THOMAS, Jack Ray, 1931–
MARMADUKE GROVE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1962
History, modern

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
MARMADUKE GROVE:
A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY

DISSEPTION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Jack Ray Thomas, B. A., M. A.

 *****

The Ohio State University
1962

Approved by

Advisers
Department of History
# CONTENTS

Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Chilean Political Development to 1929.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Marmaduke Grove, Military Officer</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>The First Alessandri Administration and the Uprising of September, 1924</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>The Revolt of January 23, 1925 and Alessandri's Return</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Ibanez the Dictator, Grove the Revolutionary</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>The Socialist Republic of Chile</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>The Rise of the Socialist Left and of Marmaduke Grove</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>Attempts By The Conservative-Liberal Coalition to Prevent the Rise of Reform Parties</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>The End of the Popular Front</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOBIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

In the late afternoon of September 6, 1924, a group of military officers walked into the presidential palace in Santiago, Chile. Dramatically, they presented President Arturo Alessandri Palma with a series of demands for social legislation, army reform, and a program to eliminate graft and corruption in government. Alessandri acquiesced by resigning. Later he sought asylum in the United States Embassy and took his family to Europe. Thus began a chaotic eight-year period in the history of a Latin American nation renowned for its political stability. In late 1932 this same Alessandri was again elected president, this time serving out his complete six-year term. However, disorder was not ended in 1932 but arose at intermittent intervals up to the election of Alessandri's successor, Pedro Aguirre Cerda. When order once again reigned, Chile was a vastly different nation. Profound and far-reaching changes had occurred in the political structure which ultimately affected every citizen of the republic.
Throughout the years of confusion Marmaduke Grove Vallejo moved about the political stage, sometimes as a hero of the people, at other times as a forgotten exile on a lonely Polynesian island. Grove's life in these years is illustrative of a new breed of Chilean, searching for solutions to the plethora of social, economic, and political problems which had gone unattended throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Grove's approach was seldom orthodox, and he often felt the wrath of the various governments in power as he attempted to change Chile's political structure. Yet Grove and men like him continued their agitation until Chile today has more social welfare legislation than any other nation in South America except Uruguay.

The following is a biographical study of Marmaduke Grove, with emphasis on the tumultuous years between 1924 and 1938, when a welfare state emerged from a nation long dominated by a system resembling the manorial structure of Europe in the Middle Ages. The transition was relatively bloodless since the military, in most cases, allied itself with those who fought to put an end to the old political and social organization of the Nation. Nevertheless, the
changes have been profound, making of Chile a nation far different from that which existed in the nineteenth century.
CHAPTER I

CHILEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT TO 1920

In September, 1810, the first national government of Chile was established. More than a decade passed before the Americans finally drove the Spanish from South American soil, but Chile dates her independence from 1810. The leaders in the independent nation were military heroes, one of whom was Bernardo O'Higgins. O'Higgins became the "Supreme Dictator" of Chile in 1818, and for the next five years he ruled his country under a quasi-monarchial system. All the while the fighting raged the Chilean aristocracy welcomed the assistance of the populace, many of whom had acquired ideas of equality, liberty, and democracy from Europe. But once the fighting ceased, the aristocracy wanted no part of such ideas, nor were they willing to permit those who honestly espoused these views to rule the nation. Therefore, from 1823, when O'Higgins was forced from office, until 1830, when the conservative aristocracy finally gained complete control, a struggle between liberals and conservatives kept
the nascent Chilean nation in almost perpetual chaos.

With conservative victory, order and stability reigned. In 1833 the conservatives drafted a constitution which was designed to keep the aristocracy in power. This document declared that the Roman Catholic religion was to be the religion of the state, "with the exclusion of the public exercise of any other." This drew the Church into an alliance with the aristocracy, not because the conservatives were particularly devout, but because they recognized the potential value of the church in preserving the status quo. The drafters of the new constitution established a strong centralized government headed by a powerful chief executive. The presidential term was set at five years with the possibility of a second term. The president was to be elected indirectly by special electors. With the accord of a council of state, which advised him, the president was

2 Ricardo Donoso, Desarrollo político y social de Chile desde la Constitución de 1833 (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1942), p. 13.
authorized, subject to the approval of congress, to declare a state of siege "in case of war or interior disturbance." As a result, personal rights, guaranteed in the constitution, could be suspended if the government so desired.

The legislature was bicameral with the lower house elected for three years and the upper for nine years. The major power granted congress was authority to approve or disapprove the annual budget submitted by the president. In addition, it had the power to authorize the president to make use of "extraordinary faculties" and thereby suspend individual guarantees.

Under this conservative, centralized document the next forty years of Chilean history were stable and orderly. Strong conservative presidents made full use of their constitutional powers. Those of a more liberal bent were effectively held in check by the army, clergy, and landed aristocracy. With stability and domestic peace the aristocracy consolidated its position,

---

4 Donoso, Desarrollo político y Social de Chile desde la Constitución de 1833, p. 34.
5 Edwards, La organización política de Chile, pp.136-37.
economically as well as politically. Still, liberal sentiment persisted, and in 1871 the conservatives were forced to rule jointly with the liberals during the presidency of Federico Errázuriz Zañartu. Five years later the liberals elected a candidate on their own, finally breaking conservative rule.

Liberal victory in 1876, however, could scarcely be termed a turning point in Chilean history. The men who adhered to the liberal program were generally from the same economic and social element as the conservatives. Their basic differences centered about clerical matters. Once in control in 1881, the liberals instituted a series of anti-clerical measures. They broke diplomatic relations with the Vatican; reduced state payments to the church; required civil registration for marriage, births, and deaths; and the state took control of cemeteries.

Liberals continued to grow strong, and with their support Jose Manuel Balmaceda was elected president in 1886. As a result of the War of the Pacific, 1879-

---

Domingo Amunategui, El progreso intelectual y político de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1936), pp. 124-25.
1881, in which Chile gained valuable nitrate fields from Peru and Bolivia, government revenue soared giving Balmaceda funds with which to finance many domestic improvements.

Near the end of Balmaceda's term trouble broke out between the president and congress. For some time sentiment had been growing for a parliamentary-type government in which the president would be subservient to congress. Then in 1890 Balmaceda sought to make a cabinet member his successor. Congress vehemently protested this electoral interference and refused to approve the annual budget. This caused the president to retreat temporarily, but when congress tried to institute electoral changes which would insure the defeat of the president's candidate, Balmaceda adjourned congress. When time for a new budget came, he issued a manifesto to the effect that the previous year's budget would be in effect for 1891. Congress promptly revolted, and with navy support, set about to overthrow the president forcibly. The army, upon whose support the Congressionalists also

counted, remained loyal, and a short, bloody, civil war occurred. Nine months after the fighting began the Congressionalists took the cities of Valparaiso and Santiago. Balmaceda had to seek asylum in the Argentine legation, where he committed suicide on September 18, 1891.

The major cause of the civil war, in addition to a sincere desire on the part of many Chileans for a parliamentary form of government, was the landed aristocracy's dissatisfaction with Balmaceda's program. The President had utilized funds for a program of public works. The landed aristocracy wanted this money to be used to redeem depreciated paper currency and to pay off the national debt. Also, the president proposed the creation of a national bank which would give credit to small and medium-sized commercial elements. Should this new element in the business world be permitted to grow strong the privileged position of the wealthy, landed class would be seriously threatened, a situation which threatened the aristocracy.

Following the civil war the victorious Congression-

alists instituted a parliamentary system of government in Chile. A series of five weak presidents found themselves in almost constant difficulty as the Conservative and Liberal Parties formed and dissolved coalitions with frequency. Still, nitrate revenue continued to enrich the treasury. With these funds politicians and government officials quickly learned that they could supplement their own personal income through graft. Government became disorderly and graft-ridden, a situation unknown in the nineteenth century. This in turn paved the way for the tumult of the 1920's.

In the period 1891 to 1925 battles between the champions of gold and the defenders of paper money dominated parliamentary debate on economic matters. Those who supported gold and a stable currency were the people who worked for a salary and the nascent small business element, both of whom lacked the benefits from the use of credit. Siding with this group were some persons of powerful influence such as bankers like Agustín Edwards and Agustín Ross whose banks had a great deal of money outstanding in the form of loans to the landed aristocracy. On the other side, in support of paper money, were the representatives of the agricultural
class who dominated parliament and possessed the land. This agricultural element had become heavily indebted and an inflated currency would enable them to repay their loans with greater ease.

During the civil war Balmaceda had printed a great deal of paper currency to finance his struggle with the Congressionalists. One year after Balmaceda fell, in November, 1892, Congress announced that it would redeem the paper money at face value. Three years later Congress passed a law providing for the redemption of the paper currency at par value. At the same time legislation established a gold standard setting the peso at 36½ cents United States money. Thus, it appeared that the weight of popular opinion had won out and forced the supporters of paper money, who dominated Congress, to pass a measure against their own interests. The victory for the hard money elements was short lived, however, and in 1898, on the pretext of mobilizing the army over a border dispute with Argentina, Chile went off the gold standard and printed fifty million

---

pesos in paper money without gold backing. The inflation which resulted from this action caused the salaried workers great difficulty. Chilean political experts place the blame for the strikes in 1905, 1906, and 1907 at the doorstep of the devaluation. In 1914 workers in Valparaiso wrote a letter to the president complaining of the inflation but the government refused to stabilize the peso until 1925 when President Alessandri created a central bank.

Progressive inflation and devalued currency which played havoc with the national economy after 1898 had a direct bearing on the social and political development of Chile in this period. Those who suffered most were the small businessmen and the workers, while those who could afford to contract debts found it simple to pay them off in devalued currency. The middle and lower sectors of society, thrown together on the common ground of economic loss, joined forces to combat the large landholders and their political representatives who prospered at their

---

10 Jobet, *Ensayo crítico del desarrollo económico-social de Chile*, p. 119.
expense. They abandoned the traditional political parties and ideological beliefs of those from the same economic and social area in order to carry into the political arena a class struggle founded on economic motives. They found expression in the Radical party which had been founded in 1858, and in several new parties born in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Dissident elements within the Liberal party ranks formed the Radical party. It included portions of those same propertied groups which made up the two dominant parties, as well as teachers, bureaucrats and merchants. The development of the party paralleled the growth of the middle class in Chile. Salaried workers joined with three other minor parties which were established during the period of parliamentary control; the Liberal-Democratic, the Democratic, and the Liberal-Independent. None of these parties, however, could be termed left-wing in the modern sense of that phrase. They agitated

---


for reforms against Conservative rule, but they espoused little in the way of social legislation. Still, youthful labor organizations, united in an effort to improve living standards and working conditions, laid the basis, in this period, for later extreme left-wing parties.

In the early years of the twentieth century, political parties in Chile generally ignored the workers and their expression of discontent—the strike. On May 12, 1903, dock workers struck for higher wages against two steamship lines in Valparaiso. The government intervened with troops, leaving thirty strikers dead and over two hundred wounded. Two years later a protest against a new tax left many dead and wounded in what came to be called "Semana Roja" (Red Week). On February 6, 1906, the government put down a strike in Antofagasta by force and in 1907, government bullets met strikers in Iquique. Then there followed a long period of labor calm as war prosperity arrived. Chile remained neutral throughout World War I, reaping an economic harvest from the sale of nitrates to

---

15 Ibid.
belligerents for the manufacture of munitions. When peace came to Europe, nitrate sales dropped and again labor agitation became prevalent. Government police sent labor leaders to prison to be held in inhuman conditions and any demonstration of protest was ruthlessly suppressed. In 1918 and 1919 "Hunger Meetings" were held in an effort to locate work for the unemployed and to pressure the government into passing laws designed to lower the cost of living. Again the government employed force and police persecuted those arrested to the extent that one committed suicide while another, poet José Domingo Gómez Rojas, died shortly after his release. Through it all, Congress concerned itself primarily with philosophical debates while weak presidents did nothing more than satisfy the will of the landed aristocracy.

 Prior to 1891 there had been some attempts to organize labor. In 1847 the Society of Artisans came into being and later contributed to the establishment of the Democratic party. Yet neither the Society nor the political party which emerged from it have had

16 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, pp. 155-56.
much influence in shaping the political history of Chile. The Democrats elected their first deputy in the elections of 1894, their first senator in 1912, and realized their first ministerial appointment in 1916. At no time has the party elected more than a few deputies and one or two senators at the same time. As a result, labor leaders turned to the formation of other groups which they believed would produce the reforms they deemed necessary for the industrial and agricultural workers of Chile.

On September 10, 1909, the Workers Federation of Chile (FOCH) was born as an outgrowth of a union movement initiated four years earlier. Almost immediately federal, provincial, and departmental worker's councils joined the new group. The first declaration of FOCH illustrates the ideology of the labor movement at this time. It could hardly be more moderate. The first article stated that the aims of the new organization were to "intervene amicably in disputes between worker and

---

17 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 146.
18 Amunategui, El progreso intelectual y político de Chile, p. 143.
employer, whenever the causes are justified; to work for
the implantation of the eight-hour work day and a mini-
mum wage whenever these are required to maintain the
necessities of the workers home." The second article
stated the FOCH would attempt "to cultivate amicable
relations with the public powers and administrative
authorities, following the spirit of the statutes...."
A few years later the federation abandoned these prin-
ciples and espoused the ideology of Karl Marx. Their
declaration of 1919 is plainly Marxian. The aims of
FOCH were:

to defend life, health, and the moral and
material interests of every working class
member of both sexes; to defend the workers
of both sexes from patronal and commercial
exploitation, from the abuses of chiefs
and authorities and from every form of
exploitation and oppression, to foment
the progress of instruction and culture
for the working classes...abolishing the
capitalist regime with its unacceptable
system of industrial and commercial
organization that reduces to slavery the
majority of the population. 20

Three years later at the Congress of Rancagua the members

19
Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos,
p. 158.
20
Ibid., p. 159
of the federation voted to join the Communist International, thereby bringing Soviet Communism to Chile.

As the workers sought more radical means to improve their economic and social position following World War I, a few of Chile's political parties also began a leftward swing. In 1918 a union of the Radical and Democratic parties, with some Liberal elements, was formed, called the Liberal Alliance. In the first year of its existence the coalition was successful at the polls, leading President Sanfuentes to ask one of its members to form a cabinet. The man chosen was Arturo Alessandri Palma, a Liberal who from his congressional seat had fought the Conservatives as far back as 1906. The appointment cannot be construed as a liberalization of the political philosophy of Sanfuentes, but rather a usual occurrence under a parliamentary system. Parliamentary tradition dictated that a new prime minister should be from the party, or coalition of parties, which polled the most votes in the preceding election. Eduardo Frei, a political scientist and leader of the Christian Democratic party, found the elections of 1918

---

21 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 183.
and the subsequent appointment of Alessandri a decisive break in the long political domination of the conservative, landed aristocracy. Frei held that the elections of 1918 paved the way for the election to the presidency of Alessandri in 1920. Alessandri campaigned under a program which each day inclined more toward social reform and which carried the votes of the professional middle class and the support of university students with it.

The campaign and election of 1920 is unique in Chilean political history. Alessandri possessed great oratorical talent which enabled him to stir the emotions of the voting public. His speeches and rallies always began with a band playing the Mexican song, El Cielito Lindo. Alessandri spoke in glowing terms of the better life for all if he were elected. He did not, however, outline his program in detail. He spoke instead in generalities that captured the imagination of the voters and instilled in the people an awareness that for the

---

22 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 184.

23 This song was used so much by Alessandri through his first and second terms as president that many Chileans even today are unaware that the song originated in Mexico.
first time they were to have a hand in the election of a president and that from this time on "an election could not be contrived among small directing circles." The awareness of their new influence in politics made the people ecstatic and Alessandri, recognizing their mood, fed their delirium with beautiful phrases and emotional promises. "This first popular expression had the romanticism of youth....It was a great moment for a caudillo, it was a great moment for Alessandri...."

Opposing Alessandri in 1920 was one hundred years of traditional rule by one socioeconomic group, the landed aristocracy. The Conservative party, the Liberal-Democratic party, the Liberal-Independents, and the majority of the Liberal party joined together in a coalition called the National Union to combat Alessandri and the Liberal Alliance. Wholehearted approval and support by the Church also increased the strength of the National Union. For their candidate they chose Luis

24 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 183.
25 Ibid., p. 184.
Barros Borgoño, teacher, writer, and public servant. He campaigned in a cold, aloof manner, carefully analyzing the problems and putting forth his solutions in the meticulous and proper style of an academician. The people were in no mood for an old professor's dry lectures. Instead they wanted to be stimulated by the rhetoric of the young, emotional Alessandri, who became their idol, their "savior." Most Chilean political authorities agree that such a campaign was never before waged in Chile, nor would it ever be possible after 1920. In subsequent presidential elections the people demanded a more articulate program from a candidate, and the candidate himself was subjected to the discipline of a political party, through which he would be popularized by the vast publicity techniques of party organizations.

Following the balloting the first unofficial report gave Alessandri 179 electoral votes to 175 for Barros Borgoño. The constitution stated that if no candidate received an absolute majority of votes the election would pass to Congress to be decided by congressional vote.

Donoso, Desarrollo político y social de Chile desde la Constitución de 1833, p. 117.
Since the National Union had a majority in Congress, Alessandri feared that once in Congress, the election would go to his adversary. The Liberal Alliance and other Alessandri supporters embarked upon a publicity program to pressure congress and to muster public opinion. Alessandri spoke from the balcony of his home denouncing the National Union and accused them of attempting to rob him of the election, while his supporters in Congress pursued the same line of attack. Throughout these days life in Santiago came to almost a halt, as merchants closed their doors in fear of property damage. Automobiles remained away from the center of the city to avoid expected riots and demonstrations.

Finally, the two opposing factions met and agreed upon a "tribunal of honor" to examine the voting and to pass their findings on to Congress. Alessandri designated two men for the tribunal, as did Luis Barros. These four then met and selected three others bringing the tribunal's number to seven. While the tribunal met

---

28 Ibid, p. 252.
the agitation that surrounded Santiago carried to other areas of the nation, leading many to agree with one writer who concluded that it must be either Alessandri or revolution. Amid this disorder another event occurred which played an important role in the election. In the north a frontier dispute arose with Bolivia. The minister of war alerted troops from Santiago and other garrisons declaring that Bolivia was mobilizing troops which threatened the security of Chile. Immediately, the Liberal Alliance charged that this was a ruse perpetrated by the National Union to take the minds of the citizenry from the domestic elections. But the charges and counter-charges made by the opposing parties continued to circulate and even the threat of an international incident could not still the clamor. Finally, on September 30, three months after the election, the tribunal of honor announced its decision. Although it decreased Alessandri's slim electoral lead, the tribunal still found him victorious, 177 electors to 176 for Luis Barros. On October 6, Congress met and voted the presidency to Alessandri, 87 to 29 with

Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor, I, 253.
With Alessandri's election an era ended in Chile. No longer would the landed aristocracy dominate the political scene, ruling the country as they did their own affairs. From 1920 on the middle and lower segments of society would have a hand in the government of their country. The change was not immediate because the conservative forces still retained control of congress, but the Liberal Alliance made the initial step in breaking this control in 1920 and within the next two decades Chile built "a social-welfare structure only equalled by that of Uruguay in the Americas, far ahead of developments in most European countries, and only realized in Britain since 1945."

The election of Alessandri would have been inconceivable fifty years earlier. In that half-century two major changes took place which enabled the Liberal Alliance to gain the presidency. The first was the increase in educational facilities and a shift from the teaching of traditional philosophy and religion

---

30 Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor, I, 263.

to the sciences. Many youths who did not belong to the "aristocracy of blood or of money" received a more liberal education than their privileged predecessors. They developed a social and political awareness which found expression in the Liberal Alliance. The second factor came from abroad. Social agitation in Europe during and following the First World War did not go unnoticed in Chile. Chileans witnessed the fall of the Russian, German, and Austrian monarchies amid the clamor for social reform. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia held out hope for the lower class in Chile that much the same thing would happen in their homeland but they became convinced that their "revolution" could be a peaceful one if it could only be led by Arturo Alessandri and the Liberal Alliance.

Yet, it was not that simple. Four years after Alessandri's election the nation was shaken by a series of military uprisings, a dictatorship, a Socialist Republic born from another military rebellion, and six years of conservative government headed by the same man

---

32 Amunategui, El progreso intelectual y político del Chile, pp. 151-52.
who led the reformers in 1920, Arturo Alessandri. Through these tumultuous years a young, socially minded officer corps took to the political battlefield to effect reforms by force of arms. Among the most prominent was Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, whose career was as stormy as the development of the country he loved through the 1920's and 1930's.
In 1840 an Irish medical doctor from County Cork, landed at Caldera, a northern Chilean port servicing the important mining city of Copiapó. This doctor, William Edward Grove, brought the Grove name to Chile. From Caldera the doctor traveled extensively throughout the mining region of northern Chile and down into the plush central valley. Of all the cities he visited, however, Copiapó impressed him the most, and he returned to spend the rest of his life in that city.

Once settled in Chile, Grove wrote to England for medical supplies with which to set up his practice. In a short while he met and married Angela Avalos, a young woman from Argentina. The doctor quickly became one of the outstanding physicians in the town, performing difficult surgery with phenomenal success. At the same time

1 Photographs, in possession of the Grove family, picture patients before and after William Grove operated. In each case, the improvement is obvious, as for example, the young boy who could not stand erect because of a back deformity. After surgery, however, the boy stood straight.
PLEASE NOTE:
Page 25 seems to be lacking. Filmed as received.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS, INC.
was a prominent member of the Radical Party and an influential Freemason. In addition to his political and professional duties Grove wrote extensively for the Copiapó press, attacking the policies of the national government in Santiago. In 1891 his attacks on Balmaceda were so vehement that government troops arrested Grove and exiled him to Argentina. After the victory of the Congressionalista forces in 1891, the new government released Grove and other exiles to return to Copiapó and the public offices they held before the civil war.

Young Marmaduke attended the public schools of Copiapó, a coeducational school, until he reached the age of ten, then a boys school, and later the Liceo de Copiapó. In 1892, when Grove was fourteen years old, he entered the naval school at Valparaíso. Prior to 1883 only sons of the landed aristocracy were admitted to careers as military officers, but by the last decade of the nineteenth century, middle class, professional families could send their offspring to the

---

4 El Atacamen0 (Copiapó), 28 October 1915.
naval school or to the military academy along with the sons of the wealthy landholders.

Reminiscing about his early education, Grove was most impressed by the cleanliness of the school buildings. Each child was made responsible for his or her own personal area within the school room while doors, windows, and halls were divided among the group. Thus, each child kept a portion of the school building clean. Grove noted that some forty years later, with greatly improved hygienic services, the schools that he visited throughout Chile were neither as clean nor as orderly as his old school in Copiapó.

Another aspect of the nineteenth-century Chilean educational system which Grove lauded was the use of women teachers, particularly in elementary and junior-high school. He felt that young children, after close

5 Johnson, Political Change in Latin America, p. 70.
6 Marmaduke Grove, "El líder Marmaduke Grove Vallejo," Claridad, January 25, 1938. This is the first of a series of 72 autobiographical articles written for the left-wing newspaper, Claridad, by Grove in the general election year of 1938 when Grove was prominently mentioned as the Popular Front's presidential candidate.
7 Ibid.
association with their mothers prior to entering school, would feel more relaxed with a woman teacher and would accept her teaching more readily than the teaching of a man. Chilean high schools of this era also impressed Grove. These schools began to teach scientific and technical courses as opposed to the earlier concentration on philosophical and theological subjects. Since Copiapó was situated in a region of fertile farm land, agricultural courses also were taught in the liceos or high schools. Grove counted himself fortunate to have been educated in such an enlightened, progressive atmosphere.

Grove's final public school year before entering the naval academy was a momentous one, both for Marmaduke and for his country as well. The civil war between the supporters of President Balmaceda and those who favored parliamentary control broke out in January, 1891, when revolting congressmen secured the assistance of most of the navy and moved north into the nitrate area to establish a base of operations. The army remained loyal to the president, but the rebels had planned well their strategy. The plan was to occupy the nitrate fields to secure revenue for use in purchasing modern weapons and
military equipment. Well supplied in this fashion the newly formed rebel army moved down from the north, driving Balmaceda's forces toward Santiago, where they finally surrendered.

The people of Copiapó felt the weight of the civil war as much as any Chilean area. Retreating government troops bivouacked in the center of the city for several days and took into custody several prominent citizens, including Marmaduke's father and two of his uncles. Troops took the prisoners into exile in Argentina where they remained until Balmaceda surrendered. Following the departure of the government troops, the rebel army arrived in Copiapó and the youthful Grove, along with many of his friends, attempted to enlist. Marmaduke was accepted for duty in a rifle company without parental permission. When his mother received word of his enlistment, however, he was taken home minutes before the troop left by train for combat in the south.

The military display he witnessed during the war in

---

9 Ibid.
1891 greatly impressed Grove. Although a career had undoubtedly been planned for him in the military prior to the civil war, it was after the completion of the civil struggle that he entered the Naval Academy. The firsthand knowledge of fighting men engaged in a military struggle fired the imagination of the fourteen-year-old youngster, leading him enthusiastically toward a military career. Thirty-five years later Grove still had the same spirit.

Marmaduke took an immediate dislike to the strict discipline of the Naval Academy. Ultimately, he broke a few minor academy rules and the school directors placed him on the list of "responsibles." Responsibles were boys who had either disobeyed academy rules or who were lax in their course work. This group was made responsible for any disorder that could not be traced to specific individuals. Their punishment was seldom severe but always annoying, such as deprivation of afternoon or evening tea, extra sentry duty, or early reveille.

10 Manuel Bedoya, Grove, su vida, su ejemplo, su obra (Santiago: Partido Socialista, 1944), p. 9.
For their part the "responsibles" developed a code of honor by which they would accept punishment if they felt the infraction was justified or "reasonable." If, however, they believed the disorder to be without reason, they would force the guilty party or parties to confess, sometimes resorting to physical violence to encourage the confession.

Because Grove was a responsible, throughout his days at the academy he had to work very hard to stay among the top men in the class. Months passed during which he never left school on the Sunday holiday because he wished to remain in his room to study. Marmaduke's first year and a half passed in this fashion, but in July, 1894, he was rewarded for his diligence by the directors of the school who named him Brigadier or student leader. All went well for a time, and the boys in Grove's barracks progressed under his leadership. After two months as Brigadier, however, Grove had words with a student lieutenant on the drill field, threatening to "break his skull" with a rifle. Grove reported to the school directors who demoted him from his post, sent him to the brig, and placed him once
again at the head of the list of responsible.

While in the brig, friends smuggled books, paper, and candles into Marmaduke so that he could continue to study and not fall behind the class. After a short period of confinement he was released and for a time everything went well. He continued to master the academic subjects, and he remained free from any serious breach of discipline. The calm, however, was short-lived and by November, 1894, Marmaduke was in the most serious difficulty of his young life.

One evening in the Academy mess hall a waiter served a cadet stale bread. The cadet complained to his Brigadier, who, in turn, asked the waiter to replace the bread. The waiter refused and the Brigadier called an officer who rebuked the Brigadier. The Brigadier responded to the humiliation of this public reprimand by shouting loudly at the officer. The officer left the room to call the sub-director of the Academy as the students rose from their seats in noisy disorder. Tables were overturned, bread was thrown,

and chaos reigned until the sub-director, Captain Leoncio Valenzuela, arrived on the scene.

As a result of the mess hall outburst, the cadet who started it all was expelled and the Brigadier was sent to the brig. The following afternoon four more students were expelled for their participation in the demonstration. These four spoke to other cadets of a possible revolt in which they would capture the arms room and take command of the school. Grove's barracks, however, refused to join in the scheme because they believed that "there was no well formulated plan and that the whole thing was stupid...."

At two in the morning the expelled cadets, along with a few others, did, in fact, try to storm the arms room, but armed marines easily repulsed them within ten minutes. The four students who started the revolt managed to escape, and they never returned to claim their equipment and clothing. Two days later ten boys were called into the office of the Academy Director and informed that they were expelled for participation in the abortive arms-room revolt. Among the ten was Marmaduke Grove.

Marmaduke Grove, Claridad, January 28, 1938.

Ibid.
The ten left immediately to ask the assistance of the provincial authorities, but nothing was accomplished. Next they traveled to Santiago and secured an audience with President Jorge Montt. Montt heard them out but refused to intervene in an Academy matter of this nature. He upheld the school director and the boys returned to their homes.

After dismissal from the Naval School Grove returned home and entered the Liceo de Copiapó. Late in 1896 rumblings of a border dispute with Argentina reached Copiapó, and several detachments of Chilean troops passed through the area. Because of the threat of war with Argentina, the military academy opened special courses for those who wished to become "subaltern" officers. Grove applied, the academy accepted his application, and he entered the school in 1897 as a cadet. At this time the school was under the direction of two German officers, who ran the school in the manner of strict discipline for which German military officers have become reputed. After the experience of the Naval

---

Academy Marmaduke paid close attention to study and became number one in his class. For his outstanding academic record the commanding officer of the school presented Grove with a "sword of honor." Upon graduation in 1898, the Army's Director of Personnel assigned Grove to the Regiment of Calvary Artillery which was stationed at Santiago. The regimental commander was Lieutenant Colonel Luis Altamirano who, like Grove, entered the political arena through military action in the mid-1920's. The army awarded the rank of second lieutenant to Grove at this time, and seven days later he took up his duties in the regiment to which he had been assigned.

Grove enjoyed military life in the artillery regiment. The discipline and orderliness of army life appealed to him and made a permanent impression on him. He was constantly aware of cleanliness and order, and filth and disorder; the former he found in military

---

life, the latter in the slums that infested Chilean cities. Marmaduke also enjoyed the camaraderie found in the officers clubs of Santiago. He noted that at the turn of the century excessive drinking was not considered shameful. Alcohol, however, could never be the cause of a soldier's absence at revielle or any other formation. Off duty the soldier might drink himself into a stupor, but when the next formation was called, he was expected to be at his post or suffer a public rebuke with all the humiliation that accompanied such action.

Not all that Grove saw in the first years of his military career met with his approval. One thing over which he was extremely unhappy was the type of punishment meted out to soldiers who committed minor infractions of military discipline. Officers in charge paraded the offender before the entire regiment early in the morning and forced him to lie face down on a blanket in full view of his comrades. Several men with branches from quince trees than applied the number of lashes designated for each man. Grove was pleased

---

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Vida y costumbres de la oficialidad," Claridad, February 2, 1938.
when a national law abolished this "inhuman treatment" a few years later. But the army was now Grove's career and although he found some aspects of military life to criticize, he, nevertheless, modeled his existence and created his philosophy of life from military experience. From that first day in the Naval Academy in 1892 until his death in 1954, Marmaduke Grove was a military officer in thought and action, despite his sixteen years as a Senator and another five in retirement as a private citizen.

In June, 1901, Grove was appointed adjutant of the Military School. Four months later he was promoted to first lieutenant. Of his years at the school, Grove had only the fondest of memories. The German method of practical application of military science influenced the school, leading the officers of the institution to take cadets on field maneuvers at the end of each school year. Marmaduke enjoyed these overland excursions and the opportunities they afforded for

officers and cadets alike to learn how to survive in open country over a long period of time.

After nearly four years at the school, the military leadership instituted a plan which enabled Grove to travel overseas to learn more about military equipment and tactics. Most of these trips were made to Germany because of the close military liaison between the two countries Balmaceda had initiated during his presidency. Thus, the school directors selected him as part of a military mission organized for a tour of duty in Germany. His assignment was to an artillery regiment that was stationed at Danzig. In this regiment Grove met many foreigners in Germany such as Chinese, Japanese, and Argentinians. He was also surprised to find many Chileans in various German cities.

Grove stayed a year at Danzig and then transferred to a technical artillery school located in Charlotembourg (Berlin). Here he remained for three years, specializing in ballistics. In this school he found the added advantage of traveling throughout Berlin, visiting historic

21 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Las influencias políticas y los ascensos en el ejercito," Claridad, February 4, 1938.
sites, and attending theaters, concerts, and conferences. Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany impressed Marmaduke, particularly the German people. In later years, when he returned to Europe, he also found France and England to his liking. Grove compared his Chile to every European state he visited and Chile always came out second best in the comparison. It is possible, as some writers have concluded, that he was an exceptionally impressionable individual, but it is also true that he was extremely critical of his homeland and that he wanted to see improvements made so that Chile could favorably compare with any European nation.

Grove spent three years in the technical school at Charlottenbourg, graduating in 1909. Next, he went to a gunnery school in Guterbourg for a short six month course. After completion of this training the military mission in Europe arranged passage for Grove's return.

---

Partido Socialista, Grove, El militar y el ciudadano (Santiago: Departamento de propaganda de Partido Socialista, 1937), p.4. This pamphlet is a part of Folletos, series 93-D in the Biblioteca Congreso Nacional, Santiago, Chile. Subsequent citations of pamphlets will include the Folleto series number along with other publication data.
to Chile by way of Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and Buenos Aires.

While in Germany Grove had been promoted to Captain by the Chilean army. Upon his return to Santiago Grove's superior officers assigned him to the Maturana regiment and placed him in command of the first battery. For the next two years Grove gained experience in leading an artillery battery and in utilizing that technical knowledge he had acquired in Germany. Finally, in April, 1912, Grove gained entry to the Academy of War with the aim of gaining a promotion to Major. Marmaduke spent two more years in the academy before being assigned to the Velasquez regiment of the Tacna garrison. The commander of this regiment was Ernesto Medina who had been Grove's first commanding officer in 1898. Most of the officers who served under Medina held him in

24 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Justicia y comprensión para el subalterno en el ejército," Claridad, February 6, 1928.
25 The city of Tacna at this time was occupied by Chilean troops as a result of their victory in the War of the Pacific. In 1929, through arbitration Tacna was turned over to Peru while Chile maintained possession of the neighboring city of Arica.
high esteem and Grove was no exception. On several later occasions Marmaduke mentioned that Medina helped him greatly when he was a young officer leading Grove to model his own military career after his first commanding officer. The other officers who served beside Grove came to respect him as a military technician and as a man. On one occasion Grove served under a very devout Catholic. At the outset Grove told this officer that he knew of his religious sentiments and then Marmaduke confessed that he held the position of chief of the masonic lodge at Tacna. The commanding officer assured Grove that this would in no way affect their relationship and that so long as Grove carried out his duties there would be no difficulty between them. Marmaduke, impressed by this frankness served under his commander, forgetting his antipathy for the church.

While stationed at Tacna, Grove petitioned his superior officers for permission to spend a short leave in Vina del Mar, a small resort city near Valparaiso. The reason for this request was the desire of the young

---

26
Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "En la Academia de Guerra," Claridad, February 8, 1938.

27
officer to marry Rebeca Valenzuela. Ironically, this young lady, who became Rebeca Grove on September 26, 1915, was the daughter of naval Captain Leoncio Valenzuela, the man who expelled Marmaduke Grove from the naval academy in 1894.

During this stage of his career Grove participated in many social organizations connected with or outside the military. One such organization was the Committee of the Military League, to which Grove proposed a plan whereby this organization would seize the presidential palace and government offices, expell the president of the Republic, Ramon Barros Luco, and establish a military dictatorship. The League, however, refused to go along with this idea and remained aloof from politics, the traditional position of the military in Chile.

It is difficult to determine the reasons behind Grove's proposal at this time. He never refuted this charge, nor did he ever elucidate on his motives. Chile,

---

28 Partido Socialista, Grove. El Militar y el ciudadano, p. 5.
in this period, was politically chaotic, and Grove had shortly before returned from Germany where the Kaiser maintained a smooth-running government by arbitrary means. The German government impressed Marmaduke, and it may be that he had much the same thing in mind for Chile when he proposed a military rebellion in 1912.

Another possibility is that Grove, like many another young army officer in Latin America, merely sought the stimulation of combat. Chile's last great war effort had been in 1879 in the War of the Pacific. Many veterans of this war were still in the army, and their tales of battle quickened the pulse of many a youthful officer, as well as enlisted men, who longed for the glory of battle, when such was still possible. Throughout his life Grove demonstrated time and again traits of character that would coincide with this idea. He was an impetuous impressionable man of action. He was not a reflective man who would ponder the advisability of a military golpe de estado, but rather the type who on the slightest provocation would pursue armed rebellion. In any case, whatever the reasons, Grove's first proposal for military intervention into politics failed and Marmaduke put away such notions for
better than a decade. The young officers were not yet prepared to move into the political arena primarily because the government still made a military career lucrative, and there was a measure of prestige connected with the officer corps. When prestige waned and the material rewards of military life slipped in the mid-1920's, the officers would go along with any suggestion of intervention into the Chilean politics.

After the failure of Marmaduke's first revolutionary activity, he settled into the routine of military life, concentrating entirely upon the furtherance of his military career. By mid-1918 he attained the rank of Major of the Army and received a transfer to the First Division as adjutant. Nine months later Grove moved to the Estado Mayor and less than a year after that he was appointed Sub-Director of the Military School.

Throughout these years in the army, Grove generally remained aloof from politics, although he was concerned [30]

Partido Socialista, Grove. El militar y el ciudadano, p. 5.
with the social problems of the urban Chilean. Grove deplored the miserable living conditions of the industrial worker, but even more he lamented the fate of the children of these people. On one occasion the officers of the military school provided hot lunches for the school children of the neighborhood, many of whom had previously gone without any lunch at all. Another time, when he was an officer at the Estado Mayor, Grove proposed to divide the city of Santiago into sections, making a regiment responsible for feeding the children of poor parents in each of the sections. There was some support for this plan among the officers, but before it could be put into effect, Grove moved to a new assignment and the others let the idea fade.

Both sadness and joy entered Grove's own personal life in the years prior to 1920. A month after his marriage, on October 28, 1915, his father, Jose Marmaduke, died. For four days after the news of the death reached the press, the newspapers of Copiapo ran full page articles recalling the life of Grove's father and

his role in the development of the Radical Party in Copiapó and the province of Atacama. The people of Copiapó also recalled the good work he performed as municipal judge and as secretary to the intendant of the province. Jose's eldest son, Marmaduke, also felt the loss of the man who had been both a father and confidant. From this time on Marmaduke's mother, herself active in civic organizations, replaced her husband in Marmaduke's life. About a year after Jose's death Marmaduke's sadness turned to delight when his wife gave birth to the first of six children. At the time they were stationed at Tacna, a city long cherished in Grove's memory because of the quiet, peaceful, family life he enjoyed there.

In 1918 Grove was back in Santiago, and as always when he lived in the capital city, he became interested in national politics. As early as 1910 Grove had written articles for military publications. Most of these were technical, but on occasion criticism of his military superiors crept into his writing. At one point, shortly after his return from Germany, Grove and his immediate superior, Commander Manuel Delano, refused to accept supplies for their regiment which they
deemed superfluous. Grove criticized the high command in a military journal for imposing such useless supplies on a regiment. For his criticism the high command sentenced Marmaduke to fifteen days in jail.

During the years when Grove was critical of the military hierarchy and anxious about the misery of Chile's urban and rural workers, agitation for reform grew throughout the country. Political parties and industrial and agricultural unions grew rapidly and hoped to lead the way in correcting social evils. While Grove shared the views of many reformers he, nevertheless, refrained from any positive action in conjunction with the labor unions, the fraternal clubs, or political parties. This is not to imply that Grove had not already chosen his side on the political battlefield, for it is certain he had decided to align himself with the reform elements. Yet, at this time he gave only his moral support to the forces which aspired to end the political predominance of the National Union.

32 Chelen Rojas, Tres hombres. Carlos Marx, Recabarren, y Grove (Chañaral, Chile: Partido Socialista, 1939), p. 35. This pamphlet is included in Folleto 116-G, Biblioteca Congreso Nacional, Santiago, Chile.
CHAPTER III

THE FIRST ALESSANDRI ADMINISTRATION AND THE MILITARY UPRISING OF SEPTEMBER, 1924

In the election of 1920 Marmaduke Grove gained his first small measure of national attention. While the tribunal of honor met to evaluate the disputed election results, the conservative National Union made one last effort to prevent the presidency from falling into the hands of the Liberal Alliance and Arturo Alessandri Palma. The government accused students and workers of working hand in hand with foreign nations to deprive their country of the territory she won in the War of the Pacific. Such charges were entirely unfounded and evidence of collusion between Chilean students and workers with Peru was never produced. Yet the charges served the National Union well. The accusations effectively discredited the various groups, allied with the Liberal Alliance, in the eyes of some of the voting

1 Alberto Edwards and Eduardo Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 186. The boundary question arising out of the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru was not settled until 1929.
public. Still, such action was not enough to stem the tide of support that was carrying Alessandri into the presidency. Realizing that Alessandri's victory probably would be upheld by the tribunal, the conservative forces stirred up a border incident with Peru in the hopes of distracting public opinion from the domestic elections. The Minister of War, Ladislao Errázuriz, announced that Peru was massing troops on the northern Chilean border. To counter such aggressive action, Errázuriz ordered Chilean forces north to prepare to meet the Peruvian threat. Alessandri and his supporters recognized this immediately as a political maneuver designed to occupy the public, while in Congress the election was being handed over to the conservative candidate, Luis Barros Borgono.

Late in 1919 Grove received an appointment to the Military School in the capacity of Sub-Director. He loyalty carried out his duties until 1920 when the political scene became turbulent. As Grove himself wrote, "no one could remain indifferent to political

---

2 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 186.
developments." Grove supported the Liberal Alliance and Alessandri because of their realization that the social structure of Chile needed an overhauling. Thus, when Errázuriz ordered the mobilization of troops, Grove protested that no need existed for such action since he noticed no threat on the Peruvian border. This subterfuge infuriated Grove, but even more distasteful to him was the manner in which the mobilization was carried out. At the order of the Minister of War, the army ignored all the intricate, well-laid plans of the general staff, and units surged northward to Tacna and Arica in complete disorder. Such unmilitary, undisciplined activity angered Grove to such a degree that he attacked the mobilization and Errazuriz in several articles in military journals. While Grove deplored the lack of discipline in the mobilization, his criticism of the Minister of War, his superior officer, was likewise an undisciplined act. Yet Grove evidently did not care, and he turned the full force of his wrath on the conservative government which for

3 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Las elecciones del año 20 y la movilización de don Ladislao," Claridad, February 12, 1938.

4 Grove, Claridad, February 12, 1938.
the sake of an election, committed for him the unpardonable crime of using the proud Chilean army to further its own political ambitions.

Such criticism of the government could not be permitted to go unpunished. Grove learned the nature of his punishment when he was informed by the military personnel section that he was about to be transferred to an artillery regiment in Traiguen. Marmaduke immediately went to his superior, the Director of the school, Arturo Ahumada, to complain about his transfer. Ahumada said that he could do nothing about it, but he granted Grove permission to carry his complaint to the Minister of War. Errázuriz received Grove and listened to his request to stay as sub-director of the school. After hearing the arguments Errázuriz promised Marmaduke that he would receive just treatment but gave no assurance that Grove would not be transferred. Feeling that the treatment accorded him by the Ministry of War was unjust, Grove asked permission to request an audience with the President of the Republic, Juan Luis

---

Grove, Claridad, February 12, 1938.
Sanfuentes. Once again he obtained his request, and the President agreed to meet with Grove. The head of state greeted this officer warmly, and after hearing Grove's story Sanfuentes declared his sympathy for Marmaduke's case, but, as before, he took no action to countermand the transfer order. Meanwhile, Ahumada visited both the Minister of War and the President on Grove's behalf but his attempts were as fruitless as those of Marmaduke's. However, Ahumada could take one step to help his assistant. Any appointment to fill the vacancy created by Grove's transfer had to originate in the office of the school director, so that the post could be kept vacant should Ahumada so desire. Ahumada believed that the election would eliminate Errázuriz from the cabinet and that with a new president and cabinet, one which Grove had openly supported, Marmaduke could be reinstated to his old position. Therefore, the post of sub-director of the Military School remained vacant for almost a year while Grove served in the Miraflores Regiment at Traiguen.

In his new post Grove took charge of instruction

Grove, Claridad, February 12, 1938.
of officers and enlisted men of the regiment because of the experience in instructional method he gained at the Military School. While at his new post, after the confirmation of Alessandri's election to presidency, Grove met the new President for the first time in what must have been a private meeting arranged by a mutual friend. Apparently Grove requested the meeting for the express purpose of returning to Santiago and the military school. In any event Alessandri promised that he personally would re-assign Grove to the Military School, a promise which he kept in April, 1921.

While at Traiguen Grove began to think more extensively about politics and the military's role in

7 Grove is vague on this meeting with Alessandri, mentioning it only to state that this was the first time that he had met the man whom he had supported in the election of 1920. The manner in which Grove phrases this statement indicates that it was a private meeting although there is no concrete evidence to support this. Likewise the reason for the meeting is not spelled out in any of Grove's writings, but the statement that Alessandri promised to reinstate him in the military school indicates that Grove had only one reason for requesting a meeting with Alessandri.

8 Departamento de Propaganda, Grove. *El militar y el ciudadano.* (Santiago: Partido Socialista, 1937), p. 6. This pamphlet is included in Folleto 93-D, Biblioteca de Congreso Nacional, Santiago.
political activity. One event left a great impression on him and crystalized his thinking on the relationship between the government and the military. On election day in the province of Malleco the provincial cacique (boss) took his three hundred huasos (Chilean horsemen) to the village of Los Sauces to vote early in the morning. After voting they closed the polls before others had a chance to vote and rode off to the cities of Traiguen and Angol, each time closing the voting places after their three hundred votes had been cast. In this manner the cacique had no difficulty in gaining reelection time after time.

This type of fraudulent election procedure in Malleco Province went on for years with no one powerful enough to challenge the authority of the cacique. Late in 1920, however, a military officer from Traiguen barracks arrived at the voting station only to find that the polls were closed. The officer reported his findings to his superior who ordered, under threat of armed violence, tables installed and the voting

continued throughout the day in fulfillment of the voting law. With the polls open the cacique and his three hundred men remained on the spot to try to dissuade opposition votes, thus enabling the voting at Angol to take its natural course without the usual three hundred huaso votes. With the entire day set aside for voting in all cities of the province and without the multiple voting of the huasos, the cacique was defeated.

Of this incident Grove wrote, "This experience affirmed in me the conviction that the army could play a great role in civilian struggles, making them [civilians] follow the law strictly..." Thus, in Grove's mind, the military should act as a police force in political matters. The army especially should watch over political developments and step in at the first sign of any irregularity to force politicians to follow the dictates of the constitution. Such action by the armed forces would itself be unconstitutional, but Grove had unlimited faith in the military leadership and, unlawful or

10 Grove, Claridad, February 15, 1938.
11 Ibid.
not, he believed the officer corps could better be trusted than the politicians of the country. Grove at this time evidenced no fear of military dictatorship. In most matters, social and political, he was an extremely astute observer, but his love for the military clouded his perspective whenever that body entered into either the social or political sphere. In Grove's philosophy military leadership was always to be trusted and to be preferred over civilian leadership in most cases. Even in 1932, after betrayal by the army drove him into exile, Grove refused verbally to assail the military intervention into government or to admit that officer's meddling in politics was dangerous for Chile. Grove attacked individual officers like Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, an ambitious young captain who later became president of Chile, but the military as an institution was for him always above reproach, and he never considered it a threat to democratic government nor to the personal freedoms of Chileans. In this respect the "gullible" label hung on Grove by his opponents is justified.

The administration that Grove and others supported in the election of 1920 met with difficulty from the first days. While the Liberal Alliance elected Alessandri and
many deputies, the Senate remained in firm control of the National Union. Thus, Alessandri was effectively blocked in every attempt to institute his reform program. Realizing this, the President knew that he must keep the support of the public or fall before the conservative forces. By utilizing his tremendous popularity, which did not diminish during his years in office, Alessandri hoped to gain control of the Senate before the next presidential election. To this end he constantly hammered away at his adversaries in public speeches, using his oratorical skill to keep earlier supporters firmly in his camp. He also attempted to keep the public informed of his attempts to put into law the program on which he had been elected and to point out the conservative obstructionist forces in the Senate who stood in the path of this legislation.

Not all the confusion and disorder that marked the first Alessandri administration can be laid at the feet of the conservatives, however. The Liberal Alliance must also share in the blame for a chaotic four years. On his part, Alessandri tried to live up to his campaign promises. He received worker's representatives in the Moneda (Chile's
presidential office) and he proposed a *Codigo del Trabajo* (Labor Code) for the benefit of Chile's working force. Alessandri also appointed a great many middle-class citizens to fill posts previously held only by the wealthy. These appointments infuriated the conservatives, for such action demonstrated that their worst fears were well founded—a new group had moved into political prominence and the predominance of the elite in government was at an end. All of these acts by Alessandri drove the conservatives further away from his supporters and made compromise impossible if ever cooperative effort was possible between the two opposing forces.

But of even greater significance is the fact that many of the Alessandri appointees contributed to the disorder of the administration. Some were corrupt and used their posts to satisfy their own personal avarice at the expense of the nation, and in particular, the Liberal Alliance government. Others were merely incompetent, suffering from a lack of preparation for the positions in which they had to take responsibility.

---

When one segment of a population has dominated a government for nearly a century, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to find qualified civil servants from another sector of the citizenry. Thus, bad appointments, while a cause of confusion, were not wholly attributable to the President. In reality he had no alternative. It was either appoint loyal but incompetent personnel or turn to competent conservatives, a move which Alessandri could never have made because of the high emotional pitch of the campaign. Therefore, both coalitions were responsible for the chaotic state of Chilean government in the first years of the 1920's.

The executive and congress were at odds from the very beginning. Long, sometimes bitter, debates occurred in the Senate and Chamber over Alessandri's appointees even though the constitution clearly stated that all functionaries were the President's representatives for whose actions the President would be responsible. This was but a prelude to the stir

---

which Alessandri's legislative program created when presented later. This program contained seventeen points dealing with problems ranging from international relations to constitutional reform to social reform. Most of the measures championed by Alessandri were later voted into law, but in the years of his first administration conservative elements successfully fought his program.

Alessandri found that the financial situation of Chile was "disastrous" when he assumed office in December, 1920. The treasury did not contain enough funds to pay the monthly salaries of the civil employees. Revenue from custom houses had been on a steady decline since 1918 when over $110 million were collected. A year later the figure fell to $27.7 million. In addition foreign exports that totaled $763.6 millions in 1918 fell to $301.4 millions in 1919. The President ultimately had to go to various banks to contract loans for the government, which he personally guaranteed, so

that government personnel would receive their paychecks at the end of each month. In subsequent years the situation eased somewhat, but throughout the first Alessandri administration the treasury was a major cause for concern. By 1925 government income was $701.2 millions while expenses mounted to $824 millions. Opponents of the administration blamed the lack of government funds on excessive spending by Alessandri, and on corruption among government officials. One Chilean writer claimed that the president bought his popular support, observing that, "Popularity rarely comes cheap." Alessandri, in his memoirs, blamed the lack of funds on the drop in world consumption of nitrate, the backbone of the Chilean economy. During the war the belligerents purchased all that Chile could mine, but with peace came a decline in orders and a subsequent loss of government revenue. Even so antagonistic a critic as Ricardo Donoso supported the President

16 Alessandri, Recuerdos de gobierno, p. 67.
17 Pérez Canto, El Mercurio, January 23, 1951, p. 3.
18 Edwards, La fronda aristocrática, p. 238.
19 Presidential Message to Congress, June 1, 1924 quoted in Alessandri, Recuerdos de gobierno, pp. 277-78.
by stating that Alessandri inherited a grave financial problem, brought about by the world nitrate market. However, he went on to point out that even after the world economic crisis passed, Alessandri was incapable of ending the economic depression in Chile.

As a result of the depressed state of business in Chile the laboring force found itself in a desperate situation. The unemployment rate soared, and labor agitators called for a social revolution to end the misery and suffering of the poor. In February, 1921, two months after Alessandri took office, the nitrate workers went on strike. From out of the northern nitrate fields, they marched into the center of Antofagasta Province to demonstrate to all of Chile that they were striking against the nitrate companies. The marchers selected the San Gregorio office as their destination. They chose this site because a certain Mr. Jones, known to be a sympathetic and reasonable administrator, was in charge. But a few carabineros (national police) and some soldiers from the city of Antofagasta were also at the office. When the strikers saw the police and military at San Gregorio, they thought these uniformed men

---

Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor, I, 277-78.
had been sent to harass them or to do them physical harm. In the ensuing confusion they murdered the commander of the troops. At the same time Mr. Jones was wounded in the leg, necessitating his removal to Antofagasta. The trip proved too difficult for Jones who died before reaching his destination. Alessandri wrote that these two murders plus the incessant propaganda of labor agitators sent the strikers into a frenzy. The workers, according to Alessandri, believed that "The Revolution" was at hand. The only course of action open to him as president was to call in the troops from the nearest garrison. When the army arrived, they met the strikers. In the struggle that followed 130 persons fell, among them many women and children. Still, despite this incident, Alessandri retained his popularity with the majority of Chileans, with only the extreme left-wing workers deserting him for

21  Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor, I, 278.
22  Alessandri, Recuerdos de gobierno, p. 73.
23  The number killed is taken from Carlos Vicuña Fuentes, La tiranía en Chile (Santiago: Imprento Universo, 1939), I, 114. Ricardo Donoso uses this same figure, while Alessandri states only that there were some dead and wounded as a result of a clash between the army and the striking workers.
Recabarren's Socialist party which a year later joined the Communist International.

The almost constant change of ministries added to Alessandri's problems. With the old parliamentary system still in existence, a crisis of any consequence was almost certain to topple the cabinet. Still the Alessandri administration was not without accomplishment. Congress passed laws of a financial nature, designed to alleviate the difficulty caused by a lack of funds. On the international scene Alessandri took the initiative in proposing means for a plebescite to settle the Tacna-Arica question. Later, in 1922, Chile, Bolivia and Peru approved a protocol whereby the president of the United States would arbitrate this conflict and they agreed that his would be the final word in the matter.

Yet, the president wanted more from the legislature. None of the basic reform laws advocated by Alessandri could muster enough support in congress for passage. By the end of 1923 little or no constructive legislation of

---

this type passed through congress. Both the president and congress spent the greater part of their time sniping at each other instead of carrying out their prescribed functions.

Alessandri came to realize that the only hope for his program was to oust the old guard conservatives from congress, especially the senate, in the elections of 1924. To accomplish this end he determined to do all in his power to elect men whose views coincided with his own, and in so doing he set in motion a series of events that culminated in the military golpe de estado of September 5, 1924.

The Liberal Alliance owned enough votes in the chamber of deputies to control that body, but the senate remained in the hands of the National Union. Alessandri hoped both to increase the Alliance lead in the lower house and to gain a majority in the senate. If this could be accomplished, he felt certain that his reform program would easily be accepted by the legislature. The President, however, overlooked the fact that simply because a man belonged to the Liberal Alliance was no assurance that he possessed the same views as his, especially on economic
and social reform matters. On the contrary, most liberal party members—Alessandri's party—did not go along with the President, primarily because they were members of the economic group which would have to pay higher wages or contribute tax money for public works programs and social welfare schemes. Thus, Alessandri's proposals would hurt his fellow party members in that most vulnerable of all spots—their pocketbooks—and they were not prepared to concede the battle simply because they happened to belong to the same political party as the man who proposed these "odious" reforms.

Alessandri ultimately took his case to the people in speeches, rallies, and manifestos. With his popularity still high, he won support throughout the country for Liberal Alliance candidates. At the same time he pressed for constitutional reform which would lessen the power of the senate and do away with the parliamentary tradition of replacing ministers by censure. His campaign went well, and in a bitterly contested election the Liberal Alliance gained control of both houses of congress. As the results became known the National Union charged fraud and

26 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 189.
presidential intervention in various provinces. The conservative press picked up the cry and one paper began referring to Alessandri as the "Dictator of the Moneda." The charges arose from the use of troops in certain areas to menace the voters. The President employed them in this manner to insure victory for his candidates. Actually the maneuver was unnecessary because the people fell into line behind their president and agreed to put his men in office without any overt pressure from the Moneda or the military.

The new congress met for the first time in June. The president expected the reform measures to be voted quickly into law, but he was soon disappointed. Congress spent its time in useless debate over the past elections and political parties were incapable of lining up their members for action on reform measures. Party discipline had broken down completely at a time when the nation, stirred by the March electoral campaigns, demanded action on economic and social matters. Teachers, civil servants, and the military had gone without pay because of the treasury crisis, but they now demanded money owed them as well

---

27 *El Diario Ilustrado*, March 2, 1924.
as an increase in their salaries. Of the elements demanding redress the military was by far the most powerful, and the most disturbed by the lack of interest displayed by the government in their plight. Throughout the winter months the military smoldered while congress did nothing to alleviate their desperate economic condition.

During this same period two other forces--the National Union and President Alessandri--became increasingly disturbed over the political turn of events. The National Union was disheartened because of the loss of seats in both the senate and chamber, while Alessandri evidenced dismay over the refusal of members of his Liberal Alliance coalition to vote his reforms into law. Both the National Union and Alessandri sought some means to alter the course of events, and both found an answer in the military. The conservatives decided that it was time to get rid of Alessandri and the best method for this would be a military rebellion. Their plan was to enlist the aid of army and navy officers

---

28 The seasons in Chile are the exact reverse of ours so that June, July, and August are winter months there.
for a revolt against Alessandri. They hoped to depose all civil authorities; dissolve Congress and, under a military dictatorship, hold new elections in which conservative forces could regain the political predominance lost in 1920.

Meanwhile, Alessandri decided that the only way he could realize his reform program would be through military intervention in government. He too planned for a military rebellion led by socially minded military officers who would take control of Congress, push through the reform legislation, and then return to their barracks in a peaceful manner.

While Alessandri and the conservatives hoped for and plotted military rebellion, Congress itself provided the fuse that ignited the explosion. Late in August Congress approved a bill granting deputies and senators a salary of 2,000 pesos a month. Such action was clearly unconstitutional because the constitution of 1833 stated that legislators would serve without remuneration. In addition, the act granted legislators free railway

29 Vicuña Fuentes, La tiranía en Chile, p. 139.
30 Juan Bennett A., La revolución del 5 de Septiembre 1924 (Santiago: Balcells and Co., n.d.) p. 53.
travel and established a congressional restaurant where members of Congress could enjoy free meals. To make matters worse the bill was made retroactive to June, meaning that the already depleted treasury owed congress thousands of pesos in back salaries.

While the congressional salaries bill was unconstitutional, it was, at the same time, extremely impolitic. Many army officers earned only about two hundred pesos a month at this time or about $40.00 in United States currency at the 1924 exchange rate. Previously Congressmen had gone unpaid but, from this time on they would receive ten times more each month than faithful army officers. The military could not permit this travesty to pass without a protest demonstration. Such action they considered acceptable, if not legal, since Alessandri had visited military establishments preaching his anti-congressional doctrine in many discourses directed specifically at the military leadership.

At the same time the National Union worked for military intervention, though their reasons were far

different from Alessandri's. When the bill came before the Senate, a group of twenty army officers were in the galleries as a symbol of military protest. Many Senators objected to the presence of their uninvited guests and forced the officers to leave. They left peacefully, but one is reported to have said that the "noise from the sabers" would be heard in the future. Following the exit of the military the bill passed the senate by an overwhelming majority.

The following day, September 4, 1924, nearly one hundred officers returned to the Senate. This time they were supported by senators from the National Union and remained in the galleries throughout the session. That evening the President agreed to grant representatives from the army an audience. Alessandri wanted to meet the leaders of the movement, to talk with them, to listen to their complaints, to hear their intentions, and thereby plan his own course of action. Spokesman for the group was Coronel Arturo Ahumada, Director

---

32 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 192.
33 Ibid., p. 193.
34 Alessandri, Recuerdos de gobierno, p. 320.
of the Military School, who presented Alessandri with an eight-point program which the military believed would solve the political problems of the nation, or at least, satisfy the military. At the top of the list was the request that the bill for establishment of congressional salaries be vetoed by the president. The second, asked that three members of the cabinet be asked to resign "for having offended the army", third, that the budget for 1924 be immediately approved; fourth, that laws of a social nature, long pending, especially the Labor Code, be immediately placed in effect; fifth, that the government initiate legislation to aid and protect workers; sixth, that a progressive income tax law be instituted; seventh, that military reform laws be passed; and finally, that the army be protected from all political influence.

Alessandri told the officers that he fully agreed with every point and that each point had been a part of his campaign program in 1920. He also pointed out that most of these requests were at one time or another

35

Alessandri, Recuerdos de gobierno, p. 321.
initiated by his administration but because of a recalci-
36
trant congress they were still pending. Alessandri then
stated that in fifteen days it might be possible to push
through some, or all of the military requests. To this
a young lieutenant replied, "This is not possible... we
did not come to ask, Excellency, we came to demand."
Alessandri considered this statement an affront to his
official and personal dignity and he attempted to close
the interview. The crisis passed, however, when the older
officers apologized, after which the meeting continued on
a very cordial basis, ending with a military pledge of
support to Alessandri in his quest for the passage of the
legislation that they all desired.

At subsequent meetings the president and the
military officers found it difficult to reach agreement
on a new cabinet. The previous cabinet had resigned,
and Alessandri asked General Altamirano to form a
new one. Finally, by September 7, Alessandri and

36 A. Ahumada, El ejercito y la revolucion del 5 de
Septiembre de 1924 (Santiago: Imprenta "La Traccion", 1931),
p. 77.

37 Ibid., p. 78 and Alessandri, Recuerdos de gobierno,
pp. 324-25.
the military agreed upon a new cabinet and it was presented to Congress the following day. After presentation of the cabinet a fourteen point program—the original Alessandri reform program—was quickly pushed through the joint session of congress. Thus, legislation that had been effectively blocked for almost four years was passed in one short, afternoon session of little more than four hours.

Up to this point Alessandri gave his approval to the events of the preceding days. He was delighted with the passage of his program and considered this a fulfillment of his plans. If only the military leaders would return to their posts and stay out of government affairs, all would be well. But the officers had tasted political power, and most were not anxious to give up that which they had so recently acquired. The cabinet to which Alessandri had agreed contained three high ranking military officers and three civilians, which meant that the officer influence in government would be strong. Alessandri, in effect, was a prisoner.

---

of the monster he had helped to set free earlier. After passage of the reform legislation the officers asked Alessandri to dissolve congress. The president refused to violate the constitution in this manner, but he realized that the military was now out of hand and that his plan had gone awry. On the afternoon of September 8 the press announced that the Military Junta would continue to look after the public interest and that it would fulfill the promises it had made to the Chilean people. When this news broke, the National Union was ecstatic. They were now certain that their plan to use the military was going according to schedule. Alessandri had become a virtual prisoner of the officer-dominated cabinet. If he stayed on as president, he would be subordinate to the officers; and if he resigned,

---


41 The Military Junta was led by Lieutenant Colonel Blanche and composed of thirteen members. Within the Junta a small group called the "committee" dealt with the ministry and later with the Government Junta. On this committee were Blanche, Commander Ewing, Major Puga and Major Ibanez.

he and his Liberal Alliance would pass from the political scene leaving the way clear for a resurgence of the National Union.

On the evening of September 8, Alessandri's daughter was married. Following the civil ceremony which was held in the Moneda, the president called a council of state. At eleven o'clock Alessandri handed his resignation to the Minister of Interior. In this short document the president noted that his program had been fulfilled, and he was ending his public life. He requested permission to leave the country because he did not want his presence to create any problems in the function of government. He ended his letter of resignation by thanking the public and his ministers for their cooperation during his administration.

The military leaders immediately sent a note to Alessandri asking him not to resign but rather requesting him to absent himself from the country with "all the honors of his rank." The note also guaranteed the personal security of Alessandri and his family. His cabinet

43 Alessandri, *Recuerdos de gobierno*, p. 452.
44 Ibid. p. 453.
asked Alessandri to accept the officer's proposals, but the president insisted that he had his personal and official dignity to uphold and he considered anything less than his "indeclinable resignation" unworthy either of Alessandri the man or Alessandri the president. By the evening of September 8, still no decision was reached, and all agreed to postpone further discussion until the following day. Meanwhile, the ambassadors from the United States, Argentina, and Mexico, having heard news of Alessandri's difficulty with the military, each offered his respective embassy as a place for asylum should the president need sanctuary. The following day the military leadership ordered the arrest of a Señor Bustamente because of his loyalty to Alessandri. This action clearly indicated that Alessandri's hold on the presidency had slipped considerably. The military committee continued to function even though the laws it set out to pass were now part of the national code, and it appeared to Alessandri that the Junta was prepared to eliminate him in a day or two. For these reasons the constitutional president of Chile fled to the Embassy of the United States.

From the embassy Alessandri communicated again with the senate, and once more asked that they accept his resignation. The Senate refused. Once more Alessandri made his request and again it was refused. This time, however, the senate granted Alessandri six months leave of absence so that he might depart the country. He would still, theoretically, be the president, but he would not be under foot to hamper the plans of the military directorate. Alessandri accepted this offer, and members of the United States diplomatic corps escorted him and his family to the Argentine border under protection of the United States flag.

Following the departure of Alessandri the military established a Government Junta, comprised of Generals Altamirano and Juan Bennet, along with Admiral Francisco Nef. Together with the Military Junta this body was to rule Chile in the absence of the president. But the military decided that it no longer needed congress. On September 11, therefore, the Government Junta issued a decree, dissolving Congress and promising that an immediate study would be made to determine the earliest

---

46 Alessandri, Recuerdos de gobierno, p. 359.
date on which new elections could be held. The next day, September 12, the Government Junta recognized Alessandri's resignation—the same document that congress had refused to accept.

After Alessandri's departure, the National Union, sought to gain control of the revolutionary movement. All three members of the Government Junta sympathized with the conservative cause and supported any action which they believed would assist this traditional ruling segment of the population. The Military Junta, however, was composed of younger officers, antagonistic to the conservatives. These socially-minded men even tried to make common cause with labor union leaders. Many officers went before labor meetings to explain the aims of the revolution and to answer the questions of the workers. Thus, a split developed early in the ranks of the revolutionaries that ultimately doomed the efforts of the Government Junta.

Throughout the early years of the Alessandri administration, Marmaduke Grove had favored the government.

47 Alessandri, Recuerdos de gobierno, pp. 360-61.
48 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 197.
As Alessandri promised, he reinstated Grove at the Military School as sub-director, an appointment for which Grove was very appreciative. Following the San Gregorio battle in February, 1921, Grove made a speech at the Military Club in which he defended the troops who fired on the strikers and condemned those "groups of misguided individuals" who displayed a false patriotism and played upon "popular discontent" to lead the nation toward destruction with their "gangrenous preachings." These were strange words to come from the mouth of a future Socialist leader and champion of the working people of Chile. But, Grove's social philosophy was not fully developed in 1921. At the same time his love for the military and his respect and admiration for Arturo Alessandri were deeply embedded in his thought.

When in 1924 the military moved against the government to force the passage of reform legislation, Grove had no problem of divided loyalties because his attachment to the military and his social conscience

Juan Siqueiros, El gorrismo, principal obstáculo para la revolución obrera y campesina en Chile (Santiago: n.p., n.d.), p. 15. This pamphlet is a part of Folleto 93-D in the collection of Folletos at the Biblioteca Congreso, Chile.
were bound up on the same side. The rebellion forced Alessandri from office, however, and while Grove disliked this turn of events he, nevertheless, supported the Military and Government Juntas, believing that a true social revolution was taking place. Some political writers include Grove in the Military Junta but Marmaduke denied that he took an active part in the uprising and Arturo Ahumada does not include Grove's name when he lists the thirteen man Junta in his book on the revolution. But Grove was fully in favor of the movement, and one author calls him the "theoretician" behind the revolt, the man who provided "ideological support" for the rebels. The holder of this view arrived at his conclusion after reading some twenty articles written by Grove for the daily newspaper, La Nacion (between September and December, 1924), in support of the revolt.

It is difficult to understand why Grove was not included in the leadership of the movement. In 1923

50 Ahumada, El ejercito y la revolución del 5 Septiembre de 1924, pp. 110-11.
51 Siqueiros, El Grovismo, principal obstáculo para la revolución obrera y campesina en Chile, pp. 14-17.
he had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel which gave him a higher rank than most of the men on the Military Junta. In addition, Grove was second-in-command at the Military Academy, a post which permitted him to remain in Santiago among all the top military and political leaders. This may be explained by the fact that Ahumada was one of the top leaders on the Junta, and at least two other officers from the Military Academy assisted the Director with his revolutionary intrigue. Thus, there was no one but Grove left to administer the school. Ahumada made this point and commended Marmaduke on a job well done. Grove did manage, however, to make one positive contribution to the movement. On September 7 Juan Bennet sent him to Valparaiso to request the adhesion of the navy to the army putsch. On the surface this may appear a perfunctory assignment, but to the army leadership it was a significant phase in the uprising. The officers could not forget that the navy had chosen to oppose the army in 1891 and that the result had been a bloody civil war. The two branches had never operated in close

---

Ahumada, *El ejército y la revolución del 5 Septiembre de 1924*, p. 82.
harmony since that struggle, and there was some fear that
the navy might again support congress as it had thirty-
three years earlier. When Grove made the trip to Valpa-
raiso, he received the assurance of naval leaders that
they would support their army brethren. The choice
of Grove for this mission had a special basis. Grove's
father-in-law was an old naval officer, and Grove him-
self had many friends in the naval officer ranks from
his days in the Naval Academy. This may help to account
for the fact that Marmaduke met with little or no
opposition and carried out his mission with dispatch.

Two days prior to his trip to Valparaiso, on
September 5, the first of Grove's articles appeared in
La Nacion. This article attacked the comments of two
deputies who criticized the Military School. Grove
defended his school and pointed out its value and its
glorious tradition. He ended his comments with the
observation that the Military School produced the offi-
cers who "carried the flag to victory in war and in
peace they have been, are, and will be the most solid

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "El movimiento militar del
año 24. La marina y Alessandri," Claridad, February 18,
1938.
bulwark of authority and law." These words were written at a time when plans for the dissolution of congress and the destruction of the constitutional president were already made. Grove was apparently "duped" by the argument that Alessandri was in favor of military intervention at this time. Yet he should have realized that such action, while sanctioned by the president of the republic was neither militarily legal nor politically constitutional in Chile. There are two possible reasons for Grove's statement that the army was a "solid bulwark of authority and of law." It may be another example of Grove's naivete where the military was concerned, or it may be an illustration of the work of an accomplished propagandist attempting to win converts to the army's cause.

Three weeks later another Grove article appeared. In this work Grove stated that Chile experienced a revolution but that this upheaval was peaceful and "right for the culture of the armed institutions and the great mass of citizens who accept it happily."

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "La escuela militar debe cerrarse," La Nación, September 5, 1924.
This was not like other revolutions, according to Grove. There was no sign of terrorism, no persecution, no loss of civil liberties. The only persons who had anything to fear were the "corrosive elements of previous governments" who must be "forced to respect the disposition of the authorities." These he described as those, who attempted to unite the workers against the government. When a citizen pursued this line of action, he lost his rights and the authorities were justified in punishing him.

If the military authority summons a citizen it is because it is necessary...it is not that the authority proceeds in an extra-legal manner. The citizen has a debt to answer the call without obliging the authority to make use of its means of action to compel him. 55

These latter statements hardly support Grove's earlier observation concerning the lack of terrorism and persecution in this revolution. It appears that some people were to be terrorized for their beliefs and that these same people would lose their civil liberties. Grove was preparing the public for such action should

55 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Cuidadocon la pintura," La Nación, September 27, 1924.
it become necessary, and he asked for cooperation in eliminating what he later termed the forces of reaction.

By October the tenor of Grove's articles became confident. The revolution was victorious, and there was no danger from the forces of reaction that Grove had attacked in his previous article. All was moving smoothly according to plan.

The military movement...produced a radical change in the government of the country, with great contentment of public opinion and with positive benefits for the needy classes who see in it...social, political, and economic liberation.

In addition, the wealthy classes would benefit from the movement and the "general well-being" of the nation would improve. He made no mention of the reactionary forces here. Everyone, according to Grove, would find some benefit in the revolution. In this article Grove confined specific reference to reforms to improve electoral laws which the Government Junta examined in an effort to prevent fraudulent elections. One method considered was to establish a system of identification.
that would limit a person to one vote and "prevent the dead from voting—a practice overworked in the past." The system of identification recommended was the *carnet* or identification card which had the added advantage of providing the citizen with identification for bank transactions and other everyday requirements for identification.

In his next article Grove wrote of the need for civil service reform. Two days later he followed up this article with another on the same subject. In these two articles Grove spelled out the young officer's views on public service. Grove, and others of the same mind, deplored the favoritism shown in selection of candidates for civil service jobs. The result of such favoritism was a bureaucracy of incompetents who rendered government services almost useless. Grove proposed that a commission be established to examine potential candidates for vacancies in government. Tests should be given to candidates, and those with the highest scores and the best qualifications would then be selected. Ahumada and Grove used this system in the Military School,

---

and it proved better than any previous method employed.\textsuperscript{59}

Checking back Grove learned that such a plan for hiring was instituted in 1913 in the Tax Service. The system was so successful that it was incorporated into the body of laws governing that agency. Yet, it was in effect for only a short time, after which the government returned to the appointive method once again. Now, asserted Grove, this old method should be revived to insure a smooth functioning government to serve the Chilean people and the new Government \textit{Junta}.

For more than a week Grove's articles failed to appear in print. Then, on October 17, he published another, this time attacking the previous government for misappropriation of funds. In 1922 a devastating earthquake struck Atacama province, especially the cities of Copiapó and Vallenar. Money and aid poured in from all parts of the Western Hemisphere and from all provinces of Chile. Much of this money was allocated for rebuilding the battered cities, especially residential dwellings, but two years later the destroyed sectors of the cities

\textsuperscript{59} Grove, \textit{La Nacion}, October 9, 1924.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
were still in shambles. The money received for reconstruction was about four million pesos. Instead of placing this money at the disposal of the local governments, the administration set up a commission on the national level under the supervision of Ismael Tocornal, a friend of Alessandri's. Most of the funds went to this commission in salaries, travel expenses, and other emoluments. As a result the commission constructed or repaired only a few houses. Grove demanded that this situation be thoroughly investigated. Grove's next article had been denied, but Marmaduke pressed for an investigation by the Government Junta. Two days later the Government Junta granted his wishes and Junta member Juan Bennet named Grove himself to a committee to study the matter. Grove reported this appointment in the press and announced that he would not write any more on this matter since he was now a member of the committee charged with investigating the use of reconstruction funds in the Atacama area. Grove also

61 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "El terremoto de Copiapo y los fondos...," La Nacion, October 17, 1924.

made the astounding statement that he had no preconceived views on the subject and that he would enter the investigation with an open mind—this coming after he wrote three separate newspaper articles condemning the administration and charging misuse of government funds!
This committee never found its way into print again until 1938 when Grove mentioned it in one of his autobiographical articles. He then wrote that his attack on the administration landed him in trouble with the Tocornal commission that administered the funds. Grove also revealed that the investigating committee resolved nothing, and everything remained as before, as was usually the case in such matters.

In November, Grove returned to his former practice of heaping praise upon the military government that controlled the government. He had little to report in the way of concrete progress but he noted that the leaders stood for a new constitution, new electoral laws, new powers of state, and emancipation of religious

---

63 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Los fondos pro damnificados del norte," La Nacion, October 25, 1924.
64 Grove, Claridad, February 18, 1938.
questions. All of these acts were inimical to the Conservative Party and to the Government Junta, but the younger army officers favored these changes in Chile's governmental structure. Grove still could not discern that the National Union had gained control of the Government Junta and that the revolution was now in the hands of the forces Grove would call "reactionary."

In explaining the reasons why none of the progressive steps had been taken in eight weeks of military control, Grove pointed out that the forces of reaction remained strong and still possessed enough influence to block radical changes. Yet, Marmaduke was optimistic because the armed forces remained united behind the Government Junta while the political parties were divided, thus making them weak and ineffectual. Once again Grove's myopia prevented him from seeing a clear picture of the situation as it was in November, 1924. While the political parties were at odds with each other, the armed forces were by no means of one mind. The basic split which existed at the beginning of the movement

65 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "No hay peor sordo que el que no quiere oir---" La Nacion, November 3, 1924.
66 Ibid.
over conservative or progressive action was still present and rather than lessening the gulf between the two factions the eight weeks that passed from the beginning of the rebellion only widened the gap.

In late November the president of the Conservative Party announced that his party would join the military movement. Grove was surprised and suspicious of the announcement. He still could not envision his military leaders and the reactionaries sharing common political ground. Still the hour drew near when Grove and other left-leaning officers would become convinced that their revolution was out of hand. They would learn that reactionaries had used the military to oust Alessandri and to dissolve a congress in which the conservatives were losing more and more seats with each election and in which the Liberal Alliance managed to gain control of both houses in the 1924 elections. The days of the Government Junta were numbered by late November. In December the events which led to a second military revolt took place. In this rebellion Marmaduke Grove

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Declaraciones sospechosas," La Nación, November 20, 1924.
emerged as a real political force, and assumed leadership of the young officers who were determined to save their revolution from reactionary forces.
CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLT OF JANUARY 23, 1925
AND ALESSANDRI'S RETURN

After Alessandri left Chile for Europe, the two military groups—the Government Junta and the Military Junta—were soon at odds. The older and higher ranking officers who controlled the Government Junta selected a cabinet without consulting their younger subordinates. The members of the Military Junta were furious at such treatment. They were the idealists of the September rebellion, men who truly believed that a profound change would take place in the political system of Chile once the politicians were eliminated and the military took control of the government. In addition, they were a proud group. To be ignored in so important a decision as the appointment of a new cabinet shattered their pride and aroused their ire. Altamirano explained the action of his Government Junta on the grounds that a quick decision was necessary in the appointment of a cabinet. He claimed that the Government Junta worked far into the night to arrive at the cabinet they believed would be the best for the nation and
for the government. To have included the larger Military Junta would only have meant more diverse opinions and more lengthy deliberations when events demanded that a cabinet be selected at once.

In the first hectic days after the triumph of the military movement, the Government Junta took control of the situation and seldom bothered to consult the Military Junta on any policy making decisions. To be sure, the latter segment of the military leadership was a cumbersome body but to snub it proved disastrous for Altamirano, Bennett, and Nef. The younger officers met frequently and discussed the problems facing the nation in a manner similar to a small parliament. They divided themselves into different sections, each concerned with one facet of government such as foreign relations, treasury, justice and so on. This Military Junta was itself divided on many matters with an articulate minority led by Carlos Ibáñez del Campo. Had Ibáñez' group been in the majority, it is doubtful that the Government Junta and the cabinet it selected could have

---

1 Carlos Sáez Morales, Recuerdos de un soldado (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Ercilla, 1934), I, 113-16.
2 Ibid., 118.
maintained itself in authority for more than a few days. As matters stood, however, Ibáñez and his followers could not muster enough support to generate any positive action against the Altamirano government.

Still, events worked in favor of the Ibáñez faction. The Government Junta and its cabinet completely ignored the young officers' serious pronouncements in support of radical political changes for Chile. In addition, the government underestimated the Military Junta and public opinion. After the initial snub of the Military Junta in the selection of a cabinet, the government continued to ignore the younger officers. In an effort to learn the problems of the Ministry of the Interior, Colonel Sáez and Captain Fenner visited Señor Alcibiades Roldan, Minister of Interior. Roldan received these representatives from the Military Junta in a cool manner. He claimed to know nothing of the Military Junta and displayed a reticence to speak of any governmental matters with the two officers. When Sáez reported his reception to the entire Junta, the members became indignant. Many favored immediate action against the government. These were in the minority,
however, and the majority still favored unity among the military.

The Military Junta then made a second visit to the Ministry of the Interior, this time by Sáez and Ibáñez. Roldan greeted them in a friendly fashion, in fact he put in a call to General Bennett with a request to have one of the three members of the Government Junta speak with Sáez and Ibáñez on the problems of the Ministry of the Interior. All three were occupied at the time, but the gesture impressed Sáez and gave him the hope that the government was now ready to cooperate with the Military Junta.

Roldan also answered two of their questions on matters which the Military Junta considered the most pressing. The Military Junta favored a change in the voting system from one of a cumulative type to a system of proportional voting, a change which they hoped would increase the degree of democracy in Chile. Roldan

---

4 Cumulative voting is a system whereby each voter has as many votes as there are positions open for election in his district. The voter may place all his votes on one candidate or distribute them among all candidates. Proportional voting, on the other hand, grants political parties legislative representation according to the amount of votes.
informed Sáez that the government could not make such a change at that time and that the cumulative system would be continued. Sáez then asked about the government's plans in relationship to the convocation of a constituent assembly for constitutional reform. Roldán pointed out that many obstacles were in the path of such a maneuver and that even if the government decided on this action a great deal of time would be required to plan adequately for the assembly. Roldán then gave the officers his personal opinion on the matter which was that no constitutional reform was necessary. Sáez retorted with a question about a plebiscite to settle some of the fundamental problems that faced the government. Roldán replied that in an advanced country "of great culture" plebescites were effective, but in Chile where the electorate was predominantly illiterate, a plebiscite would not only be a waste of time but it would destroy the political system of the nation.

When the results of the interview were relayed to the Junta, many members of that body recognized for the

---

Sáez, *Recuerdos de un soldado*, p. 121.
first time that the revolution had been lost to those who wished to maintain the Chilean status quo. By the end of October members of the Military Junta and many civilians realized that in the space of two short months the radicalism of the revolution had been turned into conservatism by a few politicians and high ranking military officers. The reformist attitude expressed in the early pronouncements of the revolutionaries, and even in their first acts, had been replaced by a policy that could only be described as conservative.

From this time on the breach between the government and the Military Junta was irreparable. General Blanche distributed secret circulars among the army officers pointing out the failings of the government and the government's "betrayal" of the principles of the revolution. For its part the government continued to ignore the Military Junta and, with each passing day the leaders managed to commit some affront to the young officers. In many cases this might be a seemingly inconsequential act, but by this time every action of the government was looked upon as

Ahumada, El ejercito y la revolucion del 5 Septiembre de 1924, pp. 116-17.
contrary to the desires of the military. On one afternoon, by special invitation, General Altamirano asked several army lieutenants to visit the presidential offices to meet with the Government Junta and the cabinet. To the Military Junta this invitation indicated that the government planned to cajole young officers away from the Junta's influence. In addition, the Junta believed that their subordinates should never be invited to visit the government unless their superior officers were also present.

The two groups continued to antagonize each other throughout the month of October. In November the Military Junta elected a committee to meet with the government periodically and to keep the government informed of the views of the military officers. The government accepted this group, and for a time it appeared that the military and government might resolve their differences but the dissonance was too profound to settle without an open battle. The schism came to light publicly in December when an over-enthusiastic officer, Major Angel Ahumada, El ejercito y la revolución del 5 de Septiembre de 1924, p. 117.
C. Pacheco, wrote a letter to a companion which the press discovered and printed. Major Pacheco, a carabinero officer, listed in his letter the possible presidential candidates for the coming elections. He noted that the man elected would have to be accepted by the young military officers as well as by the political parties. Pacheco asked, "... who will the candidate be? A Liberal, a Balmacedista, Radical or Conservative? Undoubtedly none, because the military element will not accept anyone who cannot guarantee its future. Then the future candidate must be from the army or the navy, or better said, the army." The Major then went on to recommend his superior officer, Colonel Alfredo Ewing, for the presidency of the Republic. When members of the Government Junta saw the story, they became fearful that the civilian populace might cause trouble if a military man became candidate for president, especially since the officers who led the September 5 movement pledged that the military had not taken power in order to keep it but rather to serve in the transitional period between governments. Bennett, representing the Government Junta, contacted Colonel Ewing and asked that

8
Bennett, La revolución del 5 de Setiembre de 1924, pp. 153-55.
he disavow any campaign to nominate him for the presidency. Ewing agreed to send out a circular immediately, stating that he had no desire to be the president of Chile and that he would not accept such a position if it were offered to him.

The Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Government Junta, decided that a mere refusal would not be enough to end such a delicate situation. Roldan then called a meeting in which he informed Ewing that he would have to be replaced as commander of carabineros. Ewing offered to resign from the army, but Roldan stated that the Government Junta had authorized him to offer Ewing the post of military attache in either England or the United States. To this Ewing answered that he would prefer Spain, a request that the Government Junta ignored. The government announced Ewing's successor, General Mariano Navarrete, on December 11. This news surprised and angered the members of the Military Junta who had not been advised of the proceedings. On the same day that the press published the transfer of Ewing and appointment of Navarrete, Bennett, *La revolución del 5 de Setiembre de 1924*, pp. 156-57.
the Military Junta met at nine in the evening. The officers decided that Ewing's transfer was opposed "to all principles of good administration" and that it was contrary to a "fundamental accord" of the Junta, whereby its members were not permitted to leave Santiago. The Junta decided that the government had no justification for transferring one of its members, and nearly all agreed that the "moment has arrived to change the Government and the Ministry...."

This decision came from those same men who, three months earlier, demanded democracy for Chile. They spoke of and even instituted such reforms as the payment of back salaries to public employees and the passage of a budget, both of which congress had ignored. They also fought the Government Junta for a constituent assembly for constitutional reform and for electoral reform under which more Chileans could exercise their franchise. Yet, characteristically, the moment the government rendered a decision which might lessen the prestige of the Junta or weaken its power, democracy was forgotten, and the officers laid plans to destroy by force or by intrigue the government in power.

---

10 Ahumada, El ejercito y la revolución del 5 de Septiembre de 1924, pp. 156-57.
11 Ibid., p. 157.
On December 12, a committee representing the Military Junta visited the government and asked the reasons for Ewing's transfer. The Government Junta informed the officers that a delicate situation arose when an officer started a campaign to nominate his superior for president. The government felt that the best method for handling the situation was to transfer Ewing out of the country before civilian fears led to violence. This answer did not satisfy the committee and Blanche requested a meeting with the cabinet. Out of this meeting came the realization that the cabinet was not strong at that moment and that it might easily be persuaded to resign. The cabinet did, in fact, offer to resign, but only if the Military Junta would dissolve itself. Meanwhile, the Military Junta continued to discuss the change of government. From these discussions came the decision that a civilian would lead the new Government Junta, which would include an army and a naval officer. The Military Junta even chose the civilian they believed could best lead a new government, Emilio Bello Codesido.

---

12 Bennett, La revolución del 5 de Setiembre de 1924, p. 162.
13 Ahumada, El ejercito y la revolución del 5 de Septiembre de 1924, p. 158.
Meanwhile, the naval members of the Military Junta did not vote in favor of changing the government. They requested that they be granted time to consult with the naval authorities in Valparaiso before they cast their votes. Here naval leaders discussed the political problems developing in Santiago and decided to go along with the Government Junta and to recommend that the Military Junta dissolve itself. The navy also recommended that the cabinet be dissolved and that a new one be formed immediately.

Here was exactly the situation that the army rebels feared might arise in the revolt of September 5. They had hoped to avoid bloodshed, but with naval opposition fighting could not be averted. In the end, they believed, civil war might be the result of Major Pacheco's letter. In addition, army officers not associated with the Military Junta called for the dissolution of that body. All in all, the Government Junta bested the Military Junta in this particular power struggle. The government lined up its allies early, chose them so as to disrupt

---


15 Ibid., p. 163.
the Military Junta from within, and then waited patiently for the capitulation of the young officers. Finally, on December 13, the Military Junta disbanded and the cabinet resigned. The young officers had lost the first battle, but almost immediately they began to plan for the next encounter which came several weeks later.

The new cabinet was named soon after the official dissolution of the Military Junta. This group contained many names that could be easily linked to the National Union coalition, stimulating once again the fear that the revolution had fallen into the hands of the conservative element. After the announcement of the new cabinet Grove and Ibanez paid a visit to Juan Bennett, member of the Government Junta, to express their opinion that the government had been handed over to the National Union without a struggle. Bennett argued that such was not the case; the government would continue to strive for the implantation of the principles of the September 5 movement in Chile's political life. The two young officers were unconvinced, however, and they

---

Bennett, La revolución del 5 de Setiembre de 1924, p. 168.
set about making plans to topple the Government Junta and to prevent the conservatives from regaining control of the government.

Ibanez planned to unite many captains and lieutenants into a conspiracy against the Government Junta. Altamirano, Nef, and Bennett realized that some officers planned to unseat them and, to guard against such action, the government placed the young officers under surveillance. Ibanez formed a committee of action against the government, but the Government Junta kept itself informed of the activities of this group, rendering them almost useless. In the meantime, the government played into the hands of the rebels by naming old guard conservatives to the new cabinet, an act which left no doubt as to their conservative views. This, in turn, built up public opinion against the government.

Talk of presidential and congressional elections had been strong since the dissolution of congress in September. By December popular pressure became so great that the government announced elections would be held early in 1925, leading the political parties to select candidates for the elections. The National Union coalition met in
convention on January 8 and nominated Ladislao Errázuriz for president. Of all potential candidates, Errázuriz was the most conservative, and his nomination was taken by public opinion and by the plotting officers as evidence that the Government Junta had fallen to conservatives. In addition, the quarreling parties that made up the Liberal Alliance forgot their differences and joined together in opposition to the National Union. In the National Union convention Francisco Nef, a member of the Government Junta, received thirty votes, substantiating the claim of many that the Government Junta was a conservative establishment. All in all, the nomination of Errázuriz was probably an unwise move on the part of the National Union. It was but another act of the conservative forces in Chile by which they displayed a complete unawareness of the political reality of the mid-1920's. They underestimated the young military officers; they considered the Liberal Alliance destroyed; and they could not believe that the population would support any candidate other than Errázuriz.

17 Bennett, *La revolución del 5 de Setiembre de 1924*, p. 325.
Meanwhile, the other major parties of Chile met to decide upon their choices for the coming elections. They considered Errázuriz a powerful candidate, and they realized that to defeat him they would need a popular candidate of their own. The Radical Party met first and decided upon Arturo Alessandri; so did the Democratic Party and lesser parties and organizations which made up the Liberal Alliance. The Radicals then informed Alessandri of the action they had taken, and on January 11, they received a telegram from Europe in which Alessandri stated that they could always count upon his "cooperation" in any attempt to further democracy in Chile.

While the political parties planned for the coming elections, the young officer committee continued to plot the destruction of the Government Junta. Grove was not a member of this committee, but he was aware of its existence. Meanwhile, Grove had been struck by an automobile as he crossed a Santiago street in December, 1924. Although the injury was not serious it was enough to keep

---

18 Bennett, La revolución del 5 de Setiembre de 1924, p. 327.
Grove at home after his release from the hospital. For this reason Marmaduke was not watched by the Government Junta which kept Ibáñez and others of the officer corps under close scrutiny.

Arturo Ahumada, one of the leaders of the old Military Junta, was one of the first to feel the wrath of the Government Junta when Carlos Ibáñez replaced him as director of the military academy. Other officers were transferred to posts where the government could keep close watch over them. Some were sent to posts far away from Santiago, as the government tried to break up the conspirators. The government not only replaced Ahumada at the military academy, but they also transferred Ahumada's assistants, one of whom was Grove. Marmaduke received word on January 6 that he was assigned to Artillery Regiment Number 2 in La Serena as regimental commander. Waiting each day for his movement orders Grove prepared to move to La Serena. During the same period Grove received word on two different occasions that the committee was about to revolt, but both times the news turned out

---

to be erroneous. Then, early in the morning of January 18, Grove arrived home with his wife to find an officer awaiting his return. The officer had a letter for Grove requesting his presence at the military club of the Pudeto regiment. Grove left immediately for the club, arriving about dawn. At the club about twenty officers greeted him. Spokesman for the group was a Captain Aguirre who informed Marmaduke that he and his comrades had left Ibáñez the previous evening after an argument over the revolutionary plans. The group now had no leader, and they wanted Grove to take charge of the movement.

Grove hesitated in accepting the proposal. He and Ibáñez were good friends, and he held his friend in high esteem. Then too, Marmaduke realized that Ibáñez had instigated the movement. Up to this time he had carried out every plan that had been made. As a result he felt that Ibáñez should be permitted to carry through the work he had begun in December. Therefore, Grove consented to lead the movement only in cooperation with Ibáñez, a condition which the officers readily accepted.

---


21 Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 6.
At the Pudeto regiment military club Grove's first order as leader of the revolutionary movement sent all but seven officers--members of the committee--from the room. He then asked the seven to orient him concerning preparations that had been made. The officers told him that they planned to capture Altamirano in his home the next morning, while others were to apprehend Nef at his hotel and Bennett at his office. Grove was opposed to attacking various houses and buildings. He scrapped the arrangements in favor of a more intricate plan of his own in which the Moneda (presidential offices) would be the principal objective of the revolutionaries.

Grove planned to move two regiments--Pudeto and Cazadores--from their garrisons near Santiago to the Moneda in the heart of the capital city. These he believed would frighten the carabineros on guard duty there into admitting the leaders to the presidential offices where the Government Junta sat. The show of force would also demonstrate to the Junta the impossibility of their situation and expedite their retirement from authority. The date chosen for the golpe was January 23 in the late afternoon.

---

Grove, Claridad, February 19, 1938.
At six o'clock in the morning of January 23, two of
Grove's officers captured the commander, a major, and a
lieutenant of the Pudeto regiment. This was the first act of the rebellion. It permitted lesser officers to take charge of this regiment and bring it into Santiago at the prescribed hour.

By noon all was in readiness but Grove had to visit the division office of General Lorca who waited to say good-bye to him. Grove proceeded from this meeting to his home where, at two o'clock, a lieutenant of General Dartnel informed Grove that Ibáñez and Dartnel lunched together. Following this meeting Dartnel sent a message to Grove refusing to meet with the regimental commanders as Grove had planned. This meeting was designed to mollify these commanders after they learned that subordinate officers had taken over their commands. Grove sent his answer to General Dartnel. With or without the general, the movement would be carried out as planned.

The captured officers were held prisoner at San Cristobal hill in downtown Santiago until eight in the evening when the revolution was successfully concluded.
Dartnel ultimately changed his mind and at five in the afternoon met with the regimental commanders.

After sending his ultimatum to Dartnel, Grove went to the military club to meet with Ibanez and others involved in the conspiracy. This was the first time since Grove had taken a hand in the movement that the two friends met and discussed final plans in a friendly atmosphere.

At four in the afternoon Grove arrived at the Moneda to find about two hundred carabineros in its patios, while other policemen were stationed in the vicinity of the presidential offices. Grove met a certain Captain Fuentes who related that the Government Junta knew of the plot and that he and Grove were surrounded by police. Grove remained placid, however knowing that he had many friends among the carabineros. Moreover, Marmaduke believed that when the troops arrived the carabineros would think that they had been sent to reinforce the police, and no fighting would take place. Grove then dispatched two officers to speak with the

---

carabineros. They reported that the police would go along with the army. Grove himself met with the chief of the 26 carabineros, and gained his support for the coup.

The Cazadores and Pudeto regiments arrived at the Moneda at five-thirty. At the statue of Diego Portales behind the Moneda, Grove met with Ibanez and other officers and they moved into the Moneda where they went immediately up to the dining room on the second floor. Outside the room Altamirano met the rebels and Grove asked him if he and his fellow Junta and cabinet members would resign. Before Altamirano could answer, Ibanez loudly proclaimed that "in accord with the garrison of Santiago and other provincial garrisons, we ask for the Government Junta to dissolve itself for not having fulfilled the aims for which it was designed." Altamirano protested that he and his colleagues had carried out their missions; but Grove and Ibanez refused to argue the point, and they ordered the Government Junta and the cabinet taken into temporary custody. The Pudeto regiment closed the doors of the Ministry of War, while Grove called General Dartnel and

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Luchando por restaurar ....," Claridad, February 22, 1938.
asked him to take charge of an interim government. Grove then called General Juan Emilio Ortia Vega and requested that he assist General Dartnel. Ortiz accepted immediately. A third member was to be named at a later date by the navy.

During the activity around the Moneda troops also took possession of the conservative newspaper, *El Diario Ilustrado*. The following day this newspaper printed an apology by Grove and Ibanez, for the military occupation of its offices. Throughout the early hours and days of the revolt Grove and Ibanez remained at the Moneda, greeting anyone who came to participate in the ministerial consultations that were constantly in session.

The day following the golpe, popular demonstrations throughout the nation called for the return of Arturo Alessandri to lead the government. Ibanez and Grove authorized a cablegram to be sent to Europe to inform

---

Alessandri of these events. All appeared to be going well, but in the afternoon news arrived that the navy and the Coraceros regiment, stationed near Valparaiso, did not accept the events of the previous day and were prepared to defend themselves with arms. The constant fear of naval opposition, which plagued every revolutionary in Chile, had finally become a reality. Civil war was now a distinct possibility unless the dissident forces in Valparaiso could be brought into the movement.

The Coraceros regiment presented little difficulty. Colonel Grez, commander of the regiment, was a personal friend of Grove's. He adopted a hostile attitude toward the revolt because he had not been informed that Santiago officers planned a revolt. Two days after the uprising Grove asked Commander Enrique Bravo to travel to Valparaiso to attempt to reach agreement with the navy and with Colonel Grez. Bravo explained to Colonel Grez that the movement in Santiago had been carried out so quickly that it proved impossible to notify all regimental commanders beforehand.

Grove, "Luchando por restaurar la libertad....," Claridad, February 23, 1938.
This explanation satisfied Grez and the Coraceros regiment formally joined.

The navy was the greater threat to the Grove-Ibanez forces. It was represented in the government by Admiral Nef who was deposed by the revolt. The navy had no assurance that they would be well represented in the new government, and, as a result, naval commanders were either hostile to the army movement or they were extremely cautious. Civilian elements led by Agustin Edwards, the anti-Alessandri conservative, convinced naval officers that they should not join in the revolutionary movement because their best interests would be served by the Government Junta. On January 25 Edwards left Valparaiso and journeyed to Santiago to present several propositions that the revolutionaries would have to agree upon before the navy would join in the revolt. Among the points presented by Edwards was one which opposed the return of Alessandri to the presidency.

A revolutionary committee, presided over by Grove, discussed these propositions in every detail. The Committee decided to refuse Edwards' demand to prevent Alessandri's return. Meanwhile, Edwards made an attempt

---

Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 8.
to enlist the aid of older, higher ranking army officers. He informed them of naval plans to destroy the January 23rd movement, hoping to present a hopeless picture of the revolt so that the older officers would consider the movement futile and refuse to join a doomed revolt. One argument used was that ships were sailing north to establish a base of operations in the area of Atacama province. Fortunately for Grove, a telegram arrived which stated that a ship's crew had joined the revolt. In addition the telegram stated that submarine mechanics had been offered 40,000 pesos each to put out to sea, but all had refused. The telegram further informed Grove that the personnel of the naval arsenals were in complete accord with the uprising. Grove presented this telegram to the older officers who decided to remain on the sidelines a while longer before deciding which side they would join.

Meanwhile, the situation in Valparaiso became increasingly more dangerous. Two army regiments brought from neighboring garrisons, along with police, carabineros, and most of the civilian population threatened to turn

---

Grove, Claridad, February 20, 1938.
their demonstrations of support for the Santiago revolt into a civil war. Therefore, haste in reaching a settlement with the navy became essential for the prevention of bloodshed. The revolutionary committee made it clear to the navy that they planned to recall Alessandri from Europe and that this action was not negotiable. However, the committee agreed to appoint an admiral to the new Government Junta. Finally on January 27, the revolutionary committee signed pacts of agreement with the navy and appointed Admiral Carlos Ward to the Junta.

With civil war no longer a threat the revolutionary committee settled down to name a Government Junta. General Dartnel, Admiral Ward, and, a civilian, Emilio Bello Codesido comprised the new Junta. After they reached agreement on the Junta, the revolutionary committee, in a secret vote, selected Grove as Minister of War. When the news of the appointment reached Grove, he immediately went to the committee and declined the post, asking his friends on the committee to work for the election of Ibanez to the Ministry. As a result, Ibanez became Minister of

---

33 Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 7.
34 Ibid., p.8.
Alessandri received an invitation from the revolutionary committee to return to Chile once again to assume the responsibilities of president. Alessandri cabled his acceptance, but he took a leisurely trip home, visiting several cities and Italy, France, Brazil and Argentina before reaching Santiago. Wishing to be certain that still another military revolt would not overthrow him a second time, Alessandri did not arrive in Santiago until March, two months after the revolutionary committee asked him to return as president.

Even after the Government Junta took power, the revolutionary committee continued to function, a situation similar to that which existed in September of the preceding year. For the two months prior to Alessandri's return, these two groups lived in constant fear of counter-revolution. A tension gripped government leaders leading them to panic on several occasions. At one point an officer was shot in Valdivia, a city

Grove, Claridad, February 23, 1938.
several hundred miles south of Santiago. Throughout the night the Government Junta and ministers remained in the Ministry of War fearful that war might break out in the Chilean capital. Since the news was sketchy, it only increased their fears, leading many to believe that revolution was at hand. Finally, Grove and several other officers visited all the barracks in the Santiago area to ascertain if a new revolt was in progress, but all military establishments were peaceful. When this news arrived at the Ministry of War, the relieved government officials returned to their homes. This was but one illustration of the fear experienced by men who gained authority by violence, or in this case, threat of violence. Realizing that the action they had taken could be turned against them by others, members of the Government Junta and the revolutionary committee spent a hectic two months awaiting the arrival of Alessandri.

The tension probably led to disputes among government leaders. Most of the quarrels were minor, but at least one foretold of a later clash that put an end to Grove’s military career. In his capacity as commander

---

Grove, Claridad, February 24, 1938.
of aviation, Grove, permitted training flights in a forty-mile area surrounding Santiago. Ibanez, now Minister of War, became suspicious of these flights and finally complained to Grove about them. He wanted all training flights to be reported to his office and restricted to a smaller area. When Grove asked why Ibanez favored these changes, the Minister replied that he feared these planes might be used to transmit movements against the government. Grove became furious since he considered Ibanez' fears a result of distrust of Grove's motives. These two officers ultimately had a violent argument which they later resolved, but Ibanez never trusted Grove again and he ultimately managed to eliminate Grove from responsible military positions and even from Chile because of his fear that Marmaduke might lead a revolution against him.

Finally, late in March the fears that abounded in government circles ended when the Government Junta turned the executive power over to Alessandri. The president thus returned to the greatest welcoming demonstration ever held in Chile. In Santiago throngs of people marched through the city carrying banners

Grove, Claridad, February 24, 1938.
and singing in honor of the returning president. Alessandri was given a hero's welcome which the Chilean historian, Donoso, compares to the greeting received by Napoleon on his return from Elba.

Alessandri was in a strong position to impose his will upon Chile. He had returned to the presidency after a military interlude, on the condition that the armed forces would be subservient to the legally constituted, civilian government. Popular support was solidly behind the president, placing him in the enviable position of a leader who rules without interference from a legislature or the military. At the same time his personal popularity was at its peak.

The president, in his acceptance cablegram, spoke of the need for a constituent assembly to meet and draft a new constitution. Feeling that the parliamentary form of government under which they had lived since 1891 was ineffective, the Chilean people were in complete agreement with Alessandri on the need to change the constitution. They too wished to restore to the presidency many

---

Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor, I, 404.
of the powers that resided in the legislature. The military also favored constitutional reform, leaving only the conservative forces as opponents of the constituent assembly.

On April 7, 1925, Alessandri appointed a constituent assembly, called a consultive commission, in Decree Law Number 1422. The decree designated two hundred persons, representing all parties and all political, social, and economic segments of the population. Alessandri chose such a group in order to eliminate the possibility of any elements protesting against the constitution on the strength of their exclusion from the drafting body.

While the consultive commission met to draft a new constitution, Alessandri awaited the arrival of Edward Walter Kemmerer, professor of economics at Princeton University. He was to study Chile's financial system and to recommend remedies for the financial structure. On July 2 the Kemmerer mission arrived in Santiago, where it was met at the station by five or six government officials and three hundred army officers.

---

Alessandri was furious with the officers for such a display, and he rebuked Grove personally for his presence of the military at the station, was not to protest the mission in Chile but rather to protect Kemmerer and his associates from those interests that would resort to any tactic to prevent financial reorganization of the country. In Grove's own words the officers were present as "a guard of honor" to "demonstrate to created interests" that the army would "protect these financial experts and their economic plans."

The Kemmerer mission's primary recommendation called for the creation of a central bank, a scheme that had been proposed in every one of Alessandri's previous presidential messages. With the Kemmerer recommendation Alessandri issued a decree law bringing into existence the Central Bank of Chile. Alessandri hoped that this way banking scandals could be eliminated and that the banking oligarchy could be broken up. In addition, the president hoped that the new banking system would

Makedurma, "El primer fruto de la revolucion," La Nacion, January 19, 1926, p. 5. Makedurma is one of three pen names used by Grove in writing articles for the press. The other two are KUDE and EKUD. Makedurma is merely a shuffling of the letters in Marmaduke, while the other names are variations of Duke one of Grove's nicknames.
fix the value of money and regulate public finances. The military firmly supported the creation of the bank but the conservatives opposed it bitterly because it would mean the establishment of a gold standard, an occurrence landholding, debtor conservatives did not welcome. Alessandri, however, paid little attention to this conservative opposition.

The consultive commission drafted a new constitution which was approved by plebiscite on August 30, 1925. The new document destroyed the parliamentary form of government that had existed in Chile for thirty-four years. The constitution gave the president full power to designate or replace ministers; control over the armed forces; and budgetary authority. Congress retained the right to legislate, but little more. The new constitution granted it the power to approve or disapprove a presidential request for declaration of a state of siege. About eight months out of the year, however, when congress was not in session, the president himself could declare the state of siege and rule by decree. Thus, congress could be ignored and the

---

Donoso, Alessandri, Agitador y demoleedor, I, 410.
president could institute his program despite congressional opposition.

The other major change in the new constitution was the separation of church and state. Throughout the latter years of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, political differences had centered about the degree of participation of the church in political matters. Alessandri especially concerned himself with this problem, and in the months during which the consultive commission was deliberating on the constitution, he worked with church officials to arrive at an amicable separation policy. The church was willing to agree with separation because non-Catholics had recently been in authority, enabling them to intervene in church matters through patronage. As a result, the church agreed upon the provision in exchange for a cash settlement and a five year annuity.

With Alessandri's return came two positive improvements in Chilean government; a new constitution and a revised financial structure. Yet, not everything

---

worked in the president's favor. Alessandri made the mistake of permitting Ibáñez to remain in his cabinet as Minister of War. In the person of Ibáñez the same forces that forced Alessandri to abandon the presidency in September, 1924, retained influence in the new Alessandri government.

By his failure to eliminate Ibáñez and the military forces he represented, Alessandri made himself vulnerable to military intervention, just as he had been a year earlier. In 1925 Alessandri again underestimated the force of the military and misunderstood its relationship to his government. Since the officers who led the January 23 movement invited him to return to the presidency, Alessandri assumed that they were ready to turn the government over to him and to return to the barracks. In truth many officers were ready to do just that, but one in particular, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, had other plans, and Alessandri played into his hands until it was too late to prevent his surge to political prominence and the dictatorship of Chile.

43 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 199.
In August, 1925, Alessandri neared the end of his elected term of office with elections scheduled for October. As his successor the president favored the Minister of the Interior, Armando Jaramillo. Alessandri did all in his power to win votes for his friend and he also asked him to resign his ministerial post during the campaign so that his political campaign would in no way conflict with his government position. Alessandri also requested Ibanez to resign his ministerial post because some unorganized persons had nominated him for president. Ibanez, however, refused to give up his position, and Alessandri found himself powerless to discharge him. Alessandri then asked for the resignations of the other cabinet members; but they, like Ibanez, refused. Taking his case to the military, Alessandri quickly learned that this group would not support him in this ministerial crisis. As a result, Alessandri, two months before his term expired resigned for the second time and retired to private life. His last act was to appoint Luis Barros Borgono vice-president in the absence of a president.

44 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, pp. 207-08.
When Alessandri resigned, the quarreling political parties suddenly became alarmed. They realized that if each party nominated a different candidate, Ibáñez or one of his henchmen might win the election. To avoid this the Liberal, Conservative, and Radical parties joined together against the military to support Emiliano Figueroa Larrain, a Liberal. In the meantime, Ibáñez realized that his few, scattered supporters could not possibly swing the election to him. As a result, he withdrew his name from nomination and asked his followers to work for the election of Figueroa's opponent, José Santos Salas. Figueroa finally won the election, but political observers sadly noted that Santos polled more than 100,000 votes without any major party support and with a short, unorganized campaign. His strength lay primarily in the working elements of Chile, a fact which the future leaders of the Socialist and Communist parties did not overlook.

Throughout the power struggle between Ibáñez and Alessandri, Grove devoted his time to the problem of developing a Chilean air force. He overhauled this

---

45 Edwards and Frei, *Historia de los partidos Chilenos*, pp. 207-08.
branch of military service and made it more efficient and prestigious in the general military scheme. For the most part Grove kept in the background in political matters, but he did nothing to antagonize Ibanez, and in most political questions he agreed with his superior officer. Ibanez, for his part, worked with Grove in a friendly manner so long as he was struggling to attain the prime authority in the nation. Once this goal was achieved, however, the relationship between the two leaders of the January 23 movement changed radically, and a breach opened that never could be closed.
With the election of Figueroa as president, Chileans hoped that political normality would replace the chaos of the preceding year. Figueroa was a civilian, who had attained the presidency through the democratic process of a free election. But Figueroa, in addition to being a weak politician, made the same fatal error as Alessandri. He permitted Ibanez to retain the post of Minister of War. From this position Ibanez stirred up enough trouble in government circles to prevent Figueroa from accomplishing anything constructive. In addition, Ibanez, with military support, applied pressure on the president to support the policies of the military rather than to prepare a course of action that would enable the nation to return to political peace under a democratic government. Moreover, the political parties which supported Figueroa in the election could not work out a program with him. Chile's political parties, demoralized and weakened by the
military revolts, found themselves losing prestige and power at this time. One year later the party system collapsed completely. Party leadership became corrupt, permitting Ibanez to assume dictatorial control over Chile.

Figueroa took office in December, 1926. Immediately he encountered difficulty over the selection of a cabinet. This problem stemmed from the fact that several men, principally Ibanez and Manuel Rivas Vicuna (Conservative), engaged in a struggle to dominate any new cabinet. This, however, was only the beginning of a myriad of problems. Within the cabinet the various ministers continually quarreled, while members of congress, attempted to control the executive by creating cabinet crises. In addition the cabinet had neither the approval of congress nor of the public. As a result, Ibanez ordered the president to form a new cabinet, and he did. The new Minister of the Interior, and consequently leader of the cabinet, was Manuel Rivas Vicuna, an old-guard Conservative who wished to reinstitute a

---

1 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, p. 209.
parliamentary type of government in Chile. Rivas and Ibanez quarreled from the beginning with Ibanez emerging victorious in the struggle. Rivas resigned and Figueroa named Ibanez his new Minister of the Interior.

With this appointment Ibanez became even more influential in the government and named the remaining cabinet members, all of whom supported him rather than the president. This led to the president's resignation early in May, 1927. Congress then designated May 22 as election day. Ibanez became vice-president for the interim period. In the election Ibanez, running without opposition, became president of Chile. In less than three years Ibanez had risen from a director in the cavalry school to president of the republic. Such a swift rise to power made him many enemies but through his own personal cunning and repressive measures, he ruled as dictator of Chile for four years.

After Alessandri resigned, Grove, the other leader of the January 23, movement, continued in his position

\[\text{Donoso, Desarrollo político y social de Chile desde la Constitución de 1833, p. 130.}\]
as chief of the air force. Throughout the last months of Alessandri's term of office, the president feared that Grove was conspiring against him. Rumor had it that Grove was a revolutionary to be feared and that he would dispose of Alessandri in a short time. These rumors were but a small part of those which circulated daily among government personnel who had already witnessed a series of revolts and intrigues. Grove claimed he had no part in any scheme to eliminate Alessandri but that politicians initiated such rumors to keep the government in turmoil.

When Alessandri finally resigned in frustration a ministerial crisis arose again. Some army officers wanted Grove named Minister of the Interior, but civilian elements opposed him because of the belief that he was a dangerous revolutionary. When no ministry could be formed because of the friction over Grove's appointment, Marmaduke withdrew himself from candidacy for the ministerial post and agreed to serve as a sub-secretary in the Ministry of Interior. Both military

---

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Luchando por restaurar ...," Claridad, February 27, 1938.
leaders and civilians accepted this solution, and Grove went to work on two pet themes, both of which the revolutionary committee of January, 1925 approved. The first was to lay the groundwork for a free election under the new constitution; the second called for the establishment of an administrative statute whereby all public employees, including military officers, would come under the authority of one administrative body. Thus Barros Borgoño government issued a decree law to establish an administrative statute, but it was not implemented until 1929.

After only eight days in the Ministry of Interior, Grove tired of his work and requested that he be returned to military service. He received no official word on his request until the middle of December when the Ministry of Defense notified him that he would be reinstated in the army only if he accepted a position in Europe. He was, however, to retain his post of chief of the air force. Grove complained to both Ibañez and Borgoño that this order showed a lack of confidence in him. Later Grove learned that the reason for his transfer

4

Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 12.
to Europe was because of a rumor that Figueroa, if elected, would offer Grove the position of Minister of War in his first cabinet. Grove told Ibáñez that this rumor was completely false and that he would refuse such an offer if Figueroa asked him. The decree law sending Grove overseas already had been drafted, but Borgoño and Ibáñez did not put it into effect. They wished to find out who Figueroa's cabinet nominations would be before taking any action on Grove's assignment. When they learned that Ibáñez would retain his position in the cabinet, the decree was discarded, and Grove retained his position as commander-in-chief of the air force in Santiago.

Early in January, 1926, a Santiago newspaper published a letter in which Conrado Ríos Gallardo, a one-time Liberal politician turned journalist, protested the practice of sending military officers abroad. In his usual outspoken fashion, Grove answered the letter, also printed in the press, on January 6, 1926. Grove wrote that the officers themselves were not to blame for

---

5 Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 13.
overseas assignments. The orders came from the Ministry of War, and as soldiers the officers could do nothing but obey. When Ibáñez read this letter, he immediately called Grove into a meeting at the Ministry of War. A violent argument occurred between Grove and Ibáñez in the presence of the Inspector General of the Army and several other officers. Ibáñez threatened to issue an order of arrest for him; but recanted. Instead he issued new European assignment orders for Grove. Under their terms Grove was relieved of his air force command and assigned new duties in Europe. Marmaduke felt this action unjustified and he visited the inspector general of the army, other high ranking officers, and finally the president of the republic, Emiliano Figueroa, in an attempt to have the orders rescinded. All refused to help him and, in February, Grove left for Valparaiso with his wife and four children.

At Valparaiso, while awaiting the departure of his ship for Europe, Grove gave an interview to a reporter from the Valparaiso newspaper La Union. Grove told the

6 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Luchando por restaurar... .," Claridad, March 3, 1938.
newspaperman that the government had betrayed the principles of the January 23 movement and he deplored the fact that each day it grew more reactionary. The publication of the interview caused a sensation and Ibáñez called a meeting at the War Ministry to discuss Grove's fate. Ibáñez wanted to cancel Grove's orders, return him to Santiago, and separate him from the military service. Figueroa, having been informed by Grove that his criticism did not apply to him, suggested that it would be better to let Grove continue overseas. Once in Europe he would be a great deal less dangerous. Those present agreed. The only repercussion from the incident was an order from the Defense Ministry to the effect that Grove was to give no more interviews on political matters.

In February Grove left Valparaíso for Paris by way of New York. In the United States Grove spent a week visiting various airplane factories. In his visits Grove purchased material for the Chilean air force from United States manufacturers. From New York the Grove family sailed for Paris, arriving there on March 17, 

---

Grove, Claridad, March 4, 1938.
1926. Grove's first act in France carried him to the French Air Force where he hoped to study strategy, tactics, and the administrative structure of that organization. This activity was in conjunction with his assignment as Chief of the Chilean Aviation Mission in Europe. For Grove's second assignment, that of Military Attaché to the Chilean Legation in Sweden, he sought a contact who would acquaint him with his duties in Sweden.

Grove met several old friends in Europe, all of whom helped him acquaint himself with his new job. His superior officer, General Veliz, he found was in charge of a network of men whose duties included spying on the Chilean personnel in Europe. Veliz reported directly to Ibanez who financed the undercover work of Veliz and his compatriots. Realizing the danger inherent in any activity that might be construed as anti-government, Grove avoided anyone who had not been his close friend in Chile, because he did not want his name associated with any revolutionary attempts and conspiracies that were taking shape as early as 1926. Grove also worked

---

hard to master the French Air Force establishment, as well as to acquaint himself with the new material that French factories produced.

In April Grove visited London for ten days to inspect some material he had ordered from England. Upon his return to France, he sent a detailed account of his activities in Europe, along with several recommendations to the government in Santiago for the improvement of the Chilean air force.

Meanwhile, news of discontent and unrest was coming out of Chile. In a Santiago newspaper Grove read an account of a secret session of the Chamber of Deputies in which Minister of War Ibáñez defended himself in the army's purchase of aviation material. Grove purchased this equipment when he stopped off in New York en route to Europe. Ibáñez told the legislators that Grove bought the equipment without authorization so that the contracts could be declared void and the material refused. Grove immediately wrote to the Chilean

---

9 Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 19.
10 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Viajando para Europa en Comision del gobierno," Claridad, March 5, 1938.
press denouncing Ibanez' accusations. He stated that Chile needed the material he purchased to keep its air force up to standard and that Ibáñez merely used him as a scapegoat when the deputies questioned the purchases.

In a confidential message sent by Ibanez to General Veliz, Grove received a warning against publishing letters in which he attacked his superiors and the government. Since this was not the first time that Grove directed himself to the press over the heads of his superiors, Ibáñez warned that any further activity of this nature on Grove's part would result in government action against him. In the meantime, Grove had received several personal letters from Ibáñez, asking him to return to Chile to help his country at home. Grove refused. He was now firmly convinced that a new change of government by force would only have detrimental effects on Chile.

Two months after the confidential reprimand by

---

Ibáñez, Grove received orders to transfer to London to become military attache to the Chilean embassy there. The two men who held this post previously had resigned because of salary reductions. Grove, too, believed that it would be practically impossible to support his family on the salary paid for this position, but he was afraid to refuse the transfer since his refusal might be used by Ibáñez for an excuse to expel him from the service for disobeying orders. As a result, in November, 1926, Grove moved to London and assumed the duties of military attache.

Meanwhile, in Chile, discontent mounted with the Figueroa government and deputies and senators verbally assailed both the military and the Minister of War, Ibáñez. For his part, Ibáñez continued to stir up dissension within the cabinet until the entire cabinet, with the exception of Ibáñez resigned in mid-November. The Minister of War refused to hand in his resignation because he believed that he represented the ideals of the revolution of 1924, and his withdrawal from government would be a betrayal of that revolution. In

February still another crisis arose and this time Figueroa appointed Ibanez Minister of the Interior, a post that placed the colonel first in line of succession behind the president. From this position it appeared that Ibanez could force Figueroa from office and succeed to the presidency.

The military in Chile was solidly behind Ibanez in his cabinet quarrels and in his altercations with congress. From the time of the revolution in 1924, only one high ranking officer consistently opposed Ibanez—General Enrique Bravo. When Ibañez refused to resign his cabinet post at the request of Alessandri in August, 1925, Bravo sent him a telegram stating that Ibanez must respect the constitutional faculties of the president of the republic which gave Alessandri the power to remove his ministers of state. At the same time Bravo pointed out the danger in the military's mixing in politics. Bravo, moreover, refused to support Ibanez for president, and he blocked the Minister of War's attempt to finance a campaign tour through northern Chile with military funds. All of these acts angered

---

Ibanez, and he set about to eliminate Bravo from his influential position in the army. He did not, however, possess enough power to dispose of Bravo in 1925; but in December, 1926, when Ibanez refused to resign Bravo again spoke out against him in support of the constitutional prerogatives of the president which enabled him freely to designate his cabinet members. This time Ibáñez believed that he had the power to destroy his antagonist. Bravo was thus given the option of resigning or having the Minister of War relieve him of his command. Ibáñez charged that Bravo worked with politicians to disrupt the unity of the army and that he was disloyal to his superiors. In the face of these charges Bravo retired from the army and left Chile.

From his post in London Grove corresponded with various ministers expressing hope that the promised reforms, espoused by the Revolution of 1925, would be carried out. On other occasions Grove, in typical outspoken fashion, criticized the government in letters to friends or in conversations with Chileans visiting England. He also wrote several letters to Ibáñez,

15 Grove, Toda la verdad, pp. 29-34.
the last of which he sent in April, 1927, before Ibáñez became president. In this letter Grove told Ibanez that "You know that I would like to see you in the Moneda... but I would like...you to enter by the door, not by force...." Ibanez never answered the letter.

On May 5 Grove received word that Figueroa had resigned and that Ibáñez was the vice-president of Chile. In his diary Grove noted that it had taken Ibanez only two years to attain the presidency and he hoped that Ibáñez would be inspired by the national interest rather than by the 'bad elements around him.' From this time on reports of Grove's disloyality increased as Ibáñez' henchmen in Europe watched possible opponents more closely. At the same time more and more exiles arrived in Europe, fleeing their homeland. Among those who preferred Europe to the 'New Chile' were General Enrique Bravo and Arturo Alessandri. These two went to Paris and began to plot the destruction of Ibáñez. Meanwhile, Grove received a cablegram from the Military Commission informing him that, "The government has news that Chileans resident in London conspire against its stability."

---

Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 41.
Colonel Grove, investigate and inform this Ministry."
The cable angered Grove, and he replied that he was
not equipped to handle such assignments and that the
London police might be able to help them. No answer
came from the Military Commission, but Grove later
learned that his stand in this matter was used against
him in 1928.

After Ibáñez became president, General Blanche, his
Minister of War, corresponded regularly with Grove. Most
of the letters were informal in nature because the two
had been friends for many years. Blanche spoke of
several new assignments for Grove in Berlin, Geneva, and
Paris; but there was a delay in making a final decision
regarding a new assignment because of the problem of
finding an English-speaking replacement in London.
Finally, early in 1928, Blanche informed Grove that he
would remain in London for at least four more years.

Late in 1927 General Bravo wrote to Grove asking
that the two arrange a meeting in England. Although

17 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "La tiranía de Carlos
Ibáñez empieza a precisarse," Claridad, March 6, 1938.
18 Grove, Toda la verdad, pp. 64-68.
Bravo was involved in a conspiracy against the government Grove wished to talk with his old friend over recent occurrences in Chile. Early in January, 1928, Grove had some business on the continent, and he arranged a meeting with Bravo at Calais. At the same time Arturo Alessandri and Major Carlos Millan traveled to the French seaport to take part in the meetings with Grove and Bravo. The four met on January 17, 1928, and immediately set about discussing the political situation in Chile. They all agreed that Ibáñez had not been elected president by the people in a free, democratic, constitutional election. He usurped the authority of the constitutionally elected president by using the armed forces to drive Figueroa from office and to intimidate the political parties and discourage aspiring presidential candidates in the subsequent elections. In this manner Ibáñez destroyed democracy in Chile and became a dictator. In the light of these events, the participants agreed, all Chileans were obligated to work toward the destruction of Ibáñez and the restoration of democracy in Chile.

———
Having justified their presence in an anti-government meeting, the participants of the Calais discussions went on to draft a written document which each one signed. The pact stated that from that date forward each would consider it his personal responsibility to fight for the restoration of law and constitutionality in Chile. Those signing the pact pledged to make any sacrifice necessary to achieve their goals. The document ended with a statement that under solemn oath they would "not accept for themselves, after the reestablishment of law and the Constitution, any post of honor or responsibility in the Government of the Republic."

After the four signed the pact of Calais they returned to the cities on the continent and in England in which they lived. Bravo, Millan, and Alessandri returned to Paris while Grove flew back to London. From the time of this conference the plot to expel Ibáñez from the

Miguel Angel Rivera, La Opinion, March 1, 1938, p. 6. The only member of the quartet to uphold his oath to refuse office was Major Millan. Alessandri became president and, later, senator; General Bravo was elected to the senate; and Grove was a presidential candidate in 1932, received a party nomination for president in 1935, and twice won a senate seat.
presidency began to take shape. Victims of the Ibanez regime poured into European capitals to join in the movement to destroy the president. Most of the conspirators were well-to-do business men or politicians who had enough money to spend some time in Europe without fear of starvation. Of all those who plotted against the government Grove and Millan had the most to lose. Both were in the military service and, if discovered, they stood to lose their jobs and their pensions. Yet both men placed themselves in the vanguard of the movement.

Shortly after the Calais meeting, Major Millan, accompanied by a Major Macaya, sailed for Chile. When they reached Valparaiso, both were apprehended by the police and taken, under guard, to Santiago. Early in March the government announced that a great Communist plot had been uncovered. The government accused Alessandri's sons of carrying documents from Europe to Communist leaders in Chile. The plot, said the government directive, had been underway for several months,

and its director was Arturo Alessandri. When police seized members of the Alessandri family and Millan and Macaya they found, according to the government, instructions from Alessandri to Communist leaders within Chile. The government then tried the conspirators and found them guilty. Their punishment was exile, some to the Isla de Mas Afuera and others to Isla de Pascua.

Alessandri and those who conspired with him were guilty of plotting to overthrow the Ibáñez government, but there is no evidence to support the claim that they were Communists or that they cooperated with Communists in their drive against Ibáñez. The Communists had been one of Ibáñez' favorite targets when he first became president. By 1928, with the party outlawed, Communism was struggling to stay alive in Chile. Yet, Ibáñez stirred up anti-Communist sentiment to such an extent that the majority of the people demanded no proof that a man was a Communist and accepted the charges of the government without question. Thus, when Ibáñez wished to eliminate members of the opposition, he invar-

iably dubbed them Communists and jailed or exiled them without proving the charges.

A few days before Ibáñez announced the "Communist plot," Enrique Bravo crossed the English Channel and rented a room in Dover. On the same day Grove traveled by train from London to Dover, taking a room in the same hotel at which Bravo registered. The two friends spent an entire day in conversation whereupon Bravo returned to Paris and Grove to London. Upon his return to London Grove learned that Arturo Alessandri and Agustín Edwards had visited him and that by coincidence they returned to France on the same ship as Bravo. According to Grove no one was with him at Dover except Bravo, and they merely discussed old times. However, Grove himself stated that he, Bravo, and Alessandri corresponded in the early months of 1928. In any event, Bravo and Alessandri were in close contact with each other, and it is highly unlikely that Alessandri would not have been informed of the Bravo-Grove meeting at Dover. In addition, if he knew that Grove was going to Dover, Alessandri would not have traveled to London to visit him. Yet, there is no record of Alessandri, Edwards, or any other

23

conspirators having registered at a hotel in Dover as did
Grove and Bravo. In fact, one source claimed that Agustín
Edwards could not have visited Grove at that time because
he was in Egypt in late February and early March.

While no proof is available that conspirators met in
February, 1928, and discussed the "Dover plot," it is
reasonable to assume that Bravo and Grove talked of more
than "old times" in the army. Only a month before, the
two signed the Calais pact, and both were kept informed of
developments in Chile. Thus, it is evident that Grove
worked with the conspirators throughout the first months
of 1928, although he himself denied complicity in the anti-
Ibáñez movement until the end of 1928.

On March 24, the Chilean treasurer, on a mission to
London, Miguel Vergara, received a cable asking for his
resignation with no reasons given for this action. Grove
cabled the Minister of War to learn more about the Vergara
case and to ask that the resignation request be withdrawn.
Nothing was done, until suddenly on April 9 government

25 Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 111.
police in Europe announced that Grove was participating in a plot against the government. One week later the police made a second announcement on Grove's revolutionary activity. Grove, however, continued his work as though nothing had happened and for some time he received no word from Santiago. Then, in June Ibáñez' agents in Europe notified the government that Grove participated "in certain activities contrary to the interior tranquility of the country." When this news arrived Grove was on a tour of Germany and Sweden, causing him to delay his answer until July 22. In this letter Grove denied any part in anti-government action. Eight days later a cablegram arrived which stated that Grove ceased to be the military attache in Sweden and that his status would be decided by the Minister of War. Two days later another cable from the Minister of War, Blanche, informed Grove that the government was forcing him into retirement and would refuse him reentry into Chile.

Grove countered this government action by sending

---

letters and cables to many government officials, protesting the Minister of War's decision. Finally, on August 16, the Central Bank of Chile ordered the Bank of England to stop all payments to Marmaduke Grove. The next day a cable arrived from Ibáñez. The president explained that he considered the order to force Grove to retire a generous one on his part, much the same as Grove's earlier transfer to Europe which saved him from expulsion from the service at that time. According to Ibáñez, Grove possessed an "unhealthy tendency toward politicizing," as well as "frequent and dangerous follies of temperament."

Blanche also cabled Grove and explained that he was retired because of his participation in the Complot de Dover and because of a coded message that Grove sent to Enrique Bravo in Buenos Aires, protesting Ibáñez' dictatorial rule. Grove immediately answered by denying any part in the Dover Plot and, while he did not deny that he sent a coded message to Bravo, he did claim that the message contained nothing in the way of a protest against government activity. Subsequently, Blanche

28 Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 97.
invited Grove to return to Chile to defend himself against the government's charges.

Throughout the months immediately following his forced resignation, Grove corresponded regularly with the government, which invited him to return to Chile at his own expense. Each time he set a sailing date, however, Grove decided at the last moment that he would not be able to leave for Chile. Grove feared capture by the Police. When he learned, as on one occasion, that two members of the government police booked passage on November 8, his scheduled date of departure for Chile, Grove canceled his reservations and sent word he would leave on the seventeenth. In a letter to his friend, Belarmino Fuenzalida in Berlin, Grove broached the fear that Blanche and Ibáñez, who insisted he return by way of Buenos Aire, wanted to exile him to Pascua Island or to murder him. For this reason Grove hesitated in making plans for his return trip.

29 Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 103.
30 Letter Grove to Fuenzalida, Paris, November 22, 1928. This letter is included in Grove's personal papers now in possession of Marmaduke's brother, Hugo Grove, a former senator now residing at Viña del Mar.
As the weeks passed still no definite word arrived from Chile as to Grove's disposition. He had been retired from the service and asked to return home, but the case against him had not been forwarded to Europe. Grove and his friends believed that Ibáñez retired him because even outside the country Grove retained a high degree of popularity among army officers. Ibáñez, always fearful lest a military golpe destroy him, managed to eliminate any officer who appeared to possess much influence with his fellow officers.

Finally, on November 26, Ibáñez and Blanche sent a message to the senate in which they wrote that Grove appropriated 9,676 pounds sterling from the air force account. Then, when he was ordered to return to Chile to account for the money, he had disobeyed the order and postponed the trip on two separate occasions. As a result, the message asked that Grove be expelled from the army under authority found in paragraph 8(a) of Article 72 of the Constitution of the Republic. That same afternoon

---

32 Boletín de Senado, Session ordinaria, 1928-29, II, 1753.
the senate approved the request of the president and his Minister of War and Grove, after thirty years service, became a civilian in exile.

Two days after the senate expelled Grove, Blanche issued a statement to the press concerning the expulsion. He cited Grove's participation in conspiratorial meetings held at Dover; Grove's coded cablegram to Bravo in Buenos Aires; his retention of over nine thousand pounds sterling; and his letter-writing campaign to government officials in which, on many occasions, Grove criticized Ibáñez and the government. In his own defense of these charges Grove later wrote a book and several newspaper articles, and he dealt with his expulsion in great detail in his maiden senate speech. He claimed that no anti-government meeting took place at Dover but that he and Enrique Bravo merely held a friendly chat in which they discussed a variety of topics. Grove avoided any mention of a meeting at Calais with the anti-government conspirators, neither confirming nor denying, at this time, charges that he participated in the Calais pact. Since the

33

government specifically charged that the meeting took place in Dover, Grove could deny, with a clear conscience, that he had taken part. Concerning the cable to Bravo, Grove again denied that it contained any anti-government statements but he claimed that because he and Bravo were good friends they corresponded frequently in cryptographic messages. The reason for the code was that Ibáñez knew of Bravo's activities, and Bravo wanted no messages or letters for the government police to read. To the charge of appropriating government funds, Grove protested that he did not keep over nine thousand pounds as charged, only 7,938 pounds. He defended his action on the grounds that the government led him to believe that his pension would be cancelled, and he needed money to support his wife and family in a strange country. In Grove's mind the government left him no choice but to keep the money because they deprived him of a pension due him for over thirty years military service.

Grove's defense was weak, at best. Certainly he conspired against the Ibáñez government. Ten years after the meeting, Grove admitted his participation in the
Calais pact. The meeting in Dover with Enrique Bravo could hardly have been scheduled for anything other than anti-government activity. Even in 1929 Grove admitted that he and Bravo discussed government "espionage," discontent in Chile, and the nature of the Ibáñez government. They also reminisced, as Grove claimed, over old times in the army. Grove noted that both he and Bravo agreed that Chile should be returned to constitutional normality but through peaceful means.

When news of his expulsion from the army came, Marmaduke experienced surprise and later indignation. He genuinely believed that the government treated him unjustly and that his anti-government activity did not warrant such harsh punishment. Like many of his officer friends, Grove did not believe that the government should have authority over the military. When the government stated its case, Grove found himself dismissed by virtue of Article 72 of the Constitution of 1925, not by the military code. This itself was enough to anger Grove to

36 Grove, Toda la verdad, p. 121.
the extent that he decided to join in anti-government activity openly rather than remain in the background.  

Enrique Bravo had moved to Buenos Aires a few months before Grove's expulsion to establish the South American branch of Alessandri's Revolutionary Committee. Prior to Grove's dismissal from the service, in September, 1928, Bravo wrote to Grove asking him to come to Argentina to assist in the plans for an anti-Ibáñez revolution. Surrounded by politicians and patriots, Bravo wanted the assistance of a trained military officer. He confided to Grove that it would be impossible to enter Chile openly to initiate the revolt, but Bravo assured Grove that he had a plan although he refused to commit it to paper and only Alessandri knew its details. Bravo did not trust the Chilean exiles in Europe because some were "egoistic" while others were "cowards" and all, save Alessandri, would find countless reasons to abandon the plan and withdraw their financial and physical support. After working with Alessandri in France for

---

37 Grove, Speech to Senate, Boletín de Senado, session ordinaria, May 23, 1934, I, 92.
38 Ibid. 11 June 1934, I, 279.
a short time after his dismissal Grove, in May, 1929, arrived in Argentina to join Bravo and his confederates in Buenos Aires. Grove carried with him 4,000 pounds which the committee had requested.

Grove immediately began to work with the revolutionary committee in preparation for a Chilean revolution. In order to raise funds, the revolutionaries established a periodical, Transportes y comunicaciones, in which they published all sorts of material relating to air, land, and sea transportation. The magazine lasted for one year and gained a respectable circulation. It had the wholehearted support of Argentine President Irigoyen and his Minister of the Interior. Plans for the revolt continued to be laid throughout the remainder of 1929 and through the most of 1930. Then, on September 6, 1930, the Argentinian general, Uriburu, led thousands of people to the Plaza Mayo in a golpe de estado which overthrew Irigoyen.

Fearful that the new regime might cause them trouble the revolutionary committee decided to step up their

plans and move into Chile as quickly as transportation could be arranged. They first contracted with a North American pilot for a plane to fly Grove, Bravo, and four others into Chile. The plan called for a departure from Buenos Aires on September 17 and arrival at Concepcion, in Southern Chile, on the eighteenth. Agents in Santiago informed them that a squadron of the cavalry regiment stationed at Concepción was sympathetic with the cause and would meet their plane. On the morning of the seventeenth word arrived that their plane caught fire in its takeoff from Salta, Argentina. Fire destroyed the plane, but the pilot escaped unharmed. Grove found another plane for rent but, two days were lost in preparing it for the flight. On the nineteenth the plane left Buenos Aires and headed for the Andes and Chile. The conspirators landed at an airfield near the Argentine city of Mendoza on the Chilean border. The commander of Argentina's troops there refused to let the plane continue because he feared they might be in flight from the new Argentine government. The revolutionaries notified friends in Buenos Aires and an order came from the capital to
permit the plane to continue its journey. The plane finally reached its destination September 20 at four in the morning.

At a secluded spot where the plane landed no officers met the group as had been scheduled. The revolutionaries meanwhile sat down to wait, but time passed and no one arrived. Unnerved from waiting, they began to believe they had fallen into a trap. Finally, Bravo took one man and went into the city to look for their contacts. After a period of time Bravo arrived with a young lieutenant, the only man in Concepción Bravo could find to give him aid. The others who were originally sent out to meet the revolutionaries refused now to have anything to do with Bravo or any of his men.

Bravo decided that all should go into the city and take rooms at a hotel there. Once settled they could then contact the regiment's officers in an effort to gain their support. By noon Bravo and Grove had talked with several officers and all agreed to help them.

40
"El general Bravo explica el motín de Concepción y su odisea en Pascua y el Pacifico," La Unión (Valpariso), August 1, 1931, p. 5.

41
Meanwhile, the pilot and plane fell into the hands of government police, and orders went out to take the revolutionaries into custody. Apparently the leaders of the regiment examined the situation and decided that the movement could not possibly succeed, whereupon they threw their support to the government and arrested the four insurgents. The rebels fired a few shots and Grove attempted to enlist the aid of the guard, without success, before they finally gave up their arms to the carabineros. The police took the prisoners to Talcahuano where they boarded a navy destroyer.

For the next fifty-two days Grove and Bravo remained aboard ship, prisoners of the government. Of those who travelled into Chile, only Pedro Leon Ugalde, later a senator, escaped. All others were safely in the hands of the police.

Life on board the ship was dull although the prisoners had freedom to walk about unguarded. Grove spent his time trying to convince some member of the crew that they should take command of the ship and sail

---

for Antofagasta where another attempt would be made to
start the revolt against Ibáñez. The crew refused to
support him, however, and Grove finally gave up the
scheme. Later when the ship stopped at the small
island of Quiriquina, Grove tried to incorporate an
officer of the fort into a plan to revolt and take over
the island. Somehow word of the discussions between
Grove and the officer leaked out, and the government
transferred the officer and all his men, ending another
Grove scheme.

Early in November the police ordered the prisoners
transferred to another ship. At the same time Pedro
Leon Ugalde turned up in custody of the carabineros.
He had managed to escape into Argentina, but government
police pursued him over the border and returned him
to Chile.

Immediately after transfer the prisoners learned
that they were being sent to Easter Island, condemned
to ten years exile. On December 11 their ship landed
on the island where the revolutionaries settled down

43
Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Bajo la justicia de la
dictadura de Ibáñez," Claridad, March 18, 1938.
to serve out their prison terms. Easter Island, owned by Chile, was leased almost exclusively to the Williamson-Balfour Company of England on a twenty year lease with a monthly rental fee of 100 pesos. The company had over 50,000 sheep on the island which produced a fine grade of wool. A small fraction of the total area came under direct control of the Chilean government. In this portion lived the natives under the authority of a governor sent out from the mainland. A new governor, Alberto Cumplido, traveled to the island with Grove and the other prisoners. In addition to the governor, a police force, consisting of a sergeant from the mainland and four natives, maintained order and watched over the prisoners.

The island was so isolated that only one scheduled ship a year arrived carrying supplies. The prisoner, however, had a great deal of freedom since there was no place for them to go, even if they eluded their guards. Still, the island had its unsavory aspect.

---

44 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Relegado en Pascua, una de las prisiones de Ibáñez," Claridad, March 19, 1938.
A colony of 19 or 20 lepers lived in one corner and the prisoners feared that they would contract the disease. In addition, reptiles, rodents, and tropical insects kept them constantly fearful for their health.

Early one morning in February, 1931, a small ship, flying the French flag, stopped at the island. The captain told Governor Cumplido that he had a message for Grove and Bravo. The message stated that the ship was at the disposal of the prisoners, having been sent to help them by Alessandri and the revolutionary committee in Paris. The governor presented no problem since he elected to go along with the prisoners but the sergeant made a half-hearted attempt to prevent them from leaving their island prison. Nevertheless, they managed to board the ship which sailed for Tahiti.

Bravo, Carlos Vicuña Fuentes, Governor Cumplido, and Grove reached Tahiti on February 27, 1931, but they could not immediately continue their trip to France because non possessed proper passports. They notified Alessandri of their lack of documents, and in a few

---

weeks the passports arrived. Then a problem of passage space developed, and only two of the four could sail—Bravo and Vicuña. Grove and Cumplido waited six weeks at Tahiti for the next ship. Finally, after a fifty-five day trip, Grove and Cumplido arrived in Marseilles (July 25) and proceeded immediately to Paris. Grove's wife and children met him at the station along with Vicuña and other Chileans. The following evening word arrived that Ibáñez had fallen.

The Ibáñez government, largely supported by the public after two years of prosperity, found itself in difficulty when Chile felt the effects of the world-wide depression. From the time Ibáñez gained power personal freedoms had been trampled. The people, however, remained apathetic so long as prosperity reigned and jobs were plentiful. With money in the treasury Ibáñez could institute an energetic public works program. But, when economic hardships struck, forcing the government to end its public works, a large force of unemployed grew up in the large cities. These people now decided that their freedoms had been taken away by the

48 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Viva el Coronel Grove!" Claridad, April 6, 1938.
by the government. Yet it was not primarily the workers who toppled the government. It was the professional middle class with only slight assistance from worker's organization. Neither did the army bring about the demise of Ibáñez, though it did nothing to prevent his fall.

In July, 1931, student demonstrations began to erupt in Santiago. One such demonstration turned into a riot, causing the police to fire over the crowd. Ironically a stray bullet struck a young physician who had no part in the demonstration but had taken shelter in a doorway when the shooting started. In retribution for the death of one of their compatriots, the doctors of Chile staged a strike against the government. Lawyers, engineers, teachers, students, and labor unions all joined in bringing a halt to business throughout the country. With his enlarged corps of carabineros Ibáñez was reasonably safe from an armed uprising, but when doctors refused to go to the hospitals, workers to the factories, lawyers to court, and students and teachers to universities, there was little that Ibáñez could do except bathe his country
in blood. Fortunately he refused to go to this extreme, choosing rather to step down from the presidency. It was, as a Chilean writer described it, "death by asphyxiation."

With Ibáñez no longer in command, Grove wrote to friends in Chile in an effort to win reinstatement in the service, this would enable him to retire and claim his pension. When his friends had no success, Grove decided to return to Chile to plead his own case. After placing his children in school in Paris, he sailed to Buenos Aires. From Argentina he crossed the Andes and traveled to the capital, entering the political scene once again.

---

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF CHILE

When Ibáñez fell, Pedro Opazo Latelier, President of the Senate, assumed the vicepresidency. Opazo immediately named the former Minister of Interior, Juan Esteban Montero Rodríguez, vice-president. On July 27, 1931, Montero took office, organized a new ministry, and began his program to return Chile to legal, constitutional government.

The new government informed all political parties that a presidential election would be held in October, 1931. When the parties met to choose candidates the Conservative, Liberal, Radical, and Democratic parties all nominated Montero, while some fraternal organizations and factions within the major parties placed the name of Arturo Alessandri in nomination. Montero tendered his resignation as vice-president, but congress refused because his election was assured by the support of all major political parties. On October 5 the press

---

Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor, II, 36.
announced that Montero, a former lawyer and university professor, had been elected the new president of Chile over Arturo Alessandri by a wide majority.

From the outset Montero's government found itself in difficulty. As Eduardo Frei pointed out in his book on Chilean political parties, any government that succeeds a dictatorship is confronted with gigantic problems, and Montero's government was no exception. With the suppression of personal liberties people begin to dream of freedom. As time passes their conception of freedom and of life in a free nation becomes unreal. They expect much more than is physically possible. As a consequence, many Chileans became discontented with the new government when it did not fulfill their expectations, and some began to plot against the new president.

Another, and perhaps greater, problem faced by Montero was the depressed state of the Chilean economy. Both major industries—copper and nitrate—suffered

---

greatly from the world-wide depression. Consequently, one in every four who worked in these industries found himself unemployed by 1931. At the same time the poor condition of the two major industries adversely affected other areas of the economy until the entire nation felt the effects of the depression. A League of Nations study at this time estimated that of the twenty-nine nations which represented ninety per cent of world trade, Chile was most affected by the economic crisis. From one year, 1929 to another, 1930, exports fell eighty-eight per cent.

While economic problems plagued the population and stirred up activity against Montero, the political situation added to the discontent and helped set the stage for an early end to his regime. The Conservative, Liberal, and Radical parties held posts in the Montero government; but the workers, those who suffered most from the depression and from unemployment, had no representation in the government. As a result the working population felt that it could not turn to the

---

5 Ibid., p. 215.
government for help. While the workers were not prepared to stage a revolt, neither were they prepared to fight for the preservation of the Montero government, should other elements rise against it.

Various segments plotted against Montero. Many of the professional people who helped elect him to office quickly became disenchanted when the economic situation failed to improve. At the same time, unemployed laborers grew restless and many turned to the Socialists, Communists, and other left-wing movements. Added to these elements were disgruntled military officers who wished an improved pay scale and other benefits, indicating that Montero could not long survive. The only question was which group of conspirators would launch the first revolt.

Into this atmosphere Marmaduke Grove returned home to Chile to plead personally for his army pension. In Santiago he spoke with many influential government officials; and, while none gave any assurance that his pension would be restored, several officials mentioned that the government might be interested in making
Grove commander-in-chief of Chilean aviation, the post he held in 1926 before Ibáñez shipped him to Europe. Some opposition arose to Grove's re-entry into active service, especially from the Minister of Defense, Carlos Vergara, an old friend of Grove's who feared that Marmaduke might not have outgrown his revolutionary habits. When Grove learned that his old friend spoke out against his re-instatement, Marmaduke wrote a letter to the press and one to Vergara demanding that "the injustice" done him in 1928 be rectified by placing him on active duty. This would seem to prove Vergara's point that Grove had not changed very much and that he still could be counted upon to stir up trouble with his letters and newspaper articles. Yet, Montero thought that Grove could be put to good use. Early in January, 1932, rumors had it that Ibáñez had left Buenos Aires and taken up residence in Mendoza on the Chilean border. From here the ex-president was supposed to be planning reentry into Chile when the time was ripe for a revolt. Montero reasoned that Ibáñez could only regain power with army support. Therefore, if Grove, who was popular with his fellow
officers and known to be a sworn enemy of Ibañez, could be reinstated in the service his presence probably would discourage any ibánista revolt.

Grove resented being "used," but he wanted to return to active duty and he agreed to accept the president's offer. On February 4, 1932, a decree law revoked Grove's dismissal in 1928, promoted him to Commodore of the Air (a rank equivalent to general), and assigned him to the air force in the position of commander-in-chief.

Meanwhile, the political situation grew worse. The government suspended a commission that had been investigating the "crimes" of Ibañez. Public indignation was so great that observers expected a rebellion momentarily. The revolt did not come, but the Montero government did little to strengthen itself against its enemies. The public also protested the failure of the government to call congressional elections. The same congressmen who timidly permitted Ibañez to rule as a dictator still retained their seats even after Ibañez went into

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Comandante en jefe de la Escuela de Aviación," Claridad, April 8, 1938.
exile. To many Chileans these legislators were as guilty as Ibáñez and should quickly be replaced. Montero's failure to call new elections only added to the long list of his enemies and made his downfall imminent.

On March 27, 1932, the first of a series of revolutionary meetings took place in Santiago to analyze the political climate of Chile at that time. One of the leaders of the first meeting was Aurelio Núñez Morgado, a supporter of Arturo Alessandri and a spokesman for several left wing fraternal organizations. Participants spoke only in generalities and the meeting ended with no agreement among those present. The following day Nunez held a second meeting at his home, while other participants used their homes for subsequent discussions. Representatives from the university student federation (FECH) took part in all meetings held by the revolutionary committee. Students were to have an important part in any revolt, but their representatives could not reach agreement with the other conspirators. Nearly all those present were alessandristas. The students, however, declared that they had no faith in professional
politicians, leading to a dissolution of the revolutionary committee.

Still other plots continued to grow. In April an air force officer told Grove that a military golpe would be carried off the following day, but Grove called his officers together and talked them out of their plan. At the same time he informed Montero of the plot and of the fact that it had been initiated by Oscar Davila, a journalist with political ambitions. Montero was naturally delighted with Grove's work in halting a conspiracy and showed his appreciation by giving Grove more tasks that required his presence in the Moneda. Grove traveled to Valparaiso on the presidential train for a ceremony honoring War of the Pacific hero Arturo Prat. During the trip Grove and the president had a long discussion in which Grove warned him that if some of the old problems were not quickly settled the government faced a crisis from which it might not emerge. Later, at a tea held in the Moneda, Grove asked the president about congressional elections, the nitrate industry, and other pressing matters. Montero became

---

Boletín del Senado, Session Ordinaria, June 11, 1934, I, 283-84.
angered and told Grove that since he was not a politician he should not discuss political matters. Disgruntled, Grove left determined to concentrate on his military duties.

About this time, during the early months of 1932, Eugenio Matte and Dr. Juan Cifuentes visited Grove at his home. Matte was a left-wing politician who had organized a quasi-political party called Nueva Acción Pública (NAP). Cifuentes was likewise left-leaning and interested in creating political action groups among the workers. These two men talked with Grove about the need for a change in government, but their ideas carried them much further than others who had spoken to Grove of revolt. Matte talked of the need for a complete transformation of the governmental structure of Chile, not merely for a change of personnel in high offices. Grove listened and pondered these ideas, but he told both Matte and Cifuentes that he was loyal to Montero. Still they visited Grove on two other occasions, each time telling him of their growing strength and inviting him to attend larger meetings.

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Los días que precedieron al 4 de junio," Claridad, April 10, 1938.
Grove, however, refused to participate in the clandestine discussions.

Finally, early in June, Grove consented to attend a meeting in the Santiago suburb of San Bernardo at the home of Pedro Lagos, commander of the Infantry School. Present at the meeting were Matte, Dávila, and Cifuentes, among others. Discussion revolved about the necessity for reform in the Montero government; for a complete change in government; or for the installation of a Junta composed of Ibáñez and Alessandri. No agreement could be reached and Grove proposed that the chiefs of the armed forces meet the following day with their officers and draft a request to Montero for reforms in the nitrate industry and for congressional elections. The request would contain also a threat that if the reforms were not made the army would be forced to intervene.

The next day, June 3, Grove met with his officers

---

9 Grove, Claridad, April 10, 1938.
10 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Los días que precedieron al 4 de junio," Claridad, April 12, 1938.
and the request was drafted. Montero, however, canceled a scheduled meeting with the military officers. Later in the afternoon Grove received word that rumors abounded in Santiago that he planned to overthrow the Montero government.

The story stemmed from Grove's meeting with his officers. Marmaduke denied that he had any such plans and asked General Sáez to relay his denial to the Minister of War. At four in the afternoon General Lagos informed Grove that the meeting of the military chiefs had been postponed. An hour later Matte arrived at Grove's office to tell him of the rumors which were circulating. At six in the evening Grove received the news that he had been relieved of duty and placed at the disposition of the Minister of War.

Once again Grove felt that he had been unjustly treated by a Chilean government. He immediately contacted several high-ranking army officers, all of whom promised to look into the matter for him. Next, Grove called the Minister of Defense and complained about the government's action. Grove gave the Minister a message for
Montero. "Tell President Montero," he said "that among all the hands he has shaken lately, none are more loyal than mine, and if you proceed in this manner you assume the responsibility for that which could follow."

Montero refused to heed the ominous warning in Grove's message and proceeded to name a successor, an under-secretary of aviation, Ramon Vergara Montero. When Grove returned to his office to pack his personal papers and belongings, some of his officers promised to stand by him in any action he wished to take. Grove, noting the great possibilities in such loyalty, told his men that he would return at ten in the evening. Upon his return Grove set about to build his revolution. He sent emissaries to the various regiments asking for their support, talked with the civilians who arrived to pledge their support, and readied five aircraft with fuel, ammunition and bombs. When Vergara arrived at the air base to assume his new duties, Grove's officers arrested him and held him prisoner on the base.

---

12 Ibid.
News of all this activity reached the government and Montero declared a state of siege. In addition he ordered Lagos to take his troops from the Infantry School and attack Grove at the El Bosque air field. Early in the morning on June 3 Lagos telephoned Grove to tell him that he had his troops about a mile from El Bosque and that they were under orders to attack. Grove told him to postpone his attack, while the air force officers drafted a message for the president. The message demanded that the Moneda be opened to Grove and his supporters by two o'clock in the afternoon of June 4 or Santiago would be bombed. Meanwhile, Lagos appeared to be vacillating toward the government and Grove called him in for a meeting. In the discussion that followed, names were mentioned to fill a Government Junta after the revolt. Grove and Lagos agreed upon General Puga, Eugenio Matte, and, at the insistence of Lagos, Oscar Dávila. Lagos left, apparently in complete support of Grove's movement.

As word spread of the activity Santiago became tense and restless. A reporter from El Mercurio went

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Alessandri y el 4 de junio," Claridad, April 14, 1938.
out to El Bosque and noticed that armed guards protected the camp. The reporter met Grove and other high ranking military officers, but Grove refused to make any comment. In El Mercurio's June 4 morning edition the journalist's report of the El Bosque trip was buried on page seven along with a short announcement that the El Bosque forces had issued a manifesto to the country explaining their action just as the paper went to press.

Early in the morning of June 4 a representative from President Montero visited El Bosque to assess the situation. Grove detained him at the officers club. At noon another emissary arrived from Montero, ex-president Arturo Alessandri. Alessandri presented a proposal from Montero that he remain president but that the insurgents could choose his cabinet. Grove trusted Montero, but he told Alessandri that his supporters would not accept such an agreement and demanded the complete overthrow of the Montero government. Alessandri and Grove continued their conversation as Grove walked the ex-president to his car. At the car

---

El Mercurio, p. 7. The first page and headlines of this edition carried the story of President Hindenburg's dissolution of the German Reichstag.
Grove related that Alessandri said, "No afloje, mi coronel" (Do not give up, Colonel). Thus, arose the basis for later charges that Alessandri gave his tacit approval to Grove's movement so that he might have another opportunity to regain the presidency. Through the years many alessanristas denied that these words were ever spoken but Arturo himself never branded the story false, and Grove, along with Pedro Leon Ugalde who witnessed the scene insisted year after year in senate debates that Alessandri spoke these encouraging words to Grove on the eve of the revolution.

After the meeting with Grove Alessandri returned to the Moneda to report to Montero. He told the president that Grove had answered Montero's proposal by declaring that "This revolution is necessary: it will be the last and it will definitely insure civilian control. We would not be able to work with, or to build the new Chile, with the persons that surround the President, nor with the President himself."

---
15 Grove, Claridad, April 14, 1938 and "No afloje mi coronel...", La Hora, April 15, 1938.
16 Quoted in El Mercurio, June 5, 1932, p. 11.
A second attempt was made by the president to avert trouble. Montero authorized Alessandri to call Grove and state that Alessandri would be the vice-president in any government that Grove wanted to constitute. Again Grove refused. A little before noon on June 4, Grove's planes flew low over Santiago; but instead of dropping bombs, the planes unloaded tons of leaflets, containing the manifesto mentioned in *El Mercurio* in its early edition. The pamphlets reflected the political philosophy of Eugenio Matte, Eugenio Gonzalez, and other political figures who later became important in the Chilean socialist movement. Grove probably contributed to the construction of the document which contained the state socialism ideas of the civilians in the revolutionary movement. The leaflet condemned the Montero government for its failure to aid the working classes of Chile in their need; for permitting foreign enterprise to gain control of the natural resources of Chile; and for the perpetuation of the old wealthy, landed, oligarchy in political power. After stating the problem the document announced that a Socialist Republic would be established that would

---

Quoted in *El Mercurio*, June 5, 1932, p. 11.
nationalize the economic life of Chile and bring to the poor the social reforms that they so badly needed. At the same time the leaflet declared that the revolutionaries would eliminate all vestiges of foreign imperialism, whether from foreign capital or from the Soviet Union. Most of these ideas, including the declaration of repugnance with Russian Communism, became the program of the Socialist Party that emerged a year later.

The leaflet implied that the revolution was a success. A half hour after the leaflets fell on the city, Montero's Minister of Interior announced that the President declared to all the country that he would remain in office and that Grove's declaration of victory was "absolutely false." Montero's words were more optimistic than the situation warranted. With each passing hour the revolutionaries became more powerful until the only question that remained was the exact time for the military takeover.

After noon the city was paralyzed as merchants closed their shops, transportation halted, and the
majority of citizens returned to their homes, hoping to avoid any violence that might accompany the revolt. Shortly after Grove's planes buzzed the city, Commander Lagos of the Infantry School, now completely committed to the revolt, sent an ultimatum to the president. The note contained only two points. The first demanded Montero's immediate resignation to a Junta composed of Matte, Puga, and Dávila, who would then institute the Socialist Republic of Chile; the second guaranteed the safety of the President and his family. Frantically trying to arrive at a solution that would avert revolution, Montero called several meetings of his advisers throughout the afternoon.

At the same time, high-ranking army officers traveled to El Bosque to meet with Grove and his followers. In the meeting Grove told the commander-in-chief of the army, General Sáez, and Commander Lagos that he had no intention of carrying out a revolution merely to change personnel in government. The Socialist Republic, he stated, would alter the entire governmental structure.

---

18 El Mercurio, June 5, 1932, p. 11.
for the express purpose of giving "everyone in Chile an opportunity for bread, shelter, and work." Grove further told Sáez and Lagos, who were on their way to report to Montero, to tell the president that Grove had nothing against him and that he considered Montero a "dignified, respectable, well-inspired man," but, sadly, he had not been assisted by men as honest as himself.

Throughout the afternoon both sides laid plans for the clash which they expected, but by six o'clock Montero realized that his position was hopeless. A little after six-thirty Grove and his followers arrived at the Moneda in a caravan of seven automobiles followed by trucks loaded with soldiers from the Infantry School. Both patios in the Moneda were crowded with troops, some of whom had pitched tents. Outside, other troops had taken up positions in case any *carabineros* or soldiers remained loyal to Montero and decided to fight to preserve the government. Grove, followed by the Junta went upstairs to the presidential office, where they

---

19. *El Mercurio*, June 5, 1932, p. 11. The phrase, *pan techo y trabajo*, from this day became the slogan of Grove's political campaigns of the future and a rallying cry for the Socialist Party.
found Montero standing in the center of the room with his hands in his pockets and his head held erect. Behind the president, in a semi-circle, stood his ministers of state. Grove advanced to the center of the room and stated that, "In the name of the armed forces...I ask his Excellency to resign his office so that the Socialist Republic can be established in Chile." Grove then named the Junta and assured Montero that all the armed forces supported the movement. Montero answered that he had been informed that the Santiago garrison would not support the government, leaving him no alternative but to retire. Grove assured Montero that he, his family, and his ministers would be protected by the revolutionaries. Finally, Grove told all ministers to leave their offices in the hands of their subordinates. With these words Montero and his cabinet left the Moneda to be greeted by a modest crowd of supporters who escorted the president to a carriage which carried him to a hotel and his family.

After Montero's departure Grove proclaimed the Socialist Republic of Chile. Under the new government all would work for all, without any group receiving

---

20 El Mercurio, June 5, 1932, p. 15.
privileges over the remainder of the country. Grove then asked that all cooperate in the new government, that there be no discord, and that all dedicate themselves to the success of the new regime. The Government Junta assumed authority, and Grove went home to rest before taking up his duties as Minister of National Defense, a post to which the Junta had appointed him.

Thus, a legally constituted government fell before the armed forces with the tacit approval of the majority of the people. For those out of work, hungry, and with no recognizable future, Grove and the Socialist Republic held out hope. An economic report published by the Central Bank of Chile listed unemployment as the greatest internal problem in May, 1932. In that month the Inspector of Work reported that his department could find jobs for only three per cent of those applying. Meanwhile, the national economy had reached the lowest point in the history of the country. In January, 1929, monthly exports had soared to a record 246 million pesos. Three years later, in January, 1932 monthly exports had dropped to 53 million, and in May the figure fell to seventeen million, the lowest export month in Chile's

---

21 Marmaduke Grove, Claridad, April 15, 1938.
history. The same trend occurred in importations. In December, 1929, imports reached 158 million pesos falling to only 6.9 million in May, 1932.

Distinguished and honorable men had worked for the Montero government, but their approach to the economic problem was orthodox when the situation cried out for bold, new ideas. The government saw in the restlessness of the people a lack of respect for authority, rather than a genuine distress resulting from the economic depression. Still, the government realized that steps had to be taken to improve the economic condition of the nation but the measures they chose were those championed by the classical economists, the type that did nothing to alleviate the suffering of the working population. As a result the majority of the population remained dormant, while military officers led the revolt that destroyed the government the people themselves had previously elected.

For Grove the Socialist Republic was but another

---

22 Banco Central de Chile, Boletín Mensual, 1932, Boletín No. 52, June 30, 1932. p. 120.
23 Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos Chilenos, pp. 214-16.
step along the road he chose to follow in 1920. At that
time listening to the speeches on social reform presented
by Arturo Alessandri, the young army officer became aware
of the social injustice rampant in his country. In
September, 1924, Grove approved of the military revolt
because the program of the revolutionaries called for
social, as well as economic and political reforms. Again,
in January, 1925, Grove joined in a revolutionary movement
that professed social reform as a part of its program, and
seven years later Marmaduke took his longest step in the
direction of socialism with his participation in the June 4
movement that established the Socialist Republic of Chile.

The Junta immediately began to remedy the many ills
that confronted the nation. But from the outset, within
the Junta itself, a split developed that doomed it.
General Arturo Puga, appointed to satisfy the military,
was not of the same mind as Eugenio Matte, the future
founder of the Socialist Party, and Dávila, operating
from strictly personal motivations, could not find
common ground with neither Matte nor Puga. As an
example of the discord Grove cited the incident of
selecting delegates for the provinces. Grove and Matte suggested that the Minister of the Interior travel throughout the republic to name personally these delegates for the provinces after conferences with local authorities. These hand-picked men, acceptable to provincial politicians would have added prestige to the revolutionary government in Santiago and given it the loyalty of the provincial areas. But Davila refused to agree to this system and pushed through the selection of "extremist" elements who had little or no knowledge of provincial politics or of the revolutionary philosophy. As a result these delegates ran into trouble with local authorities, police, and military leaders, and they helped drive the provinces away from the revolutionary leadership.

The military also became disenchanted with the revolution shortly after the victory. Fearing a Communist takeover of the movement, they began discussing a new intervention in politics just one day after Montero fell. At the same time rumors in Santiago circulated a plethora

---

24 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "La republica socialista," Claridad, April 16, 1938.
of reprots to the effect that counter-revolutions were imminent. The Junta denied all these remors, but they could not convince the citizens that all was well. As a result, the public lost confidence in the revolutionary government.

In the face of all this adversity the Junta, nevertheless, made an effort to carry out its promises to the people. On June 5 the Junta announced that two daily meals would be provided by the government until the depression could be defeated. The morning meal would consist of meat, the afternoon meal of cereals. As soon as sugar could be procured this too would be added to the meals. For those without shelter a commission was set up to find places in homes with available rooms. These were but stopgap measures, but they did help those in the greatest need.

Politically the Junta assumed legislative, as well as executive power. Because Congress, in the eyes of the Junta, at least acted without popular support,

26 Ibid.
it issued a decree law dissolving congress. The Junta promised to hold elections quickly, elections in which all could exercise their right of suffrage in free, democratic elections.

With congress out of the way the government declared a three-day banking holiday in an effort to stabilize the financial situation and to avoid panic. They followed this action with a law which created two new cabinet posts, Ministry of Work and Ministry of Hygiene, both designed to carry out the social program of the Junta. Another decree reorganized the Ministry of Lands and Colonization for the purpose of opening up new agricultural areas for the unemployed farm workers. A list of the decree laws proclaimed in the first days of the Matte-Puga-Dávila Junta demonstrate that it made an honest effort to put the economy back in balance, to set up an efficient program of government participation in many areas of everyday life, and to ease the plight of the poor, the infirm, and the unemployed. The members of the Junta granted amnesty to all

27 El Mercurio, June 7, 1932, p. 7.
political prisoners, demonstrating to one and all that they believed themselves to be the true representatives of the people, without fear of a counter revolution from previous political prisoners. They also made an attempt to assist the small business man by establishing a moratorium of thirty days on all debts of businesses with less than 2000,000 pesos capital investment. At the same time, the government sat up machinery for the extension of credits to these same small businesses.

Of thirty-one decree laws promulgated by the first Junta of the June 4 movement, the most famous, as well as the most controversial, was one attributed to Marmaduke Grove. Through his association with Matte and Cifuentes, Grove acquired some left-wing political ideas and a social consciousness concerning the misery of his fellow citizens. Alessandri, too, stood for social reform in his first term as president, and in Europe he and Grove discussed the social problem of Chile. As a result, Grove developed a social awareness seldom found in the ranks of Latin American military officers. Grove knew that many of the unemployed borrowed from the Caja de Credito Popular, government
organization resembling a gigantic pawn shop, using household items and tools as collateral. For some the need for ready money became so acute that they pawned the tools with which they earned their living. As a result, these unfortunate people could not work properly to earn the money with which to redeem their tools. In an effort to end this problem Decreto Ley No. 15 dissolved the Caja de Credito Popular and ordered the return of merchandise left for collateral. Such items as sewing machines, plumber's tools, mechanics tools, and typewriters came under the law as equipment essential for the livelihood of the owner. The law went a step further and added clothing, since people might injure their health in the winter without the proper attire. The government agreed to pay the cost of redeeming the items, except for those who attempted to withdraw luxury items without paying the redemption price, the scheme seemed to work well. On June 9 the press in Santiago carried the story of these cases of attempted redemption of luxury items along with an announcement from the Minister of Work, who was in charge of returning the items, that only articles of labor and clothing would be returned to their owners. For all other items the
price stipulated would have to be paid before redemption. The law was quite popular with the lower segment of society, but professional and wealthy citizens roundly criticized it as a Communist giveaway. Grove was severely criticized, some even calling him insane for instituting such a law. Shortly after the first *Junta* fell the government nullified Law No. 15.

From the outset the new government gained the support of some elements but others fought against it. The Federation of Railroad Workers (FF) pledged their support to the *Junta* while the representatives of 11,500 families, living in 145 agricultural colonies, visited the *Junta* to assure it of their adhesion to the revolutionary cause. At the same time the Assembly of the Federation of Students of Chile met on June 5 and after a "brief debate," decided upon an indefinite strike in protest against the revolution of 4 June.

Civilian groups, however, were of no immediate threat to the new government. Civilians lacked any effective organization and more supported the government

29 *El Mercurio*, June 9, 1932, p. 11.
30 *El Mercurio*, June 6, 1932, p. 9.
than opposed it. The major threat was the military. To be sure, the armed forces brought about the downfall of Montero, but there was no assurance that they would not tire of the new regime and stage a revolt against it. No one recognized the threat posed by the military more than the Minister of National Defense, Marmaduke Grove.

The day following the revolution Grove sent a circular to the armed forces explaining in great detail the political events of the previous day. The circular ended with a request for union among the military. It also asked the armed forces to be prepared to come to the aid of the government should their assistance become necessary. Again and again Grove made reference to the fact that the army stood behind the government in a strategic position, a bastion of defense against the forces of reaction that inevitably would try to destroy the new government. But Grove did not forget that the Chilean population traditionally opposed military government. Fearing that his many references to the influence of the armed forces in government might stir

---

31 _El Mercurio_, June 6, 1932, p. 9.
up civilian elements, Grove made certain that his circulars, speeches, and articles sat the minds of the citizens to rest concerning military participation in government. "The participation of the Air Force, Army, and carabineros in the revolution of 4 June has been clearly a decisive force...," but this was not a military revolution. The armed forces merely came to the assistance of the people. Moreover, General Puga, retired from active duty, sat on the Junta not as a military man but as a civilian. Therefore, there was no danger of the revolutionary government degenerating into a military dictatorship!

Carlos Davila followed much the same line of thought when he held a press conference for foreign correspondents. After disavowing any connection with the Soviet Union, Davila pointed out that Puga was not included in the Junta because he was a military man but because he was "sympathetic to our ideas." He denied the charge that the government was militarist, but he conceded that the help of the armed forces in the revolt was indispensable.

32 El Mercurio, June 6, 1932, p. 9.
33 El Mercurio, June 7, 1932, p. 1.
All members of the government took pains to disclaim any affiliation with Russia or with international Communism. Right-wing spokesmen repeatedly accused the government of being Communist led and of taking orders from Moscow. To counteract these accusations Dávila assured:

The new Government does not represent the Soviet system in any form...
I think that it will be impossible for Chile to arise from its depression under the Capitalist system; for this reason it is necessary to modify this system by means of a progressive State Socialism. I think that the Capitalist system is dying and that the only hope for Chile is the prosecution of many distributive industries, like food and others.

We have no intention of molesting private property now owned by Chileans or foreigners....

Of course, in order to Socialize, to the extent that we propose, it will be necessary that authority remain in the hands of the Junta and that Congress be dissolved.
We think that in order to better the situation of Chile for the masses, it is necessary to impose a collective economy 34 paralleling the private economic system....

Dávila's words while soothing, failed to reassure the peoples in other countries. In the United States the Journal of Commerce reported that the Chilean revolution

34 El Mercurio, June 7, 1932, p. 1.
would probably have an adverse effect on commercial and financial relations between the United States and Chile. In London, bankers and merchants who dealt with Chile expressed the hope that the "radical experiment" would fail quickly, forcing the government to return to the traditional political system.

While foreign governments and commercial interest found much in the new government to make them cautious, Chileans at home appeared to be in complete accord with the activity of the Junta. Yet, Dávila was not content to be only a member of the government Junta. He wanted more authority and many observers believed that his ultimate aim was a dictatorship. Matte and Grove had too much influence in the government for him to realize this goal, and he determined to eliminate them for the political scene by planning the downfall of the Junta of which he himself was a member. Aware that a great fear of Communism existed among the populace, Dávila and his supporters stirred up rumors that Communism daily gained strength in the government. Moreover, Dávila knew that the key to a counter

---

revolution was held by the armed forces, and if they could be convinced that Communism threatened the nation, they would topple the government.

The army thus became restless. On June 12 a meeting of officers discussed the threat of Communism and the measures taken by the revolutionary government. The Commander of the Army, General Moreno, invited Grove to participate in this meeting. When Grove realized the tenor of the discussion, he asked those present to decide whether or not they supported the Junta. The vast majority demonstrated that they opposed the revolutionary government. Grove told them that they had no right to intervene in politics, that the meeting itself was a breach of military discipline. Although he would take no action against them at that time, he would stated, apply the most strict sanctions provided by military law, if further meetings were held. After the officers departed, Grove reported the incident to the Junta, but he related that in the future he believed the officers would cooperate and permit the government to carry out its program.

36 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "La República Socialista," Claridad, April 17, 1938.
The day following the meeting General Moreno paid a visit to Grove's home to apologize for the meeting. He also promised Grove that he would work to maintain loyalty and discipline within the military ranks. The spirit of cooperation displayed by Moreno greatly encouraged Grove and convinced him that his earlier assessment of the military officers was accurate. He had no doubts now that the army would, if necessary, defend the revolutionary government.

For four days following the meeting of officers a calm settled over government circles and over the army. Then on June 16 many government commissions arrived at the Moneda seeking solutions to their problems. Late in the afternoon, after the last such commission had left the Ministry of Defense, one of Grove's aides came to report a strange occurrence near the office. The lights had been turned out under the Ministry and troops from the Buin Regiment had taken up positions in the vicinity of the Moneda. Grove then collected his friends who went down a back staircase to avoid the troops.

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "La República Socialista," Claridad, April 17, 1938.
Once on the street level Grove met Pedro Leon Ugalde, who declared that he was going to call out the workers to end the military movement. Grove told him it was too early to determine the extent of the rebellion and that any call for the workers should come later, after all the facts had been compiled. Marmaduke then moved to the Moneda to confer with the Junta. In the patio he met a large contingent of workers from the newspaper, La Nación. Grove, acting as if nothing had happened, stopped and talked with the group, writing their requests on a newspaper he carried.

At the time Grove gave an interview to the workers the Moneda was in a state of great confusion. The Cazadores Regiment arrived and took up positions inside the Moneda. They, along with the carabineros on duty, remained loyal to the government. Grove next called the air base at El Bosque and received assurance that they supported him and that planes stood ready to come to his assistance the moment he gave the order.

At about eight o'clock a group of naval officers

38
"Cambia de Gobierno hubo en la madrugada de hoy."
(Headline), El Mercurio, June 17, 1932, p. 1.
arrived and demanded that Matte resign his Junta post and that Grove resign his ministerial office. Grove answered that he would resign only when the highest ranking military chiefs asked him to leave. Grove then sent orders to several other regiments ordering them into position. The orders were ignored however, and the regimental commanders joined in the rebellion. Shortly after eight Lagos led the Infantry School against the Moneda. Grove realized that this was crucial. He then called the air field and ordered six planes to bomb the Ministry of War and to support the Cazadores Regiment and the carabineros. At that moment Eugenio Matte entered and asked Grove to rescind his order because he did not want any blood shed, and General Puga had promised Matte to settle the situation without the use of troops. Grove permitted himself to be talked into staying at the Moneda to wait for negotiations. Shortly after Matte arrived communications with the air field were out, and Grove could not get to his followers.

By 9:45 troops carried in trucks, autos, taxis, and on foot began arriving at the Moneda. At the same time

39
Grove, Claridad, April 18, 1938.
time the mechanized segment of the Chilean army, one tank, arrived on the scene and menacingly halted before the doors of the Moneda. Grove, however, refused to give up so easily. At eleven o'clock he took to the radio to try Ugalde's solution. Grove announced over the air that reactionary elements, at that very moment, stood at the gates of the Moneda ready to destroy the Socialist Republic. Shortly before his broadcast Grove, in the presence of reporters, said that the time drew near when he would be forced to take his case to the people. He evidenced optimism that the people would come to the aid of the government. In this he was greatly disappointed. A half hour after his broadcast the carabineros abandoned the Moneda, followed almost immediately by the Cazadores Regiment. Once the troops left the Moneda Grove's fate was sealed. About midnight a commission from the revolutionary committee met with Grove and Marmaduke dejectedly told them that if all units adhered to the movement he would relinquish his position. With these words Grove surrendered his pistol and the June 4 revolution was over.

---

40

At 1:45 in the morning a group of twenty persons entered the Moneda. The military spokesman, General Moreno, who only four days before had promised his loyalty to Grove, spoke to the Junta. He stated that the government appeared to be leaning toward Communism and for this reason the armed forces staged their revolt. Moreno asserted that the army had no charges against Puga and Dávila but they demanded the immediate removal of Matte and Grove, both of whom had stated Communistic theories. Moreno then asked the Junta for custody of both Grove and Matte, which they granted to him. At 3:45 on the morning of the seventeenth armed guards took Grove, Matte, Millan, Grove's brother Jorge, who was visiting Marmaduke for a few days, and Charlin to a store where they spent two nights under guard.

The revolutionary committee, composed of military officers, disclosed that it wished to preserve socialism but that the revolt was aimed at the destruction of the

---

41 "Solo enemmos cargos contra quienes querian llevarnos al comunismo," El Mercurio June 17, 1932, p. 7 and Anónimo, Por que cayó Grove, (Santiago de Chile: Talleres gráficos La Nación, n. d.), pp. 6-7.

42 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "16 de Junio de 1932," Claridad, April 19, 1938.
Communist threat. Civilian organizations followed the lead of the officers and proclaimed their support of the Socialist Republic. Shortly after the fall of Grove and Matte, a new Junta took control of the government. Davila remained from the previous regime. The two new members named were Nolasco Cardenas, a Democrat who was Minister of Agriculture under the 4 June Junta, and Alberto Cabero, a Radical senator.

On June 17 the press announced that the Junta selected Davila as its president. The news shocked Cabero since the Junta had not yet met, and no one mentioned to him anything about the selection of a president for the Junta. Though nettled over the obvious power-grab by Davila, Cabero wanted to retain his position on the Junta so that he could hasten the return to stability and democracy. Thus, he remained silent. Cabero wanted to hold immediate elections for congress and for a vice-president who would replace the Junta and lead the government until presidential elections could be held. Davila informed Cabero that elections could not be held until September, whereupon Cabero tendered resignations.

Alberto Cabero, "16 de junio de 1932," El Mercurio, June 16, 1934, p. 3.
his resignation, just four days after he assumed his post on the Junta. On June 23 the government accepted his resignation, leaving only Dávila and the pliable Cardenas on the Junta. In reality, Davila now ruled Chile.

Grove, Matte, and the other prisoners, after spending a night under guard in Santiago, where sent to Valparaíso in protective custody. On June 18 the naval destroyer "Lynch" picked up the captives and sat out for Easter Island and exile. From the ship, Grove and Matte issued a statement to the effect that they did not at any time have any contact with Communists and that they carried out the functions of government in an honest, honorable fashion.

Grove found his second trip to Pascua island less troublesome than the first, even though Davila, in taking steps to prevent escape, took away much of the freedom previously enjoyed by exiles on the island. For Grove, however, the trip merely meant reunion with many native friends. Security for the island came under the

44 Alberto Cabero, "16 de junio de 1932," El Mercurio, June 16, 1934, p. 3.
45 El Mercurio, June 18, 1932.
jurisdiction of a civil governor, a carabinero officer with ten men, and a naval lieutenant and ten sailors, left on the island because the naval commander feared that the carabineros could not fulfill their mission. Under the new security all prisoners had to be in their billets by six in the evening. Meanwhile, carpenters sent from the mainland, arrived to begin the construction of official quarters for government personnel, and of barracks, designed to accomodate forty prisoners. Dávila evidently planned a long reign with a great deal of opposition.

About a week after the fall of Matte and Grove, Dávila announced Decree Law 50. This made it a crime, punishable by imprisonment or exile, to speak or write "doctrines that tend to destroy by means of violence the social or political order of the State." Under Decree Law 50 Dávila apprehended hundreds of his adversaries, filling prisons on the mainland and islands off the coast of Chile with political prisoners.

---

46 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Nuevamente relegado en Pascua," Claridad, April 20, 1938.

47 Centralaría General de la República, Recopilación de Decretos-Leyes, 1932, p. 15.
At the end of June the Central Bank of Chile, in its monthly bulletin assured Chileans and the world that the new, modified Socialist Republic was best for the nation. At first, stated the article, many observers believed that the revolution would degenerate into "destructive Communism and anarchy," but, quick work by political leaders and the armed forces purged the government of the evil influence of Communism; after June 16 calm reigned once again. For the benefit of the capitalistic nations of the West, the bulletin pointed out that, "State socialism has no relation with Communism or Bolshevism nor...scientific socialism. In short, it is the realization that liberal capitalism has been unable to dominate the crisis and, in order to avoid general destruction, the state must take charge of the organization and regulation of the economy in all its sectors." The individual, however, would not be eliminated from the economy but the economy would be regulated for the benefit and well being of all. Thus, State Socialism, as conceived by the Davila government was nothing more than government planning or, as the bulletin put it, "planned capitalism."

48 Banco Central de Chile, Boletín No. 52, June 30, 1932, p. 120.
Under the Dávila-dominated government, which called itself the Socialist Republic, no great changes took place in the structure of government or the economy. Any radical moves made during the reign of Matte and Grove were soon rescinded under Dávila. Decree Law 12 promulgated when Matte sat on the Junta made all foreign money in state and foreign banks the property of the state. This was done to halt the conversion of Chilean currency into foreign exchange, a move which Matte believed would have worked a further hardship on the Chilean economy. Davila postponed the implementation of Decree Law 12 to July 13 in a subsequent decree, and finally, on July 27, the government announced in Decree Law 311, that the act was nullified.

As a result of Dávila's failure to implant sweeping social, economic, and political reforms, Chile remained economically depressed; the poor continued to suffer from unemployment and low wages; and the old conservative forces began to creep back into places of influence in government. Moreover, the repression exerted under the authority of Decree Law 50 became great as opposition

49

Cantraloría General de la República, Recopilación de Decretos-Leyes, 1932, p. 15.
to the government increased. More and more citizens concerned themselves with the long-promised elections that never seemed any closer, while arbitrary decree laws flooded the country. The government effectively muzzled the press and disregarded personal guarantees. Early in September the threat of another upheaval forced the resignation of Dávila, who earlier had dissolved the Junta and assumed the post of provisional president. Realizing that the citizenry would demand a return to democratic government, the armed forces contributed their support to the new provisional president, General Blanche. The military hoped that Blanche could lead the government until elections could be arranged, but an altercation broke out between the army and the air force that forced Blanche from office in less than three weeks.

The day after Blanche assumed his post, the Minister of War, General Lagos, and the chief of the air force, Commander Merino Benitez, became involved in a heated argument. Lagos charged that the argument stemmed from an air force request to Blanche for the creation of a Ministry of Air, a request that Blanche refused. Commander Merino denied this charge and claimed that
the argument arose over his desire for a speedy return to
civilian government. Late in the afternoon of September
14 both the army and the air force prepared for combat.
Finally the Infantry School, which Lagos earlier commanded,
marched on the Aviation School only to find that personnel
and equipment had been evacuated to a safer place.

On September 15 carabineros, accompanied by army
units, marched on Ovalle Air Base, on the outskirts of
Santiago, there capturing Commander Merino, forty
officers, thirty mechanics, and thirty-five planes.
The capture came without any casualties on either side.

The inter-service quarreling; combined with the use of
force to resolve the quarrel, aroused the civilian popu-
lation to the threat of a military dictatorship. Military
leaders realized that a military government would be
impossible at that time without open violence between the
armed forces and civilians. Therefore, when civilian
elements demanded the removal of General Blanche as

50 "La situación política es gravísima," El Pais
(Santiago) September 14, 1932, p. 1.

51 "La rendición de Merino Benítez," El Pais
(Santiago), September 15, 1932, p. 1.
provisional president, the officers conceded without argument. On October 2, Blanche stepped down and the leadership of the government fell to the President of the Supreme Court, Abraham Oyanedel. Oyanedel received the title of vice-president of the republic with authority to carry out the duties of his office until elections could be held.

The government selected October 31 as the date for the general elections, giving political parties little time to select candidates and the candidates even less time to campaign. At this point there were thirty-two political parties in Chile, and within the large, traditional parties factions failed to agree upon a presidential candidate. Worker's unions and fraternal organizations also had problems with personalism among the leadership, a fact which hindered their uniting behind a single candidate. Because of their failure to agree on a candidate the unions were really responsible for their own defeat. Even with factionalism rampant among the traditional parties these organizations were able to muster far more votes than the unions and fraternal organizations in their divided state.

52 "Los gremios comienzan a ver claro," (Editorial) La Nacion, September 26, 1932.
Therefore, the candidate of the Radical, Liberal, and Democratic parties and part of the Conservative party, Arturo Alessandri Palma, was unbeatable. Nevertheless, five other candidates participated in the presidential election. A portion of the Conservative party nominated Hector Rodríguez de la Sotta, while other Conservatives and some Liberals supported Enrique Zañartu Prieto. The Communist Party, displaying amazing recuperative powers after being outlawed by Ibañez, named Elias Lafertte as their candidate. The fifth and final candidate, Marmaduke Grove, received the nomination of several small fraternal organizations and workers unions. While the largest socialist parties, the Radical Socialist Party and Socialist Party of Chile, threw their support to Alessandri the smaller Socialist Revolutionary Action (ARS) composed of the men involved in the 4 June movement, backed Grove. The final paragraph of the ARS statement announcing its candidate said, "We want economic reconstruction. We want order. We want discipline. We want social justice. We want that which the entire nations wants. Viva Grove! Viva ARS."

---

53. "Cinco nombres se dan como candidatos a la Presidencia de la República," La Nación, September 18, 1932, p.15.
On September 23 a committee headed by Eugenio Gonzalez visited the Moneda and asked the then provisional president, Blanche, for the return of Marmaduke Grove, Matte, Jorge Grove, Carlos Millán, and Carlos Charlin from Easter Island. Blanche assured the committee that the return of these prisoners would be carried out as soon as possible but he mentioned no specific date.

Three days later the National Court of Appeals informed the Minister of Interior that the court decided in favor of setting Marmaduke Grove free and that it was in the hands of the government to free him from exile. On September 28 the Minister of Interior announced that Grove would be set free as soon as a ship could reach Easter Island. When, several days later, no ship had been sent to bring the prisoner home, the government announced that it would be impossible to send a naval vessel to the island in the immediate future and that the government would try to contract a privately owned vessel to make the trip.

54 La Nación, September 23, 1932.
56 La Nación, October 1, 1932.
The Blanche government continued to make excuses for their failure to send for Grove, but two days after Oyanedel took office the government announced that the ship Apolo would probably leave on October 5 for Easter Island. The trip of 2,500 miles took ten days each way so that Grove's date of arrival would be October 25, just six days before the election. But, the government changed ships, and on October 7 a converted minesweeper the Castro left Valparaíso. This type ship took twenty-four days to make the round trip setting back Grove's estimated date of arrival to October 31—election day.

Meanwhile, Grove's supporters continued to campaign for their absent candidate. Claudio Arteaga, in an article in La Nación, defended Grove from charges that he was a threat to the nation. He stated that Grove, Matte, and others involved in the 4 June movement sought to alleviate the "misery, hunger, and ignorance" that abounded in Chile. Arteaga continued that Grove opposed both the extreme right and the extreme left, the old privileged oligarchy and foreign capitalists, as well as Chile's Communists. Grove

---

57 La Nación, October 7, 1932.
was, according to the article, one of the "best hopes and guarantees of the future."

The first formal campaign rally held in support of Grove met on October 3 at five in the afternoon at the National Sports Stadium. Every seat in the vast arena was occupied as two large amplifiers carried the program to those who could not get into the stadium but stayed in the street outside to demonstrate their support of Grove. Some factories closed early to permit employees to visit the stadium, while busses came from nearby communities and from all over Santiago, bringing the faithful to the gigantic Grove rally. The educator, Eugenio Gonzalez, opened the rally with a speech on the "ideological and moral history of Marmaduke Grove." According to Gonzalez, Grove had "captured the hearts of the people because he understood their sentiments; interpreted their pain; and finally, desiring solutions for them, he installed the second socialist republic that existed in the world." The gathering concluded with the proclamation of Grove's candidacy,

58 Claudio Arteaga, "Grove--Catastrofe," La Nación, October 4, 1932, p. 3.
59 "Millares de personas concurrieron a la proclamación de Marmaduke Grove," La Nación, October 4, 1932.
read after Mrs. Grove and her daughter Rebecca drew enthusiastic applause from the crowd when introduced. After the rally a huge parade left the stadium and marched through the center of Santiago.

A second rally took place on October 12, at the Plaza de Armas in the heart of Santiago. Workers marched from outlying parts of the city to the rallying point, pausing as they passed the Moneda to cry out for a postponement of the elections until Grove could spend some time campaigning. After this meeting the leaders of Grove's campaign sent to the president a declaration that dealt with such economic problems as a shorter work day at the same rate of pay, sanctions against speculators, a national plan of public works to improve sanitation, and so on. The declaration also protested the government's failure to bring Grove to the nation at an earlier date and it made a formal request that the elections be postponed until fifteen days after the arrival of Grove on the continent. Playing for time

60 La Nación, October 4, 1932.
61 "Miles de personas participaron en la concentración grovista de ayer," La Nación, October 13, 1932.
the Grove forces hoped to gain a few more votes and hoped even more that the solid support for Alessandri would suddenly collapse.

A third rally took place on October 21. At five in the afternoon of this day a "March of Liberty" was held after which a new petition for the postponement of the elections until November 15 was presented to the government. The Minister of Interior asked a committee from the Grove camp to meet with him to discuss the request for postponement. After this meeting the Minister revealed that he would study the petition and then give his answer. Some observers believed that before announcing a final decision the Minister would consult the other candidates for their views on the matter. Finally, five days before the election, the government announced that the elections would be carried out as scheduled. The decision ended any hope that Grove's supporters might have harbored concerning the outcome of the election. Even though they sincerely believed that Grove was the "people's choice"

62 "Los grovistas pidieron la postergación de la elección presidencial," La Nación, October 21, 1932.
63 "El gobierno mantiene inflexiblemente el acuerdo de no postergar las elecciones," La Nación, October 20, 1932.
they realized that he could not possibly win election to
the presidency without setting foot in Chile during the
campaign. However, the Grove campaign committee deter-
mined to get out as many Grove votes as possible in an
effort to enhance their chances in subsequent elections.

On October 26, Eugenio Gonzalez again took to the
speakers rostrum in Grove's behalf, this time to explain
"Grove's political program." Gonzalez declared that
Grove's candidacy had been founded upon the true necess-
ities of the country. Grove's program was no "abstract
doctrine," but it was founded on a "study of facts and
possibilities." Gonzalez further commented that:

The disordered individualism of the
capitalist economy has led the western
nations to a tragic and paradoxical sit-
uation, in which at the side of the splen-
dors of technical progress the multitudes,
without work, are consumed in the prison
of misery.

---

At the time Grove was still on the Pacific
ocean and no word had reached Chile from him. There-
fore, "Grove's political program" was in reality the
program of Eugenio Gonzalez and the ARS. However,
these views coincide with the ideas expressed by
Grove on the occasion of the 4 June movement and later
from his senate seat.
To end this situation Gonzalez advocated a complete reorganization of the economy under state control:

We aspire then to a true transformation of the present capitalist economy to a socialist regime, to a technical organization of production, exchange, and consumption, in a form that will satisfy plainly and justifiably the necessities of those who manufacture the collective wealth, and maintain national vitality.

Gonzalez ended his discourse by stating that the desired economic change would also produce a change in the political structure of the state. Sindical groups of manual and intellectual workers would replace the present political parties. These workers groups would send representatives to the legislature and to Technical Council's of State, both of which would "coordinate and direct national life."

These views were beyond the ideals of the 4 June movement and for the most part they were more extreme than Grove's political and economic philosophy. While Grove flirted with many of the ideas expressed by his campaign

65 "Los dirigentes de la candidatura de Grove explicaron su programa presidencial," La Nación, October 27, 1932.
committee, he did not long hold these views. Grove's was a socialism far removed from Marxism, even though Marmaduke considered himself a Marxian Socialist. In his first brush with socialism, through Matte and Cifuentes, Grove came as close to Marxian thought as he was ever to get. From the time of his second exile to Easter Island, Grove gradually began moving toward the Right, even though he led the Chilean socialist movement for almost a decade after the failure of his 4 June movement.

In the early evening of the 18th or 19th of October the Castro arrived at Pascua Island. The governor of the island, fearing that the ship was a part of an escape plan, held the prisoners under guard in their quarters, but on board the ship were friends of Grove who rushed ashore shouting, "Viva Grove, the future president of Chile—candidate of the people." This was the first that Grove heard of political events on the mainland the first moment he learned that he was a candidate for president.

Grove's friends and the ex-prisoners made plans to

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Otra vez hacia la libertad," Claridad, April 23, 1938.
leave the following day for Chile. Eleven days later the ship docked at Valparaiso at three in the afternoon. Grove described their arrival as, "a fantastic and unforgettable spectacle." Dock workers came out into the harbor to meet the ship in every type of small craft. Lining the docks and filling the streets of Valparaiso was a throng so great that Grove and his companions had difficulty reaching their hotel. Once inside the hotel the crowd insisted that Grove, Matte, and the others speak from the balcony. Grove thanked the people for their reception and for putting his name in nomination for president. He lamented that he was involved in an election with "so illustrious" a candidate as his friend, Arturo Alessandri, who had helped him escape from Pascua Island during the dictatorship of Ibáñez. Grove displayed optimism that if Alessandri were elected social reform laws would be passed. Both Grove and Matte denied any connection with Communism, the charge for which they had been deported, but they both pledged to work for the principles of the 4 June movement.

---

67 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "La elección presidencial de 1932," Claridad, April 24, 1938.
68 La Nación, October 31, 1932, p. 7.
The following day the ex-prisoners moved to Santiago by train. From noon on into the afternoon people jammed the streets around the train depot waiting for a glimpse of Grove and Matte. By two in the afternoon the crowds became so great that traffic came to a halt in that section of the city. The crowd remained peaceful throughout their vigil with the only sign of activity a series of popular hymns presented as a tribute to the returning exiles. Finally, at 3:50 the train arrived to such an enthusiastic greeting that order could not be maintained. The locomotive carried bunting and flew a large Chilean flag. Grove and Matte, along with Grove's family, arrived in the first car of the train. When Grove stepped outside the car carrying a flag, the crowd met him with a fifteen minute ovation. The faithful then whisked Grove to his car which carried him on to the center of the city in the midst of an unorganized parade. Grove and Matte spoke briefly from the offices of Grove's campaign committee, after which Grove proceeded to his home.

Meanwhile, the government announced the results of

69 "Insistentes manifestaciones de cariño recibieron del pueblo, Grove y Matte, La Nación, November 1, 1932, p. 8."
the election. As expected, Arturo Alessandri won by an overwhelming majority, polling 184,754 votes out of a total 339,709 cast. Suprisingly enough Grove ran second, winning 60,965 votes even though he never made a campaign speech nor even put in an appearance at a campaign rally. Grove, moreover, had not had the benefit of political party support, other than the small ARS. Consequently, the results encouraged Grove, Matte, Gonzalez, and others to work toward the unification of the small left-wing parties into one socialist party of Chile. In a meeting with Alessandri, Grove told the president-elect that he considered:

\[\text{it a duty of conscience to organize the 70 odd thousand voters who had sufficient confidence...to give me their votes in the last election. I consider it a duty to organize the working masses in our country in order to form a great and unified party that will permit us to attain the triumph we desire.}\]

When Grove arrived at his home, some 2,000 persons milled about waiting to greet him. Once inside his home

\[\text{La Nación, November 1, 1932, p. 3.}\]
\[\text{Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Una promesa de Grove que es hoy una realidad magnífica," Claridad, April 26, 1938.}\]
Grove spent some moments with his family but then granted an interview to a reporter. In the interview Grove again denied that he had ever been a Communist and he embarked upon a discussion of his political philosophy:

To seek an absolute social equality is an absurdity, a biological absurdity. It can not be. It must not be. Yet, I know that to all it is necessary to give the same opportunities. Great, intelligent men have been born in destitution and poverty. Some managed to overcome it, e.g. Michelet, the French historian almost died of hunger at the age of nine. At forty he was a light as bright as the Eiffel Tower. How many more Michelets have gone uncovered because they had not the means? Socialism will be the salvation of the world!

In answer to a question concerning his future, Grove declared that he would retire from active politics but he would continue to discipline the people to fight for their rights until "the Socialist Republic is a reality." It might be necessary to carry out a revolution to gain this end, but Grove did not find the thought repulsive. He said that revolution was not "destruction nor disorder," but it was a respectable form of "construction." To convince the people that they must unite and work toward
the establishment of a Socialist Republic would be Grove's mission in the months ahead.

Following the interview in which Grove announced his retirement from active politics the socialist groups that had supported Grove in the election held a dinner for Grove and Matte. At this meeting the leaders discussed the future of socialism in Chile. They informed Grove that he would not be the leader of the Chilean socialist movement. They explained to the defeated presidential candidate that he had been chosen to represent them in the presidential election because he was "like a flag, a symbol which could unite the workers behind one candidate. A sentimental figure." But, now there was no longer any need for the symbol and the time had come to convert "grovismo to socialism." A new political force was about to be born in Chile and the men present at the intimate homecoming dinner all had a hand in its creation but, ironically, the man informed of his relegation to an insignificant position in the movement, Marmaduke Grove,

---

72 Carlos Barella, "No proclamo el derecho a la vengenza, dice Grove," Zig-Zag, No. 1441, November 5, 1932, pp. 2-8.

became the leader of Chilean socialism in a matter of months after his defeat for the presidency.
CHAPTER VII

THE RISE OF THE SOCIALIST LEFT
AND MARMADUKE GROVE

Arturo Alessandri's election to the presidency in 1932 served to hold out hope for the lower segments of Chilean society. Alessandri had been, after all, the reform president in the 1920's, leading the majority of socialists to support him in 1932. At the same time the Liberal-Conservative coalition backed Alessandri, placing him in the enviable position of a candidate supported by both the Left and Right. Obviously, Alessandri could not satisfy both groups after election, even if he remained in the exact center on all issues. Therefore, he finally took sides and his choice fell to the conservatives.

Alessandri undoubtedly remembered the frustration of his first term when he lacked a majority in congress and his opponents blocked every attempt to put his program into law. This time he wanted a working majority in congress which he could not hope to find in the Left. The right-of-center parties controlled both houses of congress, and if Alessandri wanted support, he would
have to follow the conservative line. This he chose to do. Perhaps he felt that the reform laws pushed through by the military in 1924, along with the new constitution of 1925, were sufficient to meet the needs of the nation and that the most pressing problem in 1932 was to end military intervention into politics. If this were the case, Alessandri accomplished his goal. In the process, however, the people lost civil liberties, while the conservative forces, which had steadily lost ground since 1920 found that Alessandri gave them a reprieve, enabling them to retreat until they remain even today the most powerful voice in government.

For the left-wing elements, Alessandri proved a bitter disappointment. While his government permitted the Communist and other left-of-center parties to operate, he managed to harass them as often as possible. Moreover, he permitted ultra-conservative groups, such as the Republican Militia, to flourish and to threaten the Left with violence and destruction by force of arms. In some respects, the second Alessandri administration resembled the Ibáñez dictatorship, or so it seemed to many like Marmaduke Grove who suffered exile and imprisonment under both regimes.
After the election of 1932, Grove settled down to enjoy his retirement. Soon, however, the inactivity became oppressive, and Grove went back to politics. While on Pascua Island the year before, Grove and Matte pondered the cause of the failure of the 4 June movement. They both agreed that the possibility of success would have been greater had the movement had a broader base and more effective organization. Grove's revolution was primarily the work of the army, with only a very few civilians in actual support. The apathetic population was disgruntled over the economic depression. As a result, the populace stood by and permitted the revolutionaries to overthrow the Montero government. Some of those involved, especially Grove, took the apathy of the public to be wholehearted support, a mistake which Grove and Matte realized only twelve days after their successful golpe, when the people again silently permitted the army to intervene in politics, this time for the expulsion of Grove and Matte. The two revolutionaries believed that if they had possessed the support of a fairly strong political party, the army would not have dared enter the political arena, and the Socialist Republic would have gone on to carry out its program. To build a party
sympathetic to their views, the two exiles decided to make an attempt to unite the diverse, small socialist parties into one great Chilean Socialist party.

Thus, early in 1933, Grove began to work toward the creation of one socialist party from the multitude that existed at that time. Matte, elected senator from Santiago in the 1932 general elections, joined in the task. Both men stumped the nation analyzing the Alessandri administration while, at the same time, calling for unification of Chile's socialists. Matte, because of congressional immunity, was outside the reach of the government, but Grove, holding no public office, was vulnerable to the wrath of the government.

Not only did Marmaduke criticize Alessandri and his program but he also wrote a letter to the Minister of Defense complaining about the injustice of his retirement at eighty per cent of his pension. Alessandri's secretary sent copies of this letter to every newspaper in Santiago along with a statement pointing out Grove's misdeeds and the government's case for establishing a less than full pension for him. Of course, Grove could
not let the matter die at this point. Once again he took his case to the press. If Alessandri had deplored Grove's anti-government speeches, the ex-colonels literary forays now drove the president to distraction.

Meanwhile, the drive to unify Chile's socialists progressed rapidly. With Grove and Matte leading the negotiations, the many political parties, fraternal organizations, and labor unions came together to discuss the creation of one political party. The first step in the establishment of the new party was the merger of the Acción Revolucionaria Socialista, led by Oscar Schanke, Eugenio Gonzalez, and Marmaduke Grove, with the Partido Socialista Unificado, to form the Unión Revolucionaria Socialista (URS). The ARS was the only party that supported Grove in the 1932 presidential election. It was Marxian oriented and more extreme than the Partido Socialista Unificado, a smaller organization.

The new party possessed the potential to become an important factor on the political scene, but it still lacked the numerical strength to exert much influence on

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Relegado a Melinka por el gobierno de Alessandri," Claridad, April 27, 1938.
national politics. But the URS was merely the beginning of the unification movement. Eugenio Matte and his Nueva Acción Política (NAP), the largest and most vigorous of the socialist groups, was organized over a base of workers unions. NAP remained outside the new union, but its entry was imminent and the leaders of the movement counted on its influence to carry the remaining parties with it into the all-encompassing union.

On April 19, 1933, at a huge convention held in Santiago, the URS merged with NAP, the Partido Socialista Marxista, and the Orden Socialista to form the Partido Socialista de Chile. Elected to guide the fortunes of the party was Oscar Schnake, the first secretary-general. Other top posts went to Matte, Gonzalez, and Grove. Matte, however, wielded more influence than the others due to his leadership of NAP and his possession of a senate seat.

By 1937 the new party had four senators and eighteen deputies, an indication of its immediate success in Chilean politics. By that time, however, conflict within the party

---

had become so bitter that segments threatened to desert to form new parties or to align themselves with established parties. From the beginning the declared principles of the Socialist Party were Marxian. The first statement after the merger in 1933 professed attachment to Marx and his class struggle, collectivization, dictatorship of worker organizations, and internationalism. At the same time the party declared that socialization by evolutionary means was impossible in Chile, implying that the party would sanction revolution to attain its ends. With such pronouncements as these it is not surprising that Alessandri was wary of the new party and its leaders.

After the creation of the Socialist Party, Grove embarked on an energetic schedule of speeches. He traveled throughout the nation seeking converts to socialism and informing party members of the political situation in Santiago. The government opposed Grove's activity. Even before Grove initiated his speaking tour, Santiago jails bulged with more than a hundred political prisoners. But, after the passage of a law of extraordinary

---

3 La Opinión, April 15, 1933.
faculties, which gave the Minister of Interior authority to imprison or exile any person who orally or in writing threatened the government with violent overthrow, political arrests mounted. Prominent among those seized by the government was Marmaduke Grove, who by this time had become an old hand at the game of arrest and exile. A special decree authorized secret service investigators to take Grove from his home at six in the evening on August 17, 1933. By eight-thirty Grove was again in government custody, on his way south under guard.

As the government debated his fate Grove moved from city to city at a slow pace. Finally he arrived at Puerto Montt from where he boarded a ship and sailed down the coast to the city of Ancud. Still the government hesitated, and Grove visited a girl's school, along with many other tourist attractions in the area. A report to the government stated that Grove delivered an inflammatory speech at the school and that he led the girls in singing, The International. This information hastened a government decision on Grove's case and orders arrived for his

---

"Causas por qué se relegó a Grove," El Diario Ilustrado, August 17, 1933.
transfer to Melinka, an almost uninhabited island off the southern coast of Chile. This inhospitable place had a harsh climate which Grove claimed would be detrimental to his health, but after doctors examined and found him fit, the government carried out its previous order and sent Grove to the island, where he remained for twenty days.

While Grove had traveled leisurely through the south and spent twenty days in exile, influential friends back in Santiago worked tirelessly for his release. His brother Hugo, from his senate seat and in conjunction with senators Pedro Leon Ugalde and Eugenio Matte, challenged the government on its action. Hugo lodged a protest and Ugalde asked for an explanation by the Minister of Interior. Finally, Minister Piwonka went before the senate to explain the government's action in the Grove case.

Piwonka prefaced his remarks with the statement that Ugalde had no right to criticize the government, and the government was not obligated to do more than summarize

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Relegado a Melinka por el gobierno de Alessandri," Claridad, April 28, 1938.
the events leading to the subversive acts for which, under the authority of Law 5136, a citizen might be imprisoned or exiled. Piwonka's statement accused Grove of using the discontent of the masses "to further his own personal ambition." According to the government, Grove waged an intense campaign within the Socialist Party to entice party members to resist the government. In addition, Grove's inflammatory speeches time and again exhorted his listeners to violent revolution against the Alessandri government.

The Minister cited dates and places of the various speeches, pointing out that with each address Grove became more radical in his pronouncements. Piwonka's statement ended with these words:

The country knows well what a Socialist government would mean; annihilation of all that exists --tradition, constitution, laws--annulment of the fundamental principles and rights that erect and establish the Fundamental Letter of the State,...in sum, a government dissolute, which precipitates in a few short days chaos throughout the country.

We wish to save the country from the painful moments of those days which followed 4 June.

---

The country cannot tolerate that which disturbs permanently its regular and orderly life.

We accept...the propagation of ideas or doctrines which are opposed to those of the government, but we must remember that the government is authorized, for reasons of public order, to stop these propagandists who call for the use of violence to put their ideas into practice.

Although the government certainly had the right and the duty to protect itself from subversion, later events proved that the yardstick for determining that which was subversive was not difficult to discern. On one occasion the left-wing newspaper, *La Opinion*, found itself closed by government order for a story derogatory to the president's person. Later the government confiscated an edition of the weekly satirical magazine, *Topaze*, for the same reason. On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that Chile had passed through eight years of chaos and anarchy during which the armed forces flaunted their power and toppled governments at will. If Alessandri appeared worried and subject to arbitrary, sometimes unjust acts, it was that he never could be certain that army officers were not ready to move on the Moneda and drive him from office. Alessandri's use of extra-legal means on

*Partido Socialista, La relegación de Grove*, pp.17-18.
on occasion was simply self defense when laxity might have meant the end of his government.

Five days after Minister Piwonka's charges appeared in the press, Grove wrote a letter to Pedro Leon Ugalde in which he defended himself. La Opinion printed the letter in its August 22 issue. Grove followed the government's statement charge for charge. Pointing to his role in the January 23, 1925 revolution he declared that he led the forces that restored the constitutional president to his office rather than take power himself. Again in 1932 Grove had the support with which to grab power, but he chose to turn the Socialist Republic over to civilians. Thus, although the opportunity presented itself for him to become a dictator, Grove steadfastly refused to make himself the leader of the government. In Grove's eyes this action was neither the work of a man bent on a personal gain nor of a power-thirsty man striving to establish a dictatorship. Instead, Grove considered his record as proof that he always acted as a defender of the government and champion of democracy.

---

8 Partido Socialist, La relegación de Grove, pp. 21-4.
In answering the charges that he incited his audience to violent revolution, Grove stated he never had revolutionary ends in mind for his listeners. He told many gatherings of the positive program of the 4 June movement, while at the same time criticizing Davila's association with foreign business elements. On other occasions Grove spoke out against the lack of personal rights under the Alessandri regime, pointing to the illegal Republican Militia that threatened to replace the army in the military life of Chile. He also told of graft and waste in government and of the murder of a Valparaiso university professor by government police who were assigned to guard him. In addition a journalist met his death, supposedly at the command of "high authority." In neither case were those responsible ever brought to trial. Both men had spoken against the government, leading Grove to assume that the government was responsible for their deaths. However, no concrete evidence could ever be found to link the Alessandri administration to these murders.

Grove's defense was not at all convincing, but

because of his reputation among the working classes, public opinion swung to his support. Another assist came from Senator Eugenio Matte who delivered a speech in defense of Grove. This occurred at the same time he defended himself from a government attempt to void Matte's congressional immunity. In dealing with Grove's case Matte said much the same thing that Grove had written in his own behalf. Again, like Grove's letter, Matte took the opportunity to take the government to task over the destruction of personal liberties in Chile, an obvious attempt to muster public opinion against the Alessandri government.

Grove's strongest argument came in relation to the charge that he incited the girls at a normal school in Ancud to revolution and that he led them in singing revolutionary songs. A government agent notified the Alessandri regime that Grove had committed these anti-government acts at the normal school, and on August 22 the newspaper, La Nacion reported to its readers that Grove spoke to the students and faculty of the school "in terms inconvenient for the government." Grove and his supporters insisted that such charges were
completely false. Less than a week after the story broke in *La Nación* an Ancud newspaper, *La Cruz del Sur*, reported that the charges against Grove were false. The correspondent whose name was attached to the story sent a telegram to *La Nación* disclaiming any part in the story filed under his byline. He also stated that to the best of his knowledge the story was false in every detail. In addition, the school telegraphed the Santiago newspaper protesting the story which the director claimed was a blatant untruth. Even the governor of the province of Chiloe supported Grove in his argument that no revolutionary speech had been delivered at Ancud.

Grove's account of the event at least partially exonerated Alessandri and his cabinet from complicity in the false charges leveled at Grove. In 1938, some five years after the event, Grove wrote that while he was in the custody of the government in Ancud, a government functionary visited him in his hotel room, stating that he was a good friend of Alessandri. The man boasted that he was the president's confidant

---

10 From a speech delivered to the Chamber of Deputies by Deputy Carlos Alberto Martínez, reprinted in *La relegación de Grove*, pp. 65-68.
and that he had taken care of Alessandri's house while the President lived in exile in Europe during the Ibanez government. Apparently this was an attempt to learn something about Grove's activities or to get a confession from him, because the interview took place during the period when the government displayed an uncertainty as to Grove's punishment. In any case, Grove suspected that the man was conspiring against him, and he unceremoniously asked the man to leave. The official became quite angry and went out to send the story of Grove's alleged harangue at the normal school to his superiors in Santiago. The event was significant; it gave the Minister of the Interior the basis for his action against Grove's case, which meant exile on Melinka Island.

The revelation that at least one of the charges against Grove was false aided his case for freedom. At the same time, the harassment of the government by a few senators and deputies mustered public opinion on Grove's side and forced Minister Fiwonka to grant him amnesty.

11. Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Relegado a Melinka por el gobierno de Alessandri," Claridad, April 28, 1938.
Marmaduke spent only twenty days on Melinka before Piwonka ordered his release and return to Santiago.

Grove stopped off on his way home to visit relatives in Valparaíso. He spent New Year's Eve with them, and on January 1, 1934 he returned to Santiago. As soon as Grove arrived in the capital city, he learned that the government police had uncovered a new plot. He feared that he would be involved in this just as he had been accused of anti-government speeches. Grove's fears were well founded. Almost immediately after he reached his home, detectives arrived and presented him with a government detention order. The charge stemmed from the police discovery of a plot against the government by *ibañistas* and socialists. Grove was embroiled in the intrigue when police stumbled upon a letter supposedly written by Grove to Ibanez, in which Grove spoke of plans to overthrow the Alessandri govern­ment. Grove denied complicity in any revolutionary plans and swore that the letter, which the police produced, had been forged. Since Grove's political history showed that he was not incapable of plotting against the government, the police paid no heed to his protestations of innocence.
and they interred him in the Santiago prison, along with more than a score of others who allegedly participated in the same plot.

While Grove adjusted to prison life his close friend and revolutionary companion, Eugenio Matte Hurtado, died an untimely death. The death of its illustrious founder was a severe loss to the socialist cause, but other leaders like Oscar Schnake and Eugenio Gonzalez managed to hold the newly formed party together. To fill the seat vacated by Matte, the government announced a special election to be held April 9, 1934, Previously, Matte had encountered little difficulty in his campaign to win the senate post, but socialist leaders feared that his election was more a triumph for Matte than for his party. While influential in the party, Schnake and Gonzalez did not possess the popularity necessary to gain independent votes. Of all the socialists only Grove appeared to have the qualifications necessary for election. Moreover, Grove possessed that great political asset in Latin America—he had a ready made slogan—"From prison to the Senate." Therefore, the socialist choice to fill Matte's seat was Marmaduke Grove.
While the socialist hierarchy worried over the outcome of one of their two Senate posts, other political observers predicted an easy win for the socialist candidate. Two months before the election the left-wing newspaper, *La Opinion*, carried an article to this effect. The newspaper, working with past election results, estimated that the Conservative-Liberal coalition would poll about 23,000 votes; Democrats and Radicals would control 12,000 to 14,000 votes, while the Communists had only about 4,000 supporters in the Santiago area where Matte's seat was at stake. Against these votes the new socialist coalition should have been able to muster 28,000 to 30,000 votes, giving Grove a 5,000 to 7,000 vote margin.

Throughout the months of February and March, *La Opinión* continued to watch the campaign closely, and as time went on they held to their prediction of a Grove victory but by an even greater margin. Meanwhile, Grove remained in prison, sending only an occasional short message out for dissemination among the electorate.

The press played up the fact that a candidate for a national office resided in prison, accused of conspiring against the constitutional government of Arturo Alessandri. The publicity appeared to have a positive effect for Grove rather than to hurt his chances for election. The government had succeeded in making a martyr out of Grove and he enjoyed his role.

The Ministry of Interior prepared cases against all those arrested as part of the ibanista-socialist plot and brought them to trial as quickly as possible. Trials were handled speedily and the government convicted and sentenced those charged with dispatch. The government had difficulty in proving the charges against Grove, and he remained in prison, basking in the publicity afforded him by the government. Stories abounded about his routine in prison, and magazines and newspapers carried cartoons showing Grove behind bars looking out at the congress building. Finally, as the election drew near, the Ministry of Interior announced that Grove would be set free and the charges against him dropped for insufficient evidence. But Grove recognized the advantage of his position and feared
that he might lose votes if he were suddenly freed only a few days before the election. To many of his socialist supporters it might appear as if a bargain had been made with the Alessandri government. Therefore, Grove refused to leave his cell until the Court of Appeals in Santiago ruled on his case.

Five days after the government dropped charges against Grove, the Santiago Court of Appeals met and unanimously found Grove innocent of participation in the ibánista-socialist plot and of any activity against the internal security of the nation. The Court based its ruling on the fact that the government had insufficient evidence to bring Grove to trial. In view of the fact that a letter had been initially produced linking Grove with the plot, the Court found that Grove's signature must have been forged, or the government would have proceeded against him on the strength of this letter written to Ibañez. In any case the Court absolved Grove of all charges and ordered his release from prison. The date for release was April 8, the date of the special election. The release order set

14 "Fallado el proceso del supuesto complot; Grove y Arce, absueltos," *La Opinión*, April 3, 1934.
the time for release at 11:20 in the evening, after the polls closed, giving to Grove the opportunity to remain a martyr.

Even as early as 11:20 on the night of the elections it was clear that Grove would be elected as the senator from Santiago. When he emerged from ninety-five days in the Santiago prison, streets were jammed with his faithful supporters, patiently waiting to wish their hero well. The next day the government announced the results of the election which gave Grove a 4,000 vote majority over the Conservative-Liberal candidate.

Grove and some of his ardent supporters attempted to turn the victory into a miraculous feat, and the new senator sincerely believed that he had accomplished the near impossible. But the victory was not a personal Grove conquest. It was rather a triumph for the nascent socialist party of Chile. Under political fire the various groups remained solidly together in support of one candidate, with

15 "Grove salio anoche en libertad," La Opinión, April 8, 1934.
16 "Grove es Senador," La Opinión, April 9, 1934. The government later altered these figures to give Grove better than 9,000 votes more than his closest opponent.
the result that their candidate won easily over a formidable adversary. It is quite likely that any candidate named by the Socialist Party would have won the election, even a less popular and colorful candidate than Marmaduke Grove. In any event, the election assured the Socialist Party of subsequent successes and it pushed Grove to the forefront of the party where he would remain for almost a decade.

Once elected Senator Grove made preparation for his first speech to the Senate. For weeks prior to the occasion, rumors circulated throughout Santiago that the old revolutionary planned to make some startling revelations in his initial address. Finally, on May 23, Grove stood before his peers and presented his first speech. He opened his remarks with a tribute to Eugenio Matte, followed by the modest comment that it would be difficult for him to fill the seat left vacant by the leader of NAP. Before moving into a discussion of the development of the Socialist Party, Grove told his audience that for years he had been falsely accused of crimes against the state, but now he had the opportunity to answer all charges and to put the record in order before the public. Grove also took the opportunity to
trace his role in Chilean politics from the revolution of 1924 through the Socialist Republic. In the course of this perusal of the past, he accused Bravo of keeping the 4,000 pounds he gave him in Buenos Aires in 1929 for the movement against Ibanez. In addition, Grove accused Arturo Alessandri of complicity in the movement that finally destroyed Ibanez; of attempting to gain political advantage from Montero's dying administration; and of manipulating the downfall of Grove and Matte on June 16, 1932. Bravo interrupted as did Fernando Alessandri, a son of the President, who had only recently been elected to the Senate, to protest the attack on the President. The gallery, however, was almost completely in support of Grove and shouts and jeers broke out when any opposition candidates attempted to interrupt the socialist senator.

A reporter covering Grove's speech related that the chamber filled with emotion and anticipation shortly before Grove's address. Grove read his speech in dull monotones without any hint of "oratorical affectation" or without any recognizable oratorical skill. Grove

17 "Grove, habla pro primera vez en el Senado," Hoy, May 25, 1924, CXXXI, 12.
never possessed the emotional speaking style attributed by North Americans to Latin American politicians. Marmaduke usually read his speeches in a calm, quiet manner; yet he could stir a crowd as much as any shouting demagogue. It may have been his colorful past that excited his listeners, or perhaps they became excited not at the manner in which he delivered his speeches but because of their content. Certainly, his sincerity helped make his speeches more effective, but even with significant material and a sincere delivery, Grove could never compete with Arturo Alessandri on the speaking platform.

After hurling accusations at Bravo and Alessandri, Grove moved to the socialist program, but he discussed this mostly in generalities, failing to present a clear-cut declaration of socialist plans for the future. He spoke optimistically of the future of socialism in Chile, pointing out that as long as free, democratic elections could be held, socialist candidates would be elected and their number and influence would inevitably grow. Amid cheers from the gallery and a modest applause from
two or three senators on the floor, Grove continued:

Many Chileans await these words and to them I direct myself with serenity and with integral confidence in the destiny of socialism and of the Chilena nation. It has been said that I represent nothing, that I have no program that I am deceived, and that behind me there is no organization. But these people have eyes and do not see, ears and do not hear.

Socialism has men and it exhibits a program. I hope, in the near future, to make known many of its principles and its most vigorous aspects. Socialism does not constitute a disorganized and destructive force as some voices have said. It is an organized force and it aspires to a profound and revolutionary transformation in our economic and political life....

Our mercenary enemies present us as destroyers but never have they bothered to check the socialist program or the declarations of its most distinguished persons. The fact that a party is revolutionary does not mean that this concept should be confused with simple and sterile destruction. The great English writer, H. G. Wells, says, to this respect..."Social revolutionary outbursts are not the result of conspiracies but they are the symptoms of a social infirmity." They are not causes, but effects. This, continued Grove can apply to Chile. 18

Grove later declared that the Socialist Party had no designs on the government and no wish to launch a violent attack on the Alessandri administration.

A journalist emphasized this part of Grove's speech and commended him for it. While there must be opposition to an administration, it should find expression in constitutional, democratic processes, and not in violent revolution, wrote the journalist. Since Grove, "the leader of Chilean Socialism" went on record with these principles he should 19 be congratulated on his enlightened political philosophy. Few critiques of Grove's speech found even one sentence to praise. The majority of the Santiago press completely ignored it; only a few reformist papers commented on it, and for political reasons their comments were kind.

Meanwhile, the senators alluded to in Grove's speech demanded the floor on subsequent days to answer the socialist senator. Enrique Bravo, one-time friend of Grove declared that all the money Grove gave him went into anti-Ibanez movement in 1929 and 1930. He then attacked Grove on the grounds that he was a opportunist who changed his political philosophy with each changing wind in hopes of gaining power. The conservative senator, Rafael Luis Gumucio next took the

19 "Una declaración que nuestras hombres de trabajo deben recojer," Precios, May 28, 1934.
floor and in a witty and erudite manner he shattered
Grove's contentions, sentence by sentence. In conclusion,
Gumucio told a story of a future event. In the center of
Santiago, he stated, an old man would buy some wafers from
a street peddler and give them to two young boys. One boy
would then say to the other, "This old man is Grove, who
once made revolutions." In this fashion Gumucio wanted to
make it clear that Grove would never be remembered for any
legislative accomplishment but rather for his revolutionary
activity. Strangely enough the year chosen for Gumucio's
little story, 1954, was the year of Grove's death!

From the 1934 session of congress, Grove and the
Socialist party grew in influence. Grove, always
striving to unite all the groups left of center into
one powerful force, organized Block of the Left in
Congress, just as Conservative, Liberals, and some
Radicals had earlier banded together in the Block
of the Right. But the Block of the Left was not
successful. The Radicals remained outside as did
the communists and the Democrats. As a result the

20
Rafael Luis Gumucio, Senate Record, May 28, 1934,
Ordinary Session, 1934, I. 127.
Block was composed only of socialists and mavericks from the other left-wing parties. Nevertheless, the idea spread and eventually grew into the Chilean Popular Front.

In the Senate Grove had little success in pushing across any reform measures. Most senators regarded him as an irresponsible revolutionary, and any proposal he made received only the support of those men who belonged to the Block of the Left; and even they would sometimes balk at Grove-inspired legislation. No plan proposed by Grove ever won approval in Congress but he did succeed in turning attention upon many injustices, social and economic as well as political, that existed in Chile. He constantly harangued the various ministries, especially the Ministry of Interior, pointing out slums; rental property that did not meet hygenic requirements, but which brought its owner high rents; and, what he considered, injustices in the pension plan for public employees. Grove's major struggle, however, did not directly concern the urban areas, but, instead dealt with the problem of agrarian lands and agricultural workers.
In his maiden speech in the Senate Grove flatly stated: "The agrarian problem is the touchstone of future social struggles...." Six months later Grove presented a socialist plan to bolster the Chilean economy. The heart of this plan dealt with wheat and the hardships a decline in the price of this crop caused the rural population, a decrease that never found its way to the urban purchaser of bread and other wheat products. Grove's solution to this problem involved the creation of a government Administrative Department for Wheat Control (Dirección General de Trigo). This office would be empowered to purchase the entire wheat crop produced by Chile, eliminating all private buyers from competition. A predetermined price would be paid for the crop, and a price would also be fixed beforehand for the sale of wheat. The same office would expropriate all flour mills. It would then be able to control the production of flour. Finally the department would expropriate all bakeries in order that it would control wheat production from the time of harvest to the

21 Grove, speech of May 23, 1934, Senate Record, Ordinary Session 1934, I, 160.
time of its sale in the form of bread and other baked goods.

Later Grove carried his concern for Chilean agricultural to the point that he drafted and presented to the Senate an agrarian reform law. Before reading his bill Grove discussed the agricultural problem that beset Chile during the second Alessandri administration. He noted that at that time there existed in Chile 187,264 agricultural properties composed of 25,091,493 hectares valued at 6,324,965,423 pesos. Of the total 17,028,757 hectares were owned by 1,464 large landholders. Among these 1,464 owners 626 owned 11,486,409 hectares, almost half of the arable land in Chile. The remaining 185,800 landholders had to be content with only 8,062,735 hectares. For Grove this was a "truly monstrous" situation for a civilized nation living in the twentieth century.

Equally "monstrous" for Grove was the manner in which the owners evaluated their properties. The small landholders, those with less than five hectares, valued

---

23 Grove, speech of August 29, 1939, Senate Record, Ordinary Session 1939, II, 1715-17.
their property at 2,601 pesos per five hectare unit; the owners of farms of from five to twenty hectares fixed their evaluation at 871 pesos; and the 626 proprietors of farms of more than 5,000 hectares assigned a value of only seventy-five pesos per unit to their property. Obviously such evaluations were absurd, and the latifundistas evaluated their property so low only to avoid paying taxes to the government. Thus, not only did the large landholders fail to exploit their lands to the fullest but, at the same time, they cheated the government out of badly needed tax revenue.

To correct the evils of the hacienda system, Grove developed a three phase plan for agricultural reform. First, no owner who was capable of working the land would be permitted to rent his lands for an income. Second, the government would have the authority to expropriate all agricultural land that owners did not place under cultivation. Finally, the great haciendas would be subdivided so that "the land will be exploited by working men" whose labor would enable

---

24 Grove, speech of August 29, 1939, Senate Record, Ordinary Session, 1939, II, 1717.
the land to "fulfill its mission." The draft law contained some fourteen articles to insure that the three phases would be carried out quickly and efficiently. But, the Senate wanted agrarian reform law at that time, and Grove's bill came before the senate for a vote. Out of this proposal, however, Grove found a slogan that aided him and his supporters in subsequent elections: "No land without men, no men without land." Yet slogans alone did not win elections, nor did they hold political parties with divergent principles together in a close coalition. Only clever leadership and an appealing program could accomplish these ends, and for the last years of the 1930's the Socialist party had the leadership to hold the various groups within the party in line and to increase the party's seats in congress.

Through the first years of the Socialist party of Chile only minor disagreements arose among the many factions, the most important of which were one that favored revolution while another favored a more

---

25

Grove, speech of August 29, 1939, Senate Record, Ordinary Session 1939, II, 1724.
cautious, evolutionary approach. These problems faded before the threat of the conservative forces of the country and the hope that a unified socialist party might become a powerful force in Chilean politics. With Schnake as Secretary General of the party and with Grove and Eugenio Gonzalez working tirelessly to keep the coalition together, the party managed to survive government harassment and strife within the party to emerge from the 1936 general elections with eighteen deputies and four senators in the national congress. On the surface socialism seemed to be growing by leaps and bounds. Unfortunately for the Party doctrinal strife, began to emerge as early as 1937, less than four years after the creation of the party. The previous year at the Third General Congress of the socialist party 200 delegates proclaimed Grove the Party's candidate for president in the next general election in 1938. Representatives from the Democratic Party, the Communist Party, and the Stalinist Communist Party attended this Socialist congress, and all voiced their approval at the Grove nomination. In the last session of the congress 2,000 workers entered the
meeting hall at the invitation of the Socialist party and showed their approval of the Grove nomination by a wild demonstration in honor of the Party's presidential nominee.

In 1937, at the Fourth Party Congress held in Talca early in May, party members proclaimed Grove "Maximum Leader of the Workers of Chile." The Congress also approved the year-old nomination of Grove for the presidency and laid groundwork for a platform on which Grove and other socialist candidates could run. All parties and groups in the Front were invited to prepare a platform over these fundamental points:

a. Realization of an effective democratic regime, and amnesty to those exonerated.
b. Organization of a directed economic plan.
c. Recovery, for the country, of the utilities from the great foreign businesses, which exploit national wealth.
d. Effective colonization, protection to the small farmer, incorporation of new lands to agricultural production, and suppression of the latifundio.
e. Readjustment of money, prices, and salaries.
f. Integral solution of the problem of subsistence.
g. Reform and simplification of the tributary procedure.
h. Reform of social legislation and integral fulfillment of it.
i. Education under the control and direction of the State.

As if to seal Grove's nomination, this Congress, as had its predecessor, ended with a proclamation of Grove's candidacy, and once again he accepted the nomination.

Meanwhile, the Minister of Hacienda, and Alessandri became involved in a power struggle in which Alessandri solicited Radical party support. To insure this support Alessandri called upon a Radical, Pedro Aguirre Cerda to form a new cabinet. While Gustavo Ross retained his post as Minister of Hacienda, he no longer posed a threat to Alessandri. Aguirre asked the Socialists to participate in his cabinet, and Oscar Schnake accepted the Ministry of Development. With Schnake in the government a new Secretary General of the party had to be chosen, and this choice fell upon Grove who immediately assumed office. With the presidential nomination and the election to the Secretary General's office, Grove became the most important man in the Socialist party, surpassing Oscar Schnake who had lost a senatorial election.

---

in 1935 and who had been exiled for a few months by the Alessandri government that same year. Grove leaped into his new duties as leader of the Party with a great deal of enthusiasm. In the 1937 elections he traveled throughout the country stumping for socialist and Popular Front candidates. Although he had opponents within his party, none ever denied that Grove was a tireless campaigner, not only for himself but also for all socialist and Frontist candidates.

During Alessandri’s second administration the Conservative Liberal coalition dominated the government, with some responsible posts allotted to the Radical Party. The Radicals, however, felt that their growing numbers entitled them to more voice in the government than the Conservative and Liberal parties, both of which continued to decline in numerical strength. Alessandri, nevertheless, sought to decrease Radical participation in his administration rather than to grant more influence to this predominantly middle class party. The second most important individual in the Partido Socialista, Grove a la presidencia, p. 6.
government, the Minister of Hacienda--Gustavo Ross--wanted to eliminate the Radicals altogether because he feared that they espoused a program too far left of center to be "safe."

Thus, midway through Alessandri's term, Radical leadership decided to try to gain power the only way possible--through cooperation with the left-wing parties. In 1936 the Radical hierarchy approached the Communists, Socialist, and Democrats, along with some fraternal organizations and labor unions, with the idea of a coalition resembling that which had been arranged in Spain and France and called, in both countries, the Popular Front. Fortunately for the Radicals, Moscow called for the cooperation of its Communist parties with other reform groups at this time, a reversal of earlier policy. It came at just the proper time for the Frontist movement in Chile. The Democrats also consented to join, realizing that alone they had little strength but allied with other parties they might emerge victorious and thereby gain more posts in the cabinet. With the three parties in agreement, the only major left-of-center party outside the coalition was the
socialists. At first the socialist leadership refused to join on the grounds that the Block of the Left performed the very same function and that the parties in the Front should join the Block and forget about European Popular Front ideas. Still, the Front was a more binding coalition than the Block, and the potential of a union of parties was limitless. Then, too, Grove favored almost any unifying proposal. With the combination of four small parties he had witnessed the phenomenal growth of the Socialist Party of Chile. He saw somewhat the same kind of result from the Block of the Left, again a cooperative force, mainly for voting purposes in congress. The new Frontist proposal would create a more powerful coalition that would present a common platform and common candidates who would be selected at a giant convention. All in all, if the proposal proved successful, the Popular Front could defeat any Liberal-Conservative candidate.

It is not surprising that Grove hesitated when the Radicals asked the Socialists to join. Grove, of all reform personalities had the most to lose. He had been chosen as presidential candidate of his party, but
he had no assurance that the Front would agree to follow
the dictates of the Socialist party and nominate him. In
fact, since the Radicals led the movement, it would seem
fair to assume that they had one of their own number in
mind for the presidency and that they would attempt to gain
Frontist support for him, rather than agree to Grove's
candidacy. Still, with only socialist support, Grove had
no hope of defeating a Conservative-Liberal candidate, and
there was always the outside chance that the Front would
support him and thereby enhance the possibility of a Grove
victory. Grove chose to gamble, or perhaps he submerged
his won ambitions and led his party into the Popular
Front hopeful that the program of social and economic
reform espoused by reform elements would be carried out
under a Frontist regime. Whatever his motives, after
some hesitation, Grove spoke out for socialist acceptance
of the Front. Finally, in 1936, the Socialist party
joined the Popular Front.

Each party of the Popular Front named its nominees
for the presidential election of 1938. The socialists

29 Senator Azocar, speech of August 19, 1942, Senate
Record, Ordinary Session, 1942, III, 1475.
had already nominated Grove, and late in 1937, the Radical party with Gabriel Gonzalez Videla presiding unanimously nominated Pedro Aguirre Cerda. The Democrats selected Juan Pradenas as their standard bearer; the Communists chose Elias Lafertte.

On April 15, 1938, six months before the election, the Popular Front met in convention to select their candidates. In the balloting the Radical party had 400 votes; the Socialists, 330; the Democrats, 120; the Communists, 120; and the Confederacion Trabajadores de Chile (C.T.Ch.), 60 for a total of 1030 votes. Convention rules set the requirement for nomination at two-thirds of 686 votes. The rules also stated that the sixth ballot would include only the top three candidates, and the seventh ballot would list only the top two candidates. The two remaining candidates would then be presented on each subsequent ballot until one acquired the two-thirds majority.

The first day of the convention the delegates

30 "La Junta central radical por unanimidad proclamó candidato del partido a la presidencia de Chile al señor Pedro Aguirre Cera," La Hora, December 22, 1932.

31 La Opinión, April 16, 1938, p. 1.
voted to begin balloting for the selection of a presidential candidate. On the first ballot Aguirre received all 400 Radical votes but none from the other parties. Grove gained the 330 Socialist votes along with 32 from the C.T.Ch. Lafertte picked up the 120 Communist votes and 28 from the C.T.Ch. while Juan Pradenas received all 120 Democratic votes. The next four ballots remained the same with the exception of two C.T.Ch. votes that changed from Grove to Lafertte. After the fifth ballot Pradenas, the lowest candidate, fell from contention and the 120 Democratic votes abstained. On the sixth ballot, Lafertte had the fewest votes of the three remaining candidates, leading the balloting committee to drop his name from the seventh ballot. On the seventh and last ballot for the day the Communists joined the Democrats in abstention and the convention remained deadlocked between Aguirre with 400 votes and Grove with 360.

On the second day the balloting remained the same through seven rounds. The only change came when the Radicals attempted to gain the nomination with another candidate, Juan Antonio Rios. The other parties continued

La Opinión, April 16, 1938, p. 1.
to vote as they had the first day, and the balloting ended. In the afternoon the third round of balloting began with Aguirre once again the Radical candidate. On the first ballot of the third round the Democrats changed their vote from an abstention to full support of Aguirre, making his total 520 to Grove's 360. The Communists, however, held their vote, and on the second ballot the deadlock continued.

On the third day the delegates took their seats for another round of balloting with the outlook far from encouraging. Rumors circulated that perhaps two candidates would received Popular Front support, and the opposition took heart. Any attempt to support two presidential candidates meant that the Conservative-Liberal candidate would probably win the election. In addition, such action would mean the end of the Popular Front. Before any voting could take place on the third day, Grove, flanked by Oscar Schnake and Eugenio Gonzalez, marched down the center aisle of the theater to the speakers rostrum. The hall suddenly became quiet as the delegates realized that Grove would speak to them
before the balloting began. In his dull, quiet voice—perhaps more quiet this day than ever before—Grove read from a prepared speech:

I arrived at this convention as a candidate of the Socialist Party and of the working classes, animated by the firmist Frontist spirit, and with the secure hope of meeting in the parties of popular extraction the same welcome that the middle and working classes of the country have always expressed for me.

The development of voting has demonstrated that such a unified democracy as the Communist Party has not given to me the support for which the Socialist Party hoped.

The Socialist Party has 360 votes that are the key to the convention, without which no one can obtain the designation of presidential candidate.

Today the Socialists want to demonstrate to the country the true spirit of unity that animates us; we want to demonstrate loyalty to our convictions and to our political line, and above all, our absolute loyalty to the people.

For these reasons we solemnly declare in this great assembly that my party and me renounce my candidacy to the Presidency of the Republic and we present the loyal and sincere assistance of the Socialist Party for the triumph of the candidacy of Citizen Pedro Aguirre Cerda. Thus, we give to the Left in Chile the unity and cohesion that it needs today more than ever before. 33

---

33 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, Speech withdrawing from the presidential nomination at the Popular Front convention, April 18, 1938. Reprinted in Claridad, April 18, 1938, p. 1.
The withdrawal of Grove from the race left a deadly silence in the theater for a few seconds. Then pandemonium broke loose, as delegates grasped the significance of the short speech they had heard. The Radicals snake danced and sang in a victory demonstration while the socialists, many with tears in their eyes, cheered their leader who stepped aside in order to preserve the Chilean Popular Front. The decision to defer to Aguirre was Grove's and not the party's. Up to the moment the reformist press believed that Grove would emerge victorious from the convention. For some he was a sentimental favorite because of the 4 June movement, but the more practical, hard headed journalists also chose him as the strongest candidate the Front could select. Since Grove had a far greater appeal than Aguirre among the workers of Chile, with Radical support he would have had little trouble with Gustavo Ross, the Conservative candidate. But, the majority of Radicals would never have supported Grove even if he had won on the first ballot. In such a situation they would have bolted the Popular Front, destroying it in the process and gone over to support
Carlos Ibáñez del Campo. Grove recognized this, and undoubtedly it played a part in his decision to concede to Aguirre. The most bitter disappointment of the whole convention was the failure of the Communists to come over to Grove after the delegates eliminated their candidate.

There are probably two major reasons for the Communist decision to abstain. The first is that the Communists did not want the Popular Front to be responsible for too many social improvements, thereby undercutting the Communist program. Therefore, they chose to let the Radicals, a party closer to the Right win over the Socialists who competed with the Communists for votes from the same stratum of society. A second reason for non-supporting Grove was the fear among Communist leaders that he was already too popular among the workers, and would, if nominated, increase his popularity at the expense of the Communists, an event which the Reds would go to any lengths to avoid.

34 Tancredo Prnochét, "Grove e Ibáñez," Asies, May 4, 1938.
Immediately after Grove's withdrawal the convention unanimously named him President of the Popular Front.

Taking his new appointment seriously, Grove took Aguirre in hand and led him throughout the country stumping the countryside for votes. Aguirre wanted to concentrate on the large city vote in the central valley, but Grove forced him to travel from Arica to Punta Arenas, stopping off at areas that could be reached only by muleback. Aguirre grumbled, but permitted Grove to set the itinerary. At one scheduled tour through the northern mining area, Aguirre tried to cancel the campaign swing because of a small-pox epidemic that had broken out. Grove, however, refused to post-pone the trip, and finally Aguirre consented to go into the north or schedule, and act of courage that did not go unnoticed among the voting public. Neither did the fact that Grove worked so closely with Aguirre go unnoticed, especially among journalists and cartoonists. One cartoon picture had an orchestra leader with a baton standing before a group of working men. Baton held high the conductor recited "Viva Aguirre Cerda" but the men chanted "Viva Grove."

As Tancredo Pinochet put it, Grove was the banner, the

---

Asies, May 12, 1938, p. 1.
symbol for the workers and the botes they cast for Aguirre 37 were in reality votes for Grove.

When the campaign finally came to a close in October, the Frontist leaders felt confident that Aguirre would defeat Ross and that the Popular Front slate in general would make inroads on the Conservative-Liberal coalition. The greatest fear was not the election but that Alessandri and Ross might not permit a free election and use the Republican Militia to stage a golpe to seize power. The government, however, permitted the voting to take place, and on October 26, the results showed that Aguirre polled 38 220,000 votes to 213,521 for Ross. Now rumors traveled throughout the capital that the government would void the election and install Ross as president rather than permit Aguirre to take office. All those fears proved false, but the reason for their persistence can be found in the nature of the second Alessandri administration, during which the government condoned acts of violence against news media and politicians, as well as permitting the presence of the Republican Militia.

37 Asies, May 13, 1938.
38 La Opinión, October 26, 1938.
CHAPTER VIII

ATTEMPTS BY THE CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL COALITION TO PREVENT THE RISE OF REFORM PARTIES

When Alessandri assumed presidential authority in late 1932, Chile still suffered from economic depression. Not only did she have a difficult time finding markets for her major exports, but foreign investors did not wish to chance investing capital in a nation in which political anarchy had been the rule for eight years. In addition, the peso dropped in value, adding yet another burden to troubles of the majority of Chileans. Throughout 1933 and 1934 the situation remained much the same. Speaking on the proposed 1935 budget, Grove noted that inflation diminished the acquisitive power of the Chilean worker, while the taxation burden, in form of indirect taxes, fell most heavily upon this same group. The Alessandri administration wanted to increase the budget, but Grove and a small minority of other senators argued against the administration’s proposal. Citing past figures, Grove pointed out that the allocation for public instruction in the 1933
budget amounted to 154 million pesos; in 1934, 160 million pesos; and the proposed budget called for 166 million pesos. The educational system thus received an increase of 6 million pesos a year under the Alessandri administration. At the same time, the allocation for the Ministry of Interior and Justice rose by some 11 million pesos a year in the same period. This money went to the carabineros, government detectives, and prisons, three areas that received fifteen percent of the total national budget. Grove deplored this state of affairs in a nation of over four million in which forty-eight percent were illiterate and another fifty percent found it difficult to read and write.

The situation, however, was not as bleak as Grove painted it. While the increase in spending for law enforcement agencies amounted to more than the increase in funds for educational purposes, the total amount spent for education surpassed that used by the various police agencies by some seven million pesos. Certainly the ratio should have been far greater in favor of public instruction, but at this point in the Alessandri

---

1 Speech by Marmaduke Grove, November 26, 1934, Senate Record, Extraordinary Session, 1934-35, I, 695.
administration the possibility of a rebellion remained high, and the president wanted to serve out his full term, thereby demonstrating to the people and to the outside world that the period of military anarchy in Chile had ended. Confidence in the government had to be restored if the interlude of military anarchy were to be ended. This was the hope of the Alessandri government and the police forces of the nation had to remain strong to discourage any possible revolution. Fortunately for the government, the 1935 budget passed congress despite opposition by Grove and a few Radical senators.

Not only did Alessandri keep his police well equipped and strong in numbers, but he also used them at times to intimidate opposition. Early in 1935 railroad workers went on strike for higher wages. The government declared that they had no right to strike because without the railroads, transportation throughout the nation came to a halt, disrupting the entire economy. The opposition, however, declared: "The worker who works always has the right to strike....when his petitions... are not acted upon by the government, which has the
responsibility of maintaining order and the well being of the citizens." The government used the same argument—that of maintaining order—to justify action taken to end the strike. Government police apprehended and detained leaders of the strike in an attempt to force the workers to return to work. In addition, the government threatened the use of carabineros if the strike did not end quickly. Faced with the threat of violence, the workers capitulated and returned to their jobs.

The problem remained unsolved, however, and later in the year the railroadmen again struck. Alessandri accused the Communists and Socialists of fomenting the strike and used the event as an excuse to close congress and declare a state of siege. But the Strike only served as partial justification for the government's three-month state of siege. At the same time Alessandri declared that communist activity threatened the government and the three month period of virtual dictatorship was needed to ferret out the Communist plotters and put an end to their revolutionary schemes. At the time Alessandri indicated:

"The State of Siege was not dictated in order to impede criticism of the government...." Yet only hours after Alessandri declared martial law the editors of the periodical Hoy and the newspaper La Hora found themselves in the custody of government police bound for exile. The editor of La Opinion closed his newspaper for three months to avoid similar treatment. During the same period, government police arrested and exiled twenty journalists from the opposition press. In addition, more than one hundred persons fell victim to the police roundup which led to imprisonment and exile.

This was but one instance in which the administration resorted to the use of extraordinary faculties to suspend congress and eliminate on the opposition. Only four months after Alessandri took office, congress approved first law of extraordinary faculties which lasted for six months. This law granted the president power to promulgate Decree Laws without consultation or approval of Congress. In this period the government arrested 114 persons. The editor of Hoy also received his first

taste of exile. When the six months ended, the people enjoyed one month and eighteen days of constitutional rule before December 15, 1933 when a second series of restrictions passed congress. Again the police went to work rounding up the opposition and muzzling the press. This second period lasted for seven months; then a year and a half passed before another three-month state of siege early in 1936.

With constitutional guarantees suspended for more than a year and a half out of the first three years of the Alessandri administration, both public opinion and congress tired of the practice, and the government stopped using this means to "protect" itself. Yet even while the constitution was in force, the government managed to thwart the press criticism of the government. On one occasion special agents attacked the offices and plant of the newspaper La Opinion. The intruders smashed presses and destroyed furniture and equipment. Later the government confiscated issue number 285 of Topaze, the weekly satirical magazine, for printing a caricature of Alessandri. When the editors

of the magazine took the case to court, a judgement ordered the police to return the magazine to the editors since confiscation in this instance was illegal. The government returned the entire issue to the offices of the periodical; from here it was to be distributed the following day. That night, however, "thieves" broke into the offices of Topaze, carried off the entire edition, and burned it. While, the culprits could never be found, few people doubted that the order for the destruction of issue number 285 came directly from Alessandri at the Moneda.

Alessandri refused to tolerate any criticism either in the press or on the floor of congress. When the reformist congressmen became too vociferous in their criticism of the government, the president embarked upon a Communist scare program. In 1936 he claimed to have in his possession Communist documents that proved beyond doubt that Communism threatened Chile. As a result Alessandri asked for what proved to be his final law of extraordinary faculties. In attempting to block the government's request Grove denied that any such documents existed, and he

---

5 Donoso, Alessandri, Agitador y Demoledor, II, 227-28
challenged Alessandri to produce these documents and turn them over to the Ministry of Justice so that appropriate action might be taken. Meanwhile, the government press attacked Grove, the Socialists, and the Communists, stating that party leaders received pay, in gold, directly from Moscow, and that they worked to foment social disorder and stir up the army. Grove argued that all these charges were ridiculous but if Alessandri continued to use dictational methods and force on the people, than a violent revolution might well occur. The government used Grove's words for its own ends and held the speech before congress as proof of impending revolution. In the quotation used, the government altered the conditional tenor of Grove's statement so that it appeared as a statement of fact that the Socialists were prepared to use force to gain power. With this altered evidence congress granted Alessandri his three-month state of siege.

In addition to derogatory statements from the


7 "Grove explica el origen de algunos acontecimientos ...." Hoy, No. 223, February 26, 1936, p. 10.
government press and the Moneda, police harassment aggra-
vated the members of the Socialist party. At almost every
meeting held by the party government, police appeared on
the scene to try to break up the gathering. Grove claimed
that the evening meetings held by the party were designed
to give workers cultural instructions. University profes-
sors and public school teachers donated their time to
instruct the workers in various subjects. Such meetings
never became unruly nor did the participants even discuss
political matters. Yet, the government continued to annoy
the party leadership by sending agents to disrupt these
peaceful meetings.

Of even greater concern for the Socialist party was
the existence of the Republican Militia and the rapid
growth of a Chilean Nazi party. A group of wealthy con-
servative youth established the Republican Militia during
the years of military anarchy prior to the Alessandri
administration. During the Ibáñez' and Montero admin-
istrations the Militia never gained enough strength to
become a factor in national politics. After Alessandri

8

Speech by Marmaduke Grove, July 2, 1935, Senate
Record, Ordinary Session, 1935, I, 666.
took office, however, the group acted openly and enjoyed a rapid growth. Nine months after Alessandri entered the Moneda an enormous mass meeting took place at Conchali, near Santiago. In this training exercise regiments from the various provinces traveled for miles to take part. Few concrete statistics exist concerning the militia; its affairs were grounds for short news articles. When a hand grenade injured an officer a small story appeared in the government press in which some facts came to light. Some forty grenades exploded before the one that injured the officer. The officer was then taken to the hospital in an ambulance belonging to the Republican Militia. From this and similar short articles the Militia appeared to be reasonably large with a large supply of rifles, machine guns, grenades, and ammunition. The Militia operated much the same as the army with gradations in rank among both the officers and the enlisted men. Its leaders planned their military exercises well pointing up the fact that some military officers probably took part in the movement.

The fact that such an organization could exist

---

without arousing public opinion or opposition among army officers demonstrates quite plainly that the years of military anarchy had taken a heavy toll from the officer corps. Tired of military meddling in politics the majority of officers wished to remain aloof from political struggles and concentrate on their careers as professional soldiers. In the public mind the officers had fallen so low in esteem that the idea of a Militia, as a countervailing force, met with wide approval.

Although at first not a political force, the Militia, since it aimed to preserve the government, became as conservative as the government it defended. As a result the Militia also became an avowed enemy of the reformist parties and groups, threatening them with violence should they oppose Alessandri and his government. When a bomb exploded at the house of the Commander of the Militia in 1934, threats of vengeance went out to seven reformist senators, two deputies, and five other known reformers. If further bombings occurred these men would face

---

Donoso, Desarrollo político y social de Chile desde la Constitucion de 1833, p. 145.
the consequences of vengeful Militia punishment.

The second threat to Grove and the Socialist party was the National Socialist movement in Chile. An outgrowth of the German Nazi movement, the Chilean Nazi's grew quickly in the mid-1930's. Not only did the membership increase in this period but enough funds became available for the establishment of a daily newspaper Trabajo, that published the party line for the faithful. The Nazis', like the Republican Militia, although on a much smaller scale were capable of armed violence. The uniform of the party included a pistol, which was used on several occasions. In 1934 the Nazis assaulted a group of socialists at the Iris theater in Santiago after which one man died. A year later in Concepcion "the Nazis displayed every class of activity and one of the members of our party, Senor Bastidas, was cowardly murdered in his own home." Later, in Valparaiso Socialists who sold the party newspaper, Consigna, on the street were badly beaten by the Nazis. As a result of this attack Grove

condemned the National Socialist movement in Chile and asked that his Socialist companions be granted protection while selling their newspapers. He could not understand why the police had not attempted to solve the murders and beatings perpetrated by the Nazis, and he asked that the government take prompt action against these culprits.

Late in 1936 either the Republican Militia or the Nazis attempted to assassinate Marmaduke Grove. At 1:30 in the morning of December 27, Grove arrived at his home. He parked his old, battered Ford coupe in the garage and walked to the front of the house at a leisurely pace contemplating the stars, one of his hobbies. Just as he inserted the key in the lock, a shot rang out, and a bullet crashed into the concrete wall of Grove's home. Grove pressed himself close to the wall of the arch nearest the gunman as another shot came from the garden of the house next door. Meanwhile, Grove took out his own pistol and fired once in the direction of the gunfire. He opened the door and stepped inside just as a third bullet struck the door frame. Marmaduke went to a window in time to see a

---

12 Speech by Marmaduke Grove, June 15, 1936, Senate Record, Ordinary Session, 1936, I, 386-90.
man run down the street. A carabinero, on duty in the area, saw the man with a pistol in his hand and he gave chase. When the gunman arrived in the vicinity of the Netherland Legation a second carabinero challenged him. Without hesitation Grove's assailant shot the carabinero. By this time other members of the police force had joined in the chase and trapped the man near the German Legation. Rather than surrender the gunman shot himself in the throat.

Neither the carabinero nor the gunman, Alberto Azocar Flores, died from the wounds they received. Azocar was a well-dressed man of fifty-six who had been a member of the carabineros until 1933 when his superior officer discharged him for bad conduct. From that time until the assault on Grove, Azocar worked for a construction company. Police found papers on his body which stated that he had paid dues in the Democratic party and that he

13

"Intentaron ayer asesinar a Grove," La Opinion, December 28, 1936. The government and conservative press carried the story as an attack on a police officer and only incidentally mentioned that Senator Grove had been fired upon.
had recently made application for reinstatement in the 14
carabineros.

Police questioned Azocar but he refused to divulge much information. He did state that he had been drinking for three days prior to the shooting and that he did not know Grove personally but that hey had some mutual friends. Observers believed that Azocar merely carried out orders from another man or group of men, probably either Nazis or the Republican Militia who had been involved in clashes of violence with members of the reform parties at this time. He was a poor man, yet he carried a Smith and Wesson revolver that in Chile sold for 1,200 or 1,500 15 pesos. The true facts behind the mystery never came to light; Azocar never revealed anything that would clarify the events of the night of the shooting. Later, police released Azocar for lack of evidence and a short time later some citizens found his body floating in the San Carlos canal in Santiago.

With the various armed groups in perpetual combat

14 "Intentaron ayer a sesinar a Grove," La Opinión
December 28, 1936, p. 2.
15 Senate Report, Ordinary Session, 1939, I, 295.
in Chile, it is not surprising that Alessandri tried to keep his police force strong and the legislature out of session. In this way he could develop his defensive plans without the time consuming indecision of parliamentary debate. In his drive to establish civil authority in Chile Alessandri received an invaluable assist from an upsurge in Chilean trade. With sales of nitrate and copper on the rise jobs became available for the unemployed. This class had become bitter with their poverty, and with time hanging heavily upon them, had supported such illegal and unconstitutional acts as the establishment of the Socialist Republic by military golpe de estado. Once back at work this labor force, while still overwhelmingly left-of-center in their politics, could, nevertheless, respect the Alessandri administration because it was a government that came to power in a democratic election. These same men could now understand that military intervention in government was an illegal and dangerous practice no matter what the ultimate aim of the revolutionary leadership. Citizens now looked askance at the military and the officer corps realized that so long as the majority of the population worked and earned a living, no matter how humble,
civilians would not support military uprisings, as they had in 1932.

Another fortunate occurrence for Alessandri was his choice of Gustavo Ross Santa Maria to be his Minister of Hacienda. Rosss was not particularly knowledgeable concerning economics, nor did he create any new and exciting economic plans to restore the Chilean economy after the depression. He was, however, a financier who fully understood the practical financial world in which he worked, and he knew how to take advantage of any opportunity that might come his way. His greatest contributions to the Alessandri administration were the regulation of the foreign debt and the establishment of an orderly national budget that permitted the administration to spend money on the most necessary projects without sending the government into bankruptcy. Because of his fine work in the financial area and because he had a personality that attracted people to him, Ross soon became the second important man in the Alessandri administration. Therefore, when Alessandri looked about for a successor, his choice

---

after a lengthy period of deliberation, fell upon Ross.

As the election year of 1938 opened, Chileans looked forward to October with both hope and apprehension. They hoped that in a free, democratic election a man would be elected who would continue to govern without military interference. The people feared, however, that the Alessandri government would not permit a democratic election and that Ross would be installed as president by a golpe. The capital city became tense from the moment the press began printing articles on candidates and their activities.

On May 21, 1938 Congress opened as usual in joint session to hear the annual address of the president. When Alessandri was announced, some congressmen scrambled to get to their seats while others walked out, demonstrating their feelings toward the administration and the president. In this confusion the Nazi leader, Jorge Gonzalez von Marees, leaped into the center aisle and discharged his pistol in the air. Carabineros, assisted by some spectators, immediately apprehended Gonzalez and disarmed him. As the carabineros led Gonzalez from the hall, private citizens repeatedly struck the Nazi leader. When Alessandri
began to speak, a gigantic applause went up from the audience. Alessandri opened his speech with an apology to the diplomats present for such a "lamentable spectacle of people so poorly educated." The president then noted that he approached the end of his term and that later in the year he would turn over the government to a citizen "legally and freely elected by the people."

On the same day that Gonzalez created the disturbance in congress a bomb exploded near Alessandri as he went to the congressional building to deliver his speech. After the shot fired by Gonzalez, and the bomb incident, which Alessandri blamed on the opposition reform parties, carabineros prevented opposition congressmen from entering the congressional building; at the same time other opposition congressmen inside were prevented from leaving. After the presidential message police rounded up all opposition deputies and senators, some of whom were beaten.

---

17 Senate Reports, May 21, 1938, Ordinary Session, 1938, I, 5.
by over-zealous carabineros. The Radical deputy, Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, later president of Chile, was one of those picked up for questioning. The arresting officers dragged Gonzalez through the streets of Santiago's business district "with his collar ruffled like a criminal caught redhanded."

This action on the part of law enforcement officers led many to question the words of the President when he declared that he would guarantee the people a free, democratic election.

Early in September, with the election less than two months away, an incident occurred that doomed Ross to failure in his battle against Pedro Aguirre Cerda, the Popular Front candidate. On September 5, a group of university students, members of a Nazi youth organization staged a rebellion in Santiago. One group of forty-four men took control of the University of Chile's administration building on the main street in Santiago. Another group of more than twenty students entered the Social Security Building situated diagonally across the street from the Moneda. The plan was for these two buildings to

be used as headquarters for the revolution which would gain support from other elements until the carabineros, police, and army would have to surrender because of the superior numbers of the revolutionaries. Leaving too much to chance, the plan was doomed to failure from the beginning. Earlier rebellions had been well planned over a long period, and the leaders never began the golpe until they were absolutely certain of success. This student revolt, however, depended upon assistance from diverse elements in society. In addition, then too, the general public did not want a revolution at a time when elections were only a few weeks away.

The students who occupied the Social Security Building met with slight resistance from the carabineros when they entered the building. One carabinero, Jose Luis Salazar, chased the youths into the building but as he neared the door a bullet from one of the Nazis struck him down. He died in the street, the first and only police casualty of 20 of the entire rebellion.

"Como se desarrollaron los trágicos sucesos del 5 de Septiembre de 1938," Hoy, (Supplement) November 29, 1938, pp. 3-4. This special edition of Hoy went on sale two days before its regular edition came out. The supplement dealt exclusively with the Nazi youth rebellion in 64 pages of text and pictures.
The students in both buildings had only small arms, but they managed to keep the police from entering either building. Finally, at three in the afternoon an artillery company arrived at the university and, using a small cannon, the troops blasted the doors of the building. In the face of artillery the students surrendered to *carabineros* and police who had taken up positions outside the university. Inside the university *carabineros* shot and killed seven of the students after they surrendered. Police then marched the remaining students down the main street of the city and past Social Security Building where the other contingent of Nazis still held out on the upper floors. Police had ordered the captives taken to the offices of government detectives where they were to be questioned, but as the column marched past the Social Security Building, someone countermanded the order and police took the prisoners into the building. The reason for the change in orders was the hope that once those holding out on the top four floors of the building saw their comrades as prisoners they would surrender.

---

An employee from the offices in the Social Security Building was on the eleventh floor when the Nazi youth arrived at the building. He had taken refuge in a restroom and listened to the Nazis outside as they discussed their plan. By means of a radio they kept in contact with some other students outside the city. When the leaders discovered that the University group had surrendered, they became demoralized and talked of surrender themselves. When the building employee made his way downstairs, he heard the students shout that they had disarmed themselves and that they would surrender. Still the firing continued on the upper floors even after the Nazis capitulated.

Later, a Colonel of carabineros, Roberto Gonzalez Cifuentes, declared that General Humberto Arriagada ordered him to take charge of the carabineros in the Social Security Building. Gonzalez received orders from Arriagada to hasten the action because if the revolt had not been crushed by four o'clock artillery would bombard the building. In the face of artillery fire and with the knowledge that their comrades were prisoners, the Nazi youth surrendered.

---

22 Francisco Phillips Muller, "Dramatica declaracion ....," La Opinion, October 16, 1938, p. 3.
Colonel Gonzalez prepared his prisoners for the march to jail. Before they left the building, however, a messenger arrived from General Arriagada ordering Gonzalez to kill all the prisoners. Gonzalez ignored the order and marched his prisoners down to the second floor. Commander Pezoa met him there and presented him with a paper that read: "By order of my general and the government, it is necessary to kill them all." Gonzalez asked Arriagada to rescind the order, but the General answered that he could not, since the order did not originate with him. Thus, all but three of the revolutionaries met death at the hands of the carabineros. The three survivors lived because the cadavers of their comrades fell upon them and prevented carabinero bullets from reaching their bodies.

That night Santiago mourned the dead even though most people did not yet know who had died or what their political affiliation. The average citizen knew only that sixty students and one carabinero died as a result of an attempted revolution.

The next day when details reached the public, a great wave of disgust passed over the city. The government press announced that the carabineros had been fired upon and that the sixty students were shot in self defense. The real story quickly leaked out, however, and on September 30, President Alessandri went on the radio to present the government's position in the incident. He stated that he watched the carabinero fall dead in the street, and neither he nor anyone else knew exactly what had happened. No one could be certain of the extent of the plot. Thus, the government and its police forces took no chances with the insurgents Alessandri assumed all responsibility for the actions of the police and claimed that in the confusion and ignorance of the moment he ordered his police to fight as if it were war. Alessandri, however, did not admit that he gave the order to shoot the prisoners, only that he accepted responsibility for the actions of his police.

The radio address by Alessandri did not lessen the people's distrust of the government. Many who earlier may

have voted for Ross now would not cast a vote for any
member of a government that murdered university students.
Although Aguirre probably would have won the election
without the adverse publicity the government and Ross
received from the Seguro Obrero massacre, the Frontist
candidate, after the shootings, found himself in a much
stronger position than he earlier believed possible.

After the election, it appeared for a short time that
the worst fears of some of the Popular Front leaders would
be realized. Rumors circulated that Ross planned to use
the army to void the election results on the grounds that
voters who supported him had been kept from the polls by
force. The rumors aroused the Frontist leadership and
Aguirre called a meeting at his home to discuss measures
to head off military intervention in the election results.
Ismael Edwards who was present at this meeting suggested
that they ask the support of General Arriagada offering
him his life for his part in the massacre. A committee
visited the general, and two days later a letter appeared
in the Santiago press, which stated that Ross' charges
were unfounded and that from the first results it was
evident that Aguirre had been elected president of Chile. Arriagada closed by stating that the carabineros would not permit any attempt to alter the true aspect of the election. This action deterred Ross and his supporters from attempts to void the election and he dropped his charges that his voters had been prevented from voting. Shortly after the election Ross left the country and did not return. In keeping his bargain with the carabinero General, Aguirre, in one of his first acts as president, signed a general amnesty for all those who participated in the Seguro Obero blood bath.

Alessandri's term of office ended on a violent note, but the president kept his promise that democratic elections would be held to determine his successor. Throughout the six years of the Alessandri administration, the government had been guilty of excesses in some instances and on many occasions had withdrawn civil liberties with a dictatorial rule, but for the first time since 1920 a constitutionally elected president had served out his full term.

---

term of office, demonstrating that political stability had returned to Chile.

While the Popular Front celebrated its victory at the polls and while the Chilean people rejoiced that the election had stood without military intervention, the Socialist Party felt the first waves of discord that eventually destroyed Chile's Socialist party along with the career of one of its senators and leaders, Marmaduke Grove.
CHAPTER IX

THE END OF THE POPULAR FRONT
THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY
AND POLITICAL OBSCURETY FOR GROVE

After the 1938 election of Pedro Aguirre as president Popular Front leaders expected to inaugurate their program easily. They hoped that the spirit of unity demonstrated in the campaign and election could be continued at least until the realization of the reform program that the Front espoused. With Aguirre as leader of the Front, and with Grove as President the various parties pulled together and overlooked petty differences in the name of harmony and union. Yet, the member parties, while all left of center in their political philosophy, still remained far apart on the question of how far to go in social and political reform. The Communists represented the extreme of total socialization immediately, by force if necessary. The Socialist party sanctioned the state socialism idea of partial nationalization of industry for the present but it retained the long range aim of a completely socialized nation. The Democratic party favored government intervention
to aid labor and to assist the poor and unfortunate, but
under a free enterprise, capitalistic system. The Radicals
wished to retain the free enterprise system but they
approved of increased government activity in social and
economic areas.

In the early years of the Aguirre administration, the
conservative sectors of society struck hard at the Frontist
government in an attempt to undermine its popularity with
the people. Persistent verbal attacks served to throw the
Frontist parties together in the face of outside enemy
attacks. Aguirre, however, did very well in leading his
country. In addition to the constant criticism from con-
servatives he had to combat the debilitating effects of a
destructive earthquake and the economic disruption of
World War II. The latter, however, may have been Chile's
economic salvation since one of her major export products
was nitrate from which gun powder is made. In any case,
the economy did not sag after Aguirre's election. On the
contrary, real estate transactions rose from 26,796
properties in 1939 to 30,203 in 1940. Production increased
in all areas except coal which fell by four and one half
percent. At the same time social improvement showed up
among statistics. General pensions increased by forty-three and one half percent while industrial pensions rose 42.86%. Salaries increased by better than 42% but the cost of living climbed only 14.25%. In the field of public health the mortality rate dropped, especially hospital and infant mortality. Viewed as a whole Aguirre's administration appeared to be fulfilling its campaign promise of progress for all Chileans.

While economic and social progress increased the popularity of the administration, dissension within the Popular Front began to destroy it. In 1939 and early 1940 the Socialists and Communists quarreled over Grove's desire for close cooperation between Chile and the United States in opposition to Nazi Germany. Grove had always been an ardent admirer of the United States and England, and he believed also that all nations of the Western Hemisphere should work to prevent European or Asiatic interference on the American continent. The Communists, on the other hand, deplored any talk of cooperation with Yankee or English bankers who opposed Hitler, who in turn had a

1 G. F. Wehrhahn L. "La verdad sobre la labor gubernativa," La Hora, July 8, 1941.
treaty with the Soviet Union. After Hitler marched on Russia in June, 1940, however, this particular cause for dispute between Socialists and Communists was eliminated then, in January, 1941, a question over United States' bases on Chilean soil arose. The Communists, while now supporting any anti-German proposal, did not back a scheme that would in no way benefit the Soviet Union. Grove, on the other hand, not only spoke out in favor of "air, land, and sea bases" for the United States, but he proposed that Chile offer Washington 300,000 combat troops for use against the Axis. The proposal found few supporters, but it managed to drive the Socialists and Communists farther apart.

The points of contention between the two parties were many and varied but underlying the entire situation and at the base of all the quarrels was the fact that both parties derived support from the same economic and social group. As an opposition senator pointed out, the Socialists and Communists were almost identical in their political philosophy. Both were Marxian oriented; both

2 Speech by Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, January 15, 1941, Senate Report, Extraordinary Session, 1940-41, II, 1392-93.
supported revolution to gain the desired end, although the Socialists tended to be more patient and more reliant on evolutionary change. The one major difference was the fact that the Socialist party was a Chilean party, while the Communist party was international in nature. The parties were too much alike, and they finally split the Popular Front with their perpetual quarreling.

After months of verbal strife, the Socialist-Communist problem came to the fore in January, 1941. For some time the Socialists had threatened to withdraw from the Popular Front if the Communists were not relegated to a lesser position within that group. Finally, leaders of the Front asked the Socialist party to express itself on the rumors that it would withdraw from the reform coalition. In the same request, Juan B. Rossetti, representing the Popular Front officials, reported that the leaders of the Front agreed that the Communist party could not be expelled from that organization. In the late afternoon of January 7, the Central Committee of the Socialist party met to discuss the request of the Front. The party's Secretary

3 Speech by Senator Rivera, June 18, 1940, Senate Report, Ordinary Session, 1940, I, 497-98.
General, Marmaduke Grove, emerged from the meeting to read a prepared statement concerning the Party's decision. The press release stated that the Socialist party did not wish to participate in any group of which the Communists were a part. This had been decided as early as 1940. Even at that date it was clear that the Communist party's national and international policies were contrary to the best interests of the nation.

At the same time that the Socialists withdrew from the Popular Front, Grove sent letters to the presidents of all Frontist parties, exclusive of the Communists, in which he asked them all to unite with the Socialist party to form a national Block of the left, similar to that which existed in the early 1930's but with far more binding rules. In an effort to promote such a union, Grove announced that the three Socialist members of the Cabinet would retain their posts and that the party would continue to work closely with the government.


5 "El partido socialista no volverá al Frente Popular porque este está inspirado por el Comunismo," *El Mercurio*, January 7, 1941.
A month after the Socialist withdrawal from the Popular Front, that organization met to decide upon its slate of candidates for the elections that would be held that year. Difficulties arose between the Communist and Democratic parties over the selection of a candidate for the Senate from Santiago. Meanwhile, Radicals and Democrats became embroiled in an argument over a list of candidates each had prepared for the Second District. These were but the major controversies over which new cracks developed in the Popular Front. Meanwhile, the Socialist party announced that it would enter its own slate of candidates without joining any coalition. Thus, the breakup of the Popular Front appeared to be imminent.

As the political parties stepped up preparations for the July elections, the Socialists became more and more disgruntled. They believed that the Radicals and Communists planned their campaign with the express purpose of destroying all Socialist candidates, and thereby, the Party itself. On February 28, the Central Committee of the Socialist party, presided over by

"Los partidos de izquierda continuan estudiando ubicaciones y candidaturas," El Mercurio, February 8, 1941.
Marmaduke Grove, decided to withdraw their three Socialist ministers from Aguirre's cabinet. The government, however, wanted no part of a cabinet crisis at this time, and overtures went out from the Radicals to the Socialists for a reconciliation.

For the next four months, leaders in both parties tried to reach agreement of the differences that had split the Popular Front. Throughout this period the Socialist party permitted its three ministers to remain in the cabinet. Finally, in late June leaders of the Radical and Socialist parties signed a pact by which they would participate as a coalition in the approaching elections. The following day the Democratic party joined the Radicals and Socialists in the new coalition. The Communist party was not welcome in the new grouping because of their differences with the Socialists. One part of the agreement stated that any other party with principles similar to those expressed in the pact would be invited to join the members in the new coalition. However, before any new parties would receive an invitation they would have to be

7 "Partido Socialista acordo en la madrugada de hoy retirar a los ministros Schnake Allende, and Merino," El Mercurio, February 28, 1941.
approved by **all** members. This gave the Socialists a veto on new members and assured that the Communist party would not be invited to join its old Popular Front associates in the new reform coalition.

The reform parties continued to meet with electoral success so long as they remained united in a close coalition. Even without the Communist party the other left-of-center groups managed to get their candidates elected. Grove himself won a second senate term in the 1941 elections, polling over 12,000 votes to 721 and 755 for his two opponents. Yet, over 6,000 blank ballots demonstrated that the battle with the Communist party had cost Grove a considerable amount of support in his own constituency.

Just one year earlier Grove had been the favorite of the people in Santiago. Largely through his efforts representatives from various reform parties throughout Latin America met in Santiago with the aim of coordinating the "popular forces of Hispanic-America...to defend

---

8 "Democráticos adhirieron al pacto firmado por los radicales y socialistas," *El Diario Ilustrado*, July 1, 1941.
democratic government in the hemisphere." All reform parties excepting Communist parties were invited to send their representatives but some had too many problems at home to leave for the meeting. Peru's Aprista leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre could not attend the meeting, but he sent one of his lieutenants, Luis Alberto Sanchez, to represent him. President Cardenas from Mexico also could not fit the meeting into his schedule, but he too sent a representative. One of the most influential men who did go to the meetings and who played an important role in the deliberations was Romulo Betancourt, representing Venezuela's Partido Democratico.

In the first session of the meeting the delegates unanimously elected Marmaduke Grove president of the Congress. Grove also delivered the welcoming address to the representatives. He stated that the meeting was called to try to unite the reform parties of Latin America into a force strong enough to prevent "totalitarian

---

9 "Congreso Hispano-Americano de Partidos Populares," La Opinión (Editorial), October 3, 1940.

10 "Primer Congreso Latino-americano de partidos populares de Izquierdo," La Opinión, October 3, 1940.
imperialism" such as was then spreading through-out Europe, and "democratic imperialism" economic imperialism from destroying America. The popular parties met "without inviting those parties which obey European directives, like the Communist...," to help the people of America to defeat the misery, poverty, and injustice that plagued them throughout their history. The speakers who followed Grove to the rostrum pursued much the same theme, although some took the opportunity to assail the United States. Betancourt especially demonstrated his anti-United States sentiment, declaring that if the nations of Latin America unified they could then refuse any United States requests for naval and air bases on Latin American soil.

The final report from the All-American Congress of Popular parties of the Left declared that the world war had affected the financial status of Latin American nations as well as their economic independence. Since the tax burden fell upon the laboring elements in Latin America, the Congress recommended that each party strive to force

---

11 "Revelación anti-imperialista fue acto inaugural del Congreso de Democracias," La Opinión, October 4, 1940.
12 Ibid.
their governments to readjust public expenses, institute a graduated income tax, and install an excess profits tax. Concerning economic independence the Congress made no concrete proposal for action but merely stated the problem. Because of economic underdevelopment, the poor were subject to the demagoguery of totalitarianism. In addition, the economic weakness of these nations prevented them from adequately defending themselves "in their hours of danger." Moreover, the extractive industries controlled by foreign capital were not only taking away the life blood of the nations but foreign businesses were a danger because their holdings might be taken, as after the First World War, to pay war debts, and act that adversely affected the country in which these businesses had operated. Finally, the Congress adopted a resolution to form a secretariat to coordinate the action of all "popular parties" of Latin America and to organize and prepare for a second Congress. The delegates selected Grove, Betancourt, and Manuel Seoane from Peru to lead this secretariat, which would operate from Santiago, Chile. Following approval of the final

13 "Acuerdos aprobados en el primer Congreso de Partidos Populares," La Opinión, October 7, 1940.
Following the All American Congress, Grove remained in the political spotlight by organizing a demonstration in support of the Popular Front government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda. The demonstration came about as retaliation for a conservative demonstration organized to protest the policies of the administration. Grove launched a call to all citizens asking that they demonstrate to the nation and to the world that the people of Chile had given their full support and allegiance to the Popular Front government. In a typical political maneuver, Grove referred to the conservative meeting as a Nazi rally even though many respected conservatives would be on hand. At the same time there is no evidence that the Nazi organization had anything to do with making the plans for the conservative rally. For his demonstration Grove asked that the turnout be large in order to illustrate that the democratic system under which Aguirre led his nation was

---

14 "Fue clausurado Congreso de Partidos Populares de la América Latina," *La Opinión*, October 9, 1940.
In answer to Grove's call some 80,000 persons assembled in the Parque Cousino from where they paraded throughout the city of Santiago. As the parade passed the Moneda, President Aguirre appeared on his balcony to receive a long ovation from the crowd. At ten o'clock in the evening the demonstration ended with Grove commending the participants on their good behavior throughout the day. Meanwhile, the conservative meeting, also held at the Parque Cousino, drew only about 6,000 people, a clear indication that the majority of Santiago citizens approved of Aguirre's leadership.

Grove's stock rose considerably from his public appearances and from his public relations work for his own party, for the Popular Front, and for a coalition of all Latin American reform parties. He also increased his popularity by his work in the Senate. Always concerned with the problems of the poor, Grove proposed a bill by which the Caja de Credito Popular would be forced to return tools and other utensils of work which

---

15 "Marmaduke Grove hace un llamada al Pueblo," La Opinión, October 19, 1940.
had been pawned by destitute citizens. This was the same law that Grove and Matte had instituted during the twelve day Socialist Republic in 1932. Opposition to the bill prevented its passage when a vote to send it to committee for study failed eleven to eight with five abstentions. This was much the same fate reserved for all of Grove's bills.

Another of Grove's proposals called for amnesty for the leaders of the railway strike of 1936. These men still remained in prison or exile, sentenced by President Alessandri for striking. Grove took the opportunity to declare again, as he had in 1936, that any worker, whether he worked for private enterprise or the government, had the right to strike. At this time Grove also pointed out that the families of the prisoners suffered, for no offense, because the government deprived them of their breadwinners. The plea for compassion for the wives and children of the prisoners was refused when the senate voted to send the bill to committee for further study.

---

17 Senate Record, January 22, 1941, Extraordinary Session, 1941, II, 1526-29.
18 Senate Record, August 3, 1943, Ordinary Session, 1943, II, 1345-49.
These and other proposals, while consistently defeated, made Grove even more popular with those who would have benefited had the legislation been approved. Meanwhile, the government received a severe blow when President Pedro Aguirre Cerda died suddenly in November, 1941. To fill the vacancy the government announced that a presidential election would be held in early February, 1942. Immediately, aspiring candidates sought party support and began to campaign. The Socialist Party nominated Oscar Schnake, a cabinet member for two years and a previous Secretary General of the Party. Parties of a conservative nature decided to throw their support to former dictator, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who for some time had attempted to return to the political scene in Chile. In the camp of the Radical Party an internal party struggle created a deadlock between Juan Antonio Ríos and Gabriel Gonzalez Videla which the Supreme Tribunal of the Party finally resolved on December 17, by naming Ríos as the Party's candidate. The official declaration of the Tribunal stated that after a comprehensive study of the situation the members decided that had the better claim to the nomination and that in accordance with a compromise worked out with the
candidates González Videla would become president of the election committee. The two contenders met at González' office and displayed to the press and public their pleasure at the compromise agreement.

Meanwhile, the socialists found themselves in a difficult situation. They had a candidate in the presidential race but his chances for election were poor. If they should support Schnake, it would be quite likely that their old enemy, Ibáñez, would defeat Ríos who, while not completely acceptable to the Socialists, was, nevertheless, far more palatable than the one-time dictator. Ríos himself realized the probable outcome of the election if the Socialist candidate remained in the election. Therefore, he proposed the creation of a gigantic Block of the Left with the assistance of the Socialist Party. In addition, he sent letters to Grove and Schnake in an effort to impress upon them the gravity of the situation and the adverse effect that an Ibáñez victory would have upon the country. Finally, on January 2, 1942, the Socialist

---

"Proyecciones que tuvo en el campo político proclamación del candidato del Radicalismo," El Mercurio, December 18, 1941.
Party withdrew Oscar Schnake from the presidential race and gave their support to Ríos.

At the same time Ríos received an unexpected assist from another source. Ex-president Arturo Alessandri Palma, by now a known conservative, announced his support of the Radical Ríos a few days before the election. At a Ríos rally Alessandri declared that he had forgotten all the evil acts committed against his family during the Ibáñez reign, but he could never forget the harm done his country. If Ibáñez should be elected 'public liberties, fundamental institutions and principles of human solidarity and social justice are in danger.' With such strong support the outcome could hardly be in doubt. Ríos won by a plurality of 55,945 votes out of a total of 462,080 votes cast, keeping the government in Radical hands for another term.

While the Socialists pledged to support the Ríos

20 "La idea de Juan Antonio Ríos," El Mercurio, January 2, 1942.

21 "Discurso pronunciado por don Arturo Alessandri en la grandiosa concentracion civica celebrada en homenaje a don Juan Antonio Ríos, en la noche del viernes ultimo," El Mercurio, February 1, 1942.

government, nothing like the unity experienced under the Popular Front occurred. The Socialists still fought against Communist participation in government, but trouble within their own ranks had grown to such proportions that the Party fell apart into factions, and this quarrel took precedence over any quarrels the Socialists had with other groups and parties.

As early as 1939 at the Sixth General Party Congress, Grove denounced small groups within the Party that deviated from the course of Chilean Socialism in the respect that they attempted to unseat the leadership by building up small factions. As a result of this denunciation the Party relegated the offenders to unimportant positions within the Party. Following this Congress, the Federation of Socialist Youth held their annual meeting at Rancagua. Those who had been discovered and denounced as 'unconformists' by Grove went to the meeting and attempted to establish dissidence within the Youth Movement. Learning of this situation, Grove then called a meeting of the Socialist party leadership and demanded the immediate expulsion of the leaders of the "Inconformista" movement within the party. The party
leaders agreed with Grove's proposal and expelled the trouble makers. Grove then called an extraordinary congress in which he presented to the party delegates the case for dismissal of the deviationists. The Congress, which met at Curico, enthusiastically accepted Grove's action and commended him for the swiftness with which he cleansed the party of the unsavory elements.

Grove's purge, however, did not end the internal strife that threatened to destroy the party, only weakened it. In late 1942 the problem of dissension had become so grave that Grove issued a circular to the leadership dealing with the battle that raged within the Socialist party. He charged that some "ex-directors," primarily Deputy Cesar Godoy Urrutia and Salvador Allende, sought to advance their own positions through an exploitation of "Party errors." Grove demanded that any disagreement should remain with the party and not be aired before party opponents. He also attacked a tendency toward "caudillismo" that the "ex-directors" nurtured in place of loyalty to doctrine. These same individuals, according to Grove, attempted to increase their own popularity by making

Bedoya, Grove, su vida, su ejemplo, su obra, pp.53-55.
speeches to the people in which they made promises that they well knew they would be unable to keep. "No candidate is capable of fulfilling promises in a collaborationist government." Instead of these promises all Socialist politicians should tell the workers "that the Socialists are in the government only to organize the final conquest of political power by workers and campesinos. The politicians who made promises in public forget that the liberation of the workers is the task of the workers themselves." Grove ended his circular by denouncing impatience that many party members had displayed. This evil was illustrated in the hasty nomination of Oscar Schnake in the presidential election of February, 1942. Because they did not wait to examine fully the electoral situation before announcing a candidate, the party had to withdraw Schnake when it came to a choice between supporting Rios or permitting Ibanez to win the election. Such occurrences as this greatly injured the prestige of the Socialist party and shook the people's faith in their party.

24 Circular to Socialist party leaders prepared by Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, Secretary General of the party, reprinted in the article "Sobre política socialista hace declaraciones Marmaduque Grove," El Diario Illustrado, November 21, 1942.
The problem of impatient members appears to be the crux of the party split. Younger Socialists wanted to effect a revolution and thereby establish the Socialist Republic of Chile. They did not have the patience that comes with maturity and they believed that a revolutionary effort could be successful. Grove and some of the older members, displaying the caution of their years, wanted no part in a revolutionary movement in which they stood an excellent chance of defeat and loss of all that had been gained through the years. Grove was willing to work slowly and thereby protect the reforms that had been won. Not all the leadership concurred with Grove in this and some, those whom Grove called "ex-directors," sought to capitalize on the impatience of the youthful elements and thereby gain control of the Party.

The dissident elements wanted to end Socialist collaboration with the government which they considered to be much too conservative. Grove, on the other hand, supported the idea of Socialist participation in the Ríos government. He ended his circular with a call for the party to remain in the government:

In order to realize rapidly its organic and political objectives the Party must utilize to the
maximum the facilities that are granted it in its role of party of Government and it must continue to collaborate with the regime of the Left in order to watch over attentively the democratic liberties and the sindical victories 25 obtained by the working class from October, 1938.

Only a few months after Grove's circular, at the Ninth Party Congress, the split in the party ranks became greater. Godoy and a few others left the party to form the Socialist party of Workers. Others followed Godoy until two strong and opposing factions stood facing each other. At the Congress, held in Rancagua, both factions took extreme positions making reconciliation difficult if not impossible. The Congress finally ended in an irreparable division of the party. Following the Congress, the Central Executive Committee published the following statement:

One group called the opposition has poisoned some regions of the party, raising as a combat flag, no collaboration with the government. Violating all the principles and foundations of the Socialist Organization, the Directors of this tendency disregarded, on innumerable occasions, the legitimate authority of the Central Committee, whose collaboration with the Government was for no other purpose than to fulfill the accords voted by the majority of Party Congresses prior to the General Congress.

---

25

...this moved the maximum leader and Secretary General of the Party, Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, in accord with the members of the Central Committee and chiefs of fourteen delegations, to leave the Congress.

While Grove used these reasons for his withdrawal, the real reason was not mentioned by the Central Committee. In a showdown vote for Secretary General of the party, Salvador Allende defeated Grove by a vote of 82 to 42. Allende, wanted Grove to accept an honorific position called Maximum Leader and President of the party. In this manner Allende hoped to save the party by utilizing Grove's popularity among the rank and file. Grove, however, while always a champion for unification, this time refused and instead took the path that led to destruction of the Socialist party. For the next decade there would be multiple Socialist parties in Chile, a situation that so weakened the Socialist movement that even today the party feels the debilitation effect of the Grove-Allende rupture.

Allende's faction retained the name of Socialist

party while Grove's group took the name Authentic Socialist party (Partido Socialista Autentico). By 1946 the PSA found itself weakening, while the Socialist party, the larger of the two, held its membership. Grove, possibly regretting his refusal to take an unimportant post in a united Socialist party, began to agitate for the establishment of a unified Socialist party to be called the Partido Socialista Unificado. Some groups joined in the movement but the Allende party remained outside the new coalition. As a result the unification movement failed. Grove, however, refused to give up and in 1948, his last year in the Senate, he attempted to form a new reform coalition along the lines of his Block of the Left of an earlier day. This group was to be called the National Democratic Front (F.D.N.) and it would incorporate all the "genuine forces of the Left" that wanted to belong.

The movement, however, never managed to get under way, as the government of Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, the

Speech by Marmaduke Grove, June 24, 1927, Senate Report, Ordinary Session, 1947, I, 655. A more detailed discussion of the unification proposal may be found in the pamphlet, Sobre la unidad socialista (Santiago Departamento de cultura del Partido Socialista Autentico, 1946).
last of the Radical presidents, refused the FDN permission to meet. Thus, Grove's last attempts at unification of all reform parties failed. For Grove the political career he instituted for himself in 1934 came to a close in 1949 when he was defeated for a third time in the Senate. With defeat Grove retired to private life, spending the last five years of his life in retirement. In late 1953 he became paralyzed, and in 1954 he contracted a pulmonary infection that caused his death on May 15, 1954 at the age of seventy-five.
CONCLUSION

The life of Marmaduke Grove spans what is probably the most important period in Chilean history. Grove lived under the chaos and instability of the "parliamentary government" that finally fell when Arturo Alessandri promulgated a new constitution. This returned to the executive the powers deprived it following the civil war of 1891. Grove also witnessed the frustration of Alessandri in his first term as president as he tried to institute needed social reforms, and in 1924 when the period of military anarchy began, Grove was on hand, first in a passive and later in an active role. Colonel Grove, along with other socially conscious military officers, aided in the passage of social and economic reforms, demonstrating that in the twentieth century the military in Latin America is not necessarily a conservative force. When the wealthy tired of military careers for their sons and permitted lower and middle sector men to enter the military academies, the political complexion of the Chilena officer corps changed. Not all officers became
social reformers, but many of those younger officers who participated in the military golpes of 1924 and 1925 were deeply concerned with the plight of the poor. The very fact that in 1932 Grove could use the army to institute a Socialist Republic is adequate proof that many officers possessed a social awareness equal to that of many civilian reformers.

With the demise of the Socialist Republic of Oscar Davila, Alessandri returned to the Moneda, this time as a conservative rather than a reformer. Throughout the six years of Alessandri's second administration, Grove, first as a private citizen and later as a senator, fought to preserve civil liberties at a time when some would have sacrificed freedom for the sake of political stability. While Alessandri restored confidence in a civilian government and brought political stability back to Chile after an eight year lapse, Grove reminded the nation that it had to guard its political guarantees and civil liberties.

From the time he became a political figure, Grove worked for a unification of reform parties. At first he helped unify the four small socialist groups into one
strong party. In the senate, Grove initiated the Block of the Left, joining the Socialist party with other reform elements. Although he did not officially proclaim the Popular Front, Grove was instrumental in the organization of that union. Later, he attempted to unite all reform parties in Latin America into a workable force from which the poor in all countries would gain some benefit from the national wealth.

After all the attempts to bring segments together to create a more powerful force, it is ironic that Grove should be partially responsible for the dissolution of the Socialist party. Rather than remain within the party in an unimportant position, Grove chose to lead his followers away to create the Authentic Socialist party. Up to this time Grove served as a brake on young revolutionaries who would resort to violence to gain control of the government.

After quick defeat in 1932, Grove never again attempted any revolutionary activity. This incident of June 16, 1932, made it clear to Grove that those who attain political control by violent methods must be prepared to lose that authority to others by the use of violence. That lesson
Grove transferred to his fellow Socialists so that even though his opposition within the party publicly expressed a willingness for revolutionary activity, they never attempted such action.

Grove's own personality served to lend a measure of respectability to the Socialist movement. Conservative forces attempted to create an image of Socialists as thieves and criminals who wished only to dupe the public so that they might satisfy their own political ambitions. Grove's life and career, however, hoped to disprove this theory. While Grove spent sixteen years in the Senate, he retired without wealth, living on his army pension. When he died, Grove did not even leave his family a home because he never was wealthy enough to purchase a house. A conservative newspaper editorialized that Grove was "extremely generous and altruistic and genuinely concerned with the welfare of the people." This theme recurs throughout most of the obituaries found in the Santiago press. The Radical newspaper, La Tercera de la Hora, noted that "no one can deny his profound honesty and his

1 "A las seis de la manana murió Marmaduke Grove," Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, May 15, 1954.
sincere devotion to the cause of the people." While Grove
made many mistakes in his political life, he remained
sincere in his efforts to assist the laboring elements in
Chilean society. And his behavior, once elected to the
Senate, was a credit to the government and to his party.
United States Ambassador Claude Bowers met Grove at a
diplomatic function after which Bowers revealed:

I had heard such disturbing things about the
"old man" that my first meeting with him at
the Mexican Embassy was a revelation. I found
an old, grandfatherly, soft-spoken, and kindly-
looking man who seemed as dangerous as a dove
picking crumbs in front of a cathedral and
not at all like the alleged conspirator who had
once been exiled to a lonely island in the
pacific....

Even in the early days of his political life Grove's
personality attracted those whom he met. He traveled
through the city in his battered old Ford coupe greeting
passers-by with a wave of the hand and a smile. To many
citizens who bordered on poverty their beloved "don
Marma" was a close friend. Each morning long lines of

---

2 Rene Olivares, "Murió el Coronel Grove," La Tercera
de la Hora, May 16, 1954.
3 Claude G. Bowers, Chile Through Embassy Windows: 1939-
poverty-stricken men and women stood outside the Grove gate awaiting the small amount of food that Grove could afford to distribute among them.

During the years of public service Grove was, at the same time, the best loved and most feared and hated man in Chile. His opponents never convinced themselves that he had given up the revolutionary path and they often waited nervously for him to descend upon the Moneda with a retinue of army officers to declare a golpe de estado. But the poor knew Grove as the always accessible senator who would carry their complaints to the floor of the senate if he believed it would help them. The Senate Reports abound with names of obscure people mentioned by Grove in his speeches, along with a demand that the appropriate government bureau investigate the complaint. For such action Grove won the undying support of the lower sectors of Chilean society.

While Grove enjoyed some support from the middle sectors, he was not politician enough to cultivate people

4

who disagreed with him on fundamental issues. He was too outspoken, too blunt, and too impolitic ever to become a successful politician. Only a Grove would ever propose in the Chilean Senate that San Cristobal hill, in the center of Santiago, be systematically destroyed and the stone quarried because it was an "eyesore". The hill was a Catholic shrine to which Chileans from all over the nation made pilgrimages. Thus, Grove proposed the destruction of a Catholic shrine in a nation that was 85 to 90 percent Catholic at the time of the proposal. This certainly was not the work of an astute politician.

While he was not adroit as a politician, Grove was an excellent soldier. He progressed through the officer ranks to become colonel and to win the respect and admiration of his fellow officers. Once retired from the military, Grove never forgot the army or the soldiers. He constantly argued for increased military pay, improved pensions, and other benefits for both officers and enlisted men. Until his death he considered himself a soldier. He died in a military hospital, and the government accorded him a military funeral and burial which
included a salute from a squadron of planes from the Chilean Air Force that he had helped to create. Nothing would have pleased him more.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Public Documents

Banco Central de Chile. Boletín Mensual, 1932.

Boletín de Senado. 1929-1949.


Books


Anonimo. Por qué cayó Grove? Santiago: Talleres gráficos La Nación, n.d.


Bennett A., Juan. La revolución del 5 de Setiembre de 1924. Santiago: Barcells and Company, n.d.


Articles


--------- "Entrevista con Carlos Ibáñez," Hoy, No. 257 (October 22, 1936), 11-12.


Newspapers

Arteaga, Claudio. "Grove...Catastrofe," *La Nación* (Santiago), October 4, 1932.

Asies (Santiago), 1937.

*El Atacameno* (Copiapó), 1915.


*El Calderino* (Copiapó), 1915.

*Claridad* (Santiago), 1937-38.

*El Diario Ilustrado* (Santiago), 1924 - 41.

Grove Vallejo, Marmaduke. "La escuela militar debe cerrarse," *La Nación* (Santiago), September 5, 1924.

______. "Cuidado con la pintura," *La Nación* (Santiago), September 27, 1924.

______. "Sepamos esperar," *La Nación* (Santiago), October 4, 1924.

______. "Reforma indispensable," *La Nación* (Santiago), October 7, 1924.

______. "Reforma indispensable II," *La Nación* (Santiago), October 9, 1924.

______. "El terremoto de Copiapó y los fondos...," *La Nación* (Santiago), October 17, 1924.
Grove Vallejo, Marmaduke. "Los fondos pro damnificados del norte," La Nación (Santiago), October 23, 1924.

______. "Los fondos pro damnificados del norte II," La Nación (Santiago), October 25, 1924.

______. "No hay peor dordo que el que no quiere oir...," La Nación (Santiago), November 3, 1924.

______. "Declaraciones sospechosas," La Nación (Santiago), November 20, 1924.

______. A series of 72 autobiographical articles published by the Santiago newspaper, Claridad, January through May, 1938.

______. "Volvera nuestro Chile al regimen de la Constitución y de las leyes. Grove contesta la acusacion del Fiscal militar," La Unión (Valparaíso), August 2, 1931.

La Hora (Santiago), 1935-38.


El Mercurio (Santiago), 1924-54.

La Nación (Santiago), 1920-49.

Las Noticias de Ultima Hora (Santiago), 1954.

Olivares, Rene. "Murio el Coronel Grove: el del avion rojo; el que escapo de Pascua; el que fue de la Carcel al Senado y mando el buque," La Tercera de la Hora (Santiago), May 16, 1954.

La Opinión (Santiago), 1935-41.

Orrego Luco, Luis. "Radicalismo en la hora actual," La Hora (Santiago), June 20, 1941.

El País (Santiago), 1932.

Phillips Muller, Francisco. "Dramática declaración...," La Opinión (Santiago), October 16, 1938.

Pinochet, Tancredo. "Grove e Ibáñez," Asies (Santiago) May 4, 1937

Precios (Santiago) 1937.

Rivera, Miguel Angel. "El pacto contra Ibáñez," La Opinión (Santiago), March 1, 1938.

La Tercera de la Hora (Santiago), 1954.


Wehrhahn L., G. F. "La verdad sobre la labor gubernativa," La Hora (Santiago), July 8, 1941.
I, Jack Ray Thomas, was born in Youngstown, Ohio, December 23, 1931. I received my secondary-school education in the public schools of Youngstown, Ohio and my undergraduate training at Youngstown University, which granted me the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1954. I received the Master of Arts degree in 1959 from Kent State University. In September 1960 I was appointed a Graduate Assistant in the Department of History at The Ohio State University. In 1961 the Doherty Foundation awarded me a Fellowship for study in Santiago, Chile.

I have accepted a position as Assistant Professor of History at Wisconsin State College at Eau Claire, Wisconsin.