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VIOLENT MASSES, ELITES, AND DEMOCRATIZATION: THE INDONESIAN CASE

DISSertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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The Ohio State University

2002

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the relationship between violent mass mobilization, elite response, and democratization in Indonesia from 1997-2000. It argues that violent mass mobilization was a necessary condition for a successful transition to democracy because of the absence of an organized democratic opposition during the period of President Suharto's sultanistic rule. Other factors helping in the initial stages of the transition were the moderation of the opposition elite, which persuaded incumbent regime officials that they could negotiate a transition with the opposition, and a divided military, which was weak and relatively unthreatened by the moderation of the pro-democracy leaders.

The interaction of these three factors—violent mass mobilization, a moderate opposition elite, and a divided military—resulted in a transition that was mass driven with elite negotiations that focused narrowly on removing Suharto from office and enabling democratic elections to take place. It did not, however, raise critical larger issues such as basic reform of the authoritarian 1945 Constitution and of the pattern of highly centralized government control over an ethnically and geographically diverse country. In consequence, after the transition, violent mass mobilization continued, leading to a constitutional crisis, the threat of national disintegration, and the politicization of Islam.
This dissertation contributes to the theoretical literature on the consequences of characteristics of pre-transition regimes and of transitional periods, specifically varying types of mass-elite connections and the nature of negotiations between opposition and regime elites. The problems associated with achieving and consolidating a transition to democracy from the regime type of sultanism are examined in detail. It also addresses current scholarly debates on the causes and consequences of inter-religious and ethnic violence and the politicization of Islam in the context of democratization.
Dedicated to my mother and daughter.

May love continue to be passed through generations to come.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Work on my dissertation and Ph.D. brought some incredibly exciting moments and some difficult times. I was privileged to stand in the balcony of Indonesia’s Legislature while Suharto’s hand-picked members decided that they had no choice but to hold free elections. A year later, I stood there again as votes were called out for the first democratically elected president in the country’s history. Moments like those in Indonesia and the people whom I met there made the times that I doubted the sensibility of pursuing a Ph.D. recede into the background. I hope this dissertation does justice to the Indonesian people who opened their hearts and homes to me and who fought for freedom, even when that freedom would lead them into an unknown future.

I would first like to thank my dissertation committee. All three members were invaluable throughout the process of research and writing. Bill Liddle, my advisor, has been my friend and mentor for more than ten years. It is due to him that I choose to pursue a Ph.D. with Indonesia as my country of specialty. He patiently shared with me his extensive and unique knowledge of Indonesian culture, politics, and history. He also opened his home to his students and brought us into his life on and off campus. He will always be my teacher whom I respect and very special friend.

Dick Gunther inspired me in the moments I needed it most. I also relied upon his dependability and trustworthiness. His guidance and encouragement were invaluable. I
not only respect his intellectual abilities but also his kind heart and gentle soul. I hope our paths continue to cross throughout the future.

Craig Jenkins became involved in my studies shortly before the dissertation stage of the Ph.D. Being from a different academic department, he played a crucial role in the final stages of my program. He was very familiar with political science analysis and theories but his distance from the conflicts that exist in political science enabled him to offer a fresh look at my research questions and ways to approach them. He always found time to discuss ideas – a trait I value greatly – and combined common sense with knowledge of existing research to help clarify my thoughts. I thank him greatly for his approachability and willingness to be a part of my work.

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The dissertation research was conducted with funds from a Fulbright-Hays grant and a supplementary travel grant from the University Center for International Studies at Ohio State University. Pre-dissertation research was conducted with funds from the Mershon Center. The assistance provided through these sources, as well as the numerous FLAS language fellowships I received, were invaluable.

I would like to thank various friends outside of school who have helped me along the way. Ginger deserves special thanks for allowing me to live in her home when in-between places to live due to returning from language camp, traveling scholarship, research, etc. Other times, needed encouragement and a fresh view from outside of academia were given to me by friends. Albert, Heather, Sara, Jen, Jenny, Ginger, and Mike supplied lots of encouragement, love, and care.

My parents deserve a special thanks for enabling me to write the dissertation by giving me a free place to live. I especially thank my mother who helped to care for my baby while I sat in the basement writing and refrained from asking too frequently when I would be finished. Finally, I give special thanks to Scarlett, my daughter, whose sweet smile gave me badly needed diversion from the grinding work of my dissertation. No matter what “dissertation crisis” I was in, she always made me smile.
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Outcome of the June 1999 General Election and Composition of the National Legislature and Assembly
SECTION I

THEORETICAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

The first four chapters of this work set the stage for the presentation of research that
composes the last four chapters. In this section, the argument is summarized and
theoretical context discussed. Chapters 3 and 4 provide background information for the
subsequent chapters that analyze the transitional period during which Indonesia became a
democracy.

It is not until Section II that the heart of the research is presented and the argument
unfolds. However, it is necessary for the reader to be aware of the historical context of
the period researched. The development and characteristics of Suharto’s regime,
presented in Chapter 3, constitute an important part of the argument made in this work.
Understanding how Suharto fell from power, analyzed in Chapter 4, is likewise essential
for understanding the presentation of research and argument that follows.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In May 1998, President Suharto, who had ruled Indonesia for 32 years, was forced to resign. This resignation came after massive protests culminated in three days of violent rioting that shook the capital, Jakarta, and other provincial cities. Suharto's withdrawal from power initiated a transitional period during which it was uncertain if the country would democratize or revert to a form of authoritarian control.

Suharto handed power over to his vice-president. With this transfer of power, Suharto's regime incumbents remained in power, but without Suharto at the helm, the ability of the regime to survive the economic, social, and political turmoil that engulfed the country was tenuous. The military appeared poised to take over control of the country. Observers were pessimistic about the chances for democracy in a country that lacked modern state institutions and a well-developed civil and political society.

To the surprise of the world, on June 7, 1999, Indonesia held free elections for their national legislature. The elections were declared by a multitude of international observers to be free and fair. The military played a surprisingly neutral role in the
general election and in the election, a few months later, of a new president and vice
president. ¹

This dissertation examines in detail the events of the transitional period that began
after Suharto fell from power in May 1998 and which ended in October 1999 when the
nation’s first democratically elected president and vice president were chosen. Two
questions are asked. First, how and why did Indonesia make a transition to democracy
despite the numerous obstacles and pessimistic predictions? Second, what problems does
the country face as it is attempting to consolidate democracy?

The argument in brief, elaborated in the following pages, is that many obstacles had to
be overcome in Indonesia in order to successfully achieve a transition to democracy.
These obstacles stemmed from characteristics of the pre-transition regime, including
numerous sultanistic traits of the Suharto regime and the entrenched position of the
military in the nation’s economy and politics.² These obstacles were overcome because
of three characteristics of the transitional period: mass mobilization, a moderate
opposition elite, and a progressively fragmented military. These characteristics were
helpful, and probably even necessary, for Indonesia to move from a regime type of

¹ Although the military retained 38 seats out of 500 in the national legislature and 10 percent of seats in the
provincial and district legislatures, which makes the transition to democracy in Indonesia incomplete, the
huge change from a completely non-democratic regime to open political competition in which the military
played an insignificant role has convinced most scholars studying Indonesia to use the terminology of
transition to democracy. This terminology is used here but with the acknowledgement that the transition is
still incomplete.
² The regime type of sultanism was first used by Max Weber to refer to an extreme case of patrimonialism
within the category of traditional authority. Juan Linz (1975: 259-63) brought the term back into usage in
order to differentiate authoritarian regimes into subtypes.
sultanism to democracy. At the same time, they created problems for the consolidation of a high quality democracy.³

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework for the discussion and elucidates what is theoretically expected to occur with regime change from sultanism. This is contrasted with transitions to democracy made from non-sultanistic authoritarian regimes. Theories have postulated that it is extremely difficult to move directly from sultanism, or totalitarianism, to democracy. Much of this argument is based on the lack of facilitating conditions in sultanistic and totalitarian regimes for negotiating a transition. Chapter 3 describes Suharto's pre-transition regime and its characteristics. Sultanistic, as well as some totalitarian, traits are identified as composing the dominant characteristics of the regime. Chapter 4 gives background information on the fall of Suharto. Chapters 5-7 present the heart of the research, which is explanation and analysis of how a transition to democracy was achieved in Indonesia despite the numerous obstacles stemming from the pre-transition regime type. Chapter 8 concludes with an analysis of how characteristics of the pre-transition regime and aspects of how the transition was made are now creating problems for the functioning and consolidation of democracy. These problems include poorly functioning political institutions, the continuance of uncontrolled mass mobilization that has assumed forms of violent communal conflict, the increase of elite manipulated mobilization, the use of Islamic symbolism for political purposes, and the continued role of the military in governance.

The research for this project was done with the support of a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship and with assistance from a University Center for International Studies

³ Although the predominant characteristics of the transitional period were partially the result of the pre-transition regime type, human agency and contingent choice are also emphasized in the analysis.
Supplementary Travel Grant. The Mershon Center for Foreign Policy and International Security provided support for pre-dissertation research. I lived in Indonesia from July 1998 to December 1999 and briefly returned in March 2000. Most of the time was spent in Jakarta, with a couple of months in East Java and several weeks in North Sumatra. Periodic trips were also taken to villages and towns throughout Java and Bali. I was present in the compound of the People's Representative Council (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) during both the Special Session of the Assembly in November 1998 and during the Assembly's election of the president and vice president in October 1999.1 I also observed, informally, voting at a polling station in a Central Javanese town.

I conducted extensive interviews, mostly at the elite level, but also with local people and students. I observed meetings of political parties, students, and other protest groups and witnessed the almost daily occurrence of mass mobilization in the streets of Jakarta that took place throughout the transitional period. I held informal discussions with local people in villages and in Jakarta. I also followed media reports closely as the events unfolded.

Being one of the few foreign scholars present during the transitional period enabled me to obtain a rare first-hand look at what was happening in Indonesia. Upon returning to the United States and analyzing the events, I have gained insight in retrospect, but conducting the interviews as events actually unfolded enabled me to gain valuable

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1 According to the Constitution of 1945, Indonesia has two legislative bodies, the DPR and the MPR. The DPR is comparable to a parliament or national legislature in other democratic countries. It meets several times a year to pass legislation. It also approves the annual state budget. In this dissertation I will refer to the DPR as the Legislature. The MPR is required to meet at least once in five years to elect the president and vice president, and may also amend the constitution. Historically, its membership has consisted of all members of the Legislature plus additional members representing the regions, various social groups, and the armed forces. In this work I will refer to the MPR as the Assembly or the national assembly.
unfiltered insight into the strategies and thinking of the various players as events were unfolding. No one knew what the outcome would be and no time had lapsed during which interviewees chose to gloss over the events, as frequently happens when interviewing people about past events. I hope that the information I have gathered is interesting to both scholars of Indonesia and theoreticians.

1.1. Summary of Argument

I argue that Indonesia, under Suharto's rule, can be classified as a predominantly sultanistic regime with some totalitarian elements. This is not to say that it did not have some traits that could be labeled otherwise, but the predominant characteristics of the regime were sultanistic. This became increasingly apparent as the regime aged, especially in the last decade of Suharto's rule.

For example, Suharto was able to subordinate to himself a once autonomous military. He accomplished this through manipulating the rotation of officers and intervening at unusually low levels in promotions and assignment of positions. In this manner, he was able to cultivate extreme loyalty to himself from the military.

Suharto also based his regime on a network of patronage that superseded the professional structures of state institutions, including the bureaucracy, judicial, and legislative systems. Power emanated from Suharto through his coterie of loyalists whom he rewarded with perks. Patronage also emanated out from Suharto down to the villages in the form of development projects for areas that supported his government party.

The regime did have institutional structures that were more deeply entrenched than is usually the case with sultanistic regimes. For instance, the military had a system of
territorial commands that permanently placed soldiers throughout the country overseeing the “civilian” local governments. Suharto had also developed a government party under his tutelage that was intertwined with the bureaucracy but had an extensive network of branch offices throughout the country. It controlled society by requiring many social organizations to be affiliated with it. These institutional structures gave the regime a totalitarian-like grip over society, that is described in more detail in Chapter 3, but Suharto personally controlled them. By the end of his rule he controlled the military and government party completely and used both, along with the bureaucracy, as his personal tools through which he imposed his will on the country. These are sultanistic-like qualities.

The sultanistic and totalitarian traits of Suharto’s rule presented obstacles for democratization. As is examined in Chapter 2, sultanistic and totalitarian regimes do not have the characteristics typically associated with making a transition to democracy. These characteristics include regime traits that facilitate a transition to democracy through negotiation. In order for negotiations to occur between the regime and opposition, there need to be moderates in both the regime and opposition who have the capability, authority, and will to negotiate on behalf of their sides. Transitions made through negotiation are thought to portend the most positively for the survival and consolidation of democracy.

Sultanistic and totalitarian regimes typically do not allow pluralism to exist in the regime or autonomous organizations in society. It is therefore difficult for moderates to emerge in either the regime or society who can negotiate a transition to democracy. This lack of moderates is thought to result in exits from sultanism or totalitarianism coming
through a clash of an extremist opposition and hard line regime. This clash is theorized to bring either revolutionary overthrow of the regime, suppression of the opposition movement, or the military taking over power.

Revolutionary overthrow of the regime or a military assumption of power is likely if the opposition has been forced underground. If the opposition has not organized underground, then it is theorized that the regime will either crush the opposition, due to its disorganized and inchoate nature, or that the military will take over power to establish order. Exiting from the regime types of sultanism or totalitarianism is therefore theorized to be most likely through either revolution or entail a transition to a more standard military regime. Factors such as the autonomy of the military or the extent of underground opposition will influence this outcome.

Indonesia surprised the world and did not follow the expected courses for regime change from sultanism. The mobilized opposition movement, although largely spontaneous and disorganized, was not crushed and the military did not seize power. Contrary to expectations, a transition to democracy was negotiated by the regime, military, and opposition elite. In explaining how this was possible, I highlight, as stated above, the significance of three factors: mass mobilization, a moderate opposition elite, and a progressively fragmented military.

Extensive mass mobilization initiated the regime change and forced Suharto to step from power. Mobilization then continued to be the driving force throughout the transitional period. The mobilization was, as is one possible expectation for societies ruled over by sultanistic regimes, disjointed and not well connected to the opposition elite. Significant opposition to the regime had not developed underground, as is another
theorized possibility for opposition under a sultanistic regime, due to the penetrating nature of the military and government party's presence in Indonesian society.

The disorganized nature of the opposition to Suharto's regime caused the mobilization to assume some uncontrollable forms and contributed to the violence that characterized the transitional period, but it was not effectively suppressed and the military did not take over power. The following factors, combined with the extensiveness of the mobilization, helped Indonesia to follow its unexpected course.

A moderate opposition elite came to power after Suharto fell. As stated, the existence of moderate opposition leaders is unexpected under sultanistic and totalitarian regimes due to the crushing of any opposition except that which is underground and out of the reach of the ruler. Suharto had eradicated all overt opposition to himself. However, once it became clear that spontaneous mass mobilization was forcing Suharto from power, national figures who previously did not seriously threaten Suharto's rule came to the fore and asserted themselves as leaders of the opposition movement. The three leading figures who attempted to use the opposition movement to propel themselves to power and who became crucial in negotiating a transition to democracy were Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri.

---

5 By being forced underground, it is assumed that all surviving opposition in sultanistic regimes would become radicalized (Chehabi and Linz 1998).

6 Amien Rais was the most prominent leader of the modernist Muslim community in Indonesia, which is mostly urban based and consists of many educated Muslims. He received a Ph.D. in Islamic studies at the University of Chicago under the tutelage of Bernard Lewis. The modernist Muslim movement is modeled on the "back to the Qur'an" movement in Egypt and encompasses both liberals and fundamentalists. Amien had been considered a somewhat radical Muslim in the sense that he strongly supported pro-Muslim policies. At the time of Suharto's fall, he was head of Muammadiyah, one of the two large Muslim organizations allowed to exist. He had been active in ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), an organization supported by Suharto in an attempt to co-opt the potentially threatening modernist Muslim community, until Suharto forced him out of the organization in 1997 due to his outspokenness. During the transitional period, Amien attempted to change his image and portrayed himself in public to be a pluralist.
The existence of a moderate opposition elite is explained more in Chapters 3 and 4. It is based on an attribute of the Suharto regime that is not seen in all sultanistic and especially totalitarian regimes. This was the presence of some semi-autonomous organizations in society. Although Suharto strictly controlled society, he had allowed two non-political Islamic organizations and two severely restricted “opposition” parties to exist. Two of the figures who came to be opposition leaders in negotiating with the regime, Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid, were heads of the two Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama respectively. The third figure, Megawati Sukarnoputri, had been the leader of one of the “opposition” parties and was the daughter of the founding president, Sukarno. Her father’s name and the history of the party gave her credibility as an opposition figure, as did affiliation with the Islamic organizations for the other two figures.

The respect given, at least initially, to these three figures was despite the fact that they were mostly very moderate and even timid in opposing Suharto’s regime while he ruled. It was only when mass mobilization rose up against him and forced him from power that these figures used the opportunity to propel themselves forward as leaders of the opposition. They did not initiate the mobilization against the regime and their ties to the

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Abdurrahman Wahid was the leader of the traditionalist, mostly rural based, Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama. This group was based mostly in east and central Java. Wahid at times gave mild criticism of Suharto and spoke of democratization but appeared to mainly be attempting to obtain patronage for his group from the regime. In the last election held under Suharto’s rule in 1997, Wahid campaigned vigorously with Suharto’s daughter for the government party, Golkar.

Megawati Sukarnoputri was prominent mainly due to her family name. Her father, Sukarno, was a nationalist hero and the country’s first, and only other, president before Suharto. She had been leader of the government controlled opposition party, PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party), from 1993-96. Suharto had forced her from this position due to fear that her name recognition posed a threat to him. Her forced removal and the violence that followed when her supporters staged a sit-in in the Jakarta party headquarters made her a symbol of Suharto’s repression. She was, however, not overtly oppositional to Suharto and did not speak extensively in public.
mobilization were tenuous. They were even at odds with the mobilized opposition at several points during the transitional period. However, these figures were able to gather enough authority to negotiate with the regime and military on behalf of the opposition.

Once Suharto was forced from power by mass mobilization, the members of his regime remained in power and his hand-chosen vice president was made president. The new president, B. J. Habibie, attempted to appease the riotous society by promising to hold democratic elections within one year. The fulfillment of this promise was dubious as many individuals within the regime and military were strongly opposed to holding elections and sought ways to avoid giving up any power. The regime incumbents and military, however, saw that the pyramid of power built by Suharto could not last long without Suharto at the apex. The military had begun to fragment and drift. The regime incumbents began to compete and maneuver for positions in a post-Suharto era. State institutions and law and order began rapidly to disintegrate.

As the regime stalled for time, it became progressively clear that the extensive mass mobilization would not abate unless concessions were made by the regime and military. Faced with violent mobilization that stretched throughout the archipelago, the leading members of the regime and military decided that it was better to negotiate with the leading opposition figures, who demanded only free elections, rather than risk complete overthrow through overwhelming mass mobilization. Thus, negotiations began between the regime, military, and opposition elite that would result in the holding of free elections in June 1999.

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7 As Robison and Rosser state, "Habibie cannot impose the same highly centralized and unchallenged system of authority that characterized Soeharto’s rule" (2000: 185). This is symptomatic of the sultanistic nature of the regime, despite its vastness in organizational structure.
A significant factor in the calculation to negotiate with the opposition elite was that the military was not capable of suppressing the extensive mass mobilization that had engulfed the country. The military fragmented after Suharto fell from power and could not easily quell the riots, lawlessness, communal violence, and separatist demands that spread throughout the archipelago. The commander of the military therefore sought a way to salvage some institutional unity and maintain some influence in the country’s future political system. The fact that the leading opposition figures were not demanding a complete withdrawal of military influence in politics, governance, and the economy contributed to the decision to pursue a negotiated transition rather than use force to suppress the mobilized opposition.

The military’s decision to enter into negotiations with the opposition elite did not signify that the military had withdrawn its support for Suharto and caused his fall. To the contrary, the military had supported Suharto until the end, as is explained in Chapter 4. It was not until the civilian members of Suharto’s regime defected *en masse*, in an attempt to save themselves and causing Suharto to resign, that the military was no longer willing or unified enough to suppress the mobilized opposition against the remnants of the regime.

The economic crisis and international community were also forces that pressured the regime and military to allow free elections. The military had numerous entanglements in business ventures and relied upon these to fund its own budget. With the economic crisis, the military’s operating budget was severely eroded. If the crisis did not end, the military would have difficulty sustaining itself. The international community made it clear to the political players that they wanted political stability to return to Indonesia.
which appeared to be only attainable through holding free elections. The regime was pressured by the international community to hold free elections through the threat of withholding loans that were necessary to keep the economy afloat.

A negotiated transition to democracy was therefore made possible in Indonesia, despite obstacles imposed by characteristics of the pre-transition regime, by the presence of extensive mass mobilization, a moderate opposition elite, and a progressively fragmented military in the context of a severe economic crisis and international pressure. The mass mobilization instigated and drove the transition. The moderate opposition elite, once mobilization had forced Suharto from power, offered the regime and military a way out of their predicament that would enable them to retain some power. Weaknesses in the military became profound once Suharto was not there to hold the military together and guide it. The once feared military became fragmented and incapable of quelling unrest throughout society. These factors, in the context of a severe economic crisis and international pressure, enabled Indonesia to move from a predominantly sultanistic regime to democracy.

The legacy of the pre-transition regime, however, and characteristics of how the transition was made have created problems for the survival and consolidation of a high quality democracy. For instance, the emergence of a moderate opposition elite was beneficial to achieving a transition to democracy because it prevented a zero sum conflict between the regime incumbents and mobilized opposition. The resulting negotiations were, however, narrowly focused only on holding free elections and did not address larger issues of constitutional change, reform of political institutions, or restructuring the
military's role in governance. These changes were necessary in Indonesia to create a well-functioning and stable democracy.

The moderation of the opposition elite was therefore helpful for enabling the transition to democracy, but the moderation of these figures also led them to miss the unique window of opportunity that is present during transitional periods for making significant reform of political institutions and the constitution.\(^8\) It is more difficult to make the constitutional and institutional reform necessary for creating a well-functioning democracy in the post-transitional period. The new democracy is therefore saddled with a vague constitution that was not intended for democratic governance, ambiguity about the distribution of power between branches of government, and a continued military presence, albeit greatly reduced, in governance.

The Indonesian case therefore points to the importance of the substance of negotiations in transitions to democracy. Transitions literature has pointed out the value of making a transition to democracy through negotiation as opposed to other means, such as regime overthrow or collapse.\(^9\) However, examination of the impact of the substance of negotiations has only more recently begun to be stressed.\(^10\) It is becoming more evident that negotiated transitions can vary tremendously and that it is not only important to differentiate between negotiated and non-negotiated transitions, but the substance of negotiations should be viewed as perhaps equally important for the functioning and viability of the democracy that is created.

\(^8\) The opportunity for actors to change institutional structures increases during transitional periods (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

\(^9\) See, for instance, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986); Higley and Burton (1989); Karl (1990); Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds. (1995); and Linz and Stepan (1996) for views that expound the advantages of making negotiated or pacted transitions.

\(^10\) See, for instance, Munck and Leff (1999) who argue that the substance of negotiations in transitions made through transaction (negotiation) is important for the type and quality of democracy created.
The nature of elite-mass linkages is another important factor influencing the quality of the democracy created and prospects for the consolidation of democracy. The opposition elite in Indonesia became progressively disconnected from the mass base of the opposition movement throughout the transitional period as their demands diverged. Although most of society accepted the negotiations made between the opposition elite and the regime and military due to the fact that no alternative leadership existed, the disconnection between the opposition elite and the mobilized mass base of the opposition movement has contributed to the problem of on-going mobilization in the post-transitional period.

The mobilization of society that initiated the transition to democracy in Indonesia increasingly assumed violent and destructive forms. This included the spontaneous mobilization of people on the local level against other religious and ethnic communities and against symbols of political and economic power. The disconnection between the political elite and mass based opposition, which became evident during the transitional period, and the failure of political institutions to effectively provide a peaceful conduit for demands in the post-transitional period has resulted in people pursuing conflicts and redressing grievances through extra-institutional means. This current problem can be traced back to how the transition to democracy was achieved and to characteristics of the pre-transition regime that shaped the nature of the opposition.

Another type of mobilization also became increasingly prominent during the latter stages of the transitional period and has also continued into the post-transitional period. This is elite manipulated mobilization. The ineffectiveness of political institutions and the precedent set during the transitional period that mass mobilization was the primary
means of showing strength and achieving political aims has caused the political elite to move many of their conflicts outside of the institutional arena and into the streets. The lack of a mass base or an ideological platform by most of the political elite, which is symptomatic of the sultanistic heritage, has influenced many individuals to use Islamic symbolism when organizing mobilization.

Separatist groups have also been increasing their activities. Independence activists in Aceh and Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) show no signs of being appeased by the transition to democracy and appear to be growing in popular support. The central government and military appear to be uncertain about how to best handle the growing separatist sentiment. The problem of continuing mobilization in various forms, along with problems from not reforming the constitution and political institutions is discussed at greater length in the concluding chapter.

The third factor enabling the transition to democracy in Indonesia - the fragmentation of the military - kept the military from making a bid for power but also contributed to other problems in the post-transitional period. For example, the military has not been able to maintain law and order. New Islamic groups that sprang up during the transitional period and shortly afterwards have taken advantage of the breakdown in law and order to uphold their version of the law. Islamic groups have increasingly attacked recreation establishments and kidnapped and even murdered people. Some of these groups have sent militia to areas with inter-religious conflict and have led violence against non-Muslims. The government and police in the post-transitional period have been reluctant to challenge these Islamic groups due to the weakness of the military and police and due
to the fear that a clash will provoke a cycle of conflict between the military/police and Islamic groups. The increased manipulation of Islam in politics fuels this fear.

In spite of the weakness of the military and police, the military was able to negotiate reserve domains of power for itself during the transitional period. This resulted in the military continuing to hold seats in the national and local legislatures, although no active military personnel are now allowed to serve in the bureaucracy. Since Suharto was forced from power, the military has been regaining its autonomy that was lost under Suharto’s personalized rule and attempting to mend the divisions that Suharto cultivated within its corps.

The military has been left in a position where it can grow in strength and, in the future, conceivably threaten democracy. Currently, the military shows no signs of wanting to take power, but if the institutions continue to fail and the political leaders do not build stronger linkages with the populace that enable them to channel disputes into peaceful arenas of conflict resolution, then the military may feel forced to seize power in the name of restoring order. The growing politicization of Islam adds to this list of possible reasons that the military might want to take power at some point in the future.

The problems in consolidating democracy that have been elucidated above can be traced back to characteristics of how the transition to democracy unfolded and to characteristics of the pre-transition regime. I argue that although Indonesia was able to make a transition to democracy, and although that transition was negotiated, which was contrary to expectations, the legacy of sultanism and of aspects of how the transition was accomplished have left many serious problems for the consolidation of a well-functioning democracy. The means through which obstacles presented by characteristics of Suharto’s
regime were overcome and how specific traits of the transition has led to current problems with the functioning and consolidation of democracy in Indonesia will be detailed and analyzed throughout this dissertation.

This case study contributes to theories on transitions to democracy and exits from sultanism and totalitarianism. Through examining how Indonesia was able to make a transition to democracy, despite the obstacles presented by characteristics of the pre-transition regime, it is seen that although initially lacking facilitating conditions for negotiating a transition, conditions arose throughout the course of the transition that enabled a transition to democracy to be negotiated. A transition to democracy is therefore shown to be possible from a regime type that was considered to preclude this path of regime change.

This transition was made possible through exploiting some factors commonly associated with the regime type of sultanism, and frequently totalitarianism, as well as due to the presence of at least one non-sultanistic factor. The expected traits were: mass mobilization rising up to confront the regime in a disorganized and chaotic manner and of a military that had been weakened through the intervention of the sultan and through its dependence upon him for guidance. These two resulting conditions of sultanistic rule became decisive in driving the transition to democracy.

The existence of the third, and perhaps unexpected trait - the emergence of a moderate opposition elite - was central in preventing the zero sum conflict theorized to preclude democratization from sultanistic or totalitarian regimes. This factor enabled negotiations, although limited in substance, to result in the holding of free elections. It is thought that moderate opposition figures will not rise to the fore of an opposition movement against
sultanistic or totalitarian regimes due to the reasons described earlier in the chapter involving the opposition becoming radicalized from an underground existence or too disorganized for any leadership to emerge. In Indonesia, the figures emerged based on the existence of a few severely constrained but nonetheless somewhat autonomous organizations in society. All three of the organizations involved had histories that predated the Suharto regime. Two were religious and one was nationalist.

Suharto had succeeded in effectively controlling all of the organizations from which the moderate figures of the opposition sprang. These organizations were not directly involved in the mass mobilization against his regime, as is detailed in subsequent chapters. However, the mere existence of the organizations and the name recognition given to their leaders enabled some individuals to step forth and attempt to take hold of the cry for reform. This was done partly in an attempt to bring themselves into power.

It is conceivable that other countries with sultanistic or totalitarian rulers would also have traditional or pre-existing organizations from which leaders could emerge to represent a disorganized opposition movement against the regime. In Indonesia, as stated previously, the leaders were able to use the respect and name recognition that they had to fill the void of leadership for the opposition. Although this was helpful for the transition to democracy, the tenuous connection between the opposition elite and the mass base has brought problems that have continued into the post-transitional period.

A transition to democracy was achieved in Indonesia and a similar scenario could be replicated elsewhere in other sultanistic or totalitarian countries, perhaps even more easily if the military is not entrenched in the country’s governing and economic institutions as it was in Indonesia. The legacy of the pre-transition regime and of the
manner in which the transition was achieved have however created problems for the consolidation of a high quality democracy. The Indonesian case thus shows possibilities and constraints associated with regime change from regime types deemed to be non-conducive for democratization. As more countries of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, many of which have regimes with sultanistic and totalitarian traits, attempt to make transitions to democracy, the Indonesian experience will hopefully be helpful.
I argue that Indonesia was ruled by a predominantly sultanistic regime prior to making a transition to democracy. This regime was not a perfect match for the typology of sultanism, but many characteristics of it closely approximated the ideal type. The regime also exhibited characteristics of totalitarianism, which differentiates it from other sultanistic regimes. Specific characteristics of Suharto’s regime and how they do or do not fit the regime typology of sultanism are detailed in Chapter 3 along with a discussion of the evolution of the regime.

This chapter describes characteristics of sultanism as presented in the ideal type. Theories on exits from sultanism are then discussed. Subsequent chapters will show how specific traits of Suharto’s regime affected Indonesia’s ability to achieve a transition to democracy despite its pre-transition regime type of sultanism with totalitarian elements.

Regime change from sultanism or totalitarianism is thought to preclude a transition to democracy. Transitions to democracy are instead usually made from varieties of authoritarianism that do not include sultanism. A discussion is therefore first presented on why transitions are usually made from authoritarian and not sultanistic regimes.

Facilitating conditions for negotiating a transition to democracy are central to
this discussion and are most likely to be found in authoritarian, but not sultanistic or totalitarian regimes.

2.1. Defining a Transition To Democracy

Definitions of a completed transition to democracy vary according to the theorist. A frequently used definition of a completed transition is:

Sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*.1

A more minimalist definition is used by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) in their study of African regime change. Their definition requires only one free and fair election of government to take place.

Indonesia has largely, but not completely, met the requirements of both definitions. Free and fair elections were held in 1999 that produced an elected government; however, some seats in the Legislature and Assembly are still appointed and not elected. These include representatives of social groups and of the military. The appointment of social group representatives is done in a transparent process that is controlled mostly by the social groups themselves and representatives from the political parties. The retention of reserved seats for the military, however, is more problematic for claiming that Indonesia has completed a transition to democracy.

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1 Linz and Stepan (1996: 3).
The military continues to hold 38 seats out of 500 in the Legislature and 700 in the Assembly. The military does not, however, have additional reserve powers to veto policy. Due to the minimal power of the military to determine the composition of or policies made by the new government and based upon the genuinely free election that determined the composition of the new government, I argue, similar to Liddle (2000b), that the threshold to democracy has been crossed in Indonesia. This assertion is made with the acknowledgement that technically the transition can be said to be incomplete.

2.2. Authoritarian and Mature Post-Totalitarian Regimes Have Facilitating Conditions for Negotiating a Transition to Democracy

Studies show that regime transitions to democracy tend to be facilitated by negotiating agreements, commonly called pacts and settlements, between relevant elite. These elite consist of regime, opposition, and military leaders. Reaching democracy through negotiating agreements is thought to provide the best chance for establishing a high-quality democracy that can be consolidated.2

Negotiated transitions are facilitated by the existence of certain characteristics of the pre-transition regime. Authoritarian and mature post-totalitarian regimes most commonly have the facilitating conditions for negotiating a transition to democracy. Experience has shown that transitions to democracy from regime types other than authoritarianism or mature post-totalitarianism will be problematic. If a transition is made, consolidating democracy will be difficult.

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2 See, for instance, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986); Higley and Burton (1989); Karl (1990); and Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds. (1995) for the view that a pacted (negotiated) transition to democracy is likely to produce the most stable democracy.
It should be noted that this focus on the institutional nature of the pre-transition regime does not counter the view that transitional periods are unique windows of opportunity for human agency to create change.\(^3\) In fact, proponents of negotiated transitions are often criticized for their emphasis on human agency during the negotiating process rather than on structural determinants of a transitional period. The argument that characteristics of the pre-transition regime influence the existence of facilitating conditions for a negotiated transition brings structural factors into the analysis but leaves the pre-eminence of human agency during the negotiating process. Institutional analysis and human agency are combined.\(^4\)

2.2.1. Negotiated Agreements

A negotiated transition to democracy is frequently called in the literature a pacted transition or *reforma pactada*.\(^5\) Pacts are “more or less enduring compromises…no social or political group is sufficiently dominant to impose its ideal project, and what typically emerges is a second-best solution.”\(^6\) Pacts are made on issues of creating new rules for the game and on crafting a new (or at least revising the old) constitution.

A negotiated transition is thought to be the transition path most likely to lead to the creation of well-functioning democracy that can be consolidated. Although achieving a

\(^3\) Much of elite negotiation theory within the democratization literature is based on the assumption that the transitional period is relatively free from institutional constraints. See, for example, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Share and Mainwaring (1986), Di Palma (1990), and Karl (1990).

\(^4\) An example of a recent work in the transitions literature that combines institutional analysis with agency is Bunce (1999). She analyzes how institutions structured the choices of elites during the process of regime change in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Other works on transitions that combine structural factors with agency include: Munck (1994), Kitschelt (Dec. 1992), Remmer (1991), and Bermeo (1990). For a general discussion of combining institutional analysis with human agency, see Thelen and Steinmo (1992).

\(^5\) “Negotiated reform.”

negotiated transition has been the prime emphasis of much of the democratization literature, the substance of negotiations has only more recently begun to be viewed as an important determinant of the ability to consolidate democracy.

For instance, the concept of "elite settlement" is similar to pacts but is more inclusive in the scope of issues negotiated. Settlements occur when all relevant political leaders "meet face-to-face and behind closed doors to negotiate the ground rules for nonviolent institutionalized competition in the future." While pacts are made on issues immediately relevant to the transition to democracy, such as the holding of free elections or not prosecuting the outgoing regime and military for human rights abuses, settlements encompass core issues defining the new rules of the game. One such issue is constitutional reform.

Providing a constitutional basis for democracy is extremely important:

Modern democracy cannot function without a constitution creating well defined institutions and processes to make decisions, to form and question governments and to resolve conflicts. Without a constitution, normal democratic politics, that is not based on consensus but upon a civilized conflict about policies, cannot function (Linz and Stepan 1998: 19).

Burton, Gunther, and Higley (1992) argue that because settlements encompass the key aspects of the rules of the game in the new democracy, reaching elite settlement, not just a series of minor pacts, gives democracy a greater chance of survival.

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7 Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouraos (1995: 20). However, the concepts of elite settlement and convergence are from Higley and Gunther (1992). Burton, Gunther, and Higley (1992) argue that settlements are different from pacts because pacts are more specific and do not always include all the major elites. Higley and Burton (Winter 1998: 101) state that pacts do not tame politics, as settlements do because pacts are just the personal and tactical agreements among two or three top leaders aimed at papering over, not settling, core disputes.

8 Another work that emphasizes the importance of the substance of negotiations is Munck and Leff (1999).

2.2.2. Facilitating Conditions for Negotiated Agreements

Pacts and settlements usually involve four players. These include: regime and opposition moderates and regime and opposition hard-liners.\(^{10}\) Negotiation usually occurs between the moderate players, but the hard-line players are deemed essential for forcing the moderates to the negotiating table.\(^{11}\) For instance, it is the threat of revolution from hard-line opposition forces that brings the regime moderates to the table and it is the threat of a military crack-down that commonly brings the opposition moderates to the negotiating table.

The facilitating conditions theorized to be necessary for making a negotiated transition to democracy revolve around the above four players, especially on the existence, autonomy, and authority of the moderates. These conditions are: 1) moderates in the regime and opposition both must have power capabilities, 2) moderates on both sides agree that negotiations are the best alternative, 3) both moderate players have negotiating capabilities, and 4) the moderate players on both sides become the dominant players for their side.\(^{12}\)

It is thought that the facilitating conditions are most likely to be found in authoritarian or mature post-totalitarian regimes.\(^{13}\) This is due to the characteristics of these regimes.

Other non-democratic regime types are thought to have trouble successfully completing a

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\(^{10}\) This four player model has been used and made popular by, among others, Linz (1981), Colomer (1991), and Przeworski (1992).

\(^{11}\) O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986).

\(^{12}\) Linz and Stepan (1996: 306).

\(^{13}\) See, Linz and Stepan (1996 chapters 3 and 4) for more detail on how the characteristics of authoritarian and mature post-totalitarian, as opposed to other non-democratic regime types, present facilitating conditions for negotiating a transition to democracy. See also Stepan (Autumn 1997) and Zhang (1994) for the argument that authoritarian and mature post-totalitarian regimes are the most likely to have the conditions for a negotiated transition.
transition to and consolidation of democracy due to the lack of facilitating conditions for a negotiated transition. Paths, including regime collapse and overthrow, exist that do not entail negotiations between the regime and opposition as a means of democratizing. However, these other transition paths are more difficult to achieve and bring many problems for the consolidation of democracy.14

The characteristics of authoritarian and mature post-totalitarian regimes that enable facilitating conditions for a negotiated transition to emerge are as follows. These regimes typically have a leader who is constrained by the rule of law and the need to maintain a ruling coalition. The existence of a rule of law results in the leader behaving in a quite predictable manner.15 It also supports the existence of moderates in the regime. This characteristic will be contrasted with the unrestrained power of the ruler in a sultanistic regime.

Authoritarian and mature post-totalitarian regimes also exhibit limited pluralism within the regime and military. This pluralism facilitates the presence of different factions within the regime and military that have different views on policy and politics. The existence of limited pluralism sets the basis for the existence of moderates in the regime. Pluralism also exists in society and the economic sphere that provides a basis for

14 See, for instance, Munck and Leff (1999) and Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle (1995) for a description of different transition paths and the implications each has for consolidating democracy. It is also interesting to note that Munck and Leff point to a possible problem with transitions through pact making. They argue that transitions through transaction (pacts or settlements) have the problem of the “lingering power of the old elites and the loss of identity of the anti-authoritarian coalition” and that this leads to the adoption of institutional rules that generate clashes between the executive and legislature and hinders governability (Munck and Leff 1999: 210).
various opposition groups to make competing demands.\textsuperscript{16} This is contrasted below with sultanistic regimes where factions in the regime may fight for patronage from the ruler but no pluralism is allowed to exist in the regime or society in the form of questioning policy or posing a constraint to the ruler’s power.

One of the most significant traits of authoritarian and mature post-totalitarian regimes is that organizations with some autonomy and independence from the state are allowed to exist. This is contrasted with the total control over society and the economy exerted by sultanistic and totalitarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes frequently employ different types of corporatism as a means of linking the state and society. Often, the non-state groups have significant autonomy and negotiate with the state over policy. Mature post-totalitarian regimes have matured to a point where autonomous organizations flourish. This is a key trait that distinguishes mature post-totalitarian from pure totalitarian regimes.

The organized, autonomous nature of interest groups in authoritarian and mature post-totalitarian regimes is critical because interests and demands can be organized, articulated, and channeled in a coherent manner. The presence of autonomous elites with the authority to negotiate on behalf of their groups makes it more likely that countries with these regime traits will have the moderates in the opposition deemed necessary for a negotiated transition. These autonomous elites are also more likely than elites in

\textsuperscript{16} This is especially true in weakening authoritarian (Stepan, autumn 1997) and aging totalitarian (Bunce 1999) regimes. Bunce argues that over time totalitarian regimes redistribute resources from the center to the provinces, which initiates pluralism within the regime and society.

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countries with other regime types to be well connected to a mass base of people whose interests they are representing.  

This means that the elites will be able to control mass mobilization, which is thought to be important not only for negotiating a transition to democracy, but also for consolidating democracy. If solid organizational structures and strong elite-mass linkages exist, leaders can use the threat of mass mobilization as a resource in bargaining with the state. The leaders must, however, be able to turn the mobilization on and off as needed in the negotiating process. If mass mobilization is not controlled, it may derail the transition to democracy. Mobilization that continues into the post-transitional period could also threaten the stability of the new democracy.

Another characteristic of authoritarian and mature post-totalitarian regimes is that they have functioning and well-defined state institutions. The bureaucracy, for instance, can function quite effectively without intervention from the

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17 See Zhang (1994) for the argument that corporatist authoritarian regimes have the institutional structures most conducive to a negotiated transition. He places emphasis on the presence of autonomous elites in society who are organizationally connected to a mass base and capable of channeling demands into negotiation with the regime.

18 Huntington (summer 1984: 212) and Levine (April 1988: 392) note the importance of elite control over mobilization during negotiating. Valenzuela (July 1989: 449) argues that mobilization may be useful at points in the transition but then needs to subside so that elites can negotiate. This cannot be done without solid organizational connections between the elites and mass base that enable the elites to turn on and off mobilization. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds. argue similarly that continued mass mobilization may provoke a backlash from the military.

19 Bermeo (1999) calls this the “moderation argument” because it stresses the need for mobilization to be moderated. She disagrees with the assumption that only moderated mobilization is helpful for achieving a transition to democracy. She claims that high levels of mobilization of extremist groups can at times be instrumental and even crucial to achieving a transition to democracy. Tarrow (1995) argues similarly that high levels of mobilization can be very useful during the transitional period. Both Bermeo and Tarrow, however, are referring to mobilization at specific points during the transitional period. The assumption remains that the mobilization needs to be controlled so that it can be stopped when necessary, which makes their argument very similar to the “moderation argument” that they claim to criticize.

20 Although de-mobilization is thought to be good for the survival and consolidation of a new democracy, Tarrow (1995) points to a negative aspect of de-mobilization. It has the effect of creating a legacy of collective action based upon narrowly based interests. This is because the demobilization discourages collective action based upon working-class interests or broadly based interests of the poor.
rulers. Bureaucratic norms and procedures often place limits on the rulers in respect to how extensively the rulers can intervene in the bureaucratic process. This well-developed institutional structure is the basis of bureaucratic-authoritarian complexes where policy is essentially made by technocrats. In the case of mature post-totalitarianism, the party has frequently fragmented to the point that the bureaucracy becomes the instigator of policy.

The existence of the above characteristics enables facilitating conditions for a negotiated transition to emerge. This is not to say that a transition to democracy will necessarily occur, but when a transition is instigated, the conditions are likely to be present for a negotiated transition.

If a transition to democracy is made from one of the above-discussed regime types, the chance of consolidating democracy is better than if the pre-transition regime type were of another type. This is due both to the fact that the transition is likely to have been negotiated and due to the lingering effect of characteristics of the pre-transition regime. The pre-existence of autonomous organizations with solid linkages between the elite and mass base, controlled mobilization, and well-developed state institutions all help the functioning and consolidation of a new democracy.

We shall see in subsequent chapters that Indonesia's pre-transition regime appeared to lack the above-described facilitating conditions for a transition to democracy and instead more closely approximated the regime type of sultanism, described below. As the transition unfolded, however, individuals came to the fore who were able to play the role of opposition and regime moderates and a transition to democracy was negotiated. How

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21 Linz (1975).
this was possible and the difficulties imposed from the lack of many facilitating conditions is discussed in later parts of this work. A discussion of theories of regime change from sultanism, followed in the next chapter by details of the Suharto regime, is first necessary in order to understand the constraints to and opportunities for achieving and consolidating democracy in Indonesia.

2.3. Sultanistic Regimes Lack Facilitating Conditions for Negotiating a Transition to Democracy

2.3.1 Characteristics of Sultanistic Regimes

How characteristics of sultanism, and totalitarianism, are theorized to preclude a transition to democracy directly from these regime types is explained below. This is a discussion of theory. The subsequent chapter will detail which aspects of Suharto's regime in Indonesia approximated sultanism, or totalitarianism, and which traits differentiated it from these regime types. This is followed, in later chapters, by an analysis of how Indonesia was able to achieve a transition to democracy and problems the country is facing with consolidating democracy.

Characteristics that typify sultanism are thought to preclude the emergence of the above-described facilitating conditions for negotiating a transition to democracy. In the ideal model of regime typologies, sultanistic regimes are an “extreme form of patrimonialism” where the private and public are fused, economic and political success depends on a personal relationship to the ruler, the ruler acts only according to his own
unchecked discretion, and there is a lack of rationalized impersonal ideology.\textsuperscript{22} The military versus civilian nature of the regime is difficult to classify since “fused are not only the private and the public; but also the civilian and the military” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 70).

The following discussion focuses mainly on the ideal type of sultanism, but totalitarian regimes also lack facilitating conditions for negotiated transitions.\textsuperscript{23} Totalitarian regimes do not allow political, economic, and social pluralism to exist and have rulers who rule with ill-defined limits to their power.\textsuperscript{24} The rulers are, however, somewhat constrained in their actions by the guiding ideology. Mobilization controlled by the regime is encouraged in totalitarianism whereas most all mobilization is discouraged under sultanism.

Sultanism, in contrast to authoritarianism, does not have an institutionalized rule of law, limited political pluralism in the regime or society, moderates in the regime or opposition, nor autonomous spheres where the sultan cannot intervene. The ruler in sultanism acts as he pleases, whereas in authoritarian regimes, the ruler is usually constrained by laws that must be recognized, a code of conduct, maintaining a ruling coalition, and the autonomous functioning of the bureaucracy.

Chehabi and Linz (1998: 7) define the ideal type of a sultanistic regime to consist of the following: The regime is based on personal rulership with loyalty to the ruler stemming from a mixture of fear and rewards, not from ideological commitment or

\textsuperscript{22} This description of sultanism is from Linz and Stepan (1996: 52-54). See chapter 4 of Linz and Stepan (1996) for sultanism and other regime types defined along four dimensions: pluralism, ideology, mobilization, and leadership.
\textsuperscript{23} See Zhang (1994) for a thorough account of institutional aspects of totalitarianism that preclude negotiated transitions.
\textsuperscript{24} Linz and Stepan (1996: 40).
charismatic qualities of the ruler; the ruler uses power at his own discretion and is unencumbered by rules or commitment to an ideology; the professional norms of bureaucratic administration are subverted by arbitrary personal decisions of the ruler; corruption reigns at all levels of society; the staff of the ruler are directly chosen by the ruler and tend to rotate positions frequently, thus, subverting professional norms; the position of the sultan’s staff depends upon their personal submission to the ruler and their authority derives from their relationship to the ruler; the ruler and his associates do not represent any class or corporate interests; legitimacy of the ruler extends from the system of rewards and fear that the ruler dispenses and not on a legal-rational, ideological, or even traditional basis.

As Chehabi and Linz acknowledge, no regime fits this ideal type perfectly. Instead of continually referring to a regime’s “sultanistic tendencies,” they use the general term of sultanism or sultanistic regime when the regime meets most of the criteria of the ideal type. Other scholars have used the term neo-patrimonial (for example, Bratton and van de Walle: 1997) to refer to essentially the same regime type. I prefer to use the term sultanism for the sake of simplicity, although theory based upon the so-called neo-patrimonial regime type will also be used in this dissertation and should be noted as referring to essentially the same type of regime as ones termed sultanistic.25

Additional details about the characteristics of sultanism are as follows (Chehabi and Linz 1998: 10-22): First, the line between regime and state is blurred. This means that the sultan manages the state bureaucracy and military as if they were his own personal

25 See Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) for a breakdown of the neo-patrimonial (sultanistic) regime type into sub-categories based upon Robert Dahl’s (1971) dimensions of participation and competition allowed to exist in the regime.
A sultan may bring technocrats into the state, but they are employed only as long as they please the sultan. His whim determines when they come and go. Officials in general must please the sultan in order to maintain their positions, and officials are rotated in and out of office rapidly so that the sultan can maintain strict control over their subservience.

A second characteristic of sultanism, and one that should already be clear, is that the sultan has a personalistic nature of rule. This entails both a cult of personality and dynastic elements of rule including the inclusion of family members in high positions and as recipients of lucrative contracts. "The reason for the dynasticism of sultanistic regimes is perhaps that the rulers feel that they can trust only their kith and kin. Most often the sultanistic rulers come from humble origins and are looked down upon by the traditional elite." 27

A third characteristic contends that while constitutions may exist which give autonomous authority to state institutions, in fact these constitutions are manipulated to the sultan’s whim. The ruler may claim to be following the constitution and make a great show of this while actually ruling by his own decrees. Sultans often claim to be following a democratic constitution and even hold elections, sometimes allowing opposition parties to exist, but invariably, the sultan’s party overwhelmingly wins the elections. 28

Fourth, sultans have narrow bases of support in society since their support is based upon patronage distribution. This is in spite of the fact that the regime may have at one

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26 Linz (1975).
time had a lot of support in society. As the regime relies increasingly on rewards and punishments to maintain power, as opposed to implementing an ideology approved of by society, and thus becomes more sultanistic, its support base narrows. Patronage can only be passed around to so many people. Thus, the sultan is not supported by large classes or groups in society, but instead is supported by those select individuals who benefit from his patronage.29

In order to give out patronage, the sultan needs to monopolize key economic resources that can lead to opposition to his rule from other people who want to participate in those sectors of the economy but are excluded from the sultan's privileged favor. This leads to the final characteristic of sultanism, which is that capitalism, while existing in sultanistic countries, is often distorted due to the monopolies and special privileges given to the sultan's family and cronies. These monopolies, combined with unpredictable policymaking and the lack of a rule of law, create hardships for capitalist entrepreneurs working in these countries, not to mention the havoc wrought on a free exchange system by rampant corruption. Thus, unlike authoritarian regimes that are often supported by the entrepreneurial class as a whole, sultanistic regimes' exclusionary system of dispensing patronage alienates large segments of this class, making them a potential source of opposition to the regime.30

It will be shown in the following chapter that Suharto's regime in Indonesia, prior to the transition to democracy, largely approximated sultanism. His regime was based upon a patronage network that extended out from him. Loyalty and submission to him was given priority over professionalism in his choice of staff for the bureaucracy, military,

and other state institutions. His regime took on a familial like quality due to the necessity to be personally close to him to be placed in high position. He, however, frequently rotated his staff to prevent the accumulation of power in alternative places. Suharto was not held accountable to a systematic rule of law or checked by an autonomous bureaucracy or pluralism in his regime. He instead ruled as he pleased, largely through decree, and subordinated the once autonomous military to him. Autonomous organizations in society were strictly controlled. Although it will be shown that the regime had some non-sultanistic traits, particularly an entrenched military and the existence of some semi-autonomous organizations, the regime's predominantly sultanistic nature presented many obstacles to achieving a transition to democracy.

2.3.2. Exits from Sultanism

Sultanistic regimes are thought to have great difficulty in making a negotiated transition to democracy because they lack the necessary moderate players in both the regime and opposition.\textsuperscript{31} For instance, Linz and Stepan (1996) state:

A regime that approximates the sultanistic ideal type does not have the \textit{reforma pactada-ruptura pactada} [negotiated transition] available as a transition path because the two moderate players are absent. There is absolutely no room on the 'household' staff of the sultan for a moderate player who publicly negotiates the demise of his employer [and] neither civil society nor political society has enough autonomy to enable a publicly organized democratic opposition to develop sufficient negotiating capacity for it to be a full player in any pacted transition (61-62).

\textsuperscript{31} See Linz and Stepan (1996 chapters 4 and 18), Chehabi and Linz (1998 chapters 1 and 2), Snyder (1998), and Bratton and van de Walle (1997) for more information on exits from sultanism.
As stated, totalitarian regimes, specifically early and pure totalitarian and frozen post-totalitarian regimes, are theorized, similar to sultanistic regimes, to lack the pluralism within the regime and society that enables the existence of moderate players to emerge. These forms of totalitarianism are therefore expected to follow a path of regime change similar to that of sultanism and are mentioned at points in the following explanation of theoretical exit paths from sultanism.

Based on a study of democratic transitions in Africa, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) argue that pacts are not likely to occur in neo-patrimonial (sultanistic) regimes because the regime insiders have everything to lose with the fall of their patron. This causes incumbent and opposition leaders to become polarized in “all or nothing power struggles.” In this situation, neither the regime nor the opposition is willing to negotiate.

Linz and Chehabi (1998) say, “a sultanistic regime can endure a long time, but experience shows that most end in a more or less chaotic way” (37). They argue that sultanistic regimes are unlikely to institute liberalizing reforms on their own that lead to a

32 Linz and Stepan (1996 chapters 3 and 4) and Zhang (1994).
33 For information on attempts to democratize in some specific countries with these regime types, see the following. For China, which is totalitarian, see Zhang (1994), Lin (1992), and Esherick and Wasserstrom (Nov. 1990). The China case presents an example of the regime repressing mobilization against it in Tiananmen Square. For East Germany, which was early totalitarian, see Kamenitsa (April 1998), Friedheim (April 1993), and Hirschman (Jan. 1993). For Czechoslovakia, which was frozen post-totalitarian, see Linz and Stepan (1996 chapter 17), Wheaton and Kavan (1992), and Bradley (1992). East Germany and Czechoslovakia were able to democratize but, especially Czechoslovakia since East Germany unified with West Germany, have experienced problems with the consolidation of democracy that can be traced back to their pre-transition regime type. The story of Romania is also an interesting case that combines totalitarian with sultanistic traits. For information on Romania’s attempted transition, see Fischer (1992), Sislin (1991), and Calinescu and Tismaneanu (1992).
34 Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 84).
35 Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 86) view the struggle in sultanistic regimes as not being between the paradigmatic hard- and soft-liners that comes from literature on transitions from authoritarian regimes, but instead view the struggle in neo-patrimonial regimes as being between insiders and outsiders of the patronage network. This means that an opposition movement may be taken over by people who are not motivated by democratic zeal but are outside of the patronage network and want inside.
democratization process, as might occur in an authoritarian regime. The logic of sultanism necessitates that the sultan must maintain tight control over the regime and society with himself at the apex of the pyramid.

The sultan must keep himself in the unchallenged position at the top because he has no real basis of legitimacy except for the system of rewards and fear that he personally hands out to ensure loyalty from key players. As stated, no specific groups or classes of society are in a coalition with the sultan as often exists under authoritarian rule. Reforms are not likely to be regime initiated in such a situation.

If the sultan were to allow such reforms, the whole basis of his rule would begin to crumble since he would then have to face a more organized civil society and challenges from within the state itself. Furthermore, if the sultan ever did try to initiate reforms to appease some sector of society, the opposition forces would be wary of trusting the sultan. For instance, if the sultan claimed that free elections would be held, the opposition would likely not trust this promise since “the government claims that elections have always been free.”

The characteristics of sultanism are thus thought to preclude the possibility of making a negotiated transition to democracy. Specifically, the absence of moderate players in both the regime and the opposition leaves only the hard-line regime versus maximalist opposition forces. This is predicted to lead to a violent conflict between the two immovable sides with one or the other side winning the state. This is if the military is not

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autonomous enough to step in as an institution in its own right and take over governance.\(^{37}\)

Attempts to exit from sultanism are expected to entail mass initiated regime change with violent clashes between the mobilized opposition and the regime.\(^{38}\) The outcome is likely to be either brutal suppression of the opposition, regime overthrow and establishment of a revolutionary regime, or a shift to a more standard military-authoritarian regime.\(^{39}\) Regime collapse, instead of violent overthrow, is also possible but occurs only at the last minute when it is clear that the sultan has lost all legitimacy and can no longer rule effectively.\(^{40}\)

Since the sultan is usually out of touch with the feelings of society, due to being surrounded by sycophants who all fear displeasing him by bringing bad news, he is often taken by surprise when mass mobilization suddenly surfaces. He fails to see the seriousness of the situation until it is too late:

Faced with a serious challenge, the sultanistic regime disintegrates rapidly. When Batista was faced with Castro’s rebels, the Shah with essentially unarmed

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\(^{37}\) If the military does coup, it will likely be acting alone and without the support of the middle class. This is because, contrary to authoritarian regimes, the middle/professional class under a sultanistic regime sides with the masses in opposition to the sultan (in authoritarian regimes, the middle or capitalist class often supports a military coup to restore order or maintain a capitalist economy). The distorted economy created by the sultan’s use of patronage alienates large segments of the middle and capitalist classes. Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 89).

\(^{38}\) Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 83) state that mass protest is the most likely mode of transition from a neo-patrimonial regime because the regime resists opening politics for as long as possible and seeks to manage the transition only after it has been forced upon them.

\(^{39}\) Chahabi and Linz (1998). Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 169-77) are less restrictive in their analysis, especially if the country had a prior history of democracy or if limited political competition was allowed to exist under sultanism. They break neo-patrimonial regimes into four subtypes and give corresponding paths that the regime is likely to follow in response to mass protests. Regime responses include promising reforms, holding a national conference, or holding elections. These responses were, however, frequently stalling tactics and the regime continued to seek ways to block democratization. See also Bratton and van de Walle (July 1994).

\(^{40}\) Chehabi and Linz (1998). Regime collapse refers specifically to the withdrawal of support for the regime by defectors. Regime collapse can be achieved through peaceful demonstrations, as well as being the end product of revolutionary overthrow.
demonstrators, Idi Amin with an invasion force consisting of exiles and Tanzanian troops, Jean-Claude Duvalier with widespread demonstrations, and Mobutu with a strong rebel force, their regimes collapsed.41

Foreign powers (usually the United States) that had supported the regime may abandon it and seek a moderate leader who can stave off total revolution while also providing a quick escape for the sultan as his supporters suddenly drop away and his exile becomes necessary.42

The military is often in a weakened state due to the sultan’s concern with ensuring it was not an institution capable of toppling him and by the rampant corruption allowed to prevail. Therefore, the military may not be capable of quelling the mass movement that suddenly arises. This depends on the particular ruling conditions of different sultanistic leaders, but “when rulers finally decide to step down, their armies, given their organizational incoherence, often disintegrate, opening the way for a guerrilla army (Cuba) or counter-government supported by mass movements (Iran, the Philippines) to take power.”43

Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol argue that sultanistic regimes are more vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow than other regime types because of the nature of opposition that emerges under sultanistic regimes.44 They argue that the sultan’s attempt to eliminate all opposition has the result of driving it underground and radicalizing the opposition.

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42 Although international factors can play a role in regime change, transitions theory generally gives more weight to domestic factors. This is because the same international factor, similar to economic crisis, has varying effects on countries depending upon the domestic factors (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 31-3 and Linz and Stepan 1996: 72-3).
44 Goodwin and Skocpol (December 1989). Theories on exits from sultanism originated from works on revolutions where it was noted that revolutions commonly occurred under sultanistic regimes. For works on sultanism and revolution, see Goodwin and Skocpol (Dec. 1989), Foran (1993), Dix (1983), and Farhi (1988).
Sometimes, religious organizations are the only institutions in civil society that are allowed to exist and thus become a conduit for opposition to the regime. This can combine with the radical nature of outlawed opposition to take on overtones of religious fundamentalism as was seen in Iran with the revolution against the Shah. Other times the radicalized opposition takes on communist overtones, such as occurred in Cuba against Batista and in Nicaragua against Somoza.

This is one reason why democracy is not likely to be installed after a sultan’s overthrow by a mass movement. The leader of the uprising, who then becomes leader of the new government, is likely to claim that the “people” have already won power and that elections are therefore unnecessary. The old status quo may also be threatening to stage a counter-revolution and therefore the new government finds a justification for imposing strict rule over the country in the name of securing the revolution. The situation remains polarized and the opposing sides cannot cooperate or reach agreements. The “revolutionary” government quickly becomes as repressive as the previous regime.

The opposition to a sultanistic regime does not, however, always consist of a radicalized underground movement. Spontaneous and disorganized mobilization may also erupt to demand the ousting of the sultan. This type of mobilization usually has few clearly defined goals beyond the overthrow of the sultan. Leadership and organization within the opposition is usually lacking due to the sultan’s tight rule over society. This situation is ripe for a new sultan from within the old regime to emerge to

replace the old sultan or for the military to come to the fore and either repress the
mobilization in defense of the sultan or seize control over the state.\(^{47}\)

If a transition to democracy is achieved through the driving force of disorganized
mobilization, the new democratic regime, regardless of the pre-transition regime type,
may have trouble controlling mobilization in the post-transitional period. The lack of a
clear plan will also cause problems for the new political leadership. This is especially
true if the transitional period was very short or did not entail elite agreement on the new
rules of the game.\(^{48}\)

The Philippines must be noted as an exception to the above theory on exits from
sultanism because democracy was re-installed after Marcos was overthrown in 1986.
The exceptionalism of this case has been attributed by Thompson (1995) to some unique
traits that co-existed in the Philippines with sultanistic traits. The prior experience with
democracy in the Philippines left the existence of moderates in the opposition and
organized parties even during the sultanistic period. Another important factor in the
Philippines was the greater institutional autonomy of the military, which enabled a
moderate faction within the military to come forth and negotiate with the opposition and
stave off a revolution by the more radical elements of the opposition.\(^{49}\) The Philippines

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\(^{47}\) Tiananmen Square in China is an example of repressed mobilization against a totalitarian regime for
these reasons. Lin (1992) presents a detailed account of events and a discussion on the nature of the
opposition movement. See also Zhang (1994) and Esherick and Wasserstrom (Nov. 1990). Romania
presents an example of a sultanistic (combined with totalitarian) regime that was opposed by a mobilized
but disorganized opposition. Due to the lack of organization and clear goals of the opposition, after
Ceausescu and his family were killed, a faction of the Communist Party was able to take control of the state
(Fischer 1992).

\(^{48}\) Czechoslovakia is an example of a sudden transition to democracy brought through disorganized mass
mobilization. The lack of agreement on the new institutional structure and constitution created immediate
problems. It had not even been decided whether to allow the Communist Party or incumbent members of
the regime to participate in the free elections. The opposition elite quickly fractured, which enabled the
Communist Party to regain a significant amount of power after the transition (Munck and Leff 1999).

\(^{49}\) Thompson (1995).
case thus shows that some mediating factors may be present that open up more possibilities for regime change from sultanism. The vast majority of sultanistic regimes, however, are expected to be constrained in the paths and outcomes available for regime change.

If somehow democracy is installed following an episode of sultanistic rule, the new democracy is likely to bear a lot of scars and have difficulty consolidating. The nature of institutions and society under sultanism, and most forms of totalitarianism, leaves the new democracy with the problem of simultaneously trying to craft institutions and a rule of law, and to develop a civil, political, and economic society.\(^{50}\) Perhaps most importantly, the intertwining of state institutions under sultanism and totalitarianism results in even the most fundamental elements of a modern state needing to be developed.

For instance, political institutions need to be transformed into autonomous entities and need to begin functioning according to a regularized rule of law and standard of professionalism. Accomplishing this task alone is difficult and represents the enormity of the leap from sultanism or totalitarianism directly to democracy. This is in contrast to a transition to democracy from authoritarianism or mature post-totalitarianism where the nature of the shift involves mainly just the means through which rulers come to power, not the reconstruction of institutions through which they rule.

A democracy, if it survives, that emerges following sultanism or totalitarianism is therefore not likely to function well for quite some time. Personalism and clientalism

\(^{50}\) Linz and Stepan (1996: 55-56). These authors contend that all five arenas of democracy would need to be crafted. The five arenas are: civil society, political society, constitutionalism and the rule of law, professional norms and autonomy of the state bureaucracy, and economic society. See also Linz, Stepan, and Gunther (1995) for the difficulty of making changes in many areas simultaneous with a transition to democracy.
will probably remain a feature of the new regime “with the democratically elected leaders using the resources of their office to build nationwide patron-client relationships.”

Local kingpins or sultans may also emerge using pre-existing patronage networks and taking advantage of the weakening of centralized rule that is likely to come with the passing of the sultan and the absence of developed state institutions.

The following chapters will show how the obstacles to achieving a transition to democracy in Indonesia, which stemmed mostly from sultanistic - with some totalitarian - aspects of Suharto’s regime, were overcome but continue to haunt the country in the post-transitional period. The Indonesian case shows that it is sometimes possible to make a negotiated transition to democracy from a regime type that is predominantly sultanistic, despite the above-described problems. However, consolidating a high-quality democracy has been elusive in Indonesia as is theorized. Not only have characteristics of the pre-transition regime been difficult to transform into modern and democratic institutions, but the means through which the transition was achieved have also created problems for the consolidation of democracy.

Specifically, the disorganized nature of the mass mobilization that drove the transition and the disconnection between the opposition elite and mass base have made it difficult for the elite to demobilize society in the post-transitional period. Instead, the elite have begun to manipulate mobilization in ways that portend danger for the survival of democracy. The disconnection within the opposition between the elite and mass base also prevented mass based demands from being channeled through the elite during negotiations. This resulted in narrowly defined agreements between the opposition,

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51 Chehabi and Linz (1998: 45).
regime, and military, that focused mainly on opening up opportunities for the opposition elite to get into the circle of power and failed to make institutional and constitutional reform that is necessary for a well functioning democracy. The pessimistic predictions about the success of a democracy created on the heels of sultanism threaten to come to fruition and overshadow the euphoria brought by the stunning achievement of the transition to democracy in Indonesia.
CHAPTER 3

REGIME AND SOCIETY UNDER SUHARTO'S "NEW ORDER"

Many traits of Suharto's regime approximated the typology of sultanism. In addition to the predominantly sultanistic regime traits, some other, especially totalitarian traits, also existed. How characteristics of sultanism and totalitarianism theoretically present obstacles for achieving a transition to and consolidation of democracy was described in the previous chapter. This chapter describes in detail the traits of Indonesia's pre-transition regime and their evolution. How these traits approximate sultanism or how they deviate from the ideal type of this regime classification is explained.

Many obstacles to democratization typically found in sultanistic and totalitarian regimes existed in Suharto's regime and had to be overcome in order for a transition to democracy to be possible. This included traits of both the regime and society. The regime lacked dissent and pluralism due to the necessity of being completely subservient and loyal to Suharto. This common feature of sultanism usually precludes the emergence of moderates within the regime who are essential for negotiating a transition to democracy.

Society lacked autonomous organizations that could provide a basis for an opposition movement against the regime. Individuals who were oppositional to the regime were
likewise not tolerated by Suharto. It was therefore believed by most observers and analysts that Suharto would not be challenged by any significant opposition movement or leaders in society. The enforced loyalty within the regime made the possibility of a challenge to Suharto’s continued rule from within the government party or military equally unlikely.

Based upon this assessment, it was presumed that Suharto would continue to rule until old age forced him to name a successor of his choice. His successor would likely lack the unlimited authority held by Suharto and would therefore have to share some power and decision-making with the military and government party. In this manner, it was believed that dynamics would be set in motion that would move the regime from being predominantly sultanistic to being a more standard variety of authoritarian. Over time, some facilitating conditions for democratization would hopefully emerge. It was presumed, however, that a shift to democracy would take decades.

The above-described scenario never unfolded in the gradual manner anticipated. Instead, events would suddenly and quickly transform the regime from one based on the personal rule of one man who amassed most all power in his hands to a government that was democratically elected in the country’s first democratic elections since 1955. How this was possible and the ramifications of characteristics of the pre-transition regime for the nature of the transition and the consolidation of a well-functioning democracy is examined throughout this work.

The obstacles to moving from a predominantly sultanistic regime, with totalitarian traits, to democracy are shown in this chapter so that the course of the transition can be better understood. The basis for the emergence and significance of the three variables
that are highlighted in the analysis of the transition that is presented in this work is found in the characteristics of Suharto's regime. For instance, the disorganized nature of the mass mobilization that eventually rose up to confront the regime in the midst of a severe economic crisis can be traced back to Suharto's curtailment of autonomous organizations, which is discussed in this chapter. The totalitarian-like penetration of the regime into society also prevented the development of a substantial underground opposition movement. This explains why no revolutionary movement existed that was capable of overthrowing the regime and offering an alternative basis for government. Instead, the frustrations felt throughout society were expressed in a violent but chaotic manner that lacked leadership, organization, and vision. The forms of mobilization will be traced throughout the transitional period in subsequent chapters along with the impact this characteristic of the transition has had on attempts to consolidate a high quality democracy.

Another example of how characteristics of Suharto's regime structured the nature of the transition to democracy in Indonesia can be seen in the emergence of a moderate opposition elite after Suharto was forced from power. As is described below, despite the strict control and de-politicization of society that prevented an organized opposition from forming, a few semi-autonomous, but not very oppositional, organizations that pre-dated Suharto's regime were allowed to exist. Although these organizations were not principle components of the mass mobilization that would rise and overthrow Suharto, their existence enabled three individuals with nationally recognized names who were not central figures in the regime to come to play the role of a moderate opposition elite once Suharto was forced from power by mass mobilization. The existence of these figures is a
key component explaining why Indonesia was able to negotiate a transition to
democracy. However, as stressed in this chapter, none of these three figures who came to
the fore of the opposition movement had constituted a significant threat to Suharto while
he ruled. The lack of organizational linkages of these figures to the mass based
mobilized opposition also created problems throughout the transition that extended into
the post-transitional period.

The third variable highlighted in this work’s analysis of Indonesia’s transition to
democracy centers on weaknesses and lack of unity in the military. These traits can be
traced back to the military’s relationship with Suharto. This chapter shows that the
military lacked autonomy, especially in the last decade of Suharto’s rule, and was
dependent upon Suharto for guidance. Rivalries were also created within the military by
Suharto through extensive intervention in the promotion of officers. These characteristics
weakened the military’s ability to suppress the mobilization against the regime and
contributed to the fragmentation of the military that occurred once Suharto was forced
from power. These weaknesses are also key to explaining the military’s neutrality
throughout most of the transitional period.

Despite these weaknesses and general neutrality of the military during the
transitional period, the military made specific demands during the negotiating that ensued
between the remnants of Suharto’s regime and the opposition elite. The source of these
demands is presented in this chapter. The military’s entrenched position in governance
down to the local level and in the economy gave the military institutional interests that
extended beyond Suharto’s rule. The moderation of the opposition elite protected the
military from mass-based demands that the military completely extricate itself from politics and the economy.

Besides the origins of the three variables that largely determined the course of regime change from Suharto's regime into something else, other characteristics of the regime and economy influenced the transition and efforts to consolidate democracy. The totalitarian-like nature of the government party that originated in the late Sukarno era but was expanded and developed by Suharto to maintain his personal rule provided a basis for the continuance of the regime once Suharto was gone. The origins and manner in which Suharto used this party to uphold his rule are described below. Although the party was strictly controlled by Suharto and did not represent an autonomous focus of power, the organizational structure of the party enabled it to survive once he was gone. The party was an important component of the regime that remained when Suharto transferred power to his vice president. Without Suharto there to demand subservience and preclude dissent, some moderates emerged from within Golkar who were able to negotiate with the moderate opposition elite. Struggles took place within Golkar and between Golkar and the new president over the course of the transition. These battles and the difficulty of separating Golkar from the state bureaucracy and developing a raison d'être besides upholding Suharto's rule is described in subsequent chapters.

Suharto's personal control did not stop with politics and society but extended to control over the economy. Although he at times made the choice to allow free-market economists to make economic policy, he always watched over them and intervened at will. As described below, his family and cronies were given special privileges in the economic sphere and became very rich. Corruption and the lack of an institutionalized
rule of law permeated the economy and regime, which were core causes for the severity of the economic crash of late 1997. Creating an economy in the post-Suharto era that is governed by predictable rules has proved to be as difficult as creating political institutions ruled by a regularized system of law.

The vague constitution used first by Sukarno when he moved the country to “guided democracy” and then by Suharto did not clearly define a balance of powers between institutions. Having some understanding of the constitutional basis and institutional structure of Suharto’s regime, which is discussed in this chapter, is important because reform to the constitution and political institutions would become a divisive issue for the opposition during the transitional period. The moderation of the opposition elite and disorganization of the mass-based opposition would result in a lack of reform in this area and a strictly limited focus on free elections as the basis of the transition to democracy. The narrowly focused scope of negotiations during the transitional period and the vague constitution and ill-defined political institutions that characterized the pre-transition regime have created problems for the functioning and consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.

3.1. Origins of Suharto’s “New Order” Regime in Historical Context

Indonesia consists of over 13,000 islands. Five of these constitute the “main” islands: Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Papua (the western half of the island of New Guinea). The archipelago stretches 2,000 kilometers from north to south and over 5,000 kilometers from east to west.¹

¹ Liddle (October 1996: 66).
Over 200 different ethnic groups are clustered in different regions speaking their own languages and following their own customs.\(^2\) The Javanese are the largest ethnic group and comprise nearly one half of the population of 220 million people. This is despite Java being the smallest of the bigger islands. The Sundanese are the second largest ethnic group composing about 15% of the population. The Sundanese live on the western part of the island of Java. Following this are numerous smaller groups, the largest being the Buginese of Sulawesi, the Batak of North Sumatra, and the Acehnese of Aceh. The Chinese constitute a minority of approximately 3 percent of the population, but are widely resented for holding a disproportionate share of the wealth.

The story of Suharto’s rise to power is still nebulous and debated. On October 1, 1965, after several years of economic chaos and regional rebellion under President Sukarno’s flamboyant rule, the public was told that persons associated with the communist party were trying to stage a coup against President Sukarno’s government. Several top army generals had been brutally killed, some in front of their families, and their bodies had been stuffed into a well. Chaos ensued for a brief period as no one was clearly in control of the country. In the end, a little known army general, Suharto, gained control of the army and of the country. Suharto kept his predecessor, Sukarno, as a figurehead president, under virtual house arrest, for a couple of years.

In order to put the Suharto regime in perspective, a brief history of the country since independence is given before discussing traits of Suharto’s regime. The role of the military in politics throughout this history and the failed attempt in the 1950s to rewrite

\(^2\) For an analysis of Indonesian culture from a perspective of “unity in diversity,” which is the national motto, see Liddle (1988).
the constitution and establish a democracy are highlighted because these factors are important for understanding the recent transition to democracy.

3.1.1. The Role of the Military

Indonesia had won independence in 1949 through fighting the Dutch when they attempted to return after World War II.³ The Dutch had ruled the islands of Indonesia first through the Dutch East Indies Trading Company, beginning in the 1600s and then directly.⁴ Sukarno was a civilian leader of the movement for independence and became the country's first president.

The Indonesian army that fought the Dutch was tightly connected to the people and was dependent upon them for food and clothing and assistance in fighting.⁵ The army was loosely organized with individual units responsible for obtaining their own funds and munitions. Business ventures were established, often in partnership with Chinese, in order to finance the needs of individual army units. For several years after independence, the army also fulfilled tasks of governing in many areas while the civilian government was getting organized.⁶

³ See, Reid (1986) and Said (1991) for accounts of the revolutionary period and origins of the Indonesian military. The army was the main component of the armed forces, although a navy was formed in 1945 and an air force in 1946 and helped to fight off the Dutch. (Lowry 1996: 95-108).
⁴ Not all parts of what is today Indonesia were subjugated to Dutch control at the same time. Gaining authority over the archipelago was a gradual process with some areas more difficult to subdue, especially Bali and Aceh.
⁵ The army had been created not by the civilian leaders of the independence movement, but by people who had served in the Japanese youth brigades during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. This origin of the army as a separate force from the civilian politicians influenced the later development of the army’s perceived role in society and politics as being a watchdog over the country. See Sundhaussen (1982) for an early history of the military.
⁶ Crouch (1993). Little governing structure had been left by the Dutch.
During these early years in the nation’s history, the army developed its “middle way” philosophy that justified its involvement in governance and politics. This was later accepted as an official doctrine of the army in 1965 and called *dwı fungsi*, or dual function. *Dwi fungsi* states that the army is both a military and a “social-political force,” which includes the ideological, political, social, economic, cultural, and religious realms. Besides the doctrine of *dwı fungsi*, the army’s *Sapta Marga* – sacred soldier’s oath – states that the army is defender of a noncommunist, nonconfessional, and unitary state.

During the 1950s, the army had the problem of fragmentation as some regional commanders supported local rebellions and demands for secession. Sukarno supported the central command of the army and authorized suppression of these movements. The army was also faced with what it perceived to be threats from both the left and the right. Islamic groups demanding an Islamic state were creating deadlock in the Constitutional

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7 The basis of the philosophy was articulated by the leader of the armed forces, General Nasution in 1957 when he stated that the military should participate in politics but not seek to achieve a dominant position. This became known as the “middle way” (Lev 1966: 191-2). The concept was put before the National Military Academy in Central Java in 1958. In 1962, at the army’s seminar at the Army Staff and Command College in Bandung, the concept was expanded to specify that defending the nation required good relations between the military and the people. The military should therefore maintain a presence in the territories in order to help promote the well being of society, especially in poor, rural areas. The military was also responsible for the political education of the people and instilling in them a sense of national identity. The military should guarantee political stability and social justice. This was all done in the context of the perceived failure of civilian politicians to fulfill the above mentioned goals to the Indonesian people and in the context of countering a growing communist party (Sundhaussen 1982).

8 This was done at the first Indonesian Army Seminar in April 1965 and was largely a response to the perceived threat of communism (Suryadinata 1998: 9). The agreement reached at the army seminar resulted in two doctrines being produced that comprise the “dual function” philosophy.


11 Beginning in 1956, civilian and military rebels challenged the government’s authority in several regions, especially on the islands of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and in West Java.

12 Crouch (1993: 37).
Assembly in the mid 1950s. The communist party, PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party) was simultaneously gaining momentum.\(^{13}\)

In mid-1958, army leaders proposed a return to the Constitution of 1945. The army hoped that this would enable it to increase its political role. Sukarno later agreed to dissolve the parliament, as is discussed below, seeing the opportunity to expand his own powers.\(^{14}\) The army did not acquire the dominant position it sought under Sukarno's "guided democracy" that lasted from 1959-65 and was not allowed to repress the communist party and Muslim desires for an Islamic state as it wanted. Instead, Sukarno balanced demands from the army, communists, and Muslims.\(^{15}\)

As the communist party grew in strength under Sukarno's protection, the army began to resent Sukarno and wanted the opportunity to rid the country of the communists. On October 1, 1965, several of the army's top generals were murdered.\(^{16}\) This began a chain of events that resulted in a young, relatively unknown general coming to power.

Suharto had been commander of Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Army Strategic Reserve Command) for four years before the murders. With all of the leading generals dead, Suharto was the highest ranked remaining active duty officer.\(^{17}\) He therefore assumed command of the military. It was hoped that the rising social and

\(^{13}\) The communist party did surprisingly well in the 1955 elections, getting 17% of the vote, even though it had been severely repressed in 1948 by the army. The party did even better in local elections held in some regions in 1957 (Liddle 1970).

\(^{14}\) Liddle (March 2002: 16).

\(^{15}\) Sukarno needed the army for its repressive capabilities but in order to avoid being a "prisoner" of the army, Sukarno cultivated the strength of the communist party. He also had ideological sympathy for the party (Suryadinata 1998: 7).

\(^{16}\) The circumstances and perpetrators are still unclear. The most persuasive account, which assigns principal responsibility to a coalition of communists and junior army officers, is Crouch (1993: chapter 4).

\(^{17}\) Said (June 1998).
economic disorder would be quelled and that the threats from the left and right could finally be eradicated by the military.

Suharto acted quickly after assuming power to purge the army of leftists and Sukarno supporters. He also took away power from regional commanders, intelligence, and planning units and centralized it in his hands. He removed opponents and placed people who were loyal to him in top positions. Sukarno was put under virtual house arrest as Suharto took control of the country. Communists were slaughtered as the army attempted to eradicate them once and for all. It is estimated that at least half a million people were killed during the carnage and tens of thousands more jailed for decades.

Suharto progressively subordinated the military to himself and was able to effectively manipulate the doctrine of dwi fungsi and the centralized powers given to the president under the constitution of 1945 to gain control over the military. He intervened in promotions and placement of officers to build a loyal cadre of soldiers around him who did not threaten his unlimited powers. After his fall, many military leaders sought to understand how the military had been so manipulated and reexamined the original meaning of the dwi fungsi doctrines as they sought to regain the autonomy that had been lost under Suharto’s rule.

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18 Said (June 1998).
19 Cribb (1990). Most of this killing was done on the islands of Java and Bali. Not only the army was responsible for this rampage. Local Islamic leaders who had been threatened by the communists had many of their fellow villagers killed.
20 Leading experts on the military’s involvement in politics throughout Indonesia’s history point to Suharto’s progressive subordination of the military until it became his personal tool for maintaining his power and lost the institutional autonomy it once had. See, for instance, Said (June 1998) and Suryadinata (1998).
3.1.2. The Failed Attempt to Establish a Democracy

During the early years of independence, civilian politicians hit a roadblock in trying to craft a democratic constitution that would clearly define how political institutions would function. The only free election held in the country before the general election in June 1999 was held in 1955. The parliamentarians were given the task of crafting a new constitution. This constitution was to replace the hastily written constitution of 1945 and the parliamentary democracy constitution of 1950 that was temporarily being used.21

Under the constitution of 1950, Sukarno was president but prime ministers came and went at a rate of more than one per year.

Four parties won an almost equal share of votes in the 1955 elections. Two of these parties were based on Islam: one, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), was based on modernist Islam and received most of its support from the islands outside of Java; the other, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, Association of Muslim Scholars), was based on traditionalist Islam and received most of its support from central and east Java.22 The other two parties consisted of a nationalist party, PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party) that had been founded by Sukarno in the 1920s and the communist party, PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party).23

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21 The constitution of 1945 had been hastily written on the eve of the declaration of independence. It was replaced in 1950 with a temporary constitution outlining parliamentary democracy similar to the Dutch system. This was the constitution used until 1959 when Sukarno dissolved the constitutional assembly and reverted to the constitution of 1945. For information on this period, see Feith (1962).

22 Modernist Islam refers to a “back to the Qur’an” approach that became popular in the 1800’s in Egypt. Traditionalist Islam refers to the custom of legal schools that developed after the death of the prophet. Adherents to the traditionalist variant of Islam consult with leaders in the Islamic community for guidance instead of relying on a strict interpretation of the Qur’an, as do the modernist Muslims.

23 PNI received 22% of the vote, Masyumi 21, NU 19, and PKI 17 in the 1955 elections. Sukarno, although still closely associated with the nationalist party, declared himself to be independent.
With no party having a clear mandate from society to lead, the government was at a stalemate on several issues. These included obliging Muslims to follow Islamic law and the centralization versus decentralization of power. At the same time, regional rebellions were breaking out as rogue military commanders allied with local Islamic leaders to fight for more regional power and the inclusion of Islam as the basis of the state.24 Both of these conditions led Sukarno, with the help of the central army leadership, as discussed above, to dissolve the constitutional assembly in 1959 and replace it with what he called “Guided Democracy.”25

Sukarno declared that efforts to rewrite the constitution should stop because it was causing dissension among the political elite, immobilizing government, and aggravating social conflict. Contentious issues should be put off until the country “matured.”26 Until that time, the constitution of 1945 allowed for power to be centered in the hands of the president. The experiment with democracy thus ended in Indonesia until the massive protests and rioting of 1998 demanded another attempt.

Sukarno’s six years of “Guided Democracy,” from 1959-65, were chaotic as the communist party gained in strength and vied with the army for Sukarno’s favor and ear. At the same time, as mentioned, the country’s economy had gone into a tailspin. When the army generals were killed in 1965 and Suharto took over power, many people, not just in the military, supported Suharto with the hope that he could restore order and enable the country to develop economically. His quiet smile, subdued style, and

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24 The rebels were not fighting so much for independence as they were opposing policies made by the central army leadership and economic policies of the central government that were viewed to advantage Java and Jakarta over the provinces. The rebels also demanded a formal role for Islam in the state (Liddle October 1996: 66-7).
25 For a discussion of why parliamentary democracy failed in the 1950s, see Bourchier and Legge, eds. (1994), Feith (1962), and Liddle (October 1996: 66-7).
26 Feith (1963).
traditional Javanese values were in marked contrast to the flamboyancy of the Sukarno years.

It was not anticipated, however, that over the next three decades Suharto would amass personal control over the military, bureaucracy, all state institutions, and society. The process of concentrating power in his own hands was not accomplished over night and, at times, the military had enough institutional power to check Suharto’s power. Suharto, however, progressively gained near complete control over all aspects of politics, the economy, and society and established a regime closely approximating sultanism with totalitarian elements.

3.2. Suharto Presides over a Pyramid of Power

By the end of Suharto’s rule, Indonesia’s governing regime was characterized by state institutions, the military, and government party being controlled by Suharto to the point that they were merely instruments of his personal rule. Law was meted out according to the ruler’s whim. Only loyalists within the regime were tolerated. Organizations that were not linked to and strictly controlled by the regime were severely constricted. These are characteristics of sultanism.27

No country absolutely replicates a theoretical ideal type. Indonesia is no exception to this. By arguing that Suharto’s regime became increasingly sultanistic throughout its existence is not to claim that Indonesia did not exhibit some unique features or traits that could fall into other regime typologies. The argument is that Suharto’s regime was

27 As Aspinall states, during the early years of Suharto’s regime, there was pluralism in the upper echelons of power. However, by the mid 1990s Chehabi and Linz’s (1998) description of sultanism “describes almost perfectly the final years of Suharto’s rule” (2000: 274).
predominantly, not exclusively, sultanistic. Regime traits fitting the ideal type of sultanism and those not neatly fitting the ideal type are discussed below. Their impact on the transition to and consolidation of democracy is alluded to but becomes clearer in subsequent chapters.

Suharto created a military-bureaucratic complex that was an extension of his household staff and directly under his command. This complex consisted of three main components: The military, bureaucracy, and government party. Suharto controlled them all.28 This complete control over the ruling complex and personalized nature of the regime is a key aspect that signifies its sultanistic nature. However, the extensive reach of the ruling machine into society’s lowest levels and extensive control over people’s daily lives are traits that fall more accurately within the typology of totalitarianism.29 This will be discussed more below in relation to the military’s territorial command structure and the government party’s connection with the bureaucracy. Through the following depiction of the regime, it should become clear why I have not classified the regime as authoritarian as some scholars have done in the past.30 Below, the role of

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28 For an overview of the political structure of Suharto’s regime, see Liddle (2000a and Spring 1985). The combination of Suharto’s personal control and a vast ruling structure are commonly cited characteristics of the regime, although not always placed into a specific regime typology. For instance, Robison and Rosser state, “Indonesia has been dominated by a highly centralized form of state power unmatched outside the communist world in its pervasive control of economic and social life” (2000: 175). The authors go on to identify Suharto as being at the apex of this structure and cite the inability of another ruler to replace his authority and thus the disintegration of the structure (185). Other authors are more explicit in identifying traits of the regime as falling within a specific regime typology. For instance, Liddle (2000a and 1985) note its totalitarian aspects combined with personal rule. Crouch (1978) and Aspinall (2000) identify the regime as being sultanistic combined with a penetrating reach into society. 29 For instance, MacIntyre (1990) classified Suharto’s regime as being authoritarian -- of the state corporatist variety. This may be due his goal of explaining how some segments of the business community were able to get policies, although rather limited in nature, that they wanted through using the Indonesian chamber of commerce to lobby Suharto. This was, however, written at the height of a period of relative “liberalization” of the regime. Furthermore, Suharto’s willingness to give some businesses what they wanted only increased their loyalty to him. As for other instances where the regime is broadly referred to as authoritarian, it is not clear if the term sultanism was considered and rejected or if it simply had not been
military, bureaucracy, and government party in Suharto’s regime are discussed along with a discussion of the de-politicization of society and curtailment of opposition to Suharto.

### 3.2.1. The Military’s Role in Suharto’s Regime

As described in Chapter 2, sultanistic regimes blur the distinction between civilian and military rule. Suharto’s regime exemplifies this trait. Suharto was an army general and he used the military as a tool for maintaining control over the country. Despite the military’s presence in state institutions and penetration of society, the regime was dominated by Suharto as an individual, not as a representative of the military or the military as an institution. Military officers jockeyed for powerful positions with the civilian dominated bureaucracy and government party.

The military was one vital component of Suharto’s ruling complex but it had lost its institutional autonomy by the end of Suharto’s rule. When Suharto came to power, despite the military’s continuous problem with fragmentation within the ranks, the military could be described as being an autonomous institution. As Suharto’s time as ruler lengthened, he was able to gain control over the military and destroy this

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thought of due to the relative rarity with which the term is used and the frequency with which we denote all non-democratic regimes to be broadly “authoritarian.” For instance, Surbakti (1999) describes in detail Suharto’s personal control over all institutions, non-government organizations, and military and then characterizes the regime in a manner that coincides with the traits of sultanism. He, however, does not ever mention the word “sultanism” or refer to any theories of regime typology but broadly refers to the regime as authoritarian.

31 Liddle (Winter 1999), Shiraishi (1999), and Honna (1999) make similar observations that Suharto had succeeded in obliterating the military’s autonomy by the end of his rule. For more details on the historical evolution of Suharto’s control over the military, see Suryadinata (1998, especially chapters 8 and 9).
institutional autonomy. He accomplished this by frequently rotating officers and intervening in promotions down to low levels.32

Through this intervention, and through playing rival factions off one another, Suharto was able to cultivate a cadre of officers loyal to him personally.33 He moved his son-in-law, Lt. General Prabowo Subianto, rapidly through the ranks and seemed to be cultivating him to assume command of the armed forces.34 Promotions and positions depended completely upon Suharto’s choice. Suharto valued personal loyalty over ability and experience. Some scholars suspect that Suharto purposely placed officers who were not the most capable in positions of high command in order to lessen the possibility that they would amass a loyal following of their own and question his personal rule.35

If any officer began to acquire too much power, or questioned Suharto’s policies, Suharto removed him. This happened with a leading army general, L.B. (Benny) Murdani, whom Suharto forced into retirement when he became powerful through his

32 Suharto is purported to have had a hand in promoting and rotating military men down to the district level. This tendency to personally “oversee” the placement of military and civilian officers, even at extremely low levels of management, increased as his rule continued (Crouch 1979, Aspinall 1999, and Robison 1993).

33 As Liddle says, “Suharto went to great lengths to make sure that personal loyalists (mostly former adjutants and presidential guard commanders) were given all key command positions” (1999: 21). Since the late 1980s, Suharto cultivated a rivalry between Islamic and nationalist military officers. For information on the various factions Suharto cultivated within the military in order to keep it dis-unified, see Honna (April 1999), Shiraiishi (1999), and Lowry (1997).

34 Honna (April 1999). This, combined with placing his daughter (not the one married to Gen. Prabowo) in his last cabinet, in a powerful position within Golkar, and in an advisory role to himself indicated a growing dynastic quality in his regime. The growing involvement of his other children in conglomerates that depended upon regime protection furthered this assessment of the Suharto regime as becoming more and more dynastic.

35 For instance, Wiranto, appointed commander of the armed forces in February 1998, along with other officers in key positions, did not have much field experience but was unquestionably loyal to Suharto and had served as his personal adjutant for several years (Shiraishi 1999: 80).
years as head of the army’s intelligence unit and when he began to criticize the growing involvement of Suharto’s children in privileged economic positions.36

After Gen. Murdani was removed from the commanding position of the military, the military still displayed some independent power by pressing Suharto to name Gen. Try Sutrisno vice president in 1993 over his preferred choice of B. J. Habibie.37 Following this incident, Suharto acted swiftly to eradicate any remnants of autonomous power bases left in the military. Officers with any but the utmost subservience to Suharto were purged. The military’s role in the government party was also reduced, rivalries were increased between the military and civilians in the government party and bureaucracy for positions, and divisions within the military were accentuated through Suharto’s manipulation. Suharto also became even more involved than previously in the placement and promotion of officers to extremely low levels within the military.38 It was at this point that Suharto turned excessively inward to his family and closest cronies to lead the military, government party, bureaucracy, and economy.39

This is not to argue that the military was merely a personal guard to Suharto as is sometimes the case in sultanistic regimes. The military in Indonesia had an extensive

36 Suryadinata (1998: 209), Shirauhi (1999), and Liddle (March 2002). General Benny Murdani had led the military’s intelligence unit for fourteen years and then served as armed forces commander from 1983–88 when he was dismissed by Suharto. Suharto then destroyed his power base by not promoting or forcing into retirement officers who had been close to him. Suharto also reorganized the intelligence unit that had served as the basis of Gen. Murdani’s power.
37 Gen. Try Sutrisno was a Suharto loyalist and had been placed by Suharto to be commander of the armed forces in 1988 when Suharto dismissed Gen. Murdani. So the issue is not one of an opponent being put forward by the military to share power with Suharto. The military primarily was trying to block Habibie from becoming vice president because Habibie (a civilian) had angered many officers during his previous ministerial positions. The fact that Suharto’s preference was questioned was, however, perceived as a threat to Suharto’s unlimited power.
38 See, Suryadinata (1998) and Honna (April 1999) for more details on Suharto’s swift actions to reduce the institutional power of the military and the power of any single officer.
39 Following 1993, most scholars note, although not always labeling them, the sultanistic quality of the regime.
structure, discussed below, that surpassed that of a corps of personal guards for the sultan. However, Suharto was able to effectively gain complete control over the military even while enlarging its presence in society and the economy.

The military’s concern with the issue of Suharto’s succession is sometimes pointed to as evidence of an autonomous military. Near the end of Suharto’s regime, some officers began to privately question Suharto’s refusal to name a successor and his refusal to discuss the issue of regime continuance after his rule. These officers began to discuss what role the military might have in a successive regime. Once massive protests surfaced in 1998, these “reformist” military officers began to meet quietly and outline a plan for the military’s role in governance post-Suharto.

However, making vague plans for a post-Suharto era did not contribute to his fall from power. These officers were not attempting to bring him down. In fact, the key point in their plan for the military in a post-Suharto era was that the military attempt, after Suharto was gone, to regain some of its lost institutional autonomy and not ever be again

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40 Suharto did, however, place family and people with familial-like relations with him in leadership positions within the military. His son-in-law, Gen. Prabowo, as mentioned had moved up the ranks at an extraordinary pace and appeared to be in line to take over command of the armed forces. Another example is that all leading generals had to first serve several years as Suharto’s personal military adjunct during which time the officers were judged for their unwavering loyalty to Suharto. Only after this could they receive the highest postings in the military.

41 These officers were later dubbed the “reformist” officers or “professional” and were led by Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (henceforth referred to as Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono) who was in charge of the military territorial command structure (head of the social and political division of the military).

42 The beginnings of discussion of the military’s position in a post-Suharto era should be understood in the context of a military that was completely unprepared to deal with the mobilization against Suharto in 1998. As Liddle argues, “Suharto made all the key political decisions...it became clear to close observers that no officer, including Wiranto and even the obviously politically ambitious Prabowo, had any independently formulated plan of action to deal with rising student and popular protest” (1999: 28). Aspinall similarly states that the discontented officers were more concerned with maneuvering for positions in a post-Suharto era than with developing a well formulated plan for reform (2000: 86). This was because the “Increasing ‘sultanisation’ of the regime undermined [the military’s] legitimacy and precluded a resolution of its political problems, especially the succession issue, from within the ruling elite” (Aspinall 2000: “Abstract”).

43 This was made clear to me in an interview with Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, Nov. 18, 1998.
used as a personal tool for upholding any individual’s power. Even though these officers remained loyal to Suharto, they wanted to prevent the military from being in the same weak position under a successive ruler.

In order to prevent future manipulation and regain some autonomy, it was argued by these “reformist” officers after Suharto was forced from power that the military should not be engaged directly in the power struggle at the end of Suharto's regime. Instead, the military should return to the original meaning of its “dual function” philosophy that placed the military as watchdog for the Indonesian people. This could only be accomplished if institutional unity and autonomy were regained. The loss of both of these traits due to Suharto’s manipulation of the military as his personal tool for maintaining power required the military, these officers argued, to concentrate first upon rebuilding itself internally and precluded the military from being in a position to make a bid for direct power over the country in the aftermath of Suharto’s rule.

The discussion among a handful of officers about what direction the military might take once Suharto was gone did not weaken the military commander’s resolve to support

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44 This point was stressed to me repeatedly by officers whom I interviewed, especially Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, Nov. 18, 1998 and Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Assistant to the head of general affairs of the armed forces, Dec. 8, 1998. A similar observation was made by Jun Honna who cites the subordination of the military to Suharto and his manipulation of it to uphold him personally as the reason that some officers began to privately discuss how to prevent Suharto’s successor from continuing in the same vain (April 1999).


46 Interviews: Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, Nov. 18, 1998 and Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Dec. 8, 1998. These discussions could only take place openly between officers in the military after Suharto was gone. Prior to that time, although a few officers stated concerns about the loss of institutional autonomy, “criticism was muted, since expressing internal criticisms openly would put the officers’ careers at risk” (Honna April 1999: 113). Aspinall concurs and states that if anyone approached Suharto with concerns about his succession or the growing privileges given to his family members, they were denied future contacts with him or promotions (2000: 60).
and defend Suharto until the end.\textsuperscript{47} This is evidenced by the commander's loyal refusal to defect from Suharto until it was apparent that all civilians in his regime had done so and Suharto himself expressed willingness to abdicate power.\textsuperscript{48} After Suharto fell from power, the military began to drift and splinter without his guidance. The commander of the armed forces even continued to seek orders from Suharto far into the transitional period and had as his main goal protecting Suharto and his family from harm or prosecution.\textsuperscript{49}

As alluded to above, despite the military's lack of institutional autonomy vis-à-vis Suharto, the military had features that were unique to many sultanistic regimes. These features consisted of an organizational structure that penetrated society deeply, an entanglement with civilian governing and bureaucratic posts, and large economic interests. These features of the military gave its role in governance and the economy an institutionalized quality that is not usually found in sultanistic regimes. The extensive entanglement of the military in governing structures and the economy was in some respects totalitarian-like in the control it enabled the regime to exert over society. The whole complex was, however, dominated by Suharto.

The military had a territorial command structure that extended down to the local level of society and paralleled the "civilian" government structures. Officers and soldiers were posted throughout the country with the express purpose of maintaining internal security.

\textsuperscript{47} For instance, as Aspinall states: "not only was the military permeated by Suharto loyalists, but...[even] discontented officers...retained tremendous residual respect for Suharto" (2000: 61).
\textsuperscript{48} Wiranto maintained loyalty to Suharto until the end and would have suppressed the anti-Suharto protests if given the order to do so (Shiraishi 1999: 78, 82 and Liddle 1999: 104). This is therefore not the case of a military seeking to extricate itself from power by withdrawing its support from the ruler as is common in authoritarian transitions to democracy. See chapter 4 for further evidence of this.
(repressing opposition to the regime) and aiding in governance. This territorial structure had a historical basis in the origins of the army and its “dual function” philosophy. Suharto used the “dual function” philosophy to justify the military’s presence in governance, but he effectively equated maintaining internal security with upholding his personal rule. In this manner, Suharto’s presence loomed over society and entered into most every village throughout the vast archipelago.

The territorial command structure not only enabled Suharto to keep a close eye on society, but it also provided a resource for patronage that Suharto could dispense at will to favored military personnel. Suharto allowed personnel to use their positions within this military structure to supplement their income. This included allowing the local commanders in the territories to demand payment for businesses to operate in the area, “taxes” on goods moving to and from the area, the dispensing of rights to use land or extract resources such as timber, and involvement in localized gambling, prostitution, and drug rings. Some posts were considered to provide greater opportunity for enrichment than others and were thus more desirable. Although Suharto used appointment to posts as a reward or punishment for officers, he was careful not to allow anyone to remain at any one posting for too long so that they did not develop a local power base that might threaten his authority to dictate on matters great and small.

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50 For more information on origins of the territorial structure, see Kristiadi (1999). For information on the organizational nature of the territorial structure, see Lowry (1996).
51 Although Suharto attempted to impose uniformity across the nation through this military structure and bureaucracy and government party, the presence of his ruling complex was weaker in the outer islands and on the periphery of his rule than at the center on Java. For instance, in the highlands of North Sumatra, the military was present but only intervened in the lives of villagers if they engaged in activities that were oppositional to Suharto, but not in other matters of daily life (information gained through observation of villages in this area and discussions with villagers in April 1999).
In addition to the territorial command structure that ran adjacent to "civilian" governing structures, the military was intertwined with the bureaucracy. The military was guaranteed 20% of the seats in district and provincial and national legislatures. In the mid-1990s, one-third of the governorships and two-fifths of the district heads/mayors were from the military. In addition, several thousand posts in the bureaucracy were filled with active and retired military personnel and Suharto's cabinets always had a strong military presence. Suharto used these appointments, which he personally oversaw, in the bureaucracy and government as a resource for dispensing patronage, similar to postings within the territorial command structure. He was also able to create rivalries within these structures between civilians and military personnel that kept the bureaucracy and local governing structures from amassing autonomous power and threatening his rule.

Finally, the military had an extensive presence in the economy. Less than 30% of the military expenses were covered in the state's budget. In order to make up for this huge gap, the military had to earn its own income. This was done partly through corrupt practices of individual units, as described above. Each branch of the military also owned several businesses and "charities" from which it derived income. The businesses were usually managed or co-owned by Sino-Indonesian businesspeople. Suharto gave the military affiliated businesses preferential treatment through issuing them monopolies and

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52 The number of seats in the National Legislature was reduced from 100 (out of 500) to 75 shortly before Suharto fell from power. Liddle (2000a: 30).
53 Some figures are much lower. Kristiadi (1999) puts the official military budget covered in the state's budget to be as low as 7 percent by the mid 1990s (1999: 102).
licenses in lucrative sectors of the economy. This reliance upon businesses that needed “permission” and preferential treatment from Suharto to operate further subordinated the military to Suharto.

The above-described “unique” traits of the military do not negate the fact that Suharto had control over the military in a manner consistent with sultanism. They did, however, create institutional interests for the military (and private interests of many officers). The interests created through the military’s extensive territorial command structure, entanglement in the bureaucracy and governing bodies, and privileged economic position gave the military a stake in his regime and an incentive to be loyal to him. However, once Suharto was gone, many officers in the military wanted to protect these institutional and individual interests in any subsequent regime. Protecting its institutional (and many private) interests provided an incentive to negotiate for a reserve domain of power after Suharto had been forced to step from power.

If the military was forced to suddenly give up its entanglement in the bureaucracy and governing bodies then it would have an excess of personnel with no postings open. The territorial command structure similarly provided jobs for many soldiers and officers, as well as opportunities for revenue. The military’s involvement in the economy was likewise deemed essential for the functioning of the military. The military was therefore deeply concerned that it not be forced to alter its position in these structures too rapidly.

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55 Kristiadi (1999). For detailed information on military businesses, see Aditijondro (1999).
56 Although it might superficially appear as if the military’s self-financing would give it a great degree of autonomy, in an economy where the ability to conduct any business is dependent upon the ruler’s approval, this self-financing scheme actually reduced the military’s autonomy and encouraged rivalries among units and officers as they competed for access to lucrative businesses and sectors of the economy (Surbakti 1999). As Kristiadi says, ABRI’s entanglement in business “firmly embedded officers in civilian political and economic structures [which] undermines ABRI’s ability to serve as guardian of national unity and the national ideology [and] remaining above the fray and guaranteeing general political stability, as was the original intention of General A.H. Nasution’s concept of the Middle Way” (1999: 113).
A rapid withdrawal from these positions was also argued to raise the possibility of further destabilizing the country due to thousands of military personnel being forced from their jobs and possibly joining rebellious groups.

Despite the perceived need to defend its interests in state institutions and the economy, reformist officers in the military recognized that the entrenchment of the military in governing structures and the economy was not conducive over the long-term to building a professional organization with institutional autonomy. They therefore sought, after Suharto was gone from power, to gradually reduce these aspects of the military’s position in the country. These “reformist” officers were met with resistance from other officers who wanted to continue to have opportunities to enrich themselves through the privileged position of the military. The difference of opinion over what direction the military should take in regards to these areas of entanglement constituted a new split within the military in the post-Suharto era.

3.2.2. The Bureaucracy and Government Party

The bureaucracy was used alongside the military as a tool for maintaining control over society. For instance, the bureaucracy, through the Social and Political Section in the Department of Home Affairs, gave approval for candidates running for any government office. This included village heads, legislative seats, etc. Besides screening candidates, local legislatures would be given a choice of three to five candidates for the posts of
governor or district head or mayor. The legislatures would choose one. This choice would then need approval by the Department of Home Affairs.  

The Department of Home Affairs was most always headed by an active military officer, which signifies the intertwined nature of the bureaucracy and military. Suharto chose the Minister of Home Affairs and had a direct hand in the “election” of most governors and many district heads and mayors. He is purported to have reviewed the lists put together by the Department of Home Affairs of possible candidates and to have frequently made changes to the list.  

The bureaucracy lacked autonomy to make even simple decisions. All policy emanated from Suharto and he frequently also dictated how to implement policy. This lack of autonomous institutional structure, similar to the military, differentiates Suharto’s regime from authoritarian regimes that are not sultanistic. Without an independent bureaucracy instigating and implementing policy or a regularized system of law to constrain the ruler’s power, Suharto was able to use the bureaucracy to rule through decrees and directives.  

The extensive use of the bureaucracy in governance has led the regime to sometimes be characterized as being bureaucratic-authoritarian. However, a key difference between bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes and Suharto’s is that under Suharto’s rule, the

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57 See Legowo (1999) for the structure of the bureaucracy and the evolution of Suharto’s use of it, especially use of the Department of Home Affairs to control society.

58 Aspinall (2000).

59 Included in Suharto’s control over the bureaucracy is control over the judiciary. For an overview of the subordination of the judiciary to the executive, which began during Sukarno’s “guided democracy,” see Bourchier (1999).

60 Governance was done mainly through decrees. As Surbakti (1999: 69) says, “The lives of ordinary Indonesians are not regulated so much by laws made or consented to by the Parliament, but rather by decisions issued by the president, ministers, director generals of departments, provincial governors, and district heads.”
bureaucracy did not have autonomy to make and implement policy. Not only was consent from Suharto necessary, but the bureaucracy rarely acted at all without being prompted by Suharto to do something. Bureaucratic officials waited for orders from superiors to do anything. These orders always emanated from Suharto.

This mode of operation would become very problematic once Suharto fell from power, even under Habibie’s rule. The bureaucracy instantly became paralyzed once Suharto fell. Habibie’s aides frequently complained that they could not get the bureaucracy to do anything because all of the officials had been trained to act only upon his directives.61

Suharto’s complete control over the bureaucracy did not mean that he never used technocratic expertise. He relied upon technocrats for many things, especially in regards to economic policy. However, he is purported to have read over contrasting economic proposals and personally decided which policies to choose.62 Even technocrats were not allowed free reign to determine specialized policy.

In addition to using the bureaucracy, Suharto also developed a government party, called Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups), to help him control society and maintain his power. This originated as a grouping of social organizations that pre-dated the Suharto regime.63 Suharto turned this loose umbrella organization into a political party-like organization.64 He used Golkar as his personal party that would win elections

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61 Interviews: Jimly Asshiddiqie, senior advisor to Habibie and law scholar, July 15, 1999 and Umar Juoro, senior advisor to Habibie and economics scholar, July 30, 1999. A newcomer to the bureaucracy, Din Syamsuddin, director-general in the Department of Manpower, concurred that this was a huge problem (Feb. 10, 1999).
63 The Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekber Golkar) was created in 1964 by the armed forces to counter the communist party. This was a coordinating secretariat for the functional group organizations that the army had been developing since 1957 to counter communism. Suharto expanded its structure and function and shortened the name to Golkar. For a history of Golkar, see Reeve (1985).
64 It was never officially called a political party, but acted as one.
and continually elect him as president. Suharto maintained tight control over Golkar, as he did the bureaucracy and military, through selecting leaders down to low levels within the party and being the preeminent source for decision-making. Golkar was also tightly intertwined with the state bureaucracy and linked social organizations to the state, which facilitated Suharto control over society and gave the regime a totalitarian-like aspect.

All members of the bureaucracy and military had to belong to Golkar. Family members of civil servants and military personnel were likewise required to belong to the organization/party. Most social organizations were linked to Golkar. This mandatory membership in Golkar helped the party to garner a large majority of the vote during the general elections held every five years and provided another means of controlling society.

Golkar was so closely affiliated with the bureaucracy that the two were nearly indistinguishable. With every civil servant mandated to be an active member of Golkar, the bureaucracy constituted arguably the most important pillar of Golkar. In order to rise through the ranks of the civil service, it was necessary to be active in Golkar. This included campaigning for the party near election time and promoting it at all times. The bureaucracy was thus used to mobilize support for the regime and enabled the government party to have an organizational presence that reached down into the lowest levels of society.

The military’s position in Golkar shifted over time. As mentioned above, when the military began to place demands upon Suharto, he swiftly asserted his control. One method of reducing and checking the military’s power was to reduce its influence in
Golkar. Suharto chose a civilian to lead the party for the first time in 1993. He also began to place members of his family and close circle of cronies in powerful positions within the party. His son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, was made treasurer and his daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (called Tutut), was made one of the party’s eight chairpersons. She was believed to be in line to take over the party and then succeed Suharto as ruler of the country. This was indicative of the growing dynastic tendency in the regime.

Golkar did not have a clear ideology, as do totalitarian parties. The official ideology of the regime was Pancasila. This had five tenets: belief in one god, belief in a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy – guided by wisdom in deliberations and representation, and social justice for all the people of Indonesia. However, the party was created for the purpose of and existed to uphold Suharto’s personal rule, not to propagate any ideology. Therefore, even though the omnipresence of Golkar throughout society gave the regime a totalitarian-like aspect, the party’s dependence upon Suharto points to the sultanistic quality of the regime.

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65 This was Harmoko, who was a Suharto loyalist. However, the military continued to dominate local level chapters. For example, just before Suharto resigned, 80% of district Golkar heads were retired military officers and 25 of 27 provincial Golkar heads were retired or active officers (Kristiadi 1999: 107).

66 As Suryadinata states, by 1993 it was clear that Golkar had been de-militarized and there had progressively “been a concentration of power in the hands of Suharto” (1998: 209).

67 Only three retired military men remained in the central board of Golkar in 1993. These three were furthermore regarded by the military as marginal figures and no longer had close ties to the military (Suryadinata 1998: 197).

68 Tutut not only was gaining power in Golkar but also heavily influenced the selection of members of Suharto’s last cabinet. She chose up to half of the ministers, who were her close associates, in the last cabinet and was herself given a ministerial position – minister for social affairs (Liddle 1999: 21). Analysts predicted that Suharto was “preparing to create a dynasty, with his daughter as his likely successor” (Forrester 1999: 18).


70 Pancasila had not been created by Suharto. It was created by Sukarno in 1945 to resolve ideological tensions among Indonesians, especially between proponents of a secular and an Islamic state. The tenets are in the preamble of the constitution of 1945 (Liddle 2000b).
Suharto used Golkar to co-opt potentially threatening social forces. Golkar encapsulated most all social organizations under its umbrella and linked them to the state. An example of this was the co-optation of the modernist Muslim community in the last decade of Suharto’s rule. Suharto enticed many potentially threatening leaders of the modernist Muslim community to join Golkar in leadership positions. Through offering them positions and access to state resources, Suharto was able to bring potential adversaries into his regime. His one demand, however, was absolute loyalty to him.

With so many different social forces and individuals representing different aspects of society brought into the regime through Golkar and other state affiliated organizations, it is impossible to think that all of these individuals sincerely strove to support Suharto’s personal rule. This brings up the question of pluralism within the regime. The ideal type of sultanism states that the regime has no pluralism, whereas authoritarian regimes have limited pluralism. I argue that Suharto’s regime had no overt pluralism. I think it is highly improbable that any regime would ever truly have no dissenting opinions held by individuals associated with the regime. The pertinent characteristic is the expression or lack of expression of dissenting opinion and how the ruler reacts to dissent.

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71 This not only helped to co-opt a rising and potentially threatening social force but also was a means of keeping the power of the military in Golkar in check through creating rivalries and divisions within the party (Suryadinata 1998: 196).

72 In addition to offering some rising Muslim intellectuals positions in Golkar, Suharto had made some policy choices that were intended to woo the Muslims. He allowed Islamic courts to handle matters of family beginning in 1988. In 1989, he required religion to be taught in school. In 1991, he allowed females to wear the Muslim headscarf in school and he made the pilgrimage to Mecca (Suryadinata 1998: 192). Perhaps most importantly, in 1990, Suharto encouraged the creation an organization called ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiaan Muslim se-Indonesia, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) through which modernist Muslim leaders and activists could acquire positions within the state and gain access to lucrative contracts. See, Liddle (1995), Heftner (Oct. 1993), and Harymurti (October 1999) for the history and analysis of the ICMI and the rise of the modernist Muslim community.
Suharto did not allow criticism of his rule from anyone inside or close to his regime. If someone began to question his policy, rule, or even bring up the issue of succession as he aged, Suharto removed that individual from the regime. An example of this was his having Amien Rais – later to become an opposition figure in the transition - removed from a leadership position in the modernist Muslim organization, ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), which Suharto had created to aid in his co-optation of the modernist Muslim community.

Amien had begun to suggest that Suharto should step from power soon due to his age and had begun to draw attention to the need to clean up some of the corruption that prevailed throughout all state institutions. Amien had not called for a transition to democracy or any radical changes to the regime. Suharto, however, would not stand for such questioning of his rule and pushed Amien from his position in ICMI. The question of how long Amien would have been allowed to remain leader of the Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, which he also headed, was never answered because Suharto was forced to resign not long after Amien began to criticize aspects of the regime.

Suharto had successfully created a large and penetrating ruling machine that enabled him to control a heterogeneous society that was spread out over numerous islands. This governing apparatus depended upon him for unity and guidance. Once Suharto fell from power, his ruling machine teetered and lost much of its raison d'être. The military fragmented and began to drift, the government party fragmented and searched for a new basis for existence, and the bureaucracy came to a virtual standstill. Suharto’s successor,

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73 Amien Rais was removed by Suharto in 1997 from the chairmanship of ICMI’s Board of Experts.
Habibie was not able to fill the role Suharto had played as "head" of this ruling complex. This is symptomatic of the sultanistic nature of the regime, despite its vastness in organizational structure.

The thousands of incumbent members of Suharto's regime that were left behind when Suharto was forced to step down knew that the institutional structures created and maintained by Suharto could not survive in the same form without Suharto's guiding hand. They therefore sought a way to negotiate change in a manner that would enable them to retain some power and not be completely overthrown. This explains the rise of individuals from within the regime who played the role of regime moderates during the transitional period. They stalled for time as they attempted to build a new sense of purpose in Golkar and the military, but were faced with rapid disintegration of these structures. Hence, the sudden and shocking breakdown in law and order and of all state institutions after Suharto fell from power, which has continued into the post-transitional period.

3.2.3. The Prevalence of Corruption and Patronage Throughout the Regime

Suharto, as is characteristic of sultanistic regimes, used patronage as a means of maintaining a personalized control over individuals associated with his regime. A vast patronage network extended out from Suharto. His regime simultaneously exhibited a

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74 As Robison and Rosser state, "Habibie cannot impose the same highly centralized and unchallenged system of authority that characterized Soeharto's rule" (2000: 185).
75 The fact that the military and Golkar have survived and have been building some renewed sense of purpose in the post-transitional period does not imply that they were autonomous institutions under Suharto's rule. They struggled greatly after his fall, as is detailed in subsequent chapters, and continue to struggle for unity and survival. Making a transition, for example, from being a "ruler's party" to a "ruling party" has been very difficult for Golkar (Interview, Andi Mattalatta, head of Golkar's fraction in the Legislature during Habibie's presidency, March 5, 1999).
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high degree of corruption. Many forms of patronage entailed offering opportunities for individual enrichment through the corrupt use of state or military positions. People were either inside the regime and patronage network or were outside of it, as is characteristic of sultanistic regimes. Closeness to the ruler meant more access to patronage and opportunities for enrichment.  

For instance, Suharto dispensed licenses and monopolies for economic sectors. He gave these to favored cronies, military officers, and increasingly to family members. Suharto’s children became the recipients of more and more lucrative monopolies as Suharto’s regime aged. The monopolies given to his children included trading in cloves, telecommunications, importing parts for automobile manufacture, contracts to build roads, and exclusive rights to collect tolls on roads. Other monopolies given to his close friends included rights to clearing forests and exporting timber, exporting palm oil, and partnerships with foreign companies in extracting natural resources. This drew some 

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76 Besides typical forms of control over resources through control over the banking sector and access to economic sectors through licensing requirements, Suharto also created development agencies and huge “charities” under his control. Social groups and individuals competed for Suharto’s favor in order to have access to these resources. See Subak (1999: 64-5) for a brief listing of some of these resources Suharto organized and directly controlled.

77 Liddle (2000a: 35-6) emphasizes the continued growth of the economy as enabling Suharto to have the resources to pass out patronage that upheld his rule. Whether this economic growth was fueled by the sale of oil in a fortuitous world economy or by Suharto choosing correct economic policies is debatable, but the GDP grew at approximately 8% per year throughout most of his rule.

78 The state had dominated the economy owning almost 60 percent of the equity in all domestic investment in 1980 (Robison and Rosser 2000: 175). After the plummet of oil prices in the mid 1980s, the series of deregulatory decrees privatized much of the economy. However, family members and cronies of Suharto received many of the once public companies and the rights to operate in sectors of the economy once dominated by the state. The technocrats in the bureaucracy were unable to oppose Suharto on this matter and were also unable to impose sound fiscal and lending policy. Banks lent money according to Suharto’s directives (Robison and Rosser 2000: 176-78).

79 See Schwarz (1999, chapter 6).
muted criticism from people who did not like the concentration of patronage in Suharto’s family and closest friends, but the criticism was not allowed to be openly expressed.\textsuperscript{80}

Affiliation with the regime and the use of official position for corruption extended down to low-level positions. Policemen, soldiers, and low government officials routinely used their positions to extract money and resources from common people. Bribes had to be paid and fees for services that were not needed were demanded of people. This type of abuse of power bred resentment among the populace.

Corruption was also institutionalized through the method of selecting many government officials. For instance, in order to obtain a post such as governor or mayor, the candidate not only needed to be acceptable to Suharto personally but also had to pay a large sum of money to the local military commander and legislative representatives. The money had to be paid again for re-election if the candidate wanted to renew a term. In order to make the payment of money worthwhile, people who filled these positions had to use their position to make more money.

In addition to the above forms of corruption and patronage, Suharto also distributed rewards to individual villages through awarding development projects to areas that showed high levels of support for the government party. These development projects consisted of such things as constructing public works, infrastructure, or access to more

\textsuperscript{80} The extent of corruption and the prevalence of patronage in the economic sphere was largely accepted as a normal “cost of doing business” in Indonesia and was overlooked while the economy kept growing and profits could still be made. It was not until the economic crisis, beginning in late 1997, that the vastness of the patronage and corruption was examined more closely. It became clear that the institutions that are fundamental to an economy and governance were ill developed, lacked autonomy, and centered upon the dictates of Suharto himself. Lending practices, for instance, and the lack of autonomy of the banking sector, not to mention the judiciary and state development agencies were pointed to as reasons for the rotten Indonesian economy (“Indonesia’s Economic Woes Deepen, Asia Week July 5, 1998).
fertilizer or better strains of grain. Suharto therefore not only used repression in his ruling strategy but also used rewards.\textsuperscript{81}

3.2.4. The De-politicization of Society and The Curtailment of Autonomous Organizations

Suharto de-politicized society through a series of laws enacted in 1973.\textsuperscript{82} At this time, he forced the amalgamation of all pre-existing opposition parties into two: an Islamic party called PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Development Unity Party) and a nationalist party called PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party).\textsuperscript{83} Suharto exerted a significant amount of control over these “opposition parties” to the point where he could place in power or remove their leaders and reject their candidates for legislative seats at the national and local levels.\textsuperscript{84}

These parties were not allowed to campaign until a few weeks before the election and were constrained in their ability to organize and discuss issues freely.\textsuperscript{85} Since Golkar was technically not a political party, but was instead an umbrella social organization, it was able to continually organize and campaign. All parties and social organizations, even those not affiliated with Golkar, were also required by law to declare allegiance to the

\textsuperscript{81} The inclusion of both carrots and sticks in Suharto’s ruling formula is emphasized in Liddle (Dec. 1991 and July 1992).

\textsuperscript{82} For an overview of the political laws of 1973 and their effect, see Suryadinata (1998: 14-16).

\textsuperscript{83} PPP consisted of four Muslim parties. The largest two components being Nahdlatul Ulama and Parmusi. PDI consisted of five Christian or secular-nationalist parties. The largest was PNI, the descendent of the anti-colonial movement founded by Sukarno in the 1920s (Emmerson Oct. 1999).

\textsuperscript{84} Numerous observers comment on this unlimited power. See, for instance, Surbakti (1999: 63). Suharto’s ability to remove a popular leader from an opposition party was seen most clearly in 1996 with his removal of the leader of PDI, as is discussed below.

\textsuperscript{85} In 1985, Suharto enacted a “floating mass” policy that barred political parties from campaigning below the district level (this of course exempted Golkar).
national ideology of Pancasila. This meant that potentially threatening ideologies, such as political Islam or socialist ideologies were not allowed to exist.

No parties or organizations were allowed to be oppositional in the sense that one would expect from “opposition” parties or independent organizations. This was evidenced by Suharto’s unanimous re-election to the presidency for seven consecutive terms by all members of the national assembly, including representatives from the two non-government parties. They similarly almost never questioned his rule or policies.

Suharto’s Golkar party continually won large majorities in the general elections held every five years. Suharto used the ability to dispense patronage and development projects to garner votes for the party. He also imposed sanctions upon areas that did not support the party by withholding funds and services. Voting was done in small groups of 100 in places of employment or school. This made it easy for the officials to figure out who had not voted for Golkar. Sanctions could be imposed on the whole group of 100 if

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86 This is not to claim that there were no isolated instances of protests about specific policies, such as building a dam that would affect villagers’ livelihood, or brave individuals who surreptitiously attempted to undermine the regime. However, it is to argue that there was no sustained or organized opposition to Suharto that was capable of impinging upon the regime’s unlimited powers. As Liddle states: “For three decades, organized opposition to the New Order was minuscule” (1999: 28). According to Liddle, this was due to a combination of repression, encouraging antagonisms among different communities, using patronage to bring potential opponents into his regime, and economic development.

87 Golkar and the two opposition parties contested the general election that was held every five years. During these elections, 400 out of the 1000 members of the National Assembly were elected and 80% of the provincial and district/mayorality level legislatures were elected. The National Assembly consisted of the 400 elected members (just before Suharto fell this rose to 425), 100 (reduced to 75) military seats, and 500 seats appointed by Suharto. The Assembly met once every five years, approximately one year after the general election, to re-elect the president. The Legislature consisted of the 400 elected members and the 100 military representatives and met more frequently but merely rubber-stamped Suharto’s policies according to his directives.

88 There were some instances of fledgling resistance to decisions made by Suharto. For example, the vote count in the general election of 1997 was questioned by local PPP chapter heads in Madura, East Java. However, under pressure from Suharto, the chairman of the party declared that the official government vote count had been correct. Until the issue of the party’s leadership arose in 1996, as discussed below, the other opposition party, PDI almost never took an oppositional stance to Suharto’s regime (Liddle 1999: 30).

89 Since the first general election after Suharto took power, held in 1971, Golkar consistently won over 60% of the vote with its percentage increasing to 74% in 1997.
the people not supporting the party were not singled out so that he or she could be
punished.

Suharto's control over society extended beyond just ensuring Golkar victories and his
re-election. He strictly controlled society and all social organizations in a manner similar
to totalitarianism. 90 Besides using the extensive military presence in society described
above, he also kept close tabs on society through a system that essentially required
citizens to spy on each other. Villages were organized into households with group
leaders. The leaders were required to report any noteworthy happenings to the village
head who then passed along pertinent information to district and military officials.

Visitors, family events, criticism of the government, and method of birth control were all
considered noteworthy. Directives were also passed down from Suharto to the local level
through this system. For instance, the birth control program relied heavily on this system
of village organization. 91

As described above, all social organizations were linked closely with the state through
their connection to Golkar or through strict controls placed on their activities. 92 Only two
social organizations that had a degree of autonomy and a significant mass base had been

90 Liddle (2000a and 1985) makes a similar argument noting the totalitarian-like features of the regime but
combined with a personalized rule. This is not to argue that the level of control was unchanging throughout
the three decades of his rule. During certain periods, Suharto appeared to be easing slightly restrictions on
the press and right to organize. For instance, in the late 1980s, some claimed that the regime was entering a
period of liberalization. However, Suharto quickly clamped down on budding dissent and centered power
in his own hands to an even greater degree than previously. For information on the period of

91 The lowest level of village organization was the dusun wisma (ten homes) that grouped 10 families. Four
or five of these (approximately 40-50 families) were grouped into rukun tetangga (neighborhood
associations). Two or three of these were grouped into rukun warga (citizen association) and on up to the
village, then district, province, etc. See Sullivan (1995) for more information on village organization.

92 Even non-governmental organizations of any significance needed Suharto's blessing (resmi) in choosing
their leaders (Surbakti 1999: 63).
allowed to remain during the Suharto regime. Both were Islamic organizations that pre­dated the country’s independence. These were Muhammadiyah, an organization representing modernist Muslims, and Nahdlatul Ulama, an organization representing traditionalist Muslims. Both organizations were apolitical and focused on social, religious, and charitable activities. Muhammadiyah had withdrawn from politics before Suharto took power and Nahdlatul Ulama followed suit in 1984 when it left the

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93 Other organizations with some independence from the regime did exist while Suharto ruled, but these were either too small to be significant or had extremely limited autonomy from the regime despite their claims to the contrary. The PRD (Partai Ra'yat Demokratik, Democratic People’s Party), is an example of an underground leftist movement that existed illegally in the latter years of Suharto’s rule. This organization was, however, small and not significant nationally. HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic University Students’ Association) was a Muslim student association that claimed some autonomy from the regime. The extent of this autonomy was, however, very limited. A staunchly Islamic group in the modernist tradition, DDII (Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia, the Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council) and a newer more political Islamic group, KISDI (Komite Indonesia Solidaritas Dunia Islam, the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World), were present under Suharto’s regime but the former was primarily a social and religious organization and the latter was very small and concentrated mostly on Islamic issues outside of Indonesia. Both DDII and KISDI in fact gave significant support to Suharto due to his patronage of the Islamic community (Liddle 1999: 33). A semi-autonomous legal aid organization, LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Institute of Legal Aid) was mildly critical of the regime’s human rights abuses, but was not a mass based organization and was careful not to oppose Suharto personally. A group of 50 mostly retired military officers wrote, in 1980, a letter to the national assembly demanding political reforms. This group became known as the petisi 50, petition of 50. Suharto revoked their travel permits and banned media coverage of them. They did not engage in any further overt criticisms, with several of the group retracting their statements, and did not attempt to encourage opposition to Suharto. Other examples exist of illegal unions attempting to organize and student groups beginning to form, but none of these had significant power or autonomy to influence events or provide an organizational base or leadership for the opposition movement. See, Philip Eldridge (1990) and Anders Uhlin (1997) for a discussion of attempts to build civil society under Suharto’s regime.

94 Muhammadiyah was formed in 1912. Nahdlatul Ulama was formed in 1926. The distinction between modernist and traditionalist Muslims, mentioned previously, is based upon the role of the Qur’an and Islamic clerics in following the tenets of Islam. Modernists rely directly upon the Qur’an whereas traditionalists rely upon religious teachers and clerics. This is elaborated further below. For an overview of the two streams of Islam in Indonesia and their historical development, see “God’s Warriors and Wahid’s,” The Economist May 10, 2001. For a detailed description of the development of Nahdlatul Ulama, see Barton and Fealty, eds. (1996).

95 The leader of Muhammadiyah, as mentioned above, began to criticize Suharto near the end of his regime. The leader of Nahdlatul Ulama also engaged in some slightly political activities outside of his position. He formed a loose and small grouping of intellectuals for the purpose of discussing laying some foundations for future liberalization of the regime. This group was called Forum Demokrasi (Democracy Forum). He was criticized, however, for having the prime intent of instigating Suharto to give his organization more access to state resources and patronage. He also found it necessary to continually “reasure the ulama that NU was still on good terms with the government (Ramage 1999: 213). For a historical account of Nahdlatul Ulama and Wahid’s tendency to support the status quo, see van Bruinessen (1990).
opposition party, PPP, due to dissatisfaction over the distribution of leadership
positions. 96

Although we shall see that the leaders of the two organizations, Amien Rais and
Abdurrahman Wahid respectively, became influential in the transition to democracy, the
organizations themselves did not directly participate in organizing the mass mobilization
that forced Suharto from power or the subsequent mobilization that dominated the
transitional period. It was name recognition that the leaders got from their leadership of
the organizations, not an organizational base for the opposition movement.

Although the mass mobilization that overthrew Suharto and drove the transition to
democracy was partially led, or at least instigated, by student organizations, these
organizations had sprung up quickly in the wake of the economic crisis of 1997-98. Even
though there was some precedent for the student organizations, Suharto had not allowed
any to become significantly large or influential prior to the economic and political crisis
of 1998. 97 Student organizations were tightly controlled and manipulated. This lack of a
pre-existing organizational base for the students became a factor during the transitional
period as they splintered apart and lost their momentum.

During the protests against Suharto and after his fall, three figures arose and claimed
leadership of the opposition movement. Two of these figures, Amien and Wahid, were
the leaders of the two Islamic organizations named above. The third figure, Megawati

96 Muhammadiyah had never directly participated in politics, but many of its constituents had supported a
closely affiliated political party, Masyumi, that contested the 1955 general election. Masyumi was banned
by Sukarno in 1960 explicitly for involvement in the regional rebellions of the late 1950s, but implicitly for
promoting the idea of a state based on Islamic law (Liddle 1999: 31). Nahdatul Ulama had participated in
politics as an independent political party from 1952-73, and from 1973 to 84 as a faction within PPP, the
government sponsored Islamic party.
97 For an elaboration of the failure of an organized and oppositional student movement to develop before
Sukarnoputri, had briefly headed one of the opposition parties, PDI, before Suharto forced her removal from its leadership in 1996. She was also the daughter of Sukarno, the country’s nationalist hero and first president from whom Suharto had taken power.

Each figure represented one of the three main social/cultural streams in Indonesian society. These were respectively: modernist Islam, traditionalist Islam, and abanganism (referred to by Westerners as secular-nationalism). Modernist Islam, as mentioned previously, refers to the tradition in Islam that began with the return to the Qur’an movement in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is a widely known manifestation of this movement. Adherents to this stream of Islam use the Qur’an as their guide instead of Islamic clerics. The movement is thus somewhat akin to Protestantism in Christianity.

Traditionalist Islam refers to a more commonly rural based mode of adhering to Islam that gives authority to religious teachers, scholars, and judges to interpret the Qur’an. People follow their prescribed rituals and pronouncements instead of seeking to interpret the Qur’an themselves. Adherents to this stream of practicing Islam frequently mix pre-Islamic beliefs with their Islamic beliefs.

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98 Megawati was leader of PDI from 1993-96. Suharto forced her out of the position by organizing a party conference during which an alternate leader, acceptable to him, was chosen. He then declared this to be the true leadership of the party and Megawati’s claim to be leader was declared illegal. Supporters of Megawati protested through staging a sit-in at the Jakarta headquarters of the PDI. The building was stormed by military troops and the protesters were forced to disperse. Several people were killed. Megawati henceforth became a symbol of Suharto’s repressive rule. See Emmerson (Oct. 1999) for more details of Suharto’s ousting of Megawati.

99 For a more detailed description of these three social/cultural streams in Indonesia, see Liddle and Mujani (March 2002).

100 Modernist Islam encompasses both fundamentalists who follow the Qur’an literally and Islamic liberals who interpret the meaning of the Qur’an in a liberal manner. The point is that they use the Qur’an as their guide, not the traditional clerics. These people tend to be more educated and urban.

101 Traditionalist Islam includes a range of strict to loose adherents to Islam. They tend to be more ritualistic than their modernist counterparts and are typically less fundamentalist. For example, saying
The abangan tradition refers to a specifically Indonesian cultural stream that pre-dates Islam. It encompasses syncretic traditions including animism, ancestor worship, honoring nature's forces, superstitions, and accumulating power through meditation. This social/cultural stream became associated with secular-nationalism during Sukarno's heyday. Sukarno had exemplified this tradition that is usually overlaid with a nominal adherence to Islam. The abangan tradition opposes forcing a strict observance of Islamic law. The historical predominance of Sukarno supporters in this cultural stream have led analysts to classify this social/cultural stream with Sukarno's nationalism, thus, the term secular-nationalist.

None of the three figures who came to prominence during the transitional period had been very oppositional toward Suharto in the past. Amien, as discussed above, was a partial exception. He had begun to criticize Suharto for not planning a smooth succession and for allowing his regime to become dominated by corrupt practices. He had been distanced from the regime for these critiques. Wahid had engaged in activities that could be construed as being mildly critical of the regime, but they could also be viewed as being attempts to get the regime to co-opt the traditionalist Islamic stream he represented and give them more positions within the regime. He campaigned with Suharto's daughter and leader of the Golkar party in 1997 for Golkar. He also supported Suharto up until the last moment of his rule. Megawati had been forced from the leadership of the PDI but

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102 Mietzner (1999) and Samad (1999). Wahid was present at a meeting Suharto called of some prominent Muslim leaders to attempt to shore up support for him in the final days of his rule. It is widely purported that Wahid gave his support and promised that Nahdlatul Ulama would not promote mobilization against him.
not due to any overt acts of opposition to Suharto. He was afraid that her name recognition from her father could pose a threat to him.

In explaining the emergence of moderate opposition figures during the transitional period, it is critical to emphasize that although these figures appeared and were able to garner enough authority from society to negotiate with the regime and military, this was based upon the respect given to them as well-known figures, not due to organizational connections to an opposition movement. The organizations from which each figure had sprung did not participate in the opposition movement against Suharto. Instead it was mostly spontaneous mass mobilization that forced him from power and that drove the transition to democracy. These figures merely attempted to seize the opportunity and declared themselves leaders of the movement.

Lacking any alternative leadership, the loose amalgamation of quickly formed student led organizations and unorganized individuals in society were, initially at least, willing to accept their role as representatives of the opposition movement. The divergence of demands, however, between these figures and many of the participants in mass mobilization and lack of organizational linkages between these nationally recognized opposition figures and the mass based opposition created problems for controlling the mobilization. This is elucidated throughout the chapters describing the transitional period.

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103 As Emmerson states, "Megawati was no radical. She was trying to compete within Suharto's system, by rules that he had laid down, in order to improve it by reform -- not replace it by revolution" (Oct. 1999: 41).
3.3. Concluding Observations on Suharto’s Regime

Suharto’s personalistic and pervasive rule distorted the development of state institutions, the economy, political parties, and social organizations. The military and bureaucracy were not subject to norms of professional conduct or a regularized rule of law. Instead they were extensions of Suharto’s personal power and used to implement his directives. Political institutions, such as legislatures, were filled with sycophants and merely nodded approval to Suharto’s policies. The judiciary was similarly controlled by Suharto. The government party was created and used as a means of controlling society and upholding Suharto’s rule and was at times indistinguishable from the state bureaucracy. The economy was riddled with special privileges and corruption. Political parties and social organizations were strictly controlled or eradicated.

These regime traits, approximating sultanism with totalitarian aspects, created obstacles for achieving a transition to democracy. The conditions that usually facilitate a transition to democracy, described in Chapter 2, did not appear to be present in the Suharto regime. How Suharto was forced from power and a transition to democracy was achieved despite the numerous obstacles imposed through his three decades of personalized and pervasive rule is the topic of the subsequent chapters.

We shall see that although the ideal facilitating conditions were not present, the Indonesian people were able to make use of what opportunities did exist and exploit weaknesses of the regime. The interaction of three factors became essential to the transition. First was the mass mobilization that erupted in the wake of a severe economic crisis. This type of mobilization that was rather chaotic and unorganized is what we would expect to see in a sultanistic or totalitarian regime.
The weakness and progressive fragmentation of the military was the second pertinent factor enabling and shaping the transition from sultanism to democracy in Indonesia. The military's inability to act independently, even though Suharto appeared confused and uncertain about what to do, prevented it from suppressing the protests. The lack of unity within the military also contributed to the inability to reach a decision about how to respond to the massive protests and resulted in contradictory actions being taken against the protestors.

The third significant factor that helped achieve a transition to democracy in Indonesia is perhaps more unique and not usually found in sultanistic or especially totalitarian regimes. This was the presence of some moderate figures who were able to play the role of opposition moderates. The fact that the regime allowed some semi-oppositional parties and any organizations not directly linked to the state to exist is an exception to sultanism and totalitarianism and perhaps explains the emergence of these figures who played a critical role in the transitional period. The presence of opposition moderates was very important for inducing the incumbents of Suharto's regime to negotiate a transition instead of feeling that they were engaged in a zero sum struggle.

Although the presence of individuals who can step forward and play the role of moderate opposition elites in negotiations with the regime can be pointed to as the reason Indonesia appears to be an exception to the theories on exits from sultanism, moderates stepping forward to lead a disorganized opposition could conceivable occur in other sultanistic or totalitarian countries. Few regimes in the world, even the most purely totalitarian, have been able to completely eradicate traditional structures, the bases of pre-existing organizations, or respected individuals who could play a role in leading an
opposition movement given the opportunity. If radical opposition is effectively prevented from organizing underground, as is usually the case in totalitarian and sultanistic regimes that penetrate society deeply, and some impetus spurs spontaneous mass mobilization against the regime, then the emergence of moderate individuals with whom members of the regime are willing to negotiate could occur in other countries with sultanistic or totalitarian regimes.

Similarly, a regime that displays no signs of pluralism within the regime due to the ruler’s intolerance of dissent may, under conditions of fighting for survival and when mass defections have led to the fall of the central ruling figure, have individuals step forth who play the role of regime moderates in negotiating. In Indonesia, we therefore see that the procession of events induced individuals to emerge from within both the regime and opposition – where it had appeared that none existed - who played the role of moderates and negotiated a transition to democracy.

Some of the conditions enabling this were circumstantial, such as the severe economic crisis prompting mass mobilization against the regime. Other conditions were perhaps unique, namely the existence of individuals who came to play the role of opposition moderates. However, the case shows that we should not rigidly exclude the possibility that sultanistic or totalitarian regimes can make a transition to democracy and can achieve this through negotiation. This should be good news for the numerous countries of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia that have yet to democratize and of which many are characterized by the regime types of sultanism or totalitarianism.

However, it will be shown that although transitions to democracy may be possible for these countries, as it was for Indonesia, the democracies created are likely to be of a low
quality and have problems with consolidating democracy. This is in part due to a low quality of negotiations being likely. The players involved in negotiating may be able to garner enough authority to negotiate and claim that the negotiations are accepted by society, but the characteristics of sultanism and totalitarianism would have prevented the existence of an articulate and respected leadership of moderates within the regime and opposition. Assuming that a revolutionary underground movement was not formed, as is true in the Indonesian case, the figures who are likely to emerge in representation of the opposition have a likelihood of being conservative. The elite figures of the regime and opposition engaged in negotiations also have a higher probability than in transitions from other regime types of not being representative of mass based demands. The lack of leadership that articulates mass based demands for reform, as well as an organized opposition and well defined pluralism within the regime, is likely to hurt the substance of negotiations.

For instance, as is seen in Indonesia, the opposition elite that emerged was excessively moderate due to decades of forced compliance to Suharto’s dictates. These opposition figures had no organizational connection to the mobilized segments of society, however, there were no alternative individuals who could claim leadership of the opposition movement. Similarly, the emergence of individuals within the regime who claimed to be moderates were not organized and mostly interested in protecting their privileged positions through any means available. These individuals may be able to play the role of opposition and regime moderates and negotiate a transition but they are substantially different from the type of leaders envisioned in theories of democratization and from the leaders who, leading well defined social or political organizations and factions of
regimes, negotiated transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in the countries of Southern Europe and Latin America.

In Indonesia, therefore, although a transition to democracy was negotiated, the extreme moderation of the opposition elite – a product of the Suharto regime that did not tolerate any strong or organized opponents – resulted in the failure of negotiations to significantly alter the institutional framework within which politics would be conducted in the post-transitional period. The narrowly focused negotiations on only holding free elections and not on constitutional and institutional reform have left the country saddled with a constitution and political institutions that are not conducive to a well functioning democracy. The military has also been left in a position of power from which it can influence policy and could challenge the civilian governance of the country. The moderation of the opposition elite also kept it distanced from the mass base of the opposition movement, which made the mobilization of society difficult the control and contributed to the increase and continuance of violent forms of mobilization.

The moderation of the opposition elite can therefore be seen as both beneficial and harmful to democratization. The existence of a moderate opposition elite prevented a zero sum conflict between the regime and mobilized society and enabled the transition to democracy in Indonesia, but problems were simultaneously created by the extreme moderation of the opposition elite that continue to plague attempts to consolidate a high quality democracy. The legacy of the pre-transition regime has thus been difficult to overcome despite the transition to democracy. Aspects of how characteristics of the transition and of the pre-transition regime have impacted the quality and consolidation of the new democracy are elaborated on in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 4
THE FALL OF SUHARTO

Suharto was aging but he appeared to be at the apex of his power when general elections were held in 1997. The government party, Golkar, won a higher percentage of the vote in this election than in any previous election.¹ Although Suharto was 76 years old, he was unanimously elected president for the seventh time in March 1998 by the members of the national assembly. Two months later, he was forced to step from power in the face of violent and chaotic mobilization.

This chapter will show the emergence of the three variables given prominence in this work. The first variable, mass mobilization, is seen to be the driving force of Suharto’s fall from power and the subsequent transition to democracy. The second variable, a moderate opposition elite, is not prominent in instigating Suharto’s fall from power but emerges during this period and plays a vital role during the rest of the transitional period. The third variable, a progressively weakened and fragmented military, becomes apparent during the uprising against Suharto and is significant in the explanation of Suharto’s fall from power.

The interaction of these variables push members of Suharto’s regime to defect en masse from supporting him in an attempt to save themselves. This initiates a transitional

¹ Golkar received 74 percentage of the vote (Schwarz 1999: 324).
period during which it is uncertain what course political change will follow. Subsequent chapters analyze how the interaction of the identified variables produce a transition to democracy but one that it beset with problems.

First, a brief examination of the conditions existing during the initiation of protests is given. This includes discussion of the issue of succession to Suharto and growing tensions in society at the end of Suharto's rule. This is followed by examination of the economic crisis that triggered the uprising against Suharto. How Suharto was forced from power and the importance of the identified variables is then analyzed.

Suharto's age had placed the issue of succession in many people's minds within the civilian and military components of the regime. He did not provide a clearly defined plan for succession and acted as if he would live and rule forever. The uncertainty surrounding the issue produced latent anxiety among some regime members. Individuals in the civilian component of Suharto's regime were especially concerned because they were uncertain about how they would fare under a successor to Suharto. Despite this latent anxiety, open discussion of the succession issue was not allowed by Suharto.

There were rumors that Suharto was going to arrange for his daughter, Tutut, to become head of Golkar later in the year and to succeed him as president in 2003. As discussed in the previous chapter, she had been made one of the chairpersons of Golkar and Suharto had increasingly relied upon her for advice. She had a close relationship

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2 Interview, Abdul Gafur, deputy speaker of the national assembly and leader in Golkar, Nov. 13, 1998.
3 Modernist Muslims, for example, were a relatively new group in society that had been given patronage by Suharto. They were concerned with maintaining or increasing their privileged position (interview, Jimly  Asahiddiqie; advisor to Habibie and a leader in ICMI, the modernist Muslim organization connected with the regime; July 15, 1999).
4 This was relayed to me in several interviews, including Burhan Magenda, head of the education department in Golkar, Oct. 18, 1998. It has also been widely reported in accounts of the regime prior to Suharto's fall. See, for instance, Forrester (1999a: 18).
with retired Gen. Hartono, who had been chief of staff of the army and thus had connections to the military. These connections could be used to obtain support from the military for a Tutut succession to Suharto. It was also rumored that Suharto was grooming his son-in-law, Gen. Prabowo, to become commander of the armed forces. Prabowo was known to be close to the modernist Muslim community.

No one was openly questioning this emerging dynastic duo of Tutut and Prabowo. Until forced to defect in the face of mass mobilization, no one inside the regime or military was willing to attempt to convince Suharto to step down from power or to organize his succession for the inevitable time when he became too old to rule. All of his regime members continued to play the role of loyal sycophants until the events described below forced them to struggle for their own survival. However, once Suharto was forced to step down in the midst of chaos, rivalries for power surfaced from within both the civilian and military components of the regime.

Within society, the severe constraints placed on organizations precluded an opposition from forming with the ability to threaten Suharto’s power. Protest groups did not begin to spring up in any number until approximately February 1998 when the rupiah had plummeted from Rp 2,400 per U.S. dollar the previous June to US$1 exchanging for Rp17,000. There were, however, latent grievances that had been building throughout the

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5 Despite the lack of mass based protests, there were, at the end of 1997, signs of growing audacity in society to oppose Suharto. For example, the Petition of Fifty, a group of retired generals, asked that Suharto not stand for re-election and Democracy Forum, a small group of intellectuals, advocated political reform. LBH, a legal aid group, released a list naming 13 officials whom it considered to have violated human rights. Some NGOs also called for Suharto to be held accountable for the economic crisis (Aspinall 2000: 286). While these calls were indicative of the events to come, at the time, they appeared fairly insignificant. Most people still viewed Suharto’s regime as strong and unopposed from within or without the regime. Student protests had not begun in any significant manner until February 1998 (“Depolitisasi Mahasiswa Selama 30 Tahun Berhasil,” Kompas Jan. 14, 1998).
decades of Suharto's rule. One such tension was between communal groups based on both ethnicity and religion.

Suharto had promulgated a transmigration policy that encouraged tens of thousands of Javanese and Madurese to move to less populated islands. They were given land and other privileges as an enticement. Other ethnic groups, such as the Buginese of South Sulawesi, also chose to leave their native islands for better economic opportunity in less populated areas. The migrants were often quite successful at entering areas of trade and fishing. The indigenous populations resented the intrusion of the migrants, especially when they came to dominate many economic sectors.

Resentment against these migrant groups was increasingly seen at the end of Suharto's rule. Inter-ethnic violence began to flare. For example, violence erupted in Pontianak, West Kalimantan in 1997 against the migrant Madurese. Suharto used the army to quell the unrest.

Religious tensions were also beginning to show signs of increasing near the end of Suharto's rule. Inter-religious conflicts were often overlaid with ethnic and economic issues due to the economically dominant Christian Sino-Indonesians being the target of attacks by non-Chinese Indonesian Muslims. Violence erupted in the form of burning churches in several places in central and east Java in 1997. These instances of communal violence portended the worsening conflicts that would come once Suharto was gone from power. The lack of attention from the political elite given to concerns of the groups in conflict and manipulation of conflicts by the political elite, as will be shown in later chapters, exacerbated the conflicts.
Besides growing communal tensions, there were also some signs of growing
resentment in society at the corruption of the state under Suharto’s direction. On the
local level, people complained of the increasing frequency that they were forced to pay
bribes to policemen and village officials. At the elite level, people outside of the
patronage network resented the preferential treatment of those who were inside the
network. This is not to say that people were organizing or discussing how to overthrow
Suharto’s regime, but there were some latent resentments that were present which would
burst forth during the economic crisis.

4.1. The Economic Crisis and the Beginning of Mass Mobilization

In July 1997, Thailand’s currency suddenly fell precipitously in value. This was the
first drop in value of several currencies in the Asian region. Indonesia was hit later in the
year, and its currency, the rupiah, experienced the most dramatic drop in value of the
countries hit by the economic crisis.

Between July 1997 and January 1998, the rupiah fell from US$ 1 trading at Rp 2,400
to US$ 1 trading for Rp 17,000. Many industries had to shut down due to the inability to
buy necessary imported inputs. By the middle of 1998, tens of millions of people were
reported to be unemployed. Prices were rising and the economic plight of people,
especially on the most industrialized island, Java, and in the cities was worsening

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6 My field observations in East Java, June – August 1997.
7 Interview, Azkarmin Zaini, head of news at a prominent TV station, Nov. 15, 1998.
8 The general election of 1997, although it brought Golkar the biggest victory in its history, brought the
most violence of an election under Suharto’s rule. 250 lost their lives during the election campaign as riots
broke out. Mostly, symbols of wealth and privilege were the targets of attack (Suryadinata 1998: 221).
9 Schwarz (1999: 341).
throughout the beginning of 1998.¹¹ The economic crisis had brought more frequent rioting with Sino-Indonesians - perceived to be unfairly wealthy - the usual target.¹²

Indonesia sought help from the IMF because it could no longer pay its debt with the rupiah being so devalued. While the IMF made agreements with Suharto’s government to help it withstand the crisis, Suharto kept breaking the terms of the agreements, which delayed IMF aid.¹³ As the crisis worsened, Suharto seemed unable to grapple with the immensity of the crisis.

In the early months of 1998, student protests began to erupt. The protests were not yet large, but represented the beginning of a movement that would force Suharto from power. The protests were initially centered on specific economic issues. For instance, lower prices for basic necessities, which had risen sharply since July 1997, or cheaper formula for babies was demanded.¹⁴ These sporadic protests would grow and merge with the spontaneous mobilization of ordinary people, as described below.

The economic crisis thus did two things that brought the downfall of Suharto. First, the economic crisis triggered into action some of the latent resentments that had been building against Suharto’s rule, especially among the lower classes in society. These resentments, some of which have been described above, were heightened by the economic deprivation brought by the economic crisis. In the atmosphere of rising confrontation with the regime, begun by student protests, people from the lower classes felt more emboldened to join in protests against the regime. As the regime progressively...

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¹¹ Throughout the twelve months to June 1998, construction fell by 43.7%; manufacturing by 19.3%; and trade, hotels, and restaurants by 25.2. The agricultural sector was not badly hit, with only a 2.4% decline (Forrester 1999a: 11).


¹³ For a detailed discussion of the IMF’s packages and Suharto’s breaking of the agreements, see Bresnan (1999) and Schwarz (1999: 338-345).

lost control and legitimacy, the resentment against it and conflicts within society began to erupt into a spiral of violent acts.

Second, it eroded support for Suharto’s regime within the middle and upper classes. This was because their support for him had been based upon Suharto providing economic development, patronage, political stability, and greater opportunities for them and their children. Once the economic crisis deepened and protests mounted, Suharto no longer had the economic resources to continue passing out patronage and political stability eroded. The economic crisis therefore did not solely cause Suharto’s overthrow, but it hindered his ability to continue providing the patronage upon which his regime was based and it triggered the unleashing of simmering resentments within society.

Although Suharto was eventually forced to hand over power to his vice president due to the defection of most all of the civilians in his regime, the impetus for Suharto’s overthrow was from below. It was not caused by pre-existing splits within the regime or autonomy of the military. This is characteristic of how sultanistic rulers can lose power through rapid mass defections when it is apparent that the ruler no longer has the legitimacy or capability to rule.

Once Suharto was gone, the mobilization against him pulled back from toppling the entire regime or forcing the military from power. The transitional period then began to take on characteristics that more closely approximated a negotiated transition. This is despite the tenuous ability of players to negotiate on behalf of their “constituents.” Many problems arose, however, that differentiate Indonesia from the common variety of negotiated transitions experienced by more standard authoritarian regimes.
An economic crisis alone brings a variety of outcomes to non-democratic regimes and does not explain why one ruler falls and another is strengthened. In Indonesia, the economic crisis provided a trigger and a backdrop for events that culminated in free elections. These events were primarily driven by domestic factors, as is shown below.

4.1.1. The Nature of the Mobilization

When Suharto was unanimously re-elected president by the national assembly on March 10th 1998, the student protests that had begun a couple of months earlier began to swell and to focus on opposition to him. For instance, 20,000 people demonstrated against him in Yogyakarta shortly after his re-election.\(^{15}\) This large a protest was almost unheard of during the decades of Suharto’s rule. The students began to be joined by professionals, alumni, and staff from the university. The protestors also began to push their way out of the campus gates and onto the streets.\(^{16}\)

The student protestors were composed of various groups but by March 1998 were somewhat coordinated by the student senates.\(^{17}\) Prior to the protests, Suharto’s efforts to keep the campuses de-politicized through placing strict controls on student activities had been successful, especially following the emergence of some small leftist groups in the mid 1980s.\(^{18}\) Campuses had therefore not been the hotbed for liberal views that is commonly presumed to be true in many countries. Student senates were predominantly

\(^{15}\) For information on the development of the student movement, see “Dialog atau Tidak, Aksi Jalan Terus,” *Tempo Interaktif* April 25, 1998.

\(^{16}\) Young (1999: 126).

\(^{17}\) Loose umbrella coalitions were also formed that included several campuses. For instance, Forum Kota (City Forum), called Forkot and discussed more in the next chapter, included a few dozen campuses (“Membangun Basis Perjuangan Rakyat,” *Detektif dan Romantika* May 2, 1998).

\(^{18}\) See Bhakti (1999).
quite conservative. It was thus somewhat of a surprise to the regime that the students were beginning to actively oppose Suharto.\textsuperscript{19}

The student senates were led by the senate at the largest university, Universitas Indonesia, the University of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{20} This senate was dominated by modernist Muslim students. The modernist Muslim sector of society had been in general considered a strong supporter of Suharto during his last decade of rule due to the patronage given to it.\textsuperscript{21} The feeling of the students that they should organize against Suharto was symptomatic of the growing feeling among the small middle and upper classes that Suharto could no longer provide them with the benefits to which they were accustomed. The students came mostly from these middle and upper class families.

Beyond the goal of forcing Suharto from power, most of the students had no long-term plan.\textsuperscript{22} They did not know what would happen if they succeeded in forcing him from power. There were vague pronouncements of fighting for democracy or reform, but what these concepts meant in practice was not clearly elucidated to the public or within these groups.\textsuperscript{23} This was partly due to the difficulty of reaching agreement on the bigger issues of what type of government to have in a post-Suharto era and partly due to the lack of central leadership or clear organization of the opposition movement. With no leaders to make plans, no plans were made. It was easiest to just focus on Suharto himself and leave the rest of the decisions for later. In this manner, the budding movement could

\textsuperscript{19} Interview, Abdul Gafur, deputy speaker of the national assembly and vice chairman of Golkar, Nov. 13, 1998.
\textsuperscript{20} "Aksi Mahasiswa'98", \textit{Detektif dan Ramantika} March 28, 1998.
\textsuperscript{21} This is despite the role Amien Rais, a leader in the modernist Muslim community, played in being a forerunner in criticizing Suharto.
\textsuperscript{22} Interviews: Rama Pratama, head of the student senate at UI (Universitas Indonesia, the University of Indonesia), Nov. 23, 1998 and Mustafa Fakhri, a student leader and member of the student senate at UI, Nov. 23, 1998.
\textsuperscript{23} "Dialog atau Tidak, Aksi Jalan Terus," \textit{Tempo Interaktif} April 25, 1998.
maintain unity in spite of the lack of leadership or organization beyond the coordination provided for by the student senates.

There were, however, some students who wanted more far reaching reform. These groups existed outside of the student senates and were more prevalent on private, and often Christian, campuses. These groups and their moderate counterparts are described in detail in the subsequent chapter when the differences become salient for how the transition unfolds. Here it is important to recognize that differences existed, but at this point, all of the groups were united in the demand that Suharto relinquish power.²⁴

Amien Rais, introduced in the preceding chapter along with the other two individuals who later came to play the role of moderate opposition figures, attempted to capitalize on the growing resentment in society at Suharto's mismanagement of the economic crisis. After student protests began to grow, he met with the student senates and spoke out in public more frequently against Suharto.²⁵ His criticisms were, however confined to Suharto himself and not the entire regime.²⁶ For instance, he rarely spoke of forcing the military from politics or of disbanding the structure through which Suharto ruled. He did address the issue of corruption frequently which struck a nerve with the ordinary people and people outside of Suharto's patronage network.²⁷ Although he emerged as the

²⁴ For some case studies of groups during this initial stage of instigating the transition, see McRae (1998). There was some animosity already apparent between the more radical and conservative student groups. This was seen in the leftist groups resenting the student senates taking over the student movement after the leftist groups had courageously initiated the student protests (interview, Adrian, a leader in Forkot, Dec. 3, 1998). An example of the courage necessary to initiate opposition to the regime is seen in the kidnapping, torturing, and murdering of a number of leftist activists in the early months of 1998 (“Pius Bicara, ABRI Bikin Tim Pencari, Lalu Siapa Penculik itu?” Tempo Interaktif May 2, 1998 and Schwarz 1999: 349).
²⁵ See, for example, “A Sense of Disgust: Time is Ripe for People’s Power, Says Suharto Opponent,” FEER May 14, 1998.
²⁷ Young (1999: 120-21).
leading nationally recognized spokesperson for the end of Suharto’s rule, he was not organizationally connected to the students. As stated previously, the Muslim organization led by him was not directly involved in the protests against Suharto.

Megawati Sukarnoputri began to be held up as a symbol of repression under Suharto during this period, but she herself was not very active in opposing Suharto. She rarely spoke in public on the issue and appeared to attempt to distance herself from the growing protests. Amien called for an alliance between himself and her to oppose Suharto, but she never responded.

Abdurrahman Wahid, during this time did not support the opposition to Suharto. Initially, he was recovering from a stroke and therefore was not well enough to be active in politics. By the final days of Suharto’s rule, he was recovered but still did not support the opposition. Suharto, in a desperate attempt to find support for his regime the day after tens of thousands of students occupied the legislative compound and riots had hit Jakarta, called a meeting of several leading Muslim figures. Wahid was among them. Wahid was one of the few present who gave his support to Suharto and called on the students to stop protesting. Only after Suharto resigned from power two days later, did Wahid put himself forth as a leading figure advocating reform.

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28 She did, however, criticize Suharto’s personalistic and prolonged rule in a few speeches beginning in early 1998 (Aspinall 2000: 288-9).
29 An example of her distance from the opposition movement is seen in the observation of an Australian scholar who spoke with her in a Jakarta hotel days after the violent riots of May 13-15. He said she calmly drank her tea and seemed worlds away from the violence that had just ensued (Forrester 1999b: 29).
30 The meeting took place on May 19, 1998. The other members present concurred that Wahid in fact did support Suharto continuing to rule. This was widely known in Jakarta and reported in accounts of the event, including Schwarz (1999: 362) and in the Indonesian media ("Cak Nur: Ini Hasil Terbaik," Jawa Pos May 20, 1998). See Mietzner (1999) for information on the lack of Wahid’s support for the opposition movement until after Suharto was forced from power.
31 Wahid’s continued support of Suharto in the final days could be attributable to his disdain for a Habibie presidency. Habibie is from the rival modernist Muslim camp (Forrester 1999: 48).
The students received some funding from sympathetic wealthy persons who were opposed to Suharto for reasons pertaining to their being excluded from his favoritism. One person who was often cited as providing funding to the students was Arifin Panegoro who would later become a prominent member of the PDI and allied with Megawati.32 Business tycoons purportedly provided funds and logistical support in the form of providing the students with sandwiches and water during the long hot days of protest. This became more visible as the protests mounted. These people were willing to support, although not to organize, an opposition to Suharto because they were left out of his patronage network.33 When it appeared imminent that Suharto would fall from power, some supporters of his vice president, Habibie, allegedly provided funds to groups of students.34

It was also alleged that some money may have been passed out to poor people to encourage them to protest.35 While this is unsubstantiated, it is possible. However, the extensive number of people involved in the protests make the funding of any protest activities a minor component in explaining why Suharto fell from power. He was forced to resign through spontaneous and extensive mobilization against him that rose up from below.

As the protests grew, the minister of education in Suharto’s new cabinet decreed that rallies were prohibited on campus grounds, but this order was ignored.36 While it was

32 Forrester (1999a: 19). This was also common knowledge in Jakarta.
33 Interview, Kristiadi, head of political division at a think tank, CSIS, Oct. 9, 1998.
34 Interview, Kamaruddin, founding member of the modernist Muslim group, Kammi, that was active in the protests Oct. 1, 1998.
35 This was rumored in Jakarta and relayed to me by a variety of means, including, interviews: Ida Bagus Putra, a member of Golkar’s executive board, March 14, 1999 and Sutrimo, head of political news in the state run TV station, Nov. 23, 1998.
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clear that Suharto's regime was facing the biggest threat of its existence, without organization or clear leadership, it appeared as if Suharto would be able effectively to use the tools of repression at his disposal to restore order. If he were forced from power, most observers believed that the military would step in to fill the power vacuum. As we shall see, once defections began *en masse* forcing Suharto from power, the military's lack of autonomy under Suharto prevented it from having the unity and central leadership necessary to face the extensive mass mobilization that had erupted across the country.

4.1.2. Response of the Civilian and Military Components of the Regime

When protests initially materialized against Suharto, there was no apparent dissent from within the regime. No factions were reaching out to the students attempting to spur them on so that they could win a factional power struggle and replace Suharto as commonly occurs in regimes with more pluralism. Instead, Suharto was unanimously re-elected president in March 1998. Even all of the representatives from the “opposition” parties voted for him. This occurred despite the severe economic crisis and beginnings of protests against him and made the situation appear to be approaching a zero sum game with the regime and protesters pitted against each other.

Following Suharto’s re-election, as stated above, protests increased and began to focus more pointedly on ousting Suharto from power. While in retrospect it appears that members of the regime, especially within the civilian component, were probably quietly discussing that it might be time for Suharto to go, there were no signs of this on the outside. No regime members spoke out against Suharto or encouraged the opposition.

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Although some were concerned with the succession issue, this was not sufficient to drive them to oppose Suharto.37

Suharto had come to rely upon a progressively smaller circle of advisors, with his daughter, Tutut, becoming more prominent, as he aged.38 Liddle states that “Suharto, at the age of 76 was no longer willing or able to distinguish between the interests of his family and his cronies and those of the nation” (1999: 25). The people around him had become accustomed to not giving him any bad news and only trying to please him. It is therefore purported that he did not have accurate information about the growing movement against him in society or understand the severity of the economic crisis.39 His closest cronies were mostly concerned with protecting their own interests in the economy and therefore tried to convince him not to follow IMF prescriptions and continue to place them in high positions. This was most clearly seen with the formation of his new cabinet, which was dominated more than ever by his family and closest cronies.40

As Suharto narrowed his circle of advisors and protected those closest to him, other people who had previously been recipients of the largesse of his rule were being hurt. This was one of the results of the economic crisis. It forced Suharto to narrow his circle of cronies even further, which bred resentment among some people who had previously been his supporters. While he protected his family’s interests more and more, the

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38 For an account of Suharto’s regime just prior to his fall, see Schwarz (1999: chapter 11).
40 Suharto’s daughter, Tutut was made minister of social affairs. Mohamad (Bob) Hassan, a close friend and golfing buddy of Suharto’s who had become extremely rich under his tutelage, was made minister of trade. Other notoriously corrupt officials, such as Haryanto Dhanutirto and Abdul Latief were given cabinet positions (Jenkins, D. “Soeharto Digs in with His All-Crony Cabinet,” Sydney Morning Herald March 16, 1998 and “Kabinet yang Membuat Keringat Dingin Mengalir,” Tempo Interaktif March 14, 1998).
wealthy class was being badly hurt by the economic crisis since it was individuals who had loans in foreign currencies whose debt was now ten-fold higher.

As it became apparent that Suharto was confused and did not know how to handle the economic crisis, some people probably began to reconsider their support for him. This concern for their own self-interest, however, had to be weighed against their loyalty to him and who might replace him. The uncertainty about who would replace Suharto and how people who had been recipients of his patronage would fare precluded any significant opposition to him from within his regime or concrete plans for a post-Suharto era until massive protests and rioting threatened to topple the whole ruling structure, including all of the privileged members of the regime.41

The commander of the military sent representatives and even himself went to talk with the students in order to gain information about their intentions and attempt to keep the line of communication open.42 However, the military did not seek to encourage the protesters or signal that they would be given latitude to force Suharto from power.43 As discussed below, some reports have indicated that the military “allowed” the students to occupy the legislative compound in the days preceding Suharto’s fall from power. Closer examination reveals this to be inaccurate. The military was merely immobilized due to

41 Several interviews indicated that despite the nervousness among regime members due to the succession issue and their being hurt by the economic crisis, there was no significant opposition to Suharto due to loyalty to him and fear of what would replace him. It was almost as if people in the regime and military could not conceive of opposing Suharto, who had been their patron and father figure for so long (interviews, Ekky Sjarudin, a senior member of Golkar, Feb. 14, 1999 and Burhan Magenda, head of the education department in Golkar, Oct. 18, 1998).

42 A publicized meeting was held between Gen. Wiranto and representatives of the students on April 18, 1998. Wiranto called for the students to cease their protesting and return to their studies (“Wiranto dan Mahasiswa Berdiskusi,” Kompas April 19, 1998).

43 To the contrary, Wiranto stressed that the military would not allow the students to provoke national instability (“Dialog atau Tidak, Aksi Jalan Terus,” Tempo Interaktif April 25, 1998).
its waiting for orders from Suharto that never clearly came and due to the factional
dispute within its ranks.44

The military was divided due to Suharto’s manipulation that was done to keep any one
officer, even the commander of the armed forces, from having enough power to control
the whole military. Suharto wanted to be sure, as described in the previous chapter, that
the military was not strong or autonomous enough to threaten his rule.45 He had therefore
cultivated two main factions. One was led by the commander, Gen. Wiranto. The other
was led by his son-in-law, Gen. Prabowo. Wiranto can be said to have represented the
secular-nationalists while Prabowo represented the more devoutly, especially modernist,
Muslims. The rivalry between these two generals will become salient in the final days of
Suharto’s rule and will be discussed more below.

4.2. The Fall of Suharto

Suharto was ultimately forced from power through massive protests against him that
were followed by three days of rioting in Jakarta. The rioting spread throughout the
capital cities in the archipelago and threatened to intensify. The military was beset by
rival officers competing to please Suharto. The military seemed incapable of quelling the
violence. In this atmosphere, the civilian members of the regime defected en masse and a
befuddled Suharto transferred power to his vice-president. This collapse of Suharto’s
power was not caused by some factions of his regime working to force him out. It was

44 Vatikiotis, for instance, states that “the military was non-committal, led by former presidential adjutants
who were loyal to the very end” (1998: xvii).
45 Schwarz argues, “One effect of the constant rotation of officers was Abri’s [the military’s] loss of what
political influence it had left...Suharto had effectively neutered the military as a political force just as he
had neutered all other political actors earlier in his rule...Abri became a tool of Soeharto — nothing more,
nothing less” (1999: 335).
mass mobilization from below that brought his fall, not elite level splits or the military withdrawing support for his regime.  

4.2.1. Protests Intensify and Riots Flare

The crisis began to reach a peak in early May 1998 when Suharto announced that fuel prices would be raised dramatically. The student protests were joined by members of the middle class, which was symptomatic of the loss of legitimacy of Suharto’s rule since the middle class had been one of his staunchest supporters. A few days later, Suharto left for a state visit to Egypt. As he left, he warned protesters that “the military will take action against whoever disturbs and ruins national stability.” On May 12, 1998, amidst a peaceful student demonstration, six students from Trisakti University in Jakarta were shot by soldiers. Four died. When the students were buried the following day, massive rioting led by the urban poor overtook Jakarta that lasted for three days from May 13-15th and began to spread throughout the archipelago. These were the worst riots to ever hit the country.

46 It is true that in the final days, there was some factional maneuvering within the civilian and military components of the regime. For instance, besides the rivalry in the military described below, Habibie’s supporters in the national assembly were careful to call for Suharto’s resignation, not impeachment, in order to allow Habibie to constitutionally become the president (“Habibie Presiden Baru Setelah 30 Tahun, Soeharto Bebas Tanggung Jawab?” Tempo Interaktif/May 23, 1998). However, these maneuverings were brought on by the mass mobilization and were not the cause of Suharto’s fall from power.

47 Fuel prices were raised by 70% May 4, 1998. Riots erupted in Medan, North Sumatra. Two people were killed (“Riots Bare Ethnic Hatreds in Indonesia,” The New York Times May 9, 1998).


49 Suharto went to Cairo for a G-15 (developing countries) summit on May 9, 1998 and returned May 15th.


51 “Ten Days that Shook Indonesia,” Asianweek July 24, 1998 and Schwarz (1999: 355). This was allegedly done by soldiers under the command of Gen. Prabowo.
During the riots, chaotic violence erupted on a massive scale, especially against symbols of wealth and power.52 Thousands of shops and houses were burned and damaged in Jakarta alone. Cars were stopped on the road and passengers were dragged out and beaten while their cars were burned (especially if they had government license plates). Thousands of people died, mostly in the fires. Dozens of Sino-Indonesian women were reportedly dragged from their homes and raped.53 The homes and buildings owned by top officials in the regime were prime targets of the violence.54 The violence spread to other cities, especially Solo, Central Java and Suryabaya, East Java.

On May 18th, a few days after the rioting had devastated the regime, student protesters occupied the legislative compound in Jakarta. Tens of thousands of students danced jubilantly in the waterfall that is in front of the complex. As described below, Harmoko, the speaker of the national assembly and head of the government party, called for Suharto’s resignation amidst this chaotic scene.

The protests and violence were not clearly organized or led. Their eruption was largely spontaneous and uncontrolled. The student protests, as described above, had loose coordination through the student senates, but no central leadership was present. Amien attempted to capitalize on the protests and became a vocal supporter of the students, but he had no organizational connections to them and they did not follow his

54 Official statistics state that 2,547 shops and houses were destroyed, 40 malls damaged, 1,819 stores, 383 office buildings, 535 banks, 24 restaurants, 11 police stations, 1,119 cars, 821 motorcycles, and 9 gas stations were damaged or burned during the riots. More than 1000 people died (Forrester and May 1999: 243).
lead. Instead, he followed their's.\textsuperscript{55} Furthermore, it was the spontaneous rioting much more than the student protests that led to the fall of Suharto.\textsuperscript{56}

After Suharto handed power over to his vice president on May 21\textsuperscript{st}, the student movement began to fracture. Without the unifying goal of ousting Suharto from power, the various quickly formed groups that had protested for his fall split apart, disintegrated, or lost their raison d'etre. The issue of whether to press forward for the complete overthrow of the regime or be satisfied with ousting Suharto became a divisive point for the opposition movement. This is described in detail in the following chapter.

Amien, Megawati, and later Wahid, the three figures who came to represent the movement for reform, were all conservative and did not support the complete overthrow of the regime. It will be shown in the following chapters that they negotiated with the remaining civilian regime members and military for free elections that would enable a widening of the circle of power. Their control over the opposition movement and especially over general society, which could erupt again at any time into spontaneous rioting, was, however, tenuous.

The sort of chaotic mass mobilization that brought Suharto from power is not unheard of in countries dominated by sultanistic regimes. Although theories tend to emphasize the revolutionary quality of mass mobilization opposing sultanistic regimes, it is also possible to have a spontaneous eruption of "people power."\textsuperscript{57} The likely outcome in

\textsuperscript{55} For some of Amien's statements as the protests began to escalate, see "Amien Rais: Reformasi Dari Kampus Jangan Dianggap Enteng," Suara Pembaruan April 19, 1998 and Amien Rais dan Nurcholish Madjid Testang Sidang Istimewa MPR," Tempo Interaktif April 21, 1998).

\textsuperscript{56} All of my interviewees indicated repeatedly that it was the rioting and fear of renewed rioting that resulted in defections from Suharto. The student protests were considered manageable.

\textsuperscript{57} See, for instance, Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Chehabi and Linz (1998), and Snyder (1998).
these instances, however, is theorized to be either suppression or military take over of the
regime.58

In Indonesia, although Suharto fell due to mass mobilization against him, as predicted
by theories on exits from sultanism, the totalitarian elements of his regime and it origins
in anti-communism prevented a significantly large underground, revolutionary
movement from forming. The mobilization was therefore centered on forcing Suharto
from power but did not have agreed upon revolutionary goals and was not organized. As
will be shown, this, combined with other factors, especially the existence of the three
moderate opposition figures and the weakness of the military, enabled the remaining
regime members and military to negotiate a transition instead of continuing in a zero sum
stand off.

4.2.2. Civilian Regime Members Defect en Masse

The rioting that overtook the capital city and threatened to overtake the country
convinced the civilian members of Suharto’s regime to defect from supporting him. The
rioting upset the regime members more than the student protests because the students
were limited in number, but the participants in rioting could rise to include most of the
nation of 220 million people.59 The civilians knew that the military, no matter how
willing, could not beat back all of the Indonesian people. These were not just protesters

58 As presented in chapter 2, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) do, however, allow for a more nuanced
assessment of possible pathways, especially if the country has a history of a multi-party system.
59 As stated, this assertion was repeatedly stressed to me in my interviews, including by people very close
to the regime members’ decision-making in the final days of Suharto’s rule (interviews: Abdul Gafur, Nov.
that could be scared with a few deaths into going home. These were ordinary
Indonesians who had risen up against all symbols of the regime.

It appeared as if the entire ruling complex would be toppled in a chaotic revolution.
What would follow was uncertain. The civilian regime members had economic interests
and properties that were being destroyed now not only by the economic crisis but by the
riotous Indonesian people. The elite were scared for their lives and could not believe
what they saw happening before their eyes. They ran for cover.60

In addition to the physical threats, the IMF and other international lending agencies
were pressuring members within the regime to make the necessary changes that would
bring stability to the country.61 Lending agencies did not intend to throw money at a
disastrous situation. This pressure probably influenced the decision of many regime
members but would not have been decisive if not combined with the chaotic internal
events.

In the few days following the rioting, the civilian members of the regime scrambled
for a way to save themselves. They had been terrified and became convinced that
Suharto had to go. This was the only way to prevent the entire ruling structure from
being overthrown and possibly save themselves and their property. With almost no time
and no preparations having been made for a serious challenge to Suharto’s power, they
had to work out what or who would replace Suharto. There appeared to be little

60 Interviews, Agung Laksono, Oct. 23, 1998 and Yusiril Mahendra, constitutional advisor and speechwriter
alternative to a transfer of power from Suharto to the vice president.\(^62\) The fact that the only nationally recognized figures of the opposition were moderate and not advocating complete overthrow of the entire regime may have helped to bring about the defections, but there was too little time at this point for discussions between the regime members and the opposition about what would come after Suharto.\(^63\)

The discussions among the top civilian regime members also did not extensively include the military.\(^64\) The military was preoccupied with its own internal rift that pitted Gens. Prabowo and Wiranto against each other. They each still saw their power as coming from Suharto's hand and thus sought to gain his favor in the wake of the catastrophic riots.

When the students occupied the legislative compound three days after the rioting ended, the speaker of the Assembly, who was also leader of Golkar, publicly declared that Suharto should resign for the sake of national unity.\(^65\) He was supported in this statement by his deputy, Abdul Gafur, another leading official in the government party.\(^66\) Such open dissent from within the regime and from people who had been representative of the sycophantic culture surrounding Suharto was unheard of and signaled the end.

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\(^{62}\) Habibie’s supporters pushed for this (interview, Fadli Zon, a young activist in the modernist Muslim community, Feb. 26, 1999). His supporters consisted mainly of modernist Muslims who had relatively recently been allowed into the regime.

\(^{63}\) Negotiations thus did not begin until after Suharto fell from power through rapid mass defections (interviews: Abdul Gafur, Nov. 13, 1998 and Faisal Basri, secretary-general in PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party), Amien’s political party formed during the transitional period, July 23, 1999).


\(^{65}\) “Seven Days in May that toppled a Titan: Back-Room Intrigue Led to Suharto’s Fall,” *Washington Post* May 24, 1998. There was a widely circulated rumor that Harmoko, the speaker of the Assembly, was convinced to defect from Suharto when rioters burned his favorite house in Solo, Central Java. They threatened to burn his other homes as well.

Suharto then attempted to form a new cabinet and proposed a “reform” plan to address demands for political change. Leading economists, under the direction of Ginanjar Kartasasmita, signed a petition stating their refusal to join a new cabinet. Others followed suit and no one was willing to serve in Suharto’s new cabinet. At this point it was clear that the civilians in his regime had defected en masse.

Suharto’s only option to resignation was to rule exclusively through the military. He was purportedly bewildered and confused. He could not believe that the people had risen against him and that his hand fed cronies had left his side. When he received the news on May 20th that no one was willing to serve in his cabinet, he purportedly said “Well, that’s it then,” and summoned his constitutional advisor to draft a resignation statement. With assurances from the military that he and his family would be protected, he formally transferred power to his vice president, Habibie, on the morning of May 21, 1998.

Although Habibie, upon becoming president, declared that free elections would be held within one year, he was not supported in this assertion by many of the regime incumbents. He thus would vacillate on this promise and stall for time, as is described in the following chapters. The transfer of power from Suharto to Habibie left the question of making a transition to democracy up in the air. No one was sure what would happen. Some thought that Habibie might attempt to replace Suharto by being the new sultan, that he would rule in a partnership with the military, or the military would take power directly.

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67 Schwarz 1999: 309.
68 Interview, Yusri Mahendra, constitutional law expert whom Suharto consulted on transferring power to Habibie the night before his resignation, Forum Demokrasi June 15, 1998: 65.
69 Schwarz 1999: 309.
It quickly became apparent that without the respect and authority that Suharto had wielded, Habibie could not replace Suharto and continue the regime in the same manner. Without Suharto, the regime began to splinter and it soon became evident that the ruling structure could not survive without Suharto’s guiding hand. Even the military splintered and drifted. The remnants of the regime stalled for time as they sought ways to save themselves.

4.2.3. Military Divided and Hesitant

As stated earlier, there was a rivalry between the commander of the armed forces, Wiranto, and Suharto’s son-in-law, Prabowo. This rivalry manifested itself in the final days of Suharto’s rule in Prabowo allegedly using the troops under his command to allow rioting to occur in the capital city.70 There is no solid proof for this, but it is a widely reported rumor.71 Prabowo supposedly did this in order to show the inefficacy of Wiranto as commander of the armed forces. Prabowo intended to come to the rescue and “save” Suharto by restoring order for him. In this manner, he hoped to be anointed new commander of the armed forces and better positioned to assume control over the country once Suharto did step down, in a few years, due to his age.72

The plan backfired, however, and Suharto did not replace Wiranto with Prabowo. Instead, Suharto reportedly felt threatened by Prabowo and circumvented him in favor of

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70 Prabowo had been made head of Kostrad in March 1998 and still held significant support from the other elite army unit, Kopassus, which he used to head. His ally, Maj. Gen. Muchdi headed Kopassus after him. Other allies were Gaj. Gen. Syafrie Syamauddin, who was commander of the Jakarta Garrison, and Gen. Dibyo Widodo who was head of the police.


72 This information was corroborated by several interviews, including Asahiddiqie, July 15, 1999 and Afan Gaffar, a political observer with ties to the military, Dec 2, 1998. A similar analysis is made in Forrester (1999a: 20).
Wiranto. Suharto, however, did not give clear orders to Wiranto about how to handle the crisis. This left Wiranto uncertain about what to do in the face of massive protests and rioting.73

For instance, when rioting overtook the capital city, Wiranto purportedly did not know if the involvement of Prabowo's troops was intended by Suharto. He also had trouble curbing the rioting because the troops that were stationed in the city and nearby were allied with Prabowo.74 They did very little to stop the violence. Wiranto had to call in troops from outside the region. It took a couple of days for them to arrive. Once these troops arrived, he was able to stop the rioting, but the damage had been done.

Wiranto was also reportedly left with no clear orders when the students amassed in front of the legislative compound.75 Was he supposed to use force that would surely result in several deaths to prevent them from entering or was he supposed to avoid the use of force at all costs to prevent future rioting? Suharto had not been clear on this and Wiranto did not know what he wanted him to do.76 This uncertainty led Wiranto to do very little to prevent the students from entering.77

Although he did not repress the students, Wiranto, after meeting with Suharto, denounced Harmoko's declaration that Suharto should step down from power as unconstitutional. He said that Harmoko had been speaking as an individual and that his

73 Information about Wiranto's intentions and the unfolding of events from the military's perspective was obtained from an interview with Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Jan. 5, 1999.
76 Suharto had fallen ill in December 1997 and reportedly acted befuddled since that time, which coincided with the worst period of the economic crisis (interview, Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Jan. 5, 1999). His physical and mental state thus may have played a role in his inability to piece together an effective response to the opposition. The lack of autonomy of the military prevented the military from taking the helm. Liddle states that a senior general informed him that the military would have been willing to repress the demonstrations if Suharto had given the order (1999: 104).
statement had no constitutional authority. Wiranto made it clear that the military would act firmly against unrest. As Schwarz states, “Wiranto, a Javanese general deeply loyal to Soeharto, was dead set against seeing Soeharto run out of town by the mob” (1999: 359). Thus, even after the civilians in the regime had shown signs of defecting en masse, Wiranto stood by Suharto.

It was therefore not that the military allowed the students to enter the compound because it had withdrawn its support for Suharto. Contrary to this, the military’s complete dependence upon Suharto for decision-making, and Suharto’s confusion, resulted in the military ultimately not repressing the protests and allowing the compound to be occupied. Similarly, divisions within the military, created by Suharto, hindered its ability to quell the devastating riots. Both Wiranto and Prabowo had family-like relations with Suharto and were intensely loyal to him. Although a rivalry existed with each other, neither officer showed signs of attempting to push Suharto from power.

Another instance of the military continuing to support Suharto beyond the civilian defections is that in Suharto’s final days, while the many members of the national assembly were calling for a special session of the assembly, the military blockaded streets with tanks and threatened to repress protesters if they followed through with a planned march to the national monument. It was reported that Amien, who had called for the

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78 Schwarz (1999: 359).
79 Forrester (1999: 35).
80 Although some reports give the military a more activist role in allowing Suharto to fall, analysts closest to the scene say that the military, after the fact, attempted to improve its image by claiming a role in Suharto’s fall that it did not have. For example, Salim Said, an analyst close to Wiranto, says that “Until the last minute, Soeharto was in control of the army” (in Schwarz 1999: 364).
81 As Forrester states, “Soeharto’s pitting of one faction against the other provided one of the specific triggers that ultimately brought him down” (1999a: 20). Shiraiishi argues similarly, “Given the divisions within the top leadership, it is not surprising that the military hierarchy was never able to reach agreement to act independently of Suharto. Indeed, the military remained loyal to the president up to the last minute (1999: 78). Vatikiotis concurs with this assessment (1999: 160).
mass march to the monument, was told that the military “would not hesitate to provide a Tiananmen Square incident.” The threat resulted in the march being called off.

Even without the weaknesses in the military caused by Suharto’s manipulation, it is uncertain as to whether or not the military would have been able to stall off the mass mobilization that erupted into violence. The military consisted of fewer than 500,000 troops and approximately 200,000 army personnel. This was in a country of over 200 million people spread across a vast archipelago. As rioting broke out in various areas, the military had difficulty being everywhere at once and the once feared might of the military began to show itself as an ineffective opponent to the multitude of people who rose up in anger at the regime.

When Suharto chose to hand over power to Habibie, Wiranto was concerned with protecting his security. It was agreed even among the civilians in the regime that Suharto and his family would be protected. Wiranto also purportedly continued to take orders from Suharto until months into the transition. This bothered some of the more

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82 The Australian May 21, 1998 as quoted in Young (1999: 107). Although this threat purportedly came from a representative of Prabowo, Wiranto appears to have taken the same stance because the troops and tanks involved men under his command. Both officers were at this point still fighting to please Suharto.
83 Although it is clear that the military supported Suharto long after the civilians in his regime defected, there is dispute over whether or not Wiranto ultimately did tell Suharto that the military could no longer support him. Some reports speculate that he did, others that he did not. (My interviews support the latter: Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Jan. 5, 1998 and Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Nov. 12, 1998). Even if Wiranto had finally told Suharto that the military was not capable of repressing the opposition, especially without the support of the civilian component of his regime, Suharto could have turned to Prabowo if he had wanted to attempt repression. Thus, it is clear that the final decision to step down was Suharto’s and was induced by the defection of all civilians in his regime — brought out by mass mobilization, not a military withdrawal of power.
84 Shiraishi (1999).
85 Despite the difficulties of the military, when Suharto called Wiranto to his home on the evening of May 20th and asked if the military could maintain security and order, Wiranto said yes, but there would be casualties (Shiraishi 1999: 82).
86 Wiranto’s first public statements at the ceremony of the transfer of power was that the military would protect Suharto and his family (Schwarz 1999: 366). The promise of protection gave Suharto the security he needed to resign (Samad 1999: 28).
progressive soldiers who wanted Wiranto to concern himself with restoring the unity and autonomy of the military, but Wiranto’s loyalty to Suharto prevented him from making the military his top priority over Suharto for some time into the transitional period.\textsuperscript{88}

Many of the leading officers in the military did not particularly like Habibie due to a history of antagonism between Habibie and the military in budgetary matters.\textsuperscript{89} Wiranto, however, respected Suharto’s decision to give power to him. He also wanted the transfer of power to be done according to the constitution so that less ambiguity would be present about the path of the country.\textsuperscript{90}

The rivalry between Wiranto and Prabowo extended into the beginning of the Habibie presidency. On the first night of Habibie’s presidency, Prabowo showed up at Habibie’s residency and demanded that he be made commander of the military. It is purported that his demeanor so frightened Habibie that Habibie wanted him relieved of command from any significant post.\textsuperscript{91} At this point, Habibie and Wiranto began their alliance that would last throughout the transitional period. Habibie supported Wiranto and allowed him to get rid of Prabowo and cleanse the military of his allies as much as he could. Wiranto allowed Habibie to rule without questioning his policies.


\textsuperscript{89} For example, in 1989, when Habibie had been a minister in Suharto’s cabinet, he convinced Suharto to purchase ships from the old East German navy. The ships were to be repaired by Habibie’s engineers, which benefited Habibie, and then used by the Indonesian navy. The navy did not want the ships. The project failed and was very costly. Habibie’s intervention in other budgetary matters also created resentment by depriving the military of lucrative kick-backs once made from commercial procurement (Young 1999: 156).

\textsuperscript{90} There is some speculation that Suharto offered power to Wiranto who refused saying that the transfer must be done constitutionally. Although Wiranto was clearly concerned with the constitutionality of procedures in order to reduce ambiguity and reduce the possibility of a radical overthrow of the entire ruling structure, I found little evidence to substantiate the claim that he was offered and refused power.

\textsuperscript{91} This incident was widely rumored in Jakarta. For more information, see “Habibie, Prabowo, dan Hari-Hari Dramatis Itu,” \textit{Tajuk} March 4, 1999 and Forrester (1999: 58-60).
Prabowo was dealt with quickly. Wiranto demoted him the day following the transfer of power to Habibie. A few months later, he was brought before a military tribunal for allegedly kidnapping student activists and stripped of his active duty status. He then went to live in Jordan throughout the rest of the transitional period and is no longer a player in Indonesian politics.92

Suharto’s transfer of power to Habibie left the military without its accustomed guidance. Wiranto was criticized harshly during the beginning of the transitional period that began with the fall of Suharto for being too preoccupied with protecting Suharto. He was accused of neglecting the military’s institutional interests. The military began to fragment and split along several rifts. For example, officers wanting more professionalism were pitted against those who wanted to take a more proactive stance in seeking power. The central command structure also experienced great difficulty controlling officers in the field, especially in the territorial command structure. This fragmentation resulted in minimizing the military’s power during the transitional period, as is seen in the following chapters.

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SECTION II

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

The following three chapters detail the transitional period, which began after Suharto fell from power, and ends with the selection of a democratically elected president and vice president. We shall see that the transition was driven by a combination of three factors—mass mobilization, a moderate opposition elite, and a progressively fragmented military—in the context of a severe economic crisis and international pressure to restore political and social order. The importance of these three factors for moving Indonesia from a predominantly sultanistic to a democratic regime began to be evident during Suharto’s fall from power, as is analyzed in the preceding chapter. However, once Suharto abdicated as ruler, continuing along a path of democratization was anything but certain. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will therefore trace the transitional period as it unfolded and the continuing importance of the three central factors for achieving the transition will be shown.

These chapters are organized internally according to the three above stated explanatory variables and their interaction with and impact on the regime. Examination is also made of the economic crisis and international pressure which set the context for regime change. The interaction between these variables resulted in a transition that was
mass driven but elite negotiated and therefore produced results that were not expected based upon structural factors, such as the prior regime type.¹

This nature of the transition has in turn had consequences for attempts to consolidate democracy, as will be discussed in Chapter 8. For instance, the extensive mass mobilization that was a driving force of the transition continued into the post-transitional period and became increasingly elite manipulated. The nature of the negotiations also had severe consequences for the consolidation of democracy. Specifically, the narrowly focused nature of the elite negotiations left many areas of reform untouched and widened the gap between the elite and mass base within the opposition, which would create obstacles for consolidating democracy. This is despite the fact that negotiated transitions are thought to create the most favorable circumstances for consolidating democracy.

The argument that has been laid out in the introductory chapter - that problems of democratic consolidation in Indonesia can be traced back to characteristics of the transition and to characteristics of the pre-transition regime - will therefore be fleshed out in these three chapters as the transitional period is detailed. The theoretical literature and debates, which center not only on theories of exit from sultanism, but also on the role of mass mobilization and elite negotiations in democratization, have been discussed in Chapter 2 and will not be reiterated here. However, the reader should keep in mind that the transitional period is being analyzed in depth for the purpose of showing that certain characteristics, such as the nature of negotiations and of elite-mass linkages, are important components of the transitional period that subsequently influence attempts to

¹ This is not to deny the importance of prior regime type, which I argue was important in shaping the position and relative bargaining power of the actors. However, the latitude of the actors for making decisions affecting the transition path increases during the period of regime crisis and political upheaval (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
consolidate democracy. Furthermore, not all types of negotiated transitions are equal in their scope of issues negotiated or in the quality of agreements reached. It is only through tracing the above-mentioned characteristics from the beginning of the transition to the consolidation phase that the consequences of how the transition was made can be assessed.2

The parameters of the transition were set with agreements reached surrounding the events of the Special Session of the National Assembly. This is the period covered in Chapter 5. The role of mass mobilization is especially important during this time as the extensive protests surrounding the Assembly’s special session provided the impetus for elite negotiations. Mass mobilization and the various groups involved are thus discussed at length in this chapter.

Chapter 6 explains how the details of the transition were worked out between the main actors. During this period, a situation of increasing lawlessness took hold as mass mobilization in the forms of uncontrolled grassroots mobilization and ethnic and religious conflict increased. Within this context, the elite players negotiated the rewriting of three political laws that would govern the election.

Chapter 7 analyzes the deal making among the political elite that brought Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency. During this final stage of the transitional period, fear of social conflict due to mobilization based upon primordial identity spurred the newly elected political elite to choose a “compromise” candidate for president.

Each chapter thus focuses on the negotiating of specific aspects of the transition as they occurred and on the interaction between actors during their negotiations. The final

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2 Munck and Leff (1999) argue that the process of the transition is critical in determining the outcome of the transition itself and the consolidation of democracy.
chapter will assess how the mode of transition and characteristics of the pre-transition regime have affected the functioning and consolidation of democracy.
CHAIRER 5

SETTING THE PARAMETERS OF THE TRANSITION

Chaotic mass mobilization in Indonesia had succeeded in forcing Suharto from power, but toppling his entire ruling structure and setting up something new in its place was more difficult to achieve in the absence of an organized opposition. When Suharto was forced from power, many observers assumed the military would take over power or that his vice president, B. J. Habibie, or someone else would succeed Suharto in dominating the ruling machine that had been created by him. Theories on exits from sultanism or totalitarianism predict such non-democratic outcomes.

The confluence of the three variables highlighted in this work – mass mobilization, a moderate opposition elite, and a progressively weakened and fragmented military – created an outcome that was not expected based on the characteristics of the prior regime type. The events surrounding an initial episode of the transitional period, covered in this chapter, show how these variables interacted to create an impetus for negotiating a transition to democracy. The consequences of how the transition was achieved also begin to become apparent. For instance, mass mobilization continued despite its unorganized and chaotic nature. This mobilization of society, which often took violent overtones, frightened the regime and military. Although this mobilization

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was the driving force for political change, it’s uncontrolled and violent nature continued into the post-transitional period.

Three figures emerged to claim leadership of the opposition, but they were not linked organizationally or ideologically to the mobilized people in the streets. These figures were much more moderate and tepid in their views of reform than were the mass based protesters. While the so-called opposition leaders used the condition of a highly mobilized society to demand that the circle of power be widened, they distanced themselves from the mass based demands for total reform of the political system. In a critical and telling demonstration of their tepidity, the leading figures of the opposition publicly declared support for the regime’s plan for elections and asked the protesters attempting to topple the remnants of the regime to go home and stop causing disorder. It will be shown that while this moderation of the opposition elite may have been beneficial to the transition in the sense that an alternative to repressing demands for total reform was offered to the regime and military, the disconnection between the elite and mass base in the opposition had negative consequences for the shifting forms of mass mobilization and for subsequent attempts to consolidate democracy.

During this period, the weakness of the military was recognized as a constraint on the options available to the regime in the face of violent mass mobilization. Quelling the mobilization against the regime would involve large-scale casualties that would likely prompt even more mobilization of society. Protests and violent mobilization continued to spread across the country and the military was incapable of controlling the rising discontent. If the mobilization continued to increase, the entire ruling structure, including
the military’s privileged role in governance could be toppled. In recognition of its weaknesses and constraints, the military sought a way out of its predicament.

The above factors combined to set the stage for negotiations between the leading opposition figures, military, and regime. Agreements between the actors were not officially signed by all sides or always publicly announced. Extensive interviewing, in combination with media reports, reveals however that explicit agreements were in fact reached among the main elite actors.

Negotiation brought agreement on the necessity to hold free elections within a year and to reduce the role of the military in politics, but not completely to remove its political and social presence. It was also agreed that the Constitution of 1945 would remain in force and that no radical restructuring of government institutions would take place. The narrow focus of the negotiations may have been helpful for achieving a transition to democracy because the military and regime did not feel that they would lose everything, but as will become clear in the final chapter, the failure to make more reform to the constitution and political institutions would create problems for consolidating a high quality democracy. Before analyzing the events of this period, introductory information to these events is briefly given below.

Shortly after Suharto’s transfer of power to his vice president, B. J. Habibie, in May 1998, Habibie promised to hold free elections within a year. No specific timetable was given. On November 10, Habibie convened the national assembly (MPR) to meet in a Special Session (Sidang Istimewa) to address the country’s political crisis. He had waited until November to convene the Assembly because he needed to first consolidate his authority within the regime. In the months following his assumption of power, he had
replaced the head of Golkar and had established a tentative partnership with the head of
the military, General Wiranto. Although Habibie was pushing the Assembly to pass a
decree on holding early elections, the resistance from much of the regime and the
uncertain stance of the military made it unclear if free elections would actually be held.

Events surrounding the Assembly's Special Session thus constitute a critical period
during which the broad parameters of the transition were determined and the
reconsolidation of sultanistic rule or the shift to another variety of authoritarian rule were
prevented. As detailed below, the opposition elite, regime, and military negotiated
whether a transition would happen and what that would mean in practice. The events of
the period, each actor's role in the transition, and significance of the highlighted variables
are elaborated below.

5.1. Mass Mobilization

The Special Session occurred amid extensive mass mobilization of over 100,000
people. Protests were organized mostly by student groups but were partly funded by a
few wealthy individuals who were against Habibie's presidency. The students were
joined by tens of thousands of ordinary people who lived in the Jakarta area. Bloody

3 After Habibie became president, he arranged for a special meeting of the Golkar leadership to choose a
new Golkar leader. This was done to appear to be reforming the regime and in response to the mass
protests against the Suharto-appointed leader, Harmoko. Habibie nominated Akbar Tanjung and gained the
support of General Wiranto who pressured regional heads (many of whom were retired military officers) to
vote for Akbar. Akbar Tanjung had been a cabinet minister under Suharto for fifteen years and was the
state secretary at the time of his fall. Akbar beat the rival candidate, General (ret.) Edi Sudrajat, who was
supported by many retired military officers, in a vote of 17 to 10 ("Akbar Becomes Golkar's First-Ever
Elected Chairman," The Jakarta Post, July 12, 1998). If Edi had won, then Golkar would likely have had
Habibie replaced at the Assembly's Special Session with General (ret.) Try Sutrisno, who was a former
vice president and commander of the armed forces. Since Wiranto, like Habibie, did not want this to
happen because Try would probably have replaced Wiranto, or at least curtailed his ability to control the
military, Wiranto and Habibie came closer together in order to save their own positions. Akbar Tanjung
and his role as head of Golkar is discussed more in the "regime" section of this chapter.

street battles broke out between the protesters and the military personnel guarding the Assembly compound as the protesters tried to break through the military cordon and take over the premises in order to signal the overthrow of the regime that Habibie had inherited. By the end of the three day session, at least sixteen protesters were shot dead with live ammunition and hundreds more were injured.\(^5\)

The significance of the mass mobilization that occurred during this period is that it was the driving force of the transition. Mobilization had played the leading role in inducing Suharto to step down but then had tapered off in the months following Habibie's accession. During the Special Session, mobilization once again came to the fore.\(^6\)

However, the moderate opposition elite was willing to publicly denounce efforts to oust Habibie in exchange for assurances that free elections would be held. This decision of the opposition elite stymied the efforts of many of the protesters to overthrow the regime and create a transitional government.

Although the regime was not overthrown, the extensive mobilization and fear of renewed rioting convinced the regime and military, as will be discussed below, that a legitimate government must be brought to power by free elections. Thus, the possibility that Habibie would be forced by members of his regime or military to relinquish his

\(^5\) There were snipers seen shooting live ammunition into the crowd from a building rooftop. For whom these snipers were working is not clear. The military personnel guarding the Assembly compound shot rubber bullets, tear gas, and water into the crowd for several hours ("Black Friday," *The Jakarta Post*, Nov. 14, 1998 and "Metal Bullets Found in Most Victims of Friday's Shooting," *The Jakarta Post*, Nov. 20, 1998).

\(^6\) The continued mass mobilization against the entire regime which Suharto had dominated is unusual since, according to Fischer (1992), mobilization against sultanistic regimes usually focuses on the sultan, as did the protests that escalated in Suharto’s downfall, and subside once the sultan is removed. This provides the opportunity for members of the regime to reconsolidate power, as happened in Romania after Ceausescu was deposed.
promise to hold elections was thwarted by mass mobilization during the period of the Assembly’s Special Session.\textsuperscript{7}

Mass mobilization can occur in many forms.\textsuperscript{8} In the Indonesian case, mobilization took the form of peaceful and violent protests, regime organized mobilization, grassroots mobilization against symbols of the regime, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts, and separatist agitation. The weak elite-mass linkages and organization of Indonesia’s opposition groups meant that although mobilization was the driving force of the transition, it was also a dangerous force that could easily end in national disintegration or a hard-line backlash.\textsuperscript{9}

A particularly vexing problem was that, during the transitional period, groups began to be pitted against one another, especially in the name of religion. This was seen most clearly with the regime’s mobilization of Muslim groups to defend the regime. Many students also ceased opposition to the regime because they believed that the radical opposition consisted mostly of Christians who wanted to take power from the Muslims. The use of religious symbolism as a divisive tactic portended greater mass conflict based upon religion and ethnicity.

\textsuperscript{7} This was despite the fact that mass mobilization was largely unorganized, which is characteristic of protests against sultanistic and totalitarian regimes and which usually hinders the success of mobilization against these regime types (Zhang 1994).

\textsuperscript{8} For example, Tarrow (1994) discusses a variety of forms that mobilization may take and still be considered protest movements against the state. Other works, including Gurr and Moore (1996), depict mass mobilization as a form of collective action that may be directed against the state, either directly or indirectly, or against a rival group. Even Tilly (1978), although he contends that organization is necessary for a sustained movement, defines mobilization to include acts of lawlessness when spurred by a conflict with the state or another group.

\textsuperscript{9} The weak elite-mass linkages, characteristic of organizations under sultanistic rule, have been theorized to be dangerous for completing a transition to democracy because in order for negotiations to occur, the opposition elite must be able to control the mobilization (Huntington, summer 1984; Levine, April 1988). Valenzuela (July 1989) argues that mobilization may be useful at points in the transition but then needs to subside so that elites can negotiate. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) have argued similarly that continued mass mobilization may provoke a backlash from the military.
5.1.1. Protest Groups and Their Demands

The student movement began to fragment when Habibie became president. Some students accepted Habibie as the legitimate successor to Suharto, while others rejected him and wanted to continue pressing for a transitional government before elections were held. This split became clear during the protests surrounding the Special Session. The main inter-campus groups that accepted a regime-led transition were the official student senates, the national level HMI-Diponegoro, Kammi, and Forum Salemba. The main inter-campus groups that rejected Habibie's claim to legitimacy and the continued power of Suharto's regime were Forkot, Famred, Keluarga Besar Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia Big Family), HMI - MPO (Depok), and several regional branches of HMI. Some anti-Habibie students also organized themselves into groups according to their campus, such as Legima and numerous other groups specific to individual campuses.

10 Accepting the regime's legitimacy but demanding that elections be held was dubbed "the constitutional way," as opposed to an overthrow of the constitution.
11 HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Association of Islamic Students) is a long-standing Muslim student organization that predates Suharto's regime and had been allowed to survive due to its non-oppositional stance toward Suharto. The addition of Diponegoro to the name HMI differentiates this main group of HMI from the splinter organization, HMI - MPO which, contrary to the main HMI, has never accepted Pancasila as the basis of its organization as was the law under Suharto.
12 Kammi was formed in March 1998 in order to offer students a Muslim organization through which their demands could be channeled in the heyday of protests against Suharto (Interview, Kamaruddin, Oct. 1998).
13 As stated, this is a splinter group of HMI that is more radical in its religious views and therefore more oppositional politically. This group was technically not legal until the MPR decree requiring all organizations and political parties to pledge allegiance to Pancasila was revoked during the Assembly's Special Session. It is oriented more to the right on the political spectrum in the sense that it advocates a prominent role for Islam in government. Ironically, this group also opposed Habibie and therefore protested against him alongside leftist groups. It did so because Habibie was viewed as a mere lackey of Suharto and in the belief that a regime representing the people would necessarily be more grounded in Islamic teachings (Interview with members of this group on the campus of Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Nov. 18, 1998).
14 HMI has 113 regional branches throughout Indonesia.
Despite the split over whether or not to allow Suharto’s regime to stay in power under Habibie’s presidency, all the protest groups had one common demand: to hold free elections. Beyond this, there were many divisive issues within the protest movement that had once been unified against Suharto. Although the differences of opinion centered on the issue of whether or not to accept Habibie as the legitimate president, capable of governing during the transition, there were also differences on other issues. The most significant were withdrawing the military from its dual function role, bringing Suharto to trial, removing Pancasila as the basic ideology of the nation, and writing a new constitution. The specific demands of the various protest groups are detailed below.

5.1.1.1. The Student Senates and Moderately Oppositional Groups

The problem of maintaining unity within the opposition movement was exacerbated by the acceptance of Habibie’s presidency by the student senate at the University of Indonesia (UI) and at other universities, in Sulawesi and other outer islands. The UI student senate was conservative and oriented toward the modernist Islamic social stream of which Habibie was a leader.\(^\text{15}\) The similar social orientation contributed to the senate’s decision not to continue organizing against the government once power was

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\(^{15}\) The student senate leaders began to be recruited from the modernist Muslim segment of society in 1994 when the method of election was changed from consensus of the student leaders among the university departments to election by the student body. Because the student body at UI and at many other universities nation-wide had become more Muslim-oriented due to trends in society, and especially among the university age population, leaders from this segment of the population had been elected every term since 1994. When the elections were conducted through the student leaders of each department, then minority views were weighted more since small departments with predominantly secular or more leftist views were given equal weight to the larger more Muslim oriented departments. This shift in election methods had significantly shifted campus politics to the right because the majority of students have been voting for Islamic candidates (Interview; Kamaruddin, UI’s student senate leader prior to the mobilization against Suharto and one of the founders of a modernist Muslim group, KAMMI, formed in 1998 at the Brawijaya University in Malang, East Java; Oct. 1998).
transferred to Habibie. The leaders of the big student senates, especially UI, were also “advised” by respected elders to discontinue mobilizing against the government. They were warned that they were being used by political factions who were disgruntled because Akbar Tanjung had assumed the leadership of Golkar and Habibie had continued to hold the presidency.

Many students in UI’s senate were convinced that they should be wary of manipulation by forces that wanted power but were not proponents of democracy. For example, the students suspected the motives of the head of the UI alumni association (IIuni), Hariadi Darmawan, who was prompting the alumni association and the student senate to protest against Habibie and Wiranto. Hariadi’s motives were suspect because he was related to former vice-president and army general Try Sutrisno by marriage. The group within the regime that had lost in a bid for power with the ascension of Habibie and Akbar Tanjung wanted Try Sutrisno to take over the presidency. The democratic credentials of this elite faction were not strong. Thus, the UI student senate leaders’ belief that they were vulnerable to manipulation, combined with their common social orientation with Habibie, resulted in their decision not to organize student protests against

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16 Interview, Rama Pratama, head of University of Indonesia’s student senate, Nov. 23, 1998.
17 For instance, Juwono Sudarsono, minister of education and culture and formerly a popular professor at UI, talked with the student leaders and convinced many that they were being used by unhappy political factions and that they would only create anarchy if they persisted mobilizing against the government (Interviews: Rama Pratama, president of UI’s student senate, Nov. 23, 1998; Kamaruddin, Oct. 1998; Major General Amir Syarifuddin, head of the political section in the ministry of information, Dec. 4, 1998; and Jimmie Ashidiqui, senior advisor to President Habibie, July 15, 1999. Many other interviews also supplied similar information because it was common knowledge in Jakarta political circles that Sudarsono was holding these discussions).
18 Akbar’s victory meant that a faction of the political and military elite who had hoped to gain power were cut out of the regime. This faction then became oppositional toward Habibie and Wiranto and found it useful to claim a reformist stance and to fund oppositional protests.
19 Interview, Erik Husain, spokesperson for the UI student senate, October 1998.
the Habibie government or for a transitional government. They decided instead to remain a “moral force” and focus on the demand that free elections be held.\textsuperscript{20}

The decisions of the student senate at UI had a big impact on the protest movement nationwide as UI’s senate was considered the leader of a nation-wide network of student senates and even influenced high school groups.\textsuperscript{21} It was the protests begun by the student senates, and led by UI’s senate, that triggered the mass based protests that brought Suharto down. Convincing the UI student leaders to halt protests against the regime was in fact a big part of Habibie’s strategy once he assumed power. It significantly shaped the transition process, causing the protest movement to fragment between radical vs moderate and Christian vs Muslim wings.\textsuperscript{22}

During the period of the Assembly’s Special Session in November 1998, the student senates were not active in organizing students for protest. However, most of the leaders did participate in moderate protests, which were organized officially by newly formed groups. The most prominent of those groups was called Forum Salemba and was an inter-campus (Jakarta region) organization that staged protests from the UI campus in

\textsuperscript{20} Interviews, Rama Pratama, Nov. 23, 1998 and Mustafa Fakhrri, Nov. 23, 1998, a leader in the UI student senate. Mustafa was also the son of the leader of PPP (the Islamic party under Suharto which became active against Golkar during the transitional period but which also was against replacing Habibie with a transitional government).

\textsuperscript{21} The student senates of the Jakarta area had been loosely organized into a group called FKSJM (Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta, Communication Forum of Jakarta Student Senates). This group had been active in organizing protests against Suharto and consisted of representatives from each participating university’s senate. Plans were made for protests and the representatives returned to their campuses with quotas to fill for participation in protests. Phone chains (and word of mouth) were the predominant method of mobilizing people. After Suharto fell, this inter-campus group became less active as the UI student senate halted its organization of protests. According to Rama Pratama, in an interview, Nov. 23, 1998, when student senates contacted him about plans to mobilize for a transitional government, he told them not to do it. This frustrated many students from these other universities, but without central coordination, it was difficult to mobilize effectively for the overthrow of the regime of which Habibie had become head.

\textsuperscript{22} Interviews: Jimly Asshiddiqie, July 15, 1999 and Umar Juoro, July 30, 1999. These two advisors to Habibie discussed the importance of controlling the student senates in Habibie’s early days of power.
The Salemba campus was in central Jakarta but about a fifteen-minute drive from the Assembly compound. These protests were meant to offer an alternative to the radicals who were demanding the overthrow of Habibie and the remnants of Suharto’s regime. Conflict with the military guarding the compound was hoped to be avoided by holding the protests a fair distance from the Assembly compound.

The main demand of the Forum Salemba was that free elections be held in a timely manner. Other demands were also made, including that the military gradually reduce its role in politics and society, Suharto be brought to trial, and that Pancasila be withdrawn as a required foundation of any organization. Privately, however, the leaders of conservative groups, such as Forum Salemba, admitted that they did not want to press the issues of the military and Suharto. Leaders of Forum Salemba were also vague on changing the constitution, but generally agreed that this issue be debated after free elections brought a new government to power.

23 Forum Salemba’s leadership consisted of leaders from the academic departments’ student senates of UI and the leaders of the old university wide student senate that was active in bringing Suharto down.

24 This is the old UI campus that is still used for medical and some graduate studies. The government built a new campus in the early 1990s in Depok, which is about a forty-five minute drive or thirty minute train ride from central Jakarta. The stated reason was to have more space; however, many students felt that it was part of the government’s effort to control student activities. In the new campus, besides being outside Jakarta and thus out of the center of activity, each faculty was separated by much land and trees and thus, with no central congregating area, the students were never in a setting where large groups gathered or where large meetings could be held. The effect was to make it difficult to plan any large scale inter-department activity.

25 This information was in a written statement, “Ultimatum Salemba,” November 1998, and was also supplied through several interviews with students involved in Forum Salemba. The demand that the military be withdrawn from power was included to appease sentiment of broad student populations and was also sometimes combined with demands that Golkar be dissolved; however, the leaders of this group, although the organization was loose, did not think the military could or should be immediately removed from governing the country (Interviews, Rama Pratama, Nov. 23, 1998 and Kamarrudin, Oct. 1998).

26 Interviews: Rama Pratama, Nov. 23, 1998 and Berlian Idriansyah, a leader in UI’s student senate, Nov. 24, 1998. It appeared, through conversations with protestors in the moderate groups and through observing their placards that the people protesting within these moderate groups thought that they were all united in demanding the immediate end of the military’s socio-political role and Suharto’s trial. They were not aware that the organizers of their protests were careful not to directly confront the military or to allow these issues to become a central demand.
Forum Salemba was loosely organized and as its names suggests more of a forum than an organization, but it was significant in providing an outlet for students who wanted to be a part of the reform movement but who did not want total and immediate change. Significant numbers of people, mostly students, went to the Salemba campus during the Assembly’s Special Session to participate in the forum, which included speeches and the hoisting of banners. However, they were dwarfed by the numbers of students and general public that marched to the Assembly and attempted to break through the defensive line mounted by tens of thousands of soldiers guarding the compound.

Besides Forum Salemba, many modernist Muslim groups also accepted Habibie’s government as legitimate but continued to demand that it move toward democratization. This was the official stance of HMI and Kammi. The national level leadership of HMI, in contrast to some regional branches as will be discussed below, was against forming a transitional government and agreed with the idea of keeping the pace of political change gradual. Kammi was a Muslim group more to the right politically, with a stronger Islamic agenda, but it too demanded that free elections be held. On the issue of the constitution, the more moderate Muslim groups, such as HMI, had a similar view to that espoused by Forum Salemba. They wanted the constitution to remain in force during and after the transition to democracy. Kammi, while agreeing with Forum Salemba on the

27 Approximately three thousand students went to the Salemba campus during the special session (“Forum Salemba Adalah Alternatif,” Kompas, Nov. 13, 1998).
28 Interview, Anas Urbaningrum, head of the national HMI, Nov. 24, 1998. Anas presented very moderate demands for political change similar to those of the UI senate leaders. He would not specify what he had been told by elders who were now in the regime but he did admit that he had fairly frequent communication with members of the regime. Some of this was through the HMI alumni association (Kahmi), to which many regime members belonged.
four stated goals, also had some of their own goals, including amending the constitution to provide a clear role for Islam in the country’s laws and politics.29

5.1.1.2. Radical Leftist Groups

After Suharto fell from power and the student senates ceased to be leaders in organizing protests against Habibie, there was a lull in the opposition movement for a few months.30 In late August new organizations began to form, and some groups that had been formed during the heyday of the anti-Suharto effort became more important. These groups began to protest more frequently in the months leading up to the Assembly’s Special Session in mid-November 1998.31 Two of the most prominent were Forkot (Forum Kota, City Forum) and Famred (Forum Aksi Mahasiswa untuk Reformasi dan Demokrasi; Student Action Forum for Reform and Democracy), which were inter-university but had a base in UKI (Universitas Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian University), as well as in other private universities, such as Universitas Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National University, UNI) and Atma Jaya University.32 These groups drew their members mostly from private Christian universities, making it easy for

29 The head of Kammi, Fitra Arsil, signed the written statement of Forum Salemba’s goals.
30 For instance, the largest protest to occur in four months after Suharto fell from power consisted of only 1,000 people. It was organized by Forkot. “Students back to DPR, insist Habibie quit,” The Jakarta Post, Sept. 8, 1998.
31 The activities of groups were often chronicled in the newly freed media. A summary article about the protest movement is “Gerakan Yang Terjejit Elite Politik,” Tajuk, Jan. 1-13, 1999, pp. 12-31. Information was also obtained from interviews: Adrian, a leader of Forkot at UKI, Dec. 3, 1998 and Donni, a leader of Famred at Atmajaya, Nov. 20, 1998.
32 Forkot was officially formed in March 1998 and had its headquarters in Universitas Sahid. It had representatives from 53 campuses around the Jakarta region. Most participation came from UKI, Universitas Sahid, and IAIN Jakarta. Famred splintered off from Forkot in Oct. 1998, as did several other smaller groups, such as Gempur, and Front Jakarta (“Gerakan Tanpa Pemimpin,” Tajuk, Jan 1-13, 1999. Pp. 86-7.
the regime to label them anti-Muslim. The leadership and meeting places rotated in order to prevent leaders from being targeted by the military for subversive activities. The main aim of these groups was to overthrow the regime that was now headed by Habibie and to set up a transitional government consisting of a presidium of national figures. Also included in their demands was the writing of a new constitution (possibly by the presidium, but if not, then by the new post-election government), the complete and immediate removal of the military from its socio-political role, the dissolution of Golkar, and the trial of Suharto and others associated with his regime and tainted by corruption and human rights abuses (including Habibie, Wiranto, and most of the regime incumbents).

Forkot was more confrontational in its protest tactics than Famred, but the goals of the groups were the same. They professed to be working for democratization by demanding a transitional government, but there was internal disagreement about the meaning of democracy. For instance, were political parties led by Jakarta based politicians a legitimate component of democracy? Some members thought that democracy should be electoral and based on parties, but other members, mostly those

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33 The radical groups were labeled both Christian and communist despite the fact that Forkot was composed mostly of Muslims (“Forkot Bukan Organisasi Kristen,” interview, Vedi, a leader of Forkot, Tajuk, Dec. 16-31, 1998).
34 Even though the leadership supposedly rotated, clear leaders remained and the bases of the organizations were on known campuses. However, the leadership and specific meeting places were not advertised to the public (Interviews with members and “Students: Driven by Curiosity, Spirit, Courage, and Tenacity,” The Jakarta Post, Nov. 22, 1998).
35 Information on the groups’ goals and activities was obtained from interviews with leaders, including Adrian, leader of Forkot, Dec. 3, 1998 and Doni, leader of Famred, Nov. 20, 1998 and from observation at several meetings. See also, “Students Fight for Greater Freedom in their own Way,” The Jakarta Post, Nov. 22, 1998.
36 Forkot would purposely instigate violent confrontations with the military during street protests in order to incite the public to oppose the military and to create a situation where the military was in violent opposition to the protest movement and could therefore be more easily branded as repressive and detrimental to the country (Interviews with Adrian and observation at meetings).
with origins in the PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, Democratic People’s Party), a leftist
group advocating Marxist ideology, thought that villagers should elect representatives
who would then elect regional representatives who would in turn elect national
representatives. Political parties would not be allowed to exist in the latter definition
because they were thought to be elitist.37

Although the PRD was not officially connected to Forkot and Famred, much of the
membership overlapped, especially in Forkot. Many Forkot activists, however, wanted to
attract a larger membership base and therefore did not officially advocate the extreme
leftist ideas of some of its members. The group was branded communist anyway and
never obtained the membership level that it had hoped for, even though their protests
were frequently joined by like-minded non-members.38 The support that these two
radical groups received from the public enabled them to assume a leadership role in
demanding immediate and total change through overthrowing the regime and creating a
presidium government to lead the transition to democracy.39

Forkot was in the front lines of the mobilization. Members of Forkot bore the brunt of
the violent conflict with the security apparatus. They had the goal of storming the
Assembly compound and taking over the premises, as had happened just prior to

37 Informal discussions, Siti and Niki, members of the PRD. Information was also obtained through
discussions with radical members of Forkot and through observation of meetings.
38 An example of groups such as Forkot being snubbed by other students and their problem with attracting
more members is that UI had sent three representatives to Forkot meetings under the umbrella of Keluarga
Besar UI after Suharto had fallen. However, by October 1998, Keluarga Besar had ceased contact with
Forkot due to differences in strategies, although they agreed on many goals (Interviews, members of
Keluarga Besar at UI campus, October 26, 1998 and “Forkot denies communist links,” The Jakarta Post,
39 Membership numbers are difficult to know since membership was not clearly defined except by
participation in protests. Based upon this, and judging from witnessing protests and media reports, such as
“Sisipan: Gerakan Mahasiswa Angkatan ’98,” Tajuk, Nov. 1-26, 1998, membership was in the tens of
thousands range, although the core group consisted of only a few thousand. Most all of the members were
in Jakarta, although organizations did exist in other areas of the country, especially in East Java and
Lampung, South Sumatra.
Suharto’s resignation six months earlier. They then planned to name the most prominent leaders of the opposition movement, Amien, Megawati, and Gus Dur, as well as other unspecified individuals, to be members of a national presidium which would rule the country until elections could be held.\footnote{Sultan Hamengkubuwono was excluded from the list of members for the presidium even though he was emerging as a prominent figure in the opposition movement because he was deemed too conservative and was a symbol of a centuries old Javanese dominated elitist past that the members of leftist organizations opposed.}

The choice of presidium members was debated within the groups advocating the overthrow of Habibie, but it was assumed that the three leading opposition figures would accept positions within a new government. Beyond this, Forkot did not have a clear plan as to how to bring their ideas of democracy to fruition. Their vagueness led to confusion, since if the goal was to form a “people’s democracy,” as described above, then forming a three-person presidium and planning elections based on parties would not bring realization of that goal closer. Despite this division over tactics and goals, Forkot was able to maintain a fairly united anti-Habibie stance because the radical members hoped that this would open an opportunity for them to then shift tactics as necessary.\footnote{These radical members were very open about their goals and strategies. They did not advertise them to the press, but they were not a big secret. This explains why many students chose to stay away from these groups.}

When the opposition elite—Amien, Megawati, and Wahid—publicly declared in the Ciganjur Agreement, discussed below, that they did not support overthrow of the regime, Forkot and its allies were dealt a serious blow. Without the legitimacy that these leaders would bring, a presidium government replacing the Suharto/Habibie regime would have trouble gaining public support. Even more significant, with the three opposition figures’ public request that people stop mobilizing against the government, the radical groups lost the public support needed to succeed in seizing the Assembly compound. Forkot had,
however, made a significant impression on the regime, military, and on the public by the unexpected mass support it received in confronting the military outside the Assembly.

5.1.1.3. Oppositional Groups In-Between the Moderates and Radicals

Several groups were more oppositional toward Habibie and the regime than were the student senates and Forum Salemba, but disagreed with the leftist ideology of groups such as Forkot, or added demands that were Muslim in orientation. For example, one significant group that became important after the student senates became less active was the Keluarga Besar Univeritas Indonesia (University of Indonesia Big Family). This was an inter-campus group that was considered “off campus” and therefore not regulated by the university administration. Keluarga Besar was mostly dominated by UI students. It was at times labeled radical, but it was not nearly as left leaning as Forkot and Famred.

The demands of the group tended to focus on specific issues and were not clearly organized into a concrete vision of the future. For instance, the group demanded that a “transition to democracy” occur, which meant different things to different members and leaders. Some wanted to push for a transitional government and participated alongside Forkot in confrontational protests during the Special Session. Other members preferred to stay in the background. They joined the Forum Salemba protests and

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42 Keluarga Besar UI was officially formed in April 1998 but became more important when the student senates ceased organizational activities.
43 Interviews, Ali and Dewi, members of Keluarga Besar UI, Feb. 22, 1998. Observation of meetings also showed that there was dissension on many issues.
44 According to my observation, these students tended to identify themselves as Muslim and therefore did not want to join a group, such as Forkot, that was viewed to be communist and dominated by Christians.
focused on free elections held by whomever was in power. Keluarga Besar UI therefore was a catchall group trying to be many things to many people.45

Another group critical of the regime, but with a Muslim orientation, was the HMI regional branches. As discussed above, HMI’s national leadership was moderate. It advocated that its members stay in the background and continue pressing for free elections, similar to Forum Salemba. Several of the regional branches and their members were more radical; they joined the march to the Assembly compound to overthrow Habibie.

Although some branches of HMI were more radical, they did not share all of the goals of the leftists such as Forkot.46 HMI regional branches participated in the march on the Assembly and wanted a transitional government to be formed, but they did not agree with Forkot ideas for a people’s democracy. The regional branches, like Forkot, wanted the rapid withdrawal of the military from power, the dissolution of Golkar, the trial of Suharto, and the immediate holding of free elections. In addition to these demands, HMI, both national and regional, also wanted to repeal the requirement that the state ideology—Pancasila—be the ideological basis of all organizations, which precluded organizations based upon Islam.47 Views on constitutional change varied within HMI branches, but

45 Some people claimed that Keluarga Besar UI was manipulated by the national secularist faction of the political elite, such as the Barisan Nasional (see below) and Try Sutrisno, through the influence of Ibni because the president of Ibni, Hariadi Darmawan, was related by marriage to Try (Interview, Kamarudin, Oct. 1998). However, I found little evidence of this connection.
46 Interview, Faisul, member of the HMI Bekasi branch, Nov. 29, 1998 and discussions with several members of the Ciputat and Jakarta branches, Nov. 10, 1998, at the Special Session.
47 This demand was not stressed by the radical groups and was in direct opposition to the Barisan Nasional’s demand that Pancasila be upheld, as is described below. This shows that although many demands made by different groups coincided with one another, allowing them to attack the regime in similar ways, the various groups often had very different agendas and ideas about the future of the country. These differences were largely grounded in the different social segments they represented. HMI was modernist Muslim and the radical, leftist groups, as well as the conservative Barisan Nasional, were secular.
proposals included providing a role for Islam in the nation’s formal politics, correcting problems with the centralization of power, limiting the powers of the president, and ensuring that the military remain outside of politics.  

Other critical student groups sprung up that were based on individual campuses and had much in common with the above groups but also added their own variations, making for a plethora of demands. An example of a campus group that was in between the moderates and radicals was Legima, based in Jayabaya University. Legima’s views were almost identical to those of the HMI regional branches. They included demands for a transitional government, bringing Suharto to trial, holding elections immediately, withdrawing mandatory allegiance to Pancasila as the national ideology, and ending the military’s dual function. This particular organization also added the demand that regions be given more autonomy.

The fragmentation of the “formal” opposition movement can thus be seen with some groups accepting Habibie as legitimate and others not. All of the groups agreed that free elections should be held but were divided on issues such as how fast the military could and should be removed from power and on continued adherence to the Constitution of 1945. Even among groups that agreed on the goal of forming a presidium government to lead the country to elections, there were deep divisions due to different social backgrounds, especially between Christians and Muslims. These differences would

nationalist. While the Muslims had long thought Pancasila repressed their Muslim identity, the nationalists upheld it as a unifying force.

Much of this information on the demands of HMI regional branches was obtained from observing a meeting between representatives of the Ciputat, Jakarta, and Bekasi branches with two Golkar executives on the first day, Nov. 10, 1998, of the Special Session. Subsequent interviews filled in the details.

Information from a written statement of demands given to Golkar representatives during a meeting with them on the first day of the Special Session. I was also present at the meeting.

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become even more divisive after the Special Session as group demands began to reflect closely the social segment from which they originated.

Despite the divisions within and among groups, significant portions of the general public were willing to support the overthrow of Habibie. This was evidenced by the fact that the students and "organized" groups accounted for only a small percentage of the number of people who gathered in the streets during the Special Session. The student groups initiated and led the protests, but the bulk of the protesters were ordinary people who appeared eager to take back the rights they had lost during Suharto's rule. The fact that they were not organized at all and depended upon the fragmented groups and national opposition leadership, which was weak, to guide their mobilization meant that their protests could easily become chaotic and unproductive.

5.1.1.4. Barisan Nasional

As stated earlier, some disgruntled factions that were unhappy with Habibie, Wiranto, and Akbar also wanted the Habibie government overthrown. These individuals had been in the Suharto regime or had been its clients but lost their bid for power and therefore had chosen to leave the regime. Many of them had not only lost politically with the ascension of Habibie but were also hurt economically by the policies of Habibie's minister of cooperatives and small businesses, Adi Sasono, who redistributed the vast resources under his ministry's control through new patronage networks. These individuals lacked

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50 This phenomenon of people who are outside of the patronage network in a patronage-based regime and join the opposition, but who have suspect democratic credentials, has been seen frequently in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). It includes people who were once inside the regime. The splintering of the opposition and regime can thus be seen clearly by this period as "status-quo" and "reformer" begin to lose meaning and the fight becomes about grabbing the spoils of Suharto's regime (Interview, Imam 145)
a mass base and thus were eager to provide support and encouragement to opposition
groups. They wanted the students to protest against the regime and provided logistical
support, organizing the distribution of water, food, and medical treatment.

A group of these individuals called themselves the Barisan Nasional (National Front).
They were blamed for the protests during the Assembly’s Special Session because they
had put into writing their demands for the overthrow of the government. They then faxed
a statement to key individuals within the regime. The people who signed the Komunike
Bersama (Joint Communiqué) were some of the wealthy individuals who had been
helping the students with funding and logistics. The signatories consisted mostly of
retired generals and people who had at one point had a prominent position in Suharto’s
regime. They were on the secular nationalist side of Indonesia’s political spectrum while
Habibie was on the opposing modernist Muslim side, which meant that they would not be
receiving patronage from Habibie.

The Barisan Nasional rejected the legitimacy of the Special Session because the
Habibie government itself was in their eyes illegitimate. They called for the dissolution
of the regime and the formation of a presidium to guide the country to elections. The

Prasojo, political observer, Nov. 23, 1998). Examples of former regime insiders in the group of Barisan
Nasional include Ali Sadikin, a retired general and former governor of Jakarta, and Kemal Idris, a former
commander of the army’s strategic command unit.

51 Many of these excluded former regime and military members also joined Megawati’s party. They shared
with Megawati a secular-nationalist view that included appreciation for the military’s role in politics and a
52 For instance, they faxed it to the offices of President Habibie and Wiranto (Interview, Azkarn Zaini,
head of news at a leading television station, ANTV, Nov. 15, 1998).
53 For instance, Arifin Panigoro, who is reputed to have helped the students to stage protests, is not a
signatory.
54 The Barisan Nasional had ties to Try Sutrisno’s group. As discussed above, Try was a retired
commander of the armed forces who had lost the opportunity to become president when Akbar was
successfully placed as head of Golkar. Try had also been a leader of nationalists within the military.
55 Written statement given to me by Azkarn Zaini who had it faxed to him. See also “Barisan Nasional
The presidium was to consist of representatives of all segments of society, defined corporatistically as students, farmers, military, business, etc. The Constitution of 1945 was to be kept intact and the state would remain unitary. The ideology of Pancasila was also defended in the Communique.

Although the signers of the Communique advocated a presidium government, like the radical students, their intention was to get rid of Habibie and control the government and the transition process.\(^{56}\) They did not support the radical groups’ demands to rewrite the constitution and make significant changes to the political system. The Barisan Nasional had a common interest with the radicals in overthrowing Habibie, but there was much suspicion that they then intended to take power for themselves with the support of disgruntled factions from within the military and Golkar.\(^{57}\)

Even though some individuals within the Barisan Nasional apparently provided assistance to the protesters at the Special Session, the group was small in numbers and had no mass base. It was not capable of creating the massive mobilization that rose up

\(^{56}\) This view was held by most members of the regime and opposition groups. Everyone whom I asked about the goals of the Barisan Nasional had the same answer. In an interview with a member of the Barisan Nasional, Ali Sadikin (December 6, 1998), a retired general and respected public figure, he stressed that Habibie was an illegitimate president because he had not been voted into office. He claimed that the people must be allowed to choose the government. He did not say that the Barisan Nasional and its allies would unlawfully take power, but he did say that if politics continued to divide the nation then a “unifying” government would need to assert control. This type of statement fueled accusations that allies of the group would later instigate and fan social unrest in an attempt to take power.

\(^{57}\) In fact, however, few military officers seemed to support this group. The most disgruntled faction of the military was led by Lt. Gen. Prabowo who had been forced into retirement after being accused of abducting radical students prior to the May 1998 protests. Prabowo supporters were modernist Muslims who were in opposition to the secular nationalist orientation of the Barisan Nasional. Most of the military support for the group thus came from retired generals who had lost power with the Islamization of politics and the military in the late Suharto years. Some of these generals purportedly had connections to the infamous General Benny Mardani who was a Catholic and commander of the armed forces from 1983–87. It was with his ousting by Suharto, beginning in the late 1980s, that the regime became increasingly sultanistic and the military lost influence as an institution.
against the regime. Its leaders were merely capitalizing on the protests and were themselves shocked at the magnitude of the mobilization.58

5.1.2. Mobilized Groups in Defense of the Regime

5.1.2.1. Pam Swakarsa

During the Assembly's Special Session, individuals within the regime organized the mobilization of groups in support of President Habibie and in defense of a gradual approach to democratization that adhered to the Constitution of 1945. This mobilization was not planned by Habibie or Wiranto and it is generally believed that these two regime and military heads did not even know the planned extent of the mobilization until it actually occurred.59 Individuals within the regime had gained the agreement of the president and head of the military to mobilize civilian support and to help the military defend the regime against protesters. However, when over 100,000 people were bused in from regions surrounding Jakarta, Habibie and Wiranto were both surprised.60

58 Interview, Ali Sadikin, Dec. 6, 1998. He said that they had not expected the general public to join the students in the numbers that they did and they had not expected the Forkot members to be so confrontational toward the military.

59 Interviews: Lt. Gen. Soeyono, secretary-general in the department of defense and security (of which Wiranto was head simultaneously with being the commander of the armed forces), Jan. 5, 1999 and Jimly Asshiddiqie, July 15, 1999.

60 "Furkon Bantah Bentuk Pam Swakarsa," Kompas, December 6, 1998 and "Neatapa Pam Swakarsa," Ummat, Nov. 23, 1998. Although it is unclear exactly who organized the mobilization of these groups, interviews point in the direction of individuals with links to MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Council of Indonesian Islamic Leaders, which is the regime sponsored Muslim umbrella organization) and to Suharto's children, especially Tutut, in alliance with people within the regime and military who wanted to incite a clash between the defenders and antagonists of the regime in order to have an excuse to declare martial law and to not hold elections (Interviews: Lt. Gen. Soeyono, January 5, 1999; high ranking Golkar officials; and Sutrimo, head of the political news division in the state run television station, Nov. 23, 1998).
The mobilized groups of people defending the regime were given the ironic label Pam Swakarsa (Pasukan Keamanan Swakarsa; Spontaneous Security Force) by the regime.61 The Pam Swakarsa consisted of various pre-existing groups combining some Islamic activists with Suharto loyalists who had much to lose in favored positions and patronage if a transition to democracy occurred. For instance, Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth), a paramilitary group organized and controlled by Suharto, contributed several thousand members to the Pam Swakarsa forces.62 This group had close connections to the Suharto family and was reportedly mobilized by Suharto’s daughter, Tutut.63

Several Muslim groups also mobilized in defense of the Special Session. For instance, a large but loosely organized Muslim group that contributed approximately 60,000 members was Furkon.64 Furkon had been formed just one month prior to the Special Session, by individuals with connections to the regime, for the stated purpose of providing a forum for Muslim sentiments. It quickly became a vehicle for mobilizing masses in defense of the regime through a network of personal connections and fund-raising in and around Jakarta.65 Another group that was formed just prior to the Special Session and which mobilized in the name of Islam and anti-communism was Hizbullah.

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61 Not all of the groups were mobilized with defense of Habibie as the goal. Some were mobilized to create a clash with the protesters that would justify a military clampdown and not holding elections. Some Islamic leaders, for instance, wanted the opportunity to gain power, in alliance with factions of the military, and with Habibie still as president (Interviews: Fadli Zon, a former student activist and leader among modernist Muslim students, Feb. 26, 1999; Yusuf Malenda, leader of the Islamic party, PBB, Feb. 16, 1999; Lt. Gen. Soeyono, January 5, 1999; and Maj. Gen. Amir Syarifuddin, head of politics in the Department of Information, December 4, 1998).
63 Interview, Surhizo, Nov. 23, 1998.
64 This number is the median of reports, such as “Pam Swakarsa,” Tajuk Nov. 26-Dec. 9, 1998 and “Pasukan Swakarsa Islam Pro-SI,” Tempo Nov. 16, 1998.
65 “Pasukan Swakarsa Islam Pro-SI,” Tempo Nov. 16, 1998 and “Moslem group stages anticommunist rally,” The Jakarta Post, Oct. 1, 1998. Helping their ability to mobilize people despite the fact that the group did not have many actual members was the fact that several leaders in Furkon had connections in international business and with some political/military businesses enabling them to be able quickly to mobilize funds (Interview, Fadli Zon, Feb. 26, 1998).
Hizbullah, an amalgamation of pre-existing Muslim groups, was the largest component of the Pam Swarkarsa with approximately 120,000 people mobilized under its banner.\(^{66}\)

Besides these groups, people from the surrounding areas and especially West Java were reportedly paid Rp.15,000 (US$1.50), given a headband inscribed with *Allahuakbar* (an Arabic phrase meaning “God is Great”) and a bamboo stick with one end sharpened, and were then bused into the compound.\(^{67}\) The fact that the buses of these defenders of the regime were allowed to enter the barricaded area signifies that there was coordination from inside the military and regime. However, when Wiranto and Habibie saw that they were provoking clashes with the protesters, they were reportedly angry and ordered the Pam Swakarsa to move away from the front lines of conflict between the soldiers and protesters.\(^{68}\) After the second day of the Special Session, the Pam Swakarsa’s presence was minimized.

The stated demands of the Pam Swakarsa were to defend the regime and the “constitutional way.” Defending the constitution meant that no presidium government would be formed and the constitution would remain in force unaltered. Defense of Habibie and Wiranto was not emphasized, which lent some validity to suspicions that the intention of this group was to pave the way for other individuals within the regime and

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\(^{66}\) This number is consistently reported in the media, such as the articles listed for the number of participants in Furkon in the previous footnote. Groups in Hizbullah included PII (Pelejar Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Students), HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Association of Islamic Students), PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Islamic Indonesian Student Movement), and Muhammadiyah’s youth wing. The inclusion of groups such as Muhammadiyah and HMI shows that the latter groups were split between defenders and opponents of the regime and supports the assertion that some individuals in their leadership did not want free elections to be held.

\(^{67}\) “Pasukan Swakarsa Islam Pro-SI,” *Tempo* Nov. 16, 1998. I witnessed that these people were bused into the Assembly compound in charter buses and wore the headband and were given bamboo sticks. They were prepped and given instructions. They appeared to be villagers or low-income urban dwellers.

military to take power. This is apparently what angered Habibie and Wiranto.69 After Suharto fell, some individuals and groups within the regime were not happy with Habibie and Wiranto’s attempts to consolidate their own power, as will be discussed below. They wanted to create an opportunity to get rid of Habibie and Wiranto and assume power themselves.70

Mobilization of the Pam Swakarsa did not succeed in inciting clashes between civilian groups because Wiranto was able to quickly assert his control. Nonetheless, the incident frightened the regime and military leaders, most of whom had not been involved, into realizing that they must consolidate internally in order to survive.71 They had not expected the Pam Swakarsa mobilization to be so extensive and violent just as they had not expected the protests against the regime to be so extensive and violent. The intensity of mass mobilization on all sides was thus beyond what most people and the leaders of the regime, military, and opposition had anticipated. It frightened them all into a hasty search for a solution.

5.1.3. Grassroots Mob Action, Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict, and Separatist Demands

Besides organized protests, other forms of mass mobilization began to materialize more frequently during the period leading up to the Assembly’s Special Session. These

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69 While accurate and detailed information about the true intentions behind the Pam Swakarsa mobilization was difficult to obtain definitively, it does appear likely, given the identity of the apparent organizers, that this mobilization was not organized to uphold Habibie and Wiranto but to enable other factions of the regime and military to take power. A violent clash would not only justify a declaration of emergency, but would also discredit Habibie and Wiranto.

70 This assertion is based on numerous interviews that have been listed throughout this section and upon a daily reading of the local media that chronicled some of the disputes that emerged within the regime in the months following Suharto’s resignation.

forms of mobilization included grassroots mob action, inter-ethnic and religious conflict, and separatist demands. For example, during the Assembly meeting, grassroots mobilization and mob action played a key role in forcing the regime to abide by Habibie's promise to hold free elections. It was the enormous numbers of people who had spontaneously gathered at the grassroots level in opposition to the regime that frightened officials into deciding that the alternatives to holding free elections were unacceptable. The number of protesters marching on the Assembly compound swelled to over 100,000, including many urban dwellers in the Jakarta area in addition to students.

The participation of the general public had of course been hoped for by the organizers of the protests. However, the number of people who joined them in street battles with the military surprised even many of the students. The unwillingness of the mobilized people to back down from the security forces and from the Pam Swakarsa also surprised the regime and military leaders, many of whom had thought that only a few thousand radical students would persist in their efforts to overthrow the regime. Moreover, the unorganized people who joined the students did not remain in the safe zone of the

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72 It could be argued that social unrest began to be apparent in the couple of years prior to Suharto's fall due to the increased number of inter-ethnic and religious conflicts; however, these incidents and acts of destruction and looting the properties of the political and economic elite remained infrequent until after Suharto fell from power.


74 Interviews with several student leaders of various organizations. The number of people who joined the students increased each day despite the widely publicized violence that was occurring in the streets and the visible presence in the beginning of the session of the Pam Swakarsa and their sharpened bamboo sticks.

75 Interview, Abdul Gafir, a leading Golkar official, Nov. 13, 1998, the afternoon of the final day of the Special Session. We met inside the Assembly compound since I was observing the session and was already inside. It was carefully said to me that the organizers of the Pam Swakarsa and other members of the regime and military had expected that most of the protests would subside in the face of the show of force on the regime side. However, the protesters continued to throw Molotov cocktails, stones, and anything they could find at the soldiers despite the fact that the soldiers fired tear gas, water cannons, and rubber (some live) bullets into the crowd from 3:30 pm to 10:30 pm on the final day of the session ("Black Friday," The Jakarta Post, Nov. 14, 1998).
Salemba campus as did several thousand moderate students, but instead marched into the stream of bullets and tear gas in an attempt to overthrow the regime in its entirety.76

Besides going into the streets to confront the military and to storm the Assembly compound, mob action also took the form of looting and vandalizing property of the political and economic elite in Jakarta and other provincial capitals.77 These incidents were however brought under control in a few days. Rioting on the scale that witnessed in May 1998 did not occur.78 The intense reaction of the general public against the regime and military, even though Suharto had handed over power to Habibie, frightened the regime and military much more than did the student groups.79 Students could be dealt with and the movement had already begun to fragment. But seeing that the anger of much of the public had not been quelled with the resignation of Suharto and that renewed rioting was likely if something was not done, the regime leaders were prompted to scramble for solutions, as will be described below.

Incidents of villagers burning down the offices of local Suharto-era officials also began during the period leading up to the Special Session.80 This occurred most

76 Much ado has been made about the students being the vehicles of protest against Suharto and then against the remnants of his regime. However, it should be remembered that the students, although they began and organized many protests, made up only a fraction of the number of participants in protests, such as that during the three days of the Special Session. The students all wore colored jackets signifying which university they were from, which made it easy to estimate their numbers compared to the non-student protesters.


78 The confusion, due to victory statements by the opposition elite, of the public over the success or failure of the opposition to achieve its goals is probably a reason that large scale rioting did not occur. Wiranto also dealt firmly with people involved in rioting and looting and ordered his troops to shoot on sight.

79 This repeatedly came up in all of my interviews with members of the regime and military.

frequently on Java, but was widespread enough to be of concern to the regime. The population was rejecting the regime at the local level and without apparent organization. This trend would heighten throughout the transitional period, but was already creating great insecurity within the regime at all levels.

Inter-ethnic and religious conflict had not yet become prominent, but signs of their impending eruption were evident through the increasing use of religious symbols in the political arena. \(^{81}\) Similarly, separatist demands had not yet exploded, but it would become apparent later that the GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement) had been working toward strengthening its position against a weak regime. \(^{82}\) Thus, although student led protests, joined by the general public, dominated this initial period of the transition, other forms of mass mobilization, many of them unorganized and uncontrollable by leaders in the opposition or regime, were becoming apparent. The stage was being set for the displacement of a fragmented and poorly led opposition movement by mobilization that was spontaneous, violent, and often pitted groups against each other.

5.2. Opposition Elite

The opposition elite consisted mainly of three nationally respected figures: Amien Rais, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Abdurrahman Wahid. Their backgrounds and rise to the forefront of the opposition to Suharto were discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 and need not be repeated here. However, it should be stressed that these three individuals fell into

\(^{81}\) For instance, the Pam Swakarsa used Islam to defend the regime. Religion had also become divisive within the student opposition movement.

\(^{82}\) This would become apparent when violent conflict broke out in Aceh in the months following the Assembly meeting.
the role of opposition leaders. They did not instigate the opposition movement, nor were they connected organizationally to the protesters in the streets during the Assembly’s Special Session.83

The three leaders came to the fore of the movement against Suharto mostly because they were among the few nationally recognized figures who had any claim to independence from Suharto’s regime. They all led organizations of some sort that had been walking a fine line between cooptation by the Suharto regime and autonomy, but none were actively oppositional to Suharto.84

Because the regime did not allow truly oppositional figures to emerge for three decades, these three leaders were moderate, to varying degrees. At one end of the spectrum was Wahid who had supported Suharto’s continued rule up until the last moment.85 At the other end was Amien who had been calling on Suharto to step aside for a couple of years before protests and rioting forced him to do so. However, none of the three figures advocated rapid or widespread change. They instead appeared concerned with widening the circle of power to include themselves and in moving the regime away from one man rule.86 Their moderation was in spite of the fact that the regime had weakened significantly. With the extensive mass mobilization, overthrow of the entire

83 This lack of connection between the opposition elite and mass base of protesters made the ability of the opposition elite to negotiate on behalf of the protesters uncertain. The inability of the elite to control mobilization is why uncontrolled mass mobilization is generally deemed to be detrimental to efforts to democratize (See, for example, Valenzuela, July 1989 and O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
84 For instance, Amien Rais was head of Muhammadiyah, and although Amien was critical of Suharto’s regime, Muhammadiyah was not active in the opposition movement.
85 Mietzner (1999). Wahid was present at a meeting of Islamic scholars with Suharto on the eve of his resignation. Wahid was purportedly one of the few persons present who supported Suharto maintaining power.
86 The main goal of reform was to widen the circle of power. The masses were not yet ready to make choices about who should govern (Interview, Choirul Anam, head of East Java’s branch of PKB (Wahid’s party), a leading NU official, and a close confidant of Wahid, Surabaya, Jan. 19, 1999). This wariness of mass based power was despite the fact that elections were viewed as necessary to force the regime to widen the circle of power.
ruling structure was a possibility if this path had been supported by the opposition elite.
The narrowly defined terms of the transition are therefore not so much due to the strength of the regime and military vis-à-vis the mobilized opposition as to the moderation of the opposition elite.

The three figures who came to represent the opposition movement were much more moderate in their demands than were most of the 100,000+ protesters in the streets during the Assembly's Special Session in November 1998. This divergence became pronounced when these leaders, along with a fourth respected figure, publicly denounced, in the Ciganjur Agreement, efforts to overthrow what was left of Suharto's regime and replace it with a transitional government. Although the agreement between the opposition elite, regime, and military was accepted by enough of the public to diminish anti-regime mobilization and set the terms of the transition, the moderate stance of the opposition elite had the impact of widening the gap between them and many of the mobilized masses.87

The loss of respect for the opposition elite by the protesters would taint the rest of the transition and hinder the ability of the opposition elite to channel or control the mobilization of society. It would also subsequently hinder their ability to govern effectively. Mobilization would increasingly take dangerous forms, such as the uncontrolled violent targeting of state symbols and violence against other groups.

87 The terms of the transition negotiated by the elite players may not have been to the liking of many protesters, as is evidenced by their public statements ("Mahasiswa Kocewa," Aksi, Nov. 22, 1998), but the leaders apparently had enough respect within society to prevent more people from taking to the streets and created confusion and divisions within the mass base of the opposition movement, which prevented the mass base from uniting behind the goal of forcing the creation of a presidium government.
perceived to have been advantaged by the state.\textsuperscript{88} The danger of having mass mobilization play a prominent role in a transition but without strong elite-mass connections through established organizations is clearly demonstrated in the Indonesian case. This is despite the fact that the moderate elite was able to negotiate the terms of the transition and have these terms accepted by enough of the public for the transition to proceed. In short, elite-mass connections and the congruence of elite and mass demands are key components of transitions.\textsuperscript{89}

The character of the negotiations was also very important in shaping the transition process and the subsequent functioning of the new democracy.\textsuperscript{90} From this point onward, political actors focused on holding free elections and not on the restructuring of governing institutions. This circumscribed nature of the negotiations resulted in a widespread loss of respect for the opposition elite and weakened their authority to continue negotiating on behalf of the opposition and to control mobilization. It also left the country with ill-functioning institutions which would hinder the effectiveness of the new democratic government.

\textsuperscript{88} Other forms of mobilization, such as mobilization organized by conflicting elites, also becomes problematic later in the transition and in the post-transitional period. The reasons relate to the failure of the elite to work out sufficient details of how institutions would function effectively to keep conflict within bounds. This will be discussed in the following chapters.

\textsuperscript{89} Bermeo (1999), Tarrow (1995), and Valenzuela (July 1989) argue that mass mobilization can help a transition to democracy if it occurs at key points in the process. The Indonesian case shows that not only is the timing of mobilization during the transitional period important, but the nature of elite-mass connections and their demands are key to determining the impact mass mobilization has on the outcome of the transition and on the post-transitional period.

\textsuperscript{90} As argued in Chapter 2, the Indonesian case provides support for Munck and Leff's (1999) argument that the failure to negotiate institutional rules that are optimal for democratization will create problems for the consolidation of democracy.
5.2.1. The Ciganjur Agreement

The terms of the transition were decided through negotiations between the opposition elite, regime, and military around the time of the Assembly’s Special Session. Although some contacts had been made after the fall of Suharto, all the players had taken a wait and see attitude and did not want to commit to any agreements. With the impending mobilization, although it was still not foreseen how extensive the mobilization would be, the regime and military sought out the opposition elite in order to negotiate the terms of a transition. These negotiations were done quietly and in private and often through representatives for each side.

Once the mobilization began with the opening day of the Special Session, negotiations started almost immediately.\textsuperscript{91} It was recognized that the opposition figures did not have clear control over the protesters organizationally or in any other way, but they were the only “leaders” with whom deals could be struck since the mobilized opposition was amorphous. These negotiations resulted in the public declaration by the opposition elite of the Ciganjur Agreement on the evening of the first day of the Special Session.

The Ciganjur Agreement was signed by the three main opposition figures and one other figure who had respect among the Javanese, Sultan Hamengkubuwono of the Special Region of Yogyakarta. It was publicly declared on November 10, 1998, when it was apparent that mass mobilization was larger and more confrontational than had been anticipated. The Agreement contained eight points. The most significant of these were that Habibie’s government was a legitimate transitional government and that the

\textsuperscript{91} The fact that negotiations occurred is confirmed by several interviews with representatives of the sides involved in the negotiations and with people close to the opposition elite and within the regime and military, as will be detailed below.
Assembly’s Special Session was also legitimate. Therefore, efforts to overthrow the session and the regime should cease; the Constitution of 1945 should guide the transitional period; Habibie should hold free elections as soon as possible; a new president and vice president should be selected by the democratically elected Assembly no later than three months after the general election; and the military should gradually be phased out of the Assembly in six years.92

Although the Agreement was declared only by the opposition elite, the terms had been negotiated between these figures and the regime and military.93 For instance, despite the conservative nature of the opposition elite, the one demand upon which the opposition was united with the mass protesters and on which it was not willing to compromise with the regime or military was that free elections must be held to bring a legitimate government to power. It was this demand that the regime and military conceded. This was critical in enabling the transition to move forward because even though Habibie had wanted elections, many people in the regime and military were against the idea and Habibie’s capacity to enforce his will upon them was uncertain.

In exchange for agreeing to free elections within the year, the opposition elite accepted that the current government would preside over the transitional period, as long as it adhered to the Constitution of 1945, and did not demand an immediate or total withdrawal of the military from politics. It is thus evident see that the Ciganjur

93 Representatives for the opposition elite included Hatta Radjasa, linked to Amien, Muhammad Fajrul Falsa, linked to Wahid, and Taufiq Kiemas, Megawati’s husband. Representatives for the regime included Hariman Siregar, an aide to Habibie, and Slamet Effendy Yusuf, a deputy chairman of Golkar. Representatives for the military included Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, governor of the military’s defense institute, Lemhannas (information gathered from a variety of interviews). Wahid was instrumental in instigating negotiations and in bringing the opposition leaders together, although he claimed that it was done at the request of students (interview, Hariman Siregar, Dec. 10, 1998).
Agreement, although signed by only the opposition elite, was the result of negotiations between the opposition elite, regime, and military.

Within the opposition elite, negotiations also had to be conducted in order to obtain agreement on the principles of the Agreement. For instance, watering down the demand that the military immediately withdraw from its dual socio-political role to a gradual reduction over six years and agreeing to retain the current constitution were two issues that were disputed among the opposition elite.94 Amien was never close to the military and his Islamic orientation added to the mistrust of the predominantly nationalist military.95 He did not want the military to continue having a political role and his Islamic orientation made him less fond of the current constitution than were the other opposition figures.96 Amien also supported making the state more federalist. Megawati, on the other hand, had already been moving close to the military through shared views on the unitary nature of the country, the need for a continued military presence, and reverence

94 Insight into the different views of the opposition figures during negotiations with the regime and military at the time of the special session was gained from interviews with several people, but most importantly, Hariman Siregar, Dec. 10, 1998 and Syafii Anwar, Chief Editor of UMMAT, a weekly magazine widely read by modernist Muslims, Nov. 17, 1998.

95 Interview, Syafii Anwar, Oct. 7, 1998. Amien did not support the military's dual function role, and he thought that Habibie was not a good leader. However, he saw no better alternative to Habibie before elections. Nonetheless, Amien had to be persuaded that supporting the military's continued role was necessary to ensure that they did not coup.

96 The Constitution of 1945 used by Suharto was reestablished by Sukarno in 1959 after a fierce debate between secular nationalists and Muslims over the role of Islam in the state and the issue of federalism, as is described in Chapter 3. Its re-adoptions was deemed to be a loss for the Muslims and federalists.
for the Constitution of 1945. Wahid was closer to Megawati’s views and wanted only
very gradual change in any direction.

The fact that the three figures came from opposing social segments and had so many
differing views narrowed the range of issues upon which they could agree. This,
combined with the generally conservative nature of all three figures, prevented them from
uniting behind demands for thorough or far-reaching change to the country’s governing
institutions. One demand that they could all agree on was the need for free elections
which each of them hoped would bring him or herself to power. Other changes and
details of how the current political institutions would function when filled with
democratically elected leaders were agreed to be decided upon after the elections. The
three figures agreed that Habibie should remain president throughout the transitional
period due to their fear of radical change and of losing control over the process if a
transitional government were implemented.

The fact that three opposition figures were able to come to an agreement with the
regime and military did not mean that they were able to sell this agreement to the
protesters in the streets. The latter had hoped to overthrow the regime and install the
three opposition figures, along with other activists, as leaders of a presidium government

97 Her newly formed party had the support of many retired generals and included some prominent people
with close ties to the military, including Maj. Gen. (ret.) Theo Syafei as a deputy chairman (“Megawati
98 As leader of a traditional Muslim group, he had spent fifteen years, and his father and grandfather had
spent decades before that, trying to protect the rural Islamic leaders. He did not want to unleash social
unrest that might backlash against the old traditions that the Islamic leaders under his tutelage represented.
100 Amien had committed himself to supporting Habibie’s presidency during the competition for the Golkar
leadership, which threatened to result in the Assembly replacing Habibie. Amien saw Habibie as more
moderate than alternatives within the regime. Moreover, he did not want to work with the leftist students
who wanted a transitional government, due to his Islamic background and the orientation of his support
base (Interview, Syafi’i Anwar, Nov. 17, 1998 and “What People Think of Habibie and Expect from Him
that would rewrite the political rules and remake the institutions of the country. The regime and opposition elite stressed that they were supported by mass groups, such as Forum Salemba. However, it was difficult to ignore that the overwhelming majority of protesters, joined by people from around the city, were attempting to storm the Assembly grounds and were not deterred by gunfire, water cannons, and tear gas.

After the close of the Special Session, even though the Ciganjur Agreement was scorned by the protesters and resulted in distancing the opposition figures from the mass protesters, the agreements reached between the opposition elite, regime, and military and the commitment of the opposition figures to support the regime until elections was accepted by enough of the public to thwart efforts to overthrow the regime. Although confusion had been created as to who the opposition was and if they had won or not during the events surrounding the Special Session, preparations for elections began and talk of forming a presidium government to rewrite the constitution and build new democratic political institutions became marginal.

5.2.2. PPP takes an Oppositional Stance

During the Assembly's Special Session, the Islamic party that had existed under Suharto, as described in Chapter 3, took an oppositional stance. PPP had been in the ambiguous position of being tainted by association with the regime since it had seats in the Assembly and was the product of a forced fusion of Muslim parties demanded by Suharto in 1973. It also had been dependent upon Suharto and largely controlled by him throughout his rule.
After Suharto fell and it became clear that the public was demanding change, PPP took advantage of its position inside the Assembly to create a name for itself as a party desiring reform.\footnote{For instance, PPP forced the DPR to vote for the first time in the life of the regime by refusing to give its fraction's agreement to the choice for the Supreme Audit Board (this board has the authority to audit personnel or contracts involving the government and therefore was potentially a powerful tool to fight corruption). PPP lost the vote but a statement had been made that they no longer would cooperate with the regime. PPP also refused to agree on several issues discussed at the preliminary meetings to the Special Session. In the past, agreement would be worked out among the leaders of all the fractions in the Assembly so that consensus was assured before the Assembly officially met. PPP, however, prior to the Special Session, refused to accept a decree stating that the military would retain seats in both the legislature and the Assembly. This therefore had to be voted on at the Special Session ("House Resorts to Voting on BPK Nominations," \textit{The Jakarta Post}, Sept. 18, 1998 and "Hanya F-PP yang Menolak," \textit{Kompas}, Sept. 25, 1998).} This strategy was taken in order to build support for the party in the elections that were increasingly becoming inevitable.\footnote{Interview, Ali Marwan Hanan, the secretary-general for PPP, April 23, 1999.} Furthermore, PPP, even though it had benefited from Suharto's patronage, had also long resented his domination.\footnote{Interview, Ismail Hasan Metareum, head of PPP until Nov. 1998, April 5, 1999.} Thus, PPP spoke out against the regime during the Special Session. This was the beginning of a productive role that PPP was to play for the opposition throughout the transition.

The main issues upon which PPP publicly opposed the regime included the continued presence of the military in politics, bringing Suharto to trial, and revoking a decree requiring all political parties and organizations to have Pancasila, and not religion, as their ideological foundation.\footnote{"PPP Introduces New Vision, Paradigm for 1999 Election," \textit{The Jakarta Post}, Nov. 27, 1998.} PPP was not a radical force and was not in agreement with the protesters that a presidium government should replace the current regime. However, the party's leaders saw opportunities to improve their public image during the Special Session and to regain the right to organize based upon Islam.\footnote{Interview, Ali Marwan Hanan, April 23, 1999.}
PPP was successful, although helped by other individuals with strong Islamic ties, in revoking the decree obliging Pancasila to be the basic foundation of all organizations. Suharto was also named in the decree on redressing past corruption. It was not successful, however, in abolishing the military’s reserved seats in the Legislature.

PPP and the three leading opposition figures were also instrumental in getting the regime and military to agree to the minimum requirements for initiating a democratic transition because they were arguing for elections and other political reforms from the inside of the Assembly, which was televised live. The fact that PPP, as well as the three opposition figures, was moderate helped enable negotiations because these leaders presented a desirable alternative to the rioting protesters in the streets. Unfortunately, although the moderation of the opposition elite may have helped negotiations with the regime and military, it also prevented a more thorough restructuring of politics that might have helped to create a higher quality democracy.

5.3. Military

The military is given a separate analysis from the regime because after Suharto fell, the military became an important independent player. Prior to Suharto’s fall, the military could be viewed as one component of Suharto’s sultanistic regime with all components being under Suharto’s domination, as argued in Chapter 3. During Habibie’s presidency, however, without Suharto’s controlling hand, the military began to make its own analysis.
of the crisis, and its loyalty to Habibie was not assured. Many people predicted a military
coup. Thus, even though the commanding general of the armed forces, Wiranto, had
agreed to support Habibie, that support could have been withdrawn at several points.109

By the time of the Special Session, the division within the military between the two
rival officers, Wiranto and Prabowo, was still evident, despite Wiranto’s dismissal of
Prabowo and reshuffling of officers.110 However, another division between officers was
appearing between those who were in favor of moving the country toward democracy
versus those who were opposed. Besides these divisions, the military was also beginning
to fragment into a multiplicity of power centers as the unifying figure of Suharto had
been removed.111 Fragmentation became worse as the transition progressed, especially
after the loss of East Timor, and manifested itself in some officers following their own
path instead of the instructions of Wiranto.112 Thus, despite the military having been

109 The fall from power of Suharto, as described in Chapter 4, was critical in opening up a variety of
possible paths for the transition to take that would not ordinarily be expected from a sultanistic regime (for
theories on exits from sultanism, see Chehabi and Linz 1998, especially the chapter by Richard Snyder).
The sudden independence of the military, which had remained loyal to Suharto until the last moment, left
the military initially confused and a bit wayward without knowing how to respond to events (Interview,
Kristiadi, head of the political division at CSIS, a think tank with close ties to the military, Oct. 9, 1998).

110 Three major reshuffles occurred in the months between the transfer of power from Suharto to Habibie
and the Special Session. These occurred in June, August, and late September 1998 (“ABRI Never Blinded
by Power, Says Wiranto,” The Jakarta Post, Sept. 23, 1998. Also see “Wiranto’s Army: Marching into

111 Lines were becoming blurred between the Muslim and nationalist factions within the military. A
sharper division was that between reformers and non-reformers as disputes grew over how politicized the
military should be (Interviews: Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, assistant head of general affairs for the military,
20, 1998). The military was also beginning to fragment as officers at lower levels tried to defend their
“turf” and acted autonomously on the ground. This was viewed to be the result of the territorial system that
entrapped the military in local level politics and money-generating activities and led to the analysis of
leading officers, including Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, head of the territorial system, that the territorial
system, although still needed, should be reformed to become more neutral and less corrupt. The major
problem was therefore controlling the fragmentation of the military, not the split between Islamic and

112 Evidence of this was difficult to find since instances of insubordination in the military were not made
public; however, in interviews, it was commonly referred to as a fact acknowledged by the military and
political elite that Wiranto was having trouble controlling his lower ranking officers, even after he had
reshuffled the top ranking officers in order to garner more unity (Interviews: Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono,
Nov. 18, 1998).
perceived as being strong while Suharto was in power, Suharto’s manipulation of the military had left it in a weak position once it regained autonomy. This weakness prevented it from taking forceful action against the creeping lawlessness throughout the country, from cracking down on the opposition, and from controlling the transition.\footnote{113}

The lack of unity, combined with loss of legitimacy and respect in society, was also a principal reason why the military did not attempt to take over direct political power and why the regime and military were forced to negotiate a transition to democracy with the opposition elite.\footnote{114} Since the military could not and was not willing to defend the regime from the mass uprising, the regime and military were both forced to negotiate with the moderate opposition elite in an effort to resolve the political crisis.\footnote{115} The military therefore attempted to prevent, through negotiation with the moderate opposition elite, the overthrow of the regime, protect its privileged position, control the pace of reform, and appease society’s demands that a legitimate government come to power.

\footnote{113 The weakness of the military due to factionalization is one reason why a military backlash against the protesters did not occur, as is cited in much of the democratization literature, such as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and which is frequently used to explain why extensive mobilization is harmful to democratization. However, despite the lack of control of the military over the transition, which Aguero (1995) argues places the military in a position to reserve a privileged position in the post-transitional period, the military was still able to negotiate reserve domains of power, as will be discussed below.
\footnote{114 Without unity, the leading officers feared a war between competing units of the military if Wiranto, or any other officer, tried to take power. The military also recognized that its loss of legitimacy in the public would instigate public outrage, which the military might not be able to suppress if it tried to take power (Interview, Lt Gen. Soeyono, Jan. 5, 1999).
\footnote{115 The military negotiating with the opposition was possible only after Suharto fell from power because sultans do not allow dissenion within the regime or military (Chelabi and Linz 1998). Thus, although opposition to a sultanistic regime usually results in repression, revolution, or a military coup (Snyder 1998 and Zhang 1994), the fact that Suharto had been forced to step down, as discussed in the previous chapter, opened the option of negotiating a transition by enabling the military to act independently and by bringing divisions within the military and regime to the fore.}
5.3.1. Guarding the Special Session

The session was guarded by approximately 80,000 military personnel who were equipped with protective riot gear, automatic rifles, water cannons, and tear gas.\textsuperscript{116} They stood in layers around the compound extending out a half-mile and blocked the roads leading to the site.\textsuperscript{117} In the early afternoon of the third and final day of the session, when it had become apparent that the student protests had succeeded in mobilizing the urban population against the regime, Wiranto announced on TV that he would take harsh measures to suppress the "anarchists" and "communists" who were trying to topple the government.

That afternoon and evening, mass mobilization peaked at over 100,000 people in the streets who directly confronted the military units that were standing guard over the session.\textsuperscript{118} The military used mostly rubber bullets when shooting at the demonstrators in an attempt to disperse them, but at least sixteen people were shot with live bullets.\textsuperscript{119} The origin of the live bullets is uncertain. Snipers were seen on top of a building owned by a Chinese/Indonesian businessman who had built his fortune through business contracts with the military.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{116} "Marine Corps Wins Over the Heart of the People," \textit{The Jakarta Post}, Nov. 15, 1998.

\textsuperscript{117} Interview, Maj. Gen. Amir Syarifuddin, Nov. 13, 1998. I witnessed the extensive deployment of troops as I entered the compound with difficulty (and only due to an ID tag identifying me as an official observer). The troops were well equipped and by the third day it was not possible to enter the compound without passing through several heavily guarded roadblocks. Even then, I had to exit the taxi and walk the last quarter of a mile.


\textsuperscript{120} Tommy Winata is the owner of the building and has his corporate offices there. The building is located at the Semanggi interchange, which is where the students were in the fiercest battles with the military. Atma Jaya University, which is a Catholic university that served as the headquarters of the most confrontational student protests, is also located at the interchange.
Since Wiranto claims that he did not order anyone to shoot from the top of the building, the identity of the shooters and whether they acted alone or under orders is unclear. It is also uncertain if the live bullets found in the victims and several other wounded protesters were from the snipers on top of the building or from some of the soldiers guarding the complex on the ground.\textsuperscript{121} It did appear, however, that Wiranto did not have full control of the situation and also that some people in or outside of the military had wanted deaths to occur. Their goal, it was widely speculated, might have been to ignite a firestorm that could have led to a military takeover or a declaration of a state of emergency and the cancelling of elections.\textsuperscript{122}

5.3.2. Negotiating the Future

Negotiating with the opposition elite was done after Wiranto and the officers closest to him had decided that a military coup was not a good idea due to the extensiveness of the mobilized opposition, the lack of unity in the military, and the need for international aid.\textsuperscript{123} This decision had been taken following the fall of Suharto despite the desire of many other officers to take power.\textsuperscript{124} Although negotiations with the opposition had not been officially conducted until the days preceding the Special Session, representatives

\textsuperscript{121} No one seemed certain about the identity of the rooftop snipers, but all people interviewed at the elite level in the regime and military said that Wiranto and Habibie had not wanted live ammunition used. This is supported by the fact that the casualties were as low as they were considering that a war was taking place in the streets the final day of the session. If Wiranto had wanted to have casualties, he could have easily done so on a much larger scale.

\textsuperscript{122} This was the common theory among the political elite in Jakarta.

\textsuperscript{123} Wiranto also did not want to spark a cycle of coups and counter-coups or of military-civilian governments replacing one another. There was no precedent in Indonesia of coups, and Wiranto and his advisors did not want to begin one (Interview, Lt. Gen Soeyono, Jan. 5, 1999).

\textsuperscript{124} Wiranto was often accused of being too careful in his actions and was not respected by some people in the military due to his propensity to react to events instead of taking control of the situation (Interview, Kristiadi, Feb. 17, 1999).
from the military had been in continuous contact with the opposition elite since Suharto had stepped down. Their goal was to gather information about opposition intentions and to obtain assurances that they were not going to insist that Suharto be brought to trial. The military had also been in continuous contact with the regime about how to handle the crisis.

As it became apparent that mayhem was going to occur in the streets of Jakarta during the Special Session, Wiranto began sending representatives to negotiate more seriously with the opposition elite. Contact with the opposition was initiated because Wiranto wanted to promote stability and dampen the demand for change. These negotiations resulted in the military committing to free elections with the military itself remaining neutral. Military neutrality in the elections was a critical concern of the opposition elite because in the past, the military had helped to ensure that Golkar won elections. In return for this concession, the military demanded that the opposition elite agree that the constitution be upheld and that the government remain unitarist as opposed to

124 Wiranto had been obsessed with trying to protect Suharto and his family (Informal discussion, Sophan Sopiaan, a leader in PDI-P, Oct. 26, 1999 and interview, Ekky Sjahrudin, Feb. 14, 1999).
125 For instance, the military had given Habibie an assessment of reforms believed to be necessary, as well as a timetable for these reforms and elections, in June 1998 ("Permintaan President B.J. Habibie kepada ABRI," Suara Pembangunan, June 11, 1998 and ABRI (June 1998).
126 Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar was one of those persons. He had contacts with Megawati and Wahid and had their assurances that they would not support the attempt to overthrow the regime. However, the issuance of a public declaration to that effect was not decided until the first day of the session when it became apparent that the mass mobilization was more extensive than had been anticipated (Interview, Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, Dec. 30, 1998).
127 Some military officers, including Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, head of the military's faction in the National Assembly, saw the need to add clarification to the constitution. He thought that the powers of the president and other institutions needed to be clarified so that presidential powers could be restrained (Interview, Lt. Gen. Sabarno, Nov. 12, 1998). Despite this recognition that the constitution should be clarified, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno and other leading officers in the military staunchly defended the constitution's continued use and seemed more concerned with creating a "culture" of elite politics that would promote consensus among the elite than with amending the constitution. This is partly symptomatic of Suharto's emphasis on
federalist. It was also agreed between the opposition elite and the military that the military would remain in politics for at least the next several years.

The most important concern of the military in negotiating political reform with the opposition and with Habibie was that it not be manipulated and used as a political tool as Suharto had done. The military wanted to regain its institutional integrity and therefore demanded that whoever was president and whatever system of government was adopted, the military must have some independence from the civilian politicians. The military, therefore, tried to ensure, through its negotiations with the opposition elite and with Habibie, that it would be largely left alone and would not be forced to radically alter its role in the country’s governance. In return, the military agreed not to make a bid for consensus and the fear of unleashing uncontrollable demands and conflicts. Furthermore, although a reverence for the constitution was instilled in the military, stressing adherence to the constitution was also a convenient means of slowing change and offered a justification for repressing the more radical opposition groups.

The military had fought for national unity and feared that federalism would promote separatism. The head of the territorial structure and a leading creator of the military’s “New Paradigm,” Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, made it clear in an interview, Nov. 18, 1998, that although the military intended to remain neutral and not move to the foreground of governance, it had no intention of abandoning its role in “developing” the country or to disband the territorial command structure. The officers wanted to move the military in the territories into the background and let the civilian government structure take center stage. However, the military intended to keep a watchful eye on the civilian government and to keep a hand in decision making and internal security. This was expected to continue, according to Yudhoyono, for at least two decades due to the perceived need for a guardian over civilian politicians and due to the logistical difficulty of reorienting military personnel from governing positions in the territorial structure, which is described in Chapter 3.

This information was also supported by almost all other interviews of military officers.

There was no constitutional basis for this, since the president was the supreme commander of the armed forces. Therefore, the military was trying to promote its ability to say no to a president. This was seen as the only way for the military to protect its integrity and prevent it from being manipulated by politicians. Officers were therefore talking about their duty to be a watchdog over the politicians and were trying to promote internal unity so that they would not be played against one another as Suharto had so adeptly done. (Interviews: Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Dec. 8, 1998 and Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono. See also “New Order Duties Overburdened ABRI: Bambang,” The Jakarta Post, Sept. 3, 1998). This conception of what was needed in order to prevent the military from being used by a sultanistic or authoritarian regime, although it had logic in light of Indonesia’s recent past, ran counter to the prevailing view that democracy is best secured by establishing civilian supremacy over the military, which involves the military accepting the prerogative of the civilian government to monitor the implementation of military policy (Aguero 1995: 126).
direct power and to stay in the background while gradually shifting its role away from involvement in politics.\textsuperscript{134}

Although the military saw no alternative to holding free elections, and did not control the transition, it still had significant power, especially in the initial stages. It had the guns and, even weakened, its strength was not regarded lightly. Fear, combined with the disunity of the opposition elite vis-a-vis the military and the difficulty of extricating the military from its penetrating territorial command structure, enabled the military to bargain from a position of relative strength, despite the massive public opposition. Therefore, even though the protesters in the streets, and potentially many more members of society, were willing to confront the military and demand that it leave its governing role, the moderate opposition elite was not willing to engage in a direct conflict, which gave the military bargaining power.\textsuperscript{135}

This strong bargaining position enabled the military in turn to ensure that its privileged position in governance would not be threatened. Since its power stemmed mostly from the territorial command structure, as described in Chapter 3, the military made it clear in negotiations that it was not willing to dismantle this structure.\textsuperscript{136} The moderate

\textsuperscript{134} Once institutional roles and rules were more clearly defined so that the bureaucracy functioned better and the civilian politicians had checks placed upon them, the military would be able to pull out of its governing role altogether. It would also not be as susceptible to misuse by individuals as it had been and thus could safely be subordinate to civilian politicians. (Interview, Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Dec. 8, 1998).

\textsuperscript{135} Despite this power, the military did not control the transition, and was reacting to events. If the opposition elite had wanted to oppose the military, the transition might have taken a different course with a different outcome, but blood would likely have been shed and the ability to achieve a democratic outcome was uncertain. The desire of the opposition elite to find a peaceful and consensual solution to the political crisis is what gave the military its power and enabled it to negotiate for the preservation of its privileged position in politics.

\textsuperscript{136} The Indonesian military was not only hierarchical and an integral part of the state apparatus, which, as Linz and Stepan (1986) and Linz, Stepan, and Guethner (1995) argue, creates problems in extricating the military from politics, but the Indonesian military was also highly dependent upon extra-budgetary sources of income for survival (at least 70\% of the military’s budget reportedly comes from non-budgetary sources, such as military businesses and corruption: Aditjondro 1999). This reliance upon its privileged position in
opposition elite was easily convinced that forcing the military to disband its territorial command structure might prompt the military to repress the opposition and cancel the elections. The military, knowing that it had to publicly appear to be relinquishing power, shifted the focus from the territorial structure to its acquiescence that its seats in the national and local assemblies be reduced, but not eliminated.\textsuperscript{137}

Besides protecting its position in the country, through its territorial command structure, the military demanded that the constitution used by Suharto continue to be adhered to throughout the transition. The officers further demanded that after elections the constitution could be amended but not rewritten. This stance was partly due to military training, which taught that the constitution was sacred. The military also feared that rewriting the constitution would unleash uncontrollable changes.\textsuperscript{138} The military, as well as other elite players, wanted the security of following a transition path that contained an element of certainty.\textsuperscript{139} Adhering to the familiar constitution also prevented the military from being constitutionally written out of its reserve domain of power.\textsuperscript{140}

order to pay salaries and equip units, as well as the personal wealth accumulated by some officers, made the military adamant about preserving a reserve domain of power for itself in any new government formed. The moderate opposition elite in Indonesia was easily convinced that, even though the military was weak, it might feel forced to coup if its survival was threatened by forcing complete extrication from the state apparatus.\textsuperscript{137} The seats in the assemblies were not nearly as central to the military’s power as was the territorial command structure. However, the military wanted to keep its foot in the door of formal politics (Interview, Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Dec. 8, 1998). Focusing on reducing the number of seats and agreeing to eliminate reserved seats for the military in six years was done to divert public attention from the real source of military power in the territories (Arbi Sanit, “The Military’s Real Base of Power,” \textit{The Jakarta Post}, Feb. 2, 1998).

\textsuperscript{139} Liddle (2000) argues that this desire to maintain some certainty was the prime reason that the Constitution of 1945 remained in force.

\textsuperscript{140} Interview, Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Jan. 5, 1999. This was also implied in several other interviews with military officers. The inadequacy of the constitution was recognized by the military, but it was thought that issues could be worked out through elite consensus and that some minor amendments could be made to make the constitution adequate enough (Interview, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Nov. 12, 1998).
The military also wanted Pancasila to remain the sole foundation of all organizations and political parties. The officers lost on this issue because the Assembly saw the need to appease demands from the mobilized protesters. There was also opposition to Pancasila from PPP and from individuals within the regime. The military, however, made it clear both publicly and privately that it would allow and welcome civilian rule as long as it did not violate the constitution or Pancasila, which meant that it still upheld Pancasila and would not tolerate Islam as the basis of the government.

These agreements led to the opposition elite stating, in the Ciganjur Agreement, that the military would remain in the Assembly after the elections and that the constitution should be protected. In other words, political reform would proceed gradually and according to the constitution. The potential for the military to declare a need to assume power to restore order was, however, still present despite the agreement with the opposition elite that free elections with a neutral military was the best course for the country.

While negotiations centered mostly on the opposition elite, the military was also in frequent communication with the regime. This communication was mostly between Habibie and Wiranto. Habibie and Wiranto moved closer together as a result of the

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141 Within the regime, many people within Golkar and close to Habibie (most of whom were from the modernist Muslim segment of society) had long resented the law that denied Muslims the right to form organizations based upon Islam. For instance, Akbar wanted political parties to be based upon Pancasila, but the head of the committee deciding this issue, Din Syamsuddin, a Golkar executive and leading Islamic scholar, refused to obey Akbar’s orders and successfully advocated that parties be permitted to be based upon Islam (Interview, Din Syamsuddin, deputy secretary-general of Golkar, Nov. 3, 1998).


143 No mention was made of the territorial command structure, but it was understood that the opposition elite, through their silence on this issue, were agreeing to let it remain intact.

144 The military did not plan its strategy in concert with Golkar and seemed disdainful of Golkar and of the politicking that was occurring inside of Golkar. They just let Golkar know that they would no longer be supporting them in the election and that they wanted free elections to be held. Golkar had little bargaining power since only the president could manipulate the military through the appointment of officers’ positions.
attempts to disrupt the Special Session because they saw that they needed each other in order to survive. Habibie promised not to interfere in military promotions or reshuffles and Wiranto promised not to coup. They both agreed that holding elections was the only course left open to the country, especially since the military’s public image was at its nadir. Any attempt to seize power at this time would have met with a great public outcry.

However, the failure to remove the military from politics had the effect of keeping it in a position of authority. Although that authority was weak throughout the transitional period, the military was now positioned to assert more control over the political process in the post-transitional period, either as a unified institution or by one or several officers

(Interviews: Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Dec. 8, 1998 and Agung Laksono, a leading executive in Golkar and minister of youth and sports, Oct. 23, 1998. This was also supported by many other interviews with leading members of the military and Golkar).

143 Both Habibie and Wiranto were urged by different groups to declare a state of emergency. For example, a leader of the Barisan Nasional, Kemal Idris, reportedly called Wiranto during the Special Session and urged him to join them in a coup against Habibie. Several leading Muslim figures demanded on the day after the end of the session that Habibie declare a state of emergency and replace Wiranto with someone more to their liking. Both Wiranto and Habibie were compelled to put national interests over their parochial ones and fended off these attempts at taking power. In doing so, they were drawn closer together in their support for each other. (Interview, Afan Gaffar, political observer and member of the government’s team rewriting the election laws, Dec. 2, 1998). Wiranto’s position in the duet, however, became more dependent upon Habibie since it would have been easy for Habibie to replace Wiranto following the worsened image of the armed forces doing battle with civilians in the streets on live television. This is in contrast to the strength of Wiranto’s position prior to the Special Session due to a credible threat of coup (Interviews, Lt. Gen. Soeyono Jan. 5, 1999, and Elky Sjahrudin, high official in Golkar, Feb. 14, 1999. Many other people within the regime and military also spoke of this shift in the balance of power).

146 Interviews: Jimly Asshidique, July 15, 1999; Umar Juoro, July 30, 1999; Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Jan. 5, 1999; and Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, Nov. 18, 1998. This is also evidenced by the fact that Habibie did not place any of his people in the department of defense or in other departments deemed critical by the military, such as the department of information. Habibie also allowed Wiranto to have a free hand in reshuffling officers, except for one instance when Wiranto placed Maj. Gen. Johnny Lumintang as head of Kostrad. Johnny was a Christian and therefore unacceptable to Habibie’s block of supporters who forced Habibie to demand his immediate replacement.

147 The military had already developed a “New Paradigm,” as discussed in previous chapters, which stressed gradual reform of the military’s role in politics and placed an emphasis on helping to develop the country through providing guidance, but not through taking a leading role in politics. This, however, included the assessment that the military needed to be independent from civilians, which ran counter to civil-military relations in democratic countries. (Interview, Lt. Gen. Bamhang Yudhoyono, Nov. 18, 1998. See also ABRI 1998 and “ABRI Introduces New Concept of its Societal Role,” The Jakarta Post, Aug. 22, 1998).
making a bid for power. Therefore, what seemed necessary at the time—not pushing the back of the military against the wall—may have enabled agreement on holding free elections to be reached. However, an opportunity was lost by the opposition elite to remove the military from the political arena. Despite the short-term benefit, the continued involvement of the military in politics would remain a serious threat to the consolidation of democracy.

5.4. Regime

With the transfer of power from Suharto to Habibie, the sultan no longer controlled the regime apparatus, but the structure and the individuals making up the regime remained the same. The military, as stated above, became separated from the regime, but Golkar and the president with his circle of advisors also became separated due to the lack of a central figure capable of controlling all the components of power that had made up the regime under Suharto's rule. Habibie did not have the respect or political skills to

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148 Thus, statements, such as that made by T. Mulya Lubis, head of Indonesia Corruption Watch: “It’s only the New Order minus Suharto” (“Judging Habibie,” Asiaweek, Sept. 4, 1998: 22).

149 The state bureaucracy was another component of Suharto’s sultanistic regime. The bureaucracy continued unchanged after the transfer of power to Habibie and was not central in any power struggle. After elections were planned, its members refused to support Golkar, but during the Special Session, the bureaucracy was not a key player. In fact it was a bit immobilized due to having less direction than in the past when Suharto had made its decisions. Under Habibie, it was reported that many upper level members of the bureaucracy were reluctant to make decisions due to being unaccustomed to doing so and therefore were not making any important decisions at all (Interview, Kristiadi, Oct. 9, 1998. This was corroborated by several other interviews and informal discussions with people familiar with the bureaucracy). Habibie’s people complained of this since every facet of the state apparatus looked to Habibie to make even small decisions. Habibie wanted civil servants to make decisions appropriate to their posts (Interview, Jimly Asshiddiqie, July 15, 1999). This immobility kept the bureaucracy neutral but also prevented it from responding effectively to the changing needs of society in crisis. Some exceptions existed, however, such as the newly appointed Minister of Cooperatives and Small and Medium-Sized Businesses Adi Sasono, who was moving proactively, although controversially, with new programs (see “A People’s Economy,” Asiaweek, Dec. 18, 1998: 62-67).
control the political apparatus built by Suharto. It is therefore difficult to justify, at this point, calling the regime sultanistic. Instead the regime became one that was in the midst of transition. Although still an extension of Suharto's regime, the dynamics had changed significantly with the transfer of power.

The shifting dynamics and divisions within the regime that opened up after the resignation of Suharto created the possibility that a transition to democracy could be made and that negotiations could occur between moderates within the regime and opposition. Negotiating with the opposition was not possible while Suharto still controlled everyone connected with the regime. With the fall of Suharto, members of the regime knew that they were in a weak position due both to the public anger and to the splitting apart of regime components. For instance, the military could no longer be assumed to be available to enforce compliance with the regime's dictates. Within the regime, moderates also began to speak up. Combined with the fear that renewed rioting

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130 Habibie's failure to assume sultan-like control over the political apparatus was due both to his inexperience as a politician and, perhaps more importantly, to his desire to allow reform. The question remains as to whether someone else would have been able to consolidate power as a new sultan, but I am of the opinion that this would have been very difficult due to the extensive mass mobilization and weaknesses in the military. A different regime leader, however, could have made it more difficult to negotiate with the opposition and thus changed the course of the transition.

151 For instance, Suharto had ordered Golkar to do whatever he said with no discussion about decisions. After Suharto was gone, and especially after Harmoko—the head of Golkar in Suharto's final days—was replaced with Akbar Tanjung in July 1998, open discussion began to take place within Golkar. This is attributable partly to Akbar's style of leadership, which entailed allowing different views to be aired and making people feel that their opinions were important, but was also due to the fact that no one could replace Suharto's sultanistic powers (Interviews: Agung Laksono, Oct. 23, 1998 and Abdul Gafur, a long time leading executive in Golkar and head of its fraction in the Assembly, Nov. 13, 1998. Several other members of Golkar's executive board also concurred on this). Many debates and divisions therefore arose within Golkar about how to proceed during the transitional period. These divisions, and the division between Golkar and Habibie, become more pronounced as the transition proceeded following the Assembly's Special Session.
would bring complete political and economic collapse, this provided an opening for negotiations with the opposition.\footnote{Negotiations were an attempt by the regime to control the transition that had been forced upon the regime by mass mobilization. This belated attempt to control the transition, although usually through repression, is common in regime change from sultanistic regimes because the transition is almost never initiated by the regime itself (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). What is unusual in the Indonesian case is that attempts to control the transition were done through seeking to negotiate with the opposition.}

### 5.4.1. Habibie’s Plan for Reform

The holding of a Special Session of the National Assembly was seen as necessary to legitimize Habibie’s presidency after the transfer of power from Suharto to Habibie. New guidelines needed to be decreed by the Assembly. Habibie could not attempt to rule alone in the chaotic environment of a severe economic crisis and vulnerable political situation. Since Habibie did not have the sultanistic powers held by Suharto, although he had inherited the regime apparatus, Habibie had to garner support from regime insiders. His first step had been to have Akbar Tanjung elected as the head of the ruling party, Golkar.\footnote{Due to a lack of consensus, Akbar became the first ever elected (by provincial branch heads) chairman of Golkar. The voting went into two rounds with Akbar beating Edi Sudradjat 17 to 10 (“Akbar Becomes Golkar’s First-Ever Elected Chairman,” \textit{The Jakarta Post}, July 12, 1998).} Akbar was seen as one of the few persons who could unify Golkar in support of Habibie.\footnote{Akbar had the reputation of being a unifier and a good manager. He had been involved in Suharto’s regime for some time. His political career began as a member of the 1966 student activist group whose street protests led to the downfall of President Sukarno and the ascent to power of Suharto. He then went on to lead several organizations, such as HMI from 1972-1974, the Indonesian Young Generation for Renewal (AMPI, Angkatan Muda Pemberuan Indonesia) from 1978-1979, and the Indonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI, Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia) from 1978-1981. He joined Golkar, as did most of the students who protested against Sukarno, when Suharto came to power. He had served in three of Suharto’s cabinets from 1988 until his fall (“Akbar Tanjung, Not Your Usual Political Lightweight,” \textit{The Jakarta Post}, July 12, 1998).} Habibie had thus put off the Special Session until Akbar could guarantee that the members of the Assembly would not replace him with a new president.\footnote{Akbar replaced almost 200 Golkar representatives in the Assembly with people whom he trusted. This was also a means of patronage for him to build a following of his own (Interview, Kristiadi, Feb. 17, 1999).}

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Habibie had promised accelerated general elections shortly after taking the oath of office. However, the timetable for these elections was unclear and he vacillated as to whether or not that promise would be kept.¹⁵⁶ Many people in the regime thought the statement had been hastily made and did not agree that elections should be held. Legal reasons were given for why there was not a need to hold elections before 2003 and why Habibie was the legally legitimate head of the regime.¹⁵⁷

However, several leaders, such as Amien Rais and Nurcholish Madjid, went to Habibie and convinced him of the need for elections.¹⁵⁸ Political and economic reasons were given involving the domestic and international situation. Habibie then decided that it was best to adhere to his original commitment of holding elections within one year.¹⁵⁹ This was despite the lack of support for this decision within the regime. Habibie’s ability to carry out the promise of elections remained uncertain as the Special Session approached in November 1998.¹⁶⁰

Prior to the Special Session, Habibie appears to have believed that he could control the transition and go down in history as the great founder of Indonesian democracy.¹⁶¹ His view that the transition could be controlled is evident, for example, in his assertion that

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¹⁵⁶ Although Habibie’s reasons for promising elections were various and included the belief in reform, he also appears to have thought that he could control the transition through winning these elections (The promise of elections or rigging new elections is common in authoritarian regimes under pressure from mass mobilization: Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Golkar leaders, however, knew that they would not win due to the military’s withdrawal of support. They were therefore against the elections. In sum, divisions within the regime became apparent with Habibie and Golkar fighting for control of the transition.

¹⁵⁷ Jimly Asshiddiqie, who was a constitutional scholar at the University of Indonesia and who became a leading advisor to President Habibie, gave these legal reasons and publicly declared that elections were not necessary (Interview, Imam Prasojo, Nov. 23, 1998).

¹⁵⁸ Nurcholish Madjid is a leading Islamic scholar who is known to have moderately conservative views.


¹⁶⁰ Almost all prominent figures interviewed prior to the Special Session, especially those from the regime, were skeptical that elections would be held. See also, “Our Political Agenda,” The Jakarta Post, Oct. 15, 1998.

passing a law controlling public demonstrations would prevent street mobilization.\textsuperscript{162} This belief had undergirded his unwillingness to engage in serious negotiations with the opposition about political reform until it became apparent at the outset of the Special Session that mobilization was a serious threat to regime survival. It was at this point that Habibie realized that the opposition must be brought into negotiations and that members of the regime who had been opposed to political reform realized that concessions must be made.\textsuperscript{163}

5.4.2. The Special Session of the National Assembly and the Need for Negotiations with the Opposition

Few bold reforms were planned for the Special Session due to the lack of unity within the regime and military and to Habibie's belief that he could control the transition. Habibie had, however, insisted that a decree be made ordering early and free elections to be held. The regime had also agreed to a two-term limit for all future presidents.\textsuperscript{164} Habibie had not foreseen that dissent from within the regime against holding free elections would prompt individuals to mobilize groups, such as the Pam Swakarsa, in an attempt to force a declaration of a state of emergency. Nor had Habibie realized the

\textsuperscript{162} "A Truly Express Law," \textit{The Jakarta Post}, Oct. 23, 1998. Wiranto was also behind the push to enact laws restricting public demonstrations and the bill was written by the department of defense and security, which was under Wiranto's control. The original draft of the bill included measures to restrict the number of protesters at any gathering and an article requiring the press to have a permit before reporting on demonstrations ("House to Debate Bill on Protests," \textit{The Jakarta Post}, Sept. 18, 1998).

\textsuperscript{163} Interview, Jimly Aasbiddiqie, July 15, 1999.

\textsuperscript{164} Habibie, while seeing that elections were needed for domestic and international reasons, also thought of his support for elections as a "gift" from him to Indonesia that would be remembered as a great act of statesmanship (Interview, Satya Widiayudha, a member of the executive board of Golkar, Nov. 11, 1998).
extent of opposition to the regime from society that would bring over 100,000 people into
the streets to join the students in their protests.165

Habibie and Wiranto were both frightened by the plots to unseat them. They ordered
the Pam Swakarsa disbanded and refused to declare a state of emergency. The extensive
mass mobilization and fear of rioting on the scale of May 1998—or even worse—also
convinced Habibie and Wiranto, as well as many other members of the regime, that the
public's demand for political reform must be appeased. This conclusion became more
widely accepted by the regime and military after consultation with the opposition elite
revealed that although the opposition figures supported free elections, they did not
support the unconstitutional overthrow of the regime. They were not demanding the
complete overhaul of the political system.166

Although Habibie had wanted elections from the start, events surrounding the Special
Session convinced him that elections were absolutely necessary. The leadership of
Golkar also accepted the necessity of holding elections. Habibie and other Golkar leaders
calculated that working with a moderate opposition elite that was willing to support the
regime until elections was better than risking the chaos and possible overthrow of the
entire ruling structure.167 If an agreement was not reached with the opposition elite, then

165 Information on Habibie's thinking was obtained from interviews with his close political advisors,
166 Representatives of the regime engaged in negotiations with the opposition included people who were
connected to the Islamic group, ICMI, of which Amien used to be a leader, and individuals supporting
Habibie who had connections to the student protesters, such as Hariman Siregar (Interview, Hariman
Siregar, Dec. 10, 1998). It was concluded that the moderate student leaders, such as those in the student
senates and involved in Forum Salemba, would follow the lead of the national opposition figures in any
deals made with the regime. The more radical students, such as those in Forkot, were not contacted by the
regime because they were seen as not willing to negotiate.
167 Many leaders within Golkar had wanted to "put the brakes on Habibie" and delay or stop the holding of
free elections. However, after the Special Session, the extent of mass mobilization and its conflictual
nature, along with the stance of the military that elections must be held, spurred the Golkar leadership to
conclude that repression was not a viable option. Through negotiating with the opposition elite, it became
the latter might be pushed to join the more radical students in opposing the regime. This would lend legitimacy to the drive for a presidium government and spark further social unrest. Representatives from the regime therefore sought out the leading opposition figures in order to negotiate an agreement.

The basis of the agreement reached was that the regime would keep its promise of holding free elections if the opposition elite would denounce efforts to topple the regime. The regime also agreed to set a timetable for the elections and stated in a decree issued at the Assembly that elections would be held by June 1999. It was also written into the decree that an independent agency would monitor the elections. The regime also agreed to pass, following the Special Session, a rewritten version of three political laws that were deemed by the opposition to be central in ensuring free and fair elections.168

Two other concessions were made. One was the specific naming of Suharto in a decree issued by the Assembly on punishing past corruptors; the second was an Assembly decree that revoked the need for all organizations and political parties to base themselves on Pancasila.169 Both of these concessions were made in order to appease the protesters on the streets. The leading opposition figures were mostly concerned about guaranteeing that free elections were actually held, although they also saw the need to clear that the opposition would not settle for less than free elections. As the property and lives of the regime elite were being seriously threatened, the leadership of Golkar agreed to hold elections and therefore sought ways to appear to be supporters (and initiators) of political reform (Interviews: Ekky Sjahrudin, Feb. 14, 1999 and Abu Hasan Sadzfli, March 6, 1999, both high ranking Golkar officials on the executive board).

168 Drafts of these three laws were in the process of being sent to the legislative chamber but had been held up by Akbar Tanjung who was simultaneously head of Golkar and state secretary. Debate surrounding the revision of these laws is the topic of the next chapter.

169 “Calls for MPR to do its duty color end of session,” The Jakarta Post, Nov. 14, 1998. The decree on corruption was, however, without enforcement mechanisms and, despite the fact that it stated that past instances of corruption would be tried, the elite had privately agreed not to open that hornets’ nest since most of them could be implicated (Interview, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, deputy governor at Lemhannas, Dec. 28, 1998).
appear to be in concert with the demands being made in the streets. They were not adamant that Suharto be tried, however, and there was dissension among the opposition elite, as discussed above, on whether or not Pancasila should remain the sole basis of all organizations.

The agreement between the regime and the opposition elite did not consist of one official document signed by all sides. Instead, the agreements were made privately and publicly displayed through statements of the actors individually. The opposition elite also issued a formal agreement among themselves—the Ciganjur Agreement—described above. The regime issued a total of twelve decrees at the Special Session.170

Although the decrees had been largely written prior to the session, the fate of some of them had been uncertain. The mass mobilization and negotiations with the opposition elite ensured passage of the decrees most important for political reform and prompted rewording of some of them, such as adding Suharto’s name to the decree on corruption. Another decree, on separating the leadership of the National Assembly and the Legislature, was proposed by PPP during the preliminary meetings for the session but had difficulty getting the approval of Golkar. It was in fact not slated for presentation until it

170 The twelve decrees endorsed by the Assembly were as follows: 1) separation of the leadership of the National Assembly and Legislature; 2) revocation of the 1983 decree and 1985 law requiring a referendum in order to amend the constitution; 3) revocation of the March 1998 state guidelines; 4) revocation of the March 1998 decree granting President Suharto extraordinary powers; 5) revocation of the 1978 decree on the propagation and implementation of Pancasila; 6) a decree stating that a general election will be held by June 1999 and organized by an independent election committee composed of representatives from political parties, NGOs and the government; 7) a decree that the president and vice president can only hold two five-year terms of office; 8) new state guidelines for Habibie’s presidency; 9) a verbal commitment to exploiting natural resources in a manner that is just to the provinces and which contributes to improving the lives of the local people; 10) a decree on good governance free from corruption, collusion and nepotism (specifically naming Suharto as being liable to being brought to charges if evidence shows that he cheated the country out of money); 12) a decree on the people’s economy that is to create a broad base of small and medium sized businesses and avoid the concentration of economic assets or of land ownership. (Decrees were published by the National Assembly secretariat, Nov. 1998).

182 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
became apparent that the regime needed to appear to be reformist.\textsuperscript{171} This concern with image became increasingly important to Golkar leaders as they saw that the opposition to the regime was strong. They knew that they would not be able to control the transition and that elections would have to be held.\textsuperscript{172}

Events surrounding the special session therefore represented a critical turning point. The regime recognized that it could not control the transition and was forced to negotiate terms with the opposition elite. Alternative paths were not taken. For instance, there was no declaration of emergency, no coup occurred, and the regime was not overthrown. Instead, the regime committed itself to holding free elections by June 1999.

After the Special Session, as will be discussed in the following two chapters, most members of the regime accepted that elections had become inevitable and turned their attention toward devising strategies for surviving the transition. Individuals thus began to maneuver to place themselves in the most advantageous position for post-transition politics. This included increasing calls for reform from individuals within the regime and Golkar.


\textsuperscript{172} Interviews with several individuals in Golkar and knowledgeable outsiders state this point as well as confirm the events representing this turn in Golkar’s strategy. For example, the three persons listed in the above footnote support this, as well as other insiders, including Slamet Effendy Yusauf, deputy chairman of Golkar, Dec. 1, 1999).
5.5. Economic and International Context of the Above Events

5.5.1. Economic Crisis

Indonesia’s economy appeared to be hitting bottom at about the time of the Special Session, but no one was certain when recovery would begin. The context of severe economic crisis colored the entire transitional period and contributed to the regime’s desire to find a solution to the political turmoil. It was thought by most members of the regime and military that if the government had more legitimacy, then the political chaos would end and the economy would begin to turn around. The perceived need for legitimacy was also a factor preventing the military from making a coup.

In 1998, GDP growth had dropped by 17.4% and inflation was at 78.2%. This precipitous decline was the first in thirty years and came after many years of 8% growth under Suharto. The rupiah had fallen to below Rp.10,000 to US$1 from a pre-crisis exchange rate of Rp.2,500 to US$1. Poverty was high—by UN estimates over 40% of Indonesians were living below the poverty line—and this was predicted to rise above 50% by the end of 1998. Food prices were rising and a rice shortage was frequently predicted in the local media. The disastrous economic statistics pointed toward the potential for society to erupt into even more violent opposition to the regime.

At the heart of Indonesia’s economic problem was an ailing banking system. The extent of bad debt, or non-performing loans, that had caused Indonesia to fall the hardest of the Asian countries was enormous. One senior IBRA (Indonesian Bank Restructuring

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174 The need for the government to have more legitimacy was brought up in almost every interview with members of the regime and military.
Agency) official stated that non-performing loans accounted for about half of all credit extended by commercial banks in the country and totaled approximately US$33.2 billion equaling 48% of the country’s GDP. Private and public foreign debt (by both banks and companies) totaled US$138 billion with slightly more than half of this being private debt. With the depreciated rupiah and the decade-low price of Indonesia’s biggest foreign exchange earner, oil, repaying these loans was impossible. The economy was stalled due to the cost of importing goods needed for production.

IBRA was a government-sponsored agency that had been established in January 1998 to find ways to save the country’s ailing banks. Some banks had been nationalized and others were given notice that they had to repay at least 25% of their debt or else face seizure by the agency. IBRA was authorized to inject large sums of money into the banking system for recapitalization, and some of the bad debt would be covered through the sale of bank assets. The banks also had to get money from their debtors. Since most of the companies, especially the large conglomerates, were not able to repay their loans, the banking sector was facing meltdown.

Habibie had been trying simultaneously to comply with IMF demands that tough choices be made while also putting off decisions so as not to upset the regime’s power base of crony capitalists. Liquidating banks and seizing company assets did not happen during the Special Session, but would have to be done afterwards. Nor was the

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180 Some banks had already been nationalized, such as BCA and Bank Danamon, two of the country’s largest private banks. However, not much had been done to collect their bad debts so the debt was now the government’s instead of the private sector’s (Bad Loans ‘an Obstacle to Bank restructuring,’” the Jakarta Post, Aug. 28, 1998).
problem of corruption in the state bureaucracy being tackled. Habibie had also not yet eliminated the costly subsidies on basic commodities, such as rice, cooking oil, and soybeans. He did not want the nation to be hit with higher prices on these items for fear that this would cause further unrest.

Habibie’s minister of cooperatives, small, and medium sized businesses, Adi Sasono, was trying to redirect the distribution of basic foodstuffs away from the Suharto-era monopolies, largely controlled by Sino-Indonesian capital. He favored small and medium sized businesses owned by priBMI (Indonesians of indigenous descent). Sasono’s policy contributed to fear among the Chinese that the Habibie government was trying to take their wealth. Sino-Indonesians had also been traumatized by the riots of May 1998 and feared for their future in the country. They had withdrawn much of their money and were not reinvesting in the economy. This created significant problems for the economy since the Sino-Indonesians owned approximately 90% of the commercial wealth in the country.

In sum, Indonesia’s economy was in dire straits and Habibie was merely trying to hold the wreckage together a little longer. While an economic crisis can have varying effects on regime change, it does not necessarily lead to, or even help, a transition to democracy. In Indonesia’s case, the critical condition of the economy spurred the regime to hope that

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181 An internal World Bank memo that became public reported that at least 20% of funds given to Indonesia by the World Bank were siphoned off in corruption (“Judging Habibie,” Asiaweek, Sept. 4, 1998: 18-28.
183 This includes Malay, Javanese, and the numerous ethnic groups native to the islands. It also includes Indonesians of Arab descent, but not of Chinese descent, even if the family has lived in the country for generations.
184 “Judging Habibie,” Asiaweek, Sept. 4, 1998: 18-28. This is despite the fact that the Chinese only made up approximately 3% of the population.
if a legitimate government were in power, then perhaps the economy would begin to recover.\footnote{Habibie initially believed that he could win the elections through being viewed as a great statesman and therefore would be supported by several parties—Golkar and Muslim parties—for the presidency. His presidency would then have the legitimacy it needed to act more assertively in the realm of politics, internal security, and the economy (Interviews: Umar Jauoro; July 30, 1999 and Hariman Siregar, Dec. 10, 1998).}

Additionally, many regime members had been badly hurt financially by the economic crisis. The military was also wounded since 70% of its income came from military owned businesses. Without profits, personnel could not be paid and supplies could not be bought.\footnote{George Aditjondro (1999).} The case for holding elections to create a legitimate government was also pushed by the international community.

### 5.5.2. International Pressure

International pressure came from several directions. Most important were those countries and institutions central to bailing the economy out of its crisis. The main source of funds was the IMF, although other groups of countries had come together to coordinate lending, such as the Paris Club and the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI). Japan and the United States were the dominant lenders in these multilateral groups.

The IMF was working with the Habibie government but seems to have had concerns about the ability of the government, because it was merely an extension of Suharto’s regime, to tackle serious problems, such as corruption and collusion between the government, banks, and conglomerates.\footnote{No interviews were conducted with IMF officials; therefore, assertions such as these reflect the opinion of people interviewed with connections to the regime, the US Embassy, or observers. For instance, James Seevers, second secretary for the political division at the US Embassy, Nov. 10, 1998, made this assertion.} IMF officials therefore probably preferred...
that a new regime come to power. This can be inferred partly from the views of the United States, through its embassy officials, since the US was a prime backer of the IMF bailout program. It is also supported by statements from other countries, such as those from the Australian Embassy.\textsuperscript{188}

The international community in general and the US and IMF in particular put pressure on leaders within Indonesia’s regime and military to make democratizing reforms. While this pressure was not the prime determinant of the transition (especially since it came a few months after Suharto fell from power and after it became clear that the military was not capable of restoring order), it did eventually help to push Habibie and the regime to decide that holding free elections was the best course.\textsuperscript{189}

Pressure was exerted in private meetings and through making it clear that IMF funds were contingent upon the country not falling into chaos.\textsuperscript{190} The buzzword was “legitimate” government accepted by the people. Without a legitimate government, the international community felt that stability could not be restored in Indonesia. Holding

\textsuperscript{188} Discussions about the US’s views toward Indonesia’s transition were held with two US Embassy officials. James Seevers is most relevant for information pertaining to the special session, but his information was corroborated by the second official, Ike Reed, who replaced Seevers in September 1999 and with whom discussions were held during the general session in October 1999. Information about the international community was also corroborated by other country’s embassy officials, including the Australian Embassy’s Dave Enggies, in charge of following political events, with whom discussions were held at both the Special Session and the General Session (Sidang Umum) the following year.

\textsuperscript{189} As argued in Chapter 4, the Indonesian case does not support the view that the loss of support from the prime international backer of a sultanistic regime is central to bringing about the demise of sultanistic regimes, although the economic crisis could be viewed as acting as a similar impetus for regime change (See Chehabi and Linz, eds., 1998, especially the chapter by Richard Snyder. See also Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, for this argument). If the prime backer for Suharto’s regime is viewed to have been the US, then it was not central to his fall from power. It was domestic events, following the unplanned international collapse of Asian currencies that brought Suharto down. As the transition proceeded, the US did, however, progressively assume a position that was helpful to bringing about the demise of the remnants of Suharto’s regime. But the US was mostly reacting to events, especially in the beginning of the transitional period.

\textsuperscript{190} For instance, Ginanjar Kartasasmita was someone whom the US embassy tried to win over. Ginanjar was the minister of finance, had a significant following in Golkar, and had a sizeable personal fortune to lose if the economy did not recover (Informal discussion, Ike Reed, political representative from the US Embassy, Oct. 1999).
elections deemed to be fair, through the presence of international observers, was finally concluded to be the only way to get Indonesia’s economy to recover.191

Habibie and the regime left by Suharto were very concerned about economic recovery. They saw the need for international help and for foreign investment. The desire to please the international community, added to the other factors presented above, pushed Habibie and other leaders of the regime and military to agree that free elections should be held. Once this promise was made, it became increasingly clear that it would be very difficult for the regime to back out of its promise or to rig the elections. Regime attention then turned to trying to maintain as much of its lessening control over the rules of the game as possible, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 6
NEGOTIATING THE DETAILS OF THE TRANSITION

During the special session of the national assembly, it was determined through elite level negotiation that the remnants of Suharto's regime would remain in power until free elections were held. The elite opposition figures' agreement with this angered many of the protesters who had taken to the streets demanding that a presidium government be formed to lead the transition to democracy. The mass based opposition was also at odds with the opposition figures, who claimed to be their representatives, over the scope of reforms. The three leading national opposition figures had all agreed to severely restrict the reform agenda to only holding free elections. All other reforms would have to be made after these elections. Both the elite and mass level actors knew that this in effect meant that reforms would remain very limited.

Following the events surrounding the special session of the Assembly, the gap continued to widen between the elite figures and mass base in the reform movement. The lack of an alternative nationally recognized leadership for the mass base of the reform movement kept demands for extensive reform from being articulated at the elite level where negotiations were being conducted. This lack of representation for many mass based demands pushed grievances outside of the formal process of negotiations and contributed to the uncontrolled violent mobilization that was spreading at the local level.
across the country. People began to burn out officials from their homes and offices and communal conflicts were settled through violence in the streets. There was also a proliferation of random acts of mob action, including raiding warehouses for their stored goods and reclaiming land that had been taken by Suharto’s regime. The disconnection between the political elite and mass base within the opposition would continue to worsen throughout the transitional period and in the post-transitional period creating many problems for the new democracy.

The failure of the opposition elite to represent the numerous grievances in society that were bursting forth left society with no organized means through which their demands could be voiced in a peaceful manner. The lack of leadership and organization essential for aggregating demands so that they can be channeled to the elite level for resolution can be traced back to the nature of Suharto’s rule that did not allow an extensive autonomous civil society to develop. The timidity of the three leading opposition figures can also be traced back to the fact that only extremely moderate individuals were allowed to gain leadership positions in any organization. More radical and oppositional figures were jailed or simply disappeared. The crippling effect of this regime legacy became clearly visible after the initial euphoria of Suharto’s downfall began to dissipate and attention turned toward the question of what was to be created in the wake of his rule.

The disorganization of the opposition and extreme moderation of the three leading opposition figures can be clearly seen throughout the negotiating process detailed in this chapter. The resulting problem of uncontrolled and violent mobilization worsened. This mobilization would continue into the post-transitional period. In addition to the uncontrolled mobilization, the opposition leaders also began to organize mobilization
based upon religious identity. This became more apparent after the general elections but is symptomatic of the lack of connection between the opposition figures and the mass base of the reform movement. The opposition figures saw mobilization as a resource in their power struggles but needed to cultivate a following for themselves that heeded their commands. This was most easily done by appealing to religious symbolism as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Mass mobilization can therefore be seen as being both critical in pushing the transition forward by forcing the regime and military to agree to hold free elections while simultaneously exacerbating the problems of violence and communal conflict in the country. The moderation of the figures representing the opposition at the elite level can similarly be viewed as being beneficial for the transition by preventing the regime and military from feeling pushed into a corner in a zero sum game for survival as frequently happens in exits from sultanism or totalitarianism. On the other hand, however, the opposition elite’s tepidity in regards to reforms created many problems during the transitional period that continued into the post-transitional period. One such problem was the inability to control much of the mobilization of society due to the lack of connection between the elite and mass base of the opposition. Another problem created by the moderation of the opposition elite was the failure to make substantial reform to the constitution and political institutions that would enable a well functioning democracy to be created. This is discussed further in the concluding chapter.

During the period covered in this chapter, the military continued to fragment and weaken. This is attributable to the years of manipulation and intervention by Suharto. The commander of the armed forces attempted to protect key interests of the military
during negotiations with the opposition and regime, but he was constrained by the inability of the military to halt the unrest that was spreading across the country. The growing lack of law and order forced the regime and military to realize that something had to be done or the country was in danger of disintegrating. The military’s weakness can therefore be viewed as both beneficial for the transition in the sense that it prevented the military from making a coup or repressing the demands for change, but the military’s weakness also left the country in a chaotic condition with rampant lawlessness breeding more discontent. The lawlessness and discontent are later seen to provide radical Islamic groups an opening to step into localities and impose their own brand of law and order.

It is important to note that neither the military nor the regime, despite the retention of formal power, controlled the transition. To the contrary, we shall see throughout this chapter that the regime lost in negotiations on every significant issue pertaining to how the transition would unfold. The military was able to preserve some of its reserve domains of power, but did not control the main outlines of the transition. The agreement of the opposition elite with the military and regime that political changes should be minimal and gradual was not a mere acceptance of what the military and regime wanted. The minimalist nature of the negotiations is more attributable to the reluctance of the opposition elite to demand more reforms. None of the opposition elite, although there were differences among them, had an agenda involving much more than opening the circle of power to themselves through free elections. They were afraid, as were the military and regime, of mass demands for total reform.

The fear was that a mass led transition would create a mass led democracy. The political and military elite, including the leading figures of the opposition, viewed
governance as a domain best controlled by the elite. The agreed upon objective was not
to include the ordinary Indonesian in political decision-making, but to widen the circle of
elite inclusiveness. The tension between opening up competition for power at the elite
level and excluding the mass level from the political process can be seen throughout the
transitional period and continues today. The results of attempting to manipulate mass
mobilization in elite level power struggles while simultaneously ignoring mass based
demands has created the condition of a highly mobilized but unrepresented and
disillusioned society, despite free elections.

This chapter will show how the three highlighted variables – mass mobilization, a
moderate opposition elite, and a progressively fragmented military – contributed to the
democratic outcome of holding free elections while simultaneously contributing to
growing problems that were becoming evident. The existence of the three variables
enabled the transition to occur despite the presence of opposition to elections within the
regime and military. It was also becoming evident, however, that many problems were
associated with the same three variables that arguably helped to achieve a transition to
democracy. The weak connection between the elite and mass based opposition and the
limited scope of negotiations can be linked to resulting problems of uncontrolled, as well
as manipulated, violent mobilization and ill-functioning political institutions in the post-
transitional period. In this manner problems in creating and consolidating a high quality
democracy are linked to how the transition was made and to the pre-transition regime
legacy.

Most of the discussion in this chapter centers on the three political laws that were the
object of negotiation among the elite players when working out the details of the
transition. The broad parameters of the transition had been agreed upon by the main elite players, as described in the previous chapter. It had been agreed that the transition would be limited to reformulating a package of three political laws that would enable free elections to be held. The first was a law governing the election of representatives to the national and local legislatures. The second covered the regulation of political parties. The third governed the structure and function of the National Assembly and Legislature.

The three political laws were negotiated between and within the regime, military and opposition elite in a context of increasing lawlessness, inter-ethnic and religious conflict, and separatist demands. Debate was minimal over institutional reforms that might have helped alleviate the growing problems of communal conflict and lawlessness. The elite maintained the agreement to not make significant changes to the political institutions or constitution and focused exclusively on reformulating the three political laws necessary to hold free elections.

Three issues were especially contentious in these negotiations: the eligibility of civil servants to participate in political parties; the number of seats that would be reserved in the Legislature for the military; and the election system to be used. The varying stances of players and the relevance of these issues will be fleshed out in this chapter.

Before detailing the negotiations that determined the specifics of the transition, background information is given on the drafting of the political laws. The nature of mass mobilization is then discussed. At the end of the chapter the final three political laws and decisions made by the General Election Commission are summarized.

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1 The general election promised by Habibie was for the members of the national and local legislatures. The National Legislature would then be combined with indirectly elected and appointed representatives to comprise the National Assembly that would elect the president and vice president.
During the period of negotiating the details of the transition, it should be noted that opposition figures and parties other than those tied to the three main figures became important. New parties were formed and PPP, a pre-existing party, was fashioning itself into a more genuine opposition party than it had been in the past. PPP became an important opposition force during this period because of its presence in the Legislature and therefore its involvement in the formal negotiating process. However, the three leading opposition figures – Megawati, Wahid, and Amien – remained the key figures claiming representation of the mass based reform movement.

6.1. The Team of 7

When it was apparent that Suharto was about to lose power, the minister of home affairs, Lt. Gen. Hartono, asked the head of the Institute of Government Studies, IIP (Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan), Ryaas Rashyid, to begin analyzing the political laws governing elections, parties, and the Legislature in order to see how they might be changed to accommodate some of the reformist demands. Ryaas assembled a team of “experts” who were all outside of the political system. The group, including Ryaas, consisted of seven members and was dubbed the Tim 7 (Team of 7).

After power was transferred to Habibie, and Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid was named the new minister of home affairs, Ryaas was told to draft a complete reformulation of the

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3 As head of the government bureaucracy’s largest training school, Ryaas was a bureaucrat in the regime. He worked under the minister of home affairs.
4 The members included, besides the head, Ryaas Rashyid: Ramlan Surbakti, Andi Mallarangeng, Afan Gaffar, Anas Urbaningrum, Djoherman Setiyah Djohan, and Lutthi Mutty. The first four of these members, including Ryaas, had PhDs in political science from the US and had studied at least part of the time in Northern Illinois University under Dwight King who is an expert on electoral systems. Anas Urbaningrum was the leader of the student organization, HMI. The last two members were instructors at the government’s school for administrators, IIP.
three political laws so that free elections could be held. The emphasis was to be on enabling free elections and free party formation, not on reforming the political institutions.5

The Team of 7 was given some directives by Habibie and the minister of home affairs but worked largely independently of the regime and military. Habibie told the Team to ensure that free elections could be held but left the details, such as what electoral system to use, up to the Team.6 The strict deadline of July 1998 for the draft left little time for input from any side.7 At this stage, the opposition elite, military, and regime had not had sufficient time to analyze what electoral rules would be to their benefit and were still trying to sort out what to advocate in regard to the new political laws.8 Thus, despite the later criticism of the final draft given by the Team to the government and accusations that the draft favored Golkar, the Team had not purposely worked to benefit Golkar and in fact the draft laws disadvantaged Golkar in many ways.9

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6 Five parameters were made by the team and approved by the president. The parameters were: elections must be democratic; legislatures must be representative of society, including the outer regions; representatives must be accountable to the people; the electoral law must be exhaustive and regulate everything so that no one can cheat; and the laws must be practical. The military gave the Team of 7 rough guidelines of proposed reforms, but these guidelines consisted mostly of concepts, not specifics. (interview, Afin Gaffar, Aug. 16, 1998).
7 Habibie, Golkar, the military, and the opposition elite were consulted by the Team of 7 throughout the drafting process, but only to a limited extent (interview, Ramlan Surbakti, July 27, 1998).
8 Interview, Agung Laksono, Deputy Chairman of Golkar and Minister of Youth and Sport, Oct. 23, 1998.
6.1.1. The Team of 7’s Draft of the Political Laws

The draft written by the Team of 7 was submitted in late July to the State Secretariat for review. This is standard procedure for any government-drafted bill. The State Secretariat officially submits all government bills to the Legislature for approval. The State Secretariat under Habibie was headed by Akbar Tanjung, who was simultaneously the head of Golkar. It was at this point in the process that the draft first ran into problems. Akbar wanted to quietly change several important aspects of the draft laws prior to submitting them to the Legislature. The contentious points will be detailed throughout this chapter according to different sides’ stances on the issues as they negotiated. Here a brief outline is given of the original draft, contentious points, and immediate problems the drafts faced.

The first contentious point was that the Team of 7, contrary to the benefit of Golkar, had included a provision in their draft laws that barred civil servants from participating in political party activities or from being members of any political party. This was done in an effort to prevent Golkar from using its pre-established base in the bureaucracy to gather votes. Throughout Suharto’s rule, Golkar was tied to the bureaucracy through all civil servants being required to be active members of Golkar. It was through ties to the bureaucracy and the support of the military that Golkar was able to win every election. If the bureaucracy-Golkar tie were not clearly severed, the Team of 7 feared that Golkar would continue to use the bureaucracy during election time.

The provision of civil servant neutrality was strongly rejected by Akbar Tanjung. Habibie refused to allow the provision to be removed and stood by the Team of 7’s draft laws. 

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10 The original drafts were obtained from Ryaas Rashyid, head of the Team of 7.
of the laws. This was the first major rift within the regime between Habibie and Akbar and will be discussed below in the regime section of this chapter. Eventually, the media became aware of why the drafts were being held up and Akbar was forced to submit the drafts to the Legislature with the provision on the neutrality of the civil service intact. At this point, debate and bargaining began.

The second contentious point of the drafts was that the Team of 7 had chosen a district level plurality ("first past the post") electoral system. The intention was to make the elected representatives more accountable to their constituents and to prevent central party control over representatives. Despite the intentions of the Team, critics accused the Team of purposely trying to advantage Golkar through choosing the plurality system. This criticism began as it became recognized that Golkar would fare better under a district level plurality system because of its established organizational network.

In the face of accusations, the Team of 7 insisted that they were not working for the advantage of Golkar. In fact, during the time that the Team wrote the drafts, Golkar was advocating a proportional representation system at the provincial level. It was only later, after a study commissioned by Golkar on the effects of different electoral systems, that Golkar changed its thinking and began pressing for the district level plurality system. Although the evidence does not support the accusation that the Team of 7 was working to

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11 The team wanted to break the hold of Jakarta politicians and give power to the local people and force small parties to merge. The education of several team members in the US also prompted them to use the US as a model for the electoral system (Interview, Andi Mallarangeng, Dec. 1, 1998; Afin Gaffar, Aug. 16, 1998; Ryas Rashid, Dec. 1 1998; and Ramlan Surbakti; July 27, 1998. Also see, "Pemerintah Berikutnya Terapkan Sistem Distrik," Kompas Oct. 22, 1998).


13 Interview, Agung Laksono, Oct. 23, 1998 and Buriun Maganda, Head of education dept. in Golkar, Oct. 18, 1998. This was confirmed by several other interviews.
advantage Golkar, suspicion had been laid in the public and opposition’s mind and they would remain leery of attempts to change the electoral system.\textsuperscript{14}

A third contentious provision in Team 7’s draft laws was that 55 seats in the Legislature had been reserved for the military.\textsuperscript{15} This was the amount requested by the military. The Team members may have preferred to give no seats to the military, but they were constrained in their ability to do this by the insistence of Habibie and the military.\textsuperscript{16} The number of seats would be debated, as will be discussed below, after the draft laws were submitted to the legislature.

Other points in the draft laws were important, although they were not as central to the debate over the bills as were the three above-mentioned issues. One such point was that small parties were encouraged to merge through strict requirements for parties to participate in the election. This included a very high threshold – 10\% of seats - for parties to be eligible to compete for the next election.\textsuperscript{17} The problem of numerous small parties was viewed as a contributing factor to the immobility in the 1950s that had led

\textsuperscript{14} Even a political observer who was a strong opponent of Habibie said that he believed no one had instructed the Team of 7 to choose the district level, plurality system. The Team chose it out of their belief that it was best for the country (interview, Kristiadi, head of the political section at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, Oct. 9, 1998).

\textsuperscript{15} The original drafts gave the Legislature 550 members (495 elected and 55 appointed by the military). The Assembly was to consist of the members of the Legislature plus 81 regional representatives chosen by the local Legislatures and 69 appointed social group representatives. This put the Assembly total at 700 members. This was a reduction from the 1000 member Assembly existing under the current regime, which had a 500 member Legislature (75 of those members were appointed by the military – recently reduced from 100 military seats) and 500 appointed members to make up the full Assembly (See Chapter 3 for a fuller description of the Legislature and Assembly under Suharto).


\textsuperscript{17} The draft made it necessary to have party chapters in at least 13 of the country’s 27 provinces or to obtain 1 million signatures in order to be eligible to participate in the election (“Parties United in Demand to Keep Proportional System,” \textit{The Jakarta Post} Nov. 24, 1998). The threshold of 10\% was set with the knowledge that it would be bargained to a lower number in the Legislature (interview, Afan Gaffar, Aug. 16, 1998).
Sukarno to disband the parliament. The Team of 7 hoped to avoid the problem through encouraging the formation of a multi-party system that had approximately four large parties and through prohibiting small parties.

Another important point of the draft laws was the establishment of an independent electoral commission. Previously, the elections were administered through the Department of Home Affairs and its electoral commission, the LPU (Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, General Election Body). The LPU had always been filled with government appointed people who helped to ensure that Golkar won the elections. The draft laws created the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Election Commission), which would consist of representatives from the government, political parties, and society. The commission would have the freedom to run the elections without interference from the Department of Home Affairs. Creating an independent election commission was not disputed, but the composition of this commission was debated. Once created, the KPU experienced difficulty in functioning efficaciously and effectively due to unforeseen problems.

Despite the limited scope of the three political laws, revising them enabled the holding of free and fair elections. This was the minimal requirement of a transition to democracy. The contentious points in the drafts needed to be agreed upon so that the elections would be accepted by all major players. Below, the debates surrounding the three draft bills and the social conditions during which these debates ensued are discussed.

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6.2. Mass Mobilization

During the period of negotiating the details of the transition, organized mass mobilization splintered and street protests decreased in intensity and occurrence. Student protesters were less unified and many student groups moderated their demands vis-à-vis the regime. Simultaneously, several forms of uncontrolled mobilization increased throughout the country. Violent communal conflicts and incidents of communities taking the law into their own hands through mob action became predominant forms of mass mobilization. Islamic symbolism was still being used to mobilize support for the regime, but this was not as visible as it had been during the Special Session of the National Assembly or during the selection of the president and vice president, as will be shown in Chapter 7.

Theories of negotiated transitions to democracy have shown the importance of the elite having authority to negotiate with the regime on behalf of protesters in the streets. In the Indonesian case, the opposition elite had enough authority to negotiate on behalf of the opposition movement; however, they excluded many demands made by segments of society. The opposition elite, although they were able to halt many of the street protests and have their negotiations accepted by the bulk of society, represented only the most moderate demands of the opposition movement. The exclusion of many demands from

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19 This waning of organized protests against the regime was partly due to limited organization from the beginning, as is typical of societies emerging from sultanistic and totalitarian regimes (Zhang 1994) and due to the difficulty in sustaining a protest movement once the sultan was gone, as Fischer (1992) illustrates with the Romanian case after Ceausescu was deposed. However, even though it was difficult to keep the protest movement united around goals beyond getting rid of the sultan, the protest movement in Indonesia did maintain unity around the demand for free elections within the year. The continued pressure for this demand prevented the regime from reconsolidating its power without the sultan, as occurred in Romania.

20 Linz and Stepan 1996.
the negotiating table resulted in an increased incidence of violent communal conflict and a variety of forms of mob action.\textsuperscript{21}

Of course many factors contribute to communal violence and to the breakdown of law and order. However, in Indonesia, the failure to seriously discuss, in the national level dialogue, the reasons for and solutions to communal violence and grassroots mob action left many segments of society excluded from the transition process. This exclusion heightened the potential for outbreaks of uncontrolled mass based violence.\textsuperscript{22} The political elite further exacerbated the problem, as will be shown in Chapter 7, by using the local conflicts for their self-interest and as part of their strategy for ascending to power.

6.2.1. Protest Groups and Their Demands

While the elite were negotiating the three political laws, two features of the protest movement were significant. On the one hand, the movement was divided and many moderate student leaders had been persuaded by the regime and opposition elite to halt protest activities and instead help the nation to prepare for elections.\textsuperscript{23} On the other hand, despite the lack of central organization, protests continued, albeit on a smaller scale than

\textsuperscript{21} It is important for the elite to have enough control over mass mobilization to be able to call a halt to it in order for negotiations to be conducted (Huntington, summer 1984; Levine, April 1988; Valenzuela, July 1989; and O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). The Indonesian opposition elite were able to bring much of the large scale protests to a halt, but they could not control all of the fragments of the protest movement or the grassroots mobilization. It is argued here that although the opposition elite could control many student leaders, the moderation of the elite and their failure to represent many demands made throughout society brought about the increased incidence of mobilization that was not organized on a large scale. The amorphous and spontaneous nature of this mobilization made it progressively more difficult for anyone to control.

\textsuperscript{22} There is speculation about the possibility of communal violence being initiated by provocateurs working for elite individuals. However, without pre-existing tensions, this would have been difficult. The inattention by the opposition elite to locally based grievances is a more significant factor.

\textsuperscript{23} The timing of the negotiations over the three political bills coincided with the Islamic holy month of Ramadan and the student semester break, which helped to bring calm to the streets of Jakarta.
previously, which signified that many people in society wanted more far-reaching reforms than were being demanded by the moderate opposition elite. These protests frequently turned into violent episodes of stone throwing and beatings between the military and students.24

The continued protests despite calls by the opposition elite for them to cease showed that the control of the opposition elite over the protest movement was tenuous. However, the opposition elite was able to curtail the large-scale protests and bring enough calm to the capital city to enable elite negotiations to take place. The negotiating took place despite the fact that it had become clear that many demands in society were not being channeled through the opposition elite onto the negotiating table.

Participants in the moderate wing of the movement were divided over whether more reforms should be demanded. The leaders of the biggest groups in the moderate wing of the movement, especially those associated with Forum Salemba, became convinced that they should cease protesting and instead be a “moral force” reminding the regime that free elections needed to be held.25

Despite the acceptance by the student leaders that far-reaching political change beyond the holding of elections was not ideal at this time, many students from the moderate

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24 The regime and military had passed a law regulating protests prior to the Special Session but did not begin to enforce it until after the Special Session. The law stipulated that protesters needed to obtain a police permit three days prior to holding a protest and restricted the number of participants and places where protests could be held. The failure to obtain a permit or violating the conditions of the permit gave the military an excuse to use violence against protesters. Many protesters also taunted the military by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at them. For just one example of the violence that accompanied many protests, see “Trisakti Students Injured in Clash with Riot Troops,” The Jakarta Post April 1, 1999.

25 Leaders were persuaded by their “elders” that continuing to protest at this point in the transition would bring more social unrest and possibly cause the elections to be called off. The student leaders were, however, ready to mobilize people again if they thought that elections were not going to be held or the regime was going to unfairly “rig” the elections (interviews: Rama Pratama, head of UI’s student senate, April 19, 1999 and Mustafa Fakhri, a student leader in Forum Salemba, May 6, 1999. See also “ICMI Calls on Students to Stop Demonstrating,” The Jakarta Post Dec. 5, 1998 and “Students Told to Stop Denouncing ABRI,” The Jakarta Post Dec. 8, 1998).
groups continued to protest the same issues that they had demanded during the Special Session, namely, bringing Suharto to trial, withdrawing the military from politics, holding free elections, and removing Pancasila as the sole foundation for political parties. These students, however, lacked the organizational support to call for massive rallies and their protests consisted of disconnected gatherings in the streets emphasizing various issues. Without the coordination of the student senates, the moderate wing of the movement became ineffective at doing more than reminding the elite that society was demanding political reform that at the very least had to entail free elections.

Groups that had been in-between the moderates and radicals, the biggest being KBUI (Keluarga Besar Universitas Indonesia, the Big Family of the University of Indonesia), were divided on what to do following the Special Session, but the leaders were mostly persuaded to take a moderate stance and cease protesting while the elite negotiated the details of the transition. Some members of KBUI allied with the radical groups but continued to use the name of KBUI.

The radical wing, epitomized by Forkot and Famred, was in disarray because the presidium government that they sought now seemed beyond reach and they were divided

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26 "Demonstrasi Menuntut Soeharto Segera Diadili," Tempo Dec. 7, 1998 and "Students Rally at Merdeka Palace," The Jakarta Post March 12, 1999. These demands were differentiated from the radical demands because they did not entail the underlying threat of overthrowing the regime and not accepting a new regime if the demands were not met. They were more of a “moral force” reminding the elite that society wanted these things done.

27 UI's student senate was temporarily disbanded after Rama Pratama’s term as senate leader was over. The university decided not to elect a new senate until the political climate was “more conducive.” Therefore no senate existed throughout the period leading up to the elections and selection of the president and vice president.

28 Observation of meetings. Another in-between group, HMI, was divided over whether or not to continue protesting. The national level leadership wanted the groups to cease protesting unless conditions emerged that mandated a return to the streets (interview, Anas Urbangingrum, April 29, 1999). Members, however, continued to protest various issues, especially the demand that parties not be obligated to base themselves on Pancasila.
over whether or not to support the elections.  This group became more isolated following the Special Session.  This wing of the opposition was also unsure of what to do because their main demand had been to overthrow the entire regime and have a presidium government rule during the transitional period. With the failure at the Special Session to achieve this goal, the radicals in the protest movement knew that it was not likely that another opportunity would arise to overthrow the regime. They were therefore uncertain about what course of action to take next.

The radicals were also divided on the issue of whether or not to support the holding of general elections. On the one side, it was argued that the elections were merely a guise for bourgeois control over the country. On the other side, it was argued that a freely elected government was the first step to empowering the people. The divisions and indecisiveness of the radical wing hindered the ability of this wing of the movement to effectively demand thorough political reform.

Despite their internal problems, the radical groups continued to protest that the military should completely and immediately withdraw from all forms of political activity, Suharto must be tried immediately, Habibie and Wiranto should also be tried for

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29 Interviews: Adrian, March 7, 1999 and Donni, May 2, 1999, (leaders in the radical student movement).
30 They continued to be labeled Christians and communists with the goal of taking power away from the Muslims. This was a divisive tactic used by the regime to attempt to convince the moderate student leaders, who were mostly strong Muslims, to cease protesting (interview, Rama Pratama, April 19, 1999). The opposition elite did nothing to dispel this notion.
31 Some people from the radical wing of the protest movement continued to demand a presidium government. These people were drawn from eleven organizations and were grouped under the umbrella organization called the Committee of United Students (Komite Mahasiswa Bersatu, KMB). They frequently had violent encounters with the military during their protests ("Dozens Injured in Violent Clash Between Students and Troops," The Jakarta Post March 5, 1999).
33 Observation at meetings.
corruption and human rights abuses, and Golkar should be dissolved. Protesters also demanded that the constitution be completely rewritten, but they were divided over how and by whom this should be done. These protests were, however, smaller in size and more infrequent than they had been around the time of the Special Session.

Both the moderate and radical wings of the protest movement chose not to get involved in the detailed negotiating taking place over the three political laws. The moderates demanded that free and fair elections take place but did not take the time to figure out what laws might best support this goal. The radical wing was too badly divided on the question of supporting the elections to become bogged down in details of the political laws, which were not significant in their view. Some students were organizing themselves to demand that civil servants be neutral and that the military get no seats in the Legislature; however, without central coordination, the protests were not of the same scale as had been witnessed during the Special Session.

Despite splintering of the protest movement and the lack of activity by the moderate student leaders, the protests that continued and the threat of more protests helped to force concessions from the regime during negotiations over the three political laws. The regime knew that people would take to the streets again in massive numbers if the

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35 The slogan of the radical movement was “reformasi tuntas” (thorough reform). The problem was that, in their view, only a presidium government would have the neutrality necessary to rewrite the constitution.

36 NGOs also played a minimal part in the debate over the political laws. NGOs were small in number and size, but several had legal expertise and could have participated more vocally in making demands in regard to the details of the transition. Most of the leaders of the NGOs were in agreement with the moderate student leaders that social unrest was non-productive for the transition and refrained from actively participating in raising public awareness on issues in the political laws (interview: Ifikal Kasim, a leader in the NGO, Elasam, April 14, 1999). They did, however, offer input during the Legislature’s committee hearings.
elections were deemed to be unjust or if they did not occur on schedule. The fear of this happening and the threat of national disintegration induced the regime not to use their official position of power to create laws that were not acceptable to the opposition or to society. The focus of political change, however, remained narrowly defined due to the opposition elite’s failure to use the protest movement to press for more far-reaching political change.

6.2.2. Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict and Separatist Demands

While peaceful protests dissipated and became more divided, inter-ethnic and religious conflict and separatist demands increased during the period of negotiating the details of the transition. On January 19, 1999, violence broke out between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, an island in the eastern Indonesian province of Maluku (the Moluccan archipelago). This violence would spiral and engulf several of the islands in the region and continue into the post-transitional period. The following month, inter-ethnic violence erupted in West Kalimantan between the indigenous Dayaks and migrant Madurese. In East Timor, pro-integration militia began terrorizing the province in anticipation of a referendum on autonomy. In Aceh, violence surrounding demands for secession increased.37

Inter-ethnic and religious communal violence and separatist demands have many causes that are beyond the scope of this work, but the failure of local grievances to be channeled into the negotiating process taking place in Jakarta partly explains why violence surrounding communal conflict and separatist demands increased dramatically.

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37 "Violence Intensifies in Aceh," The Jakarta Post April 1, 1999.
during the transitional period. The people involved in ethnic, religious, and separatist violence were also sending a signal to Jakarta that they did not want a return of Jakarta’s power over them. Many people in the outer islands had long resented a Jakarta-based regime ruling over them and blamed neglect and Java-centric policies for many of their current problems. Ethnic and religious tensions were exacerbated by the transmigration policy of Suharto’s regime.38 Separatist demands were fueled by the central government, which was dominated by the Javanese, taking most all of the money earned from the export of natural resources found on the outer islands.39

The three leading figures of the opposition elite were all Javanese. They (with the partial exception of Amien) largely ignored the grievances of people in the outer islands.40 Ironically, Habibie was the national level figure who most supported the rights of non-Javanese groups, but his association with Suharto’s regime and prime desire to continue to be president made him an unacceptable leader.41 With no prospects for having grievances taken up by the national level players involved in the transition, and with the authority of the state weakened, local people began to take matters into their own hands.

Inter-religious violence first broke out in Ketapang, West Jakarta. Fourteen Christian Ambonese were brutally killed and 22 churches burned. This was followed by a

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40 Much ado was made by Wahid of the threat of national disintegration, but he then blamed the threat on elite figures who were provoking violence and ignored the grievances held by the local people. The leading opposition figures also met with Wiranto in an apparent attempt to discuss the nation’s disintegrating social fabric, but the discussion concluded that the violence was due to unnamed elite individuals who were trying to derail the reform movement (“Wiranto Meets Opposition to Control Unrest: Marzuki,” The Jakarta Post Jan. 26, 1999). The meeting was more of a photo opportunity than anything and failed to address the underlying reasons for the cycles of violence.
41 Habibie’s mother was Buginese and father was Javanese. He was born and raised in South Sulawesi.
retaliatory attack in Kupang, West Timor where mosques and Muslim-owned property were damaged. A group of unidentified young men was said to have started the violence in Jakarta, but analysts also point to tensions between the minority Christian and the majority Muslim communities.

Violence between Muslims and Christians began on Jan 19, 1999 in Ambon, Maluku. The violence began with a dispute between a Christian public transportation driver and a Muslim passenger. It quickly spread and neighborhoods began to fight one another with crude weapons. Places of worship were burned. The violence continued to spiral and engulfed surrounding islands throughout the province. It has not yet abated.

In Sambas, West Kalimantan, violence broke out between the indigenous Dayaks and migrant Madurese on February 22, 1999. Sino-Indonesians and Malays later joined the Dayaks in opposing the Madurese. The violence engulfed four districts in the province and would later spread to other provinces in Kalimantan. The violence in both Maluku and Kalimantan brought the death of thousands of people and displaced hundreds of thousands to refugee camps.

It was rumored that the violence in Ambon and elsewhere throughout the country was instigated by individuals from elite political and military circles who wanted to create

46 The violence in both places was particularly brutal. In Kalimantan, victims' heads were put on stakes and marched through the streets. In Maluku, whole families were murdered and dismembered.
social turmoil as an excuse to call off the elections. These conspiracy theories usually pointed the finger at segments of the military in alliance with Suharto’s family and individuals from the modernist Muslim faction of politics and the military. They are said to have sent provocateurs to regions throughout the archipelago to provoke communal violence. Other rumors lay the blame for the communal violence and rioting on the communists who were purported to still be lurking in the shadows waiting to take over the government.

These conspiracy theories cannot be proven, but even if true, they alone are not a sufficient explanation for the violence. Although elite manipulation of the violence once it began exacerbated the situation, locally based grievances need to be taken seriously in order to understand the origins of the violence. With the power of the repressive regime slipping away, long pent up grievance could emerge. However, no national level figures came forth who voiced the demands of people in the outer islands in the widely dispersed archipelago.


48 Wiranto himself said that the communal violence was being caused by elite provocateurs who did not want elections to take place (“ABRI Sends Special Team to Ambon,” The Jakarta Post March 8, 1999). Wiranto is purported to have said that “only Suharto is able to restrain them [the elements in the military creating social turmoil]” “Suharto – Part II,” AsiaWeek Feb. 12, 1999.


50 For example, Ambon had a population divided approximately in half between Christians and Muslims for many years, with the Christians slightly outnumbering the Muslims. The Christians had been favored for government appointments and had dominated the economy. However, in the late Suharto years, many Muslims began moving to Ambon, mostly from Sulawesi and Java. Suharto had shifted his favor to the Muslims and enabled them to dominate the local government by the time that he was forced from power. Muslims were also overtaking the economy and social fabric of the island due to their sheer numbers in the cities. Resentment flared on both sides as the two communities fought for political, economic, and social dominance (International Crisis Group, December 19, 2000, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku).
The lack of representation and refusal by the leading figures of the opposition movement to discuss concerns of people in the outer islands also fueled the growing momentum of separatist movements. The exclusion of provincial demands from the transition negotiations combined with the weakening of the regime and military resulted in separatist groups increasing their activities during the transitional period. Little attempt was made by the players who were involved in elite negotiations over the course of the transition to draw separatist groups into the negotiations or to redesign the existing political institutions so that the provinces and the multiplicity of cultures and islands would have some input into the policy making process in the future.

The one decision that was made in recognition of demands for separatism was widely criticized by members of the opposition, regime, and military. Habibie surprised many people by announcing at the end of January 1999 that he was working on a plan to give East Timor the choice to become an autonomous province within Indonesia or to secede. This announcement gave hope to other separatist movements, especially in Aceh and Irian Jaya, that they could receive the same opportunity.

Following East Timor's decision to secede, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, many politicians and individuals decried the loss of territory. The Indonesian military organized large-scale violence in the province. The political elite made it clear that no

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51 This decision was made not primarily out of sympathy for the East Timorese but because of a desire to please the international community and Habibie’s belief that he would be remembered fondly for ridding the country of the East Timor problem (interview, Jimmy Asshiddiqie, a leading advisor to Habibie, July 15, 1999).

52 International Crisis Group, Dec. 7, 2000, Aceh: Escalating Tension. Separatist demands also rose in provinces other than Aceh and Irian. Riau produces more than half of the country’s oil output and demanded to receive more money from this natural resource. A group of scholars and students in Riau threatened to promote secession if the government did not give the province at least 10% of the profits from the province’s oil exports (“Riau Declaration of Independence Canceled,” and “Separatism on the Rise,” The Jakarta Post March 16, 1999).
other province would be given the same opportunity as East Timor. Most all of the elite players from the opposition, military, and regime who were involved in negotiating the transition were staunch proponents of centralist policies. No matter who came to lead a new democratic government, it was not likely that complaints from the outer islands would be given more than superficial attention.

6.2.3. Grassroots Mob Action

Grassroots mob action that was separate from the above-described violence occurred with increasing frequency throughout the transition period. A variety of pent up grievances could now be vented because the power and authority of the regime and military had been severely weakened. The opposition elite, besides not providing a voice for ethnic, religious, and separatist demands, also did not voice the grievances and demands of many other people throughout society.

These issues included demands made by many of the students still protesting in the streets, as discussed above, and demands made by people who were not organized and therefore did not have an opportunity to engage in street protests. Many people from the lower classes were concerned with the issues of land rights, environmental damage, economic inequalities, and local abuses of power. With no organization or spokesperson through which they could participate in the transition negotiations, many people in society began to engage in forms of mob action.

For instance, in a vast number of villages across Java, but also throughout the archipelago, villagers burned the offices and homes of their village officials. They were

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taking vengeance on symbols of authority from Suharto’s regime. People also raided warehouses, damaged industrial and mining sites, and looted stores of Sino-Indonesians who were viewed as being disproportionately wealthy. Land was taken back that had been confiscated by individuals favored by Suharto. Thieves were burned or beaten to death with the police unable to intervene.\textsuperscript{54}

In one incident of mob rioting, which occurred in Karawang, West Java, thousands of people joined in looting and destruction that lasted for two days before the military could regain control over the area. The violence had been sparked by rumors that a policeman had beaten a local public transport driver for failing to pay for a trumped up traffic offense.\textsuperscript{55}

Instead of taking seriously the depth of local grievances against the corrupt power of the state, the opposition elite blamed these incidents on provocateurs sent to the region by elite individuals who wanted to create social unrest and thereby prevent the elections from being held. The disconnection between the opposition elite, who were negotiating the details of narrowly focused political laws in order to get themselves into power, and ordinary people, who were rising up and violently casting aside all symbols of power and wealth associated with the regime, was striking. The two sets of actors seemed to be worlds apart.


6.3. Opposition Elite

The opposition elite had agreed with the regime and military during the events surrounding the Special Session of the Assembly that they would not demand that the regime be replaced with a presidium government. Following the Special Session, the opposition elite adhered to this agreement and also did not place demands upon the regime or military for thorough reform of the political and military institutions that had underpinned Suharto's three decades long rule. Their moderation is one reason that the regime and military continued to agree that holding free elections was the best path to follow in order to solve the political and economic crisis.

The moderation of the opposition elite, however, had the negative consequence of failing to channel many demands emanating from society into the elite arena where they could be brought forward in negotiations. The disconnection between the opposition elite and much of society, despite the respect once given to them as national figures advocating reform, contributed to the chaos and violence described above. As the transition progressed, the opposition elite's failure to take up many demands resulted in the waning of the respect they had commanded as symbols of the reform movement.58

56 The opposition elite had also agreed with the regime and military, as stated in Chapter 5, that Suharto and members of the regime and military would not be tried if one of the opposition elite led the new government. This allayed some of the worst fears of the regime and military and made them more willing to accept the transition (interviews: Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Dec. 28, 1998; Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Secretary-General of the Dept. of Defense, Jan. 5, 1999; and Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, head of the military's fraction in the Assembly, Nov. 12, 1998).
57 These demands were dismissed by arguing that the "constitutional way" must be followed. The phrase began to be used to counter demands for a presidium government but continued to be used as an expression of moderation. For instance, Wahid repeatedly called for reducing mass mobilization and argued that demands should be made in a constitutional manner through the existing institution of the Legislature instead of in the streets or through acts of violence ("Gus Dur Meets with Wiranto to Discuss Nation's Problems," The Jakarta Post Oct. 12, 1998).
58 Even Megawati's supporters wondered why she remained silent instead of pressing for reforms (Di Mana Mega? Tajuk Feb. 5, 1999).
For example, even the moderate protesters were demanding that Suharto be brought to trial and that the military be removed from the legislature. The opposition elite was divided on the issue of the military, as is detailed below, and did not press the demand that Suharto be brought to trial. The opposition elite also did not attempt to have the constitution rewritten, political institutions revamped, or have military officers brought to trial on human rights abuses. The more radical demands, including completely removing the military from not only the Legislature, but also from the Assembly and dismantling the territorial command structure, were viewed by the opposition elite as unrealistic and as only causing trouble for the country. Most of society probably lay somewhere in between the moderate and radical sets of demands, but the opposition elite was far on the side of moderation.

Besides not representing many demands made through street protests, the leading opposition figures also did not voice communal grievances. They instead made hollow calls for national unity. The increasing incidents of grassroots mob action were

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59 Occasionally, Amien would state that Suharto should be tried, but this was for media consumption. He mostly argued that Suharto should return to the nation money that was wrongfully acquired. Wahid patronizingly told the protesters that they were acting emotionally and only causing trouble for the country by continuing to protest and demanding that Suharto be brought to trial ("Suharto in the Shadows," Time Feb. 8, 1999).

60 Megawati stated that the radical protesters' demands for a presidium government and the immediate withdrawal of the military from positions of political power were unrealistic and only added to the social turmoil that might induce the military to seize power (interview, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Nov. 8, 1999).

61 The demands of society at large are difficult to precisely know in the absence of survey data. Social demands, beyond those made by groups who chose to protest in the streets, must be inferred from observation, conversations, and the media. The numerous tabloids and magazines can be assumed to at least partially represent the views of society. The willingness of non-students to spontaneously join student led protests and the numerous incidents of grassroots mob action are other indications of social support for far-reaching reform. Intellectuals also voiced demands for substantial change to the constitution and political institutions through seminars and coverage in the media. Several articles a week could be found in the print media detailing changes that needed to be made to the country's institutions and constitution. See, for just one example, "Hak Prerogatif Presiden harus Dibatasi dan Diatur," Kompas August, 15, 1998.

62 For example, the three leading opposition figures met together with Wiranto at a neutral place, Wisma Yani, to present a united front against the outbreak of communal violence in Ambon, Kupang, and Jakarta which portended national disintegration. They had a picture taken of the group and claimed that they were
similarly viewed by the opposition elite as indicative of not having a legitimate government in power.\(^6\) They argued that holding free elections would help to alleviate the growing violent communal conflicts and grassroots mob action.\(^6\)

All three leading figures of the opposition were wary of the power of a highly mobilized society and did not want to radically alter the political or economic structure of the country.\(^6\) Their moderate character is why Suharto had allowed them to remain free.\(^6\) This partly explains their lack of will to press for more demands.

Another factor moderating the opposition elite was that they were all pursuing the presidency. The method of indirectly electing the president and the knowledge that no party was going to win a clear majority necessitated building a broad coalition at the elite level. Thus, despite the fact that some activists in the opposition parties saw the need for more institutional change and urged their leaders to take a more reformist stance, all three fighting to root out the elites who were organizing the violence. No mention was made of grievances held by the local communities ("Bahas Soal Bangsa," *Kompas* Jan. 25, 1999 and "Wiranto Calls Meeting on Violence," *The Jakarta Post* Jan. 25, 1999).

\(^6\) Even though many of these actions were committed by supporters of Megawati, especially in Java, she opposed these actions as being lawless and dangerous for the nation. She, and the other opposition elite, thought that when the government regained legitimacy through being democratically elected, the acts of lawlessness and violence would cease (interview, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Nov. 8, 1999).

\(^6\) Interviews: Sukmadewi, a long time leader in PDI-P and close friend of Megawati's, Oct. 4, 1999; Abdul Matori Jailil, head of PKB, Nov. 29, 1999; and Moeslim Abdurrahim, a leader in PAN, July 13, 1999.

\(^6\) Other opposition figures existed, but none had widespread support or were significant in determining the course of events. The bulk of party leaders were moderate. For example, 40 of the 48 parties contesting the 1999 general election were against substantial constitutional change ("Constitutional Change a Must," *The Jakarta Post* June 9, 1999).

\(^6\) Even though Amien had been the strongest opponent of Suharto in the years leading up to his fall, Amien did not advocate complete reform of the political institutions. Instead, he argued that it was time for Suharto to step aside, that corruption was destroying the country, and that the military was too repressive (Speech given by Amien to the Univ. of Muhammadiyah graduating class of 1997, Ciputat, Jakarta, June 1997).
leading opposition figures either remained or became more conservative as the transition progressed.67

The opposition elite also argued that it was best not to evoke debate on contentious issues because this would exacerbate differences within society and differences among themselves. The opposition elite claimed that the demands that they and society could unite behind were minimal. Issues deemed to be too contentious for debate included changing the constitution, substantially changing the political institutions, discussing the role of Islam in the state, shifting to a federalist system, seriously debating the role of the military in the country’s politics and society, and voicing communal grievances.

Megawati was the most conservative and strongly opposed any tampering with the constitution that her father, Sukarno, had used to rule.68 She also did not want to demand that the military completely give up its dual role that provided justification for its involvement in governing society. Wahid was similarly conservative. Amien held the most reformist views of the opposition elite. He wanted to discuss the constitution,

67 PAN had many party activists who urged more reform, especially in an attempt to include outer island and communal grievances into the negotiating process (see for example, Cornelis Lay, a PAN activist, “Tapping Case Reveals Rifts in Political Elite: Amien,” *The Jakarta Post* March 2, 1999). Leaders and close aides in other parties saw the need for more reform but were reluctant to promote rapid change. For instance, Hasyim Muzadi, a leading figure in NU and close political advisor to Wahid, cited the lack of institutional reform to be a prime reason that the country would have trouble consolidating democracy. He, however, felt that all factions of the political and military elite, including the status quo, should be accommodated in an attempt to build a social pact that would prevent factions of the elite from provoking social unrest. This accommodative approach would necessarily result in the moderation of demands (interview, Hasyim Muzadi, Jan. 25, 1999).

68 Similar to Megawati’s stance of not changing the Constitution of 1945 was her support for retaining the unitary and centralist nature of the state. This pitted her against any suggestion of moving to a federal system in which provinces would have more power. She also strongly opposed allowing East Timor to hold a referendum on the question of whether or not to secede from Indonesia (interview, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Nov. 8, 1999 and Kwik Kian Gie, a senior leader in PDI-P, “Rethinking the E. Timor Solution,” *The Jakarta Post* Feb. 24, 1999).
federalism, and many other issues, but he was concerned that these issues would divide 
the opposition and possibly obstruct the primary goal of free general elections.69

All significant opposition elite members argued that more complete reform could be 
discussed after a democratically elected government was formed and that the first 
objective must be to hold free elections. They agreed with the regime and military that 
rewriting three political laws would be sufficient to enable the holding of free elections. 
The opposition elite’s demands vis-à-vis the regime and military revolved around the 
rewriting of the three political laws. Three issues were especially contentious during the 
rewriting of these laws. A detailed discussion of the elite level negotiating surrounding 
these issues is given below.

The potential power of the opposition movement is seen through the fact that the 
opposition elite was able to force the regime and military to concede on each of the three 
main disputed issues in the laws. If the opposition elite had been willing to press for 
more reforms and to harness the chaotic mass mobilization through representing the 
mass-based demands, then perhaps many problems the country is currently facing in 
attempting to consolidate democracy could have been warded off. Instead, the opposition 
elite focused solely on moderate demands involved in the rewriting of the three political 
laws. The window of opportunity for making significant institutional reform that was 
present during the period of negotiating the details of the transition was lost.

69 Amien stated publicly that he thought the nation should hold a dialogue on the issue of federalism and 
even planned on including it in his party’s platform (“Amien Launches ‘Modern’ Party,” The Jakarta Post 
Aug. 24, 1998). He was met with strong objections from both Megawati, Wahid and pundits in the media. 
Due to the criticism he received and threats from Megawati and Wahid that they would not remain in a 
reformist coalition with him if he pursued his questioning of the fundamentals of the state, Amien dropped 
the issue. (interview, Faisal Basri, Secretary-General of PAN, July 23, 1999).
6.3.1. Demands in Regard to the Three Political Laws

As discussed above, the demands made by the opposition elite in regard to the three political laws included three specific points besides the general demand that the laws allow for the holding of free and fair elections. Civil servants should not be allowed to join or actively campaign for political parties. The electoral system should be proportional at the provincial level. The military should reduce its reserved seats in the Legislature. The opposition forces won all three demands.

The opposition figures were united on the first two issues. They held varying opinions on the third issue with Megawati and Wahid accepting the draft laws’ recommendation that the military have its legislative seats reduced to 55. Amien and PPP wanted the seats eliminated or reduced further. The opposition elite stated their demands, especially in regard to the first two issues, and were consulted privately by members of the regime, representing both Habibie and Golkar. It was PPP, however, that became the vital component for achieving the demands through its presence in the Legislature.

PPP played a critical role in opposing Golkar’s attempts to manipulate the legislation governing the elections, political parties, and the Legislature and Assembly. PPP was in the Legislature because it had been one of the parties allowed to exist under Suharto. During the period of negotiating the three political laws, PPP clearly became an opposition party. Although PPP was vastly outnumbered by Golkar, the party was able

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70 Public input was heard on the political laws via public hearings held by the Legislative commission set up to debate the bills. NGOs and small parties used this opportunity to give their input (interview, Ifikal Kasim, Dec. 5, 1999). The larger parties participated but preferred to do their negotiating behind the scenes and in private (interview, Rizal Panggabean, a PAN activist, March 1, 1998).

71 PPP had never wholeheartedly accepted Suharto’s ruling directives, but the party had been silenced and co-opted by Suharto so that it rarely opposed him or his policies. The ability of PPP to transform itself from a Suharto controlled party to an independent opposition party was uncertain until they took a leading role in the negotiation of the three political laws.
to bring publicity to the attempts of Golkar to manipulate the laws, especially in regard to the three above-mentioned issues.

PPP was also able to use its position in the Legislature to prevent Golkar from maneuvering behind closed doors to obtain consensus and passage of drafts that were beneficial to Golkar.\textsuperscript{72} Frequent consultations took place between PPP and the opposition figures, especially Amien, about what was and was not acceptable to the opposition.\textsuperscript{73} PPP, representing the demands of the opposition forces, held firm on all three demands, especially the first two, and prevented Golkar from obtaining a consensus. If Golkar wanted to have drafts they liked passed, a vote would have to be called.

When it looked as if Golkar was going to call a vote as the deadline for passing the legislation neared and no agreements had been reached, PPP boycotted the plenary session.\textsuperscript{74} This boycott made it clear that although Golkar held the most seats in the Legislature and could therefore legally press their will on details about how the transition would proceed, the opposition would not accept the political laws if they were forced through the legislative process by Golkar.

The civil servant issue was the most contentious of the three issues. The original draft of the law on political parties disallowed civil servants to become party members. As described below in the regime section, Golkar tried to strike this provision from the draft and caused the bills to be held up at the State Secretariat (Akbar Tanjung’s office). When

\textsuperscript{72} During Suharto’s rule, all legislation was decided through fraction heads in the Legislature discussing it until they all agreed on the issues. Votes were never taken and dissenting opinions were rarely voiced.

\textsuperscript{73} Interviews: Moeslim Abdurrahim, July 13, 1999 and Djufrie Asmoredjo, head of PPP’s fraction in the special committee hearing debate on the political laws, Feb. 24, 1999.

Akbar lost in his attempt to change the draft before it was submitted to the Legislature, he hoped to get the clause stricken during the legislative committee hearings.

The opposition elite and PPP demanded that the only way to ensure civil servants’ neutrality was through not allowing them to join any political party or to participate in any political party activities. This law would hurt Golkar the most since most of Golkar’s leading members came from the bureaucracy at the national and local level. Golkar therefore made the civil servant issue its main priority, ahead of the issues of the electoral system or the military seats.

The opposition elite were united in their demand for civil servant neutrality. They insisted that they would not view the elections as free and fair if civil servants were allowed to participate in political party activities. This was due to the long standing tie between Golkar and the bureaucracy that had been used by Suharto to ensure Golkar victories in elections. All three main figures of the opposition elite agreed that the legitimacy of the election results would be questioned if civil servant neutrality were taken out of the law on political parties.

Golkar attempted to make a deal with the opposition that would exchange Golkar’s support for the opposition’s demand that the electoral system be proportional representation at the district level or that military seats be drastically cut. PPP, with the

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75 Observation of sessions held by the special committee on the political laws (Panitia Klausus - Panaus) in the Legislature. See also, “House Urged to Rule out ABRI’s Voting Rights,” The Jakarta Post Jan. 14, 1999.

76 This unanimity was despite the fact that at least four opposition party heads would have to relinquish their civil service jobs, which included teaching at state universities. These four leaders were: Amien Rais (head of PAN), Yusril Ihza Mahendra (head of PBB), Nurmahmudi Ismail (head of PK), Sri Bintang Pamungkas (head of PUDI) (“Empat Ketua Partai Harus Berhenti Sebagai PNS,” Kompas Jan. 30, 1999).

77 Interviews: Sutppta, head of PDI-F’s East Java branch and close associate of Megawati’s family, Dec. 9, 1999; Choirul Anam, head of PKB’s East Java branch and a prominent leader in NU Jan. 19, 1999; and Faisal Basri, July 23, 1999.
unanimous backing of the opposition elite and protest groups, stood firm in its demand for a neutral civil service and for a provincial level proportional representative electoral system. No deals could be made to change these demands.

Golkar legally could have won its central demand that civil servants be allowed to remain party members if they called a vote. However, Golkar was reluctant to follow this route due to the media exposure of the debates and the likelihood that the laws would not be accepted by the opposition or public. Without acceptance, the elections would not be deemed fair and a legitimate government could not be formed. Golkar was therefore forced to concede the civil servant issue, as is detailed in the regime section.

The second contentious issue in the draft laws was the electoral system. The opposition elite demanded that the country continue to use the proportional representation system at the provincial level. This system had been used throughout Suharto’s reign. The opposition elite made this demand not so much because they thought it would benefit them, although it would benefit small parties, but because they thought that Golkar would be advantaged by the district level plurality system proposed in the draft laws. Many people in the opposition claimed that the government had been behind the Team of 7’s decision to use the district level system and that they were trying to “rig” the election to benefit Golkar.

While obtaining an electoral system that would be advantageous to Golkar was an important part in Golkar’s strategy for performing well in the elections, Golkar, at the time of Team 7’s writing of the drafts, was in favor of the provincial proportional

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representation system.\textsuperscript{79} This was mostly out of ignorance and the belief that the system that had brought them to power election after election must be the best. It was only after an independent company was hired to analyze the party’s strengths and consider all the factors affecting electoral outcomes that Golkar changed its view to preferring a district level “first past the post” system.\textsuperscript{80}

The opposition was correct to point out that Golkar could fare better in a district level system because they had a more developed organizational network at the local level than did any other party. If only one seat were allocated to a district (in effect a plurality system) then Golkar would have a good chance of winning a lot of districts across the archipelago. In contrast, a provincial level proportional system would enable small parties to get seats based on the percentage of their votes across the province.

Once the advantages to Golkar of the district level system became known, Golkar tried to appear to be compromising during debate in the committee hearings on the drafts by offering to use a proportional representation system but at the district level.\textsuperscript{81} This would have in effect functioned the same as a plurality system due to 260 out of 310 districts having enough population for only one representative.\textsuperscript{82} This plan of Golkar’s was thwarted through public outcry and the opposition elite’s firm stance that nothing but proportional representation at the provincial level be used.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{79} Interview, Agung Laksono, Oct. 23, 1998.
\textsuperscript{81} Observation of Pansus sessions.
\textsuperscript{82} At least 600,000 people were needed for more than one seat in a district ("House Divided on Type of PR Arrangement," \textit{The Jakarta Post} Dec. 4, 1998).
The third contentious issue was more divisive for the opposition elite. This issue was the number of seats to be reserved for the military in the Legislature.\textsuperscript{84} Ironically, some members of the opposition elite were willing to give the military more seats than were members of the regime.\textsuperscript{85} For instance, Megawati did not demand that the military significantly reduce the number of seats it held in the Legislature. She readily accepted the draft law figure of 55 seats.\textsuperscript{86} This was representative of her pro-military stance.

Wahid also was not firm on this issue and argued publicly that the military must be accommodated and was still needed in governance. Golkar, on the other hand, was willing to support a large reduction in the number of seats given to the military.

Amien and PPP were the most anti-military of the elite opposition forces. Both Amien and PPP were representatives of the Islamic community and this orientation had frequently put them at odds with the military. This history of distrust made Amien, PPP, and other Islamic groups strong advocates of reducing the military’s role in politics.

Amien argued that the military should not be given any seats. PPP preferred that the military not receive any legislative seats, but if they must, then the number should be as low as possible.

Even though Amien, PPP, and other Islamic figures were ideologically opposed to the military’s involvement in politics and publicly declared that the military should not have any seats in the Legislature, they privately accepted the fact that the military needed to be

\textsuperscript{84} It was decided at the SI MPR in Nov. 1998 that the military would retain some seats in the national and regional legislatures (Assembly Decree No. 14MPR/1998, article 6). The number was to be determined through the law on the structure and function of the Legislature and Assembly, which was one of the three political laws being debated in the Legislature.

\textsuperscript{85} The opposition elite did not protest, or barely mention, the seats set aside for representatives of social groups in the Assembly or the indirect selection of regional representatives. Amien stated that these seats were acceptable because they would be allocated in a manner more fair than in the past – through the provincial legislatures and through the KPU (“Mr. Moderate,” FEER Feb. 25, 1999).

\textsuperscript{86} Interview: Sutjipto, Sept. 9, 1999.
accommodated. Amien and PPP both eventually agreed that the military could retain some legislative seats, but pressed for a figure much lower than the 55 seats written into the draft laws. This figure was negotiated over during the hearings of the drafts.

Even after the military lowered the number to 40, PPP refused to accept the figure. The military then lowered the figure to 38 and said that the military could not go any lower. PPP still refused to accept the figure and demanded that not more than 15 seats be given to the military. This demand was bolstered by protests in the streets demanding a complete withdrawal of the military from politics. The three political laws were in danger of not being passed by the Jan. 29th deadline due to deadlock.

PPP and the leading figures of opposition finally made a deal with Habibie to accept the 38 military seats in exchange for Habibie issuing a government regulation prohibiting civil servants from participating in political party campaigning. The military agreed to publicly declare support for the opposition's demands in regards to the election system. A deal was reached on Jan. 26th and Habibie issued the decree on Jan. 27th, the day before the deadline for the three political laws.

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89 Amien supported PPP efforts to reduce the military’s seats to 15 (“Amien Rais Datangi DPR: Dengarkan Rakyat,” Kompas Jan 26, 1999).
90 The most vital concern of the opposition was to have civil servant neutrality, but the issue of military seats had more emotional appeal to the protesters than did the other two main issues being debated. Members of the opposition elite refused to agree on the number of military seats and encouraged protests on the issue partly as a strategy to force concessions from the regime on the other issues (interviews: Djuftie Asmoredjo, Feb. 24, 1999 and Rama Pratama, April 19, 1999. See also, “Aturan Main Macet, Nasib Pemilu?” Tempo Feb. 1, 1999).
92 Habibie’s goal was to have the laws passed on time so that he would be viewed domestically and internationally as pro-reform. It was with this goal in sight that he pushed for settlement of the military seats issue as part of the agreement package.
226
PPP claimed that a few points in Habibie’s decree were not the same as had been agreed upon in negotiations. The main point of departure was that in the regulation issued by Habibie, civil servants were allowed to take a five-year leave of absence if they wanted to join and engage in party activities. PPP’s outcry forced Habibie to issue amendments to the original decree so that it adhered to the agreement struck between Habibie and the opposition.

The provision stating that civil servants were not allowed to join political parties was then dropped from the law being debated in the Legislature. Even though a government decree held less authority than a law passed through the legislature, the opposition was willing to accept Habibie’s decree, after he amended it, in place of legislation. They hoped to have the provision written into the law on political parties after the new government was formed.94 Essentially, the opposition won their demands on all three main points that were the subject of the most intense negotiations. Below, the bargaining positions of the other main actors, the military and the regime are discussed.

6.4. Military

The military was afflicted with many problems that worsened throughout the transitional period. It was in a defensive and weakened position after the massive protests during the Special Session of the Assembly that resulted in the deaths of 16 protesters.95 Wiranto’s name had been tainted by the killings and the military was frequently the target of unfavorable media reports and protests demanding its complete

withdrawal from politics, prosecution of officers, including Wiranto, on human rights abuses, and the dismantling of its businesses.

Internally, the military was beset by the increasing fragmentation of its command structure. The military had been divided under Suharto’s reign in order to keep it from posing a threat to Suharto’s single-handed rule. After Suharto left power, the military became even more factionalized as generals were freed from Suharto’s yoke to contest openly for positions within the military. Besides personal rivalries, a split between progressives and status quo supporters also became apparent. Wiranto tried to control the rivalries and balance the splits, but his leadership was criticized for lacking direction and strength. The military was left to slowly disintegrate in a period of intense social turmoil.

Factionalization within the military increased as a result of the military’s involvement in communal conflicts during the period following the Special Session of the Assembly. For instance, the military was called upon to stop the religious violence in the Moluccas. In attempting to quell the violence, the military was accused by both Muslims and Christians of helping the other side. Verification is difficult, but it seems that different units of the military became entangled with different sides of the conflict, depending

96 The status quo supporters were suspected of working with Suharto’s family to derail the elections and take control of the country. They were not concerned with the passage of the three political laws, just with creating conditions in society that would justify a military takeover (interviews: Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Dec. 8, 1998; Maj. Gen. Bimo, Dec. 20, 1998; and Hasyim Muzadi, Jan. 25, 1999).

upon who commanded the units. Similar entanglements took place in Kalimantan during the conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese.

Further weakening the military as an institution were reports that regional commanders were not always following orders from the military's central headquarters in Jakarta. At the local level, contrary to directives from Jakarta, the military was continuing to be involved in local affairs. They engaged in activities from illegal logging to controlling local governments, especially in the outer islands. Not all of the lower ranked officers believed in the reform movement and many wanted to take a harder line against protesters.

These local entanglements and the need for the military to spread itself thinly across the country in an effort to maintain law and order left the military too exhausted to attempt to control politics, beyond making basic demands. The increasing threat of national disintegration also frightened the military and highlighted the need for a legitimate government to come to power. The military was seriously concerned that it was not able to keep the country from spinning apart territorially and socially.

The above factors prevented the military from attempting to seize power directly through a coup or from exerting more control over the transition process. The military maintained a high degree of neutrality and did not support either the regime or any

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100 This was stated to me several times by military officers and by civilian political elites when explaining why the military should not be cornered by being pressed to relinquish all of its positions of power immediately (for example, interviews: Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Dec. 8, 1998; Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Dec. 28, 1995; and Jimly Ashiddiqie, July 15, 1999).


102 The military had reservations about the readiness of the country for democracy but accepted the transition as the only viable option at the moment. The military also wanted to move to the background of politics to prevent the corruption of the military as occurred under Suharto's rule (Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Dec. 8, 1998).
specific opposition leader during the transitional period except in the sense of supporting the right of the current regime to remain in power until free elections could be held. This neutrality was somewhat surprising judging from the military’s pervasive control prior to the transitional period, but the military perceived that the best course of action was to get a legitimate government in power.

Bringing a legitimate government to power through free elections did not, however, mean that the military was stepping completely out of politics. The military wanted to protect its privileged position as much as possible while simultaneously moving to the background of politics instead of being in the foreground. The military also did not want rapid change to government institutions or change to the constitution. The motto of gradual reform coexisted with the call for a legitimate government to come to power so that stability could be restored. The military’s demands vis-à-vis the three political laws are outlined below.

6.4.1. Demands in Regard to the Three Political Laws

The military stayed out of most of the negotiating over the three political laws except to make a few simple demands. First, the elections had to be free and fair. Despite some disaffected officers, the leadership of the military was in agreement with Habibie on this
point. Their agreement was mainly because the military knew that it could not contain
the massive protests that would break out if the elections were called off or rigged.104

The military leadership was not willing to favor Golkar and made it clear that it would
not support Golkar at the local level as it had done in the past under Suharto’s
directives.105 Retired officers had already joined other parties and leading active officers
in the military resented the military’s forced subordination to Golkar under Suharto’s
rule. They wanted to reclaim the position of the military as the independent “watch dog”
of the nation.106 This meant being free from any one political affiliation.107

On the first issue that was the subject of intense debate during consideration of the
three political laws, the military agreed with the opposition elite that civil servants should
be forced to be neutral.108 The military wanted more plurality in the circle of power and
therefore did not want Golkar to win an overwhelming victory.109 Golkar’s
disproportionate power was deemed threatening to the military because it set the
conditions for another sultan to replace Suharto.110 The military saw that its power would

104 Interviews: Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, head of territorial affairs in the military and a leading

105 Many officers at the local level, however, wanted to continue the military’s close ties with Golkar
because this relationship had benefited both Golkar and the military in the past (interviews: Harold
Crouch, a leading scholar on the Indonesian military and politics, Nov. 29, 1998 and Lt. Gen. Bambang
Yudhoyono, Nov. 18, 1998).

106 Many officers felt that the military’s lowest point in its history was when Feisal Tandjung, the
commander of the armed forces in the mid 1990s, wore Golkar’s yellow jacket during the campaign for the
1997 general elections. This symbolized the military’s subservience not only to Suharto, but also to Golkar

107 As discussed in the preceding chapter, the military’s prime concern was to prevent a civilian individual
or party from using it as a tool to uphold power. This concern reflected Indonesia’s history and was
different from many other countries making a transition to democracy. In Indonesia, the military as an
institution had not used politics to uphold its rule. Instead, a politician - Suharto, had used the military to
rule (interview, Kristiadi, Oct. 9, 1998).


110 The military wanted power to be dispersed among parties and political institutions because, “A
concentration of power in the past had created an authoritarian and corrupt government” (Lt. Gen. Hari
231
be enhanced by remaining free from the control of any one party or person. The military also wanted the election results to be accepted by the opposition and the public. If civil servants could use their positions to campaign for Golkar, then the election results would likely be questioned.\footnote{Sabarno, “Opportunities ‘still remain’ to Alter Political Bills,” The Jakarta Post Oct. 13, 1998. The centralization of power was cited by most all of the leading military officers interviewed as being a key problem that needed correction (For example, interview, Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, Nov. 18, 1998).}

On the second issue, the military ultimately decided to support the opposition’s demand that the electoral system be proportional at the provincial level. When the draft laws were originally being written by the Team of 7, the military agreed with the Team that the system should be plurality at the district level in order to force elected representatives to be more accountable to their constituents.\footnote{Interview, Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, Nov. 12, 1998.} However, the military had ambivalent feelings on the issue. When the opposition opposed the district level system, the military began to shift its support to the opposition’s demands partly out of fear that the elections would not be accepted as legitimate.

The final determinant that pushed the military to advocate using proportional representation at the provincial level came when the terms of Habibie’s decree on civil servant neutrality were being negotiated. Habibie agreed to issue a decree on civil servant neutrality, PPP agreed to 38 seats for the military, and the military agreed to publicly support the opposition’s demands on the electoral system.\footnote{Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono and the Armed Forces Commander, Wiranto, were the representatives of the military communicating with the Team of 7. Not all officers agreed on the issues (interviews: Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono, Nov. 18, 1998 and Ryaas Rashyid, Sept. 15, 1998).}

\footnote{The military was not in a position to block the opposition’s demands in regards to the electoral system, but their public support for the opposition’s demands would make it more difficult for Golkar to push through their version of the law.}
The military was less concerned about the electoral system than it was about forcing parties to be broadly based so that the number of parties would be limited. The military also demanded that the parties not be allowed to have any foundation other than Pancasila. The military did not want parties to be based on Islam. The military was forced to concede the Pancasila issue due to the firm demand by the opposition that parties be allowed to be based on Islam. In the final law passed by the Legislature, political parties would, however, be required to have branch offices in at least one third (in future elections, one half) of the country’s provinces and districts in order to be eligible to contest elections.

On the third issue of the reserved legislative seats for the military, the military was willing to negotiate but insisted that it must be allowed to keep a presence in the Legislature. These seats were viewed as critical by the military for keeping their hand in the formal political process. The military wanted to influence policy as it was being discussed. If the military had no say in the making of policy, then it might be forced to take over a government that was making unacceptable policy. This would institute a cycle of revolving civilian—military governments, as had been the case in much of Latin America.

114 Many leading military officers feared a government dominated by modernist Muslims who might try to impose their vision of an Islamic society/government on the country. This occurrence would necessitate military action against the government. The military was trying to pre-empt this situation (interviews: Lt. Gen. Hari Soeyono, Jan. 5, 1999; Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Dec. 8, 1998; and Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Nov. 12, 1998).

115 Interview, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Nov. 12, 1998. The military was not only demanding seats in the national Legislature, but also in the provincial and district level legislatures. The military, when Suharto fell, held 284 seats country-wide in the provincial legislatures and 148 seats in the district legislatures. This was 20% of the seats in those legislatures. Including the national legislative seats, the military held a total of 2, 507 seats in legislatures across the country (“Kurasi ABRI di DPR RI & DPRD,” Tempo Oct. 12, 1998). The large number made reassigning personnel if these seats were given up problematic.

116 The military did not want to be in a position where it was deemed necessary to end a civilian regime and the military did not yet trust society to make good choices through elections or the political elite to make
The military had asked the Team of 7 to give them 55 seats and the request was granted.\textsuperscript{117} The Team of 7 claimed that it was a political reality that the military must be accommodated.\textsuperscript{118} Once the public and the opposition elite began to protest the inclusion of reserved seats for the military in the draft laws, the military began assessing what was the minimum number of seats that it needed. The military lowered the figure to 40. When PPP still refused to agree to the number, this figure was then lowered to 38 and was stated to be the absolute lowest that the military would go.

The military deemed 38 seats to be necessary to function effectively in the Legislature because it was expected that there would be 9 commissions set up in the Legislature. The military wanted to have four representatives in each commission because this would allow it to sit on most all of the subcommittees. With two fraction leaders, the military needed 38 members.\textsuperscript{119}

Some dissension existed within the military on this issue. Some officers felt that the military did not need legislative seats to keep a hand in politics. The military still had its territorial command system that enabled it to remain involved in politics indirectly at the local level. It was argued by these officers that the visible presence in the national policy. The civilian politicians were eyed warily especially because it was not clear what many of them intended to do if they came to power. The modernist Muslims were the target of the most suspicion from the military (interviews: Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Nov. 12, 1998 and Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Jan. 5, 1999).

\textsuperscript{117} The Team of 7 had closer ties to the military than to Golkar. This was due to Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid (the minister of home affairs who supervised the Team of 7) being an active officer and the team being more closely aligned with Habibie than with Golkar. Rashyid and Gaffar had frequent communication with Lt. Gen. Bambang Yudhoyono and even with Wiranto (interviews: Ryaas Rashyid, Dec. 1, 1998 and Afan Gaffir, Dec. 2, 1998).

\textsuperscript{118} Interview: Andi Mallarangeng, Dec. 1, 1998.

\textsuperscript{119} "RUU Dengan "Timbal" Nyawa," \textit{Tajuk} Feb. 4, 1999 and interview, Maj. Gen. Amir Syarifudin, Feb. 3, 1999. The term "fraction" refers to \textit{fraksi}, which originated from the Dutch and refers to official groupings in the Legislature and Assembly. All representatives must belong to a \textit{fraksi}. The big parties and the military each form their own. Some of the small parties merge into one \textit{fraksi}. Each \textit{fraksi} has an official leader. One person fulfilled this role for both the Legislature and Assembly before the free elections of 1999. After that time, different leaders were chosen for the Legislature and Assembly.
and local legislatures only angered the public and was not critical to the military’s continued involvement in the country’s political development.

Wiranto had to compromise between the demands of these reformist officers and hard-line officers who were very leery about the whole reform process and wanted to give up as little power as possible. He agreed to reduce the number of military seats to the minimum required to have any impact on the legislative process but was not willing to completely forgo the military’s presence.¹²⁰

When the drafts had reached the point of stalemate in the Legislature, the military became worried that the bills would not be passed and that this would ignite more social unrest. Habibie’s efforts to break the deadlock through making an agreement with the opposition was therefore supported by the military. The military then pressured Golkar to accept the agreement and pass the bills.

6.5. Regime

Following the Special Session of the Assembly, splits within the regime became more pronounced. The most salient of these rifts was between President Habibie and Akbar Tanjung - the chairman of Golkar. Habibie had committed himself to holding free elections in exchange for the opposition elite’s support for the current regime until elections could be held. Habibie was aware that if he backed out of this agreement, then

¹²⁰ Besides wanting to retain a hand in national level policy making, the military wanted to maintain a presence in the local level legislatures because these legislatures chose the governors, mayors, and district heads who were frequently very powerful. At the time of the 1999 elections, half of the governors and 40% of the district heads were either active or retired military officers (“No Fear or Favour,” FEER Feb. 11, 1999).
massive protests would require equally massive repression in order to keep his regime standing.

For these reasons, and due to the belief that he would go down in history as a great man in Indonesia for bringing democracy to the country, Habibie resisted pressure from individuals inside the regime to cancel or indefinitely postpone the elections. Habibie also resisted pressure to “rig” the election laws so that Golkar would have a better chance at winning. Habibie’s strategy seemed to be to appear statesmanlike and obtain support from a variety of parties in order to be elected president by the new Assembly.121

This desire to allow free elections to be held without trying to ensure a Golkar victory put Habibie at odds with the chairman of Golkar, Akbar Tanjung. Akbar was not opposed to holding elections, but he wanted to use the regime’s remaining power to help ensure that Golkar fared well in the elections.122 The first instance of the differing views of Habibie and Akbar over how the transitional period should proceed was when the draft of the three political laws was submitted to the State Secretariat for inspection before being passed on to the Legislature for approval. Below, the positions in regard to the three political laws of both Habibie and Akbar’s factions in the regime are outlined.

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121 For instance, Habibie courted new parties, such as the PDR formed by one of his cabinet ministers, Adi Sasono. A leader of this party publicly declared that Habibie was not a leader of Golkar, but a statesman of the nation (“PDR Memandang Habibie Bukan Orang Partai Golkar,” Kompas May 1, 1999). Habibie hoped to use this party, PPP, and other Muslim parties to get support for his presidency (“Friction Among the Faithful,” FEER March 11, 1999).

122 Habibie was more reform-minded than Akbar. Akbar was concerned with protecting the interests of Golkar whereas Habibie’s main interest was in being legitimately elected president (Interviews: Abdul Gafur, Head of Golkar’s faction in the Assembly, Nov. 13, 1998; Umar Juoro, a leading advisor to Habibie, July 30, 1999; and Burhan Magenda, Oct. 18, 1998).
6.5.1. The Regime’s Divided Demands in Regard to the Three Political Laws

Akbar was state secretary in addition to being the head of Golkar. As state secretary, the draft laws had to pass through his government office before moving on to the Legislature. Akbar wanted several provisions in the laws quietly changed before the drafts were scrutinized by the public during the legislative phase. Habibie and Akbar’s differences became pronounced when the bills came to Akbar’s State Secretariat office. These differences centered on the provision in the law on political parties that enforced civil servant neutrality in the elections. The civil servant issue became the most contentious point of the three political laws.

Akbar was aware of the political reality that without the support of the bureaucracy or the military, Golkar would have a difficult time in the election. The military had already made it clear that their support would not be given to any party. Akbar pressed strongly for the retention of the right of civil servants to support a political party because he hoped that a significant number of civil servants would continue to support Golkar as they had in the past. Civil servants could then use their positions in the civil service to convince people to vote for Golkar. This was how Golkar had won the last six elections.

123 According to Agung Laksono, Golkar did not attempt to interfere in the drafting of the bills because this would have created a clash between fractions in the government. The Team of 7 was working under Syarwan Hamid, the minister of home affairs, who was a part of Habibie’s modernist Muslim faction of the government. Akbar, although a former head of the modernist Muslim group, HMI, was not a part of Habibie’s faction. He also did not have direct access to the Team, which reported to Syarwan Hamid and Habibie. Akbar thought that he and Golkar would have the power in the end to pass laws advantageous to Golkar because the bills had to pass through Akbar’s office and the Golkar dominated Legislature (interview, Agung Laksono, Oct. 23, 1998).

124 Akbar was more concerned with this issue than with any of the others (interview, Satya Widiayudha, a member of Golkar’s executive board, Nov. 11, 1998).

125 Interviews: Abu Hasan Sadzili, chairman of the special committee debating the political laws and a Golkar representative in the Legislature, March 6, 1999 and Slamet Effendi Yusuf, deputy chairman of Golkar and active in negotiations over the political laws, Dec. 1, 1999.
Habibie refused to agree to change the provision. Akbar was reportedly furious with Habibie and concluded that Habibie was politically naive to think that he could be elected president without relying mostly on Golkar.\textsuperscript{126} The problem was that Habibie’s idealism would bring down not only himself, but also Golkar.

The draft laws remained in Akbar’s office, the State Secretariat, with both Habibie and Akbar refusing to budge.\textsuperscript{127} It was only when the press got wind of the reason that the bills were two months late in being submitted to the Legislature that Akbar felt no option but to pass the bills on to the Legislature and attempt to get the provision changed there through political “horsetrading.”\textsuperscript{128} Habibie had no control over the legislative process.

Once in the Legislature, the bills came under public scrutiny and the opposition elite made clear their demand that the civil service be neutral in the election and that the provision disallowing them to become party members be upheld. Akbar tried to make deals with the opposition, through PPP, exchanging Golkar support for other opposition demands for the opposition’s support on the civil service issue. One such deal involved Golkar supporting the opposition’s demand that military legislative seats be drastically reduced. The leading figures of the opposition and PPP, however, refused to budge.\textsuperscript{129}

Even though Golkar constituted the overwhelming majority in the Legislature, Akbar did not want to resort to voting on the drafts in order to get what he wanted in the laws. The opposition elite would not accept this. They had already made it clear that they

\textsuperscript{126} Interview, Ekky Sjahrudin, a senior member of Golkar, Feb. 14, 1999.

\textsuperscript{127} Although the big issues, including the neutrality of civil servants, were not changed in the drafts while they were reviewed at the State Secretariat, many other provisions were changed. One important provision was that the regional representatives would not have to come from the regional legislatures as written in The Team of '7's draft. The number of regional representatives chosen by the local legislatures was also increased from 3 to 5. These changes were agreed upon by all sides.

\textsuperscript{128} Interview, Slamet Effendi Yusuf, Dec. 1, 1999.

\textsuperscript{129} Interviews: Abu Hasan Sadzill, March 6, 1999 and Djuffie Asmoredjo, Feb. 24, 1999.
would mobilize mass support against any attempts by Golkar to control the rewriting of
the draft laws. Without a vote and without agreement, the bills looked as if they would be delayed. This would delay the election indefinitely.131

The second significant issue in the drafts of the three political laws was the electoral system. Golkar, despite originally advocating a proportional representation system, had changed course, believing that it could win a majority or plurality in many districts throughout the archipelago.

Golkar was not involved in writing the original draft of the law on elections. The Team of 7 had different reasons, described above, for choosing a plurality district level system, but because the laws had been drafted by a government assembled team and because the “district system,” as the plurality proposal came to be called, favored Golkar, the public perceived that Golkar had manipulated the drafts to advantage itself. In order to appear fair and in an attempt to appease the opposition, Golkar offered a compromise system consisting of proportional representation at the district level.132

This system, upon examination, would act almost identically to a plurality system because more than half of the nation’s districts had only enough population for one seat.

130 Akbar was concerned not only with the opposition elite not accepting the laws if they were forced through by vote, but he also was keeping an eye turned to post-election coalitions. He knew that Golkar would need to form a coalition and therefore did not want to worsen the public perception of Golkar, which would frighten off potential coalition partners, or anger potential partners (interview, Jimly Assahidijie, July 15, 1999).

131 It is purported, but difficult to confirm, that one of Akbar’s plans was to have the bills remain under discussion past the deadline even if this meant delaying the elections. He thought that this delay due to the lack of agreement would pressure the opposition elite and PPP to accept Golkar’s demands in regards to the civil servant issue in order to get the bills passed and hold elections (interview, Ali Marwan Hanan, April 23, 1999). Another plan being considered by Golkar was to drop the clause from the bill and agree to discuss it in another piece of legislation. This was not acceptable to the opposition because it would mean that civil servants were still allowed to join parties until more legislation, which would likely never be made, were passed (interview, Faisal Basri, July 23, 1999).

132 "Parties United in Demand to Keep Proportional System," The Jakarta Post Nov. 24, 1998 and observation of committee hearings.

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The press was slow to realize this, but members of the opposition elite were suspicious of any Golkar trickery and demanded that the system be kept as it had always been—proportional representation at the provincial level. The opposition was not willing to make any concessions on the issue of the electoral system, just as it was not willing to compromise on the neutrality of civil servants. Golkar was backed into a corner making no headway with negotiations.

In regards to the third contentious issue—military seats in the Legislature—Golkar did not have a strong opinion. Since their partnership with the military had ended, there was no advantage to Golkar from a military presence in the Legislature. Golkar tried to sound reformist and tried to make a deal with the opposition by initially demanding very few seats for the military. This changed as negotiations revealed that the opposition would not exchange Golkar’s support for few military seats in exchange for dropping the civil servant issue or agreeing to Golkar’s proposed electoral system. Golkar’s stated position on the number of acceptable military seats went from 10 to 25 to 40. PPP, bolstered by public opinion and the demands of the leading opposition figures, refused to waver from its demands on either of the first two issues. It was also not willing to accept the military’s demand for 38 seats.

With deadlock in the Legislature over the above three issues, Habibie intervened by making an agreement with PPP and the leading opposition figures. Habibie issued a

133 Once it was clear that their strategy of trading support on issues with PPP was not effective, Golkar acknowledged that it was willing to accept the military’s demand for 38 seats (interview, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Oct 3, 1999). At this point, Akbar reversed strategy and hoped that Golkar’s support for military seats would get the military to support Golkar’s positions on the first two issues, but this never materialized (interview, Andi Mattalatta, head of Golkar’s faction in the Legislature, March 5, 1999).
government decree on Jan. 27th, the day before the deadline for the bills to be passed into law, stating that civil servants were not allowed to join or participate in activities of political parties including campaigning. In exchange for Habibie's decree, PPP agreed to the military's 38 legislative seats.

Habibie made the agreement, which went counter to the interests of Golkar and infuriated Akbar, for the same reasons that he did not allow Akbar to omit the civil servant clause while the bill was held up at the State Secretariat. Habibie wanted to appear to be a statesman and hoped to gain the support of other parties in addition to Golkar. He also felt powerless to oppose the opposition and feared that the elections would not be deemed fair if the regime forced its will on the revision of the laws. If the bills were delayed due to the deadlock, then the regime would likely be accused of attempting to manipulate the legislation in order to ensure a Golkar victory and would be faced with massive demonstrations.

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135 Habibie first issued a decree, Government Regulation No. 5/1999, that in general blocked civil servants from participating in party activities but left the loophole open of allowing them five years of paid leave from their position, with the agreement of their supervisor, to pursue party activities ("Deal Struck on civil Servants," The Jakarta Post Jan. 27, 1999). PPP and the opposition elite insisted that they had agreed to only one year of paid leave and that the civil servant could not automatically return to his or her old position, but would be posted wherever there was an opening. This made the prospect of leaving a civil service job to pursue party activities unlikely for anyone except those who hoped to get a seat in the Legislature or some other important party posting. Habibie, pressured by the opposition, agreed to revise his decree and on Jan. 29th issued a revision that was in accord with the demands of the opposition ("Some Questions Remain," The Jakarta Post Jan. 28, 1999; "PAN Leaders Say Goodbye to Their Civil Servant Jobs," The Jakarta Post Jan. 29, 1999; "Calls to Amend Political Laws," The Jakarta Post Jan. 30, 1999; and "follow-up Directives for Civil Servants Issued," The Jakarta Post Feb. 9, 1999).

136 Habibie's direct negotiations with PPP undercut Akbar's negotiating strategies and solidified the rift between Habibie and Akbar. Akbar blamed Habibie for his humiliating loss on all major points in the legislation. For instance, Akbar had hoped, as a final negotiating strategy, to trade PPP a greatly reduced number of military seats for Golkar's proposed electoral system. With PPP's agreement to support the military's 38 seats as part of the deal for Habibie to issue the civil servant decree, this plan of Golkar's was foiled. The only issue then left was the electoral system, but Golkar had no bargaining chips left with which to trade for support of its proposed system (interview, Abu Hasan Sadzill, March 6, 1999).

137 Interview, Jimly Aishiddiqie, July 15, 1999.
Golkar’s defeat on the issues most important to it in the political laws, despite its overwhelming predominance in the Legislature, was demoralizing for the party. Not only was the party used to getting its way, but the party would also be badly hurt by not being able to use civil servants to drum-up electoral support. Many Golkar leaders throughout the party’s branches were civil servants who could not risk losing their posting by taking a leave of absence to remain a party member. These branch leaders would have to quit the party.\(^{138}\)

A casual observer might make the mistake of thinking that the regime was in control of the process due to its apparent control over the state institutions throughout the transition. However, the powerlessness of Akbar to get what he wanted for Golkar in the three political laws, despite the fact that the laws were officially created by the government and needed passage of the Golkar dominated Legislature, shows how weak the regime was during the transitional period.

The fact that the scope of reforms was limited was due not to the power of the regime and military, but rather to the moderation of the opposition elite. Mass mobilization continued to keep the regime and military from reconsolidating power and enabled all significant demands made by the opposition elite to be met, as discussed throughout this chapter.

\(^{138}\) Often over half of Golkar’s provincial and district level executive boards were civil servants (“PAN Leaders Say Goodbyes to Their Civil Servant Jobs,” *The Jakarta Post* Jan. 29, 1999). In Jember, East Java, for instance, 29 of Golkar chapter executives resigned from their positions in the local Golkar branch (“Parties Urged to Sue Government over New Ruling,” *The Jakarta Post* Feb. 1, 1999). Many of these Golkar officials chose to quit Golkar because they could not take the risk of losing their current posting and receiving an unfavorable posting after their political activities were finished. Only people who expected a high posting in the new government or a seat in the Legislature or Assembly were likely to risk taking a leave of absence from their civil service job.
The regime and military fought for ways to maintain their privileged position of power and simultaneously hold elections that were accepted by society and by the international community. As it became apparent that the opposition would not accept their attempts to control the rewriting of the political laws, the regime and military (including Golkar) conceded to the demand for free elections. The moderation of the opposition elite, although it left many problems unresolved, eased some of the regime and military anxiety over what type of post-election government would be formed. This contributed to their concessions on many of the negotiated points in the three political laws.

6.6. Economic and International Context of the Above Events

6.6.1. Economic Crisis

Throughout the period of negotiating the details of the transition, the economy continued to languish. Although the rupiah had risen significantly from its low point of less than Rp17,000 to US$1 in early 1998, and stabilized around Rp7,000 to US$1, the economy remained at a virtual standstill due to chaos in the banking sector and the bankruptcy of many conglomerates.139 The government did not have enough money coming in to meet its expenses and had to rely on international aid to finance its budget.140

The people hardest hit by the economic crisis were the rich who had investments in the domestic stock market, relied on government contracts, or owned a large company.141

141 For example, Lance Castles, "The Economic Crisis Revisited," The Jakarta Post April 1, 1999 makes this argument.
This meant that many people in the regime were in danger of losing vast fortunes if the economy were not revived. The poor performance of military-owned businesses also hurt the military’s capacity to finance itself. This factor of personal and military financial loss was significant in pushing the regime and military elites to hold elections that were accepted as free in order to end the political crisis and restore international confidence in the country as a place for safe investments. 

6.6.2. International Pressure

The international community pressured Habibie to make several types of reforms. Most importantly, international actors wanted a legitimate government to come to power and saw free elections as the only way for that to happen. Habibie was also encouraged to make further reforms, especially to eradicate corruption from state institutions and from the banking sector so that the economy could function more efficiently. While strengthening the independence of institutions after three decades of sultanic rule was a lengthy process, holding free elections was a visible sign of progress that could be accomplished in the near future.

142 The significance of this factor was repeatedly told to me (for example, interviews: Syafii Anwar, editor of the Muslim magazine, *Ummat*, Nov. 17, 1998; Jimly Asshiddiqie, July 15, 1999; and Faisal Basri, July 23, 1999).

143 The IMF, in a report issued on Indonesia (“Public Information Notice” No. 99/33, April 13, 1999), states, “the macroeconomic situation in Indonesia will remain difficult until the political transition is further advanced.” The international community applied pressure for specific reforms related to the political transition, including pressuring Habibie to ensure that civil servants were not used by Golkar in the elections (“No Fear or Favour,” *FEER* Feb. 11, 1999).

144 The weakness of institutions, and the corruption that this bred, due to domination by Suharto was viewed by the World Bank to be a key cause of the economic crisis and the area that needed the most sustained effort in order to repair the economy (Dennis de Tray, World Bank Country Director for Indonesia, “World Bank’s Lessons from Indonesian Economic Crisis,” *The Jakarta Post* April 14, 1999).
Habibie and many other people in leadership positions in the regime felt that they had no choice but to hold free elections. The economic crisis forced the country to seek large amounts of international aid, as detailed in the previous chapter. If democratizing moves were not made, then this aid could be withheld. The resulting pressure helped to keep the regime on track with its promise to hold free elections and helped to keep the military at bay.

Specifically, the international community attempted to provide technical advice to the regime and opposition elite while debating the three political laws. For example, several organizations came to Jakarta after Suharto was deposed and offered free advice to the political players. Some organizations, such as IFES (International Foundation of Election Studies), had expertise in election laws and shared insight into the ramifications of different electoral systems. Other organizations, such as NDI (National Democratic Institute) and IRI (International Republican Institute) followed the unfolding events, reported back to the United States what was happening, and offered advice to the regime and opposition on a variety of issues, including crafting election laws, organizing parties, and building civil society. These international organizations were frequently not very influential in the policy making process but did serve as a link between the changes occurring in the country and the international community.\textsuperscript{145}

The UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), on the other hand, was very influential in helping to administer the elections.\textsuperscript{146} The UNDP was respected for its neutrality and had a lot of money to give the KPU and other election related

\textsuperscript{145} Many people inside the regime, military, and opposition told me that they were not influenced by the advice, which was usually not sought, from these organizations (interviews: Djufrie Asmoredjo, Feb. 24, 1999; Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, Dec. 12, 1998; and Andi Mattalatta, March 5, 1999).

\textsuperscript{146} Interview, Andi Mallangang, July 22, 1999.
organizations. The UNDP gave a total of US$36 million to 24 Indonesian organizations for electoral activities. Most of the money went to the KPU (US$30 million) for technical and material electoral infrastructure support. This included money for ballot papers, indelible ink, a national tally room for the election results, an official tabulation system, training for poll workers, and voter education. The rest of the money went to domestic poll monitoring organizations. The UNDP's technical and material support continued through the polling and vote counting stages of the general election.

6.7. Summary of the Three Political Laws Passed by the Legislature

Habibie's intervention in the negotiations between Golkar and the opposition elite helped to get the three political laws passed by the Jan. 28th deadline. Although Golkar leaders were not happy with the final product, they accepted it. The opposition elite was pleased with the laws. The need to get agreement and the time constraint, however, meant that the laws were vague in many areas, and with details to be filled in by future regulations. Below is a quick summary of the main points of the laws passed by the Legislature, including the three contentious issues discussed throughout this chapter.

The civil servant issue was decided, as described above, by Habibie's decree on the subject. Civil servants had three months from the date of the decree to ask their supervisor for a leave of absence if they wanted to pursue political activities or campaign.

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149 The following highlights of the laws were taken from the laws themselves and from a summary report issued by the Secretariat of the DPR. Highlights can also be found in media reports. See for example, "DPR Endorses Political Laws," The Jakarta Post Jan. 29, 1999.

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for a party. They could request up to one year of paid leave but would not be guaranteed their same posting when they returned to work.

The second contentious issue, the electoral system, was resolved by keeping proportional representation at the provincial level. However, a unique twist was inserted that exists nowhere else in the world. Seats would be allotted according to the percentage of vote each party obtained in the province, but the candidates to fill those seats would be chosen “with consideration to the largest votes obtained by that particular political party in the districts.” People would vote for a party, which would be listed with its symbol on the ballot, but a list of candidates chosen by the parties for each district would be made publicly available prior to the election. No residency requirements were imposed for the candidates.

The law intended to have parties fill their seats with the candidates who did best in their districts. This was supposed to insert an element of accountability of the candidates to their districts into the otherwise proportional representative system and was a compromise between the opposition elite and the Government Team of which wrote the law. The law, however, was vague and it was left to the KPU to fill in the details of exactly how candidates would be chosen.

130 The exact system of determining seats would be decided by the KPU.
132 Once the original version of the Team of T’s district level plurality system was opposed by the opposition elite and bargaining began over the electoral system, the Team of T and the minister of home affairs considered a list system where candidates were chosen individually by the voter. However, this would mean that much paper was required for each ballot. This would be confusing to the voter and create logistical problems. Therefore an alternative method of combining a simple choice of the party with making representatives accountable to a district was created (interview, Ryaas Rasyid, Feb. 28, 1999).
133 Interview, Andi Mallarangeng, July 22, 1999.
It was also decided that elections for national, provincial, and district level legislatures would occur simultaneously and that the day would be a national holiday. No voting in the workplace would be allowed. Polling stations would be manned with representatives from the community and parties and would be subject to observers approved by the KPU. These were all demands made by the opposition.

Java and Bali would get half of the elected seats in the Legislature and half would go to the outer islands. This over-represented the outer islands since more than 60% of the country’s population was concentrated on Java and Bali. The Team of 7 had wanted this provision to help alleviate Java’s domination of the country. Golkar did not object since they expected to fare best in the outer islands. Several opposition parties also hoped to draw strength from the outer islands.¹⁵⁴

The third issue was decided with the military receiving 38 seats in the National Legislature. The military would receive 10% of seats in the provincial and district level legislatures. No mention was made of the military’s territorial command structure or the number of cabinet seats the military could hold.

Shortly after passage of the three political laws Wiranto decreed that active military personnel would no longer be able to hold dual posts in the military and bureaucracy. This meant that several thousand military personnel would have to choose between their military or civil service career. The decree did not prohibit military personnel from holding positions as state officials, including cabinet ministers, governors, district heads,

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¹⁵⁴ Three of the Team of 7’s most influential members were from outer islands. These three members were its leader, Ryaas Rahyid – South Sulawesi; Afan Gaffar – Sumbawa; and Andi Mallarangeng – South Sulawesi. They wanted to ease Javanese domination of politics.

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or mayors, but it did have a large impact on the effort to build a neutral civil service and disentangle the military from the bureaucracy.

Other issues in the political laws were important but were not as big obstacles to the laws' passage as were the three issues discussed above. The most important of these additional issues was the compromise over parties' obligation to declare allegiance to Pancasila. As discussed in Chapter 5, the regime failed to have this provision inserted into an Assembly decree on Pancasila at the Special Session of the National Assembly. This omission left the issue to be decided in the law on political parties.

A compromise was reached that freed parties from officially basing their existence on allegiance to Pancasila, but all parties were required to state in their constitutions that they recognized Pancasila to be the sole and legitimate state ideology. Parties could not declare allegiance to or spread concepts that ran counter to Pancasila or in any way threaten national unity or integrity. This compromise allowed parties to declare their foundation to be Islam and to use Islamic symbolism, which was important to PPP and was demanded by many protesters in the streets. However, the door was left open for the banning of any party that began to threaten the state, including exclusivist Islamic parties. The inclusion of a legal channel to control parties that threatened the foundation of the state helped to ease military fears that a radicalized political Islam might become powerful.155

Another important point in the legislation deals with the eligibility requirements of parties to contest elections. The Team of 7 wanted to prevent numerous small parties from destabilizing the system and wanted to exclude regional and ethnic parties.

Stringent requirements were therefore made for parties. Small parties opposed these requirements.

The final law on parties largely held to the draft version and required parties to have branch offices in at least nine of the 27 provinces for the 1999 election and at least half of the provinces for elections thereafter. Parties were also required to have branch offices in at least half of the districts in each of those provinces. The alternative of obtaining one million signatures was thrown out due to fear of fraud. Parties were also required to obtain at least 2% of seats in the Legislature (10 seats), or 3% of seats in the provincial and district legislatures in half of the country's provinces and districts, in order to be eligible to contest the next election.\(^{156}\)

The law on parties included restrictions on financial donations to parties. Contributions were limited to Rp15 million from an individual and Rp150 million from a corporation. Public audits of party finances were required, but enforcement mechanisms for this law were vague.

The law on the structure and function of the Legislature and Assembly stated the number of constitutionally mandated representatives from social groups in the Assembly to be 65. The constitution states that the Assembly must include representatives from social groups, but does not state the number of these representatives or specify how they are to be chosen. The method of choosing the representatives was also not stated by the new law except to say that, for this election, the KPU would be responsible for determining which groups would get seats and how many seats would be given to the

\(^{156}\) This was another unique aspect of Indonesia's electoral law. Usually countries impose thresholds on the current election's outcome for seats with the opportunity for contesting the election again the next time. Indonesia's law purposely attempted to get rid of small parties permanently.

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Representatives would then be chosen by the social groups and the KPU would give approval. The president would give the final approval. In future elections, the Legislature, although the law did not specify exactly how, would take over the role of the KPU in this area and the president would not be involved.

The Assembly was to consist of 700 members. Five hundred of these members would be the 500 members of the Legislature (including 38 from the military). 135 regional representatives (five from each of the 27 provinces) would be chosen by the provincial legislatures and 65 social group representatives would be selected as described above.

The Assembly would meet every year instead of every five years. This was done in an effort to strengthen the role of the Assembly vis-à-vis the president.\(^{157}\)

The Assembly’s rules for electing the president every five years were not clarified by the laws. The constitution states that the president is selected by “suara terbanyak,” which literally means by “the most votes.” Constitutional scholars and custom have interpreted this to mean by “majority” vote, but the rules to follow if no candidate has a majority of votes were not specified in any legislation.

The law on elections specified the formation of a general election commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) to supervise the elections. The KPU would have one representative from each party and five government representatives. The five government representatives would have their votes weighted so that their total votes were equal to the total votes of the party representatives. Beneath the KPU was the national election commission (Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia, PPI). The PPI would implement the

\(^{157}\) The Assembly, according to the constitution, is the institution with the most authority in the country. However, by meeting only once every five years and due to Suharto’s manipulation of the selection of representatives and of the election of representatives to the Legislature, the Assembly had ceased to exert any power at all and had functioned only to re-elect Suharto to the presidency.
KPU policies, receive party lists of legislative candidates, run the elections, and count the
votes. The PPI would exist at the national down to the polling station level. Each level,
except the polling station, was to consist of government and party representatives. No
government representatives were to be at the polling stations.

An official election monitoring committee (Panwas) was established to oversee the
election and adjudicate disputes. Representatives on Panwas were to be appointed by the
Supreme Court at the national level and provincial and district courts at the lower levels.
Representatives were to consist of judges and community representatives. The
procedures and authority of Panwas were unclear, including whether or not Panwas was
the final authority and its decisions were binding.

The relationships between the KPU, PPI, and Panwas were left ambiguous by the
election law. The law stated that they would be further regulated by the Supreme Court.
As we shall see, however, the Supreme Court, was reluctant to become involved in
election disputes and the neutrality of the courts was questionable.

6.8. The KPU Prepares for the Election

The KPU was given, by the law on elections, the vague task of regulating elections.
This entailed filling in the laws with needed regulations, making guidelines and the
schedule for the campaign period, ordering the election ballots and ensuring that they

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158 The national level PPI consisted of seven members of the KPU. The chairman was voted to be Jakob
Tobing who was a PDI-P member but was formerly a Golkar representative in the legislature and had
experience with the administrative tasks of organizing an election (“Elections Committee Set up to Run
159 The Supreme Court appointed 30 members to the national level election monitoring committee
160 “The Prospects for Democratic Elections in Indonesia,” The National Democratic Institute Assessment
were distributed to the polling stations, training poll workers, regulating domestic and international observers, and overseeing the voting and counting of votes done by the PPI.\textsuperscript{161}

Since the KPU was to consist of party representatives, the parties' eligibility to contest the elections had to be determined before the KPU could be formed. The Ministry of Home Affairs appointed a Team of 11 for this task. The Team of 11 consisted of scholars and activists respected for their independence and integrity.\textsuperscript{162}

The Ministry of Justice had registered 141 parties. Of these, 105 applied to the Team of 11 for verification. Sixty met the administrative requirements. Members of the Team of 11 then went to the provinces and districts to verify that branch offices existed. Forty-eight parties passed the screening, which took place from the end of February to the beginning of March 1999. Disqualified parties protested but there was no large public outcry over the results.\textsuperscript{163}

The Team of 11 was also tasked with preparing drafts of the regulations that would be needed to clarify the three political laws and oversee the administration of the election. This preparatory work was supposed to help the KPU quickly enact these regulations because there were only three months from the time the KPU was formed in March to the election to be held on June 7, 1999.

The KPU consisted of 48 party and five government representatives. The government representatives each had a vote weighted to nine so that the government representatives' votes

\textsuperscript{161} "Jalan KPU pun Berliku," \textit{Adil} March 10-16, 1999.

\textsuperscript{162} For the background of the members of the Team of 11, see "Bisa Jadi Nasib Presiden di Tangan Mereka," \textit{Republika} March 10, 1999 and "Team of Eleven Begins Examining Poll Contestants," \textit{The Jakarta Post} Feb. 22, 1999.

\textsuperscript{163} "Menangis Pemilu Multi-Partai," \textit{Adil} March 10-16, 1999 and "48 Parties Eligible to Contest Election," \textit{The Jakarta Post} March 5, 1999.
votes would approximate the party representatives' votes. Voting, however, was avoided if possible so that a situation would not occur where the government representatives were pitted against the party representatives. An attempt was made to reach consensus on issues. Decision-making was laborious and slow and great difficulties, many of which were unanticipated, were encountered with making simple decisions. Contradictory decisions were sometimes made because that was the only way to prevent deadlock in the commission.

The authority of the KPU was also unclear, which created problems. For instance, the KPU included in its code of conduct for parties during the campaign period that the parties could not use state officials to campaign for them. This in effect prohibited cabinet ministers from campaigning or pursuing political activities, similar to the ban on civil servants engaging in politics. An uproar ensued as several cabinet ministers were leaders of parties, the most notable being the head of Golkar, Akbar Tanjung, and the head of PPP, Hamzah Haz.

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164 Four of the five Government representatives were from the Team of 11. Two of these had also served on the Team of 7 that wrote the original draft laws. See “Election Committee Holds First Session,” The Jakarta Post March 11, 1999 for the backgrounds of the five government officials.

165 Despite the inefficiency of the KPU, its main goal was to ensure that elections took place on time and that the elections were accepted by all the parties and the public as free and fair (interview, Kevin Evans, an advisor to the Team of 7, July 10, 1999).

166 “Menteri Sebaiknya tak Berkampanye,” Kompas March 17, 1999 and “KPU Bars Ministers from Campaigning,” The Jakarta Post March 25, 1999. State officials were not technically civil servants and so were not covered in the decree on civil servants issued by Habibie. State officials included cabinet ministers, governors, district head, mayors, and their aides, including the aides to the president and vice president.

167 Akbar was State secretary. Hamzah was State Minister of Investment. Other ministers included A.M. Saefuddin, who was a leader of PPP and Minister for Food and Horticulture; Panangian Siregar, who was a leader of PDI-P and State Minister of the Environment; Adi Sasono, who was a leader of Golkar (quit later) and tied to a new party, PDR, and Minister of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises; Fahmi Idris who was a leader in Golkar and Minister of Manpower; Agung Laksono who was a leader in Golkar and Minister of Youth and Sport.
The authority of the KPU to ban ministers from campaigning was questioned and Akbar filed a suit with the Supreme Court. Habibie asked the Court to decide the matter.\textsuperscript{168} The Court issued an opinion (non-binding) that the KPU had no authority to make such a ruling – only the president could do this. The Court further suggested that KPU members not be allowed to be active party members.\textsuperscript{169} The Minister of Justice concurred with the Court’s decision.

Habibie attempted to resolve the debate by issuing a decree that barred five ministers, whom he claimed held the most important positions, from campaigning. The decree did not include the ministers who were in fact tied to parties.\textsuperscript{170} The KPU continued to insist that ministers could not campaign, but the KPU had no means to enforce its decision.\textsuperscript{171} Golkar, trying to appear reformist and not go against public opinion, decided that Akbar should ask for a leave of absence from his post as State Secretary in order to campaign and that the other cabinet ministers who were leaders in Golkar would keep their state positions and not campaign.\textsuperscript{172}

Other regulations issued by the KPU were more confusing. The KPU was left to decide what specific system of proportional representation would be used to allocate seats to parties and how candidates would be chosen to fill these seats. The KPU decided to use the largest remainder system of allocating seats to parties.\textsuperscript{173} Leftover votes after

\textsuperscript{168} “KPU Ruling Referred to Supreme Court,” \textit{The Jakarta Post} March 26, 1999.
\textsuperscript{169} “Habibie, KPU Still at Odds Over Ministers,” \textit{The Jakarta Post} March 30, 1999 and “Hamzah May Quit Cabinet to Campaign for PPP,” \textit{The Jakarta Post} April 1, 1999. The KPU had inserted in its code of conduct for parties that it was permissible for KPU members to campaign for their parties (“KPU Passes Controversial Internal Campaign Ruling,” \textit{The Jakarta Post} March 19, 1999).
\textsuperscript{170} “5 Ministers Barred from Campaigning,” \textit{The Jakarta Post} March 19, 1999.
\textsuperscript{172} “Akbar to Seek Leave of Absence to Campaign for Golkar Party,” \textit{The Jakarta Post} April 21, 1999.
\textsuperscript{173} This system divides the number of seats given to a province by the total valid votes in the province. This figure is the quota for a seat. Parties who meet the quota are given one seat.
quotas for seats were filled would be combined with other parties through pre-established agreements, called “stembus accords.” Parties could enter into different stembus accords with different parties for different provinces but these agreements had to be filed with the KPU before June 4th. If no agreement had been reached with a party then the leftover votes were to be thrown out.

The method of determining which candidates would fill the seats once seats were given to parties was the most complex part of the election system. The law on elections had stated that seats, after being allocated to parties, would be filled with reference to the parties’ performance in the districts. The KPU decided that seats would be given to candidates from districts where the party had the largest votes. It was left to the parties to decide if the largest vote would be determined by total vote or percentage of vote for the district. This decision was to be made and given to the KPU by June 4th.

The method chosen of distributing seats meant that several parties could choose candidates from the same district since several parties could have the largest vote for their party in the same district. Similarly, some districts might have no candidate chosen. This ran counter to the intent of the law, which was to impose local accountability on candidates, lessen the control of the central party in choosing representatives, and have all districts represented. The KPU itself had already issued a regulation determining the number of seats to be given to each district and ensuring that each district had at least one seat. Aware of the shortcomings and contradictions, the government representatives

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174 This term comes from Dutch electoral arrangements, and was first adopted in Indonesia for the 1955 parliamentary election.
175 Seats were determined by a ratio of the total number of seats and the district’s population. Indonesia had 327 districts at the time of the election (“Commission Fails to Decide on Legislative Seats,” The Jakarta Post April 6, 1999).
could not get agreement from the party representatives on a better regulation of the method of candidate selection. The issue was allowed to pass because many critical administrative tasks needed decisions and less than one month existed before the elections were to be held.\textsuperscript{176}

After the election, the selection of candidates to fill seats was confused by the contradictory regulations and general lack of understanding about how the system was supposed to work. Parties had been forced to assign candidates to districts prior to the election without understanding the implications of their decisions. This confusion and the lack of enforcement authority prevented action from being taken against parties who moved candidates from one district to another in order to accommodate the law but have the desired candidates get seats.

Similar confusion after the elections occurred with regard to the stembus accords. Some parties made agreements with more than one party to share votes and did not specify when which party would be chosen. Many small parties did not make any agreements and their leftover votes were therefore supposed to be thrown out. To prevent the throwing out of numerous votes, the KPU threw out all of the pre-arranged stembus accords and allowed parties to make agreements after the elections.\textsuperscript{177}

The KPU was also given responsibility to fill in the law in the areas of selecting regional and social group representatives to be sent to the Assembly. The KPU was to

\textsuperscript{176} The regulations covering the system of allocating seats and candidates was not passed until May 10, due to much bickering among the party representatives over everything. Another problem with the allocation of seats was that population figures were questioned by several of the parties ("Police May Not Participate in Election: Feisal," \textit{The Jakarta Post} April 8, 1999).

\textsuperscript{177} This and the experience with the candidate selection were learning experiences for the KPU and for the parties (interview, Andi Mallarangeng, July 22, 1999). Andi Mallarangeng repeatedly stated that this was all new to them and they had so many tasks to complete in such a short time that they could not possibly resolve all of the issues before the elections.
decide how the provincial legislatures would select their regional representatives. Due to
disagreement among the KPU members, it was decided that each province could use any
method it liked to select five regional representatives. The KPU decided before the
election from which categories the 65 social group representatives would come. The
specific groups chosen and their representatives would be decided upon after the election.

Other regulations made by the KPU included a limit on parties’ total campaign
spending of Rp110 billion (US$20,000). However, this regulation was made less than a
month before the election. The campaign period was also restricted by the KPU and was
not supposed to begin until May 19th. Many parties began holding rallies earlier. For
instance, Golkar claimed that the rallies were “family reunions.” The other major parties
also began campaigning in early April. The KPU had no enforcement mechanism and
the Panwas committees that were supposed to ensure that the election was conducted
fairly and handle complaints were not yet formed in most areas.

Included in the KPU’s responsibilities was overseeing the administrative tasks
involved with holding an election in a country of over 200 million people spread across
thousands of islands. Voters had to be re-registered because many parties disputed the
population figures gathered under the Suharto regime. Registration was difficult to do in

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178 The social group categories and their number of representatives would include: 20 religious leaders;
nine economically weak groups, including workers, peasants, cooperatives and small businesses; nine
artists, intellectuals, scientists, cultural leaders and journalists; five veterans and pioneers of the
independence movement; five women; five NGOs, students and youth organizations; five civil servants;
five ethnic minorities, including indigenous peoples, Chinese, Indians, Arabs and Eurasians; and two


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such a short time and many provinces did not receive the proper forms until days before the election.\textsuperscript{181} By the date of the polls, however, registration was over 90%.

Poll workers had to be trained to man over 312,000 voting stations.\textsuperscript{182} The instruction of individuals who would in turn train the poll workers only began on May 13. This left just a few weeks to train over 2 million poll workers across the country. The late beginning of this process was largely due to the KPU not deciding upon many regulations until the final days before the elections. Many voting stations therefore did not receive official instruction on how to operate their stations and had to judge by media reports, past regulations, and common sense.\textsuperscript{183}

Polling stations had to be built in many areas because voting would no longer be allowed to take place in places of work or government buildings.\textsuperscript{184} People would now vote near their residence. Communities were given a small sum of money to build voting centers, but most were built with the help of the community.\textsuperscript{185}

It was decided by the KPU to dip voters' right thumb in indelible ink and to affix a hologram seal onto each ballot in an attempt to prevent double voting and ballot fraud. Over 400 million ballots were needed for the three levels of legislatures that were being elected.\textsuperscript{186} The KPU had planned on having the ballots printed in black and white, but after the first batch was printed, realized that due to many parties using similar symbols,
it was nearly impossible to differentiate the symbols of several parties. To avoid confusion, the KPU had the ballots printed in color. The orders for the ballots and indelible ink, however, did not go out until a month before the election. Transporting the materials in time for the June 7th polls presented problems and the KPU had to ask the military to transport materials to remote regions.

Despite the administrative difficulties, the elections took place as scheduled on June 7th. The next chapter traces the parties, military, and regime's activities during the campaign period and their bargaining over who would be elected president and vice president by the new Assembly. The shifting nature and role of mass mobilization will also be analyzed.
CHAPTER 7

ELECTING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, PRESIDENT, AND VICE PRESIDENT

The campaign period and general election went very smoothly. Fewer incidents of campaign related violence were reported in the months prior to the June 7th, 1999 elections than had occurred during the Suharto controlled elections of 1997. During the country’s first democratic elections since 1955, voters dressed in their finest clothes and peacefully lined up to vote in what were frequently makeshift voting booths.\(^1\) Poll workers conducted themselves with pride and integrity throughout the archipelago, despite nearly no training.\(^2\) All of the major domestic and international organizations observing the election agreed that the polling had taken place freely and without intimidation.\(^3\)

\(^1\) I observed the voting at a polling station in a village south of Yogyakarta in Central Java. Voting took place in a building that was under construction and had no roof. Voters were given three ballots, one for the national, provincial, and district level legislatures. The voter went behind a curtain to vote, placed the ballots into three separate boxes, had his or her thumb dipped in ink, and name checked off.

\(^2\) The man in charge of the polling station where I observed the voting was a bakso (noodle soup) seller. He had received little instruction from authorities, but vigilantly and with great pride watched over the poll workers (consisting of students and party members).

\(^3\) Over 40 domestic and international organizations were registered with the KPU to observe the elections (“On Democracy’s Front Line,” *The Economist* Jan. 30, 1999). Despite some allegations of money politics and some irregularities, such as a box filled with ballots being found in an office weeks after the election, the poll-watching organizations gave their stamp of approval to the elections. See for instance, The National Democratic Institute and The Carter Center, June 9, June 20, and July 15, 1999, *Reports on the Indonesian General Election.*
The counting of the votes was problematic, mostly due to the logistical difficulty of counting over 100 million votes by hand in a far-flung archipelago. The final vote tally was also delayed because numerous tiny parties in the KPU refused to accept the results based on isolated instances of irregularity. Two-thirds of the KPU membership was required for acceptance of the results and bickering emanating from the small parties seemed to have no end.

Habibie finally issued a decree validating the election results on August 4, 1999. The KPU (General Election Commission) finished allocating seats to parties on September 1, 1999, three months after the elections. In the subsequent weeks, the PPI (National Election Commission) finalized the list of candidates for those seats. The election results and the formation of the National Assembly are discussed in the “Opposition Elite” section and are given in Appendix 2. On October 20 and 21, 1999, the National Assembly elected a new president and vice president.

This chapter discusses the players’ stances and their efforts to build parties throughout the campaign period. Their strategies and alliances prior to the election are detailed. This is followed by an analysis of the coalition building among the newly elected political elite that elected the president and vice president in the General Session of the

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4 There were also problems due to confusion over stembus accords (seat division agreements explained in Chapter 6). Some parties had entered into accords with numerous different parties leaving it unclear how the left over votes would be shared. On August 30, the KPU finally decided to throw out all previously made stembus accords and allowed parties to make new agreements at that time (“KPU Told to Revoke Seat Allocation Decree,” *The Jakarta Post* Aug. 31, 1999).


6 It was suspected that these parties were purposely holding up the validation of the election results due to their connections to elements of the incumbent regime and military that did not want the results to ever be accepted, thus justifying a delay of regime change.


National Assembly on October 20 and 21, 1999, four and a half months after the general election.\(^9\)

The same three factors continued to drive this stage of the transitional period. The reluctance of the opposition elite to demand far-reaching reforms continued to reassure the regime and military that the opposition elite could be worked with after the elections. The moderation of the opposition elite also resulted in the opposition elite missing the opportunity to use their legitimacy and inclusion in the National Assembly following the general election to make far-reaching institutional and constitutional change or to address serious, but contentious, concerns of the populace. Violent mass mobilization and social turmoil continued to set the context for the transition and provided the impetus for staying on the course of free elections. The fear of uncontrolled violence and rioting caused the political elite to elect Megawati vice president after denying her the presidency. The military by this time was fragmented and weak in the face of mass mobilization and national disintegration. This weakness contributed to its neutrality during the general election and selection of the president and vice president.

While the same three factors discussed in earlier chapters remained prominent throughout this final stage of the transitional period, shifts in the form of mobilization and strategy of the opposition elite can be seen. Members of the opposition elite, along with members of the regime, increasingly manipulated mass mobilization as part of their

\(^9\) As detailed in Chapters 3 and 6, the general election elected representatives to the Legislature at the national, provincial, and district levels. At the national level, the legislative representatives plus regional representatives elected by the provincial legislatures and social group representatives selected by the general election commission comprised the National Assembly. A few months following the general election, the Assembly convened in a General Session to elect a president and vice president. This occurred every five years. Although some variations were made to the proportions of types of representatives in the Assembly for the 1999 General Session, as described in Chapter 6, the basic institutional outlines and Assembly procedures were not modified and were based on the Constitution of 1945 that Suharto had used to rule.

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strategy for attaining or maintaining power. This was especially apparent in the months between the general election and the convening of the National Assembly that would elect the new president and vice president. As the student movement continued to fracture and dissipate and as the political elite turned toward the manipulation of mass mobilization as a tool in their struggle for power, the use of Islamic symbolism in organized mass rallies became commonplace.

The political elite also engaged in a bitter struggle for power that blurred the distinction between opposition and status quo (regime). They contemplated who would get what in various coalition formations. After the general election, the alliance among the three leading figures of the opposition elite broke apart. This is clearly seen with Amien's formation of Poros Tengah (Central Axis) that included Muslim parties, allied with Golkar members, and blocked Megawati from becoming president.

The maneuvering and fight for a piece of the disintegrating New Order regime was in stark contrast to the idealism of voters as they checked the box under the symbol of their favorite party. Despite the greedy scramble for power by the elite, ordinary Indonesians were fascinated by the fact that after the balloting, votes were called out for all to see. The winner was not predetermined. This was democracy at its finest, at the mass level, and its worst, among the elite.

I argue that the three factors discussed throughout this dissertation, although instrumental for achieving a transition to democracy in Indonesia, left a legacy of problems for the new democracy. One cannot have witnessed or read the story and not be struck by the fact that an opportunity for thorough reform of the political system in a manner that would have allowed a well-functioning democracy to be born was missed.
As stated, the opposition elite missed the opportunity not only by inflaming communal tensions but also by not insisting on more institutional and constitutional reform. The regime missed the opportunity to create something better for the nation by being more concerned with holding onto scraps of power than with pursuing the development of the nation. The military missed the opportunity to prove its reformist stance by not completely withdrawing from politics. The mobilized masses missed the opportunity to insist upon total political reform by turning against each other and losing sight of their goal for a free and empowered society where people could live together in peace.

“Little by little” was a phrase that the political elite were fond of repeating during the transitional period, but one wonders if being overly cautious about making change has not set the nation on a course of continually weak governments that merely muddle through crisis after crisis with little prospect for resolving national problems. Even democratic governments function poorly if they are not based on sound institutional arrangements that provide an effective arena for peaceful conflict resolution and which encourage the emergence of effective political leadership.

7.1. Mass Mobilization

During this final period of the transition to democracy, mass mobilization in the form of peaceful protests led by students waned and was increasingly replaced by violent communal conflict and continuing grassroots mob action.\(^\text{10}\) Communal violence was fueled by *Time* magazine’s article outlining the family’s immense wealth hidden overseas (“Suharto Inc.,” *Time* May 24, 1999).

\(^\text{10}\) Although the moderate protesters had been persuaded to cease protesting, radical students continued to take to the streets. Issues that continued to be protested by these students included a complete withdrawal of the military, total constitutional reform, and bringing Suharto to trial. Anger at the Suharto family was fueled by *Time* magazine’s article outlining the family’s immense wealth hidden overseas (“Suharto Inc.,” *Time* May 24, 1999).
augmented by the growing polarization in society between staunch Muslims and nominal or non-Muslims. Individuals within both the opposition and regime played upon and intensified this polarization and enmity by instigating mobilization based upon Islamic symbolism. Lacking an ideological base, these individuals hoped that grassroots support could be obtained by appealing to Islamic sentiment. The use of Islamic symbolism was also a strategy devised by individuals in the opposition and regime for blocking Megawati from the presidency. 11

7.1.1. The Campaign Period

A new form of mobilization – based on party support - occurred as parties entered the campaign period. Party mobilization took place despite the ban placed on outdoor rallies by the KPU. With no enforcement mechanism, the KPU was powerless to control the parties. This type of mobilization was mostly peaceful, but some skirmishes erupted. 12 Frequent parades could be seen in the cities as supporters wore their party’s T-shirt and marched through the streets. Young men on decorated motorbikes were also common sights.

The biggest mobilization of party supporters occurred in Jakarta and was organized by PDI-P. Over one million people donned the red color of Megawati’s party and filled the

11 Megawati was portrayed as being un-Islamic and not fit to lead the nation. She is in fact a Muslim, as are the vast majority of Indonesians. However, she, like many Indonesians, practices a syncretic form of Islam that mixes pre-Islamic and Islamic beliefs and rituals. This is called *abangan* and is described in Chapter 3.

12 Golkar was usually the target of attack, which took the form of throwing stones and intimidating people who attended rallies (“Parties Push Ahead with Premature Campaigning, The Jakarta Post April, 19, 2001). Conflicts also erupted between supporters of PPP and PKB because they competed for support of local religious leaders. Old enmities between local Islamic leaders were ignited as they fought to bring followers to their respective parties (“Rebutan Antara Kyai,” Kawa Pos May 22, 1999” and “Masses Follow Leaders: Choirul,” Indonesian Observer May 24, 1999).
streets, shutting the city down for the day. Golkar tried to amass supporters, but had more difficulty and was accused of paying participants to attend a party rally held at the national stadium.

The biggest parties created their own security forces, similar to militia, to provide security during rallies. Although the creation of militia tied to competing parties had the potential to instigate violence during the campaign period or after the election results were announced, the party leaders worked hard to ensure discipline within their security forces. No significant violence was attributed to the security forces.

Other forms of mass mobilization, particularly communal violence, continued to increase during this period. The violence in Maluku between Christians and Muslims continued unabated. Efforts by the military to restore order were met with suspicion and accusations that the military had instigated the violence. Outbreaks of communal violence, based on either religion or ethnicity, began occurring throughout the archipelago, particularly on the large islands of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Sumatra. The causes of these outbreaks were unclear, but fingers were pointed at provocateurs sent by elite individuals in Jakarta.

15 This was indicative of the breakdown of law and order and the inability of the police or military to provide security for the parties.
16 This reluctance of any party to use its security forces to bully opponents may have been due to the fact that this tactic would not have helped them obtain success at the polls. This reluctance is in contrast to the alleged involvement of regime and military officials in covertly instigating communal violence.
7.1.2. From the General Election to the Selection of the New President and Vice President

During this post-election period, communal violence, separatist demands, and grassroots mob action continued. Party rallies tapered off following the election. Street protests continued, and were frequently violent, but remained sporadic.\(^{(17)}\)

Despite the moderation of most of the student leaders, radical students continued to take to the streets, even after elections had been held. The military became increasingly aggravated by them and, as discipline broke down in the ranks, began to respond more frequently with violence. In one week, eleven people protesting against the military were killed throughout the archipelago.\(^{(18)}\)

Protesters also came out in the tens of thousands, including ordinary people, to decry the military’s proposed security bill.\(^{(19)}\) At least seven protesters and one military officer were killed in two days of violent clashes after the Legislature passed the bill.\(^{(20)}\) The military was forced by the intensity of the protests to announce that the president would postpone signing the bill until it could be “socialized” among the public.

In the post general election period, mass mobilization was also increasingly manipulated by the Muslim element of the political elite (both regime and opposition).\(^{(21)}\)

\(^{(19)}\) The bill was to replace the 1959 Law No. 23 on declaring a state of emergency. It had been conceived in the last year of Suharto’s rule but was not brought to the Legislature until July 1999. Despite statutes that were more modern and allowed for a lessened military presence during a state of emergency, the distrust of the military and the fact that the bill was being deliberated by Suharto’s illegitimate Legislature created suspicion among the public (“Forkot Menentang RUU Penanggulangan Keadilan Bahaya,” Kompas Sept. 16, 1999 and “Opposition Mounts Over State Security Bill,” The Jakarta Post July 23, 1999).
\(^{(21)}\) Protests sprang up claiming to be organized by Islamic groups that had never before been heard of. For instance, a group calling itself the Majority Muslim (Muslim Majority) had 1,000 protesters in the streets of Jakarta denouncing a woman’s ability to lead the nation under the laws of Islam. It was purported that
The main culprits were Habibie and his advisors, but modernist Muslim leaders in the opposition, including Amien, were also involved. The manipulation of Islamic symbolism was done in an effort to help elite individuals in their bid for power.22 Megawati's Islamic credentials were questioned and she was even accused of secretly being Hindu.23 This elite led mobilization using Islamic symbolism had the effect of polarizing society between strongly Muslim and non-, or nominal, Muslim sentiment.

The mobilization of groups based on Islam created a situation where the election of Megawati to the presidency might have endangered national stability. Although the show of Muslim sentiment against Megawati was largely engineered by her opponents, the potential for violence was real due to her opponents' unwavering willingness to incite violence and the sensitivity that many devout Muslims felt in regards to having been pushed aside throughout the independent life of the nation. Megawati's supporters seemed unaware of the elite game that was being played and confidently assumed that she would be elected president by the National Assembly since her party had received the most votes in the June election.24

Throughout the General Session of the Assembly that would elect the new president and vice president, mass mobilization was smaller than it had been during the Special Session. The participants of this protest had been paid Rp. 25,000 (US$ 2.50) each and had been bused in from West Java ("Kelompok Islam Menolak Megawati," Tajuk July 29, 1999).

22 Habibie lacked grassroots support. In an attempt to ameliorate this, his sides organized mobilization based on Islam and had protesters hold banners equating the defense of Islam with the defense of the "constitutional way." This phrase was a euphemism for defending Habibie's right to hold another term in office if selected by the National Assembly. Amien had people organize mobilization based on Islam because he, in agreement with elements in the regime, was attempting to prevent Megawati from becoming president. The other part of his strategy was to form an alliance of Islamic parties that would select a compromise candidate for president (interviews: Jimly Asshiddiqi, a leading advisor to Habibie, July 15, 1999 and Din Syamsuddin, a Muslim leader with ties to both Amien and Golkar, Sept. 5, 1999). These strategies are discussed more fully in the "opposition elite" and "regime" sections.


24 Headlines of newspapers frequently referred to Megawati as the next president and it seemed to be taken for granted by most of the populace. See for instance, "Presiden Baru: Mega," Adil July 7, 1999.
Session one year earlier. However, protesters still numbered in the tens of thousands and filled the streets of the capital city. Islamic leaders had mobilized supporters to oppose Megawati’s candidacy for president and continued to threaten violence if she were elected. Megawati, on the other hand, called for calm from her supporters and encouraged them to stay home.

Clashes occurred between anti-Habibie protesters and security forces on the day of Habibie’s accountability speech, but the clashes did not reach the proportions of one year earlier. Order was largely maintained among Megawati’s supporters by the party’s security forces. Contrary to the advice of some leaders in PDI-P, Megawati continued to instruct her security forces to prevent rioting, even as it became clear that the presidential election was being taken from her. She did not want to rise to power through bloodshed. This well-known distaste for violence encouraged her opponents in the regime and opposition elite to feel safe in pursuing their anti-Megawati alliance.

On the night following Megawati’s loss in the presidential race, riots could not be stopped in several major cities across the archipelago. Two bombs exploded in Jakarta. Despite her humiliating defeat, Megawati stood firm in opposing violence and rioting. She was pressured by leaders in her party to “let the country burn,” but she adamantly maintained that her love for her country would not allow that to happen. She publicly

26 Interview, Sukmadewi, a PDI-P activist who is close to Megawati, Oct. 20, 1999.
29 Discussion with Dimyati Hartono, a PDI-P leader, Oct. 21, 1999. Dimyati conveyed the anger of many party leaders at their perceived betrayal by the political elite from other parties. They felt that these elite should suffer the consequences of their actions and face massive rioting.
called for restraint and for acceptance of the results the day following the election of Wahid to the presidency. It was dubious, however, if she would be able to control her supporters if she were not elected vice president. The spontaneous outburst of mass violence and fear that the rioting could not be controlled prompted the political elite to rethink their anti-Megawati stance and ultimately to give her the vice presidency.

7.2. Opposition Elite

During the period from the general election campaign to the selection of the president and vice president, the opposition elite went from being outside of formal power to being the dominant power inside the Legislature and Assembly. The term “opposition elite” is still used in analysis of this period because a new regime was not in place until the president and vice president were chosen by the new Assembly. Until that time, the opposition elite, although competing for power among each other, were still trying to ensure that a transition to democracy was completed with the legitimate election of a president and vice president.

Below, an analysis of the campaign strategy of the opposition elite and an overview of the numerous new opposition parties is presented. This is followed by a detailed account of the maneuvering and strategizing of the opposition elite during the General Session of the National Assembly that convened in October 1999 to elect a new president and vice president.

The disregard of the opposition elite for the demands that had been made by mass-based protesters that the military be completely withdrawn from power, Suharto be brought to trial, and the constitution be rewritten was clear during this period.
Individuals in the opposition elite were more interested in their struggle for power than with representing the constituents who had just elected them to the Legislature. The unity of the opposition elite also disintegrated during this time. New alliances were made that cut across the regime, military, and opposition.

7.2.1. Party Formation and Campaign Strategies

Over 100 parties had been formed in the wake of the realization that there would be free elections. Forty-eight met the eligibility requirements and were given approval to participate in the elections. Of these 48 parties, 11 were explicitly based on Islamic principles, 8 had close ties to Islamic organizations, 3 were formed with a Christian platform, 9 were left leaning or socialist, and 17 were based on Pancasila.

All three of the main opposition figures formed a political party and were hoping to use it as a vehicle to get elected to the presidency. The heads of the two largest Muslim organizations, Wahid - leader of NU and Amien Rais - leader of Muhammadiyah - chose

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30 The quest for the “Islamic vote” was thus divided among the eleven small Islamic parties and eight parties not explicitly based on Islam but using Islamic symbolism, including the parties headed by Wahid and Amien. The modernist branch of Islam was especially divided between parties claiming to be heirs to Masyumi, the main modernist Islamic party in the 1950’s (“New Islamic Parties Attempt to Cater for all Tastes,” The Jakarta Post May 21, 1999).

31 See Appendix 1 for list of parties and their bases.

32 Wahid’s party, PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Revival of the People Party), was not officially headed by him. He chose Matori Abdul Jalil to lead the party, but Wahid clearly intended to control the party. Amien formed PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party). Megawati formed a party that was based on PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party), which had existed under Suharto and which had been the continuation of Sukarno’s PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party). As described in Chapter 3, Megawati briefly headed the PDI in the early 1990s before Suharto forced her from the leadership. The party came to be called PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle) because it could not legally use the name PDI since the official PDI still existed. Megawati’s supporters constituted a breakaway group, even though they far outnumbered the PDI that existed under Suharto (“Megawati ‘Just Needs New Name’ for her PDI,” The Jakarta Post Sept. 22, 1998).
to form parties not based explicitly on Islam, but instead on a pluralist platform. Their parties, however, still relied extensively on their respective affiliated organizations for manpower and votes. Megawati’s party was secular nationalist and came to symbolize the “little people’s” demands for political reform, especially among the abangan on Java. This was despite her many non-reformist views, which were not made clear to the public.

Both Wahid and Amien knew that Megawati appealed to the numerous Javanese voters and that her party was likely to receive the largest share of votes. Prior to the general election, Wahid and Amien therefore tried to ally themselves with her and declared support for her as president. PKB even officially named Megawati as the party’s presidential candidate.

During the campaign for the general elections, each figure relied primarily on his or her name recognition. Party platforms were vague and several important demands made by society were not addressed by the opposition figures. For instance, the grievances of provinces outside of Java were frequently cited in the media but were not taken up by any of the opposition elite. Grievances of religious and ethnic groups engaged in worsening communal conflict were also ignored by the opposition figures and no solutions were

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33 This decision was hardest for Amien who had a history of taking strong Islamic stances. He chose to take the pluralist approach while simultaneously attempting to use the organizational network of Muhammadiyah because he wanted to be an acceptable presidential candidate. He knew that in order to be elected president, he would need the support of more secular oriented parties (interview, Syafi’i Anwar, editor of a modernist Muslim weekly news magazine – UMMAT - and close to Amien, Oct. 7, 1998). Wahid had a history of working with secular groups and had long touted himself as a pluralist (interview, M. Arubusman, assistant secretary-general of Nahdlatul Ulama, Oct. 9, 1998).

34 Amien stated that he would support Megawati for the presidency: “Amien Rais: A New Political Paradigm for Indonesia’s Future,” The Jakarta Post March 12, 1999. Wahid frequently declared support for Megawati becoming president almost to the day he was himself selected president by the new Assembly (See, for instance, “Mbak Mega: Presiden Depan,” Forum Keadilan April 3, 1999 and “Saya Dukung Mbak Mega,” Gastra Sept. 19, 1999).


36 For an example of the media citing grievances, see: “Provinces Demand Bigger Share of Revenue,” The Jakarta Post March 16, 1999.

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suggested. This silence on such important issues was due to agreement that some issues were too contentious for public debate, the desire to maintain unity among the opposition elite throughout the campaign period, and the effort to hide differences between the opposition elite and mass-based demands.37

Forming an organizational base in time to compete in the elections was problematic for all the new parties. Wahid and Amien, to different extents, used the organizational bases of the Muslim organizations that had been headed by them. Megawati used the old PDI’s party branches that had defected from the Suharto-controlled PDI. The other new parties had to start from scratch. Of the opposition parties, only PPP, and in a sense, PDI-P, had a pre-existing official organizational base.

The organization of a party network was the biggest problem for Amien. His decision not to base his party solely on Islam disappointed many people in Muhammadiyah. This disappointment, combined with the desire of several senior Muhammadiyah leaders to keep the organization as de-politicized as possible, made it difficult for Amien to use the Muslim organization for his political ambitions.38 Amien tried to tap into the Muhammadiyah network while simultaneously including non-Muhammadiyah people in leadership positions in the newly formed branch offices. He also attempted to develop some semblance of a party platform instead of relying only on patron-client ties running through the religious organization, as occurred in Wahid’s party.39

37 Interviews: Mochtar Buchori, on the executive board of PDI-P, April 19, 1999; Matori Abdul Jalil, head of PKB, Nov. 29, 1999; and Syafi’i Ma’arif, head of Muhammadiyah and close to Amien, July 6, 1999.
38 Interview, Syafi’i Ma’arif, July 6, 1999.
Amien’s attempt to be both a pluralist and to use Muhammadiyah created difficulties for the party as factions disputed over leadership positions and commitment to Islamic ideology. Dissension also existed within PAN on the issues of federalism, constitutional change, and the role of Islam in the state. This dissension and the desire to present himself to the rest of the political elite as an acceptable presidential candidate resulted in the watering down of the party’s initial platform and probably the loss of many Muhammadiyah voters who wanted a more strictly Muslim party. Other Muhammadiyah voters saw no advantage in switching their votes from Golkar to PAN.

Megawati had numerous people around her who had experience organizing election campaigns due to their prior involvement with the PDI under Suharto, prior membership in Golkar, or affiliation with the military. Her advisors developed a campaign strategy of building bamboo stands across the nation that would serve as meeting places for party supporters and as advertisement for the party. These stands permeated Java and Bali and could be seen throughout the archipelago.

Megawati was hailed as the symbol of the reform movement because she had been oppressed by Suharto and because her father’s image still held appeal as the antithesis of Suharto. She was especially popular among the millions of poor people throughout Java.
and Bali because it was mostly among these people where Sukarno was idealized as a hero. Megawati rarely gave a clear outline of her vision or policy platform and was notorious for saying next to nothing. This silence was in part characteristic of her leadership style and in part a conscious effort by her advisors not to emphasize the fact that her views were not in concert with the reformist visions held by many of her supporters.

Megawati wanted a change in regime and leadership of the country, preferably with herself at the helm, but she was a strong opponent of altering the political institutions or the constitution. She wanted to retain a strong presidency with few checks on power and a prominent role for the military in politics. She also strongly opposed decentralizing power to the provinces or holding a referendum on independence for E. Timor. These views made Megawati less reformist than most of her supporters seemed to realize.

Wahid successfully used the organizational network of NU to get support for his party, PKB. Local religious leaders throughout East Java used their influence with the villagers to garner support for PKB. The party did not lay out a clear plan for the country’s political future, but instead relied upon the patron-client ties of the local religious leaders and people’s long time affiliation with and loyalty to NU. Despite his party’s lack of a

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45 Her party’s vague platform entailed building an independent judicial system; promoting a clean and credible government; empowering democratic institutions; and restoring confidence in the government (“PDI Perjuangan’s Plan for Economic Recovery,” The Jakarta Post July 30, 1999).
46 Interview, Panda Nababan, a long time PDI executive who supported Megawati when she was leader of the PDI in the early 1990s and was active in promoting her in PDI-P, Nov. 10, 1999.
48 Interviews with PDI-P leaders, including: Sutjipto, head of PDI-P’s East Java branch, leader of the party’s legislative fraction, and key negotiator for the party in the presidential election, Dec. 9, 1999; Sukmadewi, Oct. 4, 1999; Widjanarko Puspoyo, PDI-P leader who had recently joined after leaving Golkar, Dec. 2, 1999; and Mochtar Buchori, April 19, 1999. For Megawati’s view of the East Timorese referendum, see “Habibie Calls on the Nation to Accept E. Timor Results,” The Jakarta Post Sept. 5, 1999.
clearly articulated platform, Wahid's views were similar to Megawati's, including the desire to keep the country unitary, to proceed slowly with institutional and constitutional change, to prevent a referendum similar to that given to East Timor, and to respect the military's role in politics.49

Wahid's main campaign tactic was to promote himself as a statesman capable of solving the problem of national disintegration. He visited most of the major figures in the opposition, military, and regime in widely publicized meetings espousing the need for elite unity in order to create national unity. He even met with Suharto several times and suggested that Suharto and his supporters be given a role in the new regime.50

In explaining the origins of the country's rise in violent mass mobilization, especially communal violence, Wahid made many conflicting and confusing statements.51 He accused individual military officers, modernist Muslim figures, and most frequently, Suharto and his clan, of provoking the violence.52 He did not attribute the violence to grievances held by ethnic and religious communities or as being a manifestation of underlying social tensions.

49 Pinning down the official PKB platform was difficult. It was not advertised publicly. Interviews with PKB and NU leaders offered vague insight into what the party wanted to accomplish if given power (interviews: Matori Abdul Jalil, Nov. 29, 1999; Choirul Anam, head of PKB's East Java branch, Jan. 19, 1999; Fuad Anwar, secretary of PKB's East Java branch, Jan. 29, 1999; and M. Arubusman, Oct. 9, 1998).


51 See, for example, "Gus Dur Lagi, Ah," Tempo April 1, 1999. Due to the numerous confusing and incoherent statements made by Wahid, speculation was rife about his mental stability. He had suffered two strokes in recent years. The last stroke, in January 1999, had left him in a coma for more than two weeks. It was rumored that he had not been mentally fit since that time. The public, however, seemed to accept his bizarre and conflicting statements. Perhaps this acceptance can be attributed to the spiritual powers and otherworldly insight accorded to traditional Islamic leaders in the villages.

Many Nahdlatul Ulama leaders who supported Wahid did not expect that he would become president. They were just happy that Nahdlatul Ulama might have a prominent role in the coalition building that would elect a new president. Wahid himself repeatedly stated that Megawati was the official presidential candidate of PKB. It is even reported by leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama and PKB that many people who supported and voted for PKB did so out of respect for their local patrons, but assumed that since PKB was supporting Megawati, they were actually voting for a Megawati presidency.

The fourth big party of the opposition was the Islamic party, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party). This party had the advantage of a pre-existing network of branch offices from the Suharto period. PPP also used its position within the Legislature to demand reforms that were popular with the people, as described in the preceding chapter. Its public display of reformist actions in the legislative debates over the three political laws earned the party respect. Despite PPP’s organizational network and support for reforms, analysts predicted that PPP would fare poorly in the elections because it had been affiliated with Suharto’s regime in the past. Moreover, it had no leading figure who was prominent among the opposition elite, unlike PDI-P, PAN, and PKB.

7.2.2. Post-Election Coalition Formation

The results of the June 7th 1999 general elections gave Megawati’s PDI-P the biggest share of votes with 34% of the electorate choosing her party for legislative seats at the national level. Golkar came in second with 22% of the vote, PKB third with 13%. PPP

53 Interview, Hasyim Muzadi, head of Nahdlatul Ulama after Wahid left this post in 1999, Jan. 25, 1999.

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did surprisingly well with 11%. Amien's PAN did not fare as well as some had predicted and received only 7%. A sixth party did well enough to pass the threshold of 2% of legislative seats, which enabled it to participate in the next general election. This was PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent Moon and Star Party), a modernist Muslim party.56

Due to the electoral law dividing the legislative seats equally between Java/Bali and the outer islands, despite the low population of the outer islands, the national percentage of vote did not translate exactly into the same percentage of seats in the National Legislature.57 Parties that had their vote densely concentrated in provinces on Java were disadvantaged. PKB ended up receiving fewer legislative seats than PPP despite the former's greater number of total votes. This was because PPP's votes were dispersed across the country, which enabled it to win seats from several provinces. Golkar was also advantaged by having most of its constituency in the outer islands.58

Once in the Legislature and Assembly, the parties formed eleven fractions (fraksi). The five largest parties each formed their own fraction. PAN and a smaller Islamic party, PK (Partai Keadilan, Justice Party), merged to form one fraction, called the Reform Fraction (F-Reformasi). Another large fraction in the Assembly consisted of the appointed social group representatives.59 The military also had a fraction consisting of

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55 See Appendix 2 for parties' percentages of the total vote.
56 These six parties are the only ones that passed the 10 seat (2%) threshold stated in the electoral law to be eligible to contest the next election. Fifteen other parties won at least one seat in the Legislature but are not eligible to contest the next election.
57 The system over represented the outer islands.
58 See Appendix 2 for seat distribution in the National Legislature and Assembly.
59 65 representatives from social groups were chosen by the groups they represented and the KPU, as outlined in Chapter 6. These representatives made up their own fraction in the assembly and were called Utusan Goiongan (literally means groups' delegation, but is here called the Social Group Fraction). They sat only in the Assembly and not the Legislature. The selection, by the KPU, of which groups within the chosen categories would appoint representatives was not done until after the general election and was controversial. The final list of groups was not agreed upon in the KPU until August 19, 1999. For more
their 38 representatives. The small parties that won seats were forced to merge in fractions due to the need to have a minimum of 10 seats in each fraction.60

Regional representatives who were chosen by the newly elected provincial regions had to chose a fraction to join. This practice had the unintended consequence of advantaging Golkar because its fraction received the most regional representatives.61 This was partly due to the party’s wide distribution throughout many outer island provinces. However, even in some provinces that had legislatures dominated by PDI-P, non-PDI-P representatives were chosen. Corruption was alleged to be the reason for this.62

In the resulting National Assembly, PDI-P and Golkar had almost the same amount of seats with PDI-P in the lead by 3 seats. PDI-P had 185 seats; Golkar had 182 seats. The third largest fraction was the Social Group fraction with 73 seats. Although large, this fraction’s representatives supported a variety of presidential candidates and did not declare allegiance to any political party. This lessened the strength of its bargaining position. PPP was the third largest party/bloc with 70 seats. PKB was fourth with 57 seats. The Reform Fraction had 49 seats. The military had its automatic 38 seats in the Legislature and Assembly, which placed it in a strategic swing-vote position. PBB, a

detailed information on this process, see “Pilihan Utusan Golongan Belum Selesai,” Kompas August 3, 1999.

This requirement was temporarily waived for the PDKB (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, Love the Nation Democratic Party), which had only five seats but was allowed to form its own fraction for the General Session of the Assembly.

PPP and the Reform Fraction also had a disproportionate number of regional representatives join their fractions. PDI-P received fewer regional representatives than anticipated based upon its total national vote and control of provincial legislatures. See Appendix 2 for the complete listing of how many seats each fraction gained from the addition of regional representatives.


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modernist Islamic party, had 13 seats. Three fractions consisting of small parties created the Assembly's total of 695 seats.\(^6^3\)

The coalition between the three leading opposition figures – Megawati, Amien, and Wahid – quickly ceased following the general election. The political elite from the opposition and regime sought to obtain the best possible positions for themselves. Pre-election strategies to obtain votes were revised as the struggle moved exclusively to the elite level.

Amien was distressed to have received such a small percentage of the vote and sought a means to save his chances of receiving a leadership position. He therefore formed an alliance of Islamic parties called the Central Axis (Poros Tengah). Amien declared that the Central Axis would support Wahid for the presidency and not Megawati. Problems with the Muslim community accepting a woman as the nation's leader were cited.\(^6^4\)

Coalitions remained extremely fluid as the General Session approached. The Central Axis continued to give its support to Wahid. However, Wahid publicly claimed to support Megawati.\(^6^5\) The leader of PKB, Matori, also maintained firm support for Megawati.\(^6^6\) Thus, PKB's inclusion in the Central Axis was uncertain despite Amien's

\(^6^3\) Since East Timor voted for independence, they did not send their five regional representatives to the Assembly. This brought the total Assembly seats from 700 to 695. See Appendix 2 for a list of each fraction's seats and their percentage of seats in the Legislature and Assembly.

\(^6^4\) The post-election shift in alliance formation was partially due to a return to "cultural cleavage" politics that pitted the modernist Muslims that Amien represented against Megawati's secular nationalists. Amien's poor electoral results convinced him that he had been wrong to try to be a pluralist and that he should return to his "Muslim roots" (interview: Moeslim Abdurrahim, July 13, 1999).

\(^6^5\) Wahid's statements were conflicting and confusing. In the domestic media he maintained support for Megawati, although he hinted at ambitions of his own (See, for instance, "Harus Segera Lakukan Konsensus Nasional," Kompas July 18, 1999). Contrary to this stance, in an interview given to a foreign news reporter, Wahid openly stated that he intended to be the next president ("I Will be the One. Why Not?", *Asiaweek* June 18, 1999).

\(^6^6\) The leader of Wahid's PKB party, Matori Abdul Jalil, disagreed with Wahid's plans to usurp Megawati as the primary presidential candidate and kept PKB firmly behind Megawati. He promoted a PDI-P/PKB/Golkar alliance (interview, Matori Abdul Jalil, Nov. 29, 1999; "Mereka Mau Memecah Gus Dur-281
call for a Wahid presidency. The inclusion of two other Muslim parties, PPP and PBB, in the Central Axis alliance was also uncertain. Both of these Islamic parties had some allegiance to Habibie through patronage networks and possibly through accepting money in exchange for political support.

PPP, as discussed in the previous chapter, had been a leader in demanding reform of the political and electoral system while the three political laws were being revised. Their presence in the Legislature had benefited the opposition movement's drive for free and fair elections. The party had opposed Golkar on many crucial points. Following the general election, PPP turned vehemently against Megawati and even issued a fatwa denouncing her candidacy because she was a woman. PPP declared that the party would support Habibie for the presidency because he best represented its interests as a Muslim party.

The fluidity of the alliance formation was due to the lack of a clear mandate by any party. Even though PDI-P had received the largest share of votes, its nearly equal number of seats to Golkar in the Assembly put the party in a vulnerable position. This prompted intense bargaining behind closed doors over possible coalitions and different presidential candidates. Both Amien and Wahid vigorously engaged in this bargaining

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68 A fatwa is an edict issued by learned Muslim scholars/leaders that is binding on all Muslims. The fatwa stated that, according to Islam, a woman could only be the leader of a community of Muslims if there were no acceptable male alternatives ("Perempuan Tidak Bisa Menjadi Presiden: PPP," Kompas July 16, 1999; "PPP Wants Male, Muslim President," The Jakarta Post July 16, 1999).

69 Habibie, as a dispenser of patronage to the Muslim community under Suharto, had ties to leaders in PPP; thus, official party support for him. However, many younger members in PPP preferred that he not be a candidate for president because they did not want PPP to vote for a figure from the old regime. They therefore maintained ties to the Central Axis and hoped that Habibie's candidacy would be thwarted enabling a third candidate to enter the race (interview, Ali Marwan Hanan, secretary-general of PPP, Oct. 9, 1999).
process in the months between the general election and the General Session of the Assembly. Megawati was conspicuously absent from this negotiating. She apparently felt no need to sully herself with the dirty politics of bargaining when, in her eyes, she clearly deserved the presidency because her party had won the most votes.  

Different parties approached Megawati as a possible coalition partner. For instance, Golkar suggested that Golkar and PDI-P, as the largest two fractions, form a coalition with Megawati as president and Akbar as vice president. Megawati refused to make any deals with anyone. This refusal to negotiate and to commit herself to sharing power with other parties cut her out of the plots that were being hatched in the months preceding the General Session and almost certainly cost her the presidency. Only PKB continued to support Megawati, but even this strong alliance between PKB and PDI-P would be forced apart by the ascension of Wahid as a candidate for president.

Opposition to Megawati mounted in the months preceding the General Session. The elite manipulated the social cleavage between secular nationalists, associated with PDI-P, and modernist Muslims so that violence could be threatened if Megawati won the

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70 Megawati had appointed young, idealistic party members, including Zulvan Lindan and Heri Akmadi, or those with little national level experience, including her husband and Sutjito, to plan strategy for her and to negotiate in the months between the general election and the General Session of the Assembly. Old-timers in the party (from PDI under Suharto) and newcomers from Golkar or the military saw that the party was being cut out of deals by refusing to negotiate, but could not persuade Megawati that she was making a fatal mistake. People in PDI-P were also reluctant to approach Megawati with bad news due to their desire to remain in her good favor so that they might obtain good positions in a new government if Megawati became president (Azkarmin Zaini, head of news at the prominent private television station, ANTV, Oct. 17, 1999).

71 This possibility was negotiated mostly through Marzuki Darusman, a leader of a reformist fraction of Golkar. Akbar allowed negotiating on several fronts to continue simultaneously so that the party would have several options. The lack of interest from PDI-P, however, necessitated vigorously pursuing other options, which eventually led to a deal being made with the Central Axis and Wahid that bypassed PDI-P.

72 The question of "who got what" drove the negotiating. Megawati refused to agree to appoint members of the other parties to high positions in the government. This left the other parties fearful that she would cut them out of any positions if she were president and provided one reason for them to seek an alternative to her as president ("Arogan Membawa Petaka," Gatra, Oct. 24, 1999 and "Seeking Support," Far Eastern Economic Review Oct. 21, 1999).
presidency. Muslim leaders from the Central Axis and from Habibie’s camp mobilized mass protests against her based on her suspect Islamic credentials. As discussed in the “mass mobilization” section, Islamic symbolism was used during these rallies and defending Habibie was sometimes equated with defending Islam. It was frequently heard that despite PDI-P’s largest share of the vote, 66% of the population did not vote for her and she therefore should be blocked from the presidency.

There were clear indications that the elite opponents of Megawati were planning to create mass level violence if she were elected president. If Megawati’s opponents violently opposed her election as president, this scenario could split the military and raise the possibility that Muslim politicians and allied officers in the military could attempt to take over the government. The possibility of violent clashes and civil war, although the threat was ironically instigated by Megawati’s opponents, gave her opponents a justification for not electing her president.

The General Session of the National Assembly that would elect the president and vice president was divided into two parts. Members were sworn in October 1, 1999. For five days the Assembly met to choose leaders of the Assembly and Legislature and to pass rules of procedure. The selection of Amien as head of the Assembly and Akbar as head of the Legislature portended the defeat of PDI-P. Amien and Akbar were elected with an

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73 The inclusion of 37% non-Muslims as PDI-P representatives in the MPR furthered the party’s image as one that was inimical to Islam because this high percentage of non-Muslims was vastly out of proportion with society’s overwhelming Muslim majority (National Democratic Institute, Nov. 28, 1999, The 1999 Presidential Election).
75 Interviews: Jimly Asshiddiqie, July 15, 1999; Umar Juoro, a Habibie advisor, July 30, 1999; Moeslim Abdurrahman, July 13, 1999; Din Syamsuddin, September 5, 1999; Saleh Khalid, deputy secretary-general of PPP, August 12, 1999.
anti-Megawati alliance that included the Central Axis (minus PKB) and Golkar. PKB, under Matori's directive, continued to support PDI-P. The same voting pattern was seen on the procedural issues in this first half of the General Session.

Leaders in PDI-P were so unprepared for the voting that they did not know how the votes would go until the moment the results were called out. Other fraction leaders had been busily engaged in communication and negotiation and knew how their allies and opponents were going to vote before walking into the plenary sessions, but PDI-P leaders were stunned and embarrassed at their defeats. At this point, they began to reach out to other parties in an effort to ensure Megawati's election as president. It was, however, too late.

The other parties had already agreed to block Megawati. If Habibie's accountability speech failed, as is described in the "regime" section, then the major fractions, except for PKB and PDI-P, agreed to elect a compromise candidate. There was some dispute over who that candidate might be, but there seemed to be no alternative to Wahid. However, PKB's continuous support for Megawati confused the situation.

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76 The Social Group fraction was split and did not vote unanimously, but most of the members apparently voted with Golkar and the Central Axis. The leader of the fraction, Marzuki Usman, was a previous Golkar leader and cabinet member under Suharto. He was purported to have ties to Habibie (interview, Azkarmin Zaini, October 17, 1999).

77 PDI-P/PKB lost to the Golkar/Central Axis alliance on insignificant procedural issues that some PDI-P members felt were senseless and only showed how weak the party was. These losses were blamed on the poor strategizing of PDI-P negotiators. The party finally decided to vote with the majority in order to avoid more humiliating losses. For this reason, and in a last minute attempt to form an alliance with Golkar, PDI-P voted for Akbar to become the leader of the Legislature (Sophan Sophian, a long-time PDI-P leader, Oct. 8, 1999).

81 Matori Abdul Jalil felt that Wahid's intention to become president was a betrayal of the PKB voters who had assumed that they were in effect voting for Megawati when they voted for PKB. He thought that democracy mandated that Megawati become president and that PDI-P should form an alliance with the reformers in Golkar (interview, Matori Abdul Jalil, Nov. 29, 1999).
Habibie’s accountability speech was important because if it passed then he would remain a candidate and the Central Axis would fall apart. PPP and PBB were prepared to vote for Habibie. Golkar’s fraction would be instructed to do the same. The Reform fraction preferred not to vote for Habibie but if the contest were between Habibie and Megawati, then the fraction would vote for Habibie. As described below, Habibie’s speech failed and he withdrew his candidacy.

PDI-P had assumed that Habibie was the main competitor to Megawati and that if his speech were rejected, then Megawati would easily ascend to the presidency. They realized too late that the rejection of Habibie’s speech did not mean that the fractions were supporting Megawati. With Habibie out of the way, and an atmosphere of “anyone but Mega,” the door was open for another candidate.

Wahid had been tentatively agreed upon by the anti-Mega factions in the first week of October when the Assembly and Legislative leaders were being chosen. Akbar had brief hopes that he might muster support for himself, but the Axis Force held firm to Wahid as the only candidate whom they could agree on. PKB was in the unusual position of officially supporting a rival candidate other than its founder. Matori, leader of

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83 The representatives from Amien’s PAN, including the Reform Fraction leader, A. M. Fatwa, were from the staunchly Muslim wing of the party. Many of them voted for Habibie’s accountability speech and preferred him over Wahid for president (interview, Faisal Baari, Secretary-General of PAN, Nov. 17, 1999). This was despite the opposition to Habibie from the pluralist leaders in the party, who did not hold seats in the party’s Assembly fraction (“Pertanggungjawaban Habibie: ‘Penolakan DPP PAN Terhadap Habibie Sikap Resmi Partai,” Kompas Oct. 18, 1999).
PKB, still thought that not electing Megawati would undermine democracy and be a betrayal of the voters.\textsuperscript{86}

In the end and under pressure from senior Islamic leaders in NU, PKB supported Wahid.\textsuperscript{87} Megawati had only her own party's votes, dissident votes from Golkar, some votes from the Social Group fraction, a couple of tiny fractions, and perhaps a few military votes. Wahid had the support of his party - PKB, the Reform fraction, PPP, PBB, most of Golkar, most of the military, and some tiny parties. He won the presidential election with a vote of 373 to 313.\textsuperscript{88}

The night after Megawati's loss, riots erupted in Jakarta, central Java, Bali, Medan, and other provincial capitals.\textsuperscript{89} The rioting could have easily escalated to proportions greater than seen in May 1998 if Megawati had not publicly asked her supporters to accept the decision made by the Assembly to choose her "elder brother," Wahid, as president.\textsuperscript{90} However, despite Megawati's call for calm, the rioters were largely out of control. The political elite, seeming suddenly to realize the consequences of what they had done, were frightened of what might come if they chose Akbar as vice president as

\textsuperscript{86} Interview, Matori Abdul Jalil, Nov. 29, 1999. Matori even attended protests that took place during the General Session of the Assembly in support of Megawati ("AM Fatwa Protes Matori," Kompas Oct. 17, 1999).

\textsuperscript{87} Wahid went around his appointed leader of PKB, Matori Abdul Jalil, who had turned out to be more independent than Wahid had anticipated, and sought support for his candidacy from senior ulama in Nahdlatul Ulama, the organization that he had led for fifteen years. These senior ulama pressured leaders in PKB to support Wahid for the presidency. Matori had no choice but to follow suit or lose control of the party (interview, Matori Abdul Jalil, Nov. 29, 1999 and “Gus Dur Gets Green Light from Spiritual Guru,” The Jakarta Post Oct. 19, 1999).


\textsuperscript{89} See the section on "mass mobilization" for more details.

\textsuperscript{90} “Mega Kalah!” Aksi Oct. 21, 1999.
tentatively planned. Wahid therefore contacted Megawati that night and asked her if she would accept the vice presidency.

There was opposition to electing Megawati vice president in the Central Axis since the Islamic parties remained strongly opposed to Megawati, especially considering Wahid's poor health. Amien was instrumental in getting enough acceptance for her as the vice president despite opposition from his own party's fraction in the Assembly. Megawati's inclusion in the government was deemed essential for giving the new government the legitimacy needed to rule.

After some hesitation, Megawati reluctantly accepted the offer. She was afraid of another humiliating defeat and trickery by the other parties. She said that she would be a candidate only if there were no vote; a consensus had to be obtained. Amien tried to get a consensus but failed. PPP, PBB, and Habibie's supporters in Golkar refused to vote for Megawati and put up a candidate of their own – Hamzah Haz, head of PPP.

Despite a rival candidate, Megawati was assured that she would win the vote. On October 21, the day following the election of Wahid, Megawati was elected vice president with 396 votes to Hamzah's 284 votes, including five abstentions. Besides her

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91 Wahid had promised Akbar to support his candidacy for the vice presidency if Akbar supported him for the presidency (interview, Slamet Effandy Yusuf, Dec. 1, 1999).
93 As vice president, Megawati would be the successor to the presidency if Wahid could not fulfill his term.
94 Rioters had ransacked Amien's mother's home where he had been raised in Solo, Central Java, and burned it to the ground. This, and other violent incidents in Central Java, is purported to have pushed him to accept Megawati as vice president. He also saw it as the politically expedient thing to do since he had already obtained a high position and he wanted to retain his public image as a reformer and leader of the opposition movement (Perkiraan Dukungan Suara," Tempo Oct. 28, 1999 and interview, Faisal Basri, Nov. 17, 1999).
95 Discussion with Dimyati Hartono, Oct. 21, 1999.
96 Decision through consensus of the fraction heads was how decisions had been made under Suharto's regime.
98 Akbar and Wiranto had withdrawn from the race.
own party, she had the support of PKB, dissident Golkar members, much of the Social Group fraction, and the military. The rioting ceased and the new “national coalition” government was accepted enough by society and the international community to be deemed legitimate.

The nation’s problems were compounded, however, by the election of a president who had only 13% of the vote. Wahid’s election, although accorded legitimacy, was seen by much of society as being fueled by self-interested maneuvers among the political elite that disregarded the voters’ mandate.\(^99\) The behavior of the political elite contributed to the growing cynicism in society vis-à-vis the new political elite.\(^100\) The opposition leaders, except perhaps Megawati, had lost more of their already diminished respect.

The opposition elite had also squandered the opportunity to use the newly elected Assembly as a constituent assembly with a public mandate to make constitutional and institutional reform.\(^101\) Instead, they bickered over who got what spoils left over from Suharto’s regime, including control over the vast patronage network of the state. The continuing corruption and lack of attention paid to social grievances since the transition

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\(^99\) This conclusion is based on a review of the media reports about Wahid’s election and from many discussions with Indonesians from a variety of backgrounds.

\(^100\) This cynicism was documented by a public opinion poll taken by the NGO, ELSAM, in the weeks following the election of the president and vice president. Although not a rigorous poll, the results were corroborated by other informal polls, including those taken by the nation’s leading weekly news magazine, *Tempo*.

\(^101\) Although nine of the constitution’s 37 articles were changed in a first amendment to the constitution, most were not very significant for the functioning of democracy. The exception was the addition of a statement restricting the president and vice president to only two five-year terms, as was agreed upon in an MPR decree issued during the Special Session of the Assembly in Nov. 1998. Some attempt was made to give the Legislature more power over the president through requiring legislative approval of the assignment of ambassadors and giving the legislature more power to initiate legislation, but these steps were limited in scope and did not address overriding problems in the division of powers and establishment of checks and balances (for more details on the constitutional changes, see National Democratic Institute, Nov. 28, 1999, *The 1999 Presidential Election* and “Amandemen UUD 1945,” *Tajuk* Oct. 28, 1999).
to democracy has perpetuated the image of the political elite as greedy and the political institutions as ineffective.

7.3. Military

The military remained surprisingly neutral throughout this latter portion of the transitional period. This neutrality was largely due to internal problems in the military, which had continued to fragment as the transition wore on. The military's capabilities were also stretched as unrest spread from the cities to towns and villages.

The preoccupation with controlling social unrest, preventing national disintegration, and retaining central control over officers and their troops in the provinces resulted in the military, as an institution, becoming progressively less involved in the politics of the transition. The leading officers, although they guarded certain military prerogatives, wanted a legitimate government to come to power that would provide social stability so that the military could concentrate on unifying and professionalizing itself. Wiranto continued to hold political ambitions, as is discussed below, but this was held in check by the need to prevent the military from being torn apart by centrifugal forces.

7.3.1. Chasing Fires

During the campaign period for the general election, the military was busy trying to maintain social order in the tumultuous archipelago. As discussed above, communal conflicts were breaking out with deadly results. Tens of thousands of people were forced
to evacuate several areas for fear of their lives and the military was called in to maintain order.102

The military was trying to maintain order throughout the country in an atmosphere of little respect for the law. Mobs continued to attack government offices, the homes of government officials, warehouses, and property. Protests were also still occurring almost daily somewhere in the capital. All of these incidents demanded a military presence since the military was still the primary law enforcer for the country.103

The military was also still engaged in policing regions where separatist groups were active. This included East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya. The military was supposed to be preparing East Timor for the referendum that would take place in a few months, as described below, but was actually organizing pro-integration militia to threaten the population prior to the vote. These militia later terrorized the region after the population voted overwhelmingly for independence.

In Aceh, the police were the primary security force.104 They were involved in escalating violence despite the government’s claim to have restored the region to normalcy. Separatist demands for independence grew louder in Irian after Habibie announced that East Timor would be able to choose independence in a referendum.105

102 The conflict in Maluku alone resulted in the military sending over ten thousand troops to the region (“Military Takes Control in Ambon,” The Jakarta Post March 12, 1999 and “ABRI Sends Special Team to Ambon,” The Jakarta Post March 8, 1999).

103 Despite the official separation of the police from the military on April 1999, the police were not yet capable of overtaking full responsibility for law and order.

104 Although the police had been separated from the military and placed under the supervision of the minister of defense and security instead of the commander of the armed forces, Wiranto held both positions simultaneously, which nullified any impact of the change at this point (“Police Separate from Armed Forces Today” and “Police Politics,” The Jakarta Post April 1, 1999).

105 Habibie announced in late January 1999 that East Timor would be given a referendum. This decision is discussed in the “regime” section of this chapter.
The potential spread of separatist demands frightened the military and placed the prevention of territorial disintegration high on its list of priorities.\textsuperscript{106}

In the past, as described in Chapter 3, the military had been used by Suharto to control the population through preventive tactics, such as manipulating elections for district heads, mayors, and governors. The military had also kept a close eye on the population and intimidated, imprisoned, or killed potential troublemakers before a situation became too problematic. During the transitional period, the rampant social unrest and mobilization exposed the weakness of the military, which in turn prompted further unrest and mobilization. The military was desperately ill-prepared or equipped to deal with the situation of disintegrating authority and legitimacy of state institutions. Just transporting personnel to hot spots took days, or weeks, due to the lack of functioning equipment and money to buy spare parts.\textsuperscript{107}

In an attempt to alleviate the lack of sufficient manpower needed to control the unrest in society, Wiranto ordered the formation of a civilian militia. This proposal was met with resistance due to distrust of the military’s intentions. The military was able to bypass the need for new legislation by using existing laws on community defense forces. Thousands of civilians began to be trained to form Kamra (Keamanan Rakyat, People’s Security) with the goal being to train and employ 40,000 people.\textsuperscript{108} These civilians were to perform the more mundane tasks of the military: directing traffic, manning community posts, and patrolling neighborhoods. They were not issued weapons but were authorized

\textsuperscript{106} Interview, Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, Governor of Lemhannas (the National Defense Institute), Nov. 27, 1999.

\textsuperscript{107} The sudden realization by society that “the emperor wears no clothes” is an apt description of what happened in regard to society’s sudden shift from being afraid of the military to having contempt for it.

to detain suspects. The military was, however, still vastly ill-prepared to deal with the continuing social unrest and rising disintegration of state authority.

Adding to the military’s problems was the allegation made by leading members of society, as discussed in Chapter 6, that some people in the military were purposely instigating the social chaos in an attempt to derail the elections and create a pretext for an authoritarian government. While no proof for these accusations was presented, the rumors grew as the unrest grew. Even military officers became uncertain about the veracity of the rumors. This further fueled the confusion and uneasiness within the military ranks and among the officer corps. Were they fighting their own men? Whom were they fighting?

The difficulty experienced by the military in performing minimal tasks of law and order prevented it from interfering in parties’ campaigns or in preparations for the elections. The deteriorating image of the military now included ineptness, corruption, bias in conflict torn regions, and instigation of the unrest. Morale in the ranks was low and fragmentation increased as officers in the field lost confidence in their superiors. Despite the unease of field officers, however, most of the commanders wanted the elections to take place as scheduled. They wanted society to view the selection of a new government as legitimate so that state institutions could regain authority and the disintegration of society could be brought under control.

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7.3.2. Attempting to Maintain Internal Unity in the Post-Election Frenzy for Power

The military remained surprisingly neutral in the negotiations over who would be chosen president by the Assembly. Wiranto had political ambitions and hoped that he would be chosen as a compromise candidate, or at least vice president, but he did not force or use threats to achieve this outcome. He knew that top priority must be given to maintaining unity and the central command structure within the military.

Following the general election, the military continued to show signs of fragmenting and its image further deteriorated. Officers in Jakarta were reportedly losing control over regional commanders in the provinces, despite the numerous reshuffles that had been made throughout the preceding year.113 Regional commanders were getting entangled in local conflicts, abusing their local power for illegal activities, such as logging and narcotics, and were using repressive tactics against protestors.114 These officers purportedly resented being hamstrung by commands from Jakarta ordering them to use restraint in dealing with taunting protestors.115 Violent human rights abuses also occurred in Aceh despite orders to show restraint.116

Under pressure from lower ranked officers, military headquarters eventually acquiesced in allowing troops to use a firmer hand in dealing with protesters. Blatant violence was, however, supposed to be avoided. The law on protests that had been passed just prior to the Special Session of the National Assembly began to be enforced

116 One example is the military firing into a crowd north of Lhokseumawe, Aceh. At least 28 people were killed ("Kontras Blasts TNI for Aceh 'Massacre,'" The Indonesian Observer May 5, 1999).
more strictly. It stipulated that protesters needed to provide the police with three days notification of a protest, receive a permit, limit protests to fifty people, and avoid strategic locations and holidays. Many protests since the passage of this law had far outstripped the fifty-person limit, but had not been disbanded. Following the general election, the military more frequently used the law to break up protests and arrest participants, especially those from the more radical groups.117

Violence against these protesters became commonplace in the months leading up to the General Session of the Assembly.118 The large outpouring of people that took to the streets to protest the Security Law in September 1999 was also met with violence that left at least seven civilians dead.119 These deaths resulted from the lack of discipline of the troops and was symptomatic of the weakness of the military’s central command structure.120

The military maintained communication with all of the major parties following the general election. The leading officers had decided not to attempt to impose their will on the outcome of either the general election or the selection of the president and vice president. This decision was made in part due to the practical concern that the military was too weak to impose its will on anyone and unable to contain the social unrest that would erupt if the military were perceived to be manipulating the selection of the

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118 For example, the military used violence against protests that were made in front of the KPU and near Suharto’s home (“Forkot Ditolak Pemilu,” Kompas June 29, 1999 and “Suharto Harus Diadili,” Kompas Aug. 3, 1999).
119 For more details, see the above “mass mobilization” section.
120 Two of the victims were hit by bullets shot randomly into a crowd from passing Mobile Brigade police trucks transporting personnel (an eyewitness account by a respected intellectual, Hermawan Sulistyo: “Dua Orang Penonton Ditewas,” Forum Keadilan Sept. 27, 1999).
The decision was also made in order not to exacerbate disunity within the military ranks and among the officers.121 The military’s desire to remain a political player, as a unified institution, was hampered by the disunity of the troops. The Muslim versus nominally or non-Muslim dichotomy that was becoming more salient in society and among the civilian political leadership also affected the military. The old rivalry in the military between Muslim versus secular nationalists was activated and undercut the efforts of pro-reform officers.122 This division, and general fragmentation of the military, was a serious threat to its ability to become a more professional, unified organization that had the strength to perform its security functions adequately.

Most of the officers agreed that Habibie should not be given another term in office because the people would not accept this and it would be the military that was called upon to quell the social unrest.123 However, the military did not want to take sides in the presidential contest. If Megawati were favored by the military, then the officers in the Muslim factions would rebel and Muslim leaders would create social unrest.

The military also did not want Habibie to be given another term as president because he had allowed East Timor to secede from the country.124 This infuriated many military

121 The military therefore did not actively participate in pre-General Session preparations or in committee hearings during the session (interviews: Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, head of the military fraction in the National Assembly, Oct. 18, 1999 and Ekky Sjahrudin, a senior member of Golkar, Oct. 19, 1999).
124 East Timor voted for independence in a referendum on August 30, 1999. The military was caught off guard with Habibie’s announcement in January 1999 that East Timor would be allowed a referendum on autonomy versus independence. Wiranto had expected more time to study the proposal. Habibie did not consult with the military about his rash decision (interview, Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, Nov. 27, 1999).
personnel who had friends who had lost their lives fighting rebels in the province.\textsuperscript{125} Habibie had never been a popular figure with the military due to his interference in their business activities when he was a cabinet minister under Suharto. After the referendum in East Timor, he was hated by many officers and troops and was perceived to be soft on the threat of national disintegration and ignorant of existing conditions in the country.\textsuperscript{126}

The anger of some officers in the military led them to organize and support violence in East Timor following the referendum.\textsuperscript{127} Wiranto either could not or would not stop this violence. The military’s image suffered further at home and abroad as evidence mounted that it was the military that armed and organized the militias that were terrorizing pro-independence people in East Timor following the referendum.\textsuperscript{128}

The opposition to both Habibie and Megawati, combined with the desire to maintain internal unity, led the military to seek a third candidate who would be accepted by all sides.\textsuperscript{129} Although Wiranto flirted with the idea of putting himself forth as a compromise candidate, it was generally agreed upon by the leading officers of the military that this was unwise and would hurt the military’s image and efforts to reform itself. Many

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The anger of the military was widely reported in the Indonesian and international media. See, for example: “Pilih TNI,” \textit{Adil} Sept. 7, 1999 and “Second Thoughts,” \textit{FEER} April 29, 1999. Numerous interviews with military and civilian leaders also spoke of this anger.\textsuperscript{125}

\item Habibie had told the military that the vote would likely be close enough for the National Assembly to refuse independence (the final approval for secession had to be granted by the new Assembly). His lack of information about the situation led him to make a poor decision (interview, Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar, Nov. 27, 1999).\textsuperscript{126}

\item See, for instance, “Scorched Earth,” “Bitter Memories,” and “Meet the Militia,” \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review} Sept. 16, 1999.\textsuperscript{127}

\item Wiranto is alleged to have been complicit in the violence by allowing his officers to organize militia that systematically burned and terrorized the homes and people of East Timor in regions known to support independence (“The Year in Review: Indonesia,” \textit{AsiaWeek} Dec. 25, 2000).\textsuperscript{128}

\item Although Akbar tried to woo military support as a compromise candidate by suggesting that Wiranto be vice president with Akbar as president, most officers did not want a Golkar leader to be president. This was because society would not accept this and because a Golkar leader would likely try to manipulate and politicize the military. The leading military officers wanted to distance the military from Golkar (interview, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabambo, Oct. 18, 1999).\textsuperscript{129}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
officers also disagreed with Wiranto's more serious efforts to become vice president. They thought the only way for the military to regain unity and to reflect upon its philosophy of "dual function" was by staying in the background and removing itself from direct involvement in politics.\textsuperscript{130} Even though Wiranto knew that many officers felt this way, he continued to pursue the vice presidency through negotiation with the civilian politicians.

Both Megawati and Habibie offered possible routes to the vice presidency for Wiranto. PDI-P, after brief flirtation with the idea of allying with Wiranto, decided that the party's image would be hurt if they supported Wiranto for vice president. Habibie's aides were more arrogant in their belief that they could do whatever they wanted, regardless of society's reaction, and therefore offered support to Wiranto in becoming the vice president if he supported Habibie for another presidential term. Habibie's aides felt that the anti-reform stance of many of the lower level officers would enable them to get support from the military in repressing the social unrest that would emerge if Habibie and Wiranto continued to be the country's leaders.\textsuperscript{131}

Leading officers who held more reformist views convinced Wiranto that his political ambitions would create civil war within the country and military between

\textsuperscript{130} These officers had been trying to return to the original vision of "dual function" as meaning that the military watched over and protected the nation. This was distinguished from the military taking direct control over politics or being used by a politician who wanted control over the country (interview, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Oct. 18, 1999).

\textsuperscript{131} A top aide of Habibie and a key strategist in his inner coterie assigned the task of getting him elected president, Jimly Asshiddiqie, seemed very unconcerned about social unrest if a Habibie-Wiranto duo were elected president and vice president. He said that there would probably be protests, but many officers in the military were willing to use force when necessary. Some people would be shot, which would scare the rest of the protesters and order would be restored (interview, Jimly Asshiddiqie, July 15, 1999).
Habibie/Islamic groups and Megawati supporters.\textsuperscript{132} If massive violence were somehow avoided and the government was able to attain control over the country, the military would still be hurt by the politicization that would flow from its direct involvement in the government. Under pressure from leading officers in the military, Wiranto stated on national television on October 18\textsuperscript{th}, the day before the vote on Habibie’s accountability speech, that he would not stand as a candidate for vice president under any circumstances.\textsuperscript{133} He claimed that relinquishing his political ambitions was a sacrifice made for the nation and military.\textsuperscript{134}

With the military no longer a contender for direct power, the question was whom would the military support in the presidential contest. The military’s 38 seats in the Assembly could easily become swing votes. In response to disagreement within the military and in order to avoid a public backlash, the military leadership decided to remain neutral.

\textsuperscript{132} This fear was compounded by the fact that if the presidential contest were between Megawati and Habibie, the vote would be the same as the vote that brought Amien to the Assembly’s leadership position, leaving the military as the determining bloc of votes (the military had thrown away their votes in the Assembly’s leadership election). With Wiranto running as Habibie’s vice president, the military would be torn apart ("Ketika Sang Jenderal Memilih," \textit{Tajuk} Oct. 28, 1999).

\textsuperscript{133} “Wiranto Kenjelaskan Posisi,” \textit{Kompas} Oct. 19, 1999 and “Wiranto Declines Habibie’s VP Offer,” \textit{The Jakarta Post}. Wiranto was, however, nominated as a candidate for vice president a few days later by a small fraction, PDU. He was not supported by the military representatives and was pressured by leading officers to quickly refuse the nomination. There was speculation that Wiranto continued to aspire to the vice presidency even after he had publicly declared that he would not accept the position (Din Syamsuddin, Oct. 19, 1999). It is even alleged that Wiranto was so angry with Akbar for allowing Habibie’s speech to be rejected, thus thwarting the two contenders for power and opening the opportunity for Akbar himself to take one of the top two positions, that he threatened Akbar’s life if he remained a candidate for either of the offices (interview, Burhan Magenda, a senior Golkar member, Oct. 22, 1999).

\textsuperscript{134} Although his motives involved practical concerns, Wiranto must be credited with not using force to seize direct power throughout the transition and with not using his position as commander of the armed forces to force his political ambitions on the country. A different commander might have pursued an entirely different course, regardless of the practical difficulties.
The military in effect abstained from the vote on the leadership of the Assembly by voting for their own candidate.\textsuperscript{135} The instruction given by the fraction leader for the vote on Habibie's accountability speech is not clear, but it seems that most of the military representatives voted against the speech.\textsuperscript{136} For the presidential election, the leader of the military's Assembly fraction, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, instructed the military fraction that they were free to choose whomever they wanted. The representatives were, however, informed that Wahid would likely create the least social unrest, which was a top priority for the military.\textsuperscript{137} Most reports cite the majority of military representatives in the Assembly as voting for Wahid for the presidency with a few votes going to Megawati.\textsuperscript{138} The military then supported Megawati for the vice presidency because it wanted to prevent further rioting.\textsuperscript{139}

\section*{7.4. Regime}

As the time for dividing the spoils of Suharto's regime came closer, the incumbent power holders fought among themselves and with the opposition elite for political survival. Habibie had not been able to establish the same control over the military as had Suharto. The regime therefore could no longer resort to repression because the military was not capable of controlling society nor willing to use force to uphold the regime. The

\textsuperscript{135} If the military had voted for Amien's opponent, Matori, Amien would have lost. By throwing their votes away, the military avoided appearing to be the swing votes. In the election of the Legislature head, Akbar had a near consensus, so it was safe for the military to support him.

\textsuperscript{136} The military wanted a clear change of regime and a legitimate government to come to power (interview, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Oct. 18, 1999). This indicates opposition to another term for Habibie. Wiranto's political aspirations under Habibie, however, complicated the position of the military (interview, Maj. Gen. Amir Syarifiadin, Nov. 30, 1999).


\textsuperscript{139} "Perkiraan Dukungan Suara," \textit{Tajuk} Oct. 28, 1999.
incumbents were forced to play by new rules and to compete in elections with the newly formed opposition parties. After the general election, backroom deal-making led to betrayals and uncustomary emotional displays in the high-stakes game of fighting for power.

7.4.1. Reforming Golkar and Campaigning in a New Era

The factionalization of the regime and division between Habibie and Akbar deepened as the general election neared. Habibie worked to have himself elected for another term as president despite growing opposition to him in Golkar. Akbar covertly allowed this opposition to grow and harbored political ambitions of his own. Golkar had to first, however, perform well enough in the general election to remain a significant player and have a strong bargaining position.

Besides no longer having the support of the military, Golkar had also lost the support of the civil service, and could not use state institutions to ensure a victory at the polls. The party had genuine competition for the first time. Without guaranteed support from the military and civil service and little prospect for rigging the polls, the Golkar leadership felt they had to rely upon the party’s patronage network to get votes. Public debates or stressing a political platform was ruled out by the party’s strategists because they felt the atmosphere was too anti-regime for this to be effective.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{140} Golkar leaders also had a distaste for mass rallies that they felt brought in “shit” or “dirt” (kotoran), or poor and uneducated people. The history of Golkar had been to depoliticize society and move politics to an elite level. This raison-d’etre for the party was difficult to move beyond both psychologically and organizationally (interviews, Agung Laksono, deputy chairman of Golkar and minister of youth and sport, Oct. 23, 1998 and Slamet Effendy Yusuf, Dec. 1, 1999).
Although Golkar had the advantage over other parties of a three-decade-old patronage network, this network had always been greased by funds from the state. Golkar was no longer able to access these funds as its privileged position was lost. The lack of funds preoccupied Golkar’s leadership and was perceived as a serious threat to the party’s ability to get votes.

As the election neared, there was suspicion that funds, with the source never being identified, were being distributed by individuals connected with Golkar - ostensibly for “humanitarian aid.” By not officially using the party’s name, Golkar could keep these funds off the books, which were subject to audit. Charitable foundations were also reportedly set up to pass out money on Golkar’s behalf.

These tactics were most effective in the outer islands where the regime’s old patronage network remained intact and just awaited the funds. On Java, opposition to the regime was too strong. Eastern Indonesia was especially poor and susceptible to this type of patronage. This part of the archipelago had also been the least imbued with the uprising against the regime. The fact that Golkar’s strongest support remained in eastern

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141 These funds came as development projects or as direct cash. Suharto had set up a number of charitable foundations to which corporations were obligated to donate a percentage of profit from government contracts. One foundation, Dakab, estimated to be worth approximately US$530 million, was given to Golkar by Suharto to cover election expenses and operating costs (“Govt. May Give Up Stakes in Charity Foundations,” The Jakarta Post Nov. 27, 1998 and “Golkar No Longer Seeks Funds from Dakab: Akbar,” The Jakarta Post Dec. 12, 1998.). Golkar also owned shares in companies, but due to the economic crisis, the shares were not generating much revenue. Funds had also been obtained from obligatory civil servant dues, but this practice had been eliminated by the new law on parties.

142 For example, Rully Chairul Azwar, assistant secretary-general of Golkar, said that Golkar individuals were giving out humanitarian aid, which was not against the law, in “No Fear or Favour,” FEER Feb. 11, 1999.

143 Interviewees close to the regime sometimes mentioned using humanitarian assistance through charitable foundations as a means of passing out patronage but staying within the limits of the law. They were never specific about the source of the money or the names of the foundations.

144 The funds went mostly to kepala (district heads) and were ostensibly humanitarian assistance for the district. Working through the civil service was necessary due to the past connection between the state bureaucracy and the party that left the party without a separate organizational structure on the local level (interview, Slamet Effendy Yusuf, Dec. 1, 1999).
Indonesia would become important during the conflict between Habibie and Akbar. The eastern Indonesian branch heads were in opposition to the Jakarta-based party leaders on many issues pertaining to the future of the party.

During the campaign period, Golkar was the target of attacks and its leadership subjected to physical assaults. Stones were thrown at the leaders and their vehicles as they attended rallies.145 Rally participants purportedly had to be paid to attend. Akbar and the leadership were furious at being repeatedly attacked and with the police for providing no protection. These incidents and the lack of enthusiasm for rallies further encouraged the Golkar leaders to limit their reliance on public rallies and instead use patronage and “humanitarian assistance” as a means to gain votes.146

While Golkar was trying to ensure an adequate turnout for the party at the polls, a fight was taking place within the party over who would be the party’s presidential candidate. Habibie had been working hard to assure his sole nomination but was not able to attain this at the party’s leadership meeting in March 1999.147 This infuriated Habibie and he began to distrust Akbar’s intentions.148 Habibie then formed a team of strategists to ensure that he had the backing of the party. A key aide, Baramuli, who was a long time Suharto associate, was accused of passing out envelopes of cash to party leaders in

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146 Interview, Ekky Sjahudin, Oct 19, 1999.
147 Five candidates were chosen. They were: Habibie (with 29 votes), Akbar (26 votes), Wiranto (25 votes), Sultan Hamengkubuwono (8 votes) and Ginanjar (5 votes) (“Satu Beringin Lima Nama,” Gatra March 20, 1999 and “Semangat ‘Asal bukan Habibie’ di Golkar,” Tempo March 8, 1999).

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the provinces in exchange for supporting Habibie. Cabinet ministers, such as Theo
Sambuaga, were also accused of doing the same during state trips to regions.149

In May, the party held another leadership meeting and Habibie was nominated the
party’s sole candidate for president. Habibie’s ability to influence the branch heads
enabled him to obtain this goal, but many of the Jakarta-based leaders were against
Habibie continuing on as president.150 Akbar, however, remained officially in support of
Habibie.

The reason that many of the party leaders gave for not wanting Habibie to be elected
president was that it would be detrimental to the party. It was acknowledged that society
would not accept his victory as legitimate and the party would suffer from a backlash of
anger. It was argued, most fervently by a new leader in the party, Marzuki Darusman,
that the party was better off to play the role of opposition for a while before assuming
power again later.151

The movement against Habibie suited Akbar well since Akbar held the ambition of
becoming president himself. He allowed Marzuki to whip up opposition to Habibie
within the party and within the public through criticizing him in the media. It was even
rumored that Marzuki was behind the leak to the press about the “Bank Bali” scandal.152
Akbar needed Habibie out of the way in order to achieve his aspirations. Marzuki used

150 Interview, Fadel Mohammad, Golkar treasurer and leading strategist for Habibie’s faction, June 17,
1999.
scandal involved the disappearance of funds that had been given to Bank Bali by the Indonesian central
bank to recapitalize. It was alleged that Habibie's inner circle of advisors were the culprits and that the
funds were used to obtain support for his candidacy from Golkar branch heads and district heads in the
outer islands. There are numerous media reports covering this issue. See, for instance, the series of
the opportunity to rapidly rise through the ranks and propel himself into the limelight and perhaps achieve a high position for himself in the new government.

As Habibie’s influence in Golkar waned, he tried to present himself as a statesman of the country and to elicit support from other parties, as well as from Golkar. As it became evident that grassroots support for him was weak, he turned to his traditional base - modernist Muslim leaders who had risen to power in the latter years of Suharto’s rule. He reached out to them as a patron of modernist Islam. Modernist Muslim leaders tended to prefer Habibie over Megawati as president because he would give them the positions and patronage they desired, whereas Megawati was inimical to the modernist Muslim community. Habibie also cultivated a reputation as a champion of outer-island aspirations.153

Habibie had his aides and Muslim leaders organize mass-based mobilization in support of his presidency.154 Supporting Habibie was equated with defending Islam and Megawati was criticized as being barely a Muslim. These groups threatened violence if Habibie were not elected president.155

In the spirit of trying to present himself as a statesman, Habibie made the surprising announcement on January 27, 1999 that a referendum on independence in East Timor

153 Habibie is half Javanese and half Buginese, but was born and raised in the homeland of the Buginese - South Sulawesi. He was sympathetic to non-Javanese aspirations and supported the decentralization of power.
154 Interviews: Jimly Asshiddiqie, July 15, 1999 and Umar Juoro, July 30, 1999 and “Lakon ‘Bharatayudha’ Yang Ganga,” Tajuk Oct. 28, 1999. As discussed in the “opposition elite” section, Muslim leaders from the opposition, such as Amien, also promoted the mobilization of masses based upon Islam because they had the similar interest of wanting to block Megawati from the presidency.
would be allowed. The announcement caught everyone, including the military, off

guard and began a maelstrom of criticism. Habibie plunged forward despite the

skepticism of many Indonesians. His opponents in Golkar allowed him to make this fatal

mistake without much comment. After the referendum was held on August 8th and it

became apparent that the East Timorese were not evenly divided on the issue, as Habibie

had predicted, but instead voted 79% in favor of independence, anger at Habibie

mounted.

Despite Habibie’s efforts to assemble a coalition of Muslim parties in support of his

election, the loss of East Timor and the much-publicized Bank Bali scandal in the months

prior to the General Assembly made it difficult for non-Golkar parties to support him.

Opponents within Golkar were also given grounds to turn on him. The political elite

began to realize that society would have a hard time swallowing a Habibie victory as the

outcome of democratic general elections. Pressure from the international community also

mounted for a clear change of regime. With the support of Muslim parties waning,

Habibie needed to rely even more on the support of his own party, Golkar, in order to win

the presidency. Could he trust Akbar?

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156 For more information, see “An Offer East Timor Can’t Refuse?” Time Feb. 8, 1999; “Does Habibie

Want Democracy?” The Economist Jan. 30, 1999; and “Habibie Wants to be Remembered for E. Timor,”


157 Many Muslim parties, including PBB, PPP, PK, and much of PAN still preferred Habibie over

Megawati; however, they were becoming reluctant to chose between the two and either actively or

passively sought a third option (numerous interviews painted this picture, especially, Syafi’i Ma’arif, July

6, 1999; Moeslim Abdurrahman, July 13, 1999; and Husain Umar, leader in PPP, Nov. 20, 1999.

158 For an overview of the pivotal role played by Akbar Tanjung in the presidential election, see, “Power

7.4.2. Post-Election Coalition Formation

Golkar fared about as the party expected in the general election, with 22% of the national vote. Much of this vote came from areas outside of the island of Java, especially the eastern islands, where Golkar was able to use its patronage network most effectively. Although allegations of exchanging money for votes were made, no substantive evidence was presented. The weak system of controlling parties’ behavior also made verifying illegal behavior of parties difficult.

Golkar bolstered its presence in the Assembly through acquiring many regional representatives. Sixty-two regional representatives joined Golkar’s fraction. This placed Golkar only three seats behind PDI-P in the National Assembly and made it a strong player in the negotiating that preceded the General Session of the Assembly.

Throughout this negotiating it was not clear if Golkar was going to support Habibie for the presidency. Akbar claimed to support him, but it was rumored that Habibie’s candidacy would be ended through the rejection of his accountability speech.\textsuperscript{159} Akbar used his power to influence the selection of Assembly delegates in Golkar’s fraction to chose people loyal to himself and not to Habibie.\textsuperscript{160} Akbar also had Marzuki Darusman

\textsuperscript{159} The constitution states that the president will be held accountable to the Assembly every five years. Tradition had been for the president, both Sukarno and Suharto, to give a speech, which was voted on by the Assembly. Suharto’s speeches had been summarily passed with a unanimous “ya” vote. Sukarno had been forced from power after having his speech rejected by the Assembly in 1967.

\textsuperscript{160} Habibie also tried to control who got the seats and was rumored to have helped some regional representatives obtain their seats through giving money to their provincial legislatures. These representatives then joined Golkar’s fraction and supported Habibie (“Kebanyakan Utusan Deerah Menjadi Anggota Golkar,” Merdeka Oct. 1, 1999). Even though Habibie controlled the majority of Golkar’s Assembly fraction members, Akbar was able to retain a sizeable minority that was loyal to him.
named leader of Golkar's fraction and allowed him to continue to whip up opposition to Habibie.  

While Akbar allowed opposition to Habibie to grow within the party, he engaged in negotiations with other parties over whom the Assembly would choose to lead the country. He had representatives of Golkar make tentative deals with different parties to keep all options open. Megawati refused to make a deal with Golkar prior to the General Session. This refusal forced Golkar to vigorously pursue other options in seeking a coalition partner.

Prior to the General Session, Golkar made a tentative alliance with the Central Axis, but it hinged on having Habibie's speech rejected so that he was no longer a candidate for president. If Habibie remained in the game, and the contest was between Habibie and Megawati, then PPP, PBB, and the Reform Fraction would support Habibie. This would mean the dissolution of the Central Axis. Akbar and many of the Muslim leaders in the Axis Force agreed that a compromise candidate would be better than either Habibie or Megawati, but had to knock Habibie out of the race in order not to have the Muslim vote be split between Habibie and a third candidate.

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161 Marzuki was elected fraction leader by the fraction after a long meeting that went into the early morning hours. Many members had already left and the exact number of people remaining was uncertain. The vote was called without prior notice. These circumstances created suspicion that Akbar and Marzuki engineered Marzuki's victory (interview, Burhan Magenda, Oct. 22, 1999).

162 Some of the communicating was done through alumni of the Muslim organization, HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Students), which Akbar used to head. Most all parties had HMI alumni members. Other contacts were made through alumni of Nahdlatul Ulama's affiliated organizations, such as the youth group Banser, which a Golkar leader, Slamet Effendy Yusuf used to head. Marzuki Darusman used his reputation as a reformer from the secular nationalist element of society to communicate with PDI-P (interviews: Anas Urbaningrum, head of HMI, Nov. 24, 1998 and Slamet Effendy Yusuf, Dec. 1, 1999).

Akbar hoped that he could be the third candidate but had trouble obtaining agreement from the other parties. Some leaders within Golkar, including Marzuki Darusman, also thought that it was a bad idea to have a Golkar leader selected for president because the backlash from society would damage future prospects for the party. Wahid was the only candidate whom the parties within the Central Axis and Golkar could agree upon as a compromise candidate.

Before Habibie’s speech to the Assembly, the leaders of the Assembly and Legislature were chosen. The alliance between the Central Axis (minus PKB) and Golkar elected Amien as the Assembly leader and Akbar as the Legislature leader, as described in the “opposition elite” section. At this point, it became clear that Megawati was in serious trouble and that the Central Axis/Golkar alliance would either elect Habibie or a third candidate to the presidency. Everyone awaited Habibie’s accountability speech.

There were two weeks between the selection of the Assembly and Legislative leadership and the vote on Habibie’s accountability speech. During these two weeks, intense negotiating took place between the parties. PDI-P tried desperately to save Megawati’s chances and get the support of Golkar. PKB continued to claim support for Megawati, as discussed in the “opposition elite” section, but if Wahid were a candidate, then that support could be lost. It was crucial, but not certain, whom Golkar would support – Habibie, Megawati, or Wahid.

165 The leadership was voted on Oct. 5, 1999; Habibie’s speech given Oct. 14th; and the vote on the speech Oct. 19th.
166 Inside sources said that the tentative decision to support Wahid was made by Akbar in the weeks prior to the General Session of the Assembly and solidified in a meeting between Wahid, Akbar, and a few other Golkar leaders, including Slamet Effendy Yusuf, on Oct. 2, 1999. It was also decided at this time that Amien would be the leader of the Assembly and Akbar the leader of the Legislature. Akbar was told that...
Habibie’s speech was rejected on October 19, 1999 in a vote of 355 against and 322 for acceptance of the speech. There were nine abstentions and four void ballots. The decisive “no” votes came from Golkar representatives. If all of Golkar had voted for the speech, then it would have passed and the same voting pattern would have brought Habibie another term as president.

Akbar had told the Golkar fraction that Habibie was the party’s candidate and that the representatives should therefore vote to accept the speech. He, however, also said that they should “follow their hearts” in voting on the speech. This was viewed by some as an implicit acceptance of voting against the speech.

Habibie had promised that if his speech failed to pass, he would withdraw his candidacy for president. He followed through with this promise because it was clear that if he stayed in the race, he would lose. It was better to give a third candidate a chance and block Megawati.

Habibie and his supporters in Golkar were furious with Akbar for taking such a soft line in regards to getting support for Habibie and allowing so many Golkar members to vote against the speech. Habibie had trusted Akbar to ensure support for him within the party. While Akbar had officially supported Habibie and had instructed his fraction

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167 The vote was closed, but sources indicate that PPP and PBB voted for acceptance of the speech. Approximately one third of Golkar representatives voted to reject the speech. These votes came from Marzuki Durasman and Ginanjar Kartasasmita’s factions in Golkar. Ginanjar held sway over a significant number of representatives and purportedly instructed them to vote against the speech because he wanted a legitimate government for economic stability (Slamet Effendy Yusuf, Dec. 1, 1999; Burhan Magenda, Oct. 22, 1999; and Husein Umar, Nov. 20, 1999).

168 Interview, Burhan Magenda, October 22, 1999.

169 Although the ballot was secret, it was clear that between 40-80 no votes had come from Golkar.
to vote for passage of the speech, he had not worked hard to ensure that dissident factions in Golkar did not vote against Habibie, knowing the consequences.  

Emotions were so high that two representatives from Habibie’s birthplace, South Sulawesi, waited for Akbar and Marzuki Darusman outside of the door to the fraction meeting on the night of the vote and physically assaulted them. Security guards had to pull them off while they were kicking and screaming and vowing revenge.

Akbar tried to move past the vote and stood in briefly as the party’s presidential candidate. However, too many hard feelings remained within Golkar, and he feared that angry Habibie supporters would turn on him. He withdrew his candidacy and instructed the Golkar representatives to vote for Wahid. Habibie also instructed his supporters in the party to vote for Wahid. Most Golkar fraction members voted for Wahid, but many votes also went to Megawati.

Akbar also briefly stood as a candidate for vice president but again withdrew at the last minute due to fear of lack of support from his own party and to Wahid’s efforts to ensure a Megawati victory. Habibie had instructed his followers to vote for Hamzah and

170 “Irmasulra Janji Pembalasan Dendam,” Gatra Nov. 1, 1999. Akbar had also obtained permission from the party’s branch heads, through negotiating into the early morning hours, for the right of the central board to nominate a new candidate if Habibie’s speech were rejected by the Assembly (“Habibie’s Candidacy Reaffirmed,” The Jakarta Post Oct. 13, 1999 and “Golkar may Review Habibie’s Nomination,” The Jakarta Post Oct. 17, 1999).

171 This story was told to me by several people, including Slamet Effendy Yuaf, Dec. 1, 1999 and was reported in the media. See, for example, “Akankah Akbar Bertahan di Golkar?” Tempo Oct. 31, 1999.

172 Akbar gave a tearful speech to the Golkar fraction claiming to have nothing to gain by Habibie’s speech failing and denying responsibility for it. He said he would only assume the party’s candidacy for president if he had support from the party. He asked those who supported him to stand. Everyone stood (interview: Burhan Magenda, Oct. 22, 1999).

173 Akbar distrusted the stated support from Habibie’s people in Golkar (interview, Burhan Magenda, Oct. 22, 1999).

174 Akbar preferred Wahid because Wahid promised him support for the vice presidency and because Habibie supporters in the party were adamantly opposed to Megawati. Akbar wanted to avoid polarization of the party.

175 These members were mostly in Marzuki Darusman’s wing of the party with the inclusion of some regional representatives who had joined Golkar’s fraction in the Assembly (interview, Burhan Magenda, Oct. 22, 1999).
not for Akbar or Akbar’s choice of candidates. Akbar had made a deal with Wahid to
support him for president if Wahid supported Akbar for vice president, but Wahid
claimed to now see no alternative to electing Megawati for the vice presidency in light of
the rioting that followed her loss in the presidential race. Without guaranteed support
from his own party or from Wahid, Akbar feared that if he pressed ahead with his vice
presidential candidacy, he could lose and create an even deeper division in his party. In
an attempt to appear not to be a traitor, and with the recognition that he would have
trouble winning, Akbar followed Habibie’s directive and instructed the party’s
representatives to vote for Hamzah. It was clear, however, to most of the
representatives that they were free to vote for whom they wanted.

Both Akbar and Habibie failed in their reach for power. Golkar was left badly
divided between the Jakarta leaders, represented by Akbar and Marzuki, and the party
branches in the outer islands, especially eastern Indonesia, that had supported Habibie.
Akbar and his coterie had thought that they could regain firm control over the party
through manipulating the selection of branch leaders in the months following the election
of president and vice president. This was shown, however, to be a difficult task. The fact
that most of Golkar’s constituency lies in the outer islands means that the current
leadership of Golkar is vulnerable to revolt from below. The future direction of the party
is uncertain.

176 “Berawal dari Penolakan Pidato Habibie,” Kompas Nov. 1, 1999 and interview, Slamet Effendy Yusuf,
177 Interview, Burhan Magenda, Oct. 22, 1999 and “Saya Ingin Hidup Tenang,” Forum Keadilan Oct. 26,
1999.
178 While Habibie, Ginanjar Kartasasmita, and many Akbar, loyalists voted for Hamzah in the vice
presidential race, many fraction members, including Marzuki’s dissident wing, voted for Megawati. The
party leadership was in such a state of emotional turmoil that party discipline within the fraction was low
7.5. Economic and International Context of the Above Events

7.5.1. Economic Crisis

The economy continued to stagnate during the months preceding the general election and the selection of the president and vice president. The rupiah remained low in value, but showed signs of improving as violence surrounding the general election did not occur. The biggest problems blocking economic recovery were Habibie’s lack of will in implementing many IMF mandated reforms, such as bank restructuring, and the uncertain political environment. Evidence of continued high-level corruption also hindered the return of international confidence in the Indonesian economy.

The IMF was unhappy with Habibie’s “foot-dragging” on many reforms that had been agreed upon in exchange for massive loans. Habibie continued to protect his close associates. For instance, he had the central bank provide re-capitalization funds for a bank owned by his friend and high-level Golkar associate, Aburizal Bakrie. The infusion of money from IMF loans was despite the fact that the bank did not meet the agreed upon requirements for the IMF funded re-capitalization program. 179

Habibie was also accused of ordering or at least being complicit in a high-level corruption scandal involving the misuse of re-capitalization funds for Bank Bali. 180 This case prompted the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the Paris Club to all

180 There are numerous media reports detailing the Bank Bali case. See, for instance, the series of articles: “Baligate,” Tempo Sept. 11, 1999.
withhold disbursements of funds to the Indonesian government.\textsuperscript{181} The IMF demanded that the case be investigated by an outside auditor.\textsuperscript{182}

The accounting firm Price-Waterhouse audited the Bank Bali books and found evidence of massive corruption.\textsuperscript{183} Approximately US$ 70 million had been transferred from Bank Bali to a dubious company owned by a leading Golkar official. This money was rumored to have been used to help Habibie gather votes for re-election. Habibie refused to release the full Price-Waterhouse report to the public, as had been mandated by the IMF. When the National Assembly met to elect the president and vice president, the IMF and World Bank were still withholding the disbursement of loans.\textsuperscript{184}

The withholding of funds by international donor and lending institutions had a serious impact on the election of the president and vice president. Many political and military elite members were frightened that if Habibie were elected president for a second term, the economy would decline further due to the inability of his government to work with the international financial institutions, particularly the IMF.\textsuperscript{185} This was a persuasive factor partly because individuals within the political and military elite, as well as the military’s businesses that provided over half of the military’s operating budget, were being severely hurt financially by the decline of the Indonesian economy.

\textsuperscript{181} "Indonesian Lending on Hold Due to Bank Bali: WB," \textit{The Jakarta Post} Sept. 14, 1999.
\textsuperscript{182} "Indonesia's Donors Give up on Habibie," \textit{The Jakarta Post} Sept. 16, 1999.
\textsuperscript{183} Price-Waterhouse is an internationally owned financial services company that provides auditing services to governments and large corporations.
\textsuperscript{184} See “The Noose Tightens,” \textit{ Asiaweek}, Oct. 9, 1999 for a detailed account of the released portion of the Price-Waterhouse report and the IMF demands.
\textsuperscript{185} Several interviewees reported to me that representatives from the US Embassy were quick to point this out to the political and military elite in an effort to dissuade them from electing Habibie and/or Wiranto (for example, interviews: Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Oct. 3, 1999 and Slamet Effendy Yusuf, Dec. 1, 1999). It was also rumored at the General Session of the Assembly that Ginanjar Kartasasmita had been swayed by threats that not only would the economy, and all of his financial holdings, decline if Habibie/Wiranto were elected, but details of his involvement in past corruption would also be brought forth and international lending agencies would demand investigation and prosecution, as they were in regards to the Bank Bali scandal. Ginanjar’s followers in Golkar were seen as key swing votes in getting Habibie’s speech rejected.
7.5.2. International Pressure

The IMF’s, and other international agencies’, actions in regards to not disbursing funds was the clearest form of international pressure applied to Indonesia for regime change. If the economy were allowed, by the international financial institutions, to collapse as a result of a Habibie/Wiranto election victory, then not only would elite individuals and military businesses be hurt, but massive rioting would likely break out and the entire government structure could be overthrown. If this happened, then the viability of Golkar and the military’s privileged position would be threatened and major changes would be made to the political and economic framework of the country. As stated above, the United States and Australia made this scenario clear to key political and military leaders.

Pressure not to elect Habibie or Wiranto was also applied through threats of bringing military leaders to international court for human rights abuses in East Timor. Wiranto had been implicated in international crimes against humanity. The military’s

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186 The international community had put a lot of money and time into helping Indonesia hold a free and fair election. To have the leaders of the old regime elected through elite level political maneuvering would have defeated all of these efforts to help Indonesia make a transition to democracy. The international community was also concerned that the country acquire a government accepted by the people so that political stability could enable economic recovery (discussions throughout the General Session of the National Assembly with Ike Reed, from the US Embassy’s political division in Jakarta, and David Enggles, from the Australian Embassy’s political division in Jakarta, Oct. 1-21, 1999).

187 The Indonesian political and economic elite seriously considered this scenario and believed that the US might very well actively encourage massive rioting and the overthrow of the complete political/military complex if Habibie and Wiranto were elected by the Assembly (interview, David Enggles, Oct. 3, 1999).

involvement in organizing militia in East Timor that terrorized whole villages and caused a massive refugee crisis was becoming increasingly clear. Because East Timor was under the auspices of the United Nations when this happened, Indonesian officers could be held accountable to an international tribunal. The impact that the threat of prosecuting military officers had on Wiranto’s decision to withdraw from the presidential and vice-presidential races is not clear, but several people indicated that this was one factor influencing Wiranto.\footnote{Interview, Maj. Gen. Amir Syarifuddin, Nov. 30, 1999. The ramifications of prosecuting Indonesian military officers is unclear, except that travel overseas would be difficult. It was, however, one more indication of the international community’s determination to have a clear regime change in Indonesia. This determination was not lost on much of the political and military elite.}

The international community was persuasive in its attempt to derail Habibie and Wiranto’s election plans; however, most international players and observers missed the domestic maneuverings that would bring Wahid to the presidency. His victory was a big surprise to both the American and Australian Embassies and to the international financial markets. The international community had assumed that the choice for president would be between Habibie and Megawati. Amien’s coalition of Muslim parties had not been taken too seriously.\footnote{Discussion with Ike Reed, during the General Session of the National Assembly. In the days prior to the presidential election, he indicated that the only option to Habibie was Megawati. Only she would be accepted by the Indonesian people.}

To understand why the politicians had turned on Megawati, one had to understand the long-standing cleavage in Indonesian society between the stricter Muslims and the nominal Muslims or secular nationalists and the fact that the Indonesian politicians were driven by “who got what.”\footnote{As the events unfolded, both Ike Reed and David Enggfas repeatedly expressed to me astonishment at the rigidity and depth of the anti-Megawati stance held by the political leaders in the Central Axis and within much of Golkar. They had thought that Islamic politics had failed in the general election judging}
underestimated the enmity between opposing societal camps.\textsuperscript{192} The short-lived alliance of the three leading symbolic figures of the opposition – Megawati, Amien, and Wahid – had outlived its purpose after the general election. The fight became one of individual ambition and political survival in the larger context of the cleavages that divide Indonesian society.

Despite the erroneous assumption that if Habibie’s attempt to hang onto power were successfully blocked, then Megawati would become the country’s first democratically elected president, the international community accepted the Wahid victory and attempted to work with the new government to rebuild the economy. The government, especially due to Megawati’s inclusion as vice president, was deemed legitimate by both the domestic and international communities. A host of problems, however, remained to be solved.

\textsuperscript{192} Although there was also enmity between Amien and Wahid, they were able to maintain an alliance based upon their shared focus on Islam and personal interests of the moment.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION: PROBLEMS IN CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

The transition to democracy in Indonesia was made with three prominent characteristics: mass mobilization, a moderate opposition elite that was willing to negotiate with the regime, and a progressively fragmented military. These features of the transition path in Indonesia have created problems for the consolidation of democracy.

This chapter outlines the main problems facing Indonesia as the country attempts to consolidate its newfound democracy. It argues that these problems are largely the result of how the transition to democracy was made and are due to the legacy of characteristics of the pre-transition regime. The lasting impact of sultanism is felt through the structure of political institutions that was not changed during the transitional period and through the lack of well-developed autonomous organizations. The legacy of sultanism also structured the transition path to democracy by presenting obstacles to making a transition to democracy. In overcoming these obstacles, the three prominent characteristics of the transition, which are referred to throughout this work, emerged.

These three driving features of the transition, although helpful and perhaps even necessary for making a transition from sultanism to democracy, created a situation where the opposition elite and mass base were disconnected, very little reform of political
institutions or the constitution was accomplished besides what was minimally necessary to hold free elections, and a fragmented military was unable to maintain law and order in society. These conditions in turn have contributed to a poorly functioning democracy, the continuation of mass mobilization that is frequently violent, the politicization of Islam, growth of radical Islamic groups, and threats of national disintegration. These problems are discussed below and traced back to characteristics of how the transition to democracy was made and to the legacy of the pre-transition regime.

8.1. A Poorly Functioning Democracy

The narrowly focused negotiations that characterized the transition to democracy in Indonesia did not address the shortcomings of the political institutions that were the product of Suharto’s three decade-long sultanistic rule and of the constitution of 1945. As argued throughout the preceding chapters, much of the mass base in the opposition movement demanded that the constitution be completely rewritten or seriously amended so that political institutions could be restructured, but the opposition elite shied away from these mass-based demands. The reluctance of the opposition elite was due to the conservative nature of all three leading figures of the opposition and to their desire not to frighten the regime and military with demands for far-reaching change.

Although creating problems for the consolidation of a high quality democracy, the moderation of the opposition elite was instrumental in accomplishing the transition to democracy. The regime and military elite negotiated with the opposition elite and agreed to hold free elections, partly due to the moderation of the opposition elite. It is possible that if the opposition elite had concurred with the multitude of people on the streets for
the establishment of a transitional government and the throwing out of the old constitution, then the regime and military would have felt cornered and sought to crush the movement. In this sense, the moderation of the opposition elite may be seen as having been necessary for negotiating a transition to democracy instead of forcing a zero sum game that could only result in suppression of the opposition movement or revolutionary overthrow of the regime.

On the other hand, by choosing to focus solely on elections, the opposition elite missed an opportunity to make the types of reforms necessary for establishing a well functioning democracy. Retaining the political institutions and constitution that were used by Suharto and Sukarno to rule dictatorially over the country for most of the country’s history has hampered efforts to consolidate democracy by leaving the country with ill-functioning political institutions. The constitution is a vague and hastily written document. It does not clearly delineate institutional powers or address many of the areas needing specification in a modern political system. Institutional rules are not spelled out and a clear separation of power or checks and balances is missing. Further exacerbating the problem is that no constitutional court exists to provide guidance or to settle disputes between branches of government.

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1 Connected with political institutions is the culture of corruption that pervades the political system. Merely restructuring the institutions would not be sufficient to stamp out corruption, but it would help if the institutions were restructured in a manner in which transparency was enforced and punishment was imminent. Recently, the development finance controller (government internal audit body) made public the results of its audits for 2001. It found 14,541 instances of deviations from budgetary rules that had resulted in US$ 9.5 billion of state losses (“Graft Exposed, Who Cares?" The Jakarta Post March 12, 2002). The problem is that the auditing agency has no power to punish those guilty. This would have to be done through the courts, which are notoriously corrupt and ineffective. For more examples of recent reports on corruption, see: “Tak Hati-Hati Berakibat Korupsi," Majalah Tempo March 18-24, 2002.

2 See Chapter 3 for the history of the constitution of 1945.
The murky domain of different branches of the political system has made the institutional arena ineffective for resolving many conflicts that have risen in the post-transitional period. Disputes between different political actors and parties have quickly digressed into disputes about what political institution has the legal right to supersede another. With no clear means of settling disputes about the separation and delineation of powers, which in other democracies is usually done by a constitution and court system with constitutional review powers, disputes easily spill over into extra-institutional arenas.

A prime example of this problem was seen in the conflict between President Wahid and the National Legislature/Assembly shortly after Wahid’s election as president.³ Political disagreements led to a dispute about which institution, the presidency or Legislature, had what powers. This dispute ultimately resulted in the Legislature getting a special meeting of the National Assembly convened and President Wahid removed from office twenty one months after he became the nation’s first democratically elected president.⁴

Wahid tried to have the courts adjudicate, but the Supreme Court stated that it did not have the power of constitutional review to determine which institutions had what powers.

³ President Wahid had been elected by the National Assembly on the promise that he would form a national coalition and include members of all the major political parties. Shortly after his election, he forced three ministers from rival parties to resign, accusing them of corruption (“Hamzah Quits as Minister,” The Jakarta Post Nov. 27, 1999; “Laksamana and Yusuf Diganti, Kompas April 26, 2000; “Di Balik Pencopotan Itu,” Majalah Tempo May 1-7, 2000; and “Dayang-Dayang Sekujur Gus Dur,” Majalah Tempo May 8-14, 2000). He later reshuffled his “national unity” cabinet further and replaced several more ministers and the Attorney General with people close to his inner circle (“Pertarungan Terakhir Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid,” Majalah Tempo June 4-10, 2001 and “Presiden Fires Five Ministers, Attorney General,” The Jakarta Post June 1, 2001).

powers. Wahid then attempted to shut down the Assembly using a presidential decree and by appointing new heads of the military and police. His power to do these acts was unclear but did have precedence in the history of the country. Wahid also moved the conflict into the extra-institutional arena and attempted to organize mass mobilization in order to intimidate his political opponents. Ultimately, Wahid was not able to sustain

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5 The supreme court reluctantly issued a vague opinion on the legality of the Assembly holding a special session to dismiss President Wahid. The court stated that it did not have the authority to settle political disputes ("Soal Legalitas Memorandum: Permerintah Tidak Puas dengan Fatwa MA," Koran Tempo June 1, 2001; "Pertaruhan Terakhir Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid," Majalah Tempo June 4-10, 2001; and "Gus Dur’s Lawyer Pan’s Court’s Legal Opinion," The Jakarta Post May 31, 2001).

6 Wahid appointed a new police chief on July 20, 2001 and threatened to declare a state of emergency on July 31, 2001 which was one day prior to the date that the Assembly was scheduled to convene and probably ask for his resignation ("Bimantoro, Pembangkangan, dan Puncak Pertikaian Politik," Majalah Tempo July 16-22, 2001 and "Gen. Chaeruddin Appointed as Caretaker Police Chief," The Jakarta Post July 21, 2001). The appointment of the new police chief, which split the police force and brought the possibility of clashes between the police and military over the Assembly’s right to force President Wahid from power, triggered the early convocation of the National Assembly. The Assembly dismissed Wahid from the presidency on July 23, 2001. Wahid then declared, as threatened, a state of emergency in the early morning hours of July 23rd and issued a decree calling for the dissolution of the National Assembly and Golkar and for new general elections in one year ("Gus Dur Melanjutkan Perjalanan," Majalah Tempo July 30-Aug. 5, 2001 and "The Making of a President," The Jakarta Post July 24, 2001).

7 In 1959, President Sukarno decreed the dissolution of the Assembly and ruled through presidential powers using the constitution of 1945, which is still used today. Law No. 23/1959, article 1 states that the president, as commander of the armed forces, may declare the country to be in a state of emergency ("A Decree is not a Way Out," Online Tempo Magazine May 31, 2001). As for appointing a new police chief, the constitution places the president as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces with the right to make top-level appointments. Even though the president is now required to gain the approval of the Legislature for appointments to top military/police positions, Wahid tried to circumvent this by merely suspending the police chief and appointing an "acting chief." The legality of this was questionable as was the definition of a crisis that warranted the president declaring a state of emergency.

8 For instance, President Wahid’s supporters engaged in violent demonstrations in East Java following the Assembly’s decision to call a special session of the Assembly ("Penanganan Unjuk Rasa di Pasuruan Sesuai Prosedur," Koran Tempo June 1, 2001; "Police Action Against Pasuruan Rioters Endorsed," The Jakarta Post June 16, 2001 and "Nahdlatul Ulama, Setelah Presiden Jatuh," Majalah Tempo July 23-29, 2001). A demonstration in Jakarta of thousands of Wahid’s supporters was also organized ("Setelah Amuk Mereda," Majalah Tempo June 4-10, 2001 and "Thousands Stage Protest Demanding the Legislative Body be Dissolved," The Jakarta Post June 1, 2001). Islamic leaders who supported President Wahid, mostly rural leaders from East Java, also threatened that they would seek independence from Indonesia if Wahid was dismissed from office ("Penalty Shootout," Online Tempo Magazine May 31, 2001). Wahid threatened to amass hundreds of thousands of supporters in the streets of Jakarta if the Assembly dismissed him ("Jika Keselamatan Negara Jadi Tantangan," Koran Tempo June 1, 2001). Wahid was, however, not able to fulfill this threat due to his loss of authority from even within his own network of supporters. A further example of the extra-institutional domain of the struggle is the explosion of two bombs in Jakarta the day before Wahid’s dismissal. These explosions were suspected of being part of a plot that would justify Wahid’s declaration of a state of emergency and frighten his political opponents ("Bom Meledak Lagi di 322"
the informal authority necessary to remain in power in a system that is not dictated by formal powers.\footnote{In such a system, the military easily becomes a crucial player. The military and the majority of the police units ignored the president’s decree calling for a state of emergency and dissolution of the National Assembly. They supported the Assembly’s right to dismiss the president. They also attempted to unify themselves, although with some trouble, in rejecting Wahid’s newly appointed police chief (Salim Said, May 2001, “President Abdurrahman Wahid and the Indonesian Military: The Short Honeymoon,” paper presented at the conference: Consolidating Indonesian Democracy, The Mershon Center, Columbus, Ohio). The military’s crucial role in dismissing Wahid has left President Megawati beholden to the military and has increased the strength of the military.}

The constitutional crisis brought about by the stalemate between President Wahid and the Legislature/Assembly shows that in the absence of clear institutional rules and few guidelines provided by the constitution, the political elite in Indonesia’s post-transitional period have needed to continue negotiating the rules of the game as they go.\footnote{It was even unclear if the Assembly had to appoint the vice president as president after Wahid’s removal from the presidency. Clause 8 of the constitution states that the president is automatically replaced by the vice president if the president dies, quits, or is unable to carry out his obligations while in office. No mention is made of the succession in the event of removal from office, probably since it was not intended for the Assembly to have the power to remove the president from office except in extreme circumstances. The political leaders of the main parties agreed among themselves that it was best for national stability if Megawati took over the presidency (“Calon Wapres dan Kabinet yang Gemuk,” Majalah Tempo June 23-29, 2001).} This is dangerous for the survival of democracy because, as already seen in Indonesia, negotiations can break down, creating a crisis where the formal structure of politics recedes in significance to the more important ability to amass informal power. During the Wahid vs Legislature/Assembly crisis, the opponents of Wahid were careful to appear to be following the guidelines provided in the constitution.\footnote{The constitution says that the president is elected for a five-year term. There is no parliamentary vote of no confidence and the system has in the past been interpreted as being presidential with most of the power to rule being vested in the presidency. In order to remove Wahid from office in the middle of his term, the Assembly used a 1978 Assembly decree (MPR decree III/1978, articles 4 and 7) that states a president can be dismissed if he violates the national will or the constitution. The Assembly claimed that Wahid had violated the national will by failing to uphold the policy guidelines decreed by the Assembly when Wahid was elected president. It was also asserted that Wahid had failed to uphold the constitution by engaging in corruption (“Jalan Kompromi atau Wallahualam,” Majalah Tempo May 14-20, 2001).} However, Wahid’s claim
that the move to unseat him was unconstitutional had some basis. Without any court authority to adjudicate, the final outcome depended upon which side individual political and military players chose to defend. In essence, informal power and extra-institutional struggles were preeminent in determining the winners and losers in the struggle for power. Fortunately, this crisis did not lead to a civil war.

Continuing to rely upon gaining elite consensus as a means to avoid conflicts that spill into extra-institutional violence is not an efficient method of managing a huge heterogeneous society. Institutional mechanisms must be agreed upon and established that are capable of providing a peaceful arena for resolving inevitable conflicts. It is these rules of the game, not policy issues, for which elite consensus is needed.

Despite the urgent need for constitutional reform and institutional restructuring, a significant portion of the political elite continues to stall the reform process. Some changes have been made to the constitution that are sometimes touted as evidence of the success of gradual reform. However, these changes are very limited, vague, and require further legislation to be implemented. Several changes that were hailed as progressive

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12 There was no clear criteria for following the policy guidelines and therefore the assertion that Wahid had failed to perform his duties as mandated by the Assembly was ambiguous at best. Furthermore, the constitution says that the president can only be impeached for treason, which contradicts and supercedes the 1978 Assembly decree. The corruption charges against Wahid had also not been upheld in any court of law.

13 In addition to, as mentioned above, issuing a vague opinion on the legality of holding a special session of the National Assembly, the Supreme Court later issued an opinion saying that Wahid’s decree dissolving the National Assembly was illegal. This opinion, however, had no legal force and was done after it was clear that Wahid would be dismissed from office anyway (“MA Nyatakan Keppres Nomor 77/2001 Tidak Sah,” Koran Tempo July 31, 2001).

14 For example, during the general session of the Assembly in Nov. 2001, the establishment of a constitutional court was agreed upon, but further legislation is necessary to bring this agreement to fruition. Other issues, such as the direct election of the president was given lip service by all of the major factions. However, PDI-P wants a second round of voting (that is almost inevitable with no party likely to obtain a majority) to be done by the national assembly. This keeps the system essentially the same to the current system with the minor changes of the presidential and vice presidential candidates running as a pair put forth by their parties and the first round of voting being done directly for the candidates. Another major
and as upholding the reform movement have been supplanted by contradictory decrees and legislation. For instance, the regional autonomy laws 22 and 25/1999 that were passed with great fanfare as a response to people's demands have been quietly undercut through decrees such as one issued in 2002 that negates the key provision in law 25/1999 on the distribution of profits from the sale of oil and gas. The failure to put issues, such as the balance of power between provinces or districts and the central government, in the constitution with an active constitutional court to adjudicate disputes has enabled the government to override legislation with decrees.

It appears that the country will have to wait several years for substantive changes to the constitution and institutional structure to take effect. Even the process of amending the constitution is a matter of debate, with proponents of an independent commission drafting the amendments pitted against the currently followed method of the Assembly drafting and reaching consensus on the amendments. President Megawati has made contradictory statements on the issue, at one point advocating the independent commission, but in the end opposing it.

issue upon which consensus has been difficult to obtain is restructuring the Assembly itself. The failure to decide these two issues has created problems for rewriting the election law for the coming election of 2004. For a sanguine view of the principles of constitutional reform agreed to thus far, see National Democratic Institute, Jan. 2002, The Fundamental Changes that Nobody Noticed. Media reports are less forgiving. See, for example, "Modern, Comprehensive Constitution Remains a Dream," The Jakarta Post Jan. 3, 2002; "Crisis Looms as Reform to Constitution Stagnates," The Jakarta Post May 7, 2002; "Process of Constitutional Reform Ambivalent," The Jakarta Post May 7, 2002; and "Backroom Deals May Spoil Amendment Process," The Jakarta Post May 20, 2002.

Decree No. 214/KMK.06/2002 issued by the finance ministry determined the split of oil and gas revenue between the central government and regional administration to be more advantageous to the central government than was written into law 25/1999. Law 25 on the Intergovernmental Fiscal Balance set the split at 15% of revenue from oil going to provinces (6% to the district from which the oil was produced and the remainder going to the provincial administration and other districts in the province) with 85% going to the central government. The split was 30/70 for gas revenues. Under the new decree, the districts will only receive 1-2% of oil revenues ("Regencies Warned Against Blocking Oil, Gas Fields," The Jakarta Post May 29, 2002).
By putting important constitutional reform issues off until the post-transitional period, the political elite in Indonesia have trapped themselves in a dangerous cycle of instability. The lack of an agreed upon institutional structure for resolving their differences has mandated the continued need for gaining consensus on contentious issues of reform. If a major segment of the political elite were not to support a fundamental change, the young democracy could easily be jeopardized. However, gaining consensus on all of the issues necessary for creating a stable institutional environment is more difficult now than it would have been during the transitional period. The element of immediacy has dissipated and key issues continue to be put off pending further discussion. Status quo forces have regrouped and regained some of their strength. Figures who were in the opposition movement now have a stake in the system, and the public momentum for constitutional and institutional reform that was strong during the transitional period has receded due to frustration and disillusionment with the political elite.

Continuing to negotiate policy and rules as the game unfolds is dangerous for the survival of democracy, as argued above, due to the propensity to move conflicts into the extra-institutional arena and due to the important role given to the military in such a setting. Furthermore, the uncertain nature of the rules of the game and the lack of clarity of who has the power to do what has also resulted in watered down policies of the government with everyone seemingly afraid to take concerted action to tackle the country's problems for fear of angering other political players. The inertness and

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16 Concensus is sought for constitutional reform and other important issues despite the legal ability of the Assembly to amend the constitution with a two-thirds majority vote.
17 In a parliamentary system, leaders need to maintain a coalition to avoid votes of no confidence. However, in Indonesia the uncertainty of the rules for changing the political leadership adds an additional measure of vulnerability and uncertainty.
instability of the government created by this situation has resulted in the country muddling forward with an ill-functioning democracy.

Symptomatic of the perceived need to maintain some sort of elite consensus in the absence of accepted institutional rules for conflict resolution is the government’s reluctance to oppose radical Islamic groups. These groups are currently small but could destabilize the country in the coming years. Megawati’s presidency rests upon the support of the Muslim parties that turned on Wahid. Even though she is supposed to fulfill the five-year term left by Wahid and the constitution does not give the Legislature/Assembly the right to call a vote of “no confidence” as in parliamentary systems, the uncertainty of the powers of different branches of government and the need to maintain the support of the Legislature/Assembly was seen with Wahid’s premature removal from office. The vulnerability of her position and the need to prevent any segment of society from being ostracized while political institutions are still being negotiated could explain Megawati’s attempt to rule through the politics of accommodation and hence her reluctance to anger Muslim forces in society, even when the radical groups are small. An example of Megawati’s accommodative stance toward the Muslim groups is her retracting support of the United States’ military actions against Afghanistan.18

The poor functioning of political institutions in Indonesia has also contributed to another problem for consolidating democracy - ongoing grassroots mobilization. This is

18 Megawati was faced with protests in the streets that had been organized by Muslim groups, and she was pressured by Islamic leaders, including her vice president, Hamzah Haz, to denounce the US’s intention of bombing Afghanistan. See, for example, “AS Jangan Bermain Api,” Kompas Sept. 20, 2001; “Jihad Jive,” Majalah Tempo Oct. 2-8; “Wapres Hamzah Haz: AS Harus Introspeksi,” Koran Tempo Sept. 15, 2001; and “War of Words,” Online Tempo Magazine Oct. 2-8, 2001.
different from organized mobilization in that it does not have clear organization and erupts more or less spontaneously at the local level. With no effective means for settling disputes or resolving grievances, ordinary people are continuing the trend begun during the transitional period, described in the preceding chapters, of taking matters into their own hands. This frequently entails acts of violence against people or property.

Finally, without political institutions capable of channeling demands from society into a peaceful arena that enables the resolution of competing demands, provinces with secessionist tendencies have not been convinced that they have more to gain than lose if they remain a part of the Indonesian nation. Provinces with populations that have been dissatisfied with Indonesia's governance over them for a long time, most notably, Aceh and Papua (formerly Irian Jaya), have stepped up their campaign for independence in the wake of the transition to democracy.

The problems of elite manipulation of mobilization, the rising significance of Islam in politics, local level violence, and national disintegration are further elucidated below. All of these problems, although their causes are numerous, are connected with the problem of poorly functioning political institutions. These institutions are the direct legacy of Suharto's, and before him, Sukarno's, personalistic and centralized rule. Due to the constraints of successfully moving from sultanism to democracy and to the timidity of the opposition elite, the institutional structure necessary for a well functioning democracy is still missing in Indonesia. This is exacerbated by the lack of organizational linkages between the political elite and much of society and the inability of the military/police to maintain law and order.
8.2. Elite Manipulated Mobilization and the Politicization of Islam

The mobilization of masses in the streets of the capital that began in the latter stages of the transition to democracy in Indonesia has continued to be a common occurrence in the post-transitional period. As argued above, poorly functioning political institutions have created an environment that is conducive to the political elite moving their struggles for power from the institutional arena into the streets. For example, in the post-transitional period, Wahid attempted to mobilize his supporters in an effort to defend himself from being pushed from power in 2001 and Akbar has recently been mobilizing street demonstrations in an attempt to defend himself against corruption charges.19 Counter mobilization was also organized by Wahid and Akbar’s opponents.20

Street demonstrations are not all elite manipulated. Many are organized by NGOs, labor unions, or professional associations. These are a normal part of democracy. However, the political elite’s tendency to move their battles into the streets is a sign of an ill-functioning democracy and is dangerous for the survival of democracy because, as Linz and Stepan (1978) argue in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, one of the most portentous signs that a democracy is nearing breakdown is when the center of politics shifts from the institutional to the extra-institutional arena and the political elite are willing to organize violent mobilization.

Indonesia’s organized extra-institutional mobilization is not as large-scale as that which was witnessed by Stepan in Latin America and politics in Indonesia has frequently been outside of the formal political structure and therefore cannot be said to have recently made a shift to the extra-institutional arena that is identified by Stepan as being indicative of a democratic breakdown. It is also unclear to what extent the political elite in Indonesia are involved in instigating violent mobilization of people against opponents. However, the continued willingness of the political elite in Indonesia to turn to extra-institutional mobilization as a means of conducting their political struggles and the ongoing violent mass mobilization across the country, whether instigated by the elite or emerging from spontaneous actions at the grassroots level, could easily lead to similar dynamics of democratic breakdown as that experienced in other countries, such as in Latin America. In Indonesia, the organization of mobilization may not be as clear-cut as it is in countries with a pluralistic authoritarian as opposed to sultanistic past, but the danger of extra-institutional mobilization remains.21

Some of the elite manipulated mobilization in Indonesia uses Islamic symbolism, which has contributed to the politicization of Islam in Indonesia. With most of the politicians lacking a base for mass support, such as an ideological platform or a modern party structure, Islam is a convenient tool for acquiring a mass base.22 Islam is therefore

21 Countries with a pluralistic authoritarian history typically have well developed organizations, such as labor unions or strong party organizations. In Indonesia, the sultanistic heritage thwarted the development of organizations and political parties. Elite manipulated mobilization therefore consists more of paying and busing in so-called supporters and gaining the support of a multitude of newly created small groups instead of calling massive rallies of members of a well developed organization.

22 Leaders have some organizational basis, such as Amien using Muhammadiyah and Wahid using NU and Megawati using the organizational structure of the old PDI, but only PPP and Golkar came into the transition with an established party organization (and Golkar’s party organization was severely hurt by the fall of Suharto and the subsequent prohibition on civil servants from engaging in party activities). In general, patronage networks, name recognition, and social cleavage have been the most important means of
being manipulated by many old and new political parties and politicians in an attempt to secure a following. A mass base is sought not only for getting votes in coming elections, but perhaps more indicative of the importance of the extra-institutional arena in Indonesian politics, supporters are mobilized using Islamic symbolism to help the elite negotiate specific policies or as a resource in non-electoral political struggles. For example, many decisions made by Megawati during her presidency have been heavily influenced by the frequent mobilization of Muslim groups in the streets around the country and mobilization based on Islam was used by both pro and anti-Wahid sides in the battle over his impeachment.

The significance of the extra-institutional arena for politics in Indonesia has enabled small but vocal groups to gain more power than would otherwise be possible if they were forced to participate in the institutional arena where they would have to obtain electoral support. Poorly functioning political institutions have therefore contributed to the politicization of Islam by opening up political space to what would otherwise be marginal groups and by instigating the elite to organize or manipulate mobilization for their own purposes. The lack of many alternative bases for mobilizing support due to the decades

gaining a following. The limited nature of these means of acquiring mass level support and the lack of ideological discussion in Indonesia has, however, increased the temptation to gain a following through appealing to issues of religion. For example, a policy issue that was heavily influenced by the mobilization of Muslim groups was clearly seen when Megawati backtracked on her original support for the US in retaliating against those responsible for terrorist attacks against the US. She was persuaded through extensive street mobilization and threats to condemn US bombing of Afghanistan ("AS Jangan Bermain Api," Kompas Sept. 20, 2001; "Ujuk Rasa di Depan kedubes AS," Koran Tempo Oct. 8, 2001; and "Protests Resume Against Air Strikes on Afghanistan," The Jakarta Post Nov. 5, 2001). Megawati was also reportedly contemplating not naming a vice president or choosing someone other than a staunch Muslim when she replaced Wahid as the president in 2001. Muslim leaders and politicians organized demonstrations demanding a strong Muslim vice president. Megawati chose the leader of the largest Muslim party, Hamzah Haz of PPP, even though this party was far behind Golkar in the number of Assembly seats ("Hamzah Minta Hasyim Muzadi Selanggarkan Islah Nasional," Koran Tempo July 31, 2001).
of sultanism that stunted the development of civil and political society has made Islam an attractive tool for manipulating mobilization.

8.3. Continuing Grassroots Mob Action and Inter-Religious and Ethnic Violence

Spontaneous mob action at the grassroots level and inter-religious and ethnic violence that began during the transitional period have continued into the post-transitional period.24 Various types of grassroots mob action and examples of inter-religious and ethnic violence have been detailed in the preceding chapters and will not be reiterated here, but it should be stressed that the continuance of these forms of mobilization and violence are symptomatic of the inability of the military/police to maintain law and order, the failure of political institutions in the post-transitional period to provide a channel for local level grievances, and the disjuncture between much of society and the political elite (including figures who were leaders in the opposition movement).25 Individuals in the political elite have also been accused of instigating local level violence, especially in the form of communal conflict, as has been discussed previously.26

The inability of the military/police to maintain law and order extends back to the fragmentation of the security forces during the transitional period and to the fact that

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24 In regard to the communal violence, it is estimated that between 5-10,000 people have been killed in the Maluku inter-religious violence since it began in 1999 and approximately 700,000 people, one-third of the population of the region, are currently refugees (International Crisis Group, Feb. 8, 2002, Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku). It is estimated that at least 1,000 people, mostly Madurese, have been killed in the inter-ethnic conflict in Kalimantan and that the entire Madurese community of over 100,000 people have fled the region (International Crisis Group, June 27, 2001, Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan). In total, Indonesia has 1.3 million refugees within its borders, mostly due to communal violence ("Govt to Relocate 1.3 m Refugees," The Jakarta Post Nov. 5, 2001). See also, Van Klinken (April 2001) for the conflict in Maluku, and Peterband and Sutrisno (2000) for the conflict in Kalimantan.25 For a more historical explanation of the violence in Maluku, see Bertrand (April 2002).
26 For a recent assertion that members of the political and military instigate local level violence, especially through using Islamic groups, as part of their strategy for attaining or maintaining power, see IRIP News Service, Oct.-Dec. 2001, "Laskar Jihad," Inside Indonesia.
Suharto had directly controlled the military/police during his years of sultanistic rule. The growth of professionalism was stunted under Suharto's rule and is now exacerbated by the existence of competing rival factions within and between the police/military. Internal rivalries and the politicians' continued attempts to use the military/police as a tool for power were clearly seen in the final days of Wahid's presidency when he tried to manipulate presidential power to appoint new military and police leaders, as described above.

The ambiguous legality of his moves underscores the earlier point that the institutional framework of Indonesian politics needs greater clarity. The energy drawn away from performing law and order functions by the struggle among rival officers and politicians is indicative of an underdeveloped political system with the military/police lacking institutional autonomy and unity. The military and police are now attempting to consolidate themselves internally and increase their internal discipline and effectiveness. While this is desirable so as to prevent the spread of chaos in society, once the military is consolidated, it could emerge as a powerful political actor in its own right.

The inability of the military/police and both the Wahid and Megawati governments in the post-transitional period to restore order to society has not only fueled the continuing grassroots mob action in general, but has provided an opening specifically for Islamic groups to step in and begin imposing their own brand of law and order in various parts of the country. This has added to the growth of Islamic groups, the politicization of Islam, and the continuance of communal violence.

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27 Fighting between the army and police has increased in the post-transitional period. Several incidents have erupted and resulted in deaths and revenge attacks between the forces. See, for example: "Two Civilians Die in Kostrad-Police Clash," *The Jakarta Post* Sept. 15, 2001 and "Killing Strains Ties Between Police, Military in Makassar," *The Jakarta Post* Oct. 8, 2001.
For instance, Islamic groups have been burning down sites of gambling and prostitution and threatening the lives of patrons more frequently than in the past. The Islamic groups cite the police’s inattention to these technically illegal acts as a justification for their actions. Islamic groups have also entered into inter-religious conflicts with the stated justification that the military/police are not preventing the killing of Muslims so they must take action themselves. The involvement of Islamic, and to a lesser degree, Christian groups, in inter-religious conflicts has fueled the violence in regions such as Maluku and Central Sulawesi.

The continuing grassroots mob actions and inter-religious and ethnic violence are also attributable to the failure of political institutions and representatives to channel mass based demands into the political system for peaceful resolution. Organizational linkages are not yet prominent in Indonesia enabling demands to be channeled up to the political

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29 For example, after a site where gambling was alleged to occur was burned down and the owner of the premises was missing, the chairman of the Ahlusunnah wal Jamaah Communication Forum (FKASWJ), the parent organization for Laksar Jihad which is infamous for sending militants to Maluku and Central Sulawesi, said that the organization was attempting to eradicate vices that the police were inattentive to (“Yuwono is Still Missing as No One Claims Responsibility,” The Jakarta Post Dec. 2, 2001). Similarly, after a night of vandalism and violence against entertainment establishments, the leader of Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front) stated: “Memang yang punya wewenang pihak kepolisian. Namun karena pemerintah dan aparat sudah mampet, masyarakat berhak mengeja moril bangsa ini: True, the police have authority. However, because the government and police are ‘clogged up,’ people in society have the right to guard the morals of this nation” (“Panglima Laskar FPI: Aksi Sweeping Tempat Maksiat Adalah Hak Masyarakat,” Koran Tempo March 15, 2002). The leader of FPI went on to declare that they always give notice to the police when and where their organization will be conducting a “sweeping” operation. The police are, however, never present until after the operation is completed, which is symptomatic of the government and police’s fear of initiating a confrontation with Islamic groups.


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elite and people have not yet come to view formal political channels as effective mechanisms for resolving disputes. They therefore resort to their own form of enforcing law and addressing grievances.

It could be argued that it takes time for people to begin to trust political institutions and their elected representatives, but if the representatives and institutions do not show more effective responses to local level grievances soon, then the chaos and violence may continue in Indonesia for the foreseeable future. This would ripen the breeding ground for extremist groups and give prominence to figures who manipulate religious and/or ethnic identities as a resource in their pursuit of power.

8.4. The Threat of National Disintegration

During the transitional period, separatist movements gained momentum. Following the referendum in East Timor, other provinces began to demand the same opportunity to leave Indonesia. The two provinces where the most separatist activity has existed outside of East Timor are Aceh and Papua.32 The responses of both the Wahid and Megawati governments to the problem of separatist demands have been ineffective. Wahid hinted at allowing a referendum in Aceh, then backtracked.33 Megawati has allowed the military free rein in attempting to use force to squelch the separatist movements.34

34 She has, for example, approved the military’s request to re-establish a special military unit for repressing separatist sentiment in Aceh (“Brigjen TNI Djali Yusuf, Calon Pangdam Iskandar Muda,” *Kompas* Feb. 2, 2002). This “Kodam Iskandar Muda” is similar to the tactics used under Suharto’s rule.
The demands for independence have many causes, including the extraction of resources, a history of repression by the Javanese dominated central government, and a feeling of historical and cultural separateness, but it was hoped that the populations in the two provinces would feel more included in the central government if that government were chosen democratically. The failure of democratization to ameliorate demands for independence can be traced back to the fact that people from these provinces were not given a role in the transition itself and are not effectively represented in post-transition political institutions.

All three leading figures of the opposition were Javanese and largely ignored the grievances of outer regions. They did not include figures representing regional grievances in the negotiating of the transition and no attention was paid to redesigning political institutions to better include outer regions in decision-making processes. Problems of national unity were only superficially addressed by the leading opposition figures when it served their strategy for getting themselves into power, as described in the preceding chapters.

Although the military is fragmented and its effectiveness is low, it has begun again to use indiscriminate force and is suspected of murdering leaders of the Acehnese and Papuan separatist movements. This is presumably in response to Megawati giving the military more freedom to “do what is necessary” to squelch the separatist movements. The recent increase in repressive tactics in provinces with separatist sentiment is despite the fact that the military is now supposed to be held accountable for human rights abuses.

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The increase in military presence and suppression does not appear to be effective, as it was not under Suharto's rule. The separatist groups continue to grow. The perception that the military and regime are currently weak and still repressive adds fuel to the secessionist fires. Democratization, in their eyes, appears to represent an opportunity for achieving independence rather than a chance to meaningfully participate in central and local government. Until the political elite in Jakarta seriously look at the problem of national unity in Indonesia, the violent calls for secession from parts of the country can be expected to continue.

8.5. The Military

Ineffectual governance, social chaos, communal violence, and the politicization of Islam appear to be problems that Indonesia will be facing for quite some time. Currently, the military seems reluctant and ill prepared to take direct control of the country. The military is, however, reconsolidating itself and is not yet completely under civilian supremacy. The problems described above, especially the growth of a politicized and elite manipulated Islam, have the potential to spur the military to end the experiment with democracy in Indonesia.36

Wahid tried to assert civilian control over the military, but did so through promoting officers who did not have much respect within the military.37 Wahid's maneuvers were seen as interfering with the military's attempt to establish professionalism and promotion

36 Statements made by military leaders indicate that they will defend the secular nature of the country. See, for example, "Army Chief Warns of Jakarta Charter Dispute," The Jakarta Post Oct. 31, 2001.
37 For example, Wahid promoted Let. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah to be head of the elite army division, Kostrad. Many figures within the military rejected his promotion and eventually got him removed from his position.
based upon capability and were seen as hampering the military’s coveted autonomy from politicians. The military’s withdrawal of support from Wahid did not initiate the crisis that brought him down but was crucial in determining the outcome of the stand-off between the legislature and the president.

Under Megawati, the military has been given more autonomy and a freer hand to act as it sees fit in addressing problems of internal security. The military has, for instance, been allowed to re-assert a stronger presence in Aceh in its attempts to quell the separatist movement. The military has also taken a more repressive position in response to the growing demands for Papuan independence. The military’s resurging presence in these two provinces is largely due to Megawati’s strong centralist policies and determination not to allow any province to secede. She has also shown her inclination to appease the military.

Does the growing presence of the military in some provinces and its renewed autonomy represent a rise of military strength that might threaten Indonesia’s democracy? As argued above, the military is still very fragmented and lacking professionalism. The central leadership of the military appears to have no intention of seizing power in the near future. However, if the condition of the country continues to deteriorate or stagnates for too long, it is always possible that the military as an institution, or a rogue officer commanding enough loyalty from troops, could attempt a coup.

What then is the likely future of Indonesia's political system and plight of the hundreds of millions of people composing the nation? While Indonesia has shown itself to be an unpredictable country, as was seen with the surprising transition to democracy, it is likely that for the time being, the country will continue to muddle along with a poorly functioning democracy. As political organizations and parties grow and mature, hopefully the country's political institutions and representation of societal demands will improve. With increasing effectiveness of the nation's political institutions and leaders, it is hoped that the military and police will become more professional and firmly placed under civilian control. Alternative and less sanguine scenarios exist, including the growing importance of Islam in the nation's politics, continuing communal violence, and the further erosion of law and order inducing a military take-over.

Indonesia is grappling with issues of institution building, national identity, and territorial integrity and is in a sense "trying to find its balance." Similar to many developing countries that are recently experimenting with democratization, Indonesia is emerging from decades of imposed order. Competing social forces are attempting to make their demands heard and redress grievances in the nation's new era of democracy, but the country had not been allowed to develop the institutions and social/political organizations that are necessary for a well functioning democracy. This stunted development, failure to address the need for institutional and constitutional reform during the transitional period, and mass mobilization that has taken dangerous forms have created problems for the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. The ability and will of the political actors to build institutions and strengthen the effectiveness of and commitment to democratic governance will determine the future path of the country.
APPENDIX A

LIST OF PARTIES ELIGIBLE TO CONTEST THE 1999 GENERAL ELECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Supplementary Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI Perjuangan (PDI-P)</td>
<td>Megawati Sukarnoputri’s party. Revival of the old Sukarno party, PNI, plus elements of the old Protestant and Catholic parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia Massa Marhaen</td>
<td>Revival of PNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia Front Marhaenis</td>
<td>Revival of PNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI-SUPENI)</td>
<td>Revival of PNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Demokrat (PND)</td>
<td>Revival of PNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI)</td>
<td>One of the three parties Suharto allowed. During the New Order, a forced fusion of three nationalist and two Christian parties, of which the most important was PNI. PDI-P splintered from this party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)</td>
<td>Akbar Tanjung is the head of this party and B. J. Habibie its presidential candidate. Party Suharto used to rule for three decades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP)</td>
<td>Splinter Golkar party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (MKGR)</td>
<td>Splinter Golkar party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PARI)</td>
<td>Main constituency is civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia</td>
<td>Revival of a party originally founded by the army in the early 1950s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Pilihan Rakyat (PILAR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia (PNBI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Aliansi Demokrat Indonesia (PADI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (PKM)

### Parties Explicitly Based on Islam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)</td>
<td>One of three parties Suharto allowed. In the New Order a fusion of four pre-existing Muslim parties. Became a leading advocate of reform during the transitional period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan (PP)</td>
<td>Splinter from PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Ummat Islam (PUT)</td>
<td>Yusril Mahendra is leader. Revival of Masyumi, the largest Muslim party of the 1950s, which was led by modernists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia (PUMI)</td>
<td>Yusuf Kalla is leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)</td>
<td>Yusuf Kalla is leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Masyumi Baru</td>
<td>Revival of Masyumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi</td>
<td>Revival of Masyumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan (PK)</td>
<td>Main constituency is young professionals and students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)</td>
<td>Revival of Serikat Islam – Muslim nationalist movement of early 1900s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905 (PSII 1905)</td>
<td>Revival of Serikat Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (KAMI)</td>
<td>Revival of Serikat Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Parties Implicitly Based on Islam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai Solidaritas Un? Nasional Indonesia (SUNI)</td>
<td>Based on Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PARTAI NU)</td>
<td>Based on NU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (PKU)</td>
<td>Based on NU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)</td>
<td>Abdurrahman Wahid formed this party, but it was headed by Matori Abdul Jalil. Based on NU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Islam Demokrat (PID)</td>
<td>Amien Rais is leader. Based on Muhammadiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)</td>
<td>Amien Rais is leader. Based on Muhammadiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR)</td>
<td>Based on Islamic socialist principles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Parties with Socialist or Worker Oriented Ideologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai Republik</td>
<td>Revival of a left nationalist party of the 1900s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (MURBA)</td>
<td>Revival of a left nationalist party of the 1900s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties Based on Christianity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia (KRSNA)</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB)</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Katolik Demokrat (PKD)</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of parties obtained from KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Election Commission) and “Perserta Pemilu 1999.” *Adil* March 10-16, 1999.
APPENDIX B

OUTCOME OF THE JUNE 1999 GENERAL ELECTION AND COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE AND ASSEMBLY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Fraction</th>
<th>Percentage of National Vote in the General Election</th>
<th>Seats in the Legislature</th>
<th>Percentage of Legislative Seats</th>
<th>Seats Gained from Regional Representatives in the Assembly</th>
<th>Total Assembly Seats</th>
<th>Percentage of Assembly Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>41&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Reform Fraction)&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI (military)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)

Table 1: Outcome of the June 1999 General Election and Composition of the National Legislature and Assembly

1 Regional representatives were chosen by the provincial legislatures and sit only in the Assembly, not Legislature, and chose which Assembly fraction to join.

2 The total number of Assembly seats was supposed to be 700 but since East Timor voted to secede from the country, they did not send regional representatives seats. This brought the total to 695.

3 PAN and PK joined to form one fraction in the Assembly: The Reform Fraction

4 This figure is the total number of seats for the Reform Fraction, including PAN and PK seats.

5 This figure is the total number of seats for the Reform Fraction, including PAN and PK seats.
Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>73 (65+8)</th>
<th>10.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDU</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKI</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDKB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Parties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

4 Utusan Golongan, Social Group Fraction. Sixty-five representatives were chosen by select social groups and approved by the KPU. This was the base of the Assembly fraction. Some regional representatives then chose to join the fraction. Social group representatives were not in the Legislature.

7 Fraksi Perserikatan Daulatul Ummah, United Ummat Sovereignty. This fraction mainly consists of the parties: PNU, PKU, PSII, PPB-Masyumi, PDR.

8 Fraksi Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia, Indonesian Nationhood. Consists mainly of the parties: PKP, PNI-MM, PNI-FM, PDI, PP, PB1, IPKI, PKD.

9 Fraksi Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa,Love the Nation Democratic Party. This small party was allowed to make its own fraction for the time being but would have to merge with another fraction after the General Session of the Assembly to meet the rule that a fraction must have ten members.

10 Several small parties received a slight percentage of the vote but no seats.
### APPENDIX C

### GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>Nominal Muslim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur)</td>
<td>One of the three moderate opposition figures. Leader of traditionalist Muslim organization, NU, and political party, PKB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia. This was the term used before the separation of the police from the armed forces in April 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akbar Tanjung</td>
<td>Leader of the government party, Golkar, and state secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aliran</td>
<td>Social/cultural stream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amien Rais</td>
<td>One of the three moderate opposition figures. Leader of the modernist Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, and the political party, PAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barisan Nasional</td>
<td>Group of mostly retired generals who had lost power in factional dispute following the fall of Suharto. They then opposed Habibie's presidency and supported radical students for the regime's overthrow and imposition of a transitional government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu</td>
<td>Preface to woman's name used when speaker is of lesser social or age standing. Comes from ibu, which literally means &quot;mother.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciganjur Agreement</td>
<td>Statement made by moderate opposition figures during the Special Session of the Assembly. Denounced radical students' attempt to overthrow regime but demanded that free elections be held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Assembly. This is the long name for the National Legislature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dwi fungsi</td>
<td>Dual function. Refers to the military's doctrine that it has a socio-political role in addition to national defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famred</td>
<td>Forum Aksi Mahasiswa untuk Reformasi, Student Action Forum for Reform and Democracy. Splinter groups from Forkot. Slightly less radical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKSMJ</td>
<td>Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta, Communication Forum of Jakarta Student Senates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forkot</td>
<td>Forum Kota, City Forum. Radical student group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Salemba</td>
<td>Moderate protests group of students in Jakarta. Centered on Universitas Indonesia students after the fall of Suharto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fraction</td>
<td>Term used for official grouping of representatives in the national legislature and assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furkon</td>
<td>Group formed by regime and military individuals to defend regime after Suharto fell. Used Islamic symbolism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habibie</td>
<td>Suharto’s vice president. Became president after Suharto fell from power. Was the president throughout the transitional period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMI</td>
<td>Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMI-MPO</td>
<td>Splinter group from official HMI. Refused to accept Pancasila as its ideology as mandated for all organizations by Suharto. Therefore, this group was illegal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iluni</td>
<td>Universitas Indonesia alumni association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahmi</td>
<td>HMI alumni organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kammi</td>
<td>Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Student Action Committee. Formed during the protests that brought Suharto down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keluarga Besar</td>
<td>Moderate student group centered on Universitas Indonesia students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopassus</td>
<td>Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command (army).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korpri</td>
<td>Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Civil Servants Corps of the Republic of Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostrad</td>
<td>Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Army Strategic Reserve Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPU</td>
<td>Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Election Commission. Created through the law on elections. Consisted of a representative from each party contesting the election and five government representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemhanas</td>
<td>Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, National Defense Institute. A military think tank, but selection of its governor and vice governor is made by the president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mas</td>
<td>Preface to male name used when speaker is of a similar social and age standing. Literally means &quot;brother.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbak</td>
<td>Preface to female name used when speaker is of a similar social and age standing. Literally means &quot;sister.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megawati</td>
<td>Daughter of founding president and nationalist hero, Sukarno. One of the three moderate opposition figures. Leader of the political party, PDI-P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modernist Islam</td>
<td>Stream of Islam. focuses on Qur’an as religious guide, not clerics. Usually urban and educated people. Includes fundamentalists and liberals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly. This is the long name for the National Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>Modernist Muslim organization led by Amien Rais.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUI</td>
<td>Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesia’s Ulama Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama, Awakening of the Muslim Scholars. Traditionalist Muslim organization led by Abdurrahman Wahid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak</td>
<td>Preface to man’s name used when speaker is of a lesser social or standing. Comes from bapak, which literally means “father.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam Swakarsa</td>
<td>Pasukan Keamanan Swakarsa, Spontaneous Security Force. Mobilized by regime and military individuals to defend regime. Used Islamic symbolism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panacasila</td>
<td>Official state ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pansus</td>
<td>Panitia Khusus, Special Committee in the Legislature that discussed the government’s draft of the three political laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panwas</td>
<td>Panitia Pengawas, Election Supervisory Committee. Committee created by the law on elections to oversee the election and adjudicate disputes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia, National Election Commission. Set up by the KPU and implemented KPU policy in the administration of the election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Partai Rakyat Demokratik, Democratic People Party. Leftist underground organization existing in later Suharto years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prabowo</td>
<td>Suharto’s son-in-law. General thought to be in the process of grooming to take over military in few years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RT</strong></td>
<td>Rukun Tetangga, Neighborhood Association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Santri</strong></td>
<td>Pious Muslim. Either in modernist or traditionalist stream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIMPR</strong></td>
<td>Sidang Istimewa Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. Special Session of the national assembly held a few months after Suharto fell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suharto</strong></td>
<td>President of Indonesia for 32 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUMPR</strong></td>
<td>Sidang Umum Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. General Session of the national assembly held for the purpose of the new Assembly to elect a president and vice president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial Command Structure</strong></td>
<td>Army’s units placed throughout the country to ensure internal security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tim 7</strong></td>
<td>Team of 7. Formed by Habibie to draft new election laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TNI</strong></td>
<td>Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Military. Name used for the armed forces after the separation of the police in April 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>traditionalist Islam</strong></td>
<td>Stream of Islam that relies mostly on clerics/teachers to provide guidance in the practice of Islam. Mostly rural.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UI</strong></td>
<td>Universitas Indonesia, University of Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ulama</strong></td>
<td>Islamic scholar and respected individual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utusan Golongan</strong></td>
<td>Literally means Groups’ Delegation. Referred to as the Social Group Fraction in the national assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wiranto</strong></td>
<td>Commander of the armed forces at the end of Suharto’s rule and throughout the transitional period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D

INTERVIEWS


Asmoredjo, Djufrie. A representative for PPP in Legislature during Habibie’s presidency. Chairman of PPP’s fraction in the committee reviewing the three political laws. Member of the KPU representing PPP. Feb. 24, 1999.

Asshiddiqie, Jimly. A senior advisor to President Habibie who had been a constitutional law scholar at the UI. July 15, 1999.


Buchori, Mochtar. A Muhammadiyah figure who joined PDI-P and was given a post in the education dept. of PDI-P and a seat in the new Legislature representing central Java. April 19, 1999.

Budiarjo, Miriam. A retired UI political science professor who used to head the Dept. of Sociology and Political Science at UI and who is a member of Komnasham (National Commission on Human Rights) since its inception in 1993. Nov. 6, 1998.


Gaffar, Afan. A political observer and a member of the Team of 7 that was appointed by the Dept. of Home Affairs to write a draft of the three political laws that were being changed in order to hold free elections. Member of the Team of 11 that determined political parties’ eligibility to compete in the elections. Government


Juoro, Umar. A senior advisor to President Habibie who had been an economics scholar at UI. July 30, 1999.

Kamaruddin. Head of Universitas Indonesia's student senate in the mid 1990s before the mobilization against Suharto and one of the founding leaders of the modernist Muslim group – Kammi. Oct. 1, 1998.


Mahendra, Yusril. Head of the modernist Muslim party, PBB. Rose in stature under Suharto’s patronage and became his key constitutional advisor and speech writer, but advocated reform during the transitional period. Feb. 16, 1999.

Mallarangeng, Andi. A member of the Team of 7 appointed by the Dept. of Home Affairs to draft the three new political laws. Member of the Team of 11 that determined which political parties were eligible to contest the election. One of five government representatives to the KPU (Election Commission). Dec. 1, 1998; and July 22, 1999.


Mattalatta, Andi. Head of Golkar’s fraction in the Legislature during Habibie’s presidency (before the free general elections). A representative for Golkar from South Sulawesi in the new Legislature. March 5, 1999.


Mietzner, Marcus. A student researcher from ANU on Islam (NU) and the military. Nov. 29, 1998.


Nababan, Panda. A long time activist for PDI and then for PDI-P. Active in efforts to promote Megawati to the presidency. Nov. 10, 1999.

Panggabean, RizaL A teacher at UGM (Universitas Gadjah Mada), an analyst at the Center for Security and Peace Studies, a long time associate of Amien Rais, and an influential activist in PAN. March 1, 1999.


Pratama, Rama. Head of Universitas Indonesia's student senate when Suharto was forced by mobilization to transfer power to Habibie and a leader in the moderate student protest group, Forum Salemba, after Habibie became president. Nov. 23, 1998 and April 19, 1999.

Puspoyo, Widjanarko. Old Golkar member until Edi Sudrajat lost the Golkar leadership to Akbar Tanjung. Moved to PDI-P in 1998 and was given a high post in PDI-P's research and development dept. and a seat in the new Legislature. Dec. 2, 1999.


Reed, Ike. Representative for the US Embassy's, Jakarta, political division. Several discussions throughout the Oct. 1-21, 1999 General Session of the National Assembly.


Sadzili, Abu Hasan. Head of the foreign relations committee in Golkar. Chairman of the committee in the Legislature debating the three political laws. March 6, 1999.


Sophan Sophian. Long time PDI leader who had supported Megawati to become leader of the party. DPR member for PDI-P. Oct. 8, 1999.

Sukarnoputri, Megawati. One of the three leading opposition figures. Leader of the PDI-P. Elected vice president by the new democratic government. Nov. 8, 1999.


Sumawiharja. A student activist in KB-UI (Big Family of the Univ. of Indonesia). Sept. 30, 1999.


Surbakti, Ramlan. Member of the Team of 7 assigned by the Dept. of Home Affairs to draft the three new political laws governing the election. July 27, 1998.


Sutrimo. Head of the political news division in the state run television station, TVRI. Nov. 23, 1998.


Urbaningrum, Anas. Head of the national HMI. A member of the Team of 7 that was appointed by the Dept. of Home Affairs to write a draft of the three political laws that were being changed in order to hold free elections. Nov. 24, 1998 and April 29, 1999.


Yusuf, Slamet Effendy. Deputy chairman in Golkar and the former head of NU’s youth wing, Ansor. A Representative for Golkar in negotiations leading to the selection of Wahid for President. Dec. 1, 1999.


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