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AN ANALYSIS OF SIR WALTER RALEGH'S THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD.

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AN ANALYSIS OF SIR WALTER RALEGH'S

THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

John Racin Jr., A. B.

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The Ohio State University
1961

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INTRODUCTION

On December 16, 1603, Sir Walter Ralegh, "the rankest traitor in England," "a spider of hell," according to the ejaculations of his prosecutor, Attorney-General Coke, entered the Tower of London. \(^1\) Spared execution three days before by James I, embittered yet grateful for his life, he was to remain a prisoner "civilly dead" to March 20, 1616. \(^2\) Though he knew that precariously rests the head which serves the monarch's will, his ambition to return to a position of power and influence never faltered, and gradually centered upon two endeavors, one scarcely less audacious than the other. The first became Ralegh's interpretation, exhaustively documented, of the relationship between time and eternity, God and man, a *summa historiae*, beginning with Creation and embracing all civilizations of the past. In this labor Ralegh assumed the role of the disinterested historian devoted only to universal truth. The second endeavor led Ralegh to pander to the avarice of James through promises of the fabulous riches of the New World. The first was finally abandoned in despair, a despair compounded when *The History of the World* was quickly suppressed by royal decree in 1615. \(^3\) The second led to an unpardoned release from the Tower, a series of betrayals and disasters, and finally to the headsman's axe in 1618. While it is a temptation to dwell upon the ironies of Ralegh's life and death, the purpose of this preliminary discussion is to present only those details relevant to the writing, publication, and the suppression of *The History of the World*.

During his early years in the Tower, Ralegh's varied pursuits attested to his irrepressible intellectual vigor. While he periodically importuned James and important friends to effect his release,
at the same time he conducted experiments in chemistry, built a furnace for assaying ore, and a still for concocting his famous elixir, the "Balsam of Guiana." For a time Lady Ralegh was allowed to live with him, three of his servants attended him, and he enjoyed frequent visits with his friends: among these were Ben Jonson, Thomas Harriot, Rev. Robert Burhill, and John Hoskyns, several of whom, as we shall see, probably helped Ralegh to compile the materials for the *History*. Among other sources, he had at his disposal the library of his friend Sir Robert Cotton, from whom he requested the loan of "old books, or any manuscripts" which contained accounts of the "written antiquities" of Britain. In about 1608, according to the conjecture of several scholars, Prince Henry became interested in Ralegh. Ralegh stated that the Prince "was extreme curious in searching out the nature of my offenses," and after studying the accounts of the trial was satisfied of Ralegh's "innocence." The Prince soon became Ralegh's most powerful friend. For example, upon hearing that James intended to bestow Ralegh's Sherborne estate upon Sir Robert Kerr, the Prince objected so violently that he got Sherborne for himself, intending to restore it to Ralegh after he had been pardoned. Roger Coke, repeating a story gotten from his father, wrote that the Prince had declared: "no other king but his Father would keep such a Man as Sir Walter in such a Cage." Shortly after the Prince's death in November, 1612, Chamberlain reported that the loss was especially bitter to Ralegh since Prince Henry and Ralegh had "growned into speciall confidence, insomuch that he had moved the King divers times for him, and had lastly a graunt that he shold be delivered out of the Towre before Christmas." Encouraged by Henry,
Ralegh became an unofficial counselor, a role he practiced energetically with his pen. He wrote numerous treatises (none published in his lifetime), most of which were aimed at shaping the Prince's views. His topics ranged from ship building (a subject which engrossed the prince) to the political questions of marriage for Prince Henry and for Princess Elizabeth. \(^9\) Ralegh's most important work was, of course, *The History of the World*, written as he said, "for the service of that inestimable prince Henry, the successive hope, and one of the greatest of the Christian world." \(^10\)

The Stationers' Register contains the following entry dated April 15, 1611: "Walter Burre Entred for his Copy vnder the [h]andes of master Doctor Overall Deane of Paules and Th' wardens, A booke called, *The history of the world* written by Sir Walter Rawleigh." \(^11\) However, not until March, 1614 (Camden testifies for the month) \(^12\) did the History appear, anonymously, bearing an elaborate frontispiece dated 1614 \(^13\) and the colophon: "LONDON/"Printed by William Stansby for Walter Burre, and are/ to be sold at his Shop in Paules Church-yard at the signe of the Crane./ 1614." The reasons for this interval of approximately three years have not been conclusively established. We know that the work was undertaken in the service of Henry. Also, Ralegh stated that "it pleased the Prince to peruse some part thereof, and to pardon what was amiss," \(^14\) and that he had been directed "to enlarge the building after the foundation was laid, and the first part finished." \(^15\) These remarks have been interpreted by Sir Charles Firth and E. C. Wilson to mean that the work had been held back to satisfy Henry's demands for a fuller secular narrative. \(^16\) It is probable that the "first part" in
Ralegh's remark refers to the Old Testament portion of the History (Bks. I and II), a portion not likely to interest the young prince as much as the second part (Bks. III, IV, and V), which covers the events of the Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires. From internal evidence we know that the work in its published form had not been completed at the time of the Prince's death, November 12, 1612; for slightly more than two-thirds through the History, Ralegh in one of his digressions alluded to the death of the Prince. Provided that Ralegh wrote his work generally in chronological order, we may surmise that as late as the close of 1612 Ralegh had one-third of the History to complete. Thus his apparent need for revision, the enlargement of his original intentions, and the reference to the Prince's death indicate that the main reason for the three-year delay in publication was that in 1611 the work was not completed.

If we accept Camden's word for March as the month of publication, the work was being sold for nine months before an order, dated December 22, 1614, was issued by George Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury, suppressing the work and calling for all unsold copies to be delivered either to him or to the Lord Mayor of London. Abbot acted on the "express directions" of James. Thus the death of Henry together with the renewed displeasure of James dashed Ralegh's hopes of winning royal favor through his pen.

The suppression of the History has been an object of considerable interest to Ralegh's biographers. Until 1894, when Arber printed Abbot's order, the most authoritative evidence that such an order had been given was provided in a letter of John Chamberlain dated January
Sir Walter Raleighs booke is called in by the Kings com-
maundment, for divers exceptions, but specially for beeing too sawcie
in censuring princes. I heare he takes yt much to hart, for he thought
he had won his spurre and pleased the king extraordinarilie."19

Even though Chamberlain's report was generally accepted by Ralegh's
biographers before Dr. T. N. Brushfield and William Stebbing both
questioned its reliability, several facts seemed to require explana-
tion. Why was the edition published anonymously? Why, if the 1614
dition was suppressed, were so many copies of this edition extant?

Before he knew of the suppression order, Brushfield took these
two facts (anonymous publication and the existence of numerous copies)
and erected an ingenious conjecture, one pointedly rejected by Steb-
bing, but later repeated and then withdrawn by Brushfield. In 1887
Brushfield surmised:

Had the work been really suppressed, few copies of the origin-
al edition of 1614 ought now to be met with. As a matter of
fact, it appears to be fully as common as any of the later ones.
The British Museum Library possesses two copies, and there
are two in my own collection. Suppression is inconsistent
with---1st, there being two distinct issues of the early
edition, one with a list of errata on the last leaf facing
the index, the other without any, but having the errata
corrected in the text; and, 2nd, the publication of another
edition three years later.

A careful consideration of these facts will, I think,
warrant our drawing the conclusion, that although the work
was "called in" by royal command, such a command must have
been soon rescinded. We may, however, advance a step beyond
this. There appears to be something more than probability
in the conjecture that all hindrances to the sale of the work
were removed on the understanding that it should be published
without the name of the author---anonymously---and this was
effected in a very simple manner by omitting the title-page,
and all copies of the original edition that have been pre-
served are destitute of one.20

Stebbing, however, was unconvined. In 1891 he answered: "The surmise
is ingenious; but it is very hard to believe that such an arrangement, if made, would have excited no discussion. Chamberlain's language, moreover, implies that the book was already in circulation. It would be exceedingly strange if its previous purchasers had the docility to eliminate the title-page from their copies, in deference to an order certain not very emphatically promulgated." Stebbing concluded by calling Chamberlain's reliability into question. "The readiest explanation is that Chamberlain, in his haste to give his correspondent early information, reported to him a rumour, and perhaps a threat, upon which James happily had not the hardihood to act."22

When Abbot's order was printed by Arber in 1394, vindicating Chamberlain's accuracy, Brushfield first interpreted the order as further support for his original conjecture; ten years later, however, having considered the matter further, he withdrew it,23 thus leaving the question of anonymous publication and suppression open. The damage had been done, however. In 1913 Sir Charles Firth took up Brushfield's conjecture and repeated it as fact:

...in spite of these objections to the History, the suppression was merely temporary. The government contented itself with the removal of the title-page, which contained the author's portrait as well of his name, and no alterations or omissions in the text were ordered.

This excision is not difficult to explain. Raleigh was a state prisoner condemned to death for high treason, owing his life to the King's mercy; respited, not pardoned. He was a man 'civilly dead', as it was alleged. Yet he had the impudence to show that he was very much alive, not only by writing a great book, which might have been winked at, but by putting his name and even his portrait on the title-page.24

Given Firth's authority, Raleigh's biographers accepted the story without question. It was repeated by Milton Waldman in 1928,25 D. B. Chidsey in
Edward Thompson in 1936, and most recently by Willard Wallace in 1959. Thus a bibliographical conjecture was transformed into an historical fact.

Presumably the History was sold for nine months before the suppression order: yet if the copies sold in this period contained the title-page, why have none survived? The Checklist of American Copies of "Short-Title Catalogue" Books lists twenty-two copies of the 1614 edition in American libraries. Although the STC lists only four in British libraries, there are undoubtedly many more. In checking many bibliographical descriptions of the History, I have not seen mention of this edition with a title-page. Anonymous publication in itself need not be considered unusual. We know from a letter (dated 1616 by Edwards) that Ralegh was very much aware of his precarious position as a man "civilly dead." Why would he unnecessarily antagonize James (or show his "impudence," to use Firth's term) when James represented Ralegh's only hope for release? Also, anonymous publication was not exceptional for Ralegh, who had no itch to see his name in print. Of all his surviving works, only three were published during his lifetime, and of these, The Truth of the Ficht About the Iles of Acores (1591), and the History, were first published anonymously. From the known evidence at present, we must assume that the work appeared in 1614 without a title-page.

Secondly, we know that the work was suppressed. The probable causes of James's displeasure are not difficult to imagine. Ralegh was alive only by the sufferance of James. In this position to pass fierce judgments on the "crimes" of monarchs, to paint Henry VIII as
the pattern of a "merciless Prince," to speak of monarchy in terms suggestive of constitutional limitations, to provide many examples of the overthrow of tyrannies, and to lament for the monarch's ungrateful treatment of England's patriot soldiers (carefully excepting James, of course, but the ironic inference was plain), all this quite understandably irritated the inflexible champion of divine right actively engaged in conflict with Catholic, Puritan, and Parliamentarian over the extent of regal power. In his Basilikon Doron, James urged Prince Henry to love God, first because He made him a man, "and next, for that he made you a little God, to sit on his Throne, and rule over other men." "Kings," he declared in the Defence of the Right of Kings, are "the breathing Images of God vpon earth." They "are not only Gods Lieutenants vpon earth, and sit vpon Gods throne, but euen by God himselfe they are called Gods." In a speech in the Star Chamber he declared:

It is Atheisme and blasphemie to dispute what God can doe: good Christians content themselves with his will reuealed in his word, so, it is presumption and high contempt in a subiect, to dispute what a King can doe, or say that a King cannot doe this, or that; but rest in that which is the Kings reuealed will in his Law.... That which concerns the mysterie of the Kings power, is not lawfull to be disputed: for that is to wade into the weakenesse of Princes, and to take away the mysticall reuurence, that belongs vnto them that sit in the Throne of God.39

The attitude of James was certain to influence the practice of historians. Camden, with all his respect for historical accuracy and truth, stated in the Preface to The History...of Princesse Elizabeth (the Latin edition was first published in 1615): "Things manifest I haue not concealed; Things doubtfull I haue interpreted more favour-
ably; Things more secret I haue not pryed into. THE HIDDEN MEANINGS OF PRINCES...and if they worke any thing more secretly, to search them out, it is unlawfull; it is doubtfull & dangerous: pursue not therefore the search thereof. And with Halycarnassaeus, I am angry with those curious inquisitiue people, which will seeke and know more than by the lawes is permitted.⁴⁰

Ralegh took a bolder view than Camden's. Certainly he had cautioned: "...whosoever, in writing a modern history, shall follow truth too near the heels, it may happily strike out his teeth. There is no mistress or guide that hath led her followers and servants into greater miseries." Consequently, though he did not intend out of "extreme ambition or extreme cowardice" to "flatter the world," he decided that it was enough for him (being in the state he was) "to write of the eldest times."⁴¹ As will become evident, however, according to Ralegh's view of history, whether the historian's subject matter was ancient or modern made no difference in terms of its moral, political, or practical relevance. All past events were seen within an immutable framework created by an immutable God, whose judgments determined history. Thus any example, no matter how ancient, had its contemporary meaning if one knew how to search for it. Since this view of history was a commonplace shared by Ralegh's contemporaries (who had not learned to judge "historically" in a universe of change), they could, as well as James, note Ralegh's judgments of the deeds of monarchs and draw their own conclusions, or parallels: and making such parallels was dangerous. James had noted Ralegh's treatment of kings. In a letter to Sir Robert Kerr, James alluded to "Sir Walter
Ralegh's description of the kings that he hates, of whom he speaketh but evil.\textsuperscript{42}

It is not probable that James "compromised" with a man he personally disliked and rescinded his suppression order with the stipulation that the title-page be removed. Such action wouldn't have changed the possible effects of Ralegh's remarks on monarchs, nor would it have rendered the work truly anonymous. Scarcely a chapter of the History is without a Raleghian observation on his own experience: his relationship with Prince Henry,\textsuperscript{43} his defense of the daring landing at Fayal,\textsuperscript{44} his answer to charges of Puritanism,\textsuperscript{45} his praise of exploratory voyages.\textsuperscript{46} From internal evidence alone it is "anonymous" authors could have been easier to identify by a knowledgeable Londoner. Also, what would have prevented an enterprising bookseller from revealing the identity of the author, then the most famous inmate of the Tower, in order to stimulate sales?

From the known evidence there is no reason to believe that the suppression order did not stand until after Ralegh's release from the Tower in 1616. Thus we need not ask why the work was suppressed and the title-page removed. Rather, why was the suppression order rescinded to allow a new edition to appear in 1617?
The breadth and depth of learning displayed in the *History*, especially in the early chapters of Book I devoted to hexaemeral materials, cannot but create the impression that Raleigh was a lifetime student of patristic, medieval, and rabbinical works on Genesis and that he assembled his materials from a great variety of sources. In these early chapters he throws out quotations and names in a bewilderingly profuse, almost casual way, citing Greek and Roman philosophers, historians, and poets; the Talmud, Cabala, rabbinical commentaries and exegetes; the Christian Greek and Latin Fathers; and many medieval and Renaissance theologians. The two following short excerpts are typical.

Tertullian, Bonaventure, and Durandus, make paradise under the equinoctial; and Postellus, quite contrary, under the north pole: the Chaldeans also for the most part, and all their sectators, followed the opinion of Origen, or rather Origen theirs; who would either make paradise a figure, or sacrament only, or else would have it seated out of this sensible world, or raised into some high and remote region of the air. Strabus and Rabams were both sick of this vanity, with Origen and Philo; so was our venerable Beda, and Peter Comestor, and Moses Barcephas the Syrian, translated by Masius....

Now for eastward, to translate it from the beginning, it is also contrary to the translation of the Seventy; to the ancient Greek fathers, as Basil, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Gregory; and to the rabbins, as Ramban, Rabbi Solomon, R. Abraham, and Chimchi: and of the Latins, Severinus, Damascenus, &c. who plainly take Eden for the proper name of a region, and set the word eastward for ab initio: for Damascene's own words are these, *Paradisus est locus Dei manibus in Eden ad orientem mirabiliter consitus*....

Hume counseled the reader to have patience wading through this portion of the *History*. Arnold pointed to it as "medieval," and Thoreau (and doubtless many others) complained about it.

Nevertheless, the display of learning is impressive. Hume remarked
that Ralegh's readers "were struck with the extensive genius of the man, who being educated amidst naval and military enterprises, had surpassed in the pursuit of literature, even those of the most recluse and sedentary lives." In an effort to account for such formidable learning and to defend Ralegh from the charge of plagiarism, several writers have pointed to Sir Robert Naunton's description of Ralegh as "an indefatigable reader whether by sea or land," to John Aubrey's story that Ralegh "always carried a trunk of bookes along with him" on his voyages, and to David Lloyd's testimony that Ralegh's lifetime habit was to read four hours every day. Since the detailed erudition in the History suggested more than part-time scholarship, however, some questions arose concerning the help Ralegh received, especially since Ralegh, by his own admission, knew no Hebrew, and probably no Greek. Isaac Disraeli, in preparing the way for what he felt would be a startling exposé, asked: "Where could Rawleigh obtain that familiar acquaintance with the Rabbins, of whose language he was probably entirely ignorant?"

It had been suggested earlier that Ralegh received help. William Drummond recorded Ben Jonson's testimony: "That sir W. Raughlye esteemed more of fam e than conscience. The best wits of England were employed for making of his historie. Ben himself had written a peice to him of ye punick warre which he altered and set in his booke." Algernon Sidney later in the century observed: "...he was so well assisted in his History of the World, that an ordinary man with the same helps might have perform'd the same things."

From a study of its context, it is evident that Sidney's comment, for which he offered no evidence, was motivated by the main purpose
of his *Discourses Concerning Government*: to answer and discredit Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* (1680), which advanced monarchical rights over those of Parliament. In his *Discourses* (written before 1682 and first published in 1698), the Republican Sidney, citing Filmer's use of Raleigh as a supporting authority, attacked not only Raleigh's performance in the *History*, but questioned his general moral fitness as well.

Jonson's claim, despite the fact that he was in his cups at the time, must be taken more seriously. His connection with the *History* is well established. He and Raleigh were old friends. He wrote "The Minde of the Front," the explanatory verses printed opposite the frontispiece of the *History*. Jonson may have aided in the publication of the *History*, for William Stansby, the printer of the 1614 and 1617 editions, printed Jonson's works in 1616. The "peice" on the Punic War which Drummond referred to has been taken by Firth to be the account of the mercenaries' revolt against Carthage, which in 1647 was printed separately. *A Notable and Memorable story of the Cruel War between the Carthariniens and Their own Mercenaries. Gathered out of Polybius and other Authors by that famous Historian Sir Walter Raleigh.* This excerpt was taken from Book V, Chapter II, sections i and iii of the *History*. Section ii, which was omitted, is one of Raleigh's long digressions, occasioned by the account of the revolt, on the general question of tyranny and more specifically on the use of mercenaries in warfare. This first person discussion reflects the influence of Machiavelli's *Il Principe* and includes observations on the recent relations between England, Scotland, France, and Spain, and on the policies
of Queen Elizabeth and King James. Unquestionably section ii is Ralegh's; and as for sections i and iii, based on Polybius, the source was as available to Ralegh as it was to Jonson. Since Ralegh made it an occasion for a first person digression, it does not seem probable that he would have failed to consult the original source.

Other figures suggested as Ralegh's helpers are Thomas Harriot, John Hoskyns, and the Rev. Robert Burhill.

Thomas Harriot (1560-1621), a mathematician and astronomer, was "credited" by Anthony à Wood with instilling Deistic doctrine into the History, a charge which is clearly controverted by the content of the History. Wood repeated the rumor that Harriot "always undervalued the old story of the creation of the world, and never could believe that trite expression Ex nihilo nihil fit." In his Preface, Ralegh selected the ex nihilo nihil fit axiom for specific refutation, and the doctrine of creation was, he emphasized, absolutely necessary according to both faith and reason. Ralegh had engaged Harriot as his tutor in mathematics shortly after Harriot took his B. A. from Oxford in 1579, sent him as a surveyor to Virginia in 1585, and later introduced him to Henry, Earl of Northumberland, who became Harriot's patron. When the Earl was committed to the Tower in 1606, he maintained a table there for Harriot, Walter Warner, and Thomas Hughes, who became known as the Earl's "three magi." Ralegh often joined them for conversations. It seems probable that Ralegh consulted with Harriot in determining his chronological and geographical computations, but in his accounts of creation, Providence, and Old Testament history, nothing suggests the unorthodox views of Harriot, if in fact he possessed any.
John Hoskyns (1566-1638) has been credited with revising the History. Hoskyns, scholar, lawyer, parliamentarian, poet, and wit, had a considerable reputation as a prose stylist, based primarily on his analysis of Sidney's prose in the *Arcadia* (Jonson copied a lengthy portion of the analysis for his commonplace book) and on his *Directions For Speech and Style*. The claim for his revision of the History is based on Aubrey: "Ben: Johnson called him father. Sir Benet [Hoskyns' son]...told me that one time desiring Mr. Johnson to adopt him for his sonne, 'No,' said he, 'I dare not; 'tis honour enough for me to be your Brother: I was your Father's sonne, and 'twas he that polished me.' In shorte, his acquaintance were all the Witts then about the Towne: e.g. Sir Walter Raleigh (who was his Fellow-prisoner in the Tower, where he was Sir Walter's Aristarchus to review and polish Sir Walter's stile)...." This claim was enlarged by Wood: "...'twas he that viewed and review'd the *History of the World*, written by Sir W. Raleigh, before it went to the press; with which person he had several years before (especially during their time of imprisonment in the Tower) been intimate." And the claim was repeated by Oldys. Isaac Disraeli stated that a manuscript he examined recorded sums paid to Hoskyns and others for revising the History. Actually, however, the manuscript Disraeli cited says nothing about payments to Hoskyns, but mentions the help given to Raleigh by the Rev. Robert Burhill.

The claims for Hoskyns state that, while he was a fellow prisoner in the Tower, he revised the History before it went to the press. Yet Hoskyns was not committed to the Tower until June 3th, 1614, three months after the History was published. Thus he could not have worked
on the first edition of the *History* as a prisoner in the Tower. Since my own collation of the five early editions (1614, 1617, 1621, 1628, and 1634) shows that the *History* was not revised, except that some one-hundred odd errata (mainly printing errors) were corrected, Hoskyns obviously revised none of the editions. Thus any claim for Hoskyns based on the fact that Ralegh and he were fellow prisoners in the Tower seems untenable.

Dr. Robert Burhill (1572-1641) was best qualified of all Ralegh's associates to assist him with the reading of Greek and Hebrew authors. According to Wood, he was "well versed in the fathers and schoolmen, right learned and well grounded in the Hebrew tongue." Ralegh had acknowledged that he was "altogether ignorant" of Hebrew and that he "borrowed the interpretations" of his "learned friends." As some indication of Burhill's qualifications and standing, the role he played in the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance imposed in 1605 is of some importance. After James's *Apology for the Oath* (1603) had been attacked by Cardinal Robert Bellarmine (writing under the pseudonym "Matthaeus Tortus"), Bishop Lancelot Andrews answered with *Tortura Torti sive ad Matthaei Torti* (1609). When he in turn was answered by the Jesuit Martin Becon's *Refutatio Tortuae Torti* (1610), Burhill entered the controversy with a series of four tracts. These tracts dealt generally with the complicated question of monarchical power versus papal power, arguing from historical precedents, citing the early Greek and Latin Fathers, medieval theologians and exegetes, etc.

Thus it seems probable, in view of Burhill's qualifications and his close association with Ralegh, that the remarks of Burhill's widow
to Aubrey were substantially correct. She said that her husband had been employed by Ralegh to help him, and that "all or the greatest part of the drudgery of his booke, for criticisms, chronology, and reading of Greek and Hebrew authors, was performed by him for Sir Walter Raleigh." Wood repeated the story, as did Oldys, and between the years 1724 to 1737 it was entered in the commonplace book of Thomas Rawlins of Pophills (MS. Lansdowne 702, f. 57v). This commonplace book has been described as consisting of "scraps collected from various sources... without any notes of explanation or correction." The reference to Burhill reads: "Dr. Robt Burrel Rector of Northwold in ye county of Norfolk was a great favorite of Sr Walter Raleigh and has been his chaplin but all or ye greatest pt of ye drudgery of Sr Walter's Hist. for criticisms chronology and reading of greek and hebrew authors were performed by him for Sr W. Rawl."

When Isaac Disraeli somewhat belatedly came upon the manuscript (unaware of its authority and treating it as a secret new discovery), he charged that Ralegh employed others to write the History and merely lent his name to the work. This charge in turn set off a controversy over the extent of Ralegh's unacknowledged help, with P. F. Tytler, Bolton Corney, Edwards Edwards, and T. N. Brushfield all entering the lists to champion Ralegh. The result has been to depreciate Burhill's role and to claim perhaps too much for Ralegh.

There the matter has rested until recently. We cannot now assume that Burhill was primarily responsible for the dazzling display of hexaemeral learning in the early chapters of the History; nor can we assume it was Ralegh's. Ralegh's sources were mainly such commentaries
on the Book of Genesis as Benedict Pererius' *Commentariorum et Dis-
putationum in Genesis*, a work of 1300 pages first published in 1590
(seven editions, perhaps nine, were published before 1622). According
to Arnold Williams, this work was the most famous of the Renais-
sance commentaries on Genesis, and from 1500 to 1650 at least twenty-
five such commentaries were published. William states that the chief
feature of the *Commentariorum* is "the thoroughness with which every
possible repository of knowledge on Genesis is ransacked and the zest
with which pages of quotations from authorities, ancient and modern,
are presented, with maps and plans, quotations from classical authors
and references to modern geographical discoveries, all to the end that
the last drop of meaning may be squeezed from the text." This des-
scription is strongly suggestive of the early chapters of the *History*,
as is the following:

Every verse, every word of the first three chapters of
Genesis has a detailed and informative commentary. ...in
discussing the command "Let there be light"...Pererius uses
twenty-one authorities. Of these, two--Aristotle and Plato--
are Pagan philosophers; three--Augustine, Ambrose, and Eucher-
ius--are Latin Fathers; six--Basil, Damascene, Gregory of
Nazianzus, Theodoret, Dionysius Cthusianus, and Gregory of
Nyssa--are Greek Fathers; eight--Bede, Hugo of St. Victor,
Lyra--are medieval theologians; and two--Tostatus and Catharin-
ud--belong to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, respec-
tively.82

The fact that Ralegh made extensive use of Pererius had gone unnoticed
(in spite of his citations of Pererius as an authority) until Williams
took the trouble to compare the early chapters of the *History* to the
*Commentariorum*. One example will establish the point.

In treating the question whether the image of God in man was lost
through sin, Ralegh stated there are opposite opinions, but they can be reconciled:

...both opinions by this distinction may be reconciled; to wit, that the image of God, in man, may be taken two ways; for either it is considered according to natural gifts, and consisteth therein; namely, to have a reasonable and understanding nature, &c. and in this sense the image of God is no more lost by sin than the very reasonable and understanding nature, &c. is lost; (for sin doth not abolish and take away these natural gifts:) or, the image of God is considered according to supernatural gifts, namely of divine grace and heavenly glory, which is indeed the perfection and accomplishment of the natural image; and this manner of similitude, and image of God is wholly blotted out and destroyed by sin. 83

This is almost a literal translation from Pererius:  

Dupliciter enim de imagine Dei quae est in homine, locui: possumus: vel prout ea consideratur secundum dona naturalia, & posita est in eo quod est habere naturam rationis & intellegentiae compotam: & hac ratione non magis peccato perditur imago Dei, quam perditur natura ipsa rationis, seu intellectualis; non enim Peccatum corruptit & tollit dona naturalia: Aut consideratur imago Dei secundum dona supernaturalia, scilicet diuinæ & coelæstis gloriarum, quae quidem est naturalis imaginis absolutio & consummatio: et huiusmodi similitudo & imago Dei Peccando penitus deletur atque destruitur.84

After offering other such examples, Williams concludes: "There can be no question that Ralegh used the Genesis commentaries. Behind the patchwork of citations and quotations which make up the first four chapters of his History of the World, with long lists of authorities presented in bewildering confusion, lie the commentaries." 85 Thus Ralegh had no need for extensive help from Burhill or from any group of unknown scholars to gather information from original sources. He had his Biblical learning available in the commentaries. Williams' work deserves to be widely known, especially since his conclusions apply not only to Ralegh, but also to Burton, Donne, and Sir Thomas Browne. Relative to Ralegh, it suggests solutions to several problems.
One is the problem of help received on the early chapters. The other concerns a puzzling feature of Book I of the History. At times Raleigh exhibited disgust for the arid distinctions of the scholastics, such at St. Thomas Aquinas, and also anger towards the dangers represented by the Jesuits. Yet often he cited St. Thomas and such Jesuits as Martin Becon (involved in bitter controversy with Andrews and Burhill) as reliable authorities with implied approval. Thus the History, especially Book I, where the influence of the commentaries is strongest, must be treated very carefully as a source for Raleigh's views. The reader must be prepared to distinguish between those passages which reflect Raleigh's sources in a mechanical way and those which express his considered views. No rule can be formulated to cover the entire History, but each passage must be seen in its context.
Despite its suppression by James, the work (in its first printing a handsome folio of 784 leaves) gained immediate and lasting popularity. A curious feature of the Folger Library copy is that of the 131 errata listed, nine were corrected in the text, one on the same page with an uncorrected erratum. This suggests that corrections were being made while the sheets were passing through the press.

The second edition, also printed by Stansby, appeared in 1617, at least nine months after Ralegh was released from the Tower. This edition was printed from the Stansby 1614. In the Stansby 1617 the Errata sheet was removed, and of the 131 errata, 105 were corrected, twenty-four remained uncorrected, and two new errors were introduced. A title-page with Ralegh's name and portrait was added.

Since the Stansby 1617 appeared in Ralegh's lifetime, the possibility of authorial revision must be briefly considered. My examination of the two volumes reveals that the 1617 edition was printed from the 1614 and that the corrections introduced were probably the work of the printer. Ralegh's biographers indicate that, in the interval between his release from the Tower in March, 1616 and his departure from London in March, 1617, he was deeply involved in preparing for his voyage to Orinoco, a voyage upon which his fortune and very life depended. Permission for the expedition had been wrung from the reluctant James, "no frend to the journey," and Ralegh left London in haste fearing a royal countermand. It is inconceivable that Ralegh had the time and energy to expend on the mechanical labor of seeing the work through the press, a work, it should be remembered, which had proved a major disappointment to Ralegh's hopes of pleasing James.
In 1621 Jaggard printed a new edition, one based on the Stansby 1617 (See Appendix A for a discussion of an edition identified as a Jaggard 1617). The differences between the Jaggard and Stansby editions resulted from the efforts to reduce costs. In the Jaggard edition the Preface is printed on sixteen leaves instead of twenty, the Table of Contents takes fourteen instead of twenty (an error of omission being introduced which left out a page from the Table of Contents), the number of lines per page was increased from fifty-four to fifty-eight; in all the size of the folio was reduced by 115 leaves. The paper is poorer, the registers not as exact, and in general the pages are more difficult to read.

From 1621 to 1652, four editions were printed, each almost identical, differing mainly in orthography. Four additional editions were published in the seventeenth century (along with several epitomes and continuations), one in the eighteenth, and two in the nineteenth. The last, published in 1329, is the most accurate available, the editors having followed the 1614 edition, but correcting all of the errata.

Degory Wheare, the first Camden Professor of Ancient History at Oxford, whose *Methodus Legendi Historias* (1637) was treated as a standard guide to recommended historical works until late in the century, wrote glowingly of both the matter and style of the *History*. After recommending Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus and Polybius, he continued:

"Nos autem sequi possunt nonnulli ex recentioribus: quos inter, principem locum obtinere meritur Qualerus Paulaeus nostrae, aequus auratus, vir clari nominis, et ob singularem fortitudinem ac pru-
Bishop Joseph Hall was quick to note the general good fortune which came from Ralegh's private misfortune: "How memorable an instance has our age afforded us of an eminent person to whose imprisonment we are all obliged, besides many philosophical experiments, for that noble HISTORY of the WORLD now in our hands? The Court had his youthful and freer years, and the Tower his latter age; the Tower reformed the courtier in him; and produced those worthy monuments of art and industry, which we should have in vain expected from his freedom and jollity."  

Peter Heylyn, after praising Ralegh, said of the History: "When it meeteth with a judicius and understanding Reader, it will speake for it selfe. For my part I onely say...it is Primus in Historia."  

Edmund Bolton described the Preface to the History as "full of proper, clear, and Courtly graces of Speech."  

Oliver Cromwell advised his son: "Recreate yourself with Sir Walter Ralegh's History: it's a body of History, and will add much more to your understanding than fragments of story."  

Hilton, who first published Ralegh's The Cabinet Council (1658), extracted a passage from the History on the plurality of wives for his commonplace book.  

The Welshman James Howell, appointed Historiographer Royal in 1661, in 1645 described Ralegh as "...that rare and renowned knight whose fame shall contend in longevity with this island itself, yea, with that great world which he historiseth so gallantly."  

William
Howell, in his *An Institution of general history*, stated that Ralegh is "never to be mentioned without honour." John Eachard, in the Preface to his *Roman History*, praised Ralegh's treatment of Roman history. John Locke in "Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman" recommended the work as "general history," but the most fulsome praise was Henry Felton's in 1715.

Sir Walter Ralegh's *History of the World* is a work of so vast a compass, such endless variety, that no genius but one adventurous as his own durst have undertaken that great design. I do not apprehend any great difficulty in collecting and commonplacing an universal history from the whole body of historians; that is nothing but mechanic labor. But to digest the several authors in his mind, to take in all their majesty, strength, and beauty, to raise the spirit of meaner historians, and to equal all the excellencies of the best, is Sir Walter's peculiar praise. His style is the most perfect, the happiest, and most beautiful of the age he wrote in; majestic, clear, and manly, and he appears everywhere so superior, rather than unequal, to his subject that the spirit of Rome and Athens seems to be breathed into his work.... If he had attempted the history of his own country, or his own times, he would have excelled even Livy and Thucydides: and the annals of Queen Elizabeth by his pen, without diminishing from the serious, judicious Camden, had been the brightest glory of her reign, and would have transmitted his history as the standard of our language even to the present age.

Louis B. Wright states that in America it was "the most popular of all histories by an Englishman during the seventeenth century.... Favored by the Puritans because it demonstrated the divine purpose in human events, the book was also well-liked by Anglicans in Virginia: for example, men like the second Richard Lee looked upon it as a work of wisdom." The immediate and continued popularity of the work in the seventeenth century seems due to many factors. In 1615, Ralegh died a hero, a victim of Stuart tyranny. His old intolerable pride, his
rumored role in Essex's execution were now forgotten. His "Christian and truthful" conduct on the scaffold "made all believe that he was neither guilty of former treasons nor of unjustly injuring the King of Spain."\textsuperscript{102} Even James granted that his execution was unpopular.\textsuperscript{103} In addition, the legal basis of the execution seemed palpably unjust. As James Howell noted in a letter to Raleigh's son: "But I must needs wonder, as you justly do, that one and the same man who should be condemned for being a friend to the Spaniard (which was the ground of his first condemnation), should afterwards lose his head for being their enemy by the same sentence."\textsuperscript{104} Sir John Eliot came to witness the execution as a follower of Lord Buckingham, an enemy of Raleigh, but in witnessing the execution found that his attitude changed. He wrote: "Such was his unmoved courage and placid temper that, while it changed the affection of the enemies who had come to witness it, and turned their joy to sorrow, it filled all men else with emotion and admiration...."\textsuperscript{105}

To the growing opposition of the Stuart Monarchy, Raleigh could have seemed (however mistakenly) a Republican. Aubrey reported the rumor current in the seventeenth century that "at a consultation at Whitehall after Queen Elizabeth's death, how matters were to be ordered and what ought to be done, Sir Walter Raleigh declared his opinion, 'twas the wisest way for them to keepe the Government in their owne hands and sett up a Commonwealth, and not to be subject to a needy, beggarly nation."\textsuperscript{106} In the \textit{History} Raleigh had characterized human law as a limitation on sovereign power established so that "dominion (in the beginning boundless) might also discern her own limits."\textsuperscript{107} In
addition, he provided many examples of the violent overthrow of tyrannies, examples certain to be noted by the precedent-minded. The popular misconception of Raleigh's Republicanism is perhaps best indicated in the "Letter to Prince Henry," actually written by Richard Steele in 1713, yet printed by the Oxford editors of Raleigh's works as his own. In this letter he is made to declare his passionate love of political liberty and his devotion to the people's "divine right of being free-agents," ideas he would have thought absurd and reprehensible, for he distrusted the "people" for their susceptibility to irrational action.

But more important than Raleigh's "Republicanism" was the fact that his was the only universal history in English which attempted to enclose the four great pagan empires of the past within a Christian framework of history, thus subordinating pagan history to the revealed truths of the Old Testament. Raleigh's providential view of history, his unquestioning utilization of the Old Testament as accurate history, his learned displays of rabbinical exegesis, his buttressing of revealed truth with new learning, his scathing attacks on Aristotle's eternal world, his stern denunciations of the sins of the pagans, his depreciation of the methods of the scholastics, all were certain to win the approval of the pious. It was not until these aspects of the History began to lose favor before the growing rationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the popularity of the History declined.

Felton's high praise of the History early in the eighteenth century centered on Raleigh's style and the 'spirit of Rome and Athens' revealed in the work, but ignored the Christian elements basic to the methods
Raleigh employed. In the same vein Hume advised: "If the reader of Raleigh's history can have the patience to wade through the Jewish and Rabbinical learning which compose the half of the volume, he will find, when he comes to the Greek and Roman story, that his pains are not unrewarded. Raleigh is the best model of that ancient style, which some writers would affect to revive at present." Dr. Johnson commented: "The attempt of Raleigh is deservedly celebrated for the labour of his researches, and the elegance of his style; but he has endeavoured to exert his judgment more than his genius, to select facts, rather than adorn them; and has produced an historical dissertation, but seldom risen to the majesty of history."

Virtually the only enthusiastic voice raised for the History in the nineteenth century was, surprisingly, Thoreau's. In a monograph, first published in 1905, Thoreau's praise is reminiscent of Felton's. Although he regretted that Ralegh "succumbs to the imposing fame of tradition and antediluvian story, and exhibits unnecessary reverence for a prophet or patriarch, from his habit of innate religious courtesy," he admired the Greek and Roman portions of the History. Ralegh did not crouch before his subject like a peasant before lords, but treats such figures as Scipio, Pompey, and Hannibal as his equals. Furthermore, Thoreau admired the History for its revelation of the "supreme nobility," the manhood, of Ralegh's character. "The alacrity with which he adverts to some action within his experience, and slides down from the dignified impersonality of the historian into the familiarity and interest of a party and eye-witness, is as attractive as rare..."

Far different is Matthew Arnold's treatment of the History. In his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1857, Arnold contrasted the times of
Pericles and Queen Elizabeth in terms of their "modern characteristics." The main criterion of his analysis was "the supreme characteristic of all: the intellectual maturity of man himself; the tendency to observe facts with a critical spirit; to search for their law, not to wander among them at random; to judge by the rule of reason, not by the impulse of prejudice or caprice." 113

Taking Thucydides and Raleigh as exemplars of the two periods, he concluded that Thucydides was a "modern," that he observed facts with a critical spirit, searched for their law, and judged them "by the rule of reason, not by the impulse of prejudice or caprice."

Turning his discussion to Raleigh, he asked: "What are the preliminary facts which he discusses...and which are to lead up to his main inquiry? Open the table of contents of his first volume. You will find:--'Of the firmament, and of the waters above the firmament, and whether there be any crystalline Heaven, or any primum mobile.'" 114 Arnold also cited Raleigh's sections on 'fate, the influence of the stars, and on paradise and its location. He concluded his discussion of the two historians with a series of rhetorical questions: "Which is the ancient here, and which is the modern? Which uses the language of an intelligent man of our own days? which a language wholly obsolete and unfamiliar to us? Which has the rational appreciation and control of his facts? which wanders among them helplessly and without a clue? Is it our own countryman, or is it the Greek?" 115

Sir Charles Firth, in commenting briefly on Arnold's criticism, leaves the charges uncontested. "Such a comparison is neither fair nor fruitful. If Arnold wished to compare the foremost historians of the two ages he should have selected Camden rather than Raleigh, and
he might have remembered that Bacon was a product of the Elizabethan age as well as Raleigh. Raleigh must not be taken as a representative of the learning or the intellectual speculations of the Elizabethan age... and he might also have claimed the indulgence accorded to poets.  

It is true that Camden showed a "modern" diligence and respect for accuracy in seeking out original documentary sources for his annals. He wins our sympathy in his description of his labors: "I light upon most thicke piles and heapes of writings and instruments of all sorts... In rigging and searching whereof... I laboured till I sweat, being couered over with dust, and gathered fit matter together." Ralegh contented himself (as his subject matter made necessary) with the traditional sources available. Richard Knolles followed a procedure similar to Ralegh's in his History of the Turks (1606), and even Bacon, whose History of the Reign of Henry the Seventh (1622) was long accepted as a primary authority, was "unmasked" by Wilhelm Busch, who showed that Bacon made extensive unacknowledged use of Hall's Chronicle (1542), which in turn was based on Polydore Vergil's Anglica Historia (1534). Also, it should be remembered that Arnold based his criticism on that portion of Ralegh's History which depended on commentaries such as Pererius', a portion not typical of most of the History, especially the latter half.

Firth's remark that "Raleigh must not be taken as a representative of the learning or the intellectual speculations of the Elizabethan age" involves a question of judgment. The popularity of the work argues for more than the personal fame or the prose style of its author. Douglas Bush comments that Ralegh's "premisses and modes of thought
appear in too many later men to warrant our regarding his attitude as an anachronism." Lily Campbell regards the Preface to the History as the "culminating document of Renaissance historiography." She continues: "In this preface Raleigh did for historiography what Sidney did for literary criticism in his Defence of Poiesie. He gathered all the theories of the Renaissance and the Reformation into a new whole, and as a great artist he fashioned a masterpiece which superseded all that went before. To see the great tradition in its fullest and most inspired expression it is necessary only to read this one document...." Furthermore, Raleigh's treatment of law (similar to Hooker's), government, reason and appetite, his rejection of Aristotelian and scholastic authority (suggestive of Bacon), his praise of experimental science, his acceptance of Biblical authority, his paradoxical and even contradictory attitudes towards man, all of these features argue that the History is representative of the cross currents of the time. It must be added that Raleigh would have rejected "the indulgence accorded to poets." For Raleigh, the poet created fables, while the historian displayed universal truth.

To return to Arnold's criticism, as will become evident in this study, Arnold was unduly harsh with the History. Raleigh not only judged historical facts (and their sources) critically, excepting only Holy Writ: but, far from wandering hopelessly among them without a clue, he used a number of criteria for giving them significance. In his preliminary discussion, for example, in a manner almost unique among Renaissance historians, he lingered at length in an effort to refute Aristotle's arguments for an eternal world. Raleigh recognized that
without Creation historical facts were unintelligible to the Christian. Creation guaranteed the existence of Providence as a prior, contemporaneous, and a posterior cause in history, working out man's destiny in time, thus giving history, the events themselves, meaning. Of course, this view created the problem of evaluating the relationship between first and second causes, a problem which Ralegh tried to solve through various methods; nevertheless, the fact that Ralegh tried to judge events in time according to his understanding of eternal principles renders meaningless Arnold's charge that Ralegh had no point of view from which to judge historical facts. If Arnold had had the patience to read more of the History, he might well have become apprehensive at his discovery of Ralegh's point of view.

No account of the modern scholarship on Ralegh should fail to acknowledge the researches of Dr. T. N. Brushfield, who, in addition to attaining eminence in the field of medicine, devoted a lifetime to a labor of love as an "amateur" biographer and bibliographer of Ralegh. Over many years he produced a whole series of studies based on original sources, and before his death was recognized by the authorities of the British Museum as the "greatest living authority on Sir Walter Ralegh." His most important studies of the History set out many of the circumstances of its writing and suppression, and offer bibliographical descriptions of its many editions. Unfortunately he is not completely reliable in the latter. For example, he is the source for the "second" 1614 edition of the History listed in the STC (no. 20637a), which is probably a Stansby 1617. His repeated claims for three and
possibly four issues of the 1614 edition I have found will not bear
inspection [see Appendix B]. In 1887, he described the Stansby 1617 as
containing a title-page, but in his Bibliography described it as without
a title-page. The Folger Library copy of this edition contains a title-
page. There is nothing to support Brushfield's statement that a second
1617 edition (a Jaggard 1617) was revised by Ralegh, a statement that
has led some scholars to regard it as the most authoritative text.125
My own study has led me to believe that this edition is a ghost [see Ap-
pendix A]. However, aside from his somewhat confusing treatment of the
early editions of the History, his Bibliography must still be the be-
ginning for any study of Ralegh.

Except for the Preface to the History and various passages excised
for the prose anthologies, especially the apostrophe to death which
closes the History, the work has been generally neglected by recent
scholars and critics, perhaps due to its great length and to its formid-
able displays of "crabbed rabbinical learning" in its early chapters.
"To be sure," one recent biographer indicated, "much of it makes tedious
and profitless reading for us."126 The historians of historiography have
ignored it or even falsified its contents, as, for example, one who
stated: "Its later sections were devoted chiefly to English history."127
(It broke off ca. 146 B.C.) Some scholars have seemed more interested
in supporting various theses about Renaissance thought than in accu-
ricy. One stated that the work "remains a chronicle and does not be-
come a vehicle for lament or exhortation."128 (Actually the work con-
tains many "laments" and melancholy exhortations which create a tone,
at times of near despair.) Another, in remarking on Ralegh's prose
works, concluded: "There is naturally hardly a reference to religion, and little more in the *History of the World*, although it begins with some pious observations of a strictly conventional character."¹²⁹ (As will become apparent, Raleigh's religious observations are more than pieties, nor are they invariably conventional.) These examples serve to show the somewhat haphazard treatment the *History* has received.

Ernest A. Strathmann's *Sir Walter Raleigh: A Study in Elizabethan Skepticism* (1951) is the only book length study of Raleigh's thought based mainly on the *History*.¹³⁰ Strathmann was disturbed by the trend exhibited in some modern works, notably M. C. Bradbrook's *The School of Night* (1936), "to re-establish Raleigh as the free thinker of his Elizabethan reputation, even to present him as markedly in advance of his time."¹³¹ His primary purpose was to re-examine in their Elizabethan setting the charges of atheism which Sir Walter Raleigh's contemporaries made against him and to survey anew his religious and philosophical beliefs.¹³² After summarizing these charges, based mainly on the Jesuit Robert Parsons' *Responsio ad Elizabetiae Edictum*, Strathmann used the *History* as the main source of evidence for answering them. He felt that "the greatest authority as a guide to Raleigh's thought is found in the *History of the World*, which has the distinct advantages of publication in his lifetime, a highly personal preface, and an encyclopedic range of comment."¹³³ Moreover, "No topic is too great or too trivial for Raleigh's notice if the context or his own inclination leads him to it. This fondness of comment in the first person makes the *History*, of all his works, the most dependable guide to his opinions on many questions relative to a study of his skepticism."¹³⁴
Strathmann concluded that Raleigh's religious thought, far from that of a freethinking "atheist", generated from theological commonplaces of the Renaissance. He saw Raleigh not as a religious, but (in a limited sense) as a philosophic skeptic, as evidenced by his distrust of Aristotle and the schoolmen, by his distrust of reason, of all human authority, in matters of faith. Certainly Strathmann demonstrated that suppositions about Raleigh's part in any "school of Atheisme" are questionable.

In considering the degree and nature of Raleigh's skepticism, Strathmann used passages in the History indicative of Raleigh's first person views: and from these passages Strathmann attempted to formulate a coherent pattern of Raleigh's ideas on God, grace, nature, man, etc. It was quite irrelevant to his purpose to treat Raleigh qua historian faced with problems of historiography. Strathmann did not examine Raleigh's methods in order to make inferences about Raleigh's thought. He did not attempt to show how Raleigh's views on God, man, and history, were related to his practice as a historian. Surely the evidence provided by a study of the relationships between Raleigh's methodology and his first person views on God, grace, nature, man, etc. is as important, if not more so, than that provided by treating each in isolation. Furthermore, the question might well be asked: in what sense could Raleigh qua historian afford to be a skeptic? That is, to what degree does Raleigh's methodology betray an attitude of skepticism concerning the efficacy of reason in discovering the principles of causation, the historian's relationship to truth, the values of the historian's art.
The questions become more cogent if at this point a preliminary discussion is introduced of the historical traditions Ralegh attempted to utilize.

One need go no further than the frontispiece of the History to be introduced to Ralegh's conception of history, a conception rooted in paradox. The frontispiece illustrates Cicero's famous description of historiography as testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, marister vitae, nuntia vetustatis. (De oratore, II, 9) Revealing his commitment to the secular-classical tradition, Ralegh states that the "end and scope of all history" is "to teach by example of times past such wisdom as may guide our desires and actions." Basic to his view of the purpose of the historian's art is the implication that man is a true secondary cause who can through the use of an informed reason determine will and action.

In the frontispiece, however, the eye of Providence has dominion over Clio. In Ralegh's Preface we find: "God, who is the author of all tragedies, hath written out for us and appointed us all the parts we are to play." Emphatically in the History, Ralegh viewed man as though his role in history is predestined, determined by God's will. Man is not a free agent who improvises his lines, but an instrument who necessarily adheres to a divinely prepared script in the cosmic drama.

In the former tradition historiography could exist independent from theology, i.e., events could be treated as carrying with them their own principle of intelligibility. They need not be referred to anything beyond themselves. The historian not only is under no obligation to
refer events to their final causes, but strictly speaking, they need have no final cause. Motives, acts, and consequences are analyzed, interpreted, and judged. Assuming that the historian has sufficient reliable data at his disposal, nothing (theoretically at least) exceeds the human grasp. Assuming reason and will in man, and assuming as well that like causes produce like effects, history as a human art can be used both as a source of knowledge and as a reliable guide to action.

In the latter tradition historiography is a part of theology. Events become significant in the human drama of salvation with its beginning and end in God. In order to be intelligible, events must be referred to an order of existence beyond the created world, to God's will. The historian reveals the divine plan. Motives and acts are referred ultimately to God's will, to the providential pattern of judgment, mercy, and redemptive purpose.

A primary purpose of this study is to examine these traditions in so far as they exist within the History, i.e., to determine their effects in terms of the formal qualities of the History. In addition, both traditions seem incompatible with a skeptical attitude towards the possible intelligibility of events, or in a more religious sense towards discovery of the divine plan. Any degree of skepticism would necessarily color Ralegh's treatment of history, both as an art and as a series of events. Therefore, this study should provide some evidence for the question of Ralegh's skepticism qua historian.

Sir Charles Firth finds no disharmony between these two traditions (termed by him "Christian or Puritan" and "Ciceronian"), while to
Newman T. Reed (his terms are "the moral historiography of the Middle Ages" and "the tradition of the pragmatic Polybius and the Florentines"), they are "absolutely incompatible." 138 Abstractly considered, Reed's conclusion seems the more probable. This apparent split in Raleigh's vision (which led to his use of radically diverse methods of historiography) helps to explain the praise of Raleigh's "classical history" by Felton, Hume, and Thoreau, and the depreciation of Raleigh's "medieval history" by Hume, Thoreau, and Arnold. His use of both traditions suggests certain problems. For example, Raleigh posited a universe controlled by the Providence of God. At the same time, he treated historical personages in a world dense with contingency created by human motives and acts. Emphasis on the former would rob man of freedom and responsibility and would render a careful examination of human motives and acts irrelevant. Emphasis on the latter would rob God of control of his creation and make human affairs meaningless in terms of ultimate goals. John McIntyre, Professor of Divinity at Edinburgh, in a recent discussion of Providence and human freedom, states: "we are here in the presence of one of the profoundest paradoxes in the Christian faith," a "fundamental and indissoluble paradox." 139 As difficult as the problem is in Christian apologetics, for the Christian historian confronted with historical fact the difficulties are compounded. While providential purpose and control may seem obvious in the establishment of the House of David, for example, they become more difficult
to determine in the conquests of Alexander the Great or the forced suicide of Hannibal after the victories of his Roman enemies.

Was Ralegh aware of the "fundamental and indissoluble" paradox? What methods did he devise to cope with it?
NOTES


2. The phrase is Raleigh's in a letter to King James. Edwards, II, lxiii.


10. Preface; II, lxiv. When referring to the History, I will cite the Preface or book, chapter, and section and also include the volume and page number from the 1829 edition of Raleigh's works. This edition of the History is the most accurate in existence.


13. Designed by Reginald Elstracke, who also did the engravings for the edition of King James's collected works, 1616. This frontispiece, bearing the date 1614, appeared unaltered in the 1617, 1621, 1623, and 1634 editions, a fact which has caused some confusion in dating the early editions.


15. Preface; II, xl.


17. V, I, vi; VI, 83.


19. The Letters of John Chamberlain, I, 568. Several other reasons have been recorded. "At its first publication it was forbid: and particularly for some passages in it which offended the Spaniard; as also for being too plain with the faults of princes in his preface."

Anon., Observations on Sanderson's History of James (London, 1656), pp. 9-10. Oldys in his "Life of Raleigh" wrote that James's displeasure was "as if, truly, the general History of the World was chiefly a secret History, or satire upon his Court; and Scotch faces were to be seen in it, stuck upon old Jewish, Babylonian or Assyrian shoulders. For, as one has observ'd, 'There was a time, when one of our most renowned Historians could not comment upon a piece of the Old Testament, without being thought to write a libel upon his own times: and the king was almost led to fancy he saw his own features in the face of Ninias the son of queen Semiramis....'" The History of the World in Five Books By Sir Walter Raleigh, Kt., 11th edition, 2 vols., To which is Prefix'd "The Life of the Author" by Mr. Oldys (London, 1736), I, exc.


22. ibid.


32. Preface; II, xvi-vii. The passage begins: "If all the pictures and patterns of a merciless prince were lost in the world they might all again be painted to the life out of the story of this king."


37. op. cit., p. 248.

38. ibid.

39. op. cit., p. 333.


41. Preface; II, lxiii.

42. For the entire letter, see Charles Williams, James I (London, 1934), p. 215.


45. IV, II, xv; V, 353.

46. V, I, ix: VI, 103-05.


60. Firth, Essays, p. 37.


70. Pro Tortura Torti contra M. Becarnus (1611), Contra M. Becarni controversiam assertio pro iure regis (1613), De potestate regia et usurpatione papali, pro Tortura Torti (1613), and Assertio pro iure regio contra Martini Becarni Jesuitae Controversiam Anglicanam (1613). For a discussion of the controversy, see the Introduction by Charles H. McLlwain, The Political Works of James I, pp. xv-cxi.


74. Trans. Devon. Assoc., XIX (1887), 393.

75. ibid.


78. The Life of Sir Walter Ralegh, I, 545-46.


80. Arnold Williams, "Commentaries on Genesis as a Basis for Hexaemeral Material in the Literature of the Late Renaissance," SF, XXXIV (1937), 195.

81. op. cit., 192.

82. op. cit., 195-96.

83. I, II, ii; II, 53-54.

84. Quoted from Williams, "Commentaries," 203.

85. op. cit., 201.


90. Methodus legendi historiarum, (Cantab., 1624), p. 28. Virtually the only dissonant note in the chorus of praise was struck by John Donne, who made Raleigh and the History the target for some low grade abuse in one of his "Problems." His son, Jack Donne, thought fit not to print it
with the test of the "Problems" in 1652. It is preserved in the Tanner MSS, 299, f. 32 and was printed in *The Life and Letters of John Donne*, 2 vols., revised and collected by Edmund Gosse (London, 1899), II, 52-3. George Hakewill in his *An apologetic or declaration of the power of God* (1627) stated that among English historians Ralegh "...is matchable with the best of the ancients" (p. 236), but disagreed with the decay of the world theme advanced by Ralegh (p. 52).


98. Quoted from Oldys, "The Life of the Author," I, clxxxiv.


105. Quoted from Thompson, p. 382. *Monarchy of Man* Harleian MSS 2228 (British Museum).

107. I, IX, 1; II, 341.


112. *op. cit.*, p. 56.


115. *op. cit.*, p. 11.


117. "The AUTHOR TO THE READER," *The History of...Princesse Elizabeth*, Sig. B².


121. In fairness to Arnold it should be mentioned that when he published his lecture, he deprecated both its style and content. "No one feels the imperfection of this sketchy and generalizing mode of treatment more than I do...." *Essays, Letters, and Reviews*, p. 8.

122. In 1864 he became Medical Superintendent of Surrey County Asylum at Brookwood. "By this time he was a recognized authority in Lunacy." "Obituary Notices," *Trans. Devon. Assoc.*, XLII (1911), 36-38.

123. *op. cit.*, 36.

124. See notes 5, 23, 24, & 61.
125. Philip Edwards, Sir Walter Ralegh (London, 1953), p. viii; Wallace, Sir Walter Ralegh, see "Illustrations." The question of the early editions needs reexamination. Irvin Anthony, Ralegh and His World (New York, 1934) and Hugh Ross Williamson, Sir Walter Ralegh (London, 1951) have even claimed, without support, that three 1617 editions were published.

126. Wallace, p. 245.


131. Sir Walter Ralegh, p. 5.

132. ibid.


135. II, XXI, vi; IV, 616.


137. Essays, p. 124.


CHAPTER I
THE HISTORIAN AND HIS APPROPRIATE SUBJECT MATTER

In this analysis, I propose to treat the History under three general categories. First, Raleigh's attitude towards the historian will be set out, an attitude which depended on his assessment of the historian's appropriate subject matter. Secondly, I shall examine the formal qualities of the work, the overall structure as well as the particular methods of historiography Raleigh employed. And finally, Raleigh's views on the purpose of historiography will be presented. Of course, none of these exist apart from the other. Indeed, this study will demonstrate the interdependency of these categories.

Raleigh saw the historian's function as the search for truth. In the History he strove laboriously to establish the historicity of the past, a task which required a carefully wrought synthesis of authority (Scriptural, Christian, and pagan), reason, conjecture, and personal experience. Repeatedly he stated that only the Scriptures were beyond doubt, but that all other evidence must be tested by "nature," "reason," and "time." The early Church Fathers themselves were not exempt from close scrutiny and criticism. For example, in his account on the location of Paradise, he noted: "And it is true, that many of the fathers were far wide from the understanding of Paradise. I speak it not, that I myself dare presume to censure them, for I reverence both their learning and their piety, and yet not bound to follow them any further than they are guided by truth: for they were men: et humanum est errare."¹ The claim of objectivity, of exclusive pursuit of
truth, appears frequently in the History. Ralegh stated that he made "no valuation of the opinions of men, conducted by their own fancies, be they ancient or modern. Neither have I any end herein, private or public, other than the discovery of truth. For as the partiality of man to himself hath disguised all things, so the factions and hireling historians of all ages, (especially of these latter times) have, by their many volumes of untrue reports, left honor without a monument, and virtue without memory...." Relative to one of the hottest and most dangerous issues of the day, Roman Catholicism versus Protestantism, he affirmed that he would not oppose an opinion "because commonly those of the Romish religion labour to uphold it," nor favor it "because many notable men of the protestant writers have approved it," but would oppose or approve it "for the truth itself."

Of course, adherence to "truth" is one of the more shop-worn of the Renaissance commonplace on historiography. The historical pyrrhonism seen in Cornelius Agrippa's De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum declamatio (1530) and in an extreme form in Charles de la Ruelle's Succintz adversaires (1567) in spite of the vogue of the former, found no imitators in England. History, for Agrippa, "...being a thing that above all things promises Order, Fidelity, Coherence, and Truth, is yet defective in every one; For Historians are at such variance among themselves, delivering several Tales of one and the same Story, that it is impossible but that most of them must be the greatest Liyers in the World." Ruelle's criticism went much further. The past is impossible to be known, and if it were possible, such knowledge is useless. "Reste a examiner l'autre partie. Rapport du Passe. La verite
Sidney would have blushed at such support for his attack on historians. While the basis of Sidney's attack involved issues of great consequence, he granted, nevertheless, that the historian presents "truth," even though that truth was restricted to the particularity of "a foolish world." Samuel Daniel expressed perhaps the extreme position among English critics when he cautioned in his *Defense of Ryme* (1603) that "reading an Historye...dooth no otherwise acquaint vs with the true substance of Circumstances, than a superficiall Carde dooth the Seaman with a Coast veuer seene which alwayes prooues other to the eye than the imagination fore cast it."^6

Although there was general agreement that historians present truth, profound differences existed on the nature of that truth. The distinctions made by Jean Bodin between the historian, philosopher, and theologian are useful in their application to Raleigh's views.

The fullest and perhaps most influential statement on historiography in the sixteenth century was Jean Bodin's *Methodus ad facilern historiarum cognitionem*, which first appeared in 1566 and went through thirteen Latin editions up to 1650. In his first chapter Bodin distinguished between three kinds of history: human, natural, and divine. Human history, restricted to the acts of man in society, concerns the probable, distinguishes between the base and honorable, leads to prudence, and is the "arbiter of human life." Natural history, restricted to the hidden causes in nature, concerns the inevitable, distinguishes
between the true and false, leads to knowledge, and is the "revealer of all things." Divine history records the power of God and immortal souls, distinguishes between piety and impiety, produces faith, and is the "destroyer of vice." Human history is the province of the historian, natural that of the philosopher, divine that of the theologian.

These distinctions, suggestive of Bacon's, were not made by Ralegh. What is of special significance is the fact that Ralegh, unlike such historians as More, Polydore Virgil, Knolles, Camden, and Bacon, assumed all three roles.

As "theologian" Ralegh attempted to describe the effects of Divine Will acting in time. The visible world, properly understood, is "the understood language of the Almighty, vouchsafed to all his creatures, whose hieroglyphical characters are the unnumbered stars, the sun, and moon; written on these large volumes of the firmament; written also on the earth and seas, by the letters of all those living creatures, and plants, which inhabit and reside therein." All this men perceive "in their reasonable souls." Seeing God, however darkly, in and beyond Creation provides the historian with a main clue to his function. In addition, he has God's word, which has "a singular prerogative above all that have been written by the most sufficient of merely human authors: it setteth down expressly the true and first causes of all that happened." The acts of Providence recorded in the Old Testament establish the precedents by which acts in all succeeding ages may be understood and judged.
And as in those times the causes were expressed, why it pleased God to punish both kings and their people, the same being both before and at the instant delivered by prophets; so the same just God, who liveth and governeth all things for ever, doth in these our times give victory, courage, and discourage, raise and throw down kings, estates, cities, and nations, for the same offences which were committed of old, and are committed in the present; for which reason, in these and other the afflictions of Israel, always the causes are set down, that they might be as precedents to succeeding ages.  

When confronted by catastrophes, men err to seek explanations in second causes alone. Second causes may properly be investigated by the historian "as long as he had forborne to derogate from the first causes, by ascribing to the second more than was due." Though all else in nature and in man is mutable, "the judgments of God are forever unchangeable; neither is he wearied by the long process of time, and won to give his blessing in one age to that which he cursed in another."  

The historian's subject thus is the emanations of an unchanging, eternal God, whose every act in time is germane to His eternal purpose. However, the historian must impose some practical limitations. To repeat God's judgments in particular upon those of all degrees which have played with his mercies, would require a volume apart: for the sea of examples hath no bottom. The marks set on private men are with their bodies cast into the earth; and their fortunes written only in the memories of those that lived with them: so as those who succeed, and have not seen the fall of others, do not fear their own faults. God's judgments upon the greater and greatest have been left to posterity; first, by those happy hands which the Holy Ghost hath guided: and secondly, by their virtue who have gathered the acts and ends of men, mighty and remarkable in the world.  

Therefore, God's judgments upon "the greater and the greatest" constitute the proper subject matter of the historian. Properly enlightened by reason (by reason alone man knows of Providence) and
by faith (some providential acts are beyond rational understanding),
men may gather out of the past "a policy no less wise than eternal." 14

For Ralegh (acting in the role of Bodin's "theologian"), Provid-
dence is the unifying power which, in man's effort to cope with plural-
istic human experience, becomes not only the motive for universal,
providential historiography, but provides the necessary criteria by
which all events must be judged. The historian is the interpreter of
God's will; and as he ranges past Old Testament history through that
of the Persians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, and the modern states
of Spain, France, and England, the historian, armed with Old Testa-
ment precedents, a static moral order, and the method of analogy,
becomes comparable to God pronouncing His judgments on the follies
and crimes of men, the "greater and the greatest." It is no wonder
that King James squirmed at the audacity of his prisoner, one "civilly
dead."

While comparable attitudes towards history as a series of God's
judgments upon mankind were not uncommon in the Renaissance, e. g., in
Melanchthon's Chronicon Carionis (1553) and in Knolles' History of the
Turks (1603), providential histories were not written or advocated by
Polydore Virgil, La Primaudaye, Bodin, Ascham, Camden, and Bacon. Poli-
tical, scientific, and theological forces were stirring in the six-
teenth century which were turning the historian away from first causes
to an exclusive concern with second causes, not to mention the renewed
interest in classical learning, part of which involved the historiog-
graphy of Thucydides, Polybius, Livy, and, of course, Cicero. More-
ever, the danger of detecting God's will in, or even absent from, the
political and ecclesiastical struggles was all too clear. The Anglica Historia of Polydore Virgil, who dared to demonstrate the inaccuracies of Geoffrey of Monmouth (the stuff from which the Tudor Myth was shaped) and thus undermined the argument that the Tudor assumption of power was heavenly ordained, suffered almost total eclipse and earned for him the abuse (shared by William Parmus) of having exhibited "lying tongues, envious detraction, malicious slaunders, reproachfull and venomous language, wilfull ignorance, dogged emule, and canckered mindes..."\(^1^5\)

In addition, the growing interest in exploration, in the discoveries of science, in man's power to control and exploit his environment turned man's attention to nature, to second causes. On the other hand, the resurgence of a reforming pietism which signalized the unworthy, fallen state of man carried with it the suggestion that human explanations of Providence could only be impious distortions. Both of these forces were straining and even breached the bond between faith and reason, a bond necessary to the historian of first and second causes.

As is well known, the main emphasis of Bacon's thought directed attention away from first to second causes. In his Advancement of Learning (1605), Bacon described the "History of Providence" as containing "that excellent correspondence which is between God's revealed will and his secret will; which though it be so obscure as for the most part it is not legible to the natural man; no, nor many times to those that behold it from the tabernacle," yet it may have value in warning "mere sensual persons" to heed God's judgments.\(^1^6\) Bacon's warning of the necessary obscurantism of providential historiography, his restriction
of its value to "mere sensual persons" are far different from his claims for second cause historiography. Edmund Bolton complained that "Christian Authors, while for their ease they shuffled up the reasons of events, in briefly referring all causes immediately to the Will of God, have generally neglected to inform their Readers in the ordinary means of Carriage in human Affairs, and thereby singularly maimed their Narrations." In 1614, Richard Brathwait, though he knew Raleigh's History well enough to quote from the Preface, felt that providential historiography was beyond the historian's grasp because reason cannot detect supernatural causes.

Yet in making use of this especiall Branch of History: Explanation of the discovery of causes, I will limit and restraine it to an asertaine bound. We must not search causes above their Natures: there may be many hidden and concealed reasons, which to enquire after were unlawfull; much lesse to wade into the secret conventions of that sacred Power, from whom all visible and apparent causes borrow their light.

What we may gather by authentick relation, or probable imagination, may without prejudice, or error, be produced. As for supernaturall causes, the more we sound them, the more we sound into the shallownesse of our owne judgments: never farther from apprehending them, than when we seeme to apprehend them.

The same year Raleigh's monumental work was published, providential historiography was in full retreat.

For Raleigh, while reason could detect the effects of supernatural causes, nevertheless providential historiography had limitations stemming from two sources: man's nature and God's. The historian may perceive the effects of Providence; "yet the manner and first operation of [God's] divine power cannot be conceived by any mind, or spirit, compassed with a mortal body." Man's reason perceives that Providence
exists, that it operates in history, that "God worketh by angels, by the sun, by the stars, by nature or infused properties, and by men as by several organs, several effects; all second causes whatsoever being but instruments, conduits, and pipes, which carry and disperse what they have received from the head and fountain of the universal." However, "of the manner how God worketh in them, or they in or with each other which the heathen philosophers, and those that follow them, have taken on them to teach: I say, there is not any one among them, nor any one among us, that could ever yet conceive it or express it; ever enrich his own understanding with any certain truth...." 

It is unjust to the contrapuntal complexity of Ralegh's thought to isolate such passages from the History in order to construct an argument for Ralegh's skepticism; for what we see above is the negative theology tradition which was long indigenous to Christianity, the **si comprehendis, non est Deus** of St. Augustine, and what Josef Pieper has recently described as a corrective against Greek rationalism within the Christian tradition. This negative theology tradition, given its greatest authority by the unknown personality who called himself Dionysius the Areopagite, the friend of St. Paul, is present even in the thought of the supreme "rationalist" of the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas, dedicated to establishing the legitimate claims of reason, nevertheless believed that "God is honoured by silence---not because we cannot say or understand anything about Him, but because we know that we are incapable of comprehending Him." In another place he wrote: "This is the extreme of human knowledge of God: to know that we do not know God."
For Ralegh, as indeed for St. Thomas, Calvin, and Hooker, to inquire "of the essence of God, of his power, of his art, and by what mean he created the world; or of his secret judgment, and the causes, is not an effect of reason... 'but they grow mad with reason that inquire after it.'" While historiography is the most exalted (albeit difficult) human art, while it presents universal truth, while it records the acts of God, it may not set out the precise terms of divine formal causes. This position was not unusual in Renaissance historiography, to say nothing of theology. James Amyot indicated that the historian is "but as a register to set downe the judgements and definitive sentences of Gods Court," and while some can be understood by man's "weake naturall reason," others "goe according to Gods infinite power and incomprehensible wisedom, above and against all discourse of mans understanding...."  

As "theologian" Ralegh recorded the acts of God's will, taking a grim satisfaction in setting out the power of divine vengeance as it destroyed impiety and vice. At the same time, he was keenly aware that in many respects divine will is ultimately unfathomable. In attempting to explain the causes of Creation, for example, he concluded: "there was no other cause preceding than [God's] own will"; i.e., at the point where human knowledge must stop, man can only say that God's will wills itself.
In the role of "philosopher," proceeding, as he said, by reason, Ralegh tried to establish the certainty of Creation and to refute the "necessitarianism" implicit in Aristotle's eternal world. In addition, acting within the province of Bodin's philosopher, he offered definitions and analyses of nature, man, law (divine, natural, and human), government, magic (what we would term experimental and applied science), etc.

It might seem strange that Ralegh, unique among Renaissance historians, should preface his history with a lengthy and difficult discussion of Creation and an eternal world. He evidently felt that he had to establish the possibility of history, a possibility which required Creation, which in turn proved the existence of Providence.

The examples of divine Providence everywhere found (the first divine histories being nothing else but a continuation of such examples) have persuaded me to fetch my beginning from the beginning of all things; to wit, creation. For though these two glorious actions of the Almighty be so near, and, as it were, linked together, that the one necessarily implieth the other; creation inferring providence, (for what father forsaketh the child that he hath begotten?) and providence presupposing creation....

It is significant that in Ralegh's discussion of Creation, he refused to resort to authority, to Christian faith (although the Scriptures offered, he felt, infallible proof), but throughout grounded his arguments on "natural reason."

The preceding remarks cannot be over-stressed. In the critical examinations of the History, too often the conclusion has been reached, as in Arnold, that the work is a throw-back to the "medieval" monastic chronicles, or to the fideistic apologetics such as Paulus Orosius' Historiarum adversum paganos libri VII. Portions of the first two
books of the History in which Ralegh acted as a Biblical exegete, lend support to this conclusion. Yet Ralegh's providential historiography does not owe its being to faith; rather the very possibility of its existence was established, with great effort, through "natural reason."

To be sure, Ralegh denied the possibility of reason discovering the divine formal causes in history. Thus an area of faith was given sanctuary through negative theology. At the same time it is important to note that reason is capable of determining the efficient and material causes of history. Thus Ralegh attempted to maintain some balance between faith and reason. He attempted to resist the forces which led to the fragmentation of historiography in the Renaissance.

In his attempt to ground his arguments for Creation on "natural reason," he selected Aristotle as his chief target. "I shall never be persuaded," he argued, "that God hath shut up all light of learning within the lantern of Aristotle's brains." The idea of Creation in time is "too weighty a work for Aristotle's rotten ground to bear up"; even so, "that the necessity of infinite power, and the world's beginning and the impossibility of the contrary, even in the judgment of natural reason, wherein he believed, had not better informed him, it is greatly to be marvelled at." Ralegh's anti-Aristotelianism thus stems from his recognition that the doctrine of Creation was necessary to providential historiography. In addition, like Bacon, Ralegh had a strong empiricist strain, a desire to ground theory in the facts of experience, a distrust of the contemplative reason of the scholastics, who "spin into small threads with subtle distinctions many times the plainness and sincerity of the scriptures: their wits
being like that strong water, that eateth through and dissolveth the purest gold. Ralegh had little use for the type of "reason" which is "more subtile in distinguishing upon the parts of doctrine already laid down," than in discovering "any thing hidden, either in philosophy or divinity...." "That these and these be the causes of these and these effects, time hath taught us, and not reason, and so hath experience, without art. The cheese-wife knoweth it as well as the philosopher, that sour runnet doth coagulate her milk into a curd."

The opposing arguments for a created world and an eternal world predate Aristotle and, given a new terminology, continue to this day among astrophysicists. One may conclude, with St. Thomas, that neither can be proved or disproved by reason. Ralegh exhibited no such caution, and it is remarkable that he did not (like St. Augustine) settle the question by invoking Genesis, but insisted that by "natural reason" Creation could be proved. We have seen the limitations on reason he imposed; yet in his discussion of Creation, acting as "philosopher," he felt that reason could solve one of the most difficult of problems, that it could lead to knowledge of the inevitable. His arguments are not original. Bodin, in Chapter VIII of the Methodus, offered similar arguments, a fact which suggests, according to John L. Brown, a common source, perhaps the De perenni philosophia libri X (1540) of Augustinus Steuchius. Henry Cuffe, Essex's unfortunate chaplain executed in 1601, presented similar arguments in The Differences of the ages of mans life (1600), a work Ralegh may have known.
Ralegh's arguments for Creation are too numerous to be treated in extenso here, but they indicate a surprising grasp of the central issue: God's freedom versus "Greek necessitarianism," Ralegh argued, with some heat, for the same position which had been taken previously by the Franciscans Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, a position which had considerable impact on the development (or decline, as some prefer to term it) of scholastic philosophy. Ralegh's solution to the problem of Creation was based on a definition of a "voluntarist" God.

The issue of God's freedom versus Greek necessitarianism as it developed in the Middle Ages is the subject of a recent penetrating discussion by the philosopher Josef Pieper. Pieper examined the nature of necessitarianism (the principle of rationes necessariae) as illustrated in the thought of St. Anselm. In arguing that human souls would take the place of the fallen angels, Anselm reasoned that it was necessary because there is no other nature from which the fallen angels could be replaced (Cur Deus homo, I, 16). Pieper asks:

Under what assumption (aside from the revelation of truth assumed by faith) can Anselm's line of argument lay claim to validity? The answer must be: Under the dual assumption that---first---everything which God does must be rational; and that---secondly---man, or more precisely, the believing man, for his part can recognize and prove this rationality.

This idea of Anselm's, however, leads us almost immediately to a further idea: that God is acting under necessity and cannot help acting in a certain way---namely, to do in every case what is most rational; and hence, that in each case the rationality of what He does can be intelligible to the reason of (believing) man....

The idea that God must necessarily act in certain rational ways, as Etienne Gilson has shown, was an inheritance of Aristotle's thought which, through the influence of the Arabian philosophers Avicenna and
Averroës, shaped the nature of scholastic philosophy before the condemnations of 1277. This rationalism, for example, permeates the thought of Siger of Brabant, many of whose theses, such as "God by necessity brings forth everything that proceeds directly from Him," were among the 219 propositions condemned by Bishop Tempier of Paris. The bishops at Paris and Oxford involved in the condemnations of 1277 and 1286 took a stand against what they felt was the dangerous pagan rationalism of some of the schoolmen, St. Thomas included. Among the condemned theses was the proposition that creation ex nihilo is impossible, an argument for the eternity of the world.  

Significantly, Ralegh cited the same proposition in order to refute it, the argument that matter is eternal because the world couldn't have been created ex nihilo, but ex materia praeeestente. Ralegh answered that if eternal matter existed, either it fitted itself to God (which is impossible since things without sense cannot adapt to the workman's will) or God accommodated himself to matter (which is untenable since it implies that God's will is limited by natural necessity).  

In addition, Ralegh cited what he took to be Aristotle's argument, similar to Siger of Brabant's condemned thesis given above, that "a sufficient and effectual cause being granted, an answerable effect is granted," i.e., since God (the cause) is eternal, the world (the effect) must also be eternal. He answered:

But what a strange mockery is this in so great a master, to confess a sufficient and effectual cause of the world (to wit, an almighty God) in his antecedent; and the same God to be a God restrained in his conclusion; to make God free in power, and bound in will; able to effect, unable to determine; able
to make all things, and yet unable to make choice of the
time when: for this were impiously to resolve of God, as of
natural necessity, which hath neither choice, nor will, nor
understanding; which cannot but work, matter being present,
as fire, to burn things combustible."

His answer is an argument for the freedom of God, a denunciation of
the rationes necessariae principle. Parenthetically, it should be said
that Ralegh placed his arguments in the Preface to the History, which
may indicate the importance he attached to them. No studies of Ralegh
or of Renaissance second cause historiography mention these arguments,
a fact which confirms the truism that, unlike providential historiog-
raphy, second cause historiography doesn't need the Creation doctrine.
Thucydides and Polybius didn't need it; nor did Camden or Bacon.

Approximately three hundred years before Ralegh's words were
written, the battle cry "freedom" had been used against Greek necessi-
tarianism by Duns Scotus. Pieper writes:

The watchword "freedom," which I said characterized
Duns Scotus, refers above all to the freedom of God. This
may seem to us a purely theological thesis, but we will
think otherwise as soon as we see the conclusion which Duns
Scotus quickly draws from this: Because God is absolutely
free, everything that He does and effects has the character
of nonnecessity, of being in a particular sense "accidental"
(contingent). This applies both to God's creative work, and
therefore to Creation itself, and to the events included with-
in the history of Salvation.... In a word: there are no
"necessary reasons" for the work of God.

In the same way Ralegh would not tolerate any suggestion of restrictions
on God's will. If God is bound by rational necessity and if man is suf-
sufficiently rational, it would mean that the historian could fathom even
the formal causes of history. I do not mean to imply that Ralegh de-
liberately followed Scotus here. The lines of influence from Scotus
to William of Ockham to Calvin seem clear, but except for a brief
examination by Herschel Baker, the influence of Scotist voluntarism in the Renaissance has not been studied. The fact is, none the less, that Ralegh felt that any restrictions on God's will involve an "impiety monstrous" because they result from confusing God with nature.

For it is God that only disposeth of all things according to his own will, and maketh of one earth vessels of honour and dishonour: it is nature that can dispose of nothing, but according to the will of the matter wherein it worketh. It is God that commandeth all: it is nature that can dispose of nothing, but according to the will of the matter wherein it worketh. It is God that commandeth all: it is nature that is obedient to all. It is God that doth good unto all, knowing and loving the good he doth: it is nature that secondarily doth also good, but it neither knoweth nor loveth the good it doth. It is God that hath all things in himself: nature nothing in itself. It is God which is the Father, and hath begotten all things: it is nature which is begotten by all things, in which it liveth and laboureth; for by itself it existeth not.

It seems clear that for Ralegh the ultimate ground of reality is the absolutely free will of God. In this sense he is a "voluntarist." He does not go to the extremes of William of Ockham, who too stressed the principle of absolute divine freedom. Ockham even argued that God becoming man was so little necessary in itself that God, "if he wished, might just as well assumed the nature of a stone, a tree, or an ass." One feels quite certain that Ralegh would have been repelled by this type of "voluntarism," which ultimately makes God a "blind, purely actual discharge of energy."

Thus, through reason, Ralegh attempted to establish the bases of providential historiography.
By the time Ralegh's *History* was published, providential historiography was out of favor. The Renaissance humanist view, reflecting classical and Florentine influences, settled on second causes as the historian's proper subject matter (as in Bodin), under which political, religious, and even geographical influences were treated. In 1553, Roger Ascham summarized the humanist position, a portion of which follows.

First point was, to write nothing false: next, to be bold to say any truth; whereby is avoided two great faults, flattery and hatred: for which two points Caesar is read to his great praise, and Jovius the Italian to his just reproach. Then to mark diligently the causes, counsels, acts, and issues in all great attempts: and in causes, what is just or unjust; in counsels, what is proposed wisely or rashly; in acts, what is done courageously or faintly; and of every issue, to note some general lesson of wisdom and wariness, for like matters in time to come.... Diligence also must be used in keeping truly the order of time; and describing lively, both the site of places and nature of persons, not only for the outward shape of the body, but also for the inward disposition of the mind....

Although Ascham saw "truth" as the proper subject matter of the historian, it differs profoundly from Ralegh's. Ascham's truth concerns the *consilia, dicta, and facta* of human affairs, and just as important, the "inward disposition of the mind," carrying with it the implication that the important causes of history originate within the human mind. He says nothing of Providence. Thus the conjunction of faith and reason necessary to Ralegh's historian has been fragmented.

A more complete and systematic account of classical or humanist historiography was supplied by Francisco Patricio, whose precepts, together with those of Accontio Tridentio, were translated by Thomas
Blundeville and published in 1574. After having restricted the subject
matter of histories to politics, Patricio continued: "Every deed that
man doth, springeth eyther of some outwarde cause, as of force, or
fortune, (which properlye ought not to be referred to man:) or else
of some inward cause belonging to man: of which causes there be two,
that is, reason and appetite. Of reason springeth counsell and election,
if affaires of the lyfe, which not being letted, do cause deedes to
ensue. Of appetite doe spryng, passions of the mynde, which also doe
cause men to attempt enterpris.\(^{48}\) Patricio ignored "outwarde" causes
(under which Providence as well as "force" or "fortune" would be placed)
in the interests of a rigorous analysis of "inward" causes. The his-
torian must "consider well the cause that moued the doer to enter-
prise the deede, & to declare the same accordingly. And note here,
that by the cause, I meane the ende. For the matter whereon the doer
worketh, is the deede of peace, of warre, or of sedicion. And the
shape or forme thereof, is the meanes and maner of doing, which the
doer vseth therein. And the cause efficient is the doer himselfe.
Affections also haue a fynall cause, as the ende of wrath, is reuenge:
of loue, the fruition of the thing beloued: and of mercy, the ende is
helpe and confort.\(^{49}\)

Each one of the causes is then discussed separately. Amplifi-
cation of the efficient cause in history, the "doer," leads to char-
acter analysis. The material cause is the act itself, the formal cause
is the means used to carry out the act, and the final cause is the
purpose of the act. Patricio thus felt that he had systematically
provided the historian with all the tools needed for his craft. The
role of Providence was ignored, for if admitted, it could only allow mystery to intrude upon the ordered patterns of history. Ralegh found ordered patterns in history also, but these were created by God's will. But the humanists, such as Ascham, Patricio, and Bodin, limited historiography (as Bodin stated) to "the activities of men only," to human activities "which spring from plans, sayings, and deeds of men, when volition leads the way. For will power is the mistress of human activity, whether it follows reason or the lower faculty of the soul, in seeking and avoiding things."50

Ralegh, in handling the affairs of Greece and Rome, confined himself mainly to the motives, counsels, acts, and issues of human events and found the "inward disposition of the mind" of great importance. He was aware, as he stated, of the "laws of history, and of the kinds. The same hath been taught by many, but by no man better, and with greater brevity, than by that excellent learned gentleman sir Francis Bacon."51 Yet, for Ralegh, a history of human causes, counsels, and acts was limited, not only because it falsified the truth by ignoring Providence, but also because it assumed that nothing human was beyond rational analysis. Apply reason, apply Aristotle's four causes to human affairs, Patricio intimated, and understanding follows. This optimism Ralegh did not share. Just as he resisted necessitarian rationalism concerning God's nature, so he resisted similar treatment of human nature. While the former resistance was motivated by a definition of God which protected His freedom, the latter was motivated by his definition of man. His views on human nature influenced his discussions of the value of historiography, of the rise and fall of empires, of law, government,
and warfare, and even such relatively minor matters as dueling. Almost invariably they display a deep pessimism about the vagaries, the perverse contingencies of human nature, a pessimism derived from his study of history and reinforced by his own wide experience. For the present, his views on human nature as subject matter for the historian will be considered.

In one of his darker passages, heavy with autobiographical overtones, Ralegh came close to stating that any generalized art or science which treats man is impossible.

But such is the multiplying and extensive virtue of dead earth, and of that breath-giving life which God hath cast upon slime and dust; as that among those that were, of whom we read and hear, and among those that are, whom we see and converse with, every one hath received a several picture of face, and every one a diverse picture of mind; every one a form apart, every one a fancy and cogitation differing; there being nothing wherein nature so much triumpheth, as in dissimilitude.52

Even though this triumph in dissimilitude would tend to render impossible an accurate history of human mind and volition, nevertheless Ralegh felt that man’s works sometimes do provide clues for determining thoughts and motives, in spite of the masks created by craft, fear, and love of the world.

And though it hath pleased God to reserve the art of reading man's thoughts to himself; yet, as the fruit tells the name of the tree, so do the outward works of men (so far as their cogitations are acted) give us whereof to guess at the rest. Nay, it were not hard to express the one by the other, very near the life; did not craft in many, fear in the most, and the world’s love in all, teach every capacity, according to the compass it hath, to qualify and mask over their inward deformities for a time.53

To make the task of the historian of human acts even more difficult, at times matters of great consequence are grounded in such "petty
trifles" that "no historian would either think upon, or could well search out." At other times no possibility of citing the real causes exists, "for the heart of man is unsearchable" [italics mine]. Such is the craft of princes that even though they are closely observed by "those many eyes which pry both into them and into such as live around them, yet sometimes, either by their own close temper, or by some subtle mist, they conceal the truth from all reports." 54

Ralegh's awareness of diversity, close tempers, subtle mists, and unsearchable hearts prevented him from being Bodin's historian of human mind and volition. He did not share Ascham's confidence about discovering the "inward disposition of the mind." For Ralegh, rational motives were easiest to determine, the irrational more difficult, the trifling virtually impossible; then too must come those occasions when the limits of human knowledge are reached in the realization that the heart of man is unsearchable. At this point, the historian can say only that the human will wills itself.

It seems clear that Ralegh's conception of the role of the historian included and transcended Bodin's theology-philosophy-history trichotomy of human learning. Ralegh resisted Bodin's fragmentation of learning. In addition, he justified providential historiography through reason, yet attempted to maintain faith's superordinate position. While he recognized the claims of reason in historiography, he also recognized the dangers of claiming too much for it.
At this point an additional approach may be used to define Ralegh's position on "truth" and historiography, an approach which will reveal further the relative uniqueness of Ralegh's attitude. A favorite critical and analytical technique in the Renaissance was to compare history with philosophy and poetry. Each art had its champions. This discussion will be limited to three of the most widely known, James Amyot, Sidney, and Bacon. Amyot used the tripartite comparison to exalt the superiority of historiography; Bacon used it for philosophy; and Sidney for poetry. The basis for superiority in each case hinged on the relationship between the art and "truth," each advocate making an exclusive claim to the highest truth: the universal.

Sidney's *Defence of Poesie* (written ca. 1580, though first published in 1595) contains an attack on historiography that is more serious than is generally realized. If Sidney's conception of history had been shared by Ralegh, the *History* would not have been written. The *Defence*, of course, must be seen in the context of the attacks on poetry (especially on the drama) launched by the Puritan reformers. One phase of the attack stemmed from the Platonic view that the poet is thrice-removed from reality, that he is merely the copier of a copy of an idea. The second phase, also based on Plato, accused poets of pandering to the inferior part of the soul, of stimulating the passions rather than addressing the reason. Thus the poet cannot properly teach. He can only delight, and this delight, separated from reason, becomes vicious and degrading.

Sidney met these charges with the argument that far from being thrice-removed from truth, poetry provides an image of the universal.
In addition, recognizing that the arts of poetry delight, he saw this as a necessary virtue; i.e., delightful qualities are necessary if man is to be "moved" to overcome his "infected will" in order to embrace truth. For Sidney, the rational apprehension of truth and goodness is insufficient by itself. The poet must delight in order "to move men to take that goodness in hand which, without delight, they would fly as from a stranger." The poet not only shows the way, "but giveth so sweet a prospect unto the way as will entice any man to enter it...."

The feigned example of the poet is superior to the literal truth of the historian because, while both may teach, the former is far superior in moving power because it "may be tuned to the highest key of passion." The moving power of the poet also makes him superior to the philosopher.

For suppose it be granted, that which I suppose with great reason may be denied, that the philosopher in respect of his methodical proceeding teach more perfectly than the poet, yet do I think that no man is so much philosophos as to compare the philosopher in moving with the poet. And that moving is of a higher degree than teaching, it may by this appear, that it is well nigh both the cause and effect of teaching; for who will be taught, if he be not moved with desire to be taught?

Of more importance in proving the superiority of poetry is its special relationship with truth. For Sidney, the philosopher and historian in their efforts to serve as guides to truth proceed "the one by precept, the other by example; but both, not having both, do both halt." The philosopher, "setting down with thorny argument, the bare rule, is so hard of utterance, and so misty to be conceived, that one that hath no other guide but him shall wade in him until he be old, before he shall find sufficient cause to be honest. For his knowledge standeth so much upon the abstract and general that happy is
that man who may understand him, and more happy that can apply what he doth understand."

On the other hand, the "peerless poet," in presenting a "perfect picture" of what the philosopher says should be done, "coupleth the general notion with the particular example." This perfect picture, an "image," can strike, pierce, and possess the soul in a manner far more effective than the "wordish description" of the philosopher.

Having banished the philosopher to a pseudo-platonic limbo of misty abstractions, which by their nature lack moving power, Sidney banished the historian to the foolish world of isolated particulars, which by their nature lack teaching power. The historian, "wanting the precept, is so tied, not to what should be, but to what is; to the particular truth of things, and not to the general reason of things; that his example draweth no necessary consequence, and therefore a less fruitful doctrine." Here Sidney followed Aristotle's distinctions, that the statements of poetry are universals, whereas those of history are singulars. Sidney, like Aristotle, assumed "that history treats only of the particular, multiple, and isolated,---that it is devoid of unity and unconcerned with the universal." Sidney, unlike Raleigh, precluded any possibility of a philosophy of history; he made impossible a universal historical frame of reference, which was basic to Raleigh's conception of history.

Sidney anticipated the objection that if the poet is superior to the philosopher because the former presents "images" of matter, the historian must be superior to the poet because the historian presents "images of true matters, such as indeed were done." He used this char-
acteristic of historiography as evidence for its inferiority to poetry. He granted that an act truly described is better than one falsely described, but the important question went beyond literal truth or falsity. Rather it concerned "for your own use and learning, whether it be better to have it set down as it should be, or as it was...." Again, for the sake of the "perfect pattern," the universal, Sidney concluded that the should be is far better than the was. The was could never be a logical basis for present and future action. Such a position argues that "because it rained yesterday therefore it should rain today." At best the historian can come only to a "conjectured likelihood" on causation. When we remember Ralegh's position that men may gather out of the past "a policy no less wise than eternal," which presupposes a static, eternal frame of reference, we must be struck by the extent of the disagreement.

Further, for Sidney, since the historian is tied to the was, he labors under the insurmountable obstacle of "being captivated to the truth of a foolish world." Therefore, instead of presenting examples in which virtue is exalted and vice punished, the historian is "many times a terror from well-doing and an encouragement to unbridled wickedness." Here another important difference between Sidney and Ralegh becomes apparent. For Sidney, the world which gives the historian his subject matter is not informed with divine justice; it is not the "understood language of the Almighty." Rather it is controlled by willful second causes; it is one in which the wicked may triumph and the virtuous be defeated. The poet, however, can create a more perfect world, one in which vice is punished and virtue rewarded. He may thus
improve on the real world, an idea which to Ralegh would be an impiety monstrous.

For Sidney, both history and philosophy are incomplete arts, incomplete by the "truth" they present. History cannot escape particularity, philosophy the abstraction. Only poetry combines the two in the image, the perfect picture, and thus presents the highest truth: universals wedded to particulars. Consequently, poetry profits, delights, and moves.

It should be noted that in order to support his claims for poetry, Sidney placed the poet within an Aristotelian universe, one in which the universal is implicit in particularity; to reduce the positions of history and philosophy, he placed the historian in a nominalistic world, one in which the historian can do nothing but cling to the purely factual; and he placed the philosopher in a "platonic" world, one restricted to the precept, the "bare rule," the "general reason of things." Thus both the historian and the philosopher suffer from their partial grasp of reality, and neither can "move" properly.

Sidney, in his effort to defend poetry through a definition of historical reality, denied three assumptions held by Ralegh. First, he denied that historiography can reveal universal truths. Secondly, he denied the possibility of providential historiography; i.e., he posited a world in which events can be no clue to divine justice and Providence. He even suggested that Providence doesn't operate within history. Third, he denied the existence of a static and universal frame of reference by which all events are given coherence and meaning.
Sidney's views on history seemingly had little influence, although some faint echoes are heard in Nashe's *Pierce Penilesse* (1592). Sir John Harington, in *An Apologie of Poetrie*, prefixed to his translation of *Orlando Furioso* (1591), followed Sidney's arguments for poetry quite closely, but dropped the comparison with history.

The *History* contains no sustained discussion of poetry. The references are brief and scattered. Yet they will support a comparison with Sidney. Raleigh cited Sidney's *Defense* in support of his argument that historians almost necessarily must be inaccurate when they attempt to explain the operation of second causes. "For it was well noted by that worthy gentleman sir Philip Sidney, that historians do borrow of poets, not only much of their ornament, but somewhat of their substance. Informations are often false, records not always true, and notorious actions commonly insufficient to discover the passions, which did set them first on foot." It is noteworthy that Raleigh juxtaposed borrowings from poets (the ornaments and substance) with false information, untrue records, and actions for which the motives remain mysterious. All of these are obstacles to accurate historiography.

Raleigh distrusted the "feigned," the "imaginations," which by their nature are unrelated to truth. Raleigh defined poetry (with Bacon) as feigned or imagined history, an account of that which never was. Of course, enough of Raleigh's poetry has survived (the canon is still being enlarged) to indicate that he was an accomplished poet. Yet in the *History*, he could not have accepted Sidney's argument that
the poet's creation improves on literal reality; for Ralegh, that reality was ultimately controlled by Providence. The most he granted to poetry is the possibility that such readers "as can either interpret [the poets'] fables, or separate them from the naked truth, shall find matter in poems not unworthy to be regarded of historians." 70

When Ralegh engaged in such separation of "fables" from "naked truth," the results are devastating to poetry. In his discussion of Aeneas, the early kings of Alba, the supernatural tales of the founding of Rome, the stories of the interchanges between men and gods in early Greek and Roman history, he termed them "poetical inventions." He gave them brutally literal interpretations, a portion of which follows. "Aeneas was a bastard, and begotten upon some fair harlot, called for her beauty Venus, and was therefore the child of lust, which is Venus. Romulus was nursed by a wolf, which was Lupa, or Lupina, for the courtesans in those days were called wolves...." 71 For Ralegh, the poetic process adds to historical reality, additions created by the poet's power of invention or imagination. When such invention is stripped away, what remains is the "naked truth," which can be used by the historian.

In assessing Xenophon's description of Cyrus the Great, he stated that Xenophon created "the pattern of a most heroical prince, with much poetical addition." Despite the poetical addition, the description is valuable because "the bulk and gross of narration was founded upon mere historical truth," ["mere" as used here means "absolute, complete, unqualified," v. Skeat's A Glossary of Tudor and Stuart Words].
Xenophon used his power of invention with such discretion that "by beautifying the face thereof he hath not in any sort corrupted the body." 72

For Ralegh, as for Bacon and Patricio,73 poetic inventions, the seems or ought to be, beautify but also can corrupt the "body" of history because they depart from truth. Thus poetry cannot properly teach, as history can, and must by that fact remain inconsequential. Perhaps the most significant feature of the contrast between Sidney and Ralegh is that Ralegh refused to accept the fragmentation implicit in Sidney's separation of history from philosophy and theology; he refused to be limited to particularity, to second causes. Rather he saw particularity as signs of the absolute: Divine Will.

James Amyot, whose preface to Plutarch's Lives was included in North's translation (1579), which went through seven editions and issues up to 1631, reflects the rhetorico-literary tradition of historiography. History does not merely inform; it must move as well, and thus is a species of oratory. In his "Prohemye" to the Polychronicon (1462), as part of his great praise of historiography, Caxton wrote: "And also yf the terryble feyned Fables of Poetes haue moche styred and mocued men to pyte / and conseruynge of Justyce / How moche more is to be sup­posed / that Historye assertryce of veryte / and as moder of alle philosophye / mocuynge our maners to vertue...." 74 Early in the six­teenth century Giovanni Pontano urged the historian to play upon the emotions, Actius de numeris poeticiis et lore historiae (1507). 75 In the preface to his translation of Froissart (1523), Lord Berners stated
that history "exciteth, moveth, and stirreth" men to seek fame through noble deeds, "and it prohibiteth reprobable persons to do mischievous deeds, for fear of infamy and shame." Indicative of the vitality of this tradition, Richard Brathwait in 1614 offered identical arguments for history, whose examples are "a moving kinde of perswasion for imitation of goodnesse: and aversion from whatsoever is evill" and beget "a manly spirit" in the pursuit of fame. Amyot's argument for the superiority of history to philosophy and poetry was based on their relative powers to profit, delight, and move. History profits more than philosophy: it serves as a guide in all human affairs. "These things [history] doth with much greater grace, efficacy, and speed, than the booke of moral Philosophie doe: forasmuch as examples are of more force to move and instruct, than are the arguments and proofes of reason, or their precise precepts, because examples be the very formes of our deeds, and accompanied with all circumstance." The basis for history's superiority to philosophy is that, while both present truth, history is a more effective teacher since its concrete examples move and instruct, while the books of moral philosophy "doe seeme somewhat harshe to divers delicate wits, that can not tary long upon them."

He attacked the reading of books of poetry. "The reading of booke which bring but a vaine and unprofitable pleasure to the Reader, is justly disliked of wise and grave men." Their most serious failing stemmed from the fact that they are unrelated to truth. History is superior because "it doth things with greater weight and gravity, than the inventions and devices of the Poets: because it helpeth not it selfe with any other thing than with the plaine truth, wheras Poetry
doth commonly inrich things by commending them above the starres and
their deserving, because the chiefe intent thereof is to delight." 32
History presents truth, while poetry feigns; history profits, while
poetry brings vain and idle pleasure. If we derive pleasure from hear-
ing an old man recite true stories from his experience, "how much more
we be ravished with delight and wondering, to behold the state of man-
kind, and the true successe of things, which antiquitie hath and doth
bring forth from the beginning of the world...." 33

Thus Amyot presented the same arguments for history that Sidney
used for poetry, that it profits, delights, and moves.

This justification of historiography in terms of persuasion was
flatly contradicted by Ralegh. Ralegh's arguments for the superiority
of historiography are unrelated to its possible effects, to its usefulness
as rhetoric or as a pedagogical device. Indeed (as will be shown
in Chapter IV of this study) he came to a paradoxical conclusion which
denied that historiography has good effects, an argument to my knowl-
dge, unparalleled in the Renaissance. This conclusion is quite un-
related to the skepticism of Agrippa, Ruelle, or Nashe, who denied that
historiography revealed truth. For Ralegh, it revealed the most signif-
ican truths discernable by man; nevertheless, he denied that it "moves"
as Amyot and Brathwait claimed. Ralegh utilized the Horatian formula
of profit and delight only once in the History, and that in relation to
poetry. Significantly, he cautioned that poetry yielded "small profit
to those which are delighted overmuch." 34 The delightful elements are
of least importance, and if emphasized can become dangerous. In his
treatment of character in the History, he exhibited the typical Renais-
sance rationalism which condemned the man who allows his reason to be
dethroned by passion. This attitude underlies Raleigh's rejection of
Amyot's exaltation of history. Although Raleigh's view of history
differed radically from that of Hobbes (as might be expected), on this
issue they agree. Hobbes in the preface to his translation of Thucyd-
ides (1629) energetically rejected the argument that history must
please or delight. He too claimed to be concerned only with "truth"
or profit.

Bacon based his fragmentation of learning on faculty psychology.
"I adopt that division of human learning which corresponds to the
three faculties of the understanding. Its parts therefore are three:
History, Poesy, and Philosophy. History is referred to the Memory;
Poesy to the Imagination; Philosophy to the Reason." Basic to all
learning is history, which "is properly concerned with individuals;
the impressions whereof are the first and most ancient guests of the
human mind, and are as the primary materials of knowledge."

These "images of individuals," the subject matter of history,
provide the mind with exercise and with "sport." "For as all knowledge
is the exercise and work of the mind, so poesy may be regarded as its
sport. In philosophy the mind is bound to things; in poesy it is
released from that bond, and wanders forth, and feigns what it pleases...."
The poet then is not concerned with "truth" as are the historian and
philosopher. Poetry, termed by Bacon "feigned history," unlike "true
history," can give some "shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in
those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it.\textsuperscript{39} The poet can feign events agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice (one of Sidney's arguments), and can bring the outcome of events more in accord with retribution and with "revealed providence." The historian, on the other hand, bound as he is to truth, to the "nature of things," cannot depict the roles of retributive justice and revealed providence in the events of the world (here should be noted the implication that either retributive justice and providence are not found in "the nature of things," or that the historian is unable to discern their influence). Poetry submits the "shews of things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things."\textsuperscript{90}

Poetry then brings only a "shadow of satisfaction." It is the work of the unpredictable and lawless imagination. It is unrelated to truth because "being not tied to the laws of matter, [it] may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things...."\textsuperscript{91} In this way Bacon discredited poetry.

History, however, concerns the "primary material of knowledge," and as such is the basis for philosophy, which "digests" the particularity of history into "general notions."\textsuperscript{92} By itself, history has no way of reaching universals, but simply serves as a repository of particulars, similar to a receptive but passive memory which lacks any active principle through which universals may be reached. In his account of natural history Bacon describes its necessary yet subordinate role. "Natural history...is in its use two-fold. For it is used either for
the sake of the knowledge of the particular things which it contains, or as the primary material of philosophy and the stuff and subject matter of true induction."^93

Ralegh and Bacon agreed that both philosophy and history reveal truth, but they differed on the nature of that truth. For Bacon, philosophy could aspire to universals, once a sufficient number of particulars were accumulated. These universals represented the highest reach of reason and were surpassed only by the truths of faith, the legitimate province of "Divine Theology." Acceptance of these divine truths had nothing to do with reason. "We are obliged to believe the word of God, though our reason be shocked at it. For if we should believe only such things as are agreeable to our reason, we assent to the matter, and not to the author. And therefore, the more absurd and incredible any divine mystery is the greater honor we do to God in believing it; and so much the more noble the victory of faith."^94

Bacon's bifurcation of the highest human knowledges, his absolute separation of reason from faith had the effect of freeing reason from the control of faith and in a sense duplicated Siger of Brabant's double truth doctrine, that what is true to faith need not be true to reason, what is true to reason need not be true to faith. Bacon's separation rendered providential historiography rooted in faith and reason impossible.

As has been shown, Ralegh was keenly aware of the limitations of reason in searching out the motives of God and man. Yet Bacon's doctrine of accepting rational impossibilities through faith played
no part in Raleigh's historiography. He explicitly rejected it. In his discussion of the celestial spheres he noted:

And what use there should be of this icy, or crystalline, of watery heaven, I conceive not, except it be to moderate and temper the heat, which the primum mobile would otherwise gather and increase; though in very truth, instead of this help, it would add an unmeasurable greatness of circle, whereby the swiftness of that first moveable would exceed all possibility of belief. Sed nemo tenetur ad impossibilia: "But no man ought to be held to impossibilities:" and faith itself (which surmounteth the height of all human reason) hath for a forcible conductor the word of truth, which also may be called lumen omnis rationis et intellectus: "the light of all reason and understanding."95

Raleigh still clung to an essential feature of the thought of St. Thomas and Hooker, the necessary unity of faith and reason in the realm of belief.

The theme of this Chapter is that underlying Raleigh's resistance to the fragmentation of learning was his belief in the conjunction of faith and reason. This belief, evidenced most clearly perhaps by his justification of providential historiography through "natural reason," allowed him to claim for the historian what Bodin claimed for the theologian, philosopher, and historian, what Sidney claimed for the poet, and far more than what Bacon claimed for the historian and philosopher combined. For Raleigh, since history revealed the most profound truths possible for man to detect, patterns of Divine Will in particularity, the historian's role was the most important possible. In this the tides were running strongly against him. In spite of the important differences in the theories of Bodin, Amyot, Patricio, Sidney, Brathwait, and Bacon, they agreed that historiography was limited to
second causes; and Amyot, Sidney, and Bacon agreed that generic differences existed between history, philosophy, and theology. Ralegh denied these views. In this sense the History is an afterglow of what I would term the Christian-humanist tradition, a tradition newly minted in the thought of St. Augustine and still bright in the time of Erasmus and Sir Thomas More.

Parenthetically it should be added that the readers of the History who isolated its providential elements for praise, such as the Puritans, were not seeing it whole. Those, such as Hume and Thoreau, who admired the classical or humanist elements, while apologizing for the providential, misread it. Arnold, who dwelled only on Ralegh's discussion of the location of Paradise in order to prove Ralegh's hopeless medievalism, who accused Ralegh of wandering among facts "helplessly and without a clue," revealed only his failure to understand the truly medieval characteristics of the History.

Such was the magnitude of Ralegh's historical vision, such was his confidence and audacity, that he took all human knowledge as his province, knowledge which included sight of the eternal. Fulfillment of this vision was denied him, but this should not be allowed to obscure what he set out to do. Of course, in terms of the development of thought within the late Renaissance, the battle was lost even before he took the field. He was unsuccessful in fighting it even on his own grounds, the History itself.
NOTES

1. I, III, i; II, 65.

2. I, VIII, xv, 6; II, 338.


8. I, I, i; II, 2-3.

9. II, XXI, vi; IV, 613.

10. II, XIX, iii; IV, 563.

11. II, XXI, vi; IV, 617.


14. Ibid.

15. Thomas Churchyard, "To the Reader," The Worthiness of Wales. Reprinted from the Original Edition of 1587 (Manchester, 1876), Sig. A2v.


20. I, I, x; II, 24-5.


24. *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei*, 7, 5 ad 14. Quoted from Pieper, p. 54.


27. I, I, i; II, 3.


29. *ibid*.

30. I, II, i; II, 144.


32. Preface; I, xlv-xlvi.


34. Brown, p. 76.

35. *Scholasticism*, Ch. XI.


40. Preface; II, li.

41. *ibid*.

42. Pieper, p. 140.
43. The Wars of Truth (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 135-144.

44. Preface; II, lvii-iii.


46. Pieper, p. 142.


48. The true order and method of writing and reading Histories, according to the precepts of Francisco Patricio, and Accoentio Tridentino, ed. by Hugh G. Dick, HLG, III (1940), 156.

49. op. cit., 157.

50. Method, trans. by Beatrice Reynolds, p. 29.

51. Preface; II, vli.

52. Preface; II, iii.

53. Preface; II, iv.


55. See the discussion by Lily B. Campbell, Shakespeare's "Histories," pp. 35-6.


57. op. cit., p. 273.

58. op. cit., p. 279.

59. op. cit., p. 280.

60. op. cit., p. 276.

61. ibid.

62. This is part of Robert Flint's characterization of Aristotle's views on history, History of the Philosophy of History (New York, 1924), pp. 145-46. Aristotle discussed history in Poetics, Ch. 9.


64. ibid.


68. II, XXI, vi; IV, 613.


70. II, XIV, i; IV, 443.

71. II, XIV, v; IV, 710-11.

72. III, II, iii; V, 50-1.

73. For Patricio, poets "make much of nothing" when they "faine fables"; orators make much of little, or little of much; but philosophers and historiographers "make of so much as much"; they depart not "one iota from the truth." *HLQ*, III (1940), 164.


75. E. B. Benjamin's unpublished dissertation "Five Historians of the English Renaissance" (Harvard University, 1946) contains a discussion of the influence of this tradition on Sir Thomas More's *Richard III*.


78. *op. cit.*, p. 20.


80. *op. cit.*, xiii.

81. *ibid*.

82. *op. cit.*, xix.

84. II, XIV, vi; IV, 492.

85. Eight Books of the Peloponnesian Warre, Sig. a3r.


87. ibid.

88. ibid.

89. Of the Advancement of Learning, The Philosophical Works, p. 88.

90. ibid.

91. The Philosophical Works, p. 87.

92. op. cit., p. 677.

93. op. cit., p. 403.

94. op. cit., p. 666.

95. I, I, viii; II, 23.
CHAPTER II

PROVIDENTIAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

Thus far it is clear that Ralegh's view of historiography differs in crucial ways from those of important Elizabethan and Jacobean figures. As has been generally recognized, Ralegh's History is expressive of the Christian providential tradition, a tradition which resulted from what R. G. Collingwood described as the second great crisis in European historiography.¹ The first crisis, in the fifth century B. C., led to the idea of historiography as a science, an inquiry into second cause particularity. The second, in the fourth and fifth centuries A. D., resulted in a radical transformation of the historical vision. With due regard for the dangers of sweeping historical parallels, it is suggestive to regard the differences between Ralegh and the Renaissance second cause historians as prefigured in the differences between the Hebraic-Christian conception of history and that of the Greco-Roman world. The situations differ, however, in that Ralegh's historiography was a futile attempt to resist an advancing tide, while the historical conception of St. Augustine and his followers remained ascendant for a thousand years. As preliminary to an examination of the methods of historiography used by Ralegh, it will be useful to recognize the salient features of the Hebraic-Christian conception of history. This will aid not only our recognition of the traditional methods Ralegh employed, but it will also prepare us to mark those elements in the History which depart from traditional practices. These departures are important, for they help to account for the person-
al. Raleghian tone of the history, which gives it its individuality.

Karl Löwith has stated that St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* (412-26) provided the "pattern of every conceivable view of history that can rightly be called 'Christian.'" As with Ralegh, the beginning point of St. Augustine's views is Creation. Unlike Ralegh, however, St. Augustine did not attempt to refute philosophically, with arguments grounded in "natural reason," the idea of the eternity of the world. Rather, "That God made the world, we can believe from no one more safely than from God Himself. But where have we heard Him? Nowhere more distinctly than in the Holy Scriptures, where His prophet said, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.'" Those who argue for the eternity of the world "rave in the incurable madness of inpiety." The concomitant Stoic theory of eternal cycles, the *circuitus temporum*, was doubly abhorrent to St. Augustine because it denied the unique importance of the Atonement (as well as that of every other event). St. Augustine dismissed the problem with the affirmation: "For once Christ died for our sins; and, rising from the dead, He dieth no more." The importance of St. Augustine's rejection to historiography was summarized by C. N. Cochrane.

To the Christians, of course, nothing could be more abhorrent than the theory of cycles. For it flatly contradicts the Scriptural view of the *saeculum* as, from beginning to end, a continuous and progressive disclosure of the creative and moving principle. It likewise denies by implication the Christian message of salvation for mankind. In the form which it assumes with classical materialism, it represents motion as dependent on forces beyond control.... For classical idealism it takes shape as a belief in the endless reiteration of "typical" situations, a belief which does the grossest injustice to the unique character and significance of the individual historical event.
The doctrine of Creation, with its correlative commitment to the unique character of events within history, collided with the anti-historical in Greek thought, its substantialism, with its concern with the Real, the unchanging absolutes which hover outside history, and its relative unconcern with the Unreal, the fluctuating arena of opinion which constitutes the historical realm. The anti-historical phase of Plato's thought was summarized by Robert Flint.

The philosophy of Plato undoubtedly failed to do justice to historical reality. It even tended to depreciate and discourage historical study, inasmuch as it relegated perceptions, particulars, phenomena, to the limbo of mere opinion. It taught that truth was to be found, not in the changing and individual, but in the unchanging and universal; that there is no science of phenomena, but that to reach science the mind must get above phenomena, through and beyond them as it were, into a region of types, exemplars, ideas. Were this the case, there could be no science of history; and that it is the case is the general tenor, the main burden, of Plato's teaching.6

The anti-historical tendencies in Aristotle's teaching was similarly summarized by Werner Jaeger.

The coming-to-be and passing-away of earthly things is just as much a stationary revolution as the motion of the stars. In spite of its uninterrupted change nature has no history according to Aristotle, for organic becoming is held fast by the constancy of its forms in a rhythm that remains eternally the same. Similarly the human world of state and society and mind appears to him not as caught in the incalculable mobility of irrecoverable historical destiny, whether we consider personal life or that of nations and cultures, but as founded fast in the unalterable permanence of forms that while they change within certain limits remain identical in essence and purpose. This feeling about life is symbolized by the Great Year, at the close of which all the stars have returned to their original position and begin their course anew. In the same way cultures of the earth wax and wane, according to Aristotle, as determined by great natural catastrophes, which in turn are causally connected with the regular changes of the heavens. That which Aristotle at this instant newly discovers has been discerned a thousand times before, will be lost again, and one day discerned afresh.7
As is evident, the result of the anti-historical in Greek thought was that, in Löwith's words, "To the Greek thinkers a philosophy of history [or a theology of history] would have been a contradiction in terms." Directly opposed to the \textit{circuitus temporum}, the Hebraic-Christian tradition held to a linear view of time, that "It begins with the creation and pursues its straight-line course on through till the millennium, the day of the last judgment and the end of the world." If time is linear, its two most important points are its beginning and end; thus the limits of history are established. Without a firm grasp on these, the interim necessarily becomes unintelligible to the Christian. Consequently, the hallmark of Christian historiography is an interest in origins and in an eschatology. The lack of interest in origins and in ultimate purpose found in Herodotus or Thucydides (along with a different view of historical evidence) resulted in a relative shortness of historical scope as contrasted with the Christian scope, which included all of time within its perspective. Moreover, within the linear movement of time, two events, the Fall and the Atonement, were seen as shaping the nature of all subsequent events. The theologian Oscar Cullmann, referring to St. Paul's outline of the history of salvation (Ga. 3: 6 ff; Romans, 9-11 and 5:12 ff), summarized the \textit{heilsplan}, the historical economy of salvation directed by Providence.
He is the "servant of Jahve" in II Isaiah, the "Son of Man" in Daniel, who represents the "people of the Saints" (Dan. 7: 13 ff.). This single person must enter history in the Son of God, Christ, who through his vicarious death at last accomplishes the purpose for which God had chosen the people of Israel—the remnant of Israel—the One, Christ (second Adam). Thus indeed has the history of salvation arrived at its center, but it has not yet run its complete course. Now it becomes necessary, in a manner of speaking, to reverse the process, namely, to proceed from the One to the many, but in such a way that the Many represent the One. Now the way leads from Christ to those who believe in him, who know themselves to be saved in their faith in his vicarious death. Thus the way leads to the church, which is the body of the One; she is now to fulfil for mankind the task of the "remnant," of the "people of the saints." Therefore she also applied to herself the title of that "remnant" (zohel Jahve), which is the Hebrew equivalent of ekklesia, "church." 10

With the Incarnation the decisive fact of history, the events of the heilsplan include Creation; the Fall, with the subsequent judgment of God on mankind; the Incarnation, or divine mercy; and an eschaton indicative of redemptive purpose. This schema shaped the general characteristics of Christian historiography, which were summarized by Collingwood under four terms: universal, providential, apocalyptic, and periodized. 11 Christian historiography is universal; utilizing a single chronology which begins with Creation, it describes all civilizations, all races. It is providential; God is the moving force in history working out His own purpose. It is apocalyptic; it has two main divisions, a dark period looking forward to Christ, and a period of light looking back to Christ. It is periodized; further subdivisions are found within the two main epochs of history. With one very significant exception, all of these characteristics are present in *Raleigh's History.*
For the overall chronological structure of the **History**, Raleigh was heavily indebted to St. Augustine's periodization of history, which in turn was a sophistication of the Pauline economy of salvation. Basic to St. Augustine's theology of history was his absolute division between the **civitas dei** and the **civitas terrae**. Founded by the good angels, with Abel as the first man, the **civitas dei** developed linearly through six epochs, analogous to the six days of God's creation, culminating in the seventh epoch, the period of the eternal happiness of the saints in the triumphant kingdom of Christ. In St. Augustine's words:

The first age, as the first day, extends from Adam to the deluge; the second from the deluge to Abraham, equalling the first, not in length of time, but in the number of generations, there being ten in each. From Abraham to the advent of Christ there are, as the evangelist Matthew calculates, three periods, in each of which are fourteen generations---one period from Abraham to David, a second from David to the captivity, a third from the captivity to the birth of Christ in the flesh. There are thus five ages in all. The sixth is now passing, and cannot be measured by a number of generations.... After this period God shall rest as on the seventh day, when He shall give us (who shall be the seventh day) rest in Himself.12

For St. Augustine, the first five epochs have meaning only when seen as a prelude to the sixth, the Christian era of grace (from the birth of Christ to the Second Coming). In turn, this sixth epoch gains its unique significance when seen as the fulfillment of the previous epochs and as the period of necessary preparation for the seventh eternal epoch. Thus in Augustine's historical survey of the first five epochs, he is most anxious to interpret them in terms of the Christian eschatology; i.e., he is eager to find prefigured in the events of these earlier epochs the central messianic fact of the history of the **civitas dei**: the Incarnation.
St. Augustine's periodization of Old Testament history became a commonplace of Christian historiography, a commonplace which Ralegh adopted. The History is divided into five books. Book I covers the periods from Creation to Noah (Chs. I-VI) and from Noah to the birth of Abraham (Chs. VII-XII), both of which constituted (in St. Augustine's terms) the age of youth under the reign of nature. Book I includes far more in terms of subject matter; at this time, however, only those materials which formed its chronological pattern are being set forth. Book II covers the third and fourth epochs, Abraham to David (Chs. I-XVI) and David to the destruction of Jerusalem (Chs. XVII-XXVII), the period of manhood under the reign of law. While Ralegh followed St. Augustine's first four epochs, his treatment is markedly different in emphasis and tone (as will be discussed later in this chapter). St. Augustine found their meaning in terms of a Christian eschatology. Ralegh did not use them for the sake of their preshadowings of coming glory, but to prove the might of God's power, the swiftness of His vengeance, and the certainty of His punishment of sin. The History does not formally treat the fifth and sixth epochs, the period of old age under the reign of grace.

Before Books III, IV, and V of the History are described, another method of periodization must be introduced, that ordering the civitas terrena. Founded by the fallen angels with Cain as the first man, St. Augustine's civitas terrena developed linearly through the rise and fall of Assyria in the east and through the rise of Rome, "another Babylon in the west." In this development, the paths of the two cities, traced by St. Augustine through the method of synchronization, joined.
"The city of Rome was founded, like another Babylon, and as it were the daughter of the former Babylon, by which God was pleased to conquer the whole world, and subdue it far and wide by bringing it into one fellowship of government and laws." For St. Augustine, Rome's conquest of the world was part of God's preparation for the sixth epoch of the civitas dei, the rise of the Church, and the eventual triumph of Christianity. Thus as with the civitas dei, the development of the civitas terrena is meaningful primarily in terms of Christian eschatological expectations. Of course, for St. Augustine, the separate development of the civitas terrena leads to destruction, to a well-deserved eternal damnation.

St. Augustine included only two great empires in the civitas terrena. The prophecies in the Book of Daniel (Ch. 7), however, refer to four "great beasts," or "four kings, which shall arise out of the earth." These are kingdoms of gold, silver, brass, and iron (the last "shall devour the whole earth"). St. Jerome, in his commentary of the Book of Daniel named these empires: the Assyrian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman (Rome was to last to the end of the world). Although some early historians, such as Orosius, substituted Carthage for Persia, Jerome's periodization of the pagan world became deeply entrenched in historical thought. Bishop Otto of Freising, whose Chronicon seu historia de duabus civitatibus (1143-46), surviving in more than fifty manuscripts, has been acclaimed as the high water mark of medieval universal historiography, reveals this general acceptance. "That there were from the beginning of the world four principal kingdoms which stood out above all the rest, and that they are to endure unto the
world's end, succeeding one another in accordance with the law of the
universe, can be gathered in various ways, in particular from the vision
of Daniel.\textsuperscript{15} John L. Brown, in his description of German historiography
in the sixteenth century, has indicated that the four monarchy schema
was "the foundation of most historical thinking and writing of the
time.... Its vitality throughout centuries is remarkable, and Bodin's
spirited attack on it is all the more commendable considering its al-
most universal acceptance by his contemporaries."\textsuperscript{16} In the seventeenth
century Degory Wheare felt obliged to defend it from Bodin's attack,\textsuperscript{17}
and late in the century it was used by Bossuet in his \textit{Discours sur
l'histoire universelle} (1631).

The four monarchy schema gave Raleigh his pattern for his treat-
ment of the \textit{civitas terrena}, which forms the greater portion of the
\textit{History}. He introduced the Assyrian Empire at the close of Book I and
continued its development throughout Book II, though the epochs of the
\textit{civitas dei} held his main attention. In Book III, however, the \textit{civitas
dei} was relegated to the background as the Persian Empire took the
central position. In Book IV all trace of the \textit{civitas dei} disappeared
as he concentrated on the Macedonian Empire. In Book V, he dealt al-
most exclusively with the ascendance of Roman power; all the nations
of the world "were broken in pieces by the iron teeth of this fourth
beast."\textsuperscript{18} The work closed at the triumph of Rome over Macedon shortly
after the final defeat of Carthage (ca. 146 B.C.). Raleigh could not
leave his discussion of Rome, however, without indicating that she too
was to be destroyed.
By this which we have already set down is seen the beginning and end of the three first monarchies of the world, whereof the founders and erectors thought that they could never have ended. That of Rome, which made the fourth, was also at this time almost at the highest. We have left it flourishing in the middle of the field, having rooted up or cut down all that kept it from the eyes and admiration of the world: but after some continuance, it shall begin to lose the beauty it had; the storms of ambition shall beat her great boughs and branches one against another, her leaves shall fall off, her limbs wither, and a rabble of barbarous nations enter the field, and cut her down.¹⁹

It should be noted that Raleigh did not use the four monarchy schema for nationalistic claims as did the Germans of the sixteenth century, such as Martin Luther, Melanchthon, and John Sleidan; or for that matter as Dante did in the interests of the Italians.²⁰ In the preface to his *Chronicon*, Melanchthon used the four monarchy schema to claim the Roman mantle of temporal power for the Germans.²¹ Bodin devoted an entire chapter of the *Methodus* to a refutation, indicating the wide spread acceptance of such claims.

A long-established, but mistaken, idea about four empires, made famous by the prestige of great men, has sent its roots down so far that it seems difficult to eradicate. It has won over countless interpreters of the Bible; it includes among modern writers Martin Luther, Melanchthon, Sleidan, Lucidus, Funck, and Parwinio.... Eventually the Germans were to control the Roman Empire. Since it was explained in this way by Germans, I judged it was written for the glory of their name, for it is altogether strange to the interpretation of Daniel....²²

Late in the seventeenth century, Bossuet, in using the four monarchy schema, found that the French monarchy was the legitimate heir to the Roman and Holy Roman Empires. The tough-minded Raleigh allowed himself no such illusions, as is evident in his description of the contemporary world of his time.
Since the fall of the Roman empire (omitting that of the
Germans, which had neither greatness nor continuance) there
hath been no state fearful in the east, but that of the Turk;
nor in the west any prince that hath spread his wings far
over his nest, but the Spaniard: who, since the time that
Ferdinand expelled the Moors out of Granado, have made many
attempts to make themselves masters of all Europe. And it
is true, that by the treasures of both Indies, and by the
many kingdoms which they possess in Europe, they are at this
day the most powerful.... These two nations, I say, are at
this day the most eminent, and to be regarded: the one seek-
ing to root out the Christian religion altogether, the
other the truth and sincere profession thereof; the one to
join all Europe to Asia, the other the rest of all Europe
to Spain.23

Ralegh employed two chronological patterns which were traditional
to Christian universal historiography. He followed the civitas dei
(he did not use the term) through the fourth epoch and the civitas
terrae to the triumph of Rome over Macedon. The first provided the
main narrative pattern for Books I and II; the second for Books III,
IV, and V. This cleavage explains why, from the first edition through
that of 1652, the two parts were paginated separately. For convenience
I shall refer to the first as the "Old Testament" history; the second
as the "classical" history. Ralegh's methods in each differ so radically
that their detailed examination becomes unmanageable unless they
are considered separately. These differences will explain why some
readers (Felton, Hume, and Thoreau, for example) have praised the his-
toriography of the latter books, while ignoring or criticizing the first
books. Arnold based his criticism on a brief look at one of Ralegh's
methods for treating Old Testament materials. His conclusions were
bound to be wrong. Again, to isolate Ralegh's classical history for
analysis and praise, while ignoring the Old Testament history, inevit-
ably will be misleading. Although the methodology of the two parts
will be treated separately in this work, and while the implications of
the differences in methodology will be pursued, part of the search will
be directed towards those assumptions which are common to both histories.

Within these two parts, Book I contains Ralegh's best effort in
Old Testament historiography and Book V in the classical. A compar-
son of chapter outlines of the two books will illustrate the justifi-
cation for treating the two parts separately. Book I covers the per-
iod from Creation to Abraham. I list the chapter headings in abbrevi-
ated form:

I. Creation
II. Man
III. The Place of Paradise
IV. Chief Trees in Paradise
V. Adam's Fall to Noah
VI. Corruptions of Truth in Greek and Egyptian Mythology
VII. Noah's Flood
VIII. Nations after the Flood
IX. Government
X. Nimrod, Belus, Nimus
XI. Zoroaster; Magic
XII. Minus and Semiramis

While the general chronological development is apparent, it is also
clear that Ralegh was not interested in developing a narrative (which,
according to Hobbes and Milton was the chief formal characteristic
of historiography); rather, he was concerned with developing various
topics in depth. In the first four chapters, no historical event,
other than Creation, was discussed. In Chapter I, for example, after
having established Creation through Scriptural authority (in the Preface he did so by "natural reason"), he analysed the meanings of such
terms as *incipit*, heaven, earth, void, spirit of God, light,
primum mobile. In the same chapter he offered studies of causation,
concluding that God, the stars, Providence, and predestination were true causes, but that nature, divine prescience, and fortune were not. In Book I, history was not a unified narrative of events, as it was in the majority of histories from More's to Bacon's; rather it was a process of subjecting a question or an event to a series of tests, etymological and Scriptural; it involved long summaries of disputes, of authorities, and testing them by the Scriptures, reason, personal experience, modern parallels, and then coming to a conclusion, positive or conjectural. At times, as in his discussion of predestination, Ralegh decided to leave the question open, acknowledging that only God knows how and why it operates. Generally Ralegh stated his topic as a question, such as that concerning the location of Paradise. Next he marshalled up a great many opinions, no matter how obscure (relying heavily, as Arnold Williams has shown, on the hexaemeral commentaries available, and probably on his friend Dr. Burhill as well), and after many pages of citing authorities, he finally came to his own opinion. While Book I does exhibit chronological development, Ralegh did not attempt to write a unified narrative; rather he was concerned mainly with exploring theological-philosophical (Chs. I-V, VII), political (Ch. IX), and "scientific" (Ch. XI) questions. Milton, in the preface to his own history, could well have had Ralegh's practice in mind as he wrote: "But I intend not with controversies and quotations to delay or interrupt the smooth course of History; much less to argue and debate long who were the first inhabitants, with what probabilities, what authorities each opinion hath bin upheld, but shall endeavor that which hitherto hath bin needed most, with plain, and lightsom brevity,
to relate well and orderly things worth the noting, so as may best instruct and benefit them that read."  

Book II differs in that, except for an extended discussion of the nature of law (Ch. IV), Ralegh was mainly involved in an attempt to synchronize the history of the Jews (the chronological touchstone) with that of Egypt, Assyria, Phoenicia, Syria, Greece, Troy, Rome, etc. The result was the most chaotic book of the History, a condition which he apologized for, while promising the reader better narrative to come.

The chapter outline of Book V is ordered simplicity in comparison to Books I and II.

I. First Punic War
II. Actions between the First and Second Punic Wars
III. Second Punic War
IV. First Macedonian War
V. Roman wars with Antiochus the Great
VI. Second Macedonian War

In this book, as in Books III and IV, Ralegh shifts to taut narrative balanced with analyses of the consilia, dicta, and facta of history, with character studies, and with analytical judgments. The affairs of the Jews are unmentioned, and Providence itself virtually disappears as a cause in history.

Enough has now been presented to justify separate studies of the two parts, Ralegh's Old Testament historiography in this chapter and his classical historiography in the following chapter.

As is evident from its periodized structure, the History is universal: i.e., beginning with Creation, Ralegh attempted to order all events of all civilizations within a single chronological framework. One of Ralegh's paramount concerns in his Old Testament history,
especially in Book II, was the establishment of an accurate chronology. This concern is traditional in Christian historiography. It comes from the assumption that all events, the destruction of Troy as well as that of Jerusalem, played meaningful parts in fulfilling God's unchanging will, that the history of the human race as a whole was the only truly general history. Consequently, the works of such historians as Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius were to the Christian historian necessarily flawed because of their particularist nature, even though they could be of great value when placed in the context of a universal chronology and properly interpreted. Flint noted:

The Christian historian or annalist felt bound to look back to the creation, to trace the special histories of the different nations as divisions of one comprehensive history, and, by the help of a chronology, derived chiefly from Biblical data, to determine how the special histories synchronised.... The underlying thought was the great one that the history of man was a divinely ordered system, beginning with Adam, centering in Christ, and closing in a day of judgment. The result was an immediate and decisive transcendence of the particularism in the treatment of history characteristic of the classical authors.27

In addition, in the face of the skepticism of the pagan world, the early Christian apologists felt the need "for more rigid methods of comparative chronology, by which they could prove the real antiquity and direct descent of Christianity...."28 James T. Shotwell showed how chronology could become a powerful source of proof for the support of Christian faith.

The path to Christian historiography lies...through a study of Christian chronology. The basis for this was the work of the Jewish scholars of the Diaspora. When the Christian apologists of the second and third centuries attempted to synchronize the Old Testament history with that of the gentiles, they could fall back upon the work of a Jewish scribe, Justus of Taberius, who wrote in the reign of
Hadrian. He prepared a chronicle of Jewish kings, working along the same uncertain basis of "generations" as had been used in gentile chronicles, and so claiming for Moses an antiquity greater than that of the oldest figures in Greek legend. The difficulties in the way of any counter proof lent this statement great value in argument, especially since it was merely a mathematical formulation of a belief already established in the Church.29

The earliest work of Christian chronology is the Chronographia of Julius Africanus, which appeared in the third century; but the outstanding figure is Eusebius of Caesarea, whose chronicle became the basis for most medieval historiography. "For the next thousand years most histories were chronicles, and they were built after the model of Jerome's translation of Eusebius' Canons."30 Ralegh appended "A Chronological Table" to the History with an explanation of its use for the benefit of the "vulgar." Shotwell's description and interpretation of Eusebius' Chronological Canons apply exactly to Ralegh's Table.

Parallel columns of all known eras extend up and down the pages; eras of Abraham, David, Persia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, etc. It is interesting to see this tangle of columns simplify as the diverse nations come and go; and finally all sink into the great unity of Rome.... As one follows the sweep of these figures and watches the steady line of those events where the Providence of God bore down the forces of the unbeliever, one realizes that in this convincing statement lay the strongest of all defences of the faith. Here, compressed into a few pages, lies the evidence of history for the Christian world-view. Origen's great conception that pagan history was as much decreed by Jehovah as sacred history finds in the Chronicle its most perfect expression; the facts speak for themselves. No fickle Fortuna could ever have arranged with such deliberate aim the rise and fall of empires. History is the reservoir not of argument but of proof, and the proof is mathematical.31

Mathematical proof is also abstract, however. Although a universal chronology might provide the Christian with comforting mathematical certainty on the governance of all nations by Providence, it
was nevertheless a pattern without historical flesh, quite different from the discourse required of the historian. It is true that such patterns in the forms of synopses, short compendia, and chronologies of universal history were exceedingly popular in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While Bacon warned that the "compendious brevity of which men are so fond" (a brevity found in universal histories) tended to obscure many historical narrative which should live, 32 Degory Wheare advised the student of world history "to begin with some short Compendium, Chronology, or Synopsis, before he enter that vast ocean, because he may by that means learn at once the series of times and Ages, the Successions of Empires, and the greatest changes which have happened amongst Mankind, and so he may if he please, draw in his mind an Exemplar or Idea of the whole body of the Universal History, which he may contemplate with ease as it were at once...." 33

The Tubus Historicus (1636), attributed to Raleigh on the title-page, but actually made by other hands anxious to profit from Raleigh's popularity, is a very brief synopsis of the History. In the "Advertisement" the work is described as "an exquisite Abstract and Summary of all the famous Kingdomes and Empires that ever were." 34 The body of the work consists of long lists, arranged chronologically, of the rulers of the kingdoms of the world, including England and France.

While chronological patterns might be a means for suggesting unity, while six or eight parallel columns of the rulers and historical events of Assyria, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Carthage, Persia, Rome, etc. might suggest orderly progression, while the overall schema might be interpreted as proof of the providentially controlled triumph of Christianity,
paradoxically when the historian cuts horizontally across the columns for his subject matter, his discourse necessarily becomes fragmented and even chaotic. In the History when Ralegh attempted to order all events within a single chronology, he found sustained narrative to be impossible. Conversely, in those places in the History where Ralegh managed to sustain his narrative, he did so by dropping his concern with universal chronology.

Book II of the History contains the best evidence of Ralegh's use of chronology, the difficulties he encountered, and his attempts to master the difficulties. Time and again he interrupted his narrative with lengthy discussions of chronological questions. In the midst of his narrative of the flight of Moses and the Israelites from the pursuing Egyptians, he noted that Moses camped "on the 15th day of the month Abib; which month, from that time forward, they were commanded to account as the first month of the year." In comparison to the miraculous deliverance which is to come in the Red Sea crossing, this day of encampment is a trivial detail; yet it becomes the occasion for the narrative to stop in order for Ralegh to summarize all of the past methods for computing time which he knew. "Now because time and motion begin together, it will not, I think, be any great breach of order, to shew here at their first setting forth, what was the form of the Hebrew year; with the difference between them and other nations, in ordering the account of time." The following section entitled "Of the solary and lunary years, and how they are reconciled; with the form of the Hebrew year, and their manner in intercalation," presents a dazzling array of detailed learning, not only on the Hebraic computations of the year,
but also on the Greek, Roman, Julian, and Gregorian calendars. Despite this long delay in delivering the Hebrews from the Egyptians, Ralegh delayed further to cite opinion after opinion on the various names of the Red Sea, even mentioning a report of Castro, a commander of Vasco da Gama, which Ralegh had given Richard Hakluyt to publish. Having delayed the action for many pages (while the Jews patiently waited), Ralegh delayed again for a recapitulation, one which illustrates the commanding interest in chronology.

But to go on with the story of Israel, in this sort I collect the times. Moses was born in the year of the world 2434, Saphrus then governing Assyria; Orthopolis, Syconia, or Peloponnesus; Criasus, the Argives; Orus, Egypt; and Deucalion, Thessaly. He fled into Midian, when he had lived forty years, in the year of the world 2474, and two years after was Caleb born. He returned by the commandment and ordinance of God into Egypt, and wrought his miracles in the fields of Zoan, in the year 2514, in the last month of that year. On the fourteenth day of the first Hebrew month Abib, or the fifteenth of that month, beginning the day (as they) at sunsetting, in the year of the world 2514, was the celebration of the passover; and in the dead of the night of the same day were all the first-born slain through Egypt, or in all those parts where the Hebrews inhabited. The fifteenth day of the first month of the Hebrews, called Abib, being about the beginning of the year of the world 2514, Moses, with the children of Israel, removed from the general assembly at Ramases, and marched to Succoth.37

Ralegh placed great trust in chronological or "mathematical" evidence, "which," he said, "in account of times I hold more sure than the authority of any history."35 Thus in a closely computed "mathematical" argument, he proved that Salmanassar, an Assyrian king, and Nabonassar were the same man; that Nebuchadnezzar and Nabopolassar also were the same. At the beginning of Book II, he devoted six sections to establishing the date of Abraham's birth. The importance of this date was great, for on it, he felt, hinged the epoch of history in
which the Assyrian kings began their rule. If Ninus, one of the early Assyrian kings, could be related to the one universal touchstone, the chronology of the civitas dei, Raleigh felt he would have the means by which to order the rise and fall of the Assyrian Empire. "The better therefore to find out in what age of the world, and how long these Assyrian kings reigned, as also for other good causes, we must first assure the time of Abraham's birth, and in what year the same happened after the flood. Now since all agree that the forty-third year of Ninus was the birth year of Abraham, by proving directly out of the scriptures, in what year after the flood the birth of Abraham happened, we shall thereby set all the rest in square and order." 39 Raleigh recognized that much uncertainty accompanied his chronological arguments and granted: "...I can therefore give no other warrant than other men have done in these computations; and therefore that such and such kings and kingdoms took beginning in this or that year, I avow it no otherwise than as a borrowed knowledge, or at least as a private opinion, which I submit to better judgments...." 40 At other times he held such mathematical proof as "folly to make doubt." 41

The chief method Raleigh employed for ordering historical events within a universal chronology was synchronization, i.e., the horizontal movement across the vertical columns of separate chronologies. The events of the various nations brought together through synchronization were related only in terms of time. This method was a traditional feature of Christian universal historiography and tended to prevent the use of a sustained, coherent narrative, or an examination of causal relationships, as is evident in the following example taken from St. Augustine.
After the capture and destruction of Troy, Aeneas, with twenty ships laden with the Trojan relics, came into Italy, when Latinus reigned there, Menestheus in Athens, Polyphidos in Sicyon, and Tautanos in Assyria, and Abdon was judge of the Hebrews. On the death of Latinus, Aeneas reigned three years, the same kings continuing in the above-named places, except that Pelasgus was now king in Sicyon, and Samson was judge of the Hebrews, who is thought to be Hercules, because of his wonderful strength. Now the Latins made Aeneas one of their gods, because at his death he was nowhere to be found. The Sabines also placed among the gods their first king, Sancus, or Sanctus, as some call him. At that time Codrus king of Athens exposed himself incognito to be slain by the Peloponnesian foes of that city, and so was slain.... The fourth king of the Latins was Silvius the son of Aeneas, not by Creusa, of whom Ascanius the third king was born, but by Lavinia the daughter of Latinus, and he is said to have been his posthumous child. Oneus was the twenty-ninth king of Assyria, Melanthus the sixteenth of the Athenians, and Eli the priest was judge of the Hebrews; and the kingdom of Sicyon then came to an end, after lasting, it is said, for nine hundred and fifty-nine years.42

One can imagine that as he wrote this passage St. Augustine had a chronological table before him with columns for Troy, Greece, Sicyon, Assyria, Italy, and Israel and cut across it for his synchronization.

Ralegh used the same method frequently, taking the Biblical history of the Jews as his chronological touchstone. He employed synchronization most frequently in Book II, which covers the Old Testament period from Abraham to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Babylonian Captivity. With Old Testament events providing the main thread of his story, at the same time Ralegh brought in the affairs of Assyria, Egypt, Syria, Phoenicia, Greece, Troy, Carthage, early Rome, etc. A chapter outline of the Book in itself is a good illustration of his synchronization method; in addition, the method is the basis of organization in most of his chapters, and frequently in single paragraphs. His chapters on Saul, David, and Solomon (XVI, XVII, and XVIII)
are typical. In each the development is the same. Ralegh began with the circumstances of their coming to power, their notable achievements, and their deaths. He closed with an attempt to synchronize the periods of their lives with all of the other nations of the world. At the close of the chapter on David, after listing the Philistine kings who reigned during this period, he continued with a catalogue of the other nations:

There lived at once with David the third of the Silvii, king of Abba, called Latimus Silvius, who is said to have ruled that part of Italy fifty years. And about his fourteenth year Codrus the last king of the Athenians died, to whom succeeded the first prince of those, who being called after Medon, Medontidae, without regal name governed Athens during their life....

Dupales, the thirty-first king of Assyria, which others account but the thirtieth, began to rule that empire about the thirteenth year of David, and held it thirty-eight years.

Near the same time began Ixion, the second king of the Heraclidae, the son of Burysthenes, in Corinth; and Agis, the second of the Heraclidae, in Lacedaemon....

Other chroniclers made this Agis the third king of Sparta, and somewhat later, about the twenty-third year of David, and say, that Achestratus was the fourth king of this race, the same whom Eusebius calls Labotes, and sets him in the thirteenth year of Solomon....

About the time that Joab besieged Rabba in Moab, Vaphres began to govern in Egypt.... In the twenty-first of David was the city of Maeonia in Asia the Less founded....

About the same time Cuma in Campania was built by the inhabitants of Chalcis in Euboea....

Eusebius and Cassiodore find the building of Carthage at this time, to wit, in the thirty-first year of David....

Throughout Book II, Ralegh ordered the pluralistic pagan world through his infallible touchstones, the inhabitants of the civitas dei. He used not only the major Biblical figures, but the lesser as well. "There lived with Joash, Mezades and Diognetus in Athens; Eudernus and Aristo- todes in Corinth; about which time Agrippa Sylvius, and after him Sylvius Alladius, were kings of the Albans in Italy. Ocrazapes, commonly
called Anacyndaraxes, the thirty-seventh king succeeding unto Ophratanes, began his reign over the Assyrians about the eighteenth year of Joash, which lasted forty-two years. In the sixteenth of Joash, Cephrenes, the fourth from Sesac, succeeded unto Cheops in the kingdom of Egypt, and held it fifty years." Obviously Ralegh had a number of chronologies before him and merely pieced them together.

Ralegh recognized that his attempt to follow a universal chronology fragmented his narrative. When he came to Troy, he dropped the synchronization method with the following explanation: "The war at Troy, with other stories hereupon depending, (because the ruin of the city by most chronologers is found in the time of Habdon, judge of Israel, whom in the last place I have mentioned,) I rather choose here to entreat of in one entire narration, beginning with the lineal descent of their princes, than to break the story into pieces, by rehearsing apart in divers years the diversity of occurrences." This history of Troy stands isolated in Book II as a self-contained unit of direct narrative, a sign of what is to come in the later books. It is noteworthy that in this account, only second causes were discussed and analysed. Providence, whose role Ralegh kept before the reader constantly in Old Testament events, was given no part to play in Trojan and Greek affairs.

Before leaving the discussion of chronology, it should be noted that such interruptions of narrative in the interests of chronology are not part of Ralegh's classical historiography. Universal chronology was completely ignored, and when time was mentioned the references are brief and casual. In describing the Roman victory over Carthage at
Panormus, Ralegh added, "The report of this victory being brought to Rome, the whole state, filled with courage, prepared a new fleet of two hundred sail, which they sent into Sicily, to give end to that war that had now lasted fourteen years." Later he referred briefly to the eighteenth year of the war, then to the fact that the war had lasted twenty-four years without intermission. Such references to time are few in his classical history, and in each case they refer to a particular segment of time within the framework of a war or of a reign of a king. Ralegh was not concerned with synchronizing classical affairs within a universal chronology.

While Ralegh used synchronization in order to follow a universal chronology (a method confined mainly to Books I and II), he employed another method throughout the five books of the History which allowed him to escape the chronological strait jacket. This method was digression (as injurious to sustained narrative as synchronization), which he put to a variety of uses. His digressions serve a vital function and warrant careful consideration. He was conscious of the fact that his digressions ran counter to the most approved practice of his day (in his preface Camden noted curtly, "Disgressions I have avoiced"), and more than once apologized for them. When he interrupted his narrative of Moses for an extended digression on divine, natural, and human law, he remarked: "...if the reader find the story any way disjoined, he may turn over a few leaves, and, omitting this, find the continuation thereof." Furthermore, he excused his practice by arguing that universal history required digression from the main narrative if "the
fragments of other stories, with the actions of those kings and princes which shot up here and there in the same time" were to be recounted.\textsuperscript{50}

The only alternative to digression was omission and thus lose what Bacon termed "the very utility which belongs to Universal History," which is to preserve "some narrations which would perhaps otherwise perish." Bacon cautioned that "for the sake of that compendious brevity of which men are so fond," which leads to abridgment, universal history would destroy many narrations "that are profitable enough in themselves and would otherwise live."\textsuperscript{51} Raleigh likewise argued for the relevance of unrelated fragments of stories.

To the same first ages do belong the report of many inventions therein found, and from them derived to us; though most of the authors' names have perished in so long a navigation. For those ages had their laws; they had diversity of government: they had kingly rule; nobility, policy in war; navigation; and all or the most of needful trades. To speak therefore of these, (seeing in a general history we should have left a great deal of nakedness by their omission,) it cannot properly be called a digression.\textsuperscript{52}

The majority of Raleigh's digressions do not preserve fragments of stories; rather, they are excursions, undertaken at times on the slightest pretext, into an encyclopedic range of topics, from the personal and even private to formally developed treatises on law, government, historiography, warfare, dueling, etc. Raleigh defended these half whimsically, half ironically.

True it is that I have also made many others [digressions], which, if they shall be laid to my charge, I must cast the fault into the great heap of human error. For, seeing we digress in all the ways of our lives, yea, seeing the life of man is nothing else but digression, I may the better be excused in writing their lives and actions. I am not altogether ignorant in the laws of history, and of the kinds. The same hath been taught by many, but by no man better, and with greater brevity, than by that excellent learned
gentleman sir Francis Bacon. Christian laws are also taught us by the prophets and apostles, and every day preached unto us. But we still make large digressions; yea, the teachers themselves do not (in all) keep the path which they point out to others.  

Ralegh here equates digression with error and sin, i.e., he violates the laws of history in the same way that men violate the laws of Christianity. This equation must not be taken seriously, for he knew digression to be a valuable device.

Although many differences in method set Books I and II off from III, IV, and V, digressions were used throughout. Whereas in the first part they develop such topics as chronology, government, and law, in the second part they become more intimate, more topical, more immediately relevant to English political and military developments. Generally they were stimulated by the events of Ralegh's narrative. Moses receiving the Decalogue occasioned Ralegh's extended discussion of law. The founding of the nations after Noah's flood led to a discussion of types of government. After describing the Carthaginians warring with their mercenaries, he digressed to discuss the general question of tyranny. He concluded: "Of these things I might perhaps more seasonably have spoken in the general discourse of government; but where so lively an example of the calamity following a tyrannical rule, and the use of mercenaries thereupon depending, did offer itself, as in this present business of the Carthaginians, I thought that the note would be more effectual, than being barely delivered as out of a common place." In each of these cases the event became the occasion for leaving the narrative in order to explore the topic in depth.
He was at his most authoritative when he digressed to discuss the tactics and strategies of naval and military warfare, especially when he drew on his own diversified experience for eye witness details. Although the temptation is strong to dwell upon the autobiographical in the History, only a few examples must suffice. After showing how Alexander the Great had forced a strongly fortified position through the use of smoke, Raleigh digressed to bring in his own experience.

I saw in the third civil war of France certain caves in Languedoc, which had but one entrance, and that very narrow, cut in the midway of high rocks, which we knew not how to enter by any ladder or engine, till at last by certain bundles of straw let down by an iron chain, and a weighty stone in the midst, those that defended it were so smothered, as they rendered themselves with their plate, money, and other goods therein hidden.

There were also, some three years before my arrival in Guiana, three hundred Spaniards well mounted, smothered to death, together with their horses, by the country people, who did set the long dry grass on fire to the eastward of them, (the wind in those parts being always east,) so as notwithstanding their flying from the smoke, there was not any one that escaped.

After citing another modern parallel, Raleigh concluded with some sound advice. "I remember these things but to give caution to those that shall in times to come invade any part of those countries, that they always before they pass into the land burn down the grass and sedge to the east of them: they may otherwise, without any other enemy than a handful of straw set on fire, die the death of honeybees burnt out of hive." Historians fail to record the number of intrepid invaders this digression saved from the sooty death of honeybees.

Raleigh's brief notation of the Roman decision to abandon naval warfare after their fleet was destroyed in a storm led to his examination of the proposition: "Whether an invading army may be resisted at
their landing upon the coast of England, were there no fleet of ours at the sea to impeach it?" In support of his conclusion, that landings could not be prevented, he referred to his daring landing at Fayal in 1597. After describing the incident in detail, including the names of the gentlemen who accompanied him, he launched a defense of the action (at the time the Earl of Essex, Raleigh's Commander-in-Chief, was greatly angered by the landing. The offense, said some of Essex's supporters, warranted death). Raleigh, writing some ten to fifteen years after the incident, recalled it with obvious relish.

The truth is, that I could have landed my men with more ease than I did, yea without finding any resistance, if I would have rowed to another place; yea even there where I landed, if I would have taken more company to help me. But, without fearing any imputation of rashness, I may say, that I had more regard of reputation in that business than of safety. For I though it to belong unto the honour of our prince and nation, that a few islanders should not think any advantage great enough against a fleet set forth by queen Elizabeth: and further, I was unwilling that some Low Country captains, and others not of mine own squadron, whose assistance I had refused, should please themselves with a sweet conceit (though it would have been short, when I had landed in some other place) that for want of their help I was driven to turn tail.56

Thus the old war horse could still breathe defiance. Such digressive reminiscences impregnate the History with the force of Raleigh's personality. Raleigh concluded the digression with advising James, the King who hated and feared displays of martial vigor, to employ his "many moveable forts" on the sea, and "not trust to any entrenchment upon the shore."57 Such presumption from a condemned traitor!

In the general area of warfare, Raleigh digressed to discuss such topics as the duel command of armies, the folly of unconditional surrender terms, the unhappy profession of a soldier, types of wars, the
debasement of the title of Captain (he had been Captain of Elizabeth's Guard), the battle habits of old soldiers, the ease with which a fleet can sail past a fortified coastal position, the relative fighting abilities of the Macedonian, Roman, and English foot soldier, etc.

He concluded in favor of the English, not a sign of parochialism, for in another place he castigated the English soldier for fighting more bravely when motivated by the hopes of loot than when motivated only by "love" of country.

Ralegh also used his digressions for attacking the Puritans and the doctrine of equivocation; for defending himself from the charges of treason; for commenting on the affairs in Ireland, on Spanish explorations (which he invariably praised), on the burdens of taxation on English Yeomen, and on the drinking habits of English women, who fill "themselves with all sorts of wines, and with artificial drinks far more forcible; by reason whereof, so many wretched feeble bodies are born into the world, and the races of the able and strong men in effect decayed." This list could be greatly extended. Perhaps his longest digression dwelt on the practice of dueling, which he traced from ancient times to his day. He was especially contemptuous of the fine point of the formal codes devolved by French gentlemen.

Yea there are (among many no less ridiculous) some so mystical curiosities herein, as that it is held a far greater dishonour to receive from an enemy a slight touch with a cane, than a sound blow with a sword; the one having relation to a slave, the other to a soldier. I confess that the difference is pretty; though, for mine own part, if I had had any such Italianated enemy in former times, I should willingly have made with him such an exchange, and have given him the point of honour to boot.

He ended by praising James for banning the practice.
The majority of Raleigh's digressions were stimulated by a past event which suggested a modern parallel, not always identical, but with a strong point of similarity; i.e., the digressions involved two terms, separated by centuries, which Raleigh yoked together topically. Thus both could be analysed at once; his comment on one was applicable to the other. When Raleigh criticized Carthaginian tyranny and then enlarged on tyrants in general, James might well prick up his ears. Raleigh's praise of the warlike Semiramis, energetic Queen of the Assyrians, and his scorn of her soft, effeminate successor Ninus, the king who craved peace, might well have stimulated James's anger. It had been rumored that he saw Queen Elizabeth and himself in the portraits. Raleigh's disclaimer of contemporary relevance in the Preface shows that he was aware of the implications of his practice.

It is enough for me (being in that state I am) to write of the eldest times; wherein also, why may it not be said, that, in speaking of the past, I point at the present, and tax the vices of those that are yet living, in their persons that are long since dead; and have it laid to my charge. But this I cannot help, though innocent. And certainly, if there be any, that, finding themselves spotted like the tigers of old time, shall find fault with me for painting them over anew, they shall therein accuse themselves justly, and me falsely.

Raleigh's claim that he was not writing modern history cannot be accepted, both because of his explicit treatment of modern history, which if compiled would fill a fair-sized book, and because of his historical assumptions, which made in the strictest sense all history modern. Raleigh's digressions stem from a frame of mind created by his deepest convictions on the nature of history. Since God's unchangeable will, though outside history, operates within history, every historical
example is relevant; a monarch's treachery, a commander's rashness, a subordinate general's cowardice, all these found their judgments in the past, and such acts must be judged similarly in the present. The discovery of parallels, separated by centuries, was only confirmation of historical absolutes. This assurance of constancy stimulated a mental stance which could not only ransack the centuries for their contemporary relevance (the same assumption underlies the theory of precedents in English law), but also could use contemporary events for their relevance to illuminating the obscure in the past. In conjecturing why Joash, King of Israel, failed to unite Israel with Judah after having defeated Amaziah, King of Judah, Raleigh examined the modern parallel of the French Charles VIII, who after conquering Florence did not unite it to France. "Diversity of circumstance may alter the case," Raleigh concluded; "it is enough to say that it might be in Jerusalem as we know it was in Florence."

This same habit of mind resulted in Raleigh's analytical comparisons, where two personages separated by centuries were evaluated in terms of a single moral standard, or where two such personages served to illustrate a single political maxim, as the following examples illustrate.

So as this rabble, his oration ended proclaimed [Achathocles] king; again and again saluting and adoring him by that name, as if it had been given to him by some lawful election. Hence had our king; Richard the Third a piece of his pattern; but the one was of base, the other of kingly parents; the one took liberty from a commonweal, the other sought only to succeed in a monarchy; the one continued his cruelty to the end, the other, after he had obtained the crown, sought, by making of good laws, to recover the love of his people.
Princes do rather pardon ill deeds than villainous words. Alexander the Great forgave many sharp swords, but never any sharp tongues; no, though they told him but truly of his errors.... The contemptuous words that sir John Parret used of our late queen Elizabeth were his ruin; and not the counterfeit letter of the Romish priest produced against him. So fared it with some other, greater than he, that thereby ran the same and a worse fortune soon after.64

The yoking together of diversity in this manner was possible when all historical events are seen within a static historical frame. The interests of story, of uninterrupted, unified narrative, were subordinated to the larger interests of history as a whole, to universal history.

The demands of universal historiography Raleigh attempted to meet through a universal chronology, synchronization, and digression. He employed other methods as well. Bacon's warning against universal historiography is relevant here.

...if due attention be paid to the subject, it will be found that the laws of regular history are so strict, that they can scarce be observed in such a wide field of matter; so that the dignity of history is rather diminished than increased by the greatness of the mass of it. For the writer who has such a variety of things on all sides to attend to, will become gradually less scrupulous on the point of information; his diligence, grasping at so many subjects, will slacken in each; he will take up with rumours and popular reports, and thus construct his history from relations which are not authentic, or other frivolous materials of the kind. He will be obliged moreover (lest the work increase beyond measure) purposely to omit a number of things worthy of record, and often to sink into abridgments.65

Bacon's warning contains two key points, that the universal historian will be forced to omit and to abridge, that he will become careless with his sources.

Inevitably Raleigh was forced to omit and to abridge, measures he readily acknowledged. He omitted what he felt was unimportant. "What
kings reigned in Babylon during these seventy years of the captivity, and how long each of them did wear the diadem, it is a matter of no great importance to know, forasmuch as neither their acts were notable in the age wherein they lived, nor the length of their reigns any way helpful to the concordance of times foregoing or succeeding. The ineffectual and rash treachery of the "effeminate Asiatics" against Artaxerxes, ruler of the Persian Empire, made "great noise without effect" and therefore was not worth mention. Also, "in the whole reign of Artaxerxes, from the war of Cyrus to the invasion of Egypt, I find nothing (the insurrection and a fruitless journey against the Cadusians excepted) worthy of any mention, much less of digression from the course of the business in Greece." At times he omitted the details of stories too well known to be repeated. In reference to Samson he merely noted: "The birth and acts of Samson are written at large in the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th of Judges; and therefore I shall not need to make a repetition thereof." Rather than narrate the wars with the Philistines, he dismissed them with the sentence: "The rest of the wars of the Philistines are remembered in the catalogue of the Judges, of Saul and David, and therefore I shall not need to collect the particulars in this place." The many adventures of Ulysses received swift treatment. "Ulysses, after ten years, having lost all his company, got home in poor estate, with much ado recovering the mastership of his own house." As preliminary to a battle between the Romans and the Gauls, he gave the causes, preparations, the outcome and an analysis of its importance, but he was content to refer the reader to his source
for the battle itself: "The manner of the fight Polybius describeth at large; which was well fought of all hands."  

In order to cope with his materials on the diverse tribes or nations ancillary to Israel, Ralegh devised a pattern, which he described as follows:

...because the land of Canaan, and the borders thereof, were the stages and theatres whereon the greatest part of the story past, with that which followeth, hath been acted, I think it very pertinent (for the better understanding of both) to make a geographical description of those regions; that all things therein performed, by the places known, may the better be understood and conceived. To which purpose...

I have bestowed on every tribe his proper portion, and do shew what cities and places of strength were by the Jews obtained, and what numbers it pleased God to leave unconquered.... To the cities herein described, I have added a short story of the beginnings and ends of divers kingdoms and commonweals.

At first, he gave this organization flesh, as in his description of the tribe of Asher (II, VII, iii); however, it soon lapsed into a mechanical formula, a bare skeleton with the drudgery showing through. The pattern depended heavily on geographical description, "For all story, without the knowledge of the places wherein the actions were performed, as it wanteth a great part of the pleasure, so it no way enricheth the knowledge and understanding of the reader; neither doth any thing serve to retain what we read in our memories, so well as these pictures and descriptions do." This description Ralegh placed first. He then gave the number of men able to bear arms. Next he listed the principal cities, giving a capsule history of each from its beginnings. Next he catalogued its rulers. Although at first he described each ruler's principal deeds, he soon lapsed into a bare listing of names, adding the years of rule. He generally closed with an account of the chief
Mountains and rivers. This pattern Ralegh used repeatedly in Book II, scarcely varying it or enlivening it with digressions. In this portion of his Old Testament story, he became a victim of universal history. The materials were more than he could gracefully assimilate; judging from his treatment, they didn't interest or stimulate him.

Universal historiography required of Ralegh the use and evaluation of many sources. One of Ralegh's editors has taken the trouble to list them (660 are arranged alphabetically in the 1735 edition of the History), and a thorough analysis of these sources is far beyond the scope of this study. However, some attempt should be made to ascertain Ralegh's attitude towards his sources. Most of his citations occur in Books I and II, and (as Arnold Williams has shown) there is little doubt that Ralegh never saw them first hand, that he repeated the authorities cited in the hexameral and other commentaries he used. In Books III, IV, and V, he relied mainly on the Greek and Roman historians, such as Herodotus, Thucydides, Quintus Curtius, Xenophon, Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and Livy. Throughout the work his attitude is analytical, even skeptical, with only the Scriptures above doubt. In Books I, II, and part of III, the main source for his narrative is the Old Testament, "wherein can be no error," "from which there is no appeal," "whereof all human reason must subscribe." Conflicting reports to which Scriptural evidence was applicable were thus tested, and all doubts resolved in favor of the Scriptures. However, where the Scriptures were silent or obscure "in a case not concerning any man's salvation, and wherein therefore none hath cared to
take great pains, all [authorities] might err...

Ralegh was impatient with those who tortured the text in order to support controversy in those areas beyond a "saving belief" where the Scriptures were silent. In such areas he felt that it was "lawful for every man to be guided...by the best reason, circumstance, and likelihood; and herein, as in the rest, I protest that I do not gainsay any man's opinion out of any crossing, or cavilling humour; for I think it the part of every Christian, rather to reconcile differences, where there is possibility of union, than out of froward subtilty, and prejudice resolvedness, to maintain factions needless, and dangerous conten-
tions." To his non-Scriptural authorities, all of which might err, and to the Scriptures on points unrelated to a "saving belief," Ralegh continually applied the tests of "nature" (natural probabilities, such as how long a man can live or how fast a whale can swim), of "time" (chronological tests), of "reason" (his own intelligence), and of personal experience (the basis of his rejection of the contention of Pineda, a Spanish theologian, that a land bridge connected Spain with Africa in Solomon's time. Ralegh had seen the swift currents in the Straits of Gibraltar). In addition, he invoked the test of "coherence." When he found disagreements or "incoherences" among his sources, he held it "the best way to omit so much as hath not some particular connexion with matter ensuing: mutual dependency in things of this nature being no small argument of truth." Such disagreements he felt justified following his own opinion, rather than "borrow any one of their old patterns." Following the opinions of others, especially those which exaggerated
the miraculous elements in the Old Testament, created dangers.

For if we advisedly consider the state and countenance of the world, such as it was in Abraham's time, yea, before Abraham was born, we shall find that it were very ill done of us, by following opinion without the guide of reason to pare the times over-deeply between Abraham and the flood; because in cutting them too near the quick, the reputation of the whole story might perchance bleed thereby, were not the testimony of the scripture supreme, so as no objection can approach it; and that we did not follow withal this precept of St. Augustine, that wheresoever any one place in the scriptures may be conceived disagreeing to the whole, the same is by ignorance of interpretation misunderstood. And therefore, where the scriptures are plainest, and best agreeing with reason and nature, to what end should we labour to bereat doubts and scruples, or draw all things into wonders and marvels? giving also strength to common cavillers, and to those men's arish brains, who only bend their wits to find impossibilities and monsters in the story of the world and mankind.

Of course Raleigh accepted Old Testament miracles as historical fact, but in general he passed over them rather quickly. He mentioned them, but did not narrate their particulars.

...the miracles which God wrought during this war were exceeding admirable; as, the stay of the river of Jordan at the springs, so as the army of Israel passed it with a dry foot; the fall of Jericho by the sound of the horns; the showers of hailstones which fell upon the Amorites in their flight from Gibeon, whereby more of them perished than by the sword of Israel. Again, the arrest of the sun in the firmament, whereby the day was so much the more lengthened, as the Israelites had time to execute all those which fled after the overthrow: a wonder of wonders, and a work only proper to the all-powerful God.

When, however, it seemed to him that a miracle was magnified beyond the authority of its source, he was quick to criticize. He ridiculed the "conceit" of Pineda that Jonah was swallowed by the whale in the Mediterranean Sea, after which the whale "in three days, swimming above twelve thousand English miles, along the Mediterranean Seas, and so through the straits of Sades [Gibraltar], and along the huge seas
round about Africa, cast up Jonas upon the shore of the Red Sea, that so he might have perhaps some six miles the shorter (though much the worst) way to Nineveh. Ralegh rejected this needless amplification of the miracle.

For this long voyage of the whale finished in three days, is a greater miracle than the very preservation of Jonas in the belly of the whale: and therefore seeing there is no necessity of this miracle, we send it back unto him [Pineda], keeping his own rule, which in this place he forgets: Miracula non sunt multiplicanda. And again, Non sunt miracula grata.

When he left his Old Testament narrative, Ralegh felt free to apply his vigorous skepticism to the original sources of miraculous events themselves. The prodigious and the miraculous in pagan and modern history proceeded many times from a "vehemency of superstition," from minds "distermed with fear." I omit as foolish tales," he said, the story of Alexander the Great having been begotten on his mother by a god in the form of a snake. Some stories, he admitted, might be true, such as the "marvelous shower" of rain which saved Alexander's army of the Egyptian desert, adding: "The purposes of Almighty God are secret, and he bringeth to pass what it pleaseth him...." But, he continued, "many of these wonders and things prodigious are feigned by those that here have written the story of Alexander." He listed a series of such stories. In a digression he dismissed as "pretty tales" similar stories told by the Spaniards in the West Indies, such as the appearance of the Virgin Mary and angels on white horses "with the like Romish miracles, which I think themselves do hardly believe."
At times, however, when the source for a pagan miracle seemed reliable, he invoked the devil, scourging mankind with the permission of God, as the cause. He stated that it would be superstitious of him to repeat the story of the two great rocks which, falling from Mount Parnassus, crushed great numbers of the Persians who were about to loot the Temple of Minerva. "Yet Herodotus, who lived not long after, saith, that the broken rocks remained even to his memory in the temple of Minerva.... And surely this attempt of Xerxes was impious; for seeing he believed that Apollo was a god, he should not have dared to entertain a covetous desire of enriching himself by committing sacrilege upon his temple. Wherefore it may possibly be true, that license to chastise his impiety, in such manner as is reported, was granted unto the Devil...." [italics mine] The power of the devil explained the numerous Greek and Roman oracles; however, "...this is certain and notable, that after the gospel began to be preached in the world, the Devil in [the oracle Hannon] and in all other idols became speechless. For that this Hannon was neglected in the time of Tiberius Caesar, and in the time of Trajan altogether forgotten, Strabo and Plutarch witness." In relating that the Romans, after disasters in war, consulted the books of Sibyl for instructions, which they received and followed, Raleigh concluded: "we may justly believe that Sibyl herself was instructed by the devil." However, he could not forbear a more probable explanation: "yet is it not improbable, that that extremity of fear caused them to hearken to wicked soothsayers; whose detestable counsels they afterwards, for their own honour, (as ashamed of such authors,) imputed to the books of Sibyl."
At other times he relied on authorities, whom he then supplemented with his own experience. He mentioned a fountain in a Roman temple "that at midnight is as hot as boiling water, and at noon as cold as any ice." This story he credited because it was reported by St. Augustine, Diodorus, Herodotus, Pliny, Mela, Solinus, Arrianus, and Curtius; because he had heard of similar wells; and because "indeed our baths in England are much warmer in the night than in the day." 92

By the standards of his day, Raleigh was most scrupulous in his treatment of sources; no authority other than the Scriptures were except from doubt, from the tests of nature, time, reason, experience, and coherence. This is not to suggest that he exercised the exhaustive diligence of the professional researcher. However, he certainly was no weaker than Bacon, was far more candid in citing his sources, and devoted far more effort to analyzing their reliability. He was concerned with avoiding the pitfall of universal historiography Bacon warned against; he did not become "less scrupulous on the point of information"; he did not "take up with rumours and popular reports."

He was continually critical of the practice of following an unexamined tradition, even when done with the best intentions in the best possible cause. For example, he referred to the tradition created by early Christian apologists (St. Augustine among them), who, in the interests of strengthening Christian faith, interpreted a prophecy in the books of Sibyl as a token of the coming of Christ.

Of the Sibylline predictions I have sometimes thought reverently, though not knowing what they were, (as I think few men know,) yet following the common belief and good authority. But observation of the shameful idolatry that upon all occasions was advanced in Rome by the books of Sibyl, had
well prevailed upon my credulity, and made me suspect, though
not the faith and pious meaning, yet the judgment of Eusebius,
when that learned and excellent work of master Casaubon upon
the Annals of Cardinal Baronius, did altogether free me from
mine error, making it apparent, that not only those prophe-
cies of Sibyl wherein Christ so plainly was foreshewed, but
even the books of Hermes, which have borne such reputation,
were no better than counterfeit pieces, and at first enter-
tained (whosoever devised them) by the undiscreet zeal of
such as delighted in seeing the Christian religion strengthened
with foreign proofs.93

Ralegh's rejection of the authority of the Sibylline Books was ad-
vanced for his time. The learned Historiographer Royal, James Howell,
some forty odd years after Ralegh still clung to the Sibylline prophe-
cies as "incontrovertible truths." He wrote: "...out of the works of
the Sibyls may be deduced a good part of the miracles and sufferings
of Christ, therefore for my part I will not cavil with antiquity, or
traduce the Primitive Church, but I think I may believe without danger
that those Sibyls might be select instruments to announce the dis-
penations of Heaven to mankind. Nor do I see how they do the Church
of God any good service or advantage at all, who question the truth of
their writings...which have been handed over to posterity as inconto-
vertible truths for so many ages."94 Ralegh, after dismissing another
such tradition, concluded with a statement which contains the essence
of his attitude towards historical evidence. "Such conjectures, being
entertained without examination, find credit by tradition, whereby,
also, many times, their fashion is amended, and made more historical
than was conceived by the author. But it cannot be safe to let our
faith [or his historiography] (which ought to stand firm, upon a sure
foundation) lean over-hazardly on a well painted, yet rotten, post."95
The "rotten post" is conjecture transformed in an unexamined tradition into historical fact. Yet conjecture, openly identified as such, was stoutly defended by Raleigh, for he felt that it was necessary to universal historiography. Again Raleigh was conscious of the fact that his use of conjecture departed from the approved practice of his day. "For he doth not feign," Raleigh argued, "that rehearseth probabilities as bare conjecture; neither doth he deprive the text, that seeketh to illustrate, and make good in human reason, those things which authority alone, without further circumstance, ought to have confirmed in every man's belief. And this may suffice in defense of the liberty which I have used in conjectures, and may hereafter use when occasion shall require, as neither unlawful nor disbe seen ing an historian." Raleigh felt that conjecture was justified whenever his sources conflicted, were incomplete (conjecture was better than silence), were suspect, or when they failed to evaluate historical causes properly. He concluded a lengthy conjecture on the genealogy of Joash with a defense of his method:

Thus much concerning the person of Joash, from whom as from a new root, the tree of David was propagated into many branches. In handling of which matter the more I consider the nature of this history, and the diversity between it and others, the less, methinks, I need to suspect mine own presumption as deserving blame for curiosity in matter of doubt, or boldness in liberty of conjecture. For all histories do give us information of human counsels and events, as far forth as the knowledge and faith of the writers can afford; but of God's will, by which all things are ordered, they speak only at random, and many times falsely.

The failure of some authorities to understand the operation of Providence in history, ascribing too much to second causes, permits a
more enlightened historian to offer conjectures on the true causes. Also, since "the heart of man is unsearchable," since second causes many times cannot be known with certainty, the historian is justified in conjecturing on man's hidden motives as well as God's.

I shall conclude this section with an example in which, where the question of the use of sources and conjecture was involved, Ralegh came to a surprising conclusion, a conclusion which demonstrates his independence of mind and his feeling that conjecture was necessary to universal historiography. Ralegh introduced the question: "Whether Phul and Belosus were one person, or heads of sundry families, that reigned apart in Nineveh and Babylon," with a formal statement of his procedure.

I will first therefore deliver the opinion generally received, and the grounds whereupon it stands; then, producing the objections made against it, I will compare together the determination of that worthy man Joseph Scaliger, with those learned that subscribe thereunto, and the judgment of others that were more ancient writers, or have followed the ancients in this doubtful case.... It will be enough to relate the whole substance of each discourse, which I will do as briefly as I can, and without fear to be taxed of partiality, as being no more addicted to the one opinion than to the other, by any fancy of mine own, but merely led by those reasons which, upon examination of each part, seemed to me most forcible, though to others they may perhaps appear weak.

After paraphrasing and analyzing authority after authority, he concluded against "the determination of that worthy man Joseph Scaliger," in favor of Annius of Viterbo. Ralegh knew the work and reputation of Scaliger (1540-1609), perhaps the foremost scholar of his age, and often praised his erudition and careful scholarship. He also knew that the Dominican Annius (ca. 1432-1502) in his Antiquitatum Vartiarum (1499) was guilty of forming some of his Mantuan "discoveries." On
the basis of his own chronological computations and closely reasoned arguments, however, he concluded that Phul and Belosus were one man and that the dubious authority of Annius was better than none at all. Annius's punishment for his forgeries was that he was never to be believed for his own sake, "though for our own sakes we make use of his boldness, taking his words for good, whereas (nothing else being offered) we are unwilling ourselves to be authors of new, though not unprobable conjectures." For Ralegh, when the past is not reliably known, the historian has two possible courses of action: he either leaves it blank or he must fill it in with conjecture. When map makers fill in undiscovered portions of the world with "fictions (or let them be called conjectures)," they draw upon themselves from those who rashly believed them "either some angry curses or well deserved scorn," when the truth becomes known. However,

...in filling up the blanks of old histories, we need not be so scrupulous. For it is not to be feared that time should run backward, and by restoring things themselves to knowledge, make our conjectures appear ridiculous: what if some good copy of an ancient author could be found, shewing (if we have it not already) the perfect truth of these uncertainties? would it be more shame to have believed in the mean while Annius or Torniellus, than to have believed nothing.... Let it suffice, that in regard of authority, I had rather trust Scaliger or Torniellus than Annius; yet him than them, if his assertion be more probable, and more agreeable to approved histories than their conjecture, as in this point it seems to me...."
Generally the History has been characterized as providential, and with good cause. As has been shown, Ralegh's rational proofs of Creation served also to prove the existence of God's providential control of the course of history. The single chronological schema by which all events were ordered, the periodized divisions both of the civitas dei and the civitas terræ, the infallibility of Scriptural revelation, all are indications of Ralegh's belief that history was intelligible only in so far as the role of Providence is recognized. Second cause historiography, not without value to the historian enlightened through reason and faith, was deficient and in its own terms fundamentally unintelligible because it did not credit and honor the impartial mover of history, whose eternally severe but just judgments applied equally to the greatest emperor as well as to the meanest beggar and sometimes, as punishment for sin, transformed the emperor into the beggar. Of God's just power man cannot properly complain; he cannot question or doubt; he can only submit himself to it. "For seeing God, who is the author of all our tragedies, hath written out for us and appointed us all the parts we are to play; and hath not, in their distribution, been partial to the most mighty princes of the world; that gave unto Darius the part of the greatest emperor and the part of the most miserable beggar...of which examples many thousands may be produced: why should other men, who are but as the least worms, complain of wrongs?"102

As one might expect, since Ralegh treated Old Testament and pagan history (although he digressed to bring in modern historical episodes as well), since he was mainly concerned with the events coming
between the Fall and the Atonement in the Christian *heilspan*, this God, while just, is primarily a God of vengeance. As he is slow to anger, "so is his wrath a consuming fire, the same being once kindled by the violent breath of man's ingratitude." Ralegh did not flinch from the implications of a God of vengeance. "And it hath been God's just will, to the end others might take warning, if they would, not only to punish the impiety of men by famine, by the sword, by fire, and by slavery; but he hath revenged himself of the very places they possessed, of the walls and buildings; yea, of the soil, and the beasts that fed thereon." Jealous of neglect or derision of His glory, "he suffered not the wicked to pass unpunished," though He spares the innocent. Too often, man through a "foolish and wicked pride" fails to be properly thankful for His successful exploits, taking all credit himself, forgetting that He "is deeply bound to acknowledge God the author of his happiness." While it is God who rewards, "so also hath God punished the same and the like sins in all after-times, and in these our days, by the same famine, plagues, war, loss, vexation, death, sickness, and calamities, howsoever the wise men of the world raise these effects no higher than to second causes, and such other accidents; which, as being next their eyes and ears, seem to them to work every alteration that happeneth."

Such sentiments are familiar to every student of Medieval and Renaissance thought (the tradition they embody is alive today). They appear quite frequently throughout the five books of the *History*, though more often in Books I and II. Students of the *History* cite such passages in support of their characterization of the *History* as providential.
Yet how does the concept operate within the History? It is one thing for the historian to grant that Providence exists; it is quite another to show how it operates. In what way does the historian recognize the operations of Providence? What are the channels through which it operates? As shown in Chapter I of this study, Raleigh stated that two certainties can be known: that Providence exists, that it acts in history. Yet he denied, utilizing the negative theology tradition, that human reason can determine how it acts. It may not set out the terms of divine formal causes. Nevertheless, in practice he does show how Providence acts and in a limited sense why. In reference to its immediate purpose, it operates to punish sin, pride, disobedience, etc; Providence reveals its will in order to provide patterns or universals to which succeeding ages of man might conform. The crucial question of ultimate purpose in history will be examined in the following section of this chapter. For the present the discussion will be confined to the means Providence employs to fulfil its purpose.

As an historian, Raleigh was compelled to show how Providence acts. His only choices concerned the methods he could adopt. He showed God acting directly, as in miracles; he showed God permitting the devil to act (miracles of a sort); he showed God as the proximate cause which uses man as its agent. We find in the Preface and in Books I and II many examples of this last type of historiography, which, in the interests of displaying God's control, tended to denigrate the role of man.

In presenting the story of Ammon (based on II, Kings, 21), Raleigh stated: "Ammon the son of Nanasses, a man no less wicked than was his
father before his conversion, restored the exercise of all sorts of idolatry, for which God hardened the hearts of his own servants against him, who slew him after he had reigned two years...." The subordinate role of man to God is emphasized by the very syntax of the sentence. God was made the subject acting upon the object, the hearts, with the servants (instruments of His will) buried in a prepositional phrase and acting in a dependent clause. We have some clue to God's motives, but none to the servants' other than their "hardened" hearts.

This type of historiography was not confined to Old Testament events; Ralegh treated more recent history in precisely the same way. In illustrating that God's justice is an historical absolute, he took many examples from French, Spanish, and English history. Typical is his narration of the story of Louis Debonaire, the usurping son of Charlenagne, who murdered his nephew, the legitimate heir to the empire, and gave a "civil death" to his brothers. He then felt secure. "Yet God raised up against him (which he suspected not) his own sons, to vex him, to invade him, to take him prisoner, and to depose him; his own sons, with whom (to satisfy their ambition) he had shared his estate, and given them crowns to wear, and kingdoms to govern; during his own life." While the story exemplifies God's punishment of cruel treachery through similar treachery, Ralegh did not investigate the characters of the sons, the motives, etc., but was content to use them only as agents of God, Who acted immediately through them. Thus God is characterized by the action, but they are not. We see that He acted, we know why He acted, and in a limited sense we know how He acted, but we know no more of His agents than we know of Amnon's servants. This
type of historiography, with God as the main actor, is responsible for those views which characterize the History as medieval, which set it in the tradition of the medieval chronicles. Against this type Bacon had warned and Edmund Bolton had complained: "Christian Authors, while for their ease they shuffled up the reasons of events, in briefly referring all causes immediately to the Will of God, have generally neglected to inform their Readers in the ordinary means of Carriage in human Affairs, and thereby singularly maimed their Narrations." 110

But Ralegh's practice throughout the History was not restricted to this type of historiography. He was not a medievalist writing history without the benefit of the intellectual developments of the Renaissance. He had an intimate knowledge of classical historiography, although he felt certain that it did not represent the most complete view of history. In addition, he had made too much history himself to undervalue man's role. Consequently, he wrote a great deal of second cause history, employing the methods of classical historiography with a sure hand. These methods shall be examined in detail in Chapter III. Some students of Ralegh's History, such as Firth and Reed, have claimed that Ralegh could not work out a compromise between his medieval and classical historiography. John McIntyre has stated that the relationship between first and second causes must remain an insoluble mystery, that both operate as free agents simultaneously. I do not suggest that any compromise is possible; nevertheless, the fact remains that Ralegh did utilize a system of thought which allowed him to exercise the office of a second cause historian without, by implication, negating the role of Providence.
His attitude towards the relationship between Providence and man is similar to his attitude towards astral determinism. Like St. Augustine, Ralegh vigorously rejected the idea that the influence of the stars, termed by Ralegh God's "reserved and unwritten laws," affects men's minds, though he granted that it affects men's bodies: "...that either the stars or the sun have any power over the minds of men immediately, it is absurd to think, other than...as the same by the body's temper may be affected." He rejected the thesis such as that found, developed in great detail, in John Naplet's The Dial of Destiny (1581), which argued for astral determinism. Ralegh's position on astral determinism was similar to that found in Henry Cuffe's The Differences of the Ages of man's Life (1600). "For though it be true," Cuffe noted, "that the celestial bodies have no direct action either of inclination or constraint upon the reasonable soul of man, which is immaterial, yet it is as true that they have singular and especially operations upon our bodies." While Ralegh rejected the notion that celestial bodies immediately affect man's rational soul (reason and will), nevertheless "but that the stars and other celestial bodies incline the will by mediation of the sensitive appetite, which is also stirred by the constitution and complexion, it cannot be doubted.... And that they wholly direct the reasonless mind, I am resolved: for all those which were created mortal, as birds, beasts, and the like, are left to their natural appetites; over all which, celestial bodies (as instruments and executioners of God's providence) have absolute dominion."
Thus man becomes subject to astral determinism when he allows his rational soul to be dethroned, when he follows the promptings of his sensible soul. The stars influence the appetites, which in turn incline, but do not determine the will. When the appetites are blindly followed, however, man can be acting under the influence of the stars, which in turn are controlled by God. For Raleigh, as indeed for St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Calvin, Hooker, Spenser, and Shakespeare (to name no others), the man who follows the promptings of his lower nature is sinning man. Raleigh's views on sin will be discussed in relation to his treatment of historical characters in the following chapter. At this point let it suffice to point out that part of the culpability of sinning man is that he submits himself to astral determinism (to which all beings without reason are subject), while part of the virtue of the rational man is that he does not.

Although astral influences were seen as theoretical possibilities in human affairs, they were given no part to play in the History. This was not true in the case of Providence, which similarly exercises its control (other than in direct, miraculous intervention) through the sensible soul of man and through removing man's rational control of his affairs; "...where God hath a purpose to destroy, wise men grow short lived, and the change of things is committed unto such as either cannot see what is for their good, or know not how to put in execution any sound advice." In presenting the how of providential control, Raleigh remarked: "the infinite wisdom of God doth not work always by one and the same way, but very often in the alteration of kingdoms and estates, by taking understanding from the governors, so as they can
neither give nor discern of counsels." As one of many examples he cited Darius's repeated acts of stupidity, divinely inspired, which led to the conquest of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great.

The same was true in Old Testament history. "Now let us a little, for instruction, look back to the occasions of sundry of the great events which have been mentioned in this story of the life of Moses, for excepting God's miracles, his promise, and fore-choice of this people, he wrought in all things else by the medium of man's affections and natural appetites." [italics mine] The affections in this example were fear, pity, grief, ingratitude, etc. In the Renaissance one of the commonplace arguments justifying historiography was that it inspires in men the desire for fame (glory, honor, reputation, renown). Ralegh turned this desire into a tool of Providence. "In such cases, especially where God intends a great conversion of empire, fame is very powerful in working." The revengeful hatred of the Thebans, Thessalians, and Locrians for the Phocians caused the former to be the providential instruments of their own enslavement to Philip of Macedon.

Although generally Ralegh did not develop the particularity of human action in his Old Testament history, he did in some cases, explaining, "The acts of this wicked man [Jehoram] I have thought good to handle the more particularly...to the end that it might more plainly appear how the corrupted affections of men, impurifying the revealed will of God, accomplish nevertheless his hidden purpose, and without miraculous means confound themselves in the seeming wise of their own folly...."

Thus the defective reason and affections of man serve to carry out the hidden purposes of God. This principle of historical causation
depends on the concept of original sin, with its correlative the concept of grace. Original sin led to "human blindness in action." As Collingwood stated, this was not a fortuitous blindness due to individual failure of insight, but a necessary blindness inherent in action itself. According to Christian doctrine, it is inevitable that man should act in the dark without knowing what will come of his action. That inability to achieve ends clearly conceived in advance, which in Greek is called αματητευσις, missing one's mark, is no longer regarded as accidental but as a permanent element in human nature, arising out of the condition of man as man. This is the original sin upon which St. Augustine laid such stress, and which he connected psychologically with the force of natural desire.¹²⁴

For an understanding of the History the importance of original sin, of blindness in action, of the intrinsic evil in natural desire, can hardly be over-estimated. They color Raleigh's judgments of human acts; they give the History its dominant tone of tragedy. However, the correlative to original sin, the concept of grace, does not play a coordinate role, as will be shown. In the History, in providential historiography in general, when man's desires do achieve worthy ends, the credit is God's. To quote Collingwood further: "Thus the plans which are realized by human action (such plans, I mean, as the conquest of the world by Rome) come about not because men have conceived them, decided on their goodness, and devised means to execute them, but because men, doing from time to time what at the moment they wanted to do, have executed the purposes of God. This conception of grace is the correlative of the conception of original sin."¹²⁵

Since Providence used man's affections as means of fulfilling Its will and since men unwittingly furthered the will of Providence by submitting to the mastery of their affections, the way was thus open
to a legitimate interest in second causes, not in their role as passive agents, such as Ammon's servants or Debonaires's sons, but as agents who in so far as they lost rational control of themselves revealed all the more clearly the intentions of Providence. For Ralegh, the particularity of second causes (intentions, counsels, desires, etc.) became even more important than they were to Thucydides, for not only did they serve to explain human action in secular or temporal terms, they also were the keys to Providential influence, to the eternal patterns of wisdom this influence revealed.

In Ralegh's account of the Peloponnesian War (based on Thucydides), where no direct role was assigned to Providence, where he was as devoted to second causes as was Thucydides, Ralegh analysed the reasons for the Athenian defeat at the hands of the Syracusans. The chief reason he found in the character of Nicias, the Greek general. Nicias, rather than avoid a battle he could not win, chose to risk the army in battle. If he had exercised prudence, his own estate, life, and honor would have been jeopardized, for the irrational rulers of Athens wanted only victories from their generals, not tactical retreats. Due to an eclipse of the moon, however, he delayed twenty-seven days before breaking camp. This delay gave the Syracusans the opportunity to press their own preparations and ensured the defeat of the Athenian army. Following mention of the eclipse, Thucydides commented briefly:

"...Nicias, who was over-addicted to divination and that sort of thing, refused from that moment even to discuss the question of departure, until they had waited the twenty-seven days prescribed by the soothsayers." (Bk. VII, 50) Ralegh, however, enlarged significantly on
his source with an analysis of Nicia's character, ascribing to it
the fatal delay which led to the disastrous battle. I quote in part:

Therefore his fear of wrongful condemnation was such, as a
constant man could not easily have overmastered; but when
afterwards the army having no other expectation of safety
than the faint hope of a secret flight, he was so terrified
with an eclipse of the moon, happening when they were about
to dislodge, that he would not consent to have the camp
break up till seven and twenty days were past. His timorous-
ness was even as foolish and ridiculous as the issue of it
was lamentable. For he should not have thought that the
power of the heavens, and the course of nature, would be as
unjust as his Athenians, or might pretend less evil to the
slothful, than to such as did their best. Neither do I
think that any astrologer can allege this eclipse, as either
a cause of prognostication of that army's destruction, or
otherwise than as the folly of men did, by application, turn
it to their own confusion. 126

Ralegh pictured Nicia as fearful, terrified, timid, and foolish, a
victim of himself as much as he was the victim of the irrational,
unjust rulers of Athens, who had the habit of precipitously condemning
unsuccessful generals to death. He concluded his analysis of the
episode: "Thus we see that God, who ordinarily works by a concatenation
of means, deprives the governors of understanding when he intends evil
to the multitude, and that the wickedness of unjust men [the Athenian
rulers] is the ready mean to weaken the virtue of those [such as Nicia] who might have done them good. 127 Both Thucydides and Ralegh recognized
the impending disaster implicit in Nicia's delay; neither attached
any supernatural significance to the eclipse; but Ralegh chose to
examine in particular Nicia's state of mind, tracing it back to its
causes, because in this way the influence of God, which works through
a "concatenation of means," could be detected. The corrupted affections
of men, in this case those of Nicia and the Athenian leaders, are
among these "concatenation of means," and thus become extremely im-
portant to the providential historian, more important than they were to
the classical historian.

Ralegh's view of the means through which Providence exercises its
control justified a most intensive examination of second cause particu-
larity. The more men act in the grip of their affections, the more
directly they reveal Providential control. The irrational were bound
by Providence just as surely as beings without reason were bound by
astral influences. The converse of this principle suggests the sur-
prising proposition that a rational man, in so far as he exercises
reason, becomes to that extent free of Providence. This is not at
all similar to the type of second cause voluntarism found in Machia-
elli's *Il Principe* (Ch. XXV). Machiavelli described a mastery of
"fortune" through impetuous, bold action rather than by cautious,
prudent action. If reason is involved at all, it is a tool, a pander
for will. Ralegh suggests the possibility of freedom from Providence
through supremely rational action. The possibility threatens the very
principle of Providential control. One way out of the difficulty is
to deny that any truly rational man ever existed. The extent to which
Ralegh applied the principle of freedom to man will be examined in the
following chapter, where Ralegh's treatment of character will be analysed.

Let it suffice here to mention that Ralegh was quite impatient with
the determinism involved in the ideas of fortune, fate, or destiny,
rejecting the former as idolatry, as the "god of fools," and the latter
as stupifying. Even in that part of the history of Israel where Pro-
vidence is shown acting directly in human affairs, Ralegh tried to pre-
serve the virtue of free, rational action in human agents. For example, he pointed out that after the prophet Samuel broke with Saul, he became quite circumspect about his own safety, even though at the time he was "God directed" to select David to succeed Saul.

And if Samuel knew that it was no way derogating from the providence of God, that by his cautious care and wisdom he sought to avoid the inconvenience or dangers of this life, then do those men mistake the nature of his divine ordinance, who, neglecting the reason that God hath given them, do no otherwise avoid the perils and dangers thereof, than as man stupified in the opinion of fate or destiny, neglecting either to beg counsel at God's hand by prayer, or to exercise that wisdom or foresight, wherewith God hath enriched the mind of man for his preservation.

In Books I and II, which have as their central narrative the first four epochs of the civitas dei, Raleigh displayed Providence acting through miracles and immediately through men. He showed relatively little interest in second causes for their own sakes. A notable exception is his account of Jezebel, especially her violent death. (II, XX, vi; IV, 597-98) His zest for the incident resulted in some of the best descriptive narrative in the entire History. In Books III, IV, and V, in which the Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires dominate the narrative, the overt role of Providence was sharply restricted. Its influence in the Trojan War, the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, the conquests of Alexander the Great, the Punic Wars, and the Macedonian Wars varies from slight to none at all. At times, as shown in his treatment of Nicias, Raleigh indicated how human agents were the tools of Providence; at other times Providence was shown (at rare intervals) as acting through seemingly trivial incidents which, Raleigh stated, had important consequences. When a meeting of Greek leaders was to be held to find measures to meet the growing Roman threat,
Ralegh found providential significance in a drink of cold water.

"...God, who had otherwise disposed of these matters, hindered all with a draught of cold water, which Cleomenes drank in a great heat, and thereupon fell extreme sick, and so could not be present at Lerna, but caused the parliament to be deferred to another time." 130 Thus Greek unity was not achieved when it was greatly needed. At the same time, however, Ralegh presented a lengthy analysis of the political and military conditions in Greece, concentrating on the characters of the many petty kings who made the necessary unity impossible. Providence with its cold water was made irrelevant. His analysis of Xerxes' character, preparations, strategy, and soldiers and a similar analysis of the Greeks made the reasons for Xerxes' defeat abundantly clear. Yet at the conclusion of the Persian disaster he noted: "Hereby it may seem, that the vision appearing to Xerxes [stimulating his desire to conquer Greece] was from God himself, who had formerly disposed of those things, ordaining the subversion of the Persian monarchy by the Greeks...." 131

At the close of a long series of episodes dealing with the cowardly and inept efforts of Perseus, the inheritor of the Macedonian kingdom, to ward off Roman domination, Ralegh concluded: "Thus dealt Perseus, like a careful treasurer, and one that would preserve his money for the Romans, without diminishing the sun. But of this painful office he was very soon discharged by L. AEmilius Paulus, the new consul; who in fifteen days after his setting forth from Italy, brought the kingdom of Macedon to that end, for which God had appointed over it a king so foolish and cowardly." 132 Ralegh showed that the victory of the Romans over the Carthaginians was due to the former's greater determina-
tion, self-sacrifice, courage, and wisdom and to the latter's greed, luxury, and stupidity. Yet again at the close he brought in a mechanical reference to the determining will of God. As an historical cause, as an actor in the cosmic drama, Providence was given little part to play in classical affairs. Why then Ralegh's decreasing emphasis on the role of Providence?

One possible explanation is that, having departed from infallible Old Testament materials, he had less evidence for providential control. Where this influence was plain in the flight of the Jews from the Egyptians, or in the establishing of the house of David, it was far from plain in Hannibal's campaigns against the Romans. Ralegh, who admired Hannibal greatly, did not attempt to indicate why Providence ordained Hannibal's eventual defeat and forced suicide. He showed, mainly through cursory explanation, that Providence ordained the rise and fall of the Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires. However, if one searches the History for the reasons God wanted these empires to flourish and whither, one searches in vain. Ralegh's silence is remarkable because the Hebraic-Christian tradition he utilized provided ample explanations; indeed it provided necessary explanations. Ralegh took pains to prove that Providence created, that it controlled, condemned, and punished. He displayed the manifold means through which it acted. However, he did not venture to explain why it acted. He did set forth its immediate purposes (to punish sin, to create and destroy empires) and its didactic purpose (to provide patterns of wisdom for succeeding ages), but he did not consider its ultimate purpose, the final cause of Creation. In short, Ralegh's providential historiography was without an eschatology.
The summary of the Hebraic-Christian conception of history at the beginning of this chapter shows that time was held to be linear, that it had a beginning and will have an end. The pivotal event within time is the fact of Christ. As Oscar Cullman described the *heilsplan*, the Incarnation looks backward to the Fall and beyond that to Creation and looks forward to the Second Coming and to the redemption of man-kind. This *heilsplan* resulted in what Collingwood has identified as the apocalyptic nature of Christian providential historiography.

It will set itself to detect an intelligible pattern in this general course of events, and in particular it will attach a central importance in this pattern to the historical life of Christ, which is clearly one of the chief preordained features of the pattern. It will make its narrative crystallize itself round that event, and treat earlier events as leading up to it or preparing for it, and subsequent events as developing its consequences. It will therefore divide history at the birth of Christ into two parts, each having a peculiar and unique character of its own: the first, a forward-looking character, consisting in blind preparation for an event not yet revealed; the second a backward-looking character depending on the fact that the revelation has now been made. A history thus divided into two periods, a period of darkness and a period of light, I shall call *apocalyptic* history.133

There is no question but that Ralegh understood the significance of the historical Christ in history, but this is not to say that the fact of the Incarnation played its necessary role in Ralegh's historiography. Ralegh's understanding of Christ is clearly reflected in his discussion of law where he contrasted the Old Law of Moses with the New Law of Christ in a manner which reflects the apocalyptic vision of the past as described by Collingwood. "[The Old Law] sheweth the way of righteousness of works, [the New Law] by faith; the law woundeth, the gospel healeth; the law terrifieth, the gospel
allureth; Moses accuseth, Christ defendeth; Moses condemneth, Christ pardoneth; the Old restraineth the hand, the New the mind...." While this may be sound theology, the question remains to determine the effects of the apocalyptic vision on Ralegh's historiography. What are its necessary consequences, and how are they revealed in the History?

To the providential historian God's individual creations are historically important because they possess those characteristics which serve God's purpose. "So a thing like Rome," writes Collingwood, "is not an eternal entity but a transient thing that has come into existence at the appropriate time in history to fulfil a certain definite function and to pass away when that function has been fulfilled." The historical meaning of the pagan past in general and of the triumph of Rome in particular was found in their relevance to the Incarnation. Eusebius of Caesarea, in his Praeparatio Evangelica, "showed that the history of the pre-Christian world could be regarded as a process designed to culminate in the Incarnation. Jewish religion, Greek philosophy, Roman law, combined to build up a matrix in which it was possible for the Christian revelation to take root and grow to maturity; if Christ had been born into the world at any other time, the world would not have been able to receive Him." The "forward-looking" qualities of the apocalyptic vision radiate throughout St. Augustine's De civitate dei. For example, in interpreting the significance of the blind Isaac blessing his son Jacob by mistake instead of Esau, St. Augustine concluded: "the blessing of Jacob is therefore a proclamation of Christ to all nations." For St. Augustine, the event confirmed
the prophetic mystery of God's power. He then exclaimed: "0 things done, yet done prophetically; on the earth, yet celestially; by men, yet divinely! If everything that is fertile of so great mysteries should be examined carefully, many volumes would be filled...." He interpreted the Sibylline prophecies in the same way, an interpretation which, as was shown, Ralegh rejected. For Orosius, St. Augustine's disciple, "the long record of human failure and human misery [was] a prelude to better times and to a future life of peace. God had not abandoned His creation, but rather had guided its development toward a definite end. The three earlier empires, begun in warfare and bloodshed, culminated in the Roman Empire, which furnished a perfect setting for God's manifestation in Christ to the world." And with the decline of the Roman Empire came the triumph of the Church. Orosius took pains to record faithfully the details of Caesar Augustus' assumption of power "so that the empire of Caesar," he explained, "might be proven in every respect to have prepared for the future advent of Christ." The details he recorded found their significance only as they prefigured the coming of Christ.

In the first place, when Augustus was entering the city on his return from Apollonia after the murder of his uncle C. Caesar, though the sky was clear and cloudless at the time, about the third hour a circle resembling a rainbow suddenly formed around the sun's disk. This phenomenon apparently indicated that Augustus alone was the most powerful man in this world and alone was the most renowned in the universe; it was in his time that Christ would come, He who alone had made and ruled the sun itself and the whole world....

In the third place, after his triumphal entry into the City, no doubt on that very day mentioned above, he, consul for the fifth time, had the gates of Janus closed for the first time after a lapse of two hundred years and assumed the very distinguished name of Augustus. What is there that we
can more faithfully and truthfully believe and recognize—when peace, name, and day united together for the purpose of such a manifestation—than that he had been predestined by some hidden order of events for the service of His preparation? Caesar on that day, the same on which the Lord a few years later was to make His appearance, chose the banner of peace and assumed the title of power.¹⁴¹

Dante, in his *De monarchia* (Ch. XII), "proved" with his syllogisms that Christ could not have been Christ had he not been born under Roman rule; i.e., He could not have been legally condemned to death and thus fulfill the requirements of the Atonement.¹⁴²

Using Old Testament and classical history for their typological significance is a common practice in Christian literature. Several isolated examples appear in the *History*. Ralegh treated a miracle of Moses thus: "But Moses taking the branches of a tree, growing near a lake of bitter water, and casting the same thereinto, made the same sweet, a plain type and figure of our Saviour; who upon the tree of the cross changed the bitterness of everlasting death into the sweetness of eternal life."¹⁴³ Concerning the truth of the story of St. George and the dragon, he concluded: "I leave every man to his own belief." However, after citing the authorities for the story, he added: "If this authority suffice not, we may rather make the story allegorical, figuring the victory of Christ...."¹⁴⁴ This allegorical interpretation Ralegh did not insist on, but offered as a possibility.

The *History* had as its narrative themes the first four epochs of the *civitas dei* and the rise and fall of the four great pagan empires. Ralegh's subject matter, exclusive of his numerous digressions, fell into the "forward-looking" period of the *heilsplan*. Yet unlike the
historians of the providential tradition he utilized, he did not "look forward." He did not find the meaning of events in terms of the providential significance to the birth of Christ. That this tradition had vitality in universal historiography long after Raleigh is clear from the following passage from Bossuet's *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681).

Thus it is that the empires of the world have ministered to religion, and to the preservation of the people of God: wherefore that same God, who caused the different states of his people to be foretold by his prophets, caused the succession of empires to be also predicted by them. You have seen the places where Nebuchadnezzar was pointed out as the person that was to come and punish the haughty nations, and especially the Jewish people for their ingratitude to their Maker. You have heard Cyrus named two hundred years before his birth, as him who was to restore God's people, and to punish Babylon's pride.... We there see those famous empires fall one after another, and the new empire which Jesus Christ was to establish, is there described so expressly by its proper characters, that it is impossible to mistake it. It is the empire of the Son of Man, the empire that is to stand amidst the ruin of all others, and to which alone eternity is promised.145

It is clear that Bossuet saw Old Testament and pagan history in the light of the Incarnation. Raleigh did not. The lack of such interpretation in Raleigh might be the basis for those views, as that of Paul H. Kocher, that Raleigh "may have had some leanings toward antitrinitarianism."146 Strathmann, in defense of his thesis that Raleigh was not an atheist, remarked that the relatively few references to Christ in the History "appears noteworthy only in comparison with the frequent appeals to God's providence and justice."147 The fact remains, however, that Raleigh did not utilize the Incarnation as a principle for assessing the meaning of providential control. The triumph of Rome was treated as a necessary prelude to her fall, not to the birth
of Christ. The period of darkness closed not with the coming of light, but with the triumph of death.

The interpretation here hinges on negative evidence. How much can be made from the fact that Ralegh did not utilize the apocalyptic tradition within providential historiography? The problem is the same in interpreting the following passage. Ralegh described the principal cities of the kingdom of Judah; he came to Bethlehem.

Bethlehem is the next unto it within six miles of Jerusalem, otherwise Lehem, sometime Ephrata; which name, they say, it had of Caleb's wife, when as it is so called by Moses before Caleb was famous in those parts, Gen. xxxviii. 16. Of this city was Abessan, or Ibzan, judge of Israel after Jephthah, famous for the thirty sons and thirty daughters begotten by him. Elimelec was also a Bethlehemite, who with his wife Naomi sojourned in Moab during the famine of Judah, in the time of the judges, with whom Ruth, the daughter-in-law of Naomi returned to Bethlehem, and married Boaz, of whom Obed, of whom Ishai, of whom David. It had also the honour to be the native city of our Saviour Jesus Christ; and therefore shall the memory thereof never end.148

The reference to Christ ends the passage. Throughout the History Ralegh employed lengthy digressions on topics of far less note than the significance of Christ (and with far less pretext). How much can be attached to the fact that Christ was given no more attention here than far less important inhabitants of Bethlehem?

In proceeding further with the implications of negative evidence, the scope of the inquiry can be widened to include Ralegh's treatment of another cardinal feature of the heilsplan: its providentially ordained telos.

The students of Christian providential historiography are unanimous in their agreement, not only on the central position of Christ, but also
on the necessity for a telos, the final consummation of history in the future. Without this consummation, without a fulfilment of redemptive purpose, history is meaningless. Löwith, in his summary of St. Augustine's theology of history, sets this out clearly.

What really matters in history, according to Augustine, is not the transitory greatness of empires, but salvation or damnation in a world to come. His fixed viewpoint for the understanding of present and past events is the final consummation in the future: last judgment and resurrection. This final goal is the counterpart of the first beginning of human history in creation and original sin.... Only by this reference to an absolute beginning and end has history as a whole a meaning. On the other hand, beginning and end are also not meaningful in themselves but with reference to the story which they begin and end, and the central happening of this history is Jesus Christ's advent, the eschatological event.

Collingwood came to the same conclusion: "The Christian revelation thus gave us a view of the entire history of the world, from its creation in the past to its end in the future, as seen in the timeless and eternal vision of God. Thus medieval historiography looked forward to the end of history as something fore-ordained by God and through revelation foreknown to man: it thus contained in itself an eschatology." Whitney J. Oates in his remarks on St. Augustine emphasized that "that which comes at the end of time provides the ultimate criterion by which all that happens in time must be judged."

To cite further summaries, such as that by Figgis, Meyerhoff, McIntyre, and D'Arcy, would repeat what every student of Christian thought knows: that Christianity without its telos is inconceivable. If we grant that redemptive purpose bound in an eschatology is a necessary requisite to "meaning" in providential historiography, if we agree with Löwith that "to venture a statement about the meaning of
historical events is possible only when their telos becomes apparent, we are faced with an inescapable conclusion that in terms of the Christian futuristic outlook, Ralegh's History is meaningless. This is not to suggest that it lacks "meaning" in another sense. However, just as Ralegh did not use the Incarnation as a principle of discovering the meaning of Old Testament and classical history, so he did not utilize an eschaton as a principle of discovering meaning in history as a whole. Of course, we are not surprised when Polydore Virgil, Camden, or Bacon fail to employ an eschatology. But Ralegh chose to write universal, providential history. He adopted many of its methods. He argued for Creation, the Fall, and displayed the operations of divine justice and vengeance. As an historian he showed that Providence controlled, how it controlled, but he did not show the ultimate why to its control. All of his History (the periods before Christ and those after Christ which he brought in through digression) reveals only darkness. There is no balancing of darkness and light (the apocalyptic vision) as we find, for example, in Otto of Freising's universal historiography.

The typical method employed by Otto, as he himself stated, was to close each book of his history with "a picture of unhappiness" resulting from his weaving together the "sadder aspects" of events "in the manner of a tragedy." These became the occasions for impassioned laments, which, however, were invariably balanced by a message of hope, a reference to the coming of Christ and the heavenly kingdom. His pessimism, stimulated by the wretched state of man's life in the world,
is linked to eschatological futurism. He is pessimistic in order to
be all the more joyful. The following is a typical example.

At this point we are constrained to cry out against the
wretchedness of life's vicissitudes. For lo! we see at what
cost, not only to its enemies but even to its own citizens,
the Roman Republic grew. For by alternating changes, after
the manner of the sea—which is now uplifted by the increases
that replenish it, now lowered by natural loss and waste—the
republic of the Romans seemed now exalted to the heavens
by oppressing nations and kingdoms with war and by subduing
them; now in turn was thought to be going down again into
the depths when assailed by those nations and kingdoms or
overwhelmed by pestilence and sickness, and—what is more
significant even than such matters—after they had ar-
ranged everything else well and had set it in fine order,
they were miserably disemboweled by falling upon one another
in internal strife.

This account of Rome, setting aside the differences in style, could
have come from Raleigh's History. Raleigh, however, would have stopped
here; Bishop Otto did not.

All these calamities springing out of unstable events and
(so to speak) the daily deaths of mortal beings should have
had the power to direct men to the true and abiding life of
eternity. But as we have said above, when the city of the
world was afflicted by these and like misfortunes the rising
of the true Light was drawing nigh as though following the
darkness of murky night. And so, since after hurrying over
the instances of fluctuating disasters that affected the
Medes and the Persians, as well as the Greeks and the Romans,
we are now approaching the coming of Him who, being truly the
peacemaker, pacified all things "Whether things upon the
earth, or things in the heavens," even Christ Jesus himself....

Ralegh utilized Bishop Otto's method of personal comment on the
events he described; but Raleigh revealed a pessimism which found lit-
tle sign of a coming dawn, which painted a picture of tragedy and ap-
proaching death. He felt that "the long day of mankind [was] drawing
fast towards an evening, and the world's tragedy and time near at an
end." Beyond the final act of mankind's tragedy, Raleigh did not
project the History. It must be emphasized that Ralegh's personal faith in a redeeming Christ is not in question here. Strathmann has examined this question, bringing in biographical evidence and evidence from Ralegh's poetry, and I find no reason to disagree with his conclusion that Ralegh was a believing Christian. As an historian, however, Ralegh restricted the meaning of history to its beginning (which established providential control) and to God's judgments upon mankind for sin. This judgment is death as long as man's pride and ambitious quest for power and glory are based on love of the world. If his study of history proved anything, it was that death is the telos to which mankind was justly destined. St. Augustine ended the De civitate dei with a discussion of "the eternal blessedness of the City of God." Bishop Otto ended his history with an examination of Last Things: Anti-Christ, damnation, and hell balanced with an account of the Second Coming, redemption, the pax aeterna, and the visio dei. Sir Thomas More's four last things were death, doom, pain, and joy. Sir Thomas Browne's Urne Burial, which demonstrated that earthly immortality was impossible, closed on a note of Christian hope. Ralegh, however, did not interpret the facts of history in terms of providential redemptive purpose. His apocalyptic vision saw only darkness. He closed his work with a tribute to God's justice (the best known but perhaps not the best understood passage of the History), his panegyric to death. When we understand that this passage offers Ralegh's closing judgment on the history of man, a judgment unrelieved by the promise of redemptive purpose, without which Christian historiography is meaningless, the passage takes on great significance.
For the rest, if we seek a reason of the succession and continuance of this boundless ambition in mortal men, we may add to that which hath been already said, that the kings and princes of the world have always laid before them the actions, but not the ends, of those great ones which preceded them. They are always transported with the glory of the one, but they never mind the misery of the other, till they find the experience in themselves. They neglect the advice of God, while they enjoy life, or hope it; but they follow the counsel of Death upon his first approach. It is he that puts into man all the wisdom of the world, without speaking a word, which God, with all the words of his law, promises, or threats, doth not infuse. Death, which hateth and destroyeth man, is believed; God, which hath made him and loves him, is always deferred.... It is therefore Death alone that can suddenly make man to know himself. He tells the proud and insolent, that they are but objects, and humbles them at the instant, makes them cry, complain, and repent, yea, even to hate their forepast happiness. He takes the account of the rich, and proves him a beggar, a naked beggar, which hath interest in nothing but in the gravel that fills his mouth. He holds a glass before the eyes of the most beautiful, and makes them see therein their deformity and rottenness, and they acknowledge it.

O eloquent, just, and mighty Death! whom none could advise, thou hast persuaded; what none hath dared, thou hast done; and whom all the world hath flattered, thou only hast cast out of the world and despised; thou hast drawn together all the far-stretched greatness, all the pride, cruelty, and ambition of man, and covered it all over with these two narrow words, Hic Jacet!61

We are now in a better position to understand Ralegh's decreasing emphasis on the role of Providence in Books III, IV, and V. I suggest that the further Ralegh became involved in classical history, the more difficult it became for him to determine the immediate purposes of Providence. These purposes became even more difficult to determine because Ralegh did not adopt the traditional explanation for the rise and fall of pagan empires: to prepare the way for the Incarnation. In addition, he did not use a Christian eschaton as the principle of interpretation for history as a whole.
We have seen that Ralegh established the necessity of providential historiography through faith and reason, that he took the general outlines of history from St. Augustine and from the Book of Daniel, that he adopted many of the traditional methods of providential historiography, and that he worked out the relationship between Providence and man which allowed him not only to show Providence acting directly, but also to find significance in the characteristics of man as he acts in history. He did not, however, adopt an important feature of providential historiography: its eschatology. Ralegh qua historian, did not display redemptive purpose operating in history. This incomplete theology of history helps to explain the general tone of pessimism which pervades the History as a whole. Through his digressions he ranged over the whole of history, modern as well as ancient, but his providential God of history which provided him his principles of interpretation remained constant: a God of justice, wrath, and vengeance. He did not become the redemptive God of love. We see the Law of the Father, not the Love of the Son. Ralegh's historical man, ancient and modern, remained graceless man whose telos was death, death which covers all man's earthly triumphs with two narrow words: hic iacet.
NOTES

1. The Idea of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, 1st ed. 1946), p. 46. As will be apparent in this chapter, my debt to Collingwood is far more than can be acknowledged in footnotes.


4. City of God, XII, xiii; Basic Writings, II, 192.


8. Meaning in History, pp. 4-5.


12. City of God, XXII, xxx; Basic Writings, II, 663.

13. City of God, XVI, xvii; Basic Writings, II, 338.

14. City of God, XVIII, xxii; Basic Writings, II, 425.

15. "Dedication," The Two Cities, trans. by C. C. Mierow, ed. by A. P. Evans and C. Knapp (New York, 1928), p. 91. In his introduction Mierow states that as testimony for its popularity, in addition to the fifty extant manuscripts, "we find also a large number of writers in the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and early 16th centuries who have made use of it in their own writings, sometimes by the actual copying out of extracts, sometimes in a somewhat changed or revised form.... The number of those who used his work as a mine of information or a model of style is so large that it would be tiresome to enumerate the full list" (pp. 45-6). "...recognized today as the author of the most celebrated works of German historical writing of the Middle Ages, Otto is universally praised by modern historians as the first to record the leading events of world history in a smooth and flowing style and at the same time to attempt to fit them into the eternal scheme. In other
words, his Chronicle is the earliest philosophical treatment of history which we have, and it has been described as 'the first presentation of universal history that possesses the unity of a work of art'" (p. 4). C. H. Haskins wrote: "In Otto of Freising the German historiography of the Middle Ages reaches its highest point." The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), p. 238.


17. The Method and Order of Reading...Histories, made English and Enlarged by Edmund Bohun (London, 1685), pp. 30-1.

18. II, XXIV, v; IV, 709.

19. V, VI, xii; VII, 898.

20. De monarchia. II, xii.


23. V, VI, xii; VII, 899-900.


26. ibid.

27. History of the Philosophy of History, p. 63.


29. ibid.


32. De Augmentis Scientiarum. II, vii; The Philosophical Works, p. 436.

33. The Method and Order of Reading...Histories, pp. 38-9.

34. TREVS HISTORICVS (London, 1636), Sig. B1r.
35. II, III, v; III, 71.
36. *ibid*.
37. II, IV, i; III, 89.
38. II, XXV, i; IV, 717.
39. II, I, i; III, 2.
40. II, VIII, ii; III, 387.
41. II, XXV, i; IV, 717.
42. *City of God*, XVIII, xix; *Basic Writings*, II, 423.
43. II, XVII, x; IV, 534-37.
44. II, XXII, vi; IV, 632.
45. II, XIV, i; IV, 441.
46. V, I, x; VI, 106-07.
47. "The AUTHOR TO THE READER," *The History of...Princesse Elizabeth*.
48. II, XXVII, v; IV, 313.
49. II, IV, iii; III, 96.
50. Preface; II, lxi.
52. Preface; II, lxi.
53. *ibid*.
54. V, II, i, 4; VI, 149.
55. IV, II, xvi; V, 355.
56. V, I, ix; VI, 104.
57. V, I, ix; VI, 105.
58. II, XV, i; IV, 463.
59. V, III, xvii, 2; VI, 459.
60. See note 19 of Introduction.

61. Preface; II, lxiii.

62. II, XXII, ix; IV, 647.

63. V, I, iv, 4; VI, 65-6.

64. V, I, iv, 4; VI, 56. Here we see a veiled reference to the fate of Essex, whose angry insult to Elizabeth, Ralegh suggested, had more to do with his execution than his abortive attempt at rebellion. Elsewhere Ralegh wrote: "True it is, that those great men of war do oftentimes behave themselves exceeding insolently towards their princes, both in respect of their service done, as also because they flatter themselves with an opinion, that either their masters cannot miss them, or that they dare not offend them. But this kind of pride hath overthrown many a worthy man, otherwise deserving great honour and respect." I, XVII, viii; IV, 525.

65. De AugMENTIs Scientiarum, II, vii; The Philosophical Works, p. 436.

66. III, I, iv; V, 9.

67. III, XIII, iv; V, 263.

68. II, XV, i; IV, 462.

69. II, XVII, x; IV, 534.

70. II, XIV, vi; IV, 462.

71. V, II, vii; VI, 212.

72. II, VII, i; III, 216-17.

73. II, III, ii; III, 62.

74. III, I, v; V, 16.

75. III, I, v; V, 17.

76. II, i, xi; III, 35.

77. Ibid.

78. I, VIII, xi; IV, 301.

79. V, III, ix; VI, 265.

80. II, VII, i; III, 217.

82. II, VI, vii; III, 209.
83. II, XVIII, iii; IV, 547.
84. II, XVIII, iii; IV, 548.
85. V, III, vi; VI, 250.
86. IV, II, i; V, 300.
87. IV, II, vii; V, 327.
88. IV, ii, vii; V, 322.
89. III, VI, iv; V, 116-17.
90. IV, II, vii; V, 329.
91. V, III, iii; VI, 292.
92. IV, II, vii; V, 329-30.
93. V, V, ix; VII, 766.
94. Familiar Letters, III, 149.
95. V, V, ix; VII, 767.
96. II, XXI, vi; IV, 617.
97. II, XXI, vi; IV, 612.
98. II, XXII, iv; IV, 668-69.
99. II, XXII, iv; IV, 682.
100. II, XXIII, iv; IV, 683-84.
101. II, XXIII, iv; IV, 684-85.
102. Preface; II, xliii.
103. II, V, iii; III, 156.
104. II, XXII, viii; IV, 640.
105. II, V, iii; III, 156.
106. II, XXII, viii; IV, 640.
107. II, XIX, iii; IV, 564.
108. II, XXVIII, i; IV, 704.
110. Hypercritica, in Haslwood, II, 255.
111. City of God, V, II-vii.
112. I, I, xi; II, 32.
116. IV, II, iii; V, 314.
117. IV, II, iv; V, 321.
118. IV, II, x; V, 335.
119. II, V, x; III, 175-76.


121. V, III, xii; VI, 345.
122. IV, I, iv; V, 283.
123. II, XX, iv; IV, 593.
126. III, VIII, viii; V, 179.
127. III, VIII, vii; V, 150.
128. I, I, xv; II, 36. He wrote further: "Fortune is nothing else than a power imaginary, to which the success of human actions and endeavours were for their variety ascribed; for when a manifest cause could not be given, then was it attributed to fortune, as if there were no cause of those things, of which most men are ignorant...." 35-9.
129. II, xxvi, v; IV, 436.
130. V, II, vi; VI, 137.
131. III, VI, ix; V, 132.
132. V, VI, vii; VII, 857.
133. The Idea of History, p. 50.
134. II, IV, xi; III, 124.
137. City of God, XVI, xxxvii; Basic Writings, II, 357-58.
138. City of God, XVIII, xxi; Basic Writings, II, 426.
140. Seven Books, p. 310.
141. Seven Books, pp. 310-12.
142. De Monarchia, II, xii. Dante's purpose was not to prove the divinity of Christ, but the divinely ordained legality of Roman rule, which he suggested that the Italian people inherited.
143. II, IV, i; III, 90.
144. II, VII, iii, 6; III, 235-36.
147. Sir Walter Raleigh, p. 137.
150. The Idea of History, p. 54.


156. *Meaning in History*, p. 5.


160. *City of God*, XXII, i; *Basic Writings*, II, 609.

161. V, VI, xii; VII, 900-01.
CHAPTER III
CLASSICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

As the reader of the History leaves Books I and II and continues with the second and larger portion (in the 1614 edition larger by 125 folio pages), he is likely to be surprised by the changes in methods, tone, and emphasis. Those who have noted the changes have generally expressed pleasure and even relief to leave behind the difficult, crabbed exegetical learning, universal chronology, fragmented prose, massed authorities, summarized controversies, diverse probabilities, and the subjection of question after question to the tests of Scripture, nature, time, reason, and coherence. In the limited narrative which was developed, Providence dominated the action, with man remaining for the most part a passive agent. Although Ralegh seconded the acts and judgments of Providence, although he indicated the lessons implicit in such acts and judgments, he could not, of course, presume to judge Providence in terms of its motives, acts, or final intentions. His diffidence was such that he even failed to avail himself of all the clues traditional to the historical mode he adopted.

In this chapter my purpose is to examine the changes in Ralegh's methods of historiography which occur in Books III, IV, and V. Even though Ralegh did not pursue further the Augustinian dualism of the two cities, he retained the Four Monarchy schema for ordering the pagan world. While the principle of providential control remained as the ultimate source of power in the universe, man emerged to take the dominant position on the stage of history. This emergence allowed
Ralegh to assume a new role as an historian. Since history became a
series not of providential but of human acts, Ralegh examined very
closely cause and effect relationships, motives, and character; pointed
to errors of policy and tactics; and offered judgments on all. In a
sense, Ralegh as historian replaced Providence as the judge of history.

The shift in man's role (Book III contains the transition from
Old Testament to classical historiography) was quite marked, as the
following examples illustrate. Both are character summaries, a method
which Ralegh employed with increasing frequency as the historical role
of man grew in importance. Both praise important historical figures,
but the praise is indicative of different sets of criteria. The first,
a portrait of Cyrus (founder of the Persian Empire) occurs early in
Book III; the second, on Epaminondas (statesman-general of the Thebans),
occurs at the close of the book.

Throughout his account of the Persian ascent to power at the ex­
pense of the Assyrians, Ralegh treated Cyrus as an agent of Provi­
dence. In narrating the story of Cyrus's stratagem of diverting the
Euphrates River from the walls of Babylon to permit a surprise entry,
Ralegh gave God the credit: "...Cyrus, whom the ordinance of God made
strong, constant, and inventive, devised, by so many channels and
trenches as were sufficient and capable of Euphrates, to draw the same
from the walls of Babylon...." As might be expected, Xenophon, one
of Ralegh's main sources, gave all the credit to Cyrus (The Cyropaedia,
VII, v); and Herodotus, another of Ralegh's cited sources, had merely
noted: "...either some one made the suggestion to him, or he bethought
himself of a plan...." (Persian Wars, I, 191) To Ralegh, because Cyrus
ended the Babylonian Captivity and gave permission for the temple in Jerusalem to be rebuilt, he was the ordained instrument of Providence. "But it is very certain that the honour of that great victory over Babylon was wholly given to Cyrus, who was the instrument preordained and forenamed by God himself, not only for this action, but for the delivery of his church; a greater work in the eyes of God, than the subversion of any state or monarchy, how powerful soever." Ralegh rejected Herodotus¹ account of Cyrus's violent death, although he repeated the story, and followed Xenophon, who reported the story of his peaceful death after a long and happy reign. (The Cyropaedia, VIII, vii) Ralegh concluded with a character study of Cyrus. I quote in part.

Which act of delivering the Jews from their captivity, and restoring the holy temple and city of Jerusalem, was in true consideration the noblest work that ever Cyrus performed. For in other actions he was an instrument of God's power, used for the chastising of many nations, and the establishing of a government in those parts of the world, which was not long to continue. But herein he had the grace to be an instrument of God's goodness, and a willing advancer of his kingdom upon earth, which must last for ever, though heaven and earth shall perish.³ Ralegh treated Cyrus as a passive instrument of God's goodness and power. Cyrus's function in terms of the overall providential pattern was emphasized at the expense of the personalized Cyrus found in Xenophon and Herodotus.

Far different was Ralegh's interpretative summary of Epaminondas's character made eight chapters later. In the interval he had treated the reigns of Darius and Xerxes, the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, and the heroic escapade of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand. Prior
to the character study Ralegh set out the details of the recovery of Theban power under the leadership of Epaminondas. After a description of Epaminondas's death in battle, he concluded with a study of this "perfect composition of an heroic general." His judgments paralleled those of Plutarch, but Ralegh enlarged considerably upon his source. In this case, however, his additions had nothing to do with the providential signification of Epaminondas; rather Epaminondas's virtues remained wholly secular.

So died Epaminondas, the worthiest man that ever was bred in that nation of Greece, and hardly to be matched in any age or country; for he equalled all others in the several virtues which in each of them were singular. His justice and sincerity, his temperance, wisdom, and high magnanimity were no way inferior to his military virtue; in every part whereof he so excelled, that he could not properly be called a wary, a valiant, a politic, a bountiful, or an industrious and a provident captain; all these titles, and many other, being due unto him, which with his notable discipline and good conduct, made a perfect composition of an heroic general. Neither was his private conversation unanswerable to those high parts which gave him praise abroad. For he was grave, and yet very affable and courteous; resolute in public business, but in his own particular easy, and of much mildness; a lover of his people, bearing with men's infirmities, witty and pleasant in speech, far from insolence, master of his own affections, and furnished with all qualities that might win and keep love. To these graces were added great ability of body, much eloquence, and very deep knowledge in all parts of philosophy and learning, wherewith his mind being enlightened, rested not in the sweetness of contemplation, but brake forth into such effects as gave unto Thebes, which had evermore been an underling, a dreadful reputation among all people adjoining, and the highest command in Greece. 4

Such character studies are an important feature of Ralegh's classical historiography. They contain Ralegh's judgments on the achievements and failures of the greats in history. Cato exemplified the "perfect man" selflessly devoted to the well-being of his country. Julius Caesar was the greatest man of history. Hannibal was the perfect
general. Darius, Xerxes, Philip of Macedon, Alexander the Great, Olympias (his mother), Cassander and Antiochus (several of Alexander’s captains), Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, Agathocles, and a host of others—all in their own way displayed patterns of evil creators of history.

In the second part of the History, instead of judging characters and events in terms of their relevance to the will of God, Ralegh came to judge them according to criteria based on his understanding of human nature and its role in history. These criteria are made clear not only by Ralegh's formal, abstract definition of man, but also by his description, analyses, and judgments of man acting in history.
Historical causation had its source in Ralegh’s classical historiography not in Providence, but in man. The following passage, inspired by his narrative of the phenomenal successes of Alexander the Great, indicates that man is the mover or creator of history. Due to its importance, I quote the entire passage.

For so much hath the spirit of some one man excelled, as it hath undertaken and effected the alteration of the greatest states and commonweals, the erection of monarchies, the conquest of kingdoms and empires, guided handfuls of men against multitudes of equal bodily strength, contrived victories beyond all hope and discourse of reason, converted the fearful passions of his own followers into magnanimity, and the valour of his enemies into cowardice; such spirits have been stirred up in sundry ages of the world, and in divers parts thereof, to erect and cast down again, to establish and to destroy, and to bring all things, persons and states, to the same certain ends, which the infinite Spirit of the Universal, piercing, moving, and governing all things, hath ordained. Certainly the things that this king did were marvellous, and would hardly have been undertaken by any man else; and though his father had determined to have invaded the Lesser Asia, it is like enough that he would have contented himself with some part thereof, and not have discovered the river of Indus, as this man did. The swift course of victory, whereby he ran over so large a portion of the world in so short a space, may justly be imputed unto this, that he was never encountered by an equal spirit, concurring with equal power against him. Hereby it came to pass that his actions, being limited by no greater opposition than desert places and the mere length of tedious journeys could make, were like the Colossus of Rhodes, not so much to be admired for the workmanship, though therein also praiseworthy, as for the huge bulk. For certainly the things performed by Xenophon discover as brave a spirit as Alexander’s, and working no less exquisitely, though the effects were less material, as were also the forces and power of command by which it wrought. But he that would find the exact pattern of a noble commander must look upon such as Epaminondas, that encountering worthy captains, and those better followed than themselves, have by their singular virtue overtopped their valiant enemies, and still prevailed over those that would not have yielded one foot to any other: such as these are do seldom live to obtain great empires. For it is a work of more labour and longer time, to master the equal forces of one hardy and well-ordered state, then to tread down and utterly subdue a multitude of servile nations, compounding the body of a gross unwieldy
empire. Wherefore these parvo potentes, men that with little have done much upon enemies of like ability, are to be regarded as choice examples of worth; but great conquerors, to be rather admired for the substance of their actions, than the exquisite managing; exactness and greatness concurring so seldom, that I can find no instance of both in one, save only that brave Roman Caesar.5

Here the principle of ultimate providential control is not threatened, for the great spirits of history fulfil the ends ordained by the "Spirit of the Universal." Nevertheless these great spirits become vitally important because through their ambitious daring, energies, control of other men, and through their clashes, they materialize the will of universal Spirit. The greatest man of history was Julius Caesar, who not only exercised power through conquest, but maintained it through exact, exquisite management. The History broke off before Caesar assumed the stage, but we can be certain he would have received the particularized, extended treatment accorded to such as Hannibal. The greater the man, the more important were the details of his activities. After the Carthaginian defeat in the Second Punic War, Hannibal fled Carthage to avoid capture. "It were enough to say, that he escaped by flight; but in the actions of so famous a man, I hold it not impertinent to rehearse the particularities."6 The particular details of the flight followed. In his narrative concerning the parvo potentes, both good and evil, involved in the episode of the Ten Thousand, Ralegh was almost apologetic about his particularized discourse. "Were it not that such particulars do best open the quality of the persons by whom things were managed, I should hold it fitter to run over the general passages of those times, than to dwell among circumstances."7 Relative to the great spirits of history, even the
seemingly trifling, accidental details were now important to Ralegh. "I think it not impertinent sometimes to relate such accidents as may seem no better than mere trifles; for even by trifles are the qualities of great persons as well disclosed as by their great actions; because in matters of importance they commonly strain themselves to the observance of general commended rules, in lesser things they follow the current of their own natures." Previously we saw that a trifling drink of cold water assumed importance because it revealed the intentions of God. Now trifles become important, more important in a sense than great actions, for they reveal more tellingly the inner qualities of great men, "the current of their own natures."

Clearly then the particular circumstances surrounding great men, the creators and destroyers alike, became extremely important to Ralegh's historiography. But history was not created only through the engaged wills of great men. Peoples were also involved. While the weak, effeminate spirit of Darius was no match for the indomitable Alexander, and while these were necessary conditions to account for the collapse of the Persian Empire, Ralegh also showed that the collective wills of the Persians and the Macedonians were important factors. Therefore, since history was created by the clashes of great men and by the collective characteristics of peoples, Ralegh had to employ methods which not only revealed the past, but which explained it. Stated briefly, this required a descent to particularity: detailed description and detailed character studies of individuals and peoples.
Amyot made the following distinctions between "histories" and "lives."

The [history] which setteth downe mens doings and adventures at length, is called by the common name of an historie; the other which declareth their natures, sayings, and maners, is properly named their lives. And although the ground of them both doe cloze very neare in one, yet doth the one respect more the things, and the other the persons: the one is more common, and the other more private: the one concerneth more the things that are without the man, and the other the things that proceede from within: the one the events, the other the consultacions...  

Ralegh's classical historiography called for a combination of "histories" and "lives." It called for more as well. Ralegh provided a capsule summary of his own classical historiography in a description of the "best" second cause historians. "Wherefore they are fain... to search into the particular humours of princes, and of those which have governed their affections, or the instruments by which they wrought, from whence they do collect the most likely motives or impediments of every business; and so figuring as near to the life as they can imagine the matter in hand, they judiciously consider the defects in council, or obliquity in proceeding."  

Here Ralegh did not restrict historiography, as did Bacon, to a function of memory, to the preservation of factual particularity. It is an inquiry into the "particular humours of princes," the makers, preservers, or destroyers of empire. It is a search into their control, or lack of control, of affections. This control or lack of control was very important to Ralegh in his analyses of cause and effect relationships and in his judgments on character and acts. We saw, for example, that part of Ralegh's praise of Epaminondas was due to Epaminondas's being the "master of his own
Historiography is a search into human motivations, a study of what Ascham termed "the inward disposition of the mind." Further, it is an inquiry into the means princes employ to fulfill their intentions. And of extreme importance, the historian must imaginatively project himself into the events of the past in order to consider judiciously the defects in counsel and errors in execution. Ralegh did all this. He also pronounced judgments on character, motives, and acts; and he was careful to indicate the political and moral precepts suggested by the success or failure of the acts. These latter practices Bacon deemed proper to "Ruminated history" but not to "perfect history"; "...it is the true office of history to represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment." For though every wise history is pregnant (as it were) with political precepts and warnings, yet the writer himself should not play the midwife." Hobbes commended Thucydides for "having so cleerely set before mens eyes, the wayes and euents, of good and evil counsels, that the Narrative it selfe doth secretly instruct the Reader, and more effectually then possibly can be done by Precept." Not so with Ralegh. His own judgments, his own emphasis on the precepts implicit in past action, constitute a prominent feature of his classical historiography. Just as God is the supreme judge of history, so too the historian is mankind's judge; and as God judges according to His universal laws, so the historian must utilize his own understanding of those laws as they are made manifest in natural and human law. Although Ralegh's judgments and analyses at times are
purely practical and pragmatic, as for example in his adaptation of
Machiavelli's analysis of the Persian Empire, for the most part they
reveal moral imperatives based on his view of man in a moral universe.
They reveal as well his own wide experience as soldier, sailor, ex-
plorer, captain, scholar, courtier, counselor of state, and victim of
Stuart power.

The emergence of man as an active historical agent was reflected
in Ralegh's historiography in many ways. Having set aside the domi-
ning concern with Providence and with an universal chronology, Ralegh
was able to sustain his narrative and present analyses of causal re-
relationships along with his judgments. His efforts at sustained narra-
tive were aided by the fact that his subject matter had become relative-
ly simplified. Rather than having to juggle the concurrent affairs of
the Jews, Assyrians, Phoenicians, Greeks, Persians, Romans, etc., he
was able to treat Persia, Greece, Carthage and Rome successively as
each gained prominence. Also, his sources became less numerous, con-
tained fewer disagreements, were relatively more reliable, and provided
him with far more particular details. They were mainly the major his-
torians of Greece and Rome: Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius,
Livy, and Plutarch. Ralegh was freer with his sources; for example,
he was not bound to accept or to explain the many prodigies contained
in Herodotus as he was bound to do for Old Testament miracles. He
ignored most of them, while attributing a few to the devil operating
with the permission of God.

It is to this emergence and to new opportunities for particularity
that we owe Ralegh's descriptive and analytic prose, prose unequalled in Renaissance historiography. Many examples will bear careful scrutiny. I offer one lengthy one instead of several since the effect of Ralegh's treatment depends on an accumulation of detail. The following is part of the description of the Persians assembled under Cyrus before the climactic battle of Issus, one of a series which broke the power of the Persian Empire and made it an appendage of the Macedonian. The passage blends concrete detail, analysis of the mental states of the Persians and Macedonians, and judgments which take the form of ironic commentary. Ralegh's source was The Historie of Quintus Curtius, containing the actes of the great Alexander (the translation by John Brende went through seven editions between 1553 and 1614). The history of Curtius is the type Bacon and Hobbes praised; Curtius allowed the narrative to speak for itself. Ralegh, however, subjected the details of the source to a continuous interpretative analysis. He judged the details and colored the entire scene with a devastating irony. He made the details serve his main purpose: to characterize the mental states of the combatants in order to prove the utter folly of Darius and the Persians. The first part of the example contains Ralegh's preliminary analysis. The second part is the description of the Persian army based on Curtius. In this second part I have underlined Ralegh's additions. The source itself is quoted in the notes. After reporting Darius' boastful words on having Alexander whipped with rods, Ralegh continued.

In this sort did this glorious king, confident in the glittering, but heartless multitude which he commanded, dispose of the already vanquished Macedonians.... The great numbers which
he gathered together and brought in one heap into the field, gave rather an exceeding advantage to his enemies, than any discouragement at all. For besides that they were men utterly unacquainted with dangers, men who by the name and countenance of their king were wont to prevail against those of less courage than themselves, men that took more care how to embroider with gold and silver their upper garments, as if they attended the invasion but of the sunbeams, than they did to arm themselves with iron and steel against the sharp pikes, swords, and darts of the hardy Macedonians; I say, besides all these, even the opinion they had of their own numbers, of which every one in particular hoped that it would not fall to his turn to fight, filled every of them with the care of their own safety, without any intent at all to hazard any thing but their own breath, and that of their horses, in running away. The Macedonians, as they came to fight, and thereby to enrich themselves with the gold and jewels of Persia, both which they needed, so the Persians, who expected nothing in that war but blows and wounds, which they needed not, obeyed the king, who had power to constrain them in assembling themselves for his service; but their own fears and cowardice, which in time of danger had most power over them, they only then obeyed, when their rebellion against so servile a passion did justly and violently require it....

The manner of his coming on, as Curtius describes it, was rather like a masker than a man of war, and like one that took more care to set out his glory and riches, than to provide for his own safety, persuading himself, as it seemed, to beat Alexander with pomp and sumptuous pageants. For before the army there was carried the holy fire which the Persians worshipped, attended by their priests, and after them three hundred and threescore and five young men, answering the number of the days of the year, covered with scarlet; then the chariot of Jupiter drawn with white horses, with their riders clothed in the same colour, with rods of gold in their hands; and after it, the horse of the sun. Next after these followed ten sumptuous chariots, inlaid and garnished with silver and gold, and then the vanguard of their horse, compounded of twelve several nations, which the better to avoid confusion did hardly understand each other's language, and these marshalled in the head of the rest, being beaten, might serve very fitly to disorder all that followed them; in the tail of these horses the regiment of foot marched, which the Persians called immortal, because if any died the number was presently supplied; and these were armed with chains of gold, and their coats with the same metal embroidered, whereof the sleeves were garnished with pearl, baits either to catch the hungry Macedonians withal, or to persuade them that it were great incivility to cut and to deface such glorious garments....
To second this court-like company, fifteen thousand were appointed more rich and glittering than the former, but apparelled like women, (bale like to breed the more terror,) and these were honoured with the title of the king's kinsman. Then came Darius himself, the gentlemen of his guardrobe, riding before his chariot, which was supported with the gods of his nation, cast and cut in pure gold; these the Macedonians did not serve, but they served their turn of these by changing their massy bodies into thin portable and current coin. The head of this chariot was set with precious stones, with two little golden idols, covered with an open-winged eagle of the same metal; the hinder part being raised high whereon Darius sat, had a covering of inestimable value; this chariot of the king was followed with ten thousand horsemen, their lances plated with silver, and their heads gilt; which they meant not to embrace in the Macedonian blood, for fear of marrying their beauty. He had for the proper guard of his person two hundred of the blood royal, blood too royal and precious to be snuffed by any valorous adventure, (I am of opinion that two hundred sturdy fellows, like the Swissers, would have done him more service,) and these were backed with thirty thousand footmen, after whom again were led four hundred spare horses for the king, which if he had meant to have used he would have marshalled somewhat nearer him.

Now followed the rearward, the same being led by Sisygambis the king's mother, and by his wife, drawn in glorious chariots, followed by a great train of ladies their attendants on horseback, with fifteen waggons of the king's children and the wives of the nobility, followed by a train of ladies their attendants on horseback, with fifteen waggons of the king's children and the wives of the nobility, waited on by two hundred and fifty concubines, and a world of nurses and eunuchs, most sumptuously apparelled; by which it should seem that Darius thought the Macedonians had been comedians or tumblers; for this troop was far fitter to behold those sports than to be present at battles. Between these and a company of slight-armed slaves, with a world of valets, was the king's treasure, charged on six hundred mules, and three hundred camels, brought, as it proved, to pay the Macedonians. In this sort came this May-came king into the field, encumbered with a most unnecessary train of strumpets, attended with troops of divers nations, speaking divers languages, and for their numbers impossible to be marshalled, and for the most part so effeminate and so rich in gold and in garments, as the same could not but have encircled the nakedest nation of the world against them. 15

As a comparison with the source proves, how much poorer this passage would be without Raleigh's analysis and ironic asides. The comparison also provides a direct refutation of the charge that Raleigh
was a mere compiler, that as Algernon Sidney mistakenly observed:
"...he was so well assisted in his History of the World, that an ordinary man with the same helps might have perform'd the same things." According to Drummond, Ben Jonson had written a piece on the Punic War which Ralegh "altered" and placed in the History. In an examination of the passage which Sir Charles Firth conjectured to be the Jonson piece,\textsuperscript{17} I find the same type of analysis which serves to indicate Ralegh's interpretation of the facts. His personality informs the discourse. As in the passage on the Persians, Ralegh's additions came from his efforts to give the facts meaning, efforts which prove that he felt interpretative analysis to be necessary for the second cause historian. No "ordinary man" could have done what Ralegh accomplished, for he brought his own tough-mindedness, his scorn of "Asiatic" effeminacy, his own authoritative experience to bear on the facts, plus, of course, his mastery of the descriptive metaphor and the periodic sentence, with its parallelism, emphatic repetition, and climactic closes, without a trace of euphuistic prettiness and monotonous regularity. When one completes Ralegh's analytic description, an account of the battle itself (to which Curtius devoted much description) could only be anti-climactic, for its outcome is certain. As might be expected, Ralegh omitted the description of the battle. He was far more interested in playing the midwife to the precepts exemplified by the battle: that "...it is by men armed with fortitude of mind, and not by the apparel they put on, that enemies are beaten"; that needy and poor nations fight willingly and effectively against rich nations; that "we find it in daily experience that all discourse of magnanimity
or national virtue, of religion, of liberty, and whatsoever else hath
been wont to move and encourage virtuous men, hath no force at all
with the common soldier in comparison of spoil and riches"; that "men
that have well to live, do rather study how to live well, I mean
wealthily, than care to die (as they call it) honourably."18 Furthermore, Ralegh took pains to examine the erroneous acts of Darius which
led to the disaster. The chief one was that Darius succumbed to the
affections of overweening pride and anger in refusing to heed the
sound advice of his Greek counselor, whom he put to death. The causes
Ralegh ascribed to the downfall of the Persian Empire stemmed not im-
mediately from his providential framework of thought, but from his
view of human nature. Passages of the type cited, revealing Ralegh's
care with particularity, with motives, with judgments, are as com-
mon in his classical historiography as they are rare in his Old Testa-
ment historiography. The reason seems clear. Man is now seen as the
prime mover of history.
Any attempt based on the History to formulate Ralegh's definition of man must be made with great caution, for the complexity of the History is such that it provides at least five areas of evidence from which definitions may be drawn. In one, Ralegh, as a theorist, presented an abstract, formally documented definition based on his understanding of Aristotle, of such philosopher-theologians as St. Thomas Aquinas and Richard Hooker. A second area of evidence is provided by his statements on man's historical role, such as that containing his "great spirits" theory of causation. A third, closely related to the second, is his portrayal of man acting in history, his analyses of motive, his judgments, and character studies. Both of these reveal Ralegh acting as an historian attempting to cope with his subject matter. A fourth is more personal. Scattered throughout the History are bitter, sometimes savage comments on human nature as he found it in his own experience. Ralegh here shows himself as the unjustly imprisoned ex-courtier, the man "civilly dead." The fifth stems from his view on the purpose of historiography in terms of its possible effects on man's acts in the present and future. The discussion of this last area will be deferred until Chapter IV of this work. What is relevant at this point is Ralegh's abstract, formal definition for the light it can shed on Ralegh's portrayal of man acting in history.

This definition of man (found in Bk. I, Ch. II and Bk. II, Ch. IV) depends heavily on the Christian intellectualist tradition as exemplified by St. Thomas Aquinas and Richard Hooker, both of whom Ralegh cited as sources. It would exceed the bounds of this work to summarize
in detail Raleigh's use of this tradition (it is important to his discussion of law and government); rather, only those tenets relevant to Raleigh's treatment of man acting in history will be considered. For Raleigh, as for a host of other medieval and Renaissance figures, man acts virtuously when he follows the dictates of right reason. "Now as the reasonable mind is the form of man, so is he aptly moved to those things which his proper form presenteth unto him, to wit, to that which right reason offereth; and the acts of right reason are the acts of virtue; and in the breach of the rules of this reason is man least excusable, as being a reasonable creature. For all else, both sensitive, growing, and inanimate, obey the law which God imposed on them at their first creation." Raleigh's discourse on eternal, natural, and human law leads to the conclusion that rational action is a divinely ordained imperative. "As it were a stream from this fountain," natural law is an effect of the eternal law, and the human or temporal law also is drawn from the eternal "in that it hath the form of right reason." In so far as man acts rationally, the faculties of his tripartite soul will be in harmony, the body politic will be properly ordered, both man and the state will act justly, obedient to natural and eternal law.

For as the north star is the most fixed director of the seaman to his desired port; so is the law of God the guide and conductor of all in general to the haven of eternal life; the law of nature, from God's eternal law deduced, the rule of all his creatures; the law human, depending on both these, the guard of kings, magistrates, and virtuous men; yea, the very spirit and the very sinews of every estate in the world, by which they live and move; the law, to wit, a just law, being resembled to an heart without affection, to an eye without lust, and to a mind without passion; a treasurer,
which keepeth for every man what he hath, and distributeth to every man what he ought to have.21

The observance of the laws governing his own nature is absolutely essential to the well-being of man. Without this observance, "we should remain but in the state of brute beasts, if not in a far more unhappy condition."22 Further: "...if we did not for our own sakes strive to observe these laws, all society of men, and all endeavours, all happiness and contentment in this life would be taken away, and every state and commonweal in the world fall to the ground and dissolve."23 When man acts irrationally, when he sins, he not only injures himself and the state, he challenges eternal law itself. The just punishment is self-destruction and, if he is in a position of power, destruction to the state as well.

Since virtuous action depends on the power of reason, the extent of injury incurred by Adam's Fall becomes vitally important. In explaining the term "image of God" (an explanation copied verbatim from Pererius),24 Ralegh granted that man's supernatural gifts were "wholly blotted out and destroyed by sin," but he denied that man's natural gifts, among these "a reasonable and understanding nature," were lost.25 Moreover, Ralegh saw man as free to resist the promptings of his evil desires. "For although it be not easy to master all our sudden passions, yet we may restrain and hinder their growing and further increase, if we please to intend our strength, and seek for grace." In addition he stated: "so long as we resist such motions, they harm us not...."26 Man has the power to resist the solicitations of affections; reason does not necessarily give way before "affections brutal." Adam
was given "a free and unconstrained will," and while the Fall had severe consequences, enough of man's reasonable nature remained unimpaired to render him responsible for his sins.

Had not Raleigh included his extended intellectualist definition of man and stated man's importance in history, from his classical historiography we could infer both. An important element of his historiography is his study of character. Some studies, placed at the close of an historical episode, summarized not only character, but indicated the causal importance of that character to the episode; as for example the study of Epaminondas, whose prudence, self-control, high magnanimity, patriotism, love of learning (not for the sake of contemplation but of action), were unmistakable signs of the good and great man. These characteristics explained the success of Epaminondas in restoring (temporarily at least) Theban power. At other times Raleigh offered brief character sketches to explain the action to follow.

...I hold it convenient in this place, before we enter into the particulars of the war itself, to shew briefly how the great ones did mutually stand affected, and by what passions they were drawn into those courses which overthrew most of them, and out of their ruins built the greatness of a few... Arideus the king, being simple and fearful, did only what he was bidden.

Polysperchon, desirous to continue long in office, had a purpose to advance the son of Alexander by Roxana to the kingdom, and become governor to a king of his own making.

Eurydice the queen, discovering plainly this intent, and meaning nothing less than to let her husband serve as a stale, keeping the throne warm till another were grown old enough to sit in it, grew acquainted with Cassander, who hated the memory of Alexander, and was therefore the fitter for her turn.28

Sketches of Cassander and others follow. Raleigh concentrated on a single passion or on several which drew characters "into their courses
which overthrew most of them." The intellectualist moral criteria by which he judged characters and events are unmistakeable. Xerxes, unable to control his passion for his brother's wife and later for his son's wife (a passion which led to great cruelties), was "a vicious prince, and as ill able to govern himself in peace as to guide his army in war; ...he was foolish, and was a coward, and consequently merciless." Acting in the grip of passion was invariably destructive. Sempronius was defeated by Hannibal because although he knew that his soldiers were not ready for combat, he nevertheless sought out battle, "being both guided and blinded by his ambition...." Ralegh then examined in detail Sempronius' errors of tactics. Ralegh felt perfectly competent not only to judge military, naval, and political tactics, but also to judge the influence of the affections, "since they are the same affections, by which the wills of sundry men are over-ruled in managing the affairs of our daily life." In relating the flight of Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse, from the Carthaginians, Ralegh commented: "That his flight of Agathocles was extremely base, I need not use words to prove: that his fear was truly, as all fear is said to be, a passion, depriving him of the succours which reason offered, the sequel doth manifest." In the grip of his fear Agathocles performed all sorts of "abominable cruelties" on the Sicilians, "so devilish is the nature of man, when reason, that should be his guide, is become a slave to his passions." Agathocles came to a base and obscure end, showing again that uncontrolled passions are self-destructive.
Ralegh's formal discussion of man and law depended on the theory of correspondences between the laws governing man, the state, and nature, all being reflections of the eternal laws of God. His analyses of political entities, therefore, often took the form of analogy.

But as in man's body, through sinews newly issuing from one branch, a finger is more vexed by inflammation of his next neighbour, than by any distemper in the contrary hand; so in bodies politic, the humours of men, subdivided in faction, are more enraged by the disagreeable qualities of such as curb them in their nearest purposes, than they are exasperated by the general opposition of such as are divided from them in the main trunk. Of this fault nature is not guilty; she hath taught the arm to offer itself unto manifest loss in defence of the head; they are depraved affections which render men sensible of their own particular, and forgetful of the more general good, for which they were created.33

What was true of microcosmic man was also true of the macrocosmic body politic. The same obligation to rationality holds. Failure of such rationality destroys the well-being of the state. The Greeks, torn by factions, each following policies dictated by private passions, hatred, and revenge, brought themselves to Roman slavery.

They wanted not the good counsel and persuasions of many wise and temperate men among them; they had also the examples of the Italians, Spaniards, Gauls, and Africans, all subdued by the Romans, and, by seeking patronage, made mere vassals, to instruct them what, in the like case, they should expect: yet could not the true reasons of estate and policy so prevail with them, but their private passions, and neighbouring hatred, which hath evermore bought revenge at the price of self-ruin, brought them from the honour which they enjoyed, of being free princes and cities, into most base and fearful servility.34

The Greeks ignored the good counsel of reason, represented by the "many wise and temperate men among them." They ignored as well the certain truths contained in history.

Ralegh's analysis of tyranny contains his most carefully wrought
exposition on the necessity of rational rule within a state. He asked: what affections led the Athenians and the Carthaginians to exercise tyranny? He answered that tyranny came from a perversion of a desire to rule and to obey which "belongeth unto the nobler part of reason." This desire was engrained by nature in the race of man "as a reasonable creature, for the ordering of his life in a civil form of justice." Ralegh then invoked a theory of excesses. Any excessive desire is evil and represents a perversion of a good desire. The more noble the desire, the more wicked becomes its perversion. The good desire for food when perverted becomes gluttony. The far nobler desire for rule and obedience when perverted leads to a far greater evil: tyranny.

But as no corruption is worse than of that which is best, there is not any passion that nourisheth a vice more hurtful unto mankind, than that which issueth from the most noble root, even the depraved affection of ruling.... But the true name of tyranny, when it grows to ripeness, is none other than ferity; the same that Aristotle saith to be worse than any vice. It exceedeth indeed all other vices, issuing from the passions incident both to man and beast, no less than perjury, murder, treason, and the like horrible crimes, exceed in villainy the faults of gluttony and drunkenness, that grow from more ignoble appetites.

Just as man's irrationality perverts the natural principle of self-government, a perversion that leads to destruction, it perverts the principle of rule and obedience necessary to the well-being of the state, a perversion which leads to tyranny and slavery. Still more important, it challenges the principle of eternal law, that which pierces, moves, and governs all creation. This challenge results in swift and sure divine vengeance. The unjust cruelties of Alexander the Great, motivated by ambition, pursued him beyond the grave.
But before he left his own coast, he put to death, without any offence given him, all his mother-in-law's kinsmen, whom Philip his father had greatly advanced, not sparing such of his own as he suspected. He also took with him many of his tributary princes, of whose fidelity he doubted; thinking by unjust cruelty to assure all things, both in the present and future. Yet the end of all fell out contrary to the policy which his ambition had commended unto him, though agreeing very well with the justice of God: for all that he had planted was soon after withered and rooted up; those whom he most trusted were the most traitorous; his mother, friends, and children fell by such another merciless sword as his own; and all manner of confusion followed his dead body to the grave, and left him there. 37

One of the traitorous wielders of the merciless sword was Cassander, Alexander's ambitious captain, who made himself a king. "Wherefore, though Cassander died in his bed, yet the divine justice brought swords upon his wife and children that well avenged the cruelty of this bloody man by destroying his whole house, as he had done his master's." After describing the murder of Cassander's two sons, Ralegh commented: "Thus in haste...were slain the children of Cassander; of Cassander, that had slain his own master's children in a wise course of policy, with careful meditation (so much the more wicked as the more long) studying how to erect his own house, that fell down upon his grave, ere the earth on it was thoroughly settled." 35 Cassander's "wise course of policy," his "careful meditation" did not escape the just power of retribution which informs God's universe.

This universal and eternal power was invoked as an unvarying principle of interpretation throughout the History; its presence was felt in Old Testament history, in classical history, and in modern history as well. In the Preface, Ralegh catalogued the cruelties of the French, Spanish, and English kings and showed how each incurred
divine vengeance. His impassioned summary demonstrates his conviction on the certainty of divine punishment.

Oh, by what plots, by what forswearings, betrayings, oppressions, imprisonments, tortures, poisoning, and under what reasons of state and politic subtlety, have these forenamed kings, both strangers and of our own nation, pulled the vengeance of God upon themselves, upon theirs, and upon their prudent ministers! and in the end have brought those things to pass for their enemies, and seen an effect so directly contrary to all their own counsels and cruelties.... God hath said it, and performed it ever; perdam sapientiam sapientiae... 39

The punishment of Henry VIII, the most modern of Ralegh's English examples, was that all his heirs died "without increase." While Providence played no direct role in Ralegh's classical historiography, its presence continued to be felt, for Ralegh's view of man and the state depended ultimately on the fact that God's justice was enforced; that violations of His mandate for rational action end in destruction and slavery, the expressions of divine vengeance.

Ralegh's more generalized reflections, his analyses and judgments on city-states, nations, empires, and sometimes entire epochs reveal him at the height of his powers as an historian and prose artist. The meaningful compression of his reflective prose passages thwarts attempts at paraphrase. They combine motives, cause and effect relationships, political and moral imperatives, and judgments; also they contain brilliantly illuminating metaphors and modern and ancient parallels which serve to create a sense of universal scope. The following analysis of Spain in the time of the Romans reveals the Spaniards' major flaw, the inability to unite for their common good. This flaw explains their domination by Rome.
The country of Spain, as it was the first part of the continent out of Italy that became subject unto the Romans; so was it the last of all their provinces which was wholly and thoroughly by them subdued. It is likened in figure by some geographers unto an ox-hide, which Calanus the Indian shewed unto the great Alexander, as an emblem of his large dominions. For, treading upon any side of it, the further parts would rise from the ground; and thus was it with Spain. Seldom did it happen, that those parts, from which the Roman armies lay furthest, were not up in rebellion. The Spaniards were a very hardy nation, and easily stirred up to arms; but had not much knowledge in the art of war, nor any good captains. They wanted also (which was their principal hinderance) good intelligence among themselves; and being divided into many small seignories, that had little other communion than of language, they seldom or never provided in general for the common good of their country; but made it their chief care, each of them to look unto their own territory. Such private respects made them often to fall asunder, when many had united themselves together for chasing out of the Romans. And these were the causes of their often overthrows; as desire of liberty, rather than complaint of any wrong done to them, was the cause of their often taking arms.

In the following example Raleigh attempted to explain the fall of the Greek city-states to Philip of Macedon. The Greeks' chief flaws were pride and irrationality; they were unable to determine their proper good. The passage closes with an extended metaphor which makes clear the failure of reason, the dangerous power of Philip, the impending violence, and the inevitability of Philip's triumph.

But as it commonly falleth out with every man of mark in the world, that they underfall and perish by the hands and arms which they least fear; so fared it at this time with the Greeks. For of Philip of Macedon...they had so little regard, as they grew even then more violent in devouring each other, when the fast-growing greatness of such a neighbour-king should, in regard of their own safety, have served them for a strong argument of union and accord. But the glory of their Persian victories, wherewith they were pampered and made proud, taught them to neglect all nations but themselves, and the rather to value at little the power and purposes of the Macedonians, because those kings and states, which sat nearer them than they did, had in the time of Amyntas, the father of Philip, so much weakened them, and won upon them, that they were not (as the Grecians persuaded themselves)
in any one age likely to recover their own, much less to work any wonders against their borders. And indeed it was not in their philosophy to consider, that all great alterations are storm-like, sudden and violent; and that it is then over-late to repair the decayed and broken banks, when great rivers are once swollen fast-running, and enraged. No, the Greeks did rather employ themselves in breaking down those defences which stood between them and this inundation, than seek to rampart and reinforce their own fields, which by the level of reason they might have found to have lain under it.\textsuperscript{41}

Frequently Ralegh's metaphors bear all the burden of descriptive analysis, a method which led to great compression. In describing the state of Alexander the Great's court after his death, he noted: "The face of the court was the same which it had been in Alexander's time; but no longer now did the same heart give it life, and windy spirits they were which moved in the arteries."\textsuperscript{42} The progressively brutalizing effects of cruelty were painted with one bold stroke: "[Antigonus] swan carelessly through the blood where at the first he doubtfully waded."\textsuperscript{43} Such use of metaphor is one of the distinctive traits of Ralegh's prose.

The most important series of events in the \textit{History}, those which received the fullest treatment, concern the establishing of the Roman Empire. While Ralegh's utilization of the Four Monarchy schema committed him to the view that the Empire was divinely ordained, Ralegh did not interpret the triumph of Rome, as a necessary condition for the birth of Christ and for the triumph of the Church, as did St. Augustine, Orosius, Otto of Freising, Dante, and others. Ralegh attributed Roman rule to policies wiser than those of the Spaniards, Carthaginians, Greeks, etc., policies which subordinated private interest to public, which encouraged greater sacrifices by the people. He explained that
had Hannibal "been prince of the Carthaginians, and one who by his authority might have commanded such supplies as the war which he undertook required, it is probable that he had torn up the Roman empire by the roots. But he was so strongly crossed by a cowardly and envious faction at home, as his proper virtue, wanting public force to sustain it, did lastly dissolve itself in his own, and in the common misery of his country and commonweal." Ralegh examined in great detail the grounds of the war between Rome and Carthage and concluded: "...the Romans had no better ground (if they had so good) of justice in this quarrel, than had the Goths, Huns, Vandals, and other nations, of the wars that they made upon the Roman empire, wherein Rome herself, in the time of her visitation, was burnt to the ground." For Dante, for Luther, for Melanchthon, for Bossuet, for all those who claimed to have inherited Roman rule, the grounds of that rule were providential and in the highest sense legal. For Ralegh, not even civil justice was involved; Rome ruled because at a given period in history she exercised the greatest temporal power, however unjust. What part then did Providence play?

The following passage was stimulated by Ralegh's narrative of a series of Roman calamities in the second Punic War due to the superior military tactics of Hannibal. Ralegh enlarged the scope of his discussion by interpreting the calamities as partial causes for the final triumph of Rome. I have divided the passage and numbered its parts to make the analysis clearer.

1 Nevertheless, if we consider things aright, the calamities of this war did rather enable Rome to deal with those enemies whom she forthwith undertook, than abate or slacken the growth
of that large dominion whereunto she attained, ere the youngest of those men was dead, whose names we have already mentioned.

2 For by this hammering, the Roman metal grew more hard and solid; and by paring the branches of private fortunes, the root and heart of the commonwealth was corroborated.

3 So grew the city of Athens, when Xerxes had burnt the town to ashes, and taken from every particular citizen all hope of other felicity than that which rested in the common happiness of the universality.

4 Certain it is, (as Sir Francis Bacon hath judiciously observed,) that a state whose dimension or stem is small, may aptly serve to be foundation of a great monarchy; which chiefly comes to pass, where all regard of domestical prosperity is laid aside, and every man's care addressed to the benefit of his country.

5 Hereof I might say, that our age hath seen a great example in the united provinces in the Netherlands; whose present riches and strength grew chiefly from that ill assurance, which each of their towns, or almost of their families, perceived itself to hold, whilst the generality was oppressed by the duke of Alva; were it so, that the people had thereby grown as warlike, as by extreme industry, and straining themselves to fill their public treasure, they are all grown wealthy, strong at sea, and able to wage great armies for the services by land.

6 Wherefore, if we value at such a rate as we ought, the patient resolution, conformity to good order, obedience to magistrates, with many other virtues, and, above all other, the great love of the commonweal, which was found in Rome in those dangerous times, we may truly say, that the city was never in greater likelihood to prosper.

7 Neither can it be deemed otherwise, than that if the same affections of the people had lasted, when their empire, being grown more large and beautiful, should in all reason have been more dear unto them, if the riches and delicacies of Asia had not infected them with sensuality, and carried their appetites mainly to those pleasures wherein they thought their well-being to consist; if all the citizens and subjects of Rome could have believed their own interest to be as great, in those wars which these latter emperors made for their defence, as in these which were managed by the consuls; the empire, founded upon so great virtue, could not have been thrown down by the hands of rude Barbarians, were they never so many.
8 But unto all dominions God hath set their periods; who, though he hath given unto man the knowledge of those ways by which kingdoms rise and fall; yet hath left him subject unto the affections, which draw on these fatal changes in their times appointed.48

The first sentence announces the theme that Rome was helped rather than hindered by her calamities. The second develops the theme metaphorically, adding the explanation that the calamities created the moral strength for sacrificing private to public interests. The third gives an ancient historical parallel, which broadens the base for the abstract political precept in the fourth sentence. The fifth offers further support for the precept with a modern historical parallel. The sixth pleads its modern relevance to England. The seventh contains the causes of the destruction of the Roman Empire, causes in the character of the people: sensuality, pursuit of pleasure, the rule of appetite, unreason. Without these the Empire could not have been overthrown by the barbarians. To this point there is not the slightest suggestion that the people: the Romans, the Athenians, the Dutch, and the English, did not hold their destinies in their own hands.

The eighth is the crux. While reassuring in its suggestion that God is managing the overall schema (for what reason Ralegh did not state), it also reveals the desperately tragic condition of man: though God has provided man with the "knowledge of those ways by which kingdoms rise and fall," though man's reason applied to the past (the art of history) can inform itself with universal truth; yet God left man "subject unto the affections, which draw on those fatal changes in their times appointed." What does the eighth sentence mean?
We have come to the heart of the problem implicit throughout the

*History*: God's power versus man's freedom. The issue was implicit in Raleigh's Old Testament historiography, but since God was portrayed as the primary agent in history, it was resolved in favor of God's power. However, since Raleigh gave the major role to man in his classical historiography, the issue must be considered anew. Raleigh offered two solutions, but in doing so he became caught in paradox. The first solution protects God's power, but its implications for man are appalling. God shapes the course of history through His control of man's affections. As man acts in the grip of affection, so he brings on those "fatal changes in their times appointed." Raleigh revealed again and again, however, that man is severely punished for succumbing to his affections. If these affections are ultimately controlled by God, Raleigh is painting the terrifying picture of man brought to his doom through the will of God. The principle of retributive justice is activated when man acts blindly, emotionally, irrationally; yet this blind, emotional, irrational action is prompted by God. Here surely we see sinners in the hands of an angry God. In protecting God's power, Raleigh creates a picture of graceless man in the *civitas terræ* whose *telos* is death. The historical vision here is one of unrelieved tragedy.

Raleigh did not achieve this vision through the application of theory. He came to it through his practice as an historian, through his attempt to understand God's role from the given facts of history. This tragic vision of man is similar to that offered by Calvin in the *Institutes*. In the chapter "How God Works in the Hearts of Man,"
Calvin held that God works His will through the instrumentality of sinning man in two ways:

When his light is taken away, our hearts become hard as stones: when his guidance is withdrawn, we immediately turn from the right path: and hence he is properly said to incline, harden, and blind those whom he deprives of the faculty of seeing, obeying, and rightly executing. The second method, which comes much nearer to the exact meaning of the words, is when executing his judgments by Satan as the minister of his anger, God both directs men's counsels, and excites their wills, and regulates their efforts as he pleases. (II, IV, 3)

Melanchthon, in following Calvin, equated man's will with his affections, denying the traditional distinction between the appetitus rationalis (the will, as St. Thomas defined it) and the appetitus sensibilis, a distinction found in St. Thomas, Hooker, Burton, and in many others. He then argued further that man cannot resist his affections, which are controlled by God. In both Calvin and Melanchthon, God's power was secure at the expense of sinning man's freedom.

Paradoxically, however, Ralegh vigorously rejected such determinism. He rejected it in theory (along with astral determinism), granting only that the affections may incline but not determine the will. He rejected it in his classical historiography: in his "great spirits" explanation of causation, in his analyses of cause and effect, in his character studies, in his carefully derived precepts for action, in his pleas to the English to profit from the mistakes of the past, pleas which would be senseless without the assumption that the English, Dutch, Athenians, Romans, etc. controlled their own destinies. Ralegh's second solution to the issue of God's power versus man's freedom, incompatible with the first, is that man remains free to resist the promptings of affection, that he may, if he so wills, follow the
dictates of right reason. This protection of man's freedom, however, led to a vision of man perhaps even more tragic than the first. God has given man the means to discern "those ways by which kingdoms rise and fall." Man's reason may discover not only the universal psychological and political principles controlling the rise and fall of empires, but also the moral, natural, and eternal laws which lie beyond and give divine sanction to the psychological and political laws. Man may understand that violations of these laws are invariably rewarded, through retributive justice, with misery, tyranny, slavery, and death. Yet with this certain knowledge, he freely repeats the errors of the past; he freely follows those affections which take him to his doom. The historical vision here again is one of tragedy, tragedy deepened by an ironic dimension not present in the first.

Several features in the second vision of man represent radical departures from the intellectualist tradition, upon which was based Raleigh's formal definition of man in the early books of the History. His treatment of man acting in history violated his definition, which depended heavily on St. Thomas and Hooker. For both, sin was a failure of reason. Hooker, in Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, stated: "If reason err, we fall into evil, and are so far forth deprived of the general perfection we seek."49 (I, VIII, 1) For both, the will by definition is unable to embrace evil rationally apprehended as evil. According to St. Thomas: "It is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite, which is the will."50 (Summa Theologica, 2, 19, Art. 9) In the Summa Contra Gentiles he stated: "The will cannot
will evil except by some error coming to be in the reason, at least in the matter of the particular choice there and then made. For as the object of the will is good, apprehended as such, the will cannot tend to evil unless evil be somehow proposed to it as good; and that cannot be without error.\textsuperscript{51}(I, XCV, 2) The same was true for Hooker: "...as everything naturally and necessarily doth desire the utmost good and greatest perfection whereof nature hath made it capable, even so man. Our felicity therefore being the object and accomplishment of our desire, we cannot choose but wish and covet it...."\textsuperscript{52}(Laws, I, VIII, 1)
The will of man, drawn irresistibly by the good, thus is wholly dependent upon reason, the discriminating power which identifies the good. As Hooker stated: "The object of will is that good which reason doth lead us to seek."\textsuperscript{53}(Laws, I, VII, 3) The moral act, summarized recently by J. V. Cunningham in his analysis of intellectualism, is as follows: "Reason must propose an end as a good, and when the end is proposed the will moves naturally to embrace it."\textsuperscript{54} Dewulf, in his summary of Thomist intellectualism, makes the subordinate position of the will quite clear: "The intellect gives rise to the necessary consent of the will when it presents something wholly good, \textit{voluntas de necessitate movetur}."\textsuperscript{55}

The question must be asked, in what sense can man have free will? St. Thomas indicated: "Intelligent beings have not only free action (which animals have), but also free judgment, which is having free will."\textsuperscript{56}(Summa Contra Gentiles, II, XLVIII, 2) Further, "All intelligent agents have free will arising out of the judgment of the understanding; and free will is defined as 'a free judgment on the matter
of a specific notion, or general concept". Father Rickaby remarked on this passage: "It seems to place freedom in the intellect rather than in the will." Father D'Arcy stated: "It is... not so much in free action as in free judgment that free will exists."

When man acts irrationally for St. Thomas and Hooker, when the will embraces what reason mistakingly identifies as a good, tragedy follows. For Raleigh, however, the possibilities open to the will of sinning man are far more ferocious. Man's will is such that it may freely embrace what reason identifies as evil. Raleigh's view seems closer to that of Timothy Bright as stated in A Treatise of Melancholie (1566). For Bright, "...where sometime understanding standeth sound, ther will bendeth to affection, and neglecteth the light of reason." Further, "...contrarie to judgement grounded either upon nature, or the plaine worde of trueth, we make choyce of what we know is naught, or perferrre the greeter evil before the lesse."[italics mine] Raleigh's vision seems closer to St. Paul, who characterized sinning man as "being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful: who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them."[italics mine] Raleigh's vision seems closer to William of Ockham. Ockham was concerned with refuting the determinism he found in St. Thomas's view of the will. In the interests of free
will, Ockham argued for the possibility of the will embracing evil apprehended by the reason as evil.

The will is attracted by the ultimate end shown in general in a contingent and free manner, as we explained it. This is to say that the will may like happiness and may not like it; may desire happiness and may not. This is evident from the fact that many believers, with faith in the future life, have killed themselves with the full use of their reason; have thrown themselves into the arms of death; these alike have not wanted to exist. And it is true, in the same way, that some may not desire happiness in specific instances. Whoever wants something efficaciously, wants everything also without which in his opinion the desired object cannot be obtained at all. Yet some of the faithful are convinced that they cannot attain happiness without a good life, and still they do not cultivate a good and saintly life. Therefore, they do not desire happiness efficiently and, consequently, with the same reason, they may not want it.63

Raleigh's vision seems closer to that of John Woolton, who in his A Treatise of the Immortalitie of the Soule (1576) considered the relationship between will and reason. For Woolton, the condition of fallen man was such that "even directly against Reason, & judgement in the power intellective, the will & hart do roush into al kind of mischeefe, according to the saying of Medea, I see good things & do like well of them: But I elect & follow the worst...."64

Raleigh's tragic vision of man in history leads to a partial synthesis of the issue of God's power and man's freedom. In his Old Testament historiography, God dooms man; in his classical, man dooms himself. The irreconcilable subject terms are synthesized in the predicate to form the general theme of the History: terrus edax rerum. Terrus edax rerum, the theme of the closing panegyric to death, unifies the History as a whole in spite of the widely divergent methods of historiography Raleigh employed. Devouring time and death were the
triumphant destroyers of all the epochs of history, the most ancient as well as the most modern. Raleigh's emotional commitment to this theme is illustrated, with great beauty, in its application to the mythological past.

But all these are again vanished; for the inventions of mortal men are no less mortal than themselves. The fire, which the Chaldeans worshipped for a God, is crept into every man's chimney, which the lack of fuel starveth, water quencheth, and want of air suffocateth: Jupiter is no more vexed with Juno's jealousies; death hath persuaded him to chastity, and her to patience; and that time, which hath devoured itself, hath also eaten up both the bodies and images of him and his; yea, their stately temples of stone and dureful marble. The houses and sumptuous buildings erected to Baal can no where be found upon the earth, nor any monument of that glorious temple consecrated to Diana. There are none now in Phoenicia that lament the death of Adonis; nor any in Libya, Creta, Thessalia, or elsewhere, that can ask counsel or help from Jupiter. The great god Pan hath broken his pipes; Apollo's priests are become speechless; and the trade of riddles in oracles, with the Devil's telling man's fortunes therein, is taken up by counterfeit Egyptians and cozening astrologers.

In the present, an age that has spawned greater vices than those of the past, time remains the restless devourer.

But it is certain that the age of time hath brought forth stranger and more incredible things than the infancy: for we have now greater giants for vice and injustice, than the world had in those days for bodily strength; for cottages, and houses of clay and timber, we have raised palaces of stone; we carve them, we paint them, and adorn them with gold; insomuch as men are rather known by their houses than their houses by them; we are fallen from two dishes to two hundred; from water to wine and drunkenness; from the covering of our bodies with the skins of beasts, not only to silk and gold, but to the very skins of men. But to conclude this digression, time will also take revenge of the excess which it hath brought forth...60

The tragic vision includes the future: "If then it be approved by every judgment, that both nature and the heavens wax old, and that the great age of time hath, with itself, enfeebled and almost worn out the
virtue of all things...and as the Devil, our most industrious enemy, was ever most diligent, so is he now more laborious than ever; the long day of mankind drawing fast towards an evening, and the world's tragedy and time near at an end. Perhaps Philip Edwards summarized the main argument of the history best: "Civilization is ostentation and vanity: war is horror and cruelty; conquest is ambition; honour is bought with damnation: and Time and Death erase them all."
NOTES

1. III, III, v; V, 62.
2. III, II, II; V, 46.
3. III, III, vi; V, 70.
4. III, XII, vii; V, 273.
5. IV, II, iii; V, 310-12.
7. III, X, vi; V, 209.
8. IV, V, x; V, 490.
10. II, XXI, vi; IV, 614.
11. Of the Advancement of Learning. Philosophical Works, p. 35.
12. De Aumentis Scientiarum, II, x; Philosophical Works, p. 437.
13. "To the Readers," Eight Books of the Peloponnesian War. Sig. a3r.
14. IV, II, iii; V, 476-78.
15. IV, II, ii; V, 305-06 and 315-16. Curtius reads: The order of their marching was in this manner. The fire which they call holy and eternall, was carried before upon siluer aulters, and the priests of their lawe went next singing after their countrey maner. There followed CCCXV young men in scarlet robes, like unto the daies of the yeare. They came the Chariot consecrate to Jupiter drawne with white palfreyes, a great hoste following which they call the hoste of the sunne. Such as did ride upon the palfreyes did weare white garments, bearing roddes of golde in their handes. Next in order came ten Chariots, garnished and worught with siluer and golde. The horsemen of twelve nations followed next in sundrie sort of armour. Than came a companie that the Persians call immortall, the riches of whose apparell, exceeded farre the rest: they had all chaines of gold, coates embroidered with golde, and sleeues sette with pearle. There followed within a small distance a band of XVII called Doriphecy, reputed for the kinges kinsmen, which were disguised in manner like Women, more notable for their galauntnes and variety of apparell, then for the armour they did weare. Such as were wont to receiue the kings robes, did ride next before the chariot, vpon the which Darius did sitte on high, with great pome and magnificence: his chariot beeing garnished on both sides with carued Images of their Goddes made of siluer and
golde. The steame whereof was set with pearls & pretious stones, with
4 Images of golde standing there-vpon of a cúbite length, commbatuant
one against the other, and ouer their heades an Eagle of golde displayed.
But amongst all the reste, the kínges apparaile shewed marueilous sump-
tuous, which was of purple empaile white, with a border embrodere of
gold, Faucions fighting together. He was gîrte effeminately with a
gîrde of golde, and the swords that hang there-vpon, had the scaborde
made of a pearle. The diademe the kînge ware vppon his head, called of
the Persians Cydarys, had a roule about it of white & greene. Next
behind the kînge came xx horsmen, which had all their speares plated
with siluer, and the speare heades gilded. Hee was enclosed on both
sides with CC of the bloud royall, at whose backes there followed xxxi
footemen, and after them CCCC. of the kîngs coursers.

Within the distance of one furlong Sisigambis the mother of Darius
was carried in a Wagon, and his wife in an other: the train of their
women riding on horsebacke. Next them xv wagons, wherein the kings
children were carried, their Nurses and Eumuchos, which are greatlie
esteemed in that cuntrey. And after them followed CCCC of the kings
concubines, all apparellèd like Queens. Then came vi. C. rîues, and
CCC Camelles, that caried the kings treasure garded, with a band of
Archers. The wiues of the kînges kinsmen, & the other that were about
the kînge, came riding next, & after them a greatie companie of slaues
and varlets. Last came the rewearde lightly armed, whereof euerie
capitaine severally with his owne companie closed in the armie, such
was the order of Darius host.

I have quoted from the 15-4 edition, fo. 19v-20v.

18. IV, II, iv; V, 316-18.
19. II, IV, vi; III, 103.
20. II, IV, v; III, 102-03.
22. II, IV, xiv; III, 135.
23. II, IV, iv; III, 133-34.
24. Dupliciter enim dc imagine Dei quae est in homine, loqui possimus:
vel prout ea consideratur secundum dona naturalia, & posită est in co
quod est habere naturam rationis & intelligentialae comperem: & hac
ratione non mægis peccato perditur inag Dei, quam perditur natura
inca rationalis, seu intellectualis: non enim Peccatum corruptit &
tollit dona naturalia: Aut consideratur inago Dei secundum dona super-
naturalia, scilicet divinae & coelestis gloriae, quae uidem est
naturalis imaginis absolutio & consummatio: et huiusmodo similitudo
& imago Dei peccando penitus deletur atque destructur. Quoted from Arnold Williams, "Commentaries on Genesis as a Basis for Hexaemeral Material in the Literature of the Late Renaissance," SP, XXXIV (1937), 203. Williams commented: "It is noteworthy that Raleigh does not credit Pelerius with this passage and that the passage is Pelerius' own, not quoted or digested from any other theologian or commentator."

26. II, IV, xii; III, 131.
27. I, II, vi; II, 62.
28. IV, III, xix; V, 432-33.
32. V, I, iv, 4; VI, 73.
33. IV, III, xiv; V, 421.
34. V, VI, i; VII, 780.
35. V, II, ii, 4; VI, 112.
36. V, II, ii, 4; VI, 114.
37. IV, II, ii; V, 304-05.
38. IV, VI, vii; V, 515-16 and 547-1.
41. IV, I, i; V, 210.
42. IV, III, ii; V, 3-7.
43. IV, IV, vii; V, 453.
44. V, VI, ii; VII, 746.
45. V, I, iii; VI, 24.


54. *Woe or Wonder* (Denver, 1951), p. 124. Cunningham's amplification sets out the intellectualist definition of sin as follows: "...the act of sin is primarily intellectual so that the process involves erroneous reasoning: action follows on reasoned deliberation as the conclusion of a syllogism follows on its premises. The will is considered to be subservient to reason and to embrace almost necessarily what reason proposes. Erroneous choice, then, from this position will be ascribed primarily to sophistry. Practical reason in the possession of the immutable principles of right action fails in the particular application, and so sins. In Duns Scotus' phrase, 'We sin by paralogism.' For the will never moves except 'under the show of goodness,' as Thomas says...." p. 106.


56. *Of God and His Creatures*, p. 110.

57. *Of God and His Creatures*, p. 111. St. Thomas equated free will with *liberum de ratione judicium*.

58. *Of God and His Creatures*, p. 110. The intellectual determinism of St. Thomas worried Father Rickaby. He noted: "Hence the doctrine of the Thomist school, that the will is determined by the last practical judgement made before action is taken. It seems to place freedom in the intellect rather than in the will. It is bound up with a further doctrine, that command (imperium) is a function of understanding, not of will. These are grave questions, which I had rather not handle. Enough for me to have translated this important passage fully and literally, and to have called attention to its significance."


61. loc. cit., p. 213.


65. I, VI, viii; II, 185.

66. V, I, iv, 1; VI, 30.

67. I, V, viii; II, 162.

68. I, VI, ix; II, 187.

CHAPTER IV
THE PURPOSE OF HISTORIOGRAPHY

The *video meliora, proboqua: deteriora sequor* theme, one of deep despair, suggested by a phase of Raleigh's treatment of man in his classical historiography, is further supported by an important element of his attitude on the purpose of the historian's art. From statements scattered throughout the Preface and the body of the *History*, two contradictory patterns emerge. One supports the conviction that the study of the past discloses truths (theological, political, moral, and practical) which enable man to avoid past errors. This view Raleigh shared with classical, Medieval, and Renaissance historians and theorists. This conviction undoubtedly led to Raleigh's undertaking the monumental labors which produced the *History*. In the narrowest sense, the *History* was designed to further the education of "the successive hope, and one of the greatest of the Christian world," Prince Henry. In the broadest, it was designed to further the education of all men concerned with improving themselves and the state, with setting aright the relationship between God and man. Raleigh's advice, exhaustively documented, ranged from the specific and pragmatic to the general and eternal.

Raleigh's study of the past, however, his views on human nature, and his own experience came to subvert, to contravene flatly, the optimism implicit in the traditional justification for historiography. A pattern emerged which was predicated on the assumption that while the study of the past reveals the profoundest truths human reason is capable of grasping, nevertheless man is determined, either willfully
or providentially, to follow the clearly posted, well-beaten paths which lead to a tragic end. Here historiography becomes supremely futile.

My purpose in this chapter is to illustrate both of these attitudes towards historiography.

There is no question that Raleigh considered historiography as the best teacher available to man.

True it is, that among many other benefits, for which it hath been honoured, in this one it triumpheth over all human knowledge, that it hath given us life in our understanding, since the world itself had life and beginning, even to this day: yea it hath triumphed over time, which, besides it, nothing but eternity hath triumphed over; for it hath carried our knowledge over the vast and devouring space of so many thousands of years, and given so fair and piercing eyes to our mind, that we plainly behold living now, as if we had lived then that great world, magni Dei sapiens opus, "the wise work," saith Hermes, "of a great God," as it was then, when but new to itself. By it, I say, it is that we live in the very time when it was created; we behold how it was governed; how it was covered with waters, and again repeopled; how kings and kingdoms have flourished and fallen; and for what virtue and piety God made prosperous, and for what vice and deformity he made wretched.... And it is not the least debt which we owe unto history, that it hath made us acquainted with our dead ancestors; and, out of the depth and darkness of the earth, delivered us their memory and fame. In a word, we may gather out of history a policy no less wise than eternal; by the comparison and application of other men's fore-passed miseries with our own like errors and ill deservings.

Optimism is too weak a word to characterize Raleigh's attitude here. Historiography is seen as the best hope of mankind in the battle against those terrible enemies time and oblivion. We saw that Raleigh's study of the past seemed to confirm that the ravages of time are irresistible; yet at the same time that very study is offered as a means to ensure man's ultimate triumph through the preservation of knowledge.
Historiography provides knowledge of the world since Creation, triumphs over time by allowing man to relive the past imaginatively, explains how kingdoms rise and fall, defines virtue and vice, confirms the power of divine justice, and reveals universal truth from which eternally wise policies may be deduced. The record of God's judgments, as necessary for understanding the past as for guiding action in the present, was left to posterity "first, by those happy hands which the Holy Ghost hath guided; and secondly, by their virtue who have gathered the acts and ends of men, mighty and remarkable in the world." The same God who punished both kings and their peoples for misdeeds in the past was as vigilant in raising up and throwing down "kings, estates, cities, and nations, for the same offenses which were committed of old, and are committed in the present...." Although the judgments of man are changeable, "the judgments of God are forever unchangeable; neither is he wearied by the long process of time, and won to give his blessing in one are to that which he hath cursed in another. Wherefore those that are wise, or whose wisdom, if it be not great, yet is true and well-grounded, will be able to discern the bitter fruits of irreligious policy, as well along those examples that are found in ages removed far from the present, as in those of latter times."

As Raleigh recognized, his description contained nothing that had not been said many times before. Although differences on the purpose of historiography existed among historians, none, whether pagan or Christian, felt that man necessarily or perversely would not profit from knowledge of the past. All seemed to assume that knowledge would lead to better conduct. For Polybius, the study of history "supplies
the only proper discipline to train and exercise the mind of those who are inclined to enter into public affairs..." For Plutarch, the study of the lives of famous men discloses examples of moral goodness which create the desire of imitation. For Diodorus Siculus, the study of history furnishes experience without its dangers and encourages noble actions by fanning the desire for fame which the historian bestowes. For Livy, "...this is the great advantage to be derived from the study of history; indeed the only one which can make it answer any profitable and salutary purpose; for being abundantly furnished with clear and distinct examples of every kind of conduct, we may select for ourselves, and for the state to which we belong, such as are worthy of imitation; and carefully noting such, as, being dishonorable in their principles, are equally so in their effects, learn to avoid them." The Medieval chroniclers such as Bede, Henry of Huntingdon, William of Mallesbury, Roger of Wendover, and Matthew Paris held similar views, although the stakes were somewhat higher, since the good life came to be defined not only in secular terms but in terms of eternity. As historiography became a record of God's unfolding plan for man, it became all the more important as a teacher whose lessons man must heed. For Otto of Freising, all of classical history amounted to nothing but a "tale of human miseries."

...in those writings the discerning reader will be able to find not so much histories as pitiful tragedies made up of mortal woes. We believe that this has come to pass by what is surely a wise and proper dispensation of the Creator, in order that, whereas men in their folly desire to cleave to earthly and transitory things, they may be frightened away from them by their own vicissitudes, if by nothing else, so
as to be directed by the wretchedness of this fleeting life
from the creature to a knowledge of the Creator.

Historiography establishes the reality of Christian hope: it gives a
foretaste of the "glory of the kingdom of Christ to which the citizens
of Jerusalem are to look forward with hope...."¹⁰

With varying degrees of emphasis, classical and Christian atti-
tudes on the purpose of historiography are found in Caxton, Lord
Berners, Sir Thomas Elyot, Melanchthon, Polydore Virgil, Anyot, North,
La Prinaudaye, Camden, Hobbes, Peter Heylyn, and many others. Perhaps
the most orderly summary is that of Heylyn in his Microcosm (1621):

Although to number up the speciall delight and profit gathered
from the reading of Histories, be but as it were to light a
Candle before the Sunne, and speake of such things as re-
quire no Rhetoricke to adorne them: yet I hope I shall no
wayes do amisse in laying before you some of the chiefe. The
profits then of History are these.
1. It is the rule of direction, by whose square we ought to
rectifie our obliquities, and in this sense the Orator call-
eth it Magistra vitae.
2. It stirreth men to vertue, and deterreth them from vice,
by shewing the glorious memory of the one, and the stinking
repetition[sic] of the other: but especially it keepeth
many men of glasses and calling in a continall feare of ill
doing, knowing that their villanies shall there be laid open
to the view of the vulgar....
3. It hath beene not onely the inventor, but the conserver
of all Arts: such especially whose end consisteth onely in
action.
4. It informeth a mans mind in all particular observations,
making him serviceable to his Prince and Country.
5. It is the best Schoolemaster of warre, the teacher of
Stratagems....
6. It is the Politicians best assistant and chiefe Tutor,
who honse suck their observations & conclusions....
7. It is most available to the study of Divinity, since
the increase, originall, defects, restauaration, and contin-
nuance of Religion is a dependant on History, which also hath
many other rare passages for the understanding of the Text.
8. It is (lastly and least of all) the study which afford-
eth a man the greatest aide in discoursing; it delighteth the
Ear, contenteth the Minke, and is endued with thousands
varieties of pleasure mixt with profit....¹¹
Renaissance historians and theorists agreed that a knowledge of history was useful, even necessary, in promoting proper conduct, whether religious, moral, political, or purely practical. As Leonard Dean states: "The idea of 'pure' information, of 'scientific' history was foreign to Renaissance minds. No one affirmed the value of information about the past for its own sake. Historical knowledge was held to be worth while only if it promoted proper action in the present." One of the obvious signs of this utilitarian attitude towards history was the great popularity of historical works.

Histories were avidly read during the Tudor age, and historians were applauded for the civilizing effect of their delightful instruction. Schoolboys learned morality and rhetoric from selected historical accounts; humanists increased their knowledge of the ancient world; statesmen and soldiers sought political and military experience; controversialists armed themselves with historical examples; the growing middle-class reading public demanded exciting instructive stories which carried the comfortable prestige of history; and all classes imbued with the spirit of nationalism turned eagerly to any narrative from England's past. To meet this demand, native historians published with unprecedented vigor, ancient and continental histories were frequently reprinted and translated, and historical themes became prominent in literature and on the stage.

The optimism implied by the utilitarian attitude towards historiography is based on a number of familiar assumptions: that reason applied to the evidence of the past may grasp an accurate view of objective reality, a reality that includes the operations of both God and man; that human nature remains constant; that like causes produce like effects; that man, free to act on his knowledge of history, may further his own well-being. All of these assumptions underlie Raleigh's classical and Old Testament historiography, although his position on
the last is complicated by the paradoxical proposition that both God and man doom man.

Ralegh's acceptance of the traditional view on purpose, "to teach by examples of times past such wisdom as may guide our desires and actions," is supported by his formal, abstract definition of man as a free agent, who through an informed reason may control his desires and actions. Such a man, with the highest wisdom at his disposal, is not necessarily doomed by God or by himself. This view of purpose is further supported by important elements of Ralegh's practice: his examination of motives, cause and effect relationships, and character; his analytical judgments on the errors of counsels and acts; and his advice on how such errors can be avoided, advice generalized into maxims. This view is contradicted, however, by his treatment of God as the sole free agent in history and by his treatment of man as a passive agent controlled through his affections by God. In these latter respects, his grasp of purpose was violated by his practice as an historian.

The optimism implicit in the four assumptions cited depends on an additional assumption that man will act on the knowledge revealed by historiography. If, however, one denies that man acts on such knowledge, the four assumptions serve equally well to support the deepest pessimism. If will is a rational appetite which necessarily embraces the good as apprehended by reason, the optimism is protected. Thus the intellectual determinism of St. Thomas and Hooker supports the possibility of good action which results from a comprehensive study of the past. Yet one may grant that man grasps accurately the nature of
objective reality as it is shaped by the constant natures of God and man, that man discovers the constancy of cause and effect relationships, that man is free to act virtuously. At the same time if one discovers that with all his gifts, both natural and divine, man nevertheless follows either necessarily or freely the errors of the past, the result must be an attitude close to despair; such an attitude was expressed by Ralegh.

In his analysis of the fall of Rome, it must be remembered, Ralegh stated that though God gave man the "knowledge of those ways by which kingdoms rise and fall," He left man "subject unto the affections, which draw on those fatal changes in their times appointed." Here man is not free to act upon divinely revealed knowledge, a condition which renders historiography useless. It can only record tragedy, but cannot be used to avert it. Even when Ralegh treated man as though he were free, he showed that man does not act upon the knowledge provided by those historians who relied on natural gifts and by those who were divinely inspired.

Ralegh, speaking in his own person independent of any source, passionately contradicted the idea that man profits from the truths contained in histories. In this respect his attitude is, to my knowledge, unique among the historians of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In the Preface, in order to illustrate the universality of divine justice, he recounted the crimes and punishments of English, French, and Spanish kings. His historiography proved that "God is everywhere the same God," a theme of reassurance as long as one assumes that man acts on such knowledge. He also proved that man is and will
be everywhere the same man, one who doesn't profit from a knowledge of history. This latter theme is suggested in his introduction to the long series of examples. "...I will for the present examine what profit hath been gathered by our own kings, and their neighbour princes; who having beheld, both in divine and human letters, the success of infidelity, injustice, and cruelty, have (notwithstanding) planted after the same pattern."\(^{15}\) [italics mine] The series of examples which follow are a fulfillment of the historian's function. Devoted solely to truth, refusing to gloss over the crimes which were dangerous to label as such by a condemned traitor, Raleigh taught by example such wisdom provided by the past to guide men's desires and actions. And yet he closed his account with a gesture of futility: "But what of all this? and to what end do we lay before the eyes of the living the fall and fortunes of the dead; seeing the world is the same that it hath been; and the children of the present time will still obey their parents?" Reigning kings did not heed the certain knowledge contained in "divine and human letters." The constancy of the world and the obedience of children lead to a terrifying dictum: the present age will not profit from the knowledge provided by historiography. "For, as we are content to forget our own experience; and to counterfeit the ignorance of our own knowledge, in all things that concern ourselves; or persuade ourselves that God hath given us letters patents to pursue all our irreligious affections with a non obstante; so we neither look behind us what hath been, nor before us what shall be."\(^{16}\)

The Romans erred through their habit of replacing their military commanders yearly, and they suffered great defeats as a consequence.
The English committed the folly of periodically replacing their commanders in Ireland. Just as the wiser commanders began to understand the "first rudiments of war and government," they were called home "to the great prejudice" of both Ireland and England. Instead of profiting from the errors of the past, "...it hath ever been the course of the world, rather to follow old errors than to examine them, and of princes and governors, to uphold their slothful ignorance by the old examples and policy of other areas and people, though neither likeness of time, of occasion, or of any other circumstances have persuaded the imitation."  

Here instead of profiting from the bad examples of the past, men use them as precedents.

What are the qualities of man, who does not take advantage of the truths of history? Raleigh's own experience and his study of history led him to conclude that man (made in God's image, with his supernatural gifts blasted by the Fall, but his natural gifts intact) is deeply steeped in hypocrisy and self-deception. In spite of the advantages offered by true religion, greater even than those offered by historiography, "...the soul hath nothing but hypocrisy. We are all (in effect) become comedians in religion; and while we act in gesture and voice divine virtues, in all the course of our lives we renounce our persons and the parts we play. For charity, justice, and truth, have but their being in terms, like the philosopher's materia prima."  

The great majority of men have been and are devout lovers of the civitas terrena. Those forces which they fear are in reality powerless; however, they defy God Himself.
But of this composition are all the devout lovers of the world, that they fear all that is dureless and ridiculous: they fear the plots and practices of their opposites, and their very whisperings: they fear the opinions of men, which beat but upon shadows: they flatter and forsake the prosperous and unprosperous, be they friends or kings: yea, they dive under water, like ducks, at every pebble-stone that is but thrown towards them by a powerful hand; and, on the contrary, they shew an obstinate and giant-like valour against the terrible judgements of the all-powerful God: yea, they shew themselves gods against God, and slaves towards men; towards men whose bodies and consciences are alike rotten.19

Over these men and all their works death is the victor. "Only those few black swans I must except, who, having had the grace to value worldly vanities at no more than their own price, do, by retaining the comfortable memory of a well-acted life, behold death without dread, and the grave without fear; and embrace both, as necessary guides to endless glory."20 These few black swans, however, no matter how learned, virtuous, and valiant, are destined through the nature of the powerful in the world to "wear out their lives in poor and dejected estates." Such a one, "whose virtue and courage forbiddeth him to be base and a dissembler, shall evermore hang under the wheel.... For whosoever shall tell any great man or magistrate, that he is not just; the general of an army, that he is not valiant; and great ladies, that they are not fair; shall never be made a counsellor, a captain, or a courtier."21 Of course, Raleigh was speaking of himself, a victim under James. He was speaking of the historian, one committed at all cost to stating the truth. Such black swans are destined to "wear out their lives in poor and dejected estates," because the nature of man is such that he hears, but will not heed.

Man, who potentially has the power of right reason and may conform
to natural and divine imperatives, is also "compounded of earth" and inhabits it. "The heavens are high, far off, and unsearchable." Man has "sense and feeling of corporal things." He knows "of eternal grace but by revelation." Raleigh concluded that man's thoughts are earthy; they cannot be cleansed by the truths of Scripture, much less by the words of ordinary men. The "blind and stupified minds" of men are such that "it is neither of examples the most lively instructions, nor the words of the wisest men, nor the terror of future torments," which can "make us remember that the infinite eye and wisdom of God doth pierce through all our pretences...." The willful ignorance of man is such that it flies against the experience which nature supplies and also against the infallible demonstrations of reason.

And though our own eyes do every where behold the sudden and resistless assaults of death, and nature assureth us by never-failing experience, and reason by infallible demonstration, that our times upon the earth have neither certainty nor durability; that our bodies are but the anvils of pain and diseases, and our minds the hives of unnumbered cares, sorrows, and passions; and that (when we are most glorified) we are but those painted posts, against which envy and fortune direct their darts; yet such is the true unhappiness of our condition, and the dark ignorance which covereth the eyes of our understanding, that we only prize, pamper, and exalt this vassal and slave of death, and forget altogether (or only remember at our cast-away leisure) the imprisoned immortal soul, which can neither die with the reprobate, nor perish with the mortal parts of virtuous men: seeing God's justice in the one, and his goodness in the other, is exercised for evermore, as the ever-living subjects of his reward and punishment.

Philip Edwards, the only commentator who has referred to this feature of Raleigh's thought, states: "It is paradoxical that a History undertaken to warn man to avoid conduct leading to damnation and disaster should at the same time be a sombre dissertation on the unteachability
of man. Inevitably, Ralegh says, men seek the pleasures and gifts of
this world and take no account of the misery they bring to themselves
and to others in encompassing them. Ralegh's History exhibits danger-
signals to a mankind he knows will not heed them. It must be in-
sisted upon that Ralegh did not doubt but that historiography disclosed
the truths necessary for man's well-being. He went to great pains to
point out the theological, philosophical, and historical bases for
such truths. At the same time he came to believe that such was the
constancy of man's nature and the world that man will not act upon the
bases of these truths. Even the knowledge that God's justice is in-
 escapable, that death is the final victor, fails to move or to persuade
men.

But when is it that we examine this great account? never
while we have one vanity left us to spend: weploy for
titles, till our breath fail us; dig for riches, while our
strength enableth us; exercise malice, while we can revenge;
and then, when time hath beaten from us both youth, pleasure,
and health, and that nature itself hateth the house of old age,
we remember with Job, that we must go the way from whence we
shall not return, and that our bed is made ready for us in the
dark; But what examples have ever moved us? what persuasions
reformed us? or what threatening's made us afraid? We be-
hold other man's tragedies played before us, we hear what is
promised and threatened; but the world's bright glory hath
put out the eyes of our minds; and these betraying lights
(with which we only see) do neither look up towards termless
joys, nor down towards endless sorrows, till we neither know
nor can look for any thing else at the world's hands.

As was suggested in Chapter II of this work, Ralegh did not adopt
the final cause of history which was traditional to providential his-
toriography: i.e., he did not use the Christian eschaton as an histori-
ical principle for interpreting the past. The visio portis, or termus
adax norm, was his substitute for the visio dox. The dominant feature
of his position on the final cause of historiography is analogous; i.e., he did not utilize the final cause traditional to both providential and classical historiography. Both of these unique characteristics of the History are due to his view of the graceless nature of man.

Just as Raleigh's traditional view on purpose is confirmed by his classical and Old Testament historiography, so his despairing attitude towards the effects of historiography confirms the general themes of the History. Clearly the man who does not profit from historiography is doomed; his telos is death. If God moves man through his affections so that he cannot act upon the truths revealed by the historian, we have further support for the theme: God dooms man. If, however, man as a free agent may ignore or blind himself to the dictates of reason, we have further support for the theme: man dooms himself. In either case the result is tragedy. In the first, man as the protagonist goes to his doom helplessly, unwittingly, blinded by his passion. In the second, the protagonist sees the better and approves, but does the worse. He does what his reason knows is naught.

Raleigh devoted at least seven years of labor and drew on a lifetime of experience in composing the monumental historical work of the late Renaissance, a work which encompasses a substantial portion of the thought and attitudes of the age. Ironically, his dedication to historiography as inquiry, as a search for truth, led to the conclusion that man cannot or will not profit from truth. The irony is heightened, or perhaps it degenerates into self-parody, when we remember that Raleigh could or would not profit from his own knowledge. Betrayed by the vision
of worldly power and glory, he finally effected his release from the Tower in order to sail to Guiana to lay claim to a long lost gold mine. At the age of sixty-five he went, as Chamberlain rightly noted, "(as children are wont to tell thyre tales) to seek his fortune." Instead he found death for his eldest son, for his best friend, and upon his return, for himself.
Although the complexities, inconsistencies, and paradoxes within the history warn against any descriptive or causal generalizations on the History as a whole, this study supports several which are contradictory, yet inseparable. For Raleigh, all historical events are controlled, either directly or through second causes, by the will of an immutable God; nevertheless, man is morally bound to bring into being God's will. Historiography reveals universal truth; nevertheless, man cannot or will not profit from such truth.

For Raleigh, the office of the historian was the highest possible because its proper exercise disclosed the truth that all events are controlled by God. This truth he felt was incontestably secure both through faith and reason. At the same time he was certain that man acts freely in history and that through an informed understanding, through rational control of his affections, he can achieve the good. Failure of rational action was morally reprehensible and incurred the just punishment of God. Raleigh is caught in insoluble paradox; yet this paradox was necessary to the History as a whole. One of the terms of the paradox was essential to his Old Testament historiography, the other to his classical. Neither by itself could do justice to the complexity of truth as he found it.

In his Old Testament historiography, God as potestas absolute was emphasized; man's position was diminished; the importance of historiography as a record of God's acts was enhanced. Raleigh set out the importance of Creation, as opposed to an eternal world; he displayed providential control; he ordered all events by a universal chronology. He adopted the Two City, Four Monarchy schemata. The
first term of the paradox led to his laborious efforts towards establishing the historicity of Old Testament events, to the citation of many authorities, to the use of new learning to buttress old Biblical truths. It led to his treatment of man as a passive agent and called for little characterization or narrative. He utilized the Augustinian medieval tradition, which exhibited history as a parallel development of the *civitas dei* and the *civitas terrena*, one leading to salvation through faith in a redeeming Christ, the other to death and damnation.

The truth of the second term of the paradox was exhibited in his classical historiography. Man's role increased greatly in importance, while God's correspondingly diminished. With man as the driving force of history, Raleigh resorted to detailed narrative, to descriptions of causal relationships, to character studies, to analytical judgment. He adopted the methods of the classical and humanist historians. He used the criteria for judgment available in the intellectualist position of St. Thomas and Hooker. He made clear that historiography records examples of good and evil and that man is free to choose between them. Both terms of the paradox were given their due.

Sir Charles Firth, in countering Arnold's criticism of the *History*, suggested that "Raleigh must not be taken as a representative of the learning of the intellectual speculations of the Elizabethan age...." While many features of the *History* serve to rebut Firth's conclusion: Raleigh's anti-Aristotelianism, his attitude towards experimental science, exploration, politics, government, natural and eternal law, his contradictory picture of man; surely, Raleigh's attempt to balance the claims of God with the emerging claims of man represents an outstanding characteristic of the age.
Ralegh's precarious balance of the claims of God and man had its darker side. This was due to his failure, as an historian, to exercise two acts of faith as principles necessary to providential historiography: that history is controlled not only by God's Justice, but by His redeeming purpose as well, and that man may use historiography to help fulfil God's redeeming purpose. As an historian Ralegh exhibited no doubts that reason could discover eternal truths through a study of the acts of God and man. This made all the more somber his conclusion that man will continue to ignore these truths. Man, because of his nature, is a loyal citizen of the civitas terrae. His acts will continue to flout reason and natural and eternal law. Ralegh could not deny what he felt to be true of man's tragic condition in history, a condition in which reason and will are insufficiently armed to cope with the demands of experience in a world which makes no allowances for human frailties. The history demonstrated that man is doubly condemned, through his own nature and through God's. Although Ralegh did not doubt the reality and necessity of grace, as an historian who judged the past and present, he did not find signs of its presence.
NOTES

1. Preface; II, iii-iv.

2. Preface; II, iv.

3. II, XIX, iii; IV, 563.


5. For a comprehensive account of the purpose of historiography among classical and medieval historians, see D. T. Starnes, "Purpose in the Writing of History," MT, XX(1922-23), 281-99.


13. op. cit., 1.

14. II, XXI, vi; IV, 616.

15. Preface; II, viii.


17. V, III, v; VI, 249.

18. Preface; II, xxxi.


20. Preface; II, xli.

22. Preface; II, xxxi.

23. Preface; II, vi.


APPENDIX A

The Jaggard 1617 and 1621 Editions

The first notice of the Jaggard 1617 edition was given by T. N. Brushfield in "The Bibliography of Sir Walter Ralegh, with notes," The Western Antiquity, V (1886), 244. Sabin, on the strength of Brushfield's notice, mentioned it in A Dictionary of Books Relating to America (New York, 1886), XVI, 259-60, but made it clear that he had not seen it; nor had he seen any previous mention of it. It is listed in the Cambridge University Library Catalogue, n. 2785. In addition, the STC locates three copies in England: in the British Museum, the Jaggard Collection, and in the Cambridge University Library. A Checklist of American Copies of "Short-Title Catalogue" Books locates two in the United States: in the Yale University Library and in the Williams College Library.

In A Bibliography of Sir Walter Ralegh, p. 90, Brushfield stated: "It is the first with a Title-page headed 'The History of the World in Five Bookes by sir Walter Ralegh, Knight.' Occupying more than one half of it is a portrait of Ralegh... This was the only portrait of Sir Walter that was engraved and published during his lifetime, and was evidently drawn expressly for this work and with his approval. We may take it for granted that this edition was revised by him."

My purpose in this appendix is to present information relevant to Brushfield's description and claims for the Jaggard 1617. This information creates the suspicion that the Jaggard 1617 is a ghost.
My remarks are based upon an examination of the Stansby 1614, the Stansby 1617, and the Jaggard 1621 editions, all of which were printed for Walter Burre. The copies I collated are in the Folger Library. Brushfield's claim that the Jaggard 1617 was the first to contain a title-page is in error, for the Stansby 1617 contains a title-page. The error is curious in that in 1887, *Trans. Devon. Assoc.*, XIX, and and in 1894, *N. & Q.*, 8th S., V, Brushfield described the Stansby 1617 as containing a title-page. In his 1908 *Bibliography* he then lapsed into self-contradiction by describing the Stansby 1617 as without a title-page.

Brushfield's statement: "We may take it for granted that this edition was revised by him," can be proven wrong by showing that the Jaggard 1617 (if it indeed exists) was based upon the Stansby 1617 and that neither bear any signs of Ralegh's revisions. To establish these is important because on the strength of Brushfield's claim of authorial revision, some scholars have come to regard the Jaggard 1617 as the most authoritative text of the *History*, which no doubt has caused much inconvenience since this edition is by far the rarest. A *Checklist of American Copies* locates 22 copies of the Stansby 1614, 5 copies of the Stansby 1617, 2 copies of the Jaggard 1617, and 9 copies of the Jaggard 1621.

Brushfield's description of the Jaggard 1617 agrees in every particular (the collation, pagination, the pagination and Table of Contents errors, the size of type and forms) with the Jaggard 1621 edition. In 1896 he stated: "I have carefully collated this [Jaggard 1621] with the previous edition [Jaggard 1617] and have come to the
conclusion that this is a re-issue of that edition, with the last page reprinted so as to insert the later date, 1621" (The Western Antiquity, V, 244). He came to the same conclusion in 1887, that "the editions of '1617 and of 1621 are identical in everything else, excepting in the alteration of the date of the colophon" (Trans. Devon. Assoc., XIX, 404). In 1904 (Trans. Devon. Assoc., XXVI, 195) and in 1908 (A Bibliography, p. 91) he reasserted the same conclusion. It would seem then that Brushfield was certain that these two editions are identical except for the date in the colophon, so certain that he termed the Jaggard 1621 a re-issue of the Jaggard 1617. I have labored this point because on it hinges much of my following discussion.

While I have not as yet had the opportunity to see the Jaggard 1617, I have examined two copies of the Jaggard 1621, my purpose being to determine its copy text and to note any signs of authorial revision. The latter is especially important since Raleigh was executed in 1618, and thus the Jaggard 1617 represented his final opportunity for revision. If we assume for the present that the two Jaggard editions are identical, the description of the Jaggard 1621 should serve equally well for the Jaggard 1617.

The copy text used for the Jaggard 1621 can be established with reasonable certainty through a study of the original 131 errata and other printing errors.

As preliminary to establishing the copy text for the Jaggard 1621, I shall present an important variant reading which, if other criteria were lacking, would serve to distinguish between the Stansby 1614, the Stansby 1617, and the Jaggard 1621.
Now let us turn to the readings which indicate the relationship between the three editions. First, several running-title errors are common to all three.

Stansby 1614
"Chap. 3.§. 5." instead of "Chap. 4. §. 5."

Stansby 1617
(Same error)

Jaggard 1621
(Same error)

Stansby 1614
"Chap. 5.§. 6." instead of "Chap. 5. §. 5."
Bks. III-V, p. 673.

Stansby 1617
(same error)

Jaggard 1621
(same error)
Bks. III-V, p. 530.

Secondly, the following variant reading show the Jaggard 1621 repeating errors initiated in the Stansby 1617.

Stansby 1614
To confirm them in this opinion./ H. Baebius one of the late Embassadours that had been in Carthage, being left by/
Stansby 1617
To confirm them in this opinion. [rest of line blank]

Jaggard 1621
To confirm them in this opinion: [rest of line blank]

Stansby 1614 Errata List reads:
"p. 554 l. 49 *empetr r. temper.*"

Stansby 1614 text reads:
the counsaille of those many being wholly/ directed by the empetr
of a few.

Stansby 1617
the counsaille of those many being wholly/ directed by the empire
of a few.

Jaggard 1621
reads "empire" instead of "temper"
Bks. III-V, p. 474, ll. 34-5.

Of course, in a work of this size no several readings alone can
be conclusive, but the following evidence, based on an analysis of
the 131 errata listed in the Errata of the Stansby 1614, indicates that
the Jaggard 1621 came from the Stansby 1617 and not from the Stansby
1614.

For each of these 131 readings, three possible sources exist for
the Jaggard 1621: the text of the Stansby 1614, the corrected readings
appended in the Errata of the Stansby 1614, and the readings in the
Stansby 1617. The Jaggard 1621 follows the readings in the Stansby
1614 4 times, the corrected readings 5 times, introduces one new error,
and follows the Stansby 1617 120 times.

Of the 120 times it follows the Stansby 1617 readings, 104 are
corrections of the 1614 errata, and 16 are uncorrected readings, the
latter fact revealing that no effort was made by Jaggard to correct the
errors of the Stansby 1617.
The weight of evidence indicates that the copy text for the Jaggard 1621 was the Stansby 1617. If the Jaggard 1621 is identical with the Jaggard 1617, as Brushfield indicated on four separate occasions, the copy text for the Jaggard 1617 must have been the Stansby 1617.

Of course, as this and the following appendix show, Brushfield is not an impeccable authority; but if we assume that his description of the two Jaggard editions is accurate, a puzzling question is raised, one that calls into doubt the very existence of the Jaggard 1617 (the text, let me repeat, which has been considered the most authoritative version of the History). If the Stansby 1617 served as the copy text for the Jaggard 1617, how could it have been possible for both editions to appear in the same year? The Pförzeher Catalogue, III, 346, estimates the time for printing a volume of this size as "several years." Even assuming that the Stansby 1617 appeared early in the year, could another edition with a wholly new format have been composed and printed in less than one year?

More questions are raised when we consider the possible number of copies printed. We know from "A copie of certen orders concerning printing" (Arbor, II, 43) that the number of copies which could be printed from one set of forms was limited to 1250 or 1500, although Arbor estimated that not more than 750 to 1000 copies of a work such as Raleigh's would have been run off (II, 23). If all of the copies of the Jaggard 1617 were run off in 1617, the printer would have been forced to have the work reset in 1621; therefore the Jaggard 1617 and 1621 could not be identical. If just a few copies were run off in 1617, could a printer afford to keep the tremendous amount of type
it took to print the History tied up in approximately 600 folio forms for four years? With a work which enjoyed the evident popularity of the History, what could have been the motive for a delay of four years?

Either of two conclusions is possible. The Jaggard 1617 and 1621 editions are not identical; or if they are, they must have appeared in 1621. The suspicion must be raised that the Jaggard 1617 is a ghost. Possibly deliberate deception was involved to make it appear an earlier edition, or possibly a few copies appeared with a misprinted colophon. A final conclusion must await more evidence.

In any case, a side by side comparison of the Stansby 1614, Stansby 1617, and the Jaggard 1621 reveals that no authorial additions or omissions were made. The Jaggard 1621 is based on the Stansby 1617. Thus neither of the Jaggard texts (if two exist) can be considered more authoritative than the Stansby 1614 or 1617.
APPENDIX B

The Question of "Issues"

In 1904 Dr. Brushfield stated that three (possibly four) issues of the 1614 edition were printed, a judgment he repeated in his Bibliography (1908). Previously he had suggested that at least two issues were printed. Due to Brushfield's many authoritative biographical and bibliographical studies on Raleigh and to his reputation as the "greatest living authority of Sir Walter Raleigh," it is not surprising that his conclusion has not been questioned. Some doubt over his use of the term "issue" is expressed in the Pforzheimer Catalogue account of the 1614 edition, but it concludes: "The fact remains that [the Pforzheimer Library copy] has all the distinctive readings of Brushfield's second 'issue' and none of his first or third." As evidence for his claim for three issues, Brushfield listed the variant readings for each. I have numbered and listed below in the left and middle columns Brushfield's readings for the three issues. In the right-hand column I have listed the readings of the Folger Library copy of the 1614 edition. A comparison of Brushfield's readings with those of the Folger Library copy reveals that the question of issues is an open one, that Brushfield's conclusions were, unfortunately, mistaken.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brushfield No. I</th>
<th>Brushfield No. II, III, and all subsequent editions</th>
<th>Folger 1614 edition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue 1</td>
<td>1700 shickles of gold</td>
<td>1700 shickles of gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>two shickles of gold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. I, p. 62, l. 3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminates at &quot;ASA.&quot;</td>
<td>Terminates at &quot;ASA.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of the great alteration falling out in the tenne Tribes during the reign of ASA; with a conjecture of the causes hindring the reunion of Israel with Iuda, which might haue beene effected by these troubles.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Amilear) was slaine.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. II, p. 511, Heading</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>After &quot;Macedon:&quot; read &quot;to the establishing of that Kingdome in the race of ANTIGONUS&quot;</td>
<td>After &quot;Macedon&quot; read &quot;to the/ establishing of that Kingdome, in the race/ of ANTIGONUS&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Part of the Historie of the World: intreating of the Times from the reign of PHILIP of Macedon, to the conquest of that Kingdom by the ROMANS.</td>
<td></td>
<td>p. 153 (for 157).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. IV, p. 157, Heading</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A Nation in Portugale called the Vettones (or as Liuie saith, at Castrum Altum, in the midway betweene Saguntum and new Carthage) fighting valiantly he (Amilcar) was slaine.</td>
<td>A Nation in Portugale, called the Vettones, (defending himself a long time with an admirable resolution) hee (Amilcar) was imurioned and slaine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. V, p. 396, l. 16.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brushfield No. I Issue</td>
<td>Brushfield Nos. II, III, and all subsequent editions</td>
<td>Folger 1614 edition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Vnhappie Captaines, and happie Clarkes, with what labour and perill doth the one attaine to beggerie, and what Places and goodly Estates doe the other obtain by keeping themselves warme. Bk.V, p.717, 11.47-9.</td>
<td>Substituted passage. As for the L. Thomas Burrough, and Peregrine Berty L. Willoughble of Eresby, two very worthy and exceeding valiant commanders, they brought with them into the world their Titles and Estates.</td>
<td>As for the L. Thomas Burrough, and Peregrine Berty L. Willoughble of Eresby, two very worthy and exceeding valiant commanders, they brought with them into the world their Titles and Estates.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brushfield Nos. I &amp; II Issues</th>
<th>Brushfield No. III Issue</th>
<th>Folger 1614 edition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 No more that 4000 foote, and 2000 horse against S euthas the Thracian King. Bk.IV, p.219, 1.21.</td>
<td>No more than foure thousand foote, and two thousand horse against S euthas their King.</td>
<td>no more than 4000. foot, and 2000. horse, against S euthas the Thracian/ King,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

? That they should pay vnto the Romans two thousand and two hundred talents; which make, after 600 French [sic] crownes to the talent, thirteen hundred and twentie thousand crownes. B. V, p. 370, 1. 44. 

"as the French reckon the talent" substituted for "after 600 French [sic] crownes to the talent" that they should pay vnto the Romans two thousand and two hundred talents; which make, as the French reckon the talent, thirteene hundred and twentie thousand crownes;

Pagination errors as evidence for "Issues"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brushfield No. I</th>
<th>Brushfield No. II</th>
<th>Folger 1614</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bk. II, p. 339 (error)</td>
<td>p. 339 (error)</td>
<td>(339) as 345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. II, p. 387 (error)</td>
<td>p. 387 (error)</td>
<td>(387) as 339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. IV, p. 276 (error)</td>
<td>p. 276 (correct)</td>
<td>p. 276 (correct)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Catchword variations as evidence for "Issues"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brushfield No. I</th>
<th>Brushfield No. II</th>
<th>Folger 1614</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 to</td>
<td>enough</td>
<td>enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. II, p. 539.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceit--</td>
<td>deceit--</td>
<td>deceit--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. II, p. 556.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on</td>
<td>fortune</td>
<td>on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. II, p. 511.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional errata as evidence for "Issues"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brushfield No. I</th>
<th>Brushfield No. II</th>
<th>Folger 1614</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Keden</td>
<td>Eden</td>
<td>Eden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. I, p. 36.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They must</td>
<td>They will</td>
<td>They will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bk. V, p. 375, l.27.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towne revolted</td>
<td>Towne rebelled</td>
<td>Towne rebelled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brushfield's evidence for a fourth "Issue"

11 Brushfield stated: "The possibility of a still earlier one than those already recorded is shown by the fact, that although a copy of the same list of errata is contained in each, the corrections made in the text are passed by unnoticed, of which the following transcribed from it are examples:---

Bk. I, p. 152, l. 15 for triemres read triemres
Bk. II, p. 271, l. 15 for had. Being being read had being. Being
Bk. V, p. 727, l. 42 for now read nor.

Now all of these are corrected in No. I issue. Does not this indicated that one containing these errors must have preceded it?"

The reading presented above prove that Brushfield's argument for three and possibly four issues of the 1614 edition cannot be accepted.

We see that in nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 the Folger Library copy follows

Brushfield Nos. II and III. In nos. 8 and 10 the Folger copy follows

Brushfield II. No. 7 follows III. No. 6 follows I and II. No. 9 follows II deceit-- and I on. No. 4 follows none of Brushfield's issues.
And equally mystifying, in the Folger copy the erratum triaeres is corrected, following I, but the other two errata, had. Being being and now, are uncorrected, thus following Brushfield's hypothesized issue proceeding No. I. Since the Folger copy contains the readings of all three of Brushfield's issues, and even those of the hypothesized issue, we must conclude that the questions of "issues" for the 1614 edition remains open.

It seems clear that a work of this length must have taken several years to print, and as errors were noted they were corrected in subsequent copies, even though these errors were still listed in the Errata. In the Folger copy, for example, 9 of the 131 errata were corrected, some on the same page containing errors also listed in the Errata list. Can we term each copy that shows a variant reading a separate issue? Conceivably the number could grow large enough to render the term "issue" meaningless. Only through the study of a large number of copies can the question of "issues" be settled.
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<th>Author</th>
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<td>Hakswill, George</td>
<td>An Apologia or Declaration of the Power and Providence of God</td>
<td>London, 1627</td>
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<td>Howell, James</td>
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AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I, John Racin, Jr., was born in Lakewood, Ohio, August 26, 1925. I received my secondary school education in the public schools of Lakewood, Ohio. After three semester's study at Ohio Wesleyan University, I transferred to Stanford University, which granted me the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1951. I completed the residence requirements for the Master of Arts degree at Stanford, majoring in American Literature, but did not write a master's thesis. I came to The Ohio State University as a Graduate Assistant in 1953. I was appointed Assistant Instructor of English in 1955, a position which I held to 1961 while completing the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. In 1961 I accepted a position of Instructor of English at Miami University.