EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF N. O. LOSSKY

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of the Ohio State
University

By
ALEX HETKO, B. A., B. S., M. A.

******

The Ohio State University
1958

Approved by

[Signature]
Adviser
Department of Education
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Indebtedness is gratefully acknowledged to Everett J. Kircher, whose understanding and keen analysis made this study possible; to H. Gordon Hullfish and Bernard Mehl, whose constructive criticisms proved a valuable aid in developing and organizing the present document. Appreciation should be expressed, especially, to the philosopher, N. O. Lossky, who gave generously of his time and wisdom in reading the document in process. His contributions and suggestions have been invaluable. Finally, it is with the greatest appreciation that I thank my wife and family for their help and understanding in this undertaking.
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1

Chapter

I  UNITY ........................................ 13

Meaning of real being and ideal being........ 13
Substantival agent is creator of his
manifestations ........................................ 15
Nature of unity ..................................... 19
The world as a unity ................................ 19
Evolution as a unity of multiplicity ............ 28

II  FREEDOM ........................................ 33

Causality ........................................... 33
Formal and material freedom ....................... 38
Man's freedom from the laws of nature ........... 40
Man's freedom from God ............................ 46
Man's free will is helped by God's Grace ......... 47

III  THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE ......................... 51

Consciousness and knowledge ...................... 51
Problem of theory of knowledge .................... 51
The relation between the knowing subject
and the human object ................................ 57

The theory of sensation

Diagrams indicating theories of observation 62
The non-sensuous experience of relation
in perception ........................................ 68

Judgment and truth ................................ 70
Judgment as a purposeful act of ego ............. 70
## CONTENTS (Contd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>III (Contd)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The nature of a judgment</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The nature of a true judgment</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of intuitivism with other theories</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-realism</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical realism</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV VALUE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth of value is realized in the process of living</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle of valuation</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinism versus free purposive activity</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive and negative values imply freedom</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God as the primary and all-embracing and absolute intrinsic value</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human personality as the potentially all-embracing and absolute intrinsic value</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulness of being means living a life of goodness, beauty, truth, love, etc</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education as the process of attaining fullness of being</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The teacher and pupil as searchers for truth</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self as a unity</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific knowledge and education</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repentance and education</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

In the history of Western thought many men have been concerned about the problems of philosophy, especially the problems of metaphysics and epistemology. In general the problems have been viewed in either-or terms. Either one assumed the position of a naturalist by viewing the world in its ultimate analysis as nature or one assumed the position of an idealist by viewing the world as ideal at basis.

One philosopher who seems to have solved certain problems related to metaphysics and epistemology is Nicolas O. Lossky. In his metaphysics Lossky asserts that the world in its ultimate analysis is one, monistic and ideal, forming one organic whole as a cosmos. Thus Lossky can be classified as an idealist. In his epistemology, however, Lossky can be seen as a realist. Combining the position he takes in his meta-physics and that in his epistemology he may be called an "ideal realist."

The philosophical theory which he sets forth offers concepts worthy of examination for one who is concerned with the philosophical problems related to education. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore Lossky's position to see what fruitful suggestions are provided for the formation of a philosophy of education.
N. O. Lossky was born in 1870 in the province of Vitebsk in Russia. He graduated both in the faculties of Science and of Arts at the University of St. Petersburg where he subsequently became professor of philosophy. In 1922 the Soviet Government exiled him from Russia. He lived in Prague until 1942, where he was professor of philosophy at the University of Prague. From 1942 to 1945 he was professor of philosophy at Bratislava, in Czechoslovakia. He has served, also, as a visiting lecturer and professor of philosophy in the United States and now lives in California.

Lossky's chief works include the following: The Fundamental Doctrines of Psychology from the Point of View of Voluntarism; The Foundations of Intuitivism; The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge; The World As an Organic Whole; The Fundamental Problems of Epistemology; Logic; Freedom of Will; Value and Existence; Types of World Conception; Dialectical Materialism in U.S.S.R.; Sensuous, Intellectual and Mystical Intuition; God and World Evil (a theodicy); The Conditions of the Absolute Good (ethics); Dostoevsky and His Christian World Conception; The World as the Realization of Beauty (in press); History of Russian Philosophy (1951).

In assuming that the world in an ultimate sense is either purely nature or ideal (i.e., naturally monistic or ideally monistic), a difficulty arises in each assumption regarding epistemology. Empiricism as stated by either the naturalist or the idealist (such as Locke or Berkeley), holds that
the only means of knowing the world, with its relations and objects, is by the five senses. Lossky feels that empiricism provides an inadequate explanation of the world with its relations and objects and, hence, secures inadequate knowledge. He explains the world, with its relations and objects, not only by means of the five senses but also by non-sensual means which he calls intuition.

Lossky explains intuition on the basis of this concept of being. The world, with its relations and objects, is composed of both ideal being and real being (ideal-realism). Real being exists only on the basis of ideal being and for this reason the world, with its objects and relations, is an organic whole. This implies that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos. As a cosmos the world, with its relations and objects, is not a product of chance but a product of the purposive activity of a World Spirit.

The World Spirit is the source of a purposive activity which reveals an absolute purpose composing a whole (a system) containing parts which have the capacity of existing for the sake of each other, as well as for the sake of the whole. When these parts exist for the sake of each other and for the sake of the whole through purposive and creative activity, they realize an all-embracing unchangeable, and eternal absolute purpose. In speaking of the
all-embracing, unchangeable, and eternal absolute purpose

Lossky says:

In accordance with the nature of the Spirit, that purpose can be no other than to make the whole structure of the world and every event in it subservient to the development of spirituality in the entities of the psycho-physical realm, and thus educate them for reunion with the Kingdom of God.¹

Education involves the spiritual aspect of the development of the entities in the world and of the world structure itself. In educating the world and its entities through spiritual development Lossky says:

The Spirit does not forcibly interfere with the lives of psycho-physical entities in order to transform their plurality into a rational unity. It simply confers actual existence upon the cosmic order, the possibility of which is inherent in the original nature of substances, since each of them, far from being a tabula rasa, is a perfectly unique essence, capable of occupying one strictly determinate place in the Kingdom of God.²

The educative process would deal not with a meaningless blank substance but with a unique entity having meaning and value. The highest value for each unique entity would be attained by developing its unique potential to its fullest meaning in terms of absolute values, such as goodness, truth, or beauty. This is individual fullness of being in the Kingdom of God. The end of education, therefore, is reunion with the Kingdom of God.


²N. O. Lossky, World as an Organic Whole, p. 166.
All beings capable of what may be called reasoning power ought to pursue in activity the highest and, therefore, most valuable purpose which is all-embracing, unchangeable, eternal, and absolute. But this purposive activity is performed according to the individual uniqueness of each substance, according to Lossky a substantival agent.

The words "substantival agent" refer to what has commonly been called substance in the field of philosophy, that is, that which is changeless and endures, and that in which properties, as existence, are manifested and can be modified. Lossky adds another notion, however, to the commonly accepted meaning of substance. It is his view that substance is neither a passive nor an abstract element but an active one.

According to Lossky a substantival agent, as substance, is active and is a spiritual force which creates its existence or manifestations in its activity. As a spiritual force it is neither male nor female; it has no sex. As spiritual force, however, it is the "most important part of the cause" of its existence and manifestations in the time and space realm revealed as both animate and inanimate being and male and female. In inanimate being the substantival agent is revealed as a unique supertemporal and superspatial self or
a subject in the sense of being the subject in a knowledge situation of objective existence. Lossky says:

It is appropriate to recall here the conception of substance and its attributes that has long been current in philosophy. One and the same self is both the creative source and the bearer of its various manifestations in time; the self is a substance and its desires, feelings and other manifestations are its attributes. In order to emphasise the fact that desires and feelings are not passively superimposed upon the self but are its living activities I will designate the self by the term "substantival agent" instead of substance. The word substance seems to suggest that the object to which it refers is something abstract, like a mathematical idea.3

In order to express the concept of substantival agent more clearly let us compare it to the school of thinking called Personalism. Personalism as a school of philosophy, in general, asserts that the world's existence in its entirety, both mind and matter, consists in individual entities which are either actual or potential personalities, Lossky's substantival agent is the Personalists' kind of an individual entity as an actual or potential personality. Therefore, Lossky can be called a Personalist.

Lossky's personalism is somewhat like Leibniz's personalism. The theories of both Lossky and Leibniz affirm a spiritual force as the basis of actual and potential personalities. Leibniz calls the spiritual force a monad and Lossky refers to it as a substantival agent.

Looking further into Lossky's works we see that the world, as ultimate reality, is composed of spiritual substances which he calls substantival agents. It may not be divided into the contrasting substances of mind and body.

Mind and body (body as matter and objects of the world) are processes of these spiritual substances or substantival agents. As processes they are activities of a multitude of substantival agents which form the mind or body. Neither mind nor body are eternal, therefore, but exist as activities or manifestations of the substantival agents. Mind is an activity of the substantival agents in time, whereas, material body is an activity of the substantival agents in both time and space. The mind activity is revealed in such expressions as wishes, desires, feelings, etc. The material body activities are revealed in such expressions as attraction and repulsion.

Lossky uses the word "body" in two senses. In the first place, he denotes by this term the material processes performed by a substantival agent in space and time. Secondly, he uses this term to denote a group of substantival agents who have associated themselves with a more developed substantival agent and who serve the latter as its organs. To distinguish between these two meanings of the word "body" Lossky sometimes uses the terms "material body" and "allied body." The meaning in which the word "body" is used is usually clear, however, from the context.
Regarding the substantival agent and the theory of knowledge which is important to educational theory, the substantival agent as the supertemporal and superspatial aspect in the knowledge situation should be distinguished from the objects of space and time. Objects of perception in space and time realm as manifestations are the products of substantival agents. As a spiritual creative power the supertemporal and superspatial substantival agent, besides being the "most important part of the cause" of his existence and manifestations, maintains the unity of the consciousness of the self or ego by means of which the objects of the world as space and time existence are known.

The self which is the unifying centre of consciousness profoundly differs from such objects as joy, sorrow, the flight of the lark, etc.: those objects have a temporal form, they arise, pass and disappear in time, while the self has no temporal form.  

Regarding the substantival agent and value, the substantival agent possesses absolute intrinsic value and creates his life as a value as his manifestations in time and space. The kind of life created by the substantival agent in terms of value is dependent upon the kind of creative activity the super-qualitative force freely exerts. It is in terms of freedom, therefore, that substantival agents create existence as life and as value.

---

God is the all-embracing and absolute intrinsic value. As the Creator of substantival agents who possess absolute intrinsic value, God does not create existence as the manifestation of substantival agents. The agents themselves create this existence as their own act of freedom and creation.

God's connection, therefore, with all of existence is not a necessary one but one of Grace, which the substantival agent knows as freedom. Freedom, then, is the basis of the building of existence, the character of the substantival agent which develops by means of the evolutionary process to become a human being and the fulness of being as the end of education or the good life. Mankind, therefore, develops (creates) his own life, mind, character, and physical manifestations by means of freedom.

In one respect this is the idea of existentialism as developed in Western thought recently, which asserts that existence as freedom precedes essence, essence being the human being's life and character. Thus this creation of life and character is either good or evil as value, according to the kind of creative activity.

Lossky also asserts the same idea, in one respect. Mankind freely creates his existence as a value. The freely created existence is a positive value if it contributes to the individual's fulness of being as absolute and
intrinsic value. It is a negative value if the freely created existence tends to retard or turn away from fulness of being.

It is in his conception of the sense of fulness of being that Lossky differs from both the Western tradition of Platonic absolutes and from Existentialism. For Lossky, absolute fulness of being (which the human being creates as his essence and as his manifestation) is not identical with the absolute found in Plato or Existentialism.

What Plato calls absolutes and ultimate reality (as for example, space, time, number, etc.) are merely abstractions. They describe the ways of acting for all substantival agents according to Lossky. Lossky's ultimate reality is not abstract but concrete, which is the fulness of being. The concrete as fulness of being goes beyond the abstract; it uses the abstract in its approach to fulness of being or concreteness.

N. O. Lossky's philosophy in terms of the concept of absolutes, therefore, is unlike the philosophy found in the Western tradition. Lossky does borrow from Western tradition, however. His philosophy, in general, combines Plato and Leibniz; but his followers feel that he goes beyond both of these philosophers.

Another concept not found in Western tradition runs through his general philosophy. This concept is "sobornost." Lossky would agree with the current Russian theological view
concerning "sobornost." (The idea of "sobornost" is not shared by the communistic government, for Lossky was exiled from Russia and would have been killed by the Communists had he not been in the hospital, rather than teaching, when they came to arrest him after the revolution.)

Concerning the idea of sobornost Lossky says:

The idea of sobornost developed by Khomiakov is also of great importance. Sobornost means a combination of unity and freedom of many persons on the basis of common love for God and for all absolute values. It will be easily seen that the principle of sobornost is of value not only for the life of the church but also for solving many problems in the spirit of synthesis between individualism and universalism. Many Russian philosophers have begun to make use of it in discussing various questions of spiritual and social life. This principle is so valuable that it ought to be designated by a special term. It is best to introduce for the purpose the Russian word sobornost which already is used sometimes in English, French and German literature. The Anglican-Orthodox Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius publishes a magazine called Sobornost.5

In Lossky's philosophy the combination of unity and freedom is expressed "on the basis of a common love for God and for all absolute values" as each individual expresses his unique love for God when the individual attains fulness of life or being. This love, as an approach to fulness of life or being, is expressed by means of creative activity which would be impossible without individual freedom. This

is to say that the more creative the individual is in his activities the more freedom he possesses and, conversely, the more free he is the more creative he is.

When individuals combine their efforts of creative activity in their expression of love for God and the absolute values in their approach to fulness of life, the concerted efforts of creativity form a family or community of a free and concerted creative activity in which the principle of "love thy neighbor as thyself" becomes a living expression of the reality of love.

Because truth is an absolute value, and an aspect of the principle of loving one's neighbor as oneself, the implication follows that truth is not the possession of any one race of peoples. "Sobornost" as the "idea of commonality" would imply the idea that truth is a possible common element of all races of peoples, of all humanity, and that the particular unique truth of each race is a partial element of the truth expressed in all of humanity. "Sobornost" also expresses the view that truth, to the extent that it is a human possibility, can only be attained by and through the sharing of these unique common elements of the truth between and among humanity as a whole. Lossky's general philosophy, therefore, is not denominational, but is based upon two basic principles found throughout religious thought. These are (1) love God and (2) love your neighbor as yourself.
CHAPTER I

UNITY

A quotation from N. O. Lossky will reveal his approach to the problem:

Thus, real being can only exist on the basis of ideal being—i.e. spatial and temporal events are grounded in what is non-temporal and non-spatial, and, in the last resort, in what is super-temporal and super-spatial, namely in substantival agents. A philosophy which thus interprets the world may be described as ideal-realism.1

Lossky calls his philosophy ideal-realism because of his conception of the relationship between real being and ideal being. One may properly ask, however, what is real being and ideal being?

By the term real being I mean events (i.e. something that arises and disappears in time) dynamically and actively realised in that aspect of space and time in virtue of which the parts of an event exist externally to one another. By the term ideal being I mean all that is free from the disruptions of time and space, i.e. all that either has no spatial and temporal form at all, or exist in that aspect of space and time which conditions the interpretation of the different parts and their power of transcending their own limits.2

Lossky calls all events, that is, all that have temporal form (psychical and psychoid processes) or temporally-


2Ibid., p. 3.
spatial form (physical processes) by the term real being. All that does not have temporal and temporally-spatial form he calls ideal being.

The most important species of ideal being are supertemporal and superspatial substantival agents, who generate real being or events, imposing upon them the form of space or time or both. Such is e.g. a human Ego and this is also the case for instance with an electron, as the source of attractions and repulsions.\(^3\)

Ideal being is the condition of the unity, the interconnectedness and the systematic character of the world, as well as of its having meaning and being knowable.\(^4\)

According to his doctrine every real being (every event) exists on the basis of ideal being, because it is created by some substantival agents according to ideal principles. Ideal being, as a substantival agent, is important to the world for it is the "condition of unity in the world." Lossky calls a substantival agent a concretely ideal being. His conception of substantival agents as the creators of unity is basic to his view of unity and warrants special consideration.

What is the nature of a substantival agent? An agent is not a line nor a point, or any other conceivable space-time entity. The agent does not arise and disappear in time, neither does he flow or last as temporal events do. The agent is a supertemporal and superspatial entity which

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 3.
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 3.
Lossky calls a substantival agent. He is a unique substance, and a spiritual entity that creates his physical or psychoid and physical manifestations and other activities. He is creative.

Every substantival agent is a person, either actual (for instance, man) or, at least, potential, i.e., it can develop and become an actual personality. Every substantival agent is a supertemporal and superspatial egos (Self). Lossky's metaphysics is a kind of personalism, therefore, like the philosophy of Leibniz, who affirms that the world consists of monads which are actual or, at least, potential persons.

Every substantival agent is an ego (Self). Highly developed agents possess an allied body which consists of less developed agents, who are subordinate to it and serve as its organs.

The substantival agent (concretely ideal being) creates his physical, psychoid, and physical manifestations in the space-time realm by his creative power with the help of other agents. A multitude of agents are subordinated to the one, the highest agent, which can be called ego. They form a unity so intimate that some of their actions which they perform seem to proceed as from one agent only. As bearers of a creative power, and as the cause of their manifestations, all substantival agents are independent;
but in other respects, for instance as bearers of "metaphysical ideal principles" or "abstractly ideal forms" they are identical and one.

All substantival agents realize their manifestations in accordance to the "abstractly ideal forms" which can be called principles and these are revealed in time, space, mathematical forms, etc.

In creating his manifestations a substantival agent makes them conformable to the principles of the structure of time and of space, to the mathematical laws of functional dependence, and so on. Those principles have an abstractly ideal character. The profound difference between substantival agents and those abstract ideas consists in the fact that abstract ideas have a limited content, whereas every substantival agent is infinitely rich in content and cannot be exhausted by any combination of abstract ideas. Substantival agents may therefore be said to be concretely ideal entities. Besides, abstract ideas are passive; of themselves they are incapable of imposing form; there must be an agent to impose form on real processes in accordance with abstract ideas. This is precisely what a substantival agent does: being endowed with creative power he produces real processes and informs them in accordance with abstract ideas. Thus, concretely ideal agents are the bearers of abstractly ideal forms.5

These principles (abstractly ideal forms) are universals in the Platonic sense. They are identical in all substantival agents.

Not only is an individual human being a unity, a hierarchy of substantival agents, but Lossky goes to the extent

---

5N. O. Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy, p. 255. Lossky refers to himself and his writings in the third person, as above, in the book History of Russian Philosophy.
of saying that even a single atom and the universe itself is a hierarchy of substantival agents.

Remarkable forms of such consubstantiality arise when a group of agents subordinates itself to one agent standing at a higher level of development and becomes its organs. That results in such a hierarchy of unities as an atom, a molecule, a crystal, a unicellular organism, a multicellular organism, a community like a beehive or a nest of termites; in the sphere of the human life there are nations and mankind as a whole; further, there is our planet, the solar system, the universe. Each subsequent stage of unification possesses higher creative powers than the preceding and is headed by a personality on a higher stage of development. Thus, Lossky's metaphysics, like Leibniz's monadology, is a hierarchial personalism.°

Not merely are the objects of this earth composed of substantival agents but other planets and the entire universe are of the same composition. In the physical and sensible sense we speak of this composition as matter. Matter (real being) is a process of repulsion and attraction, which composes impenetrable bulks, and is permeated with sense qualities. Matter is the product of the activity of a substantival agent or agents; it is not a substance in any historical or conventional sense.

We may say that the nature of the subject, as ego or self, and the things of the external world were seen to be essentially alike in that at the basis of both is the same kind of supertemporal and superspatial substance, that is, ideal being. Because of this likeness of composition in the

°Ibid., p. 256.
essential first principle, that is, supertemporal and superspatial, the relation between them is nonspatial and non-temporal, making it possible for the agents to be present to one another ideally, that is, non-causally in the physical sense.

Let us analyse a particular instance of an event created by a substantival agent. Suppose I push away a dead branch. My self, the source, of activity, is a supertemporal and superspatial entity; that is why it can create the process of pushing away and impose upon it spatial and temporal form, i.e. can realise it as an infinite plurality of moments coming "before" and "after" one another and of positions lying "further" or "nearer." In virtue of its supertemporal and superspatial character the self creates the complex content of its manifestations without being separated from, or connected with, any part of it by the relations of "before," "after," "far" or "near." It holds the parts together superspatially and supertemporally, bestowing even upon their externality the character of unity as expressed by the idea of a single whole of time and of space, and by an infinite number of temporal and spatial relations uniting all with everything.

... The omnipresence of relations in real being does not mean that the substantival agent synthesizes discrete elements of reality. In virtue of his supertemporal and superspatial character he is able to create a real event, such as pushing away the branch, as a continuous temporally-spatial process—as a process, i.e., which contains an actual infinity of points and moments external to one another.7

Manifestations of every agent possess qualities or properties. These qualities or properties are related into a unity by the coordinating power of the top agent in the hierarchical system and this unity we can say consists of

---

browness, hardness, and flatness, which are unified in a relation possessing a systematic character.

What then is the nature of this relation we call unity? Although it is in the realm of space and time, it is nonspatial and nontemporal. It transcends the mutual externality of the parts of the object it involves and gives it a character of wholeness; it combines the spatial and temporal multiplicity into a unity. The relation of unity belongs to the ideal realm.

All that belongs to the ideal realm (say, for instance, the relation of unity in a table top) is an object of nonsensuous perception, as browness, hardness and the like. One can say that browness could be seen and hardness could be touched but it is impossible to touch or to see the unity of browness or hardness. The important factor in this emphasis is that unity is an essential element in the perception of things. This means that even the sensuous perception of a thing is not wholly sensuous for the ideal aspect contained in each object is cognized by intellectual intuition. Lossky comes to this view as a necessary conclusion from his view that objects have a unity, a systematic character, because they contain a nontemporal and nonspatial aspect supplied by the substantival agents.

In considering the world as a whole, it can be said that the world itself is also a systematic unity. The object of the world, and the world itself as a real being, has a
systematic character of unity only in so far as it is ideal at basis, that is, has ideal being. This conception of unity and ideal being is worthy of closer examination. Ideal being has two aspects. One aspect is the by-product of the independent creative power of agents. Every substantival agent is independent and is the bearer of a creative power that is his own. The second aspect is that every agent is also the bearer of formal principles of activity—namely, the principles of belonging, time, space, mathematical laws, etc. Lossky calls these principles "abstractly ideal forms." The independent creative activity of the substantival agent informs the manifestation process with these principles of time, space, and so forth. As bearers of these abstractly ideal forms the substantival agents are identical and form one being.

The existence of this identical aspect of substantival agents is their consubstantiality. In virtue of their consubstantiality, all the independent aspects and manifestations of substantival agents are coordinated with one another and exist for one another. All is immanent in all. Also, in virtue of their consubstantiality substantival agents are present to one another ideally, that is, nonspatially and nontemporally, which makes possible the communion of love, sympathy, and the like.

In creating their manifestations in accordance with the identical ideas (or principles) the substantival agents
form one single world, a unity in one space and in one time. The abstract ideas are numerically identical for all agents, and for this reason they form one being, and in this sense they are consubstantial.

It is in this respect that Lossky fundamentally differs from the system of monadology expressed by Leibniz. Lossky's monads, or substantival agents as he calls them, have "windows and doors." Because of the formation of one being, intuition, love, and sympathy are possible.

Let us consider the meaning of abstractly ideal forms a little more in detail. Abstractly ideal forms are nontemporal. Abstractly ideal forms cannot be sensed; they are not grasped by sensual means. They are not the activities of the substantival agent but the ways in which the agent acts. The ways of action of the agents are alike. For instance, they all act in time and in space, according to mathematical relations, the relation of belonging, and so on. In virtue of this likeness of acting, the abstractly ideal forms are universal.

The function of the ideal form of belonging may be illustrated in the following series of events: yesterday I had the desire to go home; today I am glad that I did not go because the roads were icy and slippery; I slipped and fell on the icy road yesterday and hurt myself; today I am in pain. The events of desire, gladness and pain belong to the substantival agent; they are connected with the agent in a
numerically single nontemporal form of belonging to it. There are not three numerically different copies of the ideal forms of belonging, even though the events happened at different times and in different places. The substantival agent is aware of the three events as belonging to him. He is aware that the relation of belonging is universal, that it is not inherent in the occurrence of the event or in an object of the external world. Universality is a common action of all substantival agents and yet the actions of the substantival agent, "the I," are unique.

Although different substantival agents create different events and have different experiences, their events are not merged into one event, even though the abstractly ideal form of belonging is identical in all the different cases. The agents perform different acts, each of which is independent of the other. The way in which the acts are performed, however, is universal. This means that substantival agents are not absolutely separate from one another in their being. It also means that they are capable of living a common life in which intuition, love, hate, and the like, are possible.

Space and time are abstractly ideal forms, that is, the way that substantival agents act. The world consists of substantival agents that are always in activity. Space and time are the forms of the activity of the substantival agents. The agents create space and time, hence the world is
not in space and time; indeed, the reverse is true, space and time are in the world.

The question as to whether space and time are infinite is answered if one recalls that space and time are subordinate to the substantival agents. Space and time, as abstractly ideal forms, have a limited content, whereas the substantival agent is infinitely rich in content.

Time and space are forms of contents of events; therefore, a temporal or spatial-temporal form without a content is impossible. As an example, an act of repulsion has a spatial-temporal form and its content is repulsion. There is no empty time and no empty space, therefore.

Space in which we live, that is, the space given to us in sense perception, has three dimensions. According to Lossky's hypothesis, substantival agents in the lowest level of development act in one dimension of space because of their extreme isolation from other entities. When the substantival agent develops by a gradual process of evolution he learns to act in two dimensions and then in three dimensions. In our realm of the world all substantival agents act in three dimensions.

On a higher level, thought reveals that there may be any number of dimensions of space. If there is an indefinite number of dimensions, then also there may be new forms and relations of complexity of interaction between value-relevant
actions of the substantival agents. Space in this last com-
plexity of interaction may be thought of as infinitely-
dimensional.

Time is the condition of activity of the substantival agents, of their life. And the subconscious and conscious final end of all activity of all substantival agents is the best life, the fulness of being.

In our realm of the world all substantival agents are selfish. Their actions are ego-centric for the most part and following in this path of ego-centricity an agent can never realize his goal or the purpose of his life. The agent is, therefore, dissatisfied with what he does, and because of the dissatisfaction tries new, or partly new, ways of acting which may even be opposed to his previous actions. Yet all his activities stand in the same relation to the agent. They are his activities; they belong to him.

One activity may supplant, or partly supplant, another activity and the nature of the activity (in relation to moral value) determines the general movement of the development of the substantival agent in the space-time realm of evolutionary processes. When, however, two activities oppose each other in the one and the same direction of development, one of the activities meets with death, that is, it is cancelled and lies in the past; otherwise two opposing activities could not co-exist in the same substantival agent. Logical opposites, as
conflicts of illogical thought, result in destruction and self-condemnation in this realm.

Conflicting opposition of activities in this space-time realm produce distorted lives in substantival agents. On the other hand, non-conflicting activities destroy all that which hinders progress such as failures, falsities, and imperfections.

Substantival agents, free of egoism, create only such actions which have absolute value—moral goodness, beauty, knowledge of truth. They attain fulness of life, and have their being in the infinitely dimensional space. Ffulness of life can be attained only in the Kingdom of the Spirit.

Substantival agents in this realm have developed to the degree that their activities are compatible with one another, satisfying to one another, and necessary for the good of the whole (the moral contents of this time realm can be said to be of absolute value.). This realm contains neither death of opposing activities nor a difference of tense, such as the present or future time, for here the future has been reached in and through the realization of the purpose for which the substantival agent is living.

I have tried to show that space and time are abstractly ideal forms, that is, the way that substantival agents act and that the world itself, as real being, has a systematic character of unity only in so far as it is ideal at basis, that is, has ideal being.
The question of the realization of the purpose for which the substantival agent is living leads us to the problem of evolution. In my opinion this problem is important in the development of any theory of education. As we examine Lossky's theory of evolution his concept of unity, as discussed above, should be kept in mind as it relates to the idea of the world of space and time.

Every substantival agent, beginning with an electron, atom, or molecule, and leading to man, is endowed with all the qualities that are required for the realization of the purpose of his life. Every selfish action performed by him, gives him an incomplete satisfaction. The agent, therefore, replaces one action by another, a newer action, that is more satisfying in his search for new ways of existence. Actions, therefore, are purposive. New forms of life arise from this search, that is, a form from the existence in the shape of mineral to plant life, animal life and human life.

In organic life, plant and animal, especially man, form a multitude of substantival agents and all are subordinated to one higher agent and form a complex hierarchical system of unity.

Lossky illustrates the complexity of a hierarchical systems as follows:

It must not be forgotten that an organism consists of a number of substantival agents which are to some extent independent. It is a complex hierarchical system that may be compared to an army in its structure. At the head of an army there is a
commander-in-chief, commanders of regiments are subordinate to him, officers are subordinate to their colonels, soldiers are subordinate to their officers. Similarly, at the head of the human organism, for instance, stands the human self; agents in charge of the higher nervous centres and of systems of organs are immediately subordinated to it; going lower down the scale, it must be supposed that every cell has its own organising agent and that the same is true of every molecule and every atom. Just as in the army a number of actions are performed by individual men independently, though in the spirit of the commander-in-chief's requirements, or sometimes against his will, disturbing the order of the whole, so in the human organism its lower systems are partly independent and sometimes act against the interests of the whole.8

The subordination is so complete and intimate that some of the actions they perform seem to proceed as if from one agent only. This is plausible for they make his idea of purposiveness their own.

The actions they perform in unison are not actions resulting from conscious decision only but also of subconscious decision, such as the subconscious actions of biological processes. The well-being of the unity of agents as a whole is affected by both the conscious and subconscious decisions of the central agent in the hierarchical system.

The unity of agents in a living body and the processes in it are often disturbed by illness and deformity. This may be due either to unfavorable influences of the environment of the person (or unity of agents) or to the inner

forces of disharmony within the person. Disharmony of inner forces is possible because each agent is partly independent which enables him to act against the interests and well-being of the good of the whole.

Many times it is not merely a group rebelling in disharmony but the whole unity of agents as an individual consciously tends to oppose, in its pride and ego-centricity, the ideal of life. Such individuals grow in evil and their path is devolution rather than evolution. In other cases there are blind alleys, so to speak, escape from which requires centuries of struggle.

Evolution consists in the increasing unity in complexity, that is, it involves a greater and greater unity in multiplicity. The purpose of unity in multiplicity is not self-preservation but a greater wealth of life, and the sign of a greater wealth of life is the progress of goodness accompanied by a greater complexity.

The conception of evolution therefore is not a change, a mutation, of existence that is accidently conditioned; but one that has been purposely achieved. The central agent of a human organism has passed from an electron through all the stages of development to a highly complex being. His experiences, as well as the experiences of the agents subordinate to him, have lasted probably millions of years. In this respect we can appreciate the complexity of actions displayed, both consciously and unconsciously, by the
central agent and his associates in the organization and the ruling of his bodily manifestations and processes.

The final end of evolution is to attain the fulness of life, the fulness of being, which can be called deification. This end is not attained by the preservation of oneself at the biological level of existence for deification is a super-biological purpose. At this point it should be clear that the struggle of existence is not the primary factor in the evolutionary process, although it does have its function. The primary factor is mutual help. Mutual help does not in itself create new qualities of life but it is important in preserving those qualities attained, as for instance, the moral and intellectual qualities. Intellectual qualities often do accompany a decrease in the physical power of an individual's acts of self-preservation.

In a way the agent's subconscious carries an experience of his previous stages of existence which are utilized at a further stage of existence. In this respect the substantival agent inherits acquired characteristics from his own self; he transfers them from his past life to the present.

Because of ideal being and because of the correlatedness of every substantival agent with every other agent in an organic world unity, it can be said that the world is dependent, that is, it is not absolutely self-subsistent. The correlatedness is not dependent upon another like relation for this would ultimately lead to an infinite
regress. It is rather based upon a higher principle, which transcends correlatedness as a cosmic system. The higher principle, therefore, is unlike the relations of the world as a system; it is super-relative principle, an absolute principle, that transcends the world system.

This super-relative and absolute principle does not contain a correlatedness of multiplicity for no element or relation of the world can be subsumed under it, in respect to meaning significance of attributes. It cannot be qualified for it has no attributes that are applicable to the attributes pertaining to the cosmic system. It is even beyond the traditional laws of logic, of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. It can therefore also be said to be a meta-logical principle.

There is a relation between the world and this absolute and meta-logical principle. It is a unique one-sided relation in which the world as a whole is related to the absolute principle. The one-sidedness is recognized when it is understood that the world system cannot exist without the absolute principle that transcends it, but the reverse is true, that is, the absolute principle can exist without the world system.

When one contemplates the world system in a rightly conducted inquiry, one is led to the realization that there is a principle which transcends all system. But this
realization does not compel us to pass from the principle to the world. This means that the world is contingent and not necessary.

This principle, the super-relative and absolute, does not contain any necessity compelling it to generate the world. Because the world is different from the absolute, it is unthinkable that it should be an emanation from it. Neither is the world the result of the evolution from the principle. The world is not a completion of the principle, nor is it a means of satisfying a need of the principle. The world is a creation, an absolute creation. The world is something completely new; neither the form nor the content of the world are in any respect derived from the principle.

When the absolute creates, this does not mean that there is "nothing" outside the absolute that could be used by it as material for building the world. Neither is there "nothing" within the absolute which is used for the creation. The world is created as something new that has never existed before. In other words, God created the world "out of nothing." It means that God does not need anything in order to create the world: no material given from without or borrowed from His own essence is necessary to Him.

This position does not admit pantheism. There is an ontological dividing line between the Absolute and the world.
The ultimate, as the Absolute, is the Creator that transcends the created and is incommensurable with it.

When speaking of the Creator we cannot attribute notions about it that are found in the world. In this sense it is not any "thing" of the world, that is, it is no-thing or the Divine Nothing of negative theology.
CHAPTER II

FREEDOM

Lossky's concept of causality is a significant element in his idea of freedom. Of it he says:

Lossky proves that the will is free, taking as his starting point the law of causality but defending a dynamistic interpretation of it. Every event arises not out of itself, but is created by someone; it cannot be created by other events; having a temporal form events fall away every instant into the realm of the past and have no creative power to generate the future.\(^1\)

Substantival agents are active, and their activity is in the form of creation. For instance, the ego creates attention or it, manifest as a person, may pick up a book. These actions are produced as something new, as new events that did not exist before. The agent is the cause of the creation of that new manifestation of an event.

Substantival agents which are on a lower level of development than a human being do not act as freely as those on the higher level, thus there is more of a regularity to their activity. Yet their activity is a creation and the cause of new manifestations. For instance, this is my example not Lossky's but it may help to show Lossky's concept of freedom. An electron, as a substantival agent, follows with

a great deal of regularity its course around the positive nucleous, but it so happens, for some unknown reason, that the course is changed and a light is produced which could not have been predicted. This is something new, as a new event that did not exist before, with the agent as its cause. In this realm there is the least freedom, and predictability has the highest degree of probability. Nevertheless, it follows that substantival agents act creatively and freely, and their freedom in the creativity is limited to their own development.

To be the cause of an event means to be a substantival agent who creates the event. There are many theories of causality. According to the positivist theory the cause of an event should be understood as the totality of events regularly followed by the event in question. That theory does away with the dynamic aspect of causality and retains only the temporal sequence, insisting upon its regularity. The conception of causality formulated above on the basis of the testimony of experience emphasizes, on the contrary, precisely the dynamic element of generation, regarding the temporal order of sequence as a derivative aspect of the generation of a new event. Further, this conception of causality indicates that events are created not by preceding events but by some substantival agent, i.e., by a super-temporal entity. Events are the fleeting products of the substantival agents' creativeness, receding into the abyss of the past and unable to create a new event; only a substantival agent can be the bearer of creative power manifesting itself in time.²

This conception of causality, which he calls the dynamic conception, indicates that events are created by substantival agents and not by preceding events. Events are the production of the agent, even though at the lowest level the agent's productivity is most regular. A substantival agent creates a new event on the basis of his past and present experiences. He is not bound by any law to repeat the creation of the same event for it is an entirely new creation, a new manifestation. It is in this respect that Lossky holds that events are not created by other events. To hold this view that events are created by other events would, according to him, lead to an infinite regress.

Lossky distinguishes between the term "cause" and "occasion." Cause has reference to a substantival agent which is the creator of an event, whereas the occasion of the event is the circumstance in connection with which the creation is performed by the substantival agent.

From what has been said about cause it follows that uniformity and necessity do not form part of the idea of causality. Causality is not necessary because a substantival agent is not compelled with necessity to repeat the same actions in the same circumstances. The only necessity is the necessary relation between the substantival agent's activity and the creation of a new event. The agent's free decision necessarily creates and this creation is an event, and effect, of his causality.
We have spoken of the relation of unity in the table top and said that the relation of unity in the table top which we could not touch or see belonged to the ideal realm, saying also that unity is the result of the activity of the substantival agents. Now we can say that this ideal relation of unity is a new effect because of the activity of the substantival agent which manifests itself in time and space. The substantival agent is the creator of unity.

The object has this systematic character of unity only in so far as it has an ideal being as its basis. All objects of the world (including the world as a cosmos) have an ideal being at basis. As a system every fragment of reality which enters our field of consciousness may be analyzed into two elements related to each other as ground and consequence. The ground, for example, is the cause and the consequence is the effect as a new manifestation, connected by the necessity of cause and effect. This necessity is the basis of the formation of a judgment about that object having an ideal basis.

The ground and consequence are found in the object with its relation of unity of qualities or characteristics and as a system composes the aspect of a judgment called synthetic. Lossky holds that this relation of ground and consequence in a synthetic judgment is a necessary relation and, in virtue of this necessity, synthetic judgments also have a necessary character. The necessary character of a
synthetic judgment consists in a necessary connection between the subject and the predicate of the judgment involving a given object and a predication of that object by means of an analysis of that object in consciousness.

The analysis is a discrimination of the object discovering in it a connection of its various aspects expressed in a synthetic judgment. The ground of the new knowledge is the synthetic necessity found in the object discriminated by means of analysis.

Because the object is a unity and the world is not a chaos but a cosmos, a systematically ordered whole, synthetic necessity is the basis of all judgments. For this reason an individual discovers not merely the necessity of "s" is "s" or "SP" is "P" but the necessity of whenever there is "s" there is "P" as something new from "S". This consideration of what Lossky means by cause and effect is necessary as a background for an understanding of his concept of freedom. Substantival agents, according to Lossky, were created to be free to act. They carry out this freedom of action in the form of a creative activity which is a result of their own choosing. In the Kingdom of the Spirit there is complete and perfect freedom and therefore complete and perfect-creative activity. In the psycho-physical world, however, freedom is incomplete and imperfect because the substantival agents choose to become proud and selfish and thus limit their freedom and creative activity.
In this limited state of freedom man is helped to struggle against selfishness and evil by comfort and education. Man is educated by inspiration to choose freely and to perform those acts which are for the good of the whole. By being proud and selfish man makes errors in his decisions, analyses, and selection of values.

God foresaw that human beings would make errors. He provided, therefore, that they should not enter into absolute evil through their errors but that their errors should be used in the search for the good. A kind of a search of this sort requires that we have freedom of will and that it be directed toward the good freely. The provision, therefore, is freedom of will.

Freedom has two aspects: (1) formal and (2) material. Formal freedom means freedom of choice; it is the power of choice, the power to act as a superspatial and supertemporal essence. An individual never loses but always has formal freedom, that is, the power of freedom of choice is always his. Formal freedom is revealed in that aspect of the individual which is the creative super-qualitative power to create qualitative consequences.

Many misunderstandings of the doctrine of free will are disposed of by distinguishing between formal and material freedom. Formal freedom means that in each given case an agent may refrain from some particular manifestation and replace it by another. That freedom is absolute and cannot be
lost under any circumstances. Material freedom means the degree of creative power possessed by an agent, and finds expression in what he is capable of creating.3

In the use of the super-qualitative power, however, the individual creates evil rather than good by freely choosing evil rather than good. When this is done he limits his power of doing what he chooses to do. Evil, in this case, is the individual's free act of becoming selfish by not choosing the goodness as revealed in the Creator's purpose of creation which is fullness of being for the creature through creative activity.

The aims of a selfish creature are frequently uninteresting to other beings, and may even be contrary to their strivings. In many cases, therefore, he does not receive any aid from other creatures, and may even meet their resistance. Thus the material freedom of an egoistic substantival agent is more or less limited, and he is incapable of carrying out many of the activities which he considers to be of value to himself.

He still retains formal freedom, however, and is completely free in having the super-qualitative power to create a new desire to create a new act. For example, by means of creating a new desire he may decide not to drink or not to eat, even though he has desired it in the past according to the laws of nature. Thus Lossky makes a

3Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy, p. 261.
distinction between the power (as formal freedom) to act and the desire (as an actualization of formal freedom or material freedom) to act. Man, therefore, is free to will a will, that is, has freedom of will, and carries out this freedom to decide upon a new desire which is manifested in the laws of nature from which he is free in the formal sense. We shall see at this point how it is that man is free from the laws of nature in the formal sense. We shall examine, also, the origin and the function of the laws of nature.

Man is free from the laws of nature in the formal sense in that he is the cause of the existence of these laws which he created through the wrong use of his super-qualitative power by becoming selfish. On the other hand, he is not completely free from these laws for he, too, possesses a natural body which he created for himself.

The laws of nature, from which man is free, have an abstract hypothetical uniformity. By abstract is meant that the laws are dependent. Dependent upon what? The substantival agent who possesses super-qualitative force of action, that is, the agent is the cause of his actions which are his manifestations. How is he the cause of his actions? In the respect that since nature, that is, matter, is a process of repulsion and attraction and not a substance, the substantival agent has the freedom either to perform the actions which create matter or to refrain from performing them. And in this sense it is hypothetical that if he creates this process
then he will become manifested as a material body in nature as impenetrable bulk. If he refrains from performing them, then the material laws, which express the laws of matter, do not have domination over him. If he does, then they do have a domination over him.

It must be understood, nevertheless, that the process which creates matter, as impenetrable bulk, is permeated with selfishness and is repulsion. It is the act of repulsion, that is, action and the resistance to the action. It is an interaction. This interaction is seen as dynamic by Lossky and it involves a relation between a super-qualitative force of the substantival agent and the qualitative result of the super-qualitative force which is the agent's manifestation, that is, the agent's nature as a body.

Since repulsion and the process of matter is the result of the agent's own efforts, God as the agent's creator has placed a limit to man's selfishness below which man cannot fall in his repulsive actions. This limit is in the form of that order which we call time, space, mathematical relations, etc., by means of which every agent expresses his acts of manifestations. Every agent is the bearer of these forms of order, that is the abstract ideal forms which are his limit.

But man frees himself from this limit by creative activity. In other words, the more creative the agent's acts are, the freer he is from time, space, etc. An electron,
for instance, shows very little creative activity and his level of action is quite monotonous and shows little originality and his freedom is in that limit we call time-space activity. On the other hand, the intellectual activity of a human being is much more creative. It has evolved by means of its use of freedom in acts of creative activity to a higher degree of material freedom.

Contents of events, that is, changes taking place in nature, are the manifestations of the human self's creative actions and strivings. Strivings are not given to the individual but are his actions; "striving is never forced upon man, either from without by his environment, or by his body, or from within."\(^4\) It is the individual's super-qualitative creative power with which he is endowed. What is it that affects the freedom of strivings, actions, in one way or another? It is an autonomous adopted rule, a law.

When a striving is repeated often enough and in a uniform fashion, it becomes an autonomous adopted rule, and the realization of a law in that particular case where the striving is taking place. Because of dissatisfaction a striving may change its course due to the agent's decision to change it for he possesses the super-qualitative power to cancel his former ways of acting. The agent has the power

to change his course of actions, his strivings, because he possesses super-qualitative creative power. Actions or strivings possess merely qualitative form and do not possess a super-qualitative power. On the human level this creation of the qualitative from the super-qualitative is the moment of willing or psychical activity. On the level lower than man, it is the dynamic moment and psychoidal. Lossky says,

The transition from the super-qualitative creative force to the domain of qualitative events may be described as "the moment of willing," or better still "the dynamic moment," since it will then also apply to substantival agents that are on a lower level of development than man, and manifest themselves psychoidly and not psychically.\(^5\)

This is consistent with Lossky's philosophical statement that matter is not a substance. If it were, his philosophy would admit materialism or naturalism. Matter, then, according to Lossky, is a process. Matter is the product of the strivings of substantival agents, and is the agent's own manifestation. Since the agent creates his manifestations, which reveal his strivings, it is within the power of the agent either to continue with a particular course of action (striving) and adopt a rule of conduct or to cancel his actions.

All strivings as actions are performed in accordance with abstract ideal forms which have no power to act. Such

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 96.
abstract ideal forms as mathematical principles, for instance, "condition the unity and rationality of the world." They are not laws of nature but are used by substantival agents to realize the laws of nature, that is, the agents create the laws and the laws are subject to the agents. As "conditioning the unity and rationality of the world" the abstract ideal forms make science possible to man through the laws of nature. The unity and rationality allows for a multiplicity of actions (events) to be performed some of which may be even contrary and contradictory in man's strivings and use of his super-qualitative creative power to perform a qualitative action or event.

This transition from super-qualitative to qualitative is an act of will and a causation. The agent causes the act to exist as reality and, therefore, the existence of reality and the dynamic quality of a necessary connection between the super-qualitative and qualitative depend upon his will. If he did not cause the thing, event, or act, it would not exist as a real thing, event, or act. On the other hand, as stated above, the substantival agent is the bearer of certain abstract ideal forms such as mathematical principles, time, space, and so on. These abstract ideal forms are not dependent upon the will of the substantival agent, and for this reason do not have the dynamic quality of a necessary connection.
The laws of nature are the expression of the activities of the substantival agents; they are dependent upon the will of the substantival agent, and have a dynamic quality, therefore, of a necessary connection which is the causal creative act of the substantival agent and expresses itself as a new existence.

How is the dynamic element possible? It is possible because of the process of interaction, that is, two creative forces oppose each other in the abstract ideal form and cause mutual resistance. Mutual resistance as a process becomes matter and becomes known as such because the substantival agent's activities transcend the limits of their own being, that is, the activities are not only activities for the agent who created them but also for other agents as well.

If there were not mutual resistance in the world, there would be no matter. Matter is merely one type of a process, as the mental activity of willing is another type of process, both of which are expressions of one's super-qualitative creative power. Thus there is freedom in the world. There is no dualism of mind and body in Lossky's theory. A law of nature, from which mankind is free, is a result of the interaction of substantival agents and is realized by all agents. This leads us to the problem of how mankind is free from God the Creator.
Mankind is not only free from the laws of nature but also free from God as his creator. God (endowed) gave his creatures freedom. Freedom is a means for attaining either the good or the evil. Some creatures decided to travel the path of selfishness and caused evil by making it for themselves with the freedom that was given them. Because only a creature that has the power and the freedom to do good can do evil, evil is the possibility of the good because of freedom while the good as freedom is the possibility of evil. In other words, evil exists because of the freedom given to man to praise the good but the good which is the source of freedom exists without evil. This is to say that good can exist without evil but evil cannot exist without the good.

God does not stop at the creation of an agent having a super-qualitative character. He permits his creatures, gives them freedom, to manifest their super-qualitative quality of freedom in the qualitative space-time character to become selfish. That is, He permits the created super-qualitative essence to become qualitative; He permits the essentially created good as freedom to become selfish and therefore evil. And the extent of his participation in the creation of this imperfect and selfish world is limited to his omniscience in the permission in that he knows that some agents will not follow the path of the good and He still creates them.
Lossky makes a distinction between omnipotence and omnicreativeness. Lossky asserts that God creates superqualitative substance but He does not create events that happen; events are the product of the created substance. Although God created man, nevertheless man is free from God. Man is free from God "even in his fallen state." While in the fallen state "man still retains the power of freely and sincerely condemning evil and of trying to free himself from it." 

But to condemn evil freely and sincerely and to try to free oneself from it is not the same as to desire the good and to complete one's happiness in achieving the good desired. In other words, Lossky distinguishes between doing and completing or achieving. Man has the power to condemn evil and try to free himself from it but he has not the power to desire the good sincerely and to affirm the good completely in his doing without the Grace of God. Man's free will is helped by God's Grace. How then does God participate by means of Grace in the spiritual development of man and in the world process "without interfering with the substantival agent's freedom" even though He is both omniscient and omnipotent? First, God's omniscience is compatible with

---

6 Ibid., p. 114.
7 Ibid., p. 113.
man's free will in that God permits his creatures to exercise their freedom even when He knows that some of His creatures will use the power of freedom selfishly. Not only does He permit the selfish use of freedom but He continues to create more substantival agents and endows them with freedom even when knowing that some agents will use their freedom selfishly. God is omnipotent in the following way. God, as the Absolute Good, creates and endows agents with freedom. Freedom is the means of attaining either good or evil, that is, of the agent's praising their Creator or rebelling against the Creator by becoming selfish.

God has no doing with selfishness, which is evil. This is the agent's doing alone. But God provides by his Grace for a limit to man's selfishness in the form of a unity which are the abstract ideal forms, such as revealed in time and space and mathematical relations, etc., in terms of which all agents have abstract consubstantiality, which is the possibility of the agents acting together even when they are all unique and independent in power. This combining of independence and uniqueness into a unity is the rationality of the world. In this rationality of the world God, as supertemporal and superspatial, foreknows and foresees the past, present and future in His "supertemporal rest and supertemporal wholeness to which space and time are subordinate."

---

8Ibid., p. 117.
God is omniscient and omnipotent but not omnicreative for He does not create evil. He does not know the future that will follow upon what man does. He does not foresee, in short, in terms of the past. Nothing causes God to know either the past, the present or the future, or any causal, logical, or mathematical relation as we know relations, since He is related to the world by means of Grace and not by means of causality. Thus the world is not pantheistic in nature, neither is it an "emanation or an volution or a disjunction of God as the Absolute."\(^9\) Man's freedom from God is thus affirmed.

God's Grace, which is His participation in the world, is known by man through intuition. Unity, as rationality, exists in the world by the Grace of God. Man henceforth has the power to intuit the objects of the world by a dynamic relation of cause and effect. This relation is revealed in the epistemological coordination in which the substantival agent as a supertemporal and superspatial entity has the power to know the future in the present in terms of the past. This is possible because mankind was created as a formally free being.

By exercising his formal freedom in the realm of space and time, where material freedom is effective, mankind

\(^9\)Ibid., p. 119.
can perfect fulness of material freedom and attain fulness of life which is the end of striving for all of mankind as expressed in his creative activity. Material freedom, therefore, signifies creative activity.
CHAPTER III

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

An inquiry into the theory of knowledge presents us with the problem of the origin, content, and the validity of knowledge. Lossky has stated his view of the problem as follows:

Now, according to the intuitional theory, knowledge is neither a copy, nor a symbol, nor a phenomenal appearance of the real world in the knowing subject, but is reality itself, life itself, which has simply become differentiated by means of comparison.¹

He clarifies this position:

The entire content of knowledge is composed of elements of the world. The cognitive activity merely subjects this content to a process of discrimination and comparison; it does not introduce any qualitatively new elements into the content known. It neither creates nor reproduces the real world, for in knowledge reality is given as it is in itself.²

Lossky's intuitivism does not isolate the knowing subject (the ego or self), from the known object of the external world, as the empiricism of John Locke and the rationalism of Emmanuel Kant isolate the two. In the


²Ibid., p. 404.
foregoing discussion I will try to show how he builds upon these theories by bringing together some of their conten­tions and eliminating others, showing that both have been partly successful and partly unsuccessful in their attempted solution of the problem.

Empiricism, especially the kind expressed by John Locke, holds that the objects of the external world are known mediately and not immediately. When an object (say a tree) is perceived and a judgment about it is made, all there is in the consciousness of the observer is an image, a copy, of the tree, composed of sensations. A true judgment, then, would be based on mediate perception.

Regarding Kant Lossky says:

The intuitivist, then, will give the following answers to Kant's question as to the possibility of necessary synthetic judgments (the universality of judgments will be discussed later). The living bond that extends from one content of reality to others guides the subject's mental vision when he traces the object with the purpose of knowing it and not of indulging his fancy or constructing new objects that have never existed. According to Kant the subject builds up a system of synthetic judgments by imposing upon the sensuous manifold of experience the a priori forms of the categories. According to the Intuitive theory, the categorical ontological structure of reality enters the subject's consciousness and is revealed to his mental vision as a necessary synthetic system, i.e., as a whole each aspect of which is necessarily connected with some other, different aspect, so that the necessity of sequence and not the analytic necessity based upon the laws of identity and contradic­tion.3

Lossky's theory of knowledge is based upon his conception that the world is an organic, living unity in which isolation is not known. Since the world is an organic, living unity and mankind is an aspect of this unity, he has no problem regarding the mind-body relation, for his conception of the world and universe presupposes that one and the same ego, self, or substantival agent creates man's corporeality and therefore is at the basis of both the physical and the psychical processes which are the manifestations of the ego, as a substantival agent. Lossky calls his theory of relation between mind and body "the monistic theory of inter-determination of the psychical and physical processes." He goes on to say that he uses the word "inter-determination" rather than "inter-action" because the ego, the substantival agent, is the creator of activity in the world and the cause of it, and the generator of new events.

The human ego manifests itself as a living, active being in time and space by creating both the psychical and physical processes and combining them into a single whole.

One of these processes is that of judgment of acts of discrimination and comparison, which involves the theory of knowledge, or epistemology, which will be discussed below.

Knowledge cannot be separated from consciousness. Knowledge

---

"Nicolas O. Lossky, "Introduction to Philosophy" (unpublished lectures read at Stanford University, Palo Alto. Date not given. Translated by Natalie Duddington), p. 67."
is realized in the consciousness of the knowing subject when the knowing subject is conscious of the known object. Thus, in order to analyze knowledge, we must analyze consciousness.

Everything falls within the sphere of consciousness which the Ego "has." If we agree to call what the Ego "has" the content of consciousness (the expression is not quite free from objection, but unfortunately we can find no better one) we may formulate the theory of consciousness we wish to bring forward here as follows: Every fact of consciousness is made up of at least three moments; every such fact depends for its existence upon the presence of an Ego, of a content of consciousness, and of a relation between the two.5

Consciousness, therefore, contains the subject, the object, and the relation between the two, that is, the "ego" as subject, the content of consciousness as the object or something that the ego has, and the relation between the two.

The content of consciousness is something the ego "has," which we shall see is of two types— one, that aspect of the content which the ego affirms as "mine" and is the expression of my ego, as for example, my joy, my sorrow, my desire, etc., and two, that aspect of the content which is given to my ego. The given aspect can be a physical object such as an automobile or a tree or a non-physical entity such as a mathematical idea. Another element necessary in

consciousness for the realization of knowledge is that of attention.

The first type of content of consciousness is formed by the expression of the Ego, which belongs to "me alone" as something mine, as for instance, my desire, my wish, my satisfaction, or my effort (effort including such expressions of the Ego as acts of attention, discrimination, comparison, and so forth. These expressions (attention discrimination, effort) of the Ego are directly observed by the Ego as being intimately connected with the Ego or self, and are manifestations of the self, and are a part of the self. When one analyzes his consciousness he finds that he himself makes an "effort" of attention to realize the objective world. These contents of consciousness, formed by the expression of the Ego we shall call "subjective acts," which are mine alone, and different from the Ego which expresses them.

These feelings of satisfaction and desire may also be manifest to another individual in consciousness, and thus form a "given" content to that other individual, in the same respect as the "given" content of a physical object is to the self. Although they form a part of the subject's nature, they transcend that nature.

As noted above, the second type of content of consciousness is that of something "given to me" which is an object of the external world, as for instance, an automobile or a tree.
This second type requires us to recognize it as something apart from the Ego or the knowing subject.

We may come to the conclusion, therefore, that physical external objects of the world, as for example, automobiles and trees, and my expressions of the Ego, as for instance, desires, satisfactions, efforts, and the like, are manifestations that several individuals may have as the "content of their consciousness."

In order to distinguish more clearly the contents of consciousness, the "expressions of the Ego" which we call the subjective acts, from the "given" contents of consciousness, we can say that the subjective acts, as manifestations of the Ego, are temporal, for they may take place in time. The given content, on the other hand, may be temporal or nontemporal. As temporal, the given content of consciousness may be a physical automobile, or it may be a mental subjective act forming a part of another person's individuality, and an expression of the ego. As nontemporal, it may not be an existent at all in actuality, but merely a product of someone's imagination and a creation in the form of a myth. Regardless of the kind of content, the relation between the given content and the Ego cannot be denied.
In discussing the relation between the Ego as the knowing subject and the object a diagram illustrating this relation may be helpful.

In the above diagram, the curved line is the symbol of the field of consciousness; E symbolizes Ego, which is the subject; A B C symbolizes the object; the line connecting E and ABC symbolizes the relation of the subject and the object. This unity of consciousness, which we have said contains the subject, the object, and the relation between them, must always be maintained, even if it is for the lowest mental function in the process of knowledge, as for instance, the process of having the object in view in perception.

In closer examination of this relation, a quotation from Lossky at this point is relevant.

What is this relation? Obviously, it is not a spatial relation of nearness, contiguity, etc., nor a temporal relation of succession or coexistence. It is a purely spiritual relation, the

---

6Lossky, "Introduction to Philosophy," p. 67.
relation of having something in consciousness, not reducible to any other. We are immediately made aware of it when we say, "I have such and such an object in mind." This relation conditions a special type of union between the subject and the object, making it possible even for objects of the external world to be contemplated by the subject as they are in themselves. It may therefore be called the coordination of the subject and the object. To emphasize the fact that this type of coordination conditions the possibility of truth, it should be called epistemological coordination. The immediate observation of the object by the subject, arising in virtue of this relation, is intuition or contemplation.7

The relation is seen as a "purely spiritual" one and is a unique relation. It is not a relation of cause and effect between the knowing subject and the object. It is not a temporal relation of succession in time nor of coexistence. We can therefore say that it is spaceless and timeless. Lossky calls it a relation of "epistemological coordination" between the subject and object which, he adds, "conditions the possibility of truth." This "condition of the possibility of truth" stems from his metaphysical theories, and epistemology does not deal with this.

Attention, as an expression of the Ego, is the fourth element in consciousness which is necessary in the attainment of knowledge:

But in being explained as a relation of "being-given-to" between the subject and the known object, the true nature of consciousness is not restricted to the three already mentioned; namely, the Ego,

the content of consciousness and the relation between them. As already pointed out, the Ego brings the activity of attention into play; in other words, it brings about a subjective psychical state in an individual. The mental function necessary in the process, and the presence of the object in consciousness, which is called intuition, or contemplation, would not be experienced by the subject unless attention were present in the knowing process.

A diagram helps to understand Lossky's notion of the place of subjective acts in consciousness:

![Diagram](image)

E is the subject; α and β his activities of attending, discriminating, etc., directed upon the object; the object is a fragment of the world with an inexhaustible content; A, B, C are the cognised contents of it; dots stand for the multitude of uncognised contents.

The line passing through α and β is the epistemological coordination between the subject and the object which we have discussed.

---

8 Lossky, "The Transformation...", p. 246.

9 Lossky, "Introduction to Philosophy," p. 89.
We still confront the problem of what factors or needs cause the expression of attention.

The concentration of attention is an expression of my own spiritual power, it is realised in accordance with my interests, needs, and inclinations; no processes in the external world can produce my attention; they are merely the stimuli inciting my self to an act of attending, and not the causes that give rise to that act.¹⁰

As one of the subjective acts, the act of attention is needed as an element in consciousness in the knowing process. Although the object of the external world is in the subject's environment, it is not in the subject's consciousness, and therefore could not possibly be knowledge until the process of attention is active.

Although the subject and the object are apart, and the existence of one does not depend on the other, both are connected by a purely spiritual relation. The epistemological coordination, as has been shown, is a condition of the possibility of truth, forming a bond in which the subject has in subconsciousness the object, and experiences subconsciousness by the value of the object, yet without any causal effect of the object on the subject. The epistemological coordination between the subject and object makes the object attainable to knowledge but does not make it known. Intentional acts of awareness, of attention, of discrimination, etc., make it known. We can conclude that

¹⁰Lossky, "Introduction to Philosophy," p. 349.
knowledge is realized in consciousness, and that the four elements necessary in the process are: (1) Ego, as the subject; (2) the content of consciousness, as the object; (3) the epistemological relation between the two, and (4) the act of attention.

Consciousness is the prerequisite to knowledge, for knowledge is realized in consciousness when the knowing subject is conscious of the known object. We have seen that the knowing subject is the Ego. We have seen, also, that the known object is the content of consciousness, which is of two types, the content as an expression of the ego, and the given content. We can say that knowledge is the consciousness of a true judgment, but in order to discuss a true judgment, we must show the place of the theory of sensation in the process of knowledge. Lossky's theory of sensation shows the practical working of the relation of epistemological coordination between the subject and object in sense perception, in the ego's striving for the truth by the formation of judgments.

Objects of the external world incite the ego to express itself in activity; one such activity is that of attention. The ego's activities are purposeful, for it is striving for the truth by framing judgments about those objects that incite it. The theory of the ways and means of this incitation is the theory of sensation.

As we have seen, the relation of epistemological coordination between the subject and object makes the object
attainable to consciousness but does not make it known. The activity of attention as a process of knowing is needed. It is not a relation of interaction but one of togetherness of unity in which the subject "contemplates" and the object is "contemplated." It is not a causal relation but a purely spiritual one.

Schematically, we have shown the relation between the subject and object to be as follows:

```
In this diagram the curved line is the symbol of the field of consciousness; E symbolizes Ego, which is the subject; A B C symbolizes the object; the line connecting E and A B C symbolizes the relation of the subject and the object. This unity of consciousness, which we have said involves the subject, the object, and the relation between them, must always be maintained in the process of having the object in view in perception.

Let us suppose that there are several different subjects, or selves, observing one and the same automobile.
```

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 67.
Schematically, this would be expressed in the following manner:

In the above diagram, we see that part of the field of consciousness of the several objects coincides. We, therefore, have the single physical automobile and several selves contemplating it as it is in itself, and no images or psychical automobiles, as other philosophical systems express, which would be purely subjective sensations.

In order more clearly to express the intuitive theory, let us see the difference between intuitivism and the philosophical theory of John Locke which, for convenience, we shall call the empirical theory. To summarize, the difference lies in the reduction of all the contents of consciousness to mental processes in the one theory, but not in the other.

\[12\text{Ibid., p. 68.}\]
Diagramatically, the empirical theory can be expressed as follows: \(^{13}\)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{E} \\
\alpha \\
\beta \\
\gamma \\
\end{array}
\]

The curved line symbolizes the field of consciousness; \(E\) is the subject, or self; \(\alpha \beta \gamma\) are the sensations of which the subject is conscious; the arrow is the causal influence of the object upon the subject's body.

According to the above diagram, the object is outside the field of consciousness, and is not in the field, as expressed in the intuitive theory. When an observation is made, all there is in consciousness is an image of the object, composed of sensations. No amount of attention brings the object into the field of consciousness. The empiricistic theory lacks the epistemological relation between the subject and object which is so essential in the perception of the object. Direct and immediate contemplation of the object in consciousness or intuition is impossible in this theory.

\(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 71.
As we have diagrammed the intuitive position, supposing several selves to be observing one and the same automobile, let us make the same supposition, and a similar diagram, showing the position of the empirical theory.

In the above diagram,\textsuperscript{14} we see that no parts of the field of consciousness of the several selves coincide. All the contents of consciousness are mental and purely subjective. We find here that there are several selves observing the one physical automobile, and several psychical automobiles or mental images of it. The most that can be said for the empirical theory is that the subjective states, or the mental images which are received through sensation, are as exact as possible to the physical automobile.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 70.
According to Lossky's intuitivism, sensory qualities of the objects (colours, sounds, aroma, etc.) are not our subjective sensations, but the transsubjective properties of material processes. The arguments in favour of the transsubjective nature of sensory qualities are given in the first part of Lossky's work, "Sensory, Intellectual and Mystical Intuition."

We thus see that, according to the intuitive theory, the content of consciousness which is immanent in consciousness may also transcend the subject of consciousness. The empirical theory, on the other hand, holds that all that is immanent in consciousness must also be immanent in the subject of consciousness.

For empiricism, the relation between the subject and the object of the external world is unlike that of intuitivism, which we have seen to be an epistemological coordination. Empiricism contends that it is a causal action of the object upon the subject. For example, the rays of light reflected by the surface of an automobile fall upon the retina of the eye and cause a chemical change in it. This stimulation produces a nervous current extending to the brain. Similarly, a stimulation is sensed because of the vibration of the eardrum through its contact with air waves caused by the movement of the automobile and its motor. This stimulation impinges upon the eardrum and produces a nervous current and causes the sensation of noise. The
object is not, therefore, contemplated as it actually is in itself. Only sensations of the object which arise as an effect from the objective cause received. The external world is accessible to the "self" through the medium of images formed in our minds. Thus, for the empiricist, truth is attained when the subject holds, in consciousness, images of the external object; this truth is of the highest degree when and if the image is an exact copy of the object. The properties of truth, to him, are therefore derived from images and copies.

The empiricist cannot make the supposition that there is a certain amount of correspondence between the subject's sensations and the properties of the external object. If he could make such a supposition, then it might be said that every property of the external world is replaced in the subject's mind by the sensation. However, objective properties do not affect the color-blind persons who see one color where the normal visioned person sees two colors.

Lossky's intuitivism contains a "coordinational theory of perception." In explaining the role of the incitation of sensory organs in perception, Lossky refers to the theory of Bergson: the incitations of the sensory organs and the physiological processes in the brain are not the causes of perception; they are merely stimuli inciting our Ego to turn its attention on the very object which has affected our body, and which, therefore, can be either useful or harmful to us.
The intuitive theory has an adequate answer to the unanswered problems of the empiricist. In the cases mentioned, intuitivism holds that objects are perceived differently, and sensations also differ because every perception of an object is not a perception of the whole content of that object but of a small part of it. The world always contains infinitely more than we apprehend. For instance, we apprehend in each object some one color, according to the structure of our eyes. This is why the selection of the perceived color is made differently by different persons and accounts for differences of experiences.

In a larger sense, intuitivism does not confine experience to the realm of the sensations. It holds that there is also the nonsensuous experience of relation which involves the quality of unity and synthesis. If the term empiricism denotes that concept which holds experience to be the basis of knowledge, then intuitivism is also empiricistic, but in a wider sense. Let us take, for example, the quality of unity.

In perceiving our environment, our senses tell us of things which have qualities, such as color, hardness, warmth, and the like. We have a perception of a thing, as for instance, as apple as it enters the field of our consciousness with all its relations. The perception includes such relations as color, odor, hardness. We look
at the apple and see its color as red. We touch it, and it resists pressure, and hardness is felt. The unity of the properties, redness, and hardness of the apple are different from the concrete events that happen in time and space, for we may say that we can touch redness and hardness, but not the unity of redness and hardness. Unity is not a sensation. This unity of the properties transcends the mutual externality of its parts, and gives it a character of wholeness. In it is found no temporal flux, as in a "movement" in space. The actual unity of the qualities of redness and hardness of the apple are, therefore, non-spatial and nontemporal. This is significant, in that the relation of unity is an object of nonsensuous contemplation and even the sensuous perception of a thing is not entirely sensuous, for unity is the essential element in the perception of things.

We can say also that space, time, and motion are of a nonsensuous characteristic, for they are not elements of knowledge derived from sensations. In space, we find the relations of "to the left" or "to the right," and also the relations of "above" and "below." In time, we find the relation of "before" and "after." All these relations can be included as one of the perceptions of the nonsensuous nature. We have spoken of the importance of the nonsensuous element in the perception of things, and shall not dwell on this importance here, but shall turn to the act of
judgment, and show the connection between the act of judgment and the nonsensuous element of the object of the judgment in the realization of knowledge.

There is no knowledge apart from judgment. In the discussion of the theory of sensation, we have seen that knowledge of the object is attained, by the activity of the subjective acts, immediately and directly without any causal means. This knowledge of course is not without a judgment.

A judgment is formed when the knowing subject has in consciousness the known object, as it is in itself. Saying this in a different manner, we can say that, when an object of the external world is perceived through the activity of attention and compared with its surroundings, the ego "has" a content of consciousness, and a judgment is formed. The important subjective acts in this process of judgment are those of attention and discrimination.

The author believes judgment to be a purposeful act. It is a striving for the truth. In the formation of a judgment, the ego performs acts of discrimination and compares the objects of the world, that is, the ego selects an object or an element of an object, and purposefully compares it with its surrounding environment as a part of the world.

When the ego, as a knowing subject, compares the objects of environment which make up the world, he is
confronted with a world that is an orderly, organic, living unity. This organic unity is a reality that is harmonious and purposeful. At the basis of the harmony is an intelligence that is not without purpose. Part of this purposefulness is seen in the correlatedness of all the individuals and events in the world and of the products of these individuals.

This correlatedness has, in one respect, been explained as the epistemological coordination between the subject and the object, but it extends not only between one subject and one object but also throughout the entire world and embraces it in a purposeful harmony. It is for this reason that the relation of cause and effect, as conceived by Lossky, is quite different from the conception held by say, for example, David Hume.¹⁵

According to Lossky's theory, the ego, as a substantival agent, is the creator and the bearer of an event and is therefore the cause and the sustainer of it in his environment. Causes and effects as events are the result of purposeful actions of substantival agents taking place in time and place. A cause is a creative activity.

¹⁵ David Hume conceived of the relation of causality as a temporal order of succession or coexistence. Lossky conceives of it as a timeless relation which a substantival agent creates. An example, of a cause for Lossky would be the event of the creation of intentional acts such as an act of attention by means of which an object of the external world is known and about which a judgment is made.
It is at this point that the objection to Lossky's theory of epistemology can be understood, namely, the objection which is raised that at the time the subjective act of attention by the ego is made and directed upon an object, we must already know that the object is there.

The answer to this objection is that the individual, as a knowing subject, is not isolated from the rest of the world, but is a part of it in a correlatedness of subconsciousness which is the condition of the possibility of knowledge. Every individual and element in the world does not exist only in and for itself, but also for others as well in subconsciousness and becomes immanent in consciousness by means of creative activity as a cause.

As we have seen, the epistemological coordination does not make the object known until the act of attention is created as a cause by the knowing subject or ego and directed upon the object which is a part of its environment.

Quoting Lossky on the points of causality in the world order, he says:

Those who recognize the existence of concrete ideal entities such as the human ego do not reduce causation merely to the order of events in time. A new event cannot be caused by a preceding event with a definite, limited content; taken in the abstract, it is devoid of all dynamic character, is incapable of further development and can only sink irretrievably into the past. Forward movement, further development of an event is only possible in so far as that event depends upon an agent or a substance whose state it is, and who
strives to cancel, transform or complete it. Thus, the essentially causal element in the succession of temporal processes is always some concretely ideal entity.16

The processes of knowledge by the activities of discrimination and comparison in the formation of a judgment is an element of the knowledge of the organic unity of the universe and is a truth affirmed or denied of that universe and of a particular element of the universe if we attend to it. In other words, a judgment either affirms or denies a truth about the universe through the purposive and creative activity of a being who has the power to create intentional acts and form a judgment.

A judgment has three elements, the subject, the predicate, and a relation between them. The relation between the subject and predicate shall also be referred to as the ground and consequent.

The practical element of judging—recognition or affirmation—is also duly recognised by our theory in so far as we pronounce judging to be an act. Every act is guided by a striving towards a certain end; and, in so far as the end is or appears to be realised by the act, the activity and its product are accompanied by a feeling of consent; we sanction, we recognise, we affirm it. Judgment is based upon a striving for truth, i.e., according to our definition, upon a striving so to discriminate the real world as to obtain purely objective characteristics....In order to emphasise this practical element, our definition of judgment might be amplified by the addition that it is an

act performed by the knowing subject. It would then run thus: \textit{Judgment is the knowing subject's act of differentiating the object by means of comparison.}^{17}

The above quotation reveals the fact that the author believes the intentional act of judging to be a purposeful act. It is a striving for the truth. In the formation of a judgment, the ego performs acts of discrimination and compares the objects of the world. That is, the ego selects an object or an element of an object, and purposefully compares it with its surrounding environment as a part of the world.

There are two kinds of judgments, the analytic and the synthetic. An analytic judgment adds nothing new to our knowledge of the subject of judgment. It expresses that which is inferred in the premise and about that object which is already known and is a finished product. An example of an analytic judgment is, "Water is wet." Here we see that the meaning of the word "wet" is included in the meaning of the word "water," for if the wetness were absent the water also would be absent.

A synthetic judgment is one that adds something new to knowledge. An example of a synthetic judgment is, "Water is good for one's health." It can be seen that this example is unlike that of the analytic judgment, for here

---

\textsuperscript{17}N. O. Lossky, \textit{The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge}, pp. 248--249.
the word "water" is not identical with the word "health" but something different from it. The meaning of "health" is not contained in the meaning "water," yet health arises as something new from the idea of water; it is a new addition to knowledge, having a necessary character compelling the knower to admit its newness and presence.

As an example of a synthetic judgment, Lossky affirms direct perception. In the direct method of perception, both the ground and the consequent is affirmed in judgment based on direct perception. In other words, something new arises in knowledge compelling the knower to admit its newness and presence which is not inferred from premises. The elements of a synthetic judgment are directly seen to be contained in what we perceive in the necessity of ground and consequent. This is one of the simplest kinds of perceptions and is one of the direct perceptions. Numerous examples of this type of perception can be given, as for instance, "The chair is brown."

It is possible for a synthetic judgment to be formed on the basis of a simple direct perception which is made on the strength of a single act of perception.

Lossky gives examples of two judgments based on direct perception. He says, "Thus for instance, in the developed human consciousness the judgments 'it is dark in the room' or 'N. slipped and fell' are judgments of
direct perception.\textsuperscript{18} Regardless of how simple and unimportant direct perception and the judgment stemming from it seem to be, it is the source from which science gathers its information and upon which it builds its knowledge. Scientific knowledge is reliable because the method of direct perception is used to perceive the necessary connection of ground and consequent between the subject and predicate of a judgment made about an organic synthetic universe.

The world and the objects in it are an organic whole, a reality, which is apprehended and expressed in terms of the relations of ground and consequent in synthetic necessity between the subject and the predicate of a judgment. Both the object and its relations are given to the ego in consciousness as a reality. The object as reality contains the necessary synthetic relations of ground and consequent which are given to the knowing subject in direct perception which, as we have seen is the basis of a synthetic judgment.

Since the known reality is itself immanent in the process of knowledge, it follows that the same relation that holds between the elements of the real world will also hold between the elements of the judgment S and P. If there were no relation between the parts of reality there could be no judgment. If there were no inner necessary connection between the different aspects of the real world, then, in discovering

\textsuperscript{18} N. O. Lossky, \textit{The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge}, p.320
the element $P$, we should feel no objective necessity of joining it to $S$. But this is not what we find: in a true judgment, be it in reference to things, or events, or processes, the nature of the subject $S$ is such that, given $S$, the predicate $P$ is necessarily added to it. In the same way every part of reality is so constituted that if some aspects of it are given, other aspects are necessarily conjoined therewith in organic connection. The connection between them is organic, similar to that between the head and the body of a vertebrate animal.

The relation which consists in a certain given $A$ being necessarily connected with $B$ is found under many forms—under the form of a causal connection, of functional dependence, of the connection between motive and action, etc.\(^1\)

It is clear, then, that the known reality, the known object with its relations of ground and consequent, is immanent in consciousness and immanent in judgment but transcends the ego which creates attention to bring the object into consciousness in order to discover the truth found in it.

All analytic judgments are at basis synthetic. Synthetic judgments have the structure $S$ is $P$, for example, "The rose ($S$) is red ($P$)." Analytic judgments have the structure $SP$ is $P$, as may be seen in the proposition, "The red rose ($SP$) is red ($P$)." It can be easily seen that the subject of the analytic judgment is in fact a synthetic judgment. That is to say, "The red rose" is synthetically stating, "The rose ($S$) is red ($P$)."\(^2\)

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 263.

We must now raise in connection with the proposition the problem of truth. It is the proposition that provides us with knowledge, and to provide us with knowledge the proposition must obviously be true. What, then, is it that makes a proposition true?

A true judgment is one in which the subject and predicate are necessarily related. How necessity is involved in an analytic judgment is obvious; for in the proposition SP is P, it is clear that the predicate necessarily follows from the subject. The real problem lies in connection with the synthetic judgment. How do we establish necessity here? Lossky's reply is that necessity in the synthetic judgment S is P, is provided by reality. The content of a synthetic judgment is reality itself. Reality, according to Lossky, is an organic whole in which ground and consequent are necessarily connected. 21

If there were no inner necessary connection in reality, there would be no necessary connection of ground and consequent (subject and predicate) in the judgment which expresses that reality, for the truth of a judgment is dependent on reality. A true judgment is possible because reality is present in the judgment with its necessary relations of ground and consequent. We can therefore

21 The problem of necessary relation of ground and consequent in reality is a metaphysical question, which we shall not discuss here.
say that when the ground and consequent of the judgment is the ground and consequent of reality, the judgment is true.

Truth has an absolute significance. It matters not whether the knowing subject or subjects change. The object in view remains numerically identical, and the truth of it is numerically identical. If there is disagreement between two persons, this shows that they have different objects or different aspects of the same objects in mind. Disagreement, therefore, is due to the different selection of certain aspects of the object which are introduced into consciousness, and we have seen that the object is infinitely rich in content.

Error is due to the subjective acts of the individual, that is, the ego selects a different aspect of the object or fancies that to be an aspect of the object which is not an aspect of it. The individual, as an ego, on the basis of remembering or fancies, introduces foreign elements into the object which are not a part of its composition.

The same ego is capable of both truth and error, and the object is never an untruth. The object is not capable of an error. Error, then, is the subjective process of introducing foreign elements into the object which is the reality and truth.
Having considered intuitivism in the light of empiricism, perhaps we can better our understanding of intuitivism by comparing it with some of the more important points of still other philosophical systems. When we do this, we discover that there are likenesses and differences. Some likenesses between intuitivism and neo-realism follow. Both hold that the object of the external world is real and not a mental state of the individual, that the nature of the objects is not to be sought primarily in the nature of knowledge, and that the nature of the object is what it is and exists independently of our knowing it. Both theories hold that the object is apprehended directly and immediately as it is in itself and that no knowledge is mediated knowledge, that it is impossible for a thought to exist without the sense data or the object but the sense data may exist without thought, that the object produces a stimulation of the sensory organs and that the object is at once the stimulus and the content of the conscious act. Neo-realists, like the intuitivists, have a non-causal theory of perception, but their theory is not a coordinational theory. A coordinational theory asserts a relationship between the subject and object of knowledge in the knowing process.

There are also differences between neo-realism and intuitivism. We have seen that to the intuitivist, apprehension in the form of sensation necessitates the
direction of attention by the ego, which is supertemporal and superspatial. Apprehension in the form of sensation, to the neo-realist, is experienced when emitted energies of the object impinge upon the sense organs of the subject and reach the higher centers in the nervous system where they undergo a change in the form of energy. Neo-realism holds that when these sensations are connected into a system, they induce a center of stress and thus form an ego which is the power of perceiving. To the intuitivist, ego is supertemporal and superspatial.

Intuitivism holds that the act of thought must be distinguished from the content of thought, and not be identified as one. Neo-realism holds that both are one. The neo-realist maintains that the object enters into consciousness by its stimulating effect on the sensory organs, and that this stimulation is conveyed by neural processes to the brain, and so enters into consciousness. We have seen that for the intuitivist intentional acts of awareness and of attention make possible the entrance of the object into consciousness.

Neo-realism leaves out the superspatial and supertemporal agents from this world; that is, it maintains that there is only one system of realities in space and time, which is a system of energy. Thus it omits the ideal relation of epistemological coordination of the intuitivist position. Neo-realism is built upon a causal subject-
object relation of inter-action. It also maintains that individual perceptual knowledge is true until proven in error by a wider social type of perception. In doing so, this process becomes a mutually corrective process. Intuitivism, on the other hand, holds that the self can correct error as well as the society.

There are no major likenesses between the theories of intuitivism and critical realism. Critical realism is a theory of knowledge advocating that knowledge is mediated in the form of sensa and hence must be classified in the representational school consequently it has very little in common with the intuitivistic view. We can, however, say that both the theory of critical realism and that of intuitivism maintain that there must be a direct and immediate apprehension in order that knowledge may be realized.

Considering critical realism, let us see some of the major differences between it and intuitivism. Critical realism holds that the object of the external world is not apprehended directly and immediately, as it is in itself. It maintains, rather, that the apprehension is made of the characteristics of the object, in the form of sensa or data which are caused by the object, and produced by the subject as subsisting essences. The intuitivist does not entertain this view, for, as we have seen, the
object is apprehended as it is in itself immediately and directly in consciousness, not the sensa. The critical realist holds that the object of the external world cannot be in the individual consciousness of two persons at once, while the intuitivist says that this is possible. For the critical realist, truth is attained when the subject has, in perception, sensa that is identical with the object which started the whole process, that is, when our thoughts light up the intrinsic and essential characteristics of the object in the form of sensa. Error, on the other hand, arises from our supposing that our sensa are in fact characteristics of some object when they are not. As we have seen the intuitivist does not apprehend sensa or data, but the object directly, as it is in itself, and truth is having the object in consciousness as it is in itself. Critical realism holds that between the subject and object there is a relationship that is causal and of inter-action, for the object exerts an influence on the brain which projects the data.

Some of the major likenesses between intuitivism and pragmatism follow. Both hold that consciousness and experience are a whole, that the mind is active and in perception selects an object or an aspect of the object in consciousness according to interest and purpose of the individual. Both hold that the individual has wishes and purposes, which are satisfied.
Some of the major differences between the views of pragmatism and intuitivism are as follows. Pragmatism holds that a belief alters the fact, and, to an extent, creates the fact. The intuitivist holds that a belief does not alter the fact and does not create it in any way but discovers it. Pragmatism holds that error is experienced when the actions taken to resolve an indeterminate situation are not in harmony with the method of intelligence. It is the situation that has to be satisfied not the person as has been frequently suggested by critics of the position.

According to intuitivism, the workability or unworkability of a fact does not prove error. Truth, for pragmatism, is that which works and is tested in experience. Truth, for intuitivism, is known immediately and directly. Pragmatism states that a belief may be replaced by another belief, which may in turn be replaced by another belief, and therefore may become established as true when it produces more and more predictable consequences in experience. Intuitivism, on the other hand, does not maintain that predictable consequences of beliefs produce truth. Pragmatism limits experience to the realm of sensory knowledge. Intuitivism maintains the possibility of non-sensuous experience. Lossky says:

...even sensuous intuition, in spite of the part played in it by the sense-organs and the presence of intra-bodily sensations, is
essentially a spiritual act. It is an act of mental contemplation of qualities which, though sensuous, belong to someone else's sensuous life and are apprehended in connection with non-sensuous being, or at any rate with non-sensuous aspects of being. There is no such thing as entirely sensuous intuition... 22

CHAPTER IV

VALUE

Lossky's theory of value is what he calls an ontological theory of value. Values are organic unities of existence and meaning. Since existence and meaning imply education, and since education is connected with the process of acquiring the good life and the good life is itself a value, a consideration of Lossky's theory of value is a necessary step in dealing with the problem of discovering this philosopher's educational significance.1

According to Lossky's theory of knowledge a knowledge situation is one in which truth is affirmed in the opposition of ego as the knowing subject and the object as that which is known. The subject and the object, moreover, are related by an epistemological relation of subject and predicate in the knowing process. On the other hand, in a value situation where the knowledge of the truth of value is affirmed there is no opposition of subject and predicate. In the value situation the subject as related

---

1By the terms positive and negative value the writer follows Lossky's meaning for these terms. He says, "I shall frequently use the word good instead of the long expression 'positive value,' and the word evil instead of 'negative value.'"
to the object does not contain the same kind of an opposition as that revealed between the subject and object in the knowing process because the subject itself is value and as value the subject is a possible object for another subject to evaluate.

In the process of judging a value the value situation is different from the knowledge situation in that not only is the object in the value situation known as truth but it is also known as a value. We have knowledge plus evaluation, therefore, in a situation where both the subject and the object are values. Values, then, transcend the opposition between subject and predicate. If both the subject and the object are values, the truth of the values is revealed in the hierarchy of values.

The truth of value, then, in order to be realized as true value, must not only be known but must be lived; that is, the truth of value is not merely theoretical but also practical. It must be lived, which implies the exercise of the will and the expression of feeling in the process of living.

The practical aspect of the truth of value is revealed in an individual's feeling, for "Values make their appearance in the subject's consciousness only by way of the subject's feelings being intentionally directed upon them." The theoretical aspect of the truth of value is revealed to the individual through the intentional acts
of the knowing process, that is, the expression of the will. Both the practical and theoretical are needed for the judgment of value.

The awareness and the experiences thus far mentioned are not as yet knowledge. They have a primary practical importance as possible directors of our behaviour. But in order for them to gain theoretical importance, i.e., to become knowledge, intentional acts of cognition are necessary on the part of the observer. These intentional acts must be directed both upon the outer object and upon the feelings with which the object is clothed in consciousness. These acts are differentiation, abstraction, inference, etc., and they result in the judgment of value, the knowledge of value.²

The judgment of value consists of a subject and the trans-subjective (the predicate). The subject of the judgment is the individual's feeling and the trans-subjective the experienced object in the subject's consciousness.

...the subjective side consists in the fact that the observer experiences his own subjective "feeling of delight," "feeling of exaltedness," "feeling of beauty," "feeling of nobleness," etc., while the trans-subjective side is the perceived object of the outer world with its colours, sounds, and actions in that wholeness which gives it its specific merit and specific significance for the fulness of being, the significance which is experienced by the observer in the "feeling of delightfulness," the "feeling of nobleness." etc.³

The truth of value in the judgment of value is revealed immediately and non-causally and the Ego affirms the truth not by mental activity alone but by his very life.

³Ibid., pp. 145-146.
his existence, which is also a value and which reveals itself in the scale of existence as value. Both will and feeling as parts of his life are therefore used in affirming value immediately and directly in consciousness as an absolute truth.

It can be said of all existences, events, changes, etc., that all the situations of the existences and the existences themselves have a value and are either positive or negative in value. These values inherent in the existences, events, changes, etc., have no power to cause or create our (the agents) strivings or actions.

The action always proceeds from a substantival agent who acts in accordance with a universal principle of valuation which is to cause a positive value to remain and be felt and a negative value to be taken away and not be felt. The cause of realizing a value in one's life, therefore, is always the substantival agent which is revealed in the agent's expression to strive (i.e., to cause) a positive value to be felt and to remain or to strive (i.e., to cause) the negative value to be taken away or not to be felt. Will and feeling are thus the expressions of an individual's causality. As an expression of an individual's causality, will and feeling are not different expressions but one expression of a striving to cause or create life's activities.
As a striving to cause the positive value to be felt and to remain or to strive in order to cause the negative value not to be felt or to be taken away, the individual is expressing his freedom in the form of a will which is manifested as two kinds: (1) the theoretical intentional activity and (2) desires and wishes.

Lossky affirms that the expression of will in life's activities is free in his system. In other words, his system is one which holds that theoretical intentional expressions and desires and wishes are free purposive activities. He does not affirm (1) causal determinism or (2) teleological determinism.

Causal determinism usually implies a naturalistic view of the universe which Lossky rejects. He rejects causal determinism on the ground that at basis causation is dynamic in character and not a necessary relation in which the cause contains the effect in the necessary relation of complete identity. He rejects teleological determinism also.

The determinist, though thinking there are no absolutes, affirms absolutistic reasoning in his action by not affirming the obligatoriness in the consciousness in the form of "ought" or duty. According to Lossky the determinist "was irrevocably predetermined to this action before his birth by the nature of his ancestors, the climate and social conditions of his country and so_
The determinist cannot be blamed for whatever action he performs. He cannot say, like the believer in free will may, that "I might have resisted the temptation of evil, might have overcome my bad nature, yet had not done so but submitted to it." The determinist does not recognize the promptings, the consciousness, of the ought which impels the believer in freedom to admit that he might have resisted evil if he had the courage to submit to the consciousness of its promptings.

If he submits to the consciousness of its promptings, then he will perform a creative act, a new happening that is not determined entirely by the past experience. An example of such a creative act is the act of courage. In acting courageously, that is, in acting in such a way as to fulfill the consciousness of the ought, the individual is not bound by the "lower needs" of his nature but overcomes them and "works deep changes" in his nature. Lossky thus affirms that there is an absolute, a God and a Creator, to whom the activities of life ought to be directed.

Since the original nature of each substantival agent has been purposely created by God, each substantival agent has a unique essence and is capable, if it follows


the purpose of its creation, of fulfilling and occupying a definite place in the Kingdom of the Spirit which is God's purpose of creation. Since substantival agents combine their activities and freely subordinate themselves to a higher form of being, a more complex union of activities is formed through this combination which eventually forms a cosmic order. Lossky's position holds, therefore, that in the final analysis this cosmic order in union under one spirit is purposive or teleological.

Although the teleological order is purposive there is individual free activity. The more purposive the individual activity the more it reveals its character of freedom. Going on up the scale of united individualities in terms of purposive acts to the world spirit, there is found the combination of complete purposiveness coupled with complete freedom for each and every individual who participates with others in spiritual (positive) values as their purpose of living.

But with this ascent of the individual to complete purposiveness and complete freedom to the world spirit there is incomplete purposiveness and incomplete freedom which means that there are false aims, blind alleys, and the like. In other words, freedom implies that it is possible for the individual, in his evolution to higher and higher forms of life through combining purposes with others and having more and more complex activities, to
move either up or down in the scale of existence, that is, it is possible to do good or evil by means of freedom, that is, positive or negative value. Positive and negative values imply freedom.

In connection with the individual's purposive activity which ought to reflect the teleological purposiveness of the whole there is the task of the individual to combine the creative efforts of feeling and will in his consciousness in order that he overcome the problems of false aims, blind alleys, etc. which are negative values. This means that the individual so order the creative activity and purposes of his life that he would better coordinate the activities of feeling and willing in the act of the judgment of value. It has been shown that the practical aspect of the truth of value is revealed in the individual's feeling and the theoretical aspect is revealed in the individual's intentional acts of knowing and that both aspects are needed for the judgment of value and, hence, the good life which is connected with education.

The positive value, as a necessary component of the good life, in order to be realized as a true value, must not only be known but also lived. It must be lived to be realized which implies the exercise of the will (theoretical aspect of living) and the expression of feeling (practical aspect of living). The theoretical and the practical aspects thus are not separated in the valuation process but
are caught up in the process of living one's life. As has been said before, will and feeling as expressions of an individual's causality are not different expressions but one expression of a striving to cause, or create, an activity of life according to the principles which is to cause a positive value to remain and to remove a negative value. A life of harmony (a positive value) implies a harmony within its aspects of feeling and willing. A harmony expressing a proper balance of feeling and willing is conducive to a more accurate judgment of the value of existence with its meaningful relations.

It is in the principles of existence by means of which the substantival agents realize their manifestations as existence by and through their activities that some of the conditions of values are found. These principles are the foundations of the world and existence.

In the structure of real existence as we have described it, created as it is by the substantival agent, there are included the most important conditions of value, as the meaningful aspect of existence. These conditions are the connection between events by means of relation, the transcendence by events of their own limits, and their existence for the agent-subject as his manifestations and experiences. It is by virtue of this last condition that we may speak of the existence of a subject for itself in its own manifestations.

Now, the being who is the source and the creator of both personalities and the abstract principles is God, who is the absolute fulness of being and the primary and all-embracing and absolute intrinsic value toward which all personalities strive in their creative activity towards fulness of being.

The created personality who is not subordinate to the abstract principles is a created and, therefore, not a primary but a potentially all-embracing and absolute intrinsic value. This potentiality is partially expressed in the personality's endowment which consists of his uniqueness. This uniqueness is expressed in the personality through his strivings. The being who is the source and creator of both personalities and the abstract principles is God, who endowed personalities with their unique potential, and it is toward God that all personalities strive in their creative activities in their development of fulness of being which is their unique potential. The personality's individual idea or norm is either fulfilled or not fulfilled as the personality moves either toward its own potential of absolute fulness of being through creative acts or away from it through non-creative acts. In other words, each personality is endowed with its unique individual idea or norm and he ought to strive to fulfill it and thereby attain absolute fulness of being
and realize his potential value. If it is not fulfilled he develops a reverse being and a negative value.

In realizing his potential value and absolute fulness of being the personality makes an unrepeatable and irreplaceable contribution to the Creator's purpose. The Creator's purpose is reflected in the unison of all human purposes in which a diversity of human purposes complement each other in such a way that a beautiful whole is formed in which there are such values as truth, freedom, beauty, love, and so on, which are meaningful existences for personalities in their life.

A union of humanly unique purposes through complementation is possible because the Creator has assigned in his wisdom to each being the being's own uniqueness to fulfill in the form of an individual idea or norm. In this union there is room for each person's life as creativity to complement another person's creativity where there is found no repetition and nothing is irreplaceable. All fulnesses of beings form a beautiful and unique whole composing the unique fulness of beings of all persons as the Creator's purpose.

Fulness of being, then, is living a full life of goodness, beauty, truth, love, and so forth. It is to realize these values of goodness, beauty, truth, etc., in their fullest meaning by actions of human beings which contribute to the remaking of these values in the life of
each person through the actions. It is to live a life worth living for oneself and for other beings and existences for all of life and all of creation as existence.

Beauty, truth, freedom, goodness, love, and other such values are necessary aspects of absolute fulness of being. They are impersonal values. They also are partial absolute intrinsic values. Although they are impersonal values, they become personal through the creation of an existence which embodies and reflects their meaning in the creative activity of a personality (human being) who is not a partial absolute intrinsic value but a potential all-embracing and absolute intrinsic value.

As a potential value personality is a combination of supertemporal and superspatial existence and ideal meaning which is his potential and uniqueness. That aspect of the personality which is his uniqueness is beyond full human comprehension when considered in the fullest, not potential, sense of an all-embracing and absolute value.

Created personalities strive for the partial intrinsic values of love, truth, goodness, beauty, etc., in their growth to fulness of being. Where may these values be found? In the all-embracing Absolute value, as the absolute fulness of being toward which all creation strives. It is a unity of perfect love, perfect truth, perfect goodness, and so on, in which these
potential value aspects (unique ideal essences of personalities which are beyond meaning as parts) exist. This unity is the Kingdom of God and radiates itself to the parts of itself as unique ideal essences of personalities and also as goodness, truth, love, beauty, freedom, etc. In this scheme the unity comes first and (as the unity) it is composed of perfect truth, perfect love, perfect freedom, and so forth, and this unity as perfection exists prior to the parts.

Goodness, truth, beauty, and so on, as values "cannot exist apart from a whole." As parts they are indefinable even though they are partial intrinsic values. They are indefinable in the sense that they have a self-justifying character and one must affirm their existence as worthy of existence and highest value yet all created personalities strive to attain them in their growth toward fulness of being for this unity is the highest meaning for all of existence.

God, as the highest value and the most worthy of existence, is that Perfect Unity which the whole of existence affirms in its striving. God is beyond our full comprehension in any manner of knowledge, even beyond what is known as partial love, goodness, truth, beauty, freedom.

Love, beauty, truth, etc., as impersonal values have meaning as partial intrinsic values and this meaning is a radiated meaning from the unity of unique and ideal
meanings or the absolute intrinsic value of the absolute fulness of being of all humanity in the Kingdom of God. The absolute perfection of the Kingdom of God becomes the personal value of the individual through the strivings of the created being as absolute fulness of being for his life, by means of realizing love, beauty, truth, etc., in his life.

As partial intrinsic values love, beauty, truth, and the like are both means and end in meaning. Existence and meaning, then, in the ontological theory of value, cannot be separated; they are joined in those partial values we call love, truth, beauty, etc. They are used in the approach to that end of existence which is perfect love, perfect truth, perfect beauty, etc., found in the fulness of life of the human being as an aspect of humanity as a whole.

It must be remembered that goodness, truth, beauty, love, and the like are subordinate in value to the value of created personality who is endowed with the super-qualitative power to create his own existence and therefore his value and realize the value of love, truth, beauty, and so on for all of humanity. By existence is meant not only the meaning implied in the creation of the mental and physical activities produced by this creative power but also as existence having relations to other personalities which
make up society, the world, and so forth. His relations are also part of his existence.

We may say that because of abstract consubstantiality there is meaning and value in the world. This meaning and value is present not only for the single agent who creates certain actions as his own manifestations and the relations between his manifestations but for other agents as well. In other words, everybody and everything is meaningful and valuable for everything and everybody else. For example, it is meaningful to say that everything and everybody, if they exist at all, are in the relation of time, space, and that all things or all bodies have a numerical meaning of relation in which it is said that it is possible to classify them as one thing or body or more than one thing or body. In this sense there is a conformity of meaning and we can say that if anything or anybody exists, it exists in the meaning of space, time, number, etc.

But within this conformity of meaning there is a non-conformity of meaning in that all existences, as individual existences, have a uniqueness which is expressed in their independence of creative power. As has been said before, this uniqueness is found in the individual's norm which, as interpreted to and by the individual, ought to be used in achieving fulness of being, or, perfection.

In other words, God calls individuals, each as a unique
creative and independent being, to be perfect. Their freedom allows their individual uniquenesses to be that which they ought to be.

God foresaw that some agents would not use their freedom of uniqueness to be oneself and come to oneself in value. These agents would fail to become the best possible good, which is fulness of being. They would, instead act like other agents act, that is, conform in identical actions. God set a limit to activities of conformity, therefore. An example of conformity in identical actions is the mutual process of repulsion by means of which matter arises. It is only because there is mutual resistance on the part of two or more agents that impenetrable bulk or matter arises. Mutual resistance means the conformity to selfishness. This limit to selfishness is found in the principles of time, space, number, and other such principles, below which the agents could not fall in their mutual repulsion and selfishness.

At the limit is found the lowest level of existence within which the principle of time and space is the form where the monotonous activity of the electron is conformity and quite distinct and uncreative. Higher on the scale from the electron is found the atom, molecule, plant and vegetable life, animals, humans, society, the world, etc. Each state of development signifies more nonconformity which implies the condition for creativity
in which there may be revealed the progressive uniqueness, and individuality, of the evolutionary process of the potential personality in the freedom of being oneself as the best possible being one ought to be. This fulness of being actualized by the fulfilling of the obligation of the ought by progressive steps of the evolutionary process is the expression of combined purposes and meanings of the existence of agents by the joining of forces of the agents into a unity, that is, by mutual love which is the opposite of mutual selfishness.

In other words, agents enter into a relation of living unity by means of growth in mutual love or a relation of disunity by means of mutual hostility or hatred in their approach toward imperfection by their movement away from fulness of being through the isolation found in disunity.

A living unity in which a relation of love is expressed implies that the parts, as agents, have been related into a whole and have adopted each other's purposes through love in the experience of a living relationship. This implies that the unity has a common purpose which is perfection or a fulness of being in a unity of creative forces at work in the process of living experiences.

The individual ought to strive for unity in living meaningful relationships. This unity is growth in understanding and in appreciating by and through the acceptance
and the adoption of the purposes of others in and by each other's experiences. This is the sharing of experiences in a living unity. The value of this growth is revealed in the scale of the hierarchy of value as love and goodness, that is, fulness of being.

Movement toward or away from the perfection of fulness of being by means of the agents realizing love as the good implies freedom. This is a true freedom in which evil as selfishness as well as good as love can be realized by the human being. The good (or evil), therefore, is not that which is isolated but is that value (or disvalue) which reveals a movement which includes more and more unity of a larger and larger integration of agents that reveal a relationship of love (or of evil and of disvalue).

It is only by means of love that the purposes (revealed in strivings) of other human beings can be truly adopted as if these purposes were one's own. This unity of purposes through living adoption is a progressive unity from electron to atom, molecule, plant life, animal life, human beings, society, nations, the world, etc., and reveals the notion that purposive activity is creative and is the basis of life and that the life is the universe as a whole.

Also, the good as love is not realized in the experiences of life without freedom and the adoption of
other beings' purposes as if they were one's own.

Because of a partial cessation of enmity or hatred among beings in the world, there is a possibility of creative activity as a unity of power through the feeling of love and the adoption of common purposes of life in and through the freedom expressed by the individual. Purpose and freedom are important in the creative activity involved in absolute fulness of being. Purpose in this sense is to foretaste in feeling the valuable future, in the present, in terms of the past. A purposive creative activity means to create in the present a conscious desire or feeling in terms of the past, for the sake of the valuable future foretasted for attaining fulness of being.

In the process of correlating the time of the past, present, and future in purposive activity, it is only by a supertemporal entity that this process can be realized. An entity which was of time itself could not stand above time and correlate the past, present and future.

The process of correlation is a temporal activity performed by a supertemporal entity and may be called a purposive activity. It is an activity in which the past, which the supertemporal entity has experienced is viewed in terms of its consequences and the future is viewed in terms of the consequential effect of the past upon the
future together with the anticipated and emotional experience of the values involved. Being supertemporal, the entity can foretaste (intuit) immediately the objective value of realizing it in its activity and, therefore, deliberately and purposively strives in its activity to actualize this value.

The entity is limited, however, in his purposive activity even though he is supertemporal and superspatial. His purposive activity must conform to the principles of the structure of time and space, to the mathematical laws of functional dependence, etc. In his conformity he is qualitatively and quantitatively identical with all other entities, and this is abstract consubstantiality, and the condition of actualizing meaning in the world. Meaningful relations are established by him in terms of the values he has actualized in his life. In his purposive activity he has either approached absolute fulness of life which is the highest value for him and is positive or he has retreated from it which would be a negative value. His approach or retreat is expressed as a relation which is meaningful when measured in terms of absolute fulness of life for himself and others.

In realizing positive value or absolute fulness of life with others consubstantial with him, the entity can do this only by adopting the other's purposes as if they were his own. He must share in the striving of others and
be in harmony with their strivings. The purposes of the agents must coincide. This can be done only on the basis of love and intuition.

Love and intuition are realized only on the basis of freedom. For this reason individuals who hate do not adopt each other's purposes for they refrain from loving. Another reason the purposes of others are not realized is that individuals cannot fully intellectually intuit and fully comprehend the purposes of others. Their past experiences may have been different which may be a reason even though their activities were in the same realm of space, time, etc., that is, were consubstantial. Or if their past experiences were not entirely different their free selection of the value they desire to be realized is not in accord with the purposes of another entities' freely selected value.

The combining of powers by means of mutual love is not the only way of combining strivings and efforts. Besides mutual love which is the perfect means for the acceptance and adoption of the strivings and efforts of the existence of others, "prudential motives," fear, and "egotistical striving" may be used as a means for the actualization of the acceptance of the strivings and efforts of others. "Prudential motives," fear, and "egotistical strivings" embrace merely a partial acceptance and adoption of the strivings and efforts of others.
Such motives limit freedom so that the individual leads an uncreative life. Love, on the other hand, enhances creative activity through the acceptance and adoption of the purposes of others. Love is possible only as a voluntary manifestation of an agent, that is, on the basis of freedom. To know the purpose of another entails interest and intellectual activity which reflects freedom. It is thus possible that a purpose of another individual may be known but not adopted as a living experience.7

In the psycho-physical world there is no perfect mutual love, no perfect freedom, no perfect interest, or no perfect intellectual intuition. If there were perfection among the substantival agents, then there would be no material world, that is, psycho-physical processes of mutual repulsion which is called matter. It is because strivings and efforts are not accepted and adopted completely that the material world arises. This is another way of showing that there is no dualism of mind and body in the philosophy of N. O. Lossky.

This is also another way of showing that imperfect mutual love, imperfect freedom, imperfect interest and

7Intellectual intuition has been sufficiently explained in the chapter on perception. It should be said here, however, that interest as mental activity or psychical process is a factor which is important in broadening one's life and the lives of others, and that a community of shared interests is an important factor in promoting intellectual activity.
imperfect intellectual intuition, as revealed in physical processes, exhibit a value which is relative (i.e., relative value) to absolute value, which is perfection. In the psycho-physical world, according to Lossky, there are relative values as well as absolute values.

Those values are relative which in some relations are good, and in other relations evil; they are evil because they are at least necessarily connected with evil.

Such double-faced values are possible only in the psycho-physical kingdom of existence, a kingdom consisting of agents that are in the state of apostacy from God and of greater or lesser separation from one another. 8

The ontological theory of value does not separate meaning and existence. It is the nature of existence created by substantival agents that reveals the kind of value the agents exhibit as their own. The psycho-physical world is a kind of existence (real being) and as such in it are revealed both relative and absolute values.

If it is taken into consideration that relative good is by its own nature connected with evil, and that even the absolute good is accompanied by evil under the conditions of the psycho-physical kingdom—even though this evil does not come from the nature of the absolute good itself—then the sad picture of the life of beings who are condemning themselves to the life of the psycho-physical kingdom is outlined still more clearly before us. Each object, deed, thing, or being always calls forth ambivalent—the term of the psychiatrist Bleuler—or twofold reactions of feeling and will. On the

one hand an object is experienced as pleasing, beautiful, etc., and so desirable, while on the other hand it is experienced as unpleasant, or dangerous, etc., and so undesirable. The uncertainty as to what to choose, the impossibility of being pleased by the customary, introduces difficult situations at every step. This is owing to the fact that every object is many-sided and, met in different surroundings, requires in the different cases different valuations and different decisions of the will. This is the reason why many subjects are inclined to believe in ethical relativism and subjectivism, and are led to a scepticism which undermines their energy in the battle for the good. However, in all this mixture, and, as it seems, capricious unstability, there are hidden everywhere objective values significant for all.9

Because of the nature of our psycho-physical world, it is difficult for an individual to judge with perfect accuracy the value of an object or the event in connection with which the object is used in all instances. Our decisions are relative but this does not mean that all values are relative. Absolute values are higher on the scale of value in the hierarchy of values than relative values for:

An absolute positive value is a value unquestionably justified in itself, and, consequently, possessing the character of goodness from any standpoint, in any relation, and for any subject. Not only is it itself always good, but also the consequences that necessarily issue from it never contain evil in themselves. Such good is, for example, the Divine absolute fulness of being.

A relative positive value is a value possessing the character of goodness only in a certain relation

or for certain specific subjects. In any other relation or for certain other subjects such a value is in itself evil, or at least is necessarily connected with evil. Values in which good is necessarily connected with evil are possible only in the psycho-physical kingdom of existence, where agents are relatively isolated from each other by their greater or less egoistical self-containment.10

On the other hand, relative values are higher on the scale of values than instrumental values, which are merely means to an end.

In our psycho-physical kingdom of being there is an infinite number of activities, events, and contents of life, that possess only the character of a means for the realization of some positive value. Sweeping a room, the removing of a spot of grease from a dress with a cleaning fluid, the daily ride on the tram to the place of employment, the filling out of a questionnaire for the purpose of receiving a passport, etc., these are all instrumental values. They are possible only in a kingdom of being where there is separation and scantiness of life: they are activities and contents of existence that have no inner connection with the complex system of life as a whole, but only with some one limited element of it. They can be repeated and replaced, and they are valued not for their relatively-individual content, but only for their connection with the purpose that is apprehended as an abstract conception. The more actions there are in the behaviour of a being that have the character of simply a means and the more often they are repeated, the more the tone of such a being's life falls: there are more ordinary, uninteresting events.11

Lossky also makes the distinction between subjectiveness and objectiveness in his value theory.

We shall use the term subjectiveness to indicate that a value has significance for only one particular

10 Ibid., p. 103.
11 Ibid., p. 131.
subject; the significance of value for everybody, that is, its significance for every subject we shall call objectiveness. Absolute value, as follows from its definition, is at the same time a value that is significant for everybody, i.e., it constitutes an objective intrinsic value.

Subjectiveness and objectiveness are activities which reveal the values and the significance of values as they are interpreted by an individual for his life and the life of other individuals. In the interpretation the individual ought to use his super-qualitative power to understand the most meaningful relation and the value of it in the process of living in a particular society which in turn is a part of the world as a whole. He ought also to see himself as a value in this whole, keeping in mind that in this world whole there are both relative and absolute values.

If the teacher or the student should ask, "Is an action good because of the consequences that the action produces or is it good because of the good motive of the action?", Lossky would answer that it is both. The motive of the act stems from the fore-tasting of a value and it is revealed in the consequences or activities of life which the individual creates as his existence. For example, the fore-tasting of the positive value of love as expressed in the consequences of the acceptance and adoption

\[12\text{Ibid., pp. 103-104.}\]
of another's purposes. Contrary to the fore-tasting of love is the fore-tasting and the expression of hatred which is a negative value. The fore-tasting and expression of a negative value is not a good motive and does not bring good consequences for only perfect love is the perfect motive for a perfectly good consequence in the acceptance and adoption of another's purposes.

The fore-tasting of a value, whether positive or negative, is not without an interest in the scale of values which are revealed in the existences of beings. Since existences are the substantival agent's creations and are the consequences of their activities, interest is an important factor as an intellectual intuition in the selection of a value from the hierarchy of values in terms of which the consequences of the creative act is revealed in the created existence. Interest, then, as revealed in intellectual activity, together with the feeling of love, which is also a factor in value judgment, helps to select the fore-tasted value as an end of action in terms of which the consequences of the selections are revealed in the purposive and creative acts of the individual.

Each individual, (the teacher or the student) must know what is the consequential effect and the end of his actions upon others. In addition he ought to intend that his actions be consistent with the absolute good
which should be the standard or measure of all consequen­
tial actions of all individuals. In short, both his
intentions and the resulting actions should be in accord
with this standard of absolute good. Each teacher or
student ought to pursue the objective and absolute fore­
tasted good for the whole of humanity.

The means of gaining the objective and absolute
good as the end is intellectual and purposeful activity,
interest, and love. Both the teacher and the student
ought to think, however, of intellectual and purposeful
activity, interest and love as not only a means to the
end, but also an end which might be either growth of life
or as its degeneration, in the approach toward or away
from perfection. As the growth of life they should be
thought of as that aspect of the movement toward per­
fection which reveals a greater and greater complexity
of interrelated activity with deeper, far-reaching and
conscious interests that are permeated throughout with
a loving relationship. According to Lossky's theory
even an electron, whose signs of growth and activity are
at a minimum, due to his isolation, is not completely
isolated from the unity of the world but is united with
it by abstract ideal forms.

Being endowed with freedom (which is the greatest
intrinsic value of the person) the person ought to use it
to create an existence as a part of society which has a
positive and absolute value in its approach to fulness of being, and not a negative and relative value to move away from fulness of being, that is, he ought to create good and not evil actions which are his life and revealed in a society.

In creating positive or negative value actions and in knowing value by means of feeling and desire, value must not be thought to be the consequence of feelings and desires. Feelings and desires are mental processes and products of the substantival agent. Value is not a mental state of human being; value helps the human being to affirm, by means of his feelings and desires, the significance of fulness of being.

Value is existence, and connected with the substantival agent, its meaning is revealed in the life of the agent in his free movement towards or away from the absolute fulness of his life or being. Specifically connected with the substantival agent his life as existence is valuable and the life is expressed in the purposeful activity which exists as the meaningful aspect of existence for each agent in the evolutionary process of his existence. Lossky speaks of normal evolution as that type of evolution which leads to the "threshold of the Kingdom of God."

However numerous the ways of progress are, it is possible mentally to lay out an ideal type of evolution, which is realized along the lines that...
lead, in spite of the different concrete content of the process, straight up to the threshold of the Kingdom of God. Such an evolution may be called normal.\textsuperscript{13}

Attainment of the kingdom of God is the highest attainable value for the agent and it is in this state that the highest significance for his life is realized. After completing the movement towards this kingdom the substantival agent no longer possesses a physical body but a spirit-bearing body. Thus the evolutionary process is completed and the height of the process is a non-material body.

Now every substantival agent desires absolute fulness of being and he desires to prolong the valuable, that is, desires for it to stay and shuns that which is opposed to the valuable. In part this is manifested in the feelings of pleasure, pain, etc. But to prolong or shun is a creative activity and the cause of the creative activity is a superspatial and supertemporal being who possesses absolute intrinsic value.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 118.
As I interpret Lossky's view, education is the process of attaining fullness of being or life. It is a means of helping the individual to actualize his creativeness in the uniqueness of his life through experience which reflects freedom and purposeful activity. It is a process of growing mentally in the knowledge of those values which promote a fullness of being, of life, for the individual and the world as an organic whole.

In the educative process, both formal and informal, the teacher, like the student, as a human being, is creative through purposive acts. He helps in the creative process by promoting those conditions which are most conducive to the freedom of the highest expression of purposive and creative activity of the student.

The teacher reveals his purposiveness and creativity as he provides the physical source materials and mental atmosphere which are most promising in fostering critical thinking and also the judgment of values.

It is within such stimulating conditions that both the mental and the physical aspects of the student in the
learning process are stimulated to purposive and creative activity. The teacher as a human being and one who has great responsibility in guiding the learning experiences of students ought to be free to establish those physical conditions in which the student is free to use his senses and conduct any experiment in any scientific situation within reach of the teacher's advanced knowledge. The teacher should not set up any condition that mentally limits the student by limiting the possibilities of hypotheses selection in the experiments conducted. He should allow the student to entertain any hypothesis he chooses and help him in his selection of it and use of it in his experimentation. He should also give the student complete freedom to express the purposes of the experimentation in both his physical and mental creative acts in which a new theory or a new physical act may be advanced or even created by the student.

The teacher may be purposive and creative in the educative process not only by advancing those physical and mental conditions which are conducive to the freedom of the students' unique expression but also by sharing in the purposes of the student's new theory advancement or his new physical activities stemming from his mental activities.

In the creative process both the teacher and the student grow to a higher level of the knowledge of those values which help to promote a fulness of being in the
life of the individual and the world as an organic whole.

Education means purposive activity and the purpose of education is to increase and advance this purposive activity of the personality in the realization of value through creative activity both in the student and the teacher. If the purpose of education is to increase and to advance purposive activity, in the realization of values through creative activity, the end of creative activity is fulness of being for personality and the world as an organic whole. This implies the process of normal evolution in one's living. According to Lossky interest is an important factor in this evolutionary process.

Each step of this normal evolution represents a release from some aspect of egoistical self-exclusion. It represents a broadening of the life of the agent by the adoption of a group of alien personal or even super-personal interests into his own life as if they were his own interests (such assimilation Stern calls "introception"). Each step of normal evolution also represents the development of abilities that are necessary for the ascent to the all-embracing life, for example, the development of psychic activity from the psychoidal, the acquirering of new forms of perception (of sound, light, etc.), the development of consciousness from the elements of pre-consciousness, the transition from instinct to conscious will, the development of the capacity for intellectual intuition (mind), etc. Each gain in normal evolution, each activity in its course, is a positive value in so far as
It is existence in its significance for the ascent to the absolute fulness of being.\(^1\)

The isolation of interests, together with \textit{mutual} hatred, bring poverty of life to both the student and the teacher. Contrarily, the sharing of interests and \textit{mutual} love bring richness of life to both. Richness of life means growth as revealed in the creative activity of the educational and evolutionary process. Growth in the evolutionary process is a result of learning.

The poverty of the isolated life, as was said above, can be overcome only by means of the evolutionary process. It is the process by which the agent gradually learns to leave his self-containment at least partially, and to enter into union with other agents. He forms with them organically united wholes in which it is possible mutually to attain a greater complexity and variety of life than in isolated existence.\(^2\)

Growth and learning are closely connected. One learns to grow and grows to learn. Through the process of learning, then, one leads a richer life. Learning is nevertheless impossible without the consciousness of interest and the feeling of love by means of which organically united wholes are formed. But the consciousness of interest and the feeling of love do not guarantee an individual against mistakes in the learning process as revealed in normal evolution. Practical living as


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 116.
experience is also needed.

Under the conditions of a sundered existence, neither the conscience of relatively highly developed beings, nor the instinct on the primary levels of existence guarantees beings against mistakes. To these fundamental guides experience must be added to discover the path of normal evolution. Thus it becomes clear that in real existence there cannot be a clear-cut line of normal evolution. Trials, deviations from the correct way, getting into blind alleys, and the search for the way out of them, are unavoidable in the realm of evolution. 3

Thus, in the learning situation a teacher ought to allow for the practical expressions of the student. The teacher ought to inspire the student through his actions and also ought to encourage the student to repeat that experiment of the classroom in which the student has made an error as he grows in learning. The teacher, being a part of the evolutionary process, as he grows in learning in that process, ought likewise not to believe that he has the final knowledge of every situation for he has grasped the whole of the truth of every situation. The teacher ought to realize that man's knowledge of the truth as a whole is relative and that he as a teacher of others also grows in the knowledge of the perfect truth through the learning process in the situations of life.

The teacher, along with the student, is a searcher for the truth and when the search for the truth is interrelated with interest and love there is less isolation of

3 Ibid., p. 155.
activities of life. The consciousness of interest and the feeling of love as practical experience are important factors, therefore, in the learning process. This consciousness contributes to a better learning situation in which there is less isolation of individuals and a more correct evaluation of the situation or the object under investigation. The intelligent use of interest and a sincere feeling of love in the approach to fulness of being leads to a better knowledge of absolute truth for both the student and the teacher. The following factors contribute to a poor learning situation:

If we add to this the weakness of the intellect, conditioned as it is by a weakness of power in a relatively isolated subject, if we add also his imperfect cognition of objects, the incompleteness of deduction and prognostication of consequences, the plentiful mistakes in knowledge—then it is seen more clearly that an agent in the psycho-physical kingdom is fated to make many mistakes in valuing objects, and many mistakes in preferring one value to another.4

Lossky would thus hold that the reverse is a better learning situation in the teacher-pupil relation, that is, what is needed for a more correct valuation in the learning process is a stronger intellect, a more perfect cognition of objects, a more complete deduction and prognostication of consequences which would result in less mistakes in knowledge development. The concepts of a more perfect cognition of objects and a more complete deduction and

4Ibid., p. 155.
prognostication of consequences implies the use of the so-called scientific method of investigation in which the cognition of the objects would be the data under investigation and the deduction and prognostication would be the testing and the forecasting of the results of testing of the data. The whole process of the scientific investigation of the data would be in the framework of interest and love as a means to a more complete knowledge of the data under investigation in terms of which a value judgment would be more possible. Lossky's theory would not exclude the scientific method in the valuing process. The valuing process is not, however, the value which is known by the individual. The valuing process is a qualitative activity of the super-qualitative being. It is therefore relative to the super-qualitative absolute being.

The scientific method is needed because each object, deed, thing, and situation of life require "different valuations and different decisions of the will."

On the one hand an object is experienced as pleasing, beautiful, etc., and so desirable, while on the other hand it is experienced as unpleasant, or dangerous, etc., and so undesirable. The uncertainty as to what to choose, the impossibility of being pleased by the customary, introduces difficult situations at every step. This is owing to the fact that every object is many-sided, and met in different surroundings, requires in the different cases different valuations and different decisions of the will. This is the reason why many subjects are inclined to believe in ethical relativism and subjectivism, and are led to a scepticism which undermines their energy in the battle for the good.
However, in all this mixture, and, as it seems, capricious unstability, there are hidden everywhere objective values significant for all.\(^5\)

Lossky makes it clear that we live in a realm of relative values and must deal with them as such according to the situation involved. This could imply that the teacher and the student ought, therefore, not only to seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge (even though it may be relative) but also learn the methodology, which as a process is relative, and as such helps to resolve the problems as experienced in the different situations of living.

But as has been explained the activities of life are not an end in themselves and therefore do not constitute the value of absolute fullness of being but are a means in the evolutionary process of mankind toward absolute fullness of being which is the intrinsic end and absolute value of the super-qualitative individual. The individual, either as teacher or pupil, ought never to suppose that his activity is absolute and therefore a perfect end. He ought to recognize its dependence upon the absolute source of the activity. In other words, the teacher and pupil ought to distinguish means from end as they are related to relative and absolute values. As a teacher, the individual ought not to keep means at the level of means. He ought to raise the means to the level of ends even

\(^5\)Ibid., pp. 155-156.
though the activities, objects, and situations of life are so interrelated and complex that they might be difficult to differentiate and appear to be both means and end, (relative and absolute value) at the same time for the same individual.

More than that, each of the activities and the objects of these activities enumerated might be brought down to the level of simply a means, not only in relation to the absolute values, but also in relation to values which are likewise relative. An artisan may think of his professional activity and the products produced by it—furniture, shoes, clothing, etc.—only as a means for making a living, and not put sincere interest in his work. Similarly, a teacher of physical education might look upon his teaching and upon the physical development of the children that were entrusted to him only as a means of getting his salary and advancement, in case he is very successful. It is very doubtful, however, whether children could be safely trusted to such a teacher. Moreover, the interrelation of activities, their objects and their values, is so complicated that each of the enumerated activities and each of their objects might be at the same time and for the same agent an intrinsic value and also a means of reaching some other value.  

The student and the teacher ought to strive to realize that although the evolutionary process reveals the relative good, it is possible to grow in relative goodness, by means of interest, love, and mental activity, through the radiated values of goodness, truth, beauty, and love to the point where one is able to understand and appreciate absolute values which lead him beyond the physical world.

However numerous the ways of progress are, it is possible mentally to lay out an ideal type of

\[6\text{Ibid.}, \ pp. \ 120-121.\]
evolution, which is realized along the lines that lead in spite of the different concrete content of the process, straight up to the threshold of the Kingdom of God. Such an evolution may be called normal. It is directed by norms that emerge due to the problem of growing in relative goodness up to the point of acquiring the ability to comprehend absolute values, of beginning to place them as the purpose of behaviour, and of reaching the limit of the psycho-physical kingdom, of reaching holiness which is rewarded by becoming worthy of deification, that is, entering the Kingdom of God.

Each step of this normal evolution represents a release from some aspect of egoistical self-exclusion. It represents a broadening of the life of the agent by the adoption of a group of alien personal or even super-personal interests into his own life as if they were his own interests...

The teacher should not be dogmatic but realize that there are "numerous ways" of evolutionary progress, since each student's striving is unique and irreplaceable. Because this striving is revealed in each student's fulness of being, there is a common element in each student's striving in the final goal which is absolute fulness of being for all students. This common element of absolute fulness of being for the student as his individual manifestation (even though a manifestation is relative) is an objective value for another individual (as teacher or student) and may become a significant and positive value for many or all other individuals, both teacher and/or students. That is, every manifestation, or activity, or experience, of an individual, even though it is relative in value is significant and objective to another individual. As an individual, therefore, grows in normal

7Ibid., p. 118.
evolution he recognizes the relativity of some values and must assert that they have a significant and positive content for all individuals. The activities of individuals (teachers and students), even though they are different and relative and thus means, are significant and absolute as ends. In this sense for both the teacher and student as individuals means are ends but not all ends are means.

In many cases, especially in culture, means are important in the development of humanity. But means are not the art of life. Means ought to be used for specific ends.

As culture develops, a man more often sets up goals the attainment of which requires the realization of a long series of means before the goal itself may be realized. From this, however, we should not draw the conclusion that the development of culture must necessarily be accompanied by the lowering of the tone of life. The art of life lies in the ability to complicate the interests of life and to deepen its organic aspect so that means cease to be simply means and at least in some aspects contain intrinsic aims, or at least are permeated and attractively lighted by reflections from that intrinsic aim for the sake of which they are being realized. Thus, a scientist spending several years in preparation for a difficult scientific expedition, or a far-sighted politician like Bismarck, an active reformer like Peter the Great, could with enthusiasm be effecting the instruments for a distant purpose, seeing in each instrument some intrinsic aim, or at least a reflection of that far-removed intrinsic aim.

In considering means as ends and ends as means an individual as an interested member of a society ought to

---

8Ibid., pp. 131-132.
consider the means-ends relationship in terms of the meaning of goodness, truth, beauty, and freedom, which are the necessary aspects of fulness of being. Means and ends imply relationships and relationships imply meaning. Meaning in turn has a significance in truth, goodness, beauty, and freedom. Truth, goodness, beauty, freedom are neither the ultimate ends nor merely the means to the ultimate ends. They are a third alternative and are partial absolute intrinsic values as has been explained.

As partial intrinsic values, goodness, truth, beauty, and freedom are radiated values and are revealed in things, objects, and events. These values become known as meaning in terms of the relations of the ideal aspect of the world as expressed in abstract ideal being. When they become known as a meaning, in the educational process, they become potential aims for an individual's activity. To become an actual aim they must become the purpose of an individual's activity and be placed as the object of the individual's (both teacher and students) creative activity. In this way it is possible to find a preference to behave in one way than another. The preference is made on the basis of the meaning of goodness, truth, beauty and freedom. It may be said that these values carry within their own meaning an inner justification which is significant to all individuals in all cultures within the framework of the relations of abstract ideal being.
The teacher, therefore, can encourage the pupil to understand and appreciate the values of things, objects, and events as they express the meanings of truth, goodness, beauty, and freedom. It is hoped that the student will place this meaning at the purpose or end of his behavior. The student, as an absolute (not partial) intrinsic value, should realize such value in his creative activity as he approaches absolute fulness of his own being. The approach is made through the meaningful relations found in necessary aspects of the fulness of being which are goodness, truth, beauty, and freedom.

The more relations the student finds between his creative activity through interest, understanding, and appreciation, and the things, objects, and events of the world which express the meaning of goodness, truth, beauty, and freedom, the more meaning the student will possess.

The things and events which express beauty, are merely symbols of the absolute beauty but as a symbol it is meaning and the experience of it "remains in the soul forever" as meaning.

The beauty of the snow-capped mountains, their grandeur, harmony, and virgin purity, is only a symbol of the absolute beauty, of the absolute greatness and pureness. Therefore, the mountains themselves are not external and should not be eternal, and the experience of this beauty remains in the soul forever, not in its psycho-physical concreteness, of course, which really is not concreteness, but is only a broken abstractness; however, it does remain in its meaning. This meaning like an overtone continues
to sing in the soul, giving to everything a new
color of solemnity and greatness and invariably
keeping up, perhaps only in the sub-conscious or
super-conscious sphere, the eros for beauty.9

Those students and individuals who have not fore-
tasted the partial absolute values and who are in blind
alleys and not in the course of normal evolution to abso-
lute fulness of being find that once they experience these
values they live in a state of contradiction within their
own feeling of longing to re-experience the meaning of
these values and realize them as an end and the purpose
of their behavior.

The indelible trace remaining in the mind
due to the experience of absolute values will
never let the agent who has deviated from
the normal course of development be satisfied
with his position. He will always be tormented
with the contradiction between his conduct, full
of evil, and the 'eros' of the pure good, dimly
revealed to him in the earthly experiences of
absolute values. Sooner or later this contradiction
will lead those who have lost their way out of
the blind alley, will induce them to leave the
'sad songs of earth'...10

The "indelible trace" which remains in the mind
can be thought of as memory. In the above quotation, it
is a memory of an absolute value, the meaning of which is
so potent and over-powering, because of its perfection and
inclusiveness, that the individual who experiences it may
become conscious of his imperfection. Things of this

9Ibid., p. 137.
world such as the "beauty of the snow-capped mountains" as symbols convey meanings which serve as reminders of the absolute beauty.

Lossky makes the point concerning sensuous intuition that a sensuous intuition is not wholly sensuous. This point was explained in discussing the theory of knowledge. It was seen that the unity existing in the sense qualities inherent in an object is grasped by nonsensual means. Lossky makes this point again in considering memory and inference.

Owing to the fact that many aspects of sense-perception are perspectival and relative to the subject's body, sensuous intuition is not sufficient even for the knowledge of the sensuous contents of the object. It has to be supplemented by other means of communication with the object—by non-sensuous perception of sense-qualities, by memories of past experiences and by inference.11

Looking at the blade of a sharp knife we often not merely perceive its sharpness as visually given but seem to feel it on our skin. Clearly, in that case the perception of the actually present reality is supplemented by memories of our past experiences. As we sit in a room and hear a sound outside we immediately recognise it as the bark of a dog, the noise of a chair being moved upstairs, the ringing of a bell, etc. Such complex perceptions are also regarded in psychology as combinations of the present sensation with memories of former visual, tactile, etc. experiences.12

---


Lossky calls memories presentations in contrast to perceptions, the latter being products of sensuous activities.

As he did in his theory of knowledge and his theory of value, Lossky makes a distinction between the subjective and the objective aspects of memory in his theory of memory. The subjective aspect of memory consists of the supertemporal and superspatial self who creates intentional acts in time. Through the intentional acts the self contemplates the past.

Owing to its supertemporal character the self is capable of contemplating not only the events, which immediately precede the present, but also any events of the past.\textsuperscript{13}

It is possible for the self to "have in memory," that is to contemplate, the past immediately and directly because of the spiritual relation that exists between the self and that which is remembered and also because of the unity existing in the world as an organic whole.

The objective aspect of memory is that which is remembered (contemplated). But unlike a sensuous object which is perceived, it is ideal and does not contain sensuous qualities which stimulate the sense organs. Concerning the differences between the objective side of memory and of perception Lossky says:

The objective side of memory also differs from the objective side of perception. In the first place, a memory content, being past and complete, has no dynamic connection with the subject's present bodily and spiritual life, while it is precisely this dynamic connection that is so characteristic of the percept and makes it so intimate a part of the subject's life. A remembered crash of thunder does not sound in the way an actually perceived whisper does. Secondly, even on its sensuous side a memory content is often deficient in a way that is impossible in perception—e.g., the shape of a thing may be remembered apart from its colour or vice versa. Thirdly, a memory content may be entirely lacking in concrete sensuous elements and appear in consciousness as something unperceivable. Consequently, contents of memory have a phantom like character and appear to be less real than percepts. And indeed they are less real, since they belong to the past and have no dynamic force.14

Regarding points two and three in the above passage, Lossky goes on to say:

The two last mentioned points of difference between memory and perception are however not always to be found. In the case of persons of the so-called eidetic type, primary and even secondary memory-contents appear in consciousness with the same sensuous fulness as in perception. These people can, for instance, discriminate and observe in the memory content features which they had failed to notice at the moment of perception.15

Memories (data of presentation) enter into our experiences in the perception of things. These data help in the formation of knowledge. These data can also be the source of error in the process of knowing.

15 Ibid., p. 22.
No wonder therefore that remembrances entering into perception almost always appear to be perceived. If they do not correspond to reality, the false perception is called an illusion (for instance, coming into a room at dusk I see a man, standing by the wall and then discover that it was a towel hanging on the wall.) 16

We see that memory is the immediate contemplation of the past by a concretely ideal being who possesses the power to transcend time and space.

A temporal event as such is doomed to sink forever into the abyss of the past and to remain impotent and sterile. Only by means of a substance can it participate in eternal life: thanks to memory, characteristic of supertemporal beings, an event does not fall into the bottomless pit of the past at once, but is retained for a time in the sphere of the present; in the same way, by means of memory possessed by substances, events that have already receded into the realm of the past sometimes acquire significance for the present, if only as pale contents of memory; and finally, thanks also to memory, it is vouchsafed to events that have absolute value and perfection to preserve forever the freshness of the present (as happens in the Kingdom of the Spirit). 17

Memory is also important to science. In scientific investigation the past is projected into the future in terms of probable prediction and the validity of this probable prediction is made possible by means of memory. Lossky says:

The validity of science can only be vindicated by the aid of an immanent theory of memory—a theory, i.e., according to which the past, in and through the act of remembering, becomes once more immanent in the subject's consciousness. The past

16 Ibid., p. 22.

17 N. O. Lossky, The World as an Organic Whole, p. 132.
does not thereby become the present: the only thing that is present is the act of consciousness directed upon the past. In order to bring about this curious correlation of the present event (the act of remembering) with the past (the remembered object), thus throwing as it were a bridge over the gulf of time, the knowing subject that is, the self, must be a supertemporal entity.  

Although without the function of memory events of the past would not be known in the present and the validity of science would be impossible, the more important function of memory is the recalling in the present of the presentations of the absolute values experienced in the past. The individual re-experiences the meanings of these absolute values and makes them meaningful in his living as he tries to realize them as an end and the purpose of his behavior.

The mental activity or contemplation of the future is imagination. That which the individual contemplates or intuits is not material but ideal and valuable. As ideal the valuable future intuited in imagination can become actualized as a fact of existence through the activity of the supertemporal individual to the extent that it becomes his working scheme towards which he strives.

In the act of imagination the individual contemplates the possible. The possible, as such, in its entirety, is infinite and can exist in the divine mind only. It is greater than the world of actuality and infinitely

18 Ibid., p. 43.
rich in content. The individual, as a finite being, therefore, can imagine merely a fragment of the infinite number of possibilities which is greater than the world of actuality. A selection from the infinite number of possibilities would guide his action in imagination.

In and through the act of imagination, then, the individual intuits or has a revelation of the world which is only partly somewhat like the actual world in which he lives. Imagination reveals the new and the infinitely possible. The newer and fresher that the object of the imagination in the infinitely possible is revealed, the harder it is for the intentive act of the imagination to grasp it.

The act of imagination is a creative one. There is little similarity between the possible new as future experience and the old experience as the past. It cannot be said, in regard to imagination that the future resembles the past in the sense of being determined by the past. There is, however, some degree of similarity between the past and the future.

The contemplation of the future possibilities in imagination in terms of past happenings is a comparatively easy matter. Past happenings are merely projected into the future in a causal relation and the consequences of the happenings are measured in their effectual strength. Very little new and creative activity is released by the
individual in this process of projecting past happenings into the future. In this process of projection of past into the future a law of regularity is discovered as a possibility of the cause and effect order of determination. Imagination, then, in projecting past happenings is working at a lower creative level than it would be if it contemplated the ideal and infinite possibilities which are greater than the world and which are in the divine mind. Although it is a comparatively more difficult task it is possible for a human being to contemplate the ideal and infinite possibilities for the human being is at essence a superspatial and supertemporal being who is capable of imaginatively transcending the realm of the causal time of past and future sequence.

In the creative activity which reveals a higher degree of imagination, there is also a high degree of organic unity in which the whole, an a unity of parts, reflects an end which is different and new.

Let us take the higher creative activities of the subject, for example, the musical work of a composer. A piece of music is a complex whole in which a multitude of parts is not a chaos but forms an organic unity; all its elements are in harmony with, and exist for, one another, and this is only possible because it is the work of a being who transcends the multiplicity of time and space.19

\[19\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 48.\]
The elements, as parts of the whole, exist for each other and thereby form an organic whole, the end of which is harmony. The work of a poet might show the same degree of imagination, creative activity and unity of parts which exist for each other and form a meaningful whole as an end.

The concept of parts existing for each other and forming a whole as an end is reflected in Lossky's concept of purposive activity.

What do we mean when we describe its structure as purposive? We must turn for an answer to Kant, who has investigated the question more fully than any one. According to Kant, the purposive character of an organism consists in the fact that its parts exist not only in consequence of one another, but also for the sake of each other as well as for the sake of the whole.

...Thus a perfect work of art, such as a play, is a whole, the successive parts of which exist in consequence and for the sake of one another as well as of the whole: the parts of such a whole are not only a means but also an end for one another.20

The concept of imagination and creative activity leads us to the problem of means and ends by way of purposive activity. Purposive activity has been explained as that activity which involves interest and also love as the most perfect means of the acceptance and adoption of the purposes of others. Purposes in each case would be the elements (parts) which exist for each other and for the sake and consequence of each other by means of interest and love and thereby creating a greater interest and love.

20Ibid., pp. 159-160.
as the end or harmony. The end is something new, a new effect as compared with the cause. This implies the concept of freedom.

The product of creative activity, having a new nature as compared with its cause, is in its turn capable of introducing into the world perfectly new effects on its own account. The more creative an activity is, the greater freedom it implies both in the creator and in the product of his activity. This fact is familiar to us in the realm of the highest works of the human spirit, e.g. in the spheres of artistic creation, of moral achievement, social organization, &c. A work of art, e.g., lives outside its creator's mind with such intensity, and bears such unexpected fruit, that he himself is amazed at his own work.21

The cause of all events (effects), which implies time and space, is the substantival agent who is super-temporal and superspatial. Endowed with freedom and as the cause, the agent is different from the effects he creates. He is free to either fulfill his ideal self, his uniqueness as the image of God, and a member of the Kingdom of God, or not to fulfill it. He would do this by and through his actions, habits and ideals.

According to Lossky his "psychology has a psyche."22 The human being is considered a unity and the responses which are made by the individual are made by the self as unity. These responses are purposive and creative.

21 Ibid., p. 97.
This is especially true in the field of education, both formal and informal education. It is the individual as a self that realizes the good life through education. In the educative process the unity of the self responds to the situation or problem with its total self, that is, its emotions and intellect which are his manifestations as habits and experiences.

The self is one, an individual, and a unity. As it has been explained this unity is composed of (1) a non-qualitative power of will (creative power) (2) ideal self which we have spoken of as the image of God and normative idea. We have, then, a unity of creative power which is non-qualitative which may be expressed through a person's will and an ideal self as that which a person ought to fulfill and which is expressed through purposive activity.

As we have seen, the individual has freedom of will to either fulfill this ideal self through creative and purposive activity or not to fulfill it. The fulfilling or not fulfilling of the ideal self is revealed in the individual's life, his experiences, his empirical self. The self as empirical is the totality of definite qualities such as courageousness, timidity, aggressiveness, gentleness, etc. These definite qualities are expressions of the supertemporal self in time and are its
habits. As habits they are repetitious activities in time performed by the supertemporal self.

If a self, made after this pattern, creatively realizes in the spatial and temporal system of the world some actual definite content, if it approves of it and repeats it time after time under analogous conditions, it acquires the habit of a certain type of action, and the totality of such habits form the empirical character of a given self. The empirical character is not something given to us from above; every self creates its own character, gradually working it out.\(^{23}\)

Habits alone are not the good life and the end of education. Creative and purposive activity are also needed. Habits alone would determine an individual's actions with strict necessity. Nevertheless, habits are good for they help in the efficiency of a creative and purposive activity. The more important factor in the educative process is the fulfilling of the ideal self which ought to be the aim in education in forming those habits which promote a more comprehensive creative and purposive activity. The ideal self, as we have said, is the normative idea, the image of God, and it is revealed to the individual as his uniqueness and that which he ought to be, as his highest value and expressed through purposive activity.

The person (student or teacher) attains the ought, the highest value, through creative activity with the help

of habits which is his life, his empirical self in the
process of education in terms of inspiration, comfort and
the knowledge of the truth of value.

Education is that aspect of the individual's life
which is a temporal process and is revealed in mental
activity which is a positive value. By mental (or psychical)
Lossky means a process which is temporal but not spatial,
that is, the process takes place in time but not in space.

The mental activity as we have seen is subordinate
to the creative power of the unity of the self, i.e.,
mental activity is a process in time as physical activity
is a process in both time and space. Both mental and
physical processes are therefore activities of a super-
temporal and superspatial self who possesses a creative
power and expresses it with freedom to create a new
activity. The self is master over temporal and spatial
processes and this mastery is reflected especially in the
act of repentance.

The mastery of the self over the temporal process
shows itself most clearly in the act of repentance
which penetrates the soul right through, and so
completely cuts off the past that not merely the
experienced events but even the passions that had
possessed the soul suddenly sink into the abyss
of time, and become an object of cold observation,
no longer capable of tempting us.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24}N. O. Lossky, Freedom of Will, p. 91.
By not being determined by the past the self as an individual is free to be unique and ideal and to create a new desire to desire, a new way of acting, a new work of art in which imagination has a full and free range to be creative. This creativity is a dynamic causality as has been explained.

In this scheme the self as individual is not passive as in the philosophy of John Locke but active. The self as individual has power and freedom and uses this power and freedom to create its experiences, its very life. This, therefore, is not merely dynamic causation but also individual causation.

The self as an individual is not static but dynamic in the process of individual causation. The self is the cause of its experiences and life as it is revealed in the mental and physical processes as the self strives to attain fulness of being. Fulness of being, however, cannot be attained without realizing one's ideal self as that being which one ought to be, and strives to be, in his uniqueness in the psycho-physical world.

As has been shown, striving is important to creativity and the source of the striving is not from within or without or environment or body (i.e., time or space) but from a supertemporal and superspatial self. A striving is expressed in a creative activity, as has been explained.
Regarding the self's creativity as a student or a teacher, his power of creation is unique and the manifestation of this power is unique. Regarding the way he expresses this creative power it is not unique due to the abstract ideal principles, as has been explained. These abstract ideal principles do not depend upon a person's will. That is, the person expresses the creative power in terms of the abstract ideal principles of space, time, number, etc., which is the common form of the way of expression of all the selves in the psycho-physical realm. So that in one respect the self is unique and independent, but in another he shares with all other selves common abstract and ideal principles of expression which help to make the world rational. Nevertheless, in all acts of creation the self transcends the relations of time, space, number, etc., which these abstract ideal principles imply for he creates and is immanent in all of his manifestations, his habits, his experiences, his life of mental and physical activities with their relations.

His experiences which are revealed as his manifestations and habits exist for him. They are his own and have meaning for him and he is present in them. This principle, of manifestations, habits, experiences, as being one's own and having meaning for oneself for one is present in them, is the basis of pre-consciousness and pre-feeling and the development of consciousness and feeling which
testifies to the existences of other manifestations, habits, experiences, which are not one's own.

The structure of existence which consists of the ego being immanent in all its manifestations, and of them existing for the ego, is not only pre-consciousness, on the basis of which consciousness and also purely theoretical activity may later develop, but it is also pre-feeling. Indeed, each element of existence is also a value in so far as it is a factor in the approach or movement away from the fulness of being.\textsuperscript{25}

Pre-consciousness and pre-feeling, therefore, are the conditions of consciousness and feeling which is existence and life having meaning and, therefore, value, according to the ontological theory. Consciousness and feeling are the aspects of life in which the empirical and ideal self as a unity (habits, emotions, intellectual activity) is realized as it judges value in its approach to fulness of being or away from fulness of being. As we have seen, the movement to or away from fulness of being is realized according to two principles. These two principles do not depend upon human will. They are: (1) "every action containing a negative value causes dissatisfaction (if only partly so) to a conscious object" and (2) the principle of the hierarchy of values. This leads us to the problem of science. Before we deal with this problem let us review some basic principles which might be pertinent.

It can be said that the world is rational because of the transcendence by the self of his relations and the fact that the abstract ideal principles together with the two principles that determine the value of existence do not depend upon the human will (a will with a changeable factor.)

These principles make of the world a system or unity and a system or unity implies meaningful relations. These principles "create the possibility of activity" in the world. For whether the person wills or not these principles will be present and they stand in a meaningful relation to the person who is the creator of an activity. When an individual does act, it is in accord with them. Therefore, these principles not only "create the possibility of activity" but also the value of the activity.

But it must not be thought that these principles determine the activities of the individual. Rather it is the opposite. An infinite variety of activities can be performed within this system (or unity) some of which are even opposed to one another in meaning and value. It is for this reason that we have evolution and devolution.

It must be remembered that the abstract ideal principles in terms of which relations are realized are theoretical and not practical, for they do not have the power to cause (create) the self to act. As distinguished
from the self and the cause, events which are created and express relations such as to the right, to the left, above, below, within, without, belonging, causality, etc., and expressed as manifestations, are the occasions of the activity of the self. The cause of the activity is a supertemporal and superspatial unity of the ideal and empirical self who possesses freedom to act. It is the self who freely creates and is the cause of his manifestations, habits, and experiences which are objects of knowledge and subject to Lossky's theory of knowledge. These manifestations, habits, and experiences are practical as well as theoretical. They are practical for they are created in accordance to a hierarchy of values and theoretical because the basis of their creation is an abstract ideal principle. As practical and theoretical they form a rational unity. It is the combined unity and activity of all the selves that makes the world rational and valuable. The unity and rationality of the world makes the objects of the world subject to scientific knowledge according to Lossky's theory of knowledge. According to Lossky,

The absence of rigidly uniform connection between events does not make science impossible. It is sufficient for science that there should be a more or less regular connection between events in time. The lower the agents' stage of development, the more uniform are their manifestations.26

Regarding scientific knowledge and education, Lossky would hold to the traditional steps of the method of scientific investigation of problem solving such as: (1) given a problem, (2) the selection of relevant data for the solution of the problem, (3) testing the relevant data, and (4) conclusion. His disagreement with the method would be with the meanings derived from the words "testing of data" in the third step of the method. In particular his disagreement would be most evident in the meaning of the value of the data tested and the kind of data valued.

The value connected with data involving objects of knowledge which lend themselves to sensuous perception, such as automobiles, trees, facial expressions, colors, sounds, etc., would be more amenable to the scientific method of investigation than would the values connected with objects of knowledge which are not grasped sensuously, such as motives, unity, goodness, truth, causality, etc.

Let us re-examine how objects of sensual perception would be dealt with in the formation of knowledge as it relates to the testing of data. Testing would be in accord with his theory of perception (in his theory of knowledge) which as we have seen is interpreted in terms of a spiritual or epistemological relation between subject and object, i.e., he holds to a coordinational theory of perception. In the coordinational theory of perception the subject has in consciousness the object as it is in
itself, that is, ideal being and not a copy or an image of it. A copy or image of an object to the observer signifies a causal theory of perception, Lossky's coordinational theory of perception, on the other hand, as we have seen is not causal in the same sense.

Incitation of the sense organs is not the cause of perception, but only a stimulus for a self to pay attention to the object of the external world.

When a person has in view an object involving a problem and wishes to test it he has the object in consciousness and the object is its own self-testimony. The perceiver knows the object immediately and directly without the mediation of copies, images, data, or the like. This immediate and direct knowledge of the object's own self-testimony reveals the truth of the object's existence and structure in terms of the necessary synthetic connection of and within the object as "S is P". The synthesis of "S is P" is not made by the subject but it is found. What the subject does is to analyze the object, that is, create acts of attention, discrimination, comparison, etc., by means of which he discovers the truth of "S is P" in the object.

Because the world is rational and valuable (which makes science possible) the subject in his analyses knows that he does not create the object under investigation. Because the world is rational and valuable he can also
separate (by analysis) the various meaningful relations by means of induction which pertain to his specific problem. The relations are not the causes, however, of the object's existences. Relations are passive and realized by the superspatial and supertemporal self who creates and causes his activity. It does not follow that induction gives us a complete answer to knowledge of the truth of the object under investigation. It gives us a partial answer. The activity of the self as individual and dynamic causation and as an absolute intrinsic value must be also taken into account. Causality in this sense is based on freedom and does not have the meaning of mechanical determination. The meaning of causation used in inductive reasoning in the method of difference would not be identical with individual and dynamic causation as it is used by Lossky in his theory of knowledge and the existence of the world.

About inductive causation in the method of difference Lossky says:

The causes of events are as a rule complex, and the removal of a part of the cause may lead to the disappearance of the effect. In using the method of difference we are only warranted in concluding that a part of the cause has been found, but we have no right to affirm that the whole cause is now known to us. 27

Again quoting Lossky in referring induction to the dynamic concept of causality and its relation to ethics:

Thus, in working out the theory of induction it becomes at once apparent that inductive inferences would be impossible were it not for the direct observation of the dynamic aspect of the causal tie. If there were no such aspect, the connection between all the events in the world would be a purely external one of sequence or coexistence, and it would be impossible to extract from this ocean of mutually indifferent elements such limited cross-sections of reality as exhibit a structural relation valuable for inference, so that judgments about them could serve as premisses, and analysis of them could lead inductively to a conclusion.28

In ethics we can still less afford to neglect the dynamic aspect of causality; ethics has reached a stage of development at which it must be essentially concrete, i.e. must not confine itself to the general abstract norms of conduct, but explain the unique and individual way in which each person has to carry out the particular part for which he is ideally destined. To arrive at an explanation one must have in mind the whole structure of an act of willing, omitting none of its factors. From the point of view of concrete ethics the greatest interest attaches to that creative aspect of an act which may give it a strikingly individual character and save it from slavish conformity to this or that law of nature. This is precisely what the dynamic aspect of causality does; owing to it, it is not in the least necessary that the causal tie should be uniform; there may be such a thing as individual causation. Indeed, wherever an action is generated by an agent, there is causality; but this does not mean that the act of generation must needs be repeated with exactness and regularity; as a matter of fact, a creative act is often from its very meaning something unique and individual.29

The above quotation reinforces what has been said of the relation between individual causation, value, creative activity, and induction.

28Ibid

29Freedom of Will, pp. 65, 66.
In relating science to education, especially general education, scientific laws should not be thought of as a body of rigid laws expressing absolute connections between events in the spatio-temporal realm. The study of science deals with the uniformity of connections between events which are expressed as meaningful relations. But as we have seen this uniformity is interpreted in terms of a dynamic theory of causation in which freedom plays a part. The study of science, then is an abstraction from the cosmos, that is, a rational and not a chaotic world.

As super-qualitative an individual has a super-qualitative power either to perform an act in the temporal realm or to refrain from performing it. Having the power of freedom of expression and creative activity, he can either express a relation by and through his creative activity or refrain from expressing it.

Creative activity which is so important in the educative process is determined by freedom, and vice versa; the more creative activity the more freedom, and vice versa. In the creative activity there is no identity of cause and effect.

It is possible that in combining their super-qualitative creative powers a group of individuals can form a unity in their activities in which a new kind of a creative ability is formed through the combination. This can be revealed in what is sometimes called in educational circles
as group dynamics or group process. As stated above, the more creative activity the more freedom, and vice versa, would be found in such a group process. Going up the scale to a greater and greater combination of creative activity, we would have a unity such as revealed in a society, nation, and so on.

Reversing the situation and descending the scale of super-qualitative powers, we have a single individual with less creative activity and consequently less freedom; still lower on the scale is plant and animal life; still lower is the molecule, atom and the electron. As one descends the scale there is a progressive consistency in the expression of freedom and creative activity which are the basis of the laws of nature. At the lowest levels the creative activity and freedom is almost nil.

The activities of these lowest existences consist of repetitions. A monotonous and almost rigid uniformity exists in the causal relationship between the events. Even at these low levels there is still no guarantee of absolute regularity and, therefore, absolutely certain predictions in the scientific methodology. Even though two electrons may have repulsed each other millions of times it is possible that the next time they will not repulse each other but will combine in unity. Even at the lowest levels there is thus a remnant of freedom.
At these low levels the scientific connection between events is most uniform and, therefore, there is the most predictability of regularity. There is, indeed, less regularity on the higher levels, that is, ascending up to personalities who possess more freedom. The scientific method of induction is hence less applicable in such cases.

The degree of regularity would determine the value of the inductive process. The activities of human beings do not hold to a strict necessity and regularity. There would therefore be less predictability and certainty at this level.

So it is that in the inductive process in which the data selected is tested in the process of problem solving, a different value is given to the conclusion which stems from the testing because of the concept of freedom. Freedom does not invalidate science, however, even though the predictions are not absolutely certain.

Science, then, is not undermined by the conception of freedom, but the practical application of science, namely, the use that can be made of it for predicting particular events, is to a certain extent affected...scientific predictions cannot be absolutely certain but only more or less probable...

The basic difference between determinism and Lossky's view as related to their theory of predictions is:

...that from the determinist point of view, science that has reached a perfect degree of development would be able to make absolutely
certain predictions based upon a knowledge of the laws of nature and of the actual condition of things at the moment...

While according to Lossky's view:

...absolutely certain predictions of this sort could not at any stage of scientific development be possible.30

Science does not, therefore, give us an absolutely perfect prediction. This is especially true in relation to what has been called the empirical character although the empirical self is composed of repetitious actions in the form of habits. The reason for this lack of absolute and perfect prediction is that the self never loses its informal freedom which means that it is not determined to repeat any desire or act in order that it is made a habit. On the other hand, it is possible that repeated actions which form a created empirical self determine an individual's actions and become habits, therefore, limit his freedom and the realization of his ideal self.

It must not be thought that the ideal self is subject to sensual scientific investigation and that it determines an individual's desires and actions. If an individual's desires and actions were determined by the ideal self the individual would have no freedom and he would be an automaton of virtue which, according to Lossky, would be a contradiction. In speaking of the ideal self, Lossky says:

30Ibid., p. 105.
If it formed the natural basis of man's being and were his whole essence, all man's actions and volitions would be necessarily and inevitably perfect and man would be an automaton of virtue. But since such a conception is self-contradictory... 31

Empirical science, that is science which is based on sensuous intuition, is therefore limited. It does not and cannot predict with certainty the meaning of the ideal self and to a certain extent the full meaning of the empirical self. In the prediction of inorganic matter scientific knowledge has a high degree of probability, however.

In relating science to education scientific knowledge must not be accepted as a perfect explanation of a purposive and creative activity in terms of the dynamic conception of causality. In the educative process, Lossky would include the dynamic conception of individual causation in the formation of value judgments about the world.

Man is finite and grows in the existence of value and the knowledge of value. He makes mistakes and corrects them. He makes mistakes in his judgments and therefore, he ought not to be harsh with his neighbor and condemn him for lack of responsibility. "We should not be harsh and impute full responsibility" to an individual when we are judging his action. "We know from experience" how difficult it is for a person to exercise his will in a situation where a new desire is in conflict with a "deeply rooted empirical

character."^2 Although Lossky's position holds that an individual is absolute and intrinsic in value, the individual ought not to be "harsh" and judge the relative values and the habits of another self and charge him with complete responsibility. Relative values have worth and ought to be recognized as good in their relation to the unique worth of the individual self. Relative value is not, however, an end in itself. It is a means, as the process of education is a means, and not an end in itself.

There are means to ends which are absolute in value and there are means to ends which are relative in value. Activities are both means and ends judged according to the end value toward which they are directed in their creation. Education, therefore, ought to strive to direct activities toward that end which progressively increases creative and purposive activity and thereby to lift ends and not merely deal with means, that is, use means for the sake of ends progressively and not merely means. In this process the mind ought to be stimulated to creative and purposive activity in order that the individual's activities (both mental and physical) be coordinated for the attainment of that end which is the highest positive value.

There is definite relation between mind and body as we have seen. Both mind and body are the result of

---

^2Ibid., p. 141.
the strivings of a multitude of selves, as substantival agents, one (the top and human) agent of which is the coordinator of the strivings and activities of all the other agents. In the body-mind relation the mind is the result of the human agent's activity which is expressed as feeling, desires, and so forth. These are mental (or psychical) processes. The body is the result of the lesser agents' activities and are psychoid. The relation between mind and body is the cooperation between the human ego's activities and the lesser ego's activities.

The human being as mind and body ought to strive for the highest good, the absolute positive value. An absolute positive value is a value that contains goodness for all subjects, in all relations for it contains within itself its own self-justification. Absolute positive values exist for the individuals in the psycho-physical world and are the goal for their activities even though the individuals of the psycho-physical world deal in relative values. The absolute positive values of God and the Kingdom of God are the basic necessary conditions of all relative values and of existence itself.

In a world in which there is a system of relations there are common experiences in the form of immediate intellectual intuition or an insight into the experiences of others. An individual can accept another's existences by means of sympathy and love. In this kind of world,
a world of sympathy and love and intelligence, there is an identical common good, an absolute good, which can be identically and commonly connected with all individuals if accepted in practice. This is formal education. But there is informal education also some of which comes by way of the absolute principle.

We are educated by the absolute principle (God) Who strengthens and comforts us to oppose that which we know to be evil. This is expressed in what we have called repentance. Repentance occurs when an individual realizes that his activities could have been and ought to have been more in accord with the absolute and objective good.

The strength and comfort is in the form of an objective, and absolute good and it is expressed in our affirmation and re-affirmation of its value as that which is good in itself and authoritative. The affirmation and re-affirmation is brought about by the activity of our free wills in the form of a decision as a result of an immediate insight of that good and our consciousness of it. Lossky asks, if every thought, desire, and so on, necessarily follow from a man's past and character, how does it happen that man has a consciousness of freedom and an absolute positive good? Lossky, therefore, does not appeal to character and the past but to immediate consciousness. According to Lossky determinism destroys values of repentance, guilt, and responsibility. We are conscious of freedom and we have it.
We have freedom in all our decisions even though we recognize the authority of a comforter which we feel is a help when we make a decision in terms of an absolute positive value and objective good. We feel good in our consciousness, which gives us strength, when we recognize the good in our repentance and when we do the good and know that in doing the good it is sanctioned with an authoritative comfort. We feel good for, as we have explained, feeling is that aspect of the self by means of which we become aware of values. In this case, it is the objective and rational good as a value.

We, therefore, have a combination of free rational decision and authority in comfort and strength in the activity of repentance in one form of the informal educative process.

Repentance means that the individual has condemned his evil activities of the past. He will no longer repeat those activities considered evil. He frees himself from the past and is released into the future where imagination and creative and purposive activity is realized in his life.

In the Kingdom of the Kingdom of the Spirit there is no past. There is only the eternally present. The creative and purposive activity of every member in it is perfectly free. Each and every member's activity forms a unity in which the purposes and creativity of one individual
complements another person's in perfect freedom. In the kingdom of hostility, on the other hand, the creative activity of the agents is not perfectly free. Therefore, their creative activity is relative. As an example of the kingdom of hostility, that is, the psycho-physical realm, when a sculptor works upon a statue he works with material which does not yield to his creative thought but which has to be shaped and molded to fit his creative imagination. There is a certain material resistance which his imaginative creativity has to overcome in order that his activities might be expressed. The material world (kingdom of enmity) is not the place where perfectly free expression of artistic activity is found. Another example, in which there is more freedom of expression is in the creative imagination of the poet. The reason for this is that the poet does not use impenetrable materials as used by the sculptor. The aspect of the world of the kingdom of enmity which the poet uses is memory. Memory contents are not wholly adapted to each other and, therefore, have to be recalled, shaped and patterned in an effort to express the imaginative creativity of the agent. We see that the poet can create a new effect for he deals with the imagination which can be shaped, etc. This is unlike material impenetrability.

In all acts of creative activity there is a partially new effect from the cause, that is, the effect
does not completely issue from the cause but is a new creation for it is an act of freedom. In the case of artistic creative actions the imagination is expressed in a work of material beauty which is a unique kind of beauty, a new visual revalation of the feeling of the artist. This newness is a partially new effect from the cause expressed by means of feeling in free creative activity of the imagination.

In the class-room situation the feeling of imagination of the child would be of primary importance. The child would be encouraged to express freely its unique feeling of imaginative creativity. Likewise, learning situations would be so ordered and arranged by the teacher to give an outlet to this freedom of expression by each child.

Each and every child would be considered by the teacher as a unique self (individual) for each and every child possesses an ideal self which he ought to express as his empirical self. He would be considered as an absolute intrinsic value who possesses freedom to choose between and among values and to express the choice of these values in his unique contribution to the good of the whole of humanity by the creation of his existence as a value in the value of humanity as a whole. Each and every child would be considered as a potential member of the Kingdom of the Spirit which he attains by means of that creative
and purposive activity which reveals his ideal self as the image of God.

The child would be encouraged, by the teacher, to think critically and to judge values some of which would be seen as more valuable than others. It is by means of value that fulness of being is realized.

In the fullness of being there is no separation between value and existence. Each child would be treated by the teacher as a potential artist who has unique potentialities which should be realized in active participation of classroom activity. Each and every child's realization of active classroom participation would be encouraged in order that his or her urge of free and unique contribution reveal his feeling of imaginative creativity.

The children would be helped when in their discouragement they find difficulty in shaping the material to their creative imagination. They would be helped if discouraged that this piece of material does resist their work of the hand and that it does not fully embody their creative image. With patience and imagination on the part of both the teacher and the pupil, the work would become less difficult and more a realization of their imaginations. They would be encouraged to co-ordinate their emotional, intellectual, and bodily efforts in expressing their activity. The whole individual would be encouraged to respond to creative work.
The classroom situation would be not much different in the case of poetry in which situation more memory images would be encouraged for here the child does not work with physical materials. Not much difference would be found in the other subjects of study, as for example, arithmetic, history, geography, and so forth. In all fields of study the two factors of imagination and memory would play the leading role with a search for a balance between the two as it fits the particular subject of study.

Imagination is an aspect of the future and memory an aspect of the past. Both would be combined for the sake of the eternally present by the creative and purposive activity of the supertemporal and superspatial child as it fulfills the ideal self through its expressions of the existences of the empirical self.

Education is the process of attaining fulness of being or life. Education is a means of helping the individual, as a human being, to actualize his creativeness in the uniqueness of his life through experience which reflects freedom and purposeful activity. It is a process of growing mentally in the knowledge of those values which promote a fulness of being, of life, for the individual and the world as an organic whole.

Education means purposive activity and the purpose of education is to increase and advance this purposive activity of the personality in the realization of value
through creative activity both in the student and the teacher. If the purpose of education is to increase and to advance purposive activity, in the realization of values through creative activity, the end of creative activity is the Kingdom of the Spirit, the Good Life, fulness of being for the personality and the world as an organic whole.

The end and aim of education is the "good" life which is a life of the spirit. It is to have a perfect knowledge of the truth and to feel the peace of moral goodness in the reverence of beauty. These three values together with love and freedom and other values are "the necessary aspects of the absolute fulness of being." Because freedom, goodness, knowledge, and truth are directly related in the traditional theories of education I shall explain their relation. I would like also to add another value (the value of love) which is not ordinarily discussed in theories of education but which is essential in Lossky's theory of education.

First let me say that all the values mentioned are not fully attained in the kingdom of hostility, that is, the psycho-physical world. In this world they are attained partially only. They are attained fully only in the Kingdom of the Spirit for it is only in the Kingdom of the Spirit that there is the greatest amount of perfect
creative and purposive activity, for it is only in the Kingdom of the Spirit that there is perfect love.

It has been herein sufficiently discussed that "love can only be a free expression of personality" and that it is only by the decrease of enmity between agents, in the psycho-physical realm, that the power of creative and purposive activity can be increased by means of which the values of goodness, truth, beauty, love, freedom, etc., can be attained. I also discussed that creative activity must be purposive and that only love is the perfect means of the acceptance and adoption of another's purposes. Therefore, the values which are the necessary aspects of fullness of being must be discriminated and co-ordinated (which is a practical and theoretical activity) and attained in unity. This, as has been explained, is accomplished by a supertemporal and superspatial agent who is not subordinate to the partial absolute intrinsic values of goodness, truth, beauty, freedom, love, etc., but is superior to them in value for he is an absolute intrinsic value with a super-qualitative power of activity.

Let us suppose that, rather than using the super-qualitative power of activity fully in discriminating and co-ordinating by means of which love is determined, the value of love is omitted from the unity. We have, then, a union of agents in which is enhanced the power of mental or theoretical creative activity which is a good in terms
of attaining the knowledge of the truth. This union, which is, however, a good in terms of knowledge and truth (and accordingly would be a partial good) can be used practically for evil ends. We have seen that, according to Lossky, evil is created by mankind and not by God.

Another factor must be added to a partial good means in order that the means for attaining the end may be made better. This factor is love.

Let us then ask, is it correct to say that a man will do (practically and theoretically) no evil when he merely knows (theoretically) the good end, as Plato would say? Or that, a man will do (practically and theoretically) no evil when he has intelligently (theoretically) made the "correct" choice of a value in terms of temporal and spatial sensual means because of the temporal and spatial actions which stem from the choice of the value intelligently chosen and only for the sake of their temporal and spatial value consequences.

Or is it more correct to say that man will do (practically and theoretically) no evil when he not only chooses intelligently (theoretically) but also when he loves (theoretically and practically) the highest non-temporal and non-spatial values of goodness, truth, beauty, freedom, love, etc., after he has discriminated among them and judged the value (value judgment, which is both theoretical and practical) of them?
The third question would be the correct one, according to Lossky, for three reasons: (1) The act of judging the value is both theoretical and practical (intuition) for it is performed by a supertemporal and superspatial agent. (2) The consequences of the action which stems from the chosen values is not merely temporal and spatial but also nonspatial and nontemporal. (3) Life consists of both theoretical and practical activities and the practical (which involves value judgment as has been explained) is superior to the theoretical.

We can, therefore, conclude that both truth and love (and other values as well) are needed in a unity in order that the "good" life (education), life of the spirit, be attained. Both truth and love are caught up in what we have called the individual idea (ideal self) of the person which is his uniqueness as created by God, that is, God's image. It is the ideal norm of conduct for the individual. And not only for the individual but also for humanity as a whole because of God with Whose image all of humanity is endowed.

In acting out the individual ideal self the person is creating rational and loving (good) consequences not only to himself but to all of humanity as well for he is fulfilling the commandment of God (as God's image) in the words of "love thy neighbor as thyself." The consequences are good for society as a whole because—society
is made up of both potential and actual members of the kingdom of God each of which, with their own uniquenesses and distinctivenesses, are responsible to God for the consequences of their actions which are related to the Kingdom of the Spirit by the values of goodness, truth, beauty, love, freedom, and so forth.

But there is another commandment of God which is even more important than the one quoted. This is to love the Lord God. When a person loves the Lord God he not only is loving (in subjective sense) but also becomes lovable (in objective sense) because of his love for God as the highest of highest values. By loving the Lord God love is bestowed upon the person in return by the Lord God. The person becomes both the subject and object of love. It is then that the person truly loves and is loved by his neighbor for he, by God's Grace, becomes both loving and lovable. Thus he can better attain the Kingdom of the Spirit where there is perfect love. This is fulness of being, for himself and others, where there is no separation of value and existence.

In the composition of the world, substantival agents, bearers of super-qualitative creative power in themselves, do not constitute the absolute fulness of being. Meaningful existence is reached by them only by way of creative activity in time, i.e. by way of realizing the real being that possesses qualities. This activity cannot be reduced merely to an act of contemplation directed on God, and upon the manifestations of other agents as alien existences. Such a communion of the agent with the life of others from outside, only by way of contemplation,
would not be in him a personal experience of the ab-
solute fulness of being as his own being. Meaning-
ful existence may be reached only by way of personal 
creative activity which is meaningful. This creative 
activity, however, must not be isolated, but must be a combination of the creative power of the agent with the power of the Lord God and all other agents in so far as they follow the course of perfect union with God, i.e. in so far as they have love for God. Such a creative activity on the part of many agents on the ground of the loving acceptance of the existence of each other is a collective building of the single whole. In it the fullness of being as the personal experience of each of the participants in the build-
ing of the whole is realized. This is not a second specimen of the absolute fulness of being, standing beside the Divine fulness of being: this is the ful-
ness of Divine being with the active collective parti-
cipation of all God's creatures within it.33

33 N. O. Lossky and J. S. Marshall, Value and Existence, pp. 82, 83.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books


_______, Marshall, John S. *Value and Existence.* London: Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. 223 pp. (This book is not a collaboration in the strictest sense. The Preface and Part II were written by Professor Marshall as an explanation or commentary to make clear certain basic conceptions presented by Professor Lossky in Part I.)

B. Periodicals


I, Alex Hetko, was born in Austria-Hungary while my parents were there on a vacation from the United States. At the time of my birth, 1911, my father was a citizen of the United States. I came to this country when an infant.

In childhood I attended school in Watervliet, New York. I received my undergraduate training at Hiwassee College, a junior college in Madisonville, Tennessee, and at Bowling Green State University, in Ohio. From the latter institution I received the following degrees: Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science in Education and Master of Arts. During my last year at Bowling Green State University I was Graduate Assistant in the Department of Philosophy. In 1957 I was appointed Assistant Instructor at Ohio State University. This position I held until I received the degree Doctor of Philosophy.