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IN A SIMULATED INDUSTRIAL SETTING.

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SOME SITUATIONAL AND PERSONALITY VARIABLES OF UNETHICAL RISK TAKING IN A SIMULATED INDUSTRIAL SETTING

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1965

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgments</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tables</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter

#### I. INTRODUCTION

- Studies in Business Ethics ........................................ 3
- Psychological Studies ............................................. 6

#### II. PURPOSES AND HYPOTHESES

- Hypotheses .......................................................... 16

#### III. METHOD

- Experimental Paradigm ........................................... 18
- Sample ...................................................................... 19
- Procedure .................................................................. 20
- Experimental Task ................................................ 23
- Experimental Manipulations ..................................... 24
- Independent Variables .......................................... 25
  - The Behavior Prediction Scale .............................. 25
  - The Explicatory Value Scale ................................ 27
  - The M-C Social Desirability Scale ....................... 29
  - The Manifest Anxiety Scale ................................ 29
  - The Socioeconomic Variables ............................... 31

- The Dependent Variables ........................................ 31

#### IV. RESULTS

- Pilot Study .......................................................... 34
- Analyses of the Dependent Variables ....................... 36
- Analyses of the Independent Variables ..................... 42
- Multiple Regressions ............................................. 48
- Canonical Correlations .......................................... 52
- Interaction Trends ................................................ 53
- Socioeconomic Variables ........................................ 54
## CONTENTS (contd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dependent Variables</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Admission of Violations</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sensitization Effect</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent Variables</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Socioeconomic Variables</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conclusions</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Implications</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. SUMMARY</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Assembly Instructions, Blueprints, Error Blanks</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Behavior Prediction Scale</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Exploitative Value Scale</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The M-C-Social Desirability Scale</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The Manifest Anxiety Scale</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. The Socioeconomic Variables</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Mean Violation Scores for Socioeconomic Variables</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Figures</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Summary of Tests of Significance Performed upon the Dependent Variables under Conditions of High and Low Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Reliability (Diagonals) and Intercorrelation Coefficients among Behavioral Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Relationships between Risk Conditions and Admission of &quot;Giving Assistance&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Summary of Analysis of Variance of Scores on Admission of &quot;Giving Assistance&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Comparisons of Mean Scores on the Admission of &quot;Giving Assistance&quot; by Conditions of Risk and Degrees of Violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Summary of Analysis of Variance of Scores on Admission of &quot;Being Asked&quot; for Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Comparisons of Mean Scores on the Admissions of &quot;Being Asked&quot; for Assistance by Conditions of Risk and Degrees of Violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Mean Comparison of Independent Variables under Three Conditions of Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Mean Comparison of the Independent Variables on the Three Levels of Violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Summary of Analysis of Variance of Scores on Assistance Given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Summaries of Analysis of Variance of Scores on the Error Scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Comparisons of Mean Error Scores between Two Conditions of Risk and Two Levels of the SDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Correlation Coefficients among Independent and Dependent Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Intercorrelations between Independent Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Amount of Variance on Violations Explained by Three Groups of Independent Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Differential Weights of Independent and Dependent Variables and Canonical Correlations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Mean Violation Scores for Socioeconomic Variables</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the present study is to examine some crucial variables related to unethical risk taking behavior in a simulated industrial setting. Risk implies chances of loss, which—following the models of Social Learning Theory (Rotter, 1954) and Probability and Variance Preference Studies (Edwards, 1953; 1954)—may be analyzed into the expectancy and the reinforcement value of loss due to a behavioral act. Slovic (1964) has added a third component which he calls the "expected value of risk." The "expected value of risk" consists of both the probability and the magnitude of gain when the outcome is favorable. Risk, then, would be a balance between the perceived probability and the magnitude of loss and gain incurred by behavioral act. The higher the probability and magnitude of loss and the lower the probability and magnitude of gain, the higher would be the risk. Risk taking behavior would be a combined function of perceived risk in a given situation and a tendency to react to it in a consistent way irrespective of the situation. Slovic has attempted to explore the nature of this risk taking behavior by examining different measures employed and the findings of such behavior in the recent literature. In a variety of research reviewed, he found that three broad approaches have been adopted to measure risk taking. The first attempts to correlate risk taking with certain personality
dispositions such as the need for achievement or masculinity-femininity. Here such dispositions as "willingness to gamble," "category width," "speed-mindedness," which show a consistent style of responding to various perceptual and nonperceptual tasks, are themselves considered indices of risk taking behavior. The second approach relates risk taking to choice of occupation or decision making in everyday situations involving differing degrees of risk. The third type of approach may be found in studies using probability and variance preferences which reveal a subject's risk taking behavior during betting. Several additional studies relate risk taking to other motivational constructs such as defensiveness, anxiety (Kogan & Wallace, 1964), theoretical and aesthetic values (Scodel et al., 1960), need for achievement (McClelland, 1961; Meyer, 1961), need for exhibition (Cameron & Meyer, 1963), etc. The varied nature of this research and Slovic's previous attempt (1962) to establish a convergent validity among the various measures of risk taking seem to reveal a considerable lack of agreement among various measures of risk taking. On the basis of these findings, Slovic (1964) has come to the following conclusion:

Risk taking behavior appears to be multi-dimensional in nature. It has substantial subjective components and is susceptible to a variety of motivational and other influences. (p. 231)

Unethical risk taking shares some of the properties of risk taking in general such as the probability and magnitude of loss, and the probability and magnitude of gain from a desired outcome. However, the risk here may not only involve a loss of money, prospect, or opportunity but also the loss of reputation, status and prestige (Rettig & Singh,
1963). The irreversibility and permanence of such social consequences may impose a different set of considerations for selecting unethical alternatives. Some kinds of risk taking, such as economic risk taking, often enjoy a good deal of social support. Because it is expected to result in economic growth, achievement and success (McClelland, 1961), economic risk taking is not only accepted but appreciated and encouraged in Western society. In general, then, constructive risk taking is believed to facilitate the growth process, while unethical risk taking is thought to adversely affect the proper functioning of the social structure.

The distinction between these two types of risk taking becomes less clear when unethical risk taking is perceived as furthering a socially desirable goal such as success in business. Here the pressure to yield to temptation may be particularly great because at least part of the endeavor—the goal—is socially prized, and the successful achievement of the goal terminates and often obliterates the dubious process of reaching the goal.

Studies in Business Ethics

Even a cursory view of the literature on business ethics reveals a growing concern that the business world is lapsing into a twilight zone of practices which are "generally accepted and unethical" (Harvard Business Review, 1961, p. 7). R. A. Smith, writing for Fortune (1961), comments that "It is increasingly hard to know what is right or wrong about a lot of business practices." As part of his doctoral dissertation, Baumhart (1961) conducted a survey of unethical practices and opinions
among business executives which revealed not only conflicts in the minds of executives regarding economic and ethical solutions of various business problems, but cynicism and a double standard of ethics which are advocated and practiced in the business world. Although most executives claim that they themselves are more ethical than their fellows, they do believe that four out of seven executives would violate a code of conduct if they could be sure to avoid detection. This survey also seems to suggest two separate syndromes of ethical and unethical conduct. If an executive resists temptations to act unethically, the credit is given to his own integrity and value system whereas if he yields and acts unethically, the blame is placed on the unethical climate of the organization and behavior of superior officers.

Williams (1960) has described unethical price fixing practices in the electrical industry. One case led to the indictment of forty-eight executives and thirty-two corporations, involving virtually every major manufacturer in the industry. Sullivan (1960) has reviewed a wide variety of unethical practices in various industries. Within a specific organization the problem of unethical practices often assumes dangerous proportions. For example, advertising executives work under exceedingly high pressure to succeed at the risk of losing their jobs, executives of consumer service companies provide "kick-backs" to purchasing department employees, and they exchange price information prior to contract bidding. In addition, personnel directors often employ girls to "entertain" prospective customers, research departments maneuver for government contracts, and line supervisors try to accomplish the impossible task of
"beating the record." These practices often illustrate the kinds of ethical deviations that are being tolerated by the business world.

There have been many attempts to understand and explain the dynamics of unethical decision making. The psychoanalytic approach credits unethical and ethical codes of conduct to the functioning of a super-ego which is believed to control the biological impulses of man. In its essentials, the super-ego represents an introjected cluster of social ideals and moral values. It is hypothesized as being fairly autonomous and to function independently of the perception of external pressures and consequences. Deviation from a moral code, therefore, indicates a revolt of biological impulses and the failure of the socializing process or policing power of internalized censure. Merton (1957), on the contrary, shifts the responsibility for moral transgressions from an internalized control system to the organizational structure, and regards deviation as a normal consequence of structural deficiency. However, he does maintain that within a particular organizational structure, individual differences in deviant acts may be accounted for by personality dispositions. On the organizational level, however, disparity between means and goals, conflicting needs of various factions, and lack of correspondence between manifest and latent functions of an organization would seem to be more crucial determinants of deviant behavior than the relative strengths of the biological and restraining forces of the super-ego of individual persons. Furthermore, Merton indicates that pressure to deviate differentially affects the various strata within an organization, depending on the level of their aspirations and the availability of socially accepted means. The larger the disparity
between aspired goals and available means, the greater the pressure to act unethically. Supporting this approach, Bensman and Grever (1963) have presented a case study of the internal law of an organization (a manufacturer of military airplanes) where the explicit law not to use a particular tool (a tap) was frequently violated. The use of the tap (for cutting new threads in the nut so that the nut and the bolt could be brought into a new alignment) was for a number of reasons considered "the most serious crime of workmanship conceivable in the plant" (p. 590): (a) It concealed the structural defects of workmanship, (b) it made the maintenance of the airplane more difficult, and above all, (c) it could weaken the holding power of parts with serious consequences under stress of vibration. However, an attempted compromise among the complex plurality of ends which members of various positions within the organization cherished led to a situation whereby literally a major crime had almost become intrinsic to the system.

Psychological Studies

The psychological interest in morality flourished and culminated in the twenties and then waned, only to be renewed again in the fifties. In 1928, Hartshorne and May published Studies in Deceit, which was based on a very thorough investigation of cheating behavior in school children. They concluded that there is no single general factor of honesty even though the data indicated some consistency of behavior from one situation to another. This consistency of behavior was interpreted on the basis of similarities in the situations rather than any single personality trait. Burton (1963), however, has reanalyzed their data, and has
extracted one general factor, though its loadings are not very high. His conclusion is that

There is an underlying trait of honesty, which a person brings with him to a resistance to temptation situation. However, these results strongly agree with Hartshorne and May's rejection of "all-or-none" formulation regarding a person's character. (p. 492)

Burton attempts to explain generality in moral behavior across different types of situations by postulating two processes--"stimulus generalization" and "cognitive mediation," both of which processes recognize the importance of situational and specific variables in making an unethical decision. Generality in behavior would be the additive function of situational similarities and a cognitive bridge which a person has been able to provide between the situations. Other studies (Barbu, 1951; Maller, 1934; Froden, 1940; Allensmith, 1960; Bandura & Waters, 1963; Aronfreed, 1963) confirm the usefulness of a learning theory model for tracing the development of a stable style of unethical risk taking but disagree on the role of cognitive mediation, the degree of internalization of the generalized control system, and the independence of this system from perception of external consequences. Several studies (Bandura & Walters, 1963; Hoffman, 1963; Kohlberg, 1963) seem to indicate that cognitive evaluations play a significant part only during the internalization of a control system, for once the system is internalized, it becomes fairly autonomous and functions independently of the perception of external consequences. On the other hand, Aronfreed (1963) finds that this internalized control system may simply be a learning of specific responses reinforced by direct reward and punishment "under the most barren cognitive and evaluative surroundings." Bandura
and McDonald (1963), however, disagree with Aronfreed. Their findings indicate that generalized moral behavior is more readily acquired when the child has a model available whose responses he can reproduce even in situations where he has never seen this model operating. Several studies indicate that the development of moral standards is intimately related to age (Kohlberg, 1963; Varma, 1962; Piaget, 1948), intelligence (Varma, 1962), to position within the social structure (Boem, 1962; Bronfenbrenner 1958), and to child rearing practices (Aronfreed, 1961; Hoffman, 1963).

Studies of expressed values provide another method of examining a disposition to unethical behavior. Brumback (1963), in his doctoral dissertation, has used the exploitative dimension of Shartle's Business Form of The Value Scale (1958) as a predictor of unethical tendency. Subjects with high scores on this factor chose unethical alternatives more frequently while subjects with low scores selected chance success more frequently in a game situation. In a study by Rawson (1961), subjects' scores on socioeconomic and moral value scales were found to correlate with unethical behavior in a classroom situation under a high condition of risk.

Rettig and his associates have furthered the doctrine of specificity by a series of studies (1963, 1963, 1964) in order to find pertinent situational determinants of unethical judgment and behavior. He has developed the "risk hypothesis" which postulates that "unethical risk taking behavior varies predominantly as a function of the perceived risk," rather than in relation to internalized restraint. Rettig and Singh (1963) state that

It would appear, therefore, that as far as predictive judgments of unethical behavior are concerned, the judges
do not feel that internal restraint, even though of significant concern, is of great importance to the potential offender. (p. 232)

Rettig has postulated six determinants of unethical risk taking: (1) the probability of gain, (2) the magnitude of gain, (3) the chances of being caught, (4) the severity of punishment, (5) the severity of offense, and (6) the reference group which would suffer the injurious consequences of an unethical act. In one study (Rettig & Rawson, 1963) in which subjects were asked to make predictive judgments about the unethical behavior of a person, five out of the six sources postulated were found to be significant. Only the reference group proved ineffective. However, in another study (Rettig & Singh, 1963a) where the predictive judgments of American and Indian students were compared, the findings seemed to indicate that

It is neither the internalized constraint nor the benefits which would accrue from the engagement in unethical conduct which is the primary determinant of such behavior. Nor is it the expectancy of getting caught in committing the offense. The most critical determinant in the evaluation of whether or not a transgression will be committed is the type of externalized sanction that would follow the exposure. If the sanction is expected to be severe (e.g., public expulsion from the University) the unethical behavior is less likely to occur even though the objective may be very critical (e.g., a crucial operation). Similarly, if the censure is expected to be mild (e.g., a private settlement of the issue), the unethical conduct is more likely to take place, even though the objective is not as critical. (e.g., paying a debt) (p. 10)

This view has been substantiated in a more recent study (Rettig & Pasamanick, 1964) in which only the negative reinforcement value of censure was found to predict actual unethical behavior.

Schachter (1964) also considers anxiety arising out of fear or fear itself as one of the major sources which restrains unethical
tendencies. Schachter and Lantane (1964) varied the level of fear and anxiety by manipulating sympathetic activation through drugs such as chlorpromazine and adrenalin. It appeared that . . . "chlorpromazine, when physiologically effective, facilitates cheating," (p. 231)

In general, there have been two dominant approaches to the psychological study of unethical judgment and unethical behavior. The first attempts to explore personality variables such as exploitative-manipulative values, anxiety, guilt, intelligence, etc. Here, the basic assumption is that there exists some generalized tendency to take unethical risks across divergent situations. The most frequently used statistical technique has been to intercorrelate responses across various situations, and to perform a factor analysis leading to a single general and a few specific factors. The second approach holds that situational variables are the main determinants. Here, either the perceived severity of anticipated punishment is varied, or the demand-characteristics of organizational structure are changed. Very few attempts have been made to combine personality and situational variables in a single study. One such study (Galbraith, 1964) attempted to examine the relative effects of levels of guilt-feeling and the probability of external censure on verbal responses to sex pictures. His findings indicate that (a) different levels of sexual guilt differentially inhibit verbal responses of sexual nature, and (b) the probability of external censure has significant effects on the sexual responses of "low-guilt" subjects. However, generalization of the results is restricted by the following considerations: (a) both independent and dependent variables were measured by verbal responses which in turn might have been influenced by a response
set, (b) no attempt was made to vary the severity of external censure which has been found to be the most significant determinant in actual unethical behavior (Rettig & Pasamanick, 1964). Furthermore, sexual response constitutes a very specific type of unethical behavior. The results obtained in the study on verbal sexual behavior may not be applicable to other unethical situations.
CHAPTER II

PURPOSES AND HYPOTHESES

The chief concern of this investigation is to delineate empirically some of the sources of unethical behavior in a simulated industrial setting. The studies, reported in the preceding chapter, revealed a wide variety of practices which are considered unethical and injurious, yet are accepted and even encouraged by the industrial world. Some of the sources of such behavior were found to be located in a conducive unethical climate, in conflicting demands, and in unrealistically high expectations—although the importance of personal considerations such as integrity, morality, and values were not completely eliminated.

The present study attempts to simulate an unethically conducive situation, in which some components of the situation are designed to generate pressure toward unethical behavior while others are designed to encourage ethical conduct. The experiment takes the form of two person work-teams--a supervisor and a worker--with one (the worker) being a confederate. The supervisor is assigned the job of organizing the work and directing the worker (accomplice) who is to perform the actual assembly. An increasing rate of incentive pay and a limited time period provide pressure to adopt unfair means of achieving a maximum output and remuneration. A set of verbal instructions provide the standards of behavior expected from the supervisor. He is instructed (a) not to
provide any physical assistance in the assembly, (b) to report any errors made either by the worker or by the supervisor himself, and finally (c) to stop work precisely at the end of the experimental session. These standards of behavior are in conflict with the desire to maximize the monetary gain. Violations of these explicitly stated standards constitute unethical behavior. These violations are assumed to be, to some extent, prototypical of actual violations found on an assembly line in industry.

The review of literature in the preceding chapter revealed two major approaches (personality and situational) to the study of unethical conduct. The two approaches are considered to be different not only in strategy of analyzing the problem and locating the sources of unethical behavior, but also in their implications for industry and the business world. If unethical behavior is said to be mainly a function of a lack of restraint of internal impulses, the remedy may lie in re-educating the individual to strengthen his moral control system or to screen out potential violators. However, if unethical behavior is activated by an organizational deficiency or by a conducive psychological climate, attention might best be directed toward the rearrangement of organizational components, the improvement of the psychological climate, and the development of more effective communications regarding social responsibility.

The present study attempts to combine both approaches (situational and personality) in one. It provides an opportunity of assessing not only the relative importance of some personality and some situational variables, but also the effects of their interaction in either inducing
or restraining unethical behavior. It seems reasonable to assume that at least some of the situational and personality variables might interact, thus generating a force which would operate in combination to produce unethical risk taking behavior, which might not have taken place otherwise.

Among situational determinants, the one which appears to be the most critical in a number of studies is the risk of severe punishment. If severe punishment were anticipated, there appears to be a strong tendency to restrain oneself from committing unethical acts. Here, due recognition should also be given to the subjective elements involved in the perception of severity of censure, for there may not be a one-to-one correspondence between the objective magnitude and the perceived severity of censure. Depending on the reinforcement history and the psychological make-up of an individual, he might perceive greater or lesser risk than actually exists in a particular situation. Hence, it is hypothesized that unethical risk taking will vary as a function of perceived risk.

Here, two levels of objective magnitude of risk (high and low) are introduced by means of verbal instructions. A control group is also assessed to obtain base-line measures of questionnaire responses under various conditions. Since there is no direct way to measure the perceived severity of censure, measures of its effects are obtained through the verbal responses of the Ss. Ss are asked to report their own violations of experimentally induced norms. It is believed that the admission of violations would be a function of the perceived risk.

Very few studies which relate personality variables to unethical behavior have been reported in the literature. Those which have been reported do not provide any conclusive answer concerning the personality
determinants of ethical decision making process. It seems reasonable to
conjecture that unethical behavior may be due to a combination of many
psychological variables rather than the function of any unitary person-
ality characteristic. An attempt is made in this study to select a few
personality variables which seem most relevant to the ethical decision
making process. For example: if a person has acquired values which are
conducive to unethical practices (i.e., exploitative values), it may
be reasonably assumed that such a person would more easily yield to
temptations which would increase his personal gain. On the other hand,
if a person is very much concerned about his public image and has a
greater need to be accepted by others, he will perhaps be less willing to
risk his public image. Similarly, highly anxious persons will be less
likely to accentuate their already high levels of anxiety through
unethical conduct; and persons with greater sensitivity to situational
cues should make greater distinctions between high and low risk situa-
tions than persons who are relatively insensitive to situational cues.
The scales measuring these personality variables will be described in the
succeeding chapter. The investigator is aware that the variables con-
sidered here are not exhaustive, and that there may be additional,
equally relevant variables which are not studied due to either limited
time and resources or lack of experimental evidence regarding their
relevance to unethical behavior.
Hypotheses

On the basis of above mentioned theoretical considerations, the following hypotheses are formulated and tested:

Hypothesis 1. Unethical behavior will be significantly more frequent under low than under high conditions of risk. Furthermore, the significant effect of risk will show in all three measures of violations (the assistance given, the error score, and the overtime).

Hypothesis 2. Admission of violations will be significantly more frequent under low than under high conditions of risk; and for high violators rather than for low violators.

Hypothesis 3. Significantly more blame for violations will be put on the co-worker under high than under low conditions of risk; and by high violators rather than by low violators.

Hypothesis 4. There will be a significant correlation between exploitative values and unethical behavior.

Hypothesis 5. There will be a significant negative correlation between need for approval and unethical behavior.

Hypothesis 6. There will be a significant correlation between anxiety and unethical behavior.

Hypothesis 7. There will be a significant positive correlation between risk sensitivity and unethical behavior.

Hypothesis 8. The three measures of violations (the assistance given, the error score, and the overtime) will be significantly affected by the interactions between personality variables (i.e. exploitative values, the need for social approval, and the anxiety) and the situational variable of experimentally introduced risk.

Hypothesis 9. The questionnaire-responses will not significantly differ under the risk (high and low) and control conditions.

The details of the experimental task, the manipulations, and the scales measuring the personality variables appear in the next chapter.
The theoretical basis and some justifications for the hypotheses have already been provided in the preceding portion of this chapter. However, a few hypotheses require further clarifications. Hypotheses 3 and 4 deal with the effects of perceived risk. It is expected that when the risk is high, Ss will not only admit less to "giving" assistance, but will also tend to throw more blame on the co-worker, especially if it is the S who has violated ethical norms. A low violator should not feel the same urgency for self-protection. Hypothesis 8 is designed to study the interaction effects. It is expected that high risk takers, as determined by their values, need for approval, and anxiety, will not only violate the norms more frequently in both risk conditions, but will make a greater differentiation between conditions of risk, possibly because the environmental cues are more functional for them. Low violators will either be relatively indifferent to the external cues partly because they might be guided by some internal norms or because they were oversensitive to situational cues due to their own anxious and defensive nature. In any case, it is expected that they will make smaller differentiation between risk conditions. Here hypothesis 9 was actually a check to determine whether the scales are affected by the experimental conditions or by the violations of the Ss. If the scales are found to be significantly affected by either of the two variables, the scale-responses cannot be considered independent predictors of unethical behavior.
CHAPTER III

METHOD

I. Experimental Paradigm

To study the dynamics of unethical behavior, three groups of variables were examined. The first involved the experimental manipulation of risk. Two levels of risk (high and low) were introduced by means of verbal instructions. In both experimental conditions, Ss were tempted to violate certain experimental instructions for the purpose of material gain. In the high risk condition, punishment was mentioned for any violation. A control condition was also introduced, in which Ss were neither tempted nor given a chance to violate the instructions nor was punishment mentioned.

The second group of variables consisted of five situational determinants of risk taking behavior which were measured by the Behavior Prediction Scale (to be described later). Ss were asked to predict the probability of a hypothetical bank employee taking money which did not belong to him. The five sources of variance (the expectancy and the magnitude of gain, the expectancy and the severity of censure, and the severity of offense) were varied systematically from a high to a low level for each source. The scale was designed to measure sensitivity to situational cues.

The third group of variables measured personality dispositions toward unethical risk taking which are presumably brought to the experimental situation. These dispositions were measured by the
Exploitative Value Scale (EVS), the M-C Social Desirability Scale (M-C SDS), and the Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS). The details of the scales will be described later in the chapter. The scales were believed to measure values, need for approval, and anxiety which may separately or in conjunction determine the propensity to take an unethical risk independent of situational considerations. Two levels of such risk taking tendencies were determined by cutting the scores on each scale at the median. Ss above the median were considered high risk takers, while Ss below the median were regarded as low risk takers. Several socioeconomic variables were collected to determine if a relationship exists between them and unethical behavior.

The order of presentation of the experimental task and the scales may be shown as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Risk Conditions</th>
<th>(2) BPS</th>
<th>(3) EVS</th>
<th>(4) SDS</th>
<th>(5) MAS</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH ((N = 25))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW ((N = 25))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTROL ((N = 25))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Sample

The sample (male) was drawn from the junior and senior classes of the College of Commerce and Administration at The Ohio State University. The Ss were made familiar with the project by their teachers who introduced the experiment in their classes as a study of the relationship between supervisory practices and efficiency of performance. Those who
volunteered for the experiment were contacted individually by E and a time schedule was arranged according to the convenience of the Ss. The Ss were randomly placed into the three treatment groups. The experiment was run in the summer and autumn of 1964.

III. Procedure

E led a subject and the accomplice to the experimental room. As soon as they were seated, the E gave a typed copy of instructions to S and the accomplice. E then read the instructions which were as follows:

This experiment is being conducted under a grant awarded by Harrison & Co. of California, manufacturers of defense equipment, to Dr. W of the psychology department, and Dr. S, Dean of Research at the Ohio State University. This is a part of a study on the relationship between various types of supervisory practices, attitudes, and the efficiency of performance on a small construction task. You will first work as a team on the performance task. After the performance task is completed, you will fill out a few questionnaires.

1. Task Instructions: In this part of the experiment we are going to set-up a situation intended to be similar to one found on an assembly line in industry. Among other things, we are interested in the efficiency of various ratios of supervisor and line workers, that is, the number of workers per supervisor making for most efficient production. We are experimenting with many ratios. You happen to have signed up at a time when we are examining the rather exaggerated ratio of one line worker and one supervisor. Shortly hereafter, we will decide who plays the role of supervisor and of line worker by drawing lots. You will share equally in the "incentive" pay which will be given on the basis of (1) the number of units you complete in the time allowed, and (2) the efficiency with which the work is done. You see here on the table before you the unit parts and assembly tools, as well as the blueprints, the record blank, and instructions for the supervisor. (The E shows these materials to the subject.)

Here is the incentive pay schedule:
Unit 1. $1.00 minus 5¢ for each error.*
Unit 2. $1.50 minus 10¢ for each error.
Unit 3. $2.00 minus 10¢ for each error.
Unit 4. $2.50 minus 10¢ for each error.
Unit 5. $3.00 minus 10¢ for each error.
In addition you will receive five cents for each part assembled even if the whole unit is not completed, and $2.50 for participating in the experiment.

*Errors will include such things as trying to put a bolt in the wrong hole before the correct hole is found. It will be part of the supervisor's job to record all such errors on the record blank provided.

We have found that the average team of this kind is able to complete 3 units in the 20 minutes allowed for this part of the experiment. However, some exceptional teams have been able to complete all 5 units, and with very few errors. They, of course, collected a good bit of money for the effort.

Now let's decide which of you will play the role of line worker and which the role of supervisor.

At this point, E stopped reading instructions, wrote No. 1 on both pieces of paper, and then continued:

I have here two pieces of paper with No. 1 and No. 2 written on them. Please pick up one of them. The person who picks up No. 1 will act as supervisor and the person who picks up No. 2, will act as the line worker.

E tossed the papers on the table. The accomplice reported that he had No. 2. The S, of course, reported No. 1. So the S was declared the supervisor and the accomplice the line worker. Then the E proceeded with instructions:

It will be the supervisor's job to read these blueprints and specifications and then to direct the worker in the assembly of units. The supervisor is not permitted, under any circumstances, to assist in the actual assembly. That is, he should not actually touch any of the parts of the unit or any tools. This is to make the present experiment as similar as possible to an actual assembly line. If you handle the organization of the work efficiently and give clear and concise directions, the units can be assembled with little trouble.

The supervisor will get five minutes to get acquainted with the unit parts, the assembly instructions, and the blueprints. After that, we shall start. The time allowed for this task is 20 minutes. You will stop as soon as the time is over, and the supervisor will submit a report about the whole performance and the number of errors made.

Do you have any further questions about the experiment or is everything clear?
Additional instructions were given in the high risk conditions which will be described later on.

The $S$ was then shown the blueprints, assembly instructions, error blanks, and the unit parts. The $S$ was given 5 minutes to get acquainted with the task, but he was not allowed to handle the unit parts during this period.

As soon as the five minutes had passed, the timer was set for twenty minutes, and the work was started. $E$ then casually left the room leaving the door wide open.

At the end of the experimental period, $E$ returned, examined the parts and units assembled, and announced the amount of money that each would get. He, then, handed over the scales to the $S$ and the accomplice, and requested one of them to sit down near the door so that the task materials could be rearranged for the next subject. This was arranged so that the accomplice would not have to fill out the questionnaires. The questionnaire containing the socioeconomic variables was filled out after other scales were completed.

At the end of the experimental session, the $S$ and the accomplice again seated themselves around the experimental table, and $E$ asked the following two questions:

1. Did he (the worker) ask for assistance?
   (If yes) how many times?

2. Did you assist him (the worker)?
   (If yes) how many times?

Sometimes, in response to the first question, an $S$ would ask what $E$ meant by assistance. $E$ explained that assistance meant "to touch any of the parts or tools, or to pick up any part from the floor." At
the end, the experimenter explained the whole experiment, paid the money to S, and asked him to promise not to talk to anyone about the experimental manipulation. There was no evidence of any leakage of information at any stage of the experiment. The whole experiment took approximately 90 minutes.

IV. Experimental Task

The experimental task consisted of the assembly of five identical mechanical units. The participants (the accomplice and the subject) were given a set of assembly instructions, a set of blueprints, and two simple tools (a Crescent and an Allen wrench). The blueprints and assembly instructions appear in Appendix I.

Each unit to be assembled was approximately 4" x 3" x 3" in size, and was originally a part of an electric alarm system. Several parts from each unit were permanently removed allowing for more convenient reassembly. The units were ficticiously named Relay-Actuators. Each unit required 12 detailed steps to assemble 15 parts. This task took the average college student 10 to 12 minutes. The eighth step was especially crucial and difficult since it required correct alignment of four shafts with a top plate (the fifth part) so as to allow it to slip on and hold all shafts between it and the bottom plate. This step alone took, on the average, eight to ten minutes for an inexperienced person. Thus, the eighth step made it possible for the accomplice to fumble as long as necessary in order to hold the amount of completed work constant, and to tempt or to put pressure on Ss to violate the instructions and physically assist in the alignment of the top plate.
The amount of work actually completed in each experimental session of 20 minutes was kept constant. Throughout the experiment it was the accomplice who always assembled the units as directed by the subject. The accomplice constructed only two units and four parts of a third unit in each session. He was previously trained to adjust his pace to the efficiency of each subject's directions. Violations of the instructions by the subjects on this experimental task provided several behavioral measures of unethical behavior.

V. Experimental Manipulations

The orientation for experimental manipulations was derived from a study (Rettig & Pasamanick, 1964) on "risk hypothesis," in which only the severity of anticipated punishment was found to predict cheating behavior. Two levels of severity of anticipated punishment (which will be termed "high" and "low" conditions of risk) were introduced by the experimenter in the present study by means of verbal instructions. In the high risk condition (HR), Ss were given the following instructions:

(in addition to the instructions given to Ss in the low risk condition (LR) and the control condition)

Before we begin, let me call your attention to one additional matter. It is my duty to report any infractions of the rules to the Dean of the College of Commerce, Dean S, who is known to deal harshly with any violators of this experiment.

Following these instructions, the accomplice added:

"Who is Dean S?--the fellow at Haggerty? Yea--I know him. (a pause) He was instrumental in getting my brother kicked out of graduate school."
In LR and Control Condition no mentioning of any punishment was made, although in all conditions the Ss were given explicit instructions not to touch any of the parts or tools at any time during the experiment. At four prespecified points in LR and HR the accomplice asked for assistance in aligning parts or in picking-up a part which the accomplice had purposely dropped on the floor. Furthermore, in both conditions the accomplice continued to work (even after the buzzer signaled that the 20 minute time limit had ended) until instructed to stop by the subject. In Control Condition the experimenter sat outside the door of the experimental room, the accomplice did not ask for assistance, and the work was stopped precisely at the expiration of 20 minutes. The Control Condition was introduced to obtain base line measures so that the impact of experimental manipulations or task behavior on subsequent responses on verbal scales could be examined.

VI. Independent Variables

1. The Behavior Prediction Scale (BPS)

The BPS is a measure of predictive judgments of unethical behavior in relation to different situational variables. The scale consists of 32 items, each portraying a bank employee in a conflicting unethical situation involving the taking of money which does not belong to him. Each item includes five sources of variance in the same sequence, the levels on each source are systematically varied from high to low. These sources are (1) the chances (the expectancy) of gain, (2) the magnitude (reinforcement value) of gain, (3) the chances (the expectancy) of being caught, (4) the magnitude (the reinforcement value)
of censure, and (5) the severity of offense. A copy of the scale appears in Appendix II. The high and low levels of each source are as follows:

a. Reinforcement value of gain (RVgn)
   high: the money is needed for a crucial operation;
   low: the money is needed to pay bills.

b. Expectancy of gain (Egn)
   high: the medical operation was guaranteed to cure the illness, the money would completely cover all debts;
   low: the success of operation was not guaranteed, the money would pay only a small part of the debt.

c. Negative reinforcement value of censure (RVcs)
   high: the behavior would result in expulsion from the bank and a charge of criminal conduct;
   low: the matter would be settled privately with the bank president.

d. Expectancy of censure (Ecs)
   high: the loan or theft would be detected;
   low: the loan or theft would go unnoticed.

e. Severity of offense (Sev. Off.)
   high: stealing the money;
   low: borrowing the money without permission.

Two examples of the items are given below:

1. A bank employee was in urgent need of a large sum of money to pay his bills. The employee was thinking of stealing the money from the bank where he had access to large sums of money. The money he could get would be enough to pay a small part of his debt. The employee was sure that he would be detected. Furthermore, the employee knew that if
he was caught he would be expelled from the bank and charged with criminal conduct.

2. A bank employee was in urgent need of a large sum of money to pay for a crucial medical operation he needed. The employee was thinking of temporarily borrowing the money from the bank, but without permission. The operating surgeon had guaranteed that the operation would cure the illness. The employee was sure that the loan would go unnoticed by the bank. Furthermore, the employee was convinced that if he were caught, he could settle it privately with the bank president.

Ss were asked to make predictive judgments regarding the probability of the bank employee taking the money (ranging from definitely no (0) to definitely yes (6)). The sum total of predictive judgments on the 32 items constitute the total prediction score of a subject. The possible range of the behavior prediction score is 0 to 192. In addition, the scale provides D-scores (the difference in prediction scores on high and low levels of each dimension) which are assumed to be measures of sensitivity or importance assigned to each source (Rettig & Rawson, 1963). The use of D-scores also helps control for response-set, response bias, and faking. The D-scores on the reinforcement value of censure of this scale have been found to discriminate between cheaters and non-cheaters (Rettig & Pasamanick, 1964).

2. The Exploitative Value Scale (EVS)

The items of the EVS were drawn from Shartle's Business Form of Value Scale (1958), which was designed to measure the evaluative judgments of subjects about a wide range of practices which could or which actually do occur in a business organization. A subject is asked to evaluate the degree to which these practices are desirable or undesirable,
and a nine-point scale, ranging from extremely poor (1) to excellent (9), is provided for such evaluation. The scale had previously been factor analyzed and different orthogonal factors were extracted. Its details and dimensions are described elsewhere (Shartle et al., 1964). Brumback (1963) isolated an exploitative dimension of the Value Scale which seems to measure "value judgment of unethically competitive business behavior, which violates the social structure's regulations or norms regarding ways for reaching its goals" (p. 11). This factor was found to predict the choice of unethical alternatives in a game situation.

The EVS consists of the 35 items used by Brumback. Ten buffer items (Nos. 1, 4, 10, 11, 15, 18, 26, 28, 31, and 38), which had no loadings on the exploitative factor, were also added. This scale of 45 items was administered to all subjects. The scale is shown in Appendix III. Examples of two critical items and one buffer item are given below:

Item No. 17: The firm uses all legal means to weaken unions.

Item No. 39: Employees are asked on short notice to work overtime.

The following is an example of a buffer item:

Item No. 18: The firm is located in a rural area.

The original format of instructions for the Business Form of Value Scale was adopted. A nine-point scale was provided at the top of each page of the scale for easy reference. The score of a subject was computed by summing his evaluative responses across the 35 items. The possible range of scores was from 35 to 315.
3. **The Harlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (N-C SDS)**

This scale is a measure of need for approval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). Persons with higher scores on this scale tend to present a socially desirable picture of themselves to achieve acceptance and appreciation whereas those with lower scores on this scale show a relative independence from such behavior. It consists of 33 true-false items, each presenting a behavior viewed as either culturally desirable or undesirable, those describing desirable behavior having a high improbability of occurrence. Endorsement of an item, therefore, indicates more of a motivational disposition than the actual presence or absence of a trait. Of the 33 test items, 18 are keyed true and 15 false, thereby controlling for response set. A copy of the scale is presented in Appendix IV. The following are two examples of the items:

*Item No. 7:* I am always careful about the manner of my dress. (T)

*Item No. 11:* I like to gossip at times. (F)

The score of a subject is the sum of endorsed true and non-endorsed false items. It was assumed that persons with a strong tendency to make socially desirable responses (i.e. higher scores) would be hesitant to risk their public image by indulging in norm violating behavior.

4. **The Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS)**

Originally the MAS was developed (Taylor, 1951) to select Ss differing in generalized levels of drive. It was assumed that the scale is a measure of "manifest anxiety" or "emotional responsiveness," which
in turn contributes to drive level. The purpose of the scale was not diagnostic, and was not intended to measure all characteristics of anxiety. Taylor (1956), analyzing the purpose for which the scale was developed, states:

It is an extremely restricted one, referring only to the effects of drive level (rather than all characteristics of anxious and nonanxious individuals) in relatively simple learning situations. (p. 318)

However, it has been successfully applied to more complex situations and has been related to a number of psychological variables such as problem-solving (Maltzman & Morrissett, 1953), intolerance for ambiguity (Brogden, 1963), conflict resolution (Kamano, 1963), performance on a cognitive task (Bendig, 1959), perception of self and others (Bass & Fiedler, 1961), and more. Several studies (Gleser & Ulett, 1952; Hoyt & Magoon, 1954; Buss et al., 1955) indicate high degree of agreement between scores on the MAS and observers' ratings of overt behavior of anxiety. A high test-retest reliability ($r = .82$) over five months (Taylor, 1953) indicates that anxiety as measured by this scale is a fairly stable index of an individual's emotional responsiveness. All these evidences justify the use of this scale to measure the generalized anxiety level of subjects.

The 65 true-false items of the original LAS (Taylor, 1951) were drawn from the MMPI. The original MAS was revised (1953), and finally a 28-item version of the scale was constructed (Taylor, 1953). This 28-item MAS was used in the present study, each item describing either psychological or somatic symptoms. The scale is presented under the
title: "Biographical Inventory." A copy of the scale appears in Appendix V. The following are two examples of the items:

Item No. 1: I am often sick to my stomach. (Somatic symptom)
Item No. 15: My feelings are hurt easier than most people. (Psychological symptom)

A subject's score was computed by summing the endorsed true and unendorsed false items. The possible range of scores was 0 to 28. The use of the scales was based on previous findings (Schachter & Latane', 1964; Aronfreed, 1963) which indicate that anxiety occupies a prominent position in a syndrome of self-mediated restraints.

5. The Socioeconomic Variables

A 14-item socioeconomic questionnaire was administered to all Ss. The Ss were asked their age, marital status, area of study, parents' occupation, family income, source of financial support, their own and their parents' religiosity, family status, rural-urban background, their own and their parents' political affiliations, and their order of birth. Information regarding these variables were collected to determine if a relationship exists between them and unethical risk behavior.

VII. Dependent Variables

The dependent variables consisted of violations of experimental instructions and admission of such violations.

1. Violations of Experimental Instructions

Violations of experimental instructions were the principal behavioral criteria under consideration. The scales and the experimental
manipulations were designed to predict these criterion measures. Three types of violations were recorded:

a. Assistance given to the accomplice. The violation score in this case was the number of times a subject assisted the accomplice in the actual assembly and/or picked-up parts from the floor. The accomplice asked twice for assistance, and twice dropped a part, making possible a scoring range of zero to four (0 to 4).

b. Error scores. The accomplice committed four errors, two on each unit. The number of times a subject failed to record errors, either committed by the accomplice or by the subject himself, constituted his error score. The upper limit of the range depended on the errors made by the Ss.

c. Overtime. A buzzer was set to indicate the end of the experimental session. If a subject ignored the instructions and did not stop work at the sound of the buzzer, it was counted as a violation. The score on this criterion was yes (1) or no (0) overtime.

2. Admission of Violations

Two indices of admissions of violations were obtained. At the end of the experimental session, Ss were asked the following two questions:

1. Did he (the accomplice) ask for help? (If yes)--How many times?

2. Did you help him? (If yes)--How many times?
Responses to these questions were believed to be determined in part by the number of times a subject actually helped and in part, by the perceived consequences of his act as the latter should vary as a direct function of the risk conditions.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

I. Pilot Study

A group of 16 Ss, drawn from the same population source as that of the main study (male juniors and seniors in the College of Commerce and Administration), were run to check the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations and the shortcomings of the procedure. The Ss went through the experimental task, filled out the scales, and at the end of the experiment frankly discussed the various facets of the experimental design and procedure. The purposes of this exploratory study were to determine whether or not

1. The risk manipulations were clearly communicated and taken seriously.

2. The Ss developed an improper set about the purpose of the experiment. The experiment was introduced as a study on the relationship of various supervisory practices, attitudes, and judgments to the efficiency of performance. Emphasis was placed on performance and output on a construction task plus the need to follow instructions which in fact, made it difficult to maximize the gain (of money). It seemed necessary to ascertain whether the Ss did or did not develop the set that the E was measuring (1) the subject's flexibility to deal with the worker or (2) the socially desirable characteristics of cooperation, help, and other such human relation values. It was feared that any such
set would make the helping behavior (which is really a violation) an expected one, and would, thus, invalidate the results.

3. The duration of the experimental session and the task were optimum.

4. There were other procedural matters of which the E should be aware.

It was invariably found that Ss in the high risk condition were aware of the possible consequences of their deviant acts, although some felt that the mention of punishment was over stated. Mann-Whitney U-tests showed significant differences in behavioral violations ($p < .05; N = 16$) under high and low conditions of risk. Interviews indicated that all Ss believed that the experiment was a study of the relationship between a supervisor's capacity to organize work and the amount of output. No subject in the pilot study reported that he had suspected the actual purpose of the experiment.

However, before beginning the main study the following changes in procedure were considered necessary:

1. The duration of the experimental task was reduced from 25 minutes to 20 minutes.

2. The portion of the instructions describing the punishment for violations was shifted from the middle to the end of the instructions in order to increase the impact of this manipulation.

3. The door of the experimental room was kept wide open during the experimental task. After a few subjects were run, it became evident that if the door was kept closed, the expectancy of being caught was reduced to near zero, which in turn, made the experiment manipulation (the severity of punishment) ineffective.
As all these changes were made while running the first six subjects, the remaining ten subjects were included in the sample for the main study. Four Ss in the main study detected that the accomplice was a planted subject, and had to be eliminated from the analysis. All analyses are based on the 75 Ss, 25 in each treatment group (i.e. high risk, low risk, and control conditions).

II. Analyses of the Dependent Variables

The means and standard deviations of three types of violations under two conditions of risk appear in Table 1. The significance of the differences among mean violations under the high and low conditions are also included. The significance for differences in the first two dependent variables (i.e. the assistance given and the error score) are tested by the student t test. Since the overtime scores were dichotomized into yes (1) or no (0), a chi-square test is used. The results support the first hypothesis that unethical behavior varies as a function of perceived risk; the greater the severity of anticipated punishment the less frequent will be the occurrence of violations.

The split-half reliability coefficient scores for the dependent variables, corrected for attenuation, are listed in Table 2. The reliability coefficients are based on violation scores obtained during the assembly of the first and the second units of the machine. These units were constructed by the accomplice during the experimental session. The reliability of the third dependent variable, overtime, could not be computed. Since the supervisor either stopped or continued the work at
TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE PERFORMED UPON THE
DEPENDENT VARIABLES UNDER CONDITIONS OF
HIGH AND LOW RISK (N = 50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavioral Criteria (Type of Violation)</th>
<th>Risk Conditions</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>( p^* )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Assistance given</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>( t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Error score</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>( t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Overtime</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>( \chi^2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Two-tailed test.

the end of the experimental session, there was no way of splitting the
binary scores on this dependent variable.

The intercorrelations of the dependent variables appear in the
upper matrix of Table 2. The intercorrelations are positive, but they
are not high, indicating that the three measures of unethical behavior
cover different aspects of unethical behavior.

The means and standard deviations of admission of "being asked"
for assistance and "giving" assistance are shown in Table 3. Included
also are tests of significance of difference in means between the two
risk conditions and also between the two types of admission. It is
apparent that the Ss in both conditions report "being asked" for
assistance more often than "giving" assistance. However, this difference
reaches significance only under condition of high risk (\( p < .01 \)).
TABLE 2
RELIABILITY (DIAGONALS) AND INTERCORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG BEHAVIORAL CRITERIA (N = 50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Assistance given</td>
<td>(.84)</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Error score</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(.68)</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Overtime</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05.

TABLE 3
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RISK CONDITIONS AND ADMISSION OF "GIVEN ASSISTANCE" (N = 50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Risk Conditions</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (N = 25)</td>
<td>Low (N = 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission of being asked for assistance</td>
<td>M = .92</td>
<td>M = .64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 1.03</td>
<td>SD = .63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission of giving assistance</td>
<td>M = .16</td>
<td>M = .56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = .47</td>
<td>SD = .51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>t = 3.61</em>*</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations between being asked for assistance and giving assistance

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* *p < .01 (two-tailed test).*
Ss admit "giving" assistance significantly less often (p < .01) under high risk condition (\(\bar{x} = .16\)) than under low risk condition (\(\bar{x} = .56\)), but Ss put more blame on the worker for "asking" assistance under high (\(\bar{x} = .92\)) than low risk conditions (\(\bar{x} = .64\)). This finding is also supported by the correlations between admission of "being asked" for assistance and admission of "giving" assistance. In the low risk condition, there is a significant (p < .01) positive correlation between the two. In high risk condition, however, there is no such correspondence (\(\bar{x} = .02\)) between these two types of admission.

Summary of analysis of variance for scores on the admission of "giving" assistance appear in Table 4. The results listed in the table indicate that both the risk conditions, and the levels of actual violations, have significant effects (p < .05) on the "giving" of assistance. The levels of high and low violations are determined by cutting the violation scores at the median for each condition. Table 5 indicates that high violators have higher admission scores (\(\bar{x} = .60\)) than low violators (\(\bar{x} = .25\)), and the mean admission of "giving" assistance score is greater under low risk condition (\(\bar{x} = .57\)), than under high risk condition (\(\bar{x} = .28\)).

The summary of analysis of variance for scores on the admission of "being asked" for assistance is given in Table 6. The results indicate that the scores are not separately influenced either by the risk conditions or the degree of violation, but rather by an interaction of both. The means of the high and low violators under high and low conditions of risk appear in Table 7. The mean scores indicate that high
### Table 4

**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SCORES ON ADMISSION OF "GIVING ASSISTANCE"**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk Conditions (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.913</td>
<td>4.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violations (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.427</td>
<td>6.73*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.548</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05.

### Table 5

**COMPARISONS OF MEAN SCORES ON THE ADMISSION OF GIVING ASSISTANCE BETWEEN CONDITIONS OF RISK AND DEGREES OF VIOLATIONS (N = 50)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of Violations</th>
<th>Risk Conditions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 7)</td>
<td>(N = 12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 18)</td>
<td>(N = 13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{X}$</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 6

**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SCORES ON ADMISSION OF "BEING ASKED" FOR ASSISTANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>hS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk Conditions (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violations (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>5.83*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05.*

### TABLE 7

**COMPARISONS OF MEAN SCORES ON THE ADMISSIONS OF "BEING ASKED" FOR ASSISTANCE BY CONDITIONS OF RISK AND DEGREES OF VIOLATIONS (N = 50)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of Violations</th>
<th>Risk Conditions</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 18)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


violators put far more blame on the worker under high risk condition than under low risk condition, or than the low violators under any risk conditions.

The mean payments made to the Ss under the three conditions (high risk, low risk, and control) are compared by an analysis of variance. Since the payments were based on the parts and units assembled and on the errors made during the assembling process, and the accomplice invariably completed the same number of units and committed the same number of errors, the amount of payments are almost equal. The mean payments in the three conditions are the following:

- High risk condition = $4.93
- Low risk condition = $4.92
- Control condition = $4.96

III. Analyses of Independent Variables

The mean scores of the Ss on the independent variables under the three conditions can be found in Table 8. Included also are the tests for significance of differences among means. The table indicates that none of the differences reach significance.

The results, thus, substantiate the hypothesis (No. 9) that the experimental manipulation does not differentially affect the responses of Ss to the cognitively mediated verbal scales.

Three categories of violators were determined on the basis of the Ss' violations on the criterion of actual assistance given by the Ss. Ss who gave no assistance are designated as "No violator" (N = 44) which also includes the Ss of the control condition (N = 25). Ss with one or two violations are recognized as "low violators" (N = 18), and Ss having
scores of three or four violations are regarded as "high violators" (N = 13). In determining the categories for violators, only the assistance scores are considered, since the assistance in the assembly process provides an example of violations for the most explicitly stated norm of the experiment.

The mean scores of high, low, and no violators on the verbal scales are given in Table 9. Included also is the test of significance of differences between means. The table indicates that high, low, and no violators do not significantly differ in scores on the verbal scales, except on the Exploitative Value Scale (EVS), where the differences are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Risk Conditions</th>
<th>Control (N = 25)</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (N=25)</td>
<td>Low (N=25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>70.40</td>
<td>82.48</td>
<td>88.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>RVcs</td>
<td>21.20</td>
<td>27.12</td>
<td>22.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ecs</td>
<td>16.08</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td>13.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Rvgn</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>12.64</td>
<td>13.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Egn</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td>17.92</td>
<td>14.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Sev. Off.</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>EVS</td>
<td>165.32</td>
<td>155.52</td>
<td>166.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>16.04</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td>15.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>8.76</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 9

Mean Comparisons of the Independent Variables on Three Levels of Violations (N = 50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Violators</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zero (N = 44)</td>
<td>Low (N = 18)</td>
<td>High (N = 13)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. BPS</td>
<td>78.52</td>
<td>89.00</td>
<td>75.92</td>
<td>≈ 1.00</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rvcs</td>
<td>21.81</td>
<td>28.22</td>
<td>23.23</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ecs</td>
<td>14.84</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RVgn</td>
<td>10.38</td>
<td>15.22</td>
<td>10.38</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Egn</td>
<td>13.97</td>
<td>17.66</td>
<td>16.84</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sev. Off.</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>≈ 1.00</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. EVS</td>
<td>165.22</td>
<td>167.66</td>
<td>145.38</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>≈ .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SDS</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>14.50</td>
<td>12.69</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. MAS</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>≈ 1.00</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

significant at $p < .05$. Comparisons of individual pairs of means indicate that only the high violators differ in their value scores from the Ss classified as the low and no violators. Figure 4 also indicates this trend.

When the value scores of high and low violators under high and low conditions of risk are plotted (see Figure 4), only the high violators show variation in their value scores. Under the high risk condition, their scores are markedly lowered, which may possibly imply a strict moralist orientation. The figure also reveals the sensitivity of high violators to the risk in a situation.
Results of analyses of variance for scores on the dependent variables of (a) the assistance given and (b) the error scores appear in Tables 10 and 11. Each table contains summaries of four separate analyses of variance for each of the four independent variables. Two levels for each of the independent variables are derived by cutting the scores on each scale at the median. The analyses reveal that only the experimental manipulation of risk significantly affects the two types of violations (i.e. the assistance given and the error scores) except in one case in which the high and low levels of the SDS scores had significant effect \((p < .05)\) on the error scores. However, in this case, the interaction between the SDS levels and the risk conditions is also significant. Table 11 provides mean error scores for the high and low levels of SDS scores under the high and low conditions of risk. A survey of Table 12 indicates that the mean score is exceedingly high under the low risk condition for the subjects of low SDS scores. This finding would suggest that violations are especially marked when Ss are neither concerned for their image nor anticipate severe consequences.

The above mentioned analyses of variance include both violators and non-violators. When the non-violators are dropped from the analyses, and correlation coefficients are computed between the three types of violations and the independent variables for violators, most of the independent variables correlate significantly with assistance given and error scores. Table 13 presents these correlation coefficients. Among the five sources of the BPS, only the RVcs has significant correlation with the assistance given, although the direction is reversed. Overtime does not have any significant correlation with any of the independent
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BPS (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Condition (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44.22</td>
<td>39.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RVcs (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Conditions (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46.12</td>
<td>41.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. EVS (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Conditions (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38.99</td>
<td>34.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SDS (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Conditions (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38.77</td>
<td>33.71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01.
### Table 11

**Summaries of Analysis of Variance of Scores on the Error Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BPS (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Conditions (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>7.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RVcs (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Conditions (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>5.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. EVS (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>&lt; 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Conditions (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>5.55*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SDS (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>5.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Conditions (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>4.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (Within)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01.**

*p < .05.*
TABLE 12

COMPARISONS OF MEAN ERROR SCORES BETWEEN TWO CONDITIONS OF RISK AND TWO LEVELS OF THE SDS (N = 50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of SDS</th>
<th>Risk Conditions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>(N = 16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>(N = 9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

variables except for the risk conditions. Inspection of the correlation coefficients suggests that the experimentally induced risk conditions account for more variance than any of the other sources considered separately.

Among the 14 socioeconomic variables, only four (birth order, marital status, political affiliation, and financial support) have significant correlations with one or more of the dependent variables.

Table 14 presents intercorrelations among the independent variables. Here, most of the correlations are low, indicating that these independent variables are fairly independent.

IV. Multiple Regressions

The low correlations among the independent variables suggest the usefulness of computing multiple regression to predict the dependent variables. Multiple correlations were computed to examine the amount of variance that could be explained by the multiple correlation coefficients. Beta weights were computed by the Wherry-Doolittle back
### TABLE 13
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES (N = 31)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Types of Violations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>Error</td>
<td>Overtime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Risk Conditions (N = 50)</td>
<td>.670**</td>
<td>.317**</td>
<td>.468**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BPS</td>
<td>-.438*</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. RVcs</td>
<td>-.369*</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ecs</td>
<td>-.097</td>
<td>-.264</td>
<td>-.251</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RVgn</td>
<td>-.189</td>
<td>.288</td>
<td>-.288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Egn</td>
<td>-.143</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sev. Off.</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>-.138</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. EVS</td>
<td>-.394*</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>-.240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SDS</td>
<td>-.326*</td>
<td>-.565**</td>
<td>-.233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. MAS</td>
<td>-.121</td>
<td>.480**</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Birth Order (N = 50)</td>
<td>.444**</td>
<td>.317*</td>
<td>.468**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Marital Status (N = 50)</td>
<td>.283*</td>
<td>.274*</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Political Affiliation (N = 50)</td>
<td>.313*</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>.341*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Financial Support (N = 50)</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>-.414**</td>
<td>-.223</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01. Two-tailed test.

*p < .05. Two-tailed test.
### TABLE 14

**INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (n = 50)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Risk Conditions</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.32*</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BPS</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. RVcs</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. EVS</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SDS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.33*</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. iNAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Birth Order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Political Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Financial Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01. Two-tailed test.**

* p < .05. Two-tailed test.
solution. The following are the equations for the three dependent variables (1. the assistance given; 2. the error scores; and 3. the overtime):

\[
\bar{Z}_I = 0.67Z_1 + 0.25Z_2 + 0.17Z_3 + 0.23Z_4 + 0.20Z_5 - 0.21Z_6 - 0.18Z_7 + 0.14Z_8 - 0.08Z_9 - 0.16Z_{10}
\]

\[
\bar{Z}_{II} = 0.14Z_1 - 0.10Z_2 + 0.09Z_3 + 0.07Z_4 + 0.41Z_5 + 0.27Z_6 - 0.11Z_7 + 0.09Z_8 + 0.02Z_9 + 0.16Z_{10}
\]

\[
\bar{Z}_{III} = 0.32Z_1 + 0.19Z_2 - 0.22Z_3 + 0.01Z_4 + 0.01Z_5 + 0.00Z_6 + 0.28Z_7 - 0.20Z_8 + 0.17Z_9 + 0.09Z_{10}
\]

The multiple correlation coefficients are the following:

\[
R_I = 1 2 3 \ldots 10 = 0.95
\]

\[
R_{II} = 1 2 3 \ldots 10 = 0.49
\]

\[
R_{III} = 1 2 3 \ldots 10 = 0.40
\]

The multiple correlation coefficients, after correcting for shrinkage by the Wherry shrinkage formula, are the following:

\[
\bar{R}_I = 1 2 3 \ldots 10 = 0.94
\]

\[
\bar{R}_{II} = 1 2 3 \ldots 10 = 0.20
\]

\[
\bar{R}_{III} = 1 2 3 \ldots 10 = 0.17
\]

Table 15 presents the amount of variance explained by three groups of the predictors. The first group consists of the situational variable of experimentally induced risk, the second of the five scale scores, and the third group of the four socioeconomic variables which are significantly related to one or more of the dependent variables. The table seems to indicate the following: The risk condition is the best predictor for the first dependent variable, the scales for the second,
and socioeconomic variables for the third. Each of the three groups of variables seem to be good predictors for two of the dependent variables.

### TABLE 15

**AMOUNT OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY EACH OF THREE GROUPS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (IN PERCENT)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Variables</th>
<th>Violations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Error</td>
<td>Overtime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Risk Condition (One variable)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Scales (Five variables)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Socioeconomic Variables (Four variables)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. **Canonical Correlations**

Canonical correlations were computed to examine the predictive indices of the independent variables. Table 16 shows the differential weights of the dependent and independent variables and of the canonical correlations. It seems that for the first dimension which covers mostly the assistance given and the measure of overtime, the EVS, the SDS, and the Ecs are most effective predictors. The second dimension, which consists mainly of the error score and assistance given, is best predicted by the Ecs, the EVS, and the SDS. The ivAS, the RVgn, and the SDS have moderately higher loadings on the third dimension which consists mainly of the overtime and the assistance given.
TABLE 16
DIFFERENTIAL WEIGHTS OF INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES
AND CANONICAL CORRELATIONS (N = 50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I (Weights)</td>
<td>II (Weights)</td>
<td>III (Weights)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Dependent variables:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Assistance given</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>-3.48</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Error scores</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Overtime</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>-4.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Independent variables:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Exploitative Value Scale</td>
<td>-6.37</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SDS</td>
<td>-6.84</td>
<td>-2.10</td>
<td>-2.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MAS</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>-3.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Egn D-score</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RVgn D-score</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>-2.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ecs D-score</td>
<td>-5.79</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. RVcs D-score</td>
<td>-3.85</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sev. Offense</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Total BPS</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canonical correlations</td>
<td></td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. Interaction Trends

Interaction effects are plotted to examine the trends. Figures indicating the interaction effects appear in Appendix VIII. Figures 1 through 6 represent the interaction effects of the risk conditions and
the two categories of violators (high and low) on (a) the independent variables, and (b) the dependent variables of admissions of "giving" and "being asked for" assistance. Figures 2 and 4 show that high violators make greater differentiation between the high and low conditions of risk. The Ss put more blame on the worker for violations under the condition of high risk. This interaction is found to be significant (p < .05).

Figures 7 through 11 show interaction-effects of the risk conditions and the independent variables on the dependent variables of violations (the assistance given and the error scores). Figure 11 indicates that Ss low on the need for approval made more of the type II violations (error scores) under the low-risk condition (p < .05) than did high need approval Ss. Other figures indicate that Ss with lower than median scores on the independent variables (low risk takers) show greater differentiation in the violation scores under the high and low conditions of risk than did the high risk takers.

VII. Socioeconomic Variables

The mean violation scores of the four socioeconomic variables, which are significantly related to the behavioral criterion measures of unethical behavior, appear in Table 17. The table indicates that divorced assisted more than married or singles. Ss who depend on parents have higher violation scores than others. The only child have highest scores on the assistance given and the error scores. The mean violation scores on the remaining ten socioeconomic variables are included in Appendix VII.
TABLE 17
MEAN VIOLATION SCORES FOR SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Violations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Error</td>
<td>Overtime</td>
<td>p</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Marital status:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Single (N = 34)</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>&lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Divorced or widowed (4)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Married (12)</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Financial support:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Parental support (6)</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>&lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Partial self (30)</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Self support (14)</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political affiliation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Democrat (16)</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Republican (20)</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Independent (13)</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Other (1)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Birth order:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Eldest child (22)</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Youngest child (11)</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Only child (11)</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Neither youngest nor eldest (6)</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

1. The Dependent Variables

The lack of high correlations among the three measures of unethical behavior seems to indicate that they involve somewhat different sets of meditational processes. It is reasonable to assume that the explicitness of the verbal instructions and the available situational cues were different for the three measures. For the first measure (the assistance given) the instructions were quite explicit. However, the accomplice was the first to ask for assistance, thus creating a supportive ground for further violations. Since the instructions were explicit, awareness of violations were clear, but the seriousness of violations was possibly reduced by the sharing of responsibility with the co-worker. Different considerations are possibly involved in the measure of overtime. The sound of the buzzer demanded that a decision be taken as to whether or not to stop work and limit monetary gain or to let the worker continue and earn more money. In addition, the buzzer might be a signal for the experimenter to return, thus involving a very high expectancy of being caught and punished for unethical conduct. Only twelve out of fifty subjects (one in high risk condition and eleven in the low risk condition) violated the instructions regarding overtime, whereas thirty-one violated the other two experimental norms.
The third criterion measure, the reporting of errors, did not impose such a definite and difficult demand. Obviously, the recording of errors required a judgment as to whether an error had been committed or not. In the involved process of the experiment, it was not unexpected for subjects to make biased judgment, have a selective perception, or even to forget unintentionally to record errors on the record sheets. The relatively even distribution of violators on this measure in the high and low risk conditions (twelve violators under high and nineteen under low risk conditions), and the reduced reliability indicate that there was greater conflict within a subject about this variable than about other criterion measures. Violations on the reporting of errors perhaps resembles more a conduct in "bad faith" (Sartre, 1956) which signifies a form of unethical behavior where the violator is only partially aware of his conduct.

2. Admissions of Violations

The effects of perceived risk were measured through admissions to "having been asked for assistance" and of "having given assistance." The methodological shortcoming of the second measure (the admission of having given assistance) should be noted here. This admission was influenced not only by the risk conditions, but also by the number of times Ss actually did assist (Table 4, p < .05). Actual assistance is significantly correlated to the admission of assistance (r = .47, N = 50, p < .01). However, when the effect of risk condition was partialled out, the correlation coefficient was insignificant (r = .24, N = 50, p ≥ .05). More interesting findings were revealed when the correlations between the two variables were examined separately for high and low conditions of
risk. In the low risk condition, in which 24 out of 25 subjects actually assisted, there was no correlation ($r = .09$) between the two variables. But in the high risk condition, when only seven out of twenty-five assisted, the $r$ was increased to $.62$ ($N = 25$, $p < .01$), possibly because there was no reason why non-violators should admit that they did assist. When the correlation for only seven violators was computed, the $r$ dropped to $.36$ ($N = 7$, $p > .05$), although it was still positive. The conclusion seems to be that the admission of giving assistance does not always follow the actual assistance given, but rather, it is a function of perceived consequences of one's own conduct which in turn is determined by the severity of experimentally induced risk and the degrees of violations.

The admission to having "been asked for assistance" was the second measure of the effects of perceived risk. This measure seems more critical than the first one because the number of times Ss were asked to assist was kept constant. Any variations on this admission are believed to be determined either by some personality disposition to expose one's co-worker in a risk situation, or by the perception of the immediate situation. Since none of the personality characteristics measured in the present study (such as the exploitative values, the need for social approval, and manifest anxiety), correlate with this variable (the correlations ranged from -.04 to .08), it seems more reasonable to assume that the admission scores on this variable are a function of the experimental situation which includes the induced risk and the violating behavior. Table 7 indicates that Ss have a greater
tendency to expose the fellow-worker (a) when the risk is high, and
(b) when they themselves are high violators. Maximum blame was placed on
the worker (the accomplice) by the high violators under the high risk
condition and minimum by low violators under the low risk condition.
This finding supports the conclusion reached in the case of the first
measure of effects of perceived risk that admission of one's own
violations and the shifting of blame on to others may be a function of
perceived risk which is at least partly determined by the experimentally
induced risk, and partly by one's own violating behavior.

Further support for this view is found in Table 3. Ss made
greater differentiation between admission of "being asked for assistance"
and "giving assistance" under high than under low risk condition. Under
high risk condition, Ss possibly perceived more risk, and hence, more
often denied having given assistance as well as more frequently expose
the worker (the accomplice), thus reducing the correlation between the
two admissions to .02. When the risk is low, however, there is less
need to deny one's own violations and to expose the fellow-worker. Hence,
the correspondence between the two admissions is significant ($r = .52,
N = .25, p < .01$).

3. The Sensitization Effects

Hypothesis 4 was derived from a study by Brumberg (1963) in
which he found that the scores on the exploitative dimension of the value
scale were positively correlated with the choice of unethical alternatives
in a game situation. It seems logical to believe that persons who
approve of unethical business practices are also likely to employ similar
means themselves when personal gain is involved. However, in the present
study, the correlation coefficient between the assistance given and the scores on the Exploitative Value Scale was significantly negative. The high violators had significantly lower mean scores on the EVS (Table 9, and also in Figure 4 of Appendix VIII). The critical procedural differences between the two studies were the following: Brumback administered the complete "Organization Value Dimensions Questionnaire: Business Form" (the exploitative dimension was extracted later) in regular classroom situations at least one week prior to the major study. Furthermore, Ss were informed that "there was no connection between the first and the second experiments; both were alleged to involve independent research objectives" (p. 22). On the other hand, the present investigator administered only the exploitative dimension of the Value Scale (together with other scales) immediately after the experimental task. It was therefore quite likely that the Ss were particularly sensitive to evaluation, especially the high violators who were aware of their violations. Violations possibly sensitized them to subsequent situational cues, and the EVS provided a feedback to their "evaluative apprehension," thus arousing self-protective mechanisms. It seems likely that they defensively lowered their scores on the EVS attempting to construct facets of strict moralistic orientation. This "sensitization hypothesis" may also possibly explain the difference in findings of the present study and the one conducted by Mills (1958), in which he found that the Ss became more favorable in their attitude towards cheating if they had themselves cheated prior to the attitude measurement. On the other hand, honest subjects became more severe in their attitude towards cheating. A closer look of the study by Mills reveals several interesting facts. Firstly,
the Ss were asked not to write their names on the attitude questionnaire, thus assuring their anonymity. Secondly, items on the questionnaire referred to the instances of cheating, and Ss were asked "the degree of punishment appropriate for each misbehavior" (p. 519). Furthermore, Ss were sixth grade children, and there was a time gap of 24 hours between the experimental task and the attitude measurement. All these facts taken together seem to suggest that the dishonest subjects might have projected themselves in the cheating situations of the attitude questionnaire, and passed judgments on themselves. In that case it was natural to condone one's own misdoings.

It should be argued here that if the "sensitization hypothesis" is plausible, it should show up in the responses on other scales. It did affect the responses to the EPS, where the Ss were asked to judge the probability of a bank employee taking money which did not belong to him. The high violators reported significantly lower probability of the bank employee taking money. However, surprisingly enough, there is no such sensitizing effect on the social desirability scores. There is no effect of either the risk conditions or the violations. The SD scores are found to be negatively related to assistance given. It is reasonable to assume that the sensitization effect should influence the SD scale because it is believed to measure not only the need for approval but also to be influenced by situational variables (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964).

It seems, then, that the sensitization effect is either very specific, depending on the direct relevance of the test contents, or that it is simply an experimental artifact. It would seem necessary, therefore, to replicate the experiment, counter-balancing the EVS and the
experimental task, and varying the severity of risk in order to gather more evidence in support of either of the above positions. In the meanwhile, the sensitization effect is entertained as a purely tentative hypothesis.

4. Independent Variables

Among the three groups of independent variables, the experimentally manipulated risk proves to be very effective in predicting all three types of violations. It alone is able to explain forty-five percent of the variance in the violation of giving assistance (Table 15). The five scales (the EVS, the EPS, the SDS, and the iAS), in combination, are most effective in predicting the error-score violations. The four socioeconomic variables are best for explaining the variance of the third violation (overtime). Table 15 further indicates that for a definite purpose, a specifically designed situational variable may be the most effective predictor. However, if the phenomenon under consideration is complex, having many aspects and processes, the most pragmatic approach would be to select a battery of scales designed to measure different aspects of the phenomenon.

No definite interpretation is offered here for a significant negative correlation between the negative reinforcement value of censure (as measured by the RVcs of the EPS) and the assistance given. One possible reason might be the contaminating effect of the total prediction scores on the EPS. The total prediction scores have high negative correlation with the assistance given. Since the RVcs scores are derived from the EPS, it is not unlikely that the RVcs scores are influenced by the
strategy of Ss. As expected, the other sources of the BPS are not significantly related to any of the violators.

Manifest anxiety was positively correlated to the error scores. It seems that the high violators became highly anxious. However, for the assistance given, the high violators are highly anxious only in the high risk conditions ($r = .35$). In the low risk condition the trend is in opposite direction.

5. Socioeconomic Variables

Only four out of fourteen socioeconomic variables are significantly related to one or more of the dependent variables. Ss who are divorced or widowed or dependent on the parents for financial support are found to be high violators. Democrats have more records of violations than Republicans, although the difference is not significant. The table in Appendix VII indicates that Jewish students have significantly higher violation scores than other religious groups which confirms the finding reported in a study by Rawson (1961). Students of low income families are more unethical than the high income groups, sons of teachers are least unethical. Surprisingly enough those who claimed to be "very religious" are highly unethical.

6. Conclusions

The following conclusions were reached in support of some of the hypotheses:

1. Risk conditions have significant effects on all three types of violations.
2. Admission of "giving assistance" is found to be influenced by the perceived consequences of unethical conduct which, in turn, are determined by the severity of experimentally induced risk and by degrees of violations.

3. Admission of "being asked" for assistance seems to be determined by the combined effects of risk conditions and degrees of violations.

4. Ss who are not very concerned about their socially desirable image are high violators especially when the risk is low.

5. Ss with at least one of the following characteristics are found to be high violators: Jewish religion, low family income, dependence on parents for financial support, and professed high religiosity.

The following findings did not agree with the hypotheses:

1. Exploitative value scores are inversely related to the assistance given.

2. The negative reinforcement value of censure is inversely related to the assistance given.

3. Manifest anxiety seems to be influenced by risk conditions and by the degrees of violations. High violators are highly anxious under high risk, and less anxious under low risk conditions.

4. Overtime could be predicted only by risk conditions, birth order, and political affiliations.

7. Implications

It would be presumptuous to claim that the findings obtained in the present study are immediately generalizable to industry. This study
should be considered as an exploratory attempt to develop some tentative hypotheses and suggestions for further study concerning the control of unethical practices in industries.

It seems that the sources of unethical practices lie in the work-climate, in the personality dispositions of employees, and in the explicitness of expected behavior. Employees bring with them a set of values, needs, and modes of satisfying their needs. If the environment is perceived as conducive and the standards are ambiguous, the dispositions result in violations of role-prescriptions and norms.

For effective control of norm-violating practices, attempts should, then, be directed toward both the selection procedure and the social climate of an industry. Potential violators may be screened out by a suitably selected battery of scales. The scoring and interpretations of scales should be given special attention in the light of findings of the sensitizing effect in the present study. A supportive ethical climate can be maintained by developing codes of conduct based on a realistic appraisal of legitimate needs and demands of various factions within the organization. Furthermore, the expectations of the organization regarding codes of conduct should be unequivocally communicated. Clearly stated expectations, backed by risk of severe censure, may possibly be the best deterrent of undesired deviant acts.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to delineate empirically some of the situational and personality variables of unethical risk taking behavior by simulating conditions similar to those found on an assembly line in industry.

Research was reviewed which revealed that first line supervisors often work under high and conflicting demands from management, union, and line workers. Management is mostly interested in maximum output through maximum efficiency while workers expect a supervisor to be "warm," "friendly," and a defender of their interests. The union, too, demands a particular code of conduct. These different sets of expectations are often in conflict. Very often the first line supervisors, who are in direct contact with workers, have to resort to means which are generally considered deviant and unethical.

The present study attempted to simulate such a conflict situation. The experiment was run in two person work teams--a supervisor and a worker--with one (the worker) being a confederate. The subject was motivated to complete a large amount of work during a limited time period. The supervisor was assigned the job of organizing the work and directing the worker in assembling parts of a machine unit while the worker (the accomplice) was to perform the actual assembly. A set of verbal instructions provided the standards of behavior expected from the
supervisor. He was instructed (a) not to provide any physical assistance in the assembly, (b) to report any errors made either by the worker or by the supervisor himself, and finally (c) to stop the work precisely at the end of the experimental session. Violations of these standards provided measures of unethical behavior. At the end of the experiment Ss were asked (1) whether the co-worker asked for assistance, and (2) whether they gave it. These two admissions provided the measures of the effects of perceived risk.

Three groups of independent variables were examined as sources of unethical behavior. The first involved the experimental manipulations of risk (high and low) by mentioning or not mentioning severe punishment for any violation. In both experimental conditions Ss were tempted to violate the standards. A control condition was also introduced in which Ss were neither tempted nor given any chance to violate nor was punishment mentioned.

The second group of variables consisted of five situational determinants of unethical risk taking behavior which were measured by the Behavior Prediction Scale. These determinants are the measures of sensitivity to situational cues.

The third group of variables measured personality dispositions to take unethical risk. Here the exploitative values, need for approval, and manifest anxiety were measured. Several socioeconomic variables were also gathered to determine if a relationship exists between them and unethical behavior. Seventy-five male juniors and seniors of the College of Commerce at The Ohio State University participated in the experiment. They were randomly placed in three treatment groups.
The following findings supported the hypotheses:

1. Unethical behavior was significantly more frequent under low risk than under high risk condition. Furthermore, the effect of risk showed in all three measures of violations.

2. Admissions of violations were significantly more frequent under low than under high risk, and for the high violators than for the low violators.

3. The high violators put more blame on the co-worker under high risk conditions than the low violators under low risk condition.

4. Significant inverse relation was found between the need for approval and violations.

5. Ss with low need for approval reported less errors under low risk condition than Ss with high need for approval under high risk condition.

The following findings were not in agreement with the hypotheses:

1. The exploitative values were inversely related to the assistance given by Ss.

2. The high violators were highly anxious in high risk, and were less anxious in low risk condition.

3. The negative reinforcement value of the censure was inversely related to the assistance given.

4. Manifest anxiety was positively correlated with the error scores.

Attempts were made to interpret these findings, and implications of the results for selection and training of supervisors were discussed.
The conclusion seemed to emerge that unethical risk behavior is a function of (a) the explicitness of standards involved, (b) the perceived consequences of violations, and (c) the personality characteristics such as values, need for approval, etc.
APPENDIX I

ASSEMBLY INSTRUCTIONS, BLUEPRINTS,
ERROR BLANKS
ASSEMBLY INSTRUCTIONS

1. Orient the BASE PLATE and MOTOR SUB-ASSEMBLY so that the corner posts and motor are up.

2. Pick up the ESCAPEMENT SHAFT, orient it so that the wider shaft sections are down. Insert it in the hole in the base plate.

3. Pick up the ESCAPEMENT WHEEL, orient it so that the grooved (splined) portion of the shaft is up. Insert the shaft into the hole in the base plate. The ESCAPEMENT ARM should fit into teeth on the ESCAPEMENT WHEEL.

4. Pick up the SECONDARY DRIVE WHEEL, orient it so that the grooved (splined) portion of the shaft is down. Insert it in the hole in the base plate. (The gear should mesh with the escapement wheel shaft groove [spline], and the primary drive wheel should mesh with the secondary shaft groove [spline].)

5. Pick up the TOP PLATE and slide the SPRING onto the PAWL SHAFT.

6. Move the TOP PLATE into the position so that the corner posts are aligned with the holes in the top plate, and the MOTOR SHAFT protrudes through the wide slot.

7. Check the MOTOR SHAFT to see that it is seated as far down into the motor as it will go, i.e., the shaft does not wobble.

8. Align shaft of all wheels, escapement shaft and pawl shaft so that the top plate will slip on. All shafts are retained in place by the top and base plates. The tips of shafts of all wheels and escapement shaft should fit into the holes of the top plate.
(Misalignment of any of the shafts or the corner posts will prevent the top plate from seating fully.)

9. Pick up the **TRIANGLE PLATE**, keep the **CAM STOP POST** up, and slip it over the **MOTOR SHAFT** in such a way that it covers the wide slot in the top plate.

10. Place a **WASHER** and **HEX NUT** on each of the corner posts. Tighten all hex nuts if the plates are fully seated.

11. Slide the **CAM** into the **MOTOR SHAFT** and set it flush with the triangle plate. Tighten its **SET-SCREWS**.

12. Test to see that all wheels and shafts are in place. None of the wheels should slide back and forth more than 1/16 inch (approximately). Slowly turn the secondary drive wheel with the tip of a finger. The levers should function smoothly and easily.
**ERROR BLANK SHEET**

Unit _______.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Errors made by worker</th>
<th>Errors made by supervisor</th>
<th>Total</th>
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APPENDIX II

THE BEHAVIOR PREDICTION SCALE
Behavior Prediction Scale

This questionnaire presents 32 different situations, each situation portraying a person in conflict about taking money which does not belong to him. You are to read each situation carefully and make a prediction as to whether or not the person would take the money.

Each situation is followed by a set of numbers ranging from 0 to 6. Circle the 0 if you feel that the person will definitely not take the money. Circle the 6 if you feel that the person will definitely yes take the money. Circle the 2 if you feel that the chances are about equal that the person will or will not take the money. Use the in-between numbers for the varying degrees of certainty, 1 or 2 being more on the no side, 4 and 5 being more on the yes side.

Remember! Your choice of the numbers is to indicate whether or not the person would take the money, not how wrong it would be to take the money. Although the 32 situations may appear to you very much alike at times, each situation differs in some respect from every other situation.
1. A bank employee was in urgent need of a large sum of money to pay for a crucial medical operation he needed. The employee was thinking of temporarily borrowing the money from the bank, but without permission. The operating surgeon could not give the employee any guarantee that the operation would cure the illness. The employee was sure that his loan would go unnoticed by the bank. Furthermore, the employee was convinced that if he were caught, he could settle the matter privately with the bank president.

2. A bank employee was in urgent need of a large sum of money to pay his bills. The employee was thinking of temporarily borrowing the money from the bank, but without permission. The money that he could get would only be enough to pay a small part of his debts. The employee was sure that his loan would be detected sooner or later by the bank. However, the employee was convinced that if he were caught, he could settle the matter privately with the bank president.

3. A bank employee was in urgent need of a large sum of money to pay for a crucial medical operation he needed. The employee was thinking of temporarily borrowing the money from the bank, but without permission. The operating surgeon could not give the employee any guarantee that the operation would cure the illness. The employee was sure that his loan would go unnoticed by the bank. However, the employee knew that if he were caught, he would be expelled from the bank and charged with criminal conduct.

4. A bank employee was in urgent need of a large sum of money to pay for a crucial medical operation he needed. The employee was thinking of temporarily borrowing the money from the bank, but without permission. The operating surgeon had guaranteed the employee that the operation would cure his illness. However, the employee was sure that his loan would be detected sooner or later. Furthermore, the employee knew that if he was caught, he would be expelled from the bank and charged with criminal conduct.
5. A bank employee was in urgent need of a large sum of money to pay his bills. The employee was thinking of stealing the money from the bank where he had access to large sums of money. The money he could get would only be enough to pay a small part of his debts. The employee was sure that his theft would be detected by the bank sooner or later. However, the employee was convinced that if he was caught, he could settle the matter privately with the bank president.

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definitely no 1 2 3 4 5 6
definitely yes

18. A bank employee was in urgent need of a large sum of money to pay his bills. The employee was thinking of temporarily borrowing the money from the bank, but without permission. The money he could get would only be enough to pay a small part of his debt. The employee was convinced that his loan would be detected sooner or later. However, the employee knew that if he was caught, he would be expelled from the bank and charged with criminal conduct.

definitely no 1 2 3 4 5 6
definitely yes

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definitely no 1 2 3 4 5 6
definitely yes

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definitely no 1 2 3 4 5 6
definitely yes
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definitely no  fifty-fifty  definitely yes
0       1       2       3       4       5       6

30. A bank employee was in urgent need of a large sum of money to pay for a crucial medical operation he needed. The employee was thinking of stealing the money from the bank where he had access to large sums of money. The operating surgeon could not give the employee any guarantee that the operation would cure the illness. The employee was sure that his theft would go unnoticed by the bank. Furthermore, the employee was convinced that if he were caught, he could settle the matter privately with the bank president.

definitely no  fifty-fifty  definitely yes
0       1       2       3       4       5       6

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definitely no  fifty-fifty  definitely yes
0       1       2       3       4       5       6

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definitely no  fifty-fifty  definitely yes
0       1       2       3       4       5       6
APPENDIX III

THE EXPLOITATIVE VALUE SCALE
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL FIRM VALUE SCALE

INSTRUCTIONS:

There is great variation among business organizations and business personnel in their characteristics and the way they operate. We are interested in what is poor and what is good as you see it.

On the following pages you will find a list of items. You are to ASSUME that EACH ITEM IS TRUE....that it represents a condition as it actually exists in some business organization or organizations.

Then, for each item, please evaluate the behavior or organizational characteristic described in the item in accordance with your own point of view. Use the scale provided below in your evaluation of each item.

Don't Care

Extremely Poor Very Poor Quite Poor Slightly Poor or Neutral Slightly Good Quite Good Very Good Excellent


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

For example, assume that item 1 is a statement of fact; that each employee is put on his own. You are to EVALUATE THE DEGREE TO WHICH IN YOUR OPINION THIS IS A DESIRABLE OR UNDESIRABLE BUSINESS PRACTICE. Select the scale value which represents your judgment of the condition described in the item. Do NOT evaluate whether or not the statement is true.

At the top of every page, you will find the above numerical scale. Select a number for each question and place it in front of the question.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extremely</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Quite</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Don't Care</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Quite</th>
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<td>Poor</td>
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1. Each employee is put on his own.
2. The firm donates money only when such gifts appear to benefit the firm directly or indirectly.
3. Clever strategy is necessary for one to get promotions.
4. The basic objectives of the firm never change.
5. The firm places large profits as a top objective.
6. The firm pays women less than men for the same kind of work.
7. Executives sometimes pad their expense accounts.
8. The firm has occasionally waged price "wars" with its competitors.
9. The firm has the right political connections.
10. Many unnecessary free services are given to customers.
11. Executives criticize poor work.
12. The firm always puts a larger advertisement in the media than its competitors.
13. A firm does what is best for itself regardless of whom or what it hurts.
14. The firm takes advantage of loopholes in laws which restrict it.
15. Executives receive bonuses.
16. Executives refuse to explain their actions.
17. The firm uses all legal means to weaken unions.
18. The firm is located in a rural area.
19. The firm capitalizes on the conditions of the economy in times of distress.
20. A new method is never adopted unless it earns money.
21. The firm gives special considerations to its bigger customers.
22. Because of special favors they have received, the police force gives the firm extra attention.
23. The firm gets rid of "undesirables" by putting them in jobs they cannot do.
24. The firm has occasionally violated some state laws.
25. The firm takes big risks to beat its competitors.
26. The firm's management is comprised mainly of civic leaders.
27. In order to compete effectively, the firm must take the risk of violating some antitrust laws.
28. The firm seems to spend money freely.
29. The firm engages in open fights with union officers.
30. The firm uses every legitimate means to avoid paying taxes.
31. Many persons who quit the firm go into business for themselves.
32. The firm uses high pressure sales promotion.
33. Executives keep to themselves.
34. The firm will absorb a competitor if it can.
35. The firm is as big as a small city.
36. Executives of competing firms may be good friends but they do not trust each other.
37. Occasionally, an employee has to cover up for the actions of his superior.
38. The firm has a narrow profit margin.
４３. The firm makes it rough for competitors.
４４. The firm is attempting to become the largest in its field.
４５. The firm tries to recruit top personnel from its competitors.
４６. The executive in the firm who is a smart manipulator is more likely to get ahead.
４７. The firm donates money to charitable causes if such a contribution will indirectly increase its business.
APPENDIX IV

THE MARLOWE-CROWNE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY SCALE
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally.

1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. (T)
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. (T)
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. (F)
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone. (T)
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. (F)
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. (F)
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. (T)
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant. (T)
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do it. (F)
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability. (F)
11. I like to gossip at times. (F)
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right. (F)
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. (T)
14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. (F)
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. (F)
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. (T)
17. I always try to practice what I preach. (T)
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loudmouthed, obnoxious people. (T)
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. (F)
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it. (T)
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. (T)
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. (F)
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. (F)
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings. (T)
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor. (T)
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. (T)
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. (T)
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. (F)
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. (T)
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. (F)
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause. (T)
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. (F)
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. (T)
APPENDIX V

THE MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE
This inventory consists of numbered statements. Read each statement and decide whether it is true as applied to you or false as applied to you. You are to mark your answers on the separate answer sheet you have. If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, blacken between the lines in the first column (headed True). If a statement is FALSE or MOSTLY FALSE as applied to you, blacken between the lines in the second column (headed False). Please make an answer for each item even though it may be difficult in some cases.

1. I am often sick to my stomach.
2. I am about as nervous as other people.
3. I work under a great deal of strain.
4. I blush as often as others.
5. I have diarrhea ("the runs") once a month or more.
6. I worry quite a bit over possible troubles.
7. When embarrassed I often break out in a sweat which is very annoying.
8. I do not often notice my heart pounding and I am seldom short of breath.
9. Often my bowels don't move for several days at a time.
10. At times I lose sleep over worry.
11. My sleep is restless and disturbed.
12. I often dream about things I don't like to tell other people.
13. My feelings are hurt easier than most people.
14. I often find myself worrying about something.
15. I wish I could be as happy as others.
16. I feel anxious about something or someone almost all of the time.
17. At times I am so restless that I cannot sit in a chair for very long.
18. I have often felt that I faced so many difficulties I could not overcome them.
19. At times I have been worried beyond reason about something that really did not matter.

20. I do not have as many fears as my friends.

21. I am more self-conscious than most people.

22. I am the kind of person who takes things hard.

23. I am a very nervous person.

24. Life is often a strain for me.

25. I am not at all confident of myself.

26. At times I feel that I am going to crack up.

27. I don't like to face a difficulty or make an important decision.

28. I am very confident of myself.
APPENDIX VI

THE SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES
Please answer each of the following questions (give only one answer to each question).

1. Your age is: _____________________years

2. Are you: ___(1) Married; ___(2) Single; ___(3) Divorced; ___(4) Widowed

3. Your specialized area of study:
   ___(1) Finance  
   ___(2) Real Estate  
   ___(3) Insurance  
   ___(4) Marketing  
   ___(5) Banking  
   (6) Management:  
     ___(a) Industrial  
     ___(b) Personnel  
   ___(7) Advertising  
   ___(8) Transportation  
   ___(9) Retailing  
   ___(10) Other (please state) ______________________________

4. Your father's occupation:
   ___(1) Businessman  
   ___(2) Teacher  
   ___(3) Salesman  
   ___(4) Doctor or lawyer  
   ___(5) Farmer  
   ___(6) Skilled worker (carpenter, plumber, etc.)  
   ___(7) Semi-skilled worker (factory worker, truck driver, etc.)  
   ___(8) Other (please state) ______________________________

5. The average annual income of your family is:
   ___(1) less than $4,000  
   ___(2) $3,000 - 5,000  
   ___(3) $5,000 - 7,500  
   ___(4) $7,500 - 10,000  
   ___(5) $10,000 - 20,000  
   ___(6) $20,000 - 30,000  
   ___(7) Over $30,000  

6. How are your financial needs met:
   ___(1) Parents support me  
   ___(2) I support myself  
   ___(3) Partly from parents, partly on my own  
   ___(4) Other (state) ______________________________

98
7. Your religion:
   (1) Catholic
   (2) Protestant
   (3) Jewish
   (4) Other (please state)
   (5) None

8. How religious are your parents?
   (1) Very religious
   (2) Somewhat religious
   (3) Not at all religious

9. How religious are you?
   (1) Very religious
   (2) Somewhat religious
   (3) Not at all religious

10. Your family status:
    (1) Upper class
    (2) Upper middle class
    (3) Lower middle class
    (4) Working class

11. You spent your childhood:
    (1) On a farm
    (2) In a small town
    (3) In a city
    (4) In a large metropolis (New York, Chicago, Boston, etc.)

12. Your political affiliation:
    (1) Democrat
    (2) Republican
    (3) Independent
    (4) Other

13. Political affiliation of your father:
    (1) Democrat
    (2) Republican
    (3) Independent
    (4) Other

14. Your birth position:
    (1) Eldest child
    (2) Youngest child
    (3) Neither eldest nor youngest child
    (4) Only child
APPENDIX VII

MEAN VIOLATION SCORES FOR
SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES
TABLE
MEAN VIOLATION SCORES FOR SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socioeconomic Variables</th>
<th>Violations</th>
<th>Assistance Given</th>
<th>Error Score</th>
<th>Overtime</th>
<th>P</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Age:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) 20 (N = 8)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) 21 to 25 (36)</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) 26 (6)</td>
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<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<td>2. Area of study:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Finance (2)</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<td>(c) Insurance (1)</td>
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<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>&lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Marketing (10)</td>
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<td>1.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) Management (21)</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Transportation (1)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Others (10)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>(h) Accounting (3)</td>
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<td>1.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Father's occupation:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Businessman (17)</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; .01</td>
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<td>(b) Teacher (2)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Salesman (2)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Doctor or Lawyer (3)</td>
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<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) Farmer (3)</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Skilled worker (6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Semi-skilled (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(h) Others (12)</td>
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<td>4. Family income:</td>
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<td>(a) $3,000 - 5,000 (2)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>&lt; .01</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) $5,000 - 7,500 (13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) $7,500 - 10,000 (12)</td>
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<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) $10,000 - 20,000 (15)</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) $20,000 - 30,000 (6)</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Over $30,000 (2)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5. Religion:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Catholic (7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Protestant (34)</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Jewish (4)</td>
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<td>1.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) None (5)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

101
### Socioeconomic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violations</th>
<th>Assistance Given</th>
<th>Error Score</th>
<th>Overtime</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. How religious are your parents?
   - (a) Very religious (12) 1.92 1.17 .33 < .05
   - (b) Somewhat religious (32) 1.31 1.16 .22
   - (c) Not at all religious (6) 1.83 .50 .17

7. How religious are you?
   - (a) Very religious (9) 1.89 .89 .11
   - (b) Somewhat religious (33) 1.54 1.18 .30
   - (c) Not at all religious (8) 1.00 .87 .12

8. Family status:
   - (a) Upper class (2) 2.00 .00 .00
   - (b) Upper middle (31) 1.35 1.23 .26
   - (c) Lower middle (13) 2.00 1.25 .25
   - (d) Working class (4) 2.00 1.25 .25

9. Childhood spent:
   - (a) On a farm (4) 1.50 1.50 .00
   - (b) In a small town (15) 1.67 .80 .27
   - (c) In a city (23) 1.30 1.99 .30
   - (d) In a large metropolis (7) 2.14 1.57 .14
   - (e) Other (1) .00 .00 .00

10. Political affiliation of father:
    - (a) Democrat (19) 2.00 1.32 .26
    - (b) Republican (25) 1.32 .92 .20
    - (c) Independent (5) .90 .60 .20
    - (d) Other (1) 1.00 3.00 1.00
APPENDIX VIII

FIGURES
Figure 1

Admission of "giving" assistance

Risk Conditions

high violators

low violators
Figure 2

Admission of "being asked" for assistance

Risk Conditions

high violators
low violators
Figure 3

D-Scores (RVos) of EPS

Risk Conditions

low violators

high violators

high

low

Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5

Risk Conditions

Social Desirability Scores

low violators

high violators
Figure 6

Risk Conditions

MAS Scores

high violators

low violators
Figure 7
Figure 8
Figure 9
Figure 10
Figure 11
BIBLIOGRAPHY


