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ARTHUR L. GARFORD: A BIOGRAPHY OF AN OHIO INDUSTRIALIST
AND POLITICIAN, 1858 - 1933

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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The Ohio State University
1963

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PREFACE

The author is indebted and grateful to many individuals who made possible this biography. By far the most important has been his wife, Carol, a constant source of encouragement and assistance.

My adviser, Professor Eugene H. Roseboom, deserves particular mention and praise for heroics beyond the call of duty, for it was he who bore the brunt of the burden of textual criticism. Other individuals whom I cannot overlook are Professors Francis P. Weisenburger and Harry L. Coles, who suggested corrections and improvements throughout the manuscript. Kenneth W. Duckett, Curator of Manuscripts and Elizabeth R. Martin, Librarian of the Ohio Historical Society, were more than helpful. It would hardly be fair to forget Professor David M. Fletcher, of Hamline University, a persistent prodder with a friendly hand.

Mrs. James B. Thomas of Elyria, daughter of Garford, was most generous with her time and aid in an effort to provide the proper perspective from which to view and to write about the many faceted career of her father.
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CHAPTER I

EARLY YEARS IN ELYRIA

The Move to Elyria

The parents of Arthur Lovett Garford, George and Hannah Lovett Garford, were English by birth. Born in Northamptonshire and Leicestershire respectively, George and Hannah were married in England in the year 1851. The young couple, still in their early twenties, immediately decided upon a course which, while common enough, must have required a good measure of courage and initiative. They resolved to seek their fortune in the United States. Some years later, in a Lorain County commemorative history, Father Garford (as he was called by his immediate family) was characterized as "an ambitious young man". He had not left his home land a pauper devoid of responsibilities and obligations but rather had quit an employment for which he had been well trained. The elder Garford was the last in a paternal line of custodians and managers of large entailed English estates. Hardly past his minority he had been.

1G. Frederick Wright, ed., A Standard History of Lorain County, Ohio, II, 579.

2J.H. Beers and Company, compilers, Commemorative Biographical Record of the Counties of Huron and Lorain, Ohio, 756.
hired to care for the lands of a wealthy physician. At this point, one year after his marriage, the pattern of his future career broke with precedent. In 1852 passage aboard ship was secured and George Garford sailed for America.³

Hannah stayed behind in England awaiting the birth of the first of eight Garford children. Alone in America the father sought for a plot of land eventually buying and settling on a small farm near the northern Ohio village of Elyria. For a year or so he prepared for the anticipated reunion of his family. Of necessity he learned the art of pioneering, the construction of a log cabin being his first achievement. Having smoothed off some of the roughness of his dwelling and broken the farm's soil, George Garford sent for his family, and in 1854 the reunited Garfords settled down to a long life in Elyria, one that would span the next six decades.⁴

George Garford must have had what he considered good reasons for the selection of Elyria as a homestead, but they are now unknown like most details concerning his life. Perhaps he believed that Elyria would grow as he and his family did, furnishing the necessary "elbow-room" for individual expansion. Certainly it is that Elyrians did come to pride themselves as citizens of "A Progressive City", an epitaph the local gazette deemed appropriate later

³Ibid.
⁴Ibid.
in the century. It was progress of a material sort; the "duties and responsibilities" involved bonded indebtedness, sanitation, a fire department and a waterworks system. Members of Elyria's chamber of commerce held their town in the same perspective, acclaming its many advantages as a manufacturing center and equating them with progress. Geographically, this seat of Lorain County lay in the heart of America's "Central Territory", surrounded by industrial activity and growth. Its superior location was serviced by railway and shipping facilities. In the half century following George Garford's arrival, Elyria changed from a small village dependent upon general trade with the surrounding agricultural community into a thriving town with an economy increasingly rooted not in soil but in iron.

However, for George Garford the land and its products continued to be his sources of wealth. Initially he relied upon his undoubted skill as a landscape gardener in and around Elyria, but eventually he turned exclusively to agriculture and stock raising on his farm. And it was on the farm that he raised his family.

There is no mention of it in Elyria's newspapers, not

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5 This characterization headed an article in the Elyria Republican, April 22, 1897.

6 Ibid.

7 Letter of Arthur Garford to C.F. Laganke, April 8, 1904, in Garford Papers (hereinafter cited GP).

surprisingly, but on August 9, 1858, Hannah Garford gave birth to her second son and fourth of eight children, Arthur Lovett Garford. Arthur was named after C. Arthur Ely, one of the family after whom Elyria was named and the original owner of Elywood farm. The farm in 1858 belonged to George Garford, and it was here that young Arthur spent his first seventeen years. Not until he was eleven years old did he have his first introduction to the world outside Elyria. As a young farmer boy he accompanied his father on a trip to the Ohio State Fair. A box-car filled with prize sheep was their entry, and it was in their company aboard the train that the young shepherd had his first fleeting view of his state.

No doubt that trip to the state fair had grand moments of pleasure, but surely Arthur earned his fare and keep. It was an extraordinary trip but yet in keeping with the general life of the farmer, and this life could be most exacting. The farm and its work were not and did not become a hallowed institution to Garford, although it left its very discernible imprint. Farm life always had "its problems and hard work" as well as the ever present and unforgettable "exact ing discipline of my father." Never much of a sentimentalist Garford was in his later years to recall that the life of

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9Ibid.
10Speech of Arthur Garford, undated, Box 129, GP.
11Ibid.
the farmer, be it that of man or woman, was one of sweat and strain and measure for measure had scant rewards. He would live to see the industrial revolution in America and indeed have a considerable role in its development, but in the 1860's and 1870's his tools were the scythe, the sickle, the cradle, the rake and his own hands. In a word farming, with its ploughing, sowing, planting and cultivating was "drudgery".12

If farming was physically difficult and materially unrewarding, there was much in a positive way that could be said about life in the open air. While no romantic Garford did maintain that the rugged life included a more desirable, if not necessary ingredient for an individual, and this involved what he referred to only in a general way as "first principles". A man's work under the sky, without an intervening roof, and despite an indifferent compensation for exhaustion, was nonetheless considered to be "congenial" to his nature. In some way farmers are involved with "first principles" and while he was never to return to the soil once he had left his father's farm, Garford throughout his life retained a vague reverence for it. His agricultural roots were never to be conspicuously displayed but occasionally his desire was expressed for the simple, unspoiled society as opposed to the highly organized society of Cleveland and the "effete East".13

12 Ibid.
13 To M.B. Johnson, April 21, 1917, GP.
Arthur's schooling was of secondary importance, but he attended Elyria's public schools as the chores of the farm allowed. Despite early morning and late afternoon duties on the land, by the time he was sixteen years of age Arthur had completed the entire course of study including that of an institution which doubtless had endeared itself to the enterprising Elyrians and evoked their sense of pride in achievement: the two-year public high school. In the lower grades Arthur had received varied instruction in subjects which included the inevitable three "R's" as well as United States history and a course in morals.\textsuperscript{14} The high school program completed his liberal education with a two year classical course. Elyria's superintendent of the school in a letter of recommendation affirmed that his scholar's efforts had not been in vain. Of Arthur Professor Parker had this to say: "His character is very good. He was a faithful and industrious pupil."\textsuperscript{15} If there was any doubt about the latter, it would be dispelled by Garford's later achievements, but discerning townsmen had only to consider his oration upon graduation. Perhaps because he was the only male graduate in a class of four but more likely because the subject was so close to him, Arthur chose the topic of "Work". Of his address the local

\textsuperscript{14}G. Frederick Wright, \textit{op. cit.}, 579.

\textsuperscript{15}Letter of recommendation by H.M. Parker, July 26, 1876, held by Mrs. J.B. Thomas.
newspaper reported that it "... was concinnous [concise?], and convinced all that he possessed more than ordinary ability for one of his years. His sound logic, well modulated voice, and graceful gestures, won the admiration of the audience, and on retiring he was literally bombarded with flowers", a gesture to be repeated for each student.16

In all likelihood school was a wonderful diversion, yet it must have caused Arthur some misgiving to realize that his conscientious attendance only hastened the time of separation. In a class reunion a full generation later he reminisced about his boyhood love for school and all that was associated with it.17

Once his schooling was completed Arthur wasted little time in delaying his departure from the farm. The lure of the big city probably had little or nothing to do with his decision. There were more immediate and forceful considerations: the prospects of uninterrupted days of monotonously hard work under the direction of his exacting father. Arthur wondered about the future and "... what it had in store for me. How could such work as I was doing prepare me for anything worthwhile?"18 Unmindful of his parents' desire for him to hold to the plow, the ambitious young man

16Elyria Independent Democrat, June 30, 1875.
17Speech, undated (c 1900), GP, Box 129.
18Speech, undated (c 1900), GP, Box 129.
decided his lot at home was not to his liking; shortly after graduation Arthur took a job in Elyria.\textsuperscript{19}

For one year Garford held a position in Elyria while he presumably maintained his residence at the home of his parents.\textsuperscript{20} But in the summer of 1876 he found it necessary to retreat even further from the conditions at home. He headed south and finally stopped in Memphis, Tennessee, only long enough to discover that there was no work to be had and that he was in danger of being stranded.\textsuperscript{21} The decision to return to Elyria was not easy; father and son were estranged and a good deal of personal pride had first to be swallowed. The family mediator, the eldest sister Libbie, expressed the family's care when she asked Arthur "... to let father [sic] see that his kindness is appreciated by you. You do not know how he feels about it ... . He wants to see you so much ... . I think you can stand it at home if you could away from home. We have tried to make things pleasant ... . You do not know how welcome you will be."\textsuperscript{22}

Arthur returned to Elyria and stayed until the summer

\textsuperscript{19}See the biographical sketch in Cleveland Leader, May 2, 1909. Several days of interviewing Mr. Garford's daughter, Mrs. James B. Thomas of Elyria, also gave me much information about his early years.

\textsuperscript{20}Letter of recommendation by Turner and Preland of Elyria, June 24, 1876, held by Mrs. J.B. Thomas.

\textsuperscript{21}Interview with Mrs. James B. Thomas, Jan. 1963.

\textsuperscript{22}To Arthur Garford, Oct. 11, 1876, held by Mrs. J.B. Thomas.
of the next year. Following the suggestion of a friend he left for Cleveland and a position as bookkeeper with Rice and Burnett, importers of china and glassware. This very well may have been Arthur's formal introduction into the intricacies and methods of the business community, and although ill health shortly forced his return to Elyria, his brief experience in Cleveland led to admission into the banking profession which in turn furnished the knowledge necessary for a successful industrialist.

In 1880 Garford was given a position in Elyria's new savings bank. During the next twelve years he was to rise from bookkeeper to teller to assistant cashier and finally to cashier, an office he held until his retirement from the bank in 1892.

The illness which prompted his departure from Cleveland may have been more emotional than physical: Arthur was in love and had been for a number of years. Mary Nelson, the daughter of Thomas L. Nelson of Elyria, had long claimed Arthur's affections. Their childhood romance deepened and provided the basis by which their relationship would survive the uneasiness and distress that accompanied Arthur's youthful "job hunts" in the world outside Elyria, Mary's attendance at Wellesley College, and the occasional quarrels

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23 John A. Foote, Jr. to Arthur Garford, June 22, 1877, held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.

24 Cleveland Leader, May 2, 1909.
that even lifelong lovers may have. In December, 1881, the year after Garford's return from Cleveland, the young couple celebrated their marriage at Mr. Nelson's home in a ceremony that was both simple and pleasant. At the time their marriage was reported as "... but a continuation of the deep and pure affection which begun [sic] in early youth ...", and there is no indication in their lives that this abiding mutual love ever took any other course.

The vows taken, the Arthur Garfords moved into a friend's home while awaiting the completion of their own home, financed in large part with a loan of $2000 from Mr. Nelson. More than likely the young husband gladly parted with $192.50, the purchase price of plain but fashionable furniture: one hair mattress, one wool mattress, an ash wash stand, a pair of leather pillows, a kokobola Shakespeare table, a kokobola chair in silk and the indispensible mahogany hat rack.

During the next decade Arthur and Mary Garford settled themselves in Elyria and were, but, for one brief interlude, always to be counted among its citizenry. Not long after

25 Mary Nelson to Arthur Garford, (undated but before marriage), held by Mrs. James B. Thomas, is an account of the tears and sighs that accompanied a quarrel and reconciliation between two sensitive lovers.

26 Elyria Weekly Republican, Dec. 22, 1881.

27 T.L. Nelson to Mary Garford, April 9, 1887, held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.

28 A receipt for goods purchased by Arthur Garford, Feb. 8, 1882, held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.
their marriage, in July of 1883, they had the first of their two children, a daughter, Mary Katherine Garford. Almost exactly two years later a second daughter was born, Louise Ely Garford.29

Busy learning the fundamentals of banking and money in the 1880's, Garford nonetheless did nothing to curb his enthusiasm for other interests and before long he had developed an equal zeal for two other activities that would greatly influence the rest of his life: politicking and bicycling.

The census of 1880 revealed that Elyria's population was growing but that there were less than 5000 souls in the village.30 While the community comprised not a great many people, there were enough to warrant a local government and the resultant contests among local politicians for offices. Early in the presidential election year of 1884 Garford entered the lists of those seeking the public's favor. Like his father and evidently most everyone in Elyria, he was a good Republican and probably knew of or about the vast majority of his neighbors. Undoubtedly pointing with pride at his years of financial and banking experience, he ran for the office of city treasurer. But his name never got beyond the Republican caucus. After all a man not yet twenty-seven years of age need not set too brisk a pace.


30G. Frederick Wright, op. cit., 369.
and indeed Garford quite possibly had not had the time necessary to pave his path to a successful nomination. At least a close contest did ensue, and the margin of defeat was a scant fifty votes out of a total five hundred. This grassroots vote in the caucus represented a good proportion of Elyria's eligible voters, and indicated that Garford had considerable support. It had been a respectable debut and better results could be reasonably foreseen in the future.31

The efforts of James G. Blaine and John A. Logan to win the nation's electorate allowed Garford the opportunity to establish himself as an active and dependable Republican party worker, and he did not hesitate to lend his support. When it came time to organize Elyria's Blaine and Logan Club, Garford was not just among the faithful; he held a position of leadership, having been chosen treasurer.32

It was well that the old time politicians had allowed some new and vigorous figures to stand near the center of the stage, since the poles which flew the banner of the "Plumed Knight" and the "Black Eagle" were nothing for the weak to handle. It took the best notes of Elyria's Grand Army of the Republic's marching band and the cheers of the faithful before a strong and sturdy Garford, aided by and aiding others, could raise and lower into its base a huge pole,

31 Elyria Republican, April 10, 1884.
32 Ibid., June 19, 1884.
which measured some one hundred and ten feet. "The Star Spangled Banner" was played while the Blaine and Logan bunting was run up the pole just below "old Glory". The band struck-up again, and the hopeful Republicans marched to another corner to erect still another of the politicians' patriotic poles. 33

Public office did not long elude a determined Garford, and in 1886 he was easily elected treasurer of Elyria and continued in office until his resignation in 1892. 34 By the latter date Garford's interest in politics, while remaining substantial and active, was considerably sapped by the consequences resulting from an activity, which in the 1880's had been a form of exercise and relaxation, a hobby.

Work in the bank, far from being calm and restful, nevertheless was enervating in comparison to the work of the farm. More fresh air and strenuous bodily exertion were demanded, and for this purpose Garford took to the bicycle. 35 He and a few other lionhearted adventurers mounted their high wheels in a decade when the wheel was hardly a safe and sound craze but more of a menace to rider and passerby alike.

Nonetheless each new year found the bicyclists

33 Ibid., July 10, 1884.

34 Ibid., April 5, 1888. See also J.H. Beers and Company, op. cit., 756.

35 Cleveland Leader, May 2, 1909.
anxiously awaiting the first faint sign of spring, discussing and brooding about how long it would be until the roads became passable. It is difficult to imagine just how rugged and treacherous those town and country roads must have appeared to a rider perched a full six feet above their crests and shoals. A measure of their formidableness was bespoken by Garford's lifelong patronage of Ohio's good-roads movement.

By the end of April the dozen or so members of Elyria's bicycle club could no longer deny their fancy and could cast caution to the winds. Excursions throughout town and county were highlights of the weekends, and on special occasions members of the club would wheel to Cleveland to be entertained by the Cleveland wheelmen and perhaps witness a bicycle race. The ride to Cleveland took four hours and some form of relaxation was doubtless not only desired but demanded. While essentially a hobby Garford could take seriously his cycling. Not ever inclined to half measures he developed his skill as a racer and before long was an acknowledged leader among Lorain County's peddlers. In 1885 he competed in the county fair bicycle races entering the "half mile tricycle" event and finishing second. For his efforts he was awarded a "trunk fishing pole with pole and line." A little later in the afternoon the "\(\frac{3}{8}\) mile

36 *Elyria Republican*, March 27, 1884.

bicycle" race once more included Garford among the field. In what must have been his specialty he sped from start to finish in the time of two minutes, forty five seconds, placing first. For his winning endeavor he received a pair solid gold sleeve buttons, value $10."38

**Invention of the Bicycle Saddle**

Sometime during the last half of the 1880's Garford's cycling hobby provided the means by which he would transform his entire future life. He might very well have remained a small town's familiar bank official with a reputation as a petty politician and sports enthusiast, if he had not invented a bicycle saddle.

The invention of a bicycle saddle was the fullest expression of Garford's practical nature. It may have been the consequence of several rather painful falls off the too small and inflexible wooden seat, which crowned his wheel.39 Perhaps a more plausible explanation should place Garford astride his cycle and seat waiting for a long freight train to pass, which inevitably delayed his arrival at home after having spent the night sleeping at the bank. There being no Elyria police, the bank employees took their turns as night-watchmen. Under these circumstances Garford developed a comparatively soft and pliable leather seat,

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38Ibid., Oct. 8, 1885.
39*Cleveland Leader*, May 2, 1909.
which soon graced the wheels of grateful Elyria cyclists.\textsuperscript{40}

In 1888 Garford patented his saddle, but there is no evidence that he immediately realized its originality or value.\textsuperscript{41} On the contrary his first action was one which would have completely denied the inventor the profits of his own invention: he offered to sell his patent to a Chicago bicycle manufacturer for one hundred dollars;\textsuperscript{42}

Fortunately his well intentioned efforts were unsuccessful; Garford had failed to eliminate inadvertently the possibility of the formation of his own saddle manufacturing company.

Undeterred and possibly goaded by the rebuff Garford early in 1889 formed a partnership with two other Elyrians under the firm name of the "Garford Manufacturing Company".\textsuperscript{43}

He had decided to cast his lot with a new and highly competitive industry, which would soon capture the American imagination and a fair segment of the nation's market. Although he did not quit his position at the bank, the decision to spend much of his own assets and perhaps to go into debt could not have been easy. No sooner had the company started operations than Garford received his baptism of fire, one of many crises that would be repeated throughout

\textsuperscript{40}Interview with Mrs. James B. Thomas, Jan. 1963.
\textsuperscript{41}Arthur Garford to George D. Hazard, Nov. 1, 1888, GP.
\textsuperscript{42}Cleveland Leader, May 2, 1909.
\textsuperscript{43}J.H. Beers and Company, \textit{op. cit.}, 756.
his long career as an industrialist, until such events became commonplace. Marcus S. Hopkins, Garford's patent lawyer, notified him that the Jeffery saddle patent "... would make a firstrate foundation for a lawsuit, should its owner be litigious", despite the fact that the Garford saddle was neater and simpler and perhaps capable of monopolizing the entire saddle business. Under these conditions Hopkins' best advice was not "... to say anything about the Jeffery patent "to prospective buyers of saddles".\textsuperscript{44}

Apparently the prospective lawsuit did not materialize or at any rate seriously interfere with the new business venture. Housed in the second story of Elyria's Topliff and Ely leather works the Garford Manufacturing Company produced a product that was welcomed with "universal approval" and ever-increasing sales.\textsuperscript{45} So satisfactory were the profits and the prospects that by November of 1891 the firm was obligated to expand to meet the demands of the market. An Ohio corporation was created with a capital stock of $100,000.\textsuperscript{46}

In the spring of 1892, after a succession of three prosperous years, the Garford Manufacturing Company lost its entire stock in a fire that swept through the Topliff

\textsuperscript{44} To Arthur Garford, Jan. 5, 1889, GP.  
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Elyria Democrat}, April 1, 1891.  
\textsuperscript{46} J.H. Beers and Company, \textit{op. cit.}, 756.
and Ely works. Crowded with orders at the start of another season a worse accident could hardly have happened. But the ashes were still aglow, when the decision was made that would return to work within a fortnight the plant's eighty men. The building itself still stood and most of the saddles were insured. More important, Garford had not taken this inviting opportunity to retire from his venture and to confine his career to banking.

On the contrary during 1892 Garford retired from active service as cashier in Elyria's Savings Deposit Bank and centered his interests and abilities on the bicycle industry. Signifying his new direction and determination was the construction of the Garford Manufacturing Company's own building, Elyria's "handsomest factory". Roomy, almost spacious with its three stories plus basement, equipped with an elevator and well lighted by the sun's rays, it was "the pride of the town."

Buoyed by an optimism which was rarely absent and the undeniably healthy bicycle market, Garford's climb in station as a notable light industrialist hereafter would be of considerable consequence. Already in less than four years, what had been in 1889 more accurately an avocation rather than a business, employing a handful of men, had by

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47 Elyria Weekly Republican, May 5, 1892.
48 Elyria Democrat, Nov. 9, 1892.
49 Ibid., Dec. 14, 1892.
1893 mushroomed into a prosperous institution with approximately one hundred employees frequently working fourteen hours a day. The factory with its separate departments designed for forging, forming and grinding as well as polishing and buffing produced as many as 3500 - 4000 saddles per week in a vain effort to boost its capacity to meet the demand. Ninety thousand saddles were sold in 1894, and Garford was prompted to estimate that his company would produce sixty five percent of all American saddles the coming year. While the public could buy as many as twenty varieties, all styles were dependent upon and incorporated the improvements of Garford's basic invention. His saddle was made of steel and leather and finished in nickel. Its inherent advantages were its simplicity, its cheap construction costs and its adaptability to virtually any rider.

At Home with Garford

The popularity of the bicycle and subsequently his saddle quickly enabled Garford and his family to take an elevated status among the economically and socially prominent of Elyria. In 1895 they moved into their newly constructed

50 Ibid., April 5, 1893.
51 Ibid., May 10, 1893.
52 Elyria Republican, Nov. 1, 1894.
53 See a detailed description of his own invention, c. 1893, GP.
home, a handsome mansion located on Elyria's fashionable Washington Avenue. Garford enjoyed his leisure by insisting upon a slackened pace while at home. The hour of his rising depended upon the demands of the previous day, but certain it was that he would be the last one seated at the breakfast table. Evenings and weekends were all too frequently extensions of the day's strenuous business activities, but once in his own domain, Garford enjoyed nothing more than demonstrating his own good fellowship. He found relaxation in sitting on his front porch or strolling along Elyria's streets and was always ready to relate one of a boundless number of stories. Another source of enjoyment was the occasional reception at which the Garfords entertained their fellow Elyrians. Garford, ever the gracious host, evidently made a lasting impression on his guests at these gala affairs. One neighbor, many years after Garford's death, recalled his appearance in a "neat business suit, gray mustache, spectacles, fairly bushy eyebrows, a sort of Rudyard Kipling look." On an occasional Sunday Garford would join his family in attending the services of Elyria's Congregational Church, although he was never to be a church member. Like his

54 Elyria Democrat, Oct. 10, 1895.

55 This account is based on my interview with Mrs. James B. Thomas, Jan. 1963.

56 Copy of an article by S.J. Kelly in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, (undated), held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.
English-born parents he had as a youth attended the Episcopalian Church. Formal membership was ended after his marriage to Mary Nelson, herself a Congregationalist in a family that traced its ancestry to seventeenth century New England Puritan stock.\(^{57}\) Dissociation from active affiliation with orthodox Christianity was not a matter of expediency but the result of a well developed decision as to the role of religion in his life. During that period even the somewhat liberal Congregational church retained aspects of Puritan orthodoxy and of strict moral behavior which might have seemed oppressive to one accustomed to the somewhat easygoing Episcopal church of that time. Garford's views appear to have been much like those of his older contemporary, Rutherford B. Hayes, who steadfastly refused to join the Methodist church because of personal reservations.\(^{58}\) Somewhat sarcastically Garford had decided that he was not good enough to be a member of any church.\(^{59}\) Only two years before his marriage he had taken a close friend into his confidence concerning his "spiritual experience". Garford's exact words are unknown, but the reply from W.A. Ely indicates that both men were questioning their religious persuasion: "We were liberal; decidedly

\(^{57}\) Interview with Mrs. James B. Thomas, Jan. 1963. See also Cleveland Leader, Sept. 15, 1912.


\(^{59}\) Interview with Mrs. James B. Thomas, Jan., 1963.
too liberal, I suppose, but I don't think skeptical. We would always stick up for true religion."60

Apparently, however, Garford was less inclined to religious orthodoxy than his friend, and his backsliding led to a secularized form of Christianity. In all likelihood he did not deny the existence of God, but rather maintained an indifferent agnosticism. Upon learning of a friend's serious illness he wrote, "But there is no accounting, as you know, for the things that happen. It is a strange world. Burdens are not distributed evenly . . . I sometimes wonder whether the account some day, somewhere, will be evened up. Let us hope that such will be the case, at least."61

Although no spokesman for Christianity's ontological arguments Garford did endorse its ethics. And to a considerable extent the duties and moral obligations of the individual comprised the whole of Garford's religion. This is in fact essentially his view as expressed to the Reverend W.E. Cadmus: "The essence and tenets of my religious principles are simple and common place, and are largely covered by the principle of giving the cup of cold water to the thirsty as you pass along."62 More specifically he believed in "... the development and practice of the

60To Arthur Garford, Nov. 9, 1879, held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.
61To Samuel B. Leonard, Dec. 28, 1911, GP.
62To W.E. Cadmus, Jan. 29, 1908, GP.
intangible virtues: truth, integrity, sympathy, charity, ... attributes ... which constitute the very foundations of character." At the very heart of Garford's ethical system was character building. He desired to attain an ideal life, "a life that has been useful, noble, inspiring." Garford realized that his goals were unattainable in an absolute sense, but they proved to be eminently practical. Given a belief in the basic virtue of his own character, he could and did approach complex industrial and political problems in an optimistic and positive manner. "Right is right, and wrongs no man" was not a meaningless phrase but a source of strength and action. Imbued with a sense of self-righteousness "... disagreeable and troublesome things which of necessity must be encountered from day to day" were dispelled from a mind already burdened with a "legitimate load." Garford's ethical goals, whether realized or not, instilled him with a great faith in himself, a faith that in turn constantly renewed his courage to surmount misfortune. Adversity could not overwhelm him, if only because it corrected his perspective of

63 To J.M. Studebaker, Nov. 25, 1913, GP.
64 Ibid.
65 To Mary Garford, Aug. 5, 1895, held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.
66 To R.W. Hill, Aug. 15, 1904, GP.
67 To Henry B. Ford, Oct. 21, 1905, GP.
events. It was his guiding belief that "ordinary discouragement and obstructions to progress do not fit the cases of men of strong and ardent temperament." 68

68 To Harry B. Morse, July 28, 1921, GP.
CHAPTER II

MEN OF HEROIC MOULD

Many years after he had manufactured his last bicycle saddle Garford recalled with warmth and fondness the events "in the good old bicycling days of the 90's." Rightfully so he regarded himself as one of the "Old Guard" in the world of modern transportation, one of the men of "heroic mould", who had pioneered in the bicycle industry. He and others had labored through a decade of harsh economic crisis but had prevailed and constructed a large and important industry. Moreover it was Garford's opinion that "the bicycle was the forerunner of one of the greatest industrial developments the world has ever known": the automobile. As part of the larger industrial revolution the bicycle and the automobile were closely connected and made a distinct and positive contribution to the social, industrial and economic changes that had since occurred in the world.2

The Bicycle Craze

Garford's inventive talent, his financial training, his managerial skill and his organizational ability were

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1To C.L. Mosher, July 2, 1914, GP.
2To C.L. Mosher, July 15, 1914, GP.

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amply demonstrated in the success of the Garford Manufacturing Company, yet all might have been to no avail had not the American people seemed bent upon having a jolly time in the gay 1890's. What had been only a few short years before a foolhardy experiment for the rash and eccentric had reached by 1895 the proportions of a craze indulged in by a nation. "Everybody will go to school on wheels, go courting on wheels, get married on wheels, raise a family on wheels, and, if it must be, go to glory on wheels" predicted an enthusiastic if somewhat sacrilegious editor. Progress would wheel its inevitable way over even the most difficult country paths and the bicycle would not be denied: "Go it on wheels! A man or boy without wheels is nobody." 3

Statistics tended to support the most optimistic prophecies. Beyond any doubt "the business man's steed" was here to stay. 4 In 1894 it was estimated that there were some one million bicycle riders in America and, considering the missionary zeal of these devotees, the time was foreseen when indeed everyone would ride a wheel. 5 This enormous development had occurred only within the past three or four years and was the direct result of the invention of the so-called "safety" bicycle. By 1890 the

4 Ibid., July 6, 1892.
first of the safeties were on the market, and they signaled an end to a long period of experimentation. The "velocipede" or "ordinary", a clumsy and dangerous structure of wood and iron with a large six foot wheel in front and a small one behind was replaced by the "safety", characterized by wheels of equal circumference and equipped with pneumatic tires and ball bearings.⁶

Towns throughout the country were now blessed with bicycle clubs replete with constitution, by-laws, and officers. Membership multiplied. In Elyria "... citizens turned out en masse" awaiting the race to Ridgeville between their outstanding wheelmen. Twelve machines in all, "pneumatic safeties" each one, set a "rattling pace" over roads that were crowded with excited onlookers. An early pacesetter encountered serious troubles when his "... saddle [undoubtedly a Garford] became loose and he was obliged to dismount two times to fasten it." He did not win the first prize, a silver cup donated by the Garford saddle works. All mishaps aside it had been a glorious and successful affair, and in one week there would be another in the nature of a primer for the county fair.⁷

Equipped with his superior saddle and excellent plant facilities for its production Garford was well prepared for the bicycle craze. Competition was sharp but by 1896

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⁶Ibid. See also the New York Times, Oct. 8, 1895.
⁷Elyria Democrat, July 6, 1892.
Garford claimed that his company was the leading saddle manufacturer in the world, and he produced figures to prove his contention. He had a virtual monopoly of the largest and best bicycle manufacturers in the country with orders for around four hundred thousand saddles on his books, a sum he estimated as "... four times as many as all the rest of the makers put together have on their books."9

"Ride a Garford and win races." Armed with this slogan Garford's advertising agent, "On the Spot" F. Ed. Spooner, soon became a familiar figure and voice among the racing set. It was his particular task to hammer the saddle's virtues into the heads of racers, until they agreed to use a freely furnished "Garford". Capitalizing on the publicity given this small but well publicized group, "On the Spot" trusted that the advertisements "... would strike a fancy of the [average] riders to ape whatever the racing men are doing."10 With a deftness that merited his nickname, "On the Spot" always managed to keep one step ahead of the cyclists. During one two-week period he sent Garford a mailing list that included seven major cities in Ohio, two in Indiana, two in Wisconsin, one in Michigan, seven in Canada, two in New York, one in Massachusetts,

8To F.P. Prial, Nov. 27, 1896, GP.
9To Edwin Oliver, Nov. 2, 1896, GP.
10To Arthur Garford, June 27, 1895, GP.
in addition to Chicago and Minneapolis. Once at the track he worked his way down to the field and checked saddles. At the close of a two or ten mile handicap "On the Spot" would be found at the finish line and, providing a racer had won with a Garford saddle, he stood prepared, saddle in hand, to sign up any interested racers, who felt a switch in saddles might be of assistance.

The bicycle industry did not long enjoy this peak of popularity and prosperity attained in the years 1895 to 1897. As quickly as it had risen, it fell. By 1900 the editor of the New York Times saw fit to pen his obituary concerning the death of a craze over a novelty. With considerable hindsight he judged that "even the most popular of toys must have its day and pass." To a considerable extent the industry was plagued by overproduction. Before its collapse it had drawn thousands of individuals to it and its allied fields in the pursuit of enormous profits, which were indeed earned but chiefly by the older and already established firms, such as that of Garford. Vast development marked the field until in 1896 there were approximately 583 manufacturing concerns in the cycle business. Two years later, in 1898, the day of reckoning came and by 1900 "graveyard industries" were all that remained of what had

11To Arthur Garford, July 22, 1895, GP.
12To Arthur Garford, July 6, 1895, GP.
been so recently centers of "robust activity and prosperity". Overproduction was the underlying source of the collapse but the Spanish-American War was the immediate cause. That war had deprived the civilian population of three hundred thousand young and sturdy men, many of whom were enthusiastic owners of cycles. Not only were the wheel clubs reduced in number and size by their departure but "... on enlistment, they threw their wheels on the market at very low prices... Naturally this filled a demand which otherwise might have been supplied by new wheels." Business suffered accordingly and the bicycle trade was largely destroyed.14

The Bicycle Industry's Burden

Garford, as one of the more important and knowledgeable men in the cycle industry, realized as early as May of 1897, at the peak of its fortunes, that the trade's outlook was not reassuring.15 For the next five years he attempted to promote and then to rescue an industry, in which he had so much at stake. Throughout the previous year he had served as one of thirteen directors on the National Board of Trade of Cycle Manufacturers and in 1897 he had been

14 This simplified but excellent account is contained in a letter by Garford to the French Stockholders of the Cleveland Machine Screw Company, c. 1901, GP. See also the New York Times, May 22, 1898.

15 To C.A. Weaver, May 19, 1897, GP.
elected its president.\textsuperscript{16} Of pressing concern to the entire industry was the settlement of the future of the bicycle shows, a deeply divisive issue. The National Board of Trade, and more particularly its board of directors including President Garford, was the center of the controversy, since it was empowered to make the final decision.

The national bicycle exhibition had been an annual affair since 1894 and afforded large and small purchasers an opportunity to examine closely and then to select with some authority their wheels. Continuing for one week the shows, held either in New York or Chicago, attracted tens of thousands of admirers. But they were expensive. It was estimated that the 1897 exhibition, covering four acres with 487 exhibitors, cost the trade a million dollars.\textsuperscript{17} On the grounds of expense Garford and a majority of the board of directors opposed their continuation and passed a resolution banning both national and local shows for the coming year.\textsuperscript{18}

The decision, having been made, remained to be enforced. Unanimity among members of the trade was far from absolute; with the smaller manufacturers and dealers the board of directors' attitude was not popular. And in fact the decision was aimed at this very horde of small com-

\textsuperscript{16}New York Daily Tribune, Feb. 11, 1897.

\textsuperscript{17}New York Times, Feb. 2, 1897.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., May 25, 1897.
petitionors, who contributed to overproduction and less individual profits, as much as at its publicly proclaimed purpose, economy. President Garford clearly indicated that the discontinuance of the shows was a measure designed to facilitate a "leveling process". He wanted no more of "the regal display at Coliseums and Central Palaces". Instead, "let every concern depend upon their own resources for mechanical brains, as well as ability to merchandise their goods, and let all be placed on exactly the same footing. It will then be demonstrated impartially who are entitled to and will command the trade. It will further compel all new manufacturers going into the business to pay their good money for the experience they get, the same as the older manufacturers have had to do in the past."19

In another year the National Board of Trade of Cycle Manufacturers was dissolved. Originally created to regulate the broad affairs of the entire trade, it had been engulfed by its own internal jealousies and disputes. In particular "the larger makers were afraid of helping the smaller makers" who were their competitive rivals.20

Competition, with ensuing overproduction, was the bicycle industry's burden. The solution to the problem that Garford and other large industrialists advocated was not more competition or economic individualism but elimin-

19To E. Ward, July 14, 1897, GP. See also letter to Walter Wardrop, Oct. 2, 1897, GP.

ation of the vast majority of small concerns to be followed by consolidation among the remaining large firms. Before Elyria's chamber of commerce, Garford, himself weaned on the doctrine of unlimited competition and much indebted to its practice, repudiated that very theory. Denying the significance of other factors such as over-capitalization, inexperience, extravagance, speculation and ignorance, he credited "fierce competition" as the cause of America's economic crisis. "Competition is not the life but the death of trade... Competition stimulates over-production."21 "... I am for trusts, and I will state frankly that the prime subject of trusts is to suppress competition."22

Garford's convictions about competition and consolidation were doubtless in part the result of his own intimate knowledge of the bicycle industry's problems, as experienced by one of its larger producers. His encounters with the competitive edge of other enterprising saddle manufacturers were often sharp and painful. To meet the challenge of the Spalding Brothers, Garford introduced a new saddle with features so similar to that produced by the Spalding Brothers' subsidiary, the Christy Company, that the latter deemed it an infringement of its patent. A patent war resulted.

Charles J. Smith, who was to manufacture the saddles

21Elyria Democrat, July 13, 1899.
22Elyria Daily Reporter, July 8, 1899.
for Garford, agreed with the Spalding claim that it represented a "direct infringement of his rights . . . but a technical evasion of his patent."23

Compromise efforts between Garford and Albert G. Spalding failed, despite Garford's request that Albert A. Pope referee the issue, before it was placed in the courts.24 Despite Garford's ultimate victory in the courts, the need for close cooperation between the various saddle makers was in no way diminished. If anything the patent war only emphasized the complete want of an esprit de corps.

Hardly had the suit ceased as a news item in the bicycle trade magazines than Garford began to act according to his faith. In the fall of 1898 he outlined his plans for a consolidation of all American saddle companies before an appreciative select gathering of the industry's representatives.25 The fruits of his labor were born early the next year, when the American Saddle Company was organized. Around his Elyria plant, which served as the nucleus of the combination, were grouped about twenty other companies (including the Christy Company) throughout the United States and Canada. Garford himself held the controlling interest in the new company and was to be its president and general

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23 To Arthur Garford, Jan. 4, 1898, GP.

24 A.G. Spalding to Arthur Garford, Feb. 14, 1898 and Arthur Garford to Albert A. Pope, April 18, 1898, GP.

25 To D.F. Printz, Oct. 5, 1898, GP.
The new firm had a capital of $1,800,000.00 and one very obvious advantage: it was capable of establishing a fixed market price for saddles and thereby effectively eliminating competition.27

The American Bicycle Company

The creation of the American Saddle Company in January, 1898, proved to be the prelude to the formation of America's "Bicycle Trust" or the American Bicycle Company, popularly known as the A.B.C. In the spring of 1899 bicycle industrialists, sadly aware of the depressed conditions in their trade, listened to Albert G. Spalding and accepted a plan as presented under his leadership. Differences over the late patent war now were a matter of indifference, and Spalding communicated his urgent and confidential proposals to Garford and other leading parts makers as well as to those who created the finished product.28 Incorporation of the American Bicycle Company was accomplished in May; the consolidation of all large and most small bicycle interests was realized in order "... to control the output of the industry of this country."29

The American Bicycle Company was capitalized at forty

26Letter by Arthur Garford to French stockholders of Cleveland Machine Screw Company, c. 1901, GP. See also, Arthur Garford to Herman Ely, Aug. 1, 1899, GP.

27Elyria Republican, Jan. 26, 1899,

28To Arthur Garford, March 24, 1899, GP.

million dollars and consisted of forty-four concerns with a total of fifty-six bicycle and parts plants. These comparatively few firms represented at least seventy percent of the entire business of the industry. To buy these separate concerns the manufacturers themselves had subscribed to almost all of the ten million dollars of bonds, ten million dollars of preferred stock and twenty million dollars of common stock.30

Late in the fall of the year Garford received a farewell banquet from Elyria's business and professional men as he prepared to respond to what he believed was opportunity. Garford's bicycle interests were about to take him to New York City, where he was to assume the duties of an officer of the American Bicycle Company. He was to be for the next two years the "bicycle trust's" treasurer.31

Years after the ill-fated American Bicycle Company had been liquidated, Garford considered, as he must have done frequently, the elements of success. He concluded that "productive business judgment consists in knowing when and how to let go and to use a keen discrimination in the things one hangs on to and upon which one's hopes for success depend." This necessitated the additional ability "... to look clear through a proposition and see it in


31Elyria Republican, Oct. 19, 1899.
imagination at the end as well as the beginning."\(^{32}\) In 1899 the American Bicycle Company apparently presented just such an attractive proposition to Garford and his American Saddle Company. It was an opportunity that an opportunist could not let pass. As a consequence the American Saddle Company's property and business were transferred to the American Bicycle Company in exchange for the latter's securities. Unfortunately within a brief span of two or three years it became painfully apparent that Garford's sense of prudence had deserted him. His optimistic and positive nature must have been severely bruised, when he reported that "through this transaction my personal losses were several hundred thousand dollars."\(^{33}\) To a considerable extent all that he retained of the American Bicycle Company's fiasco were its worthless bonds and stocks.

But in 1899 Garford was confident of his sound judgement and eventual success. In New York City he energetically contributed his abilities in an effort to consolidate the consolidation. For the better part of his two years as treasurer of the American Bicycle Company his task was to help with the reorganization and the centralization of the bicycle industry. Each of the forty-four concerns had developed its own business ideas, methods and policies, but now each constituent company was to be a part of a

\(^{32}\) To Paul S. Honberger, Aug. 5, 1918, GP.

\(^{33}\) To French stockholders of Cleveland Machine Screw Company, c. 1901, GP.
harmonious whole. The company's central office in New York was to establish the general policy for all the plants, to direct all orders and sales under a central selling department (designed to distribute goods at established prices), and to control directly the purchase of and payment for materials. 34

The American Bicycle Company was blessed with initial financial success, and its treasurer seemed particularly pleased with its prospects. 35 One source of his high expectations lay in the company's rapidly maturing plans to enter into and to control the already extensive automobile industry. The American Bicycle Company was still almost totally dependent upon the bicycle for its earnings, but Garford was hopeful that by 1901 it would derive at least one half of its profits from "the motor tricycle and automobiles of the gasolene type." In its facilities the company was admirably adapted for the production and sale of the latter. 36 Nonetheless and despite what was regarded as a good financial year, the company did not earn enough in 1900 to cover required payments on its seven percent preferred stock. After first meeting payment on its gold

34 New York Daily Tribune, Oct. 26, 1899. See also Arthur Garford to J.A. Hunt, Aug. 21, 1900 and Jan. 3, 1902, GP.

35 To C.A. Gresselli, March 19, 1900, and R.B. McMullen, Jan. 24, 1901, GP.

36 To W.A. Ely, March 31, 1900, GP. See also New York Times, Oct. 10, 1900.
debenture bonds, a preference security with guaranteed dividends, the net profits were reduced to a point where additional borrowing was necessary to meet dividends on the preferred stock. In the not too distant future the American Bicycle Company deficits would be defaulted, when its debt surpassed its credit.

In the same letter in which he reported that "... we are doing a splendid business", Garford acknowledged that his position as treasurer was more arduous than he had expected: "If I had known the magnitude and character of the work I should never have accepted the position." For whatever reasons, Garford was not happy in his work, and increasingly his personal disappointment became apparent, until it caused an exceptional condition, a virtual slough of despair. In August of 1900 he wrote a letter of resignation and while it was not tendered, he offered as reasons matters of personal health and private affairs. More confidentially he wrote to an Elyria friend that the company's President, R. Lindsay Coleman, had taken issue with him several times in the matter of directing some departments and that "he has not treated me recently with the courtesy to which I am entitled."
The decision to remain or to resign as treasurer was the most difficult one Garford had ever faced, and though his inclination was to refuse, he abided by his re-election. His despondency about relations with the American Bicycle Company was somewhat relieved by his own depth of confidence that "time is a great regulator, and I have faith in the ultimate outcome of everything for the best." After his re-election Garford received congratulatory messages but with his own private reservations. Not for the rest of his life would he express such a pessimistic fatalism faintly tempered by a basic positivism.

If the American Bicycle Company was not his own business to do with as he pleased, neither was New York City the familiar and friendly small town, where neighbors forgot their political, economic and personal differences in order to stage a rousing farewell celebration for one of their kind. Elyria remained home to Garford, and there was no doubt but that his return was only a matter of time. The Christmas season of 1900 followed all too quickly the events surrounding his recent re-election and was a rare occasion on which Garford was a victim of his emotions: "It seems very strange to be away from Elyria on Christmas day. This is the first time in our lives that we have spent

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41 To S.B. Leonard, Sept. 28, 1900, GP. Four days later Garford was to write: "I do not know what the future has in store, and begin to feel as if I did not care." See letter to Fred N. Smith, Oct. 2, 1900, GP.

42 To Herman Ely, Oct. 19, 1900, GP.
Christmas away from home. I hope it will be the last."43

Garford was ready to resign as treasurer of the company; he only needed an opportunity.

Opportunity was not long delayed. In January of 1901 Garford resigned as the American Bicycle Company's treasurer and returned to Elyria to be president of a newly formed company, the Automobile and Cycle Parts Company, with headquarters in Cleveland. Acting more like twelve than forty-two years of age a frisky and happy Garford described their long lost town and homestead to his wife, still in the East. He urged Mary and the children to hasten home, where their lightness and cheeriness were most needed.44

The Demise of the A.B.C.

The formation of the Automobile and Cycle Parts Company represented a policy change of its parent organization, the American Bicycle Company. The latter had discovered that the bicycle industry was composed of essentially incongruous elements, and that close consolidation was unmanageable. Its many diverse plants, constructing saddles, chains, gears, sheet steel, ball bearings, and stampings, to name but a few, were far from homogeneous and frequently worked at odds, or in actual ignorance of

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43 To John Murney, Dec. 21, 1900, GP.
44 To Mary Garford, Feb. 3, 1901, GP.
each other's tasks. A different scheme of management was deemed necessary, and one consequence was the Automobile and Cycle Parts Company. The new firm consisted of eight different factories, largely those which had composed the American Saddle Company. However, it was a new corporation legally separated from the American Bicycle Company and authorized to increase its capital stock from $1,800,000 to $5,000,000.

R. Lindsay Coleman, president of the American Bicycle Company, had urged Garford to undertake the task of reorganizing these eight mills, since they could not be advantageously operated from the central New York office. For this difficult task Garford and his corporation lawyer, M.B. Johnson of Cleveland, were to receive $500,000, or ten percent of the authorized capital of five million dollars. Garford's commission did not mean that he would once again have the controlling interest in a company which was the direct descendant of the American Saddle Company and before that the Garford Manufacturing Company. The Auto and Cycle Parts Company was to be in no sense a competitor of the American Bicycle Company. In fact, its principal stockholders were the American Bicycle Company and the American Trust Company, which financed the reorganization.

45 Arthur Garford to Cold Rolled Strip Steel Association, April 12, 1901, GP.

46 New York Times, Feb. 5, 1901. See also Herman Ely to Arthur Garford, Jan. 23, 1901, GP.

Garford held exactly one share of the total 31,575 shares.48

Far from being a competitor of the parent organization, the new corporation had as its basic objective the rehabilitation of the American Bicycle Company's stock.49 Its eight factories embraced "the giants of the cycle parts making industry."50 Together they were capable of producing large quantities of bicycle and more importantly automobile parts and accessories. It was Garford's task to introduce an intense centralization and to glean economy by specialization.51

Less than two years after the formation of the Automobile and Cycle Parts Company, in September of 1902, the American Bicycle Company failed to deposit the interest due on its debenture bonds and applied for a receiver to reorganize the company.52 Understandably Garford was angered by this decision. He still retained substantially all of the holdings in the company for which in 1899 he had exchanged his majority interests in the American Saddle Company. And now these "A.B.C." shares, with a par value of hundreds of thousands of dollars, had almost no real value.

48 Correct List of Stockholders of Auto and Cycle Parts Company, Aug. 10, 1901, GP.

49 Arthur Garford to S.B. Leonard, Feb. 7, 1902, GP.

50 Cleveland Leader, Feb. 5, 1901.

51 Ibid.

A small fortune, which he had amassed, had been liquidated.\(^{53}\)

Beyond this, Garford was concerned about the impact the reorganization would have upon subsidiary companies like the one over which he was president, the Federal Manufacturing, as the Automobile and Cycle Parts Company had been renamed. The solvent Federal Manufacturing Company had been needlessly embarrassed by the parent company's financial difficulties and was its anxious creditor for three hundred thousand dollars in bonds.\(^{54}\) Fortunately the failure of the American Bicycle Company could not automatically ruin its subsidiaries, since the former was legally "a mere holding company".\(^{55}\) As long as the Federal Manufacturing Company itself remained financially responsible, the receivers were prevented from interfering in its affairs.

Apparently, the most immediately envisaged solution for the bicycle industry's troubled financial status was a price rise. To effect this end Garford managed, if he did not initiate, a movement to unite all bicycle manufacturers in an effort to raise their prices. He scheduled a Cleveland meeting in early November, 1902, "... to carefully discuss the subject of advancing the price of

\(^{53}\)To J.M. Vincent, Oct. 6, 1902, GP.

\(^{54}\)Arthur Garford to R.B. McMullen, Sept. 24, 1902, GP.

\(^{55}\)New York Daily Tribune, Sept. 4, 1902.
bicycles. The response was favorable, even gratifying. Homer P. Snyder approved all such efforts to increase prices with the assurance that "surely no man can take exception to an advance in prices." The Bean Chamberlain Manufacturing Company valued Garford's intentions but voiced certain doubts: "We are very much in favor of anything that would help to advance the prices, but our prices have been in advance of others, and we would still be glad to make them higher yet ... "

The meeting proved to be a grand success, as Garford informed the American Bicycle Company's President, Albert A. Pope. It had been agreed that a price rise was both desirable and necessary and that a permanent association of the manufacturers was needed. Shortly thereafter a Bicycle Manufacturers' Association was formed with the expressed purpose of promoting their interests by closer contact and assistance.

All such efforts of assistance did not long delay the final dissolution of the American Bicycle Company. Late in 1903 the Pope Manufacturing Company of Boston purchased all of its tangible assets by way of a receivers' sale.

56 Circular sent to various manufacturing concerns, Nov. 4, 1902, GP.
57 Letters to Arthur Garford, Nov. 5-6, 1902, GP.
58 To Arthur Garford, Nov. 6, 1902, GP.
59 To Albert A. Pope, Nov. 8, 1902, GP.
60 Copy of Agreement, Nov. 21, 1902, GP.
and the company ceased to be an entity. The death vigil had ended and Garford resigned himself: "I do not consider that the American Bicycle Company stock is worth one cent."61

The ultimate disposition of the Federal Manufacturing Company was of primary concern to Garford throughout the year and into 1905. The decision was made by Albert A. Pope, president of the Pope Manufacturing Company, to dispose of his controlling interests in the Federal Manufacturing Company. Garford was particularly interested in securing an option on two of the plants to be liquidated, one in Cleveland and the other in Elyria, the latter being his old Garford Manufacturing Company.

Arrangements were completed in May of 1905; Garford had "... succeeded in securing control of the automobile department of the Federal Manufacturing Company. ... "62 The new corporation, the Garford Company, was capitalized at $400,000, and consisted of the two principal factories of the defunct Federal Manufacturing Company. Together they were capable of producing a complete line of automobile chassis parts and of assembling them.63 The automobile parts industry was a prosperous and important, if relatively new, segment of America's economy, and the profits to be

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61 To E.P. Butler, Jan. 3, 1904, GP.
62 Arthur Garford to E.M.S. Young, May 17, 1905, GP.
63 Arthur Garford to I. Gifford Ladd, May 10, 1905, GP.
realized were enormous. With two excellent plants Garford had taken a giant step towards becoming a major industrial figure. It was under very similar circumstances that H.H. and W.R. Timken had built the foundation stones of their vast parts enterprises. It remained for Garford to take full advantage of this splendid opportunity.

The establishment of the Garford Company was a remarkable achievement, if for no other reason than that Garford had not placed himself under obligation to any bank. Nor had he accepted the anxiously extended proposals of assistance from John M. and Clement Studebaker. According to Garford's own explanation the new company was financed largely by his own resources and was accordingly accountable to him and his management.64 Actually Garford and his two corporation lawyers, M.B. and H.H. Johnson, had secured $350,000 of the total capital stock of $400,000. However, Garford personally had subscribed to practically none of the Garford Company's stock. One half or two hundred thousand dollars of the total capital stock belonged to the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company, of which Garford was not only President but also majority stock owner.65

64 Ibid.

The Cleveland Automatic Machine Company

It was in the spring of 1902 that Garford, quite fortuitously, was asked to reorganize the Cleveland Machine Screw Company. The latter was owned by a French syndicate with its plant facilities located in Cleveland, Ohio. It specialized in the production of a diversified line of automatic, chucking, worm milling and screw machines. These machines were all automatic and allowed for the quantity production of quality tools so necessary for America's amazing industrial growth. Like so many other businesses in the 1890's the company became identified with the bicycle industry, eventually becoming dependent upon the success of the latter. Like other tool companies, it did exceedingly well as long as the bicycle field demanded great quantities of machinery and tools. Twelve percent dividends on the entire stock were paid for several years but in 1898 the Cleveland Machine Screw Company suffered from the depression that struck the entire industry. When the American Bicycle Company was formed in 1899, the Cleveland corporation, like Garford's American Saddle Company, had the choice of joining the combination or braving the storm alone. Unlike the former it exchanged only part of its property for the American Bicycle Company's securities and retained its principal property. To supplement and to substitute for the business done formerly in the cycle

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66 Arthur Garford to Gerhard M. Dahl, July 18, 1919, GP.
industry the Cleveland Machine Screw Company decided to take a rather common course: the exploitation of the automobile. Besides furnishing tools for that industry, it also attempted to develop an electric automobile and battery.67

The American Bicycle Company had Garford travel to France in 1902 with an authorization to purchase the battery interests of the French syndicate.68 In the course of several weeks' negotiations the French owners raised their own entirely different proposal. Upon their initiative Garford was persuaded to accept the presidency of the Cleveland Machine Screw Company and to undertake personally a reorganization of the faltering firm.69 The agreement included the following conditions: President Garford was to appoint the entire board of directors and to receive an option to purchase at least the controlling interest in the new corporation. The latter was to be capitalized at not less than one million dollars and of this sum, "$250,000. shall be allotted and belong to Mr. A.L. Garford as commission for himself and any other people [his lawyers] to whom he will have liberty to attribute the whole or part of same for their concourse and help. . . . " It was hoped that

67This history of the Cleveland Machine Screw Company is contained in a letter by Arthur Garford to the French Stockholders of the Cleveland Machine Screw Company, c. 1901, GP.

68Arthur Garford to R.L. Coleman, March 25, 1902, GP.

69George Dambrmann to M.B. Johnson, Aug. 19, 1902, GP.
Garford would retain most or all of this bonus. Believing that his chances of success were reasonable, Garford accepted the plan and undertook an enterprise that was to prove eminently successful. For the rest of his life he would own the reorganized company, the Cleveland Automatic Machine, and largely depend upon it as an enduring source of financial strength. Considering his extreme dissatisfaction over the American Bicycle Company's failure, Garford's unconcealed and unreserved joy at his success is understandable. As soon as the reorganization was completed he would control a company that was essentially in "splendid shape". His hopes for "a grand and permanent success" were realistic and by late fall of 1902 he wrote, "It [the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company] is doing a large business and making large profits now, and I have been able to make a good big bunch of money out of my efforts in connection with the scheme."  

The Cleveland Automatic Machine Company was organized legally in October, 1902, on the basis of a bond issue of $500,000 and $1,000,000 of stock. The 40,000 shares of stock had a par value of $25.00 each, and within eighteen months of the date of reorganization Garford had secured the controlling interest in the company by purchasing shares

70 George Dambrmann to Arthur Garford, April 9, 1902, GP. See also copy of the agreement, April 10, 1902, GP.

71 To J.A. Hunt, Nov. 19, 1902, GP.
of stock for one to fourteen dollars. So successful was the company under Garford's leadership that within a few years these shares, purchased at depressed prices, were worth their par value. Albert A. Pope held 2,866 shares acquired at less than six thousand dollars in 1903. Less than three years later that stock was worth its par value, namely, $71,650. Pope's investment represented a profit of at least $65,000 without even considering the excellent prospects of dividends. The reorganization of the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company was a conspicuous success, and by 1906 a company that only four years prior had been on the verge of bankruptcy reported the year's net earnings as twenty-five percent on the stock of the company, or over a quarter of a million dollars.

The acquisitions of the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company and then in 1905 the Garford Company were generous compensations for the monetary losses Garford had suffered in connection with the American Bicycle Company. Not only did they enable him to recoup and to increase his fortunes, but they placed him in a position through which he could have risen to the stature of a major industrialist.

73 Arthur Garford to Albert A. Pope, Jan. 10, 1906, GP.
74 Ibid.
75 Arthur Garford to Albert A. Pope, Oct. 26, 1906, GP.
CHAPTER III

A BUSINESSMAN - POLITICIAN

Affairs of business received Garford's most attentive consideration in the years immediately preceding and following the turn of the nineteenth century, and of necessity a certain disregard for politics characterized his activities. Garford considered a sound business structure as an indispensable prerequisite to any political involvement of marked consequence. This is not to imply that he was politically apathetic or inactive. But in order of importance business took precedence over politics. He was essentially an industrialist whose political activities were governed by his companies' state of affairs. Significantly, there would come a period when Garford's institutions were so financially stable that he could achieve his statewide political prominence. When Garford declined a political post or function, as when he refused to be a member of the McKinley National Memorial Association, it was because his time and not his interest was limited.¹

¹Arthur Garford to Frederic S. Hartzell, Feb. 19, 1902, GP.
District Politics

Despite "his phenomenal success in business" and the time and energy its achievement necessitated, Garford entered Ohio state politics at an early date and late in 1895 became a candidate for district delegate to the Republican national convention the following year. Proclaimed "a son of toil" and "a young man from the people", Garford, a McKinley Republican, won one of the two places and helped nominate McKinley for President. This was his first such experience and was to be repeated on five more occasions during his life.

Management and organization were valued greatly by Garford who believed that the adept leader was no less essential in politics than in business. Early in his political career he learned that those few who controlled the state and local political organizations named candidates and handled the patronage. And so he became a member of the Lorain County Republican Committee and in 1897 held the powerful post of county chairman. Intrusted with his party's welfare Garford not only had the opportunity but was expected to organize thoroughly his county "... with energetic, prudent, watchful friends in each of your townships." That he did do this was perhaps best evinced by

[References]

2 Elyria Republican, Dec. 12, 1895.
3 Elyria Republican, Jan. 30, 1896.
4 Charles Dick to Arthur Garford, April 16, 1897, GP.
the local opposition manifested in Elyria's newspapers. He was suspected of being secretly desirous of his district's congressional seat and was denounced as "... a yellow dog, a trickster, a bolter, a boodler." After the creation of the American Saddle Company in 1899 his opponents christened him as "His Royal Nibs the Saddle-Maker" and "the Great I am".  

Garford's connection with the American Bicycle Company forced a temporary end to his political ascent but upon his return from New York, he re-entered Ohio's political scene. He participated in Myron T. Herrick's successful campaign to defeat Tom L. Johnson in the gubernatorial contest of 1903 and earned the gratitude of the former by rallying the citizens and more particularly the businessmen of Elyria to his standard. It was well that Garford, presently chairman of Lorain County's Republican Executive and Central Committees, had created a sense of obligation on the part of Governor Herrick. In 1904 it became expedient to rely upon the good will and power of the Governor in order that Garford might retain maximum political power in his own county. In November of that year Amos R. Webber of Elyria resigned his post on Lorain County's Common Pleas Bench in

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6Elyria Reporter, Feb. 23 and March 16, 1899.

7Elyria Republican, April 23, 1903.
order to campaign for the Fourteenth District's congressional seat. 8

Garford explained to Ohio's Senator Charles Dick that he emphatically favored the appointment by Governor Herrick of F.F. Thomas for the judicial vacancy on the basis of political expediency. Thomas' appointment before election day was in the interests of political harmony; if he was disregarded he and his large following would desert the party and likely cause the defeat of the congressional candidate. A victory by Webber in the all important congressional election was dependent upon a united Republican vote in the district. 9

The day after he had written the above to Senator Dick, Garford addressed an intimate letter to Governor Herrick on the subject of the judicial appointment. Again his major concern was over the preservation of Republican unity, but this was the only similarity between the two letters. Governor Herrick was cautioned to act in the utmost secrecy in appointing a compromise candidate after the election. 10 The selection of Thomas was in fact not advocated but deprecated, since he clearly was not the compromise candidate, whose identity would be revealed only after the election.

8 Arthur Garford to Charles Dick, Oct. 18, 1904, GP.
9 Ibid.
10 To Myron T. Herrick, Oct. 19, 1904, GP.
Amos R. Webber did win the congressional election, and C.G. Washburn was appointed after the election to the Common Pleas Bench. The strategy of Herrick and his aspiring local lieutenant had been successful, and Garford thanked the Governor for an appointment, which he estimated to have saved at least two thousand votes. To secure the cooperation of Thomas and his followers Garford suggested that he be given some appointment by the Governor, as this "... will assist me very much in my plans for the future." The maneuverings of Garford had apparently been completely successful. His own political position in his county and district was strengthened by the victory of a favored congressional candidate and a judicial appointment designed to pacify dissident factions. It was, however, a hazardous stratagem not designed to retain political allies or personal friends. With good reason he had counseled secrecy. If the powerful Senator Dick were to discover or to suspect the deception that Garford and Governor Herrick had worked, the relationship between the two men would at best suffer. Apparently the Charles Dick--Myron Herrick--George Cox Triumvirate established in early 1904, after the death of Mark Hanna, in order to assure Republican harmony and to prevent factionalism was not sturdy enough to survive a "triple leadership".12

11To Myron T. Herrick, Nov. 16, 1904, GP.
12Cleveland Leader, May 18, 1904.
Election of 1905 and its Repercussions

Governor Herrick, a landslide victor in the election of 1903, not unnaturally sought his renomination and re-election two years hence. Yet there developed within the Republican party serious opposition to his renomination. The Anti-Saloon League and many of Ohio's clergymen did not like him. Lieutenant Governor Warren G. Harding was favored by these elements. In a letter to Senator Dick, Garford deplored this opposition and reaffirmed his own allegiance to the Governor. In the columns of Garford's newspaper, the Elyria Republican, the Anti-Saloon League was attacked as a hypocritical organization that would in the last analysis support those candidates with the most available money. Herrick, who favored a local option law that was also satisfactory to the saloon interests, was openly indorsed.

Herrick was renominated by the Republicans in spite of apparently widespread opposition including dissension within his own party. If he was to be reelected the movement against him had to be stopped and by those throughout the state organization who remained loyal to the Governor. As chairman of his county's central and executive committees Garford was one of the many important local organizers upon whom Herrick relied. Quite early in the campaign Garford

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13 To Charles Dick, Feb. 3, 1905, GP.

gave a candid appraisal of the Lorain County situation. Based upon the reports of his member committeemen representing all townships, he detailed an "unfavorable and disappointing" account. Valuable votes were being lost for a number of reasons: The Anti-Saloon League and its allies within the churches opposed Herrick and his local option bill; some voters were simply "... tired of Boss Cox and his dominating influence in the State"; there was yet another influential group of enthusiastic horsemen composed of "every swipe, groom, driver, livery-stable man and race-track gambler or better in the county ... ", all ready to vote against a Governor that had vetoed a pool selling bill. Garford concluded that the county could be won if it was properly organized, and the most valuable ingredient of organization was money. To achieve the desired results among Lorain's considerable laboring element financial contributions had to be forthcoming. "The Committee has always found it necessary to put a considerable amount of money into Lorain among the workers" and this usually reliable method of assuring a Republican vote was in no lesser degree necessary in 1905.15

An aroused and extensive county organization can do much in a short time, as was the case in Lorain. Well before the date of election Garford was able to inform

Governor Herrick that the county's money situation was satisfactory.  

However, money in itself was no guarantee of victory, and plans were readied to poll every ward in the county to ascertain exactly how many and who were the disgruntled voters. Among the uncertain and not the regulars were the funds to be disbursed, if their weight was to be effective. 

This included a settlement of Negroes living in the town of Oberlin, with whom Garford would have to have dealings throughout his political career. The medium through which Lorain's white politicians dealt with Oberlin's colored voters was one John A. Berry of that town. Garford described Berry as "a grafter pure and simple. He is a colored gentleman with a fair smattering of education."

Berry was naturally shrewd and devoid of scruples, all of which, he concluded, made him politically influential among the Negroes. Despite his reluctance to give any cash to Berry on the grounds that "we have the solid colored vote of the county", twenty dollars were eventually paid to Berry for his influence.

Adequate funds, thorough canvasses, thoughtful spending, and the toil of many encouraged Garford to view with less alarm his county's situation. These elements, which when grouped together acquired the collective title of

16 To Myron T. Herrick, Oct. 20, 1905, GP.

17 Arthur Garford to R. Robinson, Sept. 28, 1905, GP.

18 Letters to Tod B. Galloway, Oct. 26, 1905 and to John A. Berry, Nov. 9, 1905, GP.
"organization", gave him seemingly good cause for optimism.\textsuperscript{19}

The composure that Garford was beginning to experience was abruptly shattered in the last week of the campaign by the sensational announcement of the district's Republican congressman, Amos R. Webber: on the basis of his temperance sentiments he could no longer support the candidacy of Governor Herrick\textsuperscript{20} Garford's reaction was swift and angry. He accused Webber of renouncing party responsibility and loyalty while laboring under the misconception that individuals, and not party unity, were of major consideration. In a public denunciation he called for Webber's resignation\textsuperscript{21} Privately he was even more outspoken in his contempt for what he considered a politically treasonable action by an ungrateful former friend\textsuperscript{22}

In an open letter to the \textit{Elyria Republican} Congressman Webber answered Garford's condemnation by introducing the name of Senator Dick, one of Ohio's so-called ruling "triumverate". Webber claimed that Senator Dick, who as chairman of the Republican state executive committee was also in charge of handling the Republican campaign, had informed him that the charges against Governor Herrick were indeed true, that the Governor had accepted favors of Cincinnati's

\textsuperscript{19}To Charles Dick, Oct. 26, 1905, GP.

\textsuperscript{20}Elyria Republican, Nov. 2, 1905.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22}To A.G. Comings, Oct. 30, 1905, GP.
political "boss", George B. Cox, as well as the Ohio Liquor interests. Thereupon, Webber had denounced the Governor.\textsuperscript{23} Next day Senator Dick issued a statement denying the truthfulness of Webber's allegation.\textsuperscript{24}

This flurry of open letters indicating the possibility of a deep rent in Republican unity and of a struggle for control of the state organization between the factions was short-lived. The schism that had been opened momentarily was quickly closed and the official doctrine of harmony prevailed. Yet it was clear that Republican unity in Ohio rested upon an alliance of factions which was frequently subjected to intense strains.

The Webber Affair

November 7, 1905, was a dark day for Ohio Republicans and particularly for Myron T. Herrick. While the entire Democratic state ticket suffered defeat, its candidate for Governor, John M. Pattison, defeated Herrick by almost 43,000 votes. Only two years before, Herrick had been elected by a plurality of almost 114,000 votes. In Lorain county he still retained his victory margin but suffered a reduction from a plurality of 3,047 in 1903 to a mere 266 in 1905.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Elyria Republican}, Nov. 2, 1905.

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer}, Nov. 3, 1905.

\textsuperscript{25}Secretary of State, \textit{Ohio Election Statistics}, 1903 and 1905, 11-12.
Three days after the election the Governor acknowledged Garford's contribution to his campaign and added an enigmatic reference to his "true friends". His defeat had enabled the Governor to recognize them and certainly Garford was one. But who were not counted among his true friends? Herrick mentioned no names. He did however add a cryptic one sentence postscript: "I am in the fight with you from now on."26 The next day Harry M. Daugherty wrote to Garford and in a carefully worded letter urged the solidification of the Republican party behind leaders who would not alienate Ohio's temperance element.27

Garford's thoughts about the Republican party were not shrouded in mystery and in a typical display of forthrightness and candor he wrote what Herrick and Daugherty, and particularly the former, had only suggested. In his newspaper the Anti-Saloon League was declared the perpetrator of "machinacians [machinations?] and insidious rumors". Confronted with the gubernatorial defeat the Republican party had no alternative other than to reorganize and to decentralize its entire state organization.28

Privately Garford left no doubt that the "fight" to which Herrick had alluded would involve an effort to institute a new party leadership. His reaction to Herrick's

26To Arthur Garford, Nov. 10, 1905, GP.
27To Arthur Garford, Nov. 11, 1905, GP.
28Elyria Republican, Nov. 9, 1905.
defeat and to his own political rebuff was that of a businessman confronted by a company's bankruptcy. And it was in the business community that Garford believed could be found the personnel necessary for political rejuvenation. He viewed with considerable disdain the professional politician and placed his faith in men who, like himself, had successfully and efficiently reorganized vast corporations and therefore had been qualified by business accomplishments to reorganize and to manage political governments. To Harry M. Daugherty he stated his views: "I believe that the time has come when professional political office seekers and bosses should be relegated to the rear, and that men of standing and integrity who represent the substantial affairs of communities and have something of accomplishment to their credit --- should be recognized as fully capable of representing the people in whatever capacity they may be chosen to serve. I believe also that such honor should seek the man, and not the man the honor. Only when such a condition is brought about shall we have a true reformation of existing conditions along the lines of a popular government." 29 In a veiled reference to Charles Dick or George B. Cox, or both, Garford protested the dictation of nominations in state conventions, undoubtedly having in mind the possible nomination of political foes. 30

29 To Harry M. Daugherty, Nov. 17, 1905, GP.
30 Ibid.
Congressman Webber, by virtue of his repudiation of Governor Herrick, became the principal political issue in Lorain County and in the Fourteenth District, and regular Republicans were determined to do battle between themselves until political death. The resolution of the Webber affair invariably would cause repercussions among the state's politicians, and have a bearing on the movement to reorganize the leadership of the party. The exchange of open letters between Garford, Webber and Dick was not to be dismissed by politicians as it had been by the press. Garford made this clear in unequivocal language: "A prejudice certainly exists throughout this territory [the Fourteenth District], whether justly or unjustly, against Senator Dick and his co-workers, and it would appear that other leaders must assume the burden and responsibility of the Republican organization in the State." 31

The Fourteenth District's Republican congressional convention nominated the party's candidate in June, 1906, and from the moment of Herrick's defeat until convention time the district's politicians maneuvered for the nomination. Garford seriously considered his own candidacy, but because of business "obligations and responsibilities" he felt compelled to forsake the opportunity to succeed Congressman Webber. Otherwise he would do all he could to prevent

31To Harry M. Daugherty, Nov. 9, 1905, GP.
the latter's renomination.\textsuperscript{32} And this was considerable. As one of Lorain County's two members on the Fourteenth District's congressional committee Garford and his fellow-member chose the method of selecting his county's delegates to the congressional convention. They decided on a county convention. This was to the distinct disadvantage of Webber since the unit rule would prevail at the county convention, and in all probability Webber could not command a majority of the delegates.\textsuperscript{33} This was the case; Webber did not muster the required majority, and Lorain's entire delegation of fifty-four members was nominally, at least, committed to Garford's candidate, State Senator George H. Chamberlain.\textsuperscript{34} If Webber were to be renominated it would be on the strength of his support in the district's five other counties.

Not the least and perhaps the single most important reason for the anti-Webber movement revolved around the matter of federal patronage. Once Webber stood outside the pale of the regular local party organization his chief weapon of defense and retaliation lay in his control of patronage. As long as he could recommend for appointment personally loyal postmasters throughout the district, there remained a chance that he could gain control of the party organization. Garford realized this and in December of 1905

\begin{footnotes}
\item[32] To Myron T. Herrick, Feb. 23, 1905, GP.
\item[33]\textit{Elyria Democrat}, April 26, 1906.
\item[34]\textit{Elyria Republican}, May 17, 1906.
\end{footnotes}
he urged Senator Dick to do all he could to prevent Webber's renomination. A good start would be to secure an Elyria postmastership for Fred N. Smith, the choice of Garford, not Webber.\(^{35}\)

According to Garford, Webber refused to recommend the appointment of Smith until Lorain's politicians, ninety percent of whom favored the appointment, promised to support the Congressman. And if Webber decided to recommend someone other than Smith, Garford contended that the "grass roots" workers of the organization would believe that a deserving "ward heeler" had been deprived his just reward.\(^{36}\) If Garford were to retain and to increase his political power, he could ill afford its disposal by a rival organization.

The Fourteenth District's congressional convention interrupted this patronage squabble before Webber had made any recommendation. In all probability his was a calculated delay intended to alienate as few politicians as possible and to retain his own supporters. After the convention had nominated a candidate, Webber could make his selection.

Lorain County's fifty-four delegates comprised the largest single delegation to the congressional convention, and Garford was its chairman. To nominate required a simple majority of all delegates, no mean accomplishment by any

\(^{35}\) To Charles Dick, Dec. 5, 1905, GP.

\(^{36}\) To Charles Dick, May 15, 1906, GP.
means and possible only if three or more of the six counties made common cause. Each delegation had its own favorite son to be sacrificed if and when circumstances were favorable or desperate. Personally, Garford believed that Chamberlain's chances were good, since the possibility of "reciprocation of favors received" existed between Lorain, Ashland and Richland counties. Certainly Ashland County should have supported Lorain, since the former's Frank Patterson had been elected State Senator on the strength of Lorain's Republican majority. Furthermore if Ashland now joined in "an alliance of interests" with Lorain, the latter would help Patterson to succeed himself.

The convention was virtually a marathon lasting three full days. It was apparent that Garford had failed to clasp hands with enough delegates from Richland County, and while Chamberlain led, ballot after ballot, he did not have a majority vote. Eventually the convention began to lean to Knox County's Frank Owen, a political opponent of Garford. To stave off his nomination Garford promised that his county would support Richland County's nominee for the State senatorship after Patterson's second term. In this way Richland, Lorain and Ashland counties achieved

37To Charles Dick, June 4, 1906, GP.
38Arthur Garford to Frank N. Patterson, July 6, 1906, GP.
39*Lyria* Democrat, June 7, 1906.
harmony "thus securing recognition which was our due." Together they nominated a compromise candidate, Jay F. Laning, of Huron County on the one hundred and ninety-third ballot:

The convention had been a hectic affair. Congressman Webber, whose movement for renomination never gained momentum, introduced charges of bribery and caused a brief sensation. However his supporters were quickly and "sternly ordered to desist" by the convention chairman, who used as a gavel "a full sized baseball bat" placed on the stage as a remembrance of President Roosevelt's "big stick". Webber's charges of "... alleged use of money ... received no serious credence above the dignity of campaign gossip." Even before the congressional candidacy had been decided, Garford maintained that to the eventual winner should go the vital "spoils" or patronage, and he wrote Senator Dick to this effect. He argued that if Webber were defeated then the federal government ought to ignore his future recommendations and consider only those of the victorious politicians. When it became apparent after Webber's repudiation that the Congressman had no intention of nominating Garford's choice, Fred Smith, as Elyria's postmaster but would continue to recommend his own supporters,

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40 Arthur Garford to Jesse E. LaDow, July 2, 1906, GP.
41 Elyria Republican, June 7, 1906.
42 To Charles Dick, June 4, 1906, GP.
Garford wrote a strong and indignant protest to Senator Dick. If the Senate confirmed Webber’s selection, John W. Bath of Elyria, Garford warned that there would be open revolt and a bolt by "... the constant and consistent republican workers of this county. ..." Garford personally would "... be disgusted and inclined to lay down the responsibilities attached to party work and party service."\(^{43}\)

Congressman Webber did not lose his chance to dispose patronage, and John Bath was confirmed by the Senate. Senator Dick explained that Garford’s protest had arrived after the nomination had been filed with the Senate; both he and Senator Foraker were helpless to prevent Bath’s confirmation.\(^{44}\) If Garford had heretofore suppressed acts of open opposition to the state’s political leaders and particularly to Senator Dick, there existed less cause to do so in the future. It is not unlikely that he used the Elyria postmastership to determine his own position toward the leadership. And he had been humbled, if not repudiated, despite a six months’ campaign to wrestle away the favors of patronage from Congressman Webber and regardless of unmistakable demands and threats made upon Senator Dick.

**Efforts at Political Reorganization**

The formal announcement of Garford’s candidacy for membership on Ohio’s Republican State Central Committee

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\(^{43}\)To Charles Dick, June 16, 1906 GP.

\(^{44}\)To Arthur Garford, June 19, 1906, GP.
was made in early September, 1906, but his decision was
the aftermath of Governor Herrick's defeat and the entire
Webber affair.145 The state central committee was composed
of one representative from each of Ohio's twenty-one con-
gressional districts and was perhaps the most powerful
political body in the state. It elected the entire member-
ship and chairman of the state executive committee, which
ran Republican political campaigns. In 1905 Charles Dick
had been chairman of the state executive committee, and under
his management Governor Herrick had suffered defeat. There
were those Republicans like Garford who characterized the
Senator's guidance as incompetent at best. Dick was still
chairman in 1906 when Garford, following the lead of Harry M.
Daugherty and Theodore E. Burton, decided that a political
reorganization of the party's leadership should and could
be accomplished by injecting "... new blood and new
policies... into the State Central Committee." He was
not advocating a radical departure from the party's present
principles and tenets but only a new leadership. As for
himself he was prepared to succeed the Fourteenth District's
William Francis of Huron County on the committee.146

The primary objective of the new movement was the
relegation of Chairman Dick and his supporters to an in-
ferior status within the party's hierarchy and the subsequent

145 To Jesse E. LaDow, July 19, 1906, GP.
146 To Harry M. Daugherty, July 17, 1906, GP.
elevation of the recalcitrant group to a position from which it could control party policies, elections and patronage. Garford was certain that "... the real thing to be considered, it seems to me is the temper and feeling of the people at this time toward bossism of the Dick type ... the party organization should be made the instrument for exploiting sound political principles and not used in the promulgation of principles tending to advance or exploit the interests of any individual or clique." Daugherty readily agreed "... that to insure party success this fall, a change is necessary in the chairmanship of the State Executive Committee."

A caucus of the district's delegates to the state convention, prior to the convening of the latter, effectively determined the selection of the Fourteenth District's representative on the state central committee. To attain this position of statewide political power Garford had to be able to control that district caucus; his command of the local situation was indispensable, before his influence could be statewide. Once having made his decision to seek the position on the committee Garford began to count votes and to commit his allies throughout the district's six counties.

47To Harry M. Daugherty, Aug. 17, 1906, GP.
48To Arthur Garford, Sept. 6, 1906, GP.
49Arthur Garford to Jesse E. LaDow, July 19, 1906, GP.
Huron County was the home of William Francis, the present committeeman, but Garford counted upon its endorsement because "largely through my own instrumentality", J.F. Laning of Huron had been nominated as the district's Republican candidate for congress at the recent congressional convention. Despite Huron County's "... great obligation to Lorain for the magnanimous treatment" of Laning, Garford was still concerned lest it be ungrateful, and he accordingly requested Congressman Burton's intercession on his behalf. In Richland County Garford found an ally in the county chairman, Huntington Brown, whom he promised to recommend for the state executive committee, if he, Garford, gained the state central committee. Brown also received the assurance that Theodore Burton and Harry Daugherty would do all they possibly could on his behalf. Jesse E. LaDow, another prominent Richland County politician, received Garford's pledge of reciprocal support for Ashland County's Common Pleas Judgeship.

There were no doubts that Lorain County would support Garford's bid for the committee. In the remaining counties Garford exerted whatever influence he personally had as

50 To Harry M. Daugherty, Aug. 6, 1906, GP.
51 To Theodore E. Burton, Sept. 4, 1906, GP.
52 To Harry M. Daugherty, Sept. 4, 1906, GP.
53 Harry M. Daugherty to Arthur Garford, Sept. 4, 1906, GP.
54 To Jesse E. LaDow, July 19, 1906, GP.
well as that of Myron Herrick, Theodore Burton and Harry Daugherty. In the case of Morrow County, a personal visit by Daugherty resulted in a promise to back Garford.55

Four days after he had formally announced his candidacy, Garford assured Daugherty that he would positively command enough district votes to control the caucus and to secure his selection. "The new deal" as he termed the anti-Dick movement was safe in the Fourteenth District.56 Weeks and months of careful planning, promising and maneuvering had not been in vain.

Two weeks before the state convention met Garford's newspaper, the Elyria Republican, editorially pronounced itself in unmistakeable words as anti-Dick. Its readers were apprised of the diametrically opposed alternatives confronting the coming convention: the delegates had to choose between Ohio's two Senators, Foraker and Dick, and President Roosevelt. The basis of the conflict was represented as moral, which was to say that the Senators were not righteous, courageous and sincere as was the President. In particular Senator Dick was "... merely a professional politician, pure and simple", a presumptuous dictator of


56To Harry M. Daugherty, Sept. 8, 1906, GP.
the Ohio Republican party and lacking even the saving grace of patriotism.\(^{57}\)

This editorial was unique for its animosity but even more so because it was the first eulogy accorded to the President. It signified a rash of similar editorials, heretofore totally absent from the columns of the newspaper, which continued until convention time. However, these editorials praising Roosevelt were not motivated by a desire to glorify the President, but rather they were a flanking attack against Senator Dick. Roosevelt was suddenly elevated and dignified in order to provide a contrast of principles and personality, to create an unfavorable image of Senator Dick. Not the man but his principles received most of the attention, and these anyone could theoretically possess. Shortly after the convention the editor wrote much the same thing about Congressman Burton. Burton was the sort of politician typified by President Roosevelt. He was portrayed as an earnest straightforward and dedicated servant of the people without a trace of "personal malice" or selfish ambition. Finally "there is no honor closed to Theodore Burton," presumably including Senator Dick's seat in Washington and even the Presidency.\(^{58}\)

Vice President Charles W. Fairbanks did not exaggerate when he congratulated Senator Dick after the state convention

\(^{57}\)Elyria Republican, Aug. 23, 1906.

\(^{58}\)Ibid., Sept. 20, 1906.
"... upon your recent victory. You won handsomely and no one is more gratified than myself. ... The result at Dayton can only tend to increase the strength of your hold upon the party."59 Both Senators Dick and Foraker had scored a great victory at the convention receiving the endorsement of two-thirds of the delegates. Senator Dick continued to exercise the leadership of the party and was again selected as chairman of the executive committee but not without a bitter, if unsuccessful, contest in the state central committee. Garford was among the seven state central committeemen who consistently voted against Senator Dick.60

The defeat suffered by those in opposition to Senator Dick was more of an inconclusive checkmate than a rout and promised to be one of many contests. The facade of Republican harmony had suffered irreparable damage during the convention and even an off-year election could not silence the intra-party power struggle. The Elyria Republican continued its vehement campaign against the Senators, branding them as reactionaries and "two such distinguished frauds."61 For the sake of political rehabilitation it desired nothing more than the defeat of the Republican state ticket and repudiation of its leadership at the coming

60Elyria Republican, Sept. 13, 1906.
61Ibid., Sept. 20, 1906.
This was not to be. Throughout the state a light vote returned a "normal" Republican majority without apparent discrimination between candidates. In the Fourteenth District J.F. Laning, the candidate whom Garford had supported, was elected to Congress.63

62 Ibid., Oct. 11, 1906.

63 Elyria Democrat, Nov. 8, 1906.
CHAPTER IV

ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION

Securing the Nomination of Taft

Ohio's political malcontents had the entire year of 1907 during which to augment their opposition in preparation for the presidential election of 1908. If they could settle upon and engage the sympathetic services of a strong presidential candidate, then a national election victory might signal the prelude to their ascendancy in Ohio's Republican party. The defeat of Myron T. Herrick in 1905 had immediately sparked suggestions of party reform under new leadership and the name of William Howard Taft, Roosevelt's Secretary of War, had been raised as a possibility.¹ In 1907 Garford joined in a movement to make the possibility a reality.

The movement initially took the form of a campaign to decide Ohio's Republican presidential preference by a party primary which would elect to the 1908 state convention delegates pledged to a particular candidate. Secretary Taft was already a widely popular choice among the Ohio Republican rank and file, and Garford readily acceded to the

¹Elyria Republican, Nov. 16, 1905.
plan, which, if it were to be effected, had to be the result of some arrangement by the state central committee; primaries were not legal in Ohio.²

The legality of this modified type of presidential preference primary was no more difficult a problem than the opposition to the plan. The powerful chairman of the state central committee, Walter F. Brown, was reputed to be in the camp of Senators Dick and Foraker, both of whom were unfriendly to the idea of a primary.³ Unless the malcontents could persuade a majority of the committee to accept their plan, a delegation elected by county conventions and pledged to Senator Foraker rather than to Secretary Taft would likely control the state convention and represent Ohio at the Republican national convention.⁴ Failure to control the state central committee would leave recourse to a difficult and dangerous undertaking, which Garford would not hesitate to espouse, if need be. The committee could be outmaneuvered and circumvented, if the opposition created a popular "boom" for Taft in the districts where the state organization was supported by the voters.⁵

A meeting of the state central committee was scheduled for the middle of May but was cancelled by Chairman Brown,

²Arthur Garford to A.I. Vorys, April 12, 1907, GP.
³Elyria Telegram, May 6, 1907. (The Elyria Telegram, owned by Garford, was the successor to the Elyria Republican.)
⁴Arthur Garford to A.I. Vorys, April 12, 1907, GP.
⁵Ibid.
with Senator Dick's approval, in an effort to avoid an open fight between the Taft and Dick-Foraker forces. Brown's action followed in the wake of renewed efforts to restore the party's harmony program before feuding Republicans contributed to their own defeat, as they had in 1905. One week before this decision, efforts to produce some compromise between the factions had resulted in George B. Cox's indorsement of Taft for President and Foraker for Senator. Other prominent state leaders soon followed the lead of Cox in an apparent effort to reduce political dissensions and in some cases to acknowledge the increasing popularity of Secretary Taft. Warren G. Harding and Theodore E. Burton were among those who cautioned Chairman Brown against precipitating a party fight. However, Harding did not advocate the selection of Taft and the inference was that a struggle had been postponed, not avoided.

Ideally, Garford preferred that the indorsement of Secretary Taft "... should come in a natural and business-like manner...", that it should be the spontaneous expression of the people and without the aid of any organized

6'Elyria Telegram, May 15, 1907.

7Ibid., May 9, 1907. See also F.A. Parmelee to Arthur Garford, May 9, 1907, GP. Senator Foraker in his Notes of a Busy Life, 1916, vol. II, 348, was "incredulous" about Cox's decision, which Foraker believed did more than anything else to assure Taft of Ohio's solid delegation in 1908.

8'Elyria Telegram, May 15, and 23, 1907.
political committees especially convened for the purpose. However, this was admittedly largely an imaginative procedure devoid of the reliability of a controlled county executive committee's indorsement. Late in July, 1907, Lorain's executive committee, "at the instance of A.L. Garford", formally expressed its Taft sentiments.

The probability that Taft might become the next President of the United States was increased significantly three days later when the state central committee, by a 15 to 6 vote, indorsed his candidacy. The majority that the dissatisfied Republicans had earlier deemed to be essential for their success had been attained and the forces of Senators Dick and Foraker had been defeated but not decisively. The vote had not been by unanimous decision, and reconciliation or elimination of Republican factionalism had still to be accomplished. The Dick-Foraker element had in fact forced the Taft forces to accept an amendment to the resolution indorsing Taft declaring the committee opposed to "... the elimination from public life of Senators Foraker and Dick." Garford was disgusted by this action but voted for it in order to allow passage of the Taft resolution.

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9To E.C. Branson, June 7, 1907, GP.
10Elyria Telegram, July 27, 1907, GP.
11Ibid., July 31, 1907.
12Ibid.
13To Frank V. Owen, Aug. 3, 1907, GP.
The Republican factions avoided direct, public clashes for the rest of 1907 preferring to strengthen their respective organizations throughout the counties and districts in anticipation of a contest for party control during the state convention of 1908. Garford busied himself in making "arrangements" with and between the counties in an effort to forge a Fourteenth District that was solidly behind Secretary Taft.\(^\text{14}\)

The pace of the party strife was quickened by the action of the state central committee on January 3, 1908. By a fourteen-to-seven vote the Taft supporters decided that a direct party primary to elect Taft and Foraker delegates to the Republican state convention would be held early in February.\(^\text{15}\) In Lorain County as well as in the entire Fourteenth District Garford concerned himself with the selection of the delegates to be placed on the primary ballot. The county central committee, on which he was the dominating figure, made the selections "... keeping in mind above all other considerations the necessity of having an openly declared and enthusiastic Taft supporter."\(^\text{16}\) In Lorain County it must have surprised no one that a solid

\(^{14}\)Letters between Arthur Garford and William H. Thompson, Sept. 19 and 20, 1907, GP. See also Elyria Telegram, Nov. 30, 1907.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., Jan. 3, 1908.

\(^{16}\)Arthur Garford to A.W. James, Jan. 4, 1908, GP.
Taft delegation was placed on the primary ballot. Unfortunately for Foraker the situation in Lorain County was not unique; most county leaders throughout the state were for Taft, and the conversions to the Secretary's cause settled the issue before the primary. By the middle of January the Foraker opposition had collapsed and the "progressive movement", as the opposition of the malcontents was now called, was assured of a solid Ohio delegation for Taft at the national convention. One week later Warren G. Harding, one of Foraker's "warm personal friends", announced his support for Taft; the road to Republican harmony appeared to be clear.

The Lure of the Governorship

The solution of the controversy over Ohio's presidential candidate did not however resolve the contest for state leadership of the Republican party. An editorial in Garford's newspaper asked where and how the party could command a candidate for Governor or Senator who would enjoy the loyalty of an immense following? He must be a man who would arouse the voters' enthusiasm because he had a righteous mission and not because he had a political "machine"

17 Elyria Telegram, Jan. 20, 1908.
18 Ibid., Jan. 15, 1908.
19 Ibid., Jan. 25, 1908. See also Joseph B. Foraker, op. cit., vol. II, 393: Foraker was "both surprised and chagrined" by Harding's desertion from his cause and realized that his presidential ambitions were ruined.
at his behest. Like Roosevelt, Ohio's leader must be an able and personable leader involved in the labyrinth of politics as little as possible. The editor then quickly listed and dismissed the obviously possible candidates: Joseph B. Foraker was "a mere commonplace corporation senator"; Charles A. Dick was a good organizer but an uninspirational "residuary legatee" from the days of Mark Hanna; Governor Andrew L. Harris was already too old; Myron T. Herrick was an excellent banker but an unsuccessful politician; both Harry M. Daugherty and Warren G. Harding were dismissed as having wasted their period of preeminence; and even the recently much praised favorite, Theodore E. Burton, was unsatisfactory for the want of leadership qualities.20 No where in the editorial was there a positive mention of the party's redeemer, but the piece could have been written and certainly was approved by Garford.

The lure of the governorship began to exercise at this time a decided influence on the thoughts and actions of Garford, and his paper's editorial was in all likelihood an initial effort to gain statewide Republican support. In December of 1907 he had been urged by the leading supporters of Taft to make himself available as the Republican candidate for lieutenant governor at the coming state convention, but he had refused to allow the use of his name because the Garford Company and the Cleveland Automatic Machine

20 Ibid., Jan. 27, 1908.
Company still necessitated his personal management. Rumors about Garford's candidacy persisted until the state convention ended on the third of March despite Garford's explicit denials.

Business conditions and probably the lack of personal desire kept Garford from running for the second office, but he could foresee circumstances which would favor his candidacy for the governorship in 1910. "The same friends [supporters of Taft] are still urging me to consider the Governorship two years from now, and if I can put my affairs in just the shape I want to I may possibly consider it." Garford was mightily tempted by this prospect and he believed that by 1910 his financial situation would allow for the political undertaking.

Having eliminated himself as a statewide candidate Garford narrowed his political activities to his own Fourteenth District, the control of which represented the foundation stone of his own political career.

Another Congressional Battle

The district's congressional convention presented a difficult problem, since the wisdom of the renomination of Congressman Jay F. Laning was increasingly questioned. In his struggle against the Dick forces, Garford had grown

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21 To C.M. Spitzer, March 5, 1908, GP.

22 Elyria Telegram, March 2, 1908.

23 To C.M. Spitzer, March 5, 1908, GP.
suspicious of Laning's attitude and faithfulness.\textsuperscript{24} Apparently the Congressman had attempted to avoid an open declaration of support for either faction in an effort to assure the assistance of both in the matter of federal patronage. Unless he followed a politically neutral course, Senators Dick and Foraker could not be depended upon to confirm his recommendations of postmaster appointments.\textsuperscript{25} However, when Foraker was virtually eliminated as a power in state politics in January, 1908, Laning made a quick trip from Washington D.C. to his home constituency in order to secure his rear. In a discussion with Garford, Laning was told "... very plainly that unless he ran the Taft flag up to the mast-head and kept it there, he certainly would not be returned to Congress. This he promised to do. . . ."\textsuperscript{26}

Garford favored the renomination of Laning until almost the date of the congressional convention itself. However, two days before it assembled, he changed his position. Almost overnight Laning had become a distinct political liability following the collapse of three of his businesses, a printing company, a newspaper and a steel company, as well as two banks in which he and his companies were interested. As a result a serious depression in his home town of Norwalk was credited to Laning's business

\begin{itemize}
  \item To Huntington Brown, Dec. 26, 1907, GP.
  \item Jay F. Laning to Arthur Garford, Jan. 17, 1908, GP. See also Arthur Garford to A.I. Vorys, Jan. 24, 1908, GP.
  \item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
ineptitude. Garford considered that Laning's financial failures had compromised his reputation and rendered him expendable. If the Republicans were to elect the district's Congressman, an unsullied candidate was essential and especially "at this particular time when the reform idea seems to be prevalent in the minds of the common people."28

The convention did renominate Laning, after a chaotic session, over strong minority opposition led by Garford.29 Convinced that Laning would be defeated by the Democratic candidate, Garford refused to accept the convention's selection and insisted that Laning be repudiated and replaced.

Oddly enough, Garford's chief political ally in his campaign to oust Laning was Frank V. Owen of Knox County, the man whom Garford had rejected in favor of Laning during the 1906 congressional convention. Since that time of bitterness Garford and Owen had learned to "... work together and simply reciprocate favors."30 During the more recent convention the two men had done just this and emerged as the Fourteenth District's two delegates to the national convention.31 Now Garford wrote to Owen urging every possible

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27Elyria Telegram, Feb. 25, 1908. See also Arthur Garford to G.M. Skiles, Feb. 24, 1908, GP.

28Ibid.

29Elyria Telegram, Feb. 27, 1908.

30Arthur Garford to Frank V. Owen, Jan. 28, 1908, GP.

31Elyria Telegram, Feb. 27, 1908.
action necessary to secure Laning's rejection or resignation. Not the least serious repercussion of Laning's certain defeat would be the effect upon the district's federal patronage, in the event that Taft was elected President: "We cannot afford to lose the congressman... it would upset every Federal office holder in the district." The obvious answer to the dilemma was the removal of Laning in favor of Frank Owen.32

The withdrawal of Laning had to be voluntary in order to avoid a bitter struggle among the twelve members of the district's congressional committee, which was empowered with the authority to reject Laning's candidacy. While Garford was an influential member of that committee, the chairman was S. Grant Dowds, a postmaster by the grace of Laning. And Dowds was prepared to resist any formal demand that his benefactor's candidacy be withdrawn.33

A wide-open and bitter intra-party district struggle was narrowly avoided when Laning, after having been indicted by the grand jury, voluntarily withdrew his candidacy in favor of Frank Owen. Even then the Elyria Telegram questioned the Congressman's party loyalty, because he had delayed his decision until late September, almost too late for Owen to commence a successful campaign.34

32To Frank V. Owen, May 29, 1908, GP.
33Elyria Telegram, June 3, 1908.
34Ibid., Sept. 25, 1908.
Gubernatorial Defeat in 1908

Elyria's William G. Sharp, the Democratic candidate for Congress, defeated Frank Owen in the November election by a plurality of over seventeen hundred votes, despite the loss of his own county, Lorain. William Howard Taft and Andrew L. Harris received the normal Republican plurality from the entire district, although the latter lost in his bid to defeat Democrat Judson Harmon for the governorship. While the election of Taft was undoubtedly well received by Garford, Owen's defeat was an unfortunate and unwanted reversal not calculated to serve the political interests of Garford.

Much active work and money had been demanded of and given by Garford in an effort to assure Taft's national election and a Republican victory in Ohio. When it was learned that Governor Harris had been defeated by less than twenty thousand votes and that the Democrats had captured his district's congressional seat, Garford once more

35 Secretary of State, Ohio Election Returns: 1908, 13-16, 17-20, 81.

36 Arthur Garford to John P. Brophy, Oct. 14, 1908, GF. Brophy was the Cleveland Automatic Company's plant manager and in this letter Garford tells of a $500. campaign contribution made for the company but issued in Garford's own check "owing to the stringent laws covering contributions from corporations. . . ." The company was to reimburse Garford "as I have numerous other personal contributions to make for campaign purposes." Brophy was told to make no mention of the money as a campaign contribution but to charge it to special services or special expense. Fortunately for the historian Brophy did not destroy this letter, as he was requested to do.
attributed the rebuke to the Anti-Saloon League, which "... might well take lessons and advice as to what constitutes an opportune time for presentation to the people of the propositions. ..." Garford wrote as if he was infuriated by what he considered to be a matter of inexpedient political timing. The Anti-Saloon League had prematurely injected the liquor issue into Ohio politics by forcing an election on their county option bill. The Elyria Telegram's editor wrote that the move was "... unsupported by a preponderance of earnest deliberate public sentiment" and expressed fears for its passage. What the editor did not write was that a spirited "wet and dry" contest would likely cause many "wets" to vote for a Democrat for governor. In the close gubernatorial election of 1908 Garford judged that the Anti-Saloon League's course was "a great mistake" liable to precipitate serious damage to party regularity and to the distinct disadvantage of Republican candidates. The defeats suffered by Harris and Owen seemed to Garford to vindicate his analysis.

37 To O.F. Carter, Nov. 6, 1908, GP.

38 Elyria Telegram, July 31, 1908.

39 To M.A. Karshner, Oct. 22, 1908, GP.
CHAPTER V

GARFORD'S BID FOR THE GOVERNORSHIP: 1908-1910

Early Boom for Governor

The relatively unsuccessful Republican election results in 1908 and particularly the defeat of Governor Harris intensified the party's divisions causing prospective governors and senators to bestir themselves on their own behalf. The party's misfortunes at the polls had a special importance for Garford, who now actively but cautiously projected his name before the public and politicians as the solution to the search for state leadership. The election results were barely known when Nat C. Wright, the editor of the Toledo Blade and the Cleveland Leader and a close personal friend and supporter of Garford, asked for an autographed picture of Garford, "... the next governor of Ohio by return mail."1 For the public John T. Bourke, political correspondent for the Toledo Blade, wrote that the Republican party needed a gubernatorial candidate who was a popular and "live" man in business as well as in politics and preferably from northern Ohio. Garford was mentioned by name as one such man who met all the requirements

1To Arthur Garford, Nov. 5, 1908, GP.
having proven his ability to handle and to manage large affairs of industry. Bourke then reported that a "boom" had already been started for him; in reality Bourke had released a Garford trial balloon.² To the Reverend William E. Cadmus Garford wrote that as the result of a spontaneous political movement "there seems to be a wide-spread interest in the state in my behalf at the present moment. . . ." He assured Reverend Mr. Cadmus that his nomination and election as governor would be the result of a genuinely popular vote and not any "determined effort" or "political bargainings" by himself.³

Supplanting Senator Foraker

Garford began his gubernatorial campaign two years before that contest was conclusively settled. If he was to be governor, then he had to have the backing of major political figures. At the very beginning of his campaign he encountered a political situation that was fraught with potentially perilous possibilities but impossible to avoid: the selection of Ohio's United States Senator. The choice of a successor, if indeed there was to be one, to Senator Joseph B. Foraker dominated the maneuverings of Ohio Republicans immediately after the 1908 elections until early January, 1909. As a district and state power of considerable consequence by virtue of his position on the state central

²Toledo Blade, Nov. 13, 1908.
³To William E. Cadmus, Dec. 10, 1908, GP.
committee and his availability as a gubernatorial candidate, Garford was much involved in the senatorial dealings. Correspondingly he stood to gain or to lose a great deal.

The senatorial contest was essentially a three-ring circus with at least two side attractions. The leading opponents of Senator Foraker, who himself was disinclined to yield his seat, were Theodore E. Burton, Harry M. Daugherty and Charles P. Taft, each and every one a political ally to some extent of Garford. Aside from these three spokesmen for the reform element and the embittered Senator, the recently defeated Governor Harris also had announced his candidacy. Garford was confronted with choosing between two men, Burton and Daugherty, to whom he was deeply obligated for his own political success and Charles Taft, the brother of the nation's President-elect. Garford could achieve a substantial political success and prepare for the fulfillment of his own ambitions only if he backed the eventual winner of the contest. His dilemma was sounded in his newspaper's editorial columns, which wishfully preferred an amiable settlement between Burton and Taft before political obligations and commitments further increased the divisions among Ohio's Republicans. The newspaper held out the hope that Burton would yield to Taft in order to succeed Joseph Cannon as Speaker of the House of Representatives.4

Garford quite naturally preferred that Burton and Taft

Elyria Telegram, Nov. 19, 20, 27, 28, 30, 1908.
settle their differences without his own involvement. He had already been forced to take a positive course in respect to the candidacy of Daugherty and in all likelihood had alienated a former political ally. He could ill afford to become politically isolated from either Burton or Taft.

Early in November Daugherty had asked for Garford's support in the event of his candidacy for the senatorship. Both Daugherty and Burton had a claim to Garford's allegiance because of their influential participation in his campaign to become a state central committeeman. But apparently Burton had already elicited a pledge of support, so Daugherty was informed. However, Garford wrote confidentially that he believed Foraker's successor ought to be a southern or central Ohioan. In a somewhat patronizing and overweening passage he finally dismissed Daugherty's possibilities: "I have always admired you and the stand you have taken in Ohio politics, and believe that in due course proper recognition will be given to your political aspirations."

The most disagreeable aspect of the senatorial situation for Garford was the introduction of Charles P. Taft's candidacy, since its rejection might occasion the indignation and wrath of the federal administration and because its acceptance would alienate Theodore Burton. Under

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5To Arthur Garford, Nov. 9, 1908, GP.

6To Harry M. Daugherty, Nov. 10, 1908, GP. Theodore Burton, like Senator Dick, was from northern Ohio. Garford maintained that Burton's selection would be resented in central and southern Ohio.
these circumstances Garford had to formulate his strategy with great caution and secrecy. From state central committee-
man, William H. Phipps, he requested definite information about Taft's plans. Concerning his own prospects Garford mentioned recent talks that Nat C. Wright had had with Secretary of State Carmi Thompson, Auditor of State W.D. Guilbert, Charles P. Taft and the latter's campaign manager, A.I. Vorys, about "... certain matters that will come up within the next two years. It is certainly very interesting." No direct mention of the governorship was made, but certainly Garford was attempting through the offices of Wright and Phipps to reach some accommodation and mutually satisfactory agreement with the forces of Taft and other state leaders.

After an interview with the Cincinnati candidate, Phipps was convinced that he was a senatorial "candidate in earnest" and with no designs upon the governorship. There was no suggestion that any concrete political deal had been struck between Garford and Taft, but Phipps did address Garford as if he was a loyal Taft supporter. The probability that Garford had concluded some arrangement with the latter was reflected in a decided shift in favor of Taft in the columns of the Elyria Telegram. Editorials and news items now gave prominent coverage to the possibility that Burton would accept a cabinet position and thus clear

7To W.H. Phipps, Nov. 25, 1908, GP.
8To Arthur Garford, Nov. 26, 1908, GP.
the way for his rival's selection as Senator. The declaration that "shrewd politicians believe that Brother Charles P. Taft of Cincinnati is a certain winner..." fell just short of a positive indorsement.9

While president-elect Taft declared publicly that he would not interfere in Ohio's senatorial struggle, Congressman Burton was actively gathering his pledges of support in an effort to stem the Charles Taft movement.10 Surely aware of Garford's desertion or at least aloofness Burton nonetheless presented his political claim. Like Daugherty before him he now requested Garford's active assistance, but unlike Daugherty Burton only desired what he had been promised. In uncompromising language Burton forewarned Garford that "an effort will be made to have members of the State Central Committee declare for Taft. I am confidently relying on you to oppose this."11

Garford's reply was prompt and was evidence that he knew Burton had emerged victorious in the senatorial contest. The Congressman's campaign had gathered much momentum in the last weeks of December, and Garford acknowledged that his county and the entire Fourteenth District were "...largely if not overwhelmingly for you for Senator."

Without expressing his own personal preference Garford assured

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9Elyria Telegram, Dec. 2, 1908.
10Ibid., Dec. 5 and 11, 1908.
11To Arthur Garford, Dec. 28, 1908, GP.
Burton that he would voice his district's sentiment as was his proper duty. There was little else he could do.

The next day both Charles P. Taft and Joseph B. Foraker withdrew their candidacies and Burton was conceded the senatorship without further contest. Elaborate agreements between the party's politicians were vaguely mentioned as was the humiliation suffered by the supporters of Taft. Harmony was declared the net result of the past month's politics, although the existence of rival factions was too obvious to be denied.

The Garford-Burton Feud

"I find in the mail a Garford auto bill marked 'no charge'. You are too damned good to me, bless your big heart and my gratitude is getting to be mixed with a vein of guilt." The editor of two of Ohio's more influential newspapers, Nat C. Wright, was grateful because he had just received an automobile as a present from Garford. In return Wright assured Garford that "... if you're not Governor next year it will be because you have choked me into insensibility." The gift may have been an expression of Garford's own gratitude for favorable news coverage,

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12To Theodore E. Burton, Dec. 29, 1908, GP.

13Elyria Telegram, Dec. 31, 1908.

14Ibid., Jan. 6, 1909.

15Nat C. Wright to Arthur Garford, c. Jan. 1909, GP.

16Ibid., Jan. 30, 1909.
but it also indicated his continuing interest in the governorship, as Wright recognized.

The steady grooming of Garford as a candidate for the gubernatorial nomination in 1910 was not abated by "his associates", although they now had to contend with a weighty, if not a decisive, new factor in Ohio politics: Senator Theodore E. Burton.17 Because he was popular among Ohio's Republican voters and powerful throughout county organizations, it was believed that "Senator Burton will be the man who will have the greatest weight in the naming of the next republican candidate."18 If Garford was to be that man, he had to improve the already somewhat strained political and personal relationship that existed between him and Burton.

Matters of patronage, never far beneath the political surface, soon convinced Garford that his relationship with the Senator had dangerously deteriorated. He recommended to Burton the reappointment of North Amherst's postmaster and added that he had discussed the matter with the district's new Democratic Congressman, William G. Sharp, who would "... give the matter of his reappointment merited attention."19 Burton's response was swift, brief and caustic accusing Garford of not being "... posted in regard to

17Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 8, 1909.
18Elyria Telegram, March 8, 1909.
19To Theodore E. Burton, March 11, 1909, GP.
procedure here"; the Democratic Congressman was not authorized to make recommendations concerning federal patronage.20 Needless to say, Garford was not unaware of the rules governing the dispensation of federal patronage and he considered the Senator's remarks as an affront. His reply, while technically an apology and defense, was indignant and almost sarcastic. He had deterred to Sharp to the extent of mutual discussion of appointments as a method to achieve political harmony in the district after having received the Congressman's "voluntary assurances" that he would act in accordance with Republican desires in the matter of patronage. Furthermore, Sharp, a close personal friend of Garford, was basically a Republican having openly supported both William McKinley and William Howard Taft. Finally, Garford implied that Burton did not understand the virtues and standards of businessmen like himself and Sharp: "My long acquaintance with Mr. Sharp led me to believe that he would exercise the same integrity regarding his political statements as has characterized his business career."21

The appointment of a postmastership for the city of Lorain provided a more striking illustration of the antipathy that existed between Burton and Garford. For that position Garford strongly recommended H.J. Ellen only to have his political judgment seriously questioned by the Senator.

20To Arthur Garford, March 13, 1909, GP.

21Letters to Theodore E. Burton, March 16 and 20, 1909, GP.
He reminded Garford that Ellen had opposed the district's Republican congressional candidate, Frank V. Owen, and voted for the Democrat, William Sharp. Garford did his best to explain that Ellen's actions were a direct result of his temperance views, upon which he and Owen sharply differed. In fact, the liquor issue had contributed greatly to the division of the entire Republican party. For the benefit of Burton, Garford recounted in some detail the complex political conditions in Lorain and the Fourteenth District.

Senator Burton not only objected to Ellen, but he also recommended a different individual for the postmastership. Garford regarded this as a definitely hostile act aimed at gathering the district's strings of political influence through careful distribution of federal patronage. He accused Burton of resurrecting "bossism" and asked, "Is he to become the 'Rajah' of Ohio politics?" As the single most important politician in the Fourteenth District Garford believed that he, as well as other active workers in the dominant local organization, represented more accurately than Burton the majority of the people. Consequently it was their right to control the district's patronage. If

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22 Arthur Garford to Theodore E. Burton, March 13, 1909 and Theodore E. Burton to Arthur Garford, March 15, 1909, GP.

23 To Theodore E. Burton, March 20, 1909, GP.
Burton usurped this "fruit" of the local politicians, then he was guilty of "bossism".24

Garford regarded Burton's interference as an assault upon his own personal power, yet political expediency dictated that he maintain communications as agreeable as possible. Nat C. Wright advised Garford to assume a posture of genuine friendliness and consideration in order to warm and eventually to winover Burton, whom he characterized as "the un kissed icicle".25 This was excellent political advice, but it did not work. Towards the end of 1909 Garford asserted that Burton would never alter his opinion about him. The Senator was so prejudiced that his views were unchangeable. Indignant and angry, Garford evidently had not modified his judgment of Burton. Scornfully, he charged that the Senator was a mere parrot, a talking machine better suited for the business of a pie-counter than the Senate.26 The parting of the ways had come.

President Taft: A Ponderous Imponderable

The Garford-Burton feud revealed in microcosm the general factionalism and confusion which characterized Ohio politics throughout 1909 and into 1910. However if Burton was an avowed opponent of Garford, it was also true that the latter had several strong proponents. Senator Dick's

24To A.I. Vorys, March 18, 1909, GP.
25To Arthur Garford, April 5, 1909, GP.
26To E. Snell Smith, Nov. 23, 1909, GP.
successor on the state executive committee, Henry Williams, favored Garford's nomination for governor, and it was believed that Williams could cause President Taft to advocate his candidacy. Several members of the state central committee and also many state assemblymen were counted among Garford's friends. At an August meeting of the state central committee Garford drew much attention amid speculation that President Taft preferred his nomination. Looking ahead to the presidential election of 1912 Taft was undoubtedly desirous of the defeat of Democratic Governor Judson Harmon and believed that a successful businessman might accomplish the feat. Without any mention of names it was assumed that the President meant Garford.

There was in this assumption one ponderous imponderable: President Taft. Garford refused to commit himself unconditionally to making a bid for the nomination pending a positive declaration of support by the President. He believed that Taft's attitude would be the controlling factor in the state convention, and in the meanwhile he waited upon his decision. In November Garford publicly announced that he would be "receptive" to the nomination and that he would give Ohio an efficient business admin-

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27 Nat C. Wright to Arthur Garford, April 7, 1909, GP.
28 Cleveland Leader, Aug. 2 and 6, 1909.
29 To John Hays Hammond, Aug. 25, 1909, GP.
istration. One month later the President still refused to move with an open hand in the state's politics, and with some anxiety Garford traveled to Washington for a visit and conference with him. Additional delay in Taft's selection only increased the already bitter Republican factionalism and thereby enhanced Governor Harmon's chances of reelection. Yet when Garford returned from Washington his fears had not been allayed. About President Taft Garford wrote Nat Wright: "I wish to record a guess that the big man at Washington will just 'sit on the lid' and see the procession go by. He certainly has a corner on procrastination." President Taft abruptly ended Garford's period of uneasiness by an indirect action, which left him despondent. In January, 1910, the President undertook a campaign against the "insurgents" in Congress, who opposed his legislative program. Overnight the political situation in Ohio became critical. "... That Taft is entering the fight against the insurgents has simply raised hell, from the Lake to the River." Nat Wright contended that the mere notion that Taft might support Speaker Joseph Cannon and oppose the insurgents was practically enough to destroy the President's

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30 Elyria Chronicle, Nov. 11, 1909.
31 Cleveland Leader, Dec. 9, 1909.
32 To Nat C. Wright, Dec. 15, 1909, GP.
33 Cleveland Leader, Jan. 5, 1910.
34 Nat C. Wright to Arthur Garford, Jan. 5, 1910, GP.
political usefulness in the state of Ohio: "As the matter stands today, Taft's support for you or any other man for governor, or any other office, would be fatal." In his "great disgust" Wright imagined the consequences of Taft's policy. Not only would Garford and Wright have to suspend or to end completely their own political ambitions but their Republican rivals would secure a preeminence. "Every day that this sort of thing goes on [it] is making sentiment for Roosevelt for the next nomination, and helping Jimmie Garfield's boom for the governorship. . . . You can fancy that I am suffering from a great disgust."35

Nat Wright and Garford associated both Theodore Roosevelt and James R. Garfield with the insurgent Republicans, and did not believe that Taft had directly attacked the progressive Republicans, such as themselves. Nonetheless they feared that Taft's course would create strong anti-Taft sentiment and opposition in Ohio and the nation to their own distinct disadvantage. As a progressive Republican Garford supported Taft but he could not risk alienating the insurgent Republicans, who followed Roosevelt's standard. Now it was believed that Taft had done this very thing.36

35 Ibid.
36 The distinction between insurgent and progressive Republicans and their association with Roosevelt and Taft, respectively, was clearly understood and accepted by Garford. While he acknowledged and wrote of the difference, Clarence Maris more clearly stated it: "It is necessary to our success to show that Taft and Roosevelt, Progressives and Insurgents are together for the purging of politics, the crucifixion of capital, the uplift of the proletariat
Disillusionment with the Taft administration was completed, when the President dismissed Roosevelt's close friend and head of the forestry division, Gifford Pinchot. Taft's followers wondered aloud about the possible consequences this action would have upon the party's harmony and the general public's support. They suggested that the President himself had crystallized the insurgents' movement to return Theodore Roosevelt from his political Elba.37

The editorial policy of the Elyria Telegram again veered as it reflected the belief that Taft had in fact sacrificed his and his supporters' political advantage. It now represented the insurgents as the truly progressive Republicans bent upon instilling vigor into a lifeless party.38

In consideration of the extremely confused state of political affairs Garford wrote that he had "... no desire to get mixed up in the situation at all", and he meant it.39 It was his contention that the prospects of an almost certain defeat in 1910 were his if he accepted the gubernatorial nomination. Although Garford believed that the nomination

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37 Cleveland Leader, Jan. 9, 1910. See also Elyria Telegram, Jan. 8, 1910.

38 Elyria Telegram, Jan. 29, 1910.

39 To P.S. Williams, Feb. 11, 1910, GP.
was his for the asking, he agreed with Nat Wright that "... it would be folly for you to ride to a certain fall."\textsuperscript{40}

Reports were still being published that President Taft desired his candidacy, when, late in February, Garford effectively ended all such speculation with his departure for an extended vacation in California.\textsuperscript{41}

Garford as the Party's Peacemaker

Garford, once having decided against the governorship, retained his longing for a position of statewide political power through which he could combat the influences of Senators Dick and Burton and ex-Senator Foraker. One way to attain that leadership was incorporated in a plan outlined by Nat Wright. He urged Garford to seek the chairmanship of the state executive committee recently vacated by Henry Williams. This post would enable Garford to conduct the fall campaign, and if the Republican gubernatorial candidate did win, he would be in a favorable position from which to demand concessions and authority.\textsuperscript{42}

This alternative to the governorship was never realized because, four days after its proposal, a White House conference announced its choice for the chairmanship, Wade H.

\textsuperscript{40}Nat C. Wright to Arthur Garford, March 6, 1910, GP. See also Arthur Garford to Edgar Park, Feb. 19, 1910, GP.

\textsuperscript{41}Cleveland Leader, Feb. 24, 1910.

\textsuperscript{42}To Arthur Garford, Feb. 3, 1910, GP.
Ellis. It was reported that President Taft prompted his selection in order to placate the insurgent Republicans.\footnote{43}

The announcement from Washington was not welcomed with enthusiasm by Ohio politicians, who hinted that dictation was apparently the administration's policy. A critical and stormy session of the state central committee was predicted, when that body convened to elect the state executive chairman. The Ohio Republican party appeared to be on the verge of complete chaos.\footnote{44}

The state central committee met on February 12, 1910, at Dayton and in a memorable session achieved the unexpected. The meeting resulted in a "red letter" day for Ohio Republicans, when Ellis was made the unanimous selection of the members. The many party factions had made possible this remarkable accomplishment by joining hands in a great "love feast." Where a condition of virtual political anarchy so recently existed, harmony once more prevailed.\footnote{45}

The committee had accepted with the best possible grace what was termed as Taft's tactical blunder in an effort to avoid a loss by default in the coming elections. As a member of that committee Garford had played the decisive role in the negotiations, which culminated in apparent accord. It was his "... tactfulness \[which\] aided materially

\footnote{43}{\textit{Cleveland Leader,} Feb. 8, 1910.}
\footnote{44}{\textit{Ibid.}, Feb. 13 and 14, 1910.}
\footnote{45}{\textit{Ibid.}}
to prevent what might have been an ugly feeling in the committee.\footnote{Ibid., Feb. 13, 1910.} Largely through his efforts a committee inclined to rebel had accepted Ellis as state executive chairman. Garford himself placed Ellis in nomination, and the committee eventually accepted him. Reconciliation among the factions was confirmed and a direct censure of President Taft was avoided.\footnote{Elyria Telegram, Feb. 14, 1910.} No longer desirous of the gubernatorial nomination and unwilling or unable to become chairman of the state executive committee, Garford at Dayton had assumed the posture of a peacemaker within the Republican party.

The Facade of Harmony

Ohio Republicans were officially an united, happy family for almost one month. As late as March 3, 1910, the Cleveland Leader reported that the party was enjoying a broad base of harmony as a result of the Dayton accord.\footnote{Cleveland Leader, March 3, 1910.} However, on that very day the agreement was terminated when President Taft repudiated Wade Ellis as chairman and disclaimed any responsibility for his selection. Since Ellis' prestige relied upon the understanding that he was Taft's choice, his position became nominal and the status of Ohio Republican politics reverted to a considerable extent to
conditions prior to his selection. A perplexed and apprehensive Nat Wright feared that the political portents were more inauspicious than ever. He and Garford had given their support to Ellis knowing that the latter would boost the gubernatorial candidacy of James R. Garfield. They had decided upon this course believing that their own political futures would also be the beneficiaries. But with the practical displacement of Ellis confusion entangled their arrangements.

The dismay occasioned by Taft's denial of responsibility eventually yielded before the efforts of politicians determined to salvage the pieces. If the Garfield boom had been muted, it had not been silenced and need not be in the future. A successor to Ellis and supporter of Garfield could yet be chosen by the state central committee. The editor of the Elyria Telegram sounded this possibility and suggested that Garford would seek the position "... with the aid and abetting of Washington." The newspaper's owner was considered to be the logical successor to Ellis. An understanding between Garford and the Garfield forces had occasioned this editorial; Garford had committed himself to becoming the state executive chairman, if Garfield

49 Ibid., March 4, 1910.
50 Nat C. Wright to Arthur Garford, March 6, 1910, GP.
51 Elyria Telegram, June 6, 1910.
captured his party's gubernatorial nomination.\textsuperscript{52} Garford had reverted to Nat Wright's formula for the maintenance of political power.

A few days after his newspaper had initiated his campaign for the chairmanship, Hy D. Davis, the dominant figure in Ohio's Republican League, described the progress of the "Garford-Wright combination" in enthusiastic terms. He added words of caution and encouragement lest Garford falter in his steadfastness: "Now do not let any one change your mind about being Chairman. This is the time to get control of the machinery and your getting control will make it possible for us to have some new politics in Ohio, and that of the 'Garford type'.\textsuperscript{53} Davis was an important political ally since he controlled the only effective Republican clubs in Ohio. Combined, the clubs were estimated to be a campaign power second only to the state executive committee.\textsuperscript{54} Among the 280 clubs there numbered some 86,000 members, many of whom were among the most active publicity agents in the Republican party. During a campaign these were the faithful and dedicated party workers who distributed literature, lithographs, buttons and pins, rang

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer}, July 27, 1910. Although the \textit{Plain Dealer} explicitly made this allegation, Garford's personal correspondence confirms it.

\textsuperscript{53}To Arthur Garford, June 22, 1910, GP.

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Elyria Telegram}, Feb. 14, 1910.
door bells, and joined glee clubs.  

55 Significantly Garford had concluded an arrangement with Davis and the Republican clubs whereby their interests were recognized as mutual.  

While he was developing and cementing alliances with various Ohio politicians, Garford did not fail to cultivate the sympathy of President Taft. His drive to become chairman of the executive committee was paralleled by a new and strong indorsement of the President at the expense of Theodore Roosevelt. His newspaper editorialized that Taft could write a party platform for Ohio quite as acceptable as any that Roosevelt might construct. Of Roosevelt personally it was declared that "he was a czar without the title and his will, which was sometimes erratic, was law." The public was urged to collar its propensity for hero worship and instead to cultivate loyalty to the President.  

Garford's flirtation with the insurgent movement had occurred in the early months of 1910 and had been the result of Taft's apparent unpopularity. But he had not become an implacable insurgent and was prepared to indorse the administration if necessary. That need arose when "the returns [of Ohio's congressional primaries in May warranted] ... the more general inference of a tendency toward and growing  

55Cleveland Leader, Nov. 8, 1908.  
56Arthur Garford to John Hays Hammond, Nov. 23, 1909, GP.  
57Elyria Telegram, June 22, 1910.
friendliness to the president. . . .

Thereafter it became increasingly apparent that Taft's "period of unpopularity. . . has been comparatively brief." For his own political considerations Garford had decided to attempt an alliance between the discordant forces of President Taft and James R. Garfield, whom he now pronounced a progressive Republican.

The state convention, held July 26 and 27, had "...excited much interest throughout the country" and was the climatic point after months of generally quiet dealings. In the Fourteenth District Garford labored long and successfully to assure a state delegation that was loyal to James R. Garfield and his progressive platform, which fully endorsed President Taft. His disappointment must have been considerable when Garfield abandoned the struggle after a long period of wavering. He did not even carry the platform fight to the convention floor, as promised. Without the assistance of powerful politicians, including Ohio's two Senators as well as President Taft, the progressive movement had been "...utterly overthrown and dispersed", as one obituary notice was phrased. Eventually the convention

58 Ibid., May 19, 1910.
59 Ibid., July 23, 1910.
61 Arthur Garford to H.G. Rowe, July 23, 1910, GP. See also Elyria Telegram, July 26, 1910.
63 Cincinnati Enquirer, July 28, 1910.
nominated Warren G. Harding, indorsed the platform of Senator Dick, and committed Ohio's Republicans to the renomination of President Taft in 1912.64

The convention was by no means a complete failure for Garford since he had retained his seat on the state central committee after a successful contest against a candidate indorsed by Senator Charles Dick.65 He still held a political position of considerable potential influence and power.

**Straddling the Factions**

Garford's evident desire to fuse the Taft and Garfield interests had proven unproductive, but his prestige with the President had not been seriously damaged. It may even have been enhanced by virtue of his strategic value as a mediator between the two factions. Wade Ellis' successor was still to be named and "Garford's selection as state chairman would be an important concession to the insurgent element...", and perhaps essential if Harding was to defeat Governor Harmon.66 John H. Hammond, president of the National Republican League, positively asserted that this was the case: "The President thinks you are by far the best man for the position of Chairman of the State Committee and I know he will be greatly pleased to have you accept the position... This position will give you a very

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64 *Ohio State Journal*, July 28, 1910.
65 *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 27, 1910.
strong claim on the party. I would not speak so emphatically on this point without justification."67

But Nat Wright and James R. Garfield advised Garford that acceptance of the chairmanship would constitute a serious mistake.68 Meanwhile Garford, quite independently, had reached the same conclusion. He did not foresee a Harding victory in November and under the circumstances considered the chairmanship as a "night-mare", which he would not consider even in the interests of party loyalty.69

Despite the President's and also Warren G. Harding's expressions of preference for Garford, the latter absolutely refused to consider the chairmanship.70 When the state central committee met to make its selection, Garford placed Lewis C. Laylin in nomination and, after Harding wrote his acceptance of Laylin, he was named without contest.71

Progressives in the Campaign of 1910

James R. Garfield, Walter F. Brown, Nat O. Wright, and Garford met in conference late in September, 1910, "... in relation to the progressives in the campaign."72

These men, all of whom now considered themselves as

67To Arthur Garford, Aug. 3, 1910, GP.
68Nat C. Wright to Arthur Garford, Aug. 9, 1910, GP.
69To Hy D. Davis, Aug. 3, 1910, GP.
70Cleveland Leader, Aug. 25, 1910.
72Arthur Garford to Clarence Maris, Sept. 28, 1910, GP.
progressive Republicans, agreed that a show of concurrence with the party's leadership and an enthusiasm for the election of Harding constituted their best course of conduct. Conviction was lent to their intentions when it was decided that both Garfield and Garford would actually take the "stump" for Harding.73

Clarence Maris was elated over the wisdom of Ohio's progressive leaders: "I have felt that if my friends did not join in this funeral procession they would not be on hand to secure the estate of the deceased."74 A speaking tour on behalf of Harding and the party could hardly prevent the latter's defeat, while it would leave the progressives in a position to demand that they be allowed to guide the party's destiny. Garford was no less candid in his reply to Maris. "Unless all sign fail, from now on the Progressive element of the party will dominate in the State and be known for what it rightfully represents—the regular and loyal portion of the party. . . ."75 While the progressives had scheduled an extensive speaking tour, it was designed not to help Harding but to assist with the election of local progressive candidates and in general to popularize their own cause. The speaking itinerary had been most carefully planned being careful to make "... the assignment for

73Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 25, 1910.
74To Arthur Garford, Oct. 17, 1910, GP.
75To Clarence Maris, Oct. 19, 1910, GP.
meetings in counties and districts where we knew without question that the nominees for the state legislature were progressives in all that term implies."76

On the day of the election Garford telegraphed Warren G. Harding: "Let me congratulate you on the splendid campaign you have made. You have fought a good fight and have kept the faith."77 A few hours later Harding and the entire Republican party had suffered the worst defeat in its history. Harding was overwhelmed by over one hundred thousand votes, a margin approximating the greatest plurality ever recorded and that received by Ohio's last Republican elected governor, Myron T. Herrick.78 The entire Democratic state ticket was swept to victory in the landslide, and the state assembly reverted to Democratic control. Even in Lorain County, where Democratic candidates were invariably regarded as party sacrifices, Governor Harmon and Congressman Sharp received large pluralities.79 When the results were known, it was clear that the Republican party had received a staggering repudiation.

However, not all Republicans were crestfallen. The results were considered by the progressives a boon and a vindication of their own position, even though the voters'
wrath had fallen without discrimination upon stalwart and progressive Republicans. The Elyria Telegram rejoiced over the election and the resultant expectation of a party commanded by progressives.80

The immediate result of the election was a movement initiated and designed by the progressives to reorganize Ohio's Republican party. Speaker of the Assembly Granville W. Mooney, the defeated progressive candidate for secretary of state, expressed practically no political disappointment about the election's outcome and considerable enthusiasm about the possibility of reorganization.81 Garford completely shared in his view that any disappointment was amply compensated by the opportunity to rid the party of "the political parasites", meaning Senators Dick and Burton and their hosts.82 The political situation in Ohio after the 1910 election was thought to be favorable for an extensive reorganization and leading progressives prepared to free the party of its "political barnacles".83

80Elyria Telegram, Nov. 14, 1910.
81To Arthur Garford, Nov. 11, 1910, GP.
82To Granville W. Mooney, Nov. 14, 1910, GP.
83Arthur Garford to Myron T. Herrick, Nov. 17, 1910, GP.
CHAPTER VI

FROM MOVEMENT TO PARTY: 1911 - 1912

The Problem of Leadership

Ohio's progressive Republicans allowed "a reasonable period of mourning" as was befitting after their party's 1910 election defeat, but their exuberance and even hilarity were poorly concealed.\(^1\) Beyond a doubt they were resolved to effect a "...party reorganization in the state along progressive lines", which ever increasingly meant a program in opposition to the "vested interests" or the "great combinations of wealth" and in favor of "equal liberty, equal opportunity and equal justice" for the people.\(^2\) United behind these slogans the progressives expected to attain their long established aim: the possession of the state's political organization and power.

The question of leadership still plagued the movement's followers, and vacillation between William H. Taft, Theodore Roosevelt and Robert M. LaFollette continued to characterize their efforts throughout 1911. Ohio progressives, like those

\(^1\)Arthur Garford to Granville W. Mooney, Nov. 30, 1910, GP.

\(^2\)Ibid. See also Clarence Maris to Arthur Garford, Jan. 3, 1911, and Arthur Garford to H.G. Rowe, March 10, 1911, GP.
throughout the entire United States, wanted one basic thing: a progressive candidate for President in 1912.\(^3\) Opposition to the renomination of President Taft was particularly evident in the Middle West, but it lacked a strong candidate who could take the initiative against the Taft forces and accomplish their defeat. Late in December, 1910, Senator La Follette attempted to fill the progressives' leadership breach by organizing the National Progressive Republican League.\(^4\) The league received the endorsements of many nationally prominent individuals including that of Ohio's James R. Garfield. Garfield within a year was to become one of Roosevelt's "more intimate followers" but in 1910 he did nothing to hinder La Follette's fledgling campaign.\(^5\) According to La Follette, Garfield, along with Gifford and Amos Pinchot, numbered among the most "aggressive and persistent" progressives determined to prevent Taft's renomination.\(^6\)

Anti-Taft tones in Ohio were successfully muffled until early March, 1911, when the progressives staged a banquet designed to secure a progressive Republican presidential nominee in 1912. The Akron banquet was little more


\(^4\)Ibid.


\(^6\)Robert M. La Follette, *op. cit.*, 508.
than a veiled warning for President Taft to support his party's progressives or to incur a worsened intra-party struggle. Garford was among the principal speakers at Akron, and it was he who introduced the name of Theodore Roosevelt as a battler against organized capital and a champion of reform. President Taft was utterly ignored while Roosevelt's name was repeatedly applauded, as the progressives demanded a party purge.

The Akron banquet was a veiled warning and nothing more; the espousal of Roosevelt stopped short of an indorsement for the nomination, and harmony under the sympathetic direction of President Taft was yet possible and perhaps preferable. By the middle of the year the Taft bandwagon was swelled once more by progressives like Garford who, more out of apathy than enthusiasm, announced their approval.

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7Cleveland Leader, March 7, 1911.
8Elyria Telegram, March 7, 1911.

9The political divisions and hatreds among Ohio's Republicans necessarily involved the powerful figure of the President but were more directed toward statewide rather than national figures. President Taft was the "key" to the fortunes of any one faction but was not subjected to the intense animosity of someone like Senator Burton. The depth of the genuine hatred is revealed in a letter from Hy D. Davis to Arthur Garford, Aug. 6, 1911, GP: "Do you know, I have felt more like giving up during the past six months than any time in my life? When I think the way I have been used by Burton I feel like just getting out and tell all I know and then put in the rest of my life getting even with him. . . . The time will come Art when we all will have our day at killing and we want to stand together 'till the last one is dead. I never wanted to fight as bad in all my life as now."
of his administration. The Elyria Telegram publicly proclaimed ". . . its confidence in the ultimate righteousness of the people's judgment toward so efficient and conscientious an executive as William Howard Taft." 11

The deciding factor in the progressives' support of Taft during most of 1911 was undoubtedly the widely accepted belief that the President would certainly be renominated by the national convention. However, with the off-year elections in November a new political situation was created in Ohio, and the thoughts and actions of progressive Republicans reflected this change. In Ohio the Democrats generally were more successful than the Republicans and particularly in the larger cities. 12 The returns did nothing to encourage Republican ambitions or confidence, but they did indicate that Taft's renomination was not absolutely assured. For the first time in months disheartened Republican followers criticized the President, and the Cleveland Leader again reported anti-Taft agitation and the seemingly irresistible swing to Roosevelt by progressive Republicans. 13 Even before the election results were known Garford had scented a serious Republican reversal and had written to Roosevelt suggesting a conference about Ohio's perturbed political

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10 Arthur Garford to William H. Phipps, Sept. 1, 1911, GP.

11 Elyria Telegram, June 9, 1911.

12 Cleveland Leader, Nov. 9, 1911.

13 Ibid., Nov. 14, 1911.
state. In flattering and suggestive words he informed the former President that "... many of us need wise counsel that shall properly direct our actions in the next few months." On the national level James Garfield's actions also indicated the increased favor in which some of Ohio's progressives held Roosevelt. Garfield attended the Chicago conference of the nation's leading progressives on October 16. In his autobiography LaFollette recalled that "in that great conference, from first to last, there was but one discordant note. It was sounded by James R. Garfield. He came to the meeting direct from New York, where he had been closeted with Roosevelt ... . he was singularly persistent in opposing any endorsement of my candidacy."15

Within a week after the elections the anti-Taft sentiment emerged as open opposition to his renomination, and the progressives announced that they would form their own state-wide organization committed to defeating the election of Taft delegates to the national convention.16 This announcement in the Cleveland Leader was apparently the result of a conference and agreement between its editor, Nat C. Wright, state central committee chairman Walter F. Brown and Garford. These three men had decided "... to put over an uninstructed delegation to the national convention.

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14 To Theodore Roosevelt, Oct. 24, 1911, GP.
16 Cleveland Leader, Nov. 12, 1911. See also Elyria Telegram, Nov. 15, 1911.
This means a bully good fight, but if we win it it leaves us absolutely in control of the situation in Ohio, with Mr. Burton beaten to a pulp. . . . Of course it's a hard slap at Taft, but he's got a slap or two coming, and we will still be in a position to vote for him if it seems wise when the time comes." The progressives had decided to capitalize upon Taft's present unpopularity, control Ohio's delegation and present themselves as decisive figures in the nomination of any presidential candidate. It was a plan which originally did not necessarily contemplate the elimination of Taft's renomination, but would do so very shortly. Soon after this conference between Garford, Brown and Wright, Garfield, Ohio's other leading progressive and particularly important in the national movement, helped to draft the Western Reserve progressive Republicans' declaration of principles. He was not present when the declaration was issued in a Cleveland meeting, having once more gone east for a conference with Roosevelt. Significantly, the declaration did not contain an indorsement for LaFollette and allowed Ohio's progressives time to negotiate with Roosevelt.18

Opposition to Taft assumed a more positive nature early in 1912 as Ohio's progressive Republicans announced

17Nat C. Wright to Arthur Garford, Nov. 11, 1911, GP.

18Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov. 20, 1911. See also Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 20, 1911. George E. Mowry in Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 194-195, writes that in November, 1911, the Garfield Republican Club in Toledo indorsed Roosevelt in a move " . . . probably instigated by James R. Garfield and Dan Hanna."
their preference for Roosevelt and petitioned for his "second coming." On January 1 . . . the much talked of Ohio state conference was held at Columbus. . . . Ninety-two of the leading Progressives of the state were present. In this meeting, for the first time and in an open and formal way, the friends of Roosevelt disclosed their real purpose."19 The presidential ambitions of Senator LaFollette were disregarded, and Taft's chances of success in Ohio were made even more precarious. Ohio's progressives made it clear that they would attempt to nominate their own candidate and to resist the imposition of any one man upon them.20

The conference produced a compromise whereby LaFollette was not indorsed as the sole possible presidential candidate. His name was added to that of Roosevelt and the expression "or any other Progressive Republican."21 Most observers had expected the delegates to indorse LaFollette alone since his followers were in the majority at the meeting. But a well organized minority, led by Walter Brown, Gifford Pinchot, James Garfield and Judge R.M. Wanamaker, succeeded in preventing the action despite the efforts of Cleveland's John D. Fackler, Secretary of the Ohio Progressive League and LaFollette's chief lieutenant in the state, and United

19 Robert M. LaFollette, op. cit., 573.
21 Cincinnati Enquirer, Jan. 2, 1912.
States Senators John D. Works, California, Moses E. Clapp, Minnesota, and Coe I. Crawford, South Dakota. It had been "... a forensic struggle lasting for hours" but the Roosevelt forces had won.\(^{22}\) In the eyes of LaFollette the main conspirator was unquestionably "Walter F. Brown, reactionary boss... Brown is to Ohio politics exactly what Platt, Quay, Henry C. Payne, and men of that type were to the political affairs of their time."\(^{23}\)

Three days after the Columbus convention of progressives, Garfield and Roosevelt had another conference at Oyster Bay. Although Roosevelt maintained his "sphinx-like silence as whether or not he is a candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency"\(^{24}\), his friends were "... laying special emphasis on the significance of his conference with ex-Secretary of the Interior James R. Garfield." It was possibly "... the most significant event which has occurred since the recent crystallization of the Roosevelt boom talk."\(^{25}\)

Garford was to be in the vanguard of the Roosevelt movement having agreed to be Ohio's representative and

\(^{22}\)Ibid.

\(^{23}\)Robert M. LaFollette, op. cit., 573-574.

\(^{24}\)New York Times, Jan. 6, 1912.

\(^{25}\)Ibid., Jan. 7, 1912. LaFollette sarcastically wrote that Garfield had journeyed to Oyster Bay in order to report upon "the great stirring" in Ohio. This was undoubtedly true. Robert M. LaFollette, op. cit., 576.
spokesman on the Roosevelt national committee. It was his task to aid in achieving Roosevelt's nomination in June.

The Campaign Takes Shape

The broad outlines of the campaign's direction, which Ohio's progressive Republicans were to take, became apparent during the month of February before and after Roosevelt formally announced his own candidacy. The gauntlet thrown to Taft, Roosevelt became "the people's candidate", as a daily feature in the Elyria Telegram's editorial page was entitled. Garford's newspaper participated in a planned "boom" intended to demonstrate that the people really wanted Theodore Roosevelt for President. Quite frankly and somewhat naively the newspaper hoped to stir up a "spontaneous" show of support for Roosevelt, whom it portrayed as a reluctant "soldier in the cause of the people." 

On the twenty-first of February Roosevelt appeared in Columbus for an address before the Ohio constitutional convention which Garford believed would have a bearing on the entire progressive movement throughout the state. The Review of Reviews wrote that Roosevelt's Columbus appearance was in reality a part of a draft movement. Roosevelt accepted the invitation in order to remove " . . . all doubt

26 Elyria Telegram, Feb. 1, 1912.
27 Ibid., Feb. 26, 1912.
28 Ibid., Feb. 1, 1912.
29 To Edwin W. Sims, Feb. 15, 1912, GP.
of his intention to accept the nomination if conferred upon him by the convention." It was the first public occasion he had had to answer the "remarkable memorial" in which the governors of Wyoming, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, West Virginia and South Dakota had urged him to stand for reelection. Roosevelt made clear his intentions before he arrived in Columbus when he told a reporter in Cleveland that "My hat is in the ring." Although he did not give permission to use his name during his Columbus speech, he formally granted that permission in a letter to the several governors dated three days later.

Despite four inches of snow and a drizzling rain, the state's progressive leaders, including Garford, Wright, Garfield and Brown, managed to stage a successful affair. The effect of Roosevelt's appearance was possibly marred by his public indorsement of the recall of judges and their decisions on constitutional questions. The New York Times reported that this aspect of Roosevelt's speech caused a "tremendous sensation" and "... has greatly alarmed the most radical of his followers." If the Times analysis was correct, at least Garford and other Roosevelt followers in

Ohio did not acknowledge the fact. Roosevelt revealed himself as the great master of republicanism and the progressive movement's chief exponent, as he championed the rule of the people supposedly usurped by the Taft administration. Ostensibly distrustful of Taft, Roosevelt and his Ohio followers were to march in a back-to-the-people movement.\textsuperscript{35} The implications of the Columbus rally were considerable for Garford, as he realized that Roosevelt's popularity with rank and file Republicans would force local and state politicians to support his nomination to the advantage of the prime movers in his cause.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{The Roosevelt Plan: Organization}

The Ohio Assembly in 1911 passed a law which permitted a direct primary vote for forty-two pledged district delegates to the national convention leaving the state convention to select just six delegates-at-large.\textsuperscript{37} Victory for the progressives in the Republican primary of May 21 was considered a prerequisite if they were to control the national convention and successfully reorganize their own state party. And that victory was deemed to be a matter of organization. Not issues, but primarily a thorough, grassroots organization with sensitive yet forceful contacts with every precinct was the recognized means of political success. If the

\textsuperscript{35}Elyria Telegram, Feb. 27, 1912.

\textsuperscript{36}To Edwin W. Sims, Feb. 21, 1912, GP.

\textsuperscript{37}Elyria Telegram, Feb. 28, 1912.
voters were reached, then their commanding voice for Roosevelt would be heard in the primaries. A popular expression of Republican sentiment would undoubtedly indicate President Taft's unpopularity, even in his native state of Ohio.

Garford and leading progressives selected a procedure by which "the Roosevelt plan will be to carry out, insofar as it is possible, the will and the purpose of the people ---the sentiment of the people expressed through the formation of the Roosevelt club. . . ." Roosevelt clubs in every county were to be the vehicles to prevent any so-called selfconstituted and unauthorized Taft supporters from misrepresenting the people by a selection of delegates to the national convention behind the closed doors of a Republican executive committee. These clubs, composed of one thousand or more individuals, would select ten delegates from each county to attend a district meeting, at which two delegates to the national convention would be placed on the primary ballot. Garford argued that in this way the clubs would truly express the people's indorsement. He also admitted that this method effectively eliminated the

38 Letters of Arthur Garford to Hayes Sloan, March 7, 1912; Charles L. Thurber, March 14, 1912; and Edwin W. Sims, March 23, 1912, GP.


40 Arthur Garford to Roscoe C. Skiles, March 18, 1912, GP.
possibility of independent delegates, not to mention Taft
deleagtes supported by the state organization.41

The Fourteenth District's convention of Roosevelt
club members resulted in the selection of Garford as one
of the district's national delegates to be placed on the
primary ballot and in a well organized and harmonious
endorsement of Theodore Roosevelt.42 The progressives had
confronted their reliance upon the strength of numbers as
represented by the Roosevelt clubs and the appearance of
public endorsement for their candidates against the Taft
controlled state organization.

The Taft Steamroller Begins to Move

The struggle between Taft and Roosevelt to secure
deleagtes to the national convention unavoidably involved
the members of the state central committee, which met on
the thirtieth of March to decide definitively the method of
choosing Ohio's six delegates-at-large. Chairman Walter F.
Brown desired to avoid a selection by the state convention
and the possibility of a contest of power with the Taft
forces. Instead, he proposed that the delegates-at-large
be elected by the forty-two district delegates.43 During
the committee meeting the Taft leaders attempted but were

41Letters to J.M. Bechtol, March 14, 1912 and Frank V.
Owen, March 18, 1912, GP.

42Cleveland Leader, April 9, 1912.

43Elyria Telegram, March 16, 1912. See also, Walter F.
Brown to Arthur Garford, Dec. 23, 1911, GP.
unable to prevent direct primaries in each congressional district for the election of delegates to the national convention, but they did block by a margin of one vote Brown's plan pertaining to the delegates-at-large. Supporters of both presidential candidates had won very important victories with these actions.\textsuperscript{44}

The state central committee's resolution of the correct methods of electing delegates was not a compromise solution, and in fact the struggle between the Republican factions considerably worsened immediately after the meeting. The tone of Garford's language became noticeably sharper as he railed against the committee's actions dictated by "blatant ring ruling politicians" and "federal soaked office holders".\textsuperscript{45} The progressives now announced that the delegates-at-large would not escape them, and they prepared to carry their fight into every county committee and convention in order to control county delegates elected to the state convention.\textsuperscript{46} It was argued that the state central committee's decision regarding delegates-at-large was an effort of the Taft majority to force the acceptance of six Taft delegates-at-large and calculated to produce additional

\textsuperscript{44}Cincinnati Enquirer, March 31, 1912. See also letters of Arthur Garford to F.P. Hosack, April 2, 1912, and Charles L. Thurber, April 9, 1912, GP.

\textsuperscript{45}To V.G. Miller, April 2, 1912, GP.

\textsuperscript{46}Elyria Telegram, April 1 and 3, 1912.
intra-party warfare.\textsuperscript{47} It had certainly done the latter.

\textbf{Ohio's District Primaries}

The constitution of Ohio's delegation to the national convention and the control of the state convention largely depended upon the outcome of the district primary elections held May 21.\textsuperscript{48} Garford believed that Ohio's primary contest "... will practically settle the question as to who will be nominated at the Chicago Convention."\textsuperscript{49} Confidentially he expected Roosevelt to dominate the elections and even to assure himself of a controlling number of delegates to the state convention and thereby the selection of favorable delegates-at-large.\textsuperscript{50}

In his own county Garford assured Charles L. Thurber, the progressives' state secretary, that Lorain's county convention proceedings "... will be entirely in the hands of our friends." County convention delegates, nominally uninstructed but almost entirely progressive Republicans, were to be selected at the primaries and to vote for state convention delegates four days later. However, they were not bound to select Roosevelt delegates "inasmuch as we are

\textsuperscript{47}Cincinnati Enquirer, March 31, 1912.

\textsuperscript{48}Not all county delegations to the state convention were elected by a direct primary vote; a majority, including those of Lorain County, were still elected by county conventions.

\textsuperscript{49}To Pierre Depew, May 3, 1912, GP.

\textsuperscript{50}To T.G. Pownall, April 29, 1912, GP.
adhering as strictly as possible to the idea that it is a popular movement . . . although at the right time of course the names of proper men will be submitted and doubtless ratified by the convention."51

Garford's confidence that Roosevelt would capture his own state's district and at-large delegates increased as the primaries approached. He praised the county and district organizations of the progressives in unreserved terms and wrote that he had ". . . never been more sanguine of success than I am today for the Roosevelt progressives."52 Major primary victories for Roosevelt, particularly in Illinois and Pennsylvania, furnished the progressives with additional proof that Roosevelt was riding the crest of popularity and that Ohio would provide no exception. Garford was not alone in being convinced that the Republican voters definitely preferred Roosevelt over Taft. The American Review of Reviews reported that "the great lessons of the Illinois and Pennsylvania primaries swept across the country. . . . It all meant that this country has witnessed for the last time the deliberate attempt of a President of the United States to renominate himself by the use of patronage and power in the Southern States, and by bargains and alliances with bosses and machines in the Northern States."53

51To Charles L. Thurber, April 29, 1912, GP.
52To George H. Payne, May 10, 1912, GP.
53American Review of Reviews, May, 1912, vol XLV, 519-520.
The Ohio primary was the very climax of both Roosevelt's and Taft's campaigns. The large number of delegates that Ohio controlled in the national convention was crucial but no more so than the national prestige involved in a battle in the President's own home state. On the twelfth of May, over a week before the election, President Taft arrived in Ohio and was followed by Roosevelt the very next day. Each of the candidates brought with them "a battery of orators" and launched an extremely bitter and quite personal verbal assault upon the other.

Ohio's week-long campaign, during which Roosevelt gave ninety speeches and Taft even more, was judged "...the bitterest struggle in its stormy political history." With Walter F. Brown, who the New York Times grudgingly admitted was "... very practical and resourceful and a splendid organizer", leading Roosevelt's Ohio campaign, the latter achieved a decisive victory. He captured thirty-four of the forty-two district delegates.

Ohio progressives, anxiously or perhaps wistfully, hoped that the state convention would reflect the public

54George E. Mowry, op. cit., 234-235.
56George E. Mowry, op. cit., 234-235.
59Ibid., May 22, 1912.
sentiment as expressed in the primaries and bow to the progressive movement. During the campaign Taft had said that "the vote in Ohio, my home state, will be the decisive one and will settle the question of the nomination." But to Taft his defeat did not mean that his renomination was impossible or even undesirable. Apparently buoyant and confident he immediately declared that Ohio's vote was indeed decisive: "I shall have at least 17 votes from Ohio" and control of the national convention. He was not going to allow his state's six delegates-at-large to go the way of the district primaries.

"Shake." On the day after the primary Garford received this one word letter from a district politician. The congratulations were explained by a self-drawn cartoon, which expressed the enthusiasm and generally buoyant progressive spirit and more interestingly a Garford boom for governor. The cartoon placed the progressives astride Ohio's state capital, from which hung a sign advertising for a Republican governor. About to be lassoed by the progressives was Garford, resting upon a rock with his back to the capital, and reading about Roosevelt's landslide primary victory.

60 Walter F. Brown to Arthur Garford, May 22, 1912, GP.
61 The Nation, May 23, 1912, vol. 94, 505. See also The Outlook, June 1, 1912, vol. 101, 233.
63 H.G. Hammond to Arthur Garford, May 22, 1912, GP. Along with Garford, Hammond was the Fourteenth District's other delegate to the national convention.
Three days later the Lorain Republican county convention surprised the general public by indorsing Garford for governor.\textsuperscript{64} Unquestionably, Garford was not averse to the Republican nomination, but he withheld any announcement of his candidacy pending the results of the national convention. If Roosevelt was to be the party's nominee, then Garford would seek the governorship, but he did not contemplate what he considered certain defeat, if he ran on a ticket headed by Taft.\textsuperscript{65}

The Big Six Steal

Walter F. Brown viewed with some alarm the state convention which was held in Columbus on the third and fourth of June. A few days before its opening he noted with dismay that Taft and his Ohio Lieutenants were attempting to secure the six delegates-at-large to the national convention, Ohio's "Big Six", by the skillful disposal of federal patronage. Ominously, he forewarned that "party disaster must inevitably follow misrepresentation by state delegates in the naming of national delegates-at-large."\textsuperscript{66}

The delegates to the state convention in all but twenty-six of Ohio's eighty-eight counties were officially uninstructed on the Taft-Roosevelt issue, but progressives

\textsuperscript{64}Elyria Telegram, May 25, 1912.

\textsuperscript{65}Harry A. March to Arthur Garford, April 21, 1912, and Arthur Garford to Charles Frank, May 7, 1912, GP.

\textsuperscript{66}To Arthur Garford, May 29, 1912, GP.
maintained that there was "the tacit understanding" that they would abide by the general results of the May primaries. In this way districts which had given their national delegates to Roosevelt would also be similarly represented in the state convention. But this gentleman's agreement, if it really existed, was of slight significance when confronted with the argument of political self-preservation. Progressives like Garford and Brown knew this and worried accordingly. President Taft was not to sit with idle hands as six crucial votes were given to his rival.

When the Columbus convention ended the best the progressives could report was that they had not yielded before the victorious Taft forces. But they had been defeated. The Taft men, having scored a preliminary victory when they gained control of the convention's committees, then braced themselves for the struggle over the delegates-at-large. On the next day, June 4, Roosevelt's followers were frustrated as Ohio's native son controlled the convention and captured the six delegates-at-large: Theodore E. Burton, Harry M. Daugherty, Warren G. Harding, Charles P. Taft, Arthur L. Vorys and David J. Cable. The margin of victory was quite slim, twelve and one-half votes of a total of seven hundred and fifty-three, but it was sufficient.

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67Elyria Telegram, May 28, 1912.
69Cincinnati Enquirer, June 5, 1912.
A change of a mere seven votes would have resulted in a Roosevelt victory, and it is understandable why the progressives were extremely embittered by their defeat.70

Clarence Maris, Secretary of the Ohio Republican League and a progressive, related to Garford his own story of the convention, entitled "Recollections of a Rumpus", and gave full vent to the wrath of his faction. Senator Burton in particular received a bitter denunciation but other leading Republicans were also seared: Warren G. Harding, Maurice Maschke, George B. Cox, and other lesser politicians. About Burton, Maris wrote that "no one should object to my praising Burton in an obituary. Committing hari-kari is the one heroic act of his life." It was Burton who controlled forty-six of Cleveland's fifty-three delegates, and according to his decision they would vote for either Taft or Roosevelt. Many believed he would favor a compromise solution by which the "Big Six" would be divided evenly between the two contenders, but "when the time of test arrived the Senator shamed his traducers by grandly sacrificing himself, filling the grave and saving Ohio for Taft. The Taft bandwagon was Burton's hearse." In a speech that was "... interrupted again and again by hisses, shouts and insults, and a protracted effort ... to silence him by continuous cheering", Burton declared against the progressive Republicans and instructed the Cleveland delegation

70Cleveland Leader, June 5, 1912.
to vote for President Taft. The Cincinnati Enquirer reported that Burton was not actually opposed to a compromise on the "Big Six" and in fact had favored one. But neither Taft nor Roosevelt would allow such an action. "It may be said in passing that the Roosevelt forces will accept nothing from him [Burton] but complete surrender."72

Leaders of both Taft and Roosevelt forces, including Garford, did not seriously consider a compromise by splitting the "Big Six" in the interests of Ohio's party harmony, but instead demanded a "war to the death", which is what occurred.73 On the eve of the conflict James R. Garfield declared "... that all compromise talk was off and the matter would be fought out in the convention."74 In the bitter fight that followed Warren G. Harding, as well as Burton, played a prominent role. The former's address to the delegates stirred them to the "highest pitch" arousing deep enthusiasm and animosity.75 About Harding, Maris wrote that he "... was given the task of replying to all the claims made for T.R. He did wonderfully well amid a storm

71 Clarence Maris to Arthur Garford, June 7, 1912, GP. Theodore Roosevelt's explanation of Ohio's state convention was much the same as that of Maris. The Outlook, "Two Phases of the Chicago Convention" by Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 101, July 20, 1912, 623.

72 Cincinnati Enquirer, June 2 and 3, 1912.

73 Arthur Garford to George H. Payne, June 5, 1912, GP.

74 New York Times, June 4, 1912.

75 Cincinnati Enquirer, June 5, 1912.
of insults. No man in Ohio is so handy with words as Harding."76 After the conclusion of this, one of the greatest political brawls in which Garford was ever involved, the progressives announced that the "Big Six" had been stolen by Taft. But their defeat in no way lessened their determination to eliminate from political power a long list of Republicans headed by Theodore E. Burton.

The Struggle Continues

An angry progressive delegation to the Republican national convention quickly gained a measure of revenge for their Columbus humiliation, when they acted to deny the chairmanship of the Ohio delegation to Senator Burton. The latter used his every influence to gain a position "... that is supposed to be the prerogative of the U.S. Senator from every state" but to no avail.77 The Senator was completely ignored and repudiated in the organization of the delegation as his long-time nemesis, Garford, was elected both temporary and permanent chairman of the Ohio delegation.78 Garford and the progressives had attained what was perhaps the pinnacle of their power in the Republican party.

The renomination of President Taft at the Chicago convention occasioned no bolt by the Ohio delegation, although many members, less practical than Garford and

76To Arthur Garford, June 7, 1912, GP.
77Elyria Telegram, June 17, 1912.
78Cleveland Leader, June 17 and 18, 1912.
Walter F. Brown, had to be dissuaded from the course. Brown and Garford argued that party bolts were serious but not very often successful actions. And it was to be remembered that they were usually politically fatal. These two leaders of the progressives realized that their movement needed the well established organization of the Republican party and chose to remain within that party and to secure its control by internal reorganization. The inherent dangers of a bolt were simply too great to risk. Upon this point Garford was "... very emphatic and his emphasis aided largely the efforts of Walter Brown to hold the Ohio people in line."79

Members of the Ohio delegation reached an "armed truce" that enabled Roosevelt's followers and Taft's men to vote as they pleased during the convention. As for Garford he contented himself with leading a parade for Roosevelt. Aided by J.J. Sullivan, the two inspirationalists marched around Chicago's old armory while carrying Ohio's iron standard, which was extremely heavy. Having twice circled the hall and their faces already a "deep purple", they then sought to regain their seats. "It took them several minutes to learn they had any arms left. Arms and legs were numb." Insult was added to injury when Harry M. Daugherty offered smelling salts. Neither Garford nor Sullivan acknowledged his proffered assistance.80

79Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 21, 1912.
80Cleveland Leader, June 23, 1912.
The progressive defeat at the national convention was serious but not catastrophic since a reversal of the situation was still considered a possibility by Ohio progressives. The Republican state convention convened in the first week of July for its second session, during which the matters of a state ticket and platform would be settled. If the progressives could nominate their own slate and write the platform, then victory might be the consequence despite the national leadership of President Taft. And in the event that Roosevelt ran as a presidential candidate for a third party, there was the legal possibility that Ohio's Republican candidates would also appear on the other ticket. For these tangible reasons Garford preferred "... at present at least, that we should endeavor to work out a progressive reform through the Republican organization."

The progressive drive to capture the state's nominations needed someone to spearhead it and that man was to be Garford. Throughout the Chicago convention he had been hailed as "Governor" by the progressive delegates and now his candidacy was a necessity, if the movement was to succeed. Personally Garford acted a bit like the lamb before the slaughter but was prepared to save and to perpetuate, if possible, the "... great party heritage.

81 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 24, 1912.
82 To J.D. Gray, June 29, 1912, GP.
83 Cleveland Leader, June 18, 1912.
bequeathed to us at the cost of much blood and treasure.

He maintained that "... the people's will of this country shall prevail, and every true American will answer to the call of service. The hour is midnight, but the dawn will come." After a long conference with Walter Brown, he announced his candidacy and prepared for the bitter platform fight that was surely to ensue.

The recessed session of the state convention was in reality a continuation of the death struggle that had ceased temporarily with the close of the first session. Peace between the factions was a decided possibility but it involved a certain flexibility, which neither side displayed. Burton and the Taft forces were willing to concede the gubernatorial nomination to Garford, if the latter indorsed Taft and agreed to stump for him. Walter Brown relayed Burton's position to Garford, and after a conference between the two progressives, Garford issued "a statement that seemed to put him beyond all possibility of Taft support": he absolutely would not agree to support the Chicago platform. On the other hand the Taft adherents would not agree to support Garford, unless he accepted

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84To I.E. Philo, June 29, 1912, GP.
85Cleveland News, July 1, 1912. The progressives desired several modifications in the Taft platform. The more important included a plank indorsing presidential preference primaries and the popular election of United States senators as well as specific tariff changes.
86Cincinnati Enquirer, July 2, 1912.
Taft's platform and indorsement. Burton now "... positively declined to support him [Garford]."\(^{87}\) Compromise did not prevail, and Garford was denied his party's nomination despite surprisingly strong support. On the first of five ballots he led the seven other initial contenders: Lawrence K. Langdon of Lebanon; B.H. Kroger of Cincinnati; D.T. Anderson of Youngstown; George R. Young of Dayton; William H. Boyd, a fellow progressive from Cleveland and the man who placed Garford in nomination; Warren G. Harding and Harry M. Daugherty. The latter two candidates received a token vote apiece. Garford led all candidates on the first three ballots and was finally defeated on the fifth ballot by a "dark horse", Judge Edmond B. Dillon of Columbus, introduced by Harding and Lewis C. Laylin on the third ballot in order to prevent a possible stampede to Garford. Dillon quickly secured enough votes from middle-of-the-road Republicans to assure his nomination. Even so, on the fifth and final ballot Garford received two hundred and five votes to Dillon's five hundred and twenty-five, an indication of the plain, uncompromising enmity which separated Ohio's Republicans.\(^{88}\)

Garford believed that the nomination of Judge Dillon constituted a defeat for the Taft Republicans and "a glorious victory" for the progressives, since he believed that Dillon

\(^{87}\)New York Times, July 2, 1912. See also Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 2, 1912.

\(^{88}\)Cincinnati Enquirer, July 3, 1912.
could not possibly win the governorship. His own adamant refusal to countenance the Chicago platform had caused the Taft forces to reject Ohio's progressive movement and had placed both factions "squarely on record." When the party ticket was defeated in November, then the progressives would be in a position to put together the party's pieces.

Although Garford expected and desired the defeat of the Republican state and national tickets, he did not at this point abandon the party. He declared that he would support the Republican ticket but as an indication of his disapproval and disinterest, he went abroad for almost six weeks immediately following the state convention.

Ohio's Progressive Party

The remaining days of the hot month of July were rather quiet politically until the very end of the month. On July 31 the Republican State Central Committee was called together possibly to resolve the fate of the state's Republican party. Judge Dillon, despairing of intra-party peace and support, had withdrawn his candidacy, and the committee had to select his successor! Dillon's resignation was just another in "a long list of difficulties that have bothered Mr. Taft in his own State. . . ." and prevented his control of

89To I.H. Griswold, July 3, 1912, GP.

90Arthur Garford to Medill McCormick, July 3, 1912, GP.

91Letters to W.E. Sefton, July 6, 1912, and C.B. Tewksbury, July 12, 1912, GP.
the Ohio situation. It had in fact created political chaos in Ohio. Nat Wright immediately cabled Garford, who was in Paris, that Dillon had resigned for fear of a third ticket in the November elections. And Dillon's information was correct. Roosevelt had consented "... to heading progressive Republican ticket in Ohio with full progressive Republican state ticket permitting us to remain in Republican party." Wright wanted to know if Garford would accept the Republican nomination, if the state central committee selected him to replace Dillon? "This puts you on both republican tickets and assures ardent support of Roosevelt during campaign. [Dan] Hanna, [Walter F.] Brown and myself think plan good with good prospect of election. Will push hard."'

This plan rested on the dubious assumptions that fusion between Ohio's Taft and Roosevelt Republicans was possible, and that the progressive Republicans could capture control of the state central committee. Garford acknowledged these difficulties in his reply to Wright in which he stated that he was available, if all Republican factions unanimously favored his candidacy. There was no sense in pursuing an

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93 *Cincinnati Enquirer*, Aug. 6, 1912.
94 A.L. Webster to Arthur Garford, July 30, 1912, GP. Miss Webster was Garford's personal secretary, and she relayed Wright's cable.
95 Arthur Garford to Nat C. Wright, July 31, 1912, held by Mrs. J.B. Thomas.
objective if disaster was assured. Fusion had been made possible by Dillon's withdrawal, but it remained for the state central committee to pave the way for the appearance of candidates on both tickets.96

One of the more important members on the committee and a vital leader of the Taft forces was Harry M. Daugherty. Daugherty, no friend of Garford, not only opposed the progressives' plan but preferred as an alternative to purge the committee of all progressives. Walter Brown and Garford, the champions of the progressives, would be his victims, not his allies.97 The state central committee faithfully reflected the split among Ohio's Republicans and neither faction could muster the majority vote needed for nomination. The progressives abandoned Garford's candidacy and offered United States District Attorney Ulysses Grant Denman of Toledo as a compromise. Taft supporters countered with their choices of either Daugherty or Warren G. Harding. They feared that Denman's nomination would cause the state organization to revert to progressive control. This was a possibility less desirable than completely splitting asunder the party. Control of the state organization was a bread and butter proposition which holds most of the collectors, postmasters, appraisers and gaugers, of the

96 Cleveland Leader, Aug. 6, 1912. See also, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Aug. 6, 1912.
97 Cleveland Leader, Aug. 7, 1912.
federal machine in line for a 'standpat' candidate." 98

Months of confusion and uncertainty among Ohio's Republican ranks were ended on the tenth of August. On that day the committee, by a vote of eleven to eight, rejected Denman's candidacy and ended any chance of party unity. The vote was the culmination of two weeks of intense struggle following Dillon's withdrawal and occasioned the resignation of all eight progressives, including chairman Brown. 99 With the selection of General Robert Burns Brown, sixty-eight year old Zanesville editor and Civil War veteran, as the party's gubernatorial candidate, the line of cleavage had been clearly marked. The personal representatives of Taft, including his private secretary Carmi A. Thompson, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior Lewis C. Laylin, Harry M. Daugherty, and National Committeeman Arthur I. Vorys, had acted to rid the party of the progressive element and force it to take shelter with the newly formed Progressive party. Undoubtedly they had taken this positive action to prevent a similar purge of themselves by the progressives. As the progressives took their leave of the party, Harding said of their decision: it "... is the only nice thing the Roosevelt faction has done in the campaign." 100

Nat C. Wright neatly summarized the hopes and frustrations

98 Ibid., Aug. 10, 1912.

99 Cincinnati Enquirer, Aug. 11, 1912. See also, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Aug. 11, 1912.

100 Cincinnati Enquirer, Aug. 11, 1912.
of Ohio's progressives in a letter to Garford. Immediately after the vote on Denman he wrote that "... things have all gone to hell in the last two weeks." It had appeared at first as if the committee would accept Garford's nomination, "... but Taft and their machine got into the game against us" and forced the proposal of Denman as an alternative. Finally, the nomination of General Brown "... knocked the hell out of the whole situation." Until then Wright believed that the progressives would ultimately control the committee and thus enable themselves to remain Republicans while supporting the Roosevelt ticket. This was exactly what Wright, Garford and Walter Brown most desired. They certainly did not want to bolt the Republican party. However, with the nomination of General Brown, both Wright and Walter Brown were "... ready to take the plunge into the third party and are only awaiting your return to go the limit." Both men believed that with General Brown leading the Republican state ticket, the Democratic and Progressive parties would run ahead of the Republican party in the November elections. Since only the two leading political parties were entitled to recognition on election boards, "that means that the Republican party is wiped out here." Wright urged Garford to resign from the state central committee and to lead the state's Progressive party ticket.101

Less than a week later Garford addressed a long letter

101To Arthur Garford, Aug. 13, 1912, GP.
to W.L. Parmenter, the new chairman of the Republican state central committee, in which he announced his retirement from the committee and the Republican party. In order to perpetuate the Republican party’s principles, he had followed the lead of Nat Wright and Walter Brown and joined the Progressive party.\textsuperscript{102} The progressive movement had resulted in the Progressive party.

\textsuperscript{102}To W.L. Parmenter, Aug. 18, 1912, GP.
CHAPTER VII

THE RACE FOR GOVERNOR

Garford for Governor

Ohio's Progressive party held its own Columbus convention during the first week of September, but the Lorain County Progressives anticipated its gubernatorial selection by several days. They hailed their local chief, Garford, as Ohio's next governor.¹ On the fifth of September "amid great enthusiasm" and with no difficulty of decision Garford was nominated by acclamation. John J. Sullivan rendered the nominating speech and hailed back to Garford's youthful experiences: "No man who does not know the charm of country life and love it is qualified to sit in the Governor's chair. No man can measure up to that office who hasn't followed the furrow, mingled with cattle or stuffed hay into the corner of the mow at the command of the old man. Arthur L. Garford knows."² Garford was a genuinely popular candidate among the delegates and Sullivan's rhetoric was much appreciated. After the nominating speech there followed "prolonged applause, shouts and Bull Moose 'moos!' which

¹Elyria Telegram, Aug. 31, 1912.
²Cleveland Leader, Sept. 6, 1912.

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became "a chorus of moos" lasting several minutes.\textsuperscript{3} The Progressives had nominated "... for Governor one of the strongest men that has made the race for that important office in Ohio in many years."\textsuperscript{4}

Aside from Garford the Bull Moose ticket included Lewis J. Tabor, of Belmont County, Lieutenant Governor; John J. Sullivan, of Columbiana County, Secretary of State; Charles L. Allen, of Marion County, Auditor of State; William Kirtley, of Defiance County, Treasurer of State; R.R. Nevin, of Montgomery County, Attorney General; Randolph W. Walton, of Franklin County, Congressman-at-large; and James R. Garfield, United States Senator.\textsuperscript{5} The latter was also the chairman of the convention. Other officers of the convention were Sherman H. Eagle vice-chairman, Charles Foster secretary, and Charles Thurber, assistant secretary. To guide their coming campaign the Progressives relied upon the organizational genius of Walter Brown.\textsuperscript{6}

Over half the citizenry of a proud Elyria gathered to greet their triumphant son and to extend their neighborly friendship with a "spontaneous celebration" on "Garford

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\textsuperscript{3}Ohio State Journal, Sept. 6, 1912.

\textsuperscript{4}The Outlook, Oct. 19, 1912, vol. 102, 342.

\textsuperscript{5}Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 6, 1912.

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Crowds shouted "three cheers" for hours as a band led the way along streets made light by "red fire". A mass meeting in the public square with appropriate oratory and celebration concluded what was a gala affair. 8

The Progressive campaign officially was launched on September 21 in Akron's Grace Park. Blessed with splendid weather, a large and responsive audience, some twenty thousand strong, watched as half a dozen bands led the marching candidates into the park. The response could hardly have been anything less than deafening, assuming that the Progressive followers used to full advantage the ten thousand Bull Moose megaphones distributed earlier in the day. 9

Garford and Hiram Johnson, the vice-presidential candidate, initiated what was described as "a plague of political oratory" showered on "defenseless Ohioans" and intended to reach all parts of Ohio in the brief remaining weeks before the election. 10 The keynote of Garford's opening speech was the "fight for humanity". The Akron speech was a major address and was used again and again with variations throughout the strenuous campaign. The primary issue was presented in the form of a question: can the people govern themselves? Ohio's recent constitutional

7Cleveland Leader, Sept. 8, 1912.
8Elyria Telegram, Sept. 9, 1912.
9Toledo Blade, Sept. 21, 1912.
10Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 2, 1912.
convention had allowed the state's voters an opportunity to adopt amendments concerning initiative and referendum, welfare of employees, workingman's compensation, conservation of natural resources, primary elections, and municipal home rule. By the time of the campaign of 1912 all of the above amendments had been adopted, but Garford maintained that these laws, fundamental for the rule of the people and human welfare, were dead letters unless enforced by effective legislation.

The issue of human welfare, while related to that of democracy, was treated more specifically as an economic problem. In his speech Garford indorsed practically every Progressive measure concerning human welfare but stressed certain ones, perhaps those which he as an industrialist was especially competent to handle and to discuss. Some of the bitterness of the industrial age could be eliminated or at least alleviated by the prohibition of child labor, a minimum wage for women and just hours and working conditions for women and children, an eight hour day in all continuous twenty-four hour industries, one day's rest in seven for everyone, reports on industrial accidents and occupational diseases, publicity about wages, hours and conditions, and minimum safety and health standards in industry.11 Here then was the platform upon which Garford was to present himself.

11Speech by Garford, Sept. 21, 1912, Box 128, GP.
The Akron afternoon affair was followed by an evening mass demonstration in Cleveland for which Lorain County's Progressives had prepared well and long. They had organized a Garford "booster" club, and the Cleveland meeting was the first occasion on which they could show their resolution. They provided transportation for hundreds of club members, distributed banners and badges, released communications for the press, provided reservations and employed a local band to accompany the bandanna-waving partisans.\textsuperscript{12} Too late for the Cleveland meeting but undoubtedly in the same spirit was a march written by J.C. Merthe, "the well known local composer", entitled "Bull Moose" and dedicated to Garford. This spirited piece received its premiere a few days later at Elyria's Sunday outdoor concert.\textsuperscript{13}

The Progressives intended the Akron and the Cleveland rallies to be enthusiastic expressions of popular support reserved by the people for a cause rooted in purpose and principle.\textsuperscript{14} Garford's speeches indicated this as did the meetings themselves. However, one opposition newspaper likened the atmosphere in Cleveland to that of a circus. For a headline it ran the lines "3-Ring political circus opens! Magnificent menagerie and startling stump acrobatics."\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12}Elyria Telegram, Sept. 19 and 20, 1912.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., Sept. 27, 1912.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., Sept. 23, 1912.
\textsuperscript{15}Cleveland Press, Sept. 21, 1912.
The Cleveland Leader reported the evening's activities in a more sympathetic if less realistic manner. Garford and Johnson were greeted at the Baltimore and Ohio railroad station and accompanied by admirers and a fife and drum corps to Cleveland's armory. Once there Progressive songs and hymns were sung: "Clear the track! Bull-Moose are coming" and "Onward Christian Soldiers" were standard numbers in any Progressive song and hymn bag. Martial music followed and "then, in a long rank, in marched the men who had voted for Abraham Lincoln, the rail-splitter, and now are ready to fight for Theodore Roosevelt, the new champion of the square deal." Among them was featured eighty-two year old John A. Benjamin who "... drove the train that carried Lincoln's body, from Buffalo to Toledo." At the very outset of the campaign it was clear that the Progressives would strive to have the "Abraham Lincoln attitude" penetrate the voters.

More battle hymns were chanted interspersed by Bull Moose greetings and calls. The greeting consisted of both hands spread with thumbs on the ears so that the appearance of antlers was given to the friend. A throaty Bull Moose low was executed with hands clasped over the head and the latter thrown back. It could be done in any position but

16 Cleveland Leader, Sept. 22, 1912.
17 Ibid., Sept. 21, 1912.
18 Victor Murdock to Arthur Garford, July 19, 1915, GP.
running was preferred by most. Finally Garford and Johnson entered behind a brass band and delivered what the Cleveland Leader proudly and frankly described as the gospel of humanity's uplift. 19

The Fight Is On

"The fight is on in Ohio" is the way Garford summarized politics after the Akron and Cleveland meetings. 20 At stake for Republicans and Progressives alike was their very existence as practical political oblivion might result for the party that finished worse than second. The necessity of powerful campaign weapons pressed itself upon Progressives who were particularly concerned about adequate newspaper coverage and publicity and campaign speakers. Garford did his best to remedy these matters by enlisting the efforts of Robert Wolfe, publisher of the Columbus Dispatch and Ohio State Journal, and Dan Hanna, publisher of the Cleveland Leader. The Progressives also could count upon Nat Wright and his Toledo Blade for favorable publicity.

The problem of nationally recognized speakers received particular attention. Early in the campaign Walter Brown suggested that Garford, Wright and Dan Hanna go to New York City in order to see and talk to George Perkins about "outside" speakers. 21 The next day Garford wrote to Perkins

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19 Cleveland Leader, Sept. 21 and 22, 1912.
20 To H.J. Ellen, Sept. 23, 1912, GP.
21 To Arthur Garford, Sept. 24, 1912. GP.
with his request for aid. Ohio Progressives needed the personal appearances of Theodore Roosevelt, California Governor Hiram Johnson, former Indiana Senator Albert J. Beveridge, Minnesota Senator Moses Clapp as well as James R. Garfield. \(^{22}\) Throughout the entire campaign Garford himself was the principal speaker in a quartet that toured the state together. Other members of the party were Lewis J. Tabor, John J. Sullivan, and Randolph W. Walton.

Garford was still suffering from the effects of ptomaine poisoning apparently contracted on the day he was nominated for governor, when he began an intensive and extensive twenty-six day campaign of the state calculated to reach into every county. It was a stumping tour aimed especially at those areas in southern and western Ohio where Garford was comparatively unknown. \(^{23}\) Before the voters Garford was a man who believed himself to be a politician in the very best tradition. Because he was a successful industrialist, he believed himself best qualified for the governorship: "I truly agree with you that the time is ripe for our business institutions to be represented in the Chief Executive's chair. We have had quite enough lawyers and editors trying to fill positions for which they are neither qualified by nature or experience. To my mind the same principles should govern

\(^{22}\)To George W. Perkins, Sept. 25, 1912, GP.

\(^{23}\)Ohio State Journal, Oct. 5, 1912.
in the conduct of the people's business as in private business. . . ."24

Once on the platform Garford appeared to his audience as a rather good-looking, medium-sized, square-shouldered man. He was a slow talker and very emphatic in his statements and opinions. He favored short, straightforward speeches rarely lasting more than half an hour, and he avoided any long harangues.25 His talks were delivered in a forceful and energetic style, which the Cleveland Leader characterized as that of a successful businessman.26

Most importantly, Garford had sharp and powerful movements of the hands and fingers, which well complemented his own serious and earnest look. He gave a convincing speech, especially as he narrowed his eye-lids, pointed his finger, leaned over slightly and made his point in clear and sincere language.27 Even Garford's own newspaper was pleasantly surprised over its owner's stump-speaking ability which it termed "one of the surprises of the campaign."28

The importance of being earnest, however sincere, was

24To J.P. Brophy, Sept. 10, 1912, GP. Previously Brophy had written to Garford: "You ought to be able to give Ohio a first class business administration. . . . They have always been politicians, judges or bankers,--fellow who don't know much about general business." Sept. 9, 1912, GP.

26Cleveland Leader, Sept. 22, 1912.
27Ibid.
an extremely critical tactic for Garford. On innumerable occasions he charged both of the other leading candidates, James M. Cox and Robert B. Brown, with "incompetency, insincerity and duplicity." This was a vague accusation stated without substantive evidence. Proof was not forthcoming, but Garford might convince the voters of the charge's truth merely because of his own earnest belief in it. In the meanwhile both Brown and Cox also did their best to discredit Garford's honesty and sincerity. While the stated Progressive issues of the campaign were democracy and human welfare, Garford of necessity spent much time attempting to convince all that he, and only he, was sincere. And it was in the role of a businessman-politician that Garford attempted to convince the public that he was the exception. The campaign did not degenerate into a personal onslaught upon characters but apparently voter enthusiasm for the Progressive issues lagged enough to allow for considerable digression.30

29Toledo Blade, Nov. 1, 1912.

30About Cox, Garford told audiences that he had shown no moral courage or leadership qualities in business and public affairs and that he was controlled by selfish and reactionary forces. Behind these broad generalizations the details faded away. Almost always Garford utterly ignored General Brown's candidacy except perhaps to mention the steal of the "Big Six." See speeches, c. Nov., 1912, Box 129, GF.

The question of trusts bothered Garford in the campaign, and he answered that the Progressive plank calling for an Industrial Commission to regulate concerns was necessary. The audience was given to understand that almost all businessmen were honest and that most trusts were good, but that the
A Bag Full of Tricks

Garford and other wearers of the Bull Moose antlers did not stake their all upon personal qualifications and a people's platform but took full advantage of what might be termed, for lack of a better phrase, a special effects department. When the Garford-led quartet of campaigners invaded Lorain County, the audience of voters was treated to a novel first in history. Elyria welcomed them with an "old-fashioned" political demonstration which featured a moratorium on the local anti-noise ordinance. In return the partisans were treated to motion pictures showing Garford in his spacious home and in preparation for his current speaking tour. The Elyria Telegram boasted that "it will be the first time in the history of American politics that motion pictures will be used in conjunction with campaign speeches." After the movie the candidates made their usual confessions of political faith while the audience was invited to partake in the crusader spirit by praying and singing patriotic songs.

The wound suffered by Theodore Roosevelt and the subsequent loss of his badly needed assistance in Ohio created an emergency for Ohio Progressives, which necessitated

unscrupulous individuals, not concerns, should be prosecuted. See Speeches, c. 1912, Box 128, GP. Also Arthur Garford to Daniel E. Parks, Feb. 16, 1912, GP.

31 Elyria Telegram, Oct. 18, 1912.
32 Ibid., Oct. 22, 1912.
an eleven-day whirlwind campaign aboard the "Bull Moose" or "Social Justice" special. However, it is not unlikely that this expedient would have been used even if their national leader had not been stricken. The competition for votes between the three major parties was very keen, and the Progressives believed that the unpredictable voters could still produce any result. More importantly, the Progressive campaigners had been almost unanimous in their complaints about sparse crowds. It was their ardent hope that the "Bull Moose" special would awaken the apathetic public.  

Walter Brown later revealed that H.H. Timken and Garford had financed the cost of the train, $6,300.  

A special train of two Pullman cars was chartered to allow for a spectacular and comprehensive vote-getting tour of Ohio between October 22 and November 2. Garford, the main attraction, and the entire retinue ate and slept aboard the train for those eleven days and delivered "the gospel of social justice" at eighty-five scheduled stops throughout the state.  

This new dimension in the campaign certainly caused invigorating repercussions in the quaint old town of Lebanon.

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33 Cleveland Leader, Oct. 20, 1912.  
34 Canton News-Democrat, Nov. 2, 1912. Much earlier Brown had acknowledged a check for $2500. from Garford, who financed his own campaign. See Walter F. Brown to Arthur Garford, Oct. 2, 1912, GP.  
35 Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 22, 1912. See also, Toledo Blade, Oct. 23, 1912.
on the morning of the twenty-third. The townspeople were awakened by fifty bomb explosions, which heralded the arrival of the "Bull Moose" special and announced a sunrise meeting. The attendance at this rally was given as two hundred, which was excellent under the circumstances. Enthusiasm was also engendered throughout Ohio's southeastern region. In the mining town of Jackson a night gathering featured a parade led by "200 husky young men from the mines and hillside farms in Rough Rider costumes, topped with bandana handkerchiefs. . . ."37

Hampering the Message

The "Bull Moose" special soon had its Republican counterpart, the "Prosperity Special", which featured Judge John M. Harlan and state executive chairman Harry M. Daugherty. The Republicans also made a special effort to ridicule and to castigate the "Bull Moose" special as nothing more than a traveling evangelical sideshow. In Warren G. Harding's Marion the Progressives held forth under a circus tent after a local minister had opened the meeting with a prayer. Once the supplication was over, the Republican hecklers began harassing the candidates. "Mr. Garford was interrupted at times by a Taft enthusiast who sat in the 'amen' corner."38

The coincident Republican barrage of criticism and

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., Oct. 29, 1912.
38 Delaware Herald, Oct. 23, 1912.
sarcasm was provocative, but it was not as serious as the relatively pitiable news coverage allotted the Progressive campaign by most of Ohio's newspapers. The only leading Progressive newspapers were the Cleveland Leader, the Toledo Blade, the Columbus Dispatch and the Ohio State Journal. If the Progressives were to win or even to place in the November elections, their candidates had to become familiar names and faces to most voters. Earlier in the year, before the progressive bolt, Garford had estimated that well over half of Ohio's Republican and independent newspapers favored Taft at the expense of Roosevelt. Many of these newspapers, fully a half dozen in the Fourteenth District alone, had editors who had been appointed as postmasters by Taft and were loyal to the President.39

Judging by the lament of the Progressives this disparity had increased to intolerable proportions. In Coshocton Garford not only attacked his political rivals but Ohio's newspapers as well. He "...made a scathing attack upon the newspapers in general of the state because the majority of publishers have refused to recognize the new party." He charged that petty postmasters and political bosses "...refuse to give us publicity", even if the Progressives offered to pay for space! Furthermore, "these newspapers have refused to be fair. They've been making a lot of unfair straw votes

39To W.W. Sims, March 7, 1912, GP.
trying to fool the people... By ignoring the Progressive party and its candidates the publicity strong Democrats and Republicans had struck a vulnerable spot in the Progressive armor.

Republican newspapers were not absolutely indifferent to the Progressive party; when a favorable opportunity presented itself, they eagerly published politically damaging stories. The most harmful charge was made by Malcolm Jennings, the editor of Harding's Marion Star. Jennings had also been the secretary of the recent Republican state convention and now, late in the campaign, he accused Garford of having deliberately plotted "party treachery", if he and the progressives did not gain control of the Republican party.41 This was an accusation that Garford did not allow to go unanswered, since it constituted a frontal attack upon his themes of honesty and sincerity. He denounced this charge of hypocrisy and correctly declared that he had refused the party's nomination as long as his candidacy entailed the acceptance of the Chicago platform.42 Whether his audiences believed him is uncertain, but certainly Garford labored long to convince them of the correctness of his assertions.

Aside from uncooperative Republicans, nature also took

40Coshocton Age, Nov. 1, 1912.
41Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1912.
42bid. See also, Speech by Arthur Garford, c. Oct. 25, 1912, Box 128, GP.
its toll on the effectiveness of Progressive attempts to reach the voter. Early in the campaign, while still in a weakened condition because of ptomaine poisoning, Garford watched helplessly as several scheduled meetings were forbidden by the Geauga county health officials while the populace recovered from a diphtheria epidemic.\textsuperscript{43} Severe rains also hampered the campaign of the Progressive candidates. In Jefferson, rain forced Garford's quartet into the town hall after "thrice the usual rent" was demanded and received by standpatters who "had charge of the building."\textsuperscript{44} Despite the distribution of some five thousand handbills and half page advertisements in the newspapers "...the affair was a dismal failure." By the actual count of an unfriendly newspaper reporter only eighty-seven persons attended, and most of them were part of "the invading party and the Finn Band." Matters were worsened by a biting frost that put a severe chill on any show of enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{45}

The End of a Hard Campaign

"Thoroughly worn out" by the grueling campaign, Garford, his voice husky after delivering more than one hundred speeches and his frame twelve pounds lighter after traveling more than nineteen thousand miles, ended his bid for

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer}, Oct. 9, 1912.

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Elyria Telegram}, Oct. 1912.

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Jefferson Gazette}, Oct. 10, 1912.
the governorship with rallies in Cleveland and Elyria. 46
After their long fight to capture a large segment of the
vote the Progressive leaders evaluated the results. Wel­
ter F. Brown, chairman of the campaign and possibly in the best
position to give an assessment, confidentially and con­
fidently wrote to Garford that "I believe we have an ex­
cellent chance at carrying the state."47 His optimism was
probably based on the assumption that the Progressives
would receive most of the large "silent" vote. Brown was
too optimistic.

Democrat James M. Cox was elected governor of Ohio
in 1912 having received fifty thousand votes fewer than the
combined totals of Robert B. Brown and Garford. Garford
ran third with 217,903 votes, fifty-five thousand less than
Brown.48 He received a plurality in nine counties as against
ten for Brown. In twenty counties, including Cuyahoga and
Franklin, Garford was second. In most northern counties he
had attained more votes than Brown, but his showing was
particularly weak in Cincinnati and Dayton as well as in
most Ohio River counties.49

Philosophical in defeat the Elyria Telegram concluded
that the Progressive party, a fledgling of only two months,

46 Elyria Telegram, Nov. 4, 1912.
47 To Arthur Garford, Nov. 4, 1912, GP.
48 Secretary of State, Annual Statistical Report, 1912, 323.
49 Ibid., 328-329.
had done quite well in Ohio considering the extent of the Democratic victory throughout the nation. It declared, somewhat erroneously, that Garford was after all only a political neophyte and that his future within the Progressive party was bright. Unofficially but privately Garford was of the same opinion. He was apparently not disheartened by his own personal defeat or by that of his party, and he indorsed Roosevelt's statement that "the fight has just begun."

Garford did not believe that the Progressive party was inherently repugnant to the public and blamed its defeat in Ohio on a decided lack of time in which to organize the forces and to do fruitful campaign work. For his own disappointing returns in southern Ohio and defeat by Brown, he maintained that President Taft was responsible. Taft commanded a large following in southern Ohio and Brown received many votes simply because it was a presidential and not just a gubernatorial election. If it had simply been the latter, Garford argued that he would have defeated Brown by a two to one margin.

The desire to organize the party thoroughly on a permanent basis was the real basis for Garford's and other Progressives' optimism about their political future in the

50 Elyria Telegram, Nov. 7, 1912.
51 To James R. Garfield, Nov. 20, 1912, GP.
52 To George W. Perkins, Nov. 18, 1912, GP.
party. In a speech in Ashtabula County Garford declared himself ready to perfect the party's organization so that 1914 would not be like 1912. To Walter Brown he wrote: "I stand ready to do anything I can to help along the cause."

Early in December, 1912, the Progressives of Ohio met in Columbus to open the campaign of 1914. Their determination was reflected in the decision to organize county clubs upon a permanent basis. And problems of leadership were solved by Garford's unhesitating willingness to lead the party in 1914, if its followers so desired.

53Speech of Arthur Garford, late Nov., 1912, Box 128, GP.
54To Walter F. Brown, Dec. 13, 1912, GP.
55Elyria Telegram, Dec. 9, 1912.
Chapter VIII

The Second and Last Campaign: 1913-1914

Treading Water: 1913

Discussion and rumors of amalgamation of Republicans and Progressives were the chief political topics in 1913, but conditions for compromise and reunion were not favorable. Neither party was willing to be the guest in any friendship ceremonies. Both demanded that it be the host and receiver of concessions. Given these inflexible attitudes, a coalition did not have promising prospects.\(^1\)

As long as fusion was not achieved, the Progressives of necessity concerned themselves with holding their ranks in firm order. It was recognized that many Progressive voters in 1912 were Republicans at heart and would, at the first definite sign of futility, return to the latter's fold. The loss of the "weak-kneed" but invaluable voter was one of the Progressive party's more troublesome problems.\(^2\)

Garford's cure for this ailment involved one of the best known and most common political remedies: patronage. In a letter dated August fifteenth to James M. Cox, he

\(^1\)Elyria Telegram, May 3, 1913.

\(^2\)Arthur Garford to Charles L. Thurber, June 6, 1913, and L.W. Taber to Arthur Garford, May 13, 1913, GP.
figuratively hugged the Democratic Governor and his administration. He showered high praises upon him and then assured Cox that all good citizens were or should be his political supporters. The letter gave no evidence of collusion between the leaders of the two parties but beyond a doubt Garford privately proclaimed himself at least a supporter of Governor Cox. Matters of state patronage provided a partial and possibly a complete explanation for Garford's letter to and his direct conversations with Governor Cox during the week. Garford, performing the chores normally assigned to Walter Brown, who was unfortunately unavailable for the Columbus talks, wired the latter that the "situation Columbus needs your immediate attention. Succeeded in having several adverse appointments vital to our cause held up pending your return and promised Governor Cox you would see him this week. Don't fail me."

Brown did arrive in time for at least two conferences with the Governor, and the results were most satisfactory judging from the tone of the Elyria Telegram. It reported a recent number of appointments of Progressives to county liquor license commissions and other important state commissions. The direct result was to dispel lingering doubts about the ability of the Progressives to have a state

3 To James M. Cox, Aug. 15, 1913, GP.
4 To Walter F. Brown, Aug. 14, 1913, GP.
ticket in 1914.\(^5\) Throughout the year the Progressives, and particularly Walter Brown, were to make the trek to Columbus. With basket in hand they vigorously shook Governor Cox's plum tree.\(^6\)

To the Republicans Brown's appearances were more like those of an unpleasant apparition and before long stories were circulated of a deal or trade between Cox and the Progressives. Close friends of the Governor believed that he would seek a second term as Governor as a prelude to his candidacy for the Presidency. Cox was almost assured of his reelection in 1914 unless the Republicans and Progressives united, and to avoid this it was certainly in his interests to strengthen the Progressive organization.\(^7\) Garford branded the reports of a compact as "absolutely untrue", but the allegations persisted until the election of 1914 was history.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) Elyria Telegram, Aug. 26, 1913. See also James M. Cox to Arthur Garford, Aug. 19, 1913, GP.

\(^6\) Elyria Telegram, Oct. 17, 1913.

\(^7\) Ibid., Oct. 6, 1913.

\(^8\) Ibid., Jan. 30, 1914. A letter from Walter F. Brown to Arthur Garford, Oct. 31, 1913, GP, does offer some tangible evidence that an informal understanding between Garford and Cox was desired by the former. "I talked your matter [the United States Senatorship in 1914?] over today with both the Governor and Secretary of State [Charles H. Graves]. The latter did not indicate what position he would take. I am inclined to think that he is going to try to put [Judson] Harmon over. My best guess is that the Governor will stand by you." [My italics]
The Progressives Stand Pat

The Ohio Progressives held a Columbus convention January 4, 1914, to determine the present and future of their party. The evening before, "the advance guard", some sixty state central committeemen and prominent Progressives, "... met in Brown's room and very exhaustively discussed resolutions covering a tentative platform to be submitted by the Resolutions Committee to the Convention on the next day." By one-thirty A.M., after widely variant opinions had been vehemently argued, the Progressive leaders achieved harmony and a platform acceptable to all.

The Saturday affair was marked by surprisingly good attendance and enthusiasm as the platform was unanimously adopted. Violent opposition to any suggestion of amalgamation characterized all of the speeches including that of former Senator Albert J. Beveridge, who addressed the assemblage. Instead, the Progressives decided to enter a full ticket in the November elections pledged to a platform designed to capture Ohio's wavering rank and file. Although the conference did not act in the matter of state nominations, "Garfield and Garford were the uncontested

9Walter F. Brown to Arthur Garford, Dec. 17, 1913, GP.
10Arthur Garford to H.H. Timken, Jan. 20, 1914, GP.
11Elyria Telegram, Jan. 7, 1914.
12Ibid., Jan. 5, 1914.
choices for Governor and Senator, respectively. Pro-
gressive hopes centered around two resolutions concerning
the temperance question and woman suffrage.

The platform declaration on temperance proposed that
an amendment to the federal constitution give Congress
the power to deal with the matter. Garford wrote that the
Anti-Saloon League's Wayne Wheeler was "tremendously pleased
with the Resolution" and had assured the party's candidates
of his and the league's support. "When one considers that
over forty percent of the total vote in Ohio last year was
cast by the Drys his statement is significant."14

The indorsement of equal suffrage was stronger and
more positive to the "... great delight of Mrs. Harriet
Taylor Upton" and the suffrage forces.15 Mrs. Upton, the
treasurer of the National American Woman Suffrage Associ-
ation, was one in a line of political activists and a long-
time solicitor of Garford. She was the daughter of Ezra B.
Taylor, James A. Garfield's successor in Congress, and the
author of several short stories.16 When the Progressives
adopted the advanced position on woman suffrage, she was
extremely gratified. In an unbelievably innocent and naive
way she wrote Garford that she "... could hardly believe

14To H.H. Timken, Jan. 20, 1914, GP.
15Elyria Telegram, Jan. 5, 1914.
16Ibid., Oct. 23, 1909.
my ears when I heard men shouting as they did over our resolution."17

These two resolutions were the heart and soul of the Progressive party's 1914 platform, and taken together they meant victory if anything did. "The strong endorsement given to Woman Suffrage and the advanced position taken on the Temperance question will surely command substantially the entire strength of the Dry vote of the State."18

Lincoln's birthday was the occasion for the opening of the Progressives' 1914 campaign as well as Garford's senatorial bid. Meeting in Lima the Progressives nominated Garford and Garfield for senator and governor, respectively. Of the two, Garford was considered to have the better possibilities of election, assuming that the rival parties nominated relatively "weak" candidates.19 Before the nominations were made, Nat Wright stressed the urgency connected with the Lima affair. "Walter [Brown] and I both feel that this Lima meeting is of more vital importance to the Progressive party than anything that can happen in the coming campaign. The attention of the state must be focussed on

17To Arthur Garford, Jan. 7, 1914, GP. A few months later Mrs. Upton thanked Garford for his financial contribution to the suffrage cause and among other quotable lines wrote: "I think it is the finest thing in the world for men and women to associate together on the plain of common sense and common good. . . Sometimes regardless of my strenuous life I feel like shouting because I happened to be born at this time of the world's awakening." March 17, 1914, GP.

18Arthur Garford to H.H. Timken, Jan. 20, 1914, GP.

you and Jim [Garfield] by your speeches, and the anti-Cox and anti-reactionary sentiment in the state must be crystal-
ized behind you. . . ."20

Wright advised Garford to ". . . talk very little about human welfare and human uplift, and that sort of thing, but to put yourself in the picture as a hard-headed, cool-
nerved successful business man . . . ."21 Garford's Lima speech was to be the keynote for his entire campaign and called for a rousing rush into the fight. Wright believed that Garford, having briefly sketched the Progressive platform of 1912 and taking ". . . credit for the Progressive character of the Democratic administration up to date, saying that everybody knows that the Democratic party is basically and fundamentally Bourbonistic and reactionary", should then ". . . emphasize the fact that this being a commercial nation", the Progressive party, a happy medium between the Republicans and the Democrats, was best suited for its leadership. Finally Garford was to ". . . urge strenuously the Progressive plank for woman suffrage . . . . we should go to it hard" since the Democrats had rejected it. ". . . Also bang down on the temperance question. We are not going to get any liquor votes any way . . . and we might as well do the best we can to get the other fellows . . . . I would not make it a hot total abstinence or W.C.T.U.

20To Arthur Garford, Feb. 6, 1914, GP.
21Ibid.
speech, but . . . point with vigorous pride" at the Progressive plank.\(^{22}\) To a remarkable extent Garford's actual speech at Lima accepted the pattern as outlined in Wright's letter.\(^{23}\)

Possibilities of Success

The Progressives during approximately the first half of 1914 entertained a genuine belief that their chances at the polls were bright. Both Wright and Garford felt that the latter, in particular, would achieve victory. The business interests reportedly favored him, and the public appeared eager to embrace the Progressives' reforms. Both Democrats and Republicans seemed on the verge of exhaustion following rounds of internal bickerings, and Garford anticipated a swelling of the Progressive ranks by a deserting stream of embittered factionalists.\(^{24}\) To help matters he and other Progressives encouraged the senatorial candidacy of Joseph B. Foraker, believing that if the old warrior was

\(^{22}\)Ibid.

\(^{23}\)Speeches of Arthur Garford, Feb. 12, 1914, Box 128, GP. Garford said much about business in presenting himself as the conveyor of a viable method for dealing with the nation's business problems. Specifically, he indorsed the party's plank to have a strong federal commission to supervise corporations engaged in interstate commerce or those of public importance. Aided by thorough publicity of undesirable practices, a proper balance between capital and labor would be achieved and prosperity assured.

Garford "banged down" on the liquor issue a bit more than Wright suggested by urging a national referendum designed to impose a prohibition on the liquor traffic.

\(^{24}\)Nat C. Wright to Arthur Garford, April 29, 1914, and Arthur Garford to H.C. Hoffman, July 9, 1914, GP.
nominated, he would be decisively repudiated by the voters. Walter Brown cautioned Garford to omit all references to Foraker in his speeches: "Foraker has not yet definitely announced his candidacy. . . . I feel confident that he will run, but nothing should be done by us to discourage him." For similar reasons Garford also desired the nomination of Democrat Timothy S. Hogan.

When Warren G. Harding, and not Foraker, received the Republican nomination, the handwriting on the wall was becoming discernible. But there were other straws in the wind that boded ill for Garford and the Progressives. The problem of backsliders amidst the host had never been successfully confronted except by the rather hollow charge that those who returned to the Republican party were only the "ward heelers, the camp followers, the pie hunters." Even in Garford's own political back yard, the Fourteenth District, many Progressive voters of 1912 had returned to the Republican fold. The Anti-Saloon League's Wayne B. Wheeler, from whom Garford earlier in the year had expected

25To Arthur Garford, April 23, 1914, GP.

26To C.J. Gugler, May 2, 1914, GP. Garford regarded both Foraker and Hogan as reactionaries and liabilities to their parties.

27Arthur Garford to Myron T. Herrick, May 4, 1914, GP.

28Arthur Garford to Daniel W. Williams, May 11, 1914, and E.R. Root to Arthur Garford, July 24, 1914, GP. Garford claimed that these were mere office-seekers, while Root maintained that the removal of William H. Taft as an issue was the cause of their return.
so much support, wrote that the "Progressive sentiment is practically dead" in most Ohio counties. The league would not indorse a single party in the election: "To put all our eggs in the Progressive basket this fall would be fatal to our cause."\(^{29}\)

Garford attempted remedial measures but about all that he had at his disposal were words of encouragement and assurance. To a gathering of the Progressives of Marion County he sent a letter of fond hopes intended to hearten their flagging spirits and to rekindle their political fire.\(^{30}\) He delivered a personal message to one who had expressed his pessimism about the November election. He assured him that his discouragement was unnecessary. "The way to win a battle is not for the private to worry about what the general is going to do, but rather to have faith in the leader, and in so doing, to show individual loyalty to both cause and the leader."\(^{31}\)

Despite these ominous black signs Garford was convinced that he and his party had an excellent chance to win.

Discounting the feuds within the other parties and their apparent bipartisan business sympathies, one can conclude that the basis of his optimism lay in the Progressives' strategy of linking the temperance and suffrage issues.

\(^{29}\)To E.R. Root, July 23, 1914, GP.

\(^{30}\)To the Progressives of Marion County, April 20, 1914, GP.

\(^{31}\)To J.W. Means, April 20, 1914, GP.
Ohio in 1914 was to vote upon equal suffrage, which Garford held to be an "instrument" to control and to end "the curse of liquor."\textsuperscript{32} The Progressives' plans for victory assumed that most of Ohio's large "dry" vote also considered woman suffrage in this light. With state-wide prohibition to be voted upon in 1916, it was believed that in 1914 the drys would naturally champion the suffrage issue and consequently the Progressive candidates.\textsuperscript{33}

Early in July Ohio's liquor interests created a new situation, which Garford welcomed. They began to circulate petitions for a referendum to repeal the county local option law and to amend the state constitution so that no similar law could be passed for fifteen years. This was a move apparently designed to transform the suffrage contest into a clear temperance fight and to neutralize the sentiment for woman suffrage before the women got a chance to vote on prohibition.\textsuperscript{34}

Garford, who personally did not consider himself a fanatic on the subject of temperance, did however eagerly seize upon what he considered to be a challenge and a splendid political opportunity. Without hesitation or equivocation he declared himself for state-wide prohibition and prompted the Progressive party to do the same. He

\textsuperscript{32}To John G. Reilly, June 1, 1914, GP.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Elyria Telegram}, Feb. 11, 1914.

\textsuperscript{34}Arthur Garford to George W. Perkins, July 21, 1914, GP.
believed that the ever increasing emphasis placed upon the equal suffrage and temperance issues as the only important ones in the campaign would compel the Anti-Saloon League's support.\(^{35}\)

The official platform conventions of Ohio's three major parties were held shortly after the storm caused by the brewers' actions. The Progressive platform indorsed everything that Garford desired. It took "a decided stand for state-wide prohibition" and accepted the Anti-Saloon League's recently proposed amendment to make Ohio dry.\(^{36}\) The Progressives had gladly conformed with the league's "...ultimatum to all parties that it would give neither aid nor comfort to any convention which side-stepped the issue of prohibition."\(^{37}\)

By the actions of the conventions and its own ultimatum, the Anti-Saloon League was left in the predicament of having either to break with the Republicans, denounced as straddlers, or to form an alliance with the Progressives.\(^{38}\) That Garford

\(^{35}\)Arthur Garford to John N. Willys, Sept. 8, 1914, GP. See also Arthur Garford to George W. Perkins, July 21, 1914, and to Rodney H. Brandon, Aug. 5, 1914, GP.

\(^{36}\)Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 25, 1915.

\(^{37}\)Ibid., Aug. 24, 1914.

\(^{38}\)Ibid., Aug. 26, 1914. While the Democrats declared themselves to be satisfied with the existing license laws, the Republican plank hoped that Ohioans would vote by conviction on the amendments. The party promised to enforce any laws. Neither platform approached the temperance stand of the Progressives, although the Republican promise to enforce existing and future laws technically conformed with the league's ultimatum.
believed the latter course would be pursued is evidenced
by his own optimism immediately following the platform
conventions. It was his opinion that they had "... cer-
tainly put the Progressive party in a much stronger position
than appeared might be the case a week ago."39

Garford and the Progressive party smiled on the eve
of the campaign because of the above despite such obvious
danger signs as backsliding and Wayne Wheeler's equivocations.
Still another ill augury was the Ohio primaries of August
eleventh. On that day Foraker made a strong showing but
ran second to Warren G. Harding, who became Garford's
Republican opponent. "Personal antagonisms, one of the
few certainties of Ohio politics", had probably caused
Foraker's defeat and the Progressives' consequent chagrin.40
The Progressives were disappointed not only by the results
of the Republican primary but also by their own. Although
handicapped by the lack of intra-party contests, they still
had hoped for a large primary vote. To accomplish this the
Elyria Telegram had even urged Lorain County's twelve hundred
Socialists to vote for the Progressive party.41 Despite
these determined efforts the party's candidates had received

39To John H. Price, Aug. 28, 1914, GP.
41P.S. Williams to Arthur Garford, July 20, 1914, GP.
See also Elyria Telegram, Aug. 12, 1914.
very few primary votes. Garford himself had polled a
minuscule 7,519 votes from the entire state. 142

The Wet and Dry Campaign of 1914

For eight weeks prior to the election, Garford,
sharing the platform with the party's candidate for secretary
of state, Frank W. Woods of Medina County, was on the campaign
trail presenting himself, his party and its issues to the
people. He came as an honest, practical and wise businessman
(not a small town newspaper editor) and as the defender of
the Progressive faith and attacked his favorite target,
Warren G. Harding, as the defender of reaction. He lampooned
Harding for his devotion to national issues, particularly
America's commercial prosperity and the "rag doll" of
politics, the tariff. 143 The real issue and one which
Garford insisted was political and not just moral, was the
saloon or the "trinity of evil". None too subtly he con­
tinually linked the Progressive party with the churches and
the Republican party with the saloons and their evils. 144

The Elyria Telegram's summation of Garford's first
week of barnstorming concluded that the temperance and equal

142 Charles H. Graves, Secretary of State, Ohio Election

143 Elyria Telegram, Oct. 7, 1914.

144 Ohio State Journal, Oct. 20, 1914. Garford divided the
evils of the saloon into three general classes: (1) that
which destroys and degrades the drinker; (2) that which
causes economic waste and reduces industrial worth; (3) that
which dominates politics and much of society.
suffrage planks were stirring interest among the voters. Traveling through central Ohio, Garford had climaxed the week with a "rousing meeting" at Findlay. The newspaper did not report it, but the significant feature of that first week's campaign was not the interest stimulated but rather a problem which the Progressives had never solved. In Wyandot County Garford first encountered the difficulty: he and his party had arrived only to discover "no organization and no advance advertising." This was a deadly situation to be duplicated many times again during the campaign. In Hardin County, the home of Frank B. Willis, the Republican candidate for Governor, Progressives were in "evidence" but handicapped by "no county organization." The same painful observation applied to Madison, Fayette and Clark counties. In LaRue an unfriendly newspaper sarcastically reported that "our blessed little village was noticeably disturbed" by the "alleged water-wagon clique". In an impromptu meeting, its

45Elyria Telegram, Sept. 20, 1914.

46Secretary to Garford, A Campaign Diary, Sept. 18, 1914, Box 127, GP. (Hereinafter cited Diary) This is an interesting, dust-choked but more frequently rain-soaked account of Garford's wanderings by automobile throughout Ohio during the 1914 campaign. It leaves the definite impression that a "black cloud" followed the party almost from the start.

47Ibid., Sept. 21, 1914.

efforts to "bamboozle" the good citizens attracted an audience of only thirteen.\textsuperscript{49}

The weather was little better to Garford than the lack of party organization. A warm sun during the first week resulted in excellent roads, but soon they became "thick with dust".\textsuperscript{50} And then, during the second week of the campaign, the rains came. Heavy rains turned dust-choked roads into seas of mud. During the entire campaign dark clouds were never far out of sight and much intermittent rain showered the campaigners and their partisans.

The results of the deluge were predictable. Of the tour in Perry County, Garford's secretary wrote that "heavy rains commenced early in afternoon and hilly clay roads were almost impassable. Rainstorm interfered with New Straitsville meeting [attendance given as seventy-five] and cars had terrible trip over strange roads to Logan where night was spent, reaching there after one A.M."

The party had "pushed" its way through a total of ninety miles during the day.\textsuperscript{51} Soon thereafter Licking County was entered but the company had no cause for a respite. They "traveled all day in drizzling rain, meeting people under


\textsuperscript{50}\textit{Ibid.}, Sept. 22, 1914.

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Ibid.}, Oct. 9, 1914.
grocery porches or in village halls. . . .”

The rains and the roads rendered futile any attempt to keep the tour on its exacting schedule and during the middle of October the campaign was all but abandoned. Garford strove to reach the larger towns but avoided the others.

The miserable weather conditions took their toll on the speakers who were completely fatigued at the end of each week. The Sabbath's rest was always a much anticipated reward for their exertions. Less sturdy than humans, the automobiles took the brunt of nature's punishment. In Fayette County the right drive shaft broke in Garford's automobile. Garford hurriedly made a long distance telephone call to his wife, and his son-in-law arrived from Elyria at five-thirty A.M. following an all night ride on a train. In his hand he held a shaft removed from a similar automobile owned by an Elyria bank official. Later in the campaign Garford's other son-in-law hastily produced a needed front wheel bearing.

Not every day was clouded and not all roads were muddy. On the twenty-seventh of September Garford and all good Progressives journeyed to Columbus “. . . to hear Theodore Roosevelt deliver the keynote address of the

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52 Ibid., Oct. 13, 1914.
53 Ibid., Oct. 10, 14, and 19, 1914. See also Plain Dealer, Oct. 17, 1914.
54 Diary, Oct. 6, 1914.
55 Ibid., Oct. 21, 1914.
Progressive state campaign in Ohio." Roosevelt received an absolutely tremendous demonstration as ten thousand persons tried to get into Memorial Hall. Half of that number was turned away. Managers of the Democratic and Republican parties as well as "the managers of the Progressive state campaign were utterly astonished by the volume and character of the outpouring." Garfield and Garford gave short addresses before Roosevelt appeared. All "... devoted themselves to pleading for equal suffrage, for the prohibition amendment and for a state-wide system of good roads." In his train tour through northern Ohio Roosevelt "... came out flatly for the whole temperance program of the Ohio Prohibitionists" and produced what became a campaign slogan for the Progressives: "Conditions in Ohio this year are such that if I were a citizen of Ohio I would vote against the wet amendment and for the dry amendment."57

In Bellefontaine and throughout Logan County enthusiasm was high as twenty automobiles toured the county preceded by a brass band.58 Occasions presented themselves when Garford's secretary was happily induced to boast. In Clinton County Garford's party made a tour coincident with that of Willis. The two candidates held meetings at the same time in

56Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 29, 1914.

57Ibid., Sept. 30, 1914. See also Progressive Campaign Material: 1914, the Ohio State University Library, Oct. 24, 1911, 11.

58Diary, Sept. 26, 1914.
Wilmington and then raced to Martinsville which Garford reached first (by ten minutes) and in so doing secured a "strategic advantage." To complete a banner day Garford was "escorted through the county by a brass band and fifteen autos to ten for Willis. . . ."

The crowning retribution occurred in Summit County's Copley. Throughout the county Garford's party had been accompanied by two automobiles filled with cheering suffragists and followed, at a considerable distance, by "a dapper wet speaker in a big, Olds car." Once in Copley, Garford and the Progressives were "given lunch by W.C.T.U....but wets could not get in and stood out in rain with empty stomachs." Garford's secretary may have believed that the political tide was now ready to run in favor of Garford. Only the day before a group of gypsy fortune-tellers had met the party and had prophesied Garford's election.

Midway in October Garford caused one of the most surprising developments of the campaign. Speaking in a "drizzling rain" before a small crowd of two hundred and fifty people at Shelby, he "startled the audience" by repudiating and reading out of the Progressive party E.E. Cassel. Cassel was the local candidate for representative in Ohio's

59 Ibid., Oct. 5, 1914.

60 Ibid., Oct. 25, 1914. See also Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 25, 1914.

61 Diary, Oct. 23, 1914. See also Elyria Telegram, Oct. 25, 1914.
General Assembly and had recently announced his support for the home-rule amendment and his opposition to the prohibition amendment. Upon learning this Garford announced his party's "death sentence" and "... urged all Progressives and temperance and prohibition advocates, to support John F. Kramer, Mansfield Democrat, running for re-election against Cassel."62

Garford's dramatic thunderbolt was undoubtedly prompted by the necessity of securing the all important "dry" vote. However, Cassel's independence on the temperance issue was also something of a blessing in disguise for the Progressives. It afforded them an opportunity to reaffirm in a positive way the temperance principles which guided their campaign. In the past week the Republicans had made much of the charges that the Progressives were "merely stalking-horses for the Democrats" and that their temperance program was only an eleventh hour expediency.63 An editorial in the Youngstown Telegram asserted that "it is clear as daylight that the Garfield candidacy is promoted by Governor Cox."64 The editor finished his article with the Republican campaign slogan: "A vote for Garfield is half a vote for Cox."64

Willis and Harding had charged that Garford and Governor Cox

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62 Mansfield Shield, Oct. 16, 1914. See also Diary, Oct. 15, 1914.

63 Elyria Chronicle, Oct. 9, 1914. See also Youngstown Vindicator, Oct. 8, 1914.

Youngstown Telegram, undated, quoted from Republican Campaign Material: 1914, The Ohio State University Library, 8.
were together in a joint conspiracy for their own personal advancement, and Garford had been forced to answer the statements in the strongest possible language. He bluntly declared: "It's just a plain, cheap lie... a puerile statement..."65 The Cassel case was what Garford and the Progressives needed to reassert their sincerity.

The Progressive campaign ended in the friendly confines of northern Ohio with a series of rallies in Toledo and Cleveland. But even here the Progressives encountered resistance of a sort to their efforts. However, this time the responsibility was not with the Republicans, the weather or their own inadequate organization. Rather World War I was the offender. For their large night meetings the Progressives were in the habit of lighting their parades with "red fire." Apparently the war had severely limited the supply of "red fire" available for campaigns.66 This was just another obstacle the Progressives had to hurdle, in some way, if the voters were to be won.

A Thoroughly Humiliating Defeat

Even before the final results of the election were known, Garford expressed his genuine surprise over the outcome.67 When the last ballot had been counted, the Republicans had scored a remarkable victory. Both Willis

65Youngstown Vindicator, Oct. 8, 1914.
66Toledo Blade, Oct. 28, 1914.
67To William G. Sharp, Nov. 4, 1914, GP.
and Harding, and particularly the latter, had convincingly trounced their opposition. They had buried the Progressive candidates. Warren G. Harding was elected senator with 526,115 votes. Democrat Timothy S. Hogan received 423,742 votes. Garford, with a total of 67,509, was a telescopic third and almost indistinguishable from the Socialist candidate, who received less than fifteen thousand votes under Garford. In no single county did he run better than third! He had even failed to carry his own Lorain County. There, as in the rest of Ohio, the election was between Harding and Hogan. In Hamilton County Garford had received the negligible total of 1,927 votes! In sixty-three counties he had managed no better than third and in the remaining twenty-five the Socialist candidate, E.L. Hitchens, had forced him to accept last place. It was a terrible defeat for Garford and his party.

Garford's angry reaction to the election was immediate and long continued. He personally had contributed thousands of dollars to finance the Progressive Ohio campaign. Some months after the election he wrote that "in 1914, substantially the entire burden of something like $40,000 was carried by two or three of us. Mr. [H.H.] Timken and I contributed more than two-thirds of it according to my recollection. . . . In

68Charles H. Graves, Secretary of State, Ohio Election Statistics: 1914, 21-22, 25-26. The amendments for woman suffrage and prohibition were defeated by 182,905 and 84,152 votes respectively. The amendment for home rule passed by 12,618 votes.
1912, we did substantially the same thing."69 In the eight weeks' campaign he had "... traveled over 4,000 miles in my auto, covering 44 counties, and spoke in substantially 400 cities and towns of the state."70 Not until late in the campaign did he believe that he and his party would be defeated.71 His disappointment must have been horrendous. The political repudiation by about eighty-five percent of the voters of Ohio was a personally humiliating shock. There is no better evidence that his pride was severely humbled than the scorn and sarcasm to which he now gave vent.

The New York Times, shortly before the election, declared that the Ohio political situation was "distinctly a puzzle." Little was said about the chances of either Garford or Garfield or the Progressive candidates in general. Harding was favored to defeat Hogan. Significantly, the Times added one clarifying sentence: "In the Senatorial race a bitter attack has been made on Mr. Hogan on the ground of religion."72 Hogan was a Roman Catholic and not a popular Democratic candidate for that reason. His religion cost him many votes, particularly in the rural districts and

69To E.H. Hooker, national treasurer of the Progressive party, Feb. 9, 1916, GP.

70To C.A. Carlisle, Jan. 23, 1915, GP.

71To Daniel A. Poling, Nov. 12, 1914, GP.

was the most significant factor in Harding's sweep. The defeated Democratic candidate for Governor, James M. Cox, recalled the 1914 campaign as "... one of the most exciting battles in all our political history. ... This was the year of the anti-Catholic movement which swept the country."

Unfortunately for Ohio Democrats, Hogan was a Catholic, and the "great fanaticism" which developed quite early in the campaign affected thousands of voters. "'Read the Menace' was on fences, billboards, freight cars and everything else which could be utilized."

'Read the Menace and get the dope,
Go to polls and beat the Pope.'

Both Garford and the Progressives were particularly angered by the so-called Hamilton County deal, which they asserted was the cause for their party's defeat. Supposedly, Republican State Executive Chairman Edwin Jones had gone to Cincinnati just five days prior to the election. Once there, it was alleged that he manipulated "... the one big political deal of the campaign -- the deal which put Willis over and gave Governor Cox and the Democratic leaders the surprise of their lives." Jones reportedly "... traded Hamilton County Republican support of the home rule amendment to the Hamilton County 'wet' organization in return for Democratic

74 James M. Cox, Journey Through My Years, 1946, 178.
and wet support for Willis."\(^{75}\) Willis quickly denied that he had been involved in any such deal and denounced the entire report as absurd.\(^{76}\) Garford nevertheless considered that the voters had been "disgracefully tricked" by the Republicans and that ". . . the deal entered into with the brewing interests of Hamilton County is one of the blackest spots on the political pages of Ohio's history."\(^{77}\)

But the real villain in the affair, according to Garford, was the Anti-Saloon League and its supporters. The league, as an omni partisan organization, did not officially indorse any party but favored individual candidates. And it had not given its sanction to either Garford or Garfield.\(^{78}\) To Garford this constituted "blundering leadership" and rendered the league ". . . largely responsible for the defeat which we have suffered."\(^{79}\) The league had remained noncommittal on Garford's candidacy but had been openly antagonistic towards that of Garfield. Wayne Wheeler had

\(^{75}\)Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov. 6, 1914.
\(^{76}\)Ibid., Nov. 10, 1914.
\(^{77}\)To E.S. Saurers, Nov. 13, 1914, GP.
\(^{78}\)Reverend Milo G. Kelser to Arthur Garford, Dec. 11, 1914, GP. Kelser was an assistant secretary of the Anti-Saloon League. He explained to an irate Garford that the league would have indorsed him had not the Progressive party become in effect a prohibitionist party. The league, its strength dependent upon omni partisan membership, could not afford such a close connection with the Progressives.

\(^{79}\)To E.S. Saurers, Nov. 13, 1914, GP.
insisted that Willis was preferable to Garfield, and he had advocated a vote for the prohibition amendment but not for Garfield.80

Garford maintained that the league's position created a "situation" whereby the Progressives lost Ohio's all-decisive "dry" vote. By denouncing Garfield and at the same time attacking the Democrat, James M. Cox, the league had presumably allowed Willis a free hand to bargain with the wets of Cincinnati without fearing the loss of Ohio's "dry" vote. In creating this situation, Garford believed the league had cost him, personally, "several hundred thousand votes."81 The league's actions, more than anything else, had assassinated the Progressive party. "One thing is most apparent... the slaughter took place in the house of our so-called friends. My opinion is that Wayne Wheeler was the chief conspirator and was largely instrumental in turning the dry church vote against us."82

Garford's assumptions concerning Willis, the Anti-Saloon League, and the Hamilton County politicians were never proven. Willis' biographer, Gerald E. Ridinger, states that Willis was certainly quite concerned over the "wet" district of

80 Arthur Garford to Daniel A. Poling, Nov. 12, 1914, GP.
81 To C.A. Carlisle, Jan. 23, 1915, GP.
82 Arthur Garford to H.H. Timken, Nov. 16, 1914, GP. Garford agreed with John A. Berry who wrote that "no sane man believes its [the Anti-Saloon League] big leaders want Prohibition, but want a constant fight with its attendant large donations." To Arthur Garford, Nov. 8, 1914, GP.
Hamilton County but makes no mention of a possible deal. In addition, James M. Cox, who had nothing to gain by denying the existence and importance of such a deal, did precisely that. While writing that "Frank B. Willis [was one of] ... the political children of the Anti-Saloon League", Cox added that his victory in Hamilton County was "... due entirely to our [the Democrats] establishing proper observance of the Sabbath Day."84

Garford's ultimate scorn, and hence his greatest anger, was reserved for Ohio's church members, those "dear people" who did not appreciate the Progressive party's advanced position.85 In a quite mild letter to the Reverend Mr. Kelser he expressed his astonishment at the wholesale desertion of the Christian vote. Singling out no one, he concluded that "hypocrisy is in the saddle and high ideals and clean politics have been cast into the discard."86 His bitterness was more clearly evidenced in a letter to a fellow Progressive: "I regret to say that my faith in the pretensions and sound sense of many men counted among the church element is at a low ebb."87

Garford's long campaign and the final disaster at the


84James M. Cox, op. cit., 179-180.

85To John A. Berry, Nov. 12, 1914, GP.

86To Reverend Milo G. Kelser, Nov. 16, 1914, GP.

87To E.R. Root, Jan. 6, 1915, GP.
polls amounted to a case of severe over-exposure of his sensibilities and resulted in a prolonged election "hang-over". What was at first surprise quickly became positive humiliation. In self-righteous indignation his anger welled up and overflowed. In his disillusionment he was caustic. "I am almost tempted to believe that Taft was right when he said that the voice of the people was the voice of the unthinking mob." At least Garford was inclined to accept the "unthinking" aspect of the judgment.88

The final upshot of the campaign and election of 1914 was Garford's own political epitaph. His defeat also marked the end of his "personal active participation in politics".89 He had long been active in local and state affairs to "... help redeem the Republican Party... and... to purge the Party of the political plunderers. ... It was an almost hopeless task from the start, but no struggle is too great for a man of courage and strong convictions to engage in." The recent election had climaxed his efforts, but "they all combined against me this fall": his political enemies, "the hunger cry", and the brewers. "I have always firmly believed that business men should take an active interest in politics. ... [but] I am almost of the opinion now, after years of fighting for my convictions, that

88To N.L. MacLachlan, Nov. 25, 1914, GP.

89To Seward Prosser, Jan. 15, 1915, GP. This letter is a long political swansong. Although Garford had yet to live almost two decades, he was essentially correct in stating that his active participation in politics had ended.
there is little or no place for business men in politics who think that way [that is, maintain their convictions], and that the people themselves apparently prefer to continue in command political shysters and gamesters. . . . " Dis-satisfied and injured, Garford concluded that politics did not need him and that it involved "... too great a sacrifice for any good business man to make even though he may be an idealist."90 Garford, something of a self-righteous blend of authoritarianism and idealism, had been denied the power to effect his version of the millennium, and so he now prepared to retire from the scene of his defeat.

90Ibid.
CHAPTER IX

GARFORD'S FINANCIAL FOUNDATIONS

The Garford Company

Politics had a definite fascination for Garford but did not entirely consume his interests and energies. In direct proportion to the well-being of his industrial enterprises, he engaged in political matters. During his years of greatest political activity, 1904 through 1914, his two major companies, the Garford Company and the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company, fortunately provided him with a stable economic base without which he would not have engaged in any but petty, local politics.

The Garford Company, incorporated in 1905 and a direct descendant of the Federal Manufacturing Company, originally manufactured high-grade automobile parts and was, even in 1905, a relatively healthy concern.¹ Net profits for the first six months of operation totaled ninety thousand dollars, and Garford confidently predicted that they would exceed two hundred thousand for the fiscal year.² Within a year after its founding Garford decided that to facilitate

¹See Chapter II for a history of events leading to the formation of the Garford Company.

²To R.P. Peake, April 30, 1906, GP.

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economy measures and to allow for its steadily increasing business, the company had to consolidate its two factories, one in Cleveland and one in Elyria, under a single new roof. 3 Eager "public spirited citizens", members of Elyria's "progressive" committee on new industries, and in general leading local businessmen indorsed the proposal of J.C. Hill, president of the town's Savings Deposit Bank, that five hundred thousand dollars be raised to buy one hundred and thirty acres and to erect some five to eight hundred houses for the benefit of the employees of the proposed plant. In the interests of "a greater Elyria" these powerful individuals and groups had determined that the Garford Company was not to escape Elyria. 4

Certain ". . . that Elyria is bound to become a manufacturing town" and assured that his conditions would be fulfilled, Garford announced that he would build his new plant in Elyria. 5 While his costs to do so were considerably less than the sum raised by Elyria's businessmen, Garford had still to secure funds for an investment of approximately two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in new

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3 Elyria Republican, Feb. 8, 1906. See also Elyria Democrat, Feb. 15, 1906.

4 Elyria Democrat, Feb. 15, 1906, and Elyria Republican, March 1, 1906.

5 Ibid., March 8, 1906. Aside from housing for the workers and acreage for the plant, Garford was assured of the usual public improvements around the factory site such as sewers, water mains, gas pipes, paved streets and sidewalks and a bridge over a river. See Elyria Republican, Aug. 9, 1906.
buildings and machinery. His own liquid capital had been seriously depleted if not practically exhausted by the American Bicycle Company's failure and the reorganization of the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company. In order to acquire the necessary cash, Garford increased the company's capital stock, all of which was immediately purchased by the Studebaker brothers, John M. and Clement.7

With this purchase of a minor interest in the Garford Company, Garford and the Studebaker interests began a close relationship that was to last for the next five years. As part of the arrangements Garford agreed to sell a third of his chassis output to the Studebakers.8 The trademark "Studebaker - Garford" was employed on these automobiles with chassis by Garford and body by Studebaker.9 The association with the Studebaker brothers caused the Garford Company to abandon the production of parts and products only and to enter the apparently broader field of automobile chassis. Within a year the company was to manufacture automobiles complete. Years later, in reviewing this decision, Garford could not help but reflect on his own relatively slight industrial success in comparison to that of the Timken brothers. Both he and they had been early

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6Elyria Democrat, March 8, 1906.
7Arthur Garford to R.P. Peake, April 30, 1906, GP.
8Elyria Republican, March 22, 1906.
9F.O. Richey to Arthur Garford, Jan. 16, 1919, GP.
competitors in the automobile parts industry. Unlike Garford, the Timkens had remained in this specialty and had risen to preeminence. He had chosen to produce chassis and eventually his own car. Financially this decision was a case of mistaken judgment as Garford admitted: "as I review that experience I recognize the fact that I made a great mistake..."

The Studebaker Brothers Manufacturing Company continued in 1907 to absorb as much as fifty percent of the Garford Company's chassis product and thus assured the latter of satisfactory economic prospects.\textsuperscript{11} However, in the fall of the year, Garford, after considerable hesitation, embarked on a new venture. In order to supplement his business in chassis production, he resolved to manufacture and to market an automobile under his own name. This move proved to be a grand miscalculation since it involved competing with many proven automobile firms in the perfection of style and in the distribution of the product to a far-flung and fickle public. Elyria was hardly the place to dictate America's automobile fashions, but it did have excellent facilities for their production and this apparently helped to induce Garford to take the risk.\textsuperscript{12} To offset Elyria's relative isolation Garford arranged with the Packard automobile interests to use their New York sales force and Times

\textsuperscript{10}To S.S. Eveland, Oct. 18, 1919, GP.  
\textsuperscript{11}Arthur Garford to P. Gregoire, Nov. 14, 1907, GP.  
\textsuperscript{12}Elyria Telegram, Aug. 16, 1907.
Square sales room. He also organized two new companies in Cleveland and New York to facilitate the sale of the Garford automobile.13

Despite his best efforts Garford had to discard this ambitious project after a year of failure. In October, 1908, the Garford Company entered into an additional arrangement with the Studebaker concern whereby the former devoted all of its attention to manufacturing chassis for which the Studebakers contracted.14

Two years later Garford completely severed his relationship with the Studebaker company and once more, and again reluctantly, determined to market his own automobile using his own advertising and distribution forces.15 For many months he had been thoroughly disappointed with the larger company which was on the verge of a possible reorganization. In May, 1910, the auditors of J.P. Morgan investigated the properties of the Studebaker properties because of the latter's desperate financial status. Because of his own dependency upon them, Garford was much concerned. Disgusted, he complained that the Studebakers' "... methods of doing business were unreliable" and based upon the "By Guess And By God" rule. They were "nice" people with which

13 Ibid. See also Arthur Garford to M.W. Reeves, Sept. 3, 1907, GP.

14 Arthur Garford to R.B. McMullen, Oct. 22, 1908, GP. See also Elyria Telegram, Nov. 30, 1908.

15 Arthur Garford to P. Gregoire, Dec. 12, 1910, GP.
to conduct business but without a supreme authority necessary to settle matters of policy and management, "... a sort of nebulous concern made up of relatives... more or less influenced by prejudices and family differences." Under these conditions Garford was compelled to seek his independence.

For the next year and a half, until early summer, 1912, Garford was almost literally immersed in the affairs of the Garford Company. The year 1911 was a particularly exhausting one. Almost alone, he had to alter the policies and direction of the company so that it would not fail. It was his task personally to establish agencies, supervise the construction of a body plant, organize the sales department and manage production. To do this his time, ability and vitality were sapped. Garford was prompted to write that it "... has been a tremendous problem, and I have had to bear the brunt of it alone. I never want to go through such an experience again. I am getting too old for that." To his friend, Blake Johnson, he conceded that the Garford Company "... has cost the best efforts of my life and taken the last ten years in its building up."

The Garford automobile and truck made their initial

16 To M.B. Johnson, May 4, 1910, GP.
17 Arthur Garford to P. Gregoire, April 7, 1911, GP.
18 To Edgar Park, April 19, 1912, GP.
19 To M.B. Johnson, May 14, 1912, GP.
appearance on the market in 1911. Fortunately Garford had already concluded an important arrangement with John N. Willys of the Willys-Overland Company "... for the distribution of the Garford company's product." Working together it was thought that both companies would be materially strengthened.20

Garford's efforts to save his company forced him into the exceptional and doubtlessly embarrassing role of supplicant to his unflinching political enemy, Senator Charles Dick. He sought to enlist the Senator's services in an attempt to find a market for the Garford trucks. In July, 1911, Garford learned that the United States war department desired to purchase a number of military trucks. He wrote Dick [the Senate's Chairman of the Committee on Mines and Mining] that "... we [the Garford Company] certainly would like to get a portion, at least, of that business." He suggested that they meet to discuss the matter and added that "I believe we can work out a proposition that will be very decidedly to our mutual interest."21 Shortly thereafter the meeting was held at which the two men formulated their strategy. Garford gave a hint of this in his next letter to the Senator. "Now, in consonance with our recent talk, I am sure you can materially help us in this matter, and if you will get in touch with the proper parties and

20Flyria Telegram, July 24, 1911.
21To Charles Dick, July 18, 1911, GP.
exert your influence in our behalf, I feel confident it will greatly enhance our chances of success. . . . I shall feel highly appreciative of your help, and you may depend upon a proper compensation for what you may accomplish for us."22

By now, Senator Dick, quite understandably, was becoming concerned at Garford's unusually frank and indiscreet approach to both him and the government contract. No suggestion was made that Garford's arrangement with Dick might be illegal, inadvisable or even inappropriate, but Dick did recommend that there be another personal talk: "the matter can be gone into much more fully in this way than would be possible in correspondence."23 He was undoubtedly correct.

Senator Dick obtained a conference with General Aleshire, the Quartermaster General, who assured him that the Garford Company, like other manufacturers of trucks, would be asked to suggest "... the form of the blank to be used in the making of bids."24 This, of course, would be of no particular advantage to the Garford Company, but Garford trusted "... that we shall get a foot-hold in

22To Charles Dick, Sept. 7, 1911, GP.
23To Arthur Garford, Sept. 13, 1911, GP.
24To Arthur Garford, Oct. 13, 1911, GP.
Washington for United States requirements that may prove to our mutual advantage and profit. 25

All these efforts were in vain. Dick informed Garford that the army had decided to experiment with three makes of trucks but not the Garford. Garford's bid had not satisfied the peculiar and particular requirements demanded by the army. 26

Among other things that Garford did to advance the company was to increase its capital stock from six hundred and fifty thousand dollars to two million dollars. 27 Even with this needed additional capital the burden of actually making and marketing its own automobile was disheartening. Demand for any one style of the Garford automobile was quite slight with consequent increased direct and overhead expenses for the company. Selling the finished product was by far Garford's greatest problem. 28

Garford relieved himself of this burden not long before the gubernatorial campaign of 1912. In July, he sold his recently augmented interests to John N. Willys. Garford owned personally or controlled through the Cleveland

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25 To Charles Dick, Nov. 6, 1911, GP.

26 To Arthur Garford, Jan. 30, 1912, the Dick Collection. Of the above correspondence between Garford and Dick this innocent letter is the only one to be found in the Dick Collection. It is also in the Garford Papers.

27 Elyria Telegram, April 16, 1911. At the same time a split in the common stock was declared and Garford received two shares of common for each one owned previously.

28 Arthur Garford to J.P. Brophy, May 10, 1912, GP.
Automatic Machine Company's extensive holdings nine thousand of the Garford Company's fourteen thousand shares. Willys agreed to "... take over all the common stock of the Garford Company on the basis of paying you for it at a price of $1,040,000." Garford himself received well over a half million dollars in cash. The rest of the money, over four hundred thousand dollars, was paid to the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company which suffered a net loss in the transaction.

With this transaction the Garford Company became a component part of the Willys-Overland Company. And Garford had disengaged himself from the automobile business. The Garford Company had not cost him money and in fact had ultimately yielded a very handsome profit. However, it caused considerable pain to realize that but for the fateful decision to retire from the automobile parts field, Garford's industrial and financial steps might well have been those of a giant.

**Garford's Bread and Butter**

The Cleveland Automatic Machine Company was Garford's other major industrial concern and the one upon which he

29 John N. Willys to Arthur Garford, June 8, 1912, GP.


31 N.M. Rich to J.P. Brophy, Aug. 15, 1913, GP. This considers the original cost of C.A.M.'s owning plus accumulated interest on the notes used to buy the stock.
depended most for his income throughout the rest of his life. While it suffered some unprofitable years, notably in the 1920's, the demand for automatic tooling machines was comparatively constant and dividends regular. From its very inception in 1902 the company was a close corporation allowing very little publicity about its operations to reach the public or even the financial circles. When the Moody Corporation requested information concerning its stocks, bonds, board of directors and general policies, Garford replied that "the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company is a close corporation, of which I own the controlling interest, and has no desire to give publicity to its affairs. We are asking no favors in the way of credits or otherwise, and cannot see wherein a statement would interest the general public." Garford was never to deviate from this policy governing the company's relationship with the public.

The financial condition of the company steadily improved, and in the fiscal year of 1906-1907 sales totaled over eight hundred thousand dollars. The 1907-1908 season suffered from the recession and business was only thirty-five percent of that of the previous year. Yet the company did not lose money in 1907-1908. In 1909 business conditions

32 To the Moody Corporation, Oct. 16, 1906, GP. Twenty-one years later Garford wrote that few people in Cleveland knew anything of C.A.M. "... for little local publicity has ever been given in the many years of its existence." To Victor W. Sincere, Dec. 21, 1927, GP.

33 Arthur Garford to P. Gregorie, May 8, 1909, GP.
improved and continued to do so for the machine industry until after World War I. By 1909 the company had assets of two million, four hundred thousand dollars and a cash surplus of over four hundred thousand dollars. The year before, in 1908, the first dividend was declared and Garford, the owner of seventy percent of the stock (mostly common), received forty-five thousand dollars. The payment of dividends was placed upon a regular basis after 1913, when it was certain that the company had a solid foundation. A satisfied Garford wrote to his general manager that "we can consider ourselves fortunate indeed in being so comfortably off as to cash and quick assets, and able to pay dividends for some time to come whether we operate or not."  

The Shrapnel Shells Explosion

The stimulus of World War I was probably not needed by the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company to assure its continuing operation and prosperity. Nonetheless it was forthcoming. The company's product of machine tools, capable of precisely shaping small metal parts, was ideally suited for the production of shrapnel shells. Late in 1913 John P. Brophy, the plants general manager, rendered to

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35 H.M. Rich to Arthur Garford, May 15, 1909, GP.

36 To J.P. Brophy, Nov. 5, 1913, GP.
Garford's long annual report of business conditions and included a short but interesting item about which Garford probably had previously known nothing. The company in the past year had received from the United States government more than one hundred thousand dollars in orders for machines to manufacture shrapnel shells. In his letter, Brophy included one comment which Garford deleted before the board of directors read the report: "You will understand from this [having secured the orders] that we are very close to the Government officials at this time; so close that we have been notified in advance before specifications were sent forward for machines that the order was going to be ours. This is a very unusual occurrence, but nevertheless happened in our case." 37 The government officials to whom Brophy referred was one Colonel George Montgomery of Philadelphia's Frankfort arsenal. Brophy had developed a "quite friendly" and obviously a "somewhat confidential" relationship with the Colonel and maintained close contact with him and affairs at the arsenal. 38

It was the Colonel who informed Brophy in February, 1914, that the arsenal's facilities were woefully inadequate. The production of ammunition was severely restricted and would be until Congress appropriated the funds necessary for an enlargement. Brophy had already written to Representatives

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37 To Arthur Garford, Oct. 15, 1913, GP.

38 J.P. Brophy to Arthur Garford, Feb. 11, 1914, and July 13, 1914, GP.
James C. McAndrows and George White on the House Committee of Appropriations and now requested that Garford and his friends do the same. Perhaps together they could be of service to the Colonel. For good measure Brophy frankly added: "I am quite sure you will not hesitate to assist in this case, because by assisting the Colonel we are helping ourselves."39 And Brophy knew of what he spoke. In March, Colonel Montgomery "... recommended thru the authorities in Washington an appropriation for about $100,000. worth of our machines."40 While the government did not act immediately on the Colonel's suggestion, Brophy was convinced that "... when there is any business to be had, the arsenal seems to come our way just as we expected."41

World War I tremendously increased the demand for shrapnel producing machines and in Europe the demand for American machines soared. In November, 1914, Garford wrote that "I believe if we could only get a few of our machines in use in some of the foreign countries for making shells such as we have furnished the government here, we should get large orders from them..."42 Less than two months later he confided to a personal friend that "you are certainly missing an opportunity to make a cleanup in not

39 To Arthur Garford, Feb. 11, 1914, GP.
40 J.P. Brophy to Arthur Garford, March 6, 1914, GP.
41 To Arthur Garford, July 20, 1914, GP.
42 To J.P. Brophy, Nov. 4, 1914, GP.
getting into the war game. . . . We have sold something like a hundred Automatics to the French and English Governments and have prospects for still larger orders.\textsuperscript{43} A few days later a representative from Russia, in company with a French official, visited Brophy and ordered eighteen machines for ammunition at a cost of about twenty thousand dollars.\textsuperscript{44}

The very large Allied demand for the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company's product, coupled with an already tremendous domestic demand, forced the company on an around-the-clock working basis. In May, 1915, advance orders had been contracted for one full year and four times this number had been reluctantly refused. And Garford anticipated twice as much business in the coming year as in the past one.\textsuperscript{45}

As well as being the general manager, Brophy was also the company's advertising manager. He frequently contributed highly knowledgeable and technical articles as well as advertisements to the foremost magazine of the machine trade: the \textit{American Machinist}. The May 6, 1915, issue of the journal contained one of Brophy's advertisements. On May 29, the \textit{New Republic} commented editorially on the advertisement. It was both "inhuman" and "infamous". Editor Herbert Croly wondered aloud about its motivation: "Was it

\textsuperscript{43}To Hart O. Berg, Dec. 23, 1914, GP.

\textsuperscript{44}J.P. Brophy to Arthur Garford, Jan. 19 and 21, 1915, GP.

\textsuperscript{45}To Fred N. Smith, May 7, 1915, GP.
to sell a pedestal base machine...?" The full page advertisement described in considerable detail the shrapnel shell which the Cleveland Automatic machines made. Croly termed it "a very pretty instrument of war", a highly explosive shell which contained two deadly acids. The advertisement described the ammunition as "effective". Croly quoted the more gruesome passages: "Fragments become coated with these acids in exploding and wounds caused by them mean death in terrible agony within four hours if not attended to immediately."

And significantly, the advertisement continued, "it is not possible to get medical assistance to anyone in time to prevent fatal results... as there seems to be no antidote that will counteract the poison."

Two decades later H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. Hanighen wrote in their Merchants of Death that "this company [the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company] had a shrapnel-making machine which it was anxious to sell. The death-dealing qualities of the shrapnel manufactured by this machine apparently surpassed those of any other..."

It must have rankled Garford not a little when his former business partner, John M. Studebaker, gave expression to what many people thought. He could not believe that Garford would manufacture a product "so inhumanly cruel."

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46 New Republic, May 29, 1915, 80.

Studebaker believed in "giving them all the straight, square goods that the law permits..." and nothing more.\textsuperscript{48}

Reverend Sidney L. Gulick of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America was similarly appalled.\textsuperscript{49}

Garford's reply to the \textit{New Republic} and to his mounting number of critics maintained that the advertisement was "a deplorable error" committed by the typesetters of the \textit{American Machinist}. The editorial condemning such weapons was therefore apparently justifiable, since the advertisement had given the false impression that Garford's company was actually producing the shrapnel shells. But it was all a mistake. Garford requested a retraction while giving positive assurances that ". . . neither the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company nor any other concern with which I am connected, is making or has ever made or dealt in any shells, shrapnel, or other weapons or ammunition of any character whatsoever."\textsuperscript{50}

Garford contended that Brophy's technical and descriptive article on shrapnel shells was merely intended as a "news item of interest." It was not part of the company's advertisement but was erroneously published as part of it. Furthermore, Garford denied even knowing "to what extent our machines are used in the manufacture of weapons of war,

\textsuperscript{48}To Arthur Garford, June 10, 1915, GP.
\textsuperscript{49}To Arthur Garford, June 11, 1915, GP.
\textsuperscript{50}To the \textit{New Republic}, c. June 18, 1915, GP.
or for the making of ammunitions."51 He assured Studebaker that "... the whole unfortunate affair affects my sense of moral ethics. ... However, so long as I am at peace with my own conscience, the rest will not matter."52

If Garford was upset, Brophy was perfectly relaxed. He hoped to insert a new shrapnel shell advertisement, which would quickly conclude the controversy.53 Brophy noted that the manager of the American Machinist, Mason Britton, also believed that the excitement, particularly prevalent among the church people and German-Americans, would soon cease. And besides, "... this ad will certainly not do us the slightest harm. It will do us more good than you can imagine. ... This is peculiar, but nevertheless true."54 At no time did Brophy ever claim that the magazine had in any way distorted his original advertisement. In fact he had purposely added the material about the shrapnel shells thinking it was an item of interest to machine shop officials.55 And Mason Britton had explained to the Federal Council of Churches that the shrapnel shells, which the machines produced, were very common types used by the Allies and that

51 To Sidney L. Gulick, June 18, 1915, GP.
52 To John M. Studebaker, June 21, 1915, GP.
53 To Arthur Garford, May 28, 1915, GP.
54 To Arthur Garford, June 18, 1915, GP.
55 To William C. Redfield, Secretary of Commerce, June 29, 1915, GP. Why Garford consistently offered his and not Brophy's correct explanation is a matter of speculation.
"... there is nothing new in this particular advertisement."  

Late in June the shrapnel affair took an unexpected turn: it became "an exciting story with many ramifications, nationally and internationally. ..."  

At that time E.T. Quigley, secretary to Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield, paid a visit to Brophy. He informed the latter that Washington officials were concerned over the complaints reaching them from the German government and wanted "... something substantial to combat the arguments of the other side."  

Brophy responded with a statement to which he gave an affidavit. The Cleveland Automatic Machine Company "... has always been perfectly neutral and since the war commenced has stood ready and willing to sell its product to any nation." Without mentioning individual nations, he asserted that he had not intended the advertisement to attract the attention of the Allies and not the Germans. He did not deny that his company's machines were in fact used by the Allies to produce the shrapnel shells as described in the advertisement.  

The day after Brophy wrote the above the New York Times featured a front page article by a staff correspondent writing from the headquarters of the Crown Prince of Bavaria's army.  

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56 Letter enclosed in J.P. Brophy to Arthur Garford, June 18, 1915, GP.  
58 J.P. Brophy to Arthur Garford, June 28, 1915, GP.  
59 To William C. Redfield, June 29, 1915, GP.
He reported that the question of ammunition shipments was at the real root of diplomatic differences between Germany and the United States and one of the most important reasons why Germany stood firm on its submarines' operations. The Germans were very bitter "... because more than eighty percent of the heavy casualties are being caused by shells and shrapnel."

A special grievance was the alleged use the French made of "poisonous American shells... The surgeons had all read the sensational advertisement of alleged poisonous shells by the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company, which was published in an American trade paper and made the rounds of the entire German press." German military men were in agreement that the description of the effects of the shell were in accord with the actual situation.60

The editor of the Times followed with his own explanation of Brophy's advertisement and in so doing ignored his correspondent's report and any possible explanation by either Brophy or Britton. In an apology for the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company the editorial noted that the advertisement had not directly stated that the company's machines produced shrapnel shells; "there is only the association of ideas."

Furthermore the company (President Garford?) has claimed

60 New York Times, June 30, 1915. Engelbrecht and Hanighen, op. cit., 181-183, wrote that "this advertisement was promptly forwarded to Germany and became widely known there. A copy of it was placed on the desk of every member of the Reichstag and a bitter discussion ensued."
"that the matter about poisonous shells was included in their advertising copy by a misunderstanding."

The conclusion that the Times editor drew formed the basis for his article's title: "Mendacious Propaganda".

"The thing was a hoax, diabolically planned for purposes of propaganda. . ." by German propagandists who hoped to prejudice both Americans and Germans. They seized upon the unfortunate advertisement "knowing its implications to be preposterous and hideously false. . ." The Germans knew that ". . . the kind of shell described in the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company's advertisement is physically and chemically impossible, unless the Germans themselves and alone have discovered a new abomination."61

This interesting and mistaken editorial presumably provoked contrary explanations and stimulated further questions for the very next day the editor took a different tack. He had presumed that the advertisement was actually meant to be German propaganda. But now he asked "how and Why" did such a misleading advertisement ever appear in so reliable a trade magazine? Since neither the American Machinist nor the Cleveland company had yet helped to solve the puzzle, the Times suggested the Secret Service investigate to discover if America's neutrality laws had been violated in spirit, if not in letter.62 Like the Times the authors of Merchants of

62 Ibid., July 2, 1915.
Death were principally interested in violations of America's neutrality, which President Wilson had advised Americans to uphold, even in thought.

Meanwhile, the French embassy in Washington, in a reference to the advertisement, declared that the French army used no American shrapnel shells. The British government was later to issue a much stronger declaration and official repudiation of any connection with the advertisement. It stated that the British had never even ordered such an explosive let alone a machine. The Department of Commerce conducted an investigation of the incident and Acting Secretary Edwin F. Sweet announced that the matter was closed. The department was satisfied that Garford's company did not manufacture bombs or shells. For the New York Times, Mason Britton explained that the advertisement "... was not published as a result of an oversight, as has been reported, but that it was written by J.P. Brophy..." and then distorted by "some of the German element."

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62 Cleveland Leader, July 2, 1915.
64 Ibid., July 3, 1915.
65 Ibid., July 4, 1915.
66 Ibid., July 4, 1915.

On July 3, 1915, the New Republic, 213, reported to its readers: "From the first we had our doubts about that advertisement, and we are happy to state now on the most detailed information that the advertisement was a sheer blunder, due to a printer mistaking for advertising copy the manuscript of a news article which had no reference to any product of the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company."

Garford apparently never retracted his own version of the advertisement. As late as July 27 he wrote editor Herbert
This official "whitewash" of the incident did not prevent the German Foreign Office from formally calling the attention of United States Ambassador, James W. Gerard, to the advertisement and "... pointing out that such shells are a contravention of the Hague Convention."\(^6^7\) Apparently the German government did not care to distinguish between a company's furnishing actual shrapnel shells and the machines which produced them.

The final action in this shrapnel shell incident occurred on July 19. On that date Secretary William C. Redfield sent "letters of rebuke" to Brophy and the *American Machinist*, with President Wilson's approval. Redfield did not understand how anyone could be so callous as to draft such an advertisement "with a view to selling his own wares." It was an "atrocious" publicity stunt in which Redfield charged that Brophy had "... urged the cruel and agonizing nature of the death caused by certain missiles as an evidence of their effectiveness, and suggested that as the basis as a sale for the machine. ..."

\(^6^8\) While neither Brophy nor Britton protested this strong public rebuke, the former had to restrain the impulse. He believed that he and the *American Machinist* were victims of sinister German propaganda and Croly that he would personally "... assure you that the statement made to you by me and which you so kindly published [July 3, 1915] is true." To Herbert Croly, July 27, 1915, GP.

\(^6^7\) *New York Times*, July 8, 1915.

\(^6^8\) *Ibid.*, July 20, 1915. See also *Cleveland Leader*, July 20, 1915.
power politics. He would have challenged Secretary Redfield's findings "... but on receiving confidential information from Washington, we found that it [the public letter of rebuke] was for the benefit of the Government..."

The American Machinist therefore did not protest.69

The shrapnel shell case did nothing to slacken the tremendous demand for the Cleveland automatics. In August Garford wrote that his company had been forced of necessity to reject over eleven million dollars of orders.70 Right in the midst of the shrapnel shell incident Brophy had been approached by two Russian agents in search of new or used automatic machines. Ever enterprising, he hauled down three machines, "something we were thinking of practically scrapping..." Two were fifteen years old and one was twelve years old. They did produce parts however "slowly but not very accurately." Brophy's price for each of the machines was a hundred dollars more than that for the very latest models, but the Russians eagerly purchased the lot! He drew a moral from his sale: "This whole story shows that when things are coming your way they are liable to come rapidly and when they go bad they go bad in all directions. I believe it is the way of the world."71

69 To J.P. Brophy, July 23, 1915, GP.
70 To Hart O. Berg, Aug. 6, 1915, GP.
71 To Arthur Garford, July 26, 1915, GP.
Evolution in Labor Relations

During the political campaigns of 1912 and 1914 Garford frequently had to defend and to acclaim his policies as an industrialist vis-a-vis his companies' laborers. Inevitably he proclaimed himself a friend of the workers and in actual fact his companies' histories were remarkably free from the scars of industrial strife. Nonetheless before the watershed years of the World War the "standard operating practice for the pre-World War I tycoons" in relation to the laboring element also prevailed in Garford's plants and social philosophy.¹

In 1896 organized labor placed the Garford Manufacturing Company on its "un-fair" list after deciding that the Elyria plant's conditions were unsatisfactory and that the management was "particularly antagonistic" towards labor.² Early in the year about forty of the company's seventy or so polishers of wheels and leather secretly formed a polishers' club.

¹Essay by David Riesman, "Who Has the Power?", Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., Class, Status and Power, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953, 158.

²E. Lewis Evans to Arthur Garford, April 28, 1907, GP.
union and then gradually began to decrease their daily output of bicycle saddles. These men, though paid by the piece, desired in this way to force Garford to hire more laborers, to give them a day wage plan and to acquire better facilities. The decline in production immediately gave rise to the suspicion that some of the men belonged to a union "... and the officers of the company determined to ferret it out. ... After considerable sharp cross examination" one of the men confirmed their worse fears. The members of the union were promptly discharged by Garford.³ The local newspapers were in agreement that the laborers' action was rash, immature and impractical. It constituted an effort to dictate to management and Garford's reaction was completely justified. "He did nothing more than any other person would have done under the circumstances."⁴ Some years later Garford recalled the boycott by the polishers. It had been a bitter controversy that lasted nearly two years and one which had cost the company almost one hundred thousand dollars since it could not fill all orders. About the strikers' demands Garford wrote that "naturally I rebelled against such action" and dismissed the men until they returned "under the old conditions." And this they eventually did.⁵

Garford also advocated a rather hardened counteraction

³Elyria Republican, April 30, 1896.
⁴Elyria Democrat, April 30, 1896.
⁵To Harry W. Laidler, March 2, 1912, GP.
for economically "dull times". The Cleveland Automatic Machine Company suffered a sharp decline in sales late in 1903 but Garford was ready with his remedy. He wrote Brophy that, with a possible depression close at hand, "in order to maintain the proper ratio between cost of manufacture and the selling price, my judgement is that wages must be scaled down" about fifteen percent. He reminded Brophy, lest he be reluctant to apply the cut, that while any depression lasts, there will always be "... great competition among laboring men for work... The winter is coming on, and in my judgement they will think twice before they refuse a cut."6

Garford's early attitude about the relationship between labor and management underwent a gradual transition and mellowed as time passed. The seeds of change were apparent in an article which appeared in the Union Reporter, a recognized organ of organized labor. A brief and factual account of Garford's life accompanied quotations by Garford concerning labor, its problems and solutions. With apparent approval Garford's maxim was given: "You can never elevate labor unless you make a capitalist out of him."7 Another indication of Garford's increased recognition of the needs of the laborers was his eventual approval of some kind of an injury compensation act for employees. What undoubtedly

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6To J.P. Brophy, Oct. 23, 1903, GP.
7Union Reporter, Sept. 1909, in the Garford Papers, Box 130.
would have been unthinkable a few years past, he personally favored in 1913. To Brophy (perhaps a reluctant Brophy) he expressed himself: "I have always felt that we should at least treat the human element in our factories with at least the consideration that we do our machinery." By way of illustration he drew an analogy. Just as when a boiler blows or an engine breaks and management promptly repairs it, so should it do the same for the injured workmen.

Garford did not emerge from the World War as a prototype of the "modern executive" as pictured by David Riesman but rather a blend of old and new social philosophies. He was indeed increasingly prepared to go to greater lengths "in terms of concessions, to maintain interpersonal warmth in his relations with ... " laborers as was the new "managerial" executive. And he did cultivate the art of ruling realizing that his companies' prosperity rested to a degree

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8Garford's acceptance of the principle of workmen's compensation was doubtlessly influenced by a statewide development which resulted in an optional Workmen's Compensation Law in 1911 and a compulsory plan two years later. Employers generally favored both laws since those who did not accept this plan were deprived of the common law defense, of 'contributory negligence,' the 'fellow-servant rule,' and the 'assumed risk' rule in settling suits deriving from industrial accidents. Harlow Lindley, Ohio in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1938, Columbus, 1942, 11. See also Eugene H. Roseboom and Francis P. Weisenburger, op. cit., 322-323.

9To J.P. Brophy, July 29, 1913, GP. Interestingly, Garford wrote that the Garford Company already was paying damages for injuries and that the total amount "averaged $2500. per year." Considering that the company then employed about six hundred men, this was hardly a remarkable figure. What was remarkable is that Garford had taken a step in the direction of better relations and conditions.
on the approval of his workers. Yet Garford was never one to appeal to others for leadership, and in fact he was frequently "highhanded" in his relations with both employees and fellow industrialists. He was until his death something of the "wise old man", the product of humble but clean beginnings thoroughly interlaced with rich veins of native ability and ideals. He expressed this in a letter to S.W. Henson, manager of his Elyria company, in answer to the latter's criticism of Garford for hiring a certain individual. "... I do not care to have my judgement criticized. My motive in doing it was certainly right. When you have had as many years as I have in the manufacturing game and in the capacity of trouble man, you will have gained a fair knowledge as to that which constitutes the important and the unimportant. ..." To another employee Garford wrote that "if you are not willing to give the company your entire ability and loyalty without qualification and trust me to treat your interests with entire justice and fairness. ...", then quit.

If Garford was not the model of the new industrialist, he was far from its antithesis. In 1915 he was able to and did execute an important settlement of a strike and clearly indicated thereby that he was not remiss to creating a new

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10 Essay by David Riesman, op. cit., 159.
11 To S.W. Henson, Nov. 9, 1917, GP.
12 To William R. Flint, July 7, 1917, GP.
balance in the field of labor and management. On October 1, 1915, nine hundred members of the machinists' union at the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company struck. Brophy had refused to reinstate fifteen machinists, whom he accused of strike agitation, and his action had led to the general strike. This strike was "the first interference in the manufacture of war munitions in Cleveland." More basic reasons for the strike included better working conditions, shorter hours, and higher wages. In fact the machinists' union had deliberately selected Garford's plant since it was engaged in the extensive production of war materials. If their demands were to be met and the precedent accepted, the prosperous automatic machines industry would likely capitulate first. It could hardly afford not to in view of the enormous profits to be made or lost.

It was a short strike and abruptly ended on the fifth of October "... when A.L. Garford ... led a crowd of nine hundred strikers in cheering his announcement that their wage increase and eight-hour day demands had been conceded." Garford, quite unexpectedly, had "... openly espoused the cause of the workers." The Cleveland Leader described the events in excited tones: "A dramatic scene,

16 *Cleveland Leader*, Oct. 5, 1915.
unparalleled in the history of clashes between labor and capital, signaled triumph last night for the striking machinists at the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company. . . . A.L. Garford . . . climbed to a platform outside the plant . . . and faced a throng of cheering men. . . . 'Hooray! Let's cheer again, boys!' he yelled, 'I feel like cheering myself!' A tremendous cheer woke the echoes of the neighborhood. It was a delirium of ecstasy, an unprecedented event, for 900 men found themselves being led in a cheer of victory by a man representing all that they had struck against. . . .

[It was a] fellowship jubilation. . . in which their employer joined with unfeigned enthusiasm. . . . [Afterwards] Mr. Garford fairly ran for shelter from the ovation. . . ."17

The cheers and enthusiasm greeted the reinstatement of the fifteen original agitators, the introduction of an eight hour day and pay for time and a half beyond eight hours. Workers on Saturday were to receive pay for time and three-quarters. And if the men were ever forced to work only eight hours a day, then there was to be a twelve percent wage increase. The only demand which Garford rejected concerned the "closed" shop. The company was to remain an "open" shop while following a policy of no discrimination against unions. Without a suggestion of hypocrisy, Garford could certainly say, as he did, "I am for industrial peace."18

17Ibid., Oct. 6, 1915.
18Ibid.
Not everybody was happy about the way Garford had acted. L.H. Kittredge, president of the Peerless Motor Car Company, called the settlement "a grand mistake."

Kittredge did not believe that labor troubles could be solved by granting concessions under pressure. He asked Garford to refrain from such unilateral action in the future and to seek the advice and counsel of other Cleveland manufacturers. Garford personally was pleased that his institution had been struck first. He had welcomed the "... opportunity to handle the proposition in my own way and not be embarrassed by what others might have done." It was his belief that he had struck "a new chord" in labor-management disputes based upon just and fair dealings. He recognized that laborers had been seriously hurt by the nation's mounting inflation in the face of few wage increases. "To my mind there is no reason why wages should not be advanced generally. All that is necessary is for producers and manufacturers to realize that the remedy lies in the increased selling price of the product."20

Garford was but one of many employers on whom "... the war proved a liberalizing experience." And after the war, with the world in a continuing state of flux "... deft handling of industrial relationships" was absolutely necessary. Fortunately, "the spirit of cooperation so sedulously

19To Arthur Garford, Nov. 9, 1915, GP.
20To Randolph W. Walton, Oct. 11, 1915, GP.
cultivated during the war had not entirely vanished."21 This was particularly true of Garford. Seattle's general strike in 1919 and the flood of strikes all over the country that followed must have startled Garford quite as much as it did most Americans.22 In that year Garford produced a long and coherent study of America's industrial structure and his suggestions for a viable industrial peace. This remarkable eleven-page study, the result of thirty years of experience in industry, was the culmination of Garford's thoughts on industrial and labor relations.

In the first part of his "industrial plan" Garford briefly traced the history of the United States industrial revolution down to his own day. He concluded that in 1919:

"... The man owning his machine and his job had disappeared as a factor of industrial entity. Both he and his machine had been absorbed ... Also the social relationships and obligations of proprietor and helper had been disturbed and changed.

There no longer existed that close and sympathetic touch between the man of small capital and large responsibility and his working neighbors, but in his place had been substituted the hired manager, representing a proprietorship made up of a multitude of contributors to large capital, the majority of whom were strangers. ... the day of large capital and small personality had arrived, and at this point capital and labor ceased its intimate and sympathetic touch.

[The workers]. ... sole possession was his experience and labor to be sold and bartered in


the open, fickle and competitive market. . . The interest of shareholder was limited to the size of his dividends, while the interest of the toiler in the shop to the measure of his day's wage. [The bone of contention became] . . . a just and equitable distribution of earnings and profits.

[World War I ended an era and] . . . wrought many changes in our national thought and life. It has revealed the inherent weaknesses of our social and industrial structure. It has emphasized moral wrongs in our economic system. . . . Exact justice demands that the rewards of cooperative service and use of capital shall be shared in proper measure as the rights of each are unselfishly determined."

Garford proposed an "industrial plan" whereby justice would be done for all. It involved what he considered an equitable division of any concern's profits between the three essential elements of industry: capital, management and labor. In addition, the board of directors was to have nine members, of whom two represented labor, two represented management, and five represented capital. All of the common stock, which Garford referred to as speculative stock since its potential value was to be determined in the future by "successful managing and productive force", was to be equally divided among capital, management and labor. "This plan of organization also differs from any now in practice, in that it diverts the common or speculative shares now issued and given to promoters, bankers and brokers as a bonus, without any consideration, and just to grease the sales of preference securities. . . to those elements of brains and brawn. . . ." which create and develop the great industrial units. The old system was "obviously unfair and unjust" and Garford
hoped that his industrial plan would be the solution to the nation's contentions and strikes.23

**Industry, Labor and Liquor**

Garford's industrial plan was probably too revolutionary and visionary to appear as the practical solution to the nation's social and economic ills. This cannot be said about the prohibition of alcohol.

Not long before 1919, a matter of only a few decades, many industrial firms had issued "... a regular ration of rum to their employees."24 In fact "for generations business and industry had not only tolerated alcohol, but had almost superstitiously regarded it as essential to success."25 Around 1850 employers began to be hostile to indulgence and by 1890 launched a regular anti-alcohol campaign. When scientific tests proved conclusively that physical and mental operations were impaired by any amount of alcohol, American industry initiated its own private war against the saloon. Modern industry was simply too complicated and intricate to do otherwise. The laborer had to retain his "... speed, physical and mental quickness, attention, and endurance. . . .

Indeed, these hard-headed business men grow almost as enthusi-

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23Garford's Industrial Plan, c. 1919, GP. Garford did not put this plan into practice in his companies.


iastic as the temperance advocates in describing the beneficcial results of the crusade."26

Garford was no exception to this generalization. In July, 1918, he expressed himself on the subject to H.H. Timken. More than ever before Garford now advocated statewide prohibition. World War I would someday come to a close and at that time Garford, quite correctly, anticipated an extensive period of labor difficulties. "... Knowing full well the part the present open saloon has always played in these unfortunate agitations", Garford desired to take from the laborers these inflammatory tryng spots before their "direful influence" was felt.27 An additional reason why Garford favored prohibition was most certainly because of the influence of the industrial "safety first movement." The latter aimed to reduce America's disgraceful record of industrial accidents.28 Some years later Garford acknowledged the impact which the United States Steel Corporation's survey on alcohol had on him. It indicated, and Garford's own experience as an industrialist confirmed it, that most industrial accidents occurred on Monday at 1:30 P.M. The men had received their wages the previous Saturday and many spent the weekend in a saloon. Monday noon was also spent in a saloon where a substantial meal was forsaken in favor

26Ibid., 427-430.
27To H.H. Timken, July 5, 1918, GP.
28Burton J. Hendrick, op. cit., 430.
of alcohol. Precisely after Monday's noon hour most industrial accidents happened. 29

Garford joined the Ohio Conservancy League, of which Cincinnati's William Cooper Proctor was chairman, and in August, 1918, accepted the responsibility of publicizing the League's aim and leading its forces in his congressional district. This purpose was expressed in a resolution of the league's constitution: "That it is the purpose of this organization to secure the co-operation of all manufacturers in opening their plants to the printed and spoken propaganda of the Dry Campaign." 30 In full cooperation with local chapters of the Ohio Dry Federation, Garford, representing the manufacturers' Conservancy League, attempted to gain admittance into large industrial institutions and to secure commitments of sympathy and active aid from various officials. 31

When Ohio went dry on November 5, 1918, Garford's satisfaction was great. As a Progressive in 1914 he had campaigned on this very issue, and in 1918 he had once again enlisted his active support behind the cause. His motivations, political in 1914 and economic in 1918, were different but the battle had at long last been won. Like most people Garford enjoyed a winning side, and the prohibi-

29To O. Von Halem, Oct. 25, 1930, GP.

30William Cooper Proctor to Arthur Garford, Aug. 1, 1918, GP.

31F.A. Seiberling to Arthur Garford, Oct. 15, 1918, and Arthur Garford to Z.B. Campbell, Aug. 26, 1918, GP.
tionists' victory had in a sense vindicated his political campaign of 1914 and hopefully alleviated his fear of post-World War I labor strife.

**Years of Retirement Marred**

During the years of the World War and for the first two or three thereafter, Garford personally had received yearly dividends well in excess of one hundred thousand dollars.\(^32\) In 1916, at the age of fifty-eight, he was financially healthy. His economic pillar, the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company, thrived throughout the period and by 1918 had accumulated a cash surplus of over a million dollars.\(^33\) The early months of 1919 saw a decided drop in the business done by automatic machine makers but the second half of the year was marked by excellent sales.\(^34\) The year 1920 was not quite as successful as 1917 or 1918, but the company did report gross earnings for the year of over half a million dollars and a cash surplus of over one million dollars after having paid dividends of more than two hundred thousand dollars.\(^35\)

Business was excellent, and as early as 1916 Garford seriously considered his own retirement from active participation.

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\(^{32}\) Arthur Garford to G. Thuillier, May 6, 1921, GP.

\(^{33}\) Arthur Garford to R.G. Henning, Feb. 2, 1918, GP.

\(^{34}\) J.P. Brophy to Arthur Garford, May 13 and Oct. 27, 1919, GP.

\(^{35}\) Cleveland Automatic Machine Company's annual report, Dec. 31, 1920, GP.
in industry. For years he and his wife had been accustomed to vacationing for a few months of each year in Pasadena, California, where they owned a beautiful mansion. Garford, a perennial sufferer of bronchial troubles and rheumatism, was extremely fond of southern California's mild and dry climate. He had long hoped to be able to spend his last years there away from the damp and icy grip of Ohio's winters. Without the burdens of ill health and business, he could concentrate on the pleasurable aspects of life for which he had labored so long. Great motorist that he was, he enjoyed nothing more than taking long drives about the countryside in his automobile. He was also an avid golf and horse riding enthusiast. And when a more extensive outing was desired, Garford found great pleasure fishing in the streams of the mountains near Pasadena. It was also in Pasadena that his youngest daughter, Louise, lived. She married Emanuele Lavagnino in 1911 and resided in a home that Garford had constructed for them adjacent to his own. In 1916 Garford was blessed with his only grandchild, Arthur Lavagnino, a powerful if tiny source of attraction to California.

The fond thought of retirement to California was never realized, although Garford was to live until 1933. He and the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company felt the full impact or shock of the post-war depression in 1921. Now sixty-three

36 Arthur Garford to Harry B. Morse, May 14, 1926, GP.
years of age and desirous of relaxing away from the stress and strains of business, he was faced with the choice of renewed and vigorous personal efforts or the loss of financial security. It was really not a choice for a man of Garford's determination. He was to do everything possible to maintain the Cleveland company's financial soundness. The task fully occupied him until his death.

Generally, "the war left American manufacturers with overgrown plants, an excess of raw materials. . . [while] production facilities of every kind were overextended." Normal levels of consumption were much less than during the war, and this was particularly true of those industries, such as the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company, which had engaged exclusively in war manufactures. In addition, the "peace caught the Government with a surplus. . ." which depressed the market in many areas including machine tools.37

From 1921 to 1926 the machine tool industry suffered what Garford referred to as "post war deflation". The Cleveland Automatic Machine Company entered the 1920's with far too extensive and consequently expensive plant facilities, and at a time when the demand for new tools and machinery was at its lowest. Matters were made worse when the government offered its large surplus of automatic machines at very

37 Victor S. Clark, op. cit., 324.
cheap prices to an already saturated market. Whereas the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company's sales had totaled $3,291,155. and $2,723,222. in 1917 and 1920 respectively, they amounted to only $600,000. in 1922. The next year was marked by a substantial increase in sales to $1,050,000., but still the company had a net operating loss of $55,000.39

Apparently not all of the company's difficulties were created by the "post war deflation". C.E. Farnsworth, officer of Cleveland's First National Bank and an influential member of the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company's board of directors, opposed the ideas of Garford . . . regarding management and methods to be employed in securing more business.40 Specifically, the continued value of John Brophy as manager was questioned. Farnsworth saw the company's future as "a pretty gloomy sort of a picture. . . . I still believe the company can be brought out---if the right sort of management can be injected. That the company's record is clean its product, standard, and well established, but the company has gone to seed."41

Garford was prodded into making a thorough personal investigation of the company's operations preparatory to

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38Letters of Arthur Garford to J.P. Brophy, May 14, 1921; Myers Y. Cooper, May 23, 1921; and stockholders of the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company, May 20, 1929, GP.


40Arthur Garford to Walter F. Brown, Jan. 31, 1924, GP.

41C.E. Farnsworth to Arthur Garford, Aug. 7, 1924, GP.
submitting to the board of directors a report concerning possible changes.\textsuperscript{42} The result was the forced resignation of Brophy and other less important personnel. In Brophy's former position Garford now placed himself: "... in the sea of difficulties which it may be necessary to sail I had to take command." It was for him to bring "... order out of chaos and profit out of loss."\textsuperscript{43} These changes occurred in December, 1924. Garford wrote his daughter that he welcomed this unforeseen need for him personally to command the company, since it allowed him to "... demonstrate that I can still carry on."\textsuperscript{44} However, it probably was a decision prompted in large part by dire necessity and the firm belief that he, if anyone, could once again make the company a profitable institution. Only the year before, while in California, Garford had overexerted himself and injured his heart. His was not an alarming condition but one which did require a considerably slackened pace.\textsuperscript{45} His loyalty to and dependence upon the company had forced him to shoulder its managerial duties.

Despite relapses in the recession years of 1924 and 1927, American industry, beginning in 1922, gradually recovered from the postwar depression, and the machine tool industry

\textsuperscript{42}Arthur Garford to George P. Hahn, Sept. 6, 1924, GP.

\textsuperscript{43}Arthur Garford to Harry B. Morse, May 14, 1926, GP.

\textsuperscript{44}To Louise Lavagnino, c. Dec. 1924, held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.

\textsuperscript{45}Arthur Garford to H.J. Cassady, Nov. 2, 1923, GP.
followed along, a little to the rear.\textsuperscript{46} Garford's company had net earnings of $80,000 during the last five months of 1925, and he was much encouraged about the future.\textsuperscript{47} Like the entire American economy the machine tool industry was greatly aided by the effect of the automotive industry on the nation's economy.\textsuperscript{48} Throughout 1926, the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company continued its recovery, and Garford acknowledged that "... the greater portion of the business done was with concerns identified with the motor car industry."\textsuperscript{49} By 1928 the company was once again "booming" as before 1921. Sales in 1928 were over two million dollars while net profits totaled $366,650.\textsuperscript{50} It was a year of "great encouragement" for Garford as his company, for the first time in almost a decade, had "attained a normal stride in sales and profits."\textsuperscript{51}

**Business with Amtorg**

The year 1929 was the banner year in the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company's entire history. Gross profits

\textsuperscript{46}George Soule, \textit{op. cit.}, 107 and 119.

\textsuperscript{47}Arthur Garford to Louise Lavagnino, Feb. 20, 1926, held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.

\textsuperscript{48}George Soule, \textit{op. cit.}, 168. See also Victor S. Clark, \textit{op. cit.}, 336-339.

\textsuperscript{49}Cleveland Automatic Machine Company's annual report, Jan. 29, 1927, GP.

\textsuperscript{50}Arthur Garford to Signum Sanger, Jan. 24, 1929, GP.

\textsuperscript{51}To Louise Lavagnino, Nov. 1928, held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.
amounted to eight hundred thousand dollars and enabled the company to end all of its obligations with Cleveland banks and to pay all outstanding debits. After a plentiful allowance for dividends, inventory and extra depreciation charges, there was still "plenty of money in the bank." During the year Garford first engaged in an important new source of substantial business: Soviet Russia.

In 1926, Soviet Russia began its state planning commission ("Gosplan") in an effort to revitalize its economic life. One aspect of the reconstruction involved Soviet industry, which was in dire need of machinery and materials. To accomplish its program of rehabilitation and expansion, Soviet Russia invited "American business...to lend a hand." Despite the lack of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and consequently any official trade commission, a profitable trade with American firms quickly materialized and included "...some of the most redoubtable fortresses of our capitalistic system." At the heart of the increased Soviet trade was its five year plan for industrialization. And "machinery imports play a very important part in the Soviet import trade..."[because]

52 Arthur Garford to Louise Lavagnino, Jan. 15, 1930, held by Mrs. James B. Thomas.
Russian industries—especially the machine industries—are comparatively undeveloped."55

The Soviet Union dealt with American businessmen through ". . . a central Soviet purchasing and selling bureau, 'The Amtorg Corporation'." Amtorg was a New York corporation created in 1924 and responsible for acquiring American industrial equipment.56 That it was successful the editors of Business Week had no doubts: the "total Soviet-American trade for 1929 is estimated at $155,000,000, against $101,000,000 for 1928." The same article lauded and encouraged additional Soviet-American trade.57 However, the prospects of increased trade were lessened by the Soviet desire, and in fact demand, for long term credits. This demand, the chief difficulty of future trade, compelled ". . . the American manufacturer to finance the order." Because of the lack of diplomatic recognition and uncertainty about the Soviet economic system, American businessmen, and more importantly bankers, considered these trade acceptances as distinct liabilities, not credits. Consequently many firms, particularly smaller firms, feared to jeopardize their capital and their credit standing at the banks.58

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56Article by William C. White, op. cit., 748.

57"The 'Bear' Market is a Bull Market", Business Week, Jan. 15, 1930, 40-41.

58Article by William C. White, op. cit., 752.
In the fall, 1929, Garford, like many American manufacturers, became interested in the prospects of a prosperous business with Russia. The Cleveland Automatic Machine Company was a comparatively small industrial institution, and the matter of Soviet credit deeply concerned Garford. After making inquiries he learned from the Chase National Bank, which had the Amtorg account, that the corporation had always met its obligations in a satisfactory way, and that it continued to capture the increased confidence of American industrialists. A few days later Garford, apparently satisfied, expected to conclude with Amtorg his first transaction for thirty-eight machines billed at $140,000.

Garford continued throughout 1930 to negotiate with Amtorg officials, but the impact of the American depression forced an even more cautious approach in order to conserve his company's cash and credit. He was one of many American manufacturers showing "stubborn resistance to the Soviet Government's new policy of asking longer credit terms." However, the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company's earnings were considerably less than in the record year of 1929, and Garford found it necessary to do business with Amtorg despite terms of twenty-five to fifty percent cash and the balance in

59 Chase National Bank to C. Stirling Smith, Aug. 30, 1929, GP. Smith was the vice-president of Cleveland's Engineers National Bank and passed on this information to Garford.

60 Arthur Garford to Walter F. Brown, Sept. 4, 1929, GP.

nine to eighteen months. Late in 1930, the company sold "several hundred thousand dollars of machinery" to the Amtorg corporation and expected "further and increased orders." Significantly, Garford wrote, "We certainly need business badly. If it had not been for the Russian business received we should have had to close down our factory. . . ." In addition, "our experience with the Russian business has been of great value to us, for under the scrutinizing eye of most competent Russian inspectors, the faults and defects of our machines were strikingly brought to the attention. . . ." of company officials.

Soviet-United States trade relations suffered a sixty-one percent decrease in 1931 despite the depression and the increasingly favorable opinion American business had of Soviet Russia. The Russians had met all financial obligations and the Americans did need the trade. Nevertheless a very marked decline occurred because of Russia's unfavorable credit demands and rumors about Soviet internal disorders. The Cleveland Automatic Machine Company continued its business with Amtorg in 1931 and sold over four hundred thousand dollars worth of machinery, but by 1932 Garford felt forced to decline the Soviet terms and trade. Amtorg now insisted

62 Arthur Garford to Thomas D. Campbell, Dec. 27, 1930, GP.
63 To Bart C. Young, Dec. 4, 1930, GP.
64 To Herbert E. Nunn, Jan. 3, 1931, GP.
that there be no cash payment with terms up to fourteen months. Garford, like other American industrialists, refused to grant the Soviet Union this "long time loan", because his company had to conserve its borrowing capacity with the banks. Termination of trade with the Soviets was not a happy decision but one which Garford believed to be necessary. His business relations with the Russians had been very profitable and most opportune. At a time when domestic demand was slack, the Russian trade had allowed his company to continue production.

January 23, 1933

The day of January 23, 1933, was seemingly normal enough for Garford, but it was to end with his death. Now almost seventy-five years old, he spent the hours in a routine fashion. He worked in his Elyria office during the morning and then attended a meeting in Cleveland during the afternoon. To those who had been with him nothing seemed

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66 Arthur Garford to Jones and Lamson Machine Company, July 23, 1932, GP. Garford suggested a remedy for the situation. The Soviet Union had to make her peace with the United States by first paying her debts to the latter. This would improve her financial status and enable the Russians to secure loans from the United States. "In my judgement a movement should be started among the manufacturers of the United States, urging that a conference be called between a committee appointed by the President or Congress to meet..." its Russian equivalents. The committee could settle differences and enter into "...treaties that will promote political and trade relationships." America's "large industrial concerns... could exert such influence upon our Congress and the authorities in Washington" to accomplish these aims. Those who control America's industry represent the most powerful and influential institution in the nation, and are the ones to attack and to solve the problem.
wrong. He arrived home around 5 P.M. and, after having called on a neighbor, had dinner. It was a cold January night and Garford would have preferred to stay at home for the rest of the evening, but the local bank's directors meeting prevented the luxury. When Garford returned from the meeting, he collapsed from a heart attack as he entered his home. "His death was instantaneous."  

Garford's last day was long and busy as was his entire life. The day had been cold and uncomfortable, and he had to work in the midst of the gloom of a worsening economic depression. Yet, it is safe to say, that Garford, up to the last moment, never despaired of the future. In one of his last letters the depressing weight of events since 1929 was much in evidence but so was his own determined optimism. He wrote that the depression "... demonstrates that we have made but little progress after all, either in the knowledge or use of fundamental things which go to make up what we call the social and economic structure of our country ... . We have been giving altogether too much thought and importance to material affairs rather than to spiritual values which endure... but I have an enduring faith in the future of this country and all that goes to make up its social and industrial welfare."  

67 Secretary to Arthur Garford to E.M. Fraser, c. Jan. 23, 1933, GP.
68 To Bart C. Young, Nov. 25, 1932, GP.
CHAPTER XI

IN SUMMATION

The life of Arthur L. Garford is another example of America's many success stories and one seemingly tailored after the Horatio Alger saga. Most significant are the tens of thousands of personal papers which Garford left for the perusal of the historian. Remarkably candid and unexpurgated, these documents have provided an unusual, while not unique, glimpse into the mechanism of America's industrial complex at the turn of the twentieth century and into the processes of representative democracy. Garford was neither a great captain of industry nor a nationally known politician. But he was an articulate and outspoken minor industrialist and well aware of the principles and practices which guided business and industry, whether large or small. And he was an important politician in Ohio during the eventful years 1901 -1914. He was well qualified to speak and write on the subject of local and state politics and while his statements and actions may not have been startlingly new or original, they do lend desired authenticity to generalizations about both business and politics.

Garford was one of eight children born of parents who immigrated to America from England in the middle of the
nineteenth century. Reared on an Ohio farm, he had little
time for formal education but managed to complete all that
was available in the village of Elyria. He shouldered the
burdens of adulthood and marriage with but two years of high
school training, not an unusual occurrence in the 1870's
but also not a particularly auspicious beginning. His was
not to be a rags to riches tale but then, too, neither were
the Horatio Alger encouragements. Seemingly, Garford
hardly missed the refinements of higher education but relied
upon his native intelligence, industry, determination, and
ambition, with which he was plentifully endowed. Then,
too, his maturity coincided with an historical period when
an individual had a remarkable opportunity to capitalize
on new situations and opportunities. The last half of the
nineteenth century was marked by intense competition on
the economic scene, and an enterprising soul could attain
a preferred status, economically and socially, if he was
gifted with the necessary tools to do so. Garford did
exactly this.

He invented a simple thing, literally and figuratively: a
bicycle saddle. But it was the best saddle in America and
was placed on the market at precisely the right time. The
bicycle craze was one of the phenomena of the 1890's, and
while the public's imagination was captured by this machine,
Garford busied himself with monopolizing the saddle market.
And he did this too.

A host of adjectives can be used to describe Garford
and to suggest why he was able to climb above his neighbors. He was practical, competitive, economical, conservative, steadfast, disciplined, systematic and individualistic. And always he was ambitious and determined. These characteristics certainly helped to assure his economic success. He took full advantage of the situation in the 1890's, and by 1900 he was a wealthy and outstanding leader in the bicycle industry. True to form he managed to escape the wreckage of the American Bicycle Company, the nation's ill-fated "bicycle trust", and, while not unscathed, undertook to regain his lost fortune. By 1905 he controlled two very promising manufacturing concerns: the Garford Company and the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company. The former originally produced automobile parts, and it was to Garford's lasting regret that he ever decided to leave that specialty in order to produce his own automobile. It was a great mistake and perhaps cost him a chance to be an industrial giant. Garford retained his ownership of the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company until his death. It provided him with a constant source of wealth and pride. He was gratified to know that he was instrumental in contributing to America's great industrial strides, fully realizing the importance of automatic machines to America's new industries, so dependent upon mechanization, standardization and rapid production.

The gap between the business and the political worlds is not very great and particularly to one who wants to make the leap. As soon as his financial solidarity was established,
Garford, a Republican by "birth", upbringing, and inclination, entered the political lists and retained his enthusiasm, to a considerable degree, as long as his financial rear was secured. His was an active and important role in Ohio politics for a full decade until his resounding defeat by Warren G. Harding in the senatorial election of 1914. At that time Garford effectively retired from the "game".

Garford's political activities, so well documented by his letters, afford a detailed case study in American representative democracy. The very marrow of our political institutions can be seen in his political career. Again and again the importance and power of local, county, district and state organizations are stressed and in ascending order. The apex is composed of a very limited number of individuals who control the state and to a certain extent the lesser organizations. While there is interaction between members at the apex and the broad base of local politicians, the latter are certainly the least significant members of the political structure. All members of the structure were the men who represented the people, and Garford, for one, had no illusions about the role of the people. They were voters whose right it was to approve or disapprove of candidates and policies determined by the leaders of a political party. As a leader Garford was rarely, and then only secondarily, motivated by issues. His concern was over the control of local and state patronage, personal squabbles and enmities and, most importantly, the desire for political power for
power's sake alone. This is not to imply condemnation, because Garford believed that in his hands power would be used justly and wisely. He believed further that he did not have to concern himself with issues since once in power he would quite naturally evolve the correct solutions to problems. Underneath his political actions was always a strong belief in his own genius and self-righteousness, a belief that in itself was justification enough for wielding power. As for representative democracy, one gets the distinct impression that Garford believed it to be an admirable form of government, so long as the people were intelligent enough to elect knowledgeable and superior rulers, people like himself.

Garford's political importance began shortly after Mark Hanna's death in 1904. By then, he had proven his mettle in the industrial world and assumed, logically or not, that he was also well qualified to hold a position of political power. He entered the center of Ohio's political scene in 1906 by his election to the state central committee and immediately followed the lead of Harry M. Daugherty and Theodore E. Burton in an effort to topple Senator Dick and his followers from the first rank of leadership.

A bitter intra-party power struggle between constantly shifting alliances continued until the Progressive party was formed in 1912. During the intervening years Garford increasingly viewed with favor election to the governor's office. He bided his time until 1910. But he could not
avoid entanglement in the general factionalism and confusion which characterized Ohio's politics during 1909 and 1910. In his attempt to rise to the top of politics, his path parted from those of Daugherty and Burton, both of whom became Garford's indomitable enemies.

Utter political confusion dictated that Garford not make himself available for the governorship in 1910, and instead he attempted to maintain his forward position by playing the role of peacemaker between Republican progressives and insurgents. Opposition to Taft became unavoidable by early 1912, and Garford joined with other state leaders who rallied under the banner of Theodore Roosevelt and moved to control the Republican organization.

Failing in their efforts to gain control of the party from within, the progressives reluctantly bolted in August, 1912. Garford was the new party's candidate for governor. Defeated at the polls but undeterred, he again ran for the United States Senate in 1914. This time Warren G. Harding administered a thoroughly humiliating defeat. Disillusioned and bitter, Garford, for all practical purposes, retired from active politics.

For the rest of his life he channeled his energies into the business world. All of his ability was demanded and given in order to maintain successfully the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company's financial stability, which was thoroughly tested in the post-war depression. Garford long desired to enjoy the luxury and leisure of a retirement for
which he had worked so hard but was denied the pleasure. He died in 1933 after having spent the day guiding the affairs of his financial and industrial interests.
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Record of Ohio Federation of Women's Clubs, 1909-1915 - Ohio Historical Society Library, Columbus, Ohio.

Frank B. Willis Papers - Ohio Historical Society Library, Columbus, Ohio.

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OTHER UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL


PUBLIC DOCUMENTS


NEWSPAPERS

In addition to clippings and copies in the Garford Papers, the files of the following newspapers, covering varied lengths of time, were consulted.

Cincinnati Enquirer
Cleveland Leader
Cleveland Plain Dealer
Columbus Dispatch
Elyria Chronicle
Elyria Constitution
Elyria Daily Reporter
Elyria Democrat
Elyria Independent Democrat
Elyria Republican
Elyria Telegraph
Elyria Weekly Reporter
Lorain Constitutionalist
New York Daily Tribune
New York Times
Ohio State Journal
Toledo Blade

The Garford Papers contain numerous clippings from the following newspapers. Some served to provide background information only, while others have been cited in the manuscript.

Adrian Telegram
Akron Beacon Journal
Alliance Leader
Alliance Review
Ashtabula Beacon
Ashtabula Press
Bellaire Independent
Bellefontaine Examiner
Bowling Green Democrat
Bucyrus Forum
Cambridge Jeffersonian
Canton News - Democrat
Canton Repository
Chardon Record
Chicago Daily Tribune
Chillicothe Gazette
Cincinnati Times - Star
Cleveland News
Cleveland Press
Columbus Citizen
Conneaut News Herald
Coshocton Age
Dayton Journal
Dayton News
Delaware Herald
Delaware Journal - Herald
Findlay Republican
Freeport Press
Galion Inquirer
Geneva Times
Ironton Register
Jefferson Gazette
Kent Bulletin
Kenton Democrat
La Rue News
Lancaster Eagle
Lancaster Gazette
Lebanon Patriot
Lebanon Star
Lima Democrat
Lima Star
Lima Times Democrat
Lorain News
Lorain Times – Herald
Mansfield News
Mansfield Shield
Marietta Journal
Marion Star
Marysville Journal
Mt. Gilead Republican
Mt. Gilead Sentinel
Mt. Vernon Republican News
New Philadelphia Times
Niles News
Norwalk Journal
Norwalk Reflector
Oberlin News
Oberlin Tribune
Ottawa Gazette
Portsmouth Times
Ravenna Republican
Salem Herald
Sandusky Register
Springfield News
Springfield Republican
Steubenville Gazette
Tiffin Advertiser
Toledo News – Bee
Toledo Press
Toledo Times
Troy Democrat
Urichsville Chronicle
Wooster News
Youngstown Telegram
Youngstown Vindicator
ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS IN PERIODICALS


Roosevelt, Theodore, "Two Phases of the Chicago Convention." The Outlook, CI, 620-630, (July 20, 1912).


EDITORIALS AND UNSIGNED ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS


"Blueprint of a Nation --- in Red." Business Week, Oct. 5, 1929, 33-34.


"Republican Difficulty." Nation, XCI, 92, Aug. 4, 1910.

"Ohio." The Outlook, CII, 342, (Oct. 19, 1912).

"The Campaign in Ohio." The Outlook, CI, 233, (June 1, 1912).


In addition to the articles above, the following periodicals were used:

American Machinist
American Mercury
Atlantic Monthly
Collier's Weekly
Cycling Life
Fourth District Finance and Industry
Literary Digest
New Republic
Public Opinion
Saturday Evening Post
Scribner's Magazine
Union Reporter

BIOGRAPHIES, MEMOIRS, AND WRITINGS
OF PUBLIC MEN


LOCAL AND STATE HISTORIES AND OTHER VOLUMES RELATING TO OHIO


GENERAL AND SPECIAL SECONDARY WORKS


**MISCELLANEOUS**


I, Warren Miles Hoffnagle, was born in Chicago, Illinois, March 30, 1934. I received my secondary-school education in the public schools of Chicago, and my undergraduate training at Knox College, which granted me the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1956. I served in the United States army during the years 1956-1958. In October, 1958, I was appointed University Fellow at Ohio State University, where I specialized in the Department of History. From Ohio State University, I received the Master of Arts degree in 1959. I was a graduate assistant from October, 1959, to June, 1962, at Ohio State University while completing the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree.

I have accepted a position as Instructor in History at State University College, Fredonia, New York.