to investigation and intense examination. But Plato's thought answers our difficulties in a much more meaningful sense, namely, by insisting upon the continual investigation and examination of these as well as all human questions. In a word, Plato vindicates the uniqueness of human intelligence and consequently the educative process as a human enterprise. He does not furnish us with a broad outline for inquiry as does Dewey, thereby staticizing the process of inquiry into a rigid empirical pattern. He does not profess to teach us how to learn, how to solve problems and rid ourselves of doubt. Rather he invites us into doubt, and insists that it is only within the process of philosophizing broadly conceived that man fulfills his true humanity. It is in this sense that Plato resolves our difficulties; not by solving them but by insisting that the meaning of education and human life generally is to be found in the process of dealing with them. Plato's answer is therefore methodological rather than cognitive; it is the process of inquiring and philosophizing and the continuation of this process rather than its results.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1) **Summary**

Commencing with the question of determining appropriate subject matter for the school curriculum, this study has attempted to suggest the kinds of questions and issues that arise in dealing with and solving educational problems. Three current theories which claim to resolve the question of curriculum determination were examined in order to ascertain their meaning for the educative process. The theories selected share a common conviction as to the purpose of the educative process and the appropriate content of education. The content is tradition, defined as a body of knowledge contained primarily in the classical writings of the Western world, and the purpose of education is to pass this knowledge on to each succeeding generation. According to the theories, it is only by maintaining and enriching this body of knowledge that man can hope to progress toward a more humanistic individual and social life.

The three theories for tradition were categorized according to the kinds of arguments used in their defense.

1. The argument for tradition as precept claims that tradition furnishes every age with moral and intellectual precepts for guiding social and individual action. The crux of the argument is in viewing tradition as intrinsically normative: Contemporary man must rely on the past for at least a foundation to his activity since the greatest
minds of the Western world have dealt with essentially the same human problems and in many cases have furnished viable and appropriate solutions to them. If we want to know how to deal with problems facing us today it is only necessary to consult the appropriate book or expert for answers.

2. The argument for tradition as model or archetype, while intimately related to the preceptual argument, differs from it by claiming that tradition furnishes us with the best and most perfect ideals of action and rules of practice rather than specific maxims and precepts against which we check these actions. Thus, while precepts embedded in the past may or may not be viable today, the ways in which these precepts were formulated are universal and applicable to all times. We should study the way in which Socrates and other great figures in history approached and solved their problems and emulate these methods in our own lives.

3. The argument for intellectual discipline sees in tradition neither precepts nor models for human action, but a means for structuring the human mind in such a way that it will be able to cope with all kinds of problems that may face the individual during his lifetime. The disciplinary theory argues that the individual, by studying the basic disciplines of knowledge which are embedded in tradition, will develop the powers of his mind in such a way as to enable him to live a successful and useful life as a human being and as a member of society. Tradition is important, not in its own right perhaps, but for the discipline it imparts to the mind as a result of studying it.
In examining these three theories several questions were raised concerning their implicit assumptions, the answers to which are necessary for a thorough vindication of the particular position in question. A few of these, mentioned respectively for each argument, include the following:

1. Among other things, the preceptual theory seems to assume that the problems facing men are essentially the same throughout the ages, and as a result the maxims formulated in history are applicable to contemporary problems. But there would seem to be grounds for questioning these assertions. There are many today who believe the modern world is in a unique historical situation, and we must expend all our efforts to create solutions to our problems rather than slavishly accepting the past as normative for all times. Also, there appears to be a problem in relating the cognitive precepts learned from the past to the life activity of the individual: Granting that maxims or precepts of any kind, past or present, may be used by men, precisely how are they used? What is the relation between learning precepts from a book or lecture and applying them in everyday activity? The preceptual theory assumes that such cognitive concepts are the prior condition for correct activity. Other theorists, however, for example Ryle and Dewey, claim the contrary, that practice is the prior condition to cognition. Thus, in order for an educational theory to assert that the acquisition of traditional maxims is the way for society and the individual to improve, it is first necessary to vindicate the claim that cognitive precepts can be the primary directing agents of human activity.
2. The same set of questions, as well as others, apply to the archetypal theory. Arguing for the acquisition of past methodologies is essentially the same as arguing for the acquisition of past precepts, since in both instances the object acquired is cognitive in nature, whether these are rules of procedure on how to do something or specific mandates for action. The archetypal theory, therefore, must also show the relation between an individual's acquiring methodologies and his activity consequent upon their acquisition.

3. The disciplinary theory of tradition suffers from a lack of theoretical foundation in so far as it fails to justify the use of the traditional subjects of the liberal arts rather than other subjects for the acquisition of intellectual discipline. The theory seems only to state that the arts and sciences impart intellectual discipline, and fails to examine why and how they do. Among other things, the disciplinary theory requires a vindication on grounds other than simple empirical generalizations that certain subjects impart discipline to the mind while others do not.

The series of questions raised concerning the assumptions of the three arguments examined may be summarized as follows: Current traditionalist theories apparently fail to explicate or even to examine the relation of tradition to education, that is, they fail to ask how and why tradition relates to the educative process. The realization of this as well as other unexamined issues does not, of course, in any way disprove the theories. It only calls attention to the fact that the investigation of such issues is crucial for placing the theories within a firm theoretical structure.
The concepts of tradition and education were examined more thoroughly in order to ascertain their possible meanings in relation to one another. Tradition is found to denote a process of transmission as well as a body of knowledge. The simple delineation of a transmissive aspect to tradition, however, still fails to relate such transmission to the educative process. Relating both the cognitive and transmissive aspects of tradition to education depends first on examining and understanding the conception of education.

While education has many meanings, for the purpose of the present study it is used to denote the process of education, that is, the process of deliberately transmitting and fecundating bodies of knowledge, attitudes, skills, and competencies, or whatever. In order to facilitate the investigation, the educative process was divided into its three analytic components:

1. Educational consequences are what the individual is enabled to do as a result of engaging in education. An empirical and historical study shows that such consequences are the result of certain activities and the content of the activities. Thus, the possibility of the acquisition of educational consequences requires examining both the content and process of education.

2. Educational content or subject matter is that which is acted upon within the educative process, that which is dealt with in one or more ways to produce one or more results. An examination shows that the whole of educational content is cognitive in character, which returns us to the issues raised in relation to traditionalist
theories of education. Thus, an educational theory which proposes to
determine the curriculum content must examine the relation between
such content and human activity, that is, between content and educa-
tional consequences. Moreover, since the relating of content to
consequences is in effect the educative process, an examination of the
educative process is prior both to the question of content and to the
question of consequence. We are thus led into the problem of deter-
mining the possibility of learning as a human enterprise: What condi-
tions underlie the fact of human learning? The delineation of the pro-
cess of education is therefore antecedent to the delineation of the
content dealt with and to the establishing of suitable criteria for
attaining certain results in education.

3. It is seen that the examination of the educative process
is the prior concern both in dealing with education and in attempting
to relate tradition or educational content generally to education.
The result of the examination of tradition and education is there-
fore the establishing of a prior question that must be investigated,
namely, the meaning of the activity of the individual immediately
engaged in education. For the sake of clarity this process is
referred to, not as the educative process since this often denotes
educational content and consequences as well as the immediate process
of the individual, but as the subjective process of inquiry. Thus,
before we can understand the possible relation between tradition and
education, or between the acquisition of cognitive knowledge and human
activity, it is necessary to investigate the subjective process of
inquiry.
In examining the subjective process of inquiry an expository technique was used, where first Dewey's and then Plato's examination and consequent understanding of the subjective process of inquiry was set forth by referring to and interpreting the writings of these men.

1. Dewey examines the subjective process of inquiry within the context of his logical theory and his theory of inquiry. Dewey starts his philosophizing with the implicit assumption that the process of inquiry is determinable in all its aspects, including its subjective or immediate knowing aspect which is the subjective process of inquiry. The delineation of his postulated common pattern of inquiry therefore purports to describe the subjective process of inquiry as well. A careful examination of the theory, however, and all that goes into it, including the inquiry that resulted in the delineation of the theory and his conception of habit as a prior aspect to the common pattern of inquiry, shows that Dewey essentially fails to describe the subjective process of inquiry in so far as his theory of inquiry is a completed methodology and is therefore itself a known object rather than a mode or an immediate knowing. In other words, Dewey claims on the one hand that logical forms emerge within the very on-going process of human inquiry, and then proceeds to set forth the precise components of this pattern of inquiry. But he cannot do both, from an empirical as well as a logical standpoint. Logically, because the delineation of the common pattern of inquiry, itself being inquiry, must give rise to further logical forms which
necessitate another inquiry into the emergence of such forms, and so on ad infinitum. Empirically, because if we are within experience, and unable to extricate ourselves from it, it is quite inconceivable that we could attain a transcendent position that would allow us to describe a common pattern to intelligent inquiring. Dewey's error in all this seems to be in assuming that the subjective aspects of the process of inquiry are objectively determinable or describable. The error is built in to his entire philosophical structure. Dewey wrote treatises, thereby giving us the results of his philosophizing; but he apparently failed to take account of the very process of philosophizing itself. As a result, he failed to account for the subjective process of inquiry.

2. Plato's understanding and consequent examination of the subjective process of inquiry is on an entirely different level of comprehension from Dewey's. Since the present study was concerned primarily with methodological considerations, an interpretation of Plato's thought was adopted which systematically overlooked the metaphysical problems inhering in his theories and doctrines. According to this interpretation, Plato first attempts to discern the possibility of determining the subjective process of inquiry, and concludes that from the aspect of temporality, that is within sequential human experience, it is indeterminable as an object of thought, although it may well be a determinate object of thought from some standpoint outside time. It is quite determinable, however, if such a determination is envisioned as an actual mode of knowing or a creating of human experience. This kind of
determination is represented in the theory of Ideas and doctrines of Participation and Reminiscence. Their meaning, for our present purposes, is not delineating a methodological process of inquiry which may be cognitively grasped and later implemented by students of Plato's thought; rather they may be understood as an invitation to learn, Reminiscence being the inducement to such engagement and Participation the actual engaging in the learning process. Consequently, Plato, unlike Dewey, is unable to give us the results of his philosophizing, in other than mythical form, without distorting his understanding of what I have termed the subjective process of inquiry. Rather he invites us to engage in the act of learning, in the act of philosophizing and creating human experience in general. Plato did not write philosophical treatises; he wrote dialogues where the reader is as much an integral participant in the dialogues as are the speakers. The whole of Plato's Dialogues are illustrations of the doctrine of Reminiscence, that is, they are invitations to the philosophic life.

2) Conclusions - I

As a result of examining Dewey's and Plato's understanding of the subjective process of inquiry, the following conclusions may be drawn in relation to our original questions.

1. Dewey, in failing to account objectively for the subjective process of inquiry, and indeed in failing to recognize its prior position in the sense that education as a human enterprise is subsumed under it, is unable to account for the relation existing between
educational content and consequences in general or the assumed relation between tradition and education in particular. Moreover, since it was seen in Chapter III that the determination of educational content is contingent upon first understanding the relationship between content and consequence, that is, upon first understanding the subjective process of inquiry, it follows that Dewey is unable to prescribe appropriate subject matter for the school curriculum on other than simple empirical grounds. In other words, when one considers the curriculum from Dewey's point of view, ideal educational aims and purposes are overlooked in deference to the immediate interests and activities of the individual as well as the social order as a whole.

2. Immanent in the thought of Plato, on the other hand, there is a consistent refusal to account objectively for the subjective process of inquiry. As a result, Plato presents another and rather unusual 'answer' to the problem, unusual in the sense that it is cognitively incomprehensible from the standpoint of temporal human existence. He requests or invites his friends and readers, i.e. the whole of humanity, to engage in actual discourse, thereby doing the very thing in question. Plato's answer is therefore to actually engage in the learning process, such engagement being the relating under consideration. While this does not solve the problem of determining appropriate curriculum content in the sense of antecedently prescribing subject matter that should be studied in order to attain certain results, it does suggest that appropriate subject
matter emerges within the context of the continuing process of education. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates characterizes himself as a midwife, barren of ideas himself, but capable of discerning meaningful from phantom ideas in other people struggling to attain true knowledge. The questions discussed within the maieutic relationship are not prescribed by Socrates the midwife; but commencing with any human problem the midwife is able to direct the discussion in such a way that meaningful knowledge emerges from it. Socrates finds his answer to determining appropriate subject matter, therefore, within the very asking and examining of the question, the answer being constituted in and by the examination itself.¹ This insistence on continued examination is expressed in the mythical form of the doctrine of Recollection.

¹ While it goes beyond our restricted understanding of Plato's thought, and therefore beyond our immediate conclusions, it may be noted in passing that there is nothing incompatible between viewing curriculum content as emergent within the educative process and the prescription of subject matter in the Republic. As we may distinguish between the Ideas as modes emergent in human experience and objects of thought under the aspect of eternity, so we may distinguish between Socrates the midwife and Socrates the (hypothetical) knower of the Good. Within the context of knowing the Good, subject matter, as well as the whole of the cosmos, may be known in all its immediacy as an object of thought. But this is not necessarily incompatible with viewing subject matter as emergent in sequential human experience short of attaining an atemporal point of view. It is essential to realize that Plato prescribes the curriculum for the philosopher-king only subsequent to discussing the concept of the Good, the line, and the cave allegory. While the discussion certainly does not delineate the Good, which is quite impossible, it hopefully sets the student on the path of constructing the object of thought for himself. It is not until this point has been passed that there can be a prescription of subject matter for the higher levels of education. See *Republic* 521c-541b.
3) **Further Questions**

The ostensible conclusions of the preceding section notwithstanding, it will be realized that the present study does not answer, nor indeed does it raise, all the questions surrounding the problem of determining appropriate curriculum content. It has not examined the social aspects of the problem, for example, nor has it developed to a great extent the epistemological and ontological issues underpinning the prescription of subject matter. It has not been my intention, of course, to exhaust all possible assumptive problems inhering in the original educational question but only to suggest the kinds of issues that inhere in it and the kinds of activity required to examine the issues. However, in closing the main body of the study it may be well to develop very briefly another set of questions of overriding importance which have been alluded to many times but which heretofore have remained implicit. These are the ethical questions.

1. Within the context of Dewey's thought it was seen that subject matter could be determined only on simple empirical grounds; and if we look closely at Dewey's educational writings, especially *Democracy and Education*, *Experience and Education*, and *The School and Society*, we find just such an empirical criterion being applied. But as a result Dewey has great difficulty in discerning aims and purposes in education other than an empirical one, namely, the broadening of the base of human experience regardless of what the content of that experience happens to entail.\(^2\) We would therefore

\(^2\) See especially *Democracy and Education*, Chapters Two, Eighteen, and Twenty-Six; and *Moral Principles in Education*, passim.
expect to find in Dewey's ethics a similar empirical criterion for the whole of ethical action, since an educational aim is but one formulation of the aim of human life in general. Such is precisely the case, where the fundamental postulate of his ethics is that widening the experiential base is intrinsically good. In educational terms, Dewey's thought forces us into the position of filling the curriculum with materials for increasing the flow of experience without regard to the fundamental meaning of human existence. Dewey himself, of course, constantly argued against this conclusion. But without the givenness of the ethically good man, as Dewey the man certainly was, we are driven to the conclusion that there is no other purposeful directive in human life than broadening the base of experience. Consequently, the results of examining Dewey's understanding of the nature of education under the aspect of the subjective process of inquiry not only fails to give us anything other than an empirical criterion for determining subject matter for the schools, but it also forces us in the direction of examining the aims and purposes of such education as an aspect of the meaning of human existence in order to determine whether his ethical conclusions are warranted or not.

2. Ethical considerations also emerge within the context of Plato's thought. The ostensible conclusion to examining the subjective process of inquiry from Plato's point of view is that

3 See ibid., as well as Theory of Valuation, passim.; The Quest for Certainty, Chapter X; Human Nature and Conduct, passim; etc.
curriculum determination is in effect a function of the midwife, that is, the teacher. But how does Plato determine who should be the midwife? The answer to this question is found in his ethics and metaphysics: The man who is fit to lead his fellow man, not only in the teaching enterprise but in the human enterprise generally, is the man who knows the Good, the one who is the very embodiment of virtue. And from this point we must proceed to a more fundamental examination of Plato's ethics in an effort to ascertain the meaning of human virtue and the concept of the Good. Thus, while the present study has consistently failed to raise the metaphysical question on the grounds that our concerns were primarily methodological, it is quite impossible to understand Plato's complete answer to the original educational problem without examining his envisioned ontological roots for human existence in the very structure and plan of the cosmos as a whole.

4) Conclusions - II

At the outset I stated that the primary purpose of this study was to construct a paradigm of educational philosophizing. We are now in a position to realize that the nature of the paradigm has been, not to answer any educational problems, but to prepare the way for future educational philosophizing to penetrate to the root sources of such problems. The study has led us from an apparently simple educational question to examining illustrative philosophical issues implicit within it, and finally to realizing that the question
includes, among other things, the ethical problem of discerning the nature, the meaning, and the ends of human existence.

If the study has been successful it will be realized that there are in effect no conclusions to it in the sense of arriving at set answers to set questions. The ostensible conclusions in section 2 of this chapter are only the conclusions to the arbitrary subject of the study, namely, the determination of educational content and a few of the issues raised by this problem. The real subject under discussion has been educational philosophizing and the real conclusion is the movement of the study itself: the kinds of questions examined as distinct from the specific questions, and the kinds of activity involved in their examination as distinct from the specific activities. The subjective process of inquiry, the logic of theories of inquiry, and the ontological foundations to education are certainly of paramount importance in educational philosophy. But my primary concern here has been with educational philosophizing rather than with the specific problems of educational philosophy, at least in so far as the two are distinguishable. It is by reinstating the appropriate activities of educational philosophizing, activities which are apparently lacking in a good deal of contemporary educational philosophy, that educational problems may be carried through and examined to their root sources.
5) **Rationale for the Study - A Personal Footnote**

It is highly unusual to present the rationale for a dissertation after the thesis has been developed. A moment's reflection on the nature and the purpose of the study, however, will make it obvious why this had to be the case. A personal commentary on my thoughts as I approached the study will aid in presenting the rationale.

I proceeded in the preparation and writing of the dissertation on the fundamental conviction that education is the most important aspect of the entire human enterprise. I make no attempt to justify this conviction. Arising from it is the idea that education cannot be understood unless human existence is examined from every possible aspect within the comprehension of man. A further problem arises at this point. According to the lines which presently separate the various disciplines of knowledge, it is the full-time task of philosophers to examine human existence, while educators can examine it only part-time, if indeed at all. Those who argue that the task of educational philosophers is to draw "implications" from one or more philosophers and apply them to education, for example, are in effect arguing against any kind of philosophizing in education.

My problem therefore seemed singular: I desired to convey my conviction that education is grounded in the meaning of human existence and therefore requires a continuing examination of this existence, but I was in the position of being unable to illustrate this conviction without at the same time being accused of doing
philosophy rather than philosophy of education. As a result, I
was confronted with one of two choices. Either I could construct a
study wherein I argued specifically for a return on the part of
educators to dealing with the basic issues concerning the meaning
of human existence, treating in turn with the reasons why I thought
this was necessary, or I could attempt to present an illustration
of what I meant by saying education must concern itself with these
issues. With the former alternative there was the further problem
of talking a good case without doing it. With the latter alternative
rested charges of superficiality and indefensibility due to strictures
of time -- since the kind of conviction I have outlined takes at
least a lifetime, if not more, to justify and fulfill. It is
obvious, of course, that I chose the latter alternative. Reasons
for this choice are many; I will mention only one. I hit upon the
idea of conveying my thesis in two radically distinct ways. One,
by explicitly claiming to set up a paradigm of educational philosophy,
and two, by conveying the same thesis within the context of the
study, namely, through Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence, which in
effect is an insistence upon dealing with human problems to the
greatest depths of profundity of which man is capable during his
temporal existence.

As a result, it is easy to lodge the charge of superficiality
against the study; for failing to take account of all contemporary
educational philosophy, for example, or for failing to examine all
possible meanings of the concept of education, or for only raising
and not examining in detail the ethical questions inhering in the problem of the subjective process of inquiry. I would beg reprieve on these and other failures, however, on the grounds that I have chosen to illustrate my conviction only in a suggestive manner. The study is intended to suggest the possibilities latent in the philosophy of education, possibilities which must be opened and explored if there is to be meaningful discourse in education. As such, the study is intended only as exemplary of a conviction. If I have conveyed this conclusion the study has accomplished its purpose.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Excepting for section I, the following Bibliography lists only those books that apply directly to the study. The first section lists a few general references that have contributed greatly to my thinking, but may or may not have anything directly to do with the subject matter of the dissertation. In section II I have listed only those references that deal with contemporary traditionalism in education. It will be recalled that Chapter II examines only these current theories. Section III deals with Dewey's writings and related works and section IV does the same for Plato.

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I, Robert Roy Wellman, was born in Lima, Ohio, January 18, 1933. I received my elementary education in various public schools in Lima, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in Tuckahoe, New York, and in New York City, and my secondary education in the public high school of Brooklyn Village, Ohio. My Bachelor of Arts degree was granted by Dartmouth College in 1954 after holding the Otis Waldemeyer Scholarship for four years. From January, 1955, to January, 1957, I served as a medical aidman and personnel specialist in the United State Army. I received a Post-Graduate Certificate in Education from the University of London, Institute of Education, in 1958. I am certified to teach the biological and physical sciences in the English Grammar (secondary) schools. In June of 1959 I received a Master of Arts degree from Western Reserve University. I have provisional certification to teach general science and biology in the public secondary schools in the state of Ohio. I was admitted to the Graduate School of the Ohio State University in September, 1959, and have since pursued the doctoral program in the Department of Education. During the Academic year 1959-60 I served as Graduate Assistant in science education. In September, 1960, I was appointed Instructor in the Department of Education. I have held this position for two years while completing the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree.