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AND SECULAR EDUCATION.

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PAUL TILLICH, SELF-PSYCHOLOGY, 
AND SECULAR EDUCATION

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate 
School of The Ohio State University

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* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
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The academic community is beginning to investigate anew the relationship between growth in the intellectual virtues and growth in the moral virtues. Educators are acknowledging that education has become largely a means for social mobility and in the process the educated life has deteriorated from a humanly fulfilling end to the status of a means to economic, social, and psychological security. Few today would deny the value of mass education or the legitimacy of an education which prepares for a vocation, an informed perspective on complex contemporary society, and a secure position in bureaucratic institutions. Educators are at last wondering whether significant learning is not a risk-filled, confusing, and threatening adventure, whether significant learning may not lose its passion and direction in the daily round of modern institutional life, and whether the learner desiring to maintain his intellectual inquiry should cultivate certain moral virtues. Among these are: a complex sensitivity, an intellectual honesty, the courage to interpret and integrate life for himself, and a concern to serve an increasingly universal human community.

Both existentialism and self-psychology point out that such moral virtues are not themselves so much the product of
intellectual growth as they are the pre-condition of intellectual growth. Without expansion in the "ontological subjectivity" of the self, learning deteriorates to socially defined categories of human security.

Modern education communicates those verbal, social, and technical skills which prepare one for performing some existing bureaucratically defined role. Education is to this extent conserving and perpetuating the legitimacy of the claims of social stability. If, however, established values and institutions are proven insufficient to resolve individual and social problems, a new basis of intellectual inquiry and moral courage is needed. It then becomes necessary for teachers to be sensitive to the development of the moral complexity and integrity of learners that will be demanded by the new conditions of life. The nature of the self becomes problematic when new and more complex forms of human organization are demanded by change. Contemporary American culture reflects this pre-occupation with a philosophical, moral, and psychological re-definition of adequate maturity. The teacher and learner can and must assume this burden within the framework of the conserving interests of society.

The modern teacher has many institutionally created conflicts and layers of psychological defensiveness to penetrate in his pupils, before he can hope to arouse that risk of deeper search and commitment from which significant
learning and change emerges. There are obviously many central psychological dimensions to this problem of attempting to penetrate the barriers against learning to learn. But there are also central philosophical dimensions. The problem of locating, defining, and creating the nature of the human self has long been a central concern to both philosophers and psychologists. A combination of Existential philosophy and Self-Psychology addresses itself to this predicament of the modern teacher.

In our generation the difficulty of finding and defining one's self, one's deepest meanings and life-directions, is immense. Paul Tillich argues that the modern learner is losing "the courage to be,"¹ that he is accepting a condition of self that Tillich calls "neurosis," the manageable and safe process of "affirming something which is less than his essential or potential being."² Discriminant intellectual meanings cannot be sustained by the self until the moral virtues of courage to set upon one's own convictions has developed. Tillich emphasizes that this narrowing of the reality in which one lives is a kind of neurosis, leading to selective perception, dogmatism, and fanaticism, since any threat to the self-system must be denied or destroyed. Kierkegaard has characterized this danger of a narrowed self-

²Ibid., p. 66.
structure as a move toward dogmatism, a dubious "... merit (which) would consist in having transformed a little Socratic doubt presented problematically with fine dialectical skill, with genial acumen and rare sceptical earnestness, into an eternal, matchless, historic, absolute, trumpet-tongued and sun-clear truth!" 3 All learners know the pull of the intellectual security of certain answers, a condition Camus has called "philosophic suicide." We know that it takes intellectual and moral effort to resist that "certainty" and its conclusions. We are learning how threatening it is to be initiated into intellectual search with any intensity and depth. We are learning further that the subjective dimensions of continued search, a quality of the self which Tillich calls its "dynamics," is even more difficult to sustain in adult life than it is in the relatively protected world of formal learning itself.

This dissertation attempts to face the combined philosophical and psychological problems suggested by these observations. More specifically it approaches them from a point of view seen mainly in the works of Paul Tillich. The dissertation will attempt an "integration" of Tillich's thought with the self-psychology of Carl Rogers, Rollo May, Gordon Allport, Erich Fromm, and Abraham Maslow.

It is impossible to acknowledge all the influences and authors that go into the formation of a dissertation, though the bibliography suggests many. However, I wish to mention the general influence of the magazine *Manas* upon my thought and reading selections, although I do not consider myself a philosophical Idealist in its sense. I would like to say that to the extent that a common spirit of philosophic search pervades the life of Socrates, the early dialogues of Plato, and the lives and writings of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, that spirit has most deeply moved and directed me toward a view of the integrated, philosophically sensitive and psychologically sensitive educated life, and its universal value. I would like to acknowledge an appreciation for the support of my adviser, Dr. Everett Kircher, and my dissertation committee, Dr. Bernard Mehl, Dr. Robert Jewett, and Dr. Ross Mooney. I would also like to thank Dr. Marvin Fox of the Philosophy Department who introduced me in an "existential way" to the above philosophers, and to the life and works of Dr. Tillich. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Ruth, for suffering through the issues of this dissertation with me, and then leaving me to "give birth," as Socrates said, to this final form.
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INTRODUCTION

Man, being a creature who sees himself as a part of, yet transcendent to, a culture of his own making, has perhaps always been troubled by the complexities and ambiguities of his situation. He has perhaps always sensed at his best that life is a mixture of potential and actualized forms. This mixture of the actual and potential—a combination that both reveals and conceals, that presents clearly perceived manifestations of reality but only mysteriously hints at reality itself—has perhaps always been seen as a part of the inescapable human predicament. Contemporary culture has, however, tended to intensify the problem and render it more threatening. In a world of complex interdependence, men drift uneasily in a fragmented universe and are all too easily chafed raw by association with hosts of the directionless.

According to Paul Tillich, modern ambiguity arises because some of man's actualized forms reveal or point to the powers of ultimate reality, or being-itself, while other actualized forms claim to be ultimate manifestations of potential reality in themselves.¹ Thus the essential human

condition is both more richly revealed and confusingly concealed. It is revealed by those symbolic-forms which point beyond themselves to the nature of ultimate reality and to human potentialities, and it is concealed by those sign-forms which do not point beyond themselves but become honored as manifestations of ultimate reality in their presently actualized time-space form. Since, then, we live in an era in which most of our actualized forms do not point beyond themselves to the potential and essential human condition, we live in a highly ambiguous culture.

Education must certainly grapple with this problem. Western civilization has passed down to American secular education a noble heritage, namely, a sense of responsibility to help men stay open and honest before the threats and confusions of life. In humanistic terms, the educational task is to provide for "the fullest possible actualization of each individual's unique human potentialities." It is the burden of this study to show that modern secular education must consider more seriously the philosophical and psychological dimensions of human nature. Numbers of haunting questions press themselves upon the educational inquirer and suggest the need for a proper answer.

Is it possible that man has created a civilization so complex and so ambiguous that in the process of education the immature and growing self-system can no longer develop the philosophic and psychological resources to remain open and
honest before it? Must one conclude this as he notes the increasing conditions of human loneliness—person alienated from person, the increasing rates of human neurosis and psychosis, the increasing evidence of political apathy and personal inefficiency, and the increasing frequency of crime and delinquency and suicide in youth?

Is it possible that the complex and ambiguously actualized world of human reality has become so visible and overwhelming that the individual's trust in developing his own potentialities and personal resources is crippled by doubt and anxiety? Is it possible that the ever-present demands of this created world steal all of the energies and loyalties of the human learner so that, paradoxically, little energy and loyalty remain for the actualization of those moral and intellectual resources that might more adequately handle this contemporary complexity and ambiguity?

Paul Tillich offers a tentative "yes" to these questions. He concedes that this world man has created is so complex, so dynamic and changing that the very self-structure of the contemporary human learner will need to be constantly dynamic and restructured also if the learner is to remain open and honest before it. He supposes that the qualities of doubt, of uncertainty and anxiety, have now become permanent qualities of the subjective dimensions of the learners' self-structure. He admits that the problem of self-identity through time can no longer be borrowed from external author-
ity and models, and today becomes the almost exclusive crea-
tion of each learner in a dynamic and restructuring response
to the world he meets. If this view is valid, questions of
the subjective complexity of the self-system, questions of
the moral and intellectual resources needed by the learner
to remain open and honest before the complexities and ambigui-
ities of his contemporary world have become primary and
problematic for secular American education.

In this dissertation such a perspective is assumed to
be valid. It is assumed that the conceptual insights and the
productive skills of the learner can be developed only by the
efforts of the learner himself. It is assumed that the depth
and breadth of these insights and skills will be a direct
manifestation of the moral and intellectual capacities that
each learner has managed to actualize and structure in his
growing self-system. It is assumed that the need for a con-
stantly dynamic and restructuring identity to the self-system
has become a prior concern for the learner and that the
traditional curriculum does not adequately focus on these
subjective dimensions of learning. It is assumed that the
worth of the curriculum is found at that point where the
growing self-structure of the learner and the contemporary
forms of a created world meet. And it is assumed that this
meeting will be qualitatively educational only to the extent
that the learner is motivated to actualize such increasingly
complex and integrated moral and intellectual resources in
his self-structure that allow him to remain open and honest before the contemporary human reality he encounters. Hence, it is assumed that one central concern of contemporary American secular education is a more serious consideration of philosophic and psychological views of the nature of men. The teacher ought to encourage the development of these subjective resources in the learner, either prior to or concomitant with the traditional curricular concerns. In this dissertation a combination of Paul Tillich's philosophic thought with several self-psychologists' thought is investigated as one valuable approach to these problems.

In the light of the already frequent reference to Paul Tillich, a secular educator might well ask at this point: What can a Christian theologian offer to secular education? The writer would ask first that such a doubter first disassociate Tillich from the traditional parochial theologian. Tillich's search for meaning leads him into a broad area most commonly designated by the term "religion." In this journey out from a dogmatic faith to a creative exploration the terms "religion" and "philosophy" become almost indistinguishable. It is Tillich the religious philosopher who is deemed worthy of offering a word to secular education.

Tillich defines religion as one's "ultimate concern," and then speaks of the "dimension of depth" in every secular activity man undertakes. This calls up one of Tillich's most radical and useful concepts, the "spiritual life"—a
broader and more inclusive category than the religious
dimension of life. For Tillich the realm of spirit includes
one's ultimate concern and in addition the dimensions of
morality and cultural forms. All three parts of the spiritual
life may or may not point beyond themselves to ultimate
reality. All three pervade and are communicated through
secular culture. This triumvirate of dimensions may be seen
as particularly relevant to that intellectual and moral
loyalty for which public school is responsible.

We may say that if a learner has no ultimate loyalty
to the release and structure of his own intelligence, or to
his own responsibility in the creation of his quality of
self-hood, the "dimension of depth" and spirit will not be­
come active and actualized in his learning processes.

Tillich defines "spirit" as "the union of power and
meaning."² This formulation might very well offer the
teacher one approach to the plaguing problem of motivation
or lack of motivation in public school learners. Tillich's
phrase would add an ontological connotation to the word
"power." As a Protestant, Tillich argues that every human
being is potentially receptive to the energy or power of
the "dynamics of being" that pervades the human form. Like­
wise he would add an ontological significance to the human
creation of meaning. For Tillich the dynamics of the creation
of meaning in human development are universal to all men.

²Tillich, III, p. 22.
They occur wherever men have an ultimate loyalty to the creation of new cultural forms and human relationships which honestly interpret and heal the estrangements or separations of the contemporary human situation. Hence Tillich talks of a "theology of culture," a phrase which expresses the ultimate dimension of loyalty and symbolic forms in all secular culture and morality. Further, he talks of the "kairos," the eternal as it confronts secular culture and seeks to give meaning to both individual life and history.

A teacher can find in Tillich a penetrating exploration of the nature of the self and its dynamics of growth toward increasingly universal forms of meaning and loyalty, independent of that teacher's acceptance or rejection of Tillich's Christology. Tillich himself divides his role as ontological philosopher, in which he makes a rational and existential analysis of the forms of human estrangement under the conditions of finitude, from his role as theologian in which he interprets Christian revelation as an answer to these conditions.3

Tillich takes the position that the religious dimension of human development cannot be separated from the moral and intellectual dimension of growth. The religious dimension functions as the dimension of depth or ultimate concern in all operations of the human spirit. It follows that the

3In his total theological system Tillich refers to this dual responsibility by the concept of "The Theory of Correlation."
separation of church and state is fully honored, and yet that Tillich's analysis may potentially contribute a great deal to the understanding and motivation of learners in the secular schools.4

This dissertation seeks to combine Tillich's thought with self-psychology to suggest a possible answer to the educational questions already posed. To reiterate these questions: What are the relationships between moral growth and intellectual growth in the self-structure of the secularly schooled child? In the complexities and ambiguities of modern learning, what value for education lies in a concern over the subjective dimensions of these learnings? It has now become partially apparent that Tillich's framework offers a philosophic analysis of human nature, i.e., an analysis that examines the structure of the human self in terms of its "ontological dynamics," its dimension of spirit, its cultural creations of forms and symbols, and its moral constitution. Tillich offers an ontological basis for the structuring of a personal identity and the processes of self-transcendence that the modern secular learner would appear to need. The self-psychologists honor "openness," "becoming," and the primacy of human potentiality in the learning process. Tillich's frame gives one analysis of the Being such a self

is open to, or the ontological base from which such a self grows or "becomes." Such an analysis may help the teacher to make more explicit and functional what is left implicit and potentially anarchistic or solipsistic by the self-psychologists. For example, Tillich's frame may help the teacher attain not only empathy with the complexities and ambiguities of children's growth and development but also insights with respect to moral and intellectual directions in her teaching.

The descriptions of the self-psychologists, on the other hand, precisely because they are empirical and immediately observable, offer the teacher a kind of dynamic measuring stick by which the individual's growth and learnings may be judged healthy or educative in comparison with "fully functioning" or "self-actualizing" adults. This guide is similar to the developmental stages of systems like Gessell or Havighurst or Erikson, but it is framed in terms

of individual development and dynamics of growth, rather than in terms of universal or group age levels. The self-psychologists' descriptions of growth also offer the teacher specific guides to her own supportive efforts in relation to the learner. These empirical descriptions may make more immediately apprehensible what Tillich's theoretical analysis potentially provides that is useful to the classroom teacher.

However, the constant relation between these two frames of reference must be maintained, since it is apparent that the decision to use Rogers' "fully functioning person" or Maslow's "self-actualizing personality" as criteria for an approach to the educated person is itself a moral decision. This choice ultimately needs to be rooted in the teacher's awareness of her own assumptions about the nature of man and the proper ends of human development and learning. It is also apparent that the Rogers and Maslow measuring criteria can themselves become rigid and ritualistic if the teacher is not philosophically sensitive enough to apply them with the spirit needed to interpret any ethical criteria in life.10

It follows from these considerations that the teacher who is sympathetic to the assumptions of Tillich and the self-psychologists about the nature of man and the psychological theory of learning, will conceive both the ends and

processes of learning in a somewhat original and non-tradi-
tional way. The progressive education emphasis upon
"individual differences" becomes an absolute focus, for
example, since only each individual learner can actualize
his own ultimate concerns and his own quality of self-
structuring. The very nature of education must be conceived
in dynamic terms, from the non-actualized self outward toward
a more universal realization of the various potential struc-
turings each self is capable of and chooses to affirm as
worthy of his ultimate concern.

A major thesis of this dissertation, then, is that
education can be viewed as an ever-increasing capacity on the
part of the emerging self to transcend ethnocentrism, ego-
centrism, and finite bias through subjective and symbolic
integrations of increasingly complex, discriminate, and more
universally inclusive frames of reference. These transcend-
ing frames of references are seen as intellectual classifica-
tions that are made possible and meaningful by growth in what
might well be called the ontological self, or the subjective
complexity and dynamics of personal being.

The viewpoint does not posit a perfect ideal self, or
a universal loyalty as a reachable reality, but rather employs
these as guides for transcending one's present forms and
structures of prejudicial and provincial loyalty. It further
asserts that this transcending continues throughout life in
the healthy and growing person and that each stage of
transcendence constitutes some increased degree of human freedom as well as a wider and deeper world of personal meaningfulness for the emerging self. The central focus of this dissertation will be to develop this view of human nature at a theoretical level. It will further suggest how this view of human becoming may be integrated with the frames of reference, intellectual methodologies, and content-learnings of our conventional curriculums.

This position then becomes responsible for describing a view of human transcendence and human freedom and for elaborating how and to what extent this process of learning may be institutionally implemented at all levels of human growth and development. A specific view of human nature is defended on philosophic grounds. It is argued that the existential philosophers have a somewhat common view of human nature. The central focus of this argument is the common emphasis on the dynamic and unfinished nature of reality itself. From this dynamics of Being each unfinished human self creates its own structural unity. For Tillich man is constantly able to re-create this ontological structure of self in response to the forces of through his symbolic capacities. The positive statement of this Existential position developed in this dissertation is, of course, that of the philosopher and theologian, Paul Tillich.

It will secondly be argued that the self-psychologists selected: Rollo May, Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, Erich
Fromm, and Abraham Maslow have a similar view of the nature of man. Their therapeutic observations and research descriptions of the process of the emerging mature self involves a more implicit but similar view of human transcendence and freedom. This context is especially valuable in making a transition from the theoretical issues of Tillich's existential philosophy,\(^\text{11}\) to a useful basis for curriculum and classroom application in education. If educators' goals include the stated aim of education, that of transcending ethnocentricism, egocentricism, and bias, a central concern of this dissertation must become a thorough consideration of the relationship between this path to maturity and the formal information and intellectual content that is central to both the curriculum and the growing self.

The Organization of the Dissertation

In the remainder of this Introduction there are three major issues that have been raised and appear to be in need of clarification to fix the issues and context of the dissertation as a whole. The first is a defense of the suggested definition of education, a definition that makes the view of human transcendence more explicit and suggests the need for such an emphasis in our generation. The second is an elabor-

\(^{11}\) Tillich's system is a combination of what he calls essentialist and existential dimensions of being and he argues centrally and forcefully that to see man completely we can never divorce the two. Cf. Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), Vol. II.
ation of some of the common elements of the existential philosophers and the self-psychologists, an elaboration that leads to their being combined in a single theoretical approach to education. The third is some further statement concerning the unique strengths and limitations of Dr. Tillich's thought for secular education and teacher training since his philosophy is "correlated" with his Christian commitment.

The first of these three clarifications is to develop the definition of the need for education as a continuing transcendence of bias, ethnocentricism, and egocentricism. We may note the contrast between this conception of transcendence and Dewey's definition of education as a continuing process of "reconstruction of experience." The contrast appears in the differing views of the nature of man and the differing views of human freedom. For Dewey knowledge is an inter-active pursuit on the part of an intelligent human animal to gain information that will give him control over his environment and lead to the solutions to his problems. Yet it is an empirical kind of knowledge which is only true if it is tested and actually leads to control or solutions.


The reality which such a view takes most seriously is the reality of the natural world and the social problems of the human community. Hence even the human self is essentially a social product and verbal process\textsuperscript{14} which is judged in its maturity in terms of its flexible capacity to apply intelligence to a variety of interactive problems.

The realm of Being or reality-as-such that has traditionally been called ontology or metaphysics in philosophy is not directly encountered or honored in pragmatism. Rather, it is broken into "experiences" by the empirically oriented intelligence of man, by subject-object discriminations and inter-actions. It is true certainly, as Hook\textsuperscript{15} and others\textsuperscript{16} have shown recently, that Pragmatism has an ontology. Such concepts as the "indeterminate situation"\textsuperscript{17} prior to defining a problem, and the concept of the "pervading quality"\textsuperscript{18} that gives an experience and context its unity, are suggestive of a larger unknown realm of Being-as-such. Yet in the


\textsuperscript{17}John Dewey, Logic: . . . , ch. 6.

\textsuperscript{18}John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Minton, Bolch, and Co., 1934), ch. 2.
pragmatic tradition, in its theory of meaning, this realm of being is not knowable or meaningful until it enters human experience in communicable forms having empirical referents. Hence ontology is treated as a background for experiencing, and is not in the foreground of the reality man seeks to know. Consequently, experiences, inter-action with the already actualized forms and meanings of society, come to take almost exclusive priority and focus in the pragmatic view of self-development. This viewpoint restricts the reality of human knowing and experiencing to actualized empirical referents which are possible of discrimination by the human mind.

This seems to the existentialists and self-psychologists to be an unnecessarily and arbitrarily restricted view of both the nature of ultimate reality and the complete nature of the human self. The latter views hold, on the contrary, that we can and do encounter a more complete perception of ultimate reality than we consciously understand. The human self functions far more complexly than through that which is discernible by the meaning-criteria of the conscious mind.

This dissertation will defend an ontological view of reality and meaning from the existentialists and self-psychologists in contrast to the epistemological views given us by the Enlightenment and, later, the pragmatists. The epistemological meaning criteria are rooted to empirical
science, and are then embedded in the ensuing view of self and human reality. The epistemological view of meaning has the virtue of a common referent and common meanings to all terms, especially in the preciser vocabularies of sophisticated science and mathematics. It has the limiting disadvantage of restricting each emerging self's meanings and experiences to the actualized forms and public referents of the existing community. It thus becomes conservative in spite of the pragmatist's affinity for political liberalism and progressive social reforms. The human self, in spite of a language of individualism and even of creativity, is imprisoned within a heritage of socially meaningful and environmentally referential limitations.

The view of human transcendence and freedom defended in this dissertation, by contrast, emphasizes the emerging structure of the unique human self. This structure is partly given unity by the feelings and language forms found in one's given culture, to be sure. But a dynamic and emerging self is capable of discerning and making real entirely new forms and structures of its own once the basic symbolic functions of language are learned and integrated. This view will also emphasize the capacity of such a self to respond openly to the larger ontological reality in which man is placed, a kind of perception that Maslow has called "being-cognition."\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\)Maslow, Toward a Psychology . . ., p. 69.
There are several very central concepts in Tillich's thought that are elaborated in detail in the defense of this position. This viewpoint is an existential one, meaning here that human reason is limited by the conditions of time and space just as much as man's feeling and epistemological experiencing. Tillich's existentialism does not posit an autonomous transcendent mind in the manner that philosophic idealism or orthodox Christianity usually does. But Tillich reasons that the symbolic nature of man's conceptualization enables him to enter into and experience new levels of reality which require constant re-integrations of concepts in the context of this larger reality if they are to be meaningful. This is something beyond Dewey's "reconstruction of experience" in that an entirely new form of perceiving and conceptualizing is created. The self-structure becomes more open to complexity and ambiguity with successive stages of self-transcendence. Hence not only are new patterns of perceptual and conceptual meaning possible for the learner, but also more universal ultimate concerns become real for the learner.

A final contrast between Dewey's view of human nature and Tillich's view clarifies the concept of education as self-transcendence. Tillich argues that man experiences existential guilt\(^{20}\) and responsibility for creating this

transcendence. He argues that man participates in and feels the unifying forces of ultimate reality which Tillich calls love, and that man's symbolic powers and choice allow him increasingly to identify with a more universal, loving, or freer human condition. This belief is denied by Dewey and the homeostasis psychologists, of course. They argue that education is essentially a problem-solving process—a resolution of tensions leading to new problems. In the process there is a conscious awareness that self-interest involves communal interests and in this duality there is generated the direction necessary for "progress." For Dewey, human intelligence can ascertain the most desirable means-ends relationships for achieving these resolutions and problem-solutions. However, Tillich defends the viewpoint that human symbolic powers enable man actually to conceive an ideal and utopian state of reality that can have greater validity and reality in the individual's philosophico-psychological self than any empirically "real" referent, even though this ideal is not yet actualized in the external world.

As suggested above, this belief introduces a further ontological concept, "love," in the nature of man's expanding becoming. This posits an ontologically real force or power in man that makes possible a greater unity and complexity of total reality. It asserts that man is existentially restless in conditions short of this achievement, both
internally and externally to the self. This love of a more ideal state of human relations is a necessary belief for the view of transcendence developed in this dissertation. It is held that man's symbolic capacities enable him to treat the potential as more real than the actualized if his loyalty or love\textsuperscript{22} is invested in this possible state of being to a greater extent than it is invested in the present actualized realms of being. The most famous statement of this position, of course, is the Socratic conviction that the love of knowledge and the search for wisdom only emerges as a man first admits his ignorance and error, as he gains that wisdom that it does not know.

For Tillich, then, man's self-transcendence proceeds through increasingly universal creations of meaning and structured forms, which are then identified with as "ultimate concerns." But the meaning of these new forms has a public referent for Tillich, not so much in the conscious mind's discriminations as in a kind of Jungian archetypal or collective environment in one's total subjective openness than by rational discrimination.\textsuperscript{23} This public dimension of Tillich's

\textsuperscript{22}For example, Heiddegger labels this attribute of man "sorge" or "concern" a concept which is foundational to his existential philosophy of man--Metaphysics. Cf. Martin Heiddegger, An Introduction of Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).

view of meaning is what makes his thought socially relatable to education, for example.

Earlier in this Introduction a view of education as "an ever-increasing capacity on the part of the emerging self to transcend ethnocentricism, egocentricism, and bias" was suggested. The central concept of transcendence has now been suggested. It will be the task of the chapters on "The Nature of Man" to defend the view of the becoming of self that leads to this increased capacity for transcendence, and to increasing freedom from ethnocentric and egocentric loyalties.

The second purpose suggested in the Introduction was a limited statement of the common elements of the existentialists, especially Tillich, and a selection of self-psychologists, that has led to their being combined in a single theoretical approach to education. There is, first of all, a common view of the open and dynamic nature of the universe and an assumption of purpose in the dynamic

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24 The word "purpose" is used in preference to teleology here to avoid the Aristotelian and some Christian pre-Darwinian concepts of human inner determinism or final ends. The view of purpose defended is closer to Tillich's definition of spirit as "the union of power and meaning," where power refers to ontological and physiological eros in each individual, and meaning refers to a personal creation of symbolic relationships potentially available to all men in their use of reason.
becoming of each individual human person. The existential view of purpose is not synonymous with Aristotelian teleology. The important difference is that Aristotle posited a kind of uni-directional essence in the fulfillment and maturing of man, while the existential view holds that the biological dynamic drive is combined by individually unique and self-chosen goals varying radically in the varieties of alternatives open to men. Rogers posits "growth forces" in man, and Maslow posits instinc-toid drives toward self-actualization. Allport discusses the purposeful dimensions of the "Propriate-striving of the self."\(^25\) Fromm insists that "man is not a thing."\(^26\) Tillich and May find man driven by the inner "dynamics" of an ontological separation from essential being into existential being, and this dynamic drive leads us to seek a re-unification with Being through our symbolic capacities.

This purposeful drive for growth and transcendence must be assumed for the position developed in this dissertation and the definition of education earlier suggested. The view of transcendence developed ultimately depends upon the acceptance or rejection of this "dynamics" and its potential intensity. Yet this is an assumption that is given some


degree of empirical credibility by the experiences and researches of the self-psychologists examined. Rogers and Maslow find direct evidence in therapy and in studies of healthy or mature persons to support such an assumed view empirically. Obviously it is not intended here that an assumption or faith itself can be empirically verified, but only that close empirical observation can be reasonably interpreted to support the credibility of the assumptions.

There is, secondly, a common focus by Tillich and self-psychology on the subjectivity of the self as the locus of reality and truth. It was indicated that the view of meaning adopted from Tillich avoids the solipsistic egocentricity of this subjectivity. Stated positively, this theme refers to the common focus of Tillich and the self-psychologists on the subjective dynamics of personhood, on the ontological structures of being a human being, on the quality and complexity of the self. Both frames of reference emphasize the reality of potential dimensions of human becoming and the volitional freedom and responsibility each man has for actualizing his own structure of self. Both insist that this self-creation can only be achieved authentically by each person for himself. There is therefore a common description of the process of the emerging purposeful and transcendent dimensions of selfhood, and a similar focus on human freedom as the power and control we have over the creation of our own quality and complexity of being.
Thirdly, there is a common rejection by existentialism and self-psychology of many intellectual assumptions from the Enlightenment, as well as overt criticism of many institutions and values of the Enlightenment heritage. Of these themes from the Enlightenment heritage the most important will be a focus on the unity of self-hood prior to the subject-object dichotomy of Cartesianism and empiricism, and hence a focus on ontology or what Maslow calls being-cognition. Both existentialism and self-psychology reject the Enlightenment and Lockean view of mind. A second common anti-Enlightenment theme is the rejection of Newtonian mechanistic concepts of science in relation to the person. A third focus becomes a common view of human meaning growing from the common rejection of the Enlightenment's philosophy-of-history framework of meaning. In all of these issues this dissertation will seek to demonstrate that both Tillich and the self-psychologists selected are in agreement.

It may be suggested that this common focus upon purpose, upon the subjective and becoming aspects of self-hood leading to a transcendent view of freedom, and upon these common anti-Enlightenment themes, gives this dissertation its unity and organization. It is what makes possible the integration of the existential philosophy with self-psychology. Yet this integration has a particularly valuable function to play in making the transition between Tillich's philosophic assumptions about reality, truth, and human nature and the
actual practical process of learning that teachers are responsible for in the classroom. It is in this intermediary role that a transition from existentialism to learning theory and hence to some specific educational applications becomes possible by focusing upon the self-psychologist's descriptions of the processes of the becoming of subjectivity.

A further purpose of this Introduction was taken to be some statement of the unique strengths and limitations of Dr. Tillich's thought for secular education and teacher-training, especially in the light of his commitment as a Christian theologian. One of the extremely valuable emphasis of Tillich's thought is that he has the radical honesty to describe fully the contemporary human situation, which much educational thought seems to avoid. He confronts our present situation of doubt and distrust of the adequacy of human reason to control a future world of complexity and nuclear bombs; yet he maintains a renewed faith in human reason and in our future-oriented symbolic functions. Obviously both contemporary teachers and learners need such a faith. The fact that this trust is a basic faith assumption that must be pre-supposed for all meaningful learning is strangely neglected by educators. Formal education is necessarily partly future-oriented, at least one generation ahead in time. It is necessarily focused primarily upon the liberating and disciplining of human intelligence. Tillich's framework helps
to isolate and emphasize ontological and psychological dimensions of this process that the epistemological heritage has tended to obscure and minimize.

In the organization of this dissertation the two major constructs adapted for an approach to secular education from Tillich's frame of reference are, first, his ontological descriptions of the nature of man, and secondly, his concept of the "theology of culture." There are several concepts unique with Tillich embodied within each of these large constructs. From Tillich's view of human nature this dissertation deals particularly with his analysis of the ambiguities of growth, or the "ontological dynamics" of human development. It is from this view of the nature of man that a learning theory is isolated. Tillich argues that in man under the conditions of finitude, essence and existence are estranged or separated. Much of what is "essentially" man remains potential and non-existent or not empirically known until it is actualized by the efforts of each individual. This principle is accepted by all Humanistic education from the Renaissance onward in the conception of education as a process of actualizing the fullest possible development of the individual's potentialities.27

In Greek thought, in the Rationalists, and in most of the Enlightenment, and hence in most of our Western heritage,  

men believed that human reason was itself sufficient to actualize the essential being of man, if properly employed. If this were true, rational and intellectualistic methodologies of inquiry and similar methodologies for transcending bias would be a sufficient approach to educational curriculum. However, since the British empiricists have carried the assumptions of this viewpoint to logical absurdities, and since the dynamic open-universe of Darwin and twentieth century thought, many philosophers have come to believe that man's cognitive and rational thought is as much conditioned by time-space limitations as is the rest of his life.

Tillich, along with other existentialist thinkers, adopts this latter point of view in his descriptions of human nature and learning. For example, Tillich writes "(Essentialism) asserts that man is able to transcend, in knowledge and life, the finitude, the estrangement, and the ambiguities of human existence,"28 while Existentialism believes ". . .man has no place of pure objectivity above finitude and estrangement. His cognitive function is as existentially conditioned as his whole being."29 It follows from these considerations that if any form of human transcendence is possible at all, if progress in the quality of personhood occurs, this growth will include ontological dimensions of

29Ibid., p. 126.
incorporating a more complex being in one's self-structure. It will not be primarily a cognitive methodological inquiry—though this latter is never absent as one dimension of growth in Tillich's formulation.

In Tillich's discussion of the ambiguities in the nature of man as he seeks to actualize a transcendent quality of personal becoming, a very profound and penetrating description of human anxiety is analyzed. Tillich holds that the human condition itself—finitude and injustice and suffering and death—is anxiety-producing to man who is thus aware of his own death. But man prefers to hide much of this reality from his consciousness. Tillich calls this condition "existential anxiety," and holds that "... the human mind is not only, as Calvin said, a permanent factory of idols, it is also a permanent factory of fears." In his view existential anxiety is constantly "... striving to become fears, because fear can be met by courage."

In the context of the classroom, then, a teacher would assume that many of the deepest questions of her learners are anxiety-producing and fear-producing uncertainties about the meaning of life. She would assume that learning would remain fearful and irrelevant to the learner if this basis of meaningful inquiry could not be dealt with by the development of moral growth, such as the honoring of honesty and courage. A

30Ibid., p. 39.
31Ibid., p. 39.
great deal of the non-ultimate ends and motives found in secular learning can be understood within this frame of reference. Tillich's framework provides the teacher with a base for helping the learner to liberate more meaningful and ultimate forms of inquiry. A learning theory is then developed from Tillich's view of the nature of man and his development, and this view is compared with that of the self-psychologists, especially Rogers and Maslow.

Given these considerations about human nature and a theory of learning, the problem for education then becomes one of transcending these fears and biases that are permanently engendered. This is, hopefully, the constructive contribution of the curriculum and the teacher. To achieve this positive educational goal the second major construct from Tillich's thought is adopted, the "theology of culture." Tillich holds that new creative and synthesizing forms are potentially possible to every man and generation, to heal or transcend the permanent erosion of older forms of integration. He holds that these forms arise in secular life wherever the "dimension of depth" or ultimate concern operates in man's efforts. One could call this Tillich's view of creativity.

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32See Robert C. Kimball (ed.), Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). Note Tillich's secular emphasis in the Forward: "The present volume attempts to show the religious dimension in many special spheres of man's cultural activity. This dimension... is never absent in cultural creations even if they show no relation to religion in the narrower sense of the word. This dimension, and not any ecclesiastical control of cultural creativity, was, and is, meant when the phrase 'theology of culture' is used," p. v.
For Tillich this process is always a highly symbolic process, conceived in a way that includes both unconscious and rational qualities as it creates new forms and meanings. But the integration is first an integration of one man in response to a larger social and universal condition or demand. Hence, while only a few major creative forms will be adopted by any generation as having the power and meaning to unify their relationships or transcend their biases and fears, the process of self-transcendence is available and actualized by every learner in his own educational development. Tillich's view of symbol-formation in human education provides the structure and cognitive control that many existential systems appear to minimize. Since his view of symbol-formation includes an encounter with the demands of the contemporary situation (which he calls the "kairos") this process also affirms a social and historical responsibility in one's becoming an educated person. His view of the source of symbol meanings stresses the unconsciously formed patterns of feeling and the encounters with Being that emerge from being a member of a tradition and society, for often these meanings and forms are only partially expressed in existing forms.

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33 Tillich, Dynamics of . . ., p. 43.
34 Tillich, Systematic . . ., pp. 369-372.
The methodological approach stressed in this dissertation follows Tillich’s lead in this conception and in emphasizing a kind of symbolic meaning process as appropriate to education in the secular schools. The emphasis is more upon symbol and meaning creation in the arts, humanities, and sciences, than in the religious traditions and institutions which have been Tillich’s own pre-occupation.

This former kind of symbol-formation Tillich labels, "representational symbols," in contrast to "religious symbols." It is the representational forms that are appropriate to secular education and in an approach to curriculum development. In the later chapters of this dissertation an attempt at integrating these two major constructs from Tillich's thought into a practical approach to classroom teaching is undertaken.


CHAPTER I

SOME LIMITS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT HERITAGE
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION

Existentialism is the counter-Enlightenment come at last to philosophic expression; and it demonstrates beyond anything else that the ideology of the Enlightenment is thin, abstract, and therefore, dangerous (p. 244).

William Barrett (Irrational Man)

If it can be demonstrated that "the ideology of the Enlightenment is thin, abstract, and therefore dangerous," and that the dominant beliefs of American society, particularly as the beliefs are reflected in American educational institutions, continue to embody these Enlightenment ideologies, a case can be built for the positive contribution of Existentialism, which is critical of these dangers and also attempts to suggest new approaches. This thesis cannot be conclusively established in one chapter in this dissertation, but a foundation for such a claim can be suggested. Furthermore, the context can be presented in which the existential-self-psychology position of this dissertation may be understood in its importance for contemporary education.

Barrett's quotation, as found above, suggests that Existentialism may be understood as a criticism of the epistemological view of meaning that is embodied in the
"ideologies" of eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the philosophies of history of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{1} This dissertation shall give special critical attention to the epistemological view of mind and meaning so influentially articulated by Locke, and the "idea of progress" which became the dominant philosophy of history for Europe and America.\textsuperscript{2} These two themes, it would seem, are particularly important for attempting to show the "abstractness and thinness" of many of the dominant beliefs and institutional patterns in contemporary American education and society at large.

We "good democratic American citizens" of the twentieth century appear often to suffer from a much too limited historical perspective. We forget or minimize the Enlightenment heritage that ushered in our political democracy, middle-class social striving, and proud nationalism. We all too easily forget that our eighteenth-century philosophic heritage was an effective midwife at the birth of "the great American experiment." We tend to see our "experiment" as successfully solidified, and hence the dominant values and institutions of this heritage tend to become sacrely established. This is particularly true of the public schools and the political

\textsuperscript{1}Crane Brinton, \textit{The Shaping of the Modern Mind} (New York: Mentor Paperbound, 1953).

arena, the two major stages where the drama of the good life is presented in our society.

These institutional arrangements are legacies from the Enlightenment heritage, yet we find a kind of apathy and non-participation in the educational and political processes of contemporary American society that is in marked contrast to the enthusiasm and optimism of the early philosophers as well as of our own forefathers, such as Thomas Paine. If the cause of this decline in private and public intensity and committed involvement is simply our growing size, complexity, and achievements of materialistic wealth, then the remedy should lie in a revitalizing of the educational and political processes. But if, as Barrett suggests, the Enlightenment heritage itself was a too "thin and abstract" philosophic base for a viable complex human civilization, we will have more demanding reformulations to make in a new "education for democracy." We will be driven to criticize the view of the nature of man, of mind, of reality, and of truth, that has now become somewhat sacrosanct in our schools and political institutions. Achieving such a philosophic re-orientation will surely be a delicate task demanding infinite patience and diplomacy over a long period. The movement will be "liberal" in that it calls for immediate and radical reform in both educational and political structures.

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and in people's loyalties; yet it will be "conservative" in its attempt to protect the universal good in our heritage, to re-establish some of the original Enlightenment meanings of freedom, truth, and individualism, and in the necessity to honor the gradual rate of change traditional in our educational and political processes.

If in this dissertation we view our political democracy as a kind of state government wherein the ultimate definitions of "the good society" and "the good individual" are not permanently decreed by the party in power but are left to the individual person to decide and commit himself to, we begin to return to the experimental base of our Enlightenment heritage. In this context what Tillich calls "ultimate concerns" can be trans-political, trans-contemporary. The individual person becomes the locus of thought, of choice, of reform through the creation of new forms and through the public relating of his honest convictions. Philosophy and religion have dignity as springs of real change in individual and social life, and individual human reason and intelligence have some effect on the body-politic.

The early philosophers (and Dewey) had a faith that human reason and moral integrity would welcome such a view and be equal to its demands. Our post-Freudian, post-Marxian, technologically complex world of today is not so
What does this doubt mean for the educational and political processes that must remain accountable to reason and personality? Can the philosophic and religious bases of individuality and freedom be resurrected or re-created in forms appropriate to the educational and political behavior needed to keep a mid-twentieth-century, technological welfare state democratically accountable? This dissertation will seek to answer this question affirmatively by arguing that the subjective and personal educational dimensions of learners must become correspondingly complex and integrated or man will lose moral direction and control over his own creations of culture and civilization. A combined existential-self-psychology focus is seen as optimal for achieving this kind of increased "ontological subjectivity" in learners. Before presenting such a new "philosophy of education," there is needed a brief examination of the Enlightenment heritage and its limits in American society and education.

Let us anticipate this historical perspective with a brief consideration of the nature of individualism and of the sources and development of human personhood. The founders of our political experiment lived at a historical time that we now see as a transition from philosophic rationalism to philosophic empiricism.\(^4\) If these founders believed with


\(^5\)Brinton, Shaping of . . . .
Descartes and other rationalists that the universe is rationally ordered, that natural laws can be apprehended by trained human reason, and that reason can use these laws to affect nature and society to achieve humanly desired ends, then the source of individual dignity and freedom lay for them in a kind of transcendent rationality, captured by the intellectually disciplined mind. Jefferson would be a good example here with his faith in Deism and also in the "aristocracy of the talented," where universally freed and loyal human intelligence would originate from all walks of life, all races and minority groups, from man as man. Such a view places the individual supremely above and prior to his contemporary state and society, and his highest loyalty is honest pursuit of his own rational development.

If, however, individualism is conceived as a social, environmental product—the sorting of secondary ideas from the inescapable primary ideas of one's empirical experiencing, as with Locke, or Dewey in a modified version—then the source of individual dignity and freedom lies in a responsible control of experience. Here reason or intelligence is employed contextually, in interaction with and reforming control over the environment that conditions man's very individuality. The transcendent dimensions of reason are denied altogether, and an emphasis upon being true to one's own unique pattern

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of development and creative contributions replaces the universalism of the Rationalist assumptions. Educational practice varies rather radically in this case, resulting in the progressive education reforms of our twentieth century. The focus is upon the social origins and accountability in the growth of individualism.

Tillich offers us another way of conceiving this growth in individualism and personhood. He makes a distinction between the individual and the person, and emphasizes the symbolic behavior and relationships characteristic of personhood. Though stating it more elaborately, Tillich would accept Buber's terms, where individualism is a result of the subject-object language distinctions we encounter in the world of "I-It," where objects are seen as means to other ends. Personhood results from the "I-Thou" encounter where the moral and ontological dimensions of self are primary in choice and action. Contrary to the Rationalists, Tillich does not assume a transcendent mind or reason, nor a statically ordered rational universe. He accepts the existential limits of the functioning of conscious human reasoning, as the Empiricists insist upon. He argues that we learn our individualism and personhood socially, through language. But then he adds that these forms of reasoning

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are not totally determinative, for man's symbolic behavior allows him to reconstruct the meanings and loyalties he will put his own reason in the service of. Through symbolic creation of new forms of relationship, new conceptual organizations and loyalties, a man may transcend his individual social origins. For Tillich this is not totally a cognitive process, but involves will and moral qualities, a kind of sensitivity to one's unconscious base of experiencing and ontological structuring of self-hood.9 More will be said about these concepts later. The purpose here has been to suggest briefly that the way the self and its individualism and personhood is conceived by the teacher and learner himself is fundamental for educational and political theory and reform.

Let us now examine more elaborately what the Enlightenment heritage has bequeathed to us by way of a view of human nature and mind, and the resultant institutional practices and emphases. If, as the Barrett quote suggests, this Enlightenment heritage is philosophically too "thin and abstract" to generate a quality of personhood sufficient to understand, control, and morally respond to the challenges of mid-twentieth-century reality, perhaps a combined existentialism-self-psychology philosophy of education can be shown to be

more sufficient. At least this is the thesis of this dissertation.

**Two Themes from the Enlightenment Heritage**

It is not the claim here that other dimensions of the Enlightenment heritage are unimportant or non-influential; the field is simply narrowed for the purposes of this dissertation. Existentialism is not only critical of the epistemological view of mind and meaning and self-hood and of the historical metaphysics implicit in the philosophies of history; it is also critical of the over-emphasis upon conscious reason, the Newtonian view of scientific inquiry and the Reality it supposedly reveals, the social and political dangers involved in bureaucracy, the bourgeois values that came with middle-class Enlightenment ideas and the capture of nation-state power to implement these ideals. It is critical of the loss of individuality and freedom that it believes has historically developed from these Enlightenment ideals and their institutionalization. Some of these issues will be touched upon later but the emphasis will go necessarily to the two views seen as most essential to an understanding and defense of the existentialism-self-psychology position elaborated in the following chapters of this dissertation.

These two emphases, the victory of an epistemological approach to knowledge and meaning, and the dominance of a philosophy-of-history context in which individual persons

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10 See Bibliography (Barrett, Green, Reinhardt, Kaufmann).
make their ultimate life-commitments, are usually traced to events and philosophers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively. The epistemological emphasis led to an inductive and behavioristically oriented view of science and meaning that rejected all metaphysical meanings, while the philosophies of history leaned heavily on the Romantic reaction to Enlightenment reason and embodied a core of philosophical Idealism in its metaphysics. Hence an interpretation which links them together as constituting the "enlightenment heritage" is selective and arbitrary, to say the least. Yet it seems possible to show that the common emphases of both justify this classification, and especially that they are the two dominant influences that the existentialism and self-psychology positions herein defended, both negate.

The most important common elements would seem to be a secular or this-worldly focus for meanings and loyalties in life, combined with a historical or time emphasis that requires the accumulation of scientific knowledge before utopian social reforms can be consummated. They both deify the methodology of scientific inquiry, and they both believe man can and should use this knowledge to control nature and

11 Brinton, The Shaping...

human behavior in constructing the institutions and values of an evolutionary humanity. They both accept an implicit or explicit metaphysic and teleology in Being-itself. This may be conceived as the rational order and causal structure which reason and scientific laws "reveal," or the dynamic dialectical and progressing structure of historical Becoming in nature, political or social class struggles and syntheses, or the inevitable man-made progress more dominant in the twentieth century. The names of Hegel, Marx, and Dewey can be identified best with these last three positions respectively.

Dewey's progressivism, particularly, can be seen as an integration of the two emphases concentrated on here, and it obviously becomes important for education if it is held that both of these factors can be criticized or rejected.

This inquiry first concern itself with some discussion of the larger context of the rational Enlightenment in order to justify the emphasis given to these selected factors. Whether one dates the beginning of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century or in the later seventeenth century with Descartes' method of systematic doubt as is more commonly and usefully done, the chief emphasis is that human reason and rational understanding or "Enlightenment" came to replace theology and revelation as man's ultimate faith. It was believed initially by the Rationalists of the eighteenth century that reason would only more conclusively demonstrate
and reveal the truths of ultimate reality previously known by revelation and accepted on religious faith.\textsuperscript{13}

The inquiry into the extent of knowledge of and relationships man has with Being-as-such (whether or not personified as God) has always been a central focus of philosophy. Modern philosophy has, however, become sceptical about whether man can have any conscious and certain knowledge about ontological being and has turned to a prior examination of the units and content of man's experience and of his meaningful statements about anything. This focus upon the limits of meaningful human knowledge, upon the extent and scope of empirically testable or rationally demonstratable knowledge is called epistemology.

It is the contention of this dissertation that there are two theories of meaning in conflict here, and that the Enlightenment expresses that historical period which embodied and witnessed the transition from a dominantly Christian and ontological framework of meaning to an epistemological framework of meaning. One of the best statements of this transition is found in Carl Becker's \textit{Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Philosophers}, which will be examined before attempting to define these two frameworks of meaning more explicitly. The point to be stressed here is the idea that in the Enlightenment we have the roots of the shift from the Medieval

\textsuperscript{13}Carl Becker, \textit{The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933).
ontological "climate of opinion" and that this latter world-
view remains dominant in our culture and education today.
It seems appropriate and necessary to attempt to trace how the
Enlightenment has thus affected the this-worldliness of our
major assumptions and educational institutions and practices.

Becker notes the shift from what is here called the
ontological to the epistemological contexts of meaning. He
argues that this shift is not too significant since the
philosophers of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment really
only translated the Medieval world-view into secular terms,
the "Heavenly City" into a utopian earthly city of the near
future. This is a useful framework and essentially correct
except in the judgment that the shift from an ontological
"climate of opinion" to an epistemological one is a minor
shift. The shift would seem to be worthy in the sense that
many of the Enlightenment ideals are, in fact, secularized
versions of Christian ideals: salvation and happiness are to
become achieved historically; the brotherhood of man is to
be achieved in a utopian earthly community; the "spiritual
soul" dignity of man is to be preserved in a code of uni-
versal political and moral rights of equality to all men;
the "Truth that makes man free" is to be the enlightened
faith in reason and science that makes man economically and
politically free! The Enlightenment deified God as Nature
and the Universal World Order, while Christ became essentially
one, perhaps the best, of the world's great moral and
spiritual leaders. Transcendence, the judgment, salvation, questions of being and eternity and immortality were deleted from Christianity in the secularized Enlightenment version, or, more properly, they were brought into the faith to be achieved in time-space. Becker, in his extremely revealing last chapter, shows how these old Christian hopes led to a faith in "progress" and an identification with the historical world processes, particularly with hope in the youth and coming generations, which Becker labels "the uses of posterity." The great impetus for popular education implicit in this is evident since rational enlightenment is the basis and means for achieving these secularized ideals.

But let us return more directly to Becker's thesis that the ideals cherished by these philosophes grow out of many of the assumptions and moralistic over-tones of the Medieval era. "I think," he says, "The philosophers were nearer the Middle Ages, less emancipated from the preconceptions of the medieval Christian thought, than they quite realized or we have commonly supposed." If we examine the foundations of their faith, we find that at every turn the Philosophes betray their debt to medieval thought without being aware of it. They denounce Christian philosophy, but rather too much, after the manner of those who are but half emancipated from the 'superstitions' they score. They had put off the fear of God, but maintained a respectful attitude toward the Deity. They

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 29.
ridiculed the idea that the universe had been created in six days, but still believed it to be a beautifully articulated machine designed by the Supreme Being according to a rational plan as an abiding place for mankind. The Garden of Eden was for them a myth, no doubt, but they looked enviously back to the golden age of Roman virtue, or across the waters to the unspoiled innocence of an Arcadian civilization that flourished in Pennsylvania. They renounced the authority of the Church and Bible, but exhibited a naive faith in the authority of nature and reason. They scorned metaphysics, but were proud to be called philosophers. They dismantled heaven, somewhat prematurely it seems, since they retained their faith in the immortality of the soul. They courageously discussed atheism, but not before the servants. They defended toleration valiantly, but could with difficulty tolerate priests. They denied that miracles ever happened, but believed in the perfectability of the human race. We feel that these Philosophers were at once too credulous and too sceptical.

Such a complete faith in nature and reason is an epistemological and humanistic denial of transcendence and the transcendent sources of the regeneration of the human being. A life of optimistic expectations of the coming historical utopia is a very different quality of life from that which expects suffering and travail in this life while protecting the hope and faith of eternal life. Even more centrally, a life which expects science and education to overcome quickly or eventually all ignorance and prejudice is radically different from a life which expects sin and finitude forever to separate man from truth and which sees the necessity of living in the terrible guilt and fear of the

16 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
judgment or in communion with God. One can, of course, appreciate the value of many of the Enlightenment ideals as secularized and historicized modifications of Christian hopes and virtues, but yet insist that the transformation from the kind of "meanings" in life that such an epistemological "climate of opinion" provides to the kind of "meanings" that an ontological "climate of opinion" provides is a disservice to humanity.

It seems obvious that this secularized framework of meaning has permeated heavily into American cultural and educational thinking. Becker points out that our age has a scientific view of man. The universe and man are but chance creations and products of evolution. Man is limited in intelligence and conditioned by the very natural and social forces he seeks to understand. He cannot know how or why he was created, nor whether by a malevolent, a benevolent or an indifferent Creator!

Man is but a foundling in the cosmos, abandoned by the forces that created him. Unparented, unassisted, and undirected by omniscient or benevolent authority, he must fend for himself, and with the aid of his own limited intelligence find his way about in an indifferent universe.17

Such is the "climate of opinion" of our own era, says Becker.

The presence of two divergent "climates of opinion" suggests that the dominant values and assumptions of each era, the questions and problems which confront each individual

17Ibid., p. 15.
for answers in terms of life's ultimate commitment, and his use of personal energy and devotion may be radically different indeed. A careful analysis of the two frames of reference is necessary for the purposes of this dissertation, partly to avoid the over-simplified conclusion that ontology and Christian theology must embody the same questions and meanings, or that the only alternative of an empirically oriented epistemological framework of meaning must be a return to Medieval theology. Indeed, the view of transcendence developed in this dissertation will claim that some degree of rational understanding of being is possible even though human reason is limited to time-space experience, and more centrally that human meaning involves a wider sphere of reality than can be "known" and demonstrated rationally and empirically. More explicitly yet, it will be held that an individual's emerging framework of meaning necessarily involves many ideals and private plans for actualizing his own pattern of potentiality or becoming that can have no external and empirical referent in the actualized experience of other persons. Yet denying the meaningfulness and reality of these human endeavors, as the epistemological framework of meaning seems driven to do, tends to de-emphasize the most important area in which human meaning should be centered.

A further simplification is the identification of epistemologically based meaning with materialism and this-
worldliness, while identifying ontologically based meaning exclusively with other-worldliness. The philosophies of history, for example, are seen to embody an ontological dimension while remaining this-worldly, and it is further held by most philosophers that all philosophic positions involve some ontological structure and assumptions even if left implicit.

With this acknowledgment of possible over-simplifications and over-lappings in the two "climates" discussed, we turn now to the task of distinguishing more explicitly between them. It has already been indicated that traditionally the term "ontology" refers to questions of being and ultimate reality, while the term "epistemology" refers to questions of the nature and limits of mind, knowing, and truth. Modern philosophy, especially the British empiricists Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, has shown that starting from the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy, the ideas of human consciousness can refer only to what that given individual has experienced, or encountered in the interactions of his own sensory perceptions of contact with an assumed external reality. These empiricists show that these ideas cannot be descriptions or statements of external reality in time-space and certainly that we have no reason for assuming that they describe or correspond with the forms and structures of ultimate reality independent of the form given them by human perception and conception. In this view human consciousness
and reason are entirely existential in the sense of being limited to descriptions about the relations of ideas possible to a man under the conditions of time-space, and within the limits of his own perceptual experiencing. Hence many philosophers and scientists conclude that we can have no meaningful content about the area of philosophy traditionally designated as ontological or metaphysical. We may admit that there is an area of mystery where human consciousness simply can have no meaningful knowledge, or we may with Kant agree that man must make certain assumptions of metaphysical status in order to make our daily practical decisions about substances, the self, and the moral order of the universe.  

The term "epistemology" will, then, in this work be used to refer to the reality and meanings discerned and established by starting from the assumptions of the subject-object dichotomy, while the term "ontology" will refer to the structure of being prior to the distinctions of the human perceptions and language discriminations of the subject-object dichotomy. A word of elaboration is perhaps in order here. In the first place, if one relates this focus to the self, it becomes possible to discriminate two qualities and realities to the concept of "subject" or "subjectivity." The first is the "subject," which is the conscious perceiving subject of the epistemological focus; and the "reality" which it

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discerns is the reality that our senses encounter and shape into names and "objects." Here the "subject" is basically the self-hood which is available to us in our immediate feeling states and introspection. It is a **passive objective description** of categories and feelings that already exist, or have been actualized in the culture and internalized within our specific self-system. Buber, for example, thus emphasizes in his epistemological category of "I-It" that the discriminations of I-It are always of the past and not of the immediate present encounter, even though experience is in the immediate present. Experience thus uses the distinctions and feeling-states of a past established self-hood.\(^{19}\) The second meaning of "subject" could be called "ontological self-hood," or "ontological subjectivity," and refers to the prior physical and structural being of the human category, the "existent" unit of the person prior to any learned categories and meanings or perception and conception. This self-hood is given structure and form, not by the socially learned categories, but by the emerging energy and purposefully structured forms of the individual person, and by the limits and possibilities of the human situation itself. In this sense the "ontological subjectivity" creates a self that otherwise has no existence or unique form, but does not merely adopt the finished past and actualized forms of extant

\(^{19}\)Buber, *I and Thou*. . . .
persons and selves. The term "subjectivity" or "ontological subjectivity" has been reserved for the ontological meanings of self-hood.

Becker goes so far as to say that the epistemological and Lockean psychological view of mind and reality was seen as self-evident by the men of that period and only awaited a systematic and articulate defense or explanation. "It was self-evident that man was the product of his environment," Becker says, "— of nature and the institutions under which he lived—and that by reshaping his environment in accord with the invariable and determinable laws of nature, his material and spiritual regeneration might be speedily accomplished."²⁰ We can sense from this single quotation how closely related the trust in reason and the rise in scientific control were in men's hopes for rapid environmental control.

A precondition of this hope was the elimination of the belief in original sin or any negatively active (irrational) forces from within the individual organisms. What was needed was an "empty bucket" view of mind's receptivity, as Popper calls it,²¹ or the "blank slate" view as we find Locke developing it himself.²² Hence, the individual's "mental contents"


become the residue or products of whatever experiences and external influences are shovelled in from the outside environment, so all is dependent upon the quality and purity of the social order! This belief in controlling nature and man to overcome evil is what might well be called the "environmental hypothesis," a faith that by improving the environment, and thereby all institutions and all experiences, happiness could be considered solely a matter of man's own creation. If men failed to reduce pain and to enhance pleasure, they were guilty of inhumanity, for the knowledge and political processes to achieve it lay in man's control. Cobban's statement of the Enlightenment ideals may be summarized as follows:

Slowly and hesitantly the principle of religious toleration came to be affirmed; torture, taken for granted from time immemorial as a necessary adjunct to civil and religious society, was discredited; ... war was no longer regarded as a necessary evil; the rule of law was asserted and arbitrary police powers condemned; slavery was denounced; utilitarianism proclaimed that the object of government was the greatest happiness of the greatest number.\(^23\)

J. B. Bury's *The Idea of Progress*\(^24\) is the classic treatment of this kind of faith in the coming utopia. He reviews the three major interpretations of the meaning of history, or meaning in history, for man: the cyclical or...
circular view, which expects cultures and civilizations to rise and decline repeatedly—this was the Greek view and has appeared recurrently, today, for example, in Toynbee; secondly, the doctrine of providence, which sees God directing the course of history toward individual salvation or toward the second coming and final day of judgment, whether or not man can understand this; and thirdly, the doctrine of progress, which posits continual perfectability on the part of man as a result of his own efforts, with no expectation of Fate or God's intervention to thwart or halt (or help) this progress. Bury is careful to point out what we often forget in America that faith in the idea of progress is a faith, and we cannot know the course of future history any more than a Christian can know when or if God's judgment arrives. Bury makes a convenient comparison to faith in Providence or personal immortality, and of this comparison he states that "...it is true or it is false...it cannot be proved either true or false. Belief in it is an act of faith."25

What Bury shows in this account is that the possibility of linear and uninterrupted progress only became possible with a systematic and cumulative kind of knowledge that could be used to control an assumed regular natural order, and this, of course, came with the rise of science. Bury traces the

25Ibid., p. 4.
roots of the idea of progress to the works of Bodin who first gives up the inevitable fatalism and tragedy of history; secondly, to the influence of Bacon whom he sees as responsible for the notion that the purpose of knowledge is utility and practical improvement; and thirdly, to the Cartesian influence and assumptions that man's reason could discover and control the universal laws of Nature's reality. Bury then traces how men assumed that progressive advance in science would necessarily bring greater environmental control and human happiness. He, himself, was less optimistic, claiming that

... some triumphs of philanthropy hardly seemed to endanger the conclusion that while knowledge is indefinitely progressive, there is no good reason for sanguine hopes that man is 'perfectible' or that universal happiness is attainable. 26

Yet optimistic faith in social progress does prevail, and Bury attributes this to the influence of evolutionary thought upon modern assumptions and beliefs, that is, the equating of the survival of the "fittest" with the most cooperative and vital and intelligent, and therefore "happiest."

Perhaps this can be best summarized and integrated with earlier themes, especially those of Becker, by a quotation from Eric Kahler's *Man the Measure*:

The creed of progress was, for the first time, a belief in the future, a glorification of the future, and an invalidation of the past. Religion had been

26 Ibid., p. 333.
a tie to a pre-industrial, pre-human, super-human source of life. The creed of progress ia human reference to an ideal mankind, to the tasks and aims of perfect humanity. It is based on emancipation of profane man, of the human individual, on the self-awareness and self-confidence, indeed over-confidence of man in his own reason and power, in his power by virtue of his reason.27

And again Kahler notes:

The creed of progress is the intellectual reflection and expression of human being who no longer lives according to origins but according to aims and consciously conceived purposes.28

There was a humanitarian and ethical implication in this formal doctrine of progress, strongly suggested by Kahler's emphasis--the indebtedness to men's efforts and achievements of past era's and a responsibility toward the future generations. This responsibility was not only to one's own family but the historical family of man, a concept that was greatly strengthened by the Darwinian view of man as a generic species possibly to be replaced some day in the evolutionary scale. The utilitarian ethic--the greatest good for the greatest number--in a sense gets pushed into the future abstractly, and man becomes responsible not only for all contemporary mankind but for the influences of his life upon the lives of all the future generations of man! A


28Ibid., pp. 473-474. (italics mine.)
rather heavy burden, Nietzsche\(^2\) and others later point out! Lowith shows how the "idea of progress" eventually had to carry all the functions that the old view of Providence had served, "... that is, to foresee and to provide for the future."\(^3\)

So, at the time of the Enlightenment, this "meaning in history" was woven very centrally into a time-space context, into the view of meaning as achievement and actualization by and for a nation or society or total race, and the individual's "meaning" was achieved through his contribution to this grand scale drama. Hegel's *Reason in History* is the most famous and most influential statement of this view from an Idealistic point of view, and, of course, Marx's from a sociological-economic or dialectical-materialist point of view. When Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* announces that "God is dead," he is in one sense announcing the loss of faith in the direct power and meaning of the providential and transcendent types of personal meaning in history; for, as Becker says so well,

> the secret of its (Christianity's) enduring strength . . . was that it announced with authority—whether truly or not matters little—that the life of man


has significance, a universal significance transcending and including the temporal experience of the individual. 31

But at last this meaning and happiness were not so certain, And so the Enlightenment helped to try to give a meaning inside history,

... achievable by man himself, by the progressive improvement made by efforts of successive generations of men; and in this cooperative enterprise posterity had its undeniable uses: posterity would complete what the past and present had begun. 32

And again, "It is an optimism projected into the future, sustained by the conviction that what is wrong will shortly be set right." 33 And this optimism for implementing the Enlightenment heritage into new institutional forms in America, especially education and the American version of progress, now becomes our focus.

Some Limits of the Enlightenment Heritage in Relation to American Education

The preceding section on the Enlightenment heritage has discussed the general shift from a view of Christian transcendence for the context of life's meanings in the Medieval period to an empirically oriented view of mind and meaning in a time-space context. This Enlightenment emphasis has

31 Becker, The Heavenly City . . ., p. 128.

32 Ibid., p. 129.

33 Ibid., p. 137.
been identified in this work as the Epistemologically oriented view of meaning. Two dimensions of this new Enlightenment framework of meaning have been isolated as having particular importance for suggesting the relevance of an existential-self-psychology approach to contemporary education. The first of these is symbolized by the Lockean view of mind, with its empirical and epistemological approach to truth and its subsequent motivation of the Philosophers to adopt the "environmental hypothesis"—reforming the quality of the individual through the indirect process of reforming the social dimensions of the environment. Educational reforms in this heritage still place the focus and locus of qualitative individual change in the attempt to select and purify the kind of environment children grow within, or the kind of experiences possible to them.34

This section will suggest that Dewey's view of mind is more dynamic than is Locke's view, since Dewey views man in the context of the Darwinian and social Darwinian emphasis upon mind as an environmentally adaptive and functional verbal process. Yet it must be acknowledged that Dewey basically retains the environmental hypothesis of the Enlightenment heritage. The attempt will be made to show

that the locus of qualitative change or growth for Dewey is in his concept of the interaction of the growing person with selectively perceived external reality, a process which Dewey calls "experience." It will be held that in Dewey the context and structure of the environment is dominant in setting the pervading quality which constitutes "having an experience."

While Dewey has a more active view of man than Locke, the emphasis is really at the biological level while mind remains caught in the environmental hypothesis as a verbal process called "reconstruction of experience." The form of this experience is itself more pervaded by the structure of environmental contexts than by the structuring of the individual self. The view of transcendence defended in this dissertation will by contrast, put the emphasis of evolving form and structure more within the emerging self-hood of each person. It will argue that the qualitative dimensions of human becoming involve not only a reconstruction of experience, but more fundamentally a reconstruction of the


ontological structure and reality of the subjectivity of the self.

The second influence from the Enlightenment heritage—the formulation of philosophies of history within which the individual finds his larger meaning in life—also leads directly into a consideration of the idea of progress in Dewey's "progressivism" since this has been so centrally influential upon education in our time. Yet this idea of progress is deeply imbedded in the totality of American society. As was suggested in the last section, the individual seems to have tended to join history, or the drama and power and significant currents of history, through an identification of his own destiny with the destiny of his nation-state or with groups and institutions which represent that state. To the extent that such an identification becomes the individual's highest loyalty, Tillich calls it a "quasi-religion." This label suggests the semi-transcendent dimensions of meaning which many believe to be centered in the loyalty of nationalism. To the extent that this identification of the individual with the nation-state is semi-transcendent and hence perceived as beyond criticism on the part of the individual, we may say that a Hegelian


type of philosophy of history is still dominant in the American view of progress.

From the beginning of our nation, however, there has been an emphasis upon the individual will and effort in shaping this progress and upon the supremacy of the individual over the state since political democracy does not presume to have the ultimate answers of right and wrong in life, but leaves these questions to individual reason and conscience to discern. This emphasis upon the individual's reason and will, largely within the natural rights framework of Locke and the Enlightenment, would seem to allow for a more ontologically based locus of truth and meaning for human individuality than is prevalent today. Yet the dominant Enlightenment heritage in America would seem to have been a continuation of the epistemological framework of meaning and intellectual inquiry, both in the intellectuals and in the pervading popular philosophy of progress. It is this generalization that this section hopes to establish. For, as Barrett's quotation at the beginning of this chapter has suggested, this heritage may provide meanings that are too thin and abstract to provide the courage and deeply rooted complex search for truth that is needed in the contemporary world. Clarifying and defending these criticisms will become the second major focus of this chapter, thus establishing more discriminately the problems the existential-self-psychology framework hopes to address itself to.
The most thorough and useful historical work on the influence of the general Enlightenment upon early American thought, and especially upon education, is Hansen's classic work, *Liberalism and American Education in the Eighteenth Century*. Mr. Hansen is a major historian and has gone directly to primary sources of the Enlightenment Philosophers, especially Godwin and Rousseau and Fontenelle, and to the primary writings of the early American republic, especially Thomas Paine and the writings on education submitted to the American Philosophic Society. Not only Jefferson's and Franklin's writings are discussed by Hansen, but also those papers submitted precisely for the function of setting up a system of education in the new democracy: published papers by Samuel Knox and Suel H. Smith and unpublished papers by Benjamin Rush, Robert Coram, James Sullivan, Nathaniel Chipman, Du Pont de Numours, Lofitle du Courtiel, and Noah Webster. Mr. Hansen sought to find the common expression of values and faiths that permeated all or most of these early conceptions of education, and presents his conclusions as basically expressing these historical documents. Hansen's analysis stresses what might be called the Romantic dimension of the Enlightenment analysis. His central focus is upon the perfectibility of man through the flexible and controllable

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nature of social institutions. However, the dominant epistomological tradition is emphasized also, both explicitly and implicitly. His opening statement presents an illuminating overview:

The degree to which American life and institutions were influenced by the liberal movement of the eighteenth century has not yet been adequately set forth. The characteristic ideas of the movement were: that creativeness was inherent in the individual; that the creative genius of man could be directed for social progress; that the lines of human progress could be determined; and that the continuous development of the human race through scientific control was the only valid function of institutions.

Again,

In the past, institutions had been the result of chance or accident. In America there existed an opportunity for the scientific development of institutions that would be flexible, modifiable, plastic, and directly related to the forwarding of whatever interests might arise. Initiating, refashioning, innovating, creating—all of these could be scientifically developed and fused in the motif of societal welfare.

And, finally,

Democracy implied the creating of intelligent citizens who would see clearly their responsibility for developing such a government and other institutions. Hence there must be instituted a system of education for creative democracy.41

One feels the Fabian socialist overtones of this vision; one almost senses the Constitutional promise of liberalism and even the ultimate promise of the New Deal. But again one feels the ominous problems our own generation is facing as these very institutions get too big and complex and restrictive.

41 Ibid., Preface, p. v.
upon the individual man so that they lose the precious flexibility that was to render them significant and meaningful.

Hansen goes on then to identify five "dominant ideas of the Eighteenth Century."[^42] The first of these he calls the "Indefinite Perfectability of Man and Institutions."[^43] He emphasizes here the speed and extent of progress and reform wrought by scientific invention and machines. Where progress had previously been individual and accidental, now it was to be cumulative and planned! A quotation from Godwin[^44] makes the point here admirably, and also reflects Locke's view of mind that has been seen as central in this historical account.

Let us carry back our minds to man in his original state, a being capable of impressions and knowledge to an unbounded extent, but not having as yet received the one or cultivated the other; and let us contrast this being with all that science and genius have effect: and from hence we may form some idea what it is of which human nature is capable.[^45]

Here Godwin's unbounded faith overflows in his contrast of the coming civilized present and future with the barbarous ignorance of early man; for it is the progress

.. . that constitutes that inequality between Newton and the Ploughman! . . . The development of humanity with all of its arts and refinements

[^42]: Ibid., p. 1.
[^43]: Ibid., p. 1.
from the savage state to the most highly civilized could not be denied.\textsuperscript{46}

And Hansen emphasizes that even the sub-title of so restrained a Rationalist and so early an Enlightenment thinker as Descartes in his \textit{Discourse on Method} was entitled: "The Project of a Universal Science which can elevate our Nature to its highest degree of Perfection."\textsuperscript{47} Hansen closes this section with a documentation of Rousseau's view of man as innately good, popularized by Thomas Paine and Richard Price in America.

The Enlightenment belief "that man could determine the lines of progress,"\textsuperscript{48} is the second dominant idea discussed by Hansen. The major point is that past institutional arrangements had grown up automatically and accidentally from the operation of man's instincts, but now following the clear light of reason it was possible to replace these evil institutions with a just arrangement of the social order. This is the concept of a social contract,\textsuperscript{49} applied not only to the political arena where it justifies revolution against the old order (as Jefferson's Declaration of Independence embodies), but also applied to the overthrow and reform of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{46} Hansen (Quoted from Godwin's \textit{Enquiry} \ldots, p. 43), pp. 3, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Jean Jacques Rousseau, \textit{Social Contract} (New York: Scribners, 1895).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
all inherited, unjust institutional forms. The free
sovereignty of the individual was to lie in this exercise of
reason and subservience to law thus guaranteeing through the
social contract and giving all men the same responsibilities
and rights. Subsequent political thinkers and social critics
have pointed to how this contract and its idea of the "gen-
eral will" above the individual is not only an argument for
freedom, but paradoxically the greatest argument for dicta-
torial rule since anyone who knows or claims to know what
this general will really is may then properly assume leader-
ship over the whole community. But the Enlightenment thinkers
had no such fears. They genuinely believed that this social
organization freed the individual man from his passions to
follow the light of his own reason and creativity. For
science and reason were now to contribute to universal knowl-
edge and a broad humanitarianism, and the results would be
beneficial to all.

The third dominant idea that Hansen finds in these
early American documents and thinkers is "that flexible
institutions are necessary for human progress."\textsuperscript{50} The idea
of progress and perfectability pre-supposes that man is not
already perfect, not totally trustable in his spontaneity as
the extreme Romantics had held, but reformable, educatable,
perfectible. No government that has ever existed or that ever

\textsuperscript{50}Hansen, \textit{Liberalism and . . .}, p. 9.
will exist is innately perfect, so the channels of change and correction must be built into the institutional structure itself! This idea one might regard as the genius of the democratic political system inasmuch as it provides for gradual and evolutionary reforms through time in spite of widely divergent honest human differences.

As his fourth dominant idea of early American thought Hansen discusses the conviction that "institutions exist to further progress."51 Here there is sharp contrast to the Medieval view; one can see clearly that the transcendent or semi-transcendent meaning has shifted from achieving salvation all at once, at the judgment or by grace, to achieving salvation gradually through the progressive control and shaping of history, of the "city of earth"! The optimists believed that once we ordered institutional perfectibility, justice and morality would become automatic and habitual.

As Hansen states,

The cosmopolitan, humanitarian outlook of the eighteenth century saw in the recognition of, and in the determination to erase, all narrow class and national distinctions, the possibility of an ultimate synthesis of whatever would be invaluable in human evolution.52

To continue,

Whereas man had been the means, he now became the end, and all institutions existed in order to make

51 Ibid., p. 11.
52 Ibid., p. 13.
him free for creative, effective living. But it remained for man to discover the natural laws and to fashion the institutions according to them.\textsuperscript{53}

Finally, Hansen emphasizes in his fifth dominant idea from the Enlightenment influence that they saw education as the principal means for progress.\textsuperscript{54} As history could be shaped by good institutions, so the history of the individual as he grows to maturity could be shaped by his environment and experiences. We see the environmental hypothesis and Locke's passive view of mind again here, as even the motives and sentiments of men were to be achieved through social experiences. Evil comes from authoritarian heritages, and so an impulse for freeing the child toward use of reason could be followed if the institutions and experiences of the school were rationally designed and carefully selected for their character-building dimensions. It is interesting to note here, as Hansen does, that many of these early philosophers and their American disciples leaned toward a preference for private schools where change and innovation were not so hampered by size and tradition and economic limitations. Overall Hansen is surprised by these men's naive faith in progress:

\ldots It is striking to find how general was the feeling at this time (after the Revolutionary War) that nothing should be done that would hinder further progress, that nothing should be created in the way


\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 14.
of institutions that would tend to see them as something that should be maintained for themselves. Institutions were to be human agencies, the servants of humanitarian progress, and hence in no way considered of worth in themselves.

Growth was to be the keynote of American education, and the problem of American education would be to establish in the largest way possible means of and for inter-communication, and inter-communication of such a sort as would have to do with human progress.55

The following passage from Hansen perhaps best summarizes the establishment of Enlightenment themes and ideas in early America:

The doctrine of the indefinite perfectibility of man and of institutions was defined and its implications elaborated in the eighteenth century. It became the dominant motif of the Enlightenment and of the revolutionary democratic movements in America and France. The idea that man was progressive by nature stimulated an analysis of the conditions that govern progress. This led to the conception of man as a being governed by natural law, the discovery of which was necessary in order that progress might be scientifically directed. The institutions that prevailed were in general obsolete and had been the result of chance and superstition. Institutions could alone be justified if they contributed to the advancement and welfare of mankind. In order that mankind might progress minimally institutions must be flexible, fluid, and evolutionary. The only adequate means for freeing man from the limitations of superstition and archaic institutions would be a system of education that would make inevitable a scientific, objective, experimental attitude that would lead to creative innovation and that would energize reconstruction of everything related to the progress of man. The lines of progress could in this way be scientifically determined.56

Though the Calvinist Protestant and traditional Catholic streams of thought were present also in early America, we may safely conclude that the Enlightenment complex of ideas was

55Ibid., pp. 46-47.

56Ibid., pp. 20-21.
dominant. The basic Enlightenment view was clearly espoused in such prominent early American figures as Thomas Jefferson and Horace Mann, particularly as they dealt with education.

A very excellent treatment of the early historical shift in America from the utopian Enlightenment reforms suggested by Hansen's analysis to the overly technical and socially egalitarian version of the idea of progress prevalent today is to be found in Ekirch's work, The Idea of Progress in America—1815-1860.57 This study is particularly valuable in the context of this dissertation because it not only documents the above transition, but it also emphasizes the unique development of the American version of progress as a philosophy of history. It shows that this view of progress was not only supported by dominant intellectuals, but it also shows that progress became the popular semi-metaphysical assumption about the course and meaning of history. Further, Ekirch shows that mass education—that kind of education that came with the Jacksonian revolution and the will of the common man to achieve the kind of education that would give him a place of status in America's technological state—has from the start emphasized scientific-technological meanings and processes of inquiry in our curricular structure and classroom content. Hence Americanization has gone hand in hand with the epistemological streams of the Enlightenment heritage.

This is the central American integration of the two themes that this dissertation has heretofore considered.

In the early twentieth century, Dewey becomes the best and most popular philosopher of this marriage between scientific-technological progress and the idea of progress arising from an Enlightenment philosophy of history. The utopian and universal ideals of the early Enlightenment were neglected as the philosophy of progress became nationalized though Dewey's integration believes that this universalism may again be recaptured in the distant future as we realize that our own self-interest necessarily involves the interests of mankind as a whole. However, this belief would seem unjustified in view of our emphasis on parochial and national integration, on our concept of America as the saving remnant of the future through a manifest destiny either of conquest or of ideological conversion. Be this as it may, we are faced today with institutions and value-heritages that may be in many ways irrelevant to the problems of our own generation. Ekirch's themes merit elaboration.

He first examines the utopian Enlightenment heritage that Hansen discussed. He notes that Bury's classic work on the Idea of Progress saw progress as a transcendent philosophy of history, an article of faith. But then Ekirch adds a very significant comment on the unique American emphasis or interpretation of this faith. "Bury accordingly included progress
among those ideas not dependent for their fulfillment upon man's will." He says,

However, in the United States, as we shall see, the American people felt that, although progress was indeed certain, it could nevertheless be impeded or accelerated by human will and effort. It was therefore not only a theory of the past or a philosophy of the future, but also an incentive to action.58

Ekirch shows that the utopian Enlightenment thinkers were read and highly regarded in the early American colonies.59 In fact, Ekirch concludes, "The American theory of progress in the early years may be considered a product of the philosophy of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment transplanted to the virgin soil of a new nation."60 "In the United States during these decades the material environment and intellectual atmosphere were alike favorable to a philosophy of progress"61 so that the frontier and social mobility of America led natives and immigrants alike into every-day experiences of a nation of growing power and economic achievements. Wars, of course, helped to unify this loyalty, and victories and expansion helped to nurture the semi-transcendent dimensions of the philosophy of progress as a kind of manifest destiny. As Ekirch states, "With the concrete evidence of material advancement on every side, progress was the faith of the common man as well as of the philosopher."62

58Ibid., p. 11.  
59Ibid., pp. 14, 18.  
60Ibid., p. 25.  
61Ibid., p. 34.  
62Ibid., p. 36.
This material view of progress, fortified by the advance of technology, established a formidable faith in progress itself. As Ekirch observes: "To both aliens and the native Americans these abundant resources appeared to furnish a reason for believing in the idea of progress." Because "To the generality of the American people it was the practical application of the powers of science that furnished the most obvious evidence of progress." But what is of concern and interest here is that this faith in technological progress has now been largely transferred from a process of individual transformation to a process of socioeconomic-political transformation, and it is increasingly the state and large institutions of concentrated power that are believed to be the creative and reforming agencies in American society.

It is this power, essentially from the Industrial Revolution of our country, that has demanded new skills and technicians for an expanding industrial society, and that has led into the reforms and pressures on our schools. Cremins has recently traced the schools' response to this growing industrial world in a very careful way. His analysis in The Transformation of the Schools links "progressive

63Ibid., p. 104
64Ibid., p. 106.
education" with the larger political social reforms of our society, especially in response to the demands of the new world of work and social arrangements brought about by the Industrial Revolution.

Ekirch shows that it was not only the public schools which reflected this identification of technological progress with socioeconomic progress but also the private and popular adult movements such as the lyceum and mechanics institutes. He sees this same identification reflected in governmental support of the agricultural and industrial areas of education. All of this he sees as evidence that the idea of progress had become the official philosophy of history of America at all levels. For example,

This enthusiasm for self-culture and the support given the lyceum movement were excellent illustrations of the reality in the United States of the idea of progress. Not the plaything of the cloistered philosopher, the concept was being put into actual effect in America. That an educated people meant a better society became accepted almost as a national truism.66

Ekirch examines early school readers, speeches, texts, college spokesman's positions, etc., and shows that these are not only steeped in a practical, utilitarian, scientific, faith but also in a nationalistic, patriotic faith in achieving the ultimate dreams of historical progress through mass education itself.67 Horace Mann was one particularly articulate and explicit disciple of this position.68

67Ibid., pp. 209-220.
Ekrich shows that various interest groups hoped to achieve somewhat different ends, and through somewhat different emphases in the curriculum. Some thought education would lead all men to the enlightened self-interest of adopting the social reforms of political liberalism, and that the utopian dreams of the early Enlightenment might yet be realized. More saw education as the means of social-mobility to income and status for themselves or their children, or as a constructive use of energy for otherwise hostile and revolutionary immigrant groups—especially if the school properly Americanized them. Others emphasized the importance of an educated electorate for political democracy while many scholars saw the schools as the selective agency for finding and grooming those leaders destined to be the "aristocracy of the talented" in a democracy. "Thus," concludes Ekrich, "for a variety of reasons, education appealed to various groups as synonymous with the hope offered by the idea of progress." 69

And he concludes,

Generalizing from the results of this material and cultural advancement the American people made the idea of progress both a law of history and the will of a benign Providence. . . . Confining ourselves to the period covered by this analysis, we may safely conclude that the idea of progress was the most popular American philosophy, thoroughly congenial to the ideas and interests of the age. 70

68Ibid., pp. 196, 205-206, 208.
69Ibid., p. 224.
Ekrich's discussion, then, suggests that the American version of the idea of progress combines the two main Enlightenment streams that this chapter has isolated. This American integration would seem to be very important and potentially dangerous in contemporary times. If the analysis suggested here is basically correct, we must see ourselves as growing out of a heritage of isolationism and parochial versions of the idea of progress, and realize that the institutional structures and major value currents of nearly one hundred and fifty years in this nation have tended to emphasize the epistemological dimensions of the Enlightenment heritage to the neglect or minimization of the ontological dimensions.

This marriage of epistemological meanings to an increasingly nationalistic view of the idea of progress may be further explored in the educational thought of John Dewey. It was his genius to see significance in the dynamic thrust of biology put in a historical time context by such popularizers as Spencer, Ward and Sumner. Dewey adapted this biological concept to his view of the individual. It gave him his dynamic, his focus on the activeness of mind and of the learning process, as opposed to the purely passive environmental hypothesis that has been traced from Locke. It was in keeping with the nineteenth century European philosophies of life, but at the same time it adopted the conservative-utopian faith in progress and technology as previously
presented here. It was a monumental synthesis, and unquestionably had many constructive benefits upon American education, especially in the first half of this century.

Yet we need to raise the question alluded to in earlier discussions: Can pragmatism continue to progress beyond itself? Because the central source of energy formation, in Dewey's view, comes from man as an animal in the evolutionary scheme, one could classify this version of pragmatism as a philosophy of life typical of nineteenth century philosophy's ontology. But as Dewey's pragmatism goes on to define human individuality through an epistemological framework of meaning, he moves into the social meaning realm which has earlier in this work been placed in a philosophy-of-history context, and would seem to be dependent upon the Enlightenment heritage. But still there is the biological base to Dewey's approach, renewed in each generation, and it is paradoxically honored and criticized in the following remarkable passage from Paul Tillich:

If nature (and for naturalism this means 'being') is seen as the creative expression of an unconscious will or as the objectivization of the will to power or as the product of the elan vital, then the centers of will, the individual selves, are decisive for the movement of the whole. In individual's self-affirmation life affirms itself or negates itself. Even if the selves are subject to an ultimate cosmic destiny they determine their own being in freedom. A large section of American pragmatism belongs to this group. In spite of American conformism and its courage to be as a part, pragmatism shared many concepts with that perspective more widely known in Europe as the 'philosophy of life.' Its ethical principle is growth, its educational method is self-
affirmation of the individual self, its preferred concept is creativity. The pragmatist philosophers are not always aware of the fact that courage to create implies the courage to replace the old by the new—the new for which there are no norms and criteria, the new which is a risk and which, measured by the old, is incalculable. Their social conformity hides from them what in Europe was expressed openly and consciously. They do not realize that pragmatism in its logical consequence . . . leads to that courage to be as oneself which is proclaimed by the radical Existentialists . . . . The European naturalists are consistent and self-destructive; the American naturalists are saved by a happy inconsistency: they still accept the conformist courage to be as a part.71

Surely it is a back-handed kind of compliment to claim a philosophic position is "saved by a happy inconsistency," but let us note that what is saved thereby is the individual's solipsistic isolation from himself! Tillich is critical, but he is also affirming that this approach embodies an understandable and sensible approach to meaning, to the overcoming of those doubts of ontological estrangement which men do fear and to which they do need to seek answers. These kinds of ultimate questions cease to be central and important and meaningful once one has taken this epistemological approach to resolving this uncertainty, and thereby the ontological self-hood is denied. So while it is an understandable approach to self-protection and self-affirmation, it denies one central sphere of human meanings, by no longer living with, doubting, and asking these ontological questions and

71Tillich, The Courage . . ., pp. 119-120. (Italics mine.)
meanings. In another very clarifying passage Tillich explains this:

Doubt is based on man's separation from the whole of reality, on his lack of universal participation, on the isolation of his individual self. So he tries to break out of this situation, to identify himself with something transindividual, to surrender his separation and self-relatedness. He flees from his freedom of asking and answering for himself to a situation in which no further questions can be asked and the answers to previous questions are imposed on him authoritatively. In order to avoid the risk of asking and doubting he surrenders the right to ask and doubt. He surrenders himself in order to save his spiritual life. He 'escapes from freedom' (Fromm) in order to escape the anxiety of meaninglessness. Now he is no longer lonely, not in existential doubt, not in despair. He 'participates' and affirms by participation in the contents of his spiritual life. Meaning is saved, but the self is sacrificed.

And this is the point at which we can see pragmatism more clearly as a version of the philosophy-of-history approach to meaning. The individual's self does have meaning, but only in the social context of pre-determined mutually-agreed-upon kinds of meaningfulness. In this particular passage Tillich is talking about the tendency of men fully to lose the individual self in loyalty to the great cause, the fanatic movements, the charismatic leader. One should note that pragmatism is equally critical of these extremes of loss of self-hood. Yet I believe the point has been well made by Tillich, and still holds, that it is now an epistemological kind of self-hood that pragmatism so desperately clings to.

\[72\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 49. (Italics mine.)}\]
and tries to protect. So I return to the central question: Can it do this in the modern age?

To the extent that the meanings of the self are epistemologically originated meanings from the context of the external social community and mediated by the language forms existing within it, one must conclude that the individual's meaning is largely a process of increasing social awareness. This is in fact the process of wider and more inclusive "broadening the base of experiences," and extending the context in time and space, the process that Dewey called education, growth, and democracy! The epistemological self does "grow" in this process, assuming that the base is, in fact, widened, and the differences and variations are meaningfully grafted upon the self. Dewey believed that such growth was possible through the increasingly internalized contexts of social-meanings. Tillich is, of course, sceptical.

Limitations of the Enlightenment Heritage: Some Contemporary Observations

The Enlightenment heritage in knowledge and education seems to have produced a curious paradox, namely, that as educational opportunity has been extended and taken for granted by a mass society, a new dimension of apathy, of loss of interest and intrinsic motivation has become very pervasive. The issue has been anticipated by the claim that the

institutions of learning in our society embody dominantly a view of meaning from the epistemological Enlightenment heritage. He can now add that the bureaucratic structure of these institutions, due to increased population and problems of size has been organized to achieve the institutional ends rationally and efficiently. It is a common criticism that the individual person has lost power and meaning in the process. For the new learner there appears to be such an array of knowledge and possible interpretations of that knowledge, that he cannot begin to find a basis for making his own integrations with any personal meaning or purposefulness. Hence the students soon come to meet the requirements of a particular instructor or course and put aside the problems of integrated and purposeful meanings—or so they tell themselves and others—until they have received their grades and degrees.

A comment from Kierkegaard is illuminative here. He made the same observation in regard to becoming a Christian in an already nominally Christian culture. He argued that it is more difficult to experience the true Christian impact when the whole culture already professes to be Christian but


does not live up to the risks and reality which the early Christians encountered. Kierkegaard takes it as his mission in life to demonstrate how very difficult it is to be and to live a truly committed Christian life. He seeks to undermine the nominal Christianity of his time by showing the shallowness of the easy and effortless Christian-on-Sunday religion that involves no transformed quality of love and service to humanity in the believer's life and does not provide that eternal happiness which should be its subjective reality.77

By analogy then, one can argue that it is equally difficult to become an educated person, intrinsically and qualitatively motivated, in an already educated society. Here, as in the church, there are countless uses and forms already actualized as expressions of an educated self. There is no search toward an ever-greater transcendence, toward universal reality and knowledge. The learning of words and the meeting of goals for grades and degrees becomes comparable to empty rituals and forms in nominal Christianity; the respectable status and social position or the ready opportunity to make money or sell knowledge and methodological skills becomes just as philosophico-psychologically meaningless and unsatisfying as in nominal Christianity. Since the end is thus one of disenchantment, the process of achieving

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the goal also becomes one of apathy and non-involvement in the lives of the students. This analogy is presented here for clarifying and justifying an approach to education that may seem to some to make the educational process unnecessarily difficult and personally threatening. The position defended in this dissertation is that education should involve deep risk and struggle if it is to be challenging and meaningful, worthy of the investment of one's short time, limited money, and earnest efforts.

In fact, much that is depressing and anxiety-producing in life will need to enter educational experience. This is the contemporary reality our generation must courageously confront. We cannot reason with these problems until we are aware of them and courageous enough to be concerned or personally responsible for them.

What is "thin and abstract" about the Enlightenment heritage in relation to American secular education, then, is that the learner's personal sources of energy and ultimate meanings has been rarified. The transcendent base of spirit and "ontological subjectivity" has been denied as epistemologically non-meaningful or even non-existent. The intrinsic importance of the present and the quality of the personal life have been rendered subservient to a past and future historical progress. This focuses the learner's energies upon the actualized socio-historical world and its problems rather than upon the problems of the growth of the learner's
subjective self as a prior qualitative form of being. This dissertation will claim that this prerequisite concern with the self is necessary in education to provide a qualitative and creative base for socially and historically useful lives as well as subjectively meaningful ones.
CHAPTER II

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF EXISTENTIALISM TO

EDUCATION: A VIEW OF REALITY AND

HUMAN NATURE

Tillich makes an important and useful distinction between Existentialism as an attitude and Existentialism as an "ism" or philosophic content. The "existential attitude is one of involvement, in contrast to a merely theoretical or detached attitude."¹

It is participating in a situation, especially a cognitive situation, with the whole of one's existence. This includes temporal, spatial, historical, psychological, sociological, biological conditions. And it includes the finite freedom which reacts to these conditions and changes them. . . . Existential knowledge is based on an encounter in which a new meaning is created and recognized.²

It calls to mind those involved and universally compassionate thinkers such as Socrates, Jesus, and Pascal. The attitude is well expressed in Fallico's opening sentence: "The Existentialist attitude represents not so much another philosophical position among the many, as it does, I think,


²Ibid., p. 124.
the issue of any philosophizing which comes to maturity and to self-consciousness."³ In this view, philosophy necessarily implies the honest attempt of all serious thinkers to create new forms of understanding and renew the spirit of inquiry and truth in their own generation.

"Turning now to Existentialism not as an attitude but as content," Tillich continues,"we can distinguish three meanings: Existentialism as a point of view, as protest, and as expression."⁴ He links the first two meanings—point of view and protest—in a criticism of Hegelian system building which robs the individual of his individuality. The third meaning—expression—he relates to arts and humanities, which have the courage to develop new forms showing modern man that such a systematized life is meaningless. Existentialism as content is seen by Barrett as "The counter-Enlightenment come at last to philosophic expression; and it demonstrates beyond anything else that the ideology of the Enlightenment is thin, abstract, and therefore dangerous."⁵

Existentialism is a philosophic movement, then, is regarded in this dissertation (following Barrett) as an anti-Enlightenment philosophy come to self-awareness and


⁵William Barrett, Irrational Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Paperbound, 1953), p. 244.
self-criticism. The preceding chapter developed what was believed to be some of the limits of the Enlightenment heritage in its relation to contemporary education. Existentialist thinkers have rejected the rationalist assumption of an ordered universe to be understood by the ordering principles of human intelligence. They are sceptical of the epistemological meaning theory both in relation to a narrow science and a quasi-religious philosophy of history. It will be the purpose of this chapter to illuminate the Existentialist criticisms, and then, more positively, to extract a learning theory from Existential thought that would seem to provide an adequate and exciting theoretical approach to contemporary teaching.

**The Existentialist View of the Nature of Man**

There is, of course, a large and sophisticated body of Existential writing. The Barrett volume and Fallico's article have been adjudged most pertinent to the purposes of this dissertation. Following them, this work will establish the fact that the Existentialists are trying to return to a kind of neo-Kantian phenomenological base which roots individuality in a metaphysical context and attempts to re-establish the category of the ontologically subjective individual prior to the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy. Also, it will hold that the Existentialist's have a somewhat common concept of being as dynamic in structure, and that they
have a common view of human nature which is best discussed around the central doctrine that "existence precedes essence." This very statement, of course, suggests that essence and Being, are not denied. What is denied is that view of ontology which holds that the human being is predestined by the structure of Being to fulfill a pre-ordained type of teleological path in which there is little or no flexibility of self-structuring possible, whether this is seen in personal terms such as predestination, or collective terms such as the philosophies of history earlier discussed.

This is the very heart of the existential view of freedom since the emphasis is upon the idea that there is a tremendous variety to the potentiality that an individual can actualize, and there are no essential criteria for deciding which path to follow. Each of us risks and creates his own identity and structure in this "dreadful freedom," as Marjorie Greene has characteristically labeled it. Thus we define the "essent" that is our own being. Since there are many possibilities, there is a kind of pregnant reality to this dimension of potentiality or becoming, for Existentialists; and the ontological category of "Non-Being" or "Nothingness" has become a real and important dimension of the human predicament. Sartre goes further than most toward

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*Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).
holding a nearly limitless realm of possible becomings for each individual and has probably most profoundly investigated the meaning of nothingness for human freedom and consciousness. But Heidegger, Tillich, and, in fact, all of the existential writers have such a view of open ontology and take non-being seriously. Sartre has also been most effective in popularizing the fear men have of defining their own "Existenz," as Jaspers names this individual authenticity, and of showing how we escape this demand in various deceptions and social conformities in our time.

As authority for establishing the claim that Existentialism is, in fact, concerned with the person prior to Cartesian dualism, we turn to Tillich who makes the point forcefully and clearly: Existential thinking

... does not identify reality with 'objective being.' But it would be equally misleading to say that it identifies reality with 'subjective being,' with consciousness or feeling. Such a view would still leave the meaning of 'subjective' determined by its contrast with 'objective,' and this is just the contrary of what the Existential philosophy is aiming at. ... It is trying to find a level on which the contrast between 'subject' and 'object' has not arisen. It aims to cut under the 'subject-object distinction,' and to reach that stratum which Jaspers, for instance, calls the 'Source.'

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And in another context Tillich is objecting to the fact that ontological concepts (like soul, consciousness, will-to-power, instinct, etc.)

... have been accused of introducing subjectivity into the objective realm of things. But these accusations are mistaken. They miss the meaning of ontological concepts. It is not the function of these concepts to describe the ontological nature of reality in terms of the subjective or the objective side of ordinary experience. It is the function of an ontological concept to use some realm of experience to point to characteristics of being-itself which lie above the split between subjectivity and objectivity and which therefore cannot be expressed literally in terms taken from the subjective or the objective side. Ontology speaks analogously. Being as such transcends objectivity as well as subjectivity. But in order to approach it cognitively one must use both. And one can do so because both are rooted in that which transcends them, in being-itself.10

We have in these statements from Tillich a re-affirmation of the legitimacy of cognitive thought to make such an investigation, a legitimacy that many epistemologically oriented philosophers appear to deny. But the important point to stress here is that the term "subjectivity" as used ontologically is not synonymous with the "subject" of introspection. Self-awareness, that awareness we have of the self as distinguished from the other persons and objects of our environment, that self that is consciousness alone, is a product of the subject-object dichotomy approach to self and self-knowledge.

The confusion probably arises from Kierkegaard's use of the term "subjective truth" as synonymous with "inwardness" in his polemic against Hegel. The Cartesian subjective element is only part of this larger person here called the ontological self or ontological subjectivity. As Barrett states, "This subjectivism has nothing to do with Kierkegaard's 'subjective truth'; Kierkegaard simply chose his term unfortunately, for his intention is the very opposite of Cartesianism."\(^{11}\) And Rollo May makes an interesting parallel, after claiming the ontological level of existence "... cuts below the split between objectivity and subjectivity,"\(^{12}\) by claiming that this is what Jesus meant by our having to lose ourselves first to find ourselves! Perhaps so! One has to lose an identification with the epistemologically based self before he discovers or creates a uniquely and ontologically based self-hood. It is possible, of course, that Jesus believed in a transcendent soul of a more Idealist variety; yet this comparison has value in illuminating the present point.

The Cartesian view, be it noted again, held that it was only meaningful to deal with the subject as that part of the self consciously discriminated from other objects. This


is what Kierkegaard calls a "spectator view of the self," an objectifying of the self by seeing it only through external discriminations and language symbols. The dimensions of self-hood that are important then are only those known through the social meaning and categorizing avenues of knowledge. The subtle significance of feeling, the ontological structure of self, and the whole meaning of freedom and individuality are minimized or ignored completely.

One way to demonstrate this concern with ontological self-hood, is to investigate the Existentialist view of the nature of man by tracing the concept that "existence is prior to essence." The concern with Being, and with Non-Being as a category of ontology, as well as this view of the priority of existence, is common to both the major theistic and atheistic Existentialists. In one sense, Kierkegaard's concern with existence is so prior to essence that essence never regains status in reality; in this sense he remains the completest "Existentialist" because ontological being never becomes a focus again. His concern with the inwardness of the individual, the existing person in time-space (especially time!) is almost total. Implicit in his position is the reality of history and other minds, but he never takes up ethical responsibility for contemporary political and social events, except as a category to be suspended and trans-
It is the individual man, the "single-one," and the quality of his becoming a Christian and achieving "infinite happiness" that is his total focus. Likewise, in Nietzsche's "will-to-power" and "will-to-truth" it is apparent, especially in Kauffman's excellent biography of Nietzsche, that he was a voluntarist; that will and self-affirmation and self-transcending were his near-total preoccupation. Both of these thinkers radically favor the growing and becoming person, and perhaps insufficiently recognize the essential self thus constructed.

The phrase, existence before essence, is first used and first systematically developed by Sartre, in his essay "Existentialism is a Humanism." We are so conditioned to equating reality with "existence as actualized," as things and objects there to be experienced through our senses, that serious talk about the reality of non-being and potentiality is not only epistemologically meaningless, since non-operational, but also a little haunting and "spooky"! Yet Sartre's discussions, especially in Being and Nothingness, of

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the fact that every choice we make decides or creates what will be actualized is profoundly true. As he points out, this means that there is a sense in which every affirmation also destroys many other possible becoming. Suppose that instead of actualizing the rudimentary skills of, say, fox-trot, rhumba, samba, and the twist, we decide initially to learn only the twist. Sartre's point is that it could have been otherwise; we could have invented new and original steps! He talks about waiting for a friend in a cafe. The friend does not show up, but the chair we saved for him has the "presence of absence," a particular kind and quality of non-actualization.

It is in applying this concept to the individual that Sartre has been most convincing. His claim is that we never understand fully why we choose and will, affirm or deny. He suggests that the willing precedes the understanding. Man is initially nothing, that is without structure and defining character or characteristics, without unique form, a being who defines what he will be through his own choices. Since we never fully understand, we always take a risk, an anguishing chance, in our affirmations and denials, for our choices will have consequences and may often deny something far greater! The choice comes first, and our emotions and feelings, Sartre believes, are judgmental reactions to the effects of the choice.\(^{17}\) We fear this anguish and uncertainty,

so we try to avoid decision-making; we try to become a thing, or what Sartre calls an "in-itself," a solid and unchanging substance. For Sartre we do this primarily by playing social roles that give us an identity through time, but lose the dynamic and creative center of becoming that Existentialism honors. Sartre, of course, ridicules the "in-itself" severely and honors the "for-itself," which in his radical view is consciousness that is always choosing and affirming greater becomings! If we are to be honest and open and authentic, we must admit that we are always affirming and denying hundreds of potential alternatives in our daily encounters, even if we continue to re-affirm a kind of constant identity. We need to see and admit that this is what we are doing and that it could be otherwise and that we have freedom but also cowardice, that is, we lack the courage to act according to our capacities to change and become dramatically different, even inconsistent, if we want to. This prevalence of cowardice, the surrendering of our honest and constant authentic becoming in order to possess ourselves as an identity, a thing, Sartre calls "bad-faith." It will be shown later that this concern with conformity as a form of loss of authentic individuality is a common concern with Existentialists though it finds different expression in each one. The central point here, then, is that we each affirm that quality of being and actualized self that is our lot to live with; we decide and create it. The responsibility for
one's self is totally individual. We might conclude from this radical statement of the position that there is then no place or role for others, tradition, community, or teachers in the education of the young. But let us waive judgment on this until the topic has been fully discussed, and traced in other Existential thinkers.

To add further illumination to Sartre's key statement, "existence precedes essence," Barrett explains:

Man exists and makes himself to be what he is; his individual essence or nature comes to be out of his existence, and in this sense it is proper to say that existence precedes essence. Man does not have a fixed essence that is handed to him ready-made; rather he makes his own nature out of his freedom and the historical conditions in which he is placed. As Ortega Y Gasset puts it, man has no nature, only a history. This is one of the chief respects in which man differs from things, which do have fixed natures or essence, which are once and for all what they are. However differently the various Existentialists may put this thesis, they are all agreed on it as a cardinal point in their analysis of man. . . . 18

Barrett stresses two dimensions as common to Existentialism that Sartre minimizes, namely, that what one affirms or denies also has some form or potential form of existence in the community, and that what one affirms and denies depends partly on one's "history," both cultural and private.

Reinhardt adds a third factor:

The conviction of the primacy of existence is shared by all existential thinkers, ancient, medieval, and modern. Their concern with the individual, personal aspects of being, with the

mysterious recesses of their own being, places them in opposition to those philosophers who, like Plato, or Hegel, in an attitude of detached reflection, allow the act of existing to be submerged in ideal forms or essences. Existential thinking may thus be defined as a type of speculation that is not only related to the concerns of actual life but decisive for human existence and human action. It is a kind of thinking that arouses and 'makes' the human self.19

Though one might not agree that the thought of Plato and Hegel is essentially ivory-tower, this quotation does serve to emphasize the fact that choices are made according to inward meaning and significance, according to what difference they make in the quality of self-hood. To this Sartre would perhaps readily agree, but Reinhardt adds that we measure this in part, in good pragmatic fashion, by action, and that one does not fully know what has been made or created until it is tested in action. The criteria for judging its worth are not external but the fact of some form of public encounter has been added.

To these three illuminations Ortega now adds a fourth, putting the same problem in his own terms: With man

... we are dealing ... with an entity whose being consists not in what it is already, but in what it is not yet, a being that consists in not-yet-being. Everything else in the world is what it is. An entity whose mode of being consists in what it is already, whose potentiality coincides at once with its reality, we call a 'thing.' Things are given their being ready-made. In this sense, man is not a thing but an aspiration, the aspiration to be this or that. Each epoch, each nation, each individual

varies in its own way the general human aspiration. Existence means, for each of us, the process of realizing under given conditions, the aspiration we are. We cannot choose the world in which to live. We find ourselves, without our previous consent, embedded in an environment, a here and now. . . . The aspiration or program I am, impresses its peculiar profile on the world about me, and that world reacts to impress, accepting or rejecting it. My aspiration meets with hindrance or with furtherance in my environment.20

Erich Fromm repeats the theme: "Man is not a thing; he cannot be dissected without being destroyed, he cannot be manipulated without being harmed, and he cannot be reproduced artificially."21

It is seen, then, that one must affirm or deny an alternative, and his environment must react to these choices as wholes, must reject or re-inform what he has chosen. Since this is always changing in its whole-ness, this individual environment cannot reduce one to a static category, a "thing," but must constantly re-assess him anew. Ortega uses the word "aspiration" to express this dynamic changing form within each individual, and Sartre refers to this as our "project," but we have many such aspirations or projects, and they change as we change. The central and important point is that the Existential view of man thus treats the ideal, the potential, the dynamic becoming as the most important human


reality. Non-being is more meaningfully real than anything objectively measureable. One can say that it will become publicly meaningful later, but perhaps by that time the dynamic view of person and inward meaning has gone on to new projects and aspirations!

However, this "aspiration" or "project," this self-concept or ideal-concept, may itself become static and categorical, as in fact it does for the man of "bad-faith," who in effect wills to treat himself as a "thing" already achieved. Existentialists shudder at this point and claim such a man has lost his humanity. "The theoretical identification of man with what man knows himself to be has the inner effect of destroying precisely that freedom and authenticity which is the essence of man," says Jaspers. "He loses himself in the picture he has formed of himself."22

And this process of accepting and using canned self-concepts—vocationally designed forms of what one should be, commercial and mass-media views of what aspects of one's self to actualize and how far, socially meaningful categories of what is worthy of becoming, professionally tailored and limited designs of what identity will pay off and be understandable to others—all this the Existentialists insist is not determined, but is an environment we accept in cowardice. We embrace a "bad-faith"! Fallico affirms the Contrast:

This is the declaration that man is neither a biological urge, a social function, nor a philo-

22Jaspers, Reason and . . . , p. 10.
sophical abstraction, but a self to be made. Man is a self to be made, for and against himself, for and against the world, with and against all other men and all history. Man is a hunger for selfhood and for freedom, hence, not a being, but a lack of being. He needs most to become something for himself that he is not, something that he can stand, that he can live with and not want to avoid or disown. The central project of the self is for each man a personal and unavoidable responsibility, uncharted, dangerous, without exact precedents to go by. Men are put in their own hands, so to speak, with no possibility of relegating the task of themselves to others except at the risk of gaining the whole world and losing their souls. Neither other men, Gods, ideologies, governments, or demons can choose for any individual man what he alone must choose, if he would live with himself. This is one way of restating the well-known existentialist thesis that "existence precedes essence."23

Viewing in retrospect these various reactions to the "existence precedes essence" theme, there would seem to be agreement about the unfinished nature of man and about a presumed dynamic and purposeful becoming for each individual and that this becoming constitutes the area of his freedom and his responsibility, his creative power and his dignity. There is agreement that this is a personal process and that it exists only as a functional concept. There is some common emphasis of the idea that this process of making oneself is a symbolic process and brings into being an identity, a self-hood that otherwise would not exist.

Out of the foregoing discussion of the Existential view of human nature, there are two concepts that might well be isolated for further comment. The first is that the

individual's "aspiration" or "project" is more important and more real than any present actualized achievement or other socially achieved model available to the person. The second is that Existentialism asserts a kind of radical ethical principle, close to Kierkegaard's "religious stage," which believes that this unique and honest form is not to be measured or judged by any public or universal standard of verification. We may say that in existentialist ethics the relationship of the individual to the general is not a simple logical categorization, as in math or science. All this assumes that there is a process of existential authenticity operating, that the individual has the integrity and honesty and courage to follow the purposeful impulse of his own strivings and becomings. One of the themes of this dissertation has been that we cannot assume such a commitment to truth or to the search for truth. We do in fact need a commitment to "become the self that one is," to use Kierkegaard's paradoxical language. It is here asserted that the more passive approaches to knowledge as found in the environmental hypothesis run the risk of "bad-faith," of rendering oneself a "thing" as actualized!

If the Existential emphasis has seemed thus far altogether too inward in focus, let it be acknowledged at once that Existentialism does take account of the outer dimension. There is a reality of other people; there are specific social and historical conditions; there is finitude. Some of the
alternatives one accepts or rejects are given. Much of our encounter with life has the character of being-there as actualized models already, or as Ortega puts it, of "... an embedded environment, a here and now." In Heidegger's famous definition of man as "Dasein," which may be rendered as "being-there," or "man-in-the-world," we get the same emphasis on a given human situation most of which is static. Yet this is a situation from which and in which a given individual can stand out, particularly through his dynamic and becoming nature. This is philosophically important, especially if one sees philosophy as the "investigation of the contingent," of the limits and possibilities of human knowing and being. It is philosophically important to the extent that it includes an honest description of contemporary social and historical conditions as part of this contingency, part of the scope and limits of the possible.

In this context, the pessimism and despair of Existentialism is not so much a normative judgment of woe and cynicism as it is a realistic description of the social-political-historical situation contemporary man finds himself in, and of the anguishing uncertain and lonely processes of realizing himself within such a situation. "We didn't select these conditions," Ortega says. Probably any man of any period would substantially alter some of the given conditions and limits of his time, except perhaps Voltaire's mythical

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23 Ortega Y Gasset, Toward A . . . , p. 212.
Pangloss, and some of the Enlightenment's faithful there being satirized. The resentment and fear that lead many to assume social roles of bad-faith, Existentialists argue, is partly due to this pre-supposition of optimistic desire or hope as Camus\textsuperscript{25} calls it. It is due to a theological and metaphysical pre-supposition that the world really should have been better than it is, especially our lot in life!

Part of the meaning of cutting under the subject-object dichotomy is in finding an identification of self-hood through an ontology that makes no such prior normative judgments or unconscious expectations and wishes, and hence can more honestly and freely encounter the world the way it in fact is. Such an ontological identification of self-hood is one of the key concerns of this dissertation.

The Existentialist View of Ultimate Reality

The second major concern of this review of literature has now to be encountered. It will be suggested that a common view of ontology or Being runs throughout the Existential literature. The Existentialists appear to take the metaphysical category of non-being seriously, and they see the common quest of philosophy to be that of the uncovering or opening of the essential self to the transcendent power of dynamic Being.

Sartre's use of the ontological category of nothingness has already been discussed some in this dissertation sufficiently to show that the reality of potentiality and becoming is the most important realm of being for him. The Consciousness he discusses makes choices, affirms and negates, and is dependent upon the multitudinous potential possibilities that exist pregnantly as non-actualized non-being. The point that seems certain in this is that Sartre's view of ontology is dynamic and is dependent upon human consciousness for its form or lack of form as an actualized real in time-space existence.

Inasmuch as Sartre was a student of Heidegger it might be well to go to the master himself for illumination at this point. He asks: "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" and he further questions whether or not reason can discuss and answer this query with any meaning. The term "essents" in his thought he later defines as a "self-blossoming emergence" as an "... opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such an unfolding and perseveres and endures in it; in short the realm of things that emerge and linger on," or more simply as those things which "have the power to emerge and endure." These, one could

\[^{27}\text{Ibid., p. 12.}\]
\[^{28}\text{Ibid., p. 12.}\]
say, are basically the objects of the subject-object epistemic discrimination, but the question here is whether or not they have an identity and status prior to being named and discriminated by intelligence, and if so how and why is this possible? Why is there any form and structure to anything? Why, so to speak, does not the universe fly apart and disperse into non-recognizable forms and objects? Why does the form of things persist through time? And if there are forms and structures of "essents" or individual emergent durations, why and how do they remain structured and interrelated as a whole? This latter investigation is the true focus of metaphysics or ontology, being as such. Most previous metaphysics, especially Aristotle's and the traditions stemming from his distinctions, have inquired into the "essents" and minimized the question and problem of the total larger structure, precisely because it is hidden from man's conscious epistemological mode of knowing. So Heidegger claims that most metaphysics has a "... forgetfulness of being" ... and "being as such is precisely hidden from metaphysics and remains forgotten."29 Being as metaphysically hidden Heidegger and the other Existentialists concede, but that it should remain forgotten is unnecessarily tragic. Hence Heidegger seeks a "... disclosure of being, the unlocking of what forgetfulness of being closes and

29 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
hides. And it becomes the task of philosophy to reveal the right questions, the right mood and mode of inquiry that will lead men to this disclosure of being, even though conscious concepts cannot understand all of it.

Why is this important? If this question is asked and if the act of questioning is really carried out, the content and the object of the question react inevitably on the act of questioning. Accordingly this questioning is not just any occurrence but a privileged happening that we call an event, and this "recoil of the question 'why' upon itself" is the only way of leading us to such significant events. It does not become an event passively, or through epistemological modes of inquiry or by itself, but only if we individually take sufficient intellectual energy to make a "leap through which man thrusts away all the previous security, whether real or imagined, of his life." For Heidegger the continual search for truth, the continual asking why is that leap, the dedication to search honestly for the true and real. Philosophy, therefore, leads us to the proper question-asking, to the "... actual power of seeing and inquiring and speaking." That is, philosophy "creates a state of mind consisting in a willing to know," not a

30 Ibid., p. 16.  
31 Ibid., p. 4.  
32 Ibid., p. 5.  
33 Ibid., p. 5.  
34 Ibid., p. 16.  
35 Ibid., p. 17.
mère wish, but a resolve. "To know means to be able to learn," to stand in being, to open and uncover "... the coming-out-of-cover of human being—there into the clearing of being, and not in a storing up of energy for 'action,'" only. "Ontology signifies the endeavor to make being manifest itself," and its loss means the loss of energy directed toward the fulfillment of individual character and fullness. Heidegger has one other term for this process of standing before being in such a way that reason distinguishes being from non-being without pre-judgment, an appearing that he calls "emerging from concealment," and becoming known in the knower's structure as unconcealed. This unconcealment, honesty before being, is truth for him, not as a knowledge or set of propositional relationships but a relationship of standing in being unconcealed. Further, our inability to do this is cowardice and illusion; we prefer social fictions and defenses to the truth! Yet it is not a passive standing there but an active apprehension. "To apprehend ... means to let something come to one, not merely accepting it, however, but taking a receptive attitude toward that which shows itself." This Being is dynamic and changes; this means

36Ibid., p. 18. 37Ibid., p. 17. 38Ibid., p. 34. 39Ibid., p. 86. 40Ibid., p. 117.
that there is the power of creation and destruction, of life and death, and most dramatically, our own individual death; so we shy away from honest apprehension. "Being means to stand in the light, to appear, to enter into concealment. Where this happens, i.e., where being prevails, apprehension prevails and happens with it; the two belong together. Apprehension is the receptive bringing-to-stand of the intrinsically permanent that manifests itself." Not having the courage to stand and face and honor the power of being, we fall into history and time and vent our power upon nature and other men, or in work and technical creations; but ultimately power comes from being-itself, and our efforts will be overpowered.

For Heidegger, it is the function of philosophy to get the individual man to ask those questions that will keep him from forgetting being, and cause him to be open to the significant events of standing in the truth. His philosophy and ethics thus emphasize the use of human powers and energies for honoring or revering the structure of ultimate Being rather than using it to create and destroy nature and himself!

This background from Heidegger serves as a kind of introduction to Tillich’s ontology. In some respects Tillich’s view of ontology and of the philosopher’s task is very

41 Ibid., p. 117.
similar to Heidegger's position. "Ontology is the rational explanation of the structure of Being itself," he says.

Ontology deals with the structure of Being itself, not with the nature of a special realm of beings. . . . The ontological question presupposes the attitude of a man who has experienced the tremendous shock of the possibility that there is nothing, or—more practically speaking—who has looked into the threatening abyss of nothingness. Such a man is called a philosopher.  

The division of reality into "essents" Tillich attributes to Aristotle, at least in its profound influence on the Western world; but this division does not allow the questions of a unified ontology. The Existentialists want to put the categories and essents of Aristotle's division into a unified structure and ask what holds the whole together and what is common to all. "The individual thing is 'according to Aristotle,' the telos (aim) of nature. It is the really real, namely that which has reality in itself or hypostatic, substantial reality." "Real is what has the power to resist non-being and what cannot be resolved into something else." 

Reality is the power of resistance against dissolution into nothingness. . . . Consequently Being can be described (not defined) as the power of resistance against non-Being, or simply as the power of Being, whereby power means the change of carrying through one's own self-realization.

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43Ibid., p. 302
44Ibid., p. 302
We should note the shift to a personal vocabulary here in Tillich, the attributing of power and self-directing purpose to the whole of Being, a power which he analyzes as love and ultimately labels it: "God behind the God of Theology." But the basic ontological analysis would seem to be essentially the same as in Heidegger.

For Tillich, as for Heidegger, and later for Marcel and Jaspers, man does not know in his cognitive structure the whole design and structure of Being-itself, as the Rationalists believed; full universality escapes our conceptualization. "Ontology is possible," Tillich argues, because there are concepts less universal than 'being' but more universal than the concepts that designate a particular realm of beings." These are symbolic forms. For Kant these were universal and never changed with cultures and individual learning because the perceiving and conceiving structure of experiencing (the forms) was constant. For Tillich this structure of experiencing does change and vary with history and cultural traditions and individual becomings; and this is why the Protestant principle of criticizing forms and creating new forms in every generation to point to the ultimate is central to Tillich's thought. These constructs of thought, more general than "essents" but less general than being-itself or universality, are personal creations and integrations that grow out of a common heritage of experience.

46 Ibid., p. 311.
Here it seems advisable to point to Tillich's Christian interpretation of ontology though he believes that the analyses are correct and accurate regardless of his Christian presuppositions and regardless of whether or not one accepts the Christian revelation as the "answers" to the problems posed by this ontological analysis. "The ground of Being from which every being takes its power of being has the character of self-separating and self-returning to life,"^47 of separation or estrangement into the categories of individuation and universality. In addition to this category, Tillich has two others in the structure of Being: one he calls "dynamics and form," which allows change and becoming under the critical criteria of the "Protestant principle" as previously discussed; the other he calls "freedom and destiny," which allows transcendence in this individual becoming, giving an individual freedom and control over one's own quality of Being.^48 For pagan or secular or naturalistic thought, says Tillich, this separation is an accident, just something that developed and happened, while the Christian faith is the "love" that initiates this separation (man's "fall"), as well as its re-unification through human-divine love. Yet man's self-interest, his treating himself as an end in his separated state, keeps him from re-unification;

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^47Ibid., p. 311.

^48Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), II.
and for this sin and error, God initiates the redeeming act of unification in the incarnation and resurrection of Christ. Hence Tillich can define Christian faith in ontological terms: "Faith is the acceptance of the paradox of agape as the innermost center of Being-Itself." What Tillich has done here is to describe in personified and teleological terms the answer that Heidegger gave to his original question, "Why are there essents rather than nothing"? Tillich's answer is that there is a power of being-itself that prevails against all the forces of separation and destruction, and this uniting power is just as true of reality as the destructive powers are, in fact ultimately more so, since it prevails and conquers non-being. The individual man alone is conscious and knows that he is going to die and be ultimately separated altogether, and so he alone has ontological anxiety, the awareness of the dissolution of "essents," including man. But man can also, through his reason, understand and become unconcealed to the power of union and structure in the universe; and this allows man the possibility of ontological courage, which "... affirms the ultimate prevalence of being over non-being." Again,

49Herberg, Four . . . , p. 312.

"The courage to be is the courage to affirm one's own reasonable nature over against what is accidental in us."\textsuperscript{51}

What shall we make of this from Tillich? The implications of the view of ontological anxiety and ontological courage will be developed quite thoroughly, since this is seen as centrally related to the original concern of this dissertation with getting a philosophic commitment to truth, and to the transcending of bias. But here there are also some important implications of Tillich's larger view of ontology which fit the purposes of the present analysis. First, we should note his agreement with Heidegger that the philosopher is that man who faces the threats of non-being honestly and that this effort is the proper goal of ontological philosophy. Also he agrees that this ontological "real" has its reality in its power to avoid self-destruction. Furthermore, he agrees that ontology is basically dynamic. However, he diverges from Heidegger by making a Christian interpretation, and using symbols in his view of the forms that the individual must continuously re-create to interpret his changing dynamic structure of reality. Tillich focuses mainly on that level of forms that he calls "more general than essents, but less general than being-itself or universality," which gives him the basis for conscious and rational description as the function of ontological analyses.

\textsuperscript{51}Tillich, \textit{The Courage...}, p. 13.
It would seem profitable at this point to offer some explication of the view of Karl Jaspers. As a variation from Tillich, Jaspers put a greater emphasis on the encounter with being-itself which is non-cognitive, and which he calls "the Encompassing." Marcel calls it the "Mystery of Being." But each of these also point to the common focus on non-being in their ontology and the common "Existential view of the nature of man" that is of central concern here.

Jasper's is concerned with "limit-experiences" in man, with the limits of man's cognitive knowledge. He says, "... what is lost beyond the relativity of all our perspectives, horizons, and conceptual schemes, is 'the Encompassing';... "It denotes the Ultimate Being which is the foundation of our concepts but which can never be grasped by them," and this Encompassing is a term which has "... a clear use; but it has no clear, distinct, objective, content."52 Jaspers has an interesting system in which he argues that man has three modes of being: empirical sensate experience, consciousness, and spirit or authentic Existenz. This last term refers to what has been called in this work an "Existential view of human nature." It is limit experience, or "ship-wreck," reminiscent of the anxiety and loss of self that Kierkegaard analyzes in his "three stages," and anxiety that drives man to organize his authentic self-hood.

52Jaspers, Reason and . . ., p. 10.
through his own efforts of reason. And for Jaspers, philosophy again has little or no function until a man has suffered enough shipwreck to motivate this task from within. "The central point of philosophizing is first reached in the awareness of potential Existenz."53 Here we have Jaspers' focus on the reality of potential being, and he holds that the dimension of transcendence enters a man's life at the point of this potentiality. "I am Existenz only as I know Transcendence as the power through which I genuinely am myself," he states. "Without Existenz the meaning of transcendence is lost.54 And these only arise in the man shipwrecked but still searching for authenticity and personal identity. "Spirit is the will to become whole; potential Existenz is the will to be authentic."55 The continued examination of this emerging self by reason "makes an appeal to its potentialities"; it does not objectify the self as does the method of epistemological dichotomy. Reason examines deceptions, reveals past limits and errors and the limits of cognitive awareness, and this awareness of "... the limits of objective cognition frees the real man and all being which he touches from a supposed identity with its knowability, or fixed knownness." In fact, "I am not authentically myself authentically myself if I am merely what I know myself to

53Ibid., p. 60.  
54Ibid., p. 61.  
55Ibid., p. 62.
be," and if I identify with any actualized forms and lose
my dynamic becoming, ". . . I should again lose myself in
false self-trivialization, and cease to be possible Existenz
and its actualizations."\textsuperscript{56}

Marcel, mentioned earlier in association with Jaspers,
starts with an insistence that ontological transcendent
experience is truly empirical, and that the epistemological
tradition has unfortunately narrowed human experiencing.
"Not only does the 'word transcendent' not mean 'transcending
experience,' but on the contrary there must exist a possibil-
ity of known an experience of the transcendent as such, and
unless that possibility exists the word can have no meaning."\textsuperscript{57}
He adds,

One cannot insist too strongly that what traditional
empiricism failed to see was that experience is not,
in any sense, something which resembles an imperme-
able mass. I would rather say that experience is
receptive to very different degrees of saturation
(or) varying degrees of purity . . . what I ask
myself at this point is whether the urgent need for
transcendence might not, in its most fundamental
nature, co-incide with an aspiration for a purer
and purer mode of experience.\textsuperscript{58}

"The intelligence must become pure ardour and pure recep-
tivity."\textsuperscript{59} This purer experience that Marcel seeks is
familiar to us by now; it is an honesty that makes its own

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., pp. 73-74.
\textsuperscript{57}Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being (New York: Gateway
\textsuperscript{58}Ibid., pp. 67-68.
\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., p. 69.
interpretations and encounters with the world, an effort which we fear in its strain of effort and its loneliness. So we hide. As he puts its, "... all of us tend to secrete and exhude a sort of protective covering within which our life goes on."\textsuperscript{60} We do this, as the chapter on the dominant influence of the epistemological tradition would suggest, by placing fact and the real outside ourselves and seeking the light of laws and interpretation in the external world. But it is the understanding self which integrates and grasps facts as meaning, and we refuse to let ourselves be penetrated by the "reverberatory power" of these facts. Yet we face Jaspers' shipwrecks, for at times necessity gives us "no alternative (and we) must face the facts, or face the truth." Not to do this Marcel calls a neurosis and psychosis, a "flight from necessity."\textsuperscript{61} We prefer to see reality out of our own ideology or our own neurotic slice of the whole, but "... in the light of truth, I succeed in diminishing that permanent temptation that assails me to conceive reality, or to represent it to myself, as I should like it to be."\textsuperscript{62} This transcendence, for Marcel, begins in contemplation, in the experience of discovering one's uniqueness, or in "... a kind of inward regrouping of one's resources, or a kind of ingatheredness."\textsuperscript{63} For Marcel this contemplation does not

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid., p. 79.  
\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., p. 84.  
\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., p. 86 (italics mine).  
\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., p. 156.
lean too heavily on cognitive symbols because they are too spatially oriented. Marcel makes what for him is a central distinction between the object and its presence, and he emphasizes the difference between the felt-presence of some objects another in our environment. Hence, objects can be grasped and measured, but relationships and presences "... can only be gathered to oneself or shut out from oneself, be welcomed or rebuffed."64 We can then treat the whole of being as objects, as a problem which is there, graspable, public and shared, or as a "mystery" which no one fully grasps, and to which it is more fundamental to related as to a presence than to predict and gain control over. Yet he again holds that such ontological openness only emerges "... in a sort of fundamental dissatisfaction" with the limits of power and problem-solving, and this is man's and philosophers' major problem and central challenge.

If we now look back at the elements selected for emphasis in Jaspers' and Marcel's position, it would seem fair to conclude that both are concerned with Being, whether called the "Encompassing" or the "Mystery of Being," and both emphasize that this is individual relationship to such a Being cannot be fully formulated by cognitive concepts. Both are concerned to show that the relationship must be established through an empirical encounter. Also we find

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64 Ibid., p. 255.
the common emphasis upon ontological philosophizing as arising after shipwreck experiences or a fundamental dissatisfaction with the epistemological world of reality. In both cases this existential philosopher emerges with a concern to create that authentic self that Jaspers calls spirit or Existenz. It is assumed that the dimensions of transcendence emerge in this search as well. Both Jaspers and Marcel are concerned to avoid identification with present actualized forms as either a "trivialization of the self" or an "exhuded protective covering" which keeps a man from encountering the ontological non-being category, the power of potentialities that can and should be actualized. And both, Jaspers especially, are concerned with actualizing this process through the use of human reason itself.

As a kind of grand summary of the Existential philosophers examined then, it has been shown that all are, in fact, concerned with a quite common and similar form of ontological reality, an ontology that stresses its dynamic character and the possibility of human becoming, and an ontology that makes a central category out of the possibility and the reality of non-being or nothingness. Further it has been shown that all see this ontological reality as the source for human transcendence, and that human reason used by each individual alone is the path and process of creating that ontological self that has been here called "an Existential view of human nature" and shown to be what the
Existential literature calls subjectivity. It should be added that for Tillich, and for Marcel and Jaspers, this ontological reality as the source for human transcendence is also equated with the religious realm of answers that is the proper concern of theology.

Tillich's view of this has been examined, and it illustrates one of his central concepts that he calls the "method of correlation." By this he means that human reason and philosophy can and should make ontological analyses of the human predicament, of the contingent, but that speculative philosophy cannot then go on to presume to give answers and solutions to these universal problems as posed. Only theology can give answers! This is understandably a very controversial and much criticized dimension of Tillich's thought, but his claim is that as a philosopher goes on to posit answers he is assuming the role of theologian, or acting as a theologian, preaching, telling people what they ought to believe! This is best put in his own words. The "method of correlation" deals with the interdependence between the ultimate questions to which philosophy is driven and the answers given in the Christian message. Philosophy cannot answer ultimate or existential questions qua philosophy. If the philosopher tries to answer them (and all creative philosophers have tried to do so), he becomes a theologian. And, conversely, theology cannot answer those questions without accepting their presuppositions and implications. Question and answer deter-

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mine each other; if they are separated, the traditional answers become unintelligible, and the actual questions remain unanswered. The method of correlation aims to overcome this situation... their correlation is the methodological problem of a Protestant theology.\(^6\)

In a similar fashion both Jaspers and Marcel equate the ontological realm as analytical, with the ontological realm as the synthetic source of answers for the theological interpretation of reality. One perhaps will not find a direct statement of this synthesis in Jaspers' though his discussion of opinion and faith makes the transition from an investigating of the encompassing and recognition of it. He speaks of a seeming which tends to become a claiming,\(^6^7\) and he discusses prayer as a "... depending on the mysterious will of an incomprehensible power whose plans we cannot fathom."\(^6^8\) Marcel directly equates a "strictly metaphysical inquiry, which concerns what I call being as such" with religious philosophy; for "being as such ... is necessarily to be identified with that to which a believing consciousness gives the name of God."\(^6^9\) It seems clear that this identification can be made and is being made by the religious Existentialists. But it has been shown that the same


\(^{6^7}\) Jaspers, Reason and ..., p. 4.

\(^{6^8}\) Ibid., p. 115.

\(^{6^9}\) Marcel, The Mystery of ..., I, p. 4.
ontological analysis holds, for the purposes of this work, for the non-theistic Existential ontologists as well, and that the ontological analyses of the theistic thinkers is independent of their theology. Especially is this the case and direct claim with Tillich, who is to be the major figure in this dissertation although, of course, the theological interpretations and considerations will not be of major concern.

The common ontological dimensions of Existentialist thought will now become a direct consideration, along with the common "existential view of human nature." One can have a dimension of transcendence in a "humanism" as was true in Greek philosophy and the Romantic literature, and today in Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, and Ortega Y Gasset among the Existentialists. When transcendence is stressed, the ontological reality is also stressed. And this view of transcendence is vitalized by the Existential ontology which takes non-being seriously as a "real." Human reason is itself seen as an avenue of transcendent reality in this sense, that is, in the sense that an individual becomes an ethical law of uniqueness and teleological purpose to himself. Eric Kahler, in seeking a criteria for deciding "what one is to become" comments: "This is "... of course, a transcendent responsibility, that is to say, it is beyond any law and specific convention ... for responsibility, if
it has any meaning at all, implies a reference to a criterion higher than self."\(^7\)

And Ortega says: "To me reason is the true and rigorous sense of the word, is every act of the intellect as brings us into contact with reality by means of which we come upon the transcendent."\(^1\) And finally, Fiebelman suggests that "knowledge is a by-product of the search for truth; and systems of knowledge are thrown up and left behind by every new and concerted cultural effort of inquiry."\(^2\) This holds true not only with the culture but with each individual thinker and every searching learner as well!

In the light of Existentialist thought, this work will take the responsibility of attempting to show how a system of ontological philosophy can offer transcendence through reason in the search to become educated. Tillich's philosophy of history and his concept of symbols as a positive model for the transcending use of human reason in every new creations of forms of knowledge in secular learning will be examined quite closely.

\(^7\)Eric Kahler, *Man the . . .*, p. 244.

\(^1\)Ortega Y Gasset, *Toward a Philosophy . . .*, p. 226.

CHAPTER III

PAUL TILlich'S FRAME OF REFERENCE

It may not be an exaggeration to claim that Paul Tillich's mind is the most subtle, highly disciplined, and comprehensive mind active in contemporary American theological and philosophical circles. Moreover his conceptual frame of reference is sufficiently profound and discriminate to discourage any attempts at popularization or application to realms to which Tillich has not directly addressed himself. Tillich's intellectual training reflects a kind of German Idealism and unified comprehension that makes no concept in his total Systematic Theology perfectly clear except in relation to all of the interrelated concepts. Further the sophistication of these concepts takes the reader into the subtleties of the Biblical heritage and the Western philosophical tradition as well as into Eastern thought, aesthetics, and the depths of psychoanalytic concepts. Tillich has carried on an extended dialogue with the major religious, philosophic, aesthetic, psychological, and scientific minds of the twentieth century, and this secular dialogue attests to the universal relevance and applicability of his framework. Hence, a selection and emphasis of those concepts most
relevant to a secular philosophy of education can be defended if we are careful to indicate what we are leaving behind in these selections.

One concept in Tillich's thought that appears to warrant an attempt at illuminating a secular theory of education is the centrality of his "theory of correlation;" a second is his concept of a "theology of culture." The "theory of correlation" has been earlier defined. Here its importance lies in the fact that it implies a distinction between Tillich the ontological philosopher—the thinker who by autonomous reason may make "existential analyses" of the human condition and "ask the question of Being"—and Tillich the Christian theologian—the seer who mediates the Christian Revelation as a source of answers to the questions and problems posed by these ontological analyses. If this distinction is valid, as it will be assumed to be,¹ Tillich's thoughts as the ontological philosopher is as valid and relevant to secular education as the thought of any other philosophical thinker. From this aspect of Tillich's thought we may get a penetrating investigation and description of the dynamics.

and ambiguities of the nature of man, analyses of history and the contemporary human predicament, and critiques of psychological and educational thinking. We shall not scorn Tillich the theologian, however. From this area of his thought we may also get descriptions of the integrated or centered self that Tillich calls "spirit," an analysis of human personhood and of morality, and an analysis of the relationship of the religious dimensions of being human to the cultural and moral dimensions of our lives.

It is seen at once that these concerns suggest what might be called a theology of culture. Tillich holds that the good society is "theonomous," that is one in which the secular pursuits of life are ideally concerned with creating symbols by which a dimensional of depth or ultimate concern is made manifest. One may hold that the search for ultimate reality, for truth in the classic philosophic sense of the discovery of being is the ultimate concern of humanistic education, independently of whether or not one accepts Tillich's position that such a concern should honor the god of Biblical Religion, with its presentation of Christ as the Logos made visible as person. These observations do

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not minimize Tillich's commitment as a Christian theologian whereas, they do suggest a base for approaching "ultimate reality" from the side of secular and humanistic culture. In this case the problems of "answers" and the mediation and interpretation of Revelation may properly be kept to the institutional church, as Tillich himself urges is appropriate.

When we come to look for answers to the Existential problems that reason can analyze, we approach Tillich as a theologian, as he himself is careful to point out and defend in his "method of correlation." So it will not be answers as such that we will seek in Tillich's thought. For the present purposes it is his view of ontology, of the nature of man, and particularly his view of human transcendence through the creation of "representational symbols" that becomes most relevant. We must also investigate his philosophy of history, his view of "kairos," the theology of "culture," and the "theonomous culture."

Tillich's ontology

We should first note again that for Tillich the existential and essential dimensions of the human condition are inseparable though he does not wish to be called an existentialist."4 He explains:

It is an indication that one has misunderstood existentialism if one uses it without reference

to its opposite. Philosophical ideas necessarily appear in pairs of contrasting concepts, like subject and object, ideal and real, rational and irrational. In the same way, existentialism refers to its opposite, essentialism, and I would be at a loss to say anything about the one without saying something about the other.\footnote{Ibid., p. 42.}

In a footnote he adds,

'*Existential' points to the universal human involvement in matters of ultimate concern; 'existentialist' points to a philosophical movement which fights the predominance of essentialism in modern thought, be it idealistic or naturalistic essentialism.\footnote{Ibid., p. 42.}

Again, "Existentialism is an element within a larger frame of essentialism, and it exists only as such an element, in its most radical anti-essentialist statements."\footnote{Ibid., p. 42.} Because of this definition, a closer examination of Tillich's essentialism and ontology is needed for the purpose of this dissertation.

Tillich has defined ontology as "... the search for the basic meaning of all those concepts which are universally present in man's cognitive encounter with his world."\footnote{Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Galaxy Paperbound, 1960), p. 2.} He says that ontology is the description of being as such. We live in an age of nominalism, he claims, in which we first

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
approach the real in terms of universals and particulars. But ontology asks a prior question: "What are the structures, common to everything that is, to everything that participates in being." What is the quality or texture that pervades all particular (including human) beings? In the ontological analyses in the book Love, Power, and Justice, for example, he interprets these three terms and realities as interrelated qualities and aspects of being; and his claim is that they pervade all things and all life, though love has a special form of reality in human beings. Tillich's view of love as the pervading force, the integrative power or being-itself, has already been discussed; he holds that it is the integrative force of all that is estranged and seeking reunion or unity. He gives this a personalized and theological interpretation by claiming that this was designed by "the God behind the God of Theology."

The element of Tillich's ontology that becomes most important in the present endeavor is his analysis of courage as an ontological concept. This he does most completely in his book The Courage to Be. If he is correct in his analysis of basic ontology, if the world is estranged, and constantly threatened by the forces of dissolution, of non-being, and if there is a "power of being itself" which

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9Ibid., p. 19.

reunites and maintains the basic unity and structure of our reality, then it follows that man may participate in this reuniting power and structure as well. The extreme form of the forces of dissolution, of course, is death; for man is a being who is aware that he will die and cease to be a being; and to the extent that he values life and existence this becomes a threatening and anxiety-producing awareness.

Our social critics have long told us that we fear and reject death in our culture, that we avoid funerals and basically honor youth symbols (sex!) rather than old-age (wisdom!). The message of the existentialists has understandably been not too joyously received by most! But this may well be because the positive powers and resources of an ultimate encounter have not been experienced fully.

At any rate there are social and physical forces tearing man asunder, and on the human plane it is courage that reunites the identity and unity of the person in the face of this threat, or in-spite-of this non-being, as Tillich likes to say. "The courage to be is the ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation."\[11 \text{Ibid., p. 3.}\] In this act of courage the most essential part of our being prevails against the less essential."\[12 \text{Ibid., p. 5.}\]
anxiety of non-being, of dissolution and destruction, of finite limitation and ultimately death. But to affirm one's essential nature, one's reason and "becoming" in spite of these forces is joy; for one is then free from anxiety and fear, and able to face and meet honestly whatever life brings! But the ontological structure of reality is dynamic, and hence such an achievement is itself always threatened. In fact Tillich claims we constantly fail to sustain these threats of ontological anxiety. This failure drives our general anxiety into referential fears, because courage can conquer and meet specific fears while it cannot meet ontological anxiety permanently! Related to this Tillich observes that our myth and symbol meanings also suffer dissolution with time and destruction. They also therefore have to be re-created and reinterpreted in each generation by what one might call "ontologically-grounded people." This ontological analysis is of course central to all of Tillich's thought.

One important implication of Tillich's dynamic ontology and view of the nature of man is his emphasis on the dimension of time. His concept of transcendence is basically a time-function, and he sees the core of the positive offerings of the existential analyses to be in their simultaneous focus upon potentialities and their future actualization. Having postulated a dynamic ontology and a changing social-cultural-historical base attention to the time dimension is
called for. "It is motion that distinguishes the realm of existence from the realm of essences," and the importance of noting this lies in the fact that "reason can deal only with possibilities." That is, reason can deal only with what might be or can be or perhaps will be, with that which can become an actualized reality. As reason deals with the present, it abstracts from it, and ends in essentialism and categorical analyses; but as it focuses on the future it shapes and gives form to a vital life process that is emerging, and is not destroyed but rather created in such conceptualization. Reason is the author of what will emerge from time, and we are as Ortega Y Gasset put it "novelists of ourselves." Hence time is the central category for the existentialists. Tillich adds, "That qualitative time is characteristic of personal experience is the general theme of the Existential philosophy."

The first and best statement of this aspect of existential thought was made by Kierkegaard in his rebuttal to Hegel's Essentialism and metaphysical incarnation of time in history, in his concept of the individual's transcendent reality of the "pregnant moment" and the "fullness of time"; but Tillich's statement will suffice here. What follows


14Ibid., p. 85.  

15Ibid., p. 99.
from these considerations is a more ontologically oriented base to a philosophy of education, and more attention to the virtue of courage, and the employment of symbolic reason in relation to the potential and future dimensions of time. These implications are developed in the following chapters.

Tillich's frame of reference

It is now pertinent to ask what these ontological and existential views mean in the rest of Tillich's thought; essentially what does it mean for his philosophy of history and his theology? If we will recall the historical analysis of this dissertation, it was emphasized that the modern epistemological heritage is best centered in Descartes, and one can perhaps also trace to Descartes' new method—the method of sceptical doubt—the source of much of today's scepticism and doubt, perhaps even its "meaninglessness" that Tillich stresses. The obvious benefits of this sceptical doubt in the scientific frame of reference are to be honored. We must also acknowledge one major insight this Epistemological heritage has emphasized, namely, that human conceptual understanding is relative and tentative. But this sceptical and doubting climate of opinion that pervades our whole culture and temper of life, has its disturbing side. Tillich, for one, is disturbed because it led people to doubt the value of

religion, and to embrace the easy conclusion what doubt was incompatible with faith or any positive affirmation and belief.

Tillich's whole system can best be seen as an approach to the modern situation of doubt. He tries to show that religion as "ultimate concern" is not only compatible with faith and belief but, in fact, that a belief or faith that is not questioning itself is no longer a faith at all but a dogmatic certainty. Every ultimate concern, not only religion as such, but what he calls the "dimension of depth" in every life commitment has an element of risk and uncertainty in it. This is because life is defined as "the actuality of Being" in which the essential and potential structure of Being is only partly existential or actualized. All actualized Being is constantly threatened by non-Being, by dissolution, destruction, death. In people this awareness reaches self-consciousness, the awareness of our own life's undergoing dissolution and ending in death. This awareness creates a condition of uneasiness that Tillich calls ontological anxiety. Therefore it is difficult for people to hold the true ontological human condition in conscious awareness. One manifestation of this ontological anxiety becomes the fear to grow and self-actualize because death seems to negate the meaning of finite effort.\footnote{Tillich, \textit{Systematic} \ldots, III, p. 29.} For one who is always growing
and changing—changing his loyalties and concerns, especially
the conceptualization and form of belief that he is committed
to—there is a dynamic dimension in all faith and belief.

As the previous chapter showed, this dynamic of the
human self is related not only to human finite growth and
change but also to a dynamic ontology. Since the forms of
being and life change, so also must the self-structure of
man change in order to be open and realistically related to
the universe and world. This constant dynamic is called
"ontological subjectivity" and can only be created or actual­
ized by each individual himself and not by global environ­
mental reforms. Hence the existential viewpoint has been
interpreted as an anti-Enlightenment philosophic framework.
Doubt is the pre-condition of both the search for truth, and
the search for and maintenance of faith. Since there can be
no approach to truth without some methods of systematic doubt
and transcending of bias, and since there is also no doubting
without a prior commitment to search for truth (that is, a
Socratic admission that one does not already possess the
truth), it follows that there is no realm of life that does
not have its uncertainty—what Tillich calls its "ambigui­
ties."18

Tillich, like the other existentialists, has rejected
the systems of pre-fabricated meaning, the philosophies of

18Ibid., III, p. 32.
history and the ideological and institutional systems of meaning. He starts with the declaration that there is no given meaning but that reason or thought must correlate and create it in each individual. Existential analyses seek to reveal the human condition to man, and to invite him to weave his own identity and fabric of meaning from this encounter. But man does not want to make this effort, nor does he wish to risk the responsibility for creating a system of truth that might be wrong. He feels judged and condemned by the epistemological tradition, as well as by those "single-one" individuals who appear to have it all figured out! That is, man fears the "leap of faith," the dimension of ultimacy and personal accountability for any effort he makes; he is "estranged" and prefers the security of systems; he prefers to be a "thing" to this ultimate demand upon him.19

Yet, for Tillich, this estrangement is the essence of man's freedom and the dignity that an Agape-initiated Source has given him. But the "God behind the God of Theology" suffers with man's estrangement and desires to reunite him and increase his courage for making this "leap." God as Love dramatizes the hope in such a "leap of faith" when he

19Erich Fromm has made a very penetrating and similar analysis of the contemporary human situation in a historical and psychological context in his book *Escape from Freedom*. See also Fromm's article "Man is Not a Thing" in the Liebrecht volume.
initiates the Incarnation. Tillich rejects the traditional, supernaturalistic view of the Incarnation, but he is at pains to preserve the transcendence suggested by the orthodox perfect-God-perfect-Man declaration. In a radical re-interpretation, Tillich reasons that the Transcendent is itself the ground of Being or ultimate Reality and that its dynamic structure is revealed only in the actualized Forms of existence. For Tillich Jesus became the Christ, the perfect revelation of the powers of Being over Non-being, thus making ultimate Reality visible to man. This initial act of Transcendence in time Tillich calls the Christ or the "New Being." Important as this act is in showing us the structure of the universe as a whole, its importance for all individuals is the revelation of the fact and availability of transcendent power in their own lives. In other words, they can become a New Being also, and this is the goal of a Christian for Tillich.20

Because of the changing forms of man's cultural life, this message—even Systematic Theology itself!—must be re-cast in new forms for each generation. Tillich is one of those who is attempting this in our generation. This Transcendent power of the structure of being—itself Tillich calls the "Gestalt-of-grace," which shows its dynamic and healing powers (salvation, grace) for each individual. But this

Being is ultimate and beyond total experiencing and total conceptualization by man. It follows that the symbols and myths that describe and honor it must be symbols that participate in the ontological realm, but point beyond themselves to the ultimate reality. Man's symbols initially always do this, but as history and cultural forms and problems change, these forms degenerate to signs which no longer point beyond themselves to the ultimate. For Tillich, this is one of the results of the Enlightenment heritage in our time.

Hence man is not finally dependent upon past cultural forms. Each generation can use the "Protestant principle" to criticize old forms, and insist that these forms do point beyond themselves to the ultimate. The Protestant principle affirms man's autonomous reason as the vehicle of the Logos, and his cognitive awareness of the reception of revelatory experience. It is a principle that thus judges all established authority, including religious authority, since Being-Itself is dynamic. The spirit of creating new forms originates in living, receiving beings and not in old forms which may no longer point to the power and reality of Being-Itself. A culture and generation in which most of the symbol-forms actually do this is a "theonomous" culture, and this remains Tillich's goal and ideal. One would have to say also that this is his educational goal and the basis of his philosophy of education.
But we must recall that the destructive forces of Being-Itself are always operating and threatening as well, and this Tillich calls the "demonic"; he criticizes the Enlightenment for neglecting or minimizing this. Deterioration occurs in man's cultural and religious forms, and so the "Protestant principle" must be employed to separate out the Holy from the secular and profane. In each generation there is also a central task to be done, a common threatening problem or unfulfilled ideal. That is, there is a kind of historical task before each generation. In the period following the first World War, Tillich thought that the "theonomous culture" would be brought about by a basically non-political "Christian Socialism" movement, for example. This common destiny and task is what Tillich calls the "kairos," the moments major issue for mankind and man's God-relationship--a man-to-man relationship, an inward subjective relationship. There would also be an estrangement between man and God, and between man and man, and the historical tasks would be to bring men to become "New Beings" in response to this cultural-historical demand, and help "heal" the destructive influence.

For Tillich, finite man is bound to the demands of his present historical conditions but he also has a free and transcendent calling within that context; this condition Tillich calls "finite freedom." For it is always within man's power to create new forms, new symbol relationships,
that will aid in this "healing" process. It is the job of philosophy and existential analyses rationally and creatively to reveal this human condition, and perhaps the contemporary "kairos," to man; he must be made aware of his condition of estrangement, guilt, anxiety, doubt, and meaninglessness. And, of course, for Tillich, it is the function of the theologian to interpret the "answers" of the Christian "New-Being" Transcendence that gives ultimate meaning and healing grace to this situation. In this way theology helps to create that "theonomous culture" that will heal all men's existential estrangement.

Further attention to Tillich's philosophy of history and his view of Kairos are called for. Doubt, as stated above, is the characteristic feature of our time, but there is a barren kind of doubting and a fruitful kind. According to Tillich,

The methodological doubt of Descartes was the entering door for the modern scientific consciousness. Quite different from it is the existential doubt, the doubt about the meaning of one's being in man's existential situation . . . the doubt about the meaning of living . . . and since it wrestles with the threat of meaninglessness, it cannot be answered by

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21 Tillich has reinterpreted the classic Christian symbols of the New Being, the Kingdom of God, the Eternal Now, the latent and manifest church, and the Spiritual Presence, as symbols he believes will help reinterpret the meaning of Christian revelation to contemporary man. These Theological concepts will not concern us for the purposes of this dissertation. See Tillich, Systematic . . ., Vols. I, II, III.
any of those assertions which have methodological certainty, probability, or improbability.22

Men do not enjoy the tension of doubt; they seek ready-made meanings. They tend to lose the dimension of depth in their lives, whatever their calling and loyalty! As Tillich suggests, in morality it is "the unconditioned seriousness of the moral demand" that is lost; in knowledge and the search for truth it is "the passionate longing for ultimate reality," or ontology, that is lost; in aesthetics and the search for beauty and form it is "the infinite desire to express ultimate meaning" that is lost.23 Tillich's concern is to re-establish this "ultimate concern." His attempt to do this he calls a "theology of culture."

To achieve a dimension of depth and transcendence, the "Protestant principle" must be used in all areas of man's cultural life. Richard Niebuhr states this clearly in the Introduction to Tillich's book, The Religious Situation.

Since the Unconditional is forever hidden, transcendent and unknowable, it follows that all religious ideas are symbolical. They are good symbols when they point un-ambiguously to the transcendent; they become false symbols when they are regarded as possessing an intrinsic meaning or when they claim absolute value for themselves.24


This is stated in relation to religious symbols. Yet Tillich adds:

But it is not the only phenomenon which bears witness to the ultimate and in some periods it is not even the most important of the witnesses or the most effective in expression and symbolism. Every spiritual phenomenon of a period expresses its eternal content and one of the most important characteristics of a time has been defined when we have discovered which of the various aspects of culture is most expressive of its real meaning.\(^{25}\)

All real creations point beyond time, the timeless is their testing value. As social changes occur new forms are necessary to transcend that present and point beyond time for that generation. It is therefore an existential form, temporal and contemporary. ... that which is not time becomes time, that which is not an existential form becomes an existing form. This is the other aspect of the religious situation of a time, of its situation as time in the presence of the eternal. We find self-transcendence in every time, openness to the eternal, a hallowing of time; but upon the other hand we see the appropriation of the eternal, the self-sufficiency of time, the secularization of the Holy. There is a movement to and fro between self-transcendence and self-sufficiency, between the desire to be a mere vessel and the desire to be the content, between the turning toward the eternal and the turning toward the self. In this action and reaction we discern the religious situation of every present at its profoundest level.\(^{26}\)

This "movement to and fro" becomes a central dynamic and dialectic for Tillich. The concept of "dynamics" enters Tillich's thought whenever he is discussing the subjective and ontological nature of man, as in the *Dynamics of Faith*,\(^{27}\)

\(^{25}\)Ibid., p. 37. \(^{26}\)Ibid., pp. 38-39. 

or the ambiguities of self-transcendence. From it emerges a kind of "collective unconsciousness," a kind of imbued awareness which is part conscious and part unconscious that forms the structure for the "kairos" of that and each generation. Due to the secularization of the Enlightenment, the victory of the philosophies of history, Tillich concludes; "We come out of a time which no longer possessed any symbols by which it could point beyond itself." Our "kairos" therefore is to create these symbols and forms, and to begin the creation of a more theonomous culture; this must begin with the criticism and destruction of the old forms to reveal their loss of spiritual power.

The Protestant Principle demands a method of interpreting history in which the critical transcendence of the divine over against conservatism and utopianism is strongly expressed and in which, at the same time, the creative omnipresence of the divine in the course of history is concretely indicated.

Tillich is honest and radical enough to apply this principle to an analysis of Protestantism itself, and even suggests that the Protestant era is in bad condition, since most of its forms have become signs and lost their power to invoke the transcendent encounter in men.

Protestantism as a principle is eternal and a permanent criterion of everything temporal.

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28Tillich, Systematic . . ., III, p. 36.


Protestantism as the characteristic of a historical period is temporal and subjected to the eternal Protestant principle. It is judged by its own principle, and this judgment might be a negative one. The Protestant era might come to an end. But if it came to an end, the Protestant principle would not be refuted. On the contrary, the end of the Protestant era would be another manifestation of the truth and power of the Protestant principle.  

This principle unites criticism with creation, Tillich claims, thereby overcoming the demonic deification of finite forms and giving re-birth to spirit and meaningful life. So the theological struggle of the Protestant church is one form of the "Religious Situation" in which the conditional and the unconditional are embattled, the "movement to and fro" between the eternal and demonic forms.

But every institution and area of a culture is involved in this dialectic, including all of the so-called secular and profane areas of that culture.

The relation of the conditioned to the unconditioned, in individual as well as in social life, is either an openness of the conditioned to the dynamic presence of the unconditional or a seclusion of the conditional within itself. The finite life is either turned toward the infinite or turned away from it toward itself. Where there is an acceptance of the eternal manifesting itself in a special moment of history, in a kairos, there is openness to the unconditional. Such openness can be expressed in religious as well as secular symbols. . . .

Hence, in Tillich's view, there is a kind of ontological struggle and tension between the conditional and unconditional.

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31 Ibid., Preface, p. viii.
32 Ibid., p. 43. (Emphasis mine.)
tional elements of all cultural forms. This conditional-unconditional interplay in the secular pursuits of life with their dimension of depth, or ultimate concern, has the potential to release spirit and create new symbolic forms pointing to the ultimate and to create a more loving, united, theonomous culture. This Tillich calls a "theology of culture." Perhaps such a view provides a basis for a humanistically grounded philosophy of education. For Tillich the creation of a new form which has meaning and power is one which comes "at the right time" (kairos) and responds to a contemporary struggle of larger meaning and significance. "In this way," Tillich says, "history receives the weight and seriousness which belongs to it." 33

It has been emphasized in this discussion of Tillich's view of history that the "kairos" is a public and yet ontological concept, and further, that the meaning of its encounter is not in present actualized forms but precisely in what they lack, in what they fail to express in meaningful forms or myths. It has been emphasized that the creation of new forms to meet this situation of estrangement and lack of meaning and fulfilled relationship in the human community comes through the secular channels of a culture as well as the formally religious ones. In fact, sometimes such forms are created in the secular culture with more "spiritual" power and significance than in the formal religious institutions.

33 _Ibid._, p. 38.
Tillich's view of symbols and creativity

For Tillich, symbolic meanings give present time-space form to realities that transcend immediate empirical representation. Symbolic forms mediate the future and the eternal potential becoming, the dynamic within being to present actualized forms and meanings. Symbolic meanings are thus the avenue by which ontological reality becomes part of the consciousness of man and they express the "kairos" of that generation. Because of the demonic tendency of symbols to become signs, each generation must re-create new forms which participate in ontological being. This immediate but recurrent task of creating symbol meanings which reveal and heal the estrangement of the human community from the ground of being is Tillich's resolution of the Platonic problem of the "participation" of the forms in "shadowy" time-space reality and is his substitute for a dialectical philosophy of history.

Since Tillich has defined religion as "ultimate concern," and since the ultimate dimension of depth always escapes literal signification, it follows that religious language and forms are symbolic language and forms. Both signs and symbols point beyond themselves to something else; signs point to an empirically referential reality or specific object, or to a commonly conditioned association. Tillich gives the example of cars stopping at a stop sign or red light; there is no absolute necessity for this. A sign is a
convention agreed upon by social and public practice. What distinguishes signs and symbols is that, as Tillich puts it, "... signs do not participate in the reality of that to which they point, while symbols do. Therefore, signs can be replaced for reasons of expediency or convention, while symbols cannot."\(^{34}\)

Tillich uses the example of a flag. A flag is born or created in a particular historical situation and it represents the feelings and loyalties and sacrifices of a given body of people. They will salute it and even die for it. They will have memories of wars and lost kinship, and aspirations of future glory and better conditions for present kinship. The flag cannot be replaced with any old flag or piece of paper or new form! It lives and dies in the peoples aspirations, historical continuity in time, and meanings. After a revolution or war new men with new memories and aspirations may create and symbolize a new form and flag, but then the same symbolic psychological and ontological reality is attributed to it. Symbols relate man's inner meaning with his external and commonly encountered reality. The meaning of symbolic forms is a communal product, though it has individual and idiosyncratic connotations, memories and aspirations.

In a society and nation we are inducted into ready-made symbolic forms and meanings and are given the emotions

\(^{34}\) Tillich, *Dynamics of...*, p. 42.
and past meanings that our parents and elders held about these symbols. But these may not be, indeed will not be, our own feelings, memories, and aspirations. Hence, the meaning does not become our own until we discriminate carefully how we feel and what we believe about this public representation. We may then keep and use the symbol in our own way, or we may reject it. But if we reject it, we are rejecting a reality that does have meaning for others.

This process of clarifying and appropriating symbolic meanings for one's self is the Existential process of authenticity. It is the process of "making one's self" that has been so honored. It is defining a relationship, a personal commitment of action and self-structure; and the symbol does not have meaning in the existential sense unless this relationship has been established uniquely and freshly by each individual person. This is a threatening process because we tend to associate people's beliefs with their judgments of worth, of right and wrong, and of good and bad. Thus, if a son rejects a meaning his father holds supreme—such as, the importance of attending Foreign Legion meetings and honoring the memories of war and sacrifice and lost friends and the State that has been "lived and died for," he runs the risk of being rejected by his father. It has been excluded from the father's category of "ultimate concern." The son, further runs the risk of "meaninglessness" since it is easier to reject the father's meaning (the son did not fight the war,
or risk death for his country) than it is to replace it with a new meaning. The son may have rejected it in the name of a higher loyalty, say to be loyal to the human community, to mankind, but the positive symbols of meaning for this loyalty are more abstract and ambiguous and the son receives very little support for this loyalty in his local situation. The son may have to leave all of the friends and associations that have been previously meaningful and supportive to him and seek out a new, looser community. This is threatening, dangerous, uncertain, and besides not knowing quite how to do it, the son may decide "it's not worth the effort!" In this case, which is unfortunately what usually happens, the son will accept and live with a meaning that is social and public, but which he does not genuinely believe in and feel committed to!

This is the problem of generality in education. Such national ideals as democracy, freedom, and equality today have this uncertain meaning for contemporary man and contemporary youth. We know we believe in something from our heritage that we would call freedom, but we are in the position of rejecting the forms and associations of past generations without any contemporary symbols and myths to identify with. Therefore, we simply verbalize the old meanings without individual and authentic commitment and without knowing how to create new forms and meanings that are appropriate to our genuine situation. This point has been elaborated
because it links the earlier discussion with the direction the remainder of this analysis will take. The central point here is that education is more responsible for the creation of new meanings in the emerging contemporary generation than it is for the perpetuation of old meanings and forms.

This is one radical implication of existentialism for education. Otherwise education is not meaningful and does not build authentic, honest, and creative persons. Education becomes a perpetuation of past symbols that have been reduced to signs.

The transition from signs back to symbols is difficult in a generation of adults that have not participated in the struggles that gave meaning to the symbols. A generation that grew up with wars and national loyalty knew the meaning of the freedom and democracy that they had lived and died for. For this older generation the meanings are still symbols and point beyond themselves to ultimate loyalties and defined personal commitments. These people tend to see the younger generation as lazy and irresponsible because such youth fail to honor the original sacrifices and ultimate concerns. The older generation will probably never understand the fact of a changing world that makes the honest and courageous youth unable to join them. This happens in every generation of mankind, but happens more radically in modern times, as Dewey has pointed out, when social and
historical change is increasingly rapid and complex, and new meaning must be constantly refashioned. This means that new forms, symbols, and myths must be created and generated to fit the new existential contemporary situation. This is the problem Tillich is addressing himself to in religious symbols but also in his philosophy of new art and literary forms, his "theology of culture."

As we have noted, symbols participate in the reality to which they point. There are several implications in this. The first is that this means for Tillich that only symbolic meanings can communicate the "kairos" of the contemporary generation to the individual learner. Symbolic meanings provide a meeting of the transcendent and creative autonomous resources of the individual with a historically, culturally, and ontologically conditioned demand. This demand calls for a response, a creation of meaning and commitment by the person, the student. In Tillich's view of the "kairos," this situation is not just social and cultural and epistemological; it has the "moving to and fro"elements of a dynamic or dialectic in all of the forms of a culture and all of the meanings of each individual. The student must participate in the battle between the eternal or unconditional dimensions of these symbols and the conditional dimensions. The all-pervasive symbols are a part of his consciousness and his unconsciousness. For Tillich, symbols grow out of the individual or collective unconscious and cannot function without being accepted by the
unconscious dimension of our being. Symbols which have an especially social function, as political and religious symbols, are created or at least accepted by the collective unconscious of the group in which they appear.35

This is the radical departure from the epistemological approach to meaning, which would only allow the meaning to be an actualized form, a consciously designatable form. Tillich's view, on the contrary, holds that meaning is a personal creation and interpretation, an individual and authentic re-interpretation of public meanings in the light of one's honest and total encounter—even though he does not totally understand in consciousness why or how he believes as he does. Further, Tillich holds that this meaningful creation is a response to a heritage and a given finite condition, and not a solipsistic or anarchistic, isolated subjectivism. He thus attempts to avoid or transcend the problems of inter-subjectivity that plague some other existential positions. There is still the problem of communicating these individually created meanings, but they are meanings which do have common ontological and historical, cultural referents even though they may be selected and fashioned differently.

Tillich conceives a further dimension of symbols. He says, a symbol "... opens up levels of reality which otherwise are closed for us."36 In another context Tillich

35Ibid., p. 43.
36Ibid., p. 42.
states this differently: symbols have the "... power of opening up dimensions of reality, in correlation to dimensions of the human spirit, which otherwise are covered by the predominance of other dimensions of spirit and reality."37 His claim is that through symbols we know and feel aspects of our lives as real that we would not know without symbols. Some aspects simply would not exist or have any reality for us. All of the dimensions of psychological and aesthetic discrimination work through symbols. The connotative meanings of a poem, or the structural meanings of representational art, depend upon representational symbols since we cannot directly point to inner structure or even moods and feelings. If we were limited to signs we would have no such discriminations or inner reality to live with. Neither would we have the creative forms and products, the works of art that emerge from this created reality and then become actualized reals. The work of art may become an object in itself and no longer point to a structure and quality of self-hood where it had its conception. Through symbols we sense a discriminated ontological reality, but if and only if we actively and integratedly and creatively employ them. This again is the "existential view of human nature," the

insistence that only by honest and authentic individual
effort can each man fashion a "self to be made."

There is one further aspect of Tillich's discussion of
symbols that is important. He states it this way. "Symbols
cannot be produced intentionally."38 They cannot be produced
at will, or individually and in isolation. "Like living
beings, they grow and die. They grow when the situation is
ripe for them, and they die when the situation changes."39
This has been illustrated in the discussion of the flag and
the fact that a new flag could only emerge under new group
or national conditions. It has also been illustrated in the
example of the changing meanings of reals like democracy,
freedom, and equality. These are not merely relative terms,
for their meaning is rooted in each person to the "kairos"
of his generation, and of that construction of his generation
that has been his conscious-unconscious dynamic ontological
encounter. On the other hand, these definitely are not
absolute terms. So we find ourselves here back in that mid­
ground between "essents" and "universal being as such" that
Tillich called the proper inquiry of an ontological philos­
ophy. But the specific forms of these ontological reals will
always change and need to be criticized and re-created. The
capacity to bridge toward the universal or toward the partic­

38Tillich, Dynamics of . . ., p. 43.
39Ibid., p. 43.
ular, toward the structure of being-as-such or toward the essent, Tillich adds, is "the integrating and disintegrating power" of symbols, or the "healing power of religious symbols." 40

This aspect of symbols is of particular concern for Tillich, since it allows the mediation of the "power of being itself" in the dynamic self-structure and cultural life of a people. Let us put the point a little differently. Symbols are discriminations that simultaneously include and exclude; they build and erect reality in terms of its inclusions and exclusions! Thus prejudice of any type builds around symbols. The sociologists call this an "in-feeling" or "we-group," and an "out-feeling." Symbols cannot build the one without the other! The loyalty of nationalism is the most self-evident example. In prejudice we come to identify with the in-group to such an extent that we deny the value and worth of what has been excluded. 41 In the founding of formal orders or secret societies we do the same thing; also in the honoring of national symbols. Now, the discrimination itself does not decide what the individual meaning is going to be, as earlier discussed, unless the person passively adopts earlier meanings. If a person re-identifies what for him is "inclusive" and what is "exclusive,"

40 Tillich, "The Meaning and . . .", p. 5.

he knows clearly the "beyond" and "ultimacy" to which his symbols point. But if he fails to do this, he will be operating on "borrowed meanings" and the category of discrimination is likely to migrate either toward a narrower essential or toward a universal category.

For example a person who claims to be a Christian but does not actively and dynamically or authentically decide what this includes and what it excludes in his own reason and in his own feelings and self-structure will move either toward a rigid identification of those in his own section of his own parish (a literalization, as in fundamentalism), or to a universal identification where it does not matter what one believes and everybody becomes a Christian.

Tillich's position and emphasis is that the dynamic of dissolution, this demonic element in the world is constantly pushing us to adopt these larger and smaller loyalties. In his terms it pushes us from ontological anxiety to pathological anxiety and to the creation of fears that are specific and potentially controllable. He further calls this a reduction of symbols to signs, and he designates this in religion as the process of idolatry. For if we apply this inclusiveness and exclusiveness to religious symbols Tillich points out, we are always pointing to an ultimate category that we cannot fully grasp in concepts or time-space forms; for it is the eternal and that beyond time that is being symbolized.
This very failure to recreate new symbolic meanings in the recent western historical era has been here called the Enlightenment heritage, has resulted in idolatrous loyalties of philosophies of history. Tillich calls these "quasi-religions" (nationalism status, security, communism, etc.) because they claim to give ultimate meaning and fulfillment, but in reality do not. Therefore these symbols must always keep the quality and power of "pointing beyond themselves to the ultimate" or they become signs which no longer "participate in the reality" which originated them. Or to put it differently, they become idolatrous in the sense that they achieve ultimacy themselves; that is, they become the object of our ultimate concern and loyalty, that which we will live and die for. Many people whose ultimate meaning is rooted in a nation-state or Hegelian philosophy of history feel their personal worth and quality go up and down as the achievements of success or failure of their nation-state go up or down. The state in this case has become an idol in the sense that it not only has lost its power to point to a common heritage of one group of people as differentiated from another, but it assumes the ultimate authority and loyalty to pursue its own ends at the expense and destruction of all other groups. This is the problem of nationalism in our time. The problem for religion and religious symbols is that

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their ultimate significance must always be Ultimate, and the symbols and forms and myths that express and point to this Ultimate must continue to participate in its reality. As its symbols of a particular heritage become signs or idols, the believing community must use the "Protestant principle" to discriminate the eternal from the temporal, the unconditional from the conditional.

This returns us to the goal of a theonomous culture in which all of the symbols point to the Ultimate because it is a reality in people's communal and personal lives, that the Ultimate remains discriminated and honored, revered and worshipped. It becomes a culture in which individual creations of new forms grow out of the qualitative changes of persons becoming "New Beings," and expressing the "kairos" of their time in an individually and communally meaningful way. Finally Tillich would claim that such symbol creations mediate the healing power of the structure of Being and restore the God-man relationships as well as the man-man relationships; and that without this dynamic element of constantly new creative forms that point beyond themselves to ultimacy, this community also would become idolatrous and then self-destructive. Religion and all cultural life is therefore a dynamic process, a process in the individual that Tillich calls "The Dynamics of Faith" and in the community a theonomous culture.
Tillich's view of religious education

We must now turn to a consideration of how formal education can and should create this theonomous culture, seen from the theological viewpoint of giving answers to life's existential questions. This education would seem to belong in the church, but the concept of a theology of culture gives it a wider employment in Tillich's thought which will later be applied to secular education and teacher training.

It has been noted earlier that the goal of education for Tillich is the induction of students into a fully theonomous culture in which all the forms and symbols, not only the religious ones, of that culture point to the Ultimate. We do not live in such an era. Tillich thinks some parts of the Medieval period were essentially theonomous in the sense that all skills and arts and social gathering were actually ultimate in their concerns, whether church-related or not.

What is the "kairos" of our generation? As noted earlier, after World War I Tillich and the group he associated with sought to re-create this theonomous culture, especially in the lives and the institutions of the Proletariat, which Socialism, as does Communism, sees as the carrier of a universal human community. This was the "kairos" of the time. He then believed that the middle-class revolutions, the Enlightenment heritage, and the capture of state
and national loyalty to serve the interests of this rising middle-class, were leading man away from the theonomous culture and from the dimension of depth or ultimate concern in all of his cultural and social life. After the second World War, Tillich is still concerned with these issues, but is less focused on any particular social-class group as the creator and bearer of the New Being, of the new forms of the present “kairos,” and is dominantly concerned with re-establishing the dimension of depth in all men’s lives and institutions. In such a situation the “kairos” becomes a re-establishing of ontology and of the “mystery which remains a mystery,” or the Ultimate itself. This confines him more exclusively to systematic theology and an institutional, academic life. He is attempting to recommunicate an ontological and theological reality to an epistemologically oriented generation.

In this kind of contemporary “kairos,” Tillich discusses education as a “leading from” present circumstances to a “where to,” or to an “initiation” into the realm of ontological transcendence that can help to re-create the new forms of a theonomous culture. He recalls Plato’s search for wisdom in the Symposium, and in the Republic, as a search for a

… level in life, the most and ultimately the only important one, which cannot be approached directly. … It is the level of Being and truth as such, before they split into subject and object; and therefore it has the character of a mystery.
Everything which is merely object can be approached directly with scientific reason and technical tools. . . . When the element of initiation was lost, education lost the "where to" aim and is now (1946) desperately looking for it.43

The separation of religion and secular culture, due to the Enlightenment heritage, created a desperate "sacred void," and we long for ". . . a new theonomy, for an ultimate concern in all our concerns."44

In his article entitled "A Theology of Education"45 Tillich picks up this same emphasis upon "initiation," that is upon the capacity to use symbols autonomously but in response to a transcendent demand of the "kairos," to fashion and create the new forms which help build a more theonomous culture. Here Tillich asks the question: "Why did education fall away from the Medieval inducting education?" Part of the paradoxical answer is that the Enlightenment lost or minimized the demonic reality which sets up the dynamics for criticizing idolatrous forms. Further, he makes a distinction between three different kinds of education, which he labels "technical," "humanistic," and "inducting." The Medieval period was characterized by the dominance of a theonomous culture which inducted the young into the ultimate meaning that was affirmed in all areas of its life. When


44Ibid., p. 65.

45Tillich, Theology of Culture . . ., ch. XI.
historical scholarship emerged in the Renaissance, and the concept of universal autonomous reason was reasserted (and later became the foundation of Rationalism), a new goal of education emerged; "... the ideal of the development of all human potentialities, individually and socially." Education became humanistic with a vengance. Tillich claims that this ideal has continued to remain dominant for nearly 400 years since its inception. This is because its discovery is ontologically true, that reason and the Logos do pervade every autonomous individual mind, as the Greeks had held. As Tillich expresses it, they discovered "... the presence of the infinite in everything finite." The goal that followed was to attempt to get every individual to actualize his full potential, and not only intellectually but in the area of skills as well. This, of course, was not possible for many.

The Enlightenment borrowed the theme in its view of democratic and educational reform, and sought to achieve this goal through the powers of the nation-state. An originally aristocratic conception thus became democratic, and continues now under the demonic influence of state and national idolatrous loyalty as an ultimate concern, and under the impact of the idolatrous search for money and power that has pushed the middle-classes into developing a technically oriented high-school curriculum. Education for "citizenship" and "adjust-

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46 Ibid., p. 146.  
47 Ibid., p. 147.
ment to life" and the creation of money-making and power-
making skills and loyalties have captured state-supported
education because in the larger culture these have become
the ultimate concerns of the majority. This public educa-
tion talks of the humanistic goal of developing each indi-
vidual's full potentialities, but in fact is developing
those potentialities that serve idolatrous ends. The autono-
mous individual who creates his own forms and ontological
reality, does so in spite of the system more than because of
it. In another context Tillich says,

One must ask whether education for adjustment is not
injustice because it prevents the intrinsic claim
for independence from ever coming to the surface.
One must ask whether adjustment is not a method of
overpowering and therefore essentially injustice.
The answer must be that education for adjustment is
just in so far as it is a way of giving a form to
the individual. It is unjust in so far as it
inhibits the individual from creating new forms . . .
a large part of the Existential revolt in the crea-
tive culture of the last one hundred years is an
attempt to provide justice for the individual and
to support his intrinsic claim to transcend adjust-
ment by creativity.48

So Tillich accepts the goal of an autonomous reason,
the goal of a humanistic education, but he does so only if
the reason is really autonomous, which for him means it is
rooted in transcendent ontology and capable of creating new
forms that translate the "kairos" into a more theonomous
culture. In fact, one feels that Tillich would support an
induction into a democratic nationalistic education and

48Tillich, Love . . ., p. 90.
culture, if that nation and its teachers were fully aware of the symbolic function of their heritage and pointed beyond themselves to the universal human community and to the Ultimate. But in our heritage this is not true. So Tillich is led to ask: "What was lost?" He answers,

The induction of the Middle Ages was induction into a community with symbols in which the answers to the questions of human existence and its meaning were embodied. One can say that induction was initiation into the mystery of human existence.

In this country, the public school has ceased to give an education which in my sense could be called initiation into the mystery of existence and the symbols through which it is expressed. The national idea can in no way replace an induction which is initiation.

We have lost the challenge: "Change Thy Life!" We "have nothing ultimately serious, nothing through which the mystery of being grasps us. Humanism has become empty, and so has the humanistic ideal of education." Tillich goes on to suggest that this loss of ultimacy is responsible for the apathy, indifference, and even delinquency of modern youth; for not only are the school and the home dead, but the dimension of depth has not been created in young lives so they are left to idolatrous forms of waste and destruction.

Hence Tillich turns to consider what the function of the church school should be in such a "kairos." The function of the church in all periods is to mediate the New Being and

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49 Tillich, Theology of . . ., p. 151 (author's italics).
50 Ibid., pp. 151-152.
present the challenge of becoming a New Being in one's own life. When a theonomous culture is lacking, the church school has the additional function of trying to free the humanistic rational energies to help create the new forms that will point to the Ultimate in the larger culture. Tillich states, the church school's function is to be the "place where the Medieval tradition of inductive education is still alive." But since today's churches are not universal and do not reflect a total theonomous culture, they must be careful to avoid a preoccupation with the ultimacy of their own forms and heritage and ritual meanings lest these become narrow and idolatrous themselves.

Inducting into this special tradition is unavoidable, and is unavoidably ethnocentric to begin with. The church schools must make the Ultimate and the universal relevant to this heritage, or youth will find that the meanings they get in church do not fit the larger demand of the "kairos" of their time. They will thus reject the church and the Christian message. This, of course, Tillich seeks to avoid. He recommends that religious instruction begin with the existential situation and make modern youth aware of the ontological and universal dimensions of the human predicament that they have thus far encountered. Next, an attempt should be made to show that the Christian message is unified with the Logos.

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51 Ibid., p. 152.
theory of ontology, of autonomous reason and creative energies of uniqueness in each individual person. Therefore the humanistic goal and focus of education, of questioning everything, including God and the Christian tradition, is part of Christian instruction.

In early youth the forms of ritual and the Christian community must be inducted in the form of doctrine and ritual, which will be subjected to this humanistic critical function later. But it must be there to criticize first. "It opens up the subconscious levels of the children for the ultimate mystery of being,"52 Tillich says. And this means that the central problem then becomes getting the young to re-examine this meaning actively and dynamically, so that it does not become a dead and idolatrous form for them. If it loses its symbolic power and becomes merely sign, it will close or cover up ontology and the mystery of being again. So "the problem . . . of the relation of Christianity and culture generally, and Christianity and education especially . . . is infinite and must be solved again in every generation."53

The church school, then, has the function of liberating the young to Being and to the power of creating new forms for achieving the more fully theonomous culture. Its special danger is to avoid its own idolatry. The final emphasis is that while public schools and inducting church schools must

52 Ibid., p. 156.
53 Ibid., pp. 156-157.
initially limit the kinds of questions that are meaningful to
the young—and this justifies the induction functions—it is
at adulthood and in the colleges, even the church-related
colleges that the individual’s reason is "united with its own
depth," in ontological reality; and he is capable of creat­
ing those new forms that help point others toward the Ulti­
mate that otherwise remains hidden. This will build the
theonomous culture of more perfect and universally referen­
tial symbols that heal the relationship between man and God,
and between man and man, as well as between the dynamics of
the conditional and unconditional in the spiritual life of
each individual person. This autonomous response to the
"kairos" is, let us recall, the way "... history receives
the weight and seriousness which belongs to it."54 And this
"seriousness" must be registered in the secular realms of
society, including secular education, through the dimension
of depth or ultimate concerns of every secular pursuit.

54Tillich, The Protestant . . . , p. 38.
In making an application of Tillich's thought to secular education the discussion will be guided primarily by the two criteria developed in the preceding chapter, the theory of correlation and the theology of culture. The concept of the theory of correlation permits one to deal with Tillich's philosophical ontology somewhat independently of his role as Christian theologian. It is most centrally his view of human nature and the dynamics or ambiguities of growth and self-transcendence that will be applied as useful to an approach to secular education. This emphasis will be supplemented in later chapters by showing that the self-psychologists operate from similar assumptions concerning human nature. Basic to the discussion in this chapter is Tillich's view of human reason as existentially conditioned, and yet potentially transcendent through the use of symbols and new created forms in the service of ultimate concerns. This dynamic part of the psyche he calls "spirit."

"Spirit" for Tillich is not a spiritualistic or supernaturalistic concept, nor an independent non-corporeal soul.
or rational faculty. It is an organized use of human *eros* and vitality in the service of *agape*, or universal ontological loyalties in the service of concerns which are ultimate. In developing this view of human nature it will be shown that the concept of finite freedom and self-transcendence is consistent with what this dissertation has called the "existential view of human nature," and that a concept of human freedom very useful in educational theory and practice follows from these theoretical assumptions. It will later be shown that the self-psychologists are already empirically demonstrating the power and value of these conceptions of human freedom and development. It will further be held that Tillich's concept of ontological or existential anxiety is profoundly helpful in educators' attempts to understand the limits and blocks involved in human learning and qualitative change; and once again it will be pointed out that the self-psychologists have empirically observed and noted many of the same processes and dimensions in human learning and becoming. Tillich's ontologically grounded concept of courage may be very useful to a teacher in approaching her own day's work and also to her learners as they wrestle with the meaningful aspirations and limitations of human finitude. Finally Tillich's view of character development, of the way in which the moral sensitivities and demands arise in encounter with other persons who affirm their own ultimate concerns, is very useful to one aspect of teaching. A basis of inducting
authority, intellectual discipline and direction while honoring autonomous reason in learners appears to be provided by Tillich's framework.

Many of these concepts are also useful and can be integrated within the large concept of the theology of culture. Tillich's ideal society is called "the theonomous culture," and his ideal man is called the "New Being" following his Christology. The word "theology" and "theonomy" will no doubt offend the secular reader as inappropriate in a secular philosophy of education, and it will be nearly impossible for such a reader to conceive of a Christological criteria for personal becoming in a non-sectarian frame of reference. From the viewpoint of mediating and interpreting revelation, or inducting a person into the Church community, the "Kingdom of God," such a reader's apprehensions are of course valid. The public schools would not even have this function in an achieved theonomous society. But if we conceive the theonomous culture from the viewpoint of a humanistic culture that has become once again concerned with the dimension of depth and ultimate concern in all of its secular pursuits, this reader's apprehensions would seem to be invalid. In Tillich's conception of a theonomous culture, religion and morality and culture are inseparable precisely because all three are creative expressions of a single, unified, subjectively integrated person.
The religious dimension participates in all secular activity as the dimension of depth or of ultimate concern, and in secular education this is nothing more than an affirmation of autonomous reason operating in an ontological sensitivity and concern, a search for ultimate reality. In this atmosphere of vitality and commitment the search for truth is made meaningful and personally fulfilling. In Tillich's viewpoint such religious dimensions have no creed, no dogma, no supernatural mysticism, no prior loyalties to any particular interpretation of revelation; there is only an openness before Being and a posture of dedication to pursue that which concerns one ultimately. In this dynamic ontological openness Tillich does believe the searcher will sometimes create new forms which will help himself and others see more clearly their existential estrangement and thus release those moral qualities of concern and love which may create a more unifying relationship. Perhaps every secular, humanistic teacher believes as much. As a theologian, Tillich will call this openness or receptivity to new structures of personal reality or created reality an "ecstatic experience" or even a "gestalt of grace" if the person becomes healed and reunified with himself, his peers, and his ontological reality; but this interpretation stems from his theology rather than his ontology and is not appropriate to the context of this dissertation. The religious dimension is here separated from the religious institution.
In the concept of the theology of culture one must acknowledge the centrality of this dimension of depth, or ultimate concern, or search for meaning and ultimate reality as expressed in and through secular cultural forms. It is this dimension that provides a theory of self-transcendence and of creativity that is profoundly needed and useful in secular education. And once again the self-psychologists have already discovered and demonstrated the same dynamics of development in a thoroughly empirical frame of reference. Tillich's theoretical analysis adds more depth, perspective, and direction than is offered by these empirical descriptions, and this perspective is important to the teacher.

Tillich's view of the nature of man

In a tightly written article entitled "Philosophy and Fate," Tillich has cogently argued, in keeping with the epistemological tradition traced in this dissertation, that reason and thought are conditioned by the existential limits of Fate or time-space given-ness, just as are all other aspects of finite man's life. The logos as a rational structure in Being, is affirmed, and it does pervade the conscious activity of each man's autonomous reasoning processes, but the content and concepts of thought, though conditioned by this Logos, never fully express its totality. Plato seems to

agree to this in the very form of his dialogues and the
dialectical method of reasoning which, after exhausting all
forms and given arguments and examining their basic assump-
tions, is then left to an intuitive "vision of the Good."
If this is a "mystical" element in Plato, it comes after the
limits of rational discrimination and examination have been
fully exhausted. Tillich has a similar view in his notion
that the "kairos," the transcendent in time is received by
the consciousness ready and able to receive it. In the last
chapter it was argued that this readiness is a conscious
doubt and serious inquiry or openness before Being, and that
the reality and meanings of this sphere are mediated by sym-
bolic forms. This inquiry is an active search but is not
only a process of intellectual openness, but includes all the
conscious and unconscious feelings and forms which mediate
the tensions between finitude and ultimacy in that generation
and culture. This dynamic and communal base is what makes
qualitative change in human becoming possible. For, once
again, the Existentialists are affirming that man is the form
of existence who has the power of defining his own form or
essence, within the limits of "finite freedom."

This autonomous and authentic openness to Being-itself,
this condition of ultimate concern toward creating new forms
of meaning that heal the human community makes an intuitive
grasp and structure of new forms possible. Most fundament-
ally, this becoming is possible because of a dynamic and
dialectical structure of ontology in which the individual participates in his conscious-unconscious existential milieux. He can potentially give form to this situation through his symbolic capacities. Because one posits and affirms a dynamic ontology and an unfurnished form to man's essence, it follows that man is existentially conditioned by the polar forces of reality, but that his own essence is then a continual becoming process. From this point of view there is an individual purposeful drive to fulfill one's potentialities, to give form and structure to the individual human life. Yet the Existential thesis is that each individual must do this himself if it is to be achieved authentically, for only he can feel and give shape and form to his own unique becoming.

It is only with these assumptions of dynamic human becoming as part of Being, and with reason as a transcendent and creatively autonomous force mediating the structure of Being, that the definition of education as one which transcends bias, ethnocentricism, and egocentricism becomes defensible. Existentialism re-affirms individual purposefulness as supreme, and rejects the evolutionary or historical teleology of the Enlightenment. For education this seems to mean, as Fallico has phrased it, that in becoming educated a central responsibility is the fashioning of ones "self to be made." Our central educational concern will be with how this process uses the content and methodological disciplines in its goal of transcending bias and ethnocentricism.
From Tillich there is here added a specific viewpoint of man's existential situation. He argues that man participates in an estranged reality where the forces of Being ultimately do reign over the forces of Non-Being and dissolution. Man participates in this estrangement, even his reason being conditioned by it, as re-expressed above. Yet there is a voluntarism added in which the individual purposeful force is also conditioned in its actualized forms, but is unconditioned in its potential and unrealized forms. Man is given the life-affirming energy, in his body and vitality. This energy of Eros (more in the Platonic than Freudian sense) can be united with the purposeful impulse to actualized one's self, a process that is called "eros-telos," when it is given specific direction by self-created ends, forms, and meanings. But this can only be done because of and by use of man's rational symbolic powers, which allow man to point to a potential reality that is other than his present actualized reality, both personal and social! For Tillich this is optimally and perhaps exclusively an ultimate concern, which has the dimension of depth and the dynamic forces of ontological Being as its goal and motivating power. For these ultimate concerns can only be expressed in symbolic form, and these forms always point beyond themselves to Being and hence also to potential human becoming. That is, Being includes human becoming as one of its dynamic forms. Reason—the search for truth—is seen as a proper ultimate concern of the
teacher and learner in society; this unites the dimensions of Logos and Kairos that Tillich has discussed. For Tillich, trust in the symbolic forms of measuring that point beyond themselves to the ultimate or to Being-Itself is a transcendent activity and functioning of human symbolic reason, but the conclusions or content-forms of this rational process are always themselves finite, time-space forms. Hence, it is only when these forms are symbolic and "point beyond themselves to the reality in which they participate" that they unite Logos and Kairos, or create the becoming transcendent universal meanings in a given time-space context.

There is a second dimension of Tillich's discussion of the role of symbols in his philosophy of history, of the perennially contemporary "kairos" in human time. This is his contention that the "kairos" arises in a historical-cultural time-space context which is only partly mediated by extant forms and presently actualized, conscious symbols. Part of the mediation is unconscious and archetypal in a presumably Jungian view of universal gestalt forms of apprehension; is the affirming of one's own ontological self-structure and giving a progression of form and structure to it. It will shortly be shown that in Tillich's analysis, the use of symbols, the discriminations of the self and the discriminations of the external world arise in the same process. Hence the solipsistic problem of egocentricity becomes transcended or at least is seen as a misnomer.
One dimension of this problem needs to be discussed and emphasized at this point. While the ontological and biological self is prior in both time and logic to the creation of a social-self which arises in a community, it is also true that the socially discriminated self is temporally prior to the rational and symbolic creation of one's autonomously constructed self-structure. In the view defended here, one cannot "make his self" without the prior equipment of language and symbol-manipulation, and this is first and only learned in a human community Tillich stresses this, for example: "Only in the continuous encounter with other persons does the person become and remain a person. The place of this encounter is the community."^2 Herbert Muller's discussion of the conscious individual" as the goal and aim of true civilization is one of the most widely popularized statements of this belief. He concludes,

> It is now generally recognized that the community came first, and that the individual with his rights is a product of a developed society. As far back as we can see we find men living in groups, comparable to the flocks, herds, swarms, and schools of the animal world; and only when we come to civilization do we find a high degree of individuality.

And relevant to the present discussion, he adds,

> The emergence of the individual with a mind of his own may be considered, once more, the chief justification of civilization. He also sums up its

paradoxes. The individual has always been a threat to the social order that produced him. ³

The literature of philosophical anthropology is full of this point, and one of the best discussions is Cassirer's Essay on Man. Here Cassirer traces not only the fact that man's first speculative thought was of the external natural world, but stresses that as man began to examine social life as an "extrovert view of life," ⁴ an accompanying view of the individual self began to emerge—an "introvert view of life." ⁵

For Cassirer this was the beginning not only of the self-consciousness individual, but also of myth and religion and of all the problems of man's self-knowledge. A later statement makes the present point very clearly: "Man's social consciousness depends upon a double act, of identification and discrimination. Man cannot find himself, he cannot become aware of his individuality, save through the medium of social life." Then he adds the same critical and rebellious qualification that Muller makes, and Cassirer's whole book is an attempt to show this is essentially because of man's symbolic capacities:

But to him this medium signifies more than an external determining force. Man, like the animals, submits to the rules of society, but, in addition,

³Herbert Muller, Uses of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 64.


⁵Ibid., p. 17.
he has an active share in bringing about, and an active power to change, the forms of social life. 6

As an individual learns the social meanings of the signs and symbols of his environment and community, he gains the more abstract capacity for symbols as used in Tillich's sense of a response to a "kairos" situation. Susan Langer, in her discussion of symbols, stresses that a symbol has a fashioned proportion of parts, a pattern designed by man. She emphasizes that there may be many interpretations and psychologically varying conceptions and connotations. She says,

A concept is all that a symbol really conveys. But just so quickly as the concept is symbolized to us, our own imagination dresses it up in a private, personal conception, which we can distinguish from the communicable public concept only by a process of abstraction. . . . This power of regarding a sense-datum as irrelevant except for a certain form that it embodies, is the most characteristic mental trait of mankind. It issues in an unconscious spontaneous process of abstraction, which goes on all the time in the human mind: a process of recognizing the concept in any configuration given to experience, and forming a conception accordingly.7

So the central point here has been that man does develop his reason and his abstract capacities from the language and actualized forms of his social community. But the further point has been stressed that he can then use this abstract and critical capacity to examine and re-fashion or create new

6 Ibid., p. 280.

forms. And for Existentialism the central focus of such a new form is the fashioning of a unique self. This self will have independently fashioned interaction, interpretations, and relationships, hence an ontologically based meaning that may have no objectively referential counterpart in other persons' meanings or in the presently actualized environment. This capacity we generally call creativity.

Tillich tells how this is done most meaningfully in his view of symbol meanings arising in response to a "kairos" demand. There is an element of transcendence in this view that some will find too mystical, religious, or idealistic perhaps. Heidegger suggests this same capacity by his term "Sorge," usually translated as "care" or "concern," the capacity for abstract emotional and ontological identifications as well as abstract relational identifications. This capacity is often called love or empathy. The view of transcendence here adapted from Tillich stresses that a man can emotionally, and as Tillich says in his discussion of the origin of symbols, "consciously-unconsciously," identify with a symbolic form that is larger in scope than his immediate time-space, empirical encounter. He can have genuine concern for situations and people he has never met, and may never meet, such as "starving children in underdeveloped lands," or the whole of the future; and he can identify his present self-concerns and self-responsibilities with this symbolic abstraction. In fact, it is this larger-than-time-space
identification that allows him to be able to make new integrations, new forms, and to be creative. He can, but he does not have to, and this constitutes what Tillich calls his "Finite Freedom." This is also where the epistemological tradition and the Existential view of human nature are seen in contrast. For the social-meaning theories stress cognition and concern not only in the immediate and growing space context but also in the immediate and growing externally measured time context.

Let us recall here that this given historical-cultural situation in Tillich's context is a dynamic between the forces moving toward the unconditioned (toward larger "Sorge" patterns and identifications) and toward the conditioned. This conflict is occurring in all the dimensions and institutions of every period of every society. This tension is reflected in the actualized forms and patterns of the day, and some of it is communicated to the individual through conscious forms. Much of it is communicated through unconscious encounters, and some of it through the dynamics of being and ontology in the life of that individual himself as he is pulled in both directions simultaneously. This series of dynamics creates a historical-situation having certain common dimensions for all persons of that era, but it is not likely that any single symbol or form expresses it all. This larger context and situation is the source of the identification and new perceptual and conceptual forms that are called the transcendent capacities of the individual.
If one were to contrast this with Dewey's "indeterminate situation," there would not follow the logic of focusing upon what is known and discriminatable in the immediate environments. Rather, what follows is the development of an "ontological-frustration-tolerance" to live in the indeterminate-ness long enough, and repeatedly enough, to allow one's own concern and creative relationship of meaning to begin to emerge from the symbolic and ontological center of self-hood. But this indeterminacy and frustration-tolerance are hard to live with; they are a context of "anxiety" in Tillich's framework. This chapter will show how the resources of the individual can be gathered to desire this situation, even enjoy and feel secure in it and prefer it to static security and hence learn to live new and authentic forms to his self and creative activities!

Tillich's view of anxiety and courage

This part of Tillich's analysis is also rooted in his dynamic view of ontology and the dissolutioning tendencies of non-being. "Courage is self-affirmation 'in-spite-of' that which tends to prevent the self from affirming itself," states Tillich. Those who affirm life and growth and becoming as ontological concepts of estrangement also affirm

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9Tillich, The Courage ..., p. 32.
death and destruction and non-being. Hence those who deny non-being deny life; they deny the dynamic quality of self-transcending life, and choose to be a static essence, a thing. Man alone, among all the forms of being, has the conscious awareness of birth and life, creation and destruction. He knows his universe will eventually expand into destruction or that the earth will rotate too slowly to sustain life. He also knows that his life will end, he will die. Man does not enjoy this insight. Tillich says,

Anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible non-being . . . (or) anxiety is the existential awareness of non-being. 'Existential' in this sentence means that it is not abstract knowledge of non-being which produces anxiety, but the awareness that nonbeing is a part of one's own being. It is not the realization of universal transitoriness, not even the experience of the death of others, but the impression of these events on the always latent awareness of our own having to die that produces anxiety. Anxiety is finitude experienced as one's own finitude. This is the natural anxiety of man as man.  

Then Tillich makes an all-important distinction between anxiety and fear; it is the same one Rollo May uses and is apparently accepted in the self-psychological literature. Anxiety is not specific. It has no direct referential object, or its object is unknowable and beyond human reason. The Freudian literature talks about "free-floating anxiety." In this basic anxiety, Tillich comments, "the fear of death" is basic and always "determines the element of anxiety in every

10Ibid., p. 35.
fear."11 Rollo May makes the same distinction, as follows:

In fear we know what threatens us; we are energized by the situation; our perceptions are sharper, and we take steps to run or in other appropriate ways to overcome danger. In anxiety, however, we are threatened without knowing what steps to take to meet the danger. Anxiety is the feeling of being 'caught,' 'overwhelmed,' and instead of becoming sharper, our perceptions generally become blurred or vague.12

Basically, May adds, anxiety is a person's "... reaction to a danger to his existence or to some value he identifies with his existence."13 But, May continues, to give us some hope, "The positive and hopeful side is that just as anxiety destroys our self-awareness, so awareness of ourselves can destroy anxiety";14 and again, the Existential view of man creating the self seeks this self-knowledge and awareness above all else!

But let us return to Tillich's analysis for what would seem to be a central insight. "Anxiety strives to become fear, because fear can be met by courage. ... The human mind is not only as Calvin has said, a permanent factory of idols, it is also a permanent factory of fears,"15 to escape ontological anxiety, and hence to escape ontological reality. This insight becomes the center of the present analysis and

11Ibid., p. 38.
13Ibid., p. 40.
14Ibid., p. 44.
explanation of why the prevailing concepts in education and educational theory are always losing their clarity of meaning and their power to demand commitment and existential meaning from students. We avoid clear meaning and commitment because we seek to avoid responsibility for the process of affirming our own self-hood; such affirmation is too lonely and desperate.

To continue with Tillich's analysis, he first distinguishes three types of threat to one's self-affirmation of himself—three types of Existential anxiety in relation to the self. The first he calls "ontic self-affirmation," or affirming one's ontological status as self-hood—the ultimate threat of non-being here is the destruction of the self in death, which will inevitably come so it is existential. But prior to death, and less severe, are all the threats of fate, and such limits of life as accidents and disease, each to a lesser degree threatening the affirmation of one's ontological self-hood. The second kind of self-affirmation Tillich calls "spiritual self-affirmation," or affirming the meaning and creation of one's Existential self in time-space. The ultimate threat of non-being here is "meaninglessness (or) a lack of an ultimate meaning to all meanings."16 Prior to complete meaningfulness are all the threats to the meaning of one's beliefs and values, the threats to one's trust in

16 Ibid., p. 47.
reason. The third kind of self-affirmation Tillich discusses is what he calls "moral self-affirmation." The ultimate threat of non-being here is "condemnation" or worthlessness or complete loss of identity. But prior to a complete self-concept of degradation are all the threats and temptations of cowardice and dishonesty, of quicker and easier paths to the achievement of our goals. As we give in to these, we find ourselves existentially guilty, self-judged or ontologically judged.

But Tillich has two further dimensions to his analysis that are also important to the purposes of this work. The first is his claim that "Pathological anxiety" can best be explained as "... a state of Existential anxiety under special conditions."\(^1\) Courage can conquer fear to some extent, since fear is directed toward an object and is controllable or avoidable. But courage cannot conquer the limits of Existential and ontological anxiety because these pervade the structure of being and eventually conquer the physical self itself! To avoid facing this situation and living with it one might narrow down the realm of reality one lives in to where it is understandable and controllable. Such a narrowing can be achieved by selective perception, whether conscious or unconscious! This is Tillich's concept of neurosis. "Neurosis is the way of avoiding non-being by

\(^{17}\textit{Ibid.},\ p.\ 65.\)
avoiding being,"\textsuperscript{18} he says; that is, by avoiding ontology and refusing to be the full being one is capable of becoming, or as he puts it, by affirming a "reduced self."\textsuperscript{19} Some or many of its potentialities are not admitted to actualization, because actualization of being implies acceptance of non-being and its anxiety. He who is not capable of a powerful self-affirmation in spite of the anxiety of non-being, is forced into a weak, reduced self-affirmation. He affirms something which is less than his essential or potential being. He surrenders a part of his potentialities in order to save what is left.\textsuperscript{20}

Tillich holds that such a neurotic person is often more sensitive to some things, more intense, more aware of threats to his self-chosen world and meanings, and sometimes even more creative and productive as a result of such a rigid channelling of his energies. But this neurosis becomes selectively perceptive. It becomes an ideology and ethnocentric position that easily retreats under threat to a narrower and safer world. Eventually its defenses are cracked; "he will fall back into another and much better defended neurosis."\textsuperscript{21} Tillich claims, and adds that ultimately the

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 66.

\textsuperscript{19} Rollo May, after examining neurotic defenses against and asking what is common to them, comes to the same conclusion in psychological terms: "... a shrinking of the area of awareness and activity, thus obviating the conflict which causes the anxiety." The Meaning of Anxiety (Ronald Press Co., 1950), p. 225.

\textsuperscript{20} Tillich, the Courage . . . , p. 66.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 68.
neurotic person reaches a rigid self-concept and maintains a "... compulsory defense of this base." \(^{22}\)

Rollo May echoes Tillich in the definition of anxiety and suggests a proper concern in education. He states, "Anxiety is the apprehension cued off by a threat to some value which the individual holds essential to his existence as a personality." \(^{23}\) This examination of "values which the individual holds essential to his existence" is precisely the function of the philosophy of education. In the light of Existential thought, teachers should be anxiety-creators in part. They should, of course, expect resistance and generality defenses from students! Nietzsche, with characteristic insight, asserts that "... he who feels no dread at this point must be asked not to meddle with pedagogic questions." \(^{24}\)

Another facet of Tillich's belief that ontological anxiety creates specific fears and avoids the threats of non-Being that are implicit in affirming dynamic Being is seen in his discussion of the "reduced self." He asserts that the neurotic protective self which fears the dissolving threats of non-Being retreats into a reduced self and then becomes increasingly defensive and protective of this self-

\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 77.


\(^{24}\)Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Future of Our Educational Institutions (F. Ungar, 1926), p. 45.
created meaning and reality. This defensiveness leads to a pre-occupation with the defense of the self against all criticism from the outside world. Most centrally then, such a self becomes static and represses all active conscious doubt, severely limiting interaction.\(^\text{25}\) This repressed doubt is then projected as fear onto persons who voice doubts about this sufficiency. This fear can be hostile and destructive, as in creating prejudice and suggesting scapegoats; or it can be the more passive selective perception of avoiding all expressed doubt and criticism of the position adhered to. Inasmuch as education encourages the conscious doubt, teachers should anticipate hostility as they clarify the significance of the ontological self-structure dimensions which resist this process of conscious doubt. They will, of course, realize that personal resources of love and courage will be pre-conditions of healthy and non-neurotic further conscious inquiry.

If education is to deal with the forces of fear and anxiety it must understand the extent to which human beings avoid self-knowledge and project and sublimate their energies into the social, cultural, external world, or sadistically upon others, or masochistically upon themselves. Freudian psychology suggests that which is anxiety-producing

is much of reality itself, much of the reality-principle which represses and denies the erotic energies of the body and "id," the desires for omnipotent and omniscient fulfillment. Maslow gives a useful summary statement, which surely over-simplifies the insights of the Freudian framework, but suffices here. "From our point of view," says Maslow, "Freud's greatest discovery is that the great cause of much psychological illness is the fear of knowledge of oneself—of one's emotions, impulses, memories, capacities, potentialities, or one's destiny." In this Freudian or Neo-Freudian context, the importance of parental suppression and authority, and the anxiety of moving beyond their disapproval cannot be minimized in our culture. Karen Horney's title, *Neurotic Personality of Our Times*, suggests the continued domination of parental authority and its substitute figures in the culture, a major one of which of course is teachers, or more fundamentally knowledge or truth itself, and educational institutions. Rollo May, in discussing this tradition states:

The hardest step of all, requiring the greatest courage, is to deny those under whose expectations

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one has lived the right to make the laws. And this
is the most frightening step. It means accepting
responsibility for one's own standards and judgments,
even though one knows how limited and imperfect they
are.29

Emphasis has here been given to the point May makes
about maintaining individual authority over communal or legal
authority, for this is the crux of the Existential position
and demand. The most original presentation of this is
Kierkegaard's "teleological suspension of the ethical," in
which he asserts that the ethical demand for universal loy­
alty to rational and universal goals becomes impossible and
self-destructive eventually, and that a man is driven to the
"leap of faith" where he affirms an individual ethic as
higher than the communal ethic.30 For Kierkegaard this
involved the "Absolute-paradox" of the Incarnation and what
he called the "religious" state; but the important point here
is not his answer, but his classic statement of the problem.
For most persons in our society, this is still first met and
most centrally met in the anxiety of moving beyond the values
and protective meanings and security of their parents; and
for many people this threat is never transcended. In this
regard May asserts that anxiety is a disease that afflicts
the most courageous and most gifted persons more severely

29 May, The Meaning . . ., p. 238. (Italics mine.)

30 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Garden City,
because these are sensitive to more complexity and are the ones who risk most and have the most to risk! This is **Existential anxiety, not pathological.** It means in education that the problem of transcending anxiety will likely be increased and intensified in the bright and talented, rather than diminished, as we might normally assume! "Anxiety is a sickness which attacks precisely those who are strongest in spirit and richest in gifts."\(^{31}\)

Finally, in a consideration of the major sources of anxiety in our society, it is obvious that a central source lies in the pressure to achieve dominant cultural values, most noticeably success and status, or what May calls "competitive success." In fact he concludes that "... individual competitive success is both the dominant goal in our culture and the most pervasive occasion for anxiety."\(^{32}\) This aspect of our lives and culture has perhaps been most thoroughly treated in contemporary times by Erich Fromm, especially in *Escape from Freedom* and *Man for Himself*. Fromm's "marketing orientation" is rather noticeable in the educational world, where it does often become a drive to achieve the labels of worth—grades, diplomas, degrees—and the search for truth suffers in the process! One of the pernicious elements of this is the peer-pressure for mediocrity, for not being too smart or too informed for this kind

\(^{31}\)May, *The Meaning* ..., p. 28.

\(^{32}\)Ibid., p. 153.
of person raises standards that all must meet, not only for grades but for their sense of worth. "For," says the observant Nietzsche, "so wretched is man that he never feels himself brought into such close contact with a stranger as when the latter shows some sign of weakness, some defect."33 And to the strangers of the classroom, this weakness and defect relieves the tension and anxiety of the goal of competitive success and of loneliness. More fundamentally and comprehensively, and by way of summary of these sources of anxiety and return to the original discussion, May comments: "The quantity of anxiety prevalent in the present period arises from the fact that the assumptions underlying modern culture are themselves threatened."34

We are, then, living in an age of anxiety; and whereas all ages have their existential anxiety, it is probable that our age, with its deterioration of myths and social stability and the oppressive threat this entails, has an overdose of such anxiety. The above discussion examined some of its forms, and the social critics and daily newspapers' give us many more. The educational demand to search for truth and be open to reality in such a time is indeed threatening. It has been here argued that a stronger ontological base and a philosophic commitment to truth are needed as loyalties in


34 May, The Meaning . . . , p. 188.
the educational process. It has been further suggested that Tillich's view of ontological courage is a proper source for meeting these ontological and existential threats of anxiety. Still to be discussed is Tillich's presentation of the fundamental source of energy for courage. He calls this source "vitality"; others have called it "eros-telos" or the "symbol-sorge capacity" of human reason.

The argument of this dissertation has emphasized cutting under the epistemological and subject-object dichotomy to establish the prior fact of the biological body and an ontological structure to self-hood. Tillich turns to a kind of symbolic voluntarism, in his reaffirmation of the life-affirming energies of the body. But, he emphasizes, this energy is not merely biological; for it can then be used to destroy the body as the Freudian's have shown, or to disperse one's energies and destroy the self as Kierkegaard suggests in his "aesthetic stage" of life. The bodily vitality is channelled through a symbolic self-system of meanings, which relates it to an external and universal "kairos." Tillich states:

The power of man's life cannot be separated from . . . 'intentionality,' the relation to meanings. Man's vitality is as great as his intentionality; they are interdependent. This makes man the most vital of all beings. He can transcend any given situation in any direction and this possibility drives him to create beyond himself. Vitality is the power of creating beyond oneself without losing oneself.35

This process of transcendence makes use of symbols, for it is the very nature of symbols to combine body and mind by giving direction to bodily energies through symbolic meanings that build relationships with the external environment and with the growing self. The loss of the body's energies and of its repression and dispersion into the external community has been of major concern to most of the Existentialists. Here Tillich says:

One of the unfortunate consequences of the intellectualization of man's spiritual life was that the word 'spirit' was lost and replaced by mind or intellect, and that element of vitality which is present in 'spirit' was separated and interpreted as an independent biological force.\(^{36}\)

Marcel comments similarly: today many people

... are victims of a mere illusion, an illusion which consists in the last analysis of adhering to that conception of the spirit as something at the opposite extreme from the flesh, against which I have never ceased to protest. ... the spiritual seems to wish to claim for itself the dignity of a separate existence, whereas in a deeper sense it only constitutes itself effectively as spirit on condition of becoming flesh.\(^{37}\)

These two quotations reflect one of the existential dimensions of Existentialism, the affirmation of the body as a biological base of ontological reality, and a source of the basic energies necessary for courage and the making of a self. In Tillich's terms, this biological energy must be

\(^{36}\)Ibid., p. 82.

united with its depth, that is, given direction by the ultimate concerns of the developing ontological self-structure. The phrase "eros-telos" suggests a similar and symbolically transcendent concept. The individual self as a teleological force cannot be known and self-directed until after the creation of the social self, and then only through the active symbolic project of uniting self-chosen future goals and becomings with the body's energies, thus creating the growing ontological self-structure.

In this concept, Tillich has faced the threatening and anxiety-producing demonic elements that are common to man's efforts to actualize his potential and essential being. He has argued that ontological or ultimate reality will not be confronted or received unless the self-structure of the learner is ontologically sensitive and courageous. In his concept of vitality Tillich has denied the metaphysical dualism of the popularized Western philosophical and Christian traditions, and asserted that man is essentially a unified being. His personhood is an affirmation and structure of this unity, as the following chapter will develop. Courage to continue the intellectual search in spite of the demonic and anxiety-producing fates of life, the threats of meaninglessness and emptiness, involves more than an intellectual commitment. It involves the dynamics of ontological subjectivity in the service of an ultimate purpose or telos, an ultimate concern. It is the person's openness to the sus-
taining forces in ontological Being that permits courage: the energies and personal resources for meeting life's ambiguities. In his theological writings Tillich argues that not only is eros a universally available naturalistic energy capable of being sublimated or committed to the service of courage, but also agape or love is conceived as an ontological force pervading all Being, and available to the ontologically receptive person. Eric Fromm has argued in the *Art of Loving* from a very similar frame of reference, though stated more empirically than Tillich's position. At any rate the anxieties of teaching have always been great, and its moral and demands are increasingly complex with the confusions of our life. Tillich's analysis of both anxiety and courage is seen as potentially very helpful to the classroom teacher. More will be said about this in later chapters.

**The theology of culture**

We are now in position to suggest more broadly how Tillich's view of the dynamics of ontological subjectivity, the use of symbols to create new forms of meaning and relationships, may be useful to the secular public schools and to the secular pursuits of society generally. The specifics of this application are spelled out in the chapters on education, but the general theoretical framework needs to be re-emphasized at this point. The basic ideas of the concept of

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theology of culture were elaborated earlier in this chapter: a theonomous culture in which all of the cultural forms of a society point beyond themselves to Being-itself, to ontological reality, and which help to heal the estrangement and finitude of the human condition. We have had enough discussion of Tillich's view of spirit and human vitality, for the secularly oriented reader to see that the religious dimension in Tillich's thought, the dimension of depth or of ultimate concern, is conceived as present in the unified structure of all personhood and hence in the cultural expression of all secular activity. It should be remembered that this dimension sees man-as-man and is distinguished from those institutional Religious and Spiritual (capitalized) activities which constitute the Church community and theological interpretation.

This discussion of the theology of culture will have to anticipate some of Tillich's concepts that are explained more fully in the following chapter. But sufficient definition and continuity can be provided at this point for the purposes at hand. Tillich defines "spirit" as "the unity of power and meaning."39 "Power" here means that ontological unity earlier developed as vitality, and "meaning" refers to the symbolic capacity to serve ultimate concerns, optimally in a "kairos" context. The actualization of spirit "... is the essence of the moral problem,"40 in man and can only be

achieved by each individual through his own voluntarism and freedom. Tillich writes, "In man complete centeredness is essentially given, but it is not actually given until man actualizes it in freedom and through destiny. The act in which man actualizes his essential centeredness is the moral act. Morality is the function of life by which the realm of spirit comes into being."\(^{41}\) Morality is not a system of rules, obedience to authority, "but an act in which life integrates itself in the dimension of spirit, and this means as personality in a community."\(^{42}\) Because only persons have the self-consciousness capable of symbolic behavior and of experiencing ontological reality, the moral imperative becomes the demand to honor the other person's ultimate concerns. "The moral constitution of the self in the dimension of spirit begins with this experience. Personal life emerges in the encounter of person with person and in no other way."\(^{43}\) For Tillich it is thus possible to distinguish religion, morality, and culture, as three elements within the unity of spirit, but they cannot operate separately.

Some of these interrelationships in the secular culture will be useful to illustrate Tillich's meaning. Religion, i.e., ultimate concern, is here defined as "the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit."\(^{44}\)

\(^{41}\)Ibid., p. 38.  \(^{42}\)Ibid., p. 38.  \(^{43}\)Ibid., p. 40.  \(^{44}\)Ibid., p. 96.
Tillich continues: "The definition of religion as self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit has the decisive implication that religion must first of all be considered as a quality of the two other functions of the spirit, and not as an independent function."\(^5\)

Morality as the unconditional encounter with self and others takes place in society and culture. Culture provides the contents, the specific applications (law, ethics, ideals, etc.) of morality. Religion gives to morality the unconditional character of the moral imperative, its ultimate moral aim, and its motivating power. Culture is conditioned and limited by morality, and given depth and ultimacy by religion. Cultural symbols in a theonomous culture point to the ultimacy of religion. Religion gives freedom and meaning to culture and morality by its creative life force from the dynamics of ontological Being-itself.

Tillich then proceeds to be both all-embracing of humanistic culture and education and at the same time critical of the lack of ultimate ends that humanistic culture by itself provides. He argues that meaning as the full actualization of the potentialities of the universe must take place in a historical context and that man is the point in which this meaning reaches self-consciousness. The glory of humanistic secular culture as its attempt to achieve "... the actualization of man's cultural potentialities,"\(^6\) but if it

\(^{45}\textit{Ibid.}, \text{p. } 96. \text{ (Italics mine.)}\)

\(^{46}\textit{Ibid.}, \text{p. } 85.\)
considers religion as only another cultural form of creation, it destroys self-transcendence and the creative springs of life within the secular pursuits of culture itself. Humanistic culture must have a self-transcending criteria of growth beyond itself.

Tillich makes this criticism most clear in relation to humanistic education, a clarification particularly useful to the purposes of this dissertation. If education is a "leading out," this implies the question: "Where to?" Tillich responds:

Unqualified humanism would reply: Into the actualization of all human potentialities. However, since the infinite distance between the individual and the species makes this impossible, the answer, in the humanistic view, would have to be: the actualization of those human potentialities which are possible in terms of the historical destiny of this particular individual. This qualification, however, is fatal for the humanistic ideal in so far as it claims to give the final answer to the educational and general cultural question. Because of human finitude, no one can fulfill the humanist ideal, since decisive human potentialities will always remain unrealized. But even worse, the human condition always excludes --whether under aristocratic or democratic systems--the vast majority of human beings from the higher grades of cultural form and educational depth. The intrinsic exclusiveness of the humanist ideal prevents it from being the final aim of human culture. It is the ambiguity of humanistic education that it isolates individuals and groups from the masses, and the more it isolates them, the more successful it is. But in doing so, it diminishes its own success, for the community of man to man, as an ever opening possibility, belongs to the humanist ideal itself. If such openness is reduced by humanist education, such education defeats itself. Therefore the question 'Educating into what' must be answered in a way which includes everyone who is a person. But culture cannot do that by itself--just because of the ambiguities of humanism. Only a self-transcending humanism can answer the question of the meaning of culture and the
aim of education. In addition we must remember the failure of the humanistic ideal to consider the human predicament and its existential estrangement. Without self-transcendence the demand of humanist fulfillment becomes a law and falls under the ambiguities of the law. Humanism itself leads to the question of culture transcending itself.\textsuperscript{47}

Those familiar with the liberal arts-educationist debates in higher education will recognize many of the arguments Tillich is using here in his critique of humanistic education, for the educationists are responsible for a kind of humanly fulfilling education in the lives of many people whose problems and potentialities make the humanist goal unrealizable. Tillich's concept of a theonomous culture offers the educator an alternative. Tillich continues:

In the discussion of the humanist aim of the self-creation of life, we asked the question, Into what, for example, does the educational guidance toward this aim actually guide? The development of all human potentialities, the principle of humanism, does not indicate in what direction they shall be developed. . . . We indicated that 'initiation' into the mystery of being could be this aim. This, of course, presupposes a community in which the mystery of life, particularly expressed, is the determining principle of its life. There the idea of humanism is transcended without being denied.\textsuperscript{48}

Theonomous culture, where forms point to ultimacy, and release loyalties of ultimate concern in learners, is a spirit-directed, self-transcending culture.

The idea of theonomy is not antihumanistic, but it turns the humanistic indefiniteness about the 'where-\textsuperscript{47}\textsuperscript{48}
to! into a direction which transcends every particular human aim.\textsuperscript{49}

The interdependence of morality, religion, and culture in the realm of spirit leads Tillich to suggest three criteria whereby the theonomous culture could embrace humanistic secular culture and yet transcend it.

First, such a culture should "... communicate the experience of holiness, of something ultimate in being and meaning, in all its creations."\textsuperscript{50} This cherishes a religious view that protects the dimension of depth, or the ontological sources of creativity and self-transcendence in personal growth and in all cultural creativity. Tillich continues:

\begin{quote}
The second quality is the affirmation of the autonomous forms of the creative process. Theonomy would be destroyed the moment in which a valid logical conclusion was rejected in the name of the ultimate to which theonomy points, and the same is true in all other activities of cultural creativity. ... (in such moments) the element of autonomy in it is removed--the freedom which characterizes the human spirit as well as the divine Spirit is repressed.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

The third quality or criteria of theonomous culture is its need to protect itself against becoming demonically loyal either to forms of established authority which no longer point beyond themselves to ultimate reality, or to forms which are autonomous but expressive of the "kairos" and historically conditioned human demand.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., p. 250. \hfill \textsuperscript{50}Ibid., p. 251.\hfill \textsuperscript{51}Ibid., p. 251.\hfill \textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p. 251.
In all of these concepts Tillich is affirming humanistic secular culture, denying sectarian religious instruction, and yet affirming the dimension of depth and creative self-transcendence within every area of secular creativity. In this dissertation this view of human development is taken to be appropriate for the secular public schools. The view of human nature that arises from Tillich's ontological analyses of man and the view of creativity implicit in the preceding discussion are now to be developed fully in the following chapter. It is this interpretation which makes Tillich's framework most useful to the classroom teacher in a secular setting and which makes it most usefully integrated with the empirical descriptions of the learning process presented by Maslow and Rogers.
CHAPTER V

THE DYNAMICS OF ONTOLOGICAL SUBJECTIVITY:
PAUL TILLICH ON THE NATURE OF
MAN AND LEARNING

An existential view of human nature has been developed. This chapter will seek to elaborate the dynamics of becoming of this viewpoint. That is, it will be concerned with the processes of learning that follow from the theoretical foundations that have been laid down. It will also be concerned to show that this general viewpoint of man and growth is now being investigated thoroughly in contemporary psychology under a variety of formal names. Maslow and Von Kaam have brought these together under the title of the "third force in psychology" (the other two being what Maslow calls the "... Freudian and the experimental-positivistic-behavioristic").¹ Some issues arising from the attempt of this "third force" to examine the nature of the human self in its dynamic and subjective dimensions, and still remain "scientific," must be examined. It is the broader view of scientific inquiry which emerges that allows this disserta-

tion's unification of Tillich and Existential philosophic thought with an empirically oriented psychology.

Transition from theory to practice in this dissertation centers upon the view of human nature and learning (Becoming) developed in this and the following chapters. The view of ultimate reality and ontology of this theoretical position has been elaborated in previous chapters, where the concepts of non-Being and the mystery of Being were stressed. In this chapter, however, it is essential to show that the human being is also pervaded by these ultimate conditions and that the self can be ontologically structured.

It is advisable to re-emphasize the point that the view of "ontological subjectivity" defended here is not what we commonly mean by this phrase, namely, the subject part of the epistemological subject-object dichotomy, the conscious internalized discriminations of feelings and concepts that one can isolate by introspection. It is the person as "subject" that is our concern, but our interest lies not so much in the subjectivity of his own conscious-awareness which he learns in social interaction as in that activity of creative symbol-making that he manifests in himself, the extent, as Ortega has put it, to which he becomes a "novelist of himself." Barrett's warning not to treat existential subjectivity as the Cartesian subjectivity may well be repeated:

This (Cartesian) subjectivism has nothing to do with Kierkegaard's 'subjective truth'; Kierkegaard
simply chose his term unfortunately, for his intention is the very opposite of Cartesianism.\(^2\)

Let us recall also Sartre's equation of the existential view of man with the term "subjectivity"; "Man," he says, "is nothing other than what he makes himself. Such is the first principle of existentialism. It is what is called 'subjectivity.'"\(^3\)

Finally let us add one new statement of this distinction, that of Buber's distinction between the "I-Thou" and the "I-It." Basically Buber's "I-Thou" refers to the relationship of a person to the ontological real, while the "I-It" refers to relationships of the individual in epistemological kinds of knowing and relating. Buber states:

> The I of the primary work I-It makes its appearance as individuality and becomes conscious of itself as subject (of experiencing and using). The I of the primary world I-Thou makes its appearance as person and becomes conscious of itself as subjectivity. Individuality makes its appearance by being differentiated from other individualities. A person makes his appearance by entering into relation with other persons.\(^4\)

For Buber this latter relationship has a special kind of transcendent ontological reality that he calls the "between," and only persons having ontological subjectivity have such


\(^{3}\text{George Kueller, Existentialism and Education (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), p. 3.}\)

experiential reality in their lives. The above quotation makes the present point that "subjectivity" is not the Cartesian "subject."

Ontology and the dynamics of subjectivity in existentialism

The first consideration thus becomes a further elaboration of what is meant by the dynamics of this subjectivity or ontological self-hood. The classic life of this philosophic search, of course, is that of Socrates; and the classic statement of the position is Plato's defense in the Apology, and his theoretical examination of how Eros becomes "spirit" or "love" in the Diotima speech of The Symposium. Socrates' mission, presumably from "the gods," as he states, was to find the wisest man in Athens; hence he used the "mieuetic method" of inquiry he posed as the intellectual gadfly; he attempted to foster the "birth" of ideas by the learner's "recollection." Socrates seemed to believe that the examined life was good and necessary because through reflection and recollection a man created or brought into ontological reality a form and structure to his life that otherwise would not and could not exist. Further, for Socrates, this actualized soul had a possibility of immortality or ascending reincarnation, and failure so to actualize one's self amounted to eternal suicide! Yet it seems obvious that

Socrates is most centrally concerned with the relationship of the eternal and the mortal, the infinite and the finite, as they may be mediated in the quality of a man's character and virtue while in the time-space realm. This is the concern of the Diotima speech, in which Socrates makes a beautiful defense of Love as a lack, a desire which is unfulfilled. Here Socrates and Diotima argue that the object of desire is always some form of beauty, even if the desire is merely to continue honoring in the future some object of desire already possessed. This future-orientation can be toward increasingly abstract loyalties, and in the Symposium Socrates and Diotima argue that the ultimate loyalty becomes the "pure form of beauty," that which is common and pervades all particular forms and instances of beauty. The central point is that this love mediates between the finite and infinite forms and is constantly regenerated by the tension between the two, creating a continual search which is dynamic. But it is important to emphasize that this love is deeply rooted to finite existence, to the bodily energies, and man's capacities of ever-increasing universality of identification and loyalty. This was also argued and stressed in the last chapter on Tillich's concept of vitality, and it is one of the distinguishing emphases of the existential attitude.

The dynamics of ontological subjectivity arise in the honest and growing self as it develops the resources necessary for it to transcend bias throughout life. One
analysis of this process is in Camus' *Myth of Sisyphus*. For Camus the tension of the meaningful self is mostly centered in the conflict between ontological subjectivity and the external world or reality. Camus starts with the dramatic assertion that the only really meaningful question in life, or the one giving ultimate meaning and direction to all others, is the question of "suicide." One must decide whether or not life is worth living and must choose the criteria for deciding under what conditions one can positively affirm it. Camus points out that we will die before achieving much in ourselves or in the world, and the limits of life as compared with our absolute and ultimate desires give rise to tensions that are never resolved. He calls these "absurd tensions." He warns that if a man is to be honest and have personal integrity, he must face this absurdity and its lonely tensions, for this is the reality of the human condition. He rejects world-historical meanings, and transcendent meanings, and he rejects the possibility of human reason's comprehending enough of the whole to systematically interpret it. He makes these rejections essentially because they are not the individual's creations and interpretations and direct authentic encounters, but rather are prefabricated systems that destroy the absurd tension of the honest, individual, human predicament. He criticizes the tendency to

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fall back into habitual patterns and "absurd walls" or into social roles which prescribe one's choices and goals. Just as strongly does he criticize the opposite tendency of hope and "leaps of faith" into closed metaphysical systems of meaning. In both cases we "commit suicide." Physical suicide destroys the tensions by denying the body and the unique authentic individual his free and honest encounter with life. Philosophic suicide destroys the tension by denying the individual the choice and control over the ends of his life, the direction of use of his energies.

Honesty for Camus, therefore, demands that we first keep this absurd tension alive, for either form of suicide is illusion and takes the dignity of honesty away from each man. Education should force an intentional confrontation with the absurd if it is to maintain the honesty required in a passionate search for truth. Man's freedom, in this view, comes from allowing the feelings and aspirations for absolutes to be acknowledged—the desires for peace, harmony, unity, and total comprehension—but at the same timerevolting or rebelling against the universe that both demands and thwarts the expression of these absolute desires. This prevents either kind of suicide or illusion. It prevents the loss of ontological self-hood. This revolt Camus calls a "metaphysical revolt." This effort gives a man his dignity and self-hood, a trustable basis to life; and it gives him the intensity and passion of feeling and being that the
tension generates. Finally it gives him a responsibility to the present moment, and enables him to create forms (Camus calls it "absurd creation") that alleviate the common predicament. These creations do the little that is possible by man to revolt against this absurd universe and ameliorate human suffering and meaninglessness. So Camus emphasizes the dynamics or tensions of the ontological self when it is honest and open to the structure of being and man's finitude, and also open to the self's desires for more ultimate aspirations.

Soren Kierkegaard, in a Christian framework, also emphasizes the subjective difficulties in maintaining dynamic openness. He is concerned with maintaining a passionate search for "eternal happiness," which he takes to be man's essential drive and aspiration. He states,

The infinite reflection in which alone the concern of the subject for his eternal happiness can realize itself, has in general one distinguishing mark; the omnipresence of the dialectical. (Without dialectic) . . . we have superstition and narrowness of spirit. There always lurks some such concern in a man, at the same time indolent and anxious, a wish to lay hold of something so really fixed that it can exclude all dialectics; but this desire is an expression of cowardice, and is deceitful toward the divine. Even the most certain of all things, a revelation, becomes dialectical whenever I attempt to appropriate it. . . . As soon as I take the dialectical away, I become superstitious, and attempt to cheat God of each moment's strenuous reacquisition of that which has once been acquired. But it is far more comfortable to be objective, and superstitious, and boastful about it, proclaiming thoughtlessness as wisdom.7

And again, "Every limit that is intended to keep the dialectical away, is superstition." Kierkegaard continues to discuss the necessity to remain open to non-being and the limits of being and life in one's self-hood in the following manner:

The subjective existing thinker who has the infinite in his soul has it always, and for this reason his form is always negative. When it is the case that he actually reflects existentially the structure of existence in his own existence, he will always be precisely as negative as he is positive; for his positiveness consists in the continuous realization of the inwardness through which he becomes conscious of the negative. . . . He is therefore never a teacher but a learner, and since he is always just as negative as he is positive, he is always striving.

This problem of maintaining the dynamics and tension of the ontological self, of continuing to transcend bias rather than falling into superstition and thoughtlessness must be examined in this light of what the existential literature calls "becoming."

Tillich's View of the Nature of Man and Learning

Tillich's position of concerns which are ultimate repeats the Existentialist emphasis on the dynamics of ontological subjectivity. In the Dynamics of Faith Tillich develops this concept in relation to God as one's ultimate

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8 Ibid., p. 43.
9 Ibid., p. 78. (Italics mine.)
Tillich holds that every man has a concern or loyalty which is ultimate for him, his highest value and that which gives center and direction to his life and all lesser decisions. This may be success or power in which total and unconditional surrender to the demands of this goal are genuinely believed in as the means for bringing personal fulfillment and satisfaction. To this end all other values, are then subordinated. Tillich as a theologian is, of course, concerned that a man's ultimate concern really be ultimate, that it be symbolic and point beyond time-space concreteness to the ground of being. But his position is that even if one's highest loyalty has no such transcendent dimension it still represents that man's religion or faith, the basis for unity and concentration of energies and values in that man's life. But since we as persons, in the above quotation from Buber, are inescapably responsive to the dynamic ontological structure of life and all being, our central beliefs and concerns will also change and take on new forms, new dimensions and understandings, even new loyalties. If one is open to the facts of change in his personal and cultural life, as well as of being-itself, his concerns and loyalties will also inevitably change and grow. Hence the self must inescapably be caught up in a dynamic process of shifting and reconstructing the meaning of one's ultimate concern, whatever it is.
Tillich makes an exhaustive analysis of this dynamic in the human self, suggesting some of the polarities of existential "moving to and fro" that all of us are ontologically immersed in. This tension includes the inevitable conflicts within the structure of the conscious and unconscious dimensions of the self, and the integrating of these energies is only possible by self-awareness and choice which synthesizes the "... possibility of centered acts."\textsuperscript{11} This possibility for creating a centered self is the major component of human freedom in Tillich's view.

In the Freudian framework of conflict between the ego and super-ego, Tillich believes that the super-ego should be seen not only as an internalized parental conscience but also should include an existential element, that is, an element of existential guilt as earlier discussed. In this conception the self registers or records the results and consequences of all his choices upon itself, independent of the particular cultural approval or disapproval of its contemporary social milieu. Tillich calls these intrinsic judgments by each self "valid principles," of which the desire for honesty and integrity or truth and the ontological demand for justice are most central. The central point, again, is that there is an inevitable tension within each individual self.

Tillich further points to the fact of finiteness, to the limits of human reason and what reason can understand,\textsuperscript{11}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, p. 5.
and to the fact that it cannot understand much that it desires to, let alone the whole. For Tillich, man's conscious rationality by itself is not identical with his essential nature, since men can use and employ their reason actively or choose to neglect and reject it. Man can even create beyond the limits of his present rational understanding. This is the ecstatic element of the "kairos," the capacity of using symbols to create new forms and meanings in response to an otherwise non-understandable situation. Tillich refers to this as the capacity of a man to stand outside himself without ceasing to be himself, and this process is what gives continuity and identity to the becoming self through time. This human ability to combine a transcendent capacity and the limits of conscious reason is central in Tillich's larger framework of thought. It has been previously discussed in connection with his view of symbols, of the "kairos," and of the protestant principle which criticizes those forms that have been reduced from symbols to signs and no longer point to the reality of this ecstatic possibility.

Tillich also holds that there is an ontological dynamic between the dimensions of cognition and those of emotion and will in all persons. One thinks here of the Greek theme of conflict between the "Dionysian" and "Appolonian" approaches to life— that the self is constantly driven to choose between the demands of rationality and control, and the irrational dispersing of energies.
Finally Tillich talks about an inevitable conflict between the subjective and objective demands of life, between lived or psychological time, and observed or chronological and physical time. This conflict is probably most painfully evident as children lose the early solipsistic unity of their own subjective reality and enter into the confusing but ordered and potentially controllable world of external relationships, of objects. Again the central point is that the self is inevitably caught in the changing tensions of all these various dimensions of its reality. If there is to be a center and identity to this self, it will have to be a dynamic and changing structure of meaning itself. For Tillich this calls for the "dynamics of faith," suggesting a religious framework. In addition it serves as a well-articulated expression of the inevitable dynamics of ontological self-hood in relation to all meanings and loyalties.

Tillich's central point has been that the content of faith or loyalty, the finite concern, cannot be separated from the process or set of commitment to this concern. There will always be a tension, a moving to and fro, as the strength of commitment grows and as the object of loyalty changes in concrete form. Hence ontological self-hood, like all ontology from the existential viewpoint, is an active and dynamic changing process when the self is honest, open, searching, growing, immersed unceasefully in being.
Tillich shows how such dynamics threaten the human self. It must be aware of the destructive elements of non-being and of inevitable death. Hence, for Tillich, we always seek to avoid the dynamic and becoming processes, and thereby avoid the awareness and encounter of non-being ontologically. The important point in this analysis is that the self then becomes fearful or neurotic, therefore protected and static, and loses the dynamic dimension of ontological self-hood. When this happens the search, the "lack" of Socrates' love is destroyed, and the desire to learn in the sense of becoming is also destroyed. This, perhaps, is the loss of intrinsic motivation at its deepest level, at the level of the prior philosophic commitment to the search for truth, the search that gives meaning to all other intellectual efforts.

It is Tillich's view of the ambiguities of human finitude in its aspirations toward growth and self-transcendence that needs to be most carefully developed and defended here. As the above discussion suggests, this is not exclusively a cognitive process in Tillich's conception, though our symbolic capacities play a central role. Tillich distinguishes between mind as self-conscious awareness of one's self and the objects of one's environment, and spirit as the "... unity of power and meaning."\(^{12}\) Mind can discriminate

what is actualized and therefore empirically encountered by the human senses, but to restrict one's self to these modes of perception and conception is static and untrue to the realities of life. For

... life is ambiguous because it unites the essential and existential elements. The essential or potential in man and his world is the source from which the norms of life in the dimension of spirit are derived, the essential nature of being, the logos-determined structure of reality.13

Yet we can consciously "know" this essential nature and value-directedness only through the "... ambiguous manifestations in the mixture which is life."14 These manifestations or actualizations both reveal and conceal, and therefore spiritual norms always involve uncertainty, involve a venture and risk in any concrete historical situation. All action therefore requires courage and the acceptance of the possibility of failure.


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13 Ibid., III, p. 29.
14 Ibid., III, p. 29.
15 Ibid., III, p. 30.
stage of self growth, Tillich argues "... moves between one of the polarities of Being":

... self-integration on the polarity of individualization and participation, self-creation and self-integration on the polarity of dynamics and form, self-transcendence on the polarity of freedom and destiny.16

These ontological categories need to be explained further. The process of individualization comes through the subject-object distinctions of ordinary experience and language, and begins early in childhood as the child learns he is a unit, a thing, separated from all other "essents" of being. Tillich notes: "Individualization separates. The most individualized being is the most unapproachable and the most lonely one. But at the same time, he has the greatest potentiality of universal participation."17 The person who never separates himself from his contextual interactions can only achieve what Tillich calls "self-alterations," an achievement that will permit him to live in an environment like all other living beings, but not in a world which is the "... structured unity of all possible content."18 Man is able to construct a world by his symbolic usage of reason, for he can thus create a past and future and a selective integration of the stimuli and concerns he will respond to. Man becomes person as he begins to construct a world and

16Ibid., III, p. 30.  
17Ibid., III, p. 33.  
18Ibid., III, p. 36.
re-establish relationships for which he is personally responsible. Writes Tillich:

In man complete centeredness is essentially given, but it is not actually given until man actualized it in freedom and through destiny. The act in which man actualizes his essential centeredness is the moral act. Morality is the function of life by which the realm of the spirit comes into being.\(^9\)

In Tillich's framework man does this through symbols and through an act of courage in which he affirms his essential self over against what is accidental in him. The centered self, or identity, then is pulled between the forces of essential being and existential estrangement (the polarity of dynamics and form). To affirm the essential, one must sacrifice and risk some dimensions of the presently actualized self. For Tillich affirming essential self-hood is the same as affirming \textit{agape} as an ontological reality in one's self. But it always involves the risk of temporary chaos and guilt, since the failure to restructure the centered self results in disintegration, hence, incapacity for participation. In general, efforts of self-creation are experienced as pleasurable, and results of destructive processes of life as a source of pain, but this is not a simple physiological experience.

Healthy life follows the principle of self-creation, and in moments of self-creativity the normal being disregards both pain and pleasure . . . the pain-pleasure principle is valid only in sick, uncentered, and therefore unfree uncreative life.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\)Ibid., III, p. 38. \(^{20}\)Ibid., III, p. 56.
All forms of individualization and participation operate within the subject-object distinctions of language and attempt to change or reform either the subject or the object as a means of healing the estrangement between the existential and essential self. For Tillich, healing, union, love cannot be achieved in this manner, but must turn to larger foci of self-transcendence.

It is the polarity of freedom and destiny in Being that creates the possibility of life's transcending itself. Life is restless, unfinished, a tension between the existential and essential, and man participates in its dynamics consciously as well as existentially. In self-transcendence man has the character of intentionality, of seeing one's self as subject, as the bearer of eros, and as the potential bearer of new creative tangible forms. "Self-transcendence," says Tillich, "seeks to overcome the subject-object split after it has fully developed in the personal realm—not to annihilate it, but to find something above the split in which it is conquered and preserved."\(^2^1\) For Tillich this is, of course, an awareness and openness to ultimate reality, and the structuring of essential dimensions in the self. Uniting with this ontological realm is the dimension of depth, or religion. Hence Tillich states, "Religion was defined as the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit."\(^2^2\) This dimension is present as an ultimate

\(^{2^1}\text{Ibid.}, \text{III, p. 92.}^{2^2}\text{Ibid.}, \text{III, p. 96.}\)
concern in all moral acts and in all creations of meaning in the secular realms of life. The relationships of religion, morality, and culture in Tillich's view of the theology of culture were explained in the preceding chapter, but the implications for a secular philosophy of education are so central that some of this argument must be recalled here.

Tillich states,

The definition of religion as self-transcendence of life in the dimension of spirit has the decisive implication that religion must first of all be considered as a quality of the two other functions of the spirit, and not as an independent function.²³

Self-transcendence, the creative spirit, is thus expressed through the forms of secular culture, as well as through the structuring of one's ontological subjectivity. Tillich often states that "culture is the form of religion," expressing the seriousness of a person's ultimate concern and his desire to communicate and unite with others and with Being.

Tillich's view of self-transcendence may be seen as a bridge to the more empirical approach of Rogers, Maslow, and Allport. It will be recalled that this viewpoint stresses that the individual is first inducted into the social meanings, rituals, and myths of a given cultural heritage, where he learns the sign-meanings, and the capacity for symbolization. As he becomes more aware of the changing forms of his cultural heritage and the fact that symbols deteriorate to signs and that all cultural forms and meanings are threatened

²³Ibid., III, p. 96.
by fate and time and lose their capacity to point beyond themselves to transcendent dimensions of human freedom and reality, he begins to be concerned about his own meanings and the fate of his culture and his personal future. He sees that his own meaning and future security are closely tied to his past heritage and to the symbols and myth forms of his contemporary culture. He sees that these need to be re-created in each generation, not only because of the fateful dissolution of old forms, but also because each generation has its common problems of "kairos" in which the cultural demand must meet with the human transcendent capacities to create new forms of healing and community in response to this dissolution. Openness to this "kairos" demand involves a capacity of symbolic responding that has been called the "symbol-sorge" capacity of reason, a concern for what the actualized future can be like. This concern is not only for one's self but also for the human capacity for becoming, hence for all mankind. This concern involves the creation of new loyalties and new symbolic forms expressing these loyalties in each generation. This chapter has attempted to elucidate the kind of freedom that is loyal to ultimate ends and that assumes personal responsibility for remaining open and searching in its loyalty to these ends. There remains to be considered the manner in which this viewpoint helps to provide personal resources for maintaining this openness, search, and becoming, and how it helps to build a more qualitative subjectivity.
It should be mentioned that in Tillich's own framework, the main source of such resources is a kind of "faith," the faith that "accepts acceptance without being acceptable." This is the courage to risk the faith that being itself maintains itself over (or conquers) non-being, and thus that the resources of courage and love are ontologically given in the structure of being-itself. Then the individual who is open to ontological reality can participate in these healing forces, or have them unify and pervade his own ontological self-hood. It may be so, but this solution is a theological answer and though available to any individual as one source of "the courage to be," it is not the appropriate focus for a secular philosophy of education.

It becomes necessary, then, at this point to recall that in the context of this dissertation the subjectivity of the individual includes a purposeful, ontological dimension of self-hood which exists prior to the forms of self or essence of humanness that the individual learns or adopts from his environment. "Existence precedes essence." The existential viewpoint adopted has stressed a "being-there" or a dimension of givenness in the historical and cultural forms of a specific heritage and culture, and one has only the "finite-freedom" to define himself within the broad limits of this givenness. But it has also been argued and

maintained, in adapting Tillich's "kairos" to education, that the self and the culture are pervaded by various forms of tension between symbols that point beyond himself to the "becoming" possibilities of transcendent human freedom and forms that inhibit or deny this possibility. The central claim here has been that these dynamics and tensions pervade the ontological self not only in actualized forms, but also in their "lack," in the emptiness or vacuum of an estrangement from meaningful contemporary relationships of fulfillment, and hence the search arises to create these meanings and healing symbol-forms.

Tillich's view of symbols as agents of mediation which both build a man's self and meaningfully relate him to his estranged ontological and human community has been adapted in the dissertation as an approach to educational theory. This view stresses that symbols not only point beyond themselves to potential being, to the freedom of becoming, but these symbols also "participate in the reality of that which they represent."25 The meanings of these symbol-forms grow out of a heritage, and a contemporarily and commonly shared set of tensions. Hence the creation of meaningful symbols is not simply a lonely and independent creation at will, but is, as Tillich states, "... an unconscious-conscious reaction of a group through which it becomes a symbol; no representative

symbol is created and maintained without acceptance of a group. This group is not appropriately the nation-state alone, but involves the whole of Western culture and its heritage, and in the contemporary world is brought into a set of "kairos" tensions that involves universal humanity. Thus the personal resources for transcendence and the creation of new symbol forms are given support both by the ontological realm of reality and by an identification with a particular human community. When a person is open to this dynamic ontology and personal subjective becoming, he is supported in his search not only by his own eros and spirit but also by the healing power of symbols which re-establish supporting relationships to his community. In fact, it is a prior participation in, an openness to, and a concern for maintaining this common heritage that leads him or motivates him to the attempt to revitalize the meanings of his heritage. It is an identification through the symbol-sorge powers of reason, with a larger ontological and human community that his immediate time-space empirical encounter that gives him the freedom to transcend his immediate self-forms and achieve qualitative becoming.

This point of view, then stresses that while the "single-one" is autonomous and alone in his "teleological suspension of the ethical," he is not so absolutely alone as some might claim. He participates in a culturally given

\[\text{Ibid., p. 4.}\]
human condition which makes a demand upon him. In this sense, the community is as dependent upon authentic individuals who can stand alone and allow the creation of new interpretations and forms of meaning, as the individual is dependent upon the historical-cultural milieus to structure the limits and possibilities of his personal meanings and belongings. This mutual interaction and response of the human community to the creation of new forms is a support whether the reaction is an embracing of the new forms or a rejection of them. For rejection also helps to redefine the "kairos" need and is part of the givenness of that period of man's history and culture which the individual must be both responsive to and responsible to if he is to continue to be honestly and authentically open to creating the reality of his own becoming and meanings!

Hence we may claim that part of a person's resources for subjectivity, for the leaps of faith and risks involved in transcendence, is mediated within the total human milieus of one's time. There would seem to be demanded a courageous honesty that builds relationships of more meaningful support. And yet the individual is not dependent upon any particular acceptance or rejection of his creative forms, for his very efforts presuppose a concern and relationship to ontology and a larger heritage. In fact, since his response to a larger milieux creates new forms, he would expect to be initially misunderstood by most members of his immediate environment.
If this were not the case, there would have been no "kairos" demand for new symbol forms, and no need for the dynamics of ontological subjectivity.

Some issues of integrating the existential and self-psychology views of human nature and learning

A discussion involving changes in the structure and quality of the self will necessarily ride the ridge between psychology and philosophy and move back and forth between what usually defines and separates these disciplines. This is most evident in the Existential criticism of Aristotelian logic and Newtonian science. Similarly, the self-psychologists struggle for a more ontologically inclusive approach to science. Tillich, for example, in discussing the problem the Existentialists have in communicating this non-objective, non-subjective, realm of personal reality, says that the self-psychologists use "... psychological notions with a non-psychological connotation," for these are both individually unique and yet point to universal being. He adds, "The so-called 'affects' are then not merely subjective emotions with no ontological significance; they are half-symbols, half-realistic indications of the structure of reality itself."  

Susan Langer adds an epistemological concern with her focus on what kind of reality symbols communicate, as well as

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27 Tillich, The Courage . . . , p. 94.
28 Ibid., pp. 94-95.
the mentioned concern with emotional and psychological reality. She states,

One conception of symbolism leads to logic, and meets the new problems in theory of knowledge; and so it inspires an evaluation of science and a quest for certainty. The other takes us in the opposite direction—to psychiatry, the study of emotions, religion, fantasy, and everything but knowledge. Yet in both we have a central theme: the human response as a constructive, not a passive thing. Epistemologists and psychologists agree that symbolization is the key to that constructive process, though they may be ready to kill each other over the issue of what a symbol is and how it functions. One studies the structure of science, the other of dreams; each has its own assumptions—that is all they are—regarding the nature of symbolism itself. In it she adds, referring to the common realm that symbolization appears to be opening up,

lies a new conception of 'mentality,' that may illumine questions of life and consciousness instead of obscuring them as traditional 'scientific methods' have done.

In education we are obviously concerned with all areas of symbol-capacity. The differences in emphasis that arises with the professional specialists must somehow be integrated in the growing and becoming processes of change in the learner. Yet, as Langer points out, this integration involves assumptions, not certainty; it involves a theoretical orientation to human nature and to the capabilities of human reason. This dissertation has traced the dominance of epistemological orientation in our society and intellectual life, and it is not surprising that this same dominance

remains in the disciplines of philosophy and psychology themselves. At this time this is so prevalent in psychology that there is some problem with the reputability of empirical investigations such as those of Rogers and Maslow are engaged in, for these do not conform to the epistemological and traditional philosophy of science. There was a period when all disciplines sought the objectivity, the prediction and control that characterized physical science, and used the same model of atomistic or reductionist approach to inductive science.

In criticizing this Newtonian, or as he calls it nomothetic or general-laws approach to science and psychology, Allport writes:

These (. . . writers) are frankly scandalized by the issue I here dare to raise. To them it seems self-evident that the prevailing epistemological theory in psychology is sacrosanct general laws leading to inferences (aided by statistics) account for all our knowledge of individual people. These writers are staunch defenders of Anglo-American traditions of associationism and empiricism. Although I do not doubt that knowledge of this order exists and is of great importance when applied to the single case, I also hold that it leads to rough and routine coding, not to genuine acquaintance with individual personalities. . . . The trouble may lie in their onesided view of the nature of human knowledge.30

Hence traditional psychology partly established itself as a discipline by moving away from the concern with beginning assumptions and value questions that metaphysics and ethics

are concerned with. Psychology as a science sought to be fully empirical in an epistemological fact-gathering sense, and fully objective. Hence, as Allport puts it, "Psychologists gravitate toward one or another philosophical assumption about the nature of man, often without being fully aware that they do so,"\(^{31}\) in fact often denying that any assumptions are employed. Yet the theoretical dimensions of learning and becoming are beginning to be honored in the approaches of men like Rogers, Maslow, and May; and most of these could even accept Allport's definition of the function of psychology: "The goal of psychology is to reduce discord among our philosophies of man, and to establish a scale of probable truth, so that we may feel increasingly certain that one interpretation is truer than another." He adds, more modestly and more in keeping with the philosophic awareness of the existential position that beginning assumptions are always uncertain leaps, that "The goal is as yet unattained; . . . it probably lies far in the future."\(^{32}\) More recently Allport has stated the central point:

All books on the psychology of personality are at the same time books on the philosophy of the person. It could not be otherwise. A writer who decides that one theory of learning, or of motiva-


\(^{32}\)Allport, *Becoming . . .*, p. 17.
topm. os better than another is thereby endorsing one view of the nature of man at the expense of other views.33

All the Existential literature is critical of the Enlightenment science, which abstracts and makes a thing out of human efforts and institutions; similarly, the self-psychologists are critical as they search for a broader and more humanistic scientific approach. Kierkegaard, for example, in his famous critique of Hegelian "objective" historical knowledge and scientific truth, argues that scientific methodology explicitly denies certainty as a basis for personal convictions. His point is that science is always only probability, or what he calls an "approximation process," and its inductive conclusions can be refuted by a single dissenting fact. This leads to a constant sceptical and critical attitude that is the direct opposite of the leap of faith of beginning assumptions and meanings that human beings must live by. Further, he argues, science is always collecting more data and information as a basis for choice and decision, and choice is always therefore off in the future so that the present moment of decision-making is never honored, nor can science be helpful when it is! Furthermore, the search for facts and laws seems to approach a growing body of certainty, and pushes a concept of knowable reality out into the future, and this search for certainty is the exact opposite of the

33Allport, Pattern and . . ., Préface, p. xi.
dialectical uncertainty of the subjective life, of the
dynamics of ontological reality. And even when these facts
are gathered together, they refer to what happened in the
past, in other circumstances, or in general, and never to
that unique and transcendent freedom of immediate choice and
temporality that is decisively central in one's own present
meanings and life.

The post-Kierkegaard Existential literature has con­
tinually reiterated these criticisms and variations upon them.
More recently the self-psychologists have joined in the crit­
icism. The "anti-Enlightenment" is highlighting the dangers
of this abstractive and objective concept of science. Ortega
Y Gasset states, for example:

Scientific truth is characterized by its exactness
and the certainty of its predictions. But these
admirable qualities are continued by science at the
cost of remaining on a plans of secondary problems,
leaving intact the ultimate and decisive questions.
Of this renunciation it makes its essential virtue,
and for it, if for naught else, it deserves praise.
Yet science is but a small part of the human mind
and human organism. Where it stops man does not
stop. . . .

These writers are concerned that the Enlightenment abstrac­
tions of reason and institutions have made man a pawn under
the control of his own creations, and that the major architect
of this disaster was the theoretical formulations and laws of
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scientific theory and

34 Ortega Y Gasset, Toward a Philosophy of History
practice. Hence there is the struggle to achieve a philosophy of science, or a view of science, that significantly honors the ontological and transcendent dimensions of human self-hood. Both Rogers and Maslow struggle with these issues.

Rogers is concerned with the growing body of psychological knowledge and its power in the hands of manipulators, whether psychologists or politicians or common men. He is trying to find an approach to psychology which is scientific and empirical but still does not violate the individual choice-making process. He thus becomes concerned with the values and ends implicit in a scientist's work. As a psychotherapist he attempts to make this process part of the concern of his professional work as well. He says,

In any scientific endeavor—whether 'pure' or applied science—there is a prior personal subjective choice of the purpose or value which that scientific work is perceived as serving. . . . This subjective value choice which brings the scientific endeavor into being must always lie outside of that endeavor, and can never be a part of the science involved in that endeavor.35

Hence in this view, science is not a fixed body of knowledge, or even a fixed methodological approach to knowledge that can be separated from ontological dimensions, for both motivation or search for truth and ends to which the investigation are put remain the individual's personal

responsibility. Rogers elaborates this in another article. "Science," he says,

exists only in people. Each scientific project has its creative inception, its process, and its tentative conclusion in a person or persons. Knowledge—even scientific knowledge—is that which is subjectively acceptable. Scientific knowledge can be communicated only to those who are subjectively ready to receive its communications. The actualization of science also occurs only through people who are in pursuit of values which have meaning for them.36

Rogers is here concerned with combatting the notion that science and the conclusions of science somehow exist in a transcendent realm independent of subjective persons. This quotation clearly points to the overlap between psychology and philosophy again, and this concern with assumptions and ends is continuous in the educational processes of growth and becoming just as in the psycho-therapeutic ones. His point that objective scientific conclusions cannot be received except by what one could call a certain "ontological set" recalls the earlier discussion of the need for a philosophic commitment to search for truth, for openness and honesty and unconcealment as a prior condition for learning—even for learning supposedly fixed and certain truth in the sciences! The meanings have to be understood and reintegrated by each learner. To do this the learner must be semi-passively receptive and open, and then actively and symbolically critical and finally integrating of what he has received.

36 Ibid., p. 216.
The cross-over of psychological and philosophic dimensions in this seems inevitable.

Rogers goes on to relate this to the epistemological and methodological aspects of learning and of science just as Susan Langer did earlier. This is particularly important in the context of this dissertation, since it recalls the approach to education as the search for truth and the continual transcendence of bias. What scientific methods do, Rogers claims, is to give a more stringent and public check on these lapses into bias, sifting the evidence for conclusions, and evaluating the reasonableness of beginning assumptions and interpretative inferences. Then,

This scientific methodology is seen for what it truly is—a way of preventing me from deceiving myself in regard to my creatively formed subjective hunches which have developed out of the relationship between me and my material. It is in this context, and perhaps only in this context that the vast structure of operationalism, logical positivism, research design, tests of significance, etc., have their place. They exist, not for themselves but as servants in the attempt to check the subjective feeling or hunch or hypothesis of a person with the objective fact.37

Hence, science "with a small 's,'" as Rogers puts it, is a subjective process of inquiry, an individualized pursuit of truth that requires leaps of faith, beginning assumptions, constant inferences and interpretations, constant evaluations and re-examinations by each individual inquirer. The objective epistemological tests of truth and meaning exists to

37 Ibid., p. 218.
check the bias and unreliability of this subjective pursuit. To the extent that science claims to be more than tentative or that instructors allow students to react to science as certain and established laws and conclusions, to "ram the truth down the reluctant throat" as Maslow unfortunately puts it, then the researcher or inquirer is not serving truth but simply the power of manipulation and control. Rogers states this forcefully:

To the extent that the scientist is endeavoring to prove something to someone else—an error which I have fallen into more than once—then I believe he is using science to bolster a personal insecurity, and is keeping it from its truly creative role in the service of the person.

But after one has carefully examined his assumptions and hypotheses, tested them by all the objective measuring devices of the previous quoted paragraph, and committed himself to value ends and uses of his conclusions, he then becomes desirous and responsible for sharing his findings of science (small "s," subjective inquiry) with other persons engaged in scientific inquiry. He desires his conclusions to be checked by public inquiry. This process of intersubjectivity Rogers calls Science (capital "S"). This intersubjective process gains another degree of probability, but it still falls short of certainty, and each researcher and inquirer must return to his own subjective investigations.

How are we to decide how large and how distinguished a group of inter-subjective investigations will constitute science? This was Plato's problem in the *Republic*, and he moves toward the universal judgment of the Logos as grasped and understood only by a small highly trained group of philosophers. Rogers' public Science is similar. He says such communication involves a prior agreement to "the same rules of investigation," and it also requires a mutual "... subjective readiness to believe," a trained subjective and even ethical openness to the Logos or ground of being, to the mutual judgments of trained human reason. Seen in this way Rogers puts the ethical responsibility for the investigations of science and its conclusions back upon the ontological person, the scientist as person. In a political democracy this responsibility falls also to all other persons of the community. So Rogers can conclude, "Science will never de-personalize, or manipulate, or control individuals. It is only persons who can and will do that." Again, "Science can never threaten us. Only persons can do that." So, for Rogers, the inquiry of science is inevitably a combination of philosophic and psychological issues, and the process of becoming a person in the inter-personal relationship of psychotherapy is even more so. And the view of

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science that Rogers defends, unlike the classical Enlightenment science, is more an inquiry by the subjective self that uses epistemological methods of science to publicly check its own bias and pride.

These concerns with a broader view of science, and with the recognition of the ontological dimensions of self-hood and perception are very central in Abraham Maslow's approach to psychology and motivation. In his earlier works Maslow is critical of the Aristotelian and Newtonian models of science, and of what has been called the "epistemological tradition," especially in psychology and in regard to the rejection or minimization of purposefulness. His latest book bears the relevant title Toward A Psychology of Being, and is directly concerned with the ontological self and what he calls "Being-cognition, or B-cognition." A quotation from the preface will suffice to show the common concern with a larger view of science, and with the philosophic and ontological dimensions of the growth of personality. A somewhat extended quotation from Maslow makes this point more forcefully and comprehensively than I believe further discussion of my own could:

It is quite clear to me that scientific methods (broadly conceived) are our only ultimate ways of being sure that we do have truth. But here also it is too easy to misunderstand and to fall into a pro-science or anti-science dichotomy. I have already written on this subject. These are criticisms of orthodox, 19th Century scientism, and I intend to

continue with this enterprise, of enlarging the methods and the jurisdiction of science so as to make it more capable of taking up the tasks of the new, personal, experiential psychologies. Science, as it is customarily conceived by the orthodox, is quite inadequate to these tasks. But I am certain that it need not limit itself to these orthodox ways. It need not abdicate from the problems of love, creativeness, value, beauty, imagination, ethics and joy, leaving these altogether to 'non-scientists,' to poets, prophets, priests, dramatists, artists, or diplomats. . . . Only science can progress. The fact remains, however, that it has come into a kind of dead end, and (in some of its forms) can be seen as a threat and a danger to mankind, or at least to the highest and noblest qualities and aspirations of mankind. Many sensitive people, especially artists, are afraid that science besmirches and depresses, that it tears things apart rather than integrating them, thereby killing rather than creating. None of this I feel is necessary. All that is needed for science to be a help in positive human fulfillment is an enlarging and deepening of the conception of its nature, its goals and its methods.45

In the next chapter, Rogers' and Maslow's assumptions about human nature are examined, as is their psychological description of the process of growth and the threats to growth that follow from these assumptions. Their search for a larger and more humanistic psychology, hence a larger and more humanistic philosophy of science, is a viewpoint that includes and respects the dynamic ontology and becoming of the human self as a person. In this conception philosophical and psychological issues and terminology will inevitably be closely interrelated. The ethical problems of commitment to truth, and the ethical problems of the best use of knowledge and conclusions, are inseparable from the epistemological

45Maslow, Toward a Psychology . . ., Preface, p. v.
processes of inquiry. The "whole person," as we so indis-

criminately put it, goes to school, and goes into scientific

inquiry, and also goes into becoming an educated person.

To make this concept more discriminate and useful to the

classroom teacher we will turn to the self-psychologists.

What can a broadly empirical psychology tell us about the

process of becoming, of growing and learning, that this

ontological self, or subjective self, is capable of? What

view of development follows from these dynamic ontological

assumptions and from the necessity of each learner to choose

and make his own subjectivity; and what threats to this

growth must be acknowledged and met?
CHAPTER VI

SELF-PSYCHOLOGY ON THE NATURE OF MAN AND LEARNING

In the preceding chapter a view of human ontological self-hood or subjectivity was elaborated. This view was based upon the research done on the existential philosophers, notably Tillich. The importance of the "dynamics" of self and of constant change was emphasized. In this chapter it will be shown that the self-psychologists not only have essentially the same view of human nature, but that they state more empirically the processes of change and development possible and desirable for human growth. The focus will thus be upon the common ground found in the self-psychologists and existentialists as they describe qualitative human becoming, growth and learning, and how this process may be encouraged by formal institutional education.

A few comments on the terms self-psychology are appropriate. Maslow and Von Kaam's identification of a "third force" in psychology has been previously alluded to. What is it that distinguishes this "third force," and why use the phrase "self-psychologists" to designate their emphasis? On the first point Maslow's statement about this "third force"
The two comprehensive theories of human nature most influencing psychology until recently have been the Freudian and the experimental-positivistic-behavioristic. All other theories were less comprehensive and their adherents formed many various splinter groups. In the last few years, however, these various groups have rapidly been coalescing into a third, increasingly comprehensive theory of human nature, into what might be called a "Third Force." This group includes the Adlerians, Rankians, and Jungians, as well as all the neo-Freudians (or neo-Adlerians) and the post-Freudians (psychoanalytic ego-psychologists as well as writers like Marcuse, Wheelis, Marmor, Szasz, N. Brown, H. Lynd, and Schachtel, who are taking over from the Talmudic psychoanalysts). In addition, the influence of Kurt Goldstein and his organismic-psychology is steadily growing. So also is that of Gestalt therapy, of the Gestalt and Lewinian psychologists, of the general-semanticists, and of such personality-psychologists as G. Allport, G. Murphy, J. Moreno and H. A. Murray. A new and powerful influence is existential psychology and psychiatry. Dozens of other major contributors can be grouped as Self-psychologists, phenomenological psychologists, growth-psychologists, Rogerian psychologists, humanistic psychologists, and so on and so on.¹

One should note that Maslow uses the term "self-psychologist" as one cluster of psychologists in the third force, and that he isolates Rogerian psychology as another cluster. Rollo May would be classified as an "existential psychologist" by Maslow, Fromm as a "neo-Freudian," and Allport as a "personality-psychologist." What unifies them is a common and increasingly comprehensive theory of human nature. The

assumptions of this common viewpoint, together with its learning theory, are emphasized in the present discussion.

Following Clark Moustakas the term "self psychology" has been selected to indicate the common comprehensive view of human nature implicit in the selected writings of Maslow, Rogers, Allport, Fromm and May. The common concern is with the subjective dimensions of the human self. The emphasis is upon what has previously been called the "dynamics of ontological subjectivity" in this dissertation, and the self-psychologists preferential word for this process is "becoming." A further common concern is with normal and healthy human functioning, rather than with neurotic behavior or with physiological and atomistic approaches to behavior. Moustakas, in editing a collection of papers in which all of the above authors except Rollo May are included, and which he entitles The Self, comments:

"... more and more the interest is in the understanding of health and creativity as the exploration, expression, and realization of human talents. ... (This emphasizes) the fundamental unity of personality and presents a framework for understanding healthy behavior. The emphasis is on knowing, exploring, and actualizing the self..."

"... All of these papers are for me deeply personal, exploratory, aesthetic, creative. One sees the personality of the individual in and through his writing, and the groping, searching, nature of people. To me the book has come to be a natural, spontaneous,

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3Ibid., Preface, p. xiii.
The Self-psychologist's Agreement with Existential Assumptions of Human Nature

Rogers' "client-centered therapy" or "non-directed therapy" has been established long enough that we are generally familiar with its vocabulary and basic assumptions, though some of the conclusions that are implicit in these assumptions are not so widely recognized; certainly they are not so popularly supported. Most of the references from his position that are found to be most relevant to the present purposes will come from his recent anthology of collected

\[4\] Ibid., Preface, p. xvii.
papers and research called *On Becoming a Person*,\(^5\) rather than from the earlier theory book\(^6\) or his published research findings.\(^7\) Similarly we will generally refer to Maslow's latest work which he calls *Toward a Psychology of Being*,\(^8\) even though much that supports it in both theory and empirical research is in his earlier book *Motivation and Personality*\(^9\) and various published articles. The latter book is both an anthology of the most relevant research, and also a more up-to-date theoretical integration. The material believed to be most relevant from Allport comes primarily from his book entitled *Becoming*\(^10\) and his recent integration of his position in *Pattern and Growth in Personality*,\(^11\) though other sources are occasionally cited.


\(^8\) Abraham Maslow, *Toward a Psychology* . . . .


The first thing to be examined in developing this chapter on subjectivity and a common view of the nature of man as dynamic is that these psychologists are in agreement on the basic viewpoint that has been "labeled the existential view of human nature." A famous and controversial Rogers concept is the centrality of "growth forces" within the individual, a posited individual purposefulness best known to the learner or client himself. Here Rogers states it in the very personal style characteristic of his writings;

... it is the client who knows what hurts, what directions to go, what problems are crucial, what experiences have been deeply buried. It began to occur to me that unless I had a need to demonstrate my own cleverness and learning, I would do better to rely upon the client for the direction of movement in the process. 12

But the fullest statement of these assumptions and goals is in Rogers' articles titled "A Philosophy of Persons" 13 and "A Therapist's View of the Good Life." 14

Here Rogers is categorizing those traits he believes are healthy and have been common to clients he and they themselves considered "cured" or most benefited by therapy. The first trait he notices is a moving away from facades and defenses, toward an acceptance of what the person now is, or as Kierkegaard would put it, "Being the self one truly is." 15

12 Rogers, On Becoming ..., pp. 11-12.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 167.
The second trait he notices is a tendency to move "away from oughts," or again in Kierkegaard's terms a "teleological suspension of the ethical." The psychological emphasis is added that these "oughts" are usually parental and amount to either a submissive desire to please parental authority or surrogate authority figures, or to rebel against them in order to feel power and independence by contrast to this authority. Rogers emphasizes that this dependence is a desire to be more than one's self, to refuse to face the limits and possibilities of finitude.

These people would seem to move toward the positive goals of autonomy and self-direction. Rogers states, "... gradually they choose the goals toward which they want to move," they become responsible for themselves; they move toward being a process, not the same identity in time, but changing selves through time; toward "being complexity," total and contradictory selves, not bothered by rational and value contradictions within themselves; toward "openness to experience," especially what Rogers calls "little boy" experiences of play and spontaneity, and a non-judgmental, open acceptance of other people; toward "being the process they actually are," coming to learn to trust the organism of the body and the honest direction of its development.

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16 Ibid., p. 168.
17 Ibid., p. 171.
This list of process goals is perfectly and totally in keeping with the view of man and ontological becoming developed in this chapter. But let us turn to a more definitive statement of Rogers' view of the "good life," which he calls "the fully-functioning person."

The good life is not any fixed state. It is not, in my estimation, a state of virtue, or contentment, or nirvana, or happiness. It is not a condition in which the individual is adjusted, or fulfilled, or actualized. To use psychological terms, it is not a state of drive-reduction, or tension-reduction, or homeostasis.\(^{18}\)

What is the good life positively, then? "The good life is a process, not a state of being. It is a direction, not a destination. The direction which is selected by the total organism, when there is psychological freedom to move in any direction."\(^{19}\) Rogers further adds that these organismic choices "... appear to have a certain universality."\(^{20}\)

Included in this universality are such traits as those earlier mentioned, openness to experience, and also "increasingly Existential living ... to live fully in each moment,"\(^{21}\) and an increasing trust or honesty towards one's organismic self.

It is also revealing that Rogers' discussion of the implications of this viewpoint emphasizes the same focuses that our existential view of human nature did: an increased self-control that he calls freedom, an increased creativity

\(^{18}\)Ibid., pp. 185-186.  
\(^{19}\)Ibid., pp. 186-187.  
\(^{20}\)Ibid., p. 187.  
\(^{21}\)Ibid., p. 188.
in these fully-functioning people, and increased trust of human nature toward one's self and others, and a greater richness of life which is comparable to our earlier concept of qualitative growth.

Rogers' faith in the purposefulness and rationality of the development of each organism is worth repeating fully here:

I have little sympathy with the rather prevalent concept that man is basically irrational, and that his impulses, if not controlled, will lead to destruction of others and self. Man's behavior is exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity toward the goals his organism is endeavoring to achieve. The tragedy for most of us is that our defenses keep us from being aware of this rationality, so that consciously we are moving in another. But in our person who is living the good life, there would be a decreasing number of such barriers, and he would be increasingly a participant in the rationality of his own organism.22

And in another article Rogers identifies this rationality of the organism and openness to experience with a "need for meaning," just as earlier Susan Langer stated that we have a "need for symbolic meanings."23 Rogers states it as follows: "I can trust my experience. . . . My total organismic sensing of a situation is more trustworthy than my intellect."24

The existential authenticity and autonomy follow,

Evaluation by others is not a guide for me. The judgments of others, while they are to be listened

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22Ibid., pp. 194-195.

23An entire Existential theory and therapy entitled "logotherapy" has been developed by Victor Frankl around this need for meaning by human beings, most powerfully in From Death Camp to Existentialism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959).

24Rogers, On Becoming . . ., p. 22.
to, and taken into account for what they are, can never be a guide for me. This has been a hard thing to learn; . . . only one person . . . can know whether what I do is honest, thorough, open, and sound, or false and defensive and unsound, and I am that person . . . my own experience is for me the highest authority.\(^2\)

He adds it is highest not because it is infallible, but because it is mine and therefore always correctable and changeable. Then he states: "I enjoy the discovering of order in experience,"\(^2\)\(^6\) for it seems to be " . . . a need for meaning which is in me."\(^2\)\(^7\) Finally he finds that "the facts are always friendly," and that "persons have a basically positive direction."\(^2\)\(^8\) These references are a restatement of the existential view of human nature developed in the previous chapter under the concepts of a dynamic ontology and nature of man and a process of becoming. But Rogers believes that he has clinical and empirical research to show that this is a possible path of growth and becoming and that it is successful in bringing about qualitative change or significant learning.

Maslow's work with healthy and self-actualizing people is identical to the view developed here and is equally in agreement on philosophical assumptions and goals of the process of the becoming of subjectivity. Maslow says,

The sources of growth and of humanness are essentially within the human person and are not created

\(^{25}\text{Ibid.}, p. 23.\) \(^{26}\text{Ibid.}, p. 24.\) \(^{27}\text{Ibid.}, p. 25.\) \(^{28}\text{Ibid.}, p. 26.\)
or invented by society, which can help or hinder the development of humanness, just as a gardener can help or hinder the growth of a rosebush, but cannot determine that it shall be an oak tree. This is true even though we know that a culture is a sine qua non for the actualization of humanness itself, e.g., language, abstract thought, ability to love; but these exist as potentialities in human germ plasm prior to culture.²⁹

Maslow, in general, puts more emphasis upon the bodily organic health, and less on the symbolic functioning of integrity and authenticity, than Tillich's account does, as is evident here; but the purposeful and becoming assumptions are similarly expressed.

Maslow stresses the ontological part of the self, and also stresses that the basic unique core of human nature is not good or evil in itself prior to these subject-object distinctions and judgments. As he states, this layer of self just "existentially is"; "The most accurate way to say this is to say that it is 'prior to good and evil.'"³⁰ In fact, in keeping with the implications of a posited purposeful growth-drive, Maslow holds that failure to actualize one's potentialities is not only wasteful but dangerous. It is socially dangerous as well, since it leads to narrowness and projected fears in the form of prejudice and scape-goating, or to valuelessness and amorality and hence to political and social indifference. This part of Maslow's position will be

²⁹Maslow, Toward a Psychology . . ., p. 197.
³⁰Ibid., p. 181.
developed later in this chapter. Probably the best way to present Maslow's assumptions and goals for healthy development is to re-state them in full as he gives them himself. The parallel to Rogers' views and to the existential view of human nature developed from the Existential literature and Tillich is obvious. He states:

the basic assumptions of this point of view are:

1. We have, each of us, an essential biologically based inner nature, which is to some degree 'natural,' intrinsic, given, and, in a certain limited sense, unchangeable, or, at least, unchang­ing.

2. Each person's inner nature is in part unique to himself and in part species-wide.

3. It is possible to study this inner nature scientifically and to discover what it is like—(not invent—discover).

4. This inner nature, as much as we know of it so far, seems not to be intrinsically evil, but rather either neutral or positively 'good.' What we call evil behavior appears most often to be a secondary reaction to frustration of this intrinsic nature.

5. Since this inner nature is good or neutral rather than bad, it is best to bring it out and to encourage it rather than to suppress it. If it is permitted to guide our life we grow healthy, fruitful, and happy.

6. If this essential core of the person is denied or suppressed, he gets sick, sometimes in obvious ways, sometimes in subtle ways, sometimes immediately, sometimes later.

7. This inner nature is not strong and overpower­ing and unmistakeable like the instincts of animals, it is weak and delicate and subtle and easily over­come by habit, cultural pressure, and wrong atti­tudes toward it.

8. Even though weak, it rarely disappears in the normal person—perhaps not even in the sick person. Even though denied, it persists underground forever pressing for actualization.

9. Somehow, these conclusions must all be articulated with the necessity of discipline, deprivation, frustration, pain, and tragedy. To
the extent that these experiences reveal and foster and fulfill our inner nature, to that extent they are desirable experiences.31

Gordon Allport's statement of this existential view of human nature centers around a technical concept that he calls "functional autonomy," and a second technical concept that he calls "proprium striving" in human behavior. These two concepts will be developed in detail later in this chapter. For the present context and purposes it will be sufficient to abstract some of his statements which indicate that in his view the achievement of functional autonomy constitutes the very nature of man and rests upon purposeful strivings within each person. After discussing the various dimensions and dynamics of functional autonomy he states that, "Taken together they amount to saying that functional autonomy comes about because it is the essence or core of the purposive nature of man."32 This purposeful human activity emerges only after the basic needs and securities of man are met on a homeostatic or drive-reduction basis. Yet he posits a drive beyond homeostasis as an inborn dimension of human striving. "We are saying that man's nature is such that new motives must grow up in healthy lives to supplement the inadequate minimum of homeostasis."33 Secondly, "Man has

31Ibid., pp. 3-4.
32Allport, Pattern and Growth . . . , p. 250.
33Ibid., p. 251.
energies to use that reach way beyond the need to react. For one thing, he has an expanding image of himself (a conception of what he would like to be) and the pursuit of this goal directs much, if not most, of his conduct.\textsuperscript{34} Thirdly, men pattern their propriate selves in search of personally integrated meaning.

We prefer to say that the essential nature of man is such that it presses toward a relative unification of life (never fully achieved). In this trend toward unification we can identify many central psychological characteristics. Among them are man's search for answers to the 'tragic trio' of problems: suffering, guilt, death. We identify also his effort to relate himself to his fellow man and to the universe at large. We see that he is trying to discover his peculiar place in the world, to establish his 'identity.' As a consequence of this quest—which is the very essence of human nature—we note that man's conduct is to a large degree proactive, intentional, and unique to himself. In the total process the sense of selfhood, or the self-image, is involved. Yet it is not the self (as a separate agent) that brings it about. Selfhood is a reflection of this fundamental human process of becoming. From this point of view functional autonomy is merely a way of stating that men's motives change and grow in the course of life, because it is the nature of man that they should do so. Only theorists wedded to a reactive, homeostatic, quasi-closed model of man find difficulty in agreeing.\textsuperscript{35}

Rollo May's familiarity with the Existential literature generally, and with Tillich particularly, has already been cited. It is important and useful here to stress some of the sensitive observations that Allport and Maslow make concerning their belief that psychology should attend to the Existential

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. 251.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., pp. 252-253.
view of human nature stresses the importance of the person's resources, including psychological resources, to find meaning in the vacuum of "... the total collapse of all sources of value outside the individual." For not only is "God dead," but also the Enlightenment "gods" of prosperity and progress and security have lost their ultimate power. They fail to initiate a demand and sustaining search for meaning, as was discussed earlier in Rollo May's concepts. Maslow also thinks that "... the existentialists may supply psychology with the underlying philosophy which it now lacks. Logical Positivism has been a failure, especially for clinical and personality psychologists." Maslow further observes that Existentialism "... deals radically with that human predicament presented by the gap between human aspirations and human limitations, between what the human being is, what he would like to be, and what he could be." Maslow recognizes the human finitude and "Existential anxiety and guilt" that this view implies; and he notes the possibilities of human transcendence that is involved. But he also adds: "One consequence for my thinking, of this stress on the two-fold nature of man is the realization that some problems must remain eternally unsolvable." He later discusses in great

36 Maslow, Toward a Psychology ..., p. 10.
37 Ibid., p. 10.
38 Ibid., p. 10.
detail the place that limit-experiences and threat and failure may play in our growth and becoming. He also suggests that the Existential criticisms against shallowness in culture, institutions, and social roles are valid. For example he notes that "superficiality doesn't work" but leads to war and slums and injustice and prejudice, and he believes this should teach psychologists and educators that superficiality does not work in personality either. It should teach us that qualitative becoming, difficult as it is, is yet both a personal delight and a societal necessity! Finally, Maslow observes with discriminating emphasis that Existentialism emphasizes the role of the future in personality development, and this is contrary to the experimental reductionist approach to experience. "Reduction to the concrete is a loss of future," Maslow observes; "threat and apprehension point to the future (no future equals no neurosis); self-actualization is meaningless without reference to a currently active future."40

Allport also has examined the Existential philosophers and he comments on important relationships and themes that he believes are relevant to psychology and human becoming. "Common (to the Existential writers) also is a passion not to be fooled about man's nature. If the Victorian image of man was perhaps too pretty, the Freudian image may be too

39 Ibid., p. 11.
grim. But grim or pretty, all knowledge about man must be faced. We find in these comments Allport's statement of the Existential theme of honesty and authenticity, a theme stressed in the last chapter. But he goes on to relate this to a view of psychology, and to repeat most of our other existential themes. "Life demands that we know the worst and make the best of it. It is probably true to say that all forms of Existentialism hope to establish a new kind of psychology—a psychology of mankind. The pivot of such a psychology will lie in the perennial themes and crises of human life. . . . Psychology should be more urgently human than it is." And on the theme of dynamics and Becoming Allport comments, "All Existential writers agree that existence is essentially a restlessness." "All Existentialists tell us that man is free." It is true, Allport continues, that deterministic . . . pressures exist. But becoming is the process by which all these forces are employed by the creative urge to program a style of life for oneself. The basic existentialist urge to grow, pursue meaning, seek unity is also a 'given.' It is a major fact even more prominent in man's nature than his propensity to yield to surrounding pressures. It is this desire for autonomy, for individuation, for selfhood, for existential uniqueness that enters into the shaping of the product. Growth toward this end is a law to which most personalities seem to conform. The promise I see for myself is the essence of my freedom. When a critical situation challenges me, I call forth this promise—and it

41 Allport, Pattern and Growth . . ., p. 556.
42 Ibid., p. 556.
43 Ibid., p. 557.
44 Ibid., p. 560.
becomes a major factor in the solution of the problem at hand. From this point of view freedom lies in our general posture toward life; in living out our hope of continuous becoming. Though these beliefs are stated objectively in much of Allport's phrasing, it is clear from his writing here and in what follows that he accepts these basic premises about the nature of man himself, and believes psychology can help us to understand and further this kind of becoming.

What are the implications of this? Maslow replies,

Only the flexibly creative person can really manage the future, only the one who can face novelty with confidence and without fear. I am convinced that much of what we now call psychology is the study of tricks we use to avoid the anxiety of absolute novelty by making believe the future will be like the past.

And, one is driven to add, since one cannot handle novelty or create new forms or respond to others, he is thus left with a selective perception and narrowed reality that does, in fact (perceptually) remain just like the past. So it is the problem of threats to the self-system, threats of guilt and anxieties, some of which are "existential" and some of which are "pathological," which now needs to be examined from this point of view before we discuss the positive processes of existential becoming itself.

46 Maslow, Toward a Psychology . . ., p. 15.
The Existentialist and Self-psychology Agreement
Regarding the Threats of Human Learning

Tillich's view of Existential anxiety, and Kierkegaard's view of the "fear and trembling" involved in the "leap of faith" have been discussed. But a further elaboration of these desperate, lonely, and despairing aspects of the existential view of becoming must be made. This lonely and anguished part of the process has been much popularized and much distorted by stereotypes. Yet it cannot be denied that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were individuals whose concern for man and whose honesty before an agonizing human and ontological reality were so sensitive and so oppressive that it frightens most of us. This no doubt helped to create for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche that vindictive judgment the world unkindly calls "insanity." Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's own relationship (or lack of relation, as Buber insists) was perhaps ineffective. There are some people, of course, whose security and sense of reality are so tied to the objective realm of time and space and to the familiar forms and institutionalized avenues for relating with this reality that any novel approach or any intensification of subjectivity is seen by them as insane. Existentialism is thus a threat, in

48Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (Boston: Beacon Paperbound, 1955).
its abstract forms (as in existential art, drama and literature) and in its emphasis on the prior reality of the psychological time of subjectivity. It is a threat in its claims that conventional forms are meaningless, a criticism especially strange and often threatening for those whose meaning is found in these forms and institutions and who feel what Tillich called "emptiness" and "meaninglessness" if these are attacked or destroyed. It is perhaps not empirically incorrect to suppose that this group represents a majority of people and a majority of teachers, though this is of course a personal opinion. It appears that most people are ready to say, "If the path to autonomy and authenticity leads through suffering and loneliness, through risks of what is true and what is real, through criticism and threat to my sanity and sense of worth and security, through intense anxiety and despair, then I prefer my present meanings and security." When people cannot say this consciously and honestly, they say it unconsciously, through fears and defensiveness and selective perception. But it is probably a disease of intellectuals, of the sensitive and creative and semiautonomous to feel so superior and so much more noble and courageous than normal and conventionally oriented people that they reject them in categories of "mass man" or Mill's "cheerful robots."49 These superior hostilities and rejec-

tions destroy the "educating and healing" community just as much as does the apathetic and fear-dominated clinging to essential categories and institutions. It is more ironically tragic, however, since the brighter and more sensitive and more resourceful are most in position to initiate relationships and new forms of meaning. They could therefore be freeing and supporting a healthier community.

Here we have touched upon the two "aristocratic biases" that appear to be implicit in the Existential position. The first is the qualitative schism between those who do actualize their honest authenticity and those who do not, and the second is the fact that among these various authentic persons there will be a wide range of qualitative differentiation. Some will be more complex and sensitive and universal and responsive to the "kairos" demand and thus able to help heal the community by their creative forms. This we could call a Platonic or Jeffersonian fact about the qualitative differences among men potentially and actually, as to talent and sensitivity and hence depth and breadth of becoming. Yet subjectivity and authenticity are open to all; the Existential position is in this sense democratic. So the central differentiation in these qualitative capacities can best be seen as a difference of what might be called "ontological frustration tolerance." By this is meant the amount and intensity of the dynamics of being, of human becoming, that a person can be open to, and be conscious of without losing the
resources to integrate and unify the self by symbolic meanings, meanings which keep a continuity and identity to his own becoming and which also relate him to the "kairos" and community of his time. Men obviously vary in this. Since this capacity for ontological suffering has been seen as central to the process of the becoming of subjectivity, we must now turn to a thorough examination of the Existential and self-psychology literature on its necessity, its limits, and its possibilities for qualitative growth.

Tillich's viewpoint of how ontological and existential anxiety is built into the human reality has been earlier discussed and will only be recalled here, since it sets the framework for the rest of this discussion of suffering and defensiveness against becoming. His analysis suggests that the forces of destruction and dissolution, of fate and limit and decay, and ultimately of death itself, are all part of the reality men live in and must honestly confront. Man's symbolic capacity allows him to see that his future is limited by destruction and decay. Man does not like this unjust reality, and fears death and hence fears all forms of non-being. He thus fears the future and the non-being of potentiality, and focuses on the actualized world of external reality for his basis of worth and meaning. Hence when the forms of this external world are destroyed and criticized, as they inevitably are due to the dynamics of being, and of the demonic and progressive forms of human culture and
history, he becomes personally threatened. Tillich suggests that this threat drives him to escape from existential anxiety into specific pathological fears that may be understood since they are then fears of actualized forms in the external environment. Since they are then understood and concrete they may be controlled or evaded, "conquered by courage" as Tillich says. Or this existential anxiety may drive him pathologically and neurotically to limit the sphere of reality he consciously lives within to a narrower world that he can understand and control. But Tillich warns that this is a narrower reality and that it will eventually take a compulsive and easily threatened selective perception to maintain, since the rest of reality is dynamic and omnipresent and continues to press upon one, consciously and unconsciously. The central point is that people who cannot and do not live with honest openness to ontological reality are driven into defensiveness and deceptiveness in the rest of their lives and thought, mostly by unconscious mechanisms of the evasion of existential anxiety and other forms of dynamic ontological destruction.

Much of what Kierkegaard analyzes in his *Concept of Dread* (which Rollo May received publisher permission, and translator permission, to translate as "anxiety"), is an earlier presentation of the analysis given by Tillich. The central aspect of this analysis is the view of freedom that has been discussed in this dissertation, the view that a man
has the power by will and choice to actualize his own becoming, or to refuse to do so. This is a radical freedom in the sense that his own becoming is absolutely unique and cannot or should not follow any of the actualized models of the human community if it is to be honest and authentic. Freedom is thus essentially potentiality, or the dynamic becoming of non-being, and is given form and reality primarily by a man's self-concept, by the range of alternative possibilities he can visualize or to which he is complexly sensitive. Through courage or faith he must maintain these becomings in spite of their novelty and of their not being understood initially by other members of the human community. In healthy growth, this is an anxiety-producing process since it involves a risk that the new self will be more meaningful and satisfying than the old self which is being destroyed or replaced. Since the destruction must in some senses precede the becoming, there is a period of "leap" when there is little substantial identity, only a process reality.

Kierkegaard makes the same observation that was earlier quoted from Hesse, that the more sensitive and complex a man is, the more variety and depth of pregnancy there is to his potential becoming, and hence the more normal anxiety or existential anxiety he will encounter. This anxiety only arises because the person has self-consciousness and realizes that he is destroying himself in a kind of death. Kierkegaard notices that children carry on this
process for several years before they are aware of themselves as independent units and aware of the reality of death. All this is reminiscent of Plato's observation that the "philosopher is always dying"! Yet, "to will to be oneself" is man's inescapable destiny or vocation, whatever the limits and possibilities of that given self really are. Therefore, there is no essence to the self, initially, as was earlier shown in some detail. Choice and decision "make the self" in every given moment of time, thought the choice is usually to maintain the self one already is, which is easiest and safest.

Kierkegaard had a profound psychological insight and sensitivity, especially considering that his thought was prior to the systems of depth psychology, and he points out the ways we escape from this freedom and its threatening demand. We try to avoid self-consciousness by remaining ignorant or by losing our self in a larger cause that is considered more worthy of our concern and energies. Or we follow institutional or authorized models of becoming and thus avoid the radical risks of complete uniqueness. Or we define ourselves negatively and defiantly as in adolescent rebellion in order to avoid positive responsibility for our own form of becoming. Or we escape to some neurotic anxiety or constricted form of self that weakens the will by narrowing the area of self-awareness and sensitivity to risks we can handle without undo threat.
Yet these various forms of escape from our given voca-
tion of actualizing our unique form of becoming denies our
own freedom and responsibility, and therefore produces guilt
in the personality, the existential guilt of cowardice, one
might say. Also the fact of destroying the old self-systems
and meanings that were useful and important to one's self
and to others is a form of self-initiated destruction or
even murder in a spiritual sense. Kierkegaard thinks such
destruction inevitably creates a sense of guilt. Learning
to face up to the reality of anxiety and the creative possi-
bilities of continued becoming is for Kierkegaard a better
"school" and a better "teacher" than experienced external
reality, for it leads us to intense inwardness, and hence to
qualitative growth. He emphasizes, as Tillich does, that
this guilt is existential, and that it is because a man has
the power and freedom to choose to actualize his uniqueness,
or choose not to, that anxiety or dread is an inescapable
part of honest human authenticity.

In *Sickness Unto Death* Kierkegaard re-affirms this
position, stressing that the greatest anxiety or dread is
over the fear of the loss of spiritual self, or over what
Tillich calls the fear of meaninglessness. Here Kierkegaard
points out that we can either deny that we have free-will,
a "self to be made," thus avoiding this spiritual sickness,
or we can deny responsibility for this self-hood ourselves.
He puts this latter view paradoxically as either the weakness
or cowardice of not being willing to affirm our unique self-hood, or the defiant dependence of willing to be one's self, only negatively and destructively. The weakness escape avoids awareness of self-consciousness or submissively becomes dependent upon parents or institutions to give direction to one's becoming. Basically it adopts a stoical attitude which claims suffering and despair are themselves weak and silly or immature and childish. Thus they avoid the complex sensitivity and contradictions which create inward intensity and the possibility of qualitative becoming, as earlier analyzed. The defiant escape assumes a kind of self-reliance and independence which avoids the awareness and responsibility of finite-freedom by presuming to be fully perfect and adequate already within one's self. It therefore believes that all other persons and situations can be judged by one's own present actualized self-hood. Such a person enjoys his self-chosen superiority but has rejected the dynamics of ontology and continued becoming. Thus he is a power-oriented person who wants to reform everything from the outside since he already believes himself to have arrived at the good and true. Kierkegaard thinks that most prideful men, most intellectuals and cultured persons, enjoy this position as a kind of half-justified resentment against others, and that rational philosophy by itself always runs the risk and danger of this superiority, which he calls "sin." His correction for this form of defiant self-hood,
of course, is the confrontation of the "Absolute-Paradox" of the Incarnation, as earlier discussed, which brings "grace" and the inward intensity to maintain a continued dynamics of self, a continued self-transcendence and becoming of the quality of subjectivity.

So suffering, existential anxiety and dread and guilt are part of inward intensity and reality for this existential view of human nature. Kierkegaard very profoundly contrasts this with the essentialist viewpoint that sees all fate and misfortune as external to the self, and something that happens unjustly and unfairly from the outside to one's self. This external and essentialist viewpoint avoids the limits of fate and reality. It is either aesthetically hopeful and optimistic toward the future and therefore surprised and offended by the accidents of fate; or it is ethically hopeful of man's capacities through reason and institutions eventually to control and ward off all fate and disease and war. Hence, it is impatient and hostile toward the limits of life and time. The authentic existential man, what Kierkegaard calls in his special Christian framework, the "religious stage of life," on the contrary, always lives with limit and anxiety and expects it and remains open to it. Such authenticity even receives an "uplifting through suffering," for suffering is "... a difficulty which creates men."50

Suffering shares in the limits of finiteness. Finiteness is seen in contrast to infinite becoming, in contrast to the possibilities of transcendent freedom. Kierkegaard poetically describes suffering as that which "... jestingly looks in upon the imaginative passion of the infinite." 51

One little gem of irony expresses the transition teachers feel and encounter as they move from the high ideals of, say, a philosophy of education class, or a college education in general, into a hum-drum daily life of teaching where humor and joy over suffering are indeed hard to maintain. Kierkegaard comments: "The religious discourse must therefore always be a little teasing, just as existence is; for herein lies the teasing, that we human beings have our heads full of great imaginings, and then comes existence and offers us the commonplace!" 52

It is very rewarding to find Rogers and Maslow confronting this problem of the existential suffering that is implicit in the becoming of the growing human self. Still, they continue to believe in the positive growth forces of the existential assumptions about man, and the availability of developing the personal resources to sustain and transcend this suffering. Both of these writers emphasize that self-knowledge generally, and especially when it comes through the avenue of another person's insights and communication, is

51 Ibid., p. 394.
52 Ibid., p. 431, footnote.
threatening to the learner. Rogers states this dramatically in his concept that we have to learn to permit ourselves to hear and understand another person. Why is this? Because . . . our first reaction to most of the statements which we hear from other people is an immediate evaluation or judgment, rather than an understanding . . . (for) . . . understanding is risky. If I let myself really understand another person, I might be changed by that understanding. And we all fear change.\textsuperscript{53}

In fact, "... acceptantly to be what I am, ... and to permit this to show through to the other person, is the most difficult task I know and one I never fully achieve."\textsuperscript{54} This Rogers says after a life of struggling with the problem of remaining open to clients! Why is this, again? We fear expressing positive emotions and feelings toward others because "... we may be trapped by them. They may be disappointed in our trust, and these outcomes we fear."\textsuperscript{55} So a kind of impersonal caution protects us from these threats of unworthiness, of being used or manipulated, or of risking the rejection of our meanings and security. Rogers points out that we not only desire independence and therefore fear any obvious evidence of our dependence on others, but we also hate the achievement of independence and authenticity in others, since it is a judgment upon ourselves.

\textsuperscript{53}Rogers, \textit{On Becoming} . . ., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{54}Ibid., p. 51.

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., p. 52.
But it is essentially the break-through of self-knowledge which is the deepest threat and fear in both Rogers' and Maslow's opinion. Rogers states: "When we are living behind a facade, when we are trying to act in ways that are not in accord with our feelings, then we dare not listen freely to another. We must always have our guard up, lest he pierce the pretence of our facade." Maslow emphasizes this same theme: "From our point of view," he states, "Freud's greatest discovery is that the great cause of much psychological illness is the fear of knowledge of one's self--of one's emotions, impulses, memories, capacities, potentialities, of one's destiny." And Maslow adds that this fear of one's self parallels what one fears in the outside world, and the intensity of one's prejudices and rigidities in the perception or openness to this outside world; "that is, inner problems and outer problems tend to be deeply similar and to be related to each other." This phenomenon is what the psychologists call "projection."

We therefore fear any threatening experience and knowledge from the external world that might reveal to us our own inadequacy, attack our defense-mechanisms, destroy needed illusion, or lead us in any way to find ourselves

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56 Ibid., pp. 323-324.

57 Maslow, Toward a Psychology . . . , p. 57.

58 Ibid., p. 57.
unworthy or despicable. We therefore fear our own capacity for formulating ideals for ourselves or for others, for these very ideals have a "demand" quality and responsibility about them that require us to attempt to actualize them in our own being. This judgment means that our present self as it is, is usually judged to be unworthy; it is, of course, seen as less worthy, even in the healthy and courageous learner, or there would be no qualitatively actualized risks and leaps. But many people seem to feel this not as a relative judgment of unworthiness, but rather as an absolute condemnation of what they now are, and hence a freezing of their belief in their potential resources for qualitative becoming as well. This, in Tillich's framework, is because their present self-system has become their ultimate concern, and no longer points beyond itself to more qualitative and transcendent growth and meanings.

Maslow says that if a person is repressed or defensive, "... the familiar, the vaguely perceived, the mysterious, the hidden, the unexpected are all apt to be threatening."\(^\text{59}\) In this case we fear increased self-knowledge because it implies the responsibility of changing our ways. Hence, as Maslow puts it, "... pseudo-stupidity can be a defense."\(^\text{60}\) Maslow's major empirical investigations have been with those "healthy self-acutalizing people" that he believes

\(^{59}\)Ibid., p. 61.

\(^{60}\)Ibid., p. 62.
epitomize and exemplify the best of human qualities, and he finds that these people have a much higher incidence of what he calls "peak-experiences" and "Being-cognition."

Maslow's description of these traits follows the goals and ideals embodied in this dissertation and includes such traits as: greater drive for unity and completeness; intenser and completer perceptual processes; preference for concerns that are humanly meaningful and relevant; repeated perception to increase discrimination and nuances of complexity; less ego-involvement in perceiving and conceiving; greater disorientation in time and space ("It would be accurate to say that in these moments the person is outside of time and space subjectively"61); a dominantly good or desirable affect and valuation of being-cognitions (described as "wholeness, liveness, richness, honesty, beauty, uniqueness, self-sufficiency," etc.)62 a passive openness to being prior to choice and judgment; increased feelings of wonder and reverence and holiness; a capacity to live with life's dichotomies and not integrate them all conceptually; and finally a decrease of fear and anxiety in regaining a second childhood innocence.63

But what is more central here is that Maslow points out that there are certain dangers to increased "Being-

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61Ibid., p. 76.  
62Ibid., p. 78.  
63Ibid., pp. 75-78.
cognition." There are certain dangers to increasing the capacity for suffering and for living with increased threats and anxiety. One is the stereotyped ivory-tower notion of thinkers and creative people that they may become more indecisive, even catatonic, and less capable of relevant action. A second related danger is that they may come to value their subjective reality above objective reality to such an extent that they never re-relate themselves responsibly to the community. Buber criticizes Kierkegaard in this respect.\textsuperscript{64} A third is that they may become preoccupied and appear indifferent to other persons and common problems, even when this is not true. A fourth is a possible tendency toward over-tolerance, toward living so much in the ontological realm that they become incapable of making necessary judgmental discriminations in the public community, leading to a kind of bland equality or acceptance that loses awareness of man's finitude and limits. All of these are closely related to each other and grow out of a man's pre-occupation with the intensities and problems of his own subjectivity. It is obvious that if this position is to be institutionally relevant this danger must be confronted directly.

Another danger that Maslow points out is that openness to reality may be too much for the person's present resources to meet and integrate meaningfully, so he finds that healthy

\textsuperscript{64}Buber, \textit{Between Man} . . . .
people often affirm what he calls "healthy-regressive values" or "coasting values,"\textsuperscript{65} of temporary peace and security and even fantasy dreams which permits their resources for action and integration to catch up to their rational insights and understandings. But this is done consciously and intentionally so the person is fully aware of the temporary status of these positions as contrasted to the continuing dynamics of life and meanings. Maslow is thus very much in agreement with the position defended here that a becoming person needs a high "ontological frustration-tolerance." He even uses similar phraseology, as follows: ". . . we know also that the complete absence of frustration is dangerous,"\textsuperscript{66} for it leads to shallowness and projected fears and rigidities.

In summary then, "Self-knowledge seems to be the major path of self-improvement, though not the only one. Self-knowledge and self-improvement are very difficult for most people to achieve. They usually demand courage and long struggle."\textsuperscript{67}

And again, "It seems quite clear that the need to know, if we are to understand it well, must be integrated with fear of knowing, of anxiety, with needs for safety and security. We wind up with a dialectical back-and-forth relationship which is simultaneously a struggle between fear and courage. All those psychological and social factors which increase

\textsuperscript{65}Maslow, Toward a Psychology . . ., p. 162.
\textsuperscript{66}Ibid, p. 186.
\textsuperscript{67}Ibid., p. 156.
fear will out our impulses to know." But here Maslow adds the positive note that justifies this analysis and understand­
ing, and that Rollo May made in the discussion of last chapter's analysis: "All factors that permit courage, free­
dom, and boldness will thereby also free our need to know."^68

And yet the conditions for this freedom and courage are not automatically present in our culture today. All of us are confronted with the existential anxiety and guilt, and various forms of social anxiety and guilt, that create the torments of our lives. So perhaps it is appropriate to end on a more optimistic observation from Maslow than the partly utopian hopes of the last observation. Here Maslow observes, It seems quite clear that personality problems may sometimes be loud protests against the crushing of one's psychological bones, of one's true inner nature. What is sick then is not to protest while the crime is being committed." And here he adds an observation that might well lead educators to ask themselves deeply what their central responsibility to the growing learner really is. "I am sorry to report my impres­sion" he states, "that most people do not protest under such treatment. They take it and pay years later, in neurotic and psychosomatic symptoms of various kinds, or perhaps in some cases never become aware that they are sick, that they have missed true happiness, true fulfillment of promise, a

^Ibid., p. 64.
rich emotional life, and a serene fruitful old age, that 
they have never known how wonderful it is to be creative, 
to react aesthetically, to find life thrilling." 69 And 
if there is a dimension of the aristocratic bias of the 
"existential view of the nature of man" implicit here, it 
is nevertheless also true that these remain the central 
problems and concerns and possible meanings for all human 
beings, independently of initial gifts for creating ontolog­
ical subjectivity.

69 Ibid., p. 7.
CHAPTER VII

ROGERS AND MASLOW'S DESCRIPTION
OF THE LEARNING PROCESS

One further discussion is needed to make the theoretical framework of this dissertation more pertinent to the work of the classroom teacher. We must now ask: What do the analyses of Rogers and Maslow, in their empirical studies of healthy and therapeutically healed persons, offer for an approach to a philosophy of education? The theoretical formulation, largely derived from Tillich, has stressed the importance of a radical honesty previously called "authenticity," the power of the individual person to be loyal to his own unique becoming, and the capacity to create meanings which both give him an identity through time and also relate him with the "kairos" demands for community in his time. It has stressed the importance of keeping the self-system dynamic by loyalty to ultimate ends through the "symbol-sorge" capacity of reason, the capacity to identify with concerns beyond the immediate actualized time-space context.

The agreement of the self-psychologists with the assumptions of purpose and openness to being, and with the goals of a process view of the "good life" has already been suggested. Let us re-emphasize this claim. Allport, for
example, says that "... healthy human beings (are) those
who strive not so much to preserve life as to make it worth
living."¹ And in keeping with the focus on the centrality
of symbol-capacities in this process he states that what­
ever else learning is "... it is clearly a disposition to
form structures."² The goal of the authentic individual he
states as a continuing process of "... individuation, the
formation of an individual style of life that is self-aware,
self-critical, and self-enhancing."³ He calls this symbolic
inward unity of the self the "proprium,"⁴ and again stresses
the role of ultimate loyalties. "Here seems to be the
central characteristic of propriate striving; its goals are,
strictly speaking, unattainable. Propriate striving confers
unity upon personality, but it is never the unity of the
fulfillment of repose, or of reduced tension."⁵ Rather it
is goals of process, dynamics, openness to being, and trans­
cendence through new creations of symbol forms and relation­
ships.

It is important here to recall the view of morality
that Tillich emphasizes in the development of each person's
autonomy since we must be very clear that no teacher can

¹Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton-
²Ibid., p. 27.
³Ibid., p. 28.
⁴Ibid., p. 40.
⁵Ibid., p. 67.
ever create or teach the uniqueness of any pupil. Each learner creates and actualizes his own forms of self-structuring, or he fails to be involved, to be spirited about the learning process as autonomous. To repeat Tillich's formulation,

In man complete centeredness is essentially given, but it is not actually given until man actualizes it in freedom and through destiny. The act in which man actualizes his essential centeredness is the moral act. Morality is the function of life by which the realm of the spirit comes into being.⁶

This curiosity, this openness to Being, is a responding to the universal forms of existence, all of which can be incorporated, with one limit and exception only. This is the personhood, the unity and centeredness of other's selves. "The moral constitution of the self in the dimension of spirit begins with this experience. Personal life emerges with the encounter of person with person, and in no other way."⁷ Thus, in personal relationships such as teaching, actualizing the essential potential is ambiguous or uncertain since each learner's essential self and uniqueness is unknown until he actualizes it and gives it form. If we super-impose upon a learner the form of this ought-to-be, we violate his person-hood and destroy the authentic and

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⁷Ibid., III, p. 44.
spirited dimension of his search and self-actualization.

Tillich warns:

... working toward the growth of a person is at the same time working toward his depersonalization. Trying to enhance a subject as subject makes it into an object. First of all, one can observe the practical problems implied in this ambiguity in education activity, whether it is unintentional or intentional. In communicating cultural contents by education, the extremes of totalitarian indoctrination and liberal unconcern are rarely reached, but they are always present as elements and cause the attempt to educate the person as person to be one of a culture's most ambiguous tasks. The same is true of the attempt to educate the person by inducting him into the actual life of the educational group. Here the extremes of authoritarian discipline and liberal permissiveness, although rarely practiced to the full, appear as elements in the educational process and tend either to break the person as person or to prevent him from reaching any definite form. In this respect the main problem of education is that every method, however refined, increases the 'objectifying' tendency which it tries to avoid.³

These considerations reinforce the importance of honoring the learner's authenticity as a base for his own educational venture in the process of transcending finite bias.

In the empirical studies of Rogers and Maslow that follow, there are two major points to be discussed and established. The first is, that honesty and openness and trust of present self-hood or ontological subjectivity and an acceptance of this ontological structure of self is a precondition of further growth. The second is a description of the actual process of subjective becoming that Rogers has observed in healed and growing people, and that Maslow has

³Ibid., III, p. 76.
observed in his studies of healthy self-actualizing people, for in both cases the findings and observations and interpretations are essentially the same.

First, then, it will be shown that these psychologists find that honesty and openness in the existential sense of authenticity does provide a necessary base for further becoming or qualitative growth. Rogers confesses this directly: "In my relationships with persons I have found that it does not help, in the long run, to act as though I were something I am not... . It does not help to act as though I know the answer when I do not." Rogers confesses this directly: "I find I am more effective when I can listen acceptingly to myself, and can be myself," he states, and adds the present point that is most central here: "... when I accept myself as I am, then I change... we cannot move away from what we are, until we thoroughly accept what we are." It is important to stress that this acceptance as a base for change and growth is only partly a consciously understood process. Direction of growth is more a volitional leap of faith than a self-directed rational understanding. The earlier discussion was critical of the subject-object dichotomy in its undervaluation of the purposiveness of the "wisdom of the body" and was directed to this point. Rogers states it a little differently, emphasizing the biological rationality that is only partly

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9 Rogers, On Becoming... , p. 16.
10 Ibid., p. 17 (Emphasis mine.)
conscious. "Learning as it takes place in therapy," he says, "is a total, organismic, frequently non-verbal type of thing which may or may not follow the same principles as the intellectual learning of trivial material which has little relevance to the self."\(^{11}\) This process of learning to like and accept ourselves as we are is no easy effort, for besides being a competitive culture which has what Fromm calls a "marketing orientation" of valuing and judging everything by its external social and saleable worth, we also are still a Christian culture which in many forms of doctrine makes the person feel that self-adulation of any type is a form of pride and hence a source of guilt. Yet in therapy Rogers finds that overcoming this embarrassment of positive self-love, and embracing ". . . a quiet pleasure in being one's self"\(^{12}\) is a necessary first step to qualitative change that is to be lasting.

Maslow makes a very useful distinction between "deficiency motivation" and "growth motivation." It is a distinction that helps to explain this prior necessity to accept and honor one's present self. Deficit needs are the basic needs of the biological and social organism that Maslow compares to "empty holes" which must be filled up from the outside world. This is very much like the "empty bucket" or "black slate" view of mind analyzed in discussing Locke.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 36.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 37.
Such a view led to the environmental hypothesis and a dependency on external social experiences to build the quality of mind and self-hood. In fact, Maslow defines deficiency needs as those "... which must be filled from without by human beings other than the subject." Growth-motivation, or the weaker "instinctoid" drives of higher-order symbolic development, or purposeful self-actualization, on the other hand, come after the basic drives and needs are met. On the social level of security and worth this is in complete agreement with Rogers' point above. Maslow defines this growth-motivation as the on-going actualization of potentials, capabilities and talents, as fulfillment of mission (or call, fate, destiny, or vocation), as a fuller knowledge of, and acceptance of, the person's own intrinsic nature, as an unceasing trend toward unity, integration or synergy within the person.

If we abstract from this definition the emphasis on purpose, on finitude, on the prior ontological self, and on the drive toward a unity or integration that in our analysis has emphasized the symbolic capacity of man and his capacity to be loyal to ultimate transcendent ends, we have a direct repetition of the existential view of human nature and becoming that has been theoretically defended in this dissertation.


14 Ibid., p. 23.
Maslow also gives a list of characteristics he finds typical of these self-actualizing persons; those that are important to the present analysis include: increased acceptance of self and others and of nature, increased desire for detachment and privacy and aloneness, increased autonomy and resistance to acculturation, increased identification with the human species and universality, greatly increased creativity, and the experience that "... growth is, in itself, a rewarding and exciting process." He finds that these people, when their "deficiency needs" are met, are thereby freed for what he calls "higher pleasures," for "functioning easily, perfectly and at the peak of one's powers—in over-drive, so to speak!"

Maslow's discussion here reinforces Rogers' position: for example, he says:

... growth takes place when the next step forward is subjectively more delightful, more joyous, more intrinsically satisfying than the last; that the only way we can ever know what is right for us is that it feels better subjectively than any alternative. The new experience validates itself rather than by any outside criterion. It is self-justifying, self-validating.

This amounts to Maslow's formulation of the existential thesis of transcendence and autonomy, of the "teleological suspension of the ethical." But this is frightening, as has been shown; and even when we take these steps forward we make

\[15\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 28.}\] \[16\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 30.}\] \[17\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 43.} \text{ (Emphasis mine.)}\]
mistakes. Hence we fall back upon earlier levels of security and meaning. Maslow calls this process "healthy regression." So it is necessary to first feel that one's self and meanings are reputable and secure and worthy and retrievable, before venturing the risks of qualitative becoming. "Apparently growth forward customarily takes place in little steps," Maslow observes, "and each step forward is made possible by the feeling of being safe, of operating out into the unknown from a safe home port, of daring because retreat is possible." So it follows that we cannot push or pressure people into new qualitative leaps of faith until their present ontological subjectivity has been secured and criticized enough by themselves to provide a safe and secure "home base" that can be returned as comfortably meaningful.

In recent years the experimental ventures in education have successfully employed this principle of honoring the students' right to safety and security and choice in his learning adventures: A. S. Niell's *Summerhill* and Sylvia Ashton Warner's *Teacher*. In professional educational circles these experiments are often given a kind of tacit


approval and then ignored on the grounds that they are appli-
cable to small private settings but inapplicable to mass
public education. Niell found that when students are allowed
to choose if and when they are ready to learn, and to govern
their own direction and rate of inquiry, that they do create
an autonomous base of inquiry meaningful to themselves.
This is supportive evidence for the importance of each
learner's "educational home base." Warner discovered that
when children were given key vocabulary words of intense
interest to themselves, and then allowed to learn only the
ones they remembered rather than the ones they forgot or
recalled incorrectly, that the children's learning was safe
and yet excitingly adventuresome. Both cases honored the
learner's right to choose his own concerns for further
development. In our public schools we often have so little
faith in the intrinsic merit of what we teach that we fear
that if students were not forced to learn things they do not
care about, we would find they did not want to learn anything
at all. It may be that a load of unwanted expectations so
pervades the school curriculum that it would take the learner
a while to re-discover his own intrinsic concerns and
curiosity. But it seems probable that such a discovery can
only occur in a safe, secure, inter-personal environment
where the conditional and judgmental fears of the adult com-
munity have been minimized or taken on by the teacher. This
dissertation argues that this approach to teaching is possible
and desirable in the public schools. The following learning process descriptions give us some indications of how this might be achieved and what reactions we might anticipate from the normal public-school learner.

**Descriptions of the Learning Process**

The final consideration of this chapter on the becoming of subjectivity remains. This is a description of the steps in the process of becoming itself, as Rogers and Maslow have observed it in healthy and self-actualizing persons. This description will be integrated in this dissertation with the earlier discussions and observations of this chapter to form a kind of summary and conclusion to the view of the dynamics of subjectivity. It has been shown that an assumed dynamic ontology and an assumed transcendent freedom makes each man responsible for creating his own meanings and self. Further it has been shown that this process involves fearful threats to the process of becoming a more qualitative person, but that a continued dynamic search is consistent with the existential demand to maintain an honesty before Being and the attempt to actualize one's unique purposes and potential being. Finally it has been suggested that many healthy persons find this a rewarding and satisfying approach to life and that a pre-condition to each stage of qualitative growth is the prior acceptance and security of the present stage of subjectivity. It is important for a philosophic approach to education and teacher training to show that both Rogers and
Maslow find that there is a progressive development in the growth of this subjectivity, from an initially protected and defensive and closed perception of reality and self to a trusting and open perception.

Rogers finds seven different stages, somewhat arbitrarily demarcated, along this path. He finds that many people in therapy—initially start from a fearful and narrow approach to life, just as Tillich’s analysis suggests. They communicate nothing personal or subjective and tend to see all problems and all solutions in the external environment. They maintain rigid personal constructs or symbolic meanings and follow institutionally prescribed approaches to their relationships with other people. Since the problems and answers are perceived to be external, they have no desire or belief in the possibility of changing themselves as one central dimension in meeting these problems. He finds that they are stereotyped and rigid in their conceptions and phrasings of problems, global, over-generalizing, and non-discriminate in their interpretations and judgments of people and social reality. From this beginning he observes that people in therapy move to a more discriminate awareness of the complexity of external problems when they are accepted and trusted, but they accept no personal responsibility for these problems at first. Gradually they begin to reveal their subjective feelings rather than talking about themselves as an object, and this initial self-expression is heavily
loaded with a sense of unworthiness, guilt, and fear in relation to the problems that concern them most. As this progresses, the global categories and interpretations begin to be seen as contradictory and oversimplified, and are now seen as personal alternatives. It is then that the awareness of personal responsibility for choice and decision emerges tentatively.

From here the fear and guilt and sense of burden, of feeling sorry for their lot in life, unfolds with greater intensity; and the repressed global feelings begin to be more discriminate, though also remaining negative and hostile. However the symbolic interpretations are now seen as creations rather than givens and certainties, and the possibility of error in them and of correcting or improving them is toyed with. Next Rogers observes a change in time-context, from the past to the present, and an intense search for deeply felt beliefs and feelings that are most important and meaningful to the person. With this comes a nearly compulsive desire for exactness and clarity about these feelings and beliefs and a frustration with the inexactness of subjective vocabulary. An awareness of search for self emerges. The learner begins to enjoy the process of discovery and decision as he criticizes symbolic interpretations of the real and the true.

In the next stage Rogers finds his clients very immediate and personal in their self-communication, increasingly
expressing positive and trusting emotions and ideals, enjoying finding that they like and value themselves. They are beginning a process of identifying their deep self with a becoming process rather than with a finished social role or category. He finds that there is greater discrimination of feelings and beliefs and a more rapid and contradictory flow of communication inside the self-structure. The clients have a compulsion for congruence or fit between what they feel and say and do. At this point Rogers believes the person assumes responsibility for creating his own meanings and identity. The client sees problems as essentially internal and qualitative and as problems in human relationships more than in the external and abstracted reality. At this point most people leave therapy, according to Rogers.

But in the few that have stayed with him in the final stage, Rogers finds a rapid increase in the capacity to create new meanings and forms in solitude (and apart from the support and acceptance of therapy). He finds that there is more focus on the future in time as the decisive reality for present decisions, and that clients come to use consciousness not to direct their becoming but more to be alert and discriminate about it, to enjoy it first and classify it afterwards. He finds that personal constructs and symbolic meanings are more discriminate and are held tentatively rather than rigidly, and that the clients freely create new terms and observations of reality and other people without being
compulsively concerned whether or not others agree or disagree with them. They have assumed responsibility for creating their own meaning and for initiating the kind and number and quality of relationships to life and people that are fulfilling to themselves and to the achievement of their life concerns. All this reads like Tillich's theology of culture, and perhaps like a utopian dream. Rogers is careful to point out that these illuminations come only after long sessions of intensive therapy. Yet the very fact that most people start at an earlier stage in this process than normal people should give us some hope and guide as to what goals may be achievable by a far larger number of human beings if our society and education helps to hold up the ideal and create some of the conditions for such a becoming of subjectivity!

Maslow's descriptions of the processes of growth and becoming are again very similar, and again stress the importance of the positive base of self-acceptance and worth as a pre-condition for qualitative becoming. One of Maslow's process descriptions of becoming is again so clearly and relevantly stated that I will quote it in some extensive detail, only changing the form from a schematized step-by-step listing to a flowing and developmental paragraph. He states:

(1) The healthy spontaneous child, in his spontaneity, from within out, in response to his own inner Being, reaches out to the environment in wonder and interest, and expresses whatever skills
he has, . . . (and he does this (2) to the extent that he is not crippled by fear, to the extent that he feels safe enough to dare. In this process that which gives him the delight-experience is fortuitously encountered or is offered him by helpers (such as teachers). . . . He must be safe and self-accepting enough to be able to choose and prefer these delights, instead of being frightened by them. If he can choose these experiences which are validated by the experience of delight, then he can return to the experience, repeat it, savor it to the point of repletion, satiation or boredom. (6) At this point, he shows the tendency to go on to more complex, richer experiences and accomplishments in the same sector—again if he feels safe enough to dare. Such experiences not only mean moving on, but have a feedback effect on the self, in the feeling of certainty—'This I like; that I don't, for sure'—of capability, mastery, self-trust, self-esteem. (8) In this never ending series of choices of which life consists, the choice may generally be schematized as between safety—or, more broadly, defensiveness—and growth, and since only that child doesn't need safety who already has it, we may expect the growth choice to be made by the safety-need gratified child. Only he can afford to be bold. . . . In order to be able to choose in accord with his own nature and to develop it, the child must be permitted to retain the subjective experience of delight and boredom, as the criteria of the correct choice for him. The alternative criterion is making the choice in terms of the wish of another person. The Self is lost when this happens. Also this constitutes restricting the choice to safety alone, since the child will give up trust in his own delight-criterion out of fear—of losing protection, love, etc. If the choice is really a free one, and if the child is not crippled, then we may expect him ordinarily to choose progression forward. The evidence indicates that what delights the healthy child, what tastes good for him, is also, more frequently than not, 'best' for him in terms of far goals as perceivable by the spectator. (12) In this process the environment—parents, therapists, teachers—is important in various ways, even though the ultimate choice must be made by the child:(first) it can gratify his basic needs for safety, belongingness, love and respect, so that he can feel unthreatened, autonomous, interested and spontaneous and thus dare to choose the unknown; (and secondly), it can help by making the growth choice positively attractive and less dangerous, and by making the regressive choice less
attractive and more costly. In this way the psychology of Being and the psychology of Becoming can be reconciled, and the child, simply being himself, can yet move forward and grow.21

Besides being an excellent summary of the becoming process analyzed in this chapter, this quotation gives some very useful and practical helps as to just how this point of view can become relevant to the classroom teacher with all levels of children.

But Maslow also has an over-all summary of the process of self-transcendence that is more appropriate to the teacher who is herself in the process of becoming an educated person. In fact Maslow suggests this summary as a kind of "... philosophy of education, the theory of how to help men become what they can and deeply need to become."22 Maslow suggests that we are all born with a given heredity, physiology and neurology, and with innate characteristic responses of uniqueness, and though these resources should be seen more as raw materials rather than finished products, it yet remains true that in childhood and youth it is impossible for us to gain much autonomous guiding direction over the style and form of their becoming. In our processes of socialization and acculturation we actualize our potential

21Maslow, Toward a Psychology ..., pp. 55-56. In the above quotation the ... indicate where Maslow has inserted other numbers, and the () indicate where I have added connecting phrasings.

22Ibid., p. 177.
according to socially extant forms, weakening the purposeful and unique instinctoid impulses of the higher pleasures, burying them from consciousness and making them hard to isolate and discriminate in our feelings and thoughts. Often or usually, we cease to believe in their reality, even as potentiality. He adds that much of this given nature of possible transcendence and unique becoming is unconscious and ontological, simply unused and neglected since not actualized by the individual's willing and risking. But he stresses that this inaction and repression do not destroy these potentialities. The controlled personality and defense mechanisms rather use all their energy to repress and sublimate these drives rather than giving open form or loyalty to them.

It follows from this theoretical position that therapy and education can help to decrease these defenses and encourage creative and spontaneous efforts, and hence help the person express what he potentially is. In fact, Maslow strongly believes, as was earlier quoted and shown, that failure to do this is dangerous both to the individual and to the society, for it leads to defensiveness and fearful projections of problems onto the external world. This basic nature can be encouraged and accepted and rewarded because it is assumed to be good or neutral. Maslow agrees with Kierkegaard and

23 This is excellently argued also in Carl Jung's, The Undiscovered Self (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1958).
Tillich that failure to accept the courage to become one's self creates "intrinsic guilt" and a progressively cowardly and un-worthy gestalt of self-feelings or self-concept. He agrees that this guilt is existential and healthy and not neurotic or dangerous in itself. It is, in fact, to be encouraged as a necessary guide to authentic becoming!

Maslow states this psychologically: he first distinguishes

. . . the Freudian type of super-ego from intrinsic conscience and intrinsic guilt. The former is in principle a taking into the self of the disapprovals and approvals of persons other than the person himself; fathers, mothers, teachers, etc. Guilt then is recognition of disapproval by others. Intrinsic guilt is the consequence of betrayal of one's own inner nature or self, a turning off the path to self-actualization, and is essentially justified self-disapproval. It is therefore not as culturally relative as is Freudian guilt. It is 'true' or 'desired' or 'right and just' or 'correct' because it is a discrepancy from something profoundly real within the person rather than from accidental, arbitrary or purely relative localisms. Seen in this way it is good, even necessary, for a person's development to have intrinsic guilt when he deserves to. It is not just a symptom to be avoided at any cost but is rather an inner guide for growth toward actualization of the real self, and of its poten­
tialities.24

Hence, from this point of view evil and hostility and preju­dice are mostly re-active defenses and sublimations of the fear to actualize positive becoming. One necessary dimension of healthy-growth thus becomes a high frustration-tolerance, or "tolerance of ambiguity." For as Kierkegaard has argued, we learn more by struggle and transcendence than we do by success or failure. Hence it takes a Being-cognition, an

24"Maslow, Toward a Psychology . . . , p. 182."
openness to dynamic ontological reality and to becoming to maintain a healthy personality. This dissertation has argued that a symbolic process of creating meaning and ultimate value loyalties is essential to the process of "opening up ontological reality," as Tillich says about the power of symbols. Maslow agrees with this, though stating it again more psychologically: "The state of being without a system of values is psychopathogenic, we are learning. The human being needs a framework of values, a philosophy of life, a religion or religion-surrogate to live by and understand by, in about the same sense that he needs sunlight, calcium, or love.\textsuperscript{25}

So, in this chapter we have outlined a view of human subjectivity and extended the dynamic ontological assumptions of the existential view of human nature and its demands that each individual build or create his own essence into a process of human transcendence and becoming. We have turned to Rogers and Maslow for psychological descriptions of this process of becoming and qualitative growth, but have also maintained the ontological dimensions of the threats of reality in Tillich's and Kierkegaard's analysis of human becoming. We have tried to show some sources of courage and personal resources for meeting these threats. Some of these were ontological and pointed to possible theological answers

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 192.
for some persons' meanings; others were essentially humanistic and psychological and pointed to the prior pre-condition of feeling and accepting worthiness as one is now, which must include respect both for the actualized form of self and a real belief in the goodness and power of potentiality.

**Some immediate implications for classroom teaching**

The major way in which this pre-condition is mediated and experienced as real is through encounters and relationships with other people in one's immediate environment. This points to one function of the teacher's role to be discussed in the following chapters. Also the achievement of ontological subjectivity and authentic self-hood is partly dependent on the community and the "kairos" reality. This community is its source of meanings and symbol forms, and this points to a second kind of role of the teacher to be discussed. Dialogue in the classroom is seen as one way of transcending bias, in fact as one necessary and permanent dimension of the search for truth as a continual transcendence of bias. Because the self and subjectivity as dynamic are constantly subject to the deceptions and illusions of fear or narrowed perception of reality, and because the threats to authenticity and honesty and to continued becoming must be faced, self-deception and continued defensiveness in formal learning are altogether too prevalent. Honesty and self-integration are not easily achieved nor
easily maintained, and there are dimensions of deception and bias about ourselves that escape even the most keenly self-aware teachers and those learners most highly motivated by inward intensity.

In the dynamics of the personality that have been analyzed, especially using Tillich's framework, there were ontological tensions, tensions between conscious and unconscious dimensions of self, tensions between the will and reason, etc. Hence communication within the self is constantly breaking down and having to be re-created and re-healed. Rogers states of sick persons what is equally true and existentially inevitable among normal people, and even of Maslow's self-actualizing people. Rogers claims that often "... communication within himself has broken down, and second(ly), as a result of this, his communication with others has been damaged."²⁶ Hence, one positive dimension of effective classroom dialogue becomes to reverse this dilemma and re-establish communication with others as an avenue to better communication within their own subjectivity. This involves the congruence of internal and external perception and conception that has been noted especially by the psychologists used in this dissertation's analysis. It involves a symmetry of self-perception and external-world perception. And if one accepts this assumption, it follows that

²⁶Rogers, On Becoming A . . ., p. 330
we may often see clearly what is projected and distant from us in the external environment more readily and deeply than we can in self-communication. N. O. Brown, in a recent psycho-analytical critique of culture and history has suggested, in fact, that our cultural artifacts and external sublimations and symbol-forms may be the major avenues to re-establishing the health of subjectivity.\textsuperscript{27}

Rogers gives this internal-external mutual perceptual functioning the name of "congruence." "Congruence is the term we have used to indicate an accurate matching of experiencing, and awareness" he says. "It may be still further extended to cover a matching of experience, awareness, and communication."\textsuperscript{28} And he adds the observation that is central here, and leads to the necessity of dialogue for continuing the search for truth as transcending bias: "The individual himself is not a sound judge of his own degree of congruence."\textsuperscript{29} Rogers even states this as a "general law of inter-personal relationships," which he believes applies to all human communications where each individual desires relationship, is minimally open to the other, and maintains communication over a period of time, involving continued efforts.

These conditions aptly describe the classroom situation.

\textsuperscript{27}N. O. Brown, Life Against Death (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, Modern Library Paperbound, 1959).
\textsuperscript{28}Rogers, On Becoming A . . ., p. 339.
\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 340. (emphasis mine.)
Rogers states this "law" as follows:

The greater the congruence of experience, awareness and communication on the part of one individual, the more the ensuing relationship will involve: a tendency toward reciprocal communication with a quality of increasing congruence; a tendency toward more mutually accurate understanding of the communications; improved psychological adjustment and functioning in both parties; mutual satisfaction in the relationship. Conversely the greater the communicated incongruence of experience and awareness, the more the ensuing relationship will involve: further communication with the same quality; disintegration of accurate understanding, less adequate psychological adjustment and functioning in both parties; and mutual dissatisfaction in the relationship.30

Rogers sees this "risk" as life's central existential choice. As he puts it, we are

... frequently faced with the existential choice, 'Do I dare to communicate the full degree of congruence which I feel? Do I dare match my experience and my awareness of that experience, with my communication? Do I dare to communicate myself as I am or must my communication be somewhat less than or different from this?' The sharpness of this issue lies in the often vividly foreseen possibility of threat or rejection. To communicate one's full awareness of the relevant experience is a risk in interpersonal relationships.31

These dimensions of human communication are seen to be implicit in the view of human learning defended here, and Roger's base will thus become one suggested direction for effective classroom teaching.

Today the ontological factors of this mistrust between and within people has been deeply confounded by a sophisticated awareness of the defensiveness and hidden motivations

30 Ibid., pp. 344-345.
31 Ibid., p. 345.
of other men. Freud's revealing of the irrational and unconscious dimensions of this, and Marx's revealing of the economic and power and social status dimensions of it\textsuperscript{32} have left us in an historical era where the popular consciousness deeply distrusts itself and all others as well! Buber has thus called our generation a period of "existential mistrust!" We have come to expect to be used and manipulated by the other person, even if that person means well and only "uses" us unconsciously. We may observe that this basic distrust, fear and doubt, does exist in today's classrooms between teachers and learners. This atmosphere must be transcended before any meaningful learning can occur. Buber states this convincingly:

There have always been countless situations in which a man in intercourse with a fellow-man is seized with the doubt whether he may trust him; that is, whether the other really means what he says and whether he will do what he says. There have always been countless situations in which a man believes his life-interest demands that he suspect the other of making it his object to appear otherwise than he is. The first man must then be on his guard to protect himself against this threatening false appearance. In our time something basically different has been added that is capable of undermining more powerfully the foundation of existence between men. One no longer merely fears that the other will voluntarily dissemble, but one simply takes it for granted that he cannot do otherwise. The presumed difference between his opinion and statement, between his statement and action, is here no longer understood as his intention, but as essential necessity. . . . With this changed basic attitude, which has found

scientific rationalization in the teachings of Marx and Freud, the mistrust between man and man has become existential. This is so indeed in a double sense: It is, first of all, no longer only the uprightness, the honesty of the other which is in question, but the inner integrity of his existence itself.33 Secondly, this mistrust not only destroys trustworthy talk between opponents, but also the immediacy of togetherness of man and man generally.34

These observations of Buber's suggest that when we distrust the authenticity and genuine subjectivity of another person it becomes necessary to guard ourselves against the threat and possibility of being used by him and that this mistrust has become nearly universal in our time. If we must so guard ourselves against what we fear from others, Rogers' "law of interpersonal relationships" would seem to operate and we lose our own authenticity and trustable subjectivity in the process. We fall back, in Maslow's terms, upon the security and defensiveness of "deficiency-motivation," hence this lack of trusting dialogue inevitably leads to loss of our own ontological subjectivity. It follows from this that a concern with a particular type and quality of classroom dialogue is a necessary addition to a complete philosophy of education from this existential point of view. The integration of Tillich's moral direction and symbolic creations of meaningful forms along with the self-psychologists' descriptions of optimal learning conditions provide a quality of classroom inquiry and teacher-pupil dialogue potentially exciting to both the teacher and the student.

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33His "ontological subjectivity."

CHAPTER VIII

FROM THE NATURE OF MAN TO LEARNING THEORY
TO PERSONAL BECOMING

We make an over-simplified and dysfunctional dichotomy in our usual distinction between theory and practice. It seems clear that any intelligent practice presupposes a rather carefully worked-out theory and that any theory must have a practice in view. Certainly in educational theory, we cannot work out a theoretical framework and remain oblivious to the limitations of actual operational circumstances. A theory about the nature of man and the educational process must keep one eye on buildings, bureaucracy, teachers, and students as an operational whole.

In the theoretical framework of this dissertation a view of reality (ontology) as dynamic and open has been made explicit. But the central investigation has been placed upon the existential view of the nature of man and upon Tillich's analysis of the possibilities of essential (potentiality) that are ambiguously present or suggested by existentialism—by what is actualized. It has been demonstrated that the self-psychologists, notably Rogers and Maslow, have the similar assumptions about this dynamic ontology and view
of human nature; hence the learning theory and descriptions spelled out in their psychological research and writings were found to be in the most useful form for the purposes of the classroom teacher. In both cases, the limits and blocks to this view of human actualization or becoming that are implied by the theoretical framework itself have been examined. We now must place this theoretical view of reality and human nature, with the accompanying descriptions of the learning process, in the context of the secular public schools and speculate about how the ideas might be useful to the modern learner and teacher.

It is an error, however, to hold or hope that any theoretical framework can provide specific advice and direction in matters of policy and individual choice. Theory exists because man is free to conceptualize things that are not yet realized or actualized in existence. These achievements occur only through the consciousness, volition, and action of individual human beings. One person can, of course, accept another person's perceptual and conceptual understandings and choices as more reliable authority than his own; and we all must do this in some areas and at some times in our lives. We accept parental authority, establish legal and moral and religious authority, the authority of tradition or of the scientific community as a basis for choice making in many decisions of our lives. But in the viewpoint of this dissertation we cease to be fully persons if we do not do
this consciously and purposefully, and if we are not at the same time involved in the kind of self-transcendent learning that maximizes the autonomous authority of the learner in increasingly wider spheres of human responsibility.

This is pre-eminently true in the case of teachers, for their "raw-materials" are children, other human beings. The teacher is constantly involved in what Tillich calls the realm of spirit, of religion and morality and culture. The teacher will have a thousand theoretical choices to make in the ordinary daily round of practice, and the way she conceives her own maturity, the way she conceives her learners' potentialities and limits, and the way she conceives optimal learning climate and experiences will be paramount in determining most of these choices. So, even if such a teacher were to have sympathetically read this treatment of Tillich and self-psychology, her application of these ideas would depend upon her understanding of the ideas, her selective perception of their value and importance, and her own commitment to their implications as she grasps them. Hence, the remaining three chapters in which "some implications for education" are drawn are mostly by way of speculation and suggestion. The sympathetic and autonomous reader is invited to re-write these last three chapters for himself!

In structuring the educational implications of the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation, it would seem advisable to consider the implications under three
headings: first, the individual learner, and his relationship to the teacher; second, the institutional school setting, centering around issues of curriculum development and classroom climate; third, the relationship between the teacher and the student in the classroom setting. Under this last heading a concept of "dialogue" will be developed that embodies the Tillich-self-psychology theoretical framework.

Since the thrust of the theoretical framework developed has been upon personal becoming, upon increasing "ontological frustration-tolerance," upon actualizing one's unique potential in response to the "kairos" demands of his time, upon "ontological subjectivity," the concept of learning or becoming that follows for the individual is in no way specifically or exclusively the province of the formal schools. We all know this. Most of our significant growth and learning occurs in solitude or introspection, in our response to life's dramatic events, or in response to an ultimate concern that is difficult to follow in the formal schooling structure.

Another way of defining this is to say that this chapter is concerned with a view of self-education, a self-education that goes on in response to all of life's encounters and experiences, sometimes with the support of teachers and peers and institutional arrangements, and other times in reaction to, or in spite of schooling interferences. In this Tillich-self-psychology framework, a person's self-concept, his aspiration or project or commitment to be "the novelist
of himself is the most important variable in learning. His symbolic structuring of himself and his symbol-sorge loyalties of ultimate concerns is the authority and motivation for his efforts. Where teachers and school experiences can be resources for achieving these ends schooling will be a receptive and enthusiastic venture, but where this is not the case much of his becoming will have to be a kind of sabotage of institutional offerings. This, of course, can take many forms, and we are only concerned here with those which will be constructive in helping the learner achieve his ultimate concerns.

We must now make some assumptions. We must assume that our learner is a person for whom self-development is an ultimate concern, a person, in Tillich's terms, who is concerned not only with self-alteration and self-identity but also with self-transcendence, a person whose ultimate concern is to become concerned with qualitative becoming or what Tillich calls "seriousness." He is a serious learner. This position is not anti-intellectual by any means, but transcognitive, transforming of ontological subjectivity in response to intellectual, affective, and aesthetic encounters. We must assume that our learner is in search of ultimate reality, of the truth in the sense of openness to the mystery of being or the unconcealment of being. Or better, he is a learner who is in process of becoming increasingly open to all of reality and to the structuring of his authentic
understanding of life and being as he progressively encounters it. In this context we may requote the definition of education initially used in this dissertation and claim that such a learner is seriously interested in becoming an educated person: "A major thesis of this dissertation is that egocentricism and ethnocentricism can and should be transcended toward increasingly universal identifications and loyalties through education and that this should be done essentially through the internalizing of the conscious awareness of bias and limitation and transcended through increasing the extent and intensity of ontological philosophic sensitivity." For such a learner, the process of becoming a fully functioning person, a self-actualizing person, or a new being has become an ultimate concern. In Tillich's framework the dimension of depth, the self-transcending springs of vitality and spirit, have become operative in this person's secular, moral, and cultural pursuits. If we cannot make all of these assumptions, we must be able to assume as a prerequisite that our learner is in a state of dynamics where he doubts his achievement of these ideals but yet is ready to seriously consider them as possible ultimate concerns in his own processes of becoming educated. This is enough to get us started.

This awareness of the dynamics that arises by keeping the self open to a variety of changing ultimate concerns is particularly relevant to teacher training and to the
philosophy of education. It implies a pluralistic frame of reference; or it implies the kind of personal commitment that is honestly open to competing loyalties while temporarily loyal to one framework and set of aims. If this philosophic sensitivity to a variety of ultimate concerns is not alive and active in the self, or if the ultimate is not re-conceived in newly created forms and relationships, there will be no dynamics, no spirit, and no self-transcendence. There will also be no authenticity because volition and will are not given alternatives. The intensity of subjective reality will not be dynamic because a neurotic self-system will have become closed or secure at one level of realization of potentialities.

We can see this point most clearly in Tillich's frame of reference. The insights and understandings of autonomous reason are always existentially and historically conditioned so that they are not universal in their cognitive form; they are not reliable absolutes. Further, due to changes in nature and life and man, our very perceiving and conceiving of ultimate reality changes. It has to be continually re-structured. We have to continually re-commit ourselves to new meanings. Just as our ontological anxiety "always strives to become fears," to become projected or focused upon specific existential referents, so also our symbolic processes and forms "always strive to become signs," to become existentially referential and non-ultimate loyalties. By increasing the
ontological sensitivity and "ontological frustration tolerance" of learners, however, these fears can be re-transcended to an ultimate context, a context of Being, and these signs and idolatries can be re-transcended or re-created to point beyond themselves to ultimate and universal Being. How? In Tillich's context, by ontological sensitivity, by courage, by the moral affirmation that releases spirit in our lives, by re-commitment to ultimate concerns which nurture the dimension of depth in our lives, our unconcealment before the mystery of being. By functioning in an ontologically symbolic or "representationally symbolic" frame of reference, we can re-create meanings and relationships which heal the estrangements of human finitude. Increasing ontological frustration tolerance is at base a process of increasing philosophic sensitivity. In Tillich's framework this includes moral self-affirmation, the religious dimension, and cultural creativity.

If we will imagine our learner now in a teacher-training situation, preparing to become a good teacher, a philosophy of education class would seem to be one explicit place where the question of ultimate concerns in the teaching profession are legitimately made conscious and supported by school experiences. Here the questions of authenticity, of ontological and subjective dynamics, and of self-transcendence may become part of the subject-matter of the inquiry. A variety of perspectives of these issues is presented, and
ideally the learner is free to move in his own authentic directions. Where instructor bias, grading, and institutional fears cover this ideal, the learner is beginning to confront the problems of courage, to be authentic in spite of lack of support and acceptance from the immediate social environment. The limitations of time and immediate opportunity are part of the "kairos" demand upon his generation. If his spirit and autonomous reason are not honored in this context, then one area of personal moral responsibility and creativity is confronted directly. The questions of freedom and moral responsibility in response to these demands are considered in following sections. Here we may recall some of the conditions from Tillich, Rogers, and Maslow, that were suggested as optimally helpful to the learner as he continues to achieve ontological subjectivity and self-transcendence in spite of the alienating and demonic forms of his contemporary predicament.

We may best suggest these resources by a re-interpretation of the concept of subjectivity. "Subjectivity" was conceived in terms of ontological self-hood, of its becoming, of the qualitative and self-transcending changes that human learning can and should involve. It was centrally argued that qualitative "leaps of faith" and risks of "becoming" only occur in the security and safety of a prior acceptance and respect for the present ontological self-hood and its potential qualities for actualization. It was argued that
the psychological and philosophic dimensions of this condi-
tion over-lap and become almost indistinguishable, particu-
larly in each person's self-concept and resources for meeting
the anxiety of qualitative growing. From Rogers and Maslow
it was shown that under conditions of acceptance and support
communication allows and helps a person to move from defen-
sive and fearful stereotypes and rigid symbolic-constructs
(of self and external reality) to an increasingly discrim-
inate awareness of self, ideas, and external threats and
possibilities.

One of the quotations from Maslow, for example, very
explicitly suggested for us that the "environment" (especially
other people) can optimally aid this base to the process of
becoming. This is done by: (a) gratifying the person's
deficiency needs for security and safety, hence supporting
a qualitative base of self-hood to retreat to if and when
threat is too oppressive; or by helping a person to feel the
worth of their present self-hood and potential so that all
sense of adequacy of self-worth is not dependent upon the
success of any particular leap of faith, but upon the general
human capacity for transcendence and repeated efforts of
transcending bias; (b) making qualitative change and becoming
more attractive, and less dangerous to the learner; and not
only in terms of the consciously understandable dimensions of
growth but also in the more intangible (philosophical and
ontological) dimensions of a trust in human potentiality and freedom and becoming.

The learner will thus build relationships and friendships where solitude and intimacy are possible and where the risks of change and effort are made from a secure and safe supportive base. Increasingly this trust is itself internalized as the ontological self structure becomes more essential, more unified, and more authentic. In Erich Fromm's terms the learner will need to feel "unconditional acceptance" more strongly than "conditional acceptance";\(^1\) for then the judgmental qualities of conditional accepting or rejecting, liking or disliking are secondary and non-threatening.

Paul Tillich's view of symbols, of the "kairos," and of human transcendence becomes important in realizing authenticity, dynamics and self-transcendence. The central point here has been that each individual, independently of intelligence and levels of subjective quality or intensity, participates in a larger heritage of cultural forms and meanings and in a larger ontological reality. He experiences the moving to and fro of pressures which seek to become finite ultimate ends themselves versus those forms and symbols which seek to point beyond themselves to the kind of ultimate ends which now have no extant finite forms. These latter ends and loyalties help to keep the dynamics of subjectivity and to

make a reality out of the meanings that the individual can create. He creates such meanings from his own free capacity to make new forms that mediate or explain these tensions, and in his free capacity to actualize his own quality of becoming.

It was further suggested that some forms of interpersonal communication were necessary to continue the subjective task of creating inwardness or intensity and continuing the goal of transcending bias. It was held that we all are "human, all too human" as Nietzsche says, and repeatedly deceive ourselves with illusions. These can only be confronted in external forms or through the corrective influence of external persons. It was further suggested that to the extent that we fear and distrust other persons in our immediate inter-personal environment, we become protective and defensive, and afraid to express our own authentic subjectivity. In this process we destroy our own congruence between feeling and thought and action or behavior, and thereby lose the honesty and authenticity essential to achieving increasingly ontological and dynamic qualities to our becoming.

The authentic learner who has chosen an ultimate concern, created his subjective dynamics and begun processes of self-transcendence may find Tillich's framework of ontological courage, or better the reality of ontological
Being of great help to him. He may not. If so, he is invited to a careful reading and encounter with Tillich's theological writings and investigations as well as to the ontological aspects dominantly discussed in this dissertation. If not, he may find other philosophers, theologians, or life encounters more useful to his search for ultimate reality. Tillich makes no claim to cognitive absolutes; he makes only a personal leap of faith by asserting that Jesus is the Christ, the New Being that makes manifest and visible the ontological and theological forces and resources available to man as he attempts to actualize his essentiality.

We must now assume that our learner has chosen an ultimate concern—let us say through being a competent and loving teacher—that he has begun processes of self-transcendence toward his goal, and that he now finds himself beginning to be faced with the problems of finite responsibility. In our example, he must teach. He must represent aspects of a cultural heritage, interpret it, communicate it, and creatively express it in forms that reach the ultimate concerns of the pupils in his classes. He must be concerned with the growing authenticity, dynamics, and self-transcendence of the students in his charge. Will this theoretical framework help him to meet the anxieties and tensions of a school day and give perspective and meaning to his life as a teacher? We can answer these questions affirmatively though the form of the help that it offers leaves the
teacher with much ambiguity and personal responsibility for choice-making.

The integrating theme of this section has been called future-orientedness. Implicit in the concept of becoming and of transcending, implicit also in the concept of purposefulness and of creativity is a time-focus, a grasp of controlling part of the future by creating it in the present. For Tillich it is our symbolic capacity that allows us to do this, especially when linked to a wider realm of reality than our immediate empirical encounter. Man can do this through love, or what has been called the "symbol-sorge" capacity of reason, or "eros-telos" loyalties. Man, in Tillich's terms, builds a world, not just an environment, and his world is a larger realm of time and space than his immediate empirical encounter. It is the time dimension that is central in the existential view of man as was earlier shown. For Tillich the "kairos" concept is used to suggest the encounter of the historically actualized and the infinitely or eternally possible. It is this demand of the possible that gives man his freedom, his dignity, and his creative responsibility. Hence, in this dissertation, Tillich's concepts of symbols, and of the "kairos" have been developed extensively to show the basis for social and historical relationships as well as personal transcendence. It is these possibilities that our learner encounters as he
teaches a younger generation. His responsibilities involve him in "future-orientatedness."

Let us recall that Rogers emphasized in his stages of therapy a kind of psychological time as having priority over chronological time. He suggested that the whole process is time-future directed. From Maslow we may recall two explicit statements of the future-oriented concern of self-psychology: "Reduction to the concrete is a loss of future; threat and apprehension point to the future (no future equals no neurosis); self-actualization is meaningless without reference to a currently active future."\(^2\) Again,

Only the flexibly creative person can really manage future, only the one who can face novelty with confidence and without fear. I am convinced that much of what we now call psychology is the study of tricks we use to avoid the anxiety of absolute novelty by making believe the future will be like the past.\(^3\)

It is this symbolic relationship to the future that we presently have some creative control over that gives man both his freedom and his creativity. These dimensions in our self-transcending learner will now be given some attention and consideration. He finds himself with responsibilities and possibilities in at least three realms: his personal becoming and freedom, already discussed in part; his relationship to


\(^3\) Ibid., p. 15.
his job as teacher in a secular cultural institution; and his relationship to the wider social-political-economic community that will here be called history.

The future-oriented dimension in the concepts of authenticity, dynamics, and self-transcendence have been discussed in the earlier section, but as long as one is not personally accountable for his quality of being to the human community certain dimensions of freedom, courage, and moral responsibility may not be encountered. When our teacher takes a job as a teacher, but still hopes to remain a self-transcending person, new dynamics of personal becoming are made more dominant. More limitation is imposed upon him because of the moral imperative that other human beings not be treated as means to his own ends and that their ultimate concerns be honored and nurtured. The signs and demonic forms of civilization, the institutional structures of the school and society generally, must now be supported or selectively not supported. Non-ultimate ends that are mediated by these traditions and structures must be transcended or re-created. The job has become difficult. Yet his first task will be to maintain his loyalty to authenticity and self-transcendence toward an honest disclosure of truth and ultimate reality under these conditions, and hopefully to communicate some of this in his role as teacher. He needs a perspective on culture, history, and his personal freedom to maintain this with meaning and
enthusiasm. Let us examine briefly the dimension of freedom first, or what Tillich calls "finite-freedom," since creative relationships in the other two realms will be dependent upon his maintaining his personal dynamics with its ontological base.

Let us examine those conditions that maximize subjectivity and the functioning of human freedom. What conditions can be emphasized and maximized if one consciously and intentionally takes the achievement of subjectivity as an appropriate human and educational goal? Tillich says that only the centered self, the non-neurotic self, is free. Rogers and Maslow show what conditions they find in therapy and in healthy people that do maximize this possibility and process achievement. Maslow has suggested that we can help make others feel secure and safe in terms of their deficiency needs and that we can make the achievement of self-actualization appear inviting and attractive. Rogers says that we can help others move from a protected and compulsive indiscriminate awareness of self and external reality to an increasingly complex and discriminate one. Tillich says we can increase our symbolic capacities and our awareness of the ontological reality and that we can create new symbol forms and interpretations that embody the spirit of meaning and inquiry in ourselves. Kierkegaard and Tillich say we can confront life's limits and paradoxes and dialectic and thus intensify the subjective inwardness initially that leads
to self-direction and an eventual leap of faith. We can, as Kierkegaard so ironically puts it, following the Socratic irony, make our lives more complicated and problem-laden, since everybody else seems to be solving all their problems and being left with nothing to do! While this will often be initially threatening and responded to judgmentally Rogers and Maslow have also suggested how a non-judgmental acceptance can begin to build trust in our free and venturing self.

The first implication of these suggestions is the idea that freedom may thus be seen as a process of confronting reality with an increased need to be honest and discriminate before the confusions and complexities of the human condition. Freedom is the kind of symbolic process of meanings Tillich talks about that points beyond present actualized forms and meanings. Such symbols point to the responsibility of each individual to create and define the scope and discriminateness of the reality he can and will live in. Such a view of human freedom and becoming would somewhat resolutely refuse to provide closed answers and institutional approaches to life's meanings and problems, since it sees this to be authoritarian. That is, a teacher or learner who believes in the genuine disagreement of honest men seeking their own ultimate ends in life will believe that suppression of this search leads to resentment and frustration and eventual apathy or bitterness. Maslow found this to be
the case in his empirical studies. This, in turn, leads to fear of authority and institutional forms and thence to stereotyping and rigidity and prejudice! No such person is free by these definitions. Therefore our teacher would seek to increase the complexity and discriminateness of the other person's self-awareness, and of his own awareness of the confusions of external reality. Yet he would resolutely leave the solutions of these confusions—or the creative analysis and integrations of a person's interpretative meanings of how to solve or relate himself to them—to each individual person. Thus our learner-teacher's personal realm of freedom expands not only with subjective complexity but also with his realms of conceptual relationship and responsibility or his symbolic understanding and concerns.

Let us now speculate about such relationships in the cultural and historical realms.

Tillich's discussion of "culture as the form of religion" was discussed thoroughly in the section on the "theology of culture" in Chapter V. Also Tillich's view of the educational possibilities and limitations of secular humanism were discussed, along with his suggestions of how to transcend the humanistic secular culture in moving toward a theonomous culture. The theonomous culture, it will be recalled, honors the creativity and antonomous creation of new forms by individuals whose reason is dedicated to ultimate concerns as expressed in and through secular culture.
Tillich is concerned not only with the religious symbols of communicating theology and revelation, but also with the representational symbols that help to unite the estrangements and ambiguities of men in their existential secular finitude.

Teaching is one of these secular concerns that builds renewed relationships between alienated and estranged men and generations. The teacher is responsible in secular humanistic education for inducting the young into a particular value and cultural heritage, let us say the Western tradition and the American heritage, and for communicating the symbols of words and figures by which this heritage can be understood. The creative teacher is also concerned with releasing learners' authenticity and self-transcendence so that this heritage may be re-created anew in each generation. For this is one of the consequences of finitude—that both freedom and cultural meanings are re-created anew in the lives and relationships of each individual and generation.

Our teacher-learner could be a serious scholar or artist in any one of the secular pursuits of knowledge and yet be motivated by an ultimate concern to create new symbols, forms, means of communication for transcending those social ills which bother him in the contemporary human community. These need not be religious symbols per se, but they need to have a dimension of ultimacy. They should embody an analysis of man's existential human predicament,
and of his limitations before the mystery of being if they are to communicate meaningfully with the basic concerns of other men of the human community.

Tillich is concerned with the condition of doubt in the processes of inquiry of our secular learner and with the paucity of meaningful symbols and myths that are communicated by most secular education. Tillich believes that since the Enlightenment most of the meaningful symbolic forms from both the Greek and Hebrew-Christian traditions have deteriorated to signs that no longer call for a meaningful confrontation and commitment from youth (or adults). If our serious learner is to find ultimate reality, to find a community of meaningful forms for direction and resources for actualizing his own essential being, he will have to be highly motivated to wade through the emptiness and meaningless of much that passes for information and knowledge. For Tillich the confrontation should have a serious existential quality suggested by the phrase "Change Thy Life!" if this induction is to be challenging, meaningful, and truly educational.

Under the conditions of an alienated society, a sick society, a society of social transformation and crisis, the learner and teacher become not only creative interpreters of the past, but also social critics and regenerators of forms and people. A society of crises, of deteriorating
symbolic forms, of meaninglessness, of other-directed men\(^4\)
and men escaping from freedom\(^5\) and organization men\(^6\) and
status-seeking men\(^7\) and waste-making men,\(^8\) and of cheerful
robots\(^9\)—such a society is lacking the myths and social
cohesion of creative forms that it needs for achieving its
own goals. Tillich defined myths as symbols woven into
stories. We do not have many such myths. Even the Greek
and Shakespearean and Christian ones hold little meaning in
Tillich's sense of 'Change Thy Life!' The attempt to
mythologize our founding fathers, such as in the rather
uninspiring fables of George Washington, has surely been a
failure. It seems likely that some of this classical
heritage has enough ontological universality to be
reinterpreted and re-presented to modern man, though it seems

\(^{4}\) David Reisman, Reul Denney, and Nathan Glazer, The
Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, Paperbound,
1952).

\(^{5}\) Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar
and Rinehart, 1941).

\(^{6}\) William H. Whyte, Organization Man (New York: Simon

\(^{7}\) Vance Packard, The Status Seekers (New York: D.

\(^{8}\) Vance Packard, The Waste Makers (New York: D. MacKay

\(^{9}\) C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination
equally certain that we do need contemporary myths and symbols that express the present "kairos." Camus, among others, is one such contemporary myth-maker whose works and position do express a meaning to the more sensitive and concerned of modern youth. The point here is that a society in which most of its symbolic and mythological forms have degenerated to signs and generalities is a society that has an added justification for bringing the challenge of the existential view of man and of new creations of form to the many. It is, after all, their existential situation!

We can say with real justification that most of the myths and symbols of our national heritage have now largely become generalities, and this is partly due to the dissolution of time, but more due to the threatening future for democracy and American nationalism and to the new dimensions of a threatening present. Nationalism\textsuperscript{10} itself, for example, we today see with mixed apprehensiveness; surely the lessons of the two World Wars clearly show its dangers, and surely the paranoid fear to build the arms race involves a power and reality we all fear. At the same time we see new and aggressive nations rising, and we face what we see to be a hostile and aggressive expanding force in Communism. The United Nations looks weak and impotent to us so we embrace our nation but not with the power of commitment and meaning.

that earlier generations had. We realize dimly that our loyalties and energies have to be somehow more universal than this, or that at least our national policy must be.

The meaning of the sacred word, "Democracy," has suffered a similar fate in our time and is another generality. We are not at all clear what is worth dying for in it, and we are even more confused about how to live for it. He argues over whether it has more of equality or more of freedom as its true meaning; this avoids the commitment. But if we look at equality as one of our major myths, we find that it too fails to provide that meaning that moves most of us to action for a more humane community, though it may be our most virulent contemporary national myth in the issue of racial integration and Negro rights. Yet this issue itself is tremendously threatening and complex, and illustrates the new contemporary dimensions in the problem of becoming educated.

Finally, if we turn to freedom, we probably have in this area our most sacred myth; yet though we feel most deeply about it, it also is a generality. We do not know if it means political action of some type, civil rights of some type, the freedom of conscience in religion, or freedom in public speech and group affiliations. Usually we end in a catatonia that avoids commitment and action in relation to it also. This we call apathy. It is likely that we do not desire to be untrue to these major myths of our heritage.
Yet they have become so complex and threatening and demand so much effort and individual courage from us that we find ourselves without the meanings and courage to clarify how to act in response to them. This is another way of saying that our myths are ineffective, and we do live in a time of social atrophy; it is also an argument for the relevance of the approach to education here defended.

Rollo May has made a very interesting and useful analysis of our contemporary situation in regard to these myths, and in Tillich's frame of reference. For one thing he argues that both existentialism and psycho-analysis have emerged in the Western nations as a result of the break-down of our myths and symbols to provide personal meaning and direction to our lives. He finds meaninglessness to be the major problem of people that come to him for clinical help, and believes this "... reflects the general disintegration that percolates down more and more broadly into the members of society, and seems to be a lack of transcendent symbols of any sort." In this vacuum of meanings, he argues man turns to methods, techniques, signs, and tools, especially to power-symbols such as success and automobiles and status. Here he adds a familiar theme: "But the trouble from the psychological side is that when tools and techniques are substituted for genuine symbols, subjectivity is lost."  

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12Ibid., p. 315.
It is important to clarify what May means by transcendence here. In decrying the loss of symbols and myths he is concerned with the loss of this transcending capacity. "Such symbols are the culture's form of transcending the immediate situation," he says. "They will always be bound up with the fundamental values and goals accepted in society. . . . This 'style' will always have a religious dimension since it points to a meaning beyond the immediate situation of the culture."¹³ Tillich's view of religion and symbols is implicit here, but May adds a clarifying footnote on his use of the word "transcendence." "We do not, of course, use the term 'transcend' here in other-worldly or supernatural senses but refer to the fact that the symbols and myths presuppose and point toward meaning and value not realized in the immediate situation."¹⁴ This is a good statement and definition of the essential meaning this dissertation gives to the term "transcendence."

May makes another observation and distinction about symbols that is useful for the present purposes. "Symbols are the language for the capacity of self-consciousness, the ability to question which arises out of and is made necessary by the distinction of subject and object."¹⁵ This recalls

¹³Ibid., p. 314.
¹⁴Ibid., p. 314 (My emphasis).
¹⁵Ibid., p. 311.
the earlier discussion on the priority of social meanings before the authentic self can be formed and created, and the emphasis that was put on the idea that such discriminations create the self and at the same time discriminate what is meaningful in the external environment. May adds:

It follows, thus, that an individual's self-image is built up of symbols. Symbolizing is basic to such questions as personal identity. For the individual experiences himself as a self in terms of symbols which arise from three levels at once: those from archaic and archetypal depths within himself, symbols arising from the personal events of his psychological and biological experience, and the general symbols and values which obtain in his culture.  

So the point has been re-emphasized that building a meaningful self-structure also includes building a meaningful relationship to a man's society and world situation. But it is obvious that this is a tremendous effort, a very threatening effort, which must select in the environment what to include and what to exclude, and must at the same time select from one's potentialities what to include and actualize and what to exclude and deny. For the existential position this is a radical freedom in which there are no sure guiding criteria outside the self, but such choices must be affirmed and fashioned in the process of creation itself! A risky and threatening enterprise indeed!

Both May and Tillich recognize and deal with this anxiety-producing aspect of the problem of building one's

16 Ibid., p. 311.
own meaning and self. Rollo May states: "Anxiety occurs at the point where some emerging potentiality or possibility faces the individual, some possibility of fulfilling his existence; but this very possibility involves the destroying of present security, which thereupon gives rise to the tendency to deny the potentiality."\textsuperscript{17} When the new possibility is too threatening to present self-systems and their security, one will deny the possibility. Hence our lack of inner resources, due partly to the Enlightenment heritage, leads us paradoxically not to have dramatic and utopian dreams as individuals, for this would be un-realistic, and we end by denying most potentiality! But since our position asserts that there is an innate purposeful drive for individual fulfillment of potentialities, this registers as cowardice and guilt in a person's conscious or un-conscious self-concept, creating the pervasive complex of emptiness and worthlessness we call an inferiority complex. May states this a little differently. \textquoteleft\textquoteleft... When a person denies these potentialities, fails to fulfill them, his condition is guilt. That is to say, guilt is also an ontological characteristic of human existence.'\textsuperscript{18} In other words, we cannot escape denying many or most of our potentialities, 

\textsuperscript{17}Rollo May, \textit{Man's Search for Himself} (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1953), p. 52.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 52.
and every choice affirms only one, while denying many, so this destruction or lack of creation is inescapable.

Thus our serious learner who has decided to become a teacher in a cultural condition of alienation, lacking meaningful symbols and myths of social and universal ontological mystery and relationships, finds himself needing to be a social critic and constructive creator of new public meanings and forms. The anxiety and guilt that the preceding discussion analyzes will have to be conquered and met if he is to be free to create symbols and myths and relationships that will help mankind heal this divisiveness. And so he is led back once again to the issues of authenticity, dynamics, and self-transcendence, and possibly to philosophic and religious heritages. This discussion must be left general at this point, though Tillich has written and communicated a great deal in the areas of art, of psychology, and of course of religion that suggests some possible creative directions that might be followed by any learner or teacher with such ultimate concerns.

Much of what was said above in relation to the future-orientedness of the cultural realm applies equally well to the historical realm. Our learner pursuing self-transcendence and an ultimate concern and creating new forms of symbols or myths or relationships that heal the existential estrangement is participating in that kind of life that Tillich says "gives history its seriousness."
Only two points that have been earlier discussed in detail need to be re-inforced at this point. The first is that Tillich's concept of the "kairos" is his substitute for a philosophy of history, for it gives the individual person the locus of authority and creativity for cultural and historical reform. It mediates the eternal demand that confronts the contemporary members of the given existential historical situation, and yet it must be interpreted and responded to creatively by each individual. This is the basis for the second point to be stressed, which is that our learner-teacher would resist and reject all of the secular loyalties of the public school's cultural traditions as inadequate ends for his ultimate concern. He cannot give them direction and reformulation, new interpretations or creative forms, if he is loyal only to the extant version of these contemporary meanings. Nationalism, success, a particular political party, a particular rational ideology, etc., are all forms of what Tillich calls "quasi-religions." Such claim ultimacy unto themselves, but they cannot be the source of spirit, of freedom, and of ultimate meaning in the terms developed in this dissertation. A learner or teacher who is searching for ultimate reality and is committed to being a bearer of new healing forms and relationships in his contemporary generation would have to

have his ultimate concern transcendent to the secular institutions and ideologies that he works within. This framework gives both the individual and history their dignity and seriousness and meaningfulness.

The ambiguity, the confusion and uncertainty, and the oppressive weight of these issues of future-orientedness confront our learner again with the anxieties and guilt of being humanly responsible. But morality in this framework involves the will to actualize one's own spirit, one's authenticity, and to honor other persons' ultimate concerns. It does not imply carrying the burden of choice for all other persons or for the human existential condition. This can be put most clearly by making a distinction between responsibility for and responsibility to the ambiguities of the contemporary human condition. Following our Tillich\textsuperscript{20}-self-psychology view of man and freedom, morality becomes an authentic relating to people and social forms in the attempt to create meaning. Buber has stated this directly by asking the pointed question: "What is to be done"? and giving the pointed answer: "You shall not withhold yourself."\textsuperscript{21}


CHAPTER IX

FROM TILLICH AND SELF-PSYCHOLOGY TO CURRICULUM

Tillich's concept of the theology of culture and his affirmation of the Logos that pervades man's essential and existential being as it is actualized in the symbolic processes of autonomous reason provide a basis to curriculum and the structuring of school experiences. The learning theory and the empirically documented description of learning processes provide in Rogers and Maslow a similar basis and structure. This dissertation has shown how these two frameworks reinforce and supplement each other to provide an adequate theoretical approach to education. This chapter will examine how this combination might be conceived to provide one approach to curricular issues of the school.

Indeed it is difficult to improve upon the self-psychologists' statements of the nature of man (ch. 7) and their descriptions of the learning process (ch. 8) as a functional approach to curriculum and the provision of learning experiences. In these chapters we find not only a re-affirmation of the prior honoring of the learner's authenticity and honest search for truth and appropriate striving for meaning but also a detailed description of the
kind of relationships and structure of experience that will help the learner move from defensive and timid learning to open, trustful, and ultimately concerned learning. The reader is therefore referred again to these chapters, and especially to the criteria of progressively open and meaningful learning experiences that both Rogers and Maslow delineate. These criteria appear to be especially useful to a teacher or other person concerned with providing the climate, support, relationships, and resources, for optimal processes of learning.

Now we must ask the question: What does Tillich's framework offer as an approach to curriculum that supplements, directs, and organizes these empirical descriptions of human learning? An answer to this question was developed from the perspective of the subjective teacher-learner himself in the preceding chapter. We must now attempt to answer the question from the perspective of the learner as teacher who is trying to help younger learners, and from the perspective of the organized and institutionalized school structure. In the following chapter we will return again to a focus upon the optimal relationships between the teacher and learner in the classroom, and the preferred classroom methodology that this framework appears to support.
Some institutional and administrative dilemmas

The kind of learning defended in this dissertation can and should occur in the public schools. However, like any other approach to education, it cannot flourish if people are not committed to it, and this includes both the classroom teacher and the administrator. We have a heritage from a more rationalistic and scientific organization of information and knowledge that has structured our formal school curriculum and timing of experiences into arbitrary time-blocks and disciplines of inquiry. This super-imposed structure makes a unified ultimate concern nearly inoperable. We have a heritage of competition in our society and schools, become sacrosanct in our grading and evaluation systems, that dominantly measures learning comparatively with other pupils, and by the criteria of preparation for college intellectual work or bureaucratic job performance. Thus schools are run rationally and efficiently and economically like any other large bureaucratic institution. School administrative and curricular arrangements could support the kind of learning considered desirable here if these personnel were committed to the value of this learning, and if teachers competent to free and support this learning were available. Perhaps neither of these conditions is possible at this time, but we must make the assumption that they may be in the future.
Let us state this first dilemma between administrative structuring—uniform times and curriculums; the need for control and social stability—on the one side and the honoring of unique patterns, directions, and timing of self-development on the other side. For effect, let us put the case in its most extreme form as follows. Because of the inward structuring of the existential position and the emphasis upon individual suffering and becoming, the school formal structure cannot do so much positively as it can negatively by attempting to avoid interrupting the importance of becoming. It can provide the time and flexible or loose structure to allow individual thought and struggle. Precisely because learners are embarrassed to share un-born and un-certain intimacies, it would be desirable to attempt to structure some privacy and modes of intimate aloneness, contrary as this is to present trends and to the pressures of population increase! Fallico reminds us of this focus in the following comment:

It is thinking against the back-drop of the colossal frauds of history—the blueprints of human selfhood and for human destiny devised by men in every century who would willingly avoid authentic existence and the dangerous necessity of every individual's having to assume the responsibility of his own freedom. Thus Existentialism is a revolt against all banal or unauthentic living to which, as to a great feast, everyone who is respectable is invited. It moves frontally to attack every pious deception which would explain away man's irremediable and radical tragedy—his finitude of being, and his subjective loneliness. Existentialism re-affirms at every historical juncture the dignity of our sorrow, the respectability of our fallen estate, the pathos of our little ideals. Above all,
existentialism records the rise and fall of men's needs to be themselves and to be free, warning that freedom's secret self-rejections and falsifications are exactly the same thing as the self-alienation and self-falsification of man himself. . . . the uncompromising personalistic emphasis of existentialism both permits and requires that an interpreter speak above all else for himself, not as one who knows merely about the subject, but as one rather who in fact has come into the experiences which existential problems represent. The crisis which is required to think existentially must likewise be at the basis of any statement regarding existentialist theory of education. . . .

Fallico's work expresses the spirit of the movement and also clearly pin-points the starting point of an educational theory. He clearly emphasizes the kind of experiences this position most values and desires to see in the curriculum. One is reminded here of the Socratic gadfly and the Kierkegaardian paradox of making life hard and difficult again since everyone else is making it too easy and boring! It is not so much that the position values suffering and tragedy for their own sake, though again Kierkegaard suggests we learn more from anxiety than from life. Rather, the position believes life is tragic and threatening in its existential finitude. Facing this and early developing an honesty before it and further developing the resources of character to confront and conquer it is the only path to authenticity. It is the only trustable path to a sound individual life which is properly complex and which entertains

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the ontological dynamics which can analyze and control complex social problems.

So the curricular implications would again be not so much an organizational structure that in any way designed tough and tragic problems--crime, delinquency, or war, for example. It would rather be a quality of human relationship which would not evade the threatening dimensions of all human problems as they were encountered. It would point out the tragic dimensions of life and the threats to honest becoming in such a human reality, and it would stress the necessity of a qualitative ontological self-hood as a necessary basis for confronting such a reality. It would greatly honor independent thought and honest confusions and doubt. It would honor autonomous reasoning as well as rationalistic and scientific kinds of solutions to life's general problems although these latter often become others' solutions to others' problems! Fallico says:

Both the rationalistic and--not the scientific, but scientistic--views of man are thus incapable of helping an existing man to disclose himself to himself. Employed as ideals of human living they are impotent to interiorize human living which is the greatest need of modern man, or to re-enforce man's determination to become an authentic self. Employed in education, they inevitably result in intimidation of the person which discourages independent thinking and choosing. . . .2

2Ibid., p. 165
Fallico states this Socratic-gadfly mission of the teacher even more strongly:

The mission of the teacher ends with his efforts to help another human to want desperately to be himself, at all costs and risks. The object of education is to make seeming men uncomfortable with themselves, to irritate them out of the lethargy into which home, society, education, propaganda, and history necessarily plunge them. Education is a kind of violence that a man does first of all to himself, for the health of his soul. . . . Thus, for the existentialist teacher, the problem is: how can we guide humans to choose to become self-determining agents in their thinking and in their valuing without asking them to give up the privacy of their own self-birth into being? The position of this problem is predicated on the simple proposition that a world of men self-alienated, guilty, a world of frauds and institutionalized lies, is no world at all, however much convention, science, religion, or smooth diplomacy may succeed in holding the sorry mess together. There is no substitute for self-search in the education of man. And no man can help another in these fundamental matters except by denying him palliatives and expedient ways of avoiding the genuine encounter with nothingness which is existence itself. The teacher is the rare person who knows how to withhold and to expose the obnoxious medicants, and knows also how to stand out of the way of a healthy existential crises, gladly risking the temporary resentment of his students, and the more painful but ultimately harmless rigours of the concentration camp or the firing squad if need be. . . . The primary aim of existentialist education is thus the confession of ignorance. The habit of examining one's self and one's purposes; the habit of assuming full responsibility for one's judgments of value and for one's choices in life is all that education can and should give to a man. And this is what existentialist education affirms.3

Fallico indicates how little the existentialist approach to education can be structured from the outside. It cannot be structured because the positive answers are a personal and

3 Ibid., p. 166.
ever-evolving and becoming set of unique "answers," the personal creation of each learner. Fallico again states it well:

. . . I do not believe that it is the business of the teacher to propagandize in favor of any solution. Formal education does not exhaust the agencies which are available to man in helping to solve the problem of their existence, and, in fact, I would hold that it represents the least important agency in this respect. With regard to any proposed ideals of life the teacher is in exactly the same position as other men: he influences others not by what he says but by what he is as a man, and there can be no ultimate assurance that this influence must be for good or for evil.  

This is as much a break with the rationalistic teaching-as-telling approach to institutional education as the existentialist "teleological suspension of the ethical" is with the institutionalized codes of moral and legal ethics within a society. Fallico expresses the existentialist spirit and emphasizes subjectivity, but his position is more anti-institutional than is necessary. It does, however, reflect the kind of experiences and curricular arrangements that are considered most beneficial to authentic learning.

If one says, with Kneller, that "the crisis of modern public education is one of finding ways in which the demands of social conformity may be reconciled with the intrinsic natural diversity in human beings," it follows that some 

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curricular and organizational emphases can be suggested for maximizing the unique, becoming kind of learning.

Rogers' statement of this dilemma is again clarifying:

In the significant learning which takes place in therapy, one person cannot teach another. The teaching would destroy the learning.... The most that one person can do to further it in another, is to create certain conditions which make this type of learning possible. It cannot be compelled.6

What these conditions are has been fairly thoroughly elaborated in this dissertation but will be repeated here in a more structured and curricular framework.

The interpretation from Tillich given in this dissertation does not negate nor exclude the prior necessity of an induction and socialization into the existing meanings and forms of the contemporary culture. These are later criticized and transcended, to be sure, but initially they are made conscious habits and values that one has long been influenced by and will continue to be influenced by. The place of the fundamentals in this is obvious enough, especially when we recall the emphasis this interpretation puts upon the development of the symbol-making capacity of man. Reading and writing and very careful use of language and meanings becomes a most central focus even though the meaning is here constantly related to the inwardness and

congruence of the emerging learner as well as to an understanding of the public forms and behavior patterns. But since the self is initially seen as a social product, the understanding of the patterns and forms of that culture are a minimum necessity for the capacity of transcendence and freedom through the development of spirit and the symbol-making capacity.

In this process, an honest form of social criticism becomes an important part of an existentialist curriculum. This is necessary not only to criticize the rationalistic and scientistic excesses as Fallico suggests, but also to make the person aware that his own future personal fate is deeply connected with that of his whole culture. This awareness begins to develop the sorge-concern that leads to more creative forms of solutions of this common crisis, this "kairos." An existentialist curriculum would seek as consciously and purposefully as possible to increase the moving to and fro of the tensions of varying ultimate concerns and interpretations of meaning. It would seek to increase the dynamic and intensity of subjective inwardness, and to hold each learner responsible for his own meanings and interpretations, responsible to himself and to reason and to universal humanity. The position would hold certain values sacred: honesty and authenticity, the development of a universally humane and compassionate concern for life and humanity, a belief in man's capacity to re-create the self and to
transcend bias, a belief in the dynamics of ontological reality and in the resources open to a man in the process of becoming, the importance of facing death and finitude and the dangers of slipping into pathological fears or neurosis, the priority of the search for truth and beauty and goodness. This would be true even though these values were not defined in any specific way. In fact, static definition would be resolutely rejected and the responsibility for definition of meanings and for the quality of self-hood would be constantly thrown back upon the learner, as Fallico forcefully suggests.

The existentialist curriculum would honor and nurture the capacity for symbol-creating and for symbolic interpretations. This would place a primary emphasis upon art and the aesthetic search for form and beauty. It also would place an important focus on the symbolic interpretation of the myths of the Western culture and the new myths of modern literature and poetry and drama. These forms, in fact the humanities in general and the creative capacity to formulate new ones in response to a common existential "kairos," would be a central goal of the curriculum. The importance of qualitative models and of excellence would be upheld, both in the past heritage and in the contemporary culture.

The belief in the bodily base of energy and vitality would be honored and nurtured as a necessary part of the dynamics of the intensity for self-transcendence and life-affirmation. The forms and assumptions of the Enlightenment
would be examined and criticized, and the impact of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century views of science and the methodological approaches to transcending bias would be criticized, as Rogers and Maslow have done. Individual and authentic efforts would be honored, not rewarded by a conditional positive dependence upon authority figures, but dialogued in a respectful acceptance and suffering which leaves the learner his freedom and self-criticism as the main basis to the further becoming of subjectivity.

History and literature could become more "idealistic" in Collingwood's sense of an effort to re-create the circumstances and alternative choices open to persons of fiction or of past eras, hence to show an inside view of the leaps of faith that they made. This would lead to an honoring of the limits of finitude, but also to a sympathetic awareness of the person's qualitative resources and the dignity of his choices. The "lessons" of history and literature would become the perennial human limits and possibilities. As Kneller states, "Art and literature should be taught, then, as representing in abstract manner an a priori power of human nature, a means by which the student frees himself from history and begins to exercise his talent."


8 Kneller, *Existentialism and ...*, p. 128.
Biography, not only of great men but of characteristically existential human struggles and choices would become central to the curriculum of all grade levels.

In mathematics, for example, this would imply not only a student's awareness of the structured reality of finite objects and categories and the logical problems of infinity and zero; it would also involve an emphasis upon the kinds of reality it is possible for man to create and conceive through his symbolic capacities. It would strengthen the reality of the symbolic powers, and it would also raise the problem of the logos and trust in reason as a necessary alternative to power resolutions among men.

This approach would honor a learner's needs for safety and security as a needed existential respite from the struggles of becoming. It would not only measure learning by an objective criterion that pitted a learner more against others of different background and capacity or by some standardized norms; it would emphasize the learner's unique capacities and pattern of development. As Maslow states:

"It often makes little difference what kind of explicit theory is held by the . . . teacher. . . . Only the one who respects fear and defenses can teach. . . ."9

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This last implication on the restrictive dimensions of evaluation and grading is very central and universally relevant. Since most evaluation must presume a judge, a criteria of achievement and public norms or standards, the very process becomes an affront to existential learning.

This conclusion has rather drastic implications for the present grading system implications that are perhaps best expressed in the following personal comments of Rogers:

It is when I realize the implications that I shudder a bit at the distance I have come from the common sense world that everybody knows is right. I can best illustrate by saying that if the experience of others had been the same as mine, and if they had discovered similar meanings in it, many consequences would be implied:

(a) Such experience would imply that we would do away with teaching. People would get together if they wished to learn.

(b) We would do away with examinations. They measure only the inconsequential type of learning.

(c) The implication would be that we would do away with grades and credits for the same reason.

(d) We would do away with degrees as a measure of competence partly for the same reason. Another reason is that a degree marks an end or a conclusion of something and a learner is only interested in the continuing process of learning.

(e) It would imply doing away with the exposition of conclusions, for we would realize that no one learns significantly from conclusion.

I had better stop there. I do not want to become fantastic!¹⁰

This is "fantastic" already! Such conclusions do have a certain logical and psychological validity given the becoming focus of the existential framework. And yet it is also true

¹⁰Rogers, On Becoming . . ., p. 173.
that we live in finiteness and society, that as Maslow says, we always have safety and security needs to be met also, and priorly. Rogers is correct in part here. Transcendent becoming, growth in the quality of subjectivity, cannot be publicly measured, graded, rewarded by degrees and examinations, and by comparison what can be publicly measured is inconsequential. And yet this inconsequential material and these achievements should be evaluated and judged for it is one aspect of the polarity that keeps the tension and dynamics of subjectivity alive. It is also one form of the kind of dialogue that records, however ineptly, where a person's capacities of self-expression and productivity are at a given moment. It holds his symbolic interpretations responsible to the ontological and socially universal "kairos" and "Logos," as well as to his private development. Yet Rogers' belief that the importance of grading and degrees and conditional judgment in general has become excessive in our contemporary educational institutions and practices appears valid. The solution to this excess, however, might be not so much that it be eliminated as that we begin to build and structure the other pole, inward intensity and dynamics. The dilemma arises because the ontological reality cannot be institutionalized. It can only be honored and dialogued by those teachers who value and actualize it in their own lives and approaches to teaching. Possibly evaluation has become a central problem for us today because
it is the major and sometimes the only relationship we have with students. It then becomes the point of contact that stirs the dimensions of ontological anxiety and ontological guilt that are implicit in the teacher's calling of helping to provide opportunities for the becoming of the subjectivity and meaningfulness of other human beings' lives. It is the point of ethical responsibility and self-relationship that we otherwise manage to escape. Hence, it is a temporary self-confrontation about ends and value-judgments that we try to avoid in order to avoid life's existential anxiety, its finitude and its opportunities of transcendent freedom.

The conclusion on grading and evaluation, then, is not so much an agreement with Rogers that we eliminate all competitive or conditional judgments as that we learn to balance this necessity off against the unconditional support of unique becoming that cannot be comparatively evaluated. It is the absence of the latter rather than the presence of the former that is oppressive and destructive to the dynamics of subjective becoming. It is clear that the whole climate of the school would have to be altered toward administrative flexibility if the kind of education here defended is to become operational as serious inquiry or ultimate concerns in the lives of students.
Some Curricular Issues and a Positive Curriculum Model Suggested by This Dissertation's Analysis of Tillich, Rogers, and Maslow

One set of broad outlines of an approach to curriculum and the structuring of school opportunities and experiences can now be suggested from the analysis of Tillich, Rogers, and Maslow. Some of the suggestions are quite revolutionary, but it has been argued that this is needed at this juncture in our history. The suggestions here follow the view of self-transcendence and theology of culture adapted from Tillich's frame of reference, and they incorporate the learning processes from Rogers and Maslow. It is an attempt to take seriously the definition of education as the transcendence of bias toward inclusively more universal and ontologically sensitive structure of meaning and reality.

In the first place the right-answer approach to education and learning would be strenuously resisted and counteracted. One is tempted to assert that those questions and problems in life which have publicly verifiable and conclusive answers would not form a central part of the existentialist curriculum. Under the influence of the Jacksonian revolution and education for vocational and bureaucratic employment, and under the influence of the epistemological tradition of experiences and meanings that can be measured empirically or in practice and action, our curriculum has come to be dominated by right-answer types of inquiry. The existential emphasis would not be so much upon a presumed
prior reality to be discovered and learned as upon the out-
wardly transcendent process of individual becoming, a reality
that each learner creates and validates first in the con-
gruence of his own feeling, thinking, and acting. To do this
he will use epistemological measuring tools and discrimina-
tions in part, to be sure, such as math and logic and some
version of scientific empirical inquiry. But the reality he
is ultimately responsible to is not what mankind now knows
and codifies in its textbooks and conventional wisdom, but
the mystery of being as it is revealed and discriminated in
his own intellectual adventures. The facts of the conven-
tional wisdom and reality will need to be encountered, but
the integrations of their significance and the limits of
the methodology that they rest within will need to be care-
fully criticized by each learner as he develops his own
personally integrated reality.

Such a view emphasizes that the learner exists as an
ontological unit in ontological being, and that his culture
has discriminated this ultimate reality in certain officially
established and useful forms and categories. But it also
insists that this ultimate reality is itself dynamic and
changing, and that the human self is also, so that new dis-
criminations and forms and integrations of meaning are needed
in each generation and by each human unit of spirit and
consciousness. Further, right answers are relative to a
particular context, as Dewey stresses, but the individual
learner creates his own context of meaning through his process of self-transcendence and his unique combination of intellectual integrations.

The tyranny-of-the-right-answer approach to education would be resisted and rejected then because it presumes that reality and truth reside in the external world, in a community of knowledge, or in a relationship between the learner and this presumed realm of knowledge (Pragmatism). Such a view shifts the locus of ontology away from individual subjectivity. Most centrally this belief and pretense to certainty violates the dynamic view of human becoming, or the dynamics and search that this dissertation has defended as the given human condition; it is a form of "philosophic suicide," in Camus' terms. One might argue that the presumption of a "reality and truth to be discovered and known," a set of facts already settled upon by the human community of scholarship, might provide the emerging learner with some guideline directions and a sense of closure or security that would assure him he was not alone in his investigations of reality. And this need and desire for such closure and guidance is surely present in us all, perhaps reaching a fear of insanity and non-relatedness to other human realities, at its extreme. But in the context of this dissertation, this guidance and sense of closure would come from a series of dialogued tensions, rather than from an objective and certain reality or body of knowledge.
These dialogued tensions would include, first, an induction into the established mores and socially defined meanings of one's culture and heritage, combined and followed by a symbolic social criticism of these forms in the attempt to point to the human and ontological reality they express. The limits of the power and meaning of these inherited forms for contemporary men would be experienced and examined. This dialogued tension would be followed by an attempt to provide or point to ontological reality, to the mystery of being which this human culture resides within, and hence to a psychological and philosophic openness to new symbolic forms of expression and relatedness. In the process of discriminating the social and ontological realms of being the learner would learn the epistemological tools of analysis and public-meaning verification and the philosophy of science which they reflect. At the same time he would be open to the moving to and fro of the various forms of ultimate and non-ultimate meanings which men of his generation are serving in their ultimate loyalties, and he would be consciously and unconsciously immersed within the contemporary human situation.

As he gained courage and intellectual tools to give form to his own honest confrontation and selections of these encounters the learner would be encouraged to analyze the contemporary "kairos" as he sees it, and to give original form and symbolic expression to these experiences. Such
efforts would be supported as the stirrings of subjectivity, and when the learner fashioned them as part of his own self-structure to which he was temporarily committed, the possibility of public dialogue with others concerning his interpretation would become possible. This level of dialogue would be maximized, especially at upper-undergraduate and graduate levels of college education, and the learner would be stimulated to transcend the provincial bias of his original formulations in response to others' criticisms and support. This process would be expected to continue throughout the learner's lifetime, and as he began to move in larger political and social circles of human contact as well as larger frames of reference conceptually, the hope would be that a loyalty to the universal human community might be approached.

This conceptual scheme of the process of education suggests that there might be a kind of hierarchy of realms of social and intellectual reality that each learner creates from grade one through college as he fashions his "self to be made." To the extent that this process is communal or parallel in time amongst learners of the same age and experience backgrounds, a curricular emphasis for formal schooling might be defensible. It is only apparent and obvious in the extremes however. Nursery and kindergarten experiences would center around conceptualizing the transition from the relationships of family (and some of their provincial
limits) to relationships of peers from very similar provincial backgrounds. At the other extreme the post-doctorate learner might be approaching the problems of a world human community. The stages of personality growth developed from Rogers and Maslow would serve as the best guide for an approach to a progressively enlarging sphere of intellectual concepts and human relationships for the emerging learner. But the individual would move into these wider spheres when he was able to, and when he wanted to, based on the reality of his own subjective becoming and not based on chronological age or staying with the same class of peers with whom he began this adventure.

Such a scheme would be difficult to squeeze into existing administrative structures. Yet it does not automatically follow that no administrative structure could be envisioned that optimally encouraged these individual transitions of becoming. While there would probably be no chronological grades as such in this curriculum, a school could still be arranged by levels of complexities of context, and the learner would actually decide what grade or level he should be in himself, with some professional help. He would gravitate to that level of symbolic meanings and human relationships of dialogue which were appropriate to his own state and stage of subjective becoming. The teachers and instructors would be selected and divided in terms of their particular symbol-sorge concern with a particular stage of
the transcendence of bias in human becoming. In this area they would not only be sophisticatedly informed, but also due to their concern they would be expert "dialoguers" with the young as they struggled with this stage of becoming.

One could argue that this description is not too far from what the school curriculum is supposed to be and do today. Yet a glance at Rogers' and Maslow's stages of growth suggests some rather decisive differences that would not only affect the structure of curriculum, but also the training of teachers and the kind of experiences that were maximized for learners. What is the most striking, perhaps, is that there would be no externally imposed time-limits and time-pressures for the achievement of any stage of development. Contrarily, the right to error and defensiveness and self-protection would be honored as a necessary plateau to let the learner develop those moral and spiritual subjective realities that make his conceptual discriminations and integrations meaningful to himself. Maslow emphasizes that a conscious insight cannot be acknowledged until the learner is ready to integrate it with the rest of what he believes and accepts, and until he is ready to act publicly upon its implications for him. This takes time. And it takes more time and struggle for some persons than others even to achieve comparable conceptual integrations; this depends upon the complexity and dynamics of their subjectivity.
We cannot suggest a complete theory of curriculum development from this point of view here, but let us glance briefly at Rogers' and Maslow's stages of development again to suggest some of the possible outlines of such an approach. It is important to recall that both Rogers and Maslow emphasize that as long as the learner or become fears new and complex experience rather than trusting it, or "taking delight in it" as Maslow says, he will remain closed and defensive in his conscious and conceptual learnings as well. Learners will maintain rigid and defensive personal constructs and tend to identify with established public meanings and reality for security. They will not find change and growth possible or desirable. They will not be rationally discriminate about their environment or their own feelings, nor will they be so in their judgments of others. Rogers observes that people in therapy, under the relationship of acceptance and trust, tend to become more discriminate and abstract, but initially accept no personal responsibility for their observations or the implications of them. Both Rogers and Maslow observe that it is only as the learner begins to be open to what he deeply feels himself, and as he learns to unify and integrate his own subjective self-hood, that he begins to take delight in the adventure of new insights and a complexer human reality.

Rogers notes the transition from a past-experience orientation, to a contemporary-feelings orientation, to a
future-possibilities orientation. Both Rogers and Maslow note the change from dogmatically held beliefs and interpretations to tentatively and flexibly held beliefs and intellectual formations. Both emphasize the right and necessity of the learner to meet his defense-needs first and to return to successful resolutions of these fears and insecurities as new threats arise. Both observe that the adventure of becoming emerges only as a self-trusted base is available to return to when needed. It is always a personally and actively achieved base rather than a socially dependent base.

These observations from Rogers and Maslow were initially concerned with adults blocked in their process of becoming. But it appears that the same factors are central at all levels of learning and subjective becoming. What alters from grade level to grade level is the particular kind of provincial bias which needs to be emotionally and intellectually transcended and the complexity of ontological self-structure and dynamics needed to supply progressive integrations. One could arbitrarily suggest what some of these self-transcending stages of development would be, but it must be emphasized that they will vary tremendously from individual to individual. It is the internalized and ontological subjectivity which is decisive and not the established sociological and political demarcations.
Within these limits the following schemata may be used here for illustrative purposes to suggest one possible outline of adopting this theoretical position to curricular planning. In this curricular schemata Bacon's famous four idols$^{11}$ as progressive stages in the outward movement of the learner as he achieves a new level of self-transcendence are adopted. Each achieved level of self-transcendence provides new qualities of ontological frustration tolerance that Tillich calls the "dimension of depth." It is this growth in the depth and scope of subjectivity that incorporates the stages of becoming that Rogers and Maslow here articulate. The dynamics of self, or the increased ontological frustration-tolerance increases flexibility, openness to new and rationally contradictory or threatening experience, the compassion or sorge to hñor differences, and the self-trust to become immersed within the contemporary human "kairos."

Level one: Transcending parent-child identification and dependency. We traditionally start schooling at age five or six presumably because the child is then verbally and symbolically autonomous enough to discriminate himself from his parents, his own feelings and desires from theirs. Freud centers the oedipus-complex at this age, and argues that as the child sees himself as a separate individual he

necessarily identifies his sex role, and that all of his hopes and fears about himself as an individual initially focus around this obvious distinction. He comes to emulate and simultaneously fear the parent of that same sex, and egotistically want all of the opposite parent's attentions and affections for himself. Tillich and May have pointed out that as this self-awareness of oneself as a unit in time emerges, so also does the awareness of death and dissolution (fate and destruction). The child senses that separation and identity-building also means insecurity and the facing of fears of death. More relevantly he begins to move from unconditionally accepted bliss to the traumas of conditionally proving his worth as a separate person. Erich Fromm has noted that this "masculine" struggle is rewarded and punished dominantly by father and by father-surrogates in the community.12

The pre-school teacher becomes one of these father-surrogates in the sense that it is her function to induct the child into new peer relationships and introduce new skills and symbols representing a larger social reality than the dominantly unconditional family. The child-learner is not very discriminate or self-responsible about this larger reality at first, just as Rogers and Maslow indicate about the

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neurotic in relation to normal reality. Little of this larger culture has yet been internalized into the child's ontological self-hood. But as the child lives in and experiences this wider social group, and distinguishes its many manifestations in peers and conceptual discriminations, the separation from parents becomes increasingly transcended. The quality of this process then depends upon the quality of these discriminations that can be conceptually and symbolically integrated into an increasingly complex and dynamic ontological self-hood. This will obviously be slow and gradual with many regressions and plateaus in early childhood. It partly depends upon parental capacity to maintain the pole of unconditional acceptance through difficult conditional (socially disapproved) experiences. The central process of autonomous becoming has been initiated and probably it is seldom completed until middle life for most people.¹³

Level two: "Induction" and transcending idols of the tribe. Most of the elementary years are devoted then to a continuation of this process, but yet within the protection of a given culture and society, and usually within a given social class structure and set of values reinforced by the home. The child is inducted, in Tillich's sense, into the dominant beliefs and traditions of this provincial world.

¹³Carl Jung suggests this. See Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindsey, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley and Son, 1957), ch. 3.
He begins to be more discriminate and more symbolic about this world, and for this process he needs the traditional three R's and language skills. He learns characteristic patterns of perception and conception and what the adult community of his society defines as the good, true, and beautiful. He learns about the possible variety in human lives, the conflict of values and traditions of the heritage of a pluralistic society. But he does not yet go on to transcend his own provincial roots. For again it takes a long time for this wider cultural heritage to be structured into a self.

This level has included Bacon's famous category of the "idols of the tribe" in its description. In elementary education the child assimilates these "idols," this ethnocentrism, but does not yet have the personal resources nor the conceptual tools to transcend these biases. What is important from the point of view of this dissertation, then, is that this induction process include as rich a diversity of conflictual elements within this heritage as possible. The child needs to be experiencing honest human differences and disagreements even though he cannot resolve them autonomously at this point. But if he does not experience the moving to and fro of diverse views of the good and true he will not even have the dynamics necessary to personal search and continued becoming.
In the intermediate grades some contact with national symbols and the world-perspective that includes the plurality of cultural and national heritages would therefore be introduced. This is not so much for conceptual understanding of another heritage as to extend the roots of one's own heritage backward and forward in time and outward in space. Since elementary education is primarily induction into the secular culture, a multiplying of the complexity and depth of discriminations within one's own cultural heritage, it is not surprising that many elementary teachers become provincially cultural themselves, become victims of the idols of the tribe. This is indeed unfortunate, and does not necessarily follow from their function. From Maslow's framework, we might say that the elementary teacher is providing the cultural security needs, the social basis of self-hood which every human being needs as a base of security and sanity, as a safe and meaningful human community or plateau to return to throughout life as the threats involved in continued becoming overwhelm one temporarily.

One's cultural heritage is called provincial here, but this does not imply a value-judgment that it is not therefore good. In fact, there seems to be little doubt that all of us interrelate best with other human beings of our own persuasion and conditioning and that the symbols of this solidarity contain strong feelings and meanings central
to our sense of identity and worth. What is rather stressed by the word "provincial" is that it remains one slice of the human reality. Many of the "idols of the tribe" will need to be transcended before the person can live freely and meaningfully in an increasingly universal human community. Such transcendence will not eliminate one's cultural roots, but will build creatively and outwardly upon them. So it would seem important that the elementary teacher see her ethnocentric function in the context of this larger view of human becoming, for if she does not, she builds in the various fears and rigidities of conceptualization that characterizes Rogers' early stage of therapy. It appears very likely that a teacher communicates this more by her emotional manner of open or closed inquiry of conceptual relationships than by the content of the instruction itself. Hence, again, the subjectivity of the teacher becomes the most important factor in the curriculum!

Level three; Ego-centricism and transcending idols of the cave. In our culture the junior-high years of schooling represent the ages where most learners seem first to re-encounter the initial struggle of separation from parents and established secular authority, but this time with some of the ontological self-hood ready to take responsibility for the implications of this separation and identity-building process. Sexual maturity and its intensity undoubtedly has much to do with this since the subjective realm of reality
is thereby honored in its fullest and most romantic intensity. One suspects that the simpler the self-structure at this point, the more physical and direct will be the channelling of this new physiological basis to eros. This is why the previous level stressed the complexity and dynamics of self-structure even though this intensity of responsible and autonomous action was yet missing.

Obviously, not only positive emotions but also negative and socially destructive emotions reappear in early adolescence. The hostility may partly be seen now as a more sophisticated and discriminate awareness of the alienated human condition; it is partly an awareness of death and of the huge amount of time and effort it will take the learner to build the means for achieving his intensely-felt romantic ends. But now he has strongly felt and individuated ends and goals. He not only recognizes them to be his own, but he also sees that he has some choice over formulating his own future becoming. The framework of this dissertation can therefore be said to become most relevant to high-school and adult learnings though an attempt has been made to relate the fundamental ideas to the early years of life as well.

It is at the point that a person begins to discern that his own quality of being is largely his own construction that the view of learning here defended becomes most relevant. It is at this point in life that the personal subjective identity may begin to be expressed symbolically and
dynamically as a self-created identity through time. Hence also the future orientation of transmitting eros into eros-telos or into the symbol-sorge use of human reason first becomes possible at this stage of growth. This is partly due to the dynamics set up by the conflicts in the physiological versus the socially approved expressions of eros, as Freud has shown so brilliantly. But it is also due to the larger search for meaning and the many philosophic alternatives of defining the good and fulfilling human life that now compete for the adolescent's loyalties and energies. It appears that this struggle first emerges, intensely and perhaps often crudely, in early adolescence.

It is during these junior-high-school and senior-high-school years that we find the most radical emphases of "educational implications" suggested by the theoretical formulations of this existential philosophy—self psychology viewpoint. The central reason for this conviction is the emphasis placed upon the subjective ontological reality once the process of becoming has been initiated by the now self-conscious and socialized learner. One new emphasis becomes ontologically-based experience and relationships! A second would be an intentional program of social criticism which searches for the contemporary "kairos" and how to analyze it and create new forms for healing its alienations. A further

\[14\text{See Sigmund Freud, An Introduction to Psychoanalysis (New York: Boyl and Liveright, 1924).}\]
new emphasis in our time grows out of the international and
interracial context in which the contemporary human condi-
tion is so inextricably entrenched. Since this is the con-
text of becoming a mature and responsible educated person in
our generation, it begins to be relevant at the point where
autonomous becoming is initiated. It follows that not all
reading about the wider world but also meeting it in Buber's
"between" becomes a necessary part of contemporary high-
school education. All education will need to become in-
creasingly international and interracial education. The
implications of these convictions are indeed staggering.
The threat and the very immensity of institutional change
involved will no doubt take generations to achieve.

In our culture one mistake has been to allow the
technical and vocational dimensions of the Jacksonian Revolu-
tion which were institutionalized into our curriculums after
the Civil War to remain central in the curriculum in a
nuclear and automated age. Increasing numbers of adolescents
in junior and senior high schools are no longer preparing for
a vocational and social role directly from high school to the
world of work. Few of the jobs they can and do take after
school for income depend upon a vocational focus in school
experiences. As specialization of function continues,
abstract, verbally conceptual skills and human relations
(management) skills are the most important kind of "vocational
education." The job and employment situation in an automated
and affluent society will undoubtedly alter the curriculum of the schools as much as the industrial revolution did in our Jacksonian and post-Civil War periods.

Yet we have only begun to envision what new experiences and conceptual trainings will be appropriate for these societal conditions. The conclusion does seem warranted, however, that a major concern will be with the quality and intrinsic satisfactions of individual human life itself, and the meanings of a healthy human community, rather than so dominantly with the technical skills of production, distribution, and consumption of goods. At the same time understanding the complexity of bureaucratic institutions in relation to their over-all function in society and history involves a fantastically complex general education as well. For this responsible democratic citizenship such education will mean college education for many, and an in-service industrial education and training for others. Meanwhile at the very period in life where the adolescent wants to define his identity and worth conditionally, he is faced with five to ten more years of abstract and somewhat non-related kinds of experiences and relationships. Paul Goodman has expressed these problems dramatically in Growing Up Absurd.15

In the context of this dissertation we may say that the adolescent is removed and insulated from those currents of real power and influence—the "trends" of history in the contemporary generation—that he needs to encounter to feed the dynamics of his own subjectivity and to provide the "kairos" context for his symbolic integrations. Without these large and dramatic dimensions to the adolescents' struggle there can be little symbol-sorge concern about public social problems and universally human concerns. As a consequence many of the first efforts of human becoming will necessarily take an egotistic and economically based kind of focus, and a short-range or immediate context for their resolution. The quality of human being we help to educate will then surely not be a very complex, dynamic, nor universally self-transcending type of person. The adolescent will then be frustrated and bored, and unconcerned about the adult community. Likewise the adult world remains unconcerned about him and leaves him only "inconsequential kinds of learning" as Rogers states.

But many adolescents know that there is a lot wrong with our society and world. They would welcome an intelligent curriculum of social criticism and idealistic individual and social reform if it can be shown that there is a place for their ontological self-hood and cultural contributions. Further, adolescents are often very egoistic persons due to their provincial training and experience and due to the
mystery of eros with which sexual maturity has dramatically teased them. Hence, a major educational implication of this dissertation would be that we introduce and welcome the new adolescent into the adult institutions and adult relationships of our society. We can in part take the large world into the school, by educational television, by speakers and resource materials. We can move outwardly by planned field trips and community-school co-operative ventures. But we need a kind of modern apprenticeship program where youth can observe and talk to adult people capable of dialogue over a prolonged and intense period of time. Then we also need to recognize William James' problem of a "moral equivalent to war"; that is, adolescents (and adults) need adventure and skill-development, the dignity of disciplined effort, courageous and daring efforts that are rewarded, and time to follow self-chosen pursuits toward fun and dignity. Helping to build an international and interracial community in the school may become one focus of this if the adult community is flexible enough to do its part and welcome the young into its problems as well as its present solutions. Time for dialogue between man and man, for reading and thinking about self-chosen areas of interest and areas of skill-development would seem to be absolutely central. A curriculum would therefore need to be flexible enough to allow a high degree of interruptions and changed directions on the part of learners.
In short, it would seem that early adolescence is that period in life where the individual recognizes his own egoism and begins to struggle with the problems of transcending egocentricity. He recognizes that he wants sexually to have fulfillment and probably a mate; that he wants a job because he wants money, status, security, and to be part of a larger world for security's sake; that he wants friends and individualized relationships; etc. He is starting to look at the world through his own eyes and it is necessarily ego-centric initially. Even the idealism of the adolescent is probably often a way of giving expression to a new sense of identity and a valued sense of worth for that identity.

The challenge in teaching adolescents would therefore seem to be showing them a wider world and alternative qualities of personal becoming in such a way that both the individual and the community are honored. Perhaps, creating symbol-sorge relationship and self-activated interpretations of the contemporary "kairos" and choosing one's forms of relating to it is one answer to this challenge. The adolescent has become sophisticated enough to recognize many of the "idols of the tribe" in himself and others, and he now begins to have to encounter the "idols of the cave." These are his own peculiarities, his own talents and limits and possibilities, his own propensity to over-react to some dimensions of reality and under-react to others due to the peculiarities of his neurology and value-conditionings. He
needs to "find himself," as we say. There may be some tendency for some adolescents to be over-preoccupied with themselves. Yet this is only bad if the context of self-examination is empty and static. If the schools can help feed into this self-concern the great traditions of our culture, and social criticism, and an opening-door into the "kairos" trends of the contemporary human situation, this self-preoccupation may be the best form of intensity for building ontological subjectivity and personal becoming.

A final implication becomes the focus upon the classics in our traditional heritage. The early adolescents' range in intelligence is as broad as that of much as mankind, of course, and some will conceptually be able to handle more complex and more universal kinds of literary and philosophic themes than others. But the necessity to introduce symbolic formulations of the human situation and to stress the universal dimensions of the human predicament would seem to be absolutely central. This kind of dialogue leads to a base for human contact with an optimal number of persons who also have struggled with this literature and these issues as Hutchins and Adler like to stress. But more centrally here, it leads to a dialogue with the self that increases the dynamics of subjective becoming. It stresses the central place of the symbolic form, its creative aesthetic base, and its role in mediating meanings and relationships beyond the egocentric "idols of the cave." Rogers' and Maslow's
descriptions emphasize not only that one must learn to take
delight in his own feelings and human adventure, but that
one cannot relate himself to the increasingly threatening
adventure of complexer social and human conditions unless
this ontological self-hood is itself complex, dynamic, and
secure. A narrowly secure adolescent base will not sustain
continued becoming, so a period of pre-occupation with the
idols of the cave may be very educational indeed.

Level Four: Transcending the idols of the marketplace. No doubt the self-transcendent problem of level three,
that of establishing an autonomous self that is an authentic
ontological self-hood and yet related to the contemporary
human "kairos" continues throughout life. Certainly it can-
not be said to be completed in the early or late adolescent
years. So the curriculum will continue to be concerned with
this problem of personal identity, and increasingly in a
socially concerned and related context. In our culture—and
existential literature would suggest that this observation
is true in technically advanced and bureaucratic societies
generally—the greatest threat to this achieving of authentic
self-hood comes from the socially defined roles and models
of human existence that are already established in that cul-
ture. Our social critics refer to this tendency as conformity,
and Sartre, following Nietzsche, calls it "bad-faith." Bad-
faith would seem to include the added dimension of not
realizing that one has compromised, or become hypocritical,
or non-authentic in the formation of his self-hood. In such a case the learner does not realize that his ideals are socially designed, that his tastes and standards of judgment and interpretation of the contemporary human condition are products of the standardized mass-media, that his energies are obsessively channelled in socially approved ways, etc. It is probably true that these "idols of the market-place" are a far greater proportion of our quantitative and qualitative experience than in Bacon's time, that they are more intrusive, inescapable, subtle, and perhaps more monolithic.

It appears that while these two major foci of transcending bias—the idols of the cave and the market-place—are central throughout adolescence, the market-place becomes dominantly tempting and pervasive from around the high-school sophomore years through the college sophomore years. Social approval becomes a major focus of worth, and in-group acceptance based on conformity to the market-place tastes in dress and behavior and ideas and values becomes often oppressive, destroying the subjective basis of dynamics and becoming.16 Starting often with the junior or perhaps more often the senior year of college, one may observe that the struggle often shifts to level five. This concern is with transcending the limits and confinements of ideologies and philosophies

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16 David Riesman et al., The Lonely Crowd...
of life in order to find a context of meaning and wider human relationships of lasting significance. If this is correct, it suggests that a great deal more emphasis upon the contemporary human "kairos" is needed, and a great deal more significant "dialogue" with ideas and persons of other cultures and social sub-groups is needed to break through the rigid generalities of the market-place idolatry.

In the end the educator as "dialoguer" and social critic will also have to be a citizen of social reform in order to help break the stranglehold of the market-place ideals upon the becoming of youth. The idea suggested for level three, that a prolonged and intense involvement in the adult community is needed to begin to feel the currents "moving to and fro" of the contemporary human condition, would need to be continued and symbolically extended in this sophomore-to-sophomore period. To the extent that self-worth is identified with prevailing market-place standards, or with Fromm's "marketing orientation" for the value of one's self on the economic job-market, the dynamics of subjectivity would be seriously threatened. Once again, however, the interpretation of this dissertation would not be so much upon changing these conditional elements in society as upon re-vitalizing the pole of unconditional support for the unique subjective becoming of the learner in spite of, and sometimes in opposition to, these market-place idols.
It is understandable that learners in our standardized curriculums often see little relationship between the content learnings they must master and this drama of subjective becoming on the one side, or between the curriculum and their visions and fears of preparing for a social role on the other side. It is understandable that they often tend to see personal becoming and job-preparation in opposition to each other and to claim that they must do the content work in order to get the grades and degrees necessary to fill the social and vocational role after graduating. What is not so understandable or forgiveable from the point of view of this dissertation, is the failure to maintain the tension of loyalty to these somewhat conflicting ends throughout the educational adventure. This is one means of intensifying the dynamics of subjective becoming and of discerning dimensions of the contemporary human "kairos" that relates them to a more universal human community and creative life.

We cannot reason with these problems until we are aware of them and courageous enough to be concerned or personally responsible for them. It is not only their oppressiveness, but also their distance from our usual world of private meaning that provides contemporary education with an apathetic dilemma that one might call "the problem of generalities." The term "generality" may be described as an "intellectual defense mechanism" which needs the support
and understanding of peers. Many adolescents (and adults) cannot risk discriminating careful disagreements that might lead to misunderstanding, hostility, and rejection. In Tillich's framework "generality" can be seen as an attempt to avoid life's existential anxiety and existential guilt by agreeing with others on common fears in the external environment. Being common they need not be differentially discriminated; in fact solidarity is thus built by the commonness of an external threat. Education seems to be responsible, in part, for that kind of socialization that builds and perpetuates national myths. We may therefore define generality as "a compulsive intellectual defence mechanism which avoids a discriminately complex awareness of reality and the personal risks of creating individual interpretations and commitments by agreeing with peers that some externalized dimension of their reality is commonly threatening, important, and meaningful." This objectification or projection of the problem succeeds in avoiding the ontologically and psychologically threatening questions of the quality and personal responsibilities of the self. The important point to emphasize here is that it is the very complexity and calamitous nature of learning the truth of our modern reality and educational challenge that so threatens the self at psychological and ontological levels. The problems of ethics and creative responsibility are avoided by the intellectual defense mechanism of "generality."
The protection of generality rather than meaningful and relational generalizations seems to be greatly needed during the late adolescent period of life. As earlier suggested this reflects the dominance of the epistemological heritage in our culture and the failure to achieve very complex and qualitative levels of ontological subjectivity. What is curious here seems to be the conclusion that the intellectual defense mechanism of generality is more meaningful and gives greater security to the self than the authentic adventure of building generalizations that relate one to the larger cultural heritage and contemporary human condition. In Rogers' and Maslow's framework we can conclude that generality is a kind of plateau that the self needs while it gathers the greater ontological complexity to sustain the insights and moral actions demanded by increasing intellectual knowledge. The protection of the "idols of the market-place" then may be a mask behind which subjective becoming is growing. Or it may be a neurotic identification with a narrowed reality that destroys the dynamics of subjective becoming. From the viewpoint of this dissertation, this difference is of fundamental importance. The teacher would want to honor the one condition, but puncture the other. In either case, however, energy and symbol-sorge use of reason would seem to need to be shifted from social and vocational definitions of self-worth and meaning to the context of ontological subjectivity defended in this dissertation.
It is probable that the very knowledge and content-information that discusses and describes this larger human reality that such learners cannot yet sustain in personal emotions and intellectual integrations will be resisted and rejected. This may be seen as one aspect of the anti-intellectualism of our society and of many learners within it. But as the learner resists the methodological disciplines of more precise and discriminate observation on this larger human reality, he is also reducing himself necessarily to generality solutions of his insecurities. He is undermining trust in reason and universal humanity. So it appears that the "idols of the market-place" often serve as resolutions to a human reality that has become too complex and threatening. They may be the hardest idols for educators to help learners transcend. Economic security and prestige become defense needs that feed upon the generality resolutions of these tensions. In the context of this dissertation, this becomes a very serious social as well as individual problem since we are now beginning to live in an international and interracial world of rapid change and intense personal feelings and conflicts. This world will demand flexible and complex human persons to meet it openly and humanely.

It would seem to follow, therefore that the curriculum of the existential-self-psychology position developed here would apply the Socratic method and the "torpedo sting" to
the "idols of market-place" that learners seem to adopt in this period of life. The language and philosophic assumptions of the generalities would need to be examined and undermined. The social criticism of the market-place idols would be supplemented by real human relationships with persons of conflicting cultural beliefs and backgrounds. All education becomes international and interracial, and a direct confrontation of prejudice in its personal and institutional forms becomes inescapable. This will be a threatening kind of education, but also a necessary and ennobling kind. The possibility of dialogue with the human variety that history has produced opens up the challenge to all to continue the transcendence of bias into more universal forms of relationship. This life should be individually fulfilling as well as socially necessary. But the kind of person who can sustain such an adventure and such a context of human responsibility pre-supposes the achievement of transcending most of the idols previously discussed. Ways by which the schools and colleges can institutionalize these concerns into its content and experience curriculum may become the most central educational problem of the coming generation.

Level Five: Universality and transcending the idols of the theatre. As the learner lives in a social milieux where he encounters persons who approach life from different traditions and assumptions about the good life, about how to have fun and be happy, or about what is significant and
important in life, he again encounters the problem of alternative ways of life for himself. It seems that in verbal education, in abstract symbolic meanings, we often are able to avoid this self-confrontation of the alternatives open to us and our responsibilities for the quality of our own life. But as we examine various philosophies, various political ideologies, various religions, various anthropological accounts of differing cultures, various myths and heroes in the traditions and literature of peoples, and various archetypes and psychological symbols of diverse cultures, we begin to wonder what is common to humanity.

We begin not only to be concerned about human relationships and the survival of mankind in our time, but to be concerned with how education can help build a process of communication that honors these diversities and yet builds a single human community. We begin to ask not only; "What is the meaning of my life?" but also "What is the meaning of history and the universe?"

As Bacon ingeniously suggests in his category of the "idols of the theatre," large-scale generalizations and interpretations of history and human meaning themselves become "idols" and lead to separations between man and man, and between man and his authentic encounter with the mystery of being. In earlier chapters of this dissertation we were particularly concerned with the virus of nationalism in our time, and with the impact of the philosophies of history
upon the loyalties of men. The combinations of these "idols
of the theatre" have led to fantastic wars, and to a badly
non-universal human community in our generation. The re­
sponsibility of education cannot therefore be said to stop
with socialization into a given culture, but must continue
the "torpedo sting" until a concern with the total human
community is integrated into the learner's subjectivity.
The "kairos" context also affirms this necessity. So the
ideologies of nation-states, of cultural groups or religious
orders, of political parties and pressure groups within
nations will also need to be transcended from this point of
view.

Once again, this does not imply that one stops being
a political democrat, or American citizen, or even a believer
in the idea of progress. It affirms simply that each learner
create his own dynamic and complex definition of these
loyalties, and refrain from the easy identification with
already actualized institutional and symbolic forms that
have become demonic or non-ultimate in their energies and
power. It has been the theme of this dissertation to attempt
to discuss what might be involved in this process and how it
might be achieved. The universal disciplines, such as
philosophy and history and anthropology and foreign travel,
would therefore seem to have a central place in the later
years of learners—say, from the junior year in college on
throughout life. Yet these would need to be supplemented by
that impulse to aesthetic form, perhaps from the various arts, that allows the learner to trust his formulation of new symbolic forms of healing the provincial breaches of contemporary humanity. The subjective learner would have many opportunities for time to spend on autonomous and self-chosen inquiries of his own, including time to talk with those adults who were struggling with the same issues and varieties of form he was most interested in. Ideally this would include men from many cultures, so that foreign language would often be a necessary precondition of dialogue. The "idols of the theatre" would be transcended by creating new ones which directed themselves to the ontological reality and human relationships of the contemporary human condition.

This possible "curricular schemata" has been organized not around grade levels but around stages of the transcendence of bias in human becoming. The goal has been to help produce or make provision for persons capable for an education in ontological subjectivity, an education that relates them to the universal human community and the contemporary "kairos."
CHAPTER X

TEACHER AND LEARNER IN THE CLASSROOM:
A VIEW OF DIALOGUE

The educational implications of the theoretical inquiry of this dissertation have been examined in the context of the subjective learner and from the perspective of an approach to curriculum; this final chapter will focus upon the learnings and relationships within the classroom itself. Here the focus will be upon methodology, upon a kind of teacher-pupil relationship that we shall call "dialogue."

We must assume at this point that our teacher has accepted and committed herself to the basic theoretical position developed. Educational theory becomes operable only through committed people. We must assume that our teacher accepts the value and goal of ontological frustration tolerance, and some concept of education as the transcendence of bias. This teacher will bear these qualities in her own personhood and communicate them in the classroom learning context. We must further assume that this teacher has some sympathy with the curricular implications discussed and that she is creative and authentic enough to function in her
classroom autonomously in spite of the institutional and administrative dilemmas earlier discussed.

The Socratic methodology: A dialogue that increases ontological subjectivity

The Socratic methodology of dialectical inquiry has been implicit throughout this discussion. Emphasis has been placed upon the dynamics of the learner, the trust in autonomous reason symbolically structuring the Logos and ultimate reality and the subjective demand for each learner to create meaning and realize his own potential being. Kneller adds, "In methodology, there is no question but that the existentialists favor the Socratic approach." In Rogers' position we can see this method operable in his approach to client-centered counseling; in Maslow's context we can infer it as implicit in the goal of the self-actualizing person. However, in education we are responsible for the cognitive focus of these processes of acquiring knowledge, achieving self-transcendence, and interpreting ultimate reality and contemporary society meaningfully. From Tillich's framework we have concluded that this cognitive function must be interpreted symbolically, and inclusive of the unconscious, aesthetic, and volitional dimensions of self.

The classic approach to encouraging ontological subjectivity and for helping the learner to give birth to a process of becoming that Plato calls "recollection" is, of course, the Socratic method, sometimes called "entelechy" or the "mieutic method."

It is the method that Socrates no doubt actually employed in his conversations with his fellow Athenians, and which Plato has so beautifully and powerfully re-created in his Socratic dialogues. The fact that this method is a social process, and the similarity of it to the view of human nature and becoming that has been defended in this dissertation, are both clearly presented in the following observations by Cassirer.

We cannot discover the nature of man in the same way that we can detect the nature of physical things. Physical things may be described in terms of their objective properties, but man may be described and defined only in terms of his consciousness. This fact poses an entirely new problem which cannot be solved by our usual modes of investigation. Empirical observation and logical analysis, in the sense in which these terms were used in pre-Socratic philosophy, here proved inefficient and inadequate. For it is only in our immediate intercourse with human beings that we have insight into the character of man. We must actually confront man, we must meet him squarely face to face, in order to understand him. Hence it is not a new objective content, but a new activity and function of thought which is the distinctive feature of the philosophy of Socrates. Philosophy, which had hitherto been conceived as an intellectual monologue, is transformed into a dialogue. Only by way of dialogical or dialectic thought can we approach the knowledge of human nature. Previously truth might have been conceived to be a sort of ready-made thing which could be grasped by an effort of the individual thinker, and readily transferred
and communicated to others. But Socrates could no longer subscribe to this view. It is as impossible—says Plato in the Republic—to implant truth in the soul of a man as it is to give power of seeing to a man born blind. Truth is by nature the offspring of dialectic thought. It cannot be gained, therefore, except through a constant cooperation of the subject in mutual interrogation and reply. It is not therefore like an empirical object; it must be understood as the out-growth of a social act. Here we have the new, indirect answer to the question 'What is man?' Man is declared to be that creature who is constantly in search of himself—a creature who in every moment of his existence must examine and scrutinize the conditions of his existence. In this scrutiny, in this critical attitude toward human life, consists the real value of human life. 'A life which is unexamined,' says Socrates in the Apology, 'is not worth living.'

What is so effective about this method and approach is that each party in the dialogue is responsible for his own meanings and for examining the meanings of the other person, even though many of Socrates dialogues seem to be a bit one-sided in this regard. This is less true, of course, the brighter and more philosophically sensitive his participants are. We see this in the Phaedo for example, in the Theaetetus, and of course in the Parmenides where even if Socrates is young he comes off rather poorly in terms of a total defense of his central doctrine of the Forms and Ideas. But as Cassirer suggests, the Socratic approach purports to examine the nature of man by examining men's conscious nature and quality of ontological subjectivity; and this is a responsible two-way social confrontation. This is, of course,

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extremely threatening and difficult, especially in one's early years. So Socrates gets his partner in dialogue to commit himself to some beginning assumption and then to each successive stage of its logical development. Naturally, if he cannot accept each logical conclusion the discussion returns to a re-examination of the beginning assumption. What usually happens to most of us, of course, is that we do not have the clarity and perseverance to follow our own or others' meanings so carefully and so we end up, as Kierkegaard says, in subordinate considerations and "parentheses." This is particularly true when we do not commit ourselves to the beginning assumptions and "leaps of faith" of each step of the argument.

One reason we are such poor listeners to other's dialogues is precisely this factor, that usually they lack the element of conviction and commitment and turn out to be idle "parentheses." "In general, what makes it so tiresome to listen as a third party to argumentative dispute," says Kierkegaard

is the fact that usually by the second round the dispute has already run into a parentheses, and now moves in this perverse direction more and more passionately away from the point at issue. This failing may be used as a sort of fencing feint, for the purpose of testing out an opponent, to determine whether he is a real master of the dialectical parade, or a mere parenthesis-hound who leaps into a gallop whenever the parenthetical suggests itself. How often has it not happened
that an entire human life has from early youth
moved only in parentheses"!13

Yet it is apparent, then, that much dialogue does move into
parentheses and generalities, and precisely to avoid the
existential commitments and leaps of faith implied in a
closer attention to the meanings encountered in the dialogue.
So what is central here in the Socratic method is the in­
sistence Socrates and Plato have upon the participant's
being willing to search and commit himself in character, and
subjective becoming, as well as in rational or logical
coherence. From this dual commitment to reason and the
search for truth, and to the becoming of what this truth
implies comes the central Socratic and Platonic doctrine of
the equation of knowledge and virtue, for as this disserta­
tion has argued in a different context the two grow and
proceed together.

But these statements only say in the Socratic-Platonic
context what has been argued earlier in this dissertation,
namely, that qualitative becoming is a very threatening,
continual birth-process (and death-process), and hence easily
slides over into parentheses. For the present purposes of
showing how dialogue can help to initiate and support con­
ditions for the learner's subjective becoming, a fuller
description of the Socratic method itself and its philosoph­

3Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Post­
script (Princeton, New Jersey: University of Princeton
ic assumptions appears to be relevant. The most famous of Socrates' formulations of this process is probably the idea that "awareness of ignorance is the beginning of all knowledge," that a lack must be created in the individual (argued in discussing the Symposium) as a pre-condition to the search for greater wisdom or qualitative becoming. The assumption is, of course, that the person who is in error and ignorance and has the awareness that he is in ignorance will thereby be motivated to overcome or transcend this state by at least searching for what might fill or heal his lack. Hence the method which interrogates persons as to what they purport to believe and be certain of usually reveals to such persons that they are not so certain after examination; thus the dynamics of the search for truth is re-instigated.

The goal of this philosophic investigation, then, is to get the learner constantly to examine his own assumptions and conclusions in this manner so that he is always dying and recollecting! Many learners have difficulty at the point of self-criticism. The first stage, then, becomes a "... destructive catharsis," as Koyre states, or an "awakening from one's dogmatic slumbers," as Kant states so kindly about Hume's influence upon him. Socrates here compares himself to a gadfly or a midwife who stings or helps give-birth, but he insists that the creative and active

process of recollection is going on by the others' efforts alone. In one of the most famous examples of this process and method, that of the slave boy producing the pythagorean theory in the *Meno*, the following revealing and interesting conversation is recorded by Plato:

Boy. Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.
Soc. Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet; but when he thought that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows.

Meno. True.
Soc. Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?
Meno. I think that he is.
Soc. If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's shock,' have we done him any harm?
Meno. I think not.
Soc. We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world . . . (error) . . .

Meno. True.
Soc. But do you suppose that he would ever have inquired into or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, and had desired to know?

Meno. I think not, Socrates.
Soc. Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch?
Meno. I think so.5

So we may agree with Socrates and Meno that any human being is better off when he becomes aware of the extent to which many of their beliefs and opinions are un-examined. We may even agree that the slave boy is now more likely to be open

to a philosophic sensitivity in his life, though it is surely improbable that this single instance will give enough "intensity of inwardness" enough doubt and guilt over error to lead the slave boy into an impassioned search for truth! In fact Koyre suggests very sensitively that it may be because most people do not have this sensitivity or the dynamics of subjectivity to maintain the continued search that Plato leaves his dialogues incomplete and without answers, since this at least avoids the danger of his own or Socrates' answers being taken as final conclusions by the non-seekers. As Koyre states, the incomplete nature of the dialogue ushers in precisely that which distinguishes "... those who understand and those, doubtless the majority, who do not." It is the very difficulty itself, as Kierkegaard argues so cogently, that increases the inward intensity and complexity, that continues to create the dynamics and becoming of subjectivity.

So it would follow from this view of the Socratic method that the teacher who did know something, in spite of the Socratic irony of never knowing anything conclusively, could aid a learner in creating the lack or the awareness of ignorance and error that might lead to the individually active and creative search. Yet such a teacher would also be extremely careful to show that she did not have the

[Koyre, Discovering ..., p. 7.]
answers and final conclusions to life's basic questions either and remains herself an inquirer. She would respect the diversity of ultimate concerns in learners and honor the variety of stages in interpreting these concerns.

There is one further dimension of the Socratic approach that would seem to be particularly germane to the present work, namely, Socrates' and Plato's belief in the Logos, the rational and consistently judging structure of the universe which informs and corrects all honest men's searching and reason. Koyre, for example, describes philosophic thought as

... a 'dialogue the soul holds with itself' (Theatetus). This is because, moreover, in the dialogue, philosophic thought, freeing itself from all control of an external authority, frees itself likewise from its individual limitations by submitting to the control of another thought.  

This is a very central and useful lead for suggesting the kind of dialogue that helps create conditions for another to create his subjectivity without imposing the kind of threat and judgment that Rogers and Maslow insist must be eliminated if there is to be qualitative becoming. Koyre's concept of a voluntary "submitting to the control of another's thought" in dialogue, or of both to a common set of rules of rational discourse and Logos universality, is a very different interpersonal relationship and communication than the kind of conversation and dialogue initiated from existential distrust.

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7 Ibid., p. 3 (footnote).
and a fearful protection against the presumed power interests of the other person.

The whole spirit and argument of Rogers and Maslow suggests to us here that to the extent that the teacher can avoid or transcend initial judgmental reactions to the pupils learnings and becoming he can lead the student toward the judgment of the student's own reason. Eventually this will lead to the Logos reality and truth to which he is individually responsible! This is not easy or automatic, of course; yet, to repeat Rogers claim, "This tendency to react to any emotionally meaningful statement by forming an evaluation of it from our own point of view is, I repeat, the major barrier to inter-personal communication." As one gets in the way by judging others becoming and quality as right or wrong as judged by one's own ideals or actualized achievements, he only succeeds in diverting the other learner from the more central struggle of integrity and his own subjective becoming. Yet we cannot escape this judgment existentially, for we are what we are, and we have our ideals for ourselves and others. Nor can we escape the authority relationship from those who value and fear our judgment and therefore transfer their central ontological struggle to an external kind of publicly measureable process. But it is also true that we can come to communicate to others our respect for and acceptance of

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their ontological being, independent of their ratio of actualized potentiality, or in spite of our own value-judgments of acceptability or un-acceptability. We can communicate what Fromm calls an "unconditional acceptance." This ontological acceptance is recognized and felt as a reality in which the learner is supported to risk his process of subjective becoming.

Let us return to Koyre's view of the kind of dialogue that is a common "submission of thought to the control of another's thought" or to the Logos. This viewpoint presupposes a commonly approachable ontological reality and perhaps a cultural context in which the "rules of thought" or "laws of thought" are agreed upon by all members of the culture, at least all members who claim to be intellectual. In this sense, dedication to reason and search for truth have a common universal referent and form. Socrates and Plato, of course, called this universal realm of forms the Forms or Ideas, the realm of essences which structured and named each thing to be what it was and only what it was, and hence recognizable as such by all people. Since the epistemological heritage from the Enlightenment, we have learned that these forms of thought are partially man-made, partially the creations of our own language distinctions. They are partly the assumptions of what is real and true, assumptions deeply

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embedded in our heritage, in our early childhood socialization, and in our very language structure.

With the Enlightenment we hoped that a humanly agreed-upon method or a set of publicly agreed-upon rules of evaluation and correction—namely, the scientific method—could give us again a common approach to truth that all minds would honor. While this viewpoint has been criticized for the present purposes of maximizing ontological subjectivity it obviously has its values in the sciences and in the social sciences. Tillich has claimed that the dynamic ontology and the fact of culturally changing forms leads us to the necessity to recreate new forms and meanings in each generation. At the same time the common "kairos" and human ontological conditions do keep a trans-individual reality that we all must confront with honesty and reason. Therefore a mutual criticizing of the interpretation of this common "kairos" and the forms best able to "heal" across it becomes another focus of the kind of dialogue that can help to lead learners to their own subjectivity. Thus a classroom where multiple instructors teach and honestly disagree in their interpretations and judgments of emphasis about the same common human problems, or a classroom in which several viewpoints and interpretations of a single theme are honored and understood would seem to intensify the possibility for the dynamics which leads to inwardness and subjectivity, for individualized interpretation and commitment to ultimate concerns.
This honest disagreement on ends leads many people to feel there is no common reason or standards of thought for judging and criticizing all of the positions which initially seem to be equally plausible. In an important passage in the *Phaedo*, Plato has Socrates discussing this danger with Simias and Cebes, and arguing that this distrust of reason soon degenerates to a distrust of all ideas and of the philosophic life and then inevitably leads to a distrust and hatred of men also! This follows for Socrates and Plato and the early Greeks generally because of their conviction that man's reason or rationality was his essential defining quality; therefore, to reject reason and ideas was by definition to reject mankind. Therefore in the *Phaedo* passage, Plato talks about how those men who are "misologists" (haters of ideas) are also "misanthropists" (haters of men). The man of ideas becomes a threat to them because he affirms their essential humanity that they have denied. A man of ideas who is a teacher would then cause learners to suffer existential guilt and existential anxiety, to use Tillich's words. Contrarily the misologist teachers would become "murderers" of language and thought and use it carelessly and cruelly, and eventually they would inadvertently


11 I am indebted to Dr. Fox, Philosophy Department, Ohio State University, for this emphasis in Plato's thought.
encourage men of power who are willing to "murder" or destroy other men.

What is instructive here for the present purposes is the emphasis on the carefulness of language and definition, the clarity of forms and communication. This becomes another medium in which a teacher can help to lead a learner to a concern with life and with the intensity of his own meanings and subjectivity. This concern with the discriminate and complexly careful use of language, with the responsibility of knowing how one is using and defining the words and concepts he uses in his own interpretations and meanings is seen as a major focus of an approach to the philosophy of education. It will help break down the problem of generality that earlier was suggested. A lack of the belief in a larger criteria for judging what is true, Plato warns, results in the "eristic" art of quarrelling and rhetoric or sophistic persuasion and hence becomes simply another form of power and manipulation.

Transcending the Socratic Method: Democratic and Classroom Dialogue

The Socratic method is here seen as one pole of the dynamics in the optimal learning situation. It is a conditional intellectual relationship to a learner, more concerned with his becoming than with his being. It is a direct judgment that the "unexamined life is not worth living" and a serious attempt to help initiate an examination. But in our
discussion of Rogers and Maslow we emphasized that the learner will also need the kind of encounter and dialogue that honors the self as it now is, and that honors his essentiality and potentiality independently of the rate of speed or form of his actualization of that potential.

Public school teachers must be particularly concerned with this aspect of learning because the human persons they are teaching are yet immature, ontologically unformed. They need, therefore, to communicate not only a conditional relationship and dialogue with the classroom learner but also what Fromm calls "unconditional acceptance." This paradoxical combination needs to be expressed in order to intensify the subjective dynamics of the learner. Teachers, therefore, need a form of classroom dialogue and relationship which honors Tillich's search for ultimate reality and which embodies Rogers' and Maslow's emphasis upon the conditions of support and non-judgmental, non-threatening, relationships in which a climate of freedom and venturing become an ontological and psychological reality. Teachers need a climate where mistakes and honest disagreements are not overly anxiety-producing in themselves and their students. Our Democratic heritage combined with Martin Buber's concept of interpersonal dialogue, provides a base for creating exactly this kind of climate in the public school classroom. As these conditions are then maximized, the descriptions of the learning process from Rogers and Maslow become functional and
It has earlier been suggested that the view of dialogue discussed in this part of this chapter is believed to be central to the Existential view of freedom and to a concept of the kind of honest disagreement and expression of differences of ontological subjectivity that makes democracy seem to be the optimal form of political arrangement for men, as they struggle to create the good life and the good society. This needs to be elaborated briefly here as a lead to a second Form of dialogue, the kind of dialogue that presupposes ontological subjectivity whether in potential or actualized forms.

The concept of democracy is conceived here as a political concept, rather than a concept applicable at all levels of all institutions—such as the family and school and industrial order—or applicable to personality structure. However, the loyalty to reason, respect for law and individual rights, and the constant re-creation of freedom, do suggest some personality dimensions. Yet we may see the concept as mainly political in the sense that it represents an agreed-upon form and social structure in which there are no agreed-upon or established answers to man's ultimate questions of the good, true, and beautiful. Neither the good man nor the good society has been finally decided or blue-printed. On
the contrary, the populace believes that each individual must decide both of these values for himself. In this search is constituted his freedom and individual dignity. As these views crystallize into parties and institutional forms different interest groups move temporarily into power only to be criticized and rejected in four or eight years by the veto power of the majority vote. And even while in power these groups must honor the search for ultimate values and loyalties in their own party and among people of all other persuasions. They must not only honor this, but honor it supremely, and thus defend and encourage it! This approach to solving the ultimate questions in life, as earlier suggested, may turn out to be too much for most men to shoulder in our complicated contemporary reality, and the experiment in democratic freedom may be modified by various elitist answerings for order and stability. But this is a challenge each democratic generation must meet anew and answer for itself.

To the extent that we avoid structuring the lives and answers of our children, we re-vitalize our faith in their human potentiality and becoming as the better source of solutions to the problems they will encounter. This faith is a philosophic assumption about the nature of man, a trust in human reason and the achievement of ontological subjectivity anew in each generation. And it is also a faith that men can and will in some way include the general good in their
formulations of their private and individual good. One such formulation has been the "kairos" concept and the views of dialogue developed in this dissertation, but there are many more.

Since there are many more, since we do not agree upon ultimate ends and values, nor upon the optimal means for achieving commonly held general ends, it follows that all positions of honesty and intellectual integrity which purport to answer common good problems should be honored and considered by all open and growing men. This market place of ideas is similar to the early Enlightenment's liberal focus on the freedom of press and assembly. This view stressed the sharing and competing of ideas much as one competed economically in the laissez-faire struggle for economic forms of power and ownership. But in the realm of ideas and honest differences over the ultimate ends of life, it is not merely a competition of already achieved forms and beings. A central dimension of the political dialogue becomes an openness to the common "kairos" which has no final form and to the becoming of each person's ontological subjectivity which has no final form. In fact, one central reason for the value of such a democratic dialogue is that each individual who is dynamic and open to ontological and social changes knows that he will alter and re-fashion his own ends and quality of being as he matures through life. He will therefore later be supporting different ultimate ends and possibly different
institutional means for achieving his ends. Therefore he is very open and responsive to the honest differences and approaches of other men. These men he now disagrees with may later not only be his co-workers, but also may be the means of helping him to decide the directions of his own becoming. The political dialogue, therefore, helps him to check on where he is now in relation to the "kairos" and others' responses, and it helps him to clarify and intensify his ontological subjectivity and possibly to gain new directions to becoming.

From this point of view, then, freedom itself becomes the absolute value of a democratic community and dialogue. The conditions for open disagreement and growth are publicly allowed and honored. The values and pre-conditions of this position were very well recognized in the early period of our nation, with the emphasis on the refusal to use force initially to solve disagreements but rather to turn to human reason and the exchange of honest disagreement in dialogue. This tolerance allows human error and recognizes that all men are finite and will make mistakes and change their own minds and ultimate concerns as well as accepting criticism from others. It has faith in the genuine desires of most men to serve the common good. It puts a tremendous faith in human reason and education to achieve ontological subjectivity and lifetime of openness and becoming. Freedom in this sense is not so much created by institutional government as it is
in the struggles of individual men. Government's function becomes a protection of the individual's rights to serve the ultimate ends of his choosing and thus to create his own freedoms and responsibilities.

In this sense freedom is the opportunity to keep shifting one's hierarchy of values, giving them the ranking and ordering of present honest convictions. Freedom is, then, in this sense, like the institutional means and methodological means of the Enlightenment, only here it is the ontological means to the possibility of human subjectivity and dialogue. As Rogers earlier stated, the healthy and happy human being is one who is creating his self throughout life; his life is a process and is always becoming. Therefore, the political machinery must be a process also, a process of registering and recording the changing gestalts of all these individual processes! This posture toward the community makes the individual learner both receptive to its individual forms of subjectivity and responsible to express his own present forms of subjectivity. This is a dialogue, as Buber emphasizes, that requires trust, and requires that "we must not withhold ourself." It requires openness to being and to the complicated threatening human reality, openness to the "kairos," and self-trust in one's capacity to interpret this himself and to create healing forms in response to it. It requires an absence or minimization of fear and threat in order to dare to express one's deep and honest
self, and this freedom from fear is especially difficult in our modern world of power and suspicion. Just as existential distrust is mediated from the community to the individual's fear of expressing his own congruence, it is also true that the self-trust and courage of congruence that does dare to express itself openly in public dialogue contributes one positive and healing being to the common problem of overcoming or transcending this distrust. For a further discussion of this kind of dialogue that pre-supposes ontological subjectivity adequate to the threats of expressing that subjectivity in spite of existential distrust let us examine briefly Buber's view of the ontological reality that exists in the very process of dialogue itself, in the between of the dialogue between man and man.

Buber's concept of dialogue and the between rests upon the fundamental distinction he makes in his famous work *I and Thou* between the relationships of "I-Thou" and of "I-It." He says:

> To man the world is two-fold, in accordance with his two-fold attitude . . . with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks. . . . For the I of the primary word I-Thou is a different I from that of the primary word I-It.12

In the context of this dissertation it appears that the "I" of the "I-Thou" relationships is the ontological self-hood

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or achieved ontological subjectivity, that which includes sensitivity to being and assumes responsibility itself for transcendence and becoming. Buber separates three levels of relationship for this "I." The first is with nature, on a sub-lingual level of confronting the being and life of other whole units in reality. The second is with other men through speech and silence that honors their uniqueness. The third is with "spiritual being" wherein we "... feel we are addressed and we answer—forming, thinking, acting... ."\(^\text{13}\) This latter view is similar to Tillich's ground of being, and to the concept of the "kairos." Since this ontological reality is always there for us to encounter and have relationship with, to honor and feel our own ontological being in response to, Buber can state that "... all real living is meeting."\(^\text{14}\) The capacity for a present transcending focus becomes a "life of dialogue."

"I-It," on the other hand, is the relationships that grow out of the subjec-object dichotomy. This includes the kind of meanings previously called epistemological the categorizing and discriminating of external objects and things, the world of social meanings, and the world of experiences. Buber's emphasis stresses that it is the world of the past, which eliminates the threats of the transcending and risking

\(^{13}\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 6.\)

\(^{14}\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 11.\)
elements of man's present finite-freedom. Buber, of course, is taking the ontological reality as the prior reality, while modern man under the influence of the epistemological tradition tends to take the world of "I-It" as primal and real. Maurice Friedman, in discussing Buber's epistemology in an intellectual biography, states of the categories of time and space and causal separation: "We usually think of these categories as reality itself, but they are actually only the symbolic representation of what has become... (Psychology, for example) observes its phenomena after they have already taken their place in the categories of human knowing."^15 His central point is that science fundamentally deals with the realm of "I-It."

Yet Rogers and Maslow are in the forefront of a movement that is beginning to honor the "I-Thou" reality of the person as well, and it is notable that Friedman singles Rogers out as an exception to the above characterization of psychology as "I-It." He sees Rogers as a psychologist who honor's Buber's "I-Thou." Friedman, in agreeing with Buber about the priority and fundamental nature of ontological reality, then states: "What is necessary, therefore, is that we overcome the tendency to regard the subject-object relation as itself the primary reality."^16 He later states that

^16 Ibid., p. 172.
the ethical realm of creating the quality of human existence
is the prior reality that should determine the rest. For
Buber this prior ethical reality is grounded in the "...ontological reality of the life between man and man."\(^{17}\)

So the between is the narrow ridge where "I" and "Thou"
meet, not in conceptual and epistemological categories of
naming and discriminating, but rather of

... one being turning to another as another, as
this particular other being, in order to communi-
cate with it in a sphere which is common to them
but which reaches out beyond the special sphere
of each. I call this sphere, which is established
with the existence of man as man but which is
conceptually still uncomprehended, the sphere of
"between."\(^{18}\)

Friedman describes the same concept:

But when two individuals "happen" to each other,
then there is an essential remainder which is
common to them, but which reaches out beyond the
special sphere of each. That remainder is the
basic reality, the "sphere of the between."\(^{19}\)

In regard to personal conversation Friedman elaborates this
as follows:

Genuine conversation, like every genuine fulfill-
ment of relation between man, means acceptance of
otherness. This means that although one may
desire to influence the other and lead him to
share in one's relation to truth, one accepts and
confirms him in his being this particular man made
this particular way. One wishes him to have a

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 200.

\(^{18}\)Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (Boston: Beacon

\(^{19}\)Friedman, *Life of . . .*, p. 85.
different relation to one's own truth in accordance with his individuality.\textsuperscript{20}

This prior acceptance of the ontological being of the other is the kind of relationship that was discussed from Rogers and Maslow.

In discussing this view of dialogue between man and man Buber makes several distinctions. He shows that most conversations in modern times aim at the technical dialogue of objective understanding, or some variation of monologue in which a person is really talking to himself in the disguised form of dialogue. (Here Buber distinguishes the "debate" that seeks to influence or persuade or control, the "conversation" that is autistic oral expression with no will to communicate, the "friendly chat" which allows one to see himself as absolute and right, and the "lover's talk" which is usually self-glorifying and self-aggrandizing.)\textsuperscript{21} Genuine dialogue, by contrast, and as suggested in the above quotations describing the reality of the between, is focused upon the uniqueness and the becoming of the other in his immediacy. Hence the dialoguer accepts responsibility for his own subjectivity and for this self-chosen quality of being in his uniqueness, his responding in authenticity. Buber defines this responsibility responding as "... a man holding his

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Buber, I and . . .}, p. 20.
ground before reality . . . ", or later as " . . . becoming a person with a relation to the truth. . . . ". These expressions may be recognized in the context of this dissertation as the approach to maximizing ontological subjectivity and personal becoming.

So dialogue in Buber's sense presupposes some achievement of subjectivity. But even here Buber is concerned to show that this possibility of open dialogue is not then a command or duty externally imposed upon one, but an opportunity. "There is no ordering of dialogue. It is not that you are to answer but that you are able." Nor is Buber essentially aristocratic in his view of dialogue, but he rather holds that it occurs wherever men are honest and open in their encounter with each other, wherever the between happens. He states:

Dialogue is no privilege of intellect. It does not begin in the upper story of humanity. It begins no higher than where humanity begins. There are no gifted and ungifted here, only those who give themselves and those who withhold themselves.

In such a view of dialogue we re-acclaim the individual person as the end and unit of meaning and ethical value in this "absurd" world and re-establish both education and political democracy as means to this end. Seen from this point of

22Buber, Between Man . . ., p. 25.
23Ibid., p. 73.
24Ibid., p. 35.
25Ibid., p. 37.
view, in fact, democracy is a means and set of conditions that offers man freedom as the ontological possibility for creating his own quality of individual life. From the results of this achievement or lack of it, the democratic citizen fashions the institutional forms that continue to enhance this freedom and becoming. And it would seem to follow from this formulation that the encounter of men in dialogue would itself be the major institutional form in both classroom learning and political democratic dialogue. For here in the between, one discovers and builds his ontological subjectivity. The specific content and issues of the classroom dialogue would depend upon the learner's stage of becoming, and upon the levels of the transcendence of bias as suggested in the preceding curricular schemata.

A learner also discovers men who made other choices and becomings in life and thus sees in actualized forms what he might have been and still might be to some degree. Hence, he meets his own potential that might otherwise have been denied. He encounters this in the dialogue of the classroom, and honors it. This is Rogerian "significant learning." This kind of encounter is perhaps often threatening. But one who has accepted finitude and the responsibility for the choices he has affirmed, this kind of dialogue opens up a human community that is potentially fulfilling far beyond what a single individual can actualize inside the limits of his own existential becoming. Such a human community or
public school classroom is potentially a rewarding life to live and dialogue within. It appears to be a necessary focus for transforming an economic and political institutional society into a human community of persons. These educated persons would address themselves to a common "kairos," receiving both support in their subjective becoming and the opportunity to discern and transcend the egocentric and ethnocentric bias of their own created life forms.

In conclusion, then, we may say that the relationship between the teacher and the learner in the classroom involves a dynamic, a moving to and fro, between these two types of dialogue. The Socratic "gadfly sting" or "torpedo touch" is utilized by the teacher in expressing her own authenticity and social criticism before the "idols" of the tribe, cave, market-place, and theatre that constitute the defense-needs, protective generalities, and biases to be transcended in her less mature students. This is a conditional and social dialogue that is frankly committed to human reason, a view of created truth and reality, and a conviction that the examined life which includes the dynamics of ontological subjectivity is more satisfying, more socially valuable, and more worth living than the unexamined life. Yet this conditional and judgmental value position that the teacher represents as teacher and as educated human being is itself communicated within the context of the second form of dialogue. This relationship between the teacher and learner honors the
ontological being of both. It honors the defense-needs and
anxieties of the new learner as he begins to actualize his
unique potentialities authentically, and as he begins to
structure both his "self to be made" and his created inter-
pretations of the meanings of his life and ultimate concerns
in relation to his growing understanding of the contemporary
human community and "kairos." It also honors the ambigui-
ties of the teacher as one member of a pluralistic democratic
community, who being finite may be in error, but who being
an open and inquiring teacher is ready to admit honest value
differences and disagreements and to begin to rectify her
own errors and exhibit the processes of transcending bias
in the classroom itself. In such a context and inter-
personal relationship, classroom learning by both the student
and teacher would appear to be potentially significant (in
Rogers' terms), and worthy of being one's ultimate concern
(in Tillich's terms).
It is traditional to close a dissertation with a statement of possibilities for further research. In the case of the present dissertation this is particularly valuable because there has been very little application of the presently examined frames of reference to the area of formal education. What has been focused upon here in introductory form could be extended into a lifetime of professional specialization, and no doubt most of these areas will find this concentration from some scholars and specialists.

It is apparent, first of all, that the distinction between ontology and epistemology remains introductory in the present dissertation, and that some of the meaning of later categories such as "ontological self-hood" would benefit from more extensive research in this area. The English language seems to suffer from a lack of introspective discriminations and categories as compared with the philosophic and psychological writings from France and especially Germany, or the ancient Greeks. We may find that greater international and intercultural scholarship in the areas of the subjectivity of the human being is one of the most
important frontiers in contemporary education. The contem­
porary work of the French Existential philosopher, Merlou-
Ponty,¹ who is examining the "phenomenology of perception,"
seems particularly important here, and the present work
ignores his position since very little of it is yet trans­
lated into English. Also the work on concept development
and formation of values and judgments by Piaget and the
researchers continuing his efforts seems to be especially
relevant. The research into new approaches to the philosophy
of science, as suggested in the present account around the
discussion of science in psychology—in the treatment of
people as persons rather than as things—seems particularly
central, as does all research into the processes of concept
development or symbol formation.

More pertinent to the present focus of this disserta-
tion, however, are the suggestions for further research that
come from the paucity of literature applying the existential
frame of reference and the self-psychology frame of reference
to educational theory and practice. There is presently very
little educational theory and practice that reflects this
point of view. The position developed here finally focused
only upon one existential thinker, namely Paul Tillich. Any
one of the other major existential philosophers is equally

¹Maurice Merlou-Ponty. See Bibliography for works
presently available in English.
available and important. Further, there will undoubtedly be new philosophic thought emerge in these areas.

The attempt was made in this dissertation to integrate a view of philosophy and a view of psychology as a potentially valuable approach to the theory and practice of education. There appears to be a close affinity between the assumptions of existential philosophy and some self-psychologists, as this dissertation shows. So other combinations of existential philosophers and psychologists would appear to be potentially valuable approaches to education. Very closely related is the movement for an existential psychology, represented today by such thinkers as Binswanger\(^2\) and Rollo May, who will undoubtedly collect therapeutic and research information that could be of inestimable value to educators. Also the phenomenologists both in philosophy and psychology become relevant and important, and very little has yet been done to apply their framework systematically to education.

In this dissertation the self-psychologists have been focused upon as potentially very valuable as a basis for an approach to education, and the work of Rogers and Maslow was singled out particularly. This could easily be extended to the theoretical formulation and research findings of these two men. They will no doubt both continue to produce works

of potential value to future approaches to education. The nature of the self and the research on healthy and healed persons, seem a valuable approach to education, and central to both theory and practice. There are other psychologists who are potentially valuable in this school of thought. Clark Moustakas would be especially valuable in developing the implications of this theoretical position to an approach to the Elementary levels of interpersonal relationships and curricular practices. Erich Fromm’s position is compatible with the general viewpoint defended in this dissertation and deserves considerable attention in education. Also, Gordon Allport’s position appears valuable. Self-psychology is a growing frame of reference in psychology that should be central and exciting for educators to watch in the present and near future.³

A third large area of further research suggested by this dissertation is that implied in the focus on man’s

³As Maslow suggests, it is impossible to list all of the thinkers and authors in this frame of reference. He suggests: A simpler way of grouping these is available in the five journals in which this group is most apt to publish, all relatively new. These are the Journal of Individual Psychology (University of Vermont, Burlington, Vt.), the American Journal of Psychoanalysis (220 W. 98th St., New York 25, New York), the Journal of Existential Psychiatry (679 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Illinois), the Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry (Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), and the newest one, the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (2637 Marshall Drive, Palo Alto, California).
symbolic capacities. The research on the philosophical anthropologists, especially the formulations of Cassirer, Langer, and Tillich, seems to have great potential power and scope as an over-all approach to education. A thorough and systematic examination of Cassirer's thought, of the view of man as a symbol-making animal, appears to be a profitable frame of reference. The broad application of this position that Suzanne Langer is making to art and music and drama forms is extremely suggestive as to how the position might be made the base of an inter-disciplinary approach to all levels of symbolic learning. Also we will increasingly have research in the area of children's development of symbols and concepts, and this research is fundamental to the approach to educational theory and practice defended in this dissertation.

A fourth area of further research is suggested by our increasingly international and inter-cultural social reality. The comparison of cultural assumptions and heritages has so far been quite haphazard in America. It could be done systematically as culture conflict continues and the integrity of other cultural forms is maintained and honored rather than integrated into our own forms and meanings. There is now a great deal of writing and research in the area of the nature of prejudice and of how education can help to transcend this
social virus. There are beginning studies on how philosophies and values are also sometimes used as prejudicial categories, and it appears evident that such writings and research are of fundamental importance.

There is the necessity for an increased comprehensiveness of comparative education and international education in the training of teachers. The interpretation given in this dissertation points to a more ontological approach to the education of man. This would not only compare the cultural differences and similarities of the various cultural heritages and national structurings of education, but would increasingly focus on the common universal human conditions of contingency and possibility. It might also focus on the contemporary "kairos" tensions and forms seen from differing cultural backgrounds. This is a tremendous undertaking of scholarship and understanding, of course, but the pressures of the contemporary and future human reality will demand nothing less than this.

A final area of further research suggested by the investigations of this dissertation grows out of the focus and concepts of Paul Tillich. It is obviously believed that Tillich's thought is worthy of serious attention from secular educators and educational theorists. The concepts

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of transcendence and of creativity appear to be universally valuable to education, independent of Tillich's frame of reference. Investigation of ontological philosophy has been defended as needed in education. Finally, this dissertation suggests that some major theological thought and a re-investigation of the relationships between secular education and some formulations of religious questions may be very valuable to secular educators.
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