VanHORN, Elizabeth Caroline, 1924-
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEODORE M. GREENE AND
ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION.

The Ohio State University, Ph. D., 1964
Education, theory and practice

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEODORE M. GREENE AND
ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Elizabeth Caroline VanHorn, B.S., M.S.

The Ohio State University
1964

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PREFACE

Theodore M. Greene, a contemporary philosopher, was selected as the subject of this study for two reasons. First, I wanted to study the thought and beliefs of a professional philosopher. Second, since my own professional interest is philosophy of education I wanted to study in depth the thought of a general philosopher who was particularly interested in the problem and issues of modern education.

Therefore the general scope and task of this study is sufficiently clear. I shall attempt to set forth those dimensions of Greene's philosophical thought and beliefs which seem to be most relevant to gaining insight into crucial aspects of our contemporary cultural situation and to note the significance that such thought and beliefs have for philosophy of education.

To accomplish this task the study is divided into three parts. A brief word describing the concrete intention of each of these organizational parts should suffice to indicate the limits and proposed content of the study.

Part I, Precursory Data and Insight, is primarily concerned with an intimate view of Greene as a person and with his mode of thought; its secondary purpose is to set forth Greene's general philosophical position and unique approach to philosophical endeavor.

Part II, Greene's Idealism: Considerations of Knowledge, Reality and Values, as the title implies, is concerned with setting forth aspects of Greene's thought within the traditional categories of philosophical
concern. The emphasis here will be determined by Greene's insight and resultant conclusions in respect to human nature and experience within the context of the contemporary cultural scene. In short, the intention is to explicate Greene's major beliefs concerning human experience within the context of his view of man's ideological concerns with modern American culture. This approach should yield fruitful results not only in the explication of aspects of Greene's philosophical beliefs but also in the inherent meanings of these beliefs as they are related crucially to the construction of philosophy of modern education.

Part III, The Significance of Greene's Philosophy For Philosophy of Education again, as the title implies, is concerned with establishing the significance of definitive aspects of Greene's thought as it relates to philosophy of education. Here in addition to highlighting the significance of Greene's idealistic beliefs as related to philosophy of education our attention will be directed toward setting forth Greene's social philosophy and its significance for philosophy of education.

It seems to me that acknowledgments of gratitude by an author for a scholarly study must first pay tribute to all those beloved friends and acquaintances of one's remote past with whom the author has had the good fortune and opportunity of dynamic exchange of significant ideas. First, then, a debt of gratitude must be paid to my beloved parents who during their lifetime and from my earliest moments of recollection endeavored to foster in me a respect for significant, critical, and responsible inquiry. Second, I acknowledge with deep gratitude all my friends of school and college days who most assuredly have molded my thinking as I
have theirs in the course of our vital friendship with each other. From within this category of friendship I pay special tribute to the many teachers of my past from grade school through graduate study. For, it is these special individuals who knowingly and willingly bear the awesome responsibility for the creation of scholarly persons who are willing and able to carry on their own special task of the pursuit of truth and wisdom. Many of these beloved mentors have in one sense laid their task aside by physical death, but in another sense this is not true, for this study itself reflects that they are still carrying on and truly live today and perhaps forever through the history of mankind. I pay high tribute with great humbleness then to all of my past and present teachers, both the beloved and disliked, who shouldered the task of my education.

Most recently certain individuals of the Ohio State University and Denison University merit special recognition for expressing serious concern, enduring patience and warm encouragement to me at sundry times throughout the course of my doctoral program. Those individuals of the Ohio State University are my friend and adviser, Dr. Everett Kircher, Dr. Marvin Fox, Dr. Paul Klohr, Dr. Elizabeth Maccia, Dr. Bernard Mehl and Dr. Margaret A. Mordy. It is honest to conclude that without the serious concern and tangible evidence of this concern shown by each of these individuals at various times throughout my doctoral study, this dissertation would not have become a reality. Likewise those of Denison University who merit the same special acknowledgment are as follows: Dr. Stanley Jonaitis, Dr. A. Blair Knapp, Jane Secor, Dr. Natalie Shepard,
and Dr. Harold Titus. A special tribute must be paid also to a friend and teaching colleague, Marjorie K. Andrews, who, above all, through the years of my advanced study remained a constant source of encouragement, an ideological consultant, and a wise "common sense" counselor. Indeed, I am sure that in great measure it is because of her serious concern, wise counsel, and valiant proof-reading that my scholarly endeavour is now culminating in an interval of success.

A special thank you is due also to several publishers who have generously consented to the use of substantial quotations from their copyrighted publications of Theodore M. Greene's books and articles. The specific publication and publisher are as follows: Liberal Education Re-examined, Harper and Row Publishers, 1943; Liberal Education Re-considered, Harvard University Press, 1953; Fifty-fourth Yearbook, Part I, Chapter IV, National Society for the Study of Education, 1955; The Meaning of the Humanities, Introduction, Princeton University Press; Moral, Aesthetic, and Religious Insight, Rutgers University Press, 1957; Our Cultural Heritage, The Rice Institute, 1956; Liberalism, Its Theory and Practice, University of Texas Press.
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PART ONE: PRECURSOR DATA AND INSIGHT

CHAPTER ONE

GREENE, THE MAN

The intent of this chapter is to introduce the reader to Theodore M. Greene as a philosopher-citizen, educator and author. In the philosopher-citizen category the attempt will be made to examine Greene's point of view regarding our contemporary culture and related issues. Again, in what mode and disposition does Dr. Greene as a philosopher-citizen view the modern scene? The second and third categories, "educator" and "author" respectively, have to do principally with biographical data about Professor Greene. The chapter will serve its purpose adequately if at its conclusion the reader believes he is somewhat acquainted with Mr. Greene, the man.

Philosopher-Citizen

In a recent article entitled, Philosophy and The Life of the Spirit, Professor Greene begins with a short paragraph which reveals his appraisal of at least one aspect of the modern cultural scene.

Ours is an age of paradox. It seems impossible to describe it save in terms of contradictory opposites. On the one hand, the now familiar charge that we are "hollow men," half-alive in "wasteland" of spiritual aridity, seems amply justified. Yet in apparent opposition to this view, violent beliefs are sweeping through our
own land and other lands in a mounting wave of irrationalism. How can an age of hollow men be an age of such fervid affirmations?"1

Indeed, this charge that our age is paradoxical and pervaded with spiritual insecurity is not, as the quotation implies, an appraisal unique with Greene. "Hollow men" is the charge of Eliot, the "lonely crowd" of Riesman, "the opposing self" of Trilling and our "age of anxiety" by Auden, to mention other significant appraisals of the plight of modern man. And if one considers that the human predicament is a basal concern in existentialism then one understands its present popularity. Greene then as one among many reflective individuals of our time is acutely aware of and highly sensitive to the human predicament involved in the living-of-life in the mid-twentieth century. As a professional philosopher it seems that Greene strikes a healthy balance between his serious concern for and attention to both the speculative and practical aspects of philosophical inquiry. "The problems of the 'intellectual' are important," he says, "only when they are ultimate problems of human life itself, as vital for the relatively inarticulate as they are for those who are critical and voluble." 2 A major portion of Greene's publications reflect his great concern for the significance of meaningful experience and the degree of its pragmatic value, i.e., deducing the vital character of all experience and judging this deduction

1 Paul G. Obler, Mirrors of Man: A Reader for Composition and Humanities (New York: American Book Company, 1962) p. 241. For the reason of accessibility this reference shall be used throughout the text for this article as it is reprinted in full in this reference by permission from The Christian Scholar, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1 (March, 1955), 31-46.

upon the extent of its actual "workability" in human experience.

Further along in the article mentioned above Greene proffers the opinion that there are three contemporary tensions that are characteristic of our age and culture. Stated in more philosophical language these are tensions that exist between (1) rationalism and irrationalism; (2) absolutism and relativism; and (3) the religious and the secular. A brief exposition of this material may serve as an especially apt and summarizing digest of Greene's point of view and appraisal as a philosopher-citizen of contemporary culture. But we must now, to arrive more securely at a summarizing point, consider what factors in our culture according to Greene have propelled us toward our present tensional human and therefore cultural predicament. And we may agree among ourselves at the outset that what future historians will say of our age is of course unpredictable but from the present perspective of us-who-are-living-it, it seems that the least to be said is that our age was one of great cultural change which spent its force in creating and producing many critical and tensional predicaments for human beings.

In his book, _Our Cultural Heritage_, Greene compiles what he believes are the ten basic affirmations and allegiances of the American people. He is not dogmatic regarding his own selection of the basic beliefs affirmed by a majority of American people for he states:

I am well aware that no two individuals would draw up the same list of major American beliefs. I would therefore urge each reader

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to propose his own list and to scrutinize mine for notable omissions. My own selection and formulation of the following ten articles of our unformulated national creed will serve its purposes if it provides us with a common frame of reference, an area of initial understanding and agreement.

Greene's motivation for serious consideration of the basic beliefs held in common by American people stems from his thesis that we of the Western tradition are losing our common faith in and agreement upon the basic ideological premises that form the foundation of this tradition. According to Greene it is time that Americans consider whether we have a national creed and if so what are the articles of common agreement of this creed. Professor Greene asks, "What do we, as a people, actually believe in, however implicitly and inarticulately?" The complete exposition of this thesis and related issues makes up the content of his book, Our Cultural Heritage. For our present purpose of making clear Greene's appraisal of contemporary culture it is not necessary to deal specifically with his selection of common American beliefs, their historical raison d'être of their contribution to the richness of Western culture. What is necessary is to note Greene's numeration of the cultural factors or trends that have led and are constantly leading to a state of individual and cultural anxiety. The issue is, what present cultural factors or trends does Greene view with alarm and

4 Ibid., p. 2.
5 Ibid., Preface, vii-x.
6 Ibid., p. 2.
grave concern? The answer to this question will place us at the heart or source of cultural anxiety as seen from Greene's point of view. With the accomplishment of this task we ought to be in a better position to understand within a larger perspective Greene's summary propositions appraising the contemporary cultural scene. With this in mind, then, we will direct our attention to the contemporary cultural trends which Greene believes are implemental forces toward cultural anxiety and paradox.

Professor Greene sees six cultural trends as factors contributing to the anxiety of modern man and thus to general cultural weakness and instability. These trends which tend to undermine and threaten our traditional Western beliefs may be named as follows: our "scientism", our "modern technology", our "cult of prosperity", our "sheer size", our "energia" and our "predatory selfishness in its more organized forms." What is the major threat in each of these trends? And how and why do these trends contribute to the present personal and social anxiety as evidenced in our culture? To secure Greene's answer to these specific questions it is necessary to deal succinctly but clearly with each trend.

1. Greene defines scientism as "the general tendency to reduce man to the status of a complicated animal and to conceive of him as the sole creator of all the values which men cherish." In a philosophical context this view of human nature and human values obliterates man's faith in the validity of the religious dimension of human experience and

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7 Ibid., pp. 60-69.
8 Ibid., p. 62.
the existence of objective values. There is no God of religious worship as set forth in the Hebraic-Christian faith and there are no objective values rooted in the universe. The philosophy of naturalism and its variant formulations support this thesis. Also "humanism" contributes to this view in that it insists "that man is 'on his own' and that there is no 'supernatural' Deity to whom he can turn for guidance and strength." The doctrine of "cultural relativism" adds its strengthening bit to this "scientism" trend in that it insists "that the values which men cherish are entirely the product of, and therefore 'relative to', this or that human culture, and that it is in principle impossible to prefer the values of one culture to those of another culture or to claim that some value judgments are more valid than others." Lastly, the modern logical positivist's view of human nature and knowledge contributes its support to the undermining of modern man's religious faith and belief in the objective values of truth, justice, beauty and love; for it "insists, in brief, that the only knowledge available to us as men is knowledge based upon sense experience and verified, or verifiable, with scientific rigor. It therefore rejects, on principle, the very possibility of valid moral insights and valid religious beliefs." 

Greene is not concerned that these philosophies and doctrines have directly influenced the majority of Americans as they are far too
sophisticated to reach them. His concern is centered around their indirect influence upon the American public. He expresses this concern in the following manner:

Their chief effect, I believe, has been a subtle modification of our national ethos, our prevailing "climate of opinion." They have contributed to the "secularization" of our culture—to our growing tendency to regard mankind as self-sufficient and therefore to rely more and more exclusively upon human initiative, inventive and creative. At its best, this tendency has strengthened our efforts to improve our human lot. At its worst, it has tended to promote the kind of arrogance which our Hebraic-Christian tradition has so sharply condemned. It has, one might say, somewhat weakened our spirituality while strengthening our self-reliant initiative.  

2. Modern technology has had a powerful effect upon contemporary human beings according to Greene. It has lessened man's labor burdens and at the same time chained him to the care of the labor-saving machines. This care involves non-creative skill and routine drudgery for the human being involved. Our machine-centered culture has thereby de-humanized many men to the level of robots or human machines. Such a circumstance increasingly deadens man's willingness creatively to respond to life's experiences. As such it determines too much the qualitative aspects of human life. Therefore we must recognize that the over-all effects of technological development in our culture is producing good and evil results for man. The long-range effect of this development upon the evolving character of human life is yet to be determined.

12 Ibid., p. 65.
13 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
3. Greene views our cult of prosperity and our concept of accepted standards of success as a most threatening trend in American culture. However, he does express acute understanding as to how and why this situation developed in our culture. In short, he believes as we bask in our high standard of living, which is and was the result of individual initiative in the energetic development of rich natural resources, we naturally tend toward measuring the worth of men and things in terms of material value. Personal success therefore is primarily measured in terms of tangible effects and we admire those who achieve wealth, power and prestige. Greene claims that much too often success is measured by the dollar sign and no questions asked. It is not surprising then that Americans are becoming a sensuous people with no consideration given to social, intellectual, creative and spiritual values as necessary related criteria of a "successful" man.

4. Greene sees the sheer size concepts of modern culture as a threatening source of anxiety in our culture. When the modern man contemplates the sheer size of our country, of the population, of the complexity of society, it makes him feel powerless, lonely and insignificant in the facing up to these facts. He asks what one person can do about anything? Greene believes technology is partly responsible for the increasing growth of this threat in that our communications and transportation media bring everyone, everything and every place within close range of each of us whether we like it or not. And the effects of our

14 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
15 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
close-range civilization upon man may be harmful as well as beneficial. Consider that we are not only constantly confronted and bombarded with problems of national, state and local concerns, but also world-wide affairs and events are brought to our attention immediately and vividly. If a famine begins in India in the morning we are told by evening how many are suffering and dying. With all this barrage of insight into the complexity and vastness of human miseries and predicaments coming constantly at man, it is no accident that these cause in him acute moment by moment anxiety which very quickly settles into a chronic and perhaps indefinable state of anxiety. As Greene says, "It is much harder to live in our new 'One World' than it was to live in the provincial isolation of earlier times."\textsuperscript{16} The real danger here is that man can so easily become completely overwhelmed by the stark realities of life. In this state he has no sense of the significance or responsibility of governing the destiny of his own life or that of society. His protection is escapism and indifference.

5. Man's perennial enertia according to Greene takes on in our American culture the smugness of self satisfaction and a "contentedness" that is unparalleled in human history.\textsuperscript{17} Our high standard of living makes available the pleasures of life and to choose to face or see the unpleasant aspects of life requires too much effort, avoidable pain, and sacrifice. It is so much easier to close our eyes to social

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 68.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 68-69.
injustice wherever it may be. To endeavour to "right a wrong" is to face and see through an unpleasant, avoidable, painful task, and we cringe from unpleasant circumstances. How much easier to pass by and move on to something pleasurable. We seek the short cut, the easy way out and at the same time deplore our lack of personal and social integrity. Greene warns that in "a time of crisis this lethargy can be our undoing." 18

6. "Predatory selfishness in its more organized forms" is, Greene insists, the "most disruptive single force threatening our cultural vitality." 19 Here the major point to be emphasized is that certain individuals who are solely seeking their own power, prestige and comfort band together into an organized group and under the good banner of Americanism or other public recognized "good" causes proceed to tear down without discretion any barrier that stands in the way of accomplishing their selfish ends. The strategy of this type person or group knows no limit or boundary relative to the human decency of its tactics. "It appeals," says Greene, "for popular support with bare-faced lies and malicious innuendo; it exploits public and private fears and capitalizes on every type of prejudice; it flatters and cajoles, threatens and smears, with equal relish and equal skill." 20 This type of activity rocks the foundation of man's faith and trust in his fellow man and leads to a general relationship of suspicion and anxiety among all men.

This paraphrased rendition of six cultural sources of or trends

18 Ibid., p. 69.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 228.
leading toward the contemporary anxiety plight of our culture as proposed by Greene indicates the concrete pressures and circumstances that he feels help to produce a general feeling of anxiety in the individual and tension in the culture. It is in the light of these concrete sources, as fairly distinct but necessarily inter-related causes, that we are in a better position to understand Greene's proposal of the contemporary tensions in our culture as seen in a technical philosophical setting.

We remember that according to Greene the evident tensions of our culture can be seen to settle within a philosophical context into three distinct categories of tension. And there is strife and tension within the components of each of these categories. The three categories of prevalent tension are (1) "rationalism and irrationalism"; "absolutism and relativism" and "the religious and the secular." Although the article entitled Philosophy and the Life of the Spirit, in which Greene submits these three categories of contemporary tensions also deals with the resolution of these tensions, we will not concern ourselves with their resolution for this would take us too far afield for our present purpose of gaining Greene's point of view regarding contemporary culture as a philosopher-citizen. Rather, our present concern and task is to set forth in a distinct and compendious way two aspects of the subject that seem to be significant to our purpose. In question form these aspects are (1) How does Greene define the terms, e.g., rationalism, absolutism, etc.? Stated otherwise, What is the essential meaning for

21Paul C. Obler, Mirrors of Man, pp. 245-257.
Greene of these terms? (2) Having discovered his meaning of the terms, what valid evidence from our culture does Greene submit to support his meaning of the terms? That is, if his thesis is that, within the realm of philosophical inquiry, contemporary tensions settle into intra-conflict between the terms of each of the three distinct categories of tension, then does he submit cultural evidence that convincingly supports this thesis? It is quite clear that the ultimate significance of this whole matter hinges upon a personal judgment however Greene attempts to define the terms involved veridically. Our procedure then with each category will be to present: first, Greene's definition of the terms involved and second, the cultural evidence that he submits to support his substantial thesis.

The first contemporary tension to be considered is that of the conflict between "rationalism and irrationalism." Greene's definitive and attending statements in regard to "rationalism" are as follows:

By "rationalism" I mean the disposition to rely on human reason so exclusively that whatever transcends our rational comprehension is automatically ignored or denied. Rationalism, so defined, is a narrow and arrogant intellectualism.\(^2\)

Paraphrases indicating Greene's definition of "irrationalism" are as follows:

("Irrationalism") . . . is a systematic distrust of reason and its uncritical acceptance of the irrational as such. . . . its political manifestations is the spirit of fascism . . . an upsurge of passionate and uncritical belief.\(^2\)

\(^{2}Ibid., p. 246.\)

\(^{23}Ibid. (italics mine).\)
The cultural manifestations of the conflict between "rationalism" and "irrationalism" are most prominent today in the area of religious faith. "If the title of Immanuel Kant's treatise on religion, 'Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,'" says Greene, "be taken as the slogan of rationalism, Kierkegaard's 'belief in the absurd' can serve as the corresponding slogan of extreme irrationalism." Likewise Greene feels this "irrationalism" tendency is evidenced in the theology of Karl Barth; in philosophy, in contemporary "existentialism"; in politics, in the underlying spirit of fascist groups and movements. But the urgent, significant and basal problem, as Greene sees it, that arises from conflict between rationalism and irrationalism "is the widespread conviction today that man is essentially irrational and that the only way to appeal to him successfully is by irrational means, that is, by propaganda." To further substantiate this claim Greene cites as examples the advertising and lobbying tactics of big business; the rampart cynicism in politics relative to the intelligence of the average voter; the fact that all too often in the area of religious faith "irrationalism" is the major premise of both the defenders and opponents of religious faith.

In summary, Greene sees many cultural manifestations of a conflict between rationalism and irrationalism which spend their force in creating

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
contemporary cultural tension and anxiety. The weight of the evidence
Greene presents seems to give the upper hand at this point to "irrational-
ism." "In short," Greene states, "we are living in an age in which
reasonableness is selling at a discount. We all find it hard to believe
that a reasonable solution of our international tensions can prevail, ...
that a reasonable political program can secure the support of the voter,
... that reasonable advertising can suffice to assure a reasonable sale
of goods, ... that a reasonable way of life is possible to most men, ...
that a reasonable faith in God is possible at all." 27

We shall now consider Greene's proposal of the second area of con-
temporary cultural tension. That is, the conflict that exists in our
time between "absolutism" and "relativism". First, to meet our agree-
ment of the presentational plan of this material, we shall attend to
Greene's definitive meaning of the terms involved. Greene's references
indicate that his definition of absolutism and relativism can be para-
phrased in order as follows:

(Absolutism is) ... the way of permanence, wherein man despite his own immersion in the
flux, strives to rise above it. ... is the
reality of the changeless and the timeless ... is identifying the permanent with Deity ... is recognition of eternal and changeless Values: the True, the Good, the Beautiful and in a re-
ligious sense, the Holy. 28

(Relativism) ... is the way of flux, wherein the Absolute is ignored or denied. ... is
the reality of the temporal and changing.
... is the belief in the shifting and chang-
ing values of our human experience. 29

27 Ibid., pp. 246-247.
28 Ibid., p. 249 (italics mine).
29 Ibid., pp. 249-250.
Cultural manifestations of this tension created by the conflict between absolutism and relativism are widespread and easily detected. It is especially noticeable in our culture in man's moral value experiences. On the one hand, those men who witness in action to a belief that man has no moral obligation in his relations with other men; on the other hand, those men who witness in deeds to a firm conviction that innate to man is a sense of moral obligation toward his fellow man. When the individual man takes thought of the extreme difference in point of view here and its ramifications for consequent behavior, it is no accident if he faces such with fear and trembling. Many other cultural manifestations besides the moral are implied in Greene's principle concern in regard to the tension created by the conflict between absolutism and relativism. "What should deeply concern us meanwhile," Greene states, "is the unhealthy effect upon the life of the spirit of both absolutism and relativism in their extreme forms." According to Greene, in the extreme form, relativism leads to nihilism and both are most harmful to the human spirit. In defining the effect extreme relativism has upon the human spirit Greene asks:

What happens to man's sense of moral obligation if he becomes convinced that all moral values are merely social conventions and cultural mores ... what happens to man's scientific search or philosophical quest if all his thinking is merely culturally conditioned, if all reasoning is mere rationalizing, if man is radically incapable of apprehending reality more or less validly or truth-

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Ibid., p. 250.
fully? What, finally, happens to honest and intelligent piety if the very possibility of religious insight, of Revelation, and of communion with Deity is a priori denied?31

Likewise Greene defines the effect that extreme absolutism has upon the human spirit. He states:

The besetting sin of the absolutist is the idolatrous insistence that certain human apprehensions and formulations of the Absolute—his own, or those of whatever institution he endows with absolute authority—are themselves absolute. Who can rehearse all the self-righteousness and all the cruel persecutions which this authoritarian spirit, secular and religious, has inflicted on mankind through all the centuries and in every culture.32

Greene sums up the long-range effects of extreme relativism and extreme absolutism upon the human spirit in the following sentence: "If the final product of relativism is soul-destroying doubt, that of absolutism is soul-corroding certainty."33

In summary of Greene's view that the conflict between relativism and absolutism is a contemporary cultural tension it should be noted that Professor Greene is quick to acknowledge that every age and culture has had both its absolutists and its relativists; thus it is in our time and possibly for all time. It follows then that a survey of cultural manifestations of this conflict in any age will be balanced more in favor of either absolutism or relativism. Greene feels our culture reflects a predominance of relativists in contrast to absolutists.

31 Ibid., pp. 250-251.
32 Ibid., p. 251.
33 Ibid.
Regarding this point Greene declares:

It seems clear, finally, that some historical epochs as a whole exhibit a major trend in the direction of relativism, others, of absolutism, and that our period has at least until very recently, been a strongly relativistic period. Witness the many proponents today of a more or less extreme relativism in academic circles; witness all the widespread transvaluation of values in our society since the Victorian period and the general acceptance by the unsophisticated of a relativism of values.34

If this is Greene's judgment of our age and we reconsider the questions he poses to the relativist in regard to patterns of belief and behavior, it is not difficult to see concrete instances in the cultural milieu which substantiate this relativistic judgment. We can dismiss this topic by restressing Greene's condemnation of both relativism and absolutism in their extreme forms. Greene sums it up as follows: "We need not waste our time discussing whether absolutism or relativism is the greater threat to the life of the spirit. We can leave it to the pot and kettle to call each other black; both charges will be valid."35

The last area of contemporary tension proposed by Greene is that arising from the conflict between the religious and the secular. We can determine Greene's definition of the terms by quoting his statement of the problem that such a cultural conflict poses:

34Ibid., p. 250.
A third major cleavage, certainly not new but tragically divisive in our own and other lands, is the cleavage between the secular and the religious—between those who profess and those who repudiate a religious faith. When 'religion' is wholly identified with the prescribed cult, creed, and conduct of some institutionalized religion, that is, of some church or synagogue, temple or mosque, the line between the religious and the non-religious or secular can of course be sharply and neatly drawn. It is the self-assured religious traditionalists and their no less self-assured irreligious antagonists who take pleasure in drawing this hard line between the sheep and the goats, the saved and the damned, or, from the secular perspective, the gullible and the sophisticated, the victims of illusion and the enlightened.\(^{36}\)

We can readily agree with Greene that cultural manifestations of this conflict between the religious and the secular in our contemporary culture are not far to seek. We remember immediately the recent legislation in regard to banishment of prayer in public institutions. The most expedient way to determine the evidence submitted by Greene to support his contention of this conflict and its concomitant tension manifest in our culture is to cite Greene's view of the charges and counter-charges made by the parties concerned. With this insight we will see by implication the specific cultural manifestations Greene's analysis suggests.

To begin we should note that both terms, the religious and the secular, are stark contrarieties, i.e., one term is so related to the other that it is impossible for both to be true though both may be

\(^{36}\text{Ibid., p. 252.}\)
false. This fact is the logical situation of the conflict. In the
main the legend of the conflict reveals those who profess a religious
faith assuming a stance or position which those who repudiate such a
faith attack. The secularists conduct a polemic against the religion-
ist's affirmations. Thus, to get at the crux of the matter it is nec-
essary to set forth the religious position and then review the polemic
of the secularists to this position.

For our present purpose we can limit our purview to a glance at a
major issue of the conflict. For, indeed, to do otherwise would require
a volume or two. The issue is the one suggested by Greene earlier, the
identity of "religion" with the church or institutionalized religion.
Stated otherwise, "the religious" persons are those who are active
members of a church or synagogue, temple or mosque and as such prescribe
to the cult, creed and conduct becoming to members belonging to that
particular organized body. Within this context the religionist's posi-
tion affirms the necessity of the church and membership therein for ef-
fective and significant worship. Greene presents the reasoning of the
religionist on this issue as follows:

Man's religious aspirations, like all his
other endeavours, must be institutionalized. They can flourish only in community, and
community means a common past, shared beliefs, familiar rituals and symbols, cooperative
action in loyalty to a common cause. Un-
institutionalized religion is as impossible as is uninstitutionalized family life, or unin-
institutionalized education, or uninstitution-
alized science, or government or business.
Hence the futility of supposing that a purified *religious attitude* can prevail in the hearts and minds of individuals who are wholly divorced from a religious tradition.37

To repeat, this reasoning supports the argument not only for the need of an organized body, the church, but also the necessity of its function.

The secularists attack this "church" position of the religionists from all angles. Look, say they, at the historical record of the church and what do you see? An affirmative dogmatism; hence authoritarianism which by definition prevents it from practicing the very teachings it professes and on which its existence is warranted. Greene's words in regard to the authoritarianism of the absolutist is an apt summary of the secular attack upon the historical record of the church: "Who can rehearse all the self-righteousness and all the cruel prosecutions this authoritarian spirit, secular and religious, (the church), has inflicted on mankind through all the centuries and in every culture."

Further protests of the secularists against the church get more specific and according to Greene have convincing force. These are, Greene states: "... that the churches have often discouraged or perverted authentic spirituality, and that they have held no copyright on genuine spiritual concern and achievement."39 Also, no doubt the secularist would point to past and present individuals of saintly character who were not inside the fold of a church. And the "cincher" protest of

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39 *Ibid.*.
the secularists more often than not takes the form of Greene's observation that the "worldliness, arrogance, and self-righteousness in all organized religion is notorious."

From this terse presentation of the conflict between the religionist and the secularist in regard to institutionalized religion it is fairly easy to surmise by implication the supporting cultural evidence to substantiate Greene's claim that such conflict is a major tension in contemporary culture. Since such concrete evidence for the most part would be an unnecessary recall of familiarity we shall let the matter stand here. However, in doing this it must be remembered that the issue covered is only one of many involved in the conflict between the religionists and the secularists. This circumstance portends of many more issues that would present cultural manifestations of the conflict.

In summary, Greene sees the conflict between the religionists and the secularists as a particularly divisive tension in our culture. When we take stock of the emotive nature of this conflict for men it is not surprising that passions run high in the battle. Also when we recognize that the religious aspirations of men influence the individuals' beliefs and deeds in all the varieties of human experience we are convinced of the tensional power this conflict generates in any given culture. Our immediate purpose limits further discussion of the issue, but at this point we are noting the far-reaching consequences such a conflict has upon the social, economic, political, emotional and intellectual life of the individual.

Ibid.
In concluding this presentation of Greene's perspective upon the human situation in contemporary culture it seems apt to ask Greene to stop his anxiety ridden, paradoxical world for a moment and tell us what man is thinking in his admittedly rare but vital "quiet moments." Greene gives us no direct answer to this specific question, but it is fair to surmise from his writing that his answer might be somewhat as follows:

When we take thought, we know that our knowledge is limited and that it will always be limited; yet we stubbornly try to envisage what we as men can never fully comprehend—absolute truth, complete justice, pure beauty, perfect love. We know that we are mortal and that our bodies are destined to die and rot; but we persist in our search for what might give our lives some ultimate meaning, and we continue to hope that death may not mean our total extinction."^41

Educator and author

Theodore Meyer Greene, born in Constantinople, Turkey, 1897, is the son of American parents and is presently associated with Scripps College in Claremont, California, as a professor of philosophy. Greene pursued undergraduate study at Amherst College and earned a doctoral degree at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland. Upon completion of his studies at Edinburgh, Greene accepted a post at the University of Panjab in India, teaching there for several years. Upon return to the United States, Dr. Greene became a professor of philosophy at Princeton University and remained in this position for over twenty years. From Princeton, Greene joined the faculty of Yale Uni-

versity as a professor of philosophy and maintained this association for ten years. In 1955, he moved to California and accepted his present post with Scripps College at Claremont.

As the record reveals, Theodore M. Greene prepared himself to lead the life of a scholar with a special concern and interest in philosophy. In light of this preparation it is not astonishing to find Greene living his life as a professional educator and author of philosophy. For the record clearly reveals that he has a sustaining interest in young people and their thinking.

As a professional philosopher, Professor Greene is known for his Kantian scholarship. As such, his Introduction to a volume of Kant Selections and to Kant's Religion Within the Bounds of Pure Reason, are probed by serious students of Kant. Many of Greene's basal beliefs have had public and professional notice in that he has accepted the honor of guest lecturer in many distinguished lecture series. In most cases, the material first presented in lecture form has been since incorporated into one or more of his published books. Dr. Greene has written many articles for publication in a variety of periodicals; however, the student of Greene turns principally to his published books. To date his chief books are: The Arts and the Art of Criticism; Our Cultural Heritage; Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight; Liberal Education Re-examined; Liberalism, Its Theory and Practice.

It seems appropriate to conclude this chapter by repeating the declaration made at the end of the first paragraph of the chapter. "The chapter will serve its purpose adequately if at its conclusion the reader believes he is somewhat acquainted with Mr. Greene, the man."
CHAPTER TWO

GREENE'S POSITION AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

Greene's Position

The following statement summarizes a critical survey of Kantian idealism by A. E. Ewing.

Historically its effects have been very great, but few who have been influenced by it have succeeded so well in hitting the middle path, for his doctrine is liable to grave abuses both by those who make use of his theoretical agnosticism to bolster up irrational and unfounded views and those who reduce religious beliefs to mere fictions and yet think they can preserve their value for life and practice.1

This passage is particularly apt in the light of the present purpose of introducing the reader to the philosophical position of Theodore M. Greene. For Professor Greene as a contemporary professional philosopher is influenced by Kantian doctrine. But this in itself cannot be looked upon as unique to Greene. For, indeed, there is common agreement among philosophers on the point that no philosopher following Kant can ignore his doctrines with impunity. The issue, then, is not whether Greene or any other philosopher following Kant has been influenced by his doctrines, for this is an accepted assumption in philosophical society, but rather to what degree of influence has Kantian philosophy pervaded another man's thought. In the case of Professor Greene the degree is great. This being so the question is,

has Greene succeeded in finding the middle way? Does he use Kantian doctrines to substantiate "irrational and unfounded views"? The complete exposition of the answers to these questions is a major aspect of the total purpose of this study and will be dealt with in due time, but our present concern is focused upon establishing Greene in a general fashion within the confines of a traditional philosophical position. We are looking for an historical philosophical label which admittedly is sciolistic relative to a man's total thought.

We may label Greene an idealist. In view of this it will not be a digression to define as basally as possible what is implied philosophically to label someone as an idealist. An idealist is someone who, "in brief, asserts that reality is closely related to ideas, thought, mind, or selves rather than material forces." This assertion is the keystone of the idealistic position. Again, this concept encompasses the whole of the idealistic endeavor: its beginning, what lies between and its ending. It is only within the context of "what lies between" that it is possible to build an adjective such as "subjective" or "objective" qualifying idealism. It is within this basal definition of idealism that we can presently place Greene in the idealistic camp.

This placement, however, does not end the issue. For Greene "balks" against the validity of the placement principle itself. It would not be particularly necessary or germane to the ultimate purpose of this

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study to carry the discussion of this "balk" of Professor Greene any further except that it most aptly illustrates here in the beginning two enduring characteristics of Greene's thought which the student of his must understand and deal with continuously if he is to master crucial aspects of his philosophy. Furthermore, elucidation upon these characteristics at this point will lead a clearer way toward understanding Greene's approach to the philosophical enterprise itself and his unique contribution thereto. To get on, then, we see that Greene resents being placed within a "school" of philosophical beliefs because in the first place "'schools' or positions are not mutually exclusive in all respects. On the contrary, all, of necessity, share some common presuppositions . . . . Secondly, no philosopher worthy of the name is a pure exemplification of any school or type . . . ."¹

The first objection besides recognizing that there is no "pure" and "mutually exclusive" system of philosophical ideas also tells the informed student of Greene that here is a man who consistently searches for the rational and essential meaning within any given context so that the end result will be a basis for reasonable agreement and acceptance. In this sense unless one is careful, astute and persevering in reading Greene's works he may judge Greene a mediatory without scruple. But this is not the case. Rather, it is the case that one must be willing to follow along until the very end Greene's logical discussion or dialectic.

¹Ibid.
If in the process one step is missed or misunderstood there is danger of losing completely the results which are oft-times subtle in form and meaning. It is true that in many instances Greene's beliefs seem to settle into a mediatory position but the point is that if this occurs it occurs only after rigorous and honest examination of all the relevant data. In practical application, for one who holds a mediatory position we often judge him to be a peacemaker. And this Greene seems to be. This characteristic pose of Greene may be the practical outcome of his theoretical speculation in the area of epistemology. But the emphasis here is upon Greene's rigorous dialectical approach to formulating philosophical beliefs and discovering the points of unity amid diversity.

The second objection to being placed in a particular "school" of philosophy emphasizes Greene's estimate of the unique value of the individual and his capacity for creative thought. Greene asks, How can a "philosopher worthy of the name (be) a pure exemplification of any school or type?" And, Greene continues, "if he actually functions as a philosopher he is devoting his life to the development and articulation of his own more or less distinctive beliefs, even if these fall primarily, or even wholly, within the confines of a historical school or tradition." Here again the informed student of Professor Greene sees not only the merit of the point at issue, but also an enduring attitude and characteristic of Greene himself. This is his devotion to and conviction of the essential dignity, worth and power of the individual.

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5 Ibid. (Brackets mine).
6 Ibid.
Holding such a belief Greene is resolutely against all forms of radical authoritarianism and absolutism, secular and religious. He has the utmost faith in the individual as a free agent with the capacity of reasonable choice. This belief is a major assumption which underlies the whole of Greene's speculative endeavour. As such it re-echoes in vibrant fashion in the ether of Greene's thought. Indeed, it may not be incongruous to judge that the exposition of this belief is the fundamental motivating factor in Greene's speculative ventures.

It is then with hesitancy and qualification that Greene may be placed in the "school" of idealism. That he accepts the basal assertion of any particular idealist is not being questioned. The question remains whether in principle a pure, in all respects, school does or can exist and if so would it be possible for an individual philosopher to be an unadulterated exemplification of this school. We shall lay this question on the table for the time being. The evidence for Greene's negative answer shall be more convincing as we probe further into his philosophical position.

Dr. Greene describes his position as "mediating between two extremes—between religious and philosophical authoritarianism, on the one hand and nihilistic skepticism, both secular and religious, on the other." (We may recall here Dr. Ewing's warning to all who have been influenced to any degree by Kantian idealism that to be successful it is "the middle

7 Ibid., p. 97
8 Ibid., p. 98.
path that must be tread. Herein Dr. Greene expresses the significance of epistemology in establishing an idealistic position. However, we are presently concerned to point out that the mediate position described above within idealism, as an historical philosophical system, warrants the adjective "objective". What are the first thoughts that occur if someone is labeled an "objective" idealist? Firstly, the thought is of an opposition to and disassociation with "subjective" idealism as allegedly definitive of Berkeley's position. Secondly, there is the thought that an objective idealist holds that reality is "objectively" real, i.e., what is, is not man-made, it is really "out there" to be discovered by man. Actually "subjectivism" and "objectivism" are both inherent aspects of the idealistic position and must be dealt with. Whether a philosopher is considered to be a "subjective" or "objective" idealist depends upon where the major emphasis is placed. Greene associates himself more with "objective" idealism than with its "subjective" correlate. Professor Greene states: "I am in general sympathy with the long tradition of "objective" idealism, from Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to Kant and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century "objective" idealists in England, Europe and America."

Having established Greene as being in "general sympathy" with traditional "objective" idealists it is necessary to qualify this establishment. To do this we must bring into account Christian theism. For Greene is "a professing Christian in the Protestant tradition."

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9 Cf., text, p. 25.
11 Ibid., p. 94.
we have the makings of an apparent head-on collision between the traditional and common idealistic assertion that values are the nature of ultimate being and are self-sufficient and the Christian assertion that God is the ontological ultimate Being and as a dynamic agent He is the ultimate ground and source of all values. And with Greene's confession of Christian theism this collision is only one of many problems that will have to be faced and resolved within the context of this Christian confession. At this point his confession may serve as a portent of things to come for we are ready now to pull in the implied adjuncts of Greene's idealism and present a broad but fairly definitive statement of Greene's philosophical position.

To recapitulate briefly, we have seen that Greene rejects and doubts the veracity of the existence or possibility of a pure philosophical school. Likewise Greene rejects the possibility of an individual philosopher being a complete exemplification of any school or type. He is an idealist and in general sympathy with traditional "objective" idealists. But he rejects the objective idealist's characteristic notion of the ontological ultimacy and self-sufficiency of values because he accepts the beliefs of Christian theism. What is now needed is a statement of Greene's position which incorporates the beliefs enumerated above. We may turn to Greene's writing for this. He states: "In short, I am not at all a typical 'secular' objective idealist; I am, rather, a philosophically a-typical Christian idealist.”

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
At this junction we may accept this loose statement of Greene's with the assumption that the tightening of it constitutes a major aspect of the purpose of this study. However, before leaving the matter, an addendum relative to Greene's acceptance of or opposition to characteristic emphases of other "schools" of philosophy seems in order here in that it sheds further light upon establishing his position in a general fashion. The instigation for such brief and fundamental treatment and consideration of this matter by Greene arises from the circumstance of his being the "idealistic" contributor to a "Yearbook" which in chapter units reviews modern philosophies and education. ¹¹ We have pointed out that Greene rejects the idea of pure schools or positions in the philosophic enterprise. Thus he reacts to the pure-school-and-position implication of the chapter structure of the book and feels an honest compulsion to extricate himself from holding a belief in the implication. He does this in a simple form in that he chooses major insights that are characteristic of the "other schools" represented in the book and responds to them. Since this material is serving as a significant addendum to the establishment of Greene's philosophical position it will be dealt with in a most cursory and unorthodox manner. ¹⁵ The philosophical position will be stated and Greene's response to it will follow by presenting short sentences that either paraphrase his thought or directly quote his own words upon the matter at hand. ¹⁶


¹⁵The single footnote reference cited at the end of each "school" section shall serve as the sole reference documentation for all of the directly quoted material contained in that section.

¹⁶See Nelson B. Henry (ed.), Modern Philosophies and Education, pp. 94-96 for the complete content of Greene's thought toward the schools of philosophy represented in the Yearbook.
Realism Realism Greene believes is the "most ambiguous philosophical position." The label itself is a misfortune in that "it implies that 'nonrealists' are less interested in, or responsive to, 'reality' than are 'realists,' i.e., that, in some vicious way, they are escapist or dreamers or bunglers." I am "in basic agreement with some of the fundamental tenets of what is today called 'realism.'" I only dissociate myself "from those 'realists' who decline to ascribe ultimate reality to God and/or to basic values, though here again, very much depends on how 'God' and 'values' are conceived of ... ." 17

Pragmatism and Existentialism I feel "both labels are highly ambiguous, yet both are associated with basic insights and emphases which I would wish to accept wholeheartedly." I agree with the existentialist "that reality, to be known, must be vividly and poignantly encountered in experience by man as a willing, acting being." I agree with the pragmatist "that all our knowledge is human and therefore finite, that cognition is only part, though an essential part, of human life, and that all our thinking has consequences and makes a difference, for better or for worse." In short, I heartily agree with "most of the generic affirmations of contemporary Existentialism and Pragmatism; I quarrel only with some of their negations, e.g., that reality is, for us humans at least, reducible to experience, or that truth and goodness are reducible without remainder to what 'works.'" 18

Organicism and Semanticism I believe both labels "point to beliefs

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17 Ibid., pp. 94-95.
18 Ibid., p. 95.
and problems which, however important, are, nonetheless, far less embracing than philosophy itself." I agree with the organicist's belief that "the 'organic' structure of everything that is—of man himself, the realities which he encounters, and all his apprehensions of them" should be stressed. I agree with the semanticist on "the crucial importance of the semantic problem" and progress in philosophy depends upon doing "full justice to the nature of language, the variety of its types and possible uses, and the difficulty of determining the meaning of meaning."  

Logical Positivism, Marxism and Scholasticism. I find my relation to these three schools the least ambiguous. I must reject completely the logical positivist's "usual assumption, which I find very arbitrary," that sense experiences alone are "productive of reliable knowledge," that "all values experiences are merely emotive," and that "traditional metaphysical problems are merely pseudoproblems, unsusceptible of fruitful exploration." I quarrel not "with what is usefully asserted and attempted" but "with what is so dogmatically and unjustifiably denied." In regard to Marxism, I reject completely "the ultimate dogma of Marxism," although I recognize "the shrewdness of many of its more specific interpretations of history and criticisms of our social order." I do not approve of the spirit in which its affirmations are made. In respect to Scholasticism I must totally disconnect myself from its characteristic authoritarianism however I accept many "of its central philosophical and theological doctrines."  

This brief profile of Greene's response to some of the common characteristics of other philosophical positions will have served its purpose if

19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
the result is a clearer insight into Greene's philosophical position.

We may now direct our attention to the consideration of Greene's approach to the philosophical enterprise.

**Greene's Approach to Philosophy**

It seems wise if not necessary to begin an investigation of Greene's approach to philosophical enterprise by elucidating his point of view regarding philosophy per se and related concepts. What is involved here is Greene's point of view toward or response to the following questions: What is philosophy? Is philosophy necessary? What is the subject matter of philosophy? Does philosophy have a cultural role? Although there are many more questions that could be posed these are sufficient to indicate our present concern.

Certainly history reveals many attempts to answer the question, What is philosophy? The answers are many times expressed succinctly in the form of a definition. We can begin and perhaps finally end with the Greeks. The Greeks defined philosophy as the love of wisdom and beauty. This is the genius of ancient Greece. Relative to this view Professor Greene states:

> When we think of the Greeks two words come immediately to mind—wisdom and beauty. No people has ever sought wisdom more avidly; none has created more beauty or loved it more intensely. However notable may have been their other experiments, in politics, for example, or in war, we can be sure that their peculiar genius will reveal itself most clearly in their speculations and in their art.21

And the history of philosophy reveals, he goes on to say, the truth in "Whitehead's half serious, half whimsical, remark that modern philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato." 22

If we would review the historical gamut of the definitions of philosophy we would detect that for the most part the use of the reflective methods of thinking is stressed and the aim of philosophy is unity—to see life as a whole. In other words philosophy is an attempt to formulate well-founded beliefs relative to the meaning of life, death, God, physical objects, right and wrong, beauty and ugliness. These beliefs are the evaluations of these things by a particular individual. And as Greene states:

Our evaluations are conditioned partly by the emotional intensity and vividness of particular experiences, and partly by a sense of their larger implications. The less reflective the agent, the more will his evaluations be determined by the poignancy of each immediate experience; the more thoughtful he is, the more will he tend to evaluate his experiences and their objects in a wider frame of reference, i.e., in terms of their more ultimate import for himself and his fellow men. Both emotion and reflection are requisite to adequate evaluation. 23

From this quotation we can clearly see not only Greene's response to the question "What is philosophy?" but also a response to the questions, "Is philosophy necessary; is it valuable?" Philosophy is necessary because constructing "beliefs" is a generic characteristic of human beings. As to the value of philosophy if philosophy is judged to be an evaluative

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22 Ibid., p. 72.

experience the question becomes meaningless. In this sense every human being has a philosophy whether or not he recognizes this fact. A person's philosophy would consist of the sum total of his basal beliefs and convictions. Of course these beliefs would be acquired through the varieties of human experience but undergirding human experience itself is man's generic capacities of emotion and reflection. "Emotion and reflection are thus," says Greene, "the two chief subjective factors in human evaluation. Each individual's synoptic sense of value, in turn, may be entitled his 'philosophy of life.' This philosophy of life is normally not the product of professional philosophical inquiry." And Greene reminds us at this point that William James stated:

> The philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means. It is only partly got from books; it is our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos.

Another point should be made here regarding the necessity and value of philosophy. Let us not forget that a man's "beliefs" are the foundation for his actions. A man acts according to his basal beliefs and convictions and it is his actions which are judged to be valuable or worthless. Man's deeds and ideas are motivated by a belief in something. Take away the human capacity for belief in something and the residue is sub-human. "It" would have nothing with which to identify "itself" as human.

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24 Ibid., p. 463.
Both Greene and James note that the philosophy of the "lay" person is different from that of the "professional." So the issue is, what is the content or subject matter of philosophy for the professional when the professional is defined as an individual who engages in philosophical inquiry in depth and as a means of livelihood or gain?

In short, a broad statement of the subject matter of philosophy is that it is the study of man's total environment, i.e., a profound study of or inquiry into the realm of nature, human society and the ultimate depths of reality itself. This total environment in turn is delineated into depth study areas classified as the social sciences, mathematics, the pure and applied sciences, theology and philosophy. But, despite this segmenting of the human environment for the purpose of meeting individual interest as well as a prudent confinement of depth study, Dr. Greene sees a major premise common to all disciplines--disciplines defined as the orderly attempts to discover the truth regarding man's environment. Greene explains this major premise common to all disciplines as follows:

Despite all their diversities, men do have a common human nature, and the reality they confront does have its constants. Each of us, no doubt, has his unique problems, and many of our needs, if not unique, are more or less specialized. But all these unique problems and special needs are, after all, variants of man's recurrent problems and ubiquitous needs. All of us must somehow cope with man's universal predicament of life and death; whether we like it or not, we must all face the common challenge of sickness and health, growth and decay, misery and welfare.  

If, as argued above, the subject matter of philosophy is the study of man's total environment but this environment is segmented into depth study areas of specialization, then, the implication is that philosophy subsumes these areas. Its subject matter is not distinctive in the same sense as other recognized disciplines. But philosophy, according to Professor Greene, is not the only discipline in the circumstance of having non-distinctive subject matter. He believes history, also, is in this circumstance. And if we accept the "non-distinctness" of subject matter as a common characteristic of philosophy and history, we logically seek other aspects of commonness. Is their function, task and ultimate purpose the same? Greene believes that it is. He states:

The primary function of both, however, is to provide integration and synoptic interpretation. ... Their primary task is to relate the specialized activities of the less comprehensive disciplines. Their most significant insights are those which emerge from taking an embracing point of view. Parts acquire new meaning when they are set in a larger context. It is the responsibility of history and philosophy, in combination, to supply this context.

We cannot tarry too long upon the firm amalgamation between philosophy and history that Greene insists upon. For, indeed, this amalgamation is a major aspect of his approach to philosophical inquiry. Realizing this it behooves us to study this irrevocable mating of philosophy and history in greater detail.

Dr. Greene sees the disciplines of philosophy and history as having

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28 Ibid.
a single primary function or purpose, i.e., to provide integration and synoptic interpretation of human experience. The achievement of this primary purpose is possible only if there is clear recognition of the distinctive tasks of the philosopher and historian. The crux of the matter rests upon identifying the important relations inherent in a synoptic interpretation of reality. To this point Greene states:

The two most significant ways of relating things to one another are the temporal and the systematic. All things are in fact related in time, and all things can be examined with respect to similarities, differences, and basic interrelationships. 29

The historian's task deals with the temporal; the philosopher's with the systematic. Within this context and with due consideration of the mutual primary function of the two disciplines it is possible to distinguish a rather distinct subject matter for each of the disciplines. "The subject-matter of history is, at least ideally," Greene states, "the whole sweep of past events regarded as an intelligible interconnected sequence of temporal occurrences; that of philosophy, the whole of reality reviewed sub specie aeternitatis." 30 The serious concern of the philosopher and the historian with his distinctive subject matter may be termed the secondary function of philosophy and history. This distinction in subject matter may be more correctly construed as a difference in emphasis, i.e., the historian with the temporal approach to reality and the philosopher with the systematic approach. But only together can they attain their joint primary purpose and thus actualize the full potentiality of each of their unique being.

29 Theodore M. Greene, Liberal Education Re-examined, p. 72.
The concrete task of the historian is to study all aspects of human experience from a temporal perspective and out of this endeavour be able to reconstruct the aspect in question into a significant synthesis. The concrete task of the philosopher is comparable except he is endeavouring to make a larger, systematic interpretation and evaluation of human experience which culminates in a belief about the whole of reality, a metaphysics. At first glance it may seem that the task of the philosopher and historian are independent of each other. But this is not the entire case. Greene explains their working dependence as follows:

There is a history of philosophy, since philosophical ideas have themselves evolved in time, and there is also a philosophy of history, since the methods, presuppositions, and principles of interpretation invite critical scrutiny. The philosopher cannot afford to divorce himself from historical events; if he does, he exiles himself to a realm of bloodless and meaningless abstractions. The historian cannot afford to ignore those basic interpretative principles which are the philosopher's chief concern, for without these principles history reduces itself to meaningless and unilluminating chronology. 31

It is clearly evident by now that Greene believes in an historico-philosophical approach as a crucial element in the philosopher's attempt to significantly synthesize reality and human experience. The wedding of philosophy and history characterizes a major aspect of Greene's approach to philosophical inquiry. Along with effective cooperation between the historian and philosopher there runs the same cooperative spirit with experts of more specialized disciplines. *The latter, in

turn," says Greene, "should be able to go to professional philosophers and historians for assistance in wider orientation—to the historian for a wider historical perspective and to the philosopher for those general concepts in terms of which specialized bodies of knowledge can be effectively related to one another." 32

The second major aspect of Greene's approach to philosophical inquiry has to do with the spirit in which inquiry is undertaken. The meaning of spirit in this context might be more clearly apprehended if it is thought of as the character of, nature of, or personality of the inquirer. The question is: With what kind of a spirit does an individual approach the task of philosophical inquiry? It is obvious that the complete answer to this question would ultimately reveal the essential beliefs and ideas of the inquirer. This revelation, in turn, of Professor Greene is the inclusive intent of this study, but now our concern is merely to discuss "spirit" in the light of its bearing upon an elucidation of Greene's philosophical approach. Indeed the "spirit" factor of Greene's approach is of major significance and any account ignoring it should be judged negligent.

The general spirit in which Greene approaches philosophical inquiry may be succinctly described as an intellectually humble "seeking" of wisdom and beauty. With this statement memory recalls through history the same predominant spirit of philosophical inquiry by many Greek philosophers, but in particular Socrates. The informed student of Greene is

32 Ibid., p. 75.
keenly aware of the significant influence that the "Socratic" spirit of philosophical inquiry has had upon Greene's thought. In discussing the Greek contribution as it relates to America's cultural heritage in his book, Our Cultural Heritage, Greene reveals at length his astute knowledge about and admiration of not only the "Socratic" spirit of philosophical inquiry, but also of the man Socrates. Greene culminates this presentation of his admiration and estimation of the Socratic spirit relative to its influence upon our cultural heritage with animation as the following abridged ideas demonstrate: (1) It "characterized all Greek thought at its best." (2) It "animated the most germinal philosophical speculations in the West throughout the medieval and modern period."  

Professor Greene would be the first to acknowledge and accept the judgment that the spirit of his approach to philosophical inquiry is "Socratic." The specific meaning here can be quickly digested by the consideration of three outstanding personal characteristics of Socrates as set forth by Greene. "These are," according to Greene, "his lifelong preoccupation with dialectical inquiry, his noble humanism, and his essential piety and religious faith." When these personal characteristics of Socrates are transformed into traits which characterize an approach to philosophic endeavour, Greene names them in the following alliterative words: "process", "person" and "piety." The informed student of Greene recognizes that the basal meaning of "process," "person" and "piety" further defines and characterizes the spirit in which Professor

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33 Theodore M. Greene, Our Cultural Heritage, pp. 72-84.
34 Ibid., pp. 81-84.
35 Ibid., p. 72.
Greene approaches the philosophical enterprise. Thus, for our present purpose each of these words merit further elaboration. We shall take them in turn and thus begin with "process".

"Process" for Greene means the ceaseless critical examining of all the major facets and ensuing issues of human experience. And this "process" as an adventure of the mind may not be done effectively alone. Its intrinsic nature being critical implies an honest give and take or exchange of ideas among persons regardless of the ultimate outcome or consequences. "Its chief purpose," Greene explains, "is to enable fallible mortals with limited experience and narrow perspectives to share in one another's partial insights, to pool their finite resources, and so to accomplish together what no one individual could accomplish alone." And it should be noted that "process" is a ceaseless activity: there is no stopping point; its business is continually unfinished. Here we must interpret Greene as meaning he has great faith in "process" itself, rather than in any conclusions to which it might lead. The utmost faith in "process" itself as here defined is the first aspect of the spirit in which Greene approaches his work.

"Person" for Greene means an avid humanism. A humanism that does not make the Protagorian dictum, "Man is the measure of all things—of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not," its basal assertion. Rather a humanism that asserts a tenacious faith in man's ability to gain insight increasingly into his

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36 Ibid., p. 73.
37 Ibid., p. 76.
total environment; to communicate his insights to other men; progressively to explore and gain understanding of an "objective" dimension of existence that is not of his own making and increasingly to recognize and develop his inherent potentialities of "goodness" and thereby yearn for their total actuality. This primary interest-in, faith-in and concern-for man, this humanism, within the above context, is the meaning of Greene's "person." "Person," then, is the second aspect or mood of the spirit in which Greene undertakes philosophical inquiry.

"Piety" for Greene means the recognition of the quality of the godliness of life. A recognition which necessitates intellectual humbleness whenever we face the facts of cosmic mysteries. Or again, "piety" is the sense in man of the unfathomable depth of all that is and his only logical response is one of "wonderment" and awe. This response, in turn, cannot help but influence and permeate the thought and deeds of the man proclaiming it. This proclamation of "piety" as here expressed marks the third and last aspect of the spirit in which Greene approaches the business of philosophy.

It is, then, within the meaning of these three terms: "process," "person" and "piety" that we may understand spirit as a major aspect of Greene's approach to philosophical inquiry. This aspect coupled with the other major aspect of an historico-philosophical orientation completes the account. It is from within these two major realms of thought or belief that Greene begins his philosophical inquiry.

From this account of the major aspects of Greene's approach to philosophical inquiry it is evident that Greene may not proceed in either
a purely deductive or inductive manner. Relative to this point Greene explains that "both of these approaches are, I believe, doomed to failure. In any case, my own approach seeks to mediate between these two simon-pure extremes." 38

We may conclude this section regarding Greene's approach to the philosophical enterprise by quoting him at length in a summary description of his own process of philosophy.

Human consciousness presumably develops, in each individual, out of a relatively inchoate and atomistic type of experience, in infancy, through a gradual specification of experience and a gradual development of interlocking, interpretative concepts and judgments, to whatever maturity of experience and reflection the individual is capable of. Similarly, philosophy, as an ongoing venture, never starts from scratch, either with pure experience or pure theory. It starts, in the case of each philosopher, with whatever experiential data and whatever interpretation of these data are initially available and congenial to him. The philosopher then proceeds, with the aid of other philosophers, past and present, to make his implicit major premises more explicit, to clarify and extend his experiential data, and to make his theoretical interpretations of them more powerful and adequate. In the process, he keeps re-examining his major premises and, in the light of all his continuing experiences and reflection, to revise them as radically as his estimate of the total situation seems to warrant. 39

39 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
Aspects of Thought on Being Human

In the Inglis Lecture at Harvard in 1952 Professor Greene speaks of John Dewey as follows:

Dewey's peculiar strength was his capacity for basic analysis of basic human problems. It was the creative philosopher in him who was able to formulate the great ideas or concepts for which he has justly become famous--such powerful concepts as those of human nature, institutionalized society, and the world of nature in dynamic interrelation, or the concepts of the great polarities of thought and action, fact and value, end and means ... But, above all, it was his Socratic spirit of unremitting critical inquiry which impelled him to reexamine again and again not only the traditional beliefs and mores in his society but his own constructive principles as well.¹

This quotation expressing Greene's esteem for John Dewey is most relevant in its meaning for our immediate concern, human experience. For Greene, too, a basic analysis of basic human problems or experience is the starting point of philosophy and most emphatically all thinking must take place within a perpetual spirit of critical inquiry.

But making this analogy between Dewey and Greene adds little to our knowledge of Greene's concrete thought, for the original statement tells us little of Dewey's thought on these matters. Indeed, we do not know what "human" means for either man. Nor do we know what each means by "experience" or "problems." And lastly, what is "critical" inquiry? In short, for our immediate purpose we must get at Greene's definitive meaning of the terms "human" and "experience." In a sense the essential meaning inherent in the words "human," "experience" and "critical" provides the raw framework so to speak on which Greene's philosophy hangs. In this section we will concern ourselves with gaining an insight of Green's thought relative to aspects of human nature and human experience.

To discuss the definitive meaning of "human" for Greene is to present aspects of his theory of the nature of man. Essentially Greene's theory is based upon an assumption of the agreement common among most men as to the dignity and value of human life. Specifically the assumption highlights the fact that the vast majority of men do not from empirical or rational evidence feel justified in denying their common agreement as to the universal basic potentialities or endowments found in a human being. Greene states this assumption and the task ahead as follows:

What we actually find is widespread agreement regarding the sanctity of human life and man's dignity and intrinsic value. Let us start with this area of agreement and try to discover what it is in human nature that gives man the dignity and the value so widely ascribed to him.²

Greene's concern at this point is to set forth in a distinct mode three simple propositions regarding human nature that all men in the light of human experience must agree to. And recognition of these simple propositions shall, in turn, explain why it is that men commonly hold to a belief in the dignity, value and sanctity of human life. As with any philosopher Greene's basic belief in regard to the generic nature of man influences to no small degree the course of his thought as well as his ultimate beliefs.

The three basic propositions regarding human nature that seem to be indisputable are as follows: (1) Man is an evaluator. (2) Man is a moral agent. (3) Man is a being capable of reverence. Each proposition at this point deserves a brief explanation of meaning from Greene himself. Thus, man is an evaluator according to Greene because

He is a being who can discriminate between truth and error, honesty and falsehood, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, love and cruelty. He can also appreciate the value of truth and honesty, beauty, justice, and love and the disvalue, or evil, of their opposites. In short, he is able to evaluate, to make value judgments; he can discriminate and then consciously approve or disapprove. Of course, he does so only inadequately; his evaluations are often mistaken and never perfect. Nonetheless, he can distinguish between good and evil, and he can abhor evil and cleave to the good.3

Likewise, man is a moral agent Greene believes because

He can distinguish between good and bad, right and wrong; moreover, he can deliberately take sides with moral responsibility. He can envisage alternative lines of action, reflect on them, assess them by reference to some ideal standard, decide in favor of one of them, and then express his decision in appropriate action. Man is thus capable not only of responsible evaluation but also of responsible choice and conduct in the

3Ibid., p. 59.
light of such evaluation.\textsuperscript{4} And lastly, man is a being capable of reverence Greene asserts regardless of the religious overtones implied in the statement because

The assertion can, I believe, be accepted with complete sincerity by believers and nonbelievers alike because it epitomizes another human capacity of crucial importance—one that, even more than the two already considered, justifies our faith in man's intrinsic dignity and value. Man's "quality of greatness" is above all his ability to respond to ultimate mystery with genuine awe... The statement that we are capable of awe points not only to our finitude but also to our ability to transcend it sufficiently to be aware of it... Our assertion goes further. It claims, at least by implication, that reality itself, as we most sensitively and imaginatively encounter it, actually does confront us with a dimension or quality of mystery that can evoke in us wonder and awe.\textsuperscript{5}

We are now in a position to give a definitive statement of the meaning of human to Greene: being called or named "human" in our experience of living signifies and means a creature who is capable of evaluation, moral responsibility and an awareness of his own finitude or mortal predicament in relation to the whole of reality as well as his ability to transcend his predicament enough to be aware of it. This latter natural capacity of man takes us deep into the heart of human experience itself and when the pause of thought now is long enough and deep enough on this point we can experience the "awe-someness" to which Greene refers.

But in spite of the great significance and potential value that Greene attaches to man's inherent capacity for genuine reverence in the

\textsuperscript{4}Tbid., p. 74.
\textsuperscript{5}Tbid., pp. 96-97.
face of the ultimate mystery of life, it does not mean that Greene could be pushed into the dogmatic assertion that this capacity is the unique distinguishing characteristic of the nature of being human. For just as the modern biologists tell us that arguments as to the predominance of influence of heredity or environment relative to life are passe in that we now know life is a continuum in which neither element can be distinctly separated out at any given moment, then likewise, Greene's theory as to the nature of man is an indivisible whole. In short, being human means to Greene a creature who in theory and in practice at any given moment is capable of evaluation, moral responsibility and reverence. These three propositions state in the simplest fashion the least that can be said about human nature. And even this stripping down to the bare bone of the matter evokes a common response of wondrous admiration in the heart of all men which in turn motivates them in theory and practice to a deep sense of the intrinsic value, dignity and sanctity of human life. The matter may rest here for the moment for our present purpose of defining Greene's meaning of "human" has been accomplished. We will now turn to consider Greene's definitive meaning of "experience."

**Aspects of Thought on Human Experience**

The issue is: "What does 'experience' essentially mean to Greene?" Can experience be defined in any but the vaguest statements? Isn't all of life or living itself experience? Is it possible to find the basal ingredients that seem necessary for any experience; to find the ingredients that would be acceptable to common agreement among men analogously to Greene's
account of human nature.

To get at the crux of the matter quickly we shall approach it from an existential point of view. Thus, a most immediate component of experience is the presence of the "I", self, subject or human entity as an integral aspect of experience. What is the "I", the me, of any experience? Now this question makes Philosopher Greene rather uncomfortable. Not because he doesn't have a response to offer but he wonders whether the hypothetical questioner is aware of how profoundly involved a complete account of the "I" of experience can be. To test the depth of understanding of the questioner on this matter Greene can respond by merely referring back to his definition of human nature. The "I" is, at the least, a creature who is capable of experiences of evaluation, moral responsibility and reverence. This response apparently satisfies our questioner for the time for he counters as follows: Granted, I'm a creature capable of the experiences you cite, just what do you mean by experience? This question is more to Greene's liking because it will permit him to present some crucial aspects of human nature and experience which he feels is an important consideration before any attempt is made to define the "I" of experience.

For the time being, then, we shall leave our hypothetical questioner in alert silence upon this matter of defining "experience" and attend to an account of Greene's belief on some issues that are related to understanding his thought about human nature and experience. The following passage aptly sets the stage so to speak for this immediate task and concern:
Most of us do have our moments of reflective solitude, moments in which we take stock of life and face the certainty of death. These are the moments, however fleeting, of loneliness and ultimate concern, when man's age-old doubts and fears engender a profound anxiety and the anguish of human finitude. Even the "common man" whom intellectuals tend to patronize, asks himself in his own way the questions which have tormented mankind since the dawn of history. What does my life really amount to? What lies ahead, in this life and after death? What kind of universe am I living in? What is there in it worthy of my complete loyalty?

In a sense we can see that this passage summarizes Greene's thought on several issues related to human experience. In the first place, it reveals that Greene believes that the majority of men occasionally are solemnly reflective and thus they do inquire into the nature of man and his experience of living. In the second place, we see clearly that Greene feels that most men seek to analyze the meaning of human experience. And also we see the implication that it is the business of the professional philosopher to analyze the meaning of human experience in the most profound and sensitive manner.

But if we probe the thought of the passage deeper and expand its implicit meaning we can discern that Greene believes that man in his search for the meaning of existence desires to someway transcend his mundane and finite state. He imagines, if you will, his participation in an ideal something that will completely absorb him and yet permit him to keep his identity as a free, noble, generous and necessary part of the whole. And if we ask Greene at this point to name the ideal that man com-

ceptualizes and believes he has the potential to attain he would reply as follows:

The concept of human culture, in contradistinction to that of diverse "culture patterns" as geographic and temporal social phenomena, is the concept of the ideally good life, that is, of human experience in its highest and most complete potential manifestations.

Greene is telling us that he believes that there dwells in the mind and heart of all human beings a normative ideal, i.e., "the concept of the ideally good life." And thus the highest type of human experience is man's envisionment of the ideally good life. For this experience is of such poignancy that it compels man to see not only his own urgent need to find meaning in his existence but also to realize the fact that he can and does envision an ideal experience. In short, he sees that he is capable of self-transcendence. And we might ask, isn't this highest type of human experience essentially an experience of self-realization of self-potentiality? In any case the idea is fundamental to an understanding of Greene's analysis of human experience. This is true because searching for or striving for the ideally good life according to Greene is man's inherent proclivity and therefore all of man's possible experiences—in evaluation, moral responsibility and reverence—are pervaded by the concept of the ideally good life, i.e., the highest type of human experience. In due time a more elaborate explanation of this belief will be presented. As of the moment we are introducing it here in order to identify the

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8 Ibid.
the normative ideal toward which Greene believes human experience is
directed. At this point we know only that Greene believes the
"good life" is the normative ideal of mankind. No attempt has been
made to further define what Greene means by the "good life" thus far and
no attempt will be made to do so in this section. For now it is
enough to know that it is toward this concept that Greene's analysis
of human experience is directed. Greene, in addressing himself to the
cause of humanism and a liberal education, expresses the basic idea to
be understood here very adequately. He states:

The many conflicting accounts of the good life
which history has recorded testify to the
elusiveness of this normative ideal. No ex­
haustive analysis can here be attempted. I
can, however, try to indicate some of the more
crucial aspects of human nature and experience
with which all humanists must, I believe, come
to terms in any comprehensive interpretation of
culture and a liberal education.\textsuperscript{9}

With this idea firmly in mind we are in a position to understand more
adequately Greene's meaning of "experience" which emerges from his
concrete analysis of human nature and experience. To this concrete
analysis we will now direct our attention.

To repeat, Greene does not purport to give us an exhaustive
analysis of human nature and experience. On the contrary he states: "I
can, however, try to indicate some of the more crucial aspects of human
nature and experiences ... ."\textsuperscript{10} His intention, then, is to highlight or
bring forth some determining and decisive elements found in human nature

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
and experience. To do this Greene will distinguish five so-called "levels" of experience. But Greene should be permitted to speak for himself regarding his intention in his analysis. He declares:

This analysis (of human nature and experience) will involve distinguishing five "levels" of human experience. The first two levels, which may for convenience be entitled the levels of "atomistic awareness" and "solitary synthesis," are frankly figments of the imagination; they have an expository value but are, so far as we know, never perfectly exemplified in actuality. The third and fourth "levels," which I call the levels of "social convention" and "creative and critical specialization," are actual and familiar. The fifth level, that of "cultural or historico-philosophical synthesis," is ideal and therefore only partly actualized, since it constitutes the highest objective of all humanistic thought and action.  

Our immediate task is to search each "level" of experience analysed by Greene for the "key" concept that furthers our purpose of understanding Greene's definitive meaning of experience. In other words, if Greene sees fit to distinguish five levels of experience there must be a key concept expressed in each "level" that directly aids our immediate purpose. It is the key concept in each "level" that we are after. Again, each "level" should contain a concept that is unique to it and therefore distinguishes it from the other "levels" and this in turn will provide five concepts that are fundamental components to be acknowledged for a clear insight into Greene's definition of human experience. Obviously following this procedure will permit only a limited expository of Greene's analysis of human nature and experience. In fact, only the details of each "level"  

11 Ibid. (italics mine).
as presented in his analysis that are deemed essential for a clear understanding of the key concept will be presented. This plan of action should adequately accomplish our immediate objective. The "levels" of human experience will be considered in order. We begin with "atomistic awareness."

The key concept in the first "level" of experience, i.e., "atomistic awareness" is conscious awareness. We remember that Greene states that this level is a figment of his imagination and as such has only expository value. Indeed it does. For it tells us in certain expression that conscious awareness for Greene is the first and basal condition of anything that may be termed experience. The implicit implication is that conscious awareness and experience are synonymous terms and as such could conceivably be used meaning-wise interchangeably. This level of experience is imaginary compared to normal human experience because Greene's imaginary being is merely a sentient being. Greene states:

Starting, then, with the lowest level of conscious awareness, let us conceive of a living organism wholly devoid of memory, reason and imagination, but possessed of man's normal capacity for sensation, emotion and the feelings of pleasure and pain. [12]

Note that Greene does not name this sentient being as human. Rather such a being is called a "living organism." It is in actuality a sub-human conscious entity. The "experience" of such a being is conjectured by Greene for conjecture it would have to be since no normally endowed human exists to experience "experience" in this state. So be it for now, the

[12] Ibid., p. xix.
key concept in the first level of experience has been exposed. It is "conscious awareness" and this concept is the first defining component of Professor Greene's definition of "experience."

In the second level of human experience we are again faced with a living being that is a figment of Greene's imagination and likewise is created for expository value only. What is imaginary however is not related directly to the inherent nature of the human being involved but rather to its environment. Therefore the key concept at this level will be concerned with defining a necessity of the environment, or a conditional requirement of the setting for "experience" as proffered by Greene. Greene's selection of the title for this "level", that is, "solitary synthesis" presages its thought content. But first, Greene's concrete setting for the level is as follows:

Let us consider next the case of a conscious being who is not only capable of sensation, feeling and emotion but is also endowed with the faculties of memory, reason and imagination, but who, from the moment of birth, has been deprived of all contact with human society.  

Brief reflection upon this setting leads one to immediately conclude that it is indeed an imaginary level of human experience for one's knowledge of the utter biological dependence of new born human life is such that left alone from the moment of birth no one has to be concerned about its experience! It will cease to exist after missing feedings of food and water for a very short time and therefore to bother to postulate its experience beyond a matter of hours is absurd! But this is a digression and

\[13\] Ibid., p. xx.
Greene has informed us that this "level" of experience is not actually possible and is also being presented for expository value only.

The fact in the setting that we should note for our purpose is that here is presented a living organism with all the so-to-speak standard equipment of a human being but it is to be deprived of contact with other humans throughout its life. Herein emerges the key concept of the second "level" of human experience. It is simply that man must to rise above subhuman experience be involved in conscious interrelationships with other man. It is, in turn, these relationships that produce a culture and thus a social heritage which must be quickly absorbed by any human if he is to experience in any meaningful sense for us normal human experience. It is true, assuming biological survival which in itself is most questionable, that such a "solitary mind" would be able to order its experience to a small degree. "Its 'world'," according to Greene, "would no longer be a mere chaos of particulars (as in the first level of experience) but the primitive beginning of an orderly cosmos." Even so, "we cannot," Greene adds, "by the wildest stretch of the imagination, attribute to it more than the most rudimentary experience as measured by ordinary human standards."  

To sum up the second "level" of experience discloses the following key concept: human experience to be judged "human" and "experience itself" demands the environmental condition of other humans, a social

\[\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ xxii. \ (italics \ mine).\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
environment, with whom communication and/or conscious relation is possible. This concept highlights in a cogent fashion Greene's assertion that normal experience for man demands a social environment. Individual conscious awareness is the first key concept and inter-conscious awareness is the second key concept. At this point the question might very well be, inter-conscious awareness of what? Other conscious humans is the answer if experience is to reach the human level and the level of actuality in contrast to fiction. And further, the result of inter-conscious awareness is a building of a social heritage which stated broadly is human culture. Thus, in a sense, the way is prepared by Greene for rising to the level of experience that is actual and familiar, that is, the "level" of "social convention."

At this junction before continuing our search for key concepts and thus rising up with Greene to examine his third "level" of human experience it seems prudent in the light of understanding the remaining "levels" of experience proffered by Greene to re-emphasize at least two notions previously presented. Firstly, that beginning with the third level of experience we no longer are considering "fancied" or imaginative human experience, for from the third level on in Greene's thought the experience suggested for human beings is actual and familiar. A reminder of this fact at this point seems most important not only for an all-over synchronized view of the possible meaning of human experience for Greene, but also to expedite with better understanding our immediate task of probing the "levels" for key concepts. Secondly, as we enter the levels of
experience that are actual for human beings we should recall Greene's postulate of the inherent proclivity of man to seek the-before-him-and-yet-beyond-him ideal of the "ideally good life." And to repeat a correlative point, at no time thus far have we attempted to deal with Greene's insight into the "ideally good life" and we will not do so now because this is too far afield of our immediate context of thought. Rather, our primary purpose in calling attention here again to this aspect of Greene's thinking is merely to indicate the direction or final focus that must be kept in mind as we enter into possible and actual levels of human experience.

In summary, then, we should bear in mind as we continue our search for key concepts to aid us in discovering Greene's definitive meaning of "experience" firstly, that the highest experience of man, whether or not at this point it is deemed actual or even possible, is according to Greene's thought the concept of the "ideally good life"; and secondly, that we are entering into non-fictional levels of human experience.

"Inter-conscious awareness," the key concept of the second level of human experience, is social. It involves man's relation to his fellow-man. The interaction of the conscious relations between men, in turn, produce ultimately an order or functional form out of the existent operating relations which is recognized by all men and thus a society of men comes to be established. The new-born into society are immediately and rapidly exposed to the social inheritance, i.e., the accumulative pre-established conscious relations among men, of a given society. It is at this level of society and social inheritance that we really recognize actual human experience. It is within this framework of an existential setting then that
the generic meaning of the socially broader term "culture" develops and also the fact emerges that the living of human life necessarily and to a great extent takes place in an osmotic arena of social convention. Thus, Greene's third level of human experience.

At the level of "social convention" the basic concept that sheds light upon Greene's definition of experience centers in the thought of the significance, value and dignity of man who by inherent nature is a conscious-normative creature and who, in turn, seeks his own self-realization or raison d'etat in social-normative experience. This type of experience, as with all experience, is subject to and conditioned by the surrounding social culture. Greene distinguishes the cultural scope and distinguishing characteristics of the level of "social convention" in human experience as follows:

To describe the level in detail would involve a survey of all the generic characteristics of man as a social being and the incredibly complex society of which he is a part. Fortunately, it will suffice for our purpose merely to mention those familiar characteristics which serve to distinguish normal human experience from that of an hypothetical solitary mind. These characteristics are embraced in the terms language, tradition and institution.16

Now it seems evident that if the social vehicles of language, tradition and institution of any given society are basically grounded in a concept of the significance, worth and validity of cosmic objective values the resultant culture pattern will reflect the influences of the social vehicles

16 Ibid., p. xxiii.
so as to produce a "value culture" in which it is possible, probable if not necessary, for man to acquire culture in a normative sense. The issue at hand can be stated more simply. Greene feels that in spite of his belief in the innate capacity of man for normative experience the realization or development of this capacity is largely if not wholly determined by the culture pattern in which any given man exists. But the key concept remains, i.e., that experience is a socially conscious normative venture because man is endowed with the unique capacity or potentiality for value experiences. Whether or not this potentiality is developed to any degree depends for the most part upon the present and functional values inherent in the presiding culture pattern. In short, Greene states:

We are not only what we are because of the cultural heritage into which we have been born; our lives are as rich or as impoverished as they are largely because of the cultural value, or lack of value, of the particular culture pattern in which we find ourselves.¹⁷

With this thought of the significance of a value culture pattern as it relates to man, as a social-normative being, we can leave the "social convention" level of human experience and proceed to probe Greene's next level, "creative and critical specialization."

Just as the key concept of the third level of experience ultimately settled in characterizing an essential innate capacity of human nature, according to Greene, the same ultimate result occurs in the fourth level,

¹⁷Ibid., p. xxv.
"creative and critical specialization." Greene supports this interpretation as follows: "Though neither type of experience (social convention or creative and critical specialization) ever appears in complete isolation, each is an essential generic characteristic of the thought and activities of the human race." At this level we recognize Greene's assertion of man's innate capacity for creative rational thought and/or critical inquiry relative to his total environment.

The development of man's rational capacity, in turn, reflects an identification of the major generic interests of mankind. These diverse but closely interrelated generic interests, which grow out of the social-normative nature of man, are reflected in the social mores and institutions of a given society. This circumstance concomitantly generates individual participation in each of the diversified generic interests of mankind and thus, an individual's choice of specialization within the context of a particular generic interest. Greene declares: "Were man's basic interests not themselves diverse, individual specialization in art and science, religion and politics, history and philosophy, would be psychologically and socially impossible."\(^\text{19}\) It is at this level of specialization that it is possible to understand more clearly Greene's definitive declaration of the activity of man's innate capacity of reason. Specialization, representing an individual's intense concern with a particular generic interest, is characterized by "creative" and "critical" activity relative to the chosen interest. "Creative" and "critical" define the

\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. xxvi. (italics mine).
\(^{19}\)Ibid., p. xxvii.
essence of the activity of reason. But meaningwise aren't we running into difficulty by conceiving of reason as a noun, that is, a word denoting a person, place or thing? Is not reason a phantom as a noun? Is it not truer to normal human experience to think of reason as an activity? In this sense reason, as reasoning, is synonymous with "creative" and "critical" activity. And this activity as an inherent capacity of human beings is the key concept found in Greene's fourth level of human experience in our probe of his thought for a definition of "experience."

And it is this capacity coupled with the social-normative capacity of man that provide the identifying mark of the human being as unique, as an individuality of dignity and worth. This identification served to recognize not only other humans or selves, a social concept, but also in the end, personal identity, an individuality. More shall be said in this regard in due time. We must now consider the fifth level.

The key idea to be found in Greene's analysis of the fifth level of experience is in a loose sense an adverbial extension of the key concept of "reasoning" as found in the fourth level. We remember in regard to our new level Greene said:

The fifth level, that of "cultural or historico-philosophical synthesis," is ideal and therefore only partly actualized, since it constitutes the highest objective of all humanistic thought and action. The humanist, I shall argue, is uniquely defined in terms of his allegiance to this ideal, whose attainment constitutes, as he believes, man's true ambition as a human being. Those on the other hand, who repudiate this ideal will be found to define the goal of human endeavour in terms of the third or fourth levels of experience.20

20 Ibid., pp. xviii-xix.
It is plain from this quotation that Greene is using meaning-wise the term "cultural" or "historico-philosophical synthesis" as either/or concepts. The implication is distinctly intelligible, i.e., culture is "historico-philosophical synthesis" or "historico-philosophical synthesis" is culture. And this is as it should be if we have followed Greene's thinking through the preceding levels of human experience. For Greene's meaning of "culture" throughout the levels could not be interpreted as presenting a mere factual or descriptive account of human experience. Rather the case is that "culture" has been used largely to denote a qualitative aspect of human life in that it reflects human "hope-for's", aspirations, or ideals. And what is the highest ideal of human experience? It is according to Greene, the concept of the ideally good life! This concept is the concrete meaning embedded in Greene's "synthesis". It is important to realize that in Greene's thinking the pursuit of this ideal is the ultimate goal of all human endeavour.

Accordingly, "culture" taken as the word implying mass humanity may be interpreted in a normative sense as the concept of the ideally good life. This concept is synthetic in nature. That is, in itself it is a synthesis, a complex whole concept; and as such is made up of a combination of the objects of thought. This is the concept's theoretical explanation. Practically or experience-wise it means that man throughout his multiple and fragmentary experiences of everyday life is constantly striving for an experience of unity, a synthetic experience, which is qualitative in essence because it is the highest, i.e., the best, the most worthy, the "hoped-for". Thus, human experience is purposeful.
It is moving somewhere meaningfully. Movement implies activity and we have seen that the spring of activity for man is his capacity of normative reasoning or evaluating. Here is the spring that nurtures and produces the tributaries in their relentless search for the mighty river.

Contrary to natural fact in that tributaries eventually and actually do find a mighty river is the fact that man's search for his ultimate goals or ideals is never fully achieved because being ideals they are always at least one step ahead of him. For man, then, the search for unity is an approximate venture of self-realization and is characteristically a ceaseless, an on-going activity. In short, it is a timeless, eternal venture.

Thus it is apparent that the concept of the "eternal" resides uniquely in man in the form of perfection, the ideal, the ultimate. Equally apparent is that a cultural synthesis is a temporal-timeless synthesis. And stated in Greene's terms a "historico-philosophical synthesis". "Historico" because it interprets and refers to the temporal aspects of experience and "philosophical" because it interprets and refers to the eternal meaningful aspects of experience in relation to the whole of objective reality. In conjunction as "historico-philosophical" because they are mutually dependent if the task of meaningful synthesis is to be reliable and a valid interpretation of human experience. "History and philosophy, broadly conceived," Greene states, "are of vital import to man because they constitute the only possible ways in which the particular experiences of the race and of the individual can be interpreted in their relation to one another and to reality as a whole."21 Again,

21Ibid., p. xxxiii.
Greene asserts:

The temporal and the timeless are thus the two basic axes of objective reality, on the one hand, and of subjective experience, on the other; it is only by reference to these two axes that reality becomes intelligible and the human mind intelligent.22

Now, to sum up this level of human experience. At the outset we suggested that the key concept of this level was an adverbial extension of the concept "reasoning" found in the preceding level. This is still the case in that man's use of his "reasoning" or normative creative-critical capacity in conjunction with the proper functioning of his sensory capacities directs him toward an ideal concept of synthesis as to the ultimate meaning of human experience. A synthesis that reveals meaning or intelligibility not only to all human experience itself but also to human experience in relation to all aspects of life, to the whole of reality itself.

In circumspection of the key concepts found in Greene's analysis of the five levels of human experience what can be said of Greene's point of view of the meaning of "experience." To get at his definition of experience as a term inclusive of aspects of human nature requires closer scrutiny at the first two levels, "atomistic awareness" and "solitary synthesis." There is a factual element in each level which in combination defines on the one hand human experience itself and on the other hand the necessary condition of the possibility of anything that can be intelligibly termed or referred to as human experience. Both

22Ibid., p. xxxiv.
facts have to do with the normal innate endowments of man.

Firstly, at the "atomistic awareness" level, the point is made that normal man possesses the capacity for sensation, emotion and the feelings of pleasure and pain. In short, normal man is a sentient being. Secondly, at the second level, the point is made that normal man possesses the capability of memory, reason and imagination which permit him to reflect meaningfully. Thus man's generic capacities of emotion and reflection make him an intelligible evaluative being in that he is able to so organize and order all his multiple experience into an intelligible meaningful account not only of his own personal identity as an emotive-reflective self undergoing these multiple evaluative experiences but also of his meaningful relationship to all else, i.e., the not-self of his multiple experiences. It seems to follow that the ultimate consequent of this account would lead to a concept of a harmonious whole of existence, an intelligible value-ridden universe. Man, therefore, as a whole being with his normal endowments of sentience and intelligence or emotion and reflection is able to "make sense" of life. Through his sentient capacity he is able to organize the meaningless particulars of experience and through his intelligible capacity the meaningful interrelatedness of all aspects of the environment and his experience in it. It is these two endowed capacities of man, sensory and intellectual, that are the definitive ingredients in Greene's thought of the meaning of conscious awareness or human experience. That being the case the most terse interpretive definition of human experience according to Greene's thinking could be stated as follows: Experience is conscious awareness. Or a more elaborate definition could be as follows: Experience is the whole
of sentience with intelligence striving to create or discover some meaningful significance and regularity in it. "Meaningful" and "significant" because this is of the very essence of conscious experience itself. Man, Greene insists again and again, is essentially an evaluator, a normative being. "In short," Greene states, "he is able to evaluate, to make value judgments; he can discriminate and then consciously approve or disapprove. Of course, he does so only inadequately; his evaluations are often mistaken and never perfect. Nonetheless, he can distinguish between good and evil, and he can abhor evil and cleave to the good."

Consequently, all aspects of man's experience, understood as conscious awareness, are of an evaluative nature. Greene endorses and elaborates upon this interpretation of his thinking as follows:

Each of these aspects of man's total environment—the world of nature, human society, and the ultimate depths of reality itself—not only pique man's curiosity and invite his perennial inquiry but also present themselves to him from the very first as full of human import, that is, as profoundly affecting his well-being. He is forever judging them and assessing his reactions to them in terms of their value or disvalue, their significance for him as a conscious selective agent.... In short, his apprehensions and evaluations are coterminous: he assumes that everything he encounters in nature, behind and beyond nature, and in human society is pregnant with potential good or harm, value or disvalue."

Aspects of Thought on the Nature and Texture of Reality

And if this is the case relative to human nature and experience

24 Ibid., p. 27.
does it tell us anything about reality itself? Most certainly. Because why can man "make sense" to a degree of any of his experience unless his conscious awareness is in contact with an environment that in some sense is "like" or akin to conscious awareness? Again, why can the scientist, for example, discover a law, a law being a statement of a relation or sequence of phenomena invariable under the same conditions, about our natural environment? This fact of our experience simply could not be possible unless the conscious awareness of man is identical to some degree and in some sense to the essential nature of reality itself.

The world is capable of intelligible or meaningful interpretation. This is the assumption whenever any human endeavour is undertaken and is more so the special, purposeful task of philosophy. For as previously stressed Greene feels the unique task of philosophy is a systematic, meaningful interpretation of human experience in its environment. In this sense, if the world were not conducive to systematic meaningful interpretation there would not be a body of knowledge designated as philosophy. Nay, more, there would not be anything that is. This is a most interesting thought and justifies a brief digression on my part. Such digression may be warranted in that it may shed significant light upon aspects of Greene's philosophical position of idealism.

I can begin by noting that the fact that I as a human being can pose any thought of relation whether it be about the nature of the world, myself and human society or ultimate reality is ultimately and totally inexplicable from the finite human point of view. The issue here is, why is human experience meaningful or intelligible for me as an individual? Or, stated otherwise, why do I have any thought about anything at all?
Now we must go deeper. I am asking why. The crux of the issue is why can I ask why? Or stated differently; to ask a question is to question why I can ask a question. This is the human situation on this matter and it is utterly mysterious! There is absolutely no way the human mind can conceive of this fact of being. I cannot in my most creative imaginative state of mind even begin. For in this matter, for me and my finite mind, there is "nothing"; but even "nothing" is "something" for my mind. It is clear that further thought on this matter is futile. For it could only continue to be an endless cycle of fruitless logic.

To sum up. It is futile for the human mind to question itself as to why it asks why. It simply does transcend itself in this matter and most unbelievably it recognizes itself its own transcendence. The following two comments will end this digression. A digression which, according to its message, was impossible from the beginning. Firstly, to me this fact of man's existential situation is, beyond comparison, the most embarrassing situation or dilemma in human life. How anyone who recognizes or contemplates this fact of existence can even so in the face of this fact, possess in a marked degree an intellectual pride that borders on arrogance is illogical and incongruous to me. Likewise, and secondly, how anyone can face this fact and not be so-to-speak "overcome" by a reverential fear mixed with sublime wonder is equally illogical and incongruous to me.

Now to pick up where we were in Greene's thought is to repeat that Greene believes that the texture of the universe is intelligent and meaningful. He bases this conclusion upon two correlative facts of human experience. In the first place, man is a normative being who
telligibly interpret or evaluate the world. And this fact in turn infers the world, to some degree because it can be thus interpreted, is identical with man's conscious awareness or experience. And in the second place, the very notion of intelligibility per se implies meaning and system. Consequently, the character of reality must be meaningful and systematic. Thus, these two experiential facts in conjunction provide the main evidence for Greene's belief that the world is a meaningful, related system whose prime characteristics are reflected in the nature of the individual man. In light of Greene's belief that man is essentially a normative being, reality is therefore essentially spiritual in texture. Greene endorses several aspects of the thought here expressed as follows: 

Were reality a meaningless chaos, our experience would be equally meaningless and chaotic. The fact that human experience is, in varying degrees, intelligible indicates that reality is not a chaos but, at least in many respects an orderly and meaningful cosmos.25

Indeed Greene's point of view of the texture of reality as spiritual endorses beyond doubt his philosophical alliance with idealism. Perhaps "spiritual" is a poor term because it so often carries the thought of some nebulousness of matter floating in space or a human being clothed in a white sheet and somehow floating in mid-air. There exists legitimate historical evidence for this interpretation of meaning in regard to the word "spiritual" but this information is not really pertinent to the philosophical technical use of the term. What is pertinent and most

important is an understanding of the sense in which Greene uses the word "spiritual" and thus its meaning throughout this research. I suggest that spiritual for Greene means at the least the non-material and more specifically such commonly classified human values as truth, beauty, goodness, love, and holiness. Greene's exact meaning of "spiritual" will become increasingly clear as we progress in this study, but for now a fuller discussion of this concern should be postponed. For it is time to pull together the facets of this chapter and see just where Greene stands in his basic philosophical presuppositions which in essence constitute his frame of reference in regard to human nature, experience and the texture of the surrounding world.

Greene's Four Philosophical Pre-suppositions

In the light of the foregoing general account of Greene's thought relative to human experience and the texture of the surrounding world we can summarize his thought by a statement of the four fundamental philosophical presuppositions he cites in the Harvard Inglis Lecture as the frame of reference for his ensuing account of aspects of a liberal education. The four presuppositions according to Greene "relate to the human individual, to his society with its mores and institutions, to the world of nature which constitutes our spatio-temporal environment, and to whatever ultimate Reality may underlie both man and nature as their final ground." We shall present these four presuppositions in an

26Theodore M. Greene, Inglis Lecture, p. 6.
Outline form.

Greene's Two Presuppositions Related to the Individual

1. My first presupposition is that the individual human being is infinitely complex and valuable. His complexity is evidenced by the fact that he is, simultaneously,

   - a psycho-physical organism,
   - a social or "political" animal,
   - a creator of artifacts, both utilitarian and artistic,
   - a self-conscious thinker and critic,
   - a carrier of culture,
   - a responsible moral agent,
   - and (many would add) an immortal soul.

2. My second presupposition is the enormous influence of society, with all its overlapping and interlocking institutions, upon each individual.

   - Each of us has been profoundly affected since birth by the multiple impacts of his family, his local community, and his nation.
   - Each of us reflects in countless ways the ideologies and mores--economic, political, and social--of our society.
   - Each of us, in his own way, is the product of our complex Greco-Roman, Hebraic-Christian, scientific, democratic Western culture which differs so significantly from the no less complex cultures of India and China.

Greene's Two Presuppositions Related to Nature and Reality

1. My third presupposition is man's dependence upon,

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 7.
and increasing control of, that larger environment which we call the world of nature. This physical world, of which we are a part by virtue of our physical nature, is the source of all our physical necessities and comforts and the object of all our scientific inquiries. ... Its orderliness makes possible our growing scientific understanding and our ever expanding technological power. Its beauties of form and color elicit our breathless admiration. Its fecundities, inanimate and animate, invite our explorations and exploitations. Its droughts and floods, diseases and violences, threaten our lives. Omnipresent, both benign and destructive, both stubborn and tractable, this world of nature affects our lives so continuously and profoundly that we live and live well only in proportion as we learn its ways and learn to "control" it by adapting ourselves to it.29

2. My final major presupposition is, (as I have said,) more controversial. It is that man and nature do not comprise the whole of reality but that both are rooted or grounded in an ultimate Reality that transcends space and time and all finite existence .... Men's metaphysical accounts of this Reality have differed as radically as have the descriptions of God in the great world religions, and there have always been intelligent and high-minded men who have, for a variety of reasons, repudiated all such metaphysical flights as irresponsible and all religious faith as unfounded. Yet the most convinced naturalist, if he is a man of intellectual integrity and humility, will at least acknowledge, with John Dewey, the unfathomable mystery of Nature, the finitude of all human knowledge, and the value of man's spiritual aspirations. Such naturalists will join with the sincere metaphysical idealist and the enlightened man of religious faith in condemning all moral cynicism and spiritual iconoclasm.30

29 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
30 Ibid., pp. 9-10 (italics mine).
Sifting through these philosophical presuppositions proffered by Greene we see reflected in more concrete form the three basic concepts of "person," "process" and "piety" with which we characterized Greene's approach to philosophical endeavour. We remember that "person" means an avid humanism that asserts a tenacious faith in man's ability to gain insight increasingly of his environment; that "process" means the ceaseless critical examining of all the major facets and ensuing issues of human experience; and that "piety" means the sense in man of the unfathomable depth of all that is and his only intellectually honest response is one of wonderment, reverence and awe. We remember also that these basic concepts and their meaning for Greene characterized all Greek thought at its best and animated the most germinal philosophical speculations in Western culture, and Greene named this the Socratic "spirit."

These presuppositions set into sharp relief the various aspects of man's total environment, i.e., the world of nature, human society, and the ultimate depths of reality itself. These are the dimensions of reality that surround any individual man and by this fact to which he must obtain some relation.

And if we reconsider that man is essentially a normative being then this relation with all other than self will be a meaningful one and therefore shot through with significance for the particular evaluating self. Greene sums up the evaluative character of all human experience in regard to all dimensions of reality as follows:

Finally, since man is essentially a normative being, so constituted as to evaluate, explicitly or implicitly, everything he encounters and everything he thinks and does, his knowledge of reality and the reality he encounters
are inescapably permeated through and through with significance for him. He never evaluates in the abstract but only in the context of his real (or imagined) encounters with, and apprehensions of, the "world" in which he belongs; and he never encounters anything, and never thinks or acts, without these encounters, thoughts and actions having in fact some significance for him. 31

Man's experience then is value ridden, and requires value choices and decisions. Life forces man to make choices, to rate things and people as better or worse, good or evil, to judge actions as right or wrong, to name an object beautiful or ugly. So the issue is not whether man wants to evaluate. It is the existential fact that man must evaluate and thereby form some scale of values to which reference is made for decisions and concomitant actions. In actuality the only alternative to personal choice is to either let someone else make the decision for us or remain inert and let the passage of time and its consequences determine our decisions.

Aspects of Man's Search for Truth

If man's experience is evaluative in nature and thereby has significance for him then it follows that man has an ultimate concern for the truth about the various dimensions of his reality. But within this context of thought what is the meaning of truth? In this regard Greene declares:

For our purposes, we may define truth as the quality of propositions that "do justice" to

or are "adequate to" the aspect of reality—to the actual situations or matter of fact—to which they refer. That is, truth is the distinguishing characteristic of what a conscious mind really knows or might know about whatever is real. Reality itself is not "true"; it simply is what it is. Were there no knowing mind, finite or infinite, the problem of truth would never arise. It is only when consciousness is directed to something that is real in its own right and has a character of its own that the possibility of truth and error arises. When conscious mind more or less seriously misapprehends what it seeks to know, it falls into that degree of error. When, on the other hand, its apprehensions of its "object" is more or less adequate and accurate, it has to that extent grasped the truth.32

Now man takes his search for truth very seriously for two reasons. One is that man gains intrinsic satisfaction from knowing as much about his total environment as possible because of his innate curiosity. The second reason is that the truer man's knowledge of reality the better chance he has to adapt himself to reality and in turn his greater opportunity for personal well-being. The latter reason is practical and hinges upon the fact that true knowledge of things is man's most "effective way of adjusting himself to them and of controlling them for his own welfare."33 The generic capacities with which man is endowed to approach the dimensions of his surrounding reality are his powers of sensation and reflection. It is through these powers that man is able to make the desired adjustment to the whole of his environment. It is true that man as animals inherit instinctive aptitudes and responses but

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33Ibid.
these in man are weak and for the most part too unspecialized to account for much value in man's adaptive strivings. Of man's two generic capacities for true knowledge of his environment in order to attain maximum adaptation to it the power of reflection is the most significant. In this regard Greene states:

It is man's reason that above all enables him to learn the ways of nature, to adapt himself to it, and thus to induce it to satisfy his needs. He encounters nature with his senses, but it is with his reason or power of reflection that he interprets what he sees and hears, touches, smells, and tastes and then decides how to act.34

Man searches for truth or knowledge in three related but fairly distinct dimensions of reality. His search for truth in the world of nature is essentially a social enterprise as represented by modern science and is fundamentally a search for factual information concerning the physical world. A second dimension of reality to which man devotes himself to a quest for truth is his social environment. Here the object of his inquiry is human beings and he seeks to know and understand human nature so that he can more successfully adapt himself to corporate social causes and functions and make his own unique contribution thereto. "A third area of inquiry is opened to man by his unique ability," according to Greene, "not shared by other living creatures, to reflect upon his own essential nature and the ultimate character of the universe in which he finds himself."35 In this dimension of human inquiry man

34Ibid.
attempts to come to grips with the ultimate what and why of things.

Throughout man's attempt to understand or know the three aspects of his environment he is forever estimating the value or disvalue of his inquiry in terms of its significance for him as a conscious selective agent. In each dimension he sets up a scale of values which seem to him to be the most reasonable response and attitude in its bearing on his own well-being. Greene declares:

In short, his apprehensions and his evaluations are coterminous; he assumes that everything he encounters in nature, behind and beyond nature, and in human society is pregnant with potential good or harm, value or disvalue. He is therefore deeply concerned to know as truly as possible what in nature, in his fellow men, and "behind" nature is good or evil, of potential help or harm.36

From this consideration of the dimensions of man's total environment we can see that man's experience of inquiry can be classified into two distinct types: that of factual inquiry and that of value inquiry. These types of inquiry are necessary if men value truth in regard to the totality of the environment of their experience. And men do value truth or knowledge partially for its own sake but mainly to further their practical need of learning how to better adapt themselves to their environment in order to exist and possibly to increase their state of well-being. Greene sums up why men value truth as follows:

Egregious ignorance of nature spells instant death; notable error dooms men to a state of bare survival. Only as we come to know nature more and more truthfully are we able

36Ibid., p. 27.
to adapt ourselves to it with scientific and technological competence. Only as we come to understand ourselves and our fellow-men can we adapt ourselves to our society and learn to live with our fellow-men in peace and harmony. Only as we fathom the dark mysteries that underlie nature and constitute the inner essence of reality itself can we learn how to discipline our ultimate beliefs into conformity with things as they really are and to conduct our lives with realistic long-range wisdom. Without truth regarding both "fact" and "value" we are doomed to frustration and failure. 37

Presently we look to modern science as the most authentic passage-way toward truth in the spatio-temporal world of nature in its own terms. Thus our attention is now directed toward Greene's point of view in regard to aspects of science and the scientific method.

37 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONTEMPORARY STATUS OF SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE AND THE
SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC INSIGHT

We will begin this chapter by re-stating from Greene's point of view the major characteristic of man and his environment as implicated specifically in the statement of his philosophical presuppositions, and generally throughout the panoramic view presented in the last chapter. Firstly, man's distinguishing characteristic is his power of reflection. It is "with his reason or power of reflection that he interprets what he sees and hears, touches, smells, and tastes and then decides how to act." Secondly, in consequence of this power of reflection man can transcend the natural world and is able to participate in all three dimensions of reality, that is, the world of nature, the intellectual world of man, and an ultimate Reality in which the natural and human dimensions of reality are rooted or grounded. In short, man's power of reflection permits him in the last analysis to transcend not only himself but his objective environment. And, thirdly, it is through man's participation in each dimension of reality - the natural, social, and universal ground of all that is - that he may fully understand his moral responsibility to himself, to other men, and the totality of life. For reflective participation in the dimensions of reality with moral responsibility renders to him an interpretation of the basic meaning of concepts or ideas related to the qualitative aspects of human existence. Man
understands, then, the meaning of dignity, loyalty, goodness, friendship, etc. and their opposites for his life; and, more importantly, he understands that his highest aspirations are not objects of sensory perception but are nonetheless ever present to him. With this statement we have passed with Greene beyond the realm of knowledge with which empiricism may deal. In fact, we have passed into the realm of metaphysics. But let us ask at this point, if it is possible to define man with due and serious considerations of all factors in his conscious experience and omit an underlying metaphysics? Probably inherent in all psychological studies of man, no matter how objective they claim to be, there is embedded a metaphysics. And is it not the ideal of all scholarship that we objectively consider all real factors of any problem with which we choose to investigate? Be this as it may for now, the point to be stressed here is that Greene does not see that man and nature comprise the whole of reality. Rather there is an ultimate Reality that transcends space and time and therefore all finite existence. However differently men's metaphysical accounts of the nature of this Reality may be is in a sense beside the point here for Greene. This is so because he feels the crucial issue in the practical dimension of human life is the recognition of the existence of an ultimate Reality that is essentially, in its totality, beyond the grasp of man's finite cognitive powers. As Greene states:

Yet the most convinced naturalist, if he is a man of intellectual integrity and humility, will at least acknowledge, with John Dewey, the unfathomable mystery of Nature, the finitude of all human knowledge, and the value of man's spiritual aspirations. Such naturalists will join with the sincere metaphysical idealist and the enlightened
man of religious faith in condemning all moral cynicism and spiritual iconoclasm.¹

All this is to say that human beings with their endowed capacity of instinct, emotion, and reflective power live in an order which is essentially beyond their intellectual grasp. Possessing the power of reflection and self-reflection man is able to a degree to discern that his total environment has both a physical and spiritual quality. This fact of man's existence is at the same time a blessing and a curse. For he, himself, being partly physical and partly spiritual and realizing such, is forever struggling with the conflicts that such knowledge poses for him. The more deeply he probes himself the more conscious he is of his participation in a more embracing qualitative, intelligible universe. Yet the nearer he approaches toward infinite boundaries the more conscious he is of his own finiteness. There is no rest for man in his search for the final meaning of human existence. And, no animal but man can deliberately choose to live life at a level of reverential grandeur or within the depths of loneliness and despair. With this account in mind of how man stands before and within the universe according to Greene we can direct our attention to science and the scientific method as man's concerted attempt to understand himself and reality.

Beginnings and Background of Modern Science

Modern science, Greene believes, just as philosophy, religion, and art, has a history which must be understood if one is to correctly

¹Theodore M. Greene, Inglis Lecture, p. 10.
evaluate its contemporary status in our culture. In short, we must look briefly at the background and beginnings of modern science if we are to assess its present distinctive genius and unique contribution to modern society.

Greene maintains that in the light of the history of man's evolving orientation to the world of nature a drastic and revolutionary change took place about the time of Descartes, i.e., the study of nature began to be no longer the integrated search for wisdom that had been its purpose in the Greek and Medieval periods. Greene stresses that our Western heritage reveals that man's search for knowledge originally was a search for wisdom and beauty. This search for wisdom and beauty in contrast to a search for limited factual knowledge can best be differentiated by a reconsideration of the three personal traits of Socrates that Greene attributes to him: (1) Socrates' unrelenting faith in the "process" of dialectic as being man's endless critical search for reliable but never infallible knowledge. (2) Socrates' profound humanism in his deep respect for the value and dignity of man as "person." "He respected man so deeply because man," Greene declares, "unlike the animals, can reflect, distinguish between right and wrong, and search out ultimate values rooted in reality."2 (3) Socrates' "piety" in that it "so clearly reflected his lively realization that our finite minds cannot ever fathom the ultimate riddles of the universe and should not pretend to do so."3 In brief, the search for wisdom takes into account

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2Theodore M. Greene, Our Cultural Heritage, p. 78.
3Ibid., p. 80.
an integrated view of human nature, experience, and human aspirations and as such expounds that all of man's experiences are cognitively significant in his search for truth of reality. Greene declares:

It was Socrates' final allegiance to process and person, so conceived, and his religious faith which expressed itself in this piety, which constituted his life-long search for wisdom... Wisdom, so far as it is available to man at all is, insight coupled with humility, knowledge put to use, faith purified by honest questioning and doubt.4

Now Greene maintains that it is this Socratic spirit in a search for wisdom that has characterized for the most part all significant scientific thought in the West throughout its Greek and Medieval history. Even the pre-Socratic philosophers searched for wisdom in that their quest took into account an integrated view of human nature and experience. To this point Greene explains:

It is important to note the relation of these Greek beginnings of science to what we have described as the "Socratic" quest for wisdom. Socrates' dialectic was, we recall, an authentic search for wisdom because it was never, in his mind, divorced from his humanistic concern for values or from his pious reverence for ultimate mystery. According to this criterion, the pre-Socratic inquiries into nature must also be described as a search for wisdom.5

Greene sums up his view of the beginnings and background of modern science as follows:

We can conclude, then, that the study of nature prior to the Middle Ages was seldom

4Tbid.
5Tbid., p. 121.
dissociated from an integrated search for wisdom. The same can be said, of course, of the dominant trend in the Medieval period, culminating in Aquinas. The natural was indeed studied for itself, yet always in its relation to the supernatural. Reason was carefully explored but always finally related and subordinated to Revelation.... The Medieval synthesis of Greek speculation and Christian faith precluded the possibility of any extensive autonomy for science. The study of nature remained, with minor exceptions, a well-integrated part of man's total quest for wisdom and ultimate salvation.  

Modern Science and Knowledge

The most profound change in science from the medieval period to the modern era is its indifference for wisdom in contrast to scientific knowledge or new factual knowledge for its own sake. Beginning with the Renaissance science became increasingly irresponsible and impious toward the whole of nature. To be more correct we should say scientists, as individuals, became more irresponsible and impious towards themselves and mankind, nature and Deity. This is not to discredit the early men of the Renaissance who approached the scientific enterprise with a broad range of interests and wide cultivation in all aspects of human endeavour and concern. But the development of science and the scientific method rapidly consumed for the most part the bulk of the individual's time and energy. On this point Greene contends:

As scientific inquiry progressed, however, it became more and more specialized and time-

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6 Ibid., pp. 123-124
consuming. It was still possible in the eighteenth century for a Leibnitz to combine important mathematical discovery with philosophical speculation and theological controversy. But, by then, empirical science was becoming a full-time vocation leaving little time or energy for non-scientific pursuits. 

In the latter part of the nineteenth century after the impact of Darwin's theory of evolution it became necessary to reassess man's own nature in the light of the evolutionary theory and the prestige of science reached a new high. "In this reassessment," Greene maintains, "man tended to become merely a complicated animal, the highest of living species, no doubt, yet differing from other species in complexity rather than kind." Furthermore the same scientific method that had proved to be successful in the natural sciences could now be applied in full strength to a study of man himself. Thus the development of anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc. "These studies," according to Greene, "once initiated, quickly grew in respectability and scope and powerfully reinforced the belief that human nature is as susceptible to scientific analysis as physical nature and that science, natural and social, is the only reliable road to truth." 

This state of affairs relative to man's uncritical faith in science led to the development of a new cultural ethos which was destined to become as rigid as that experienced in the religious orthodoxy of the medieval period. As faith in science increased man's faith in religion

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7Ibid., p. 132.
8Ibid., p. 133.
9Ibid., (Underlining mine).
decreased. "Hence not only the increasing secularization of the modern ethos but the progressive weakening of man's faith in objective goodness, beauty, and holiness." In short, according to Greene, "the main trend since the Renaissance has been, as we have seen, increasingly to divorce science from ethics and politics, aesthetics and theology. It has also been to limit 'science' to the rational interpretation of sense impressions and to rule out, as 'unscientific,' man's most rigorous and reflective interpretations of his aesthetic, moral and religious experiences." In this manner science has grown increasingly narrow in its orientation and thus its growing tendency to limit all knowledge to scientific (factual) knowledge and thus place more and more reliance upon man's sense experience as the most reliable source of knowledge. And this narrow conception of scientific knowledge, which in essence is a naturalism in a modern form, is presently persuasive in our cultural ethos. To this point Greene contends:

The question as to the relation of science to wisdom becomes crucial in the area of contemporary philosophical interpretations of science and of the bearing of science on man's aesthetic judgments and on his moral and religious beliefs.... The growing tendency to limit all knowledge to scientific knowledge of this strict and narrow type has been initiated by philosophers and eagerly adopted by many scientists. It has resulted in a "reductionistic" conception of human nature, human knowledge, and human belief which is profoundly at variance with both the Greek and the Palestinian variants of man's ancient search for wisdom. If scientific knowledge, narrowly defined is the only real knowledge we can have, it follows

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 137.
that all man's secular evaluations and religious beliefs are equally incapable of validation.\textsuperscript{12}

**Greene's Major Concern**

At this point we recall that Greene in viewing our modern cultural scene as a philosopher-citizen is most concerned with the effect such "scientism" has had upon the prevailing "climate of opinion." Indeed, "scientism" defined as "the general tendency to reduce man to the status of a complicated animal and to conceive of him as the sole creator of all the values which men cherish is increasingly obliterating man's faith in the validity of the religious dimension of human experience and the existence of objective values."\textsuperscript{13} There is no God of religious worship as set forth in the Hebraic-Christian faith and there are no objective values rooted in the universe. Thus, Greene views the modern cultural scene with acute concern and trepidation; therefore, he is especially concerned with the plight of modern man relative to his ideological state. We may sum up how Greene sees the basic ideological state of modern man in one word, scepticism.

Greene maintains that the questions being asked by the "lonely" and "anxious" American reflect the basic scepticism of our age and culture. The doubt and fear of modern man's sceptical attitude is reflected in his interrogations in his rare and poignant moments of reflective solitude. In regard to this matter Greene states:

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 62.
Even the "common man", whom intellectuals tend to patronize asks himself in his own way the questions which have tormented mankind since the dawn of history. What does my life really amount to? What lies ahead, in this life and after death? What kind of universe am I living in? What is there in it worthy of my complete loyalty?\footnote{Theodore M. Greene, Moral, Aesthetic, Religious Insight, p. 7.}

Such questions do reflect modern man's quest for the existential meaning in life and they are ontological in character. But the underlying motive for posing the questions is epistemological in character in that it stems from a sceptical attitude. In essence, then, the question is, what can I know with a degree of certainty? As an educator at the college level Greene states the point of view of modern youth in this matter as follows:

It is also significant that the most acute and critical of our undergraduates reflect the basic scepticism of our age. Their approach is typically epistemological rather than ontological. They are more troubled by the problem of knowledge and the criteria of valid insight than they are by the complementary problem of reality. They are not ready to explore the nature of cosmic order, of beauty and justice, or of God; they are preoccupied with the anterior question as to whether authentic aesthetic, moral, and religious insight is possible at all and if so whether there are any criteria of valid insight.\footnote{Tbid., pp. 7-8.}

Now we are in position to see that for Greene the "question as to whether authentic aesthetic, moral, and religious insight is possible at all and if so, whether there are any criteria of valid insight" is
the crucial and burning contemporary cultural issue; therefore, we can safely conclude that the problem of authentic insight cogently motivates Greene in his chosen task of philosophical inquiry. In short, we should note here, that as Greene sees it the central philosophical problem is, essentially, an epistemological problem. For the crucial prior question in philosophy must be, "Can we know anything about the self and nature, man and God?" 16

Greene maintains that prior to the Renaissance the questions being asked by modern man relative to the meaning of life and how one should lead a purposive and significant existence were asked in an ontological form, i.e., in terms of reality or being. But with Descartes and his attitude of radical doubt there is a shift of emphasis from the ontological approach to the concerns of philosophy to the epistemological approach. Thus, the contemporary questions are: "Can we know anything with certainty? Indeed, may not our most vital problems defy solution?" 17 Accordingly, it follows, that a science of knowledge necessarily implies or reveals the content of knowledge or the nature of reality itself. In a word, method and content of knowledge can not be separated for each implies the other. That the sceptical attitude prevalent in our culture focuses primarily upon the question whether authentic aesthetic, moral, and religious insight is possible is not easily denied. That there is honest doubt in the minds of men as to the possibility of valid insight into these generic dimensions of human experience is not being

16 Ibid., p. 5 (Underlining mine).
17 Ibid.
questioned seriously by contemporary thoughtful persons. In our recent account of Greene's estimate of the tensions of modern culture there was submitted ample evidence in support of his point of view in this matter. Greene states the case of contemporary man's ideological predicament as follows:

What dismays our leading scientists as well as thoughtful men and women in all walks of life is the contemporary loss of faith in basic moral and aesthetic values and the difficulty which so many people have today in achieving or maintaining a religious faith which is not only vital but reflective and intellectually honest.  

Now the question is, where shall we turn to obtain an authentic insight into the generic experiences of man? And Greene's response is, to modern science and its well-tested method of inquiry. He states:

It is a truism that what is most valuable in modern science is not its cumulative achievements, impressive as they are, but its well-tested method of inquiry. The actual findings of science in any period are bound to be superseded by later findings. What endures, and what so richly justifies our faith in science, is its complex self-corrective method of orderly and cooperative inquiry. Today we need above all else an analogous method of responsible inquiry in the areas of moral and aesthetic value and of religious commitment. Can we, perchance, devise a blueprint for such a method?  

Greene is telling us that science at its ideal best is the search for wisdom in the Greco-Roman and Hebraic-Christian tradition. For scientific discovery has an unquenchable spirit to correct old errors

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18 Ibid., p. 9
19 Ibid.
and discover new truths regardless of all obstacles. "This spirit, which is responsible for all our scientific discoveries and inventions," Greene believes, "expresses itself in the process which we call the scientific method, in the personal attitude of the scientist towards his work and his scientific colleagues, and, at least ideally, in an authentic natural piety for nature and human nature." Here Greene dresses the Socratic spirit in a modern scientific form. He sees that the point at which modern science fails, and thus may be called "scientism," is at the level of authentic natural piety for nature and human nature. This occurs as a result of not recognizing the inherent limitations of the scientific method. Such non-recognition of the limit and ultimate boundary of scientific method and its insight accounts for the impious arrogance characteristic of modern "scientism." Greene claims that by "natural piety" he means more than the due respect of the scientist for empirical data, the intellectual and physical tools of his trade and mutual trust and respect of his colleagues. In the more profound sense "natural piety" means, according to Greene, "a respect for limits and a humility, akin to religious humility, for whatever may lie beyond these limits." Therefore the individual scientist is impious who fails to recognize the limit or frontier of scientific method and in turn the limit or boundary of the resultant insight. Greene believes that "the true scientist will be the first to recognize and honor the limits of his own methodology and the ultimate mystery of human nature and of our

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20 Theodore M. Greene, Our Cultural Heritage, p. 140.
21 Ibid., p. 142.
universe." As to the proper function of science in modern culture, Greene declares:

Indeed, is it the proper function of science in its most advanced stages to describe the objective world at all? Is it not its sole epistemological function to render its observations of sensory data ever more precise and then, with the aid of strictly non-descriptive mathematical operations, to anticipate and confirm future sensory observations under controlled conditions? Science, thus interpreted, loses none of its value for technology, but it does abdicate its earlier role as man's most reliable source of authentic insight into the nature of the physical world.

Greene sums up his estimate of our scientific heritage as follows:

What is most vital in our scientific heritage, in short, is what is most dynamic in it—the process of never ending inquiry, the endless succession of scientists of integrity and humility, and the underlying attitude of pious recognition of methodological limits and finite horizons.

"So interpreted," Greene explains, "science is the stalwart ally, not the enemy, of the philosophical search for wisdom, of artistic creativity and enjoyment, and of enlightened religious faith."

We clearly see that Greene feels the crucial problems and questions of our time are axiological and religious in character and modern man is "preoccupied with the anterior question whether authentic aesthetic, moral and religious insight is possible at all and, if so, whether there

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22 Ibid., p. 114.
25 Ibid.
are any criteria of valid insight." In short, it is in the area of values and religious faith that modern scepticism is rampart and exerting its corroding influence upon all aspects of modern culture. Thus, Greene's philosophical concern is basically epistemological and directed toward discovering a method of inquiry that will serve to counteract the modern sceptical attitude. It is this aspect of Greene's philosophical endeavour that we shall emphasize in this study. Greene believes that

What endures, and what so richly justifies our faith in science, is its complex self-corrective method of orderly and cooperative inquiry. Today we need above all else an analogous method of responsible inquiry in the areas of moral and aesthetic value and of religious commitment.27

Thus Greene asks, "Can we, perchance, devise a blueprint for such a method?" Greene's response and the philosophical implications implicit in it is the subject matter of the next chapter.

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE

GREENE'S NEO-KANTIAN APPROACH TO AUTHENTIC INSIGHT
OF FACT AND VALUES

We have previously mentioned with some amplification Greene's Kantian scholarship and the influence of Kantian doctrines upon Greene's own creative philosophical thought. In Moral, Aesthetic, and Religious Insight Greene follows the thought of Kant and presents the major conclusions set forth by Kant in his major works, i.e., the three Critiques, namely, the Critique of Pure Reason, of Practical Reason, and of Judgment and the work entitled, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Greene's primary purpose is to plunder Kant's thought for its significance in indicating an approach that may point the way toward alleviating if not solving the crucial axiological and religious problems of contemporary culture. We can recall in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant presents an elaborate analysis of the basic presuppositions and implications of man's ordinary sense perception and the science of his day. And, in the Critique of Practical Reason and Judgment, he analyzes man's moral and aesthetic experience respectively. And, finally, in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant comes to grips with man's religious experience. Each of these experiences, that is, sense-perceptual or knowing activity, valuative and reverential, or religious, is, according to Greene's thinking, a type of experience generic to the nature of mankind.
And we need not stress here again that Greene's major philosophical concern is to critically examine man's major types of experience. In short, then, just as Kant in his major works attempts to analyze man's major generic experiences, which in turn reflect the major human problems of knowledge, i.e., reality, goodness, beauty, and holiness, so too this chapter will set forth Greene's neo-Kantian interpretation of these same major human experiences and the resultant insight shed upon major human problems. To stay within the stated scope of this study this task presupposes the impossibility of a recapitulation in depth of Kant's elaborate analysis and argument as found in his original studies. Thus the plan is to limit our discussion of Kantian doctrines to the depth that Greene feels is necessary to clearly explicate his own neo-Kantian thesis. In a word, we will be dealing principally with the major aspects of Kant's basic approach and his chief conclusions as interpreted by Greene. Whereas this procedure will allow, first, a reasonable and manageable presentation of Kantian doctrines in the light of Greene's neo-Kantian beliefs, and, second, will permit this study to remain within the bounds initially prescribed for it, there is intended no denial that an understanding of the full purport and validity of Kant's chief conclusions can only be attained by following throughout the various stages of his argument and thought in its original form. As a Kantian scholar, Greene would be among the first to acknowledge this contention; however, the fact of his Kantian scholarship invests in him a degree of interpretive authority that promotes confidence in the authenticity of his judgment of Kant's ultimate beliefs and philosophical stance.
Man's Sense-Perceptual Experience and Scientific Insight

We saw in the last chapter that Greene judges the crucial concerns of contemporary man in our culture to ultimately settle into problems of knowledge and the criteria of valid insight. Contemporary man wants to know if authentic moral, aesthetic, and religious insight is possible at all and, if so, whether there are any criteria of valid insight? We saw also Greene's point of view toward science and his affirmation of faith in the scientific method as responsible inquiry into the nature of the physical world. Thus we ended the chapter with the proposal that we are in search of an analogous method of responsible inquiry into the moral, aesthetic, and religious dimensions of human experience. It is Greene's conviction that the central insights of Kant provide the best intellectual base for this endeavour. And thus we see that Kant's philosophy also provides the most promising guide for enlightenment upon Greene's own creative thought in regard to this matter. Greene states:

Kant, unlike the Ancients and the Medievalists, is essentially modern in basic orientation... Furthermore, Kant not only saw man's perennial problems through modern eyes; he also grappled, resolutely and powerfully, with the problems which most deeply concern us today. He asks the very questions which are uppermost in our minds. His answers, though we may be critical of some of them, are the kind of answers we are looking for.¹

Furthermore, it is Greene's conviction that Kant provides the method of inquiry of which we are in search. Greene declares:

¹Theodore M. Greene, Moral, Aesthetic, and Religious Insight, p. 12.
What makes him (Kant) most useful to us, however, is the method of inquiry which he defined and used so brilliantly in his monumental Critique of Pure Reason. This method is, in basic outline, as valid today as it was nearly two centuries ago. It may well prove to be the method of which we are now in search in our efforts to counteract the corroding acids of modernity.

It should be pointed out at this juncture that Kant undertook his investigations of man's sense-perceptual, moral, aesthetic, and religious experience on the assumption that such were existential facts of reality. Only in this context does his laborious investigation have any meaning. That is to say, if anyone rejects out of hand any one of these experiences as non-generic of mankind then the resultant conclusions of the analysis of the particular rejected experience is *ipso facto* meaningless. Be this as it may for now; we return to our major thought and see that Greene's neo-Kantian thesis claims in simple terms that the method of analysis that Kant used most rigorously in his first investigation, i.e., the Critique of Pure Reason, in which "he analyzes the basic presuppositions and implications of ordinary sense perception and of the science of his day," should be applied consistently and rigorously to the other major human experiences. Hence Greene's statement of his own task is as follows:

It is, accordingly, our task to out-Kant Kant—that is, to apply his own method to some types of experience, notably the aesthetic and the religious, more consistently than he himself was able to do. . . .

Ibid. (brackets mine).
While making full use of his discerning
genius, we must presume to improve on him,
to develop, if we can, a neo-Kantian ap­
proach to the crucial problems of our day.  

Just as Greene feels that the major philosophical problem today is
epistemological in character so did Kant in his day.  Kant labels his
position "critical" idealism.  A brief reflection into "pre-critical"
days can help us understand Kant's main concern in the Critique of Pure
Reason.

As mentioned in the last chapter it is with Descartes that the em­
phasis in the approach to philosophy shifts from the ontological to the
epistemological.  Descartes' approach to philosophy is in a spirit of
radical scepticism.  He begins his quest for certainty by doubting the
sure reliability of everything.  In the second Meditation Descartes
declares:

I suppose, accordingly, that everything
that I see is false; I convince myself that
nothing has ever existed of all that my
decisful memory recalls to me.  I think
that I have no senses; and I believe that
body, shape, extension, motion and locomo­
tion are merely inventions of my mind.
What then could be thought true?  Perhaps
nothing else, unless it is that there is
nothing certain in the world.

Ultimately Descartes' method of systematic doubt in his quest for cer­
tainty leads him to his famous declaration of "Cogito, ergo sum" — "I
think, therefore I am."  The cogito establishes the certain factuality
of the processes of the mind's activity without saying anything about the

3Ibid., p. 13.

4Rene Descartes, Meditations, trns. with an Introduction by Lawrence
independent realities or the objective reality of physical objects to which these processes allegedly point. The *ergo sum*, "therefore I am" establishes by inference, hence the *ergo*, the reality of a conscious subject or self. That is, it is impossible to accept the factuality of the processes of doubting, understanding, imagining, willing, perceiving etc. without conceiving of a doubter, thinker, etc. that performs these functions. It is true that this self can only be inferred rather than directly experienced, but Descartes' is convinced, Greene explains, "that this inference, from the 'given' to the 'necessary condition' of the given, was an inescapable and valid inference." Yet this inference, as important as it is, still does not allow Descartes to solve his problem of determining reliable and verifiable contact with an independent or external-to-the-self reality. This circumstance has since been labeled the "ego-centric predicament." Greene describes Descartes' predicament at this point as follows:

He was in the predicament of a man encased for life, as a disembodied self, in a telephone booth and cursed with radical doubt as to whether any of the "messages" which he hears do indeed originate outside the booth and, if so, whether they are at all reliable.

Descartes does offer a solution to the ego-centric quandary which need not concern us in detail except to say that his inquiry culminates in the decision that the senses and reason must be a valid source of

6 Ibid.
knowledge for a benevolent God would not condemn us to a state of radical and necessary illusion. The crucial issue for our immediate concern is, Descartes does set the stage so to speak for the validity and necessity of serious attention and concern for problems of knowledge by subsequent philosophers. Actually it is the result of inquiry in aftermath to Descartes that ultimately provokes Kant to formulate his "critical" philosophical stance as formulated in the Critique of Pure Reason. In short, the aftermath of Descartes saw the development of one group or school of philosophy seizing upon the sensory aspect and another group upon the reason aspect as the valid source of certain knowledge; and each developed logically his chosen aspect in isolation from the other until both ended in a barren conclusion. In a word, pure empiricism culminated in Hume's philosophical scepticism and pure rationalism culminated in a dogmatism that asserted reason and reason alone was the one and only way to truth about the objectively real in reality. This, then, was Kant's philosophical heritage of which he was acutely aware and hence his serious concern and preoccupation as a philosopher with problems embedded in the knowledge situation. It is in the light of the pre-critical traditions to which Kant fell heir in his date and time in history that he is motivated to contemplate, in "critical" fashion, a solution to the knowledge problem as initially set forth by Descartes. This brief and rough sketch of Kant's philosophical heritage as it throws light upon his own concern may be summed up adequately by stating: Kant felt that "pure" empiricism, which culminated in philosophical scepticism, undercut not only the reliability of the science of his day but also, and perhaps more importantly, the moral convictions of men; and
likewise, "pure" rationalism, as a subjective process of spinning out of one's own mind facts concerning the objectively real in reality, is totally useless in that there is no contact with any aspect of the objectively real and therefore it stands that reason, by itself, can never establish the valid and reliable truth regarding its objective reference. It is in this state of mind that Kant approaches his task and makes his unique contribution to philosophical inquiry.

A summation of this backward glance into Kant's philosophical heritage and the philosophical ethos of his time may be gleaned from Greene's statement of Kant's major problem.

Hence, Kant's great problem, as he himself envisaged it, was twofold. Assuming, as he did, the validity of scientific inquiry, on the one hand, and of moral "faith," on the other, he asked himself two crucial questions. How is science possible? That is, how, in principle, can we validate the basic presuppositions of scientific inquiry? And how is moral "faith" possible? That is, how, in principle, can we validate the deliverances of man's moral conscience? He set himself the formidable task of answering these two questions successively in his first and second Critiques.7

This passage which expresses Greene's interpretation of Kant's major problem and task provokes the re-statement of Greene's own thesis to the effect that the method of inquiry that Kant defined and used so successfully in his Critique of Pure Reason "is, in basic outline, as valid today as it was nearly two centuries ago. It may well prove to be the method of which we

7 Ibid., p. 17.
are now in search in our efforts to counteract the corroding acids of modernity.\(^8\) And, also, as pointed out previously, in the first *Critique* Kant analyzes man's ordinary sense perception, and since Greene claims to understand Kant's method he declares, "we need not here attempt to recapitulate Kant's elaborate analysis in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. All that concerns us here is his basic approach and his chief conclusions. These, in combination will suffice to indicate his all important method."\(^9\)

Greene asserts that Kant's approach to an analysis of sense perception is "characterized by two major assumptions, both of which are of crucial importance to our own inquiry."\(^10\) Both of these assumptions are epistemological in character and have to do specifically with the knowing process itself. The first assumption concerns the conflict between empiricism and rationalism that grew out of the Cartesian philosophy. As previously mentioned each school ultimately concluded that sensation alone or reason alone was the reliable way to truth about the objectively real in reality. By Kant's time the empiricists were claiming reason was "decayed sense" and the rationalists were claiming sensation was "confused reason." Kant claims and Greene concurs that our knowledge of reality depends upon both primary sensory experience and rational interpretation of such experience. To this point Greene declares:

Both the empiricists and the rationalists are like men who are trying to hop on one leg; actually, walking requires two legs, duly coordinated.\(^11\)

Indeed it is so that through primary sensory experience we are in touch with the world of nature; but such sensory data is meaningless unless it is interpreted by reason. Greene's culminating belief and its importance for his argument in regard to this matter is as follows:

Our knowledge of nature depends upon sense and reason in combination; both are essential. Kant expresses this profound insight in the most important single sentence in the first Critique. "Concepts without percepts are empty; percepts without concepts are blind." Knowledge is the product of rational interpretation of primary experience. Our entire subsequent argument will presume the validity of this insight.\(^{12}\)

The second basic assumption that characterizes Kant's approach to an analysis of sense perception is concerned with a solution to Descartes' ego-centric predicament. The basic and essential difficulty of the predicament is a radical dualism of mind and matter. For both schools growing out of the Cartesian philosophy had formulated the problem of knowledge in an insoluble form in that they assumed, as Descartes had, that true ideas must correspond to an external reality which is wholly independent of man's knowing mind. If the problem of knowledge is thus stated in this radically dualistic mode, then, it follows that an insurmountable difficulty exists which creates an impossible impasse: for how can we be sure that our ideas correspond to a reality that is totally different than ourselves? If radical dualism is the initial basal assumption then, the ego-centric predicament is a trap from which there is no escape. Again, as Greene states the situation: "If we start with

the assumption that the knowing mind may be radically out of touch with, and unrelated to the "object" which it seeks to know, the problem of verifiable knowledge is indeed hopeless. In the light of this hopeless ego-centric predicament to which Descartes' rationalistic philosophy had been reduced by Kant's time, Kant offers a solution which he terms his "Copernican Revolution." Its essence is a complete re-definition of the knowledge problem. Why, Kant asks, must we assume that the knowing mind is radically out of touch with the object which it seeks to know? Why not assume the opposite and Greene's interpretation of Kant's re-definition of the problem is as follows:

Let us, therefore, assume the opposite—that what we actually start with is a conscious process with two necessary poles, the subjective pole of the knowing agent and the objective pole of the encountered object. Let us, in other words, take the knowing process seriously, as a process of genuine encounter and not as a mere spinning out of one's self of subjective fancies with no cognitive import.

In essence, Kant's re-definition of the knowledge problem proposes that objective reality to be known at all must conform to the structure of man's mind; mind being used in the sense that it is an active constitutive element of experience. Greene proposes

We can today best formulate Kant's revolutionary proposal in terms of the more recent concept of Gestalt, or configuration. Let us start, says Kant in effect, with the total Gestalt: knower--knowing--the knowable.

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11 Ibid., pp. 18-19. (underlining of "process" mine).
15 Ibid., p. 19.
In the light of this proposal each of these necessary components of the conscious process are mutually dependent upon each other and no one term or component in isolation from the other two can have any intelligible relation or meaning. With this basic assumption that the conscious or knowing process is a Gestalt composed of three clearly distinguishable components it is possible to initially assume that sense-perceptual knowledge of the physical world is indeed possible and the next step to be taken is an examination into the essential nature of each of the components of the knowledge Gestalt.

The examination of each of these components is the task Kant cuts out for himself in the Critique of Pure Reason. It should be noted here again and re-emphasized that Kant's purpose in this Critique, being the first one, is to analyze only man's sensuous experience. That is, to determine what true philosophical knowledge may be acquired through man's sensuous apprehension of the physical world. It follows that such will also explain how valid scientific insight is possible. We should note the fact that science is able to provide valid insight of the physical world is not being questioned by Kant. For as far as he is concerned this is the case and indisputable but how science is possible is Kant's concern! Thus in Kant's first Critique he assumes that the reality which man seeks to know with certainty is the physical world of nature; and if an analysis is made of man's knowing process of this physical world, as experienced necessarily through his sensory equipment and interpreted by his reason, then, such an analysis will reveal not only the essential character of the sense-perceptual knowing process itself
but also the implications about our physical reality that the essential character of the perceptual knowing process implies. Greene interprets Kant's precise purpose in the first Critique as follows:

He wanted to discover, once for all, the generic structure of this total Gestalt, the structure which would necessarily characterize the perceptual experiences of all men everywhere, however various their specific sensory experiences may be.

We are now in position to see in a general fashion the outline, or form, of the method of inquiry that Kant uses in the first Critique which Greene feels may be put to effective use in a search for a vital faith in objective values and in a God of religious worship. In essential character the method is epistemological in that an analysis of each of the components of the knowledge Gestalt is to be made as each applies specifically and to all major generic experiences of man when such experiences are seriously considered. In each major generic experience the examination begins with the total Gestalt of the experience in question and then proceeds to analyze each of the components of the relevant Gestalt. This sketch of the method and clues to the use of it that Greene makes in developing his neo-Kantian defense of authentic insight into major generic experiences depends fundamentally upon the conclusions concerning the essential character and implications about our physical reality that an analysis of man's sense-perceptual experience indicates. In short, the method of inquiry which Greene will use is essentially based upon the assumptions, argument, and conclusions of Kant's analysis.

16 Ibid.
of man's sense-perceptual experience and its implications as formulated by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Greene's statement of his thesis confirms this interpretive judgment.

It is my thesis that Kant's inquiries in the areas of the good, the beautiful, and the holy were fruitful in direct proportion as he put to use the method and presuppositions of the first *Critique* and that they were unilluminating in proportion as he abandoned this method.\(^{17}\)

It is therefore essential for Greene's subsequent argument in defense of a vital faith in objective values and in a God of religious worship that we carefully scrutinize with Greene Kant's analysis of the nature of each of the components of the knowledge Gestalt as proffered by Kant's "Copernican hypothesis." The three components of the knowledge configuration are the "knower," "knowing" and the "knowable." And Greene asserts: "Like an electric spark leaping from pole to pole, consciousness of objects involves the act of knowing and the two end terms, the knower and the known."\(^{18}\) Our search for the generic structure of the total knowledge Gestalt may begin where Kant begins: with the "knowing process," followed by an analysis of the "knower" and the "knowable."

1. **The Knowing Process**

The process of ordinary sense perception is very complex and not the simple matter that it may very well seem to be. Sense-perception is not simply a process of a passive receiving of sensations but involves strenuous and profound mental activity. According to Greene, Kant found the knowing process to be "not only temporal—an ever changing

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 42.

flow or succession of temporal states; it is also essentially spatial in content—we can perceive spatial objects only in space. In short, this statement means that space and time are not components or elements residing out in the atmosphere as commonly supposed but are in Kant's thinking pure forms of intuition that are "built in" to the human mind. Therefore, all intelligible experience will necessarily conform to the necessary internal conditions of such experience and one such necessary condition is the pure forms of intuition, space and time, which the mind contributes to the objects given in experience. Hence all given objects in experience will necessarily conform to the pure forms of intuition, space and time. Again, it is as though the mind of man is a mould through which experience must flow and thus any intelligible experience necessarily conforms to the contours of the mould and one of these contours is the pure forms of intuition, i.e., space and time. Secondly, Kant found according to Greene, that perception "is also unvaryingly sensuous, a succession of sense data presenting themselves to consciousness during every waking moment." At this point if we accept that perception is unvaryingly temporal and sensuous in that it is a continuous succession of sense impressions that must enter consciousness through sensuous intuition then a formidable problem arises: how is it possible in perception, if the elements of experience are discontinuous and unrelated, that we are conscious, as we are, of these elements or sense data as a series? In other words, how is it possible that perception is not

20 Ibid.
just awareness of discrete sense data rather than, what is the case, that we are aware of a related series of such data? Greene believes Kant's analysis of this problem is especially impressive and states Kant's findings as follows:

What happens, he says, is that each datum, as it fades away, is revived in the form of a memory image which, because of its "warmth and intimacy" (to use a relevant phrase of William James), we accept as "familiar" and therefore identify as the memory image of the original datum. It is the extraordinary feat of memory to revive past experience so that it can be apprehended, after it has transpired, as a unified experience.\(^{21}\)

But we must take note here that the function of memory in the perceptual process, as the preserver of discreet sense impressions so that a sensory series is possible, is not able to give unity to such a series; nor can it find unity in such a series. For as Greene states the case: "apprehended unity is apprehended order." \(^{22}\) Thus, throughout our sensory experience there is an ordering process or a grasping of relationships according to absolutely basic concepts or categories of order. These major and basic categories of order are quantity, quality, relation, and modality. And, as we know it, sense perception throughout must involve this ordering process and use of basic categories of order. Greene explains the issue as follows:

That is, to have the experience of sense perception involves: (a) receiving spatio-temporal sense data, (b) reviving them in the form of memory images, which serve as their surrogates, and (c) organizing them in terms of certain


\(^{22}\) *Ibid.*
basic categories. Only by thus interpreting the imagistic replicas of our primary sensory experience can we transform an aggregate of distinct sense data into meaningful sensory apprehension.23

Greene contends that Kant in his analysis of sense perception is primarily concerned with the multiple activities or processes that occur during sense perception and he conceives of these processes in terms of mental faculties that operate together in the process of sense perception. That is, we have the faculties of spatial and temporal "intuition," "sensuous apprehension," "reproductive imagination" and "understanding" which operate simultaneously in all sense perception. As previously pointed out we are able to apprehend the temporal and spatial aspects of our experience because of the pure forms of intuition; our "sensuous apprehension" faculty permits our awareness of sense data; our "reproductive imagination" faculty permits recall of sensory data in the form of memory images; and, lastly, our faculty of "understanding" permits us to order and rationally interpret what has thus been apprehended.24

It is the possession of these faculties, then, being common to all men, that Kant claims "is the generic character of human sense perception."25 It is within this framework that man's perceptual experience functions. Greene states Kant's conclusive ideas on this issue as follows:

... we can know a priori (that is, prior to any specific experiences, and with complete certainty) that these are man's basic cognitive faculties and that these are the basic processes which in harmonious coordination, constitute

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 21.
25 Ibid.
the universal structure or pattern of human sense-perception. But we can only discover a posteriori (after the event, on the basis of unpredictable empirical observation) the specific content of any particular act of sense perception and, in addition, the specific empirical concepts which men will employ to interpret these specific experiences in any particular age and culture. All these empirical concepts are merely the particularized variants of the universal categories. 26

To clarify the meaning surrounding the idea of "empirical concepts" we must return to a closer look at the faculty of "understanding" and its function. Firstly, as we have seen, it is thought of as a mental faculty of grasping relationships. Just as Kant established pure forms of sensuous intuition he established pure forms of the understanding. These forms of the understanding are deduced, or discovered, by Kant, by using the established traditional kinds of judgment as formulated in logic as a guide. And the result is the discovery of twelve categories of the understanding which can, in turn, be reduced to the four fundamental types of categories, i.e., quantity, quality, relation and modality. Indeed, the relation category is most significant since every judgment, regardless of its content, expresses a relation. The two most important concepts that come under the category of relation are the concepts of substance and causality. Now the function of the understanding through its use of the categories is to give the logical laws by which all nature, as an object of experience, must abide if one's experience is to be intelligible. In short, the categories are the necessary-conditions-of-thought in a possible experience just as space and time are necessary-

26Ibid.
conditions-of-intuition for that same experience. The categories, or as Kant calls them the schemata, are abstract forms and become empirical concepts when they are particularised through the addition of concrete empirical meaning. In brief, whereas the categories are innate and pure forms of the understanding; the empirical concepts, as a class of tools that the understanding uses, are acquired through experience and the process of empirical generalization. And as Greene states: "All these empirical concepts are merely the particularized variants of the universal categories." For a simple illustration we can suggest that the empirical concepts of stool, desk, door, etc. are the particularized variants of the universal concept of substance.

Empirical concepts, as concrete tools which the understanding uses, are most important, according to Greene, "because it is only with their aid that we are able to explore and understand the complex world of nature in all its specificity with ever increasing precision and scope. This is the great achievement of science." Greene defines the function of the scientist in regard to the development of empirical concepts as follows:

It is the scientists who, working cooperatively generation after generation, increase the accuracy of their sensory observations and devise new and ever more powerful empirical concepts with which to reconstruct and reinterpret the world of nature in all its factual complexity.

To sum up this sketch of Kant's analysis of the knowing process as interpreted by Greene is to say that knowing involves the spontaneous

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
cooperative activity of sensuous intuition, imagination, and understanding as faculties of the mind. Thus it is that we can, from our primary sensory experience, convert the sum total of discreet sense data into a meaningful sensory apprehension. We will now turn to consider the subjective pole or the knower as an essential component of the knowledge Gestalt.

2. The Knower or the Self

Kant's definitive label for the knower, or the self, is well known to those concerned with philosophical endeavour. As Greene states: "Kant's own cumbersome but descriptively accurate label for this self is the 'transcendental unity of apperception.'" In a sense Kant is only interested in the nature of the self or the knower to the extent that it will render his analysis of the knowing process intelligible. If we reflect upon the knowing process itself we realize that the individual self can never be the object of this process of conscious awareness, because it is always the subject of conscious awareness. However, there is a fact to be recognized here in that there is a sense of personal identity that pervades all conscious activity. It's as though all consciousness involves self-consciousness. Kant, then, is in complete agreement with Descartes in regard to the nature of the self on the point that from the "cogito" we must infer the existence of a self as the subjective center of reference that remains unchanged throughout the knowing process. It is true, however, that "we can only infer what the self must be like in

\[30\text{Ibid., p. 23.}\]
order to support the processes just described. But whereas Descartes inferred from his cogito the existence of an enduring indestructible self Kant does not see that the facts in the analysis of the knowing process warrant such inference nor is the inference necessary to render man's knowing experience intelligible. Rather, we are only justified, as Greene interprets Kant,

In conceiving of it (the self) as a unifying principle as enduring as the span of memory; for memory is inexplicable save in terms of a remembering self which is the same self which had the original experiences and which now, at a later date, remebers them.  

In short, Kant believes that although we cannot discover the self through either introspection or sensation we must necessarily infer the reality of the self, for it is only by this inference that we can explain the personal quality or experienced unity that exists in all consciousness. This necessary inference of the self Kant terms "transcendental" and Greene explains that this inference is not, Kant believes, "an irresponsible or precarious guess; he calls it 'transcendental' and insists that it is both necessary and valid."

In a word, Kant's knower as the "transcendental unity of apperception" can be best understood as a correlative aspect to the knowing process and therein gains its essential nature. We can sum up Greene's interpretation of Kant's thought upon the knower component of the knowledge Gestalt by noting Greene's brief description of each of the terms of the

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31 Ibid., p. 22.
32 Ibid. (italics mine).
33 Ibid.
label Kant confers upon the self, that is, the **transcendental unity** of apperception. Greene's terse description of each of the three terms of the label is as follows:

> It is "transcendental" because it can be discovered only by means of transcendental inference, never by direct introspection. It is a "unity" because its prime function is to unify our successive sensory data and memory images into a single coherent whole. It is a unity of "apperception" because it is precisely this unity, no more and no less, which is required to explain the resultant unity and coherence of sensuous apprehension as we know it.34

In conclusion of Greene's interpretation of Kant's "knower," he comments to the effect that if Kant's argument presenting his faculty psychology is taken seriously, even in face of the fact that such has become psychologically suspect, we must, at the least, attribute to the self the capacities to intuit, sense, imagine and understand as they function cooperatively in human sense perception. For, he reasons, this total process does occur and it is complex but somehow unified and meaningful. So Greene asks: "Must we not then believe in a subject or subjective principle which constitutes the subjective pole, basis, or matrix of the total process?"35 With the assumption of Greene's affirmative response to this query we can proceed to his interpretation of Kant's analysis of the knowable or the objective pole of the knowledge Gestalt.

3. The Knowable or the Object of Knowledge

The crucial issue and problem in an analysis of the object or objective pole in sense perception is in regard to the object's **objectivity**. The

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problem hinges on the question, why we commonly feel justified in believing that the physical objects which we encounter are real, and not just pure inventions of our own creative imagination? The basal issue and question then is, what constitutes an object's objectivity? As Greene rightly points out in regard to this matter: "It was Descartes' failure to answer this crucial question which finally left him in his ego-centric predicament." And it is apparent here also that unless Kant can establish the objectively "real" in reality he will end up in the same predicament. For the reasoning is, if the objects of sense perception do not have an objective reality that is independent of the knowing subject, then, indeed, all objects of sense perception are merely subjective imaginative productions! Thus, to avoid this predicament Greene claims that Kant must cogently accomplish two tasks with the latter task partly dependent upon the conclusions reached in the former. In short, in order to avoid the ego-centric predicament, Greene asserts that Kant must first be "able to give us a satisfactory account of what we actually mean by the objectively real and (unless he can) then show that what we perceive, the objects of our sense perceptions, really do satisfy the conditions of objective reality as thus defined." \(^{37}\)

For Greene Kant's solution of this problem is crucially important to his own philosophical concern in that it will permit him to deal cogently with what he judges is the basic issue of contemporary Western culture, that is, the scepticism rampant in society in regard to a reflectively

\(^{36}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Ibid. (italics mine).
vital and honest faith in basic values and religious commitment. In a word, Greene will use Kant's meaning of the objectively real and the conditions of proclaiming objective reality as the fundamental basis of his belief that the value dimensions of reality are just as objective as its factual or non-value dimensions. Accordingly Greene believes that Kant's analysis of the objective pole of sense perception is valid and provides a satisfactory solution to the ego-centric problem. Greene expresses the relationship that Kant's solution has to his own philosophical concern as follows:

It will show us how we can, presently, define objectivity in the areas of man's moral, aesthetic, and religious experiences in such a way as to validate the claim, which we shall make, that these experiences, like sense perception, are also, in principle, experiences of the objectively real and therefore the basis for verifiable and reliable moral, aesthetic, and religious insights.

We can begin Greene's interpretation of Kant's analysis of the objective pole of the knowledge Gestalt by taking special note here that Kant's treatment of the meaning of objectivity and objective reality is the basis of the claim made by Kant and Greene that they are objective idealists in contrast to a subjective idealistic stance. In its essence the problem here is to show that the objects of sense perception are not merely ideas in our own mind, or subjective creations, but are rather in a genuine sense objective to consciousness. Accordingly our immediate point of focus will be upon Kant's conception of objectivity and the meaning and criteria of objective reality.

The question is, what do we mean or what should we mean when we declare an object of sense perception objectively real? There are, according to Greene's interpretation of Kant, three basic characteristics which an object possesses that warrants the assertion that it is objectively real in its own right. Again, to assert the objective reality of any object of sense perception the object must possess three basic characteristics that impel ascribing to it objective reality. These three characteristics are: coersiveness, orderliness and the factor of publicity. We will deal with each characteristic in turn.

An object of sense perception possesses the basic characteristic of coersiveness when it is empirically coersive, that is, when it is present or "there" and thus forces conscious awareness of it whether or not such awareness is desired or agreeable to the percipient. In this sense each object of sense perception has a character of its own which forces itself upon the percipient's consciousness. It is true that in a particular instance of sense perception of a particular object we can close our eyes or turn away from perceiving the object but if we perceive it we must perceive what is given, what is "there," what is "before us." "We cannot," Greene is convinced, "by an act of will, change its given nature." This conception Greene points out might be termed Kant's voluntaristic criterion of reality. Greene sums up the characteristic of coersiveness as it relates to defining the meaning of objectivity and objective reality as follows:

\[40\text{Ibid.}\]
This coerciveness is a necessary and universal condition of objectivity; we should not ascribe objective reality to anything which cannot, in principle, be thus experienced as coercive, and we must and do ascribe some sort of reality to whatever is thus empirically coercive.  

The second basic characteristic that an object of sense perception must possess if we are to ascribe objective reality to it is orderliness. Here the concern is to point out that no matter how vivid or coercive any particular object of sense perception is in a given instance of perception it may not be judged as a real physical object unless it fits coherently without contradiction into the many other objects of sense perception that make up the world of nature and are validly accepted as real physical objects. In other words, reality is orderly. And an object of perception to be deemed real must possess a structure of its own which blends it consistently and coherently into the accepted order of the remainder of reality. Greene uses the experience of dreams as a negative case of illustration on this issue. He maintains that we do not consider the objects encountered in dreams as experiences of real objects because they do not fit consistently into what is accepted and believed about the uniform order of nature in our waking state! The question may be asked, why do we not judge a dream with its coercively perceived objects as real and dismiss as unreal our waking state? We dismiss the dream as unreal Greene asserts, "for the simple and compelling reason that all my waking experiences hang together, both in memory and in the light of reasonable reflection and interpretation."  

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1Ibid., pp. 24-25.  
Indeed, we find that upon awaking from a dream we quickly relate the dream experience to our present existential situation and past experiences immediately preceding the dream experience and through this process of reasonable reflection and interpretation upon the dream experience we conclude the dream experience and its perceived objects is unreal. And then, too, normally the perceptual objects which we judge as real all conform to the conditions which have come to be associated with real objects or natural events. In short, they all conform to accepted beliefs about space and time, and being unified entities they all possess adjectival attributes and possess individually intense qualities. "Above all," Greene declares, "they all conform to those basic regularities which we entitle the causal laws of nature." To sum up Greene's thinking on this basic characteristic of orderliness as it pertains to the objective reality of perceptual objects is to say that any perceptual object that adequately meets our orderly conditions of objectivity may be validly judged to be perceptually real, and likewise, those that do not measure up to these conditions must be judged as unreal, i.e., as dreams, hallucinations, figments of the imagination, etc.

The third and final characteristic of the real world of sense perception is the factor of publicity. This factor is crucially important but does not gain its significance from its logical strength as the preceding characteristics of objectivity do but rather from its psychological and methodological importance. Stated in simple terms the essential meaning of this factor is that we can accept only those perceptual objects

\[3\] Ibid., p. 27.
as objectively real that are, in principle, available and capable of the
same judgment by all men who are qualified percipient beings. We can-
not say that we accept as objectively real those objects judged real by all
men—men, being considered as merely percipient beings—for there are men
who are cut off in one way or another from qualification or competency in
their perceptual judgments. This would be the case for those who are
blind or deaf and for those who lacking scientific training cannot be ex-
pected to share in the acute observations and disciplined interpretations
of the objects and events in the world of nature as competently as the
trained or qualified scientist. "With these provisos," Greene declares,
"we insist, as Kant rightly points out, on the universal availability to
all human beings of whatever any single human being is entitled to call
'real'." Thus, we as competent percipients distinguish those percep-
tual objects as real as privately perceived only if such objects are pub-
licly perceivable by other competent percipients.

As previously mentioned, Greene holds that in principle this factor
of publicity as a characteristic of objectivity is not a crucial logical
factor in that a person by application of the first two characteristics
can determine the reality of perceptual objects. In other words, an
individual in complete isolation should be able to determine, in prin-
ciple, his awareness of a real perceptual object by discovering that it
possesses the two basic characteristics of coerciveness and orderliness
and thus in his own mind confirm its objective reality; but the publicity

Ibid.
characteristic of perceptual objects functions significantly for psychological and methodological advantage. On this issue Greene insists:

*Psychologically, we are all of us far too finite and unsure of ourselves to feel confident of our own experiences and interpretations until they have been confirmed by others whose competence we respect.*

*Methodologically, our common sense knowledge of the physical world, and particularly our more precise and sophisticated scientific comprehension of it, is essentially the product of extensive social collaboration.*

Furthermore, as Greene points out, collaboration of any kind is possible only because men are faced with a common, public world of nature, and collaboration itself serves a psychological need of mankind.

At this point in our analysis of the objective pole of the knowledge Gestalt, according to Greene’s interpretation of Kantian thought, we can mention that the world of nature or the totality of all possible objects of sense perception Kant labels the "phenomenal" world. Thus, the objects of this phenomenal world are "phenomenal" objects and as we have just seen these objects are objective or real only if they possess the basic characteristics which Greene entitles coerciveness, orderliness and publicity. Why Kant sees fit to label the world of nature and its objects as "phenomenal" will become increasingly clear. Now our immediate interest is focused upon the criteria that may be used to test the truth, or validity, of sense-perceptual judgments of phenomenal objects.

Kant, according to Greene’s interpretation, proposes three criteria

for testing perceptual judgments and Greene suggests, "We can, for convenience, label these the criteria of 'correspondence,' 'coherence,' and 'communicability'." We recognize immediately that the first two of these criteria are currently established epistemological theories of the tests of truth, and Greene relates each of Kant's three criterion of truth to each of the three previously analyzed characteristics of real objects; thereby lending epistemological recognition to these characteristics. That is, the criterion of correspondence is the epistemological recognition of the characteristic of coerciveness of the object and that of coherence of the factor of orderliness or objective order and, lastly, that of communicability of the factor of publicity. With this in mind we can look briefly at Greene's descriptive account of the application of each of these proffered criterion of truth.

According to Greene's thinking we apply the criterion of correspondence whenever we question the extent to which our perceptual judgments conform to facts or agree with the actual situation. Truth in conformity with the theory underlying the criterion of correspondence may be defined simply as consisting in the agreement of ideas with "things" that are external to them. "Things" that are external to ideas in our present frame of reference are the phenomenal objects and, these, in themselves, can be neither true nor false for they just are or are not. It is only in our perceptual judgment of them that we pronounce them to be true or false. Thus, according to the correspondence theory of the test of truth, if a judgment corresponds with the facts it is true, if not, it is

Ibid., p. 29.
false. Greene sums up in question form the application of the criterion of correspondence in establishing the validity of perceptual judgments as follows:

To what extent have we taken into account and done justice to all the relevant primary deliverances of direct sense perception, that is, our own primary experience and that of others?\footnote{Ibid.}

Again, we note that it is the criterion of correspondence that lends epistemological identification to the coercive characteristic of objects. And, in conclusion Greene suggests, that it is in reference to this criterion of truth that the familiar remark that one ugly fact can upset the most beautiful theory is directed.

The second criterion of truth, coherence, is complementary to the first and also is the epistemological recognition of the characteristic of objects which Greene has labeled orderliness, or the factor of objective order in reality. Greene asserts:

Because we believe that we are all confronted by one orderly world of natural objects, subject to the same universal laws or regularities, we are impelled to believe that our several judgments about the detailed nature of this world must not only contradict each other but should, as far as possible, supplement one another so as to constitute, progressively, a more and more coherent and synoptic comprehension of nature as an orderly whole.\footnote{Theodore M. Greene, Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight, p. 29.}

In short, Greene is saying that we accept those perceptual judgments or interpretations of reality as true in proportion as they are consistent with other judgments based upon the same data or similar data.
In other words, by applying this criterion of coherence a judgment is said to be true if it is consistent or has coherence with other judgments that are accepted or known to be true. It is this criterion of truth that we appeal to in making a judgment relative to the reality of a dream and/or dream objects. Thus it is that we dismiss some dream objects as unreal for they are seen to be in the light of reasonable reflection and interpretation to be totally inconsistent with all our beliefs about perceptual objects and events that we believe in when we are awake and making perceptual judgments. In a word, and by way of conclusion, we can say the coherence theory puts its faith in the consistency or harmony of all our judgments; therefore, true judgments are logically coherent with other relevant judgments. Thus any judgment may be deemed to be false or absurd if it is not in harmony with past judgments of the same basic type that have already been discovered to be true.

The last criterion of truth, communicability, is concerned with the factor of publicity as set forth as a significant characteristic of the real world of sense perception. Communicability as a criterion of truth is not equal logically to the other two criterion but gains its importance from its psychological and methodological importance in the same manner as the factor of publicity does in characterizing real perceptual objects. In this regard it will be recalled that we can accept only those perceptual objects as objectively real that are, in principle, available and capable of the same judgment by all men who are competent percipient beings. In like manner Greene declares that the criterion of communicability claims: "We cannot accept as true any
alleged insights which we cannot, at least in principle, share with others, that is, with all who are both interested and competent.\(^{49}\)

By this statement it is evident that Greene is not claiming that all insights to be true must be capable of being communicated to all men. For communicability does not mean actual communication. Rather the idea is that insights to be true or valid must "be capable of being communicated to, and confirmed by, other competent judges. In practice, of course, we depend heavily upon the confirmation of others, both as laymen and as scientists."\(^{50}\)

With the presentation of this last criteria for testing perceptual judgments Greene has adequately covered for his purpose Kant's account of the objective pole of man's perceptual experience. In a word, we know Greene's interpretation of Kantian doctrines in regard to the nature of phenomenal objects and the criteria for testing perceptual judgments. But according to Greene there remain some questions that may not go unanswered if Kant's basic position as expressed in the Critique of Pure Reason is to be outlined distinctly enough so that his own neo-Kantian position is understandable. Thus, we will begin with consideration of the kind of reality that Kant "has ascribed to our coercive, orderly, and public world of nature."\(^{51}\)

We have previously noted that Kant entitles the world of nature apprehended by perceptual experience as phenomenal. And this suggestion as to the kind of reality that Kant ascribes to the world of nature

\(^{49}\)Ibid., p. 30.

\(^{50}\)Ibid. (underlining mine).

\(^{51}\)Ibid.
provokes the following question: Is the **phenomenal** world the **whole** of reality? This very question, i.e., inquiry into the idea of the **whole** of something, is an example of a unique capacity of man that can not be denied and according to Greene is of such crucial concern to Kant that he feels it is necessary to **invent** a basic **subjective capacity** as its source. This faculty or capacity is **reason**. **Reason**, as an **innate capacity** of man which is distinctly distinguishable from the faculty of understanding, is man's **innate source** of the unique and most significant idea of the Infinite, the Unlimited, the Wholeness of things. And, most importantly, Kant holds that man uses this concept of the absolute Unlimited to measure all other concepts! Thus, man's capacity of reason strongly suggests to him that he should **not** assume that the **whole of reality** is of such a character that he can **sensuously** experience it. Rather there is the definite possibility that our sensuous experience reveals only the partial **appearances** of an ultimate reality that reaches beyond sense experience. Thus it is that our world of nature and its distinguishable objects may be termed the **phenomenal world of appearances**; and, what lies beyond our sensuous apprehension the realm of ultimate, or using Kant's term, **noumenal**, reality. We are now in a position to restate the question, is the phenomenal world the whole of reality, to the question, is the world of phenomena that we can know by scientific insight the sum total of Reality? We can note here that this restatement of the question highlights the ancient basic conflict between materialists and rationalists within an **epistemological** frame of reference. Greene interprets Kant's answer to the question as follows:
His (Kant's) answer in the first Critique is clear and unambiguous. We cannot know, merely on the basis of our perceptual experiences, whether the phenomenal world is all there is to Reality or not.52

Thus, we see that in Kant's opinion materialists and rationalists are equally unjustifiably dogmatic in their epistemological assumptions, i.e., in the case of the former, that sense perception as refined in the natural sciences is the only type of experience that reveals the truth of Reality, and in the case of the latter, that without regard for other types of experience claim that through reason and reason alone man may know ultimate Reality.

On the assumption that the phenomenal world is not the whole of Reality and the possibility that there is a more ultimate Reality Greene next poses before Kant the following question: "How real is the phenomenal world, and how is it related to Reality as a whole if such a more inclusive Reality exists?"53 Greene tells us that Kant's exact belief on this issue has been the subject of philosophical argument and debate through the years and Kantian scholars are not, to the present day, in agreement in their interpretation of Kant's thought on the matter. This circumstance suggests than that Kant's answer to the question in his writing is vague and unclear which Greene claims that it is. Greene's own interpretation of Kant's answer to this important question is as follows:

It was, I believe, Kant's mature conviction that the phenomenal world is Reality itself as it appears to human perception, that is, as encountered by

52 Ibid., p. 31. (italics mine).
53 Ibid., p. 32.
man's senses and apprehended by his human understanding. This would mean that phenomena are completely real but not the only possible "appearances" of Reality to us. We apprehend them as we do for two reasons: because they actually present themselves to us, and also because we are able to receive and grasp them cognitively. But further reaches or dimensions of Reality, if there be such, must remain hidden from us as perceptual beings because sense and understanding cannot, in combination, pierce through the veil of phenomenal appearances to what Kant here calls the (possible) "noumenal" world.\footnote{Ibid.}

Greene uses an interesting analogy to further explain the meaning of the Kantian doctrine expressed in the first Critique. In effect, his analogy proposes that man's capacity for authentic scientific insight is like a pair of glasses that only permit red objects to be seen and these glasses are fastened permanently before the eyes. Therefore if a group of multi-colored objects are given as present before the eyes and of this group there are four red objects actually present, then, it stands that only four objects will be perceived by the percipient regardless of how many other colored objects may be actually present also. Actually the percipient will see only the four red objects for two reasons: he can or is able to see red objects and a certain number of red objects are really there or present before him to be seen.

Greene's use of this analogical compendium of Kant's analysis of human perception permits him to extend the analogy to indicate Kant's endeavour in the realm of man's moral experience as well as prepare the
ground for his own neo-Kantian thesis. Thus Greene claims that Kant in his analysis of man's moral experience proposes, in effect, that man has another pair of glasses fastened permanently before his eyes and this pair of glasses, symbolic of his capacity for moral insight, enables him to transcend phenomena and apprehend with a moral certitude or "faith" the fundamental law, i.e., the Moral Law, of the noumenal world or realm of reality. In essence, then, Kant is saying, that man possesses another cognitive capacity, that is, his capacity for authentic moral insight. Accordingly Greene's neo-Kantian thesis asserts that man also possesses two more pair of glasses fastened permanently before his eyes. One pair symbolizes man's capacity for authentic aesthetic insight and the other pair for authentic religious insight. Thus, it is through these added cognitive capacities that man is able to authentically apprehend the aesthetic and religious dimensions or aspects of Reality. In short, Greene's neo-Kantian thesis asserts that each of man's major generic experiences is a cognitively useful encounter with an aspect of the real; thus, we can have authentic insight of major dimensions of reality as revealed in major generic human experiences. Greene elucidates this aspect of his thesis in the following declaration:

Kant was right in principle when he insisted that "concepts without percepts are empty." . . . Kant was wrong, however, in believing that the only data capable of yielding valid empirical knowledge are sense data, and that man's only cognitively useful experiences are his sense experiences. I would insist, therefore, that we should accept all human
experiences as potentially revelatory, i.e., as encounters with some facet or aspect of the real. I deplore all a priori prejudicial exclusions of this or that type of experience as "of course" non-cognitive or as cognitively useless by definition.

Before we continue on to consider Greene's neo-Kantian thesis as it relates to man's moral, aesthetic and religious experience there is a final question in regard to Kant's analysis of sense perception and of scientific insight that is most important and needs to be answered. The question is, how certain is our emergent knowledge of the phenomenal world? Greene is in complete agreement with Kant on this matter and maintains that Kant's answer to this question is fairly certain and unambiguous. Simply stated Kant's answer is that it is impossible to achieve absolute certain knowledge of phenomena through the inductive process. His reasoning which leads to this conclusion rests essentially upon the idea that all our perceptual and scientific knowledge of the phenomenal world results from the process of reconstruction as conceived in the perceptual process of cognition itself. Greene explains this reconstruction process of sense experience as follows:

We receive from phenomena various sense data which we accept as clues to the existence and the nature of public phenomenal objects in space and time. These data come to us in orderly fashion, but we must apprehend this order with the aid of memory (made possible by the reproductive imagination) and of our understanding. These two faculties, working in conjunction, enable us bit by bit, both individually and collaboratively, to reconstruct the structure and order of the phenomenal world.

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56 Theodore M. Greene, Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight, p. 34.
This reconstruction process as characterizing sense-perceptual experience leads to the belief that our insight of nature can gradually improve but absolute or final knowledge of phenomena is not possible because we can never know when future observations may require radical revisions of presently held theories and beliefs. In a word, Greene concurs with Kant that the inductive process always fails to achieve absolute certainty in our knowledge of phenomena. On this point Greene proposes:

The most it can do is to give us increasing probability... This is the limitation, and the strength, of what Kant calls a posteriori knowledge—knowledge based upon man's successive experiences which, by their very nature, can never be exhaustive.57

Greene points out, however, that Kant does claim that a philosopher can obtain a priori knowledge of phenomena which is a superior kind of knowledge which results from a correct analysis of the knowing process with its subjective and objective pole. "Such an analysis can, in principle," Greene explains, "give us a priori certainty because it is based, not on an endless and never completed series of experiences, but upon a generic type of experience which, because it is common to all men, is completely available to any shrewd philosopher."58 Thus, Greene maintains that Kant's aspiration in the first Critique was to give an absolutely certain analysis of man's perceptual experience, i.e., a correct analysis of the fundamental structure of the perceptual process and of its subjective and objective pole, and this Kant accomplished. But Greene insists, nevertheless, that Kant's philosophical claim to

57 Ibid., p. 35.
58 Ibid.
a priori certainty is questionable. Not because his method is not sound for Greene believes that it is, but because the generic structure of sense-perception or any other type of experience cannot be analyzed and described with absolute certainty by any finite human mind. Greene then asks: "May not genuine maturity express itself in a willingness to accept a progressive certitude suitable to finite man, in lieu of a certainty which would seem to be the perogative of Divine omniscience?" In a word, Greene proposes that man finds himself in a complex environment which he can to some degree know, but he can never know anything with complete and final certainty. In regard to this concern Greene declares:

I believe that man can know something, but not everything; that he can know many things with increasing clarity and assurance, but that he can never, because he is incorrigibly finite, know anything with complete certainty and finality. "Now," to paraphrase St. Paul, "We do see, but only darkly," i.e., partially.

Furthermore Greene believes "that knowledge makes a difference, both practically, in our attempts to 'control' reality, and normatively, in our attempts to live the good life and to be what we should be and act as we should act." In other words, the more knowledge man can gain of himself and his environment the better. For it is through such knowledge that man might increasingly come to realize his real nature and destiny.

59 Ibid., p. 36.
61 Ibid.
Greene affirms that Kant's method of inquiry and his analysis of man's sense perception and of the science of his day as set forth in the first Critique is beyond a doubt most brilliant. "Indeed," Greene exclaims, "it is our thesis that he was so successful that we would today be well advised to extend his method further than he himself was able to do by applying his basic epistemological concepts and criteria not only to moral values but to the realms of beauty and holiness." Accordingly, our attention in the next section will be focused upon Greene's neo-Kantian approach to man's moral experience and moral values.

In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant analyzes man's moral experience and its implications to the nature and status of moral values. We should be reminded here that Kant's philosophy is not complete or "all-in" with just the Critique of Pure Reason. Actually one must continue and come to an understanding of his thought in the second Critique if one desires to know Kant's full philosophy. With this in mind and in the light of Greene's interpretation of Kant's basic thought as revealed in the Critique of Pure Reason we are ready to set forth in a somewhat compendious fashion the neo-Kantian thesis which Greene proposes to combat modern skepticism in regard to objective values and a God of religious worship. To accomplish this task we will be concerned to highlight the most pertinent aspects of man's moral, aesthetic and religious experience that seem to shed significant light upon Greene's primary concern and neo-Kantian stance. In a word, our treatment of these experiences does not presume to be an exhaustive account of either Kant's or Greene's thought in this regard; rather an attempt will be made to bring into sharp relief their chief findings as they bear upon an exposition of Greene's basic beliefs and primary concern.

In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant's approach to analyzing man's moral experience, as a valuative experience, is the same as used in the first Critique. That is, he assumes man's moral experience, its essence being man's sense of duty or moral obligation, is a fact of human existence or a generic type of experience that need not be debated regarding its actuality but only needs to be examined in order to explain
or understand its existential actuality and reality. In short, he assumes man has a sense of duty or "oughtness" and "ought-notness" which is the essence of moral experience; and, he is seeking the universal principles or laws which are inherently sound apart from any particular circumstances that make up the minimal content of universal morality. Thus it is that moral philosophy is concerned with what "ought-to-be" and Kant is searching for the moral principle or law that is universally acknowledged by all men endowed with moral sensitivity.

Greene points out that Kant's initial basic assumption in regard to man's moral experience is identical in meaning to his basic assumption in regard to man's sense-perceptual experience. That is, he assumes that moral experience is a unique generic total Gestalt having three elements: the moral self, the moral experience, and the moral object. Each of these components of the total configuration is necessarily dependent and related to the other two and therefore a particular component carries no meaning apart from its total context. Likewise, as in the case of perceptual experience Kant proceeds to analyze each component of the total Gestalt. Greene explains Kant's method of inquiry in this regard as follows:

As in the first Critique, he starts with a careful analysis of man's moral experience. He then explores, by means of "transcendental" inference, the freedom and responsibility of the moral agent. He also examines at length the nature of the objective Moral Law.

We have previously mentioned that Kant believes the essence of

\[63\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 43-44.}\]
moral experience lies in man's sense of duty or moral obligation. This sense of duty, or the sense of moral obligation in terms of "I ought," expresses itself in what Kant terms a categorical imperative in contrast to a hypothetical imperative. Imperative as a noun means "command" and this is the sense in which Kant uses it; however, we can substitute "ought" for "imperative" and perhaps have a clearer understanding of Kant's meaning in his usage of the word. In practice we do commonly use "ought" within a hypothetical and categorical context of meaning; and, in actuality, we do make a clear distinction of kind between the "ought" used hypothetically and its usage in a categorical sense. For example if I say, "You ought to leave by seven o'clock if you want to get a good seat at the concert," I am using the "ought" hypothetically because the "ought" represents a practical necessary action on your part if you will, or desire, to get a good seat at the concert. If you do not will this then there is no obligatory force to the "ought", for leaving by seven is only a means to the desired or willed end of getting a good seat. You have an option in the matter that depends solely upon your own desire.

In sharp contrast to this the categorical imperative or "ought," as the expression of man's sense of duty, is not dependent upon any "ifs." The force of the categorical "ought" is absolutely obligatory and admits no exceptions or qualifications. The "ought" is categorical in meaning when I say, "You ought to be honest." Here the meaning in terms of practical application is that honest action is good-in-itself. It admits no qualifications as to whether you are to be honest in one situation and dishonest in another. Or exceptions such as: you should
be honest in your dealings with the rich and educated person but dishonesty is acceptable in dealings with poor and ignorant persons. The categorical "ought," within this context, demands and commands honesty, period! And that is the end of the matter. Again, in this sense, honest action or honesty is conceived to be good-in-itself, that is, without reference to any further desired claim or end. In short, the categorical "ought" dictates certain conduct absolutely and immediately without reference to any other purpose or desire beyond itself. In sum, then, the two "oughts," hypothetical and categorical, differ in kind in that the former commands in an optional frame of reference and the latter admits no options and commands absolutely without reference to any end beyond itself.

It is, therefore, man's sense of duty or absolute moral obligation which is expressed in a categorical I-ought-to-do-so-and-so; and this is the crucial factor in his moral experience and the essential characteristic of authentic morality. Furthermore, the specific dictates of man's moral conscience may differ widely within diverse cultural circumstances and patterns, but man's sense of duty which finds expression in the categorical "ought" is the same for all men, at all times, in all cultures. And it follows, as Greene explains, that man's sense of duty "expresses itself voluntaristically in what Kant calls 'good will' which he carefully defines as the determination to do one's duty (as one sees it), not for any extrinsic reward, even the loftiest, but *for duty's sake.*"64 (May I suggest that if the above sentence is re-read

64Ibid., p. 45.
substituting "good motive" for "good will" I believe Kant's precise meaning of "good will" is somewhat clearer.)

Kant treads beyond a mere setting forth of the essential factor or aspect of authentic morality by formulating what he discerns to be the content of the categorical "ought." He offers several formulations which Greene feels can be fairly summed up in the following moral injunction: "Do everything in your power to promote the kingdom of ends—that type of community in which all men respect one another and themselves as beings of intrinsic worth."65 Certainly we can see that this injunction, as a statement of the basic content of universal morality, highlights Kant's high regard for the essential dignity and worth of human life.

Now to say that men ought to respect one another is ridiculous unless they are free to do so. Likewise it is foolish and utterly meaningless to speak of man's sense of duty if it is not within his power to freely will to do, or not do, his duty. We can not hold someone responsible for his conduct except upon the belief or hypothesis that his conduct in a particular situation was expressive of his free will in the given situation. In stark reality, then, where there is no free will, there is no morality! Thus, it is completely realistic and logical to reason, as Kant does, that since man has in him a sense of duty he knows that he is free and in turn his freedom is seen to be the necessary dependent condition of his sense of duty or moral obligation. Again,

for man to be morally responsible he must be free; and, to be free he must participate in a dimension of reality that is free. In sum, man's sense of duty impels him to believe he is free and the thought of freedom permits him to make significant sense of the idea of duty or moral obligation.

At this point we recall the question posed at the end of the first Critique by man's faculty of reason as it functioned "speculatively" to inquire if the phenomenal world, which is wholly subject to the causal laws that operate universally in the world of phenomena, is the whole of reality? Now we know that freedom and causal necessity are incompatible and so the situation is fairly clear: man does exist in time; therefore, by his phenomenal nature he is subject to causal necessity; but his sense of duty or moral obligation demands freedom; thusly, his moral experiences convince him that his nature is not purely or wholly phenomenal. It is in the light of this thought that Kant, according to Greene, is ready to answer the posed question. Greene interprets Kant's answer in the following manner: "It is man's moral experience which, taken seriously, provides us with the necessary clue to the existence and the nature of those farther reaches of Reality which in the first Critique he prophetically entitled 'noumenal'."66

But the crucial question now is, what can we know about the "object" of moral experience, i.e., noumenal reality, except that it is the realm of moral freedom? Greene claims that Kant is very clear in his response to this question. In short, the realm of noumenal reality is as orderly, 

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coercive, and public as is the phenomenal world. Its orderliness is expressed in its distinctive law, the Moral Law. The Moral Law is discerned by man because of his capacity of practical or moral reason. In other words, the same reason that functioned "speculatively" in enabling man to have a vision of the whole, or the absolute totality of things, in the first Critique, is now considered to be functioning "practically" in man's moral experience in that it is able to determine man's conduct. And it is because of the fact that all men possess this capacity of moral reason that we can respect man as a being of indissolubly value and dignity. Only man of all the creatures of nature has a sense of duty which expresses itself in his relation to the whole of his environment as to what "ought to be." Is it not ridiculous to ask of anything else in nature as to what it "ought to be" in contradiction to what in fact it "is"? Greene sums up Kant's thought on this matter as follows:

The essential nature of men is noumenal—that is, all men possess, however latently, the germ of moral reason.... We dare not exploit them or use them merely as means to our own ends because of their noumenal character and hence their potential membership in the ideal kingdom of ends.67

It follows also that the Moral Law is the same law for all men as rational beings and man's moral experience is characterized by a constant struggle for dominance over him by his phenomenal and noumenal natures. The Moral Law itself being impersonal and non-dynamic cannot help man directly in this struggle. But it can and does provoke in man, as a

67Ibid. p. 48 (underlining mine).
free and autonomous being, an absolute loyalty and dedication to it which, in turn, serves to save man from the radical evil to which his phenomenal nature tends to direct him. "Noumenal reality can thus, through man," Greene declares, "manifest itself increasingly in the phenomenal world. Phenomenal events can, on man's initiative, take on moral meaning and purpose. This is man's proper destiny on earth."\(^{68}\)

Now, according to Greene's interpretation, what Kant has developed thus far is a human and cosmic dualism which results from his theory of a world of phenomena and a world of noumena. In man this dualism concerns his phenomenal nature which, as phenomenal, is subject to the necessary regularities of all phenomena; and, as noumenal, is subject to absolute obedience to the Moral Law. The issue is, how can man having both a physical and spiritual nature participate in both realms when each in its unique way demands his whole allegiance and participation? The solution to this problem between mechanism and freedom as it relates to man is in Greene's opinion dependent upon a correct understanding of Kant's conception of causality and how man's noumenal nature expresses itself into and through his phenomenal attitudes and behavior. In short, causality is not conceived of as a dynamic force but merely, as Greene understands Kant, as an "emergent regularity" or pattern of regularity of all phenomena "which becomes apparent as all phenomena behave spontaneously in accordance with their own essential natures."\(^{69}\) In other words, man and all other phenomena have the capacity for spontaneous

\(^{68}\)Ibid., p. 49.

\(^{69}\)Ibid., p. 50.
action which reflects their own essential nature. Greene feels that this interpretation of man's phenomenal nature permits the reasonable conclusion that his noumenal nature—being his essential nature—finds spontaneous expression in and through all aspects of his phenomenal life. Greene points out, however, that strangely enough Kant in the first Critique many times makes reference to causal laws as dynamic; in which case, moral freedom and responsibility is out of the question, for causality as dynamic force would reign supreme over all of the phenomenal world. This ambiguity in Kant's conception of causality may stand as it is for now with the understanding that Greene believes on the basis of Kant's own argument that causality is best understood as non-dynamic in character.

With the acceptance of this interpretation of Kant's conception of causality Greene proposes a solution to Kant's problem which he believes completely solves it. His proposal is that Kant's "noumenal reality" need not be conceived "as another 'world' which competes, so to speak, with the phenomenal 'world' for man's allegiance, but rather (to use another metaphor) as the dimension or quality of moral value with which man can, with appropriate moral effort, impregnate his own character and behavior."70 Thus, man's will is still subject to phenomenal regularities and volitional laws but it can become "good" by his dedication and loyalty to an objective Moral Law as the object of his dominant interest and motivation. In effect, then, Greene is re-interpreting Kant's concept of noumena as being objective values that are

70Ibid., p. 51.
out there in our world to be discovered; and furthermore, the noumenal world as being a qualitative or valuative dimension of reality. In other words, just as man encounters in his sense experience genuinely "objective" and "real" physical objects so in his valuative experience he encounters qualities such as "goodness" and "beauty" which in their own distinctive way are as "objective" and "real" as physical objects. Greene comments upon his refinement of Kant's account of noumena as follows:

We are not contradicting his own statements, but we are restating them in terms of the modern concept of "value" which was not available to Kant in the eighteenth century. 71

We will not consider the remainder of Kant's account of man's moral experience except as it is vicariously apparent from a brief exposition of Greene's summary estimate of Kant's total moral philosophy. In a word, Greene judges that Kant's ethical insights are brilliant but inadequate from either a theological or secular point of view. Kant, in Greene's opinion, fails to come to grips with man's moral experience within more than a rationalistic and legalistic understanding. From a theological perspective he secularizes Christian ethics by substituting the Moral Law for God and envisioning man as an autonomous being endowed with moral reason and a sense of duty instead of as a child of God who responds with love and obedience to God the Father. "Above all," Greene declares, "Kant substitutes strict impartial justice for what the Hebraic-Christian tradition describes as the gift of utterly selfless sacrificial

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71 Ibid., p. 52.
love which does not destroy justice but transcends it as the Great Commandment transcends and fulfills the Ten Commandments." Likewise from a secular point of view Greene feels that Kant's moral philosophy is deficient in that man's deepest moral insights reveal to him that human love at its best transcends and transforms justice, and all men need to give and receive love and understanding above mere respect and this above all is the source of man's joy and strength which neither respect nor impersonal justice can ever produce. Greene sums up the case from a secular perspective as follows:

However searching Kant's insight into the human heart with its enduring capacity for good and its inextirpable proclivity to evil, however valuable his emphasis on moral reason, and however passionate his ultimate allegiance to justice, his ethical theory fails to express a profound humanism at its imaginative best.73

That some of Kant's specific ethical doctrines are inadequate to a deep insight of man's moral experience is readily acknowledged by Greene; but this does not mean that Greene thinks Kant's method of inquiry is not valid and can lead to a deeper comprehension of morality and moral experience than Kant himself was able to achieve. As we have seen, Greene claims that Kant uses the same method of inquiry in analyzing man's moral insight and moral values as he put to use in analyzing sense-perceptual experience and science in the first Critique. That is, he takes for granted that moral experience has its own generic uniqueness

72 Ibid., p. 56.
73 Ibid., p. 58
and distinctive pattern or Gestalt. He then proceeds as in the first Critique to analyze each component of the configuration.

But Greene claims that Kant does not apply the method of the first Critique rigorously to man's moral experience. He does not do so because he never subjects the "object" of moral experience, i.e., the noumenal realm and the Moral Law as the essence of noumenal reality, to the basic epistemological concepts and criteria that he uses in the first Critique to establish that physical objects, or the realm of phenomena, are "objective" and "real" and to establish the cognitive validity of factual judgments. As a matter of fact Kant never claims that man's moral insights constitute knowledge or truth but can only result in a reasonable moral "faith." Kant limits man's knowledge to phenomena upon the premise, which Greene feels is unjustifiably dogmatic, that for authentic knowledge the only primary data is sensory; and, values—whether moral, aesthetic or religious, i.e., goodness, beauty or holiness—are not sensory data or sensory objects. That is, a value such as "goodness" or "friendship" cannot be set on a table to be seen, manipulated, or measured; nor can we smell or taste values. All we can do is experience "goodness," for example as contact with something that has a character of its own which we entitle "goodness." But just as it is impossible to describe a particular color (or smell) to a person blind from birth it is impossible to describe "goodness" to anyone who has not had a first-hand experience of it. But the crucial question for Greene is, does authentic knowledge of the "objectively" real or "knowable" of Reality rest upon the dogmatic premise that the only fruitful primary data is sensory? Here Greene is adamantly combating the moral and general value
skepticism of a materialism, or to use his term a "scientism," that asserts man's only cognitively useful experience is his sensory experience. From Greene's point of view the only cogent response to those who insist factual knowledge is our only real knowledge is to demonstrate that, in principle, moral and aesthetic values and a God of religious worship are as "real" and "objective" as physical objects and as such may be subjected to the same epistemological concepts and criteria that the scientist uses in testing the validity of his judgments of fact. In short, man's value experiences when considered seriously are seen to be cognitively fruitful in that they too provide him with significant hints to various dimensions or aspects of the Real of an endlessly complex Reality.

Greene's concrete task then in regard to man's moral experience and moral values is to demonstrate that the "object" of moral experience, i.e., the Moral Law, can be honestly and properly said to be "real" and "objective," and that judgments of moral value can be subjected to the same criteria of the tests of truth as used to test the cognitive validity of factual judgments.

We recall that Kant proposes in the first Critique that the three crucial characteristics that any physical object must possess in order to be judged "objectively" real is coerciveness, orderliness and the factor of publicity. He never applies these characteristics to the moral object of moral experience in his second Critique. Now Greene asks, "Does not this 'object' -- that is, the Moral Law as the essence of noumenal reality -- possess, for the morally sensitive person, all three of the characteristics which in combination serve to define 'ob-
jectivity in the phenomenal realm? Greene believes that it does and for three reasons. Firstly, he claims that the Moral Law is absolutely coercive for man's moral consciousness. In fact its coerciveness dictates the categorical imperative or "ought". Whereas it is true that man may not obey the Moral Law, and thus the moral injunction of the categorical imperative because it is compelling only in an obligatory mode, he cannot escape the injunction of the moral "ought" itself or disregard its requirements with impunity for such requirements are but the expressions of man's essential inner nature.

Secondly, our moral insight reveals a law, the Moral Law. We accept a law as a statement of orderly and regular relations under the same conditions and since the Moral Law expresses the essence of noumenal reality our moral consciousness apprehends theorderliness and regularity of the noumenal world of value. Indeed the constant dictates of the Moral Law are but reflections of its orderly nature which culminates in man's envisionment of a corporate and orderly community of freedom—an ideal kingdom of ends.

And lastly, the Moral Law is public and universally available to all rational beings, for it is not a different law for one person in contrast to another but the same Law for all men irregardless of how it is interpreted by different men. Greene expresses Kant's thought on this matter as follows: "Kant knows nothing of a wholly private morality or an ideosyncratic conscience. Every man's conscience, he believes, dictates the same duty for duty's sake, the same respect for all men,

74Ibid., p. 59.
the same quest for the kingdom of ends."

Now, in the light of the fact that the Moral Law does possess, in principle, the three essential characteristics necessary to determine a phenomenal object as "objective" and "real," how is it easily reasonable to deny that moral values too are honestly and properly "objective" and "real?" Denial is only possible, Greene feels, if one prejudicially excludes, a priori, any type of experience except sense experience as a cognitively useful experience. Greene believes this should and need not be the case.

But if we acknowledge as Kant does, that man's value experience, and specifically his moral sense, constitute a generic type of experience worthy of being taken seriously as a source of real clues to objective moral values, it is hard to see why moral values, at least, are not as objective and real in their way as phenomena are in theirs.\textsuperscript{76}

Greene insists further that we can test the validity of moral insight by the same criteria of truth or knowledge used to test the validity of perceptual judgments. Firstly, beginning with the criterion of correspondence which is recognition of the object's characteristic of coerciveness, Greene insists we can claim a particular moral judgment validly true in proportion as it does no violence to man's deepest conscience or innermost sense of duty. Secondly, a moral judgment can pass the second criterion, coherence, to the degree that it is not inconsistent with presently held "true" moral beliefs and therefore

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., p. 60.

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.
properly fits into these beliefs within a logically connected or coherent framework. And, thirdly, a moral judgment may be deemed to be morally valid to the degree that it is meaningful to other men endowed with moral reason or sensitivity; thus, a particular moral judgment-being shareable meaning-wise-may, in turn, be corporately considered and if ultimately judged as valid may thereby illicit common acceptance, support, and loyalty. The importance of this criterion of truth as previously stressed is its psychological and methodological significance to man in the light of his awareness of his own finitude; thereby, the recognition of his affinity to possible fallibility in all his own individually derived judgments.

Again, as witnessed at the end of the first Critique, Greene questions Kant's tendency to absolutize his own formulations of the categorical "ought" and thereby claim for them a final and universal certainty which Greene questions regardless of their essential soundness and persuasiveness. Such questioning is justifiable from Greene's point of view in the light of his belief in man's finitude and in the ever present possibility of progressively new and "truer" insight. With this proviso Greene contends that Kant's conclusions of the second Critique warrant the title "authentic knowledge" rather than "faith." Indeed, certainty may not be claimed for them but a moral assurance or certitude analogous to the certitude that the modern scientist rightly claims for some of his findings.

In sum, Greene's neo-Kantian interpretation of the Kantian method in regard to moral experience and moral values permits him to hold, along with Kant but with more certitude, a middle or mediatory position
in respect to the ancient and significant contemporary conflict between extreme moralistic authoritarism and nihilistic moral relativism. In brief, Greene demonstrates that it is possible to believe with complete and honest integrity in an absolute, objective Moral Law or an objective Good; and man can, in principle, apprehend it through its incomplete phenomenal manifestations but he can never claim, as the authoritarians do, to fully comprehend it or to have infallible moral insight. Thus, on the one hand Greene's mediatory position rejects the extreme authoritarian's claim to absolute, certain and infallible moral insight of the Good; but, on the other hand, he accepts its claim that the Good is unchangeable and absolute. Greene terms his position a "critical" relativism which essentially asserts: man's moral experiences, regardless of their diversity, are able to provide reliable evidence to the existence and nature of the Good; and man's moral conscience, regardless of its environmental and hereditary conditioning, is able to point the way, increasingly, to deeper moral virtue and comprehension. Greene clarifies this point as follows:

our evaluations must, on this view, always be no more than re-creative approximations to absolute Value, our sense of justice no more than our best understanding of absolute Justice. But we are justified in taking our best moral insights seriously, in the reasonable faith that there is an objective Justice or Goodness with a character of its own, and that we are so made that, with appropriate effort, we can make progress in apprehending it and actualizing it here on earth. 77

77Ibid., pp. 62-63.
The question which concerns Greene next is, can Kant's basic method of inquiry when applied rigorously to aesthetic experience prove to be as fruitful and successful therein as it has in the dimension of moral value? Thus, the next section will be concerned with Greene's Neo-Kantian account of man's aesthetic experience and aesthetic value.
Man's Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Value

Aesthetics, the study of the nature of beauty and of judgments of taste, is a primary interest of Dr. Greene. His interest and concern with this realm of human experience is particularly reflected in his monumental work The Arts and The Art of Criticism which was published in 1940 by the Princeton University Press. Also his particular concern with Kant's aesthetic theory is reflected in the essay A Reassessment of Kant's Aesthetic Theory. This fact and data is mentioned here for two reasons. Firstly, since the material of this section is to be concerned with Greene's neo-Kantian approach to aesthetic experience and value its pre-occupation and emphasis is essentially epistemological in character and therefore will necessarily fail to do justice to Greene's complete aesthetic doctrines and philosophy of art. Furthermore, and secondly, no attempt elsewhere in the study will be made to set forth in a more erudite manner Greene's aesthetic philosophy. With this in mind it only seems fair to recognize and duly stress here that Greene is an aesthetician of the first order and, therefore, anyone seriously concerned with the nature of the aesthetic experience, response, and values is well advised to consult Professor Greene's endeavour in this area of inquiry. In brief, his major publication The Arts and The Art of Criticism, which was written in collaboration with six experts representing the six arts under study, is a comprehensive analysis of the crucial and fundamental principles of aesthetics and the art of criticism and it is highly recommended to those

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readers particularly interested in aesthetics and the philosophy of art. With the recognition, then, of the limitation of this study to do full justice to Greene's comprehensive scholarship in aesthetics we can proceed to consider the crucial aspects of his neo-Kantian thesis in respect to aesthetic experience and aesthetic value.

If we take stock of common everyday instances of aesthetic experience we recognize that these seem to occur at two inter-related but distinguishable levels. The first level has to do with our response to beauty. Thus, we commonly find man judging a landscape, a person, a poem or a song as more or less "beautiful" down to a degree where the particular object seems to violate the demands of beauty in which case we term it "ugly." Herein "ugly" denotes not only the lack of beauty but in some measure more than this because it expresses in meaning a more or less painful experience of violation against beauty. The second level has to do with our creation of beauty. Thus, again, we find man commonly endeavouring to create beauty in various ways, such as, by the way he combs his hair, arranges his furniture, spaces the shrubbery in the yard or selects background music for his dinner guests. In sum, it does seem in everyday experience that man has an aesthetic sense of obligation that impels him to not only seek for beauty but also to increase beauty and to share beauty with his fellow man.

That, beauty, as the object of man's aesthetic sensitivity, is recognized in some sense and form by all men can be hastily accepted at its face value by an inquiring mind; however, further reflection upon common
aesthetic experience poses some interesting perplexities that are not so readily acceptable even to the common layman. For instance, why is it that I judge a particular object to be beautiful and you judge it as hideous? Who is right? Or again, why when I listen to a Tschaikowsky symphony do I become overwhelmed with its beauty whereas you refuse to listen; for to you, it is valueless or meaningless sound? Indeed, it does seem that a concentrated study of man's response to and creation of beauty should reveal many surprising insights for the inquiring mind in respect to human nature, knowledge and experience.

We recall that Kant at the end of the first Critique has "speculative" reason asking if the phenomenal world is the whole of reality? We have seen that this question is answered by Kant only after he has analyzed man's moral experience in the second Critique with the assertive conclusion that we are justified in believing there is an additional moral or noumenal order. Greene claims that even though Kant does not ask the same question at the end of the second Critique the fact that he immediately began an analysis of man's aesthetic experience in Part I of the Critique of Judgment reveals his own interest in and attempt to answer this very same question. Can Kant's basic method of inquiry prove to be as successful in analyzing aesthetic experience as it has been in analyzing sense and moral experience? In short, Greene believes Kant's analysis of man's response to and creation of beauty is very acute and impressive when one considers that Kant's background and experience did not actually equip him to deal in depth with either aesthetic appreciation
or creativity. Greene suggests that Kant's actual aesthetic reveals he gained most of his understanding of the aesthetic realm from a great deal of reading and conversations of a general nature with visiting luncheon guests in his culturally bleak home town of Königsberg, Germany. Be this as it may, Greene concludes: "His resultant aesthetic is therefore far more acute and, at times profound, than one would have any right to expect from a man of his temperament and cultural background."  

Kant, Greene claims, approaches an analysis of man's aesthetic experience from a "pure" point of view. That is, he is not interested in beauty as artistic expression but in "pure" beauty. Likewise in considering the judgment of taste as denoting man's expression of aesthetic experience he does not mean artistic criticism but rather "pure" taste. "This is why he praises sea shells and arabesques;" Greene declares, "he values them, not as instances of natural sublimity or of great art, but as notable instances of pure beauty and therefore as ideal objects of pure taste."  

Even though Greene judges this as a limited approach to the problems of aesthetic experience, he believes it is, however, a valid and significant approach and Kant's findings are nevertheless of permanent value. Greene, therefore, agrees for the most part with Kant's resultant aesthetic within its restricted frame of reference with the exception of one major aesthetic doctrine which Greene feels impelled to straightforwardly repudiate and criticize. This doctrine has to do with Kant's claim and conviction that "beauty," as the object of the judgment of taste,

80 Ibid., p. 72 (underlining mine).
is subjective rather than objective. The remainder of this section then, for the most part, will be limited to presenting Greene's refutation and criticism of Kant's stand on this single fundamental issue of aesthetic theory.

Greene is convinced that Kant's doctrine that beauty is subjective does an injustice to aesthetic experience itself and furthermore undermines Kant's own account of this experience. But even more than this Greene claims that "it violates a basic presupposition of that basic method of inquiry which he used so brilliantly in the first Critique and so effectively in the second Critique." In short, we recall that Kant's methodological formula in the first Critique was knower-knowing-knowable; and in the second Critique it was moral agent-moral experience-object of moral reason. In each case the underlying presupposition is that the "experience" or "process" in question cannot be analyzed by itself in isolation from its distinctive subjective and objective pole; That is, there is the total Gestalt of any experience with which we must begin; and, we recall, that the three elements of the total Gestalt are mutually related and dependent. But, Kant, in his analysis of man's aesthetic experience, is not consistent in that he does not insist upon starting with the total Gestalt of aesthetic experience which is formulable according to Greene as: man of taste-judging-beauty, or in its creative form, genius-creating-beauty. Greene points out that Kant does discuss the processes, i.e., the judgment of taste and artistic creativity,
respectively, and the subjective poles of judging agent and creative artist as such aid in the comprehension of the processes themselves. But he does not follow his preceding pattern by a consideration of the aesthetic object, i.e., beauty, as either the product of genius or the object to which taste responds! Greene maintains, therefore, that Kant in describing taste and creativity talks about beauty as though it were real but "when he comes to a head-on discussion of beauty, he flatly denies its "objective reality," either in art or nature."

Now the crux of the matter in question governing Greene's neo-Kantian thesis is: Why does Kant deny the objectivity to beauty, as the object of aesthetic experience, that he has imputed to sensory phenomena and with due considerations to the Moral Law as the respective "objects" of sensory and moral experience? In a word, Greene discerns that he does so because beauty, as Kant has discovered and defined it, is not characterized by the kind-of-order that man's intellectual faculties can comprehend and formulate conceptually! That is, Kant has, in effect, described beauty, the object of taste, as being purposive-without-the-idea-of-purpose and Greene interprets Kant to mean by this strange phrase that "every instance of beauty has (to use a phrase which Kant did not employ) an 'internal aesthetic logic' of its own which a discerning taste can detect and approve, and by which, in artistic creation, the artist is guided and disciplined in his own creative labors." Furthermore,  

82 Ibid., p. 73.
83 Ibid., p. 69.
Greene points out that Kant's description of beauty as purposive-without-the-idea-of-purpose discloses two important characteristics of beauty. First, that each part of an aesthetically satisfying configuration is organically related to every other part in that each has an essential aesthetic contribution to make to the composite aesthetic effect. In other words, each component of the aesthetic Gestalt is aesthetically purposive and can never be aesthetically purposeless. "But, second," Greene points out, "this aesthetic purposiveness can never be achieved, in artistic creation, by an appeal to aesthetic rules or principles." Therefore, whether in the case of aesthetic taste or aesthetic creation all beauty is purposive-without-the-idea-of-purpose in that each instance of beauty is purposive to the aesthetically sensitive but neither critic nor artist can prove by conceptual argument in regard to any particular instance of beauty that this purposive demand has been or has not been met. Now again, the point is that even though beauty is characterized by a purposiveness or order which is compelling to man's aesthetic taste, this order, in each particular instance of beauty, is unique to the instance and therefore is not adaptable to rational formulation of universal rules or principles. In final summary, then, Greene claims that Kant will not consider beauty objective because even though it possesses the crucial characteristics of a coercive public order or purposiveness of its own the fact that man's intellect cannot grasp and conceptually formulate this order convinces him that beauty cannot be objective.

Ibid., p. 68 (underlining mine).
We remember that Kant insists, according to Greene, that phenomena are real and objective not only because they possess the crucial characteristics of coerciveness, publicity and orderliness—distinguishing what we mean by the "objectively" real of reality—but also because the faculty of understanding can and does grasp this order and expresses it in terms of applicable universal categories. Similarly with the Moral Law with the result that man's moral reason can and does formulate the universal categorical "ought." Greene points out that upon the basis of Kant's description of the judgment of taste he faces the same situation and problem. And, according to Greene's interpretation of Kant's reasoning on this issue, Kant claims every instance of the judgment of taste is, like beauty, totally unique in that it is not an expression of universal rules or principles but an expression of a singular immediate aesthetic insight. Thus the judgment of taste is not amenable to being tested for truth by the special conceptual criterion of truth, namely, coherence, because it is not liable to conceptual formulation. So once again beauty cannot be termed objective because our judgments of it cannot be tested by the conceptual criterion of truth that we use in testing the validity of scientific and moral insight!

Yet, Greene points out that, paradoxically, Kant is convinced "that the judgment of taste does claim to be valid for all men and therefore equally universal and necessary for all." Kant is insisting here that the judgment of taste is universal in the sense that it lays claim to

85Ibid., p. 67 (underlining mine).
universal acceptance if it reflects genuine aesthetic insight; and it is necessary in the sense of being aesthetically obligatory for all men of aesthetic sensitivity.

But Greene argues to the effect that if Kant denies that beauty is genuinely objective in the sense that it is not amenable to analysis and proof then how can Kant claim that taste is universal and necessary? Greene concludes that Kant's own answer to this question which is reflected in his analysis of taste is resourceful but most unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory because in taking stock of Kant's analysis of taste—which Kant claims is a type of experience that is essentially a sharpened sense perceptual experience, i.e., in the aesthetic experience the faculties of imagination and understanding are stimulated into a greater than usual harmonious activity that expresses itself in a harmonious feeling which emerges as the judgment of taste—Greene discerns that he completely fails to reveal why the faculties of imagination and understanding are sometimes stimulated into such an unusually harmonious and cooperative activity! Of course, we recognize that Kant's explanation does relieve him of having to invent a special faculty to account for aesthetic experience but leaving this aside for a moment the crucial question remains: Why is it that in the aesthetic experience the common-place faculties of imagination and understanding are occasionally stimulated into unusually harmonious activity? Surely, Greene believes, it can only be because the object itself, that is, any particular perceptual object either natural or man made, possesses a structured quality or qualitative Gestalt of its own that is capable of goading or inciting
these perceptual or cognitive faculties to their unique function in an aesthetic experience. Greene concludes, then, that this quality, which characterizes some perceptual objects, must be on Kant's own terms, beauty, and it may be honestly considered as a tertiary quality of some perceptual objects and, thus, it is this quality which man's aesthetic taste perceives and appreciates. It stands than that each perceptual object will possess, in degree, this tertiary quality or beauty. In this regard Greene states:

Perceptual objects which make no pretense to such quality are aesthetically neutral; those which, in whatever way, profess to have this quality but which, in fact, lack it, or violate it, are, in varying degrees ugly.86

Thus, Greene believes upon Kant's own analysis of taste we must conclude that beauty and its opposite ugliness are not only the proper objects of aesthetic taste but are, indeed, objectively real in some definable sense. So the question now is, can they meet the requirements of objectivity as set forth by Kant in the first Critique? As we have previously pointed out, for Kant an object is objective or "real" not only because it possesses a coercive public order of its own but also because this order can be grasped by man's intellectual capacities and thereby expressed in terms of basic universal principles and rules. We can, then, according to Greene, break Kant's account of objectivity into two distinct phases, i.e., the essential hallmarks of

86Ibid., p. 76.
"objectivity" and the invocation of conceptual rules or principles. It is within this frame of reference that we can see more clearly Greene's neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant's actual aesthetic; and, therefore with this distinction in mind, let us briefly scrutinize and draw together Greene's stance in this particular regard.

In the first place, Greene accepts Kant's description of beauty and upon Kant's own definition and analysis of beauty argues in a neo-Kantian manner that beauty does possess the essential hallmarks of objectivity. This is true because in all its instances beauty presents itself to us coercively or stated otherwise forces itself upon our awareness with an orderly Gestalt or character of its own which we must accept for what it is and thereupon make our judgment. Again, Greene's neo-Kantian argument claims that any instance of beauty is objectively real because it possesses a Gestalt which for the individual man of taste is aesthetically coercive and to all men of taste is universally public or available.

Now, in the second place, Greene is equally convinced along with Kant that every instance of beauty is totally unique, i.e., it is a Gestalt with its own "internal aesthetic logic" or its own purposiveness-without-the-idea-of-purpose and as such any specific instance of beauty is necessarily the object of a singular or unique judgment of taste. Thus, it is clear that from Kant's rationalistic point of view the judgment of taste is not testable because no appeal can be made to conceptualized rules or principles. But Greene takes issue here and argues against Kant to the effect that the judgment of taste is testable by an appeal to man's cultivated taste. Here Greene is maintaining that this is possible
because man has the ability to develop and discipline his innate capacity for aesthetic taste to the point where he can have authentic insight of objective beauty in any of its manifested appearances. Here, in essence, Greene is asserting that just as Kant substituted moral reason for the understanding as the distinctive faculty for moral insight or the subjective source of moral insight he is substituting aesthetic "reason," "taste" or "sensitivity" as the distinctive cognitive faculty of aesthetic insight.

One of the clear implications of Greene's neo-Kantian interpretation of aesthetic experience is that a Gestalt can be both unique and objective. Whereas Kant would reject this for the reasons previously presented Greene does not see in the light of Kant's own basic account of objectivity that any instance of beauty does not possess the essential hallmarks of objectivity; and, furthermore, even though any specific instance of beauty is totally unique and therefore defies universal conceptual assessment, it can be assessed by the developed or cultivated taste of the trained or disciplined connoisseur. Why, Greene's neo-Kantian interpretation asks, should we, when we perceive the distinctive kind of objectivity that beauty possesses, insist that because beauty is not amenable to universal rules and principles which are aesthetic sense might conceptually formulate, it, therefore, is not authentically objective? Thus, Greene insists that in the light of the distinctive character of aesthetic experience there is need for greater flexibility than Kant's account of objectivity permits and we should admit and most readily accept that beauty
possesses the kind of authentic objectivity which the connoisseur with his cultivated taste can assess. In summary of this point Greene declares:

It is my neo-Kantian thesis that we are fully justified in defining the distinctive objectivity of beauty in terms of its singular uniqueness, and that we need not, and should not, deny that beauty is objective merely because it refuses to submit itself to a conceptualized "idea" or rule.87

If we pause to consider for a moment Greene's assertion that beauty may be judged by man's cultivated taste it may seem at first glance to be precluding the possibility that aesthetic taste is anything more than the result of cultural and historical conditioning. This, of course, is the stance of the cultural relativist who, in essence, asserts the impossibility of universal and necessary taste from which it follows that there is actually no need to seriously consider if beauty, in its own right, is objective and real. As Greene ultimately points out the relativist's argument is cogently supported in view of the historical record of the profound difference among different persons and cultures in respect to aesthetic taste and style. So often also the record reveals that the same artist and his work in one era has been acclaimed but at another time condemned. Indeed, it is true and commonplace too, that critics who are accepted as experts in taste differ greatly among themselves. But Greene's argument asks, is it not true that on the whole the cultural relativist's position eventually seems to do itself in? That is, if beauty's status is not in some sense objective and "real" then,

87 Theodore Meyer Greene, Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight, p. 78.
firstly, how is it possible for critics to claim, as they all do, any
degree of authoritative "expertness" in aesthetic taste and insight?
And, secondly, if beauty is not objective, why is it that equally informed
and sensitive critics agree more often than not in their critical apprais­
als? In short, Greene sees that the relativist's position is cogent to a
degree and must be reckoned with by believers in objective beauty. But
likewise Greene feels the relativists have the more difficult—if not im­
possible—task of explaining why it is that good critics do for the most
part agree and also asserting if it is possible to validate the critics' and
connoisseurs' claim to expertness in aesthetic taste and insight?
"Expertness," in this respect, obviously comes not alone through a recondi­tioning process but rather through an educative or developmental process
that results in greater aesthetic sensitivity and understanding which, in
turn, produces more informed and illuminated critical appraisal.

It follows from the foregoing account of the objectivity of beauty
that Greene's neo-Kantian aesthetic asserts that responsible critics
can test and verify their several judgments of taste by discriminate use
of the three criteria of truth as set forth by Kant in the first
Critique. That is, a judgment of taste that fails to meet either of
the three criterion: correspondence, coherence or communicability, may
not be regarded as a valid or true judgment of taste. We will not
elaborate upon this assertion to any degree except to quote directly
Greene's meaning in the matter. The specific criterion will be speci­
fied followed by Greene's own descriptive account of its application to
judgments of taste.
1. Correspondence: "(fidelity to or conformity with primary aesthetic response duly sensitized and disciplined)"  
2. Coherence: "(the avoidance of contradiction between comparable judgments of taste and the promotion of mutual enlightenment of all one's judgments of taste taken in conjunction)"  
3. Communicability: "(the refusal to regard either beauty or taste as merely private, and the determined effort to check one's own taste against the taste of all those for whose aesthetic judgment one has respect)"

We see that Greene's revision of Kant's aesthetic assigns to beauty an objectively real status that resembles that assigned to moral value. Beauty is not merely a phenomenal fact, even though it is manifested only in and through phenomena, it is also a value like moral virtue or goodness. But Greene points out we cannot assign beauty a noumenal status according to Kantian doctrines because his noumenal world is strictly limited to the moral order and beauty therefore remains completely phenomenal. But fortunately Kant does, according to Greene, inconsistently refer repeatedly in the Critique of Judgment to a transphenomenal realm which he terms the "supersensible substrate" which he seems to consider as the source of natural beauty and purposiveness. Even so he never elucidates upon the relation of this supersensible substrate to the

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88 Ibid., p. 81  
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid., p. 87.
moral order. But if we interpret, as Greene does, Kant's account of
the realm of noumena as the realm of objective values then beauty just
as moral virtue is both a value and noumenal. Greene states the case
as follows: "So conceived, beauty, like moral virtue would be both a
value and noumenal—or, more precisely, it would be noumenal by virtue
of being an objective value. This conclusion, though not explicitly
Kantian, is certainly consistent with the major trend of Kant's own
philosophical thinking." 92

In conclusion it is clear that Greene's neo-Kantian interpretation
of Kant's actual aesthetic shows how it is possible, in principle, to be-
lieve in and defend authentic aesthetic insight. Again, in this respect
Greene does not claim that an infallible aesthetic and infallible aes-
thetic judgment is possible, for "we are as fallible and finite here as we
are in science and ethics." 93 "All that is claimed is the possibility,
in principle and also in actuality," Greene declares, "of varying degrees
of aesthetic expertness in the detection and assessment of varying mani-
estations of authentic beauty." 94
Man's Religious Experience

Indeed it is true that with the completion of the third Critique Kant must have felt, Greene believes, that his gigantic task was finished in that he did not produce a fourth Critique. Even so Kant did within a short time after finishing the Critique of Judgment see fit to work out his own analysis of religion in a critique of the Christian faith. Thus Greene believes Kant did, so to speak, direct attention to and concern with man's religious experience as yet another generic type of human experience. Our concern then in this section is with Greene's interpretation of Kant's success in dealing with man's religious experience and insight as well as presenting Greene's own neo-Kantian thesis in regard to religious insight and Divine revelation.

We can begin by recalling Kant lived during the Enlightenment which was an essentially revolutionary period in history being characterized by an emphasis upon individualism and rationalism. Revolutionary assertions of individual freedom and the power of reason made their impact upon all aspects of life in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the realm of religion there was a vigorous attack against traditional ecclesiastical authority and dogmatism. This attack according to Greene assumed two main forms, evangelical pietism and rationalistic deism.95 Thus it is that Kant, having been reared by a mother who was a devoted pietist and having been surrounded by rationalistic influence in his university days, approaches religion in his later years with strong

95Immanuel Kant, Religion Within The Limits of Reason Alone, Introduction and Translation by Theodore M. Greene, p. xii.
influence from both of these forms of rebellion of the age against traditional church authority and dogma.

It is not unduly surprising, then, Greene tells us, that Kant's attempt to come to grips with man's religious experience and religion in general, as presented in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, reflects to some extent both the pietistic and rationalistic influences of the time. In short, Greene claims that Kant by the time he is concerned to consider religion in general and Christianity in particular is a confirmed and convinced humanist. Thus it is that his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone becomes a remarkable elaboration and enrichment of his earlier moral theory. Greene claims that Kant's chief concern in attempting to come to grips with the distinctive traditional Christian doctrines is, fundamentally, to pare away and cull out all ecclesiastical ritual and dogma which he is convinced is unnecessary, and to preserve from his point of view the only true value of Christianity which is its moral kernel of ethical idealism. In brief, Greene sees that Kant rejects in his Religion all the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, e.g., sin and salvation, forgiveness and redemption, etc., and thus, all in all, his Religion becomes a most profound and commendable secular study of man as a moral agent.

But Greene does not see that this notable achievement attends to

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96 Ibid., pp. xii-xxi for Greene's account of the influence of pietism and rationalistic deism upon German life and thought in general and upon Kant in particular.

the comprehension of the specific needs and demands of man's distinctive religious aspiration and experience. Indeed, Greene believes that to pursue the development of Kant's thought in his Religion would not help us to understand man's generic religious experience to any appreciable degree, for his Religion, being strictly humanistic in orientation, merely serves to reinforce his moral theory as set forth earlier in the second Critique. To this point Greene insists:

Kant was incapable of genuine religious awe for the "Holy" in its distinctive religious sense. He failed, to the end, to understand man's generic religious experience, even at its enlightened best. He could therefore not achieve in this area what he achieved, with such signal success, in his analysis of man's sensory experience and his moral experience, and, with such impressive though limited insight, in his analysis of man's aesthetic experience.98

We see from this statement that Greene's neo-Kantian analysis of religion cannot be built upon Kant's own thought and argument as presented in his Religion but must be built "anew" by applying Kant's basic method of inquiry as previously used in the areas of science, morals and aesthetics to the area of religion and religious experience. That Kant did not see fit to apply his method to the realm of religion is sure evidence from Greene's point of view that Kant simply could not and therefore did not "take man's generic religious experience 'seriously', that is, to regard it as a possible source of reliable clues to the reality and the nature of the God of religious worship."

98Ibid., p. 93.

99Ibid.
Within this religious context then Greene's neo-Kantian thesis asserts that Kant's basic method of inquiry as used in the first Critique is applicable in the realm of religion and religious experience; and, therefore, Greene's concrete purpose is to develop a neo-Kantian analysis of religion similar to that developed for the other generic types of experience. We clearly see that Greene's thesis is based upon the presupposition that man's generic religious experience should be taken seriously in that it is capable of providing important and reliable clues to the reality and the nature of the "object" of religious concern and worship. Our immediate task then is to follow Greene's thought in this new venture.

Greene begins by a consideration of the total Gestalt of man's religious experience. He reasons the three components of the Gestalt, i.e., subject, process, object, may be described in religious terms as follows: Man as religious believer; religious experience as a cognitive process; God as the object of this experience. Next he endeavors to identify the basic characteristics of religious experience itself. His fundamental premise for this task is that religious experience is a unique type of human experience that can only be described in terms of itself. It follows, therefore, that its distinctive essence is ineffable and thus it can only be known by first-hand experience and can only be described in terms of this first-hand experience! Thus it is that Greene believes we can justifiably use Rudolf Otto's definition of religious experience even though it expresses a kind of tautology in that use is made of two distinctive religious terms in the definition itself. That is, Otto, according to Greene, proposes that religious experience may
be defined as "those experiences which, in some way, express man's 'awe' for the 'holy'."\textsuperscript{100} For the reasons stated above then Greene feels we can accept this definition and note that at the least, at this point, we understand that man's religious experience always involves a sense of awe in the presence of something that is in some sense judged to be holy.

To determine more clearly and precisely what the terms "awe" and "holiness" signify or mean in defining religious experience Greene traces the meaning of the terms through an account of the evolution of religion from its primitive animistic beginnings to its last stages of development, i.e., the so-called higher religions of mankind. Throughout the uneven evolution of man's religious quest, Greene points out, we discover man's response to God develops hand in hand with his concept of God. We see, for example, that as man's concept of God changes from a finite being to an infinite being man's response accordingly changes from an enlightened respect to an enlightened reverence. Greene has us note also that even though defining religion as man's "awe-ful" response to the "holy" is indeed valid in retrospect of the evolutionary stages and types of religious experience we must not therefore make the mistake of assessing all religion in terms of its primitive superstitious and magical beginnings! To do this would be as unjust to modern religion as it would be to modern science if it were judged meaningless because its primitive speculations about nature were thoroughly fanciful and imaginative superstitions. In regard to this matter Greene concludes:

\textsuperscript{100}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 94.
Our chief present concern is the validity and the value of religion at its enlightened best. We should therefore not merely identify awe and holiness as the pervasive characteristics of all religious experience, however primitive or developed; we should focus our attention primarily on man's highest apprehensions of holiness and his most disciplined and purified feelings of awe and reverence.

Greene is concerned to stress also that whereas science has gradually developed world-wide cooperation in methods, criteria and language in its approach to understanding nature, religion has not developed in this fashion. Indeed, even in its most advanced stages religion is culturally oriented. That this is so is evidenced by the present existence of the several predominately culturally oriented world religions. Thus it is that when we seek to perceive man's highest apprehensions of holiness, reverence and awe, Greene believes, we must mean either the apprehensions that all the world religions hold in common or the highest apprehensions that any particular man of faith can achieve and validly hold within a particular religious tradition. But, as Greene sees it, we need not conclude in view of the fact that there exists many major ways that man has chosen to approach God that all religious faith is therefore meaningless and invalid! Furthermore we need not assume that there will always be multiple "higher" religions with each claiming to be the true religion but rather that one day there may very well be a more united and cooperative human search for God, and thus organized religious bodies will not tend to absolutize their particular theological precepts.

101Ibid., p. 97 (underlining mine).
and special revelations! Greene goes on to suggest that it is really highly contradictory that the present day so-called "higher" religions do tend to absolutize their own beliefs and practices in view of the fact that each stresses the unfathomable depth of mystery that surrounds the Divinity itself as well as the certain and unavoidable sinfulness and finitude of man. In short, Greene concludes on this point, one would think that such convictions would promote greater tolerance and humility in the area of human concern and endeavour. But, presently, this is not the case in that most of the prominent leaders of each of the major religions insist their particular revelation is exclusively the truth and likewise their apprehensions of it are equally true and valid.

It is partly because of the need to rise above these considerations of religious parochialism that Greene feels Tillich's definition of religion as "man's ultimate concern for the Ultimate" is especially astute and all in all his theology is deserving of serious attention.\textsuperscript{102} Such a definition emphasizes not only the fact that religion does reflect man's ultimate or highest concern, and therefore, a man of faith regardless of his chosen religious tradition is justified in being loyal to his chosen tradition, but also the fact that his ultimate loyalty or concern is only valid or authentic, religiously, in proportion as it is the honest pursuit of what is, in fact, the Ultimate itself in Reality. Thus man's religious quest is authentic ultimately only if it expresses an honest effort to discover that Ultimate Holiness which all religious traditions approach and worship in their diverse ways. In short, religion

\textsuperscript{102}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 99-100.
so conceived asserts: first, that it is possible that God Himself has revealed Himself in diverse ways and therefore each religious tradition has precious insights which should not be overlooked or easily dismissed by men of faith; and, second, that religious and any theological accounts of God, being the ventures of finite and fallible humans, are necessarily defective and not finally absolute. Greene considers that this stance is not impious since it does not relativize God's own Self-Revelations to man but rather stresses man's ruinous disposition to play God and thus make claim to infinite knowledge which God alone may justly claim and this, indeed, is clearly blasphemous.

If we attempt now to draw together the main points of Greene's account of the basic characteristics of man's generic religious experience we find that one essential characteristic is man's sense of "awe" which is analogous to his aesthetic and moral sense. Furthermore religious experience is seen to be a relational process in that there is a subjective pole, -the religious agent, -and an objective pole, -the Divinity. "Kant's Gestalt (knower-knowing-the knowable), duly translated into religious terms," Greene states, "is as applicable here as Kant found it to be in the first and second Critiques."

We have seen also that Greene stresses human history reveals a correlative evolution between man's sense of awe or reverence and his insight of the holy. That is for example, as man's understanding of Deity developed to ascribe infinity to Deity his sense of reverence changed along with his conception of the appropriate response or religious behavior which he deemed worthy to

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103 Ibid., p. 102.
worship an *infinite*, in contrast to a *finite*, Deity. Likewise, his conception of himself changed, for now, having an *infinite* God he poignantly sensed to a greater degree his own finitude. Many such instances of the parallel evolution of man's sense of awe and his apprehensions of the holy could be readily cited to give a more complete understanding of Greene's thought in this respect but the following passage can serve to sum up the matter:

In short, the history of religion, seen in large outline and in long perspective, is a history of the evolution of the total religious configuration or Gestalt—a concomitant evolution of man as seeker and worshipper, of belief and worship, and of man's ever changing theological apprehensions of God as the "object" of his quest and his encounter.104

The question to be answered now in respect to Greene's neo-Kantian analysis is, how real is the object, i.e., the God of religious encounter and man's religious faith, of religious experience? Greene contends that the God of man's religious faith according to the believer possesses all three of the essential hallmarks of reality that Kant has so clearly established. Firstly, God is, according to the testimony of the majority of persons of authentic and vital faith irregardless of the diverse theological conceptions of God as held by the different world religions, *coercively* encountered with a character of His own. We can see this point clearly in the example of the Judaeo-Christian tradition where God presents Himself coercively with a dynamic character of His own to such persons as Moses and Paul and to the prophets, mystics and saints.

104 Ibid.
Indeed, the God here encountered is a dynamic Being which the man of faith must accept for what He is regardless of his own response to His righteous love and wrath. Secondly, the God encountered by the person of vital faith is not the private God of the particular individual worshiper but rather a public God who is available to all men in all places. In other words, as the sole ultimate Creator of all that is, God is ipso facto the God of all time and of all men everywhere. And lastly, those of a vibrant religious faith proclaim with resounding common conviction that God is orderly. He is ever steadfast in His justice and mercy and in the fulfillment of His promises to and covenants with man. Indeed, for the most part the past and present theologians provide ample witness to the fact that the more enlightened religious faith becomes the greater the endeavour to construct a logically consistent and coherent belief both in God and in the relation of God to man and the universe. Certainly, Greene declares, "reflective faith must assume the inner consistency of all truth, and therefore the ultimate coherence of all valid religious insights."105

Greene's neo-Kantian analysis of religious experience also proclaims in certain terms that man's religious insights just as his scientific, moral, and aesthetic insights are subject to the three measures of truth used by Kant, i.e., the criterion of correspondence, coherence, and communicability. Indeed, theologians, whom society accept and recognize as the so-called "experts" in the religious dimension of experience, make regular and consistent use of these criteria in their attempt to

105Ibid., p. 103.
understand the truth about man’s belief in and relation with God who is the object of religious concern and worship. Specifically, Greene points out that theologians apply the criterion of correspondence to the problem of man’s knowledge of God by seeking "to do full justice to what they consider to be man’s most reliable and revealing primary experiences." Greene goes on to say that "it is only as a religious faith, once vital, begins to lose its vitality that theology neglects its empirical anchorage and lapses into rootless speculation." Likewise, the criterion of coherence is used as religion expands in enlightenment. Greene sees that the historical record reveals the constant and expanding search among theologians for conceptual clarity of religious doctrines and the avoidance of contradiction between approved and accepted secular and religious beliefs. And lastly, although religions do differ greatly in their missionary zeal there is no existing religion that does not proclaim the universality of Deity and thus seeks to communicate to all men who will listen its proclamation of the universal validity of its central belief which is available to all sincere men who are seriously in search of a vibrant religious faith.

In the light of the necessary generality of Greene’s neo-Kantian analysis of religious experience thus far, Greene is concerned before dismissing the topic, to set into sharp relief two specific logical implications that his analysis portends. Stated negatively the first implication is that his analysis does not mean to convey that man's

106 Ibid., p. 104
most enlightened approach to God is an eclectic compromise which avoids wholehearted religious commitment to a coherent set of beliefs within the framework of one of the great historic religions."\textsuperscript{108} On the contrary, Greene feels his analysis logically and distinctly affirms that one's approach to God is not an eclectic enterprise nor is it as effectively advanced in isolation. Indeed, to hold that man's search for God is a solitary, idiosyncratic pursuit is to fly in the face of the historical record of man's ever progressing religious enlightenment. Most certainly the historical record reveals that for the most part the prominent religious prophets, saints, and mystics have been the product of some great religious tradition with which for the most part also they have remained in alliance throughout their life-time. Greene is convinced that the clarity and profundity of the private "I-Thou" relation with God evolves out of communal search within the disciplinary confine of some great religious tradition.\textsuperscript{109} It is by this path that an individual may eventually, by imagination and humility, transcend the parochialism of a given religious tradition. Is it not meaningful, Greene asks, that those who have had the deepest insights of God are more spiritually akin to each other regardless of their diverse chosen path to God than the fellow members of each of their particular religious traditions are to each other? "In this sense all the higher religions," Greene declares, "at their developed best, may be said to be self-corrective and self-

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., p. 105.
transcendent."\textsuperscript{110} In short, Greene believes, "their own deepest insights constitute a prophetic critique of their own traditional parochialism and intolerance."\textsuperscript{111}

The second implication of his analysis that Greene is concerned to stress is that the analysis does not logically imply a type of religious egalitarianism which in effect proposes that all religious ventures are equally valid. Again, Greene maintains this is not the case from either a correct interpretation of his account of religious experience nor when seen from an historical perspective. In fact such a conclusion is unintelligible and therefore unreasonable since two contrary beliefs may not both be true however both may be false. Actually when we face the fact of human finitude it is most reasonable to conclude that on the one hand no human apprehension of God is fully adequate to His nature and on the other hand only an initial stance of radical religious skepticism would prevent the likewise reasonable conclusion that some of man's religious beliefs and ventures are more true than their rival options.

This course of thinking provokes the question, What is the best and truest way to God? Greene's answer is threefold. In the first place, the path selected is chosen in faith and the reflective judgment that it is the best way of the alternatives available however limited these may be. And on this point it is most important, Greene believes, to realize that the path of religious faith chosen by an individual is to some degree a free choice in that alternatives, religious and un-

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
religious, are available, and thus a person's choice indicates not only his best judgment of the matter but also his willingness to assume the necessary mortal risk which such a choice and decision entail. In the second place, it is necessary to realize that the path so chosen may be traveled either within a spirit of dogmatic self-righteousness or of humility. "With this point in mind is it not reasonable to presuppose that the choice of a most devious and unorthodox path to God when pursued within a spirit of humility and loyalty may very well bring forth deeper religious insight to the traveler than might be possible to the self-righteous dogmatist traveling a more orthodox way? And in the last place, one must face the fact that "a priori certainty is no more possible in man's religious quest than in his secular ventures."

With this statement Greene is clearly invoicing the pragmatic test of truth to both man's religious and secular quests. Greene believes that within the religious dimension of experience, "as elsewhere, life itself—that is, Reality itself, or God himself—judges us, rewarding our successes with spiritual health and peace and punishing our failures with frustration and misery." As Greene sees the pragmatic thesis, i.e., that which works is true, it is perfectly legitimate in that the only way men have, while living, to judge the validity of any belief is to appraise the apparent results the belief has in the life of the individual man and mankind in general. Indeed, a man may believe that fire does not burn until he is burned. And likewise a man may believe that God is the

112 Ibid., p. 106.
113 Ibid.
source of the "peace that passeth all understanding" and the truth of this belief is readily apparent to all men if they can observe a tranquility which seems to pervade the life of the one professing this belief.

But Greene also sees that there is real danger in the pragmatic test of truth, particularly when applied to religious belief, if its application is based too exclusively upon feelings of pleasure or pain. That is, in regard to the religious quest there is ample historical evidence to the effect that the spiritual pilgrimage is very difficult and the most sincere searcher is destined to experience not only the heights but also the depths of human emotion in the venture. How then can a person rely too heavily upon feelings if he is not to abandon the quest? And may it not be that an occasional sinking in the mire along the way eventually motivates one to renew his effort to reach the familiar foothills of the eternally ascending mountain? In this sense Greene suggests that negative feelings may prove to be more spiritually promising and rewarding than their counterparts. Thus it is this reasoning as here found in Greene's portrayal of the misapplication of the pragmatic criterion of truth that provokes him to issue a warning against its exclusive use.

There is also another significant aspect to the issue of truth as it relates to the religious quest. To begin let us recognize with Greene that there is the spiritual pilgrimage only because God Himself has chosen to reveal Himself to finite man. Thus, with God considered as the Creator of all that is the crux of the matter becomes, how can finite men, being merely respondents to Divine revelation, look to each other's response to this revelation to discover what God is and does? Indeed, men must not look to each other to determine what God is and does! They
must look to God Himself, and His revelations of Himself to them if they are to be in a position to appraise pragmatically their own and each other's religious response and insight. In a word, Greene is saying here that only by an ultimate appeal to God's Own revelations of Himself can man come to know true or real spiritual dividends, i.e., fulfillment of the pragmatic thesis in regard to religious experience.

In regard to revelation Greene believes that God has chosen to reveal Himself to man primarily in two ways which he terms "natural" and "special." By "natural" Greene means that each of the dimensions of Reality, that is, nature, man, and ultimate mystery or God Himself, is so constructed and constituted to make itself known to man in its own unique mode. In respect to "natural" revelation then and, firstly, nature thrusts itself upon man not only in forceful sense perception but also in answering affirmatively many inquiries of the imaginative mind of the scientist. Secondly, man's nature within the context of "natural" revelation is not only observable but more significantly and importantly man expresses himself to other men symbolically and artistically. And, lastly, the dimension of ultimate mystery which the man of religious faith deems to be holy and Divine is, in itself, its own distinctive mode, and it may be typed as "natural" revelation in that herein God speaks to all men everywhere throughout all time and culture. By "special" revelation Greene means, in contrast to "natural" revelation, the unique or singular revelations that God has given to man in exceptional ways and to specific cultures. It is in the appeal to special revelation

that each of the great religious traditions not only finds its *raison d'être* and initial grounding but also its understandable logic that its own revelation infers the *sole authentic path to God*. **Even so,** Greene believes it is much more in keeping with the teachings of all great religions as well as with the fact of man's incorrigible finiteness that it behooves man to recognize that God has most assuredly revealed himself to man in different ways. This does not preclude the decision that one "special" revelation is seemingly more inclusive and convincing than the rival alternatives; it merely *emphasizes* the need for sincere humility as one perseveres upon his particular chosen path to God.

The final aspect of Greene's account of religious experience and reflection to be considered, which will bring it to a close, is the crucially important concept of *faith*. To get at the heart of Greene's thinking here he insists that "religious faith at its mature best is an 'enlightened,' 'primary,' 'resultant' faith which differs crucially from a mere faith about God, which reflects a growing realization of what God is, but which, above all, is a living faith in God Himself."115

To arrive at this conclusive statement defining religious faith Greene distinguishes four basic variants of faith in general. First, a distinction is made between "initial" faith and "resultant" faith. Initial faith is characterized by being an individual's commencing act of faith to the effect that the venture in question and the presuppositions of it may be actually well-grounded and assuring. In other words, one must be willing to take an initial risk of faith before entering upon any venture...

115Ibid., p. 113.
and this risk involves the initial faith that the venture, from the surface view of it anyhow, is not only worthwhile but also interesting enough to warrant personal participation and involvement. In short, we are willing to enter into it and thereby hope to see it from a participant's point of view in contrast to an outsider's perspective. "Resultant" faith in contrast to "initial" faith is characterized by being the ever progressing development of one's resultant comprehension of the venture in question. It, therefore, signifies the steadfast progress of deeper insight and the movement from the undiscerning belief of "initial" faith to a more assured and enlightened belief. "Resultant" faith may also be termed or distinguished as "primary" faith and likewise "initial" faith distinguished as "secondary" faith. Here the emphasis is upon the difference between an individual's own experience and reflection in the venture in question, and the acceptance of the authoritative report of others. In this sense "initial" faith is firstly of a predominately "secondary" nature, and "resultant" faith is "primary" in character. Greene is concerned to stress that in regard to the religious quest one's faith in some instances may not be able to rise above a secondary status. As a case in point he asks, "Do not Christians, for example, believe in immortality chiefly, if not wholly, because they have faith in the profound spiritual wisdom of Jesus as the Christ whose more primary faith in immortality seems so indubitable?" 116

Greene's third and fourth distinctions of faith to help him set forth what faith may be adequately dealt with in a few words. The

116 Ibid., pp. 111-112.
third distinction centers around the idea of the importance of a reflective or enlightened faith in contrast to an uncritical and more or less blind faith. That is, all religions, regardless of their status as major or minor traditions, place great value upon the vital, sincere faith of a believer whether or not this faith represents critical reflection and analysis. But a relatively blind faith does notwithstanding underestimate the value of a faith that is held with critical insight. Indeed, those religious traditions in society that do permit, encourage and value critical analysis and refinement are the very ones society labels "great," "high" or "major" religious traditions. In a word, an "enlightened" faith in contrast to a "blind" faith is accorded preference because being grounded in reflective activity it has the potentiality of an ever increasing growth in depth and breath of religious insight.

In the fourth distinction of faith Greene sets into sharp relief the variance in meaning between "faith in", "faith that" and "faith about." 117 We see that Greene believes one has faith-in or believes-in a particular object through direct encounter or confrontation with the object. Thus it is, Greene suggests, that man through direct repetitive encounter and first-hand experience believes-in physical objects, believes-in people as persons and "the man of faith believes in God on the strength of his confrontations with Him." 118 It follows then that through man's inquiry into the explicit nature of these objects that he is able to develop a

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117 Ibid., pp. 111-112.
118 Ibid., p. 112.
"faith that" or belief-that a given object does, indeed, possess certain relevant attributes and characteristics. In a word, "faith that" must follow "faith in" because it is the adjectival counterpart of the object of "faith in." In this sense, "faith in" is a necessary and fundamental pre-condition of "faith that," and its significance to man always arises above that of "faith that." At this point it should be clear that "faith about" is defined by Greene as of a secondary character, i.e., it grows out of second-hand, vicarious experience, and is inferior in assurance and enlightenment to both "faith in" and "faith that." It is by this path of analysis and reasoning that Greene arrives at his definition of religious faith previously cited. To repeat and sum up then, Greene claims that a mature religious faith "is an 'enlightened,' 'primary,' 'resultant' faith which differs crucially from a mere faith about God, which reflects a growing realization of what God is, but which, above all, is a living faith in God Himself." 119

Greene believes that this analysis of faith makes it "clear that faith is, in its generic essence, an assurance based always on partial evidence and incomplete understanding." 120 Greene is especially concerned to point out here that only man is capable of faith because only man can reflect, can know something but never everything. Thus reflection may be seen to be the primordial origin of faith. Consider too that the very living-of-life forces us to make decisions and act continuously and that we do not always decide and act upon conscious reflection, but when

120 Ibid., p. 114.
we do, we must realize that our resultant decisions and actions are not
grounded in certainty but in faith. This is why it is ridiculous to
claim that science is based upon reason alone and religion upon faith
alone. All human decision and activity is based upon faith and the
stronger the faith in a particular segment of life, for example, the
marriage relationship, the better the preparation to live well in that
relationship and face up to the various vicissitudes, joyful or painful,
that attend to the aspects of this experience or any other human experi-
ence. Thus, Greene insists:

Our vital option, therefore, is never faith
or absence of faith, but the kind of faith,
secular or religious, primary or secondary,
credulous or enlightened, that we make our
own. That some kinds of faith, in every
walk of life, are vastly superior to others,
should by now be abundantly clear.\textsuperscript{121}

Greene's last consideration in regard to faith has to do with its
attainment. The core of his thinking on this matter rests upon the
conviction that the attainment of faith, in any particular aspect of
life, does not result from man's effort alone but is partly given in
nature, i.e., it is a gift. He reasons that we cannot by sheer will-
power gain a faith in or believe in any thing that seems to us completely
unreal and therefore entirely uncertain and incomprehensible. Therefore,
the only course open for an individual to attain a faith in something
is to expose himself to the actual prevailing influences that exist to
create a certain type of faith and in the meanwhile probe himself to

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., pp. 114-115.
develop his own latent talents for the particular faith in question.
If, by this process, faith emerges, the individual is impelled to ac-
knowledge, in all honesty, that his resultant faith was not strictly
of his own making but partly a gift for which he is, indeed, grateful.
"The greater our emergent faith," Greene suggests, "the greater is
our impulsive gratitude for it likely to be. This is the universal
testimony of all great lovers and statesmen, artists, and men of God." \(^{122}\)

In regard to religious faith in particular, Greene believes it is
most important to recognize and understand its two essential operative
components, i.e., Divine Initiative and man's response to it. In his
elucidation of this concern Greene proposes that Pascal summed up the
situation accurately and plainly enough when he concluded that in regard
to God's Own revelation to man He had three options and chose the latter
one, i.e., God could have chosen to completely hide Himself from man,
or completely reveal Himself to man, or \textit{lastly}, chosen to partially
reveal Himself to man so that all those who were earnestly disposed to
seek Him could succeed and find Him but those who were disposed contrari-
wise could likewise maintain their disinterested stance. \(^{123}\) It seems,
therefore, that God's choice of the latter option highlights rather
clearly that the attainment of religious faith is dependent not only upon
an equal two-way search between God and man but also upon an equal shar-
ing between them of the responsibility for the necessary initiatory or
commencing provocation to begin and continue the search for religious

\(^{122}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 115.\)
\(^{123}\textit{Ibid.}\)
faith. In this sense if we see God as a Father and man as His son we see that religious faith itself symbolizes the mutual search of the beloved for the beloved.

Greene again refers to Pascal's thought in attempting to sharply define man's search for God when he takes under consideration the fact that for many men the religious search is attended by momentous suspicion and sincere disbelief. In a word, Greene feels that Pascal brings into sharp focus the idea that the very fact one is searching for God demonstrates that one has already to a degree found God. Greene sees that Pascal is very discerning in this regard for is it not true that man would not search, indeed, would not even have the idea of searching for something utterly unknown or unthinkable? Thus, it would seem that the fact of a search establishes the fact of a somewhat known object of the search no matter how true or illusory the object may, in fact, be. It follows, then, that in the religious context if one skillfully and contritely pursues the course continually revealed by the Divine Initiative that one's assurance is progressively developed not only in respect to the worth of the search itself but also in the reality and presupposed nature of God, the object of the search. In the light of this thought, Greene suggests in final conclusion of his account of religious experience and insight, that what the religious quest demands of man is faith, hope and charity or love. In this context Greene defines "charity" or "love" as ____________

124 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
"a unique blend of humility and acceptance," and affirms with St. Paul that of the three—faith, hope and charity—charity is the greatest of all. That love is judged to be the greatest of the three is easily accepted and understood if one recalls that the religious quest, in its generic essence, is the reciprocal search of the Beloved for the beloved. Faith and hope do, indeed, function as significant integral aspects of the religious quest but consider for a moment that without love there would be no religious quest; for, above all, God is Love. It is love, then, that welds together and undergirds the religious experience and insight of mankind. Greene presents a highly sensitive and moving description of the function of love in human experience which merits direct quotation and may appropriately serve to conclude his neo-Kantian analysis of religious experience and insight.

For love is creative and binding in all its works, eliciting our faith and engendering in us that responsive love that alone can unite man to nature in natural piety, to his fellow men in human charity, and to God in joyous obedience and praise.

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125 Ibid., p. 116.
126 Ibid.
The purpose of this final chapter in the exposition of Greene's philosophy is two-fold. First, we will succinctly and cogently draw together Greene's conclusive thoughts as reflected in the subject matter of the preceding chapters and, second, in performing this summarizing task place considerable emphasis upon explicating aspects of Greene's social philosophy of liberalism. This procedure will allow in the first place a culminating review of Greene's major thoughts within the confines of a perspective that is to some degree fresh, and in the second place the opportunity to set forth in a clear fashion the "liberal" aspect of Greene's thinking which, indeed, characterizes his social and general philosophical stance.

In Liberalism, Its Theory and Practice Greene champions a social philosophy of liberalism as it particularly applies to combating the threat of modern communism. To do this his interest is primarily focused upon establishing the articles of faith that make up a liberal creed for it is a fact that the strength of communism lies in its creed or Manifesto that is believed so ardently by its advocates. As Greene points out, "Dulles believes that the growing might of communism is due primarily to the fact that it has a creed of world-wide import in which the hard core of party members believe fanatically and which they are spreading with missionary zeal throughout the world."¹ This being the

case with communism Greene endeavours to establish in opposition a liberal creed which he believes reflects the basic ideological presuppositions of our Western heritage.

Greene's first step in establishing a liberal creed is to define explicitly the terms "liberal" and "liberalism". In a word, he concludes that any man labeled a "liberal" ought to be "characterizable in two ways --as one who excels in open-mindedness and a sense of fair play and whose ultimate objectives are freedom, justice, and truth, and also as a man who believes that certain specific beliefs and policies will best safeguard freedom and increase social justice."\(^2\) Likewise in respect to defining "liberalism" he concludes that liberalism, "signifies an open, receptive, and generous attitude . . . , a critical rather than a subservient attitude to tradition and convention . . . ."\(^3\) He goes on to say that liberalism suggests "at least by historical association, the supreme value of liberty as a prime condition of individual creativity and free social solidarity, and the ultimate threat slavery presents to all human aspiration and advance."\(^4\) In sum, he concludes that liberalism "points to the life of the spirit and its ultimate values without committing us to any dogmatic formulation of these values or to any specific means for their realization."\(^5\)

The second step Greene takes in establishing a liberal creed is

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 19.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 23.
\(^4\)Ibid.
\(^5\)Ibid.
concerned with the liberal attitude and man's search for truth. In short, he insists that the liberal attitude "is the natural expression of a faith in freedom" and this "liberal attitude will, in turn, reflect a prior concern for freedom of speech." A prior concern for freedom of speech because it is only as men are free to express their ideas to each other that the search for truth can continue and prosper. Indeed, freedom of speech and the search for truth seem to necessarily imply each other. We need not dwell for long upon Greene's thought as to the imperative need of man both to seek and value truth, for his thought in this regard should be sufficiently clear by now. However we can highlight here the fact that Greene equates man's search for truth with the liberal attitude, i.e., the four basic presuppositions that underlie man's search for truth also underlie the liberal attitude. With this in mind a mere listing of the four basic presuppositions that underlie man's search for truth will suffice to suggest Greene's more inclusive thought concerning the correlative relation between man's search for truth and the individual and corporate liberal attitude. The four presuppositions are:

1. All human beings are fallible; all man's apprehensions of the truth are therefore necessarily partial and inadequate. 

2. Man can benefit by pooling his fragmentary insights and by correcting his provincialisms through contact with others.

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6 Ibid., p. 24.
7 Ibid., p. 28.
8 Ibid., p. 29.
3. Diversity of human perspectives and beliefs is an asset rather than a liability, provided such diversity is put to constructive use.  

4. It is to man's advantage to discover and agree on truths that are relatively abiding.  

It is clear that if the liberal attitude or man's search for truth is to survive and flourish he must nurture and treasure above all other freedoms, the freedom of speech. "Freedom of speech is not an end in itself," Greene points out, "but it is the only means whereby we can realize ourselves as beings endowed with reason." It is Greene's firm belief that the liberal will always staunchly protect this freedom because without it he cannot effectively carry on his search for the truth that alone can set him free.  

Greene's last step in the direction of establishing a liberal creed is to consider from the liberal point of view the provocative question, Is a free yet cohesive community possible? In short, Greene's answer is "yes" if we duly consider that the liberal attitude alone or single-handedly does not make up the full scope of liberalism in that the liberal attitude itself is grounded in basic and underlying beliefs regarding man and the universe. Here Greene is attempting to combat and cut away the foundation of those individuals who would contend that the liberal attitude is nothing more than an attitude of tolerance and critical inquiry; therefore, liberalism itself in this sense is merely universal.
tolerance and continuous criticism. Indeed, Greene believes, to hold this conception of the liberal attitude and liberalism is irresponsible and superficial in at least two respects. In the first place, it fails to recognize that any particular attitude is not a self-sufficient entity in that it is, itself, an outgrowth or product of basic beliefs that must be anterior to its own creation. In the case of the liberal attitude being accepted as one of tolerance and critical inquiry we can easily and plainly see that this attitude is wholly dependent upon prior basic convictions in regard to the nature of man and the universe. And, in a word, Greene believes the liberal attitude presupposes the following two basic beliefs about man and the universe: (1) Man is essentially a rational or reflective being and therefore to realize his true nature and to live well he must without restriction of any kind use his mind or engage in critical inquiry. (2) As man stands he faces an ultimately complex and mysterious universe and for this reason he is impelled to embrace a humbleness which acknowledges not only his own inadequacy to completely understand the cosmos but also that of all men and thus his stance of tolerance toward other man as the abiding reflection of his own humility. In the second place, Greene sees that a superficial conception of liberalism fails to recognize that the liberal attitude itself does not necessarily preclude the possibility of holding beliefs firmly enough so that they are the bases for decision and action. Indeed, is not reflective commitment to some degree the natural goal of critical inquiry? If so, how can we engage in critical inquiry and at the same time fail to achieve reflective commitment to some degree? We must stress here "to some degree" because Greene's underlying premise to the
whole issue is that absolutely certain knowledge is an impossibility; but even so, Greene insists, this does not preclude the fact that it is possible to hold a belief with enough assurance or certitude that one can live by it and at the same time have an open mind and an honest, receptive attitude toward new insight that might radically change a cherished belief. In short, real open-mindedness and wholehearted conviction are not completely incompatible nor are they necessarily inconsistent with the liberal attitude and liberalism. Actually, when we take thought, all our decisions in life are based on our commitment to a particular belief or faith that is held with enough assurance that we can and do act upon it. "Man can and does," Greene insists, "at his creedal and critical best, declare: 'Here I stand--I can do no other!' without, in the process, surreptitiously playing God and claiming for himself even a fragment of divine omniscience."12

Thus it is from Greene's point of view that all those who contend that the liberal attitude and liberalism is not only nothing-more-than universal tolerance and unceasing criticism but also by its inherent nature necessarily precludes the possibility of resolute beliefs are short-sighted in their point of view and hence misconceive a truly liberal attitude and liberalism at its developed best. It should be clear by now that Greene believes a free yet cohesive society is possible because a free people stand together in a belief about the essential nature of man and his destiny. Indeed, man's nature is seen to be essentially rational or reflective in character and for this reason he, above all

12Ibid., p. 43.
else in creation, responds to life as an evaluator, a moral being, and as one who is capable of facing ultimate mystery with genuine awe and wonderment. It is as an outgrowth of this belief also that there is among free men wide-spread agreement in their ascription of intrinsic value and dignity to human life. It is from the common agreement found among men about the true essence of man that Greene claims the liberal creed emerges. In a word, then, the basic propositions embedded in a liberal creed assert that man is a being who faces the whole of life as an evaluator, a moral creature, and one who can respond to ultimate mystery with reverence and wonderment. It should be pointed out here that Greene is not claiming that free men agree in their belief about the nature of ultimate reality itself. To the contrary, men hold most divergent beliefs about the nature of ultimate reality but this fact does not change the equally recognized fact that for the most part men do commonly agree in their belief regarding the sanctity of human life. Thus, it is Greene's thesis that this agreement forms the underlying working premise of a liberal creed and it follows that the initial propositions constituting the creed affirm a common reading of human nature even though accounts regarding its ultimate ground differ widely.

Greene proposes that each of the three initial propositions of the liberal creed, that is, man is an evaluator, a moral agent, and a being capable of genuine awe, "raises a distinctive metaphysical problem that has puzzled mankind since serious speculation first started and seems to be as far as ever from definitive solution."\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{13}\text{Ibid.}, p. 58.\)
assertion that man is an evaluator raises the perplexing problem of values, their status and our knowledge of them; and, second, the assertion that man is a moral agent raises up the vast problem of human freedom and responsibility; and, lastly, the assertion that man is capable of reverence issues in the highly controversial and perennially baffling problem regarding the validity of ultimate belief. Indeed, each of these assertions indicate a unique experience generic to mankind and the preceding chapters of this study witness to Greene's theoretical and practical concern with each of them. But presently in the attempt to finalize and summarize our interpretation of Greene's philosophy we must cogently recognize and stress that the latter experience, that is, man's capacity for genuine awe in the face of ultimate mystery, is for Greene in fact the supreme and most unique experience of mankind. And this in turn suggests, in a most simple form, the rudimentary conception from which Greene's entire philosophy of spirit springs. This being so and to accomplish the stated task of this chapter, that is, an attempt to draw together and summarize in a fresh and meaningful manner Greene's philosophy, we can best begin by following the trail of thought this single fundamental conception generates as it receives Greene's creative loyalty and concern. This procedure should allow not only a fresh re-emphasis upon major aspects of Greene's thought as presented up to this point in the study but more importantly a view of the consistent unfolding of Greene's thought until it reaches culmination in a succinct statement of Greene's ontology, epistemology and axiology. Our final course is set, then, and we will begin with careful scrutiny of the basic experience that is involved with the assertion that man is a being who is capable of genuine reverence and
awe in the face of ultimate mystery.

Greene firmly believes that the assertion man is capable of reverence cuts deep into the very heart of human experience itself. It is indeed true as the propositions of the liberal creed declare that man is capable of responsible evaluation and also responsible choice and decision in the light of this evaluation; but his capacity for awe and reverence above all directs attention to a level of human experience which Greene feels lies beneath and pre-conditions all of his beliefs and correlative actions. It is as though evaluation and moral responsibility are basic human aptitudes; but, Greene declares, "man's 'quality of greatness' is above all his ability to respond to ultimate mystery with genuine awe." Why is this true? Upon what experiential evidence does Greene found this assertion? In short, Greene sees two aspects of human experience that compel him to this conclusion. Both, of course, are integral parts of human experience itself but one directs attention more to the essential nature of man himself and the other to the essential nature of reality itself. We will now deal briefly with each of these aspects in turn.

First, we have previously presented Greene's definition of awe and "awe-some" experience but here our major concern is not in mere description of this experience but rather to consider Greene's point of view as to what this experience tells us about ourself as well as its abiding effect upon our life. Greene sums up this consideration most adequately when he declares:

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11Ibid., p. 96.
The statement that we are capable of awe points not only to our finitude but also to our ability to transcend it sufficiently to be aware of it. All living creatures are finite, but only man, so far as we can tell, is conscious of his finitude. This consciousness in turn contributes to our torment, for the more we reflect upon our finitude the more are we impressed by our lack of self-sufficiency and our inescapable mortality.15

And, second, the assertion that man is capable of awe and this is his quality of greatness implies that indeed the reality itself which he encounters is of such quality that it does and can evoke in him wonder and awe. In elucidation of this matter Greene says:

It calls our attention to the fact that whenever we probe reality as deeply as we can at any point we come upon some aspect of what has been described as the mysterium tremendum— not just another teasing problem challenging our scientific ingenuity, but a mysterious quality of ultimate and unfathomable significance, a quality of "holiness" to which no human response is adequate save a feeling of reverence.16

It is these two thoughts, that is, man's sense of his own finitude, and the ultimate mystery of reality itself as they stem from man's capacity for awe that seem to be the two steadfast conceptions that consistently permeate the development of Greene's thought. It is as though Greene's recognition and acceptance of these two facts of human experience when conceptualized become the foundational girders for the construction and development of his philosophy of spirit. That this is

15Ibid., p. 97.
16Ibid.
the case will become increasingly clear as we continue to probe these ideas as they relate to Greene's philosophical endeavour and position.

We have several times in the preceding chapters of this study made reference to specific instances in which Greene, along with others equally qualified, has seen fit to affirm that modern man exists in a state of acute or profound anxiety. But Greene does not see that anxiety itself is a uniquely modern condition of man. To the contrary Greene believes anxiety reflects man's distinctly human condition! What may be termed modern about it, is simply its degree-labeled as acute or profound. But anxiety itself, whether we like it or not, is the natural companion of human existence. Why is this true? Simply because man is so endowed that he is not only able to sense his own finitude but also, and perhaps more importantly, he can consciously reflect upon his own finite condition. Here then is the source of the anxiety that is the natural accompaniment to human life. For the more he reflects upon his own mortality the more he realizes its certainty and his own helplessness in face of it. It is this situation, that is, man's sense of his own finitude, that evokes in him not only a sense of wonder and awe concerning the final mystery of reality itself but also a basic anxiety that drives him to search for whatever in reality can someway, somehow complete his finitude and give his life some ultimate meaning; and, therefore, this is why Greene claims the experience based upon man's capacity for reverence and awe is the most basic and significant of all human experience. For, it is quite clear that it is in this experience that man really confronts reality itself and faces squarely the enigmas of human life. It is in this light that Greene feels Pascal's description of man as a "thinking
"reed" is most profound for it calls attention to the fact that man like a reed is "a fragile and pliable reed, susceptible to all the winds of human fortune, yet self-transcendently aware of his plight and therefore open to redemption from above." 17

In the light of this understanding of Greene's point of view regarding the universal human predicament we are now in position to adequately expedite our summarizing review of Greene's philosophy. In short, Greene sees that as man stands in his mortal predicament facing sensitively and imaginatively the mysterium tremendum of reality he has three ways to deal with the situation. First, he can try to escape the situation by deliberately suppressing any thought about it and valiantly attempt to immerse himself so completely in the immediate pleasurable aspects of life that, indeed, he will almost seem to forget his plight and be able to live life as an impulsive and relatively thoughtless creature. This method of escapism is quite easy as long as man is walking on the sunny side of the street; but let the shadows fall and as water loosed from the dam rushes through the spillway man's realization of his mortal plight overwhelms him. But even so he can try even harder to escape and eventually his own death will release him from the struggle and his mortal anguish.

Second, man can deal with his mortal predicament by finally deciding, Greene declares, "that life has no ultimate meaning, that reality is indifferent to man's deepest needs, and that our only valid option is therefore to face life and its vicissitudes and frustrations with all

17Ibid., p. 98.
the human creativeness and courage we can muster."\(^{18}\) This is the choice of the honestly skeptical and courageous secularists. Because they can honestly find no Infinite who may certainly complete their finitude, and by this fact is thereby deserving of worship and ultimate loyalty, they unflinchingly reject the counterfeit relief of a contraband religious faith. In a word, they spend their life giving their highest loyalty to human causes and attempting to make the most of everything in life while they live. "The more self-centered they are," Greene explains, "the more effort will they make to be intelligently prudential; the greater their capacity for genuine human concern, the more self-sacrificially will they devote themselves to the welfare and happiness of others."\(^{19}\) Herein, Greene believes, is secularism at its honest and mature best.

If we label the first and second way that man can choose to deal with his mortal predicament as the way of escape and the way of fortitude, respectively, we can best understand the third and last option by labeling it the way of trust. And this option in Greene's thinking is not limited to only those who can embrace a traditional religion in a conventional form. Furthermore, Greene believes the way of trust predominately distinguishes itself from the other two options by "its greater humility, its greater hope, and its greater openness and sensitivity to the mysterious depths of reality itself."\(^{20}\)

Indeed, the way of trust is Greene's own choice and it seems to

\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 100.

\(^{19}\)Ibid.

\(^{20}\)Ibid.
him to be the necessary outcome when one squarely faces the facts of reality. That is, the dual fact of man's incorrigible finitude and the ultimate mysterious dimension of reality itself necessarily or logically require in itself man's choice of the way of trust. The crux of the matter is, how can man honestly choose otherwise? For the way of escapism essentially ignores and attempts to obliterate the problem. And the way of fortitude, selected by the secularist and the confirmed religious believer, produces a dogmatic certainty which totally belies and denies the essence of the problem itself-man's finite condition. So, in the light of reasonable reflection what choice is actually left to man but the way of humility, hope, and open sensitivity to whatever in reality may, indeed, relieve his mortal anguish. This oratorical question reveals in an implicit manner the supreme position in which Greene holds epistemology. Indeed, it is safe to surmise that for Greene, the nature, limits, and criteria of human knowledge is philosophy itself and it is even more—it is human life itself. For Greene believes man is so created and constructed that all experience is equivalent in meaning to knowing for him. For as far as we can tell, Greene reasons, man from his first breath until his last one endeavours to know or relate himself to nature, his fellow man, and the mysterium tremendum aspect of reality itself. As we have just perceived the endowment given to man that is essential to this endeavour is his capacity for wonder and awe. A capacity that points first, not only to man's own finitude but his ability to transcend it sufficiently to be aware of it, and, second, implies that there is a quality of reality that can evoke in man a sense of wonder and awe.
So man lives, that is, decides and takes action based upon decision, in the tormented conscious state that because of his incorrigible finiteness he can never decide and therefore act with absolute certainty; and, yet, he is so created that he can never give up the search for absolute truth, pure love, perfect beauty and complete justice. In short, man is forever destined to face an ultimate insecurity and the question is, how does he face and deal with this fact of human existence? It is Greene's contention that man's only recourse from a logical review of the human predicament is in facing up to it with deep humility, vibrant hope and open sensitivity to whatever conclusive or ultimate enigma reality itself may avouch with a degree of security. This is the way of trust and it is the approach that Greene advocates; for it is the most reasonable one man can make in dealing with the facts of the human condition.

Indeed, it follows that Greene as a professional philosopher approaches his unique task in the way of trust and in the light of this knowledge we can set forth with expediency the basic presuppositions or the framework, so to speak, in which Greene does his philosophical thinking. Having done this and to arrive at Greene's concrete convictions and conclusions we will need to return to a re-consideration of the way of trust as it influences Greene's personal convictions and the resolutions to contemporary human tensions which he proposes. In the light of the summarizing purpose of this chapter this subject matter will be dealt with in a cursory and interpretive fashion. Our first concern, then, is the philosophical framework of Greene's thinking; and, second, Greene's own basic conclusions as they serve to answer the crucial questions being asked by modern man.
We can best begin a consideration of the philosophical framework, so to speak, of Greene's thinking by high-lighting two general philosophical assumptions which Greene makes and holds fast to. First, as we have previously seen, Greene sees that man stands facing a complex environment which he can to some degree know and therefore adapt himself to. The reasoning here is, simply stated, that man is inherently a knowing being who has the capacity to sense his own incorrigible finitude and because of this fact he recognizes the correlative fact that he is destined to never know anything with complete and final certainty. This is what may be named for now man's "awe-some" position which necessarily generates in mankind an ineradicable uneasiness or anxiety. Thus man is forever destined to evaluate or know increasingly a great deal about many things but he is likewise destined to never know any one thing with absolute certainty. In sum, then, this first general assumption affirms the idea that man can know increasingly the complex environment in which he finds himself and also that he places great value upon the increase of his knowledge for the more he knows the better able he is to live a good life, i.e., a life with a minimal amount of misery and frustration.

We can see that because of this first general assumption regarding the nature of man and his destiny we are able to see also the deeper reasoning behind Greene's second assumption in regard to the essential significance that the surrounding complex environment has upon man's life and destiny. Indeed, man's life is characterized by a continuous inter-play and radical interdependence between him and his total environment. It is true that man is essentially a being who seeks to know his surrounding total environment but this in itself certainly implies
that the surrounding complex environment or reality is at least in some sense and degree objective to him and it must, therefore, exist in its own right with a character of its own. And, most importantly, it implies that reality is knowable in some sense and degree to man. Also when we consider the fact that man is essentially an evaluative being we realize that all his knowing experience is explicitly or implicitly evaluating experience; and, thus, in the last analysis his every thought and action have significance for him in his encounter with reality; furthermore, reality itself being partially knowable to man is equally evaluative in its essential character and significance to man's life and destiny.

In the light of these two general philosophical assumptions that Greene holds we begin to see the emergence of Greene's epistemological, ontological and axiological frame of reference for his endeavour. And to remain within the compendious bounds initially prescribed for this material we will set forth only a brief paragraph about each of these traditional philosophical categories; but, it will succinctly reveal the primary presupposition which Greene holds in respect to each of them. We will begin with epistemology.

Epistemology is concerned with the nature, limits, and criteria of human knowledge and we have plainly seen elsewhere in the study that Greene agrees and sanctions the whole of Kant's theory of knowledge with one major and significant exception. The exception is that whereas Kant when interpreted literally holds that sense experience is man's only cognitively fruitful experience, Greene in contrast holds that all types of human experience are potentially revelatory and thus cognitively
fruitful. More precisely, then, Greene believes man's major generic experiences categorized as sense-perceptual, moral, aesthetic, and religious are all cognitive confrontations with some aspect of the real of Reality and therefore merit serious concern and interpretation. In sum, the epistemological presupposition upon which Greene bases his thinking proposes that all of man's major generic experiences are potentially capable of revealing significant knowledge about the real of reality; therefore, it behooves man to be seriously concerned with each of these experiences and their relation to one another.

Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality or being. Greene believes an ontology necessarily implies an epistemology or theory of human knowledge, and vice versa. The two cannot be radically separated either in fact or theory. This being so, Greene's ontological presupposition proposes that the reality which we seek to know is objective to man in the sense that it has a character of its own which is coercively impinged upon man whether or not he desires or wills it. The data of this process represents man's knowable reality and is not to be considered as reality itself for to do so would be to fly in the fact of the fact that no matter how deeply we probe any aspect of reality we eventually strike a point that is utterly mysterious which in turn necessarily evokes in us a sense of wonderment and awe. In this light we can plainly see that reality is not the same as the knowable data which impinges upon man but is that which underlies this data. In this sense man's knowable reality is contingent upon the functioning of his cognitive equipment which reveals only various appearances of reality but not reality itself.
In a word, Greene's ontological presupposition professes that reality makes itself known to man in some degree in that it forces man's attention to progressively explore all aspects of his objective world, the data of which confronts him with a coercive and orderly character of its own. It is this **objective reality** that man seeks to know and must know not only to successfully adapt himself to life itself but also to live well.

Axiology is concerned with values and evaluation. And, again, from Greene's point of view no radical separation can be made in building a philosophy between the philosophical category of axiology and the other two traditional categories, i.e., epistemology and ontology. This is true because the fact is that man is essentially a normative being and as he stands facing the objective world with his endowed cognitive equipment he evaluates explicitly or implicitly **everything** he encounters in order to judge its significance both specifically for him and generally for all of mankind. We see, then, that man is essentially a purposive being too in that his decisions and concomitant actions being necessarily evaluative in character must also signify the significance to him of **particular goals or particular purposes**. And this realization, in turn, implies that there are value dimensions of reality that are as objective as its factual dimensions. And with this thought we have brought into sharp focus the crucial concern in axiology, that is, the nature and status of values. It is true no one denies that man is essentially an evaluator and therefore his experiences reflect the **actuality** of values but what is disputable in this area of inquiry is the nature and status of these values. Of course one's concrete answer here is
intricately intertwined with one's epistemological and ontological stance. In the light of our knowledge of Greene's epistemological and ontological presuppositions we can readily foretell his axiological presupposition: there are value dimensions of reality that are not only just as objective as the factual dimensions of reality are to man but also are objective in the same sense and manner as the factual dimensions. And thus man can know value dimensions of reality to the same degree and in the same manner as he is able to know factual dimensions of reality. That is, man as a purposive being encounters values in concrete manifestations as they are actually embodied forth in personalities and things, but these knowable values cannot be judged to be wholly adequate to the perfect or absolute Values to which they only point and partially represent. To the aside we can note that we do commonly find that it is truly impossible to judge anything as absolutely just, perfectly beautiful, or utterly holy. In a word, then, Greene believes that absolute values are embedded in reality itself and these values are manifested to man in several concrete embodiments which he actually encounters, but at the same time he holds before himself a vision of the ideal or absolutely perfect embodiment of these values. These values, then, in their visionary abstracted form are the ideals and standards that man sets for and before himself and, once again, his life is successful and good in direct proportion to the degree of success of his search for the value dimensions of reality and the proper resultant response thereto.

We have now finished our concise and summary account of the framework, so to speak, of Greene's philosophical thinking. We have seen that from two general philosophical assumptions or presuppositions that
Greene holds the epistemological, ontological, and axiological aspects of his thought can be delineated and set forth in presuppositional form respective to each aspect. In the light of this account revealing the basic framework in which Greene's thought moves we are prepared to consider several of his basic and specific convictions and their relevancy to the major tensions of contemporary society.

We recall Greene's belief that the way of trust is man's only reasonable or logical response in facing up to his ineradicable condition and predicament. We recall also that man's condition is his finitude and the predicament occurs because he has the ability to transcend his finitude enough to be aware of it. And, in turn, his recognition of this existential fact of finitude creates in him a basic and ineradicable insecurity or anxiety that causes a predicamental situation that may be best defined as one of mortal anguish. Equally involved in this situation is the fact that in itself man's sense of his own finitude suggests there is in some sense an infinite that can someway, somehow make his finitude good. In short, as man stands facing reality in his finite condition he finds that reality itself confronts him with an ultimately mysterious dimension which being unfathomable to him evokes in him not only a sense of anguish but also a sense of awe--this is man's most elemental and uniquely human experience. It is man's essential existential predicament and he must select some way to deal with it. The question is, in the light of this predicament: how does man approach reality?

Greene chooses the way of trust as the best approach to reality because, first, he sees it to be the most reasonable one in the light
of an analysis of the universal human predicament, and second, because it is more hopeful and respectful. In its essence it evokes in man a sense of piety toward nature, man, and the ultimate mystery of reality which the man of religious faith calls God. This way of trust, however, is not limited to only those who can associate themselves with an orthodox and traditional religion, for its distinguishable characteristics are not dependent upon religious belief and commitment. These characteristics are deep humility, great hope, and an openness to the enigmatic proportions of reality itself. In a word, the man of trust approaches reality with an attitude of hopeful humility to honestly and respectfully find what it has to offer and say to him. Thus, following after this way man approaches and explores nature forthrightly in a state of wonderment and awe and the more deeply he probes the more his wonderment and awe increase until at last he holds a natural piety that essentially expresses his feeling with full enlightenment toward the ultimate mysteries of nature herself. Now when the man of trust turns to study man himself his basic experience with nature is repeated but increased in complexity—because man does have both a sub-human nature and also a distinctly human nature which must be particularly accounted for and reckoned with. But, again, at the end of the study there can honestly be nothing but a deep sense of wonderment and reverence at the ultimate mystery of man himself. Finally, the man of trust finds himself especially reverent when he is impelled to an experience which can only be termed religious. This experience essentially involves a belief in either a single or multiple supernatural beings that are independently dynamic and have a quality or qualities that can best be expressed by the word holy. The word
"holy" is used here because it projects both the feelings of fear and love; anger and compassion. Indeed, man's capacity for wonderment and awe is most highly developed in religious experience because his concern with ultimate mystery finally resolves itself into a belief which professes that ultimate mystery itself is a divine holiness—a dynamic holiness that rises above man's finiteness as well as resides with it. Indeed, it is this divine holiness which the man of religious piety calls God.

It is plain that a confirmed secularist may adequately follow in a way of trust in dealing with the universal human predicament. But Greene himself is a professing Christian in the Protestant tradition. Thus he accepts Christian theism and in particular his own understanding and concomitant interpretation of the Biblical account of human nature, human destiny, and ultimate Reality. The following passage sums up Greene's thought in respect to his religious stance:

For I am also a professing Christian in the Protestant tradition. This means that I believe in a God who, whatever else He may be, is a dynamic agent, a spiritual power of force, not to be equated with the most objective of values but rather to be conceived of as their ultimate ground and source.21

We see that because of Greene's Christian stance God is the principle of continuity in Greene's philosophy of spirit. For it is a philosophy of spirit in that Greene's own unique idealism gives a privileged position to mind. This privileged position of mind is in turn

the basic underlying premise of any idealism. This being so it follows that any idealism will assert in some fashion at the least the following four conceptions: (1) The world has a meaning. It is, therefore, viewed as a logical or spiritual whole which is organic in structure in contrast to mechanical. (2) It follows from the above conception that meanings are more than facts and cannot be merely the products of the natural casual order, for the casual order itself presupposes a larger structure of meaning of which it is itself only a part. (3) It follows also that what is true of meaning is also true of value—for meaning itself presupposes value. And values are not, therefore, additions to reality or products of physical forces but are ultimate and have cosmic significance. (4) Lastly, since it is obvious that meaning and value do exist in the world this implies that the core of reality is at the least some kind of mental life because to detach meanings and values from mind is nonsense and utterly unintelligible. Have we not seen that in his own unique manner Greene holds to each of these conceptions? And if we consider these conceptions in the light of the doctrines of Christian theism by recalling what the Bible declares about the nature of ultimate reality, human nature, and human destiny, then we can easily discern Greene's concrete response to each of them. We will let this thought stand here on the assumption that knowledge of Christian doctrines concerning the major dimensions of reality, i.e., nature, man, and ultimate reality itself is commonplace; and, therefore, Greene's concrete and personal convictions in this context are sufficiently clear. With this in mind we will now direct our attention to the final consideration of the chapter, i.e., the application of Greene's philosophy of spirit to com-
temporary tensions. We will try to discover what resolutions are proposed by one who advocates living a "life of the spirit."

To expedite our immediate concern we will begin by recalling that the three major tensions that Greene sees as besetting upon contemporary society is the bitter tension and controversy between rationalism and irrationalism, absolutism and relativism, and lastly, the religious and the secular. (We should recognize immediately and note here that these tensions reflect not alone the major categories of concern that have occupied the philosopher since recorded history but, specifically, for Greene, the major resulting tensions that stem from enlightened recognition of the human predicament!) Our immediate concern with these tensions is not to dwell upon defining them, as this has been adequately done elsewhere in the study, but rather to concentrate upon Greene's proposed resolutions of these perennial tensions and issues. We will consider them in turn beginning with the conflict between rationalism and irrationalism.

Greene labels his resolution of the contemporary tension between rationalism and irrationalism as a super-rationalism.²² In a word, Greene's super-rationalism suggests that a middle path be trod in regard to man's capacity to know reality. This middle path proposes that we recognize man's finite condition and therefore his limitation in this regard but this does not in itself preclude trusting man's reasoning power to increasingly enlighten man in the presence of objective mystery.

Greene essentially asks, Why should we revert to a belief in irrationalism just because we cannot by the power of our cognitive capacities completely comprehend the universe? Thus, the concerted plea of Greene's super-rationalism is for reflective commitment in all areas of life. In its essence reflective commitment is based upon an enlightened faith which according to Greene's thinking is the only reasonable assuring stance that man can take in regard to this issue. In sum, then, Greene's super-rationalism rises above the issues involved in the conflict between rationalism and irrationalism and asserts in certain terms a middle path of assured faith based upon reflective commitment.

Greene's suggested resolution of the second major tension, that is, the conflict between absolutism and relativism is also seen to steer a middle course. He labels it incarnationalism. Here the central issue is that we must recognize both the relative and the Absolute in nature, in man, and even in God. For was not God,—for a limited time at best,—supposed to be incarnate in Christ? In a word, Greene believes what we actually find in all aspects of reality is an incarnationalism which recognizes and grants reality to both change and permanence. Thus we do and should carry on, with wonder and joy, our progressive exploration of the incarnation of the Absolute in the relative. In sum, Greene's incarnationalism treads a middle path, both religious and secular, between authoritarian absolutism and nihilistic relativism.

Finally, Greene suggests that the spiritual is society's resolu-
tion to its tension between the religious and the secular. This conflict, as the other two, has its roots deep in history but the conflict involved here for Western civilization has been particularly compounded since the Middle Ages. In its true essence both sides, the religious and secular, are seen to be equally valid and of value. How is it possible then to truly resolve the conflict finally and forever? Greene's answer is that it isn't. Therefore, we must deplore all sharp hostility on the issue between men of genuine humility and honest good will and we must develop a sincere respect and broad tolerance for all types of spirituality whether or not they reflect our own confirmed beliefs. We see that Greene's proposed resolution of this conflict does not preclude firm religious belief nor does it preclude the crucial importance of different perspectives and loyalties upon this issue. What Greene's resolution essentially pleads for is genuine tolerance, respect, and charity toward all who are honestly engaged in a spiritual pilgrimage.

Looking back on Greene's resolution of contemporary tensions we see that in each case Greene attempts to first acknowledge the validity of both sides of the conflict and then seeks to reconcile them at a higher and more inclusive level which all the while honors both sides. In a word, Greene's resolutions highlight in a poignant and powerful fashion the emphasis which Greene places upon the proper role and task of philosophy as being a mediator and a healer of wounds. In this sense philosophy is seen to be capable of giving the wider perspective so greatly needed upon the narrow provincialisms as reflected in the major

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2Ibid., pp. 252-257.
tensions of modern society. Finally, we see also that Greene pleads for a liberalism that champions reflective commitment rather than reflective doubt and unreflective certainty in all areas of human concern and endeavour. In short, we see the crucial importance of three terms, that is, "liberal", "Christian" and "idealist" as characterizing Greene's thinking and patterns of belief. It seems fitting to close this chapter and Part II of the study by the following passage which briefly explains the essential meaning Greene attaches to each of the terms of his philosophical label, i.e., a liberal Christian idealist:

I am a "liberal" in at least two complementary respects—in my radical opposition to all authoritarianisms, secular and religious, and in my faith in man's indefinite capacity for progress. I am an "idealist" in my belief in the reality, the discoverability, and the importance to man of objective values—of truth, beauty, and goodness as pure essences, and of truths, beauties, and concrete instances of goodness as finite embodiments of these absolute values. Finally, I am a Christian in my wholehearted acceptance of Christian theism and, in particular, of what I conceive to be the Biblical account of ultimate reality, human nature, and human destiny.

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As the title suggests Part III of this study is concerned with an exposition of the significance of Greene's philosophy for the theory of education. Our concrete task in this part then is to show the significance of Greene's idealism in education and the educational process. We will see that Greene's theory of education is the sheer logical consequent relative to educational theory from within and as projected from his general philosophical stance which has been explicated in Parts I and II. Our approach, therefore, will necessarily be characterized by repeated terse reference to admittedly broad, but crucially important, categories of Greene's thought that have been dealt with in the previous chapters.

The precise plan of our approach is to divide the presentation of the material into two chapters. Each represents a broad category of educational thought that in some degree can be set apart as two separate, though interrelated, thought categories for those who choose to concern themselves with educational theory and practice. I refer, of course, to the twin categories of thought in respect to, first, the basic aims and values of education and, second, in respect to the educational process itself. Thus, the first chapter of this Part will be concerned to determine
the unique role of the school in our present society in the light of Greene's philosophical diagnosis of our cultural heritage. We can see in following this procedure that necessarily, though indirectly, Greene's point of view in regard to the basic aims and values of education in modern society will be revealed. It follows, then, that the second chapter will set forth various aspects of Greene's thought concerning both the school and the educational process itself. We recognize that this procedure will reflect essentially the logical outcome of Greene's previously established social philosophy of liberalism and its relevancy to educational theory and practice.
CHAPTER SEVEN

WESTERN CULTURE AND THE SCHOOL

Our Cultural Heritage: "Process," "Person," and "Piety"

Fortunately, but not surprisingly, in view of the fact that Greene is not only an idealist but also is devoting his life to education as a teacher-philosopher, he is concerned with educational theory and practice. He has expressed this concern in several published works. Although each emphasizes a different aspect of educational theory and practice, they do not vary in the basic or underlying thought that essentially a liberal education reflects most genuinely and realistically the dictates of our Western cultural heritage. This being the case, an understanding of his view requires that we set forth what it is that Greene sees in our Western cultural heritage which seems to him to dictate a generally applied social philosophy of liberalism for American society and its social institutions.

In Our Cultural Heritage Greene attempts to analyze the basic philosophy of life of Americans and to point out the over-all program and ultimate values to our society that this philosophy seems to indicate. To accomplish this task he is necessarily concerned with a diagnosis of our cultural heritage. His intention in this diagnosis is not so much ultimately to venerate the past but to see what there is in it that is enduring and worthy of serious and lively concern for the present and future.
For our present purpose, Greene's initial paragraph introducing this diagnosis can suffice to indicate the scope and direction that his thinking takes in this regard. He declares:

No tidy formula can encompass the tremendous richness of our Western cultural heritage. The cumbersome label "Greco-Roman, Hebraic-Christian, scientific, democratic" has, as its only merit, its specification of the chief historical components of this culture—the four great movements which, more compellingly than any others, have moulded it into the cultural amalgam we know today.

Greene's analysis of each of these four labeled historical components, or great traditions, of our Western cultural heritage centers around his exposition and development of three key concepts. These he labels, "process," "person," and "piety." These key concepts originate as a convenience to Greene in specifying the interlocking personal traits which he believes characterized the great Greek philosopher Socrates. And, it follows, that it is these traits which serve to make up the so-called "Socratic spirit" which Greene believes permeated and characterized all ancient thought at its best and "animated the most germinal philosophical speculations in the West throughout the medieval and modern periods." In a word, our present cultural amalgam is a result of the different meanings that each of our four great historical movements have given to the key concepts of the Socratic spirit which Greene labels "process," "person" and "piety." We will now set forth in a cursory

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1 Theodore M. Greene, Our Cultural Heritage, p. 70.
2 Ibid., p. 81.
fashion the essential ideas which Greene seeks to express through his use of these three key concepts as each of these concepts relates to each of the major strands of our cultural heritage. Having done this, we shall be in a position to understand Greene's thought concerning the present place and scope of not only the school from a historical cultural perspective, but also, of all our basic social institutions. We will begin with defining the meaning Greene gives to the key concept "process" followed by "person," and "piety."

"Process" in its most elementary meaning for Greene signifies man's eternally on-going search for truth and pursuit of absolute truth. Thus it is that "process," according to Greene's thinking, in ancient Greece, was exemplified by the Greeks in their pursuit of wisdom by "the dialectical process of philosophical inquiry" and in their love of beauty by "the processes of creation and re-creation in art ..." Also, "process" as found in the great Hebraic-Christian strand of our heritage is seen to be "process as man's continuing religious response to God's continuing Self-revelation of Himself in history ...." And in the great scientific movement which has molded our culture, we see "process as exemplified in scientific method ...." And, lastly, our great democratic experiment exemplified "the slowly evolving process of political self-government."

The point to emphasize here for our immediate purpose is that Greene

\[\text{Ibid.} \text{, p. 184.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
does not see that the fundamental meaning of "process," at its enlightened best in each of the four great traditions of our cultural heritage, is essentially different one from another and therefore rendering our four great traditions incompatible in this respect. On the contrary, the "process" of each tradition is not only highly compatible with each other, but also each of these traditions in this respect is ultimately dependent upon the other for the continuance of a vital culture. In sum, each of the great historical components of Western culture witness to man's abiding faith in the importance and validity of a relentless and valiant search for truth which is, in fact, an ever on-going process never to be completed in the relentless pursuit of absolute truth.

In this respect the crucial questions for contemporary man in Western culture are: What is to become of Western culture? Is it to become free, creative, vital and healthy or enslaved, mechanical, sick and dying? Indeed, the relevance that this type of question has to educational theory is poignantly clear. We will return to reconsider such questions in the light of their import to educational theory. But for now, we must continue on to consider the meaning that Greene attaches to the second and third key concepts, "person" and "piety" as they relate to his characterization of the four great traditions that have molded Western culture.

"Person" and "piety" must be considered together for each is seen to be held in a contrasting position to the other in each of the four great movements of our cultural heritage. Also, as Greene declares,
"We can appropriately discuss them together because the conception of the one is, in each strand, so largely determined by the conception of the other." Greene attacks the task of explaining his precise meaning of "person" and "piety" by dividing the four strands of our cultural heritage into two sets of two. That is, he discusses "person" and "piety" in the dual framework of first our Greco-Roman and Hebraic-Christian heritage and then, second, in the framework of our modern science and democratic heritage. He makes this division for the relatively obvious reason that both science and democracy are merely the distinctive products of Ancient Western culture. Therefore, being products, they necessarily reflect the same essential meaning of "person" and "piety" as originally established in the historically preceding great movements of Western culture. This being so, our immediate concern is to bring into sharp focus Greene's understanding of the meaning of "person" and "piety" as each was conceived in the historically first two strands of our Western culture. Having done this, making an application of the essential meaning of "person" and "piety" to the two later strands, modern science and democracy, is a relatively simple matter. We begin then with discerning the meaning of Greene's key concepts of "person" and "piety" as they serve him to distinguish the essential elements of our Greco-Roman and Hebraic-Christian heritage.

It seems that the very heart of the issue in regard to the meaning of "person" and "piety" that Greene attempts to convey can be most quickly

\[\textit{Ibid.}, \text{p. 208.}\]
discerned from the following two quotations which reflect, in turn, the Greek concept of the nature of man and the Hebraic-Christian concept:

1. "Man is the measure of all things." (Protagoras)

2. "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?" (Biblical source)

We need to point out and stress here that both of these contrasting concepts of man ascribe to him intrinsic value and dignity. Both, also, point to an ultimately mysterious reality which man encounters and which somehow stands beyond man himself. That "man is the measure of all things" is one thing compared to the statement that man is the measure of the universe or of all that is. In a word, each statement reflects the essential value of "person" and "piety" that both the dominant Greek and Palestinian view of man stressed.

In Greene's thought, the only readily identifiable difference in this particular regard is seen to be purely a matter of emphasis. That is, whereas the Greek strand of our culture stressed "person" the Palestinian movement stressed "piety." Or stated again in other terms, Greene declares, "Whereas the Greeks were predominantly anthropocentric in their orientation, the Biblical orientation was predominantly theocentric." But this does not rule out in any sense or means that both "person" and "piety" were of great importance to both of these two great movements of our cultural heritage. Indeed, Greek culture did prominently emphasize the here and the now and human self-sufficiency. But at

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8 Ibid., p. 209.
the same time, it acknowledged the sin of pride and maintained a rever­
ence for its Gods. And, indeed, the Hebraic-Christian tradition
does insist that man is totally and absolutely dependent upon God for
his life and ultimate destiny. But at the same time, it also proclaims
that all of this world being God's creation is good and, therefore, no
man can rightly or reasonably stand in contempt and shallow concern for
his fellow man and his world.

Thus, it is from Greene's point of view that the real issue here
is centered in the problem of priority of values rather than trying to
discern a radical separation between "person" and "piety" that existed
and was wholly unique to either the Greek or the Hebraic-Christian
tradition alone. To repeat, a radical separation cannot be made be­tween these two key concepts because they are seen to be meaning-wise
the same. It is simply a matter of a differing and dominating em­phasis from each of these strands of our culture that we have inherited.
This being so, we see that a profound humanism according to Greene, con­sistently points "beyond itself to an Ultimate Mystery which Hebraism
and Christianity have so deeply probed." And likewise, we see that
our religious tradition at its enlightened best consistently and re­peatedly cherishes "man here on earth and all his loftiest cultural
achievements."

Herein, then, there is no radical incompatibility between these two
traditions for each acknowledges the importance of both "person" and

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9 Ibid., p. 212.
10 Ibid.
"piety" and neither concept is exclusively ruled out of court in either tradition because to do so would violate the deepest insights of both traditions. The crux of the matter is in the issue of priority of values and allegiances. For it is at this junction that we face an either/or proposition. Either we give ultimate allegiance to man and his culture or to God and salvation. We cannot give ultimate allegiance to both, or two things, at the same time. We must make a final and last decision, for in this context, this is the essential meaning of "ultimate." Where, then, shall our final allegiance reside? Shall it reside in a love and worship of man and culture or in a wholehearted love of God, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit? If at this point we bring these two positions into sharper focus for deeper scrutiny, we see that Greene believes, on the one hand, "a really self-contained humanism does contradict and exclude a Biblical faith in a spiritually supreme Deity." But, on the other hand, a faith in the God of Christianity does not contradict and exclude the major postulates of an avid humanism. How can the God of Christianity be hostile or indifferent to man who He has created in His own image and to whom He has revealed Himself to be a loving Father? In elaborating upon this important insight, Greene declares:

Faith in such a God involves no repudiation of man but only of man playing God, no opposition to culture but only to culture deified. In such a faith "true humanism" can come into its own and realize itself more fully and richly than it can while

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11 Ibid.
it insists on absolute autonomy. This is a faith which makes men more, not less, human, more complete persons not persons maimed and incomplete.  

Here in this passage, we see once again Greene's affirmation of his own deep religious faith as well as an explicit statement, from Greene's point of view, of the true meaning of humanism when seen from within a religious perspective.

We should mention here that Greene is quick to point out in regard to this interpretation of humanism that for many diverse reasons this interpretation would probably not please or prove acceptable to either an Aristotle or a St. Paul. But, indeed, it does essentially re-echo the conclusive stand on this issue by a Pascal or a Socrates and all those who can be seen to be or have been saintly humanists or humanistic saints. In this sense, Greene himself must be labeled a saintly humanist. The following quotation can serve to sum up both Greene's meaning of the key concepts of "person" and "piety" and his interpretive resolution of the issue regarding ultimate allegiance:

My own conclusion, at least, is that these contrasting estimates, Greek and Palestinian, of both "person" and "piety", are both precious and valid, that the loss of either would be tragic, and that the genius of Greek humanism is not only honored but safeguarded by being incorporated into the more inclusive framework of enlightened Hebraic-Christian faith.  

As mentioned previously, both modern science and democracy are unique products of our Greco-Roman and Hebraic-Christian heritage.

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\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 213.  
\(^{13}\) Ibid.
Thus, we see in both of them essentially the same expression of the meaning of the key concepts, i.e., "person" and "piety," that we have just explained. In this respect, then, both science and democracy are dedicated to an essential respect for man, a deep concern for human welfare and firm allegiance to truth, freedom and justice. That both of these modern movements reflect in themselves a deep concern for both "person" and "piety" is not questionable. Therefore, the more pertinent question is: how are these two modern movements related to "person" or culture on the one hand and on the other hand to the "piety" of religious faith? In a word, Greene is concerned to point out that both science and democracy are intimately related to our Western culture for, indeed, they are part of it. That is, science is a human product and as such cannot possibly be distinguished from any known historical cultural heritage; therefore, the absurdity of any view that sees science in radical opposition to the so-called humanities. Likewise, democracy is intimately related to culture because it is, itself, a product of culture in that its very creation arose from Western man's need to protect and improve his own cherished and fundamental values.

In attempting to explain how these two modern movements are related to the "piety" of religious faith, Greene holds fast to the view that a secular "piety" is indigenous to both modern science and to democracy. In short, in science we see piety in the form of a basic faith in an orderly universe and more significantly in the scientist's attitude of reverence which he holds towards the unfathomable mysterious depths
of nature itself. In regard to democracy, Greene sees that "piety" takes "the form of respect for human freedom, responsibility, and a justice which transcends all human comprehension or embodiment." This is why all who are seriously committed to democracy are equally committed to the theory of the inalienable or natural rights of man. "No conscientious democrat, in the generic Western meaning of that term," Greene insists, "wavers in his recognition of, and respect for, these rights, but many a sincere democrat is sorely perplexed as to why they are 'inalienable,' or how 'nature' could bestow them on man, or whether they are in fact the gift of Deity." In sum then, scientific and democratic "piety" in contrast to authentic religious piety is seen to express essentially an inarticulated and transmuted form of man's religious faith in God. For is it not true that so-called secular science and democracy see, respectively, nature and man's inalienable rights as merely mysterious and enigmatic? Whereas, is it not equally true that so-called religious science and democracy see nature and man's intrinsic value as essentially mysterious too, but not merely mysterious for it is also considered to be sacramentally mysterious, i.e., nature is God's work and man only derives his intrinsic value and rights from God who is the ground and source of ultimate value. Indeed, in this light secular and religious piety are not the same but neither are they radically incompatible. The following quotation seems to sum up adequately for our purpose Greene's thinking in regard to the relation of "piety" to modern science and democracy:

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11 Ibid., p. 215.
15 Ibid.
Like other expressions of profound humanism, secular piety, whether scientific or democratic, becomes hostile to religious piety only when it is absolutized. If it is kept in its proper place and duly subordinated to man's reverent response to God Himself it not only maintains itself with full integrity; it finds its ultimate meaning and support in God and God's creative and sustaining relation to His entire creation.\footnote{Ibid., p. 217.}

**Liberalism and The School**

In the light of our present understanding of the three key concepts which Greene uses to interpret each strand of our cultural heritage and in the light of our previously acquired understanding of Greene's account of the liberal attitude and conception of liberalism, we can see that Greene believes our cultural heritage is a liberal heritage. Thus, the liberal attitude and liberalism best characterize the essence of Western man and his corporate social endeavour. This is clear because we see that these three concepts, "process," "person," and "piety" are analogous in meaning to the three initial propositions in Greene's thinking that constitute the liberal creed. These propositions are: man is an evaluator, man is a responsible moral agent and, finally, man is a being capable of reverence and awe. Here, then, in the context of formulating a liberal creed we see respective to each of its initial propositions the corresponding key concept in meaning of "process," "person," and "piety." We need not develop this analogical circumstance any further, for both
of its essential aspects have now been developed in this study. Our prime purpose in noting it here is merely to underscore the fact that from Greene's point of view our cultural heritage, as well as his own philosophical frame of reference, seem to dictate and foster liberalism in theory and practice for American society. This, in turn, highlights the fact that for Greene the basic social institutions of American culture should exemplify and promote the cause and creed of liberalism. Indeed, since the school is one of our basic social institutions, our special task is to show Greene's thought regarding liberalism and our basic social institutions with particular emphasis upon the place and function of the school. To do this we will continue to make use of the meaning that Greene has given to the key concepts of "process," "person," and "piety."

We can best begin this task by noting Greene's definition of an institution. "An 'institution' can be defined, most simply," Greene believes, "as a habitual pattern of social behavior, a more or less established way of doing things together." Now, if we ask why institutions arise in society, the answer is fairly obvious and simple. Institutions arise because human beings have common basic needs which must be satisfied and therefore institutions are created by people to enable people to work together and structure more efficiently their effort to satisfy their common basic needs. We might say that institutions are the symbolic affirmation of the principle that there is more strength

in union in accomplishing a common objective, or goal, than in anarchy or chaos. Thus it is that all human societies throughout recorded history, regardless of their primitive status, have firm and well-marked institutional ways of satisfying man's common basic needs. In summary, we see that all human societies have some kind of an evolving structure of social relations that make it possible for people to work together and thereby advance toward accomplishing certain common goals founded upon certain human basic needs. This structure we name an "institution." Its process of functioning may be termed the "institutional ways" that man has created to best satisfy man's common basic needs. There are, according to Greene, "five basic institutions that are the most influential in our society in molding our cultural values and giving our national ethos its distinctive character. These five institutions are the state, the family, the school, the church, and that amalgam of organized activities which we call 'business and industry'."  

We must take note here that thus far in our discussion of Greene's point of view in regard to social institutions there is the certain and clear implication that institutions are not to be considered as merely organized theoretical bodies that take delight in expounding social theories. To the contrary, social institutions are the working structures that reflect the on-going practical application of a social theory and its embedded ethics. Thus, having seen that Greene proffers a liberal

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 124}\]
social theory we recognize that within the context of social institutions we are primarily concerned with exposing the practical application of Greene's social philosophy of liberalism. We can note here also that because Greene sees that liberalism per se is Western culture's unique heritage and thereby must presently permeate the entire structure of American culture that liberal theory itself is now being applied at least in some degree and form in and through our contemporary social institutions. The principle issue, then, is not a matter of Greene's creating or inventing liberalism as a new social ideal. But rather, it is one of revitalizing and reclarifying it as a relatively old ideal in terms of its practical import and consequence for contemporary individuals and social institutions. In this light, we understand that the nature of Greene's concern with the basic social institutions of American culture may be judged to be essentially reformative in character rather than revolutionary. Keeping these notations in mind, we can continue setting forth Greene's thought regarding social institutions in American culture.

We recall that Greene sees in our society five basic social institutions: that is, the state, the family, the school, the church, and economic activity which may be labeled business and industry. Now it follows that if each of these institutions only exists in order to satisfy certain basic needs of mankind, then each of these institutions has its own unique nature, virtue and purpose to and for the society in which it exists. We can summarize Greene's definitive thought in this
regard by the following diagram Greene, himself, uses for this same purpose.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{STATE}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Purpose:} Protection, maintenance of law and order, appropriate support of other institutions
  \item \textbf{Nature:} Inclusive, impersonal
  \item \textbf{Prime Virtue:} Justice
\end{itemize}

\textbf{FAMILY}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Purpose:} Procreation, nurture, intimate companionship
  \item \textbf{Nature:} Exclusive, personal
  \item \textbf{Prime Virtue:} Love
\end{itemize}

\textbf{SCHOOL}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Purpose:} Education
  \item \textbf{Nature:} Humanly initiated self-improvement
  \item \textbf{Prime Virtue:} Truth
\end{itemize}

\textbf{CHURCH}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Purpose:} Worship
  \item \textbf{Nature:} Response to divine initiative, faith
  \item \textbf{Prime Virtue:} Reverence
\end{itemize}

\textbf{BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Purpose:} Subsistence, economic security
  \item \textbf{Nature:} Production and distribution of economic goods
  \item \textbf{Prime Virtues:} Efficiency and integrity
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 129.
It should be made clear that Greene is not proposing that these basic institutions are mutually exclusive either in their nature or actual function in society. In regard to this point, Greene declares:

Our five major institutions do, of course, functionally overlap in many important ways. . . . Yet, despite all these overlapping, each of these major institutions does have a unique function of its own, which no other can properly discharge.²⁰

Thus, we can see that "purpose" in the above diagram not only denotes the unique function of each of the listed basic institutions, but also indicates that it is this unique function that is rightly conceived to be the primary and pre-emptive concern of the particularly involved social institution. In sum, Greene sees that each of our basic institutions do overlap functionally, and each of them does rightly have a unique responsibility to society that no one of the other institutions can properly meet and discharge. But at the same time, they are essentially interdependent, compatible and complementary to each other. This is the case in Greene's thought because each of them is seen to be a product of our cultural heritage, and they, therefore, represent at least in theory the ideal ideological components of this heritage. It follows then that these ideal ideological components become the working source or ground of the major propositions upon which each institution derives not only its uniqueness but also its raison d'etre.

²⁰Theodore M. Greene, Our Cultural Heritage, pp. 238-239.
The thought that each of our basic social institutions is a product of our cultural heritage takes us back to the three key concepts of "process," "person," and "piety" that Greene uses to define our heritage as a liberal heritage. Thus the crucial issue here is: what is the relation between each of the key concepts that reflect our liberal heritage to each of our basic social institutions? The answering of this question should adequately demonstrate Greene's dual claim that ours is a liberal heritage and that each of our basic social institutions, at least at its ideal best, reflects liberalism as a living force in our society. Thus, our immediate task is clear.

In view of the dual facts that on the one hand we have covered, in some depth, the essential meaning that Greene attributes to the key concepts of "process," "person," and "piety," and likewise on the other hand, his thought in regard to the purpose, nature and prime virtue of each of our basic social institutions, we shall summarize with a diagram Greene's thought regarding the relation between the three key concepts and our basic social institutions. The diagram has been devised to serve two purposes. First, it reveals, explicitly, a concise and descriptive summary of Greene's definitive thought regarding the relation between each of the key concepts of our liberal heritage to each of our basic social institutions. Second, it reveals, implicitly, the authenticity of Greene's claim that our basic social institutions, at their ideal best, promote and defend the cause and creed of liberalism.
STATE

Process: Democratic, an evolving and experimental process of popular government
Person: Incorruptibly respectful of all persons within its borders
Piety: A living and authentic piety for freedom and justice

FAMILY

Process: Intimate personal process of love and belonging in which the highest personal values and cultural ideals are nurtured, encountered and savored
Person: Dedicated to a mutually loving and enduring development of an individual to face life victoriously and render service to the larger community of mankind
Piety: A living and authentic piety for love as the vital and binding force that unites all men into a family or brotherhood of men

SCHOOL

Process: Loyal to the processes of human creativity and discovery in man's pursuit of wisdom
Person: A profound concern for the intrinsic value of each person
Piety: A pious dedication to truth in all its many aspects

CHURCH

Process: Faith in a living God and thus the on-going process of divine Revelation and human dedication to God
Person: The intrinsic value of all men as God's children
Piety: Ultimate allegiance to and reverence for God, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

Process: The on-going process of economic implementation of political freedoms and exemplifying in practice in the world of affairs all the values we really live by.

Person: Active respect and concern for all individuals involved in any way with business and industry.

Piety: Display in their functioning the piety of knowing and sustaining their proper place and role in our ideal heirarchy of institutions and values.

Clearly, the meaning content of this diagram may be interpreted to more or less represent a perfect actualization of liberalism in either a person or our basic social institutions. It should be apparent by now, also, that Greene's conception of liberalism embraces the individual and social institutions into an inseparable whole both in theory and practice. On this matter Greene declares:

Our personal liberalism will be largely conditioned by the multiple impacts upon us of our institutions, and they in turn will reflect the pervasive ethos of our nation and our entire culture.

That we are in part what our institutions have made us and they are what they are because we make them that way is not easily denied in that it merely reflects to some degree in this particular context the operation of the universal natural phenomenon of causality. The really pertinent insight in regard to the jointly-conditioned actualization of liberalism in either the individual or social institutions is grounded in the issue of the creed of liberalism. For we do take action based

upon certain beliefs, and we do have a particular attitude because of a particular belief. Thus, if we are to really understand the actualization of liberalism in either the individual or social institutions, we must first know, so to speak, the intellectual creed of the particular individual or institution. It is in this sense of actualization, then, that liberalism becomes more than an expression of the creed of liberalism. It genuinely becomes a dynamic force or spirit. This is why Greene continues to insist that liberalism is more than an attitude and it is more than an intellectual creed. "It is a spirit," Greene declares, "a dynamic force capable of molding men's minds, kindling their hearts, strengthening their wills, and girding their individual and corporate activities." Indeed, we see in this definitive statement that what we have termed liberalism is actually a living spiritual force which expresses itself in the liberal attitude and a liberal creed. And, we see also that liberalism defined as "living spiritual energy" recognizes beyond dispute or doubt the intrinsic dignity and value of man. It is in the affirmation, defense and support of this latter idea that Greene as a person and professional philosopher is primarily concerned. The above statement, in view of our previous elaboration upon Greene's formulation of the liberal creed, his diagnosis of our liberal heritage and his general philosophy of spirit, needs no further development or documentation. Our primary interest here is highlighting the claim

22 Ibid., p. 156.
which Greene makes that the innermost heart of liberalism is a "living spiritual energy." This has been done now, and we can turn to consider the meaning and significance of this claim as it relates to our basic social institutions, in particular the school.

It may seem that we have taken an unusually long path to arrive at the place where we can forthrightly discuss the school as one of our basic social institutions. This is true, and it has also been necessary. For when we recognize that a philosophy of spirit such as Greene holds is essentially a whole interpretation of the world in which the totality of all that is is conceived to be organic in nature rather than mechanical, then we realize that to do justice to Greene's thought regarding a particular topic in a particular context we must be willing to travel along with him long enough and deep enough to discover the essential and unique place in the whole that the particular topic properly and logically holds. We have traveled this way with Greene in regard to the school, for we are now in a position to see clearly, from his point of view, the essential and unique place of the school in our society.

We can note here that a distinct and most fascinating advantage in traveling the long way to a particular place is the time it provides one to envision and factually orient oneself to his final proposed destination or place. And, indeed, upon arrival, if one so chooses, he is

23 Ibid.
adequately prepared to go with dispatch to the very heart of the place. This analogy reflects our situation in regard to Greene's thought and the school. In short, we are adequately prepared to go directly to the heart of the matter by quoting Greene as follows:

Our school is the institutional embodiment of the spirit of Ancient Greece, the spirit of scientific inquiry, and the democratic spirit of equality of opportunity.24

And what is this spirit to which Greene refers? We should know by now and we do. It is that spirit which in the confines of Greene's social philosophy can only be understood as the spirit of liberalism. Have we not just seen that in Greene's thinking the innermost heart of liberalism is spirit, i.e., "a dynamic force capable of molding men's minds, kindling their hearts, strengthening their wills, and girding their individual and corporate activities?"25 Then, too, we previously have seen this same spirit called "Socratic" and being interpreted by using a triology of concepts, i.e., "process," "person," and "piety," in Greene's attempt to diagnose the major strands of our liberal cultural heritage. All in all, we can have little doubt that the "spirit" to which Greene refers in this quoted passage must be the spirit of liberalism.

Now, if Greene holds that the school is the institutional embodiment of the spirit of liberalism and also that the living spirit is the heart of liberalism, then logically the full development of these two

24 Theodore M. Greene, Our Cultural Heritage, p. 250.
interrelated ideas should constitute the whole of setting forth the signif- 
ificance of Greene's philosophy for educational theory and practice.

We are reminded here that the accomplishment of this task is the ultimate 
goal of the entire final part of this study, and this immediate chapter 
is dedicated to elucidating Greene's thought in regard to our cultural 
heritage and our basic social institutions with special regard for the 
school. Thus, the final question to be answered in this chapter may 
be stated as follows: What is the place of the school in our culture 
in regard to the liberalism that we have inherited, profess and defend?

Our answer in a word is that the place of the school in Greene's 
thought is of utmost importance and significance. This is so because 
the school in Greene's thought is one of three basic social institutions 
in our society that are properly and specially responsible for preserving, 
generating and nourishing the living spirit of liberalism.

In the light of this statement denoting the special but shared res- 
ponsibility of the school the utmost importance of the school in Greene's 
thought becomes crystal clear when we recall that Greene defines liberal-
ism itself as living spirit. Greene sees that beside the school the 
two institutions that share the responsibility for the spirit of liberal-
ism are the church and the family. In this same sense, the unique rela-
tion to liberalism of the other two outstanding major institutions, i.e., 
the state and business/industry, is seen by Greene to be respective to them 
in turn, the political bulwark and the implementation of liberalism.
But, again, the family, the school and the church are the institutions
that share the important and significant responsibility for the spirit of liberalism. The following quotation reveals, in a general fashion, Greene's thought regarding this spirit and the contributing share of responsibility for it that each of these institutions makes:

If it is to operate as a vital force, this spirit must be instilled in childhood generation after generation and, through the cycle of each adult life, be tested and strengthened in the atmosphere of the loving home. If it is to escape sentimentality, it must be informed and disciplined by an educational process that is itself liberal and liberating. If it is to escape dogmatic rigidity and idolatry, it must be quickened and oriented by a lifelong dedication to whatever in the universe transcends all actual human achievements and all human evaluations.26

It stands to reason, then, that each of these institutions can contribute to liberalism in this fashion only if they, themselves, are, as Greene states it, "impregnated with the dynamic spirit of liberalism."27

In the light of this statement, we see clearly the final task of this study. In a word, we must determine from Greene's point of view how both the school and the educational process itself presently are, and may be, increasingly so, "impregnated with the dynamic spirit of liberalism." It follows that the accomplishment of this final task will also complete the logical requirements inherent to an exposition of the significance of Greene's philosophy of spirit for philosophy of education.

26 Ibid., pp. 156-157.
27 Ibid., p. 157.
CHAPTER EIGHT

LIBERAL EDUCATION AND THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

Our Educational Goal and Four Standards of Rationality

The Inglis Lecture, entitled Liberal Education Reconsidered, delivered in 1952 by Greene presents an inclusive account of his thought regarding liberal education and the educational process. Greene is initially concerned in this lecture to state his basic philosophical presuppositions that constitute the frame of reference for his thinking in respect to the problem of education in our society. These presuppositions are four as presented by Greene:

1. My first presupposition is that the individual human being is infinitely complex and valuable.

2. My second presupposition is the enormous influence of society, with all its overlapping and interlocking institutions, upon each individual.

3. My third presupposition is man's dependence upon, and his increasing control of, that larger environment which we call the world of nature.

4. My final major presupposition is . . . that man and nature do not comprise the whole of reality but that both are rooted or grounded in an ultimate Reality that transcends space and time and all finite existence.  

1Theodore M. Greene, "Liberal Education Re-considered," The Inglis Lecture, pp. 6-10.
In the light of our familiarity with Greene's general philosophy, we need not explain these presuppositions to any appreciable extent. For our present purpose, we need only to point out that the first and second presuppositions stress man as both a unique and social being, and the third and fourth presuppositions stress man's environment as both spatio-temporal and eternal. This, we might say, is the realistic philosophical setting from Greene's point of view within which one must move for effective and practical thought regarding the problem of education in our society.

When we search this realistic setting further to discover basic concepts universal in scope and relevance, Greene believes that we find three such concepts. These three he labels as follows: "structure," "texture" and "dynamism." Again, in the light of our understanding of Greene's thought, we need not explain the inclusive meaning of these concepts. That is, we need only to know Greene's definitive meaning of these concepts. With this we are prepared to imagine the full development of them in respect to various aspects of thought related to Greene's philosophical stance and position. Our immediate concern then is: what essential meaning does Greene give to the basic concepts of "structure," "texture" and "dynamism?"

In short, by "structure" Greene means "the factor of generic organization—the typical way in which the parts and attributes of anything are related to each other."2 By "texture" Greene means "the uniqueness

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2Ibid., p. 12.
of things, their particularity, their inexhaustible specificity. "3 And, lastly, by "dynamism" Greene means an elusive and hard to define factor that "is, in living organisms, their vitality, their life. It is that which disappears at death and which, during each human being's lifetime, manifests itself in such vital processes as growth and reproduction, thought and action."4 Indeed, from these definitive statements reflecting the essential meaning that Greene attributes to these basic concepts and in the light of our present depth of understanding of Greene's inclusive thought, we can surmise Greene's further elaborative development of these basic concepts in respect to their universal scope and applicability. This being so, and in view of the fact that our immediate interest in these basic concepts is their fundamental educational value, we must bring into sharp relief these three basic concepts as they serve Greene in the capacity of basic educational concepts. Here, we must be concrete and specific. We must see these concepts as educational concepts and determine clearly their meaning in regard to the problem of education.

We can best begin this task by recalling the resultant realistic facts stemming from Greene's four philosophical presuppositions. That is, man is both unique and social and man's environment is both spatio-temporal and eternal. In the light of these facts, we can see in a generalized form Greene's point of view in regard to the problem of education. He declares:

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3Ibid.
We can say that the goal of education is to prepare each individual, so far as his native endowment permits, to live well in his society and in the universe in which he finds himself; that that educational process is best which advances us most efficiently towards this goal; and that that academic community is best which best initiates and sustains this educational process.\(^5\)

Our primary interest here is with Greene's statement of the goal of education. For it is in this respect that we see clearly Greene's thinking in regard to the individual human being or student and the application in an educational sense of the basic concepts of "structure," "texture" and "dynamism." We see then that essentially our educational goal is the fullest development of the individual "so far as his native endowment permits." In the sense of education, "man's native endowment" must refer to man's mind or reflective capacity. Thus, since all things in the universe have, according to Greene's meaning of the terms, a "structure," a "texture" and a "dynamism" of their own, it follows then that so-called minds are well developed Greene believes "in proportion as they are well disciplined or well structured, individualized or well textured, and, above all, active and lively."\(^6\)

At this point, it would not be fair to assume that Greene's triology of basic educational concepts dictate for the goal of education a narrow intellectualism that would divorce mind from the total personality. To the contrary, Greene's philosophy emphatically denies that such is possible even if it were desired and desirable. However, it is indeed

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 24.

\(^6\)Ibid., p. 25.
true that Greene's philosophy does dictate that the primary concern of education is the development of man's cognitive capacities. But this is simply because it is only by this process and method that man can develop as a person, i.e., become a vital personality. In regard to this issue Greene declares:

It is appropriate that the goal of education be defined with major emphasis on the development of the mind, since this is the very special responsibility of the school. Our task as teachers is not to condition animals, but to educate human beings, and the only education worthy of man must be focused primarily on that which so signally distinguishes him from all other living beings.7

We might sum up, then, at this point and say that Greene's philosophy dictates the goal of education as personality development. But if we consider this idea for a moment longer, we realize that a concern for the development of each individual's total personality necessitates an equal concern for the entire humane community that encompasses the individual personality. For we must admit that personality implies community and reversely community implies personalities. In short, we must see that personality implies in itself essential social needs and obligations. Therefore, we can discern that the goal of education defined as personality development necessarily includes specific concern for and study of man's social needs and the complex social structure of which he is an embedded part. Stated in the light of Greene's basic educational concepts, then, the goal of education is the development of a well-structured, well-textured, and creatively vital personality who is

7Ibid., pp. 30-31.
fully aware of his unique responsibility to, and integral relationship with, a well-structured, well-textured, and vital society. In conclusion, the following passage sums up the goal of education when viewed from within the context of Greene's triology of basic educational and philosophical concepts:

This goal is, first and foremost, the cultivation of the well-disciplined, highly individualized, and lively mind—of a mind strong in structure, rich in texture, dynamic and creative. But our goal is also the nurture of man's total personality through structural integration and textural individuation, the development of persons able and eager to enjoy life to the full. And it is also, and no less urgently, a preparation for life in a community, a life of conformity to social order and of responsible deviation and revolt, a life of joyful cooperation with others in common enterprises for the common good.8

If we consider at this point that Greene is here stressing the rational endowment of man and proclaiming that the foremost goal of education is the development of an individual's rational capacity, then it behooves us to re-consider Greene's conception of rational and rationality. We are to "reconsider" for in fact Greene's neo-Kantian analysis of the generic structure of types of human experience as set forth in Chapter Five of this study reveals most explicitly Greene's meaning of "rational" or "reasonableness." That is, Greene's analysis reveals that for him all generic types of human experience are essentially "reasonable" or "rational" in that they are all cognitively useful and meaningful experiences. Furthermore, all generic types of human experience

8Ibid., p. 34.
may be subjected equally to the same basic tests of cognitive validity. And, likewise, that the respective objects of these experiences may be equally deemed to be "objective" and "real" according to the same judgmental criteria of what we mean when we call anything real and objective. In a word, we recall Greene's neo-Kantian analysis demonstrates that judgments of value and judgments of fact are equally valuable and cognitively significant because each of them reveals respectively a value dimension of reality and a factual dimension of reality that can be authentically said to be "objectively real."

Thus we do know what Greene explicitly means by "rational," and we are able to see then that basically his neo-Kantian analysis of generic human experience reveals that in his mind there can be and are four standards, or conceptions, of rationality that may very well exist, i.e., man can conceive of rationality in four different conceptions and stages. Each conception after the first one presupposes the inclusion of the former conception so that a progressive series is formed. Let us look briefly at each of these standards of rationality that Greene feels man may legitimately hold, keeping in mind that Greene himself believes that all four of these standards are meaningful and useful.

The first conception or standard of rationality that men may hold with authentic validity Greene labels "logical rationality."9 It is best exemplified by pure mathematics and pure logic. The validity of this kind of rationality is, of course, the indispensable condition of all rational thought and belief. But rationality conceived of in

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this pure sense does not necessarily relate itself to factual reality and therefore to truth. "It suffices as a test of pure," Greene insists, "but not applied, mathematics; of pure, but not applied, logic." If we are to pursue the truth of reality we must realize that truth also signifies adequacy to the facts of reality. Thus the second conception of rationality Greene terms "factual rationality."

The meaning of "factual rationality" as a standard of rationality that men may hold is best explained by noting its principal difference from logical rationality. Greene declares: "Factual rationality differs from purely logical rationality because it includes sensory experience as an essential component of knowledge." Here we are treading principally in the realm of perceptual and scientific truth. The conditions of scientific truth can be seen with classic brevity, Greene believes, in Kant's famous dictum—"Concepts without percepts are empty; percepts without concepts are blind."

If one stops at this level and adopts this standard of rationality, he essentially believes that factual knowledge is the only real knowledge we can have. This belief Greene labels "scientism," and he defines it as "the dogma or uncritical and unproved assumption that the only valid knowledge available to us is factual knowledge based exclusively on rational interpretation of sensory evidence and best exemplified in the

10 Ibid., p. 119.
11 Ibid., p. 121.
12 Ibid., pp. 119-20.
'exact' natural sciences.\textsuperscript{13} It is "scientism" in this sense that Greene's neo-Kantian philosophy vehemently rejects, for this belief Greene insists "refuses a priori to accept any of man's basic moral, aesthetic, or religious experiences as cognitively significant, that is, as providing him with further experiential bases for valid knowledge of the real."\textsuperscript{14} It follows from this that for the disciple of "scientism," value experiences are merely emotional responses to an essentially "value-less" reality and of course it follows that there are no objective values that exist characterizing reality itself. We have previously elaborated extensively upon Greene's neo-Kantian approach to this problem of the nature and status of values. The following passage sums up the essence of his approach as well as clearly indicates his estimate of the validity of holding to a standard of rationality that does not go beyond exact factual knowledge:

The best way, and the only affirmative way, to refute "scientism" is to show that judgments of value can, in principle, be subjected to the same basic tests of cognitive validity to which the scientist subjects his judgments of fact, and to demonstrate, in addition, that moral and aesthetic values and the God of religious worship can properly be said to be "real" or "objective" in a sense strictly analogous to the way in which physical objects are said to be "objective" and "real."\textsuperscript{15}

But in respect to values and the standard of factual rationality,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 122.
  \item \textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 123.
\end{itemize}
Greene insists there is one value which this standard holds in high esteem and willingly bestows upon it some kind of an objective status. This value is truth. Not only is truth in this context valued for its own sake, and not dependent upon personal preference, but such truth is considered good. Herein we see some sort of objectivity being assigned to goodness also because the assumption is that truth in itself is not merely and hypothetically preferable by men but imperatively preferable or required. In other words, truth is good and it ought to be embraced by all honest and thoughtful men. We need not belabor this point any longer as we have for our present purpose adequately covered the pertinent aspects of Greene's meaning in respect to the conception of factual rationality as a standard of rationality. The next higher level of rationality Greene labels "normative rationality," and we must now turn to discover Greene's precise meaning of this conception of rationality.

Again, we can most expeditiously discover Greene's thinking in regard to a standard of rationality labeled "normative" by stating the principal difference between it and the preceding standard "factual rationality." It differs essentially from factual rationality by acknowledging and accepting the cognitive significance of man's value experiences as well as his sense experience. In other words, whereas factual rationality claims that only sense experience can contribute to valid and testable knowledge, normative rationality accepts this and adds that man's moral, aesthetic and religious experiences can also contribute to valid and testable knowledge. In a word, normative rationality affirms the cognitive significance of value experiences and the validity of value judgments in the same identical manner as that affirmed for.
sense experiences and factual judgments.

In considering normative rationality, Greene excludes religious faith from this standard. He does so for a simple and clear-cut reason. This is that he acknowledges that many persons in our half secular, half religious American society do believe in objective moral and aesthetic values but cannot honestly believe in God and therefore take man's religious experience seriously and judge it to be cognitively significant. In a word, Greene considers normative rationality as the secular standard of rationality that is held in good faith by the confirmed and convinced humanist. Furthermore, Greene agrees in principle with the religiously skeptical humanist who distinguishes between a faith in objective goodness and beauty and a religious faith in God. On this issue Greene declares:

However justifiable or unjustifiable may be their religious scepticism, these humanists are certainly right in distinguishing a secular faith in goodness and beauty from a religious faith in God, and in insisting that religious faith entails problems of its own which must be dealt with on their own merits.\(^{16}\)

To sum up then, the standard of normative rationality rests upon the acceptance of three basic ideas. In the first place, man has distinctive types of experience which are labeled "moral" and "aesthetic" and these experiences are considered to be cognitively significant and therefore value judgments can claim the same validity as that accorded to factual judgments. In the second place, in moral and aesthetic

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 125.
experience man encounters qualities which we call "goodness" and "beauty" which have a recognizable character of their own. These qualities like color can be experienced but are essentially ineffable to anyone who has not had first-hand experience of them. "They are sui generis and unique;" Greene explains, "they can be known and understood only in terms of their own uniqueness, never by reference to something else with which they may be correlated." In sum, Greene declares: "The good and the beautiful are encounterable, explorable, knowable, communicable, but not translatable." And in the third and last place, these values goodness and beauty are always seen to be imperfectly embodied in persons and things with the result that we never encounter absolute or perfect Goodness and Beauty. In a word, being finite, we recognize partial and finite embodiments of goodness and truth, but also, we have the ability to conceive of perfect Goodness and Beauty which stand for us as necessary points of ultimate reference in the same manner that ultimate and absolute Truth remains beyond the reach of the most dedicated and persevering scientist.

Within the context of scientism, the following passage may serve to sum up Greene's defense of the intelligibility of a standard of rationality that may be properly termed "normative."

A rigorous scientism would reduce us to the status of amoral beings in amoral societies, beings with nothing but irrational aesthetic and social preferences in societies with

\[17\] Ibid.

\[18\] Ibid.
merely conventional aesthetic and social norms. Nothing could do greater violence to man's moral and aesthetic nature and to his deepest moral and aesthetic convictions. Scientism's allegiance to science makes sense; its refusal to transcend science and to recognize, in principle, the nature and significance of man's moral and aesthetic capacities makes no sense, repudiating as it does the intelligible claims of normative rationality. 19

As we move into consideration of the last standard of rationality which Greene proposes and terms "synoptic rationality," we should do so with the full awareness that several ideas embedded in this conception of rationality need not be explicitly accounted for here again as they have been sufficiently and distinctly dealt with in various preceding chapters of this study. But before proceeding to enumerate these ideas, we should recognize that as we have progressed from the first conception of rationality to our present and last conception, Greene's task of defining the successive conception has been progressively difficult. He implicitly acknowledges this fact in his introductory comment regarding these four conceptions or standards of rationality when he declares: "the first (conception) being the least venturesome and the most precise and definitive, and each successive conception being more inclusive, and perhaps more bold and hazardous, than its predecessor." 20 This being the case we recognize with Greene that defining "synoptic rationality" is the most hazardous and difficult. This is so first because synoptic rationality is the most inclusive of the four conceptions in that it

19 Ibid., p. 129.
20 Ibid., p. 118 (Italics mine).
refers to the religious realm of experience, and second, this religious realm is itself so complex and diverse and thus it is very difficult to discover and formulate ideas that are common to all religious belief and practice. Nevertheless Greene is undaunted in facing the task for he is convinced that this standard of rationality is justifiably not only the inclusive standard of rationality but also the most intelligible standard for honest and thoughtful men. With these thoughts in mind and in the light of our familiarity with Greene's neo-Kantian analysis of the religious dimension of human experience we can merely sketch and summarize Greene's thought regarding the synoptic standard of rationality.

First, Greene believes that there are certain generalizations in respect to religion and religious experience that are common to all religious belief and practice. In this sense these generalizations become or are the generic pattern of religious faith and practice and reveal the explicit meaning of religion itself. In a word, it is only when we know the meaning of religion itself that we can hope to deal intelligently with the validity or non-validity of religious beliefs. Thus Greene believes we must define religion itself and then attempt to answer the crucial question whether, in principle, religious beliefs can be validated. The following list presents a brief paraphrased account of the most pertinent aspects of Greene's thought in regard to the generic pattern of religious faith and practice:

1. Religious experience involves a sense of awe in the presence of something that is judged to be holy. These terms, awe and holy, "can be understood only by those who have had the experience in question."21

21Ibid., p. 130.
2. Man's religious beliefs and practices as all of his other adventures of the mind has an evolutionary history from primitive level to an increasingly enlightened level and thus present beliefs and practices cannot be understood or appraised independently from their evolving heritage.  

3. Throughout the evolution of religious beliefs and practices the Deity has been conceived of as both adjectival and substantival. Substantival as a dynamic being and adjectival as "entering into" nature and history.  

4. Whenever the holy or Divinity is encountered with real religious awe it is judged to be essentially mysterious; "it forever defies our complete comprehension because the finite cannot, in principle, encompass the truly infinite." God, Tillich says, is the "Ground and Abyss" of all reality. "Ground," here, should signify what finite man can know regarding God's nature; and, "abyss," the ultimate mystery of God's nature to the finite mind of man.  

5. "Religion in all its historical manifestations has three essential components—the cognitive, the experiential, and the morally volitional." In short, every world religion has its own unique creed, cult and obligatory social attitudes and conduct.  

6. Religion is at the same time a social phenomenon and an intensely personal concern. Its beliefs are both private and shared. Vital religion therefore needs a continuing religious community as well as individual members of this community seeking to relate themselves singly and uniquely to God.  

It is within the context of this list of generalizations that we know what religion is. Now, we are prepared to ask if religious beliefs

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22Ibid., pp. 130-31.  
23Ibid., pp. 131-32.  
24Ibid., pp. 132-33.  
25Ibid., pp. 133-34.  
26Ibid., p. 134.
in principle can be validated? In other words, is it proper to use the concepts of true and false in respect to religious belief and, in a word, are we justified in proposing the standard of synoptic rationality at all in that it asserts the validity of religious beliefs? At this point and in retrospect of Greene's neo-Kantian analysis of religious experience, we most assuredly know his thought in this regard. We know that Greene refutes all a priori claims that religious beliefs are unintelligible and necessarily false. Indeed, Greene's analysis endeavours to demonstrate that when religious beliefs are taken seriously and subjected to the same tests that we apply to all sincere judgments of fact and value we find them not wanting in either meaning or workability. In short, from Greene's point of view religion is within the scope of rationality and this standard of rationality being essentially religious in character necessarily gives a general view of the whole of reality and therefore may be most properly termed "synoptic rationality."

It seems fairly apparent that if Greene believes the goal of education is "first and foremost, the cultivation of the well disciplined, highly individualized, and lively mind" that an understanding of Greene's four conceptions or standards of rationality will indeed illuminate in general our understanding of Greene's thought regarding specific aspects of the educational process itself. It should be apparent also that when Greene defines the goal of education in this manner he is once again stressing, in a different fashion only, the same basic conviction which he holds to the effect that the school as well as the educational process itself must be impregnated with and dedicated toward furthering a dynamic spirit of liberalism. Thus our concern in the next section is
essentially identifiable as the task of discovering the significance of Greene's thought regarding specific aspects of the educational process as becomes his account of liberalism, its theory and practice. In short, we will be concerned to discover a liberal pattern of the educational process.
The Educational Process: Curriculum and Methods

Probably the two perennial questions facing educators in respect to the educational process are: What shall we teach and how shall we teach it? In the light of our understanding of Greene's conception of the goal of education as well as his conception of the four standards of rationality both of which direct attention to his liberal conception of mind, we are in a relatively good position to deal succinctly with his concrete answers to these perennial educational questions. We will approach this matter by attending for a moment to Greene's answer to the following preliminary question: What can be directly taught through formal instruction? His answer to this question will tell us not only what we shall teach, but also what we should attempt to teach our students.

The question is: From Greene's point of view what can we directly teach through formal instruction? First, in accordance with Greene's conception of the goal of education we can see that the central concern of the educational process itself must be of a two-fold nature, that is, it must stress knowledge and the development of the mind. We understand that by "mind" here Greene means "man's total cognitive equipment--his senses, emotions, imagination, and will, no less than his intellect or reason" and by "knowledge" Greene means to include "the whole range of human insights, appreciations, appraisals, and decisions."27 So in the light of this liberal conception of mind and of knowledge, we see that Greene's answer to the question, what can be directly taught through

formal instruction, is clear and makes sense. In a word, we can help directly through formal instruction to develop man's innate cognitive capacities and increase his knowledge so far as the individual's native cognitive capacities permit. In the following passage, Greene sums up very clearly what he believes can and cannot be directly taught through formal instruction:

We can help the student by formal class instruction to develop certain basic "liberal" skills; we can teach him, within the limits of his native ability, the basic "liberal" disciplines; we can teach him a great variety of more or less complex vocational skills and procedures—but we cannot directly "teach" him any basic attitudes or values. 28

Herein we see clearly from Greene's point of view what can and what should be the realistic concern of formal instruction. It essentially involves basic "liberal" skills and basic "liberal" disciplines. The crucial questions then are: What are the basic liberal skills? What are the basic liberal disciplines and upon what foundation does Greene base his deduction of basic "liberal" skills and basic "liberal" disciplines? An exposition of Greene's answer to these questions should most adequately answer the two primary questions concerning the educational process which were stated in the beginning of this section, namely, what shall we teach and how shall we teach it?

Greene believes that there are four basic skills which a student should acquire if he is to develop his full potentiality as a human being and therefore be able to live life well as a person and as a

28Ibid., p. 121.
responsible citizen. These four skills Greene labels as follows: (1) "Logical-Linguistic," (2) "Factual," (3) "Normative," (4) "Synoptic." By these labels we discern immediately the correlative relationship of these basic skills to the results of Greene's neo-Kantian analysis of major generic human experiences. We recall that the result of this analysis provokes Greene to propose a progressive series of four standards or conceptions of rationality. While each of these conceptions functions complementary to each other in the actual thought process itself, each of them also is uniquely and significantly in a single innate human capacity. These innate capacities are essentially valid cognitive capacities. Thus it is that the root of Greene's proposal of the basic "liberal" skills lies in his conception of man as essentially a being endowed with certain innate cognitive capacities which it is the business of education to develop. This being so, it might be said that the overarching objective of the educational process from Greene's point of view is to provide the fertile opportunity for the development of each individual's innate cognitive capacities. In a word, then, Greene believes that formal class instruction can directly teach students four basic skills which are termed "liberal" because essentially these skills reflect in meaning the three initial propositions upon which the liberal creed is based, i.e., man is an evaluator, a moral agent, and a being capable of reverence and awe. In sum, then, to repeat, each of these basic "liberal" skills corresponds to an innate human capacity and formal instruction can help the student to develop skill in the use of each.

29Ibid., pp. 121-123.
of his unique and innate human capacities.

The core of meaning that Greene believes each of these skills portrays may be tersely stated in view of all our past understanding and analysis of Greene's thought. To do this best we can use the following listing from which states first the particular liberal skill and, second, explanatory words and phrases that suffice to indicate in a brief but significantly telling fashion the essential meaning Greene gives to each of these basic skills:

1. "Logical-Linguistic" skill: Learning to think clearly and consistently. Since we never think "in vacuo" but in some language of human communication the logical and linguistic skills are necessarily bound together for anything that may be properly termed "thought." 30

2. "Factual" skills: "Every student needs to learn a great many facts about himself and his physical, social, and cosmic environment if he is to survive, and many more if he is to live happily and usefully." He needs to learn what "facts" are. How factual analyses are made and the nature of factual judgments. 31

3. "Normative" skills: Man has no choice whether to evaluate or not—the fact is that he does in every aspect of life according to "some standards of value." "A student needs, therefore, to be taught how to evaluate, in all the major areas of evaluation, more sensitively and objectively." He should learn the nature of both the authoritarian and nihilistic stance toward knowledge of values and also "learn the possibility and advantage of the middle road of 'critical realism'" upon this issue. 32

30 Ibid., pp. 121-22.
31 Ibid., p. 122.
32 Ibid.
4. "Synoptic" skills: Students "can and should be helped to acquire in some degree the skill of seeing things in wider and deeper perspective." We must combat provincialisms of all types, i.e., "spatial and temporal, racial and social, geographical and national, cultural and religious." No human being can completely "outgrow all his provincialisms and really see life sub specie aeternitatis"; but, progress can be made in degree of extending and broadening horizons.

It follows that Greene believes the acquisition of these four basic complementary skills is the core of the educational process and to the degree that a person acquires these skills he may be said to be liberally educated. These skills can be directly taught by competent teachers and learned by willing students of reasonable ability.

It follows also that Greene's thought regarding the basic disciplines or fields of inquiry in respect to various generic aspects of experience and reality emerges fundamentally from his conception of innate human capacities and their progressive development through the educational process. Indeed, from Greene's analysis of the basic liberal skills we have no difficulty in identifying academic disciplines that are really basic and liberal from his point of view in spite of the fact that scholars have, so to speak, increasingly staked out claims for new fields of inquiry and our society naturally demands and encourages more specialized vocational training. We can see clearly that the academic disciplines which Greene considers to be really basic are those which develop skill in logical-linguistic proficiency, factual discovery, normative evaluation and synoptic interpretation. These disciplines are the basic liberal disciplines that issue from the application of basic

33Ibid., pp. 122-23.
liberal skills and attitudes. The following list can serve to sum up Greene's proposal of the basic liberal disciplines which constitute, in liberal or general education, what can and should be taught from grade school through college:\(^3^4\)

**Disciplines**

1. "The formal disciplines": Logic, mathematics, linguistics and semantics, verbal languages.

2. "The factual disciplines": The natural and social sciences.

3. "The normative disciplines": Ethics, aesthetics, artistic and literary criticism, religion.

4. "The synoptic disciplines": These disciplines endeavor "to explore the major ways in which things and events stand in meaningful relationship to one another."\(^3^5\) They are: History, geography, philosophy and religion in the sense that religion "is man's ultimate attempt to relate time and eternity, the profane and holy, causality and freedom, fact and value, objective theory and existential decision to one another in a meaningful and life-giving manner."\(^3^6\)

That from Greene's point of view a soundly conceived curriculum will include training in each of these disciplines may now be taken for granted. Each student from grade school through college within the limit of time and his native ability should receive as much training

\(^3^4\)Nelson B. Henry, (ed.), *Modern Philosophies and Education*, pp. 125-26 for a full account of Greene's thought on this matter.

\(^3^5\)Ibid., p. 125.

\(^3^6\)Ibid., p. 126.
as possible, Greene declares, "linguistically, factually, normatively, and synoptically."37 How they are taught must depend upon the age and background of the student and, no less," Greene insists, "upon the individual talents of each teacher and the unique personality of each boy and girl."38

In a moment, we can return to consider in more detail the "how," or methods, that Greene's account of man's basic liberal skills and the basic liberal disciplines that issue from the application of these skills seem to indicate. But now, we must consider from Greene's point of view what cannot be directly taught in any formal way, that is, basic attitudes or values.

Whereas Greene holds a student can be directly taught or trained in formal class instruction to develop his own innate human capacities to the fullest, he cannot be directly taught to place a value upon this development. Indeed, we can directly drill into a student logical-linguistic, factual, normative, and synoptic skills within the limit of his native cognitive capacities, but there is no way to directly drill into him, regardless of the degree of his native cognitive endowments, a respectful attitude toward these skills. On this issue Greene declares:

> You can do a good deal to drill these skills into your students, but you cannot, by any formal pedagogical devices, induce them to respect logical clarity and linguistic felicity, to respect fact and abhor error, to respect nature, responsible evaluation, and

37 Theodore M. Greene, Inglis Lecture, pp. 39.

38 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
to feel a passionate hatred for all divisive provincialisms and a corresponding hunger for synoptic perspectives and enlightened, open-minded tolerance.39

If this is the case, we have brought into sharp relief the stark irony embedded in the total educational process. For what we really and essentially seek to teach we cannot directly teach. For the ultimate goal to which the process is dedicated is beyond the direct reach of the process itself, and thus, the process itself is seen to be merely a means for the achievement of an intangible end or goal. Yes, we can, from the first grade through graduate school, directly teach certain basic means or skills, but we cannot directly teach attitudes or values. And it is the latter that is actually the most important ultimate objective of the total educational process. Greene insists that attitudes or values can only be taught indirectly and this being so it follows that the personal character and integrity of the teacher is a crucial factor if not the crucial factor in the total educational process. In regard to this aspect of the educational process Greene declares:

The teacher's total responsibility is, on this analysis, not fully discharged in his formal instruction; far more important than all his knowledge and skill is his character, or his basic attitudes, his scale of values, and his philosophy of life. It is these intangibles which distinguish the great teacher from the competent teacher, the beloved and revered teacher from the feared and respected teacher.40


40 Ibid., p. 124.
We will return to this important conception for further consideration in the next section when we deal with Greene's account of the ideal academic community. Presently and in conclusion of Greene's analysis of the educational process, we must consider more concretely the methods of teaching which Greene's educational thesis thus far seems to indicate.

In respect to concrete methods of teaching according to Greene's liberal philosophy of education, we can surmise what these methods are in spite of the fact that Greene in his writing does not endorse or advocate a particular method or methods. We should not be surprised that this is so, because we should know by now that Greene would not believe there is a single method or set of methods that all teachers could use with all students, for a particular purpose and given circumstance. Indeed, we can see that his basic philosophical concepts of "structure," "texture," and "dynamism" when applied to the process of education itself initially portends his belief that each teacher is a creator and determiner of methods rather than an enthusiast of some one method or set of methods. Therefore, if we wish to be concrete in regard to the teaching methods that Greene proposes, we must surmise what these would and should be in the light of his basic philosophical presuppositions and the resultant conception for the basic aims and values of education that these presuppositions seem to dictate.

We have already indirectly noted a general principle which Greene holds in respect to teaching methods, namely, that of flexible and creative adaptation of the teacher to the specific needs of students. In terms of concrete methods this means that Greene believes that at a
specific time and for a specific purpose a teacher will use experimentation as the best method, but with a change in circumstance and purpose, the lecture method may be the most desirable and at another time the project method is best and so forth. In short, a creative teacher selects among many methods, perhaps devises new methods and makes novel combinations of teaching methods to serve a given circumstance and purpose.

We can, however, in the light of understanding Greene's thought in respect to education, surmise his preference of concrete methods. That is, we can discern that Greene would favor heavily those methods which permit the student free range for self-involvement and self-activity. The methods that seem to achieve this goal most adequately are questioning and discussion in an informal atmosphere in the classroom. In short, we can see that Greene would prefer that an informal dialectic be in process in the classroom because this process requires student decision and selection of alternatives of thought and alternatives of action. So we can assume that Greene would highly favor the use of these two methods, that is, informal questioning and discussion, for teaching any subject matter that lends itself reasonably well to the dialectical process. Needless to say the teacher favoring these methods is primarily interested in cultivating the student's judgment rather than determining what the student does or does not know in regard to the subject under study.

Also, we can see Greene favoring both the method of lecture and project. In his thought we can see that the lecture would be justifiable as an inspiring presentation of objective information that is
sensitively interpreted and received in such a manner that students respond in much the same way as listening to a great symphony. In short, lectures should, and can, be inspirational works of art and as such are effective and efficient teaching methods. We must surmise also that Greene sees the project method as a most effective method in that it allows for constructive and creative work from either an individual student or a group of students. Indeed, the project method permits the student to pursue some constructive task that may lead from following the steps of scientific method to community excursions, written essays, art productions and on into all types of educational endeavour and concern. Certainly Greene is in some accord with those that see learning as doing, but not to the extent that all learning is doing if by doing is meant overt activity.

To sum up then, we can surmise that Greene's favored teaching methods are: questioning and discussion, lecture and the project method. We recognize that each of these methods places considerable emphasis upon creating a suspenseful situation for the student in which his own unique thought and active effort is solicited by the teacher. For it is by these teaching methods that the student has the guided opportunity to develop his own unique human capacities. In brief, Greene favors solid instruction, opportunity for individual student decision and active judgmental effort, and student activity in constructive and creative tasks.

In final summary of Greene's thought regarding the educational process and our attempt to answer from Greene's point of view the questions, what shall we teach and how shall we teach it, we can see the
relation between the trilogy of concepts that Greene uses to define our educational goal and the educative process itself. We recall that these concepts were "structure," "texture" and "dynamism" and they are meaningwise not merely basic educational concepts because they are basic concepts that are meaningwise universal in scope and relevance. With this thought in mind it seems that the following passage sums up most adequately and concisely the significance of Greene's thought in respect to the educational process:

The educational process is well structured in proportion as it teaches the basic disciplines not as dead facts to be memorized but as vital tools to be mastered and put to use. It is richly textured in proportion as each participating teacher and student is encouraged to explore and use these disciplines in his own distinctive way. Teaching with this attitude is indeed an art and not a science. The true teacher is born, not made; all the rules and procedures in the world cannot, of themselves, make teaching and learning the vital personal experiences they actually become in a dynamic educational process.\footnote{Theodore M. Greene, The Inglis Lecture, p. 40 (underlining mine).}
Our primary concern in this section is to consider from Greene's point of view the ideal school or academic community. This consideration in a sense will answer the questions posed quite early in this part in respect to Greene's meaning of "process" and his analysis of our Western culture, namely, What is to become of Western culture? Is it to become free, creative, vital and healthy or enslaved, mechanical, sick and dying? Also, in a sense this consideration will sum up the significance of Greene's general philosophy of spirit for philosophy of education. In short, to speak in terms of becoming and the ideal we will be concerned to understand from Greene's point of view the present status of the problem of education in our society, and the reforms that are necessary in order to produce the ideal academic community. Throughout this section, we must keep in mind that Greene's social philosophy is liberalism and this is not an arbitrary choice as far as Greene is concerned in that a serious study and diagnosis of our Western cultural heritage seems to dictate in all honesty and enlightenment this choice for our American society and culture. This being the case it follows that our emphasis in this section will be upon the problem of ideal liberal education in our inherently liberal society. We can best begin by considering within the confines of a general perspective and from Greene's point of view the major educational needs that he feels face American society today.

In 1938 Greene was appointed by the American Council of Learned Societies to be the Chairman of a committee to study American education
on a nationwide basis with special emphasis upon the nature "of liberal
education and of the place of the humanities therein." The result of
this study was a book published in 1943 entitled, *Liberal Education,
Re-examined*. As Chairman of this group, Greene is specifically res­
ponsible for authorship of all the chapters in the book save Chapter I
and part of Chapter V and the Appendix. In the final chapter of this
book, Greene attempts to summarize some of the main conclusions from
this analysis of American education. At one point he reformulates, in
general terms, what he considers to be the most pressing educational
needs of American society. These needs are four in number. A brief
consideration of each will give us a general view of Greene's major
criticisms of contemporary educational theory and practice.

In the first place, Greene believes we have a great need for "lib­
erally minded and well-educated teachers in charge of programs of study
which offer students a sound liberal education as a preparation for
responsible citizenship and human living." This is an urgent need
also because our society shows its greatest weakness to be the lack of
genuine culture. That is, many of our standards are superficial, many
persons are poverty stricken in vital living and individual experiences,
and many are dangerously inadequate in social consciousness and social
responsibility.

In the second place, Greene sees that there is an urgent need for
manifold types or kinds of differentiation in respect to the problem
of education and types of educational institutions. Even so institu­
tions regardless of their individuality and level should recognize and condone a common educational goal and work toward this common goal within the confines of their own distinctive temper and genius. There is the need also to make a sharper differentiation within a given educational institution in respect to its prime purpose, emphasis and correlative program. Differentiation is also needed Greene declares between intensive specialization, whether vocational and professional or academic, and cultural orientation. If we fail to do so we are certain to forget the educational necessity for both depth and breadth, technical proficiency and cultural synthesis, specialized knowledge and synoptic vision." In these considerations of differentiation we must not think that differentiation is undemocratic because our democracy itself demands that provision be made for the education of its abler citizens.

In the third place, Greene points out that the need of differentiation calls for another urgent need, namely, much more effective cooperation between all those concerned in any way with the problems of education. Specifically there is a vital need today for a great deal more cooperation between the teachers and administrators of different levels of formal instruction, between administration and teaching faculty, between departmental divisions and groups, and finally, between individual faculty members of different departments and professional interests. In short, since education is essentially a continuous process it is only through effective cooperation between those responsible for this process

\[^{145}\text{Ibid., pp. 115-116.}\]
that we can hope to construct and operate a vital, integrated and effec-
tive program of education.

The final educational need which Greene cites, in general terms, is
the need for wiser and more assured leadership in respect to the prob-
lem of education in our society. In a word, Greene believes there are
far too many persons attempting to initiate educational reforms who are
themselves unable "to distinguish between ultimate and immediate ends,
basic and subsidiary values, and their relation to one another."\textsuperscript{16} If,
however, educational reform is to take place the leaders of these re-
forms must be wise and not reflect a confused philosophy of education.
Greene clarifies what he means by "wise" here as follows:

The wisdom required includes recognition
of the conceptual tools and the habits of
mind, as well as the physical instruments,
such as laboratories and libraries, which
are essential to a liberal education;
factual knowledge, memory, and instruction
in research and critical inquiry; of
aesthetic, moral, and religious sensitivity;
of specialization and integration; of a
capacity for reflective commitment and
responsible action.\textsuperscript{17}

More assured leadership is needed also from teachers, administrators
and scholars themselves in the field of education. In short, teachers,
scholars and administrators must assert in effective and dynamic ways
their rightful claim to special competence in respect to the problem
and basic issues of education. "Since education is itself a specialized
activity, educational problems can be envisaged, and solutions for them
devised, only by those who are qualified by temperament and education to

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 117.
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
understand the basic educational issues. Indeed, the crucial question is, If those who claim to be experts in the field of education cannot provide assured leadership in this field for our society, then who can?

If we look more closely at Greene's account of urgent educational needs, as expressed in general terms, we can discern several major and specific protests that Greene has not only against the institution of education and the educational process itself but also against our society at large in respect to its concept of and attitude toward education and the educational process. We will briefly consider each of these two categories of more specific protests in turn, beginning with education itself and then society at large.

1. Protests Against the Existing Educational System

As we look at liberalism in education from Greene's point of view, we must not forget that Greene believes that the school is one of three basic social institutions in our society that is properly and specifically responsible for preserving, generating and nourishing the living spirit of liberalism. Yet, as Greene states the case, "nothing kills the creative spirit more quickly than formal organization." That the school is a corporate venture which demands correlative formal organization and institutionalized structure and function is not, in all honesty, contradictory. In this sense it does not and cannot differ markedly and essentially from any of our other basic social institutions.

Fundamentally then we must accept the fact that the school is the institutional vehicle of formal instruction.

But, in the light of the specific responsibility of the school, that is, in tending to the development of the creative spirit of man, we must continuously and courageously combat, Greene proclaims, all institutional procedures and regimental influences that are inevitably at work to enslave teacher and student and to transform vital human creative activity into dull and deadening routine. When this occurs to any marked degree we might say that the "system" or "institution" has devoured the Board of Education or trustees, the administration, the teachers and students of any given situation. Education is no longer a creative, vital process; it is a routine business. In respect to this point Greene declares:

> Education becomes a business; the school becomes a factory into which malleable young people are poured for wholesale processing and from which they presently emerge duly "certified," as "educated," according to predominately quantitative standards. 50

Thus it is that those directly concerned with education must clearly recognize the pitfalls inherent in "institutionalizing" or "systematizing" education; and, therefore, maintain a continuous and vigorous stance against raising the level of the educational evils therein above the inherently necessary minimum. It is in this sense, then, that Greene sees liberalism in education begins and ends with a persistent and

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50 Ibid., p. 170.
vigorous protest against extensive and widespread institutional procedures and practices that tend to generate beyond necessity per­
versions in respect to enlightened and vital educational theory and practice. It is in this sense also that all specific protests in regard to the total problem of education in our society today may very well ultimately arise from, or have their roots in, the necessary institutional character and framework of mass education.

Be this as it may for now, Greene sees that the first and most general protest that liberalism makes against our school system today is in respect to manifestations in education of spiritual entropy and stagnation. Here the point to be understood is that education must not be a formal, soul-destroying, and rigid process; but, rather, a living, creative and vitalizing process. In short, Greene's plea in this regard is for neither a completely "child-centered" school nor a completely "teacher-centered" school but a school that is proportionally balanced between both student participation and mature guidance within the confines of our most enlightened knowledge in respect to all aspects of the educational process. Herein we can see clearly that liberalism in education according to Greene consistently and vigorously fosters the principle of balance and proportion in respect to the various aspects of the educational process.

This thought of balance and proportion leads directly into the second protest that Greene believes a mature liberalism makes against the area of education today. This protest is that liberalism is against all form of extremes and violent radicalisms specifically in the
field of education and generally in all areas of societal concern. That is, a mature liberalism calls for a median position between one-sided radicalism and one-sided conservatism. In respect to education, we cannot, and we must not, initiate and nourish lop-sided development. In a word, if the educational goal of liberalism is to be achieved we must constantly strive to find the middle path between spontaneity and discipline so that the end result will be disciplined spontaneity or in other terms significant originality. In this sense the liberal in education Greene believes has the "perennial desire in the field of education to progress along the little-traveled middle road of creative and inclusive synthesis." 51

The third protest that Greene renders against our educational system today is the "stupid dichotomy" at present so deeply entrenched in American education of 'liberal' versus 'vocational' training." 52 Indeed, there is a clear historical explanation for this dichotomy, but this does not sanction that the evil effects of this artificial split between the theoretical and the practical should continue in our contemporary efforts in the area of education. The widespread belief which this split generates and which is so stupid is that either the one or the other of these two emphases in education is a totally self-sufficient preparation for life and requires nothing from the other. How absurd can we be in face of education's appointed task of educating the total and whole human being? In short, Greene believes there is need for

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51 Ibid., p. 172.
52 Ibid.
drastic reform in both the liberal arts curriculum and in the vocational school of today if the educational program is to achieve the ideal of liberally educated persons. We must once and for all recognize that lop-sided development in any individual renders him a menace to himself and our social order. Greene does not belittle the difficulty of establishing an educational program that would most fully realize the whole human development of man. In this respect he highlights the following fact:

Educators must indeed struggle with such ever present stubborn facts as time and cost, individual motivation, and public support. But unless those who address themselves to this practical task keep the liberal ideal steadfastly before their eyes and refuse to be satisfied with anything less than its closest possible actualization, the present highly unsatisfactory policy of patching and tinkering, evading and compromising will continue, to the harm of the individual student as well as his society.53

In conclusion of Greene's protest against the unreasonable dichotomy that exists in education today between so-called liberal and vocational training, the following passage indicates the direction Greene thinks we should move for a resolution of the situation:

What is called for in the liberal-arts curriculum and in the vocational school is drastic reform—a basic rethinking of the proper objectives of education in a free society, a thorough reorganization of the entire educational process from kindergarten through graduate school, not an endless series of petty

53 Ibid., p. 175.
changes at this or that level without any over-all guiding ideal or plan. In sum, what is needed is a really progressive movement in education, more sweeping and inclusive than the "progressivis" ever dreamed of.\footnote{54}

The final major protest Greene has against the contemporary school system is in regard to defining democracy in egalitarian terms. Greene holds to the Jeffersonian concept of democracy which fundamentally asserts in respect to the area of education that equal opportunity be given to everyone according to his educational need regardless of what this need may be. In its essence we see that this general concept when translated into educational policy actually fuses together the concepts of objective aristocracy and social democracy. That is, to believe in objective aristocracy one must assume that life itself is selective and to believe in social democracy one must hold that all individuals regardless of race, color, or creed must have equal opportunity to make the most of themselves according to their unique native endowments. It is totally unrealistic, then, and flies in the face of everything we know, to hold on to an educational policy that adheres to a belief in human egalitarianism. "In short," Greene declares, "it seems to be a very obvious fact that men are not equal in native capacity or in final achievement in any area of human effort."\footnote{55} Yet, today, we see all too often a stupid egalitarianism defended in the name of democracy being applied in educational policies and practices. Greene explains the stupidity of egalitarianism in regard to educational policy as follows:

\footnotetext{54}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext{55}{Henry B. Nelson, (ed.), \textit{Modern Philosophies and Education}, p. 129.}
This policy rests on the absurd assumption that it is unfair and undemocratic to help Tom develop his marked native ability because John, less well endowed, cannot benefit from such help, even though the still less able Ed is quite inconsistently judged to merit special help to compensate for his subnormal aptitudes.56

In sum, Greene believes that educational egalitarianism is not only hopelessly unrealistic but socially suicidal. Indeed he protests against an egalitarian policy in respect to education and believes there is an urgent need for serious concern in this regard which should result in a policy that is both objectively aristocratic and socially democratic in that equal opportunity be given to all students—the remedial, normal and advanced student—to fully realize themselves as completely as possible within the confines of their native endowments. Greene insists: it is time, and past time, that the public at large and educators in particular realize that real democracy should not be defined in terms of a stupid egalitarianism. If we are honest, clear-headed, and realistic we see, Greene believes, that

Life itself, in a word, seems to operate in a very aristocratic fashion, its regularities and dynamisms producing among men, as they do in the world of nature, very uneven results, some vastly superior to others. . . . To deny this objectively ordained hierarchy of values and this unevenness of human performance is to lapse into a hopelessly unrealistic and utopian egalitarianism which flies in the face of everything we know.57

2. **Protests Against Society in Respect to Teaching and Scholarship**

Greene raises his voice in explicit defense of aspects of teaching and scholarship which he feels our American society both underestimates and ignores. First, he protests the fact that Americans tend to pride themselves upon their concern for education. This is simply not true in the light of the following two facts: (1) As a nation we spend a great deal more money on luxury items such as liquor, refrigerators, cars, etc. than we do on the education of our children. (2) In general the teaching profession is held in low esteem, and more often than not public funds are legislated to education as a "rider" appropriation to a bill concerning sewers or some other public works project. How then in the light of these facts can we as a nation pride ourselves upon our serious concern for adequate educational facilities and personnel for our children? What is sorely needed here is greater realism in the facing of the facts in respect to our supposedly serious concern for education as a nation. In general our attitude toward the problem of education is painfully unrealistic. In short, we need to face the facts in respect to the problem of education and decide whether gadgets and luxuries are more important than the education of our beloved children. How unintelligent and immature are we in facing up to the problem of education in our nation! We must, in all honesty, admit that as a nation we are culturally ignorant for how else can this fact be interpreted when we persist in holding the teaching profession in such low esteem and concern

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and for the most part relegate education as a whole to a "rider" category of concern.

The second protest against our American society that Greene registers in defense of teaching and scholarship has to do with our respect for truth, our loyalty to free speech, and critical inquiry. Again, we as a nation pride ourselves in this regard. But the cold facts reveal that as a nation we are, for the most part, actually indifferent or overtly hostile to man's search for truth in respect to controversial issues. It's as though we fear the truth when we censor school books that are uncongenial to certain reformers; when we forbid teachers to discuss with students the work of internationally organized bodies such as the United Nations; when we suspect eminent scholars if their honest thinking conflicts with national policy or bias; when we ban informed study of communism in schools and colleges; when we have to tell beginning teachers to stay clear of classroom discussions concerning "racial and social discrimination, sex, politics, economics, internationalism, religion, because otherwise the prejudices rampant in their prospective communities would endanger their jobs." Does preoccupation with these types of restrictive concerns and measures indicate a nation that may justifiably pride itself for its loyalty to freedom of speech and devotion to truth and justice? Greene thinks not and liberalism must reject vigorously all forms of prejudice and propaganda, falsehood and injustice in whatever manner and circumstance it may be found. Indeed, a basic respect

\[59\] Ibid., pp. 177-78.
for truth must be safeguarded and defended even if it means in many instances a great degree of personal sacrifice.

Greene's third protest against society has to do with defending the cause of significant scholarship. He explains, "I say 'significant' because scholars do tend to lose perspective and lean to pedantry." Here the point to be emphasized is: first-rate scholars who are in search of the truth in respect to serious human concerns should not be personally persecuted by popular opinion because of their "stand" on controversial issues and their ideas that seem to reflect an unfavorable critique of ourselves and our society. In a word, to popularly condemn so-called "eggheads" is stupid for it is these people in our society whose primary task it is to illuminate significant truth in respect to important human concerns. Significant scholarship, then, does not need nor nourish itself upon railing and upbraiding but upon the contrary. Indeed, it is by constructive support that reputable scholars are better able to address themselves courageously and resolutely to the accomplishment of their primary task. We must remember Greene declares, "There is a sense in which all truth, however trivial and inconsequential, must be valued for its own sake and for its possible though unpredictable future use." 61

The final protest Greene registers against our present society in defense of teaching and scholarship is in regard to the circumstance that if a teacher takes an honest stand in any emotionally charged human issue, 60

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60 Ibid., p. 178.
61 Ibid.
he is currently more often than not accused of being propagandistic and prejudiced; and, in a likewise circumstance, the scholar is accused of having forsaken the ideal of impartial scholarship. Herein the crucial question is, then, should individual teachers and scholars, and indeed the school as a whole when recognized as one of our basic social institutions, provide intellectual leadership in vitally human and therefore controversial areas and issues of contemporary societal interest and concern? In a word, Greene's response to this question is an immediate and unequivocal "yes". Not only should they provide intellectual leadership in controversial areas and the related issues, but they must provide intellectual leadership if the conception of teaching and scholarship is to have any meaning whatsoever. In this regard Greene insists that the teacher and scholar is imperatively obligated to exemplify and to teach society at large, but in particular the youthful "what it means to take sides on a controversial issue in a mature and responsible way. . . ." And how else can this be accomplished or taught, he declares, "unless our teachers and scholars tell us where they stand and what they believe and, above all, why they stand where they do and believe what they believe?" Similarly, in respect to the school as a whole as a basic social institution Greene insists:

No institution in our society today has as great a responsibility as does the school to teach us how to distinguish between emotional propaganda, which is always essentially illiberal, and enlightened persuasive discourse, between blind prejudice and well-
grounded convictions; between intolerance and the tolerance of firm belief coupled with genuine humility. 65

Greene does not overlook the necessary interdependent and fused character of the school and the society the school serves. But this does not in any way preclude the school from defending its own proper autonomous task of leading society in the search for and dissemination of truth. The question remains, if the school in society, its teachers and scholars, do not provide intellectual leadership in matters of profound human import and vital interest, who will? And perhaps more importantly, Greene points out, "If those responsible for education and scholarship are no better informed and no wiser than their students, their students' parents, the average citizen, and the average legislator, our school system is either a fraud or a reactionary vehicle for popular egalitarian conservatism." 66

In summary, then, of this final protest, Greene sees that the spirit of liberalism must be released through teachers and scholars who have the courage and conviction to take a "stand" on vital human issues which indeed are inevitably controversial. This role of intellectual leadership is a clear responsibility and obligation of teachers and scholars if there is to be any sensible meaning to the conceptions of teaching and significant scholarship. "It is our task to lead, not follow," Greene declares, "and to lead as imaginatively, courageously, and wisely as we can." 67 Presently Greene feels there is far too much timidity and in-

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., pp. 180-181.
sensitivity among teachers and scholars to be forthright in their opinion in regard to the crucial economic, political and religious issues of our day. Yet it is intelligibly clear that those who hold positions of teaching and research should best qualify intellectually to lead our students and our society in respect to vital human problems. In a word, Greene firmly believes that those concerned with teaching and scholarship ought to exemplify or explain "in every possible way the true meaning of liberalism in the field of knowledge and informed opinion." And those who enter and engage in teaching and research ought to be prepared to assume the responsibility and obligation of providing intellectual leadership to our youth and to our society with full knowledge that such leadership if pursued honestly and boldly may entail a great deal of personal sacrifice. This obligation the potential teacher and scholar must understand and accept or it would be far better for our society if he or she would select some other occupational task that does not demand, in the imperative mode, the responsibility of intellectual leadership of youth and the social community. More specifically then, teachers and scholars should be prepared to enter into in an enlightened way the discussion of all controversial topics; to have an informed opinion on all social issues; and to openly and courageously reveal his opinions to his students and to his reading and listening public. The society that rejects out of hand this intellectual leadership from teachers and scholars cannot be honestly called a liberal society. For lest we forget, essentially the

68 Ibid., p. 180.
responsibility for the living, dynamic spirit of liberalism itself rests upon the broad and upright shoulders of those who choose to dedicate their life to teaching and scholarship. A truly liberal society knows this and ideally will protect, defend, and nurture all aspects of the educational process to the best of its corporate ability.

And, now, our final concern is to set forth Greene's conception of the ideal academic community. In a sense this conception should summarize Part III of this study in that it reinforces in a positive manner the major thoughts that Greene holds in respect to the problem of education.

We can best begin by making clear that liberalism as Greene conceives of it has its own basic virtues and corresponding vices which can be clearly defined in the context of a liberal educational policy. These basic values of liberalism, of course, are a direct ideational product of Greene's conception of liberalism; and this conception, in turn, is founded upon the basic philosophical presuppositions which he holds and within which he does his creative thinking. The following passage, in respect to Greene's defense of liberalism, seems to highlight both of these points:

The only liberalism I would defend is one which is rooted in a profound respect for man as a responsible moral agent, and for all those basic rights and freedoms without which man cannot hope to develop a responsible maturity and without which society must inevitably lapse into either anarchy or tyranny.69

What are, then, from Greene's point of view, the basic virtues and corresponding vices of liberalism within the context of a liberal educational policy? Stated in contrasting pairs with the virtue first and the corresponding vice second they are: (a) "serious concern" and "frivolous or cynical indifference," (b) "intellectual and moral integrity" and "lack of integrity," (c) "profound humility" and arrogance. In a word, then, not only the ideal academic community but society at large if it is to be a liberal society must foster and nurture these three basic virtues and do everything in its power to combat their corresponding vices.

We can see herein in respect to education that Greene would advocate the hiring and firing of teachers and scholars, with the added criteria of intellectual competence, as a direct result of their possession or non-possession of all three of these basic virtues. And we see also that the school should have as its prime concern the fostering of these virtues in students as well as cultivating each student's creative and intellectual talents.

But most of all, we see the very heart or essential major theoretical conception of a philosophy of spirit which Greene fundamentally holds being reflected in a tangible and more or less practical manner. For indeed we see that the development of Greene’s conception of the ideal academic community and indeed the conception of anything that is grounded in Greene’s firm and basal conviction that man is a unique, normative-intelligible being living in a normative-intelligible universe.

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70 Ibid., pp. 111-12.
With this overarching and undergirding so-called "theme" in mind, we can pin-point the major concerns that interest Greene in respect to his conception of the ideal school or academic community.

If we were to select one word which in its essential meaning and broad interpretation distinguishes Greene's thought in regard to an ideal academic community, this word would be ethos. This is so because all of the essential and relevant ideological aspects of the development of Greene's conception of an ideal school fall within the framework so to speak of his basal definition of the term, ethos, and its subsequent interpretative development. In short, the ideal school in Greene's mind is an ideal ethos for older and younger inquirers of truth. It follows that to be sufficiently clear in respect to Greene's conception of the ideal academic community we must bring into sharper focus his definitive meaning and interpretive development of the term ethos. Thus, the crucial two-fold question is: What does Greene mean by ethos in respect to the problem of education and what are the specific implications of this meaning for his envisionment of the ideal ethos or school?

Greene actually appears not to define ethos because meaning-wise it reaches beyond effability. That is, ethos is essentially intangible in character and like color cannot be described to anyone who has never had visual experience. In a word, we can talk about it, we can attempt to illustrate it, but in the last analysis we do not know what it is until we personally experience it and yet having experienced it we are not able to tell someone else what it really is. Just as trying to explain friendship to a person who has never experienced being a friend or
having a friend is a hopeless situation, so too to explain ethos to someone who has never experienced it first-hand is futile.

Be this as it may, we will not be talking about nothing when we attempt to explain from Greene's point of view the meaning of ethos. Indeed if this were the case we would have to conclude now that Greene is truly mad because he asserts that the ideal school is ideal ethos and in this case we best end this tirade about nothing as quickly as possible. This, of course, is not the case for we find that Greene is quite capable of a highly sensitive interpretive description of the expressible aspects of the meaning of ethos. Periodically he refers to ethos as the "climate," "temper" and "spirit" prevailing in a given school. And he believes this ethos, as an elusive and intangible factor, is absolutely crucial to the total educational process when it is rightly conceived for its presence or non-presence in degree affects everything that takes place in a given educational community. It follows, then, that every school will have a prevailing ethos of some kind; however, it should be recognized that between different schools there can be a wide range of disparity in terms of the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of the prevailing ethos.

In regard to this aspect of his attempt to define ethos Greene declares:

The ethos of the school can be unfriendly, suspicious, grudging, and even hostile or rebellious; it can be friendly, confident, outgoing, and enthusiastic; it can be anything between these two extremes—but whatever it is, it is pervasive and contagious, for better or for worse.

As soon as we talk in terms of "better or worse" in respect to the prevailing ethos of a given school we have ventured beyond the level of

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71Ibid., p. 120.
pure objectivity in defining the term. We are ready for this advance in that we have seen Greene's essential meaning of the term and recognize that a kind and degree of ethos exists in every school community. In short, ethos is the existing spiritual quality that dominates a given educational institution and, as such, it functions causally and therefore powerfully affects the entire educational process. In this regard Greene declares:

Selection of teachers, their working conditions and their pay, the physical plant, the curriculum, extracurricular programs—all these and many other factors are of course of very great importance. But most important of all is the dominant corporate spirit of the entire community as it reflects itself among all who share in its life and work—administrators and service personnel, teachers and students, parents and members of school boards.72

It should be sufficiently clear by now that from Greene's point of view the ideal ethos or temper of the academic community will be a lively and liberal spirit of responsible cooperative inquiry. In short, the school as a corporate body of younger and older persons committed to a common search for truth should be, ideally, the perfect realization and actualization of the living spirit of liberalism. It is in this sense that the ideal school is ideal ethos within the context of Greene's thought.

In concluding Greene's thought in respect to his conception of the ideal school we can highlight some specific aspects of it by taking the view of the school as a corporate body in the light of our past familiarity

72Ibid.
with the essential meaning that Greene gives to his trilogy of basic concepts which he believes are universally applicable. These basic concepts are: "structure," "texture," and "dynamism." We recall and briefly restate: "structure" refers to the generic organization of anything; "texture" refers to the uniqueness of things; and "dynamism" refers to the vitality of organic things and that factor in respect to inorganic things that make them react and behave as they do.

Now in the sense that the school is a corporate body and vital thing, it, too, must possess in some degree each of these basic components. Thus, the ideal school, Greene declares, "will reflect in its organization and curriculum the structure of the educational process . . . ."\(^7^3\) And we recall that the educational process in Greene's thought is "well structured in proportion as it teaches the basic disciplines . . . as vital tools to be mastered and put to use."\(^7^4\) In respect to organization the ideal school will do everything within its institutional limitations and power to sustain and nourish the process of liberal education. That is, it will endeavour to have no serious conflicts between the teaching and non-teaching personnel, it will foster a cooperative spirit of inquiry between teachers of differing interest and subject matter, and it will not tolerate any kind of threat or action that would in any way dampen or impair any aspect of the on-goingness and integrity of the liberal educational process itself. In respect to the component of "tex-

\(^7^3\) Theodore M. Greene, Ingles Lecture, p. 43 (underlining mine).
\(^7^4\) Ibid., p. 40.
ture" Greene believes that the ideal academic community will reflect "in its administrators, faculty, and students, that texture of individuality and freedom which is no less essential for a liberal and liberating education." Finally, Greene insists the ideal school will be dynamic in its scholarship and teaching. In respect to this point he explains:

It will be vital in its scholarship because this scholarship will take live cognizance of the structure and textured vitality of everything that man encounters and seeks to understand—of nature, of human society, of human artifacts, and of ultimate Reality itself. It will be vital in its teaching because it will do justice to man's need for structured discipline and for the texture of spontaneous initiative and creation.

We see in the light of Greene's portrayal of the ideal school—as an institution which is well structured, rich in texture, and intensely vital—that in social terms such a school is performing its duty and function to our nation and our world in these unstable times. We discern also that the ideal school, as Greene envisions it, is essentially dedicated to persons as beings of intrinsic value and dignity. And, finally, we clearly realize that from Greene's point of view ideal education is liberal education because it is within the context of liberalism, its theory and practice, that man's unique value and dignity is realistically acknowledged, vigorously but tenderly nourished, and always resolutely respected.

Ibid., p. 43. (underlining mine).

Ibid. (underlining mine).
It seems quite proper to end this study of the significance of Greene's philosophy of spirit for philosophy of education by quoting at length Greene's clear and compelling reasoning in respect to a conception of the non-liberally and liberally educated person. This we will do for we should be able to see by now embedded therein the crucial and significant aspects of his idealism in respect to philosophy of education.

Would we not all agree that a person was not liberally educated who was illiterate and inarticulate, uninformed and with no knowledge of how to acquire knowledge, insensitive to aesthetic, moral, and religious values, provincial, unintegrated, and enslaved? Does it not follow, then, that a person is liberally educated in proportion as he is literate and articulate in the "languages" of human intercourse, verbal, symbolic, and expressive; as he is possessed of the basic facts concerning the world of nature, human nature, and human society, and, in addition, a master of the main techniques of acquiring new knowledge in these realms; as his native sensitivity to values is cultivated and as he is capable of reflective commitment in the realms of aesthetic, moral, and religious values; as he is freed from the tyranny of provincialism through temporal, spatial, and systematic orientation—in short, as he is an intelligent and responsible agent, able to participate richly in the good life, and ready and eager to contribute all he can to the welfare of his fellow men? Is not this the positive freedom which democracy should cherish and which a liberal education should foster? And is it not our duty and privilege, as citizens, as scholars and teachers, and as human beings, to make liberal education in this country a powerful instrument for human freedom, a bulwark of human dignity, a source of human value?  

77Theodore M. Greene, Liberal Education Re-examined, p. 120.
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